In this interview with the ECPS, Professor Werner Pascha—Emeritus Professor of East Asian Economic Studies—examines Japan’s evolving political economy amid electoral volatility, fiscal strain, and geopolitical uncertainty. Reflecting on the LDP’s supermajority, he cautions against reading the outcome as systemic rupture, arguing instead for “continuity” and warning of a possible “popularity bubble.” Professor Pascha also clarifies how populism operates differently in Japan, where elite–people antagonism is “very rare,” and highlights the persistence of technocratic governance, noting that “the technocratic model remains very much alive.” Framing Japan’s approach as “strategic pragmatism,” he argues that Western democracies should look beyond “short-term electoral cycles” and take East Asia seriously as “highly instructive.”
Interview by Selcuk Gultasli
In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Werner Pascha—Emeritus Professor of East Asian Economic Studies (Japan and Korea) and Associate Member of the Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST) at the University of Duisburg-Essen—offers a nuanced assessment of Japan’s contemporary political trajectory under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi. At a time when many advanced democracies are grappling with populist insurgencies, fiscal strain, and geopolitical fragmentation, Professor Pascha suggests that Japan’s experience—particularly under Takaichi’s unexpectedly strong mandate—deserves closer scrutiny: “we should not only look at Europe or the US, but also keep East Asia in mind, as it is highly instructive.”
PM Takaichi’s landslide electoral victory, which delivered a two-thirds supermajority for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and its coalition partner, has dramatically consolidated executive authority and provided her government with an exceptional legislative cushion. As Japan’s first female prime minister, she combines a programmatic ideological profile with a distinctive leadership style that voters perceive as both “diligent and tough-speaking.” Her rapid ascent and decisive electoral endorsement have reshaped the political landscape, strengthening conservative forces and enabling her to advance an ambitious policy agenda. This includes large-scale fiscal stimulus, proposed consumption-tax cuts, a renewed industrial strategy focused on technological innovation and artificial intelligence, and a more assertive security posture in East Asia. Her leadership has also been marked by a willingness to take politically risky positions—particularly regarding Taiwan and China—that have resonated domestically while heightening regional tensions.
At the same time, PM Takaichi’s policy agenda has raised significant concerns about fiscal sustainability and market confidence. Japan’s already elevated public debt—among the highest in the developed world—has made investors sensitive to expansionary fiscal measures, and early market reactions to her proposals have underscored the tension between electoral mandates and macroeconomic credibility. Nevertheless, her overwhelming electoral mandate may also provide political space for policy recalibration and more cautious implementation, a dynamic that Professor Pascha identifies as characteristic of Japan’s long-standing pattern of governance.
Crucially, Professor Pascha cautions against interpreting Sanae Takaichi’s rise as evidence of systemic transformation. Rather than signaling a structural rupture in Japan’s political economy, he emphasizes continuity: “I would regard it as continuity. I do not really see a major change developing in Japan.” Even the scale of the LDP’s victory, he suggests, may partly reflect “a kind of popularity bubble” surrounding Takaichi rather than a durable realignment.
Importantly, Professor Pascha resists simplistic narratives about Japan’s supposed technocratic decline. Despite electoral promises and fiscal pressures, “the technocratic model remains very much alive.” While no longer operating in the rigid form of the postwar developmental state, policymaking continues to rest on strategic planning—particularly in areas such as artificial intelligence and economic security.
This continuity is best captured, in Professor Pascha’s view, by the concept of “strategic pragmatism”: the capacity to pursue long-term goals while remaining adaptive in implementation. Japan’s 2022 economic security legislation, he observes, reflects a broader and longstanding logic dating back to the 1980 doctrine of “comprehensive security.” The pattern is strikingly consistent: Japan adapts without abandoning strategic orientation.
This framework helps explain how Japan can accommodate electoral responsiveness, conservative policy shifts, and technocratic governance without sacrificing institutional stability. It also highlights the broader relevance of Japan’s experience for Western democracies facing shorter electoral cycles and increasingly volatile political environments. As Professor Pascha suggests, Japan’s model of calibrated, long-term political management—now embodied in Takaichi’s leadership—offers an instructive counterpoint to the reactive and polarized dynamics visible across Europe and North America. In his view, “Western countries might do well to study this concept more closely and to look beyond short-term electoral cycles.” Japan’s political economy, often underestimated, may thus provide a model of long-term calibration under conditions of uncertainty.
