Disembarkation of 300 migrants from Libya from the German rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 in Pozzallo, Province of Ragusa, Italy, on June 9, 2022. Photo: Alec Tassi.

The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe

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Please cite as:
Yogo, Edouard Epiphane. (2025). “The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 4, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0048

 

Abstract
This research examines the influence of populism on the redefinition of citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. It explores how populist movements leverage anti-immigrant sentiments to shape political discourse, laws, and societal attitudes. The study combines qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants, and quantitative data from national surveys to analyze changes in citizenship laws and social inclusion challenges. Through case studies, it highlights variations in populist influence across European countries. The research concludes with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society amidst rising populism.

Keywords: Populism, citizenship, social inclusion, migration dynamics, European societies

 

By Edouard Epiphane Yogo*

Introduction 

The rise of populism in Europe has become one of the most significant political phenomena of the 21st century, fundamentally altering the political landscape and reshaping discussions surrounding citizenship and social inclusion for migrants. According to Arzheimer & Carter (2006), populist movements have emerged across various European countries, characterized by their anti-elite sentiments and a rhetoric that often scapegoats immigrants and minorities for societal issues (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). As these movements gain traction, they exploit and amplify anti-immigrant sentiments, influencing political discourse, legislation, and societal attitudes toward migrants. This dynamic presents a critical need to explore how populism is redefining citizenship and the concept of social inclusion within the broader context of migration (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

At the heart of this inquiry lies a fundamental question: How does populism redefine the essence of citizenship? This question invites us to consider the shifts in legal frameworks, societal norms, and public perceptions surrounding the rights and identities of migrants in Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The changing landscape of citizenship laws particularly the principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) illustrates how populist narratives can reshape notions of national belonging (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). Moreover, the impact of these changes on the social integration of migrants poses significant implications for the cohesiveness of European societies.

To investigate these pressing issues, this research adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants with quantitative data derived from national surveys. This comprehensive analysis aims to uncover not only the changes in citizenship laws but also the challenges to social inclusion faced by migrants in various European contexts. By examining the intersection of populism and migration, the study seeks to illuminate how populist movements influence citizenship policies and shape societal attitudes toward migrants.

One of the central themes of this research is the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions of migrants. In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping these perceptions (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Populist leaders and parties often utilize rhetoric that stigmatizes migrants, framing them as threats to national security, cultural identity, and economic stability (Talani, 2021). Such narratives contribute to the development of negative stereotypes and social divisions, making it increasingly difficult for migrants to achieve social integration in education, employment, and healthcare (Scheiring et al., 2024).

The first section of the study will examine how populist narratives reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship. By analyzing the rhetoric employed by populist movements, the research will highlight the ways in which these narratives seek to define and limit national belonging. Furthermore, it will explore case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries, illustrating how populism has influenced legislative reforms aimed at restricting migrants’ rights and opportunities.

The second section will focus on the challenges to social inclusion for migrants under the influence of populism. By investigating the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions, the study will analyze the stigmatization of migrants and the resulting impacts on their ability to integrate into society. The research will delve into how negative portrayals in the media can lead to societal attitudes that hinder access to essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, ultimately affecting migrants’ social standing and quality of life.

In exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion, the research will address the restrictive measures that impact integration efforts. These policies often prioritize the needs and rights of native citizens over those of migrants, resulting in systemic barriers that prevent meaningful social inclusion. The study will also incorporate case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of populist policies based on varying economic and historical contexts across European countries. This analysis aims to demonstrate how local conditions shape the outcomes of populist approaches to social inclusion and migration dynamics.

To interpret these dynamics effectively, this research will utilize the phenomenological constructivism framework proposed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 2011). According to Berger and Luckmann (2011), this theoretical approach posits that social reality is constructed through human interactions and is deeply influenced by the contexts in which these interactions occur. By applying this framework, the study will explore how populist narratives and policies are socially constructed and how they influence perceptions of citizenship and social inclusion (Mudde, 2014). This perspective will allow us to examine the processes through which migrants are categorized, marginalized, and included or excluded from the social fabric of European societies.

Using Berger and Luckmann’s insights, the research, based on phenomenological constructivism, will analyze how societal constructs surrounding nationality and belonging are negotiated and redefined in the context of populism (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). It will facilitate a deeper understanding of the ways in which individual and collective identities are shaped by populist discourse, as well as the implications of these construct s for migrants’ experiences of citizenship and social integration. By situating our analysis within this theoretical framework, we aim to highlight the significance of social constructions in shaping the realities of migrants in Europe. In addition to phenomenological constructivism, this research will also employ François Thual’s geopolitical method to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Thual’s approach emphasizes the importance of contextual factors such as geography, history, and socio-political dynamics in shaping political behavior and policy decisions. This method allows us to analyze how populist movements are not only a response to immediate political conditions but are also deeply rooted in historical and geographical contexts that influence their evolution and impact (Thual, 1996). 

Thual’s geopolitical method will guide the exploration of how different European countries experience and respond to populism in distinct ways (Loyer, 2019). By examining the geographical and historical backgrounds of specific case studies, we can uncover the localized factors that drive populist sentiments and how these sentiments manifest in citizenship laws and social inclusion policies (Zajec, 2018). This analytical lens will enhance our understanding of why certain countries adopt more restrictive policies while others may strive for inclusivity in the face of populism. 

As the research unfolds, it will emphasize the need for inclusive policies that can counteract the negative effects of populism on citizenship and social inclusion. By synthesizing the findings, the study will conclude with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society in the face of rising populism. These recommendations will focus on strategies that promote equitable access to rights and opportunities for migrants, thereby enhancing social cohesion and countering the divisive narratives propagated by populist movements.

In summary, this research seeks to illuminate the complex interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. By examining the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions and legislative reforms, the study will provide valuable insights into the challenges migrants face in achieving social integration. Ultimately, the findings will underscore the importance of developing inclusive policies that address the needs and rights of all members of society, fostering a more equitable and cohesive European community amidst the challenges posed by populism.

The Impact of Populism on the Redefinition of Citizenship

In the current global landscape shaped by the rise of populism, discussions around citizenship and national identity have gained renewed significance. Recent changes in citizenship laws reflect the increasing influence of populist movements that seek to redefine national belonging. This document will examine two key aspects: Changes in citizenship laws and principles under populist influence (A) and the relationship between populism and the concept of national identity (B), highlighting the tensions and redefinitions that arise.

Changes in Citizenship Laws and Principles Under Populist Influence

Discussing on changes in citizenship laws and principles leads us to examine two key areas. Firstly, the shifts in jus soliand jus sanguinis citizenship principles (1) and secondly, the influence of populist discourse on recent legislative reforms (2). 

Analysis of Shifts in Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis under Populist Influence

The principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) are long-established frameworks that define how individuals acquire nationality (Retailleau, 2024). Jus soli grants citizenship to those born within a country’s territory, promoting inclusion and diversity, while jus sanguinis bases citizenship on parentage, linking it to lineage and heritage. Many countries have historically blended both principles to accommodate social and political contexts. However, the rise of populist movements has altered how these principles are applied, with significant implications for citizenship laws (El País, 2024).

Populism, characterized by its anti-immigration and nationalist rhetoric, has shifted the conversation toward more restrictive definitions of citizenship, often challenging jus soli by framing it as too inclusive (Giugni & Grasso, 2021; Le Monde, 2024). Populist leaders argue that automatic birthright citizenship allows individuals with no cultural or historical ties to the nation to gain full membership. For example, in the United States, under the Trump administration, jus solicame under scrutiny, with arguments about “anchor babies” used to portray birthright citizenship as a loophole exploited by immigrants (Schmidt, 2019).

Similarly, in Europe, populist movements have pushed for limiting or abolishing jus soli to preserve national identity. Germany, for instance, had integrated jus soli to respond to globalization, but recent populist pressures aim to reverse these changes.

While jus soli face restrictions, populist leaders have embraced jus sanguinis. This principle aligns with their focus on ethnicity, heritage, and national purity, promoting a more exclusionary form of citizenship based on ancestral ties (Le Monde, 2024). In Hungary, for instance, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s policies prioritize ethnic Hungarian identity, offering citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad while maintaining a rigid stance against immigrants and refugees. Likewise, Italy emphasizes jus sanguinis, granting citizenship to individuals of Italian descent but placing increasing scrutiny on migrants and refugees (Le Monde, 2024; Kymlicka, 2001).

The preference for jus sanguinis reflects a broader trend of ethno-nationalism under populist regimes. By favoring bloodline-based citizenship, populists create a narrower definition of national identity, excluding individuals without ancestral ties to the country (Joppke, 2010). This shift has serious consequences for social cohesion, as it marginalizes immigrants and minorities, potentially deepening societal divides.

The erosion of jus soli particularly affects children born to immigrant families, who may face statelessness or legal obstacles to full integration. Meanwhile, the reinforcement of jus sanguinis perpetuates exclusionary notions of citizenship, creating a tiered system where only those with ethnic or cultural ties to the state are considered full citizens (Le Monde, 2024). This dynamic threatens to alienate large segments of the population, especially in multicultural societies, contributing to increased social tensions.

The changes to jus soli and jus sanguinis driven by populist movements illustrate a shift toward restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies. These alterations not only affect individuals directly impacted by more rigid laws but also have broader implications for the social and political stability of nations grappling with diversity and globalization (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). As populist ideologies continue to shape political discourse, the future of citizenship laws remains a contentious issue.

Influence of Populist Discourse on Legislative Reforms

Populism has significantly impacted global politics, shaping discourse and driving legislative reforms. Defined by its appeal to “the people” against perceived elites, populism thrives on nationalism, anti-globalization, anti-immigration, and protectionism (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019). Populist leaders push simplified solutions to complex issues, leaving lasting effects on policies related to immigration, citizenship, labor laws, and the judiciary. 

Populism views politics as a battle between the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elites, positioning populist leaders as defenders of the common citizen against established institutions. Exploiting grievances over economic inequality, cultural alienation, or fears of losing national identity, populists advocate for radical reforms (Olivas Osuna, 2020). Their emotionally charged rhetoric resonates with voters who feel marginalized, fostering a political environment that supports swift, often divisive, legislative changes.

One of the most significant areas of populist influence is immigration and citizenship policy. Populists frame immigration as a threat to national identity and economic security, pushing for stricter controls. In the US, Donald Trump’s administration implemented controversial policies such as the Muslim Ban and attempted to end birthright citizenship (Inglehart, 2016). These moves, rooted in populist rhetoric, sought to restrict immigration and tighten borders, casting immigrants as burdens on the system. Similarly, in Europe, populist leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán have championed anti-immigration laws, presenting migrants as threats to national security and Christian identity (Dahlgren, 2006). These legislative changes, shaped by populism, have led to a more hostile environment for migrants and refugees, contributing to growing xenophobia.

Economic protectionism is another key area influenced by populism. Populist leaders, responding to fears of globalization and job displacement, advocate for policies that protect domestic industries. Trump’s “America First” rhetoric resulted in tariffs aimed at protecting American jobs, leading to trade wars with countries like China (Jones, 2019). While these policies offered short-term relief to certain industries, they also raised consumer prices and strained international trade relations. In Europe, populist figures like Marine Le Pen in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy have similarly pushed for economic protectionism, though such policies often hinder long-term growth and international cooperation (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019).

Populists also target the judiciary, portraying it as an elitist institution disconnected from the people. This view justifies legislative reforms that increase executive control over the judiciary, undermining democratic checks and balances (Bauer & Becker, 2020). In Poland, the populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) introduced reforms giving the government greater control over judicial appointments, weakening judicial independence. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan similarly used populist discourse to justify constitutional changes that consolidated executive power and diminished the judiciary’s role (Blokker, 2019). These reforms, driven by populist ideals, threaten democratic governance by reducing the separation of powers and weakening the rule of law.

Cultural nationalism is another area where populist discourse drives legislative changes. Populist leaders often promote national culture while resisting multiculturalism. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government enacted the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019, which grants citizenship to non-Muslim refugees, marginalizing Muslims and promoting Hindu nationalism (Adamidis, 2021). This, along with the National Register of Citizens (NRC), exemplifies how populist rhetoric can shape exclusionary legislative reforms, reshaping national identity along religious lines (Tushnet, 2020).

Populism’s influence on legislative reforms is profound, particularly in immigration, economics, judiciary control, and national identity. Although populists claim to represent the will of the people, their policies often lead to restrictive, exclusionary measures that challenge democratic principles (Löfflmann, 2022). As populism continues to grow, its influence on legislative processes will likely persist, raising concerns about the future of democratic governance and civil liberties worldwide.

Populism and the Concept of National Identity

This section delves into the relationship between populism and national identity, focusing on two critical aspects: The use of anti-immigrant rhetoric to reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship, highlighting how such discourse seeks to define and limit national belonging (1) and Case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries (2). 

The Use of Anti-immigrant Rhetoric to Reinforce Exclusive Citizenship

Populist leaders frequently employ anti-immigrant rhetoric to portray immigrants as existential threats to a nation’s cultural, economic, and social fabric. This rhetoric becomes a powerful tool to shape national identity in exclusionary terms, typically casting immigrants as outsiders based on racial, ethnic, or religious differences (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). Through this discourse, populist movements argue that immigrants dilute national culture, displace native workers, and strain public resources, all while posing threats to national security. By framing immigration in such stark terms, populist rhetoric fosters fear and division, creating a political climate in which restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies can be justified (Mudde, 2014).

At the core of populist anti-immigrant rhetoric lies the concept of an “authentic” national identity one that is rooted in historical, cultural, and sometimes religious heritage. This identity is portrayed as under siege by foreign influences, particularly immigrants who are seen as incapable of integrating into the national fabric (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Populist leaders often evoke a sense of nostalgia for a perceived golden age when national culture was more “pure” or homogeneous, untainted by external influences. This idealized past is contrasted with the present, where immigration is depicted as eroding the cultural unity and social cohesion of the nation (Talani, 2021). By appealing to this notion of cultural purity, populist leaders can present themselves as defenders of the nation’s true identity, rallying support from those who feel alienated or threatened by globalization and multiculturalism.

Immigrants, particularly those from non-Western or non-Christian backgrounds, are often depicted as fundamentally different from and incompatible with the values, traditions, and way of life of the host country (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This portrayal not only amplifies existing prejudices but also legitimizes exclusionary policies. In many populist narratives, immigrants are scapegoated for a range of societal problems from unemployment and housing shortages to crime and the perceived decline of national values. This scapegoating simplifies complex socio-economic issues, presenting immigration as the primary cause of these challenges and offering a convenient target for public anger and frustration (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

The distinction between “us” (native citizens) and “them” (immigrants) is a central feature of populist rhetoric. This binary division serves to reinforce a sense of national unity among the “native” population while casting immigrants as a threatening “other” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). This division is often racialized, with immigrants from non-European or non-Christian backgrounds portrayed as more dangerous or culturally alien. In some cases, populists draw on religious differences, framing Muslim immigrants, for example, as a threat to secular or Christian values (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). 

These distinctions are used to justify policies that restrict immigrants’ access to citizenship, limit their rights, and reduce their opportunities for social and economic integration (Manatschal et al., 2020). One of the most prominent ways in which this rhetoric translates into policy is through reforms aimed at restricting immigration and tightening citizenship requirements. Populist leaders often advocate for measures that make it more difficult for immigrants to acquire legal status, obtain work permits, or access public services (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). In some cases, they push for the revocation of citizenship for naturalized immigrants who are deemed to have violated national norms or values. These policies are framed as necessary steps to protect the nation’s identity and security, resonating with voters who feel that their cultural heritage and economic opportunities are being undermined by immigration.

This anti-immigrant rhetoric also extends to asylum seekers and refugees, who are often portrayed as economic migrants in disguise, seeking to exploit the nation’s welfare system rather than fleeing genuine persecution (Talani, 2021). By blurring the lines between refugees and economic migrants, populist leaders erode public sympathy for those seeking asylum and create a narrative in which all forms of immigration are seen as illegitimate or dangerous. This narrative provides political cover for policies that deny refugees access to asylum processes, push them back at borders, or place them in detention centers with limited legal rights (Hammar, 1990).

Beyond shaping immigration and asylum policies, populist rhetoric also influences broader social attitudes. By constantly framing immigrants as threats to national security and culture, populist leaders normalize xenophobic and exclusionary attitudes (Löfflmann, 2022). This not only stokes fear and resentment among the native population but also creates an environment in which discrimination against immigrants and minorities is more likely to be tolerated or even encouraged. In some cases, this rhetoric has been linked to increases in hate crimes and other forms of violence against immigrant communities (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

Moreover, populist anti-immigrant rhetoric undermines the principles of equality and inclusion that are foundational to democratic citizenship. By advocating for policies that exclude certain groups based on their race, religion, or ethnicity, populist leaders challenge the idea of universal citizenship and equal rights for all individuals within a nation (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Instead, they promote a hierarchical vision of citizenship, where some individuals are deemed more deserving of rights and protections than others based on their cultural or ethnic background.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric serves as a key tool for populist leaders to shape national identity in exclusionary terms. By portraying immigrants as threats to culture, economy, and security, populists legitimize policies that restrict immigration, deny citizenship, and limit the rights of minorities (Talani, 2021). This rhetoric not only fuels fear and division but also reshapes public policy in ways that undermine the principles of equality and inclusion, leading to a more fragmented and polarized society. As populist movements continue to gain traction globally, the challenge of balancing national identity with inclusivity and tolerance remains a pressing issue for modern democracies (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

Case Studies of Citizenship Policy Adjustments in Select European Countries

Across Europe, populist movements have played a pivotal role in shaping national identity and citizenship policies, often pushing for more restrictive laws that make it harder for immigrants to gain citizenship or legal residency. This shift reflects the growing influence of populist rhetoric, which frames immigration as a threat to national culture and security. By examining the cases of Hungary, Italy, and France, it becomes evident how populist leaders have redefined national identity and driven legislative reforms that reflect exclusionary views of citizenship.

In Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the government has adopted a strongly anti-immigrant stance, particularly targeting Muslim-majority countries. Orbán’s administration has positioned itself as the defender of Hungary’s Christian identity, presenting immigration as an existential threat to the nation’s cultural and religious fabric (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). The construction of border fences to block refugees, along with Hungary’s refusal to participate in EU refugee resettlement programs, demonstrates the government’s commitment to preventing the settlement of immigrants (Palonen, 2018). This emphasis on exclusion is further reflected in the tightening of citizenship laws, which aim to maintain a homogenous national identity, rooted in ethnic and religious purity.

A key piece of legislation that encapsulates Hungary’s approach to immigration is the “Stop Soros” law, named after Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros, who has supported pro-migrant policies (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). The law criminalizes aid to asylum seekers and organizations working with immigrants, reinforcing the idea that immigrants are unwelcome in Hungary. Orbán’s government has used this law to portray immigrants as threats to the nation, while redefining Hungarian national identity along ethnically and religiously exclusionary lines. By positioning itself as the protector of a pure, Christian Hungary, the government has marginalized anyone perceived as foreign or different, particularly those from Muslim backgrounds (Pappas, 2019).

Italy, another example of populist influence on citizenship policies, has seen significant changes under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing League party. Salvini, who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, built his political platform around the idea of protecting Italy’s national identity from the perceived dangers of immigration (Varshney, 2021). His “Italians First” campaign emphasized limiting immigration, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, as a way to safeguard Italy’s cultural and economic interests.

Salvini’s government enacted several legislative changes that made it harder for immigrants to gain legal residency and citizenship. For example, the “security decree” introduced during his tenure tightened residency requirements and made it easier for the government to revoke asylum status. These policies were framed as necessary for maintaining public safety and reducing the immigrant population (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). By casting immigrants as criminals or economic burdens, Salvini tapped into public anxieties about national identity and security, securing popular support for more restrictive immigration and citizenship laws. His efforts also extended to children born to foreign parents in Italy, for whom gaining citizenship became increasingly difficult under the new regulations.

France, under the influence of Marine Le Pen and her National Rally party, has similarly witnessed a rise in populist-driven immigration policies. Le Pen has long advocated for a reduction in immigration and the protection of French identity, positioning herself as a defender of the nation’s cultural heritage (Mayer, 2013). Her party has pushed for laws that would end birthright citizenship, making it harder for children born in France to immigrant parents to acquire citizenship (Soffer, 2022). This approach reflects a broader desire to redefine French citizenship in exclusive terms, prioritizing the interests of native-born citizens over those of immigrants.

Le Pen’s framing of national identity is closely tied to the preservation of France’s cultural and historical legacy, often in opposition to immigration from Muslim-majority countries. During her 2017 and 2022 presidential campaigns, Le Pen emphasized the need to protect French values from external influences, linking immigration to issues of national security, cultural erosion, and economic instability (Bonikowski et al., 2018). While she has not won the presidency, her influence has pushed mainstream political parties in France to adopt stricter stances on immigration and citizenship, showing the broader impact of her populist rhetoric.

In all three countries, populist leaders have successfully reshaped public discourse around immigration and citizenship, using anti-immigrant rhetoric to justify more restrictive policies. By framing immigrants as threats to national identity and security, they have fostered a climate of fear and division, where exclusionary measures are seen as necessary to protect the cultural and social fabric of the nation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This dynamic not only makes it more difficult for immigrants to integrate and gain citizenship but also redefines what it means to be a member of the nation, often in ways that marginalize racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.

Clearly, populist movements across Europe have significantly influenced citizenship policies by promoting exclusionary definitions of national identity. Whether in Hungary, Italy, or France, populist leaders have used anti-immigrant rhetoric to push for legislative reforms that limit immigration, restrict access to citizenship, and reinforce a narrow conception of national belonging. These changes reflect broader concerns about preserving cultural homogeneity in an increasingly globalized world, where immigration is often framed as a threat rather than a source of enrichment.

Challenges to Social Inclusion for Migrants Under Populism

In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions of migrants. These portrayals can significantly influence societal attitudes and policies. This study will explore two key areas: Media representations and public perceptions of migrants (A) and the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion (B), examining how these narratives and policies interact and impact marginalized communities.

Media Representations and Public Perceptions of Migrants

In this section, we investigate the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions of migrants. We focus on two key aspects: first, the influence of populist narratives on the stigmatization of migrants, examining how these narratives contribute to negative stereotypes and social divisions; and second, the impacts of these perceptions on social integration in education, employment, and healthcare, highlighting the challenges migrants face in accessing essential services and opportunities in society.

Influence of Populist Narratives on Migrant Stigmatization

Populist narratives have a powerful influence on the stigmatization of migrants, shaping public perceptions in ways that often fuel fear, division, and hostility. These narratives simplify complex social issues by framing migrants as threats to national identity, economic stability, and security, which amplifies existing societal tensions. In many countries, populist leaders use anti-immigrant rhetoric to galvanize political support, constructing migrants as scapegoats for various social and economic challenges (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015). This stigmatization has far-reaching consequences, reinforcing negative stereotypes and shaping public policy in exclusionary ways.

At the heart of populist narratives is the concept of “otherness,” where migrants are depicted as fundamentally different from the native population. This otherness is often framed along ethnic, racial, or religious lines, with migrants presented as a homogeneous group that poses a threat to the nation’s cultural identity. In Europe, for instance, populist parties frequently depict Muslim migrants as unwilling or unable to assimilate into Western societies, associating them with extremism or radicalism (Hawley, 2016). This portrayal suggests that migrants are not merely different but incompatible with the nation’s values and way of life. Populist leaders, such as Marine Le Pen in France or Viktor Orbán in Hungary, leverage these fears of cultural erosion to rally support, positioning themselves as protectors of the nation’s authentic identity (Wojczewski, 2019).

Populist rhetoric often goes beyond cultural concerns to frame migrants as economic threats, claiming that they steal jobs, exploit social services, and drain public resources. This portrayal is particularly prevalent during economic downturns, when populist leaders can channel public anxieties about unemployment and financial insecurity into anti-immigrant sentiment (Steele & Homolar, 2019). Migrants are depicted as competitors for scarce resources, pitting them against native citizens in a zero-sum game where the prosperity of one group is seen as coming at the expense of the other. The media plays a significant role in perpetuating this narrative by sensationalizing stories of migrants benefiting from welfare or engaging in criminal activities, often without providing context or balance (Betz, 1994). This selective reporting reinforces the perception that migrants are a burden on society, even when evidence shows their positive contributions to the economy.

In addition to cultural and economic threats, populist narratives often link migrants to security risks, portraying them as potential criminals or terrorists. This is particularly pronounced in countries that have experienced terrorist attacks, where populist leaders frequently draw direct connections between immigration and security (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). By framing migrants as dangerous outsiders who pose a threat to national safety, populist leaders can justify restrictive immigration policies and securitization measures. In the United States, for example, President Donald Trump used rhetoric that depicted migrants (Becker, 2019), especially those from Latin America, as criminals and rapists, capitalizing on fears of crime to promote his anti-immigration agenda (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This rhetoric resonates with portions of the electorate who are already concerned about safety and security, amplifying support for exclusionary policies.

Populist leaders skillfully use media platforms to spread these narratives, particularly in today’s highly polarized media landscape. Traditional news outlets, social media, and even political advertisements become conduits for anti-immigrant rhetoric, allowing populist leaders to reach broad audiences with messages that vilify migrants. In this environment, misinformation and sensationalism thrive (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). False or exaggerated stories about migrant crime rates, welfare fraud, or cultural clashes circulate widely, reinforcing negative perceptions of migrants. Social media, in particular, has proven to be a fertile ground for these narratives, where algorithms amplify divisive content and create echo chambers that reinforce preexisting biases (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

The consequences of this stigmatization are profound and far-reaching. As populist narratives gain traction, public opinion shifts toward greater hostility and mistrust of migrants, making it easier for populist leaders to enact exclusionary policies. This shift in public sentiment often leads to increased support for policies that restrict immigration, limit access to citizenship, and curtail the rights of refugees and asylum seekers (Mudde, 2019). For example, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government has passed a series of laws that severely limit immigration and criminalize activities that support asylum seekers, framing these measures as necessary to protect Hungary’s Christian identity. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s anti-immigrant rhetoric helped fuel the passage of laws that tightened residency requirements and made it easier to revoke asylum statuses, reflecting a broader European trend of hardening immigration policies.

Beyond policy, the stigmatization of migrants has deep social consequences. It fosters an environment where xenophobia and discrimination become normalized, affecting the daily lives of migrants and their ability to integrate into society (Wodak, 2015). Migrants face prejudice in the workplace, in schools, and in public spaces, often experiencing social exclusion and hostility based on their perceived status as outsiders. This stigmatization also fuels tensions between native populations and migrant communities, deepening social divisions and undermining efforts toward inclusion and cohesion.

Impacts on Social Integration in Education, Employment, and Healthcare

The stigmatization of migrants, fueled by populist narratives, significantly impacts their social integration in key areas such as education, employment, and healthcare. These effects not only hinder the ability of migrants to contribute to society but also exacerbate social divisions, perpetuating cycles of marginalization and exclusion (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). By examining these three critical sectors, we can better understand how negative perceptions of migrants shape their experiences and opportunities in host countries.

In the realm of education, migrant children often face significant challenges that hinder their ability to integrate successfully. Populist rhetoric can create an environment of hostility in schools, where migrant students may be perceived as outsiders or even blamed for the struggles faced by the local population (Palonen, 2018). This stigma can lead to bullying, discrimination, and social isolation, significantly impacting the emotional and psychological well-being of these children (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Additionally, language barriers and differences in educational backgrounds can further complicate their integration. Schools may lack the necessary resources and training to support non-native speakers, resulting in disparities in academic achievement and engagement (Mayer, 2013). Consequently, many migrant children may fall behind their peers, limiting their educational opportunities and long-term prospects.

Furthermore, the negative perceptions of migrants can influence the attitudes of teachers and school administrators, leading to biased expectations and treatment. In environments where populist sentiments prevail, educators may unconsciously lower their expectations for migrant students, perpetuating a cycle of disadvantage (Soffer, 2022). This systemic bias can result in fewer opportunities for advanced coursework or extracurricular activities, limiting the social networks that are crucial for future success. As a result, the educational system, instead of serving as a vehicle for social mobility, can reinforce existing inequalities, ultimately affecting the broader societal fabric.

In the employment sector, stigmatization often manifests in barriers to job opportunities and professional advancement for migrants. Populist narratives typically portray migrants as competitors for jobs, leading to negative stereotypes that they are less qualified or less committed than native workers (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This perception can result in discriminatory hiring practices, where employers may favor native candidates over equally qualified migrants. Studies have shown that migrants, particularly those from non-Western backgrounds, often face significant hurdles in securing employment, despite possessing relevant skills and qualifications (Pappas, 2019). They may be relegated to low-wage jobs or sectors characterized by high turnover and job insecurity, limiting their economic mobility and integration.

Moreover, even after securing employment, migrants may encounter challenges in the workplace stemming from stigma. They might face harassment, exclusion from social networks, or limited access to professional development opportunities (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This can create a hostile work environment that not only affects job satisfaction but also impacts overall mental health and well-being. The lack of upward mobility can lead to a sense of disillusionment and alienation, reinforcing feelings of being an outsider in their host society (Kymlicka, 2001). 

In terms of healthcare, the stigma surrounding migrants can create significant barriers to accessing essential services. Fear of discrimination or negative treatment can deter migrants from seeking medical care, even when needed (Goodman, 2010). Populist narratives often frame migrants as burdens on public health systems, perpetuating the idea that they are undeserving of resources and services. This perception can lead to healthcare providers exhibiting implicit biases, resulting in inadequate treatment or care (Joppke, 2010). Migrants may experience delays in receiving necessary medical attention, contributing to poorer health outcomes.

Additionally, cultural differences and language barriers can further complicate healthcare access for migrants. Many may struggle to navigate complex healthcare systems or communicate their needs effectively, leading to misunderstandings and misdiagnoses. In some cases, these barriers can prevent migrants from receiving preventive care, increasing their vulnerability to chronic health conditions and exacerbating existing health disparities. 

The impact of these challenges extends beyond individual migrants; it affects families and communities as well. When migrants struggle to integrate into education, employment, and healthcare systems, it creates a cycle of disadvantage that can perpetuate intergenerational poverty and marginalization (Bauer & Becker, 2020). Children of migrants may inherit these challenges, facing compounded obstacles in their own efforts to integrate and succeed. This can lead to a lack of social cohesion, where communities become polarized along lines of nationality, ethnicity, or immigration status. 

To end, the stigmatization of migrants, largely driven by populist narratives, has profound impacts on their social integration across education, employment, and healthcare sectors. These negative perceptions hinder the ability of migrants to access opportunities, contribute to society, and achieve their full potential. The consequences of this marginalization are far-reaching, not only affecting the lives of migrants but also undermining the social fabric of host communities. To foster greater social integration, it is essential to combat harmful stereotypes and promote inclusive policies that recognize and value the contributions of migrants. By addressing these barriers, societies can work towards a more equitable and cohesive future, benefiting everyone involved.

Consequences of Populist Policies on Social Inclusion

Exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion compels us to understand the restrictive measures that impact inclusion and integration. Additionally, it invites us to examine case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of these policies based on varying economic and historical contexts.

Restrictive Policies on Inclusion and Integration

The rise of populist movements across various countries has led to the implementation of restrictive policies that significantly impact social inclusion and integration, particularly for migrants and marginalized communities (Varshney, 2021). These policies are often framed as necessary measures to protect national identity, security, and the interests of the native population, but they frequently create barriers that hinder the full participation of individuals from diverse backgrounds in society.

One of the most significant aspects of restrictive policies is the tightening of immigration laws, which can result in limited pathways for legal residency and citizenship for migrants. Many populist governments have introduced measures that require higher income thresholds, extensive documentation, or language proficiency tests that disproportionately disadvantage less affluent or non-native speakers (Blokker, 2019). Such requirements not only exclude potential immigrants but also create an environment of uncertainty and fear among those already residing in the country (Adamidis, 2021). The fear of deportation or legal repercussions can deter migrants from seeking essential services, including healthcare, education, and employment, thereby exacerbating their marginalization.

Moreover, these policies often reinforce negative stereotypes about migrants, portraying them as potential threats to public safety or as burdens on social services. Populist rhetoric frequently capitalizes on economic anxieties by suggesting that migrants take jobs from locals or strain public resources (Tushnet, 2020). This narrative is particularly powerful during times of economic downturn, where competition for jobs and services is heightened. As a result, policies that restrict access to social benefits for migrants can lead to a situation where these individuals are excluded not only from economic opportunities but also from social protections that are essential for integration (Hammar, 1990).

In many countries, populist leaders have also targeted specific groups of migrants, often based on their nationality, ethnicity, or religion. For example, anti-immigrant laws may specifically affect those from predominantly Muslim countries or refugees fleeing conflict (Schmidt, 2019). This targeted exclusion fosters a climate of division, where certain communities are systematically marginalized. In schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods, this can lead to increased tension and hostility, making it challenging for migrants to form connections with the broader community and hindering their ability to integrate socially (Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 2015). 

Furthermore, restrictive policies on inclusion are often accompanied by a lack of investment in programs that promote social cohesion and integration. For instance, funding for language classes, job training, and cultural exchange initiatives may be cut or deprioritized in favor of enforcement mechanisms aimed at controlling immigration (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This lack of support means that even those migrants who wish to integrate and contribute to their new communities face significant obstacles (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). The absence of inclusive policies sends a clear message that diversity is not welcomed, further entrenching social divisions.

In addition to impacting migrants, these restrictive policies can have broader societal implications. By promoting exclusion rather than inclusion, populist policies undermine the social contract that binds communities together (Bonikowski et al., 2018). This erosion of trust can lead to increased polarization within society, where divisions based on nationality, ethnicity, and class are exacerbated. The resultant societal fragmentation can hinder collective action and diminish the capacity for communities to address common challenges, ultimately impacting national cohesion and stability.

To counteract the negative impacts of these policies, it is crucial for governments and civil society to advocate for more inclusive approaches to social integration. This involves not only reforming immigration laws to create fair and accessible pathways to residency and citizenship but also investing in programs that promote understanding and collaboration among diverse communities (Manby, 2018). By fostering an environment of inclusivity, societies can harness the potential contributions of migrants and build resilient communities that thrive on diversity rather than fear.

Case Studies on Differentiated Effects Based on Economic and Historical Contexts

The consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform; they vary significantly based on the economic and historical contexts of different countries (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Examining case studies from diverse regions provides valuable insights into how populism shapes social inclusion and reveals the complexities of these dynamics.

One notable example is the case of Hungary under PM Orbán. Hungary’s historical context, shaped by its post-communist transition and ongoing struggles with national identity, has made it particularly susceptible to populist rhetoric (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Orbán’s government has employed a narrative that frames immigration as a threat to Hungary’s Christian identity and cultural homogeneity (Becker, 2019). As a result, restrictive policies have been implemented, including the construction of border barriers and the introduction of laws aimed at criminalizing support for asylum seekers.

These measures have had profound effects on social inclusion in Hungary. The narrative of an “us versus them” mentality has resulted in a climate of fear among migrants and refugees, many of whom have faced violence and discrimination (Győrffy, 2018). The historical context of Hungary’s tumultuous past has contributed to a national discourse that prioritizes ethnic homogeneity, leading to the marginalization of diverse groups. Consequently, the restrictive policies have not only limited the rights and opportunities of migrants but have also created a polarized society where fear and hostility thrive (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2018).

In contrast, the case of Canada illustrates a different approach to populism and social inclusion. While Canada has experienced populist movements, its historical context of multiculturalism and immigration has shaped a more inclusive national identity (Triandafyllidou, 2015). Policies that promote diversity and integration, such as the Multiculturalism Act, have fostered an environment where immigrants are seen as valuable contributors to society (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). While populist rhetoric has attempted to challenge this narrative, the overall economic and historical framework has led to a more resilient approach to social inclusion.

Canada’s commitment to welcoming refugees and immigrants has resulted in positive economic outcomes, as diverse groups bring varied skills and perspectives that enrich the workforce. However, challenges remain, particularly in addressing the needs of marginalized communities and combating discrimination (Granovetter, 1973). The contrasting experiences of Hungary and Canada underscore how historical narratives and economic conditions influence the outcomes of populist policies on social inclusion.

Another significant case study is Italy, where the rise of populism under leaders like Matteo Salvini has led to restrictive immigration policies that have profoundly affected social integration. Italy’s historical context, marked by economic challenges and high unemployment rates, has fueled a perception of migrants as competitors for scarce resources (UNHCR, 2012). Salvini’s “Italians First” campaign sought to capitalize on these anxieties, leading to policies that restrict access to social services and legal residency for migrants.

The effects of these policies have been particularly pronounced in regions where economic struggles are most acute. Migrants in Italy often face discrimination in the job market, and many are relegated to precarious employment (OECD, 2020). Additionally, populist rhetoric has fostered an environment where xenophobia is normalized, leading to increased violence against migrant communities (ECRI, 2024). This case illustrates how economic conditions, combined with populist narratives, can exacerbate the challenges faced by marginalized groups, resulting in significant barriers to social inclusion.

In summary, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are shaped by a complex interplay of economic and historical factors. Case studies from Hungary, Canada, and Italy reveal how these dynamics can lead to divergent outcomes in terms of social integration. Understanding these contexts is crucial for addressing the challenges posed by populism and developing strategies that promote inclusivity and social cohesion in increasingly diverse societies. By recognizing the differentiated effects of these policies, stakeholders can work towards creating environments that foster belonging and participation for all members of society.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the role of populism in redefining citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe reveals a complex and often troubling landscape. The emergence of populist movements has significantly influenced citizenship laws and principles, shifting the focus toward more exclusionary practices that prioritize ethnonational identity over inclusive citizenship. Through an analysis of changes in jus soli and jus sanguinis, it is evident that populist rhetoric has led to legislative reforms that reinforce a narrow definition of national belonging, marginalizing migrant communities and reshaping the fabric of European societies.

The implications of these changes extend beyond legal frameworks to the societal level, where public perceptions of migrants are increasingly shaped by populist narratives. These narratives often stigmatize migrants, portraying them as threats to national identity and social cohesion. As a result, migrants face considerable challenges in accessing essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, hindering their social integration and reinforcing systemic inequalities.

Furthermore, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform across Europe; they vary significantly based on historical and economic contexts. Case studies from countries like Hungary, Italy, and Canada illustrate the divergent effects of populism on social inclusion, revealing how economic anxieties and historical narratives shape the experiences of migrants. While some nations adopt restrictive measures that foster division and exclusion, others maintain more inclusive approaches that recognize the contributions of migrants to society.

Ultimately, this exploration underscores the pressing need for a reevaluation of citizenship and social inclusion policies in the face of rising populism. Addressing the challenges posed by exclusionary practices and fostering a more inclusive understanding of citizenship can enhance social cohesion and resilience in diverse societies. To achieve this, it is essential for policymakers, civil society, and communities to work collaboratively in promoting narratives that celebrate diversity, combat discrimination, and advocate for equitable access to rights and opportunities for all individuals, regardless of their background. In doing so, Europe can navigate the complexities of globalization while ensuring that its commitment to fundamental human rights and social justice remains unwavering. 


(*) Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo is a lecturer of political science and Executive Director of the Bureau of Strategic Studies (BESTRAT). He teaches at the University of Yaoundé II and has over 20 years of experience as a leading consultant in peace, security, and defense. With 11 books and more than 30 academic articles, his research focuses on security dynamics in Central Africa and the Lake Chad Basin, addressing issues like terrorism and conflict management. His expertise has contributed to numerous international peacebuilding efforts, and he regularly consults for organizations such as the United Nations System. Email: edouardyogo@yahoo.fr  


 

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Melting icebergs along Greenland's coast.  Photo: Shutterstock.

Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by PiS, AfD, and SD

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Lewis, Morgan. (2025). “Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by PiS, AfD, and SD.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 6, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0047



Abstract

Two major global challenges of recent decades are climate change and populism. While there is a strong scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, social science research highlights how climate change and policy reforms have provoked significant backlash within populist discourse. Despite the clear intersection of these phenomena and the threats they pose to modern democracy, limited literature explores this relationship. This article examines the mechanisms by which right-wing populist (RWP) parties promote climate skepticism or hostility to climate policies. Focusing on the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, the Sweden Democrats (SD), and Alternative for Germany (AfD), this study conducts a rhetorical analysis of their climate communication to investigate how RWP positions align with shifting ideological and electoral contexts. The research employs Scott Consigny’s (1974) rhetorical situation framework and integrates Wodak’s (2015) interdisciplinary approach to populism, establishing a novel methodology for analyzing populist rhetoric. Findings reveal that RWP parties deploy rhetorical strategies such as framing an antagonism between the “elite” and “the people,” prioritizing national self-interest over climate concerns, and using anti-intellectual rhetoric. However, notable differences in rhetorical strategies emerge among the parties due to varying ideological and political contexts, demonstrating the adaptability of populist rhetoric around its ideological ‘center’. This study highlights the interplay between ideological and rhetorical facets of populism in shaping climate communication. By offering a nuanced understanding of how RWP parties engage with climate discourse across contexts, this research provides a foundation for further exploration of climate communication within populist narratives.

Keywords: Climate change, climate skepticism, right-wing populism (RWP), climate communication, anti-intellectualism, Euroscepticism

 

By Morgan Lewis*

Introduction

Contemporary international relations have been increasingly dominated by two salient challenges over recent decades: populism and climate change (Buzogány & Mohammad-Klotzbach, 2021). As right-wing populism (RWP) is on the rise, it has become an increasingly formidable presence in European politics, epitomized by results such as the Brexit referendum and strong electoral performances by Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) in 2024 (Angelos & Nöstlinger, 2024), French National Front (RN) (Forchtner & Lubarda, 2022), and Swedish Democrats (SD) (Diehn, 2022). 

This notable rise in RWP is paralleled by a climate crisis the genesis of which lies at the heart of our economic system. Climate change, as a paradigmatic example of a crisis that demands cosmopolitan and internationally orchestrated action, is contrasted by the fragmentary and nationalist discourse of RWP parties (Mudde, 2004; Huber, 2020). Thus, the global mushrooming of RWP and its congruence to climate skepticism and hostility to action poses a serious threat to global climate targets, as evidenced in a recent report by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, which found that rising populist opposition to climate policies is jeopardizing plans to achieve net zero emissions (Campanela & Lawrence, 2024). 

Indeed, as the more confrontational and transformative decisions on climate change increasingly lie fore front of political debate, understanding how RWP parties promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to action through their rhetoric is essential for generating an appropriate response that allows for a continuation (and acceleration) of decarbonization efforts (Lockwood, 2018). Despite the importance of understanding RWP climate communication, the specific rhetorical mechanisms through which this occurs remains largely unexplored (Lockwood, 2018; Marquardt et al., 2022). It is this lacuna in the relevant literature that forms the basis of this thesis. 

Literature Review

RWP is a longstanding feature of European politics and has attracted considerable interest from social scientists and political commentators. This has been engendered by the recent uprising of RWP movements across Europe (Sandrin, 2021; Ortu, 2014; Greven, 2016; Abromeit, 2017). While the impacts and potential ramifications of the growth of RWP across Europe have been heavily debated, there is a noticeable dearth of literature on how RWP parties promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to action on climate change. The most current literature suggests that climate skepticism is associated with conservative ideological positions, with many studies findings a correlation to institutional distrust, a preference for a small state, and the belief that environmentalism is stereotypically feminine (Huber, 2020; Atanasova & Koteyko, 2017; Jylha et al., 2020). In line with this, the literature on right-wing environmental communication also details how right-wing actors cast doubt over climate science to legitimize normative claims about climate change for ideological and political purposes (Carvalho, 2007; McCright & Dunlap, 2008).

However, few accounts directly interrogate the nature of the relationship between populism and climate skepticism. Mudde’s (2004) article interprets populism broadly as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology in which the fundamental cleavage in society is framed as between a ‘corrupt elite’ and ‘pure people,’ evoking a sovereign demos. More recent scholarship has conceptualized RWP as being marked by themes such as democratic backsliding and the erosion of institutions of the ‘liberal order,’ such as feminism or pacifism (Moghissi, 2016; Klein, 2018). The congruence of RWP and hostility to climate action is argued to be a consequence of both the ideological composition of RWP, which frames the ‘climate agenda’ as elitist and antithetical to national interest, and the changing structural conditions in many countries that have ‘left behind’ portions of the population. Indeed, within this framing, climate policies are conveyed as further extension of these processes of modernization and globalization that reflect the interests of an elite class that do not serve the population at large (Lockwood, 2018). Many recent examples illustrate this point, such as the AfD’s opposition to the Green New Deal, arguing it would harm farmers (Chatham House, 2024), and the Spanish Vox party’s claims that climate policies are part of a globalist agenda aimed at damaging Spain while benefiting China (Mathiesen, 2022). 

However, there are severe limitations to the current literature on this connection between RWP and climate skepticism. Limited research has examined the specific rhetorical devices used by populist parties to promote these views, despite their importance in understanding the dynamics of this relationship. Moreover, much of the literature does not differentiate between distinct RWP parties, often treating them as part of a broader regional or global phenomenon. An exception is Gemenis et al. (2012), who, after surveying 13 RWP parties across 12 EU countries, concluded that “party positions on this issue [anthropogenic global warming] are clearly anti-environmental.” My research addresses these cleavages in the literature, and in doing so will contribute to the literature by establishing a framework to better understand the linkages between the expansion and deepening of populist rhetoric in political discourse and climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate action. To best do this, I will analyze how this rhetoric is shaped by domestic political contexts, how these rhetorical devices differ between party contexts, and the implications for future climate change communication in the context of continued RWP electoral success. 

Methods and Structure

Regarding the chosen method for this study, I will undertake a qualitative, comparative analysis of three European populist parties. The relevant primary data I will be assessing will be speeches, interviews, or statements regarding climate change/climate policies, with a broader investigative framework also considering party manifesto transcripts and member magazines. Secondary sources will include monographs and academic journals. Due to language barriers, much of my primary data will be translated or collected via English-speaking media outlets/journals. 

This choice of methods is appropriate for two reasons: first, as I intend to perform a rhetorical analysis to inductively examine populist climate communication, a quantitative research approach is unnecessary as I am not seeking to quantify or provide a value for how populist leaders espouse hostility to climate policies. Second, a comparative research design enables me to assess RWP parties in relation to one-another, providing more insight into how domestic political contexts affect rhetorical choices as-well as mitigating the danger of individual examples reducing the more general applicability of my results (Clark et al., 2019).

I will be examining Poland’s PiS, Germany’s AfD, and Sweden’s SD. I have chosen these European parties as they provide a broad range in terms of the vehemence of their opposition to climate mitigating policies, with all members categorized as either ‘denialists/skeptical’ or ‘disengaged/cautious’ on their climate policies by Schaller and Carious’s (2019) study. Moreover, I have selected all European parties, with all three operating within EU states that share similar constitutional structures as this allows me to gain greater insight into the similarities and differences of populist rhetoric in broadly similar contexts.

My research project will be structured as follows: Section two will outline my methodology, through which my qualitative framework will be employed to answer my research question. Through doing so I will elucidate Consigny’s ‘rhetorical situation,’ an assessment of Wodak’s interdisciplinary interpretation of populism, and an analysis of the association between nationalism, climate change and RWP. Section three will implement a rhetorical analysis of each chosen political party. Section four, following the rhetorical analysis, will discuss the results and outline the implications of this research.

Methodology

In this section, I will outline the methodology employed in this thesis. By examining Scott Consigny’s theory of the rhetorical situation, I will demonstrate why this theoretical lens is the most suitable for the analysis. Additionally, I will evaluate and justify the selected methodology for studying populism, which aligns with Ruth Wodak’s interdisciplinary approach, highlighting its effectiveness for analyzing RWP positions on climate policy. Finally, this section will conclude with a summary of the intersection between populism, nationalism, and climate change.

The Rhetorical Situation

This study will use Scott Consigny’s notion of the rhetorical situation – referring to a determinate situation fueled by a problem – as a theoretical prism to inform and frame the later rhetoric analysis (Consigny, 1974). This framework provides an excellent foundation for interpretively understanding the rhetoric of the chosen right-wing populist (RWP) parties as it considers both the context and constraints that shape the construction of rhetoric, and the creative agency of the speaker to shape audiences’ perspectives in indeterminate situations. 

According to Consigny, there are three core aspects of the rhetorical situation: i) The Exigence/Urgency: which is a problem than can be modified by the audience; a defect of the status quo to which the rhetor responds. ii) The Audience:those with the capacity to act on the speaker’s message and mediate change. iii) Constraints: The limitations that shape the rhetorical situation and influence how the speaker responds, these can encompass cultural, social, historical, political, and technological factors.

Consigny’s theory initially came as an instructive intermediary between two theories of rhetorical political analysis: the positivist approach of Bitzer (1968) which emphasizes the importance of the situation in compelling the speaker to act on an exigence; and the constructivist approach of Vatz (1973) who emphasizes the agency of the speaker in actively shaping the situation through rhetoric. These origins of birth provide the strength of this framework for this thesis as its epistemological underpinnings balance the dual concerns of the poststructuralist and positivist rhetorical traditions that preceded it. Thus, by considering both the agency of the speaker to maneuver within their context, and the constraints created by their context, this approach offers a more complete understanding of how rhetoric is formulated and its implications (Consigny, 1974). 

Martin (2013) describes how overall, rhetorical analysis can be understood as an examination of how political actors’ ‘appropriate’ situations through interventions in which they deploy ideas that reorient the audiences’ perspective (Martin, 2013). Rhetoric, in this framework, can be considered akin to projectile-like ideas that move outward and displace the surrounding context (Consigny, 1976; Vatz, 1973). This is particularly useful for analysis of climate policy since how an audience comprehends climate change/policy is central to gaining the mass momentum required to reach net-zero. 

The importance of rhetoric in climate communication is supported by the most recent literature. As Nordensvard and Ketola (2021) note, the ambiguity surrounding climate change creates considerable space—what Consigny identifies as the ‘existential dimension’—for rhetors to creatively restructure the situation and reshape the electorate’s perspectives on climate change and policy. This is done as the rhetors—in this case, politicians—select argumentative structures (what Consigny identifies as ‘topics’) that are germane to the situation, enabling them to determine the form of persuasion that best fits the particularities of the issue (Lanham, 1991). Therefore, the actor can creatively resituate the situation, granting them considerable agency to construct narratives relating to the exigence—in this case, climate change and policy. 

This theoretical lens is also uniquely suited for assessing populist ideology, which is operationalized via a communication style that relies on established ideological focal points, namely nationalism and anti-elitism, which form a restricted core morphology (Mudde, 2004; Canovan, 2001). Accordingly, within this study, this theoretical framework will allow us to comparatively assess the narrative frames or ‘topics’ used by RWP party politicians, while also accounting for the contextual and structural constraints faced by each party and the creative agency of each actor. Thus, this interpretative approach emphasizes the value of historical and cultural context while also considering the rhetor’s agency to navigate their situation.

This framework of analysis is superior to other forms of hermeneutics for this analysis. An oft-used approach in reference to RWP is Critical Discourse Analysis as it provides an approach that embeds language in power and social inequality, thus utilizing a broader theoretical scope (Fairclough, 2013; Krotofil & Motak, 2018). However, as a mechanism for rhetorical meaning-making it is too broadly focused, taking as its object the “general domain of signs and symbolic exchanges [while] rhetoric specifies quite determinate techniques, devices and strategies” (Martin, 2022: 170). Consigny’s rhetorical situation rigorously assesses how language is used to influence an audience by identifying which rhetorical strategies are being employed, creating a more focused framework for comparative political analysis.

Having established a theoretical framework for rhetorical political analysis, I can move on to outlining a methodological understanding of populism.

How to Analyze Right-Wing Populism: An Interdisciplinary Approach

The contemporary literature on populism has posed significant methodological questions regarding how it should be interpreted, as De Cleen (2012: 1) notes, “one of the most used and abused terms inside and outside academia is undoubtedly populism.” The central focus of populist movements is regarded broadly as an emphasis on the inadequacy of the ‘corrupt governing elite’ to effectively respond to ‘general will’ of the ‘pure people’ (Huber at al., 2020; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). However, the marked increase in the prominence of populism globally has brought about significant debate on the potential causes and implications of its recent resurgence (Abromeit, 2017). These methodological debates have resulted in a significant breadth of literature on how to evaluate RWP, which I will now interrogate to demonstrate the applicability of this thesis for studying RWP.  

Scholars such as Jagers & Walgrave (2007) define populism as a political communication style devoid of any coherent or consistent ideological content or principles that guide it, the essence of which exists in its performative rhetoric and communication. This rhetoric appeals to abstract notions of ‘the people’, villainizes the establishment, and embellishes certain emotional tropes (Moffit, 2016; Nordensvard & Ketola, 2021). 

Others such as Laclau (2006) shift the focus to the ontology of populism, arguing that populism represents a method of articulating those demands via a performative structuring logic that discursively constructs collective identities between groups. Another dominant school of thought in the literature focuses on the ideologically substantive aspects of populism (Freeden, 2017; Stanley, 2008). In this view, populism is conceived as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology which views of politics as an “expression of the volonté généale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). Thus, populism is interpreted as an existing ideology, which operates through a severely restricted but identifiable morphology that utilizes a small number of core concepts oriented around ‘people-centrism,’ anti-elitism and often an inclination toward authoritarianism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). 

In view of these competing methodologies, truly interdisciplinary approaches to analyzing populism have been lacking (Marquardt et al., 2022). Recent literature has sought to remedy these blind spots. Following this, populism will be interpreted in line with Wodak’s discourse-historical approach, outlined in The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (Wodak, 2015). This study interprets RWP as a dynamic mixture of both style (the rhetorical devices being deployed) and substance (the ideological focal points around which RWP operates). Wodak’s approach establishes a methodology for studying populism that acknowledges the ideological content of RWP discourse, without reducing it to a “frivolity of form, prose and style” (Wodak, 2015: 3) which would downplay important aspects of how RWP resonates with the audience (Pels, 2012). This methodology for populism creates an interpretation of populism that “does not only relate to the form of rhetoric but to its specific contents” (Wodak, 2015: 1). 

Wodak’s interpretation is well-equipped for this thesis because it acknowledges how populism is both a form of communication and an ideology, which utilizes rhetorical devices to mobilize political support around certain ideas. Populist modes of communication thus help to “form expectations [and] shore up confidence” (Beckert & Bronk, 2018: 1-2), by helping guide people’s sensemaking facilities around the climate issues. Moreover, her study is primarily focused on Europe, therefore the ideological content she identifies is applicable to the ideologically ‘thick’ established politics of Germany, Poland and Sweden around which the ‘thin-centered’ populist ideology wraps itself. This enables a point of departure for my rhetorical analysis that is easily operationalized into a European context. One of the central content areas of populism identified by Wodak is nationalism. As such, this study will now turn to the intersection between nationalism, RWP and climate change to gain a more complete picture of its relevance for understanding climate skepticism. 

RWP, Nationalism and Climate Change: Patterns of Association

Wodak argues that, while there is no overarching explanation for the resurgence of RWP within Europe, certain phenomena transcend the ‘micro-politics’ of RWP, thereby providing a suitable framework for broader political analysis. The primary trend she identifies is the creeping ‘renationalization’ of EU politics (Wodak, 2015; Abromeit, 2017). As the ‘nation-state’ remains the dominant context for democratic political representation, populism operates via the vector of nationalism as the previously sharp distinction between nationalism and RWP becomes increasingly blurred (Brubaker, 2019; De Cleen, 2017). For Wodak (2015), RWP parties offer clear-cut answers for the electorate by constructing scapegoats and common enemies, as Pelinka (2013: 8) argues, “populism simplifies complex developments by looking for a culprit.” Which groups are selected depends largely on local political, economic, and historic contexts due to the adaptive plasticity of populist ideology. 

Contemporary RWP mobilizes less against a common enemy, and more against a (perceived) enemy from abroad by strategically selecting the ‘other.’ The ‘elites,’ in this view, play a key role as the secondary defining ‘others,’ who are represented as responsible for the modernizing trends that threaten the nation (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). These elites exist at regional and global stages, with organizations such as the EU and the United Nations being central to European RWP rhetoric (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). This results in a proclivity for conspiratorial thinking, with phenomena deemed to be damaging to the ‘nation-state’ being easily dismissible as elitist projects. Climate change here is reflective of a threat to the innately territorial and bordered nature of nationalism as a fundamentally borderless phenomenon. In this sense, the canopy comfort of a nationalist morphology encourages skepticism (Conversi, 2020; Ghosh, 2018). 

In summary, this section has outlined the theoretical framework of the rhetorical situation, its relevance for this study, and how it can be operationalized for analysis of RWP rhetoric. This section then explained the chosen methodology for populism, the usefulness of an interdisciplinary approach and the importance of nationalism as an ideological focal point for populist discourse. In sum, it has established a unique and valuable approach for analysis of RWP rhetoric.

Research and Analysis

Following the inductive question motivating this research, this study will now examine the selected RWP parties to uncover the rhetorical strategies they use to promote climate skepticism and/or hostility toward action on climate change. Drawing on our operational methodology for populism, the chosen primary and secondary sources are well-suited for analysis. To perform my analysis, I have accessed primary data through interview transcripts, conference statements, and parliamentary proposals/statements. Due to language barriers, a broader investigative framework will include quotes from online newspapers, articles, and academic journals.                        

This section outlines the context of each political party to inform the rhetorical political analysis, followed by an exploration of how the different rhetorical devices employed promote certain views on climate policy. This analysis is based on the notion that the statements made by various politicians within the chosen parties are interconnected, allowing the process of meaning-making to extend to the entire party.  

The Law and Justice Party (PiS)

Context

Poland is widely perceived as a laggard within the EU in terms of its climate ambitions. Identified as ‘disengaged/cautious’ by Carius & Schaller’s (2019) study of European climate agendas, the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) has prioritized economic development and energy security over climate protection (Biedenkopf, 2021; Lockwood, 2018; Judge & Maltby, 2017). Its strong opposition towards climate-friendly policies is illustrated through it being one of the last nations to put forth a decarbonization plan at the recent COP26 negotiations, after it reversed its decision to phase out coal by 2030 (Burki, 2021). Moreover, on a European level, its opposition to climate treaties such as the European Green Deal and the EU emissions trading scheme evidence its lack of ambition (Szulecki & Ancygier, 2015; KPMG, 2021). An important context for the PiS’s energy policies is Poland’s high reliance on indigenous coal supplies – which forms upwards of 70% of its energy supply (Notes From Poland, 2022). 

The PiS is an interesting case as it is the only selected party that has enjoyed complete political power after being elected in 2015, and again in 2019, while losing power in 2023, and enjoying the support of incumbent President Andrej Duda throughout (Cadier & Szulecki, 2020). Żuk & Szulecki (2020) argue that the PiS is a clear example of a RWP party, with an ideology that blends support for conservative ‘traditional’ values, nativist objection to immigration and nationalism (Kulesza & Rae, 2017). These form the ‘thick’ ideological bases around which the PiS construct a populist layer via a style of communication juxtaposing the ‘elites’ and Polish ‘people’ (Wodak, 2015).

Analysis 

These topics form the key narratives used by the PiS, acting as nodal points through which climate change rhetoric is oriented: i) Anti-intellectualism and scientific dissent over the existence of climate change. ii) Climate policy as elitist and a threat to national sovereignty and economic competitiveness

Scientific Dissent and Anti-intellectualism

A key layer of Wodak’s ideological micro-politics of populism is the construction of scapegoats and enemies via a discourse of an untrustworthy elite. This theme, as anticipated, was evident in PiS rhetoric with anti-elite frames being used to promote skepticism over the validity of climate science/climate policy (Faiola, 2016). Anna Zalewska, former PiS Minister of Education, when proposing the removal of anthropogenic climate change from school curriculums, claimed: “There is really no global warming because ice should melt in the Arctic, and it is growing. Why do they tell us otherwise? Because it’s cosmic money; ecologists earn such money on this warming” (via Nowak, 2016).

Furthermore, PiS leader and former deputy PM Jaroslaw Kaczyński has said that: “At least some of this so-called green policy is madness, [it is based on] theories without evidence” (Notes from Poland, 2021). He further argued that: “The climate is changing, but it’s not our fault. We’re not going to kill our industry just because some people in Brussels think they know better than us” (Reuters, 2018). 

Additionally, former PiS Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski attempted to draw a more overt connection between pro-climate politics and Marxism, claiming that PiS’s predecessors acted “according to a Marxist model which has to automatically develop in one direction only—a new mixture of cultures and races, a world made up of cyclists and vegetarians who only use renewable energy” (Żuk & Żuk, 2018).

Disputing the viability of science and their motives is an important element of PiS discourse. 

Throughout the primary data, terms such as ‘Brussels,’ the ‘EU,’ ‘Ecologists’ and ‘Marxists’ were used interchangeably (based on the context) to denote an external and elitist enemy. Behind these quotes, a hidden ideology underpins RWP’s tendency toward conspiratorial thinking, which is the view that knowledge is always reflective of a form of power projection. Thus, by clearly defining the nation’s ‘enemies,’ the ‘people-elite’ dichotomy is re-emphasized while climate policy is presented as a means through which artificially constructed enemies exert power over the Polish nation (Wodak, 2015). 

This is exacerbated by the ambiguous and complicated nature of climate change, in addition to most climate communication being top-down from prestigious scientific institutions or government bodies which provides considerable space for RWP politicians to portray these issues as sinister elitist projects. This topic invokes nationalist and anti-EU sentiment as the foreign origins of climate policy is rhetorically foregrounded, inviting the audience to view climate policy and its proponents as similarly foreign. Pelinka (2013) observes that contemporary populist anti-elitism does not purely mobilize against an enemy, but a foreign enemy who are seen to be responsible for Europeanization and globalization. As noted by Laclau (2006: 648), “populism displaces the imminent social antagonism into the antagonism between the unified people and its external enemy.”

Another facet of this rhetoric topic is that it effectively illustrates what Wodak (2015: 2) identifies as the “arrogance of ignorance,” which refers to how RWP “appeals to common sense and anti-intellectualism [marking] a return to pre-modernist or pre-enlightenment thinking.” Phrases such as “some people in Brussels think they know better than us,”“because ice should melt in the arctic and it is growing” (see above quotations) communicate how expert views are framed as another mechanism through which elites seek to centralize authority to the disadvantage of the people (Brewer, 2016; Merkley, 2020).

Climate Policy as a Threat to Polish Sovereignty and Economic Competitiveness 

The EU’s institutions and political processes, while not the exclusive target of PiS, are typically in the firing line when attempts are made to undermine climate-friendly policies (Fuksiewicz & Klein, 2014). This rhetorical strategy occurs through a prism of national self-interest. As Wodak argues, the ‘renationalization’ of European politics is a core feature of RWP, with the nationalist leanings of PiS evidenced by the Health, Work and Family Programme (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2014), which stated: “We will not lead Poland into any voluntary arrangements increasing the extent of European integration that do not meet the criterion of being clearly beneficial for Polish interests.” This rhetorical topic is commonly operationalized around the notion that climate policy unjustly threatens Polish sovereignty, and in particular the long-term viability of the Polish coal industry (Biedenkopf, 2021). 

Krzysztof Szczerski, former PiS head of office, speaking on the EU’s Energy Union, stated: “Can it be called anything else than the death of Polish coal?… So, we eliminate our own energy resource and become even more addicted to imports” (wPolityce, 2015). Furthermore, in 2018, at COP24, Andrzej Duda stated: “There is no plan to abandon coal in Poland. Coal is our strategic raw material. We have supplies for 200 years, and it is difficult to give up coal, thanks to which we have sovereignty.” He followed this by claiming: “As long as I am president, I will not allow anyone to murder the coal industry. It’s because we have such deeply ingrained traditions in this industry, of which St. Barbara’s Day is a part—a part that is actually included in the list of our heritage” (TVP World, 2018).

These quotations effectively demonstrate an important intersection between climate change and the nationalist ideology – resource nationalism. This phenomenon is evident in PiS rhetoric and is employed by many RWP parties as a strategy that sacralizes soil-rooted national resources as a suggested common good, despite the small proportion of people that reap the benefits of their exploitation (Conversi, 2020). As fossil fuels are often framed as part of Poland’s cultural heritage and a source of sovereignty and economic growth, not only is coal extraction justified, but any proposals threatening its viability are presented as a threat to collective Polish well-being. However, this discourse rarely addresses the inherent contradiction of the intergenerational national catastrophe that continued coal exploitation and associated emissions will cause (Kim, 2019).

This argumentative strategy links PiS rhetoric directly to my methodology, as national self-interests form the ideological substance around which the thin ideology of populism wraps itself. While more recent PiS rhetoric contains frequent references to their intent to overhaul the coal industry and make it harmonious with global climate ambitions, as stated by Andrzej Duda in 2018: “[The coal industry] must be kept, although it needs modernisation and reform” (TVP World, 2018). These can be viewed as attempts to reappropriate and manage the rhetorical situation in the context of the growing pressures to decarbonize through attempts to align Polish industry with modern climate commitments, despite the fanciful notion that Poland can achieve carbon neutrality while reliant on coal (Wójcik-Jurkiewicz et al., 2021). 

Closely linked to discourse on energy security, the PiS also invoked the supposed threat climate-friendly policies pose to Polish economic competitiveness. The PiS Party Programme (2014) stated: “The biggest obstacle in the field of electricity production is the climate policy imposed by the European Union” and went on to state they will not lead Poland into any European climate arrangements “which do not meet the criterion of being clearly beneficial for Polish interests”(Fuksiewicz & Klein, 2014). Dismissing climate policies for economic reasons constitutes what Forchtner & Lubarda (2022) identify as the imagined economic pragmatism existing in far-right political discourse. In this sense, the PiS objection to climate policies can be embedded in a wider theme within their rhetoric that challenges the suggested unfair economic arrangements brought by globalization and European integration (Marquardt et al., 2022). 

Although, seeming contrary to what was outlined in my above methodology, PiS rhetoric on the economic cost of climate policies is far from cohesive. This is demonstrated through statements such as that of Konrad Szymanski, Minister for European Affairs, who stated that: “We should take into account not only the costs of the transformation in themselves but also the costs of the lack of transformation…there is the impression that the lack of transformation generates zero costs for the economy” (Biedenkopf, 2021). While the majority of PiS rhetoric villainizes climate policy, these important exceptions to the rule demonstrate that PiS climate communication is not monolithic, with a range of differing constraints and contexts shaping the rhetoric of individual speakers. In this case, there is an acknowledgement of the gravity of the crisis, and the long-term benefits of climate action, differing from the short-term and reactionary rhetoric of many RWP parties (Antonio, 2019). This acknowledgment also has important implications for policy decisions, evidenced by the PiS support for developing smaller scale renewable energy forms, such as solar panels (Lockwood, 2018). 

In summary, analysis of this rhetoric shows how PiS discourse on climate change can be distilled into several key rhetorical devices that employ some of the central aspects of Wodak’s interpretation of populism. The PiS consistently frame climate policy as an elitist conspiracy, with anti-intellectual rhetoric utilized to invite the listener to view climate policy/science as a means of power projection and a threat, alluded to via references to ‘Marxists’ ‘ecologists’ or ‘Brussels’ which represent a foreign enemy to the rhetorical audience (Polish electorate). This topic intersects with the broader villainization of pro-climate policies and its proponents, with organizations such as the EU and/or UN cast as elitist in a Manichean worldview. Furthermore, PiS rhetoric portrays climate policy as a threat to Polish sovereignty and economic competitiveness via a discourse of resource nationalism. While several PiS actors have produced rhetoric that demonstrates an appreciation of the long-term economic benefit of integration, the majority remains insular and nationalist. 

Swedish Democrats (SD)

Context

The Swedish Democrats (SD) are the second largest party in the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) after gaining 20.5% of the vote in the 2022 Swedish general election, their best ever electoral performance (Diehn, 2022). A former pariah party associated with fringe neo-Nazi movements, the SD has seen an astonishing rise in recent years after denounced its extremist roots and pursuing more populist dimensions. The SD, through taking a broadly Eurosceptic and anti-establishment stance, has sought to profile itself as a party free from elitism and ideological constraints, and thus free to represent the true will of ‘the people’ (Mudde, 2004; Wodak, 2015; Tomson, 2020). The SD’s ideology, which is rooted in nativism, nationalism, and social conservativism, has also integrated climate change/climate policy into their broader populist frame as it becomes an increasingly salient political issue (Emilsson, 2018). 

The SD’s official stance is that climate change is a real and pressing issue; however, the party’s rhetoric has frequently disputed scientific findings and is categorized as “deniers and skeptics” in Carius and Schaller’s 2019 study (Vilhma et al., 2021). The SD was the only Swedish party not to vote in favor of ratifying the Paris Climate Agreement, and they have strongly opposed the government’s climate strategy, particularly regarding wind power development and environmental taxes, as illustrated by their 2019 vote against increasing the aviation fuel tax (Bierbach, 2019; Hofverberg, 2022).

An important context for the SD climate change rhetoric is Sweden’s history as a global leader in environmental politics. Sweden is ranked 5th on the Environmental Performance Index and, as Lockwood (2018) notes, Nordic political discourse at large contains less outright climate denial compared to Anglophone countries due to climate denial carrying less political capital, which can be considered a limitation on Swedish climate skeptical rhetoric (EPI, 2022; Bäckstrand & Kronsell, 2015). 

Analysis 

These rhetorical topics have been identified as the central argumentative structures used to promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate action: i) Climate nationalism and eco-populism; ii) Promoting ambivalence and challenging universalized forms of knowledge production; ii) Climate policy as a threat to traditional lifestyles.

Climate Nationalism and Eco-populism  

As climate change has been getting more space in SD discourse following extreme weather events, in particular widespread wildfires in June 2018, the SD have sought to manage this changing context – or ‘exigence’ – by utilizing a variety of rhetorical strategies. One such topic has been to acknowledge the crisis, while simultaneously denying Sweden’s responsibility to make drastic emissions cuts. 

This topic was evident in the SD 2022 manifesto, which stated: “Sweden does not contribute to reduced emissions by raising fuel prices and making it more expensive for companies to operate in Sweden if China can increase its emissions every year by more than what all of Sweden emits” (Party Programme, 2022: 24). Moreover, in a 2020/21 motion the SD claimed: “In many places, there is a lack of basic insight that Sweden or the EU alone can control global carbon dioxide emissions to a significant extent.” And that: “When the EU decided on the burden sharing, Sweden was given the most ambitious emission reduction requirements by all countries. This is strange in light of the fact that Sweden’s emissions of greenhouse gases per capita are already well below the average for industrialized countries” (Motion 2020/21: 727). 

This topic demonstrates an acceptance of the scientific consensus, while refocusing issues of climate reform onto developing nations, such as China, while framing Sweden as having already serviced its debt and ‘done its share’ (Wodak, 2015). This climate nationalist rhetoric has been identified by the literature as a key strategy of RWP actors to recenter discussions of decarbonization away from their nation by inviting the listener to view it as both ineffectual and unjust (Bang & Schreurs, 2010; Kashwan et al., 2022). As Dubash (2019) notes, the “turn toward nationalism…has created a short-term, looking-out-for-our-own mentality that is inimical to the global collective action needed to address climate change.” This rhetoric not only centralizes Swedish national interest, but also normatively reasserts the nation-state as the primary actor when setting climate policy by inviting the listener to view it as an issue to be addressed by siloed and self-serving nations, instead of intergovernmental institutions (Forchtner & Kølvraa, 2015). 

This embeds SD rhetoric firmly into my previously outlined methodology as it promotes a populist framing of ‘us versus them’ wrapped around a nationalist ideology. Sweden’s environmentally progressive context and the mainstream presentation the SD are trying to establish could have limited the effectiveness of more overt climate denial. However, this rhetorical strategy still establishes a discourse that is antithetical to the collective climate action that is needed (Margulies, 2021). 

This topic of climate nationalism closely linked to another rhetorical strategy to promote hostility to climate action identified in my analysis: eco-populism. While not anticipated in my methodology, the ecological inclination of RWP parties has been heavily discussed in recent literature (Forchtner, 2019; Sconfienza, 2022). This narrative was present in the SD’s 2018 manifesto which stated that: “Sweden alone cannot solve the world’s environmental problems, so we want to protect our unique natural environment and take our share of responsibility for the global challenges, while our environmental considerations are based on love and care for our own homeland” (Party Programme, 2018: 18).

The SD romanticization of the local environment is identified by Fochtner (2019) as a form of “ethno-nationalist imagery according to which ‘the people’ is rooted, and emerged from, a particular space.” By attributing value to the symbiotic relationship between the ‘nation’ and the ‘homeland,’ the SD promote a nature-nation-purity nexus. This rhetorical strategy crafts a narrative in which support for the local environment via domestic governance and traditions stands in opposition to global environmental issues such as climate change, which are supported by cosmopolitan institutions/elites and supported by a range of foreign traditions, considered as ‘other,’ embedding this topic into a populist frame (Sconfienza, 2022). As the audience is invited to view ecological purity as an important facet of Swedish nationalist imagery, the importance of a nationalist environmentalist frame is reified while less importance is placed on climate change and global climate cooperation, which is dismissible as a transient issue (Hultgren, 2015).

Promoting Climate Ambivalence and Challenging Universalized Forms of Knowledge Production

The SD’s approach to climate change is characterized by ambiguity, as seen in statements such as: “The debate among researchers is alive about the consequences of different levels of temperature increase” (Motion 2020/21: 727). This quote underpins how the SD seeks to sow doubt over the scientific consensus by emphasizing the ‘aliveness’ of the climate change ‘debate.’

Moreover, this argumentative structure demonstrates how the SD questions the notion of universalized mechanisms of knowledge production for political means. Marquardt et al. (2022) argue that RWP parties utilize not only anti-elitist and anti-cosmopolitan arguments but also question the forms of knowledge production and experience upon which climate action is based. This was illustrated by Josef Fransson, an SD Politician, who emphasized the benefits of CO2 emissions in a 2015 article, claiming: “The soil [will] become greener, and crops grow larger due to the plants’ greater access to carbon dioxide” (Hultman et al., 2020). More recently, SD politician Elsa Widding, when denying the severity of climate change, argued that: “The last time that was the case was in the 1960s when summers either stopped or became so short that we couldn’t produce a harvest” (The Local, 2022). 

Parallel to the SD, online far-right media within Sweden also employ these rhetorical tools to sow distrust around climate science, with media sites such as Nya Tider claiming “climate threat-sceptics have identified a series of basic problems with climate science as it is presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Among these are deviations from the scientific method, the accuracy of climate models, modelling of the carbon cycle and questionable data adjustments” (Björklund, 2018a). Promotion of ambivalence around the scientific method reflects how the Swedish far-right utilize these rhetorical topics to frame science and the scientific method as a tool of cosmopolitan, supranational institutions or secondary ‘others,’ dismissing these institutions and forms of knowledge production as both fallible and the product of a corrupt elite.

This constitutes what Jasanoff (2010) argues is the prioritization of subjective and local experiences over the apolitical and universal imaginary of bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The SD, by strategically creating tension between these competing epistemic worldviews – the local and the cosmopolitan – makes climate change a politicized and contestable issue as the epistemology being prioritized reflects a broader worldview. By reframing climate change with an emphasis on subjective personal experiences regarding ‘past short summers’ or ‘the positive effects of carbon,’ the SD are also posing a challenge to the forms of knowledge that bolster the scientific consensus and justify climate reform (Marquardt et al., 2022). This topic leads to personal experience constituting knowledge that is valued higher than the positivist knowledge claims of climate policy proponents. Wodak’s concept of the “arrogance of ignorance” (2015: 2) underscores this phenomenon, referring to the tendency of RWP communication to legitimize forms of truth conceived as the ‘common-sense’ of the people, while delegitimizing climate science.

Climate Policy as a Threat to Traditional Lifestyles  

The SD have often utilized a rhetorical pattern portraying climate policy, and its advocates as a cavalry of elites that threaten traditional lifestyles and industries. Wodak, (2015), as outlined previously, identifies RWP’s proclivity for scapegoating elites as the process of creating secondary defining ‘others,’ who are villainized based off their apparent responsibility for the modernizing policies and trends that threaten the nation-state and its traditions.  

This is evident throughout SD climate communication, as seen when stating: “The goal of a more environmentally friendly society should be achieved primarily through awareness raising, technological development, and positive incentives…not through a one-sided focus on punishing ‘undesirable’ lifestyles” (Sverigedemokraternas principprogram, 2019). This notion was also evidenced when claiming: “There is no indication that free people [should] refrain from travel and a good standard of living, nor should it be the aim of politics” (Motion 2019/20: 2682). As evidenced, SD climate rhetoric invites the listener to view climate policy as a threat to people’s lifestyle, thus creating a dichotomous perspective that positions climate reform as antithetical to the interests of the citizens. In this case, the ruling government is positioned as the ‘elites,’ reflecting the SD’s position as an opposition party in the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament). 

This topic is made more evident when the SD discuss specific policy issues, such as the petrol/diesel and carbon tax: “Aggressive taxation and policies focused on cities have turned the car into a class issue…for the vast majority of people the car is not a luxury but a necessity.” Moreover, the SD argued that: “Today, environmental taxes far exceed the cost of emissions. The car has become a cash cow for the government” (Party Programme, 2022: 27). These quotes demonstrate how climate policy is framed as antagonistic to aspects of modern life, such as individual car ownership, which are simultaneously portrayed as unproblematic. These discursive appropriations are supported by Hultman et al. (2020), who argue that RWP hostility to climate change is partly rooted in a refusal to recognize the inherent issues in modern lifestyles, rates of consumption, and capitalist modes of production which in part caused the current ecological crisis (Pulé & Hultman, 2019). This argumentative structure links to Wodak (2015) argument that RWP utilizes/constructs a ‘politics of fear’ to mobilize support around their party as the vindicators of these ‘harmless’ lifestyles, and therefore as the only truly representatives of ‘the people.’

Outside of direct party sources, parallels can be drawn here to Swedish anti-COVID discourse, with Önnerfors (2024) noting how similar rhetorical devices are employed in a range of so-called protest songs. One example includes Swedish artist Christoffer Lundquist’s, whose song ‘Vi är fria’ employed distinct rhetorical devices to promote skepticism about the role of the government in pushing vaccinations and COVID restrictions by urging brave truthtellers who “have truth and meaning” (Lundquist, 2021) to take back control as a unified grassroots movement against a suggested evil and overreaching state (Hughes et al, 2021: 7). The rhetorical devices emphasizing subjective ‘common sense’ knowledge are contrasted with the machinations of a vaguely defined elite, which threaten the freedom and lifestyles of the ‘people.’ Similar to the SD’s, these rhetorical topics position the government as a malicious elite in a quest to return the freedoms and traditional lifestyles which they claim have been lost. This wider discourse speaks to how RWP seeks to position the policies of a corrupt elite – such as through climate or pro-vaccination policy – against the suggested interest of the ‘people’ and diffuse claims of freedom and tradition.  

In summary, the SD employ various rhetorical devices to promote ambivalence and/or hostility to climate action. While important constraints limit the SD’s ability to formulate rhetoric, such as Sweden’s strong environmentally progressive ethos, SD actors creatively employ rhetorical devices to promote hostility to climate policy in ways that demonstrate some fundamental aspects of Wodak’s interpretation of RWP, while also differing in some unexpected ways. One such topic was climate nationalism, which directed the focus of the rhetoric audience away from domestic reform onto developing nations. Interestingly, this topic also intersected with eco-populism which was prevalent in SD climate discourse and sought to promote ecological purity within a nationalist frame, thereby positioning climate change and international climate cooperation as secondary to the importance of securing the ‘homeland’ ecology. 

SD’s rhetoric challenged the epistemologies underpinning climate science and in doing so, delegitimizing climate policy/expertise and its associated worldview while prioritizing subjective and local ‘common-sense’ knowledge forms. Moreover, closely associated with this topic, the SD depicted climate policy as an elitist threat to the lifestyles of the Swedish people, as suggested by Wodak (2015), invoking the suggested ‘elitism’ of climate science is a common strategy of RWP, however the defense of the free-market and modern consumerist lifestyles demonstrates how the rhetorical devices being employed shift in relation to ideological/contextual factors. 

Alternative for Deutschland (AfD)

Context 

The Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party is a right-wing populist (RWP) party holding an influential position within the German political system after gaining 10.3% of the vote share in 2021, with 83 seats in the German Bundestag (parliament), and winning its first state election in the German state Thuringia in 2024 (Kirby & Parker, 2024; Laumond, 2023). Founded in 2013 in reaction to the European Central Bank (ECB) and European Commission’s bailout of Greece, the AfD has been characterized by extreme Euroscepticism and identarian nationalism as well as being in favor of a free-market economy (Boecher et al., 2022). Its radical political positions are paralleled by its position on climate change with the AfD vigorously opposing Germany’s ambitious plan to reach carbon-neutrality by 2045 (The German Energiewende) (Kurmayer, 2023). 

The AfD is an important case within this thesis as it is the only chosen party that has made climate policy as one of its key issues, only following immigration and the Euro in salience (Arzheimer, 2015). Categorized as ‘deniers and sceptics’ by Carius and Schaller’s 2019 study, the AfD have acknowledged a warming trend, however, dispute its anthropogenic origins. This attribution skepticism has become a key feature of its political profile and has mobilized voters around the suggested elitism and corruptness of climate policy (Grimm, 2015). In line with this, the AfD has voted against all EU climate and energy policy proposals tabled in the European Parliament and is opposed to the proposed phasing out of the fossil fuel industry while supporting nuclear development (Waldholz, 2019). 

For many of the quotes used in this analysis, articles from the AfD membership magazine (AfD Kompakt) were utilized. This is appropriate as these articles are written by AfD politicians and, although typically brief, provide a more detailed analysis of AfD policy positions and rhetorical strategies due to their frequent publication.

Analysis

These two topics were identified as the central rhetorical devises used to promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate action: i) Portraying climate science as false and elitist; ii) Promoting technological innovation as the solution.

Portraying Climate Science as False and Elitist 

A central mechanism through which the AfD promote doubt over climate change is by frequently highlighting the beneficial effects of carbon emissions, epitomized by AfD candidate Guido Reil declaring that: “Carbon Dioxide is good for plants [and is having] no impact on the climate” (Farand, 2019). Moreover, the AfD’s manifesto (2017: 78) claims: “[The] IPCC and German government conveniently omit the positive influence of COon plant growth and world nutrition.” By emphasizing the benefit of carbon emissions, the AfD strategically reframed climate change from a less contestable situation, to one of ambivalence in which the listener is invited to challenge the epistemic authorities that underpin knowledge on climate change (Boecher et al., 2022). 

Prioritizing alternative or experiential knowledge over expertise is a common mechanism through which RWP reframes climate science within an ‘elite’ versus the ‘people’ dichotomy. By radically simplifying the issue, and challenging the knowledge foundations that support it, an antagonism between the ‘folk’ or experiential and scientific knowledge foundations is created, demonstrating Wodak’s (2015) notion of the ‘anti-intellectualism.’ 

In addition, contrary to what one might expect from RWP parties such as the Polish PiS, which typically promote conspiracist arguments claiming that scientists manipulate evidence, a dominant theme used by the AfD to invoke climate skepticism is that the establishment—primarily the German media, government, and the EU—is alarmist and employs scare tactics. Karsten Hilse, AfD spokesman for environmental policy, stated in AfD Kompakt that: “On the occasion of the terrible forest fires that rage in Sweden, the colleagues from Heute Journal [one of Germany’s main news programs] […] deemed it appropriate to once again produce a panic program on (man-made) climate change” (Hilse, 2018). Moreover, Professor Ingo Hahn, science policy spokesman for the AfD, claimed that: “The radicalization of the climate ideologues continues to increase. The main blame lies with the established parties and the mainstream media, which have been spreading fictitious horror scenarios about ‘climate change’ for years” (Hahn, 2023). 

While this rhetorical strategy differed from the other chosen parties, it does entail a topic which firmly embeds climate rhetoric into the AfD’s populist core by inviting the audience to perceive climate change/climate policies as a project orchestrated by a cosmopolitan elite, detached from the workings of everyday people that are defined within a nativist frame (Wodak, 2015; Lockwood, 2018). This is evident when AfD politician Alexander Gauland in an AfD Kompakt article claimed in 2017 that: “While more and more money is being pulled out of the pockets of the hard-working people, electric cars are to be subsidized” (Gauland, 2017). Another article claimed that “with the plans to deliberately increase the price of the staple food, meat, the old parties show that they are out of touch with the ‘little guy’” (Chrupalla, 2019).

Outside of the mainstream party discourse, a corpus of far-right German blogs and magazines have echoed this rhetorical device. For example, the far-right blog Politically Incorrect, which argued that climate change policy was leading to the suppression of “serious [scientific] voices” and resulted in the creation of blacklists of “climate deniers” (PI News, 2007). This discourse, while not produced directly by official AfD sources, speaks to the wider rhetorical approach of these ideological positions to the exigence of climate change and the characterization of scientific reasoning as fundamentally antagonistic to the interests of the people. Reflecting on these wider discourses underscores how the apparent ‘people-centrism’ of the AfD reorients the rhetorical situation into one in which the AfD are the defenders of the taxpayers from the machinations of a corrupt cosmopolitan enemy or a foreign ‘other’ which is juxtaposed against the ‘little guy,’ or German public who is framed as paying the consequences of policies such as electric var subsidies or meat taxes (Küppers, 2022).

This topic thus centers AfD rhetoric into our methodology for populism, as it centers a suggested ‘antagonism between the ‘people’ and ‘elite,’ using it to promote hostility to climate policy.

Technological Innovation as the Solution

The AfD frequently attempt to reorient discourse on the German energy transitions via a topic claiming that technological breakthroughs are the solution to energy/environmental issues. The AfD are outspoken champions of alternatives to renewables, citing vaguely described energy alternatives, arguing that: “Promising new developments such as the thorium high-temperature reactor in Hann Uentrop or the fast breeder in Kalkar were prematurely terminated. Thus, these ground-breaking ideas could never be fully developed” (Manifesto for Germany, 2017: 79). When discussing issues associated with nuclear expansion, such as nuclear waste, the AfD claimed that radioactive residues should be stored and catalogued “in order to recycle them when technical progress permits” (Manifesto for Germany, 2017: 79), underscoring the technological optimism in AfD energy policy. 

This topic is utilized to reframe the exigence of proposed climate reforms away from more ideologically threatening state-led reforms, such as carbon tax, by conjuring optimism over vaguely defined and abstract technological solutions created by the market. This strategy reflects the AfD’s right-wing conservative ideology, with several studies demonstrating the link between climate skepticism and pro-market attitudes (McCright & Dunlap, 2008; Cann & Raymond, 2018). As Küppers (2022) argues, the AfD’s support for a free market economy under its ‘ordo-liberal’ ideology informs its contemporary neoliberal economic position. Indeed, a primary reason stated for its rejection of the German Renewable Energy Act was that it is “akin to a state-directed economy and a departure from German social-market economy”(Manifesto for Germany, 2017: 79). Thus, by placing the onus of reform onto technological advancement, the status quo is fortified as any necessary changes to modern consumption patterns or lifestyles are circumvented in line with the AfD’s radical pro-market ideology (Damico et al., 2023). 

Another mechanism through which this rhetorical strategy promotes hostility to climate policy, particularly the German Energiewende, is by asserting that interests and power struggles determine science-policy relations. By painting academic/scientific findings as political positions, the listener is encouraged to view renewable energy as only being prioritized due to a corrupt, wealthy elite reaping the benefits of subsidies, while fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and alternative advanced technologies are rejected for political, instead of practical, considerations (Boecher et al., 2022). This sentiment was evident when Alice Weidel, Chairperson of the AfD parliamentary group, claimed: “The planned shutdown of the last German nuclear power plants is an ideologically insane act against all economic and political reason and against the will of a majority of German citizens” (Weidel, 2023). The AfD also argued, in reference to the Energiewende policy’s planned phasing out of nuclear energy, that: “Truly civilian nuclear concepts such as the liquid-salt reactor have never been seriously tested, although their feasibility has long been proven. Since the 1970s, no development has taken place, not least because money was invested in unrealistic visions such as renewable energy sources” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020).

This topic thus reorients the audience away from the real concerns surrounding nuclear and fossil-fuel power generation, instead inviting the listener to view renewable development and climate policy as political ploys. As outlined in Wodak’s methodology for populism, the AfD evoke the antagonistic relation between the ‘elite’ and the ‘people,’ as the former are framed as the beneficiaries of renewable energy development and Germany’s Energiewende, thus promoting hostility to climate policy. This can be interpreted as the rhetor looking to structure an indeterminate situation, utilizing the complicated and nature of energy production and how it interfaces with the climate to promote doubt and hostility towards climate reform.

In summary, several central rhetorical topics are visible that promote hostility to climate change/policy. The party portrays climate science as false and elitist, while promoting technological innovation as the solution. Moreover, by employing mechanisms to challenge the knowledge foundations of climate science, an antagonism between experiential and scientific knowledge and a dichotomy between an ‘elite’ versus the ‘people’ frames climate policy as an elite-orchestrated project. The AfD’s rhetoric embeds climate change/policy into its populist core, while also making subtle changes given contextual differences, with key factors for the AfD being both the ambitious scale of the German Energiewende, and the AfD’s radical subscription to market economics. 

Comparative Analysis

All three RWP parties (PiS, SD and AfD) portray climate change as an agenda orchestrated by a self-interested and corrupt cosmopolitan elite. While each case demonstrated varying degrees of climate skepticism, all emphasized the injustice of climate reform on everyday people, thereby reframing the climate issue within a worldview defined by an antagonism between ‘the people’ and the ‘elites,’ as outlined in my preceding methodology. Which ‘elites’ are selected as the rhetorical focus depends largely on the context, with the AfD/SD parties primarily targeting the national government, while the PiS, as a former governing party, emphasizes regional/supranational groups such the EU/UN (Biedenkopf, 2021). PiS rhetoric was also less cohesive than the other parties, with some pro-climate frames being deployed, potentially reflecting what their constraints were during their position as a leading party to adhere to global and regional climate targets and expectations. 

Moreover, differences in how these argumentative strategies were utilized was evident with the AfD party, which invoked climate skepticism by suggesting climate predictions were an elite-driven scare tactic, while the SD/PiS primarily claim that climate change is an ideologically driven conspiracy that lacks evidence. These anti-establishment narratives are underpinned by a strong nationalist agenda among each party, with a discourse prioritizing national sovereignty over climate ambitions being readily apparent throughout the findings. 

The topic of climate nationalism was present in all three parties, which depicted climate-friendly policy as contrary to national sovereignty and/or economic interests, although how this topic was expressed differed based on party context. The PiS utilized a narrative of resource nationalism, arguing that climate reforms would have extreme economic ramifications given Poland’s high reliance on indigenous coal supplies, as-well as the traditional cultural value of coal as a source of sovereignty. The AfD party similarly primarily sought to discredit climate reform strategies under the German energy transition (Energiewende) by arguing climate policy is akin to a state-led economy designed to disadvantage Germany, thereby embedding anti-elitist sentiment in the AfD’s ideological underpinnings (Arzheimer, 2015). Following these ideological contexts, the AfD party also demonstrated an optimistic belief in the ability of future technological advancements to solve energy and climate issues, reflecting both its ‘ordoliberal’ enthusiasm for the free-market, and its support of nuclear energy advancement, which is planned to be rapidly phased out under the German Energiewende (Rechsteiner, 2021). This topic was also present in PiS rhetoric to a lesser extent, which made arguments for the development of ‘clean coal.’

The SD’s climate nationalism took a different form than that of the other chosen parties. While still portraying climate change as an undue economic burden, the party argued that Sweden has no responsibility to make further emissions cuts due to its relatively low emissions and that such cuts would be inconsequential. Instead, they advocated for higher-emitting nations to take greater responsibility. The SD’s nationalist ideology also took the form of eco-populist rhetoric which was less apparent in the other cases and promoted a symbiosis between the ‘nation’ and local environment, while dismissing international environmental issues like climate change.

Closely related to this topic, another rhetorical device used in each case was anti-intellectualism via prioritizing localized and experiential forms of knowledge over the scientific and positivist epistemologies that necessitate climate action. This crafting of an epistemic tension was utilized similarly by each party, demonstrating its centrality to RWP climate communication. 

Conclusion

Discussion of Findings

The starting point for this article, supported by a literature review, was that relatively little attention has been paid to the specific rhetorical mechanisms through which right-wing populism (RWP) promotes climate change skepticism and/or hostility to climate action. Thus, the chief aim has been to analyze the rhetorical choices of RWP parties regarding climate change/policy and offer new insights into how RWP positions reshuffle and adapt in line with shifting ideological considerations and contexts. By focusing on a range of relatively contemporary quotes from official party programmes, policy proposals and individual politicians, and buttressing my findings with supportive secondary data, I have demonstrated real examples of how RWP parties promote skepticism and/or hostility to climate change policy by deploying argumentative strategies, or topics, conceived within a rhetorical situation (Consigny, 1974)

In doing so, this study advances knowledge in the field in three ways. First, while nationalist discourse has long been understood as an ideological focus for RWP, as outlined in my methodology, the results of the study show how nationalist opposition to climate change shifts depending on each parties’ unique context. This demonstrates how nationalist ideology forms the ‘thick’ substantive base around which RWP articulates opposition to climate policy. 

Second, RWP opposition to climate policy is rhetorically promoted through a discourse of ‘the elites’ versus ‘the people,’ which serves as the central frame around which various forms of climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate change are articulated. Multiple narrative frames were deployed to undermine the scientific consensus on climate change, either by dismissing it as a scare tactic or outright conspiracy, or by claiming that climate policy threatens economic competitiveness and citizens’ lifestyles, often associating it with a socialist command economy. Given the varying ‘elite’ groups targeted depending on context, the adaptive plasticity of RWP climate communication is fully evident.

Third, it is also evident that European RWP parties frequently seek to disqualify scientific expertise by utilizing anti-intellectual rhetoric, while prioritizing local, experiential sources of knowledge. This was a core feature of RWP identified by Wodak (2015), these interpretative findings reveal by how this epistemic challenge to the universal, scientific epistemologies that support climate action is a shared strategy across European RWP parties. By focusing on the utilization of scientific knowledge, this study contributes to recent literature on populist climate communication. 

Furthermore, these findings are broadly supportive of Wodak’s (2015) methodology for populism, with both ideological substance and rhetorical style coalescing to form climate communication strategies. Indeed, much of the current literature interprets populism as isolated from the broader contexts in which it arises, resulting in theoretical and methodological assumptions (Mudde, 2004; Jagers & Walgrave, 2004). By emphasizing the importance of different contexts in shaping rhetoric, the way in which rhetorical devices shift in accordance with different conditions is evident while shared tendencies between parties can also be seen. 

This theoretical research builds upon the work of Stanley (2008: 95), who identified populism as an existing ideology that varies considerably based on the societal context as its ‘thin’ ideological base which can be found in “combination with established ‘full’ ideologies.” These findings are compatible with this thesis, however by emphasizing both the ideological and stylistic/rhetorical facets of populism, and how this differs between contexts, a more updated relationship between populism and climate change is apparent.

Limitations and Implications 

One limitation of my research was that all parties chosen were European. This could limit the applicability of my knowledge claims due to the potential bias inherent in only assessing Western-centric normative viewpoints on climate change. While this choice of methods allowed for a more focused interpretive research frame for analyzing European RWP discourse, the applicability of this study is arguably limited when examining the RWP in non-Western regions, such as Jair Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party in Brazil. Moreover, populism is a far more ideologically extensive and heavily debated issue than was presented in this study, and while some extent of the most contemporary debates on the issue is interrogated, a more extensive investigation into the relationship between other forms of populism, such as Left-wing populism, and the climate issue, is beyond the scope of this article (Gamble, 2018). 

In outlining how RWP parties promote skepticism/hostility to climate action, this article provides an investigative framework for future study on climate change communication. The impact of these findings on future climate change communication, and how it can more effectively circumvent populist anti-science rhetoric is valuable given the relevance of public opinion for climate politics (Huber et al., 2020). RWP primarily positions climate change and its policies as elitist and disconnected from the true interests of the ‘people,’ utilizing anti-science frames to dismiss the epistemologies that underpin climate policy. Thus, the top-down nature of climate communication, which primarily occurs in international settings and is negotiated by elites disconnected from the interests of local communities, could undermine public support.

These findings suggest that climate communication should take place more frequently in settings that foster community engagement and local participation to reach individuals exposed to RWP attitudes. This study finds that more inclusive modes of climate communication, such as messaging through local representatives and business owners, could be effective in conveying that climate reform is in the interest of all. Additionally, emphasizing the impact of climate change on local communities and ecologies would help contextualize it as a tangible and relevant issue, preventing it from being framed as an abstract and elite-led phenomenon.


 

(*) Morgan Lewis recently earned an MSc in International Business and Strategy from the University of Bristol, graduating with Distinction and receiving the Dean’s Award for Outstanding Academic Performance. His dissertation, Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by the Polish Law and Justice Party, German Alternative for Deutschland, and Swedish Democrats, examined the rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist parties to shape climate discourse. He also holds a First-Class BSc in Politics and International Relations from the same institution. His academic interests include political theory, contemporary European populism, and sustainability discourse.


 

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Map: Shutterstock.

Unveiling China’s ‘Transnational Populism’ and Sharp Power Politics: The Case of the Belt and Road Initiative

Abstract

In a mutually reinforcing context, the rise of multipolarity and the decline of the rules-based liberal multilateral world order have transformed populism from a national phenomenon into one with global dimensions, characterized by transborder transgressiveness. Rooted in nationalist rhetoric that emphasizes independence and sovereignty, this dynamic challenges the norms and values of multilateralism, fuels a vicious cycle of sharp power politics (SPP), and opens new fronts in the competition for national interests. China’s recent political and economic trajectory under President Xi Jinping provides a compelling case for examining the interplay between these factors. Drawing on the evolving theoretical framework of populism and an analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this article argues that Xi Jinping’s strategic framing of SPPs within an appealing populist narrative does not qualify him as a transnational populist leader. Notably, Chinese rhetoric lacks a cohesive ideology, a clearly defined transnational citizenry with shared interests, and a corresponding mechanism for the participatory representation of global citizens.

Keywords: Populism, sharp-power politics, multipolarity, multilateralism, China, governance, development, (in)dependence, global public goods, cooperation.

 

By Ibrahim Ozturk

Introduction

The transformation of global power dynamics, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has exposed vulnerabilities in the Western-dominated liberal multilateral order, leading to a multipolar world (dis)order. This shift has also curtailed the dominance of any single superpower, intensifying competition for influence and resources. This complex landscape has witnessed two notable political phenomena: the global rise of right- and left-wing populism and the adoption of Sharp Power Politics (SPP) by rising powers like Russia and China to enhance their global influence.

The emergence of this geopolitical landscape significantly limits the global cooperation necessary for collective action to effectively secure global public goods. Increasingly characterized by a “negative-sum game,” this environment poses deeply troubling implications for the future. It fosters the development of a causal chain in which populism, typically addressed at the national level, transcends borders and amplifies the influence of sharp-power politics.

While populists often portray themselves as champions of the people, challenging the established order on behalf of the masses, SPP co-opts populist rhetoric to serve the interests of authoritarian regimes, ultimately consolidating their power. A plausible transmission mechanism involves the gradual co-option of a functioning, though flawed, rule-based democracy by exclusionary, interest-driven coalitions of established elites. These elites prioritize their class interests at the expense of long-term efficiency, leading to stagnation. Over time, populist leaders exploit systemic vulnerabilities, using their rhetoric to gain power. If they maintain power long enough, they eventually transform the system into a form of authoritarianism, reinforcing this new status quo through sharp-power tactics both domestically and internationally to expand their influence and national interests.

Within this framework, the central aim of this article is to explore the extent to which the concept of “transnational populism” (TNP) can be considered an intermediate stage linking the progression from national-level populism to authoritarianism and, subsequently, to SPP beyond national borders. Following these theoretical discussions, the article also seeks to examine whether the notion of TNP can be inferred from the extensive use of populist rhetoric within China’s SPP framework, specifically in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The article is organized as follows: The second section explores key theoretical issues, evaluating the existence of a robust concept of transnational populism while examining the intersections, overlaps, and tensions between national populism, transnational populism, and sharp power politics (SPP). The third section builds on these theoretical insights to assess whether China’s foreign policies can be interpreted through the framework of transnational populism within its authoritarian regime. The fourth section connects China’s so-called transnational populism (TNP) to SPP, highlighting their incompatibilities, particularly in the context of the BRI. The final section concludes by summarizing the key findings.

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Muslim women wearing hijabs walking on the streets of Paris, France, June 15, 2012. Photo: Shutterstock.

The Importance of In-group Favouritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands

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Please cite as: 

van Oosten, Sanne. (2025). “The Importance of In-group Favouritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 12, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0046

Please find all replication materials including data, code and appendices here: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/T7G5N

 

 Abstract

The voting behaviour of racial and ethnic minorities is a topic that attracts much speculation, with some claiming that racial and ethnic minorities do vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs) and some claiming they do not. In the European Union, where saving data on individual’s race and ethnicity is prohibited, it is very difficult to contribute to these conversations with real facts. Do ethnic minorities and majorities tend to vote for PRRP and what explains their (lack of) support? Thanks to a novel yet costly sampling method, I surveyed racial/ethnic minority and majority voters in France, Germany and the Netherlands and asked them about their propensity to vote for Rassemblement National (RN) in France, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands. I compare racial/ethnic minority groups, including Muslims, with majority groups and test the mechanisms that might predict their support for PRRPs. My findings indicate Muslims are among the least likely to vote for PRRPs, though the difference with voters without a migration background is only significant in the Netherlands. When testing what explains the propensity to vote for PRRPs, I find that indicators of in-group favouritism usually explain support to larger extent than out-group hate. Though anti-immigration attitudes predict PRRP voting in all three countries, in-group favouritism explanations explain PRRP voting to a slightly stronger extent. In France and Germany, the ethnocentrism scale predicts voting for RN/AfD more than immigration attitudes do. In the Netherlands, feeling accepted as belonging in the Netherlands explains voting for the PVV the most. Amongst Muslim French, German and Dutch voters, in-group favouritism, or the lack thereof, explains voting for PRRPs as well. French Muslims who feel more attached to France are more likely to vote for RN. German Muslims who do not believe in religious freedom for Muslims are more likely to vote for AfD. This also applies to Dutch Muslims, though immigration attitudes also predict voting for the PVV: the more a Dutch Muslim is against immigration, the more likely they are to vote PVV. Generally, this study makes a case for expanding the standard predictors of PRRP voting towards more indicators of in-group favouritism for the majority in-group, while for Muslims PRRP voting is more driven by policy attitudes. Feeling close or distant towards ethnic in- or out-groups does not predict PRRP voting in any of the cases. These findings contribute to our understanding of PRRP voting in Europe.

Keywords: Populism, Muslims, race, ethnicity, voting behaviour, France, Germany, Netherlands, RN, AfD, PVV.

 

By Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at Oxford University, sanne.vanoosten@compas.ox.ac.uk)

Introduction

Political pundits and strategists have long believed that increasing diversity and gender equality would naturally expand the US Democratic voting base, assuming racial and ethnic minorities would reject ethnonationalist extremism in the Republican Party and have nowhere else to turn (Judis & Teixeira, 2002; Skocpol & Tervo, 2020). While this view has been challenged over time (Judis & Teixeira, 2023; Lee, 2008), the 2024 US elections highlighted the complexity of racial and ethnic minority voting behaviour, with racial and ethnic minority voters shifting from Democrat to Republican, though still leaning Democrat (ANES, 2021).

In Europe, studying minority voting behaviour is more challenging due to privacy regulations, yet it remains crucial as the “Replacement Theory” — a conspiratorial claim that immigrants are brought in to vote for political elites — has shaped far-right rhetoric across France, Germany, the Netherlands (Bracke & Aguilar, 2020) as well as the US (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011). Despite this, some pundits suggest that racial and ethnic minorities are increasingly inclined to vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRPs), with figures like Geert Wilders[2] and Donald Trump[3] claiming that Muslim and Black voters support them. However, all of these claims remain underexplored in Europe. This paper investigates whether Muslims and ethnic minorities in France, Germany, and the Netherlands vote differently from their white counterparts, and what factors drive any differences in their voting behaviour.

Answering these questions in the European Union is more difficult than in the US or UK (as shown by the wealth of data in Sobolewska & Ford, 2020). Standard sampling strategies do not yield enough minority participants for statistical analyses (Font & Méndez, 2013). Moreover, strict European privacy regulations limit the availability of sampling frames for racial/ethnic and religious minorities in the European context (Simon, 2017). To overcome these challenges, I surveyed a large sample of Kantar-panellists and used a mini-survey to oversample voters from France, Germany, and the Netherlands with a migration background in Turkey (France, Germany, and the Netherlands), North Africa (France), Sub-Saharan Africa (France), the Former Soviet Union (Germany), Surinam (the Netherlands), and Morocco (the Netherlands). I sampled a high number of minority respondents, with 1889 out of a total N of 3058 respondents having a migration background, of which 649 self-identify as Muslim.

In this paper, I test how likely Muslims or other minority groups are to vote for PRRPs compared to majority groups, and why. I find that Muslim voters are much less likely to vote for the PVV in the Netherlands, though they are just as likely to vote for RN or AfD in France or Germany, respectively. I also explore what predicts the likelihood of Muslims voting for PRRPs. The literature on minority voting is not focused on voting for PRRPs, but explanations vary from issues, belonging and in-group favouritism, or the lack thereof, in this case. I find that issues explain PRRP voting, or the lack thereof, the most amongst the Muslims in France, Germany and the Netherlands.

Amongst majority groups, voting for PRRPs is generally often explained by economic and cultural factors, or their level of education and attitudes towards immigration. In-group favouritism is generally not studied, despite the longstanding evidence that in-group favouritism operates independently from out-group hate (Brewer, 1999). My various indicators of in-group favouritism indeed predict voting for PRRPs more strongly than immigration-attitudes and the impact of level of education disappears when including policy positions and in-group favouritism in the models.

In essence, this research advocates for broadening the conventional factors used to predict PRRP voting to encompass a greater emphasis on affinity towards the dominant in-group. Conversely, among Muslims, PRRP voting tends to be influenced more by policy stances. Whether one feels a sense of closeness or detachment from ethnic in-groups or out-groups doesn’t seem to have any bearing on PRRP voting outcomes in any scenario examined. These discoveries deepen our comprehension of PRRP voting patterns across Europe.

Theory

It has long been believed that increasing racial and ethnic diversity and gender equality would naturally lead to an expansion of the US Democratic voting base (Judis & Teixeira, 2002), as racial and ethnic minorities are put off by ethnonationalist extremism in the Republican Party (Skocpol & Tervo, 2020; Sobolewska & Ford, 2020) and, therefore, have nowhere else to go (Judis & Teixeira, 2002). Though this thesis had been questioned for a longer time (Judis & Teixeira, 2023; Lee, 2008), the most recent US elections drove the point home that reality is more complicated than the “demography is destiny” thesis claims it is[4]: The 2024 US elections saw a significant swing of racial and ethnic minority voters from voting Democrat to voting Republican[5], though the latest most robust data still indicate that the majority of Latinx voters prefer the Democrats[6], just as in 2020 (ANES, 2021). Studying the voting behaviour of racial and ethnic minorities is relatively easy in the US and UK, yet the more stringent privacy regulations in the European Union (EU) make sampling European racial and ethnic minorities more costly and, therefore, rare. In this paper, I use a novel sampling method and study to what extent and why racial and ethnic minority and majority voters in France, Germany and the Netherlands vote for Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP).

In Europe, the influential conspiratorial “Replacement Theory” claims that immigrants are imported by political elites so they will vote for the political elites who imported them[7][8], as recently propagated by Elon Musk in an effort to promote Trump in the US election campaign[9], this narrative shapes the “demographic imagination”[10] on both sides of the Atlantic. In France, the Great Replacement theory was introduced by writer Renaud Camus in 2011 (Bracke & Aguilar, 2020: 685-686), while similar claims were being made in the US before that (Skocpol & Williamson, 2011: 79-80). Promoted by right-wing figures like Marine Le Pen, it has become central to nationalist rhetoric, suggesting that French culture and identity are at risk due to immigration. This conspiracy theory has influenced political discourse, especially within far-right parties, fuelling xenophobic fears of cultural “submersion.”[11] In Germany, similar views gained traction through the works of Thilo Sarrazin, who claimed that mass immigration would lead to the decline of ethnic Germans. The theory has also been propagated by figures from the Alternative for Germany (AfD), who argue that immigration policies are designed to replace native Germans. Meanwhile, in the Netherlands, populist politicians such as Geert Wilders and the current chair of Dutch Parliament, Martin Bosma, have embraced the theory as well.[12][13][14]

However, pundits and PRRPs also sometimes claim the opposite: that racial and ethnic minority voters are actually very much inclined to vote for PRRPs. For instance, when Geert Wilders’ Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) won the Dutch general elections on November 22, 2023 (van Oosten, 2023b), Geert Wilders gave a speech in which he thanked all of his voters, especially the many Muslims who had voted for him.[15] Pundits weighed in by giving anecdotal evidence of Muslims voting for Wilders.[16][17] Were these claims an effort to legitimize Geert Wilders as a potential prime minister of all Dutch people, or was it really true? Given the lack of research on the voting behaviour of minority groups, these claims remained unsubstantiated.

In summary, the voting behaviour of Muslims, ethnic minorities and immigrant origin individuals is speculated about wildly. As seen above, in an effort to gain perceived legitimacy, some pundits and PRRP leaders will argue minorities vote for them. Conversely, to amplify “demographic anxiety,”[18] PRRP leaders will argue minorities vote for the pro-immigrant Left. So, which one is it? Do Muslims and ethnic minorities in France, Germany, and the Netherlands vote differently than their white majority counterparts? And what drives the differences?

In this theoretical framework, I first discuss the literature on minority voting which is mostly based on policy positions held by minority voters and discrimination they have experienced. Then, I discuss the most frequent explanations of PRRP voting amongst majority groups. I conclude with a discussion about in-group favouritism and how the dynamics of in-group favouritism differ amongst majority and minority groups.  

Cultural and Economic Issues as Explanations of Minority Voting

I do not know of any literature on PRRP voting amongst minorities in Europe, though there is literature on the tendency for minorities to vote for left-wing parties. In general, claims that ethnic minority voters vote for Left-wing parties because of their tendency to prefer redistributive policies (Bird et al., 2010: 10–11) have been debunked (Baysu & Swyngedouw, 2020; Bergh & Bjørklund, 2011; Sobolewska, 2006: 206–207; van Oosten et al., 2024e). Cultural issues play a much larger role in explaining voters’ choices than economic issues do (Otjes & Krouwel, 2019: 1159, 1152; Vermeulen et al., 2020: 445, 448). Many of these issues directly influence the way racial and ethnic minority voters see their place in society (Loukili, 2021a, 2021b), and the discrimination that they have experienced (Grewal & Hamid, 2022; Nandi & Platt, 2020; Phalet et al., 2010), or the discriminatory rhetoric they hear coming from politicians on the Right, making them side with the Left, not out of conviction, but out of necessity (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020) or circumstance (Rovny, 2024).

Though racial and ethnic minority voters align with the Left in their views on immigration, integration and Islam, they are less likely to do so on issues such as gender equality (Spierings & Glas, 2022), Lesbian Gay, Bi and Trans (LGBT)-rights (Geurts et al., 2023) and anti-Semitism (Koopmans, 2013). These differences between racial and ethnic minority and majority voters within the Left-wing voting coalition (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020) are used to drive the Left-voting coalition apart (Brubaker, 2017; Farris, 2017; Puar, 2007; van Oosten, 2024e). The general assumption is that racial and ethnic minority voters make the trade-off between aligning with the Left on issues such as immigration, integration and Islam on the one hand, and making compromises on gender and sexuality issues on the other hand (Sobolewska & Ford, 2020). The extent to which this is true, remains under researched, but the rhetoric of this “awkward alliance” (van Oosten, 2025) has influenced political narratives and has rendered party strategists on the Left anxious about how to deal with cultural issues such as gender equality, immigration, and LGBT-rights (Dancygier, 2017; van Oosten, 2022a, 2022b, 2023a).

The awkwardness of the assumed diverse voting coalition of the Left has led to some similar civilisationist forms of nationalism (Brubaker, 2017). Homonationalism, femonationalism, and judeonationalism are examples of these forms of nationalism that instrumentalize vulnerable groups such as women, LGBT individuals, and Jewish people to justify exclusionary practices, particularly against Muslim immigrants. Homonationalism, coined by Puar (2007), refers to the use of LGBT-rights, particularly in Western countries, to contrast “civilised” Western values against perceived intolerance in non-Western groups, particularly Muslims. Femonationalism, introduced by Farris (2017), involves the strategic use of gender equality, often framing Western interventions as a means to liberate women in non-Western countries, such as the justification for the war in Afghanistan.

Homonationalism and femonationalism are not the only forms of civilisationism. For instance, Judeonationalism, recently coined by me (van Oosten, 2024c, 2024d, 2024e, 2024f), refers to the instrumental use of antisemitism to discredit immigrants and justify anti-immigrant rhetoric. Animeauxnationalism (van Oosten, 2024h) is a term I coined to describe the infamous US election campaign quote, ‘they are eating the pets,’ as another form of civilisationism that leverages the idea that racial and ethnic minorities do not believe in animal rights, especially the rights of pets, not so much farm animals, to the same extent as white majorities do. These, and many other, forms of nationalism are often mobilized to promote xenophobia by framing vulnerable groups as symbols of Western values under threat from outsiders, contributing to the marginalization of immigrants and minorities. However, because the literatures on homonationalism and femonationalism are much more developed, I will focus on the impact of these narratives on voting.

Homonationalism first emerged in the Netherlands in 2002 with populist radical right leader Pim Fortuyn, as a response to perceived threats to the country’s liberal values. This was particularly in reaction to Moroccan and Turkish immigrants, coinciding with the Netherlands’ legalization of same-sex marriage in 2000, the first in the world (Brubaker, 2017). This unique context juxtaposed a traditionally progressive stance on LGBT-rights with an alleged Islamic intolerance (Mepschen et al., 2010). In contrast, around the same time, femonationalism gained more traction in the United States, where it was initially used to gather support for the war in Afghanistan by framing it as a mission to liberate oppressed Afghan women (Farris, 2017). This strategic instrumentalization of gender equality has since spread to other Western countries, particularly in Europe (Rahbari, 2021). Meanwhile, Judeonationalism—the use of antisemitism to discredit newcomers—has been especially prominent in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US, particularly following the Palestine protests in the spring of 2024 (van Oosten, 2024c, 2024d, 2024e, 2024f).

Civilisationism is frequently leveraged during political crises or when national identity is perceived to be under threat, particularly from cultural outsiders (Brubaker, 2017; Farris, 2017; Puar, 2007; van Oosten, 2024c, 2024d, 2024e, 2024f). Conceptual work on these narratives indicates they are primarily elite-driven, top-down efforts aimed at stoking xenophobia, particularly Islamophobia (Khalimzoda et al., 2025), to scapegoat minorities and distract from failing policies (de Haas, 2023). Politicians and media elites, however, frame civilisationist narratives as reactive responses to imminent threats particularly following high-profile acts of violence against women or LGBT-individuals (e.g. Frey, 2020).

Existing research demonstrates that civilisationist rhetoric affects public opinion amongst majority populations (van Oosten, 2022a, 2022b, 2023a), but it remains unclear whether this extends to racial and ethnic minority voters and Muslims. Might views on gender and sexuality impact whether racial and ethnic minority and Muslim voters vote for PRRPs? Or are minority voters more influenced by their views on immigration, integration and Islam?

Indeed, immigration policy and discrimination do impact the everyday lives of racial and ethnic minority voters. Immigration policies play a key role in determining the opportunities for family reunification, while Islamophobia and anti-discrimination laws affect access to the job market, and so on. It is therefore logical that these matters would influence the voting behaviour of racial and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, Muslims endure particularly high rates of discrimination in their day-to-day experiences (Awan, 2014; Fernández-Reino et al., 2023; Mansouri & Vergani, 2018), and witness their inclusion in society be mobilized for electoral purposes (Schmuck & Matthes, 2019: 739). This research will analyse the extent to which racial and ethnic minority voters and Muslims trade-off economic, gender and sexuality-related cultural issues, as well as immigration and Islam-related cultural issues influence voting for PRRPs.

Cultural and Economic Issues as Explanations of Majority Voting

There are two main schools of thought on how to explain why majority groups vote for PRRP: cultural and economic explanations. Just as is the case with minority voters, popular claims that voters are attracted to PRRPs because of economic insecurity instead of cultural issues are largely debunked with cultural issues being the most explanatory of all (Abou-Chadi & Helbling, 2018; Abou-Chadi & Wagner, 2019; van der Brug & van Spanje, 2009). However, economic factors also continue to explain PRRP voting, when the scarcity created by the arrival of immigrants is thrown into the argument.

Although migration experts agree that the economies of receiving countries benefit from immigration (de Haas, 2023; Kustov, 2024), economic challenges and the perceived injustice faced by the populations of receiving countries are often cited as arguments against immigration: whether the argument is that ‘they’ are stealing ‘our’ jobs (Thom & Skocpol, 2020), public services (Cremasci et al., 2024), or housing (Fernández-Reino et al., 2024; Ghekiere & Verhaegen, 2022), material concerns rooted in scarcity lie at the core of the debate. The mobilization of perceived economic injustice has proven to be an effective strategy for attracting voters, with the most recent U.S. elections serving as yet another example.

The US Republican Party now champions the strongest anti-immigration narratives, though this has not always been at the top of the party’s political agenda (Skocpol, 2020). This shift occurred during the Obama-era. His first campaign and term were predominantly focused on healthcare reform (idem). However, beneath the surface, anti-immigration sentiments swelled, with many voters perceiving Obama as a symbol of immigration (idem). While he didn’t, in reality, let more immigrants in than his Republican predecessors, Bush or Reagan (Thom & Skocpol, 2020). Although voters are generally positive about Black politicians (van Oosten et al., 2024a), Obama’s African roots invigorated the Tea Party, a grassroots movement, leading them to turn to immigration as a response to the latent, smouldering old-fashioned racism his presidency stirred (Tesler, 2013).

This puts into question whether concerns over economic issues are not actually concerns over cultural issues, in other words: immigration and racism. Even in the most conservative corners of the US, openly admitting to being racist is stigmatized, prompting many to mask such views (Creighton, 2023). Concerns over economic justice often serve as a justification for racism by pointing to the scarcity of ‘our’ jobs, public services, housing, or whatever scarce economic resource is the challenge of the moment (idem). By invoking these appeals to economic justice, one can pull off xenophobic claims without the stigma attached to more explicit expressions of xenophobia (idem). Putting into question, once again, whether claims of economic injustice are real, or masks to justify anti-immigration views, racism and Islamophobia.

Anti-immigration views and Islamophobia are also not one and the same dimension that can be studied interchangeably. Views towards Muslim predict voting behaviour in the US (Jardina & Stephens-Dougan, 2021; Weller & Junn, 2018). Even those with more positive attitudes towards immigrants are far more critical towards Muslims (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2018), suggesting that discrimination based on religion is much more accepted than discrimination based on ethnicity. The study at hand also sets out to answer whether views towards immigration on the one hand, and Islam on the other impact PRRP-voting differently. This research I am conducting here, will compare and contrast all of these cultural and economic explanations of PRRP-voting for both majority and minority groups. On top of this, I will also include how in-group favouritism compares to the explanations we already know.

The Differential Impact of In-group Favouritism Amongst Minorities and Majorities

According to Social Identity Theory, humans strive towards a positive self-image, and a central strategy to achieve this is in-group favouritism, which is the tendency to prefer members of one’s own group (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In-group favouritism is an effort to achieve, what Social Identity Theory calls, positive distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the tendency to seek a favourable comparison of one’s self (positive distinctiveness) through preferring members of one’s own group (in-group favouritism) (Haslam, 2001, 21). Many people mistakenly assume that in-group favouritism is a universal phenomenon, despite the pioneers in Social Identity Theory specifying specific conditions under which this occurs (Tajfel & Turner, 1979: 36). I highlight how individuals can be incentivized to consider alternative strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness without in-group favouritism and the role social status plays in these dynamics.

Social Identity Theory proposes that individuals use three possible strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness: individual mobility, social creativity, and social competition. The choice of strategy depends on various factors such as the group’s social status, belief in social mobility or change, the permeability of group boundaries, perceived security of group relations, and the perceived homogeneity/heterogeneity of the out-group.

Low-status groups, such as racial and ethnic minority or Muslim voters, can use the three strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness in different ways. Some groups may perceive their boundaries as permeable, for instance because they have a name or appearance that makes them pass as part of the high-status out-group. This could be the case amongst German citizens with a migration background in the Former Soviet Union or Maghrebi French with fair skin and a French name. If that is the case, they will be likely to strive for individual mobility to join the high-status group, leading to out-group favouritism through accepting the out-group’s superiority. Other groups may perceive their boundaries as impermeable, possibly due to having an ethno-racially distinct name or black skin. This may be the case amongst citizens with a migration background in Turkey or French citizens from Sub-Saharan Africa. In that case, boundaries are impermeable. If group relations are seen as legitimate and stable, individuals will try to achieve positive distinctiveness through social creativity by redefining the dimensions of group comparison or attributing different meanings to current comparative dimensions (Haslam, 2001: 25), think of Muslim women in Europe countering common stereotypes of themselves as complacent and docile (van Es, 2019). This redefinition of group membership coincides with avoiding a direct challenge to the out-group’s superiority. If group boundaries are perceived as impermeable and status differences as illegitimate and/or unstable, low-status groups are more likely to choose social competition, leading to direct and open in-group favouritism (Haslam, 2001: 25), also known as “fighting fire with fire” in the case of Muslim voters voting for a political party advocating for and run by Muslims in the Netherlands, DENK (Loukili, 2021a, 2021b). In summary, not all low-status groups favour their in-group.

For high-status groups, the same three strategies exist, but they always lead to in-group favouritism. If group boundaries are perceived as permeable, high-status groups expect low-status groups to exert individual mobility and join them. If not, high-status groups may argue that low-status groups are guilty of causing their own inferiority. If group boundaries are perceived as impermeable, legitimate, and stable, high-status group members may exhibit “magnanimity” while engaging in latent discrimination and covert repression (Haslam, 2001: 26), which may be the case amongst high-status groups claiming to be colour-blind (Tiberj & Michon, 2013). If a high-status group perceives group relations as unstable and threatening, they may resort to “supremacist ideologizing, conflict, open hostility, and antagonism” by directly promoting the out-group’s inferiority (Haslam, 2001: 26), as is the case with some members of populist radical right parties (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019; Kortmann, Stecker, & Weiß, 2019). For high-status groups, all strategies lead to in-group favouritism, as already demonstrated for voting behaviour (Nadler et al., 2025; van Oosten, 2024g).

Comparing France, Germany, the Netherlands and their PRRPs

I conducted this research in France, Germany and the Netherlands, three countries with key differences. In France, there is a strong emphasis on citizenship, secularism and a strong division between church and state, there are no religious parties in the political landscape of France (Kuru, 2008). In Germany, Christian political parties have had a longstanding presence (Schotel, 2021) and the approach towards Muslims is characterized by the history of integration of guestworkers (Yurdakul, 2009). The Netherlands has a host of PRRP and Christian parties in Parliament (Kešić & Duyvendak, 2019), and a history of guest workers from Turkey and Morocco and immigrants from former colonies such as Surinam and Indonesia (Vermeulen et al., 2020). All three countries have a history of parliamentarians from mainstream and PRRPs espousing Islamophobic rhetoric, with France and the Netherlands having a longer and more vociferous history of PRRPs and Germany being relatively new to the game and taking on a comparatively less strident tone (Brubaker 2017).

In France, secularism (laïcité) tends to frame debates on Islam more than in Germany and the Netherlands (Kuru, 2008). For decades, French discussions on the headscarf have more often been related to religious neutrality of the state than to gender equality (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2021). Although Marine le Pen, leader of France’s PRRP Rassemblement National (RN) mixes civilisationist weaponization of gender equality and LGBT-rights with Christian conservatism championing traditional gender roles and the abolition of marriage equality (Scrinzi, 2017: 5; Snipes & Mudde, 2020: 455–456), gay French voters are still attracted to RN more than their straight counterparts (Dancygier, 2017: 188). Nevertheless, the supposed binary between gender equality/LGBT-rights on the one hand and Islam on the other remains a powerful civilisationist argument against Islam in France (Brubaker, 2017: 1201; McGlynn, 2020). 

In Germany, the first Populist Radical Right Party (PRRP) emerged relatively late in the Bundestag, compared to France and The Netherlands (Albertazzi & Mcdonnell, 2008; Althof, 2018). Germany has relatively conservative policies on homosexuality, such as not yet adopting marriage equality (Schotel, 2021). Germany’s PRRP Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has a more conservative Christian nature and following than their French and Dutch counterparts. AfD propagates traditional gender roles and opposition to marriage equality and to homosexual couples adopting children (Althof, 2018: 341), although examples of German homonationalist rhetoric do exist (Ayoub, 2019: 25). The rare instances of a civilisationist backlash against Islam are more often framed in feminist than homonationalist terms (Choi et al., 2021; Dancygier, 2017: 188).

The Netherlands is considered the most striking example of a country that uses civilisationist rhetoric in combating Islam (Brubaker, 2017: 1194). While France and Germany’s PRRPs need to navigate between civilisationist rhetoric and courting of conservative Christians (Marzouki et al., 2016), Dutch PRRPs have not been nearly as inhibited by constraints posed by conservative Christian electorates. Therefore, the weaponization of gender equality and LGBT-rights in combating Islam are more common, more ingrained and more virulent than in France and Germany (Brubaker, 2017: 1193–1197; Mepschen et al., 2010). Islamophobia is by far the highest in The Netherlands, compared to France and Germany (Heath & Richards, 2019: 29). Nonetheless, of the three countries, the Netherlands is the only one to recognize Islam as a state religion (Saral, 2020: 5). 

The electoral systems of France, Germany and the Netherlands could help explain the different flavours of PRRPs we see in the three countries. Germany knows mixed-member proportional representation, with a first vote for a direct candidate of their constituency and a second vote for a party list. The threshold of five percent for a political party to enter the Bundestag and elements of a single-member district system and the sizable Christian population make it necessary to court conservative Christian voters, partially explaining why AfD chases conservative Christians in the way they do.

France belongs to a completely different family of voting systems with single-member districts and a two-round runoff for national elections, making it even more necessary for new parties to enter politics with a broad coalition of voters. Despite France’s strong history of secularism, exacerbating civilisationist rhetoric, RN needs to woo conservative Christian electorates in order to make it first past the post. This means that civilisationist rhetoric is less likely to be visible.

The Netherlands knows party list proportional representation and a very low voting threshold: a mere one seat in parliament. This system allows for many parties who each have their own flavour of populism and Christian conservatism separately. Indeed, the Netherlands has four PRRPs in parliament at the time of writing and three separate Christian parties as well. Dutch PRRPs are therefore less likely to need to court Christian conservatives. This explains, in part, why civilisationist rhetoric pitting Dutch secular liberal values against a regressive Islam did not need to be combined with pursuing Christian conservative voters as much as we see in France and Germany, making Dutch civilisationism “strikingly” (Brubaker, 2017: 1194) different and all the more virulent.

Methods

I oversampled respondents with specific migration backgrounds to make group-specific statistical inferences (Font & Méndez, 2013: 48) and chose minoritized groups: numeric minorities that state experiencing discrimination to the largest extent (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 31). In France, the oversampled groups of ethnic minority citizens consist of French citizens with a North-African (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), Sub-Saharan African (Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo) and Turkish background. In Germany, I oversampled German citizens with a Turkish and Former Soviet Union (FSU) background. In the Netherlands, I oversampled Dutch citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese background. Some groups have come to France, Germany or the Netherlands as a result of the colonial ties between host and home country, some came as guest workers (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 93). I also oversampled French citizens with a Turkish background and German re-migrants from the FSU. Some, but not all, of the oversampled migration backgrounds are countries with Muslim-majority populations (Phalet et al., 2010; Verkuyten & Yildiz 2009; Dangubić et al., 2020), making it possible to disentangle whether effects are either religiously or ethnically/racially driven.

After running pilots and obtaining the ethics approval, see Appendix, I gathered data between March and August of 2020 and surveyed 3.058 citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands, administered by survey agency Kantar Public. One important challenge in surveying ethnic/racial minority groups comes from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a European law legally restricting saving data on race and ethnicity (European Commission, 2018). I overcame this challenge by employing a large-scale filter question to the representative Kantar-panels in all three countries. I asked a very large sample to participate in a mini survey. The first and only question of this mini survey asks where their mother and father were born. If either one of their parents were born in a country of origin I wanted to oversample, we redirected this respondent to the full survey. If not, we either terminated the survey or redirected a small percentage to the full survey. This enabled me to form sizable groups of minority citizens for my final survey, ensuring ample diversity, a feature so often missing from survey research (Coppock & McClellan, 2018; Krupnikov & Levine, 2014; Mullinix et al., 2015). Though there is still a chance of selection bias, I have variables to weight the data on gender, migration background, education, age, urbanization and region, and the findings are broadly the same with and without weights. All data, survey questions, information about the sampling strategy implemented, pre-registration details, and ethical review documentation can be found on Harvard Dataverse for France (van Oosten et al., 2024b), Germany, (van Oosten et al., 2024c) and the Netherlands (van Oosten et al., 2024d). I ended up with the following number of respondents in each group:

I asked all respondents about their ethnic and religious identification. For ethnic identification I asked: “In terms of my ethnic group, I consider myself to be… (max. 2 answers).” I presented the respondents a list of 13 answer categories, including French, German, Dutch, Turkish, Maghrebi, Yoruba, Former Soviet Union, Kazakh, Moroccan, Surinamese, and Hindustani, see the full list on Harvard Dataverse (van Oosten et al., 2024b, 2024c, 2024d). The last questions of the survey were about religious identification. I asked: “Do you consider yourself as belonging to any particular religion or denomination?” If the respondent answered yes, I followed up with “Which one?” allowing respondents to answer “Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Other, [specify].” Respondents were able to indicate that they identified with a max of two ethnic groups, of which one could be French, German or Dutch and one religion. Table 1 shows the exact number of each group of respondents based on their migration backgrounds, and the percentage of which identified as Dutch, an ethnic minority group or belonging to a religion.

For each ethnic group and religion respondents selected, the respondents then received a list of four statements with answers ranging from 0 (disagree) to 10 (agree), which together form an ethnic in-group favouritism scale (Bizumic et al., 2009). Respondents received this battery of four statements between zero and three times, depending on how many ethnic or religious groups they identified with. I measured levels of ethnic and religious in-group favouritism on a scale from 0 to 10. I asked respondents to answer the following questions:

  1. In general, I prefer doing things with [ethnic or religious group] people.
  2. The world would be a much better place if all other groups are like [ethnic or religious group] people.
  3. I don’t think it is good to mix with people from other groups.
  4. We should always put [ethnic or religious group] interests first and not be oversensitive about the interests of others.

I conducted principal component analysis and the Chronbach Alpha for the ethnic scale was 0.87 and for the religion scale it was 0.80.

I measured issue stances in both the cultural and economic dimensions, split into eight issues: taxing the rich, social benefits, climate change, fuel prices, immigration, Islam, equal pay for men and women, and Lesbian, Gay, Bi (LGB, I did not measure attitudes towards trans rights)-rights. I standardized all independent variables to run from 0 to 1. For the exact measurements of issues, belonging in the Netherlands and experiences with discrimination, age, gender and level of education, see the full list of survey questions on Harvard Dataverse (van Oosten et al., 2024b, 2024c, 2024d).

As the dependent variable, I measured propensity to vote (PTV) for RN, AfD and PVV by asking respondents: “Please indicate the likelihood that you will ever vote for the following parties. If you are certain that you will never vote for this party then choose 0; if you are certain you will vote for this party someday, then enter 10. Of course, you can also choose an intermediate position” (as formulated in LISS, 2018). I also measured the PTV for all other parties in parliament at the time of gathering data, see the data and appendix on Harvard Dataverse (van Oosten et al., 2024b, 2024c, 2024d).

In figure 1a, 1b, and 1c, I analyse and present the data using marginal means where I compare different subgroups because I wish to avoid confusing readers with different reference categories (Leeper et al., 2020). I present marginal means of PTV-scores for all racial, ethnic and religious groups sampled separately. I do not use weights. I ran robustness checks with weights for the general population and didn’t find differences between the outcomes with and without weights, see code. Weighting the data for the minority and majority groups separately is impossible because France and Germany do not have population data of educational attainment, gender, age, urbanization, or region of ethnic minority and majority citizens, let alone Muslims. I analyse the underlying mechanisms using linear models. I prepared the data using R-package “tidyr” (Wickham, 2020), analysed it using linear models with R-base, and visualized it with R-package “ggplot2” (Wickham et al., 2020).

Findings

Intergroup Voting Differences

How likely are the racial, ethnic and religious groups to vote for PRRPs? In Figure 1a, I present the mean PTV-scores of RN in France and show that voters with a Turkish background in France are most inclined to vote for RN, followed closely by Christian and non-migrant French voters. Conversely, Muslims exhibit the lowest likelihood of supporting RN, significantly less than Turkish-background voters. In Figure 1b, I present the mean PTV-scores of AfD in Germany and show that voters from the Former Soviet Union are most likely to support AfD, with no significant difference in Muslim voters’ likelihood to support AfD compared to other groups. Finally, in Figure 1c, I present the mean PTV-scores of PVV in the Netherlands and find that Dutch voters without a migration background are most inclined to vote for PVV, while Muslim, Turkish, and Moroccan voters are significantly less likely to support PVV compared to other groups, with Muslims showing the lowest likelihood.

Based on Figure 1a, voters with a background in Turkey are the most likely to vote for RN in France, with a score of 3.26 (SD = 0.34). This is closely followed by Christian voters, with a score of 2.78 (SD = 0.19), and French voters without a migration background, with a score of 2.78 (SD = 0.30). Voters with a background in North Africa come next, scoring 2.66 (SD = 0.37), followed by non-religious voters, scoring 2.56 (SD = 0.24). Muslims have the lowest likelihood of voting for RN, scoring 2.25 (SD = 0.45). When considering confidence intervals, there is overlap between all groups except for voters with a background in Turkey and Muslims. This suggests that the difference in voting likelihood between only these two groups is statistically significant, indicating that voters with a background in Turkey are more likely to vote for RN than Muslims in France. Although the group of French citizens with a background in Turkey is small (N=87) and mostly secular. It is important to note that Muslims are just as likely to vote for RN as non-religious and Christian voters, as their confidence intervals overlap with those groups. This suggests that there’s no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of Muslims voting for RN compared to non-religious or Christian voters in France.

In the German case, voters with a background from the Former Soviet Union (FSU) are the most likely to vote for AfD, scoring 2.42 (SD = 0.39). This is followed by Christian voters, with a score of 2.34 (SD = 0.37), and German voters without a migration background, scoring 2.08 (SD = 0.34). Non-religious voters come next, scoring 1.97 (SD = 0.27), while voters with a background in Turkey score 1.72 (SD = 0.43). Muslims have the lowest likelihood of voting for AfD in Germany, scoring 1.50 (SD = 0.53). Notably, there is no significant difference between Muslims’ likelihood to vote for AfD and any other group, as the confidence intervals for all groups overlap. This suggests that there is no statistically significant difference in voting likelihood between these groups when it comes to supporting the AfD in Germany.

In the Netherlands, Muslim, Turkish, and Moroccan voters are significantly less likely to vote for PVV (Party for Freedom, Partij voor de Vrijheid) compared to non-religious voters and Dutch voters without a migration background. Dutch voters without a migration background have a score of 1.99 (SD = 0.33), followed by Surinamese voters at 1.60 (SD = 0.29), non-religious voters at 1.67 (SD = 0.24), and Christian voters at 1.62 (SD = 0.24). Turkish and Moroccan voters have lower scores, 0.99 (SD = 0.26) and 0.63 (SD = 0.13) respectively, while Muslims have the lowest likelihood of voting for PVV, scoring 0.66 (SD = 0.20).

What Explains PRRP Voting Amongst Muslims?

Figure 2a, 2b, and 2c provide insights into the factors influencing the voting behaviour of Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands regarding PRRPs. In France, attitudes towards fuel prices, social distance towards Maghrebi individuals, and attachment to France significantly impact voting for RN. In Germany, level of education, attitudes towards social benefits, Islam, perceived social distance towards FSU individuals, and in-group favouritism towards Muslims are significant predictors of AfD support. In the Netherlands, attitudes towards taxing the rich, immigration, and Islam, along with social distance from Dutch Moroccans, influence the likelihood of voting for PVV among Dutch Muslims.

What predicts whether French Muslims vote for RN? The adjusted R-squared for the model is 0.08931. Among the predictors, significant variables include the perceived social distance towards the ethnic minority group Maghrebi (Estimate = 1.67036, p-value = 0.03644), and attachment to France (Estimate = 2.58745, p-value = 0.00703), indicating that these factors have a significant impact on predicting whether French Muslims vote for RN. However, other variables such as education, taxing the rich, social benefits, climate, fuel prices, immigration, Islam, equal pay, LGB-rights, and several measures of social distance and group favouritism were not found to be statistically significant predictors in this analysis.

The adjusted R-squared for the model is 0.4062. Among the predictors, significant variables include level of education (Estimate = -2.2044, p-value = 0.00763), attitudes towards social benefits (Estimate = -1.9359, p-value = 0.03729), Islam (Estimate = -3.2628, p-value = 0.00124), perceived social distance towards FSU individuals (Estimate = 2.2490, p-value = 0.00566), and in-group favouritism towards Muslims (Estimate = 2.1648, p-value = 0.04216). However, other variables such as taxing the rich, climate, immigration, equal pay, LGB-rights, perceived social distance towards Turkish, German, Christian, and non-religious individuals, Belonging, attachment, and self-identified ethnic group were not found to be statistically significant predictors in this analysis. In addition to the significant variables mentioned earlier, some predictors came close to meeting the threshold for significance. These include attitudes towards fuel prices (Estimate = 1.4701, p-value = 0.08188), equal pay (Estimate = 1.3387, p-value = 0.06756), and German in-group favouritism (Estimate = 2.6970, p-value = 0.06304).

The adjusted R-squared for the model is 0.1914. Among the predictors, significant variables include attitudes towards taxing the rich (Estimate = -0.6797338, p-value = 0.038547), immigration (Estimate = -1.1692163, p-value = 0.003246), and Islam (Estimate = -1.3668919, p-value = 0.000557). The more positive at Dutch Muslim is about taxing the rich, immigration and Islam, the less likely a Dutch Muslim is to vote for PVV. The more distant one feels from Dutch Moroccans, the more likely one is to vote for the PVV (Estimate = 0.7867001, p-value = 0.051232). These results suggest that perceptions of immigration, attitudes towards Islam, and social distance from Moroccans significantly influence the likelihood of Dutch Muslims voting for PVV. However, other variables such as education, social benefits, climate, fuel prices, equal pay, LGB-rights, perceived social distance towards Surinamese, Turkish, Dutch, Muslim, Christian, and non-religious individuals, feeling accepted as belonging in the Netherlands, attachment to the Netherlands, self-identified ethnic group, and favouritism towards Dutch and Muslim in-groups were not found to be statistically significant predictors in this analysis.

In-group Favouritism

The analysis of in-group favouritism amongst ethnic minority and majority groups, as well as Muslims and Christians in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, reveals differences in in-group favouritism scores. Amongst the majority ethnic group voters, in-group favouritism emerges as notably higher compared to minority ethnic groups. Muslim and Christian in-group favouritism are comparable.

In-group Favouritism as a Stronger Predictor to Voting for PRRPs

The findings across Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c underscore the significance of measuring in-group favouritism when examining voting behaviour for PRRPs. In each case, a substantial portion of the variance in the likelihood to vote for these parties is accounted for by factors related to in-group favouritism and attachment. Notably, French and German in-group favouritism emerge as the strongest predictors of voting behaviour for RN and AfD, respectively, outweighing other variables such as immigration attitudes. In the Netherlands, feeling accepted as belonging in the Netherlands was the strongest indicator of voting PVV, with those who feel less accepted being more likely to vote PVV. While negative attitudes towards immigration remain a potent predictor across all cases, views that pertain to the in-group predict PRRP voting more strongly.

The adjusted R-squared for the model predicting whether French voters without a migration background vote for RN is 0.1626, indicating that approximately 16.26% of the variance in likelihood to vote for RN is accounted for by the predictor variables. Among the predictor variables, statistically significant predictors include attitudes towards immigration (estimate = -1.727, p < 0.01), feeling accepted as belonging in France (estimate = -1.363, p < 0.05), French in-group favouritism (estimate = 2.731, p < 0.001), and feelings of attachment to France (estimate = 1.360, p < 0.05). These results suggest that negative attitudes towards immigration and a strong sense of French identity are associated with a higher likelihood of voting for RN, while positive attitudes towards France and attachment to the country are associated with a lower likelihood of voting for RN. Conversely, variables such as education, taxing the rich, social benefits, and others are not statistically significant predictors of voting for RN in this model. The indicator with the highest impact was French in-group favouritism. Having a stronger preference for the French in-group is associated with a substantially higher likelihood of voting for RN.

The adjusted R-squared for the model predicting whether German voters without a migration background vote for AfD is 0.2739, indicating that approximately 27.39% of the variance in likelihood to vote for AfD is accounted for by the predictor variables. Among the predictor variables, statistically significant predictors include attitudes towards immigration (estimate = -1.905, p < 0.01), feelings of acceptance as belonging in Germany (estimate = -0.744, p < 0.05), German in-group favouritism (estimate = 3.862, p < 0.001), and Christian in-group favouritism (estimate = 3.25373, p < 0.001). These results suggest that negative attitudes towards immigration and a strong sense of German and Christian identity are associated with a higher likelihood of voting for AfD, while positive attitudes towards Germany and attachment to the country are associated with a lower likelihood of voting for AfD. Conversely, variables such as education, taxing the rich, social benefits, and others are not statistically significant predictors of voting for AfD in this model. The indicator with the highest impact was German in-group favouritism. Having a stronger preference for the German in-group is associated with a substantially higher likelihood of voting for AfD, amongst Germans without a migration background.

The adjusted R-squared for the model predicting whether Dutch voters without a migration background vote for PVV is 0.2732, indicating that approximately 27.32% of the variance in likelihood to vote for PVV is accounted for by the predictor variables. Among the predictor variables, statistically significant predictors include attitudes towards immigration (estimate = -2.463, p < 0.001), concern about climate change (estimate = -1.579, p < 0.05), raising fuel prices (estimate = -1.246, p < 0.05), feelings of acceptance as belonging in the Netherlands (estimate = -2.616, p < 0.05), and preference for the Dutch in-group (estimate = 1.784, p < 0.05). These results suggest that negative attitudes towards immigration are associated with a higher likelihood of voting for PVV, while positive attitudes towards the Netherlands and attachment to the country are associated with a lower likelihood of voting for PVV. Conversely, variables such as education, taxing the rich, social benefits, and others are not statistically significant predictors of voting for PVV in this model. The indicator with the highest impact was feeling accepted as belonging in the Netherlands. Feeling less accepted is associated with a substantially higher likelihood of voting for PVV.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on the likelihood of minorities and majorities to vote for PRRPs and what explains the voting likelihoods. In France and Germany, there are remarkably few differences in the likelihood of voting for minority and majority groups. In France, voters with a Turkish background exhibit the highest inclination to support RN, followed closely by Christian and non-migrant French voters. Conversely, Muslims show the lowest likelihood of supporting RN. In Germany, voters from the Former Soviet Union are most likely to support AfD, with no significant difference in Muslim voters’ likelihood to support AfD compared to other groups. In the Netherlands, Dutch voters without a migration background are significantly more inclined to vote for PVV, while Muslim, Turkish, and Moroccan voters are significantly less likely to support PVV compared to other groups, with Muslims showing the lowest likelihood.

I also discuss the factors influencing the voting behaviour of Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands regarding PRRPs. Generally speaking, issues are the biggest predictor of Muslim voting for PRRPs. In France, attitudes towards fuel prices, social distance towards Maghrebi individuals, and attachment to France significantly impact voting for RN. In Germany, level of education, attitudes towards social benefits, Islam, perceived social distance towards FSU individuals, and in-group favouritism towards Muslims are significant predictors of AfD support. In the Netherlands, attitudes towards taxing the rich, immigration, and Islam, along with social distance from Dutch Moroccans, influence the likelihood of voting for PVV among Dutch Muslims.

Moreover, when it comes to majority voters, I find in-group favouritism predicts voting more than issues do. French and German in-group favouritism emerge as the strongest predictors of voting behaviour for RN and AfD, respectively, outweighing other variables such as immigration attitudes. In the Netherlands, feeling accepted as belonging in the country was the strongest indicator of voting PVV, with those who feel less accepted being more likely to vote PVV. Overall, negative attitudes towards immigration remain a potent predictor across all cases, while views related to the in-group predict PRRP voting more strongly.

Lastly, the examination of in-group favouritism among ethnic minority and majority groups, alongside Muslims and Christians in France, Germany, and the Netherlands, reveals that in-group favouritism is much higher among racial and ethnic majority voters. Meanwhile, the analysis shows remarkably low levels of in-group favouritism within minority groups. This trend underscores that groups with more power and privilege tend to uphold and reinforce their social dominance through favouring their own group, while the groups with less power and privilege do not favour their in-group to the same extent and might benefit more from siding with the dominant out-group.

I argue that in-group favouritism can be extended towards voting for PRRPs because the analysis reveals that French, German and Dutch in-group favouritism and PRRP voting are strongly related for racial and ethnic majority groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands. The relationship between majority group in-group favouritism and PRRP voting is stronger for majority voters compared to minority voters due to the dynamics of social identity and power asymmetry. For majority voters, who typically hold higher social status and enjoy dominant societal norms, in-group favouritism serves as a reinforcing mechanism of their perceived superiority and control over resources. In-group favouritism not only bolsters their positive self-image but also reinforces their position of privilege within the social hierarchy. I argue this extends to PRRP voting. Moreover, for majority voters, in-group favouritism and PRRP voting is intricately linked with the preservation of their cultural and political hegemony. Supporting policies or political parties aligned with their group interests not only reinforces their social identity but also serves to protect and advance their collective interests within society. In-group favouritism as well as voting for PRRPs becomes a means of maintaining the status quo and resisting challenges to their dominance from minority groups.

In contrast, minority voters often face systemic barriers and discrimination that limit their access to resources and opportunities. Sometimes their situation leads to in-group favouritism, but in some situations it is more beneficial to favour the dominant out-group. This is most visible in France and Germany, where racial and ethnic minority and Muslim voters are just as likely to vote for PRRPs as their majority counterparts. In France, the Turkish group of voters is even most likely to vote for PRRPS, possibly because they are only a very small part of the population and do not have a very large in-group community to favour, unlike in Germany and the Netherlands where there are larger Turkish communities. Thus, siding with the out-group through PRRP voting might reveal an inclination towards favouring the dominant out-group to navigate existing power structures. In the Netherlands, the strong focus on multiculturalism historically, might have bolstered the Muslim, Turkish and Moroccan communities leading them to be much less likely than other groups to vote for PRRPs. However, this could also be due to the relatively explicit nature of the PVV in their opposition against Muslims, especially those of Turkish and Moroccan descent.

In conclusion, the significance of in-group favouritism varies between majority and minority voters due to the differential distribution of power and privilege within society. For majority voters, in-group favouritism reinforces their social dominance and cultural hegemony, whereas for minority voters, it may be one of many strategies employed in the pursuit of equality and social change. In-group favouritism is also more important compared to immigration attitudes in predicting PRRP voting. While negative attitudes towards immigration remain a significant predictor across most cases, I show that in-group favouritism often outweighs immigration sentiments, especially among majority voters. This suggests that for majority groups, the allegiance to their in-group holds greater sway in shaping their electoral choices than attitudes towards immigration, arguably the out-group.

Conversely, among minority voters, policy positions, especially regarding issues relevant to their community, such as immigration policies, play a slightly more decisive role in guiding their voting behaviour. This relationship between in-group favouritism, immigration attitudes, and policy preferences underscores how important it is to consider in-group favouritism in future research, recognizing its relationship with power dynamics. By doing so, we can deepen our understanding of the factors shaping electoral behaviour and contribute to a more inclusive and equitable democratic process.


 

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Footnotes

[1] Please find all replication materials including data, code and appendices here: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/T7G5N

[2] https://www.nu.nl/formatie-2023/6292199/moslims-stemmen-helemaal-niet-massaal-op-de-pvv.html

[3] https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-08-01/donald-trump-suggests-kamala-harris-suddenly-became-black/104167996

[4] https://www.theamericanconservative.com/is-demography-still-destiny-after-2024/

[5] idem

[6] idem

[7] https://apnorc.org/projects/immigration-attitudes-and-conspiratorial-thinkers/

[8] https://apnorc.org/1-in-3-fears-immigrants-influence-us-elections-ap-norc-poll/

[9] https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2024-musk-x-election-influence-immigration/

[10] https://europeanstudiescentre.blogspot.com/2024/06/democracy-of-last-man-politics-of.html

[11] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/technology/replacement-theory.html

[12] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/18/technology/replacement-theory.html

[13] https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2018/01/22/kasteelheer-slaat-alarm-over-cultuur-van-europa-a1589332

[14] https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2024/06/21/de-diepe-racistische-wortels-van-de-omvolkingstheorie-a4857248

[15] https://www.telegraaf.nl/video/45024727/geert-wilders-bij-overwinningsspeech-nederland-bedankt

[16] https://www.ad.nl/politiek/switchten-moslims-in-nederland-massaal-naar-de-pvv-dit-zeggen-de-cijfers~afea4f90/?referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F

[17] https://www.nu.nl/formatie-2023/6292199/moslims-stemmen-helemaal-niet-massaal-op-de-pvv.html

[18] https://europeanstudiescentre.blogspot.com/2024/06/democracy-of-last-man-politics-of.html

Emirati men perform the traditional Al Ayala dance in Abu Dhabi, UAE, on December 23, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries

Please cite as:

Shewan, Molly. (2025). “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).January 10, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0094

 

On December 19, 2024, ECPS hosted the 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, titled “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries.” This session examined a number of key contemporary dynamics at the intersection of populism and authoritarianism in the Gulf region. A distinguished panel of experts presented on a wide range of topics, including the evolution of social contracts in Gulf states; autocratization processes; the environmental dimension of authoritarian leadership; and the role of religion in shaping both domestic and international politics. The session thus offered many key critical insights into both the nebulous features of populism itself and the importance of bringing the Gulf region into scholarly conversation regarding populism’s impact across the globe. 

Report by Molly Shewan

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted the 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries,” on December 19, 2024. The session explored the complex dynamics surrounding populism and authoritarianism across the Gulf region. Bringing together a distinguished panel of scholars and practitioners, the discussion focused on a number of key developments, including the environmental and religious dimensions of autocratic leadership in the Gulf States, as well as the evolution of the social contract, in order to examine the diverse causes, manifestations and impacts of populism and authoritarianism in the region.  

Moderated by Dr. Courtney Freer, Assistant Professor at the Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies-Emory University, the panelists included  Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber, Professor of Middle East at the Friedrich Alexander University, Erlangen-Nürnberg-Germany; Dr. Gail Buttorff, Hobby School of Public Affairs-University of Huston;  Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel, senior researcher and lecturer at the Department for Human Geography at Heidelberg University-Germany; Mr. Kardo Kareem Rached, University of Human Development-Iraq, and  Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington. 

The panel made a multidisciplinary, wide-ranging, and insightful contribution to the scholarly exploration of populism and autocracy in the rapidly evolving social and political context of the Gulf region. Therefore, this session constitutes a significant and timely addition to the panel series overall, aiding in its goal of generating a more complete understanding of the diverse impact of populism and authoritarianism across the globe. 

Panel Overview 

Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber opened the panel with his presentation on “Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf Region.” Dr. Demmelhuber began by arguing that Gulf regimes are often much too complex to be neatly categorized into a binary division between democracy and authoritarian governance. Rather, he regards autocratization as a fluid, multifaceted process which can occur within a variety of regime types in notably different ways. Dr. Demmelhuber argued that autocratization is primarily driven through the actions of prominent elites at the domestic, regional and international levels. 

At the domestic level, populist discourses can be utilized as a means of consolidating regime power, utilizing affective appeals to the citizenry as a united collective in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime. At the regional level, regimes often learn from one another and adapt their political strategies to mirror their neighbors, which is linked to the emergence of authoritarian gravity centers. On the international level, norm diffusion can occur through transnational networks, promoting authoritarian practices across the globe. Dr. Demmelhuber concluded his insightful presentation by flagging the need for greater scholarly interrogation of the non-material dimension of populist appeals, as well as of the populism which emerges “from below.”

Our second speaker, Dr. Gail Buttorff, a researcher of gender and political participation in the Middle East, followed with an engaging talk titled “The Evolving Social Contract in the GCC” with a particular focus on gender as a key factor. Dr. Buttorf began by offering a succinct overview of the social contract in the GCC up to the 2000s, which was heavily reliant upon strong wealth redistribution and a generous welfare state in exchange for limited political participation by the citizenry. She then went on to note a variety of factors that have put pressure on this institutional arrangement since then: declining oil rents, lower revenue, and growing populations, which led Gulf states to embrace austerity while unemployment was rising. 

In an effort to renegotiate their social contracts in this new contemporary context, Gulf regimes have deployed policies of labor renationalization, which in turn resulted in a significant increase in female employment, as well as “vision statements” which explicitly emphasize “mutuality” between state and citizen responsibility. The gendered impact of these adjustments was particularly visible during the COVID-19 outbreak, as a number of states – including the UAE and Bahrain – passed legislation which illustrated the intersection between labor nationalization and women’s participation in public life. 

Overall, Dr. Buttorff effectively explored the ways in which Gulf states have attempted to retain legitimacy in uncertain economic conditions by adjusting their social contracts, with particularly significant implications for women across the region.  

Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel, who has written extensively on the environmental dimension of state power in the Gulf, turned to focus on the environmental dimension in his presentation: “The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership.” He, too, began by examining the social contract in the Gulf, emphasizing the enhanced role of provision and protection by regimes—made possible through the vast income generated by the oil and gas industries—in exchange for a lack of participation by their citizens. In the wake of growing pressures to lessen their dependence on fossil fuels, Dr. Zumbraegel argued that the emerging “Green Gulf Model” is characterized by strong, personalistic leadership, a techno-utopian vision which perhaps over-exaggerates the potential for new technologies to reverse environmental harm, strong emphasis on the continuing importance of fossil fuels; and a close alignment of environmental goals with other economic diversification projects, such as in sports and entertainment. Dr. Zumbraegel further sought to locate the role of these “green autocrats” in influencing global environmental governance, supported by a strong alliance of transnational corporations whose goals align with those of the Gulf regimes. 

To conclude, Dr. Zumbraegel argued that autocratic regimes in the Gulf have embraced a top-down approach to sustainability. By gradually pivoting towards green energy yet continuing to protect their oil and gas interests, Gulf states are attempting to maintain the rentier welfare state system whilst neglecting the environmental and social justice dimensions of sustainability altogether.  

Mr. Kardo Kareem Rashed, an expert on the intersection between religion and politics in the Middle East, discussed the intersection between religion and authoritarianism in his talk: “The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies.” Taking a historical-analytical approach, Mr. Rashed began by tracing the roots of Salafism back to Saudi Arabia, emphasizing its complex role in shaping Saudi Arabian domestic and international politics since 9/11 due to links with Jihadism. He went on to note the relevance of the political decision-making process in Saudi Arabia, a strictly patrimonial regime, wherein power flows downwards through a hierarchical model of authority from the King to tribal sheikhs and army leaders. 

As Saudi Arabia evolved into a rentier state, Mr. Rached argues, Salafism became institutionalized; post-World War II, Salafism was a powerful tool used by Saudi King Faisal to oppose and suppress Arab nationalist movements, bolstered through the establishment of new educational institutions. The Gulf War marked a key turning point, however, as the Salafist movement rejected the presence of US troops on Saudi soil. As a result, the Saudi state began to tighten control over religious institutions and strengthened alliances with other nations on the basis of shared Islamist ideology. Overall, Mr. Rached argued, in a supposedly post-Salafi era, a complex relationship remains between the Saudi state and transnational religious dynamics.  

Finally, Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, a leading scholar on the politics of Arab Gulf States, presented on the topic “Populism in Gulf Monarchies: Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption,” concluding our discussion with a more direct interrogation of populism itself, its varying definitions and its contemporary manifestations across the Gulf region. 

Dr. Diwan began by discussing salient conceptualizations of populism as a theory of international relations, an approach to economic policy, and a style of political leadership before arguing that populism appears particularly prominently as a discursive form of rhetoric in the Gulf region. Populist rhetoric frequently features direct appeals to “the people” as a virtuous citizenry and depicts a cultural, economic or political elite as a corrupt “establishment.” Dr Diwan aptly noted that populist rhetoric is also often tightly entwined with nationalism, as it punches both downwards, outwards the “undeserving” unproductive class, as well as outwards, targeting migrants and non-citizens too. 

While it might be surprising to see populism emerge in the Gulf states, considering their strong track record of resource distribution, Dr. Diwan argued that both increasing wealth inequality and the emergence of communication technology – e.g. social media – are both important factors in explaining the emergence of populism from below. Detailing a number of examples of populist rhetoric by opposition figures, Dr. Diwan argued that different Gulf Monarchies have responded with varying strategies of suppression, cooptation and adoption. In a particularly interesting case, she noted that Saudi Arabian elites have deployed populist rhetoric from above in an attempt to consolidate their state power, emphasizing the fluid nature of populist discursive strategies.  

Conclusion 

The 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series provided an engaging examination of some of the key contemporary features of populism and authoritarianism in the Gulf region. Each speaker presented an insightful contribution to this theme, from conceptualizing autocratization to gendering the social contract to the intersection between autocracy, environmentalism, and religion. Overall, the panel highlighted the pressing need for greater scholarly attention on the region within the field of populism studies, owing largely to the rapidly evolving social, political and environmental landscape of the Gulf states. In particular, scholars emphasized the need to consider both the material and non-material causal factors at play in furthering populist or autocratic trends. For instance, changes in wealth redistribution and affective emotional or discursive appeals were both highlighted as particularly relevant. 

The highly engaging and insightful analysis shared throughout the panel was, therefore, not only successful in representing a number of key developments within current scholarship on the region but also in signposting important avenues for further research. 

Overall, this session constituted an effective contribution to ECPS’s broader goal of advancing our understanding of populism across the globe. It will undoubtedly prove a valuable resource for those looking to enhance their understanding of the way in which populism and autocracy manifest and interact within the Gulf region today.  

In this AI-generated image, US presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump appear. Photo: Shutterstock.

What Do the US Election Results Tell Us about the Global Trajectory of Populism?

Please cite as: 

Sithole, Neo. (2025). “What Do the US Election Results Tell Us about the Global Trajectory of Populism?” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0093

 

The ECPS panel provided an in-depth exploration of how the 2024 US Presidential Election reflects and impacts global populism. Experts analyzed key dynamics, including economic grievances, cultural shifts, and political polarization. Moderated by Ali H. Aslan, the discussion highlighted the role of evangelical populism, Trumpism’s transatlantic influence, and global democratic erosion. Distinguished panelists emphasized the need for liberal democracies to counter autocratic trends by offering compelling solutions and reinforcing institutions. This timely dialogue shed light on the interplay between economic, cultural, and institutional forces shaping contemporary populist movements worldwide.

Report by Neo Sithole

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened an insightful panel discussion to analyze the implications of the 2024 US Presidential Election on the global trajectory of populism. This critical event, held on Thursday, November 14, 2024, featured leading scholars and experts exploring how the election results reflect shifting political dynamics in the United States and their ripple effects worldwide.

Moderated by Ali H. Aslan, a seasoned Washington-based journalist and former Washington correspondent for Zaman Daily, the panel brings together prominent voices in political science and sociology to dissect key themes shaping contemporary populism. Dr. Alan Abramowitz, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Emory University, delves into the economic underpinnings of the election with his presentation, “It Was (Mostly) the Economy, Stupid: Explaining Trump’s Victory.” Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University and Research Affiliate at CEU’s Democracy Institute, examines the broader implications of the election for global populism in her talk, “Explaining the US Election Outcome and Its Implications for Global Populism.”  Dr. Marcia Pally, a scholar at New York University and Humboldt University-Berlin, sheds light on the pivotal role of white evangelical voters in shaping the 2024 electoral landscape in her presentation, “The Role of White Evangelicals in the 2024 US Presidential Election: What We Know So Far.”  Dr. Mabel Berezin, Distinguished Professor at Cornell University and Director of the Institute for European Studies, extends the discussion to transatlantic populist trends with her analysis, “Does Trumpism Cross the Atlantic?” Dr. Marina Nord, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, explores the long-term implications of Trump’s return to power for global democracy in her presentation, “The Return of Trump and the Future of Global Democracy.”

This timely panel offered a comprehensive examination of the US election’s domestic and international implications, emphasizing how populist movements and ideologies influence governance, democracy, and political discourse across the globe. Attendees gained valuable insights into the interplay of economic, cultural, and religious factors shaping contemporary populism and its global manifestations.

Mr. Aslan: ‘Trump’s Campaign Successfully Leveraged Anti-establishment Rhetoric, Economic Promises, and Nationalist Appeals’

Moderator Ali H. Aslan began by providing an overview of the constitutional, federal, and governmental structure of the United States, emphasizing that, while minor parties exist, the US predominantly functions as a two-party democracy, with the conservative-leaning Republican Party and the liberal-leaning Democratic Party as the primary contenders. He noted that the recent US elections marked a significant political shift, with voters replacing Democratic President Joe Biden with Republican nominee Donald Trump. 

Mr. Aslan recounted growing concerns about Biden’s age and health, which led him to withdraw from the race months before the election and endorse Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic candidate. Trump’s victory over Harris was decisive, securing 312 Electoral College votes and winning the national popular vote by over 3 million. His campaign successfully leveraged anti-establishment rhetoric, economic promises, and nationalist appeals, expanding support among traditionally Democratic groups, including Hispanic, African American, and Muslim voters. The election also saw the Republican Party flipping the Senate with 53 seats and narrowly regaining control of the House of Representatives, consolidating significant political power.

Mr. Aslan noted that this consolidation raises concerns about the potential erosion of democratic institutions, given the Supreme Court’s conservative majority and Trump’s anti-establishment approach. He highlighted that critics warn of authoritarian risks, while others express confidence in the resilience of US constitutional traditions. Trump’s unpredictable leadership style adds further uncertainty as his administration begins shaping policies and making key appointments.

Professor Abramowitz: ‘Democrats’ Electoral Loss Was Primarily Driven by Economic Concerns’

The first contribution to this session was made by Professor Alan Abramowitz who analyzed how the 2024 US Presidential Election underscored critical dynamics shaped in part by Incumbent President Joe Biden’s low approval rating, with a net disapproval of -20%. He argued that the decisive factor in the Democratic Party’s defeat was largely economic, encapsulated in the phrase, “It was (mostly) the Economy, Stupid.” Professor Abramowitz pointed out that the Democrats’ electoral loss was primarily driven by economic concerns, particularly the high inflation that persisted throughout Biden’s term. This followed historical trends in which unpopular presidents often lead their parties to electoral defeats. While recent improvements in job growth, easing inflation, and a resilient labor market offered positive economic indicators, these developments failed to alter public perceptions of economic instability, which were deeply entrenched among key voting blocs and created fertile ground for demands for change.

Professor Abramowitz illustrated how President-elect Donald Trump effectively tapped into this discontent, narrowly winning the national popular vote by 1–2% and flipping pivotal swing states by razor-thin margins. His victory highlighted the enduring polarization of the American electorate, with turnout patterns reflecting deep demographic and geographic divides. While both parties continued to dominate their respective strongholds, competition in battleground states showcased the intensity of partisan loyalties. The election results reflected broader challenges in bridging ideological divides and navigating an electorate fractured along economic and cultural lines. Despite significant policy debates and contrasting visions for the country, economic perceptions and presidential approval ratings remained the dominant forces driving voter behavior, ultimately shaping the trajectory of this closely contested election.

Professor McCoy: ‘Economic Stress and Cultural Disruption Drive Political Shifts’

Professor Jennifer McCoy was the second panelist who explored how sustained duress—whether in the form of threats, economic hardship, or perceived loss—often fosters an “us vs. them” mentality. Professor McCoy highlighted that this psychological shift is a common human response, where the perceived source of harm becomes the target of suspicion and blame. Consequently, individuals may distance themselves from outsiders to protect their own group. This dynamic is particularly evident in populist movements, where economic stress and cultural disruption drive political shifts. She referenced a study of 800 elections across 20 democracies from the 1870s to 2014, demonstrating how financial crises have consistently resulted in significant gains for both far-right and left-wing populist parties. Under such conditions, people often turn to leaders who promise to restore security and address their fears, especially when threats are perceived as originating from outsiders.

Professor McCoy addressed the global trend of anti-incumbent voting, observing that in the US, this phenomenon has skewed rightward due to narrow electoral margins and the structure of the two-party system. She emphasized the need to distinguish between campaign rhetoric and actual policies, raising questions about who benefits from Republican agendas: upper-income earners or working-class voters. She characterized the Republican coalition as a mix of wealthy elites, middle-class supporters, and the religious right. In conclusion, Professor McCoy argued that the same anti-authoritarian and community-focused principles that once contributed to America’s vibrancy have, under current pressures, evolved into suspicion, division, and polarization.

Professor Pally: ‘Anti-authoritarianism, Theological Distrust of Government, and Perceived Cultural Losses Intensify White Evangelicals’ Alignment with Right-wing Populism’

Professor Marcia Pally delivered the third presentation and examined the historical, cultural, and political forces shaping American and white evangelical populism. Professor Pally explained that white evangelicals in the US are influenced by historical and doctrinal frameworks, such as Covenantal Political Theory, Aristotelian Republicanism, and Liberalism, which emphasize skepticism toward government, elites, and outsiders. These traditions, coupled with cultural and economic distress, have fostered deep distrust of authority. The Puritan and covenantal ideals brought to the US emphasized community governance and personal responsibility, with a strong reluctance to depend on external authorities. This perspective has been compounded by a sense of cultural and religious loss in the face of increasing secularism, leading white evangelicals to adopt a defensive “us vs. them” worldview, often perceiving secular government and liberal society as antagonistic.

Professor Pally identified economic stress, technological changes, demographic shifts, and cultural anxieties as key drivers of populism among white evangelicals. She highlighted their struggle with declining cultural dominance in an increasingly secular society, noting that legal changes, such as the legalization of same-sex marriage, have heightened fears of marginalization. For white evangelicals, a mix of anti-authoritarianism, theological distrust of government, and perceived cultural losses has intensified their alignment with right-wing populism. Professor Pally also pointed out the irony that evangelical values, once a force for community and anti-authoritarianism, now contribute to divisive rhetoric in a polarized political climate, further exacerbating challenges to American democracy.

Professor Berezin: ‘Trumpism Emboldened Paramilitary Groups, Fostering a Culture of Intimidation and Fear’

Following Professor Pally was Professor Mabel Berezin who delivered a presentation titled “Does Trumpism Cross the Atlantic?” Acknowledging the evolving nature of the discussion, Professor Berezin noted that the recent US election results had reframed many issues, leaving several aspects too early to fully assess. Reflecting on previous presentations, she traced the rise of anti-democratic, right-wing nationalist trends in Europe while emphasizing the distinct dangers posed by the American context.

Professor Berezin highlighted the global trend of democratic backsliding, where skepticism toward democracy is growing, but she pointed out that the US faces unique “dangerous pulse points.” These include the rise of paramilitary groups, judicial realignments, and intellectual movements advocating for social authoritarianism. She particularly emphasized the concerning legitimization of paramilitary groups under Trump, which had previously been relegated to the fringes of society. Trumpism emboldened these groups, fostering a culture of intimidation and fear. Recalling personal experiences in campaign areas marked by gun culture and economic hardship, Berezin underscored the growing normalization of such groups.

In addition, Professor Berezin warned about the rise of intellectual and institutional movements aimed at dismantling regulatory frameworks and traditional family structures. These movements, she argued, pose an even greater threat than paramilitary groups due to their organized and legally entrenched influence. She also highlighted the weakening of democratic protections and the erosion of international institutions. She cited Marine Le Pen’s call for Europe to defend its interests as an example of the broader challenges posed by Trump’s presidency, warning of its implications for global democratic stability.

Dr. Nord: ‘Many Countries Experience Rising Political Polarization, Disinformation, and Weakening Democratic Standards’

The final presentation was delivered by Dr. Marina Nord who discussed the decline of democracy in the United States, comparing it to global trends and the Liberal Democracy Index. She highlighted that while the US once ranked above the Western European and North American average for democracy, it now falls below, particularly after the Trump presidency. The sharp drop in democratic accountability since 2016 has not been fully reversed under Biden’s administration. Dr. Nord showcased declines in key indicators such as deliberative processes, electoral integrity, and the spread of misinformation, illustrating the significant challenges facing US democracy. She explained that globally, many countries—including the US—are experiencing rising political polarization, disinformation, and weakening democratic standards, all of which contribute to a broader trend of democratic erosion.

This shift aligns with the growing influence of autocracies, with countries like those in the BRICS bloc gaining economic and political power. Dr. Nord concluded by emphasizing the need for liberal democracies to counter populist and autocratic narratives by offering more persuasive solutions. She cited research on the dividends of democracy, particularly in areas like security and media freedom, underscoring the necessity for democracies to adapt to global challenges and strengthen their institutions to prevent further decline.

This ECPS panel highlighted how the 2024 election reflects broader global trends in populism, polarization, and democratic erosion. Through insightful presentations, scholars dissected the interplay of economic, cultural, and institutional factors shaping contemporary populist movements. From economic grievances driving political shifts, as Dr. Abramowitz explained, to the complex role of cultural identity and evangelical populism discussed by Dr. Pally, the event underscored the multifaceted nature of populist influence. The panelists collectively stressed the urgency for liberal democracies to adapt and counter autocratic narratives to safeguard democratic institutions worldwide.

Illustration: Shutterstock.

The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice — Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice — Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. December 26, 2024.https://doi.org/10.55271/br0024

 

Tariq Modood’s groundbreaking work on multiculturalism is celebrated in this volume, highlighting his transformative contributions to the field. Through the concepts of “multicultural nationalism” and “moderate secularism,” Modood offers a sophisticated framework that harmonizes diverse identities with a cohesive sense of national belonging. Edited by Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi, and Nasar Meer, the book tackles pressing challenges such as populism, globalization, and transnationalism, while situating Modood’s legacy within global debates on identity and citizenship. Although the collection’s depth and interdisciplinary scope are impressive, its Western-centric focus somewhat limits its comparative applicability. Nonetheless, this volume is an indispensable resource for advancing multiculturalism as a counter to the populist radical right in both theory and practice.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

The connections between populist radical right ideologies and racism, nativism, nationalism, welfare chauvinism, anti-immigration sentiment, Islamophobia, and anti-minority discourses, actions, and policies are undeniable. One potential countermeasure to this form of homogenizing cultural and racial populism is the establishment of a robust framework for multiculturalism, cultural hybridity, and heterogeneity. This framework should uphold and guarantee individual and collective rights and freedoms, both to and from, for minority groups and peace and comfort for dominant majority culture.

In this context, the contributions of Tariq Modood have garnered significant attention. The European Centre for Populism Studies (ECPS) has recognized the relevance of his work and decided to publish a review of the book The Resilience of Multiculturalism: Ideas, Politics and Practice: Essays in Honour of Tariq Modood. Edited by Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi, and Nasar Meer, this volume explores and celebrates Modood’s influential ideas on multiculturalism and its practical implications in contemporary society.

The book serves as a tribute to Tariq Modood’s substantial contributions to the theory and practice of multiculturalism. It offers a wide-ranging exploration of multiculturalism as a concept that continues to evolve, addressing contemporary issues of identity, inclusion, and diversity in diverse societies. Divided into four thematic sections—philosophical orientations, diversity and inclusion, nationalism and transnationalism, and secularism—the book includes contributions from eminent scholars across these fields.

The chapter “Introduction: Modoodian Multiculturalism,” co-authored by the book’s editors, explores Modood’s influential contributions to multiculturalism, situating his ideas within global debates on identity, citizenship, and diversity. It emphasizes Modood’s interdisciplinary approach, blending political theory with sociology to address evolving multicultural challenges. Contextualizing critiques and the perceived decline of multiculturalism, particularly amid populist narratives, cultural “wars,” and political skepticism, the editors highlight its resilience as both a policy and theoretical framework. They underscore multiculturalism’s relevance in tackling racial and ethnic justice, as reflected in movements like Black Lives Matter and indigenous rights debates.

The chapter delves into Modood’s key contributions, particularly his formulation of “Modoodian multiculturalism,” integrating sociological insights with normative political theory. Central concepts include ethno-religious identities and cultural racism, addressing gaps in traditional anti-racism and secularist paradigms. Modood’s advocacy for plural anti-racism and “multicultural nationalism” is pivotal, proposing an inclusive reshaping of national identities to foster minority belonging. By articulating Modood’s innovative approaches to recognition, inclusion, and national belonging, the chapter situates his work as vital to advancing multiculturalism in theory and practice. It effectively introduces the volume, tracing Modood’s intellectual legacy and global relevance, while setting the stage for thematic explorations of multiculturalism’s enduring significance.

In the chapter “Invoking the Idealist World of Ideas,” David Boucher explores Modood’s intellectual engagement with British idealism, particularly the philosophies of Michael Oakeshott and R.G. Collingwood. Boucher highlights how Modood’s grounding in idealist traditions informs his conception of multicultural citizenship, shaping his interdisciplinary synthesis of political theory and sociology. Boucher argues that Modood’s work embodies a “world of ideas” rooted in Collingwood’s hierarchical and overlapping forms of experience and Oakeshott’s philosophical skepticism toward rigid abstraction. Modood’s rejection of the categorical separation between theory and practice, derived from Collingwood, becomes central to his critique of Oakeshott’s anti-essentialism and his emphasis on identity as dynamic and contextual rather than fixed. This conceptual orientation allows Modood to address the practical challenges of multiculturalism while remaining philosophically rigorous.

Boucher demonstrates how Modood adapts the idealist framework to contemporary issues of multiculturalism, such as identity, cultural continuity, and anti-racism. The author also situates Modood’s contributions within a broader philosophical revival, emphasizing his alignment with the idealist principles of “identity in difference” and “continuity through change.” Ultimately, Boucher’s analysis underscores the enduring influence of British idealism on Modood’s theoretical and practical engagement with multicultural citizenship, offering valuable insights into the philosophical underpinnings of his work.

In chapter titled “Intimating or Iterating? Modood on Contextualism and the Danish Cartoons of Muhammad,” Sune Lægaard critically evaluates Tariq Modood’s iterative contextualist methodology through the lens of the Danish Cartoon Affair. Lægaard examines the tensions between Modood’s stated commitment to contextual sensitivity and the practical application of this methodology in his writings on the controversy. Lægaard acknowledges Modood’s contextualism as a theoretically rich approach, particularly in its sensitivity to local norms and iterative refinement of general principles. However, he raises concerns about the selective nature of Modood’s contextual engagement. For instance, Modood’s interpretation of the cartoons, particularly the “bomb-in-the-turban” cartoon, is critiqued for privileging one interpretation—Muslims as targets of racism—while neglecting the cartoonists’ stated intentions, such as criticizing extremism. Lægaard argues that this selective framing undermines Modood’s broader claim to contextual neutrality.

Further, Lægaard challenges Modood’s use of analogies, such as Holocaust denial laws, to justify restrictions on speech targeting Muslims. He points out inaccuracies in Modood’s application of Danish blasphemy and hate-speech laws, which already protected religious groups, including Muslims, thereby questioning the relevance of Modood’s arguments in this specific case. While Lægaard commends the adaptability of Modood’s contextualism, he highlights methodological inconsistencies that weaken its application. These critiques underscore the challenges of balancing context-sensitive analysis with normative commitments in political theory. Lægaard’s analysis reinforces the need for greater precision in contextual methodologies, even as he acknowledges the enduring value of Modood’s broader theoretical contributions.

Simon Thompson’s chapter, “Tariq Modood and the Politics of Recognition,” provides a critical exploration of the role of recognition in Modood’s theory of multiculturalism. The chapter positions recognition as a cornerstone in Modood’s intellectual framework, especially in understanding and addressing the dynamics of multicultural societies. Thompson organizes his analysis around four themes: equality, identity, struggle, and inclusion. He commends Modood for his dual conception of equality—equal dignity and equal respect—and his emphasis on the interplay between individual and group recognition. Thompson also highlights Modood’s nuanced focus on ethno-religious identities, which distinguishes his work from traditional liberal multiculturalist theories. Further, he underscores Modood’s dynamic understanding of identity as a dialectical process shaped by insider self-ascriptions and outsider perceptions, framing struggles for recognition as central to addressing misrecognition and exclusion.

However, Thompson raises critical concerns about Modood’s framework. He critiques the lack of practical guidance on when and how to apply equal dignity versus equal respect and calls for a more robust metric to navigate this distinction. Additionally, he notes Modood’s relative neglect of socio-economic inequalities, arguing that a comprehensive theory of justice should integrate both multicultural and economic dimensions. Thompson also challenges the ambiguity in Modood’s conceptualization of group recognition, urging greater clarity about whether groups deserve recognition for their intrinsic value or for the sake of their members. Nevertheless, Thompson’s critique is constructive, acknowledging Modood’s valuable contributions while suggesting areas for further refinement. 

In chapter titled “What’s to Be Done? Reuniting the People,” Charles Taylor engages with the divisive impact of exclusionary populism, proposing inclusive frameworks to reconcile societal divisions and foster cohesion. Taylor’s chapter is a robust examination of how modern democracies, fractured by inequalities and identity politics, might navigate towards unity through redefining national identity and embracing multicultural and intercultural narratives. Taylor’s analysis is compelling in its multi-faceted approach, identifying the dual fissures in contemporary democracies: the elite-populist divide and the tensions arising from cultural or ethnic differences. He underscores the need for democracies to craft inclusive political identities that honor both equality and historical narratives of national identity. His advocacy for interculturalism, particularly as a counterpoint to misinterpretations of multiculturalism in Europe, provides a roadmap for societal integration, emphasizing dialogue, collaboration, and a rejection of exclusionary policies. However, the chapter is not without shortcomings. Taylor’s solutions, while idealistic and principled, lack concrete mechanisms for implementation, particularly in polarized contexts where identity politics dominate public discourse. His reliance on examples like Canada and Quebec, while illustrative, may not translate seamlessly to societies with entrenched histories of racial and cultural strife, such as the US or France. Furthermore, his critique of exclusionary populism occasionally underplays the structural forces that sustain such ideologies.

In the chapter titled “The Unfinished Tasks of Multiculturalism: Thinking of Multiculturalism, Thinking with Tariq Modood,” Gurpreet Mahajan presents a thorough exploration of Modood’s contributions to multicultural political theory, with a specific focus on the interplay between multiculturalism, religion, and secularism. Mahajan highlights Modood’s approach to integration, which emphasizes the positive recognition of diverse identities, and his advocacy for reframing secularism as compatible with multicultural principles. This chapter stands out for its systematic articulation of “unfinished tasks” within multicultural discourse, inviting further scholarly and public engagement.

Mahajan effectively foregrounds the complexity of Modood’s argument that religion should be seen as a “public good,” thus challenging rigid secularist frameworks and pushing for inclusive policies that integrate minority religious perspectives into public life. However, this proposition raises critical questions regarding the balance between accommodating religious identities and maintaining secularism’s neutrality, especially in contexts where religious orthodoxy may conflict with liberal values. A notable strength of Mahajan’s analysis is her critique of multiculturalism’s perceived alignment with religious resurgence, which has alienated left-liberal allies. She also underscores the need for deeper engagement with intra-group inequalities and the homogenizing tendencies of identity-based discourses. While Mahajan successfully identifies pressing challenges for multiculturalism—such as inter-minority conflicts and the methodological tensions of de-essentializing communities—the chapter could benefit from more concrete proposals to address these gaps. 

In her chapter titled “From the Race Relations Act 1968 to the Great Repeal Act 2018: Back to Square One in 50 Years?” Maleiha Malik presents a deeply analytical and historically grounded examination of the evolution of race relations in the UK, juxtaposing the promise of legislative progress with the regressive realities that culminated in Brexit. Malik’s work underscores the enduring influence of Britain’s imperial legacy on contemporary racial hierarchies, connecting colonial governance to modern racialized exclusion. Her critique of the Race Relations Act (RRA) 1968 reveals its limitations in addressing structural racism, focusing instead on individual acts of discrimination, a pattern that persists through subsequent legal frameworks.

Malik’s critique of Brexit as a racially charged political project is particularly compelling. She argues that populist rhetoric glorifying the British Empire masked the exclusionary nationalism that defined the Leave campaign, fueling a backlash against migrants and minority communities. Her analysis highlights how cultural and religious discrimination—especially Islamophobia—has evolved, amplifying new forms of racialization beyond traditional categories of color or ethnicity. While Malik’s historical framing is powerful, her portrayal of race relations legislation as consistently undermined by nativist anxieties invites further exploration of successful counter-movements. Moreover, her reliance on Brexit as a focal point risks overshadowing broader trends in global populism and anti-immigrant sentiment. Overall, Malik’s chapter is a robust critique of Britain’s struggle to reconcile its imperial past with a truly inclusive multicultural future, urging renewed efforts to combat the structural legacies of racism.

In “Multicultural Nationalism as an Ethics of Social Membership,” Will Kymlicka offers an exploration of the interplay between multiculturalism and nationalism, presenting a potential reconciliation through the concept of “multicultural nationalism.” Drawing from T.H. Marshall’s citizenship framework, Kymlicka contends that national solidarity and multicultural inclusion can coexist by redefining shared societal membership in pluralistic terms. His argument builds on empirical data, highlighting both opportunities and challenges in fostering an inclusive national identity. Kymlicka’s analysis is commendable for addressing the perceived incompatibility between nationalism and multiculturalism. His argument that membership rights can act as a vehicle for inclusivity resonates with Modood’s advocacy for multicultural nationalism. However, the chapter also critically acknowledges the risks inherent in Marshallian politics, particularly its historical tendency to marginalize minorities and reinforce societal hierarchies. The discussion on majority perceptions of minority commitment adds a critical dimension, revealing how perceptions influence support for minority rights. However, this approach risks oversimplifying minority identities and aspirations by framing their inclusion primarily in terms of majority acceptance. Populism surfaces implicitly, as Kymlicka critiques nationalism’s potential for exclusion while emphasizing its capacity for solidarity. 

In chapter titled “Integrating Modood and Kymlicka on National Inclusion,” Geoffrey Brahm Levey undertakes a critical analysis of Modood’s multicultural nationalism and Kymlicka’s liberal nationalism, arguing for a synthesis that leverages the strengths of both approaches to foster inclusive democracies. Levey critiques Kymlicka’s dismissal of significant differences between the two frameworks, as well as Modood’s assertion of the superiority of multicultural nationalism, ultimately advocating for an integrative model. Levey highlights Kymlicka’s recalibration of his cultural rights framework to emphasize minority contributions to society as a means of fostering solidarity. However, he critiques this shift for placing undue responsibility on minorities while neglecting structural adjustments required from majority groups. Similarly, he challenges Modood’s reliance on top-down transformations of national identity, arguing that such efforts often provoke resistance and caricature rather than fostering inclusion. The chapter engages with populism indirectly, critiquing majoritarian tendencies to frame minorities as undeserving or disloyal, which underpins populist rhetoric. Levey’s proposed integration of liberal and multicultural nationalism emphasizes concrete protections for minorities alongside a gradual reshaping of national identity through inclusive symbols and narratives. Levey’s analysis offers valuable insights into multicultural theory, though it underscores the challenges of balancing theoretical ideals with pragmatic strategies for fostering social cohesion.

Riva Kastoryano explores the complexities of transnationalism and its implications for nationalism and multiculturalism in her chapter titled “Transnational Experiences: Redefining Solidarity and Nationalisms.” She critiques state-centric multicultural policies, arguing that transnational belonging fundamentally reconfigures traditional nationalist paradigms by fostering non-territorial solidarities that challenge bounded national identities. Kastoryano draws on historical frameworks, such as Randolph Bourne’s concept of a “transnational America,” to contextualize modern transnational dynamics. She contrasts the civic integration goals of multicultural nationalism, as articulated by Modood, with the deterritorialized identities emerging from transnational networks. This juxtaposition highlights a tension: while multicultural nationalism seeks to integrate diverse groups within a nation-state framework, transnationalism transcends borders, creating new, imagined communities and solidarities based on shared identities or causes.

A key criticism is that state-driven multicultural nationalism may fail to address the non-territorial and fluid identities fostered by globalization. Kastoryano underscores the rise of “diaspora politics,” where states and transnational actors negotiate identities and allegiances, sometimes reinforcing exclusionary or populist discourses. She critiques the resurgence of ethno-cultural nationalism, often rebranded as populism, for exploiting migrants’ transnational solidarities as perceived threats to national sovereignty. Kastoryano’s chapter is a significant contribution to understanding the intersections of globalization, identity, and nationalism. 

Anna Triandafyllidou’s chapter “What Can Migration and National Identity Look Like in the Mid-Twenty-First Century? Transnational Diasporas and Digital Nomads” examines the interplay of migration, digital technologies, and national identity, projecting forward into the mid-21st century. By bridging physical and virtual mobility, she explores how these evolving dynamics redefine notions of belonging, identity, and citizenship. The chapter reflects on theoretical frameworks like Modood’s multicultural nationalism, plural versus neo-tribal nationalism, and everyday nationhood, questioning their applicability in an era shaped by augmented reality and digital nomadism. 

Triandafyllidou identifies a dichotomy between “cosmopolitan nomads,” who navigate globalized systems with ease, and “vagabonds,” marginalized by restrictive migration policies. She underscores the challenge of integrating virtual mobility into theories of migration and identity, noting its potential for both fostering transnational solidarity and amplifying socio-political exclusions. Particularly compelling is her discussion of neo-tribal nationalism, which thrives in the echo chambers of social media, reflecting the populist exploitation of mobility-induced anxieties. While the chapter is innovative in situating digital and physical mobility within broader global transformations, criticisms arise from its speculative tone and lack of empirical substantiation regarding the identity negotiations of digital nomads. Furthermore, the potential environmental and ethical implications of such mobility remain underexplored. Nevertheless, Triandafyllidou’s work opens critical pathways for rethinking nationalism and migration in an increasingly digitized and interconnected world.

Cécile Laborde’s chapter “Rethinking Race and Religion with Rawls and Modood” engages in a critique and synthesis of John Rawls’s and Modood’s perspectives on race and religion, proposing an interpretive framework that seeks to reconcile their divergent approaches. Laborde highlights the limitations of Rawls’s “bifurcated view,” which treats race and religion as separate normative categories rooted in distinct sociopolitical contexts. While Rawls centers religion within his political theory due to its epistemic and moral complexities, he relegates race to the realm of contingent injustice, underestimating its structural and enduring sociopolitical significance. Laborde effectively critiques Rawls for his intellectualist and decontextualized treatment of race, noting its inadequacy in addressing racial inequality and the historical interplay of race and religion.

Conversely, Modood’s integrated view, informed by his British context and the concept of “religio-racial” identity, is presented as a richer framework. Modood’s recognition of the intersectionality between race and religion and his advocacy for extending anti-discrimination protections to Muslims exemplify an inclusive approach to multiculturalism. Laborde deepens this perspective by introducing a dual “First-person” and “Third-person” framework to address individual agency and structural discrimination. While Laborde’s framework is compelling, critics might argue that it remains largely theoretical, with limited engagement with empirical case studies. Furthermore, the application of her dual perspective to real-world conflicts requires further elaboration, particularly in navigating populist discourses targeting religious minorities. Nevertheless, her chapter provides an invaluable contribution to debates on identity, justice, and multiculturalism.

Rajeev Bhargava’s chapter, “On Modood’s Moderate Secularism,” offers a comparative analysis of Modood’s “moderate secularism” and the Indian model of “principled distance,” critically examining their adaptability in addressing religious diversity in modern states. Bhargava acknowledges Modood’s significant contribution in theorizing moderate secularism as a model that accommodates religious pluralism while maintaining the autonomy of political authority. This framework, rooted in European traditions, challenges the rigid binaries of American and French secularism, advocating for an inclusive and multicultural approach.

Bhargava, however, critiques moderate secularism for its limited flexibility, particularly in accommodating deeply diverse societies. He highlights the entrenched biases in European secular frameworks that privilege Christianity, arguing that these models often fail to account for the structural inequities faced by Muslim minorities. Bhargava calls for a shift from mere institutional adjustments to broader conceptual reforms, aligning more closely with the Indian model, which integrates positive and negative engagements with religion to promote equality and mitigate inter- and intra-religious domination. The chapter’s populism-related insights emerge in Bhargava’s critique of European secularism’s inability to counter Islamophobic discourses, exacerbated by populist politics. While his proposal for adapting Indian principles to European contexts is compelling, critics might argue that the complexities of Western secular traditions and socio-political dynamics make such transplantation challenging.

In chapter titled “Secular State: Its Importance and Limits,” Bhikhu Parekh critiques rigid and dogmatic secularism, advocating for a nuanced and pragmatic approach that accommodates the complex interplay of religion and state. He emphasizes the instrumental nature of secularism, whose value lies in fostering liberty, equality, and common belonging in multicultural polities, rather than in adhering to an abstract ideal. Parekh aligns with Modood’s pluralist approach to secularism, commending its flexibility in recognizing religion’s potential contributions to public life. He highlights that secularism must balance the need for separation with the practical realities of mutual influence between religion and state, arguing against an absolutist interpretation. This is particularly significant in multicultural contexts where religion plays a vital role in cultural and communal identity. However, Parekh critiques secularism’s tendency to overreach, potentially alienating religious communities and fostering populist backlash, as seen in the rise of Hindutva politics in India. His critique extends to the failure of rigid secular models, like France’s laïcité, to equitably address diverse religious expressions, suggesting they inadvertently privilege majority traditions. Parekh’s proposal for context-sensitive, relational secularism is compelling, though critics may challenge its reliance on subjective interpretations of cultural and religious practices. 

Tariq Modood’s chapter, “From Then to Now: Some Friendly Responses,” offers a reflective engagement with the contributions to the volume while advancing his key themes of multiculturalism and moderate secularism. This response consolidates Modood’s intellectual trajectory and his pluralist methodology, blending personal narratives with theoretical critiques. Modood adeptly addresses critiques of his contextualism, particularly Sune Lægaard’s challenge regarding its application in the Danish Cartoons affair. While acknowledging the shortcomings in execution, Modood underscores his iterative approach, emphasizing the dialogical and evolving nature of contextual analysis. Similarly, he engages Simon Thompson’s deconstruction of the concept of recognition, embracing its multidimensional framing—equality, identity, struggle, and inclusion—while expanding its relevance to majority identities.

A recurring strength of Modood’s responses lies in his openness to constructive critique. For instance, he engages with Maleiha Malik’s historiography of racial equality in Britain, connecting it to Brexit’s implications for multiculturalism. Yet, Modood avoids reductive binaries, advocating instead for the mutual recognition of majorities and minorities. However, the chapter is not without limitations. Modood’s defense of multiculturalism as a “democratic constellation” is compelling but raises questions about its applicability in non-Western contexts. Similarly, his critique of Charles Taylor’s Quebecan interculturalism as “majoritarian” invites further elaboration on balancing national identity and minority accommodations. Anyway, Modood’s chapter enriches the volume by weaving together critical reflections and advancing his theory of multiculturalism as an inclusive, dialogical framework. It exemplifies a balance of self-critical humility and scholarly rigor, making it an invaluable contribution to the discourse on diversity and inclusion in democratic societies.

Overall, this volume highlights Modood’s transformative contributions to multiculturalism, framing it as a vital and evolving approach to managing diversity in today’s societies. By advocating for “multicultural nationalism” and “moderate secularism,” Modood offers a cohesive model that balances the recognition of distinct group identities with the promotion of a shared sense of national belonging. The book engages with critiques of multiculturalism, demonstrating its resilience in addressing challenges such as globalization, transnational affiliations, and the rise of populist movements. Modood’s work is contextualized within global debates, showcasing the strength of his framework in uniting diversity and fostering collective identity—a cornerstone of his idea of “multicultural nationalism.”

While the volume stands out for its philosophical depth and theoretical insights, some chapters—particularly those on secularism—are heavily centered on Western contexts, offering limited comparative perspectives on non-Western experiences. Furthermore, its focus on philosophical discourse may leave practitioners seeking more tangible policy recommendations. Despite these limitations, the book is an essential resource for scholars in political theory, sociology, and public policy. It underscores Modood’s groundbreaking role in redefining multiculturalism as a versatile and sustainable framework for diversity and inclusion in pluralistic societies. Beyond commemorating Modood’s legacy, the book fosters meaningful scholarly dialogue, ensuring that his ideas continue to shape and influence the ever-evolving discourse on multiculturalism.


Thomas Sealy, Varun Uberoi &Nasar Meer (eds.). (2024). The Resilience of Multiculturalism Ideas, Politics, Practice. Edinburgh University Press. 328 pp. Hardcover $110, Paperback  $23,71, ISBN-13: 978-1399537261

Demonstrators of the Austrian Identitarian movement form a guard of honor of flags in Vienna, Austria on June 11, 2016. Photo: Johanna Poetsch.

Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right

Sargi, Islam. (2024). “Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. December 25, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0023

 

Teun A. van Dijk’s book explores how radical right parties adapt their discourses to cultural, economic, and historical contexts in Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Integrating discourse studies with social cognition theories, van Dijk reveals how nationalism, anti-globalism, and sociocultural backlash drive these narratives. With a focus on populism as a strategic discourse rather than ideology, the book underscores the dynamics of ingroup/outgroup rhetoric and its role in mobilizing support. While highlighting ideological clustering, the work offers valuable insights for scholars of political communication, critical discourse studies, and international relations.

Reviewed by Islam Sargi*

Teon A. van Dijk, a prominent scholar in linguistics, discourse analysis, and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), is the founder of renowned journals such as Discourse Studies and Discourse and Communication. He also established the Center of Discourse Studies in Barcelona in 2017. Van Dijk’s book, Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right, part of the Critical Discourse Studies series, examines the political ideologies and discourse of radical right parties. It explores how these parties adapt their rhetoric to the unique economic, cultural, and historical contexts of four countries: Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands. The book bridges the gap between political science and discourse studies, providing a theoretically grounded analysis of radical right ideologies. Highlighting the limited research on the discourse of radical political parties, van Dijk incorporates a theoretical framework linking ideology as a form of social cognition to discourse and social structures.

By examining four cases—Chile, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands—the book highlights the primary configurations, divergent ideologies, contextual impacts, populism, and the significance of national contexts. It argues that each country showcases distinct ideological stances. For example, while abortion is a central theme in the radical right discourse in Chile, it plays a less significant role in the Netherlands and Sweden. However, nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments appear to be common across European contexts.

The author employs a mixed-methods approach, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative analyses, to investigate election programs from the four countries. Through this lens, the book explores language and discourse, emphasizing ideological positioning and political strategies. The findings reveal reactionary stances against social change, liberalism, and political correctness, framing these as part of a broader cultural backlash.

Through comparative analysis, van Dijk argues that radical right discourse and ideologies are shaped by country-specific contexts. For instance, in Chile, radical right discourse is rooted in Catholic ideologies, emphasizing traditional family values, such as opposition to abortion, and intertwining with the authoritarian historical narratives of the Pinochet era. The radical right in Chile also avoids engaging with the multicultural identities of the Mapuche people in their rhetoric.

In Spain, particularly in the case of the Vox Party, the focus shifts to nationalism, marked by a strict anti-separatist stance opposing the autonomy of Catalonia and the Basque regions. This approach also embodies a strong rejection of modern globalist ideologies.

In the Netherlands, one of Europe’s prominent radical right parties, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom (PVV), centers its discourse on Islamophobia, embedding it within broader national themes. Wilders portrays a struggle against liberal elites, who are perceived as eroding Dutch cultural identity and integrity.

In Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (SD) emphasize the preservation of culture, framing it as a social issue linked to crime and immigration. This case exemplifies a broader European pattern, where immigration is associated with security concerns and the preservation of national cultural hegemony.

Van Dijk’s analysis highlights how the radical right adapts its narratives to local contexts while sharing overarching themes such as nationalism, anti-globalism, and opposition to multiculturalism.

The author emphasizes that the electoral strategies of radical right parties in these four countries are shaped by their unique national contexts, cautioning against broadly categorizing them under the blanket term of populism. Populism, as a discursive phenomenon, requires an analysis rooted in discourse strategies rather than mere ideological critiques. This approach encourages a deeper exploration of ideological clustering and its role in fostering the radical right’s broader acceptance and integration within democratic systems.

Regarding the interplay between populism and discourse, the book highlights populism primarily as a strategic use of language by political parties rather than a cohesive ideology. This framework reveals that populist discourse often constructs narratives centered on the dichotomy between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elites.”

Moreover, the book examines the socio-cultural backlash against modern liberal ideologies, demonstrating how the radical right skillfully employs discourse to reassert traditional values. It underscores how radical right narratives leverage this backlash to challenge liberal norms and promote their vision of cultural and societal order, ultimately highlighting the ideological and cultural underpinnings of their discourse strategies.

The book makes a significant contribution to scholarship by offering a fresh perspective on ideological clusters, particularly the interplay of nationalism, racism, and political dynamics within radical right parties. It provides an insightful introduction to understanding how radical right ideologies are constructed, communicated, and situated within broader socio-political contexts, shedding light on their increasing influence.

By integrating discourse studies with social cognition theories, the book appeals to those interested in exploring the psychological and linguistic foundations of political ideologies. Scholars and students in political science, sociology, and international relations will find value in the comparative case analyses, which illuminate the global patterns and localized adaptations of radical right parties and their discourses.

The author effectively integrates theories from discourse studies and social context, providing a comprehensive framework for understanding how political ideologies are constructed and communicated. This approach offers valuable insights into the tactics and strategies employed by radical right movements. By embedding his analysis within a well-articulated theory of ideology, van Dijk explores the cognitive foundations of radical right discourse, adding depth to the study and establishing a clear structure for his investigation.

Through comparative analysis, the author demonstrates how these movements adapt their rhetoric to cultural, economic, and historical contexts, offering readers a nuanced understanding of global patterns and local variations. The book sheds light on the pragmatic role of distinct national contexts in shaping political communication strategies, emphasizing how language is used to construct ingroup/outgroup dynamics. These dynamics are crucial for understanding the populist appeal and the ways radical right parties mobilize support locally.

Van Dijk further illustrates the interconnectedness of various ideologies within the radical right framework, showcasing their ideological composition and adaptability. This comprehensive approach underscores the role of language and context in shaping political narratives, making the book a valuable resource for scholars and students of political communication and ideology.

Although the book provides a broad comparative framework, its specific discourse analysis is somewhat limited. A more in-depth linguistic examination of concrete examples could better substantiate claims regarding the effectiveness or variability of discourse strategies. Additionally, the study’s focus on only four countries, while diverse, does not fully capture the global spectrum of radical right discourses or address the dynamics of emerging movements in other regions.

Methodologically, the book would benefit from greater transparency in its approach to discourse analysis. Clearer details on data collection and the analytical process would enhance the replicability and robustness of its findings. While the book persuasively argues that populism should be viewed as a discourse strategy rather than a fixed ideology, it does not thoroughly investigate the practical implications of this distinction in political behavior and communication.

Despite these limitations, van Dijk’s study remains a well-structured and significant contribution to critical discourse studies of radical right ideologies, offering valuable insights into the intersection of language, ideology, and political strategy.


 

(*) Islam Sargi holds a Ph.D. in Contemporary Comparative History from the University of Szeged. His doctoral thesis examined the Kurdish question and Turkish modernization. iszeged509@gmail.com

van Dijk, Teon A. (2024). Discourse and Ideologies of the Radical Right. Cambridge University Press, London, pp. 95, Paperback £17.00, Hardback £49.99, ISBN 978-1-009-54993-6 Hardback, ISBN 978-1-009-54991-2, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009549929, Online ISBN: 9781009549929, Print publication: January 2, 2025.

Easter festival in the folklore village of Hollókő, Hungary: On April 18, 2022, as part of the tradition, men sprinkle water on women in celebration. Photo: Shutterstock.

Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s Diaspora Engagement

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Please cite as:

Molnar, Judit. (2024) “Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s Diaspora Engagement.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 20, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0045

 

Abstract

In the Hungarian context, the term ‘diaspora’ can refer to two types of communities: those formed through emigration and those emerging from the Treaty of Trianon redrawing borders in 1920. While emigrant-diasporas increasingly adopt migration as a political stance, transborder Hungarians’ strong desire to uphold their national identity aligns them with Fidesz’s nationalist narratives. It highlights their potential as agents of Hungary’s emigrant-diaspora outreach. In this paper, I explore how and to what results the two remarkably different experiences of national identity are bridged by Hungary in attempts to revive the historic nation through emigrant-diaspora engagement.

Keywords: nationalism, diaspora politics, transborder Hungarians, emigrant-diaspora outreach, state-led transnationalism

 

By Judit Molnar*

Introduction

“Fidesz received 94% of the votes of Hungarians outside the borders,” reported the 24.hu online portal after the 2022 Hungarian elections. This statistic might seem surprising for those familiar with recent emigration from Hungary. In response to the autocratic and populist government, which increasingly infringes on democratic principles, politically motivated emigration has slowly but steadily replaced the economic emigration of Hungarians first triggered by the 2008 financial crisis (Sampson, 2021; Örkény, 2018; Moreh, 2014; Ayodele, 2018). Hallmarked by events such as the expulsion of forward-thinking educational institutions like Central European University, the aggressive campaign pushing women into traditional childbearing roles, and severe limitations placed on the LGBTQ community, many Hungarians opted to start a new life abroad driven by a yearning for a more liberal political environment. For this reason, recent Hungarian migrants can be increasingly interpreted as having ‘voted with their feet’, a concept Triandafyllidou and Gropas (2014) used to describe resistance to the regime underlying the decision to leave. As such, the Hungarian communities forming in Western Europe can be seen as counter-diasporas, as highlighted by Szily’s 2018 report, which shows that only 7% of those living in London would vote for Fidesz. Similarly, a 2022 poll by the 21 Research Center involving 5000 Hungarians abroad found that only 11% supported the governing party (Rutai, 2022).

Therefore, it is vital to understand the people behind the 94%. According to Brubaker (1996), there are two types of diasporas: those that result from people crossing borders and those that emerge from borders crossing people. When the Treaty of Trianon that closed World War I in 1920 detached two-thirds of Hungary’s territory and attached them to surrounding countries, many ethnically Hungarian people found themselves under the sovereignty of another state overnight. As Feischmidt (2020: 130) argues, memory politics fuelled by the Trianon cult “became the engine of new forms of nationalism.” In 2004, a national vote was held on whether transborder Hungarians[1] should be granted Hungarian citizenship but failed due to low turnout. Despite this, when Fidesz came to power in 2010, they passed legislation granting dual citizenship to transborder Hungarians, followed by voting rights in 2011. The intergenerational trauma of being separated from Hungary, despite a strong Hungarian identity, made people living on these territories keen to support Fidesz’s nationalist agenda. As such, they became allies of the Orbán government’s nation-building efforts, not least when Fidesz turned its attention to the recently emigrated population through large-scale diaspora outreach.

The past decades have seen growing interest among social scientists in how home countries exert control over their emigrated populations transnationally. State-led transnationalism is defined by Goldring (2002: 64) as “institutionalized national policies and programs that attempt to expand the scope of a national state’s political, economic, social, and moral regulation to include emigrants and their descendants outside the national territory.” While the forms, goals, and extent of such involvement may vary (Levitt, 2001), Portes (1999) emphasizes that state-led transnationalism is driven by economic and political gains from the diaspora, leveraging emigrants’ feelings of belonging to encourage remittances, investment, voting, or lobbying in favour of their home state. According to Margheritis (2007), state-led transnationalism is typically implemented through political discourse that reinforces national ties and recognizes those living abroad as part of the nation. Gamlen (2008) further notes that diaspora narratives empower migrants by constructing transnational collective identities, elevating people who once saw themselves as minorities to being part of a global network.

With half of the world’s states estimated to engage in some form of diaspora outreach (Gamlen et al., 2013), research on diaspora engagement has become a key area of enquiry for the social sciences, which has been conducted with the primary aim of analyzing the contributions emigrants make within such frameworks. However, less attention has been paid to the micro-level implementation of these schemes, including the role of facilitators and the affective responses evoked in the targeted population. These responses are crucial in understanding how autocratic systems relying on populist narratives achieve their goals, as populism depends on provoking relevant emotions. In my ethnographically inspired paper, I focus on incorporating transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s emigrant-diaspora outreach. I am interested in how their cultural identity is used to promote Hungary’s nation-building efforts, what narratives accompany their presence from the side of the home state, and what response this prompts in the emigrant-diasporas. I undertake the enquiry to uncover how the two remarkably different experiences of ethnic identity and connectedness to the homeland amongst transborder Hungarians and emigrants from Hungary are bridged by Hungarian populist discourse in the country’s attempt to govern its diasporas across borders and reconstruct the historic nation. The data used in this paper was collected in London, UK, in 2022/23 and Dublin, Ireland, in 2016/17. All proper names, including those of organizations, are pseudonyms.

‘Hungarians Can Only Be Replaced by Hungarians’

It was my first visit to the Hungarian House, one of London’s longest-standing and most prestigious Hungarian diaspora institutions. The occasion was Whit Sunday, for which a ball with a three-course dinner, folk dancing, and live music had been organized. As I did not know anyone, I booked a randomly assigned seat. Once everyone arrived, we took our places and did a round of introductions. When it was my turn, my short monologue prompted one of my tablemates to jokingly comment: “We can hear from your accent that you are not from beyond the borders, but don’t worry, we will still talk to you.” It was then that I realized that on my table of 14, I was the only person who had migrated from within the current borders of Hungary. As my research unfolded, it became somewhat of an ethnographic commonplace to find transborder Hungarians dominate Hungarian events in London, even though most of them had never lived in Hungary. Some did not even hold Hungarian citizenship. While I initially found their overwhelming participation surprising, it can be explained by the place they have historically occupied in their respective home countries as ethnic minorities. Since the Treaty of Trianon attached two-thirds of Hungary’s territories to surrounding countries in 1920, transborder Hungarians cultivated their Hungarian identity under often oppressive regimes of the bordering countries, which have limited their freedom to practise their culture, most notably through restrictions imposed on the use of their mother tongue. Seeking out the company of other Hungarians for cultural preservation activities has thus become a crucial aspect of their lives. Moreover, they have been the beneficiaries of Hungary’s outreach for much longer than the emigrant population, with many schemes aimed at emigrant-diasporas modelled on initiatives successful in transborder communities.

At the core of diaspora politics is a concept shaped by the state that defines which groups constitute the nation, how co-nationals are connected, and what role the state fulfils in their lives. Verdery (1994) explains that the term ‘nation’ can refer to citizenship comprised of shared sovereignty rooted in political participation. However, it can also denote an ethnic connectedness, whereby a nation consists of individuals sharing a common language, history, or culture. In an ethnic understanding of the nation, political identity is defined by shared language and culture, while in a civic one, by shared citizenship and loyalty to political institutions. Verdery (1998) claims that unlike democratic constitutions in the West, where sovereignty resides with individual citizens, Eastern European constitutions often grant sovereignty to an ethno-nation. Although no state’s borders contain an ethnically uniform population, nations in Eastern Europe have historically been imagined around ethnocultural homogeneity, which members of the nation are expected to maintain. These expectations have often led to political measures, with Hayden (1992) proposing ‘constitutional nationalism’ to describe legal processes that privilege members of an ethno-nation.

Hungary is a clear example of a state that assigns national belonging on an ethnic basis. Since the turnover, there has been a strong emphasis on ethnic similarity as the organizing principle of the nation, with transborder Hungarians playing a crucial role. This was reflected in the 1989 amendment of The Fundamental Law of Hungary, which included a new section on the state’s commitment to them: “Bearing in mind that there is a single Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of transborder Hungarians, and shall facilitate the survival and development of their communities; it shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the assertion of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, and their prosperity in their native lands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other and with Hungary” (Article D of The Fundamental Law of Hungary).

After Fidesz came to power in 2010 with a clear nationalist agenda, the Constitution and The Fundamental Law of Hungary were amended again to reflect a stronger sense of interconnectedness with Hungarians outside the borders, including transborder Hungarians and emigrants. While the old Constitution already stated that the president of Hungary represents the voice of all the world’s Hungarians inside and outside Hungary (Verdery, 1994), the new documents went further, emphasizing a ‘single Hungarian nation’ that transcends borders. The new Constitution includes the oath “to preserve the intellectual and spiritual unity of our nation torn apart in the storms of the last century” (Körtvélyesi, 2012).

As illustrated by Hungary’s severe response to the refugee crisis of 2015, despite the alarming decrease in Hungary’s population due to outmigration, ageing, and declining birth rates, Hungary seeks to compensate for these numbers exclusively through ethnically Hungarian people. As Viktor Orbán stated at the 9th plenary session of the Hungarian Diaspora Council in 2019, “Hungarians can only be replaced with Hungarians” (kormany.hu). Joppke (2005) argues that right-wing nationalist parties engage co-ethnic populations abroad to counterbalance growing immigration and sustain the dominant national group’s claims over the state. Since 2010, 1374 billion HUF has been spent on national politics (kormany.hu). Notable schemes include the Bethlen Gabor Fund, which provides financial support for transborder and emigrant communities (Kántor, 2014); the Rákóczi camps organized to provide an opportunity for young people in the diaspora to visit the homeland; the Balassi Programme that enables Hungarian language training in Hungary; the Diaspora Scholarship, which brings talented young people of Hungarian roots to Hungary for study; ReConnect Hungary, the Hungarian birthright program; and the Julianus and Mikes Kelemen Programmes, which focus on preserving material culture in the diasporas.

Exemplary Communities of National Consciousness

In 2013, the Hungarian State Secretariat for Nation Policy introduced a new scheme called the Kőrösi Programme, which soon evolved into the flagship project of Hungarian diaspora engagement. Aimed at strengthening national identity in Hungarian emigrant-diasporas worldwide and consolidating ties between Hungary and its population abroad, young intellectuals have been delegated to locations with significant Hungarian populations. The Hungarian state had previously mapped independently emerging ethnic organizations to offer them state-affiliated status, which the facilitators would support. They would be in charge of organizing the community, disseminating knowledge, and conducting educational activities, which include teaching language classes, folk dancing and traditional instruments, facilitating scouting, and organizing events to commemorate national holidays. Facilitators are recruited through a competitive selection process and are required to “possess outstanding professional expertise relevant for the Hungarian diasporas and to have actively engaged in community organizing, traditionalist activities” (website of the Kőrösi Programme, 2018).

Transborder Hungarians have played a crucial role in the Kőrösi Programme. A quick look at the profiles listed on the programme’s website highlights that since its inception, around 60% of facilitators have been from transborder territories each year. Some had never lived in Hungary before their assignment and may struggle to provide in-depth knowledge about contemporary life in Hungary. However, their expertise in traditional cultural forms has often been prioritized, because, as described in the Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad (2013), transborder Hungarians “to the universal Hungarian culture is invaluable.” Amongst the detached territories, Waterbury (2023: 32) underlines explicitly the role of Transylvania in the nation’s cultural identity, describing the region as having a ‘mythical significance’ to Hungary, considered the ‘cradle’ of Hungarian civilisation […] and the Transylvanian rural Hungarian populations as the makers and carriers of ‘real’, ‘archaic’ and ‘authentic’ Hungarian culture.” 

Their adequacy for these tasks was widely acknowledged. In a conversation with the first Kőrösi facilitator sent to Dublin in 2015, she confided in me her sentiment that she would never be as good at the job as transborder Hungarians, although she noted that some of these feelings stemmed from how the state labelled the two groups: In my opinion, the ideal candidate was [mentions the name of the delegate sent to a different location in the same year of the programme], because on the one hand, she is from Transylvania, so that is somehow important. These days those who are not from Hungary are often considered more Hungarian than us, excuse me for my honesty. But yes, her identity is different from mine as somebody from Budapest. For me it is like I am Hungarian and then what? I am that and full stop. But for her, she and her parents and grandparents all had to fight for it. To keep it alive. So, it is crucial to her identity.”

Pogonyi (2015) argues that, unlike most diaspora schemes globally, Hungary’s outreach to its emigrated population was not devised to mobilize people for political or economic gain but to folklorize the emigrated population to strengthen Fidesz’s nationalist image. Analysing diaspora as a claims-making tool (Brubaker, 2005), Pogonyi defines Hungarian diaspora outreach as a non-instrumental identity project. Its principal goal is to reverse assimilatory tendencies, prevent intermarriage, and promote Hungarian national identification through education programs and a network of institutions reinforcing national identity. This is echoed in the Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad (2013), which claims that “the borders of the nation stretch as far as the influence of the national institutions, which help maintain the national identity”.

To incentivize Hungarians to (re-)cultivate their Hungarianness, the state has identified transborder Hungarians as indispensable. According to Fidesz’s discourse, transborder Hungarians are the exemplary communities of national consciousness and the kind of ideal citizens that emigrants should aspire to become. While historically, emigrants’ treatment by the Hungarian state went from “fascist criminals, class enemies, and useless, workshy rabble” (Kunz, 1985: 102) in the 1950s and 60s to traitors who placed their well-being above that of the homeland after 1989 (Herner-Kovács, 2014), transborder Hungarians have stayed framed as loyal victim communities. Placing them at the centre of diaspora schemes thus applauds them for preserving national consciousness for over a century despite often repressive circumstances. Hence, their presence communicates the Hungarian state’s expectations to all its citizens abroad.

As Kiss and Barna (n.d.) highlighted in the early 2010s, transborder Hungarians increasingly fail to consider Hungary as the primary destination of their emigration projects and, instead, tend to venture further afield. For people in the transborder territories without European Union membership when Hungary joined the EU in 2004 or under labour movement restrictions like Romanians after accession in 2007, Hungarian citizenship served as a passport to the West. Consequently, a growing number of transborder Hungarians decided to migrate to countries that they perceived as economically more viable than Hungary. Still, once in the country, they often sought out Hungarian diaspora organizations to join for sentimental reasons. It is therefore essential to highlight that while the involvement of transborder Hungarians in diaspora communities generally occurred out of their own will and enthusiasm, their presence is often interpreted through the lens of dominant Fidesz narratives, which influences not only their reception and integration opportunities in the community but also the extent to which their views are welcomed.

My fieldwork revealed that their presence often exacerbated resistance from the emigrant community against the government. On the one hand, they played a cultural revitalization role that was appreciated by families with young children and sensitized Hungarians to the fact that the ability to practise one’s identity, language, and culture should not be taken for granted. However, precisely the fervent practice of culture and strong national identity repelled emigrant Hungarians. Outbursts of appreciation for being Hungarian often made Hungarians from Hungary cringe, with critical remarks about what was commonly perceived as ‘magyarkodás.’ ‘Magyarkodás,’ a word that means the active cultivation of being Hungarian, denotes an overly zealous attitude towards expressing one’s Hungarian cultural identity. My informants saw ‘magyarkodás’ as irritating and something to be avoided, mainly due to its close association with the Orbán government and its expropriation of national symbols.

Such sentiments frequently translated into discriminatory remarks from Hungarians. While they welcomed the transborder Hungarians’ efforts to ensure the continuity of events, they complained that they were pushing them out of an organization that was supposed to be theirs. When I inquired into such feelings, I found that many had held resentment towards transborder Hungarians since their time in Hungary. Common reasons included the feeling that they were taking jobs and opportunities meant for locals, with many believing transborder Hungarian networks were strong and helped them get ahead quickly. Additionally, a large part of the resentment stemmed from the perception that these people received priority treatment from the Hungarian state, which seemed to care more about them than its citizens. For example, when the Hungarian state replaced the beloved priest of the community with a Csángó [ethnic Hungarians of Roman Catholic faith mainly living in the Romanian region of Moldavia] priest, it resulted in tangible resistance from the community, who complained about his unusual choice of Hungarian words, but most of all, his incorporation of nationalist sentiments in his sermons.

During my fieldwork, the Hungarian House was undergoing a slow but steady transition. Originally a refuge for all Hungarians who left their homeland after the World Wars, it became a vibrant place for Hungarian social and religious life since 1956, with the arrival of refugees fleeing the revolution against Soviet occupation. To this day, the leadership primarily consists of people who left Hungary during that time. They hoped to pass on roles to Hungarians who arrived post-accession. Still, since this group enjoyed a transnational lifestyle involving frequent trips home, they did not feel a strong need to cultivate their culture through diaspora organizations. Eventually, the group that took the initiative were transborder Hungarians, much to the dismay of the older generation. According to a transborder Hungarian committee member, the biggest challenge they faced was creating peaceful coexistence with older members, who viewed transborder Hungarians with growing suspicion. Despite this, the Hungarian House inevitably shifted towards becoming a predominantly transborder Hungarian organization, which ensured its continuity and gave it a cultural character that many of my informants from Hungary found hard to identify with.

Tapping the Diaspora’s Political Remittance Potential

On 2nd October 2016, the new Kőrösi facilitator in Dublin organized a memorial walk in the Glendalough mountains to honour Áron Márton, the bishop of Transylvania who dedicated his life to promoting Hungarian culture despite the oppressive Romanian government. As the facilitator came from a region of Serbia with a large ethnic Hungarian population, everybody understood that this commemoration was a project of personal importance to her. However, few understood why the meeting point was in front of the Hungarian Embassy in Dublin. As we later discovered, it was the day of the referendum on vetoing Brussels’ proposal to distribute incoming asylum seekers across the EU. As soon as the cars started arriving, the facilitator would quickly usher everyone into the Embassy, emphasizing that it was the duty of everyone with any national feelings to cast a vote.

Transborder Hungarians and the European Union (EU) represent two opposing poles in Fidesz’s thinking. According to Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017), populism divides society into two homogenous groups: the ‘pure people,’ associated with the nation, and the ‘corrupt elite,’ which hinders the nation’s unity. Populism’s belief that the people’s will is clear fosters authoritarianism and illiberal attacks on perceived threats to national homogeneity. Populist leaders argue that real power lies not with democratically elected officials but with illegitimate forces like organizations and bureaucracies undermining the people’s will. Hungarian populist discourses stem from a fear of external threats to national unity, often framed through the memory of Trianon. Anti-elite sentiments target foreign or supranational institutions, like the EU, frequently blamed for promoting a globalized outlook that conflicts with the national one. Like other xenophobic populists in Europe, Hungary views the EU as representing the interest of ‘aliens’ that threaten the nation’s purity, from which ‘the people’ must be protected. In this logic, if the EU is the villain, transborder Hungarians are glorified as the ‘true’ people who can save the nation.

The Orbán government has long relied on transborder Hungarians for support in national elections and referenda by making voting significantly easier, effectively allowing them to tilt the results. As Herner-Kovács (2020) explains, transborder Hungarians have come to represent a potent political remittance potential to the state as “politically active and organized communities with strong and effective ties to Hungary” (1161). Since they represent a predictable voter base, those with non-resident Hungarian citizenship – and thus the right to vote – have been granted access to letter voting. After Fidesz enabled ethnic Hungarians abroad to apply for citizenship, nearly half a million have benefitted from the opportunity. Patakfalvi-Czirják (2017) argues that this created a moral obligation, and transborder Hungarians’ overwhelming support can be seen as a ‘vote of gratitude.’ Their perceived duty to defend Fidesz became especially evident during the 2022 campaign when the opposition leader was rejected by local representatives of several transborder territories (Bereznay, 2022).

Recent Hungarian emigrants to Western Europe, often perceived as critical of the Orbán regime and likely to vote for the opposition, face limitations in their election participation. In 2022, Hungarians in the United Kingdom were restricted to only three polling locations despite the 15 that the community lobbied for (Czinkóczi 2022), which meant a 1000-kilometre journey for some voters. Outraged by these arrangements, the Hungarian diaspora self-organized itself to fundraise money to support the travel costs of those who wanted to vote but could not afford to travel. The discrepancy between the opportunities given to transborder communities and emigrant-diasporas to exercise their democratic rights is apparent. This led Waterbury (2023: 1) to assert that the “2022 Hungarian parliamentary election highlights the phenomenon of competing external demoi, a situation that emerges when an incumbent government differentially enfranchises and mobilizes different external national communities for electoral purposes, thus triggering a competing mobilization of external voters by nonincumbent political actors.” 

Incidents of transborder Hungarians incentivizing emigrant-diaspora members to vote have not been well received among the emigrant-diasporas. The unequal arrangements have generated feelings of jealousy and a sentiment that the Hungarian state prioritizes transborder Hungarians’ preferences about the direction in which the country is headed. Hungarians from Hungary find it unfair that people who may have never lived in Hungary would decide on issues affecting those living there. Among the emigrant-diaspora in London, three attitudes emerged toward voting. Some stated that they did not want to impact the outcome since they had committed to the UK. Though not planning to return, others felt responsible for the fate of their families and friends still in the country and found it important to vote. The third group insisted on voting, emphasizing that they would consider the return if Fidesz lost power. As such, to make sense of Fidesz’s overwhelming victory in the 2022 elections, a frequently uttered evaluation amongst emigrant Hungarians was that ‘Hungarians had no chance as the transborder Hungarian allies of Orbán decided the outcome,’ even if, their numbers are too small to have a significant impact.

‘The Carpathian Basin Coming Together’

Frigyes was impossible to miss in the Hungarian community in Dublin, not only because his manners were reminiscent of early 20th-century Hungarian novels – a literary period that inspired him greatly. Having initially migrated for economic reasons from the Hungarian-speaking region of Slovakia, Frigyes spent nearly a decade in low-paid service jobs, but eventually, he decided it was time to reap the benefits of his hard work: he registered as unemployed and committed himself entirely to the diaspora community. His enthusiasm was driven by a sense of finally being recognized as Hungarian after having experienced repression as a minority in Slovakia and as inferior in Hungary: Borders have disappeared. It is a huge thing that for example at the [mentions specific event in Dublin] there are almost as many people from the transborder territories like from the mother country. […] Here, the fact that everybody is Hungarian is so natural that it is not even a question. Just like it is evident for you that you are Hungarian, not a question and is something that you take for granted. For me, it is a huge thing to see the Carpathian basin coming together, that the nation has come together and to see that this is not something unimaginable, but something that can actually function.”

Once facilitators began arriving in his community, Frigyes recognized himself as a Kőrösi facilitator: having dedicated years to supporting the diaspora community in Dublin, he was confident that he could excel at the task and thus decided to apply for the position. The application process was not straightforward, as it required first acquiring Hungarian citizenship, which posed a challenge. Slovakia, in opposition to Hungary’s policy of granting citizenship to transborder Hungarians, did not recognize dual citizenship. Despite this, Frigyes was determined and, in a bold move, gave up his Slovakian citizenship. Although he hoped to be assigned back to Ireland, he was open to taking on the role in any Hungarian diaspora community worldwide, indicating that his commitment was ultimately not to his host country but to the newfound freedom to be Hungarian fostered by emigrant-diaspora spaces. Shortly after, another transborder Hungarian from the Dublin diaspora followed suit and stayed in the job with her assigned community ever since.

Transborder Hungarians thrived in every diaspora community I studied, often attributing their success to the emigrant-diaspora space, which allowed them to express their Hungarian identity fully. Placing a great emphasis on national identity and cultural practices, they regularly attended diaspora events, which they described as giving them a sense of integration into the nation for the first time. Although some had spent much of their lives in Hungary, they described facing xenophobia and resistance from locals. One participant explained that identities are born out of people’s need to differentiate themselves from the people around them based on the ‘us vs them’ formula. Nonetheless, as the population of Hungary is relatively homogenous, there is not much option to create such distinctions. Therefore, as he put it, discrimination is often not based on fundamental differences but on perceptions that “paint one with the colours of the nation and the other one with the colours of distance.” In Ireland, however, where all Hungarians became a minority, it was a natural instinct to come together to maintain their identity, forming a unified community. While many transborder Hungarians initially arrived in Ireland to return to Hungary, their participation in the diaspora led them to reconsider that intention, as their connection to the home community conflicted with the fulfilment that emerged from being part of a cohesive Hungarian group abroad.

Rooted in this experience, in Ireland, transborder Hungarians felt that with their presence, they were actively contributing to a new definition of national unity, which involved the spreading of irredentist ideologies. As one of my participants explained, she had plans to bring her experience back home to Transylvania, but she often felt side-tracked by feelings experienced in her diaspora community. She explained, “They seem to like the thought of big Hungary and appreciate people from these territories a lot. And I find it fantastic to get this feeling. I always get goosebumps”—such processes aligned with Fidesz’s agenda. As Lowe and Peto (2013) emphasize, irredentist narratives are forever present in modern Hungarian politics. While Orbán has never specifically claimed to intend to re-attach the lost territories to Hungary, he consistently peeves neighbouring countries with the close ties he maintains with transborder Hungarians, not least by designating 4th June – the anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon – as a ‘day of national unity.’ Lowe and Peto also note that Hungarian everyday life is scattered with allusions to the detached territories inherently belonging to Hungary, including the generalised use of the term ‘mai Románia területén’ [on the territory of current-day Romania] and weather forecasts showing temperatures for the detached territories. As Sava (2020) further illustrates, since 2018, Hungary has also opposed Europe’s celebration of the end of the two World Wars as moments of reconciliation and European integration, instead hoarding resentment against Western states for letting the Trianon Treaty happen.

At the New Year’s Eve ball at the Hungarian House, as the clock struck midnight, three anthems played to usher in the New Year: The Hungarian national anthem, the British national anthem, and finally, the anthem of the Székely people, an ethnic Hungarian group primarily living in Harghita, Covasna, and Mureș counties of Romania. I was already accustomed to hearing this anthem at Hungarian church services, so I did not question its inclusion in such an event. However, a fellow participant was visibly confused and asked, “What is this? Is this something from here? I’ve never heard it before!” When another person explained what it was, the first person sighed and made a face, clearly disapproving of the choice. When I inquired with the operating director of the event, he explained that the decision was personal, as he felt the anthem was meaningful and dear to many attendees. Other transborder Hungarian attendees justified the inclusion by referring to Fidesz’s decision to replace the European Union flag with the Székely flag on the National Parliament—an act many Hungarians from Hungary saw as provocative and irredentist. The incident highlighted the complex dynamic that Hungarian diaspora members often faced. By practicing their culture at the Hungarian House, they were forced to navigate the delicate balance between balancing a cosmopolitan European identity, which had helped their integration into the UK, and the growing nationalist and irredentist sentiments within the diaspora community, which suddenly seemed like a pre-condition to keeping their traditions alive.

Conclusion

Populism is a tool of isolation that works well with the restrictive ideologies of nationalism as illustrated by the recent political processes unfolding in Hungary. Nationalism centres on the nation as a community with shared values, culture, and identity and emphasizes the importance of sovereignty and independence. It frames the country as being threatened by external or internal forces, such as immigration, foreign influence, or globalization, to which the antidote is people loyal to the nation-building process through their insistence on the practice and preservation of the authentic culture pertinent to the nation. In the Hungarian context, Fidesz has identified transborder Hungarians as key allies for their patriotic feelings regarding Hungarian culture that evolved due to a century’s worth of being a minority. 

In this paper, I enquired into one specific context in which their help in promoting nationalist narratives was relied on, namely the diaspora outreach programmes of the Hungarian state targeting recently emigrated Hungarians to the West of Europe. In line with the goals of diaspora engagement, their involvement was aimed to boost nationalist pride and cultivate Hungarian culture, incentivize voting behaviour on the side of Fidesz, and an irredentist approach. Further to the government being invested in mobilizing transborder Hungarians for such purposes, what enhanced their collaboration was that these people found a unique haven of identity preservation in emigrant-diasporas. In London and Dublin, transborder Hungarians thrived in emigrant-diaspora communities, primarily due to the deterritorialised nature of diaspora spaces. The territorial detachment from their country of origin and from Hungary rid them of the resistance of the states whose territories they used to reside on and the resistance of Hungarians in Hungary, who often perceived them as unwanted migrants. While, on the one hand, this new space empowered them to cultivate their Hungarian identity without limitations, at the same time, it reinforced their alignment with the Hungarian state’s goals: regardless of whether they supported Fidesz, their participation took places within dominant Fidesz narratives and as such, through their presence, Fidesz found a way to penetrate emigrant-diaspora spaces.

Nonetheless, the response was mixed. While the two communities studied were geographically not too far apart, the context differed: the Irish diaspora community in 2016/17 consisted of recent emigrants who were only trying to find their feet in the country. Most of these emigrants identified as economic migrants with plans to return. Thus, they were keen to stay in touch with their Hungarian roots and identified membership in the community of compatriots as a pre-condition to their success in the country. As such, the atmosphere in diaspora spaces was more community-oriented and forgiving of differences. However, in the case of the Hungarian House in London, which principally emerged out of political migration, people were less welcoming of state narratives and often penalized individuals who were seen to represent the home state’s ideologies. Nonetheless, in a community where most people lived transnational lives and felt equally invested in their host country, transborder Hungarians were often the only people motivated enough to invest time into keeping the community of Hungarians alive. By taking on such roles, they were transforming the very texture of what being part of an emigrant-diaspora meant: spaces of political resistance transformed into venues expressing nationalistic sentiments, reproducing Fidesz’s narratives. While on the surface, aligning transborder Hungarians with Hungarian diaspora outreach highlights a clever political move, it remains to be seen what impact this strategy can achieve. From the evidence gathered, it seemed that the long-term effect might be counter-productive and might result in the withdrawal of Hungarians from spaces dedicated to the preservation of Hungarian culture as they increasingly fail to identify with the state-led processes unfolding in them, thus undermining the very goal of diaspora outreach.


 

(*) Judit Molnar is a PhD researcher of Anthropology at the University of Oxford, where her research focuses on the correlations between home state ideologies and the cultivation of diaspora subjectivity amongst first-generation Hungarian and Venezuelan migrants to London, the United Kingdom. Judit holds a research Master’s in Cultural and Social Anthropology from the University of Vienna and another Master’s in Cultural Studies from the University of St Andrews. Judit has engaged with Hungarian diasporas in Ireland, Argentina, and the United Kingdom. Before coming to Oxford, she was a diaspora facilitator of the Hungarian State Secretariat for Nation Policy. She has also worked with the UN’s International Organization for Migration, focusing on the Venezuelan migration crisis, and the European Commission’s Cabinet for Education, Culture, Youth and Sport, researching ways to foster a pan-European identity.


 

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[1] In academic literature, the term ‘kin-state minorities’ is also frequently employed.

Soldier on duty to protect people during dinner in Baidoa, Somalia on May 15 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

Authoritarian Populist ‘Civilization-States’ and Their Influence in Africa: Hard and Soft Powers of TRIC

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Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). Authoritarian Populist ‘Civilization-States’ and Their Influence in Africa: Hard and Soft Powers of TRIC. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 11, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0092

 

Turkey, Russia, India, and China (TRIC) are reshaping the power dynamics in Africa, challenging Western dominance and promoting alternative development models. These nations leverage their untarnished histories with Africa and emphasize shared anti-colonial struggles to position themselves as allies of the Global South. However, their competition is far from altruistic. Beneath promises of “no-strings-attached” aid lies a strategic pursuit of resources, trade, and influence. While they share a common goal of diminishing Western power, TRIC nations also compete fiercely with each other, making Africa a critical battleground in the quest for a multipolar world order.

By Ihsan Yilmaz & Nicholas Morieson

Executive Summary

Context

Africa has become the focal point of a new great power struggle, reminiscent of the Cold War but with a distinctly civilizational dimension. Unlike the colonial powers of the past, today’s major actors—Turkey, Russia, India and China (TRIC)—position themselves as allies of the Global South, presenting alternative paths to modernization that challenge Western dominance. This competition is driven by the pursuit of Africa’s vast natural resources, strategic geographic positions, and potential economic partnerships.

The new great power competition in Africa is reshaping the continent’s political, economic, and security landscape. Unlike the colonial era, this competition is characterized by a narrative of anti-Western solidarity, TRIC states present themselves as alternatives to the Western model of development. Each position itself as a partner of Africa, offering infrastructure investments, trade, and security assistance without the liberal democratic conditions often attached to Western aid. At stake are billions of dollars in trade, access to critical minerals, and influence over strategic regions.

Turkey leverages its Ottoman heritage and cultural ties, combining soft power initiatives like education and humanitarian aid with increasing defense exports. Russia, through its Wagner Group and strategic partnerships, combines military assistance with anti-colonial rhetoric. India emphasizes historical ties and South-South cooperation while expanding its trade and energy partnerships across Africa. China leads this competition with extensive infrastructure projects, debt financing, and its Belt and Road Initiative, offering a model of authoritarian modernization.

These nations share a common goal: diminishing Western influence and promoting a multipolar world order. Their efforts resonate in Africa, where Western powers are criticized for their colonial past and for attaching conditions to aid. However, the involvement of these new great powers is not purely altruistic. Their strategies often involve competing among themselves for resources, markets, and geopolitical influence, with some adopting hard power tactics that echo the imperialism of the past.

This report provides actionable recommendations for policy makers, NGOs, and academics in both liberal democracies and African nations, aiming to navigate this evolving geopolitical landscape while prioritizing Africa’s autonomy and development goals. It underscores the importance of collaboration, transparency, and shared values to ensure a balanced and equitable future for Africa in the global order.

Key Observations

Shared Motivations: Turkey, Russia, India and China seek to diminish Western influence, particularly that of the United States, in Africa. Each nation emphasizes a historical absence of colonial exploitation in Africa, contrasting their engagement with the imperialist history of the West.

Civilizational Narratives: China and Turkey assert the superiority of their civilizational values over Western norms, presenting themselves as models of development without liberal democratic constraints. Russia and India leverage their shared anti-colonial history with Africa, portraying themselves as partners in the broader fight against Western imperialism.

Strategies: Soft Power – All four nations employ development aid, infrastructure projects, and educational programs to gain influence. China leads in infrastructure, while Turkey and India focus on cultural and educational ties. Hard Power – increasing military engagements, such as China’s Djibouti base and Turkey’s defense agreements with African states, demonstrate a willingness to use force to secure interests. Russia’s Wagner Group and India’s naval presence underscore their strategic ambitions.

Opportunities and Risks: These powers offer no-strings-attached aid and economic partnerships, appealing to African leaders wary of Western conditionality. However, their growing use of hard power raises concerns about neo-imperialism, resource exploitation, and authoritarian influence, challenging the narrative of altruistic partnership.

Competing Interests: Despite a shared goal of diminishing US hegemony, China, Russia, Turkey, and India increasingly compete with one another for influence, creating potential flashpoints in regions like East Africa.

The new great power competition in Africa represents a complex struggle involving economics, geopolitics, and ideology. While China, Russia, Turkey, and India align in their opposition to Western dominance, they also vie against each other for strategic advantage. This competition challenges the liberal democratic order, offering Africans alternative development models rooted in authoritarian governance and civilizational narratives. 

As these powers expand their presence, the risk of militarization and resource-driven exploitation grows, underscoring the complexity of Africa’s geopolitical landscape. For liberal democracies, this competition highlights the need for a recalibrated approach to African engagement. Transparent partnerships, infrastructure investments, and strengthened support for democratic institutions can counterbalance authoritarian models. 

For African nations, this dynamic presents both opportunities and challenges. Leveraging this competition to secure fairer terms for trade, development aid, and security assistance is essential to preserving sovereignty and fostering sustainable growth. Engaging with these emerging powers could accelerate development, but it may also erode democratic governance and foster dependency. 

Meanwhile, the United States and its allies must reassess their strategies to remain relevant in a multipolar Africa. This evolving contest reflects a broader global shift toward multipolarity, with Africa positioned as a pivotal arena in the battle to reshape the post-Cold War world order.

 

Introduction

Statue of a child slave in Zanzibar. Photo: Shutterstock.

In the 19th century, the competition among Europe’s major powers led to the invasion and colonization of almost the entire African continent. However, drawing a direct analogy between today’s great power competition in Africa and the colonial era oversimplifies the dynamics at play. Unlike the previous scramble for Africa, the so-called “New Scramble for Africa” (The Economist, 2019) might bring tangible benefits to ordinary Africans.

Africa, despite being the poorest inhabited continent, remains a region of immense potential. Its vast oil and mineral wealth, coupled with significant agricultural resources, are juxtaposed with widespread poverty. Yet, there are reasons for cautious optimism about Africa’s future. The continent is increasingly recognized as a region of strategic importance by global powers such as China, Russia, and the United States, as well as regional actors like Turkey and India. Africa’s importance is rooted in its rapidly growing population—projected to be the largest globally by the end of the century—and its abundant natural resources, including minerals essential for emerging technologies like electric vehicles and mobile phones. While much of the developed world grapples with aging populations and declining fertility rates—some, like China, even confronting the paradox of growing old before achieving widespread prosperity—Africa’s demographic trends point to a youthful and dynamic future.

Between 2000 and 2020, African nations experienced stable economic growth (Zajączkowski & Kumar, 2020), a trend that has continued largely uninterrupted in sub-Saharan Africa, except during the COVID-19 pandemic. By the mid-2010s, Africa’s economic performance surpassed that of other developing regions such as Latin America and Southeast Asia (UNECA, 2015; African Development Bank, 2014, 2015). This growth has often been driven by internal demand, including private consumption, public infrastructure investment, and expanding trade ties with emerging markets (African Development Bank, 2019). Projections estimate that by 2060, Africa’s middle class will reach 1.1 billion people—approximately 50% of the continent’s population (UNECA, 2015; African Development Bank, 2012).

Despite these promising trends, Africa currently accounts for just 3% of global trade (African Development Bank, 2012; UNECA, 2013). However, the continent’s youthful population, rapid urbanization, and expanding educated middle class are transforming it into an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment. Nations such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, the United States, and European powers are deepening their engagement with Africa, driven by a mix of strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests.

The competition among these major powers has the potential to create a win-win scenario for Africans. By leveraging rivalries, African nations could secure better investment deals and improved terms of engagement. However, there are risks. This competition could result in increased external support for corrupt or oppressive leaders as foreign powers prioritize their strategic goals over good governance. Nevertheless, the potential benefits are evident: increased investment can create jobs, improve infrastructure, and enhance Africa’s influence within global institutions. For emerging global powers, Africa represents an opportunity not only to boost national wealth and secure access to critical raw materials but also to expand their global influence and military reach, often at the expense of established powers like the United States.

China, Russia, Turkey, and India, in particular, are deepening their economic, diplomatic, and military ties with African states using a mix of soft power, sharp power, and, occasionally, hard power.

The civilizational populism promoted by emerging powers like Turkey, China, and others provides a distinct alternative to the Western liberal democratic model. These nations seek to position themselves as “civilization-states,” claiming to reconnect with the values and traditions that historically made their societies great. This strategic positioning not only challenges the hegemony of liberal democratic norms but also resonates with African states seeking development paths that reject Western-imposed conditions and values.

In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdogan exemplifies this civilizational populism. Erdogan’s leadership employs a dual narrative: domestically, he positions himself as the defender of Islamic values against secularist elites, and internationally, he portrays Turkey as the protector of Muslim interests against Western dominance (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022). By framing Turkey as the heir to Ottoman-Islamic civilization, Erdogan not only consolidates his domestic support but also positions Turkey as a leader of the Muslim world (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). Central to this strategy is the AKP’s rhetoric, which invokes collective historical traumas and fears. This securitization narrative portrays Turkey as a nation under constant threat from internal and external enemies, including Western powers, secularists, and minority groups (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2021). By doing so, Erdogan legitimizes authoritarian measures, silences dissent, and garners support for Turkey’s active role in global anti-Western coalitions (Yilmaz, Shipoli, & Demir, 2021).

In addition, civilizational populism heavily relies on narratives of victimhood. Erdogan’s political strategy has evolved to incorporate both national and manufactured victimhood narratives, which resonate deeply with his base. These narratives amplify historical grievances and create a sense of solidarity among supporters, portraying the AKP and its leader as the only forces capable of defending the “true” Turkish identity (Morieson, Yilmaz, & Kenes, 2024). These strategies extend beyond domestic politics to foreign policy. By aligning with anti-colonial sentiments and emphasizing solidarity with historically marginalized nations, Turkey appeals to African states as a partner that understands their struggles. Unlike the West, which ties aid and investment to democratic reforms, Turkey offers “no-strings-attached” assistance, furthering its influence in regions seeking alternatives to Western conditionalities (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022). This model of civilizational populism not only undermines liberal democratic norms but also demonstrates the AKP’s ability to adapt its messaging to different audiences. By emphasizing shared grievances and cultural pride, the AKP constructs a narrative of unity and resistance that resonates globally while reinforcing its domestic authority (Yılmaz, 2021).

These civilization-states emphasize anti-colonial solidarity and highlight their success in achieving economic growth without adhering to Western norms. Their strategies are designed not only to challenge American hegemony but also to position their governance models as viable alternatives to liberal democracy.

This report examines the strategies employed by China, Russia, Turkey, and India in Africa, focusing on their use of soft and hard power and their framing of themselves as civilization-states offering alternatives to Western liberalism. By analyzing their approaches, this report seeks to understand how these powers influence Africa’s development trajectories and what this means for the future of global power dynamics.

 

Turkey

The Turkish Islamist humanitarian aid foundation IHH serves as one of the key instruments of the Erdogan regime’s policies in Africa. African children participate in activities promoting IHH in Niamey, Niger, on December 20, 2017. Photo: Burak Tumler.

Turkey’s Erdogan-led AKP government has demonstrated unprecedented interest in Africa, establishing 26 new embassies and 12 consulates across the continent since 2010, bringing the total to 44 (The Economist, 2019). This outreach aligns with Erdogan’s increasingly anti-Western national ideology, which portrays Turkey as both a defender of Islam and the downtrodden peoples of the global south (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2023). For Erdogan, Africa represents a region with deep-seated resentment toward Western powers and a positive perception of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, offering opportunities to cultivate trade partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international bodies, including the United Nations.

Historically, Turkey’s engagement with Africa was limited. While the Ottoman Empire maintained ties with North Africa, the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe until the 1990s (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This neglect was shaped by Africa’s colonial history, Turkey’s pro-European orientation under Kemalist rule, and Cold War dynamics that placed much of Africa under American or Soviet influence.

Erdogan has contrasted Turkey’s approach with that of Western powers, emphasizing solidarity over exploitation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he criticized Europe’s failure to provide vaccines to Africa, contrasting it with Turkey’s medical aid (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023). He has frequently highlighted Europe’s selective application of universal values, pointing to the neglect of African refugees and Western double standards on human rights. According to Erdogan, “The EU is not in a position to defend all its self-proclaimed universal moral values while it turns a blind eye to sinking boats in the Mediterranean, building wire fences, and adopting a push-back policy” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023).

Erdogan positions Turkey as a country free from colonial baggage, committed to anti-imperialism, and sharing values with Africa. He frames Turkey’s engagement as rooted in sincerity, brotherhood, and solidarity, rejecting “old colonial practices with new methods” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023). Erdogan’s rhetoric emphasizes a “unique economic and development model” that Turkey can export to help Africa prosper without adopting exploitative or neo-colonial practices.

This narrative blend promises of mutual economic growth with appeals to shared values and opposition to the West. Erdogan adeptly connects Europe’s colonial legacy with its modern policies, particularly in redistributive justice. For instance, he has contrasted Turkey’s pandemic aid with Europe’s vaccine withholding, presenting Turkey as a genuine partner in Africa’s development (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023).

Turkey’s African policy underwent a significant transformation in the post-Cold War era. After the European Union (EU) rejected Turkey’s membership, Ankara adopted a multidimensional foreign policy, moving away from exclusive Western alignment (Tepecikliogu, 2017). The “Opening to Africa Policy” of 1998 marked the beginning of this shift, with economic priorities playing a growing role. This approach intensified under the AKP government, which, after facing resistance to EU membership, turned to cultivating alliances in non-Western regions, including Africa.

In 2005, Erdogan’s government declared “The Year of Africa,” with Erdogan becoming the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey’s economic growth under AKP leadership enabled the country to pursue a proactive foreign policy, focusing on the African continent as a region of strategic importance (Tepecikliogu, 2017). Today, Turkey positions itself as a reliable partner, offering an alternative to Western dominance while strengthening its presence in Africa through economic, cultural, and diplomatic initiatives.

Turkey’s Soft Power in Africa

Turkey’s soft power initiatives in Africa have been complex, leveraging humanitarian aid, education, religion, media, and infrastructure development. This aligns with President Erdogan’s increasingly anti-Western national ideology, which frames Turkey as both a defender of its people and Islam, as well as a spokesperson for the downtrodden peoples of the global south (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). In Africa, Erdogan perceives a continent harboring understandable resentment toward Western powers and views it as a region where Turkey and the Ottoman Empire are remembered positively. This creates opportunities for Turkey to gain trade partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international organizations such as the United Nations.

Historically, the Ottoman Empire maintained close ties with North Africa, but the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe until the 1990s (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This neglect stemmed from Africa’s colonial history, Turkey’s pro-European orientation under Kemalist rule, and Cold War dynamics that left Africa under American or Soviet influence. However, Turkey’s interest in Africa increased following the Cold War, particularly as its relevance to the US and Europe waned and its bid for EU membership was rejected. In 1997, Turkey adopted a multidimensional foreign policy, diversifying its alliances beyond the West (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This shift included the 1998 “Opening to Africa Policy,” which coincided with the rise of a new Turkish bourgeoisie influencing foreign policy through economic priorities.

Under the Erdogan-led AKP government, which came to power in 2002, efforts to enhance trade and relations with non-Western states, including African nations, accelerated. When it became clear that the EU was reluctant to accept majority-Muslim Turkey, Erdogan sought to build alliances in regions like Africa. Economic growth under AKP rule enabled a proactive foreign policy, and 2005 was declared “The Year of Africa.” Erdogan became the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa, signaling Turkey’s increasing focus on the continent.

In a 2011 speech in Mogadishu, Erdogan underscored Turkey’s commitment to Africa, describing the continent as “the cradle of civilization and one of the epicenters of the future of humanity.” He expressed support for “African ownership of African issues” and highlighted Turkey’s role as a “strategic partner of the rising Continent of Africa” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This rhetoric emphasized Turkey’s distinction from Western powers often viewed as exploitative (Voice of America, 2024). Unlike Western nations, Turkey’s aid comes with few or no conditions regarding governance or human rights reforms, a stance that resonates with many African governments (GIS Reports, 2024). Erdogan has presented Turkey as an alternative to the West, emphasizing sincerity and partnership rather than exploitation (Voice of America, 2024).

Turkey’s engagement in Africa has primarily centered on humanitarian aid and development assistance, which complement its commercial interests (Tepecikliogu, 2017). Selin Gucum of the Observatory of Contemporary Turkey noted that Turkey has capitalized on African efforts to reduce reliance on former colonial powers for aid and security (Voice of America, 2024). Analysts like Teresa Nogueira Pinto highlight that Turkey avoids making its assistance conditional on governance or human rights, a key factor distinguishing it from Western aid models (GIS Reports, 2024).

Education has played a pivotal role in Turkey’s soft power strategy. Initially, the Gulen movement opened schools across Africa, but following the failed 2016 coup, which the AKP blamed on Gulen, these schools were replaced by the Maarif Foundation, which now operates 140 schools in Africa, educating 17,000 students (Daily Sabah, 2021). Additionally, approximately 60,000 African students currently study in Turkey, fostering cultural and educational ties (TRT Africa, 2023).

Religion is another significant element of Turkey’s approach, particularly in Muslim-majority countries or those with sizable Muslim minorities. Turkey-funded mosques and schools promote socially conservative values that resonate with many Africans, especially in opposition to Western liberal norms. Erdogan’s rhetoric against LGBTQ+ rights and his emphasis on traditional family values often find a receptive audience in Africa (Voice of America, 2024).

Media has become an avenue for Turkish influence, with state broadcaster TRT reaching African audiences in multiple languages, including local African dialects. This allows Turkey to promote pro-Turkish narratives and portray itself as a friend to Africa while casting its adversaries as enemies of the African people.

Turkey has also invested in diplomatic training to strengthen ties with African nations. Since 1992, its Diplomacy Academy has trained 249 African diplomats through its International Junior Diplomats Training Program, aimed at capacity building and enhancing human resources upon requests from African foreign ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).

Infrastructure development further cements Turkey’s presence in Africa. Turkish Airlines (THY), for example, flies to 62 African cities, including Mogadishu, Somalia, where its planes land at an airport built with Turkish funds and expertise. This demonstrates Turkey’s commitment to connecting Africa with global markets and boosting tourism (Němečková & Varkočková, 2024).

Humanitarian aid, particularly disaster relief, has been another cornerstone of Turkey’s soft power. During Somalia’s 2011 famine, Turkey provided substantial aid, with Erdogan himself visiting the country to highlight the crisis and Turkey’s role in alleviating it. This not only improved Turkey’s image but also opened doors for Turkish businesses and NGOs to contribute to Somalia’s reconstruction. Somalia became a litmus test for Turkey’s Africa policy, with Ankara playing a mediating role in the country’s internal conflicts (Tepecikliogu, 2017).

Turkey’s initiatives extend beyond aid. It is exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coasts of Libya and Somalia in partnership with local governments (Daily Sabah, 2024). Like other rising powers, Turkey’s involvement in Africa is driven by both economic ambitions and a desire to expand its influence on the continent.

Erdogan’s rhetoric and policies have effectively positioned Turkey as a unique and reliable partner for African nations, contrasting sharply with Western approaches and emphasizing shared values, solidarity, and mutual growth. Through complex soft power initiatives, Turkey has carved a significant role for itself in Africa’s development narrative while pursuing its broader geopolitical and economic interests.

Turkey’s Hard Power in Africa

Turkey’s engagement in Africa extends well beyond disaster and famine aid. Today, Turkey is actively exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coasts of Libya and Somalia in collaboration with local governments (Daily Sabah, 2024). Like the BRICS group and Western powers, Turkey’s initiatives in Africa aim to achieve both economic gains and growing geopolitical influence on the continent.

Turkey has earned a reputation as a reliable partner in delivering major projects on time, which has enhanced its value across Africa. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey-Africa trade reached $34.5 billion annually in 2022, up from $5.4 billion in 2003—an extraordinary increase that underscores the economic rise of African nations and Turkey’s expanding interest in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). President Erdogan’s anti-colonial rhetoric further positions Turkey as a trusted ally of Africa, contrasting its sincerity with the perceived exploitation by Western powers. Erdogan also emphasizes Turkey’s unique economic model as a potential roadmap for Africa’s development (Aydın-Düzgit 2023).

Turkey’s hard power approach became more prominent in the 2010s, particularly during the Arab Uprisings and subsequent conflicts. The 2020 Libyan civil war marked a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy, as Ankara supported the Tripoli-based government by deploying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval forces to counter Russian-backed factions. This intervention showcased the effectiveness of Turkish military technology, especially drones, which have since become highly sought after by African nations (GIS Reports, 2024).

The defense industry has been a major beneficiary of improved Turkey-Africa relations. Turkey has increasingly signed arms deals with African governments, leading to a fivefold growth in defense and aerospace exports to the continent—from $82.9 million in 2020 to $460.6 million in 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022; Demirdirek & Talebian, 2022). While still a small fraction of total arms sales to African states, this growth highlights Turkey’s expanding role as a defense partner. Despite its focus on humanitarian assistance and economic partnerships, Turkey’s security and defense sectors see Africa as a growing market for military goods.

Turkey’s intervention in Libya likely had two main objectives: securing access to the Libyan coast and maritime boundaries, and countering Arab and Russian influence in the region. Turkey’s successful defense of the Tripoli government relied heavily on-air superiority and UAV technology, demonstrating both the effectiveness of its military prowess and the utility of its hardware in modern conflicts.

Following the Libya intervention, Turkish UAVs gained popularity in Africa. Analysts note that Turkish defense products offer significant advantages to African countries—they are affordable, reliable, and battle-tested in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine (GIS Reports, 2024). For nations grappling with insurgent movements, porous borders, and under-resourced armies—such as Togo, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia—Turkey’s drones and counterterrorism expertise have become especially valuable.

Turkey is primarily a supplier of arms and military training rather than an active combatant in Africa’s wars. It has signed defense agreements with countries including Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda, with expected agreements in Uganda and Mozambique. These agreements often encompass security provisions, technical support, and arms sales, though some, like the Mozambique deal, also involve sharing military intelligence (GIS Reports, 2024).

Somalia remains Turkey’s closest partner in Africa. In 2017, Turkey established a large foreign military base in Mogadishu and has since provided extensive training to Somali soldiers engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda (Atlantic Council, 2024). Such defense agreements serve not only Turkey’s strategic interests but also reinforce its image as a significant ally of African stability. Alper Aktas, Turkey’s ambassador to Somalia, remarked, “[Turkey] never considered Somalia’s stability separately from our own country’s stability” (ADF, 2024). Erdogan describes Turkey as an “Afro-Eurasian” country, sharing common values and interests with African nations (Politics Today, 2022).

Turkey has positioned itself as a reliable alternative to Russia, China, France, and the United States in supplying arms to Africa. Abel Abate Demissie, an associate fellow at Chatham House, observes that “Turkey provides a means of actually purchasing military hardware” (DW, 2022a). African nations are particularly interested in Turkish-manufactured armored vehicles, naval equipment, infantry weapons, and drones (DW, 2022a).

By deepening its defense partnerships and increasing arms sales, Turkey not only enhances its influence in Africa but also pushes back against competing powers like Russia and China. These efforts underscore Turkey’s broader strategy to carve out its sphere of influence on the continent while presenting itself as a reliable and cooperative partner to African states.

 

Russia

T-shirts for sale at Windhoek Market alongside a portrait of Putin in Windhoek, Namibia, on March 26, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

Russia developed strong relationships with African states during the Soviet era, competing with the United States to gain influence across the continent and spread its communist ideology. The Soviets offered development aid and, crucially, solidarity with leftist regimes fighting colonialism and Western imperialism, effectively capitalizing on widespread anti-Western sentiment in Africa (Bienen, 1982). After the collapse of communism, however, Russia struggled to compete with the United States in terms of soft and hard power, as it lacked the resources and global reach of its Soviet predecessor. Nonetheless, because Russia had minimal involvement in the colonization of Africa in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it continued to be perceived by many Africans as a friend to their people and an opponent of Western colonialism and exploitation.

In the post-Soviet era, Russia has consistently sought to maintain its influence in Africa, with efforts expanding significantly under Vladimir Putin’s regime. Putin’s government emphasizes Russia’s historic ties to Africa and its opposition to Western colonialism. For instance, at the second annual Russia–Africa Summit held in St. Petersburg in July 2023, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, declared that Russia would “pursue avenues that would liberate sovereign states from their colonial heritage.” This statement underscored Russia’s ongoing strategy of supporting anti-Western dictatorships and regimes that defy liberal norms. In exchange for Russian development and military aid, these regimes provide diplomatic backing for Russian initiatives in international bodies, including the United Nations Security Council.

In a 2022 speech in Moscow, Putin elaborated on his anti-Western narrative, blaming the “West,” particularly the “Anglo-Saxons,” for colonialism and the slave trade (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022). He portrayed the Soviet Union and Russia as leaders of the 20th-century anti-colonial movement—a legacy, he argued, that the West has never forgiven. Putin framed Russia’s current opposition to Western liberalism and atheism as a continuation of its historic resistance to colonialism. According to this narrative, the West seeks to eradicate traditional ways of living and religious practices, while Russia, as a civilization-state, stands as a protector of Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and other faiths (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022).

Putin further claimed that the promises of democracy and wealth from the West have consistently led to poverty, imperialism, and the erosion of cultural and religious traditions in societies they influence. He argued that the West’s quest for “total domination” drives it to eliminate “sovereign centers of global development,” even by force if necessary (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022). While this rhetoric may not carry the same ideological weight as it did during the Soviet era—when communism provided a compelling alternative to capitalism—it resonates in regions like Africa, where anti-Western sentiments remain strong, and where Western promises of democracy and development often fail to meet expectations.

In Africa, Putin’s anti-Western narrative finds an audience, particularly in areas with strong religious conservatism and enduring memories of colonial humiliation. Russia’s framing of itself as a champion of traditional values and a defender against Western imperialism bolsters its appeal, even as its actual resources and influence remain limited compared to its Soviet predecessor. This narrative continues to shape Russia’s engagement with African states, aligning with its broader geopolitical goals of challenging Western hegemony and asserting its role as a sovereign center of global influence.

The Putin regime does not, of course, rely solely on rhetoric to spread its influence across the African continent. Instead, it employs a range of soft and hard power programs designed to elicit support and back friendly nations in Africa. However, the institutions that Russia builds across Africa consistently promote a narrative blaming the West for Africa’s challenges and portraying Russia as an opponent of Western imperialism.

Russia’s overall strategy in Africa can be summarized as a combination of stabilizing the region to facilitate mineral extraction, opening alternative markets for its energy exports, and leveraging anti-colonial rhetoric and aid to win the support of African nations. While Russia does not actively seek to suppress democracy in Africa, the Putin regime has no qualms about supporting repressive regimes and often prefers dealing with authoritarian governments over democracies. Russia is particularly interested in competing with other global powers, including the United States, France, China, and Turkey, for influence in Africa. To this end, it portrays itself as a long-standing ally of the African people, emphasizing its history of supporting independence movements.

Russian Soft Power in Africa

The Putin regime maintains ties with friendly African states by fostering collaboration between Russian and African educational institutions, building schools and training facilities, and assisting in securing mining operations and combating insurgencies. This latter aspect often involves the Wagner Group, whose activities in Africa have a mixed record. In 2024, the Wagner Group’s operations were incorporated into Russia’s Ministry of Defense’s African Corps.

Russia’s soft power efforts in Africa primarily focus on spreading Russian culture and language. Russian cultural centers operate in over 80 countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, offering Russian language courses and promoting Russian literature. Since 2019, Russia has expanded its language education initiatives to include 28 nations, with a goal of reaching at least 50. It also aims to follow the lead of China and France in admitting talented Africans to its universities to strengthen Africa-Russia ties.

Although Russia has succeeded in garnering support from some African states, including abstentions during votes condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it would be misleading to assume uniform support across the continent or consistent alignment with Russia in UN General Assembly voting (Carnegie Endowment, 2023). Russia’s popularity is not universal in Africa. Despite mostly positive relationships with some countries, it faces competition from wealthier nations better equipped to facilitate development.

Since 2003, Russia has established physical Russian language schools in Africa under the Russky Mir Foundation (Russian World Foundation). These schools teach Russian language and culture, often in collaboration with African governments and universities, such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Namibia (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). In return, Russia has pledged to teach African languages in Moscow schools, signaling respect for African cultures and languages (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024).

Russia has also increased its engagement with higher education institutions in Africa, launching the Russian-African Network University consortium in 2023. This initiative includes agreements with various Malian institutions, such as the National School of Engineering, the University of Humanities and Social Sciences, and the Private University Ahmed Baba (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). These projects complement earlier Soviet-era initiatives, such as the university established in Egypt in 1960, underscoring Russia’s historical and ongoing interest in African education.

Olena Snigyr argues that Russian educational and cultural initiatives aim to expand a shared knowledge base and foster ideological alignment. Educational cooperation, Russian language and culture programs, and journalist training are central to Russia’s strategy of disseminating its narratives and ideas (FPRI, 2024). According to Snigyr, Russia’s narrative of “modernization with Russia” appeals to African nations struggling with poverty despite resource wealth, offering a partnership model distinct from the conditional aid frameworks of Western countries.

Russia positions itself as a protector of African interests, advocating for fairer representation in international organizations such as the UN, opposing foreign interference in political regimes, and supporting traditional values in African societies (FPRI, 2024). However, its impact remains limited. Only about 35,000 African students are currently enrolled in Russian universities, and the Russian-African Network University involves just 75 Russian and 27 African institutions, with significant participation from Zimbabwe (FPRI, 2024). Nonetheless, initiatives like the Consortium of Universities “Subsoil of Africa” at St. Petersburg Mining University, which includes over 130 organizations from 42 African countries, demonstrate Russia’s ambition to deepen collaboration with Africa on its own terms (FPRI, 2024).

In 2023, Russia diversified its educational initiatives, including courses in religion and journalism. For example, it signed an agreement with Burkina Faso to collaborate on secular and Islamic education to combat radical Islam (Russian Mufties Council, 2023). Additionally, partnerships with Nigeria focus on advanced technological education, such as robotics, microelectronics, and 3D printing, while negotiations with South Sudan involve constructing a refinery (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). Events like robotics and astronomy workshops in Tanzania, which featured a cosmonaut and attracted 800 students, further underscore Russia’s investment in portraying itself as a technological power in Africa (RT, 2023; Daily News, 2023).

These soft power efforts, while not unique to Russia, are integral to its strategy of portraying itself as a non-imperialist, anti-colonial partner to Africa. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has emphasized Russia’s appreciation for African states that resist Western pressure, framing the partnership as one of mutual respect and shared interests (Kornegay, 2023). This rhetoric has helped Moscow persuade some African states to resist Western sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. However, many African states continue to trade with Russia out of necessity, as food and energy shortages leave them little choice but to prioritize their immediate needs over geopolitical alignments.

Russian Hard Power in Africa

Russian use of hard power in Africa has become increasingly prominent since 2017, largely through the activities of the Wagner Group, a private military company advancing Russian interests across the continent, often in opposition to Western priorities. The Wagner Group has been active in several African states, most notably the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Libya.

The Wagner Group, founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, gained prominence during Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. While commonly referred to as a single entity, it is better described as a complex network of businesses and mercenary groups operating in conflict zones and even in alleged peacekeeping operations worldwide (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Before 2023, the Wagner Group operated somewhat independently of the Kremlin. However, following its apparent rebellion against the Putin regime and Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an air crash, the group has operated as an instrument of the Russian state, with much of its operations absorbed into the Ministry of Defense in 2024. Even prior to these events, the Wagner Group was closely aligned with Kremlin objectives, despite its profit-driven motivations.

In Africa, the Wagner Group has approximately 5,000 personnel, including former Russian soldiers, convicts, and foreign nationals (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). Among its most significant campaigns is its involvement in CAR, where Wagner soldiers were deployed in 2018, initially as military instructors. Their numbers later swelled to 1,500–2,000, transforming into a fighting force tasked with securing the country’s lucrative mining industry and protecting the pro-Russian government from rebels (Granta, 2024).

In 2019, Wagner began stationing forces around gold mines in central and eastern CAR and later expanded its presence to the north. Russian officials claim their operations have brought “peace and security” to CAR, but these claims are contested. The US State Department reports that Wagner has engaged in indiscriminate killings, abductions, and sexual violence in its efforts to control mining areas near Bambari (US State Department, 2024). UN experts further accuse Wagner of harassing journalists, aid workers, and international peacekeepers (OHCHR, 2021).

For instance, in October 2024, Wagner forces reportedly executed at least a dozen civilians in the gold-mining town of Koki, allegedly targeting artisanal miners. Witnesses recounted how Russian paramilitaries arrived by helicopter, indiscriminately opening fire on locals (Al Jazeera, 2024). Such violence is not isolated; it aligns with a broader pattern of Wagner’s operations, where violence often accompanies lucrative mining agreements between Russian companies and the CAR government. For example, the CAR government revoked mining licenses from a Canadian company and awarded them to Midas Resources, a Wagner-affiliated entity (Al Jazeera, 2024).

At times, Wagner’s priorities in CAR appear more focused on securing mineral resources than protecting the government. Wagner reportedly collaborated with the rebel group Union for Peace (UPC) to ensure the safety of its mining operations but later turned against the group, launching a counteroffensive targeting both rebels and local civilians (Al Jazeera, 2024).

CAR’s former Prime Minister Martin Ziguele expressed regret over inviting Wagner into the country, describing the group as a “criminal organization” now dominating CAR’s economic, security, and political spheres (BBC, 2023). Despite these criticisms, many in CAR view Wagner’s presence favorably, believing it has brought a degree of stability. In Bangui, the CAR government erected a monument honoring Wagner forces, depicting Russian troops protecting a woman and her children, accompanied by tributes to Yevgeny Prigozhin (BBC, 2023).

The Wagner Group’s activities in CAR exemplify both the potential and the pitfalls of Russia’s paramilitary strategy in Africa. On one hand, it highlights the failure of US and European initiatives to bring security and democracy to the continent. On the other hand, it demonstrates how Russian soft power effectively garners local support for the presence of its hard power. This growing influence strengthens Russia’s alliances in Africa, securing votes in the UN General Assembly and helping to shield Russia from Western economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. However, these developments also underscore the precarious balance between Russian objectives and the well-being of African states under Wagner’s shadow. 

 

India

India’s Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi greets heads of delegations at the alighting point during the 3rd India-Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi on October 29, 2015. Photo: Shutterstock.

India’s relationship with post-colonial Africa is longstanding and predates that of many other nations, including Turkey. Since the 1950s, India has actively engaged with African nations, with Prime Minister Nehru famously describing Africa as a “sister” continent. The establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which included India and all African nations except South Sudan, further solidified this bond. Shared opposition to European colonialism provided a strong foundation for collaboration, fostering a sense of solidarity and shared purpose.

In the post-World War II period, India and African states were united by their mutual aspiration to chart independent foreign policies, a vision that became even more pronounced during the Cold War era (Kidwai, 2023: 359). During this time, both India and African nations sought to strengthen bilateral and regional ties to advance their collective interests. India has been a consistent partner, offering humanitarian aid, disaster assistance, and cooperating on defense and security matters. For example, as early as 1956, Emperor Haile Selassie requested India’s assistance in establishing a military academy in Harar, marking the beginning of India’s significant security cooperation with African states (Kidwai, 2023: 359).

Since the end of the Cold War, India’s engagement with Africa has deepened, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who assumed office in 2014. Modi has portrayed himself as a leader of the ‘Global South’ and has positioned India as a steadfast ally of developing nations. This approach has been reflected in Modi’s initiatives, such as his advocacy for the African Union’s inclusion in the G20 during India’s presidency of the group. Modi’s rhetoric underscores the importance of Africa in India’s global strategy. “When we say we see the world as a family, we truly mean it,” Modi stated, emphasizing Africa’s significance in shaping a more inclusive global dialogue (CNN, 2023).

The inclusion of the African Union in the G20 was, according to Modi, a “significant stride towards a more inclusive global dialogue” (X., 2023). While this move demonstrated India’s commitment to amplifying African voices on the global stage, India’s interest in Africa is not purely altruistic. Like other major powers, India seeks to bolster its influence and expand trade relations with Africa to further its own strategic and economic interests.

Africa has become India’s fourth-largest trading partner among global regions. Trade between India and sub-Saharan Africa has grown significantly, rising from $47 billion in 2012 to nearly $90 billion in recent years (African Business, 2023). Total trade with all African nations reached $98 billion in 2024 (Confederation of Indian Industry, 2024). Energy is a cornerstone of this relationship, with African nations supplying roughly a quarter of India’s crude oil imports. Nigeria, in particular, has become India’s largest supplier of oil (African Business, 2023).

This increasing dependency on African energy resources underscores the continent’s importance to India’s economic security and growth. Consequently, the Indian government has prioritized building stronger ties with African nations through trade, security partnerships, and diplomatic initiatives. India’s strategy also seeks to challenge the influence of other powers, such as the United States, China, Europe, and Russia, in the region. Africa’s growing economic potential and its strategic significance make it a focal point for India’s foreign policy ambitions. 

Indian Soft Power in Africa

India’s soft power in Africa is rooted in a shared history of anti-colonialism, trade, and humanitarian assistance. While India has historically provided aid to African nations, its primary focus has been on neighboring countries or, paradoxically, on receiving aid itself, such as from Great Britain. However, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has increasingly directed aid to African nations, particularly Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique—countries where China also has a significant aid presence. This reflects growing competition between India and China for influence in Africa.

Prime Minister Modi emphasizes that India’s engagement in Africa is aimed at fostering cooperation rather than rivalry. He stated, “As global engagement in Africa increases, [India and Africans must work] together to ensure that Africa does not once again turn into a theatre of rival ambitions but becomes a nursery for the aspirations of Africa’s youth” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). This sentiment underscores India’s aim to position itself as a sincere partner to Africa, untainted by exploitative motives.

India’s foreign aid to Africa has grown significantly, with a compound annual growth rate of 22% over the past decade. Initiatives like the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program exemplify this approach, offering training and education to leaders and scholars from developing countries. With 40,000 alumni globally, ITEC serves as a soft power tool to cultivate goodwill and a generation of leaders with favorable views of India.

India’s soft power also extends to trade. Modi has often emphasized that India’s development partnership with Africa will be guided by African priorities. For example, he remarked that India’s support will “liberate your potential and not constrain your future” (Nantulya, 2023). India seeks to leverage its expertise in areas like the digital revolution to support Africa’s development, including expanding financial inclusion, improving education and health services, and mainstreaming marginalized communities.

Although trade between India and Africa is growing, it remains overshadowed by China-Africa trade. In 2023, China-Africa trade amounted to $282 billion, significantly surpassing India’s $90 billion in trade with sub-Saharan Africa and $98 billion overall (Indian Confederation of Industry, 2024). Nevertheless, certain sectors illustrate the growing depth of India-Africa economic ties. India imports significant amounts of minerals from Africa, while African nations benefit from India’s mining expertise and investment. Conversely, African countries import pharmaceuticals from India, with $3.8 billion worth of medicines and healthcare products purchased in 2020-2021.

India’s trade imbalance with Africa, particularly in manufacturing, is utilized as a soft power advantage. Modi has promised to keep Indian markets open to African goods and to support Indian industries investing in Africa. Furthermore, India is making strides in exporting green energy technology to Africa, positioning itself as a valuable partner in addressing climate change.

One of India’s unique advantages in Africa is the presence of a significant Indian diaspora in countries like Seychelles, South Africa, and Mauritius. Modi’s visits to African countries with large Indian communities underscore this connection. Under Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rule, India has sought to engage the diaspora to advance its foreign policy objectives, including addressing security concerns and facilitating trade. However, Modi’s message to African audiences diverges from his focus on Hindu civilizational rejuvenation for the diaspora. Instead, he portrays himself as a leader of the Global South, emphasizing solidarity with Africa in advocating for a “just, representative and democratic global order” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020).

In sum, India’s soft power in Africa is a mix of historical ties, developmental cooperation, and strategic engagement. While India’s initiatives are dwarfed by China’s influence, they are nonetheless significant in cultivating goodwill and expanding India’s footprint across the continent. Through trade, aid, and a focus on shared aspirations, India positions itself as a genuine partner and advocate for Africa on the global stage.

Indian Hard Power in Africa

India is not a major military power in Africa. Instead, its strength lies in its soft power—the perception that India is a trustworthy and benevolent partner to African nations—which gives it an advantage over rivals like China and the United States. Nevertheless, as India’s economic power grows, so too does its military capacity, and it is increasingly likely that India will expand its hard power presence in areas of strategic importance, including parts of Africa.

India’s hard power in Africa is primarily focused on the Indian Ocean region, which acts as a strategic corridor between the African continent and the Indian subcontinent. Indian military facilities have been established in key locations, including Madagascar, which hosts a radar and listening facility; Oman, where Indian Navy vessels have docking rights; Mauritius, where India is constructing an airfield and facilities for stationing soldiers; and the Seychelles, where India has installed a surveillance system to monitor surrounding waters (Military Africa, 2023; Voice of America, 2024; Deccan Herald, 2024; The Geostrata, 2021). These facilities, while modest compared to the expansive presence of the United States or even Russia in Africa, serve critical functions. They help India secure its interests in the region, combat piracy, and contribute to the stability of vital maritime routes.

India’s hard power initiatives are deeply tied to its aspirations as an Indo-Pacific power. The Modi administration has emphasized the importance of securing Indian influence in the region to counter the expanding presence of China and, to a lesser extent, the United States. India’s strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific includes establishing partnerships with African nations along the eastern shores of Africa, particularly in areas near the Indian Ocean.

Indian military engagements in Africa also highlight its collaborative approach to regional security. Prime Minister Modi has underscored India’s commitment to addressing shared security concerns, stating that India will prioritize “strengthen[ing] …cooperation and mutual capabilities [between India and Africa] in combating terrorism and extremism; keeping our cyberspace safe and secure; and supporting the UN in advancing and keeping peace” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). Modi’s rhetoric often emphasizes that Indian military activities are driven by the need for stability and collaboration rather than competition, asserting that “the world needs cooperation and not competition in the eastern shores of Africa and the eastern Indian Ocean” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020).

While India’s military footprint in Africa is currently limited, its actions signal a gradual but deliberate increase in its regional hard power. India’s presence in the Indian Ocean is likely to expand further, as the country seeks to position itself as a key player in global maritime security and a counterbalance to Chinese and American influence in the region. Partnerships with African nations on counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and peacekeeping missions will likely be pivotal in shaping India’s military strategy in Africa.

 

China

A Chinese yuan placed on a map of Africa symbolizes trade, tourism, economy, and investment between China and African countries. Photo:
Oleg Elkov.

China’s rise is arguably the most consequential event of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Before the 2000s, it was commonplace in Western capitals to believe that China’s embrace of market capitalism would inevitably transform the country into a liberal democracy. This ahistorical and naïve belief shaped American policy towards China throughout the 1980s and 1990s, which facilitated China’s economic growth by dismantling barriers to trade. However, this approach failed to transform China into either a democracy or a reliable ally of the United States. Instead, following a period of economic reform and relative social liberalization under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping’s leadership has transformed China into a surveillance state governed by an authoritarian populist regime, which portrays itself as the culmination of “5,000 years of Chinese civilization” (Liu Qingzhu, 2023).

China’s growing economic strength, while it has created a large middle class, has not led to its transition into a liberal democracy. Although China’s middle class enjoys economic freedom, it remains either unwilling or unable to demand freedom of expression and other liberal reforms. From one perspective, it would seem irrational for Chinese citizens to challenge a regime that has delivered unprecedented prosperity. Indeed, China is arguably the world’s largest economic powers and its second greatest military power, giving its citizens a sense of prestige and influence not experienced for centuries. The Communist Party of China (CCP) continuously reinforces this narrative of national ascendancy, framing China’s increasingly assertive behavior in Asia—including its claims over maritime territories belonging to Vietnam and the Philippines—as part of a legitimate effort to reclaim territories historically taken from China by imperial powers (Zhang, 2019).

Simultaneously, China positions itself as a model for the Global South and is instrumental in building economic blocs such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), aimed at countering the influence of the US and EU in global economic affairs (Char, 2024). For the CCP and its supporters, China’s rise is evidence of the superiority of its civilizational model over Western civilization and proof that modernization can occur without Westernization (Char, 2024). The CCP adopts a deeply civilizational perspective on global affairs and has repeatedly urged the US to respect civilizational differences and cease imposing liberal democratic values on non-Western nations (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018).

China appears to recognize that liberal democracies tend to act peacefully toward one another but view the rise of non-liberal powers as existential threats, often responding with hostility. Xi Jinping has warned the US not to provoke a “clash of civilizations” by attempting to stifle China’s rise. Instead, he has called for an acceptance of China’s autocratic system and its hegemony in Asia as natural outcomes of its civilizational rejuvenation. To achieve harmony between civilizations, Xi advocates replacing “estrangement with exchange, clashes with mutual learning, and superiority with coexistence” (Zhang, 2019: 19).

China’s rise serves as an inspiration to many developing nations, particularly in Africa, as it demonstrates rapid development achieved without capitulating to Westernization. Aware of this, China leverages its position as a rising non-Western power through soft power initiatives, presenting itself as a non-Western civilization that has risen above the West. The CCP claims that China is inherently more peaceful and civilized, emphasizing that it has never colonized or invaded other nations. While this narrative is not entirely accurate, it resonates with many Africans who continue to feel the historical pain of colonization. China’s claim of never having invaded African territory is particularly appealing, as it contrasts sharply with the history of European colonial powers.

China’s relationship with Africa is shaped by this self-image. The CCP portrays China not merely as a nation-state but as a rejuvenated 5,000-year-old civilization capable of serving as a role model for other developing, non-Western societies. By positioning itself as an alternative to Western imperialism, China fosters goodwill and deepens its influence across the African continent. 

Chinese Soft Power in Africa

Chinese soft power in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is considerable. China has opened more than 50 embassies across the continent—more than the United States—and has become the most significant trade and aid partner for a variety of African nations (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).

China provides infrastructure, including roads and railways, in areas where the US often does not, and facilitates development through aid and debt forgiveness. However, China also offers a different path to development and modernity, one that does not insist on compliance with liberal democratic norms and at times challenges, rather than imitates, Africa’s former colonial masters.

China is heavily involved in infrastructure development in Africa. For instance, in Kenya, China was responsible for the construction of the Nairobi to Mombasa Standard Gauge Railway, a project costing $4.7 billion, with plans to build industrial parks connected by the railway, which was also supposed to extend to Uganda (BBC, 2023). However, the railway is underused and widely considered unnecessary, leading to accusations that China has deliberately trapped Kenya in unmanageable debt to gain influence over the African state (BBC, 2023). Despite this, only 19.4% of Kenya’s debt is owed to China (BBC, 2023).

In Ethiopia, China has invested in hundreds of projects valued at over $4 billion (Cabestan, 2019). China has been instrumental in constructing roads and railways. Beyond infrastructure, China supported the Ethiopian government in December 2021 by voting against a UN resolution condemning human rights abuses in the Tigray region (South China Morning Post, 2021).

China also constructed the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at a cost of $200 million (South China Morning Post, 2018). Unsurprisingly, the building was reportedly bugged, and its servers were regularly hacked by CCP operatives (South China Morning Post, 2018). Nevertheless, China continues to build critical infrastructure across the continent. In 2018, China announced plans to build the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria (Xinhua, 2022). In 2022, China completed construction of the African Centre for Disease Control Headquarters (CIDCA, 2023). Additionally, Chinese-owned companies have built or financed dozens of presidential, prime ministerial, and other government buildings throughout Africa (Heritage Foundation, 2020).

China is also seeking control over African ports. For instance, Djibouti nationalized its Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018 (Bloomberg, 2018). However, China owns 25% of the port, gaining significant control over regional shipping. Chinese companies have also established large cargo facilities near the port, and hundreds of Chinese soldiers are stationed there. The People’s Liberation Army Navy uses the terminal for anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations and likely other intelligence and power-projection activities (Bloomberg, 2018).

Reports suggest that China is looking to build a large maritime base, potentially in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, or Gabon (The Diplomat, 2024). Although these plans have not yet materialized, they indicate China’s intent to expand its military power in African waters to protect its lucrative fishing industry and extend its influence over African states (The Diplomat, 2024).

China has also invested in space programs in nine African states as part of its Belt and Road Space Information Corridor. China launches satellites for African states and trains Africans to work in the space industry (United States Institute of Peace, 2023).

Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications technology company, is thought to provide around 70% of Africa’s telecommunications and information infrastructure (DW, 2022; Feldstein, 2020). Across the continent, Chinese companies build telecommunication networks, including government networks. Nine African countries have adopted Chinese-designed and built surveillance projects as part of China’s “Smart City Surveillance” initiative, involving the installation of vast numbers of cameras. Whether the CCP has access to these cameras remains unclear (Financial Times, 2021; The Wall Street Journal, 2019).

China does not merely build infrastructure in Africa but also invites Africans to live and study in China, often at the Chinese state’s expense. This effort aims to create a generation of educated African elites with favorable opinions of China and its development model. For example, Xi Jinping’s approach to Africa, articulated in an editorial by China’s ambassador to the Seychelles, emphasizes “South-South cooperation” and building a China-Africa community based on “sincerity, real results, amity, and good faith” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Seychelles, 2023).

China’s efforts to develop relationships with emerging African elites align with its broader goal of exporting the “China model” of development, which emphasizes industrialization and modernization without democratization or the adoption of Western liberal values. Initiatives like the Sino-Africa Political Party Leaders program bring young African politicians to China for training in governance and economic development based on Chinese principles (Brookings, 2016). Additionally, in 2022, the CCP financed the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania, which educates political leaders from six Southern African countries (FPRI, 2022).

Confucius Institutes, which aim to teach Chinese language and promote Chinese culture, are widespread in Africa, though they have been criticized for spreading CCP propaganda. China has overtaken the United States in hosting African students, making it the second most popular destination after France for Africans pursuing higher education.

China measures its success in Africa partly by examining voting patterns in international organizations. African states are increasingly aligning with China in the UN, with many voting against resolutions critical of Beijing’s policies, such as its South China Sea claims or human rights abuses in Xinjiang (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).

China’s growing popularity in Africa reflects its strategy of combining infrastructure development, educational outreach, and alignment with African priorities. Despite criticisms of its authoritarian model and accusations of debt-trap diplomacy, many Africans view China as a reliable partner offering an alternative path to development. As African nations increasingly adopt aspects of the “China model,” it becomes evident that China’s influence in Africa is reshaping the continent’s political and economic landscape.

Chinese Hard Power in Africa

Military relations between the People’s Republic of China and Africa began during the Cold War, as China sought to combat both Soviet and American influence across the continent and portray itself as a fellow non-white society resisting white global power. During this period, China encouraged national liberation and socialist movements in Africa. Although it no longer attempts to foment communist revolutions in Africa, China continues to present itself as a non-white power naturally aligned with and sympathetic to Africans.

Under Deng Xiaoping, China adopted a policy of “hiding our capabilities” and projecting a friendly or benign face to the world. This approach meant that, while China was a significant arms supplier to African nations, it rarely involved itself directly or indirectly in African conflicts. Xi Jinping has broken with this policy, declaring that “China now stands tall and firm in the East” and should “take center stage” in global affairs (Nantulya, 2019).

As a result, China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia and along its border with India, largely driven by efforts to reclaim land and maritime territories that once belonged to the Chinese Empire (e.g., Taiwan and the South China Sea). At the same time, China has long been involved in African conflicts and is eager to assert its military might in support of its national interests, as well as to “protect” ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals living in Africa. China’s use of hard power in Africa is deeply tied to the CCP’s civilizational rejuvenation project, its conception of all Chinese globally as belonging to the “Chinese people,” and its efforts to restore China to its rightful place at the center of global affairs. For example, Xi (2017) emphasizes China’s “more than 5,000 years of civilized history,” portraying the Chinese as a people who “created a brilliant civilization, made outstanding contributions to mankind, and became a great nation of the world.” Xi claims that the Chinese people are now being “rejuvenated” and will soon achieve a “moderately prosperous society” while becoming a global power.

Expanding its hard power influence in Africa helps China present itself as a global power and a civilization with its own development models and norms, which other nations may follow to achieve similar prosperity. Furthermore, this expansion allows China to protect friendly African regimes, prevent American-led coups or interventions, and secure its strategic interests.

China is also exporting its governance model to African states, most notably to Ethiopia, often referred to as the “China of Africa.” Many African countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania, have made “observable changes to their governance styles and models as a result of these deepening engagements.” These changes reflect the adoption of elements from the Chinese development model, including strong export-led growth, significant state involvement in the economy, and the promotion of labor-intensive industries (Nantulya, 2018). China is also believed to be exporting principles like “democratic centralism,” the establishment of special economic zones, and the concept that the military should remain loyal to the ruling party rather than the state or its citizens (Nantulya, 2018).

Despite considerable attention to China’s military footprint in Africa, it remains relatively small compared to that of the United States, which maintains military bases in 26 African nations under the auspices of the United States Africa Command. In contrast, China has just one military base in Africa, located in Djibouti. Nevertheless, given China’s global ambitions, it is likely to establish additional bases in Africa to defend its interests and challenge US, Russian, and Turkish influence in the region.

Though China has only one base in Africa, it has conducted military drills in Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, and Nigeria. Its military medical units have collaborated with counterparts in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zambia to improve combat casualty care as part of long-standing relationships involving arms sales and intelligence cooperation (Nantulya, 2019). China is also developing military ties with Burkina Faso, which recently ceased recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state (Nantulya, 2019).

In 2018, China held a Defense and Security Forum with officials from 50 African nations, resulting in a comprehensive security framework. Through this framework, China pledged to provide military and intelligence support to combat pirates, terrorists, and criminals, as well as to participate in peacekeeping operations. China committed $100 million toward building the African Union Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis and contributed to the China-UN Peace and Development Fund and various training programs (ISPI, 2018).

China’s increasing interest in African security and defense reflects its desire to protect friendly regimes, facilitate trade, ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and safeguard ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals in Africa. While China’s actions often align with African interests, such as infrastructure development and security enhancement, the establishment of Chinese police stations and other security facilities across Africa is also part of projecting China as a civilization-state that protects Chinese people globally and maintains their loyalty to the CCP.

China has openly expressed its intentions in Africa. A 2015 Chinese policy paper emphasized “deepened military engagement, technological cooperation, and capacity building for Africa’s security sectors” (Nantulya, 2019). As a result, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s largest weapons supplier (SIPRI, 2018). Its exports include not only small arms but also tanks, armored personnel carriers, maritime patrol craft, aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and artillery (Nantulya, 2019).

China is also deeply involved in educating African military officers. Approximately 2,000 African officers train annually with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with an additional 500 attending the PLA Naval Medical University and another 2,000 receiving policing and law enforcement training at China’s People’s Armed Police (PAP) schools (Nantulya, 2023). The PLA and PAP, as extensions of the CCP, advance the party’s ideological and political goals in Africa.

While China avoids direct military intervention in Africa, it increasingly leverages UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) to expand its influence. In West Africa, China has steadily increased the number and variety of personnel it contributes, including medics, engineers, and armed infantry. In Mali, China’s involvement in the MINUSMA mission is seen as symbolic but marks a new willingness to deploy combat troops (Merics, 2020). China’s peacekeeping activities are not politically neutral. Instead, they aim to promote a “Chinese approach” to peacekeeping, prioritizing regime stability and economic development while avoiding interventionism and democratization (Merics, 2020).

Not all Africans welcome China’s growing influence. For example, Khalil Ibrahim, leader of Sudan’s Justice and Equality Movement, once complained that “China is trading petroleum for our blood” (Pant & Haidar, 2017). Anti-China violence has occurred in Ethiopia, Mali, and other nations, demonstrating that China’s activities are not universally accepted. Nonetheless, China continues to strengthen its position in Africa, often at the expense of democratic norms. These developments are part of the CCP’s broader civilizational rejuvenation project, aimed at reshaping the global order in favor of a multipolar world with China at its center. 

Conclusion

The Debswana Jwaneng Diamond Mine pit in Jwaneng, Botswana, on November 15, 2022. Photo: Bashi Kikia.

The new great power struggle for influence in Africa contains a distinct civilizational element. However, rather than claiming to bring civilization to Africa, each non-African nation involved in this struggle presents itself as a representative of a broader civilization in conflict with the West, offering a new, non-Western path to development. At stake in this competition are billions of dollars in trade revenue, access to vital minerals, and control over key military staging points and geographically strategic areas.

Turkey, Russia, India and China (TRIC) share a common goal: to expand their influence across the African continent and weaken Western—particularly American—power in Africa. Their advantage over the West lies in their relatively untarnished history with Africa, their lack of a colonial legacy tainted by bloodshed, and their ability to point to their own economic successes as evidence that nations can achieve wealth and power without adhering to Western norms and governance models.

Each of these nations offers Africa—often addressing it as though it were a monolithic culture—friendship and ostensibly “no-strings-attached” development aid and direct investment, something the liberal West has traditionally refused to provide. They frequently cite the evils of the colonial period and the West’s insistence that aid be contingent on liberal democratic reforms as examples of Western arrogance and imperialism.

Turkey and China claim that their own civilizations possess values superior to those of the West, demonstrated by their peaceful engagement with Africa. Meanwhile, Russia and India emphasize their shared anti-colonial struggle and present themselves as allies of the Global South in its resistance to Western imperialism. All four nations position themselves as voices for the Global South in its ongoing struggle against the global North.

Yet, these nations are not altruistic actors. They, too, seek Africa’s mineral wealth and view the continent as a key territory for expanding their influence. Although their methods are not as violent or oppressive as those of the European colonial powers, their actions reveal a similar underlying motivation. The increasing reliance on hard power by Turkey, Russia, India and China in Africa highlights that these “new” great powers are not so different from the old ones.

Ultimately, the competition for influence in Africa pits Turkey, Russia, India and China not just against the West but also against one another. Yet, these four nations share a critical objective: constructing a multipolar world in which American power is no longer hegemonic. Winning greater influence in Africa is integral to this project, as is persuading Africans to reject reliance on Western assistance for economic growth and infrastructure development. Instead, the emerging powers argue that Africans should turn away from the values of their former colonial masters and draw on the experiences of rising civilization-states to develop their economies and construct vital infrastructure. Given the West’s failure to facilitate African development and the ongoing challenges faced by liberal democratic societies globally, it would not be surprising if Africans began to distance themselves from liberal democratic norms.

However, the United States remains by far the most powerful foreign nation in Africa, capable of projecting hard power across the continent at a level unmatched by any other nation.

From an Anglo-American—and broadly Western—perspective, the competition between the West and its old and new rivals may appear to be a confrontation between democratic and autocratic regimes. To some extent, the language used by states like TRIC, when presenting themselves as “civilization-states” with unique values, serves to legitimize authoritarianism. However, these regimes perceive the competition differently. They view it as a struggle to construct a new world order in which the US is no longer the central power and the ancient civilizations of TRIC regain the power and prestige they enjoyed before.

These nations are serious about displacing the US and dismantling the liberal norms and global order that have defined the world since the end of the Cold War. They, along with their growing number of allies, believe this shift is desirable, marking the end of Western imperialism and the notion that Western values—such as liberal democracy—are universal. At the same time, they compete with one another in Africa. For instance, if China’s base in Djibouti signals plans to establish further bases in East Africa, India may feel compelled to respond by increasing its military presence to counter Chinese influence, lest it risk an East Africa dominated by China and potentially hostile to Indian interests.

While it is possible that TRIC could find avenues for cooperation in Africa, it is far more likely that their competition will intensify. Despite sharing the common goal of diminishing American power in Africa and globally, their conflicting interests are likely to make Africa a critical arena of rivalry among these new global powers.

 

Recommendations

For Liberal Democratic Countries

Reassess Engagement Strategies!

– Liberal democracies should emphasize the unique value of transparent, accountable governance and rule of law as part of their development partnerships.

 – Shift from conditionality-based aid to partnerships that prioritize mutual benefits without sacrificing democratic values.

Strengthen Infrastructure Investments!

– Compete with China and others by funding large-scale infrastructure projects with transparent terms to counter debt-trap diplomacy narratives.

– Prioritize renewable energy, digital infrastructure, and transport networks to align with Africa’s long-term goals.

Increase Support for Democratic Governance!

– Offer robust support for democratic institutions in Africa through capacity-building programs for judiciary, electoral, and civil society.

– Collaborate with African governments to counter the spread of authoritarian governance models, such as China’s “democratic centralism.”

Develop Cultural and Educational Ties!

– Expand scholarships and exchange programs for African students in liberal democracies to compete with Chinese and Turkish educational initiatives.

– Support local language media and cultural initiatives to counter disinformation and propaganda from authoritarian states.

Enhance Military Cooperation!

– Strengthen military partnerships focused on combating terrorism, piracy, and organized crime while avoiding neo-imperialist optics.

– Support African-led peacekeeping missions and regional security initiatives to offer alternatives to Russian mercenary involvement.

Collaborate with African Nations on Resource Management!

– Promote sustainable development models by partnering with African nations on equitable resource extraction and environmental conservation.

– Ensure that development initiatives include local community benefits to counter the exploitative practices of other powers.

Support Multipolar Engagement!

– Avoid framing the engagement as a “new Cold War”; instead, focus on inclusive global partnerships where African nations have agency in decision-making.

– Advocate for reforms in international institutions (e.g., UN, IMF) to increase African representation.

For African Policy Makers, NGOs, and Academics

Maximize Leverage in Partnerships!

– Use the competition between great powers to negotiate better terms for aid, trade, and investment agreements.

– Insist on infrastructure projects that prioritize local employment, technology transfer, and long-term sustainability.

Diversify Economic Partners!

–  Avoid over-reliance on any single country (e.g., China) by fostering diversified trade relationships with liberal democracies, BRICS nations, and regional blocs.

– Strengthen intra-African trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to reduce dependence on external powers.

Protect Sovereignty and Avoid Dependency!

– Resist pressures to adopt authoritarian governance models in exchange for development aid.

– Develop robust legal frameworks to prevent resource exploitation and ensure fair terms for foreign investments.

Invest in Regional Security Cooperation!

– Strengthen African Union (AU) and regional security mechanisms to reduce reliance on external military support, such as Russia’s Wagner Group.

– Build partnerships with global allies that respect African sovereignty and promote peacekeeping capabilities.

Promote Transparency in Aid and Trade Deals!

– Publicize the terms of agreements with external powers to foster public accountability and prevent corruption.

– Work with civil society organizations to monitor the social and environmental impacts of foreign-funded projects.

Expand Educational and Technological Opportunities!

– Collaborate with all partners to build higher education institutions, vocational training centers, and tech incubators.

– Develop programs to train a new generation of African leaders who can engage strategically with global powers.

Strengthen Civil Society and Democratic Institutions!

– Support NGOs and academic institutions to monitor and counter authoritarian influences from foreign actors.

– Foster dialogue on governance models that prioritize African values while safeguarding individual freedoms.

Build Alliances with Liberal Democracies!

– Partner with liberal democracies to balance authoritarian influences and ensure that Africa’s development aligns with global democratic values.

– Engage in diplomatic efforts to ensure African nations have a greater voice in multilateral forums like the G20 and UN Security Council.

These recommendations aim to balance the opportunities presented by the new great power competition with safeguards against exploitation, authoritarianism, and loss of sovereignty. Both liberal democracies and African nations must work collaboratively to create a mutually beneficial, sustainable, and democratic framework for Africa’s development.


 

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion and Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.


 

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