The Hood on Rhodes and the Politics of Moral Purification

Statue of Cecil Rhodes on the exterior of Oriel College, Oxford, UK.
Statue of Cecil Rhodes on the exterior of Oriel College, Oxford, UK, August 20, 2020. The statue has been the subject of protests calling for its removal due to Rhodes’ association with racism and British colonialism. Photo: Chris Dorney / Dreamstime.

In this commentary, Dr. João Ferreira Dias examines the controversy surrounding a planned talk by philosopher Nathan Cofnas at Oxford University’s Oriel College, following a protest in which a Ku Klux Klan hood was placed on the statue of Cecil Rhodes. Drawing on debates about academic freedom, safetyism, moral purification, and Popper’s paradox of tolerance, Dr. Ferreira Dias explores the tensions between free expression, institutional responsibility, and the protection of students from discrimination. While rejecting Cofnas’s racial hereditarianism as scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable, he distinguishes institutional endorsement from providing a platform for public debate. He argues that universities should apply consistent principles, protect legitimate protest, and encourage critical engagement rather than allowing moral disagreement alone to justify exclusion.

By João Ferreira Dias

On November 12, 2026, a Ku Klux Klan hood appeared on the statue of Cecil Rhodes above the entrance to Oriel College. Below it, a sign read “racists welcome here.” The people who placed it there were protesting against a talk by Nathan Cofnas, scheduled for November 17. Why put the hood on Rhodes? The statue gave the protesters a way to make an accusation about the college. An institution that continues to honor a British imperialist, they suggested, was acting in character when it gave Cofnas a room.

Who invited Cofnas?

Cofnas is a philosopher affiliated with Ghent University. In his public writings, he argues that genetic differences contribute to alleged differences in average intelligence between racial groups. He uses this claim to predict who would reach positions of elite status under what he considers meritocratic selection. There are two questions here. What evidence establishes a genetic explanation for differences between groups? And why should a test score carry the weight in selection that Cofnas gives it? A trait’s heritability within a population, by itself, tells us nothing about the cause of a difference between population averages. Nor would such a difference tell a university what an individual candidate deserves.

The invitation came from the Oxon Universities’ Reform Society, a student association that describes itself as linked to Reform UK. Its public announcement advertised a talk on whether diversity policies affect university hiring and academic quality, with advance booking and questions from the audience. That topic explains why Cofnas’s wider views matter to the controversy, even though the announcement leaves open whether he would present his argument about race. Oriel College described the event as a booking by a registered student society under its freedom of speech code.

A college speaks in its own name when it chooses whom to commemorate. When it makes rooms available under general rules, it exercises authority over access. Of course, Oxford’s prestige can lend weight to an invitation issued by students. That makes the terms of access and the nature of the event worth stating plainly. As Simpson and Srinivasan (2018) argue, academic freedom includes the authority of scholars to decide which work meets disciplinary standards. A political society’s invitation to an academic for a public discussion and a department’s decision to feature his research in a seminar involve different judgements.

When Disagreement Becomes a Safety Question

An open letter reported by Varsity called on Oriel to cancel the invitation or halt the event pending a published risk assessment, an independent review and safeguards for Black students and staff. At a meeting on November 11, student representatives asked how risks had been assessed. A college has a duty to take credible threats and harassment seriously. Those reports leave open what specific dangers the signatories anticipated. The question is what would justify withdrawal if the concern were that hearing Cofnas’s views would itself make students unsafe.

The term safetyism describes what happens when safety expands to override other values (Lukianoff & Haidt, 2018). Mounk (2023) identifies a difficulty for free expression when the category of harm comes to include the expression of an objectionable view as such. There is a paradox in the intellectual background to this argument. The suspicion that prevailing accounts of truth are shaped by power can coexist with a remarkable certainty about which views others should be permitted to hear. In a university, that certainty can become paternalism. Students who might ask Cofnas to defend his premises are imagined chiefly as people who need to be shielded from them.

The hood expressed a further claim. If opening the door implicates Oriel in what Cofnas believes, closing it becomes evidence of the college’s moral rectitude. Mary Douglas’s account of pollution and social boundaries helps explain how exclusion can take on that meaning (Douglas, 1966/2002). It also helps explain why a demand for cancellation can benefit the very association it was intended to oppose. Removing the room leaves the argument circulating and gives the organizers a reason to talk about censorship instead of answering for their choice of speaker.

Who May Organize on Campus?

Oxford also has student associations on the left, including the Oxford Labour Club. The university publishes general criteria for registered societies. The harder question is whether a university can apply its rules to a society whose politics many of its members consider objectionable. Progressives may regard their own associations as morally preferable. Institutional legitimacy requires reasons that can also be applied when the people exercising authority have different political sympathies.

This is where Popper’s paradox of tolerance is useful. Popper (1945, chap. 7, note 4) considered suppression unwise while intolerant views could be met by argument and checked by public opinion. He reserved the possibility of restraint for circumstances in which movements sought to prevent argument, including through intimidation or violence. At Oxford, a society can be expected to respect the conditions of participation and contestation it claims for itself. Students must also be free to protest against its events. A request to cancel a talk is itself an exercise of expression. The college’s decision to act on that request requires its own justification.

There is a temptation to think that our generation, after a long history of arriving at better moral judgements, has reached the final version of social morality. Yet convictions about equality can be held firmly while leaving room to test what we believe follows from them. Suppose another student society invites a historian who argues that Rhodes should come down. Opponents claim that giving her a room amounts to endorsing her account of British imperialism. What would we ask Oriel to do? The rule we would accept then should also govern how the college treats the students who invited Cofnas. I find his racial hereditarianism scientifically unpersuasive and morally objectionable. Even if the organizers and their opponents leave with their views unchanged, other students will have had the chance to hear the claims challenged and make up their own minds. 


 

References

Douglas, M. (2002). Purity and danger: An analysis of concepts of pollution and taboo. Routledge. (Original work published 1966)

Lukianoff, G., & Haidt, J. (2018). The coddling of the American mind: How good intentions and bad ideas are setting up a generation for failure. Penguin Press.

Mounk, Y. (2023). The identity trap: A story of ideas and power in our time. Penguin Press.

Popper, K. R. (1945). The open society and its enemies: Vol. 1. The spell of Plato. George Routledge & Sons.

Simpson, R. M., & Srinivasan, A. (2018). “No platforming.” In: J. Lackey (Ed.), Academic freedom, (pp. 186–210). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198791508.003.0011

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