



Authoritarian Populist 'Civilization-States' and Their Influence in Africa: Hard and Soft Powers of Turkey, Russia, India, and China (TRIC)

IRSHAD YILMAZ
NICHOLAS ANDERSON

DECEMBER 19, 2024

<https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-6609-0584-2>



IRFAN YILMAZ is Associate Professor and Chair of Islamic Studies and Intercultural Dialogue at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADIG), Deakin University Melbourne, Australia. He has conducted research on nation-building strategies, ethnic/religious/political identities and their assimilation (Kosovo, East, Balkans, Indonesia), minority-majority relations (Australia, Turkey, the UK, and the USA), socio-legal affairs, identities, belonging and political participation of Muslim minorities in the West (the UK, Australia, and the USA), Islam/state/society relations in the majority and minority contexts, global Islamic movements, political Islam in a comparative perspective, Turkish politics, authoritarianism, Turkish diaspora (the UK, Australia, the USA), transnationalism, immigrant women (Australia), and politics of citizenship (Australia, Turkey).

RESEARCH INTERESTS include a Ph.D. in politics from the Australian Catholic University/Melbourne, and a master's in international relations from Monash University. He is the author of *Belgium and the European Radical Right: Christian Nationalism and Populism in Brussels, Europe*, and is an associated Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation.

Africanization Popular Mobilization Movements and Their Influence in Africa West and East (2000-2010)

Turkey, Russia, India, and China (TRIC) are reshaping the power dynamics in Africa, challenging Western dominance and promoting alternative development models. These nations leverage their anticolonial histories with Africa and emphasize shared anti-colonial struggles to position themselves as allies of the Global South. Through their competition for influence, TRIC nations promote a new strategic approach and has strategic pursuit of resources, trade and influence. Additionally there is common goal of diminishing Western power. TRIC nations also compete heavily with each other, making Africa a critical battleground in the quest for a multipolar world order.

By: David Holmes & Nicholas Holman

Executive Summary

Context

Africa has become the focal point of a new great power struggle, reminiscent of the Cold War but with a distinctly institutional dimension. Unlike the colonial powers of the past, today's major actors—Turkey, Russia, India and China (TRIC)—position themselves as allies of the Global South, presenting alternative paths to modernization that challenge Western dominance. This competition is driven by the pursuit of Africa's vast natural resources, strategic geographic positions, and potential economic partnerships.

The new great power competition in Africa is reshaping the continent's political, economic, and security landscapes. Unlike the colonial era, this competition is characterized by a narrative of anticolonism solidarity. TRIC states present themselves as alternatives to the Western model of development. Each position itself as a partner of Africa, offering infrastructure investments, trade, and security assistance without the brutal demographic conditions that attached to Western aid. At stake are billions of dollars in trade, access to critical minerals, and influence over strategic regions.

Turkey leverages its Ottoman heritage and cultural ties, combining soft power initiatives, the education and infrastructure aid with increasing defense exports. Russia, through its Wagner Group and strategic partnerships, combines military assistance with anticolonial rhetoric. India emphasizes historical ties and South-South cooperation while expanding its trade and energy partnerships across Africa. China leads the competition with massive infrastructure projects, debt financing, and its Belt and Road Initiative, offering a model of authoritarian modernization.

These nations share a common goal: diminishing Western influence and promoting a multipolar world order. Their efforts harness in Africa, where Western powers are criticized for their colonial past and for creating conditions to aid progress, the institutions of these new great powers is not purely altruistic. Their strategies often involve compelling African themselves for resources, markets, and geopolitical influence, with some adopting hard power tactics that echo the imperialism of the past.

This report provides actionable recommendations for policy makers, TRIC, and

realities in both liberal democracies and African nations, aiming to navigate the existing geopolitical landscape while prioritizing Africa's autonomy and development goals. It underscores the importance of collaboration, transparency, and shared values to ensure a balanced and equitable future for Africa in the global order.

Key Observations

Shared Interests: Turkey, Russia, India and China seek to diminish Western influence, particularly that of the United States, in Africa. Each nation emphasizes a material interest of colonial exploitation in Africa, connecting their engagement with the imperial history of the West.

Civilizational Narratives: China and Turkey assert the superiority of their civilizational values over Western norms, presenting themselves as models of development without liberal democratic constraints. Russia and India leverage their shared anti-colonial history with Africa, portraying themselves as partners in the broader fight against Western imperialism.

Geopolitical Realism: All four nations employ development aid, infrastructure projects, and educational programs to gain influence. China leads in infrastructure, while Turkey and India focus on cultural and educational ties. Russia leverages military engagements, such as African support for Syria and Turkey's defense agreements with African states, demonstrating a willingness to use force to secure interests. Russia's Wagner Group and India's naval presence underscore their strategic ambitions.

Opportunistic and Risk: These powers offer resource-oriented aid and economic partnerships, appealing to African leaders wary of Western conditionalities. However, their growing use of their power poses concerns about neo-imperialism, resource exploitation, and authoritarian influence, challenging the narrative of altruistic partnership.

Competing Interests: Despite a shared goal of diminishing US hegemony, China, Russia, Turkey, and India increasingly compete with one another for influence, creating potential faultlines in Africa.

The race for great power competition in Africa requires a complex strategy balancing interests, geopolitics, and strategic risks. China, Russia, India, Turkey, and the US align in their opposition to Western dominance, they also vie against each other for strategic advantage. This competition challenges the liberal democratic order, offering African alternative development models, rooted in authoritarian governance and civilizational narratives. As these powers expand their presence, the risk of militarization and resource-driven exploitation grows, undermining the complexity of Africa's geopolitical landscape. For liberal democracies, this competition highlights the need for a reinvigorated approach to African engagement. Transparent partnerships, infrastructure investments, and unconditional support for democratic institutions can counterbalance authoritarian models. For African nations, this dynamic presents both opportunities and challenges. Leveraging this competition to secure better terms for trade, development aid, and stability assistance is essential to preserving sovereignty and fostering sustainable growth. Engaging with these emerging powers must maintain

Developments that may also erode democratic governance and foster dependency elsewhere, the United States and its allies must reassess their strategies to remain relevant in a multipolar Africa. This evolving context reflects a broader global shift toward multipolarity, with Africa positioned as a primary arena for the battle to reshape the post-colonial world order.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Executive Summary	ii
Abstract	ii
Key Observations	2
Introduction	6
Findings	17
Findings Soft Power Institute	18
Findings Hard Power Institute	19
Results	19
Results Soft Power Institute	19
Results Hard Power Institute	19
India	19
India Soft Power Institute	19
India Hard Power Institute	19
China	20
China Soft Power Institute	20
China Hard Power Institute	20
Conclusion	20
Recommendations	20
For Global Economic Growth	20
For Achieving Policy, Policy, and Leadership	20
References	21

Introduction

In the 21st century, the competition among Europe's major powers led to the tension and uncertainties of almost the entire African continent. However, drawing a direct analogy between today's great power competition in Africa and the colonial era oversimplifies the dynamics at play unlike the previous scramble for Africa, the so-called 'New Scramble for Africa' (The Economist, 2019) might bring tangible benefits to ordinary Africans.

Africa, despite being the poorest inhabited continent, remains a region of immense potential. Its vast oil and mineral wealth, coupled with significant agricultural resources, are juxtaposed with widespread poverty. Yet, there are reasons for cautious optimism about Africa's future. The continent is increasingly recognized as a region of strategic importance by global powers such as China, Russia, and the United States, as well as regional actors like Turkey and India. Africa's importance is rooted in its rapidly growing population—projected to be the largest globally by the end of the century—and its abundant natural resources, including minerals essential for emerging technologies like electric vehicles and mobile phones. While much of the developed world grapples with aging populations and declining fertility rates, some, like China, are confronting the paradox of growing old before achieving widespread prosperity—Africa's demographic trends point to a youthful and dynamic future.

Between 2010 and 2015, African nations experienced steady economic growth (Development & Finance, 2015), a trend that has continued largely uninterrupted to this day.

Africa emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic. By the mid-2010s, Africa's economic performance surpassed that of other developing regions such as Latin America and Southeast Asia (Africa, 2015). African Development Bank, 2015). This growth has often been driven by internal demand, including robust consumption, public infrastructure investment, and expanding trade ties with emerging markets (African Development Bank, 2019). Projections estimate that by 2030, Africa's middle class will reach 1.1 billion people—approximately 50% of the continent's population (Africa, 2019; African Development Bank, 2019).

Despite these promising trends, Africa currently accounts for just 7% of global trade (African Development Bank, 2019; UNCTAD, 2019). However, the continent's youthful population, rapid urbanization, and expanding internal middle class are transforming it into an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment. Factors such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, the United States, and European powers are deepening their engagement with Africa, driven by a mix of strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests.

The competition among these major powers has the potential to create a vibrant market for Africans. By leveraging resources, African nations could foster internal investment, trade, and improved terms of engagement. However, there are risks. This competition could result in increased external support for corrupt or oppressive leaders, as foreign powers prioritize their strategic goals over good governance, transparency, the potential benefits are evident increased investment can create

jobs, impose infrastructure, and enhance ethnic influence within global institutions. For emerging global powers, Africa represents an opportunity for originalist-national wealth and secure access to critical raw materials that also to expand their global influence and military reach, often at the expense of established powers like the United States.

China, Russia, Turkey and India, in particular, are deepening their economic, diplomatic, and military ties with African states using a mix of soft power, sharp power, and occasionally, hard power.

The national-populist approach by emerging powers like Turkey, China, and others provides a distinct alternative to the Western liberal democratic model. These nations seek to position themselves as 'civilization-states,' vying to connect with the values and traditions that historically made their societies great. This strategic positioning not only challenges the hegemony of liberal democratic norms but also resonates with African states seeking development paths that reject Western-imposed institutions and values.

In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan exemplifies this national-populist approach. Erdoğan's leadership epitomizes a dual narrative domestically: he positions himself as the defender of Islamic values against secularist elites, and internationally, he portrays Turkey as the promoter of Muslim interests against Western dominance (Yılmaz & Başkaya, 2018; Yılmaz & Molluoglu, 2022). By framing Turkey as the heir to classical Islamic civilization, Erdoğan not only mobilizes his domestic support base but also positions Turkey as a leader of

the Islamic world (Yılmaz & Molluoglu, 2022). Central to this strategy is the JDP's rhetoric, which invokes religious historical trauma and myths. This securitized narrative portrays Turkey as a nation under constant threat from internal and external enemies, including Western powers, secularists, and minority groups (Yılmaz & Şipşip, 2022). By doing so, Erdoğan legitimizes authoritarian measures, suppresses dissent, and garners support for Turkey's active role in global and regional theaters (Yılmaz, Şipşip, & İnce, 2022).

In addition, national-populist heavily relies on narratives of civilizational. Erdoğan's political strategy has aimed to incorporate both national and manufactured civilizational narratives, which connect deeply with his base. These narratives employ historical grievances and create a sense of solidarity among supporters, portraying the JDP and its leader as the only force capable of defending the 'true' Turkish identity (Yılmaz, Yılmaz, & İnce, 2022). These strategies intend to legitimize Erdoğan's domestic policies by aligning with anti-colonial sentiments and emphasizing solidarity with historically marginalized nations. Turkey appeals to African states as a partner that understands their struggles. Unlike the West, which has all and investment to democratic reforms, Turkey offers 'the strings attached' assistance, furthering its influence in regions seeking alternatives to Western conditionalities (Yılmaz & Molluoglu, 2022). This model of national-populist not only undermines liberal democratic norms but also demonstrates the JDP's ability to adapt its messaging to different audiences. By emphasizing shared grievances and cultural goals, the JDP constructs a narrative of unity

and religious that resonates globally while reinforcing its domestic authority (Jinnah, 1911).

These civilisation-states emphasise anti-colonial solidarity and highlight their success in achieving economic growth without adopting or Western norms. Their strategies are designed not only to challenge American hegemony but also to position their governments models as viable alternatives to liberal democracy.

This report examines the strategies employed by China, Russia, Turkey and India in Africa, focusing on their use of soft and hard power and their framing of themselves as civilisation-states offering alternatives to Western liberalism. By analysing their approaches, this report seeks to understand how these powers influence Africa's development trajectories, and what this means for the future of global power dynamics.

Turkey

Turkey's Erdogan-led AKP government has demonstrated unprecedented interest in Africa, establishing 33 new embassies and 12 consulates across the continent since 2010, bringing the total to 44 (The Economist, 2018). This outreach aligns with Erdogan's increasingly anti-Western national identity, which portrays Turkey as both a defender of Islam and the underdeveloped peoples of the global south (Jinnah and Mustafa, 2018). For Erdogan, Africa represents a region with deep moral commitment toward Western powers and a positive perception of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, offering opportunities to cultivate multi partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international bodies, including the United Nations. .

Historically, Turkey's engagement with Africa was limited. While the Ottoman Empire maintained ties with North Africa, the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe until the 1950s (Sapamkoko, 2018). This region was largely left African colonial rule. Turkey's post-European orientation under Kemalist rule, and Cold War dynamics that placed much of Africa under American or Soviet influence.

Erdogan has renewed Turkey's appetite with that of modern powers, emphasising solidarity over exploitation. During the 2007-18 pandemic, he criticised Europe's failure to provide vaccines to Africa, connecting it with Turkey's medical aid (Sapamkoko, 2018). He has frequently highlighted Europe's selective application of universal values, pointing to the region of African refugees and Western double standards on human rights. According to Erdogan, 'The EU is not in a position to demand all its self-proclaimed universal moral values while it turns a blind eye to sinking boats in the Mediterranean, building wire fences and adopting a push back policy' (Aykan Çengiz, 2018).

Erdogan positions Turkey as a country free from colonial baggage, committed to anti-imperialism, and sharing values with Africa. He frames Turkey's engagement as rooted in sincerity, brotherhood, and solidarity regarding 'not colonial practices with new methods' (Aykan Çengiz, 2018). Erdogan's rhetoric emphasises a 'unique economic and development model' that Turkey can export to help Africa prosper without adopting exploitation or neo-colonial practices.

This narrative liberal promises of mutual economic growth with

appeals to shared values and opposition to the West. Erdogan adapts various Europe's cultural legacy with its modern politics, particularly in redistribution justice. For instance, he has constructed Turkey's partnership with Europe's economic wellbeing, promoting Turkey as a strategic partner in Africa's development (Ayarlıoğlu, 2022).

Turkey's African policy underwent a significant transformation in the post-2002 era after the Erdogan's ascent (Eg) reaped Turkey's membership. Ankara adopted a multidimensional foreign policy moving away from exclusive Western alignment (Ayarlıoğlu, 2022). The 'Opening to Africa Policy' of 2005 marked the beginning of this shift, with economic priorities playing a growing role. This approach intensified under the 2011 government, which, after facing resistance to its membership, turned to cultivating alliances with non-Western powers, including Africa.

In 2011, Erdogan's government declared 'The Year of Africa,' with Erdogan becoming the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey's economic growth under 2011 leadership attracted the country to pursue a proactive foreign policy, focusing on the African continent as a region of strategic importance (Ayarlıoğlu, 2022). Today, Turkey positions itself as a reliable partner, offering an alternative to Western dominance while strengthening its presence in Africa through economic, cultural, and diplomatic initiatives.

Turkey's Soft Power in Africa

Turkey's soft power initiatives in Africa have been complex, leveraging

humanitarian aid, education, religion, media, and infrastructure development. This aligns with President Erdogan's increasingly anti-Western national ideology which frames Turkey as both a defender of its people and Islam, as well as a spokesperson for the disenfranchised peoples of the global south (Hüner & Hürmer, 2022). In Africa, Erdogan pursues a narrative featuring undeniable testament recent Western powers and states is as a region where Turkey and the Orthodox Empire are demonstrated positively. This creates opportunities for Turkey to gain partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international organizations such as the United Nations.

Historically, the Ottoman Empire maintained close ties with North Africa, but the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe and the Middle East (Ayarlıoğlu, 2022). This region emerged from Africa's colonial legacy. Turkey's post-2002 orientation under Kemalist rule and Cold War dynamics that left Africa under American or Soviet influence. However, Turkey's interest in Africa increased following the 2011 'Big Five' summit as its relevance to the EU and Europe's external affairs lost for its membership was rejected in 2005. Turkey adopted a multidimensional foreign policy diversifying its alliances beyond the West (Ayarlıoğlu, 2022). This shift marked the 2005 'Opening to Africa Policy' which coincided with the rise of a new Turkish bourgeoisie influencing foreign policy through economic priorities.

Under the Erdogan-led 2011 government, which aims to power in 2011, efforts to enhance trade and relations with non-Western states, including African nations,

confidential. What is known is that the EU was reluctant to accept majority status in Turkey. Erdogan sought to build alliances in regions like Africa. Economic growth under AKP rule created a protectionist foreign policy, and AKP was skeptical 'The West is Africa'. Erdogan became the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa, signing Turkey's increasing focus on the continent.

In a 2011 speech in Maputo, Erdogan underscored Turkey's commitment to Africa, describing the continent as 'the cradle of civilization and the African epicure of the future of humanity'. He expressed support for 'African ownership of African issues' and highlighted Turkey's role as a 'honest partner of the young Countries in Africa' (priority of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This rhetoric emphasized Turkey's distinction from Western powers often viewed as exploitative (Yilmaz of America, 2016). Unlike Western nations, Turkey's aid comes with few or no conditions regarding governance or human rights reform, a stance that resonates with many African governments (Zoh. Reports, 2016). Erdogan has presented Turkey as an alternative to the West, emphasizing stability and partnership rather than exploitation (Yilmaz of America, 2016).

Turkey's engagement in Africa has primarily centered on humanitarian aid and development assistance, which complement its commercial interests (Jagadeesha, 2017). This facet of the ideology of Contemporary Turkey noted that Turkey has capitalized on African efforts to reduce reliance on former colonial powers, for aid and security (Yilmaz of America, 2016). Analysts like Tamas Huparova Etem highlight that Turkey avoids making its assistance conditional on

governance or human rights, a key factor distinguishing it from Western aid models (Zoh. Reports, 2016).

Education has played a pivotal role in Turkey's soft power strategy. Initially, the Gülen movement opened schools across Africa, but following the failed 2016 coup, which the EU blamed on Gülen, these efforts were replaced by the Thrust Foundation, which now operates 140 schools in Africa, educating 11,000 students (Daily Sabah, 2021). Additionally, approximately 40,000 African students annually study in Turkey, focusing on cultural and technological ties (Zoh. Africa, 2021).

Religion is another significant element of Turkey's approach, particularly in Muslim-majority countries or those with sizable Muslim minorities. Turkey-funded mosques and schools promote socially conservative values that resonate with many Africans, especially in opposition to Western liberal norms. Erdogan's rhetoric against LGBTQ+ rights and the emphasis on traditional family values often find a receptive audience in Africa (Yilmaz of America, 2016).

Media has become an avenue for Turkish influence, with state broadcaster TRT reaching African audiences in multiple languages, including local African dialects. The vision Turkey to promote pro-Turkish narratives and portray itself as a friend to Africa while countering the influence of Western media of the African people.

Turkey has also invested in diplomatic training to strengthen ties with African nations. Since 1984, its Diplomatic Academy has trained 240 African diplomats through its International Junior Diplomats Training Program, aimed at capacity building and enhancing

human resources upon requests from African through ministerial (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011).

Infrastructure development further secures Turkey's presence in Africa. Turkish airlines (TSA), for example, flies to 50 African cities, including Maputo, Namibia, where its planes land at an airport built with Turkish funds and expertise. This demonstrates Turkey's commitment to connecting Africa with global markets and keeping Turkey prominent in the continent (2011).

Humanitarian aid, particularly disaster relief, has been another cornerstone of Turkey's soft power. During Somalia's civil war, Turkey provided substantial aid with Erdogan himself visiting the country to highlight the crisis and Turkey's role in alleviating it. This markedly improved Turkey's image but also opened doors for Turkish businesses and NGOs to contribute to Somalia's reconstruction. Somalia became a formal test for Turkey's Africa policy, with Ankara playing a mediating role in the country's internal conflicts (Bapayidoga, 2011).

Turkey's initiatives extend beyond aid. It is exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coast of Libya and Somalia in partnership with local governments (Erdi Sahin, 2011). Like other rising powers, Turkey's involvement in Africa is driven by both economic ambitions and a desire to expand its influence on the continent.

Erdogan's rhetoric and policies have effectively positioned Turkey as a unique and reliable partner for African nations, contrasting sharply with Western approaches and emphasizing shared values, solidarity, and mutual growth. Through complex soft power initiatives, Turkey has carved a significant role

for itself in Africa's development narrative while pursuing its broader geopolitical and economic interests.

Turkey's Hard Power in Africa

Turkey's engagement in Africa extends well beyond disaster and famine aid. Today, Turkey is actively exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coast of Libya and Somalia in collaboration with local governments (Erdi Sahin, 2011). Like the BRIC group and Western powers, Turkey's initiatives in Africa aim to achieve both economic gains and growing geopolitical influence on the continent.

Turkey has earned a reputation as a reliable partner in delivering major projects on time, which has enhanced its value across Africa. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey-Africa trade reached \$10.1 billion annually in 2010, up from \$5.5 billion in 2003—an extraordinary increase that underscores the economic ties of African nations and Turkey's expanding interest in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). President Erdogan's pro-commercial stance further positions Turkey as a trusted ally of Africa, contrasting its sincerity with the perceived exploitation by Western powers. Erdogan also emphasizes Turkey's unique economic model as a potential roadmap for Africa's development (Ayhan Kilig, 2011).

Turkey's hard power approach became more prominent in the 2010s, particularly during the Arab Spring and subsequent conflicts. The 2011 Libyan civil war marked a significant shift in Turkey's foreign policy, as Ankara supported the opposition government by supplying commercial aerial vehicles (F-16s) and naval

known to counter Russian-backed factions. This intervention showcased the effectiveness of Turkish military technology, especially drones, which have since become highly sought after by African nations (CNN Reports, 2016).

The defense industry has become a major beneficiary of improved Turkey-Africa relations. Turkey has increasingly signed arms deals with African governments, leading to a rapid growth in defense and aerospace exports to the continent...from \$6.6 billion in 2010 to \$4.6 billion in 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Countries like Tunisia, Egypt, and Ethiopia are small fractions of total arms sales; to African states, this growth highlights Turkey's expanding role as a defense partner. Despite its focus on humanitarian assistance and economic partnerships, Turkey's security and defense sectors now thrive as a growing market for military goods.

Turkey's intervention in Libya truly had two main objectives: restoring access to the Libyan coast and maritime boundaries, and countering both US and Russian influence in the region. Turkey's successful defense of the Tripoli government relied heavily on its superiority and use technology, demonstrating both the effectiveness of its military prowess and the utility of its hardware in modern conflicts.

Following the Libya intervention, Turkish arms gained popularity in Africa. Drapers note that Turkish defense products offer significant advantages to African countries...they are affordable, reliable, and built based in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine (CNN Reports, 2016). For nations grappling with insurgent movements, porous borders, and under-resourced armies...such as Egypt, Niger, Nigeria,

and Somalia...Turkey's drones and counterterrorism expertise have become especially valuable.

Turkey is primarily a supplier of arms and military training rather than an active competitor in African wars. It has signed defense agreements with countries including Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Somalia, with reported agreements in Nigeria and Ethiopia. These agreements often encompass security provisions, technical support, and arms sales through intermediaries, but the intermediaries stand, often involve sharing military intelligence (CNN Reports, 2016).

Somalia remains Turkey's closest partner in Africa. In 2015, Turkey established a large foreign military base in Mogadishu and has since provided extensive training to Somali soldiers engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda (Atlantic Council, 2016). Such defense agreements serve not only Turkey's strategic interests but also reinforce its image as a significant ally of African stability. After Libya, Turkey's ambassador to Somalia remarked, "[Turkey] never considered Somalia's stability separately from our own country's stability" (CNN, 2016). Foreign Minister Fatih Erbakan's "Africa Strategy" stresses sharing common values and interests with African nations (Reuters Turkey, 2016).

Turkey has positioned itself as a reliable alternative to Russia, China, France, and the United States in supplying arms to Africa. Abel Abate Girma, an associate fellow at Chatham House, observes that "[Turkey provides a means of actually purchasing military hardware]" (CNN, 2016). African nations are particularly interested in Turkish-manufactured armored

vehicles, naval equipment, infantry weapons, and drones (Diz, 2016).

By deepening its defence partnerships and increasing arms sales, Turkey not only enhances its influence in Africa but also positions itself against competing powers like Russia and China. These efforts underscore Turkey's broader strategy to carve out its sphere of influence on the continent while positioning itself as a reliable and cooperative partner to African states.

Russia

Russia developed strong relationships with African states during the Soviet era, competing with the United States to gain influence across the continent and spread its communist ideology. The Soviets offered development aid and, gradually, solidarity with leftist regimes fighting colonialism and Western imperialism, effectively capitalising on widespread anti-Western sentiment in Africa (Blanton, 1982). After the collapse of communism, however, Russia struggled to compete with the United States in terms of soft and hard power, as it lacked the resources and global reach of its Soviet predecessor. Nonetheless, because Russia has minimal involvement in the colonisation of Africa in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it continued to be perceived by many Africans as a threat to their people and an opponent of Western colonialism and exploitation.

In the post-Soviet era, Russia has increasingly sought to reassert its influence in Africa, with efforts expanding significantly under Vladimir Putin's regime. Putin's government emphasises Russia's historic role as both a rival and an opponent to Western colonialism. For instance,

at the annual annual Russia Africa Summit held in St. Petersburg in July 2022, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, declared that Russia would 'pursue measures that would liberate sovereign states from their colonial tutelage'. This statement underscored Russia's ongoing strategy of supporting anti-Western dictatorships and regimes that defy liberal norms in exchange for Russian development and military aid, these regimes provide diplomatic backing for Russian initiatives in international bodies, including the United Nations Security Council.

In a 2011 speech in Moscow, Putin elaborated on his anti-Western narrative, blaming the 'West' particularly the 'Anglo-Saxons' for colonialism and the slave trade (Piotrowski, 2011). President of Russia, 2000, he portrayed the Soviet Union and Russia as leaders of the 20th-century anti-colonial movement...a legacy he argued that the West has never forgiven. Putin framed Russia's current opposition to Western liberalism and reform as a continuation of its historic resistance to colonialism. According to this narrative, the West seeks to eradicate traditional ways of living and religious practices, while Russia, as a civilisation-state, stands as a protector of Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and other faiths (Piotrowski, 2011). President of Russia, 2012).

Russia further claimed that the promises of democracy and wealth from the West have consistently led to poverty, imperialism, and the erosion of cultural and religious traditions in societies they influence. He argued that the reform quest for 'total domination' drives it to eliminate 'knowledge centers of global development,' even by force if

paradoxically (Shahar 2003) (readers of *Russia 2014*) while this rhetoric may carry the same ideological weight as it did during the Soviet era, when communists provided a compelling alternative to capitalism. It resonates in regions like Africa, where anti-Western sentiments remain strong, and where Western promises of democracy and development often fail to meet expectations.

In Africa, Putin's anti-Western narrative finds an audience, particularly in areas with strong religious conservatism and enduring memories of colonial humiliation. Russia's framing of itself as a champion of traditional values and a defender against Western imperialism (Scholar, no page) even as its actual treaties and influence remain limited compared to Soviet powerhouses. This narrative continues to shape Russia's engagement with African states, slipping with its broader geopolitical goals of challenging Western hegemony and asserting its role as a strategic counter-Atlantic influence.

The Putin regime does not, of course, rely solely on rhetoric to spread its influence across the African continent. Instead, it employs a range of soft and hard power programs designed to elicit support and build friendly nations in Africa. Moreover, the institutions that Russia builds across Africa consistently promote a narrative blaming the issue for Africa's challenges and portraying Russia as an opponent of Western imperialism.

Russia's moral strategy in Africa can be summarized as a combination of establishing the region as Russia's moral sanctuary, offering alternative markets for its energy exports, and leveraging anti-colonial

rhetoric and aid to win the support of African nations. While Russia does not actively seek to suppress democracy in Africa, the Putin regime has no qualms about supporting repressive regimes and often profits (Scholar, no page) dealing with authoritarian governments (see *Democracy*). Russia is particularly interested in comparing with other global powers, including the United States, France, China, and Turkey, for influence in Africa. In this and, in perhaps itself as a long-standing ally of the African people, upholding its history of supporting independence movements.

Russian Soft Power in Africa

The Putin regime maintains ties with friendly African states by fostering collaboration between Russian and African educational institutions, building schools and training facilities, and assisting in mining, mining operations and combating terrorism. This latter aspect often involves the Wagner Group, whose activities in Africa have a mixed record. In 2014, the Wagner Group's operations were incorporated into Russia's Ministry of Defense's African Corps.

Russia's soft power efforts in Africa primarily focus on spreading Russian culture and language. Russian cultural centers operate in over 40 countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, offering Russian language courses and promoting Russian literature. Since 2014, Russia has expanded its language education initiatives to include 20 nations, with a goal of reaching at least 50 by 2025 (see *China and France*). In addition, Russian cultural centers in Africa aim to foster ties with neighboring African nations, to strengthen Africa-Russia ties.

Although Russia has succeeded in

generating support from some African states, including abstentions during votes condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it would be misleading to assume uniform support across the continent or consistent alignment with Russia in the General Assembly voting (Language Environment, 2022). Russia's popularity is not universal in Africa. Despite mostly positive relationships with some countries, it faces competition from another nation better equipped to facilitate development.

Over 2000 Russia has established physical Russian language schools in Africa under the Russian World Foundation (Russian World Foundation). These schools teach Russian language and culture, often in collaboration with African governments and universities, such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Russian Embassy, 2022). In turn, Russia has pledged to teach African languages in Russian schools, signaling support for African cultures and languages (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2022).

Russia has also increased its engagement with higher education institutions in Africa, launching the Russian-African Network University consortium in 2022. This initiative includes agreements with various African institutions, such as the National School of Engineering, the University of Tumbefina, and Saint Petersburg, and the African University of Science and Technology (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2022). These projects complement earlier initiatives, such as the university established in Egypt in 2015, underscoring Russia's historical and ongoing interest in African education.

Oliver Krüger argues that Russian

educational and cultural initiatives aim to spread a shared knowledge base and foster ideological alignment. Educational cooperation, Russian language and culture programs, and journalism training are central to Russia's strategy of disseminating its narrative with Africa (FIOA, 2022). According to Krüger, Russia's narrative of 'modernization with Russia' appeals to African nations struggling with poverty despite natural wealth, offering a partnership model distinct from the conditional aid frameworks of Western countries.

Russia positions itself as a partner of African nations, advocating for fair representation in international organizations such as the UN, opposing foreign interference in political affairs, and supporting traditional values in African societies (FIOA, 2022). However, its impact remains limited. Only about 2000 African students are currently enrolled in Russian universities, and the Russian-African Network University involves just 15 Russian and 27 African institutions, with significant participation from Zimbabwe (FIOA, 2022). Nevertheless, initiatives like the Consortium of Universities 'School of Africa' at St. Petersburg Mining University, which includes 100 UN organizations from all African countries, demonstrate Russia's ambition to deepen collaboration with Africa on its own terms (FIOA, 2022).

In 2022, Russia diversified its educational initiatives, including courses in religion and journalism. For example, it signed an agreement with Burkina Faso to collaborate on secular and Islamic education to combat radical Islam (Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Additionally, partnerships with Nigeria focus on advanced technological education, such as robotics, microelectronics, and AI

printing, while negotiations with South Sudan ended concerning a refinery (African Digital Democracy Observatory 2019). Russia has initiated and sponsored workshops in Tanzania, which featured a conference and seminar. The students, furthermore, view Russia's involvement in portraying itself as a technological power in Africa (Df, 2018; Baskybasan, 2018).

These soft power efforts, while not unique to Russia, are integral to its strategy of portraying itself as a non-imperialist, anti-colonial partner to Africa. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has emphasized Russia's appreciation for African states that resist Western pressure, fostering the partnership as one of mutual respect and shared interests (Korotkiy 2018). This rhetoric has helped Moscow persuade some African states to resist Western sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. However, many African states continue to trade with Russia out of necessity as food and energy shortages leave them little choice but to prioritize their immediate needs over geopolitical alignments.

Russian Hard Power in Africa

Russia's use of hard power in Africa has become increasingly prominent since 2011, largely through the activities of the Wagner Group, a private military company answering Russian interests across the continent, often in opposition to Western priorities. The Wagner Group has been active in several African states, most notably the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Libya.

The Wagner Group, founded by Yuryey Prigozhin, gained prominence during Russia's 2016

invasion of Ukraine and propagation of Crimea. While commonly referred to as a mercenary force, it is better described as a complex network of businesses and monetary groups operating in conflict zones and even in alleged peacekeeping operations worldwide (Korotkiy in Foreign Relations, 2018). Before 2018, the Wagner Group operated semiautonomously of the Russian Ministry, following its apparent rebellion against the Putin regime and Prigozhin's mysterious death in an air crash, the group has operated as an instrument of the Russian state, with much of its operations described in the Ministry of Defense in 2018. Foreigners in these zones, the Wagner Group was closely aligned with Kremlin objectives, shaping its profit-driven motivations.

In Africa, the Wagner Group has approximately 1,000 personnel, including former Russian soldiers, mercenaries, and foreign nationals (Korotkiy in Foreign Relations, 2018). Among its most significant campaigns is its involvement in CAR, where Wagner soldiers were deployed in 2018, initially as military instructors. Their numbers later swelled to 1,000-2,000, transforming into a fighting force tasked with securing the country's lucrative mining industry and protecting the pro-Russian government from rebels (Korotkiy, 2018).

In 2018, Wagner began expanding forces around gold mines in central and eastern CAR and later expanded its presence to the north. Russian officials claim their operations have brought "peace and security" to CAR, but these claims are contested. The US State Department reports that Wagner has engaged in indiscriminate killings, abductions, and sexual violence in its efforts to control mining areas near

Bertels (J.A. State Department, 2014). The reports further accused Wagner of harassing journalists, aid workers, and international peacekeepers (Crisis, 2014).

For instance, in Gough Mine, Wagner forces reportedly executed at least a dozen civilians in the gold-mining town of Gough, allegedly targeting artisanal miners, themselves reclassified from Russian paramilitaries armed by helicopter, indiscriminately opening fire on locals (El Jazera, 2014). Such violence is not limited; it aligns with a broader pattern of Wagner's operations, where violence often accompanies lucrative mining agreements between Russian companies and the GDI government. For example, the GDI government awarded mining licenses from a Canadian company and awarded them to Viktor Kuznetsov, a Wagner-affiliated entity (El Jazera, 2014).

In times, Wagner's priorities in GDI appear more focused on securing mineral resources than protecting the government. Wagner reportedly collaborated with the rebel group Union for Peace (UPC) to ensure the safety of its mining operations but later turned against the group, launching a counteroffensive targeting both rebels and local civilians (El Jazera, 2014).

GDI's former Prime Minister Boris Yipate expressed regret over inviting Wagner into the country, describing the group as a 'criminal organization' now dominating GDI's economic, security, and political spheres (BBC, 2014). Despite these criticisms, many in GDI view Wagner's presence positively, believing it has brought a degree of stability. In Borjomi, the GDI government awarded a monument honoring

Wagner forces, depicting Russian troops protecting a woman and her children, accompanied by a plaque in Russian/Georgian (BBC, 2014).

The Wagner Group's activities in GDI exemplify both the potential and the pitfalls of Russia's paramilitary strategy in Africa. On one hand, it highlights the failure of UN and European initiatives to bring security and democracy to the continent. On the other hand, it demonstrates how Russian support effectively garners local support for the prospects of its hard power. This growing influence empowers Russia's interests in Africa, securing votes in the UN General Assembly and helping to shield Russia from Western economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. However, these developments also underline the precarious balance between Russian objectives and the well-being of African states under Wagner's shadow.

India

India's relationship with post-colonial Africa is long-standing and predates that of many other nations, including Turkey. Since the 1950s, India has actively engaged with African nations, with Prime Minister Nehru famously describing Africa as a 'new' continent. The establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which included India and all African nations except South Africa, further solidified this bond. Shared opposition to European colonialism provided a strong foundation for collaboration, fostering a sense of solidarity and shared purpose.

In the post-World War II period, India and African states were united by their mutual aspiration to chart independent foreign policies, a vision that became even more pronounced

during the Cold War are shared (Jain, 2008, 2009). During this time, both India and African nations sought to strengthen bilateral and regional ties to advance their collective interests. India has been a consistent partner, offering humanitarian aid, disaster assistance, and cooperation on defense and security matters. For example, as early as 1952, Emperor Haile Selassie requested Indian assistance in establishing a military academy in Addis Ababa, marking the beginning of India's significant security cooperation with African states (Jain, 2008, 2009).

Since the end of the Cold War, India's engagement with Africa has deepened, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who assumed office in 2014. Modi has portrayed himself as a leader of the 'Global South' and has positioned India as a significant ally of developing nations. This approach has been reflected in Modi's initiatives, such as the advocacy for the African Union's inclusion in the G20 during India's presidency of the group. Modi's rhetoric underscores the importance of Africa in India's global strategy: 'When one region sees the world as a family, one truly means it' (Modi, 2020), emphasizing Africa's significance in shaping a more inclusive global dialogue (Jain, 2008).

The initiation of the African Union in the G20 was, according to Modi, a 'significant step towards a more inclusive global dialogue' (J, 2016). While this move demonstrated India's commitment to amplifying African voices on the global stage, India's interest in Africa went beyond rhetoric. Like other major powers, India seeks to extend its influence and expand trade relations with Africa further to meet strategic and economic interests.

Africa has become India's fourth-largest trading partner among global regions. Trade between India and sub-Saharan Africa has grown significantly, rising from \$67 billion in 2012 to nearly \$80 billion in recent years (African Business, 2024). Total trade with all African regions reached \$100 billion in 2024 (consolidation of Indian industry, 2024). Energy is a cornerstone of this relationship, with African nations supplying roughly a quarter of India's crude oil imports. Nigeria, in particular, has become India's largest supplier of oil (African Business, 2024).

This increasing dependency on African energy resources reinforces the continent's importance to India's economic security and growth. Consequently, the Indian government has prioritized building stronger ties with African nations through trade, security partnerships, and diplomatic initiatives. India's strategy also seeks to challenge the influence of other powers, such as the United States, China, Europe, and Russia, in the region. Africa's growing economic potential and its strategic significance make it a focal point for India's foreign policy ambitions.

Indian Soft Power in Africa

India's soft power in Africa is rooted in a shared history of anti-colonialism, trade, and humanitarian assistance. While India has financially provided aid to African nations, especially those that were or neighboring countries or, paradoxically, not receiving aid itself, such as from Great Britain. However, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has increasingly directed aid to African nations, particularly Tanzania, Kenya, and Madagascar—countries

China for influence in Africa

China Minister Zhou emphasized that India's engagement in Africa is almost financing cooperation rather than rivalry. He stated, 'the global engagement in Africa increases. India and Africans must work together to ensure that Africa does not once again turn into a theatre of rival ambitions but becomes a nursery for the aspirations of African youth' (Ministry of External Affairs, 2016). The statement underlines India's aim to position itself as a strong partner to Africa, unclouded by exploitative motives.

India's foreign aid to Africa has grown significantly, with a compound annual growth rate of 10% over the past decade. Initiatives like the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program exemplify this approach, offering training and education to leaders and scholars from developing countries. With student shares globally, ITEC serves as a soft power tool to cultivate goodwill and a generation of leaders with favorable views of India.

India's soft power also extends to trade. India has often emphasized that Indian development partnerships with Africa will be guided by African priorities. For example, he remarked that India's support will 'honour your potential and not constrain your future' (Kumaraya, 2015). India seeks to leverage its expertise in areas like the digital transition to support African development, including expanding financial inclusion, improving education and health services, and mainstreaming marginalized communities.

Although trade between India and Africa is growing, it remains overshadowed by China's Africa

trade. In 2022, China's Africa trade amounted to \$280 billion, significantly surpassing India's \$90 billion in trade with sub-Saharan Africa and \$98 billion overall (Indian Confederation of Industry, 2024). Nevertheless, certain sectors illustrate the growing depth of India-Africa relations. India imports significant amounts of minerals from Africa, while African nations benefit from India's mining expertise and investment. Conversely, African countries import pharmaceuticals from India, with \$28 billion worth of medicines and healthcare products purchased in 2021-2022.

India's trade imbalance with Africa, particularly in manufacturing, is offset as a soft power advantage that has prompted to keep Indian markets open to African goods and to support Indian industries investing in Africa. Furthermore, India is making strides in exporting green energy technology to Africa, positioning itself as a valuable partner in addressing climate change.

One of India's unique advantages in Africa is the presence of a significant Indian diaspora in countries like Egypt, India, South Africa, and Mauritius. India visits to African countries with large Indian communities underline this connection. Under Narendra Modi's (2014) rule, India has sought to engage the diaspora to advance its foreign policy objectives, including addressing security concerns and facilitating trade. Moreover, Modi's message to African audiences changes from his focus on Hindu civilizational rejuvenation for the diaspora to a message of partnership, himself as a leader of the Global South, emphasizing solidarity with Africa in advocating for a 'just, representative and democratic global order'.

(Ministry of External Affairs, 2022).

In sum, India's soft power in Africa is a mix of historical ties, developmental cooperation, and strategic engagement. While India's intentions are described by China's influence, they are substantial significant in cultivating goodwill and expanding India's footprint across the continent. Through trade, aid, and a focus on shared aspirations, India positions itself as a genuine partner and advocate for Africa's global stage.

Indian Hard Power in Africa

India is not a major military power in Africa. Instead, its strength lies in its soft power—the perception that India is a trustworthy and benevolent partner to African nations, offering significant advantages over rivals like China and the United States. Nevertheless, as India's economic power grows, so too does its military capacity, and it is increasingly likely that India will expand its hard power presence in areas of strategic importance, including parts of Africa.

India's hard power in Africa is primarily based on the Indian Ocean region, which acts as a strategic corridor between the African continent and the Indian subcontinent. Indian military facilities have been established in key locations, including Madagascar, which hosts a naval and landing facility (India, 2020), where Indian Navy vessels have docking rights; Mauritius, where India is constructing an official and facilities for stationing soldiers; and the Seychelles, where India has installed a surveillance system to monitor surrounding waters (Military Africa, 2022; India of America, 2016; German Marshall, 2016; The German,

2022). These facilities, while modest compared to the extensive presence of the United States or even Russia in Africa, serve critical functions. They help India secure its interests in the region, maintain sway, and contribute to the stability of vital maritime routes.

India's hard power initiatives are deeply tied to its aspirations as an Indo-Pacific power. The Indian administration has emphasized the importance of securing Indian influence in the region to counter the expanding presence of China and to a lesser extent, the United States. India's strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific includes solidifying partnerships with African nations along the eastern shores of Africa, particularly in areas near the Indian Ocean.

Indian military engagements in Africa also highlight its collaborative approach to regional security. India believes that has underscored India's commitment to addressing shared security concerns, stating that India will prioritize "cooperation[and]...cooperation and mutual capabilities [between India and Africa] in combating terrorism and extremism, keeping our cyberspace safe and secure" and supporting the UN in achieving and keeping "peace" (Ministry of External Affairs, 2022). India's rhetoric often emphasizes that Indian military activities are driven by the need for stability and collaboration rather than competition, asserting that "the world needs cooperation and not competition in the eastern shores of Africa and the eastern Indian Ocean" (Ministry of External Affairs, 2022).

While India's military footprint in Africa is currently limited, its actions signal a gradual but deliberate increase in its regional hard power.

India's presence in the Indian Ocean is likely to expand further, as the country seeks to position itself as a key player in global maritime security and a counterbalance to Chinese and American influence in the region. Friendships with African nations on counterterrorism, cybersecurity and peacekeeping missions will likely be pivotal in shaping India's military strategy in Africa.

China

China's rise is arguably the most consequential event of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Before the 1980s, it was commonplace in Western capitals to believe that China's centuries of isolationist capitalism would inevitably transform the country into a liberal democracy. This idealism and naive belief shaped American policy towards China throughout the 1960s and 1970s, which facilitated China's economic growth by dismantling barriers to trade. However, this approach failed to transform China into either a democracy or a reliable ally of the United States. Instead, following a period of economic reform and relative social liberalisation under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping's leadership has transformed China into a surveillance state governed by an authoritarian populist regime, which portrays itself as the culmination of '4,000 years of Chinese civilisation' (Xi Jinping, 2018).

China's growing economic strength, while it has created a large middle class, has not led to its transition into a liberal democracy. Although China's middle class enjoys economic freedom, it remains under scrutiny or unable to demand freedom of expression and other liberal reforms. From one perspective, it could

seem irrational for Chinese citizens to challenge a regime that has delivered unprecedented prosperity. Indeed, China is arguably the world's largest economic power and its second greatest military power, giving its citizens a sense of prestige and influence not experienced for centuries. The Communist Party of China (CPC) continuously reinforces this narrative of national superiority. Framing China's increasingly assertive behaviour in Asia—including its claims over maritime territories belonging to Vietnam and the Philippines—as part of a legitimate effort to reclaim territories historically taken from China by imperial powers (Shang, 2018).

Simultaneously, China positions itself as a model for the Global South and is instrumental in building economic blocs such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) aimed at countering the influence of the US and EU in global economic affairs (Chen, 2016). For the CPC and its supporters, China's rise is evidence of the superiority of its civilisational model over Western civilisation and proof that modernisation can occur without Westernisation (Chen, 2016). The CPC adopts a deeply nationalist perspective on global affairs and has repeatedly urged the US to respect civilisational differences and cease imposing liberal democratic values on non-Western nations (Brown & Winaya-Cameroles, 2018).

China appears to recognise that liberal democratic tend to act peacefully toward one another but view the rise of rivalised powers as existential threats, often separating with hostility. In Beijing, that entails the US not to promote 'values of civilisation' by attempting to alter China's rise. Instead, the has called for an acceptance of China's

autocratic system and its hegemony in Asia as natural extension of its institutional reproduction. To achieve harmony between civilisations, it advocates replacing 'harmony' with exchange, clashes with mutual learning, and especially with coexistence' (Xiang 2016: 9).

China's rise serves as an inspiration to many developing nations, particularly in Africa, as it demonstrates rapid development achieved without capitulating to Westernisation. Indeed, in fact, China leverages its position as a rising non-Western power through soft power initiatives, presenting itself as a non-Western civilisation that has risen above the West. The G20 claims that China is 'inherently more peaceful and robust' emphasising that it has never colonised or invaded other nations. While this narrative is not entirely accurate, it resonates with many Africans who continue to feel the lasting pain of colonisation. China's claim of never having invaded other territory is particularly appealing, as it contrasts sharply with the history of European colonialism.

China's relationship with Africa is shaped by this self-image. The G20 portrays China not merely as a nation-state but as a rejuvenated 5,000-year-old civilisation, capable of serving as a role model for other developing, non-Western societies. By positioning itself as an alternative of Western imperialism, China fosters goodwill and disperses its influence across the African continent.

Chinese Soft Power in Africa

China's soft power in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is considerable. China has opened more than 50 embassies across the continent...more than the United

States...and has become the most significant trade and aid partner for a variety of African nations (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).

China provides infrastructure, including roads and railways, in areas where the rest often does not, and facilitates development through aid and debt forgiveness. However, China also offers a different path to development and modernity, one that does not insist on compliance with liberal democratic norms and a free-market, rather than impose, Africa's former colonial masters.

China is heavily involved in infrastructure development in Africa. For instance, in Kenya, China was responsible for the construction of the Nairobi to Mombasa Standard Gauge Railway, a project costing \$4.7 billion, with plans to build industrial parks connected by the railway, which was also supposed to extend to Uganda (BBC, 2015). However, the railway is underused and widely considered unnecessary, leading to accusations that China has deliberately trapped Kenya in unrepayable debt to gain influence over the African state (BBC, 2015). Despite this, only half of Kenya's debt is owed to China (BBC, 2015).

In Ethiopia, China has invested in hundreds of projects valued at over \$4 billion (Gibson, 2019). China has been instrumental in constructing roads and railways. Regional infrastructure, China supported the Ethiopian government in December 2018 by voting against a UN resolution condemning human rights abuses in the Tigray region (South China Morning Post, 2018).

China also constructed the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at a cost of \$160 million

South China Morning Post, 2018). Unsurprisingly, the building was reportedly looted, and its contents were regularly looted by UN operations (South China Morning Post, 2018). Nevertheless, China continues to build critical infrastructure across the continent. In 2018, China announced plans to build the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria (Africa, 2018). In 2020, China completed construction of the African Centre for Space Cooperation Headquarters (AFSCA, 2020). Additionally, Chinese-owned companies have built or financed dozens of presidential, prime ministerial, and other government buildings throughout Africa (Heritage Foundation, 2016).

China is also seeking control over African ports. For instance, Djibouti nationalised its Somali-Gambian Terminal in 2018 (Bloomberg, 2018). However, China owns 50% of the port, gaining significant control over regional shipping. Chinese companies have also established large cargo facilities near the port, and hundreds of Chinese soldiers are stationed there. The People's Liberation Army may use the terminal for anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations, and likely other intelligence and power projection activities (Bloomberg, 2018).

Reports suggest that China is looking to build a large maritime base, potentially in Malawi, Equatorial Guinea, or Gabon (The Diplomat, 2016). Although these plans have not yet materialised, they indicate Chinese intent to expand its military power in African waters, to protect its maritime trading interests and extend its influence over African states (The Diplomat, 2016).

China has also invested in space programs. International space is part of its data and intelligence information corridor. China launches satellites for African states and trains Africans to work in the space industry (United States Institute of Peace, 2016).

However, a Chinese telecommunications technology company is thought to provide around 50% of Africa's telecommunications and information infrastructure (Ipsos, 2018). Furthermore, 2019 shows the continuing Chinese companies build telecommunications networks, including government networks. Nine African countries have adopted Chinese-designed and built surveillance projects as part of China's 'Smart City Surveillance' initiative, increasing the penetration of vast numbers of cameras. Whether the UN has access to these cameras remains unclear (Financial Times, 2020; The Wall Street Journal, 2019).

China does not merely build infrastructure in Africa but also trains Africans to live and study in China, often at the Chinese state's expense. This effort aims to create a generation of educated African elites, with favorable opinions of China and its development model. For example, in Beijing's approach to Africa, articulated in an editorial by China's ambassador to the Republic, emphasizes 'South-South cooperation' and building a 'China-Africa community based on 'win-win, mutual benefit, and good faith' (Ministry of the People's Republic of China in the Republic, 2018).

China's efforts to develop relationships with emerging African elites align with its broader goal of expanding the 'China model' of development, which emphasizes

industrialization and modernization without democratization or the adoption of Western liberal values. Initiatives like the Great China Political Party leaders' program bring young African politicians to China for training in governance and economic development based on Chinese principles (Broukings, 2019). Additionally, in 2022, the CCP founded the Institute of African Studies, which educates political leaders from six Southern African countries (GOD, 2022).

Confucius Institutes, which aim to teach Chinese language and promote Chinese culture, are widespread in Africa, though they have been criticized for spreading CCP propaganda. China has awarded the United States its largest number of students, making it the second most popular destination after France for Africans pursuing higher education.

China measures its success in Africa partly by assessing voting patterns in international organizations. African votes are increasingly aligning with China in the UN, with many voting against resolutions critical of Beijing's policies, such as its South China Sea claims or human rights abuses in Xinjiang (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).

China's growing popularity in Africa reflects its strategy of combining infrastructure development, educational outreach, and alignment with African priorities. Despite criticisms of its authoritarian model and accusations of debt trap diplomacy, many Africans view China as a reliable partner offering an alternative path to development. As African nations increasingly adopt aspects of the 'China model' in economic

systems, their China's influence in Africa is reshaping the continent's political and economic landscape.

Chinese HardPower in Africa

Military relations between the People's Republic of China and Africa began during the Cold War, as China sought to counter both Soviet and American influence across the continent and portray itself as a fellow non-white society resisting white global power. During this period, China encouraged natural resources and weapons movements in Africa. Although it no longer attempts to foment communist revolutions in Africa, China continues to portray itself as a non-white power naturally aligned with anti-imperialists in Africa.

Under Gang Huopeng, China adopted a policy of 'trading war capabilities' and propaganda heavily in foreign wars to the world. This approach meant that, while China was a significant arms supplier to African nations, it rarely involved itself directly or indirectly in African conflicts. In 1969, Mao issued the policy declaring that 'China was a sword and firm in the East' and should 'hide under wings' in global affairs (Hornidge, 2019).

As a result, China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia and along its border with India, largely driven by efforts to reclaim land and maritime territories that once belonged to the Chinese Empire (e.g., Taiwan and the South China Sea). At the same time, China has long been involved in African conflicts and is eager to assert its military might in support of its regional interests, as well as to 'project' where Chinese and Chinese nationals living in Africa. China's use of hard power in Africa is largely tied to the CCP's nationalistic reputation,

subject its conception of all Chinese (probably as belonging to the 'Chinese people') and its efforts to restore China to its rightful place on the center of global affairs. For example, its joint emphasis on China's 'more than 5000 years of civilized history' portraying the Chinese as a people who 'created a brilliant civilization, made outstanding contributions to mankind and became a great nation of the world' it claims that the Chinese people are now being 'rejuvenated' and will soon achieve a 'moderately prosperous society' while becoming a global power.

Expanding its hard power influence in Africa helps China present itself as a global power and a civilization with its own development models and norms, which other nations may follow to achieve similar prosperity. Furthermore, this expansion allows China to protect friendly African regimes, protect American-led groups or transactions, and secure its strategic interests.

China's deepening engagement in governance model in African states, most notably in Ethiopia, often referred to as the 'China of Africa' by African countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Tanzania, have made noticeable changes to their governance styles and models as a result of these deepening engagements.¹ These changes reflect the adoption of elements from the Chinese development model, including strong export-led growth, significant state involvement in the economy and the promotion of labor-intensive industries (Hernandez, 2018). China is also believed to be exporting principles like 'democratic centralism,' the establishment of special economic zones, and the concept that the military should remain loyal to the

ruling party rather than the state or individuals (Hernandez, 2018).

Despite considerable attention to China's military footprint in Africa, it remains relatively small compared to that of the United States, which maintains military bases in 48 African nations under the auspices of the United States Africa Command. In contrast, China has just one military base in Africa, located in Djibouti. Nevertheless, given China's global ambitions, it is likely to establish additional bases in Africa to defend its interests and challenge US, Russian, and British influence in the region.

Though China has only one base in Africa, it has conducted military drills in Cameroon, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria. Its military-trained units have collaborated with counterparts in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zambia to improve combat readiness over a span of long-standing relationships involving arms sales and intelligence cooperation (Hernandez, 2018). China is also developing military ties with Burkina Faso, which recently ceased recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state (Hernandez, 2018).

In 2018, China held a Defense and Security Forum with officials from 50 African nations, resulting in a comprehensive security framework. Through this framework, China pledged to provide military and intelligence support to combat piracy, terrorism, and criminals, as well as to participate in peacekeeping operations. China committed 10,000 million toward building the African Union Security Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises and contributed to the Economic Force and Engagement Fund and various training programs (PSC, 2018).

China's increasing interest in African security and defense reflects its desire to protect friendly regimes, facilitate trade, ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and safeguard African Chinese and Chinese nationals in Africa. While Chinese actors often align with African interests, such as infrastructure development and security enhancements, the establishment of Chinese police stations and other security facilities across Africa is also part of projecting China as a globalized and stable power. Chinese people globally and maintain their loyalty to the CCP.

China has openly expressed its intentions in Africa. A 2015 Chinese policy paper emphasized "disseminating military, technological, and capacity building for African security sectors" (Hornidge, 2018). As a result, China has become sub-Saharan Africa's largest weapons supplier (Hill, 2018). Its exports include not only small arms but also tanks, armored personnel carriers, maritime patrol ships, aircraft carriers, unmanned aerial vehicles, and military (Hornidge, 2018).

China is also deeply involved in enhancing African military efforts. Approximately 1,000 African officers train annually with the People's Liberation Army (PLA) with an additional list announcing that the PLA found "special friendship" and another 1,000 training facilities and has enhancement training at Chinese People's Armed Forces (PLA) schools (Hornidge, 2018). The PLA and PAF, as members of the G20, enhance the party's ideological and political goals in Africa.

While China assists African military intervention in Africa, it increasingly encourages UN peacekeeping

operations (Hornidge) to spread its influence in West Africa. China has steadily increased the number and variety of personnel it contributes, including medical engineers, and armed infantry in that. Chinese involvement in the Eritrean mission is seen as significant but marks a new willingness to deploy combat troops (Hornidge, 2018). Chinese peacekeeping activities are not politically neutral instead they aim to promote a "Chinese approach" to peacekeeping, prioritizing regime stability and economic development while avoiding humanitarianism and democratization (Hornidge, 2018).

Not all Africans welcome China's growing influence. For example, Ghana's Justice and Equality Movement, once complained that "China is making peace for our blood" (Dart & Fowler, 2017). Anti-China violence has occurred in Ethiopia, Mali, and other nations, demonstrating that Chinese activities are not universally accepted. Nevertheless, China continues to strengthen its position in Africa, often at the expense of democratic norms. These developments are part of the CCP's broader geopolitical expansion project, aimed at reshaping the global order in favor of a multipolar world with China at its center.

Notes to section

The new great power struggle for influence in Africa contains a distinct civilizational element (Hansen), rather than claiming to bring civilisation to Africa; each non-African nation involved in this struggle presents itself as a representative of a broader civilisation in conflict with the West, offering a non-Western path to development. It seeks in this competition and battles of wits in trade wars, access to vital minerals, and control over key military staging points and geographically strategic areas.

Turkey, Russia, India and China (HIC) share a common goal to expand their influence across the African continent and weaken Western...particularly American...power in Africa. Their advantage over the West lies in their relatively unmarred history with Africa, their lack of a colonial legacy tainted by brutality, and their ability to point to their own economic successes as evidence that nations can achieve wealth and power without adhering to Western norms and governance models.

Each of these nations offers Africa...often addressing it as though it were a monolithic culture...friendship and solidarity 'partnerships-against' development aid and direct investment, something the West has too reluctantly refused to provide. They frequently link the role of the colonial past and the West's insistence that aid be contingent on liberal democratic reforms as examples of Western arrogance and imperialism.

Turkey and China claim that their own civilisations possess values superior to those of the West, demonstrated by their peaceful engagement with Africa. Meanwhile, Russia and India emphasise that shared anti-colonial struggle and present themselves as allies of the Global South in its resistance to Western imperialism. All four nations position themselves as allies for the Global South in its ongoing struggle against the global North.

Yet these nations are not absolute actors. They too seek Africa's mineral wealth and use the continent as a laboratory for expanding their influence. Although their methods are not as direct or as explicit as those of the European colonial powers, their actions reveal a similar underlying motivation. The increasing reliance on hard power by Turkey, Russia, India and China in Africa highlights that these 'new' great powers are not as different from the old ones.

Ultimately, the competition for influence in Africa pits Turkey, Russia, India and China not just against the West but also against one another too, these four nations share a critical objective: constructing a multipolar world in which American power is no longer hegemonic. Winning greater influence in Africa is integral to this project, as is persuading Africans to reject reliance on Western assistance for economic growth and infrastructure development. Instead, the emerging powers argue that Africans should turn away from the values of their former colonial masters and draw on the experience of being civilisation-states to develop their economies and societies and infrastructures. Given the West's failure to facilitate African development and the ongoing challenges faced by liberal democratic societies globally, it would not be surprising if Africans began to distance themselves from liberal democratic norms.

However, the United States remains by far the most powerful foreign nation in Africa, capable of projecting hard power across the continent at a level unmatched by any other nation.

From an Anglo-American—and broadly Western—perspective, the competition between the West and its old colonial rivals may appear to be a confrontation between democratic and autocratic regimes. In some ways, the language used by states like TNC, often presenting themselves as 'civilization states' with unique values, serves to legitimize authoritarianism. Moreover, these regimes perceive the competition differently. They view it as a struggle to construct a new world order in which the L1 is the largest the current global order has created. Allusions of TNC repeat the power and prestige they enjoyed before.

These nations are serious about displacing the L1 and dismantling the liberal norms and global order that have defined the world since the end of the Cold War. They, along with their growing number of allies, believe this shift is desirable, marking the end of Western imperialism and the notion that Western values—such as liberal democracy—are universal. At the same time, they compete with one another in Africa. For instance, if China's base in Egypt signals plans to establish further bases in East Africa, India may feel compelled to respond by increasing its military presence to counter Chinese influence, but it risks an East Africa dominated by China and potentially hostile to Indian interests.

While it is possible that TNC could find avenues for cooperation in Africa, it is far more likely that their competition will intensify. Despite sharing the common goal of diminishing American power in Africa and globally, their conflicting interests are likely to make Africa critical arena of rivalry among these two global powers.

III. Conclusion/Summary

For Liberal/Democratic Countries

1. Economic Engagement Strategies

- Liberal democracies should emphasize the unique value of transparent, accountable governance and rule of law as part of their development partnerships.

- Establish conditionality-based development partnerships that prioritize mutual benefits without sacrificing democratic values.

2. Strengthen Infrastructure Investment

- Compete with China and others by funding large-scale infrastructure projects with transparent terms to counter debt-trap diplomacy narratives.

- Prioritize sustainable energy, digital infrastructure, and transport networks to align with Africa's long-term goals.

3. Increase Support for Democratic Institutions

- Offer robust support for democratic institutions in Africa through capacity-building programs for judiciary, electoral commissions, and civil society.

- Collaborate with African governments to counter the spread of authoritarian governance models, such as China's "democratic socialism."

4. Revitalize Cultural and Educational Ties

- Expand scholarships and exchange programs for African students in liberal democracies to compete with Chinese and Turkish educational initiatives.

- Support local language media and cultural initiatives to counter disinformation and propaganda from authoritarian states.

5. Enhance Military Cooperation

- Strengthen military partnerships focused on combating terrorism, piracy, and organized crime while avoiding neo-imperialist optics.

- Support African-led peacekeeping missions and regional security initiatives to offer alternatives to Russian monetary involvement.

6. Collaborate with African Nations on Resource Management

- Promote sustainable development models by partnering with African nations on equitable resource extraction and environmental conservation.

- Ensure that development initiatives include local community initiatives to ensure the exploitation practices of other powers.

4.Support Multipolar Engagement

- Avoid framing the engagement as a "zero-sum game" instead focus on building global partnerships across different nations/areas regarding its decision making.

- Advocate for reforms in international institutions (e.g., IMF, WB) to increase African representation.

For African Policy Makers, NGOs, and Academics

1.Strengthen Capacity in Home Regions

- Use transnational networks given pressure to negotiate better terms for aid, trade, and investment agreements.
- Invest in infrastructural projects that prioritize local employment, technology transfer, and long-term sustainability.

2.Diversify Economic Portfolio

- Avoid over-reliance on any single country (e.g., China) by fostering diversified trade relationships with various economies, BRICS nations, and regional blocs.
- Strengthen intra-African trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to reduce dependence on external powers.

3.Protect Sovereignty and Avoid Dependency

- Resist pressure to adopt authoritarian governance models in exchange for development aid.
- Strengthen robust legal frameworks to prevent resource exploitation and ensure fair terms for foreign investments.

4.Focus on Regional Security Cooperation

- Strengthen African Union (AU) and regional security mechanisms to reduce reliance on external military support, such as Russian Wagner Group.
- Build partnerships with global allies that respect African sovereignty and promote peaceful dispute resolution.

5.Promote Transparency in Aid and Trade Deals

- Initiate the terms of agreements with external powers to foster public accountability and prevent corruption.
- Work with civil society organizations to monitor the social and environmental impacts of foreign-funded projects.

2. Expand Educational and Technological Opportunities

• Collaborate with all partners to build higher education institutions, vocational training centers, and tech incubators.

• Develop programs to train a new generation of African leaders who can engage strategically with global powers.

3. Strengthen Civil Society and Democratic Institutions

• Support NGOs and academic institutions to monitor and counter authoritarian influences from foreign actors.

• Foster dialogues on governance models that prioritize African values while safeguarding universal freedoms.

4. Build Alliances with Liberal Democracies

• Partner with liberal democracies to balance authoritarian influences and ensure that Africa's development aligns with global democratic values.

• Engage in diplomatic efforts to ensure African nations have a greater voice in multilateral forums like the G20 and the Security Council.

These recommendations aim to balance the opportunities presented by the new great power competition with safeguards against exploitation, authoritarianism, and loss of sovereignty. Both liberal democracies and African nations must work collaboratively to create a mutually beneficial, sustainable, and democratic framework for Africa's development.

Italy: Telsat, 2016. "Turkey's expansion across Africa off schedule to search for oil gas" Italy Telsat, December 29, 2016. <https://www.telsat.it/en/turkeyexpansionacrossafricaoffscheduletosearchforoilgas>

Reuters, World, 2016. "India expands strategic presence in Asia: shaping alliances in some countries, others, Asia" August 2016. <https://www.reuters.com/article/india-india-expands-strategic-presence-in-asia/india-allies-in-some-countries-in-asia-asia-idUSKCN120160820>

Hammond, M., & Jackson, M. (2016). "Reversing the Economic Tides and Their Tightening Tie with Africa" (June, House Select, H. Committee Natural Resource for Global and Asia Pacific, 2016) . cabinet.matter for Global and European Union. <https://www.house.gov/committees/natural-resource>

Iran (2016). "Africa continues Russia's rich strategic security concerns" August 4, 2016 Africa continues Russia's rich strategic security concerns... 2016 . <https://www.iranica24.com>

Iran (2016). "Turkey provides a means of security partnership Turkey hardware" Iran December 29, 2016. <https://www.iranica24.com/turkey-provides-a-means-of-security-partnership-turkey-hardware>

History of the People's Republic of China in the Republic. (2016). "China and Africa New Vision and Opportunities" <http://www.china-af.org/eng/af/afchina/afchina.htm>

Hollander, Bruce. (2016). "History before the 19th Africa Economic and Security House Committee Hearing on Africa Strategic Asia in Africa" March 14, 2016 https://www.house.gov/committees/economic/hollander_bruce_july14_2016.pdf

Financial Times, 2016. "Expanding Chinese surveillance the security ties of Africa issue" June 9, 2016. <https://www.ft.com/content/5b16a1c0-7016-11e6-8000-11d8c0000000>

FRP (2016). "Political Training under the Belt and Road Initiative is held at the Chinese Communist Party's first Party School in Africa" August 29, 2016 <https://www.frcp.org.cn/eng/af/afchina/afchina.htm>

FRP (2016). "Strategic aspects of Russian influence in Africa" Foreign Policy Research Institute March 2016 December 19, 2016. <https://www.fpri.org/articles/2016/12/strategic-aspects-of-russian-influence-in-africa>

For Reports, (2016). "Turkey's push for influence in Africa is working" News Magazine News April 6, 2016. <https://www.gazetevatan.com.tr/turkey-influence-africa/>

Marriage Foundation, (2016). "Government Buildings in Africa are a likely market for Chinese building" May 19, 2016. <https://www.marriage.org/en/af/afchina/afchina.htm>

2006. (2006). 'Report on Add to India' March 16, 2006
<https://www.indianembassynewdelhi.org/india-reports-report-on-add-to-india>

2016. (2016). 'Belongs Security Study' 2016.
https://www.southafricanembassy.org.za/press-releases/2016/06/2016-06-20-01

2020. Kumar. Arun. (2016). 'India's role in the African space' Journal of Indian Studies 19 no. 4 (2016) 386-399.

2020. David A. (2016). 'Indian soft power influence in Africa' The International Affairs Department 2016.
<https://www.in.gov.ng/india/india-soft-power-in-africa>

2020. Gupta. (2016). 'Introduction: Interpreting "China as a Factorial Element of South Asia"' In A History of International Chinese Relations in Asia: A Comparative Perspective, pp. 1-16. Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore.

2020. V. A. (2016). 'Implications of Indian Indian Foreign Policy Towards a United International in Asia During the First and Second World Wars' Journal of International Studies and Global Studies Studies 19 (2016) <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10992-016-9318-0>.

2020. (2016). 'In his anniversary speech, Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi' 2016.
<https://www.pib.gov.in/Press-Release-2016/2016-06-20-01>

2020. (2016). 'India's growing power and security role in Africa' Observer Institute for Africa Studies
<https://www.oiafrica.org/india-growing-power-and-security-role-africa>

2020. Africa. (2016). 'While the world watched China made quietly built a great base in Africa' October 19, 2016
<https://www.africa.com/india/india/while-the-world-watched-china-made-quietly-built-a-great-base-in-africa>

Ministry of External Affairs. (2016). 'Speech by Modi at the 16th Indian-Africa Ministerial Forum Partnership Summit' September 16, 2016
<https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements/india/16th.htm>

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2016). 'Turkey's role in Africa and Partnership' Report of Foreign Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Nairobi, Dec. (UPI) – ‘Local strategy and Africa’s role under Bush in Africa’ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, August 10, 2000.
<https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/stratgry-afric-studies-0001-pubst-in-africa/>

Nairobi, Dec. (UPI) – ‘Africa’s role under Bush: supports to building strategic interests in Africa’ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, January 17, 2001
<https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0002-pubst-in-africa/>

Nairobi, Dec. (UPI) – ‘Africa’s role: cooperation, trade, partnership’ Africa Center for Strategic Studies, November 16, 2000
<https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0003-pubst-in-africa/>

Nationalism, Power, and Strategic Interests (2000) “United Nations Facilitating Foreign Aid Under U.S. Africa” National Journal of African Studies / Social Transformation Studies Africanus, 1-28. <https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0004-pubst-in-africa/>

Smith, (2001) ‘Aid, Human Rights, Group, Terrorism, and Internationalization – US experts’ Africa

<https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0005-pubst-in-africa/>

US Africa Center, Africa group, terrorism, and internationalization – US experts

Smith, March 11, and Smith, Jan 10. (2001) ‘Africa expanding footprint in Africa’ Africa Today, 199.
<https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0006-pubst-in-africa/>

Smith, James, (2001) ‘Group in Africa’ Africa, April 25, 2001. <https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0007-pubst-in-africa/>

Smith Today (2001) ‘Turkey is an Africanized zone’ Smith Today February 10, 2001 <https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0008-pubst-in-africa/>

President of Russia (2001) ‘International conference is required’ (2001, 2001) International Conference is required (2001) ‘International Conference is required’ September 10, 2001 <https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0009-pubst-in-africa/>

U.S. (2001) ‘International Africa in America to involve role in African policy’ October 10, 2001 <https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0010-pubst-in-africa/>

United States Council (2001) ‘United States of Africa and Africa’ Jan 10, 2001 <https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0011-pubst-in-africa/>

South Africa Working Group (2001) ‘South Africa: the (un)certainties in South Africa’ South Africa Working Group, September 10, 2001
<https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0012-pubst-in-africa/>

South Africa Working Group (2001) ‘South Africa: the (un)certainties in South Africa’ South Africa Working Group, September 10, 2001
<https://www.africacenter.org/pubs/afstudies/afric-studies-0013-pubst-in-africa/>

South Africa Mining: How (2004). 'China's rise made the world richer in steel but Africa's trade deficit widens, with commodity prices a key factor' *South Africa* February 1, 2004. <https://www.scoop.international.com/2004/02/01/china-rise-made-the-world-richer-in-steel-but-africa-trade-deficit-widens-commodity-prices-a-key-factor/>

Southafrican International Trade Research Institute (2019). 'Trade in international arms transfers 2017' ¹⁴. <https://www.scoop.international.com/2019/01/01/south-african-international-arms-research-institute-2017/>

Sperling, Marc (2019). 'Economic relations between Turkey and Africa: challenges and prospects' *Journal of Sustainable Development* (in advance) (2019) no 1-26. <https://www.scoop.international/>

The Diplomat (2019). 'Which countries are for or against China's Belt and Road?' *The Diplomat* (June 19, 2019) <https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/19/which-countries-are-for-or-against-chinas-belt-and-road/>

The Diplomat (2019). 'Which countries are worth for a maritime military presence in East Africa?' February 20, 2019. <https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/20/which-countries-are-worth-for-a-maritime-military-presence-in-east-africa/>

The Economist (2019). 'The new scramble for Africa' March 7, 2019. <https://www.economist.com/2019/03/07/the-new-scramble-for-africa>

The Economist (2019). 'India means military bases?' *The Economist* May 11, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/2019/may/11/india-means-military-bases>

The New York Journal (2019). 'Foreign technicians helped African governments lay out national budgets' August 15, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/15/world/africa/foreign-technicians-helped-african-governments-approve-national-budgets.html>

The Africa (2019). 'What makes foreign investment a magnet for African students?' July 2, 2019. <https://www.africaworld.com/2019/07/02/what-makes-foreign-investment-a-magnet-for-african-students/>

World (2019). Economic report on Africa 2019 showing the state of Africa's economies, infrastructure for growth, jobs and economic transformation. <https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/economic-report-africa-2019/>

World (2019). Economic report on Africa 2019 industrializing through trade <https://www.un.org/development/desa/publications/economic-report-africa-2019/>

World Bank Institute of Peace (2019). 'Africa's space industrialization with Africa implications and recommendations for the United States' September 19, 2019. <https://www.wpi.edu/sites/default/files/2019-09/africas-space-industrialization-africa-implications-and-recommendations-for-the-united-states.pdf>

U.S. Department of State (2019). "Report to Congress Submitted Pursuant to Public Laws 104-190 and 105-62" (March 10, 2019). <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/330492.pdf>

State	Department	Year	Value	Change	Notes
Alabama	State	1990	100	0	
Alabama	State	1991	100	0	
Alabama	State	1992	100	0	
Alabama	State	1993	100	0	
Alabama	State	1994	100	0	
Alabama	State	1995	100	0	
Alabama	State	1996	100	0	
Alabama	State	1997	100	0	
Alabama	State	1998	100	0	
Alabama	State	1999	100	0	
Alabama	State	2000	100	0	
Alabama	State	2001	100	0	
Alabama	State	2002	100	0	
Alabama	State	2003	100	0	
Alabama	State	2004	100	0	
Alabama	State	2005	100	0	
Alabama	State	2006	100	0	
Alabama	State	2007	100	0	
Alabama	State	2008	100	0	
Alabama	State	2009	100	0	
Alabama	State	2010	100	0	
Alabama	State	2011	100	0	
Alabama	State	2012	100	0	
Alabama	State	2013	100	0	
Alabama	State	2014	100	0	
Alabama	State	2015	100	0	
Alabama	State	2016	100	0	
Alabama	State	2017	100	0	
Alabama	State	2018	100	0	
Alabama	State	2019	100	0	
Alabama	State	2020	100	0	
Alabama	State	2021	100	0	
Alabama	State	2022	100	0	
Alabama	State	2023	100	0	
Alabama	State	2024	100	0	
Alabama	State	2025	100	0	
Alabama	State	2026	100	0	
Alabama	State	2027	100	0	
Alabama	State	2028	100	0	
Alabama	State	2029	100	0	
Alabama	State	2030	100	0	
Alabama	State	2031	100	0	
Alabama	State	2032	100	0	
Alabama	State	2033	100	0	
Alabama	State	2034	100	0	
Alabama	State	2035	100	0	
Alabama	State	2036	100	0	
Alabama	State	2037	100	0	
Alabama	State	2038	100	0	
Alabama	State	2039	100	0	
Alabama	State	2040	100	0	
Alabama	State	2041	100	0	
Alabama	State	2042	100	0	
Alabama	State	2043	100	0	
Alabama	State	2044	100	0	
Alabama	State	2045	100	0	
Alabama	State	2046	100	0	
Alabama	State	2047	100	0	
Alabama	State	2048	100	0	
Alabama	State	2049	100	0	
Alabama	State	2050	100	0	
Alabama	State	2051	100	0	
Alabama	State	2052	100	0	
Alabama	State	2053	100	0	
Alabama	State	2054	100	0	
Alabama	State	2055	100	0	
Alabama	State	2056	100	0	
Alabama	State	2057	100	0	
Alabama	State	2058	100	0	
Alabama	State	2059	100	0	
Alabama	State	2060	100	0	
Alabama	State	2061	100	0	
Alabama	State	2062	100	0	
Alabama	State	2063	100	0	
Alabama	State	2064	100	0	
Alabama	State	2065	100	0	
Alabama	State	2066	100	0	
Alabama	State	2067			

What do Americans think about things in Africa?
 What do Americans think about things in Africa?

More of America (page 10) tells that up two index.

© 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd, *Journal of Internal Medicine* 260: 391–398

It greatly exceeds that of a "the inclusion of its achievement in the national curriculum to promote its global progress, the moral duty to further education and have our shared aspirations, the all long working closely for global well-being" because it is much more than a global education.

18. <http://www.singaporeair.com> "Airline & Aviation History in Building a Modernity: Proposed History in all Airports and Hotels for the Great Success of Singapore with Various Transportation for a New Era" *Singapore Business* 15, 2007. http://www.singaporeair.com/eng/sga_report_01_2007_2008.htm. (The Singaporean)

Author	Year	Article title	Journal	Page numbers
Supriya Chatterjee and Barbara May 19, 2002				
http://www.bioscience.com/content/full/31/10/1000				

TITTON, J. & MORGAN, W. 2000. "Translation Studies: Methods, Literature Theory, and Practice" in *Language and the Social Use of Translated Products* (ed. L. A. Kupperman). Westport, CT: Ablex, pp. 109-121.

FIGURE 1. A. BARNES, E. (1998). "The end after 15 years: Impacts of education in India." *THE WORLD BANK*.

TURNER, I., & MATHIAS, B. (2003). "Multinational Corporations in Domestic and Foreign Markets: The Case of Russia." *Business*, 10(4), 309-320. <http://www.businesstoday.com>

FIGURE 1. A. Shaped B. (empty) "total of past collective treatment that will completely eliminate the occurrence of the epidemic and afterwards maintain the herd immunity" (immunity threshold) (2002) (left axis, green line) and the threshold of past collective treatment that will completely eliminate the epidemic (right axis, red line).

[illegible]

Yin, Hui, and Nicholas Martin. 2011. "Globalized Transition in Economic and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey." *European Journal of International Relations* 17(1): 1-20. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13602709.2011.568281>

Yin, L. (2017). *Shaping the Global China Strategy: From Analysis to Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zajoncowski, Robert A. Robert Smith (2018). "Impacts of Asia-Europe Union Cooperation in Africa." *International Studies* 55(1): 10-28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0022216X.2018.1468288>

Zhang, Peng. (2018). "The Evolving Nature of China's International Relations." *Asia Policy* 16(1): 1-20. <https://www.pewglobal.org/2018/01/01/>

Zhang, Xuebin. (2018). "The New Silk Road, Trade, and Shipping: Use of Routes in the South China Sea." *International Security* 43(1): 10-28. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02643758.2018.1468288>

