Brazil After the Ballots: From Lula’s Digital Army to a Democratic Base

Supporters of Brazilian President and Workers’ Party (PT) presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva attend a reelection campaign rally on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo, Brazil, on October 24, 2026.
Supporters of Brazilian President and Workers’ Party (PT) presidential candidate Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva attend a reelection campaign rally on Avenida Paulista in São Paulo, Brazil, on October 24, 2026, ahead of the presidential runoff election. Photo: Dreamstime.

In this commentary, Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano examines Brazil’s 2026 presidential election through the interplay of digital populism, social inequalities, and political mobilization. Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork and campaign observations, he explores how Lula’s remarkable electoral comeback was supported by André Janones’s Exército do Lula, a digitally coordinated network that mobilized millions of supporters. Moving beyond conventional distinctions between online and offline politics, Dr. Bayarri Toscano analyzes how economic precarity, political identities, and social relationships shape contemporary populist movements. While highlighting the effectiveness of digital campaigning, he questions whether hierarchical online mobilization can evolve into sustainable democratic participation. He argues that Brazil’s central challenge lies in transforming electoral mobilization into enduring collective organization, democratic literacy, and meaningful participation beyond election day.

By Gabriel Bayarri Toscano*

The Material and Ideological Terrain of the Contest

Brazil’s 2026 presidential election cannot be understood without first considering the country’s social complexity. The election took place in a Brazil where the figure of the formal, industrial, unionized worker no longer captured the experience of large segments of the population. As in many countries where informal work is widespread, the growth of digital platforms and the “Uberization” of the economy had expanded self-employment and insecurity: many people pieced together jobs, small businesses, and other activities to make ends meet. In this fragmented labor market, demands for equality and rights coexisted with aspirations for individual prosperity, religious fulfillment, family life, and consumption, without necessarily finding a common political expression.

Nor was Brazilian society divided into two homogeneous blocs. Working classes in urban and peripheral areas, along with large informal sectors, had demands that did not automatically coalesce into a shared political project. Brazil’s bourgeoisie brought together financial, industrial, and commercial interests, as well as those tied to agribusiness, and formed shifting alliances with the urban middle classes. In the countryside, agribusiness and conservative forces held sway alongside rural workers, peasant movements, and Indigenous peoples. Understanding this social composition helps explain why the electoral contest was not simply a confrontation between rich and poor or a competition between online messages. It was also a struggle over what prosperity meant, who could claim to represent working people, and how political actors addressed precarity and insecurity.

We can understand Bolsonarism only in light of this complexity. It did not coalesce around a single social group or rely solely on spreading reactionary messages online; instead, it brought together, often uneasily, experiences of precarity, aspirations for autonomy, conservative values, and promises of prosperity. This coalition did not erase the differences among its supporters, but it gave them a shared language and political identity. For the Workers’ Party (PT), the challenge is not only to oppose Bolsonarism but also to understand why it attracts support and what material future the PT can offer people who do not see their own concerns reflected in the popular demands the party has historically championed.

Theoretical and Methodological Challenges in the Study of Digital Populism

The social complexity outlined in the previous section also became visible during my fieldwork. Over the past several months, I conducted interviews and carried out participant observation at Bolsonarist campaign events. The day before the election, I attended the campaign’s closing rally in Barra da Tijuca, an area where the right enjoys strong support in Rio de Janeiro. The crowd spanned different ages, backgrounds, and life experiences. Attendees wore Brazilian national team jerseys, sang the national anthem, and displayed flags of Israel and the United States. This diversity did not form a uniform social identity, but it showed Bolsonarism’s capacity to bring different symbols and experiences together. The interviews suggested a similar pattern: people connected WhatsApp messages with family conversations, social gatherings, and their experiences of work, religion, insecurity, and the pursuit of prosperity. The digital and the in-person did not appear as separate spheres, but as dimensions of the same political life.

This connection poses a methodological challenge: the tools we use to study politics can also separate the digital from the in-person, metrics from meaning, and content circulation from the relationships that sustain it. Metrics can show a message’s reach, interactions, and speed of circulation, but they cannot explain what it means to those who receive it or why they trust the person sharing it. Interviews help reconstruct these meanings, but on their own they cannot show how many people share them or whether a message influenced their vote. Digital ethnography lets us trace how messages move across platforms and in-person relationships, and how people interpret them in specific situations, but it cannot establish causality on its own either. That is why we need to break down the barriers between quantitative and qualitative approaches, and between studying online networks and observing in-person life. The goal is not to find a method that explains everything, but to combine approaches to understand how circulation, meaning, and political relationships work together.

The theoretical challenge is just as important. A central question in populism theory is how political actors articulate heterogeneous demands into a collective will and define it against an adversary. Studying digital populism means keeping that question in view while developing our own tools to explain what changes when this process unfolds across platforms and in-person relationships. We cannot simply transpose concepts developed for other settings onto social media, as if the digital were just another channel. Platforms reshape the pace and form of political struggle: users repeat and edit political signifiers, linking them to different experiences, while demands come together around shared ideas of work, faith, security, prosperity, and fairness. These moral economies are diverse and sometimes in conflict; they meet and clash through increasingly rapid cycles of circulation.

Hybridity, then, means more than combining online activity with a presence on the street; it is essential to understanding how populist politics works today. Studying it means tracing both the circulation of content and the relationships, interpretations, and experiences that give it meaning. Lula’s comeback offers a concrete case for examining this relationship: the role Janones and the Exército do Lula (“Lula’s Army”) played raises the question of how digital mobilization connects messages and participants, and whether it can build a social base capable of acting beyond election day.

Lula’s Army, Janones, and the Comeback

Brazil elects its president through a two-round system. If no candidate wins more than half of the valid votes in the first round, the top two candidates advance to a runoff. On October 4, 2026, Flávio Bolsonaro received 47.03 percent of the vote, while Lula received 45.16 percent. Three weeks later, Lula won the runoff with 51.79 percent, compared with 48.21 percent for his opponent. The result was truly unexpected and unprecedented in Brazil’s democratic history: Lula had trailed by more than two million votes and ended up with 10,379,615 more votes than in the first round.

Several factors contributed to the comeback, but we cannot understand it without looking at the mobilization led by André Janones, a federal deputy from Minas Gerais. Through the WhatsApp channel Exército do Lula (“Lula’s Army”), Janones coordinated campaign materials and urged supporters to take part on other platforms. The channel amassed 10.8 million followers. On Flávio Bolsonaro’s side, Tropa do Flávio (“Flávio’s Troop”) reached around 2.1 million. A study of the campaign found a substantial difference in response times: some tasks issued through Lula’s channel reached other platforms within seconds, while the fastest responses recorded in the rival channel took several minutes. This comparison covers specific actions and does not, by itself, measure the campaigns as a whole, but it illustrates the scale, speed, and effectiveness of Lula’s operation.

Janones’s channel did more than amass a large audience. Participants followed instructions on how to edit and cut videos, repost them on other platforms, promote hashtags, and share content with their contacts. This coordinated strategy turned followers into active distributors of messages. It helped Lula’s camp regain the initiative after the first round had left many supporters with little hope. The comeback, however, was not the work of a single channel or leader. Individuals and groups outside the PT’s official campaign structure also took part; supporters spoke with people face-to-face; and the campaign drew on social and political networks that were already in place.

From Digital Mobilization to Democratic Participation

Despite the PT’s presidential victory, the Liberal Party, the main Bolsonarist force, and other right-wing parties will hold majorities in both houses of Congress (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) and retain control of key municipalities and states, including São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. Lula will need to build legislative coalitions to advance his agenda in a Congress where the opposition can block reforms, raise the cost of negotiations, and sustain polarization. These disputes will involve budget priorities and policies that directly affect everyday life, from social protection to working conditions. The government’s ability to act will depend on its parliamentary alliances, as well as on the social support it can sustain beyond Congress. The presidential defeat does not mean that Bolsonarism has disappeared. It may instead adapt by putting forward more moderate-looking figures who retain the movement’s original violent rhetoric but use it with less force and brutality than the Bolsonaro family has so far.

The different trajectories of these political camps raise a central question about the recent success of Lula’s Army: how can digital mobilization become a social base capable of acting after the election? The Exército do Lula showed that rapid coordination could change the mood of a campaign and help mobilize millions of people. It also revealed some of the model’s built-in limitations. Its military language (a “general” summoning “soldiers”) allowed organizers to assign tasks and respond quickly, but it also concentrated decision-making. The model’s ability to circulate messages does not guarantee that those sharing them can discuss the organization’s goals, set its priorities, or sustain it once the campaign is over.

The operation provided participants with primarily technical skills: they learned to edit, cut, and repost videos, distribute them across platforms, and drive engagement. During the campaign, many felt they were “breaking the algorithm” and opening new possibilities for digital sovereignty. That feeling did not mean they controlled the platforms or had changed their rules. This hierarchical, binary logic can help campaigns compete for online visibility, but it is not the same as democratic literacy. Democratic literacy requires participants to help shape messages, disagree, make proposals, and make decisions collectively. Janones’s recommendation not to debate Bolsonarist opponents could work as a short-term tactic; for example, when responding to a provocation would only amplify misleading content. But if avoiding opponents becomes a general rule, the strategy reinforces isolation between groups. A democratic base must be able to mobilize while also creating spaces for disagreement.

Building a democratic digital politics also means going beyond learning how to game the algorithm or calling for its regulation. Digital sovereignty means asking who controls the infrastructure, the data, and the conditions under which content circulates, and who gets to make those decisions.

Some Indigenous epistemologies offer a valuable perspective because they understand knowledge as rooted in relationships among community, territory, memory, and responsibility, rather than as a resource detached from the people who produce it. Alongside community networks, independent media, and collective decision-making about communication, these perspectives help us imagine digital infrastructures that communities govern. The Exército do Lulashowed that popular mobilization could, at least temporarily, change who had visibility. The task now is to turn that possibility into spaces where participation means more than sharing messages: it must also mean having a say in decisions.

Lula begins his new term with a presidential victory and a Congress dominated by the right. Legislative negotiations will be difficult, and the Bolsonarist opposition remains strong enough to obstruct, polarize, and pressure institutions. The central challenge is to connect governing and mobilizing without subordinating mobilization to the government or reducing democracy to a permanent campaign. The Exército do Lula showed how digital coordination could help secure an electoral victory. The political challenge is to ensure that those who made it possible can keep organizing, take part in decisions, and sustain shared demands after the election.


 

(*) Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Audiovisual Communication at Rey Juan Carlos University. He is an interdisciplinary researcher working at the intersection of communication and the social sciences. His research focuses on the “far right” and contemporary polarized discourses in the public sphere. In recent years, Dr. Bayarri Toscano has conducted research in European and Latin American contexts. He has also delivered regular courses and guest lectures at various international academic institutions.

Add a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Latest News

Category