Anti-Trump protest in London.

Long Read — Trump and the European Right: A Strained Relationship

In this long-read analysis, Dr. Amedeo Varriale examines the increasingly strained relationship between Donald Trump and Europe’s right-wing and far-right leaders, focusing on Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel. Despite enduring ideological affinities over nationalism, immigration, and opposition to progressive liberalism, Dr. Varriale identifies four sources of divergence: Trump’s declining popularity, protectionist trade policies, controversial foreign-policy interventions, and the institutional constraints limiting the transferability of Trumpism to European political systems. Through comparative analysis of Italy, France, Britain, and Germany, he demonstrates how national interests, electoral calculations, and geopolitical considerations increasingly override transatlantic ideological solidarity. The study suggests that future cooperation between Trump and Europe’s nationalist right and far right may become more pragmatic and transactional than ideologically driven.

By Amedeo Varriale

This extensive commentary explores the relationship between US President Donald J. Trump and political figures from the European right who are currently polling strongly in Italy, France, Britain, and Germany. 

The first part of the piece will focus on how and why key right-wing and far right leaders such as Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel have, to varying degrees, recently been distancing themselves from Trump, while simultaneously analyzing their ideological convergences and divergences with him, and speculating about how their relationship may evolve as these leaders exercise, or potentially come to exercise, political power. 

The second part will argue that presently the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is straineddue to a series of factors, ranging from the unpopularity of the President (at home and abroad), and his tariff dispute with the European Union (EU), to his unconventional foreign policy (particularly concerning Iran and Ukraine) and the limitations of reproducing his political model in the European context. 

The investigation is meant to be timely and pertinent in a moment of broad opposition towards Trump’s second presidency across Europe. In fact, it attempts not only to shed light on the present condition of international right-wing conservatism and populism but also indirectly contributes to ongoing debates surrounding the new right’s domestic and foreign policy vis-à-vis transatlantic relations.

Giorgia Meloni 

Giorgia Meloni.
Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy and leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, speaks at an electoral rally ahead of the national elections in Turin, Italy, September 13, 2022. Photo: Antonello Marangi / Dreamstime.

As a right-wing leader Meloni’s relationship with Trump (and “Trumpism”) has always been ambivalent and has been previously defined as one of only “partial harmony” (Lazar, 2026: 56). While the Italian Prime Minister expressed her support for Trump on several occasions — she attended his second Presidential inauguration, spoke at CPAC 2025, and referred to his politics as “a model for Italy’s center-right” (Valenti, 2020) — her political vision and Italian concrete interests (as interpreted by Meloni’s government) do not always align with the American President’s. 

One reason why Meloni has been accused by political analysts and opponents of being excessively close to Trump is that JD Vance (a staunch promoter of the MAGA/America First platform) prefaced the English version of Meloni’s book (Giorgia’s Vision) as he saw affinities between Trumpism and Meloni’s agenda revolving around national identity, anti-immigration(-ism), and Judeo-Christian values. Actually, clear convergences between Meloni and Trump do not go beyond their opposition to illegal immigration and woke ideology. In fact, the former does not aspire to create an “illiberal democracy” (like Viktor Orbàn’s in Hungary) nor has she resorted to methods like those utilized by Trump’s ICE to tackle immigration in Italy. 

Also, while remaining a fervent sovereigntist, Meloni is substantially aligned with the EU’s elite and is in particularly good terms with Ursula von der Leyen (Alli, 2025: 4) and Manfred Weber’s European People’s Party (EPP) — a liberal-conservative group that does not share Trump’s radical views on globalization, trade, and immigration. To be sure, Meloni distanced herself from Trump on more than one occasion. First, she criticized Trump’s verbal attack on Pope Leo XIV, calling it “unacceptable” (Le Monde with AFP, 2026). Second, Meloni called Trump’s tariffs threat against the European countries that objected to his plans concerning Greenland “a mistake” (AFP & Rapporteur, 2026). Third, Meloni’s unequivocal pro-Ukraine stance is in conflict with Trump’s transactional approach, which is more conciliatory towards Russia. Fourth, Meloni’s government refused to allow Trump’s US to utilize the Italian airbase at Sigonella in Sicily for offensive military operations correlated to the war against Iran (Giuffrida, 2026). 

Together, these incidents led to a gradual deterioration of the relationship between Meloni and Trump. In fact, Trump accused Italy of not doing enough to support the US against Iran (Mazza, 2026) and claimed in an interview that Meloni “begged” for a photo with him at the G7 summit (also calling her unpopular) (Amante & Balmer, 2026; Cheetham, 2026). Trump also shared a meme of Meloni with the caption “restraining order needed” on his social media Truth Social (Duso, 2026). While in the first case Meloni responded to Trump calling him out for making up the story and stating “…neither I nor Italy ever beg” (Amante & Balmer, 2026), in the second case she decided to ignore Trump.

In the following months, personal relations between Meloni and Trump may even worsen, mainly as a consequence of Trump’s unpredictable character. However, they are more likely to stabilize, with the US and Italy continuing to cooperate strategically, as Meloni will possibly do her best to avoid new personal confrontations and prevent any significant diplomatic rupture. In fact, although with some flexibility, Meloni continues to support higher defense spending at a NATO level (Ciriaco & Colombo, 2026; Gagliardi, 2026), and this aligns with Trump’s long-standing demand regarding Europe. 

Even if the relationship between Meloni and Trump remains somewhat strained and they never become full-fledged political and ideological allies, under Meloni the Italian government will maintain the Atlanticist and Europeanist foreign policy pursued since 1945, entailing “a duty to remain close to America and to be among its most reliable and zealous allies” (Lazar, 2026: 55). This will occur regardless of the political color of temporary US administrations and Trump’s behavioral patterns. 

Moreover, Italy’s position at the heart of the Mediterranean exposes it to Russian military and intelligence threats, making continued US support essential for its defense. Concomitantly, the current conservative government fears that reduced US commitment may result in Italy being more dependent on the EU, possibly steering the country towards deeper integration and an additional loss of sovereignty. This scenario is not desirable to Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI) party and most of her political class. Therefore, Italy seeks to balance strong bonds with both the United States and the European Union.

Marine Le Pen

Marine Le Pen
Marine Le Pen delivers a speech at a gathering of European far-right party representatives in Wenceslas Square, Prague, April 25, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

For several years, the relationship between Le Pen and Trump has been a positive one underpinned by mutual respect and (limited) reciprocal support. In fact, Le Pen was the only French Presidential candidate to openly endorse Trump in the 2016 American electoral competition and was the first to congratulate the tycoon before his victory against Hillary Clinton was even officialized (McAuley, 2016). Similarly, Le Pen’s right-hand man, Jordan Bardella, praised Trump’s nationalist politics, stating his success represented “a wind of freedom, of national pride blowing all over Western democracies” (Gozzi, 2025). Bardella also argued that Trump won because he “defended America’s interests” (Bardella, 2025). More recently, after Le Pen’s conviction in early 2025, Trump expressed his solidarity to the French politician by writing the message “FREE MARINE LE PEN,” and referring to the court’s ruling as a “Witch Hunt” on Truth Social (Solmaz, 2025).

However, a long-standing anti-American sentiment deeply ingrained both within the French general public (81% think Trump is dangerous) (see Odoxa, 2026) and in the ideology and political tradition of the National Rally (RN) (formerly National Front) has prevented Le Pen (and Bardella) from embracing Trump’s program fully. While the RN’s agenda on topics such as immigration, climate change, and the “culture war” against woke and gender ideology perfectly aligns with Trump’s, the French far right has disassociated itself from the American President’s foreign policy, particularly on trade and security. 

Regarding trade, although both Trump and Le Pen are protectionists, the former’s wide-ranging tariffs on imports — including French goods such as wine, luxury products, aerospace components — significantly damage French economic interests as an exporting country. 

Regarding security, while Trump wants European allies to spend much more on defense within the NATO framework, Le Pen instead promotes French strategic independence, calling for a reduced involvement and integration within NATO’s military command. Actually, once the conflict in Ukraine ceases, Le Pen aims to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command altogether (Besch & Varma, 2025: 19). Notwithstanding, it was mainly Trump’s threats to Greenland, his hostile demeanor towards Volodymyr Zelensky’s Ukraine, his overthrow of Nicolás Maduro, and his military actions against Iran that marked a turning point in relations between the US administration, the RN, and much of the European right. 

For example, concerning Iran, Le Pen declared: “Nobody knows what Donald Trump’s ultimate goal is in Iran. Today, this war has taken proportions that were not foreseen, affecting many Gulf countries, and with consequences that directly impact us: the increase in energy prices” (Roundtable, 2026). Instead, concerning Ukraine, Le Pen denounced the “brutality” of Trump’s decision to freeze US aid to the Eastern European country (Guillou, 2025). 

Allegedly, Le Pen even told officials within her party to maintain a distance from Trump as he has turned into a political liability (Caulcutt & Nöstlinger, 2026). The same reasoning had previously led Bardella to cancel his appearance at CPAC after the MAGA ideologue, Steve Bannon, supposedly made a Nazi salute on stage (Reuters, 2025). 

Le Pen’s cautious distancing from Trump may result in a substantial change of the nature of their relationship, making it more withdrawn in public but more transactional — on farming, trade, defense spending, and military activities — in the event of a future Le Pen presidency. This transactional disposition seems very appropriate and likely to prevail since American and French interests do not always align in those areas. However, this does not necessarily mean that Le Pen and Trump will be openly antagonistic towards each other. After all, the two still share a common enemy identified by both in “the international(-ist) left” operating at an elite level within supra-national institutions such as the European Commission, Council of Europe, United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Trade Organization (WTO). 

Given this, if Trump’s foreign policy shifts back to a more isolationist/non-interventionist one especially with regards to the Middle East (while simultaneously not abandoning Ukraine), there are stronger possibilities of an open rapprochement between Le Pen’s RN and Trump before the next Presidential elections in France and the US. Even so, in the more distant future it will be JD Vance (even more[1] nationalist, populist, and isolationist than Trump himself) who will play a key role in redefining the relationship between the American Republicans and European far right parties such as the RN and others. 

Nigel Farage

Nigel Farage.
Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

Farage and Trump have been friends and essentially political allies since the latter’s rise to power in 2016. The two partially share a weltanschaaung revolving around capitalism, the defense of borders, law and order, Western exceptionalism, and the preservation of national cultural identity. Moreover, both have always been skeptical of (if not opposed to) the gradual development of the European Union as a political and economic power, and its strategic relationship with China. 

Farage has spoken favorably about Trump on distinct occasions. For instance, he has stressed that Trump is a role model for him (and his party Reform UK) because the American President stands for “national interest” and keeps the promises made to his electorate (Bloomberg, 2025). Also, during a rally in the US, Farage has praised Trump as the “most resilient” and “bravest person” he has ever met (BBC, 2020). Undeniably, Trump holds a positive view of Farage as well, given he has expressed an interest in having him as UK ambassador to the US (Langfitt, 2016) and has always supported the Brexit project (Langlois, 2018: 7).

Against this backdrop, the relationship between the two became colder between late 2025 and early 2026. Today, it appears Farage does not have the same privileged access to Trump, and — at least on one occasion — the American President did not meet the British politician who had purposely traveled to the US expecting to reinforce their “special relationship” (Gross et al., 2026; Cobham, 2026). Since then, not only have Trump’s priorities shifted (he currently focuses on domestic issues rather than securing alliances abroad) but Farage himself discreetly distanced himself from Trump (Gibbons, 2026). 

One reason for this is Trump continues to be very unpopular among voters in Britain (Schofield, 2026; The Economist, 2025), including part of Reform UK’s electoral base (Mitchell, 2025). Research indicates that a significant portion of potential Reform voters — especially women — have trouble understanding why Farage associates with Trump (Dawson, 2026). While they may support the party on other policy issues, this perceived closeness to Trump could dissuade them from voting for Reform UK. After all, Trump’s hardline approach on “law and order,” exemplified by the Minnesota immigration raids (carried out by ICE), may have limited appeal among many moderate voters in Britain and continental Europe (see Wike et al., 2025). 

Another issue that has certainly (negatively) influenced the relationship between the two leaders is the Iran war. Although Farage has refrained from unequivocally condemning Trump’s campaign in the Middle East (which he initially supported) and has even stated Iran is a “bigger danger than Putin” (Mason, 2026), concomitantly, he has warned against British involvement in the war (White, 2026). The conflict with Iran has been devastating for the British economy,[2] mainly due to the sharp rise in oil and gas prices alongside general inflation. Thus, while Farage remains strongly opposed to the Iranian regime for pragmatic reasons, he has also had to state that Trump was badly advised on the war (Elliot, 2026) and that the UK should remain out of the conflict, inevitably distancing himself from the US administration’s position. 

The divergences vis-à-vis the Iran war have been exacerbated by broader economic and foreign policy disagreements. While Farage has always praised free markets, Trump is a pro-tariff protectionist. Additionally, over the years, Farage has endorsed the West supplying weapons to Zelensky’s government more explicitly than Trump. Perhaps these differences have further contributed to the increasing distance between the two political figures. 

Nonetheless, considering a circumstance where Trump remains US President and Farage becomes UK Prime Minister, it is likely the relationship between the two would be largely amicable, with their respective countries expanding collaboration in certain policy areas.By way of illustration, a Trump-Farage synergy is expected to lead to a large-scale UK-US free trade agreement and a general reduction of barriers and regulation for bilateral trade. 

Given this, America and Britain will presumably continue to cooperate at a NATO-level as — notwithstanding his confrontational statements — Trump does not have a concrete plan to withdraw from the transatlantic organization. Actually, it is possible that a Farage-led Britain could embrace Trump’s position on “burden-sharing” and pressure European allies (especially France, Germany, and Italy) to increase expenditure on defense. 

Similarly, Farage and Trump’s agreement on the immigration issue is very likely to result in greater cooperation on intelligence, security, and border control. 

Ultimately, their skepticism regarding climate change and policies to protect the environment could lead them to economize on climate policy and instead pursue an increase of oil and gas production. 

Alice Weidel

Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).
Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), displayed during the 2025 German federal election campaign. Such posters are reportedly often torn down or vandalized. Photo: Dreamstime.

Before 2025, direct contact between Trump and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) was relatively limited and intermittent, and to this day, a close relationship between Trump and the AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, does not appear to have fully developed at either a personal or a direct political level. Be that as it may, in the weeks preceding and months following the 2025 German federal election, high-profile figures from the Trump administration such as Elon Musk, Marco Rubio, and JD Vance have publicly defended or openly expressed support for Weidel’s party. In fact, while interviewing Weidel online, Musk proclaimed, “only AfD can save Germany, end of story” (Le Monde with AFP, 2025). In the same context, Weidel reiterated (as she had previously stated during a Bloomberg interview[3]) that it caused her “physical pain” to see Trump and his entire family “disparaged” by the mainstream media (Alice Weidel, 2025). 

Instead of explicitly endorsing the AfD as Musk did, US Secretary of State, Rubio, disputed Germany’s domestic intelligence agency’s classification of Weidel’s party as “right-wing extremist” (Wertheimer, 2025). The US Vice-President JD Vance went even further, meeting Weidel at the margins of the Munich Security Conference (February 14-16, 2025) to discuss issues ranging from the war in Ukraine to freedom of speech and German politics (Reuters, 2025). Vance’s decision to meet Weidel can be interpreted as an act of legitimization by the Trump administration. 

Beyond pro-AfD statements, Trump’s officials have engaged with AfD politicians/lawmakers through private meetings in Washington D.C. (Pfeifer, 2025). For example, the more “moderate” national-conservative wing of the German party, which includes the popular Beatrix von Storch, is known to have had repeated contacts not only with Vance’s staff but also with representatives of the US State Department and National Security Council (Pfeifer, 2025). Although there are substantial differences between Trump’s distorted form of American exceptionalism and the anti-American latent Eurasianism promoted by the most radical faction of the AfD (mainly led by Björn Höcke), this did not prevent Trump’s loyalists from seeking ties with the AfD and inviting them to the US After all, until recently, Weidel, von Storch, and the AfD’s establishment have looked upon Trump favorably due to his campaign (or “culture war”) against woke ideology, immigration, Islam (Pfeifer, 2025) and liberal-progressivism in general. This alignment was broadly reciprocal. As the Anglo-German journalist Henry Donovan (2026) posits: “In MAGA World, the AfD was increasingly spoken of as Germany’s conservative insurgency – a mirror image of how Trump sees his so-called revolt against liberal elites” (Donovan, 2026).

Weidel and Trump hold common beliefs on several issues. First, both leaders have centered their platform on opposing immigration. Second, Weidel and Trump share a skepticism towards climate change policy and the introduction of renewable energy sources. Third, the two leaders embrace supply-side (or even “trickle-down”) economics and selective forms of protectionism simultaneously — and can be (paradoxically) described as “liberal-protectionist” (for an account of the AfD’s economics, see Cattani, 2016). 

Nevertheless, the ideological affinities between Trump’s MAGA movement and Weidel’s AfD were not sufficient to impede an almost sudden break between the American and German far right earlier this year. Trump’s unpredictability and risky political moves such as armed conflict with Iran, regime-change operation in Venezuela, and repeated threats to Greenland forced AfD leaders and key figures — including co-chair of the party Tino Chrupalla and Weidel herself — to markedly distance themselves from both the tycoon and the “Grand Old Party” (GOP). It was especially the strikes on Iran (highly unpopular among the German electorate[4]) that led Weidel to ask her party’s senior lawmakers to cut back on their trips to the US where they would regularly meet pro-MAGA Republicans (Pitel, 2026). Condemnation of Trump’s actions came from both Weidel and Chrupalla who in a joint statement remarked “renewed destabilization of the Middle East is not in the German interest and must end” (Hoyer, 2026). The fears of the AfD’s elite, particularly Chrupalla, is that Trump — who apparently “started off as a peace president” — would become another American president known for war campaigns and neoconservative interventionism (Hoyer, 2026). 

Overall, far-right parties like the AfD remain largely skeptical about US interventionism (sometimes described as “US imperialism”) due to its economic and migratory consequences, such as recession, higher gas prices, and mass migration towards Europe. This is the main reason why Weidel (sounding like her opponents from the pacifist far-left) also referred to the Iran War as “a catastrophe” (Pitel, 2026). However, the party appears divided, as there have been prominent figures within the AfD — especially Maximilian Krah and (to a lesser extent) Markus Frohnmaier — who continue to unequivocally support Trump despite the Iran war (Pitel, 2026). In early April 2026, the former expressed his opinion on social media: “a break with Trump would be harmful to the AfD in all sorts of ways. It must not be allowed to happen” (Pitel, 2026).

Surprisingly, as of this writing, Trump has not reconsidered his predominantly positive opinion concerning the AfD. In fact, the American President welcomed the AfD’s striking 44% electoral victory in the Saxony-Anhalt region in early September by stating (on Truth Social) “Wow! The Populist Party in Germany just had a really big night” and congratulated the party (Zakharova, 2026). In any case, although a near future (unlikely) scenario where an AfD-led Germany is simultaneous to a Trump-led America is still technically possible, predicting the type of relationship the two countries would have in such a context remains a difficult and problematic endeavor. 

In essence, as the political scientist Marco Tarchi explains, the AfD has three ideological currents: the first, is the national-conservative one, which is also economically liberal and is currently the majoritarian faction in the party led by Weidel; the second, is the “old-school” nationalist one, unfairly (according to Tarchi) labelled as neo-Nazi; the third, is the social-national one which was very successful in the recent elections occurring in the Eastern region(s) of the country and could possibly engage in dialogue with Sahra Wagenknechts’s party (BSW) (Tarchi as cited in Boezi, 2026, my translation). 

Currently, with the party on the rise electorally, it is unclear which one of these three factions will politically prevail and in which manner and degree they will interact with Trump in the event they obtain power. For example, AfD’s “national conservatives” could rekindle their relationship with Trump (especially if the Iran war ends abruptly) and be strongly backed by the latter when they pursue hardline “law and order” policies, including their signature policy, Remigration,[5]which may put Germany at odds with the European Union and part of the international community. Also, notwithstanding some of Weidel’s anti-American rhetoric, the AfD and Washington can have a transactional transatlantic partnership that stems from sovereigntism, meaning Germany would spend more on defense and rearm but buy American weapons (and American LNG[6]). How this very pragmatic settlement would fit in a major bilateral or multi-lateral framework is still uncertain. 

For instance, would the present NATO agreements remain the strategic “umbrella” for Germany yet? Regarding such potential developments from Trump’s perspective, providing AfD’s Germany with preferential treatment, in terms of both security and bilateral trade, America would be promoting the party’s sovereigntist ideology and at the same time even encourage Weidel government’s gradual distancing from the European Union. 

Reversely, in contrast with the EU’s common foreign policy, Weidel’s AfD could pressure an already Ukraine-skeptic Trump administration to realign with Russia, leaving Ukraine to its own fate. The predictability of the above-described scenario — it has to be recognized — is highly dependent on a series of factors, the main of which is the capacity and the will of the most anti-American views in the party to compromise with the idea of a new partnership with the US. Weidel herself should revise some previous hostile attitudes towards the military American presence on German soil.

Why Trump’s Relationship with the European Right and Far Right Is Strained: Four Factors

The relationship between President Trump and significant segments of the European right and far right has become increasingly strained. While — as mentioned previously — a substantial ideological overlap endures (especially opposition towards immigration and progressivism), several developments have resulted in tensions between Trump’s “America First!” agenda and the national interests of the European right-wing and far right parties led by Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel. Today, Trump is no longer the ideological lodestar for Europe’s right and far right: with Meloni, relations are cold at best, while Le Pen keeps the MAGA movement at arm’s length, similarly, Farage is now more cautious in publicly expressing support for the tycoon, and Weidel has distanced herself and limited her party’s contacts with the US administration.

More specifically, there are four factors that have contributed to alienating Trump’s US from the European right and far right. First, Trump’s popularity has significantly declined both domestically and internationally (Hartig & Kiley, 2026; Dionne, Jr., 2025). A recent study shows his approval rating at a very low 32% in America, losing 15 percentage points since the beginning of his second term in January 2025 (Lange, 2026). At the same time, Trump’s approbation among the Republican electorate has also declined, standing at 73% (Lange, 2026). 

Considering the wider context, a YouGov survey (from October 2026) found that 85% of Italians have an unfavorable opinion of Trump, against 83% in France, 86% in Britain, and 85% in Germany (YouGov, 2026). After all, Trump’s political brand has become so toxic for the global right that nearly every time he became directly or indirectly involved in a country’s election — either by threatening annexation, tariffs, or by endorsing a candidate — his engagement has backfired on the candidates he endorsed. 

This occurred in the last Canadian election in April 2025, as Trump suggested Canada could become the US’s “51st state” while concurrently increasing tariffs against the country, and resulted in a Liberal Party victory and an unexpected defeat of the conservative pro-Trump candidate Pierre Poilievre (Dionne Jr., 2025). 

It also occurred in Hungary, precisely a year later, as Vance attended a Viktor Orbàn rally in Budapest with 1,000 supporters on behalf of Trump (Spike, 2026). However, this strategy did not produce the intended outcome as elections were ultimately won by Orbàn’s opponent, Péter Magyar. 

As simply put by two experts — Jeremy Shapiro and Zsuzanna Vegh (2025) — “His [Trumps’s] growing unpopularity means aligning with him may not appear politically advantageous for these forces” (Shapiro & Vegh, 2025). 

Second, Trump’s protectionism, which has taken the form of tariffs as a trade policy against EU nations, has led to an escalation of tension between the US administration and some of its rightist “allies” in Europe. In essence, while far right forces such as the RN and the AfD may embrace economic nationalism or protectionism theoretically, and even practically when it suits their own national economies, they instead wholeheartedly oppose it when US tariffs[7] on European goods risk damaging their own countries’ businesses, industries, and workers. After all, for years populists have presented themselves as the main defenders of rural and blue-collar workers, who now form their core constituency. 

Thus, aligning with Trump over his tariffs and trade measures (even if for purely ideological reasons) would be counter-productive and self-sabotaging for the European right and far right, as they ultimately damage artisans, luxury craft producers, exporters, farmers, manufacturers, and small-medium businesses in general, located in Italy, France, Britain, Germany and so forth. While there have been examples of populist politicians (e.g. Le Pen and Matteo Salvini) on the right defending Trump’s economic strategy (especially anti-China tariffs) the majority of rightists have either awkwardly ignored or condemned his course of action contra the EU. 

Among those who originally supported Trump but criticized him on anti-EU tariffs are Le Pen (who spoke of the American’s “brutal approach”) and Weidel (who called them “far too aggressive and self-defeating” and “fundamentally bad for free trade”) (Pitel, 2025). Instead, the conservative PM Meloni, simply called Trump’s tariffs “a mistaken choice” (Pitel, 2025). In fact, one commentator, writing for The Guardian has shrewdly suggested that “analysts have long noted the difficult challenge that Trump’s policies pose to nationalists in the EU: while they may agree with some of them principle, MAGA is ‘America first’ – while they are ‘France first,’ ‘Germany first’ or ‘Spain first’” (Henley, 2025). 

Third, Trump’s foreign policy — especially regarding Iran — emerged as increasingly at odds with the crypto-isolationist, selectively non-interventionist (see Greene, 2024) and sovereigntist foreign policy stances of the nationalist right in Europe. Trump’s involvement (alongside Israel) in a conflict that expanded beyond the initial strikes (February 2026) and targeting of Iran’s nuclear program became viewed as an indirect threat to Europe by part of the right and far right. This is due to the costs of the war, its negative economic consequences to international trade and oil, gas, and fuel prices, as well as its wider impact on mass migration and population displacement. For evident reasons, a large-scale war in Iran could result in a new wave of migration and increase in the influx of refugees in the Old Continent.

Also, the European nationalist right (but also part of the mainstream right) wants to avoid getting involved in an American-Israeli War that would potentially result in hardship for European soldiers and taxpayers. As discussed previously, far right leaders like Le Pen and Weidel have shown their disdain for Trump’s actions against Iran, whilst Farage called in question Trump’s judgement (Coates, 2026). In essence, Trump’s move against Iran (like the one against Maduro’s Venezuela beforehand) did not consolidate Trump’s “transatlantic alliance” with the European right and far righ but actually contributed to its deterioration (Riccardi & Spike, 2026).

Instead, regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the situation is more complex. Whilst some right-wing parties — inspired by Eurasianists ranging from Alexander Dugin to Alain de Benoist[8] — have remained staunchly pro-Putin and pro-Russia (e.g. AfD) others have shifted to more “mainstream” pro-Ukraine positions (e.g. FdI, RN, Reform UK). Unlike specifically extreme right parties (e.g. AfD), today, conservative (e.g. FdI) and populist radical right parties (e.g. RN, Reform UK) and leaders in Europe are increasingly skeptical of Trump’s conciliatory approach towards Russia. 

Unsurprisingly, Meloni often calls Russia an “aggressor” (Hook Global, 2026) and has clearly criticized Trump’s deal with the Russian President (to import a significant amount of Russian diesel fuel and temporarily lift US sanctions) calling it “a very risky choice” that legitimizes Moscow (Barbati, 2026). In the Italian Parliament, her party has consistently voted to aid Ukraine militarily. 

More surprisingly, the — once Russophile — RN has reassessed its position on Russia, because although the party has opposed sending French troops and military aid (for long-range strikes) both Le Pen and Bardella have publicly supported Ukraine’s right to defend (and recover) its sovereignty (Sandford, 2022; Par Le Parisien avec AFP, 2025; Crone & Klinke, 2025: 24, 44). Also, the RN supposedly interrupted all contacts with the Kremlin after 2022 (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 44). This shift towards more liberal-conservative positions has been prompted by the increasing influence of a new generation of identitarian, Gaullist, and civilizationist thinkers that advise the higher ranks of the party — such as Pierre-Romain Thionnet and few others (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25). The “new” RN no longer considers Russia a bastion for traditional Christianity and European identity but instead views it as a multicultural melting pot (a “Eurasian empire” with a considerable Islamic population) that represents a menace to the sovereignty of a white, Christian, and Western, “Fortress Europe” (see Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25, 27, 40, 44). 

Shifting the focus to Britain, even Farage — possibly the greatest admirer and supporter of Trump in Europe — has recently spoken against Trump’s new Russian deal (Henrys, 2026) and now is more inclined to back Ukraine (even suggesting NATO adherence) (Keate, 2025) at the cost of disagreeing with the American President. 

It is difficult to say whether these parties and leaders are ideologically or strategically (as some are close to obtaining governmental power) driven to support Ukraine over Russia. However, what is evident is that whilst the US-Iran War is viewed as something occurring far from Europe’s borders and involving a nation that is culturally very distinct and of little interest to the Old Continent, the Russia-Ukraine War is a conflict at the heart of Europe involving a nation that has been invaded by an “alien” superpower. 

Moreover, far right and right-wing parties are much more comfortable with Ukrainian immigration than with Iranian immigration resulting from the War, as the former are perceived as “white” and “Christian” and the latter as “non-white” and “Muslim.” A further concept worth exploring is that introduced by the French political analyst Thibault Muzergues (2026): many of these right-wing and/or far right parties in Europe are presently led by a younger generation of politicians who have become increasingly wary of aligning with Putin’s Russia (France 24 English, 2026). Essentially, this new political elite adopts a different stance towards Russia than its predecessors did fifteen to twenty-five years ago (France 24 English, 2026).

Fourth, Trump’s political model, especially his modus operandi of leadership and exercise of executive power, is difficult (if not impossible) to reproduce in Europe. The particular institutional structure and political-cultural context of the US confer the American President significantly more decisional autonomy, power, and freedom of maneuver compared to the numerous checks and balances, political fragmentation, and institutional constraints characterizing systems such as the European Union. 

In the event that they assume office, leaders such as Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel would operate in a very distinct context from Trump — one that involves specifically European parliamentary mechanisms, proportional electoral frameworks, coalition administrations, independent constitutional tribunals, and supranational regulatory bodies. 

Contrastingly, Trump’s institutional environment is shaped by a two-party system where — although restrained by courts, Congress, and the states — the executive is directly elected by the people and is able to exercise substantial authority without having to necessarily depend on a parliamentary majority. For instance, the American President has the right to pull out from most international agreements without the approval of Congress. Furthermore, Trump utilized executive orders to make US immigration policy stricter (also enforcing mass deportations) without always relying on new legislation. 

In summary, the impracticality of replicating Trump’s model in Europe ineluctably contributed to an increasing estrangement between the American President and the European right. 

Conclusion

This commentary examined the complex political and relational dynamics surrounding President Trump and successful right-wing and far right party leaders in Europe. The analysis revealed that although — overall — the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is significantly strained, it has yet to reach a breaking point, nor does such an outcome appear imminent. After all, given the American and European economies are largely interconnected, especially considering trade and supply chains, finance, military security, intelligence, energy, and technology, a full rupture between the US and Europe’s major nations (and its potential future leaders) such as Italy, France, Britain, and Germany appears both undesirable and unrealistic. 

In any case, the main takeaway is that although there is strong ideological affinity between at least three of the four leaders discussed and Trump — Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel (more so than Meloni) are closely aligned to the US President’s views on state authority to combat globalization, immigration, woke, and modern liberalism — realpolitik combined with Trump’s trade and foreign policy have forced these parties/leaders to distance themselves from his actions and emerging legacy, primarily to defend their own national interests. 

Considering political realism, Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel have all understood the political cost of aligning too closely with a foreign President who is experiencing a sharp decline in public support (both domestically and internationally) and who always prioritizes pursuing his own national agenda to satisfy his electoral base at home (MAGA) rather than strengthening transatlantic alliances. 

Furthermore, these leaders evidently see no benefit in attempting to imitate or replicate Trump’s failing political model in their own parliamentary (Italy, Britain, Germany) and semi-presidential (France) democracies. Considering Trump’s policies, all of the rightist and far right leaders mentioned above have no choice but to object to the President’s hazardous maneuvers on trade and foreign policy that damage their economies and long-term societal plans. Today, American tariffs on European goods, Russian “appeasement,” and new wars (e.g. Iran) (potentially causing an increase in global immigration), are not looked upon favorably by the leaders of parties who are — above all — sovereigntist (and except for the AfD — FdI, RN, and Reform UK, view Russia as a foreign threat to national sovereignty), nativist, culturally and economically nationalist, and partially isolationist. 

After Trump’s failed midterms election, it is likely the European right will distance itself from him and his political paradigm (namely “Trumpism”) even further. However, it is only natural that — if they take office — the European right and far right will seek coordination and cooperation with Trump’s America on most of the issues mentioned above (trade, security, intelligence, energy, etc.). Nevertheless, such cooperation is likely to become increasingly pragmatic, transactional and driven by strategic considerations rather than ideological affinity. 

As already stated, Trump is no longer considered an ideological point of reference or natural ally by any of the leaders and parties under scrutiny. On the contrary, Trump is perceived as an erratic, precarious, and unpredictable interlocutor whose imperatives and core aims usually diverge significantly from their own, especially on topics such as commercial policy and foreign policy. Ideally, future studies could shift the focus towards other right-wing political actors (e.g. Santiago Abascal, Péter Magyar, and Geert Wilders) and assess their affinity with Trump from a political-strategic and ideological standpoint.


 

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Footnotes

[1] For detailed accounts of JD Vance’s political views refer to Benjamin Wallace-Wells (2024), and Swapna Venugopal Ramaswamy (2025).

[2] For an in-depth account on how the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict has negatively impacted the UK economy, see Daniel Harari (2026). 

[3] The interview mentioned above can be found online at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IeYB_Hmsu84.

[4] A recent survey shows that most Germans disapprove of Trump’s actions against Iran (and Maduro in Venezuela) — see Claudia Müller (2026).

[5] This particular AfD policy is concisely (yet comprehensively) discussed in a book chapter written by the scholar Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli (2026: 149-151). 

[6] Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 

[7] Especially the 20% levy on all EU imports (see Hernández-Morales et al., 2025).

[8] Alain de Benoist is not strictly Eurasianist in the Duginist sense. While he supports multipolarity (objecting to American dominance and liberal universalism) and calls for an ethno-pluralist “Europe of the peoples”, he also believes Russia’s role is central in any anti-American, anti-Atlanticist, and illiberal continental project. 

Professor Bernard Avishai.

Prof. Bernard Avishai Warns: Netanyahu’s Removal Could Trigger Greater Political Violence

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Bernard Avishai of Dartmouth College warns that Benjamin Netanyahu’s removal from power could intensify political violence in Israel. Examining the enduring influence of Netanyahuism, religious nationalism, and the settler movement, Professor Avishai argues that Israel’s democratic crisis extends beyond electoral politics. He highlights the deepening confrontation between “Greater Israel theocrats” and “global Israel liberals and cosmopolitans,” cautioning that meaningful democratic reforms could provoke violent resistance. Advocating constitutional reform, judicial independence, universal civic obligations, and Arab political inclusion, he calls for a fundamental rethinking of Zionism and citizenship. Professor Avishai also emphasizes that lasting democratic renewal requires ending the occupation and establishing reciprocal political rights for Israelis and Palestinians.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Israel faces profound political uncertainty following the October 27 elections. Although Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud remains the largest party, his right-wing and religious coalition has lost its parliamentary majority. Gadi Eisenkot’s efforts to form an alternative government confront deep divisions over Arab political participation, ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, and the enduring influence of religious nationalism. Beyond coalition arithmetic, fundamental questions persist concerning judicial independence, Palestinian rights, and Israel’s democratic identity.

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Bernard Avishai, visiting professor of political economy at Dartmouth College and former technology and strategy editor of the Harvard Business Review, warns that Netanyahu’s departure could intensify rather than resolve Israel’s political and institutional crisis. “The potential for violence here is really great, regardless of whether Bibi remains in power,” he cautions. “The prospect of violence might be even greater if he’s removed from power.”

For Professor Avishai, the underlying conflict extends beyond Netanyahu’s personalized leadership. “I think Bibi’s world will outlive Bibi,” he argues, emphasizing the entrenched religious-nationalist constituencies and institutional arrangements sustaining Netanyahuism. Comparing a possible Eisenkot government to Abraham Lincoln’s accession to power in 1860, he suggests that substantial democratic reforms could threaten communities whose political identities and material interests depend on the existing order.

Professor Avishai anticipates particularly fierce resistance from ultra-Orthodox communities and armed West Bank settlers. “If the opposition takes power and tries to introduce genuine changes,” he warns, “there will be violence.”Invoking Yitzhak Rabin’s assassination, he underscores the historical precedents for political extremism: “These people have already killed a prime minister. Let’s not forget that.”

Nevertheless, Professor Avishai rejects political violence as a justification for postponing democratic renewal. He advocates constitutional reform, an empowered independent judiciary, universal schooling, and equal civic obligations. A new Basic Law enshrining Israel’s Declaration of Independence, he argues, could establish the foundations for a more inclusive democratic republic.

Central to this transformation is the struggle between what Professor Avishai calls “Greater Israel theocrats” and “global Israel liberals and cosmopolitans.” Arab political participation becomes a defining democratic test. “There’s absolutely no reason why Hebrew Republicans cannot cooperate with Arab parties,” he insists, framing Israel’s predicament as a fundamental choice between “a Jewish theocracy and a Hebrew democracy.”

Drawing on his longstanding scholarship on Zionism and secular republicanism, Professor Avishai also maintains that lasting democratic renewal ultimately requires ending the occupation and developing reciprocal political rights with Palestinians.

The interview thus explores a central paradox of Israel’s post-election moment: electoral alternation may create an opportunity for democratic reconstruction while simultaneously provoking resistance from the very forces that such reconstruction seeks to constrain.

Here is our interview with Professor Bernard Avishai, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Netanyahu Mobilizes Voters Through Fear and Hatred of Arabs

Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel visits the Synagogue of Copacabana in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on December 28, 2018.

Professor Avishai, thank you for joining us. In The Tragedy of Zionism, you argued that unresolved contradictions within Zionism threatened Israeli democracy. Four decades later, how much of Israel’s current crisis reflects these foundational tensions, and how much is attributable to Netanyahu’s personalized, populist style of leadership?

Professor Bernard Avishai: That’s an excellent question. If I understand you correctly, you’re asking how much of Israel’s current crisis we should attribute to an inherent, underlying crisis in the state’s constitutional structure, and how much to Netanyahu’s peculiar, aggressive populist ideas. It’s a little like asking, when somebody gets the flu, how much is attributable to the virus and how much to a lack of antibodies.

So why don’t we start with Netanyahu? Netanyahu has built his career on fomenting suspicion and considerable loathing toward Palestinian Arabs in particular, and the Arab world more generally, although this has been moderated by his efforts in the Gulf. But we can return to that later. Historically, he has fomented fear and loathing toward Palestinian Arabs, both within Israel’s borders, including Palestinian Arab citizens, and among Palestinians living in the territories occupied in 1967.

The question, then, is how this fomenting of hostility produces a strong, nationalist, I would even say ultranationalist, mobilized population. Where does he get his support? People say, “Oh, well, as a politician, he’s a magician,” and so on. He’s not a magician; he’s a one-trick pony. That’s his trick. And to the extent that you study populism, I think we know that this is the trick of populists almost everywhere: to take a country’s difficulties and find someone to hate and someone to blame.

So how does he mobilize this constituency? First of all, Netanyahu’s own supporters are not the only ones who have brought him to power. There are two components of his coalition that have consistently supported him.

Religious Zionists and the Ultra-Orthodox Sustain Netanyahu’s Theocratic Coalition

One is the national Orthodox Religious Zionist world, centered on very hermetically sealed yeshivot and, essentially, the settler community, which has grown almost by inertia over the past 50 years. There were perhaps 5,000 settlers at the end of the 1970s, and now there are more than 650,000, including over 450,000 in the West Bank outside East Jerusalem. That’s a huge constituency, and its members have an inherent interest in maintaining what is now called a right-wing government, although the word “right” is being stretched somewhat here. These are theocrats. They want a messianic version of the country, and they don’t care about democracy. For them, Netanyahu and Likud have always been a ticket to punch.

Then there are the ultra-Orthodox within the Bibi coalition, who were not originally Zionists. These are communities that have inherited the mantle of religious Jews who lived continuously in Jerusalem, in Israel and Palestine, even before Zionist colonies began. Early on, they made a pact with the state apparatus under which the state would support yeshiva study for young men. In many of these religious schools, particularly those for boys, core subjects such as math, English, civics, and science receive limited instruction. Students are essentially kept in a cloister.

Originally, these communities were thought to be a kind of nature preserve that would gradually disappear with modernization. When Ben-Gurion first recognized this group and allowed it to maintain independent study and school systems, there were about 400 young men engaged in Torah study. There are now more than 100,000, and the community around them has grown so substantially, particularly in Jerusalem, that approximately 60% of children entering first grade in the city attend ultra-Orthodox schools. The cost of supporting ultra-Orthodox families is approximately 38 billion shekels annually. It’s effectively three shekels to the dollar. That’s a third more than all the money spent on hospitals and universities in the country. This represents a tremendous burden on the state, and these communities regard Netanyahu and his theocratic allies as their allies.

Historical Resentment and Ethnonationalism Sustain Likud’s Political Base

Together, the national Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox constitute about half of Netanyahu’s Knesset coalition. Then there’s another group: those who vote for Likud and its ultranationalist ideal, who think of Jews largely in terms of a permanent affirmative action program. It’s as though Israel represents a permanent form of retaliation against antisemitism and the Arab world.

The question becomes: Who supports this outlook? Historically, a substantial share of Likud’s support has come from North African Jews who regard themselves as refugees from the Arab world, having been expelled in much the same way that Palestinian Arabs understand their displacement from Palestine during the Nakba. They think, “Why are they complaining? We are also refugees, and we know the Arabs. We understand them. They hate us. They created this terrible dislocation in our lives, so what’s their complaint? We found life here; let them go find life in Arabia.” And it’s important to remember that Israel is a very small sliver of Arabia.

On top of that, they tend to harbor resentment toward the European socialist, secular establishment they encountered in 1956, 1957, and 1958. Their own wives were generally illiterate, and they entered a society dominated by a labor aristocracy that controlled everything. This produced a kind of anti-elitist sentiment, a belief that Europeans looked down their noses at them. Likud became their form of retaliation.

Then there are “the Russians” who arrived in the 1990s. That’s another constituency that tends to support Likud, as well as its own party, including Avigdor Lieberman, whom we’ll probably return to later. Russians, in my view, believe their role is to disabuse us of our fantasies and illusions. They see the world in terms of power politics. They want their Putin, and they think Israel should have its own Putin. They’re not exactly democrats. They’re secular, they like their ham, but that doesn’t mean they believe in a secular, democratic world. They believe the world consists of tribes and power politics, and that Jews are a tribe that must remain strong in the face of their enemies.

War Trauma and Fear of Arabs Reinforce Netanyahu’s Political Support

Finally, there are young people who have been through this war. Young people experience war without necessarily having processed everything they’ve done. Take the documentary film NAZA, which has generated enormous attention in Europe but is received very differently in Israel. The reaction is something like: “What? You’re calling us war criminals? You’ve asked us to serve for three years, and now you’re going to call us war criminals? I’ve just lost my friend, I’ve lost my cousin.” Tens of thousands are suffering from PTSD right now. They see Arabs as having come and killed and slaughtered people on October 7, and they regard themselves as part of the effort to rid the country of that threat. Now they’re being accused of war crimes.

This is not the time, from their perspective. It’s like approaching the American Army during the bombing of Dresden in World War II and asking, “You don’t really feel very bad for the Germans, do you?” That’s simply not how they’re thinking. I’m not trying to justify the commission of war crimes. I’m saying that you have to understand where these people are coming from.

So if you ask how this one-trick pony manages to foment hatred, fear, and loathing toward the Arab world, or to create this Likud constituency whose voters seem unshakable, that’s how he does it. And these votes are not easily shaken.

Can Israel Privilege Jews Over Arabs and Still Be Democratic?

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

In your October 19, 2026, New York Times essay, you distinguish political, religious, and cultural Zionism, arguing that only the latter is fully compatible with liberal democracy. Has Netanyahuism fundamentally transformed Zionism, or does it represent the political ascendancy of its historically illiberal currents?

Professor Bernard Avishai: In a way, that’s the same question in a different guise, because it raises the question of whether there is a form of Zionism that’s compatible with democratic norms. What I’ve described so far is a view of the country that tends to define itself retrospectively in terms of a Zionist challenge. That challenge is to survive in a world where Jews are at risk and, as I said before, to define the state apparatus as a kind of permanent affirmative action program.

So, for anybody who isn’t Jewish, it’s identity politics taken to the level of ideology. You define Jews in ethnic and religious terms, privilege Jewish life on that basis, and use the state apparatus to do so. That’s not really compatible with democratic norms. It’s especially incompatible when you have a population that’s 20% Arab. How can you privilege Jewish life in ethnic and religious terms on the one hand, have a minority population on the other, and still call yourself democratic?

There is, however, a whole other line of Zionist thinking that saw the problem not as, “The bastards won’t let us assimilate. The bastards victimize us; therefore, we need to create a state apparatus to defend ourselves.” Rather, it said, “No, no, our problem is modernization. Our problem is our own rabbis. Our problem is our own inability, as Jews, to confront the challenge of modernization.” And modernization means secular, liberal life, which our religion cannot possibly survive. Because Jewish religion, in spite of all the ways—or maybe because of all the ways—in which it anticipated a certain style of thinking, a liberal style of thinking, modernization subverts us from within. We need a way of surviving in the modern world that the rabbis could not possibly provide.

Cultural Zionism Offers a Path to Arab Equality and a Democratic Israel

At the turn of the 20th century, cultural Zionists began to realize that their real Zionist project was to develop the Hebrew language, put down roots in Palestinian colonies, and create little incubators of Hebrew language and culture as the foundation for a new culture. Ahad Ha’am, the original mentor of the cultural Zionists, said that when he visited Palestine in 1911–1912, he saw these little colonies as cultural generating stations in a grid. They were generating Hebrew culture and would eventually link up in a network, which is exactly what happened.

That kind of Zionism—the notion that you create a Hebrew-speaking republic and that this constitutes the Jewish state—can accommodate a minority that assimilates into it. Consider the Russians who came after the fall of the Soviet Union. Many of them aren’t really Jews. Of the million who came, about 300,000 were Christian, or at least had Christian families. But they could assimilate into Hebrew culture and become members of, as it were, the Israeli nation. And don’t forget, this is called Israel. It’s not called Ishmael. It’s the State of Israel, and Hebrew is the primary language of work, culture, and education in the country.

You now have three generations—actually, four by now—of Arab young people, three of whom were born in the country and speak Hebrew as well as, if not better than, I do. They constitute a fifth of the doctors, a quarter of the nurses, and half the pharmacists in the country. They live in this Hebrew-Israeliness and are knocking at the door, saying, “We want to live fully as citizens in this country. We voted in this election.” They came out in very large numbers in the last election and are saying, “We want to be part of this game. We want a democratic country.” It’s a little like Black people in Mississippi now finally electing a senator. They want to overcome aspects of the state that have been discriminatory against them.

They want to be part of it. And yes, to that extent, Zionism can create a legacy of Hebrew-speaking, secular civil society that can assimilate others and be fully democratic—not only for Arabs but also for idiosyncratic people like myself.

Israel Must Move Beyond Ethnoreligious Supremacy

Your Hebrew Republic envisions a secular, democratic Israel grounded in Hebrew culture rather than ethnoreligious supremacy. Can this vision accommodate full equality for Palestinian citizens while preserving Jewish national self-determination, or does that require a more fundamental constitutional transformation?

Professor Bernard Avishai: I’ve just answered that question, but the issue of constitutional reform relates to the question of antibodies that I never got to in the first place. The Israeli state apparatus rests on a series of Basic Laws that don’t really amount to a liberal constitution. In Israel, you have no immigration law to speak of. What you have is something called the Law of Return.

The Law of Return allows any Jew anywhere in the world—and I don’t know what “Jew” means here—to enter the country and become a citizen immediately. You basically have to sign papers and so on, but you can become a citizen immediately. That devalues Israeliness, doesn’t it? You don’t arrive in America without speaking English and immediately become an American citizen. You have to go through a process of naturalization. Naturalization to what? In Israel, naturalization would mean becoming part of the Hebrew language, Hebrew culture, and Israeliness. But that is not recognized by Israel’s constitutional framework. There is no immigration law to speak of.

All you need to prove is that you had one Jewish grandparent. Why? Why, I ask you, one Jewish grandparent? Because that was the Nuremberg Law. If you had one Jewish grandparent, you were considered a Jew and therefore qualified to be shot. The Israeli state apparatus in the early 1950s determined that if you were someone Hitler would have hunted, you could find a place in Israel. You could become a citizen of Israel. So that’s why we have no immigration law. It made perfect sense in 1950 to have this kind of immigration law. It makes no sense in 2026.

There are other things. There’s the Israel Land Authority, which has borrowed some of the practices of the pre-state Jewish National Fund. This means that if you acquire land from the Israel Land Authority, you can’t sell it to a non-Jew. We still haven’t defined what a Jew is. Okay, but you can’t sell it to a non-Jew. Could you imagine? That made sense in the 1930s and 1940s, when the Jewish National Fund was buying land for colonies and didn’t want people to turn around and sell it to somebody else. They wanted those who acquired land from the Jewish National Fund to actually farm it and live on it rather than turn around and sell it. So it made sense in the 1930s and 1940s. It makes no sense in 2026.

Netanyahu Fears an Independent Judiciary That Could Dismantle His Political Order

Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.

So, when I talk about constitutional reform, I’m talking about empowering the judiciary to rely on a liberal democratic constitution, which we would have had if, in 1949, we had enacted a constitution based on the Declaration of Independence. The Israeli Declaration of Independence could have been written by Eleanor Roosevelt. If Israel had enacted a constitution based on its Declaration of Independence, we could have a judiciary today that could examine something like the Law of Return, the Jewish Nation-State Law, or the Israel Land Law and say, “This is unconstitutional. We have to move forward toward Israeliness and away from this ethnic, religious, theocratic solidarity that was somehow allowed to develop within the state over all these years.”

I haven’t even mentioned the occupation yet. Obviously, that has also had an enormous impact on Israeli society because Jerusalem and its immediate settler suburbs have become something like an apartheid state. That’s not true of Tel Aviv, Herzliya, and Haifa. You can’t simply say, “Israel is an apartheid state.” The world of Herzliya, Tel Aviv, and Haifa supports the state apparatus. Seventy-five to 80% of taxes are paid by companies operating in global Israel along the coast, not by the Greater Israel population in Jerusalem and the settlements. But along the coast, people are much more liberal. They don’t want this, yet it’s the people of Jerusalem who have captured the state apparatus and have been exploiting the coastal cities for as long as Bibi has been in power.

Right now, the people of Greater Israel have created this world that the judiciary would be dismantling if it were empowered to do so by a constitution. That’s why constitutional reform is one of the things being promised by the opposition, and why Bibi has taken on the task of disempowering the Supreme Court. He speaks of an activist Supreme Court in much the same way that segregationist senators in the American South were always confounded by the activist Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education and similar cases. What they really mean by an activist Supreme Court is a court that overturns laws that should never have been part of a democratic state in the first place.

That’s why the judiciary is so dangerous to the Bibi world.

Netanyahu’s Political World Will Outlive Him

Netanyahu’s Likud lost its parliamentary majority in October but remains Israel’s largest party. Does this outcome suggest the erosion of Netanyahu’s personal political dominance, or has the populist, anti-institutional political culture associated with Netanyahuism become entrenched beyond his leadership?

Professor Bernard Avishai: I think Bibi’s world will outlive Bibi. I don’t think there’s any question about that. But it’s also true that he’s become the face of it. We have exactly the same issue with Trump in America. Will MAGA outlive Donald Trump? It will, but it will survive on a much smaller scale. The people who voted for Bibi in the last election are a fairly good indication of his residual support. Without Bibi, that support may decline to 30% of the vote instead of 40%. But there will continue to be a political world that outlasts Bibi. The culture war in Israel is not just personal.

If Eisenkot takes over in Israel today, if he manages to take over, it’ll be like Lincoln taking over in 1860. The people who feel threatened by Eisenkot taking over are not simply people who think, “Oh, well, he’s going to cut taxes by 12%. I don’t like that,” or “He’s going to raise taxes.” No, no, we’re talking about people whose entire way of life is profoundly threatened by a government that challenges their commitment to the status quo and to an occupation that gives them a foothold across the entire historic, biblical Land of Israel.

They see themselves in messianic terms, want a kind of theocracy, and fear that if their settlements stop expanding, they will come under siege. They’re desperately afraid of what will happen to them. They live in a world where, unless they continue to make demographic gains and continue not just to colonize the West Bank but also to colonize the Knesset, they’re in a lot of trouble.

One also has to remember that there is a demographic and geographic division here. I spoke earlier about Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and the coast. Something like 75–80% of Bibi’s vote came from Jerusalem and the settlement areas, as well as some development towns where North African Jews lived. But what I’m saying is that, if you look at Jerusalem and its surrounding areas, 75–80% voted for Bibi and the various parties in his coalition. In Tel Aviv, it’s exactly the reverse. Seventy-five to 80% voted for the opposition parties. These places may be separated by only 40 kilometers, but politically and culturally, they’re worlds apart.

Israel’s Culture War Could Turn Violent

And this division could become violent. It absolutely could. If the opposition takes power and tries to introduce genuine changes—and we can discuss in a moment what those changes might be—there will be violence. There will be talk of, I won’t say secession, but certainly resistance in Jerusalem to whatever the new government tries to impose. The Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox of Jerusalem, can shut down the country in a heartbeat simply by occupying the streets, mobilizing tens of thousands of protesters, and blocking highways and railroad lines. It wouldn’t be difficult to shut down the country. And as far as the West Bank settlers are concerned, they’re armed! The army that would be required to suppress their provocative terrorist acts against Palestinians includes many junior officers who are very sympathetic to them and who have been through their own yeshivot and training.

The potential for violence here is really great, regardless of whether Bibi remains in power. The prospect of violence might be even greater if he’s removed from power. I’m not saying that’s a reason not to remove him. I’m just saying we have to be prepared for a tremendous amount of dislocation. These people have already killed a prime minister. Let’s not forget that. They killed the prime minister for exactly this reason. It was a prime minister whose government relied on Arab votes in the Knesset. This is not new.

The Settler Movement Has Become Politically Uncontrollable

Your writings distinguish Israel’s secular national traditions from the increasingly influential religious-nationalist right. How did movements associated with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich progress from ideological marginality to governmental influence, and what explains their continuing electoral resilience?

Professor Bernard Avishai: That’s really the question I was implying earlier. If you don’t have the antibodies to nip this in the bud, these movements just continue to grow. In the early 1970s, when the settler movement was just getting off the ground, there was an opportunity to stop it.

In 1976, during the first Rabin government, when Rabin was a younger man—he had been prime minister since the end of 1974, before resigning over a banking issue involving his wife. Anyway, he resigned, and Shimon Peres ran against Menachem Begin in May 1977. When Rabin’s first government faced a group of settlers trying to establish a settlement near Nablus, called Kedumim or Elon Moreh—it had various names—the government could have stopped it then. But the chief of staff, Mordechai Gur, reported back to the cabinet and said, “There’ll be blood. Do you want to have Jewish blood on your hands?” So the government refrained from ending the settlement project outside the border settlements, which were really not problematic. But that’s what governments always did. The more brazen the settlers’ actions became, the less willing governments were to act against them.

We saw what happened when Ariel Sharon, who had been the architect of the settlement movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s, finally decided, as prime minister, to remove the settlers from Gaza. Only about 6,000–7,000 people were removed from Gaza, yet it tore the country apart. You cannot remove that many people from the settlements without enormous upheaval. So, the settlements have now become an enormous political obstacle that the government is unable to deal with. They have grown and grown in the absence of a government prepared to stifle them and stop them.

They’ve also been able to exploit the sort of quasi-theocratic ideas that the state apparatus has tolerated. In Jewish Israel, there’s no civil marriage. A Jew cannot marry a non-Jew in the State of Israel because marriage, divorce, and burial have all been left in the hands of the rabbinate. That has been true since 1948. It was another compromise made early on, like giving ultra-Orthodox children separate schools.

So, we have a continuing marriage of democratic institutions, on the one hand, with these quasi-theocratic legacy institutions from before the state was formed. How do you resolve this without one side winning and the other losing? The theocratic side has been winning because the occupation has blown back into the country in a way that makes it very difficult to defeat.

But today, it’s absolutely clear that this is a choice. This new government, if it’s formed, had better start acting. It has to act to extend the boundaries of liberal Israeliness against this theocratic world, which has faced no resistance for so long and has had the power and moral prestige of the occupation, of the status quo, behind it.

It’s a very dangerous moment.

Israel’s Real Struggle Is Between Theocrats and Liberals

Election billboards of religious political parties Shas and Otzma Yehudit before Israel’s fourth election in two years in a street of Jerusalem on March 22, 2021. Photo: Gali Estrange.

In your August 2026 New Yorker essay on Lior Schleien, you examine how religious nationalism challenges secular culture and democratic freedoms. Has Israel’s central political cleavage shifted from territorial security toward a deeper struggle between secular citizenship and religious authority?

Professor Bernard Avishai: I absolutely think so, and I’ve explained why. The territorial issue is a dependent variable, not an independent variable. There’s a culture war going on. The real question is: Who’s going to win? Greater Israel theocrats or global Israel liberals and cosmopolitans?

Both groups think of themselves as patriots. Both see themselves as rooted in a Zionist past. But the global Israel types are the country’s elites. They’re more highly educated and tend to be more European, with roots going back to the original pioneering settlements.

That’s the irony. You listen to people on campuses today who think they’re offering highly sophisticated critiques of Israel by invoking the colonialism of the 1920s and 1930s. But actually, those pioneers, along with their grandchildren and great-grandchildren, are the liberals of the country.

They’re the ones who believe in a secular, liberal commonwealth that provides opportunities for the assimilation and integration of all minorities as full citizens. It’s really the people who came after them who tend to support the more ultranationalist and theocratic forces in the country.

Israel Needs Sweeping Reforms to Restore Democracy

Netanyahu’s confrontations with the judiciary have been justified by supporters as restoring democratic accountability, while critics view them as executive aggrandizement. How should we distinguish legitimate institutional reform from populist constitutionalism that undermines judicial independence and liberal democracy?

Professor Bernard Avishai: This raises the larger question of what any new government can do. A new government would have a profound and urgent agenda if Israeliness, Hebrew republicanism, and democratic norms are to prevail.

A new government would have to undertake a series of immediate steps. First, it would establish a judicial commission of inquiry into what happened on October 7. This is symbolically important because it re-empowers the state apparatus, rather than just politicians, and creates the evidentiary basis for determining how to proceed in the future.

You immediately repeal all the laws Netanyahu and his government passed that subvert the Supreme Court and the Attorney General. You also repeal all the laws that subordinate the press and universities to government politicians. You appoint new heads of the police, a new governor of the Bank of Israel, and a new head of the Secret Service.

You create a national system of state schools in which all schools are required to teach core curricula. In effect, no funding would go to religious schools that fail to teach civics, math, science, history, and English.

You introduce universal conscription or national service so that everyone in the country, including Arabs and the ultra-Orthodox, serves for the same number of years that, right now, basically only secular Israelis serve in the army. But if you don’t want to serve in the military—and I presume most Arabs would not, and most Haredim might not—you could perform national service instead, working in hospitals, cultural centers, and so forth.

You’d also have to pass a new Basic Law that enshrines the Declaration of Independence and its democratic norms, giving an independent judiciary a legal basis for determining the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of undemocratic laws.

That’s a huge agenda, but it’s all very doable. And none of it has anything to do with the occupation. People outside the country tend to think that the division between right and left in Israel is entirely about whether you support or oppose a Palestinian state. That’s not really how it’s viewed in Israel.

Right now, if you asked Israelis whether they favor a Palestinian state, you’d probably get 90% saying no, simply because they associate a Palestinian state today with empowering Palestinians to do to them from the West Bank what was done to them from Gaza. So the next Al-Aqsa Flood could come from Qalqilya instead of Gaza. That doesn’t feel like something anyone wants to risk.

But there is nevertheless a distinction within the country. There are people who believe that being part of global Israel means maintaining good relations with the Gulf states and who also believe that a regional plan for Gaza’s reconstruction may, in fact, be possible. Even though you’d be paying the price of allowing a Palestinian Authority-adjacent administration to enter Gaza and take responsibility for administering the territory, you’d do so knowing that Hamas is basically giving its tacit consent. And you’d allow the disarming of Hamas in Gaza to become more a matter of telling its members to take off their Hamas uniforms and put on the uniforms of a new Palestinian administration. Then you give them back their guns and provide them with new leaders.

Hamas will still be influential. Its members will still obviously see themselves within the framework of having joined Hamas, of having joined the steadfast warriors in the first place. That’s inevitable. You can’t avoid that now. But a new administration would mean that the Arab League would essentially provide a moral foundation for that administration. The Arab League would also have the support of Qatar and Turkey, and these are not people Hamas members would want to fire on.

Do you know what I mean? There’s the possibility of an administration that has the endorsement of the Palestinian Authority but is really supported by an outer ring of Arab countries, forcing the issue and pushing Israel and the Palestinians toward some kind of pathway to compromise in which the Palestinians accept Israel and learn to live with it. In the same way, America, under some new administration, would be pushing Israel to accept a pathway to Palestinian independence.

Israeli Democrats Have No Reason to Exclude Arab Parties

Israeli Parliament Knesset.
Israeli Parliament Knesset. Photo: Dreamstime.

Following the October 27 elections, Gadi Eisenkot has received the mandate to form a government, yet his potential majority depends partly on Arab parliamentary support. Does the reluctance of major Zionist opposition parties to cooperate with Arab representatives reveal a deeper contradiction between electoral democracy and ethnonational conceptions of political legitimacy?

Professor Bernard Avishai: The answer is simply yes. There’s absolutely no reason why Hebrew Republicans cannot cooperate with Arab parties.

Golda Meir’s coalition, back in the late 1960s, had four Arab members who were part of an independent Arab party affiliated with the Labor Zionist world. We’ve had minority governments in the past, including Rabin’s government, that relied on Arab parties.

Rabin was asked about this in 1994 or 1995. I saw a short video clip of Rabin talking to a group of reporters. One of them, a very distinguished Arab affairs correspondent who remains highly respected, asked him, “Do you think it’s okay to have Arab parties supporting your government when these parties may, in fact, be beholden to Arafat or perhaps be supporters of Arafat?”

Rabin visibly tensed up and said, “This question infuriates me.”

“Just imagine,” he said, “that an American senator, a Jew, decides to vote to provide money for Israel. How would you feel if the argument were, ‘Oh, this Jewish senator is taking his orders from Jerusalem, taking his orders from Israel’? How would you feel if that were said about Jews in America? Jews have always hated racism, opposed racism, and suffered from racism. And now you’re telling me that, in the Jewish state, we’re going to default to these racist ideas?”

No opposition member right now, except for one, Yair Golan from the Democrats, would say that to a reporter. It kind of breaks my heart. But the truth is, there’s only one opposition party that is absolutely adamant that the opposition should not form a government with the help of Arab parties, and that’s Avigdor Lieberman’s party. It’s largely a hardline secular party that appeals to Russian voters, those Russians I mentioned earlier, who generally vote for Likud but have also voted for Lieberman.

Arab Participation Could Redefine Israeli Democracy

In your October essay, you question whether politicians can meaningfully claim to support a Jewish and democratic state while excluding Arab parties from governing coalitions. Does the record representation of Arab voters in the new Knesset create an opportunity to redefine the boundaries of legitimate democratic participation?

Professor Bernard Avishai: Absolutely. This is what I’m counting on. This is a critical moment for Israel, there’s no question about it. If an opposition government forms today with the support of 19 Arab members, it’s going to redefine what Israeli liberalism means for the liberal world of Israel. It’s a moment to recognize the difference between a kind of Jewish theocracy and a Hebrew democratic republic, a Hebrew democracy. A Jewish theocracy versus a Hebrew democracy. This is a fundamental decision, and we have the possibility of seeing it today.

But I must tell you, the opposite is also true. If, for some reason, Lieberman prevails and doesn’t change his mind, and the opposition groups decide to form a government with the Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox, rather than allow liberals from the Arab bloc in Israel to help form the government, Arab citizens are going to see this as a moment somewhat like the way Herzl viewed the Dreyfus case.

Arab liberals are going to say, “What do you want from us? We’ve done everything we can to prove to you—not just the doctors at Hadassah Hospital and so on, but everything we can—that we want to be, and can be, part of this Hebrew-speaking civil society. We want equality, and you’re telling us that no matter what we do, we’ll always be viewed as a fifth column?” My fear is that they’ll say, “You want to know what a fifth column really looks like?”

We had a measure of that in May 2021, with the so-called War of the Walls, or whatever it was called. There was a Gaza war in May 2021, and there were riots in Acre, Lod, and some Israeli-Arab towns. Sinwar, in my view, was counting on that when he attacked in October 2023. He was counting on the Arabs of Israel rising up, and they didn’t. Among other things, they were so appalled by the terrorism on the border. But they also saw that this was a test for them. They weren’t going to join in that kind of crusade against Israel. They saw themselves as citizens of the country. They’ve proven ever since that they are citizens of the country. Israeli Arabs died on October 7. They die when missiles fall on the northern towns. They’re part of Israel’s world. 

If they see that they’re going to be swatted away at a moment like this, they’re not going to vote in these numbers next time. You can see that young people are going to start reevaluating whether integration into Israel is really something they should be contemplating.

Israel’s Future Requires Universal Schooling and Civic Obligations

Campaign signs for the Israeli government “Shas” party head by Arye Deri, depicting Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, prior to the April 2019 elections in Safed, Israel on March 10, 2019. Photo: David Cohen.

The dispute over ultra-Orthodox military exemptions has become central to post-election coalition negotiations. Does this conflict expose a broader crisis of citizenship, in which competing religious and secular communities increasingly reject a common understanding of civic obligations and political equality?

Professor Bernard Avishai: Of course. If the opposition, in order to take power, makes a deal with the Haredim, the ultra-Orthodox, and refuses to impose universal schooling and a universal draft on them, it will be another missed opportunity. You have to impose these requirements on the ultra-Orthodox, not only for reasons of civic responsibility but also for the country’s economic future. You can’t have such a large population unqualified to participate in public life.

My fear—and it’s not just my fear—is that if the Haredim are not drawn into the wider world, the problem will extend beyond the question of how citizenship is defined. You’re going to have 100,000, 200,000, or even 300,000 of the country’s most educated people leaving. Many of the global Israelis have opportunities elsewhere. They may have an entrepreneurial company registered in Delaware, or they may head a department of urology, and there’s a need for urologists in Buffalo, New York, or elsewhere. These people have the qualifications to leave and find plenty of opportunities elsewhere.

Israeli Democracy Requires Ending the Occupation

Your writings have consistently linked Israeli democracy to Palestinian self-determination. Could an Eisenkot-led government restore domestic democratic safeguards without substantially changing policies toward Gaza and the West Bank, or is democratic renewal inseparable from ending the occupation?

Professor Bernard Avishai: In the long run, obviously, yes. In order to have a democratic Israel, you ultimately have to end what the occupation has become.

The problem is the phrase “self-determination.” I don’t like that phrase. I don’t like “Jewish self-determination,” and I don’t like “Palestinian self-determination.” It’s hubristic to talk about self-determination in the first place, even on an individual level, let alone a national level. The real questions are: What institutional commitments are you making? What norms do you live by? And how do these allow you to thrive as a human being?

We have to end the occupation of the West Bank. That doesn’t necessarily mean saying, “Oh, we care about our democracy, so let’s get out of the West Bank. Maybe they’ll leave us alone.” That’s not going to happen, and I must tell you, I don’t think it should be that way. In order to redeem Israeli democracy, you’ve got to look for and work with democratic and liberal forces in the Palestinian community and find reciprocal ways of creating political institutions that will allow both sides to have the same rights. In other words, neither side should have rights that the other doesn’t have.

But that doesn’t mean complete independence from one another, because that’s ridiculous. You can’t have complete independence when you’re sharing water, bandwidth, spectrum, sewage systems, epidemiological problems, roads, bridges, and financial services. You have to remember that Israel and Palestine together are basically the size of Greater Los Angeles. So the idea that the two can separate, like Japan separates from Korea or something like that, is preposterous. You can’t have that.

What you need to think about is how each side can have rights and responsibilities that are reciprocal with those of the other society. These are two distinct countries. You live in Brussels; you know what the European Union is. This has to be resolved in ways that, in some respects, draw on what the European Union has taught us.

Do all settlers have to leave the West Bank? I think that any settler who thinks of himself as a violent messianist intent on expanding and oppressing neighboring shepherds and Arab towns should obviously be taken and thrown in jail if necessary. But the idea that all Israelis currently living in the West Bank have to come back?

Or that Palestinians whose families lost their homes in 1948 and who have a claim to a particular piece of land can’t possibly live in the Valley of Jezreel if that land is currently unoccupied?

I’m not saying Palestinians should have a claim to the land underneath the Azrieli Towers in Tel Aviv. I’m just saying that, in individual cases, it’s perfectly reasonable for these people to stay in place. But they’ll stay in place in the way we’ve learned from the European Union: you can be a resident, even a permanent resident, of a country without being a citizen of that country. Palestinians can be residents of Israel without being citizens of Israel. Israelis can be residents of Palestine without being citizens of Palestine. And if an Israeli living in Ma’ale Adumim, across the Green Line, wants to vote in an Israeli election, the drive to the Hebrew University to vote would take about seven minutes. So, let’s remember the scale here.

Democratic Reforms Could Fundamentally Transform Zionism

And finally, Professor Avishai, considering Netanyahuism alongside the experiences of Trump, Erdogan, Orbán, and other populist leaders, what makes Israel’s democratic crisis distinctive? Can electoral alternation dismantle entrenched authoritarian practices and religious-nationalist power structures, or does lasting democratic renewal require a fundamental rethinking of Zionism, citizenship, and Palestinian self-determination?

Professor Bernard Avishai: I think the two will go hand in hand. If a new government in Israel implemented all the reforms I outlined earlier, a rethinking of Zionism would be the natural result. Sometimes, intellectual and ideological change comes from reflecting on realities that you now have to deal with. It’s true, to some extent, that there will be forces in a new government that have already undergone that change, experienced an ideological shift toward a more liberal and secular Zionist ideal, and will use this shift to justify and push for these reforms.

But once the reforms come, they take on a life of their own. They begin to shape people’s expectations. Just look at the civil rights movement in the South. You needed ideological champions. But once you have legal changes and new generations growing up and getting used to new realities, the ideological shift happens more broadly. I don’t know if I’m answering your question, but I feel that the idea that you need to have this sort of revolution in thinking before you can have these new realities is inconsistent with my understanding of how human change happens.

Even on the right, you initially had champions of a certain kind of settlement movement. Then, as the settlements grew and grew, and their footprint in the West Bank became bigger and bigger, this began to shape expectations on the Israeli side more generally. That’s what I was trying to say earlier.

I remember in 1974, when I first saw someone use the term “Judea and Samaria” in a liberal newspaper, Haaretz, without scare quotes. I thought, “Oh, they’re winning.” They’re winning because now we’re talking about these territories as though they’re part of this country, and we’re not even questioning it. We’ve stopped calling them “occupied territories” or “the West Bank” and started calling them “Judea and Samaria.” The same can be true in reverse. You start to address new realities, and those realities begin to shape the ways in which you develop political norms and refine your institutions.

If there is a new government that empowers the judiciary through constitutional reform, with a Basic Law that enshrines the Declaration of Independence and its commitment to full equality irrespective of religion or gender, and if that commitment becomes enshrined in law and the judiciary is given the power to begin reinterpreting laws accordingly, it could have the same impact as Brown v. Board of Education had on the American South.

It doesn’t change things immediately. I mean, Brown v. Board of Education was in 1954. The first Black senator from Mississippi was last night. These things take a lot of time. Consider the confessional school system in Quebec, where Protestants were taught in English and Catholics were taught in French. I grew up in Montreal. I went to the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal because I was learning English. I wasn’t Protestant; I was Jewish. We were sort of honorary Protestants in Montreal. The Quiet Revolution in Quebec began in the 1960s, but the confessional school system was finally ended in 1990. So these things take time. But you’re on the right path when you make a certain shift.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky.

Prof. Lewandowsky The AfD Does Not Create Xenophobia, It Amplifies It

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Marcel Lewandowsky, Professor of Government and Public Policy at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, examines the consolidation of Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and its implications for liberal democracy. Challenging the interpretation of the AfD as merely a protest party, he argues that its electoral resilience reflects deeply rooted political alienation, anti-immigration attitudes, and dissatisfaction with democratic representation. Professor Lewandowsky explains how perceptions of economic crisis activate existing xenophobic sentiments, which the AfD amplifies through populist narratives and scapegoating. He also warns that mainstream parties may inadvertently strengthen the radical right by adopting its rhetoric. Ultimately, he emphasizes that restoring democratic confidence requires socioeconomic reforms, renewed political representation, and stronger democratic engagement.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Germany is undergoing a profound political realignment. Amid economic stagnation, immigration controversies, and growing distrust of established parties, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has consolidated its position as a major political force. Its unprecedented gains in the September 2026 state elections, particularly in eastern Germany, challenge the resilience of democratic institutions and the traditional Brandmauer against the radical right. While populist movements elsewhere have experienced electoral setbacks, the AfD continues to expand its appeal, raising fundamental questions about democratic representation, political alienation, and the normalization of radical-right politics.

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Marcel Lewandowsky, Professor of Government and Public Policy at Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg, whose research focuses on populism, authoritarianism, and democratic politics, examines the structural foundations of the AfD’s electoral resilience and the challenges facing Germany’s liberal democracy.

Rejecting the conventional interpretation of the AfD as merely an expression of anti-establishment protest, Professor Lewandowsky argues that “the AfD has never been just a protest party. It has always been able to fill a representation gap in the party system.” Its electoral strength, he explains, reflects not only dissatisfaction with democratic institutions but also a durable alignment between voters’ ideological preferences and the party’s political agenda, particularly on immigration.

Central to his analysis is the relationship between economic insecurity, preexisting authoritarian attitudes, and populist crisis narratives. Rather than generating xenophobia independently, the AfD exploits perceptions of economic and cultural threat to reinforce existing prejudices. As Professor Lewandowsky emphasizes, “They do not create it, but they amplify it.” This dynamic becomes particularly consequential when mainstream parties adopt similar rhetoric, inadvertently strengthening the radical right’s ownership of migration as a political issue.

The interview also challenges assumptions about democratic dissatisfaction and electoral accountability. Drawing on experimental research, Professor Lewandowsky explains how voters may prioritize preferred policies over liberal-democratic principles, while AfD supporters display exceptional loyalty even when their party faces political scandals. His research further complicates the presumed relationship between loneliness and radical-right support, finding that social isolation is more closely associated with electoral abstention than with AfD voting.

Looking ahead, Professor Lewandowsky identifies political representation as central to democratic renewal. Criticizing mainstream parties for following rather than shaping the political agenda, he argues that economic and social reforms must address underlying grievances while rebuilding citizens’ confidence in democratic institutions. Above all, he insists that “political parties are at the center of saving democracy.”

In sum, the interview explores whether Germany’s established parties can reclaim their representative functions—or whether the AfD’s consolidation signals an enduring transformation of the country’s political landscape.

Here is our interview with Professor Marcel Lewandowsky, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The AfD Has Never Been Just a Protest Party

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) booth in Görlitz, Germany, on August 16, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Lewandowsky, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your research on the AfD’s evolution from a Eurosceptic protest party into a populist radical-right movement. Following its extraordinary gains in the September 2026 state elections, has the AfD become a structurally entrenched political force rather than a temporary expression of anti-establishment discontent?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: It absolutely has. Even early studies on the AfD showed that the driving force behind voters’ support for the party was not only protest against the establishment but also congruence with the AfD’s program, especially on the issue of migration. So, what I would say is that the AfD has never been just a protest party. It has always been able to fill a representation gap in the party system.

What we can see now is that AfD voters are among the most loyal in the party system. When we look at the propensity to vote and electoral availability, as studied by Aiko Wagner from the Free University of Berlin and me, we can see that AfD voters have the lowest probability of voting for another party. For example, if you vote for the CDU, there is a certain probability that you might also consider supporting the AfD. If you vote for the SPD, you have a certain propensity to vote for the Greens. But AfD voters have the lowest propensity to vote for any other party.

Why is that so? It has to do with the AfD being the only party that its voters trust. In other words, individuals who vote for the AfD do not trust any of the other parties. This distrust of the political system and its actors is not simply an expression of temporary protest. Rather, it has to do with discontent with democracy and the perception that democracy is in a state of crisis. That is something the AfD can really capitalize on, much like other parties with similar ideologies, such as the FPÖ, Rassemblement National, and others.

Economic Insecurity Activates Existing Authoritarian Attitudes

How would you distinguish the objective socioeconomic drivers of AfD support—economic stagnation, regional inequality, and insecurity—from subjective grievances involving cultural displacement and political alienation? Why have these factors proved particularly powerful in eastern Germany, where the legacies of reunification continue to shape political identities?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: Generally, the basic reasons individuals support the AfD are not so different between West and East Germany, just as they are not that different among AfD voters, FPÖ voters, and even Trump voters. There are certain driving factors that we find in almost all established democracies that explain why individuals vote for populist radical-right parties. These factors are the same in the case of the AfD.

So, to what extent does the economy come into play? The economy—macroeconomic factors—is a driving factor, but these factors essentially activate individual attitudes that are already in place. Let me explain. If you look at a former CDU voter or a non-voter, they might have a negative attitude toward migration. They might be skeptical about asylum seekers but remain non-voters or conservative voters, perhaps even SPD or Social Democratic voters, though to a much lesser extent, as we have seen in the work of Cas Mudde, Max Mitteregger, and Tarik Abou-Chadi.

What we do know is that the perception of an economic crisis—not necessarily being personally affected by that crisis but fearing that people like me could be affected in the future—can be a driving force behind voting for a party like the AfD. This is because such perceptions activate authoritarian or nativist attitudes that were already present but had not previously influenced voting behavior.

Parties like the AfD capitalize on this because they can take voters’ perceptions of crises and not only offer a simple solution but also engage in scapegoating, following a strategy of naming and blaming. They essentially say, “These are the people responsible for this crisis. It is those up there, and it is the ones they let in.”

So, what they capitalize on is an attitude of xenophobia. They do not create it, but they amplify it. And they have the opportunity to amplify it because there is a perception of an economic crisis. That is how these factors at the macro and micro levels work together.

Mainstream Parties Amplify the AfD’s Migration Narrative

AfD demonstrated with slogan “Stop Islamization” in Rostock on May 14, 2018. AfD, Alternative for Germany, is a right wing political party in Germany.

Immigration remains central to the AfD’s political mobilization, even where direct exposure to immigration is relatively limited. How does the party transform perceptions of cultural threat and demographic change into durable political identities, and why have mainstream parties struggled to counter this narrative?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: First of all, I wouldn’t necessarily say that the other parties struggle to counter the narrative. I would say that they struggle to imitate it. If you look at the work of Michael Bayerlein, Tarik Abou-Chadi, Werner Krause, and others, we can see that, in international comparison, conservative parties try to catch up. And it’s not only conservative parties; if you look at Denmark, Social Democratic parties do so as well, though to a much lesser extent. They try to catch up by adopting, to some extent, the narrative that outsiders pose a threat—not necessarily to national identity, but to security.

We know that when conservative parties do this, they strengthen their right-wing competitors. Parties like the AfD, the FPÖ, and the Sweden Democrats have issue ownership over migration, particularly when it comes to taking certain positions and framing the issue in a particular way. When other parties shift to the right on this issue, migration remains prominent in political and media discourse, and its importance is amplified. As Abou-Chadi, Denis Cohen, and Krause have shown, right-wing populist parties either don’t lose votes or even gain votes.

So, what are these parties able to do? I think that connects to what I said before. We know that these parties can offer a particular interpretation of a crisis. A crisis, or the perception of one, must already exist. They cannot create the perception of a crisis; it must already be present within society. What they do is offer a particular framing and certain solutions.

Benjamin Moffitt pointed this out in a 2015 paper in which he analyzed how populist parties use and frame crises. This is what we’re seeing here. These parties take an existing perception of crisis—whether concerning the economy, migration, or asylum seekers, as in 2015—and amplify it, thereby becoming stronger.

Other parties then react, making the perception of crisis permanent. Everybody starts talking about the crisis, but right-wing populist parties retain issue ownership. This is how it works. It shows that, through their own strategies and the shifts of other parties, especially conservative parties, populist radical-right parties no longer remain pariahs. To some extent, they become part of the mainstream—or at least their issues, framings, and rhetoric become mainstream. This is what helps these parties establish their narratives.

AfD Voters Support Democracy but Distrust How It Functions

In your September 2026 interviews, you distinguished between ideologically committed far-right voters and a broader AfD electorate driven by populist resentment. Given your findings on voters’ willingness to trade liberal-democratic principles for preferred policies, does AfD support primarily reflect democratic disaffection, conscious illiberalism, or an increasingly powerful interaction between them?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: All of it. If you look at why individuals vote for the AfD, one factor is dissatisfaction with democracy. But to be dissatisfied with democracy, you also have to have an idea, at least to some extent, of what you expect from it. You cannot be dissatisfied if you never had an expectation. What we see is that AfD voters are dissatisfied with democracy as it currently functions. They do support the idea of democracy; they are not outright anti-democratic. But we also know that they have strong populist attitudes.

Let me give you an example of what that looks like. If you look at voters as a whole and want to determine whether the likelihood of voting for the AfD increases because individuals are right-wing or because they are populist, you find that right-wing individuals without strong populist attitudes do not have a particularly high probability of voting for the AfD.

However, when individuals are both right-wing and populist—when you examine the interaction between their right-wing positions and populist attitudes—we see that the probability of voting for the AfD depends on that interaction. So, it is not simply right-wing individuals, or even necessarily populist individuals, who vote for the AfD; it is individuals who are both right-wing and populist. Those who are right-wing but not populist might be more inclined to vote for the CDU. But I think populism is a very strong driver.

At the same time, what Michael Jankovsky and I found in our 2023 paper is something that, from a normative standpoint of democracy, can be somewhat concerning. We found that when individuals have the option of voting either for a liberal-democratic candidate whose positions on certain issues differ substantially from their own or for an illiberal candidate whose positions align closely with theirs on issues they consider important, they are highly likely to support the illiberal candidate if the alignment is sufficiently strong.

That finding applies across the board. It does not apply only to AfD voters; it applies to all voters. Populist and authoritarian attitudes strongly influence that behavior, but we still observe it across the board.

This means there is a certain willingness to support illiberal candidates, at least according to our experimental design, even among voters who do not themselves hold illiberal attitudes. We do not know whether this means that the AfD, for example, can capitalize on such willingness, because it does not have much to do with ideology. Rather, it concerns a willingness to abandon liberal attitudes or liberal democracy if you believe that the issues important to you will be addressed.

Loneliness Discourages Voting Rather Than Driving AfD Support

Your recent study with Anna-Sophie Heinze finds that loneliness primarily discourages electoral participation rather than increasing AfD support. What does this reveal about the relationship between social isolation, political alienation, and radical-right mobilization, particularly among younger voters?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: First of all, we looked at the 2025 German election, using data from the German Longitudinal Election Study. Since we are looking at just one point in time, our findings are basically correlational. But the important message is that we did not find what other scholars have claimed. We do not find that lonely voters are more inclined to support a right-wing populist party, nor do we find that young, lonely voters are more likely to vote for such a party. If anything, we find that loneliness decreases the likelihood of participating in an election in the first place.

This is an important finding, given the ongoing discussion about what some call a male loneliness epidemic and the claim that lonely young males are voting for the far right. At least we can say that we do not find this in the 2025 German election. Even though the AfD is pretty well established at this point, we still do not see it gaining the support one would expect based on claims that the male loneliness epidemic affects the political behavior of lonely young males. We simply do not find that to be the case.

This means that perhaps it would be more interesting to study what kind of loneliness we are actually looking at. I think, first and foremost, we have a problem measuring loneliness. We ask individuals, using the standard item battery, how lonely they have felt over the past few months, or something like that. What we are actually measuring is the feeling of loneliness, not social isolation.

Measuring social isolation and the perception of social isolation in a more complex, differentiated way is something we should look into. I do not doubt that, in some instances, loneliness affects political behavior. We do find that it has a significant effect on non-voting. But when it comes to cases where individuals do vote in a certain way, support the far right, or support authoritarian alternatives, we would need a more differentiated approach. Because if loneliness is a driving factor, we are not measuring it well enough.

Distrust of Mainstream Media May Protect the AfD from Scandals

Protest against the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Trier, Germany, on January 28, 2024. Demonstrators gathered in support of human rights, diversity, and a society free from discrimination and racism. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your research on voters’ loyalty to corrupt politicians emphasizes the importance of viable political alternatives. Does the AfD benefit from an electorate that increasingly considers mainstream parties unacceptable, making scandals, extremist rhetoric, and violations of democratic norms less electorally consequential?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: The short answer is yes, but you’re not looking for a short answer, so let me put it this way. In our study, Christina-Marie Juen, Michael Jankowski, and I found that individuals who vote for the AfD do not punish the party when there is a scandal. Other voters do—Green voters, SPD voters, and CDU voters, all to varying degrees—but AfD voters don’t. So why is that the case?

It has to do with the AfD being the only alternative in terms of the issues that matter to its voters. Even when there is a scandal, the AfD remains the party closest to their own positions. This is consistent with other studies, including those by Aiko Wagner and me, which show that this perceived proximity between the AfD and its voters’ positions is extremely important in explaining their loyalty to the party. In this case, that proximity means voters do not defect. They stick with the AfD despite a scandal because no other party represents their demands as well as the AfD does.

Something we were unable to examine in our research is whether these voters believe the reports about the scandal. Many voters might learn about a scandal through the mainstream media, but because they do not trust those media outlets, they might not believe the scandal is true in the first place.

The AfD might frame the scandal as a lie fabricated by the mainstream media or by politicians seeking to hurt the party. Voters might be more inclined to believe that explanation. So, this is another factor that may come into play. Overall, we find that this provides further evidence of the loyalty of AfD voters.

For AfD Voters, Migration Overshadows Economic Grievances

While the AfD mobilizes grievances through nationalism, immigration, and cultural identity, Die Linke emphasizes social inequality, redistribution, and economic justice. To what extent do these parties compete for similarly alienated voters, and why do socioeconomic grievances increasingly translate into support for the radical right rather than the populist left?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: The populist left is not only economically left-wing but also socially progressive. Many of its positions, for example, on migration, do not align with those of AfD voters. We do not find much overlap between AfD and Die Linke voters. In some states, there is voter exchange between these parties, but in general, the AfD mostly wins voters from the CDU, sometimes from the SPD, and from non-voters. That is the non-electorate, or the segment of the electorate that the AfD is able to mobilize.

Interestingly, there had been a widespread belief in Germany that Die Linke was pretty much finished. Then, shortly before the 2025 general election, the party was able to make a comeback. It did so, on the one hand, through its frontrunner, Heidi Reichinnek, who had a strong presence on social media, and, on the other hand, by focusing on certain social and economic issues, such as housing prices and rents.

When we look at voters and their propensity to vote, we see that there is little overlap between the AfD and Die Linke. The AfD does not focus much on economic issues. These issues are not particularly important to the party or its voters. The most important issue for these voters, or the main driving factor behind voting for the AfD, is migration. That is something we found even in the AfD’s early stages, when it was not yet a populist radical-right and, in part, right-wing extremist party.

There might be objective factors or conditions under which one might think that, for some voters who currently support the AfD, it would be more rational to vote for a left-wing party. But the problem is that these issues are not as salient to them. They often believe that migration is the major issue and that, once migration is addressed and the political elite is replaced, everything else will fall into place—or they have already lost the belief that everything else might fall into place to begin with.

There is a certain mindset among AfD voters, as among voters of other parties of this kind, that binds them to the AfD. Migration and a populist idea of democracy are at the center of that mindset. That is something that, at least at this point, other parties, including the left, have been struggling to counter.

The AfD Benefits from Its Position Outside Government

As right-wing populist movements have recently encountered electoral defeats or political setbacks in Brazil, Serbia, Hungary, Israel, and the United States, the AfD continues to gain support in Germany. What explains this divergence? Are Germany’s economic conditions, party-system dynamics, and political culture creating unusually favorable circumstances for the radical right?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: In the United States, for example, the radical right is in office and is creating grievances. In Brazil, the left and Lula were able to mobilize, for example, through social media during the second round of the presidential election. In Hungary and Poland, parties like Fidesz and PiS had been in office, so strong opposition movements emerged, capitalizing on the grievances these parties had created while in government.

What we see in Germany, however, is that the AfD remains excluded from government. There is still such a thing as the Brandmauer, or cordon sanitaire, but it is not as strong as it used to be—if it ever was. That is something one can discuss.

Another factor comes into play here, beyond the AfD’s position as an outsider that has not yet held office. It might enter government, most likely in Saxony-Anhalt in December. There is also an extremely unpopular federal government, an equally unpopular chancellor, and a conservative party that has, to some extent, lost its ability to integrate more right-wing voters. All these factors are comparable to those in other countries. The first country that comes to mind is Austria, where the situation is quite similar. Another is France, although there is an additional factor there: extreme polarization between the extreme left and the extreme right.

Overall, I don’t think Germany is necessarily a special case compared with these countries. With the establishment of the AfD, Germany has, at least to some extent, become a normal case in Europe. Its situation is now very similar to that of other countries in the region.

Restoring Democratic Trust Requires More Than Economic Reform

Friedrich Merz
CDU Chairman Friedrich Merz speaks at a campaign event ahead of the North Rhine-Westphalia state election on May 15, 2022. Photo: Paul Ruesing | Dreamstime

And finally, Professor Lewandowsky, looking toward Germany’s next federal election and considering recent democratic developments in Hungary, Serbia, Brazil, and the United States, what would be required to reverse the AfD’s rise? Can socioeconomic reform, renewed political representation, and democratic engagement restore confidence in liberal democracy, or has Germany entered a more enduring phase of radical-right political realignment?

Professor Marcel Lewandowsky: I would say all of it, including the last option. All these aspects are interconnected. Trust in liberal democracy is, to some extent, linked to confidence in economic well-being. A paper by economists Manuel Funke, Moritz Schularick, and Christoph Trebesch, published in 2016, showed that, over the past hundred years, right-wing populist, extreme-right, or radical-right parties in democracies have mostly been successful under certain conditions of economic crisis. That is something we find here as well. The perception of an economic crisis, at least among some segments of the electorate, is associated with declining trust in democracy and government. So, I think these things are linked.

For the moment, the AfD has a certain momentum, especially after the elections in Saxony-Anhalt. In some eastern German states, the AfD is now polling at 40%. It has also scored more than 40% in the elections in Saxony-Anhalt. One crucial factor is that the other parties no longer see themselves as setting the agenda. Instead, they are essentially following—or chasing—the AfD.

What they need to try to do, although it is extremely difficult, is to address both grievances with liberal democracy and economic grievances through economic and social reforms that are also popular. I do not think Friedrich Merz is the person who can achieve that, nor do I think this government or coalition can do so. But Friedrich Merz believes that he does not need popular reforms. He believes he was elected as someone willing to do unpopular things that will eventually work out. However, as long as his policies remain unpopular, the AfD might gain votes. At this moment, I do not see that changing.

One last thing. What is crucial at this point—and something I have analyzed and argued in a paper coauthored with Anna-Lisa Neuenfeld for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, titled Parteien im Stresstest—is that political parties are at the center of saving democracy.

One aspect here is that the AfD has been able to establish a perception of itself as the representative of “the people.” It presents itself as a party that is present in certain areas, speaks a different language, comes from a different social background, and is able to offer social gatherings where other parties have failed to do so. This is especially important in certain areas of eastern Germany.

Representation through political parties is key to restoring faith in democracy because parties are the key players. At present, the AfD is the only party able, at least in the eyes of its electorate, to present itself as its representative—speaking in Hanna Fenichel Pitkin’s terms, symbolically, descriptively, and substantively. That is something the other parties might want to look at.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Dr. Roi Zur.

Dr. Zur: Prolonged Political Instability Could Consolidate Israel’s Populist Radical Right

Israel’s October 27 elections have exposed deepening ideological polarization, parliamentary fragmentation, and mounting challenges to democratic legitimacy. In an interview with the ECPS, Assistant Professor Roi Zur of the University of Essex examines Netanyahu’s electoral resilience, Likud’s transformation into a populist radical-right party, and the normalization of religious-nationalist extremism. Highlighting the growing ideological convergence between Likud and its far-right allies, Dr. Zur warns that prolonged coalition deadlock could further consolidate authoritarian-populist forces. He also examines the political exclusion of Arab parties, the decline of Israel’s liberal-left, and emerging claims of electoral fraud resembling Trumpian populism. Ultimately, the interview explores how political instability and ethnonationalist polarization threaten Israel’s democratic institutions and future political trajectory.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Israel’s October 27 elections have produced a fragmented political landscape, exposing the deepening ideological polarization, institutional vulnerabilities, and shifting boundaries of political legitimacy that characterize Israeli democracy. Although Likud remains the largest party, neither Benjamin Netanyahu’s religious-nationalist bloc nor his opponents have secured a parliamentary majority. The results reveal the resilience of Netanyahuism, the growing dominance of competing right-wing formations, Labor’s historical decline, and the potentially decisive role of Arab parties. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about populism, democratic backsliding, secularism, and Palestinian rights.

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Assistant Professor Roi Zur of the Department of Government at the University of Essex, whose research examines electoral competition, party strategies, and political polarization, offers a theoretically informed assessment of Israel’s evolving political landscape. His central warning is that prolonged political deadlock could further strengthen the forces responsible for Israel’s democratic deterioration. As Dr. Zur observes, “What seems more likely, in my view, is that we are heading into several months, or perhaps even a year, of political instability.” Crucially, he emphasizes that “Historically, such instability has helped the populist radical right maintain and consolidate its power.”

Dr. Zur situates this danger within Netanyahu’s transformation of Likud from a conventional conservative party into an increasingly radicalized populist formation. By systematically directing public frustration toward judicial authorities, security institutions, and allegedly unaccountable elites, Netanyahu has redefined political accountability through antagonistic populist narratives. As Dr. Zur argues, “Likud is no longer a classic center-right party. It increasingly resembles a European populist radical-right party.”

Equally consequential is the normalization of religious-nationalist extremism. Dr. Zur explains that Netanyahu’s cooperation with Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism has legitimized positions previously excluded from mainstream political discourse. These developments have fundamentally altered debates over territorial sovereignty, Palestinian rights, military conduct, and international law. Indeed, he argues that the ideological proximity between Likud and its radical-right partners makes it “increasingly difficult to differentiate between them.”

The interview also explores the structural obstacles confronting an alternative government, particularly the exclusion of Arab parties from legitimate coalition-making, disputes over ultra-Orthodox military exemptions, and the weakness of Israel’s liberal-left. Despite unprecedented Arab parliamentary representation, ethnonationalist boundaries continue to constrain coalition possibilities, while the Israeli–Palestinian conflict remains central to ideological competition.

Perhaps most disturbingly, Dr. Zur identifies emerging allegations of electoral illegitimacy as evidence of democratic erosion. He notes that “Likud is making statements claiming that the elections were stolen, much like Trump’s claims in the United States after his electoral defeat.” Against this backdrop, the interview illuminates how electoral fragmentation, populist delegitimation, and radical-right normalization could interact to reshape Israel’s democratic future.

Here is our interview with Assistant Professor Roi Zur, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Netanyahu’s Electoral Resilience Reflects Israel’s Rightward Shift

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Prague, Czech Republic, on December 5, 2012. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Zur, thank you for joining us. Despite the political fallout from October 7, the Gaza war, and the judicial overhaul, Likud remains Israel’s largest party, with approximately 27 seats in the provisional results. How do you explain Netanyahu’s enduring electoral appeal? Does his resilience reflect ideological loyalty, perceived leadership competence, or the personalized nature of Netanyahuism?

Dr. Roi Zur: It is important to put these results into context and perspective. On the one hand, Netanyahu’s party, Likud, lost five seats compared to the 2022 election and nine seats compared to its representation at the end of the previous Knesset, following its merger with a smaller party during the last term. This represents a significant loss in parliamentary seats.

On the other hand, Likud received approximately 50,000 more votes than in the previous election. These are therefore bittersweet results, particularly when considered in light of mainstream media polls conducted immediately before the election. It is quite surprising that Likud secured 27 seats, while media outlets affiliated with Netanyahu had projected around 30 or even 32. So, these results can be interpreted as both a loss and a victory for Netanyahu. From his perspective, the outcome remains ambiguous.

Now, considering everything Netanyahu and Israel more broadly have experienced over the past four years—including the problems preceding October 7, the fallout from the October 7 attacks, the Gaza war, and the judicial overhaul—this period can be characterized as a struggle for Israel’s very existence. Netanyahu, in a sense, has led Israel through these challenges, for better or worse, depending on one’s political perspective.

Within this context, the results suggest a shift in perceptions of Netanyahu among people who previously disliked or did not support him, but relatively little change among his established supporters. This indicates a degree of resilience at both the party and coalition levels.

Although Likud lost a substantial number of seats, we can also observe a rightward shift in Israeli public opinion. For example, research by Liran Harsgor of the University of Haifa shows that younger Israelis are more right-wing than older generations. Similarly, work by Gal Bitton identifies a modest but statistically significant rightward shift in ideological self-placement among Israelis displaced during the war.

Likud appears to have benefited from these developments, attracting voters who have moved to the right or already held more right-wing positions before the election. These gains are understandable, given that many voters identify with Likud’s policies during the war and in the preceding period.

This became particularly evident in the later stages of the campaign, when Netanyahu successfully differentiated himself from his former coalition partner, Gadi Eisenkot. Through Likud’s campaign, Eisenkot came to be perceived by many voters as more willing to cooperate with the Palestinians, including the Palestinian Authority, Palestinian citizens of Israel, and Arab parties in the Israeli parliament.

Neither Netanyahu nor Eisenkot Has a Viable Path to Power

The provisional results suggest approximately 53 seats for Netanyahu’s bloc, 48 for the predominantly Jewish-led opposition, and 19 for Arab parties. What governing alternatives are realistically available? Could an Eisenkot-led coalition overcome its ideological divisions, or might coalition fragmentation ultimately sustain Netanyahu’s political influence?

Dr. Roi Zur: Currently, there are no realistic alternatives. The numbers simply do not add up for either Netanyahu or Eisenkot.

To form a coalition, Eisenkot would have to break one of his two promises. On the one hand, he promised not to cooperate with non-Zionist parties. On the other, he promised not to cooperate with any ultra-Orthodox party that maintains its opposition to drafting ultra-Orthodox students into the army. It is unlikely that Eisenkot could pull this off and bring the Arab parties to the table. But even if the Arab parties agreed to support him and he agreed to cooperate with them, there is still Lieberman, the leader of one of the more right-wing opposition parties, who has repeatedly objected to cooperating with the Joint List and the ultra-Orthodox parties. So, there simply are not enough seats for Eisenkot to build a stable coalition without breaking one of his major campaign promises.

On the other hand, Netanyahu is also short of a majority. To form a governing majority, he would need to bring at least one opposition party into his coalition. He is six seats short, meaning that six seats would need to shift from the opposition to a Netanyahu-led coalition. Alternatively, at least 14 members would need to abstain to allow him to form a minority government, which seems unlikely at this point.

So, for either Netanyahu or Eisenkot to gain or retain power, they would have to be extremely creative and break at least one major election promise.

Netanyahu’s Populist Narrative Helped Deflect Responsibility for October 7

In your research on party strategies, you distinguish policy positions from valence attributes such as competence, integrity, and leadership. Following October 7, how did these considerations shape electoral competition? Did dissatisfaction with Netanyahu’s performance benefit alternative right-wing leaders more than parties advocating fundamentally different policies?

Dr. Roi Zur: We don’t yet have updated data showing which issues moved voters toward particular parties. However, we can draw on theoretical understanding and historical trends in Israel to consider what might have happened.

There is a substantial body of political science research dating back to the 1960s showing that voters consider the policy positions of political parties. At the same time, another large body of research demonstrates that voters also consider other party attributes, such as the leader’s popularity, competence, trustworthiness, and so on.

These considerations usually work together. From a voter’s perspective, the best option is someone who advocates policies close to their own preferences and is also competent. Moreover, perceptions of competence and trustworthiness are themselves related to how closely voters identify with a particular party.

In the case of Israel in 2026—and I should emphasize that this assessment is based on historical trends rather than updated data—we can imagine that some voters probably defected to parties further to the right, particularly Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, which are more extreme than Likud, itself already a far-right party. Together, these two parties gained approximately 100,000 more votes than in 2022.

It seems to me that, following October 7, many voters perceived Likud, and especially Netanyahu, as responsible for what happened. However, during the war, many of these voters returned to Netanyahu’s camp because he was able, in a very populist way, to convince them that October 7 was not his fault and that he was the strong leader willing to fight to protect Israel.

His campaign claimed that it had reshaped the Middle East by removing the leadership of Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and so on. As a result, much of the blame associated with Netanyahu early in the campaign gradually evaporated, particularly among voters who already liked him.

Those who disliked Netanyahu, however, still regard him as one of the principal figures responsible, if not the most responsible, for October 7, the war, and everything that followed. But these voters were not supporting Netanyahu in the first place.

Ideological Polarization Is Deepening Across Israel’s Political Spectrum

Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition’s policies in Ra’anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg

In “The Israeli Parties’ Positions in Comparative Perspective,” co-authored with Ryan Bakker, you demonstrate the distinctive importance of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict in structuring left–right competition. Does the October 27 election suggest a lasting rightward ideological realignment? Why has political competition increasingly shifted toward rival versions of nationalist and security-centered politics?

Dr. Roi Zur: Across the board, right-wing parties in Israel seem to have been shifting further to the right over the past few years, especially Likud, which was once a moderate-right party but is now considered a classic European far-right party. I think this process has continued over the past three or four years. However, our updated survey, which Ryan and I are currently conducting, is still in the field, so I don’t yet know exactly where the parties’ positions will fall. Judging from the campaign, though, it seems that the right wing is moving further to the right, the left wing further to the left, while parties in the middle remain in the center.

What I mean is that the structure of the party system, in terms of parties’ ideological positions, is based on an overarching left–right dimension. In politics, people commonly talk about left and right. In the European context, we know that this distinction generally refers to economic issues, such as taxation and housing policies, as well as certain social issues, such as immigration.

In Israel, however, when parties and their voters talk about left and right, they are primarily referring to questions of national identity: Where do we see ourselves as a country? What kind of country are we? Above all, they are referring to security issues. This has always been the case. Obviously, the importance of security increases in some periods and takes second place in others. But security has always been central to Israeli politics, and since October 7, it has probably become the most important dimension distinguishing political parties.

What does this mean in practice? Parties on the right adopt more hawkish positions regarding the territories in the West Bank, or Judea and Samaria. They express stronger opposition to Palestinian statehood and cooperation with the Palestinian Authority and advocate more offensive military strategies in Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, Syria, and elsewhere.

The left, by contrast, is more open to cooperation with Palestinians within Israel and with the Palestinian Authority, more receptive to international negotiations, and more supportive of land-for-peace agreements.

So, I don’t think this is a new reality. Rather, it is reshaping the political spectrum because, quite simply, Israel is part of the Middle East, where there is an ongoing conflict that needs to be resolved. Indeed, the question of the territories and the possibility of land-for-peace agreements have been central issues in Israeli politics since Israel occupied the Palestinian territories previously controlled by Jordan and Egypt in 1967.

Netanyahu Has Transformed Likud into a Populist Radical-Right Party

Netanyahu frequently frames political competition as a struggle between the authentic Israeli people and allegedly unaccountable judicial, media, and political elites. How central is this populist antagonism to Likud’s electoral resilience? Has Netanyahuism transformed the traditional nationalist right into a more explicitly populist political movement?

Dr. Roi Zur: The short answer is yes; he has. We have seen this transformation since the late 2010s and early 2020s, particularly when Netanyahu was first indicted and allegations of corruption against him emerged. Netanyahu made a decisive turn toward a populist agenda, consistently blaming the judicial system for problems in policymaking and accusing it of targeting him personally and attempting to remove him from office as Prime Minister.

This approach is not unique to Likud, but Likud is certainly the largest party and has also been in power for many years. What Netanyahu has managed to do is shift the blame for virtually any policy problem onto these allegedly unaccountable elites, whether within the security apparatus or the judicial system. In that regard, Likud is no longer a classic center-right party. It increasingly resembles a European populist radical-right party.

Likud Is Converging Ideologically with Israel’s Extreme Right

Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism retain significant parliamentary representation. How should we distinguish their religious-nationalist radicalism from Netanyahu’s populism? Have these parties shifted the boundaries of mainstream political discourse, particularly concerning Palestinian rights and territorial sovereignty?

Dr. Roi Zur: We can look at this in two ways. First, we can consider whether Likud, Otzma Yehudit, or Religious Zionism is closer to the far-right end of the left–right spectrum. In that regard, there is simply not much further to the right to go.

From a comparative perspective, Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism are as far right as parties can possibly be. If you look at the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, one of the largest datasets on political parties’ policy positions, these two parties are positioned as far to the right as the most extreme right-wing parties in Europe or elsewhere in the world. Now, Netanyahu and Likud have, in that sense, caught up with them. This raises questions about what it means to be on the right and what it means to be populist.

In both respects, these three parties are very close to one another. Likud is perceived as slightly less right-wing than Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, but it remains very close to the far-right end of the spectrum. The three parties are also very similar in terms of their populism. In this regard, it is increasingly difficult to differentiate between them.

Over the past three years, we have seen Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism, but also parts of Likud, pushing the boundaries of the scale itself, making us reconsider where the far-right end of the left–right spectrum actually lies.

In Israeli politics, particularly in response to the war in Gaza, questions about what the Israeli army is allowed or not allowed to do, and to what extent the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) should comply with international law, have become increasingly prominent. The idea of allowing the military to operate without regard for international law—something that was not part of mainstream political discourse before October 7—has become much more mainstream. Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism have popularized such positions as legitimate expressions of political opinion. 

From their perspective, it is acceptable to advocate occupying the entire West Bank or reoccupying the Gaza Strip and rebuilding settlements in both the West Bank and Gaza. These positions were neither as mainstream nor as widely popularized before October 7.

Netanyahu Has Mainstreamed Previously Marginal Far-Right Positions

Election billboards of religious political parties Shas and Otzma Yehudit before Israel’s fourth election in two years in a street of Jerusalem on March 22, 2021. Photo: Gali Estrange.

Your research on party competition and ideological positioning offers a framework for examining the normalization of radical political alternatives. Has cooperation between Likud and the religious-nationalist parties of Ben-Gvir and Smotrich mainstreamed previously marginal positions? Does their electoral persistence reflect changing public preferences or the strategic repositioning of established right-wing parties?

Dr. Roi Zur: In addition to what I said earlier, through this cooperation, Netanyahu has legitimized the far-right thoughts, beliefs, and positions of parties and individuals who had previously been on the fringes of the Israeli political system.Since 2019, when the breakdown of the party system was at its height, Netanyahu has increasingly legitimized these positions. Ten or fifteen years ago, people like Ben-Gvir were not considered legitimate politicians. Their positions were regarded as far-right and remained outside the accepted political mainstream.

Since 2019, however, Netanyahu has legitimized them in the eyes of many voters. This is reflected in the fact that both parties have entered government, particularly Otzma Yehudit, which is slightly more extreme than the Religious Zionist Party. These parties have gained governmental power and shaped policies that, just ten or fifteen years ago, would have been considered outside the boundaries of politically legitimate positions.

Ultra-Orthodox Parties Are Losing Their Traditional Kingmaker Role

Shas and United Torah Judaism remain important coalition actors, while military exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men have become increasingly contentious. Could the conscription dispute restructure Israeli party competition? Is the secular–religious divide becoming more electorally consequential than conventional socioeconomic disagreements?

Dr. Roi Zur: There are two important points to make before answering this question. First, the election results show, for the first time in history, that there are more Arab members of the Knesset than ultra-Orthodox members. This represents a major shift in who holds political power and who can act as kingmakers. Historically, the ultra-Orthodox parties played that role and, more often than not, determined whether the center-left or center-right would come to power.

The second major shift is that the ultra-Orthodox parties are no longer in power and are not currently accepted as coalition partners by the center-left or the opposition to Netanyahu. This could change as the government formation process evolves. I have seen media reports suggesting that the ultra-Orthodox parties might allow Eisenkot to control the Knesset by abstaining from important votes, simply to keep things moving and avoid a second election. However, I am not sure they will actually do so.

Now, the second most important dimension of Israeli politics, after issues related to the Arab–Israeli conflict, is indeed the secular–religious divide: whether parties position themselves on the more Jewish or more democratic side of the political spectrum. The ultra-Orthodox parties are obviously at one end of this scale, emphasizing the Jewish character of the state more strongly and its democratic character less.

This divide has always been consequential in Israeli politics, and I think it was particularly important in this election. However, as we have seen, the ultra-Orthodox parties were less successful than in the past, suggesting that some voters who previously supported them preferred more right-wing parties instead.

The question of whether the government should draft ultra-Orthodox students into the army has also long been the second most important issue in Israeli politics, and I think it will remain so.

Returning to one of the earlier questions, if Eisenkot wants to form a government, one option would be to reach an agreement with the ultra-Orthodox parties. He promised not to do that, but it remains an option. If he has to break an electoral promise, he could say, “Okay, we’re going to break this promise to draft ultra-Orthodox students into the army and give them some concessions in return for replacing Netanyahu.”

Israeli Parliament Knesset.
Israeli Parliament Knesset. Photo: Dreamstime.

Secular Politics Does Not Necessarily Mean Liberal Politics

Avigdor Lieberman’s Yisrael Beytenu combines secular positions on military service and religious authority with strong nationalist security policies. How should we locate such parties within Israel’s multidimensional ideological space? Can secularization advance without corresponding liberalization on minority rights or the Palestinian question?

Dr. Roi Zur: We see this quite often in the Israeli political system. Lieberman’s party is somewhat unusual, as you pointed out. If we think about politics in two dimensions—secular versus religious on the one hand and left versus right on the other—secular parties are almost always positioned on the left or in the center of the left–right spectrum, while more religious parties tend to be more right-wing.

Yisrael Beytenu is unusual because it is closer to Likud on issues related to the general left–right dimension, particularly those concerning the Palestinian Authority, peace, and security. On the other hand, it is closer to left-wing parties on issues concerning social groups and the Jewish versus democratic character of the state. So, you are right to highlight this distinction.

When positioning Lieberman within the Israeli political spectrum, we need to be conscious of these differences. This is also what makes Lieberman particularly powerful right now, because he can decide whether to maintain his opposition to both ultra-Orthodox and Arab parties joining the government.

As we discussed earlier, Lieberman, like the other opposition parties, pledged to form a government that would include neither the ultra-Orthodox nor the Arab parties. However, it seems to me that, among the four leaders or parties in the Jewish opposition, Lieberman has the strongest objections to including either the ultra-Orthodox or Arab parties in a governing coalition.

The Failure of the Peace Process Accelerated Labor’s Electoral Decline

The historically dominant Labor Party now survives within the Democrats alliance, far removed from its former centrality in Israeli politics. What explains this profound electoral decline? Has Labor lost its organizational and social foundations, or has the growing salience of security and national identity displaced the economic and redistributive issues on which it once competed?

Dr. Roi Zur: It’s a chicken-and-egg question. What came first? We know that the party’s social power, organizational strength, and institutional foundations have gradually eroded over time. The Labor Party, Meretz, and now the Democrats have long since lost their former control over the government apparatus. They no longer possess the grassroots power they once had.

Labor’s decline essentially began in the early 2000s, when the peace process broke down and the Second Intifada erupted. Many Israelis associated the peace process with deteriorating security, and large numbers of voters abandoned the Labor Party, leading to its rapid electoral decline.

In the current election, however, the Democrats performed slightly better than in the previous one. If we consider the two Zionist left-wing parties that now constitute the Democrats, they received roughly the same number of votes as before but secured seven or eight seats in the Knesset, compared with the four seats they held in the previous parliament.

Centrist Parties Face a Structural Dilemma of Ideological Positioning

In “Stuck in the Middle: Ideology, Valence and the Electoral Failures of Centrist Parties,” you demonstrate that moderate parties can suffer from weak reputations for competence and leadership despite occupying electorally attractive positions. Could this framework help explain Labor’s decline and the limited appeal of the liberal-left? Can ideological moderation compensate for weakened political credibility?

Dr. Roi Zur: In theory, yes. The problem for parties in the center is that they have very little room to maneuver. If they move to the right, they risk being squeezed by more competent right-wing parties. If they move to the left, they face the same challenge from more competent left-wing parties.

In the case of Israel’s Labor Party, two developments occurred simultaneously in the early 2000s. First, Israeli public opinion shifted to the right. The electorate became more right-wing than before, leaving fewer voters who identified closely with Labor. As a result, regardless of whether Labor is perceived as competent or trustworthy, there are simply not enough voters inclined to support it because of this broader shift in Israeli public opinion.

In theory, Labor could moderate its positions and attract more centrist voters at the expense of other centrist parties. However, doing so would also risk losing its distinctive identity as the only Zionist left-wing party.

Ethnonationalist Exclusion Limits Arab Parties’ Coalition Potential

The Joint List and Ra’am could collectively hold approximately 19 seats, potentially making them decisive in government formation. Yet major Jewish-led parties remain reluctant to depend on their support. Does this exclusion reflect a broader ethnonationalist definition of legitimate political representation? Could Arab parliamentary participation become indispensable to forming an alternative government?

Dr. Roi Zur: First of all, the final, updated election results show that the two Arab parties secured 19 seats. As we discussed earlier, this is a unique result. I would not say that Arab voter turnout was the highest in Israeli electoral history, but it was certainly the highest in the last 30 years. Arab parties have also not achieved such electoral success during that period.

Now, about a week after the elections, but before the government formation process has begun, we can see two distinct narratives emerging in the media. The first comes from right-wing media outlets and politicians, who argue that any cooperation with Arab parties is illegitimate. According to this view, Arab parties should neither be included in government formation nor participate in policymaking.

On the other hand, center-left parties and their voters appear more open to cooperation with Arab parties. I saw a survey published a couple of days after the election asking supporters of Jewish opposition parties whether they would prefer forming a coalition with Arab parties, entering a coalition with Netanyahu, or holding another round of elections. A plurality, though not a majority, of these voters indicated that they would prefer a coalition with Arab parties rather than another coalition with Netanyahu and the right wing.

However, there is considerable variation in these ethnonationalist perceptions of political legitimacy. Voters who supported the Democrats are more open to cooperation with Arab parties than supporters of Yashar, Eisenkot’s party, or Bennett’s and Lapid’s parties. Those voters, in turn, are more willing to cooperate with Arab parties than Lieberman’s supporters.

Replacing Netanyahu May Not Transform Israel’s Palestinian Policy

Ramallah, Palestine, surrounded by the controversial Israeli wall that separates the State of Israel from West Bank.
Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

Much of the anti-Netanyahu opposition remains committed to security-centered nationalism rather than a negotiated two-state solution. Would an Eisenkot-led government represent a substantive departure from Netanyahu’s approach to Gaza and the West Bank, or primarily a change in leadership competence and governing style? What electoral conditions could make Palestinian self-determination politically salient again?

Dr. Roi Zur: This is the million-dollar question. If a new government were formed, which does not seem likely at this point, would its policies be any different? First of all, it depends on the composition of that government. If it were an opposition government supported by the ultra-Orthodox parties, or the current coalition joined by one of the opposition parties, we would be unlikely to see any significant change.

A Palestinian state has never been popular among Jewish voters in Israel, but since October 7, the idea has become almost a curse for the majority of voters. Of course, attitudes vary both generationally and ideologically, with people on the center-left more open to the idea than those on the right.

If we consider Eisenkot specifically, just this morning I saw a report in which he discussed the options for the day after the war ends. He made it very clear that he considers the Palestinian Authority illegitimate, much like the other right-wing parties in Israel. Instead, he expressed support for what the Americans call the Board of Peace, the technocratic organization intended to deal with Gaza.

So, if we see any change, it will be because Eisenkot, Bennett, and Lieberman have changed their core positions on Palestinian statehood. But for this to happen, we would first need to see a Jewish-Arab coalition, followed by a successful process of changing the situation in Gaza. These developments would take many years. I do not think we are likely to see them in the next couple of years.

Coalition Deadlock and Democratic Backsliding Threaten Israel’s Political Future

And finally, Professor Zur, your research highlights how party positions, issue salience, leadership reputations, and ideological polarization interact in shaping electoral competition. Looking beyond the immediate coalition negotiations, what developments could fundamentally reshape Israel’s party system? Might the country experience a renewed center-left alternative, further populist radical-right consolidation, or prolonged competition among different forms of nationalism?

Dr. Roi Zur: The first priority for the center-left, or the left more broadly, is to gain power and then demonstrate that it can govern successfully. The first step would be to form a coalition, gain control of the Knesset, and provide citizens with, first and foremost, security and, second, economic success. If they can achieve this over a full four-year term, voters may shift back toward them, or at least the Jewish electorate might.

What seems more likely, in my view, is that we are heading into several months, or perhaps even a year, of political instability. Historically, such instability has helped the populist radical right maintain and consolidate its power, contributing to its current strength.

As for the nature of political competition, we will continue to see a classic populist agenda, particularly from the populist right and Netanyahu’s political environment. In fact, we are already witnessing it. Likud is making statements claiming that the elections were stolen, much like Trump’s claims in the United States after his electoral defeat. These statements allege that Arab voters were bribed, that their turnout was illegitimate, that the elections were bought, and that the judicial authorities overseeing the elections were incompetent and failed to do their job.

The next few days will provide a great deal of new information. We will learn which party or political leader receives the first opportunity to form a government, whether that will be Eisenkot, and whether he can gain control of the Knesset and the legislative process.

These two questions will shape Israeli politics over the coming years. I want to emphasize one important point here: if Eisenkot can gain control of the Knesset within the next month, his coalition could repeal much of the judicial overhaul legislation that the previous government worked on for four years.

A substantial portion of the legislation concerning government control over the judicial system is scheduled to take effect on January 1. This, in my view, is the main reason Eisenkot is in such a hurry to gain control of Parliament and the legislative process, even if forming a coalition government takes another three, four, or six months.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Professor Yaniv Roznai.

Prof. Roznai: Israel Would Not Survive Another Coalition Like Netanyahu’s

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, constitutional scholar Professor Yaniv Roznai warns that another Netanyahu-led coalition could threaten the country’s liberal-democratic future. In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, he declares: “I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.” Examining democratic backsliding, judicial independence, political polarization, and the growing influence of religious nationalism, Professor Roznai also cautions that Netanyahu’s defeat would mark only the beginning of democratic restoration. Drawing comparisons with Poland and Hungary, he argues that Israel’s fragmented opposition would face formidable coalition challenges. Meaningful democratic renewal, he maintains, requires constitutional safeguards, stronger institutional checks and balances, and democratic education.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, its democracy faces profound challenges stemming from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s populist leadership, the growing influence of the religious-nationalist far right, the controversial judicial overhaul, and the devastating consequences of October 7 and the war in Gaza. Together, these developments raise fundamental questions about democratic backsliding, constitutional resilience, and whether electoral change can reverse the institutional and societal transformations of recent years.

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Yaniv Roznai, Professor of Constitutional Law and Co-Director of the Rubinstein Center for Constitutional Challenges at Reichman University and Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Professor for Distinguished Teaching at Princeton University’s University Center for Human Values, offers a deeply concerned assessment of Israel’s democratic trajectory. A leading scholar of constitutionalism, populism, and democratic erosion, Professor Roznai warns that another Netanyahu-led coalition could have existential consequences for Israel’s liberal-democratic future.

Reflecting on the possibility of Netanyahu remaining in power, Professor Roznai states: “I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.” His warning extends beyond institutional deterioration to the potential departure of Israel’s educated and liberal population. “I’m afraid that if another Netanyahu coalition comes to power, hundreds of thousands of people will leave Israel in the coming years,” he observes, pointing to the already significant emigration of academics, doctors, and other professionals.

Professor Roznai situates these concerns within a broader analysis of populist constitutionalism. Although Israel has not yet crossed the threshold into electoral authoritarianism, he argues that its democratic institutions remain vulnerable to executive encroachment. As he explains, “The more polarized a society becomes, the weaker the commitment to democratic values within a leader’s political base.” He identifies the judiciary, independent legal authorities, and civil society as essential safeguards against the concentration of political power.

Drawing on comparative experiences, Professor Roznai argues that a post-Netanyahu Israel would resemble Poland more than Hungary, primarily because of the fragmentation of its opposition and the complexities of coalition formation. Unlike Hungary, where Péter Magyar emerged as a dominant opposition leader, Israel’s alternative political camp encompasses ideologically diverse parties from the left, center, and right, alongside Arab parties. Even if Netanyahu loses, Professor Roznai cautions, the resulting government would struggle to pursue a unified agenda of democratic restoration. “From a comparative perspective, this would resemble Poland more than Hungary,” he observes, emphasizing that Israel would not have “a single leader winning the elections and exercising overwhelming control over the coalition.” Such fragmentation could complicate efforts to reverse institutional abuses and strengthen democratic safeguards.

Professor Roznai also cautions against assuming that Netanyahu’s electoral defeat would automatically restore democratic governance. “That will not be the end of the story. It will only be the beginning,” he emphasizes. Meaningful restoration, in his assessment, would require completing Israel’s Bill of Rights, strengthening constitutional safeguards, protecting judicial independence, and rebuilding democratic literacy through education.

Ultimately, his assessment presents the coming elections not simply as a contest over political leadership but as a critical juncture in the struggle over Israel’s constitutional identity, democratic institutions, and long-term national future.

Here is our interview with Professor Yaniv Roznai, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Netanyahu Has Used Polarization to Weaken Commitment to Democratic Values

Israelis protest at Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup on April 1, 2023. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Professor Roznai, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your recent research on Israel’s democratic crisis. In your study with Noam Gidron, “Israel – Populism, Polarization and the Crisis of Democracy,” you identify the interaction between populist leadership, affective polarization, and institutional vulnerability as a major driver of democratic backsliding. How has Netanyahu exploited these dynamics, and has Israel crossed the threshold from democratic erosion toward competitive authoritarianism?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Thank you for this question. The relationship between populism and polarization has been particularly interesting in the Israeli case. Since the early days of the current government, in late 2022 and early 2023, we have seen attempts to undermine various mechanisms of checks and balances. The main target has been the judiciary, but the government has also sought to weaken independent media, institutional gatekeepers such as the Attorney General and the Ombudsman for the Judiciary, civil society organizations, and others.

Of course, the gravest attack has been on the courts, through attempts to limit judicial review and capture the judiciary. Some of these attempts have failed because of the truly outstanding protest movement that emerged in 2023, when hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets against the judicial overhaul and Netanyahu.

What is particularly interesting, however, is how Netanyahu has used polarization. Various surveys conducted in 2023 asked Likud voters whether they supported the proposed constitutional reforms concerning the judiciary. About one-third said they did not support them. Let’s put them aside.

The remaining two-thirds supported the reforms. When asked why they supported these changes to the judiciary—whether because they regarded judges as detached elites or believed democracy was simply about the will of the majority—the strongest predictor of support was how much they loved Netanyahu and how much they hated the opposition. In other words, it was about love and hate. It was about affective polarization.

This analysis worries me greatly because it creates an incentive for populist leaders who want to introduce reforms harmful to democracy and capture the judiciary to deepen polarization. The more polarized a society becomes, the weaker the commitment to democratic values within a leader’s political base.

This is precisely the dynamic we have seen in Israel. On the one hand, Netanyahu has attempted to advance major reforms that would undermine democracy. On the other, he has sought to deepen polarization so that his political base would not punish him for those reforms. This is the mutual symbiosis between populism and polarization that we have observed in Israel.

Now, I do not think Israel has yet crossed the threshold into electoral authoritarianism. We are not there yet, particularly because Netanyahu has failed to implement the vast majority of his program. He has failed to capture the judiciary and to remove the independent Attorney General. We still have relatively independent media and a very strong civil society.

We can discuss this further later, but we have seen how civil society has organized to ensure that the coming elections remain competitive. Netanyahu has certainly managed to enact various problematic laws and undermine civil society in significant ways. I believe we are clearly experiencing democratic erosion, or democratic backsliding.

However, we have not yet crossed that threshold. If Netanyahu is elected again and the same coalition remains in power, it will be a different ballgame. Then, it will be game over for Israel’s liberal democratic project. That is why I very much hope the coming elections will bring about major change.

Personalized Loyalty to Netanyahu Threatens Democratic Rotation of Power

Your research suggests that emotional attachment to Netanyahu and hostility toward his opponents predict support for the judicial overhaul more strongly than ideological commitments. Does this indicate that Netanyahuism has become a form of personalized authoritarian populism in which loyalty to the leader supersedes constitutional principles?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: The answer to that question is certainly yes. It’s quite remarkable. You see this in various street surveys in which voters are asked, “Who are you going to vote for?” And they respond, “Oh, I will vote for Netanyahu.”

When asked, “But wait, he has proposed reforms that could undermine your rights. He hasn’t really won the war in Gaza. Hamas is still standing. We know the situation with thousands of soldiers serving in the reserves, while he is allowing the ultra-Orthodox not to serve in the military. How can you still support him?” people simply respond, “I support Netanyahu because that’s what I do. I just support Netanyahu. No one else can replace him.”

Even when you discuss specific policies, it doesn’t matter. Real-world facts make no difference. Democratic or constitutional values make no difference. It’s entirely personal: “We want Netanyahu. He is all we know. My parents voted for Netanyahu, and I will vote for Netanyahu. No one else can replace him.”

This is deeply frustrating in a democracy because it raises a fundamental question: How are we supposed to convince one another and maintain some form of democratic rotation of power if, regardless of what happens, one side of the political spectrum continues to vote for the same person simply because of who he is?

Israel’s Coalition Has Sought to Create a ‘Frankenstate’

Billboard reading “The Looting Government,” part of a protest campaign against the conservative coalition’s policies in Ra’anana, Israel, May 2023. Photo: Rene Van Den Berg

In “Populist Constitutionalism and the Judicial Overhaul in Israel,” written with Amichai Cohen, you argue that Israel’s institutional architecture makes it particularly vulnerable to populist capture. How have the absence of a rigid constitution, unicameralism, and concentrated executive power facilitated Netanyahu’s attempts to weaken democratic checks and balances?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s a good question. To answer it, I’ll start with how Netanyahu has been abusing comparative constitutional law. The main pillars of the judicial overhaul were to change the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee so that the coalition would control the appointment of all judges; limit the courts’ authority to review laws; enact an override clause that would allow a majority of members of parliament to override various decisions of the Court; change the status and independence of legal advisors in government; and weaken administrative judicial review by abolishing the reasonableness doctrine, which is central to Israeli administrative law.

I emphasize this because one of the key arguments Netanyahu and his coalition members used to justify these reforms was comparative law. Netanyahu repeatedly says, “But look, in the United States, politicians select the judges. Is the US not a democracy? In Canada, there is an override clause. We simply want to enact a similar override clause. What, Canada is not a democracy? In the UK, the courts cannot strike down laws. What, the UK is not a democracy?”

Essentially, the coalition has been doing what Kim Lane Scheppele calls the “Frankenstate.” Through what Rosalind Dixon and David Landau describe as “abusive borrowing,” elements are borrowed from different countries and combined to create a monster state rather than a functioning liberal democracy.

This brings me to the question of checks and balances. It is true that Canada has an override clause, that politicians in the US select Supreme Court justices, and that the Attorney General in the UK does not have the same authority as in Israel. 

However, when you compare democracies around the world, you find various mechanisms of checks and balances designed to ensure that political power is not concentrated in a single body. These may include a presidential system with veto powers, a federal system with a vertical separation of powers between the central government and the states, or a bicameral legislature with upper and lower houses elected differently. In Europe, there are also supranational institutions.

Israel has none of these mechanisms of political checks and balances. We have a unicameral Knesset controlled by the government. Essentially, five or six politicians who lead the coalition can impose their will through coalition discipline. 

There is also no rigid constitution. In a single day, the Knesset can enact or abolish a Basic Law by a simple majority. For example, Basic Law: Human Dignity or Basic Law: The Judiciary could be abolished in a single day by an ordinary majority, even by a vote of two to one.

Because of this weak system of checks and balances, we must be very cautious when making comparative arguments. Given the weakness of Israel’s political checks and balances, the only real constraints on political power are the judiciary and the Attorney General. That is precisely why these institutions are relatively strong in Israel. If you weaken them, you risk creating an unlimited government with absolute powers. That was the fundamental danger of the judicial overhaul.

Netanyahu’s Judicial Overhaul Was Designed to Give His Government Absolute Power

Your work distinguishes legitimate constitutional reform from abusive constitutionalism. Looking at the Netanyahu government’s judicial overhaul since 2023, which measures most clearly reveal an effort to consolidate executive power rather than improve democratic governance?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Yes, that is true. I’m the last person in Israel who would argue that the judicial system needs no reform, that the office of the Attorney General should remain untouched, or that no changes should be made to constitutional review mechanisms. I’m not saying that the system is perfect.

The problem is that Netanyahu’s reforms had nothing to do with the issues that actually needed correction. The purpose of his judicial overhaul was to provide his government with absolute power, without any mechanisms of checks and balances. That was the fundamental problem, and my concern was precisely the concentration of absolute power in the executive.

We’ll probably discuss this further later, but I believe various constitutional reforms are needed to improve the system. The judicial overhaul, however, was not about such improvements. It was entirely abusive because it would have undermined the rule of law, the separation of powers, and the very democratic identity of the state. It would also have severely undermined, if not completely destroyed, judicial independence. In that respect, it was fundamentally abusive, unfortunately.

As I mentioned earlier, Israel’s constitutional system is extremely flexible, making it remarkably easy to enact a Basic Law. To give you some numbers, Israel has undergone more constitutional changes in the past decade than the United States has experienced throughout its entire history. Since the enactment of our first Basic Law, we have had more than 140 constitutional changes.

Many of these changes have involved ad hoc, personalized amendments, sometimes even temporary ones, introduced for the benefit of incumbents, political convenience, or the government’s narrow political interests. Unfortunately, this is a deeply abusive practice.

Democratic Erosion Has Shifted from Major Constitutional Reforms to Incremental Institutional Changes

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

In “From the Hungarian Blitz to the Polish Salami,” you describe how Israel’s judicial overhaul shifted from rapid institutional transformation to incremental democratic erosion. Has this strategy proved more effective under the cover of the Gaza war, particularly through changes to judicial appointments and the weakening of independent legal authorities?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Yes, that is indeed the case. In early 2023, Netanyahu’s government, primarily through Minister of Justice Yariv Levin, announced a sweeping judicial reform on national television. This triggered a civil backlash and an unprecedented protest movement, with hundreds of thousands of citizens taking to the streets every week for 10 months to demonstrate against the judicial overhaul.

In mid-2023, these protests prompted Netanyahu to enter negotiations with the opposition under the auspices of the president. When those negotiations failed, the coalition changed its modus operandi. Instead of pursuing a single major package of constitutional reforms, it adopted what I call the “salami system”—introducing changes slice by slice.

The first slice came in July 2023 with the abolition of the reasonableness doctrine in administrative review. This amendment to Basic Law: The Judiciary was subsequently invalidated by the Supreme Court in early 2024. However, as the coalition itself indicated, this was merely the amuse-bouche, the first dish in a series of reforms that would follow.

Following October 7 and the war in Gaza, the coalition changed its approach entirely. Rather than pursuing major constitutional reforms, it shifted toward subconstitutional measures, including ordinary laws, regulations, secondary legislation, and, above all, administrative actions, particularly concerning appointments and civil society.

Let me briefly outline the various measures undertaken after October 7, although I can elaborate on each of them if you wish. The government refused to appoint a president of the Supreme Court according to the seniority rule and subsequently refused to recognize Justice Amit’s appointment as president. It does not recognize him as president of the Supreme Court and refuses to address him by that title. The government has also failed to fill four Supreme Court vacancies since October 2023, leaving only 11 justices instead of 15.

The coalition also unlawfully attempted to dismiss the Attorney General and enacted legislation undermining the authority of that office. In 2025, it changed the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee. For many months, the Minister of Justice refused to convene the committee until the Supreme Court compelled him to do so.

The government also changed the law governing the Ombudsman for the Judiciary and the procedure for appointing the Civil Service Commissioner. It introduced legislation to weaken the Israeli Bar Association. The police underwent extensive politicization, primarily through appointments.

In addition, the coalition enacted legislation undermining independent media and made various attempts to ban political parties.

So, what we have witnessed is a broad package of legislative and administrative measures rather than a few sweeping constitutional reforms. That is the fundamental difference.

The Supreme Court and Incremental Democratic Erosion

In your article “When the First Brick Falls of the Fortress of Democracy,” you argue that courts must resist even the earliest stages of authoritarian constitutional change. Has Israel’s Supreme Court adequately defended its institutional independence, or has incremental executive encroachment already weakened its capacity to protect democracy?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is a serious problem around the world, not just in Israel. We know that democratic erosion occurs incrementally, step by step. I often refer to what I call the “bald guy paradox.” Imagine a person with a full head of hair who removes one hair every day. We know that eventually this person will become bald, but when exactly can we say that he is bald? We cannot identify the precise day. Democratic erosion works in exactly the same way.

You weaken the courts a little, independent media a little, the opposition, the ombudsman, and civil society. But at what point does this gradual weakening transform a country from a democracy into an autocracy? It is very difficult to draw that line. That is precisely the problem.

Various constitutional doctrines, such as the unconstitutional constitutional amendment doctrine and eternity clauses, are ill-equipped to address this kind of incremental erosion. These doctrines tend to envision a single amendment that explicitly transforms a country into something other than a democracy.

Consider France in July 1940, when a single law granted Marshal Pétain both executive and legislative authority, effectively concentrating all powers in his hands. But this is no longer how democratic erosion typically occurs. We are unlikely to see such an explicit law. Instead, we see multiple laws that, slowly but surely, undermine and ultimately destroy democracy. Courts must therefore recognize this process in their jurisprudence.

They need to shift their judicial thinking away from examining only the individual amendment or law before them. Instead, they must adopt a more aggregated, cumulative approach that also considers the broader context.

This is what I argued in July 2023, when the Knesset enacted a Basic Law amendment undermining the reasonableness doctrine. I maintained that the Court should examine this amendment within its broader context. There were already various other laws awaiting enactment, but the crucial question was why the government was so determined to abolish the reasonableness doctrine.

The reason was that, without the reasonableness doctrine, the government could remove other institutional gatekeepers, most importantly the Attorney General. Once the Attorney General was removed, the government could interfere with elections and pursue other measures. This is why such amendments must be examined within their broader context.

Here, I must say that the Court refused to adopt the idea of aggregated judicial review. Nonetheless, it struck down the amendment concerning reasonableness. The Court concluded that, even when examined on its own, the amendment so seriously undermined the rule of law and the separation of powers that it had to be declared, for the first time in Israel’s history, an unconstitutional constitutional amendment.

So, notwithstanding the various attacks it has faced over the past four years, the Court has remained quite strong and has resisted these threats whenever it could.

Ben-Gvir, Smotrich, and the Rise of the Far Right

Itamar Ben Gvir, speaking in election conference at Ale Zahav in Samaria/Isreal on September 9, 2019. Photo: Barak Shacked.

The political empowerment of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich has elevated religious ultranationalism within Israel’s governing institutions. Are these actors merely radical coalition partners, or do they represent a more fundamental project to replace liberal constitutionalism with an exclusionary, ethno-religious conception of sovereignty?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s an extremely important and troubling question. If you had asked me five years ago, I would have said, “Look, Ben-Gvir is extremely radical. He’s a clown. He has no support.” In earlier election campaigns, Netanyahu himself refused even to be photographed with Ben-Gvir because he was regarded as such an extreme outlier.

Unfortunately, I don’t think that is the case anymore. After four years in power and the trauma of October 7, significant segments of Israeli society have moved further toward the extreme right.

I also want to emphasize the role of social media. Ben-Gvir has been remarkably clever in his use of social media, particularly in influencing young people and young voters. You can now go into schools and hear children shouting “Ben-Gvir” and expressing their support for him. He has been extremely effective on social media, which I find quite frightening.

I’m afraid that Ben-Gvir is gaining more and more supporters. What is particularly troubling is the damage he has done to the police, the fact that Netanyahu has not removed him from office, and the fact that the Court has allowed his appointment to stand rather than removing him. We should remember that this man, who serves as Minister of National Security, has a criminal conviction for assisting a terrorist organization.

To me, this is a complete disaster. Unfortunately, I expect his political support to grow in the coming elections. I can no longer dismiss him as some kind of clown—an extreme figure with no meaningful support. That situation has fundamentally changed over the past few years.

Religious Nationalism and the Coalition Against Judicial Independence

Religious Zionist parties, ultra-Orthodox movements, and Likud approach questions of Jewish identity, religious authority, military service, and territorial sovereignty differently. Despite these differences, have they formed a durable illiberal alliance against judicial independence and constitutional limitations on majority power?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: A useful way to analyze what has been happening in Israel over the past four years, particularly regarding the attacks on democracy, is to examine the different interests of the groups that formed the current coalition.

On the one hand, you have extreme groups led by figures such as Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich. These parties have been pushing for annexation and the deepening of the occupation of the occupied territories. That is one group.

Another powerful group is the ultra-Orthodox. Their primary concerns are twofold: first, securing exemptions from military service for their communities; and second, obtaining budgets for their population through discriminatory budget allocations.

The Supreme Court has been the only central institution that has so far blocked these initiatives—deepening the occupation, exemptions from military service, and discriminatory budget allocations. This explains why these two groups within the coalition have such a strong incentive to weaken or capture the Court, or to introduce an override clause that would allow the coalition to override its decisions.

There are two additional incentives. First, there are people within the coalition, such as Minister of Justice Yariv Levin, who are genuine ideologues. They are populists who believe that democracy is essentially the will of the majority. Their thinking is: “We have the majority. We won the elections. That means we represent the people, and we can do whatever we want because we have the authority of popular sovereignty.” These are genuine ideological convictions.

Then there is Netanyahu. We must remember that he has been undergoing a criminal trial for several years. Previously, Netanyahu had blocked meaningful attempts to undermine the judiciary. It is only since facing his own criminal trial that he has been willing to give the Minister of Justice a blank check to undermine the judiciary and the Attorney General. These developments are interconnected.

If the Attorney General is dismissed and Netanyahu can appoint whomever he wants to that position, the consequences could be significant. In Israel, the Attorney General also heads the prosecution. There is no separation between the offices of Attorney General and Chief Prosecutor; they are effectively the same position.

A newly appointed Attorney General could therefore stop Netanyahu’s criminal trial or at least negotiate a favorable deal for him. This is one of Netanyahu’s major incentives, and it illustrates how these interests are connected.

This provides a useful framework for understanding the situation. And absolutely, the ultra-Orthodox, through their ambition to expand the role of religion in public life and the public sphere, are also directly challenging the liberal and secular way of life. This is certainly a struggle over Israel’s constitutional identity.

The Gaza War Weakened Democratic Protests

Thousands march in Jerusalem against judicial overhaul, March 2025. A broad protest fills the streets at night, with demonstrators calling to save Israeli democracy. Photo: Dreamstime.

In your analysis of the judicial overhaul after October 7, you argue that the security crisis facilitated rather than suspended the government’s populist constitutional project. How did the Hamas attacks and subsequent war weaken democratic resistance while enabling further concentration of executive power?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s a very interesting question because, in the days following October 7, many people in Israel, myself included, believed the judicial overhaul was over. We were convinced that, given the grave security threats, the trauma of October 7, the challenges of the war, and the hundreds of thousands of people displaced from northern and southern Israel, the government would focus on what really mattered: security, the economy, the hostages, and the wounded. We assumed it would set aside its plans and ambitions concerning the judicial system.

But I was wrong. During the first few months of the war, we had a unity government, and during that period, the government indeed pursued only legislation related to the war, rather than other matters. However, soon after the unity government collapsed, the government resumed its attacks on democracy under the fog of war. Essentially, the coalition used the war as an excuse to continue its judicial overhaul.

First, we saw allegations that the judiciary and government lawyers were responsible for October 7. Instead of acknowledging responsibility, the government argued, “It’s because of the Court’s activism, because of Aharon Barak, and because of the legal advisors who tie the hands of the IDF that October 7 happened.”

We also saw allegations that the judiciary and government lawyers were assisting Hamas. Whenever the Supreme Court heard petitions concerning humanitarian aid to Gaza, for example, the government accused the Court of assisting Hamas and being “Nukhba lovers.”

We also need to consider the broader impact on the media and civil society. As I mentioned earlier, throughout 2023, we had major weekly protests against the judicial overhaul for 10 months. But during the war, people were much less willing to take to the streets to protest against the government.

Especially during wartime, we see what is known as the “rally-around-the-flag” effect. People tend to unite around the government rather than protest against it. Although demonstrations continued, they were nowhere near the scale of those before the war. Tens of thousands of people were serving in the military reserves, while others were preoccupied with the economy or the war itself.

Similarly, media and public attention shifted almost entirely toward the war, particularly the hostages. Even most of the protests focused on ending the war and bringing the hostages home rather than opposing the judicial overhaul.

There are two further points worth emphasizing. First, military reservists had played a crucial role in the protest movement. Many had declared that if the judicial overhaul were enacted, they would refuse to serve in the reserves under a dictatorship.

However, during the war, there was understandably enormous reluctance to use military service as a means of protest.

Second, we need to recognize that populism in Israel, unlike in Europe or the United States, is very much security-based. There is an excellent article by Yonatan Levy and Shai Agmon, Security-Based Populism, which shows how the Israeli government has employed friend-versus-enemy rhetoric primarily around questions of security rather than economic or cultural issues.

So, of course, security threats enabled the government to deepen its populist project.

Netanyahu Has Used the War to Strengthen His Political Power

The October 7 attacks exposed profound failures of Israel’s security establishment and political leadership. Yet Netanyahu remains electorally competitive. Has the politics of existential insecurity enabled him to transform accountability for these failures into renewed claims of national leadership and political legitimacy?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: It’s quite remarkable. First, we need to understand just how extraordinary the situation is. Netanyahu has refused to establish a national commission of inquiry into the failures that led to October 7. For three years, he has refused to establish such a commission, while managing to instill in his political base a lack of trust and confidence in the Supreme Court and in the very mechanism of a commission of inquiry.

Under Israeli law, the government usually decides whether to establish a commission of inquiry, while the President of the Supreme Court appoints its members. Netanyahu has repeatedly argued, “We have no trust in the judiciary. We have no trust in the President of the Court. We don’t recognize the President of the Court.” This, in turn, has generated distrust in the very mechanism of a commission of inquiry. I believe that undermining confidence in the President of the Court was part of his intention.

Why does he refuse to establish a commission of inquiry? Because he knows he bears responsibility for October 7. There were dozens of threats and warnings before the attacks, and he ignored them all. He continued providing millions of dollars to Hamas because he wanted to preserve the separation between Gaza and the Palestinian Authority.

Although he knows he bears responsibility, everyone else has paid some kind of price. Senior officials, including the heads of intelligence and the Shin Bet and the Minister of Security, have resigned from office. Netanyahu is the only one who has remained in power since October 7. He has also refused to call elections following the war. No one in Israel imagined that he would remain in power after the war.

Netanyahu has been using the war to strengthen and entrench his political power, primarily through two strategies.

First, he blames the “deep state.” His argument is essentially: “It was you—the military, the security services, the judges, and the protest movement. You deliberately failed to warn me. You didn’t wake me up on the morning of October 7 because you didn’t want me to respond to the threat. You wanted this to happen so that I would abandon the judicial overhaul and my government would fall.” In other words, he blames the deep state for October 7.

Second, he argues, “Look, even if there were failures before October 7, from October 8 onward, I was the one fighting. I fought against Syria, Iran, Lebanon, and Hamas. I was the only one who fought. Everyone else wanted to surrender or give up. I’m the only one who can continue fighting.”

It’s interesting how he makes this shift. Essentially, he claims, “From October 8 onward, I have been the best leader, and no one can replace me.” Unfortunately, many people in Israel still accept what he is telling them. And here, we need to say something about the media.

As I mentioned earlier, Israel still has free and independent media. However, Netanyahu also has what I would describe as his own propaganda channel, Channel 14. It is a propaganda channel par excellence, conveying Netanyahu’s messages almost exclusively. Unfortunately, for many people, this is the only news channel they watch. As a result, his messages and slogans continue to resonate throughout the public sphere.

Developments in the Occupied Territories Are Undermining Democracy Inside Israel

The controversial Israeli separation wall dividing Israel from the West Bank, often referred to as the segregation wall in Palestine. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

Israel’s devastating military campaign in Gaza, accompanied by mass civilian casualties, displacement, and allegations of war crimes and genocide, raises profound questions about constitutional democracy. Can Israel meaningfully safeguard liberal-democratic principles domestically while maintaining a system of occupation and denying Palestinians political self-determination?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is a profoundly important issue in Israel because, for many years, many Israelis have tried to draw a distinction between what is happening in the occupied territories and what is taking place inside Israel, as if developments in the territories had nothing to do with Israel’s domestic affairs.

For decades, many Israelis maintained the illusion that Israel was a liberal democracy. They acknowledged that there were serious problems in the occupied territories but believed that, domestically, Israel remained a liberal democracy.

However, what we have witnessed since the war demonstrates how difficult it is to maintain this distinction. It is not a binary separation. Developments in the occupied territories are increasingly affecting what happens inside Israel. How can a country sustain its identity as a liberal democracy for decades while maintaining control over other territories through occupation?

I don’t think this situation is sustainable in the long term. It has profound implications for the very project of Israel as a liberal democracy. These issues are interconnected.

On the one hand, we have the negative consequences of the occupation, which undermine Israel’s project as a liberal democracy. On the other hand, as we discussed earlier, we have an increasingly influential religious element within Israeli society that is also growing demographically.

I don’t think a liberal democracy can be sustained indefinitely under these two pressures. So, I hope the next government will be able to bring about meaningful changes in both areas.

Higher Arab Voter Turnout Could Transform Jewish-Arab Political Cooperation

Your constitutional scholarship emphasizes the protection of fundamental rights against unchecked majoritarian power. How does the increasing political marginalization of Palestinian Arab citizens, alongside intensified settlement expansion in the West Bank, expose the tensions between Israel’s Jewish-national character and its democratic commitments?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s a very interesting and challenging question, particularly because we’ve also witnessed changes within Israel’s Arab minority. About 22 percent of Israeli citizens are Arab Palestinians. They have suffered more than almost any other group under this government, apart from Palestinians in the occupied territories. I’m referring specifically to Arab citizens living within Israel. They have suffered particularly from violence within their communities. Under Ben-Gvir, we’ve seen large numbers of deaths and shooting incidents, with devastating consequences for the Arab population.

The reason I emphasize this is that, until now, the Arab population has shown relatively limited interest in participating in Israeli politics. Voter turnout among Arab citizens in Knesset elections has generally been quite low. Of course, there is another side to this. Until a few years ago, hardly anyone imagined that Arab parties could play a meaningful role in government or become part of a governing coalition. That changed in 2021 with the government of change, when, for the first time, an Arab party, Ra’am, a Muslim party, joined the coalition.

I emphasize this because we may see another change in the coming elections. According to surveys, given the grave situation facing the Arab population, turnout among Arab voters could increase substantially. I certainly hope so. Until recently, we were discussing turnout rates of around 50–55 percent. Now, surveys suggest turnout could reach 65 percent, which would represent a significant change. If that happens, it will be extremely important and send a powerful message.

It would strengthen the visibility of Arab politicians in the Knesset and perhaps encourage greater collaboration between Jewish and Arab parties. More importantly, for the first time, we have a senior Jewish politician, Yoav Segalovich, who previously served as Deputy Chief of Police and was a member of the major political party Yesh Atid. He has now moved to become the number two candidate in Ra’am, the Muslim Arab party, and is its candidate to replace Ben-Gvir as Minister of National Security.

If Ra’am supports the next government and Segalovich becomes Minister of National Security as a representative of that party, it would be an extraordinary example of Jewish-Arab collaboration. I very much hope the coming elections will also bring meaningful change in the relationship between Arab voters, the broader Arab population, and Jewish political parties.

I should also remind your audience that Israel, like Germany and Turkey, has a legal mechanism for banning political parties. Last month, the plenary of the Central Elections Committee voted to ban all Arab parties—parties representing more than 20 percent of the population. This was purely political propaganda because the coalition knew the decision would be overturned by the Court.

Indeed, the Supreme Court invalidated the decision. But this created a win-win situation for the coalition because it could then accuse the Court of supporting Arabs and terrorists, and so on. From the coalition’s perspective, it was a win-win situation. It was simply political propaganda. Nevertheless, this episode reveals the zeitgeist of the current Israeli coalition toward the Arab minority, which I find deeply saddening.

Netanyahu Could Refuse to Recognize Election Results if He Loses

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Prague, Czech Republic, on December 5, 2012. Photo: Dreamstime.

In your June 2026 article “The Populist Coalition in Israel Is Stressed from Orbán’s Loss and Is Gaslighting,” you examine the implications of Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat for Netanyahu’s coalition. What lessons does Hungary’s experience offer regarding the defeat of entrenched populist leaders, electoral integrity, and the prospects for democratic restoration in Israel?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: After Orbán lost the elections in Hungary, several members of the Israeli coalition, including Simcha Rothman, chair of the Constitution Committee and one of the leaders of the judicial overhaul, said, “You, Professor Yaniv Roznai, and the protesters were lying to us throughout 2023. You warned that we would become an autocratic government, like Poland or Hungary. But look, Poland held elections and experienced a rotation of power. Now Orbán has lost the elections in Hungary. So what kind of dictatorship have you been trying to convince us we were becoming?”

I tried to explain what had actually happened in Hungary. I also traveled there during the elections to observe and learn from the experience. My point was that Hungary was not an autocracy like North Korea, but its electoral system was neither genuinely competitive nor free and fair. I explained the various ways Orbán had manipulated the electoral system during his 16 years in power. Israel’s situation is different. Institutionally and structurally, Israel still has a competitive electoral system.

That is precisely why I am concerned that Netanyahu and his coalition, lacking substantial public support and certainly not enjoying majority support, will resort to various manipulations and tricks to undermine electoral integrity in the coming elections. We have already seen the creation of fake videos, including deepfakes, designed to influence voters. We know that personal data on voters is being collected in attempts to influence them.

We also know about plans involving intimidation at polling stations, including the possibility of gangs threatening voters, particularly in Arab cities and villages, to discourage Arab citizens from voting. So, there are various plans that concern us. But what I find remarkable about these elections, something we have not witnessed in previous elections, is that civil society has redirected the enormous energy of the 2023 protest movement toward protecting electoral integrity.

We now have tens of thousands of volunteers. To give you an idea of the scale, according to official figures from the Central Elections Committee, 270,000 people have applied to serve as polling station secretaries to ensure that voting is conducted according to the rules. That is an extraordinary number.

Similarly, in the nonprofit civil society organization I work with to ensure that the coming elections remain competitive, tens of thousands of people have expressed interest in volunteering as observers, either inside or outside polling stations, to prevent violence, intimidation, cheating, and other irregularities.

For the first time in Israel’s history, civil society has organized on such a scale to safeguard free and fair elections. This mobilization reflects our concern that Netanyahu may attempt various forms of electoral manipulation.

Over the past six months, we have also witnessed a campaign by Netanyahu and his coalition members to undermine public confidence in the Central Elections Committee and in the electoral process itself. For example, they have portrayed the chair of the Central Elections Committee, who is actually a religious conservative Supreme Court judge, as an extreme left-wing figure. They claim, “This extreme left-wing guy wants to steal the elections.” That is, of course, ridiculous.

But this is the campaign they have been conducting. It appears designed to prepare the ground for what might happen afterward, particularly if Netanyahu loses and refuses to recognize the results. We have seen what happened with Bolsonaro in Brazil and the events at the US Capitol involving Donald Trump. I am concerned that we could witness similar developments in Israel, with Netanyahu refusing to recognize the election results if he loses.

A Post-Netanyahu Government Would Resemble Poland More Than Hungary

Recent polling suggests a highly fragmented electoral landscape, with Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar challenging Likud and opposition parties confronting difficult coalition arithmetic. Given Netanyahu’s resilience and the potential parliamentary importance of Arab parties, which post-election scenarios appear most plausible—and what risks do you foresee for electoral legitimacy and a peaceful transfer of power?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is an issue we are all struggling with. Although Netanyahu and Likud have been dramatically weakened since the previous elections, and certainly since October 7, Netanyahu’s bloc remains very homogeneous, united under a single leader: Netanyahu.

On the other hand, the opposition, despite leading in the polls, is highly fragmented. We have Gadi Eisenkot, Bennett, Lapid, the Democrats, Lieberman, and the Arab parties. These are different political forces, and they cannot agree on a single candidate. Anyone hoping that the next government will be a coalition of change, entirely different from the current coalition and capable of reversing all the problematic laws that have been enacted, shifting Israel toward liberal democracy, and strengthening judicial independence, will probably be disappointed.

Even if Netanyahu steps down and another coalition takes power, it will be a very diverse coalition rather than a homogeneous one, bringing together left-wing and right-wing parties. Advancing a common agenda under such circumstances would be extremely challenging.

From a comparative perspective, this would resemble Poland more than Hungary. We would not have a single leader winning the elections and exercising overwhelming control over the coalition. That simply would not be the case.

The situation would be especially challenging if Arab parties were part of the coalition, given the delegitimization of the Arab population by Netanyahu and his political allies. Maintaining a strong coalition that depends on the support of Arab parties would be particularly difficult.

So, I do not envision a scenario in which we could simply say, “That’s it. Like Péter Magyar in Hungary, we’ll win the elections, and then we can do whatever we want.” That is not how things would work.

One possible scenario is that Netanyahu loses and a new, highly complex coalition emerges, one that would have to navigate competing interests and political differences.

A second possibility is some form of national unity government, with or without Netanyahu. One scenario involves Netanyahu receiving a pardon from the president, which could restore his political legitimacy, at least to some extent. Currently, other parties refuse to cooperate with him because he is undergoing a criminal trial.

If he receives a presidential pardon, he would no longer be facing that trial, which would also allow him to serve as a minister. We could therefore imagine a mixed coalition in which Likud joins other Zionist parties to form a national unity government.

Another scenario is that no party or bloc succeeds in forming a government, leading to another cycle of elections. Remember that between 2019 and 2022, Israel held five rounds of elections. That was extraordinary.

Imagine continuing to hold elections while Netanyahu remains prime minister of successive caretaker governments. This is a scenario I very much hope we can avoid.

People understand that these are among the most consequential elections in Israel’s history. Thousands upon thousands of Israelis living abroad, myself included, are returning to Israel specifically to vote. I do not expect this level of mobilization to continue if we enter another prolonged cycle of elections. That is why I sincerely hope the election results will be decisive.

Post-Populist Populism and Democratic Restoration

In your work on post-populist populism, you warn that governments succeeding populist incumbents may reproduce their predecessors’ illiberal governing practices. If Netanyahu loses on October 27, what constitutional reforms would be essential to prevent a new government from perpetuating the institutional abuses it was elected to reverse?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: This is a challenge we see around the world. Professor Amichai Cohen and I wrote a blog post on post-populist populism, and we are now editing a special volume of Constitutional Studies on this topic, bringing together experts from around the world. Post-populism presents a fundamental rule-of-law challenge. On the one hand, you want to restore democracy. Let’s say a populist leader loses an election, and a post-populist government comes to power with the aim of restoring democracy.

But the judiciary has been captured by political judges appointed by the previous government. You have civil servants who are either controlled by or allied with the previous government. You also have media organizations that have been politicized and brought under its control. What do you do to dismantle these structures?

If you start dismissing civil servants and judges or attempting to capture the courts yourself, you risk falling into the trap of using exactly the same methods as the populists. You also expose yourself to accusations such as, “Aha, when we captured the courts, you called it populism, fascism, or dictatorship. But when you do the same thing, it’s acceptable because you’re the good guys. How do you explain that?”

This is the rule-of-law dilemma. The problem is that populism corrupts the entire political playing field, while the populist toolkit remains available. Resisting the temptation to use those tools is an enormous challenge. You want to use them, but for good purposes. This creates a dilemma that we are still not sure how to resolve.

Of course, much depends on how deeply the system has already been corrupted. In Hungary, after 16 years, the corruption is so deeply entrenched that correcting it will take years, and decisive action will be necessary. Looking at Poland and Hungary, one important lesson is that an incoming government has a very narrow window of opportunity during which it has the legitimacy to act quickly and decisively. If it fails to act within that window, it may lose the ability to act effectively.

For a new Israeli government, this means addressing the most pressing issues immediately. Take, for example, the 2025 amendment concerning the Judicial Selection Committee, which completely politicized the system. I believe one of the first things the new government must do is repeal that amendment and restore the status quo ante.

In terms of procedure and due process, there is an important distinction between introducing an entirely new reform and repealing an existing amendment to restore the previous situation. The latter can be accomplished much more quickly. So, I believe the new government must act rapidly on two priorities: establishing a commission of inquiry into October 7 and repealing the three or four principal judicial overhaul laws that were enacted. 

However, when it comes to pursuing more comprehensive reforms, the government must proceed much more carefully to secure the legitimacy required for such changes, especially if it lacks a substantial parliamentary majority. If it has only a narrow majority, I fear that undertaking sweeping reforms would be extremely risky. Nevertheless, it would need to entrench the essential constitutional safeguards to ensure that another judicial overhaul cannot be carried out in the near future.

Trump’s Endorsement Is Unlikely to Change Deeply Polarized Electoral Landscape

Israelis walk next an Israeli election billboard of Likud Party showing US President Donald Trump shaking hands with Likud chairman and Israeli Prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Beth Shemesh, Israel on September 8, 2019. Photo: Gil Cohen Magen.

What will be the impact of US President Donald Trump’s endorsement of Prime Minister Netanyahu in the Oct. 27 elections?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: Yes, we’ve seen Trump’s intervention in the Israeli elections through his endorsement of Netanyahu. Let me make a few observations. First, we also witnessed US intervention on behalf of Orbán in Hungary, and it did not help him. In fact, it may have made things worse for Orbán.

In Israel, I don’t think Trump’s endorsement will have the same negative effect because Trump is very popular among Israelis. However, I also don’t believe it will make a significant difference. Israeli society is so deeply polarized that voters rarely move between the pro-Netanyahu and anti-Netanyahu camps. Such shifts are particularly unlikely just a week before the elections. So, I don’t expect the endorsement to bring about any major change.

There is also an interesting possibility that I’ve heard discussed. According to a media report published today, Netanyahu wanted to launch an attack on Iran, but Trump prevented him from doing so. One possibility is that Trump’s public endorsement of Netanyahu’s candidacy was offered in exchange for Netanyahu refraining from attacking Iran. I don’t know whether that’s the case. It’s an assumption I’ve heard, and it sounds plausible to me. Nevertheless, I don’t think Trump’s endorsement will make a substantial difference.

Defeating Netanyahu Would Be Only the Beginning of Restoring Israeli Democracy

And lastly, Professor Roznai, looking beyond the elections, would Netanyahu’s defeat and the exclusion of the religious-nationalist far right constitute a genuine democratic turning point, or would meaningful restoration require a deeper constitutional settlement addressing judicial independence, minority rights, executive accountability, and Palestinian self-determination? Are Israel’s democratic institutions sufficiently resilient to withstand another Netanyahu government?

Professor Yaniv Roznai: That’s the million-dollar question. My analysis is that even if Netanyahu loses the elections and the alternative camp—what we call the camp of change or the camp of restoring democracy—wins, that will not be the end of the story. It will only be the beginning.

To truly restore democracy in Israel, we need to undertake various reforms, beginning at the institutional level. First, we must complete our Bill of Rights. Unlike other countries, Israel does not have a comprehensive Bill of Rights. For example, fundamental constitutional rights, such as equality, freedom of speech, and freedom of religion, are not formally enshrined in a Basic Law. We need to complete the Bill of Rights and introduce a Basic Law on legislation that would stabilize our constitutional system. Such a law should ensure that enacting or amending a Basic Law requires a supermajority, as is the case in other countries. Institutionally, we must also strengthen checks and balances and other independent institutional gatekeepers. These are essential reforms at the constitutional level.

But we also need to do much more in education. For many years, we have neglected education about democracy and democratic literacy. Regardless of how strong or independent the Court may be, or how rigid our Basic Laws become, democracy cannot survive without committed small-d democrats—citizens who understand the importance of liberal democracy and what it truly means. So, we have important work to do at both the constitutional and educational levels. We need to strengthen the understanding of liberal democracy within Israeli society.

My aspiration is to establish a unified stream of education. You need to understand that Israel currently has different educational streams: a religious stream, an Arab stream, and a more secular stream. What is remarkable is that large numbers of children in Israeli schools have little understanding of democracy or liberal democracy, while Arab children often have little understanding of what it means to live in a Jewish state. We need a unified educational framework that explains to students that they live in a state that is both Jewish and democratic, and how these two potentially conflicting values are supposed to coexist.

I believe it will take years to repair the damage that the current coalition has inflicted on Israel. And the only way to begin that process of correction and democratic restoration is to win the elections. That is the first step.

I’m afraid that if another Netanyahu coalition comes to power, hundreds of thousands of people will leave Israel in the coming years. That would be a disaster. Already, tens of thousands have left, many of them liberals, academics, and doctors. There was a cartoon in one of the Israeli newspapers depicting a flight attendant asking, “Is there a doctor on the plane?” And everyone on the plane was raising their hands. It’s funny, but at the same time, it isn’t funny because it’s not merely a joke; it reflects reality. I know many academics who have already left Israel, and I’m deeply concerned that many more will leave if another Netanyahu coalition takes power.

According to a recent survey published by News Channel 12, approximately a quarter of opposition voters said they would consider leaving the country if Netanyahu wins. That is an extraordinary number. So, I genuinely fear that Israel, as a country seeking to endure for generations to come, would not survive another coalition like this.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Professor Gideon Rahat.

Prof. Rahat: Netanyahu’s Departure Could Pave the Way for Democratic Renewal in Israel

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Gideon Rahat of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem examines Israel’s democratic prospects ahead of the October 27 elections. He argues that Netanyahu’s departure could enable a redistribution of political power and a return to consensus-based democracy, while warning that deeply personalized parties and weakened institutional checks threaten democratic resilience. Highlighting Netanyahu’s role in legitimizing the religious-nationalist far right, Professor Rahat cautions: “But once you let this genie out of the bottle, which is what Netanyahu did, the genie is here to stay.” Despite these enduring challenges, he sees opportunities for democratic renewal through institutional reform, stronger political parties, and the restoration of checks and balances.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

As Israel approaches the October 27 elections, its political landscape remains deeply polarized by Benjamin Netanyahu’s leadership, the growing influence of the religious-nationalist far right, and the profound consequences of the October 7 attacks and the devastating war in Gaza. Beyond the immediate electoral contest, fundamental questions concern the resilience of democratic institutions, the personalization of political power, and whether a post-Netanyahu government could reverse Israel’s democratic backsliding.

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Gideon Rahat, holder of the Gersten Family Chair in Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and Senior Fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute, offers a nuanced assessment of these challenges. Drawing on his scholarship on political parties, populism, and democratic institutions, Professor Rahat argues that Netanyahu’s departure could create an opportunity for democratic renewal, although Israel’s deeply personalized party system presents formidable structural obstacles.

Central to his analysis is Netanyahu’s consolidation of political authority and his transformation of Likud. According to Professor Rahat, Netanyahu’s populism combines centralized personalism with an antagonistic division between the supposedly authentic people and institutional elites. Yet his removal could fundamentally alter these dynamics. As Professor Rahat explains, “Netanyahu did not allow anyone around him to grow politically.” Consequently, he argues, no obvious successor possesses the capacity to reproduce Netanyahu’s centralized political infrastructure. His departure could therefore allow political power to be redistributed, potentially facilitating a return to consensus-based democracy.

However, Professor Rahat simultaneously warns that Netanyahu has fundamentally transformed Israel’s political landscape by legitimizing previously marginal ultranationalist forces. Examining the rise of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich, he emphasizes the decisive role of political elites in enabling radicalization. Referring to Netanyahu’s political elevation of Ben-Gvir, Professor Rahat observes: “But once you let this genie out of the bottle, which is what Netanyahu did, the genie is here to stay.” This normalization of the far right represents an enduring challenge that may survive Netanyahu’s eventual departure.

The interview also explores the weakening of judicial independence, the marginalization of Arab political parties, and the enduring trauma of October 7. Professor Rahat emphasizes that the erosion of institutional safeguards cannot be reversed through leadership change alone, warning that “a court cannot sustain democracy by itself.” Democratic reconstruction, he argues, requires stronger political parties, institutional reforms, and a broader distribution of political authority.

Moreover, Professor Rahat’s analysis distinguishes between the possibility of ending Netanyahu’s personalized rule and the more demanding task of rebuilding Israeli democracy. His cautiously hopeful conclusion underscores the importance of institutional transformation beyond electoral alternation: “Hopefully, this would allow Israel to return to a more consensus-based form of democracy.”

Here is our interview with Professor Gideon Rahat, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Political Personalization Extends Beyond Netanyahu to the Opposition

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during his visit to Prague, Czech Republic, on December 5, 2012. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Rahat, thank you for joining us. Let me begin with your research on Likud’s personalization under Netanyahu. In your research with Ofer Kenig, you argue that Likud has transformed from an institutionalized leader party into a personal party under Netanyahu. Has this transformation reached the point where Likud’s political identity, organizational survival, and ideological direction have become inseparable from Netanyahu himself? What would remain of Netanyahuism without Netanyahu?

Professor Gideon Rahat: The party might collapse after Netanyahu, but you have to remember that most of the other relevant parties in Israel are also personal. This means that Likud might survive because it still has a brand name and a platform that could remain after Netanyahu. If Likud and Netanyahu were competing against an institutionalized party, Likud might have collapsed. But there are no such alternatives these days. Israeli politics is very personal—not only when it comes to Netanyahu, but also to the opposition to Netanyahu.

Netanyahu Embraced Populism Amid His Legal Troubles

Your recent research with Tristan Klingelhöfer links centralized party personalism to illiberalism and majoritarian conceptions of democracy. To what extent does Netanyahuism exemplify this relationship? Is Israel experiencing a populist challenge to liberal democracy or a more profound transformation toward personalized authoritarian governance?

Professor Gideon Rahat: No, populism in Israel is clear. I must say that until around 2015, Netanyahu was actually blocking populism in Israeli politics. There were many initiatives that he himself blocked. In 2015, this started to change. In 2019, once he began having problems in court over allegations of corruption, he really changed course and became a populist in a very clear and simple sense: There is me, the person who represents the genuine people, and there are these corrupt elites—the courts, the prosecutors, the media, academia, and everybody else, the usual suspects of any populist regime.

So, it is clearly populism. Of course, in Israel, it is blended with centralized personalism. Netanyahu is at the center; he is the symbol of this populist side. His populism is clear, but he is also allied with other populists, such as Viktor Orbán. He was aligned with Bolsonaro and, of course, with Donald Trump.

Religiosity Matters More Than Ethnicity in Netanyahu’s Support

Election billboards of religious political parties Shas and Otzma Yehudit before Israel’s fourth election in two years in a street of Jerusalem on March 22, 2021. Photo: Gali Estrange.

Likud’s historical populism drew heavily on the resentment of marginalized Mizrahi constituencies toward Ashkenazi political elites. Has Netanyahu successfully transformed these historical grievances into a durable anti-establishment identity, even after decades of Likud dominance? How much of his continuing appeal rests on identity rather than political performance?

Professor Gideon Rahat: It’s clear that Netanyahu and Likud receive more support from Mizrahi Jews than from Ashkenazi Jews, who came from Europe and the West. But I must say that the most important factor is not ethnic background but religiosity. Netanyahu’s supporters tend to be more religious, while Mizrahi Jews tend to be more traditional. They generally occupy a middle ground, whereas Ashkenazi Jews may be either very secular or very religious, like the ultra-Orthodox. Many Mizrahi Jews fall somewhere in between. They are not fully religious, but they are clearly not secular, and Netanyahu enjoys considerable support among them.

However, studies show that the growing Mizrahi middle class, which has emerged through economic and social mobility, tends to be more supportive of the opposition. More educated Mizrahi Jews, particularly those with higher incomes, are more likely to support the opposition than those who are more traditional, poorer, and more dependent on patron-client relationships.

Extreme Personalization Threatens Even Likud’s Survival

In your 2026 article Is the Party Perspective Over?, you defend the continued analytical centrality of political parties despite increasing personalization. Does Israel’s 2026 election reinforce that argument, or has competition increasingly become a contest between political personalities rather than coherent ideological and organizational alternatives?

Professor Gideon Rahat: If the entire democratic world looked like Israel, I wouldn’t defend the parties. Israel is an extreme case of political personalization. The only comparable case in the democratic world might be Italy. If Israel were the typical case rather than the exception, I wouldn’t argue that parties remain so relevant to politics. But parties are still relevant in most countries, as even very simple examples demonstrate.

Take Austria, for example. Sebastian Kurz was a very strong, highly personalized leader who took over his party. Once he was found to be corrupt, he was gone. In Japan, prime ministers change frequently because of corruption allegations. The party stays, while the leader goes. This is not, of course, the case in Israel. Elsewhere, parties survive their leaders, which demonstrates that they are institutionalized and not dependent on a specific individual. Even some personal parties become less personalized, or perhaps evolve into leader parties, where the leader remains very strong, but the party survives after their departure. The parties associated with the Le Pens in France are an example.

Israel, however, remains an extreme case where political parties come and go. Just two days ago, Benny Gantz, who led one of Israel’s strongest parties four years ago, had to leave because he found that he no longer had sufficient support to pass the electoral threshold. He had only 1% support, while he needed 3.25%. So, it’s about him, not about a political party.

His party, which was highly personalized, will probably disappear into history with him. If you look at Israeli politics, parties are constantly changing, with new parties emerging around specific leaders. Once those leaders leave, their parties disappear. Likud, of course, is a brand name that might survive Netanyahu. But as I said, it would survive because the other parties do not offer comparable alternatives in terms of brand names, not because Likud itself is not a personal party.

Netanyahu Let the Far-Right Genie Out of the Bottle and It Is Here to Stay

Itamar Ben Gvir, speaking in election conference at Ale Zahav in Samaria/Isreal on September 9, 2019. Photo: Barak Shacked.

The political normalization of Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich has brought previously marginal ultranationalist currents into the center of government. Has their participation fundamentally radicalized Israeli politics, or does their growing influence reflect a broader ideological shift already underway within Israeli society?

Professor Gideon Rahat: Both are true. First, there has been radicalization in Israel, especially since October 7. October 7 was a traumatic event. Israelis see themselves as having been exposed to this kind of massacre, and this has produced another shift to the right. The first major shift to the right, the first political earthquake, came in 2001, during the Second Intifada, when suicide bombers attacked buses and about 1,000 Israelis were killed. This time, another thousand Israelis were killed in a single day. They could not defend themselves, and this has moved people further to the right.

However, at the end of the day, political elites are more important. If Netanyahu had not allowed Ben-Gvir to enter politics as he did, I’m not sure Ben-Gvir would have become so strong. But Netanyahu did allow him. Ben-Gvir had, if I remember correctly, around 60,000 votes, which was not enough to pass the electoral threshold, and Netanyahu brought him into the Religious Zionism Party. Now Ben-Gvir himself is very strong. So, I think much depends on how political elites shape the political landscape.

This doesn’t mean that people are not extreme, racist, right-wing, or whatever. They are. But elites often have the ability to moderate these forces. People may accept that, even if they are more extreme than their politicians, their leaders must maintain foreign relations and deal with others. They understand that. But once you let this genie out of the bottle, which is what Netanyahu did, the genie is here to stay.

And Ben-Gvir is here to stay, not because he has been particularly successful. He is the Minister of National Security, and if you look at the number of crimes and killings, nothing particularly good is happening. But he doesn’t need success. His rhetoric alone is enough to attract considerable support.

Smotrich, who is supposed to be somewhat less extreme, actually comes from the more extreme wing of religious nationalism, from a historical perspective. He is more extreme in terms of religion, as well as foreign affairs and security.

So, the national religious movement is moving toward the extremes, and this represents a historical transformation. Once upon a time, the national religious movement in Israel was moderate. It was actually part of what was called a historical alliance with the Labor Party. But after 1967, when Israel took control of the territories, the movement gradually changed course. Today, it occupies the most extreme position in the Israeli political system.

Military Service Divides Religious Nationalists and Ultra-Orthodox Jews

How should we analytically distinguish the religious-nationalist radicalism of Otzma Yehudit and Religious Zionism from the political objectives of ultra-Orthodox parties such as Shas and United Torah Judaism? Are these movements converging around an illiberal conception of the Jewish state, or do their competing interests limit the coherence of the religious right?

Professor Gideon Rahat: The ultra-Orthodox are different. If you look at public opinion in both communities regarding foreign affairs and xenophobia, their views are almost the same. But the main goal of the ultra-Orthodox elite is to isolate their community from the rest of society. They don’t want its members to modernize or move beyond the boundaries of the ultra-Orthodox community.

This creates an important distinction. While the national religious are the avant-garde, seeking to lead the State of Israel toward their goals, the ultra-Orthodox are primarily concerned with their own community.

This difference is particularly evident in attitudes toward military service. The national religious serve in the military and regard it as something very important, even as a form of serving God. The ultra-Orthodox, by contrast, do not want to serve in the military. They claim this is because they spend their days studying the Torah.

The real reason, however, is their fear that military service would expose members of their community to modernism. They would encounter women who do not dress as women do within their own community. In other words, the ultra-Orthodox leadership does not want them to be exposed to the outside world and therefore opposes their military service.

So, military service represents the main cleavage, the central dividing line between the national religious and the ultra-Orthodox.

Netanyahu’s Coalition Vows to Continue Judicial Overhaul if Reelected

Israelis protest against Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s anti-democratic move targeting judiciary in Tel Aviv on March 11, 2023. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Israel’s judicial overhaul controversy exposed competing understandings of democratic legitimacy: majoritarian sovereignty versus institutional checks and minority protections. Following the October 7 attacks and the Gaza war, has the struggle over judicial independence become secondary to national security, or does it remain the defining conflict over Israel’s democratic future?

Professor Gideon Rahat: It remains a defining conflict because Netanyahu and his coalition want to continue with it, while the opposition remains against it. So, this is a very important issue. What Netanyahu is trying to do, of course, is to reduce the checks and balances on the executive, as other leaders are doing around the world. He is doing this by weakening the courts and confronting the media, academia, and civil society. This is an ongoing process, and members of his coalition are saying that if they win the elections, they will continue with it.

You have to remember that in the previous elections, this judicial coup was not on the agenda. Now, everybody knows about it, and Netanyahu and his coalition are openly saying that they intend to continue with it. This has become a very important part of their agenda.

Israel’s Political Parties No Longer Provide Essential Checks and Balances

Your scholarship demonstrates how personal parties can undermine institutional accountability. To what extent has Netanyahu’s control over Likud facilitated the weakening of democratic checks and balances? Could an electoral defeat reverse these developments, or has democratic backsliding become structurally embedded beyond Netanyahu’s leadership?

Professor Gideon Rahat: On the one hand, Netanyahu has really driven populism, personalism, and the centralization of power. But let’s imagine that he’s no longer there. We still have to remember that political parties in Israel are highly personalized. When parties become highly personalized, they no longer serve as checks and balances; they simply serve their leaders.

This is a problem for democracy, particularly in a system where there are already very few checks and balances. We don’t have federalism or two houses of Congress. We have a highly centralized electoral system with a single nationwide electoral district and very weak legislators. So, when you look at Israel, you see that there are hardly any checks and balances, whereas political parties once played precisely that role.

Returning to a more democratic course would not be easy. Changes would be necessary. But without Netanyahu, I don’t think any single leader would centralize the system to the same extent.

There is also reason for hope. Look at the new Hungarian leader who came to power. He could have become Orbán II, taking all the powers Orbán had accumulated and using them for himself. But instead, he is giving up those powers. So, we can always hope that Israel’s next leader will be generous enough to distribute political power more broadly, allowing checks and balances to be reestablished.

However, political parties in Israel are really in very bad shape. They need to be reconstructed, but you cannot base your entire reform program on political parties alone. You need to consider new reforms, such as giving more power to local governments, perhaps introducing some form of regional government, and developing other creative ideas to ensure that we do not remain in the current situation, with a very strong executive and a relatively strong and courageous court. But a court cannot sustain democracy by itself.

Populism Helps Netanyahu Evade Accountability for October 7

Morning bombing attack on Gaza near the Al-Saraya buildings. Photo: Ahmed Fraije.

The Hamas-led October 7, 2023, attacks represented an extraordinary failure of Israel’s security establishment. Yet Netanyahu retains a substantial electoral constituency. How do you explain his political resilience despite this failure? Has the resulting insecurity strengthened populist leadership identification rather than weakened it?

Professor Gideon Rahat: It plays into the hands of populism because, according to this narrative, Netanyahu is not to blame. Instead, the blame falls on the deep state—the military leadership, the intelligence services, and all these supposedly horrible forces. Netanyahu, meanwhile, presents himself as the representative of the genuine people, someone who is not to blame.

This is precisely how populism works. It allows leaders to escape blame for failures for which they bear responsibility. Even if we imagine that Netanyahu is not personally to blame, he is still the prime minister and therefore bears responsibility. Yet populism enables leaders to claim credit for what they regard as successes while shifting the blame for their failures onto others.

October 7 Trauma Reinforces Israel’s Zero-Sum View of Palestine

Israel’s military campaign in Gaza, involving mass Palestinian civilian casualties, extensive destruction, and accusations of war crimes and genocide, has profoundly damaged its international standing. To what extent have these developments altered Israeli electoral preferences, or has a broad national-security consensus insulated domestic politics from international criticism?

Professor Gideon Rahat: Unfortunately, most Israelis do not see it this way. They regard Israel’s military campaign as a logical consequence of what happened on October 7. They believe that the Palestinians attacked first, that the attacks were particularly cruel, and that Israel’s response was retaliation. This is how they understand the situation. They also do not perceive international criticism in the same way as much of the rest of the world does.

Some international criticism makes more sense than others. For example, when Israelis see demonstrations calling for a Palestinian state “from the river to the sea,” they interpret this as a demand for Israel to disappear. This reinforces the perception of the conflict as a zero-sum game, leaving little room for empathy or sympathy toward the other side.

Even the two-state solution, despite some support for it within Israel, is perceived by many Israelis as a threat to their survival. Israel is still experiencing profound trauma from October 7. For Israelis, this was the most horrific event to happen to Jews since the Second World War.

When you look at the situation from the outside, you might say that around a thousand Israelis were killed, compared with 60,000 or 70,000 Palestinians. Comparing these numbers, you may naturally feel greater sympathy for the Palestinians. But that is not how Israelis see it. Their argument is that there could have been 60,000 Israeli casualties as well if Israel had not responded.

This illustrates the fundamental problem with viewing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a zero-sum game, in which it is either us or them. If anyone wants to begin addressing the conflict, they must give Israelis the feeling that they can have security even if a Palestinian state is established. Without that sense of security, any solution is a nonstarter.

You also have to remember that this is not the first time Israelis have experienced such fears. There was the second Palestinian uprising in 2001. The Oslo Accords had created an opportunity for the Palestinians to begin building their state, but instead, thousands of Israelis were killed in suicide bombings. Then came the Hamas attack. So, Israelis are afraid, and they believe they have reasons to be afraid. Hamas itself presents the conflict as a zero-sum game.

That is how many Israelis perceive the situation. When you look at the conflict from the outside and argue that these two peoples must come together, you have to understand that both sides have their grievances. Bringing them together is extremely difficult. If you want even to begin that process, you have to think about how to change the perception that this is a zero-sum game.

A Post-Netanyahu Government Could Restore Palestinian Property Protections

The Gaza war and intensified settlement expansion in the West Bank have brought competing visions of sovereignty, annexation, and Palestinian statehood into sharper focus. Has the radical right succeeded in shifting the boundaries of legitimate political debate so far that even a post-Netanyahu government would struggle to reverse these trajectories?

Professor Gideon Rahat: For many years, Israel benefited from two factors. First, the Palestinians themselves were divided between Hamas and the PLO, making negotiations extremely difficult. Even if Israel reached an agreement with the PLO, what would that achieve if Hamas refused to respect it? This division worked to Israel’s advantage.

Second, the Israeli Supreme Court did not allow settlers to take privately owned land, only land that was not privately owned. This provided Israel with some protection against international criticism because the Supreme Court was widely respected. However, once the current government began attacking the Supreme Court and disregarding the principle of private property, Israel became much more exposed to international criticism.

Any government other than the current one would probably return to the previous policy. I don’t think there would necessarily be negotiations over Palestinian statehood, but I believe such a government would respect the previous status quo, under which the private property of Palestinians was not to be touched.

Delegitimizing Arab Parties Undermines Israeli Democracy

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Palestinian Arab citizens constitute roughly one-fifth of Israel’s population, yet their parties face persistent political exclusion. Following the recent controversy over attempts to disqualify Arab-majority electoral lists, does the 2026 election expose a fundamental contradiction between Israel’s Jewish-national identity and its commitment to equal democratic citizenship?

Professor Gideon Rahat: When you look at this issue, you have to remember that the so-called Arab parties are also, in a sense, non-Zionist parties. They do not support the idea that Israel is the state of the Jewish people. However, these parties are not exclusively Arab. Although most of their voters are Arabs, the Communist Party is a Jewish-Arab party. Another party also has a Jewish representative, and there are Arab representatives in Zionist parties as well. So, the situation is not entirely clear-cut.

Nevertheless, you are absolutely right that there is a delegitimization of Arab parties. They are not regarded as legitimate coalition partners, and from my perspective, this is a problem.

Let’s imagine that some of these parties hold positions that are considered illegitimate. That may be the case. But if that is the problem, other parties should make their conditions explicit. They could say, for example, “If Party X from the so-called Arab or non-Zionist camp agrees to certain conditions—one, two, and three—we can cooperate with them.” This would put suspicions of racism aside and make the question one of political opinions and policies. From my point of view, this is what should be done.

On the other hand, you have to understand why some people are suspicious of particular parties. For example, one party has connections to the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood is a huge movement, encompassing both more moderate elements and others that are openly terrorist. Such connections make some people worry that this party’s ultimate aspiration is a Muslim caliphate rather than the State of Israel.

Then there is the Arab nationalist party, which talks about a state from the river to the sea without any special status for Jews. You have to remember that the State of Israel was established as a safe haven for Jews who had been killed in the Holocaust and persecuted and killed in many other places. The idea was to establish a state for the Jewish people.

So, there is a genuine problem here. Once again, if both sides could show empathy and understand each other’s grievances and the sources of their mutual distrust, there might be opportunities for alliances. My personal view is that such alliances are possible. I don’t see why they should not be.

However, many people carry these feelings and grievances, and after October 7 and everything that has happened since, building a coalition with these parties has become extremely difficult. It is important to distinguish between these particular parties and Arab political participation more generally. Israel has already had a Muslim Arab minister, as well as a Druze minister. Of course, the Druze community is more closely aligned with the state, so the situation is more complex than it might initially appear.

Nevertheless, you are absolutely right that this is a problem. One of the best things that could happen to the State of Israel would be some form of coming together and an effort to build these alliances. Such cooperation would not necessarily have to begin with Arab parties formally joining a coalition. They could remain outside the government and, for example, support a minority government by refraining from voting to bring it down. There are possibilities for cooperation. However, this remains the deepest rift, the most fundamental cleavage in Israeli society: the divide between Jews and Arabs, most of whom are Muslims.

Opposition Fragmentation and Weak Political Parties

Recent polling places Gadi Eisenkot’s Yashar party in close competition with Likud, while Naftali Bennett and other opposition figures compete for the anti-Netanyahu electorate. Does this fragmentation reflect healthy democratic pluralism, or does the opposition’s dependence on competing political personalities reproduce the very personalization you identify within Likud?

Professor Gideon Rahat: I must say that Likud at least has an established party organization. In the other parties, there is hardly any organizational structure. You could argue that most opposition parties, with the exception of the Democrats, the left-wing Zionist party, are almost entirely personalized parties that would probably not survive beyond their current leaders.

This is a huge problem because, even if we imagine that these leaders would behave differently from Netanyahu, there would still be no party organization capable of serving as a check and balance. Something important is missing in Israeli politics. Political parties and their organizations can play a crucial role in opposing populist forces.

You can see this in Turkey, for example, where opposition parties continue to exist as established organizations even when their leaders change. These parties remain important. In other countries with populist regimes, political parties also play a significant role. In Israel, however, this organizational dimension has become very weak.

We need to reconstruct political parties. Israel used to be what scholars call a “party state.” In the past, 25 percent of the Israeli population belonged to political parties. But these parties have largely collapsed.

Nobody particularly likes political parties, perhaps because they divide society, represent particular interests, and are associated with internal political struggles. Yet if you look at the empirical evidence from around the world, the stronger political parties are—and I mean parties in the plural—the greater the degree of party organization, or “partiness,” and the stronger democracy tends to be.

It is very important to remember the connection between political parties and democracy. You are absolutely right that we need to reconstruct them to sustain democracy in the long run, even if Netanyahu were to allow democracy to flourish.

The Far Right Would Sacrifice Israeli Children for Greater Israel

Campaign signs for the Israeli government “Shas” party head by Arye Deri, depicting Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, prior to the April 2019 elections in Safed, Israel on March 10, 2019. Photo: David Cohen.

Although leading opposition figures promise to restore institutional accountability and reverse some ultranationalist policies, many remain committed to restrictive positions on Palestinian statehood. Would an opposition victory represent genuine democratic renewal, or primarily a change in leadership within an enduring ethnonational and security-oriented political consensus?

Professor Gideon Rahat: I think there would be democratic renewal. Even if the new government included clearly right-wing forces, such as Bennett, Lieberman, and others, it would still be possible to engage in dialogue with them. There would no longer be an automatic veto by the extreme right.

You have to understand that the extreme right’s veto power over Netanyahu’s government extended beyond the Palestinian issue. It even affected negotiations over the Israeli hostages in Gaza. These parties would not allow Netanyahu to reach a deal to bring Israeli citizens home from Gaza. That is before considering all the other issues. They are extremely nationalistic and are prepared to sacrifice not only others but also their own children and their own people for the sake of Greater Israel. That is their vision.

If these forces were no longer part of the government, some progress would be possible. Would the next government establish a Palestinian state? Forget about it. But there would still be opportunities to move forward. Dialogue could resume, and efforts could begin to explore whether the Palestinian Authority, together with whoever governs Gaza, could start building something that might eventually become a state. Perhaps it would not ultimately become a state, but at least the lives of Palestinians could improve to some extent.

Israel’s Fragmented Party System Makes Coalition Outcomes Unpredictable

Recent polls offer conflicting projections, with some indicating a substantial anti-Netanyahu advantage while others suggest a closely balanced parliamentary landscape. Given the 61-seat coalition threshold, the electoral weight of religious parties, and the potential role of Arab parties, which coalition scenarios do you consider most plausible after October 27?

Professor Gideon Rahat: If neither side secures a majority of 61 seats after the elections, everything remains open. Several scenarios are being discussed. One possibility currently under consideration is for the opposition, together with the Arab non-Zionist parties, to first replace the Knesset speaker and then pass legislation that would prevent Netanyahu from returning to power. This could potentially be followed by another election.

There are many possible scenarios, and you can never be certain what will happen after an election. We might even find ourselves with a unity government involving Netanyahu and Eisenkot. You simply cannot know because this is coalition politics. No single party commands a majority, and Israel does not have large parties. According to opinion polls, the largest party is projected to win just 24 of the 120 seats, or 20 percent. That means a coalition must be built.

When you build a coalition, everyone applies pressure, everyone plays chicken with everyone else, and everyone negotiates. The final outcome is impossible to know in advance. It is like cooking: you bring together many different ingredients, and you cannot be sure what the final result will be. So, if you expect the elections to produce a clear answer, I would be surprised.

Netanyahu’s Departure Could Restore Consensus-Based Democracy

And lastly, Professor Rahat, looking beyond October 27, what would constitute the more consequential outcome for Israeli democracy: Netanyahu’s defeat, the exclusion of the religious-nationalist far right from government, or a deeper institutional transformation that restores pluralism and accountability? Are we witnessing the possible end of Netanyahuism, or the consolidation of a political order that may outlast its founder?

Professor Gideon Rahat: If Netanyahu is ousted, there is a good chance for change because there is no single person who could become the next Netanyahu. Netanyahu did not allow anyone around him to grow politically. If he saw someone who might challenge him in any way, that person was pushed out.

As a result, I don’t think there is anyone who could take over the political infrastructure Netanyahu has built and use it in the same way. So, there is a good chance that once he is removed from power, political power will be dispersed and redistributed among different forces. These forces might even have an interest in dispersing power because none of them would want another leader to become the next Netanyahu.

Only someone who imagines himself as Netanyahu’s successor might want to preserve this centralized power structure. But most political leaders understand that they are unlikely to become the next Netanyahu, so it would be better for them to distribute power more broadly.

Hopefully, this would allow Israel to return to a more consensus-based form of democracy. I also hope that the next government will undertake institutional reforms to establish and consolidate this broader distribution of political power.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

MEP Hanna Gedin.

MEP Gedin: The EU Is Losing Its Voice When It Comes to Upholding International Law

MEP Hanna Gedin argues that the EU’s credibility as a defender of democracy, human rights, and international law is being weakened by political double standards and the growing normalization of radical-right ideas. In this ECPS interview, she warns that “the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law” and points to inconsistencies in migration policy and relations with Israel and Turkey. Gedin also urges the European left not to adapt to the far right, but to build its own agenda around inequality, housing, energy, and the cost of living. “You need to have your own agenda,” she says, and to “make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Hanna Gedin, Member of the European Parliament for Sweden’s Vänsterpartiet (Left Party, V) and Vice-Chair of The Left Group, reflects on Sweden’s post-election political deadlock, the normalization of radical-right ideas in European policymaking, the erosion of international law, and the strategic dilemmas facing the democratic left. Gedin, who works on the internal market, industry, energy, women’s rights, and gender equality, situates these questions within a broader critique of inequality, restrictive migration policy, and the weakening of Europe’s normative credibility. 

The interview begins with the struggle to translate Sweden’s new parliamentary majority into a viable center-left government. Gedin rejects the idea that Vänsterpartiet should once again support a government from outside, insisting that “if our votes are needed, if our mandates are needed, of course we should be in the government.” She argues that the Center Party (C) “needs to choose,” because “there is no middle way.” At the same time, she acknowledges the deep economic divide between the two parties but maintains that cooperation remains possible on issues ranging from feminism and climate to international law and support for communities outside major cities.

A central theme of Gedin’s remarks is the extent to which the radical right has reshaped mainstream political agendas. She argues that Swedish parties have been “adapting and moving closer to the Sweden Democrats,” while politics has increasingly shifted away from “bread and butter” concerns toward culture-war issues. For Gedin, the answer is not imitation but political differentiation: “For the left, it’s really important not to adapt.” Instead, she insists, “You need to have your own agenda,” centered on the cost of living, inequality, housing, and material security.

This concern extends to migration policy at both Swedish and European levels. Gedin describes a “shift and an adaptation to the radical right” in EU migration politics and recalls far right and right-wing MEPs cheering “Send them back, send them back” during a vote on return hubs. Yet she also points to Sweden’s debate over teenage deportations as evidence that public attitudes can shift when abstract migration categories acquire “names and faces.”   

The interview’s sharpest normative critique concerns international law. Gedin argues that “the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law” and warns of “a complete erosion of international law” driven by double standards. She contrasts the EU’s firm response to Russia’s war against Ukraine with what she sees as a much weaker approach toward Israel, arguing that such inconsistency undermines European credibility globally.    

Ultimately, Gedin presents a distinctly materialist response to the rise of the far right. She argues that the left must make politics concrete: reduce inequality, address rents and energy costs, tax the very rich, and “make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.”

MEP Hanna Gedin. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Here is our interview with MEP Hanna Gedin, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Center Party Needs to Choose

Ms. Gedin, welcome. Let me begin with the tension between Vänsterpartiet (Left Party) and the Center Party and the prospects for forming a new red-green government. Sweden’s 2026 election produced a parliamentary majority for S, V, C, and MP, but that majority has so far proved difficult to turn into a government. Vänsterpartiet (V) insists that it must be part of the next government, while the Center Party (C) still refuses to accept V in government. Magdalena Andersson has now received a second opportunity to form an administration, and the four parties have at least begun talking together. Where, concretely, do you see a way out of this deadlock?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I’m not stressed or concerned because we have had this situation before, during the 2018 election, and it took a couple of months before we had a government. My party’s position is quite normal. If they want our votes, if they want our support for the government, of course we should, like every other party, be in the government. That’s a very normal position.

The Center Party has not really done its homework because they have said absolutely no to the Sweden Democrats, while at the same time they say absolutely no to us, and then there is no majority. So, they need to choose. There is no possibility in the middle, as they seem to think.

They have also been very clear and vocal in saying that Magdalena Andersson is their prime minister candidate, just as we have been. Then they need to show that and to choose. There is no middle way, and in the end, we will see this government forming.

V Wants a Stable Center-Left Government

The Center Party says it can support Magdalena Andersson as prime minister but draws a red line against Vänsterpartiet entering government. Why should the Left accept supporting a government from outside after an election in which its votes are indispensable to the new majority? And is there any compromise—cabinet participation, a formal cooperation agreement, budget influence—that V could realistically accept?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I’m not part of the negotiating team; I must start by saying that. But our demand is clear. We have been clear for many years now: if our votes are needed, if our mandates (seats) are needed, of course we should be in the government. We can’t support the government from the outside.

We have seen what that did before, in the 2018 election, when we were supposed to support the government from the outside. It became a very weak government. They did not have a majority for their budgets, and in the end, when they proposed a marketisation of the rent system in Sweden, we actually had to vote the government down. We don’t want that situation. We want a stable center-left government. This is our position.

The Ideological Divide Between V and C

Behind the dispute over cabinet seats lies a much deeper ideological conflict. The Center Party remains economically liberal, while Vänsterpartiet wants stronger welfare provision, greater redistribution, public investment, and tighter constraints on market power. If a red-green government is eventually formed, which of these substantive economic disagreements could become more difficult than the present argument over who gets to sit in government?

MEP Hanna Gedin: It is true that the Center Party and the Left Party have quite opposite economic politics. I would even say that the Center Party is quite extreme when it comes to economic politics. However, I have understood for several years now that they might be needed in the government, and we might sometimes have to undertake some very hard negotiations and find some kind of solution on these issues.

We do believe it’s possible, and we also think that we have a lot of issues that unite us—for example, when it comes to support for communities outside the big cities, feminism, international law, and climate. So, we do think that there are a lot of issues that we have in common.

The SD Is Now Seen as an Establishment Party

Sweden Democrats’ Square Meeting in Umeå. Jimmie Åkesson speaks to the people on the city square where opposition left-wingers have formed a chain and protest in Umeå, Sweden on August 14, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Vänsterpartiet entered the election promising to help remove a government whose policies were heavily dependent on the Sweden Democrats. If the parties that won the parliamentary majority cannot agree on a government, is there a danger that the post-election dispute itself strengthens SD’s argument that the established parties are incapable of governing—and gives the radical right another opening?

MEP Hanna Gedin: What we saw in the Swedish election was that the Sweden Democrats, for the first time since they entered the National Assembly, actually decreased. They had quite a bad election, and this is, in a way, due to the fact that they are now seen as an establishment party. Even though they have not been part of the Tidö government, they have been the biggest party supporting this government.

When it comes to economic issues, they have shown that they are a right-wing party. They support the economic politics of the right-wing parties. So, I don’t think they have a case for saying that they are anything other than an established party nowadays.

I also think that the election results, where our party, the Swedish Left Party, had a very good election and where we can see that the left side actually got stronger, show that people want something else than the politics we have seen from the Tidö government. And I do think that we will be able to form a government.

Mainstream Parties Moving Toward the Sweden Democrats

You argued earlier that the Sweden Democrats, even without formally entering government, exercised enormous influence over migration, crime, and ethnicity, and that ideas once considered politically unthinkable had moved into government policy. After four years of Tidö government, how deeply has SD changed the political center of gravity in Sweden? Is the larger story now less about SD itself than about mainstream parties adopting parts of its agenda?

MEP Hanna Gedin: We have seen in Sweden a lot of parties adapting and moving closer to the Sweden Democrats, and that is something we see in many countries. It’s extremely dangerous. It’s dangerous when politics focuses on things that are not bread and butter. It’s not about the cost of living or what people really feel in everyday life, but about culture-war issues, and what that has done to society in Sweden is very dangerous.

During the Tidö government, the government put forward, and we adopted, snitch laws, so you should snitch on your neighbors or coworkers if they come from a different country. This is quite extreme. We have seen it even when it comes to criminal issues and so on—this kind of obsession that if you are from another country, you should go away, you should go out of Sweden. It’s also linked to the notion of criminality being colored, in a way. It has been quite an extreme development in Sweden.

What the election showed is that people do not want this kind of policy. During the election campaign, we talked about bread and butter. We talked about people’s cost of living. We talked about the skyrocketing rise in rent, for example. We did canvass. We knocked on almost half a million doors, and when we met people, they were not talking about snitch laws or the need to be tougher on criminals. They were talking about things that affected them in their ordinary lives.

A lot of people also said that. I met a woman who said, “You know, I have stomachache. They don’t want me here. They want to throw me out. What this government has done to me and my neighbors is horrible, and I can’t vote for them. I will vote for you.”

So, in a way, it has affected us. But I do think that what we have seen during these four years—this obsession with people of a different color of skin, or criminals, and so on—is not what people want. I really feel a bit like it’s easier to breathe now. It’s like opening a window, and I think a lot of people in Sweden agree with me.

And I think that’s also very important: the first thing these four parties did, even before forming a government, was to stop the deportation of young people that was planned under the Tidö government. We stopped it.

How the Left Should Confront the Far Right

You have described the far right as particularly effective at finding scapegoats, offering simple answers to complex problems, and forcing its issues to the center of public debate. Across Europe, far-right, radical-right, and populist radical-right parties are increasingly shaping policy even where they are not governing. Why has the democratic left struggled to set the agenda with the same effectiveness—and what has it failed to understand about voters attracted to these parties?

MEP Hanna Gedin: In politics, it’s easier to make people vote for something they are afraid of than for something they hope for. If we have been living for several years with this repressive politics and the right-wing agenda, people also forget what solidarity is and what equality is, and you need to be reminded of it sometimes.

But for the left, it’s really important not to adapt, not to only talk about the Sweden Democrats or the right, the extremist parties, and not to adapt to them. What the Social Democrats did in Sweden, mainly during the election campaign—talking about the Sweden Democrats—did not work. You need to have your own agenda, and you need to put forward reforms about the cost of living, for example. That was what we did, and we were rewarded by the election results in Sweden.

Gender, Migration, and the Far Right

Celebrating Sweden’s National Day in Norrköping, Sweden, on June 6, 2014. Immigrants and native Swedes participate together in National Day celebrations. Sweden’s National Day is an official public holiday. Photo: Dreamstime.

The far right increasingly presents itself not only as anti-immigration but as the defender of a particular European cultural order, often combining nationalism with opposition to abortion rights, LGBTQ rights, and gender equality. As an MEP working on women’s rights and gender equality, do you see these struggles as separate policy battles, or as parts of a broader political project to redefine who belongs and whose rights are considered legitimate?

MEP Hanna Gedin: We see these attacks every day in the European Parliament, and you can see them in a lot of countries as well. The struggles are connected, and you can’t just take one struggle; you need to see the fight as a common fight.

In this Parliament, we see attacks from the right-wing parties on trans people and on migrants, for example. We don’t yet see the same number of attacks on abortion rights, but I’m sure it will come if they are successful.

Stopping Teenage Deportations Is a Very Important Step

You recently raised the issue of what you called Sweden’s “teenage deportations”—young people who have grown up in Sweden but face removal when they turn 18. Sweden has moved toward some of Europe’s most restrictive migration policies. If a new Social Democratic-led government takes office, what specific changes would V demand on asylum, deportation, and family reunification, and which policies introduced during the Tidö period should be reversed first?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I’m not a parliamentarian in Sweden, I work mainly with EU policies. But I think it’s very interesting that, in 2015, something changed in Sweden. It was when there was a big migration to Sweden, and we started having these repressive laws.

During the last government, the Tidö government, something changed last year when we first had a mayor in the city of Jokkmokk (a small municipality and town in Norrbotten County, northern Sweden, in Swedish Lapland / S.G.) saying, “I don’t want you to deport my people living in my city,” and a lot of mayors started saying the same: “We don’t accept this kind of very repressive policy.”

Then we had the teenage deportations. As you said, we saw many deportations of teenagers who spoke perfectly good Swedish, who had grown up in Sweden, and who were deported from their families. And the debate started shifting. Instead of saying, “Yes, people should go out, we should send them out, we should have more oppressive laws,” people were saying, “These are my neighbors, these are my coworkers, these are my friends.” They had names and faces, and the debate changed and shifted.

The first thing the four parties—the Swedish Left Party, the Centre Party, the Social Democrats, and the Green Party in Sweden—have been doing, even though we have not yet formed the government, is to stop these deportations. I think this is a very important step.

EU Migration Policy and the Radical Right

EU Commission.
Berlaymont Building, headquarters of the European Commission, Brussels, Belgium. Constructed between 1963 and 1969, the building has become the iconic symbol of the European Commission, the executive branch of the European Union. Photo: Wiktor Wojtas / Dreamstime.

At EU level, the Migration and Asylum Pact entered into application in June, while the new Return Regulation creates faster return procedures and opens the possibility of “return hubs” outside the Union. Governments are now discussing even tougher measures. Are we witnessing the normalization at EU level of ideas that only a few years ago were associated primarily with the radical right? And where should the legal and moral limits of European migration policy be drawn?

MEP Hanna Gedin: Yes, we are witnessing a shift and an adaptation to the radical right when it comes to migration, even at the EU level. I was present in the chamber when the return hubs were voted on, and what happened was that the radical right stood up and cheered together with the right-wing parties when they voted this through. They cheered and screamed, “Send them back, send them back.” This would not have been possible a couple of years ago.

This is a situation that we’re actually seeing, and that is why it’s quite hopeful to see what happened in Sweden and how the debate shifted with the teenagers who were deported. I do hope that we will see the same shift in Europe as well.

I also think you need to see the positive things happening in Europe when it comes to the Swedish election, but also the election in Berlin, where you had a very big left-wing party; the election in Copenhagen, a city close to where I live, where the biggest party was the Left Party; and Mamdani in New York. You do have these positive things happening as well.

You have also criticized the prolonged border controls between Sweden and Denmark and warned about allegations of racial profiling. Governments increasingly justify exceptional border measures through migration, crime, or national-security arguments. At what point does a supposedly temporary security measure become a permanent restriction on free movement and equal treatment within the EU?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I live in Malmö, a city close to Denmark. I take the train between Denmark and Sweden almost every week, and there is still this border control that was put in place in 2015. I would say that this is a permanent restriction. It is not allowed according to EU law, and it still goes on and on and on. So, yes, this is a permanent restriction, and that should not be allowed.

The EU Should Show Some Backbone

The EU has traditionally presented itself internationally as a normative power built around democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Yet critics increasingly point to restrictive migration policies, cooperation with authoritarian governments to stop migration, and inconsistency in the application of international law. Is the EU losing credibility as a normative role model—and how much of that erosion reflects the growing influence of the populist and radical right on mainstream European policy?

MEP Hanna Gedin: Absolutely, the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law. It’s very important to see that there have always been double standards, in a way, when it comes to the EU, because a lot of countries are still colonial powers.

But now, when you can see the very correct way of handling Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine—adopting sanction packages and being tough on Russia—that is good. Why do we see this double standard when it comes to Israel? I’m absolutely sure that people see this all around the world, and countries not being part of the EU are then saying, “If the EU does this, why should we adhere to international law?”

We see a complete erosion of international law now, and with the sanctions from the US against the International Criminal Court (ICC), I think the EU should immediately activate the Blocking Statute, show some backbone, and not be as cowardly as we have seen.

One Must Be Critical Toward NATO While Not Being Naive

NATO
NATO headquarters and monument in Brussels, Belgium, the political and administrative center of the North Atlantic Alliance. Photo: Dreamstime.

On Ukraine, you have been unequivocal that Russia’s invasion must be resisted, that Ukraine deserves continued support, and that Europe should stop financing Russia through energy purchases. At the same time, Vänsterpartiet historically opposed Swedish NATO membership. How does the European left build a security policy that is credible against Russian aggression without accepting an open-ended militarization of Europe or abandoning its traditional critique of NATO?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I think one must be able to be critical toward NATO while, at the same time, not being naive. Of course, we live in a very dangerous world, and we need cooperation between countries when it comes to defending ourselves.

My party is not against the augmentation that we have seen in Sweden when it comes to military spending. This should not be taken from schools or hospitals and so on, but we want to impose a wealth tax instead. We also want cooperation between countries, the Nordic countries, and parts of the EU.

I don’t think it’s a smart way to militarize the EU as a side project to NATO and then increase military spending there as well. So, one must be able not to be naive while still being able to criticize the notion of building defense on nuclear bombs and so on. You must be able to do both.

Gaza, Israel, and International Law

You have been one of the European Parliament’s most outspoken critics of Israel’s conduct in Gaza and have called for suspension of the EU–Israel trade relationship, sanctions, and support for international accountability. You and Jonas Sjöstedt were also denied entry by Israel in August. What did that episode tell you about Europe’s leverage over Israel—and why, in your view, has the EU struggled to translate its language of international law into a common policy toward Gaza and the West Bank?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I think that the Swedish government and the EU have been too weak when it comes to Israel. As I said earlier, you need to uphold international law wherever you see crimes against humanity, whether it comes to what happens in Ukraine or what happens in Gaza.

What we see in Gaza is actually a genocide, and you can’t just wait for the ICC or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to say, “This is a genocide.” You have a responsibility, as countries and as politicians, to prevent genocide, and this has not been done at the EU level.

I find it quite appalling that the EU keeps trading with Israel as if nothing has happened and that there are no consequences when you breach international law. Benjamin Netanyahu has an arrest warrant against him. This should, of course, be reflected in EU relations toward Israel.

Economic Cooperation with Turkey Makes the EU Quite Weak on Human Rights

Women and LGBTQ+ activists in İzmir, Turkey, rally for the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, highlighting femicide and the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. Photo: Idil Toffolo.

Your parliamentary work has also addressed repression in Iran, women and girls under Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and the imprisonment of journalists and opposition figures in Turkey. How can the EU demand democratic standards from Iran, Afghanistan, or Turkey while avoiding accusations of selectivity when its economic, migration, or security interests lead it to cooperate with governments accused of serious rights violations?

MEP Hanna Gedin: This is also a problem with double standards. The EU’s economic cooperation with Turkey when it comes to migration, of course, makes the EU quite weak in also pushing for the upholding of human rights in Turkey. So, this is a problem with EU politics that you can see toward many countries—being hijacked when it comes to how to handle these countries.

Focusing on the Cost of Living Is the Only Way

You have repeatedly argued that Europe’s market-liberal framework restricts the public investment needed for the green transition, while rising rents, electricity prices, and living costs have intensified inequality. Radical-right parties have often converted economic insecurity into cultural and anti-migrant grievances. Does the left have to win the material argument—on housing, wages, energy, and welfare—before it can successfully challenge the far right’s politics of identity and resentment?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I think this is the only way, and we saw it in the Swedish election as well. My party, the Swedish Left Party, focused mainly on the cost of living, on issues related to bread and butter, and that is what made us the party that gained the most. That was the biggest success for us. We see it when it comes to EU policies as well. This right-wing environment that we’re living in at the EU level and in many countries, which focuses on cultural issues, makes people poor. You need to be able to focus on the cost of living instead.

In Sweden, during these last years, we have seen an explosion of inequality. We have 46 people in Sweden who own as much as eight million Swedish people, and we have 700,000 poor people in Sweden. The number of poor people has doubled in just a couple of years. This is the reality people are living in, and, of course, for the left, it is about focusing on those real issues—on how to make life nice and good and possible to live, and on reducing inequalities.

Rebuilding a Credible European Left

Finally, the European left faces a strategic dilemma. It wants to confront the radical right without simply reproducing its polarizing style, while also distinguishing itself from centrist parties associated with austerity, market liberalism, and restrictive migration policies. What would a credible European left project look like today—one capable of rebuilding working-class support, defending migrants and minorities, advancing gender equality and climate justice, and at the same time persuading voters who have drifted toward populist and radical-right parties that democratic politics can still materially improve their lives?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I think you need to be very concrete about what you want to change in society. When we talk about taxing the very rich, we get a very good response. For example, we see rising inequalities everywhere, and we need to focus on reducing those inequalities by also focusing on the cost of living, on what people pay in rent, on rising electricity bills, and on the fact that a lot of people are struggling to pay for their food. So, you need to be able to make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

MEP Brando Benifei.

MEP Benifei: An Alliance of Interests Between the Extreme Right and Techno-Oligarchs Threatens Our Democracies

MEP Brando Benifei warns that Europe’s struggle for technological sovereignty is inseparable from the defense of democracy. In this ECPS interview, he argues that the EU must strengthen its technological capacity while preserving its regulatory autonomy against external pressure and concentrated corporate power. Benifei stresses that “regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans” and warns that the extreme right has moved closer to “techno-oligarchs,” forging “a form of alliance and mutual support.” He describes this convergence as “an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.” Beyond regulation, Benifei calls for “a democratic reaction” and a “new social contract” capable of making European societies “more equal and freer.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

In an era in which technological power, geopolitical rivalry, and democratic vulnerability are increasingly intertwined, the European Union faces a double challenge: strengthening its strategic autonomy while defending the institutional and normative foundations of liberal democracy. Few policy areas illustrate this convergence more clearly than artificial intelligence, digital regulation, platform governance, and transatlantic relations. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States and a central parliamentary figure in the development of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, reflects on Europe’s technological dependencies, regulatory sovereignty, Big Tech power, disinformation, and the growing political relationship between digital oligarchies and the popuplist radical right.    

At the center of Benifei’s analysis is the argument that Europe’s struggle for sovereignty cannot be reduced to economic competitiveness or technological capacity alone. It also concerns who has the power to establish the rules governing digital societies. He insists that Europe must develop its own technological capabilities while preserving its regulatory autonomy, arguing that “regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans” and describing this principle as “an absolute red line.” At the same time, he warns that Europe cannot remain merely a regulatory power without developing the technological infrastructure necessary to sustain that role. As he puts it, the EU “can’t remain a regulatory reference if it doesn’t also develop the technological power that is needed today.”    

The interview becomes particularly significant when Benifei turns to the political consequences of concentrated technological power. He argues that the rise of the extreme right is increasingly connected to powerful actors within the technology sector. “The extreme right has been getting closer and closer to these techno-oligarchs,” he says, adding that they have “forged a form of alliance and mutual support.” For Benifei, this convergence now constitutes “an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.”    

His response is not limited to regulation. Benifei calls for what he describes as “a democratic reaction” and “the proposal of a new social contract” capable of making societies “more equal and freer.” In his account, inequality and declining freedoms can provide “fertile ground” for an alliance between the extreme right and techno-oligarchs and for what he characterizes as a “hateful and democracy-demolishing approach.”

Against this backdrop, the conversation explores the broader implications of AI governance, algorithmic amplification, digital enforcement, disinformation, transatlantic pressure, and European sovereignty. Benifei’s remarks ultimately frame the contemporary digital struggle not merely as a debate over innovation or regulation, but as a deeper contest over democratic authority, economic power, and the institutional capacity of Europe to determine its own political and technological future.

MEP Brando Benifei is the Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States and a central parliamentary figure in the development of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Here is our interview with MEP Brando Benifei, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Europe Needs to Have a More United Voice

Brando Benifei, welcome! As Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States, you have repeatedly defended a strong transatlantic relationship, while also arguing that Europe must become more capable of defending its own interests. Following renewed US pressure on trade, technology, defense, and digital regulation, has the transatlantic relationship entered a fundamentally more transactional phase? And what would a genuinely more sovereign—but still cooperative—European approach to the United States looks like?

MEP Brando Benifei: I think it’s important to consider that the relationship between the European Union and the United States is based on strong economic integration that has been developing over decades, but also on security, cultural exchange, and social interconnections. In fact, the economic interchange is the biggest between two areas of the world. The EU and the US have not only trade, but also a direct economic presence of EU companies in the US and US companies in the EU. That goes beyond any other similar comparison we could make between the EU and other parts of the world, or the US and other parts of the world, even compared with neighboring South America.

So, this transatlantic relationship is rooted in values and history, but also in economic interests at the moment. We always need to consider that when we look at what has been happening in these last months, where objectively the European Union has been pushed by the US administration to accept certain conditions, for example on trade, based on pressure and on profiting from the fact that the EU is not very united.

The truth is that the European Union is made up of countries that have been divided on issues such as different economic interests. So, the US was able to profit from these divisions to actually push for a relatively punitive regime for trade, which, in the end, was stabilized and ameliorated. It’s not, in the end, what was initially foreseen by President Trump, and it’s something that is viable today, but it’s the result of these pressures. We have also seen pressures regarding environmental legislation and digital legislation.

My point is very clear: we need this relationship. It’s very important that we work in the transatlantic context for various reasons. I tried to mention a few, but we need to demand respect. We need to have a more united voice. The United States doesn’t speak with the voices of its various individual states; it speaks with the federal voice of the United States, the federal administration. The EU should find its own voice, which today is not there.

This is crucial to having a healthier transatlantic relationship, based on respect and equal footing, which today is being put under pressure and called into question by the attitude of President Trump toward the Europeans.

The So-Called Kill Switch Has Already Been Pressed

You have argued that US restrictions on advanced AI chips amount to a direct challenge to Europe’s economic resilience and technological sovereignty, and that dependence on semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, computing power, and critical raw materials can become geopolitical leverage. Does Europe now need to treat AI infrastructure in much the same way it treats energy or defense—as a strategic capability that cannot safely remain overwhelmingly dependent on external powers?

MEP Brando Benifei: It’s crucial that we build more sovereignty on these topics because we have already seen that the so-called kill switch has already been pressed. In fact, the US has restricted the use of advanced models for cybersecurity objectives to the European Union from one day to another, and this was a clear challenge to our sovereignty and our capabilities because we were depending on systems that revealed themselves to be in the hands of another political actor that could really stop us from using them at any moment.

So, today technological sovereignty is one of the crucial points in how we can build a more autonomous EU, which can guarantee the future of its citizens in terms of security and economic prosperity. But this also means using resources today to develop this capability, which means deciding to devote some expenditure to it.

That’s why I support the idea of having a common plan of investment like the one we had after Covid. That’s also the idea in the Draghi report that has not been picked up by the member states, but that’s a very big mistake because we need that leverage today to invest in accelerating innovation for sovereignty and to guarantee that the EU has its own alternatives.

This doesn’t mean we need autarky or protectionism. It means we need the European Union to always be able to have alternatives when it becomes unviable to continue with the existing technological solutions.

Photo: Bustiuc Dumitru / Dreamstime.

Europe Can’t Remain a Regulatory Reference Without Technological Power

In your 2026 report on AI and EU trade, you argue that Europe must combine competitiveness, openness, and strategic autonomy rather than relying on regulation alone. Yet the EU still trails the United States and China in computing capacity, investment, cloud infrastructure, and AI scale. Can Europe realistically remain a global regulatory power if it does not also become a substantially stronger technological and industrial power?

MEP Brando Benifei: My opinion is that it can’t. It can’t remain a regulatory reference if it doesn’t also develop the technological power that is needed today, and this is a crucial point on which a lot of our efforts should be concentrated. In fact, the European Commission has taken some steps with the proposal of a digital sovereignty package, which was something that we could not imagine before. It’s the result of a new situation, and this package addresses important issues like semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, and open-source models. So, it goes deep into our present dependencies and tries to build an alternative.

But to pursue this agenda, we need political resolve. We need the willingness to actually go down a road that will create some tension with the US, with China, and with other powers. We need to know that. We need to be ready to sustain that through dialogue, obviously keeping a door open for discussion with all our counterparts, but having a clear objective of creating more European autonomy and sovereignty.

This is something that our citizens also want. If you look at the polling and surveys, our citizens are saying, “We want a more sovereign Europe. We do not want to depend on foreign technology.” It’s important that our governments listen to our citizens, who are saying this very clearly.

Regulatory Sovereignty as a Red Line

You have criticized US tariff pressure as potentially targeting not only European economic interests but also the regulatory and social model itself. Where should the EU draw the line between legitimate transatlantic negotiation and external pressure to dilute European rules on digital markets, food safety, environmental protection, data, or fundamental rights? Can regulatory sovereignty become one of the defining fault lines in future EU-US relations?

MEP Brando Benifei: Maintaining the principle that regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans is an absolute red line. We cannot negotiate on legislation that is based on democratic processes. This is something that the US must understand, and I have to say that they have understood it at this moment. They knew that this attempt—to actually convince us to change legislation based only on their pressure—would be difficult for them.

We need to look realistically at the content of these pressures because, in some cases, they reflect existing dynamics in the European political scenario. I give you an example: the pressures to change some of the EU’s environmental legislation were, in fact, already sustained by legitimate political decisions inside the EU by political actors. So, this is a topic where we have seen some things changing in a way that the US liked, but it was, in fact, based on a political positioning inside the EU that was not related to US pressure.

On other topics, like digital legislation, however, there are clearly greater differences between what the US is asking of the EU and what the EU is ready to do based on its regulatory autonomy. This must be understood, this must be accepted, and we need to keep this as a clear red line because we cannot negotiate on our regulatory autonomy.

The Brussels Effect, at Least at the Company Level, Is Already Happening

European Parliament offices and European flags in Brussels, Belgium on July 20, 2020. Photo: Lena Wurm.

You were one of the central parliamentary architects of the AI Act, and you continue to argue that Europe should promote a human-centric, risk-based model internationally. After several years of implementation debates, do you still believe that the so-called “Brussels effect” can shape global AI governance, or are divergent US, Chinese, and other models making regulatory convergence increasingly unrealistic?

MEP Brando Benifei: Clearly, regulatory divergence is an obstacle to this kind of convergence through the so-called Brussels effect. But let’s look at the data. We have researchers from important European foundations who have conducted scientifically sound surveys with American companies, showing that the AI Act has been taken as a reference point for voluntary compliance schemes, including by companies operating only inside the US.

So, the Brussels effect, at least at the company level, is already happening. That’s one of the dimensions of the Brussels effect, because it’s not only governments taking the same stances, but also companies voluntarily adopting ways of acting that reflect legislation that is not present in their internal jurisdiction but is, in fact, taken from the EU.

The decision could be linked to various reasons: operating in a global market or wanting to have easy-to-apply schemes that can be replicated globally. In fact, this is happening with US companies developing and deploying AI. The data are clear, and this shows that our approach has not been very bureaucratic or extremely complex, but rather quite company friendly.

I want to underline that a significant role for self-assessment has been built into the regulatory framework of the AI Act. Companies are entrusted with responsibility, but they are not asked to undergo a lot of third-party assessments, which is instead the case for other product-safety legislation, because we wanted to maintain some flexibility in this AI legislation, considering the quickly changing technological scenario.

So, I see some Brussels effect happening. Obviously, we are also looking more specifically—this is a slower process—at the adoption of similar legislation in other parts of the world. This is also happening. There are many parts of the world that, in recent months, have adopted legislation on AI content transparency, copyright protection, and countering AI abuse for mass surveillance that has been taken quite directly from the EU AI Act.

The AI Act and European Competitiveness

You have warned against presenting deregulation as the principal route to European competitiveness, arguing instead for investment, industrial policy, stronger European AI institutions, and better support for start-ups and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). How do you respond to the growing political argument that the AI Act and other digital regulations have become a competitive burden that Europe can no longer afford?

MEP Brando Benifei: In my opinion, we should listen to those who develop AI in Europe, because otherwise we are talking in a very abstract way. Those who develop AI in Europe tell us what their problems are and why they are not growing enough. One issue is access to capital, so we need an integrated capital market where more risk capital is flowing. They also face a lack of access to computational infrastructure. We are dealing with that through AI factories and AI gigafactories, but we need to accelerate.

They also say they have an issue with regulatory complexity, but this relates mainly to data legislation—the use of data—which is not linked to the AI Act. In general, they recognize that the AI Act protects them from abuses by bigger companies, often non-European ones, that do not want to share information and want to avoid transparency.

In fact, the AI Act is generally supported by those companies. When they look at the regulatory burden, they are more concerned about the overall amount of legislation, and more specifically about data, where they want further reform. This is what we are also working on at the EU level at the moment: simplifying data legislation.

They also want clearer, more harmonized enforcement. The problem today with the EU is very fragmented enforcement, where we still have rules that are too dependent on national implementation. This is something that I see as one of the crucial priorities.

And I don’t understand how we can sustain the argument that the problem would be the AI Act, considering that the AI Act applies to all companies that operate in Europe and sell products in Europe. This means that it is overwhelmingly more applicable to non-European companies, which make up the majority of those operating in the EU today on AI matters.

Open-Source AI and Digital Sovereignty

Image: Wrightstudio / Dreamstime.

You have described open-source AI as a “structural response” to the concentration of compute, cloud, and data in a handful of firms. Could open-source AI become a genuine pillar of European digital sovereignty, or is Europe still too dependent on non-European hardware, cloud providers, foundation models, and capital for open-source ecosystems alone to materially change the balance of power?

MEP Brando Benifei: We are still too dependent on these closed systems, and in fact, we need to build a better balance with open-source and open-weights models. This is something that is now a focus, and the EU’s open-source strategy will also deal with that. We are working on this, starting from the European Commission’s sovereignty package, and the EU is now concentrating more on it.

We are building some alternatives. We are working on this in terms of adoption, but also in terms of development in Europe, and that’s a way we need to pursue to rebalance the situation.

This is also something where we need to build more consciousness, more awareness, and more training on how to deal with this among our operators, our public administrations, and our entrepreneurs, because this is a way to rebalance power and to avoid the concentration of resources and power that we see today. That is an objective risk in how our AI is being developed today.

The Rules Need to Be Applied More Forcefully

Your interventions repeatedly emphasize that rules in the digital sphere will exist one way or another—the question is whether they are created democratically or effectively dictated by large technology companies. Have major digital platforms and monopolistic Big Tech actors acquired a form of quasi-constitutional power over speech, information visibility, political mobilization, and even democratic participation? If so, is existing EU law sufficient to constrain this concentration of private power?

MEP Brando Benifei: Many of the laws of the European Union are already capable of constraining this, but they need to be applied more forcefully. The point is the political will to apply the rules in a way that is not constrained by other political considerations, such as avoiding retaliation or political problems.

This means that we need more independence in how the rules are applied, and this is something we are discussing in the European Parliament. There is a discussion about building a digital enforcement agency that could bring more independent enforcement of the rules and depoliticize their application.

Today, this means overcoming the restraint on applying the rules in the right way and in the strong way needed to actually pursue this objective: having the rules really applied, not only conceived abstractly, but applied by democratic powers, and not decided among themselves by the strongest private actors, mostly non-European.

We Should Tackle Both Disinformation and the Algorithmic Structure

In discussing the European Democracy Shield, you argued that “democracy does not fall in one day” but can be dismantled “one post at a time,” and you stressed that the problem is not only foreign interference but also the platform business model itself, in which algorithms reward anger and polarization. Should Europe therefore stop treating disinformation primarily as a problem of false content and focus more directly on the underlying algorithmic architecture that systematically amplifies polarizing material?

MEP Brando Benifei: I think we should look at both sides because disinformation content can be extremely harmful even if we do not have addictive-design algorithms. So, we need to look at the content, but also, obviously, at the risks of the addictive construction of algorithms, which is being targeted by new legislation: the Kids Act for minors, but also the Digital Fairness Act for adults at large.

The way we are leading on this is extremely important, and this is something where we need this new legislation to be in place and integrated with the existing norms that focus more on disinformation content rather than on the algorithmic structure. The algorithmic structure also needs to be tackled with clear action, like these new proposals that are on the table. 

One of them is already there, the Kids Act. The Digital Fairness Act, which is getting through very soon, will deal with these issues and should be an important piece in completing our digital regulation architecture.

Democratic Reaction Needed Against the Alliance Between the Extreme Right and Techno-Oligarchs

Anti-Trump protesters.
Anti-Trump protesters gather across from Trump Tower on Fifth Avenue during the annual Labor Day Parade in Midtown Manhattan, New York City, on September 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have explicitly warned that platform ownership and algorithmic amplification can assist far-right actors, citing Elon Musk’s intervention in German politics as an example. To what extent is the contemporary rise of the populist and radical right inseparable from the transformation of the digital information environment? Are we looking at a political phenomenon that traditional party competition alone can no longer adequately explain?

MEP Brando Benifei: There is clearly a link to these phenomena because we see that the extreme right has been getting closer and closer to these techno-oligarchs, and they have forged a form of alliance and mutual support. This is where we are standing now: an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.

I think it’s important that we react not only with rules, obviously, and with actions to tackle the most pernicious practices, but also with a democratic reaction, with the proposal of a new social contract where we are able to allow our societies to become more equal and freer. Because this is the context—with more unequal societies and less free societies—in which we see the nurturing of this hateful and democracy-demolishing approach that has become the fertile ground for this alliance between the extreme right and techno-oligarchs.

AI Companies Don’t Want to Be Regulated

And lastly, Mr. Benifei, populist radical right and far-right parties increasingly frame EU digital regulation, anti-disinformation measures, judicial independence, minority protections, and constraints on majoritarian power as forms of censorship or technocratic control. Is the central struggle now becoming one over the very meaning of democracy—between a liberal-constitutional conception based on rights and institutional restraints and a more plebiscitary or majoritarian conception of popular sovereignty?

MEP Brando Benifei: I find it honestly ridiculous, and I have said it many times, with a frank attitude toward my American interlocutors, that we hear from certain institutions or think tanks, especially American ones, that we are censoring and that there is no freedom of expression in Europe, while we have seen censorship happening very explicitly in the US. At the same time, we haven’t seen any of these kinds of actions and attacks from the US toward countries where there is no freedom of expression, there are no elections, there are limitations on anything that can be said, and you can end up in jail for real.

This has been a clear contradiction in the approach from the US, which makes it clear that, in this very extreme representation of the issue, there is instead a specific economic interest—a specific interest coming from companies that just don’t want to be regulated.

We need to take the discussion about freedom of expression seriously and avoid rules that also create, involuntarily, forms of censorship that are not needed. I take that very seriously. But the way this topic has been framed by American interlocutors, especially by the Trump administration has not been credible, and I’ve been very clear with them that they need to make a better case for us to be convinced of the benefit.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Women protest in Brazil.

The Antifeminist Paradox: Eduarda Campopiano and the Political Rewards of Reaction in Brazil

The electoral rise of Eduarda Campopiano illustrates how female political entrepreneurship, antifeminism, and cultural backlash converge in contemporary Brazil. Beyond the contradictions surrounding her public discourse, the case reveals how the radical right transforms moral confrontation into electoral capital, while reviving older narratives of national regeneration and cultural enemies. Dr. João Ferreira Dias situates Campopiano’s success within a broader transformation of right-wing politics in which women are not merely participants but active entrepreneurs of reaction. Her trajectory shows how digital visibility, antifeminist identity, welfare deservingness, and culture-war polarization can reinforce one another electorally. The case also raises a wider democratic question: how liberal institutions can empower actors who use those same freedoms to challenge pluralism, minority rights, and the legitimacy of political opponents.

By João Ferreira Dias

How does a young woman turn antifeminism into a political career? In October 2026, Eduarda Campopiano, a 23-year-old politician from Jair Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party (PL), was elected to São Paulo’s Legislative Assembly with nearly two million votes. Her political identity has been built around opposition to feminism, abortion, racial quotas, and what she describes as progressive cultural domination. Following her victory, searches about feminism surged across Brazil (UOL, 2026a). 

The paradox is evident. Campopiano exercises political freedoms historically expanded through women’s struggles while rejecting a movement associated with those achievements. Yet the contradiction is more complex than it first appears. She explicitly supports women’s suffrage, and opposing contemporary feminism does not necessarily mean opposing female political participation. The question is how antifeminism itself has become a resource for female political emancipation within the radical right.

When Reaction Becomes Political Capital

Campopiano belongs to a generation for whom political participation begins not in party organizations but in the digital marketplace of ideological confrontation. Provocation produces visibility, visibility builds an audience, and an audience can become an electorate. Her election demonstrates that the culture wars are no longer merely symbolic struggles surrounding politics. They can provide a direct route to political power.

Norris and Inglehart’s (2019) concept of cultural backlash helps explain this development. Social transformations involving gender, sexuality, religion, and identity can produce counter-movements seeking to restore familiar moral hierarchies. In Brazil, Bolsonarism has articulated these anxieties through a language combining Christianity, nationalism, anti-communism, and hostility towards progressive cultural movements (Ferreira Dias, in press).

Women are not simply passive participants in this process. Some become prominent entrepreneurs of the reaction itself. The digital environments associated with tradwife culture and pink pill discourse illustrate how traditional femininity and antifeminism can be repackaged as personal liberation. 

This produces a distinctive political inversion: emancipation becomes the instrument through which the emancipatory project is contested. The conservative woman need not remain confined to the domestic sphere she may idealize. She can become a public figure, accumulate political influence, and exercise institutional authority while advocating more traditional understandings of gender.

There is no need to assume insincerity. Conservative women may genuinely regard feminism as incompatible with their beliefs. Nevertheless, the political marketplace rewards those who transform cultural rejection into an identifiable public persona. What matters is less whether an activist believes her own discourse than how that discourse functions politically. 

The Moral Boundaries of Social Protection

A second controversy surrounding Campopiano reveals a related contradiction. In October 2026, Brazilian media reported that her mother had received the Benefício de Prestação Continuada (BPC), a public assistance benefit, since 2019. Campopiano has meanwhile criticized social assistance policies (Folha de S. Paulo, 2026).

The available evidence does not establish improper receipt of the benefit, and having a relative who depends on public assistance does not prevent legitimate criticism of welfare programmes. The political significance lies in the tension between the private need for social protection and public narratives that morally distinguish deserving from undeserving beneficiaries. 

Radical-right politics does not necessarily reject the welfare state. It often seeks to redefine the moral boundaries of solidarity. Protection may be legitimate for those considered hardworking, respectable, or culturally deserving, while other beneficiaries are portrayed as dependent or privileged. 

The same political grammar operates across apparently different questions. In debates about gender, family, immigration, or welfare, complex institutional problems become conflicts between morally legitimate and illegitimate groups. Political belonging increasingly depends on identification with the supposedly virtuous side.

This is particularly effective in societies experiencing insecurity and distrust. Rather than explaining structural difficulties, the narrative identifies groups whose alleged conduct or values prevent national recovery.

A New Generation, an Old Political Grammar

Brazil has encountered versions of this political language before. In 1964, conservative women’s organizations played an important role in mobilizations against João Goulart, particularly the Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade (Cordeiro, 2021). Appeals to family, Christianity, national salvation, and anti-communism helped create a climate favorable to military intervention. 

Contemporary Bolsonarism is not a repetition of 1964, nor does every conservative movement belong to the fascist tradition. Nevertheless, the recurrence of national regeneration, moral purification, and the identification of internal enemies invites historical comparison (Stanley, 2020).

The language of cultural restoration becomes especially troubling when political opponents cease to be treated as legitimate competitors and are instead represented as threats to the nation’s moral existence. This is where conservatism can move towards illiberalism. The distinction matters: defending traditional values is compatible with liberal democracy; denying the political legitimacy of those who reject them is not. 

Campopiano’s election therefore represents something larger than the success of an antifeminist influencer. She belongs to a growing category of ideological representatives whose electoral appeal is organized around national cultural conflicts rather than territorial constituencies. Reporting on the 2026 São Paulo elections identified a substantial increase in these so-called deputados de opinião (UOL, 2026b).

Such representatives are democratically elected. Yet when political careers depend upon permanent confrontation, compromise can appear as betrayal and institutional restraint as weakness. The radical right has discovered that it does not need to exclude women from political power to defend traditional gender hierarchies. Women themselves can become some of the most effective representatives of that project.

The central question is consequently not whether Campopiano is personally contradictory, politically ambitious, or ideologically sincere. It is how a political environment has emerged in which antifeminism, moral polarization, and cultural antagonism can generate extraordinary electoral rewards.

Brazil’s challenge is not to prevent conservative women from exercising democratic rights. It is to preserve a political order in which the exercise of those rights does not become a mandate to delegitimize the rights and freedoms of others.The paradox of contemporary reaction may be precisely this: liberal democracy provides the opportunities through which some of its most determined cultural adversaries acquire power.


 

References

Cordeiro, J. M. (2021). “A Marcha da Família com Deus pela Liberdade em São Paulo: direitas, participação política e golpe no Brasil, 1964.” Revista de História (São Paulo), (180), a01720.

Ferreira Dias, J. (in press). “The struggle for Brazil’s soul: Culture wars and the fight for hegemony.” In: C. Royer (Ed.), Culture wars from a global perspective: Mountain or molehill? Routledge.

Folha de S. Paulo. (2026, October 10). Crítica de programas de assistência, Eduarda Campopiano tem mãe que recebe benefício.

Norris, P. & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Stanley, J. (2020). How fascism works: The politics of us and them. Random House Trade Paperbacks.

UOL. (2026a, October 6). Após eleição de Campopiano, buscas sobre feminismo atingem maior patamar desde 2023.

UOL. (2026b, October 11). ‘Deputados de opinião’ crescem 48% na Alesp e regiões ficam sem parlamentar.