In this Voice of Youth (VoY) commentary, Emmanouela Papapavlou reflects on the wave of student protests sweeping France and asks what lies beneath the barricades, tear gas, and confrontations with police. She argues that the unrest should not be reduced to disorder alone but understood as the expression of accumulated frustration with teacher shortages, overcrowded classrooms, deteriorating school conditions, academic pressure, and a growing sense that institutions listen only when young people make themselves impossible to ignore. Without excusing violence, Papapavlou calls for attention to the grievances that precede it. Her central warning is stark: when a generation is repeatedly told to wait while its future feels increasingly insecure, frustration can become political anger—and democratic institutions risk teaching young people that being heard requires escalation.
By Emmanouela Papapavlou*
There is something deeply unsettling about watching a seventeen-year-old stand in front of a line of riot police. Not because young people are incapable of anger. But because we have somehow become so accustomed to ignoring them that we only seem to notice them once they are standing in the streets.
And the images are difficult to look away from. Students running through clouds of tear gas. Police in riot gear standing opposite teenagers. Barricades burning in the streets. Arrests. Injuries. A fifteen-year-old boy losing his hand during a confrontation involving a police grenade. And suddenly, everyone has an opinion: Some say the students have gone too far. Some say the police have gone too far. Some blame political parties. Some blame immigrants. Some blame the far left. Some blame the government. Some blame the students themselves.
But somewhere between all the shouting, the actual question is being lost. Why are these students so angry in the first place? Because this is not really about one protest. It is not really about one school. And it is not really about one government decision. It is about what happens when young people spend years being told that education is the key to their future, only to enter an education system that increasingly feels incapable of giving them one. They sit in overcrowded classrooms. They wait for teachers who never arrive. They study in buildings that have been allowed to deteriorate. They carry schedules that leave them exhausted. They face constant academic pressure and an increasingly competitive path toward university. And then they are told to work harder. To be patient. To understand. To wait… But how long are young people supposed to wait before frustration becomes anger?
When Patience Turns Into Anger
France’s education ministry found that almost one in ten teaching hours in public secondary schools went untaught during the 2024–2025 school year, with a significant proportion lost because replacement teachers could not be found. Students have repeatedly pointed to teacher shortages, overcrowded classrooms, poor infrastructure and the pressure surrounding university admissions as reasons for taking to the streets. And maybe the most painful part is that none of this is new. That is what makes it worse. The students are not discovering that their system is imperfect. They are discovering that the adults who have known it was imperfect for years have still allowed it to remain that way. And that changes everything.
Because there is a difference between being failed once and being failed repeatedly. There is a difference between hearing that something will be fixed and watching nothing change. There is a difference between being told that your voice matters and being listened to only after you start shouting. That is what I think we are watching in France. Not simply a student protest. But a generation reaching the point where patience no longer feels like virtue. It feels like surrender. And when that happens, the question is no longer why are they protesting? The question becomes: Why did they have to protest to be heard?
The Fire Is Not the Beginning
Of course, not everything happening in the streets is justified. Burning schools does not repair schools. Throwing objects at police officers does not make education better. Violence against teachers, students or police officers cannot be excused simply because the cause behind a protest is legitimate. But we should be equally careful not to make the opposite mistake.
Because once violence appears, it becomes very easy to stop asking why the protest began. It becomes easy to look at the flames instead of what started the fire. And it becomes even easier to look at a teenager throwing a bottle and forget that there is a teenager underneath it who may have spent years feeling that nobody was listening. That does not excuse violence. It explains why understanding the cause matters. Because, if all we do is extinguish the fire, without asking why the building keeps catching fire, we will eventually be standing in the same place again.
When Institutions Hear Only Shouting
The French government has promised dialogue and changes, including a review of the university admissions system and measures addressing school conditions. But the response has also been dominated by policing, political accusations and arguments over who is responsible for the violence. On October 7, the government temporarily suspended the use of stun grenades at student protests after the Lens incident, while investigations into police conduct continue.
And perhaps that is the tragedy. A generation is asking to be taken seriously. And the country is arguing about how loudly they asked. But students should not have to become perfectly behaved victims before their problems become worthy of attention. They should not have to be injured before we ask what they were protesting. They should not have to fill the streets before we look inside their classrooms. They should not have to become a national crisis before we remember that they are the people who will inherit the country we are building now.
A Generation Asking to Be Seen
Because education was never supposed to be about simply surviving. It was supposed to be about becoming. Becoming educated. Becoming independent. Becoming capable of thinking for ourselves. Becoming the people who will eventually decide what kind of society we live in.
So, what are we teaching them now? Are we teaching them that institutions listen? Or are we teaching them that institutions listen only when they are forced to? Are we teaching them that democracy gives them a voice? Or are we teaching them that their voice matters only when it becomes impossible to ignore? Are we teaching them that their future belongs to them? Or are we quietly asking them to accept a future that we have failed to build?
Because young people are watching. They are watching their schools deteriorate. They are watching their teachers disappear. They are watching their parents’ struggle. They are watching politicians argue. They are watching institutions promise. And they are watching nothing change.
And eventually, something inside a person breaks when they realize that the people responsible for protecting their future have become more comfortable with the problem than they are. That is why this is bigger than France. Because every generation eventually reaches a moment when it looks at the world it has inherited and asks: Is this really all you have prepared for us? And if the answer is yes, then perhaps we should not be surprised when they refuse to accept it.
They Are Not the Future—They Are Here
The students of France are not simply asking for better classrooms. They are asking for proof that their future matters. They are asking to be respected. To be heard. To be considered. And maybe, more than anything, they are asking the adults around them to remember something that should never have needed reminding: They are not the future. They are the present. They are already here. They are already watching. They are already speaking.
And if we continue to ignore them, they will only have one thing left to do. To speak louder. So, listen carefully. Because beneath the shouting, beneath the sirens, beneath the tear gas and the barricades, there is a generation trying to tell us something. They are tired of being told to wait. They are tired of being told that change takes time. They are tired of being told that their concerns are complicated, that the budget is difficult, that reform is coming, that someone is working on it. They have heard enough promises. They want to see change.
And perhaps that is why the streets are burning. Not because young people have suddenly become violent. But because their frustration has been allowed to burn for far too long. The question now is not whether the fire can be put out. The question is whether anyone is finally willing to ask why it started.
Because the students are saying: We are catching fire, and if we burn, you burn with us.
(*) Emmanouela Papapavlou is a high school student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com
In this ECPS Voice of Youth (VoY) interview, Dr. Amedeo Varriale reflects on the study of populism, the responsibilities of scholars, and the boundaries between public engagement and political activism. Working primarily within the ideational tradition, he stresses conceptual clarity, methodological pluralism, and intellectual humility, arguing that “there is not necessarily one correct answer” in populism research. Dr. Varriale maintains that scholars should contribute to public debate through empirical evidence, theoretical transparency, scientific rigor, and procedural validity while resisting political advocacy. He also emphasizes the need to acknowledge uncertainty, present competing interpretations fairly, and remain transparent about research limitations. Ultimately, scholarship should inform democratic debate without attempting to determine its political outcome or replace citizens’ own electoral choices.
As part of the ECPS Youth Program’s Voice of Youth (VoY) interview series, Dr. Amedeo Varrialereflects on the intellectual, methodological, and ethical challenges confronting a new generation of scholars studying populism. A political scientist specializing in populism, the radical right, and contemporary European politics, Dr. Varriale traces his research interests to the political transformations that followed the 2015 refugee crisis, Donald Trump’s 2016 election, and Italy’s 2018 League–Five Star Movement coalition. His work subsequently developed around questions of how populism should be conceptualized, measured, and distinguished from more explicitly authoritarian and anti-democratic phenomena.
A central theme running through the interview is the importance of intellectual openness in a field characterized by competing definitions and methodological traditions. Although Dr. Varriale works primarily within the ideational approach associated with Cas Mudde, he emphasizes that populism studies contain legitimate theoretical disagreements. For him, scholars should resist the temptation to transform conceptual preferences into unquestionable certainties: “There is not necessarily one correct answer.” Instead, they should “recognize ambiguity and avoid presenting one interpretation of populism as an absolute truth.” His broader methodological principle is correspondingly straightforward: “The most important thing is to keep an open mind when approaching political science.”
This commitment to scholarly pluralism is closely connected to Dr. Varriale’s understanding of the public role of academics. He argues that “scholars have some responsibility to intervene in public discussions,” particularly because research on politics, society, and democratic life can produce consequences extending far beyond universities. Yet public engagement, in his view, requires clearly defined boundaries. “I am skeptical of academic activism,” he stresses, adding that “engaging with the public should not turn into political advocacy or activism.” Instead, academics should contribute “empirical evidence, theoretical transparency, scientific rigor, and procedural validity,” while maintaining sufficient humility to acknowledge that scholarship remains fallible and that research findings “cannot be treated as absolute truths.”
Dr. Varriale extends this principle to democratic decision-making itself. Scholarship, he argues, can clarify the opportunities and risks associated with populism, distinguish democratic protest from challenges to democratic norms, and communicate evidence to journalists, policymakers, educators, and civil society. But its democratic function should remain informational rather than prescriptive: “Scholars can provide evidence to society, but democratic societies and the demos ultimately make their own political and electoral decisions.” Academia, he concludes, should “facilitate democratic debate without attempting to determine its outcome.”
Across discussions of populism, authoritarianism, digital methods, early-career research, and public engagement, the interview therefore presents scholarly rigor, conceptual humility, and openness to competing interpretations as essential foundations for politically relevant—but politically independent—research.
The interview with Dr. Amedeo Varriale is lightly edited to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
From the Refugee Crisis to the Study of Populism
Refugees arriving by inflatable dinghy boats remain in camps on the island of Lesvos, Greece, on October 5, 2015. Photo: Anjo Kan.
Please introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, and explain how your research interests developed. Why do you believe your area of research is particularly significant in today’s global environment?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: I am a politics graduate of the University of East London, and I completed my PhD in 2024. I am currently a non-resident research fellow at the European Center for Populism Studies, and I am also a research fellow at a center focused on the study of the radical right and populism.
My interest in populism developed over several years. There were three major events between 2015 and 2018 that particularly shaped my research interests: the refugee crisis in 2015, Donald Trump’s election in 2016, and Italy’s 2018 coalition between the League and the Five Star Movement.
The refugee crisis was particularly significant because it created a major divide in public opinion and between political parties, with some advocating for greater openness towards immigration and others strongly opposing it. This contributed to the rise of populist and nationalist parties, particularly on the right.
Trump’s election in 2016 was another important moment. It attracted enormous international attention because the United States, as the leading country of the liberal democratic world, had elected a president whose political language was very different from the traditional language of liberal democracy.
The third event was the most important for me personally. In 2018, for the first time, a key EU member state, Italy, had a government coalition led by fully Eurosceptic populist forces from the right and left: the League and the Five Star Movement.
I eventually studied this coalition during my PhD. I became increasingly interested in understanding what populism was and how it functioned ideologically and rhetorically, particularly because it appeared to me as something very different from mainstream consensus politics on the center-right and center-left.
I believe studying populism today is extremely important. Approximately half of EU member states have a populist party either in government or as the largest opposition party, and this is only within Europe. There are many more populist parties and leaders around the world.
Populism can have a significant impact on political systems. When populists come to power, they do not necessarily abolish democracy altogether, but they can significantly alter democratic institutions. They can erode checks and balances, the rule of law, and minority rights. If we want to understand how liberal democracy is affected, we need to understand why, how, and by whom it is challenged.
Defining Populism Through the Ideational Approach
Do you have your own definition of populism that you use in your research? And do you have a particular conceptual approach that you use? And has your understanding and your definition of populism changed throughout the trajectory of your research?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: I primarily adhere to the ideational school of thought. I am a big fan of the ideational approach to the study of populism, particularly as conceptualized by the prominent Dutch scholar Cas Mudde.
In my PhD thesis, I used Mudde’s definition of populism. Essentially, populism is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people versus the corrupt elite. It argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale, or the general will of the people.
There are three reasons why I think this is a particularly useful approach.
First, it allows us to distinguish between populism and non-populism and therefore establishes relatively clear boundaries. There are two opposites to populism: elitism and pluralism.
Secondly, Mudde’s definition allows for cross-national and cross-regional applicability. There will always be populists to study around the world because anti-elitism and anti-pluralism are recurring features on both sides of the political spectrum.
Third, the ideational approach has a certain versatility. It can be applied at different levels of analysis, including qualitative studies at the mass level. Observing or measuring anti-elitism and people-centrism is possible not only when studying party leaders, but also when studying citizens.
The only aspect of the ideational approach that I am not completely convinced by is Mudde’s argument that populism is thin centered. Unlike thick ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and communism, populism supposedly offers relatively few specific views on political, institutional, or socioeconomic issues.
I personally believe that populists do share a number of common views. They tend to support a strong majoritarian popular mandate, strong executive power, limitations on the privileges of politicians, and direct democracy. On socioeconomic issues, they can support welfare chauvinism, lower taxation for small and medium-sized businesses, and less or no immigration.
So, I believe populism has a Weltanschauung. While anti-elitism and people-centrism may be its core characteristics, as I argued in my PhD thesis, it also has other important characteristics, such as sovereignism, producerism, reformism, and direct democracy.
My understanding of populism has not radically changed throughout my research. However, I would say that I am now slightly more open to the idea that populism can be thin-centered in some cases.
Populism, Fascism, and the Importance of Conceptual Boundaries
AfD demo with slogan Stop Islamization and counter demonstration of the Left in Luetten Klein in Rostock, Germany on May 14, 2018. AfD, Alternative for Germany, is a right wing political party in Germany. Photo: Shutterstock.
Are there any theoretical debates that you have considered most consequential for the future of the field of populism studies? And what kind of misconceptions do you frequently encounter, both in and out of academia when doing your research?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: One important debate for the future of populism studies may be whether different approaches can eventually be brought together. Rather than asking whether populism is an ideology, strategy, discourse, or style, scholars may increasingly examine how ideas, political agency, discourse and performance, institutions, and citizen reception interact to create populist politics or populist societies. Perhaps in the future, these different approaches can be complementary rather than mutually exclusive. That is, however, speculation.
Regarding misconceptions, I would say there is a recurring blurring of boundaries between populism and fascism, or between populist radical-right actors and the extreme right. This is particularly common in political journalism, but it also occurs to a lesser degree in academia. It is important to distinguish between populist radical-right actors, who are illiberal but not necessarily anti-democratic, and neo-fascist extreme-right actors, who are both illiberal and anti-democratic.
Populism is reformist. It is not revolutionary. It is anti-establishment rather than anti-system. Once it ceases to be anti-establishment and becomes genuinely anti-system, it starts to become something else and potentially something much more authoritarian.
Populists can be skeptical of or opposed to the rule of law and minority rights, but they generally believe in popular sovereignty and electoral democracy. They do not necessarily believe in liberal democracy.
The Italian scholar Marco Tarchi, for example, distinguishes populists and fascists based on their views of the state, markets, sovereignty, the nation, and other important political questions. We therefore need to be careful not to conflate the two.
Measuring Populism Across Different Contexts
Every research agenda can encounter conceptual and methodological challenges. How do you operationalize and how do you measure populism in your own work? Particularly when comparing different systems, different contexts, or different countries, different case studies. So, how can you balance qualitative and quantitative approaches when doing your research?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: Many scholars have developed different ways of measuring populism. For example, Pippa Norris with her Global Party Survey, Kirk Hawkins, Akkerman, Mudde and Zaslove, Kurt Weyland, and many others. Personally, I usually observe and interpret populism through qualitative methods, sometimes comparing one case to another. I use party manifestos, thematic content analysis, and discourse analysis.
During my PhD, however, I developed a methodology to measure the ideological populism of two Italian parties. I identified six populist themes from the literature: anti-elitism, people-centrism, sovereignism, reformism, producerism, and direct democracy. I identified these themes in interviews with politicians and in party manifestos. My method also had a quantitative component because I counted the occurrence of these themes to assess the degree of populism.
I used a gradational approach inspired by Charles Ragin’s fuzzy-set methodology. The values were 0, 0.3, 0.7, and 1, corresponding to not populist, barely populist, considerably populist, and full-blown populist. If none of the themes were present, the result was not populist. One or two themes meant barely populist, three or four meant considerably populist, and five or six meant full-blown populist.
I interviewed ten political figures, five from each party. The themes occurred consistently in the interviews, and the manifesto analysis resulted in the Italian parties being classified as full-blown populist.
I have not, however, measured populism in a strict sense across different countries, political systems, and historical contexts. In most of my work, I have analyzed and interpreted it qualitatively.
I think qualitative and quantitative approaches work best in a complementary way. Quantitative approaches can identify broad patterns across different historical and geographical contexts, while qualitative research can explain the significance, mechanisms, and context behind those patterns.
The Digital Transformation of Populism Research
The study of populism increasingly relies on digital data, social media, and computational methods. What role have these tools played in your own research, and how have they transformed the way scholars investigate contemporary political phenomena?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: In my own research, computational methods and software have essentially played no role so far. I was once a research assistant working on a book where I helped identify themes. Other researchers subsequently used NVivo to locate these themes in tweets, but I was not directly involved in that part. These tools have nevertheless transformed populism studies. Researchers can now examine political communication on a much larger scale and almost instantaneously. They can analyze thousands or millions of posts on platforms such as X, Truth Social, Facebook, and Instagram, as well as online engagement and digital networks. This makes it possible to identify populist themes such as anti-elitism, appeals to the nation, and other forms of political discourse.
Text mining and sentiment analysis can also help researchers measure political discourse and understand relationships between party leaders, parliamentarians, citizens, grassroots activists, and journalists. These tools are particularly useful during major events such as political crises and election campaigns.
There are, however, limitations. Algorithms can contain biases, and social-media users are not necessarily representative of the population or electorate as a whole. There are also ethical and privacy concerns surrounding online data, which can affect research funding or institutional approval, particularly for PhD and postdoctoral research.
Right-Wing and Left-Wing Populism in Italy
Supporters of Five Stars Movement in Naples rally with Italian flag and political symbol of the movement in Napoli, Campania, Italy on May 30, 2018. Photo: Antonio Balasco.
Research can often produce unexpected discoveries. What has been the most surprising finding in your work? Have you encountered evidence that fundamentally challenged your original assumptions or redirected your research idea?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: During my PhD fieldwork, when I interviewed politicians from the League and the Five Star Movement, I was struck by an interesting difference between right-wing and left-wing populism in Italy. The two parties had a similar overall agenda because of their anti-elitist populism, but their Euroscepticism was different.
The Italian populist right criticized Europe and wanted a Europe that did less but better. They envisioned a Europe that would gradually return to something closer to its pre-Maastricht status.
The Italian populist left criticized Europe from a different perspective. Their Euroscepticism was based more on the idea that the EU should do more but better, particularly regarding fiscal and environmental policy integration.
Overall, both populist right-wing and left-wing actors tended to favor reforming the EU from within rather than leaving it altogether.
The left’s Euroscepticism was aimed more at international corporate elites because of their economic power and influence over sovereign states. Right-wing Euroscepticism was aimed more at national and international liberal-progressive elites because of their positions on immigration, globalization, and popular sovereignty.
Of course, there are also areas where right and left populism overlap. I would not say these findings fundamentally challenged my original assumptions or redirected my research agenda, but they did reveal some interesting differences between right- and left-wing populism.
Conducting Research in Polarized Political Environments
Populism can frequently involve politically polarized environments, disinformation campaigns, and contested narratives. Have these dynamics affected your ability to collect data, access reliable sources or to conduct objective research? And how do you navigate politically sensitive topics while maintaining scholarly rigor?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: I would not say these dynamics have significantly affected my ability to collect data, access reliable sources, or conduct objective research. However, they can certainly make research on populism more daunting.
Accessibility, accuracy, and reliability can be influenced by polarization, disinformation, and competing narratives. The best way for scholars to address this is to distinguish between sources that provide verifiable evidence, those that provide political or scholarly opinions, and subjective or partisan journalism.
Whenever possible, researchers should collect their own data through fieldwork. If that is not possible, primary sources, peer-reviewed academic sources, and respected independent organizations can be useful. Using multiple sources and avoiding a predetermined ideological perspective can increase the objectivity and reliability of research.
In populism studies, it is also normal to encounter different approaches and conclusions. There are competing ideational, sociocultural, and political-strategic approaches to populism.
There is not necessarily one correct answer. Scholars need to recognize ambiguity and avoid presenting one interpretation of populism as an absolute truth. The most important thing is to keep an open mind when approaching political science.
Research Beyond Academic Publication
Looking beyond academic publication, what impact would you ideally like your research to have? How can scholarly work contribute to addressing democratic challenges associated with populism while avoiding becoming politicized itself?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: Scholars have some responsibility to intervene in public discussions. Research often deals with questions concerning society and democratic life, and those findings can have real-life consequences for communities.
That said, I am skeptical of academic activism. Engaging with the public should not turn into political advocacy or activism. Academics should try to be as objective as possible and contribute empirical evidence, theoretical transparency, scientific rigor, and procedural validity. They should also have the humility to recognize that their research is not flawless and that findings cannot be treated as absolute truths.
Communicating academic findings to the public, policymakers, politicians, and journalists can be difficult. Academic language needs to be simplified for wider audiences and made reader friendly. Findings should also be summarized clearly and concisely, particularly for journalists and policymakers. There should be concrete examples, and unnecessary jargon should be avoided. Finally, academics should be transparent about the limitations and weaknesses of their research frameworks and methodology.
The Importance of Academic Networks
So, I’m going to shift gears a little bit for my next question. And I would like to ask you about international collaboration. Because contemporary research increasingly involves collaboration with other researchers, how has cooperation with other scholars, with other academic networks and initiatives, such as the ECPS Early Career Researchers Network, influenced your research, your professional development, and your intellectual outlook?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: I have not directly used the ECPS Early Career Researchers Network yet, but I have had the opportunity to write and publish different articles with ECPS. Earlier this year, I participated in the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, We, the People and the Future of Democracy: An Interdisciplinary Approach. I served as a discussant for several sessions and as a moderator or chair for one. These workshops gave me the opportunity to engage with scholars who are more experienced than me, and I learned a great deal simply by listening to them. Preparing to act as a discussant also expanded my knowledge and research skills because I had to engage closely with other scholars’ work and prepare meaningful discussion points.
I also participated in a workshop on the New Right in Copenhagen, where I presented research on Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy.
These experiences allowed me to meet people with similar interests and career objectives. Although I have not yet co-authored anything through these networks, I now have professional contacts and people I can approach for opinions, advice, or potential academic collaboration. I also really value meeting people from different countries, age groups, and areas of expertise.
The Role of Research in Democratic Decision-Making
Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.
What impact would you ideally like your research to have? How could scholarly work contribute to addressing democratic challenges associated with populism while avoiding becoming politicized itself?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: Looking beyond academic publication, I would like my research to contribute by better informing the public about the opportunities and threats associated with populism. I would like citizens to understand what they are likely to get in terms of policymaking and institutional reforms when they vote for a populist party or leader.
I think it is a moral duty to explain how populism affects liberal democracy, not only in terms of institutions but also political representation and public debate. Once citizens are informed, however, they should be left alone to decide who they want to vote for.
Research can also be useful to journalists, educators, policymakers, and civil society organizations. It can help these groups distinguish between legitimate and spontaneous forms of democratic protest and more serious challenges to democratic norms. It can also identify ways democratic institutions can respond to those challenges while addressing everyday concerns without abandoning the rule of law and political pluralism.
To avoid excessive politicization, I think scholarship should do four things: use methodology transparently; present competing interpretations fairly; acknowledge uncertainty and new evidence that contradicts one’s own argument; and be honest about the limitations and weaknesses of research.
Scholars can provide evidence to society, but democratic societies and the demos ultimately make their own political and electoral decisions. If academics dislike populists, that does not mean they should demonize citizens who support them. Academia should facilitate democratic debate without attempting to determine its outcome.
Challenges Facing Early-Career Researchers
Next, I would like to talk about career obstacles. What has been the greatest personal or professional challenge that you may have faced? Particularly as an early career scholar, and what has enabled you to overcome these obstacles?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: One of the biggest challenges during my PhD was having to restructure and rewrite a large part of my thesis. Fortunately, I managed to do so successfully, and I was actually happier with the second version of my thesis than the original. My examiners gave me valuable feedback, particularly on how to connect my theoretical framework to the existing literature.
Another challenge has been finding the right postdoctoral position. Populism studies is a very niche subfield of political science, so there are not as many postdoctoral positions as one might expect, and the ones that are available are extremely competitive. This can be particularly challenging for someone who cannot relocate anywhere in the world for personal reasons.
It can be frustrating, but it is important not to give in to that frustration. Continue studying, continue reading other people’s work, continue publishing, get up early every morning, and keep trying.
The Rewards of Academic Research
I want to ask you about what has felt rewarding in your research journey, but also if there is anything that you would have approached differently.
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: The most rewarding aspect has undoubtedly been being published and seeing a well-presented, well-written, and aesthetically pleasing article with my name on it published in an important journal or magazine. This makes me proud, but it also makes my parents, friends, family, and partner proud.
A couple of weeks ago, I received a hard copy of a policy journal containing one of my articles, and it was a very fulfilling experience. It made me realize that all the hard work had served a purpose and, in a complex and not immediately noticeable way, contributed to knowledge.
The pursuit of truth is a noble aim. It is also rewarding to contribute to common knowledge and, indirectly, to society, by producing in-depth work that helps explain how political systems function.
Intellectual Influences on the Study of Populism
Are there any particular scholars, books, experiences, or even unexpected sources of inspiration that have fundamentally shaped your thinking and your research?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: Certainly. I have several favorite authors and books that have contributed to my intellectual development. When I first started studying populism at a higher level during my PhD, I encountered the work of Cas Mudde and many other scholars who examined populism primarily from an ideological and qualitative perspective. I would particularly recommend Mudde’s books to young scholars entering the field. His writing is conceptually sophisticated without being unnecessarily difficult to understand.
I would also recommend the British scholar Paul Taggart and his seminal book Populism, which helped me understand the origins of populism, including its development in the late nineteenth-century United States with the People’s Party and in Russia with the Narodniks.
I am also a great admirer of Marco Tarchi because he comparatively analyses populism and the fascist extreme right.
Another scholar I would recommend is Benjamin Moffitt. His book Populism examines similarities and differences between populism and other ideologies, including liberalism, socialism, and nationalism.
These scholars have been fundamental to my intellectual development, and I think it is difficult to study populism without becoming familiar with their work.
Advice for the Next Generation of Political Scientists
If there are any skills that you believe young political scientists need in order to thrive. And what advice do you offer to the next generation of scholars entering the field, especially regarding to the fact that universities are becoming increasingly internationalized, and research has become more competitive than it has ever been before?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: I think computational methods and the ability to work with large amounts of digital data are increasingly important. Learning how to use tools such as NVivo and RStudio, as well as platforms such as MTurk, can be valuable. I myself need to develop these skills further.
Another important skill is teaching experience. It is useful to gain teaching experience early, preferably during the PhD, because it can make a significant difference to your CV and can be valuable when universities are hiring postdoctoral researchers.
But the most important piece of advice I can give is very simple: read, read, and read. Read academic books, political journalism, history, sociology, and even things that are completely unrelated to your research, such as novels and classical literature. Reading widely allows you to develop intellectual connections beyond your immediate field.
Ultimately, an academic needs to be well-read.
The Future of Populism Studies
Populism and political marketing: An illustration of how populist rhetoric is often employed as a strategic tool to swiftly gain voter support. Illustration: Jakub Jirsak.
Looking ahead, where do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Which research questions or neglected areas deserve far greater scholarly attention than they currently receive?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: I think it is reasonable to speculate that populism studies may become increasingly connected with research on authoritarianism. Populism is often described as democratic or even hyper-democratic to the point of becoming illiberal. We have seen populists moderate themselves after entering government, but we have also seen political actors that began as populists evolve into something different.
I am thinking particularly about developments such as Donald Trump’s second term, the AfD, and National Future in Italy, which have advanced policies that are considerably more radical or extreme than those of many populists of ten or twenty years ago.
One example is remigration. This concept does not simply refer to returning illegal immigrants. It can also involve legal immigrants and second-generation citizens who are considered insufficiently integrated. That goes beyond populism and raises questions about authoritarianism and democratic norms.
I therefore think future research should examine more carefully where the boundary lies between populism and extreme-right authoritarianism, particularly in terms of policymaking. This area has been somewhat neglected. Academia has not always provided clear ideational distinctions between neo-populism, neo-fascism, and reactionary right-wing authoritarianism. Scholars such as Marco Tarchi and Robert Paxton have made important contributions to distinguishing these concepts, although in different contexts.
Sometimes parties are described as populist when they are actually neo-fascist or extreme right. In those cases, calling them populist can obscure important distinctions. The opposite can also happen. I think we should try to call political phenomena by their appropriate names. Of course, this can be difficult in political science, and particularly in political journalism, where terminology is often used inconsistently.
A Large-Scale Taxonomy of Populist Parties
If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle for you, what research project would you most like to pursue? More broadly, what do you hope will ultimately be the lasting contribution of your work to both scholarship and to public understanding?
Dr. Amedeo Varriale: If time and resources allowed me, I would like to undertake a large-scale project with the ultimate aim of developing a taxonomy of populist parties based on their relationship with liberal democracy, their conceptualization of anti-elitism, and their views on important aspects of the political system, including the state, economy, and markets.
This has been done before to some extent. Margaret Canovan conducted similar work in the 1980s and 1990s, and Mudde did something similar in his 2007 book Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. However, these classifications are now somewhat outdated.
There may therefore be a gap in the literature for a new taxonomy. If I pursue a postdoctoral project in the future, this is likely to be the kind of proposal I would put forward.
I would like to use interviews as a primary methodology, as I did during my PhD, and speak with populist leaders in countries such as Argentina, Britain, Italy, and Poland, potentially expanding the research beyond Europe.
I also think it would be useful to move beyond the simple division between right-wing and left-wing populism. There are different subgroups, including neoliberal or centrist populists on the right and different varieties of socialist populism on the left. Right and left can be treated as broad categories, but there are more detailed distinctions between populists in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Americas in terms of their beliefs and overall worldviews.
I would hope that developing these kinds of distinctions could become one of the lasting contributions of my research, alongside my work distinguishing between neo-populism and neo-fascism.
The public also needs to understand that populism is not necessarily undemocratic or anti-democratic. It can give a voice to silent majorities or minorities in political systems that are authoritarian or competitively authoritarian.
At the same time, populism can obstruct the rule of law and minority rights in liberal democracies. It can therefore have different effects depending on the political context.
More research needs to be produced and communicated not only within academic circles but also through the media, which plays an important role in shaping public narratives. People need to understand the good, the bad, and the ugly sides of populism.
If I could write a book that brought together all of these aspects, I think that would be a lasting contribution that I would be proud of for many years.
In this ECPS interview, Associate Professor Nick Beauchamp of Northeastern University examines the evolving relationship between MAGA, democratic socialism, political communication, and the institutional structure of American politics. Assoc. Prof. Beauchamp argues that MAGA’s dominance of the Republican Party should not be confused with uniform ideological agreement among Republican voters, emphasizing that “there’s a difference between how much the beliefs have spread and how much the ideology or the party has taken over.” He suggests that democratic socialism could exert comparable national influence even without achieving majority support, noting that a progressive or DSA-aligned faction could still have “similar effects nationally.” The interview also explores media selection, institutional trust, polarization, AI-driven political persuasion, and the persistence of anti-establishment politics.
As the United States approaches the November 3 midterm elections, the political landscape is defined by an unusually narrow congressional balance, weak public evaluations of the economy, declining approval of President Donald Trump, and an election increasingly interpreted through attitudes toward Trump himself. At the same time, MAGA has become deeply embedded in the Republican Party, while Democrats remain divided over how far an economically populist and democratic-socialist agenda should shape their response to Trumpism. Against this backdrop of personalized politics, ideological polarization, institutional conflict, and an increasingly fragmented information environment, the relationship between insurgent movements and the established two-party system has become especially consequential.
In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Nick Beauchamp of Northeastern University’s Department of Political Science and Network Science Institute offers a structural interpretation of the apparent asymmetry between MAGA’s transformation of the Republican Party and democratic socialism’s more contested position within the Democratic coalition. Rather than treating MAGA as equivalent to the Republican electorate as a whole, Assoc. Prof. Beauchamp stresses that “there’s the MAGA further-right faction and then the center-right faction. Those two things still exist.” He consequently distinguishes between the diffusion of ideological beliefs among voters and the institutional capture of a political party: “there’s a difference between how much the beliefs have spread and how much the ideology or the party has taken over.”
That distinction underpins one of the interview’s most consequential observations. Assoc. Prof. Beauchamp argues that democratic socialism does not necessarily have to become nationally majoritarian in order to acquire transformative political influence. Even if the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) or the broader progressive left were unable to move substantially beyond their current “core of urban, educated, young, left-leaning liberals,” he maintains that “they could still have similar effects nationally.” There is also, he adds, a possible route toward a broader populist coalition appealing to “economically distressed rural or suburban voters,” although such expansion is “not necessary for having a MAGA-sized effect.”
More broadly, Assoc. Prof. Beauchamp situates both MAGA and democratic socialism within the institutional architecture of American politics. Because the presidential and first-past-the-post systems sustain two large parties, he argues, ideological movements operate as factions competing for control within them. Political outcomes therefore depend not only on ideological appeal but also on contingency: “Trump almost lost the primary in 2016, and Sanders almost won the primary in 2016.” Had those outcomes shifted, he observes, “we’d be living in a very different world.”
The interview thus moves beyond a simple comparison of left- and right-wing populism to examine how factional capture, institutional structure, media selection, political communication, AI-driven personalization, and anti-establishment sentiment may shape the next phase of American democracy.
Here is our interview with Associate Professor Nick Beauchamp, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Trump’s Unpopularity Adds to Republican Midterm Problems
Demonstrators at The People’s March, an evolution of the Women’s March, NYC, January 18, 2025. A protester holds a sign reading “Presidents Are Not Kings.” Photo: Erin Alexis Randolph.
Professor Beauchamp, welcome! Let me begin with the broader meaning of the November 3 midterm elections:The November 3 midterms are taking place with an exceptionally narrow congressional balance, weak evaluations of the economy, and Donald Trump remaining unusually central to an election in which he is not himself on the ballot. Should we understand this primarily as a conventional midterm judgment on an incumbent administration, or as a broader referendum on Trumpism as a governing project and on the MAGA transformation of the Republican Party?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: It’s a little bit of both. In general, based on historical patterns, you would expect the incumbent party to lose ground simply because it’s a midterm election. When you add the poor state of the economy, particularly inflation, you would expect even greater difficulties for the incumbent party.
Then there is Trump’s own unpopularity, reflected in his low approval rating, which may or may not be separate from his role as an ideological figure within the MAGA movement.
So, whether we can identify an additional effect specifically attributable to Trumpism or MAGA, beyond all these other factors, is difficult to say. Given the broader circumstances, we would already expect the incumbent party to be struggling in a midterm election.
MAGA Is a Faction—but It Now Controls the Party
The Republican Party has changed markedly from the Reagan-era combination of free trade, limited government, and internationalist conservatism toward economic nationalism, immigration restriction, cultural conservatism, and a stronger conception of executive power. From your perspective as a scholar of ideology and political text, do you now see MAGA as one faction among several inside the Republican Party, or as the dominant ideological grammar through which most Republican candidates are compelled to communicate?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: Those two things don’t have to be incompatible; it can be both. A theme I’ll probably return to is that MAGA is a faction within the Republican Party. There are two broad factions within the party, the farther right and the center right, and similarly, there are two factions within the Democratic Party, the farther left and the center left.
At the moment, the Republican Party apparatus has shifted rightward because the farther-right faction represented by Trump has taken over, beginning with the 2016 primary. But there are still other factions within the Republican Party that continue to operate, even if they are, as you were saying, compelled to use the dominant grammar of the faction that now controls the party.
Trumpism and Trump Are Very Well Fused
Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud
The 2026 campaign has become highly personalized around Trump, with loyalty to him functioning as an important criterion of Republican identity. How should we analytically distinguish Trumpism as an ideology from Trumpism as a leader-centered political relationship? If the presidency, the movement, the party, and the leader increasingly become rhetorically fused, does this change the way voters process political information and partisan identity?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: That’s a hard question. The sense in which they are potentially more readily fused than some combinations of leader and ideology is that leaders and ideology, no matter what your ideology, tend to be fused together in various ways. Regardless of the ideology, many voters take their cues from leaders under any circumstance.
The sense in which it is more fused for the current Republican Party is that the ideology itself tends to be more authoritarian in its structure and therefore has a much more directly and explicitly privileged role for the leader. So, in that sense, the ideology and the leader are naturally compatible with each other, in the way that maybe there’s a little bit of tension between a strong leader and the more traditional liberal individualist ideology.
So, they’re definitely very well fused, and in part that’s just due to the compatibility between the two of them at this particular moment.
Left and Right Populism Both Emphasize Enemies
Right-wing populism under Trump often constructs several antagonisms simultaneously: ordinary Americans against elites, the nation against immigrants or cultural outsiders, and the elected president against institutions that constrain him. In your work on political language and stance detection, how important is this combination of moral judgment, identity, and blame in making populist messages especially effective?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: Maybe the answer is similar, in the sense that both left and right populism, in particular, tend to put a pretty strong emphasis on enemies. Often, the enemies are different versions of the elite, whether the elite are the rich or the cultural elite. Certainly, during a period of anti-establishment fervor right now, both can agree that the establishment, although they disagree about what the establishment is, is a locus for the enemy.
So, in a sense, that is one of the symmetries between the further left and the further right. I’m not somebody who believes that there are lots of symmetries between these two sides, but that’s certainly, structurally, one of these things.
It’s particularly, again, compatible with far-right populism because, along with authoritarianism, you tend to have the opposites—the enemy—that are structurally playing an important role in these things. So, yes, I’d say that having a distinct enemy, or indeed many different enemies, is really constitutive of the ideology and thus feeds into the engine of the far right in the US.
Loss of Institutional Trust Depends on What Institutions Do
The current debate over American democratic backsliding centers on executive power, attacks on institutional constraints, media freedom, immigration enforcement, political retaliation, and the legitimacy of opposition. But democratic erosion also depends on how citizens interpret those developments. To what extent is the durability of democratic norms now a problem of political communication—specifically, whether voters perceive courts, election officials, journalists, universities, and civil servants as legitimate referees or merely as partisan actors?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: That’s a tricky question. The literature on faith in democratic institutions is often portrayed as a matter of communication—showing that these institutions are unbiased, procedural rather than personal, and have these other characteristics. Often, that’s portrayed, as your question was implying, as a task of political communication.
Maybe I’m just an optimist. But my sense, at least in the US context, is that the loss of faith in institutions is driven primarily by what those institutions do, not by how they’re packaged. So, when the courts or the Department of Justice are seen to be operating in a fairly methodical and law-oriented way, it’s very hard to re-describe all of that as unjust. Conversely, when they’re acting in an unjust or personalized way, it’s hard to re-describe that as just.
Again, this is maybe just me being an optimist, but the fundamental problem with loss of faith in democratic institutions, at least maybe just on the left side, is due to how they’re actually operating, not a matter of communication. That doesn’t change the fact that there are other sources of loss of faith in democratic institutions, such as believing that there’s widespread fraud in mail-in voting that has no particular grounding in the truth and thus must be driven by political communication. Maybe there is a bit of an asymmetry there between the two.
A Democratic Congress Would Intensify Confrontation
If Democrats were to secure majorities in both the House and the Senate after the midterms, how consequential could that be for the remainder of Trump’s presidency? Beyond blocking legislation, could a Democratic Congress meaningfully challenge Trumpism through oversight, investigations, subpoena power, appropriations, confirmation politics, and the defense of institutional autonomy? Or, given the intensity of partisan polarization and the growing tendency to portray institutional checks as illegitimate obstruction, might divided government simply shift the conflict from electoral competition toward an even more confrontational struggle between Congress and the executive?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: It certainly will shift the emphasis to an even more confrontational struggle. If the Democrats take the House in particular, surely there will be a bunch of investigations. If they take the Senate, there will be larger fights about confirmations.
Whether either of those things has direct effects on policies will depend on the bills they’re trying to put through. Trump, as we know, has not had a particularly strong emphasis on legislating. It’s part of their philosophy of executive power, and they much prefer to do things through executive orders and other direct effects. So, the ability of Democrats to block bills might not change things that much, but their ability to hold hearings, in particular, will give them an opportunity to raise the salience of all issues and to have an ongoing narrative.
The big challenge for them in that case will just be picking and choosing, because there are literally hundreds of different things that they could choose to investigate or prosecute, and there’s probably a dozen different reasons that they could justify at least having an impeachment vote.
So, the challenge for them, from a political communication perspective, from a PR perspective, is going to be: how do they sequence these things to keep the attention up? That’s not an easy task. As a media consultant or political consultant, I have no idea how they’re gonna do it, but, again, strategically, if they’re smart, they’ll figure out a way to organize the television narrative to keep things moving along for the next two years. That will certainly lead to much more confrontation if they’re successful in that strategy.
What Media Make Salient Has Large Political Effects
Your research shows that media bias can operate not only through partisan wording but through the strategic inclusion or omission of events, even in outlets with strong norms of objectivity. In the highly polarized 2026 campaign, is the more consequential form of media influence often not what outlets say, but which facts, actors, conflicts, or consequences they choose to make visible—or invisible—to their audiences?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: That’s been a perspective I’ve been exploring and testing in research for a number of years now, because there are all these norms, particularly in the major media, about non-bias and so forth. That shapes the way they describe what they’re talking about. But there are very few norms about what they choose to talk about or not, although people try to bring this up occasionally. As a result, they’re fairly unconstrained in what they choose to focus on.
In many ways, this has more latitude in intra-party disagreements. So, the New York Times or other arguably liberal media outlets can choose which things to report on, and those choices can have strong effects on intra-Democratic, intra-left disagreements. If they choose to focus, or if the party apparatus chooses to focus a lot, on what a particular YouTuber has been saying, whether various candidates have an opinion about this YouTuber, or, most recently in the Boston Globe, what happened in a very small bar in western Massachusetts, they might not be directly biased in terms of what they’re saying about it. But the fact that they focus on these particular things has strong effects on these intra-party arguments.
Similarly, they talk more or less about what’s going on in Gaza, or they talk more or less about Trump’s corruption. Or, to choose another example from the headlines just today, if Barry Weiss, who’s taken over the long-running 60 Minutes show, decides not so much to change the tone of the show but to change who’s being interviewed by the show, that, too, has lots of downstream effects on where the attention of viewers is, what kind of judgments they’re making, and what things they consider salient or not for the upcoming elections.
So, much more than changes in their language, it’s changes in what they’re choosing to report on. Those do have large effects, particularly in the primary season for the general election now and again comes around.
Compartmentalized News Is Not Necessarily a Problem
If news organizations on the left and right systematically emphasize different events, different moral stakes, and different political actors, are American voters effectively inhabiting parallel campaign realities? And does this make it harder for elections to function as shared democratic judgments, because citizens may no longer be evaluating the same set of political facts?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: This is where the normative questions diverge from the descriptive questions. Most of the research I’ve done has been empirical and quantitative, looking at these selections and the effects of the selections. Then there’s a normative question: what do we think about that? What should be done about that? That one is more of a subjective perspective.
My perspective is that the selection effects are, in some ways, inevitable—you have to choose, because there’s a finite amount of space and a finite amount of time to report on things. The main problem is not so much the choice, but that the choices themselves are hidden from the viewers. They’re not made explicit as part of the editorial or reporting process.
So, for me, it may not be a problem if there’s a bunch of compartmentalized news organizations that have different foci, as long as the news consumers understand how that works and make their choices in an informed way. This is where I diverge a little bit from some of the people in the polarization world who think that every news organization should cover all the articles in an equally unbiased way.
I’m very cognizant of the fact that this marketplace of ideas does not necessarily work very well in practice, but it still seems the best of a number of incomplete or insufficient solutions here. So, yes, there is this tendency towards bubbles, as they call it, but it’s better to be transparent about the bubbles than to try to erase them altogether.
Authoritarian Ideology Pairs Leaders with Enemies
Immigration remains one of the most durable MAGA issues, combining border control, sovereignty, crime, demographic anxiety, and national identity. From the standpoint of political communication, why is the language of “invasion,” threat, or loss of control so effective? Does anti-immigration politics work primarily because of policy concerns, or because it provides a morally and emotionally simplified narrative that links cultural change to political grievance?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: This gets back to your earlier point about having enemies. We know that, structurally, part of authoritarian ideology is to have an authority figure that you revere and, on the opposite side, a series of enemies that are challenging the structure or have already ruined the structure that needs to be reclaimed from them.
The anti-immigration politics of Trump, in particular, fits into that structure pretty well. But structurally, it doesn’t have to be anti-immigration. It can, in fact, be trans people right now, and it has historically been Black people and various other minority groups and so forth. All of those have slightly different ways of framing the enemy problem, but structurally, they’re similar.
Immigration is certainly well suited to it, and we see that in quite a lot of far-right European parties and so forth. But there’s nothing necessarily about immigration per se that doesn’t function structurally similarly to other out-groups like trans people, Black people, and other minority groups that are threatening the power structure that authoritarians prefer.
Economic Grievances May Be More Fixable Than Identity-Based Enemies
A homeless US Army veteran sits on a street corner in Mesa, Arizona, holding a sign asking for help because he is hungry. Photo: Vicki Been / Dreamstime.
The current US landscape contains two different populist projects. MAGA tends to define “the people” in national-cultural terms against elites, immigrants, globalists, and liberal institutions, while democratic-socialist actors tend to define “the people” socioeconomically—as workers, renters, debtors, and consumers confronting billionaires, corporations, and concentrated wealth. From your perspective, how different are these two populisms in their communicative structure, emotional appeal, and capacity to build durable coalitions?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: That again gets back to the enemy structure, where both of them have things that they’re opposing, both of them have things that they consider to be responsible for the problems here. But, of course, they target different things.
In terms of their capacity to build durable coalitions, both of them, obviously, historically, are quite durable as ideologies, in part because neither of them manages to solve the purported problem that they point to.
Going further in terms of their capacities, one would have to get into the actual truth of the matter: whether a series of policies that progressively restrict immigrants, liberal institutions, and so forth would feed back on itself and produce a more—Jonathan Bein—secure, happy, and wealthy world, or whether that sequence of policy pursuits would, in fact, work counter to that.
Similarly, you would have to answer whether an ideology that’s directed towards supporting debtors and against billionaires would produce a better or wealthier society. My version is that I tend to lean towards the latter, and so, in a sense, one might be more durable than the other. Although perhaps it’s not durable in the sense that one of these sets of things—the economic ones—are potentially fixable, whereas the existence of immigrants, liberal institutions, minority groups, and so forth is not something that is likely to be fixed, absent some extreme set of policies.
MAGA and Democratic Socialism Are Both Party Factions
One of the most striking asymmetries of the current party system is that MAGA has become a governing project and a dominant force inside the Republican Party, whereas democratic socialism remains influential but contested within a much broader Democratic coalition. Is this principally an organizational difference, a media and communication difference, or a difference in how effectively each movement has translated grievance into a simple and emotionally resonant political identity?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: As with all your questions, it’s a little bit of all these things. What I’m coming back to repeatedly is that these are both factions within these parties. Because of our presidential system, because of our first-past-the-post, winner-take-all electoral system, we have two parties, and so the structure, essentially, of our political system is a hierarchical tree, where you have two parties here. Then, within each of the parties, you have the more extreme and the more centrist faction, and all those factions continue to exist, even with Trump and so forth.
The importance of that is to be cognizant of how important accidents and contingency are. Like, Trump almost lost the primary in 2016, and Sanders almost won the primary in 2016. If either of those things had happened, we’d be living in a very different world, because a different faction would have taken over each of those parties under each of those circumstances.
And we’d have a world in which we’d be talking about Sandersism or whatever; we’d be talking about that versus center-right Republicans. Had political opinion shifted by only 10 points or so in these primaries 10 years ago, maybe the current faction that’s dominating in the Democratic Party, which is the center-left faction, might be more durable than the center-right faction was. The center-right faction obviously had lots of concentrated wealth, but didn’t have quite as much cultural clout, whereas the Democratic faction that currently runs the party has both a lot of wealth and a lot of cultural capital.
So, it may be that we’ll see this recurrent pairing between the furthest, most extreme faction on the right and the centrist faction on the left. But again, a lot of this really depends on the contingency of national presidential politics and who runs and who wins in a couple of years.
The Far Left Could Have a MAGA-Sized Effect Without Majority Support
Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez at the “Bernie Is Back” political rally in Queensbridge Park, Queens, New York, on October 19, 2019. Photo: Aleksandr Dyskin / Dreamstime.
The democratic-socialist current has gained visibility through Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, DSA-backed candidates, and a younger activist constituency, but its strongest support remains concentrated in metropolitan areas and particular primary electorates. Do you see democratic socialism developing into a genuinely national current inside the Democratic Party, or is its ideological and geographic appeal still too uneven to reshape the party in the way MAGA reshaped the GOP?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: Maybe there, too, I’d push back a little bit on the degree to which MAGA has reshaped the GOP. It certainly reshaped the GOP in the sense of the party itself, the candidates, and what the candidates are doing. But it’s still the case that, at least among voters, and probably even among the actual representatives, if they were able to honestly respond to surveys or questions, there’s the MAGA further-right faction and then the center-right faction. Those two things still exist.
By analogy, you could have very much the same thing happening on the left, where the progressive or maybe DSA faction, if that’s what it ends up being called, wins the primaries, takes over the Democratic Party, the Democratic Party wins the presidency, and takes over the reins of the government. Structurally, you’d have something very similar, where it would seem that the far left has become dominant. But in terms of the actual opinions of the actual people, it would be analogous to what’s happened with MAGA, where, if you actually look at the surveys that ask people what their views are, probably only half of Republicans and therefore only maybe 1/6 or so of the actual country shares these core, strong far-right beliefs.
So, there’s a difference between how much the beliefs have spread and how much the ideology or the party has taken over. In that sense, even if the DSA couldn’t, or the far left couldn’t, extend beyond their core of urban, educated, young, left-leaning liberals, they could still have similar effects nationally.
That said, there’s also a pathway towards an even broader populist movement where this is what they want, where they appeal to economically distressed rural or suburban voters that aren’t the traditional far left of the Democratic Party. That’s certainly possible, but it’s not necessary for having a MAGA-sized effect.
People Can Still Learn in a Polarized World
Your work on online political conversations found that people often engage across wide ideological divides and that negative or unpleasant exchanges can sustain participation, while extended interaction can sometimes bridge differences rather than simply reinforce information bubbles. Does that finding still give grounds for optimism in the current environment, or have social-media incentives become so dominated by outrage, identity signaling, and algorithmic amplification that cross-partisan argument now more often deepens polarization than reduces it?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: The nuance to emphasize there, in terms of my own research, is that I’ve looked at long-term changes in opinion—radicalization, shifts in people’s positions, or at least how they talk on social media. But one of the things we’ve tended to find is that, while there can be large shifts over time, these tend to occur across smaller differences rather than across the partisan gap between the two sides.
You can still have long-term shifts, long-term changes, long-term evolution, and, if you want to be optimistic, long-term learning, without necessarily having this huge conversation across gigantic political divides. There’s this tendency to lose faith in the deliberative system because the far left and the far right can’t talk to each other, but that doesn’t necessarily have to be the case for people to move, change, and learn more as they go along.
Maybe across the exact middle, there’s going to be a problem because, as people become more polarized or learn more about politics, that gap is large. But at the same time, what we’ve learned is that this unidimensional ideological spectrum doesn’t really capture the way actual people’s opinions work. Actual moderates, or even liberals or conservatives, have a mixture of different policy opinions. As a result, you can have people talking to people about specific policies where they don’t necessarily disagree very much, even across apparently wide divides in their overall voting politics.
So, all of this is, in some ways, a more optimistic view that, even in a heavily polarized world, you can still have changes in people’s views and learning, and become more knowledgeable about politics through these smaller, more gradual changes in conversations.
AI Is Not Fundamentally Different from Existing Campaign Practices
AI, artificial intelligence, and the concept of fake news, misinformation, and disinformation: A man uses his smartphone displaying the red text “Fake News,” surrounded by related keywords. Photo: Dreamstime.
Your recent work on personalized large language models shows how systems can adapt to users’ histories, preferences, and evolving beliefs. In an electoral context, does this create the possibility of a qualitatively new form of political persuasion—where campaigns no longer send one message to millions of voters but generate millions of individually tailored messages, each calibrated to a person’s ideological priors, emotional triggers, and political history? Can AI make political persuasion radically more personalized?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: Now we’ve moved on to the AI side of things. Often, my perspective there is that, despite what the discourse says, at least at the moment, what AI is doing is not fundamentally different from what people are already doing.
The move towards personalized persuasion, micro-targeting, and messaging has been happening in politics for decades now. The dream has always been that, even if the blanket television advertisement doesn’t have much of an effect, maybe if we find just the right message for just the right people by measuring their views very precisely and delivering just the right thing to each door, we can get much more leverage than with these blanket approaches.
In my reading of the research and the evidence, this may be true in a laboratory setting, but in the real world, the overall effects are fairly small in terms of persuasion. The additional effects of personalized persuasion are even smaller; they’re very uncertain outside of the laboratory, even inside the laboratory.
There’s an empirical limit on just how well this can work, due to the inherent noisiness of the human mind. Then the question is: if we have the ability to ramp this up through AI, where we can call up each individual person and have a long conversation with each of them on the telephone, with an AI on the other side, can we get some miraculous additional boost?
The evidence we already have suggests that there are inherent limitations on just how far that can go and that, even though it can probably increase the amount of harassment we all get from campaigns, it might not really change the discourse, particularly when both sides have the capacity to use the same tools.
Personalized Messages Are Not Necessarily Bad for Accountability
If AI-generated political communication becomes increasingly personalized, what happens to democratic accountability? A candidate might present one version of immigration, another of taxation, and another of foreign policy to different voters without those messages ever entering a common public space. Could AI therefore move campaigning from micro-targeting toward something closer to individualized ideological worlds—and make it harder for journalists, opponents, or voters to hold politicians accountable for a coherent public position?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: That, too, is a similar type of question, where we’ve had a lot of these effects already operating before AI. Obviously, within the world of social media studies, there has been a huge amount of attention to bubbles. This is not necessarily about political campaigns, or just about algorithms or other types of things where everybody’s getting their own world, as it were.
What the research suggests is that, again, here too, there are inherent limitations on this: the idea that somebody would be completely in a bubble and unaware of all the other things going on out there just is not the way social media or human interactions actually work.
They could certainly try to make it more targeted to emphasize certain things that matter to each voter. But I don’t think that would necessarily entail voters losing knowledge about other things outside of their world. Without that loss, it’s not necessarily normatively bad if individuals learn more about the things they care more about.
So, again, this is AI aside, just saying that it’s not necessarily the case that personalized messages or campaigns are bad, because maybe a climate-sensitive moderate who’s trying to choose between Democrats and Republicans could really benefit from learning more about the climate policies of the two candidates. As long as that doesn’t exclude their knowledge of the other things, it’s not necessarily bad for democratic accountability, public knowledge, voting, or that sort of thing.
Isolationism Ends When American Dominance Is Challenged
The Iran war has exposed a significant tension within Trumpism: one strand of MAGA rejects “endless wars,” another favors overwhelming force when US power or prestige is challenged, while traditional Republican hawks remain influential. Does this suggest that “America First” is less a coherent foreign-policy doctrine than a flexible political narrative? And from a communication perspective, how can the same movement successfully frame both non-interventionism and military escalation as expressions of the same nationalist principle? How should we understand the tension between “America First” and military intervention?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: I don’t know. I agree that that’s a contradiction. I’m not a campaign strategist for the right, so I don’t really know how to sell those two things. I guess one would try to understand them from the framework of the authoritarian mindset, where your ideal is a world of uncontested American hegemony, where there are no wars and there’s no intervention. They leave us alone in the sense that America is not being attacked. But we’re not being left alone in the sense that America still has economic domination and military bases around the world. There’s no effort to rein those things in prior to any of these wars starting.
On the international stage, maybe the position of America is closer to the authoritarian ideal than it is domestically, in the sense that America’s dominance in the world has been fairly unique, or at least there have only been a few countries in all of human history that have been that dominant. So, it’s closer to what their utopia would already be.
In a sense, they can speak about America First and isolationism in the context of that utopia, but as soon as there’s any challenge to that utopia, where Iran or the Palestinians or other types of groups are pushing back against it, then the traditional structure of suppressing the enemies comes back.
Those two poles go together. In the US context, the story is that the enemies have largely ruined the greatness of America, and it needs to be reclaimed. Whereas in the external context, it’s more like the greatness of America is already in place to some degree, and these things just need to be suppressed.
The Anti-Establishment Mood Will Continue to Shape US Politics
Finally, looking beyond the midterms, what indicators would you watch to judge the future direction of American politics: whether MAGA can survive Trump as a durable ideological movement; whether democratic socialism can move from insurgency toward broader influence inside the Democratic Party; whether institutional trust continues to erode; and whether AI-driven political communication further fragments the public sphere? In other words, are we moving toward a durable system of competing populisms operating inside increasingly personalized and technologically segmented information environments—or is there still a plausible route back toward a more shared, deliberative democratic politics?
Assoc. Prof. Nick Beauchamp: There are six big questions. Maybe working backwards, shared deliberative democratic politics was largely a fiction, or, if it existed, it was a brief product of a very limited television media environment in the 50s, 60s, and 70s. So, I don’t think there’s a route back to this, if it ever existed. Nor do I normally think that we necessarily want such a route as believers in democracy and so forth.
A fragmented media landscape with personalized news, personalized campaigns, and so forth is compatible with deliberation, as long as one’s able to explore this space freely and is not completely unaware of the things going on outside of it. That said, there are much more serious problems with democratic institutions. A lot really turns on the contingency of power in the US or even in the world.
Presumably, in 2028, some form of MAGA Republican, whether it’s J.D. Vance, Trump again, or some other figure, will probably be representing the Republican Party. So, it’s hard for me to believe that, absent some giant catastrophe, the center-right faction, which I still think exists, is gonna succeed in taking over the party. Usually, that happens after the party’s in the wilderness for a while, when you have this change of power.
So, the bigger question is going to be whether that MAGA candidate, whoever they are, is running against a progressive-left candidate or a center-left candidate. In terms of gaming out the election, if it’s a center-left candidate—and there are many more strong center-left candidates than there are progressive candidates, just in terms of polling at the moment—it’s gonna be a structurally challenging approach for the Democrats, because they’re going to be working within what I presume will still be an anti-incumbent, anti-establishment, pro-populist mood, both on the left and the right, and they’ll be running a more centrist establishment figure.
That figure will try to present themself as a figure of change, often probably using strong anti-MAGA or anti-Trump language and so forth. But they won’t necessarily be proposing anti-establishment policies in many cases. So, that’s going to create an interesting structure where, as they are in various primaries, the center left will be adopting many of the tones of the anti-establishment, but not many of the policies, while running against a far-right candidate who will presumably still be running on these very anti-establishment policies, but also will be running as the party that has been running the country for four years.
So, in that case, it’ll be an interesting mix of anti-establishment policies and pro-establishment identity or messaging on both sides. If, on the other hand, the contingency is such that a DSA or far-left candidate wins on the Democratic side, then we’d have a very different debate happening here, and the possibility of a very different set of outcomes.
So, again, unfortunately for scientists who like to study regularities rather than accidents, a lot of these things really depend on the accident of what’s going to happen. The only thing we can be fairly confident of is that I expect this anti-establishment mood will continue and will be shaping the environment in which these figures are contesting things in the near future.
In this ECPS interview, Associate Professor Karl Loxbo of Stockholm University examines Sweden as an increasingly striking case of radical-right mainstreaming. He argues that the Sweden Democrats’ electoral decline should not be confused with diminishing political influence, since the party’s rhetoric and policy positions—especially on immigration—have become widely normalized. Assoc. Prof. Loxbo stresses that Sweden has moved “from one extreme to the other,” with SD incorporated into the right-wing bloc and restrictive migration policies broadly accepted across mainstream politics. He also discusses changing boundaries of political acceptability, elite cues, the “bandwagon effect,” Social Democratic accommodation, and the wider European consequences of legitimizing the radical right. Ultimately, he links these developments to “the declining legitimacy of mainstream politics.”
Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Karl Loxbo, Senior Lecturer at the Department of Political Science at Stockholm University, argues that Sweden has become an unusually far-reaching case of radical-right mainstreaming. For Assoc. Prof. Loxbo, the Sweden Democrats’ electoral setback in the September 13 election should not be read as evidence that their political influence has receded. On the contrary, he stresses that the party’s ideas, rhetoric, and policy preferences have become deeply embedded in Swedish political competition. “Sweden is a special—or I would even dare to say extreme—case,” he says, pointing to the speed with which the Sweden Democrats have been incorporated into the right-wing bloc and accepted by other parties.
The central paradox of the interview is therefore the growing distance between electoral support and ideological influence. Although SD lost votes, Assoc. Prof. Loxbo argues that the party has helped transform the boundaries of acceptable political debate, particularly on immigration. Sweden, he notes, has moved from a comparatively liberal migration regime to a radically more restrictive one, a transformation that is “largely due to the SD.” More significantly, he observes that there is now “no opposition in principle to this among the mainstream parties.”
This process, in Assoc. Prof. Loxbo’s account, goes beyond policy convergence. Restrictive positions on immigration have become “highly normalized throughout the political debate and in the media,” while SD’s “rhetoric and policy positions have been extensively normalized in Sweden.” The result is not simply that the radical right has entered the mainstream, but that the mainstream itself has shifted.
Assoc. Prof. Loxbo also emphasizes how dramatically the boundaries of political acceptability have changed. “What would not have been considered acceptable 10 years ago certainly is today,” he says, adding that these boundaries have been “completely erased and redrawn.” In his view, this transformation is reinforced when mainstream elites adopt positions previously associated with the radical right, creating what he describes as a “bandwagon effect” in which citizens either shift their views or become more willing to express preferences they already held.
The Swedish experience, Assoc. Prof. Loxbo warns, carries broader European implications. Once mainstream right parties legitimize the radical right, he argues, “the party system can be reshaped beyond recognition.” Sweden’s incorporation of SD into the right-wing bloc has already produced long-term changes that, while perhaps not fully permanent, now appear deeply entrenched.
Ultimately, Assoc. Prof. Loxbo situates radical-right mainstreaming within a wider crisis of representation. The radical right, he argues, is “just a symptom of a broader phenomenon: the declining legitimacy of mainstream politics.” The democratic challenge, therefore, is not merely whether SD loses votes, but whether mainstream parties can once again develop distinctive agendas and reclaim the capacity to shape political conflict on their own terms.
Here is our interview with Associate Professor Karl Loxbo, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
SD’s Decline Reflects a Shift in Voters’ Political Priorities
Sweden’s 2026 general election produced a narrow parliamentary majority for the red-green parties, with 176 seats compared with 173 for the Tidö parties. The Social Democrats remained the largest party with 28 percent of the vote, followed by the Moderates at 19.8 percent and the Sweden Democrats at 17.5 percent. Source: SVT.
Professor Loxbo, welcome! Let me begin with the recent election result and what it may tell us about the Sweden Democrats’ position. After years of growth, SD fell to around 17.5 percent in the September 13 election, while the centre-left bloc won a very narrow majority. How should we understand this setback? Has SD reached an electoral ceiling, or is this more likely a temporary decline linked to its role in supporting the Tidö government?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: It’s difficult to say, but what is clear is that the issues they own, especially the immigration issue have not been that salient among the electorate during this election campaign. In fact, the electorate has turned back to more traditional materialist and redistributive issues during this election. This is one of the reasons why the focus has not been on the urgency of the topics they raised and, as a result, on which they had increased their support in all elections so far since 2010. I guess there is a perception among the electorate that these issues are not as important as they were in the last election.
That result also raises an important question about the difference between electoral support and political influence. SD lost votes, but many of its positions on migration, integration, deportation, crime, and assimilation have become more mainstream. Should we therefore distinguish between electoral loss and ideological success? Can a radical-right party lose support because other parties have adopted parts of its agenda?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: Sweden is a special—or I would even dare to say extreme—case, in the sense that, in a very short time, the Sweden Democrats have been incorporated into the right-wing bloc as almost a full member. They are now fully accepted by all of the other parties, including the Liberals, and I am not really aware of a similar situation elsewhere.
Their current position, and what you referred to as the mainstreaming of their issues, has to be understood in light of that. The mainstreaming of their agenda is closely connected to their incorporation as a completely normal part of the right-wing bloc. In a very short period—roughly four years—it is almost like moving from one extreme to the other.
Sweden’s Immigration Policy Has Gone from One Extreme to the Other
This connects directly to your research on how radical-right parties shape political debate. You describe SD as an “issue entrepreneur” that helped make immigration more central to Swedish politics. If immigration is now firmly established on the agendas of mainstream parties, has SD become less necessary to voters? Can a party lose ownership of the issue it helped make dominant?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: This again needs to be seen in light of the Sweden Democrats being incorporated into the right-wing bloc as a fully accepted part of it, and that also applies to their position on immigration. At the same time, the leading party on the other side, the Social Democrats, have also adopted this position, so in that sense, maybe the Sweden Democrats can lose ownership of the issue.
But when immigration is highly salient in an election campaign, they are bound to benefit from it. The thing is, it was not really a highly salient issue in this election.
Sweden stands out as a rather special case because immigration policy has gone from one extreme to the other. Before the refugee crisis, Sweden had a highly liberal immigration policy compared with many other European countries. This has changed completely, and it is largely due to the SD. And there is no opposition in principle to this among the mainstream parties. None.
This also raises the question of how mainstream parties react to SD’s success. When established parties adopt stricter positions on immigration to compete with SD, do they weaken the party—or do they instead help normalize SD’s language and way of defining political problems?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: Going back to the previous question, you have to distinguish between the issue of immigration and the actor. Whereas the policy position of being strict on immigration is now highly normalized throughout the political debate and in the media, this was not always the case. The view of the actor itself—the radical right as a political actor—is different. The Sweden Democrats have been mainstreamed within the right-wing bloc, but there is still some tension surrounding the party itself. At the same time, it is certainly the case that their rhetoric and policy positions have been extensively normalized in Sweden.
Policy Influence Does Not Automatically Translate into Electoral Reward
Sweden Democrats’ Square Meeting in Umeå. Jimmie Åkesson speaks to the people on the city square where opposition left-wingers have formed a chain and protest in Umeå, Sweden on August 14, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
There is also a puzzle about the relationship between influence and electoral reward. SD had considerable influence over migration and criminal-justice policy during the last four years, yet it still lost support. Does this suggest that voters distinguish between getting the policies they want and supporting the party that first promoted them?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: Again, voting depends very much on issue saliency, and in this election, the issue was not particularly salient. But it could, of course, be that many voters effectively free-rode on the Sweden Democrats: the policies had already been advanced, and the work had, to some extent, been done.
Let me turn to the relationship between SD and Social Democracy. Your research shows that Social Democrats can sometimes reduce losses to the radical right by taking a tougher line on immigration. But does this create a longer-term problem? Can Social Democrats win back working-class voters without also accepting the idea that welfare and solidarity should be more closely tied to nationality?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: No. In the short term, it seemed that they could do this in some Scandinavian countries, as we saw in Denmark. The Swedish Social Democrats attempted to do the same, but in this election they won little or nothing back from the Sweden Democrats.
So, this appears to be a losing gamble, as much of the research in this field suggests. Accommodation generally does not work, and it works particularly poorly for social democratic parties. In that sense, voters tend to go with the original.
That creates a very slippery slope for social democracy. In the Swedish case, they seem to have adopted this position in order to neutralize the issue and make it less salient, but it has not won them votes. It is difficult to say whether this contributed to the Social Democrats’ weak election result or whether the more important factor was the general ambiguity of their campaign.
Immigration Has Become a Lasting Feature of Swedish Party Competition
This brings us to the wider structure of political conflict in Sweden. Your research suggests that immigration has become more important in shaping how voters understand left and right, while traditional economic issues have become less central. But cost of living, healthcare, welfare, and household finances were also important in 2026. Are economic issues becoming more important again, or has immigration permanently changed Swedish party competition?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: Yes, immigration has become a lasting feature of Swedish party competition—although “permanent” may be too strong a word. Party competition in Sweden has clearly changed, and there is no longer a stable political supply of long-term redistributive platforms.
At the same time, demand for such platforms is highly fragmented and no longer consistently sustained over time. The reason is that the main dimensions of political conflict have become increasingly intertwined. Cultural and economic issues now overlap to a much greater extent, and party competition reflects this development. As a result, Swedish politics has become increasingly centered on cultural issues, particularly immigration.
The election also showed clear geographical differences. SD remained strong in many smaller towns and rural areas but faced more resistance in large and diverse cities. How should we understand this divide? Are different parts of Sweden developing increasingly different political cultures around immigration, identity, and social change?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: You see the same divide everywhere between cities and rural areas. The radical right tends to be stronger in rural areas and somewhat less strong in more affluent urban environments. This is not a division that is specific to Sweden. But to answer your question, yes, for sure, there are different political cultures. Sweden, however, does not deviate in any significant sense from other countries in this respect.
Younger Generations Remain More Libertarian and Cosmopolitan
Greta Thunberg, climate activist, has been demonstrating on Fridays outside the Swedish Parliament. Photo: Liv Oeian
Another interesting result concerns younger voters. SVT’s exit poll suggests that SD lost significant support among 18–21-year-olds. What might explain this? Are younger voters becoming less attracted to radical-right politics, or are they simply moving between parties more easily than older voters?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: Younger voters are not generally that attracted to radical right-wing politics. In fact, the general tendency is that younger generations are more libertarian or more cosmopolitan in their mindset. However, in the last election, it was clear that the SD was strong among young men. The decline now probably also reflects the decline in issue saliency. There are other issues on the agenda, and they are not the issues that the SD own. As a result, you see a decreasing gap between young girls and boys, who are becoming less likely to support the radical right.
Let me turn to the question of normalization. In your earlier work, you argued that strong criticism and isolation of SD could sometimes help the party present itself as an outsider and strengthen its internal unity. Today, SD is much more established. How has the line between what is seen as racist, xenophobic, radical-right, or simply legitimate migration policy changed in Sweden?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: It has changed dramatically—substantially. As I said before, it is like moving from one extreme to the other. What would not have been considered acceptable 10 years ago certainly is today.
The boundaries around these issues have been completely erased and redrawn. One example is the recent debate about why the right-wing side lost the election. The Sweden Democrats quickly argued that this was because immigrants vote for the left, and the narrative seemed to imply that these votes somehow did not count.
Yet hardly anyone reacted to that, except on the left. Ten years ago, it would have caused a major scandal. Today, it does not, and that illustrates how profoundly the boundaries around this issue have shifted.
Democracies Should Be Wary When Political Arguments Target Particular Groups
That leads to a difficult but important distinction. Democratic states clearly have the right to control migration and set rules on citizenship and integration. At what point does a restrictive migration policy become nativist or exclusionary? What signs should scholars and people look for?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: You should look for signs such as the one I just mentioned: when political rhetoric begins to single out specific groups. When particular groups become the focus of political argument—when people are told to be wary of this group or that, or when individuals are treated as if they act collectively—that is, at least from the Swedish case, one warning sign.
Your research with Mike Farjam also shows how people respond to what they think the majority believes. Could this help explain the normalization of radical-right ideas? If restrictive views are increasingly presented as “common sense” or the voice of a “silent majority,” can this make people more willing to accept or express such positions?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: Yes, definitely. It’s the same mechanism here, but it is more about people revealing preferences they already hold. They do so in response to elite cues. When elites shift their positions on these issues, people often shift as well.
The key point is that this broader change does not occur simply because the Sweden Democrats move in a certain direction. They tend to reach a more limited electorate, particularly those who already hold strongly anti-immigrant views. The broader shift comes when mainstream parties also change their positions.
In the Swedish case, that can produce a bandwagon effect: people either shift their positions on these issues or become more willing to express views they already held. That is what redraws the boundaries.
Swedish Exceptionalism Was Greatly Exaggerated
Jimmie Åkesson speaks to the people on the city square where opposition left-wingers have formed a chain and protest in Umeå, Sweden on August 14, 2018.
This also connects to Sweden’s image as a highly trusting and tolerant society. You have questioned the idea that high social trust automatically means high tolerance toward outsiders. Looking at Sweden’s shift toward a more restrictive migration debate, was the idea of Swedish exceptionalism always somewhat exaggerated?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: Yes, somewhat exaggerated, perhaps. But if you compare Sweden with many other countries, it is still more tolerant. Although these issues have been normalized here as well, the idea of Swedish exceptionalism has certainly been greatly exaggerated. The belief that Sweden was immune to radical-right populism was actually widely held around 20 years ago. That turned out to be highly naive and reflected an exaggerated belief in the liberalism of Swedish public opinion.
Let me broaden the discussion to Europe. Your recent research with Brigitte Pircher suggests that European integration has reduced conflict in some economic areas while leaving more room for political conflict over identity and social protection. Could this help explain why migration, borders, and national identity have become so important for radical-right parties?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: Yes, and this is a traditional explanation in the literature for the general rise of right-wing populism: the convergence of established parties on economic issues. To some extent, European integration has pushed them toward similar positions on issues that were previously more politicized. As a result, this creates political space that can be exploited by other parties, including the radical right. So yes, I believe that.
Sweden Shows the Risks of Mainstream Conservatives Embracing the Radical Right
The Swedish case also has wider European relevance. Germany faces the AfD, France the National Rally, and Britain Reform UK. What lessons can these countries draw from Sweden about isolating the radical right, adopting parts of its agenda, or giving it influence over government?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: As soon as mainstream right parties legitimize the radical right—not only by accommodating its main issues and adopting the same positions, but by actively saying that it was right all along—the party system can be reshaped beyond recognition. I doubt that will happen in Germany with the AfD, but if it does, the consequences would be profound.
That is what happened in the Swedish case. When the right-wing bloc included the Sweden Democrats, it produced long-term shifts that now look almost permanent, although I would hesitate to call them fully permanent.
So, it is a significant risk, as the Swedish conservatives have shown. If the German CDU were to follow the same path, I would be worried.
The Radical Right Is a Symptom of the Declining Legitimacy of Mainstream Politics
Finally, let me end with the broader democratic question. If SD continues to lose votes but much of the political agenda it helped create remains in place, how should we judge democratic resilience? Is it enough for the party itself to weaken, or do mainstream parties also need to regain the ability to shape political debate on their own terms?
Assoc. Prof. Karl Loxbo: Yes, definitely. Otherwise, someone else will come along. I would say that the radical right is just a symptom of a broader phenomenon: the declining legitimacy of mainstream politics.
This does not occur in a vacuum. It is the result of a long-term decline in the legitimacy of mainstream parties, which in turn creates space for the mobilization of new parties. So, if the radical right declines, someone else will come along, as long as we have voting rights.
So yes, of course, mainstream parties need to develop clear agendas and political issues of their own again. The question is: can they?
In this ECPS interview, Dr. Sophie Suda, Postdoctoral Researcher in Comparative Politics at the University of Basel, examines the AfD’s transformation from a protest party into a broader political force capable of mobilizing multiple grievances across Germany. She argues that the party’s rise cannot be explained by eastern German exceptionalism or immigration alone, but reflects the interaction of structural neglect, economic insecurity, political distrust, and effective grievance mobilization. Dr. Suda cautions that dismantling the Brandmauer or imitating AfD positions would further legitimize the radical right rather than win voters back. Instead, she emphasizes effective policy delivery, sustained investment in neglected regions, political representation, and clearer party differentiation as the more viable democratic response to the AfD’s continued advance.
Germany’s party system is entering a period of profound strain as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) expands beyond its earlier identity as a protest formation and establishes itself as a durable force across an increasingly broad range of policy domains. In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Sophie Suda, Postdoctoral Researcher in Comparative Politics at the University of Basel, argues that the AfD’s recent trajectory cannot be reduced either to eastern German exceptionalism or to a single grievance such as immigration. Instead, she describes a party that has become “a broader political phenomenon rather than simply a vehicle for protest,” increasingly credited by voters not only on migration and security but also on the economy and social security.
For Dr. Suda, the AfD’s rise reflects the convergence of long-term structural grievances, economic insecurity, distrust of political elites, demographic decline, and the party’s capacity to mobilize disaffected and previously non-voting citizens. In eastern Germany, post-reunification legacies still matter: unemployment, infrastructure deficits, regional neglect, and the perception that political elites “did not care about” large parts of the population have created fertile ground for the party. Yet she cautions against treating this as a uniquely eastern phenomenon, stressing that far-right and nativist attitudes have existed elsewhere as well and that the crucial change is the emergence of a party capable of effectively mobilizing them.
At the center of the conversation is the increasingly contested question of how mainstream parties should respond. Dr. Suda firmly rejects the idea that the Brandmauer, or firewall, has failed simply because the AfD has continued to grow. Its purpose, she argues, is not “to keep the AfD small,” but to define the limits of political cooperation and prevent its entry into office. Bringing the party into government, in her view, would produce “greater legitimization and inclusion, not fewer voters for the AfD.” Nor does she expect governing responsibility to moderate the party ideologically: institutional constraints may limit what populist or extremist parties can do, but “participation in government is more likely to lead to legitimization.”
Her prescription for mainstream parties is therefore sharply defined: do not dismantle the firewall, do not imitate the AfD, but deliver. Copying its positions—particularly on immigration—“does not win voters back either; it simply legitimizes those positions, while voters still choose the original in the end.” The more promising strategy lies in effective governance, sustained investment in neglected regions, political representation, and clear programmatic differentiation. As Dr. Suda puts it, parties must remain “distinguishable while also demonstrating that [they] can deliver.”
Dr. Sophie Suda is a Postdoctoral Researcher in Comparative Politics at the University of Basel.
Here is our interview with Dr. Sophie Suda, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
The AfD Is No Longer Simply a Protest Party
Dr. Sophie Suda, welcome! Let me begin with Saxony-Anhalt. AfD’s 43.8% victory appears to mark more than the consolidation of a marginal protest constituency. Should we interpret this primarily as the deepening of an eastern German exceptionalism rooted in post-reunification grievances and regional alienation, or as evidence that AfD has crossed a more consequential threshold—from protest party to potential governing force, with implications for Germany’s national party system and coalition politics?
Dr. Sophie Suda: In general, the AfD is strong across Germany, not only in the east. What is particularly striking is the extent of its strength and the positive trajectory it has shown, including doubling its vote share compared with the previous election there. So, this is not necessarily a phenomenon specific to Eastern Germany. What is especially interesting is how the party has evolved. You mentioned that it may once have been described as a protest party, but we have now reached a point where that characterization no longer seems adequate.
We can see this particularly in the policy areas in which citizens attribute competence to the AfD. Traditionally, these include migration and security, where the party is perceived as highly competent, but increasingly also areas such as the economy and social security. This suggests that the AfD has become a broader political phenomenon rather than simply a vehicle for protest. There are, of course, regional differences within Germany, but these relate more to the degree of legitimization than to a phenomenon confined to particular regions.
The AfD Has Been Able to Exploit Multiple Grievances
Germany was long regarded as one of Europe’s most resilient party systems, with strong institutions, stable coalitions, and a powerful cordon sanitaire against the radical right. What, in your view, went most fundamentally wrong: economic stagnation, migration politics, distrust of elites, weak political leadership, eastern German alienation, failures of representation—or the mainstream parties’ own strategic choices?
Dr. Sophie Suda: You mentioned a lot of points, and there isn’t really one reason I can give. There are long-term grievances, including economic grievances, as well as crises and weaknesses among other parties, and all of these factors contribute to one another. Some have longer-term effects, while others are more immediate.
Especially in Eastern Germany, many people have long felt that political elites did not care about them. After reunification, unemployment was high, and there are still infrastructure problems compared with the West. At the same time, nativist attitudes have always been present, and the AfD has been able to mobilize around them. What we can see, particularly in the last election but also more generally, is that the party is very effective at mobilizing people, especially non-voters. It managed to attract more non-voters than all other parties combined.
So, there is no single reason. It is more about all these factors coming together and the AfD being able to exploit them. There is also demographic decline in many areas. All of this contributes to distrust of political elites, the federal government, and incumbents, along with the perception that people are being left alone with their problems. So, it is more about this broader sense of how people perceive politics and political elites than about any single wrongdoing.
Cooperating with the AfD Would Lead to Greater Legitimization
Photo: Shutterstock.
The Brandmauer (firewall) was designed to isolate the AfD, yet the party has continued to grow. Has exclusion protected democratic norms, or has it unintentionally reinforced AfD’s outsider narrative by allowing the party to claim that an entire political establishment is conspiring against its voters? At what point does democratic containment risk becoming electorally counterproductive?
Dr. Sophie Suda: As you mentioned, the Brandmauer is not there to keep the AfD small, but rather to make clear which parties you are willing to cooperate with, allow into office, or include in your decisions. So, it is not a failure in any way, because it has kept, and continues to keep, the AfD out of office.
The first question is what the alternative would be. If the alternative were to bring the AfD into office or cooperate with it, that would lead to greater legitimization and inclusion, not to fewer voters for the AfD. Another important point is that the AfD is an anti-democratic party and, at least in Saxony-Anhalt, is classified as right-wing extremist. So, parties do not really have a great deal of choice. Where they can differ, however, is between cooperating with the AfD, on the one hand, and, on the other, taking the concerns of its voters seriously and responding to this part of the population.
Parties Should Not Adapt to and Tolerate the AfD
In your research with Andorff-Woller and colleagues, you find that coalitions including populists tend to be less stable, but that this destabilizing effect diminishes where populist participation becomes more common. Does Saxony-Anhalt suggest Germany may now be approaching precisely that moment—where the question is no longer whether AfD can be excluded indefinitely, but whether the system will begin adapting to its presence?
Dr. Sophie Suda: Yes, it’s quite a difficult situation. We do find, in general, that having populist parties in government correlates with premature government dissolution. At the same time, they are also more likely to enter government in situations where there is already instability, which may further reinforce this lack of cooperation.
So, if the question is whether the political system should adapt simply to their presence, this relates to the point I mentioned earlier: they are undemocratic and an extremist party. The real question is whether other parties should adapt to that and tolerate it, and I believe they should not. They should draw a clear line where certain forms of behavior begin to pose a risk of democratic decline.
Populists in Government Do Not Generally Become More Moderate
Your work raises a difficult possibility: populist parties may become institutionally normalized without becoming ideologically moderate. If AfD eventually enters a state government, should we expect governing responsibility to constrain it, or could normalization instead legitimate radical positions while leaving its anti-pluralist core largely intact?
Dr. Sophie Suda: To some extent, they would be institutionally constrained, because in a state or federal government, you cannot simply do whatever you want. There are constraints from the courts, the EU, and the federal government. But those constraints are institutional, not ideological. Ideologically, extremist or populist parties in government do not generally change their positions or become more moderate. Instead, participation in government is more likely to lead to legitimization.
Other research also shows that when such parties enter government—whether as a junior partner, senior partner, or in a single-party government—democratic quality immediately declines, particularly in terms of minority rights and liberal freedoms. So, this is not a situation in which governing responsibility would necessarily make them more moderate.
The AfD Is No Longer Defined Primarily by Anti-Immigration
AfD demo with slogan Stop Islamization and counter demonstration of the Left in Luetten Klein in Rostock, Germany on May 14, 2018. AfD, Alternative for Germany, is a right wing political party in Germany. Photo: Shutterstock.
AfD’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt coincided with deep dissatisfaction with the CDU-led political establishment, economic insecurity, cost-of-living pressures, and very low confidence in Chancellor Merz. Yet immigration was not necessarily the dominant concern for all voters. Does this suggest AfD is now succeeding because it has transformed itself from a single-issue anti-immigration party into a broader vehicle for accumulated anti-system discontent?
Dr. Sophie Suda: The AfD has always been quite effective at incorporating many different sources of dissatisfaction. Even when it began as an anti-EU party and later became strongly associated with immigration, its appeal was never limited to that issue. During COVID, around pro-Russian attitudes, and amid various other crises, the party was able to capitalize on a wide range of grievances.
I think the main difference now is this broader approach. At least in Saxony-Anhalt, immigration was not even such a major issue, nor the most important one. Yet the AfD manages to gain credit, or to be perceived as competent, across a wide range of policy areas. That is what is new. So, becoming broader and being seen as competent in almost all policy areas marks a significant change.
Reunification Provided Fertile Ground for AfD Support
Your earlier work on Mecklenburg-Vorpommern highlighted persistent east-west differences, weaker economic performance in eastern districts, border effects, and the importance of regional neglect, while also warning against monocausal explanations. How much of AfD’s strength today can still be explained by post-reunification grievances, and how much has become a more contemporary rebellion against the Federal Republic itself?
Dr. Sophie Suda: Looking only at historical explanations is definitely too simplistic. Historical legacies matter, and they matter considerably in shaping the level of support, but they do not really explain why the AfD suddenly doubled its number of voters, or its vote share, and why this increase occurred.
There are still many structural factors that were, or are, the result of reunification, such as economic problems and infrastructure. Many companies were also dissolved or bought up by Western German firms. These are structural factors that can benefit the AfD everywhere, but in eastern Germany many of them come together. There are also longstanding far-right strongholds that the party can now draw on. In that sense, reunification created many of the conditions that help explain why people vote for the AfD and provided fertile ground for its support.
At the same time, when we look at social norms and the way far-right ideas have become normalized, this is not something specific to eastern Germany. Far-right and nativist attitudes existed elsewhere as well; what has changed is that there is now a party capable of mobilizing them. So, the recent increase is better explained by shorter-term factors that the AfD has been able to exploit and mobilize around.
Neglected Areas Can Be Won Back
Your 2021 analysis showed that targeted regional investment, stronger political attention to neglected areas, and a popular, credible incumbent helped the SPD cut into AfD strongholds in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern. Does the current AfD resurgence there suggest that those gains were temporary, or that mainstream parties failed to institutionalize the lesson that territorial neglect and political distance must be addressed continuously rather than episodically?
Dr. Sophie Suda: To some extent, it shows the latter. In 2021, several factors came together to explain why the SPD performed so well. There were a number of short-term factors: the incumbent was quite popular, the AfD candidate was very weak, and there was also a favorable federal trend for the SPD.
But the previous government had also pursued this Vorpommern strategy, especially in the east of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, where the AfD was, and remains, strong, and where it had previously been particularly strong. They had a long-term strategy of investing in the region. So, it was not only about short-term factors. They also had a parliamentary state secretary who focused on this region. It was therefore also about political attention and representation.
They also managed, perhaps more than now, to deliver on a number of policies, such as childcare. So, it was this combination of short-term factors and a longer-term strategy of reaching voters, especially in the East.
Saxony-Anhalt Could Produce Either AfD Momentum or Counter-Mobilization
AfD posters displayed on a stand during Germany’s 2025 federal election campaign. Such posters were relatively rare in public spaces, as they were often quickly torn down. Photo: Dreamstime.
AfD now leads the latest Mecklenburg-Vorpommern poll with 35%, while the SPD has recovered to 32%. Given that AfD received only 16.7% there in 2021, what would a possible AfD victory on September 20 signify? Would it confirm a durable realignment of eastern German politics, or could candidate effects, government satisfaction, and late mobilization still reproduce something closer to the 2021 outcome?
Dr. Sophie Suda: Looking at the polls now, it seems quite likely that the AfD will make enormous gains. At the same time, the candidate effect still favors (Minister-President of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) Manuela Schwesig, whom voters across most of the political spectrum continue to prefer over AfD’s Leif-Erik Holm —though not, of course, among AfD voters.
There are also still many undecided voters, so the key question now is who will be able to mobilize them. It will also be important to see whether the AfD can benefit from the momentum generated by its success in Saxony-Anhalt, or whether that result instead produces a counter-mobilization among other voters.
Berlin Would Show That the AfD Is Not Just a Rural Party
Berlin presents almost the opposite social and political environment: a large, diverse, metropolitan electorate in which CDU, Linke, Greens, and AfD are all competing near the top while the SPD has fallen sharply. If AfD approaches or exceeds 18–20% in Berlin, would that be more consequential than an even larger result in eastern rural Germany because it would demonstrate that AfD’s appeal has broken decisively out of its traditional geographic and sociological strongholds?
Dr. Sophie Suda: Yes, perhaps symbolically to some extent, because they can show that they are not just a rural party. But, in general, they are strong across all German states, and the difference is that in Berlin they will not be able to govern. So, the actual consequences would not be as significant as they potentially are in Saxony-Anhalt. This result would therefore confirm that the AfD is strong, but it would not necessarily have the same consequences as the party reaching almost 44% in other states.
Parties Must Cooperate without Losing Their Political Identity
Germany’s mainstream parties have increasingly been forced into ideologically awkward coalitions whose principal common denominator is excluding AfD. Can such alliances remain democratically persuasive if voters perceive them as programmatically incoherent? At what point does coalition engineering to contain AfD begin to deepen the very anti-establishment resentment on which AfD thrives?
Dr. Sophie Suda: It fits the AfD narrative quite well when all other parties are portrayed as the same and as part of a corrupt elite, while the AfD presents itself as the only alternative that looks after voters. But the AfD makes that claim regardless of who is governing. So, while this fits its narrative, it does not necessarily change what the party is doing or the approach it takes.
I think the more important point is that these coalitions have to govern and cooperate effectively. That is, of course, difficult when they bring together more parties with greater ideological differences. On the one hand, they have to cooperate; on the other, they must show voters what they stand for and demonstrate that not all elites are the same. Each party has to maintain a clear identity, deliver for its voters, and show that it can produce effective policies. That is the greater difficulty with these coalitions.
Cooperation and Efficiency Can Reinforce Each Other
Your research with Detlef Jahn shows that executive efficiency and consensus capacity need not be opposites and can jointly improve policy performance. Has Germany’s current problem become precisely a failure to combine the two—a political system still oriented toward consensus but increasingly perceived by citizens as unable to deliver decisively on growth, migration, infrastructure, energy, and public services?
Dr. Sophie Suda: Yes, this is exactly what we find. Sometimes cooperation and efficiency are perceived as a trade-off, but in fact they can reinforce each other and produce better policy outcomes. The key question is how to combine them, in which areas, and how governments coordinate effectively enough to achieve both.
There has always been competition between parties, and there still is. But when parties govern together, they also have to cooperate across many areas. At the same time, they need to remain sufficiently distinct for voters to understand what each party stands for. So, you need consensus to reach decisions, but also efficiency in implementing them.
To some extent, this is where Germany has struggled in the past. We had many grand coalitions in which center-left and center-right parties governed together, but the compromises they reached did not necessarily satisfy voters on either side. In recent years, parties have probably failed to communicate clearly enough what they stand for.
The AfD Is Very Effective at Exploiting Crises
Your recent work on critical events finds that governing parties tend to converge and project unity during externally driven shocks, whereas opposition parties have incentives to differentiate themselves and exploit grievances. Has AfD become unusually effective at turning successive crises—Ukraine, migration, inflation, energy insecurity, the Middle East, and economic stagnation—into a permanent opposition advantage?
Dr. Sophie Suda: Yes, they are quite good at exploiting this. In general, this is what all opposition parties do to some extent when there is a crisis or external event. They can use that to show how they are different, and they can criticize the government, especially when it is an important event. There have been many crises now, which also leads to a lot of insecurity, and the AfD works on that, builds on that, and exploits it, essentially.
We Should Not Expect a Change in German Foreign Policy
The Bundestag building at dusk, with German and EU flags waving in front, in Berlin, Germany, on November 17, 2024. The Reichstag dome is visible, symbolizing Germany’s democracy. Photo: Margarita Kosareva.
AfD’s pro-Russian orientation and opposition to continued support for Ukraine distinguish it sharply from the German foreign-policy mainstream. Your research shows that critical foreign-policy events usually strengthen cohesion among governing parties while opposition parties strategically distance themselves. Could AfD’s electoral rise eventually break Germany’s post-2022 foreign-policy consensus and constrain Berlin’s ability to lead within NATO and the EU?
Dr. Sophie Suda: At the moment, no. Part of the campaign in Saxony-Anhalt focused on foreign policy, but state governments do not decide foreign policy, so they have little power to change it. Supporting Ukraine, for example, is an essential part of Germany’s foreign policy, and there is no intention to change that.
Our research on cohesion shows that governing parties tend to stick together and become more cohesive during foreign-policy crises, at least to some extent and for a certain period. This is also an area where Friedrich Merz enjoys support within his own party and among voters, especially compared with other policy areas. So, for him, this is probably one area he should not change.
I therefore do not think he will. Of course, there will be pressure from the AfD, and there are other parties with different foreign-policy positions, such as the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance -BSW). But these parties are not governing at the federal level. So, there will certainly be debate, but I do not think we should expect a change in German foreign policy.
Don’t Break the Firewall, Don’t Imitate the AfD—Deliver
And lastly, Dr. Suda, stepping back, what should mainstream German parties do now? Continuing the firewall may reinforce AfD’s anti-establishment appeal; accommodating AfD risks normalizing its radical positions; imitating its migration and cultural agenda may validate its diagnoses; and broad anti-AfD coalitions can appear incoherent. Is there still a viable democratic strategy for defeating AfD electorally—and if so, does it require better policy delivery, renewed social and territorial representation, clearer ideological differentiation, or a fundamental reconstruction of Germany’s party system?
Dr. Sophie Suda: Unfortunately, there is no single strategy for winning back 44% of voters. But the first thing parties should not do is break the firewall, because that would only lead to further legitimization of the AfD and the radical right, normalize those attitudes, and reinforce those positions. It would not win voters back.
The same applies to trying to imitate the AfD, which is something the CDU in particular, but also other parties, have tried to do in the past, including by adopting its positions on immigration. That does not win voters back either; it simply legitimizes those positions, while voters still choose the original in the end.
What parties can do—and this is easier said than done—is deliver effective policies. We saw in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern that neglected areas can be won back if there is a long-term strategy to address voters, respond to their concerns, and give them a sense of being represented, including through policies on the economy, infrastructure, and public services.
This does not require a fundamental reconstruction of the party system. It may instead require parties to adapt how they work together so that politics is not reduced to the AfD versus all other parties. At the same time, each party has to ensure that its policies remain distinguishable while also demonstrating that it can deliver. I think that is the more difficult trade-off parties are facing now.
In this commentary, Dr. Bulent Kenes examines the political transformation of Sweden through the rise of the Sweden Democrats (SD) and normalization of far-right. Drawing on his experience of seeking refuge in a country once widely regarded as a “moral superpower,” Kenes contrasts Sweden’s longstanding commitments to liberal democracy, pluralism, multicultural accommodation, gender equality, minority rights, and inclusive citizenship with the SD’s increasingly influential nativist and ethno-nationalist project. He argues that the breaking of the cordon sanitaire and the Tidö Agreement have helped move ideas once confined to the far right into mainstream politics. As Sweden approaches the September 13 election, Kenes asks whether the SD’s promise to “make Sweden Sweden again” ultimately risks dismantling the very values that historically made Sweden distinctive.
A Sweden Democrats (SD) campaign poster ahead of Sweden’s September 13, 2026 parliamentary elections, featuring the slogan “This is how we make Sweden Sweden again” and highlighting the party’s policies on immigration, crime, Islamism, citizenship, welfare, and the economy.
For as long as I can remember, I have worked for human rights, the rule of law, constitutional and liberal democracy, an egalitarian and just society, and global peace. During my years as a professional journalist and media executive, I likewise sought to defend and advance these values. I vocally opposed every step taken by Erdogan’s government after 2011 as Turkey moved increasingly toward one-man rule and authoritarianism, and I never withheld my criticism. As Erdogan rapidly advanced toward one-man rule and autocracy, as every aspiring dictator does, I became a target of his repression. Because of my criticism centered on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights etc., I was subjected to countless smear campaigns in pro-Erdogan media and on social media, faced dozens of investigations, was repeatedly detained, and was briefly imprisoned.
By 2016, as Erdogan was constructing his autocratic regime step by step and there was no longer room for me to breathe in Turkey, I decided to leave the country. But where should I go? By virtue of my profession, I had by then visited more than 70 countries, including Sweden, and had lived in the United States for several years. Yet the choice for me was not so difficult. I knew that the very values and standards whose absence I had felt in my own country and for which I had struggled—democracy, human rights, transparency, the rule of law, freedom of the press and expression, gender equality, environmental rights and justice, and similar principles—shone most brightly in Sweden, which at the time was widely regarded as a “moral superpower.”
As Turkey fell into the grip of autocracy and Islamofascism, my choice was clear. Sweden stood out as a country in which virtually everything we had struggled, unsuccessfully, to establish and consolidate in Turkey had already become largely institutionalized. If, despite all our efforts, pluralist and liberal democracy, a state governed by the rule of law according to universal standards, an almost exemplary environment for freedom of the press and expression, and similar values would simply not come to us, I believed that it was my most natural right to go to them. Having overcome all the technical obstacles placed in my way by the Erdogan regime, I eventually managed to reach Sweden.
Over the ten years since then, unfortunately, Sweden—like the rest of the world—has changed considerably. Alongside some genuine problems generated by the 2015 migration wave, far-right perceptions of threat were constructed on a scale vastly exceeding the actual magnitude of those problems. In the process, both the social sensibilities that made Sweden the Sweden we knew have been eroded and political actors increasingly influenced by the far right have gradually weakened the country’s once-proud status as a “moral superpower.” Sweden, which one might have hoped would serve as one of the moral barriers against the global drift toward the far right, has itself undergone a far-reaching political transformation in the same direction.
At the center of this transformation are the Sweden Democrats (SD), who increasingly challenge the liberal, pluralist, and inclusive political culture that long underpinned Sweden’s reputation as a “moral superpower.” The ideological core of the SD combines nativism, authoritarianism, and populism, while migration, Islam, national identity, and cultural homogeneity constitute central axes of its political discourse. The party advances a more homogeneous conception of the nation grounded in ethno-nationalism and frames immigrants, particularly Muslims, as potential threats to Sweden’s cultural integrity and welfare state. At this point, however, I should not fail to acknowledge the provocative and highly irresponsible activities of certain Muslim immigrant groups.
Given the SD’s historical roots in Swedish fascism, nazism, white nationalism, and far-right milieus, one of the most consequential changes under Jimmie Åkesson has been the effort to largely free the party from the burden of this past and give it a more legitimate and parliamentary appearance. Yet despite this “normalization” and transformation of its public image, opposition to immigration and Islamophobia have retained their central place in the party’s political discourse. As early as 2009, Åkesson described various phenomena associated with Islam as “the greatest foreign threat to Sweden since the Second World War” and placed Muslims at the center of this threat narrative—one of the most striking manifestations of this ideological continuity.
Although its historical roots extend much further back, in the populist far-right political imaginary represented today by the SD, multiculturalism is portrayed not as a form of pluralism that enriches Swedish society but as a source of social fragmentation and weakening national cohesion. In its place, folkhem—the “people’s home”—is being reasserted. Yet Åkesson’s vision of folkhem differs markedly from Per Albin Hansson’s: it is a tightly integrated society based largely on the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of the native Swedish majority, shared values, and solidarity. Within this understanding, “being Swedish” means more than merely holding Swedish citizenship; immigrants are expected to adapt culturally to “Swedish values” and to the “Christian, democratic world” to which Sweden is understood to belong. The boundary between integration and assimilation consequently becomes increasingly blurred.
Islam and Muslims occupy a distinctive place in this politics of boundary-making. In Åkesson’s discourse, Christianity and its moral values are defined as foundational pillars of folkhem, whereas Islam is frequently portrayed as being in conflict with Sweden’s cultural and social order. The rise of the SD therefore cannot be understood simply as the hardening of immigration policy or the electoral success of a populist radical right party. At a deeper level, it represents a broader political transformation in which Sweden’s “exceptionalism,” built upon consociational democracy, multiculturalism, inclusive citizenship, and pluralism, is increasingly displaced by the normalization of a more closed, assimilationist, and ethno-culturally homogeneous vision of Sweden.
Many racist and far-right positions that were once considered shameful, or even unacceptable, within mainstream politics when the SD was founded have today become substantially normalized. The breaking of the cordon sanitaire surrounding the SD in 2022 did more than open greater political space for the party’s far-right and ethno-populist positions. In exchange for its external support for the coalition government formed by the center-right parties, the extensive policy agenda it secured through the Tidö Agreement gave the SD extraordinary influence over government policy. Discourses once regarded as unacceptable and incompatible with the Sweden we knew have, through the Tidö Agreement, become part of government policy and mainstream political debate. Changes to migration and terrorism legislation over the past four years, measures that have generated debate over press and freedom of expression, and new political orientations concerning gender equality have made the question of whether Sweden is steadily moving away from the Sweden we knew all the more pressing.
It is precisely here that the central irony of the SD’s promise to “making Sweden Sweden again” lies. Sweden’s extraordinary international prestige was not built merely on prosperity and effective governance. It was also grounded in liberal democracy, openness, multicultural accommodation, gender equality, strong minority rights, and an inclusive conception of citizenship. Despite certain notable deteriorations in some international indicators amid initiatives moving in the opposite direction—initiatives spearheaded by the SD—international indices show that significant parts of this institutional architecture, thankfully, remain resilient today.
The Sweden Democrats, however, offer a different answer to the question of what Sweden should be. Their political project places more restrictive immigration policies, assimilation, cultural homogeneity, and the preservation of a particular Swedish national identity grounded in ethnicity at the center of political belonging. Particularly significant is the increasingly hard-line approach toward Islam and Muslims: legitimate debates that need to be conducted about radical Islamism and problems of integration can, at times, become intertwined with broader Islamophobic narratives that treat the very presence of Muslims as a cultural threat. Opposition to multiculturalism similarly imagines social cohesion not through pluralism but through a greater degree of cultural—and implicitly ethnic—homogeneity.
Sweden now heads back to the polls on September 13 after four years of the Tidö experiment and this broader transformation. The latest polling indicates a clear advantage for the opposition. Across the four most recent major surveys, the opposition’s lead over the Tidö bloc ranges from 3.7 to 10 percentage points, while the weighted polling average as of August 27 indicates an opposition advantage of approximately seven points. Together, S, V, MP, and C stand at roughly 52.6 percent, compared with approximately 45.7 percent for SD, M, KD, and L. Moreover, with the Liberals hovering around 2 percent—well below the 4 percent parliamentary threshold—the parliamentary arithmetic becomes even more difficult for the Tidö bloc.
The SD, once excluded behind a cordon sanitaire, is no longer content merely to pull the Tidö parties toward the far right from outside government. It now openly expresses its ambition to enter government directly, demanding key ministerial portfolios. With a Trumpian slogan, it tells voters how, over the past four years, it has “made Sweden Sweden again” from outside government and now seeks a mandate to push its nativist, ethno-nationalist, populist, anti-Islam, and anti-immigration etc. policies even further.
Yet what made the Sweden we knew distinctly Swedish was neither racism, the legacy of neo-Nazi politics, nor opposition to multiculturalism. If there is genuinely an ambition to “make Sweden Sweden again,” the Sweden worth remembering is the Sweden of Per Albin Hansson’s folkhem ideal, Tage Erlander’s democratic welfare state, and Olof Palme’s egalitarian, internationalist, and human-rights-centered political legacy. The question facing Swedish voters on September 13, therefore, is not simply who will form the next government. The more fundamental question is this: “Making Sweden Sweden Again”—but which Sweden? And what will the Sweden the world came to know as a “moral superpower” have to sacrifice for the Sweden that the SD is now seeking to create?
In this commentary, Dr. Kamil Joński examines why Poland remains an exceptional case in contemporary Europe, where high levels of religiosity continue to overlap with strong right-wing political identification. Drawing on data from the 11th wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), he demonstrates that regular church attendance and conservative political identity increasingly reinforce one another, creating a distinctive “churchgoing right” that shapes both political discourse and the Catholic Church itself. Dr. Joński argues that this convergence helps explain Poland’s restrictive social policies, the enduring influence of the Church on public life, and emerging tensions between Polish conservatives and the post-Vatican II direction of the Holy See. The commentary offers fresh insights into religion, polarization, and democratic politics in Europe.
The breakup of the Polish right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party has inspired numerous analyses, commentaries, and anecdotes. One of them offers intriguing insight into the uniqueness of the Polish right on the European political landscape. The leader of the new initiative, Development Plus, M. Morawiecki (“Law and Justice” Prime Minister from 2017 to 2023), hosted its July 31, 2026, kick-off as a grill event. Among other preparations, he secured a Roman Catholic bishop’s permission to violate the canon law requirement of abstaining from eating meat on Fridays (the day of the Crucifixion), so that his fellow right-wingers could enjoy grilled sausage. Quite a bizarre touch at the gathering of a self-proclaimed modern and pro-development right, led by a former bank CEO? Only at first glance.
Many Poles Remain Religious…
The data collected during the recent (11th) wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) documents the relatively high religiosity of Poles, with nearly 60 percent of respondents describing themselves as religious (“Regardless of whether you belong to a particular religion, how religious would you say you are?”, variable rlgdgr).
…and Maintains Bond with Institutional Church
The theory predicts that “secular transition happens in three steps: first, public ritual participation declines; second, the importance of religion to individuals declines; and third, people shed religious affiliation.” In this context, it is even more important that a substantial share of Poles maintains its bond with the institution of the Roman Catholic Church. Despite the post-COVID drop in religious participation, 40 percent of respondents declare regular, weekly participation in religious services (“Apart from special occasions such as weddings and funerals, about how often do you attend religious services nowadays?”, variable rlgatnd).
The Right-Wing Is Strong…
At the same time, the Polish political landscape is skewed toward the right, with two out of five respondents placing themselves on the right end of the political spectrum (“In politics, people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Using this card, where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?”, variable lrscale).
… and Overlap Matters
However, the most revealing insight emerges from combining these two dimensions: the bond with the institutional Church, as measured by religious participation, and self-placement on the political spectrum. It turns out that nearly one in four Poles declare both weekly attendance at religious services and right-wing identification.
What makes this situation truly unique on the European political landscape is that this “churchgoing right” constitutes the majority among both churchgoers and right-wingers. In other words, their sensitivities are likely to set the tone for both political rallies and sermons. As a consequence, the Polish throne and the altar remain entangled in ways that are virtually unimaginable elsewhere in contemporary Europe.
The result is, among other things, an extraordinarily restrictive abortion law, a state-enforced de facto blasphemy law (the criminal provision on “offending religious feelings”), and the rejection of same-sex civil unions (not to mention marriages). For the mechanisms of Church influence, see A. Grzymała-Busse (2015), Nations under God: How Churches Use Moral Authority to Influence Policy.
“Post-Secularism” or Anti-Vatican II
The situation seems to affect the Church as well. Back in the early 2000s, when the Polish conservative Pope John Paul II made statements that were interpreted as endorsing Poland’s accession to the EU, the population of churchgoers included self-declared moderate leftists and rightists, with a firm anchor in the center.
As time went by, the mutually reinforcing processes of polarization (not to say radicalization) and secularization (people voting with their feet) shifted the proportion of right-wingers among churchgoers from 30 to nearly 60 percent. According to the 11th wave of the ESS, right-wing hardliners (i.e., those who place themselves at 10 on the ten-point left-right scale) alone account for one-fifth of churchgoers. The median churchgoer in Poland now places herself at 7 on the ten-point left-right scale. There is evidence of similar processes shaping the clergy as well.
If a right-wing churchgoer demands a firm anti-left and anti-liberal group identity (spiced with a sense of divine truth and centuries-old tradition), she is unlikely to be satisfied by Pope Leo XIV’s visit to Lampedusa. Indeed, at Morawiecki’s grill event, the very first panel discussion—entitled “The Right 2027: How to Win Elections and Widen the Supporter Base”—drifted into a discussion of the Holy See’s teaching on migration, with one participant declaring what he called “Pope-skepticism.”
That could be the indication of “post-secularism”, with politicians hand-picking suitable pieces of religious tradition, without particular regard to the religion itself. Alternatively, it could be just a nostalgia to pre-Vatican II Roman Catholic orthodoxy. All the disappointed rightists need to do, is to dust-off the writings of Pope Leo’s XIX-century namesake. In Leo XIII view, humanity is inherently “separated into two diverse and opposite parts, of which the one steadfastly contends for truth and virtue, the other of those things which are contrary to virtue and to truth. The one is the kingdom of God on earth … The other is the kingdom of Satan”.
That could be an indication of “post-secularism,” with politicians hand-picking suitable pieces of religious tradition without particular regard for the religion itself. Alternatively, it could be just nostalgia for pre-Vatican II Roman Catholic orthodoxy. All disappointed rightists need to do is dust off the writings of Pope Leo’s nineteenth-century namesake. In Leo XIII’s view, humanity is inherently “separated into two diverse and opposite parts, of which the one steadfastly contends for truth and virtue, the other for those things which are contrary to virtue and to truth. The one is the kingdom of God on earth … The other is the kingdom of Satan.”
In political life, the latter insists “that marriage belongs to the genus of commercial contracts, which can rightly be revoked by the will of those who made them … all men have the same right … each one is naturally free … power is held by the command or permission of the people, so that, when the popular will changes, rulers may lawfully be deposed … that the State should be without God; that in the various forms of religion there is no reason why one should have precedence over another … Their chief dogmas are so greatly and manifestly at variance with reason that nothing can be more perverse.”
Please cite as: Ali, Karrar & Urooj, Aamina. (2026). “Beyond Islamo-Populism: Religious Framing and Sectarian Mobilization among the Far-Right Islamist Parties in Pakistan.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 07, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0055
Abstract
Pakistan’s far-right Islamist political parties hold a significant space in the electoral and mobilizational base, yet their scholarly examination is quite limited in the existing literature. Although these parties have different doctrinal positions and unique political agendas, the existing literature treat them all under broad umbrella terms assuming that they share a common narrative and have homogeneous logic. This paper challenges this assumption by conducting a first systematic comparative framing analysis of three far-right Islamist parties that represent three different sectarian constituencies namely the Tahreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F), and Majlis Wahdate-e-Muslimeen (MWM) representing Barelvi, Deobandi, and Shia sects respectively. The study applies Benford and Snow’s (2000) framing theory that constitute three core framing tasks and four frame alignment processes. For data sources, the study relies on party manifestos, campaign slogans, party leadership statements, and documented public discourse spanning from the period of 2015 till 2024. The chosen time period starts from the point when TLP was formed, till 2024 that marks the latest elections in the country. The findings of the study reveal that although all three parties conduct their activities within the same political environment and invoke Islamic symbols, but they manifest different political logics and mobilization strategies. TLP’s positioning is built upon religious populism that centers on Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (the finality of prophethood), constructing a moral antagonism between the pious people and corrupt elites. JUI-F operates through Islamist conservatism, pursuing the state to institutionalize Sharia in the country, and MWM mobilizes through sectarian minority identity politics, constructing their political narrative around Karbala symbolism to frame Shia Muslims as a persecuted community demanding protection and recognition. These distinct logics of each party are shaped by sectarian identity and historical grievances which demonstrate that religious political mobilization in Pakistan is internally differentiated in ways that umbrella categorization does not reveal. The findings of this study contribute to how scholars theorize religious populism in Muslim-majority states and help understanding the structural sources of political polarization and sectarian tension in Pakistan.
PTI supporter at Jinnah Cricket Stadium during a political rally of cricketer turned politician Imran Khan on March 23, 2012 in Sialkot, Pakistan. Photo: Jahanzaib Naiyyer.
The far-right Islamist landscape in Pakistan presents an analytical puzzle, manifested by three political parties: Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F), and Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM), which operate within the same religious-political field, draw on the same Islamic tradition, and all deploy religious symbols to construct political narratives and mobilize public support. Yet, they do through strikingly different strategies, targeting different constituencies, invoking different symbols, and constructing different political logic. TLP shows their support from the Barelvi sectarian tradition, JUI-F from the Deobandi tradition, and MWM from the Shia community. This paper argues that these differences are not incidental but are analytically significant. Through a systematic comparative framing analysis grounded in Benford and Snow’s (2000) framework, this study examines how each party strategically constructs its political narrative through religious symbols and what those differences reveal about the internal differentiation of far-right Islamist mobilization in Pakistan.
The involvement of far-right Islamist parties in the political sphere in Pakistan has remained significant since its inception. They have played an important part in Islamization of the state and society especially since late 1970s under the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq. To legitimize his military rule, he reorganized governance around “Islamic” norms, most notably through the Hudood Ordinances (1979) and the creation of the Federal Shariat Court (1980). These strategies soon became an enforceable state policy that strengthen the role of religious parties and clerical networks extending their leverage into the public life, law, and political bargaining (Kennedy, 1990: 65). The Islamic provisions in the constitution of 1956, 1962, and 1973 are one such manifestation of their involvement (Roy, 1994: 23). This Process did not redefine constitutional language, but it normalized the use of Islamic symbolism in political discourse and opened institutional space for religious parties to claim moral authority in the public sphere.
The Islamist political parties under focus of this study have emerged in different times having different objectives to come into politics, but they all share common popular strategies to remain in power and have significant voter base. JUI-F, Pakistan’s largest Islamist political party currently holds fourth-most seats in the Senate and fifth-most in the National Assembly and has proven street power, largely drawn from the students of madrassas (Rahimullah, 2021). TLP became 4th largest party in Pakistan following the 2024 general election, securing nearly 2.89 million votes (Gallup Pakistan, 2024). Although still struggling to make significant presence in the political space, MWM has also secured seats in both national assembly and senate in 2024 general election (Hussain, 2024).
An initial step toward an understanding of these parties is the scholarship on religious populism, which is helpful but insufficient. The scholars of religious populism such as Mudde (2004), Yilmaz, Batool and Shakil (2023), and Hadiz (2014) have demonstrated how Islamist movements use the same rhetoric by replacing the term “the people” with “ummah” and the term “political opposition” with “moral and theological opposition.’ TLP fits this description quite well; it builds a moral dichotomy between the righteous and the corrupt, it defines blasphemy as an existential threat to the civilizational values of Islam and it sees itself as the true voice of the Barelvi Muslim community against what it considers to be the secular, corrupt, and morally bankrupt government.
The situation becomes much more complicated, however, if JUI-F and MWM are viewed the same way. JUI-F’s politics are not directed against the political system but toward its completion on Islamic lines, it doesn’t involve protesting against the corrupt elite but the creation of Sharia institutions in the current political system. The dominant discourse on the other hand, which MWM is best known for, is one of sectarian community protection, in which Shia Muslims are portrayed as apersecuted minority that deserves recognition, security and representation from a government “ignoring their plight.” These are different political logics, and it is important to consider them as different, otherwise the comparative analysis will lose the value of comparing the differences that make it possible.
Though the use of populism and religious symbolism has been researched in other contexts, such as Hindu populism in India (Jaffrelot, 2021: 85) and Christian populism in Europe (Brubaker, 2017: 1191–1226), few in-depth scholarly studies have explored how far-right Islamist parties in Pakistan use framing strategies to mobilize popular support. This research seeks to address that gap. To the best of our knowledge, there is still no systematic comparative study of far-right Islamist parties in Pakistan. Much of the existing scholarship has explored these actors separately, mainly as a religious populist movement (e.g., Sabat et al., 2020; Zahid et al., 2022; Yilmaz & Shakil, 2022), and has not considered the possibility of their doing the same political work with other symbols, or of them representing truly different styles of religious political mobilization. This paper goes to the heart of the issue.
At the outset, it should be noted that framing analysis, though analytically useful, is not a full account of the political career of these parties. But the framing is not the only key to success or failure; structural conditions are, as well. In addition to framing strategies, outcomes are influenced by resource access, organizational capacity, political opportunity structures and institutional patronage. In TLP, Javid (2021) has shown that although the party was able to mobilize its supporters on street, its clientelist nature and competition among the religious right limited its electoral success. This paper does not assert that the only forces behind these parties’ political paths are framing. Instead, it uses framing analysis as a fruitful tool for examining how they shape political meaning, build their constituencies and position themselves in relation to each other; something that structural approaches are unable to do.
The key research question of this paper is: How do far-right Islamist political parties in Pakistan strategically use religious symbolization and framing to construct political narratives and mobilize public support, and what do differences in their framing strategies reveal about the differentiation of religiously inflected political mobilization within Pakistan? A related sub-question follows: Why do these groups, despite operating within the same political context and drawing on the same Islamic tradition, construct different political logics, and to what extent do sectarian identities explain these differences?
The paper is organized as follows. The theoretical framework presents Benford and Snow’s (2000) framework, including the three core framing tasks (diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational) and the four framing processes (bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation). It also defines the type of discourse employed in this study. The methodology explains the case selection, data sources, time period, and analytical process. The discussion is organized thematically, with an emphasis on comparative analysis rather than a party-by-party examination. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the main findings, discusses the study’s theoretical implications for understanding religious populism in Muslim-majority states, and outlines its limitations.
Theoretical Framework
Framing theory, conceptualized by Benford and Snow (2000: 611–639), has emerged to be one of the foundational frameworks for understanding the dynamics of social and political movements. It focuses on how movements construct, articulate, and disseminate meanings in efforts towards mobilization. Movements do this by addressing three primary framing tasks: diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing. These empower a movement to create resonance with its target audience and to translate grievances into actionable agendas.
Diagnostic framing involves the identification of social problems, attributing specific actors or structures with blame. While the specific targets of diagnostic framing vary across movements, secular elites, minority communities, foreign powers, or rival sects there are an underlying logic remains consistent: identifying a threat, assigning blame, and constructing a moral boundary between those who belong and those who do not.
Prognostic framing offers solutions to the grievances thus identified. In most cases, these solutions may be found within the ideological or cultural ethos of the movement. For instance, in the case of the JUI-F, the framing of Shariagovernance as the missing panacea for corruption and inequality is rooted in religious ideology. The credibility of prognostic framing depends on its alignment with the movement’s broader ideological identity; the proposed solution must appear morally necessary within the movement’s own normative universe.
Moreover, motivational framing inspires action by appealing to moral obligations and evoking emotional resonance. This framing task often contains religious, historical, and cultural symbols to galvanize collective action. In religiously inflected movements, motivational framing shows particularly on sacred history, martyrdom narratives, and divine obligation, transforming political participation into an act of faith and collective moral duty.
In addition to core framing task, Benford and Snow (2000) underlines frame alignment processes as key devices by which movements link their frames with wider societal discourses. It is through processes of frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation that movements reveal strategic responsiveness to shifting political and social terrains.
While frame bridging refers to the linking of disconnected but congruent grievances or stories, it allows movements to expand their scope by linking their goals to interests in society (Van Dijk, 2023: 153–178). Frame bridging itself is particularly consequential in fragmented political contexts, where each movement must stitch together disparate constituencies by demonstrating that their specific demands serve broader shared interest.
Frame amplification involves heightening the salience of specific values or issues to enhance their relevance and urgency. Through amplification, movements can elevate particular grievances above others, constructing a hierarchy or urgency that channels collective energy toward specific symbolic and political objectives.
Frame extension broadens the scope of a movement’s narrative by incorporating additional issues to appeal to a wider audience. Frame extension reflects a movement’s strategic awareness of its own limits, by reaching beyond its core constituency which trades ideological purity for broader coalition appeal.
Frame transformation redefines existing narratives, creating new meanings that resonate with changing sociopolitical contexts. Frame transformation is the most ambitious of the alignment process, because it requires movements to reinterpret the established meanings.
There is a need for a theoretical clarification before moving on. The definition of populism by Mudde (2004) is a thin-centered ideology, namely a rather coherent body of ideas about society organized around the moral polarity between the pure people and the corrupt elite. This is an ideological conception that is not the discursive approach followed in this paper. This study views framing as a strategic communicative action whereby political actors are actively shaping meaning, defining problems, solving them, and calling them to action, following the example of Benford and Snow (2000) and Entman (1993). The distinction is significant: in this paper, the idea of party is not understood as an ideology merely in advance of the evidence but is rather analyzed as the kind of story each party tells, who they’re going to fight, what they’re going to offer as a solution, and the people they’re going to rally behind. This is how the empirical differences between the three parties come out of the analysis and not assumed as a prerequisite, which is the reason the comparative results are possible.
In this study, Benford and Snow (2000) model is used to examine political communication by TLP, JUI-F, and MWM.Importantly, the discussion section is not party by party, but rather thematically. All three parties are compared to one another in each framing task so that the framework can shed light on the similarities and differences in the way they make sense of the political position. It is this comparative thematic structure that enables the paper to go beyond description to an explanatory argument as to why these parties frame their political positions in such different ways, despite the fact that they operate within the same political reality. The methodological decisions that provide the basis for this analysis are described below.
Research Methodology
This study used a qualitative research design, with framing analysis as the primary analytical technique. In line with Benford and Snow (2000), framing analysis is understood as the systematic investigation of how political actors, through public communication, create meaning by defining a problem, identifying those responsible, proposing a solution, and calling for collective action. The study is situated within the broader field of political discourse but does not adopt discourse analysis as a method per se, such as Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough, 1995) or Discourse-Historical Analysis (Wodak, 2001). Instead, framing theory is employed as the specific analytical tool through which the discourse of the three selected parties is examined. This distinction highlights two important differences: first, framing analysis focuses on the strategic and purposeful dimensions of political communication; second, it is particularly useful for studying parties that consciously employ religious symbols to construct political narratives and mobilize constituencies (Snow et al., 1986: 464).
Case Selection
The three groups selected for this study—Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F), and Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)—were chosen based on two explicit selection criteria. First, they each represent different sectarian constituencies within Pakistan’s far-right Islamist landscape: TLP mobilizes the Barelvi-Sunni community, JUI-F mobilizes the Deobandi-Sunni community, and MWM mobilizes the Shia community in Pakistan. This sectarian variation constitutes the key variable for explaining differences in the framing strategies employed by the three parties, and it is this variation that the paper seeks to explain. Second, during the study period, all three groups were actively engaged in political mobilization and maintained a public presence across all three modes of participation—electoral politics, street mobilization, and public communication—thereby providing a sufficient basis for the systematic analysis of their discourses.
The most important omitted case requiring explanation is Jamaat-e-Islami (JI). On theoretical grounds, JI is excluded because, unlike the three selected parties, it does not mobilize a specific sectarian constituency but instead represents a pan-Islamist ideological platform that transcends sectarian boundaries. Its organizational model and discursive logic are therefore fundamentally different from the sectarian community-based mobilization that constitutes the analytical focus of this study. Including JI would introduce a different type of case that could not be analyzed using the same analytical dimensions as the three selected cases. Likewise, smaller organizations such as Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan were not included because they lacked sufficient publicly documented discourse during the study period to permit systematic analysis.
The inclusion of MWM warrants particular comment because its electoral presence is relatively limited. However, electoral size is not the key consideration here; rather, it is its discursive distinctiveness. MWM is the only organized Shia political party within Pakistan’s far-right political landscape and mobilizes a Shia community that has received far less scholarly attention than Sunni Islamist parties (Rajani, 2013). Its inclusion is therefore both theoretically justified and empirically meaningful, as it allows us to examine whether Shia political mobilization follows the same framing logic as Sunni Islamist parties or instead reflects a distinct form of religious political mobilization.
Data Sources and Time Period
This analysis is based on publicly available political communications produced by the three political parties and their leaders between 2015 and 2024. The starting point, 2015, was chosen because it marks the founding of TLP, which laid the foundation for the contemporary far-right Islamist contest in Pakistan. The end point, 2024, represents the most recent general election cycle and encompasses a complete period of contemporary political mobilization for each of the three parties.
The data corpus consists of four types of sources. First, it includes official party documents, such as Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan’s Election Manifesto 2024 (2024), and documented party materials, such as Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan’s Official Anthem 2018 (Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official, 2018). Second, it draws on the verbatim speeches of party leaders as reported in Pakistan’s leading national newspapers—Dawn, The Express Tribune, The News International, and Business Recorder—which serve as the principal public archive of political communication in Pakistan. Third, it incorporates party social media content, including verified hashtag campaigns and documented social media slogans used by all three parties on platforms such as X (formerly Twitter) and Facebook. Fourth, it draws on academic studies that directly cite and analyze party discourse, particularly the works of Sabat et al. (2020), Zahid et al. (2022), Yilmaz and Shakil (2022), and Javid (2021).
This corpus has certain limitations. The analysis relies heavily on reported statements rather than on a comprehensive collection of primary texts. However, full transcripts of leaders’ speeches are not always available in digital or searchable formats, nor are many Urdu-language primary sources, such as party newspapers like Sada-e-Wahdat published by the MWM. Consequently, the findings are based on credible journalistic and academic sources that document the parties’ public political communication rather than on an exhaustive corpus of primary source materials.
Analytical Procedure
The analysis is conducted at two levels. First, the publicly documented discourse of each party is analyzed according to the three fundamental framing tasks identified by Benford and Snow (2000): diagnostic framing, in which each party defines the problem and assigns blame; prognostic framing, in which each party proposes solutions; and motivational framing, in which each party constructs moral and emotional appeals for collective action. Second, the four frame alignment processes—bridging, amplification, extension, and transformation—are employed to examine how each party connects its core frames with broader societal concerns and adapts its framing practices to changing political environments (Snow et al., 1986).
The study adopts a thematic comparative analysis rather than a party-by-party analysis. In other words, the discussion does not examine all three framing tasks for each party individually; instead, it compares how the three parties approach each framing task. This design is intentional, as it highlights the comparative logic of the analysis and allows convergences and divergences among the parties to become clearly visible at each analytical stage, rather than being merely inferred from three separate case descriptions.
The coding of party discourse was carried out deductively, with the framing tasks and frame alignment processes serving as the principal analytical categories for coding the data. Recurring religious symbols—such as Khatm-e-Nabuwwat for TLP, Sharia governance for JUI-F, and Karbala for MWM—were identified as the symbolic anchors around which each party organizes its diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational framing in its public communication.
Discussion: Comparative Framing Analysis of Far-Right Islamist Parties in Pakistan
The following analysis applies Benford and Snow’s (2000) framing framework comparatively to the three parties examined in this study: TLP, JUI-F, and MWM. The discussion is organized thematically around the three core framing tasks. The following subsections examine each party’s approach to the issues it emphasizes. The analysis focuses on the problems each party identifies, the solutions it proposes, and the motivational appeals it employs to mobilize collective action. It also examines how these frames align with broader societal discourses. This structure makes it possible to identify both the convergences and divergences that distinguish these parties on analytical grounds. The preliminary study of all parties suggests that even though all three parties deploy Islamist symbols strategically, they do so from a different political logic that dictate their behavior shaped by their distinct sectarian identities and historical grievances.
Diagnostic Framing: Identifying the Problem and Assigning Blame
Diagnostic framing refers to the identification of social problems and the attribution of blame. It is the fundamental process through which political actors derive their political identity and demarcate the boundary that separates them from their opponents, thereby constructing the distinction between “us” and “them” (Benford & Snow, 2000: 615). Examining each party through the lens of diagnostic framing reveals that they identify strikingly different problems, assign blame to different actors, and construct distinct categories of enemies. These differences are not arbitrary; rather, they reflect the sectarian identities of each party and the specific grievances of the constituencies they seek to mobilize.
Tahreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP)
A large numbers of people gathered to attend funeral prayer of Khadim Hussain Rizvi, Chief of TLP, held at Minar-e-Pakistan in Lahore on on November 21, 2020. Photo: Asianet-Pakistan.
TLP emerged in 2015 as a major political force in Pakistan. It was established by Khadim Hussain Rizvi. TLP claims that it is the true herald of the deep-rooted Barelvi school of thought and is one of the proudest fighters of the Khatm-e-Nabuwat, which is also the ideology that underpins the very existence of TLP. The party became popular quite quickly because it raised a monumental rally against principles threatening its existence by the Ahmadi community, calling them Ahmadis alongside all such incidents of alleged blasphemy (UK Visas and Immigration, 2025). It employs a combination of street protests, social media campaigns, and religio-symbolic imagery to mobilize conservative Muslim constituencies under the banner of saving Islamic values from the secular political machinations of Pakistan’s sociopolitical scene.
In this regard, TLP has claimed that they have diagnosed the real problems of society, such as the failure of true spirit of Islam and undue lenience towards acts of blasphemy. In this way, these factors have been indicated as the causes of societal disintegration and moral decay in Pakistan. These narratives are strongly propagated through their party anthem, which is filled with religious fervor, designating the party as the sole savior of Pakistan, bringing Sharia into the political system, and categorically alienating the previous governments and political parties as looters, and corrupt, and label them as one and the same group who are dividing Pakistan. The anthem is filled with rhetorical lines such as “Pakistan banaya tha, Pakistan bachana hai (We created Pakistan, and we have to save it),” “deen ko takhat par lana hy (we have to bring religion to govern),” “watan ko katne wale sabhi ye aik chakoo hain (those dividing the country are all one group),”alluding that we are going to come and be the sole savior of the country by bringing religious rule (Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official, 2018).
The party particularly identifies the Ahmadi community as its primary target, declaring Ahmadis to be non-Muslims (IHRC, 2024). The central basis for this allegation is the sanctity of Khatm-e-Nabuwwat, as Ahmadis believe in a prophet after Muhammad. This is not merely a theological disagreement but is presented as an attack on the very political identity that TLP has built around defending the doctrine of the Finality of Prophethood.
Ahmadis have been affected by TLP campaigns directed against them, with cases such as Mubarak Sani, who was lynched on suspicion of blasphemy in 2014, cited by TLP as exemplary cases against Ahmadis (Mahmood, 2024; Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, 2022). This incident was similarly framed by TLP as a successful expression of public piety against heresy, reinforcing its claim that social grievances stem from the ineffective implementation of blasphemy laws (Jalil, 2024).
TLP thus diagnoses the fundamental ills of society—namely, the erosion of the true spirit of Islam and undue leniency toward acts of blasphemy—as the causes of social disintegration and moral decay in Pakistan. The outrage expressed by TLP leaders following the acquittal of Asia Bibi, a Christian woman convicted on blasphemy charges, was particularly intense. At a protest in Lahore, TLP leader Afzal Qadri declared: “The judges who have ordered the release of the accursed Asia are all liable to be killed under religious edict” (Al Jazeera, 2018; Khan, 2018).
For diagnostic framing through social media, TLP employed hashtags such as #Tajdar_Khatam_e_Nabuwat and #Labbaik_Ya_Rasoolallah. These slogans were instrumental in constructing a narrative of moral urgency that resonated strongly with its support base. This emphasis further reinforced an “us versus them” dichotomy, portraying the party’s supporters as the pious defenders of Islam in opposition to secular elites, Ahmadis, and Western influences (Mahmood, 2024).
During protests demanding the expulsion of the French ambassador, TLP demonstrators were confronted by law enforcement agencies. In response, Khadim Rizvi questioned the ideological foundations of the Pakistani state, stating: “We cannot forgive the enemies of the Prophet (PBUH). While traveling to Islamabad, I wondered whether we could send back the French Ambassador. [Alas] the Muslims living in France can protest, but in the state, which was achieved in the name of Islam, the nation is not allowed to protest for the honor of the Prophet. Now, we have to ask a question about the type of leadership we have been led by for the last 72 years. Had Labbaik (TLP) been ruling the country, it would have executed them [blasphemers],” (Zahid et al., 2022).
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F)
JUI-F has its roots in the Deobandi movement, which sticks to some rigid fundamentals of the Sharia and Sharia legalism over literalism and puritanical reforms. JUI-F has possessed both a religious and an organizational face in Pakistan ever since its inception as a party. The party entered the political limelight by taking advantage of its communication network of religious institutions, called madrassas, and aligning itself with the conservative Muslim culture and belief system of the voting population (Karamat et al., 2019: 29–36). Throughout the years, JUI-F has sustained its political relevance by masquerading as a protector of Islamic values amidst perceived threats posed by secular and liberal ideologies. In the political context, JUI-F uses its political symbol, the book, referring to the Quran, the holy book of Muslims, and its candidates refer to their audiences by saying that not stamping its symbol is equivalent to rejecting the holy book (Nazar, 2013).
In this broader context, JUI-F traces the root of the crises affecting society to the inability of others to properly implement Islamic law. The party continuously criticizes secular models of governance for promoting corruption, inequality, and moral decline (Khan, 2019). At a 2016 press conference, Fazlur Rahman stated that he would “not let Pakistan become secular,” asserting that secular legislation was “in conflict with the Holy Quran, the life of Prophet Muhammad, the Constitution of Pakistan, and the values of our country” (Express Tribune, 2016). This framing was reiterated during the 2024 election campaign, with the party urging voters to support JUI-F as the party committed to Islamic values and governance (Express Tribune, 2024b).
In 2019, during the Azadi March, Fazlur Rahman argued that the policies adopted by the ruling Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) government had undermined the country’s Islamic traditions. He framed the actions of the ruling government as being entirely contrary to the injunctions of the Sharia (Batool, 2019). During the march, he portrayed the PTI government as an existential threat to both the constitutional order and Islamic governance, declaring that the march aimed to “protect the Constitution, democracy and Pakistan” from a government that had made “the Constitution a joke” and put “the survival of the country at risk” (Shaikh & Hussain, 2019). This narrative resonates with JUI-F’s core constituency, which views the party as a representative of conservative Muslims.
Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)
MWM came into being in 2009 to fight against the systematic persecution and escalating violence targeting Shia Muslims in Pakistan (Shah, 2019). Guided by the tenets of Shia Islam, especially those rooted in the history of Imam Hussain and his martyrdom at Karbala, MWM serves both as a force for the protection of Shia rights and as a force for unity among Pakistan’s Muslim communities. The ideological foundation of the party is thus deeply embedded in notions of justice, sacrifice, and resistance, which are represented by its electoral emblem, the Khama (the tent)—the tent of Imam Hussain (Naqvi, 2025). This reinforces MWM’s claim to follow in the footsteps of Imam Hussain and his struggle for truth and justice. Additionally, in recent elections, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) has been a political ally of Majlis-e-Wahdat-ul-Muslimeen (MWM) (BR Web Desk, 2024). Allama Raja Nasir Abbas, the Chairman of MWM, was elected to the Senate in the 2024 elections and was nominated as the Leader of the Opposition in the Senate with the support of PTI at a time when PTI Chairman Imran Khan was incarcerated (Sadozai & News Desk, 2026).
Within this frame of reference, MWM identifies sectarian violence, institutionalized discrimination, and foreign interference as the causes of social unrest in Pakistan. The party often refers to the Quetta Hazara killings (Baloch, 2021) and the Parachinar bombings (Mehdi, 2024) as examples of the state’s failure to provide security for Shia Muslims. Through slogans such as “Pakistan Banya Tha – Pakistan Bachyanga (“Pakistan was made, and Pakistan will be saved”),” MWM underlines its role as a guardian of the country’s ideological and territorial integrity.
It further draws on the legacy of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, who was claimed to be a Shia Muslim, to give legitimacy to its position as the protector of Pakistan’s Islamic identity. This becomes a narrative not only within the Shia community but also in broader nationalist sentiments, presenting this as a collective responsibility toward the ideals on which Pakistan was founded.
Although all three parties possess a clear religious narrative, the diagnostic framing reveals a fundamental divergence in how they construct political antagonism. TLP’s diagnostic frame clearly alludes to Mudde’s (2004) definition of populism: it constructs a moral antagonism between the pious Muslim people and a corrupt secular elite that is complicit in blasphemy and moral decay. JUI-F’s diagnostic framing stands in contrast to that of TLP, targeting secularism as an ideological failure of statecraft rather than political elite corruption. It identifies the absence of divine governance as the enemy, rather than the political elite per se, which reflects a conservative rather than a populist logic. MWM’s diagnostic framing is categorically different from that of its counterparts. It identifies the Shia community as a persecuted minority within a hostile majority environment and views sectarian enemies and state negligence as blameworthy, rather than a generalized corrupt elite, as TLP does. This framing reveals that the convergent factor among all three parties is the use of Islamist referents to frame grievance, while they differ in the structure of the antagonism they construct and the identity of the enemy they identify.
Prognostic Framing: Proposing Solutions
Prognostic framing concerns how actors advance solutions to the problems they have diagnosed (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). The analysis of each party highlights that the proposed solutions are closely tethered to their diagnostic frames, showing the logical connection between the defined problems and the solutions proposed. Examining these solutions comparatively not only reveals what each party wants but also sets out its vision for the political project it seeks to implement.
Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP)
TLP believes the remedy for the real moral and social crises in the fine land of Pakistan is the lawful, strict, and complete application of blasphemy laws and the exclusion of Ahmadis from the public domain. It has demanded the full implementation of laws concerning crimes against the Holy Prophet Muhammad. For instance, during one of the sit-ins at Faizabad in 2017, TLP demanded the resignation of the lawmakers responsible for amending the electoral oath relating to Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (Dawn, 2017). The government’s surrender to TLP’s demands at Faizabad, including the resignation of the minister responsible for the oath amendment, was framed by the party as strong proof that street pressure grounded in religious obligation could force the state to comply with Islamic imperatives. Its ritualized symbolic practices at public gatherings, including collective prayers and recitations, further reinforced its prognostic framing by embedding its political demands within a register of religious observance and constructing compliance with the party’s agenda as an act of devotion rather than a simple act of political choice (Sabat et al., 2020).
Designating the government and opposing state institutions as mere stooges of the West, the TLP leadership proposes a solution by expressing its intention that “once we are in power, we will treat them (the West) with an iron fist” (Zahid et al., 2022). Its solutions are mostly emotive rather than based on rational or practical grounds. For instance, at a public gathering, the firebrand Rizvi proposed launching a missile attack against the USA and the IMF if they asked Pakistan to repay its loans, stating, “Lo ji fer aaya je Ghauri (here comes the Ghauri missile to hit you)” (Zahid et al., 2022).
Designating the government and opposing state institutions as a mere stooge of the West, TLP leadership proposes a solution by expressing their intentions as “once we are in power, we will treat them (West) with an iron fist,” (Zahid et al., 2022). Their solutions are mostly emotive rather than based on rational or practical grounds. For instance, in a public gathering, firebrand Rizvi proposed to launch a missile attack against the USA and IMF if they ask Pakistan to pay back its loan stating “Lo ji fer aaya je Ghauri (here comes the Ghauri missile to hit you) (Zahid et al., 2022)
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F)
JUI-F prefers the implementation of Sharia law as the ultimate solution to the governance issues in Pakistan. The party’s rhetoric has consistently emphasized that only an Islamic model of governance can overcome the deeply ingrained problems of corruption, inequality, and societal discord. Additionally, it presents itself as the protector of democracy and the guardian of the sanctity of the Constitution, while portraying others as diminishing its value (Dawn, 2024a).
Election campaigns are often marked by calls to establish an “Islamic state” as a moral imperative (Dawn, 2024b; Karamat et al., 2019). Symbolic actions, such as leading prayers at political gatherings, further reinforce this vision and create a sense of urgency among supporters to rally behind the party’s agenda.
Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)
The prognostic framing by MWM can be reduced to three main postulates that it propagates: the unification of all sects, the strict application of the law in dealing with extremist groups and increased political representation for Shia Muslims. The electoral campaigns frequently feature the slogan “Life for Hussain—Vote for Hussain,” which alludes to tying political action to religious devotion. This framing helps MWM present its political platform as a continuation of Imam Hussain’s struggle for justice, playing a catalytic role in mobilizing its followers to view voting as a religious and moral obligation.
Image credit: Taken from the party’s Facebook page. The flyer was produced by MWM for the 2013 general election campaign, in which the Khama (tent) represents the party’s political symbol, while the slogan at the top reads, “Life for Hussain, Vote for Hussain.”
The party advocates for an independent foreign policy, free from Western influence, as can be witnessed eloquently in its slogans, such as “Down Down America” and “Down Down Israel” (Hasan, 2012). These slogans demonstrate MWM’s resistance to liberal, Western-appeasing policies, which, according to the party, are against the Islamic identity of Pakistan. The emphasis on self-reliance and resistance to foreign dominance reinforces the party’s populist appeal among the ranks of nationalist and religiously conservative voters.
The prognostic frames are different for each party, further illuminating their distinct political logics as their proposed solutions correspond to the problems identified earlier. TLP emphasizes the implementation of strict blasphemy laws, the expulsion of Ahmadis from public life, and taking strict action against the perceived enemies of the Prophet. These reflect a rupture logic in its prognostic framing that alludes to the existing order being morally compromised and, hence, needing to be purged.
JUI-F’s proposed solutions are different. They reflect a completion logic by calling for the institutionalization of Sharia within the existing state. It points to a political order that, in its view, should not be dismantled but rather fulfilled along Islamic lines, which puts forward a fundamentally conservative rather than populist orientation.
Meanwhile, MWM’s proposed solutions, including sectarian unity, legal accountability for anti-Shia violence, and increased Shia political representation, reflect a recognition logic, in which the party is not seeking to transform the political order outright but instead wants to secure a legitimate place within it for a marginalized community.
These three qualitatively different political projects reflect distinct political logics advanced by different actors, all expressed in the shared language of Islamic governance.
Motivational framing revolves around how actors push for action based on the narrative they have been creating. It concerns how movements translate diagnostic and prognostic frames into calls for collective action by constructing moral obligations and emotional imperatives that drive participation (Benford & Snow, 2000: 617). All three parties demonstrate the use of religious symbols in constructing motivational framing. It is here that the specific symbolic repertoires of each sectarian tradition are most directly deployed to generate emotional zeal and a sense of duty among those who support their cause.
Tahreek-e-Labaik Pakistan (TLP)
Their solutions are often filled with emotive zeal, pushing their followers to take to the streets, incite violence, and, at worst, lynch people on accusations of blasphemy. Their aggressive fervor motivates their supporters to champion the cause of defending the blasphemy laws in Pakistan and the finality of the Prophet.
TLP’s motivational framing for mass protests is centered on calling upon religious zeal and defining a common identity. Thus, the party relies on slogans such as #Member_o_Mahrab_Se_Siyasat (Politics from the Pulpit) as evidence of how the authority of religious leaders shapes the boundaries of political discourse. The tradition of Prophet Muhammad, together with that of other Islamic martyrs, is extensively used to build emotional and spiritual commitment among TLP supporters.
Social media is at the center of all motivational action by TLP. Through public campaigns using hashtags such as#Labbaik_Ya_Rasoolallah, the party encourages its followers to mobilize for protests and political rallies, presenting participation as a communal duty. Digital platforms further expand the party’s community, drawing more people to the message it espouses through these calls to action.
The “us versus them” framing presents the secular elite, liberal policies, and Ahmadis as existential threats to Islamic unity, as reflected in TLP’s political rhetoric. The sentence handed down to Mubarak Sani provided a significant opportunity to highlight what TLP portrayed as a moral victory over the Ahmadis by drawing attention to their alleged heretical status (Mahmood, 2024a). Such narratives not only carry the potential for grassroots mobilization but also marginalize minorities by portraying them as enemies of Islam.
Their criticism extends beyond the influence of Western cultural traits, which they perceive as corrupting values and eroding the Islamic identity of Pakistan. Their focus relies more on the dichotomy of “pious defenders” and “corrupt elites,” through which they legitimize their populist claims and strengthen their support among conservative constituencies. In practice, symbolic mobilization means that TLP makes effective use of religious congregations, media, and Madaris (madrassas) to spread its narrative. Mass protest events, such as the 2017 Faizabad sit-in, have demonstrated how the party is able to transform symbolic mobilization into concrete political power. Madaris serve as sites of ideological dissemination, providing a steady supply of activists committed to the mission of TLP.
Symbolic mobilization of TLP through social media has therefore turned out to be completely essential. Tweets carrying the hashtag #Tajdar_Khatame_Nabuwat and numerous widely shared posts across social media platforms have allowed the party to promote its agenda broadly. Through both conventional and new media, TLP sustains its populist appeal and defines itself as the defender of Islamic Shariah (Zahid et al., 2022: 276–295).
Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rahman Group (JUI-F)
Motivational framing serves as a primer for the conditions that enhance the potential for large-scale mobilization, and JUI-F demonstrates considerable capacity in this respect. The “book” as the electoral symbol is portrayed as the Holy Quran, and thus, for any religious Muslim, voting for anyone other than JUI-F would be sinful to their faith. In another instance, JUI-F takes time to remind people of various episodes in Islam and, at times, of the great sacrifices of leaders who fought for Islam in order to evoke a particular emotional response that influences their political choices. Such framing rebrands election campaigns as a religious mission and cultivates, with great vigor, a powerful sense of identity and purpose among its supporters (Dawn, 2025).
Additionally, JUI-F uses the “us vs. them” dichotomy as a tool for maintaining its hard core and demarcating its territory and identity. It portrays secular forces as the enemies of unity among Islamic states, while presenting the liberal elite and other sects as enemies of the correct Islamic values, and portrays itself as the defender of the correct Islamic values (Ashfaq, 2024). This not only mobilizes its supporters but also dismisses opposition groups as enemies of Islam. For instance, JUI-F has blamed secular elites for their penchant for embracing Western culture and easily portrays such groups as symbols of corruption and moral decadence. This type of narrative increases polarization and simplifies the binary between the sacred and the profane.
Symbolic mobilization is at its best in JUI-F’s religious meetings, madrassah network, and media presence, all of which speak to the organization’s commitment to symbolic action. Party structures enable the diffusion of party narratives as well as the reinforcement of its identity as the defender of Islam. Like all political parties, madrassas are an integral part of JUI-F’s organizational setup and a strategically important component in terms of ideological indoctrination and network mobilization. The framing strategies are further developed and disseminated through media appearances and speeches. These practices not only facilitate JUI-F’s political mobilization but also solidify the party’s ties with its religious voter base.
Majlis Wahdat-e-Muslimeen (MWM)
MWM is able to marshal its base through effective motivational framing, coupling religious symbolism with nationalist rhetoric. Its “Khama” electoral symbol turns out to be a very potent reminder of the sacrifice of Imam Hussain and evokes the feeling among its followers that political participation is part of their religious duty. Slogans such as “Life for Hussain – Vote for Hussain,” displayed on campaign materials, reinforce this message by framing political choice as a matter of faith.
MWM also resorts to emotive slogans such as “Pakistan Ka Matlab Kya? La Ilaha Illallah” (What is the meaning of Pakistan? There is no God but Allah) to mobilize the people (Iqbal, 2014). These slogans link national identity with Islamic principles, thereby constructing a shared identity among Pakistan’s Muslim population while excluding those perceived as “others”: the liberal elite, foreign influences, and extremist groups threatening Shia Muslims.
MWM has engaged in several symbolic practices to mobilize its base. Religious gatherings during the months of Muharram and Ashura, considered the most prominent, are crucial for the party in reaching out to the Shia community and propagating its narratives. These events provide ample opportunity for MWM leaders to underline issues of resistance and justice, drawing parallels between the sacrifices of Imam Hussain at Karbala and present-day struggles (Rajani, 2013).
The motivational frames of the three parties draw on distinct sectarian symbolic traditions that help construct different modes of political duty among their targeted constituencies. TLP mobilizes through what can be characterized as sacred outrage, invoking narratives of blasphemy as an existential civilizational threat that demands an immediate, emotionally charged response (Sabat et al., 2020; Zahid et al., 2022).
JUI-F places religious incumbency at the center of its motivational framing, presenting electoral participation as a religious obligation and positioning its candidates as stewards of Islamic governance, while bringing the Quran as a reference book that equates voting for the party with affirming one’s faith (Nazar, 2013).
MWM’s mobilizing strategy revolves around martyrdom solidarity, drawing on the Karbala narrative. It helps construct political participation as a continuation of Imam Hussain’s struggle against injustice, transforming the act of voting into an act of religious remembrance and communal resistance that supporters perceive as a religious duty (Rajani, 2013).
Each mode of motivational framing is thus culturally specific and sectarianly grounded, appealing to the particular audience of its targeted constituency. This is why the symbols are not used interchangeably across parties, as Karbala cannot motivate Barelvi constituencies in the way Khatm-e-Nabuwwat can, and vice versa.
Frame Alignment Processes: Strategic Adaptation and Broadening
Supporters of the religious political party TLP chant slogans during a protest following the Supreme Court decision on Pakistani Christian woman Asia Bibi in Lahore on November 02, 2018. Photo: A.M. Syed.
Beyond the three core framing tasks identified by Benford and Snow (2000), their framework also stipulates four frame alignment processes. These refer to the ways in which movements link their frames to wider societal discourses and adapt strategically to shifting political contexts. The four frame alignment processes include frame bridging, frame amplification, frame extension, and frame transformation (Snow et al., 1986). Examining these processes across the three parties reveals the ways in which each expands its reach beyond its core sectarian constituency and responds to changing political opportunities.
Frame Bridging
Frame bridging refers to grievances that are otherwise disconnected from religious appeals but affect the parties’ voter base. All three parties employ frame bridging differently, while commonly attaching it to their proposed solutions to the identified problems.
JUI-F, for instance, bridges economic grievances such as poverty, unemployment, and IMF-imposed austerity with its demand for Sharia governance, arguing that material deprivation exists because of the absence of divine law (Khan, 2019; Express Tribune, 2025). Through this bridging, JUI-F becomes able to appeal to economically marginalized populations who might not be primarily motivated by theological concerns.
TLP, on the other hand, bridges blasphemy politics with broader nationalist sentiment, arguing that a state that loses the ability to honor the Prophet has forfeited its Islamic legitimacy. By doing this, it connects a specific religious grievance to a wider crisis of national identity (Zahid et al., 2022).
MWM bridges Shia-specific sectarian grievances with broader Pakistani nationalist narratives by invoking Jinnah’s claimed Shia identity. By doing so, it argues that a state persecuting Shia Muslims is actually demonstrating a betrayal of Pakistan’s founding vision, connecting minority rights claims with majoritarian national sentiment (Iqbal, 2014).
Frame Amplification
Frame amplification refers to the heightening of the salience and urgency of specific issues. It is highlighted in each party’s treatment of its central symbol.
TLP amplifies Khatm-e-Nabuwwat from a theological doctrine into an existential civilizational crisis requiring an emergency response, arguing that any perceived compromise on the finality of prophethood would pose a catastrophic threat (Shakil & Yilmaz, 2021). The deployment of hashtags such as #Tajdar_Khatame_Nabuwat and the 2017 Faizabad sit-in are instances of this amplification, elevating a specific doctrinal issue to the level of a national emergency.
JUI-F amplifies the moral authority of its clerical leadership by conflating electoral choice with religious observance, placing them side by side to amplify a political act into a matter of faith and sin.
MWM amplifies incidents of anti-Shia violence into clear evidence of a systematic existential threat to the Shia community by citing the Quetta Hazara killings and the Parachinar bombings. By doing so, it constructs a sense of urgency around a situation that might otherwise be understood as a localized security failure (Baloch, 2021; Mehdi, 2024).
Frame Extension
Frame extension helps broaden a movement’s narrative to incorporate additional issues and appeal to wider audiences. In the case of these three parties, it reflects each party’s attempt to transcend its sectarian base.
TLP extends its blasphemy-centered frame to encompass anti-Western foreign policy positions, linking the sanctity of the Prophet to resistance against Dutch politicians, French cartoonists, and Western cultural imperialism more broadly (Zahid et al., 2022). This extension takes TLP beyond its Barelvi base to constituencies of Muslims who perceive Western secularism as a threat to Islamic identity.
JUI-F extends its Sharia governance frame to encompass constitutional democracy. By doing so, it paradoxically positions itself as both the defender of Islamic law and the protector of the democratic process against military interference. This places the party in a strategic position that broadens its appeal to anti-establishment voters as well (Dawn, 2024a).
MWM’s frame extends beyond its Shia-centric grievances to encompass inter-sectarian unity. This extension positions the party within a broader Muslim solidarity base, framing its struggle not merely as a Shia cause but as a defense of justice and pluralism within the Pakistani state (Rajani, 2013).
Frame Transformation
Frame transformation occurs when a movement tries to redefine an existing narrative to create new meaning that resonates with changing contexts. All parties use frame transformation from time to time, but it is most visible in MWM’s treatment of the Karbala narrative. The Battle of Karbala is specifically associated with a Shia historical event commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Hussain in 680 CE. MWM transforms this sectarian religious event into a universal symbol of resistance in the face of injustice. It does not limit Karbala merely to Shia heritage; rather, it constitutes a moral framework applicable to all communities facing persecution (Naqvi, 2025). This transformation not only speaks to the Shia audience but also potentially expands to communities beyond it.
TLP has also engaged in frame transformation over time. Its earlier framing was centered narrowly on blasphemy enforcement, but it has progressively transformed into a broader civilizational discourse about the moral corruption of the Pakistani state and its subservience to Western powers, as is evident from a comparison of its 2018 and 2024 electoral manifestos (Allama Khadim Hussain Rizvi Official, 2018; Tahreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan, 2024).
Comparative Synthesis: Convergence, Divergence, and What it Means
The comparative analysis of all three parties presents a picture of Pakistan’s far-right Islamist landscape that is more internally differentiated than the umbrella categories in the literature suggest. At the level of surface convergence, all three parties deploy religious symbols, construct “us vs. them” narratives, and invoke religious duty to motivate their supporters toward political participation. These strikingly similar strategies explain why they are often treated as variants of the same phenomenon. However, a deeper analysis through the framing framework shows that, beneath these surface similarities, lie three structurally distinct political logics.
TLP employs a logic of religious populism by constructing a moral antagonism between the pious Muslim people and a corrupt secular establishment, calling for a rupture with the existing moral order, and mobilizing through sacred outrage. This positioning places TLP within the analytical category of religious populism as defined by Mudde (2004) and Yilmaz et al. (2023): a movement that channels popular anger simultaneously against internal elites and external civilizational enemies, with the ummah serving as the populist people.
JUI-F operates through a logic of Islamist conservatism that does not seek to dismantle the current political order but to complete it under the guidance of divine law. It does not portray the corrupt elite, in the populist sense, as its enemy but rather an ideologically misguided system of governance that has failed to implement God’s law in the land. JUI-F does not remain isolated from the current system; rather, it works within democratic institutions, forms coalitions across the political spectrum, and frames its demands as those that, in its view, will fulfill Pakistan’s constitutional identity. This positioning is closer to what scholars of political Islam describe as institutional Islamism (Roy, 1994), reflecting a conservative rather than a populist logic.
MWM occupies a very different place on this spectrum. Rather than posing a people-vs.-elite antagonism, its primary frame revolves around communal persecution, recognition, and protection, providing a picture that is closer to a logic of sectarian minority identity politics than a populist one. The Karbala narrative does not construct a populist people; rather, it speaks directly to a suffering community that experiences political persecution and injustice. This positioning is closer to the minoritarian political logic identified in the comparative literature on identity-based movements (Brubaker, 2017).
The explanatory variable for these differences is the sectarian identity. It suggests that framing strategies cannot be interchangeably used for these parties, as they are anchored in specific theological tradition, communal grievances, and historical memory that is attached to the sectarian constituency it mobilizes. Barelvi theology emphasizes the personal sanctity of the Prophet, which perpetuates TLP’s blasphemy-centered outrage politics. Deobandi theology promotes jurisprudential governance, which underpins JUI-F’s Sharia institutionalism. The foundational martyrdom narrative of Shia Islam informs MWM’s Karbala-centered solidarity politics. This backdrop demonstrates that sectarian identity does not merely provide background information; rather, it structurally embeds these parties’ framing strategies and determines their content, logic, and tone.
Conclusion
This paper examines the space and scope of far-right Islamist parties in Pakistan that use religious symbols and framing strategies to construct political narratives and mobilize public support. The comparative analysis of these parties’ framing strategies reveals that, although they are often referred to as uniform religious groups under the generalized term Islamo-populism, far-right religious parties exhibit significant internal differentiation that shapes their political mobilization.
This study applies Benford and Snow’s (2000) framework to TLP, JUI-F, and MWM, which represent the Barelvi, Deobandi, and Shia sectarian constituencies, respectively. The framing analysis of these parties reveals that, despite operating within the same political environment and drawing on a shared Islamic tradition, they construct fundamentally different political logics. TLP’s framing contours suggest a religious populist positioning, mobilizing Barelvi constituencies through sacred outrage centered on Khatm-e-Nabuwwat and constructing a moral antagonism between the pious Muslim people and a corrupt secular establishment. JUI-F’s positioning resonates more with Islamist conservatism, seeking the institutionalization of Sharia within the existing state structure rather than mobilizing outright against the corrupt elite. MWM operates through sectarian minority identity politics, calling for the protection of minority rights within a majority environment. It derives its political stance from the Karbala narrative to frame the Shia community as a persecuted minority demanding recognition, security, and political representation from a state that is not paying heed to its suffering. Their divergent political logics demonstrate that these are three structurally distinct political projects expressed in the shared language of Islamic governance.
The findings of this study extend substantive implications for the study of religious populism in Muslim-majority states. The existing literature on religious populism treats all religious groups from a monolithic viewpoint by arguing that Islamist movements adapt the populist logic of people-vs.-elite antagonism, where the ummah represents the people, framing political conflict in moral and theological terms (Mudde, 2004; Yilmaz et al., 2023; Hadiz, 2014). This paper’s comparative findings suggest that, although this framework provides a useful analytical lens for cases such as TLP, it does not offer a general account of far-right Islamist mobilization. Not all religious parties that deploy Islamic symbols, invoke religious duty, and construct a general us-vs.-them narrative engage in populism; rather, some are engaged in advancing conservatism, while others pursue identity politics, and these differences are important for making analytical distinctions. Applying the term “Islamo-populism” indiscriminately to religious parties risks obscuring the internal variation that provides a comparative logic for understanding these parties. Given this context, this paper proposes that sectarian identity is not merely background information but plays the role of a structural variable that shapes not only the symbols these parties use but also the political logic they carry. This finding calls for a more rigorous analysis of the sectarian foundations of Islamist mobilization rather than treating religious framing as analytically equivalent across cases.
Applying this framing model to Pakistan’s case demonstrates a diverse political landscape that the existing literature has not sufficiently addressed. The far-right Islamist space that scholars often view as a shared entity does not constitute a monolithic bloc united by a common Islamo-populist project; rather, it is a fragmented and internally competitive field in which parties mobilizing different sectarian communities pursue different political objectives by employing different framing strategies. This context makes understanding internal differentiation important and helps explain the political polarization and sectarian tension in Pakistan. Diagnostic framing not only highlights existing sectarian divisions but also reveals an active and systematic political structure that assigns blame to different entities, identifies different enemies, and builds political identity around different symbolic repertoires. The four frame alignment strategies, especially frame extension and frame transformation, further reveal that these parties make deliberate attempts to transcend their sectarian space and appeal to larger constituencies. This suggests that the boundaries between sectarian communities are not static but are porous and susceptible to expansion. For civil society actors and policymakers working to understand and address religious mobilization, these findings underscore the importance of disaggregating the far-right Islamist landscape rather than treating all its actors under unified labels.
This study has several limitations that invite further research to address them. First, the analysis largely relies on leadership statements as documented in reputable journalistic sources and existing academic studies rather than on a fully systematic corpus of primary texts. While this approach is defensible given the scattered and largely non-digitalized nature of primary party documentation, it creates the possibility of selection bias, as the statements receiving journalistic coverage may not fully represent the broader discursive stance of the party. Future research could construct a systematic primary corpus using empirical evidence from Urdu-language party publications, archived social media content, and direct speech transcripts. Second, this study is confined to a single case study, which limits the possibility of establishing the generalizability of its findings. The relationship between sectarian identity and framing logic observed in this study may take different forms in other Muslim-majority states with different sectarian configurations and political opportunity structures. Third, this study treats framing as a discursive practice and does not examine the organizational, institutional, or financial factors that affect each party’s ability to disseminate its frames. This dimension can be further explored by applying structural approaches to social movements (Javid, 2021). These limitations do not undermine the paper’s core findings; rather, they mark the boundaries of what can be claimed on the basis of the evidence presented here.
These findings open several directions for future research on this issue. The most immediate is a systematic primary source study of all parties’ Urdu-language communications, including party newspapers, manifestos, madrassa curriculum materials, and social media archives, which will allow the framing analysis conducted here to be rigorously tested against a comprehensive empirical corpus. A second important direction would be extending comparative research across Muslim-majority states with similarly fragmented sectarian landscapes, including Indonesia, Lebanon, and Iraq. This will reveal whether sectarian identity functions as an explanatory variable shaping Islamist framing strategies in other national contexts, as it appears to do in Pakistan. Finally, the relationship between the parties’ framing strategies and their constituencies deserves empirical attention: how do the recipients of these parties’ framing strategies internalize and interpret the frames constructed by the party leadership? Survey-based and ethnographic approaches will provide pertinent answers to these questions, which framing analysis of public discourse alone cannot address.
Corresponding author Karrar Ali and Aamina Urooj are from Universitas Islam International Indonesia (UIII). Email: karrar.ali@uiii.ac.id
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[1]Statement of Acknowledgment: The authors would like to express sincere gratitude to the faculty members and mentors at Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII) for their academic guidance and intellectual support during the development of this research. The authors also acknowledge the valuable insights gained through scholarly discussions and institutional resources that contributed to the completion of this study. Any errors or omissions remain the sole responsibility of the authors.
Dr. João Ferreira Dias argues that the rise of anti-immigrant unrest across Europe reflects not simply tensions over migration, but a deeper crisis of democratic integration. In this timely commentary, he contends that diversity alone cannot sustain social cohesion without strong institutions capable of transforming difference into common citizenship. Drawing on scholarship by Robert Putnam, David Goodhart, Yascha Mounk, and others, Dr. Dias examines how weakening civic institutions, declining social trust, and unresolved integration challenges create fertile ground for nativist mobilization. Rather than framing the debate as a choice between openness and exclusion, he calls for renewed attention to the civic foundations that make pluralism politically sustainable. At stake, he argues, is Europe’s ability to reconcile diversity, solidarity, and democratic stability.
Recent episodes of anti-immigrant unrest in cities such as Southampton and Belfast are often interpreted through the lens of public order, criminality, or political extremism. Yet these events may also be symptomatic of a deeper challenge confronting liberal democracies across Europe: the growing tension between openness and social cohesion.
One of the defining assumptions of the late twentieth-century liberal order was that increasingly open societies would naturally generate greater inclusion. Diversity, mobility, and multiculturalism were frequently treated not merely as compatible with democratic stability, but as self-evident expressions of it. What this assumption overlooks, however, is that openness alone does not produce integration.
Democratic societies require more than legal frameworks and economic opportunities. They depend upon a shared civic foundation capable of sustaining trust, cooperation, and political legitimacy. As Robert Putnam (2007) argued in his influential work on diversity and social capital, heterogeneity can enrich societies in the long term, but it may also create short-term challenges for social trust when institutions fail to mediate difference effectively.
The fragility of contemporary liberal democracies lies not in diversity itself, but in the weakening of the mechanisms that transform diversity into common citizenship. Schools, political parties, trade unions, local associations, and public institutions historically played a crucial role in integrating individuals from different backgrounds into a shared civic culture. When these mediating institutions weaken, identities that might otherwise coexist within a broader political community increasingly become sources of social fragmentation (Judt, 2010).
Immigration policy illustrates this dilemma particularly clearly. Contemporary European migration regimes often emerge from the intersection of several legitimate objectives: humanitarian obligations, historical responsibilities, labor market demands, and demographic decline. Yet political debate frequently neglects a more uncomfortable question: the absorptive capacity of receiving societies.
The notion that democratic states must continuously assess their capacity to integrate newcomers is often portrayed as morally suspect, as if limits necessarily imply exclusion. Yet a growing body of scholarship suggests the opposite. Sustainable inclusion requires not merely access, but incorporation into a common civic framework defined by rights and responsibilities, constitutional norms, linguistic participation, gender equality, and democratic values (Mounk, 2022; Miller, 2016).
Without such a framework, diversity risks evolving from pluralism into segmentation. Social groups become increasingly disconnected from one another, trust declines, and political entrepreneurs find fertile ground for mobilizing resentment. It is under these conditions that nativist movements gain traction.
The appeal of contemporary nativism rests on a powerful narrative: that European societies are losing control over their cultural continuity, historical identity, and political sovereignty. Whether empirically accurate or not, this perception acquires political force when citizens conclude that mainstream institutions are either unwilling or unable to address concerns related to integration, social cohesion, and public order.
Importantly, the rise of nativism should not be understood as a simple reaction to immigration itself. Such explanations are analytically insufficient. The same levels of migration can produce dramatically different political outcomes depending on the strength of institutions, the effectiveness of integration policies, and the degree of social trust present within a society (Goodhart, 2017; Krastev & Holmes, 2019).
The danger emerges when individual acts of crime, disorder, or social conflict cease to be interpreted as the actions of particular individuals and instead become symbolic markers of collective identity. In such contexts, immigrants are increasingly viewed as representatives of an undifferentiated out-group, while native populations come to see themselves as members of a threatened in-group. The resulting dynamic resembles what social psychologists have long identified as the transition from individual judgment to group-based political cognition.
History suggests that democracies become particularly vulnerable when they lose the ability to interpret and respond to the anxieties of their own citizens. Polarization thrives when complex social challenges are reduced to simplistic moral binaries, dividing societies into opposing camps of “us” and “them.” In this environment, both exclusionary nativism and uncompromising forms of ideological universalism feed off one another, narrowing the space for pragmatic democratic solutions.
The challenge facing Europe today is therefore not simply whether to accept more or fewer immigrants. It is whether liberal democracies can rebuild the institutional and civic foundations necessary to transform diversity into solidarity. The question is not openness versus closure, but whether openness can remain politically sustainable without a renewed commitment to integration.
The events witnessed in Southampton, Belfast, and elsewhere may not signal the inevitable triumph of nativism. They do, however, suggest that the political center is increasingly squeezed between competing certainties: on one side, an understanding of inclusion that often underestimates the importance of social cohesion; on the other, a nativist reaction that seeks belonging through exclusion.
Europe’s democratic future may well depend on its ability to recover the difficult middle ground between these two positions.
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In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja challenges conventional explanations of xenophobic violence in South Africa by underscoring the concept of “survival populism.” Rather than viewing anti-immigrant mobilization simply as irrational hatred or economic frustration, Dr. Solaja argues that it represents a decentralized form of grassroots political reasoning emerging from structural abandonment, fractured citizenship, and deep socio-economic inequality. Drawing on the legacies of apartheid, decolonial theory, and contemporary populism studies, the commentary explores how marginalized communities construct exclusionary notions of belonging in their struggle for resources, dignity, and recognition. By examining xenophobia as a political response to insecurity rather than merely a social pathology, Dr. Solaja offers a compelling reinterpretation of populism from below and highlights the profound crisis of citizenship, solidarity, and democratic inclusion in post-apartheid South Africa.
Familiar narratives about unemployment, criminality, poverty, and social frustration have been used repeatedly to account for recurrent attacks against foreign nationals in South Africa. Politicians, commentators, and sometimes even academics depict xenophobic violence as either “irrational hatred” or “spontaneous public anger” over economic decay. Such accounts, although not completely false, are analytically weak. They do not reflect the underlying political logic of anti-immigrant violence in post-apartheid South Africa. Xenophobia in this case is not only hatred toward foreigners; increasingly, it has come to constitute a form of grassroots political reasoning rooted in conditions of structural abandonment, economic precariousness, and fractured citizenship.
What we have witnessed in South Africa might best be described as survival populism: the everyday, decentralized form of exclusionary politics in which economically marginalized populations establish moral and territorial boundaries in an effort to safeguard their access to scarce resources, space, urban living, and social legitimacy. Unlike conventional populism mobilized by leaders with charismatic personalities in an electoral context, survival populism evolves horizontally through conversations, neighborhood watch meetings, community patrols, forums, taxi associations and informal markets, in addition to social networking sites. It is populism without populists; an everyday political reasoning that communities use to construct a definition of “the people” in contrast to outsiders.
The above understanding challenges popular thinking on populism within contemporary political theory. Most studies of populism concentrate on political actors of elite origin such as the United States’ Donald Trump, Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, or Hungary’s Viktor Orban, who have mobilized nationalist resentment via an anti-elite and anti-immigrant stance (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). Within this context, populism is understood as an electoral strategy led by charismatic personalities. What takes place in South Africa is different in that xenophobic mobilization seldom appears through coherent ideologies and central leaders. Rather, exclusionary politics arise from what could be called everyday populism: everyday political reasoning that shapes a people against outsiders.
From Internal Foreigners to External Outsiders
This differentiation is critical because it exposes populism as not just a form of political expression occurring in parliaments, ballot boxes or rallies, but also an element that emerges from places of survival like informal settlements, townships economies, crowded taxi ranks and local markets where politics takes place through practical struggles.
The architecture of exclusion has much to do with the history of South Africa as not merely a racial but also a spatial and economic system defined by the containment of Black South Africans. Pass laws, migrant labor hostels, separate territorial structures, and fragmented spatial organization resulted in a society in which Black Africans were regarded as only temporary residents. For many decades, millions of Black South Africans were stripped of their permanent urban citizenship, yet they built South Africa’s cities through their labor.
Apartheid made many Black South Africans internal foreigners, with conditional residency in urban South Africa. Understanding the fact that Black South Africans were internal foreigners helps us realize how the modern form of xenophobia reproduces these spatial logics, with migrants presented as illegitimately possessing jobs, wealth and legitimate residency. The policing of migrants and their access to urban South Africa mirrors previous systems of apartheid governance.
One of the striking features of xenophobic attacks in South Africa is that they almost exclusively target foreign Africans from countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Nigeria, rather than European migrants and expatriates. This racial and national specificity of South African xenophobia reveals a history of unequal relations, the persistence of colonial hierarchies, and ideas of belonging that continue to shape post-apartheid South Africa (Mignolo, 2011). The most ironic and tragic fact is that it is precisely here—the place from which the international struggle against apartheid was championed and which was seen as a beacon of African liberation and pan-African unity—that a recurrent war against Africans takes place. The support that Africa provided in the struggle against apartheid has not been reciprocated with welcome and security for African immigrants in post-apartheid South Africa.
The Unfulfilled Promise of Democratic Citizenship
In 1994, the democratic dispensation promised inclusion, human dignity, and socio-economic justice. Yet political liberation has neither brought about structural transformation nor eliminated the socio-economic inequalities inherited from the apartheid state. South Africa remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, characterized by widespread poverty, high unemployment, and spatial segregation (Piketty, 2014). For many Black South Africans, formal citizenship and the promise of democratic rule remain shallow promises.
It is this disconnect between formal political inclusion and the lack of concrete socio-economic benefits for most South African citizens that helps explain how survival populism is born. While citizens exist on paper, they often fail to achieve basic human dignity. In a society where access to and the distribution of resources are fiercely contested, particularly where the state is absent in providing economic security, protection, and opportunities, people find themselves in conditions of chronic abandonment and exclusion. Xenophobia emerges as an ultimate response to exclusion from economic benefits in society, becoming a tool through which individuals establish an ethical claim to resources and place.
It is here that the township economy becomes an interesting phenomenon. While it provides alternative livelihoods, it also represents conditions of uncertainty, competition, and survival. Furthermore, it is a site where foreign migrants often display economic success, in part through the transnational networks and cooperative practices they share, as well as their lower overhead costs (Crush & Ramachandran, 2014). Their relative visibility within township economies allows them to appear as an important source of economic anxiety for some citizens in this society.
In many township spaces, foreigners and the shops they own are portrayed not merely as competitors but as those responsible for taking over opportunities. Such descriptions and narratives serve as a way of politicizing migrants as legitimate strangers who have illegitimately claimed a portion of the available resources, while local citizens have been abandoned and subjected to misery by their own government.
Here, a Laclauian understanding of populism becomes significant. According to Laclau, populism is essentially a political discourse structured around enmity between “the people” and their enemies (Laclau, 2005). In this context, “the people” are framed as deprived yet hard-working citizens of the South African state who have been excluded from its promises. Migrants are thus represented as foreigners who, despite lacking rights and a legitimate stake, have invaded the state and appropriated what rightfully belongs to South Africans.
Populism without Leaders: Informal Sovereignty from Below
The interesting dimension here is that no such political reasoning necessarily arises from the leadership of populist figures. Rather, it is reproduced within political networks on the ground, from street committees and neighborhood patrols to organizations like Operation Dudula, which not only advocate for stricter immigration policies but also actively patrol urban areas, monitor shops and businesses, and enforce exclusive boundaries, thereby performing informal sovereignty in the absence of legitimate state authority (Misago, 2019).
Such actions are a response to a deeper malaise within the post-apartheid state. It is clear that, in many cases, state institutions have become delegitimized; citizens, feeling neglected by the state, resort to popular measures to enforce governance. Thus, xenophobic movements are not merely attacks against immigrants but expressions of citizens’ anger over the state’s incapacity to provide. Communities assert control over their territory and defend it against perceived external threats.
However, an exclusively domestic reading of the popular dynamics of discontent obscures the decolonial underpinnings of xenophobic violence in South Africa. The reality of xenophobic violence is inextricably linked to a coloniality of power (Quijano, 2007) that persists beyond the period of colonial rule and continues to value and categorize people according to histories of colonial experience. African immigrants are often despised simply because they are African and are treated by many South Africans in ways similar to how they themselves would have been treated by colonial rulers.
This means that, in a tragic sense, one formerly oppressed population has turned against another. This has much in common with what Frantz Fanon warned about decades ago in The Wretched of the Earth—that without genuine redistribution, liberation could transform former victims into oppressors themselves.
Survival populism arises precisely in this vacuum of fractured solidarity. As citizenship loses its material content due to ever-increasing economic insecurity, a range of alternative political communities based on exclusion are formed by ordinary citizens. Migrants then become convenient targets onto whom structural frustrations can be projected. Xenophobia, in this sense, is not the absence of politics; it is politics under conditions of abandonment. Yet, while the political logic of xenophobia may be recognizable, its moral implications cannot be condoned.
Migrants themselves often become victims of precisely the neoliberal inequalities from which poor South Africans suffer. Many have fled persecution, economic disaster, or armed conflict in neighboring countries, only to be subjected to violence and exclusion in South Africa. Ultimately, xenophobic mobilizations provide scapegoats that divert anger away from structural causes—corruption, inequality, unemployment, and policy failures—and toward vulnerable migrants and poor South Africans. However, ignoring these factors will result in underestimating the significance of xenophobia as a political practice and force.
Xenophobia can persist only as long as it provides a language through which the abandoned can voice their grievances, articulate a form of resistance, and renegotiate access in contexts where formal citizenship offers little tangible substance—in other words, as a distorted political response to systemic marginalization. The global significance of such a phenomenon cannot be overstated.
The Global Lessons of Survival Populism
Everywhere across the globe—from Europe to Latin America, across Africa and into Asia—increasing economic precariousness can foster exclusionary ideologies targeting migrants and minority groups. However, South Africa is remarkable because it is the historically oppressed Black majority that is involved, largely without elite populist rhetoric or direction. This challenges our conventional ways of understanding populism, nationalism, and citizenship. While populism is usually understood in elite- and election-driven terms, in South Africa it demonstrates how a populist discourse can emerge from the ground up, be highly localized, and center on survival.
A populist mode of address can emerge whenever abandoned people face the struggle for self-defense and access to resources under conditions of precarity. It is South Africa’s greatest post-apartheid tragedy that populations once excluded under the apartheid system now themselves construct an “outsider” in order to re-establish their own space through exclusion.
Xenophobic violence is a testament to a deeper crisis of belonging within the democratic framework and to the lack of transformation of apartheid’s economic landscape. This is a world in which citizenship and political freedom coexist with mass abandonment, a world where the challenge lies not only in containing migration and the violence that accompanies it, but also in reforming society so that citizenship offers material benefits, the capacity to exercise and enjoy the material aspects of citizenship is more equitably distributed, and an inclusive sense of belonging becomes the norm rather than exclusion. Until that happens, survival populism will remain one of the defining languages of the post-apartheid urban sphere.
References
Crush, J., & Ramachandran, S. (2014). “Xenophobic violence in South Africa: Denialism, minimalism, realism.” Migration Policy Series, 66, 1–35.
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Laclau, E. (2005). On populist reason. Verso.
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Mignolo, W. D. (2011). The darker side of Western modernity: Global futures, decolonial options. Duke University Press.
Misago, J. P. (2019). “Political mobilisation as the trigger of xenophobic violence in post-apartheid South Africa.” African Studies Review, 62(4), 111–135.
Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.
Neocosmos, M. (2010). From “foreign natives” to “native foreigners”: Explaining xenophobia in post-apartheid South Africa. CODESRIA.
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the twenty-first century. Harvard University Press.
Quijano, A. (2007). “Coloniality and modernity/rationality.” Cultural Studies, 21(2–3), 168–178.
