Ecuador Police

Security at What Cost? Punitive Populism and Democratic Trade-offs in Ecuador

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHomeHuman Rights

In this commentary, Emilio Hernández examines Ecuador’s recent security crisis through the lens of punitive populism, offering a nuanced account of how crime control becomes intertwined with political legitimacy. Moving beyond conventional policy analysis, he demonstrates how states mobilize insecurity not only to justify coercive measures but to reshape the very logic of governance. By situating Ecuador’s militarized response within broader theoretical debates—from Bottoms and Garland to Simon’s “governing through crime”—the piece highlights how emergency discourse, symbolic action, and the construction of internal enemies converge to produce authority. Hernández’s analysis ultimately raises a critical question: when security becomes a political performance, what are the long-term costs for democratic institutions, rights, and accountability?

By Emilio Hernandez*

Security crises are rarely only about security. They are moments in which states redefine the boundaries of authority, recalibrate the balance between coercion and rights, and reconstruct their relationship with the public. In such contexts, crime ceases to be treated solely as a policy problem and becomes instead a central organizing principle of political action. The language of emergency, the visibility of force, and the promise of immediate control begin to shape not only how governments respond to violence, but also how they seek to be perceived. What emerges is not simply a shift in security policy, but a transformation in the political logic through which legitimacy is produced.

Ecuador provides a particularly illustrative case of these dynamics. Following a rapid deterioration of security conditions and the onset of a major crisis in early 2024, the government adopted a series of highly visible and coercive measures, including the militarization of public security, the expansion of punitive legal frameworks, and the articulation of a confrontational discourse centered on the identification of an internal enemy, often labeled as “terrorists” (Voss, 2024). 

These responses, while framed as necessary to restore order, also reconfigured the relationship between crime control and political authority. Rather than operating solely as instruments of crime control, these measures point toward a broader shift in governance, where punishment, coercion, and political communication converge. In this sense, Ecuador’s response can be understood as part of a wider turn toward punitive populism, in which the management of insecurity becomes inseparable from the construction of political legitimacy.

Punishment, Power, and the Politics of Insecurity

Moments of acute insecurity tend to reorganize the relationship between crime, politics, and state authority. In such contexts, criminality is no longer framed exclusively as a social problem to be addressed through technical or institutional responses. Instead, it becomes a central axis of political articulation, around which governments construct narratives of crisis, order, and control. As Jonathan Simon (2007) argues in his notion of “governing through crime,” crime increasingly operates as a framework through which political authority is exercised and communicated. A key feature of this transformation lies in the growing importance of visibility and immediacy. 

Political responses to insecurity are evaluated not only in terms of their effectiveness, but also in terms of their capacity to signal action, decisiveness, and control. As David Garland (2001) notes, contemporary crime control strategies are deeply embedded in a political logic that prioritizes responsiveness to public anxieties, often privileging symbolic action over expert-driven policy. In this sense, punitive measures acquire a dual function: they operate both as instruments of policy and as mechanisms of political communication.

It is at the intersection of crime control and political communication that the concept of punitive populism becomes analytically useful. Originally conceptualized by Anthony Bottoms (1995) and further developed by David Garland (2001) and John Pratt (2007), punitive populism refers to the political mobilization of crime and punishment in ways that appeal to public sentiment while expanding the scope and severity of penal intervention.

Crucially, as Elena Larrauri (2006) suggests, these dynamics are not merely a response to public demand but are actively shaped and amplified by political actors themselves. Under these conditions, the appeal of punitive action lies less in its long-term effectiveness than in its capacity to provide immediate reassurance and to align political authority with perceived public expectations. Punishment, in this sense, becomes not only a tool of control, but a central mechanism in the construction of political legitimacy.

From Crisis to Exception

Ecuador’s recent security crisis emerged from a rapid and profound transformation in patterns of violence, driven by the expansion and fragmentation of organized criminal groups, as well as the erosion of state control over key territories and prison systems. After years of relatively low levels of violence, homicide rates increased dramatically between 2020 and 2023, positioning the country among the most violent in the region (UNODC, 2023; Voss, 2024). This escalation culminated in early 2024 with a series of highly visible and coordinated events, including prison uprisings, attacks on public institutions, and the escape of a high-profile criminal leader, Adolfo Macías from a maximum-security prison, which exposed the limits of state capacity and intensified public perceptions of insecurity. 

The government’s response took the form of a series of exceptional measures that went beyond conventional crime control strategies. These included the formal declaration of an internal armed conflict, the expanded use of the military in domestic security roles, and the legal reclassification of criminal groups as terrorist organizations (International Crisis Group, 2025). 

At the same time, these policies were embedded within a broader transformation of legal frameworks and political discourse, in which insecurity was increasingly portrayed as an existential threat demanding immediate and decisive action. This approach has also relied heavily on the sustained use of emergency powers. According to the Ecuadorian Conflict Observatory (2025) some key provinces, including Guayas, Los Ríos, Manabí, and El Oro remained under states of exception for approximately 82% of the first two years of President Daniel Noboa’s administration, allowing the military to support policing functions while suspending certain constitutional protections.

Although these measures initially received broad public support and were associated with short-term reductions in violence, their longer-term impact has been more ambiguous. Levels of insecurity have remained persistently high, and in some cases have intensified, raising questions about the sustainability of this approach (International Crisis Group, 2025; Voss, 2026).

Reframing Crime as War

Crucially, these developments did not simply transform Ecuador’s security landscape; they redefined the political meaning of crime. The government’s framing of the crisis as an “internal armed conflict” marked a decisive shift from a criminal justice approach to a war-based logic of governance, in which crime is no longer treated as a social phenomenon but as an existential threat. This reframing enabled the expansion of executive power and the normalization of exceptional measures, while simultaneously constructing a clear moral boundary between “law-abiding citizens” and criminal actors, portrayed as enemies of the state. 

In this context, security policy became not only a tool for controlling violence but also a central mechanism for demonstrating political authority. The visibility of coercive action, including military deployment, mass arrests, and punitive reforms, served to signal decisiveness and control, reinforcing the government’s claim to legitimacy. Rather than being evaluated solely in terms of effectiveness, these measures functioned as political performances, aligning state authority with public demands for order and protection. As recent analyses suggest, the government’s “war on gangs” has struggled to produce sustained control, instead contributing to cycles of violence and instability (Dudley, 2025; Newton, 2026).

Mechanisms of Punitive Populism and Political Legitimacy

The Ecuadorian case shows that punitive populism operates through a set of mechanisms that translate insecurity into political authority. Rather than simply responding to crime, these mechanisms reshape how it is governed and communicated. First, crisis conditions enable the expansion of executive power. The declaration of an internal armed conflict facilitated the adoption of exceptional measures and the suspension of ordinary legal constraints, contributing to the normalization of emergency governance (Observatorio Ecuatoriano de Conflictos, 2025). 

Second, public security has become increasingly militarized. The deployment of the armed forces in domestic roles reinforces a war-based understanding of crime, privileging confrontation over institutional or preventive approaches. 

Third, political discourse constructs criminal actors as “internal enemies,” often labeled as terrorists. This framing simplifies complex dynamics into a moral binary, legitimizing punitive responses and aligning political authority with public fears (Pratt, 2007). 

Finally, punishment functions as a form of political communication. Visible and immediate measures, such as mass arrests and harsher penalties, signal control and decisiveness, often prioritizing symbolic impact over long-term effectiveness (Garland, 2001). These dynamics also carry heavy electoral implications. President Daniel Noboa’s re-election in 2025 occurred in a context shaped by sustained militarization and emergency governance, suggesting that punitive strategies can generate political legitimacy through visibility and immediacy.

Normalization of Emergency and the Costs of Punitive Governance

However, the expansion of punitive populism raises important concerns for democratic governance. Measures initially justified as temporary responses to crisis, such as states of exception and military involvement in policing, risk becoming normalized, blurring the line between extraordinary and ordinary rule. This process reshapes the balance between security and rights. When insecurity is framed as an existential threat, restrictions on due process and legal safeguards are more easily justified and publicly accepted. Over time, this can weaken institutional oversight and reduce the capacity of democratic systems to limit executive power. 

At the same time, reliance on punitive strategies as a source of legitimacy may narrow the space for alternative responses. Governments become incentivized to prioritize visible and immediate action over long-term institutional solutions, reinforcing a cycle in which political authority depends on the continued performance of control.

Ecuador’s recent crisis illustrates how insecurity can be transformed into a central mechanism of political governance. Punitive populism operates not only through policy, but through the visible exercise of authority and the construction of legitimacy. As similar dynamics emerge elsewhere, understanding how crime is politically mobilized becomes essential for assessing the future of democratic governance.

 

(*) Emilio Hernández is an Ecuadorian lawyer and PhD candidate in Criminology at Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Barcelona). His research focuses on punitive populism, criminal policy, and the relationship between security crises, political narratives, and justice systems.

 

References

Bottoms, A. (1995). “The philosophy and politics of punishment and sentencing.” In: C. Clarkson & R. Morgan (Eds.), The politics of sentencing reform (pp. 17–50). Clarendon Press.

Dudley, Steven. (2025). “How organized crime shaped the agenda of Ecuador’s presidential elections.” InSight Crime. February 5, 2025. https://insightcrime.org/news/organized-crime-agenda-ecuadors-presidential-elections/

Garland, D. (2001). The culture of control: Crime and social order in contemporary society. University of Chicago Press.

Newton, Christopher; Manjarrés, Juliana; Cavalari, Marina and Macías, Luis Felipe Villota. (2026). “2025 homicide round-up.” InSight Crime. March 11, 2026. https://insightcrime.org/news/insight-crime-2025-homicide-round-up/

International Crisis Group. (2025, November 12). Paradise lost? Ecuador’s battle with organised crime (Latin America Report No. 109). https://www.crisisgroup.org/rpt/latin-america-caribbean/ecuador/109-paradise-lost-ecuadors-battle-organised-crime

Larrauri, E. (2006). Populismo punitivo… y cómo resistirlo. Jueces para la Democracia, (55), 15–22.

Observatorio Ecuatoriano de Conflictos. (2025). Ecuador en llamas: Conflictividad y seguridad en Ecuador[Report]. https://www.llamasuce.com/_files/ugd/7c86d8_532216924def4fb8a8d7845c0609cd1f.pdf

Pratt, J. (2007). Penal populism. Routledge.

Simon, J. (2007). Governing through crime: How the war on crime transformed American democracy and created a culture of fear. Oxford University Press.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2023). Global study on homicide 2023. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/gsh/2023/Global_study_on_homicide_2023_web.pdf

Voss, Gavin. (2024) “Gamechangers 2024: Ecuador finds victory elusive in ‘war on gangs’.” InSight Crime.December 27, 2024. https://insightcrime.org/news/gamechangers-2024-ecuador-finds-victory-elusive-war-gangs/

Voss, Gavin. (2026). “From airstrikes to cooperation: Will the “new phase” of Ecuador’s drug war deliver?”InSight Crime. March 31, 2026.  https://insightcrime.org/news/airstrikes-cooperation-will-the-new-phase-of-ecuadors-drug-war-deliver/

Lagos, Waste, Nigeria.

Survival Populism: How Environmental Crisis Fuels Democratic Distrust in the Global South

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHome

In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja introduces the notion of “survival populism” to capture how environmental crisis and material insecurity are reshaping democratic politics in the Global South. Moving beyond conventional ideational approaches, the article foregrounds lived experiences of hardship—linking fuel price shocks, flooding, energy insecurity, and inflation to moral claims about fairness, state responsibility, and distributive justice. Through the case of Nigeria, Dr. Solaja demonstrates how climate-related disruptions and policy reforms converge to erode institutional trust and reconfigure political contestation. Rather than rejecting climate policy per se, citizens contest its unequal burdens. The article thus reframes democratic distress as rooted in distributive conflict, offering a compelling framework for understanding how ecological crisis fuels new forms of populist mobilization and legitimacy crises.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja*

In much of the Global South, the politics of survival and the politics of environmental crisis have become deeply intertwined. What were once distinct policy domains—the politics of fuel prices, flood mitigation, food inflation, waste accumulation, and energy insecurity—have converged into a single, lived experience of persistent hardship. For millions of citizens, the environmental crisis is not primarily defined by climate reports, international negotiations, or adaptation frameworks, but by submerged homes, rising transport costs, prolonged electricity outages, disrupted livelihoods, and escalating prices for basic goods.

Within such contexts of livelihood insecurity, ecological degradation takes on political meaning. Citizens come to see hardship not just as the result of misfortune or climatic fluctuation, but as an instance of unequal protection, institutional neglect and democratic distance. Under such conditions, public politics enters a new phase: a populism of survival emerges.

“Populism of survival” names a distinct mode of political interpretation that links environmental and economic distress to moral claims about state responsibility, fairness, and sacrifice. It departs from classical theories of populism by foregrounding the lived experience of hardship. Unlike the variants often associated with populist mobilizations in the Global North and East—typically structured around a binary opposition between “the people” and “the elite”—populism of survival is rooted in citizens’ experiences of material insecurity. Fuel becomes political when rising prices constrain mobility and limit access to basic goods; flooding becomes political when relief is inadequate or unevenly distributed; waste becomes political when its unequal management deepens social inequalities and disproportionately endangers already vulnerable populations.

In such contexts, public anger arises not only from opposition to environmental policy reforms but also from citizens’ everyday moral intuitions about who bears the costs of environmental disruption, who is required to pay, and who is protected. The relationship between climate policy and democratic legitimacy begins to erode when policies are perceived as non-distributive or unfair. Increasingly, the roots of climate populism lie in conflicts over how the costs and benefits of environmental transition are allocated. As Harrison (2025) observes, “across many settings, opposition to environmental reforms may stem not from a rejection of climate policies per se, but from opposition to the inequities of how their costs are distributed.”

An illustrative example of these dynamics can be found in Nigeria, where the government removed fuel subsidies in May 2023 and framed the resulting increase in fuel prices as a necessary macroeconomic adjustment. Public discourse surrounding the policy quickly became highly politicized, as rising fuel costs contributed to significant inflation and tightened household budgets. While state officials justified the reform in terms of fiscal discipline and economic rationalization, many citizens interpreted it through a moral lens: why should those at the bottom struggle to make ends meet while those with access to power remain insulated from such burdens? As Gbadebo (2025) argues, public responses to subsidy removal were shaped not only by the material consequences of economic hardship but also by concerns over governmental credibility and the plausibility of promised developmental outcomes.

These processes were intensified by other long-standing environmental and structural vulnerabilities and crises that now affected a wider portion of society than in past years. Following the floods that devastated numerous states—destroying livelihoods, homes, and arable lands—rising costs merged with food insecurity and frequent blackouts to form an inseparable social and ecological predicament. The state could no longer frame this predicament as exclusively “natural” or solely as the outcome of a natural disaster or poor market conditions. The experience was one of combined, cumulative crisis, and the credibility of the state in addressing such predicaments is tied to its performance on both fronts.

Flooding has, in particular, emerged as a major site of citizen dissatisfaction and a potent factor driving democratic distress. Displaced communities that have lost homes and productive capacity immediately feel cheated when the amount or distribution of government aid seems to reproduce and reinforce existing patterns of social inequality, and they begin to ask why state assistance appears uneven across communities and is not delivered to them preferentially. Climate policy has entered a phase in which state legitimacy is judged not solely in terms of its objectives or rationale, but also in terms of the effectiveness and fairness of its management of combined environmental and social threats.

Studies such as those by Okonkwo and Ezenwegbu (2024), which find that subsidy removal in Nigeria sparked significant concern among citizens who lacked a clear understanding of mitigation strategies or social protection, as well as analyses of the success and failure of fossil-fuel subsidy reform across various settings by Droste et al (2024), indicate that, when it comes to distributing the burdens of adjustment policies effectively, “technical argumentation alone has rarely been able to overcome such deeply seated mistrust.” The need for state institutions to earn citizens’ confidence through fairness, reciprocity, and demonstrable competence is therefore crucial in contexts with lower levels of public trust.

These issues are exacerbated in countries such as Nigeria, which suffer from chronic failures in infrastructure provision. Hussainzad and Gou (2024) show, for instance, that informality places the burden of adapting to ecological threats onto already existing socio-ecological inequalities. The populism of survival therefore cannot be interpreted solely as a product of irrational or ideological anti-state discourse, but as a request for a visible display of state competence. It requires public recognition from the state that it is aware of how these crises disproportionately affect ordinary citizens and is therefore prepared to demonstrate fairness and protection when such crises occur. 

It may or may not amount to explicitly anti-government discourse; but at its core, it expresses a demand for visibility. What citizens seek is not just state intervention, but a demonstration of its commitment to justice when addressing both economic pressures and the demands of adapting to the climate crisis. These developments are interpreted by populists as a crucial and opening field of study centered on real, survival-oriented daily experiences, rather than on the ideologies and leaders of state actors. The main dilemma for democratic governments in the coming decade will be less about acknowledging that an environmental crisis is underway than about fairly distributing the costs of confronting it.

 

References

Droste, N.; Chatterton, B. & Skovgaard, J. (2024). “A political economy theory of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in OECD countries.” Nature Communications, 15, 5452. 

Gbadebo, A. D. (2025). “The political economy of fuel subsidy removal: Governance and sustainable development in Nigeria.” Journal of Governance and Administrative Reform, 6(1), 1–18. 

Harrison, L. (2025). “Climate populism: the limits of the ideational and discursive approaches.” Environmental Politics, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2025.2591469

Hussainzad, E. A., & Gou, Z. (2024). “Climate risk and vulnerability assessment in informal settlements of the Global South: A critical review.” Land, 13(9), 1357. 

Okonkwo, A. E., & Ezenwegbu, J. C. (2024). “Removal of petrol subsidies and its impact for democratic governance in Nigeria.” Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science, 9(3), 38–47.

Gas-Nigeria

When Fuel Prices Turn Political: Trust, Climate Reform, and Everyday Populism in Nigeria

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHome

This commentary examines how fuel pricing in Nigeria has become a central site of democratic contestation, linking economic reform to everyday political experience. Drawing on recent scholarship, Dr. Oludele Solaja shows that the removal of fuel subsidies is interpreted less through macroeconomic logic than through lived realities—rising transport costs, food inflation, and declining purchasing power. In this context, fuel policy functions as a visible test of state credibility and fairness. The analysis highlights how “everyday populism” emerges as citizens frame reforms through moral distinctions between suffering publics and detached elites. Crucially, the study argues that climate and fiscal reforms cannot succeed without trust: where institutional credibility is weak, even economically rational policies risk generating political backlash and deepening democratic discontent.

Dr. Oludele Solaja*

In Nigeria, fuel isn’t simply a commodity but perhaps one of the most immediate points through which Nigerians engage with the state. Changes at the pump influence transport prices, the distribution of food, the nature of informal work, substitutes to electricity, household coping mechanisms. Any significant change at the pump is rapidly translated through market and commuters’ routes, domestic budgets, turning fiscal policy into political experience. Consequently, fuel pricing has evolved into perhaps the most visible site of democratic validation and of state-society trust (Gbadebo, 2025; Okonkwo & Ezenwegbu, 2024). 

The lifting of a long-standing petrol subsidy as part of recent reforms re-ignited an ever recurrent and sensitive national debate around governance, fairness and burden-sharing. The declared rationale for subsidy removal was correction of unsustainable fiscal spending, drain on public finances and constraint on welfare and infrastructure investment (Gbadebo, 2025). Nevertheless, macroeconomic rationales never fully determine political meaning. In the view of many Nigerians, what is primarily being assessed in post subsidy withdrawal policy aren’t ratios in macro-economic indicators, but transport fare hikes, food price volatility, diminishing purchasing power and pervasive uncertainty; studies found mitigation measures to be inadequate and unevenly distributed, which compounded distrust in the government (Gbadebo, 2025; Okonkwo & Ezenwegbu, 2024). 

This dilemma reveals the more important sociological aspect of the problem: economic reform easily gains political meaning in fragile trust situation. Populism is not merely about elite discourse or electoral tactics, but also everyday interpretation where citizens divide the social world along the moral lines of “normal citizens in suffering” and “detached politicians.” Petrol pricing is one aspect where it comes into the citizen vocabulary as its impact is immediate, transparent, and social inequal (Yang et al., 2021; Moerenhout et al., 2021). Rather than seeing it as the market correction, for many citizens the rising of petrol price is viewed as an indication of their anxieties over issues of justice, elite benefit and the credibility of the state. 

Public conversations often return to questions such as: Why must austerity begin with ordinary households? Why do reforms demand sacrifice where visible political restraint appears limited? These questions contribute to what may be called everyday environmental populism — a form of public meaning‑making in which environmental and economic reforms are judged through moral experiences of inequality and institutional betrayal (Gbadebo, 2025). While classic fuel subsidy literature focuses on economic costs and distributional effects, political economy research highlights that reform success depends on public trust and the social contract between state and citizens (Yang et al., 2021). 

The contradiction is clear: long‑term fiscal rationality collides with short‑term social hardship. In principle, subsidy removal may improve efficiency and reduce distortions in consumption. But in an unequal society with fragile institutional credibility, citizens encounter “energy transition” through transport costs, generator fuel, food inflation, and daily mobility (Esekpa, 2024). 

Within an urban environment, such as Lagos, rises in fuel price can rapidly influence commuter patterns, market costs and flow of informal economy money. In peri-urban and rural settings electricity is already unreliable, with generators being extensively used. Here price of fuel is likely to define the profitability of a micro business. In a local study within Nigeria, increases in fuel price are seen to correlate with economic suffering and an increase in the cost of living, therefore reinforcing the public opinion that the burden of reforms is primarily on the common man (Abaddah, 2025). 

This explains why trust becomes central to policy legitimacy. Historical memory matters: earlier reforms were often accompanied by promises of safety nets, infrastructure improvements, or welfare expansions that many citizens believe were never fully realized. Consequently, new fuel adjustments are interpreted not in isolation but against accumulated experiences of unfulfilled government commitments and governance shortfalls (Okonkwo & Ezenwegbu, 2024). 

Public reactions in both formal surveys and public commentary reflect this complex interpretation. A nationally representative household study finds that opposition to fuel subsidy reform is strongly linked with beliefs about government corruption and capacity to deliver compensatory programs; respondents were more likely to support reform only where they believed in transparent governance and effective social protection (Yang et al., 2021). 

There is also a profound communication gap in Nigerian fuel governance. Policy announcements often emphasize fiscal necessity while underestimating how reforms are emotionally and morally received. Citizens rarely oppose reform simply because they reject technical economics; rather, they resist because they doubt institutional fairness. This creates fertile ground for populist framing and political contestation around trust and governance (Gbadebo, 2025; Yang et al., 2021). 

The political symbolism is intensified by Nigeria’s oil‑dependent identity. In a major oil‑producing country, public expectations remain shaped by the belief that resource wealth should translate into broad social benefit. When hardship deepens in an oil-rich economy, citizens often interpret such contradictions politically. Research on global subsidies also shows that fuel subsidy reforms often generate political controversy where institutional quality is low and trust weak (Droste et al., 2024). 

While some assessments confirm that reducing subsidies can yield macroeconomic benefits, these gains do not automatically produce democratic legitimacy where hardship expands faster than visible welfare delivery. The result is a politics of resentment, where state actions are judged through everyday experiences of inequality rather than abstract fiscal reasoning (Gbadebo, 2025). For this reason, fuel policy should be understood not merely as economic reform but as democratic communication. The challenge is not only whether subsidy should exist, but whether citizens can trust that reform burdens are socially shared, publicly justified, and institutions remain accountable (Yang et al., 2021). 

This is where Nigeria’s climate politics becomes especially instructive. The democratic sustainability transition in developing democracies can no longer be carried out through technocratic sequencing. It will demand overt distribution, convincing social protection and credible assurance that burdens are not unilateral (Gbadebo, 2025). Fuel becomes politicized in the sense that it encapsulates a variety of societal fears including inequalities, citizenship, institutional trust and the moral narrative of the state itself. Therefore, the sociology of petrol prices illustrates how the politics of environment is evaluated by “the governed,” in relation to everyday politics of trust, fairness and public meaning (Yang et al., 2021; Esekpa, 2024). 

The lesson here is stark: climate and fiscal reforms implemented without democratic trust are politically dangerous, even when economically defensible. For the citizen in Nigeria asks the basic and obvious question of who bears the cost, who reaps the reward, and to whom should believe (Gbadebo, 2025; Okonkwo & Ezenwegbu, 2024).

 

(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is an Environmental Sociologist and Developmental Scholar based in Olabisi Onabanjo University, Nigeria. His research focuses on environmental governance, climate policy, and everyday political populism in African contexts. He is a Nonresident Research Fellow at the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) and has published extensively on climate governance, citizen trust, and socio-political interpretations of environmental reforms. 

 

References

Abaddah, G. A. (2025). Effect of fuel subsidy removal on the Nigerian economy: Implications for households in Nigeria. BIMA Journal. https://journal.pdmbengkulu.org/index.php/bima/article/view/1984

Droste, N., Chatterton, B., & Skovgaard, J. (2024). A political economy theory of fossil fuel subsidy reforms in OECD countries. Nature Communications, 15, 5452. https://www.nature.com/articles/s41467-024-49835-4

Esekpa, O. I., Ekarika, W. A., & Njama, G. J. (2024). Economic implications of fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria: Challenges and prospects. Journal of Public Administration, Policy and Governance Research.https://jpapgr.com/index.php/research/article/view/131

Gbadebo, A. D. (2025). The political economy of fuel subsidy removal: Governance and sustainable development in Nigeria. Journal of Social Political Sciences, 6(3), 206–224. https://doaj.org/article/e97ce91a0aff459a9106ff8fc6cff551

Okonkwo, A. E., & Ezenwegbu, J. C. (2024). Removal of petrol subsidies and its impact on democratic governance in Nigeria. Nnamdi Azikiwe Journal of Political Science, 9(3), 38–47. https://najops.org.ng/index.php/najops/article/view/267

Yang, J., Moerenhout, T., & others. (2021). Fuel subsidy reform and the social contract in Nigeria: A micro‑economic analysis. Energy Policy, 156, 112336. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421521002068

People walk along a flooded road after heavy rain in Lagos, Nigeria.

When Floods Become Political: Disaster Relief, Democratic Trust, and Everyday Environmental Populism in Nigeria

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHome

In this insightful commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja reconceptualizes recurrent flooding in Nigeria as a site of political contestation rather than merely an environmental crisis. Introducing the concept of “everyday environmental populism,” the piece shows how lived experiences of disaster, unequal relief, and institutional failure generate bottom-up political claims that reshape democratic trust. Drawing on case studies from Delta, Anambra, and Niger states, the analysis demonstrates how citizens’ responses—from grassroots mobilization to digital dissent—reconfigure perceptions of state legitimacy. Situated at the intersection of environmental governance and populism studies, this commentary advances a novel framework for understanding how climate-related risks can catalyze political agency and redefine state–society relations in vulnerable democracies.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja

In Nigeria, recurring floods have moved beyond being environmental disaster to become political events that shape relations between citizens and states and influence democratic trust. In the context of recent floods and uneven relief, this commentary introduces a new political concept-everyday environmental populism-to conceptualize citizens’ bottom-up political claims rooted in everyday experience of environmental hazards, institutional inadequacies, and inequitable disaster relief delivery. 

In contrast to elite-driven claims, everyday environmental populism emerges from lived experiences of vulnerability in the face of environmental disasters and from citizen-centered complaints about institutional shortcomings, which in turn generate bottom-up political dynamics. The states of Delta, Anambra, and Niger provide illustrative case studies, showing how floods stimulate civic engagement, trigger institutional critique, and reshape popular evaluations of state legitimacy. 

Situated within the broader frameworks of environmental governance, climate security, and democratic legitimacy, this commentary argues that flood disasters are transformative political events that generate bottom-up agency in Nigeria. It also discusses the implications for policy and academia, as well as for community-led resilience in environmentally vulnerable contexts.

Conceptualizing Everyday Environmental Populism

In Nigeria, devastating floods recur, with the 2022 floods alone displacing more than 1.4 million people and wreaking widespread damage to infrastructure, livelihood and housing (Agbiboa, 2024; Solaja et al., 2020). More than mere destruction, they represent the confluence of environmental hazard and political accountability. Political response—how it is delivered, and how resources and infrastructure are distributed and allocated—serves as a barometer of the state’s democratic legitimacy. Existing research has already linked environmental hazards such as recurrent floods to public critique, collective agency, and political attitudes (Obatunde, Akanle, & Solaja, 2025; Barnett, 2001; Dalby, 2013).

Populism research has generally focused on elite-led constructions opposing “the people” to “the elite” (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Extending this tradition, the concept of everyday environmental populism is introduced here as “citizens’ collective understanding and articulation of political claims shaped by their experiences and interpretations of environmental risk, disaster-relief inequalities, and institutional failures” (Solaja et al., 2020; Solaja, 2025). While elite populism is framed against political actors/elites, the idea of everyday environmental populism foregrounds ordinary citizens whose everyday experiences of vulnerability lead to complaints and grassroots political action which then fuels the distrust against political figures.

This conception centers on the agency of citizens, as they challenge the political status quo, express their expectations for accountable and equitable disaster responses and seek state actions beyond the traditional structures of politics (Obadare, 2020; Solaja, 2025).

Figure 1: Everyday Environmental Populism: How Flood Catches Political Capital.

This diagram illustrates how floods trigger citizens’ responses and shape political opinions, ultimately influencing levels of public trust in the state and in its policy formulation.

Floods and Democratic Trust in Nigeria

Repeated floods expose critical failings in Nigeria’s disaster response and governance structures, thereby politicizing environmental disasters (Adebayo, 2018; Agbiboa, 2024). More broadly, the scale of such disasters can undermine citizens’ confidence in political institutions (Barnett, 2001; Dalby, 2013). 

In Nigeria, successive floods have consistently triggered similar public reactions, as affected citizens cope with material losses while evaluating the adequacy of government responses. When state intervention is inconsistent, delayed, or inequitable, declining democratic trust leads citizens to rely on community-based assistance or to express dissent through social media, public meetings, and civil society organizations (Solaja et al., 2020; Solaja, 2025). Even prior to state involvement, citizens often self-organize, cultivating forms of autonomous political agency that can, in turn, shape public perceptions of state legitimacy (Obatunde, Akanle, & Solaja, 2025).

Citizens’ Response and Political Opinion

As illustrated in Figure 1, community mobilization in the initial stages of a flood event constitutes the foundation of everyday environmental populism, as citizen-led relief and response processes shape public political opinion and perceptions of the state’s democratic credentials. Grassroots relief initiatives often emerge in response to the absence or inadequacy of state intervention. In flood-affected areas, community leaders frequently assume responsibility for organizing shelters, disseminating alerts, and mobilizing local volunteers to assist victims, thereby demonstrating forms of self-reliance in disaster management (Solaja et al., 2020; Solaja, 2025).

These actions are inherently political, as they prompt evaluations of state responsiveness, challenge governmental priorities, and articulate demands for accountability. The internet serves as a platform where individual grievances coalesce into collective claims, transforming environmental crises into indicators of trust in the democratic system. In this sense, they exemplify everyday environmental populism, with citizens initiating forms of political mobilization from below (Obadare, 2020; Solaja, 2025).

Policy and Governance Challenges

It is crucial to address floods as political problems requiring preventive, equitable, and citizen-oriented governance. Such response mechanisms should include robust early warning systems, as well as transparent processes for the disbursement of funds and the allocation of resources to affected communities (International Rescue Committee & EU, 2025; Barnett, 2001; Solaja et al., 2020). Neglecting governance dimensions of disaster risk management fuels citizen distrust and intensifies public discontent. Conversely, equitable relief and fair governance can reinforce the legitimacy of democratic institutions (Dalby, 2013; Solaja, 2025).

Scholarly and Theoretical Contribution

The contribution of this commentary to populism studies and environmental governance lies in framing environmental disasters as triggers of political contestation. Through the concept of everyday environmental populism, it argues that lived experiences of disaster—driven by environmental threats—can empower citizens with the agency to resist injustice and challenge governmental actions (Solaja et al., 2020; Obadare, 2020).

The concept calls for further research into how environmental hazards shape citizens’ political attitudes and how such bottom-up agency influences the democratic legitimacy of state structures. Beyond political dynamics, it also intersects with debates on sustainability and the circular economy, opening new avenues for community-based initiatives—such as recycling plastic into productive materials through projects like EcoBalls and other entrepreneurial models (Solaja, 2025).

Conclusion: Politics in the Water

Floods are not merely natural disasters; in Nigeria, they constitute defining political events that shape the relationship between the state and its citizens, as well as perceptions of governmental legitimacy and responsiveness. The way citizens interpret state responses influences their assessment of whether democratic governance can deliver efficient, accountable services and provide support in times of crisis. Everyday environmental populism offers a useful framework for understanding these dynamics, highlighting how citizens’ responses are shaped by their exposure to environmental threats and by perceived inadequacies in governmental management (Solaja et al., 2020; Obadare, 2020).

There is a need to strengthen anticipatory governance, integrate citizen participation into flood management, and ensure that relief resources reach affected communities without being filtered through partisan interests. From an academic perspective, more extensive research is required to examine the political impacts of environmental hazards on mobilization, citizenship, and the pursuit of democratic accountability in flood-prone societies worldwide (Solaja et al., 2020; Obadare, 2020; Barnett, 2001).

 

References

Adebayo, B. (2018). “Nigeria overtakes India in extreme poverty ranking.” CNN.

Agbiboa, D. E. (2024). “Deep waters: Flooding and the climate of suffering in Nigeria.” PS: Political Science & Politics.

Barnett, J. (2001). The meaning of environmental security: Ecological politics and the United Nations. London: Zed Books.

Dalby, S. (2013). “Climate change and the security state: Critical perspectives.” Security Dialogue, 44(3), 191–206. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967010613481291

International Rescue Committee & EU. (2025). Strengthening flood preparedness in Nigeria.

Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

Obadare, E. (2020). Everyday politics in Africa: Publics, grievances, and popular engagement. Cambridge University Press.

Obatunde, B. A., Akanle, O., & Solaja, O. M. et al. (2025). “Doing sociology in Nigeria.” International Journal of Sociology, 16(1), 14–26. https://doi.org/10.13169/ijs.16.1.0014

Solaja, M.O., Awobona S., & Adekanbi, O.O. (2020). “Knowledge and practice of recycled plastic bottles (RPB) built homes for sustainable community-based housing projects in Nigeria.” Cogent Social Sciences, 6(1), 1778914. https://doi.org/10.1080/23311886.2020.1778914

Solaja, O.M. (2025). “EcoBall as a sport-based intervention for community engagement, behavioural change, and sustainable solutions to plastic pollution.” Discovery Environment, 3, 186. https://doi.org/10.1007/s44274-025-00347-y

Young African girl.

Algorithmic Environmental Populism and the Digital Politics of Waste in Africa

by CommentariesDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHome

Dr. Oludele Solaja’s analysis introduces the concept of “Algorithmic Environmental Populism” to illuminate how digital platforms are reshaping the politics of waste across African cities. Moving beyond conventional policy-centered approaches, Dr. Solaja demonstrates how environmental degradation—from plastic pollution to urban flooding—has become a site of algorithmically mediated political contestation. In this emerging landscape, complex ecological crises are reframed into morally charged narratives of blame, privileging visibility, outrage, and immediacy over systemic understanding. By linking populism theory with digital governance and environmental politics, the article offers a novel framework for understanding how platform logics transform ecological grievances into potent political forces. It is an essential contribution to debates on populism, digital media, and environmental governance in the Global South.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja

Environmental politics is now occurring not only at policy and infrastructure levels, but also through algorithms—from the clogged drains of Lagos to flood-prone Accra to landfills in South Africa. Environmental degradation has become a politically charged phenomenon on social media, and the sensational, outrage-driven, and immediate nature of these platforms has created an environment where narratives of blame outpace formal, institutional action. I refer to this new phenomenon as Algorithmic Environmental Populism, and I argue that digital infrastructure has become paramount in the formation, circulation, and contestation of ecological grievances.

The environmental crisis is no longer merely a management problem but a digitally mediated political language across the African continent, in which grievance, blame, and claims to power or moral legitimacy are performed. Plastic pollution, floods, burning dumpsites, and informal recycling have entered platform ecologies within which, according to a range of criteria, the most intense, visible, and confrontational content receives algorithmic attention. From this combination emerges a condition in which the environmental crisis is abstracted from complex systemic causes and reframed as a direct moral confrontation between “the people” and villains: polluters, corrupt elites, those who ship waste to Africa, and absent governments. In this process, platform algorithms prioritize the most engaging framing rather than the most policy-relevant one (Zeng & Schfer, 2023; Heidenreich et al., 2022).

The concept offers a way of extending understandings of populism and digital media, by foregrounding the environmental as a key site of algorithmically mediated political struggle. Classical theory on populism deals with the ideological construction of ‘the people’ and ‘the elite,’ while the infrastructures through which populist rhetoric is dispersed have been historically overlooked. Algorithmic Environmental Populism instead draws focus to platform logics, showing how they shape the contours and narratives of ecological complaint. By this it builds on research on algorithmic governance, the increasing role of algorithms in policy perception and the legitimacy of state power (Parthasarathy & Rajala, 2023).

In African cities the role of algorithms in producing a political context for waste is further amplified by its material presence on everyday life. Clogged drains, plastic-choked lagoons, burning dump sites and litter, produces and feeds readily available data streams, which produce, or a “condition of constant possibility” for data to be recorded and transmitted, resulting in environmental breakdown becoming rapidly politicisable. Take, for example, Nigeria. When the Lagos State government implemented restrictions on single-use plastics in 2025, environmental considerations took a back seat to narratives of bias, and selective policy enforcement. Viral image of floodwater pouring through plastic-clogged drains fed accusatory commentary that blamed the state, turning environmental degradation into a performance of political betrayal. 

Although it is true that a massive volume of plastic waste is annually dumped in Lagos State, these digital conversations tend to flatten the systems behind environmental degradation into morally legible pronouncements of blame and victimhood, which are amplified in the digital domain for emotional impact, rather than for systemic nuance (Couldry & Mejias, 2023). 

The significance of such arguments for politics in Africa is that these stories become diagnostically central. In such cases, a multiple-layered system of production, consumption, municipal service provision and global trade are collapsed into stark oppositional narratives because it is the only way in which environmental problems can be successfully broadcast within an algorithmic environment, where visibility takes priority over complexity. As digital media research shows, what gets amplified is content that triggers reactions: outrage, pity, and the assignment of blame. 

Similarly, we can observe this in Kenya where political activism is closely tied to moral pronouncements. Though debates exist surrounding extended producer responsibility, green economy initiatives, and refill systems; their manifestation in the digital space, in an effort to capture attention and elicit reaction, tends to focus on “blame-allocation” rather than the mechanics of institutional responsibility between citizens, corporations, and the state. Floods in Kenya’s urban centers of Nairobi and Mombasa provided highly visual and charged contexts to exacerbate these dynamics, producing further blame-oriented discourse regarding governmental incompetence and the inadequacy of infrastructure. In essence, the digitally mediated form of this political problem is not merely transmitting it; it is actively transforming it.

Another significant dimension of the digital landscape is how it also creates new forms of political subjectivity. Waste pickers and scavengers, once entirely invisible components of the informal city, are now visible. They challenge their invisibility through interventions in the digital domain, attempting to recover material flows and claim their political agency. They are now recognized as integral parts of urban recycling systems, while remaining ignored in the policy sphere (Njeru & Ochieng, 2025). Their visibility can be attributed to algorithms that amplify their stories, portraying them as overlooked labor fighting back against systemic neglect. Locally based actions, such as coastal clean-ups by youth groups in Kenya, become symbolical performances. The clean-up has the effect of politicizing the environment, either as an assertion of the citizen’s responsibility, as an attack on state incompetence or as a demonstration of collaborative effort. Environmental activism is transformed into a moral battlefield on the digital platform.

In South Africa we see a similar phenomenon of politically charged, algorithmically amplified resistance to landfill expansion and waste siting decisions. In 2026 protests against landfill development in urban periphery settlements, turned into a national narrative of social and environmental injustice through media mobilization; landfill as a continuance of structural violence through spatial inequalities. The discourse produced and amplified across the networks links contemporary exposure to historical environmental inequities through these landfill developments. Here Algorithmic Environmental Populism and environmental justice are closely interwoven, as the narratives attributed to technology and its governance are interpreted through morally loaded systems of victimhood and violence. The broader implications of Algorithmic Environmental Populism in Africa are that the histories of unequally mediated ecological flows, including plastics, second-hand goods and e-waste that flow into African cities and homes as waste from global consumption and production patterns. Such stories tend to produce a framing where the external imposition of blame arises from deeper historical conditions known as waste colonialism – an unequal world where states and their inhabitants bear uneven burdens of waste (Mah, 2024; Dauvergne, 2022).

This links directly into concepts of waste sovereignty – a state of ownership and control over material waste flows, their meanings and governance. In the digital space, sovereignty can now be enacted through the control of narrative. Those able to frame environmental crises in terms of simple, easily accessible, morally legible oppositions, are gaining political ground regardless of their technical knowledge. Environmental politics of waste is no longer a question of physical waste, or of policy-makers’ actions, but increasingly a matter of the visibility of what it is that matters and to whom it matters, a battle of recognition, and control, within platform governed space. 

Therefore, I suggest a three-stage process of digitally mediated waste politics: first, visible urban environmental decay; second, morally legible frames of attribution; and third, algorithmically favored amplification. It is in these stages that complexity is simplified and environmental disaster turns into visible, and therefore governable, political matter.

A certain democratizing aspect is that it allows for participation on new grounds, where citizens, informal waste workers and activist groups can join in debates around the environment on the internet. The downside is that these systems allow for a contraction of discourse: immediate visibility takes the form of sensation and outrage over deliberative engagement, bringing together political mobilization and propaganda (Heidenreich et al., 2022). Consequently, the environment has begun to be spoken of in conflicting terms: critical discourse clashes with simplified frameworks of accusation. A street in Accra that floods, or a dirty drainage canal in Kenya, or a burning landfill in South Africa, are instantly turned into evidence against the state, corporations, or the global system, obscuring underlying complexities.

This new discourse dynamic has major implications for environmental governance. Effectiveness is no longer solely about design and capacity but also about how environmental policies are understood, accepted, and engaged with on line. Municipalities and governments, as well as non-profit organizations need to operate in the digital space to manage the material and political aspects of waste. Scholars of environmental data governance agree that algorithms are key in framing environmental information (Gabrys, 2023). This is also significant for populist politics; waste cannot continue to be seen as an auxiliary or an afterthought. Instead, it has to be seen as a key component of the negotiations around citizenship, inequality, sovereignty and state power; the material traces of society that make social tensions visible and open to struggle. Algorithmic Environmental Populism provides an explanatory frame that connects environmental governance, digital media, and populist politics together, and helps to make sense of the way ecological grievance can be translated into potent political force by means of technologically managed visibility.

In short, the environmental politics of waste in Africa is no longer solely regulated by state and international institutions; its regulation is also about what becomes visible and how, within the spaces that platform logics control. What is now at stake is how we see waste, what we make of it in the discourse we construct, and the meaning that it is given within our digitally mediated attention economies. This transformation is an emblem of a broader shift: authority is no longer held by those who convene political discussions in spaces that are free from the influence of amplification. The management of waste, therefore, involves managing its meaning, a task that in the digital age depends greatly on the very politics of platforms.

 

References

Couldry, N. & Mejias, U. A. (2023). “Data colonialism and the future of social order.” New Media & Society, 25(4), 945–962.

Dauvergne, P. (2022). “Waste, pollution, and the global plastic crisis.” Global Environmental Politics, 22(1), 1–10.

Gabrys, J. (2023). “Digital waste and environmental data politics.” Information, Communication & Society, 26(9), 1785–1801.

Heidenreich, T., et al. (2022). “Populism and digital media: A comparative perspective.” Political Communication, 39(3), 345–362.

Mah, A. (2024). “Waste colonialism and global inequality.” Nature Sustainability, 7(1), 12–15.

Njeru, J. & Ochieng, C. (2025). “Plastic waste governance and informal economies in Africa.” Environmental Politics, 34(2), 256–275.

Parthasarathy, S. & Rajala, R. (2023). “Algorithmic governance and environmental policy.” Regulation & Governance, 17(4), 987–1003.

Zeng, J. & Schäfer, M. S. (2023). “Conceptualizing algorithmic populism.” New Media & Society, 25(8), 2015–2032.

Plastic waste dumping site on Thilafushi Island.

Algorithmic Populism and the Politics of Waste: How AI Reproduces Plastic Colonialism in the Global South

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHome

In this incisive analysis, Dr. Oludele Solaja interrogates how AI-driven waste governance reproduces global inequalities under the guise of efficiency. Introducing the concept of “algorithmic populism,” the article reveals how technocratic systems, framed as serving the public good, instead concentrate power within elite infrastructures while marginalizing affected communities. Through empirical insights on global plastic flows and case evidence from Nigeria, the article demonstrates how optimization logics perpetuate “plastic colonialism.” It calls for transparency, participatory design, and updated regulatory frameworks to prevent algorithmic governance from entrenching environmental injustice.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja

Even though the world was debating about a new global plastic treaty and big multinational companies were developing intelligent AI systems for managing worldwide recycling, nothing actually changed the status quo. The Global South remained the global repository for the world’s plastic waste. Far from being an outcome of ignorance or incompetence, the logic behind this persistent pattern of global environmental injustice could be explained by concepts of algorithmic populism. Algorithms designed to optimize global waste flows were simultaneously creating new forms of global environmental governance that duplicated existing power hierarchies, while ostensibly addressing a global waste crisis (Dauvergne, 2018; Brooks et al., 2018; Vinuesa et al., 2020). Algorithmic optimization, not the solution to our waste crisis, increasingly served as the vehicle for reproduction of the system of plastic colonialism in digitally encoded form.

This problem is conceptualized here by the idea of algorithmic populism. Following Mudde’s influential definition of populism as a moralized political logic that differentiates between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017), algorithmic populism suggests the new logic of governance through which algorithmic systems are promoted as apolitical tools of expertise serving the ‘people,’ yet control and authority are increasingly concentrated within a small technocratic elite (Beer, 2017; Pasquale, 2015). Within this regime of technocratic management, ‘the people’ have been transformed into data points managed through complex computational infrastructure created and controlled by corporate and institutional entities. This structure of governance presents a facade of democratic and technical efficiency while obscuring significant inequalities in the application of decision-making authority.

This pattern reflects a wider contemporary mode of governance. As Michel Foucault noted (1980), modern power structures are built through the creation of regimes of knowledge through which what can be known and what constitutes rational and efficient behavior are determined. Within the sphere of waste governance, algorithmic systems increasingly produce their own authoritative ‘truths’ about the destinations, treatment processes and the comparative economic efficiencies of exporting or receiving waste. These truths, however, are socially embedded, shaped by a global economy in which cost efficiency may easily override concerns about environmental justice (Kitchin, 2017; Pasquale, 2015). Optimization therefore perpetuates, rather than ameliorates, patterns of global inequality.

An example of this dynamic can be observed in patterns of the global plastic waste trade. Despite international regulations such as the Basel Convention high-income countries continued to export large amounts of plastic waste into countries with limited environmental regulations (Jambeck et al., 2015; Geyer et al., 2017). When China banned imports of plastic waste in 2018, global waste flows rerouted themselves to Southeast Asia and parts of Africa, now managed through an array of global optimization, tracking and tracing algorithms that help to streamline and automate logistical operations (Brooks et al., 2018). Optimization algorithms identifying cheap destinations also naturally target locations with weaker regulatory institutions and environmental controls, typically those in the Global South.

The waste trade in Nigeria provides a clear example of this pattern. Nigeria is one of Africa’s most populous nations and one of the continent’s largest consumer markets; the nation has long faced an overwhelming plastic waste problem and is a destination country for enormous quantities of plastic waste generated both within its own borders and abroad (Dauvergne, 2018). The overwhelming majority of the informal waste picking sector in Lagos operates as an unofficial but fundamental component of waste management systems, where pickers sift through landfills and waterways for materials to recycle under dangerous and precariously employed conditions, and these workers remain completely outside decision-making circles regarding new forms of smart and algorithmic waste management (Beer, 2017; Heeks, 2022). Tools and applications developed in distant corporate and institutional settings serve to create a system of waste management that fails to account for the conditions that workers face at local sites of accumulation.

This exclusion is a manifestation of the contradictions inherent in algorithmic populism. In fact, where algorithmic governance is supposed to create more democratic forms of participation, it often works to obscure power asymmetries and lack of participation; indeed, many contemporary populist movements draw power from precisely the perception of exclusion and lack of voice, a problem increasingly amplified in the digital space (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Environmental policy, for instance, increasingly relies on information systems and models that make decision-making opaque to even its most implicated stakeholders (Pasquale, 2015; Kitchin, 2017). As such, efficient algorithmic logic may ultimately consolidate rather than alleviate environmental injustices.

The popular circular economy model is itself a perfect illustration of this contradiction; it seeks to build a system of material flows that aims to minimize waste but ends up facilitating global waste flows through optimized systems that reproduce traditional economic and political hierarchies. As has been shown above, this circular logic simply becomes a circular illusion whereby waste continues to circulate globally in the context of unequal power relations, ultimately continuing to accumulate in the countries with weaker environmental and political infrastructure (Vinuesa et al., 2020; Dauvergne, 2018).

This difference is striking when comparing how these technologies are often experienced in different parts of the world. In Europe, AI applications in waste management are presented as “green” technological innovations, part of broader goals for climate-compatible resource consumption; in many parts of Africa, they function to exacerbate waste problems, through the continued accumulation of waste in landfills and waterscapes and increased precarious work in the informal sector (Brooks et al., 2018). Cost efficiency trumped local realities and environmental justice outcomes in Europe, while for Africa continued accumulation resulted in increased environmental degradation and precarity.

This isn’t just about failing to adequately represent the people; algorithmic populism actively digitizes populism itself. What could and should be debated as political issues around the global distribution of waste, through the processes of debate and consensus-building, are reframed and regulated as technical problems solvable through expert-driven algorithmic intervention, de-politicizing them in the process, and ushering in new forms of technocratic rule (Beer, 2017; Pasquale, 2015). Without checks on their operation, optimization-driven technologies risk legitimating environmental inequality.

There are number of solutions required to solve this problem. First, algorithmic transparency should be a central pillar of future governance of waste. Public access should be required to the decision-making logic behind algorithmic choices, including the factors used to identify destinations for waste streams (Kitchin, 2017; Vinuesa et al., 2020). Second, participatory models should be part of future design and deployment of technology systems. Waste pickers in Nigeria, for example, possess unique on-the-ground knowledge of the complex political and environmental ecology of waste that can help to create truly ‘smart’ systems that are ‘fairly smart’ and beneficial to local contexts (Beer, 2017; Heeks, 2022). Third, international governance frameworks need to adapt to address the reality of algorithmic infrastructure as a central force in shaping the contemporary global waste trade. 

Existing conventions that regulate waste flows were written prior to the rise of algorithmic systems, and new regulations and standards must be devised in order to guarantee fairness, accountability and environmental justice in technological governance (Pasquale, 2015; Vinuesa et al., 2020). Lastly, environmental technology governance needs to be de-politicized: algorithmic tools must be reconceptualized not as ‘solutions,’ but as socio-technical systems implicated in patterns of power and exclusion (Foucault, 1980). In the absence of such measures, algorithmic governance may become the ultimate tool for disguising environmental inequality as technological progress.

In conclusion, algorithmic populism reveals how ostensibly neutral technologies can entrench, rather than resolve, global inequalities. By depoliticizing waste governance and privileging efficiency over justice, AI systems risk reproducing plastic colonialism in digital form. Meaningful reform therefore requires transparency, participatory inclusion, and updated global regulatory frameworks. Without such interventions, algorithmic governance will continue to legitimize unequal environmental burdens while masking them as technical necessity and progress.

 

References

Beer, D. (2017). “The social power of algorithms.” Information, Communication & Society, 20(1), 1–13.

Brooks, A. L.; Wang, S. & Jambeck, J. R. (2018). “The Chinese import ban and its impact on global plastic waste trade.” Science Advances, 4(6), eaat0131.

Dauvergne, P. (2018). “Why is the global governance of plastic failing the oceans?” Global Environmental Change, 51, 22–31.

Foucault, M. (1980). Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977. Pantheon Books.

Geyer, R.; Jambeck, J. R. & Law, K. L. (2017). “Production, use, and fate of all plastics ever made.” Science Advances, 3(7), e1700782.

Heeks, R. (2022). “Artificial intelligence for sustainable development: The new frontier.” Development Informatics Working Paper Series, University of Manchester.

Jambeck, J. R.; Geyer, R.; Wilcox, C.; Siegler, T. R.; Perryman, M.; Andrady, A.; Narayan, R. & Law, K. L. (2015). “Plastic waste inputs from land into the ocean.” Science, 347(6223), 768–771.

Kitchin, R. (2017). “Thinking critically about and researching algorithms.” Information, Communication & Society, 20(1), 14–29.

Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563.

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Pasquale, F. (2015). The black box society: The secret algorithms that control money and information. Harvard University Press.

Vinuesa, R.; Azizpour, H.; Leite, I.; Balaam, M.; Dignum, V.; Domisch, S. & Fuso Nerini, F. (2020). “The role of artificial intelligence in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.” Nature Communications, 11, 233.

Young African woman carrying water.

Climate Populism in the Global South: Environmental Crisis and the Politics of Economic Discontent

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHome

Environmental crises are increasingly reshaping political conflict across the Global South. In this ECPS commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines the rise of climate populism—a political dynamic in which environmental policies and climate transitions are reframed as struggles between “the people” and technocratic or global elites. As governments implement reforms such as energy transitions, subsidy restructuring, and carbon taxation, the economic consequences—particularly rising fuel and food prices—often generate social backlash under conditions of economic insecurity and political distrust. Drawing on examples from Africa and global energy geopolitics, the commentary shows how climate governance, distributive inequality, and populist political narratives increasingly intersect. Dr. Solaja argues that sustainable climate transitions require integrating environmental policy with social protection, economic justice, and inclusive democratic governance.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja*

Environmental crises are reshaping political conflict across the world. As governments pursue climate-related policy reforms—such as energy transitions, carbon taxes, and subsidy restructuring—the economic consequences of environmental policies, particularly rising fuel and food prices, increasingly turn climate governance into a contentious political arena in many countries of the Global South. Under conditions of economic precarity and political distrust, these pressures create fertile ground for climate populism—a phenomenon that scholars are increasingly examining—where environmental crises and climate policies are framed through narratives that pit “the people” against corrupt, technocratic, or global elites.

The escalating confrontation between Iran, Israel, and the United States is demonstrative of how the geopolitics of energy transition increasingly converges with that of global confrontation. As major oil routes like the Strait of Hormuz continue to form the spine of global energy supply, even limited military escalation can prompt volatility that quickly becomes translated into increases in fuel prices and foodstuffs in import-reliant economies of the Global South. Here, economic disruptions tied to energy geopolitics could potentially consolidate populist discourse framing climate policies and energy transitions as “elite” enterprises imposed on “the people” (Lockwood, 2018; Haas, 2023; Marquardt et al., 2022).

The convergence of climate governance, economic vulnerability, and a populist political logic of “the people vs. the elite” explains why climate populism has become a growing trend. Climate populism describes the tendency to frame climate crises and environmental policies as political struggles between “the people” and elites who, for example, design policies without public input and are insulated from the negative effects. This is not necessarily about rejecting climate science. Rather, it reframes climate politics as an economic issue that affects ordinary people who bear the brunt of climate policy costs. Populism, understood as the political logic that divides society into two antagonistic groups—virtuous citizens versus corrupt elites (Mudde, 2004)—is emerging in an environment where structural transformations, such as energy and climate transitions, threaten citizens’ economic security, while political institutions are perceived as either unwilling or unable to protect it.

Climate Policy and the Politics of Energy Prices 

The political conflict surrounding climate policy is closely linked to the politics of energy markets. The distribution of energy resources, particularly fossil fuels, is a key element of social welfare policies in many developing economies. Governments have historically relied on fuel subsidies to alleviate the cost of living and gain political legitimacy. Policy changes toward energy subsidies and price reform, typically introduced either due to fiscal pressure or international environmental commitment, can and have become a source of political backlashes, protest and civil disobedience (Cheon et al., 2013). Fuel prices are not simply a policy instrument but an integral part of the political relationship between governments and citizens. Environmental policy reforms now become political rather than apolitical technocratic measures.

Measures aimed at reducing emissions can be translated by elites as policies that hurt the poor while benefiting elites or distant entities in ways that can be exploited to incite resentment by actors such as the state and other institutions. This happens primarily during times when economic fragility and political distrust are widespread. Norris and Inglehart (2019) note that populist politics is particularly suited for instances where cultural or economic marginalization occur due to structural shifts. This is exactly what climate transition brings about as governments overhaul energy systems and regulate the environment to facilitate the transition, creating anxieties and uncertainty which populist politics is able to exploit. 

The Climate Populist Framing of “People vs. Elites” 

Climate populism specifically arises when the issue of environmental policy becomes an important element of populist narratives of social and economic injustice, where environmental policy reform and climate transition are depicted as an agenda of distant elites. The issue of climate governance often becomes framed in the Global South as a policy of global governance institutions such as UN, multilateral financial institutions and environmental NGOS whose global agenda does not have legitimacy in local context. It also assumes a populist stance where the people are unable to influence the decisions. Importantly, climate populism should not be seen as a rejection of climate science. Climate politics itself may be reframed to represent a struggle for fairness, economic and distributive justice. 

While climate populism may not challenge the underlying science behind climate change, the perception that the policy may disproportionately affect vulnerable or working class population may translate into protest action and populist politics. Climate populism in the Global South takes two main forms: i) anti-environmental populism which reject climate policies on grounds of economic harm or political injustice and ii) environmental justice populism where environmental policy is criticized on the basis that it either is insufficient or has distributive inequalities in how it applies costs and benefits across society. Both types draw on populist logic by invoking the idea that climate policies do not benefit ordinary citizens and serve elites instead. The nexus between climate governance and the politicization of economic hardship often characterizes the Global South. Increased food prices, fuel price hikes, and climate shocks can make room for populist claims based on widespread inequality and lack of trust in government.

Africa and the Politics of Climate Economic Discontent 

Examples from various African countries illustrate the politics of climate economic hardship. Subsidy reforms and fuel price changes often trigger significant political mobilization. Nigeria provides one of the starkest cases where the 2012 fuel subsidy removal triggered protests known as “Occupy Nigeria” which halted the economy, forcing the government to reverse parts of the reform (Ogunyemi, 2013). In many of these protests, fuel price hikes were perceived as the product of government corruption and elite mismanagement. 

Similar cases of mass protests are visible across African countries in countries such as Sudan where rising fuel prices contributed to the collapse of the regime, as well as Kenya and Ghana where fuel price hikes have become recurrent drivers of political dissent. These instances reflect the convergence of energy politics, climate policy, governance and inequality within African countries. The politics of climate transition is therefore fraught with the risk of triggering widespread opposition through populist political rhetoric on matters of economic injustice. Efforts to implement climate policies while simultaneously seeking to maintain economic stability face heightened risks in such countries.

The Global South and the Politics of Environmental Inequality 

The emergence of climate populism in the Global South can also be understood through global inequality of climate impact. Countries in the Global South, while least responsible for climate change, suffer disproportionately. These inequities give rise to global justice claims that can easily translate into political discourse in the Global South. Developing countries also have limited resources and institutional capacity to meet global climate policy demands. The push toward global climate mitigation goals coupled with global policy reforms that carry certain conditions attached with funds may increase the perception of external imposition and lack of democratic processes on climate policy making. In this context, climate populism arises out of these dynamics of unequal distribution of climate impacts, risks and responsibilities. In other words, climate policies can become entangled with questions of state sovereignty, national autonomy, and global power relations. 

Climate policy reforms must incorporate social protection in order to be politically sustainable. It has been shown that policy changes regarding fuel reforms face much less resistance when they are accompanied by compensating social protection mechanisms such as targeted cash transfers and welfare support programs that benefit the poor (Scurfield, 2003). The inclusion of ordinary citizens in climate governance can also strengthen public buy-in and resilience. Popular engagement can enhance the legitimacy of climate policy and prevent anti-climate populist narratives from gaining traction. 

Conclusion 

Climate change impacts ecological systems as well as politics. Environmental crises in developing countries where they intersect with the existing lack of equity and institutional capacity provides conditions for populist politics based on the issues of fuel prices, subsidy reform and climate governance. Climate populism therefore indicates the deep distributive inequalities and challenges associated with climate transition. As more governments move towards a transition toward climate smart economies, contests over distribution of costs and benefits associated with reforms will increase. To respond to climate populism, policy actors will need to integrate climate governance with distributive justice, social protection and equitable policy making at all levels. Failure to ensure social fairness of climate transition will also trigger anti-elite populist backlash.

 

(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.

 

References

Cheon, A.; Urpelainen, J. & Lackner, M. (2013). “Why do governments subsidize gasoline consumption? An empirical analysis of global gasoline prices.” Energy Policy, 56, 382–390.

Marquardt, J. (2022). “Climate change and populism.” Environmental Politics, 31(1), 1–23.

Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

White, J. (2023). “Climate populism: The political consequences of environmental crisis.” London School of Economics Working Paper.

Cargo ship transporting containers of waste to a recycling facility. Conceptual image of global waste trade and environmental pollution. Photo: Evgeniy Parilov | Dreamstime.

Plastic Colonialism and the Politics of Waste: Toward a Theory of Waste Sovereignty in the Global South

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHome

Plastic waste has become one of the defining environmental crises of the twenty-first century—but its politics extend far beyond questions of recycling and waste management. In his commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines how global plastic trade reflects deep structural inequalities between the Global North and the Global South, where environmental burdens are systematically displaced onto poorer regions. Drawing on insights from political economy and environmental justice scholarship, he introduces the concept of waste sovereignty—the claim that states should exercise political control over transboundary waste flows as part of broader struggles for ecological justice and economic autonomy. By examining global waste markets and emerging regulatory responses, Dr. Solaja highlights how plastic pollution has become a key arena of power, sovereignty, and inequality in global environmental governance.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja*

For decades the plastic waste has been travelling through global trade routes and has ultimately landed on waste pickers and informal sector recyclers in developing countries. Although most of the plastic products are consumed in richer economies, the bulk of waste generated through their consumption processes is handled in countries that lack technical capabilities and facilities to do proper recycling. What seems like a technical issue of dealing with waste is, in fact, tied up to the power politics and global asymmetrical relationship between Global North and South resulting in large transfer of environmental risk and pollution to the poorer world, thereby causing rampant pollution.

The first part of the twenty-first century has undoubtedly been defined by an environmental crisis involving plastics. The production of plastic has rapidly escalated to over 400 million tons of material annually since the late 1970s. Despite this, only countries in the Global South have to manage the overwhelming environmental problems related to the processing of this waste, which is mostly generated by more prosperous countries. The flow of plastic waste to the South is a direct result of the export business where more industrialized countries ship their own plastic waste to developing countries for disposal under the guise of recycling markets. Although these movements often disguise themselves as a technical solution to plastic waste disposal, it’s truly about exporting environmental harms to less equipped regions. 

According to many researchers and environmentalists, these movements reflect a “plastic colonialism,” where developing nations bear the burden of ecological unequal exchange. As political economist Dani Rodrik describes “globalization is in conflict with democratic politics.  A great tension now exists between deep global economic integration and the conditions of domestic political legitimacy.” Plastic has therefore moved beyond being merely an environmental problem; it has become a symbol of global inequality, giving rise to the emerging political concept of waste sovereignty—the argument that nations should have the right to control the transboundary movement of waste as part of broader struggles for environmental justice and economic autonomy.

The Global Plastic Waste Economy

The world economy of plastic involves intricate networks spanning continents that link production, consumption, and disposal, while producing globally distributed yet inequitable environmental impacts. For a long time, China has been a recipient of bulk quantities of plastic waste exported from the US, Japan, and various European countries; this changed in 2018 when China refused to process contaminated waste products. In turn, the export markets shifted, mainly to Southeast Asia and parts of Eastern Europe. 

However, these new arrangements are evidence of weaknesses in our recycling infrastructure. In 2017, research from the journal Science showed that only a mere 9% of all plastic waste has ever been recycled. While the remainder of the waste gets dumped, incinerated, or deposited in natural environments. A study from Nature reveals the sheer amount of plastic pollution in our oceans: “275 million tons of plastic, of 4.8 million tons, are drifting across the world’s seas” (Jambeck et al., 2015). The irony of promoting recycling for plastic waste is clear: the recycling industry relies on disposable structures.

Plastic Colonialism and Environmental Inequality

Political ecology and critical political economy inform the notion of plastic colonialism, illustrating that waste is rarely just a result of technical failures in managing waste disposal; rather it is a consequence of wealth disparities, power imbalances, and weaknesses within governmental infrastructure.

In this light, the flow of global waste represents a process of ecological unequal exchange, where waste generated in richer parts of the world results in environmental degradation predominantly in the poorer regions of the world. Thomas Piketty in his study of political economy confirms the persistence of structural disparities within global politics. Moreover, it has been suggested by scholars like Nancy Fraser that environmental problems frequently entail “expropriation,” where marginalized populations bear the ecological costs of production within a globalized world. Plastic waste is therefore not simply about recycling techniques but a critical political struggle between different parties over an issue of environmental justice and unequal resource distribution.

Waste Sovereignty Theory

In an effort to contextualize these issues, Waste Sovereignty Theory introduces the concept of governing waste as an expression of political and environmental sovereignty. Here, governments seek to reclaim ownership over environmental decision making while rebuffing impositions by international markets which place the burden of ecological costs on them. The theory is best understood through the framework of four interconnected concepts representing how states and communities tackle unequal global waste governance.

Territorial Control: States attempt to regulate and control transboundary movements of waste through bans and regulatory checks, with China’s 2018 plastic waste ban being a prime example.

Economic Transformation: Nations are looking to make waste a resource rather than a burden. The creation of circular economy strategies aims to reintroduce waste as part of the production system.

Environmental Justice: Claims for waste sovereignty are primarily derived from accusations that developing nations bear an unjust ecological burden due to the consumption in wealthier nations. These claims call for a new system of waste trade that prevents the unequal distribution of environmental responsibility.

Political Mobilization: The debate over waste governance is often linked to populist and nationalist narratives, which frame these issues as a struggle against oppressive distant powers and an exploitative system where rich nations offload their environmental burdens. 

These four pillars, therefore, show how waste politics has become a political and environmental battlefield.

Global Case Studies

Several of the countries across the world exemplify the increasing power of waste sovereignty politics. In Malaysia, a dramatic increase in exports of plastic waste, recently taking place there, is attracting national concern over pollution. Malaysia’s government is trying to regain control of waste streams via a strategy of inspection and sending of suspect materials back to source countries. 

Turkey, along with other European countries, is also now dealing with large shipments of plastic waste from Europe, leading to domestic focus on the issues the trade raises in Turkey, and demands for a more responsible waste trading relationship with European countries. 

The management of plastic waste across many African countries, presents a multifaceted problem intimately linked to development, and millions survive by waste picking (Ghana). In Kenya, there is a ban on all single-use plastic bags, and in Nigeria research explores avenues for using waste plastic in sectors like textiles. 

They all portray a story of nations attempting to address their domestic plastic pollution concerns, while also attempting to retain some control over imported waste streams.

Waste Politics and Populist Narratives

Waste politics and populist ideas are increasingly interconnected. Waste import debates offer powerful evidence that the world’s powerful global players continue to exploit weaker nations. As demonstrated in Naomi Klein’s analysis of environmental crises, these issues can become a part of a larger critique against neoliberalism; the problem of plastic waste is not just a technological issue but also political as it symbolizes the unequal nature of globalization.

Conclusion

The worldwide crisis in plastics unveils a significant discrepancy between the circular economy strategies proposed by global institutions and the ongoing replication of inequality in the sharing of environmental problems that exists in the global waste trade. Plastic colonialism isn’t just an inability to deal with waste, but a structured reflection of the inequality found within the globe, a growing challenge that has sparked protest across the Global South. Waste Sovereignty theory provides an understanding of such developments by framing waste governance as a battle for environmental justice, political sovereignty, and economic autonomy. The international debate surrounding waste governance is likely to play an integral role in the future of global environmental politics and the path towards establishing a more equal world.

 

(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.

 

References

Brooks, A. L.; Wang, S. & Jambeck, J. R. (2018). “The Chinese import ban and its impact on global plastic waste trade.” Science Advances, 4(6), eaat0131. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aat0131

Fraser, N. (2016). Expropriation and exploitation in racialized capitalism: A reply to Michael Dawson. Critical Historical Studies, 3(1), 163–178. https://doi.org/10.1086/685779

Geyer, R.; Jambeck, J. R. & Law, K. L. (2017). “Production, use, and fate of all plastics ever made.” Science, 3(7), e1700782. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1700782

Jambeck, J. R.; Geyer, R.; Wilcox, C.; Siegler, T. R.; Perryman, M.; Andrady, A.; Narayan, R.; & Law, K. L. (2015). “Plastic waste inputs from land into the ocean.” Nature, 347(6223), 768–771. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1260352

Klein, N. (2014). This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Piketty, T. (2020). Capital and Ideology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rodrik, D. (2011). The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy. New York: W.W. Norton.

Gas mask in the aftermath of chemical warfare.

War Beyond the Battlefield: Environmental and Human Security in Iran

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHomeHuman Rights

In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines the often-overlooked ecological consequences of modern warfare. Moving beyond traditional analyses focused on military strategy and territorial control, he argues that contemporary conflicts produce long-lasting environmental damage that can destabilize societies for decades. From contaminated farmland and polluted water systems to devastated ecosystems and forced migration, war’s environmental fallout directly undermines human security. Drawing on historical examples such as Agent Orange in Vietnam and the Kuwaiti oil fires during the 1991 Gulf War, the commentary highlights how ecological destruction persists long after hostilities end. Dr. Solaja ultimately calls for stronger international environmental governance and greater integration of environmental protection into global security and peacebuilding frameworks.

By Dr. Oludele Solaja*

Thinking About War in an Ecological Framework

When war is finished in terms of battles, water systems remain polluted, nature destroyed, and infrastructure shattered—and continues to shape the ways in which societies survive and exist. Whereas the majority of scholarly focus concerning warfare centers on issues of military victory, deterring enemies, or controlling territory, the environmental consequences of war can often produce effects that can persist over decades (Lawrence & Stohl, 2019; UNEP, 2009). The current confrontation between the United States, Iran, and Israel, for instance, should be understood not merely as a geopolitical conflict, but as an ecological disaster, as well. The bombing and attack on industrial and energy infrastructure result in more than mere destruction of physical property; these incidents produce ecological disarray, which can lead to widespread contamination of landscape, livelihood and inhabitants, even long after the end of hostilities (Foster et al., 2010; Ide, 2021).

Understanding war in relation to ecology and displacement is one way of looking at the long-term consequences of military combat. Destruction to environment can create instability for societies by contaminating farmland, polluting water sources, or even eliminating the natural resource base required to survive. Therefore modern warfare reaches beyond the battlefield to create different forms of insecurity that may exist in the environment for generations (Nixon, 2011). Hence a sociological study of war, examining both strategic and environmental results of battle, should be adopted in understanding conflict in the 21st century. In an age of increasing environmental crises and security concerns, treating war as an ecological affair can become as significant as viewing it as the domain of military actions (Foster et al., 2010).

Environmental Effects of Modern Warfare

Even though destruction of the environment has historically been a factor of warfare, it often goes overlooked in analyses of security. It can create massive ecological devastation, not just exacerbate humanitarian crises within a warzone, but create an environmental crisis for surrounding regions as well (UNEP, 2009; Lawrence & Stohl, 2019). Aerial bombardment of infrastructure can spread poisons into the air, water sources and natural habitat required for sustenance. Industrial buildings and energy sources—refineries, chemical plants, water treatment plants—are sometimes prime targets. When these sites are destroyed, dangerous pollution can linger in land, air and ground water long after fighting has ended, with effects on human security far reaching (Ide, 2021).

Toxic lands may become unfit for farming and public health will be compromised by contaminants and the food supply jeopardized. It can often take decades to repair the environmental damage so that it may become safely habitated again (UNEP, 2009). Attacks on Iranian oil refineries and petrochemical industries, for example, could cause catastrophic environmental degradation over a wide region of the Middle East, compromising public health and damaging natural ecosystems of the area (Lawrence & Stohl, 2019).

Historical Evidence of Environmental Destruction during War

The long-term humanitarian effects have historically been a characteristic of war-induced ecological damage. Between 1961 and 1971, the US deployed large quantities of Agent Orange across Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. Large portions of farmland and forest became useless while their soils were contaminated with toxins. In addition to long-lasting health problems, communities continue to deal with the aftermath of these chemicals (Vo & Ziegler, 2018). 

Also, during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi troops burned hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells in an attempt to deter advancing forces. Large quantities of pollutants were released into the air, and oil slicks devastated marine life (Al-Dabbous & Kumar, 2014). As in Vietnam, long-lasting human security issues and a devastated ecosystem resulted from environmental disaster during wartime. The widespread destruction of natural and manmade landscapes caused during conflict does not end immediately and the need for their repair is a long-term challenge that often prolongs instability within nations affected by war. Such environmental harm frequently unfolds gradually and invisibly, what Nixon describes as “slow violence,” in which ecological destruction continues to affect communities long after the immediate conflict has ended (Nixon, 2011).

War, Environmental Degradation and Human Security

Seeing war as a source of ecological devastation helps to better understand the link between war and human security. Attacks on water systems, farms or factories can harm societies through ecological harm which causes social consequences. An attack on an ecosystem could destroy farms, harm public health through pollution of water sources and prompt migration as farming has no longer become an option. These elements—war, environment, displacement—can therefore be described as having a circular relationship, where destruction to one aspect of existence directly fuels destruction in another. 

Rural communities are particularly susceptible, since their entire way of life is contingent on their surrounding environment. Without the existence of healthy ecosystems, a livelihood becomes unsustainable and this leads to forced migration in order to survive (Ide, 2021). Homer-Dixon has emphasized the importance of the environment as the driver of conflict through its impact on resource availability and human security; with widespread ecological destruction during conflict, this connection is intensified, creating an even more dire situation (Homer-Dixon, 1999).

Implications for International Environmental Governance

The ecological devastation that war leaves in its wake makes clear the need for international action to help govern the conduct of war so that environment is not harmed so severely and, hopefully, at all. Although international laws of armed conflict are already in place to help alleviate the harm inflicted upon the environment during war, their enforceability has not been successfully maintained (UNEP, 2009). The long-lasting results of ecological destruction often are not considered and may never be compensated for or rectified in the absence of stronger governance structures. 

The establishment of environmental monitoring systems, strict liability laws for states or parties engaged in warfare that are responsible for ecological damage, and inclusion of environmental restoration within peacebuilding initiatives would all serve to diminish the long-term negative effects of war on ecology (Ide, 2021). Making protection of the environment a component of security strategy will make policies aligned with global security concerns, and address issues of ecological sustainability as well.

Conclusion

The conflict with Iran highlights the vast ecological consequences of modern warfare. It is a process that not only brings conflict to lands and peoples, but can reshape entire landscapes. Its consequences, historically in war zones such as Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, show that it can be a far more destructive phenomenon to ecosystems than merely battlefield action, lasting far into the future of human habitation (Vo & Ziegler, 2018; Al-Dabbous & Kumar, 2014). Considering war an ecological threat has made it easier to grasp its entire meaning, and looking at warfare from a strategic and environmental perspective allows for a far greater understanding of warfare itself. In an age of increasing geopolitical turmoil, it may soon become just as significant as military victories, if not more so, to understand the environmental threat war poses.

 

(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.

 

References 

Al-Dabbous, A. & Kumar, P. (2014). “Environmental impacts of the Gulf War oil fires.” Environmental Pollution, 189, 59–68.

Foster, J. B., Clark, B., & York, R. (2010). The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth. Monthly Review Press.

Homer-Dixon, T. (1999). Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton University Press.

Ide, T. (2021). “Environmental peacebuilding and the impact of war on ecosystems.” Global Environmental Politics, 21(1), 1–12.

Lawrence, M., & Stohl, A. (2019). “The impact of military emissions on climate change and air pollution.” Nature Communications, 10(1), 1–9.

Nixon, R. (2011). Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Harvard University Press.

UNEP. (2009). Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law. United Nations Environment Programme.

Vo, M., & Ziegler, A. (2018). “Agent Orange and the environmental legacy of the Vietnam War.” Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 13(2), 1–28.

Makoko fishing settlement in Lagos, Nigeria.

Climate Security from Below: Community Environmental Action and Democratic Gaps in Coastal Nigeria

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHome

Along Nigeria’s vulnerable coastline, climate change is not a projection but a daily struggle shaping survival, governance, and democracy. In this incisive commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja reveals how communities—from Lagos to Cross River—are filling critical gaps left by weak institutions, organizing drainage cleanups, mangrove restoration, and informal warning systems to confront flooding, pollution, and shoreline loss. These grassroots practices constitute “climate security from below,” challenging state-centric narratives that equate security with national planning alone. Yet this resilience also exposes deep democratic deficits, as citizens assume responsibilities that should belong to public authorities. The Nigerian case calls for a rethinking of climate security—one that bridges community initiative with accountable governance and recognizes local actors not as substitutes for the state, but as indispensable partners in building sustainable, democratic adaptation.

By Oludele Solaja*

Along the Nigerian coast, climate change is not a distant forecast; it is an everyday reality. Floodwaters inundate homes. Shorelines relentlessly recede. Saltwater contaminates freshwater supplies. Drains choke with plastic refuse, transforming streets into temporary lakes when the rains arrive. For those in the Niger Delta and adjacent coastal areas, climate insecurity is not a concept but a lived experience.

Yet climate security is often discussed in terms of state stability, resource conflicts, or national-level adaptation planning. On the ground, the picture is very different. In many parts of the Nigerian coast, securing the climate is a local endeavor—it is climate security from below.

All along Nigeria’s long coastal belt—from Lagos in the west to Cross River in the east—communities are filling governance gaps caused by weak infrastructure, state absenteeism, and an economy structured around extractive activities. Their everyday efforts to prevent environmental hazards, safeguard livelihoods, and protect daily life from environmental instability constitute a concrete instance of climate security from below.

Climate Risk and Governance Gaps

Among all regions of Nigeria, the coastal zone—characterized by high population density, vital ecosystems, and extensive oil-sector industrial development—is one of the country’s most climate-sensitive areas. Devastating nationwide floods (2012 and 2022) caused massive population displacement (UN OCHA, 2023), while the low-lying areas of the delta region are vulnerable to flooding due to the combined effects of sea-level rise and subsidence. The persistent and serious pollution of marine and coastal areas by oil (UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 2021) is another major challenge to the region’s resilience, in addition to the issue of waste disposal.

However, these climate hazards do not operate independently of existing governance failures: the most basic measures of environmental protection—drainage, waste management systems, shoreline stabilization, and adaptation measures—are still absent from the majority of coastal Nigerian communities even after over half a century of oil production. The institutions responsible for addressing these hazards often exist only on paper rather than being effectively implementable, and are seen by communities as out of reach, lacking sufficient resources, or being overly controlled by industrial corporations (Watts, 2004; Adekola & Mitchell, 2011).

National planning and large infrastructure projects have come to dominate official discourse on climate security. However, daily maintenance tasks—such as unblocking drainage channels and maintaining vegetation cover along coastlines—appear to receive little attention. The resulting governance gaps mean that environmental risks mount even as the ability of institutions to respond to them fails to keep pace. The response? Communities themselves have filled these gaps.

Everyday Climate Security

Across the Nigerian coast, locals organize cleanups of drainage channels in anticipation of the rains. Youth groups remove plastic waste from waterways. Local fishers actively plant mangrove trees that offer protection from storm surges, and some local leaders invest in manually reinforcing shorelines. Informal communication networks are established to disseminate warnings during extreme weather events. These actions perform critical climate-security functions: clearing waterways reduces flooding risks, planting mangroves strengthens coastlines, waste removal enhances public health, and social networks bolster community solidarity during critical moments.

This is climate security lived through everyday practice. It involves the extensive use of local ecological knowledge—the implicit understanding of local tidal systems, sedimentation processes, vegetation cover, and flood dynamics that formal engineering approaches sometimes fail to capture (Berkes, 2018). These efforts are frequently outside state plans, organized through communal labor, volunteers, and community associations (Adger et al., 2005; IPCC, 2022). This form of security has moved from a distant policy objective to a matter of routine—often invisible, often unpaid—maintenance that ensures continued habitation in these communities.

The Politics of Resilience

However, community agency is only one aspect of the story. It reveals deep democratic deficits in Nigeria’s governance landscape. Many communities in Nigeria’s coast have had minimal participation in environmental decision-making and very limited input in planning related to coastal infrastructure (Adekola & Mitchell, 2011). Environmental damage and subsequent exclusion caused by the operations of the oil industry in the Niger Delta continue to fuel local suspicion and resentment of both the state and oil companies (UNEP, 2011).

Dominant narratives about national development tend to focus on megaprojects, especially those involving infrastructure such as new highways and expanding coastal reclamation schemes, instead of the vital work of maintaining drains or planting mangroves. Communities therefore take on tasks that ought to be part of municipal governance. On the one hand, this enhances community resilience; yet, on the other, it may inadvertently normalize state withdrawal and a general lack of commitment from both national and subnational governments. When people do not expect the municipality to respond, self-help becomes the norm, and they may no longer notice the absence of this state function. Climate security from below becomes both a function of and evidence of failed state governance. Understanding this dynamic is critical; the ability of a community to exhibit resilience through its own actions should not serve as justification for abandoning its rights to a participatory state governance structure.

Informality and Legitimacy

A significant proportion of this community-based environmental management along Nigeria’s coast operates informally. There are no municipal plans that document these practices, nor are there official funds allocated to support them, yet they possess strong local legitimacy. The practice of collective labor and a long tradition of shared ownership over local environments continue to be powerful social resources. The application of indigenous ecological knowledge enhances their efficacy, given that local actors may possess more detailed knowledge of flood dynamics than engineers. For instance, locally managed mangrove planting may have higher survival rates than centrally implemented technical solutions that are often not sensitive to local ecology (Berkes, 2018; IPCC, 2022). Nevertheless, informality means that these efforts struggle when faced with widespread industrial pollution or encroaching urban waste. Sustained resilience under such conditions requires not only community initiative but also institutional support and legitimacy.

Rethinking Climate Security

The Nigerian case thus requires a reconsideration of conventional understandings of climate security. Security may not simply entail preventing conflict and safeguarding states but also includes the protection of livelihoods, human health, and natural ecosystems threatened by contemporary climate change processes. In the Global South, resilience is emerging first in informal, grassroots, locally managed communities rather than through national adaptation planning. 

To achieve sustainable climate security, bridging grassroots efforts and inclusive state governance institutions must be a priority. Formal acknowledgement of these community-led adaptations within national adaptation frameworks, cooperative frameworks integrating local knowledge and technical capacity, participatory planning mechanisms to overcome democratic gaps, small-scale climate financing to support community projects without over-bureaucratization, as well as the integration of local ecological knowledge into formal assessments are some policy strategies. This reconfigures communities not as a substitute for the state but as legitimate and important partners in governance.

Conclusion

In fact, climate security is already being constructed from below on Nigeria’s coast—with drainage repair, mangrove planting, waste disposal, and vigilant self-policing, communities are managing daily life under accelerating environmental breakdown. This is indicative of both community strength and utter policy collapse simultaneously. The Nigerian case makes clear that strategies for climate security need to consider possibilities beyond the state and engage in discussions around daily security practices if adaptation is to become the practice of democratic, responsive statehood.

 

(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.

 

References

Adger, W. N.; Hughes, T. P.; Folke, C.; Carpenter; S. R. & Rockström, J. (2005). “Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters.” Science, 309(5737), 1036–1039.

Adekola, O. & Mitchell, G. (2011). “The Niger Delta wetlands: Threats to ecosystem services, their importance to dependent communities and possible management measures.” International Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystem Services & Management, 7(1), 50–68.

Berkes, F. (2018). Sacred ecology (4th ed.). Routledge.

IPCC. (2022). Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press.

UNEP. (2011). Environmental assessment of Ogoniland. United Nations Environment Programme.

UN OCHA. (2023). Nigeria floods situation report 2022–2023. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Watts, M. (2004). “Resource curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta.” Geopolitics, 9(1), 50–80.

World Bank. (2021). Climate risk country profile: Nigeria. World Bank Group.