SummerSchool

ECPS Academy Summer School — Europe Between Oceans: The Future of the EU Trade Between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific (July 6-10, 2026)

Are you interested in global trade politics and the future of Europe in a shifting world order? Do you want to understand how populism, great-power rivalry, and geopolitical tensions are reshaping EU trade between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific? The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 offers a unique five-day program where leading scholars and policymakers explore the EU’s role in an era of economic uncertainty and strategic competition. Participants will engage in interactive lectures, small-group discussions, and a dynamic simulation game on EU trade strategy, gaining hands-on experience in policy analysis and recommendation drafting. Join an international, multidisciplinary environment, exchange ideas with peers worldwide, earn ECTS credits, and become part of a global network studying populism, political economy, and international relations.

Overview

In today’s rapidly shifting global order, the European Union can no longer afford to think in one direction. For decades, the transatlantic relationship has been the backbone of global trade, built on shared institutions, economic interdependence, and liberal values. Yet this foundation is no longer stable. As highlighted in the ECPS report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, domestic political polarization and the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic are reshaping trade policy, weakening trust, and challenging the very principles of open markets and multilateralism. The EU now faces a critical question: how to remain a global trade power when its closest partner is becoming less predictable.

At the same time, the center of gravity of global trade is shifting toward the Indo-Pacific. This region has become the epicenter of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition, where the future of global trade rules is increasingly being contested. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is not only a security issue but also a trade and technological struggle shaping supply chains, investment flows, and regulatory standards. As the US adopts more unilateral and strategic approaches to trade, moving away from traditional multilateralism, the EU must navigate a complex environment where cooperation, competition, and coercion coexist. Ignoring the transpacific dimension would mean missing where the future of global trade is being written.

For the European Union, the challenge and opportunity lie in managing both arenas simultaneously. The transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for economic scale, regulatory cooperation, and political alignment, while the transpacific region is crucial for diversification, resilience, and strategic autonomy. As scholars increasingly argue, the EU is no longer just a “junior partner” but an actor that must define its own role within a triangular system shaped by US–China competition. To lead in international trade today means mastering this dual engagement: stabilizing relations with the United States while actively shaping the Indo-Pacific order. This requires not only policy innovation but also a new generation of thinkers who understand trade through a geopolitical lens.

Against this backdrop, ECPS Academy Summer School-2026 brings together leading scholars and policymakers to examine how populism and great-power competition are reshaping EU trade policy across both transatlantic and transpacific arenas. 

It offers a unique opportunity to explore:

  • The future of EU–US trade relations in an era of populism
  • The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the US–China trade rivalry for the EU
  • How global trade is being reshaped by geopolitics, security, and ideology
  • The populist discourse around trade, policy, and power, and its implications for the EU’s trade relations
  • It also allows participating in an enjoyable and dynamic simulation game on the EU’s trade relations, trying to bring policy suggestions.

You will learn and actively engage in discussions, develop your own policy ideas, take part in simulation games, have the opportunity to publish on ECPS venues, and become part of an international network working at the intersection of political economy, international relations, and populism studies.

Tentative Program

Day 1 – Monday, July 6, 2026

Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics

This opening day sets the conceptual stage. It introduces how EU trade policy evolved from embedded liberalism to strategic autonomy, and how trade is now intertwined with security and geopolitics. It also establishes the role of populism and domestic politics in reshaping trade preferences and legitimacy crises in Europe and beyond.

Lecture One: (15:00-16:30) – Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order

Lecturer: Arlo Poletti (Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento).

Lecture Two: (17:30-19:00) – Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

TBC

Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism

Focuses on the transatlantic pillar, still central but increasingly unstable. It examines tariff disputes, regulatory divergence, and how populist and protectionist politics in the US and Europe challenge long-standing cooperation and WTO-based norms.

Lecture Three: (15:00-16:30) –  Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

Lecturer: Erik Jones (Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute and Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe).

Lecture Four: (17:30-19:00) – Populism and the Erosion/Reconfiguration of Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Lecturer: Alasdair Young (Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech).

 

Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026 

Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy

This session introduces the triangular dynamic (EU–US–China) and how the EU navigates between partnership and rivalry. It highlights de-risking, economic security, supply chains, and competing models of globalization.

Lecture Five: (15:00-16:30) – EU–US–China Trade Relations and Global Power Competition

Lecturer: Ramón Pacheco Pardo (Professor of International Relations at King’s College London and the KF-VUB Korea Chair at the Brussels School of Governance of Vrije Universiteit Brussel).

Lecture Six: (17:30-19:00) – Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

Lecturer: Reuben Wong (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore).

Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026

Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre

This session shifts focus to the transpacific dimension, emphasizing that the future of trade is increasingly shaped in the Indo-Pacific. It explores how US strategies toward China and the region reshape global trade, and how the EU responds through diversification and partnerships.

Lecture Seven: (15:00-16:30) – US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications

Lecturer: Kristi Govella (Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations in the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies and the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford). 

Lecture Eight: (17:30-19:00) – EU Engagement in the Indo-Pacific (FTAs, Partnerships, Strategic Positioning)

Lecturer: Axel Berkofsky (Associate Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at ISPI).

Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026

Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership

This session will ask whether the EU can become a global trade power amid fragmentation, populism, and great-power rivalry. It also allows for normative and policy-oriented discussions.

Lecture Nine: (15:00-16:30) –  Scenarios for the Future of Global Trade Governance (Fragmentation vs Reform)

Lecturer: Manfred Elsig (Professor of International Relations and Managing Director of the World Trade Institute of the University of Bern). (TBC)

Lecture Ten: (17:30-19:00) – Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Lecturer: Markus Kotzur (Professor of European and International Law, Vice Dean for International Relations and Chair for Public Law, European and International Public Law, Hamburg University). 

Methodology

The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.

The final program with the list of speakers will be announced soon.

Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a simulation game will be organized on a pressing theme within the broader topic to identify solutions to issues related to the future of the EU trade relations.

Who should apply?

This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for submitting applications is June 16, 2026. As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.

The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.

We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds. 

Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance

Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.

Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.

Credit

This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.

Mark Corner

Ten Years on with Brexit / Prof. Corner: With Brexit, the UK Has Lost More Than It Has Gained

As the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum approaches, debate has shifted from slogans to evidence. In this interview, Professor Mark Corner offers a measured but clear conclusion: “the UK has lost more than it has gained.” Drawing on political economy, constitutional analysis, and historical perspective, he revisits Brexit not as a singular rupture but as a dual crisis affecting both the European Union and the internal cohesion of the United Kingdom. Professor Corner highlights the paradox at the heart of Brexit—“taking back control” did not strengthen parliamentary sovereignty, but instead elevated popular sovereignty. At the same time, expectations of global economic freedom have given way to the enduring realities of geography and interdependence. His reflections situate Brexit as a revealing case of the gap between political promise and institutional consequence.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the tenth anniversary of the Brexit referendum approaches, public debate has moved decisively beyond the binary language of Leave and Remain toward a more empirically grounded reckoning with Brexit’s long-term political and economic consequences. In this context, Professor Mark Corner, Emeritus Professor at the University of Leuven, offers a particularly valuable perspective. His work situates Brexit not simply as a rupture in Britain’s relationship with the European Union, but as a dual constitutional and political crisis—one affecting both the European project and the internal cohesion of the United Kingdom. Bringing together political economy, constitutional analysis, historical memory, and populist mobilization, his reflections illuminate how Brexit has reshaped not only policy but also political imagination.

In his interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Corner advances a sober conclusion captured in the headline of this conversation: “With Brexit, the UK has lost more than it has gained.” That judgment is not presented as a dramatic slogan, but as the outcome of a broader reassessment now taking place in British public life. As he puts it, “most economists would agree that the UK has lost more than it has gained,” and if that were not so, “the present government would [not] be trying so hard to move back toward a closer economic relationship with the EU.” In this sense, Brexit appears less as a fulfilled promise of renewed sovereignty than as a strategic rupture whose costs have become increasingly difficult to deny.

Yet Professor Corner’s account is more layered than a narrow economic audit. He draws attention to one of the central ironies of Brexit politics: that a project framed around “taking back control” did not, in fact, restore parliamentary sovereignty. On the contrary, he argues, the referendum “assert[ed] popular sovereignty over parliamentary sovereignty,”since most MPs would have preferred to remain. Similarly, the promise that Britain could flourish once “freed from the shackles of the EU” has, in his view, been undermined by the enduring reality of geography, interdependence, and trade. The fantasy of becoming “Singapore-on-Thames” has largely faded, replaced by the quieter recognition that “a very large share of our trade is conducted with Europe.”

The interview also places Brexit within a broader political and historical frame. Professor Corner shows how populist and radical-right actors have successfully shifted the argument away from economic performance toward sovereignty, border control, and cultural identity. In doing so, they have helped transform British political conflict from an older class-based divide into a more complex terrain shaped by “social and cultural division alongside economic division.” At the same time, he warns that Brexit’s most profound destabilizing effects may ultimately be domestic rather than European. While the feared cascade of exits from the EU never materialized, the United Kingdom itself remains vulnerable to centrifugal pressures, particularly in Scotland and Northern Ireland. In his words, “in the long run, [these] may prove more troubling than the difficulties in the EU.”

In sum, Professor Corner’s reflections offer a penetrating and historically informed account of Brexit’s legacy. Far from vindicating the claims of its proponents, Brexit emerges here as a case study in the gap between populist promise and institutional consequence—one that continues to shape the future of Britain, Europe, and the politics of sovereignty itself.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Mark Corner, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Brexit Strains Britain More Than Europe

Professor Corner, welcome. In A Tale of Two Unions, you argue that Brexit must be understood simultaneously as a crisis of both the European Union and the British Union. Ten years on, how would you assess the relative degree of strain placed on each union, and has Brexit ultimately proven more destabilizing domestically than internationally?

Professor Mark Corner: I think it has. When the UK left in 2016, I remember seeing a book titled The EU: An Obituary.A lot of people thought that the UK’s departure would trigger a stampede. People began to talk about Nexit or Swexit after Brexit. But it didn’t happen. 

It is important to note that, despite all the recent difficulties with Hungary, it did not leave the EU. It was not expelled from the EU. Yes, pressure was brought upon it, and in the recent election, it got rid of Orbán. But all this has happened with Hungary remaining a member of the EU.

In the case of the UK, there is an instability built into the fact that it is effectively a multinational state: England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. It seems to me that the UK has done very little to develop some kind of stable constitutional structure around which these different nations can coalesce. I think there are difficulties. The forthcoming elections next month will show that there are difficulties. In fact, there will quite possibly be a nationalist first minister in Scotland, similarly in Wales, and there already is Michelle O’Neill in Northern Ireland. So, there will be difficulties in the UK, and in the long run, they may prove more troubling than the difficulties in the EU.

Economic Reality Undercuts Sovereignty Claims

Your work highlights the tension between parliamentary sovereignty and supranational governance. To what extent does the post-Brexit economic record—particularly reduced trade and investment—challenge the political narrative that “taking back control” enhances state capacity?

Professor Mark Corner: There are certain ironies here. There was a great deal of talk about taking back parliamentary control in 2016. But in fact, the Brexit vote did the very opposite. If Parliament had had the authority to decide on Brexit, a majority of MPs were against it. Effectively, what the referendum did was to assert popular sovereignty over parliamentary sovereignty. Members of Parliament—most of whom would have preferred to remain—accepted that this popular vote must be binding. I think that was the correct decision. But it hardly amounted to strengthening parliamentary sovereignty. So, I am not sure Brexit really led to that. It strengthened an idea of popular sovereignty, and that is something about which there can be a number of questions. But I do not think it strengthened parliamentary sovereignty.

As for the trade arguments, the general view in the UK now is that Brexit has not been beneficial to trade. In 2016, many people had the idea that, freed from the shackles of the EU, we could go out and strike ambitious trade deals with the far corners of the world—a deal with Japan, a deal with India—we would be free, no longer moored to Europe. But the reality is that, even in the 21st century, geographical proximity remains crucial, and a very large share of our trade is conducted with Europe. You can see the present government trying, as far as it can, to nudge itself back toward a closer economic relationship with the EU. This is quite different from the atmosphere under Boris Johnson, with all the talk of becoming “Singapore-on-Thames”—the idea that Britain could roam the world and secure major trade deals simply by freeing itself from Europe. That notion has largely disappeared.

Policy Shifts Signal Economic Costs

If we move beyond rhetoric to measurable indicators—GDP performance, trade volumes, FDI, labor market shifts—how would you construct a balanced “Brexit scorecard”? Does the empirical record validate or undermine the core claims of Brexit proponents?

Professor Mark Corner: Scorecards differ, and economists always arrive at different figures. You know the saying that an economist is someone who, if you ask for a phone number, gives you an estimate.

I would have to speak in general terms: most economists would agree that the UK has lost more than it has gained. If that were not the case, I do not think the present government would be trying so hard to move back toward a closer economic relationship with the EU.

In the last few days, there has been discussion of whether the UK could align with EU rules without having to secure a vote in Parliament on every measure. That is, in political terms, a dangerous way to proceed, but it is being considered because, economically, the government perceives the scorecard as pointing toward as close an alignment as possible for the UK’s benefit. I do not think it would pursue this course otherwise.

Populists Shift Debate to Identity

How has populist discourse, particularly on the radical and far right, managed to reinterpret or neutralize the economic costs of Brexit by shifting emphasis toward sovereignty, identity, and cultural autonomy?

Professor Mark Corner: That is an important point to make: the arguments are not simply about whether Brexit is economically beneficial. They also involve these other questions, and even during the 2016 campaign there were people on the Remain side who said, look, we are talking too much in terms of economics alone—we should think more broadly.

There is no doubt that issues like immigration were a very important factor in precipitating the Brexit vote. The idea that the UK could take back control of its borders, decide who was going to come in if it left the EU, and thereby maintain its cultural identity and its sovereignty was a very powerful argument at the time, and that has to be recognized. At the same time, there are some very powerful arguments against that position. There is a strong case in favor of multicultural and multinational society that has been built up in the UK over the last 50 years, and I do not think that is emphasized enough.

Because I am old, I can go back to the 1960s and 1970s. At that time, there were arguments about admitting members of the former British Empire, and there was talk of an “Asian” or “Black” invasion—the language was very racist. Yet at that time there was actually net emigration from the UK, so there was no real issue of rising numbers. The only objection could have been that people did not like those who were not white coming in.

I do not see that in the 21st century. There is still racism, of course, but it is not like it was in the 1960s or 1970s. People generally accept that society is made up of many different cultural backgrounds, and that this is worthwhile—that it is a benefit.

There is, however, a different kind of problem, which is that overall numbers—irrespective of color or ethnic background—have been rising very quickly. Any country whose population is increasing rapidly year by year is going to face difficulties adapting to that, whether or not it is beneficial in the long run. So, the nature of the argument is different from that of the 1960s or 1970s.

I also think it is rather unfortunate that even in 2016, when David Cameron tried to renegotiate terms with the EU, he did not say that we need a period in which to stabilize the numbers coming into the UK, regardless of their background. Within the EU, there are countries like Bulgaria, whose population fell from 9 million to 7 million and which face the opposite problem—they cannot stabilize their numbers because too many people have been leaving.

So, there might have been an opportunity to say that, yes, there is the principle of the four freedoms, but there are also moments when it is reasonable to argue that we need to stabilize population flows.

It has all become rather ironic, because the main issue over the last five or ten years since Brexit has not been large numbers of people coming from other parts of the EU, but from outside the EU. That is not in itself a problem, but rapid shifts in numbers, whether upward or downward, can create difficulties.

I find the idea of identity quite interesting. If you look at London, it has a Muslim mayor, Sadiq Khan. He has won three times and may win a fourth in 2028. He is very keen on rejoining the EU. He is 100 percent a Londoner, but also 100 percent a Muslim. It seems to me that there is a very positive sense of a multinational, multicultural identity—certainly in cities like London, but also in other parts of the UK—which should not be underestimated.

Identity Politics Deepens Divisions

Brexit
Photo: Lucian Milasan / Dreamstime.

Recent research suggests Brexit has produced enduring identity-based polarization (“Leavers” vs. “Remainers”). How does this align with your analysis of narrative construction and “historical arcs” in British political consciousness?

Professor Mark Corner: There is no doubt that there is a divide between Leavers and Remainers—you are right about that. It is reflected, for example, in the fact that the Reform Party at present shows a strong degree of continuity with UKIP and the Brexiteers of ten years ago. So, there is certainly a divide in the country.

But, of course, there has always been a political divide in the UK; it has simply been understood in different terms. Traditionally, people spoke of UK politics in terms of a strong class divide between the middle class and the working class, with Labour representing the working class and the Conservatives the middle class. That has largely broken down.

To some extent, this kind of division—once seen primarily in economic terms—has not been replaced but rather supplemented by a division in more cultural and identity-based terms: between those who are comfortable living in a multinational society and those who are not, and who feel that they are losing their identity.

Of course, the question then becomes: within the UK, do we mean identity as English, Welsh, Scottish, Irish, or British? There are all sorts of questions about which identity we are referring to. So, there has always been division, but it has perhaps become more complex—combining social and cultural divisions alongside economic ones.

You can now see people who might traditionally have voted Labour, who are working class, choosing instead to vote Reform because they feel their identity is under threat, and that this matters more than protecting their economic livelihood. It has become a more complicated picture.

Narratives Replace Clear Policy

You warn against selective historical narratives that privilege moments of “splendid isolation.” To what extent has the far right—particularly figures like Nigel Farage and his UK Reform—successfully mobilized such narratives to legitimize Brexit and its aftermath?

Professor Mark Corner: The key point about the far right is that it largely consists of people who feel fed up with the way things are but do not have a very clear idea of how they could be better. My idea of what a populist is—though this may be a definition open to question—is someone who does not actually have a very clear idea of what they believe in. For them, politics becomes something like a sport. They latch onto people’s resentments and think about how to express them more effectively, how to take them further, and how to turn them into a real political campaign. I do not think they necessarily have a clear policy agenda. You may disagree with this, but I think for many people populism is a kind of sport—a very dangerous one—in which they do not generate ideas themselves but instead observe what people are saying and try to express those views even more forcefully.

So, it is often very difficult to pin things down exactly. Who, for example, can say precisely what the economic program of Nigel Farage is? This is partly a reaction to the fact that it is also quite difficult to say what the economic program of Keir Starmer is. There is a kind of vacuum in the center of British politics as well. To that extent, the rise of the Green Party is rather significant, because it does appear to be offering—at some risk to itself—some very clear ideas about what it would like to see happen. I do not see that coming from any other part of the British political spectrum.

Reform UK Channels Public Discontent

A placard urging voters to support Richard Pearse, the Reform UK candidate at the general election in Weston-super-Mare, UK on July 4, 2024. Photo: Keith Ramsey / Dreamstime.

How do you interpret the rise of Reform UK within the broader trajectory of populist radical right (PRR) politics in Britain? Is it a continuation of Brexit-era mobilization or a transformation into a more permanent political force?

Professor Mark Corner: It is certainly linked to the Brexiteers, but it is more a reflection of feelings of resentment and of being left out on the part of a significant minority of the population—people who feel they have been bypassed and ignored by the mainstream parties. To some extent, I think that is true. The Labour Party has notoriously taken for granted the support of people in poorer areas of the country and has not paid sufficient attention to their needs. That is perfectly true.

But, as I said, the idea that the Reform Party has really developed a clear program that attracts some and rejects others, beyond its hostility to immigration, is questionable. If you take the other side of the political spectrum, one may disagree with what the Greens propose, but it comes down to some very concrete proposals. For example, a 2% tax on the very rich—one may think this would lead to them all running off to the Bahamas and be economically catastrophic, or one may think it is a very good way of raising money—but it is at least clear. I do not see that sort of clarity from Reform, and I therefore wonder whether it is more than an expression of disaffection.

Populists Turn EU Skepticism into Power

Before 2016, Euroscepticism was not a dominant voter concern. In your view, how did it become the central axis of political mobilization, and what role did populist entrepreneurs play in this transformation?

Professor Mark Corner: Oh, gosh—there is a long answer to that. There has always been a problem in the UK in seeing EU membership as being in its economic interest. It is partly because of when we joined in 1973, after dealing with a couple of vetoes from de Gaulle in the 1960s—we first applied in 1961. We got in at the very moment when the post-war boom collapsed. There was an oil crisis, a little bit similar to today, and this precipitated very difficult economic circumstances in the 1970s. So, it was very easy for people in the UK to say that it was when we joined that economic community that all our troubles began. The 1960s were good years economically, and then we joined at the moment of crisis.

We also joined when there were the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy, which, whether good or bad, did not particularly benefit the UK, given its relatively small agricultural sector. Then there were all those arguments in the 1980s, when it was said that Britain was paying too much into the EU budget, and Mrs. Thatcher was running around saying, “we want our money back.” In that situation, it was very difficult to argue that, overall, EU membership was economically beneficial.

Then, of course, you had the campaign in 2016, with Nigel Farage and his big red bus, saying this is what we pay into the EU, and that we would get all our money back and invest it instead in the National Health Service, as he wrote on the side of the bus—totally ignoring all the money that came the other way. But he got away with it, because there was a fairly widespread feeling in the UK that it had not done well economically from being in the EU, and had not from the beginning. There is more of a sense now that the UK would do well economically by being part of the EU than there was for a long time when we were inside it.

Brexit Accelerates Culture Wars

Protest
XR protest in solidarity with refugees and climate migrants in Westminster, London, April 23, 2023. Photo: Jessica Girvan / Dreamstime.

To what extent has Brexit accelerated the shift from class-based politics to culture-war polarization, and how has this benefited Populist Radical Right (PRR) actors in structuring political competition?

Professor Mark Corner: I think it has. If you leave a group of 28 and say, no, we want to be on our own—we had too much cooperation, we were too close to you, and we want to get further away—then it does rather support the idea that people want to shut themselves up within their own separate identity.

But at the same time, there is perhaps a greater awareness now that we benefit more by working together. That includes cooperation with other EU countries. If you think of how vulnerable the UK feels at the moment—in terms of everything happening in Ukraine and the perceived unreliability of Trump—there is a growing sense that we really do need to work together with the EU, because otherwise we could be picked off separately. Then, that you can see, in political as well as economic terms, a strong incentive to engage with European countries, for instance in sharing the defense burden. Every week, I read articles about how the UK needs to spend more money on defense, warning that otherwise we are going to be attacked at dawn.

One of the things to note is that there is a great deal of wasted spending in defense, partly because different European countries do not cooperate. Eight years ago, President Macron suggested a common European army, but you do not hear much about that when UK defense chiefs argue that we must increase defense spending.

So, there is a strong case—not just in the economic sphere but also in the defense sphere—for taking a much more serious European approach. That may be one of the most important factors in the years ahead, because there is no doubt that we are in a very dangerous and vulnerable situation, and in such circumstances, people naturally think we should come together with those who are our friends—and that is, obviously, the other European countries.

Brexit Costs Fail to Shift Votes

Given the documented decline in trade integration and investment, why has this not translated into a sustained electoral backlash against Brexit-aligned parties? Does this reflect the resilience of populist framing?

Professor Mark Corner: I do not think it is simply a matter of populist framing. Getting back into the EU would not be easy, and one cannot simply assume that 27 countries would welcome the UK with open arms. The UK has caused a good deal of difficulty by leaving, and people might reasonably ask whether it would create further complications by returning. So, I do not think there is an easy path back in.

We might also have to accept certain conditions if we were to rejoin—things that have not been popular in the past. For instance, the EU might say that, as a new applicant, the UK would have to join the Eurozone. One could easily imagine political arguments arising from that. So, it is not a straightforward route.

In some ways, it might be preferable for the UK to approach the question more along the lines of Norway. Norway voted not to join the EU, partly because of the Common Fisheries Policy and its 2,000 miles of coastline. At the same time, however, it is part of the single market and contributes financially in order to participate. It may be that something along these lines would be a better option for the UK.

There is a genuine debate about how the UK should move closer to Europe. There is, however, a growing sense that it should be closer—not only for economic reasons, but also for political ones. When one considers the current geopolitical context—one superpower pressing in from the east, as in Ukraine, and another expressing interest in places such as Greenland in the west—it may be sensible to work more closely with allies in between.

I do not want to see this only in economic terms. Cultural considerations matter as well, and one of those is the defense of democracy. Whatever our ethnic backgrounds, we are part of democratic societies, and on either side, there are powerful, sometimes autocratic states. So democratic values are something we may wish to emphasize when thinking about cultural identity—values that are shared with the rest of Europe, including Hungary, I am glad to say.

Brexit Fuels UK Fragmentation Risks

UK Map
Photo: Michele Ursi / Dreamstime.

Your book raises the possibility that Brexit could trigger centrifugal pressures within the UK itself. Ten years on, how do you assess the risks of fragmentation—particularly in Scotland and Northern Ireland—and their connection to Brexit politics?

Professor Mark Corner: I think it could happen. Imagine yourself as a Scotsman for a moment. You had a vote in 2014 on whether to stay inside the UK, and David Cameron argued that leaving the UK would mean finding yourself outside the EU—and that this was not desirable. The Scots were quite influenced by this and voted to remain in the UK. Two years later, in the Brexit vote, the Scots voted to stay in the EU, yet the rest of the UK—England and Wales, at any rate—dragged them out. They may well feel that they were misled two years earlier. It is not surprising that many Scots feel betrayed. Another referendum is hardly impossible. At the time, it was described as a once-in-a-generation event. Well, fine—once in a generation—that was 2014. 2039 is not that far away; it is just over a decade from now. So, I would not be surprised if there were another referendum in the 2030s.

What has the UK done about this? It could have taken steps, and perhaps still could. It might say: look, we have this House of Lords—what is it actually doing? It is appointed, not democratic. It is, in effect, “North Korea on Thames.” It could be transformed into a second chamber in which the different nations and regions are represented, rather like the Bundesrat in Germany. This is especially relevant now, because it has often been argued that the imbalance in population—3 million Welsh, 5 million Scots, and 60 million English—makes such a structure unworkable. But the 60 million English can now be broken down: there is Andy Burnham in Manchester, a mayor of Liverpool, a mayor of the Northeast Combined Authority, and a mayor of London. They could form part of a second chamber with real powers, including, arguably, some veto authority. If that kind of constitutional reform were seriously developed in the UK—it has been suggested but never pursued very far—that is what is needed.

Without real constitutional reform, such as a powerful second chamber in which the nations and regions are represented, the centrifugal forces you mention are likely to prove too strong. It is not enough simply to talk about devolving more powers to Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland; they need to be brought into a genuinely national second chamber where they can exercise central authority.

Pressures Grow Within States, Not Between Them

Finally, do you see Brexit as a unique case, or as a broader “laboratory” illustrating the structural tension between globalization and national sovereignty—one that continues to fuel populist radical right movements across Europe?

Professor Mark Corner: There are obviously other dimensions to this. There are really two questions: do I think that other countries, or other member states, will try to leave the EU? In the short to medium term, I do not see that happening. There are, however, movements within member states—one might think, for example, of Catalonia—where there are quite powerful pressures, and it is possible that these will create certain difficulties in the years ahead. But they may not.

If nation-states are prepared to share power internally, in the same way that, as members of the EU, they share power externally, then such outcomes can be avoided. Of course, I cannot predict the future. But what I do not see is the kind of queue of member states leaving the EU that was once suggested  — John Gillingham wrote The EU: An Obituary ten years ago. That scenario is not materializing. The pressure to leave exists primarily within nation-states rather than between them.

Professor Jonathan Portes

Ten Years on with Brexit / Prof. Portes: Brexit Has Not Solved Britain’s Problems; It Made Them Worse

As the United Kingdom nears the tenth anniversary of the 2016 Brexit referendum, Professor Jonathan Portes offers a sober, evidence-based reassessment of its economic and political legacy. In this ECPS interview, Professor Portes argues that Brexit did not resolve the structural problems it promised to overcome; rather, “the UK still confronts the same fundamental problems it did 10 years ago,” and, in key respects, they have worsened. Drawing on a decade of research on trade, migration, labor markets, and policy autonomy, he shows how weakened investment, reduced integration, and persistent political tensions have defined the post-Brexit settlement. Moving beyond slogans, Professor Portes situates Brexit within broader debates on sovereignty, interdependence, and populist politics in an increasingly unstable international order.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the United Kingdom approaches the tenth anniversary of the 2016 Brexit referendum, the debate has moved decisively from slogan to scrutiny, from promises of restored sovereignty to the measurable consequences of economic and political separation. In this context, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) is pleased to host Professor Jonathan Portes, Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the School of Politics & Economics, King’s College London, whose extensive scholarship has been central to understanding the economic and labor-market consequences of Brexit. Throughout the past decade, Professor Portes has offered one of the most rigorous and evidence-based assessments of how trade, migration, policy autonomy, and public expectations have evolved under the post-Brexit settlement.

This interview is framed by a stark and sobering conclusion that runs through Professor Portes’s reflections: Brexit did not resolve the structural dilemmas it claimed it would overcome. Rather, as he puts it, “the UK still confronts the same fundamental problems it did 10 years ago.” The core promise of Brexit, he argues, was that it would allow Britain to escape the constraints associated with globalization, immigration, and post-2008 economic stagnation. Yet the reality has been quite different. “Rather than solving those problems,” he observes, Brexit “has probably made them worse.” In Professor Portes’s analysis, the UK remains what it always was: “a middle-sized, advanced Western European economy,”still grappling with familiar pressures, but now doing so from a more exposed and less advantageous position.

The interview explores this argument across several interrelated domains. On the economic front, Professor Portes notes that the evidence on growth, trade, productivity, and investment has broadly confirmed the mainstream pre-referendum consensus: Brexit was never likely to produce collapse, but it would impose “significant and material long-term damage”on British economic prospects. Trade, especially goods trade, emerges in his account as the most enduring site of disruption, while weakened investment and reduced integration with the European market suggest an adaptation process that may culminate in a “permanent loss of integration.”

On migration, Professor Portes offers an especially illuminating account of Brexit’s unintended consequences. Rather than simply reducing immigration, Brexit reconfigured it, replacing free movement from within the EU with larger-than-expected inflows from outside it. That outcome, he suggests, exposed a contradiction at the heart of the Leave campaign: the demand for both lower migration and greater economic flexibility under national control. More broadly, the interview shows how the promise of sovereignty often failed to produce meaningful control in practice. As Professor Portes cautions, sovereignty “in the abstract legal and political sense does not necessarily translate into having control.”

Taken together, Professor Portes’s reflections offer a penetrating assessment of Brexit not as a completed nationalist correction, but as a prolonged and costly reconfiguration of Britain’s political economy. His analysis challenges triumphalist narratives from both the sovereigntist and populist right, while posing deeper questions about the limits of national autonomy in an interdependent world.

Here is the edited version of our interview with Professor Jonathan Portes, revised slightly to improve clarity and flow.

Brexit Has Intensified, Not Resolved, Structural Economic Pressures

A Brexit Day ‘Independence’ parade was held at Whitehall and on Parliament Square in London to celebrate the UK leaving the European Union on January 31, 2020.

Professor Portes, welcome. You have been among the most careful and empirically grounded observers of Brexit’s economic and political consequences over the past decade. As we approach the ten-year mark since the 2016 referendum, how would you characterize the overall trajectory of the UK economy and policy landscape under Brexit? What stands out most when you step back and take a long view?

Professor Jonathan Portes: I think what stands out most, perhaps, is that the UK still confronts the same fundamental problems it did 10 years ago. The UK remains very much a middle-sized, advanced Western European economy, with many of the same issues and problems as other such economies. The difference, however, is that Brexit was, in some ways, touted as a means for the UK to escape some of those problems, issues, and constraints relating to globalization, immigration, and economic stagnation since 2008, as well as a range of political problems within the UK that arose from those economic challenges.

But rather than solving those problems, as Brexit was presented as doing by some of its proponents, it has probably made them worse. This is partly because it led, obviously, to a period of political chaos in the UK. Even after that, and despite a degree of relative stability being restored, it has possibly caused some damage to the UK’s political institutions. At the same time, rather than resolving any of these political economy problems, it has arguably exacerbated them.

In other words, the difficulties of managing globalization and its impacts were already very apparent when the UK was a member of the EU. They manifested themselves partly through EU membership and partly outside it. However, outside the EU, these difficulties have become even starker. Rather than being resolved by Brexit, as was hoped, they have become more visible and more difficult. This is partly due to the structural contradiction of Brexit itself. It is also, of course, partly the result of global developments since then—most notably the election of Trump—which have made the UK’s position outside the EU more difficult for fairly obvious reasons.

Growth, Trade, and Investment Have Weakened as Expected

Much of your work highlights the gap between political expectations and economic outcomes—particularly in areas like growth, trade, and migration. Looking across the evidence now available, how should we understand the real costs of Brexit compared to what was anticipated or promised at the time?

Professor Jonathan Portes: Of course, politicians on both sides said a lot about Brexit. In terms of the economic impacts of Brexit on things like growth, trade, and investment, this is one area where we economists can actually be rather pleased with ourselves. Economic forecasts rarely turn out to be accurate, and of course there is still quite a lot of debate about the precise impacts of Brexit. But we now have a wide range of economic evidence on the impact on growth, trade, and investment, and it is pretty much entirely consistent with the mainstream economic consensus that I and others formed part of, before Brexit: that Brexit would not be a complete catastrophe for the UK economy, but it would do significant and material long-term damage to our economic prospects by reducing growth, productivity growth, trade, and investment. And all of those have been fairly clearly borne out.

The interesting difference is on migration, where both I and others thought that Brexit would reduce migration through the free movement channel within the EU, which would only be partly offset by increased inflows from outside the EU. In fact, it has turned out that the direction for both of those numbers has been correct. But the relative magnitudes were wrong, and the increase in migration from outside the EU has more than offset the reduction in flows within the EU. As a result, the UK population and labor force are actually larger than they would have been without Brexit, not smaller. That provides, not a small, offset to the negative impacts of Brexit, although it has also generated a great deal of political backlash. From an economic point of view, however, this is a positive—though certainly not by anywhere near enough to offset the negative impacts of Brexit on trade and investment.

Trade Took the Hardest Hit, While Services Showed Resilience

If we think of Brexit as a large, multi-dimensional economic shock, where do you see its most significant and lasting effects—across trade, investment, labor markets, and productivity—and which of these have proven more resilient than many expected?

Professor Jonathan Portes: The biggest persistent shock has been to trade, particularly trade in goods. The UK did quite well out of EU membership in terms of being integrated into pan-European and hence pan-global supply chains for goods. We have seen that small and medium-sized exporters benefited from being able to export to the EU without regulation or red tape. And, of course, British consumers benefited from frictionless imports from within the EU. None of that has disappeared completely—you still have trade under the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and the EU remains by far our largest trading partner. But nonetheless, there has been a significant impact, particularly for those manufacturers integrated into global supply chains, who have faced increased costs as a result, and also for some of those small and medium-sized businesses that benefited from frictionless trade within the single market.

On the more resilient side, there has also been some damage to the financial services sector, which, of course, was a major issue in the run-up to Brexit. Again, the UK’s financial services sector is large and resilient, and London remains by far the largest financial center in Europe, but it is nonetheless somewhat smaller than it would have been without Brexit. There has been some damage there, but the sector is not going anywhere and will continue to be an important part of the UK economy.

There has been more resilience in other areas of the high-productivity tradable services sector—things like consultancy, legal services, and accountancy—where trade barriers were never that large, because there are no tariffs and there is less in the way of regulation than in financial services. Hence, the UK has actually done pretty well; it has not just been resilient but has also seen very fast growth in those sectors. This has helped preserve the overall picture and means that the economic impacts have not been as clear, as severe, or as visible as they might have been, as some people at one end of the spectrum feared.

And then on the labor market, there was considerable concern that the end of free movement would do quite a bit of damage to sectors that relied on European migration. While migration from outside the EU is not a perfect substitute—because it involves different types of people in different sectors with different skills and so on— overall, the rather large increase in non-EU migration has done a lot to cushion the UK labor market and sectors that are dependent on migrant labor from what the impacts would otherwise have been. So, it has been a mixed picture.

Short-Term Adjustment, Long-Term Disintegration

Brexit.
Photo: Dreamstime.

There is now substantial evidence that UK trade with the EU has underperformed relative to its pre-Brexit trajectory, alongside signs of weakened investment. How should we interpret these developments in structural terms—do they reflect a permanent loss of integration, or an ongoing process of economic adaptation?

Professor Jonathan Portes: I think the answer is, in some ways, both. It is an ongoing process of adaptation that, eventually, leads to a permanent loss of integration, assuming that the new situation continues as it is. Of course, because this has done significant damage to the UK economy, both politicians and the public are now trying to think of ways to reverse that damage, at least in part. So, we do not know exactly where we will be in five or ten years. But if the current status quo continues, then you have, as you suggest, a process of adaptation that has partly happened but still has some way to run, leading to a permanent loss of integration.

On the other hand, as I said, there are now active discussions acknowledging that this is a bad outcome—recognized as such from an economic perspective by the UK public and policy establishment—and efforts are being made to think of ways to reverse it, at least to some extent.

Migration Fell from the EU, Rose from Elsewhere

Your research shows that Brexit fundamentally reshaped the composition of migration rather than reducing it overall, with declines in EU-origin workers offset by increases from non-EU countries. How should we interpret this outcome in relation to the central political promise of “taking back control”?

Professor Jonathan Portes: This is absolutely fascinating, because there was a very large implicit contradiction in some of the arguments made by pro-Brexit campaigners, which sought to present it both as a way of substantially reducing immigration overall and, by taking back control, ensuring that migration policy would be tailored to the needs of the UK economy or labor market, rather than dictated by EU rules.

But it turned out that, particularly at the time of Brexit and in the aftermath of the pandemic, the interpretation of the then-government—which was the government that delivered Brexit—was that what the UK economy needed was a significant increase in migration, and that is what we got. So, you had people within the Brexit movement saying, “We have been betrayed, immigration is going up,” and others saying, “No, we have control—yes, immigration is going up, but it is immigration that is entirely under our control and dictated by the needs of the UK economy and labor market.”

That contradiction was always implicit in some of the claims made by Brexit proponents at the time of the referendum, when it was never entirely clear whether they were making a concrete pledge to reduce immigration or not. But nobody, certainly not me, expected that contradiction to become so obvious and so large as it did in the post-pandemic period, because of the significant labor shortages that emerged post-Brexit and post-pandemic in the UK, and, to some extent, in other countries as well. 

The result is that the UK political system has not really been able to cope with this. It has done a great deal of damage to the Conservative Party and has been one of the significant factors behind the rise of the Reform Party, contributing to divisions within the Conservative Party. Despite the fact that the Labour Party opposed Brexit but is now having to manage this new post-Brexit immigration system, it is also leading to very severe tensions within the Labour Party and the current government between those who believe that immigration needs to be reduced regardless of the needs of the economy, and those who, for economic or broader political reasons, think that, on the whole, a relatively liberal and open immigration system is a good thing.

Migration Policy Reveals the Limits of Political Steering

In your analysis, the UK has moved from a largely automatic free-movement regime to a highly managed, points-based system—yet with outcomes still strongly shaped by labor demand and external shocks. Does this suggest limits to how far governments can actually steer migration and labor markets?

Professor Jonathan Portes: It illustrates the difficulties and contradictions in having control. One of the perceived disadvantages, from a political point of view, of free movement was that we could not say who could come. People would simply come and go as they wished, and we had no control over that because of EU rules. But the upside, of course, was that this had two advantages. From an economic perspective, it meant that these flows were, to a significant extent, determined by the market. Labor demand led to people coming in, a weak labor market led to people leaving, and these things happened more or less automatically. From an economic perspective, that, on the whole, is a good thing.

But the second advantage was political, and I think people did not fully appreciate it. Governments could largely sit back and say, “well, these are market decisions, and we do not have the remit to interfere with them,” so migration could be somewhat removed from the political process. The disadvantage of the current system, as it has turned out, is that having control means there is a great deal of political pressure on governments to do something about migration, regardless of whether it is actually a problem in economic terms.

That leads to sharp swings in policy, and often, as we are seeing at the moment, swings that are somewhat counter cyclical. This reflects an old problem that we used to discuss as macroeconomists with demand management through fiscal policy in a Keynesian framework: in principle, it is good to cut taxes when the economy is weak and increase taxes when the economy is strong. But in practice, because governments react slowly and economic data comes through with delays, it often turns out that policies are implemented at the wrong time—by the time you cut taxes, the economy is already recovering, or by the time you raise taxes, the economy is already weakening.

We seem to be seeing something similar with migration. The government was panicked by the large rise in migration in 2022 and 2023 and has now put in place very draconian measures to reduce migration at exactly the time when migration to the UK was already falling very sharply. That is a very bad way of making policy. We have control—this is all entirely under government control—but we have ended up with policy where that control is being exercised in a way that is quite damaging economically and does not really convince the public that we actually have control. To the public, it looks as though the government is just flailing around and does not really know what it is doing. To be honest, they are not wrong about that.

Mismanaged Migration Policy Fuels Shortages and Bottlenecks

Air Travellers Proceed to Passport Control at a British Airport. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have described post-Brexit migration patterns as producing “unintended consequences,” particularly in terms of scale and sectoral distribution. To what extent do these dynamics help explain persistent labor shortages, sectoral imbalances, and broader economic bottlenecks?

Professor Jonathan Portes: I think it goes back to what I just said, which is that, as in many other things, a relatively free market is the worst possible way of managing the matching of supply and demand, except for all the other ways of doing it. So, when you have a government that is trying, in some way, to use the migration system to match supply and demand and is also doing so in an environment where it faces all these political constraints, real or imagined, it ends up getting things wrong.

Partly this is because you simply cannot manage an economy or a labor market in that way, and partly it is due to politics. Once you have said you are in control, and that everything is under control, you face pressure to make policy changes that are not necessarily justified by anything in particular, except perceived political pressures. As a result, the government ends up getting a number of things wrong.

This has been particularly evident in the health and care sector, where the government liberalized probably too much, too quickly, in a way that did not take account of the dynamics of the immigration system or the labor market, and has now tightened up too much, too quickly, again without taking those dynamics into account, or considering how the labor market works or its own role in shaping pay and conditions in this workforce.

The result is both poor policymaking and poor political outcomes—shortages, bottlenecks, and broader imbalances. It also causes significant harm to individuals caught up in this system, including migrants, who can find the rug pulled out from under them and are sometimes treated very badly, both by their employers and by the government, as well as the people who depend on care—the consumers of these services—who ultimately should be our primary concern.

Widespread Impact Undermines Claims of Uneven Gains

Brexit’s economic consequences have not been evenly distributed. How important are these distributional effects—for workers, firms, and regions—in shaping both the economic outcomes and the political sustainability of Brexit?

Professor Jonathan Portes: In one sense, there has been a great deal of work on the regional impacts of Brexit, and I am not sure it has demonstrated that they are as differential as one might expect. You can, of course, point to very specific examples, such as the loss of European regional funding in some disadvantaged areas. There has also been a particularly negative impact on parts of the food and agriculture sector. I mentioned the City of London and the financial services sector, but overall, the impact has been quite diffuse across the economy as a whole.

So, you can point to individuals or particular businesses that have been put out of business by Brexit, and there are people who are especially dependent on certain sectors. But beyond that, there has mostly been a general pattern of lower growth, lower trade, and lower investment, affecting pretty much the entire UK economy to a greater or lesser extent.

You can see that in the opinion polling. The view that Brexit has been an economic failure is very widely shared across UK society. It is very hard to find a section or interest group that says Brexit was great for them, even if it was bad for others. Rather, there is a broad consensus that, from an economic point of view, Brexit has been a failure across the board. So, while you can identify individuals or businesses that have suffered much more than someone like me, for the most part it has been a broadly shared, generalized negative impact.

Formal Sovereignty Cannot Override Economic Realities

Your work suggests that while Brexit restored formal policy autonomy, outcomes have remained difficult to control in practice. Does this point to a deeper structural tension between political sovereignty and economic interdependence in advanced economies?

Professor Jonathan Portes: Yes, and I think that goes back to what I was saying before. You may or may not have thought it was plausible for the UK to argue, in 2016, that as a middle-sized, advanced economy—like other European countries—dependent on global trade and investment, there were nonetheless various structural, political, and economic reasons why it should not be part of the EU. Partly political—we have a different political tradition—and partly structural and economic. We are much more dependent on services trade, particularly high-value services, and while we are economically integrated with the EU, it is not to the same extent as countries like Germany or France. So, the UK could, and should, for this combination of reasons, be independent, make its own trade policy, and make its own, to some extent, foreign policy, retain close economic links with the EU, but not subordinate its political, economic, or trade decision-making to the EU. And we could make a success of it as a global economy, just as some other countries—whether Singapore or Australia, or to some extent Switzerland—have done. That case was always flawed, and most economists thought it was flawed, but it was not obviously unreasonable.

But it is now pretty clear that geopolitical developments over the last ten years have been very unfavorable to that strategy. It is much easier to pursue such a strategy when there is a benign, liberal hegemon—or perhaps two hegemonic powers, the US and China—both with a strong interest in a stable, liberal international trading order that accommodates countries in the position I have just described. You can argue about what might have happened without Trump. I think it is plausible that even without Trump, we would have been moving, to some extent, in the direction we are already going, which would have made that strategy increasingly implausible. But it is clear that Trump has accelerated this trajectory, to the point where that strategy now looks unrealistic.

That is where we are now, unfortunately. Even if Trump himself were reversed, it is very hard to see a return to the sort of benign, liberal international trading order I described—one in which a middle-sized power like the UK can comfortably pursue an independent path while still participating fully in global trade.

Brexit Reconfigures Long-Standing Migration Debates

In your work on free movement and the UK, you situate Brexit within a longer trajectory of labor mobility and political contestation. From that perspective, does Brexit represent a rupture, or a reconfiguration of deeper structural tensions within the British political economy?

Professor Jonathan Portes: It is very much the latter. Immigration—both its political, economic, and social consequences—has been an issue in British politics that has gone up and down in prominence for a very long time, certainly in the post-war era, from the mid-1950s to now, over the last 70 years. Brexit has clearly changed things. It has changed the system, as we have just discussed, and it has changed the environment. But many of the issues being contested now are very much the same as those that were contested in the 1960s, in the Powell era, were contested again in the 2000s immediately after enlargement, and are being contested today.

These include questions such as: to what extent is the UK—like other European countries, albeit in a different context—a country shaped by migration? What is the role of migration in a modern economy and labor market? What is its role given the demographic challenges and ageing that all our countries face? And what are the implications of migration for a country’s national and cultural identity?

We are not, for the most part, countries of immigration in the same way as the US, but equally, certainly in the UK—and in most of Europe—we are no longer monocultural or ethnically homogeneous societies either. Those who seek to take us back to that are very dangerous. So, the question becomes: what is the model of a multi-ethnic European democracy? That is something we are all struggling with. The UK was struggling with it before Brexit, and it is struggling with it now.

Brexit Pushed the Far Right Toward a European Strategy

Brexit was widely seen as a landmark moment for populist and sovereigntist politics, including the rise of far right and populist radical right mobilization around migration and national control. Looking back, how do you assess the relationship between Brexit and these broader political currents—both at the time and in their evolution over the past decade?

Professor Jonathan Portes: It has been quite interesting in that Brexit has, in a sense, forced European far-right movements to reconfigure their offer. What most of them seem to have recognized is that Brexit is neither a success nor is it perceived as a success, either domestically in the UK or in their own countries. So, you have far-right movements that were, at the time and immediately afterwards, flirting with their own ideas of exit from the European Union, but have now reconfigured themselves to retain the same focus on migration issues while embedding those concerns within a European frame rather than a purely domestic one.

This has, if anything, been bolstered by what we see from across the Atlantic, with figures such as J.D. Vance talking about European culture or European Christian values, rather than Italian or French values. So, you have this form of ethnically based, anti-immigrant nationalism that has, in a sense, shifted toward a European-level identity, alongside a domestic one.

In that respect, these movements have been, whether one likes it or not, quite effective in adapting. When you look at figures like Le Pen and Meloni, they have pivoted away from overt anti-Europeanism toward a form of European white nationalism.

Populist Right Is Here to Stay—but Its Shape Is Uncertain

Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence Party UKIP. Nigel Farage, leader of the UK Independence Party, speaking at Chatham House in London on March 31, 2014. Photo: Dominic Dudley / Dreamstim.

In the same context, how do you interpret the continued prominence of Nigel Farage and the rise of Reform UK within the UK’s political landscape? Does their trajectory suggest that Brexit has consolidated a durable populist radical right (PRR) and far-right constituency, or are we witnessing a more fluid and contingent phase of political realignment?

Professor Jonathan Portes: I hesitate to make predictions on this. But the obvious answer is a bit of both. The presence of Farage and the populist right in the UK is now well established; it is no longer a flash in the pan. We now have some years of it, so I think it is not going away. But how the current political shake-up in the UK plays out is very difficult to assess.

Structurally, our political system is configured around a two or two-and-a-half-party system. We have a roughly 50–50 division between right and left blocs, with a group of voters in the middle who are willing to support either side on occasion. That is a reasonably stable political configuration. But when you have four or five parties, the system becomes much more unstable, especially when these cleavages cut across both economic and socio-cultural dimensions.

It is not clear that the current first-past-the-post system is well suited to this new context. Whatever one thinks in the abstract about first-past-the-post versus different forms of proportional representation, the dynamics look very different in a two or two-and-a-half-party system than in a four or five-party system, where instability increases significantly.

So, it is very unclear how this will shake out. Populism—and in particular far-right populism—is certainly not going away in the UK. But how it will reconfigure the right of the UK political spectrum, and to what extent the more traditional conservative right, which still has a constituency in the UK, can reassert itself and regain control, remains very uncertain at the moment.

Economic Reality Challenges Populist Narratives

To what extent do the economic and migration outcomes of Brexit challenge or reinforce the core claims of populist narratives about globalization, elites, and national sovereignty?

Professor Jonathan Portes: As discussed, they illustrate some of the limitations of national sovereignty and the fact that sovereignty in the abstract legal and political sense does not necessarily translate into having control. There is a fundamental issue here: people felt that they wanted more control over their lives, and Brexit was sold to them as a way of achieving that, yet they certainly do not feel that this has been delivered. That is a fundamental problem.

It is also a fundamental problem for politicians, because it is very difficult to explain to people that, on the one hand, politicians need to demonstrate concretely that they have given people back some control over their lives, while on the other hand they must also be honest about the fact that there are areas where national governments simply cannot exercise control and must be realistic about those limits.

We are seeing this right now with oil and gas prices. The UK government cannot stop global oil and gas prices from rising. At some point, politicians have to be honest and say that we can try to protect the most vulnerable households and mitigate the impact of this economic shock, but it remains an economic shock, and that means the country as a whole is poorer, and we have to live with that.

Populists Shift Strategy as Exit Loses Appeal

Finally, for other sovereigntist or “exit” movements across Europe that have looked to Brexit as a model, what lessons—economic, political, or institutional—should be drawn from the UK’s experience over the past decade?

Professor Jonathan Portes: As I said, populists have correctly learned that Brexit, or its equivalent, is largely going to be a political loser, and they have pivoted away from that. They have shifted towards a more pan-European, ethnically based opposition to immigration—a form of pan-European white nationalism that mirrors some of what is going on in the US at the moment. To some extent, they have done this quite successfully in countries such as France and Italy.

To my mind, the challenge is for those of us who are not part of these movements and do not want to see them succeed: what is the narrative—economic, political, and cultural—that we use to push back against this and say that this is not the sort of Europe we want? The kind of Europe we seek to build is not one that will be economically successful, nor one that most people would want to live in. That is the challenge, and frankly, I do not think we have met it yet.

Iran, US, Israel.

Power Transition in the Middle East: The Intersection of US Global Rivalries and Israel’s Regional Ambitions

In this long ECPS commentary, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk examines the 2026 US–Israeli strikes on Iran as part of a broader transformation in global power politics rather than an isolated regional conflict. He argues that the confrontation reflects a strategic intersection of energy security, regional military dynamics, and intensifying great-power rivalry, particularly between the United States and China. The crisis surrounding the Strait of Hormuz—through which a substantial share of global oil flows—demonstrates how military escalation, energy markets, and geopolitical competition are increasingly intertwined. Professor Ozturk suggests that contemporary conflicts are being managed through strategic compartmentalization: limited escalation, selective alliances, and narrative control. In this emerging landscape, regional actors and global powers alike seek to reshape influence within a fragmented and increasingly competitive international order.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

The Israeli-US attack on Iran, at this pivotal moment, is more than just another Middle Eastern conflict or a simple prelude to a new oil shock. It should be seen as part of a broader shift in global power, in which regional conflict, energy security, and great-power rivalry are managed together rather than separately. The aim in this deliberately segmented crisis caused by the last military stand-off with Iran is (i) to weaken Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities to bolster Israel’s regional dominance focused on security; (ii) Washington’s effort to retain strategic control over global energy flows amid rising competition with China; and (iii) in doing so, to keep the conflict politically contained—avoiding the perception of a broader clash of civilizations in the Muslim world, thus preventing them from falling under China’s influence and minimizing the reasons for China’s growing influence in the Global South.

That stance closely aligns with a recent British parliamentary report, which suggests that energy, war, diplomacy, and narrative are no longer separate policy areas. Instead, they are being strategically managed together. The result is a new power dynamic—one that shifts away from crisis management within a liberal international order and toward a more fragmented system characterized by selective coalitions, limited violence, and varying legitimacy.

Beyond Energy and Iran’s Nuclear Capacity

Without any convincing legal justification, UN resolution, or data from American institutions indicating that Iran posed an imminent threat—and launched during ongoing negotiations—these attacks resulted in the “arbitrary” killing of thousands of civilians in Iran, the massacre of schoolchildren, the arbitrary sinking of an unarmed Iranian ship returning from military exercises in India and of a Sri Lankan ship, killing hundreds of soldiers, as well as severe damage to many UNESCO-protected historical monuments in Iran. In such a context, the first and most important task is to correctly situate these attacks by the US–Israel axis.

On February 28, 2026, Israel and the US carried out coordinated strikes on Iran, targeting leadership sites, military forces, and nuclear and ballistic missile infrastructure. The immediate market response was straightforward. After the attacks, global energy markets became extremely volatile, with Brent crude soaring to a peak of $119.50 on March 9, 2026, as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz threatened 20% of global supply. This ‘panic spike’ was followed by a sharp intraday reversal, with prices sliding back toward $90.00 after US officials indicated a quick end to the military operations, ultimately leaving the market stuck in a highly volatile trading range between $85.00 and $105.00 (Figure 1). 

The strategic role of the Strait of Hormuz in the global oil supply is beyond discussion. In 2025, nearly 15 million barrels of crude oil per day and about 20 million barrels of total oil transited Hormuz, most of which headed to Asian markets rather than Europe (Figure 2). Any serious disruption, therefore, impacts not just supply but also freight, insurance, and risk premiums across the wider global economy. Therefore, the 2026 assault on Iran has clearly and rightly revived a familiar concern: that the global economy remains vulnerable to disruption at the Strait of Hormuz.

Energy Leverage and the China Factor

The energy dimension gives this compartmentalization broader strategic significance. The IEA reports that China and India together received 44 percent of the crude oil exported through Hormuz in 2025, while Europe accounted for only around 4 percent of those crude flows. The Atlantic Council similarly estimates that roughly 78 percent of Middle Eastern crude exports to China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan passed through the Strait in 2025. A crisis involving Iran and Hormuz is therefore not merely a Middle Eastern problem; it is also a point of pressure on Asian industrial power.

China is particularly vulnerable, though not helpless. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies estimates that about half of China’s crude imports and roughly one-third of its LNG come from the Middle East. According to comprehensive market monitoring and tanker-tracking data, unofficial Iranian oil flows to China reached an average of approximately 1.38 million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2025 (Kpler; Vortexa). While some short-term fluctuations were observed in early 2025, the annual average remained robust, consistently exceeding the 1.3 million marks. Reuters and financial analysts report that China purchased more than 80 percent of Iran’s total shipped crude throughout the year (Reuters; Modern Diplomacy). This volume represents approximately 13.4 percent of China’s total seaborne oil imports, underscoring Iran’s critical, albeit unofficial, role in Beijing’s energy security strategy despite ongoing international sanctions (Energy Policy Research Foundation). In this context, pressure on Iran also indirectly affects a vital part of the Chinese economy. However, the strategic significance should not be overstated. The EIA indicates that China’s crude supply sources are diverse, with Russia and Saudi Arabia remaining its top suppliers in 2024, while the IEA’s Global Energy Review shows China continuing to lead global renewable capacity growth. Blocking Iranian flows can cause friction, uncertainty, and increased costs, but it is unlikely to fundamentally derail China’s rise on its own.

The situation in Venezuela aligns with this perspective. Even before the January 2026 US unilateral and unlawful military strike that led to Nicolás Maduro’s kidnapping, Venezuelan crude oil was not a key element of Chinese energy security. Reuters reported that, in the first half of 2019, China imported around 350,000 barrels of Venezuelan crude daily—about 3.5 percent of its total imports. In 2025, Reuters estimated Chinese imports from Venezuela at approximately 470,000 barrels per day, or roughly 4.5 percent of China’s seaborne crude imports. A later Reuters report stated that Venezuelan supply accounted for only about 4 percent of China’s crude imports. The message is clear: Venezuela has been a useful supplier to China due to its discounts and political convenience, but not a vital part of Chinese energy security. Disrupting one sanctioned supplier may be strategically significant; however, it is not automatically a decisive move.

There is also a broader distribution issue. An oil price spike caused by war would hurt not only Asia but also Europe. The IEA has already warned of renewed volatility in the gas market and ongoing pressure on European competitiveness, while its Electricity 2026 report notes that electricity prices for energy-intensive industries in the European Union remained roughly twice US levels in 2025. In contrast, the EIA indicates that the US has been a net petroleum exporter since 2020, and its world oil transit chokepoints analysis shows that US imports from Persian Gulf countries have decreased significantly over time. The energy situation is real and important—but in the larger power struggle, it appears as a meaningful yet still limited factor rather than a decisive tool of containment.

Despite all these facts and figures, it would be inaccurate to view the current crisis as just a repeat of the 1970s. The main issue is not only scarcity but also how conflict is framed, limited, and strategically handled. The war is better understood as a managed crisis within a larger shift in global order: force is used, but not arbitrarily; escalation is tolerated, but only to a certain extent; legitimacy is not universal but gradually built through temporary alliances and selective diplomatic efforts. In this context, energy is more than just a commodity at risk. It is a vital part of a broader strategic struggle.

Israel’s Security Dilemma and the Logic of Securitization

As R. Gilpin puts it, history suggests that moments of major power shifts or systemic transitions do not simply unsettle small and middle powers; they also redistribute opportunity. Some regional actors use great-power rivalryimperial retreat, or strategic ambiguity to rise above their original weight—as Piedmont-Sardinia did in the wake of the Crimean War, Meiji Japan under the pressure of Western encroachment, and Ibn Saud amid the collapse of Ottoman authority. Some others, for instance, misread the same fluidity and overreach, as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did in 1990, when a bid for regional expansion triggered the first major post–Cold War crisis and ended in rapid military defeat. In this sense, periods of power transition rarely leave the regional tier untouched: they create openings for some states to rise and traps for others to collapse. Israel’s conduct in the present phase of global power transition suggests that it is trying to exploit precisely such a window—not merely reacting to uncertainty but attempting to convert it into a regional hegemonic opportunity.

As US primacy becomes more contested and the Middle East is reorganized by overlapping energy, security, and corridor politics, Israel appears to be pursuing a dual strategy of expansion through both partnership and coercion. Besides, on the side of deterrence, its aggressive stance on war also reflects Israel’s recognizable security calculation. For years, Iranian missile capabilities, proxy networks, and nuclear advances have been cast in Israeli strategic discourse as existential or near-existential threats. From that vantage point, the February 2026 campaign is intelligible even if it is not thereby rendered lawful or strategically prudent. Once a hostile regime is defined as a total strategic danger, the political threshold for extraordinary measures falls: Preemptive force, regime-degrading strikes, regional militarization, and external coalition-building become easier to justify.

That said, deepening structured cooperation with states can help establish a favorable regional order. In that context, Israel is using punitive military actions against adversaries such as Iran, Syria, Hamas, and allied armed groups to weaken hostile capabilities, restore deterrence, and expand its strategic maneuvering spaceThis suggests that Israel is acting less like a besieged small state and more like an aspiring regional poweraiming to secure regional dominance before the emerging multipolar order becomes less accommodating. This also explains why the current conflict setup is not just about immediate battlefield outcomes but about shaping the future political landscape of the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader Middle East. 

The partnership aspect of this strategy is particularly evident in the Eastern Mediterranean. Israel’s trilateral framework with Greece and Cyprus has evolved well beyond ad hoc diplomacy into a more institutionalized framework for security, maritime coordination, energy cooperation, connectivity, and technological partnership, sharply excluding Turkey. The December 2025 joint declaration explicitly linked this cooperation to natural gas development, electricity interconnectors, energy security, the Great Sea Interconnector, and the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), The emerging axis is supported by tangible defense ties: Greece has approved the purchase of Israeli PULS rocket systems, and Reuters has reported plans to strengthen joint exercises among Greece, Israel, and Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Egypt, Greece, and Cyprus have solidified their own trilateral format focused on maritime security, natural gas infrastructure, energy diversification, and UNCLOS-based delimitation. The broader framework connecting Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel is the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which institutionalizes regional gas cooperation and uses energy as a tool for political unity. Collectively, these arrangements go beyond typical bilateral or trilateral diplomacy; they are forming the backbone of an emerging Eastern Mediterranean order, with Israel playing an increasingly central role.

Rising patterns show that Israel’s Mediterranean strategy is now part of a broader geo-economic vision extending from the Caspian Sea in the Caucasus-Central Asia region to India and Europe. In his February 2026 address to the Knesset, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi described India and Israel as sharing “ancient civilizational ties” and called for deeper cooperation through IMEC and I2U2, giving the relationship a geopolitical depth beyond transactional defense ties. This matters because Israel’s partnerships are no longer confined to immediate neighbors; they are increasingly tied to larger corridor projects, technology platforms, and Indo-Middle Eastern alignments. This relationship is anchored in the geopolitical logic of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), a proposed multimodal route linking India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Israel, with maritime, rail, energy, and digital components converging on Israel’s Mediterranean gateway, and again excluding Turkey. Promoted by its backers as a faster and more resilient alternative to existing routes—and widely read as part of a broader effort to balance China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—IMEC helps explain why India–Israel ties now extend beyond bilateral cooperation into the strategic architecture of an emerging Indo-Mediterranean order.

At the same time, not every actor moving closer to Israel should be labeled as part of an open pro-Israel bloc. Saudi Arabia still publicly conditionally normalizes relations on Palestinian statehood, yet its strategic interests overlap with Israel’s on issues such as containing Iran, protecting energy supplies, and maintaining a favorable regional balance. The new Syrian leadership’s revived US-mediated security talks with Israel present an even clearer example of pragmatic convergence. These are not full alliances, but they do show that Israel is operating in an environment where former or potential adversaries are increasingly involved in patterns of coordination, deconfliction, or selective accommodation. The broader point is that Israel is trying to transform multipolar disorder into a hierarchical regional order: building networks where possible, managing enemies where necessary, and using both cooperation and calibrated force to expand the sphere within which it can act as the dominant regional power.

Strategic Compartmentalization and the Avoidance of a Civilizational Trap

This is where Samuel Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations thesis becomes relevant—though not in the crude sense often invoked in moments of war. Huntington argued that post-Cold War conflicts would increasingly follow cultural and religious fault lines. Yet the emerging strategy of Washington and its regional allies is not to embrace such a clash outright, but to instrumentalize its logic selectively while containing its broader consequences. 

According to SIPRI, Israel is widely recognized to possess a nuclear arsenal. Meanwhile, the International Court of Justice has ruled that Israel’s ongoing presence in the occupied Palestinian territory is illegal, and repeated UN reports under Security Council Resolution 2334 continue to document settlement expansion. At the same time, UN humanitarian reports recorded that, by early December 2025, Gaza’s Ministry of Health reported more than 70,000 Palestinians killed, over 170,000 injured, and mass displacement on a devastating scale. Taken together, these facts make any claim that Israeli actions remain firmly within a stable zone of legal and moral legitimacy highly questionable.

Thus, the US-Israeli challenge has never been limited to threat detection alone. It has also involved managing the political fallout from their responses. From Trump’s and Netanyahu’s perspectives, the operation against Iran needed to be framed in a way that preserved as much international legitimacy as possible, even when a clear legal justification was difficult to establish. At the same time, the conflict had to be prevented from escalating into a civilizational clash that could push Muslim-majority societies toward China and expand Beijing’s strategic influence across the Global South. Here, deeper contradictions become unavoidable. 

Iran and Hamas are cast as securitized and containable threats, while Gulf monarchies and other Muslim-majority states are engaged through donor diplomacy, regime-security guarantees, and calibrated alliance management. The objective is not simply to fight an adversary, but to prevent the war from consolidating an anti-Western political identity across the broader Muslim world—especially at a moment when parts of the Global South are drifting toward more China-friendly alignments.

This is precisely where the current war differs from a simple Huntingtonian interpretation. The conflict has not been allowed to evolve into a straightforward “West versus Islam” narrative. Instead, much of the diplomatic framework has sought to confine it to a narrower Iran-Hamas security issue. The Council on Foreign Relations noted that the Board of Peace relied heavily on participation from Gulf Arabs and Central Asians, while excluding direct Palestinian political representation at the highest levels of decision-making. Conversely, the UN Human Rights Office sharply criticized this setup as incompatible with a reparative, rights-based approach to reconstruction. From an analytical perspective, however, the main point is not whether the structure is morally convincing. It is that the structure acts as a mechanism of compartmentalization: some actors are isolated as threats to be disarmed or neutralized, while others are kept within a cooperative framework of reconstruction, stabilization, and donor politics.

The regional response confirms that interpretation. In their extraordinary GCC-EU joint statement, Gulf and European ministers condemned Iran’s attacks on GCC states, emphasized that GCC territories had not been used to launch attacks against Iran, invoked self-defense, and highlighted the importance of protecting maritime routes, supply chains, and energy market stability. Meanwhile, Carnegie noted that Gulf monarchies are caught between Iranian escalation and US recklessness, with their main focus on preserving fragile economic and security systems. This is not the language of a unified civilizational bloc; it is the language of regime survival. Nor did the broader Muslim political field unify into a single anti-Western Front. The OIC’s condemnation of Israeli attacks on Iran coexists with muted and ambivalent official Gulf reactions, while AP reporting emphasized elite anger at the US for exposing Gulf states to retaliation without sufficient warning or protection. As a European Council joint statement states, what emerged was fragmentation rather than bloc unity—and that fragmentation was not accidental but part of the crisis’s strategic outcome.

As a conclusion to this part, Gulf monarchies are neither full participants in an anti-Iran crusade nor members of an anti-Western camp. They are defensive actors seeking to preserve commercial credibility, domestic order, and external security amid a war they did not want. That posture is inherently compartmentalizing. It seeks to prevent regional collapse without fully endorsing the strategic logic that produced the crisis in the first place.

Washington’s Domestic Politics and the Uses of External Crisis

The domestic American context also matters, although it should be approached with analytical caution. While the operational details of the strike on Iran are often examined solely from a kinetic perspective, the decision-making process cannot be separated from the Trump administration’s increasing domestic vulnerabilities. The kinetic action serves as the ultimate “escape forward,” where the smoke of external conflict hides the fire of internal issues. Notably, two factors—the recently disclosed Epstein Scandal and the motivations of Trump’s eschatological cabinet—are significant. 

DOJ/FBI memorandum issued in July 2025 stated that investigators found no evidence of a Jeffrey Epstein “client list.” However, in March 2026, the Associated Press reported that newly disclosed files—previously omitted due to an alleged coding error—contained strong allegations involving Donald Trump. While this may not directly confirm a causal link between scandal exposure and war-making, as the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation note, it nonetheless supports a more defensible argument: a scandal-ridden domestic environment can increase the short-term political value of external escalation by diverting scrutiny, reinforcing partisan discipline, and shifting media focus to security rather than accountability.

Beyond the tactical use of distraction, this pressure is increasingly driven by a fundamentalist-Christian elite that has gained unprecedented influence within the cabinet. The appointment of Christian-Zionist ideologues to key bureaucratic positions in the US and diplomatic roles abroad, especially in Israel and the surrounding region, shows that the administration’s foreign policies are being guided by eschatological beliefs. The recent gathering of prominent pastors to “anoint” the President for a perceived war acts as a strategic response to the Epstein disclosures. By portraying the President as a Cyrus-figure—a flawed vessel chosen for divine geopolitical realignment—this faction provides a moral cover that redefines personal scandal as part of spiritual warfare.

In this context, Epstein’s emergence as a posthumous influence agent suggests that the timing of these disclosures may be less coincidental and more coercive. Trapped between the threat of legal disgrace and the demands of his Dominionist base, the President’s move toward external escalation becomes an expected outcome of survival politics. The combination of these allegations with radical religious rhetoric shows that the administration is being pushed into a policy space where aggression is used as the main tool for maintaining domestic stability and ideological legitimacy.

Europe’s Passive Alignment with Trump’s Vision

Europe now appears less as a strategic leader and more as a sign of Western division. Although it remains an important economic player, its geopolitical influence is diminishing. It is a giant in market size, but surprisingly weak in political unity, strategic direction, and external influence. Its direct reliance on Hormuz crude is lower than Asia’s, but it remains highly vulnerable to energy price shocks, industrial setbacks, and alliance pressures. What is especially notable is that Europe has faced the recent escalation in the Middle East while transatlantic relations are already strained. A recent European Parliament study notes that since early 2025, EU-US relations have been increasingly tense over NATO, Greenland, Ukraine, trade, technology, climate, and China, indicating a deeper split in strategic visions across the Atlantic. A recent ECPS Report concurs, finding that the transatlantic relationship has reached a turning point under Trump-era right-wing populism, with erosion in security, trade, international institutions, and democratic norms. In this context, Europe faces the Iran-Israel crisis not with confidence, but amid broader geopolitical confusion. 

Yet this is exactly what reveals Europe’s muted stance on Israel. While Washington has become a source of pressure and unpredictability for Europe, the EU has struggled to develop a clear and independent position on Israel. This silence signifies more a weakness than a deliberate strategy: leadership gaps, the lack of a strong, shared perspective within the Union, and the lingering influence of Cold War-era habits of outsourcing hard security to the US. The ECPS volume is especially useful here because it views the current Atlantic crisis not as isolated turbulence but as a systemic shift that requires greater European agency and strategic independence. Europe’s relative passivity, then, should be seen not just as deference but as a sign of unpreparedness: a wealthy political bloc that has yet to turn economic influence into geopolitical power.

Conclusion

The 2026 war with Iran should be seen as more than just a regional military conflict or a temporary energy crisis. It reveals a broader shift in the global order, in which the lines between war, energy security, alliance politics, and narrative control are increasingly blurred. What is emerging isn’t a return to a stable US-centered system, nor a fully developed multipolar balance, but rather a fragmented and coercive landscape. In this environment, major powers, regional players, and smaller states seek to gain advantages through selective alliances, limited escalation, and compartmentalized crisis management. In this context, Israel has acted with unusual clarity, trying to turn global uncertainty into regional dominance through military deterrence, strategic partnerships, and corridor politics. The Gulf monarchies sit at a crucial middle ground, balancing pressure, exposure, and opportunities. Europe, on the other hand, seems less a driver of outcomes than a reflection of Western fatigue—economically significant, politically hesitant, and strategically unprepared for a world where American leadership has become both less dependable and more disruptive.

The deeper significance of this moment lies specifically here. The crisis isn’t just about Iran, or even about the immediate future of the Middle East. It’s about how power is exercised in an era when the liberal language of rules, institutions, and multilateral restraint persists but increasingly lacks the material cohesion or political authority that once sustained it. Strategic compartmentalization has become the preferred way to manage disorder: adversaries are securitized and targeted, partners are reassured and selectively brought in, and broader civilizational escalation is contained rather than solved. This might bring temporary stability, but it does so by reinforcing a new international logic—one characterized by differentiated legitimacy, asymmetrical coercion, and declining normative consistency. The real lesson of the Iran war, then, isn’t just that energy geopolitics has returned, but that it now functions within a more severe and openly hierarchical struggle over who will shape the regional and global order to come.


 

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Oil Tanker

Energy Geopolitics from Hormuz to Lagos: Commodity Shocks and African Vulnerability

In this analysis, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines how geopolitical tensions around the strategic oil chokepoint of the Strait of Hormuz transmit economic shocks across the global political economy and disproportionately affect African states. Because many African economies remain highly dependent on commodity exports and imported energy, oil price volatility quickly translates into inflation, fiscal stress, and social pressure. Even oil-exporting countries such as Nigeria face paradoxical effects, benefiting from higher crude revenues while simultaneously suffering from rising domestic fuel costs. These inflationary pressures can fuel economic discontent, weaken government legitimacy, and create fertile ground for populist mobilization. Dr. Solaja argues that recurrent commodity shocks expose deep structural vulnerabilities, underscoring the need for economic diversification, energy transition, and stronger regional integration to build resilience.

By Oludele Solaja*

Geopolitical conflicts rarely stay within their battlefield boundaries. In a world with integrated economy, war in strategic energy corridor would swiftly lead to inflation, political instability and governmental pressures far from conflict. Geopolitical tensions in the strategic energy corridor are central to the functioning of the global political economy. The Strait of Hormuz holds a peculiar important position in the transit routes among all. Some one fifth of the global petroleum liquids passes through the narrow maritime passage in between Iran and Arabian Peninsula (US Energy Information Administration, 2023), hence the perception of armed conflict even if it’s just the rumor of one in the area would lead to an immediate volatility shock in the global oil market.

Not just the physical supply disruptions but the uncertainty itself would create price volatility. Higher cost of insuring the vessels, shifting of the routes and market responses all contribute to the volatility as well. Scholars of energy politics have always acknowledged that oil markets are intrinsically connected with national security and strategic rivalry (Bridge & Le Billon, 2017). As such, conflict occurring in energy producing areas could have economic impact across nations without any boundaries.

The effects on the developing nations would be even worse. World Bank warns that such shocks from the Middle Eastern energy supply chains could push the oil prices beyond $100/barrel, creating inflation pressure and fiscal burden upon developing nations. In an integrated global economy, a geopolitical shock will be transmitted across the commodity supply chain. Energy supply, food production, transportation network and capital flow are all interconnected.

Inflation Transmission and African Political Economy

When energy prices shock happens in African countries, typically there are two related effects: windfall profit to oil exporters, and inflationary pressure to domestic markets.

On one hand, oil exporters like Nigeria, Angola and Algeria could profit from rising crude oil prices through high export revenues and balance of payments surplus. In theory, windfalls can stabilize fiscal conditions and support increase development expenditure. Nevertheless, political economy literature argues that commodity windfalls often reproduce and strengthen existing vulnerabilities of the economies, which fail to transform into sustainable development instead of generating rent-seeking behavior without firm institutions and diversified economies (Auty, 2001; Ross, 2012).

On the other hand, rising global oil prices will transmit inflation through the domestic economies. Transportation costs rise with higher fuel prices, pushing the price up of goods including foods, which need logistics and transportation, as well as costs for manufactured goods and fertilizers for farming. Electricity costs are also higher and so forth.

In Nigeria, this paradox is crystal clear. Despite being one of Africa’s biggest exporters of crude oil, Nigeria needs to import its supply of refined petroleum products as its own refining capacity is insufficient. This creates two divergent effects at the same time: Nigeria has to pay high fuel import costs from imported refined oil, while export revenue is expected to rise with higher crude prices. Informal sector workers who are in the vast majority in Nigerian labor market would experience increasing cost of living.

The consequences for oil-importing African countries are even harsher. Rising costs of fuel import not only leads to greater trade deficit and depreciation of national currency but also increase countries’ exposure to sovereign debt distress.

Commodity Shocks and Politics of Economic Discontent

The macroeconomic impact beyond energy sector can reshape the domestic political landscape by raising costs of living especially in the vulnerable societies. Political scientists have noted that a sudden increase in living costs can cause popular unrest, weaken government legitimacy, and contribute to the emergence of populism (Rodrik, 2018; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015).

In this case, a global economic shock would have translated into domestic political pressure. When confronting with inflation pressures, African governments often are compelled to subsidize the consumption of oil or enforce price caps, which have proven to undermine fiscal positions and postpone necessary structural adjustments. Repeated commodity shocks in institutionally weak economies can reproduce the same vicious cycles of economic discontent and political instability.

Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors therefore do more than creating turbulence for economies. They challenge domestic political legitimacy by accentuating conflicts between different strata of society about inflation, social welfare, and commodity distribution.

Structural Vulnerability in Commodity-dependent Economies

All of the aforementioned highlights the inherent structural vulnerabilities of commodity-dependent economic systems. Dependency theorists have consistently asserted that countries that depend on exports of primary commodities are exposed to volatility in international commodity markets (Frank, 1967; Amin, 1976). Moreover, the “resource curse” debate emphasizes rent seeking, volatility, and limited industrial development in extracting economies (Ross, 2012).

Energy geopolitical shock can only intensify this vulnerability. Shipping disruptions or higher freight costs resulting from higher insurance fees due to conflict at Persian Gulf can be re-routed around Africa’s Cape of Good Hope, further intensifying the costs borne by all importing nations, especially those relying on food imports, manufactured goods and agricultural inputs. In such cases, the impacts of wars fought at energy corridors are redistributed across the commodity markets that link the Strait of Hormuz to consumers across a faraway land.

Policy Implications: Building Resilience

Mitigating vulnerability of geopolitical commodity shocks requires a long-term perspective beyond ad hoc management strategies. The first thing for African countries is to speed up economic diversification (industrialization and value adding in agriculture), because it will lead to sustainable development not only by reducing dependence on the exports of oil. Secondly, investment in infrastructure and on renewable energies will lead to energy sustainability in African countries and reduces the reliance on imported refined goods. Third, strengthen the social safety net (cash transfers, food security program, etc.) can shield the poorest households from inflationary shocks. Fourth, expand intra-African trade using the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) will make the region reduce dependence on unstable international commodity market.

Conclusion

Volatility in strategic energy corridors such as the Strait of Hormuz is a manifestation of geopolitical tensions’ spread across the global political economy. For Africa’s commodity-dependent economies, it amplifies the persistent structural vulnerabilities that are embedded in extraction-based development strategies. Short term export gains associated with rising prices rarely outweigh the subsequent inflationary pressures and fiscal instability in the longer run. Unless these development strategies are actively reformed to emphasize diversification, energy transition and resilience, each commodity shock following every conflict will result in the similar outcomes: temporary windfall gains followed by inflation-induced hardship and fragile development. Geopolitical conflicts in energy corridors, hence, are not just regional security issues; they are fundamentally tests of structural resilience in the development agenda of the Global South.


(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.


 

References

Amin, S. (1976). Unequal development: An essay on the social formations of peripheral capitalism. Monthly Review Press.

Auty, R. (2001). Resource abundance and economic development. Oxford University Press.

Bridge, G., & Le Billon, P. (2017). Oil. Polity Press.

Frank, A. G. (1967). Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America. Monthly Review Press.

Kriesi, H., & Pappas, T. (2015). European populism in the shadow of the Great Recession. ECPR Press.

Rodrik, D. (2018). “Populism and the economics of globalization.” Journal of International Business Policy, 1(1–2), 12–33.

Ross, M. (2012). The oil curse: How petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations. Princeton University Press.

U.S. Energy Information Administration. (2023). World oil transit chokepointshttps://www.eia.gov

World Bank. (2023). Commodity markets outlook. World Bank.

Emblem of the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland. Photo: Dreamstime.

From the ‘End of History’ to the ‘End of a Fiction’: What Davos 2026 Really Announced

Davos 2026 revealed a global order no longer converging on a single liberal model, but sliding into a harsher era in which power increasingly outweighs rules and “integration” is reframed as vulnerability. The most striking paradox was that this diagnosis came not from critics at the margins, but from the system’s own architects—transforming elite “candor” into a strategy for managing declining legitimacy. In a world shaped by fragmentation and coercive interdependence, China’s state-capitalist model is increasingly perceived as a more effective crisis-response framework, while the United States and Europe drift toward a troubling hybrid: adopting not China’s developmental strengths, but its coercive instruments of control. This dynamic reflects an emerging logic of reverse convergence—the West is no longer guiding the world toward liberalism, but being pulled toward the governance style of its principal rival.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

The Davos platform can be seen as a stage where dominant actors test narratives, identify legitimacy losses, and modify the public vocabulary they use to govern (or justify governing). It rarely makes formal decisions; instead, it indicates what elites believe they can still publicly defend—and what they can no longer convincingly pretend. Davos 2026, in that sense, can be viewed less as a policy summit and more as a diagnosis of the regime.

In this context, Davos 2026 is significant because the words spoken inside the room seemed less like a reaffirmation of the post-1990 liberal-global order and more like an early draft of its obituary. Larry Fink, Interim Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and CEO of BlackRock—one of the world’s largest asset managers—started with a blunt admission that the world trusts Davos and the WEF’s ability to shape the future “far less,” warning that the forum risks seeming “out of step with the moment: elites in an age of populism” (Fink, 2026). Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, took it even further. He suggested that the problem isn’t just declining trust in institutions; it’s the collapse of the narrative foundations of the “rules-based liberal multilateral order” itself. He described “the end of a pleasant fiction… and the beginning of a harsh reality,” emphasizing that “we are in the midst of a rupture, not a transition” (Carney, 2026).

If anything was “announced,” then it was not a new treaty or a coordinated policy package. It was an elite confession: the old legitimating story no longer works.

What Exactly Is Ending?

The natural questions—What was declared at Davos? Is it the end of the Western system? Is Chinese-style state capitalism rising? —are the right ones. But they require careful separation of the West as power from the West as ideology, and of neoliberal globalization from liberal democracy. What seems to be ending is not “the West” as a geographical or civilizational fact, but a historically specific settlement—visible in three interlocking dimensions.

The end of the convergence myth: One part of the story traces back to assumptions about nineteenth- and twentieth-century modernization. Classical modernization thinking regarded history as a linear, stage-like process where societies would converge toward a single “advanced” model through diffusion, emulation, and integration—so that cross-civilizational differences would eventually appear as “time lags,” not alternative paths (Apter, 1965; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Rostow, 1960). In that framework, modernity was not just one option among many; it was seen as the expected endpoint of development.

Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis—initially presented as an essay and later expanded into a book—was a late-twentieth-century extension of this modernization perspective (Fukuyama, 1989, 1992). After the fall of Soviet-style planning, liberal capitalism seemed not just victorious but final: no significant systemic challengers remained, and future conflicts were seen as minor issues rather than real alternatives.

Davos 2026, however, seemed to quietly acknowledge that this convergence theory has run its course. After decades of “learning-by-doing” globalization, the idea that marketization, integration, and digitization would inevitably lead to liberal-democratic outcomes has become less convincing. Among many others, Öztürk (2025) calls this a fundamental “liberal fallacy,” revealed by post-2008 stagnation, growing inequality, and the resilience of authoritarian governance under capitalist conditions.

The decline of the authority of the “rules-based order” (as performance): A second aspect involves the public authority of institutional rules. Carney’s remarks illustrated a familiar phenomenon: states show belief in a rules-based order—displaying the “sign” publicly—while privately recognizing how often the rules break down in practice (Carney, 2026). His metaphor strongly mirrors Václav Havel’s assessment of late-socialist legitimacy: the system’s survival relied on ritualistic compliance and public participation in an official fiction, even when no one truly believed it (Havel, 1978).

In modern global politics, this is the credibility crisis of liberal internationalism: the rules exist, but enforcement seems selective; the universal language stays, but power distribution shapes outcomes. This is exactly where realism comes back—sometimes openly, sometimes disguised as “values-based pragmatism.”

The end of elite capitalism’s moral economy: Third, Davos 2026 hosted a legitimacy check on elite-led capitalism itself. Fink’s insistence that prosperity cannot be reduced to total GDP gains or stock-market success implicitly admits what critics have argued for decades: growth narratives do not automatically generate social approval when the distribution of wealth is unfair, public services decline, and opportunities disappear (Fink, 2026; Piketty, 2020).

This line closely mirrors Robert F. Kennedy’s well-known critique of national income accounting, asserting that GDP can measure “everything… except that which makes life worthwhile” (Kennedy, 1968). What once seemed like fresh wisdom at Davos in 2026 now appears as delayed recognition: a long-overdue admission that the legitimacy of capitalism cannot rely solely on aggregate indicators. Taken together, these three dimensions do not imply “the end of the West.” They signify the end of the West’s story about itself—the self-description of a system that universalizes its model as destiny, naturalizes its institutions as neutral rules, and considers legitimacy to be the automatic result of growth. Historically, when a hegemonic story collapses, systems rarely vanish overnight; instead, they change and adapt.

The Crisis of Corporate Capitalism as a Reflection of the System

Öztürk’s (2025) “reverse convergence” hypothesis provides one of the clearest ways to interpret Davos 2026. It avoids two lazy conclusions— (1) “China is replacing the West,” and (2) “nothing changes; it’s only noise”—by arguing that the direction of convergence has reversed. Liberal democracies are increasingly adopting illiberal governance techniques (expanded surveillance, executive discretion, securitized policy frames, controlled pluralism), while authoritarian regimes are adopting capitalist tools (market mechanisms, technological dynamism, corporate scale) without liberalizing. This is not ideological convergence through persuasion. It is functional convergence driven by systemic pressure.

Here, Karl Polanyi’s concept of the “double movement” becomes central: disembedded markets cause social division and political backlash, but the protective countermovement can be seized—redirected into nationalist, exclusionary, or authoritarian forms instead of democratic re-embedding (Polanyi, 1944). Fernand Braudel’s distinction is also important: capitalism is not the same as competitive markets; it is often a structure of lasting domination shielded from democratic accountability (Braudel, 1982, 1984).

Add the modern layer of digital political economy. The tools of governance increasingly function through infrastructures of data extraction, algorithmic control, and dependency rather than through persuasion or consent. This is the shared domain of surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2019), vectoral power and information monopolies (Wark, 2004, 2019), and “techno-feudal” rent extraction via digital platforms and cloud infrastructures (Varoufakis, 2023). In this view, Davos 2026 was not just a geopolitical event; it also revealed that corporate capitalism has created a legitimacy gap that traditional liberal narratives can no longer fill.

When Fink’s speech is analyzed through the perspectives of Polanyi and Braudel, it seems to outline a plan to restore legitimacy. He urged the WEF to “regain trust,” boost participation, and modernize the language used to defend capitalism (Fink, 2026). Even if the diagnosis is sound, the messenger presents a problem. The contradiction is structural: the credibility crisis he describes is closely linked to the financial and corporate structures that BlackRock represents. When the “doctor” is also one of the system’s most powerful beneficiaries, criticism is often seen as mere damage control by elites rather than genuine reformist bravery. 

Fink also emphasized that prosperity must become distributive, turning “more people into owners of growth,” not spectators (Fink, 2026). Yet this is where Davos rhetoric regularly stalls: it acknowledges the legitimacy problem but often proposes solutions at the level of communication rather than at the level of reconstruction. The 2026 shift, then, is not the defense of globalization’s moral premise; it is an attempt to rewrite capitalism’s legitimacy contract amid mass distrust.

A key concern running through the Davos discussions about AI is anxiety. The worry is that AI will repeat the distributional betrayal of globalization: early benefits go to owners of data, compute, models, and platforms, while the social costs are spread out to others. Without strong redistribution and governance, AI risks being less of a productivity leap and more of a new enclosure system—worsening dependence instead of expanding opportunities (Zuboff, 2019; Varoufakis, 2023).

From Benign Interdependence to Fortress Logic

Carney’s intervention was more impactful because it explicitly addressed what “trust” rhetoric often overlooks: the geopolitical and geoeconomic rupture of the rules-based order. His speech repeatedly suggested that the liberal promise of mutual interdependence has run its course. Integration can become a source of vulnerability and subjugation, leading states to pursue strategic autonomy in energy, food, critical minerals, finance, and supply chains (Carney, 2026).

At one point, Carney invoked a brutally realistic moral: “the strong can do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.” The phrase echoes the Melian Dialogue in Thucydides—a canonical statement of power politics rationality (Thucydides, trans. 1972). The significance is not the originality of the reference; it is that Davos discourse now treats such realism as publicly speakable.

This is where “weaponized interdependence” becomes relevant: network power can be transformed into coercion when states or firms control critical chokepoints in finance, infrastructure, trade, and digital platforms (Farrell & Newman, 2019). Carney’s prescription—strategic autonomy or a “world of fortresses”—is therefore less a nationalist shift than an acknowledgment that global integration is no longer seen as harmless.

Seen from the broader perspective of globalization discourse, Davos 2026 signifies a significant reversal of the assumptions that characterized the early 2000s. Thomas Friedman’s The World Is Flat summarized the era’s belief that digital connectivity and integrated supply chains were “flattening” the world into a more open, opportunity-filled, and ultimately convergent space (Friedman, 2005). Two decades later, David J. Lynch’s The World’s Worst Bet reads like an obituary for that optimism: globalization now seems less like a benign force for shared prosperity and more like a risky gamble that has weakened industrial resilience, increased inequality, empowered strategic competitors, and fueled political backlash in the West (Lynch, 2025). The transition from “flatness” to “worst bet” reflects the same shift Carney now describes in geopolitical terms: integration is no longer assumed to be mutually beneficial; it is increasingly viewed as a potential pathway to dependence, coercion, and subjugation (Carney, 2026; Friedman, 2005; Lynch, 2025).

This closely aligns with Amitav Acharya’s argument that the liberal “rules-based order” was never entirely universal; it functioned as a Western-centered system with selective membership and inconsistent enforcement. What follows, according to Acharya, is not just “multipolarity,” but a decentralized “multiplex” world—more diverse, more contested, and less controlled by a single hegemon (Acharya, 2017; Acharya, 2018). Even defenders sympathetic to the liberal order acknowledge its historically Western core and its expansion after the Cold War (Ikenberry, 2008, 2018). 

Davos 2026, therefore, seemed like a moment when elites started speaking more openly than before about a world they can no longer describe as heading toward a single institutional model. However, there is a deeper contradiction at Davos: many of the harshest critiques in 2026 were made not by independent critics but by the system’s own architects—CEOs, senior officials, and high-level political leaders. This doesn’t invalidate their diagnosis, but it should change how we interpret it: what looks like honesty may also be a form of preemptive storytelling, a controlled version of systemic self-criticism aimed at maintaining core power structures while giving rhetorical ground.

The US–EU–China Triangle: Three Paths, One Convergent Pressure

Against this backdrop, the question facing mainstream systems is no longer just whether globalization can be “fixed,” but which governance model is increasingly seen as the better response to a high-stress world full of uncertainty, fragmentation, and coercive interdependence. Under conditions of heightened geopolitical competition, supply-chain insecurity, volatility in energy and food, and rapid technological rivalry, the focus is quietly shifting toward the idea that China’s model—often called socialist state capitalism—may provide faster, more disciplined, and more strategically coordinated solutions than the liberal market approach, mainly because it can mobilize resources, direct finance, and prioritize long-term national goals. In this context, Davos 2026 didn’t just expose a legitimacy crisis; it also pointed to a growing competition over “effective modernity,” where resilience and the ability to command are beginning to matter more than openness and procedural legitimacy.

Indeed, an even more concerning sign is emerging from within the West itself: leading trends in the United States and the European Union increasingly indicate that what they are taking from China is not its potentially positive strengths—such as developmental coordination or strategic industrial policy—but rather its negative governance traits: securitization, surveillance expansion, executive centralization, and the normalization of emergency-style rule. This creates a growing zone of hybridization, where liberal democracies preserve electoral rituals while gradually adopting illiberal techniques of control and exclusion. In other words, the West seems to be entering a phase of reverse convergence—a process where the “center” shifts toward the logic of its challenger, often in its most coercive forms—a dynamic that I will explore in detail.

Öztürk’s (2025) structured comparison across five dimensions—surveillance regimes, populist discourse, regulatory architecture, market concentration, and distributional outcomes—acts like a decoder for Davos 2026. It does not claim that the US, EU, and China are becoming identical. Instead, it argues that all three are responding to the same structural pressures—tech-driven control, oligopolistic concentration, legitimacy erosion—while doing so through different institutional legacies.

China’s large-scale integration of state and capital shows that advanced capitalism can exist without liberal democracy. It combines market activity and corporate growth within one-party control, increasingly extending worldwide through infrastructure, standards, and digital systems (Callahan, 2016; Creemers, 2018; Dai, 2020). Its governance tools—such as data-driven monitoring, biometric systems, and ideological control of platforms—provide an attractive model for regimes dealing with insecurity and social unrest, even though it also poses legitimacy challenges (Greitens, 2020).

The United States’ hybrid drift shows how liberal democracy can weaken internally due to inequality, institutional capture, and polarization, especially after the 2008 crisis delegitimized traditional economic promises and heightened distrust between elites and the public (Öztürk, 2025). Illiberal populism has proved to be a resilient narrative ecosystem (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Mounk, 2018). Meanwhile, corporate surveillance and algorithmic governance operate alongside expanding security measures, leading to convergence driven by technique rather than ideology (Zuboff, 2019).

The European Union’s regulatory ambition, even under legitimacy stress, stands as the strongest counterexample to simple convergence claims because it has built the most ambitious rights-based regulatory framework in the democratic world, especially in the digital area (Floridi, 2020; Véliz, 2021). However, it remains vulnerable to legitimacy stress: far-right normalization, internal rule-of-law conflicts, uneven fiscal capacity, and ongoing reliance on US platform power. Regulation can limit domination, but legitimacy ultimately depends on distributive foundations—not just technocracy (Brown, 2019; Piketty, 2020).

If one sentence embodies the West’s strategic trauma, it is this: China demonstrates that sophisticated capitalism can operate without liberal democracy—and at scale. The Davos concern is not just that China competes, but that China’s model is increasingly serving as a reference point for organizing power in the twenty-first century (Öztürk, 2025).

The Hidden Davos Declaration

If we summarize Davos 2026 into a single implicit statement, it is: The global order based on rules-based multilateralism, benign interdependence, and trickle-down legitimacy has reached a final crisis. What comes next is probably going to be centered around: i) strategic autonomy (energy, supply chains, critical minerals, digital sovereignty) (Carney, 2026), ii) narrative legitimacy repair (“inclusive prosperity,” participation, trust) (Fink, 2026). iii) technological control architectures (AI governance, surveillance trade-offs, platform regulation conflict) (Zuboff, 2019; Varoufakis, 2023), and iv) a reduced faith in universalism, and a greater acceptance of bloc rivalry, vulnerability management, and “value-based realism” (Acharya, 2017; Ikenberry, 2018).

This is why Davos 2026 felt like a turning point: elites are no longer pretending we still live in the 1990s. But the new order being outlined is not automatically democratic. It can just as easily shift toward market authoritarianism—combining capital preservation with control-first governance. A democratic solution is still conceptually possible: re-embedding markets in democratic institutions (Polanyi, 1944), rebuilding a distributive social contract (Piketty, 2020), and limiting both corporate and government power through enforceable rights (Floridi, 2020; Véliz, 2021). Davos 2026, however, raises a brutally practical question: Can democracies re-legitimate themselves quickly enough before surveillance, AI, and strategic autonomy become permanent justifications for executive insulation?

That question, more than any speech, was the true “announcement.”


 

References

Acharya, A. (2017). After liberal hegemony: The advent of a multiplex world order. Ethics & International Affairs, 31(3), 271–285. (Cambridge University Press & Assessment)

Acharya, A. (2018). The end of American world order (2nd ed.). Polity. (Wiley)

Apter, D. E. (1965). The politics of modernization. University of Chicago Press.

Braudel, F. (1982). The wheels of commerce (Vol. 2). Harper & Row.

Braudel, F. (1984). Civilization and capitalism, 15th–18th century: Volume 2—The wheels of commerce (S. Reynolds, Trans.). Harper & Row.

Brown, W. (2019). In the ruins of neoliberalism: The rise of antidemocratic politics in the West. Columbia University Press. (Columbia University Press).

Callahan, W. A. (2016). China dreams: 20 visions of the future. Oxford University Press.

Carney, M. (2026, January). Special address by Mark Carney, Prime Minister of Canada, at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting (Davos 2026). World Economic Forum. 

Creemers, R. (2018). China’s social credit system: An evolving practice of control. SSRN.

Dai, X. (2020). Enacting the social credit system: Governance through digital trust in China. Media, Culture & Society, 42(3), 408–423.

Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. International Security, 44(1), 42–79.

Fink, L. (2026). Remarks as Interim Co-Chair of the World Economic Forum at the 2026 Annual Meeting in Davos. LinkedIn.

Floridi, L. (2020). The fight for digital sovereignty: What it is, and why it matters, especially for the EU. Philosophy & Technology, 33(3), 369–378.

Friedman, T. L. (2005). The world is flat: A brief history of the twenty-first century. Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Fukuyama, F. (1989). The end of history? The National Interest, 16, 3–18.

Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. Free Press.

Greitens, S. C. (2020). Dealing with demands for surveillance. Journal of Democracy, 31(3), 15–29.

Havel, V. (1978). The power of the powerless. (Essay; English trans. published 1985).

Ikenberry, G. J. (2008). The rise of China and the future of the West: Can the liberal system survive? Foreign Affairs, 87(1), 23–37.

Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). The end of liberal international order? International Affairs, 94(1), 7–23.

Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence. Cambridge University Press.

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Lynch, D. J. (2025). The world’s worst bet: How the globalization gamble went wrong (and what would make it right). PublicAffairs.

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AI generated image by Cami Schefer / Dreamstime.

From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations During the Second Trump Administration

Please cite as:
Young, Alasdair R. (2026). “From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations during the Second Trump Administration.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00128

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Abstract
The transatlantic economic relationship is the most valuable intercontinental relationship in the world. It is also uniquely interpenetrated by European and American firms, which are extensively invested in each other’s markets. Absent a comprehensive trade agreement, the transatlantic economic relationship has been characterized by ‘muddling through’ within the broad framework of World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The economic relationship between the United States (US) and Europe has periodically been punctuated by sometimes intense trade disputes. Historically, these disputes were narrowly focused and left the bulk of the transatlantic economic relationship untouched. Starting in spring 2025, the Trump administration dramatically departed from past US trade policy, imposing sweeping ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on all US trade partners as well as industry-specific tariffs on national security grounds. The European Union (EU) sought accommodation rather than confrontation, leading to a framework agreement in August. This agreement is fragile, but while it holds, it is a manifestation of ‘muddling through’, albeit under worse trading conditions than before Trump returned to office. It is possible that the relationship could deteriorate further.

Keywords: European Union; retaliation; tariffs; trade; Donald Trump; United States

 

By Alasdair Young*

A Valuable and Previously Generally Calm Economic Relationship

The transatlantic economy is the ‘largest and wealthiest market in the world’ (Hamilton and Quinlen 2025, 2). Despite the current political focus on trade in goods, in which the United States has run a persistent deficit with the EU for more than a quarter century (Hamilton and Quinlen 2025, 12), the transatlantic economy is rooted primarily in mutual foreign direct investment (FDI). Almost 40% of the global stock of US FDI is in the EU, and EU firms account for slightly more than 40% all the FDI in the United States. The economic activity of transnational corporations in each other’s markets is therefore an important component of the transatlantic economy (see Table 7.1). The overall transatlantic economic relationship is much more balanced than a focus on just goods would suggest. Moreover, due to the extent of the investment relationship, 64% of US goods imports from Europe in 2023 occurred within the same firm as did 41% of US exports to Europe (Hamilton and Quinlen 2025, vii). Thus, goods imports are used as inputs in domestic production.

As there is no bilateral trade agreement between the EU and the United States – the most ambitious effort to create one, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, ended with the first Trump administration – their trading relationship is subject to the rules and the most-favoured nation (MFN) tariffs they agreed to under the World Trade Organization (WTO) (see Chapter 8 in this report). Despite not having a trade agreement, in 2024, their average tariff rates were low and comparable: 1.47% on US imports from the EU and 1.35% on EU imports from the United States (Barata da Rocha et al 2025).

Table 7.1. The transatlantic economic relationship (2024)
(US$ billion)

  United States to the European Union European Union to the United States US–EU balance
Goods 372 609 –237
Services 295 206 89
Value-added by FDI (2022) 494 456 38

Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (2025).

The transatlantic economic relationship has historically been relatively calm. It has, however, periodically been punctuated by high-profile trade disputes from the ‘Chicken Wars’ in the 1970s to disputes over bananas, hormone-treated beef, genetically modified crops and commercial aircraft subsidies in the 1990s and into the 2000s. Despite the attention they attracted, these disputes affected only a tiny fraction of transatlantic trade, and the more recent ones were contained within the WTO’s dispute settlement process (see Chapter 8 in this report). There were persistent, if episodic, efforts to try to address these transatlantic trade tensions, beginning with the ‘new transatlantic agenda’ in the 1990s. Historically, there was far more cooperation than conflict in the transatlantic economic relationship.

The Populist Turn in US Trade Policy

The transatlantic economic relationship has become much more confrontational under President Trump. He shares the populist view that trade is harmful and that the United States is being taken advantage of by foreigners, abetted by domestic elites (Baldwin 2025a, 1; Funke et al. 2023, 3280; Jones 2021, 29; and Box Figure 7.1). Trump considers the EU to be a particularly venal trade partner, describing it as ‘one of the most hostile and abusive taxing and tariffing authorities in the world’ (quoted in Gehrke 2025).

Figure 7.1 Trump’s populist view of trade

Globalization has made the financial elite who donate to politicians very wealthy. But it has left millions of our workers with nothing but poverty and heartache. … We allowed foreign countries to subsidize their goods, devalue their currencies, violate their agreements, and cheat in every way imaginable. – ‘Declaring America’s Economic Independence’, 28 June 2016.We must protect our borders from the ravages of other countries making our products, stealing our companies, and destroying our jobs. Protection will lead to great prosperity and strength. – First Inaugural Address, 20 January 2017.… over the last several decades, the United States gave away its leverage by allowing free access to its valuable market without obtaining fair treatment in return. This cost our country an important share of its industrial base and thereby its middle class and national security. – The President’s 2025 Trade Policy Agenda, 3 March 2025.For decades, our country has been looted, pillaged, raped and plundered by nations near and far, both friend and foe alike. American steelworkers, auto workers, farmers and skilled craftsmen…watched in anguish as foreign leaders have stolen our jobs, foreign cheaters have ransacked our factories, and foreign scavengers have torn apart our once beautiful American dream. — ‘Liberation Day’ speech, 2 April 2025. 

In line with this rhetoric, President Trump took several steps during his first term that deviated from traditional US trade policy (Grumbach et al 2022, 237; Jones 2021, 71). He imposed a series of punitive tariffs on China in response to what the United States considered unfair trade practices. He also blocked the appointment of judges to the WTO’s Appellate Body, bringing the dispute settlement process to a halt (see Chapter 8 in this report). Despite characterizing the EU as ‘worse than China’ on trade in 2018 (Korade and Labott 2018), only the tariffs imposed on aluminium and steel imports under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (the so-called ‘Section 232 tariffs’) on the grounds of protecting national security directly impacted the EU. This use of Section 232 tariffs invoked a uniquely expansive understanding of national security that included trade causing substantial job, skill, or investment losses (Jones 2021, 74–75). The Trump administration also threatened tariffs on European governments that imposed digital services taxes on US platforms, although it did not impose them after those governments agreed to postpone implementation of the taxes. It was also set to impose national security tariffs on automobile imports when Trump left office. It did adopt enforcement tariffs on the EU as part of the long-running dispute over subsidies to Airbus, but that was in line with conventional US trade policy. The transatlantic economic relationship therefore deteriorated during the first Trump administration, but only modestly.

The Biden administration was not a huge fan of free trade (see, for instance, Sullivan 2023). It did not pursue bilateral trade agreements, seriously engage with WTO reform or enable the resumption of WTO dispute settlement. The United States also made extensive use of controls on semiconductor exports to China, including forcing European companies that used US intellectual property or inputs to comply with them. Under Biden, however, the United States focused on the economic and geopolitical challenges posed by China, so it adopted ceasefires with the EU over the steel and aluminium tariffs and in the aircraft dispute. Thus, while the transatlantic economic relationship did not fully return to where it was before Trump entered office, it was considerably better than when he left.

Trade policy in Trump’s second term, however, has made his first term look like a warm-up act.

A Shocked Transatlantic Economic Relationship

The second Trump administration has adopted a series of unprecedented trade measures that have dramatically impacted the EU. It significantly expanded its use of Section 232 tariffs, imposing them on a range of products important to the EU, including cars and car parts, aircraft and pharmaceuticals. President Trump also used the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in an unprecedented way to impose ‘reciprocal’ tariffs on all US trading partners. President Trump initially announced that EU products, other than those subject to Section 232 tariffs or investigations, would be subject to an additional 20% tariff on top of the United States’ MFN tariff. He almost immediately announced that the additional tariffs would be lowered to 10% until 1 August to allow time for negotiations, but subsequently threatened to impose a 30% additional tariff on EU goods if no agreement were reached by the deadline.

With the deadline looming, the United States and the EU reached a political agreement, which was subsequently elaborated in a framework agreement. This agreement established a baseline 15% tariff on most EU products (see Table 7.2). It had the effect of significantly reducing the tariffs the United States would have imposed on some of the EU’s most valuable exports, which were subject to Section 232 tariffs or investigations. Medicinal and pharmaceutical products, medicaments, cars and car parts and aircraft and associated parts accounted for 34% of the value of EU exports to the United States in 2024 (own calculations based on Eurostat 2025a). To secure this less-bad treatment, the EU agreed to eliminate all remaining tariffs on American industrial goods; give preferential market access for certain US seafood and non-sensitive agricultural products; and indicated that Europeans would purchase US weapons and liquified natural gas, and EU firms would invest in the United States (Politico 2025). The EU did not accede to US pressure to address its digital content and competition rules (Politico 2025). The European Commission (2025, 2) stressed that the deal ‘compares well’ to those secured by the United States’ other trade partners and thus EU exports remain competitive against other US imports. It also characterized the agreement as the ‘first important step’ toward reestablishing the stability and predictability of the transatlantic trading relationship and as a ‘roadmap’ for continuing negotiations to improve market access (European Commission 2025, 2).

Table 7.2 Framework agreement tariffs in context

Sector 2024 Without the deal With the deal
General (IEEPA ‘reciprocal’) 3.4%* 30% + MFN rateAdditional tariff for steel and aluminium content 15%
Cars and car parts 2.5%  27.5% 15%
Pharmaceuticals (patented) 0–5% 100%** 15%
Pharmaceuticals (generic) 0–5% 0–5% 0–5%
Semiconductors 0–5% Subject to Section 232 investigation 15%
Aircraft Low Subject to Section 232 investigation Low
Aluminium 10% above the duty-free quota (based on historical levels) 50% New tariff-rate quota to be negotiated
Steel 25% above the duty-free quota (based on historical levels) 50% New tariff-rate quota to be negotiated

Notes:
* The United States’ average MFN rate, which is the more appropriate comparator to the headline rate for the new tariffs, applies to a bit over 60% of EU exports, so the average tariff rate is lower (Nangle 2025).
** Unless the manufacturer is building a plant in the United States.
Source: revised and updated from Berg (2025); European Commission (2025); WTO (2025)

The deal also included commitments to hold talks to address non-tariff barriers, to strengthen cooperation on economic security, including investment screening and export controls, and to enhance supply chain resilience, including for critical minerals, energy, and chips to power artificial intelligence (AI) (European Commission 2025; Politico 2025). These are long-standing areas of transatlantic cooperation that have yielded few results, with the notable exception of coordinating export controls on Russia in response to its war in Ukraine. It is therefore hard to assess how meaningful these new commitments are.

The EU’s commitment to eliminate industrial tariffs is unlikely to significantly affect EU industries, as these tariffs are generally low and already zero for all countries with which the EU has concluded free trade agreements (Berg 2025). The one exception is automobiles, where the EU’s tariff is relatively high (10%), and the United States is a major producer, although American cars are not necessarily to European tastes. The EU’s pledges on weapons and energy purchases, as well as new investments, are not binding (Berg 2025). The deal is very one-sided, but key EU industries – aviation, pharmaceuticals and semiconductors – avoided the worst that might have happened, and the EU did not concede much of economic significance. However, the agreement only mitigated the harm caused by higher US tariffs. By forestalling a trade war but not restoring the economic relationship to the way it was at the end of 2024, let alone improving it, the deal is a manifestation of ‘muddling through.’

The agreement, however, is fragile for three reasons. One is that there is opposition to the agreement in the EU. In particular, the European Parliament must approve lowering tariffs on US industrial and agricultural goods and it is considering amendments that would alter the agreement by making the preferential tariffs only temporary, allowing the EU to suspend preferential treatment if there is a surge in US imports and postponing EU tariff cuts on aluminium and steel until the United States reduces its own tariffs on the metals (Lowe 2025). The Commission will not be able to accept these changes to the deal, so there is likely to be a protracted process before the Parliament adopts the legislation necessary to implement the EU’s side of the deal. The United States has already expressed its unhappiness at the delay (Williams and Bounds 2025). Another reason the deal is fragile is that the Trump administration is known for coming back with further demands after an agreement has been reached (Sandbu 2025). For instance, since the deal, it has demanded that the EU ease environmental rules that impose burdens on US firms (Hancock, Foy and Bounds 2025). The United States, therefore, might threaten even higher tariffs to pressure the EU to change regulations that irritate US companies. The current deal is not great, but things could get worse.

The third source of fragility runs in the opposite direction. On 5 November 2025, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments on whether President Trump’s use of IEEPA to impose sweeping tariffs exceeded his authority, as two lower courts had found. Based on the justices’ questioning, there is an expectation that the Court will rule against the President in the next few months. If it does, the IEEPA tariffs that are part of the reason for the EU-US deal will go away. As the real benefits (such as they are) for the EU are due to the caps on the Section 232 tariffs, it would probably not be in the EU’s interests to try to renegotiate the deal, even if new tariffs are not imposed under other provisions.

Possible Policy Options for the EU

Although the EU contemplated imposing retaliatory tariffs, it has thus far chosen compromise over confrontation. As a result, there has not been a transatlantic trade war. Several commentators have criticized the EU for not retaliating, which might have led the United States to accept terms more favourable to the EU (Alemanno 2025; Baldwin 2025a, xii; Bounds et al. 2025; FT Editorial Board 2025; Malmström 2025). French President Macron lamented that the EU was not ‘feared enough’ by the United States (quoted in Caulcutt et al 2025).

While sufficiently robust retaliation might have made the United States more willing to strike a more favourable deal, the downside risks for the EU were considerable. In particular, the United States has ‘escalation dominance’ for at least two reasons (see also Berg 2025; Gehrke 2025). First, the EU relies on the United States militarily, which is particularly important in the context of Russia’s war in Ukraine (Alemanno 2025; Berg 2025). Sabine Weyand, the EU’s director-general for trade, explained that ‘The European side was under massive pressure to find a quick solution to stabilise transatlantic relations with regard to security guarantees’ (quoted in Ganesh 2025). Second, European leaders have been more concerned than Trump about the adverse effects that imposing tariffs would have on their economies. Given those economic and security concerns, the member states were unwilling to support a trade war with the United States (Berg 2025; Bound et al. 2025; Malmström 2025).

There are three intersecting issues confronting the EU going forward: 1) How to mitigate the negative economic costs of the United States’ new, higher tariffs; 2) How to reduce the EU’s dependence on the United States to improve its bargaining position; and 3) How to respond should the United States come back with further demands for politically unacceptable changes to EU policies. The first and third of these issues might be affected by the Trump administration’s emerging concern about the harmful impact of tariffs on prices in the wake of dramatic Democratic victories in November’s elections (Desrochers 2025; Swanson et al. 2025).

The EU has already taken steps to mitigate the consequences of losing access to the US market. The Commission has begun the process of signing the EU’s trade agreement with Mercosur and its upgraded agreement with Mexico. It has also finalized negotiations with Indonesia and is pursuing negotiations with India, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Even combined, however, these economies come nowhere near the importance of the US market (see Table 7.3). Given the EU’s economic and geopolitical concerns about China, a trade agreement with China is out of the question (see Chapter 6 in the present report). There are no other significant markets with which the EU does not already have preferential trade agreements. There is, however, scope to improve trading arrangements with the UK and Switzerland, which accounted for 13% and 7% of EU exports in 2024, respectively (García Bercero et al. 2024). Nonetheless, the EU will not be able to offset the loss of access to the US market through trade agreements. That said, the White House’s greater concern about the cost of living raises the possibility that the EU might be able to secure tariff relief for additional products (Foy 2025; Gus 2025).

Table 7.3 European Union exports to selected markets in 2024

  € million Share of extra-EU exports
United States  532,697 21%
Mercosur 55,168 2%
India 48,701 2%
UAE 44,389 2%
Malaysia 17,854 1%
Indonesia 9,810 0%
Philippines 7,730 0%

Source: Author’s own calculations based on Eurostat (2025).

Given the limited scope for securing improved market access, there is a strong case for the EU to look inward to pursue reforms that will both foster economic growth and competitiveness and enhance its military capabilities. The former will help to offset the loss of the US market, while the latter will help to redress the United States’ escalation dominance. The EU and its member states have launched initiatives on both goals, but they will take time to yield results, even with greater political impetus.

Brussels will face tough choices if Washington threatens to impose even higher tariffs unless the EU changes its rules on food safety, the environment and/or the digital economy. The EU could choose to retaliate to try to get the United States to back down. To avoid the adverse effects of imposing its own tariffs, the EU might target services – especially digital and financial services – where the United States runs a trade surplus (Gehrke 2025; Sandbu 2025). The EU might also restrict exports of key inputs to US manufacturing, since it accounts for 19% of such inputs and is a particularly important source of pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and manufacturing machinery (Baldwin 2025b). The EU could also limit US firms’ access to some key services – including insurance, shipping and commodity trading. Curbing those goods or service exports, however, would negatively affect European firms. 

Thus, while the EU has the potential to inflict economic pain on the United States, doing so would significantly harm itself. Rather, it might be better for the EU to simply endure the tariffs and wait Trump out. Arguably, it was not China’s retaliatory tariffs that caused the United States to back down during the summer, but the domestic economic and political pain caused by sky-high US tariffs on key Chinese industrial inputs (Baldwin 2025b). Given the administration’s greater concern about the cost of living, particularly with the US midterm elections approaching in November 2026, it might refrain from imposing tariffs or be unable to sustain them for long. Should the EU choose to retaliate against new US tariffs, a trade war would be likely, which would imply the transatlantic trading relationship ‘breaking apart’. Continuing to ‘muddle through’ is probably the preferable approach.


 

(*) Alasdair R. Young is Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology.  He is Director of the School’s Center for Research on International Strategy and Policy and is Interim Associate Dean for Faculty Development for Georgia Tech’s Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts. He was Co-editor of JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2017–2022) and was Chair of the European Union Studies Association (USA) (2015–2017). Before joining Georgia Tech in 2011 he taught at the University of Glasgow for 10 years.  Prior to that he held research posts at the European University Institute and the University of Sussex. He has written extensively on EU trade policy and transatlantic economic relations and performed consultancy work for the United States and United Kingdom governments and for the European Commission. Email: alasdair.young@gatech.edu


 

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The World Trade Organization (WTO) headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland—the only international organization responsible for setting and overseeing the rules governing trade between countries. Photo: Hector Christiaen.

Transatlantic Trade, the Trump Disruption and the World Trade Organization

Please cite as:
Jones, Kent. (2026). “Transatlantic Trade, the Trump Disruption and the WTO.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00129

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Abstract
This chapter traces the evolution of transatlantic trade relations within the rules-based trading system established during the post-Second World War period by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which later became the World Trade Organization (WTO). United States-led hegemonic stability supported European recovery through the Marshall Plan and later through backing for European integration, linking trade liberalization with political stability and containment of Soviet influence. As European economies revived, commercial frictions emerged, but most disputes were managed – if not always resolved – through GATT/WTO negotiations and dispute settlement. Globalization created new opportunities but also regulatory tensions that multilateral rules struggled to accommodate. Efforts to craft deeper discipline through the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) ultimately failed amid divergent regulatory approaches. Over time, differences on core WTO principles have eroded the shared legitimacy of panel and Appellate Body rulings. The election of Donald Trump marked a rupture: his use of national security exceptions and abandonment of most-favoured nation (MFN) practices triggered a global trade conflict and challenged the WTO’s foundations. The European Union (EU) now confronts difficult choices on diversification, systemic WTO reform and future trade leadership.

Keywords: transatlantic trade; European Union; populism; World Trade Organization; Donald Trump

 

By Kent Jones*

Introduction

Transatlantic trade relations during the post-Second World War period coincided with the establishment of the global trading rules system, first under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), later transforming into the World Trade Organization (WTO), along with the development of European economic and political integration. While there were numerous transatlantic trade disputes, GATT/WTO dispute settlement provisions and a joint political commitment to peaceful trade relations contributed to joint economic growth and stability. As postwar recovery continued, however, disruptive elements began to appear. The growth in GATT/WTO membership among developing countries – including China – created trade pressures on both the United States and European Union (EU) member states as global trade competition increased. The informal GATT dispute settlement procedures gave way to the more legalistic approach of the WTO, making US–EU disputes lengthier and more contentious.

Meanwhile, the increasingly complex issues of regulatory and trade-adjacent issues prevented a successful conclusion of a formal bilateral US–EU trade agreement. Finally, the mercantilist tendencies of the Trump presidency escalated US–EU trade tensions and led to a significant erosion of WTO rules themselves. With the United States retreating from its former leadership role and institutional obligations in the WTO, the EU was forced to consider various strategies for dealing with the evolving institutional environment of global trade, including leadership or joint leadership in a reformed WTO-like global trading order, an enhanced set of new bilateral trade agreements, or ‘muddling through’ the current difficulties with hopes of bringing the United States and China back into a reconstituted WTO.

US-led Postwar Trade, Aid and Security for Europe

Postwar US trade policy focused on creating a framework for global trade liberalization and economic growth. The launch of the GATT in 1947 established US-centred hegemonic stability, based on common trade rules for all participants, a forum for negotiations and a process of dispute settlement. The most-favoured-nation clause required non-discrimination among trading partners in the system, along with tariff binding through trade liberalization treaties and the peaceful resolution of trade disputes to prevent trade wars. These institutional features also promoted growing transatlantic investment flows, which reinforced trade growth. All current EU member states joined the GATT (or later the WTO) either before or in conjunction with their EU accession.

Transatlantic trade relations were also linked with postwar recovery through the Marshall Plan (1948–1951) and US support for European economic integration. The US policy goal was to create regional political and economic stability as a bulwark against Soviet expansion, thereby supporting democratic governments in Europe (Gehler 2022). The formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 cultivated a close military and security relationship among the United States, Canada and European countries explicitly designed to deter Soviet aggression. Its membership grew during the Cold War and after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and many Eastern European countries formerly aligned with the Soviet Union also joined. Strong US leadership of NATO paralleled the expansion of transatlantic trade, as most European NATO members were also part of the EU. Between 1960 and 2024, transatlantic trade increased in real terms from roughly $100 billion to $8.7 trillion. This expansion corresponds to a compound annual growth rate of 7.3% – higher than the United States’ trade growth with all partners (6.3%) and the EU’s global trade growth (6.9%). 

Transatlantic Trade and the GATT/WTO System

Continued postwar economic growth and globalization created further transatlantic trade opportunities but also heightened tensions, driven by competing commercial interests and differing trade policies. These issues were largely contained, if not always resolved, through GATT/WTO dispute settlement and negotiation. In the early years of European integration, trade disputes under the GATT system primarily concerned agricultural issues and clashes over US trading partners’ access to the common market (Hudec 1988). As European economic integration expanded and deepened, later disputes became more complex, contentious, longer-lasting and often bitter. The GATT’s successor organization, the WTO, took over protracted disputes over allowable government subsidies for Boeing (from the United States) and Airbus (from the EU), the contested safety of beef hormones, banana trade preferences for former EU colonies and controversies over the use and limits of WTO safeguard measures. Yet throughout these years, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement served a valuable purpose by providing an institutional framework for compartmentalizing such disputes while allowing normal trade relations to continue. The United States and the EU shared an ethos of cooperation that favoured trade liberalization and the stability of trade relations.

However, globalization and the expansion of the WTO to include many developing countries created new pressures on the trading system. Adjustment problems mounted in advanced industrialized countries, reaching a peak after China joined the WTO in 2001. Evolving comparative advantage, combined with increasingly mobile capital in the global economy, culminated in the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, further dampening support for globalization (Hays 2009). The weight of rapid change also put pressure on the dispute settlement system, as many countries used WTO trade law measures and subsidies to protect their domestic industries, which their trading partners challenged. China posed a special problem, as its government support for state-owned enterprises did not neatly fall under WTO subsidy disciplines. Dispute settlement decisions in all these cases did not always satisfy the litigants, and the United States and EU grew increasingly frustrated with certain WTO dispute settlement outcomes, including several between them.

A particularly volatile flashpoint was the growing criticism of the WTO dispute settlement Appellate Body’s (AB) controversial decisions, sparking charges of judicial overreach and a violation of WTO members’ sovereignty (Miranda and Miranda 2023). President Obama subsequently vetoed the appointment of AB judges he deemed unfair to US interests, an action repeated later by President Trump. Other countries, including the EU, suspected that judicial nominations were becoming politicized (Shaffer et al. 2017). These conflicts culminated eventually in the suspension of Appellate Body activities in 2019. Since then, the WTO dispute settlement body has been unable to litigate cases to completion, a sign that the WTO system has been weakening under the weight of rigid judicialization of dispute settlement (Busch and Reinhardt 2003).

After the founding of the WTO in 1995, multilateral trade liberalization also weakened. Several rounds of earlier GATT/WTO negotiations had lowered global tariffs, but many non-tariff barriers remained. Existing GATT/WTO rules appeared inadequate to secure future gains from trade by removing non-tariff barriers specific to particular industries and governments, calling for new negotiations on trade-related government policies and more flexible dispute settlement rules and processes. Meanwhile, the WTO’s protracted Doha Round of negotiations (2001–2009) failed to achieve broad and comprehensive trade liberalization, suggesting that the WTO had become too large and divided to address the varied issues of its increasingly diverse membership.

With these WTO constraints and shortcomings in mind, many countries turned to regional trade agreements under GATT Article 24, which proliferated rapidly. The United States and the EU also set out to negotiate an ambitious bilateral agreement, the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Negotiations began formally in July 2013, creating 24 joint working groups that indicated the complexity and breadth of the negotiations. The most important issues focused on harmonizing regulations and reducing non-tariff barriers. Yet the negotiating bandwidth was not wide enough to accommodate cross-cutting trade and non-trade issues, including climate change, financial regulations, subsidies, labour standards and health and safety measures. Bargaining over trade-offs across so many sectors of public interest was especially difficult since their trade negotiators could not effectively represent adjacent environmental and social health interests in their home capitals in a coordinated manner.

Furthermore, limited public access to information on the negotiations sparked a backlash in both the United States and the EU, and a final agreement would have required contentious ratification in all EU countries and in the US Congress. The election of Donald Trump – no friend of trade cooperation – to the presidency in 2016 stalled the TTIP talks shortly afterwards, and the European Commission (EC) abandoned the negotiations in 2019. Since then, a US–EU agreement of deeper economic integration has remained out of reach.

The Trump Shock

The WTO, in its already weakened state, faced threats to its very foundations with the election of Donald Trump in 2016, and transatlantic trade relations suffered as a result. Trump’s presidential campaigns combined anti-immigrant rhetoric with a protectionist platform linking imports with de-industrialization, which he described as ‘American carnage’. He placed blame for both issues at the feet of ‘global elites’, whom he accused of opening US borders to illegal immigrants and job-stealing trade agreements. Trump’s political strategy was typical of right-wing populism, instilling anger in his base of disaffected, culturally conservative ‘true Americans’ against liberal elitist internationalists.

Trump also had a long-standing fascination with tariffs as the key to a country’s prosperity, but unlike other populist leaders, he was uniquely positioned to attack the foundations of the global trading system. Not only was the United States the world’s largest import market, but it was also the country most responsible for founding and leading the GATT/WTO system. Trump adopted a zero-sum mercantilist approach to trade in which imports amounted to a loss of national wealth and exports served as the primary measure of economic strength. In this framework, tariffs became a form of retribution against countries Trump accused of dumping ‘unwanted’ imports into the US market. He also asserted that tariffs were always paid by foreigners, a key element of his false claim that tariffs do not raise prices.

In his first administration, Trump waged a trade war with China and imposed national security tariffs on steel and aluminium under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (the so-called ‘Section 232 tariffs’). This move was his first significant anti-WTO action, a subversion of GATT Article 21. The rarely used provision had always been reserved for member countries facing demonstrably hostile foreign actions from other member countries, against which they could legitimately suspend GATT/WTO rules and restrict imports. Trump declared that the United States could self-declare a national security emergency for any reason, including unemployment and reduced output in ‘strategic’ industries. Other WTO members, he asserted, could not challenge the US decision or retaliate against it. This reinterpretation of the rules opened the door for any WTO member to unilaterally raise tariffs on any domestic industry for any self-declared national security reason. All foreign suppliers of steel imports to the US, not least the EU, were surprised to discover that their shipments suddenly represented a security threat to their largest trading partner and erstwhile trade ally. In his second term, Trump extended Section 232 tariffs to cover automobiles, auto parts, copper, pharmaceuticals, kitchen cabinets, bathroom vanities and heavy trucks, with more products planned (Covington and Burling LLP 2025).

However, Trump had even broader tariff plans, having devised a narrative of global foreign responsibility for US trade deficits. He announced a set of tariffs against nearly every country, while abandoning all negotiated WTO tariff commitments and the MFN clause completely. Denouncing what he considered an unfairly low, long-standing US effective tariff rate of approximately 2.1%, he devised a set of variable ‘reciprocal’ tariffs based on a flawed economic explanation of trade imbalances and applied them in a discriminatory manner, ranging from 10% to 49% (Doherty 2025). Each US trading partner would have to submit concessions to Trump individually to avoid his unilateral tariffs and gain any additional access to the US import market, usually in the form of greater and sometimes preferential market access for US exports, the elimination of what Trump deemed unfair non-tariff barriers, and commitments to make significant foreign investments in US-based manufacturing. Trump’s goal in his trade policy was to achieve total control over tariffs and trade negotiations. To this end, he chose to impose his global tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), which he interpreted as giving the president complete control over trade policy by executive order. Tariff rates and their duration would be at the president’s discretion and subject to change at any time, according to his preferences, without congressional ratification or mandatory review.

The Trump–EU Trade Framework

Trump’s abandonment of WTO rules became abundantly clear in his announcement on 2 April 2025 of unilateral tariff increases that discriminated among countries, followed by bilateral negotiations with the EU and other countries. These measures violated GATT articles 1 (MFN) and 2 (tariff binding). The primary basis for US ‘emergency’ tariffs was a long-standing US trade deficit, which appears inconsistent with GATT Article 21 (Kho et al., 2024). In bypassing WTO dispute settlement procedures, the United States also violated Article 3 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding, which was meant to prevent trade wars, a key underlying motivation in establishing the original GATT. The Trump negotiations were entirely bilateral and one-sided, with his demands for concessions in exchange for US import market access, violating the WTO norm of multilateralism and the provisions of GATT Article 24. US demands for preferential market access to the EU in certain products further violate GATT Article 1. In addition, final tariffs in the US–EU agreement were not bound, a further violation of GATT Article 2, leaving open the possibility that Trump could unilaterally raise those tariffs in the future (WTO 1999).

The initial US tariff assigned to the EU was an alarmingly high 30%, along with special Section 232 tariffs of 50% on steel and aluminium. From the perspective of the initial US tariffs, the Trump–EU ‘framework’ agreement was greeted with relief by many EU officials, even though the final 15% baseline tariff was more than twelve times the average US tariff rate of 1.2% on EU goods that prevailed at the end of 2024 (see U.S. Department of Commerce 2025). Young (chapter 7 in this report) provides details of its provisions. EU trade officials, like those from other countries, had faced a one-sided, coercive negotiation. Many observers complained that the EC had failed to fight hard enough for EU economic interests through retaliation (Stiglitz 2025). The final package, however, seemed to indicate that the United States softened its terms, perhaps to forestall possible EU retaliation, as shown by lower US tariffs and more exemptions than originally announced. Christine Lagarde (2025) insisted that EU tit-for-tat escalation would only have provoked the tariff-loving Trump, risking a much worse outcome for the EU (see also Baldwin 2025, 83–92). An economic perspective suggests that retaliation would be justified only if it forced the United States to back down from a multi-stage trade war, which typically amplifies economic damage to all parties. The EU did in fact prepare retaliatory measures that could have demonstrated its resolve, including limiting US tariffs on automobiles and pharmaceuticals, two of the EU’s most valuable export products (UN Comtrade 2025).

While the framework agreement contains specific tariff commitments, it lacks the structure and specificity of a WTO treaty. US negotiators were careful to make the US tariff rates contingent on European Parliament approval of its new US trade obligations, but there is no corresponding mention of required US congressional approval or ratification, presumably since Trump was basing the agreement on an executive order with no congressional input. The United States’ obligations therefore appear not to be treaty obligations. Another aspect of the deal is that EU commitments on natural gas and computer chip purchases, and on $600 billion of foreign investment in the United States, appear not to be legally enforceable, as they involve largely private, contingent commercial transactions and investment. If these or other targets are not met, the question arises as to what recourse the United States will have to redress the EU’s noncompliance. The answer appears to be that Trump, through the end of his term in 2028, would be able to raise US tariff rates on EU goods unilaterally in response.

Outlook for the European Union

Despite many trade disputes between the United States and European countries since the end of the Second World War, the GATT/WTO transatlantic trade rules enabled trade to expand. Dispute settlement procedures, while imperfect, tended to keep trade conflict separate from broader trade relations until Trump’s second term. The best strategy for the EU in response to Trump’s disruptions is therefore to seek, as much and as broadly as possible, to expand rules-based trade with its non-US trading partners. Trade with the United States will require an extended period of capricious tariff policies by Trump and possibly his successors, but the framework agreement with the United States suggests that the EU is likely at least to maintain access – albeit reduced – to this valuable import market in the meantime. ‘Muddling through’ the current US–EU trade framework will probably require the EU to adopt a transactional (rather than rules-based) approach to transatlantic trade, involving sector-by-sector or item-by-item bargaining, matching Trump’s mercantilist instincts. After Trump leaves office, it may be possible to establish more systematic and predictable trade relations, as US businesses are likely to push for a more open and predictable trade and investment environment.

Nonetheless, the EU should seek to apply WTO rules in expanding its export markets through new trade agreements (see Poletti, chapter 6 in this report), as growth in international trade is likely to occur outside the United States, especially in Southeast Asia (Altman and Bastian 2025). Inevitably, EU trade expansion under WTO rules could trigger threats and sanctions from the United States if it persists in forcing its trading partners to grant preferential treatment to US exporters, in violation of MFN rules. Managing this problem will be challenging in any EU efforts to ‘muddle through’ mercantilist US trade policies. Yet the EU and other countries have continued to apply WTO rules to their non-US trade, and the United States is likely to reach the limit of its ability to bully its trading partners into cheating on WTO rules they wish to maintain as long as the United States remains a WTO member. Successful WTO-based trade expansion by the EU and other countries could also provide an incentive for the United States to return to the same rules.

Planning trade policies for the future, however, is difficult because of uncertainties in the short- and medium-term. Trump’s tariffs are unpopular with the US electorate, but there will be no legislative check on his policies as long as Republican majorities in Congress remain beholden to him. However, Democrats will challenge these majorities in the 2026 midterms and the 2028 presidential election. It remains unclear who will run for president in 2028. Vice President J.D. Vance appears to be Trump’s successor for the nomination, but it is not certain that he commands the loyal following that Trump has. The Democratic Party, for its part, has no clear leading presidential candidate at this writing, and no clear alternative trade policy platform to rally around. A more trade-friendly US president from either party could eventually move the United States back towards trade policies consistent with WTO rules, but this may also depend on reforms in contested WTO rules and dispute settlement procedures, especially as they pertain to China’s trade policies.

A more immediate issue, unresolved at this writing, is the US Supreme Court (SCOTUS) case challenging the constitutionality of Trump’s IEEPA tariffs. SCOTUS has agreed to expedite the decision, but is not bound by a timetable, and its verdict may not be definitive. A verdict vindicating Trump’s tariffs would allow them to stand indefinitely, or until Congress succeeds in challenging them. An unconditional overturning of Trump’s tariffs would cause them to revert to a pre-Trump effective level of 2.1%. Yet compromise verdicts might allow the tariffs to continue, subject to duration or level limits, or to additional congressional oversight or legislation (see Miller and Chevalier 2025). Even a complete reversal of the IEEPA tariffs is unlikely to deter Trump from imposing additional tariffs under other emergency trade laws, especially Section 232 (Werschkul 2025).

Beyond US domestic politics, geopolitical uncertainties abound. The vacuum left by Trump’s abandonment of US leadership in the WTO, if it continues, will require a large country or a coalition of countries to fill or coordinate new institutional leadership roles. The difficulty of resetting WTO rules-based trade is that no single country can replace the United States in terms of economic size, political influence, financial market depth and reserve currency status, elements that reinforced the United States’ previous leadership of the global trading system. The United States may eventually re-emerge from its Trumpian protectionism to reclaim leadership of the multilateral trading system. Still, a prolonged period of US tariffs and economic nationalism is likely to severely weaken the US economy. The more US economic and political attributes erode due to self-inflicted damage, the closer the United States comes to forfeiting its chance to return to its previous position of global hegemonic leadership.

In the meantime, the EU’s role in the future trading system faces a highly volatile global institutional environment marked by geopolitical divides, scepticism towards globalization, and a general lack of international trust and cooperation (Zelicovich 2022). The EU will first need political consensus among its own member countries to pursue a broader role in global trade governance and corresponding enthusiasm from its potential partners in leading any post-US trading system.

A crucial issue in this regard is devising a system that can accommodate, if not discipline, China and its state-managed trade policies. The United States missed the opportunity to rally other countries to common action regarding China’s opaque trade interventions through negotiation and reform of WTO rules. In the absence of US leadership, a revitalization of rules-based trade liberalization will require a strong coalition of countries to bargain together to address this problem. Only then might large regional trade alliances such as the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the EU and perhaps others merge, possibly eventually drawing in China and the United States as well, to provide the critical mass for a new global trade institution. The ability of the EU to take on a more prominent role in global trade leadership will depend on the strength of its internal economy, its internal political cohesion, its foreign policy engagement and its skill in trade diplomacy (see Smith 1999). If the EU is not capable of the sort of hegemonic leadership the United States once exercised, a different, more fragile institutional model of cooperative trade leadership will be necessary. Yet an EU committed to WTO principles will still be able to play a crucial role in achieving institutional change alongside other trading powers.

The Trump trade war, disruptive as it has been, may ironically provide an opportunity for the EU and other WTO members to correct, reform and strengthen WTO rules and processes of dispute settlement and trade liberalization for all countries. The EU should continue its efforts to bridge the gap in WTO dispute settlement through its Multiparty Interim Appeal (MPIA) initiative (Wouters and Hegde 2022). The scope of policy space in trade agreements, issues related to changing technologies, and the WTO consensus rule should all be on the table for reform. Differences in trade-related environmental, labour and human rights preferences, as well as dissimilar approaches to regulation, need to be made compatible with normal trade relations at the global level. One potentially important, but so far little-used, provision of the WTO is Annex IV, allowing sub-groups of WTO members to conclude plurilateral agreements on smaller agendas of specific issues, while being open to the accession of new members. Hoekman et al. (2025) suggest this approach for negotiating new agreements among like-minded countries on environmental and other trade-related issues. Negotiating such agreements could free the WTO from its consensus straitjacket, which has stymied progress on many trade liberalization proposals. The EU in particular would benefit from a ‘variable geometry’ of social interests in trade policy that are currently difficult to pursue within the existing WTO framework. Adapting to the realities of globalized, developmentally diverse, environmentally sensitive and geopolitically engaged world trade, perhaps on an incremental basis, is likely to be essential for its institutional survival.


 

(*) Kent Jones, Dr. ès sci. pol. (international economics), Graduate Institute of International Studies/University of Geneva, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Babson College, where he taught from 1982 until his retirement in 2023. He continues his academic interests in trade policy and trade institutions, having published several books and articles on these topics, including Populism and Trade (2021). His teaching also included visiting appointments at Brandeis University, the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and the University of Innsbruck, Austria.  In addition, he served as a visiting senior economist at the U.S. Department of State. Email: kjones@babson.edu


 

References

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Baldwin, Richard. 2025. The Great Trade Hack: How Trump’s Trade War Fails and the World Moves On. Paris and London: CEPR Press. https://cepr.org/publications/books-and-reports/great-trade-hack-how-trumps-trade-war-fails-and-world-moves

Busch, Marc L., and Eric Reinhardt. 2003. “Transatlantic Trade Conflicts and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement.” In Transatlantic Economic Disputes: The EU, the US and the WTO, edited by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann and Mark A. Pollack, 1–28. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Covington & Burling LLP. 2025. “Status of Section 232 Actions by the Trump Administration.” Alert, July 28. https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2025/07/status-of-section-232-actions-by-the-trump-administration

Doherty, Emma. 2025. “Economists Take Issue with Trump’s Tariff Formula.” CNBC, April 5. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/04/05/economists-take-issue-with-trumps-tariff-formula-arguing-rate-is-inflated.html

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Hoekman, Bernard, Betül K. O. Taş, and Rohit Ticku. 2025. Plurilateral Approaches to Managing Cross-Border Industrial Policy-Related Spillovers. RSC Working Paper 2025/27. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute. https://cadmus.eui.eu

Hudec, Robert E. 1988. “Legal Issues in US–EC Trade Policy: GATT Litigation 1960–1965.” In Issues in US–EC Trade Relations, edited by Robert E. Baldwin, Carl G. Hamilton, and André Sapir, 1–36. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Two elderly men sit on the street in front of a café in Oslo, Norway, asking for alms on August 1, 2013. This image symbolizes the indifference of society and the state toward poverty. Photo: Medvedeva Oxana.

Vulnerable Groups, Protections and Precarity

Please cite as:
Azmanova, Albena. (2026). “Vulnerable Groups, Protections and Precarity.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00138

DOWNLOAD CHAPTER 17

Abstract
This chapter examines how impoverishment, inequality and precarity have become defining features of contemporary societies in Europe and the United States, reshaping domestic politics and altering the foundations of the transatlantic relationship. Poverty persists despite overall affluence, with COVID-19 reversing earlier gains in Europe and entrenched racialized and generational disparities characterizing the United States. Inequality follows divergent patterns: Europe experiences wide variation shaped by austerity and structural barriers facing migrants, while the United States is marked by extreme wealth concentration and systemic racial gaps. Yet inequality alone does not fully explain public discontent. Instead, precarity – politically produced vulnerability across class, gender, age and status – emerges as the central grievance. Expanding temporary and platform work, weakened labour protections and strained welfare systems expose women, youth, migrants and racial minorities to compounding risks. The chapter argues that rising precarity undermines trust in governance and shifts transatlantic cooperation toward transactionalism, requiring renewed social investment and stronger labour and environmental standards.

Keywords: poverty; precarity; inequality; employment; insecurity; populism

 

By Albena Azmanova*

Introduction

Over the past decade, Europe and the United States have faced intensifying social vulnerabilities stemming from economic shocks, political realignments and labour market transformations. Transatlantic EU–US relations are increasingly shaped by internal socioeconomic pressures, especially the precarization of labour and the rise of populist politics responding to widespread physical, economic, social and cultural insecurity. These forces are subtly but significantly reshaping cooperation across trade, security and global governance. The domestic pressures driving change have especially to do with deteriorating employment conditions – marked by low wages, gig work, weakened unions and eroded social protections. This trend is evident in both the United States and the EU, although with different institutional buffers. Economic insecurity – especially post-2008 and post-COVID-19 – has fuelled resentment toward globalization, trade liberalization and perceived elite consensus, which have historically underpinned transatlantic cooperation. To this adds cultural and physical insecurity – including migration anxieties, demographic shifts and perceived threats to national identity – which have intensified populist narratives that challenge liberal internationalism. In what follows, we review three interlinked trajectories in domestic developments – poverty, inequality and precarity – to highlight structural patterns, policy responses and emerging fault lines that are likely to affect domestic political attitudes and, consequently, transatlantic relations.

Poverty: Persistent Risks and Shifting Demographics

Europe: The fragmented landscape of poverty amidst wealth

After the 2008 financial crisis, poverty rates in Europe slowly declined. However, COVID-19 disrupted this trajectory, leading to a renewed increase in poverty risk across many EU countries. The ‘Europe 2020’ strategy aimed to lift 20 million people out of poverty by 2020 – a goal that went unmet, with the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating vulnerabilities and deepening the scarring effects of poverty across the continent (Mussida and Sciulli 2022). The pandemic increased the risk of poverty, particularly for already vulnerable groups and widened disparities between countries due to differences in policy responses. Southern European countries (e.g., Italy, Spain, Greece) experienced sharper increases in poverty risk due to weaker welfare systems and higher reliance on tourism and service sectors. Northern and Western European countries, with stronger social safety nets, were better able to cushion the impact.

In 2024, 21% of the EU population – approximately 93.3 million people – were at risk of poverty or social exclusion, according to Eurostat’s AROPE indicator, which combines income poverty, severe material deprivation, and low work intensity (Eurostat 2025a). Rates remain highest in Bulgaria (30.3%), Romania (27.9%), and Greece (26.9%). Notably, in-work poverty is rising: 10.9% of employed individuals are still at risk of poverty.

Gender disparities persist: overall, women face a higher risk of poverty (21.9%) than men (20.0%), largely due to wage gaps and disproportionate caregiving responsibilities.

The United States: Structural poverty and policy gaps

According to the OECD, the United States has one of the highest relative poverty rates among member countries, with income inequality and poverty deeply entrenched (OECD 2024). The bottom quintile earns less than 3% of national income, while the top quintile earns over 50%.

Racialized poverty remains a defining feature: Black, Hispanic and Indigenous populations face disproportionately high poverty rates, compounded by housing segregation and educational disparities. Child poverty is particularly acute, with 16.1% of children living below the federal poverty line in 2023 (Guzman and Kollar 2023). Elder poverty is rising due to healthcare costs and insufficient retirement savings (Scott 2024).

Despite solid economic growth, real income gains have been uneven, and intergenerational mobility remains low (Kochhar and Sechopoulos 2023; Kochhar 2024). Impoverishment – both absolute deprivation (inability to meet basic needs) and relative poverty (living below a certain percentage of median income in a given society) – has been on the rise in Europe and the United States. This rising poverty has fuelled grievances about affordability, as households struggle to cover essential costs such as housing, food, utilities and debt repayments. Affordability grievances have been prominent in anti-establishment mobilizations, which have placed cost-of-living issues at the centre of national elections. In Europe, this has led to challenging EU integration, migration policy and austerity legacies – which are perceived as causes of impoverishment. In the United States, public anxiety over purchasing power and declining real incomes have driven support for populist candidates who frame globalization and liberal elites as threats to national sovereignty and working-class dignity.

Inequality: Structural Divides and Policy Responses

Europe: Between convergence and divergence

Income inequality in Europe varies widely. The Gini coefficient ranges from 23.8 in the Slovak Republic to 39.5 in Bulgaria (World Bank Group 2023). Post-2008 austerity widened inequality in Southern and Eastern Europe, with long-term effects on youth and low-income workers (Oxfam 2013).

The protective role of higher education has diminished, while employment stability and childcare provision have become more important in mitigating poverty and inequality (Mussida and Sciulli 2022). Migrant populations often face structural barriers to income parity, with limited access to housing, education, and labour protections (ETUC 2024).

The United States: Polarization and policy stagnation

The United States has seen a dramatic rise in income and wealth inequality. Households in the top 10% of the wealth distribution own 79% in the United States (OECD 2024, 86). Tax expenditures disproportionately benefit high earners, exacerbating inequality and reducing fiscal space for redistribution. Coastal urban centres show high income levels but also high living costs, while rural and post-industrial regions face stagnation. Racial disparities in educational attainment, access to capital, and exposure to environmental hazards deepen inequality (Beard et al. 2024). While impoverishment in absolute terms (i.e., reduced purchasing power) has often been expressed in social discontent, inequality (relative impoverishment) has not been reliably traced to social discontent, even as it has been at the centre of academic research and public debate.

Precarity: Labour Market Insecurity and Social Dislocation

Precarity – politically produced vulnerability caused by social threats to lives, livelihoods, and lifeworlds (Azmanova 2020; 2023) – has recently been identified as a critical condition afflicting contemporary democracies, cutting across class, gender, age, educational attainment, professional attainment and even income levels.

Europe: The rise of precarious work

Precarity has intensified through non-standard employment. Eurostat data show that young workers aged 30 or younger are disproportionately represented in temporary and low-paid jobs (Eurostat 2025b). Women are more likely to be in part-time or informal work, often linked to caregiving responsibilities.

Sectors such as hospitality, retail and care show high levels of precarity, with limited union coverage and weak protections. Platform work has expanded, but regulatory frameworks lag behind. The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has called for the full implementation of the EU’s directive on platform work and for universal social protections (ETUC 2023).

The pandemic disproportionately affected workers in precarious employment, temporary contracts, and low‑income service sectors. This disproportionate impact has reinforced the link between insecure labour markets and the persistence of poverty (Mussida and Sciulli 2022).

The United States: Fragmentation and Flexibilization

The US labour market is characterized by high flexibility but low security. Gig economy workers often lack health insurance, paid leave, or retirement benefits (Human Rights Watch 2025). Union membership has fallen to historic lows, around 10% (BLS 2023). Frequent job changes, layoffs and contract work contribute to income volatility and psychological stress. Employer-based health insurance ties security to employment, making job loss a significant risk factor for medical debt and coverage gaps. Policy debates over universal basic income, portable benefits and labour classification have gained traction but remain politically contentious.

COVID‑19 intensified poverty in Europe and the United States by exposing the precariousness of households and labour markets, undoing part of the progress made since the Great Recession. It significantly worsened mental health globally, with sharp rises in anxiety, depression, and stress (WHO 2022), while lockdowns and social isolation also triggered a surge in gender‑based violence, often described as a ‘shadow pandemic’ (UN Women 2020).

Overall, even as societies on the two sides of the Atlantic have returned to economic growth, economic and social precarization has persisted. Labour market insecurity and cost-of-living concerns are diminishing public trust in existing systems of governance and driving an upsurge in anti-establishment, populist mobilizations.

Vulnerable Groups: Intersectional Risks and Policy Blind Spots

Across both regions, certain groups face compounded vulnerabilities, resulting from impoverishment and precarization:

  • Women: Gender pay gaps, caregiving burdens, and exposure to part-time work increase risks (UN Women 2023).
  • Migrants and refugees: Legal status, language barriers, and discrimination limit access to services and stable employment (ETUC 2023)
  • Youth: Entry-level job insecurity, student debt and housing unaffordability create long-term precarity.
  • The elderly: Fixed incomes, rising healthcare costs, and social isolation contribute to poverty (Tornton and Bowers 2024).
  • Racial and ethnic minorities: Structural racism, residential segregation, and unequal access to education and healthcare deepen inequality (Bailey et al. 2017; Mirza and Warwick 2024; Clark et al. 2022; Yearby et al. 2022; Kisa and Kisa 2025).

Thus, while precarity is becoming the overarching grievance in Western democracies, it is strongly stratified and is most acutely felt among the poor and socially marginalized. However, as economic and social insecurity are becoming ubiquitous across income levels and educational attainment, precarity is increasingly being identified as the key factor driving social discontent and fuelling anti-establishment, populist mobilizations (Azmanova 2004, 2020, 2023; Apostolidis 2020; Zhirnov et al 2024; Scheiring et al 2024; Rodríguez-Pose 2020).

Protections: Welfare States, Labour Rights and Emerging Models

Europe: Welfare retrenchment and innovation

European welfare states offer a range of protections, but austerity and demographic pressures have strained their capacity. Some of the key developments include:

  • Minimum income schemes: These vary widely across countries, with some offering robust support (e.g., France’s Revenu de solidarité active (RSA)) and others providing minimal assistance.
  • Universal healthcare: This remains a cornerstone of European social protection, although access and quality vary.
  • Labour market policies: Active labour market programs (ALMPs), vocational training and unemployment insurance help mitigate precarity.
  • EU-level initiatives: The European Pillar of Social Rights and the Recovery and Resilience Facility aim to strengthen social cohesion post-COVID-19.

However, gaps remain in coverage, adequacy and enforcement, especially for non-standard workers and migrants.

The United States: Fragmented safety nets and policy innovation

The United States lacks a comprehensive welfare state, relying instead on a patchwork of federal, state and local programs. Key features include:

  • Means-tested programs: SNAP (food stamps), Medicaid, and TANF (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families) provide targeted support but face eligibility barriers and stigma.
  • Tax-based transfers: The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and Child Tax Credit offer income support, although coverage is uneven.
  • Healthcare reforms: The Affordable Care Act expanded coverage but left millions uninsured or underinsured.
  • Local innovations: Cities like New York and San Francisco have piloted guaranteed-income schemes, tenant protections and worker cooperatives.

Despite these efforts, systemic gaps persist and political polarization hampers federal reform.

The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted that poverty is not only cyclical but also deeply tied to structural vulnerabilities in employment and welfare systems. It revealed how poverty dynamics are shaped not only by economic shocks but also by institutional resilience. Emergency measures (short‑time work schemes, income support, moratoria on evictions) mitigated some effects, but structural weaknesses in welfare systems left many households exposed. Recent policy shifts in the EU that have placed a higher priority on competitiveness and defence spending risk weakening social investment and deepening employment insecurity.

Comparative Reflections and Policy Implications

Since the turn of the century, the combined effects of labour market liberalization, automation and the radical opening of national economies have generated widespread employment insecurity and wage depression, fuelling fears of real, perceived and anticipated losses of livelihood. More broadly, political attitudes have been shaped by anxieties linked to physical insecurity, political disorder, cultural estrangement and economic precarity driven by flexible labour markets, outsourcing and competition with immigrant workers. Together, these four sources of anxiety constitute the core of a new antiprecarity public agenda centred on demands for order and security. This agenda of public concerns cuts across the left–right divide and tends to replace the left–right vectors of electoral competition with a new risk–opportunity divide shaped by the social impact of the new economy of open borders and information technologies (Azmanova 2020, 68–69, 140; See also Azmanova 2004, 2011).

Although these developments are tangible in both the United States and Europe, the transatlantic comparison reveals that Europe’s welfare states offer more robust protections but face demographic and fiscal pressures. The United States exhibits higher inequality and precarity, with fragmented safety nets and racialized vulnerabilities. Both regions struggle to adapt protections to non-standard work and intersectional risks. Policy innovation is emerging at subnational levels, but national coherence is lacking.

Social exasperation resulting from ubiquitous precarity is fuelling both economic and cultural xenophobia and undermining solidarities within countries and between the EU and the United States. This is expressed in adversarial foreign economic policy and in the undermining of the traditional EU–US political and economic partnership. Populist movements in Europe (e.g. the AfD in Germany, the Rassemblement national in France) and the United States (especially under Donald Trump) often frame transatlantic institutions as out of touch with ‘ordinary people’. These actors tend to be sceptical of multilateralism, critical of NATO and hostile to EU regulatory frameworks, which complicates traditional alliance structures.

Populist governments or pressures can lead to policy volatility, weakening long-term commitments to shared goals such as climate action, digital regulation and democratic norms. Indeed, trade tensions have resurfaced, especially around subsidies, digital taxation and industrial policy. The EU’s Green Deal and the United States’s Inflation Reduction Act have created friction over protectionism and competitiveness. While security cooperation remains strong on Ukraine and NATO, it diverges on China, Middle East policy and defence spending expectations.

Fundamentally, institutional trust is eroding. The EU increasingly hedges against US unpredictability by deepening internal defence and tech strategies, while the United States questions European burden-sharing. Under populist demands for short-term stabilization measures, a shift is underway from normative alliance-building to interest-based transactionalism. This shift means cooperation is increasingly contingent on short-term domestic political gains rather than shared values. The EU is recalibrating its strategic autonomy, while the United States – especially under populist leadership – prioritizes sovereignty and unilateralism.

Countering precarization as the root driver of reactionary populism would require a systematic effort for building a ‘political economy of trust’ (Azmanova 2020) that provides economic and social stability along two trajectories: domestic and global. In terms of domestic policies, this means replacing the current focus on competitiveness in the global economy (which is prompting governments to cut job security and social investment) with an industrial policy that generates good jobs, as well as increased investment in the commons (public services and social insurance). In terms of global market integration, the logic of pursuing competitiveness, which is prompting governments to weaken labour and environmental standards, should be replaced by a more rigorous implementation of labour and environmental standards of production, trade and consumption.


 

(*) Albena Azmanova is Professor of Political and Social Science at City St George’s, University of London. She has held academic positions at the New School for Social Research, Sciences Po Paris, Harvard University, UC Berkeley, and the University of Kent’s Brussels School of International Studies. Her research spans critical social theory, political economy, democratic transitions, populism, and the rule of law, with a focus on how precarity has become the defining social harm of contemporary capitalism. Her book Capitalism on Edge (2020) is the recipient of numerous awards, among them the American Political Science Association’s Michael Harrington Award for scholarship advancing social justice. Beyond academia, she has served as a policy advisor to institutions including the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the European Parliament.


 

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Can Mamdani’s Municipal Socialism Counter Democratic Backsliding?

In a period of deepening global democratic recession Zohran Mamdani’s ascent as mayor of New York City poses an important question: Can municipal socialism provide meaningful resistance to authoritarian and oligarchic drift? Mamdani’s redistributive agenda—rent freezes, universal childcare, fare-free transit, public groceries, and a $30 minimum wage—seeks to decommodify basic needs and challenge monopoly power. His platform echoes broader critiques of financialized capitalism and “techno-feudalism,” offering a localized experiment in restoring democratic control over markets. Yet structural constraints—capital mobility, state-level authority, and limited municipal capacity—risk reducing his project to a palliative rather than transformative intervention. Still, Mamdani’s rise signals renewed potential for democratic agency within advanced capitalism and highlights the symbolic power of left urban governance.

By Ibrahim Ozturk

In an era marked by the ninth consecutive year of global democratic decline—with more autocracies than democracies worldwide—the question of whether municipal socialism can serve as a meaningful counterweight to authoritarian drift has acquired renewed urgency. In my earlier analysisTrump and the New Capitalism: Old Wine in a New Bottle, I argued that the rise of populist-authoritarian tendencies represents not an aberration but an outcome of structural transformations within capitalism. The fusion of excessive neoliberal deregulation, financialization, and techno-feudal monopolies has produced a regime in which power is concentrated in networks of rent-seeking elites while democratic accountability erodes. Within this global configuration, figures such as Donald Trump exemplify a politics of reaction, harnessing social discontent to reinforce rather than transcend capitalist contradictions.

The newly elected mayor of the New York municipality in the US, Zohran Mamdani, represents another countermovement that is evolving. Having an Indian lineage, born in Kampala, Uganda, in 1991 and educated at the Bronx High School of Science and Bowdoin College in the US, Mamdani is a community organizer and politician representing a new generation of democratic socialists in New York City politics. His family background reflects a distinguished intellectual lineage: his father, Mahmood Mamdani, is a renowned Ugandan academic and political theorist at Columbia University, while his mother, Mira Nair, is an internationally acclaimed Indian filmmaker. This cosmopolitan and intellectually engaged upbringing informs his perspective on justice, diversity, and structural inequality. Before his mayoral campaign, he served as a state assembly member for Queens, gaining recognition for his advocacy on housing, transport, and labor rights.

The emergence of Mamdani, a self-described democratic socialist and now mayor-elect of New York City, raises a critical question: Can left municipalism, operating within the framework of advanced capitalism, achieve more than temporary relief? Can it open pathways toward structural transformation, or does it risk serving merely as a palliative to capitalism’s crises? This commentary examines Mamdani’s project as a potential alternative within the confines of globalized urban capitalism and explores whether it constitutes a genuine rupture or a managed reform.

Mamdani’s Program and Its Socialist Premise

Mamdani’s platform centers on affordability—housing, transit, groceries, childcare—labor empowerment, anti-monopoly measures, and public-sector revival. His proposals include rent freezes, universal childcare, fare-free buses, city-owned grocery stores, and a minimum wage of $30 by 2030. The program is explicitly redistributive—funded through higher taxation on the wealthy, municipal bonds, and redirected public investment—and endorsed by the Democratic Socialists of America. Reports from The Nation and The Guardian emphasize his focus on social affordability and economic justice.

Taken together, these policies articulate a coherent vision of municipal socialism that seeks to reconcile equity with feasibility. They represent not merely an electoral program but a normative statement about how value creation and distribution should be reorganized in an era of inequality and urban precarity.

Alignment with Structural Critiques of Capitalism

While Mamdani’s proposals emerge from the immediate material pressures of urban life—housing unaffordability, wage stagnation, and public disinvestment—they also speak to deeper theoretical concerns. His platform implicitly challenges the dominant accumulation regime that has shaped advanced capitalism since the 1980s.

  • Constraining monopoly and platform power: His regulation of delivery apps and advocacy for municipal alternatives echo calls to counter techno-feudal control.
  • Fiscal re-politicization: Expanding municipal investment and debt capacity revives the Keynesian principle of democratic capital allocation, countering the austerity logic.
  • Labor empowerment: Raising wages and curbing algorithmic exploitation of gig workers directly addresses the erosion of collective bargaining in the digital economy

In essence, Mamdani’s local socialism represents a municipal-scale experiment in reversing the disembedding process. It seeks to restore social control over markets without dismantling the capitalist framework entirely.

Structural Constraints and the Risk of Palliative Reform

Despite its radical rhetoric, Mamdani’s agenda faces formidable structural limits:

  • Jurisdictional dependency: Many proposals—such as rent control, wage laws, and tax reform—require state-level approval. Dependence on higher-tier institutions (Albany, Congress) restricts municipal sovereignty.
  • Financial constraints: Global capital mobility enables landlords and investors to circumvent local regulations through capital flight or pre-emptive rent inflation.
  • Administrative capacity: Rebuilding the state apparatus after decades of privatization demands resources, expertise, and political endurance.
    Global market discipline: As I noted elsewhere, cities embedded in global capital circuits cannot easily alter systemic rules of accumulation.

Thus, while progressive, Mamdani’s project risks acting as a palliative: It might ease inequality, precarity, and housing shortages without actually transforming the fundamental regime of accumulation. In this way, it resembles the New Deal paradox—reforms that saved capitalism from itself by institutionalizing social compromise.

Theoretical Implications: From Populism to Municipal Socialism

In contrast to populist movements such as Trumpism that weaponize social anger for authoritarian consolidation, Mamdani represents a left-populist or socialist response oriented toward redistribution and participation.

Drawing on thinkers such as Shoshana ZuboffYanis Varoufakis, and McKenzie Wark, genuine transformation would require dismantling the global rentier system based on data extraction, monopolistic control, and financial dominance. Mamdani’s measures operate largely at the level of urban welfare and infrastructure, not at the structural nexus of digital and financial capital.

This suggests that while municipal socialism can create breathing space for democracy, it cannot, alone, displace capitalist command over value creation. Nevertheless, its symbolic power is significant: It demonstrates that political agency still exists within capitalist democracies and that redistribution, social housing, and decommodification are viable public policies.

A Short Reminder from the Obama Experience

While Mamdani’s rise has generated enthusiasm among progressive circles, historical experience counsels caution regarding the transformative potential of reform within existing institutions. The election of Barack Obama in 2008 offers a revealing precedent. His campaign, built around the populist slogan “Yes We Can,” unleashed one of the most powerful waves of civic mobilization in modern US history.

A signature pledge—the creation of a single-payer healthcare system—was quickly abandoned amid intra-party resistance. Even with a unified government, centrist Democrats refused to support the plan. The resulting Affordable Care Act represented a policy milestone but fell short of structural transformation.

Simultaneously, the conservative backlash was immediate and fierce. The Tea Party movement– funded by corporate networks and amplified through right-wing media—redefined the Republican Party and laid the groundwork for Donald Trump’s Make America Great Again (MAGA) insurgency. 

The political consequences were swift. In the 2010 midterms, Democrats lost both houses of Congress. Even vacancies in the Federal Reserve Board and the Supreme Court remained unfilled, enabling the next administration to reshape the judiciary decisively.

A Constraint Hope for the Future

Zohran Mamdani at the Dominican Heritage Parade on 6th Ave in Manhattan, New York City, August 10, 2025. Photo: Aleksandr Dyskin.

Mamdani’s rise signals a generational shift toward pragmatic socialism—a reassertion of collective goods amid a cost-of-living crisis. His program offers hope within limits: Hope that governance can be reoriented toward equality and sustainability; limits because the city remains bound to global circuits of capital and data.

If such movements scale upward—through cooperative federalism, trans-urban alliances, and progressive taxation—the Mamdani experiment could prefigure a new model of democratic socialism adapted to the 21st century. Otherwise, as warned in Trump and the New Capitalism, the system will continue oscillating between neoliberal authoritarianism and fragmented reform.