Panel III of the ECPS Conference 2025, held at the University of Oxford, gathered five scholars from the Jean Monnet Chair in European Constitutional Democracy (EUCODEM) at the University of Barcelona to explore how populist forces are challenging liberal-democratic norms—and what institutional remedies might resist them. Chaired by Dr. Bruno Godefroy, the session addressed threats to judicial independence, the populist appropriation of secessionist demands, and the theoretical underpinnings of populism as a political strategy. It also examined the role of parliaments and second chambers in preserving constitutional order. Drawing from both comparative and case-specific perspectives—ranging from Spain and Scotland to Canada and the United States—the panel provided a timely and interdisciplinary diagnosis of populism’s constitutional impact and offered potential avenues for democratic resilience in increasingly polarized societies.
Reported by ECPS Staff
Panel III of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford brought together a group of distinguished scholars from the Jean Monnet Chair in European Constitutional Democracy (EUCODEM) at the University of Barcelona. Titled “Populist Threats to Modern Constitutional Democracies and Potential Solutions,” the session explored some of the most pressing challenges facing contemporary liberal democracies, from the erosion of judicial independence and the weaponization of secessionist demands, to the theoretical foundations of populist strategy and the underutilized potential of second chambers in democratic governance.
Chaired by Dr. Bruno Godefroy, Associate Professor in Law and German at the University of Tours, the panel featured five papers, each delving into different dimensions of populist encroachment on liberal-democratic norms.
Kicking off the session was Dr. Daniel Fernández, who traced the intellectual lineage of populism through the works of Heidegger, Lacan, and Laclau, offering a conceptual map of populism as a strategic response to post-hegemonic pluralism. Following this, Dr. Marco Antonio Simonelli examined how populist regimes strategically erode judicial independence, using comparative cases from Europe and the United States to illustrate how institutional autonomy can be dismantled under the banner of democratic legitimacy. Dr. Núria González then shifted the focus to secessionist populism, comparing Catalonia and Scotland to argue that the method of pursuing independence—via institutional fidelity or populist defiance—has long-term consequences for democratic cohesion.
In the final two presentations, Dr. Elia Marzal and Dr. Roger Boada explored structural alternatives to populist polarization. Marzal emphasized the Canadian model of parliamentary centrality in mediating secession, while Boada critically assessed Spain’s second chamber as a cautionary tale of underperformance and political vulnerability.
Collectively, the panel offered a rich interdisciplinary dialogue that blended constitutional theory, comparative jurisprudence, and political analysis—illuminating the risks posed by populism and the democratic pathways that might still be reclaimed.
