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Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “Trumpism, Democratic Resilience, and the Rise of Democratic Socialism: ECPS Panel Examines the Stakes of the 2026 US Midterm Elections.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 30, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00156

Ahead of the November 3, 2026, US midterm elections, the ECPS convened a scholarly panel on October 29 titled “Trumpism, Democratic Resilience, and the Rise of Democratic Socialism.” Moderated by Professor Lane Kenworthy, the discussion brought together Professors Michael Kazin, Sheri Berman, Jennifer McCoy, and Andrew Karch to examine the political, institutional, and socioeconomic forces reshaping American democracy. Addressing the revival of democratic socialism, declining support for Trumpism, pernicious polarization, democratic backsliding, and the constitutional significance of federalism, the panelists explored whether anticipated electoral shifts could produce meaningful democratic renewal. Their analyses converged on a central warning: defeating populist incumbents does not necessarily resolve the grievances sustaining populism. Durable democratic resilience requires credible economic alternatives, institutional accountability, political inclusion, and renewed public trust.

Reported by ECPS Staff

As the United States approaches the November 3, 2026, midterm elections, fundamental questions concerning democratic resilience, right-wing populism, political polarization, and the future of progressive politics have assumed renewed urgency. Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened an international academic panel titled “Trumpism, Democratic Resilience, and the Rise of Democratic Socialism” on Thursday, October 29, 2026. Bringing together distinguished scholars of American politics, comparative democracy, political history, and federalism, the panel examined whether the elections would merely reflect conventional dissatisfaction with incumbent governance or reveal deeper transformations in American democratic institutions, ideological identities, and political-economic arrangements.

The panel was moderated by Professor Lane Kenworthy, Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Yankelovich Chair in Social Thought at the University of California, San Diego. In his opening assessment, Professor Kenworthy situated the American midterms within broader international patterns of right-wing populist mobilization, democratic institutional contestation, and electoral backlash. Drawing comparisons with developments in Hungary, Poland, and Brazil, he examined the relationship between populist governance and democratic resilience while highlighting the growing ideological appeal, but still-limited electoral representation, of democratic socialism in the United States.

Professor Michael Kazin, Professor of History at Georgetown University, delivered a presentation titled “Explaining the Socialist Revival in the US.” Tracing the contemporary resurgence of socialism to the Great Recession, Occupy Wall Street, and the presidential campaigns of Bernie Sanders, Professor Kazin examined how economic inequality and dissatisfaction with neoliberal capitalism had reshaped progressive political mobilization. He emphasized the distinction between revolutionary socialism and the social-democratic policy orientations of prominent American democratic socialists.

Professor Sheri Berman, Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University, presented “The 2026 Midterms in Comparative Perspective: Shifting Support for Trumpism and the Issues Reshaping the Electoral Landscape.” Drawing on comparative experiences in Europe, particularly Hungary and Germany, Professor Berman examined declining support for Trumpism through the interconnected dynamics of economic dissatisfaction, immigration enforcement, and corruption. She warned that electoral defeats of populist governments would not necessarily resolve the structural grievances sustaining anti-establishment politics.

Professor Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor Emerita of Political Science at Georgia State University, addressed “Democratic Resilience Amid Pernicious Political Polarization.” Her presentation explored the democratic consequences of antagonistic partisan identities, institutional erosion, economic inequality, and declining political trust. Advocating structural democratic reforms, participatory mechanisms, and a renewed social contract, Professor McCoy emphasized the limitations of electoral alternation as a solution to recurring populist mobilization.

Finally, Professor Andrew Karch, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, presented “Beyond Washington, DC: American Federalism and the Midterms.” His analysis highlighted the frequently overlooked significance of state legislative and gubernatorial elections, decentralized electoral administration, redistricting, and partisan federalism in shaping democratic accountability.

Together, the presentations and subsequent discussions offered a multidimensional assessment of the approaching elections, examining whether American democracy could move beyond recurring electoral polarization toward more durable institutional legitimacy, responsive governance, and political representation.

Professor Lane Kenworthy: US Midterms Will Test the Resilience of American Democracy

Professor Lane Kenworthy, Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Yankelovich Chair in Social Thought at the University of California, San Diego, offered a comparative assessment of right-wing populism, democratic resilience, and the emerging appeal of democratic socialism in the United States. Moderating the discussion, Professor Kenworthy situated the approaching November 3 midterm elections within broader international patterns of populist electoral success, institutional contestation, economic discontent, and ideological realignment.

Opening the panel, Professor Kenworthy introduced four distinguished scholars whose presentations addressed different dimensions of contemporary American politics: Professor Michael Kazin of Georgetown University, examining the revival of socialism; Professor Sheri Berman of Barnard College, Columbia University, analyzing the midterms comparatively; Professor Jennifer McCoy of Georgia State University, discussing democratic resilience amid polarization; and Professor Andrew Karch of the University of Minnesota, exploring American federalism and the significance of state-level politics.

Professor Kenworthy began by situating Trumpism within the international trajectory of right-wing populism. He observed that populist movements had achieved considerable electoral influence across Europe and, more recently, Latin America, while emphasizing the fragility of their political dominance. Referring to developments in Poland, Hungary, and Brazil, he distinguished between short-term electoral fortunes and the potentially enduring institutional consequences of populist governance. Even when populist parties lose office, he suggested, their influence may persist through policy changes and institutional arrangements established during their tenure.

Turning to the United States, Professor Kenworthy discussed the electoral outlook shortly before the November 3 midterms. Citing polling, election forecasts, and betting markets available at the time, he reported expectations of substantial Democratic gains in the House of Representatives and a possible Democratic majority in the Senate. He suggested that Democratic control of Congress could constrain Trump’s ability to alter electoral institutions and democratic procedures, although he anticipated continuing confrontation over institutional rules.

In comparative terms, Professor Kenworthy characterized Trumpism as a form of right-wing populism sharing important features with the political project associated with Hungary’s Viktor Orbán. Despite differences in political systems and international influence, he identified similarities in attempts to reshape institutional arrangements. In his assessment, three particularly consequential features of populist institutional transformation in Poland and Hungary involved weakening judicial independence, reducing media autonomy, and modifying electoral rules and procedures. He argued that Trump had pursued comparable objectives, although with more limited institutional success.

Economic Discontent, Electoral Backlash, and the Growing Appeal of Democratic Socialism

Nevertheless, Professor Kenworthy cautioned against assuming that democratic institutions necessarily constitute voters’ principal concern. While acknowledging that apprehensions about democratic governance influence electoral behavior, he suggested that economic grievances and dissatisfaction with government performance may be more immediately consequential. Rising living costs, inflation, corruption concerns, international conflicts, and controversies surrounding artificial intelligence infrastructure were among the issues he identified.

He also emphasized what political scientists describe as the thermostatic reaction: the tendency of voters to turn against the incumbent president’s party during midterm elections. Such patterns, he suggested, complicate interpretations of electoral outcomes as straightforward endorsements or rejections of democratic norms. Drawing comparisons with Hungary, Professor Kenworthy argued that economic conditions frequently shape both the electoral success and eventual decline of populist governments.

The second major component of his opening assessment concerned the apparent revival of democratic socialism in American politics. Professor Kenworthy distinguished between its growing ideological appeal and its still-limited electoral representation. According to the figures he presented, only nine Democratic nominees for the 435-member House of Representatives identified with socialism, representing approximately 2% of the total. He similarly highlighted the small number of self-identified socialists occupying Senate seats, governorships, and mayoral offices in major American cities.

These figures, however, contrasted sharply with changing public attitudes. Referring to an August 2026 Gallup survey, Professor Kenworthy reported that 65% of self-identified Democrats expressed a positive image of socialism, compared with 35% who viewed capitalism positively. Crucially, he noted that Americans’ attitudes toward capitalism varied considerably according to the economic institutions involved: 93% of Democrats viewed small businesses positively, 65% expressed favorable opinions of free enterprise, while only 17% held positive views of big business.

For Professor Kenworthy, this divergence suggested that support for socialism does not necessarily imply wholesale rejection of markets or private enterprise. Rather, particularly among younger Democrats, socialism increasingly symbolizes economic security, affordable housing, healthcare, childcare, higher minimum wages, and opposition to concentrated corporate wealth. He also noted that debates surrounding Israel and Gaza had become intertwined with contemporary socialist identification, despite their conceptual distinction from socialism itself.

Overall, Professor Kenworthy’s introductory assessment highlighted a central tension in American politics: the coexistence of persistent institutional challenges, widespread economic dissatisfaction, and growing interest in alternative political-economic arrangements. His remarks established a comparative framework for examining whether the 2026 midterms would primarily reflect conventional electoral reactions to incumbent governance or reveal deeper transformations in American political identities, democratic institutions, and the ideological orientation of the Democratic Party.

Professor Michael Kazin: America’s Socialist Revival Reflects a Growing Demand for Economic Security

Professor Michael Kazin, Professor of History at Georgetown University, offered a historically grounded assessment of the contemporary resurgence of socialism in American political life. In his presentation, “Explaining the Socialist Revival in the US,” Professor Kazin traced the movement’s origins to the economic dislocations of the Great Recession, the emergence of Occupy Wall Street, and the electoral breakthroughs of Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. He argued that the growing appeal of socialism reflects widespread dissatisfaction with economic inequality and corporate capitalism, while emphasizing that its most influential American proponents advocate policies closer to European social democracy than to revolutionary socialism.

Socialism’s Resurgence in American Political Life

Professor Kazin began by observing that socialism may currently enjoy greater public acceptance in the United States than at almost any previous point in its history. Referring to recent opinion surveys, he noted that approximately 40% of Americans expressed favorable attitudes toward socialism, with particularly strong support among Democratic voters and younger generations. Nevertheless, he cautioned that public enthusiasm for the term does not necessarily indicate agreement about its ideological meaning or institutional implications.

Central to this transformation is the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), established in 1982 through the merger of the New American Movement and the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee. For decades, the organization remained politically marginal, maintaining approximately 5,000–6,000 members. According to ProfessorKazin, however, its membership has expanded to more than 120,000, reflecting a significant transformation in the organizational landscape of the American left.

He highlighted the growing presence of socialist-affiliated politicians in municipal and congressional politics, including New York City, Seattle, and other progressive urban constituencies. Although their numerical representation remains limited, Professor Kazin argued that their visibility has transformed socialism into a consequential subject of debate within the Democratic Party and an increasingly prominent target of Republican political criticism.

A defining feature of this contemporary resurgence, he explained, is that socialists generally seek office through the Democratic Party rather than through an independent socialist electoral organization. This distinguishes the current movement from much of American socialist history, when socialist candidates contested elections under separate party labels, achieving occasional local successes but relatively little representation nationally.

The Great Recession and the Crisis of Neoliberal Capitalism

Tracing the historical origins of the contemporary socialist revival, ProfessorKazin identified the Great Recession of 2008–2009 as a decisive turning point. The financial crisis destroyed substantial household wealth, increased unemployment, and exposed the vulnerabilities of an economic system increasingly dependent on financial institutions and unequal distributions of wealth and income. For many Americans, particularly younger generations, the crisis generated fundamental questions about the legitimacy and social consequences of the neoliberal economic arrangements supported by successive Democratic and Republican administrations.

ProfessorKazin also examined the disappointment experienced by sections of the progressive left during Barack Obama’s presidency. Although Obama’s 2008 campaign employed language associated with the Civil Rights Movement and progressive reform, his administration’s response to the financial crisis frustrated those who had anticipated more extensive structural changes. According to Professor Kazin, Obama’s decision to appoint figures associated with Wall Street, alongside his reluctance to dismantle major financial institutions or pursue prosecutions sought by some critics, contributed to a lasting sense of dissatisfaction among left-leaning Democrats. This discontent created favorable conditions for renewed political mobilization against economic inequality.

Occupy Wall Street and the Reemergence of Class Politics

Professor Kazin characterized Occupy Wall Street, which emerged in lower Manhattan in autumn 2011, as a critical precursor to the contemporary socialist movement. Although it lacked a conventional organizational structure and did not initially develop into a durable electoral movement, Occupy articulated grievances that resonated far beyond its immediate participants. Its defining political contribution was the popularization of the distinction between the “99%” and the “1%,” which provided a readily understandable framework for criticizing concentrated wealth and economic power.

Professor Kazin stressed that the movement helped reintroduce economic inequality into mainstream American political discourse after decades in which class-based critiques had occupied a comparatively marginal position. He situated these developments within a longer trajectory of economic change, noting that American wages had increasingly lagged behind corporate profits since the 1970s, notwithstanding periods of improvement. Occupy’s significance, therefore, extended beyond its demonstrations and encampments. It helped establish the political vocabulary through which subsequent progressive movements could articulate demands for redistribution, economic security, and institutional reform.

Bernie Sanders and the Electoral Breakthrough of Democratic Socialism

For Professor Kazin, the presidential campaigns of Bernie Sanders in 2016 and 2020 represented the decisive transition from protest-oriented economic discontent to a nationally visible electoral movement. Sanders, a longstanding socialist, succeeded in presenting democratic socialism as a legitimate framework for progressive reform within American electoral politics. Particularly important was his ability to mobilize younger voters across racial backgrounds.

However, Professor Kazin emphasized that Sanders’s understanding of socialism differed significantly from revolutionary traditions advocating the abolition of capitalism. Instead, Sanders associated socialism with extending the New Deal of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Great Society initiatives of Lyndon B. Johnson, and the economic aspirations of Martin Luther King Jr. His agenda emphasized universal healthcare, employment guarantees, income security, stronger labor rights, and an expanded welfare state. Professor Kazin therefore interpreted Sanders’s program primarily as an American expression of left-wing social democracy.

The electoral success of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in 2018 further consolidated this transformation. Her victory over an established Democratic incumbent demonstrated the potential for explicitly socialist candidates to challenge party elites, particularly in strongly Democratic constituencies. Together, Sanders and Ocasio-Cortez helped expand the visibility of democratic socialism and encouraged the organizational growth of DSA.

Ideological Divisions Within the Democratic Socialists of America

Despite the movement’s expansion, Professor Kazin cautioned against treating American democratic socialism as a unified ideological formation. He identified substantial differences between pragmatic socialists seeking incremental reform through Democratic Party institutions and more radical factions committed to fundamentally transforming or abolishing capitalism.

Some factions within DSA, he observed, explicitly embrace Marxist-Leninist perspectives, positions that differ considerably from the anti-communist democratic socialist tradition associated with Michael Harrington, one of DSA’s founding figures.

Nevertheless, Professor Kazin argued that the organization’s most prominent elected representatives generally emphasize policies that remain compatible with a regulated capitalist economy. Their priorities include affordable housing, publicly financed healthcare, stronger unions, improved wages, and expanded economic security. These objectives, he suggested, resemble the social-democratic arrangements of Scandinavian countries considerably more than the political-economic systems historically associated with the Soviet Union or Maoist China.

He also emphasized the substantial overlap between socialist elected officials and the broader progressive wing of the Democratic Party. In practical legislative terms, differences between democratic socialists and many non-socialist progressives are often considerably narrower than their ideological labels suggest.

Socialism, Social Democracy, and the Future of the Democratic Party

A central argument of Professor Kazin’s presentation concerned the distinction between socialism as a political identity and socialism as a substantive policy agenda. While Republican critics frequently associate socialism with authoritarian communist regimes, Professor Kazin maintained that the proposals advanced by prominent American democratic socialists overwhelmingly resemble established social-democratic reforms. He suggested that the political significance of the socialist revival should therefore be measured less by ideological terminology than by its capacity to influence the Democratic Party’s economic priorities.

At the same time, he expressed skepticism that the Democratic Party would become an explicitly socialist party in the foreseeable future. Although socialism has gained support, substantial sections of the American electorate remain skeptical of the term. Consequently, Democrats continue to face the challenge of maintaining coalitions encompassing left-wing activists, moderates, and voters in politically competitive or conservative states.

For Professor Kazin, the potential achievements of democratic socialism depend partly on whether socialist activists can advance progressive economic policies without generating divisions that undermine broader party cooperation.

An Ideological Revival with Significant Political Constraints

Overall, Professor Kazin presented the contemporary socialist revival as the product of long-term economic grievances, generational political change, and the institutional integration of progressive social movements into electoral politics. His assessment suggested that the movement’s principal historical significance may ultimately lie not in transforming the United States into a socialist society, but in shifting the boundaries of acceptable economic debate. By strengthening demands for healthcare, affordable housing, labor protections, and economic security, democratic socialists have contributed to renewed attention to structural inequality within mainstream American politics.

Nevertheless, Professor Kazin’s analysis also underscored the continuing tension between ideological ambition and electoral coalition-building. The movement’s future influence, in his interpretation, will depend on its ability to translate growing public sympathy into durable institutional achievements while navigating the Democratic Party’s ideological diversity.

His presentation thus situated the resurgence of democratic socialism within a broader struggle over the political meaning of economic justice, the legacy of neoliberal capitalism, and the evolving relationship between progressive mobilization and representative democracy in the United States.

Q&A Session

Democratic Socialism Has Helped Shift the Democratic Party’s Economic Agenda to the Left

During the question-and-answer session, Professor Lane Kenworthy questioned Professor Kazin about the increasingly blurred ideological boundaries between democratic socialism and mainstream progressive politics within the Democratic Party. Referring to Professor Kazin’s recent review in The New York Review of Books, which examined publications concerning the historical legacy of Eugene V. Debs and contemporary conceptions of socialism, Professor Kenworthy raised the question of whether self-identified democratic socialists continued to represent a distinctive political movement or had increasingly converged with the Democratic Party’s progressive mainstream.

Professor Kenworthy argued that the ideological center of gravity among elected Democrats had shifted considerably to the left, particularly during Joe Biden’s presidency. He highlighted the administration’s cooperation with progressive lawmakers and its emphasis on policies traditionally associated with social democracy, including expanded childcare, healthcare provision, and financial support for families.

Responding, Professor Kazin agreed that the Democratic Party had undergone a significant progressive transformation, attributing much of this shift to the political influence of Bernie Sanders’s presidential campaigns in 2016 and 2020. As an illustration, Professor Kazin highlighted Biden’s appointment of Lina Khan as chair of the Federal Trade Commission. Her assertive approach to antitrust enforcement and corporate regulation, including scrutiny of technology giants such as Facebook and Amazon, reflected a departure from the more accommodating regulatory approaches of previous administrations.

Professor Kazin emphasized that Sanders’s campaigns had demonstrated the growing influence of progressive activists within Democratic politics. These grassroots supporters, who contribute through electoral mobilization, canvassing, and small donations, increasingly favored policies addressing economic inequality, corporate concentration, and social welfare. He also noted that frustration with economic inequality extended beyond Democratic constituencies, contributing to the political grievances that Donald Trump had mobilized during his 2016 presidential campaign.

Professor Kazin further argued that President Biden’s progressive economic record remained insufficiently recognized, partly because of his limited effectiveness in communicating his administration’s achievements. He highlighted Biden’s unprecedented appearance on a striking workers’ picket line and his engagement with union leaders in the Oval Office as evidence of a more supportive presidential approach toward organized labor.

Overall, Professor Kazin’s response suggested that the substantive policy distance between democratic socialists and progressive Democrats had narrowed considerably. Rather than transforming the Democratic Party into an explicitly socialist organization, the socialist revival had helped normalize economic priorities previously associated with its left-wing minority. The exchange thus underscored the importance of distinguishing ideological identities from practical policy commitments when assessing the evolving political economy of American progressivism.

American Democratic Socialists Operate More Like European Social Democrats Than Revolutionary Socialists

Dr. Bulent Kenes raised a fundamental conceptual and political question concerning the distinction between democratic socialism and social democracy. Addressing Professor Kazin, Dr. Kenes asked why American progressives continued to embrace the terminology of democratic socialism when social democracy had become widely accepted within European and North American liberal democracies. His question highlighted both the economic objectives of these traditions and the potential electoral consequences of ideological terminology. Specifically, he asked whether democratic socialism represented a substantively distinctive political project or whether its historically controversial associations created unnecessary obstacles to building broader electoral coalitions.

Responding, Professor Kazin began by acknowledging the scholarship of Professor Sheri Berman, who also participated in the panel, describing her as a leading authority on social democracy. He then emphasized the distinctive historical trajectory of socialist terminology in the United States.

According to Professor Kazin, the term “social democracy” has never gained significant political recognition in American public discourse, although he acknowledged uncertainty about the precise reasons for its limited appeal. Democratic socialism, by contrast, has become a recognizable political identity, particularly through the emergence of contemporary progressive movements and elected officials.

Nevertheless, Professor Kazin cautioned against interpreting this terminology as evidence of revolutionary political objectives. He argued that most American politicians identifying as democratic socialists pursue agendas considerably closer to those historically associated with left-wing European social democracy. To illustrate this distinction, Professor Kazin referred to New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani, suggesting that his governing approach resembles the tradition of American municipal socialism rather than revolutionary socialism. He noted that Mamdani had made relatively little use of explicitly socialist terminology following his inauguration.

Professor Kazin drew a historical parallel with the so-called “sewer socialists,” particularly those who governed Milwaukee and other American municipalities during the early twentieth century. These socialist administrations became known for practical municipal reforms, including extending modern sanitation systems to working-class neighborhoods, improving public infrastructure, and protecting workers exercising their right to strike. For Professor Kazin, this tradition demonstrated that socialist political identification in the United States has frequently coexisted with pragmatic approaches to local governance and public service provision.

He nevertheless emphasized the importance of distinguishing contemporary electoral practice from socialism’s historical ideological foundations. Democratic socialism, he observed, originally encompassed revolutionary aspirations involving the overthrow of capitalism. Yet most contemporary American elected officials identifying as democratic socialists do not advocate such a transformation.

Professor Kazin’s central conclusion was that ideological labels should not obscure the substantive character of political programs. In his assessment, the governing priorities of prominent American democratic socialists are better understood through the historical experience of social-democratic reform and municipal progressivism than through revolutionary socialist traditions. The exchange thus illuminated a central tension in contemporary American progressive politics: the distance between the historical meanings of socialism, its contemporary electoral associations, and the pragmatic reform agendas advanced by politicians who embrace the democratic socialist label.

Professor Sheri Berman: Electoral Defeats of Right-Wing Populists May Not End the Cycle of Democratic Disillusionment

Professor Sheri Berman, Professor of Political Science at Barnard College, Columbia University, delivered a comparative analysis of the political dynamics shaping the approaching November 3 US midterm elections. In her presentation, “The 2026 Midterms in Comparative Perspective: Shifting Support for Trumpism and the Issues Reshaping the Electoral Landscape,” Professor Berman argued that declining support for President Donald Trump reflected mounting dissatisfaction with economic conditions, immigration enforcement, and perceived government corruption rather than primarily concerns about democratic erosion.

Drawing comparisons with Hungary and Germany, she warned that electoral setbacks for right-wing populists do not necessarily resolve the underlying grievances responsible for their emergence. Unless mainstream democratic parties demonstrate their capacity to address these grievances, she suggested, democracies risk becoming trapped in recurring cycles of populist mobilization, electoral rejection, and renewed disillusionment.

Trump’s Declining Support and the Limits of Democratic Backsliding as an Electoral Issue

Professor Berman opened her presentation by highlighting what she described as a sustained deterioration in President Trump’s public approval. Drawing on polling trends, she argued that this decline represented more than a temporary fluctuation, reflecting an extended erosion of support across significant sections of the American electorate. The central question, she suggested, was not simply whether Trumpism was losing electoral momentum, but why voters were withdrawing their support and what this revealed about the broader political dynamics sustaining right-wing populism.

Professor Berman challenged the assumption that concerns over democratic backsliding constituted the principal explanation. She observed that Trump’s controversial institutional actions, including pardons, administrative purges, and challenges to established democratic norms, had not immediately produced comparable declines in public support. If institutional violations were the dominant factor shaping voter attitudes, she reasoned, polling trends would have shifted more dramatically at the beginning of his presidency. Instead, she identified three interconnected sources of dissatisfaction: the cost of living, immigration enforcement, and corruption.

Economic Frustration as the Central Driver of Electoral Discontent

The first and most consequential factor, according to Berman, was the persistent economic pressure experienced by American households. She emphasized that reducing inflation and improving affordability had been central promises of Trump’s electoral campaign. Voters expected the administration to prioritize these concerns, yet growing numbers appeared dissatisfied with its response.

Professor Berman pointed to polling evidence suggesting that many Americans believed the administration devoted greater attention to symbolic projects, including renovations and monuments in Washington, than to reducing everyday living costs. She also identified gasoline prices as a particularly visible indicator of economic dissatisfaction, observing that fluctuations in fuel costs appeared closely associated with changes in presidential approval.

For Professor Berman, these developments illustrated a broader political principle: voters often evaluate governments primarily through their perceived capacity to improve material living conditions. The political vulnerability of populist governments, she argued, frequently emerges when their promises of economic improvement collide with the continuing difficulties experienced by ordinary citizens.

Immigration: Popular Objectives and Unpopular Enforcement

Professor Berman identified immigration as a second major source of declining support. She distinguished between public approval of stricter border controls and dissatisfaction with the specific methods employed to enforce immigration policy. According to her interpretation of survey evidence, securing national borders and restricting unauthorized immigration continued to enjoy considerable support among American voters. However, she argued that the administration’s deportation practices had generated substantial opposition, particularly where enforcement appeared indiscriminate or disproportionately affected individuals without serious criminal records.

Professor Berman highlighted public unease over deportations involving long-established residents, individuals married to American citizens, and people who had worked, paid taxes, and maintained otherwise law-abiding lives. She also emphasized the political consequences of highly visible enforcement operations in workplaces, courthouses, schools, and urban neighborhoods. In her assessment, confrontational enforcement tactics had weakened support for an immigration agenda whose broader objectives remained popular.

This distinction was particularly relevant to Hispanic voters, whom Professor Berman identified as an important electoral constituency. Having shifted significantly toward Trump in the 2024 presidential election, sections of this electorate appeared, in her reading of contemporary polling, increasingly dissatisfied with both immigration enforcement and economic conditions.

The broader implication was that electoral support for restrictive immigration policies does not necessarily translate into public acceptance of every enforcement measure adopted in their name.

Corruption and the Perceived Misuse of Government Power

The third major factor identified by Professor Berman was growing public concern about corruption. She argued that allegations involving the Trump administration had become increasingly politically salient as dissatisfaction with economic management and immigration enforcement intensified.

Her discussion distinguished between the existence of controversial governmental practices and the point at which voters begin treating those practices as politically consequential. As examples, she referred to reported concerns involving the Hatch Act, political campaigning by administration officials, and allegations concerning the politicization of the Department of Justice. Professor Berman maintained that such controversies contributed to an accumulating perception that public institutions were being used for partisan or personal purposes.

Nevertheless, her broader analytical point was that corruption rarely operates independently of economic dissatisfaction. Rather, it becomes especially damaging when citizens already question a government’s competence and responsiveness. In Professor Berman’s comparative framework, democratic violations become electorally consequential when they are accompanied by perceived corruption, ineffective governance, and failures to improve citizens’ everyday lives.

Comparative Lessons from Hungary and Germany

Turning to Europe, Professor Berman situated the American electoral landscape within broader patterns of support for and opposition to right-wing populism. She devoted particular attention to Hungary, where she interpreted Viktor Orbán’s electoral defeat in April 2026 as evidence that even long-established populist governments could become vulnerable when economic dissatisfaction and corruption concerns intensified.

According to Professor Berman, the successful opposition campaign led by Péter Magyar emphasized inflation, economic stagnation, healthcare, education, and corruption rather than focusing primarily on violations of democratic norms. She cited Hungary’s economic difficulties, disputes over European Union funding, and poor performance on corruption indicators as central elements of the political environment confronting Orbán. Professor Berman suggested that emphasizing these concrete concerns enabled the opposition to build a coalition extending beyond traditional anti-Orbán constituencies, including some former supporters.

She then turned to Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), arguing that its electoral appeal could not be explained exclusively through ideological extremism or xenophobia. While acknowledging the presence of explicitly exclusionary attitudes among portions of its electorate, she emphasized the role of frustration with economic conditions and dissatisfaction with established political parties.

These comparisons reinforced her argument that right-wing populism should be analyzed not only through ideology and institutional conflict but also through governmental performance and the perceived failures of mainstream political representation.

Democratic Electoral Gains and the Risk of a Recurring Populist Cycle

In the concluding section, Professor Berman addressed the implications of the approaching American midterms for the Democratic Party. She anticipated substantial Democratic electoral gains but cautioned against interpreting a victory over an unpopular incumbent administration as evidence of renewed public confidence in the opposition. Drawing on survey findings, she argued that the Democratic Party’s public image remained deeply unfavorable, with many independent voters expressing dissatisfaction with both major parties. Consequently, she distinguished between winning elections through positive political appeal and benefiting from voters’ rejection of an incumbent government. This distinction formed the foundation of her most significant warning.

Professor Berman described the possibility of a recurring political cycle in which populist governments lose support because of corruption, ineffective governance, or unmet economic expectations. Mainstream democratic parties subsequently return to power but fail to address the grievances that originally encouraged populist mobilization. The resulting disappointment then creates opportunities for renewed populist success. She interpreted the aftermath of the 2020 US presidential election as an illustration of this vulnerability, suggesting that removing populists from office does not necessarily eliminate the socioeconomic and institutional conditions that facilitated their rise.

Professor Berman also expressed concern that internal divisions between progressive and moderate Democrats could inhibit the party’s ability to formulate a coherent governing program ahead of the 2028 presidential election.

Beyond Electoral Victory: The Challenge of Democratic Renewal

Overall, Professor Berman’s presentation advanced a distinction between the electoral defeat of populism and the deeper reconstruction of democratic political legitimacy. Her comparative analysis suggested that public dissatisfaction with right-wing populist governments may create opportunities for electoral change without necessarily resolving the underlying crises of representation, economic security, and institutional trust.

For Professor Berman, the crucial challenge facing mainstream democratic parties was therefore not merely to defeat populist competitors but to demonstrate that democratic government could respond effectively to citizens’ material concerns.

Her assessment placed the 2026 US midterms within a wider international pattern in which political alternation can coexist with persistent public dissatisfaction and recurring anti-establishment mobilization. The central implication of her presentation was that democratic resilience requires more than electoral turnover: it depends on whether governing parties can translate electoral opportunities into credible policy responses, institutional legitimacy, and sustained public confidence.

Q&A Session

Political Polarization and Limited Public Attention Help Explain the Persistence of Corruption

During the question-and-answer session, ECPS’ Chair Selcuk Gultasli questioned Professor Berman about the extent of corruption in the Trump administration and the apparent inability of established American institutions to constrain presidential misconduct. Referring to Professor Berman’s identification of corruption as one of three principal factors behind declining support for President Trump, Gultasli asked whether the administration could be considered the most corrupt in American history. He also questioned how such practices could persist despite the United States’ traditionally strong checks and balances, independent civil society, and influential universities.

Responding, Professor Berman acknowledged the complexity of historical comparisons. She noted that corruption and political patronage had long been features of American political development, particularly during the era of machine politics. Consequently, she cautioned against directly comparing contemporary practices with those of a century or more ago.

Nevertheless, Professor Berman characterized the scale and breadth of corruption in the contemporary American political system as unprecedented in the modern era. She emphasized that her concerns extended beyond allegations involving Trump and his family to the conduct of the administration more broadly.

Particularly troubling, in her assessment, was the politicization of executive authority, including the alleged use of the Justice Department and other governmental institutions against individuals perceived as the president’s personal or political adversaries. She distinguished such actions from legitimate law enforcement, arguing that personal political grievances should not determine the exercise of state power.

Addressing why these developments had not immediately generated stronger public opposition, Professor Berman identified two principal explanations.

First, she emphasized the limited attention that most citizens devote to everyday political developments. Unlike academics, journalists, and politically engaged observers, ordinary voters often lack the time or inclination to follow the continuous stream of governmental controversies. Consequently, allegations of corruption may initially have limited electoral salience, becoming more consequential as dissatisfaction with government performance accumulates.

Second, Professor Berman highlighted the effects of intense partisan polarization on political perceptions and information processing. Strong partisan identification, she argued, encourages voters to discount information contradicting their established political loyalties. This tendency may have contributed to Republican voters’ initial reluctance to accept critical reporting about Trump.

Importantly, Professor Berman also criticized controversial Democratic electoral practices, referring to a recent case in Alaska reported by The New York Times. She argued that such conduct, even when not technically unlawful, could undermine electoral integrity and provide political opponents with opportunities to dismiss allegations of more extensive misconduct.

Overall, Professor Berman’s response emphasized that corruption becomes politically consequential not simply through its existence, but through public awareness, partisan interpretation, and its interaction with broader dissatisfaction over governance.

America’s Two-Party System Favors Internal Insurgencies Over the Emergence of Third Parties

Natalia Crane raised the possibility that intensifying political polarization and recurring electoral competition between populist and mainstream political forces could eventually fracture America’s established two-party system. Drawing on her observations as a younger participant whose political awareness had developed amid increasing partisan divisions, Crane asked whether the United States might experience the emergence of a viable third party as an alternative to the existing Republican–Democratic configuration.

Responding, Professor Berman acknowledged that such a development was possible but considered it unlikely under existing American political conditions. She emphasized that the institutional structure of the US electoral system makes establishing a competitive third party considerably more difficult than in many other democracies. Nevertheless, ProfessorBerman noted that third parties have appeared throughout American political history. She also referenced Britain, whose electoral arrangements share certain similarities with those of the United States, yet accommodate more than two significant parties.

The central explanation for the persistence of American two-party competition, however, lay in the relative openness of existing parties to internal ideological challenges. Professor Berman illustrated this dynamic through the Tea Party movement, which transformed Republican politics by mobilizing within the party rather than establishing an independent organization. 

She identified a comparable strategy among activists associated with the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA), who seek to influence Democratic Party politics through internal organization and electoral participation.

For ProfessorBerman, the relative organizational weakness of American political parties creates opportunities for insurgent movements to reshape established institutions from within. This contrasts with the more cohesive party organizations historically characteristic of postwar Europe.

Consequently, movements dissatisfied with the existing political establishment face two possible strategies: constructing an independent party from local politics upward or seeking to transform an established party through internal mobilization. Professor Berman concluded that although a third-party breakthrough cannot be ruled out, the ability of insurgent movements to pursue influence through existing parties makes such a development comparatively unlikely.

A Democratic Congressional Majority Could Constrain Trump, but Institutional Checks Depend on Political Cohesion

Dr. Bulent Kenes questioned whether a Democratic congressional majority could effectively constrain President Donald Trump’s exercise of executive authority. Challenging conventional assumptions about the resilience of American constitutional institutions, Dr. Kenes emphasized that populist leaders may disregard democratic norms and institutional limitations. He asked what would happen if an unconventional president refused to respect the rules underpinning congressional oversight, even after losing legislative control.

Responding, Professor Berman acknowledged the significance and timeliness of the question, arguing that the effectiveness of American checks and balances depends not only on constitutional design but also on the political behavior of elected representatives. She maintained that the Republican-controlled Congress had demonstrated extensive compliance with Trump’s political agenda, substantially weakening the institutional constraints traditionally associated with the separation of powers.

Professor Berman contrasted this situation with earlier interpretations of American government as an exceptionally fragmented system in which multiple institutional veto points frequently obstructed legislative action. The experience following the 2024 election, she suggested, demonstrated how those constraints could become ineffective when presidential authority was reinforced by a politically compliant legislature.

A Democratic takeover of Congress would therefore impose meaningful, though incomplete, limitations on Trump’s power. Legislative opposition could obstruct presidential initiatives requiring congressional approval, but ProfessorBerman cautioned that Trump might continue pursuing controversial executive actions through alternative means. Such conflicts, she anticipated, would increasingly reach the judiciary, transferring disputes that should ordinarily be resolved through political institutions into the courts and potentially intensifying partisan divisions. 

Professor Berman emphasized that the effectiveness of congressional resistance would also depend on Democratic unity and organizational cohesion.

Ultimately, she argued, the challenge extended beyond restraining presidential authority. Democrats would need to use any congressional majority to develop a credible policy agenda and rebuild public confidence, rather than relying exclusively on opposition to Trumpism. Her assessment underscored that democratic resilience depends on institutional arrangements operating alongside political accountability, partisan independence, and effective collective action.

Overcoming the Populist Cycle Requires Credible Democratic Alternatives

Professor Ilhan Kaya questioned Professor Berman about the broader crisis confronting democratic institutions and mainstream political parties. Drawing on her comparisons of Germany, Hungary, and the United States, Professor Kaya asked whether established democratic parties had become increasingly incapable of responding to citizens’ economic concerns, human rights expectations, and other societal challenges. He also questioned whether alternative political approaches were necessary when mainstream parties appeared to benefit electorally from populist unpopularity rather than their own compelling policy agendas.

Responding, Professor Berman emphasized that breaking the recurring cycle of populist mobilization and democratic disillusionment requires mainstream parties to offer credible and effective political alternatives. She argued that support for radical or anti-democratic movements, whether on the right or left, does not emerge in isolation but frequently reflects frustration with established parties’ inability or unwillingness to address pressing societal problems.

Professor Berman stressed that understanding these grievances did not amount to justifying extremist politics. Rather, it provided an essential explanation for their electoral appeal. She maintained that both center-left and center-right parties must substantially reconsider their approaches to governance. A durable democratic alternative, she argued, must respond effectively to economic insecurity, immigration, technological transformation, and other structural challenges confronting contemporary societies.

Her central conclusion was that populism cannot be sustainably weakened through electoral rejection alone; mainstream democratic parties must demonstrate their capacity to deliver meaningful solutions to citizens’ concerns.

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Democratic Resilience in the US Requires Systemic Reform Beyond Electoral Change

Panel’s third speaker, Professor Jennifer McCoy of Georgia State University, offered a structural assessment of American democratic vulnerability ahead of the November 3 midterm elections. In her presentation, “Democratic Resilience Amid Pernicious Political Polarization,” Professor McCoy argued that the United States stands apart from comparable established democracies because of its exceptionally intense political polarization and rapid democratic erosion. Building on Professor Sheri Berman’s analysis of recurring populist cycles, Professor McCoy maintained that electoral alternation alone cannot restore democratic legitimacy. Instead, she called for fundamental institutional reforms, stronger citizen participation, an inclusive redefinition of national identity, and a reconsideration of economic arrangements that concentrate wealth and political influence.

American Exceptionalism: Pernicious Polarization and Democratic Erosion

Professor McCoy began by identifying two characteristics that, in her assessment, distinguish the United States from other established liberal democracies, including those in Europe, Canada, Japan, and Australia.

The first is the exceptional intensity and persistence of what she termed “pernicious political polarization.” ProfessorMcCoy defined this phenomenon as the division of society into mutually antagonistic political blocs, characterized by an entrenched distinction between “us” and “them.” Unlike ordinary ideological disagreement, pernicious polarization becomes particularly damaging when political leaders deliberately portray opponents as existential threats whose legitimacy and right to govern must be denied. Such strategies encourage partisan loyalty even when supporters disagree with particular policies or governmental practices.

Professor McCoy illustrated this dynamic through competing perceptions of political danger. Republican voters may overlook policies they find objectionable because they fear that Democratic opponents will introduce socialism or communism. Conversely, Democratic voters may regard the Republican Party and Trump as fundamental threats to democratic institutions.

The second distinguishing characteristic, according to Professor McCoy, is the rapid deterioration of American liberal-democratic institutions during Trump’s presidency. She argued that the United States had experienced an unusually pronounced decline in democratic performance compared with other wealthy, established democracies.

For Professor McCoy, these developments made the approaching midterms particularly consequential, especially given concerns involving the separation of powers, civil liberties, executive authority, and the rule of law.

Elite Polarization and Public Dissatisfaction

Professor McCoy nevertheless emphasized an important distinction between polarization among political elites and attitudes within the broader electorate. Although party leaders increasingly engage in antagonistic political competition, many ordinary Americans express dissatisfaction with both major parties. She noted that significant numbers of citizens identify with neither party and are frustrated by political hostility, congressional dysfunction, and the perceived inability of elected representatives to address pressing social problems. This creates a paradoxical political environment: intense partisan mobilization coexists with widespread distrust of the political establishment.

Professor McCoy observed that high polarization can stimulate electoral participation, pointing to indications of substantial enthusiasm during early voting. Yet heightened turnout does not necessarily indicate renewed confidence in democratic institutions. It may instead reflect fear of political opponents and anxiety about the consequences of electoral defeat.

Consequently, Professor McCoy suggested that democratic resilience requires transforming the underlying relationships between citizens, political parties, and representative institutions rather than merely increasing electoral participation.

Breaking the Cycle of Populism and Democratic Disillusionment

Building on Professor Berman’s discussion of recurring populist cycles, McCoy argued that electoral victories against populist movements rarely produce durable democratic renewal. She referred to Brazil as an illustration of the difficulties confronting democratic forces when populist competitors retain significant electoral support.

According to McCoy, many countries experience repeated alternation between populist and mainstream political leadership without achieving sustainable improvements in democratic governance. She maintained that the principal limitation of conventional responses is their tendency to prioritize electoral competition while neglecting the institutional and socioeconomic conditions that generate public dissatisfaction.

“I think we need whole system change to get out of this cycle,” Professor McCoy declared. Her argument suggested that durable democratic resilience requires a broader transformation of political representation, institutional incentives, public participation, and economic power.

Grassroots Mobilization and Emerging Cross-Partisan Coalitions

Despite her concerns about democratic deterioration, Professor McCoy identified encouraging developments within American civil society. She observed growing grassroots resistance to the perception that political and economic institutions are systematically structured against ordinary citizens. This dissatisfaction transcends partisan boundaries and reflects shared concerns about housing affordability, childcare, healthcare, energy prices, and political corruption.

Professor McCoy highlighted local opposition to artificial intelligence data centers as an especially revealing example of cross-ideological mobilization. Residents from different political backgrounds have organized against projects they believe could increase electricity costs, strain water resources, and undermine local decision-making.

Particularly important, she suggested, are concerns about negotiations conducted without sufficient public transparency. These movements demonstrate the possibility of political cooperation around concrete community interests despite national-level partisan hostility. For Professor McCoy, such initiatives provide evidence that polarization is not necessarily insurmountable at the grassroots level.

Three Ecosystems of Democratic Renewal

Professor McCoy identified three interconnected areas of civil society activity that could contribute to rebuilding American democracy. The first concerns structural democratic reform, including efforts to revise institutional arrangements that limit political accountability, representation, and electoral competition.

The second involves citizen engagement and deliberative democracy, particularly initiatives enabling people to participate directly in public problem-solving beyond periodic elections. She highlighted citizens’ assemblies as an increasingly significant democratic innovation. Although the United States has lagged behind several European countries in institutionalizing deliberative mechanisms, Professor McCoy noted growing experimentation at local and state levels. She also referenced efforts to organize a national deliberative process before the 2028 presidential election, potentially developing reform proposals supported by broad public participation.

The third area involves economic transformation and the development of thriving, inclusive communities.

Professor McCoy connected these initiatives to efforts promoting multiracial democracy, social belonging, cooperation, and the reconstruction of trust across ideological divisions. However, she cautioned that the economic dimension remained the least developed of the three.

Reconsidering Capitalism, Inequality, and Concentrated Power

Moving beyond institutional reform, Professor McCoy argued that contemporary democratic difficulties cannot be adequately understood without examining prevailing economic arrangements. She questioned an economic paradigm that prioritizes growth, returns on capital, and wealth accumulation while allowing economic and political influence to become increasingly concentrated.

The emergence of powerful technology corporations and exceptionally wealthy individuals, she suggested, has intensified concerns about the relationship between private economic power and democratic accountability. Referring to Elon Musk’s involvement in political and foreign policy debates, Professor McCoy highlighted the expanding influence that concentrated private wealth can exercise over public affairs.

She therefore called for greater public engagement with alternative economic frameworks, including ecological economics and traditions emphasizing reciprocity, cooperation, and environmental sustainability. In particular, she suggested that Indigenous approaches to collective responsibility and harmonious relationships with nature could contribute to rethinking prevailing assumptions about economic development.

Without reconsidering these underlying arrangements, Professor McCoy warned, economic inequality, the influence of money in politics, and inadequate regulation of artificial intelligence could continue undermining democratic governance.

Renewing the Social Contract and Reimagining National Identity

Professor McCoy subsequently emphasized the importance of political leadership capable of transforming public frustration into constructive democratic reform. Such leadership, she argued, must engage citizens directly, listen to their concerns, develop substantive proposals, and facilitate inclusive public deliberation. Central to this process is renegotiating the social contract: reconsidering what citizens owe one another and what obligations the state should fulfill.

She also called for a more inclusive understanding of patriotism and national identity. Rather than abandoning nationalism to exclusionary political movements, Professor McCoy suggested that democratic leaders should articulate forms of national belonging grounded in shared citizenship, solidarity, and respect for diversity. She referenced Péter Magyar’s political approach in Hungary as an example of efforts to combine patriotic language with a more inclusive national narrative.

Electoral Reform and the Limits of the Two-Party System

Professor McCoy also addressed institutional obstacles to political pluralism in the United States. She argued that winner-take-all elections, single-member districts, campaign financing arrangements, and the counter majoritarian characteristics of the Senate and Electoral College constrain meaningful political competition. These structures, in her assessment, make it difficult for new parties to emerge and encourage voters to choose between established parties primarily out of fear of the alternative.

Professor McCoy therefore advocated considering forms of proportional representation capable of expanding political choice without reproducing the fragmentation associated with highly proportional electoral systems. Such reforms, she suggested, could create opportunities for political realignment and reduce the incentives sustaining antagonistic two-party competition.

The Midterms as an Opportunity, not a Democratic Solution

Concluding her presentation, Professor McCoy emphasized that the 2026 midterms alone could not resolve America’s deeper democratic difficulties. Even if Democrats gained control of the House of Representatives, narrow legislative margins, possible Senate opposition, and presidential veto powers would constrain their capacity to enact major reforms.

Congressional investigations could strengthen accountability by exposing corruption, conflicts of interest, and governmental misconduct. However, Professor McCoy warned that such initiatives could also provoke partisan backlash if perceived as politically motivated persecution. She therefore argued that Democratic representatives would need to demonstrate policy coherence, organizational unity, and a credible commitment to institutional renewal.

Looking toward 2028, Professor McCoy suggested that the critical measure of political progress would be whether new candidates, ideas, and civic movements could translate public dissatisfaction into a constructive democratic agenda.

Her central conclusion was that sustainable democratic resilience requires more than defeating populist incumbents. It demands institutional redesign, economic reform, meaningful citizen participation, and a renewed social contract capable of restoring public confidence in democratic government.

Q&A Session

Electoral Reform in the US Does Not Necessarily Require Constitutional Amendment

During the question-and-answer session, Natalia Crane questioned Professor McCoy about the political and constitutional feasibility of reforming America’s electoral system. Referring to Professor McCoy’s advocacy of proportional representation, Crane asked whether such changes would require constitutional amendments and substantial bipartisan agreement.

Responding, Professor McCoy distinguished between reforms achievable through ordinary legislation and those requiring constitutional change. She explained that the Constitution grants states considerable authority over electoral arrangements, while Congress established single-member districts for House elections through legislation in 1967. Professor McCoy situated this requirement within the historical struggle for African American political representation. Southern states had employed multimember districts with bloc voting, allowing white electoral majorities to defeat Black candidates systematically. The adoption of single-member districts was intended to counter these exclusionary practices.

However, Professor McCoy argued that the subsequent development of partisan gerrymandering had contributed to an electoral landscape dominated by safe seats, limiting competition and producing disproportionate political representation. She emphasized that proportional representation could be introduced for state legislatures and the US House of Representatives without constitutional amendment, although congressional legislation would be necessary to alter the federal single-member-district requirement. By contrast, fundamentally restructuring the Senate or abolishing the Electoral College would require constitutional amendments, making such reforms considerably more difficult.

Professor McCoy outlined several alternative electoral arrangements, including multimember districts using ranked-choice voting through the single transferable vote system and mixed-member electoral systems resembling Germany’s model. She also acknowledged existing grassroots initiatives advocating ranked-choice voting but cautioned that introducing it within single-member districts would not necessarily overcome the structural dominance of the two-party system.

Her central argument was that electoral reform remains institutionally feasible if policymakers distinguish attainable legislative changes from more demanding constitutional transformations. By introducing proportional representation and expanding meaningful electoral competition, Professor McCoy suggested, the United States could create greater opportunities for political pluralism and reduce incentives sustaining entrenched partisan polarization. 

Professor Kenworthy: Can Democratic Parties Sustain Electoral Majorities in an Age of Persistent Political Discontent?

Professor Lane Kenworthy raised a fundamental question about the long-term prospects for democratic political stability amid recurring cycles of populist mobilization and electoral dissatisfaction. Building on Professor Sheri Berman’s analysis of the populist cycle and Professor Jennifer McCoy’s proposals for systemic democratic reform, Kenworthy questioned whether mainstream political parties could still construct enduring electoral coalitions capable of sustaining majority support across successive elections.

He observed that right-wing populist movements had gained substantial influence across different institutional contexts. In European countries employing proportional representation, such parties frequently attracted approximately 15–25% of the electorate, while in the United States, Trumpism had secured control of the federal government.

Nevertheless, Professor Kenworthy noted that the anticipated Democratic gains in the November 2026 midterms appeared driven predominantly by dissatisfaction with President Trump and the Republican Party rather than renewed enthusiasm for Democratic policies. This distinction raised a broader theoretical question: Could mainstream democratic parties develop sufficiently attractive and coherent policy programs to overcome recurring electoral backlash and establish durable political majorities?

Professor Kenworthy acknowledged the argument advanced by Professor Berman and Professor McCoy that breaking the populist cycle might require ambitious institutional reforms, substantive economic alternatives, and broader political coalitions. However, he introduced a more fundamental possibility: contemporary political conditions might themselves undermine the prospect of sustained electoral loyalty, regardless of the quality or ambition of governing programs.

Drawing a contrast with the historical dominance of center-left parties in several democracies between the 1930s and 1970s, Professor Kenworthy questioned whether comparable periods of stable electoral support remained achievable. He highlighted the transformative influence of social media, particularly its capacity to circulate continuous negative political messaging, amplify dissatisfaction, and sustain criticism of incumbent governments regardless of their achievements. Professor Kenworthy also pointed to the recurring electoral defeats of governing parties and coalitions over the preceding decade as possible evidence of a structural transformation in democratic competition.

His intervention therefore challenged the assumption that better policies or extensive institutional reforms would necessarily generate lasting electoral majorities. Instead, he suggested that persistent anti-incumbent sentiment might have become an enduring characteristic of contemporary democratic politics. Professor Kenworthy’s intervention left participants with an unresolved question: whether democratic renewal can restore durable political legitimacy or whether contemporary information environments and electoral dynamics increasingly make sustained majority support structurally elusive.

Professor Andrew Karch: American Federalism and State-Level Elections Are Crucial to Democratic Resilience Beyond Washington

As last speaker of the panel, Professor Andrew Karch of the University of Minnesota offered an institutional and geographically grounded analysis of the approaching November 3 US midterm elections. In his presentation, “Beyond Washington, DC: American Federalism and the Midterms,” Professor Karch argued that assessments of American democracy must extend beyond presidential politics and congressional competition to encompass the decisive role of states in political representation, electoral administration, and institutional accountability. 

Highlighting approximately 7,400 state legislators, 39 gubernatorial elections, ballot initiatives, and the constitutional authority of states over electoral procedures, he emphasized that American federalism functions simultaneously as a potential constraint on national executive power and a source of significant inequalities in democratic participation. His central argument was that the outcomes of state-level elections may prove as consequential for the long-term trajectory of American democracy as changes in control of Congress.

American Democracy as a Geographically Organized Federal System

Professor Karch began by identifying two foundational characteristics of American political representation that, in his assessment, receive insufficient attention in discussions dominated by national electoral competition. First, political representation in the United States is geographically organized. Electoral outcomes must therefore be understood through variations among states, regions, and local constituencies rather than exclusively through nationwide political trends. Second, the United States operates as a federal, multilevel political system in which state governments exercise substantial constitutional and administrative authority.

These characteristics, Professor Karch argued, make state-level politics indispensable to understanding democratic resilience. He organized his presentation around two principal dimensions: the electoral and policy stakes of state-level contests, and the constitutional responsibilities of states in administering elections. Together, these dimensions illustrated how American democracy is shaped by political developments occurring well beyond Washington.

State Legislative Elections: An Overlooked Arena of Political Competition

Professor Karch emphasized the extraordinary scale of state legislative elections scheduled for November 2026. According to figures presented during his remarks, the United States has approximately 7,400 state legislators, with more than 6,100 legislative seats—roughly 83%—subject to electoral competition during the current cycle. Of the country’s 99 state legislative chambers, 88 were involved in elections. Quoting a characterization from The New York Times, ProfessorKarch described state legislative contests as “the most important elections you haven’t heard about.”

He noted that Republicans controlled the legislatures of 28 states, Democrats controlled 17, and four states had divided legislative chambers. For Professor Karch, this distribution illustrated the territorial dimensions of American political polarization, with partisan control increasingly concentrated within geographically distinct political environments. Although he anticipated potential Democratic gains, he stressed that such advances could assume several forms.

Beyond outright changes in legislative control, reductions in Republican supermajorities could significantly alter political dynamics, particularly in states where governors belong to the opposing party. Supermajorities may enable legislatures to override gubernatorial opposition or substantially constrain executive discretion. Consequently, even relatively modest electoral shifts can affect institutional checks and balances.

Minnesota and the Uneven Geography of Electoral Competitiveness

Professor Karch used Minnesota, his home state, to illustrate the exceptional circumstances in which both legislative chambers remain genuinely competitive. He noted that only approximately 15 of the 88 legislative chambers involved in the 2026 elections were considered moderately competitive. This limited competitiveness reflected a broader characteristic of contemporary American politics: many state legislative outcomes are largely predetermined by existing partisan alignments. Minnesota therefore represented an unusually competitive environment, where relatively small electoral changes could produce significant consequences for legislative control.

Professor Karch also highlighted the importance of potential changes in unified party control, including situations in which governorships and legislative chambers could come under the authority of the same party. Such developments, commonly described as partisan trifectas, can substantially reshape a state’s legislative agenda and institutional relationships.

His analysis demonstrated that the political consequences of state elections depend not merely on aggregate party gains but also on how those gains interact with existing institutional configurations.

Gubernatorial Elections and State Executive Authority

Turning to state executive elections, Professor Karch noted that voters would select governors in 39 states, with 21 contests involving open seats without an incumbent candidate. Open-seat elections, he explained, are frequently more competitive because they lack the electoral advantages typically associated with incumbency. Nevertheless, he observed that relatively few gubernatorial contests had been classified as genuine toss-ups. Among the states attracting particular attention were Alaska, Georgia, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, and Wisconsin. 

Professor Karch situated these contests within a longer historical pattern of Republican strength in state executive offices. He reported that Republicans held 26 governorships compared with 24 controlled by Democrats, continuing a pattern of Republican numerical advantage that had largely persisted since the mid-1990s.

The significance of these elections, however, extended beyond partisan competition. Governors exercise substantial authority over state policy and can become important institutional actors in disputes between state and federal governments. Their political orientation can therefore influence how states respond to presidential initiatives and national policy changes.

Partisan Federalism as a Check on Presidential Power

One of Professor Karch’s central analytical contributions concerned the relationship between American federalism and democratic accountability. Building on earlier discussions about weakened congressional oversight, he argued that state governments can function as additional institutional checks on national executive authority. Under conditions of intense polarization, this relationship increasingly takes the form of partisan federalism. Republican-controlled states frequently challenge policies introduced by Democratic presidents, while Democratic-controlled states employ similar strategies against Republican administrations.

Professor Karch emphasized the growing political importance of state attorneys general. Historically relatively low-profile officials, attorneys general have become prominent participants in national political and legal disputes. Drawing on a database maintained by Paul Nolette at Marquette University, Professor Karch described the increasing frequency and significance of lawsuits filed by state attorneys general against presidential administrations.

Such litigation has addressed healthcare reform, environmental regulation, immigration, higher education, and election administration. He cited disputes involving the Affordable Care Act and environmental policy under the Obama administration as examples of how state governments can challenge federal priorities. For Professor Karch, these developments demonstrated that the federal structure provides institutional opportunities for resistance even when the national legislature is politically aligned with the president.

Ballot Initiatives and the Democratic Significance of State Policy Choices

Professor Karch also highlighted the importance of direct democracy at the state level. Unlike the national government, where citizens primarily influence policy through elected representatives, many states permit voters to decide substantive policy questions directly through ballot initiatives and referendums. He noted that ballot measures would appear in 39 states during the 2026 elections. These initiatives provide an important indication of changing political priorities.

Comparing the current electoral cycle with 2020, Professor Karch observed that earlier ballot measures frequently addressed marijuana legalization and criminal justice reform. By contrast, the 2026 agenda featured greater attention to election-related issues, including redistricting and ranked-choice voting. He referred to a proposed redistricting measure in Missouri and efforts to repeal ranked-choice voting in Alaska. Other ballot questions concerned taxation and transgender-related policies.

Professor Karch argued that these initiatives reveal how state electorates participate directly in defining the institutional and policy boundaries of American democracy.

Constitutional Authority Over Election Administration

Moving from electoral competition to constitutional structure, Professor Karch examined the Elections Clause of the US Constitution, contained in Article I, Section 4. He emphasized that this provision assigns states responsibility for determining the times, places, and manner of congressional elections, subject to congressional authority to establish or modify applicable regulations. The practical result is an electoral system governed through overlapping federal and state legal frameworks.

Professor Karch drew attention to a particularly consequential constitutional distinction: the Elections Clause explicitly identifies state legislatures and Congress but does not assign comparable election-administration authority to the president. He raised this point in connection with executive orders and Justice Department involvement in election-related matters.

Although acknowledging that he was not a constitutional lawyer, Professor Karch suggested that the constitutional allocation of responsibilities deserved careful consideration amid contemporary disputes over executive influence on electoral administration. His broader argument was that state autonomy in administering elections constitutes a fundamental institutional characteristic of American democracy.

Voting Rights and Unequal Conditions of Democratic Participation

Professor Karch subsequently explored the consequences of decentralized election administration for political participation. He emphasized that the Constitution does not establish a single, comprehensive national framework guaranteeing identical voting procedures across every state. Consequently, citizens encounter substantially different electoral requirements depending on where they reside.

Using voter identification requirements as an example, Professor Karch noted that Minnesota was among 14 states without such requirements, while the remaining 36 imposed some form of voter identification rule. These regulations vary considerably in their restrictiveness.

Professor Karch identified other important differences involving voter registration, automatic registration systems, and the restoration or restriction of voting rights for individuals convicted of felonies. For him, these variations raised fundamental democratic questions about membership in the political community and the practical accessibility of political participation. State legislatures and governors therefore exercise considerable influence over the everyday meaning of democratic citizenship.

Gerrymandering, Redistricting, and the Decline of Electoral Competition

Professor Karch concluded his substantive analysis by examining congressional redistricting. He explained that congressional district boundaries are generally determined through state-level processes involving legislatures, independent commissions, or courts. Although redistricting ordinarily follows the decennial census, he identified mid-cycle redistricting as a distinctive feature of the 2026 elections. Such changes, he emphasized, can influence how votes translate into congressional representation.

Professor Karch suggested that Republican-led redistricting initiatives might affect Democratic performance in the approaching elections. However, his principal concern extended beyond immediate partisan advantage. He warned that increasingly sophisticated district design could undermine meaningful electoral competition by creating constituencies in which outcomes are highly predictable. From the perspective of democratic theory, this raises concerns about accountability, political choice, and the responsiveness of elected representatives.

Professor Karch pointed to his own congressional district as an example of an electoral environment where the likely outcome was effectively known in advance. The deeper democratic problem, he suggested, is not simply which party benefits from redistricting, but whether voters retain meaningful opportunities to influence electoral outcomes.

Federalism and the Future of American Democratic Resilience

In conclusion, Professor Karch urged participants to resist interpreting the November 3 elections exclusively through the composition of Congress or the political standing of the president. State legislative contests, gubernatorial elections, attorney general races, ballot initiatives, election administration, and redistricting decisions all carry substantial implications for democratic governance.

His presentation illuminated the dual character of American federalism. On the one hand, decentralized political authority provides institutional opportunities for states to challenge federal policies and constrain national executive power. On the other hand, decentralization permits significant variation in voting rights, electoral competitiveness, and the practical conditions of democratic participation. These competing dimensions make state politics indispensable to understanding the resilience and vulnerabilities of American democracy.

ProfessorKarch’s central message was that American democratic institutions cannot be adequately assessed from Washington alone. The states are not peripheral actors in national democracy; they are essential sites where political authority is contested, electoral rights are defined, and the long-term conditions of democratic accountability are determined.

Professor Kenworthy: American Federalism Combines National Polarization with State-Level Autonomy and Resilient Local Governance

Professor Lane Kenworthy offered additional reflections on Professor Karch’s analysis of American federalism, emphasizing three frequently overlooked dimensions of the country’s multilevel political system: the contrast between national electoral competitiveness and state-level partisan dominance, the decentralization of election administration, and comparatively resilient public confidence in local government.

First, Professor Kenworthy observed that American politics is characterized by an unusually close partisan balance at the national level, with the two major parties commanding roughly comparable shares of politically active citizens. This equilibrium, persisting since approximately 2000, has contributed to closely contested presidential elections.

However, he stressed that this balance does not extend uniformly across individual states. In states such as California, New York, Oregon, and Washington, Democrats have maintained substantial political dominance, while Republicans have enjoyed comparable advantages in states such as Texas. Unified partisan control of governorships and legislative chambers enables state governments to implement extensive policy agendas despite national political gridlock.

Second, Professor Kenworthy highlighted the democratic significance of decentralized election administration. Because states possess considerable authority over electoral procedures, federal attempts to reshape voting rules may encounter substantial institutional resistance. He pointed specifically to state-level opposition to Trump administration initiatives concerning ballot access, early voting, and voting by mail.

Third, Professor Kenworthy emphasized the often-neglected importance of municipal governance. Although Americans’ trust in national government has declined considerably since the 1960s and 1970s, he noted that survey evidence indicates substantially greater and more stable confidence in local government. According to his interpretation of Gallup and Pew polling, public trust in local institutions has remained relatively consistent since approximately 2000.

Professor Kenworthy’s intervention underscored that American democratic resilience cannot be understood exclusively through national polarization or federal institutional conflict. State governments retain considerable policymaking autonomy, while local institutions continue to exercise authority over every day public services and maintain comparatively strong public confidence, revealing important sources of institutional continuity within an otherwise deeply polarized political system.

Q&A Session

Disputed Midterm Election Results Could Trigger Extensive Litigation and Test America’s Judicial Institutions

Responding, Professor Karch acknowledged the difficulty of predicting developments surrounding a hypothetical rejection of election results, emphasizing the considerable uncertainty involved. Before addressing the question directly, Professor Karch returned briefly to the implications of political polarization for American federalism. He distinguished between the legislative gridlock frequently associated with polarization at the national level and the substantial policy divergence it produces among states. In his assessment, the increasing separation between Republican-controlled and Democratic-controlled states has generated markedly different policy environments, particularly concerning abortion, gun ownership, and electoral regulations.

Turning to Professor Aktar’s central question, Professor Karch suggested that any serious dispute over the legitimacy of election results would likely place the judiciary at the center of the resulting institutional confrontation. He observed that the groundwork for potential post-election disputes was already becoming visible, although he refrained from offering definitive predictions about their consequences.

Should Trump or the Republican Party challenge election outcomes in particular states, Professor Karch anticipated extensive litigation concerning electoral procedures, certification, and the validity of contested results. He also noted that the Supreme Court might be reluctant to become embroiled in an explicitly political electoral confrontation, recalling the institutional controversy surrounding Bush v. Gore in 2000.

Professor Karch’s main assessment was that a contested election could produce significant judicial intervention, although its ultimate consequences would remain uncertain. His response underscored the potential importance of courts in resolving electoral disputes within America’s polarized federal system, while acknowledging the limits of forecasting how such a confrontation might unfold.

Partisan Federalism Is More Likely to Produce Recurring Institutional Conflict Than Secessionism

Dr. Bulent Kenes questioned Professor Karch about whether intensifying conflicts between state and federal authorities could eventually threaten American political unity. Dr. Kenes asked whether federalism, traditionally understood as a safeguard against centralized power, might paradoxically encourage secessionist tendencies. His central question was whether sustained state-level resistance to Washington could ultimately evolve into demands for territorial separation.

Responding, Professor Karch expressed skepticism that contemporary federal-state tensions would generate secessionist movements comparable to those found in parts of Europe. Instead, he emphasized the instrumental relationship between partisan political interests and federalism.

According to Karch, both Republicans and Democrats invoke federal principles selectively, depending on their position within the national political system. When excluded from federal executive power, parties frequently turn to sympathetic state governments as alternative centers of political authority and resistance. He challenged the conventional characterization of Republicans as defenders of states’ rights and Democrats as advocates of centralized government, arguing that such distinctions obscure the strategic calculations underlying political behavior.

Professor Karch suggested that recurring confrontations between state and federal governments were considerably more plausible than outright secession. He linked this prospect to Professor Berman’s analysis of recurring political cycles, suggesting that changes in presidential control could repeatedly reverse the partisan configuration of federal-state resistance.

Finally, Professor Karch emphasized that constitutional ambiguities concerning the distribution of authority between Washington and individual states could sustain these institutional disputes. His assessment thus highlighted the potential persistence of partisan federalism as a source of political contestation rather than territorial fragmentation.

Reducing Partisan Litigation Requires Cross-Party Cooperation and a Less Polarized Policy Agenda

Natalia Crane questioned Professor Karch about the growing frequency of lawsuits filed by state attorneys general against presidential administrations. Referring to the increasingly confrontational relationship between state governments and federal executive authority under Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump, Crane asked what conditions might reverse this trend or whether litigation would continue increasing or eventually stabilize.

Responding, Professor Karch emphasized the extent to which partisan litigation has become institutionalized within contemporary American federalism. Recalling the Obama presidency, he cited a Republican state attorney general who characterized suing the administration as a routine professional responsibility. Professor Karch suggested that many Democratic attorneys general now approach Republican administrations with a comparable understanding of their institutional role.

He argued that reversing this trajectory would require substantial changes in political polarization and the policy priorities of the major parties. A less adversarial political environment, he suggested, would reduce incentives for state officials to challenge federal initiatives primarily because they originated with an opposing party.

Professor Karch identified opposition to artificial intelligence data centers and concerns about pharmaceutical companies as potential areas of cross-partisan cooperation. Such issues might enable political actors to transcend conventional ideological divisions through shared policy objectives. Nevertheless, he acknowledged the considerable difficulties involved in constructing durable cross-ideological coalitions.

Professor Karch’s conclusion was that reducing litigation between state and federal authorities would depend less on legal adjustments than on broader political realignment and renewed opportunities for bipartisan policy cooperation.

Professor McCoy: Democratic Renewal Requires Structural Reform to Break the Cycle of Political Instability and Economic Disillusionment

During the concluding discussion, Professor Jennifer McCoy addressed two interconnected concerns: the possibility of a post-election constitutional crisis in the United States and the broader challenge of overcoming recurring cycles of democratic backsliding and political instability.

Responding to Professor Cengiz Aktar’s question about a potential constitutional confrontation, Professor McCoy largely agreed with Professor Karch that disputes over election results would most likely unfold through litigation. Recalling Donald Trump’s unsuccessful legal challenges to the 2020 presidential election, she suggested that similar attempts to contest unfavorable outcomes could emerge in individual states.

Professor McCoy referred specifically to anticipated legal disputes in Alaska, where competing Republican candidacies could potentially affect electoral outcomes. She also acknowledged concerns that Trump might invoke emergency powers, the Insurrection Act, or extraordinary security measures in response to political unrest. However, given that early voting was already underway across numerous states, she considered such an extreme scenario less plausible than prolonged legal contestation.

Nevertheless, Professor McCoy identified voter intimidation as an unresolved concern, particularly regarding the potential presence of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel and cooperating local police near electoral activities. Such visibility, she suggested, could discourage some citizens from exercising their voting rights.

Turning to Professor Kenworthy’s broader question about whether democratic parties could sustain public support, Professor McCoy emphasized the structural foundations of contemporary political volatility. She argued that democratic systems increasingly experience recurring alternation between populist governments and mainstream parties without achieving durable democratic renewal. The succession of Trump, Biden, and Trump illustrated, in her assessment, this pattern of electoral turnover without resolution of underlying grievances.

Professor McCoy maintained that breaking this cycle requires fundamentally reconsidering the relationship between democracy and contemporary capitalism. She contrasted today’s economic arrangements with the postwar social contract, when industrial economies, organized labor, and negotiated compromises between capital and workers contributed to greater political stability.

According to Professor McCoy, the transformation of economic structures and the growing concentration of private economic power have weakened democracy’s capacity to respond effectively to citizens’ demands. She therefore advocated renewed democratic institutions, broader citizen participation, and economic frameworks capable of addressing contemporary inequalities.

Her central conclusion was that without substantial institutional and economic transformation, democracies risk remaining trapped in prolonged cycles of polarization, governmental dysfunction, and recurring populist resurgence.

Conclusion: Beyond Electoral Alternation—The Structural Challenges of Democratic Resilience

The ECPS panel on US Midterms entitled “Trumpism, Democratic Resilience, and the Rise of Democratic Socialism”offered a comprehensive examination of the political, institutional, and socioeconomic challenges confronting American democracy ahead of the November 3, 2026, midterm elections. Although approaching these challenges from different disciplinary and comparative perspectives, the participants converged on a fundamental insight: electoral outcomes alone cannot determine the durability of democratic institutions or resolve the structural grievances sustaining contemporary populism.

Panel’s chair Professor Lane Kenworthy situated the elections within broader patterns of right-wing populist mobilization, economic dissatisfaction, and anti-incumbent sentiment. His observations raised an important question about whether electoral backlash reflects substantive democratic renewal or merely the recurrent rejection of unpopular governing parties.

Professor Michael Kazin complemented this analysis by tracing the revival of democratic socialism to longstanding economic inequalities and the political consequences of neoliberal capitalism. His assessment suggested that contemporary democratic socialism’s principal influence lies less in revolutionary transformation than in shifting the Democratic Party toward a more expansive social-democratic economic agenda.

Professor Sheri Berman emphasized the limitations of electoral victories over populist governments. Drawing on comparative experiences, she warned that mainstream parties risk perpetuating cycles of political disillusionment unless they develop credible responses to economic insecurity, immigration, corruption, and governmental dysfunction.

Extending this argument, Professor Jennifer McCoy identified pernicious polarization, institutional vulnerabilities, and concentrated economic power as interconnected obstacles to democratic resilience. Her proposed remedies—including electoral reform, deliberative participation, economic restructuring, and a renewed social contract—underscored the importance of systemic transformation beyond conventional partisan competition.

Professor Andrew Karch, meanwhile, demonstrated that American democratic resilience also depends on federalism’s decentralized institutional architecture. State governments can constrain federal executive authority, yet divergent electoral regulations, partisan litigation, and gerrymandering simultaneously expose significant inequalities in democratic representation.

The discussions further illuminated unresolved questions concerning constitutional checks and balances, potential electoral disputes, political polarization, and the capacity of democratic institutions to maintain legitimacy under sustained partisan confrontation.

Ultimately, the panel highlighted a distinction between electoral accountability and democratic renewal. While the midterms could reshape the balance of political power, their longer-term significance would depend on whether political actors and institutions could address citizens’ material grievances, strengthen democratic representation, and rebuild public confidence.

The panel thus framed the 2026 elections not simply as a contest over congressional control, but as a critical moment for assessing the possibilities and limitations of democratic resilience in an increasingly polarized political order.