Founder of Georgian Dream, Bidzina Ivanishvili, seen among supporters during the presidential election in Tbilisi, Georgia, on October 27, 2013. Photo: Gevorg Ghazaryan.

Professor Aprasidze: Ivanishvili Governs Georgia Like His Business Company

Professor David Aprasidze: In Georgia, the Georgian Dream party exemplifies a technocratic form of populism, treating state governance like corporate management. Founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, a former businessman, brings a non-ideological, efficiency-focused approach, applying principles from his business career to politics. He appoints key officials as “managers” to carry out strategic directives, allowing him to remain distanced while exercising control. This model emphasizes expertise and governance over ideology, with Ivanishvili viewing the state as if it were one of his companies.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a revealing interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. David Aprasidze, political science professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi, sheds light on how Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of Georgian Dream, has transformed Georgian governance through a “technocratic populism” model. According to Professor Aprasidze, Ivanishvili “treats the state almost as if it were a business,” blending his extensive business experience with politics to establish a unique governance style that sets Georgian Dream apart from other political movements. Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia in the 1990s, sees himself as a “highly successful businessman” who can replicate that success in governing Georgia. 

Professor Aprasidze further highlights how this approach has affected democratic institutions in Georgia, where the judiciary and parliament operate less as independent bodies and more as extensions of Ivanishvili’s centralized authority. This concentration of power, Aprasidze suggests, marks a significant step back for democracy in Georgia and reveals broader trends of democratic backsliding that align with the recent autocratic shift in Georgian Dream’s populist narrative.

Interestingly, Professor Aprasidze points to Georgian Dream’s evolving relationship with Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his Fidesz Party. Initially, Georgian Dream was aligned with the European Socialists, positioning itself on the center-left, but “especially after the war in Ukraine,” Professor Aprasidze notes, the party quickly pivoted to the far right, embracing nationalist and traditionalist rhetoric. Professor Aprasidze observes that Orbán has become a “close ally and influential mentor to Georgian Dream,” offering a populist playbook that guides their current approach.

Reflecting on the EU’s recent stance, Professor Aprasidze underscores the European Commission’s demands for reform before recommending membership talks with Georgia. Yet he remains skeptical, stating that he and “many observers of Georgia” believe it’s unlikely the current administration will undertake the necessary democratic reforms. With a mixture of caution and insight, Professor Aprasidze’s analysis provides a critical lens on Georgia’s political transformation and its implications for both democratic integrity and EU integration.

Dr. David Aprasidze, political science professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor David Aprasidze with some edits.

Georgian Case Illustrates How Populism Can Evolve

David, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How and under what circumstances does technocratic populism emerge in hybrid regimes? What are its principal characteristics, and what strategies do technocratic populists use to stay in power and govern? What is its difference from conventional populist parties? 

Professor David Aprasidze: The Georgian case illustrates how populism can evolve—its color, content, and format can all shift. I believe we could indeed call the initial period of the Georgian Dream a form of technocratic populism. Now, returning to your questions: What are the main features of this type of populism?

A key feature is that those in power, or those aiming to assume power, possess a specific skill or expertise that sets them apart from others. They are, in effect, free from any rigid ideological stance and do not claim to adhere to one. Instead, they emphasize their ability to govern effectively and improve the lives of ordinary citizens. In Georgia, and particularly with the Georgian Dream, this technocratic approach to populism is reflected in their comparison of state governance to corporate governance, treating the state almost as if it were a business model. One of the most influential people in Georgia today, and the founding father of the Georgian Dream, exemplifies this approach. He comes from a business background, having built his fortune in Russia in the 1990s, and sees himself as a highly successful businessman. By bringing his business experience into politics, he positioned himself as someone who could replicate his business success in governing the country. He claimed that the principles he used to run a business would similarly apply to running the country, treating it as if it were one of his companies.

If we combine these features, first, they possess technical expertise. Second, they do not have or embody a strong ideological basis. Third, they bring business experience and apply similar principles to politics. This forms the foundation.

In Georgia, this approach was implemented by Bidzina Ivanishvili, who selected his followers—party members and especially those in government—as he would select managers in his own company. Acting as a stakeholder, he owns the “business” but hires managers to run it on his behalf. He is not involved in every routine decision; instead, his operatives carry out his strategic directives. Thus, the Prime Minister, Ministers, Speaker of the Parliament, and Chairman of the party function as his managers, each responsible for a specific area he has entrusted to them. Naturally, he can replace them based on their performance. If he’s dissatisfied, he can easily remove them and appoint new managers. This, in essence, was how Georgia was governed until 2022.

Technocratic Populism Poses a Serious Threat to Democratic Principles

How has the technocratic populism influenced the balance of power and the role of democratic institutions like the parliament and judiciary in Georgia?

Professor David Aprasidze: That’s a very good question, as technocratic populism has effectively subjugated these institutions. If we accept that this model describes how Georgia was governed, then all authorities—all institutions—become part of a unified mechanism. In this framework, the judiciary functions somewhat like the legal department of a business, while the parliament serves as a procedural body where policies are developed and drafted. Ultimately, however, these institutions do not balance or oversee one another, as the parliament is supposed to do with the executive. Instead, they operate as interconnected components of a single system—as administrative divisions within what resembles a corporate structure.

This approach is, of course, very harmful to democracy because it undermines key institutions. As you mentioned, both the judiciary and parliament are affected: the parliament loses its authority and prerogative to oversee and check the government, or the executive. The judiciary, similarly, becomes merely a registry, simply implementing decisions handed down from the top rather than making independent judgments. Like other forms of populism, this model is detrimental to democracy—though it employs a different method and approach. Ultimately, it poses a serious threat to democratic principles.

What role does the Georgian Dream’s strategy of managing political opposition through loyalty-based appointments and selective prosecution play in shaping an increasingly autocratic governance model in Georgia?

Professor David Aprasidze: Observing how the Georgian Dream developed over time, starting with their rise to power in 2012, we see that it was a weak coalition. Unlike traditional coalitions in European countries or elsewhere, the Georgian Dream wasn’t a coalition in the conventional sense. Instead, it was a unified front that included various opposition parties on a single list, aiming to challenge the previous government. In 2012, rather than competing individually in elections and forming alliances based on outcomes, these opposition parties came together before the elections. This unity created a diverse front in the initial period, with different politicians in Ivanishvili’s government and Parliament, providing a facade of democracy and contestation.

Starting with the second term in 2016, the Georgian Dream began to remove former allies. Some were co-opted, while others were pushed toward the opposition and marginalized. From 2016 through 2020, during this second period of Georgian Dream’s rule, they gradually co-opted or marginalized various politicians. In this process, they used all necessary means to compromise these individuals—whether through the judiciary, the media, or by corrupting them to the extent that they lost legitimacy to function as an opposition or challenge the ruling party.

They employed a range of methods, including controlled media and propaganda against these politicians, as well as selectively applied judicial actions. Those who remained loyal or stayed silent faced no legal challenges, while individuals who dared to criticize or act as opposition saw law enforcement agencies and the judiciary weaponized against them. Through these threats and by shaping public opinion, the Georgian Dream approached the opposition in a calculated manner, gradually silencing a significant portion of it. By the 2020 elections, the opposition was fractured, divided, and in many cases, effectively silenced.

Georgian Population Remains Strongly Pro-European

‘March for Europe’ demonstrations in support of EU integration and membership at Liberty Square in Tbilisi, Georgia, on October 20, 2024. Photo: Mirko Kuzmanovic.

To what extent do pro-Russian influences within the Georgian Dream party align with or diverge from the public’s pro-European aspirations, and how might this tension impact Georgia’s trajectory toward EU integration?

Professor David Aprasidze: This is a very good question. We could also reframe it slightly and ask, “Is Georgian Dream pro-Russian or not?” But there is no simple answer. I would say that, as with many populist parties across Europe, there is indeed a certain ideological alignment or shared understanding between Russia and this type of populist party, as they promote similar ideas. They both tend to undermine liberal democracy and the Western-style democracy we associate with Western Europe and other parts of the world. In that sense, they may appear to be natural allies.

However, this isn’t always the case. I wouldn’t argue that Georgian Dream is explicitly pro-Russian; rather, it is primarily pro-Georgian Dream. They seize every opportunity to strengthen their hold on power. Until 2020, 2022, or even the onset of the war in Ukraine, Georgian Dream attempted to maintain a pro-Western facade while operating autocratically behind the scenes. As a result, there was no clear stance. Many voices criticized Georgian Dream, claiming the party’s policies or rhetoric were pro-Russian, but it was challenging to make a definitive judgment on this.

Following the war in Ukraine and Georgia’s attainment of EU candidate status with a formal path to membership, Georgian Dream realized that this status would bring pressure to implement deep and far-reaching reforms—reforms they were unwilling to pursue. As a result, they gradually distanced themselves from the EU’s requirements. Step by step, they began shifting toward an anti-Western, anti-European stance, effectively distancing themselves from the Western sphere. Simultaneously, they increasingly adopted rhetoric similar to that currently used by Russia. Since 2020, and especially after the 2024 elections, this alignment of Georgian Dream with Russian policies has become more visible and noticeable than ever before.

As for the Georgian population, it remains strongly pro-European, as confirmed by public opinion polls and surveys. However, the recent election had contested outcomes, both domestically and internationally. I personally believe it was rigged, with Georgian Dream employing various methods to falsify the results. Still, it is now challenging to gauge the true public opinion.

We may learn more in the weeks and months ahead, depending on whether public protests emerge. If many people take to the streets to oppose Georgian Dream’s autocratization efforts, it would confirm that the Georgian population remains Western-leaning, while Georgian Dream acts in opposition to this will, effectively “capturing” the state. However, if there isn’t significant public protest or resistance, we may need to reassess our understanding of public opinion on this issue. Hopefully, this won’t be the case. 

Elections in Georgia Mark a Clear Negative Trend

Given the Georgian Dream party’s recent policies that some compared to Russian-style “foreign influence” laws, how do you see these laws affecting civil society and independent media in Georgia, and are they part of a larger autocratic trend?

Professor David Aprasidze: Absolutely. I am quite certain that this is part of a larger autocratic trend, unfortunately. We saw signs of this when the law was introduced in the spring, just a few months before the elections, and have since witnessed further deterioration. Although there were critical voices and warning signs that the elections would deal another blow to democracy, it is now clear that this decline has continued following the adoption of this law.

The elections demonstrated a decline in the quality of democracy in Georgia, marking a clear negative trend. Will this go further and have a tangible impact on civil society and the media? That remains to be seen. However, if the current trend persists, we can expect Georgian media and civil society to face increased pressure in the coming days and weeks.

Firstly, we see a clear trend of deterioration. Secondly, with the law’s provisions soon to be implemented, if these are fully enforced by the relevant authorities, they will certainly shrink the space for civil society, limit access to independent funding, and may soon lead to a significant reduction in the number of independent media outlets and non-governmental organizations.

The European Commission has stated that it cannot recommend EU membership talks unless Georgia changes course. What specific changes do you believe the Georgian government would need to make to regain the EU’s confidence, and how likely are such reforms under the current/new administration?

Professor David Aprasidze: Unfortunately, I, along with many observers of Georgia, believe that under the current government or administration, it is very hard to imagine a restart of relations with the EU.

When the European Commission issued the requirements—known as the “9 steps”—for Georgia to progress toward membership, they were very specific about opening negotiations. The most important of these 9 points was free and fair elections, with an expectation for Georgia to conduct elections that are free, fair, and competitive. Now, we see those leading countries in the European Union, except Hungary (due to similarities in populist governance between Georgia and Hungary), have condemned the way the elections were organized and held in Georgia. They demand that the Georgian government fully investigate all the irregularities observed both on election day and beforehand.

However, we do not see any signs that the Georgian authorities are prepared to meet this requirement. Therefore, I do not expect that Georgian authorities will be ready to meet the other 8 requirements set by the European Commission. While Georgian authorities officially continue to argue that Georgia is still on the path to integration, the reality and evidence are quite limited. Thus, I do not expect, unless there is a comprehensive change in administration or policy, that these authorities are prepared to make the necessary changes.

Georgian Dream’s Shift to Far-Right Rhetoric Derails Path to EU Integration

Georgia’s President Salome Zurabishvili is welcomed by European Council President Donald Tusk ahead of a meeting at the European Council in Brussels, Belgium, on January 22, 2019. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

How do recent allegations of electoral fraud and interference reflect broader trends of democratic backsliding in Georgia, and what role does populism play in reinforcing this shift?

Professor David Aprasidze: Well, absolutely. We have already talked about the irregularities during elections, and this is an unfortunate confirmation, a proof that Georgia is backsliding on its path of democratization. Actually, Georgia has never been a fully functioning, consolidated democracy. It was moving along a difficult path toward democratization, but now we are undermining all the achievements we have made along the way. Therefore, these elections were a very strong and significant step backward.

Populism—we initially discussed technocratic populism, right? Until around 2022, Georgian Dream exemplified this type of populism, emphasizing expertise and claiming to run the country like a successful business. However, since 2022, especially during the election campaign, we have seen a complete reshaping of this populist narrative. It has shifted toward a far-right, extreme position rooted in traditional values. While I have nothing against family values, this far-right approach frames family and religion in an anti-minority, anti-liberal context, openly attacking liberal values, including the protection of individual and minority rights. This shift from a purely technocratic populism to a far-right, anti-Western, anti-liberal rhetoric has become an important ingredient of Georgian Dream’s electoral campaign. This departure is why Georgian Dream has moved the country so far from its European integration trajectory, and it’s why I believe it’s simply impossible to restart the relationship between Georgia and the European Union under the current administration.

Hungary’s Populist Playbook Guides Georgian Dream’s Strategy

And lastly, David, Hungarian Prime Minister and the term president of European Union Victor Orbán visited Tbilisi and congratulated the leaders of Georgian Dream for their success while other EU’s leading officials criticized the election process. What sort of relationship does Georgian Dream have with Victor Orbán’s Fidesz Party in particular and with other far-right, populist parties in Europe? 

Professor David Aprasidze: When Georgian Dream first embarked on its European trajectory, it joined the European Socialists as an observing member, initially positioning itself on the center-left of the ideological spectrum. However, especially after the war in Ukraine—partly due to geopolitical factors but, I believe, primarily due to domestic political motives and a desire to consolidate power—they quickly shifted toward the far right.

They aligned with and engaged in an exchange of ideas with Hungary’s Fidesz Party, and with Viktor Orbán in particular. Numerous mutual meetings took place; the Georgian Prime Minister met with Hungarian leaders multiple times, and Orbán visited Georgia. These exchanges occurred at various levels—parliamentary and party—making Hungary and its leadership Georgian Dream’s most reliable, if not only, partners in Europe.

Interestingly, if we trace the transformation of Fidesz and the evolution of Orbán himself—from the start of his political career to his current stance—it serves as a model for Georgian Dream. To answer your question directly, Orbán is a close ally and influential mentor to Georgian Dream. The Hungarian model of populist transformation, led by Fidesz, provides Georgian Dream with a playbook on how to proceed.

Dr. Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science, Vice Provost for Global Engagement of Temple University, and Dean of Temple University Rome campus.

Professor Zankina: Many Bulgarians Remain Deeply Skeptical of the West

In an interview with ECPS, Professor Emilia Zankina explains that, despite the financial and mobility benefits of EU membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West” due to Bulgaria’s strong historic ties to Russia. The communist era deeply embedded Russian language, culture, and education in Bulgarian life, and “for many,” Professor Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator.” She observes that while the war in Ukraine initially reduced pro-Russian sentiment in the country, as the conflict continued, some Bulgarians have returned to their original views.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Emilia Zankina, a leading expert in political science and Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University, delves into the intricate landscape of Bulgarian politics. Currently Dean of Temple University’s Rome campus, Dr. Zankina offers an in-depth analysis of Bulgaria’s shifting political dynamics, particularly highlighting the nation’s complex relationship with Russia, the rise of populism, and public sentiment toward the West.

In Bulgaria’s recent parliamentary election, the center-right GERB party secured first place, but will need a coalition partner to govern. GERB garnered 25.52% of the votes, with the reformist We Continue the Change (PP) party in second at 13.74%, and the ultra-nationalist Vazrazhdane (Revival) party in third with 12.92%.

Exploring Bulgaria’s historic affinity with Russia, Dr. Zankina explains that despite the financial and mobility benefits gained through European Union membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.” She attributes this sentiment to the powerful legacy of the communist era, during which Russian language, culture, and education were integral to Bulgarian life. “For many,” Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator, and this view endures across generations, who often make little distinction between Russian people and the government.” She describes how, initially, the war in Ukraine prompted a decline in pro-Russian sentiment, but as the conflict has continued, some Bulgarians have reverted to their original views.

Addressing Bulgaria’s “mushrooming” populist landscape, Dr. Zankina sheds light on why the country has faced seven elections since 2021. The rapid turnover of parties, she explains, is fueled by populism’s promise of quick solutions and charismatic leadership, which attracts voters eager for change but dissatisfied with democratic processes’ slow pace. “This populist formula,” she says, “favors emotional appeals and big promises without real solutions.” In Bulgaria, populism has contributed to a “never-ending cycle” of new parties, each aiming to capture a portion of an electorate constantly shifting its support.

Dr. Zankina also highlights the unique dynamic of female representation within Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties, where women play a “strategic role” in appealing to female voters. However, the PRR remains largely male-dominated, reflecting broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien.” As Bulgaria navigates its future in the EU amidst the influence of both Russian-aligned parties and anti-establishment movements, Dr. Zankina’s insights underscore the complexities of national identity, populism, and external influences in shaping Bulgarian democracy.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Emilia Zankina with some edits.

Populism Fuels Ongoing Volatility in Bulgaria’s Party System

Professor Zankina, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. With the fragmentation of the Bulgarian parliament and the presence of nine parties, what role does populism play in shaping public perception and voter alignment within Bulgaria’s complex political landscape? Could this be the primary reason why Bulgaria has gone to the polls seven times since 2021? Additionally, what role have populist parties specifically played in contributing to this political crisis?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Populism is a broad phenomenon that has contributed to developments in party systems, not only in Bulgaria but throughout Europe. What we see is that populist appeals favor easy solutions in Manichean rhetoric and salvation narratives that make voters less patient with the difficulty and complexity of the democratic process, making them eager to vote for the next “savior” and the next quick solution. So certainly, the growing penetration of populism, both as a discursive technique and a way of organizing parties, as well as a way of moving away from hardcore ideologies, has contributed to an overall expectation by voters that they could be offered a simple solution by the next new party.

So we have this combination of populism breeding a string of new parties that come in a never-ending cycle with new promises and a core body of voters who move from one new party to the next. There is certainly a lot to be said about populism contributing to an overall volatility of a party system which, in the case of Bulgaria, was never fully stable, as it is a relatively young party system. It’s been 35 years, and we have already seen populist appeals for the last 20 or so years making their way, and these have become even more prevalent in the past four years.

Eastern Europe Tries to Build Party Systems as Western Models Erode

Boyko Borisov at a meeting with the President of Bulgaria in Sofia on April 20, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

How has the shift from traditional political parties to personalistic, charisma-centered leadership impacted Bulgaria’s democratic institutions, and what long-term effects do you foresee? What role do crises play in the rise of charismatic leaders in Bulgaria, and how have leaders like Simeon and Borisov utilized such moments to construct and sustain political charisma? What made GERB and Boyko Borisov so successful in Bulgarian elections since 2006?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Moving away from traditional parties is a significant shift for Western European countries. Central mobilizing themes—often described by the “frozen party thesis” with divisions such as rural versus urban or industrial versus agricultural—have become less relevant as new issues like migration, climate change, and economic crises come to the forefront. In Eastern Europe, however, moving away from traditional political parties holds less relevance because there isn’t a long history of such parties. Eastern Europe emerged from a one-party system that was far from democratic; it could hardly be called a party system—it was essentially an authoritarian regime masquerading as a party system.

In building a party system, Eastern Europe faces a situation where the systems it seeks to emulate in the West are gradually eroding. Now, trends between West and East are less discernible because we also see interparty connectedness, transnational party cooperation, European party families, and so forth, as well as the replication of organizational formulas or personalistic behavior formulas.

In Bulgaria, a major shift occurred with the arrival of Simeon, a charismatic figure with significant legitimacy who attracted a substantial share of votes. During his tenure, he accomplished much and fulfilled many of his promises. At the same time, he established a personalistic model of charisma that Boyko Borisov later emulated in a markedly different style. While the two differ greatly in character, objectives, and persona, Borisov managed to replicate Simeon’s success through his own personal appeal.

Borisov’s approach is less refined and graceful, focusing instead on the image of a “tough guy” capable of handling criminals due to his familiarity with such environments. This approach quickly earned him credibility, not only domestically but also with the European People’s Party, which endorsed him as soon as GERB was formed. In the 2007 elections—Bulgaria’s first for the European Parliament—he gained this support and has continued to benefit from it due to the predictability and stability he brought to Bulgaria.

Borisov’s electoral record is impressive: in 15 years and 11 parliamentary elections, he has only faced defeat twice. His success extends to presidential elections, with his candidates winning twice, as well as to local and European Parliament elections. However, his party, GERB, has been marred by associations with corruption, fueling opposition that combines grassroots protests with a series of populist parties and personalities riding this wave of discontent. This opposition has recently challenged Borisov’s hold on power, while also enabling numerous newcomers to rise on anti-corruption narratives and critiques of GERB. Not all of these actors are necessarily sincere in their appeals, as each has specific political objectives and aims to gain power.

How significant is Boyko Borissov’s ability to distance himself from far-right oligarch Delyan Peevski for GERB’s potential coalition-building efforts, and what does this suggest about the influence of corruption-related sanctions on Bulgarian politics?

Professor Emilia Zankina: He has not shown any willingness to distance himself, even in the aftermath of the elections. On Sunday night, in his speech, he did not exclude Peevski and the MRF(Movement for Rights and Freedoms)-New Beginning from potential coalition-building efforts. Although We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria—the most likely and much-needed potential partner for Borissov—has called for a cordon sanitaire around Peevski, GERB remains one of the few parties in Parliament unwilling to join this exclusion. In fact, every other party has supported the cordon sanitaire except Borissov’s party, which suggests that there may be dependencies between Borissov and Peevski that are not apparent to the broader public. Whether it’s a question of financing or compromising information, he appears reluctant to sever that connection. This stance will undoubtedly create significant challenges in finding other coalition partners and establishing a viable governing coalition.

Far-Right Parties Gain from Alignment and Financial Support from Putin Regime

Demonstration commemorating May 9, Russia’s Victory Day over Nazi Germany, with participants expressing their emotions and displaying slogans in Sofia, Bulgaria, on May 9, 2022. Photo: Yulian Staykov.

Given the rise of pro-Russian and far-right groups like Vazrazhdane, how do you interpret the current balance between Bulgaria’s pro-European aspirations and the growing appeal of populist, anti-Western ideologies? How might Bulgaria’s prolonged political instability impact its path towards EU integration, and do you foresee populist narratives either accelerating or hindering this process within the current coalition negotiations?

Professor Emilia Zankina: The nationalist vote in Bulgaria has traditionally accounted for around 10 to 12%, beginning with ATAKA in 2005. However, in the latest elections, Vazrazhdane and other new parties like March for Justice and Great Glory collectively gathered over 20% of the vote. It’s important to interpret this cautiously, as it doesn’t necessarily reflect purely nationalist sentiment—a significant portion of this vote is protest-driven. Nationalist parties have capitalized on widespread discontent regarding various issues, from the economic crisis to Bulgaria’s stance on the war in Ukraine, becoming a magnet for groups experiencing different types of dissatisfaction. Whether these supporters are genuinely nationalist or simply unhappy is, in some ways, beside the point. If these parties manage to gain power, nationalists, once in government, tend to govern as nationalists.

We have already seen these parties push through two pieces of legislation in the previous parliament: one against so-called LGBT “propaganda” in schools and another targeting “foreign agents,” similar to measures observed in Hungary and Georgia. Additionally, these parties benefit not only from alignment with the Putin regime but also, at times, from its financial support. Examination of their financial reports over the past 10 years reveals that around European elections, unexplained funds—though not substantial—appear in the records of these populist parties. This is particularly notable as the categorization of these funds often shifts from donations to memberships, showing a lack of consistency, which strongly suggests these funds may originate elsewhere.

While directly linking these funds to the Putin regime is complex, it is well-documented that Western parties like Rassemblement National (RN) in France have received similar support. We can therefore reasonably surmise that Russian support reaches these parties, not only financially but also through disinformation campaigns and internet trolls, which amplify their narratives while eroding others, including basic facts.

In your view, what are the primary challenges for pro-European coalitions such as PP-DB in countering populist narratives, especially regarding issues like judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts? Given the “top-down, externally driven” approach to reform in Bulgaria, what specific measures do you believe could enhance the sustainability and local ownership of these reforms?

Professor Emilia Zankina: It doesn’t help that the champions of judicial reform and pro-EU orientation have proven to be quite incompetent themselves and often rely on populist narratives. They also depend on swing votes from the right, left, and center. The first priority is to establish themselves as legitimate political figures capable of predictable political behavior, which they have yet to demonstrate. Despite the sound programmatic appeals behind many of their reforms, their behavior during the campaign has been one of endless bickering with Borisov, and the collapse of the government showed a lack of political experience and acumen. Their inability to inspire trust or project legitimacy and experience doesn’t help their cause.

Furthermore, they face a complex situation: the largest party is GERB, and they have run on an anti-GERB platform, yet now they are in the position of having to uphold the pro-European line, with GERB as their only viable partner. It’s not an easy position, as GERB is both their biggest opponent on corruption—after Peevski—and their strongest ally on European versus pro-Russian orientation. This is a very delicate balance and a difficult task.

They must attempt to form this pro-European coalition while pushing GERB to distance itself from Peevski and commit to anti-corruption reforms. Although complex and challenging, they have no other option but to try to take this difficult step.

Corruption Persists, Demanding Focused and Sustained Solutions

People protesting on the main streets of the capital, demanding the Prime Minister’s resignation, in Sofia, Bulgaria, on July 14, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

How have historical legacies and political choices shaped the challenges in Bulgaria’s public administration reform, particularly regarding transparency and accountability? What is the role of corruption in either consolidating or weakening populist parties in Bulgaria? 

Professor Emilia Zankina: Corruption has been a major mobilizing factor, as there have been numerous corruption scandals involving key GERB figures, some of whom, like Tsvetan Tsvetanov, are no longer in power. Corruption remains a persistent problem, and it’s crucial to focus on and stay committed to solutions.

From experience in other former communist countries with similar bureaucratic legacies—a nomenklatura system, highly politicized, and, after the collapse of communism, highly corrupt—we know that one effective solution is electronic governance. Reforming public administration and expanding e-governance across more sectors and procedures have already made substantial strides in addressing corruption, particularly at lower levels. Currently, however, Bulgaria is dealing with political corruption at the highest levels, embodied by figures like Peevski. Peevski’s influence, demonstrated by his control over both the prosecution and the courts, also extends to swaying party behavior within other political groups.

The fact that he managed to secure more votes than party founder Ahmed Dogan, with only 25% of these votes coming from ethnic Turks and over 50% from the Roma population, suggests he has substantial resources for elections and vote-buying. Many of these votes are indeed purchased. Meanwhile, the splinter party Alliance for Freedom and Rights holds over 50% of the ethnic Turkish vote and the majority of the ethnic Turkish vote abroad, indicating that it is the party most recognized by ethnic Turks as their representative. Nonetheless, Peevski has managed to partially hijack the party, purchasing votes and accumulating around 280,000 votes—a considerable number and a significant financial investment.

How does voter perception of corruption differ from expert evaluations in Bulgaria, and what does this reveal about public tolerance for corruption among political parties? How does the relationship between ethnic identity and party support complicate anti-corruption voting behavior in Bulgaria? Furthermore, what role does voter apathy or ‘fatalism’ about corruption play in shaping the success of anti-corruption parties like “There Is Such a People”?

Professor Emilia Zankina: We have a political culture with low institutional trust, which opens opportunities for anti-establishment rhetoric and allows populist parties across the spectrum to benefit from this general distrust. At the same time, there is a dissonance between actual corruption, perceived corruption, and experienced corruption. Corruption is a significant problem in Bulgaria; at the highest levels, there is political control over prosecution and the distribution of EU funds—both serious corruption issues. These factors make it easy for new parties, like There Is Such a People, to exploit the issue. However, the question remains: what are the solutions, and which of these parties actually offers viable ones?

Judicial reforms were pushed by the last regular government with support from GERB, PP-DB, and Peevski; however, many of these reforms were poorly designed. They are often targeted at specific political situations or figures, and in 10 years, these reforms may prove as problematic as the current laws. We need to move away from witch-hunting and detach reform efforts from specific political figures when considering institutional solutions and mechanisms to combat corruption and prevent such opportunities from arising in the first place.

Pro-Russian Sentiment in Bulgaria Rooted in History and Soviet Legacy

How have the war in Ukraine and the Russian influence in the country affected populism and nationalism in Bulgaria?

Professor Emilia Zankina: This has certainly enabled parties like Vazrazhdane to increase their support tenfold over the past three years. In Bulgaria, there is a blend of genuine pro-Russian sentiment, rooted in the country’s long history, including its war for independence and a communist regime backed by Moscow. This regime benefited large portions of the population, though it also harmed many others. Nevertheless, deep-rooted support for all things Russian persists, embedded in families and generations who feel an affinity for the Russian language, culture, country, and worldview.

Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has placed many people with moderate views—those who may be pro-European but not anti-Russian—in a difficult position, forcing them to choose between their progressive pro-European stance and their affinity for Russia. This dynamic has contributed to the growth of parties like Vazrazhdane.

Interestingly, another strongly pro-Russian party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, has almost disappeared, losing over 1 million voters in just a few years and now falling below 8%, despite holding nearly 30% in the 2017 elections. This indicates a limit to the mobilizing power of both pro-Russian and anti-Russian rhetoric. Roughly a third of the population is likely strongly pro-Russian, while about half supports a position of neutrality in this war. For many Bulgarian voters, the stance of the European Union and the Western world on this conflict is challenging to accept.

How do you explain the mushrooming of populist parties in Bulgaria? What are the similarities and differences with other populist parties in Europe?

Professor Emilia Zankina: There are many similarities and differences, perhaps more than we might expect, with considerable variety. Across Europe—whether east or west, north or south—we see a proliferation of populist parties, and within each country, there is significant variation. In Bulgaria, populist parties emerge from the center and the right, while in other Eastern European countries, like Slovakia, they also emerge from the left.

What has become firmly established, however, is the populist formula: strong emotional appeals, a charismatic figure highlighting sharp divisions and real societal problems, yet offering no real solutions—only big promises and quick fixes that fail to materialize. In the long run, this erodes the foundations of democracy by creating voters who are less patient and loyal, making party identification and loyalty seem like luxuries.

Instead, we see an emphasis on responding to the mood and crisis of the day, with different charismatic figures performing almost in a TV show setting to attract more votes. This is a Europe-wide trend. In a country without a well-established party system, it’s even easier to erode what was never solidly in place to begin with.

Ethnic Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Endured Trauma from Forced Assimilation and Expulsions

The Banya Bashi Mosque, a landmark and the largest mosque in Bulgaria, on September 18, 2013, in Sofia, Bulgaria. Photo: Shutterstock.

Why have populist radical right parties significantly increased their share of the vote in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, and what key issues have driven their success? How has the Turkish minority influenced the mobilization of nationalist votes, and what role does ethnic and nationalist populism play in the strategies of Bulgarian political actors, particularly regarding the Turkish minority and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Bulgarian nationalism does exploit anti-Turkish rhetoric, but this is not its main mobilizing argument, as there is another minority in Bulgaria, the Roma minority, which actually has a far stronger mobilizing factor—much more so than the ethnic Turks or even external migrants. The Roma minority has traditionally been the primary target of such rhetoric, generating narratives around issues like welfare chauvinism, pensions, schooling, and healthcare, emphasizing access only for taxpayers.

Other issues, like the war in Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments, also influence the discourse, particularly on topics such as energy policy—decisions around local refineries, the atomic power plant, and related matters. Regarding the ethnic Turkish minority, one key argument fueling nationalist parties is the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in history books. The ongoing debate centers on whether Bulgaria was under the so-called “Turkish yoke” or merely experienced Turkish presence or dominance, making history books a battleground for these interpretations.

The ethnic Turkish minority, meanwhile, has faced significant historical trauma in Bulgaria, especially during the renaming process, when 800,000 ethnic Turks were forced to leave the country, and the entire minority was subjected to forced assimilation policies, including killings, expulsions, and restrictions on language, culture, and religion. This history has created a deep distrust within the ethnic Turkish community toward all parties, pushing them to continue supporting a corrupt party like the MRF, which understands their loyalty is rooted in a lack of trust for any other party.

Despite attempts from both left and right to reach out to the ethnic Turkish minority, the distrust runs deep, as the wounds are recent and severe, dating back only 30 to 40 years. Many people still hold passports with multiple names, reflecting the forced name changes. It will take time before the ethnic Turkish minority feels confident enough to vote outside an ethnically Turkish party and place their trust elsewhere.

In your recent article for the ECPS report, you note that prior to 2022, 58% of the population reported positive attitudes toward Russia and Putin, suggesting that the war in Ukraine has created fertile ground for PRR parties with strong pro-Russian stances. What are the main reasons behind this pronounced pro-Russian sentiment?

Professor Emilia Zankina: Immediately after the war began, this percentage dropped sharply, but it started climbing again as the conflict continued and Ukrainian refugees arrived in the country. The initial backlash and shift away from strong support for Russia were reversed as refugees from Ukraine came, and as the war extended into a second and third year, people gradually reverted to their original views. Here, we return to the powerful legacy of the communist regime and a party that had 1 million members, with many families still revering Russia regardless of its current regime. Little distinction is made between the Russian people and the Russian government, which becomes problematic; few people object to Russian culture and people, but many oppose Putin’s regime, including within Russia itself.

The historical legacy frames Russia as a liberator, followed by a communist regime that actively promoted Russian culture and language for many years. Many people studied in Russian schools, pursued professional development in Russia, and were raised with that cultural influence. Despite the benefits of the European Union—funds, improved living standards, and mobility—many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.

Populist Radical Right Parties Typically Remain “Men’s Parties”

How do you interpret the discrepancy between the low female representation in Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties and the comparatively high level of activity on women’s issues among PRR women MPs? How might the presence of women in PRR parties in Bulgaria influence broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien,” and what factors contribute to this dynamic?

Professor Emilia Zankina: There is extensive research, not only mine but also by many other authors, showing that populist radical right parties are typically “men’s parties.” They are represented by men, supported by men, and largely serve men’s interests. However, we have also seen a narrative of traditional family values promoted by women within these parties. This trend, while not dominant, has been firmly established, extending from the UK to France and across Eastern Europe.

These parties have also strategically positioned women as a tactic to appeal to female voters and as a more legitimate means of promoting specific policies. When addressing gender issues, reproductive rights, or family services, having a woman advocate for these policies lends greater legitimacy. Consequently, parties have co-opted and promoted more women to the forefront as part of this strategy. Yet, for the moment, the appeal remains predominantly directed toward male voters, and representation within these parties still skews male. Despite these efforts, if you examine the gender balance in these parties, on electoral lists and among MPs, it remains largely male-dominated.

Former U.S. President Donald Trump at a rally for then-VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

Dr. Wojczewski: Trump Externalizes US Problems, Presenting Them as Originating from Abroad

In an ECPS interview, Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski of Coventry University argues Trump uses foreign policy as a tool to externalize US problems, reframing issues like poverty and unemployment as outcomes of foreign influence. Trump’s “American people vs. Washington establishment” narrative, Wojczewski says, fuels populist-nationalist sentiment by attributing domestic challenges to global elites and immigration, aligning with longstanding US nativist narratives. Wojczewski compares this approach to other populist strategies, contrasting it with left-populists like Bernie Sanders, who emphasize multilateralism and solidarity.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University, examines how Donald Trump’s foreign policy discourse reframes domestic issues as external threats, solidifying a populist-nationalist coalition. According to Dr. Wojczewski, Trump went beyond the typical “Republicans versus Democrats” divide, framing the political landscape as “the American people versus the Washington establishment.” This re-framing allowed Trump to attribute societal issues, such as “poverty, unemployment, decaying infrastructure, and crime,” to foreign policy decisions driven by “the ‘globalist’ establishment, immigrants, and foreign nations.” Wojczewski notes that “foreign policy became a projection screen for societal problems” in Trump’s rhetoric, attributing America’s domestic challenges to flawed foreign influences.

Dr. Wojczewski  also explains that this tactic of externalizing US issues resonates with longstanding nativist narratives, as Trump portrayed foreigners and the “globalist” establishment as key threats to American interests. Trump’s rhetoric, which framed the elites as an existential threat, blended populist anti-establishment sentiments with nationalist elements that particularly appealed to white Americans. “This approach draws on longstanding nativist themes in US history,” Wojczewski remarks, adding that Trump’s discourse taps into the deeply ingrained idea of America as a civic community threatened by outsiders.

Wojczewski further contextualizes this strategy within a broader populist landscape, referencing other populist actors like Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and France’s Rassemblement National (RN), who similarly emphasize national identity and seek to project foreign influences as detrimental to national well-being. While AfD plays with Euroscepticism, often highlighting Germany as the “stupid paymaster” within the EU, RN frames the EU as a German-dominated project that harms French interests, showing how national narratives shape distinct yet similar populist approaches.

In contrast, left-populists like Spain’s Podemos and Bernie Sanders in the United States offer a more inclusive notion of “the people.” As Wojczewski points out, “Sanders and Podemos criticize the establishment for securitizing migration,” presenting the people as an open, pluralistic group rather than focusing on an ethnocultural identity. This is reflected in Sanders’ appeals to America’s legacy as a “nation of immigrants,” emphasizing solidarity over isolation. Unlike the extreme nationalism seen in Trump or RN, Podemos and Sanders criticize liberal internationalism as masking a militaristic agenda. Sanders, for example, advocates multilateralism, as “issues like climate change and economic inequality require multilateral action and solidarity,” explains Wojczewski, showing a left-wing populist commitment to international cooperation rather than exclusion.

Through these comparisons, Dr. Wojczewski illustrates the diversity in populist foreign policy, noting that populism can vary widely depending on its ideological combination, from extreme nationalism to global solidarity. Trump’s approach, however, clearly leverages external threats to build a populist-nationalist base, setting a precedent that aligns with right-wing populist movements worldwide.

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski with some edits.

Populism and International Relations: A Highly Dynamic Research Field

Professor Wojczewski, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How do you assess the evolution of populist theory in the field of international relations? What is the impact of far-right ideology on foreign policy beliefs and preferences?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: Populism and international relations has become a highly dynamic research field. If we look back about 10 years, there was minimal research on this topic, but in the last 5 or 6 years, numerous studies, books, and edited volumes have emerged, leading to substantial progress in a relatively short period. We now see increasing theoretical pluralism, with different approaches to conceptualizing populism—as an ideology, a style, political logic, or strategy. Research agendas are also varied, ranging from conventional analyses of populism’s impact on foreign policy preferences to examining how populism influences foreign policy-making style, foreign policy as a space for political mobilization, and populist identity construction. Additionally, factors like international relations, global governance, and regional governance have played roles in populism’s rise, resulting in a diverse and multifaceted research agenda.

That said, there are certain limitations. One major limitation, especially in the field of international relations, is that populism is still largely viewed as inherently negative and dangerous. To some extent, this perception is understandable, as populism can indeed pose risks and challenges to liberal democracy—especially when it comes to the populist radical right, which can be quite destructive, as seen in cases like Donald Trump. However, there are also forms of populism that pose no threat to liberal democracy and, in many ways, can even strengthen it. This perception reflects an “establishment bias” in populism research, where populists are seen as the problem and the establishment as the solution. This binary is problematic, as populism can also serve as a positive force. For example, left-wing populists like Podemos or Bernie Sanders offer a very different political vision compared to the populist radical right. Thus, populism should be approached as a more nuanced phenomenon, rather than being seen as purely negative and dangerous.

Another challenge is distinguishing populism from related phenomena such as authoritarianism, nationalism, and the radical right. Often, the boundaries are unclear—where does populism end, and where do these other ideologies or discourses begin? For instance, how can we differentiate between populism and radical right politics?

Regarding the second part of your question on the impact of far-right ideology on foreign policy beliefs and preferences, this is the focus of my most recent paper. I argue that, as Cas Mudde’s terminology suggests, we should concentrate more on the “thick” or host ideology than on populism’s “thin” ideology. To truly understand the populist radical right, we should focus less on populism itself and more on radical or far-right ideology, which has a far more substantial influence on foreign policy preferences and beliefs.

In far-right ideology, a core belief is a strict adherence to a natural order of inequalities, which significantly shapes its foreign policy outlook. A central component is ultranationalism—a form of nationalism that defines the nation primarily in ethnocultural or racial terms and perceives various groups as being inherently in conflict. This worldview is deeply antagonistic, promoting an “us vs. them” mentality where one ethno-culturally or racially defined nation stands in opposition to others. Such a perspective fosters negative attitudes toward regional and global governance institutions and rejects universal norms, as the primacy of national identity, defined in ethno-cultural or racial terms, logically leads to a dismissal of international or universal principles.

Another related aspect is a chauvinistic foreign policy outlook—a relentless pursuit of a nation’s interests, often encapsulated in slogans like “America First,” which prioritize national interests over the rights, concerns, and interests of others. While there are other elements of far-right ideology that influence foreign policy, I believe ultranationalism is the most crucial. Research in populism and international relations would greatly benefit from a deeper examination of far-right nationalism, as I argue that it plays a far more significant role in shaping foreign policy preferences than populism itself.

Populist Securitization Undermines Democratic Institutions and Fosters Authoritarian Tendencies

Democratic Senator Bernie Sanders speaks at Presidential Rally at Springs Preserve Ampitheater evening before Nevada Caucus, Las Vegas, NV on February 21, 2020. Photo: Joseph Sohm.

How do you see the interplay between securitization and populism shaping the legitimacy of democratic institutions, especially when populist leaders present the establishment as a security threat? Could you elaborate on the role of moral and existential threats in populist securitization strategies, and how these might differ when targeting domestic versus foreign “elites”?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think populist securitization—essentially framing elites or the establishment as a security threat—can certainly undermine democratic institutions and foster authoritarian tendencies and policies. Donald Trump is a prominent example using this populist securitization strategy frequently, especially during his 2015–2016 campaign, by presenting the elites and establishment as a security threat.

However, populist securitization is not always harmful. For instance, if we contrast Trump with Bernie Sanders; Sanders also challenged the political establishment or elites. Still, his focus was on the destructive and undemocratic influence of big donors and the billionaire class. He highlighted how large corporations undermine democracy’s core principle of political equality through substantial influence over US politics via campaign donations. This also represents a populist securitization strategy but in a very different way.

We can say that populist securitization is an effective strategy for populist leaders or parties, as it legitimizes them while delegitimizing the establishment. By portraying elites as an existential threat, the populist leader can claim, “I am standing up for you; I am defending democracy and your interests against an elite that no longer represents you.”

Chauvinistic Nationalism in Populist Radical-Right Parties Limits Compromise and Cooperation

How do you assess the interplay between populism and nationalism shaping future cooperation among populist radical-right movements across borders, especially considering their inherently nationalist foundations? Could you elaborate on challenges populist radical-right actors face in building sustained transnational coalitions, given their nationalistic and often anti-globalist stances?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think, to some extent, populism can assist the radical right in terms of international cooperation and transnational networking by providing a common enemy. This enemy may take the form of bureaucrats or so-called globalist elites, which helps the radical right mitigate national differences and antagonisms. Particularly in the United States and Europe, the radical right frequently uses the globalist conspiracy theory, suggesting that a globalist elite is disenfranchising ordinary people—an aloof elite disconnected from the common populace. This conspiracy theory is not new; it has existed in far-right discourse for decades and carries a clear anti-Semitic undertone, with “globalists” often serving as a code for Jews. This shared adversary becomes a rallying point that the radical right leverages to build international cooperation. In essence, having a common enemy is essential, and populism, combined with radical-right nationalism, offers this shared target, whether it be globalist elites or Eurocrats.

However, nationalism certainly complicates international cooperation for the radical right. While they may find common ground in shared opposition, significant differences emerge when it comes to proposing comprehensive alternatives, crafting policies, and making concrete policy proposals. This lack of unity is underscored by the fact that there are currently three radical-right factions in the EU Parliament. I would argue that the issue is less about ideology—there are more ideological similarities than differences among Europe’s radical-right groups—and more about national context and political style. Some radical-right parties, such as Italy’s Brothers of Italy (FdI)or France’s Rassemblement National (RN), aim to appear more moderate to attract conservative voters, toning down some of their more radical rhetoric. Meanwhile, Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) is less focused on moderation, which makes other parties hesitant to associate with them, despite few substantive ideological differences.

One challenge, then, is the national differences and the varied political strategies and styles among these movements. Another obstacle is the inherent chauvinistic nationalism within these parties. When parties adopt slogans like “Germany First” or “France First,” they limit their ability to compromise and cooperate, as this mindset prioritizes national interests above all else. This is evident in the contrasting narratives about the EU promoted by Rassemblement National (RN) and Alternative for Germany (AfD). RN depicts the EU as a German-dominated project with Germany as the hegemon, while AfD claims Germany is the “stupid paymaster” subsidizing other EU countries. This clash of narratives creates further barriers to cooperation, as each party mobilizes distinct political strategies based on differing national narratives.

Conflicting Affective Narratives as Powerful Tools in Populist Radical-Right Rhetoric

What is the impact of affective narratives—such as fear, nostalgia, and moral superiority—within populist foreign policy discourses, and how these emotions shape international relations dynamics?

Dr.  Thorsten Wojczewski: These affective narratives are absolutely crucial in populist radical-right discourses. Whether we look at figures like Donald Trump, Alternative for Germany (AfD), or others, they all, in some way, evoke fear, anxiety, and resentment. Their messaging often revolves around a perceived loss of control: “We’re being overrun by foreigners,” or as Trump famously put it, “Either we win this election, or we lose our country.” Mobilizing such existential fears is essential to their strategy.

However—and this is the interesting aspect—in addition to invoking negative emotions like fear and anxiety, populist radical-right discourses also promise a better future. While mobilizing existential fears, they simultaneously offer hope: if they gain power, they’ll “restore sovereignty” or “make America great again.” This evokes positive emotions, such as hope and nostalgia for the “good old days,” with promises to reverse multiculturalism, globalization, and restore order, identity, and sovereignty. These conflicting affective narratives—fear and hope, nostalgia and moral superiority—are powerful tools in populist radical-right rhetoric. I would argue that this blend of conflicting emotions and narratives partially explains their broad appeal and success.

AfD’s Populist Radical-Right Stance Is Less Eurosceptic than Germany’s Neo-Nazi NPD

Hundreds of people attend the Summer Festival in the center of the town and listen to Citizens’ dialogue with Björn Höcke in Sömmerda, Germany on August 24, 2024. Photo: Ryan Nash.

How does the foreign policy approach of far-right parties like AfD and NPD reflect broader trends in global far-right movements, particularly regarding their stance on supranational institutions like the EU? What factors contribute to the differences in foreign policy outlooks between populist radical-right parties and extreme-right parties, and how do these distinctions impact their real-world diplomatic strategies?

Professor Thorsten Wojczewski: Alternative for Germany (AfD), as a populist radical-right party, is somewhat less dogmatic and less Eurosceptic than the extreme-right National Democratic Party (NPD), a neo-Nazi party in Germany. To start, AfD does not explicitly call for Germany’s immediate departure from the EU. While they entertain the notion of “Dexit,” it’s not a primary objective. Instead, AfD’s position is to first attempt reforms or implement specific changes within the EU rather than advocating for an outright exit. This approach can be partly explained by divisions within AfD’s voter base on EU membership—about 43% of AfD supporters favor Dexit, indicating that many remain uncertain or opposed to it. This lack of strong support for an immediate exit, even among their own voters, likely informs AfD’s cautious stance, as a significant majority of the broader German electorate also opposes Dexit. This approach reflects a degree of opportunism, with AfD keeping the option open without fully committing to it.

At the same time, AfD advocates for reforming, rather than dismantling, the EU. For instance, they support retaining elements like the customs union, free trade zone, and certain aspects of the common market. Thus, while AfD is highly Eurosceptic, it still views specific EU components as beneficial and worth preserving.

In contrast, the NPD demands Germany’s immediate exit from the EU and offers no defense of EU institutions. The only aspect of European cooperation the NPD promotes is a “Fortress Europe,” envisioning Europe as a racially and ethnically homogenous “living space” for white Europeans. According to the NPD, European states should cooperate solely to prevent mass migration and block other so-called destructive foreign influences, such as US hegemony. Unlike AfD, NPD rejects the common market, customs union, and similar EU structures entirely.

This contrast reflects broader trends among European populist radical-right parties, most of which adopt less extreme positions. They maintain a certain ambivalence, being critical of the EU without advocating for its immediate dismantling or exit, likely to appeal to a broader voter base.

Trump Challenges Bipartisan Consensus on Liberal Internationalism in US Foreign Policy

What are the implications of securitization theory in the populist discourse of Donald Trump? In what ways does Trump’s populist approach to “Othering” differ from traditional forms of nationalism in US foreign policy?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: When we look at Trump’s 2015 campaign, two things stand out: first, the unusually prominent role of foreign policy in a US election; second, Trump’s framing of the entire Washington establishment as a security threat. He famously stated, “They have dragged us into foreign wars that have made us less safe, left our borders wide open at home, and shipped our jobs and wealth to other countries,” with “they” referring to the Washington establishment. Thus, in Trump’s rhetoric, the Washington establishment is cast as an existential security threat.

The difference between a populist mode of ‘othering’ and a nationalist mode of ‘othering’ is that, in populism, it’s often the elites within one’s own country who become the security threat, rather than other states or foreign entities. While immigrants, illegal immigration, and countries like China also figured into Trump’s rhetoric, he notably framed the Washington establishment itself as a primary threat to the American people—a “corrupt elite” no longer representing Americans.

By combining populist and nationalist forms of ‘othering’, Trump sought to rally people behind him and redefine who is “American.” His rhetoric primarily appealed to white Americans of European ancestry, positioning them as “real Americans” under threat from mass migration, among other issues. Through this mode of ‘othering’, he also challenged the bipartisan consensus on liberal internationalism in US foreign policy, claiming that a flawed foreign policy, pursued by elites, was responsible for America’s grievances. This, he argued, was why he should become president—to change course and move away from these flawed policies.

There Is No Singular “Populist Foreign Policy” 

How does the framing of “the people” versus “the elite” in left-populist movements differ from that of right-wing populism, particularly in the context of foreign policy? How does left populism reconcile nationalist elements with international solidarity, particularly in areas like trade, immigration, and global governance? What do the cases of Bernie Sanders and Podemos tell us about the relationship between left-wing populism and foreign policy?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: In my recent co-authored paper with colleagues Emmy Eklund and Frank Stengel, we show that Bernie Sanders and Podemos offer a quite different conception of “the people” compared to the radical right, both in Europe and the United States. Left-wing populist discourses from Sanders and Podemos envision the people as a relatively open, pluralistic, and heterogeneous group. In principle, anyone can be part of this group; it’s not closed or essentialized, nor grounded on ethno-cultural or racial criteria. This is a clear distinction between left-wing populism and the populist radical right, where figures like Trump often incorporate ethno-cultural and racial elements into their definition of “the people.”

Furthermore, both Bernie Sanders and Podemos adopt a decisively pro-immigrant stance. This is significant, as populism is often associated with anti-immigration sentiments. However, Sanders and Podemos instead criticize the establishment for securitizing migration. This is noteworthy because it challenges the assumption that only the far left or far right poses a threat; establishment politics itself often exhibits nativist and authoritarian tendencies. Sanders and Podemos highlight this by exposing the establishment’s own authoritarianism and nativism concerning immigration. Sanders, in particular, draws on the classic American narrative of the United States as a nation of immigrants with a moral responsibility to support others in their pursuit of “the American Dream.” He emphasizes that being American means embracing solidarity, openness, and support for those seeking a better life, rather than building border fences.

Another notable aspect is how both Podemos and Sanders criticize flawed liberal internationalism. Sanders, for example, argues that liberal internationalism, as promoted by the US establishment, often conceals a unilateral, militaristic, and neo-imperialist foreign policy, which has caused significant issues in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. For Sanders, the alternative is clear: multilateralism and international solidarity. This focus on multilateralism may seem counter-intuitive, as populism is often associated with isolationism and opposition to multilateral institutions. Yet, Sanders emphasized that cooperation through coalitions would be central to his foreign policy, believing that global challenges like climate change and economic inequality require multilateral action and solidarity. Both Sanders and Podemos seek to promote progressive change beyond their own countries. They do not wish to abolish the nation-state but believe solidarity should extend beyond borders, demonstrating a commitment to fostering progressive change both domestically and internationally.

In terms of left-wing populism and foreign policy, we can conclude that there is no singular “populist foreign policy.” The foreign policy outlooks of populist movements vary greatly depending on the specific ideology and discourse combined with populism. These outlooks can range from extreme nationalism and isolationism to robust international solidarity. Therefore, we are critical of the term “populist foreign policy,” as it suggests a misleading commonality between vastly different political actors like Bernie Sanders and Trump.

How has the Trumpian discourse used foreign policy in creating a platform for the (re)production and consolidation of a populist-nationalist electoral coalition?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think, what Trump did, which was quite interesting, was to extend his discourse beyond the classical political divide of “Republicans versus Democrats,” framing it instead as “the American people versus the Washington establishment.” This was a key element of his rhetoric, where he attributed poverty, unemployment, decaying infrastructure, crime, and essentially all that was wrong in the United States to flawed foreign policy. In this way, foreign policy became a projection screen for societal problems.

Foreign policy played a very prominent role in Trump’s campaigns, as he often attributed domestic problems to the US establishment and its foreign policies—military interventions and free trade agreements, for example. This is the populist element in his approach. He combined this with a nationalist angle by scapegoating immigrants, minorities, and other nations for US issues. This blend of populist and radical-right nationalist ‘othering’ was quite effective in his discourse, with the populist side appealing to a broader audience across US society due to widespread anti-establishment sentiments. Meanwhile, his radical-right nationalism particularly resonated with white Americans.

Trump also externalized America’s problems, presenting them as originating from abroad. In his rhetoric, issues stemmed either from the so-called globalist establishment, which he claimed prioritized foreigners over Americans, from immigrants, or from other nations. This discourse effectively attributed everything wrong to a flawed foreign policy and to “foreigners” broadly defined.

In this way, Trump tapped into deeply rooted nativist discourses that have existed in the United States for centuries. Historically, mass migration has often triggered nativist backlash in the US, with the so-called indigenous population mobilizing against newcomers as perceived threats. Trump’s discourse serves as a reminder that the idea of the United States as a civic community has long been contested. Ethno-cultural and racial constructions of American identity have often co-existed with a more civic and pluralistic American nationalism.

Trump Poses a Real Threat to Democratic Institutions, Minorities, and Migrants

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

There are those very concerned experts who argue that American democracy will not survive another Trump presidency. Others claim that these concerns are over-blown and American democracy is resilient enough for another possible Trump administration. Where do you stand in this debate?

Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: I think a very diplomatic answer would be that I stand in the middle. I believe American democracy can likely survive another Trump presidency, but it would undoubtedly suffer severe damage to its core institutions. The reason I’m not extremely pessimistic is that the United States is a consolidated liberal democracy with well-established institutions and an active civil society. Democratic backsliding tends to occur in societies where institutions are still underdeveloped or relatively new. The Weimar Republic in Germany, before the Nazis came to power, is an example; often called a “democracy without democrats,” it had an underdeveloped civil society and contested institutions, creating an environment where fascism could rise more easily compared to the US.

That said, Trump poses a real threat not only to democratic institutions but also to minorities and migrants, who would likely bear the brunt of his anti-immigrant and racist rhetoric. His influence would undoubtedly harm US democracy and endanger specific sectors of society. Additionally, Trump fuels political polarization in the US, making it increasingly ungovernable, as the system of checks and balances requires parties to cooperate. With extreme polarization, such cooperation becomes impossible, leading to dysfunction. This polarization could pave the way for an even more radical leader in the future, one who might promise to restore unity and order in an increasingly ungovernable United States.

The silver lining here is Trump’s age. He likely has limited time left to damage US democracy, as this would likely be his last term. His mental and physical state in the next two to three years may also play a role in limiting the damage he could do.

Dr. Mabel Berezin, Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Cornell University.

Professor Mabel Berezin: The People Behind Trump Are Scarier Than He Is

The potential re-election of Donald Trump on November 5, 2024, raises significant concerns for American democracy, according to Professor Mabel Berezin. While she acknowledges that Trump is a troubling figure, she emphasizes that it is the individuals surrounding him who are especially dangerous. “What makes him even more dangerous is the group of people around him—J.D. Vance, Elon Musk, and the Project 2025 people. I think American democracy will be in serious danger if these people come into power. They are smart, they have a project, and they’re going to push it through,” she explains.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The re-election of Donald Trump on November 5, 2024, would pose serious concerns for American democracy, warns Dr. Mabel Berezin, Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Cornell University. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Berezin makes it clear that while Trump himself is concerning, it’s the people surrounding him that she finds truly alarming. “What makes him even more dangerous is the group of people around him—J.D. Vance, Elon Musk, and the Project 2025 people. I think American democracy will be in serious danger if these people come into power. They are smart, they have a project, and they’re going to push it through.”

The interview touches on how populism in the United States differs from its historical and European counterparts. Professor Berezin explains that while American populism has always been defined by class differences, particularly between urban elites and rural populations, there is now a stronger emphasis on white Protestant nationalism. “There’s a much stronger emphasis on white American Protestant nationalism, which has become more public, especially evident at Trump rallies,” she notes.

Fascism and its relation to contemporary populism are key themes in Professor Berezin’s work. She highlights the “epistemic plasticity” of the term fascism and how its application can obscure more than it reveals. However, she emphasizes that what makes today’s political climate dangerous is not just rhetoric but the infiltration of far-right ideologies into American institutions. “What I call an institutional creep has begun, and this concerns me the most—particularly the courts and issues like free speech and social changes, such as abortion laws.”

Professor Berezin also points to the rise of paramilitary groups in the US, noting their similarities to those that fueled fascist movements in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. “These groups are much more organized and mobilizable today,” she warns, drawing a parallel between historical fascism and current threats to American democracy.

As the conversation turns to the economic and social forces driving populism, Professor Berezin highlights inequality and economic insecurity as fundamental factors. “People don’t think about cultural issues until basic security—like having a place to live or food to eat—is shattered,” she explains. According to Berezin, these economic grievances are often exploited through cultural and racial divisions, further fueling populist movements.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Mabel Berezin with some edits.

The United States Has Always Been Somewhat Exceptional

Crowds at Coney Island, NY, on July 4, 1936. Photo: Everett Collection.

Professor Berezin, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How does the contemporary populist movement in the United States differ from historical populist and far-right movements, such as those of the early 20th century, and what continuities, if any, do you observe?

Professor Mabel Berezin: First, I think it’s important to note that when you talk about the early 20th century, people tend to think about Europe—and for good reason. I do think there are significant differences between the movements.

In the American instance, one of the key issues is the focus on significant class differences in the United States, particularly between the so-called elites who live in multi-racial and multi-ethnic cities, and those who live in more rural areas. It highlights those who feel left behind.

Second, the contemporary populist movement has a specific focus, which has grown since Donald Trump first descended his golden elevator—it is hard to remember exactly when that was, in 2015. There is now a much stronger emphasis on white American Protestant nationalism. While that sentiment was always present as an underlying factor, it has become much more public, especially evident at Trump rallies.

Many historians have written about the American neo-Nazi movement in the 1930s, which shared a similar focus. A famous example is the rally at Madison Square Garden in New York, where participants wore Nazi uniforms, and the leader talked about the need for a white Christian America. Some themes from the 1930s are still present today. Trump does not get on television and say those things explicitly, but it’s part of the underlying message.

I think the European case in the 1920s and 1930s was more complex, with multiple factors at play that were distinct to the European context. The United States has always been exceptional. In many European countries of that era, there was less experience with democracy, and distinct cultural features influenced their political movements.

The US has a more consistent narrative, with a strong emphasis on radical individualism, which is not as central to the political culture of Europe. In America, there has always been this idea of the individual moving westward and expanding the nation, which has been a defining feature of American political culture. I think that radical individualism has been an important factor, which is not part of the political culture of Europe.

The Growing Threat of Institutional Reshaping in the US Mirrors Historical Fascism

In recent years, the term ‘fascism’ has been increasingly used to describe certain political dynamics in the US. In your article “Does the Fascism Debate Matter for Understanding 2024 American Politics?” you argue that the term ‘fascism’ has an ‘epistemic plasticity’ that may obscure more than it reveals when applied outside its historical context. How do you suggest scholars navigate this challenge while addressing contemporary threats to democracy in the United States?

Professor Mabel Berezin: First, as events change, a scholar working on the present should also change their view of things, and I have changed my view, or the way I would argue, considering events. So, it is an extremely plastic term, and I think the historiography supports that. Colleagues, whom I respect enormously, have worked on this issue, but I would say there are two things about fascism that need to be noted, and then I will point to the change.

First, there are a series of qualities or characteristics that characterize fascism: violence, paramilitary suppression of speech, performativity, spectacles, and so on. These are qualities that, when taken in isolation, are found in various kinds of politics. Performativity, for example, is not unique to fascist politics. When these qualities come together in different ways, they can lead to anti-democratic forms of politics.

What I think is really important—and I say this in the article and am even more convinced of it now, which is why I am more worried than before—is that there has always been a total institutional synthesis around fascism as it existed in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe. It wasn’t simply performativity or violence; it was the combination of those elements with the ability to control a state. This was the case in both Germany and Italy.

Fascism is a plastic term, and I am old enough to remember when people thought Richard Nixon was a fascist. The concern now, and something I addressed in that article, is that fascism becomes truly dangerous when it infiltrates institutional structures—and that is what we are seeing in the United States today. After January 6th, my alarm grew. Watching those events unfold on television, it was clear to me that this was a crime against the Constitution—an attack on the American state and the Capitol. However, when I saw arguments defending it, with people embracing Trump’s narrative that the election had been stolen, alarm bells went off in my head. This was the point where I began noticing a seepage into institutions, something we had not observed during Trump’s first administration. There had been anti-democratic actions and rhetoric, but nothing that started to coalesce like it did after January 6th.

Since then, what I call an institutional creep has begun, which I find extremely frightening. The areas that concern me most are the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, and the institutional rearrangements happening around them. The second concern is the increasing salience of free speech issues. The third is related to social issues, like the changes in abortion laws. These institutional shifts are rethinking and redefining both social and political life in ways that were not possible before. Trump himself was not able to reshape these institutions, but now we are seeing a body of people willing and capable of doing so—people who are much smarter and more focused on making these changes.

So, I see J.D. Vance as very dangerous because he can think these things through. I see similar traits in people like Elon Musk. Years ago, I had a science fiction fantasy about techno-geniuses taking over, never imagining it would happen because they had the money to make it a reality. And now, who is campaigning in Pennsylvania as we speak? Elon Musk. I believe he just spent $60 million on a super-pac contribution to Trump’s campaign yesterday. This is extremely frightening. I do not want to dwell too much on it, but I have always thought Trump was clearly a racist. He has a history of that—with his real estate dealings and his infamous 1989 ad about the Central Park Five, if I recall correctly.

But Trump does not have the synthetic mind that his new collaborators do. And their synthetic mind is not moving in a democratic direction, in my view, which is frightening. To me, this marks a new stage. It is not just about calling them fascists or pointing to their fascist or violent tendencies, which they certainly have. This is something that has the potential—it is not there yet, but it is on a path to take over the American state.

This is absolutely frightening because these are people with the mental capacity to make it happen, and we must not underestimate their brainpower. There are not really guardrails against this, especially with the current state of the Supreme Court. Maybe some local courts will push back on some of this, but yes, I maintain that fascism is a plastic term. It has flexibility as a concept, but I think it matters when we start seeing how fascism in the 1920s and 1930s reshaped institutions. And I think we are seeing the potential for that to happen in the United States now in a much more real way than eight years ago, when Trump first emerged.

And that, I think, is dangerous.

Religion Is a Major Definer of Americanism

A protester carries a large wooden cross during the annual March for Life at the US Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 19, 2024. Photo by Philip Yabut.

In the same article, you highlight the differences between American nativism and European fascism, suggesting that the two phenomena should not be conflated. What are the key distinctions between these two, and how do they shape the political landscape in the US differently than in Europe?

Professor Mabel Berezin: I think, as I said earlier, and I know people are using the term “nativism” now to talk about Europe, they tend to think of it as, you know, a “people who are already there” kind of thing. But I do think that the United States is much more racially focused than Europe.

When I say this, I mean it needs to be nuanced. It does not mean that I think different groups don’t live in Europe—different religious groups, etc.—but the focus on race has defined the United States in ways that perhaps haven’t been adequately acknowledged.  If you look at historical books on populism published in the early 1900s,they  focused on ethnic immigrants coming into the country—those from Southern and even Northern Europe, like Irish Catholics. Religion was a big definer of Americanism, and what it meant to be American.

People spoke about nativism in terms of keeping these groups out, or, if they were already here, regarding them as somehow different. These groups may have had white skin, but they were not considered white. They were Catholics, not Protestants. This is a very different situation from Europe, which has a much more complicated religious and ethnic landscape.

I would even argue that race plays out differently in Europe. There is a kind of singular focus to American prejudices, I guess you could say. And then, of course, we have the history of slavery, Black Americans, Indigenous peoples, and so on. Our complications are unique in the sense that America is more singularly focused on the things it rejects.

In your article “Fascism and Populism: Are They Useful Categories for Comparative Sociological Analysis?”  you highlight the importance of examining institutional contexts when analyzing the emergence of populist and fascist movements. Could you elaborate on which institutional factors are most influential in either constraining or facilitating these movements in contemporary democracies?

Professor Mabel Berezin: Well, I think I’ve already touched on this in the first part. You want to look at the courts, freedom of speech, First Amendment issues, and freedom of religion—at least when examining the United States. You also want to look at how the government operates. These are things that, in my imagination when I wrote that article, I never thought would be at risk of breaking down in the US, but now I do think they are extremely important.

These factors vary depending on the country. One thing I have not mentioned yet is the presence or growth of paramilitary groups, which were important in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. The ability to recruit paramilitary groups was crucial for Mussolini in Italy. In the US, it is well-known that there have always been paramilitary groups in various parts of the country, and today, these groups are much more organized and mobilizable.

These are the kinds of institutional arrangements I would look at. Most of them are constitutive of the breakdown of democracy. You need the Constitution, the courts, the press, freedom of religion, etc. And you do not want organizations that can be mobilized in the same way as the military or police—what Max Weber would call “extra-organizational agents of legitimate violence.” In the 1930s European context, these factors were more prominent.

In terms of populism, specifically in Europe, another key issue is how people perceive and interact with the European Union—whether they see it as doing or not doing enough for its citizens. This has been a major institutional player in the rise of populism, alongside immigration, which is closely tied to perceptions of the EU.

A Lack of Security Can Be Exploited in Various Ways

Old Mailboxes in west United States. Photo: Andrey Bayda.

To what extent do you think economic insecurity and inequality contribute to the rise of far-right movements in the US, and how do these factors intersect with cultural grievances to shape contemporary populist rhetoric?

Professor Mabel Berezin: The rise of inequality is actually key. I do not always like the word “inequality” because sometimes I find it a euphemism for the things people lack—and there are serious lacks in the United States. There are people who cannot find places to live, and the homelessness in some major cities is staggering. Even in Ithaca, where Cornell University is located, which is a rural part of the United States, when you leave the university, the inequality and absence of basic needs are quite astonishing. This has been well documented, and there is a lot of social science data that supports what I am saying.

So, it is absolutely key. People do not think about cultural issues until basic security—like having a place to live or food to eat—is shattered. Security is more than just the absence of threats; it provides stability. You know where you are going to live, what you are going to eat, or that you can afford food. That sense of security has broken in many ways, both in the United States and Europe, and I think it is one of the major driving forces behind these movements.

When there is a lack of security, it can be exploited in different ways, especially through cultural differences. You can tell people, “Those people have what you don’t,” which fuels the feeling of being left behind. This has become a common narrative, but the major driving factor is the absence of basic expectations of stability in the places where people live.

Place is an important part of this equation. People do not need to live in cities to feel secure. We often say cities offer more opportunities, which drove people out of rural areas, but security can exist anywhere if there’s stability. Most people do not have that stability anymore.

One interesting thing I have noticed, based on informal conversations in Ithaca, is how people define happiness. Many people who do not live in Ithaca anymore—because they cannot afford it—work in service occupations and live outside the city. I have had conversations with these people who have told me that, for them, the right to go home at night and work on building their own little wood cabin is what makes them happy. That is not something you hear in an urban environment.

This divide is not just about culture or politics—it is about basic expectations and what makes people feel secure. For instance, I once saw a sign on a car in a parking lot in Ithaca that read, “How many ways will you show contempt for me today?” It was a big station wagon covered in American flags, parked at a food place in Ithaca. I almost took a picture of it, but I did not want to violate that person’s sense of dignity. Instead of tough guys with guns coming out, two middle-aged women, clearly country folk, got into the car.

And I said to myself, you know, this is what we are missing somehow. This is what Trump is tapping into. It is not just about culture, although they obviously believe different things than I do. I believe in the country, too, even though I do not have flags on my car. But there is a gap there, and these are the things we need to pay attention to, I think.

A Dangerous Mix of Misinformation and Inefficacy Could Propel Trump’s Return

Given the rise of populist leaders with authoritarian tendencies, how resilient do you think American democratic institutions are to such challenges, and what measures could be taken to safeguard democracy against far-right incursions?

Professor Mabel Berezin: Well, I do not even think that is the right framing at this moment, in the sense that I think what we have… If you look at Project 2025, which you have probably heard a lot about, I assume—maybe the people who read this know about it. It is basically a 900-page document from the Heritage Foundation about how to completely restructure the American state and political institutions. It is very frightening. These are people with, I would almost say, totalitarian visions rather than authoritarian, in the sense that they want to redefine the entire way of being in the world, in the state, and in the culture.

Now, what would safeguard against that? Well, certainly, we need to reaffirm and convince people that the institutions we have were well-designed, are functioning well, and that people can participate in the political sphere. In other words, there needs to be an emphasis on civic education in schools. People do not understand what the government is for. They think it is only about how their life was better a few years ago, so they vote accordingly—without understanding the larger role of government.

For example, people often do not see the connection between government and their lives beyond immediate concerns. They forget that government provides social security, Medicare, and the right to participate in democracy. There is a lack of understanding, and I believe this is partly due to the deficiency of civic education. If I had the capacity to influence policy, that is where I would focus. And I am not the only one arguing this at the moment.

Local organizing, getting people to vote, and increasing participation are crucial. But restoring a sense of efficacy is also important—people need to believe that if they participate, their actions matter. When you see someone with a car sign that says, “How many ways can you show contempt for me today?” it is clear they don’t feel like they matter. One thing Trump has been particularly good at is convincing people that they matter to him, at least, and that is a political gift.

I do not think we focus enough on that. Policies are important, but they are not what the average person really wants from their politicians. The lack of understanding about what government and civil society are, combined with a feeling of inefficacy, creates a toxic brew. And it is not just Trump’s core supporters who would elect him again; a whole group of other people would push him over the threshold, and that’s another concern.

The Real Threat Lies with the Powerful Figures Behind Trump

Former US President Donald Trump at a rally with VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.
Former US President Donald Trump at a rally with VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

What do you think will happen to American democracy and its democratic institutions if Trump gets elected on November the 5th?

Professor Mabel Berezin: I am deeply concerned. I mean, I am deeply concerned because of the group that he has around him. I am not as deeply concerned about Trump himself.

I do not see him as someone who thinks deeply about politics. I recognize him as a certain type—a criminal type, a con artist—who has seized the moment, as it were. But that does not mean he isn’t dangerous. He is dangerous in multiple ways, primarily because he is more interested in power than politics.

What makes him even more dangerous is the group of people around him—J.D. Vance, Elon Musk, and the Project 2025 people. I think American democracy will be in danger if these people come into power. As I said earlier, they are smart, they have a project, they have an idea, and they are going to push it through. It will be quite different. Look at the recent Supreme Court decisions about the power of the presidency.

There are others who share these concerns. If I were writing this as an academic paper with footnotes, I could cite several people who agree. Project 2025 has a website, and anyone can access it—that alone should scare you. These people are not kidding. This is not the same Trump administration as before. To me, Trump is not the main issue right now. He may get elected, and that is scary, but I’m more afraid of the people behind him.

Dr. Francesco Tamburini, a Professor of Political Science at Department of Political Sciences, Università di Pisa, Italy.

Professor Tamburini: The Absence of Ennahda Is a Bleeding Wound for Tunisian Politics

The re-election of Kais Saied on October 6, 2024, has sparked debates about the future of Tunisia’s democracy and the legacy of the Arab Spring. With only 28.8% voter turnout, the result reflects a growing disillusionment among Tunisians. Professor Francesco Tamburini examines the wider impact of Saied’s actions, drawing comparisons between Tunisia’s path and other post-revolutionary autocratic regimes in the MENA region. He emphasizes that “the absence of Ennahda is a significant loss for Tunisian politics,” noting that the lack of a moderate Islamic voice has left a deep void in the country’s political landscape.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The re-election of Kais Saied on October 6, 2024, has ignited discussions about the future of Tunisia’s democracy and the remnants of the Arab Spring. With a turnout of only 28.8%, the election result signals a growing disillusionment among the Tunisian people. As Dr. Francesco Tamburini, a Professor of Political Science at Department of Political Sciences, Università di Pisa, points out in his interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Thursday, the problem is not necessarily one of legitimacy, but rather a reflection of widespread political disaffection. “The country is in a state of economic suffering, with young people struggling to find proper jobs. Tunisia is being suffocated by a relentless economic crisis that Saied cannot solve and at the moment, no one seems to be able to address it,” Professor Tamburini notes.

A key theme of this interview is the absence of Ennahda, which Tamburini considers a “bleeding wound” for Tunisian politics. Following the 2011 Revolution, Ennahda and its leader, Rached Ghannouchi, had the opportunity to shape a vision of modern Islam combined with democratic principles. Yet, due to internal divisions and lack of experience, the party failed to govern effectively. Today, Ennahda has been sidelined and many of its intellectuals are now excluded from political life, largely due to Kais Saied’s declaration that the party is illegal. “The absence of Ennahda is a great loss for Tunisian politics. The lack of a moderate Islamic voice is a significant wound for Tunisian politics today,” Professor Tamburini asserts.

In this wide-ranging interview, Professor Tamburini delves into the broader implications of Saied’s actions, comparing Tunisia’s trajectory with other post-revolutionary autocratic consolidations in the MENA region. He explores how Tunisia, once an exception in the Arab Spring, now faces the challenge of maintaining democratic institutions amidst growing authoritarian tendencies.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Francesco Tamburini with some edits.

The Colonial Influence Remains Deep in the MENA Region

Professor Tamburini, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your research on African and Middle Eastern politics, how do you see colonial legacies influencing contemporary political structures and governance challenges in these regions?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: The impact of colonial legacies in the Maghreb and Mashreq—that is, Northern Africa and the Middle East (MENA)—is profound and continues to shape the nations in these areas. In many cases, there was a lack of a true watan (nation-state) before colonialism, and this absence has left a mark. To this day, tribal identities often take precedence over national ones, as we see in places like Libya or Iraq. Take Libya, for example: before the Italian invasion during the colonial era, Libya did not exist as a unified state. Later, Muammar Gaddafi attempted to establish a Jamahiriya, but it never became a real state in the traditional sense.

Many countries, after independence, relied on the French Fifth Republic and its semi-presidential form of government. Even Morocco, a constitutional monarchy, heavily relied on French law. The colonial influence is still very deep, even today, starting from the former government structures and, for example, the influence of civil law. This is a fundamental creation of Western culture and Western jurisprudence.

You have examined authoritarian regimes and their role in state stability. In your view, what are the key factors that sustain authoritarian rule in some states while leading to collapse in others?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: I would start by saying that all regimes are very different and have very few common patterns. What is certain is that many regimes use Islam as a source of legitimation and even stability. The fear of anarchy and disorder, instilled by these regimes, works as a deterrent. For example, in Tunisia and Algeria, you have to consider that Algeria has enshrined in its constitution the concept of Fitna—civil strife. Constitutional law in Algeria forbids Fitna, so the government is seen as a protection against civil war and disorder. Islam serves as a way of avoiding this kind of chaos—institutional chaos.

However, sometimes this form of legitimation is not enough. The masses can overwhelm regimes that fail to provide a minimum level of welfare. So, it is very difficult for regimes to rely solely on Islam for their legitimacy.

How do international powers, such as the European Union, the United States and China, influence the political dynamics and conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East, and what are the long-term implications of their involvement?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: Well, each international actor has a different purpose, of course. The European Union, as we all know, does not have a real foreign policy because it was primarily established as an economic union. When the European Union attempts to have a unified foreign policy, it often fails due to the many differing voices within it, which generally lead to chaos. Take, for example, Viktor Orban in Hungary—his concept of the European Union is very different from that of France or northern countries like Sweden or Norway.

The main issue for the European Union is immigration. On the other hand, China is primarily interested in commerce and economic penetration. The United States is gradually retreating from the MENA region, although it remains interested in maintaining stability and preventing foreign enemies from gaining influence in the area.

Long-term foreign policy is now characterized by multiple factors. Western countries will have to face the emergence of new political and military powers, both small and medium-sized, which will reshape international relations not only in the MENA region but globally.

The State of Emergency Legitimizes an Autocratic Regime in Tunisia

In your analysis in the article titled “The Ghost of the Constitutional Review in Tunisia: Authoritarianism, Transition to Democracy, and Rule of Law,” you discuss the historical challenges Tunisia has faced in establishing an effective constitutional review system. What do you believe are the primary obstacles that have prevented Tunisia from building a stable and functional constitutional court, especially in light of its transition to democracy?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: I would divide the question into three periods: before, during and after 2011. During the Bourguiba era, from 1956 to 1987, Tunisia and Bourguiba established a constitutional control that was deemed unnecessary. The Supreme Court was considered the guarantor of the Constitution. This perception also influenced the regime of Ben Ali, who only created a constitutional court in the final period of his rule, but it was merely an advisory body. Its rulings were not binding.

After 2011, the main challenges were the lack of a working majority in the legislative branch and instability in Parliament. I would also point to the lack of a judicial tradition in constitutional control and the political immaturity in handling such a delicate issue. Essentially, Tunisia lacked the legitimacy and maturity to establish effective constitutional oversight. Even today, the Saied presidency does not support the establishment of a constitutional control system.

In your analysis in the article titled “The State of Emergency and Exception in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia: The ‘License to Kill’ the Rule of Law,” you mention that emergency powers have often been extended indefinitely in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, sometimes becoming the norm rather than the exception. What are the long-term impacts of such prolonged states of emergency on the rule of law and democratic institutions in these countries?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: At the moment, only Tunisia is under the pressure of a state of emergency, which deeply limits its ability to develop a true democratic regime. Under a state of emergency or exception, executive power can easily bypass many of the checks and balances designed to protect citizens. Moreover, civil and political rights are heavily compromised by this state of emergency.

I would recall that the state of emergency originated in France during the Fourth and Fifth Republics, but in France, it was limited by checks and balances within the Republic. Tunisia, however, does not possess these safeguards. As a result, the state of emergency legitimizes an autocratic regime, which will severely impact the country’s ability to develop a true democracy.

Kais Saied Has Free Rein to Act as He Pleases

The President of Tunisia, Kais Saied at the press conference with new Libyan Presidential Council head, Mohamed MenfiTripoli, Libya 17 March 2021

In your article “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Autocracy: Kais Saied’s ‘Constitutional Self-Coup’ in Tunisia,” you describe Kais Saied’s use of Article 80 of the Tunisian constitution as a ‘constitutional self-coup.’ To what extent do you believe this move was justified within the framework of constitutional legitimacy, and what precedent does it set for the future of Tunisian governance? 

Professor Francesco Tamburini: Article 80 is a controversial article because it empowers the President of the Republic to take measures imposing the state of emergency (Istithna’ in Arabic) in the event of an imminent danger threatening the institutions of the nation, the security and independence of the country, or hindering the regular functioning of public powers. The President can take the necessary measures to address this exceptional situation after consulting the head of the government and the president of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and informing the Constitutional Court. The President must then announce these measures in a statement to the people. That’s the theory.

The aim of these measures is to ensure the return to the regular functioning of public authorities as soon as possible. However, the broad wording of Article 80 has always raised concerns, especially due to the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes “imminent danger.” What exactly is an imminent danger? Even the nature of the measures taken remains unclear.

Moreover, was Tunisia’s political, economic, social and health crisis comparable to an imminent danger? The actions taken by the Tunisian government are difficult to reconcile with the spirit of Article 80, which explicitly denies the President the power to dissolve Parliament. Yet, Kais Saied dissolved the Parliament without any substantial obstacle. According to Article 80, the President should have consulted the Constitutional Court before such actions, but the court was not functioning at the time.

As a result, Saied had free rein to do as he pleased. Even now, without a functioning Constitutional Court, the executive power is unchecked and able to act as it desires. This is why establishing a Constitutional Court is crucial to determining what kind of misconduct can occur in the country.

Given your argument that Tunisia’s state institutions were unable to prevent Saied’s power consolidation, what are the long-term implications for Tunisia’s democratic institutions, and what measures could have been taken to reinforce these institutions against autocratic shifts?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: The legacy will be far-reaching. Tunisia is now experiencing a new form of leadership, which could be translated as “chieftainism,” emulating the regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. It’s a new kind of authoritarian regime, combined with a version of direct democracy that will likely be out of control for the reasons I explored a few moments ago.

Islamic High Councils in the Maghreb Are Part of the Bureaucratization of Religion

In your analysis at your article titled “The Islam of the Government: The Islamic High Councils in Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia,” you discuss how governments in the Maghreb use Islamic High Councils to consolidate power and strengthen national identity. How effective have these councils been in maintaining political legitimacy and control over religious discourse, especially in the face of rising Islamist movements?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: They were and have always been, fundamental in promoting a national form of Islam—the “real Islam,” as they call it. This national Islam is specific to each country, such as the “real Islam” in Algeria or Morocco, for example. These councils are part of the bureaucratization of religion, with their main task being to control religious practices and combat radicalism. They act as the state’s mouthpiece and propagate a moderate form of Islam that controls mosques, imams and religious discourse across the country.

Their primary purpose is to fight radical ideas in the religious sphere, which is crucial for preventing the spread of external religious ideologies like Shi’ism, Salafi movements or the Muslim Brotherhood—ideas seen as a counterculture to the state’s version of Islam. These external influences challenge the state’s national idea of Islam.

The Absence of Ennahda Is a Great Loss for Tunisian Politics

A large group of Tunisians gathered outside the White House in Washington, DC, on February 27, 2022, to protest the erosion of democracy in Tunisia under President Kais Saied’s administration. Photo: Phil Pasquini.

Your article discusses Tunisia’s unique trajectory as an ‘exception’ among Arab countries post-Arab Spring. How does Kais Saied’s releection and recent actions compare to other examples of autocratic consolidation in post-revolutionary contexts, particularly in the MENA region?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: Tunisia’s exception clearly emerges in its use of populism and direct democracy, which were trademarks of the propaganda during the electoral campaign. There was a strong criticism of parliamentarism and an instrumental use of religion, which attracted votes from Islamist parties, such as Ennahda. It is the use of a conservative agenda for the sake of maintaining power. That is the main distinction between Kais Saied’s trajectory and other autocratic consolidations in North Africa.

What does the re-election of Kais Saied on October 6 tell us about the future of Arab Spring? The turn-out at the election was only 28.8% which shows the overwhelming part of the population did not support Kais Saied, do you think this creates a serious problem of legitimacy?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: In my opinion, it’s not a problem of legitimacy. It’s mainly a problem of disaffection towards politics and politicians by the Tunisian population. There is a growing disillusionment with elections as a tool to solve the everyday problems of ordinary citizens. The country is in a state of economic suffering with young people struggling to find proper jobs. Tunisia is being suffocated by a relentless economic crisis that Saied cannot solve and at the moment, no one seems to be able to address it.

How do you view the role of Annahda and Gannushi in Tunisia’s transition to democracy right after the Arab Spring and then in the election of Kais Saied?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: Ennahda and Ghannouchi, immediately after the Revolution, had a very powerful chance to address Tunisia’s problems and to give the country a vision of modern Islam combined with a truly democratic spirit. They proposed the concept of Madania—a civil state that was neither an Islamic state nor a secular state, but something in between. Unfortunately, Ennahda was not able to govern the country properly due to its lack of experience. The party was and still is, very divided.

Nowadays, unfortunately, Ennahda no longer exists as a political force. Many intellectuals who were part of the party are now outside of politics, largely because Kais Saied declared the party illegal. The absence of Ennahda is a great loss for Tunisian politics, in my opinion. The lack of a moderate Islamic voice is a significant wound for Tunisian politics today. It’s a bleeding wound for the Tunisian politics.

Tom Ginsburg is the Leo Spitz Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, working on comparative and international law from an interdisciplinary perspective.

Professor Ginsburg: The Search for a ‘Strongman’ to Fix Everything Is a Naive Approach

Professor Tom Ginsburg warns against the simplistic notion that a “strongman” can solve complex political and social problems, arguing that such leaders often weaken democratic institutions by eroding trust. He discusses how authoritarian regimes manipulate international law to shield themselves from scrutiny. Despite these trends, Ginsburg remains cautiously optimistic, believing that well-established democracies can endure with vigilance and strong institutions. However, he emphasizes the need for constant global cooperation to prevent the further erosion of democratic norms and institutions.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, discusses global democratic backsliding and the rise of authoritarianism. He cautions against the simplistic notion that a “strongman” can solve complex political and social issues, emphasizing that such leaders often undermine democratic institutions and erode public trust, ultimately weakening nations rather than strengthening them. Ginsburg highlights the importance of safeguarding democracy and the critical role of strong institutions.

Professor Ginsburg underscores the importance of institutions in preserving democracy, noting that while democracies may experience backsliding, complete breakdowns are rare. He also warns of the manipulation of international law by authoritarian regimes to entrench power and diminish democratic principles. Reflecting on historical examples, Professor Ginsburg points out that many authoritarian regimes, during their first term, often present themselves as relatively moderate, only to erode institutions more effectively once they learn how to wield power. He notes that although democracies, especially established ones like the United States and France, are resilient and unlikely to break down completely, they are vulnerable to backsliding, particularly when polarization intensifies. When political opponents are seen as existential threats, the foundations of democracy can weaken.

In discussing the impact of rising authoritarianism on international law, Ginsburg highlights how authoritarian regimes are increasingly manipulating international institutions to protect themselves from scrutiny and criticism. He warns that authoritarian regimes are using international law strategically to legitimize their rule and repress opposition through tactics like exploiting vague terms such as “extremism” or “separatism.” He also mentions how some authoritarian governments have hijacked institutions like Interpol to target political opponents under the guise of legal protocols.

Despite these troubling trends, Professor Ginsburg remains cautiously optimistic about democracy’s survival in well-established systems. While authoritarianism poses serious challenges, he believes that, with vigilance, democracies will continue to endure and that the resilience of their institutions can help them weather periods of backsliding. Nonetheless, he calls for constant awareness and global cooperation to prevent the further degradation of democratic norms and international institutions.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Tom Ginsburg with some edits.

Rising Polarization Is a Major Cause of Democratic Backsliding

Professor Ginsburg, thank you so very much for joining our interview series.

Professor Tom Ginsburg: It’s my pleasure to be here. I think the work you’re doing is important.

Thank you. Let me start with the first question. You argue that there is a strong possibility that the twenty-first century will be known more as an authoritarian century than a democratic one. What are the reasons for this assumption and what impact rising authoritarianism will have on international law? Additionally, what do you think are the primary factors contributing to the global trend of democratic backsliding and constitutional erosion, and how do you see it impacting the future of global constitutionalism?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: Well, that’s quite a lot of questions! Let me start by saying that over the last three decades, wehave tended to think of democracy as something that naturally emerged through modernization theory. We haveacknowledged that throughout most of human history, governments have been undemocratic and authoritarian. But after the Cold War, it seemed like democracy was on the rise—what Samuel Huntington called the ‘Third Wave of Democratization.’

At the time, democracy appeared to be the only game in town, as people used to say. However, from where we stand now, that seems not only like a naive assumption but also quite mistaken. Democracies now seem more like a historical blip in some sense, as the world appears to be reverting to its more common state of violent conflict and authoritarianism.

Now, I would disagree with the simplicity of that assumption. I still believe that the richest, most powerful, and successful countries—those that deliver public goods to their citizens—are grounded in the will of the people. While there are a few high-performing non-democracies or limited democracies, like Singapore, which would be an excellent place to be born, these are exceptions. In such cases, there exists a kind of responsive authoritarianism.

However, in general, if you had the choice, you would want to be born in a democracy. Despite all their flaws and challenges, democracies allow us to express disappointment in our leaders, which can create a sense of existential crisis. Yet, when we look at most performance indicators, democracies still excel. Sometimes there’s a naive belief that we just need a dictator to “make the trains run on time.” But for every Singapore, there’s a Cambodia in 1975 or something equally disastrous. For every high-performing authoritarian regime, there are plenty of terrible ones. The search for a “strongman” to fix everything is almost always a naive solution, and this ties into your question about populism. The desire for a strongman rarely leads to the outcomes people hope for.

Take Tunisia, for example. It now has a weak strongman—who, ironically, was a constitutional lawyer—who took power following widespread disappointment with the democracy’s economic performance. But the result is stagnation, and people are not better off. So, overall, I support democracy and believe it will persist in countries where it is well-established. However, it is fraying, and there’s a sense of existential concern.

You also asked about the causes of democratic backsliding. There are many factors to consider, but one major cause is rising polarization. When political opponents are seen not just as people with differing opinions but as existential threats, it escalates democratic competition, eroding the institutions necessary to make democracy work. Polarization is a significant factor, fueled in part by social media, which places people into ideological bubbles.

In the United States, for example, I’m encouraged that the public seems less polarized than its leaders. Many areas of policy actually enjoy broad agreement among citizens. So, I’m not one of the more alarmist analysts who predict civil war in the US—that’s not going to happen. Most of us have family or friends on the other side of the political spectrum and we’re not going to kill each other over Donald Trump or something similar.

Finally, you asked about the impact of rising authoritarianism on international law. Indeed, this is changing rapidly before our eyes. A few years ago, I wrote about Authoritarian International Law and published a book called Democracies in International Law. In it, I pointed out that democracies and authoritarians use international law differently. Europe, for example, has built the European Union on an international legal framework that has provided public goods and fostered cross-border cooperation, including the commitment to human rights. Authoritarians, on the other hand, are less interested in these principles because they don’t trust each other and struggle with deep cooperation.

What we see in international law today is a pattern where democracies innovate—through mechanisms like transparency laws, citizens’ assemblies and administrative reforms—while authoritarians copy these innovations and repurpose them for their own ends. This repurposing is happening in international law too. Authoritarian regimes have taken over bodies like the Human Rights Council, where their main goal is to avoid criticism of themselves. Similarly, the General Assembly now has a majority of authoritarian states and this shift degrades some of the highest ideals of international law.

We also see double-speak, like Russia’s claim that its invasion of Ukraine is a defense against genocide by the Ukrainians. These kinds of manipulations are meant to confuse citizens and degrade the potential for genuine international cooperation.

I know I’ve answered many questions quickly, but I hope this provides a useful overview.

Indeed, Professor Ginsburg, thank you. In your article “The Value of ‘Tyrannophobia’,” you mention the blurred distinction between democratic backsliding and breakdown. How important is it for scholars and policymakers to clearly differentiate between the two and what criteria should be used to make this distinction effectively?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: That’s a great question. I think even talking now in 2024 compared to six years ago, our perspective has to shift somewhat. Democratic backsliding, as it turns out, is fairly common. Many democracies experience degradation in the quality of their institutions and their self-perception. However, a full democratic breakdown—meaning the end of democracy—is actually quite rare for countries like yours and mine, those that are wealthy and have long democratic histories.

Adam Przeworski, the great scholar at NYU, calculated that the probability of a wealthy country with a strong democratic history, like the United States, seeing its democracy end is infinitesimally small. And I think he’s right. Democracies like the US and France will persist; the electoral mechanisms will continue to function and the basic components of the rule of law will remain, even if they become degraded. However, the quality of democracy can decline and we may experience what is known as subnational authoritarianism in federal systems like the US.

We have seen this before. Between the end of the Civil War and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the entire southern United States was not a democracy because Black citizens were disenfranchised by various legal mechanisms. So, while the US as a whole may have been a democracy, significant regions within it were not. This kind of subnational authoritarianism could happen again because states are very powerful in our system.

But as for a full breakdown? When we look at history, democracies typically break down due to war, revolution or military coups. I don’t see any of those happening in the US or in countries like France. There are certainly revolutionaries, but they don’t have a social base and military coups are extremely unlikely in countries like ours. Civil-military relations are well-controlled here. Even with all the discussion about figures like Donald Trump, I don’t see any scenario where he or anyone else would order the military to stop an election.

In short, the oldest and strongest democracies are certainly subject to backsliding, but I don’t believe they are at serious risk of breakdown.

European Union Failed to Develop a Demos

By PX Media

In your article ‘How Authoritarians Use International Law,’ you underline that democracies have produced the grandest legal achievements including the European integration and the development of the global trade regime. You clearly see European Union as a great success. How do you explain the rise of far-right parties and their recent successes in elections in the founding members of EU like France, Italy and the Netherlands?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: That’s a great question. By the way, I happened to be living in Europe when the euro was introduced in 2000. It was fascinating because, for most ordinary people, there wasn’t much public discussion about it. I was living in the Netherlands and I found that many ordinary folks didn’t like the euro; it led to inflation and there was a sense of resentment because the decision seemed to have been made by the government without much public input.

A lot of people talk about the failure of Europe to develop a demos—a true sense of a continent-wide polity. The project, in some ways, felt technocratic and elitist. I think that’s right. It doesn’t work to have someone like Valéry Giscard d’Estaing pronounce a constitution from on high; people rejected that and rightly so. It lacked the social base necessary to sustain it.

At the same time, economically, the EU has been massively successful. It is a major global regulatory power and it has made people wealthier than they would have been otherwise. But politically, it hasn’t quite gained the legitimacy it needs. The nation-state, the idea that it would fade away, was naive. I remember reading scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter in the late 1990s and early 2000s who celebrated the European project and thought it would lead to an ever-closer union, as if it were an unstoppable machine. I was skeptical, especially because I study East Asia, where national consciousness is still very strong. There’s no sense that China or Japan, for example, would ever give up their national identities.

Even in Europe, I was somewhat skeptical. When I visited, I noticed a lack of a European identity—people still identified as Italians, French or Dutch. No one, aside from EU bureaucrats in Brussels, introduced themselves as European.

So, what does that mean? The nationalist backlash we’re seeing is healthy and we need to admit that. It’s not some kind of pathology; it reflects real feelings in society. This is important when studying populism. We shouldn’t view populism as a disease to be cured. It’s a natural political development, particularly when elites are out of touch. That’s why we’re seeing the rise of far-right parties across Europe.

The key thing is not that populist parties are running for office. In fact, in the United States, there’s a long tradition of running as a populist—every politician runs against Washington, DC. George W. Bush did it, Barack Obama did it and of course, Trump did as well. But running as a populist is different from governing as a populist. Once in office, you can’t govern like a populist.

Take Italy, for example. Giorgia Meloni leads a far-right party and she ran as a populist. But from what I see, while she pursues some far-right policies, she isn’t governing as a populist in the sense of trying to dismantle the institutional structure of the country. In fact, Italy’s institutional structure constrains her, as it has constrained every post-war leader. Italy’s constitutional order has many pathologies, and it will constrain her too.

So, the key point here is that we need to distinguish between running as a populist, which is healthy and governing as a populist, which can degrade democratic institutions.

In my book with Aziz Z. Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy (2018), we talk about the forces leading to democratic backsliding. One of those forces is what we call partisan degradation, but the key one relevant to this discussion is charismatic populism. Donald Trump embodies this—the idea that “I alone can fix everything” and that anyone or any institution that stands between me and the people must be eliminated. That kind of rhetoric can lead to actions that destroy institutions and the fact is, for constitutional democracy to succeed, you need strong institutions.

That’s why I’m against governing as a populist.

Authoritarian Constitutional Systems Are Incredibly Diverse

The concept of ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ has gained traction in the academic literature, describing regimes that use constitutional tools to consolidate power. How do you distinguish between genuine constitutionalism and its authoritarian use and what role do international and domestic actors play in challenging or supporting these regimes?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: Hmm! That’s an interesting question. First of all, I think the term authoritarian constitutionalism is valid. It can represent a genuine form of constitutionalism. For instance, Britain, until the Reform Act of 1832, had a constitutional system, albeit a non-democratic one. So, we shouldn’t assume that constitutionalism only applies to liberal democracies. Just because a system isn’t a liberal constitutional democracy—which is itself a rare phenomenon—doesn’t mean there isn’t constitutionalism. Power can still be constrained in meaningful ways.

Take Thailand, for example. It’s not a strong democracy—certainly not at the moment, with political parties being banned and other such measures. Yet, the military-backed leader stepped down after eight years, as required by the Constitution. This means the text constrained the power holder, which is a form of constitutionalism, even though it’s not liberal constitutionalism. So, I tend to think of authoritarian constitutionalism as a broader category where power is constrained, even in non-democratic settings.

Mark Tushnet wrote about authoritarian constitutionalism, using Singapore as a case. But I wasn’t entirely convinced by that example. What he meant was a regime that is still authoritarian but not too bad. However, true constitutionalism requires a deeper examination of the actual mechanisms in place—such as the role of constraining institutions. It’s fascinating to study because there are so many variations. The famous Tolstoy quote comes to mind: “Every happy family is alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Similarly, authoritarian constitutional systems are incredibly diverse—perhaps even more so than constitutional democracies.

Now, when it comes to the role of the international community, I hold a fairly thin view of international law. I don’t believe there’s a right to democracy under international law. States are required to observe basic human rights, but there’s no legal obligation for them to be democratic. It would be problematic if international law insisted on democracy, as it would render many members of the international community illegitimate. Historically, the majority of governments have not been democratic.

What can international law do, then? There are examples of international efforts to keep backsliding democracies from completely derailing or to hold authoritarian regimes accountable to some degree. One example is Poland under the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Since they took power, they’ve engaged in institutional takeovers, especially of the courts, which created friction with European law. The EU has mechanisms like Article 7 and Article 2 processes, and while they didn’t stop the PiS from consolidating power, they helped prevent things from going too far off the rails. Being part of the EU gave the Polish opposition space to organize, and they eventually won the recent election. PiS may return to power, but the point is that democracy didn’t completely collapse in Poland.

Hungary is a different story. Of course, we don’t really know for sure, but the playing field there seems extremely tilted and it’s plausible that Viktor Orbán may remain in power for the rest of his life. Fortunately, it seems the European Union has become more aware of the situation. However, you also see examples in Latin America and Africa where courts play a role on the margins. While they may not save democracy entirely, they help keep space open for opposition to organize and prevent the worst outcomes, stopping the country from devolving into one of the truly oppressive dictatorships wehave seen too many times throughout history.

Constant Vigilance Needed to Prevent Authoritarian Hijacking of International Legal Institutions

The symbol of United Nations Human Rights Council. Photo: Shutterstock.

In your article “How Authoritarians Use International Law,” you discuss how authoritarian regimes are increasingly using international law to legitimize their rule and shield themselves from criticism. How effective has this strategy been in reshaping international norms and what can democratic states do to counter this manipulation?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: I do think we are seeing the manipulation of international law. One clear example is explicitly authoritarian cooperation, like in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the Eurasian institutions that Vladimir Putin set up as counterweights to the European Union.

One of the key tactics these organizations use is cooperation on internal security issues. In my article, I mention the creation of new international norms, such as labeling crimes like extremism and separatism. These terms have been defined by authoritarian regimes in a way that can criminalize anything from advocating for LGBT rights to seeking greater autonomy for regions like Tibet. These are now international norms in those regions, with enforcement mechanisms. If I, as a government, label you an extremist or separatist, other countries in the group are obligated to arrest and extradite you. These terms are vague, but they have real teeth and are being used to reinforce domestic dictatorships while binding them more closely in their shared projects.

Another concern is the degradation of human rights norms, such as the rise of concepts like human rights with Chinese characteristics. I previously mentioned the Human Rights Council and the kinds of cases they focus on. A while back, there was a proposal before the Human Rights Council for a norm against the defamation of religion. Traditionally, defamation is an individual-level crime—if you say something false about me, I can seek legal recourse. But this proposal aimed to extend defamation protections to religions themselves. The driving force behind this was the desire to prevent the denigration of Islam, though it included other religions as well. This is inconsistent with democratic norms of free speech.

Suddenly, the focus of human rights shifts from humans to religions. That’s a profound shift—what does it even mean? Who speaks for the religion? These are subtle but significant changes in international law that deserve close scrutiny.

Another example is the abuse of institutions like Interpol. Authoritarian regimes have been using Interpol’s red notices to target political opponents who haven’t committed any real crimes, forcing them to be arrested internationally under the guise of legal protocol. This is a clear abuse of international systems and it shows just how important it is to pay attention to who controls institutions like Interpol. The Chinese government, for instance, had made significant inroads into influencing Interpo and Western powers were somewhat asleep at the wheel. Fortunately, they have started to wake up to the risk of such institutions becoming politicized and used for authoritarian purposes.

This is why it requires constant vigilance, advocacy, and awareness from democratic states. We need to ensure that international legal institutions are not hijacked by authoritarian regimes for their own ends.

Democracy Will Endure Under Another Trump Administration

How could a possible Trump victory on November the 5th impact American democracy? There are those who are very concerned and there are those who argue that American democracy will survive another Trump administration. Where do you stand at this debate?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: I have two views on this. First, we in the United States tend to not look much at the rest of the world—we’re quite inward-looking and sometimes a bit arrogant in that sense. But if we did pay attention to global experiences, we’d have reasons to be very concerned.

If you look at other countries where democracy has been eroded, many leaders had a first term that wasn’t so bad. Some people say, “We survived Trump once; it’s no problem, the institutions held.” But look at examples like Viktor Orbán in Hungary. His first term was relatively moderate—he governed as a reasonable nationalist. Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland didn’t show clear signs of trying to dismantle the country’s institutions initially. Even Narendra Modi’s BJP had a more normal first term in government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

The pattern is that during their second time in power, these leaders learn how to use the machinery of government more effectively to consolidate power and undermine institutions. So from that perspective, I think we should be very worried about a second Trump administration.

But here we have to think about who this character is and what his motivations are. The Supreme Court has been very helpful to Trump. They have given him a very expansive notion of immunity and they allowed him to remain on the ballot despite some efforts by certain states to remove him. They’re not going to be much of a constraint on him.

Now, what exactly is he threatening to do? I think it’s clear he’s going to use the justice system to go after his political opponents. He’s said he will, so we might as well believe him. The key question then becomes: is the justice system capable of withstanding that kind of politicization? In the end, I think it is, but I certainly wouldn’t want to be one of his political opponents.

The way it works here is that Trump can direct national prosecutors. While they have norms of independence, those are just norms. He can tell them, “I want you to prosecute Biden, or I’ll fire you,” and if they refuse, they get fired and someone else is appointed who is willing to do it. I think that’s likely to happen. The question is, will it work? It will definitely cost those prosecuted a lot of money and cause harassment and it will degrade public confidence in the legal system. It’s a terrible situation.

But at the end of the day, in this country, you need judges and a jury to secure a conviction. I don’t see fake charges getting very far. Yes, Trump has appointed a lot of judges, but so has Biden. Biden has been very quick in appointing judges and right now, about half of the appeals court judges are appointed by Democrats and half by Republicans. The lower courts lean more towards Democratic appointees. So, judges are not partisan to the point where they will just do whatever Trump says.

I also don’t expect him to try to stay in power after another four years. He’s old, and he might want his children to run for office. If he tries to stay on, that would ruin their chances, so I don’t see that being part of his motivation.

So, what are my biggest fears? My biggest concerns are policy-related, particularly around immigration. It’s going to be very, very ugly. They have promised to establish large detention camps for immigrants and round people up. That will be terrible to witness. While it’s a human rights issue, it’s not necessarily anti-democratic since it’s a popular policy with a segment of the electorate.

I also worry about the administrative state. They may discourage career bureaucrats, especially those working in agencies like the EPA, to the point where they quit, reducing state capacity. That would be very bad for democracy.

But I don’t see democracy itself ending. So, in some sense, I have a mixed answer. I’m certainly not the biggest Trump fan and I do worry about American democratic institutions. I think Trump is bad for them, but I don’t believe he will end them.

That being said, it still requires vigilance. One last point to mention is that we are a federal country, which means most law enforcement is local and state-run. The states are very divided. For example, California has a bigger economy than France and there’s very little Trump could do to change what happens there in any significant way.

So yes, democracy will survive.

State-Level Prosecutions of a President Can Set a Dangerous Precedent

Former US President Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

In your recent article ‘Trump is gearing up for lawfare,’ you argue that Trump, if elected, will instrumentalize and politicize the prosecution. In a system of solid check-and-balance, how can Trump possible achieve his goal?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: That’s a great question. I touched on this a bit earlier, but let me go into more detail.

During President Richard Nixon’s time in office, specifically around the Watergate scandal where he was caught spying on his opponents, he sought to control the prosecutors. Nixon fired people until he found someone willing to follow his orders. Eventually, after Nixon resigned, a new Attorney General came in and aimed to restore dignity to the office, putting in place very detailed internal rules before prosecutions could happen at the federal level. These rules became internal norms at the Justice Department, helping to regulate the prosecution process.

Now, a president like Trump has the authority to hire and fire an Attorney General at will. I believe he will appoint someone willing to overrule some of these norms to carry out certain key prosecutions, for example, going after Biden. However, the law itself still constrains what can be done and there are limits. That said, even though a president has the power to appoint a compliant Attorney General, there are checks in place that would make this difficult to pull off effectively on a large scale.

One of my bigger fears, though, is something we’ve already seen on the Democratic side. In New York State, for example, the Attorney General ran for office on a platform that included prosecuting Trump and she did manage to get a judgment against him. Then, there was Alvin Bragg, the New York City District Attorney, who prosecuted Trump on fraud charges and won. Trump is now a convicted criminal, which is unprecedented for someone running for office.

However, I’m not a big fan of that prosecution. If you ask the average American what Trump was prosecuted for, they likely wouldn’t be able to explain it and even many lawyers would find the legal theory behind the case to be a stretch. Technically, yes, it was a violation of the law, but my concern is that state-level prosecutions, especially involving a president or former president, can set a dangerous precedent. Even when presidents commit wrongdoing, I believe they should be subject to a different standard than the average citizen.

This is controversial to say, but I think presidents deserve a bit more leeway because there is another mechanism of accountability—political accountability. The law should not be a substitute for political accountability, and sometimes pursuing legal accountability can undermine it. If the public wants to elect someone who has committed a crime, like Donald Trump, they will. When prosecutions are poorly understood or seem politically motivated, they can damage public trust in the justice system.

I worry about these state-level prosecutions and if Trump’s attempts to prosecute Biden are unsuccessful, you may still see state-level prosecutions being weaponized. That’s not good. It further politicizes the justice system, and in many countries, once this starts, it’s hard to reverse. So, yes, I do worry about this.

Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider, Assistant Professor at the Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna.

Professor Ausserladscheider: Austria Is an Exceptional Case Where Neoliberalism Was a Project of Far-Right Politics

Underscoring that Austria represents a unique case where neoliberalism has been driven by far-right politics—a phenomenon not commonly seen in other European contexts—Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider reflects on the FPÖ’s historical trajectory. She explains how the party, initially founded by former National Socialists, positioned itself as a pro-business, liberal alternative to the dominant Socialist and Conservative parties. This liberal economic stance was integrated into government policies when the FPÖ gained power, particularly during its coalition government in the early 2000s, introducing neoliberal measures such as deregulation and market liberalization. “What we’ve seen in Austria,” Professor Ausserladscheider notes, “is an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an engaging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider, Assistant Professor at the Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna, delves into the complex dynamics of far-right populism and neoliberalism in Austria. She underscores that Austria represents a unique case where neoliberalism has been driven by far-right politics, a phenomenon not commonly seen in other European contexts.

Reflecting on the historical trajectory of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Professor Ausserladscheider explains how the party, initially founded by former National Socialists, positioned itself as a pro-business, liberal alternative to the dominant Socialist and Conservative parties. This liberal economic stance was carried into government policies when the FPÖ entered power, especially during its coalition government in the early 2000s, introducing neoliberal policies such as deregulation and market liberalization. “What we’ve seen in Austria,” she notes, “is an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking.”

The professor also addresses the normalization of far-right parties across Europe, emphasizing the shift in the political spectrum, where far-right positions have become increasingly mainstream. She points to recent electoral successes of the FPÖ, mirroring trends seen in Italy, France, and the Netherlands, which indicate a broader European shift that raises concerns about the effectiveness of measures like the cordon sanitaire. “The FPÖ has long been a role model for other far-right populist movements, influencing the political landscape far beyond Austria,” Professor Ausserladscheider states.

Professor Ausserladscheider also highlights the strategic use of economic nationalism and socioeconomic insecurities by far-right parties, which integrates cultural and economic factors to mobilize support effectively. She warns of the dangers of these developments, noting that while far-right populism often challenges liberal democratic values, it simultaneously adopts neoliberal policies, creating what she terms “exclusionary neoliberalism.” This duality, as she explains, is both a tool for political mobilization and a mechanism for reshaping the economic landscape.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider with some edits.

Rise in FPÖ Votes Most Evident in ‘Left-Behind’ Areas

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: What role do economic inequality and social marginalization play in the appeal of populist and far-right movements in Austria, and how have these factors been exploited by political parties like the FPÖ?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think socioeconomic insecurities and inequalities play a huge role in any kind of party competition and electoral turnout. And, of course, this is also the case for the FPÖ in Austria. Rather than calling it economic inequality and social marginalization, I would frame it under the term socioeconomic insecurities because, very often, it’s a complex set of intertwining factors. Some of these factors might be related to a generally unstable economic situation, which leads to increased perceived insecurities among voters. This means they might be more easily targeted by the FPÖ’s mobilization efforts.

Geography is actually a very good indicator for this. In the recent Austrian elections, we observed a significant gap between people who voted in rural areas versus those who voted in urban places. As some new political science studies suggest, there are “left-behind” places that experience various issues, such as inequality, marginalization, or infrastructural poverty. It’s precisely in these areas that you see a rise in FPÖ votes.

What the FPÖ does is target these specific areas strategically. For example, you’ll see significantly more campaign posters in these areas than in some districts in Vienna because they see a greater chance of mobilizing these electorates. This strategy works well in their favor, and they often suggest that all of these insecurities and economic dissatisfactions are the fault of the centrist parties, political elites, and, very often, migrants. In the FPÖ’s case, this is their key mobilization strategy. The targeting and strategic mobilization are very effective for them, unfortunately.

Connections Between Populism and Business Elites

Signboard of “Bank Austria” in Vienna, January 29, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

What is the relationship between populism and business elites in the context of the global rise of populist parties and actors? How do you perceive the relationship between populism and business elites in Austria? Has the rise of populist parties influenced the strategies and behaviors of Austrian businesses?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: The link between populism and business is an important one, and I think we see this particularly well in the US, especially with the way Trump is supported by various business elites. The most recent example is Elon Musk’s very open support for the Trump campaign. We see this kind of support across the board, but I don’t think it’s a straightforward phenomenon. It’s not simply that all businesses are pro-populism. In fact, it’s much more complicated. Some businesses are actively opposed to the far-right and explicitly express that stance.

Here, we observe a clear rift, particularly among businesses interested in international and transnational trade. They are concerned that if far-right populist leaders like Donald Trump come into power and implement trade tariffs, it could create significant problems for their businesses.

In the specific case of Austria, we have seen in the past that there are links between business and the FPÖ. However, as I mentioned, it’s not as pronounced or tangible as in the American context, which is a representative example. But these links do exist. One of the best examples is the recent announcement that Barbara Kolm will be in Parliament for the FPÖ. Barbara Kolm is the leader of the Hayek Institute in Vienna and was previously the president of several important economic organizations in Austria. As such, she is an important figure within the business network. So yes, there are connections.

In your analysis, you mention that right-wing populism can lead to policy decisions that both challenge and benefit business interests. Could you elaborate on how this duality has manifested in Austrian politics, particularly in relation to the FPÖ?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think we can go back roughly 20 years, to the second time the FPÖ was in power, from 2000 until 2006. Within that coalition with the Conservatives, the FPÖ implemented many business-friendly regulations and also deregulated some sectors, which were beneficial for businesses. This instance shows a significant internationalization of some market sectors within Austria, partially due to Austria’s entry into the European Union in the late nineties, becoming a member of the common market. However, the FPÖ also pushed for business-friendly policies during this period.

At the same time, when the FPÖ entered the government, it was still a novelty to have far-right populists in power, which is, unfortunately, no longer the case today. This novelty led many European member states to impose barriers on trade cooperation with Austria because they found it unacceptable to engage in bilateral or multilateral agreements with a country led by a far-right populist government.

So, the impact can go both ways. However, times have changed, and we have seen a significant mainstreaming and normalization of far-right actors in power. Therefore, I no longer expect this duality to be as pronounced as it was at the beginning of the 2000s.

Neoliberalism as a Far-Right Project in Austria

How and to what extent does far-right populism impact the nation-specific implementation of neoliberal policymaking? What role do far-right populists play in economic policy change? On this topic what does Austrian experience (FPÖ) tell us?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think there are several facets to this, making it quite a complex phenomenon. In economic sociology and political economy, we discuss institutional change—how institutions change, and specifically, how institutions like the state change. The state is a key institution in any political economy. As soon as new governing parties implement different economic policies, you will ultimately see economic policy change. This is not specific to any particular party; it’s inherent to the structure of our liberal democracy.

However, what we have not quite understood until recently, or what has been overlooked, is the power of parties and political forces perceived to be at the margins of the political spectrum—those at the edges. This is no longer entirely true, as we are now witnessing a significant mainstreaming and shift in the political spectrum’s center, which I am happy to discuss further later on.

When the FPÖ came to power in Austria, we saw an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking in a European country. I describe this as neoliberalization. In the early 2000s, partly due to Austria’s entry into the European Union but also because of the FPÖ’s leadership in government, particularly in the Finance Ministry, we saw immense deregulation and the neoliberalization of markets driven by the FPÖ. Until that point, we only understood neoliberalization as a force coming from the center-right rather than the far-right. Austria presents an exceptional case where neoliberalism was a project of far-right politics.

Given your focus on the supply-side of political strategies, how do you see far-right parties in Austria using economic nationalist discourse to frame their policies and mobilize voter support differently than other European countries?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: The way I describe economic nationalism is as a combination of cultural and economic factors that are often tied to economic policies presented as being in the national interest or aligned with national identities. Since nationalism is nation-specific, I would expect that economic nationalism in Italy, for example, would look different from economic nationalism in Austria. It doesn’t necessarily have to be different; similar policies can be described as being in the national interest of any country. 

However, because of the national specificity within economic nationalism, it differs in the sense that Austria’s economic nationalism will have its unique characteristics. This is related to what we call methodological nationalism. Of course, we also observe similarities across different cases, such as the resurgence of policy instruments like trade tariffs—long thought to be obsolete in our globalized economy—that are now being implemented again. So, while economic nationalism doesn’t have to differ drastically between nations, discursively, it is distinct as it appeals to the unique national characteristics of each country.

How do you analyze the link between the rise of far-right parties and economic nationalism beyond economic insecurity and cultural backlash? 

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: One key development, particularly after the great financial crisis of 2008, is that many political economies, especially in cases like Austria, have used economic nationalism as a means to, in a way, rescue neoliberalism. Shortly after the crisis, many countries implemented Keynesian-style demand-side economics, indicating a strong return to demand-side strategies to support economic recovery.

In far-right populist terms, these strategies have often been framed as, or have taken the form of, economic nationalism. Thus, economic nationalism can also be seen as a tool for neoliberal policymaking to maintain stability and persist, even in times of crisis.

Links Between Socioeconomic Insecurities and Cultural Backlash

Jörg Haider, ex-leader of the FPÖ, delivering a speech at Viktor Adler Markt in Vienna, Austria, on June 11, 2004. Photo: Shutterstock.

You argue that the existing literature often separates cultural and economic explanations for far-right support. What methodological approaches would you recommend to better capture the interconnectedness of these factors in studying far-right populism?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think one approach is to examine the supply side of political strategies. If you listen to far-right populists and read their programs, you can clearly see that their cultural backlash arguments—such as claims of losing national identity, displacing traditional norms and values, or losing the Austrian way of life—are often tied to economic visions. For example, anti-immigration slogans are frequently justified through economic concerns like resource scarcity or the potential loss of jobs for Austrians. These discursive and rhetorical constructs effectively integrate cultural and economic values as part of their mobilization discourse.

On the other hand, examining the demand side through public opinion studies, such as surveys and electoral polls, can also be insightful. Researchers in this area have shown links between socioeconomic insecurities and sentiments that may relate to cultural backlash. For instance, Noam Gidron and Peter Hall´s study on the politics of social status highlight the economic-cultural linkages in voters’ opinions. These connections become clearer when viewed in relation to one another. However, many supply-side studies still tend to separate these factors. I believe that demonstrating their interconnection can reveal these concurrent effects more effectively.

In your newly published book ‘Far right populism and the making of exclusionary neoliberal state,’ you basically argue that neoliberalism appeared first as a project of the far right. We study populism as the embodiment of illiberal values which at the first glance seems to be contradictory with your assessment. Can you explain how neoliberalism has been a product of far-right populism?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: Neoliberalism has indeed been a product of far-right populism, at least in the case of Austria, although this may not be true across the board. In Austria, you can see quite clearly that after the Second World War, the FPÖ was founded by former National Socialists, who mobilized as a liberal counterweight to the two other core parties at the time: the Conservatives, who were focused on conserving the status quo, and the Socialists, who represented the workers’ interests. The FPÖ sought to provide this liberal counterweight and promoted pro-business policies that the Conservatives were not advocating for. They also supported European integration, which was a novel position in the Austrian political spectrum at that time.

When neoliberalism began to rise in the 1980s, particularly in the US and the UK, it was actually the FPÖ in Austria that adopted these ideas and brought them into government in 1983. For a brief period in that year, they were the junior coalition partner to the Socialists, who had lost their majority after 12 years in power due to the economic impact of the oil crisis. This opened the door for the FPÖ to introduce neoliberal ideas into Austrian politics.

In contrast, in the UK, it was Margaret Thatcher, a Conservative, who championed neoliberalism, and in the US, it was Ronald Reagan, a Republican. So, while these classic conservative forces brought neoliberalism to power in other countries, in Austria, it was the FPÖ.

I think this is the story of Austria that they have adopted these ideas. Yes, it might seem contradictory in the sense that we describe far-right populists as illiberal when they actually promote neoliberal policies. However, when we refer to these forces as illiberal, we mean that they pose a threat to liberal democracy, which is, of course, true. There is evidence of them implementing policies that clearly contradict the foundations of liberal democracies.

What I think we’ve overlooked, though, is that this also includes an economic ideology, and that ideology can indeed be neoliberal. Some authors describe this as “authoritarian neoliberalism,” while I use the term “exclusionary neoliberalism.” You see this specific strain of exclusion when neoliberalism is promoted by far-right populists.

What is the significance of FPÖ’s victory in the parliamentary elections in terms of far-right parties both in Austria and Europe? Do you think ‘cordonne sanitaire’ still holds?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think it’s a very important development. For a long time, especially since the 1980s and 1990s, the FPÖ has been a role model for far-right parties across Europe. The leader of the Austrian Freedom Party at the time, Jörg Haider, who took leadership in 1986 and led the FPÖ to significant electoral success in the 1990s, was instrumental in this. We even talked about the “Haiderization” of Europe—a concept referring to this new brand of populism that was adopted by other populist parties beyond Austria.

In many ways, the Austrian Freedom Party has been, and continues to be, a model for far-right populism across Europe. Austria’s recent electoral success mirrors what we’ve seen in Italy, the Netherlands, France, and increasingly in regional elections in Germany. This indicates a broader shift occurring in Europe, which is particularly concerning, especially considering efforts to block these parties have not been very effective.

The Far-Right Becoming Normalized and Mainstream

European Union’s reaction to FPÖ’s victory in 1999 and 2024 are quite different. This time around EU has not reacted to the victory of FPÖ in alarmist terms. Do you think far-right parties have been mainstreamed in Europe in the last couple of years?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: Yes, massively. We’ve seen several things happening simultaneously. To talk about the socioeconomic context, ever since the great financial crisis of 2008, there has been a lot of economic instability across various countries. That instability was further exacerbated by several events, particularly in 2014-2015 when there was a significant influx of migrants, which far-right parties used as a mobilizing tool. Then we had the pandemic, inflation, and now a slight recession. This context has created fertile ground for far-right populists to mobilize.

At the same time, there has been a shift in party competition, with more and more conservative politicians seeking to attract far-right voters. They tried to win votes on far-right issues, but the problem with that strategy is that people tend to choose the original. If voters want a nationalist, exclusionary party, they are likely to go for the FPÖ, AfD, Marine Le Pen, and others like them. This shift in party competition has effectively moved the entire political spectrum to the right, even leading centrist parties to try and mobilize on similar issues, such as immigration, though often unsuccessfully.

This rightward shift in the entire political spectrum has made the far-right appear less extreme. We have seen a huge normalization of far-right powers in government, starting with Austria as a role model, as I mentioned earlier, and then spreading to other countries. We saw Brexit, influenced heavily by Nigel Farage and UKIP; Trump’s presidency in the US; Giorgia Meloni governing in Italy; and three separate instances of the FPÖ governing in Austria.

As a result, the far-right now seems more normalized and mainstream, particularly as countries like Austria are still considered liberal democracies. If we can conceive of a far-right populist government operating within a liberal democracy, it contributes to the perception that these movements are more normal and mainstream.

Dr. Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany.

Professor Roesel: FPÖ Will Remain a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

Highlighting that the success of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with origins tracing back to the post-World War I period, Professor Felix Roesel argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence both before and after World War II. According to Professor Roesel, the continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany, provides an in-depth analysis of the political landscape in Austria, specifically focusing on the rise and entrenchment of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Professors Roesel argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He discusses how the FPÖ has effectively capitalized on Austria’s distinct historical context, conservative traditions, and societal anxieties to secure its place in the Austrian parliament for decades.

Professor Roesel highlights that the FPÖ’s success is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with its origins tracing back to the post-World War I period. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence before and after World War II. The continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.

Moreover, Professor Roesel emphasizes the FPÖ’s anti-establishment and anti-immigration rhetoric as key factors in its continued success. During the 1980s, under the leadership of Jörg Haider, the FPÖ transformed from a minor political party into a significant force, gaining widespread support through its anti-establishment stance. This approach resonated with Austrians who felt disillusioned by the two dominant parties—the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP)—which had controlled Austrian politics since the post-1945 period. Haider’s populist strategy of appealing to those excluded by the political mainstream, combined with anti-immigration narratives, positioned the FPÖ as a viable alternative for disaffected voters.

Professor Roesel also sheds light on Austria’s unique political system, known as ‘Proporz,’ which historically ensured that both major parties were represented in various aspects of everyday life, creating the perception that there was little difference between them. This lack of differentiation provided the FPÖ an opportunity to position itself as an outsider and criticize the system, further appealing to voters dissatisfied with the status quo.

Looking ahead, Professor Roesel foresees that the FPÖ will remain a significant and permanent force in Austrian politics, as its deep-rooted historical connections, strategic adaptations, and appeal to nationalist sentiments continue to resonate with a substantial portion of the Austrian electorate.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Felix Roesel with some edits.

Many Post-War Parties in Austria Had Direct Links to the Nazi Party

You argue that right-wing populism in Austria has deep historical roots. What historical factors have contributed to the enduring appeal of far-right populism in Austria, and how do these differ from populist movements in other European countries? Could you also elaborate on these historical roots and how they have shaped the modern-day FPÖ?

Professor Felix Roesel: That’s a very good question. Austria is quite distinct compared to other European countries. While many countries have seen a rise in far-right parties, what sets Austria apart is its long-standing tradition of far-right politics. Even during Austria’s first democratic period, following World War I, there was a significant far-right camp. At that time, there was a Conservative camp mainly aligned with the Catholic Church and the Workers’ Party on the left, but also a very strong far-right camp that advocated for Austria’s annexation into Germany, envisioning a larger pan-German state.

This far-right tradition was already well-established before World War II, with the Nazi Party being part of this camp. After World War II, many of those who established the new party structure in Austria had direct links to the Nazi Party. For instance, the first leader of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) after the war was a former SS member. This continuity from the pre-war period is significant and distinguishes Austria from other countries, such as France’s Rassemblement National or Italy’s Lega, which are more modern parties without predecessors in the pre-war era.

If we compare voting results before and after World War II, we see strong connections and a continuity of far-right influence. In Austria, there has consistently been a far-right party in Parliament in every election since World War II, which is quite different from other countries where far-right parties have only surged recently.

How has the rise of populism in Austrian politics over the past few decades impacted the country’s political landscape, particularly with regard to the success of far-right parties like the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)? 

Professor Felix Roesel: The FPÖ has successfully dominated the political agenda for several years, particularly with its focus on immigration, which has been its most significant topic since the 1980s. A unique aspect of Austria is that, in the 1970s and 1980s, the two major parties—the Conservative Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)—were incredibly dominant. They were influential in all aspects of society, even down to sports clubs, which were often aligned with either party. You had to take a stand, either supporting the center-right or the center-left, and those unwilling to identify with either were left behind. There was a growing perception that the country was ruled by these two parties, creating a sense of exclusion among those who didn’t align with them.

The FPÖ capitalized on this sentiment by effectively introducing an anti-establishment narrative. They positioned themselves as the alternative to the two main parties, and this anti-mainstream, populist rhetoric resonated with many people. The two main components of the FPÖ’s success are its strong stance on anti-immigration and its anti-establishment messaging—classic populist elements.

This approach proved effective, influencing even the moderate right-wing party, the ÖVP, under Sebastian Kurz, who shifted their policies further to the right, especially on immigration. The FPÖ has had a significant impact on the political debate in Austria, pushing the entire political spectrum to address these populist themes.

The ‘Proporz’ System May Have Contributed to the Rise of the Far-Right

Could you please explain what ‘Proporz’ stand for and how do you think it evolved in the past several decades?

Professor Felix Roesel: ‘Proporz’ is a specific Austrian system where both major parties were historically represented across all aspects of everyday life. This ranged from sports clubs to institutions like workers’ associations. Essentially, there was always a “red” (Social Democrat) and a “black” (Conservative) representation. Moreover, Austria had all-party governments at the state and local levels, though not at the federal level. In these cases, council elections determined the composition of the government, with all parties represented rather than forming classic coalitions. This ensured that both major parties had a share—if you will—of influence and positions in local and state governments.

This system created the impression that it didn’t matter who people voted for because, in the end, both major parties were guaranteed representation in the government. This lack of differentiation between the two parties may have contributed to the rise of the far-right, as parties like the FPÖ could criticize the ‘Proporz’ system and position themselves as the true alternative to the established order.

You argue that Austria’s main far-right party FPÖ is one of the most successful and prominent cases worldwide. Could you elaborate on the peculiar reasons why FPÖ has been so successful?

Professor Felix Roesel: There are several reasons but let me highlight a few. First, there are the historical roots. Austria had a strong far-right camp even before World War II, and it was easy for the FPÖ to connect with this legacy after the war. Secondly, Austria is a very traditional and conservative country, making it easier for a far-right party to resonate by promoting traditional values such as family.

Additionally, Austria has a long history of immigration, including workers from Germany and other countries, long before Germany itself experienced such immigration waves. This made immigration a significant issue in Austrian politics early on, and the FPÖ has consistently leveraged this topic to gain support.

Lastly, Jörg Haider played a pivotal role in the FPÖ’s success. He was instrumental in popularizing populist ideas in the 1980s by combining an anti-establishment stance with anti-minority rhetoric. While the specific minority groups targeted have changed over time, the anti-establishment narrative remained a constant. Haider was a political entrepreneur who identified and filled a gap left by other parties, which explains why this development happened in Austria earlier than in many other countries.

Jörg Haider’s Focus on Immigration Built a Broader Voter Base

Jörg Haider, ex-leader of the FPÖ, delivering a speech at Viktor Adler Markt in Vienna, Austria, on June 11, 2004. Photo: Shutterstock.

You underline that the two main and dominant Austrian parties in the post-1945 period are the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP). Both parties accounted for up to 95% of all votes until the early 1980s, but their vote shares have declined significantly since then. What happened in 1980s that led to the rise of FPÖ? 

Professor Felix Roesel: I would really emphasize the role of Jörg Haider. He understood how to effectively use populist slogans, transforming the FPÖ from a small party with around 4-6% of the vote into one that gained 20-25% from election to election. It was Haider who made the FPÖ a major political force.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, immigration began increasing, or at least reached levels where it became visible to the general public, making it an accessible topic for political mobilization. However, in the very beginning, Haider didn’t focus much on immigration. Instead, he concentrated on an anti-establishment message: if you didn’t want to align with one of the two big parties, the FPÖ was the alternative, positioning itself as outside the system. This message was very attractive at the time.

It’s also important to note that, before this period, there were hardly any other coalitions other than grand coalitions between the two dominant parties at the federal level. This created a perception among many people that there was no way to avoid the dominance of these two big parties in government. The FPÖ’s anti-establishment stance appealed to those who felt disillusioned with this arrangement.

Later, Haider incorporated anti-immigration rhetoric, which became a central theme. Interestingly, early on, there were some connections or references to the Nazi era, but Haider quickly realized this did not gain widespread support. He found that focusing on immigration was much more effective in building a broader voter base.

In what ways have populist and far-right parties in Austria influenced the mainstream political parties like SPÖ and ÖVP? Have these influences led to shifts in policy or political discourse?

Professor Felix Roesel: Yes, certainly. In particular, the immigration issue has seen a significant shift. The Conservative party, especially under the leadership of former party leader Sebastian Kurz, heavily changed its stance in response to the success of the FPÖ. Kurz adopted policies similar to those promoted by the FPÖ, making it clear that the far-right party had a substantial impact in this area.

As for the government, the FPÖ has been part of the coalition several times. However, when it comes to actual policy impact during their time in government, we do not see major policy shifts. While their involvement led to political consequences, such as scandals—many of which are still unresolved—their influence on concrete policy changes was limited, primarily because they served as a junior partner in these coalitions. The real question now is what will happen in Austria moving forward.

FPÖ’s Nazi History Occasionally Resurfaces, Highlighting Its Roots

Nazis parade in Vienna, Austria, on May Day, 1938. Photo: Shutterstock.

How do you assess the link between the Nazi ideology and FPÖ? How much has FPÖ been influenced by Nazism?

Professor Felix Roesel: The FPÖ was founded in the mid-1950s, and its predecessor, the VdU, was also a right-wing movement with strong personal connections to the Nazi era. As I mentioned, the first FPÖ party leader was a former SS leader. So, there were clear ties in terms of personnel, as well as ideology.

Initially, if you were confirmed as a Nazi, you were ineligible to vote in the very first post-war election. However, by the second election, those restrictions were lifted, and many former Nazis turned to support the FPÖ. This shows the strong connections from the voter base as well.

In terms of ideology, Jörg Haider, for example, would sometimes use phrasing that was reminiscent of Nazi slogans—close enough to evoke the connection but vague enough to avoid direct accountability. The party has often played with these boundaries.

Even today, local FPÖ politicians occasionally become embroiled in scandals involving connections to Nazi symbolism, such as singing Wehrmacht songs. These are things you don’t see with other parties, which indicates a lingering influence. 

However, it’s important to note that the FPÖ has now evolved into a more modern populist party, focusing primarily on anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric rather than Nazi ideology. Despite this shift, the party’s history occasionally resurfaces, reminding us of its roots.

FPÖ Links Sieges of Vienna by Ottoman Turks to Contemporary Issues

A pastry shop in Vienna displays a picture of Ottoman soldiers and tents on the wall to commemorate the Ottoman siege of Vienna (German: Cafe Bäckerei, Zum Türkenloch) on April 5, 2013. Photo: Fatih Yavuz.

How have the two sieges of Vienna by Ottoman Turks resonated with the Austrian public and how have collective memories and historical narratives played a role in the ideology of FPÖ? How did FPÖ instrumentalize these historical tools against the Turkish and Muslim population in Austria?

Professor Felix Roesel: My co-author and I have a paper on this topic. We observed that some villages around Vienna, which were besieged by Ottoman forces in the 16th and 17th centuries, still carry traces of that history. You can find street names like “Türkenschanz” or “Türkenstraße,” which are reminders of those times when these villages suffered; houses were burned down, and there were significant losses. These events are embedded in the local memory.

For centuries, however, these memories remained dormant. As we demonstrated in our paper, it wasn’t until the FPÖ began campaigning against Muslims that this historical context became politically effective. We found that in those areas that had experienced the Turkish invasions 300 years ago, support for the far-right FPÖ increased significantly compared to areas that had not been affected by the sieges. This suggests that the FPÖ was able to reawaken and instrumentalize these collective memories for political gain.

This is a common strategy among populists—they often invoke the past, whether glorious or traumatic, to mobilize support. In Austria, the FPÖ has connected these historical events to contemporary issues. One former FPÖ leader even referred to the need to prevent a “third siege of Vienna” in response to the growing Turkish and Muslim population, playing on these historical fears and sentiments to gain political advantage.

How have the immigration crisis and other recent socio-economic challenges contributed to the rise of far-right populism in Austria, and what parallels can be drawn with similar movements in other parts of Europe?

Professor Felix Roesel: Let me refer to two studies on this topic. One study has shown a robust correlation between immigration and increased votes for the far-right in Austria. The data indicates that as immigration levels rise, support for far-right parties also increases.

A second study specifically examined the large influx of migrants in 2015. It found that areas along the Austrian-German border, which were most affected by this wave of migration, also saw a significant rise in far-right votes. Interestingly, the study noted that in areas where residents had direct, personal contact with refugees in 2015, there was actually a decrease in support for the FPÖ. This suggests that direct interaction with migrants can reduce anti-immigrant sentiment and far-right support.

In comparison, similar patterns have been observed in other countries, such as Germany, where studies show a clear link between increased immigration and a backlash among native populations, leading to a rise in votes for anti-immigration parties. However, findings differ across Europe, and the picture is not entirely uniform.

Overall, at least in Austria and Germany, there is consistent evidence that higher levels of immigration are associated with increased support for far-right populist parties.

Whether FPÖ Can Form a Coalition Remains the Pressing Question

What is the significance of FPÖ’s victory in the parliamentary elections, that were held last week, in terms of far-right parties both in Austria and Europe?

Professor Felix Roesel: The significance of the FPÖ’s victory really depends on the ultimate outcome of the election, particularly on the formation of the next Austrian government. While the far-right FPÖ won the election by a narrow margin—just one or two percentage points—making it the largest party with around 30% of the vote, it’s important to remember that 70% of voters did not choose the far right. Being the largest party does not guarantee leadership of the next government.

The FPÖ’s status as the number one party certainly can’t be ignored, but the real test lies in whether they can successfully form a coalition. There are significant challenges ahead: other parties, including the Conservatives, have already ruled out any coalition with the far right. Additionally, the Conservative Party, traditionally accustomed to having Chancellors for many years, may be reluctant to join as a junior partner in a coalition led by the FPÖ.

The possibility of a grand coalition between the two former main parties remains, but such arrangements have lost favor in Austria, as they are perceived as ineffective in solving problems. If the FPÖ manages to form a coalition, it would signal to other far-right parties across Europe that it is possible to reach government status even without an absolute majority.

Another challenge is the role of Austria’s President, who has considerable influence. The current President is from the Green Party, which is ideologically opposed to the far-right FPÖ. In fact, the Green Party has even refused to support a parliamentary president from the FPÖ. It remains to be seen whether a Green Party President would appoint a far-right Chancellor. The President’s stance will be crucial as coalition discussions unfold. It’s unclear which direction this will take—whether it’s truly possible to form a coalition with the far right or seek an alternative beyond it. This remains the pressing question at the moment.

Criticizing a Third of the Voters Isn’t a Productive Approach

European Union’s reaction to FPÖ’s victory in 1999 and 2024 are quite different. This time around EU has not reacted to the victory of FPÖ in alarmist terms. Do you think far-right parties have been mainstreamed in Europe in the last couple of years?

Professor Felix Roesel: Yes, that’s certainly one point. Another is that we’ve become somewhat accustomed to these kinds of election results. We’ve learned that criticizing a third of the voters, as is the case in Austria, isn’t a productive approach. Moreover, it’s still possible to form a coalition without the FPÖ.

Additionally, there have been previous elections in Austria where the FPÖ was even more successful. For instance, in the last presidential election, there was a head-to-head race between the Green candidate and the far-right candidate, with the latter gaining almost 50% of the vote. We’ve also seen similar outcomes in other countries, such as France, where far-right candidates have garnered a significant share of votes beyond the traditional far-right base.

These factors might explain the EU’s more restrained response. We’ve also learned that outside intervention isn’t particularly effective, especially in a complex political landscape like Austria’s.

There are experts who believe that Herbert Kickl, the leader of FPÖ, would inevitably moderate, à la Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the far-right Brothers of Italy, who has taken a more pragmatic course than most expected since becoming Italy’s prime minister two years ago. Do you think we can witness a ‘Melonization of Kickle’ as FPÖ has now won the elections?

Professor Felix Roesel: That’s an interesting question. The difference is that Meloni had the advantage of a clear alliance and a majority in Parliament, which is not yet certain for Herbert Kickl. However, I wouldn’t underestimate him. Kickl has been the mastermind of the FPÖ for the past 20 years, designing many of its campaigns and having significant influence, even when he wasn’t the frontman.

Since stepping into the spotlight after the major scandals of 2019, when the coalition in Austria collapsed, he has shown his strategic acumen. He is very smart and will undoubtedly do everything in his power to form a coalition under his leadership.

As for whether his leadership would look different, it’s uncertain. He has already served as Minister of the Interior and, during that time, implemented tough, anti-immigration policies, though much of it was rhetoric. The real question is whether things would change if the FPÖ were to lead a coalition. But again, I wouldn’t underestimate him; he will certainly do everything possible to secure his place in the next coalition.

FPÖ Remains a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

And lastly, looking ahead, what trends do you see in the future of Austrian populism and far-right movements? Do you expect these movements to gain further traction, or are they likely to diminish in influence?

Professor Felix Roesel: Typically, when the FPÖ enters government, there is a significant drop in their support, as people often become disillusioned soon after they join coalitions. However, after a short period, they tend to recover and often come back stronger. While I can’t say if this is a consistent pattern, it’s worth noting that nearly 50% of the population has, at some point, voted for the far right in Austria, as seen in the recent presidential elections. So, there is certainly a solid base of support to build upon.

There’s also the incumbency advantage to consider. Once a party leads as the Chancellor, they may gain additional votes from those who rally around the flag. It makes strategic sense for the FPÖ to aim for the Chancellor position and lead a coalition to solidify their role as an established part of the Austrian parliamentary system.

Whether this will require the FPÖ to change its policies, I’m skeptical. Herbert Kickl himself has expressed that one of the mistakes made by Jörg Haider, after his significant successes, was not taking on a leadership role within the government. Kickl seems well aware of past errors and will likely try to avoid them. Thus, it’s very probable that we will see the FPÖ remain a permanent and strong force in Austrian politics, at least for the next few years.

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor McCoy: A Trump Victory to Embolden Populist Movements and Authoritarian Regimes Globally 

In an interview with ECPS, Professor Jennifer McCoy warns that a Donald Trump victory in the November 5th US presidential elections could embolden populist movements and authoritarian regimes worldwide. Professor McCoy asserts that Trump is unlikely to prioritize reinforcing democracy in countries where leaders are consolidating power or undermining democratic norms. “Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China,” she explained, highlighting the potential global consequences of another Trump term.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, predicts that a Trump victory in the November 5th elections will embolden populist movements and authoritarian regimes worldwide. “I think it will embolden populist movements globally because Trump will likely support them,” McCoy stated. She explained that Trump would not prioritize reinforcing democracy in countries where leaders are concentrating power or eroding democratic norms. “Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China,” McCoy argued, highlighting Trump’s differing stances on global powers.

Professor McCoy, an expert on democratic decline and polarization, also delved into the broader effects of pernicious polarization on democracies. She explained how polarization, especially the extreme form she terms as “pernicious,” divides societies into hostile camps that undermine democratic institutions. “Pernicious polarization involves a perception of threat and a zero-sum mentality, which leads people to cut off communication with those on the other side,” McCoy said. ‘‘This kind of division complicates governance, reduces the capacity for compromise, and fosters deep social and political rifts.’’

Drawing from her research, McCoy emphasized that this destructive form of polarization often leads to a weakening of democratic systems. Historically, the resolution of such polarization has required significant systemic upheavals, such as wars, colonial transitions or authoritarian regime changes. However, McCoy warned that relying on such extreme disruptions today would be detrimental. Instead, she advocates for addressing polarization by restoring the ability of democracies to govern effectively without resorting to such drastic measures.

When asked about the rise of far-right parties in Europe and advanced democracies, Professor McCoy pointed to economic dislocation and political convergence around market-based policies as significant factors. “Globalization was rising and many people felt left behind,” Professor McCoy noted, explaining that traditional parties’ failure to address these concerns opened the door for populist outsiders. These leaders, often using divisive rhetoric, scapegoat marginalized groups—especially immigrants—offering simplistic answers to complex socio-economic issues.

As Professor McCoy sees it, the challenge for democracies lies not just in addressing the root causes of polarization but in mitigating its effects before democratic institutions are irreparably damaged. In her analysis, both electoral reforms and changes in political strategy are essential to restore stability in deeply divided societies.

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Jennifer McCoy with some edits.

Negative Emotions Are Generally More Powerful Than Positive Ones

Professor McCoy, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. In your study, you found that negative emotions, such as anger and resentment, can increase populist attitudes. Could you elaborate on the specific emotional triggers that are most effective in activating populist sentiments?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Negative emotions are generally more powerful than positive emotions, which makes them harder to counteract. The negative emotions that populists often tap into are related to feelings of unfairness and injustice. They highlight situations that seem unjust or unequal, which can generate resentment and anger—sometimes even anxiety or fear. But anger and resentment, in particular, drive people to seek someone to blame. Populists are very skilled at identifying scapegoats or “enemies,” which provides their supporters with a sense of control.

While populists can also evoke enthusiasm, especially for themselves as leaders, it’s the distrust of others that becomes particularly dangerous. Populists encourage trust in themselves, but simultaneously foster deep distrust in those outside their group.

In your research on democratic decline, what specific factors have you identified as the most critical in driving polarization in the United States and other democracies? What is the relationship between polarization and democratic decline? How are these two phenomena interrelated?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Well, we’ve found that increases in what we call extreme or “pernicious polarization”—which occurs when societies split into two mutually distrustful and antagonistic camps—are particularly significant. In this context, politics is seen as a zero-sum game, where one side’s gain is perceived as the other side’s loss. When people feel threatened by the prospect of the opposing side being in power, they may support politicians or actions that sacrifice democratic principles in order to gain or maintain control.

We’ve observed a strong correlation between rising political polarization at extreme levels and declining scores in liberal democracy. This correlation may reflect a causal relationship, where heightened perceptions of mutual existential threat from the other side lead people to become more willing to undermine democracy in order to protect their interests.

Populist Leaders Deliberately Use Polarization to Divide Society

What are the root causes of polarization in the contemporary world and how can we measure and compare its severity across different cases?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: The kind of polarization I’m referring to is difficult to measure. Traditionally, scholars have used terms like ideological polarization, which is measured through surveys that assess individuals’ positions on issues or their placement on a left-right or liberal-conservative scale. Another growing area in the literature is affective polarization, which measures people’s feelings—specifically how much they dislike other political parties, leaders or supporters of opposing parties.

However, what I find crucial is the perception of threat. It’s not just about dislike but about people feeling threatened by another political camp. This might not even be tied to a specific party—it could be centered around a leader. For example, in Venezuela, there was deep devotion to Hugo Chavez, a populist leader and strong opposition to him without necessarily supporting an alternative party. We see this in other countries, like Hungary with Viktor Orbán or Turkey with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. So, polarization can exist even without clear divisions between two political parties.

At the national, systemic level, polarization is a process of dividing society. A single measure to capture this is almost impossible to develop. However, we’ve used tools like the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database, which relies on expert surveys to assess the extent to which societies are divided into hostile camps. This gets close to what we’re discussing. Additionally, we can look at perceptions of threat in surveys among voters and analyze the rhetoric used by political leaders.

Leaders play a critical role in polarization. Polarizing, populist leaders often identify enemies and use divisive “us vs. them” rhetoric. When we see leaders discrediting their opponents—calling them traitors, disloyal to the country or questioning their citizenship—that’s a clear sign of polarization and a deliberate strategy used to divide.

You often refer to “pernicious polarization” as a threat to democracy and its role in fostering autocratization. How do you define “pernicious polarization” and how does it differ from regular political polarization in a democratic society? What makes it particularly dangerous for democratic systems?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Our definition of political polarization refers to the process of simplifying politics to the point where society becomes divided into two mutually distrustful and antagonistic camps—an “us versus them” dynamic. This leads to a perception of politics as a zero-sum game, where one side’s gain is perceived as the other side’s loss and both sides feel an existential threat from the other.

In political science, the term polarization is often used to describe the differentiation of political parties. For example, when parties distinguish themselves by saying, “We are different from the others—vote for us because we’re better at this,” they are merely differentiating their platforms. As these differences grow, it can be considered polarization. In this sense, some level of polarization is beneficial because it provides voters with cues about where parties and leaders stand, which helps them make informed choices.

However, when this differentiation becomes more toxic, we enter the realm of pernicious polarization, which is harmful to democracy. Our definition goes beyond affective polarization—which is focused on feelings of like and dislike—because it’s not just about emotions. Pernicious polarization involves a perception of threat and a zero-sum mentality, which leads people to cut off communication with those on the other side. It results in a bifurcated society, where political identities become intertwined with social relationships and people retreat into their own silos, unable or unwilling to engage with opposing views.

Solutions That Avoid Systemic Interruptions Are Needed

Presidential Election 2024 in the United States. Photo: Andrew Angelov.

You argue that “we have compelling historical reasons to worry about the pernicious consequences of polarization for democracy.” Could you elaborate on these historical examples and their relevance?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: We’ve seen societies divide throughout history. If we look at episodes of pernicious polarization dating back to the 1900s—more than a century ago—many of these arise in certain contexts. For example, during the interwar period in Europe, we saw the extreme “us versus them” strategies employed by fascist leaders. We’ve also seen polarization increase during struggles for independence in the colonial world, both before and after post-colonialism, as countries fought for self-determination. In some cases, these conflicts escalated into civil war.

What we’ve observed is that, historically, episodes of pernicious polarization have often been resolved through major systemic disruptions. These include coming out of a war and reaching a peace agreement, transitioning from colonialism to post-colonial independence or moving from authoritarianism to democracy. These types of solutions—war, independence struggles or regime changes—are drastic and disruptive.

However, today we face a different challenge. We don’t want to rely on such extreme solutions to resolve polarization. The issue now is that existing democracies are becoming deeply divided, which threatens their ability to govern effectively. When polarization hampers a democracy’s capacity to compromise, negotiate and solve collective problems—things that democratic politics should enable—we need to find solutions that don’t involve the systemic interruptions we’ve seen in the past. We need to address polarization within the framework of maintaining and strengthening democracy.

Polarization Eliminates the Cross-Cutting Ties Essential to Democracies

Once the harmful form of polarization takes root, how can it be avoided or reversed? What strategies or institutional reforms do you believe are most effective in mitigating polarization and restoring democratic stability in deeply divided societies? 

Professor Jennifer McCoy: This is a really difficult question to answer, and I’m working on research with Murat Somer from Turkey on this. We’re currently writing a book, trying to look at historical examples. What have countries that have been democracies done to overcome this? Unfortunately, we do not have many good examples of established democracies from the past that have reached these levels of polarization and successfully come out of it in peaceful ways. So, we don’t have many strong examples, but we do have some instances.

We’ve identified several key principles that need to be addressed. First, think of polarization as the division of society that simplifies politics into two opposing camps, an “us versus them” mentality. This eliminates the cross-cutting ties that are so important in democracies. In healthy democracies, people have different identities and can relate to others based on those diverse identities and interests, despite differing political views. With extreme polarization, however, people’s social identities and their patterns of interaction begin to align with their political identities. As a result, they lose those cross-cutting ties with people from other political camps.

We need to restore these cross-cutting ties and create spaces for people to come together. A lot of work has been done on this in terms of bridging divides, bringing people together to work on projects at the local level—one effective way to foster connection. In neighborhoods, for example, people working together on local issues allows them to know one another first through social relationships. They begin to see their shared humanity and common concerns, such as the safety and well-being of their children. Once that foundation is established, they can start discussing politics and political solutions.

A second approach involves moving away from zero-sum perceptions toward positive, win-win perceptions of politics and economic issues. This shift requires better information and changes in how the media reports on issues. In the United States, for example, media often focuses on the “horse race” during elections, presenting the competition between candidates without providing in-depth analysis of policy solutions or the real impact on people’s lives. One candidate may even threaten democracy by refusing to accept election results, but if the media only focuses on the competition, people may lose sight of the broader consequences. Highlighting positive news, accomplishments and win-win solutions can help people see that not everything is a zero-sum game.

The third point I want to mention is changing incentives—particularly for politicians, but also for voters—to engage in less polarizing strategies. Politicians know that appealing to anger, resentment, and unfairness with divisive, blame-oriented rhetoric can be a highly effective electoral strategy. However, they also need to understand that appealing to positive emotions, offering a vision of hope and fostering enthusiasm can also be a winning strategy. We’ve seen examples of this recently in Turkey during local elections, where politicians successfully used more positive appeals.

Changing incentives for politicians may also involve electoral reforms. In countries like the United States, the UK, Canada and India—former British colonies with winner-takes-all electoral systems—single-member districts create disproportionate representation for larger parties. This system reinforces the two-party model, making it difficult for third or fourth parties to break through and have a voice. By contrast, countries in Europe and Latin America that use proportional representation allow parties to gain representation based on their share of votes, which encourages coalition-building and a broader range of voices. 

In winner-takes-all systems, politicians are incentivized to turn out their base rather than broadening their appeal to a larger group. They don’t need to form coalitions, so they rely on polarizing appeals to mobilize their supporters. Reforming electoral systems to encourage broader representation could help reduce polarization by incentivizing politicians to appeal to a wider range of people, rather than simply energizing their base with negative rhetoric.

Transformative Repolarization Can Help Strengthen Democracy

In an article, you mention that polarization can sometimes contribute to democratic deepening under certain conditions. Can you explain the mechanisms by which polarization might strengthen democracy, and what factors differentiate constructive polarization from destructive polarization?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: There are two ways I want to highlight. One is simply building political party identity, which requires differentiation. Here, I’m referring to polarization as the differentiation of political parties, not the extreme or pernicious form we’ve been discussing. For instance, Adrienne LeBas focuses on cases in Africa where differentiation helps to build and mobilize citizens in new parties that can challenge long-dominant parties. This type of polarization can be positive because it helps to mobilize people.

In our research, Murat Somer and I argue for what we call constructive polarization or transformative repolarization. This occurs when a country is already perniciously polarized around a divisive issue that a polarizing leader has emphasized, such as immigration or “the people versus the elites.” In these cases, challenging leaders and parties can attempt to shift the axis of polarization. There are many possible axes of polarization—religious versus secular, urban versus rural or nationalism versus cosmopolitanism (e.g., the EU versus national identity in Hungary).

One important axis we’ve observed is democracy versus authoritarianism. In a country experiencing democratic backsliding or sliding into autocracy, identifying a new dividing line—centered on the values of democracy, integrity and anti-corruption—can be a constructive form of polarization. This approach works as long as the focus remains on values and ideas, rather than demonizing individuals or voters who may support an authoritarian leader. By focusing on democratic principles, this can serve to correct democratic deficits and address social injustices.

For example, during the US civil rights movement, the focus was on correcting racial injustice, promoting equality and inclusion and erasing discrimination and subordination of particular races. This kind of transformative repolarization can help strengthen democracy by addressing fundamental injustices.

How do you explain the rise of far-right parties in Europe, particularly in some of the most developed democracies? Why do citizens in seemingly advanced political systems feel powerless and turn to support far-right populist parties?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: I think there was a convergence of political parties in the 1990s and early 2000s toward market-based economic solutions. Globalization was rising and many people felt left behind. At the same time, there was a sense that political parties weren’t responding to the needs of ordinary citizens. In Europe, in particular, Social Democratic parties started to lose their anchoring in society, especially through labor unions. In the United States, labor unions have been decimated, only now showing early signs of recovery.

Without strong social anchors and a clear programmatic vision, particularly on the left, people began to feel that the major parties were indistinguishable and unresponsive to their needs—especially those who felt excluded from the benefits of globalization. In addition to this, we’ve seen other global systemic changes, such as technological advances, which have led to automation and job losses. Information technology has also changed how people receive their news and political messages.

Moreover, we’ve seen the impacts of climate change, which has influenced the movement of people. Wars and civil conflicts have also contributed to significant migration flows, including immigrants and refugees. All these factors converged, especially following the global financial crisis of 2008–2010. Traditional political systems struggled to respond effectively, leaving a gap for outsider populist leaders and far-right parties to step in.

Far-right parties often exploit these issues by using divisive rhetoric, blaming particular groups for society’s problems and identifying enemies that need to be eliminated. In Europe, this rhetoric is usually centered around anti-immigrant sentiments, though it can also target other groups.

US Electoral System Creates a Disproportionate Representation

What role did polarization play in Donald Trump’s victory in 2016? Could you elaborate on how polarization contributed to Trump’s appeal among American voters?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Many of the same factors were at play in the US as in other parts of the world. There was a strong convergence between the Democratic and Republican parties around globalization measures, but there wasn’t enough compensation for workers and industries that were negatively impacted by these changes in the 1990s and early 2000s.

However, polarization in the US has been rising for several decades, stemming from long-standing, unresolved debates in American history. One of the major divides is racial—the ongoing struggle over inclusive and equal citizenship, which dates back to the founding of the nation when slavery was legal. At that time, enslaved African peoples were not considered fully human, women were second-class citizens and Indigenous Native Americans were not included. These unresolved issues have persisted as the US has attempted to address injustices and become more inclusive over the past 200 years.

The country has gone through several tumultuous cycles, including the Civil War in the 1860s and, more recently, the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s and the Women’s Movement in the 1970s. These movements have been disruptive but necessary for democratic progress. Each time democracy moves forward to include new or previously excluded groups—such as LGBTQ individuals—there is often backlash. In the US, this backlash has grown since the Civil Rights Movement, as some dominant white groups, particularly men, have felt that their identities and positions as community leaders and economic providers were being threatened.

Additionally, we’ve seen changes in media and communication technology. Cable news, talk radio and the proliferation of social media have created a vast array of information sources that people can turn to. Since the 1990s, the Republican Party has employed a polarizing, confrontational political strategy. All of these factors contributed to the rise of Donald Trump in 2016.

Trump was able to sense these underlying grievances—many still reeling from the 2008 financial crisis—and the anxieties triggered by demands for new rights and greater inclusion, which are essential for democracy. His instinctive use of bullying and blame tactics allowed him to galvanize support by identifying enemies and railing against political correctness. Many people, feeling tired of having to be cautious about their words and how they identified others, were drawn to his message.

Trump presented himself as an outsider and a successful businessman, someone who could “save” the economy and democracy. He also employed a strong anti-immigrant message. It’s important to note, however, that Trump did not win the majority of the popular vote—Hillary Clinton did. The US has a unique system with an Electoral College, an indirect presidential election process and a Senate that creates a disproportionate system of representation. Rural areas, which tend to lean more Republican due to polarization and political sorting, hold more weight in this system, which also contributed to Trump’s victory.

Trump’s Victory Will Empower Authoritarian Regimes

Caricatures of US President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un. Photo: Willrow Hood.

How do you think American democracy and its institutions will respond to another Trump administration if he wins the election on November 5? Some scholars and institutions argue that American democracy might not survive another Trump term—where do you stand on this debate?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: I am concerned and I fall on the more worried side of the debate. While I don’t think democracy will completely collapse, I do believe it could be significantly damaged and become extremely unstable.

One major concern is that, during his first term, Trump was unprepared. He didn’t expect to win and as a result, he didn’t have a team ready to support him or fully understand how to wield executive power. There were still institutional guardrails in place that could stop him at various points. For example, Democrats frequently resorted to lawsuits to challenge many of his autocratic tendencies and the courts were used extensively during his first term.

However, over those four years, Trump was able to make numerous judicial appointments, which have since politicized the courts to a significant degree. In the US, you can sometimes choose which court or district to bring a case to and certain courts are known for being more conservative than others. This, combined with the fact that Trump was able to appoint three Supreme Court justices by pushing the limits of constitutional legality, has weakened the judicial guardrails that were once stronger.

More importantly, both Trump and his supporters have had time to prepare. People looking to use his presidency for their own agendas have spent time developing legal strategies that could allow him to assert even more executive power than he already has. They’ve also focused on placing loyalists in key positions throughout the federal government and bureaucracy, which could further erode the civil service guardrails.

Additionally, the US is increasingly divided along state lines. There are more Republican-dominated states than Democratic ones and many states are fully controlled by one party. What used to be institutional safeguards are now weakening under these partisan divisions.

If Trump wins, the country will be even more divided. A significant portion of the population—around 30%—is deeply entrenched in their support for him, while another 30% is firmly aligned with the Democratic side. There is also a large group in the middle, around 40%, that remains unaffiliated but leans one way or the other. The concern is that those strong Trump supporters may react very negatively if he loses and surveys suggest that around 10% of the population supports the idea of political violence in response to an election loss. Trump himself is likely to claim the election was rigged if he loses.

On the other hand, if he wins, Democrats and those who oppose him will do everything they can to prevent further curtailment of rights. While I don’t foresee them resorting to violence, they will certainly push back against any attempts to undermine democratic institutions.

If Trump wins the elections on November the 5th, how do you think this victory will impact the populist movements worldwide?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: I think it will embolden populist movements globally because Trump will likely support them. He won’t push to reinforce democracy in areas where leaders may be concentrating power or eroding democratic norms. Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China. While Trump has maintained a strong anti-China stance, he’s shown a more favorable approach to Putin and Russia. So, overall, I believe a Trump victory will embolden these movements and regimes.

A homeowner displaying their political affiliation and religious devotion on their front lawn in Forest, Virginia, USA, on August 21, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Pally: Evangelicals Face a ‘Double Loss’—Both Socio-Economic and as a Religious Community—Positioning Them to Find Trump Appealing

In exploring the socio-political dynamics behind white Evangelicals’ support for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States, Professor Marcia Pally of New York University identifies what she calls a “double loss” experienced by this group. She explains that white Evangelicals face both economic and societal losses—challenges shared by many Americans—which are further intensified by their distinct struggles as a religious community. This “double loss,” Pally argues, is coupled with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”: a widespread American distrust of centralized authority, minorities, and new immigrants, paired with a doctrinal suspicion rooted of priestly and other authorities in Evangelical religious beliefs.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Marcia Pally of New York University delves into the socio-political dynamics driving the support of white Evangelicals for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States. Highlighting what she describes as a “double loss” experienced by this demographic, Professor Pally explains how both economic and societal losses—shared by many Americans—are compounded by the unique religious challenges facing white Evangelicals. This sense of loss, she argues, is accompanied by a “double suspicion” of government and of “outsiders” (minorities and new immigrants): a general American wariness of centralized authority, alongside a doctrinal distrust of priestly and other authorities and of “outsiders’ rooted in Evangelical religious teachings.

Professor Pally, an expert in theology and political culture, teaches at New York University and was awarded the Mercator Professorship in the Theology Faculty at Humboldt University, where she is an annual guest professor. She has authored several influential books, including White Evangelicals and Right-wing Populism: How Did We Get Here?From This Broken Hill I Sing To You: God, Sex, and Politics in the Work of Leonard Cohen; and Commonwealth and Covenant: Economics, Politics, and Theologies of  Relationality. Her work focuses on the intersection of religion, politics and society, making her a leading voice in understanding the socio-cultural underpinnings of right-wing populism in the US.

Throughout the interview, Professor Pally unpacks the role of white Evangelicals in American right-wing populism, tracing their political engagement to a deep-seated suspicion of government and of “outsiders” and to a perceived erosion of cultural influence. She elaborates on the phenomenon of “Christian nationalism,” a relatively recent term describing a political movement that uses particular readings of Christianity to justify nationalist goals. However, she notes, Christian nationalism is not truly a form of Christianity but rather a form of nationalism that taps into the anger that arises from significant socio-economic losses and cultural marginalization.

Professor Pally also addresses how Trump’s rhetoric and policies—particularly on immigration and national identity—resonate with white Evangelicals, drawing on long-standing cultural anxieties about “outsiders” and threats to community. Finally, she explores the global implications of Trump’s potential re-election, predicting that right-wing populist movements around the world would likely adapt his strategies and rhetoric to their own contexts.

In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Pally provides a nuanced understanding of the political and cultural forces shaping the white Evangelical electorate and their continued support for Donald Trump’s populist rhetoric in the United States.

Professor Marcia Pally is an expert in theology and political culture, teaches at New York University and was awarded the Mercator Professorship in the Theology Faculty at Humboldt University, where she is an annual guest professor.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Marcia Pally with some edits.

Populism as a Response to Duress: Loss, Threat, Fear or Anxiety about Change

What key differences do you observe between left- and right-wing populisms in the US, in particular the role of Evangelicals in American right populism, and how do these movements draw differently from America’s religio-cultural history? Could you elaborate on the American religio-political background from which populist beliefs emerge, and explain how this historical and cultural trajectory influenced Trump’s election in 2016?

Professor Marcia Pally: That’s a series of very complex questions. Let me take them step by step. You asked about the differences between left-wing and right-wing populism. Let me begin by saying that, following prominent research, I’ve developed a minimal core definition of populism. Then we can talk about left, right, strong and weak variants. The core definition of populism is that it’s a response to duress: loss, threat, fear of loss or anxiety about changes in economic situations, ways of life, technology, demographics, gender roles, etc.

When these losses or fears accumulate, people naturally shift their focus outward. They move away from their usual preoccupations—family, friends, schools, teams—and focus instead on identifying a “them” who is perceived to be causing harm to “us.” This shift to an “us versus them” mentality is a normal human response. It’s not specific to Europe, America or any particular ideology—it’s a species-wide reaction to perceived threats.

The third prong in this response to duress is identifying “them.” Populist movements—especially right-wing ones—seek to identify those they see as causing the harm. This identification usually draws from culturally familiar “others,” which can differ from culture to culture or even subculture to subculture. For instance, in the US, we don’t hear much about the Roma people because they play a negligible role in American history. But in other parts of the world, the Roma people have been historically singled out as a “them” responsible for certain fears or harms.

The “them” in the “us versus them” dynamic draws from historical and cultural ideas about society–who is “in” and who is “out”– as well as beliefs about the proper role and size of government.

To sum up, we can define populism as driven by duress, leading to an “us versus them” binary, where the “them” is identified based on long-standing cultural and historical factors. The key difference between left-wing and right-wing populism lies in who the “thems” are. Right-wing populism traditionally identifies the “them” as outsiders—new immigrants, religious and racial minorities and sometimes a corrupt government.

Left-wing populism, on the other hand, doesn’t usually target the government, as the left often views democratic governments as representatives of the people and legitimate agents of governance. Instead, left-wing populism tends to focus on economic exploitation, rather than identity politics, and identifies “them” as those responsible for economic inequality rather than as racial, ethnic or religious minorities. So, one key difference is that the right is more suspicious of government, while the left sees it as a potential agent of positive change.

I should also note that populism is not a static concept; it exists on a continuum. On one end, you have softer forms of populism, which align more closely with the normal agonistic aspects of democratic processes. For example, Bernie Sanders or Martin Luther King Jr. could be considered proponents of “soft” populism, which stays within the realm of democratic debate.

As you move along the continuum, populism can grow stronger, characterized by a much sharper “us versus them” binary and a diminished tolerance for ambiguity. In softer populism, someone can be an ally on one issue and an opponent on another. For instance, a corporation might support climate change action but oppose raising the minimum wage, and soft populism would recognize this complexity as part of politics.

In stronger populism, however, the “us versus them” division becomes much more rigid, often framing the struggle as a battle between good and evil, with existential stakes. This can lead to more extreme and uncompromising solutions.

The second part of your question, about cultural history and its impact, was quite broad. Could you narrow it down so I can address it more specifically?

The Problems People Face Are Often Real and Justified

Can you elaborate on the role of Evangelicals in American right-wing populism?

Professor Marcia Pally: Sure. I’m going to break this down by distinguishing between white Evangelicals and Evangelicals of color, because their histories in the US are very different. Evangelicals of color have a rich and vibrant history that really deserves its own study. Since my research focuses on white Evangelicals, I’ll focus on them here.

White Evangelicals—and their ancestors—have been coming to the US since the 17th century. They’ve contributed to and participated in the development of the country and contributed to three of the most foundational aspects of American political culture.

First, there’s covenantal political theory, which views the governed as a covenanted community. In this theory, sovereignty rests with the people, not the king or a ruler. If the leader—what we might now call the President or Prime Minister—violates the covenant with the governed, it is seen as legitimate to remove them. This is a productive heritage, and the ancestors of today’s Evangelicals played a significant role in introducing this idea to the United States.

Second, they contributed to republicanism—with a small “r”—which comes from Aristotelian thought. It emphasizes that citizens run the polis or state. This idea also centers around community engagement and governance, with sovereignty rooted in the people themselves.

Third, Evangelicals played a role in shaping liberalism, which, while less focused on the community aspect, emphasizes individual opportunity. However, like the other two traditions, liberalism maintains a strong suspicion of any government or ruler that abuses power. This suspicion runs through all three aspects: A leader who violates the covenant with the people; a tyrant who attempts to take control of the republic; and a ruler who tries to constrain individual freedoms.

Evangelicals, like other immigrants, contributed to all three of these foundational elements of American political culture. Additionally, two other important factors shaped their current position on the right wing of American politics.

First, their doctrinal belief that all governments are flawed and imperfect—none embody the Kingdom of God—leads them to be wary of authority. Each person, they believe, must determine how to live a moral life and foster a moral society, reinforcing their suspicion of centralized authority.

The Evangelicals we’re discussing are Protestants, heirs of the Protestant Reformation, which emphasized the individual conscience in developing a moral life and society. They are skeptical of priestly authority and instead trust the individual’s conscience. This, again, amplifies their wariness of government. This may foster the fear that the government could violate their covenant, their republic, their liberal rights and their doctrinal obligation to uphold the moral life. This suspicion also extends to outsiders who might interfere with their way of life.

This skepticism can be positive: a healthy distrust of government can guard against authoritarianism, bolster democracy and promote individual opportunity. Their strong sense of community has been a key factor in local development and community engagement. This commitment to community and localism is part of a long tradition in the US, especially within Evangelical circles.

However, under duress, things change. The usual focus on community and democratic localism can shift outward, leading to suspicion and fear of outsiders. Under pressure, the commitment to community may flip into an “us vs. them” mentality, where outsiders are perceived as threats to the community. Similarly, a healthy suspicion of autocratic government can morph into a blanket distrust of all government. Under stress, people tend to look for a “them” to blame for their problems, and nuanced thinking can give way to simplistic explanations.

Under these conditions, a suspicion of autocracy turns into a general suspicion of government, except when government is used to constrain outsiders. This shift makes it difficult for society to function effectively—if government is distrusted and outsiders are seen as threats, collaboration and compromise are stifled. If the government itself is seen as inherently suspect and if outsiders—who often bring talent, innovation, and entrepreneurialism—are also viewed with suspicion, a final tragedy emerges. This shift in perception, from community cohesion to distrust of outsiders and from a healthy skepticism of tyrants to a blanket suspicion of all government, leads to a loss of nuance in understanding the original sources of duress.

In today’s interconnected global economy, with its complex networks of transportation, communication and technology, problems such as economic hardship or changes in ways of life often have multiple, intertwined causes. This complexity can be overwhelming, leaving individuals feeling powerless to address the issues. In this context, the “us vs. them” mentality offers a simple explanation by blaming an identifiable group for the strain.

However, this appealing simplification can prevent people from recognizing the more intricate, systemic causes behind the challenges they face. In my research, I have found that the problems people experience are often very real and justified—people are generally aware when they are being impacted. The tragedy is that, if they can’t properly identify the true causes of their struggles, they may misdirect their frustration and fail to address the root issues.

Nothing Trump Said Is New in the American Cultural or Political Context

Former US President Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

We know that it is not only Trump but other Republicans as well addressed economic and way-of-life duress but what made Trump’s policies so effective and ‘persuasive’ in garnering the votes? In what ways does the evangelical sense of cultural and political marginalization influence their embrace of Trump’s rhetoric and policies on immigration and national identity?

Professor Marcia Pally: This is a complex question but let me address it step by step.

First, it’s crucial to recognize that nothing Donald Trump said was new in the American cultural or political context. His identification of the “deep swamp,” the insider elite in Washington and the so-called elite media or “fake news,” is not new. It’s an expression of the long-standing suspicion of government in the US. As I’ve mentioned, this suspicion has a healthy, democratic side but can also morph into a general distrust of government. Trump was able to tap into this long-standing element of American political culture.

Similarly, regarding outsiders—whether new immigrants, religious minorities like Muslims or occasionally even anti-Semitic themes—Trump was able to activate these entrenched cultural anxieties. When you ask why he was so effective, it’s because he tapped into sentiments that had existed for a long time. In the 2015–2016 campaign, he experimented with different slogans to see what resonated, and when he received applause for certain themes, he kept using them.

When a political message touches on a long-standing concern—one that feels familiar or “right” to people—it’s likely to gain traction. Trump successfully tapped into both anti-government and anti-outsider sentiments and he continued to use those themes because they worked. But it’s important to emphasize that these ideas were not new.

For example, “America First” was not Trump’s invention. Woodrow Wilson used the phrase in 1916 in his efforts to keep the US out of World War I. Senator William Borah from Idaho also used it to argue against US involvement in the League of Nations after the war.

Similarly, “Drain the Swamp” was not Trump’s creation either—it was a campaign promise used by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.

Now, for the second part of your question regarding evangelicals, could you clarify what specifically you’d like me to follow up on?

In what ways does the evangelical sense of cultural and political marginalization influence their embrace of Trump’s rhetoric and policies on immigration and national identity?

Professor Marcia Pally: Thank you for that. Let’s return to our core definition: duress and the “us vs. them” shift through culturally familiar themes.

The pressures that white Evangelicals face are real and legitimate concerns. White Evangelicals experience the same duress many Americans do. There has been a loss of purchasing power since the 1980s, a decline in unionization and the disappearance of jobs for which Americans had been trained, alongside insufficient training for new jobs emerging from new technologies. Health care, housing, education, day care, senior care are all expensive for middle- and working class- Americans. Rapid technological advancements and changes in gender roles have also contributed to the sense that life today is harsher and more difficult than it was for their parents or grandparents. 

There’s a growing sentiment that life has become less fair. People work hard, yet they lose their jobs or find themselves underemployed and communities are devastated when factories close or, more significantly, when technological changes increase productivity, reducing the need for workers. These are legitimate, very real hardships and neither political party did much to address them—until the Obama and Biden administrations, which took several productive steps, though not enough.

In addition to these economic hardships, Americans face “way of life” losses. By this, I mean the sense that one’s standingas respectable, middle-class individuals is being eroded or undermined. They feel powerless to change this, as policies are made by distant decision-makers who seem out of reach and unaccountable. These complaints are quite real.

On top of that, white Evangelicals have suffered a demographic loss. In 2004, they made up about 23–25% of the population; today, they are roughly 13%. They are the most aged of all religious groups in America, with an average age of around 56, and there is a growing fear of losing cultural influence in the US.

White Evangelicals once held more “soft power,” or cultural sway, in American life. As society has become more secular, urbanized and socially progressive, they’ve seen a decline in their influence. These demographic and cultural losses are felt as real and painful, compounding the economic and social changes that many in the middle and working classes are experiencing.

In summary, Evangelicals face a “double loss”: the economic and societal losses many Americans endure and the unique losses faced by their religious group. This double loss is paired with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”—both the general American wariness of centralized authority and “others” (minorities, new immigrants) and the religious, doctrinal suspicion of priestly and other authorities.

This combination of double loss and double suspicion, particularly under duress, creates a volatile situation. When people are under pressure, they look for a “them” to blame and they turn to familiar explanations for their very real difficulties—ones that are culturally familiar, understandable, and resonate with their lived experiences.

You underline that in late 2019, the influential, mainstream evangelical publication, Christianity Today, ran an editorial calling for Trump’s removal from office. Yet in the 2016 presidential election, 81 percent of white evangelicals voted for Trump. How do you explain this strong bond despite forceful Evangelical reservations?

Professor Marcia Pally: It’s important to remember that Americans, in general, are suspicious of authority and evangelicals are doubly so. While Christianity Today is an influential magazine, an editorial it publishes doesn’t dictate how evangelicals across the country will respond. Evangelicals are likely to make up their own minds, based on their individual assessments of the situation, their personal sense of duress, loss or threat, and their views on the root causes of these challenges.

I’m not at all surprised that a major, influential magazine would criticize Donald Trump and declare him unfit for office, while at the same time, a substantial portion of evangelicals make their own decisions, grounded in their own perspectives and evaluations.

Christian Nationalism Is Not a Form of Christianity, but a Form of Nationalism

Christian singer Sean Feucht hosts a “Worship Protest” on the National Mall in Washington, DC, during the COVID-19 pandemic on October 25, 2020. Photo: Nicole Glass.

Can you elaborate on the concept of “Christian nationalism” and how it has been employed by White Evangelicals to justify their support for Trump and right-wing populism?

Professor Marcia Pally: Christian nationalism is a relatively recent term and it’s an important one, developed by colleagues of mine who have done excellent work. However, I’m not convinced that white evangelicals are actively using Christian nationalism. It might be more accurate to say that Christian nationalism is using white evangelicals. Let me explain.

First of all, Christian nationalism is not a form of Christianity; it is a form of nationalism. The core of it—the noun—is nationalism.

Christian nationalism aims to implement specific political, economic and social policies. It is a political position, not a faith tradition that aligns, for instance, with the teachings in Matthew 25, which calls for caring for “the least of these.” Rather, Christian nationalism is a political ideology that its proponents claim is justified by their particular readings or interpretations of Christianity.

Adherents of Christian nationalism argue that their political stances are rooted in their understanding of Christian doctrine and the Bible. However, it’s crucial to note that many Christians in the US have vastly different interpretations of Christianity. These Christians are working tirelessly to promote other understandings of the faith. This includes 20–25% of white evangelicals, whose voices are often underrepresented in mainstream media. They are actively advocating for alternative interpretations of the Bible and the Christian doctrine.

It’s also important to point out that Christian nationalism is not a uniquely white evangelical invention or “brand.” The movement extends far beyond white evangelicals, encompassing individuals from the broader religious right, including Catholics and mainline Protestants. So, while some white evangelicals may identify with Christian nationalism because they align with its “us vs. them” themes, it is a much broader political movement that goes beyond just one group.

How do you think right-wing populism will be affected globally if Trump gets elected on November 5?

Professor Marcia Pally: Right-wing movements around the world communicate with one another. Of course, this is not unique—left-wing movements, centrist movements, governments and NGOs also communicate globally. This is to be expected.

Given that right-wing populist movements exchange ideas and strategies, closely observing each other’s successes and failures in order to learn from them, if Trump is re-elected in November, I expect right-wing groups and leaders—or those aspiring to leadership on the right—to examine the strategies, rhetoric and promises of Trump’s campaign. They will likely try to adapt and apply these approaches within their own political contexts.