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Toward a Three-Dimensional Understanding of Populism: Discourse, Ideology, and Democratic Mediation

Please cite as:
Tauil, Rafael Marchesan. (2026). “Toward a Three-Dimensional Understanding of Populism: Discourse, Ideology, and Democratic Mediation.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 6, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000131    


Abstract

The diversity of conceptual approaches to populism has enriched the study of the phenomenon while leaving unresolved the problem of identifying its common structure across different historical, national, and ideological contexts. This article addresses this problem by proposing a three-dimensional understanding that brings together Ernesto Laclau’s conception of populism as an ontological-discursive process, Cas Mudde’s understanding of populism as a thin-centred ideology, and Pierre Rosanvallon’s account of populism as a form of democratic indetermination. We argue that these perspectives should not be treated as competing or merely complementary definitions, but as analytically distinct and constitutive dimensions of the same political dynamic. Our hypothesis is that populism can be identified through the articulation of three processes: the constitution of an antagonistic fissure between “we” and “they”, the organization of this fissure through moral polarization and its projection onto democracy through the simplification of representation, mediation, and popular sovereignty. To assess the analytical plausibility of this proposition, the article examines four heterogeneous cases—Rodrigo Duterte, Recep Erdogan, Daniel Ortega, and Evo Morales—drawing on peer-reviewed secondary studies and the Global Populism Database’s classification. The analysis provides preliminary evidence that the three dimensions can be identified across substantially different contexts while their substantive contents remain contingent. The article first examines existing multidimensional approaches, then develops the relationship between ontology, ideology, and democracy, and finally applies the proposed approach to the four cases before discussing its implications and limitations.

Keywords: Populism, Discourse, Ideology, Democracy, Ernesto Laclau, Cas Mudde, Pierre Rosanvallon, Political Antagonism, Moral Polarization, Democratic Mediation, Popular Sovereignty, Plebiscitary Democracy

By Rafael Marchesan Tauil

Introduction

The article takes as its starting point a conceptual problem arising from theoretical debates on populism: the diversity of conceptual formulations of the phenomenon has stimulated the construction or mobilization of highly valuable interpretative frameworks but has not yet satisfactorily resolved the problem of identifying a minimal structure capable of recognizing populism across distinct national, historical, and ideological contexts. This article seeks to address this problem through a three-dimensional theoretical-conceptual framework, bringing together the formulations of Ernesto Laclau, Cas Mudde, and Pierre Rosanvallon on populism.[1] The challenge is to preserve the conceptual variability of populist contents and manifestations without allowing the interpretation to become so broad that it is forced to adapt contextually to the different expressions of the same phenomenon.

This is a predominantly theoretical-conceptual study, complemented by an exploratory empirical exercise involving the analysis of four distinct cases. The hypothesis is that the articulation of these three dimensions makes it possible to apprehend the fundamental properties of populism in a coordinated manner, while simultaneously preserving its conceptual unity and contextual variation.

The framework distinguishes three analytical levels that do not correspond to independent phenomena, but rather to constitutive dimensions of the same political dynamic. At the ontological-discursive level, Laclau makes it possible to apprehend the logic through which frustrated social demands, initially particular and heterogeneous, produce an antagonistic fissure within the social sphere and reorganize political positions and identities around an opposition between “we” and “they.” This division thus constitutes the relational structure through which political identities and hegemonic forms are rearticulated in populism.

At the ideological level, Mudde makes it possible to apprehend the specific way in which this antagonistic relationship is organized by populism through moral polarization. Because of its thin-centered character, populist ideology does not substantively determine the constitutive essence of the two poles but structures their relationship through a moral division between the people and the elite. The concrete contents of these poles remain contingent: different actors and groups may occupy the position of the elite or represent the people according to the context. What constitutes the populist dimension is the persistence of the moral polarized form of the relationship, rather than the stability of its contents.

At the democratic level, Rosanvallon makes it possible to apprehend the unfolding of this antagonistic and polarized configuration within democracy itself. The opening of an antagonistic fissure and its ideological organization as moral polarization tend to reduce the plurality of forms of representation and mediation to a conception of direct, immediate, and polarized popular sovereignty. Democratic indetermination thus appears not as a third property simply added to the previous ones, but as the level at which the political consequences of the articulation between antagonism and polarization become manifest. The plebiscitary simplification of democracy therefore constitutes the unfolding of the specific way in which populist conflict organizes the relationship between the people, power, and representation.

The relationship between these levels is therefore constitutive rather than causally linear. At the ontological-discursive level, antagonism structures the political fissure constituted through frustrated demands; at the ideological level, populist ideology organizes this fissure into a moral polarization whose content remains contingent and currently assumes the form of an opposition between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite”; and, as this configuration is projected onto democracy, it tends to produce its simplification in terms of direct, immediate, and plebiscitary sovereignty.

The framework thus articulates discursive-ontology, ideology, and democratic indetermination as different analytical dimensions of the same process, allowing for the formulation of three distinct but complementary questions through which the cases analyzed here can be empirically examined: 1) does the article identify the presence of an antagonistic fissure that divides the social field between “we” and “they” and produces new political identities through processes of hegemonic rearticulation? 2) does the article identify the organization of this antagonistic division through an ideological form that divides the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” according to a moral yardstick? 3) does the article identify the simplification of forms of democratic representation, mediation, and sovereignty, expressed through the production of a unitary, direct and/or immediate popular will exercised in a polarized and plebiscitary manner?

The empirical exercise consists of assessing the plausibility of this architecture through the analysis of four scientific articles addressing distinct manifestations of populism, selected for the diversity of their national, historical and ideological contexts. The analysis seeks to identify, in each case, the presence and articulation of the three dimensions, assessing whether the framework is capable of producing a common interpretation of empirically heterogeneous manifestations of populism.

The cases selected for the empirical assessment were chosen according to the criteria of the Global Populism Database (GPD) populist classification. The project aims to identify populist features in the speeches of leaders from different countries and periods. The GPD emerged from a project initiated in 2006 to construct a database on the populist discourse of political leaders, initially focused on Latin America and subsequently expanded to different countries and historical periods. The methodology employed is holistic grading, a technique originally developed to assess latent aspects of texts, such as tone, style, and argumentative quality. In the GPD, trained coders assign speeches a score from 0 to 2 according to a rubric that identifies the presence and intensity of populist elements. For a discourse to be considered populist, it must present some conception of popular will; the mere existence of a Manichean worldview is insufficient. For each term in office, the sample normally includes four speeches: a campaign speech, a domestic/commemorative speech, an international speech, and a speech considered representative or famous of the leader.

In addition to this classification, the GPD separates cases and selected speeches according to different ideological, temporal, and geographical dimensions. To maintain case diversity in this analysis, populist leaders were selected with the greatest possible diversity across cases, thereby preventing potential methodological bias. Leaders from the Philippines, Turkey, Nicaragua, and Bolivia were considered, classified across the left, center, and right, with GPD scores of 1.375 (Duterte), 1.466 (Erdogan), 1.25 (Ortega), and 1.462 (Morales), and who were in government between 2002 and 2022. This temporal period was defined in order to test the empirical application of the framework to the political context of the twenty-first century.

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Chinese lanterns displayed during an event promoting cultural exchange and tourism between the EU and China near the European Commission building at Schuman Roundabout.

From Tariffs to Conditional Integration: An EU Strategy for Chinese Electric-Vehicle Investment under the Industrial Accelerator Act*

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Please cite as:
Yang, Li; Yeh, Ray; Raza, Hassan; Abdelbaki, Mohamed; Incani, Noemi; Koleszar, Réka; Ruttencutter, Sarah & Camoletto, Virginia. (2026). “From Tariffs to Conditional Integration: An EU Strategy for Chinese Electric-Vehicle Investment under the Industrial Accelerator Act.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 3, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0006

 

Abstract

Europe does not face a simple choice between admitting inexpensive Chinese electric vehicles and closing its market to protect domestic producers. The harder question is how foreign manufacturing can support decarbonization without hollowing out the industrial and employment base that makes the transition politically sustainable. The European Commission’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) is an important but incomplete answer. Tariffs can buy time and origin rules can anchor production, but neither instrument alone can create software capabilities, retrain workers or strengthen regional suppliers. This paper compares defensive localization, managed openness and conditional integration, and recommends the third. Its three core proposals are a European Automotive Investment Compact, a Skills and Regional Transition Covenant, and a ring-fenced European Automotive Transition Financing Window. A software and data pillar and a structured implementation dialogue with China would support delivery. The aim is not decoupling or unconditional access, but the conversion of market-seeking investment into capabilities that Europe can retain.

Keywords: European Union; China; electric vehicles; Industrial Accelerator Act; conditional integration

 

By Li Yang, Ray Yeh, Hassan Raza, Mohamed Abdelbaki, Noemi Incani, Réka Koleszar, Sarah Ruttencutter & Virginia Camoletto

Introduction

Europe’s automotive debate is often framed as a contest between climate ambition and industrial protection. The issue is broader: can the European Union decarbonize transport while retaining enough productive, technological and social capacity to sustain public support? The sector provides direct and indirect work for approximately 13.8 million Europeans and supports extensive networks in steel, chemicals, electronics, software, logistics and services (European Commission, 2026a). When a major plant or supplier reduces production, the effects concentrate in towns where alternative employment may be scarce, and industrial identity remains politically important.

The pressure is real, but its causes are mixed. European producers face high energy costs, fragmented capital markets, uneven charging infrastructure, regulatory complexity and slow progress in software-defined vehicles (Draghi, 2024; European Commission, 2025; van Wieringen, 2024). They also confront a Chinese industry built on scale, intense domestic competition, integrated battery supply chains and rapid product development. China accounted for more than 70 percent of global electric-car production in 2024, while sales of Chinese-made electric cars in Europe continued to grow in 2025 (IEA, 2025; IEA, 2026). This is not merely an import surge, but a collision between industrial systems as EU regulation creates a large market for electric mobility (Ban & Šćepanović, 2026; van Wieringen, 2024).

This collision has a political dimension. The IAA proposal notes that more than 100,000 automotive job cuts were announced in 2024 and 2025 (European Commission, 2026c). Chinese competition is not the sole cause: weak demand, delayed investment, management choices and technological change also matter. Research on Germany shows that actual job loss and fear of future decline can produce different forms of protest, with right-wing populist support particularly responsive where manufacturing remains central to local identity, but its future appears insecure (Bayerlein, Kölzer & Metten, 2026). Trade shocks also make openness easier to portray as a bargain imposed on workers rather than negotiated with them (Poletti, 2026).

The EU has already responded. Following its anti-subsidy investigation, it imposed definitive countervailing duties on battery electric vehicles imported from China, with company-specific rates ranging from 7.8 to 35.3 percent in addition to the ordinary tariff (European Commission, 2024). The duties address identified subsidization and create breathing space for European manufacturers. They do not resolve Europe’s internal weaknesses. A tariff cannot build a battery plant, train a software engineer, connect a factory to affordable electricity or help a medium-sized supplier convert from combustion-engine components to power electronics.

The European Commission’s March 2026 proposal for the Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) moves beyond border measures. It would create lead markets for low-carbon and European-made products, simplify permitting and seek to ensure that major foreign investments generate value inside the Union. Its foreign-investment chapter would cover investments above EUR 100 million in strategic sectors when a single third country holds more than 40 percent of global manufacturing capacity. Under the Commission proposal, covered investments would have to meet at least four of six conditions concerning ownership, joint ventures, technology licensing, EU research spending, employment and local sourcing; the employment condition would be mandatory (European Commission, 2026c, 2026d).

This policy paper argues that the IAA should become the basis for a policy of conditional integration rather than defensive exclusion. Chinese investment can accelerate European electrification and add manufacturing capacity. Yet investment should not be treated as beneficial simply because a factory stands within EU borders. The relevant test is whether it strengthens capabilities that remain in Europe: skilled employment, local suppliers, research, engineering, data governance, circular production and regional resilience. The task for DG TRADE, DG GROW and the wider Commission is to make these conditions predictable, proportionate and common across the Single Market.

Europe’s Automotive Dilemma

The EU’s dependence on China runs through battery cells, processed materials, components and production equipment, not only finished vehicles. Chinese firms benefit from a dense ecosystem in which battery makers, car manufacturers, software providers and suppliers develop products quickly and at scale. European companies remain strong in engineering, premium brands, safety and research, but competition increasingly turns on vehicle software, battery management, data integration, user interfaces and rapid product cycles (IEA, 2025; IEA, 2026; van Wieringen, 2024).

This is why the present ‘China shock’ differs from a conventional import surge. European climate policy is deliberately expanding demand for electric mobility. If European firms and suppliers cannot respond quickly, the demand created by EU regulation will be met by imported vehicles and components. Decarbonization would proceed, but with fewer of the industrial learning effects, investments and jobs that policymakers expected. The dilemma is therefore not whether Europe should remain open. It is how to prevent openness from becoming a one-way transfer of market share while avoiding a protectionist turn that raises consumer prices and slows electric-vehicle adoption (IEA, 2026; van Wieringen, 2024).

Trade figures reinforce the sense of imbalance. In 2025, the EU exported EUR 199.6 billion in goods to China and imported EUR 559.4 billion, producing a deficit of EUR 359.8 billion (Eurostat, 2026). A bilateral deficit is not, by itself, evidence of unfair trade. It does, however, intensify political pressure when it coincides with plant closures and visible import growth in a strategic industry. Measures presented as technical trade defense can quickly become symbols in a wider argument about sovereignty, dependence and the distribution of globalization’s costs.

Hard protectionism would not solve the problem. Europe still needs affordable EVs, competitive batteries and private investment, as well as cooperation with China on climate, standards and trade. Closing the market would reduce competition, delay capacity expansion and invite retaliation. It could also divert Chinese exports towards Europe’s southern neighborhood, where European manufacturers already face stronger competition (Fulton, Lons & Tsang, 2026). A broader protectionist turn would also shrink a major market for Chinese firms and make EU rules less predictable (IEA, 2026; Tagliapietra, Trasi & Sebastian, 2025).

Unqualified openness is equally inadequate. Chinese car and battery manufacturers are investing in Europe or considering local production, which can create jobs and shorten supply chains. Yet local assembly does not necessarily create local capability. A plant may import high-value inputs, retain research and software functions elsewhere and generate mainly assembly jobs. Separate Member-State negotiations can therefore produce uneven benefits and a subsidy race in which the largest public budgets attract the most valuable projects (Tagliapietra, Trasi & Sebastian, 2025).

The green transition must therefore be understood as a political bargain. Consumers need affordable vehicles. Firms need predictable rules and access to finance. Workers need credible routes into new occupations. Regions need replacement investment before old capacity disappears. The EU needs resilience without autarky, and Chinese investors need access without assuming that access can remain detached from European social and industrial concerns. Conditional integrationoffers a way to connect these interests.

Why the Industrial Accelerator Act Is Only a Partial Answer

The proposed IAA is significant because it recognizes that trade policy, industrial policy and foreign investment can no longer be treated as separate fields. Its demand-side measures would use public procurement and support schemes to favor low-carbon and European-made products in selected sectors. Its permitting provisions would aim to reduce delays through digital procedures and industrial acceleration areas. Its investment chapter would seek to prevent strategic foreign projects from operating as isolated enclaves by linking approval to European participation, research, training and value-chain integration (European Commission, 2026c, 2026d).

These are useful corrections to a policy model that relied heavily on carbon regulation and market incentives while assuming that industrial capacity would follow. The proposed IAA also reflects the Draghi Report’s argument that decarbonization can support growth only when climate targets are matched by investment, innovation and coordinated industrial action (Draghi, 2024). In the automotive sector, the proposed Act could help create demand for European batteries and components and give public authorities leverage when negotiating with major investors.

The difficulty is that location is not the same as competitiveness. The proposed IAA is strongest on vertical questions: where a battery cell is produced, how much Union-origin content a supported vehicle contains, or whether an investment creates jobs. It is weaker on the horizontal systems that determine long-term performance, including software platforms, vehicle data, cybersecurity, testing environments, charging infrastructure and recycling (European Commission, 2025; van Wieringen, 2024). A factory may satisfy an origin rule while remaining dependent on technology and critical components controlled elsewhere.

The proposed foreign-investment provisions also need refinement. A four-out-of-six test gives flexibility, but investors may select the least demanding combination without producing the capabilities Europe most needs. The proposed 50 percent EU-workforce threshold cannot distinguish temporary assembly jobs from durable technical and research positions. Moreover, conditions tied directly to the purchase or use of domestic goods can create risks under the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, while compulsory or uncompensated technology transfer would be politically and legally vulnerable (WTO, 1994). China’s Ministry of Commerce has criticized the proposal on precisely these grounds and warned of countermeasures (MOFCOM, 2026a, 2026b).

A further weakness is finance. The proposal warns that uncoordinated national measures can fragment the Single Market, but much industrial support still depends on national fiscal capacity. Germany or France can offer packages that smaller or more indebted Member States cannot match. Without a common EU layer, ‘Made in EU’ may in practice become ‘made in the Member States with the largest subsidy budgets.’ This would deepen regional inequalities and weaken the collective bargaining power that a common European approach is meant to create (Collin, García Bercero & McWilliams, 2026; Tagliapietra, Trasi & Sebastian, 2025).

Finally, the proposed IAA’s social logic remains too automatic. It assumes that anchoring production will anchor employment. Yet electrification changes the industry’s occupational structure, and new factories may be far from the regions losing old ones. Research on the European car industry shows that the transition can reproduce regional and social inequalities unless policy addresses who receives investment, who bears adjustment costs and who participates in decisions (Szabó & Newell, 2024). The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is therefore right to call for mandatory training, worker participation and regional transition planning, not employment numbers alone (ETUC, 2026).

The proposal should not be abandoned. It should be completed. Its central insight is correct: access to the scale of the Single Market gives the EU bargaining power. That power should be used to secure outcomes rather than to build a wall. Recent assessments similarly caution that poorly calibrated origin and investment rules could delay capacity formation or distort the Single Market unless they are tied to clearer sectoral objectives (Collin, García Bercero & McWilliams, 2026).

Assessing Three Policy Options

At the present stage of the legislative debate, three policy approaches can be envisaged.

The first option is defensive localization. The EU would tighten ‘Made in EU’ rules, maintain or increase tariffs, restrict Chinese participation in public support and apply the proposed IAA’s ownership and technology conditions in their most demanding form. It offers a visible response to job losses and may create protected demand while European producers scale up.

The costs would be substantial. Strict exclusion would raise prices, reduce competitive pressure and delay capacity expansion. It would invite retaliation, while broad local-content requirements could conflict with WTO rules if they discriminated against imported goods (WTO, 1994). Protection would not guarantee innovation: firms could gain a sheltered market without closing gaps in software, batteries and production speed. Export diversion would also expose European manufacturers to stronger Chinese competition in nearby third markets (Fulton, Lons & Tsang, 2026).

This option carries a political paradox. Protection can temporarily reassure workers, but if it leads to expensive electric vehicles, weak demand and continued restructuring, populist actors will shift their argument. Brussels can then be blamed both for imposing the transition and for making it unaffordable. Evidence from manufacturing regions also cautions against assuming that one visible protective measure will settle deeper anxieties about status, employment and regional decline (Bayerlein, Kölzer & Metten, 2026; Poletti, 2026).

The second option is managed openness. The EU would retain countervailing duties and general investment-screening tools while welcoming Chinese factories case by case. Member States would remain free to negotiate investment packages, and the Commission would intervene mainly where subsidies, security risks or market distortions were evident. This approach could attract capital quickly and expand European production without the conflict generated by rigid joint-venture or technology-transfer requirements.

Managed openness is preferable to a trade war, but it is too weak for the scale of the transition. Individual Member States may compete to offer subsidies, land and tax advantages while accepting limited commitments on suppliers, research or skills. Investors could divide production across Europe in ways that maximize incentives rather than industrial coherence. A series of assembly plants would improve output statistics without necessarily strengthening European capability. The approach would also disadvantage smaller Member States and make monitoring uneven (Tagliapietra, Trasi & Sebastian, 2025).

The third option, recommended in this paper, is conditional integration. It starts from two propositions. First, Chinese investment is not inherently a threat; it can support decarbonization, competition and employment. Second, the value of an investment cannot be measured by its location alone. It should be judged by the capabilities it creates and retains in Europe.

Conditional integration would establish common EU rules for major electric-vehicle and battery projects, regardless of which Member State hosts them. Investment approval, eligibility for relevant public support and access to lead-market measures would remain available when investors make verifiable contributions to local research, skilled employment, supplier development, circularity and secure digital systems. The framework would not require firms to surrender corporate control or transfer proprietary technology. Instead, it would impose outcome-based obligations proportionate to the scale of the investment and the public support received.

This approach better balances openness and resilience. It uses the Single Market as leverage without treating investment as a zero-sum contest and aligns with proposals for a common European strategy towards Chinese EV investment (Tagliapietra, Trasi & Sebastian, 2025). Chinese firms would gain a predictable route into Europe: invest for the long term, build local capabilities and meet common standards. Europe would convert competitive pressure into learning and capacity-building rather than a sequence of trade disputes and national restrictions.

Political Feasibility on Both Sides

Conditional integration is viable only if it can be defended in domestic politics. In Europe, governments must show that openness does not mean accepting low-value assembly while research and supplier development remain elsewhere. Commitments on permanent technical jobs, paid retraining and regional supplier conversion should therefore be visible before public support is granted. This matters in industrial regions where expected decline can be as politically consequential as closures already recorded (Bayerlein, Kölzer & Metten, 2026), and it answers populist claims that trade policy protects abstract European interests while local communities absorb the costs (Poletti, 2026).

China faces a different constraint. Beijing is unlikely to accept a framework described as forced technology transfer, discriminatory localization or an anti-China ownership regime (MOFCOM, 2026a, 2026b). Chinese firms may nevertheless accept training, European R&D, supplier-development and carbon-performance commitments when these are presented as normal conditions for long-term investment and apply to all covered foreign investors. Deeper localization can then be framed as commercial adaptation rather than a political concession.

The framework should therefore privilege measurable outcomes over symbolic ownership tests. Country-neutral rules, protection of pre-existing intellectual property and a transparent route to approval make conditional integration easier to defend on both sides: Europe gains visible domestic value, while Chinese investors avoid openly punitive treatment.

Three Core Recommendations

1. Establish a European Automotive Investment Compact

The first step should be a European Automotive Investment Compact anchored in the proposed IAA framework. During the legislative negotiations, the co-legislators should strengthen Article 18 by making capability creation a mandatory element of covered EV and battery investments. In addition to the proposed employment requirement, each project should meet either the EU research-and-development condition or a strengthened supplier-development condition. The relevant legal bases are Articles 18(2)(d), 18(2)(f) and 18(3). The Commission should then use the implementing act foreseen in Article 18(5) of the proposal to establish a sector-specific verification scorecard (European Commission, 2026c).

The scorecard should test substance: technical and permanent jobs, engineering and research performed in Europe, paid training, supplier contracts and the treatment of jointly created intellectual property. An investor should not be able to meet formal ownership conditions while contributing little to learning, nor should a project be rejected merely because a joint venture is commercially inappropriate.

Technology cooperation must be handled carefully. The Compact should recognize paid licensing, joint research centers, jointly created intellectual property, testing facilities and university partnerships, while protecting pre-existing rights. Europe should seek competence rather than ownership of every foreign technology. Supplier conditions should be framed as verifiable value-chain development rather than a blanket obligation to purchase domestic goods, reducing WTO risk (WTO, 1994).

2. Attach a Skills and Regional Transition Covenant to Major Investments

The second recommendation is a Skills and Regional Transition Covenant. The Commission’s March 2026 IAA proposal would require at least half of the workforce in covered investments to be EU workers across occupational categories, accompanied by training. A qualitative plan should also identify the occupations created, qualifications required, share of permanent positions and routes for displaced automotive workers to enter them (European Commission, 2026c).

Investors should partner with vocational schools, universities and recognized training providers. Training should occur during paid working time and extend to affected supplier firms. Where projects receive significant public support, unions and worker representatives should participate in design and monitoring, preventing Europe from gaining mainly assembly jobs while high-value engineering remains elsewhere (ETUC, 2026).

The Commission should also favor projects linked to regions undergoing automotive restructuring, where infrastructure and skills conditions permit. Industrial Acceleration Areas should be tied to regional development, clean-energy access and supplier conversion rather than treated as deregulatory enclaves. A new battery plant does not automatically compensate for a distant components-factory closure; the connection must be designed and funded (Szabó & Newell, 2024).

3. Create a European Automotive Transition Financing Window

The third recommendation is a ring-fenced European Automotive Transition Financing Window under existing EU instruments, coordinated by the Commission and the European Investment Bank. The proposed IAA relies on synergies across the Innovation Fund, InvestEU, Horizon Europe, the Connecting Europe Facility and cohesion funds rather than a new spending envelope (European Commission, 2026c). The Commission should begin preparing a coordinated pilot in 2027, with implementation to follow once the IAA’s legal basis and the necessary budgetary arrangements are in place. In the longer term, the financing window could be incorporated into the European Competitiveness Fund if that instrument is established under the 2028-2034 Multiannual Financial Framework.

The window should finance shared European public goods rather than routine vehicle production: supplier conversion, battery recycling, testing facilities, worker training, grid connections and first-of-a-kind manufacturing. Cross-border value chains and shared research should receive priority over isolated plants with limited spillovers.

National aid could continue, but major packages should be listed on a common transparency platform with public contributions, expected jobs, training, supplier contracts and environmental performance. Investors would then face one European framework rather than a patchwork of national bargains, accepting consistent obligations in return for access to finance and lead markets.

Two Enabling Measures

A Software, Data and Innovation Pillar

The proposed IAA’s emphasis on manufacturing is understandable, but the competitive frontier is shifting towards software-defined vehicles, autonomous-driving systems, battery management, digital services and data. Europe could localize vehicle assembly while remaining dependent on external operating systems and data architectures. That would replace one form of dependence with another (European Commission, 2025; van Wieringen, 2024).

The Commission’s automotive action plan already points towards testing zones, connected and autonomous vehicle alliances and public-private research. These initiatives should be linked to the proposed IAA investment regime. Major projects should comply with EU cybersecurity, data-protection and competition rules; critical software updates and remote-control functions should face independent security auditing; and access to vehicle data generated in Europe should be governed by transparent legal rules (European Commission, 2025).

This pillar should remain open to Chinese firms. Exclusion from European research ecosystems would slow learning and encourage incompatible standards. Participation, however, should depend on interoperability, auditability and compliance with EU data governance. Joint testing facilities could allow European and Chinese firms to develop products for the EU market while ensuring that safety, cybersecurity and data standards are verified in Europe.

A Structured EU-China Implementation Dialogue

The second enabling measure is a structured EU-China implementation dialogue. It should not replace enforcement or offer China exemptions unavailable to others. A working group involving DG TRADE, DG GROW, relevant Chinese ministries, industry and social partners should instead reduce uncertainty during the proposed IAA’s legislative and implementation phases.

The agenda should cover Union-origin calculations, joint research and intellectual property, recognition of training expenditure, reporting and carbon accounting. It could also examine WTO-compatible alternatives to duties, including price undertakings where they address the subsidization identified by the Commission (European Commission, 2026b). Non-confidential guidance should be published for firms on both sides.

Reciprocity should remain on the agenda, but through defined sectors and measurable commitments rather than a demand that every market opens simultaneously. Progress on procurement, standards and research partnerships could be linked to greater confidence in implementation of the proposed IAA. The aim is managed bargaining, not rhetorical escalation.

Risks and Safeguards

Conditional integration will not eliminate conflict. China may challenge provisions of the proposed IAA or retaliate against European firms. The EU should prepare sector-specific contingencies, diversify critical inputs and use trade-defense instruments when evidence supports them. Rules should remain country-neutral and rest on transparent market-share, security and value-creation criteria, making them easier to defend legally (European Commission, 2026c; WTO, 1994).

Symbolic compliance is another risk. Research centers or training programmes may remain small relative to the investment. Approval decisions should therefore include measurable milestones and five-year reporting on permanent jobs, paid training, R&D, jointly developed intellectual property, supplier contracts, recycled content and carbon performance. Failure to meet commitments should trigger proportionate recovery of support or revised approval conditions.

Industrial policy can also become detached from affordability. Consumers cannot carry the full adjustment cost through higher vehicle prices. The Commission should preserve competition, expand charging infrastructure and target demand measures towards small and affordable EVs. Resilience will not be politically sustainable if electric mobility becomes a premium product (European Commission, 2025; IEA, 2026).

Finally, the proposed IAA should not be sold as a victory over China. Such language would strengthen nationalist narratives on both sides. It should be presented as a rule for all major investors: access to public support and the Single Market comes with responsibilities to workers, regions, innovation and climate goals. Visible local benefits are the strongest answer to populist claims that trade and decarbonization serve only distant institutions and large corporations (Poletti, 2026).

Conclusion

The European automotive transition cannot be secured by tariffs alone. Nor can Europe assume that any factory built within its borders will automatically deliver resilience. The decisive issue is the quality of industrial integration.

Defensive localization would protect selected producers but risk higher costs, retaliation and technological complacency. Managed openness would attract capital but leave Member States competing for investments that may create limited European spillovers. Conditional integration offers a more durable route. It welcomes Chinese electric-vehicle and battery investment when that investment creates capabilities Europe can retain skilled jobs, research, suppliers, secure digital systems, circular production and regional development.

The proposed Industrial Accelerator Act provides the beginnings of such a framework, but it needs clearer priorities, a realistic financing channel and stronger links to skills, software and regional policy. A European Automotive Investment Compact would turn broad legal conditions into predictable sectoral rules. A Skills and Regional Transition Covenantwould connect industrial location to social legitimacy. A European Automotive Transition Financing Window would limit fiscal fragmentation, while the two enabling measures would address future technological competition and reduce uncertainty without weakening enforcement.

Europe should not ask Chinese firms to become European. It should ask every major investor benefiting from the European market to make a measurable contribution to European capacity. The strategic shift is from market access to co-development, and from the location of output to the creation of capability. Implemented in that form, the proposed IAA could do more than manage a trade dispute. It could support decarbonization, democratic stability and a more balanced EU-China economic relationship.


 

(*) This policy paper is based on research conducted by the ECPS Summer School 2026 China Team during the case competition on the side of Summer School titled “Europe Between Oceans: The Future of EU Trade Between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific,” held on July 6-10, 2026.


 

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Tsipras, Orban and Trump.

Mandate Inflation: How Populists Claim Authority to Challenge Global Constraints

Please cite as:
Aslam, Muhammad Faizan. (2026). “Mandate Inflation: How Populists Claim Authority to Challenge Global Constraints.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). August 24, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000130   



Abstract

Populist leaders often say they are restoring popular sovereignty against treaties, courts, trade rules, migration regimes, expert bodies, and international organizations. Yet their behavior toward international order varies. They may withdraw, renegotiate, obstruct, selectively comply, or perform public defiance while remaining inside institutions. This article explains that variation through mandate inflation: a process of turning a vote into a broader political claim in which an election or referendum is recast from a limited permission to govern into wider authority to challenge constraints in the name of the people. A structured comparison of Trump’s ‘America First’ politics, Brexit’s ‘take back control’ discourse, and Viktor Orbán’s conflict with EU constraints shows four recurrent moves: mandate condensation, construction of ‘the real people,’ reframing of constraints as anti-democratic obstruction, and assertion of special authority to act. The argument does not replace material, institutional, or nationalist explanations. It shows how leaders present these strategies as the will of the people; it does not assume that audiences accepted those claims or that rhetoric alone caused policy choices. The article contributes to recent debates on global populism by showing why exit is only one possible outcome of populist constraint politics.

Keywords: Populism, mandate, global governance, international institutions, sovereignty, Brexit, Trump, Viktor Orbán

 

By Muhammad Faizan Aslam*

Introduction

Populist leaders rarely challenge international order by saying only that a treaty, court or organization is inefficient. They often say something stronger. They argue that constraints on government action stand between the people and democratic control (Dijkstra & Ghassim, 2025). Trade agreements become “bad deals” made by globalist elites (Finbow, 2023). Courts become “foreign” or “unelected bodies.” Migration rules become “imposed commands.” Expert advice becomes “technocratic obstruction.” The point is not only policy disagreement. The point is authority (Wajner et al., 2024).

This creates a puzzle for international relations as populist leaders do not respond to global constraint in a single way. Some withdraw from agreements. Some seek better terms. Some stay inside institutions while blocking decisions. Some comply with parts of a regime while attacking other parts. Some use defiant language even when policy change is limited. Recent research on global populism has made this variation clear (Pacciardi et al., 2024; Wajner & Giurlando, 2024). It has also shown that populist foreign policy is now a serious research programme rather than a side question for domestic politics (Ozdamar & Yanik, 2024; Wajner & Giurlando, 2024). What remains underdeveloped is the democratic authorization mechanism that makes such varied strategies appear legitimate to supporters.

This article calls that process of turning a vote into a broader political claim “mandate inflation.” Mandate inflation is the process through which a populist leader recasts an election or referendum from a limited permission to govern into a wider claim of authority to challenge, override or rewrite constraints in the name of the people. The concept is deliberately narrow. It is not a synonym for nationalism, anti-globalism, sovereignty talk or ordinary treaty renegotiation. It is present when four claims appear together: a complex vote is condensed into one clear mandate; that mandate is attached to “the real people”; international or EU-level constraints are described as illegitimate barriers to that people; and the leader claims authority to act against those constraints. Mandate inflation is therefore observed in actors’ claims; whether those claims generate public acceptance or independently cause policy outcomes is a separate empirical question.

The argument matters because global constraints are not self-explanatory objects, and their political effects depend on observable factors such as legal form, institutional location, economic impact and domestic visibility. They can be legal commitments, institutional procedures, market pressures, treaty obligations, policy standards, rights regimes or expert rules. Many have been voluntarily accepted by elected governments. Some are popular because they provide security, market access, rights protection or credibility. Others are weakly accountable, socially unequal or politically remote. Populist leaders exploit this mixed character. They do not need to prove that a constraint is legally invalid. They need to make it look democratically suspect (Ecker-Ehrhardt et al., 2025; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019).

This is why the argument avoids a simple defense of global governance. It does not assume that international institutions are always democratically healthy or that popular control is a false problem. Many voters experience international commitments through job loss, austerity, migration pressure, border disputes, legal complexity or distant expert language (Bellodi et al., 2024; Scheiring et al., 2024a). The issue is not whether these concerns should be dismissed. The issue is how a leader turns them into an exclusive claim to speak for the people against constraints that may also have democratic authorization of their own.

This article compares three cases: Trump’s “America First” politics, Brexit’s “take back control” discourse and Viktor Orbán’s confrontation with EU constraints. The cases are not treated as identical. Trump shows presidential mandate inflation in a great power setting, with exit, renegotiation and symbolic defiance. Brexit shows how a referendum can be converted into a mandate to leave a regional legal order. Orbán shows that mandate inflation can also work from inside an institution through obstruction, selective compliance and public defiance. The cases vary by mandate source, institutional location and strategy toward constraint. This variation is useful because the argument does not predict one outcome. It explains how different strategies are justified through a similar claim about the people. The relevant actors are the Trump administration, the Leave-to-government coalition centered on the May government, and the Orbán government; campaign rhetoric, official government claims, legal acts and institutional responses are treated as distinct forms of evidence.

The article makes three contributions. First, it adds a mechanism to recent work on populism and international affairs. Existing scholarship shows that populist governments affect foreign policy, international institutions, trade, migration, security and world order visions in uneven ways (Brusenbauch Meislova & Chryssogelos, 2024; Destradi & Plagemann, 2024; Wajner & Giurlando, 2024). Mandate inflation explains how this unevenness can still share a common democratic grammar. Second, it connects populism research to work on international institutions and unilateral challenges. Institutions face not only legal non-compliance, but also domestic struggles over whether their constraints count as legitimate democratic commitments (Walter & Plotke-Scherly, 2025). Third, it separates voter-side causes from leader-side authorization. Economic insecurity, status grievance, territorial loss and backlash against globalization may help explain why populist appeals resonate(Carter & Pop-Eleches, 2025; Koenig & Mendelberg, 2026; Scheiring et al., 2024b). They do not by themselves explain how leaders turn a vote into authority to contest courts, treaties or international organizations.

The article proceeds in five steps. It first places the argument in recent literature on global populism, foreign policy and international institutions. It then defines “mandate inflation” and its boundary conditions. The empirical sections trace the mechanism in the United States, the United Kingdom and Hungary. The comparative discussion explains why the same authorizing logic supports different strategies toward constraint. The conclusion draws implications for scholars and policy practitioners who face populist challenges to global governance.

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Donald Trump's supporters wearing "In God We Trump" shirts at a rally in Bojangles' Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

The Political Theologies of Populism: The Garveyites, the Klan, and the Wobblies, 1905–1930

Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen’s book offers a compelling reinterpretation of American populism through the lens of political theology. Challenging conventional accounts that reduce populism to anti-elitism or electoral strategy, Rev. Dr. Bossen demonstrates how competing visions of “the people” are constructed through narratives of belonging, redemption, and collective identity. By tracing the historical continuity of white supremacist, Pan-African, and pluralistic populisms from the Progressive Era to Trumpism, the Civil Rights Movement, Black Lives Matter, and progressive labor politics, the book makes a significant contribution to contemporary populism scholarship. While its comparative framework occasionally risks creating an unintended moral symmetry between emancipatory and exclusionary movements, it remains an original, theoretically sophisticated, and highly recommended study for scholars of populism, political theology, religion, and American political development.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

Few concepts have generated as much scholarly debate over the past two decades as populism. Whether understood as a thin ideology, a political style, a discursive logic, or a mode of constructing “the people,” populism has become one of the defining frameworks through which scholars interpret democratic transformation in the twenty-first century. Yet despite the flourishing literature on populism, comparatively little attention has been devoted to its religious dimensions or to the theological narratives that shape collective political identities. Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen’s The Political Theologies of Populism: The Garveyites, the Klan, and the Wobblies, 1905–1930. enters this crowded field with an ambitious and refreshingly original intervention. Rather than approaching populism primarily through electoral politics, party systems, or charismatic leadership, Rev. Dr. Bossen investigates the theological imagination underlying populist movements, arguing that populism is fundamentally a process of “people-making” through narratives of salvation, ritual, belonging, and collective identity. The book thus offers an innovative synthesis of political theology, American religious history, social movement studies, and populism scholarship.

The volume examines three influential movements of the Progressive Era: the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), and the Second Ku Klux Klan. Although these organizations pursued radically different political objectives, Rev. Dr. Bossen argues that each sought to answer the constitutional question embedded in the opening words of the American Constitution—“We the People”—by constructing its own vision of who genuinely belonged within the political community. In doing so, he identifies three enduring forms of American populism: pluralistic populism, Pan-African populism, and white supremacist populism. These competing projects of collective identity, he contends, have not disappeared with the Progressive Era but continue to shape American political life into the twenty-first century.

Rev. Dr. Bossen is unusually well positioned to write such a study. Trained as both a historian and a scholar of religion, he is also an ordained Unitarian Universalist minister whose long involvement in labor activism—particularly within the IWW—deeply informs his analytical perspective. Rather than concealing his normative commitments behind claims of detached neutrality, Rev. Dr. Bossen openly acknowledges that the book emerged during a period marked by the resurgence of white supremacist politics in the United States. Echoing Howard Zinn’s famous observation that one cannot remain neutral on a moving train, he explicitly rejects the possibility of complete scholarly neutrality and instead argues that historical inquiry should contribute to understanding and resisting contemporary threats to democratic life.

This methodological transparency constitutes one of the book’s principal strengths. Rather than pretending to occupy an impossible position of complete objectivity, Rev. Dr. Bossen clearly situates his scholarship within broader democratic and ethical concerns. His extensive archival research, coupled with his experience as both minister and labor organizer, enables him to bridge historical analysis with contemporary political theory in a manner rarely achieved within existing populism scholarship.

Equally impressive is Rev. Dr. Bossen’s conceptual innovation. Instead of defining populism through anti-elitism, charismatic leadership, or ideological “thinness,” he shifts analytical attention toward the construction of collective political identity. Populism, in his account, is less about particular policy agendas than about the creation of a populus—an imagined political community whose boundaries define inclusion and exclusion. This emphasis resonates with Ernesto Laclau’s theory of populist articulation while simultaneously incorporating insights from Charles Taylor’s concept of the social imaginary and Margaret Canovan’s work on “the people.” Yet Rev. Dr. Bossen moves beyond these traditions by arguing that political identities are sustained not merely through discourse but through deeply embedded theological narratives, rituals, myths, and symbols inherited from American Protestant culture.

Perhaps the book’s most significant contribution lies in demonstrating the historical continuity of these three competing populist traditions. Contemporary discussions of populism often begin with Donald Trump, Brexit, or the European radical right, inadvertently suggesting that populism is primarily a recent electoral phenomenon. Rev. Dr. Bossen persuasively demonstrates instead that today’s political conflicts are rooted in much older struggles over belonging, sovereignty, race, labor, and democracy. The three traditions he reconstructs during the Progressive Era continue to reverberate throughout American political development.

White supremacist populism, represented historically by the Second Ku Klux Klan, survives today in modified forms within elements of Trumpism and the broader MAGA movement. Its rhetoric of reclaiming the nation, defending “real Americans,” protecting traditional values, restricting immigration, and portraying demographic change as existential decline echoes many of the exclusionary narratives that Rev. Dr. Bossen identifies in early twentieth-century white populism. While contemporary movements operate within vastly different institutional and constitutional contexts, the underlying logic of constructing “the people” through exclusion exhibits remarkable historical continuity.

Similarly, the tradition Rev. Dr. Bossen describes as Pan-African populism did not disappear with Marcus Garvey and Garveyism. Rather, it evolved through successive generations of African American political mobilization—from the Civil Rights Movement to Black Power and, more recently, Black Lives Matter. Although these movements differ profoundly in strategy, ideology, and organizational form, each represents an effort to redefine democratic membership by confronting the historic exclusion of Black Americans from the full promise of citizenship. Rather than simply demanding policy reform, they have sought recognition, dignity, and inclusion within the American political community itself.

Rev. Dr. Bossen’s third tradition, pluralistic populism, likewise extends beyond the IWW. Its aspiration to construct solidarity across racial, ethnic, and occupational divisions can be traced through segments of the American labor movement, democratic socialism, Occupy Wall Street, and Bernie Sanders’ campaigns. Here, “the people” are constituted not by ethnicity or race but through shared economic interests and democratic participation. This continuity illustrates one of the book’s central insights: populism is not inherently authoritarian or democratic, progressive or reactionary. It is instead a contested political logic capable of generating radically different democratic projects depending upon how “the people” are imagined.

This tripartite framework represents one of the most original contributions of The Political Theologies of Populism. By recovering these competing historical traditions, Rev. Dr. Bossen challenges simplistic understandings that reduce populism either to an authoritarian pathology or to a democratic corrective. Instead, he demonstrates that American political development has long been characterized by competing populisms, each offering rival answers to the enduring constitutional question of who belongs within “We the People.” The chapters of the book develop this argument through a richly detailed historical reconstruction of the Progressive Era and its lasting influence on contemporary American politics.

The Enduring Legacies of White Supremacist, Pan-African, and Pluralistic Populisms

Rev. Dr. Bossen develops his central thesis through an eight-chapter structure that moves systematically from conceptual foundations to historical case studies before returning to the contemporary implications of his argument. Rather than presenting the Ku Klux Klan, the IWW, and UNIA as isolated historical phenomena, he demonstrates how each movement constituted a distinctive political theology—a comprehensive moral vision that sought not merely political power but the construction of a particular understanding of the people. This emphasis on “people-making” distinguishes the book from much of the existing literature on populism, which has frequently privileged electoral mobilization, anti-elitist rhetoric, or leadership styles over the deeper ontological question of collective identity.

The opening chapter situates American populism within the unresolved constitutional ambiguity surrounding the phrase “We the People.” Rev. Dr. Bossen argues that American political history is characterized less by a stable democratic consensus than by recurring struggles over membership, belonging, and sovereignty. Every major populist movement attempts to answer the same foundational question: who legitimately constitutes the American people? This conceptual move immediately elevates the discussion beyond conventional institutional analysis. Instead of treating populism as a temporary electoral pathology, Rev. Dr. Bossen understands it as an enduring contest over political ontology—that is, over the very constitution of the political community itself.

The subsequent chapter introduces what is arguably the book’s most original analytical contribution: the identification of three distinct varieties of American populism. White supremacist populism constructs the people through racial exclusion; pluralistic populism seeks solidarity across class and ethnic divisions; Pan-African populism builds collective identity around the shared historical experience of Black oppression and aspirations for racial self-determination. These three traditions are neither merely ideological positions nor electoral constituencies. They represent competing moral universes, each grounded in narratives of redemption, sacrifice, community, and historical destiny. In Rev. Dr. Bossen’s formulation, theology becomes less a matter of organized religion than of symbolic frameworks through which political communities understand themselves and their collective futures.

The conceptual richness of this framework becomes particularly evident in the chapters devoted to political ritual, mythmaking, and collective memory. Rev. Dr. Bossen convincingly demonstrates that each movement employed remarkably similar organizational mechanisms despite radically different political goals. All developed founding myths, sacred texts, ceremonial performances, songs, symbols, and narratives of salvation that transformed fragmented social groups into imagined political communities. The Klan’s rituals of racial purity, the UNIA’s Pan-African ceremonies, and the Wobblies’ labor songs all functioned as instruments for constructing political solidarity. Here, Rev. Dr. Bossen successfully bridges political theology with social movement theory by showing that identity formation depends not only upon ideological programs but also upon emotionally resonant symbolic practices.

One of the book’s greatest strengths is its sustained attention to historical continuity. Rather than treating the Progressive Era as a closed historical episode, Rev. Dr. Bossen demonstrates that the competing populisms of the early twentieth century established durable political traditions whose influence extends well beyond their original organizational lives. This historical perspective offers a valuable corrective to contemporary scholarship, which frequently treats populism as a phenomenon emerging primarily after the global financial crisis of 2008 or the electoral victories of Donald Trump and other contemporary populists.

Indeed, one of the most illuminating aspects of the book is the ease with which Rev. Dr.  Bossen’s historical framework can be extended into subsequent periods of American political development. The Pan-African populism represented by Garvey’s movement did not disappear with the decline of the UNIA. Instead, it evolved through successive generations of Black political mobilization. While Martin Luther King Jr.’s Civil Rights Movement emphasized constitutional equality and nonviolent democratic inclusion, Malcolm X and later Black Power organizations increasingly embraced forms of collective self-determination that echoed certain elements of Garveyite political thought, albeit under profoundly different historical circumstances. Contemporary movements such as Black Lives Matter similarly continue the struggle over democratic membership by insisting that Black Americans be recognized as fully equal participants within the American political community rather than perpetual outsiders.

Importantly, however, continuity should not be mistaken for identity. The Civil Rights Movement, Black Power, and Black Lives Matter differ significantly in leadership, ideology, organizational structure, and strategic objectives. Yet they share with Garveyism a fundamental concern with redefining political belonging and confronting structures of racial exclusion. Rev. Dr. Bossen’s framework allows readers to perceive these continuities without collapsing important historical distinctions.

A similar continuity characterizes pluralistic populism. The IWW’s aspiration to unite workers across race, nationality, and occupation prefigured later forms of progressive labor politics that sought to construct solidarity through shared socioeconomic interests rather than ethnic or racial identity. Although the organizational influence of the Wobblies declined dramatically after the 1920s, their broader democratic imagination survived within segments of the American labor movement, the New Left, Occupy Wall Street, and, more recently, Bernie Sanders’ campaigns for democratic socialism. These movements likewise understand democracy as requiring broad popular participation against concentrated economic power, illustrating the remarkable persistence of pluralistic populism across more than a century of American political development.

Rev. Dr. Bossen’s discussion of progressivism further enriches this historical narrative. Rather than equating progressivism with contemporary liberal politics, he defines it as a political theology centered upon the administrative state, legal reform, and technocratic expertise rather than the construction of popular identities. Whereas populists seek to constitute a people, progressives seek to reform institutions. This distinction provides a useful analytical vocabulary for understanding why progressive governments often struggle to respond effectively to populist mobilization. Administrative competence alone rarely satisfies citizens searching for belonging, recognition, or collective purpose.

This insight carries considerable contemporary relevance. Much of the political conflict surrounding Trumpism cannot be adequately explained through policy preferences alone. Trump’s political success rested less on detailed programs than on constructing an emotionally resonant narrative of “real Americans” reclaiming their nation from perceived elites and outsiders. Rev. Dr. Bossen’s historical reconstruction demonstrates that this style of political mobilization has deep roots within American history. Trumpism thus appears less as an unprecedented rupture than as the latest manifestation of a much older tradition of exclusionary people-making.

Yet Rev. Dr. Bossen avoids the temptation to reduce populism to authoritarianism. His historical comparison instead reveals that competing populisms have long struggled against one another. White supremacist populism has consistently encountered resistance not only from institutional liberalism but also from alternative populist projects rooted in racial justice, labor solidarity, and democratic inclusion. This recognition substantially enriches contemporary debates by reminding readers that populism has never been politically monolithic. It has always been a contested terrain upon which rival democratic and anti-democratic visions compete to define the boundaries of political community.

By the midpoint of the book, therefore, Rev. Dr. Bossen has accomplished something remarkably difficult. He has transformed three seemingly disparate historical movements into components of a coherent analytical framework that explains not only the Progressive Era but also enduring patterns of American political development. His combination of archival depth, theoretical sophistication, and interdisciplinary ambition makes these chapters among the most intellectually stimulating contributions to recent scholarship on American populism and political theology. 

The Political Theology of Populism from the Progressive Era to Trumpism 

The latter half of the book represents the culmination of Rev. Dr. Bossen’s broader intellectual project. Having established that populist movements are fundamentally engaged in the construction of collective identities, Chapters Five through Eight examine the symbolic practices through which these identities are sustained. Here, the book moves beyond conventional political history into the domains of ritual, performance, salvation, memory, and political imagination. The result is an unusually sophisticated account of populism that integrates insights from religious studies, historical sociology, and political theory without sacrificing empirical depth.

Particularly illuminating is Rev. Dr. Bossen’s discussion of ritual and performance. Rather than treating ceremonies, uniforms, hymns, catechisms, or mass meetings as peripheral cultural phenomena, he demonstrates that they constituted the very mechanisms through which “the people” came into existence as a political community. The Garveyites’ elaborate parades, the Klan’s carefully choreographed ceremonies, and the Wobblies’ musical traditions each transformed abstract political ideas into lived collective experiences. Politics, in this account, becomes inseparable from emotion, symbolism, and shared moral narratives. Populism succeeds not merely because it articulates grievances but because it offers individuals a compelling sense of belonging during periods of profound social dislocation.

Rev. Dr. Bossen’s treatment of political soteriology (his analysis of competing narratives of salvation) is equally original. Each movement promised redemption, albeit in radically different forms. The Klan envisioned the restoration of a purified White Protestant nation. The UNIA promised racial dignity, Black self-determination, and collective liberation from centuries of oppression. The IWW anticipated emancipation through industrial democracy and working-class solidarity. These contrasting visions demonstrate that populism cannot be reduced to anti-elitist rhetoric alone. Rather, it constitutes a moral project that offers comprehensive explanations of social crisis while simultaneously identifying the agents of redemption and the enemies of collective flourishing.

The chapters examining decline are particularly noteworthy because Rev. Dr. Bossen refuses to interpret organizational decline as ideological disappearance. Although each movement experienced institutional fragmentation, repression, or internal crisis, their underlying political imaginaries survived. This distinction between organizational collapse and ideological continuity represents one of the book’s most valuable contributions. Political movements may disappear, but the symbolic resources they generate often remain available for subsequent generations confronting new historical crises.

The concluding chapter, significantly entitled “Look for Me in the Whirlwind”: Enduring Populisms, demonstrates precisely this point. Rev. Dr. Bossen argues that the three competing populisms identified in the Progressive Era continue to animate American political conflict well into the twenty-first century. This historical continuity is arguably the book’s central achievement and provides an important corrective to interpretations that portray recent populist mobilization as historically unprecedented.

Indeed, contemporary American politics vividly illustrates the durability of Rev. Dr. Bossen’s analytical framework. Trumpism, despite its distinctive twenty-first-century media environment and electoral strategies, can be understood as the latest manifestation of the exclusionary populist tradition that Rev. Dr. Bossen identifies with the Second Ku Klux Klan. Such a comparison does not imply organizational continuity or ideological identity. Rather, it highlights recurring political logics. Both movements define “the people” through exclusionary conceptions of national identity, portray demographic change as existential decline, invoke nostalgia for a lost national greatness, and frame political conflict as an existential struggle between authentic citizens and corrupt elites allied with threatening outsiders.

The slogan “Make America Great Again,” for example, functions as more than an electoral slogan. It evokes a redemptive political narrative that promises national restoration following perceived moral decline. Immigration, globalization, demographic transformation, and multiculturalism become interpreted not merely as policy disagreements but as threats to the moral integrity of the nation itself. Rev. Dr. Bossen’s emphasis on political theology helps explain why such narratives resonate so powerfully. They address questions of identity and belonging rather than simply economic interests or governmental performance.

Conversely, Rev. Dr. Bossen’s category of Pan-African populism illuminates important dimensions of contemporary Black political mobilization. Although the Civil Rights Movement pursued constitutional equality through integrationist strategies largely absent from Garvey’s separatist vision, both sought to redefine democratic membership by challenging the exclusion of Black Americans from full political belonging. Later movements, including Black Power, increasingly emphasized cultural autonomy, community empowerment, and independent political agency—concerns that resonate more directly with aspects of Garveyite political thought.

More recently, Black Lives Matter has continued this broader historical struggle, albeit through decentralized organizational forms and digital activism unimaginable during the Progressive Era. Like earlier Black movements, it insists that democracy cannot be understood solely through formal legal equality but must confront enduring structures of racial domination embedded within public institutions. Rev. Dr. Bossen’s framework thus demonstrates that Pan-African populism has undergone significant transformation while retaining its central concern with reconstructing political community around principles of racial dignity, recognition, and justice.

Likewise, pluralistic populism continues to shape contemporary progressive politics. The IWW’s aspiration to organize workers across divisions of race, nationality, gender, and occupation anticipated later democratic socialist traditions emphasizing broad-based economic solidarity. Occupy Wall Street’s distinction between the “99 percent” and the “1 percent,” the resurgence of labor organizing across multiple sectors, and Bernie Sanders’ repeated appeals to working-class democracy all reflect attempts to construct an inclusive political people grounded primarily in shared economic interests rather than ethnic or racial identity.

Rev. Dr. Bossen’s historical reconstruction therefore challenges one of the dominant assumptions in current populism research: namely, that populism is inherently anti-democratic or necessarily associated with the political right. His comparative analysis instead demonstrates that democratic inclusion and authoritarian exclusion have long competed through rival populist projects. The decisive analytical question is not whether a movement is populist, but rather how it defines the peoplewho is permitted membership, andwhich forms of solidarity it seeks to institutionalize.

This insight significantly enriches ongoing scholarly debates surrounding populism. It moves beyond the binary opposition that has often characterized the literature, in which populism is either celebrated as democratic renewal or condemned as democratic pathology. Rev. Dr. Bossen instead presents populism as a contested political field within which multiple normative projects coexist. White supremacist populism, Pan-African populism, and pluralistic populism each mobilize “the people,” but they do so toward fundamentally different political horizons.

At the same time, the book’s impressive conceptual synthesis occasionally invites further reflection. By organizing these movements within a single comparative analytical framework, Rev. Dr. Bossen necessarily foregrounds structural similarities in their methods of identity construction. This comparison is intellectually productive and yields important theoretical insights regarding ritual, symbolism, and collective identity. Nevertheless, the comparative architecture also raises difficult normative questions that deserve closer consideration. Similarities in political form should not obscure profound differences in historical purpose, ethical orientation, or democratic aspiration.

This tension does not undermine Rev. Dr. Bossen’s larger argument. On the contrary, it demonstrates the analytical richness of his framework. Yet it also prepares the ground for a broader critical discussion concerning the limits of comparison itself—a discussion that becomes central to assessing both the book’s enduring significance and its principal limitations.

A Critical Assessment of Rev. Dr. Bossen’s Contribution

The greatest strength of the book lies in its intellectual ambition. Rev. Dr. Bossen successfully brings together fields that too often remain isolated from one another—American religious history, political theology, social movement theory, labor history, African American studies, and populism research—and demonstrates that each can enrich the others. His archival work is extensive, his command of the historical literature is impressive, and his conceptual framework offers an original vocabulary for understanding populism as an enduring struggle over collective identity rather than merely an electoral phenomenon. Particularly noteworthy is his insistence that populism should be understood as a process of “people-making,” one that is sustained through narratives, rituals, symbols, and moral imagination as much as through political programmes or charismatic leaders. In this respect, the book deserves to become a significant reference for future scholarship on American populism.

Equally commendable is Rev. Dr. Bossen’s willingness to acknowledge his own intellectual and political commitments. Unlike many scholars who present normative assumptions as methodological neutrality, Rev. Dr. Bossen explicitly situates himself as a Unitarian Universalist minister, labor activist, and advocate of democratic participation. His long engagement with the IWW informs both his historical sensitivity and his appreciation for grassroots democratic organization. This transparency strengthens rather than weakens the credibility of his scholarship because readers are never left wondering about the standpoint from which the analysis proceeds.

Nevertheless, precisely because the book is so theoretically ambitious, it also raises important methodological questions. The most significant concerns the comparative architecture itself. Rev. Dr. Bossen’s decision to analyze the Ku Klux Klan, the UNIA, and the IWW within a single conceptual framework is undoubtedly productive. It reveals common mechanisms through which populist movements construct collective identities and mobilize followers. Yet comparison, while indispensable as a historical method, carries its own risks.

Most notably, placing emancipatory and exclusionary movements within the same analytical structure can occasionally generate an unintended impression of moral symmetry. Rev. Dr. Bossen is careful throughout the volume to distinguish white supremacist populism from Pan-African and pluralistic populisms and repeatedly affirms his opposition to racial domination. His normative position is therefore never in doubt. Yet the comparative framework itself sometimes places disproportionate emphasis on structural similarities—rituals, myths, narratives of salvation, political symbolism, and collective identity formation—while giving comparatively less analytical attention to the fundamentally different ethical purposes toward which these mechanisms are directed.

This distinction matters considerably. White supremacist movements emerged historically to preserve racial hierarchy, political exclusion, and systems of domination. By contrast, Garveyism, despite its own ideological contradictions and internal tensions, developed as a response to centuries of racial oppression, disenfranchisement, colonialism, and segregation. Likewise, later African American political movements—from the Civil Rights Movement to Black Power and contemporary struggles for racial justice—cannot be adequately understood without recognizing that they sought democratic inclusion, equal citizenship, and protection from institutionalized violence rather than the exclusion of others from political membership.

To acknowledge that these movements all engaged in “people-making” is analytically illuminating. However, democratic theory also requires distinguishing between the politics of emancipation and the politics of domination. Similar mechanisms of collective identity formation do not necessarily imply comparable normative projects. A movement struggling to secure equal citizenship for historically excluded communities occupies a fundamentally different moral position from one seeking to preserve racial privilege through exclusion and violence. Future editions might therefore benefit from engaging more explicitly with scholarship on historical injustice, democratic inclusion, and recognition theory in order to sharpen this distinction further.

Relatedly, while Rev. Dr. Bossen convincingly demonstrates the persistence of three populist traditions across American history, greater engagement with contemporary comparative populism scholarship would have strengthened the book’s broader theoretical intervention. The framework developed by Ernesto Laclau regarding populist articulation, Cas Mudde’s influential conception of populism as a thin-centered ideology, Jan-Werner Müller’s emphasis on anti-pluralism, Nadia Urbinati’s work on populism and representation, Benjamin Moffitt’s theory of populism as political style, and Pierre Rosanvallon’s reflections on democratic legitimacy all offer fruitful points of dialogue. Rev. Dr. Bossen’s contribution stands comfortably alongside these major theorists, yet the conversation occasionally remains more implicit than explicit.

The book also invites reflection on developments beyond its historical period. Although Rev. Dr. Bossen concludes by emphasizing the endurance of the three populisms he identifies, readers are naturally drawn toward contemporary politics. Trumpism illustrates the remarkable resilience of white supremacist populist narratives centred upon national restoration, exclusionary conceptions of citizenship, and nostalgia for an idealized past. Conversely, Black Lives Matter, contemporary labor organizing, democratic socialism, and broader progressive coalitions demonstrate that Pan-African and pluralistic populisms likewise continue to evolve in response to changing social and political conditions. One of the book’s lasting achievements is precisely that it provides a conceptual vocabulary through which these contemporary developments can be interpreted within a much longer historical trajectory.

In sum, The Political Theologies of Populism succeeds because it fundamentally reframes the study of populism. Rather than asking whether populism is inherently democratic or authoritarian, Rev. Dr. Bossen encourages readers to ask a more fundamental question: Who constitutes “the people,” by what moral vision are they united, and whom does that definition inevitably exclude? In shifting attention from electoral competition to the moral construction of political communities, he significantly expands the conceptual horizons of populism research.

If one reservation remains, it concerns not the historical scholarship—which is exemplary—but the comparative balance of the analytical framework. While comparison reveals important structural affinities, greater normative differentiation between emancipatory and exclusionary populisms would have further strengthened the book’s democratic argument and prevented any possible reading that places victims of racial oppression and architects of racial domination within an overly symmetrical analytical space. This is, however, a criticism directed at the limits of comparison rather than the quality of the scholarship itself.

Taken as a whole, Rev. Dr. Bossen’s book is an impressive, original, and intellectually courageous work. It enriches our understanding of American political development by demonstrating that populism has never been a singular phenomenon but rather a contested field of competing democratic and anti-democratic projects. Combining historical depth with theoretical sophistication, it offers an important contribution not only to the study of populism but also to political theology, American intellectual history, religion and politics, and democratic theory. It deserves a wide readership among historians, political scientists, scholars of religion, and anyone seeking to understand why struggles over belonging continue to define American democracy in the twenty-first century.


Colin Bossen. The Political Theologies of Populism: The Garveyites, the Klan, and the Wobblies, 1905–1930. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2026.

SummerSchool

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 — Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition

The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 brought together leading scholars to examine how geoeconomics, populism, technological competition, and strategic rivalry are transforming the European Union’s place in the international order. Spanning nine lectures, the programme explored the evolution of EU trade policy, the crisis of multilateralism, transatlantic relations, strategic autonomy, de-risking, the Indo-Pacific, EU–Asia relations, Japan’s emerging populism, and the Union’s capacity to exercise global leadership through law, regulation, and market power. Combining insights from international political economy, European integration, international law, comparative politics, and strategic studies, the lectures demonstrated that Europe’s future will depend upon its ability to reconcile economic openness, democratic resilience, and strategic responsibility amid an increasingly fragmented and contested geopolitical landscape.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held online from July 6–10, 2026, brought together an international community of scholars, policymakers, and students under the theme Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition.” Against a backdrop of intensifying great-power rivalry, democratic polarization, technological transformation, and the growing politicization of international economic relations, the programme explored how Europe is redefining its role within an increasingly fragmented global order. Throughout five days of intellectually rich discussions, participants examined the profound ways in which geopolitics, trade, security, law, technology, and domestic politics have become inseparably intertwined, challenging many of the assumptions that shaped the post-Cold War international system.

The nine lectures presented during the Summer School approached these transformations from complementary disciplinary and regional perspectives. Together, they examined the evolution of European Union trade policy, the crisis of multilateralism, the changing political economy of transatlantic relations, the rise of geoeconomics, strategic autonomy, de-risking, Europe’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific, the implications of US–China strategic competition, the resilience of EU–Japan relations, and the European Union’s capacity to exercise global leadership through law, regulation, and market power. Rather than treating these issues as isolated policy domains, the programme consistently demonstrated how contemporary international politics is increasingly shaped by the interaction of domestic political developments, populist mobilization, technological innovation, economic security, and geopolitical competition.

A recurring theme throughout the Summer School was the recognition that Europe now operates in a world where economic interdependence has become both a source of prosperity and an instrument of strategic rivalry. As globalization gives way to geoeconomics, and as trade, investment, technology, and supply chains become matters of national security, the European Union faces the complex challenge of preserving openness while strengthening resilience, maintaining multilateral cooperation while pursuing strategic autonomy, and defending liberal democratic values amid intensifying geopolitical contestation.

The reports collected in this volume seek to capture not only the substance of each lecture but also the broader intellectual dialogue that emerged across the programme. The reports synthesize the lecturers’ principal arguments while situating them within wider scholarly debates in international political economy, European integration, comparative politics, international law, and strategic studies. Read together, these reports provide a comprehensive account of one of the central questions confronting Europe today: how can the European Union reconcile economic openness, democratic legitimacy, and strategic responsibility in an international order increasingly defined by uncertainty, power competition, and global transformation?

Lecture – I- Prof. Arlo Poletti: The Evolution of EU Trade Policy and the Global Trade Order

How has the European Union’s trade policy evolved from championing liberal multilateralism to pursuing strategic autonomy in an era of geopolitical rivalry? In his opening lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Arlo Poletti examines the historical transformation of EU trade policy against the backdrop of globalization, China’s rise, populist contestation, and the growing weaponization of economic interdependence. Moderated by Dr. Sonali Chowdhry, the session demonstrates that contemporary trade policy can no longer be understood solely through the lens of market liberalization but must increasingly be viewed as an instrument of geopolitical strategy, economic resilience, industrial policy, and European strategic autonomy.

Lecture – II – Prof. Kent Jones: Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

As international trade becomes increasingly entangled with geopolitical rivalry, democratic legitimacy, and populist politics, understanding the future of the rules-based trading order has never been more urgent. In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Kent Jones examines how the resurgence of populism—particularly under Donald Trump’s second presidency—is reshaping the World Trade Organization (WTO) and challenging the legitimacy of multilateral trade governance. Moderated by Dr. Neo Sithole, the session combines international economics, institutional theory, and political economy to explore why the future of global trade depends not only on markets and tariffs but also on trust, shared norms, and the political foundations of international cooperation.

Lectute – III – Prof. Erik Jones: The Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

What happens when the political foundations of the transatlantic partnership begin to erode? In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Erik Jones argues that Europe is entering a “post-Atlantic” era in which the assumptions that sustained EU–US cooperation since the Second World War are being fundamentally reconfigured. Moderated by Professor Elaine Fahey, the session examines how globalization, democratic polarization, populism, and geopolitical rivalry are reshaping transatlantic trade relations, European strategic autonomy, and the liberal international order. Combining historical perspective with political economy, the lecture offers a compelling framework for understanding Europe’s changing role in an increasingly fragmented world.

Lectute – IV – Prof. Alasdair Young: Populism Trumped Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Can the transatlantic trading order survive the rise of populism? In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Alasdair Young argues that Donald Trump’s second presidency marks a fundamental break with more than seventy years of EU–US trade cooperation. Moderated by Dr. Jessica Lawrence, the session explores how populist narratives, protectionism, geopolitical rivalry, and legal innovation are transforming the politics of international trade. Combining historical perspective with international political economy and trade law, Professor Young demonstrates that the future of transatlantic relations will depend not only on commercial negotiations but also on reconciling economic openness with democratic legitimacy, strategic autonomy, and global stability.

Lecture – V – Assoc. Prof. Reuben Wong: Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

The European Union’s pursuit of strategic autonomy has emerged as one of the defining geopolitical debates of the twenty-first century, reflecting the growing convergence of security, economics, technology, and global power competition. In this intellectually stimulating lecture, Associate Professor Reuben Wong examined how Europe’s search for greater strategic independence has been reshaped by an increasingly volatile international environment marked by intensifying US–China rivalry, Russia’s revisionism, and rapid technological transformation. Challenging conventional assumptions about Europe’s transatlantic relationship and its approach toward China, he argued that strategic autonomy requires not only stronger defense and economic security instruments but also a fundamental reassessment of Europe’s place within an emerging multipolar order. The lecture offered participants a provocative and nuanced framework for understanding the future of European geopolitics.

Lecture – VI – Dr. Giulio Pugliese: The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics

As Europe deepens its engagement with the Indo-Pacific, the region has become far more than a distant theatre of economic opportunity—it has emerged as a central arena where geopolitical competition, technological innovation, supply-chain resilience, and strategic autonomy intersect. In this insightful lecture, Dr. Giulio Pugliese demonstrated how the Indo-Pacific evolved from a Japanese strategic narrative into a defining framework for understanding twenty-first-century international politics. Examining the growing rivalry between the United States and China, Taiwan’s geopolitical and technological significance, and the implications of Washington’s increasingly transactional alliance strategy, he argued that Europe must move beyond traditional regional perspectives and formulate a coherent Indo-Pacific policy rooted in its own interests. The lecture offered participants a nuanced understanding of how Europe’s future security and prosperity are becoming increasingly intertwined with developments across Asia.

Lecture – VIII – Prof. Axel Berkofsky: EU-Japan Relations and Populism

Japan has long been regarded as an outlier in comparative studies of populism, distinguished by political stability, Liberal Democratic Party dominance, and limited immigration. In this thought-provoking lecture, Professor Axel Berkofsky challenged that conventional wisdom, arguing that Japan has entered its own delayed populist moment. Examining the rise of the Sanseito party, demographic decline, labor shortages, identity politics, and the evolution of conservative nationalism, he demonstrated how structural economic pressures and political discourse are reshaping Japanese democracy. The lecture also assessed the resilience of EU–Japan relations, highlighting the enduring importance of the Economic Partnership Agreement despite growing geopolitical uncertainty. Combining comparative politics with international political economy, Professor Berkofsky offered a nuanced framework for understanding populism beyond its traditional European context.

Lecture – IX – Prof. Markus Kotzur: Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Professor Markus Kotzur’s lecture explored one of the defining questions of contemporary European integration: can the European Union translate its regulatory influence into genuine geopolitical leadership? Rejecting conventional measures of power centered solely on military capability, he argued that the EU’s comparative advantage lies in its constitutional foundations, legal authority, and capacity to shape global norms through regulatory governance. Examining concepts such as Normative Power Europe, the Brussels Effect, and strategic autonomy, the lecture demonstrated how Europe’s economic strength, legal order, and institutional resilience remain essential assets amid intensifying geopolitical competition. Combining European constitutional law with international relations and political economy, Professor Kotzur offered a compelling vision of an EU capable of reconciling values with strategic responsibility in a fragmented international order.

Participants’ Feedback

EU Commission.

ECPS Academy Summer School — Prof. Markus Kotzur: Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Professor Markus Kotzur’s lecture explored one of the defining questions of contemporary European integration: can the European Union translate its regulatory influence into genuine geopolitical leadership? Rejecting conventional measures of power centered solely on military capability, he argued that the EU’s comparative advantage lies in its constitutional foundations, legal authority, and capacity to shape global norms through regulatory governance. Examining concepts such as Normative Power Europe, the Brussels Effect, and strategic autonomy, the lecture demonstrated how Europe’s economic strength, legal order, and institutional resilience remain essential assets amid intensifying geopolitical competition. Combining European constitutional law with international relations and political economy, Professor Kotzur offered a compelling vision of an EU capable of reconciling values with strategic responsibility in a fragmented international order.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The concluding lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the overarching theme Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” addressed one of the most consequential questions confronting European integration today: Can the European Union exercise genuine geopolitical leadership in an increasingly fragmented international order? While much contemporary debate focuses on Europe’s economic competitiveness, military preparedness, or strategic autonomy, the lecture by Professor Markus Kotzur, Professor of European and International Law at the University of Hamburg and Vice Dean for International Relations, invited participants to examine a more fundamental issue. Before asking whether the European Union possesses sufficient power to lead, it is necessary to clarify what leadership itself means for a political entity that is neither a sovereign state nor a conventional international organization. Drawing upon constitutional law, international law, and European integration studies, Professor Kotzur argued that the future of European leadership depends not merely on accumulating material capabilities but on reconciling legal legitimacy, regulatory influence, political integration, and strategic purpose within a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. 

The session was introduced by Dr. Camille Nessel, who situated the discussion within the European Union’s broader geopolitical transformation initiated during Ursula von der Leyen’s first Commission. Recalling von der Leyen’s ambition to create a “geopolitical Commission” in 2019, Dr. Nessel explained how this initiative fundamentally altered scholarly and policy debates surrounding the European Union’s external role. Whereas previous decades had largely conceived European integration through the lenses of market integration and regulatory governance, recent developments increasingly emphasize economic security, strategic partnerships, critical raw materials, and geopolitical competition. Trade policy, environmental regulation, and technological governance have progressively become instruments of geopolitical influence rather than merely vehicles of economic integration. In this context, concepts such as open strategic autonomy, economic security, and regulatory sovereignty have emerged at the center of European policymaking, raising new questions about how the Union can exercise influence while remaining committed to multilateralism and the constitutional values upon which European integration has historically rested. Dr. Nessel’s introduction effectively framed the lecture by illustrating that Europe’s external policies can no longer be understood independently of broader geopolitical transformations, particularly the rise of China, renewed great-power competition, and increasing skepticism toward globalization. 

Can the European Union Lead? Reconceptualizing Power, Political Community, and Global Actorship

Professor Markus Kotzur.
Professor Markus Kotzur is a Professor of European and International Law at the University of Hamburg and Vice Dean for International Relations.

Building upon this context, Professor Kotzur proposed that discussions of European leadership often begin from an inadequate premise. Much contemporary commentary measures geopolitical influence primarily through traditional indicators of state power—military capability, coercive capacity, or hegemonic dominance. Such perspectives, strongly associated with realist approaches to international relations, inevitably portray the European Union as structurally disadvantaged when compared with major powers such as the United States or China. Yet Professor Kotzur argued that this comparison overlooks the Union’s distinctive political character. Rather than attempting to evaluate the European Union as though it were an ordinary nation-state, he suggested conceptualizing it as a political community—a unique form of political organization that transcends the conventional distinction between sovereign state and international organization. This conceptual shift, he maintained, fundamentally alters how European leadership should be understood.

For Professor Kotzur, describing the European Union as a political community emphasizes that European integration extends far beyond economic cooperation or market regulation. The Union embodies an ongoing process of political integration grounded in shared constitutional values, institutional cooperation, and collective decision-making. Consequently, Europe’s capacity for leadership cannot be reduced solely to military capabilities or traditional notions of sovereignty. Instead, its influence derives from the interaction of legal authority, regulatory capacity, democratic legitimacy, and institutional resilience. The European Union therefore exercises a form of political leadership fundamentally different from that of conventional great powers—a leadership rooted less in coercion than in governance, coordination, and the production of international norms. 

This argument naturally led Professor Kotzur to distinguish between different conceptions of power itself. Realist perspectives traditionally associate leadership with material capabilities, particularly military strength and the ability to impose outcomes through coercive means. Judged according to these criteria alone, the European Union undoubtedly faces significant limitations. Defense remains primarily the responsibility of individual member states, while security has historically depended upon NATO and, above all, the strategic umbrella provided by the United States. Compared with the military capabilities of Washington or Beijing, the European Union possesses only limited autonomous coercive capacity. Yet Professor Kotzur cautioned participants against equating these limitations with geopolitical irrelevance. Power, he argued, also assumes regulatory, legal, institutional, and normative forms that have become increasingly important within an interconnected global economy.

Indeed, one of the lecture’s central themes was that the European Union has historically developed precisely these alternative forms of influence. Rather than aspiring to classical hegemonic dominance, Europe has sought to shape international behavior by establishing legal standards, promoting regulatory convergence, and embedding international cooperation within institutional frameworks. This distinctive mode of influence reflects the constitutional foundations of the Union itself. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which enshrines democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as the Union’s foundational values, provides not only an internal constitutional framework but also the normative basis for Europe’s external engagement. In Professor Kotzur’s view, these legal principles have enabled the European Union to become a global standard-setter whose influence often extends far beyond its territorial borders.

At the same time, the lecturer acknowledged that the international environment sustaining this model has changed profoundly. For much of the post-Cold War period, a functional division of labor characterized transatlantic relations. While the United States largely assumed responsibility for military security through NATO, the European Union concentrated on economic integration, regulatory governance, and the promotion of multilateral norms. This arrangement allowed Europe to exercise considerable international influence without developing equivalent military capabilities. However, shifting geopolitical realities—including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, intensifying strategic competition with China, and growing uncertainty regarding American security commitments under Donald Trump’s second presidency—have increasingly exposed the limitations of this model. Europe can no longer assume that military security will remain permanently outsourced while it focuses exclusively on regulatory leadership.

These developments, Professor Kotzur suggested, require a fundamental reconsideration of European leadership itself. Rather than abandoning its normative foundations, the European Union must determine how legal authority, economic strength, and strategic capability can be combined within a coherent geopolitical strategy. Leadership in today’s international order demands more than the capacity to regulate markets; it increasingly requires resilience, institutional coordination, technological innovation, and credible security capabilities. Yet Europe’s comparative advantage continues to reside in the constitutional and legal traditions that distinguish it from more conventional great powers. The challenge therefore lies not in replacing normative power with military power but in integrating both within a broader conception of strategic actorship.

By framing the discussion in this manner, Professor Kotzur established the analytical foundation for the remainder of the lecture. The central question was no longer simply whether Europe possesses sufficient power to compete with other global actors, but whether its unique combination of law, regulation, political integration, and democratic legitimacy can provide the basis for effective geopolitical leadership in an era increasingly defined by strategic rivalry and geoeconomic competition. This perspective would subsequently guide his examination of the European Union’s normative influence, the Brussels Effect, and the evolving concept of strategic autonomy. 

Normative Power Europe, the Brussels Effect, and the Evolution of Strategic Autonomy

European Union flags against European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium.

Having established that the European Union should be understood as a distinctive political community rather than a conventional nation-state, Professor Kotzur turned to the sources of Europe’s international influence. If the Union lacks the military capabilities traditionally associated with great-power politics, how has it nevertheless managed to shape global governance and international economic relations? Professor Kotzur argued that the answer lies in Europe’s longstanding role as a normative and regulatory power, a form of influence that derives not from coercion but from the ability to establish legal standards that increasingly structure international political and economic behavior. This regulatory capacity, he suggested, remains one of the European Union’s greatest strategic assets, even as the geopolitical environment becomes more competitive and uncertain.

Central to Professor Kotzur’s argument was the concept of Normative Power Europe, which has occupied a prominent place in European integration scholarship for more than two decades. Unlike traditional powers that project influence primarily through military or economic coercion, the European Union has historically sought to shape international conduct through the diffusion of legal norms, constitutional principles, and regulatory standards. Democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and sustainable development constitute not merely internal constitutional values but also external objectives guiding European foreign relations. According to Professor Kotzur, these principles provide the normative foundation upon which the Union’s international influence has long rested. Rather than compelling other actors to follow European preferences, the Union seeks to encourage convergence by making adherence to these standards increasingly advantageous for states wishing to deepen political or economic cooperation with Europe.

Professor Kotzur explained that this normative influence operates through two complementary mechanisms. The first ispositive conditionality, whereby closer cooperation with the European Union—including association agreements, neighborhood partnerships, accession negotiations, and preferential trade arrangements—is linked to the adoption of European legal and constitutional standards. Countries aspiring to strengthen relations with the Union are encouraged to improve democratic governance, judicial independence, human rights protection, and the rule of law. This “more for more” approach reflects the belief that regulatory convergence strengthens both political cooperation and legal certainty. In this sense, European integration has historically functioned not only as an economic project but also as an instrument for promoting constitutional transformation beyond the Union’s borders.

The second mechanism operates through market access. Access to the European Union’s vast internal market increasingly depends upon compliance with European regulatory requirements. Firms wishing to export products, provide services, or invest within the European market must satisfy standards relating to product safety, environmental protection, digital governance, consumer rights, competition policy, and increasingly artificial intelligence. Compliance therefore becomes not merely a legal obligation but an economic necessity. Through this process, European regulations frequently extend far beyond the Union’s territorial jurisdiction, influencing commercial practices across global markets without relying upon traditional forms of extraterritorial coercion.

This phenomenon, Professor Kotzur observed, is most commonly described as the Brussels Effect. Building upon the influential scholarship surrounding this concept, he explained that the European Union’s enormous market size, combined with its sophisticated regulatory framework, often incentivizes multinational corporations to adopt European standards globally rather than maintaining separate regulatory systems for different jurisdictions. Because complying with a single high regulatory standard is often more efficient than producing multiple versions of the same product, firms frequently extend European rules to operations beyond Europe itself. Consequently, regulations adopted in Brussels may shape business practices in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and North America despite the absence of formal international legal obligations.

Professor Kotzur highlighted several contemporary illustrations of this regulatory influence. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) fundamentally reshaped global approaches to privacy and digital governance by establishing one of the world’s most comprehensive data protection regimes. Similarly, the Artificial Intelligence Act seeks to position Europe at the forefront of regulating emerging technologies through a risk-based legal framework that may influence legislative developments far beyond the European Union. Environmental policies associated with the European Green Deal, including sustainability standards and climate-related regulations, likewise demonstrate how domestic European legislation increasingly generates significant international repercussions. These examples illustrate that regulatory power has become an important dimension of contemporary geopolitics, particularly as technological innovation and global supply chains become progressively integrated.

Yet Professor Kotzur also emphasized that the Brussels Effect should not be understood simply as a technocratic process driven by legal expertise. Rather, it reflects a broader transformation in the relationship between markets and political authority. Regulation itself has become an instrument of geopolitical influence. By determining the conditions under which access to one of the world’s largest consumer markets is granted, the European Union exercises considerable leverage over international commercial behavior. This capacity enables Europe to project influence internationally even where its military capabilities remain comparatively limited. Regulatory governance thus constitutes an alternative form of power, rooted in economic interdependence rather than territorial coercion.

Nevertheless, Professor Kotzur argued that recent geopolitical developments increasingly challenge the sufficiency of normative power alone. The relative stability that once enabled Europe to rely primarily upon regulatory influence has gradually eroded under the pressures of great-power competition, technological rivalry, and economic coercion. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, and growing uncertainty surrounding transatlantic relations have all demonstrated that legal standards alone cannot guarantee geopolitical resilience. The European Union therefore faces the difficult task of preserving its identity as a normative power while simultaneously developing greater strategic capacity.

This challenge has given increasing prominence to the concept of strategic autonomy, which Professor Kotzur approached through both linguistic and political analysis. Returning to the Greek origins of the concept, he explained that autonomia signifies the capacity to live according to one’s own laws, while strategy refers to the ability to lead and direct collective action. Strategic autonomy therefore implies far more than economic independence or military capability. It represents the capacity of a political community to formulate and pursue its own objectives independently while remaining faithful to its underlying constitutional values. Europe, in this conception, seeks neither isolation nor disengagement but the ability to make sovereign strategic decisions without excessive dependence upon external actors.

Importantly, Professor Kotzur deliberately omitted the increasingly fashionable adjective “open” from his presentation’s title in order to stimulate critical reflection. Rather than accepting “open strategic autonomy” as an uncontested policy objective, he encouraged participants to consider whether genuine strategic autonomy can remain fully open under conditions of intensifying geopolitical rivalry. This question reflects one of the European Union’s most fundamental contemporary dilemmas. Europe seeks simultaneously to preserve openness, defend multilateralism, strengthen economic resilience, and reduce excessive strategic dependencies. Reconciling these objectives requires careful balancing between economic integration and geopolitical prudence.

By the end of this section, Professor Kotzur had demonstrated that Europe’s future leadership cannot depend exclusively upon either normative influence or strategic power in isolation. The Brussels Effect continues to provide the European Union with remarkable global regulatory reach, yet contemporary geopolitical realities increasingly demand that this regulatory capacity be complemented by greater strategic resilience. Rather than abandoning its identity as a community founded upon law and multilateralism, Europe must learn to integrate regulatory influence with a more comprehensive understanding of geopolitical actorship. In doing so, the Union seeks to transform legal authority into a broader form of strategic leadership capable of navigating an international order that is becoming simultaneously more interconnected and more contested.

From Outsourced Security to Strategic Responsibility: Institutional Limits and the Future of European Defense

Photo: Pavlo Lys.

Having examined the European Union’s regulatory influence and the conceptual foundations of strategic autonomy, Professor Kotzur shifted the discussion toward one of the Union’s most persistent structural challenges: the relationship between legal competence, political will, and military capability. Rather than delivering a purely expository lecture, Professor Kotzur transformed this section into an interactive dialogue, inviting participants to reflect upon whether the existing constitutional framework of the European Union is capable of supporting meaningful geopolitical leadership. Their questions and observations became an integral component of the discussion, illustrating precisely the kind of interdisciplinary debate that the ECPS Academy Summer School seeks to foster.

Professor Kotzur began by emphasizing that discussions surrounding European defense cannot be separated from the constitutional architecture established by the EU Treaties. Unlike sovereign states, whose governments exercise inherent authority across the full spectrum of foreign and security policy, the European Union operates according to the principle of conferral, whereby it may act only in areas where competencies have been explicitly transferred by its member states. This legal principle, fundamental to European constitutional law, continues to shape every debate concerning the Union’s geopolitical ambitions. While economic integration has become highly supranationalized, foreign policy and defense remain areas in which national governments retain extensive authority. Consequently, the question confronting Europe is not simply whether it desires greater strategic autonomy, but whether its constitutional framework currently permits such ambitions to be fully realized.

Rather than providing an immediate answer, Professor Kotzur invited participants to consider whether the existing treaty framework already contains sufficient legal instruments for the European Union to become a more significant geopolitical actor or whether meaningful strategic autonomy would ultimately require comprehensive treaty reform. This interactive approach encouraged students from diverse disciplinary backgrounds to engage directly with questions that are often confined to specialist legal scholarship.

Several participants offered observations that significantly enriched the discussion. One participant suggested that European defense integration had historically remained underdeveloped precisely because military security had long been outsourced to the United States through NATO. As long as Washington guaranteed Europe’s security, the incentives to construct genuinely autonomous European defense capabilities remained relatively weak. Professor Kotzur broadly agreed with this historical assessment. He recalled that attempts to establish European defense structures date back to the earliest years of post-war integration but repeatedly encountered political resistance. One recurring concern was that independent European military structures might duplicate—or even weaken—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Consequently, NATO became the principal framework for collective defense, while European integration concentrated largely upon economic and political cooperation.

At the same time, Professor Kotzur stressed that the situation has evolved considerably since the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which significantly expanded the legal foundations for cooperation in foreign and security policy. Although the Treaties do not currently permit the creation of a fully-fledged European army, they nevertheless provide important mechanisms through which member states can deepen defense cooperation. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) establish institutional frameworks for joint action, while initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) demonstrate that considerable progress remains possible without immediate treaty revision. From a legal perspective, therefore, the European Union already possesses greater flexibility than is often assumed, even if important constitutional limitations remain.

The discussion subsequently broadened to consider whether recent geopolitical developments have fundamentally altered the political incentives surrounding European defense integration. Professor Kotzur suggested that two historic developments have acted as powerful catalysts. The first was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which fundamentally transformed European perceptions of security by demonstrating that large-scale interstate war had returned to the European continent. The second was the return of Donald Trump to the American presidency, which further intensified doubts regarding the long-term reliability of the United States as Europe’s principal security guarantor. Together, these developments have accelerated debates over strategic autonomy far more rapidly than decades of academic discussion ever achieved.

Drawing upon Germany’s own experience, Professor Kotzur pointed to the profound transformation in domestic political attitudes toward defense spending. The concept of Zeitenwende, introduced following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, symbolizes a broader shift in German political culture regarding military responsibility. Political parties traditionally associated with pacifism, most notably the Green Party, have increasingly accepted that preserving peace may require greater investment in defense capabilities. This evolution illustrates how external geopolitical shocks can reshape democratic consensus, generating political support for policies that previously appeared unimaginable. What had once seemed politically controversial has increasingly become regarded as a necessary response to changing strategic realities.

Yet Professor Kotzur cautioned that military capability alone cannot create effective European leadership. Institutional legitimacy remains equally important. Another participant questioned whether Europe’s remarkable political diversity—comprising twenty-seven democracies with distinct historical experiences, domestic electorates, and strategic priorities—might itself constitute an obstacle to coherent foreign policy. Professor Kotzur acknowledged this challenge while rejecting the conclusion that diversity necessarily precludes collective action. The European Union’s legal personality under international law, established by the Treaty of Lisbon, enables it to conclude international agreements, participate in international organizations, and exercise meaningful diplomatic influence. Although foreign policy frequently requires consensus among member states, this institutional complexity should not be mistaken for institutional incapacity.

The discussion also addressed the politically sensitive question of hegemonic leadership. Professor Kotzur noted that, unlike the United States or China, European political discourse has historically regarded the very concept of hegemony with considerable suspicion, reflecting the continent’s experience of imperialism, nationalism, and colonial domination. Yet participants observed that even the European Union’s normative ambitions contain elements of hegemonic influence insofar as Europe seeks to encourage—or at times require—other countries to adopt its legal and regulatory standards. Professor Kotzur accepted this observation but distinguished between coercive hegemony and normative leadership. The European Union’s objective, he argued, should not be domination but persuasion, exercising influence through law, cooperation, and mutually beneficial partnerships rather than through military coercion.

Questions concerning Germany’s expanding military role further highlighted the complexity of European defense integration. Participants noted that increasing German defense expenditures inevitably evoke historical sensitivities among neighboring countries. Professor Kotzur acknowledged these concerns but suggested that today’s context differs fundamentally from earlier periods of European history. Germany’s rearmament takes place within dense multilateral institutions—NATO, the European Union, and an extensive network of constitutional safeguards—that substantially reduce the risks traditionally associated with unilateral military expansion. Contemporary defense integration therefore represents not a return to historical rivalries but an attempt to strengthen collective European security within established democratic frameworks.

Ultimately, this interactive exchange illustrated one of the lecture’s central insights: Europe’s future as a geopolitical actor depends not simply upon acquiring greater military capabilities but upon successfully integrating constitutional legitimacy, democratic support, institutional coordination, and strategic purpose. The European Union already possesses important legal foundations for deeper security cooperation, yet translating these possibilities into effective geopolitical leadership requires sustained political commitment from its member states. Strategic autonomy, Professor Kotzur suggested, is therefore neither exclusively a legal project nor solely a military one. It represents an ongoing constitutional and political process through which Europe seeks gradually to assume greater responsibility for its own security while remaining faithful to the principles of democracy, multilateralism, and the rule of law that have long defined the European project.

Europe Between Values and Power: Strengthening the EU’s Global Leadership in an Era of Geopolitical Fragmentation

EU-AI
The European Union’s AI Act introduces restrictions on high-risk artificial intelligence applications and requires greater transparency from companies regarding data use and algorithmic practices. Photo: Dreamstime.

In the final section of his lecture, Professor Kotzur moved beyond diagnosing the European Union’s geopolitical challenges to outlining a constructive vision of how the Union might strengthen its global leadership without abandoning the constitutional principles that have long defined the European project. Rather than advocating a radical transformation into a traditional military power, Professor Kotzur argued that Europe’s future influence depends upon building strategically upon its existing strengths while adapting to an international environment increasingly characterized by geopolitical rivalry, technological competition, economic coercion, and the erosion of multilateral institutions. His concluding reflections therefore sought to reconcile realism with legal idealism, arguing that effective European leadership requires neither the abandonment of normative values nor naïve reliance upon them alone, but rather a careful integration of power and principle.

Central to Professor Kotzur’s concluding argument was the proposition that the European Union should “strengthen its strengths.” Throughout the history of European integration, the Union’s greatest comparative advantage has not been military capability but economic integration, regulatory governance, and legal certainty. Attempting to imitate the geopolitical behavior of traditional great powers would therefore be both unrealistic and strategically counterproductive. Instead, Europe should continue to capitalize upon the assets that have already made it one of the world’s most influential political actors: its single market, its sophisticated regulatory framework, its institutional stability, and its capacity to shape international standards. These resources remain significant sources of geopolitical influence even within an increasingly competitive international system.

Accordingly, Professor Kotzur argued that revitalizing multilateral trade should remain one of the European Union’s foremost strategic priorities. While acknowledging the growing dysfunction of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—particularly the paralysis of its dispute-settlement mechanism—he maintained that Europe possesses both the credibility and the economic weight necessary to champion the renewal of rules-based international commerce. The European Union’s continued commitment to reducing barriers to trade, supporting predictable legal frameworks, and defending multilateral economic governance reflects not only economic interests but also broader constitutional values rooted in openness, cooperation, and legal certainty. In an era when many major powers increasingly employ tariffs, sanctions, and industrial policy as geopolitical instruments, Europe’s defense of an organized multilateral trading system constitutes both a strategic necessity and an expression of its normative identity.

At the same time, Professor Kotzur rejected any suggestion that Europe should distance itself fundamentally from the United States despite recent political tensions. Although the return of Donald Trump and growing uncertainty surrounding American foreign policy have accelerated debates over strategic autonomy, transatlantic relations, he argued, remain an indispensable pillar of European security and prosperity. What requires reconsideration is not the partnership itself but its internal balance. Europe should assume greater responsibility for its own defense while preserving the broader Atlantic alliance. In this sense, strategic autonomy complements rather than replaces transatlantic cooperation. A stronger European defense capability would ultimately reinforce NATO by enabling a more balanced distribution of responsibilities between European allies and the United States. Strategic autonomy should therefore be understood as a process of maturation rather than separation.

Professor Kotzur likewise emphasized that Europe’s geopolitical credibility increasingly depends upon technological innovation and industrial competitiveness. Regulatory leadership alone will prove insufficient if Europe gradually loses its capacity to innovate in emerging sectors. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, digital infrastructure, renewable technologies, and advanced manufacturing have become decisive arenas of international competition. Should Europe fall behind technologically, its ability to establish global standards through instruments such as the AI Act or environmental regulation will inevitably diminish. Normative influence cannot be sustained indefinitely without corresponding scientific, technological, and economic capacity. Consequently, investment in innovation represents not merely an economic policy but a strategic imperative essential to maintaining Europe’s long-term geopolitical relevance.

Environmental leadership occupied a similarly prominent place within Professor Kotzur’s concluding reflections. The European Green Deal, together with the broader objective of achieving climate neutrality, exemplifies the European Union’s aspiration to combine economic modernization with global environmental responsibility. Yet Professor Kotzur cautioned that successful climate leadership requires greater sensitivity toward historical inequalities and the needs of developing countries. Drawing upon principles of international environmental law, particularly the doctrine of common but differentiated responsibilities, he argued that industrialized European states bear special responsibilities in supporting sustainable development across the Global South. Financial assistance, technological cooperation, and equitable climate partnerships are therefore indispensable if European environmental policies are to retain international legitimacy rather than being perceived as protectionist or neo-colonial instruments.

This emphasis on partnership naturally extended to Professor Kotzur’s discussion of the Global South. One of the lecture’s most forward-looking arguments concerned the need for Europe to diversify its international relationships beyond its traditional geopolitical partnerships. If strategic autonomy ultimately seeks to reduce excessive dependence upon any single external actor, the European Union must cultivate broader and more balanced global networks. Emerging economies in India, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia should therefore be viewed not merely as markets but as long-term strategic partners capable of contributing to a more resilient and diversified international order. Agreements such as the EU–Mercosur trade agreement, although politically controversial, illustrate the broader strategic logic underpinning this approach. Similarly, Africa’s rapidly expanding population and economic potential present opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation founded upon equality rather than paternalism. Professor Kotzur stressed that such partnerships require honest engagement with Europe’s colonial legacy while simultaneously focusing upon future-oriented cooperation based on mutual respect and shared interests.

Importantly, Professor Kotzur argued that Europe’s normative commitments should continue to shape these partnerships, albeit in a more dialogical manner. Rather than presenting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as unilateral prescriptions imposed upon others, the European Union should promote these principles through sustained dialogue and cooperative engagement. Such an approach recognizes that constitutional values remain central to the European project while acknowledging the increasingly pluralistic nature of contemporary international politics. Europe’s credibility, he suggested, depends less upon moral preaching than upon demonstrating that liberal democracy, legal certainty, and multilateral cooperation provide practical advantages in addressing common global challenges.

As the lecture drew to a close, Professor Kotzur returned to the question posed in its opening moments: Can the European Union lead? His answer was neither unequivocally optimistic nor unduly pessimistic. Europe possesses significant assets—economic strength, regulatory influence, constitutional legitimacy, and institutional resilience—that continue to distinguish it from other global actors. Yet these advantages cannot be taken for granted. Sustaining European leadership will require continued investment in innovation, stronger defense capabilities, renewed commitment to multilateralism, and deeper partnerships with emerging regions of the world. Above all, the European Union must avoid the false choice between values and power. Its greatest comparative advantage lies precisely in its ability to combine legal legitimacy with strategic purpose, transforming constitutional principles into instruments of effective international leadership.

Taken together, Professor Kotzur’s lecture offered a sophisticated synthesis of European constitutional law, international relations, and geopolitical strategy. By demonstrating that leadership in the twenty-first century increasingly depends upon the interaction of regulatory authority, economic resilience, technological innovation, institutional legitimacy, and strategic responsibility, he challenged simplistic conceptions of power based solely upon military capabilities. Instead, he argued that Europe’s future role in an increasingly fragmented international order will depend upon its capacity to strengthen its existing advantages while adapting pragmatically to new geopolitical realities. In doing so, the lecture encapsulated one of the central messages of the ECPS Academy Summer School: that Europe’s place “between oceans” will ultimately be determined not only by external competition but also by its own ability to reconcile openness with resilience, values with interests, and normative ambition with geopolitical responsibility.

Eu-Japan flags.

ECPS Academy Summer School — Prof. Axel Berkofsky: EU-Japan Relations and Populism

Japan has long been regarded as an outlier in comparative studies of populism, distinguished by political stability, Liberal Democratic Party dominance, and limited immigration. In this thought-provoking lecture, Professor Axel Berkofsky challenged that conventional wisdom, arguing that Japan has entered its own delayed populist moment. Examining the rise of the Sanseito party, demographic decline, labor shortages, identity politics, and the evolution of conservative nationalism, he demonstrated how structural economic pressures and political discourse are reshaping Japanese democracy. The lecture also assessed the resilience of EU–Japan relations, highlighting the enduring importance of the Economic Partnership Agreement despite growing geopolitical uncertainty. Combining comparative politics with international political economy, Professor Berkofsky offered a nuanced framework for understanding populism beyond its traditional European context. 

Reported by ECPS Staff

While much scholarly and policy attention has focused on the rise of populism across Europe and North America, Japan has long appeared to constitute a notable exception to this global political trend. For decades, the country’s remarkable political stability, the electoral dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and its comparatively homogeneous social structure appeared to insulate it from the anti-establishment movements that transformed politics elsewhere. Yet recent developments suggest that this exceptionalism may no longer hold. The emergence of overtly populist and anti-immigration political actors, coupled with growing public anxiety over demographic decline, economic stagnation, inflation, and national identity, indicates that Japan is increasingly experiencing many of the political tensions reshaping advanced democracies more broadly. 

Against this backdrop, the eighth lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the overarching theme Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” explored the evolving relationship between domestic political transformation and international economic cooperation through the lens of EU–Japan relations and populism. Delivered by Professor Axel Berkofsky, Full Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), the lecture combined comparative politics, international political economy, and East Asian studies to examine whether Japan is witnessing the emergence of its own variant of populism and how these developments may shape one of the European Union’s most important strategic partnerships in Asia. 

Japan’s Late Encounter with Populism

Professor Axel Berkofsky.
Professor Axel Berkofsky is Full Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI).

The session was introduced by Dr. Sébastien Goulard, Manager of Cooperans and an expert on EU–Asia connectivity projects, who situated the lecture within the broader comparative study of populism. He observed that while populism has become a defining feature of European politics over the past three decades—manifesting itself through movements ranging from Brexit in the United Kingdom to the electoral successes of radical-right and radical-left parties across the continent—its development in Asia has followed a more uneven trajectory. Dr. Goulard briefly pointed to examples such as Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India and Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency in the Philippines before posing the central question that would animate the lecture: Does Japan, long regarded as politically exceptional, now face its own populist moment? Equally important, he asked whether any rise of Japanese populism could affect the EU–Japan partnership, particularly given that many populist movements elsewhere have been deeply skeptical of international trade agreements and economic integration. His framing effectively connected domestic political developments in Japan to broader debates surrounding globalization, regional cooperation, and the future of liberal international order. 

Rethinking EU–Japan Relations in an Age of Political Discontent

Professor Berkofsky started his lecture by underscoring that Japan has long represented something of a puzzle within comparative studies of populism. While right-wing populist movements expanded across much of Europe during the 1990s and 2000s, and Donald Trump’s election transformed American politics, Japan appeared remarkably resistant to similar developments. Unlike many Western democracies, where established party systems fragmented under the pressure of anti-establishment mobilization, Japanese politics continued to be dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party, whose uninterrupted rule—interrupted only briefly on two occasions since 1955—provided an extraordinary degree of institutional continuity. This prolonged political stability, Professor Berkofsky suggested, delayed rather than prevented the emergence of populist politics. 

The lecturer explained that understanding Japan’s political exceptionalism requires appreciating the unique character of the LDP itself. Rather than functioning as a narrowly ideological organization, the LDP historically operated as a broad catch-all party composed of multiple internal factions representing diverse constituencies. Through an intricate system of intra-party bargaining, factional competition, and clientelist networks, the party successfully incorporated competing interests while maintaining overall political dominance. Prime ministers changed frequently, often every twelve to eighteen months, yet the governing party remained the same. Consequently, political stability did not depend upon individual leaders but upon the institutional resilience of the LDP as Japan’s dominant governing organization. This remarkable continuity, Professor Berkofsky argued, insulated Japan from many of the political ruptures experienced elsewhere, reducing opportunities for anti-system movements to gain electoral traction. 

Nevertheless, Professor Berkofsky contended that important changes have gradually emerged beneath this surface stability. The watershed moment, in his view, came with the 2025 lower house elections, during which the overtly populist and xenophobic Sanseito (“Japan First”) party secured representation in Japan’s parliament by winning approximately 7.4 million votes and fifteen parliamentary seats. Although modest by European standards, Professor Berkofsky regarded this breakthrough as historically significant because it marked the first time that an explicitly populist, anti-immigration movement had established a meaningful parliamentary presence in post-war Japan. The country’s long-standing immunity to global populist currents had, he argued, effectively come to an end. Japan had become, in his words, a “latecomer” to the global populist wave rather than a permanent exception to it. 

Importantly, Professor Berkofsky cautioned participants against interpreting this development as an abrupt rupture with Japan’s political past. Instead, he argued that contemporary populism has developed gradually within an existing political environment where elements of nationalism, cultural conservatism, and skepticism toward immigration had long been present, albeit often in implicit rather than explicit form. Japanese society itself, he stressed, should not be characterized as inherently xenophobic or racist. Having lived and worked extensively in Japan, Professor Berkofsky emphasized both his personal admiration for the country and the openness of Japanese society in everyday life. Yet beneath this generally welcoming social environment there had always existed what he described as a latent distinction between “the Japanese” and “the outsiders.” This distinction did not automatically translate into exclusionary politics, but it provided fertile political ground upon which more overt nationalist narratives could subsequently be constructed. 

According to Professor Berkofsky, this gradual normalization of exclusionary political discourse accelerated significantly during the premiership of Shinzo Abe. While Abe remained firmly within the mainstream LDP tradition rather than representing an anti-system outsider, his administration increasingly legitimized political rhetoric that portrayed foreigners with greater suspicion and framed questions of national identity more prominently within public debate. Professor Berkofsky carefully distinguished between Abe’s policies and those of contemporary European radical-right leaders, noting that Japan under Abe did not become a populist regime. Rather, Abe expanded the boundaries of politically acceptable discourse by making previously marginal nationalist themes more mainstream. Discussions surrounding immigration, cultural identity, and national sovereignty became increasingly visible within Japanese political life, creating opportunities for more explicitly populist actors to advance even stronger versions of these arguments in subsequent years. 

This trajectory, Professor Berkofsky argued, reached a new stage under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, whom he described as representing a more assertive and uncompromising version of the conservative nationalism associated with Abe. Although Takaichi continues to govern through the institutional framework of the LDP rather than through a newly created populist movement, her political rhetoric increasingly revolves around themes familiar to observers of European populism: identity politics, concerns over immigration, anxieties regarding national cohesion, and skepticism toward globalization. Professor Berkofsky drew explicit comparisons with leaders such as Giorgia Meloni in Italy, arguing that although important historical and institutional differences remain, contemporary conservative discourse in Japan increasingly resembles broader international trends evident across numerous advanced democracies. Populism, he suggested, has become a genuinely global phenomenon whose ideological vocabulary increasingly transcends regional boundaries. 

One of the lecture’s central analytical contributions lay in Professor Berkofsky’s insistence that Japan’s emerging populism cannot be understood simply by borrowing European categories. Unlike many European countries, Japan remains one of the world’s least immigrant-intensive societies. Foreign residents account for only around three percent of the total population, an extraordinarily low proportion compared to most advanced industrial democracies. Consequently, anti-immigration narratives claiming that foreigners threaten employment opportunities, overwhelm welfare systems, or fundamentally transform Japanese society rest upon empirical foundations that Professor Berkofsky repeatedly described as highly questionable. Indeed, one of the striking paradoxes emphasized throughout the lecture was that Japan’s populist discourse has emerged despite the absence of the large-scale immigration flows typically associated with the rise of anti-immigration politics elsewhere. This paradox would become one of the central themes explored during the remainder of the session, as Professor Berkofsky examined how demographic decline, labor shortages, and economic stagnation have created political opportunities for populist entrepreneurs despite Japan’s continued need for greater levels of immigration.

National Identity, Immigration, and the Political Mainstream: The Gradual Normalization of Populist Discourse

Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Photo: Dreamstime.

Having argued that Japan has entered what he described as its own delayed populist moment, Professor Berkofsky devoted the second part of his lecture to explaining why this transformation has occurred despite the country’s long-standing reputation for political moderation and institutional stability. Rather than attributing Japan’s changing political landscape to a sudden surge of anti-establishment sentiment, he argued that contemporary populism has emerged through a gradual process of ideological normalization within the political mainstream itself. This process, he suggested, differs significantly from the trajectories observed in many European democracies, where populist parties frequently arose in opposition to established political elites. In Japan, by contrast, important elements of nationalist and identity-based politics developed from within the governing establishment before eventually creating opportunities for more explicitly populist actors to flourish.

Central to Professor Berkofsky’s analysis was the political legacy of Shinzo Abe, whose nearly eight years in office made him Japan’s longest-serving post-war prime minister. Professor Berkofsky was careful to reject simplistic characterizations of Abe as a populist in the European or American sense. Abe neither campaigned as an anti-system outsider nor sought to dismantle existing political institutions. Instead, he remained firmly embedded within the LDP and governed through established institutional channels. Nevertheless, Professor Berkofsky argued that Abe played a pivotal role in shifting the boundaries of acceptable political discourse. Under his leadership, themes of national identity, patriotism, constitutional revision, security normalization, and historical memory acquired far greater prominence within public debate than they had during previous decades. Although these themes remained largely compatible with mainstream conservative politics, they also contributed to the gradual legitimization of rhetorical strategies that later proved advantageous for more overtly populist movements.

According to Professor Berkofsky, Abe’s greatest political innovation lay not in introducing entirely new ideas but in redefining the political center of gravity. Issues that had previously occupied the margins of political discussion gradually entered mainstream discourse. Questions concerning immigration, cultural cohesion, and the preservation of Japanese identity increasingly became legitimate subjects of electoral competition rather than peripheral concerns associated with fringe nationalist organizations. This evolution mirrored broader developments observable across many advanced democracies, where mainstream conservative parties increasingly incorporated elements of populist rhetoric in response to shifting public attitudes. Professor Berkofsky emphasized that such developments should not be interpreted as evidence that Japan had become fundamentally xenophobic. Rather, they reflected the gradual politicization of issues that had previously remained relatively insulated from electoral contestation.

The lecturer then turned to the administration of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, whom he presented as representing a further stage in this ideological evolution. While Takaichi continues to govern through the institutional framework of the LDP, Professor Berkofsky suggested that her political style places greater emphasis on themes of national sovereignty, cultural identity, and immigration control than many of her predecessors. Her rhetoric increasingly resonates with narratives familiar from contemporary European conservative politics, particularly those stressing the need to protect national traditions against the perceived pressures of globalization and demographic change. Although important contextual differences remain, Professor Berkofsky drew comparisons with political figures such as Meloni, arguing that conservative politics across advanced democracies increasingly shares a common vocabulary centered upon nationhood, identity, borders, and sovereignty.

Yet Professor Berkofsky repeatedly cautioned participants against assuming direct equivalence between Japan and Europe. One of the lecture’s most important comparative insights concerned the striking disparity between the intensity of anti-immigration rhetoric and the actual scale of immigration into Japan. Unlike Germany, France, Sweden, or Italy, Japan has experienced relatively limited immigration. Foreign nationals constitute only a small proportion of the overall population, and immigration has historically remained tightly regulated. Consequently, political narratives portraying Japan as overwhelmed by immigration bear little resemblance to empirical reality. Professor Berkofsky described this disconnect as one of the defining paradoxes of contemporary Japanese politics: anti-immigration discourse has intensified despite the absence of mass immigration itself.

Demographic Decline, Economic Anxiety, and the Rise of Sanseito

Sanseito party.
A campaign poster for the right-wing populist Sanseito party in Tokyo, Japan. The slogan *Nihon o Nameruna* (“Don’t underestimate Japan” or “Don’t look down on Japan”) reflects the party’s nationalist political message. Tokyo, July 11, 2025. Photo: Hiroshi Mori / Dreamstime.

Having demonstrated how nationalist discourse gradually entered Japan’s political mainstream, Professor Berkofsky turned to the structural conditions that have enabled explicitly populist movements to gain electoral traction. Central to this discussion was the emergence of Sanseito, which he identified as the clearest expression of right-wing populism in contemporary Japanese politics. Although the party remains considerably smaller than the dominant LDP, its parliamentary breakthrough marked a significant turning point, establishing an institutional foothold for political narratives long associated with European and American populism. Rather than dismissing Sanseito as a temporary protest movement, Professor Berkofsky argued that its electoral success reflects deeper socioeconomic and demographic transformations reshaping Japanese politics.

Sanseito has positioned itself as a challenger to Japan’s political establishment by combining nationalism, economic protectionism, skepticism toward globalization, and particularly strong opposition to immigration. Presenting itself as the defender of “ordinary people” against detached political elites and international influences, the party’s slogan, “Japan First,” echoes nationalist rhetoric that has become increasingly familiar across advanced democracies. Yet Professor Berkofsky stressed that Japanese populism should not be viewed simply as an imitation of its European or American counterparts. Rather, it represents the adaptation of broadly similar narratives to Japan’s distinctive political institutions, demographic realities, and historical experience.

Immigration occupies the center of Sanseito’s political message. The party attributes rising crime, economic insecurity, and social fragmentation to increasing numbers of foreign workers. Professor Berkofsky challenged these claims as empirically unsupported. Japan remains one of the least immigrant-intensive societies among advanced economies, and available crime statistics provide no evidence that foreigners constitute a disproportionate burden on public safety. Likewise, labor-market data indicate that migrant workers overwhelmingly fill positions in sectors experiencing chronic labor shortages rather than displacing Japanese employees. Agriculture, construction, manufacturing, hospitality, logistics, and elderly care increasingly depend upon foreign labor simply to maintain existing levels of production and service provision. Far from undermining Japanese society, immigration has become an indispensable component of economic sustainability.

This disconnect between political rhetoric and demographic reality formed one of the lecture’s central arguments. Professor Berkofsky emphasized that Japan’s principal challenge is not excessive immigration but the opposite: an insufficient inflow of foreign workers to offset rapid population ageing, persistently low fertility rates, and a shrinking workforce. Employers across the economy increasingly struggle to recruit labor, while long-term demographic projections point toward further decline. Under these conditions, reducing immigration would almost certainly deepen Japan’s economic difficulties rather than alleviate them.

The paradox, Professor Berkofsky argued, illustrates a broader characteristic of contemporary populism. Its political effectiveness derives less from empirical accuracy than from its ability to simplify complex structural problems into emotionally compelling narratives. Long-term economic stagnation, weak wage growth, inflation, declining purchasing power, and demographic decline are multifaceted challenges rooted in economic, technological, and demographic change. Yet populist actors frequently attribute these developments to more visible political targets such as immigration, globalization, or detached elites. Even in a country where immigration remains comparatively limited, these narratives resonate because they tap into broader anxieties surrounding national identity, cultural continuity, and social cohesion.

Professor Berkofsky nevertheless cautioned against reducing Japan’s political transformation solely to economic grievances. While acknowledging that many citizens have experienced genuine economic insecurity after decades of slow growth and rising living costs, he argued that concerns about immigration also reflect deeper questions of identity and national belonging. Public unease cannot simply be dismissed; however, it should not be mistaken for an accurate description of Japan’s demographic realities. Policymakers therefore face the challenge of balancing legitimate concerns over social integration with the country’s undeniable economic need for greater international labor mobility.

Japan’s experience, Professor Berkofsky concluded, offers an important comparative perspective on the global evolution of populism. Unlike many European countries, where anti-immigration movements emerged following sustained immigration, Japan has witnessed the rise of similar political narratives despite maintaining exceptionally low levels of foreign residents. This demonstrates that identity politics need not depend upon large-scale migration alone but can also emerge from broader demographic anxieties, economic uncertainty, and shifting political discourse. By distinguishing carefully between rhetoric and empirical evidence, Professor Berkofsky showed that Japan’s encounter with populism reflects a complex interaction of demographic decline, economic pressures, identity politics, and institutional change rather than a straightforward rejection of globalization itself

The lecture also highlighted the increasingly important role of digital communication in facilitating populist mobilization. Like many contemporary populist movements elsewhere, Sanseito has proven particularly effective at utilizing social media platforms to disseminate simplified political messages, challenge mainstream media narratives, and cultivate direct communication with supporters. Professor Berkofsky noted that such strategies have enabled relatively small political organizations to achieve levels of visibility that would previously have required far greater organizational resources. The digitalization of political communication has therefore lowered barriers to electoral competition while simultaneously amplifying emotionally charged narratives concerning immigration, national identity, and political distrust. Although Japan’s media environment differs significantly from those found in many Western democracies, similar technological dynamics increasingly shape political discourse across advanced industrial societies.

Throughout this section, Professor Berkofsky consistently urged participants to distinguish between the political success of populist narratives and their analytical validity. Anti-immigration rhetoric may resonate with segments of the electorate experiencing economic anxiety, yet demographic evidence overwhelmingly suggests that Japan’s long-term prosperity depends upon attracting—not excluding—greater numbers of foreign workers. Likewise, blaming globalization or immigration for structural economic challenges risks obscuring deeper issues relating to productivity, demographic ageing, labor-market reform, and fiscal sustainability. Populism, in this sense, offers politically powerful narratives but rarely provides comprehensive solutions to the complex problems confronting advanced industrial democracies.

By examining the rise of Sanseito within this broader structural context, Professor Berkofsky demonstrated that Japan’s political transformation reflects far more than the emergence of a new political party. It illustrates how demographic decline, economic insecurity, identity politics, and digital communication increasingly interact to reshape democratic competition across advanced societies. Japan may have entered the global populist era later than Europe or the United States, but the underlying dynamics driving this transition reveal striking similarities. The country’s experience therefore offers valuable comparative insights into how populism adapts to distinct national contexts while drawing upon an increasingly shared repertoire of political narratives, grievances, and electoral strategies.

Populism, Free Trade, and the Future of EU–Japan Relations

Photo: Marian Vejcik / Dreamstime.

In the concluding section of his lecture, Professor Berkofsky shifted from analyzing Japan’s domestic political transformation to assessing its implications for one of the European Union’s most important strategic partnerships in Asia. Returning to the question posed at the beginning of the session, he asked whether the gradual emergence of populist politics in Japan might ultimately undermine the deepening economic and political cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels. His answer was deliberately cautious. While acknowledging that populist narratives are becoming increasingly visible within Japanese politics, Professor Berkofsky argued that there remains little evidence to suggest that Japan is on the verge of abandoning its long-standing commitment to international economic openness. Unlike many European and North American populist movements, whose electoral success has often been accompanied by hostility toward free trade agreements and multilateral institutions, Japanese populism has thus far developed within a political environment where broad elite consensus continues to support international economic engagement. Consequently, the future of EU–Japan relations appear considerably more resilient than many observers might initially assume.

Professor Berkofsky reminded participants that the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which entered into force in 2019, remains one of the most comprehensive bilateral trade agreements ever concluded by either party. Negotiated against the backdrop of growing protectionist tendencies elsewhere, the agreement represented a powerful political statement in favor of rules-based trade, multilateral cooperation, and open markets. Covering approximately one-third of global GDP and creating one of the world’s largest free trade areas, the EPA extended well beyond tariff reductions to encompass regulatory cooperation, government procurement, intellectual property, environmental standards, and sustainable development. For both Brussels and Tokyo, the agreement symbolized a shared commitment to preserving an international economic order increasingly challenged by geopolitical rivalry and economic nationalism.

At the same time, Professor Berkofsky cautioned against viewing the partnership through overly idealized lenses. Despite its considerable achievements, the EPA has not eliminated all commercial frictions between the two economies. Agricultural market access, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, public procurement, automotive trade, and steel safeguard measures continue to generate periodic disagreements. European exporters frequently seek greater access to Japanese agricultural markets, while Japanese firms remain attentive to European trade defense measures affecting industrial products. These issues, Professor Berkofsky suggested, should not be interpreted as evidence of weakening relations but rather as normal features of a mature economic partnership between two highly developed economies with occasionally divergent commercial interests. Importantly, such disagreements continue to be managed through institutional dialogue and negotiated compromise rather than escalating into broader political conflict.

This institutional resilience, Professor Berkofsky argued, distinguishes EU–Japan relations from many contemporary trade relationships increasingly characterized by unilateral tariffs, retaliatory sanctions, and economic coercion. Both parties continue to view predictable rules, legal certainty, and multilateral governance as essential foundations of international economic cooperation. Even as governments around the world increasingly embrace industrial policy, supply-chain diversification, and strategic competition, Brussels and Tokyo remain committed to maintaining a broadly liberal trading relationship. In this respect, the EU–Japan partnership has acquired significance extending beyond bilateral commerce itself, serving as an important example of how advanced democracies can continue supporting international economic openness while adapting to a more uncertain geopolitical environment.

The lecture nevertheless acknowledged that domestic political developments could gradually complicate this picture. Should populist parties expand their electoral influence, trade agreements may become increasingly vulnerable to broader political debates concerning sovereignty, globalization, and national identity. Professor Berkofsky noted that this pattern has already become familiar across Europe, where opposition to international trade agreements often extends beyond economic concerns to encompass wider anxieties regarding immigration, democratic accountability, environmental regulation, and cultural identity. While Japan has not yet experienced comparable levels of political contestation surrounding trade policy, the emergence of more vocal nationalist actors suggests that similar debates may become increasingly prominent in future electoral campaigns. The challenge for policymakers will therefore be to preserve public support for economic openness while addressing legitimate concerns regarding inequality, regional disparities, and economic insecurity.

One of Professor Berkofsky’s most important observations concerned the relationship between economic performance and political stability. He argued that Japan’s experience demonstrates how prolonged economic stagnation, declining real incomes, and demographic pressures can gradually erode confidence in established political institutions even where those institutions remain highly stable by international standards. Populist movements frequently gain support not because they offer comprehensive policy solutions but because they provide emotionally compelling narratives that identify clear causes for complex structural problems. Consequently, defending liberal economic cooperation requires more than simply emphasizing the aggregate benefits of free trade. Governments must also demonstrate that globalization generates broadly shared prosperity capable of maintaining democratic legitimacy. Failure to address the distributive consequences of economic change risks creating political opportunities for movements seeking to replace nuanced policy discussions with simplified nationalist narratives.

Professor Berkofsky further suggested that the European Union may itself draw valuable lessons from Japan’s experience. Although Europe and Japan differ substantially in terms of immigration levels, demographic structures, political institutions, and historical development, both confront remarkably similar long-term challenges: ageing populations, labor shortages, technological competition, slowing productivity growth, and increasing geopolitical uncertainty. Both have also sought to balance economic openness with greater strategic resilience without abandoning their commitment to rules-based international cooperation. In this sense, EU–Japan relations increasingly extend beyond traditional trade diplomacy to encompass broader cooperation on economic security, digital governance, technological innovation, supply-chain resilience, and the defense of multilateral institutions. These shared interests provide a strong foundation upon which the partnership can continue to develop despite evolving domestic political landscapes.

Throughout his concluding remarks, Professor Berkofsky repeatedly resisted alarmist interpretations of Japan’s political trajectory. While acknowledging that the country’s immunity to populism has weakened, he argued that contemporary Japanese politics remains fundamentally different from the highly polarized environments observed in several Western democracies. The LDP continues to dominate national politics, institutional continuity remains strong, and broad elite consensus in favor of international engagement persists. Populist actors have undoubtedly entered the political arena, but they have not displaced the established structures that continue to shape Japanese policymaking. Consequently, the emergence of parties such as Sanseito should be understood less as evidence of systemic political rupture than as an indication that Japan is gradually experiencing political dynamics already familiar elsewhere.

As the lecture concluded, Professor Berkofsky returned to the broader comparative perspective that had framed his analysis from the outset. Japan, he argued, should no longer be viewed as an exceptional democracy somehow insulated from the social and political transformations affecting other advanced industrial societies. Rather, it represents a particularly instructive case illustrating how populism adapts to distinctive national contexts while responding to common structural pressures. Demographic decline, economic uncertainty, globalization, identity politics, and digital communication increasingly interact across democratic systems in ways that transcend regional boundaries. Yet Japan’s experience also demonstrates that institutional resilience, pragmatic policymaking, and sustained international engagement can moderate these pressures without eliminating them entirely.

Taken as a whole, Professor Berkofsky’s lecture offered participants a sophisticated comparative framework for understanding the evolving relationship between domestic political change and international economic cooperation. By tracing Japan’s gradual encounter with populism while simultaneously examining the resilience of EU–Japan relations, he demonstrated that contemporary debates surrounding globalization, immigration, and national identity cannot be separated from wider questions of demographic transformation, economic governance, and strategic competition. In doing so, the lecture reinforced one of the central themes of the ECPS Academy Summer School: that Europe’s future “between oceans” will increasingly depend upon its ability to cultivate resilient partnerships with like-minded democracies facing many of the same political, economic, and geopolitical challenges.

Image: Dreamstime.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Dr. Giulio Pugliese: The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics

As Europe deepens its engagement with the Indo-Pacific, the region has become far more than a distant theatre of economic opportunity—it has emerged as a central arena where geopolitical competition, technological innovation, supply-chain resilience, and strategic autonomy intersect. In this insightful lecture, Dr. Giulio Pugliese demonstrated how the Indo-Pacific evolved from a Japanese strategic narrative into a defining framework for understanding twenty-first-century international politics. Examining the growing rivalry between the United States and China, Taiwan’s geopolitical and technological significance, and the implications of Washington’s increasingly transactional alliance strategy, he argued that Europe must move beyond traditional regional perspectives and formulate a coherent Indo-Pacific policy rooted in its own interests. The lecture offered participants a nuanced understanding of how Europe’s future security and prosperity are becoming increasingly intertwined with developments across Asia.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The third day of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 continued its exploration of Europe’s changing geopolitical environment by shifting attention beyond the Atlantic theatre to the increasingly consequential dynamics unfolding across the Indo-Pacific. Held under the overarching theme, Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” the sessions examined how the European Union is recalibrating its external relations amid intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China. Following discussions on strategic autonomy, de-risking, and economic security, the sixth lecture broadened the analytical horizon by investigating Europe’s evolving engagement with Asia and the conceptual transformations that increasingly shape international politics. Against this backdrop, Dr. Giulio Pugliese, Director of the EU–Asia Project at the European University Institute and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali and King’s College London, delivered a stimulating lecture entitled “The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics.” Combining insights from international relations, strategic studies, and Asian regional politics, the lecture challenged participants to rethink the Indo-Pacific not merely as a geographical designation but as a politically constructed strategic space whose emergence has profoundly influenced European foreign policy. <

The session was thoughtfully introduced by Anita Tusor, doctoral researcher at Charles University and Staff Officer at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, who situated the discussion within one of the defining strategic dilemmas confronting contemporary Europe. She observed that the European Union increasingly finds itself navigating between its two most important economic partners—the United States and China—at a time when their rivalry is reshaping both global trade and international security. Rather than portraying the Indo-Pacific as a distant theatre of commercial interest, Tusor argued that recent geopolitical developments, particularly Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have fundamentally altered European strategic thinking. The conflict has created direct linkages between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security theatres, compelling European policymakers to recognize that developments in East Asia now carry direct implications for Europe’s own security calculations. She further suggested that Europe’s growing interest in Japan’s experience of managing long-standing US–China tensions provides valuable opportunities for policy learning as Brussels seeks to navigate an increasingly polarized international environment. Her introduction effectively framed the lecture by emphasizing that Europe’s engagement with Asia is no longer peripheral but has become an integral component of its broader strategy for managing geopolitical competition. 

Reimagining the Indo-Pacific: Strategic Narratives and Europe’s Asian Turn

Dr. Giulio Pugliese.
Dr. Giulio Pugliese is Director of the EU–Asia Project at the European University Institute and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali and King’s College London.

Connecting live from Taipei, Dr. Pugliese began by explaining that his primary objective was not simply to review recent European policy initiatives toward Asia but to unpack the intellectual foundations of one of the most widely used yet insufficiently examined concepts in contemporary international relations: the Indo-Pacific. While the term has rapidly entered the vocabulary of policymakers, diplomats, and scholars alike, he argued that it should not be understood as a politically neutral geographical label. Instead, it represents what strategic communication scholars describe as a strategic narrative—a carefully constructed story designed to simplify complex geopolitical realities, define particular challenges, identify preferred actors, and legitimize specific policy responses. Seen through this lens, the Indo-Pacific is not merely a map but a political project that reflects competing visions of regional order, international leadership, and global governance. Dr. Pugliese invited participants to appreciate that language itself constitutes an instrument of power, capable of shaping perceptions, legitimizing alliances, and influencing strategic behavior. 

At the heart of Dr. Pugliese’s analysis lay the argument that the Indo-Pacific concept originated not in Washington but in Tokyo. Drawing extensively upon his own research on Japanese foreign policy, he demonstrated that the contemporary understanding of the Indo-Pacific owes much to the strategic vision developed by the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and a relatively small circle of policymakers who sought to redefine Asia’s geopolitical architecture during the late 2000s and early 2010s. Their objective was to present an alternative regional order capable of responding to China’s expanding economic and strategic influence, particularly the growing prominence of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By advancing the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Japan deliberately expanded the geographical imagination of Asia beyond a China-centered perspective. Rather than viewing Asia exclusively through East Asia and the Western Pacific, the Indo-Pacific connected the Pacific and Indian Oceans into a single strategic theatre stretching from East Africa to the western shores of the Americas, encompassing India, Australia, Southeast Asia, and maritime democracies across the region. In doing so, the concept challenged what Pugliese described as the increasingly Sinocentric geographical narrative embedded within Beijing’s own regional initiatives. 

Dr. Pugliese explained that each element of the FOIP formulation carried important political meaning. “Free” referred not only to democratic governance but also to the provision of alternatives to Chinese-led infrastructure financing and development initiatives. “Open” emphasized freedom of navigation, overflight, and the maintenance of open sea lanes that remain indispensable for international commerce. Collectively, the concept sought to portray the Indo-Pacific as a region characterized by openness, connectivity, transparency, and respect for international law, thereby implicitly contrasting it with perceptions of China’s expanding strategic influence. While acknowledging that such narratives inevitably simplify reality, Dr. Pugliese argued that their political effectiveness lies precisely in their capacity to mobilize coalitions of like-minded states around a shared strategic vision. The Indo-Pacific therefore functions simultaneously as a geographical concept, a diplomatic framework, and a normative narrative through which states articulate competing understandings of regional order. 

The lecture further traced the intellectual genealogy of this strategic narrative to earlier Japanese initiatives, including Abe’s conception of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving Japan, Australia, India, and the United States. Dr. Pugliese argued that these initiatives reflected a sustained Japanese effort to cultivate a network of maritime democracies capable of balancing China’s growing influence without necessarily resorting to overt containment. Behind these policy innovations stood a relatively small but highly influential group of Japanese officials and strategic thinkers who consistently sought to integrate economic policy, diplomacy, security cooperation, and strategic communication into a coherent foreign policy vision. Their efforts, he suggested, represented one of the most successful examples of middle-power agenda-setting in contemporary international relations, demonstrating that states need not possess overwhelming material capabilities to shape global strategic discourse. 

According to Dr. Pugliese, Japan’s most remarkable achievement was its ability to persuade the United States to adopt this conceptual framework during the first Trump administration. He described this as an exceptionally rare case in which a close ally effectively exported a foreign policy narrative to Washington rather than merely adapting to American strategic preferences. Following intensive diplomatic engagement, the United States officially embraced the Indo-Pacific concept in 2017, replacing the long-established Asia-Pacific terminology within its strategic vocabulary. The subsequent declassification of the US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific further illustrated how the concept had become integrated into American grand strategy, where it served not only to strengthen partnerships among regional democracies but also to provide an overarching framework for managing strategic competition with China. Dr. Pugliese emphasized that this represented far more than a semantic adjustment; it marked the institutionalization of a new geopolitical imagination that would subsequently influence the policies of numerous allies, including those within Europe. 

Thus, Dr. Pugliese had fundamentally reframed participants’ understanding of the Indo-Pacific. Rather than accepting it as a self-evident geographical reality, he demonstrated that the concept itself constitutes an important arena of strategic competition, reflecting broader struggles over regional leadership, international legitimacy, and the future architecture of global order. This conceptual foundation established the basis for the remainder of the lecture, which would examine how the intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing has increasingly drawn Europe into this evolving strategic landscape, compelling the European Union to rethink both its relations with Asia and its own geopolitical identity.

Europe’s Strategic Recalibration: From the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific
Flags of the Quad countries—Japan, Australia, the United States, and India—alongside a chess king, symbolizing strategic competition and the Quad’s evolving role in balancing China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Illustration: Sameer Chogale / Dreamstime.

Having established that the Indo-Pacific is fundamentally a strategic narrative rather than a neutral geographical designation, Dr. Pugliese proceeded to examine how this conceptual innovation gradually reshaped the foreign policies of the world’s leading powers. His central argument was that strategic narratives matter not merely because they influence political discourse but because they can fundamentally alter the way governments define interests, identify partners, and formulate grand strategy. The Indo-Pacific, he argued, evolved from a Japanese diplomatic initiative into the dominant geopolitical framework guiding American policy toward Asia before eventually being embraced—albeit in modified form—by the European Union and several of its member states. Understanding this process, he suggested, is essential to explaining why Europe increasingly views developments in East Asia as directly relevant to its own security and prosperity. 

Dr. Pugliese argued that the decisive turning point came during the first Trump administration. While previous American administrations had pursued engagement with China alongside regional balancing, President Donald Trump’s first term marked a more explicit shift toward strategic competition. Rather than viewing China’s rise as an opportunity for deeper integration into the liberal international order, Washington increasingly came to regard Beijing as a systemic rival whose growing technological, economic, and military capabilities required active counterbalancing. The trade war initiated against China, restrictions on Chinese technology firms such as Huawei, and growing concern over supply-chain vulnerabilities all reflected a broader transformation in American strategic thinking. Crucially, however, Dr. Pugliese emphasized that the conceptual vocabulary through which this shift was articulated had largely originated in Tokyo. Japan’s success in persuading Washington to officially adopt the Indo-Pacific framework represented, in his view, one of the rare instances in modern diplomacy where a middle power successfully influenced the grand strategy of the world’s leading superpower. 

Particularly significant was Dr. Pugliese’s discussion of the United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, a document declassified at the conclusion of the first Trump administration. Unlike carefully crafted public statements, this internal strategic document revealed with unusual candour the objectives underpinning Washington’s regional policy. It openly framed China as the principal strategic competitor and explicitly identified the promotion of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as a means of strengthening alliances while countering Beijing’s expanding influence. Dr. Pugliese drew participants’ attention to the informational dimension of this strategy, noting that the Indo-Pacific narrative was designed not only to organize military and diplomatic cooperation but also to compete with China’s own strategic messaging surrounding the BRI. Strategic communication, public diplomacy, and the contest over international narratives thus emerged as integral components of contemporary great-power competition. 

This observation led Dr. Pugliese to one of the lecture’s broader conceptual contributions: the growing importance of information politics within international relations. Great-power competition today extends well beyond military deployments and economic sanctions to encompass competing stories about the international order itself. He pointed to narratives portraying China’s BRI as “debt-trap diplomacy” as examples of what he termed informational contestation. Such narratives sought to shape international perceptions by presenting Chinese infrastructure investment not as development assistance but as a mechanism for creating political dependency. Whether entirely accurate or not, these narratives significantly influenced public debates across Europe, North America, and Asia, reinforcing broader geopolitical efforts to limit China’s expanding influence. The Indo-Pacific, therefore, functions not simply as a strategic framework but also as a powerful communicative device through which competing powers seek to legitimize their preferred regional order. 

Against this backdrop, Dr. Pugliese turned to the question of why Europe gradually embraced the Indo-Pacific concept despite its initial reluctance. He recalled that, during its early years, the term carried uncomfortable political connotations within many European capitals because it appeared closely associated with American efforts to contain China. For governments seeking to preserve productive economic relations with Beijing, openly endorsing a framework perceived as anti-Chinese seemed diplomatically unwise. Consequently, European policymakers initially preferred the more familiar Asia-Pacific terminology and avoided language that could be interpreted as aligning Europe too closely with Washington’s increasingly confrontational posture.

Several developments, however, fundamentally altered European calculations. According to Dr. Pugliese, one important factor was the gradual deterioration of EU–China relations driven by persistent trade imbalances, concerns over market access, investment reciprocity, technology transfer, and broader disagreements regarding human rights and political governance. These tensions had already encouraged European institutions to adopt a more cautious approach toward Beijing before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic further exposed vulnerabilities associated with dependence on global supply chains concentrated in China. The pandemic reinforced concerns regarding economic resilience, strategic dependencies, and the security implications of excessive reliance on external suppliers, thereby lending greater credibility to calls for diversification and de-risking. 

The most decisive catalyst, however, was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Dr. Pugliese argued that the war fundamentally transformed European perceptions of China, not primarily because Beijing directly participated in the conflict but because of its increasingly close relationship with Moscow. Although China formally maintained neutrality, European policymakers became increasingly concerned by evidence suggesting that Beijing had provided Russia with critical dual-use technologies and economic support that helped sustain its war effort. From a realist perspective, Dr. Pugliese explained, such behaviour reflected China’s strategic interest in preventing the emergence of a weakened or pro-Western Russia that might leave China strategically isolated. Yet for many Europeans, China’s unwillingness to distance itself from Moscow significantly weakened confidence in the possibility of a stable strategic partnership.  

At the same time, Dr. Pugliese cautioned against interpreting Europe’s Indo-Pacific engagement exclusively through the lens of ideological confrontation with China. Instead, he proposed a more nuanced explanation rooted in strategic bargaining within the transatlantic alliance. Following Russia’s invasion, Europe became even more dependent upon the United States for military assistance, intelligence sharing, energy supplies, and broader security guarantees. This asymmetry inevitably strengthened Washington’s leverage over European foreign policy. In return for sustained American support in Ukraine, the United States increasingly expected its European allies to align more closely with broader American strategic priorities in Asia. Support for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and other regional partners thus became part of a wider process of transatlantic strategic coordination extending well beyond the European continent itself. Europe’s growing Indo-Pacific engagement should therefore be understood not only as a response to developments in Asia but also as an indirect consequence of the changing political economy of the transatlantic alliance. 

Yet Dr. Pugliese repeatedly emphasized that European alignment with the United States also reflected Europe’s own interests. Asia’s extraordinary economic dynamism provides compelling incentives for deeper European engagement irrespective of American preferences. The Indo-Pacific contains many of the world’s fastest-growing economies, leading centers of technological innovation, and increasingly important markets for advanced manufacturing and defense industries. European firms have substantial commercial interests in expanding cooperation with countries such as Japan, South Korea, India, and Taiwan, particularly in sectors related to semiconductors, green technologies, digital infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing. Consequently, Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy cannot be reduced to alliance politics alone; it also reflects a broader recognition that the center of gravity of the global economy continues to shift toward Asia. 

Dr. Pugliese illustrated this economic dimension by highlighting Europe’s growing interest in securing access to high-end semiconductors produced by Taiwan’s globally significant manufacturing sector. The political signaling directed toward Taipei should therefore be understood not solely as an expression of democratic solidarity but also as part of a broader strategy aimed at attracting investment, diversifying technological supply chains, and supporting Europe’s twin digital and green transitions. The Indo-Pacific thus emerges simultaneously as a security theatre, a technological ecosystem, and a vital economic space whose importance transcends traditional geopolitical categories.

By the conclusion of this section, Dr. Pugliese had demonstrated that Europe’s embrace of the Indo-Pacific reflects the convergence of multiple structural forces: intensifying US–China rivalry, deteriorating EU–China relations, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, changing transatlantic dynamics, and the growing economic significance of Asia itself. Rather than representing a sudden strategic pivot, Europe’s Indo-Pacific policy emerged as the cumulative product of shifting geopolitical realities that increasingly blur the boundaries between European and Asian security. The lecture therefore invited participants to reconsider the European Union not as a passive observer of Indo-Pacific developments but as an increasingly active participant in the evolving strategic architecture linking the Atlantic and Pacific worlds.

Taiwan, Economic Security, and the Geopolitics of Interdependence

The flags of Taiwan, the United States, and China.
The flags of Taiwan, the United States, and China displayed on semiconductor chips, symbolizing intensifying global competition over advanced chip production, technological leadership, and strategic supply chains. Illustration: Korn Vitthayanukarun / Dreamstime.

Building upon his analysis of Europe’s gradual embrace of the Indo-Pacific framework, Dr. Pugliese devoted the third section of his lecture to what he described as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary international politics: the growing strategic centrality of Taiwan. While public debate often portrays Taiwan primarily through the lens of cross-Strait tensions or democratic solidarity, Dr. Pugliese argued that the island has acquired a far broader geopolitical significance. Taiwan today occupies the intersection of military strategy, technological competition, global supply chains, and great-power rivalry, making it one of the principal theatres through which the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly contested. For the European Union, he suggested, Taiwan represents not merely a distant regional issue but an increasingly important component of its own economic security and technological resilience. 

Dr. Pugliese encouraged participants to move beyond simplified narratives that portray cross-Strait relations as an inevitable confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism. Instead, he situated recent developments within a longer historical trajectory. The election of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government in 2016 marked an important turning point because the new administration rejected the political understandings that had underpinned earlier efforts to stabilize relations with Beijing. From the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party, this shift fundamentally altered the trajectory of cross-Strait relations by diminishing prospects for eventual peaceful reunification under previously accepted political formulas. Beijing consequently intensified diplomatic, economic, and military pressure designed to isolate Taiwan internationally while discouraging further movement toward a distinct Taiwanese political identity. Rather than interpreting these developments solely through ideological categories, Dr. Pugliese invited participants to recognize the complex interaction of historical memory, nationalism, domestic politics, and strategic calculation that continues to shape Chinese policy. 

The deterioration of cross-Strait relations coincided with a profound transformation in American grand strategy. As the first Trump administration adopted a more confrontational approach toward China, Taiwan assumed an increasingly important position within Washington’s broader strategy of balancing Chinese power. Dr. Pugliese argued that Taiwan gradually evolved into what he repeatedly described as a strategic chess piece within the wider architecture of US–China competition. This characterization did not diminish Taiwan’s own agency or democratic achievements; rather, it reflected the reality that major powers increasingly viewed the island through the prism of broader regional military calculations. Maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait became essential not only because of Taiwan itself but because of its location within the broader maritime geography of East Asia and its implications for regional power projection. 

To explain this strategic importance, Dr. Pugliese introduced participants to the concept of the First Island Chain, a geographical arc extending from northern Japan through Okinawa and Taiwan to the Philippines and onward toward Southeast Asia. Far from representing a mere cartographic feature, this chain constitutes one of the most strategically significant maritime corridors in the contemporary international system. Control over—or access through—these waters shape naval mobility, intelligence gathering, anti-submarine warfare, and the broader military balance in the Western Pacific. Dr. Pugliese illustrated how the deployment of advanced surveillance systems, missile capabilities, radar installations, and underwater sensors throughout this maritime corridor has increasingly transformed the region into a densely monitored strategic environment. In this context, Taiwan occupies a uniquely sensitive position because any alteration to the status quo would fundamentally affect the operational environment of both China and the United States, as well as their regional allies. 

This strategic logic, he explained, has profoundly reshaped alliance structures throughout East Asia. The United States has pursued what contemporary defense planners describe as integrated deterrence, strengthening operational cooperation with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and other regional partners while enhancing interoperability, logistical coordination, and joint contingency planning. Japan, in particular, has assumed a much more prominent role within this evolving security architecture, expanding defense cooperation with Washington and adapting its own military posture to the possibility of a Taiwan contingency. The Philippines has similarly increased cooperation by providing greater access to military facilities, while Australia has deepened its participation in regional security initiatives. According to Dr. Pugliese, these developments illustrate that Taiwan has become embedded within a much broader regional deterrence strategy extending well beyond the island itself. 

Yet Dr. Pugliese was equally careful to avoid reducing Taiwan’s significance to military considerations alone. One of the lecture’s central themes was the growing fusion of security and economics in contemporary international relations. Taiwan’s extraordinary technological capabilities—particularly its globally dominant semiconductor industry—have elevated the island from a regional security concern to a cornerstone of the global digital economy. Advanced semiconductor manufacturing has become indispensable for artificial intelligence, telecommunications, defense systems, electric vehicles, and countless other technologies underpinning modern industrial production. Consequently, disruptions to Taiwan’s manufacturing ecosystem would carry profound consequences far beyond East Asia, affecting supply chains, industrial production, and technological innovation across Europe and the wider international economy.

For Europe, these developments have acquired increasing policy relevance through the emerging concept of economic security. Dr. Pugliese explained that the European Union’s efforts to diversify supply chains and reduce strategic dependencies have naturally directed attention toward Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. European governments have actively sought to attract investment from leading Taiwanese firms, recognizing that securing access to advanced chip production has become essential for the continent’s digital transformation, industrial competitiveness, and technological sovereignty. Europe’s growing diplomatic engagement with Taiwan should therefore be understood not merely as an expression of support for democratic values but also as a pragmatic effort to strengthen resilience within strategically vital industrial sectors. 

This convergence of economic and security considerations extended beyond semiconductors to encompass defense industrial cooperation more broadly. Dr. Pugliese observed that both Europe and East Asia have experienced a dramatic expansion in defense expenditure following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the intensification of geopolitical competition. Rising military budgets have created new opportunities for collaboration in defense technologies, weapons systems, logistics, maintenance, and industrial production. European defense manufacturers increasingly view Indo-Pacific markets as important destinations for exports, co-development projects, and long-term industrial partnerships. At the same time, such cooperation contributes to reducing production costs and strengthening Europe’s own defense industrial base. Security cooperation, therefore, increasingly reflects not only strategic necessity but also significant commercial incentives. 

Throughout this discussion, Dr. Pugliese repeatedly cautioned against simplistic explanations of Europe’s growing engagement with Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific. While democratic values undoubtedly play an important role in shaping European discourse, he argued that material interests remain equally significant. Taiwan matters because it is democratic, but it also matters because it occupies a pivotal position within global technology supply chains, financial markets, and maritime trade routes. Likewise, Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy reflects concern over regional stability, but it also reflects the continent’s own industrial ambitions, technological needs, and economic future. These multiple motivations coexist rather than compete, producing a more complex picture than narratives centered exclusively upon ideology or security.

An equally important contribution of the lecture lay in Dr. Pugliese’s application of the concept of the security dilemma to contemporary US–China relations. He suggested that many of the military deployments, alliance expansions, and deterrence measures currently unfolding across East Asia are driven by reciprocal perceptions of insecurity. Measures intended by one side to preserve stability may be interpreted by the other as preparations for confrontation, thereby generating self-reinforcing cycles of strategic competition. Taiwan, in this sense, is both an object of genuine political concern and a symbol of broader geopolitical rivalry. Understanding these action–reaction dynamics, Pugliese argued, is essential for avoiding overly deterministic interpretations of current tensions while appreciating the structural pressures confronting policymakers on all sides.

By the conclusion of this section, participants were presented with a nuanced portrait of Taiwan as far more than a regional flashpoint. Instead, the island emerged as a focal point where questions of technological leadership, economic resilience, alliance politics, military deterrence, and strategic communication converge. For Europe, Taiwan increasingly embodies the wider challenges of navigating an international environment in which economics and security have become inseparable. The European Union’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific, therefore, cannot be understood solely as an extension of transatlantic solidarity or support for democratic partners. Rather, it reflects the recognition that Europe’s own prosperity, technological competitiveness, and strategic autonomy are becoming progressively intertwined with developments unfolding thousands of kilometers beyond its traditional neighborhood.

Transactional Alliances, Strategic Autonomy, and Europe’s Indo-Pacific Future

In the concluding section of his lecture, Dr. Pugliese turned to the question that ultimately linked every preceding discussion: how should the European Union position itself in an Indo-Pacific increasingly shaped not only by intensifying US–China competition but also by profound changes within the United States itself? While much of the strategic debate over the past decade has focused on China’s growing influence, Dr. Pugliese argued that Europe’s most immediate challenge now lies in responding to the transformation of American grand strategy under Donald Trump’s second administration. The issue confronting European policymakers, he suggested, is no longer simply how to manage China’s rise but how to navigate an international environment in which the reliability, priorities, and strategic commitments of the United States have themselves become less predictable. 

Dr. Pugliese observed that the second Trump administration has introduced a noticeably more transactional approach to international alliances than its predecessors. While the broader American national security establishment—including the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the defense-industrial sector—continues to regard strategic competition with China as the defining challenge of twenty-first-century international politics, the White House has increasingly emphasized burden-sharing, domestic priorities, and the reduction of costly foreign commitments. Rather than fundamentally abandoning America’s alliances, Washington has sought to redefine them according to a logic that requires allies to assume substantially greater responsibility for their own security. In this sense, Dr. Pugliese suggested, contemporary American strategy reflects not isolationism in the traditional sense, but a recalibration of alliance management designed to reduce American costs while preserving strategic influence. 

This changing approach has had profound implications for both Europe and East Asia. Throughout the lecture, Dr. Pugliese repeatedly emphasized that Washington now expects its allies to devote considerably larger shares of national resources to defense. European governments have been encouraged to expand military expenditure well beyond previous commitments, while similar expectations have been directed toward Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and other Indo-Pacific partners. Such demands are presented not merely as financial obligations but as evidence of political resolve and strategic credibility. In practical terms, this means that allies are increasingly expected to shoulder a greater proportion of deterrence, procurement, logistics, and operational planning, thereby allowing the United States to preserve flexibility while maintaining its broader strategic posture toward China. 

Dr. Pugliese also highlighted the important economic dimension underlying these developments. Rising defense expenditure is not simply a matter of military preparedness; it has become an increasingly significant component of industrial policy on both sides of the Atlantic. The expansion of defense production stimulates investment, creates manufacturing demand, and contributes to broader efforts at industrial revitalization. Referring to developments in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, Dr. Pugliese observed that defense procurement has increasingly been linked to debates surrounding reindustrialization, technological innovation, and economic competitiveness. Former civilian manufacturing facilities are gradually being adapted to defense production, while military industries have assumed renewed importance within national economic strategies. The security agenda, therefore, cannot be separated from wider questions concerning employment, industrial policy, and technological modernization. 

The lecture nevertheless cautioned against interpreting contemporary alliance politics exclusively through the lens of burden-sharing. Dr. Pugliese argued that Washington’s approach toward China has itself become increasingly complex. Although the strategic framework established during the first Trump administration continues to shape American policy, recent developments suggest a greater willingness on the part of the White House to pursue tactical accommodation with Beijing where domestic political or economic interests require it. He pointed to the temporary stabilization of US–China relations following the escalation of tariff disputes and China’s restrictions on exports of rare earth minerals as evidence that geopolitical rivalry increasingly coexists with selective negotiation and pragmatic compromise. Great-power competition, therefore, does not unfold as a linear process of confrontation but rather through continuous cycles of competition, bargaining, and limited cooperation. 

Rare earths emerged as a particularly revealing illustration of the changing character of economic statecraft. China’s restrictions on exports of strategically important minerals exposed the extent to which advanced industrial economies remain dependent upon Chinese production in sectors essential to digital technologies, renewable energy, and defense manufacturing. Dr. Pugliese noted that these measures affected not only civilian industries but also the American defense-industrial base itself, demonstrating that economic interdependence continues to constrain even the world’s most powerful states. The resulting negotiations between Washington and Beijing therefore reflected mutual vulnerabilities rather than unilateral leverage. For Europe, this episode underscored the urgency of diversifying critical supply chains while avoiding simplistic assumptions that complete economic disengagement from China remains either feasible or desirable. 

Turning once more to Taiwan, Dr. Pugliese argued that recent American policy illustrates the increasingly transactional character of alliance politics. While Washington has continued to announce substantial arms packages and reaffirm its interest in maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait, implementation has often proven uneven. Delays in weapons deliveries, greater pressure on Taipei regarding trade and tariff issues, and adjustments to diplomatic engagement all suggest a more flexible approach shaped by immediate political considerations, including domestic electoral calculations. Nevertheless, Dr. Pugliese cautioned against interpreting these developments as evidence of strategic disengagement. Beneath the political rhetoric of the White House, the broader American national security apparatus continues to deepen military cooperation with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and other regional partners. Defense planning, alliance coordination, and operational integration initiated during earlier administrations have largely continued, illustrating the considerable institutional continuity that often characterizes foreign policy despite changes in political leadership. 

One of the lecture’s most insightful observations concerned the coexistence of continuity and change within American strategy. Although presidential rhetoric may fluctuate considerably, longstanding institutional commitments frequently persist beneath the surface. Military exercises continue, defense partnerships expand, and strategic planning remains oriented toward balancing China’s growing capabilities. This distinction between political leadership and institutional strategy, Dr. Pugliese argued, is essential for understanding current international developments. It also cautions against interpreting individual diplomatic episodes in isolation from the deeper structural forces that continue to shape US–China competition.

Throughout this concluding discussion, Dr. Pugliese consistently returned to the position of the European Union. Europe, he argued, increasingly finds itself compelled to pursue a delicate balancing act. On one hand, the continent shares important strategic concerns with the United States regarding China’s growing military capabilities, technological ambitions, and economic influence. On the other hand, Europe possesses significant commercial interests in maintaining productive relations with Asian economies, including China itself. Simultaneously, the unpredictability associated with American foreign policy reinforces longstanding European aspirations for greater strategic autonomy. Rather than blindly aligning with either Washington or Beijing, the European Union must therefore cultivate the capacity to pursue its own interests while preserving constructive partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.

Importantly, Dr. Pugliese rejected simplistic narratives portraying Europe as either an unquestioning follower of American strategy or an independent geopolitical pole entirely detached from transatlantic cooperation. Instead, he depicted European policymaking as a process of continuous negotiation among competing priorities: maintaining alliance solidarity, preserving economic competitiveness, protecting critical technologies, strengthening defense capabilities, and avoiding unnecessary escalation with China. The Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the European Union reflects precisely this balancing effort. Its deliberately inclusive language seeks to strengthen engagement with democratic partners while avoiding explicit endorsement of comprehensive containment strategies. Europe, in other words, is gradually seeking to develop a distinct Indo-Pacific identity that remains compatible with transatlantic cooperation without being wholly defined by it.

As the lecture drew to a close, Dr. Pugliese emphasized that understanding Europe’s evolving role in Asia requires abandoning narrow regional perspectives. The Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic can no longer be treated as separate strategic theatres. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s growing global influence, technological competition, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and alliance politics have created an increasingly interconnected geopolitical landscape in which developments in one region inevitably reverberate across the other. Europe’s future prosperity, security, and strategic autonomy will therefore depend upon its ability to engage effectively with both theatres simultaneously.

Taken as a whole, Dr. Pugliese’s lecture provided participants with a remarkably nuanced framework for understanding the European Union’s evolving engagement with Asia. Rather than presenting the Indo-Pacific as merely the latest geopolitical slogan, he demonstrated how strategic narratives, alliance politics, economic interdependence, technological competition, and shifting global power structures have become deeply intertwined. By tracing the intellectual origins of the Indo-Pacific concept, examining the evolution of US–China rivalry, analyzing Taiwan’s strategic significance, and exploring the implications of America’s increasingly transactional alliance policy, the lecture illuminated the profound transformation currently underway in international politics. Most importantly, it underscored that Europe’s future “between oceans” will not be determined solely by the choices of Washington or Beijing but by its own ability to formulate a coherent, strategically autonomous, and globally engaged vision capable of navigating an increasingly contested international order.

The iconic euro (€) sculpture.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Assoc. Prof. Reuben Wong: Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

The European Union’s pursuit of strategic autonomy has emerged as one of the defining geopolitical debates of the twenty-first century, reflecting the growing convergence of security, economics, technology, and global power competition. In this intellectually stimulating lecture, Associate Professor Reuben Wong examined how Europe’s search for greater strategic independence has been reshaped by an increasingly volatile international environment marked by intensifying US–China rivalry, Russia’s revisionism, and rapid technological transformation. Challenging conventional assumptions about Europe’s transatlantic relationship and its approach toward China, he argued that strategic autonomy requires not only stronger defense and economic security instruments but also a fundamental reassessment of Europe’s place within an emerging multipolar order. The lecture offered participants a provocative and nuanced framework for understanding the future of European geopolitics.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The third day of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 marked a decisive transition from examining the political economy of international trade toward confronting the broader geopolitical forces reshaping Europe’s external relations. Convened under the overarching theme, Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” the programme explored how the European Union is increasingly compelled to navigate an international environment characterized not only by intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China but also by the erosion of long-standing assumptions about globalization, security, and the liberal international order. Against this backdrop, Associate Professor Reuben Wong of the National University of Singapore delivered a thought-provoking lecture entitled Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools,” inviting participants to reconsider Europe’s geopolitical position through an analytical lens that combined European integration studies with the strategic realities of contemporary international politics.

From the outset, Assoc. Prof. Wong made clear that his objective was not merely to catalogue the European Union’s emerging economic security instruments or explain the technical dimensions of de-risking. Rather, he sought to interrogate the underlying assumptions shaping European strategic thinking at a moment when the continent finds itself simultaneously confronting geopolitical uncertainty, technological transformation, and shifting distributions of global power. Drawing upon his long-standing scholarship on European foreign policy, as well as his experience observing both European and Asian strategic debates, Assoc. Prof. Wong encouraged participants to move beyond familiar policy slogans and instead examine the deeper questions surrounding Europe’s identity, capabilities, and long-term strategic interests.

One of the lecture’s distinguishing features was the perspective from which it was delivered. Speaking from Singapore—a country whose foreign policy has long depended upon balancing relations among competing major powers—Assoc. Prof. Wong approached debates over European strategic autonomy with a degree of analytical distance rarely encountered within discussions dominated by either Brussels or Washington. Rather than treating Europe’s geopolitical dilemmas as uniquely European, he situated them within a broader transformation of the international system, where established powers increasingly confront rising competitors, traditional alliances are being reassessed, and economic interdependence has itself become a source of strategic vulnerability. This external vantage point enriched the discussion by encouraging participants to question assumptions that often remain implicit within European policy circles.

Assoc. Prof. Wong also began by highlighting the conceptual ambiguity surrounding two of the most frequently invoked expressions in contemporary European policy discourse: strategic autonomy and de-risking. Although both terms have become central to debates on European foreign and economic policy, they often carry different meanings depending upon the context in which they are employed. Assoc. Prof. Wong observed that discussions of de-risking almost invariably evoke Europe’s increasingly complex relationship with China. The concept reflects growing concerns regarding excessive dependence on Chinese supply chains, critical raw materials, strategic technologies, intellectual property protection, and infrastructure deemed essential to European economic resilience. De-risking, therefore, does not necessarily imply economic decoupling from China but rather seeks to reduce strategic vulnerabilities while preserving mutually beneficial commercial relations.

By contrast, Assoc. Prof. Wong suggested that strategic autonomy has historically been associated less with China than with Europe’s relationship with the United States. At its core lies the question of whether the European Union possesses the political, military, and institutional capacity to pursue its own foreign policy independently of American strategic preferences. While the expression has acquired renewed prominence following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and amid renewed uncertainty surrounding American global leadership, Assoc. Prof. Wong reminded participants that the debate itself stretches back to the end of the Cold War. Since the early 1990s, European leaders have repeatedly grappled with the challenge of transforming the Union from an economic giant into a credible geopolitical actor capable of defending both its interests and its values.

Rather than presenting these concepts as separate policy debates, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that they should be understood as interconnected responses to a rapidly changing international environment. Strategic autonomy addresses Europe’s dependence on external security guarantees, while de-risking reflects growing awareness of economic dependencies that may equally constrain political decision-making. Together, they illustrate the European Union’s broader search for resilience in a world where geopolitical competition increasingly extends beyond military affairs to encompass trade, technology, investment, industrial policy, and digital infrastructure.

Throughout this opening section of the lecture, Assoc. Prof. Wong established the intellectual framework that would guide the remainder of his presentation: understanding Europe’s future requires examining not only the policies it adopts, but also the assumptions it holds about power, alliances, and the changing architecture of the international system. By placing strategic autonomy and economic security within this wider geopolitical context, he invited participants to reconsider whether Europe’s existing conceptual frameworks remain adequate for navigating an era defined by intensifying great-power competition and accelerating technological transformation.

The Long Search for Strategic Autonomy: From European Aspirations to Geopolitical Reality

Associate Professor Reuben Wong.
Associate Professor Reuben Wong is Deputy Head of the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore.

Having established the conceptual foundations of strategic autonomy and de-risking, Assoc. Prof. Wong proceeded to examine the historical evolution of Europe’s quest for greater geopolitical independence. Rather than portraying strategic autonomy as a recent response to heightened tensions with China or the return of Donald Trump to the White House, he situated it within a much longer trajectory of European integration that has unfolded since the end of the Cold War. His historical reconstruction demonstrated that contemporary debates over European defense, foreign policy, and economic security are best understood not as abrupt policy innovations but as the latest chapter in a decades-long effort to reconcile Europe’s political ambitions with its enduring strategic dependencies.

At the center of Assoc. Prof. Wong’s discussion stood a deceptively simple definition of strategic autonomy: the ability of a state—or, in the European Union’s unique case, a union of sovereign states—to pursue its preferred foreign policy and defend its interests without excessive dependence on external powers. Although straightforward in formulation, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that this definition immediately exposes one of the European Union’s most enduring dilemmas. Unlike conventional nation-states, the EU has long aspired to exercise geopolitical influence while lacking many of the instruments traditionally associated with great-power status, particularly unified military capabilities and a fully integrated foreign policy apparatus. Consequently, strategic autonomy has remained as much an aspiration as an accomplished reality.

This ambition has shaped European foreign policy thinking since the early 1990s, when the collapse of the bipolar international order appeared to create new opportunities for Europe to emerge as an independent strategic actor. The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) represented one of the most ambitious manifestations of this aspiration. By seeking to coordinate foreign policy among member states, the EU hoped to complement its growing economic integration with greater diplomatic coherence and international influence. Yet, as Assoc. Prof. Wong reminded participants, translating institutional innovation into effective geopolitical action proved considerably more difficult than its architects had anticipated.

To illustrate this challenge, Assoc. Prof. Wong revisited one of the defining moments in post-Cold War European diplomacy: the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. At the outset of the crisis, European leaders famously declared that the conflict represented “the hour of Europe,” signaling their confidence that the continent possessed both the responsibility and the capability to resolve security crises in its own neighborhood. Events quickly exposed the limitations of that ambition. As the conflicts escalated into prolonged warfare, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, European diplomatic initiatives failed to prevent violence, while decisive military intervention ultimately depended upon the United States and NATO. For Assoc. Prof. Wong, the Yugoslav wars became an enduring reminder that Europe’s geopolitical aspirations remained constrained by its continued reliance on American military power.

This lesson profoundly shaped subsequent debates over European defense integration. Assoc. Prof. Wong devoted particular attention to the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, jointly issued by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, which called for the European Union to develop autonomous military capabilities capable of responding to regional crises. Although frequently celebrated as a milestone in the evolution of European security policy, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that the declaration also revealed fundamental differences regarding the meaning of strategic autonomy itself.

France, he explained, traditionally viewed strategic autonomy through the lens of genuine strategic independence. Rooted in Gaullist thinking and reinforced by decades of skepticism toward excessive reliance on Washington, successive French governments argued that Europe should possess independent military capabilities, autonomous command structures, and the political freedom to undertake operations without depending upon NATO. Strategic autonomy, from this perspective, required Europe to become a fully-fledged geopolitical actor capable of acting on its own behalf.

Britain’s interpretation differed significantly. While London supported stronger European defense cooperation, it remained firmly committed to preserving NATO as the cornerstone of European security. British policymakers generally understood strategic autonomy not as an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance but as a complementary mechanism that would enable European states to contribute more effectively to collective defense without duplicating NATO structures. As Assoc. Prof. Wong noted, this more Atlanticist understanding was shared by many other European governments, particularly those in Northern and Central Europe, which regarded American security guarantees as indispensable to continental stability.

These competing interpretations, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued, help explain why European defense integration has repeatedly advanced in incremental rather than transformative ways. Although successive crises—including the Arab Spring, Russia’s intervention in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and ultimately Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—have reinforced calls for greater European strategic capacity, member states have continued to differ over the extent to which strategic autonomy should supplement or gradually replace dependence on the United States.

Drawing upon his own experience as a diplomat and scholar observing European capitals, Assoc. Prof. Wong enriched this historical analysis with comparative reflections on how different countries interpreted the post-Cold War strategic environment. He recalled that policymakers in Paris were already contemplating a future in which American reliability could no longer be taken for granted, prompting early efforts to strengthen European defense capabilities. By contrast, officials in London, Bonn, and many other European capitals struggled to imagine a European security architecture detached from American leadership. These contrasting strategic cultures, he suggested, continue to shape debates over European defense to this day.

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has injected renewed urgency into these long-standing discussions. While strategic autonomy had often been treated as an ambitious long-term objective, changing transatlantic dynamics have increasingly transformed it into what many European leaders now perceive as an immediate strategic necessity. Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong cautioned against viewing contemporary developments solely through the lens of personalities or electoral cycles. The deeper issue, he argued, concerns whether Europe has sufficiently adapted to a changing international system in which alliances can no longer be assumed to be permanent or unconditional.

In one of the lecture’s most intellectually provocative moments, Assoc. Prof. Wong introduced a distinctly realist interpretation of contemporary international politics. Reflecting upon the evolution of European strategic thinking, he suggested that the European Union had spent much of the post-Cold War era operating under liberal assumptions regarding the durability of democratic solidarity and the permanence of the rules-based international order. Those assumptions, he argued, increasingly require reconsideration. States, including democratic allies, ultimately pursue their own interests, and alliances endure only so long as they continue to serve mutually beneficial strategic purposes. From this perspective, expecting the United States to indefinitely shoulder the burden of European security irrespective of its own changing priorities may represent less a realistic strategic assessment than an increasingly untenable political assumption.

By tracing the historical evolution of strategic autonomy through successive geopolitical crises, Assoc. Prof. Wong demonstrated that Europe’s present predicament is neither accidental nor entirely new. Rather, contemporary debates reflect the culmination of unresolved tensions that have accompanied European integration for more than three decades. The challenge facing the European Union today, therefore, is not simply to devise new policy instruments, but to determine whether it is finally prepared to align its strategic ambitions with the capabilities required to sustain genuine geopolitical autonomy.

Between Washington and Beijing: Reassessing Europe’s Strategic Environment

Photo: Dreamstime.

Having traced the historical evolution of strategic autonomy, Assoc. Prof. Wong shifted the discussion toward the rapidly changing international environment within which the European Union must now pursue that ambition. Rather than treating Europe’s security dilemmas as the product of a single crisis, he situated them within a broader transformation of global politics marked by shifting power balances, intensifying great-power competition, and the gradual erosion of assumptions that had underpinned the post-Cold War international order. Throughout this section of the lecture, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that Europe’s strategic predicament cannot be understood solely through its relations with either Washington or Beijing; instead, it emerges from the increasingly complex triangular relationship among the European Union, the United States, and China.

Assoc. Prof. Wong began by observing that Europe finds itself confronting an unprecedented convergence of external pressures. Relations with Russia have deteriorated dramatically following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, fundamentally altering Europe’s security landscape. At the same time, the return of Donald Trump to the American presidency has reopened longstanding questions regarding the reliability of the transatlantic alliance, while relations with China have become increasingly complicated by disputes over trade imbalances, technological competition, industrial policy, human rights, and concerns over Beijing’s growing strategic partnership with Russia. Rather than confronting a single geopolitical rival, Europe now faces the far more demanding challenge of managing simultaneous tensions with multiple major powers whose interests increasingly intersect.

The lecture devoted particular attention to the implications of changing transatlantic relations. Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that the debate over European strategic autonomy has acquired renewed urgency not simply because of Russia’s military aggression but because uncertainty regarding American strategic commitments has become significantly more pronounced. Referring to the early months of Trump’s second presidency, he recalled disputes over tariffs, trade policy, and even Washington’s controversial rhetoric regarding Greenland. These developments, he suggested, reinforced concerns among European policymakers that the United States was becoming an increasingly unpredictable partner whose strategic priorities might diverge from those of its European allies.

Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong was careful to emphasize that such developments should not be interpreted merely as the consequence of one administration or one political leader. Instead, he invited participants to consider whether Europe has been too slow to recognize broader structural changes in international politics. Drawing upon a realist understanding of international relations, he argued that great powers do not maintain costly alliances indefinitely out of sentiment or historical loyalty alone. Rather, alliances endure because they continue to serve concrete strategic and material interests. From this perspective, the expectation that the United States will remain permanently committed to underwriting European security regardless of shifting geopolitical priorities may no longer represent a sustainable assumption.

This argument marked one of the lecture’s most provocative departures from conventional European policy discourse. Assoc. Prof. Wong suggested that, for much of the post-Cold War period, European strategic thinking had been shaped by liberal assumptions concerning democratic solidarity, institutional cooperation, and the durability of the rules-based international order. While these assumptions contributed significantly to European integration itself, he argued that they have become increasingly difficult to reconcile with contemporary geopolitical realities. The resurgence of great-power rivalry, growing economic nationalism, and renewed emphasis on national interest all point toward a more competitive international environment in which states, including democratic allies, increasingly prioritize their own strategic calculations.

It was within this broader realist framework that Assoc. Prof. Wong introduced what was arguably the lecture’s most controversial proposition. Contrary to prevailing narratives within many European political circles, he suggested that the United States, rather than China, has increasingly become the principal source of strategic uncertainty confronting Europe. Several years earlier, such an assessment might have appeared implausible. Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that recent developments require a reassessment of long-held assumptions about the respective roles of Washington and Beijing within the international system.

To support this contention, Assoc. Prof. Wong contrasted the behavior of the two powers in relation to the international rules-based order. While acknowledging the numerous disagreements that continue to characterize relations between Europe and China, he nevertheless argued that Beijing has, in several important respects, sought to operate within existing international institutions and norms established after the Second World War. By contrast, he suggested that recent American policies have increasingly challenged many of the very principles that Washington itself had historically championed, including support for multilateral institutions, international trade regimes, and predictable alliance commitments. In Assoc. Prof. Wong’s assessment, the paradox of the current international order lies in the fact that the principal architect of the post-war liberal system now appears increasingly willing to revise or abandon elements of that system, while China often presents itself as a defender of institutional stability and economic globalization.

This interpretation naturally challenged participants to reconsider familiar geopolitical narratives. Assoc. Prof. Wong acknowledged that many European policymakers continue to view China primarily through the lenses of strategic competition, human rights concerns, and systemic rivalry. Nevertheless, he encouraged his audience to distinguish between legitimate concerns regarding China’s growing influence and broader assumptions that automatically portray Beijing as the principal disruptor of the international order. Historical experience, institutional inertia, and deeply embedded transatlantic political cultures, he suggested, have made it difficult for many Europeans to recognize the extent to which the geopolitical landscape has evolved.

At the same time, Assoc. Prof. Wong cautioned against reducing international politics to a simplistic binary competition between Washington and Beijing. Instead, he argued that Europe’s strategic interests require a far more nuanced understanding of both powers. China should neither be romanticized nor automatically treated as an adversary whose rise inevitably threatens European prosperity. Equally, the United States should not be assumed to remain an unchanging guarantor of European security simply because of decades of successful transatlantic cooperation. Strategic autonomy, therefore, demands that Europe develop the analytical capacity to evaluate both relationships on the basis of its own interests rather than inherited geopolitical assumptions.

The lecture also situated China’s rise within the longer trajectory of global power redistribution. Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that China should no longer be understood merely as an emerging power but rather as a fully-fledged superpower whose influence increasingly shapes international politics, global markets, technological innovation, and diplomatic agendas. Referring to recent high-level interactions between Washington and Beijing, he suggested that historians may ultimately identify the latest summit between the two governments as a symbolic moment in which the United States implicitly acknowledged China as a strategic peer. The absence of unequivocal American dominance in these negotiations reflected, in his view, a broader transition toward a more multipolar international system.

Within such a system, Europe can no longer rely upon geopolitical habits formed during the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War decades. Instead, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that the European Union must cultivate a more independent strategic identity grounded in realistic assessments of its own capabilities, interests, and external environment. This requires moving beyond reflexive alignments with either superpower while simultaneously preserving constructive relations with both. For Europe, the challenge is not to choose between Washington and Beijing, but to develop sufficient strategic confidence to cooperate, compete, and disagree with each according to its own long-term interests.

By the conclusion of this section, Assoc. Prof. Wong had fundamentally reframed the strategic autonomy debate. Rather than presenting it as a defensive response to external threats alone, he portrayed it as a process of intellectual and political maturation through which the European Union must redefine its place within an increasingly fragmented international order. Strategic autonomy, in this sense, is less about distancing Europe from particular partners than about equipping it with the capacity to navigate a world in which geopolitical certainty has become the exception rather than the rule.

Normative Power, Market Power, and Europe’s Technological Challenge

Photo: Maryna Kushnarova / Dreamstime.

Having examined Europe’s shifting geopolitical environment, Assoc. Prof. Wong turned to one of the lecture’s central analytical questions: whether the European Union still possesses the capacity to shape the international order through its traditional strengths. Rather than focusing exclusively on military capabilities or diplomatic influence, Assoc. Prof. Wong explored Europe’s changing position as a producer of international norms, regulatory standards, and market rules. In doing so, he revisited two of the most influential concepts in European Union scholarship—Normative Power Europeand Market Power Europe—before questioning whether the material foundations that once sustained these forms of influence remain sufficiently robust in an era of accelerating technological competition and shifting global economic power.

Assoc. Prof. Wong began by discussing the influential work of political scientist Ian Manners, whose concept of Normative Power Europe has long occupied a central place in debates on the European Union’s international role. Manners argued that the EU’s distinctive influence derives not primarily from military power but from its capacity to define what constitutes legitimate behavior in international politics. Through the promotion of democracy, human rights, rule of law, multilateralism, environmental protection, and good governance, the Union has sought to exercise influence by shaping norms rather than imposing coercion. This vision has become deeply embedded within both academic literature and European policymaking, reinforcing the idea that the EU represents a unique kind of international actor whose strength lies in persuasion rather than force.

While acknowledging the significance of this intellectual tradition, Assoc. Prof. Wong encouraged participants to distinguish between aspiration and empirical reality. The European Union undoubtedly seeks to project normative influence, he argued, but successful norm entrepreneurship requires willing audiences capable of accepting and internalizing those standards. In practice, the EU has proven most effective when engaging countries that aspire to join the Union or maintain exceptionally close institutional and economic ties with it. The accession process itself illustrates the remarkable power of European conditionality, whereby candidate states undertake extensive political, legal, and economic reforms in exchange for eventual membership. Beyond this sphere of attraction, however, Europe’s capacity to shape political norms becomes considerably more limited.

To illustrate this point, Assoc. Prof. Wong referred to states that possess sufficient political autonomy, demographic weight, or strategic leverage to resist European pressure. Russia represented the clearest example of a country unwilling to organize its domestic or foreign policy according to European expectations. Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong also cited Turkey, Iran, and other significant regional powers that, despite maintaining important economic relationships with the EU, have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to reject European normative preferences when these conflict with domestic political priorities or broader strategic interests. Such examples, he argued, reveal that normative influence ultimately depends upon underlying distributions of political and economic power rather than normative appeal alone.

If Europe’s ability to export political values has become increasingly constrained, Assoc. Prof. Wong suggested that its more enduring source of influence has historically resided elsewhere. Here he introduced Chad Damro’s concept of Market Power Europe, which shifts attention from political ideals to economic scale. Unlike normative power, which rests upon persuasion and legitimacy, market power derives from the size, wealth, and regulatory sophistication of the European single market. As one of the world’s largest integrated economic areas, the EU has long possessed the ability to establish product standards, environmental regulations, competition rules, labor protections, and consumer safety requirements that multinational corporations frequently adopt worldwide. Access to the European market has thus encouraged firms and governments alike to conform to European regulatory frameworks, extending the Union’s influence well beyond its territorial borders.

For Assoc. Prof. Wong, however, even this formidable source of influence can no longer be taken for granted. Market power ultimately depends upon economic dynamism, technological leadership, and sustained commercial relevance. Here he painted a considerably more cautious picture of Europe’s future. While the European Union remains one of the world’s largest economies, its relative share of global trade has steadily declined over recent decades as emerging economies—particularly China and increasingly India—have assumed a larger role in global production, investment, and innovation. Whereas Europe once accounted for roughly a quarter of world trade, its share has gradually diminished, reflecting broader structural changes in the global economy.

This decline carries consequences extending well beyond trade statistics. Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that countries which dominate emerging industries also acquire disproportionate influence over the standards governing those industries. Historically, Europe’s industrial strength enabled it to shape international regulations across numerous sectors, from manufacturing and pharmaceuticals to environmental protection and consumer rights. Yet leadership in future technologies increasingly belongs elsewhere. As innovation shifts toward artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductors, electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, and digital infrastructure, regulatory influence will increasingly follow technological leadership rather than historical institutional prestige.

Artificial intelligence emerged as perhaps the most illustrative example of this transformation. Assoc. Prof. Wong observed that Europe possesses world-class universities, research institutions, and highly skilled scientific communities. Nevertheless, these strengths have not translated into globally dominant AI platforms capable of competing directly with American and Chinese technological giants. While companies such as OpenAI, Google, Anthropic, DeepSeek, Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu increasingly shape the global AI ecosystem, Europe has yet to produce comparable commercial champions operating at similar scale. Consequently, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued, Europe risks finding itself in the position of regulating technologies whose fundamental architecture, commercial logic, and technical standards are being established elsewhere.

The discussion then broadened to encompass the wider technological transformation underway in China. Assoc. Prof. Wong challenged participants to reconsider widespread perceptions that continue to portray China primarily as a manufacturing economy dependent upon copying foreign technologies. Drawing upon personal experiences from his recent visits, he described a society that has rapidly become one of the world’s foremost laboratories of technological innovation. Cashless payment systems, integrated digital platforms, sophisticated logistics networks, and autonomous delivery technologies illustrated the extent to which China has advanced in areas where many developed economies still rely upon older infrastructures. These examples were not presented merely as anecdotes but as evidence of China’s growing capacity to shape future technological ecosystems.

Particularly striking was Assoc. Prof. Wong’s discussion of China’s digital economy. Recounting his surprise when physical cash and even international credit cards proved largely unusable during his visits, he highlighted how mobile payment platforms such as Alipay and WeChat Pay have fundamentally transformed everyday economic life. Likewise, China’s extensive deployment of automated logistics—including robotic delivery services in hotels and urban environments—served to illustrate the speed with which technological innovation has been integrated into ordinary commercial practice. Such developments, he argued, underscore the increasingly significant gap separating technological adoption in parts of Asia from prevailing assumptions still common in Europe.

These observations naturally fed into Assoc. Prof. Wong’s broader concern regarding Europe’s future competitiveness. If technological innovation increasingly determines not only economic prosperity but also the capacity to establish international standards, Europe faces a narrowing window within which it can preserve meaningful regulatory influence. Regulatory excellence alone cannot indefinitely compensate for declining industrial leadership. Without stronger innovation ecosystems and greater participation in frontier technologies, Europe’s capacity to shape global governance may gradually erode despite its sophisticated legal and institutional frameworks.

The lecture also encouraged participants to place China’s contemporary rise within a broader historical context. Assoc. Prof. Wong reminded his audience that Chinese strategic thinking continues to be profoundly shaped by the historical memory of the so-called Century of Humiliation, during which successive unequal treaties, foreign occupations, and imperial interventions severely constrained Chinese sovereignty. Although China escaped formal colonization in the manner experienced by many Asian and African societies, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that nineteenth-century European and Japanese interventions nonetheless left enduring historical scars. The visible architectural legacies of foreign concessions in cities such as Shanghai continue to serve as reminders of a period during which external powers exercised extraordinary influence over Chinese territory and governance.

By invoking this historical perspective, Assoc. Prof. Wong sought neither to justify nor to excuse contemporary Chinese policies. Rather, he encouraged participants to appreciate how historical memory informs present-day strategic behavior. European concerns regarding China’s growing global influence are undoubtedly significant, he acknowledged, yet Chinese policymakers likewise interpret international politics through a historical narrative centered upon sovereignty, national rejuvenation, and the determination never again to experience external subordination. Understanding these competing historical narratives, Assoc. Prof. Wong suggested, constitutes an essential prerequisite for developing more sophisticated European engagement with China.

From De-risking to Strategic Partnership: Reimagining Europe’s Economic Security

Stacks of euro coins placed before the flag of the European Union.
Stacks of euro coins placed before the flag of the European Union, symbolizing the euro currency and European economic integration. Photo: Marian Vejcik / Dreamstime.

In the concluding section of his lecture, Assoc. Prof. Wong shifted from diagnosing Europe’s strategic predicament to exploring the policy choices available to the European Union as it seeks to strengthen its economic resilience in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment. Returning to the second concept introduced at the beginning of the session—de-risking—he examined how the EU’s emerging economic security agenda fits within the broader pursuit of strategic autonomy. Rather than viewing economic security solely through the lens of defensive measures against perceived external threats, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that Europe’s long-term success will depend upon combining resilience with openness, regulation with innovation, and strategic caution with international cooperation.

Although he acknowledged that discussions surrounding de-risking are frequently associated with reducing Europe’s dependence on China, Assoc. Prof. Wong cautioned against equating de-risking with comprehensive economic decoupling. Such an approach, he implied, would neither be economically sustainable nor strategically desirable. Instead, he presented de-risking as an effort to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in areas where excessive dependence on external suppliers could undermine Europe’s political autonomy or economic stability. Critical raw materials, advanced semiconductors, digital infrastructure, strategic technologies, and resilient supply chains have all become central components of this emerging economic security agenda. Yet, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued, the effectiveness of these policies ultimately depends upon whether they enhance Europe’s own competitiveness rather than merely restrict external actors.

The discussion naturally turned to the policy instruments increasingly available to the European Union. While Assoc. Prof. Wong did not provide an exhaustive catalogue of individual legislative measures, he emphasized that Europe has gradually assembled a more sophisticated economic security toolbox capable of responding to external coercion and strategic pressure. These instruments include mechanisms to scrutinize foreign investment, strengthen supply-chain resilience, regulate emerging technologies, protect critical infrastructure, and respond collectively to economic coercion by third countries. Such measures, he suggested, represent an important evolution in European policymaking, reflecting the growing recognition that economic interdependence can generate strategic vulnerabilities as well as mutual benefits.

A particularly revealing illustration of this evolving approach emerged from Assoc. Prof. Wong’s discussion of the tensions that followed the return of Donald Trump to the White House. Referring to disputes surrounding Greenland and the renewed threat of punitive tariffs against European partners, Assoc. Prof. Wong observed that these developments produced an unusually unified response from several EU member states. He highlighted the symbolic decision by a number of European governments to express support for Denmark following Washington’s increasingly assertive rhetoric regarding Greenland. Although these gestures carried limited immediate military significance, they nevertheless reflected an important political signal: European solidarity could no longer be assumed to operate only against external competitors traditionally perceived as strategic rivals. For perhaps the first time in NATO’s history, Assoc. Prof. Wong noted, several European governments found themselves collectively signaling resistance to political pressure originating from the United States itself.

This episode, he argued, underscored the growing relevance of Europe’s economic security instruments. Faced with the prospect of American tariffs and economic coercion, the European Union demonstrated its willingness to contemplate robust countermeasures capable of imposing significant economic costs in return. Assoc. Prof. Wong referred to the Union’s capacity to deploy powerful retaliatory trade instruments, observing that although such measures would inevitably entail substantial economic consequences for both sides, they nevertheless constitute an increasingly important source of European strategic leverage. Economic statecraft, in other words, has become an indispensable complement to traditional diplomacy within the EU’s broader pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong was equally careful to stress that Europe’s future cannot be secured through defensive instruments alone. Protection, regulation, and retaliatory capabilities may reduce vulnerability, but they cannot substitute for technological dynamism or sustained economic competitiveness. It was at this point that he introduced what emerged as one of the lecture’s most forward-looking themes: digital sovereignty. Rather than understanding digital sovereignty as an attempt to isolate Europe from global technological ecosystems, Assoc. Prof. Wong presented it as the capacity to shape the governance of technologies that increasingly underpin modern economies. Artificial intelligence, digital platforms, data governance, and algorithmic regulation have all become critical arenas in which geopolitical competition increasingly unfolds.

For Assoc. Prof. Wong, Europe continues to possess a valuable—albeit narrowing—opportunity to influence the regulatory architecture governing these emerging technologies. Although European firms have not produced global AI champions comparable to those found in the United States or China, the Union still retains considerable regulatory authority through the size and attractiveness of its internal market. By establishing clear standards concerning transparency, accountability, privacy, competition, and digital governance, Europe may continue to shape aspects of global technological development even where it no longer leads in technological innovation itself. However, Assoc. Prof. Wong repeatedly emphasized that this window of opportunity is unlikely to remain open indefinitely if Europe’s technological capabilities continue to lag behind those of its principal competitors.

This concern naturally led to one of the lecture’s most distinctive policy recommendations. Rather than seeking to insulate European markets from external technological leaders, Assoc. Prof. Wong advocated a more pragmatic strategy centered on selective international cooperation. In particular, he argued that Europe should deepen engagement with technologically advanced partners across Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and other innovation-driven economies. Such partnerships, he suggested, would enable Europe to participate more actively in emerging technological ecosystems while simultaneously strengthening its own competitiveness.

In advancing this argument, Assoc. Prof. Wong challenged approaches that rely primarily upon restrictive regulation or defensive protectionism. Attempting to legislate foreign technologies out of European markets, he argued, risks isolating Europe from the very innovations that are reshaping the global economy. Instead, Europe should seek opportunities for collaboration with market leaders, recognizing that technological leadership increasingly depends upon interconnected networks of research, investment, industrial production, and commercial cooperation rather than purely national capabilities.

To illustrate this point, Assoc. Prof. Wong referred to developments within the global electric vehicle industry. He observed that successful firms increasingly pursue partnerships across national boundaries rather than relying exclusively upon domestic production or political protection. As an example, he pointed to the willingness of companies such as Tesla to cooperate with leading Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers, demonstrating that commercial realities often encourage collaboration even amid broader geopolitical competition. Europe, he suggested, should draw lessons from such developments. Instead of viewing technological interdependence solely as a source of vulnerability, policymakers should also recognize its potential to accelerate innovation and strengthen long-term competitiveness.

Underlying this recommendation was Assoc. Prof. Wong’s broader conviction that Europe must cultivate a more confident understanding of its own strategic interests. Throughout the lecture, he consistently argued against framing international politics in rigid ideological or binary terms. Europe need not choose between unconditional alignment with Washington and comprehensive confrontation with Beijing. Nor should strategic autonomy be interpreted as strategic isolation. Rather, genuine autonomy requires the capacity to cooperate, compete, and disagree with multiple partners according to Europe’s own evolving interests and priorities.

As the lecture drew to a close, Assoc. Prof. Wong returned to the central theme that had connected each stage of his analysis: the European Union’s search for strategic autonomy in an era of profound geopolitical transformation. He suggested that this search cannot be reduced to military capability alone, nor can it be achieved solely through economic regulation or institutional reform. Strategic autonomy ultimately demands a broader intellectual shift in how Europe understands power itself. In a world where technological leadership, supply chains, innovation ecosystems, and digital infrastructure increasingly determine geopolitical influence, economic security has become inseparable from foreign policy and strategic decision-making.

The lecture concluded on a cautiously optimistic note. While Assoc. Prof. Wong openly acknowledged Europe’s relative decline in several domains—including demographic growth, technological innovation, and global market share—he rejected narratives of inevitable European marginalization. The Union continues to possess significant assets: one of the world’s largest integrated markets, highly developed regulatory institutions, advanced research capacities, and an enduring commitment to multilateral cooperation. Whether these strengths can be translated into sustained geopolitical influence, however, will depend upon Europe’s willingness to adapt to an international environment that increasingly rewards flexibility, innovation, and strategic pragmatism rather than reliance upon inherited assumptions.

Taken as a whole, Assoc. Prof. Wong’s lecture offered far more than an assessment of the European Union’s emerging economic security policies. It presented a comprehensive reflection on Europe’s place within a rapidly evolving international order, urging participants to reconsider established geopolitical narratives and to approach strategic autonomy not as a slogan but as an ongoing process of political, economic, and intellectual adaptation. By combining insights from European integration studies, international relations theory, and an Asian perspective on global power shifts, the lecture challenged participants to think beyond conventional dichotomies and to appreciate the complexity of Europe’s strategic choices in what is becoming an increasingly multipolar and geoeconomically contested world.

Conclusion

Associate Professor Reuben Wong’s lecture offered a sophisticated and timely examination of one of the European Union’s most pressing strategic dilemmas: how to preserve political autonomy, economic resilience, and regulatory influence amid an increasingly fragmented international order. Moving beyond conventional policy debates, he challenged participants to reconsider Europe’s assumptions about alliances, power, and globalization through a realist yet forward-looking analytical framework. 

By juxtaposing strategic autonomy with de-risking, normative influence with market power, and geopolitical competition with technological transformation, Assoc. Prof. Wong demonstrated that Europe’s future will depend not only on strengthening its economic security instruments but also on redefining its strategic identity in a rapidly evolving multipolar world. Perhaps the lecture’s greatest contribution lay in its distinctly Asian perspective, which encouraged participants to look beyond transatlantic paradigms and appreciate the profound shifts taking place in global power distribution. 

Ultimately, the session reinforced the Summer School’s central message that Europe’s future between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific will be determined not by choosing between competing great powers, but by developing the confidence, capabilities, and strategic vision necessary to engage an increasingly interconnected and contested world on its own terms.

Image: Paulus Rusyanto / Dreamstime.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Prof. Alasdair Young: Populism Trumped Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Can the transatlantic trading order survive the rise of populism? In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Alasdair Young argues that Donald Trump’s second presidency marks a fundamental break with more than seventy years of EU–US trade cooperation. Moderated by Dr. Jessica Lawrence, the session explores how populist narratives, protectionism, geopolitical rivalry, and legal innovation are transforming the politics of international trade. Combining historical perspective with international political economy and trade law, Professor Young demonstrates that the future of transatlantic relations will depend not only on commercial negotiations but also on reconciling economic openness with democratic legitimacy, strategic autonomy, and global stability.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The transformation of transatlantic trade relations has become one of the defining features of the contemporary international political economy. For more than seven decades, the economic partnership between the European Union and the United States served as one of the principal pillars of the liberal international order, underpinning global trade liberalization, multilateral governance, and unprecedented levels of economic integration. Although the relationship periodically experienced disputes over agricultural regulation, industrial subsidies, market access, and monetary policy, these conflicts were generally managed within a shared commitment to rules-based cooperation and institutional compromise. Today, however, intensifying geopolitical rivalry, the resurgence of economic nationalism, the growing politicization of trade, and the rise of populist politics have fundamentally altered the assumptions that long sustained transatlantic economic cooperation. Understanding this transformation therefore requires moving beyond conventional analyses of tariffs and trade balances to examine the deeper political, institutional, and ideological forces reshaping the global trading system.

These questions lay at the heart of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the theme Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition.” Bringing together leading scholars and participants from around the world, the programme explored how geopolitical competition, strategic autonomy, democratic polarization, and technological rivalry are redefining Europe’s external relations and the future of global governance. Within this broader intellectual framework, Professor Alasdair Young, Neal Family Chair at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, delivered a historically grounded and theoretically sophisticated lecture entitled “Populism Trumped Transatlantic Trade Cooperation.” Drawing upon decades of research on European Union trade policy and international political economy, Professor Young argued that the second Trump administration represents not simply another period of transatlantic commercial tension but a fundamental break with the cooperative logic that has characterized EU–US trade relations since the creation of the post-war trading order. By situating recent tariff disputes within the longer evolution of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the broader history of transatlantic economic integration, he demonstrated that contemporary protectionism reflects a deeper transformation in the politics of international trade itself.

The session was expertly moderated by Dr. Jessica Lawrence, Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law, whose scholarship on international economic law, World Trade Organization governance, European Union internal market regulation, and the intersection of trade with broader public policy objectives provided an ideal intellectual point of departure for the discussion. Her introductory remarks effectively framed the lecture by emphasizing that recent developments—from the so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs and regulatory disputes to growing tensions over sustainability standards, digital governance, and industrial policy—should be understood not as isolated trade disagreements but as manifestations of broader geopolitical and institutional change. By encouraging participants to consider whether transatlantic trust has been fundamentally weakened, whether the WTO can continue to anchor the global trading system, and whether regional arrangements may increasingly displace multilateral governance, Dr. Lawrence situated Professor Young’s lecture squarely within the Summer School’s overarching exploration of geoeconomics, populism, and strategic competition.

Combining historical analysis, international political economy, trade law, and comparative politics, Professor Young challenged participants to rethink the relationship between populism and international commerce. He argued that Donald Trump’s protectionist agenda cannot be adequately explained through conventional accounts centered on sectoral interests or geopolitical competition alone. Instead, it reflects a distinctive populist conception of trade in which imports, trade deficits, and international economic interdependence are interpreted as evidence of exploitation by foreign actors enabled by domestic political elites. Equally significant was his analysis of the European Union’s response, which demonstrated that Europe’s acceptance of an asymmetrical trade agreement reflected not diplomatic weakness, but the complex strategic constraints imposed by wider security considerations, including NATO and the war in Ukraine. Offering a rich synthesis of historical perspective and contemporary policy analysis, the lecture provided participants with a compelling analytical framework for understanding how populism, protectionism, legal innovation, and geopolitical rivalry are collectively reshaping one of the world’s most consequential economic partnerships and, with it, the future of the liberal international economic order.

The Transatlantic Economy: A Relationship Built on Deep Integration Rather Than Simple Trade

Professor Alasdair Young.
Professor Alasdair Young is Neal Family Chair at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology.

Professor Young began his lecture by challenging one of the most common misconceptions surrounding EU–US economic relations: that the relationship can be adequately understood through bilateral trade balances alone. Public debate, particularly under Donald Trump’s second administration, has become heavily dominated by discussions of merchandise trade deficits, tariff levels, and market access. While these indicators undoubtedly matter politically, Professor Young argued that they provide only a partial—and often misleading—picture of the transatlantic economy. To appreciate the significance of recent policy changes, it is first necessary to understand the extraordinary depth and complexity of economic integration that has developed across the Atlantic since the end of the Second World War. 

Presenting a series of comparative economic indicators, Professor Young demonstrated that the transatlantic economy remains unparalleled in both scale and intensity. Together, the European Union and the United States account for roughly one-third of global gross domestic product and a similar proportion of world imports, while also representing approximately one-quarter of global exports. Yet these aggregate trade figures reveal only part of the relationship. The defining characteristic of transatlantic economic integration, he argued, is not merchandise trade but investment. Cross-Atlantic foreign direct investment (FDI) constitutes the largest bilateral investment relationship anywhere in the world, creating dense networks of production, ownership, finance, research, and innovation that extend far beyond conventional trade statistics. 

Professor Young therefore encouraged participants to reconceptualize the Atlantic economy as an integrated production system rather than merely a trading relationship. American companies operating within Europe generate enormous sales through their European subsidiaries, while European firms maintain similarly extensive operations throughout the United States. Consequently, many goods and services exchanged across the Atlantic are produced within multinational corporate structures whose operations transcend national boundaries. This level of economic interdependence means that political decisions affecting trade frequently influence investment, employment, production networks, and technological cooperation simultaneously.

Beyond the Trade Deficit: Understanding the Real Structure of EU–US Economic Relations

One of Professor Young’s central analytical interventions concerned the political misuse of bilateral trade statistics. Throughout Donald Trump’s political career, trade deficits—particularly deficits in manufactured goods—have occupied a central place in his criticism of international trade. According to Professor Young, however, this emphasis ignores essential dimensions of the transatlantic economy.

The Trump administration’s narrative focuses almost exclusively on the American merchandise trade deficit with the European Union. Yet Professor Young demonstrated that this perspective neglects two equally important realities. First, the United States enjoys a substantial trade surplus in services, reflecting American comparative advantages in finance, technology, digital services, consulting, education, and intellectual property. Second, and even more importantly, American multinational corporations generate significantly higher commercial sales through their European affiliates than European firms achieve through comparable operations in the United States. When investment-related economic activity is incorporated alongside conventional trade flows, the transatlantic relationship appears considerably more balanced than merchandise trade statistics alone would suggest. 

This distinction carries significant political implications. Populist narratives frequently portray trade as a zero-sum competition in which one country necessarily benefits at another’s expense. Professor Young argued that the transatlantic economy instead illustrates the opposite principle: sustained investment integration creates mutual dependence and shared prosperity that cannot be captured through simple import-export calculations. Policies designed exclusively to reduce merchandise trade deficits therefore risk disrupting broader economic relationships that generate substantial benefits for both partners.

Equally significant was Professor Young’s observation that more than half of all transatlantic trade in goods occurs within multinational corporations themselves. Parent companies and subsidiaries routinely exchange components, intermediate goods, technologies, and specialized services across national borders as part of integrated production processes. Even transactions occurring formally between separate firms frequently take place within long-established supply chains characterized by stable contractual relationships rather than anonymous market exchanges. Consequently, imports often function not as substitutes for domestic production but as indispensable complements to it. Restricting such trade through tariffs may therefore increase production costs for domestic firms rather than protecting them from foreign competition.

From Cooperation to Conflict: The Historical Evolution of Transatlantic Trade Relations

Having established the exceptional nature of the transatlantic economy, Professor Young turned to its historical evolution, emphasizing that economic interdependence has historically been accompanied by extensive institutional cooperation. While disagreements have periodically emerged, they rarely displaced the broader commitment to multilateral governance that characterized EU–US relations for most of the post-war era. Understanding today’s tensions therefore requires distinguishing between recurring commercial disputes and the more fundamental transformation currently underway. 

The earliest major disruption occurred during the Nixon Shock of 1971, when President Richard Nixon suspended the convertibility of the US dollar into gold, effectively bringing the Bretton Woods monetary system to an end. Simultaneously, the administration imposed a temporary ten-percent surcharge on imports as leverage to encourage trading partners to revalue their currencies. Professor Young emphasized that although these measures represented a dramatic departure from previous American policy, they remained explicitly temporary. Once negotiations concluded successfully through the Smithsonian Agreement, the additional tariffs were promptly removed. The episode therefore illustrates an important historical pattern: earlier trade conflicts sought to resolve specific macroeconomic problems without fundamentally challenging the legitimacy of multilateral cooperation itself. 

A second period of tension emerged during the 1980s, when the United States increasingly adopted what became known as “aggressive unilateralism.” Rather than relying exclusively upon multilateral negotiations, successive American administrations identified what they regarded as unfair foreign trade barriers and threatened unilateral retaliation to secure market access. While controversial, these policies nevertheless remained focused on particular commercial disputes rather than rejecting the broader institutional framework governing international trade.

Institutionalizing Trade Disputes: The WTO Era

The World Trade Organization (WTO) headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland—the only international organization responsible for setting and overseeing the rules governing trade between countries. Photo: Hector Christiaen.

Professor Young argued that the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 fundamentally transformed the management of transatlantic trade tensions. Under the WTO’s institutional framework, disputes increasingly became subject to formal legal procedures rather than unilateral political bargaining. This institutionalization helped contain conflicts while preserving the broader cooperative relationship between the European Union and the United States. 

Several disputes discussed during the lecture illustrate this pattern. Long-running disagreements over hormone-treated beef and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) reflected American objections to European regulatory standards that restricted access for US agricultural exports. Although politically contentious, these cases remained confined to specific sectors and were ultimately addressed through established WTO dispute-settlement procedures.

Similarly, the prolonged conflict between Boeing and Airbus over alleged government subsidies generated years of litigation without fundamentally destabilizing transatlantic economic cooperation. Each side accused the other of unfairly supporting its domestic aircraft manufacturer, yet both accepted the legitimacy of resolving the dispute through multilateral legal mechanisms rather than abandoning the institutional framework altogether.

Professor Young also recalled the American safeguard tariffs on steel imports introduced during the early 2000s, which prompted measured European retaliation. Once again, despite political tensions, the dispute remained limited in scope and duration. Such episodes demonstrated the resilience of transatlantic cooperation precisely because both parties continued to recognize the authority of common international rules.

Cooperation as the Defining Characteristic of the Atlantic Partnership

Against this historical background, Professor Young advanced one of the lecture’s central arguments: although individual disputes frequently attracted media attention, they represented exceptions rather than the defining characteristic of EU–US trade relations. Throughout the post-war period, cooperation overwhelmingly outweighed conflict. He illustrated this point by tracing the joint leadership exercised by Europe and the United States in constructing the post-war trading system itself. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) emerged largely from Anglo-American cooperation, while the subsequent creation of the World Trade Organization likewise depended heavily upon sustained collaboration between Washington and Brussels. Rather than competing institutional visions, Europe and the United States shared a common commitment to progressively liberalizing international trade through mutually agreed multilateral rules. 

Even beyond formal multilateral negotiations, successive initiatives sought to deepen bilateral cooperation. Following the end of the Cold War, the New Transatlantic Agenda and related initiatives attempted to strengthen regulatory coordination and reduce unnecessary barriers to commerce. Although many of these efforts achieved only modest practical success, they reflected an enduring political commitment to managing differences cooperatively.

Professor Young highlighted data privacy as one of the most notable examples of successful regulatory accommodation. European data-protection legislation imposed strict conditions governing transfers of personal information outside the European Union, while American national security legislation following the September 11 attacks required extensive intelligence access to private data. Rather than allowing these competing legal frameworks to disrupt broader economic relations, both sides repeatedly negotiated compromise arrangements that sought to reconcile European privacy protections with American security requirements. Although challenged before European courts on several occasions, these agreements demonstrated a continuing willingness to preserve cooperation even under difficult legal circumstances.

The Promise and Failure of TTIP

Professor Young concluded this historical overview by examining the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, which represented the most ambitious attempt to deepen transatlantic economic integration in recent decades. Contrary to many public perceptions, TTIP did not seek sweeping regulatory harmonization. Instead, negotiations focused primarily on eliminating remaining industrial tariffs, liberalizing selected service sectors, improving public procurement access, and reducing unnecessary regulatory duplication through mutual recognition where appropriate. 

Nevertheless, TTIP ultimately failed—not because of Donald Trump’s election alone but because political resistance had already emerged on both sides of the Atlantic. Within Europe, widespread public protests reflected fears that the agreement might weaken environmental, consumer, and food safety standards. In the United States, meanwhile, domestic regulatory agencies proved reluctant to accept European standards as functionally equivalent, while individual states resisted commitments concerning public procurement. Professor Young therefore emphasized that TTIP was already experiencing significant political difficulties before Trump’s first administration formally abandoned the negotiations.

Yet, despite TTIP’s failure, Professor Young argued that its broader significance lies elsewhere. Even unsuccessful negotiations reflected a continuing commitment to expanding transatlantic cooperation through negotiated institutional mechanisms. It is precisely this cooperative tradition, rather than any individual agreement, that distinguishes the historical transatlantic relationship from the confrontational and unilateral approach that has emerged under Donald Trump’s second presidency.

The Second Trump Administration: A Fundamental Departure from Post-War Trade Policy

Donald Trump.
Donald Trump’s first presidential campaign rally at the Phoenix Convention Center, where thousands gathered to hear him speak as protesters demonstrated outside. Photo: Danny Raustadt.

Having situated contemporary developments within the broader historical evolution of transatlantic economic cooperation, Professor Young turned to the central argument of his lecture: the trade policy pursued during Donald Trump’s second presidency represents not merely another episode of protectionism but a profound departure from the principles that have guided American trade policy since the Second World War. While previous disputes had largely concerned specific sectors, regulatory disagreements, or temporary macroeconomic adjustments, the current administration has challenged the very logic of post-war trade liberalization. According to Professor Young, this transformation cannot be adequately explained through traditional political economy models emphasizing industrial lobbying, sectoral interests, or changes in the structure of the American economy. Instead, it reflects the distinctive political worldview of Donald Trump himself and the growing influence of populist narratives within American trade politics. 

To illustrate this shift, Professor Young presented evidence showing the dramatic increase in American tariff levels during 2025. Although subsequent negotiations and exemptions moderated some of the initially announced tariff rates, the broader trend remained unmistakable. For the first time in decades, the United States had reversed the long historical trajectory toward progressively lower trade barriers that had characterized American policy since before the Second World War. Importantly, Professor Young emphasized that this reversal occurred without any comparable structural transformation within the American economy itself. There had been no sudden collapse of industrial competitiveness, no dramatic surge in demands for protection from domestic manufacturers, nor any major economic shock capable of explaining such a radical policy change through conventional economic reasoning. The explanation therefore lay elsewhere—in politics rather than economics.

Populism and Trump’s Understanding of International Trade

Professor Young argued that understanding Trump’s trade policy requires appreciating how he conceptualizes international commerce. Unlike earlier administrations, which typically focused on removing specific foreign trade barriers or expanding export opportunities for American firms, Trump’s approach is characterized by a far broader skepticism toward trade itself. Throughout his political career, extending back to the 1980s, Trump has consistently portrayed international trade as inherently disadvantageous to the United States. His concern is directed less toward individual regulatory disputes than toward imports generally, particularly manufactured imports that contribute to the American merchandise trade deficit. 

Professor Young described this perspective as fundamentally populist. Within Trump’s narrative, trade deficits are not the product of complex patterns of comparative advantage, global production networks, or consumer preferences. Rather, they are presented as evidence that foreign governments—assisted by corrupt domestic political elites—have systematically exploited ordinary American workers. This interpretation transforms international trade from a mutually beneficial economic exchange into a moral struggle between “the people” and a coalition of foreign competitors and domestic elites.

The lecture explored several possible explanations for Trump’s enduring commitment to protectionism. Professor Young noted that Trump’s hostility toward trade predates his entry into electoral politics by several decades, suggesting that it reflects deeply held personal convictions rather than short-term political calculation. He referred to the work of political scientist Diana Mutz, whose concept of the “drawbridge-up worldview” offers one possible interpretation. According to this perspective, individuals who perceive the outside world primarily as a source of threat are naturally inclined to oppose immigration, globalization, and international trade alike. Such a worldview provides a coherent psychological foundation for Trump’s consistent preference for tariffs and economic nationalism. 

Professor Young also discussed alternative scholarly interpretations. Some analysts, including Stacie Goddard and Abraham Newman, have argued that Trump’s trade policy reflects a form of neo-royalism, whereby tariffs serve principally to enhance presidential discretion by allowing the executive selectively to reward allies and punish opponents. While acknowledging that tariff authority undoubtedly strengthens presidential power, Professor Young questioned whether neo-royalism adequately explains Trump’s motivations. In his assessment, Trump’s long-standing commitment to tariffs predates the acquisition of executive authority itself. The concentration of political power resulting from tariff policy is therefore better understood as a consequence rather than the original objective of his protectionist agenda.

Geopolitics or Protectionism? Reassessing Trump’s Tariff Strategy

Another important theme addressed during the lecture concerned the relationship between trade policy and geopolitics. Many contemporary observers interpret Trump’s tariffs primarily as instruments of strategic coercion designed to advance broader foreign-policy objectives. Professor Young challenged this interpretation by distinguishing between exceptional geopolitical cases and the administration’s broader trade strategy.

He acknowledged that tariffs had occasionally been employed to exert diplomatic pressure—for example, threatening Colombia over the acceptance of deported migrants or Brazil concerning judicial proceedings involving former President Jair Bolsonaro. Yet these cases remained relatively limited and, in several instances, the threatened tariffs were either quickly withdrawn or never implemented. Similarly, despite political disagreements with European governments over issues such as Greenland, defence cooperation, or support for Ukraine, the administration generally refrained from imposing the sweeping punitive tariffs that many observers anticipated. 

For Professor Young, these examples demonstrate that geopolitics alone cannot explain the administration’s overall trade policy. Rather than using tariffs primarily as instruments of foreign policy, Trump continues to view them principally as solutions to what he perceives as structural problems within international trade itself. His administration’s protectionism is therefore rooted fundamentally in a populist understanding of economic exchange rather than in a coherent geopolitical grand strategy.

The Legal Architecture of Trump’s Trade Policy

A particularly illuminating aspect of Professor Young’s lecture concerned the legal mechanisms through which the second Trump administration implemented its trade agenda. Rather than seeking comprehensive new trade legislation from Congress, the administration relied extensively upon creative reinterpretations of pre-existing statutory authorities. This strategy reflected both political calculation and institutional constraint. As Professor Young observed, the absence of congressional legislation suggests that the administration lacked sufficient political support to enact its protectionist programme through ordinary legislative channels. Instead, it expanded presidential authority by drawing upon emergency powers and older trade statutes originally intended for very different circumstances. 

The most significant of these measures were the Liberation Day tariffs, introduced under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Initially imposing a twenty-percent tariff on European Union imports before temporarily reducing the rate to facilitate negotiations, the administration subsequently threatened to increase duties further if satisfactory agreements were not reached. Simultaneously, tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act were justified on national security grounds, extending earlier measures on steel and aluminium while adding automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and potentially aircraft and semiconductors to the list of targeted sectors.

Professor Young carefully distinguished between these various legal instruments. Section 232 investigations required formal administrative procedures and national security justifications, whereas Section 301 of the Trade Act addressed unfair foreign trade practices. Meanwhile, Section 122 provided temporary authority to respond to balance-of-payments crises. The administration’s increasing reliance upon multiple overlapping statutory provisions reflected its determination to preserve tariff authority even as judicial challenges intensified.

A particularly significant development occurred when the United States Supreme Court ruled that the administration had exceeded its authority under the IEEPA by imposing sweeping tariffs unrelated to genuine national emergencies. Professor Young explained that this decision forced the administration to reconstruct its trade policy through slower and more procedurally constrained legal mechanisms. Without IEEPA authority, the president could no longer credibly threaten immediate tariffs at will. Instead, future protectionist measures increasingly depended upon formal investigations under Sections 232 and 301, reducing executive flexibility while preserving significant scope for continued intervention.

Europe’s Response: Why the European Union Accepted an Unequal Agreement

European Commission headquarters with waving EU flags in Brussels. Photo: Viorel Dudau.

Professor Young then turned to one of the lecture’s most consequential questions: why did the European Union ultimately accept a trade agreement widely perceived as asymmetrical? At first glance, Europe’s willingness to tolerate higher tariffs while making extensive concessions on investment, liquefied natural gas purchases, defense procurement, and market access appeared surprising. Yet Professor Young argued that the agreement can only be understood within the broader geopolitical environment confronting European policymakers. 

The decisive factor, he suggested, was American escalation dominance. European leaders recognized that retaliatory tariffs might provoke not merely commercial countermeasures but broader strategic consequences affecting NATO, military support for Ukraine, and wider transatlantic security cooperation. Under such conditions, trade negotiations became inseparable from security considerations. Unlike China, which responded to American tariffs through symmetrical retaliation, the European Union confronted a much more complex strategic calculus in which commercial interests could not be isolated from defense and foreign policy.

Domestic economic considerations further reinforced this cautious approach. European governments also understood that tariffs impose significant costs upon importing countries themselves. Unlike President Trump, who consistently maintained that foreign exporters bear the burden of tariffs, European policymakers accepted the mainstream economic consensus that tariffs raise costs for domestic consumers and producers. Consequently, there was insufficient political support among member states for an escalatory strategy that risked both economic harm and geopolitical instability.

Professor Young emphasized that the resulting agreement should therefore not be interpreted simply as diplomatic weakness. Rather, it reflected a constrained strategic choice shaped by the intersection of trade policy, security dependence, domestic political calculations, and broader geopolitical uncertainty. The episode vividly illustrates how the second Trump administration has fundamentally altered the relationship between economics and security within the transatlantic partnership, making future trade negotiations inseparable from wider questions concerning the political future of the Atlantic alliance itself.

The Future of Transatlantic Trade: Between Strategic Adjustment and Structural Transformation

In the concluding section of his lecture, Professor Young shifted from diagnosing the contemporary crisis in transatlantic trade relations to assessing its longer-term implications for the liberal international economic order. While acknowledging that Trump’s second presidency has fundamentally disrupted established patterns of cooperation, he cautioned participants against interpreting current developments either as the complete collapse of globalization or as a temporary political aberration that will inevitably disappear with a future change of administration. Instead, he argued that the transatlantic trading relationship is entering a period of structural adaptation in which both the United States and the European Union are reassessing longstanding assumptions concerning openness, interdependence, and economic security. The precise trajectory of this transformation remains uncertain, yet its implications are likely to extend well beyond the current political cycle. 

Professor Young emphasized that contemporary trade conflicts cannot be understood simply through the language of winners and losers. Much of the public debate surrounding tariffs assumes that protectionist measures primarily harm foreign exporters while benefiting domestic industries. Throughout the lecture, however, he repeatedly challenged this assumption by drawing upon well-established principles of international economics. Tariffs are collected by the importing country and are generally borne—at least in substantial part—by domestic consumers, firms, and downstream producers through higher prices and increased production costs. While particular industries may receive temporary protection from foreign competition, the broader economy typically experiences reduced efficiency, increased inflationary pressures, and declining competitiveness.

This distinction is particularly important because it exposes the tension between economic analysis and populist political narratives. Professor Young observed that President Trump consistently presents tariffs as payments made by foreign governments, a characterization that enjoys considerable political resonance despite contradicting mainstream economic understanding. Such narratives simplify complex international production networks into easily understandable stories of national victimhood and economic exploitation, thereby reinforcing broader populist appeals centered upon sovereignty, fairness, and national renewal. The persistence of these narratives demonstrates that trade policy increasingly functions as a symbolic political instrument as much as an economic policy tool.

Is the World Entering an Era of Peak Protectionism?

Professor Young invited participants to consider whether the extraordinary escalation of tariff measures witnessed during 2025 might ultimately represent the high-water mark of contemporary protectionism rather than the beginning of an indefinite upward trajectory. He avoided making deterministic predictions but suggested several reasons for cautious optimism.

One important constraint derives from the institutional environment itself. Judicial scrutiny has already limited some aspects of presidential tariff authority, most notably through court decisions questioning the administration’s expansive interpretation of emergency powers under the IEEPA. Future administrations may therefore encounter greater legal obstacles should they attempt similarly broad exercises of executive trade authority. Moreover, reliance upon alternative statutory mechanisms such as Sections 232 and 301 requires more extensive investigations, administrative procedures, and opportunities for legal challenge, thereby reducing the flexibility that initially characterized Trump’s trade strategy. 

Economic realities may also impose practical limits upon sustained protectionism. As tariffs increasingly affect production costs, inflation, investment decisions, and consumer prices, domestic political support may weaken among sectors previously expected to benefit. Large multinational corporations operating integrated transatlantic supply chains face particularly complex adjustment costs, while export-oriented industries risk retaliatory measures from trading partners. These economic constraints do not eliminate the political appeal of protectionism but complicate its long-term sustainability.

Professor Young nevertheless cautioned against assuming that any future American administration will simply restore the pre-2016 status quo. Concerns regarding industrial resilience, supply-chain security, technological competition, and strategic dependence now extend across much of the American political spectrum. Although future governments may adopt less confrontational methods, greater emphasis upon industrial policy and economic security is likely to remain an enduring feature of American trade policy. Consequently, Europe must prepare for a transatlantic relationship in which strategic economic considerations occupy a far more prominent position than they did during the era of liberal globalization.

The WTO and the Resilience of Multilateral Governance

The lecture concluded with an assessment of the WTO and the broader future of multilateral trade governance. Professor Young acknowledged that the WTO currently confronts one of the most serious crises in its history. The paralysis of the Appellate Body, the increasing use of unilateral trade measures, and growing geopolitical rivalry have significantly weakened the institution’s capacity to enforce common rules. Yet he resisted suggestions that the multilateral trading system has become irrelevant.

Instead, Professor Young argued that the WTO continues to provide the essential legal and institutional framework within which the overwhelming majority of international trade still occurs. Even governments that increasingly resort to unilateral measures frequently justify their actions through existing WTO provisions or seek to preserve the broader institutional architecture. This paradox illustrates both the organization’s current weaknesses and its continuing importance. States may increasingly contest particular rules, yet relatively few advocate abandoning the multilateral trading system altogether. 

The relationship between the United States, the European Union, and China will be especially significant in determining the future evolution of the WTO. Professor Young suggested that effective reform will require accommodating new patterns of state intervention, industrial policy, technological competition, and strategic rivalry while preserving the core principles of predictability, reciprocity, and rules-based cooperation that have historically distinguished the multilateral trading system. Achieving such reforms will undoubtedly prove difficult, but abandoning institutional cooperation altogether would likely generate even greater instability.

Concluding Reflections

Professor Alasdair Young’s lecture offered participants a historically informed, theoretically sophisticated, and policy-relevant examination of one of the defining transformations currently affecting the international political economy. By tracing the evolution of EU–US trade relations from the immediate post-war period to Donald Trump’s second presidency, he demonstrated that contemporary tensions cannot be understood merely as another episode within a familiar cycle of transatlantic disagreement. Rather, they represent a more profound reorientation of American trade policy, one rooted in populist politics, growing skepticism toward globalization, and the increasing fusion of economic and security considerations.

A particularly significant contribution of the lecture was its insistence upon historical perspective. Throughout more than seventy years of transatlantic cooperation, disputes over agriculture, aircraft subsidies, steel, regulatory standards, and exchange-rate policy repeatedly emerged without fundamentally undermining the broader institutional relationship. By situating today’s conflicts within this longer historical trajectory, Professor Young showed precisely why the current moment differs. The second Trump administration has challenged not merely individual policies but many of the assumptions that previously sustained the transatlantic economic partnership itself.

Equally valuable was his nuanced interpretation of the European Union’s response. Rather than portraying European restraint as diplomatic weakness, Professor Young demonstrated that policymakers confronted a far more complex strategic environment in which trade negotiations were inseparable from wider concerns regarding NATO, Ukraine, and transatlantic security. His analysis illustrated how contemporary geoeconomics increasingly blurs the boundaries separating commercial policy, foreign affairs, and national defense.

Perhaps the lecture’s most enduring insight concerned the interaction between populism and international trade. Protectionism, Professor Young argued, derives much of its political power not from economic evidence but from compelling narratives of national decline, external exploitation, and sovereign recovery. These narratives increasingly shape democratic politics on both sides of the Atlantic, ensuring that trade policy will remain deeply politicized regardless of future changes in leadership.

For participants in the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, the lecture provided far more than an overview of current tariff disputes. It offered a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding how populism, legal innovation, geopolitical rivalry, and institutional change are collectively reshaping one of the world’s most important economic relationships. By integrating historical scholarship, international political economy, trade law, and contemporary policy analysis, Professor Young demonstrated that the future of transatlantic trade will ultimately depend not only upon commercial negotiations but also upon the broader capacity of liberal democracies to reconcile economic openness with political legitimacy, strategic resilience, and an increasingly contested international order.