In this commentary, Dr. Prerna Chahar examines the domestic and geopolitical implications of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s historic comeback in Brazil’s October 25, 2026, presidential runoff. Overcoming a first-round deficit, Lula secured a fourth presidential mandate with 51.79 percent of the vote, defeating Flávio Bolsonaro amid persistent polarization and contested electoral legitimacy. Dr. Chahar argues that this outcome underscores both Brazil’s democratic resilience and the continuing challenges posed by political division and institutional distrust. Internationally, Lula’s victory reinforces Brazil’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, multilateralism, and a more representative global order. Particular attention is devoted to BRICS, the G20, South–South cooperation, and relations with the United States, China, and India, highlighting Brazil’s evolving position within an increasingly multipolar international system.
Dr. Prerna Chahar
Brazil’s presidential election of October 25, 2026, has implications extending far beyond Latin America. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won an unprecedented fourth presidential mandate, defeating conservative challenger Flávio Bolsonaro with 51.79 percent of valid votes against 48.21 percent. The result has renewed debates about democratic legitimacy, US influence in the Western Hemisphere, Brazil’s strategic autonomy, and the future of BRICS, the G20 and South-South cooperation. It also demonstrates how domestic electoral choices can influence the foreign-policy orientation of an important emerging power.
Lula’s political career reflects Brazil’s democratic transformation. Born into poverty in northeastern Brazil, he worked as a metalworker before emerging as a trade union leader during labor mobilizations against military rule in the late 1970s. He subsequently helped establish the Workers’ Party (PT), which became associated with labor rights, social inclusion and economic redistribution.
After several unsuccessful presidential campaigns, Lula won the presidency in 2002 and was re-elected in 2006. His governments from 2003 to 2010 prioritized social welfare, poverty reduction and Brazil’s international engagement. His political career was later disrupted by corruption investigations and imprisonment. His convictions were subsequently annulled, restoring his eligibility to contest the presidency. He returned to office after defeating Jair Bolsonaro in 2022. His 2026 victory marks his fourth successful presidential election, following those of 2002, 2006 and 2022.
Timing, Scope and Significance of the Election
Brazil’s general elections took place on October 4, 2026, with a presidential runoff on October 25 because neither candidate secured an absolute majority in the first round. The elections covered the presidency, state governorships, the National Congress and state legislatures. The results therefore determine not only executive leadership but also the legislative balance that will shape the next government’s ability to implement its agenda.
In the first round, Flávio Bolsonaro received 47.03 percent of valid votes, ahead of Lula’s 45.16 percent. Lula subsequently reversed this deficit, becoming the first candidate in Brazil’s current two-round presidential system to finish second in the first round and win the presidency in the runoff. He received 64,256,232 votes against Bolsonaro’s 59,826,041.
Lula’s victory marks the first time in Brazil’s modern democratic history that a presidential candidate has overturned a first-round deficit to win the presidency. Since the adoption of the two-round presidential election system in 1989, every candidate who led the first round had gone on to win the runoff until Lula’s historic comeback in 2026.
Reactions from Bolsonaro and Trump
Following his defeat, Flávio Bolsonaro initially refused to concede and called for the election to be annulled. He challenged a two-hour extension of voting at some polling stations, authorized to address transport difficulties affecting voters. However, the extension itself did not establish electoral fraud. His position subsequently shifted towards pursuing a legal challenge over alleged abuse of incumbency. Meanwhile, Brazil’s electoral authorities confirmed Lula’s victory. The episode recalls the response of his father, Jair Bolsonaro, to his 2022 defeat. Jair Bolsonaro was subsequently convicted over an attempt to overturn the electoral order and sentenced to 27 years in prison.
The central democratic question is whether electoral disputes are resolved through evidence, judicial review and constitutional procedures rather than unsupported allegations that undermine public confidence. Lula’s victory demonstrates the functioning of electoral competition, but Brazil’s democratic resilience will depend on institutional independence, transparency and the treatment of political opposition.
US President Donald Trump added an international dimension to the controversy by describing Brazil’s election on October 26 as appearing to be “another rigged election,” without providing evidence of irregularities. His comments reflected the ideological proximity between the Trump administration and the Bolsonaro political movement.
Lula’s victory preserves a government committed to an independent Brazilian foreign policy. His assertion that Brazil would not be anyone’s backyard captures its ambition to maintain strategic autonomy while engaging with the United States, China and other major powers.
BRICS, the G20 and South-South Cooperation
Lula’s fourth victory provides continuity for Brazil’s role in BRICS, where it has advocated greater representation for developing economies in global governance, stronger development financing and reform of international financial institutions. Brazil’s engagement with China will remain important for trade, infrastructure, agriculture and energy, without necessarily requiring alignment against Washington.
The G20 offers a broader platform for cooperation between advanced and emerging economies on climate finance, food security, debt sustainability and development. While BRICS can deepen coordination among emerging powers, the G20 can facilitate negotiations across different political and economic groupings. Neither forum, however, guarantees reform; progress depends on members translating shared commitments into practical outcomes.
For India, Brazil is an important partner in both institutions. Stronger India–Brazil cooperation could advance agricultural research, biofuels, renewable energy, digital technologies and climate action. More broadly, Lula’s mandate offers an opportunity to strengthen South–South cooperation through reciprocal trade, technology sharing, development finance and institutional capacity-building. Such cooperation must deliver measurable benefits rather than remain a declaration of political solidarity.
Lula’s fourth presidential victory represents a consequential moment for Brazilian democracy and its international orientation. It preserves Brazil’s commitment to strategic autonomy, multilateral engagement and cooperation through BRICS and the G20, while exposing the challenges of governing a divided electorate.
Ultimately, Brazil’s global influence will depend on economic performance, coalition-building and its ability to translate diplomatic ambitions into practical partnerships. The broader lesson for the emerging global order is that multipolarity depends not simply on resistance to established powers, but on democratic choice, national policy autonomy and effective international cooperation.
(*) Dr. Prerna Chahar is a scholar of International Relations whose research focuses on US foreign policy, inter-American relations, regional cooperation, and India’s foreign policy. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Centre for the Study of the Americas (CSA), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.
MEP Hanna Gedin argues that the EU’s credibility as a defender of democracy, human rights, and international law is being weakened by political double standards and the growing normalization of radical-right ideas. In this ECPS interview, she warns that “the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law” and points to inconsistencies in migration policy and relations with Israel and Turkey. Gedin also urges the European left not to adapt to the far right, but to build its own agenda around inequality, housing, energy, and the cost of living. “You need to have your own agenda,” she says, and to “make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.”
In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Hanna Gedin, Member of the European Parliament for Sweden’s Vänsterpartiet (Left Party, V) and Vice-Chair of The Left Group, reflects on Sweden’s post-election political deadlock, the normalization of radical-right ideas in European policymaking, the erosion of international law, and the strategic dilemmas facing the democratic left. Gedin, who works on the internal market, industry, energy, women’s rights, and gender equality, situates these questions within a broader critique of inequality, restrictive migration policy, and the weakening of Europe’s normative credibility.
The interview begins with the struggle to translate Sweden’s new parliamentary majority into a viable center-left government. Gedin rejects the idea that Vänsterpartiet should once again support a government from outside, insisting that “if our votes are needed, if our mandates are needed, of course we should be in the government.” She argues that the Center Party (C) “needs to choose,” because “there is no middle way.” At the same time, she acknowledges the deep economic divide between the two parties but maintains that cooperation remains possible on issues ranging from feminism and climate to international law and support for communities outside major cities.
A central theme of Gedin’s remarks is the extent to which the radical right has reshaped mainstream political agendas. She argues that Swedish parties have been “adapting and moving closer to the Sweden Democrats,” while politics has increasingly shifted away from “bread and butter” concerns toward culture-war issues. For Gedin, the answer is not imitation but political differentiation: “For the left, it’s really important not to adapt.” Instead, she insists, “You need to have your own agenda,” centered on the cost of living, inequality, housing, and material security.
This concern extends to migration policy at both Swedish and European levels. Gedin describes a “shift and an adaptation to the radical right” in EU migration politics and recalls far right and right-wing MEPs cheering “Send them back, send them back” during a vote on return hubs. Yet she also points to Sweden’s debate over teenage deportations as evidence that public attitudes can shift when abstract migration categories acquire “names and faces.”
The interview’s sharpest normative critique concerns international law. Gedin argues that “the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law” and warns of “a complete erosion of international law” driven by double standards. She contrasts the EU’s firm response to Russia’s war against Ukraine with what she sees as a much weaker approach toward Israel, arguing that such inconsistency undermines European credibility globally.
Ultimately, Gedin presents a distinctly materialist response to the rise of the far right. She argues that the left must make politics concrete: reduce inequality, address rents and energy costs, tax the very rich, and “make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.”
MEP Hanna Gedin. Photo: Umit Vurel.
Here is our interview with MEP Hanna Gedin, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
The Center Party Needs to Choose
Ms. Gedin, welcome. Let me begin with the tension between Vänsterpartiet (Left Party) and the Center Party and the prospects for forming a new red-green government. Sweden’s 2026 election produced a parliamentary majority for S, V, C, and MP, but that majority has so far proved difficult to turn into a government. Vänsterpartiet (V) insists that it must be part of the next government, while the Center Party (C) still refuses to accept V in government. Magdalena Andersson has now received a second opportunity to form an administration, and the four parties have at least begun talking together. Where, concretely, do you see a way out of this deadlock?
MEP Hanna Gedin: I’m not stressed or concerned because we have had this situation before, during the 2018 election, and it took a couple of months before we had a government. My party’s position is quite normal. If they want our votes, if they want our support for the government, of course we should, like every other party, be in the government. That’s a very normal position.
The Center Party has not really done its homework because they have said absolutely no to the Sweden Democrats, while at the same time they say absolutely no to us, and then there is no majority. So, they need to choose. There is no possibility in the middle, as they seem to think.
They have also been very clear and vocal in saying that Magdalena Andersson is their prime minister candidate, just as we have been. Then they need to show that and to choose. There is no middle way, and in the end, we will see this government forming.
V Wants a Stable Center-Left Government
The Center Party says it can support Magdalena Andersson as prime minister but draws a red line against Vänsterpartiet entering government. Why should the Left accept supporting a government from outside after an election in which its votes are indispensable to the new majority? And is there any compromise—cabinet participation, a formal cooperation agreement, budget influence—that V could realistically accept?
MEP Hanna Gedin: I’m not part of the negotiating team; I must start by saying that. But our demand is clear. We have been clear for many years now: if our votes are needed, if our mandates (seats) are needed, of course we should be in the government. We can’t support the government from the outside.
We have seen what that did before, in the 2018 election, when we were supposed to support the government from the outside. It became a very weak government. They did not have a majority for their budgets, and in the end, when they proposed a marketisation of the rent system in Sweden, we actually had to vote the government down. We don’t want that situation. We want a stable center-left government. This is our position.
The Ideological Divide Between V and C
Behind the dispute over cabinet seats lies a much deeper ideological conflict. The Center Party remains economically liberal, while Vänsterpartiet wants stronger welfare provision, greater redistribution, public investment, and tighter constraints on market power. If a red-green government is eventually formed, which of these substantive economic disagreements could become more difficult than the present argument over who gets to sit in government?
MEP Hanna Gedin: It is true that the Center Party and the Left Party have quite opposite economic politics. I would even say that the Center Party is quite extreme when it comes to economic politics. However, I have understood for several years now that they might be needed in the government, and we might sometimes have to undertake some very hard negotiations and find some kind of solution on these issues.
We do believe it’s possible, and we also think that we have a lot of issues that unite us—for example, when it comes to support for communities outside the big cities, feminism, international law, and climate. So, we do think that there are a lot of issues that we have in common.
The SD Is Now Seen as an Establishment Party
Sweden Democrats’ Square Meeting in Umeå. Jimmie Åkesson speaks to the people on the city square where opposition left-wingers have formed a chain and protest in Umeå, Sweden on August 14, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
Vänsterpartiet entered the election promising to help remove a government whose policies were heavily dependent on the Sweden Democrats. If the parties that won the parliamentary majority cannot agree on a government, is there a danger that the post-election dispute itself strengthens SD’s argument that the established parties are incapable of governing—and gives the radical right another opening?
MEP Hanna Gedin: What we saw in the Swedish election was that the Sweden Democrats, for the first time since they entered the National Assembly, actually decreased. They had quite a bad election, and this is, in a way, due to the fact that they are now seen as an establishment party. Even though they have not been part of the Tidö government, they have been the biggest party supporting this government.
When it comes to economic issues, they have shown that they are a right-wing party. They support the economic politics of the right-wing parties. So, I don’t think they have a case for saying that they are anything other than an established party nowadays.
I also think that the election results, where our party, the Swedish Left Party, had a very good election and where we can see that the left side actually got stronger, show that people want something else than the politics we have seen from the Tidö government. And I do think that we will be able to form a government.
Mainstream Parties Moving Toward the Sweden Democrats
You argued earlier that the Sweden Democrats, even without formally entering government, exercised enormous influence over migration, crime, and ethnicity, and that ideas once considered politically unthinkable had moved into government policy. After four years of Tidö government, how deeply has SD changed the political center of gravity in Sweden? Is the larger story now less about SD itself than about mainstream parties adopting parts of its agenda?
MEP Hanna Gedin: We have seen in Sweden a lot of parties adapting and moving closer to the Sweden Democrats, and that is something we see in many countries. It’s extremely dangerous. It’s dangerous when politics focuses on things that are not bread and butter. It’s not about the cost of living or what people really feel in everyday life, but about culture-war issues, and what that has done to society in Sweden is very dangerous.
During the Tidö government, the government put forward, and we adopted, snitch laws, so you should snitch on your neighbors or coworkers if they come from a different country. This is quite extreme. We have seen it even when it comes to criminal issues and so on—this kind of obsession that if you are from another country, you should go away, you should go out of Sweden. It’s also linked to the notion of criminality being colored, in a way. It has been quite an extreme development in Sweden.
What the election showed is that people do not want this kind of policy. During the election campaign, we talked about bread and butter. We talked about people’s cost of living. We talked about the skyrocketing rise in rent, for example. We did canvass. We knocked on almost half a million doors, and when we met people, they were not talking about snitch laws or the need to be tougher on criminals. They were talking about things that affected them in their ordinary lives.
A lot of people also said that. I met a woman who said, “You know, I have stomachache. They don’t want me here. They want to throw me out. What this government has done to me and my neighbors is horrible, and I can’t vote for them. I will vote for you.”
So, in a way, it has affected us. But I do think that what we have seen during these four years—this obsession with people of a different color of skin, or criminals, and so on—is not what people want. I really feel a bit like it’s easier to breathe now. It’s like opening a window, and I think a lot of people in Sweden agree with me.
And I think that’s also very important: the first thing these four parties did, even before forming a government, was to stop the deportation of young people that was planned under the Tidö government. We stopped it.
How the Left Should Confront the Far Right
You have described the far right as particularly effective at finding scapegoats, offering simple answers to complex problems, and forcing its issues to the center of public debate. Across Europe, far-right, radical-right, and populist radical-right parties are increasingly shaping policy even where they are not governing. Why has the democratic left struggled to set the agenda with the same effectiveness—and what has it failed to understand about voters attracted to these parties?
MEP Hanna Gedin: In politics, it’s easier to make people vote for something they are afraid of than for something they hope for. If we have been living for several years with this repressive politics and the right-wing agenda, people also forget what solidarity is and what equality is, and you need to be reminded of it sometimes.
But for the left, it’s really important not to adapt, not to only talk about the Sweden Democrats or the right, the extremist parties, and not to adapt to them. What the Social Democrats did in Sweden, mainly during the election campaign—talking about the Sweden Democrats—did not work. You need to have your own agenda, and you need to put forward reforms about the cost of living, for example. That was what we did, and we were rewarded by the election results in Sweden.
Gender, Migration, and the Far Right
Celebrating Sweden’s National Day in Norrköping, Sweden, on June 6, 2014. Immigrants and native Swedes participate together in National Day celebrations. Sweden’s National Day is an official public holiday. Photo: Dreamstime.
The far right increasingly presents itself not only as anti-immigration but as the defender of a particular European cultural order, often combining nationalism with opposition to abortion rights, LGBTQ rights, and gender equality. As an MEP working on women’s rights and gender equality, do you see these struggles as separate policy battles, or as parts of a broader political project to redefine who belongs and whose rights are considered legitimate?
MEP Hanna Gedin: We see these attacks every day in the European Parliament, and you can see them in a lot of countries as well. The struggles are connected, and you can’t just take one struggle; you need to see the fight as a common fight.
In this Parliament, we see attacks from the right-wing parties on trans people and on migrants, for example. We don’t yet see the same number of attacks on abortion rights, but I’m sure it will come if they are successful.
Stopping Teenage Deportations Is a Very Important Step
You recently raised the issue of what you called Sweden’s “teenage deportations”—young people who have grown up in Sweden but face removal when they turn 18. Sweden has moved toward some of Europe’s most restrictive migration policies. If a new Social Democratic-led government takes office, what specific changes would V demand on asylum, deportation, and family reunification, and which policies introduced during the Tidö period should be reversed first?
MEP Hanna Gedin: I’m not a parliamentarian in Sweden, I work mainly with EU policies. But I think it’s very interesting that, in 2015, something changed in Sweden. It was when there was a big migration to Sweden, and we started having these repressive laws.
During the last government, the Tidö government, something changed last year when we first had a mayor in the city of Jokkmokk (a small municipality and town in Norrbotten County, northern Sweden, in Swedish Lapland / S.G.) saying, “I don’t want you to deport my people living in my city,” and a lot of mayors started saying the same: “We don’t accept this kind of very repressive policy.”
Then we had the teenage deportations. As you said, we saw many deportations of teenagers who spoke perfectly good Swedish, who had grown up in Sweden, and who were deported from their families. And the debate started shifting. Instead of saying, “Yes, people should go out, we should send them out, we should have more oppressive laws,” people were saying, “These are my neighbors, these are my coworkers, these are my friends.” They had names and faces, and the debate changed and shifted.
The first thing the four parties—the Swedish Left Party, the Centre Party, the Social Democrats, and the Green Party in Sweden—have been doing, even though we have not yet formed the government, is to stop these deportations. I think this is a very important step.
EU Migration Policy and the Radical Right
Berlaymont Building, headquarters of the European Commission, Brussels, Belgium. Constructed between 1963 and 1969, the building has become the iconic symbol of the European Commission, the executive branch of the European Union. Photo: Wiktor Wojtas / Dreamstime.
At EU level, the Migration and Asylum Pact entered into application in June, while the new Return Regulation creates faster return procedures and opens the possibility of “return hubs” outside the Union. Governments are now discussing even tougher measures. Are we witnessing the normalization at EU level of ideas that only a few years ago were associated primarily with the radical right? And where should the legal and moral limits of European migration policy be drawn?
MEP Hanna Gedin: Yes, we are witnessing a shift and an adaptation to the radical right when it comes to migration, even at the EU level. I was present in the chamber when the return hubs were voted on, and what happened was that the radical right stood up and cheered together with the right-wing parties when they voted this through. They cheered and screamed, “Send them back, send them back.” This would not have been possible a couple of years ago.
This is a situation that we’re actually seeing, and that is why it’s quite hopeful to see what happened in Sweden and how the debate shifted with the teenagers who were deported. I do hope that we will see the same shift in Europe as well.
I also think you need to see the positive things happening in Europe when it comes to the Swedish election, but also the election in Berlin, where you had a very big left-wing party; the election in Copenhagen, a city close to where I live, where the biggest party was the Left Party; and Mamdani in New York. You do have these positive things happening as well.
You have also criticized the prolonged border controls between Sweden and Denmark and warned about allegations of racial profiling. Governments increasingly justify exceptional border measures through migration, crime, or national-security arguments. At what point does a supposedly temporary security measure become a permanent restriction on free movement and equal treatment within the EU?
MEP Hanna Gedin: I live in Malmö, a city close to Denmark. I take the train between Denmark and Sweden almost every week, and there is still this border control that was put in place in 2015. I would say that this is a permanent restriction. It is not allowed according to EU law, and it still goes on and on and on. So, yes, this is a permanent restriction, and that should not be allowed.
The EU Should Show Some Backbone
The EU has traditionally presented itself internationally as a normative power built around democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Yet critics increasingly point to restrictive migration policies, cooperation with authoritarian governments to stop migration, and inconsistency in the application of international law. Is the EU losing credibility as a normative role model—and how much of that erosion reflects the growing influence of the populist and radical right on mainstream European policy?
MEP Hanna Gedin: Absolutely, the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law. It’s very important to see that there have always been double standards, in a way, when it comes to the EU, because a lot of countries are still colonial powers.
But now, when you can see the very correct way of handling Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine—adopting sanction packages and being tough on Russia—that is good. Why do we see this double standard when it comes to Israel? I’m absolutely sure that people see this all around the world, and countries not being part of the EU are then saying, “If the EU does this, why should we adhere to international law?”
We see a complete erosion of international law now, and with the sanctions from the US against the International Criminal Court (ICC), I think the EU should immediately activate the Blocking Statute, show some backbone, and not be as cowardly as we have seen.
One Must Be Critical Toward NATO While Not Being Naive
NATO headquarters and monument in Brussels, Belgium, the political and administrative center of the North Atlantic Alliance. Photo: Dreamstime.
On Ukraine, you have been unequivocal that Russia’s invasion must be resisted, that Ukraine deserves continued support, and that Europe should stop financing Russia through energy purchases. At the same time, Vänsterpartiet historically opposed Swedish NATO membership. How does the European left build a security policy that is credible against Russian aggression without accepting an open-ended militarization of Europe or abandoning its traditional critique of NATO?
MEP Hanna Gedin: I think one must be able to be critical toward NATO while, at the same time, not being naive. Of course, we live in a very dangerous world, and we need cooperation between countries when it comes to defending ourselves.
My party is not against the augmentation that we have seen in Sweden when it comes to military spending. This should not be taken from schools or hospitals and so on, but we want to impose a wealth tax instead. We also want cooperation between countries, the Nordic countries, and parts of the EU.
I don’t think it’s a smart way to militarize the EU as a side project to NATO and then increase military spending there as well. So, one must be able not to be naive while still being able to criticize the notion of building defense on nuclear bombs and so on. You must be able to do both.
Gaza, Israel, and International Law
You have been one of the European Parliament’s most outspoken critics of Israel’s conduct in Gaza and have called for suspension of the EU–Israel trade relationship, sanctions, and support for international accountability. You and Jonas Sjöstedt were also denied entry by Israel in August. What did that episode tell you about Europe’s leverage over Israel—and why, in your view, has the EU struggled to translate its language of international law into a common policy toward Gaza and the West Bank?
MEP Hanna Gedin: I think that the Swedish government and the EU have been too weak when it comes to Israel. As I said earlier, you need to uphold international law wherever you see crimes against humanity, whether it comes to what happens in Ukraine or what happens in Gaza.
What we see in Gaza is actually a genocide, and you can’t just wait for the ICC or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to say, “This is a genocide.” You have a responsibility, as countries and as politicians, to prevent genocide, and this has not been done at the EU level.
I find it quite appalling that the EU keeps trading with Israel as if nothing has happened and that there are no consequences when you breach international law. Benjamin Netanyahu has an arrest warrant against him. This should, of course, be reflected in EU relations toward Israel.
Economic Cooperation with Turkey Makes the EU Quite Weak on Human Rights
Women and LGBTQ+ activists in İzmir, Turkey, rally for the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, highlighting femicide and the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. Photo: Idil Toffolo.
Your parliamentary work has also addressed repression in Iran, women and girls under Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and the imprisonment of journalists and opposition figures in Turkey. How can the EU demand democratic standards from Iran, Afghanistan, or Turkey while avoiding accusations of selectivity when its economic, migration, or security interests lead it to cooperate with governments accused of serious rights violations?
MEP Hanna Gedin: This is also a problem with double standards. The EU’s economic cooperation with Turkey when it comes to migration, of course, makes the EU quite weak in also pushing for the upholding of human rights in Turkey. So, this is a problem with EU politics that you can see toward many countries—being hijacked when it comes to how to handle these countries.
Focusing on the Cost of Living Is the Only Way
You have repeatedly argued that Europe’s market-liberal framework restricts the public investment needed for the green transition, while rising rents, electricity prices, and living costs have intensified inequality. Radical-right parties have often converted economic insecurity into cultural and anti-migrant grievances. Does the left have to win the material argument—on housing, wages, energy, and welfare—before it can successfully challenge the far right’s politics of identity and resentment?
MEP Hanna Gedin: I think this is the only way, and we saw it in the Swedish election as well. My party, the Swedish Left Party, focused mainly on the cost of living, on issues related to bread and butter, and that is what made us the party that gained the most. That was the biggest success for us. We see it when it comes to EU policies as well. This right-wing environment that we’re living in at the EU level and in many countries, which focuses on cultural issues, makes people poor. You need to be able to focus on the cost of living instead.
In Sweden, during these last years, we have seen an explosion of inequality. We have 46 people in Sweden who own as much as eight million Swedish people, and we have 700,000 poor people in Sweden. The number of poor people has doubled in just a couple of years. This is the reality people are living in, and, of course, for the left, it is about focusing on those real issues—on how to make life nice and good and possible to live, and on reducing inequalities.
Rebuilding a Credible European Left
Finally, the European left faces a strategic dilemma. It wants to confront the radical right without simply reproducing its polarizing style, while also distinguishing itself from centrist parties associated with austerity, market liberalism, and restrictive migration policies. What would a credible European left project look like today—one capable of rebuilding working-class support, defending migrants and minorities, advancing gender equality and climate justice, and at the same time persuading voters who have drifted toward populist and radical-right parties that democratic politics can still materially improve their lives?
MEP Hanna Gedin: I think you need to be very concrete about what you want to change in society. When we talk about taxing the very rich, we get a very good response. For example, we see rising inequalities everywhere, and we need to focus on reducing those inequalities by also focusing on the cost of living, on what people pay in rent, on rising electricity bills, and on the fact that a lot of people are struggling to pay for their food. So, you need to be able to make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.
MEP Brando Benifei warns that Europe’s struggle for technological sovereignty is inseparable from the defense of democracy. In this ECPS interview, he argues that the EU must strengthen its technological capacity while preserving its regulatory autonomy against external pressure and concentrated corporate power. Benifei stresses that “regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans” and warns that the extreme right has moved closer to “techno-oligarchs,” forging “a form of alliance and mutual support.” He describes this convergence as “an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.” Beyond regulation, Benifei calls for “a democratic reaction” and a “new social contract” capable of making European societies “more equal and freer.”
In an era in which technological power, geopolitical rivalry, and democratic vulnerability are increasingly intertwined, the European Union faces a double challenge: strengthening its strategic autonomy while defending the institutional and normative foundations of liberal democracy. Few policy areas illustrate this convergence more clearly than artificial intelligence, digital regulation, platform governance, and transatlantic relations. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States and a central parliamentary figure in the development of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, reflects on Europe’s technological dependencies, regulatory sovereignty, Big Tech power, disinformation, and the growing political relationship between digital oligarchies and the popuplist radical right.
At the center of Benifei’s analysis is the argument that Europe’s struggle for sovereignty cannot be reduced to economic competitiveness or technological capacity alone. It also concerns who has the power to establish the rules governing digital societies. He insists that Europe must develop its own technological capabilities while preserving its regulatory autonomy, arguing that “regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans” and describing this principle as “an absolute red line.” At the same time, he warns that Europe cannot remain merely a regulatory power without developing the technological infrastructure necessary to sustain that role. As he puts it, the EU “can’t remain a regulatory reference if it doesn’t also develop the technological power that is needed today.”
The interview becomes particularly significant when Benifei turns to the political consequences of concentrated technological power. He argues that the rise of the extreme right is increasingly connected to powerful actors within the technology sector. “The extreme right has been getting closer and closer to these techno-oligarchs,” he says, adding that they have “forged a form of alliance and mutual support.” For Benifei, this convergence now constitutes “an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.”
His response is not limited to regulation. Benifei calls for what he describes as “a democratic reaction” and “the proposal of a new social contract” capable of making societies “more equal and freer.” In his account, inequality and declining freedoms can provide “fertile ground” for an alliance between the extreme right and techno-oligarchs and for what he characterizes as a “hateful and democracy-demolishing approach.”
Against this backdrop, the conversation explores the broader implications of AI governance, algorithmic amplification, digital enforcement, disinformation, transatlantic pressure, and European sovereignty. Benifei’s remarks ultimately frame the contemporary digital struggle not merely as a debate over innovation or regulation, but as a deeper contest over democratic authority, economic power, and the institutional capacity of Europe to determine its own political and technological future.
MEP Brando Benifei is the Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States and a central parliamentary figure in the development of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. Photo: Umit Vurel.
Here is our interview with MEP Brando Benifei, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Europe Needs to Have a More United Voice
Brando Benifei, welcome! As Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States, you have repeatedly defended a strong transatlantic relationship, while also arguing that Europe must become more capable of defending its own interests. Following renewed US pressure on trade, technology, defense, and digital regulation, has the transatlantic relationship entered a fundamentally more transactional phase? And what would a genuinely more sovereign—but still cooperative—European approach to the United States looks like?
MEP Brando Benifei: I think it’s important to consider that the relationship between the European Union and the United States is based on strong economic integration that has been developing over decades, but also on security, cultural exchange, and social interconnections. In fact, the economic interchange is the biggest between two areas of the world. The EU and the US have not only trade, but also a direct economic presence of EU companies in the US and US companies in the EU. That goes beyond any other similar comparison we could make between the EU and other parts of the world, or the US and other parts of the world, even compared with neighboring South America.
So, this transatlantic relationship is rooted in values and history, but also in economic interests at the moment. We always need to consider that when we look at what has been happening in these last months, where objectively the European Union has been pushed by the US administration to accept certain conditions, for example on trade, based on pressure and on profiting from the fact that the EU is not very united.
The truth is that the European Union is made up of countries that have been divided on issues such as different economic interests. So, the US was able to profit from these divisions to actually push for a relatively punitive regime for trade, which, in the end, was stabilized and ameliorated. It’s not, in the end, what was initially foreseen by President Trump, and it’s something that is viable today, but it’s the result of these pressures. We have also seen pressures regarding environmental legislation and digital legislation.
My point is very clear: we need this relationship. It’s very important that we work in the transatlantic context for various reasons. I tried to mention a few, but we need to demand respect. We need to have a more united voice. The United States doesn’t speak with the voices of its various individual states; it speaks with the federal voice of the United States, the federal administration. The EU should find its own voice, which today is not there.
This is crucial to having a healthier transatlantic relationship, based on respect and equal footing, which today is being put under pressure and called into question by the attitude of President Trump toward the Europeans.
The So-Called Kill Switch Has Already Been Pressed
You have argued that US restrictions on advanced AI chips amount to a direct challenge to Europe’s economic resilience and technological sovereignty, and that dependence on semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, computing power, and critical raw materials can become geopolitical leverage. Does Europe now need to treat AI infrastructure in much the same way it treats energy or defense—as a strategic capability that cannot safely remain overwhelmingly dependent on external powers?
MEP Brando Benifei:It’s crucial that we build more sovereignty on these topics because we have already seen that the so-called kill switch has already been pressed. In fact, the US has restricted the use of advanced models for cybersecurity objectives to the European Union from one day to another, and this was a clear challenge to our sovereignty and our capabilities because we were depending on systems that revealed themselves to be in the hands of another political actor that could really stop us from using them at any moment.
So, today technological sovereignty is one of the crucial points in how we can build a more autonomous EU, which can guarantee the future of its citizens in terms of security and economic prosperity. But this also means using resources today to develop this capability, which means deciding to devote some expenditure to it.
That’s why I support the idea of having a common plan of investment like the one we had after Covid. That’s also the idea in the Draghi report that has not been picked up by the member states, but that’s a very big mistake because we need that leverage today to invest in accelerating innovation for sovereignty and to guarantee that the EU has its own alternatives.
This doesn’t mean we need autarky or protectionism. It means we need the European Union to always be able to have alternatives when it becomes unviable to continue with the existing technological solutions.
Photo: Bustiuc Dumitru / Dreamstime.
Europe Can’t Remain a Regulatory Reference Without Technological Power
In your 2026 report on AI and EU trade, you argue that Europe must combine competitiveness, openness, and strategic autonomy rather than relying on regulation alone. Yet the EU still trails the United States and China in computing capacity, investment, cloud infrastructure, and AI scale. Can Europe realistically remain a global regulatory power if it does not also become a substantially stronger technological and industrial power?
MEP Brando Benifei:My opinion is that it can’t. It can’t remain a regulatory reference if it doesn’t also develop the technological power that is needed today, and this is a crucial point on which a lot of our efforts should be concentrated. In fact, the European Commission has taken some steps with the proposal of a digital sovereignty package, which was something that we could not imagine before. It’s the result of a new situation, and this package addresses important issues like semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, and open-source models. So, it goes deep into our present dependencies and tries to build an alternative.
But to pursue this agenda, we need political resolve. We need the willingness to actually go down a road that will create some tension with the US, with China, and with other powers. We need to know that. We need to be ready to sustain that through dialogue, obviously keeping a door open for discussion with all our counterparts, but having a clear objective of creating more European autonomy and sovereignty.
This is something that our citizens also want. If you look at the polling and surveys, our citizens are saying, “We want a more sovereign Europe. We do not want to depend on foreign technology.” It’s important that our governments listen to our citizens, who are saying this very clearly.
Regulatory Sovereignty as a Red Line
You have criticized US tariff pressure as potentially targeting not only European economic interests but also the regulatory and social model itself. Where should the EU draw the line between legitimate transatlantic negotiation and external pressure to dilute European rules on digital markets, food safety, environmental protection, data, or fundamental rights? Can regulatory sovereignty become one of the defining fault lines in future EU-US relations?
MEP Brando Benifei: Maintaining the principle that regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans is an absolute red line. We cannot negotiate on legislation that is based on democratic processes. This is something that the US must understand, and I have to say that they have understood it at this moment. They knew that this attempt—to actually convince us to change legislation based only on their pressure—would be difficult for them.
We need to look realistically at the content of these pressures because, in some cases, they reflect existing dynamics in the European political scenario. I give you an example: the pressures to change some of the EU’s environmental legislation were, in fact, already sustained by legitimate political decisions inside the EU by political actors. So, this is a topic where we have seen some things changing in a way that the US liked, but it was, in fact, based on a political positioning inside the EU that was not related to US pressure.
On other topics, like digital legislation, however, there are clearly greater differences between what the US is asking of the EU and what the EU is ready to do based on its regulatory autonomy. This must be understood, this must be accepted, and we need to keep this as a clear red line because we cannot negotiate on our regulatory autonomy.
The Brussels Effect, at Least at the Company Level, Is Already Happening
European Parliament offices and European flags in Brussels, Belgium on July 20, 2020. Photo: Lena Wurm.
You were one of the central parliamentary architects of the AI Act, and you continue to argue that Europe should promote a human-centric, risk-based model internationally. After several years of implementation debates, do you still believe that the so-called “Brussels effect” can shape global AI governance, or are divergent US, Chinese, and other models making regulatory convergence increasingly unrealistic?
MEP Brando Benifei: Clearly, regulatory divergence is an obstacle to this kind of convergence through the so-called Brussels effect. But let’s look at the data. We have researchers from important European foundations who have conducted scientifically sound surveys with American companies, showing that the AI Act has been taken as a reference point for voluntary compliance schemes, including by companies operating only inside the US.
So, the Brussels effect, at least at the company level, is already happening. That’s one of the dimensions of the Brussels effect, because it’s not only governments taking the same stances, but also companies voluntarily adopting ways of acting that reflect legislation that is not present in their internal jurisdiction but is, in fact, taken from the EU.
The decision could be linked to various reasons: operating in a global market or wanting to have easy-to-apply schemes that can be replicated globally. In fact, this is happening with US companies developing and deploying AI. The data are clear, and this shows that our approach has not been very bureaucratic or extremely complex, but rather quite company friendly.
I want to underline that a significant role for self-assessment has been built into the regulatory framework of the AI Act. Companies are entrusted with responsibility, but they are not asked to undergo a lot of third-party assessments, which is instead the case for other product-safety legislation, because we wanted to maintain some flexibility in this AI legislation, considering the quickly changing technological scenario.
So, I see some Brussels effect happening. Obviously, we are also looking more specifically—this is a slower process—at the adoption of similar legislation in other parts of the world. This is also happening. There are many parts of the world that, in recent months, have adopted legislation on AI content transparency, copyright protection, and countering AI abuse for mass surveillance that has been taken quite directly from the EU AI Act.
The AI Act and European Competitiveness
You have warned against presenting deregulation as the principal route to European competitiveness, arguing instead for investment, industrial policy, stronger European AI institutions, and better support for start-ups and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). How do you respond to the growing political argument that the AI Act and other digital regulations have become a competitive burden that Europe can no longer afford?
MEP Brando Benifei: In my opinion, we should listen to those who develop AI in Europe, because otherwise we are talking in a very abstract way. Those who develop AI in Europe tell us what their problems are and why they are not growing enough. One issue is access to capital, so we need an integrated capital market where more risk capital is flowing. They also face a lack of access to computational infrastructure. We are dealing with that through AI factories and AI gigafactories, but we need to accelerate.
They also say they have an issue with regulatory complexity, but this relates mainly to data legislation—the use of data—which is not linked to the AI Act. In general, they recognize that the AI Act protects them from abuses by bigger companies, often non-European ones, that do not want to share information and want to avoid transparency.
In fact, the AI Act is generally supported by those companies. When they look at the regulatory burden, they are more concerned about the overall amount of legislation, and more specifically about data, where they want further reform. This is what we are also working on at the EU level at the moment: simplifying data legislation.
They also want clearer, more harmonized enforcement. The problem today with the EU is very fragmented enforcement, where we still have rules that are too dependent on national implementation. This is something that I see as one of the crucial priorities.
And I don’t understand how we can sustain the argument that the problem would be the AI Act, considering that the AI Act applies to all companies that operate in Europe and sell products in Europe. This means that it is overwhelmingly more applicable to non-European companies, which make up the majority of those operating in the EU today on AI matters.
Open-Source AI and Digital Sovereignty
Image: Wrightstudio / Dreamstime.
You have described open-source AI as a “structural response” to the concentration of compute, cloud, and data in a handful of firms. Could open-source AI become a genuine pillar of European digital sovereignty, or is Europe still too dependent on non-European hardware, cloud providers, foundation models, and capital for open-source ecosystems alone to materially change the balance of power?
MEP Brando Benifei: We are still too dependent on these closed systems, and in fact, we need to build a better balance with open-source and open-weights models. This is something that is now a focus, and the EU’s open-source strategy will also deal with that. We are working on this, starting from the European Commission’s sovereignty package, and the EU is now concentrating more on it.
We are building some alternatives. We are working on this in terms of adoption, but also in terms of development in Europe, and that’s a way we need to pursue to rebalance the situation.
This is also something where we need to build more consciousness, more awareness, and more training on how to deal with this among our operators, our public administrations, and our entrepreneurs, because this is a way to rebalance power and to avoid the concentration of resources and power that we see today. That is an objective risk in how our AI is being developed today.
The Rules Need to Be Applied More Forcefully
Your interventions repeatedly emphasize that rules in the digital sphere will exist one way or another—the question is whether they are created democratically or effectively dictated by large technology companies. Have major digital platforms and monopolistic Big Tech actors acquired a form of quasi-constitutional power over speech, information visibility, political mobilization, and even democratic participation? If so, is existing EU law sufficient to constrain this concentration of private power?
MEP Brando Benifei: Many of the laws of the European Union are already capable of constraining this, but they need to be applied more forcefully. The point is the political will to apply the rules in a way that is not constrained by other political considerations, such as avoiding retaliation or political problems.
This means that we need more independence in how the rules are applied, and this is something we are discussing in the European Parliament. There is a discussion about building a digital enforcement agency that could bring more independent enforcement of the rules and depoliticize their application.
Today, this means overcoming the restraint on applying the rules in the right way and in the strong way needed to actually pursue this objective: having the rules really applied, not only conceived abstractly, but applied by democratic powers, and not decided among themselves by the strongest private actors, mostly non-European.
We Should Tackle Both Disinformation and the Algorithmic Structure
In discussing the European Democracy Shield, you argued that “democracy does not fall in one day” but can be dismantled “one post at a time,” and you stressed that the problem is not only foreign interference but also the platform business model itself, in which algorithms reward anger and polarization. Should Europe therefore stop treating disinformation primarily as a problem of false content and focus more directly on the underlying algorithmic architecture that systematically amplifies polarizing material?
MEP Brando Benifei: I think we should look at both sides because disinformation content can be extremely harmful even if we do not have addictive-design algorithms. So, we need to look at the content, but also, obviously, at the risks of the addictive construction of algorithms, which is being targeted by new legislation: the Kids Act for minors, but also the Digital Fairness Act for adults at large.
The way we are leading on this is extremely important, and this is something where we need this new legislation to be in place and integrated with the existing norms that focus more on disinformation content rather than on the algorithmic structure. The algorithmic structure also needs to be tackled with clear action, like these new proposals that are on the table.
One of them is already there, the Kids Act. The Digital Fairness Act, which is getting through very soon, will deal with these issues and should be an important piece in completing our digital regulation architecture.
Democratic Reaction Needed Against the Alliance Between the Extreme Right and Techno-Oligarchs
Anti-Trump protesters gather across from Trump Tower on Fifth Avenue during the annual Labor Day Parade in Midtown Manhattan, New York City, on September 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.
You have explicitly warned that platform ownership and algorithmic amplification can assist far-right actors, citing Elon Musk’s intervention in German politics as an example. To what extent is the contemporary rise of the populist and radical right inseparable from the transformation of the digital information environment? Are we looking at a political phenomenon that traditional party competition alone can no longer adequately explain?
MEP Brando Benifei: There is clearly a link to these phenomena because we see that the extreme right has been getting closer and closer to these techno-oligarchs, and they have forged a form of alliance and mutual support. This is where we are standing now: an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.
I think it’s important that we react not only with rules, obviously, and with actions to tackle the most pernicious practices, but also with a democratic reaction, with the proposal of a new social contract where we are able to allow our societies to become more equal and freer. Because this is the context—with more unequal societies and less free societies—in which we see the nurturing of this hateful and democracy-demolishing approach that has become the fertile ground for this alliance between the extreme right and techno-oligarchs.
AI Companies Don’t Want to Be Regulated
And lastly, Mr. Benifei, populist radical right and far-right parties increasingly frame EU digital regulation, anti-disinformation measures, judicial independence, minority protections, and constraints on majoritarian power as forms of censorship or technocratic control. Is the central struggle now becoming one over the very meaning of democracy—between a liberal-constitutional conception based on rights and institutional restraints and a more plebiscitary or majoritarian conception of popular sovereignty?
MEP Brando Benifei: I find it honestly ridiculous, and I have said it many times, with a frank attitude toward my American interlocutors, that we hear from certain institutions or think tanks, especially American ones, that we are censoring and that there is no freedom of expression in Europe, while we have seen censorship happening very explicitly in the US. At the same time, we haven’t seen any of these kinds of actions and attacks from the US toward countries where there is no freedom of expression, there are no elections, there are limitations on anything that can be said, and you can end up in jail for real.
This has been a clear contradiction in the approach from the US, which makes it clear that, in this very extreme representation of the issue, there is instead a specific economic interest—a specific interest coming from companies that just don’t want to be regulated.
We need to take the discussion about freedom of expression seriously and avoid rules that also create, involuntarily, forms of censorship that are not needed. I take that very seriously. But the way this topic has been framed by American interlocutors, especially by the Trump administration has not been credible, and I’ve been very clear with them that they need to make a better case for us to be convinced of the benefit.
In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Semir Dzebo, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford, examines Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 4 elections through the lenses of populism, nationalism, secessionism, and ethnic politics. He argues that Bosnia remains marked by “stable instability”: Dayton secured peace but has struggled to function as a democratic constitution. Dr. Dzebo discusses “populist secessionism,” the erosion of anti-elite appeals under long incumbency, competing constructions of “the people,” Croat and Bosniak representation, foreign influence, disinformation, and the limits of territorial revisionism. Rather than expecting dissolution or a sweeping constitutional settlement, he points toward incremental reform, EU integration, stronger state capacity, desegregated schooling, cross-ethnic electoral incentives, and improved economic conditions.
Bosnia and Herzegovina approaches its October 4 elections amid renewed strain on the political architecture established by the Dayton Peace Agreement. More than three decades after the end of the 1992–95 war, questions of statehood, entity autonomy, ethnic representation, foreign influence, and the legitimacy of shared institutions remain deeply intertwined. Political competition continues to be structured less by a conventional left–right divide than by competing understandings of sovereignty, citizenship, collective rights, and of who constitutes the legitimate political community. Against this fragmented backdrop, the elections are not simply about who will govern Bosnia and Herzegovina, but about the character and durability of the post-Dayton state itself.
In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Semir Dzebo, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford, examines these tensions through the lenses of populism, nationalism, secessionism, and ethnic politics. He argues that electoral competition in Bosnia carries unusually high constitutional stakes because “whatever coalition gets formed after the October 4th elections is, in a way, a choice about the state itself.” In this sense, the election resembles “a de facto referendum” on the country’s future political architecture.
A central theme of the conversation is what Dr. Dzebo conceptualizes as “populist secessionism.” Whereas ordinary nationalism operates along a horizontal axis of competition between national communities, populist secessionism introduces a vertical, moral division between an allegedly authentic people and corrupt or illegitimate elites. In this framework, political disagreement becomes morally charged: as Dr. Dzebo puts it, disputes that might otherwise be negotiated can acquire “this moral dimension that turns them into treason,” making compromise appear as capitulation.
The interview also explores the limits of this strategy. Dr. Dzebo’s research suggests that support for secession in Republika Srpska is driven less by populist attitudes than by ethnonational identification, ingroup bias, deteriorating intergroup relations, and economic grievance. Long incumbency, moreover, can erode the credibility of anti-elitism: voters predisposed against elites may increasingly view Milorad Dodik himself as part of the elite.
The broader diagnosis culminates in Dr. Dzebo’s assessment of Dayton itself. Bosnia, he argues, lives in a condition of “stable instability.” Dayton “has really accomplished the first task” of securing peace, but “has not really been great at the second task” of functioning as a democratic constitution. Yet he rejects both expectations of imminent dissolution and hopes for a sweeping constitutional reset, instead pointing toward incremental reform, EU integration, implementation of Strasbourg judgments, stronger state capacity, desegregated schooling, cross-ethnic electoral incentives, and improved economic conditions as the more plausible path toward a more cohesive democratic order.
Here is our interview with Dr. Semir Dzebo, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Bosnia’s Elections Are De Facto Referendums on the State
Photo: Dreamstime.
Dr. Dzebo, welcome! Bosnia and Herzegovina enters the October 4 elections with its post-Dayton political order under considerable pressure, and the central political divisions concern not simply left and right but competing understandings of statehood, sovereignty, entity autonomy, citizenship, and ethnic representation. Looking at the campaign as a whole, are these elections fundamentally about who governs Bosnia and Herzegovina—or about what kind of political community and state Bosnia and Herzegovina should be?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: Before I start responding, thank you very much for the invitation to be part of the series. With regard to your question, it’s very hard to separate those two things, especially in Bosnia. Whatever coalition gets formed after the October 4th elections is, in a way, a choice about the state itself. It’s a little bit like a de facto referendum on what kind of coalition architecture we’re going to have after the elections.
There’s the option of continuing the Troika model, then potentially the return of SDR, or strengthening the entity-focused axis of SNSD and HDZ. And there’s maybe a larger question looming there about the pardon of Milorad Dodik, depending on what kind of coalition is formed.
I think it’s a little bit unusual because, in most other countries, elections are just about elections and who’s going to govern, without necessarily thinking these elections are going to change the nature of the state itself. But in Bosnia, it’s always a little bit intertwined when it comes to those things.
Certainly, what I really liked in your introduction about the elections was that you said it’s really less about issues that are considered in other countries’ elections, where it’s liberal versus conservative, it’s left versus right. There’s very little sort of program being announced and promoted by parties. Some of the people who have done research on these elections have found that not even 10% of social media content by parties has been about anything but a program.
It’s more about these traditional ethno-national tensions, and that’s why the tension is on top of everything. It’s not necessarily what ordinary voters care about, but, in a way, it’s omnipresent, so they’re almost forced to think about those things.
Then we recently had the death of Ratko Mladić, the convicted war criminal, which was almost a gift for those wishing to stoke the flames of nationalism again, and it forced itself into these elections again as something to really be considered.
Populist Secessionism Turns Disagreement into Treason
Your recent work introduces the concept of “populist secessionism” to describe the fusion of anti-elite populism with ethnonational claims to territorial separation. In Republika Srpska, how should we distinguish ordinary Serb nationalism from specifically populist secessionism? What changes when the claim that Republika Srpska must defend its national autonomy is reframed as a struggle of a morally authentic “people” against corrupt domestic elites, Sarajevo institutions, and international authorities?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: I followed the line of thinking of people who have done earlier work on the distinctions between nationalism and populism and the fusion of those two, like Rogers Brubaker, and then my PhD advisor at Central European University, Erin Kristin Jenne, who writes about ethno-populism. They tried to differentiate them as having two different axes.
I would say that ordinary Serb nationalism would be a horizontal axis, where claims of rights and autonomy of the Serb nation relative to other nations are made in this comparative sense, and the goals of that nationalism can be pursued through institutions. It is acceptable, in that view, that there will be those who disagree on the best course of action and the best way to pursue the goals of Serb nationalism within Serb people.
But populist secessionism has a vertical or moral axis, where the nation has a singular will. The leader is the one who embodies it, and everyone who presents an obstacle is part of the corrupt elite. In my paper, I thoroughly analyzed the discourse of Milorad Dodik. I find that he has three types of elites that he targets.
The first one is the domestic opposition, the Serb political parties within Republika Srpska that are his opposition, the ones that run for votes, that he used to run for votes against; now he’s technically not a part of these elections. Then you have the Bosniak elite in Sarajevo, whom he also targets within the country. Then there’s also the element of what he presents as a neo-colonial international community that he sees as standing in the way of the will of the people and imposing these external decisions without, according to him, any legitimacy to do so.
So, what happens is that some of these disagreements that could happen and could be debated get this moral dimension that turns them into treason. It almost prohibits any sort of compromise, because it sees it as capitulation to the interests of those who wish to harm the Serb national project in Bosnia.
Dodik Uses Populism to Redirect Discontent
Milorad Dodik greets supporters in Pale, Bosnia and Herzegovina, following a meeting and referendum on Republika Srpska’s National Day, September 25, 2016. Photo: Vladimir Stanisic / Dreamstime.
One of the most intriguing findings of your research is that Milorad Dodik’s populist-secessionist discourse appears to function more effectively as an elite political strategy than as a direct reflection of mass attitudes: stronger anti-elitism was actually associated with lower support for both secession and Dodik’s party, while ethnic identification, ingroup bias, and economic grievances were stronger predictors. Does this suggest that analysts have overestimated the popular foundations of secessionism in Republika Srpska? And if so, why does the rhetoric remain politically so persistent?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: Partly, it really does. There’s definitely support for secession in Republika Srpska. It’s real support, and it tends to vary a great deal. But in a survey that I’ve done, I found that it has almost nothing to do with populist attitudes. In fact, those who really hold populist attitudes, and we see them as a combination of anti-elitism, pro-people, and a Manichaean element, are actually the ones who have lower support for both Dodik’s party and secession.
Those who support secession are actually motivated by other, more traditional motivations, like just a sense of distinct ethnonational identity, just a sense that intergroup relations in the country are already poor, that the country is really not a unified whole.
But again, the reason why this populist secessionism exists, and the reason why Dodik uses it, is because it really enables him to have a tool and a discursive arsenal to attack domestic opposition, the Bosniak elite, and the international presence in the country. It really helps him to try to mobilize against all of these elites in pursuit of goals, because he can’t mobilize the anti-elite discourse.
What it shows is that, among people living in Republika Srpska, those who are predisposed to dislike elites are the ones who think of elites in Banja Luka; those are the ones they directly live under. So those who are dissatisfied with elites tend to think of Dodik as elite, while Dodik essentially wants them to think of the Bosniaks in Sarajevo or the international presence in the Office of the High Representative as the elite.
It’s a discursive move to try to shift attention from his long-standing incumbency and the things that people might be dissatisfied with, and to get the people’s attention onto other targets where he can fare more favorably in competition with.
Anti-Elite Voters Increasingly See Dodik as the Elite
That finding also creates an apparent paradox: populists normally mobilize against entrenched elites, yet SNSD has exercised power for many years while continuing to present itself as a resistance movement against Sarajevo, international bureaucrats, and external interference. Does prolonged incumbency eventually exhaust the credibility of populist anti-elitism? Or can ethnonationalism compensate for that contradiction by continually redefining the incumbent elite as the defender of the community against more distant and allegedly more threatening elites?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: Exactly. At the mass level, it really shows that long incumbency is going to exhaust the appeal of anti-elitism. As I said in response to the previous question, those who are predisposed to have anti-elite attitudes are less likely to vote for Dodik or his party because they think of him as the elite. So, if they have an anti-elite predisposition, they’re going to think negatively of him and his party.
This also shows, and is in line with other work, that it’s a bit of a methodological question for all of us working on populism whether standard attitude scales work for predicting support for populists once they are in power for a long time. Sebastian Jungkunz and his colleagues had a paper on this, where it shows that these scales predict support really well when populists are in opposition, but once they hold on to power for a long time, the predictive power of populist attitude scales for support for populists actually vanishes.
This is something that the field still needs to try to figure out better: How do we measure this once populists are in power for a bit longer? What you also see in this campaign for these elections is that those who are really appealing to anti-elitism in the sense of intra-ethnic competition are the opposition in Republika Srpska. They’re saying, we need justice back. We’ve seen them accuse Milorad Dodik of being a false patriot who’s just willing to sell national interests for personal gain, or just asking him to let the reins of power go so the people can finally live.
So, the opposition is really trying to mobilize this anti-elitism against Dodik and his party. What he tries to do is, like you said, shift this anti-elitism from intra-ethnic competition towards the High Representative, towards the Bosniak politicians, and present themselves, the SNSD, as really the savior, the defender of the interests of Republika Srpska.
Weakening SNSD Would Not Weaken Serb Nationalism
How important is it to separate dissatisfaction with SNSD and Dodik from attitudes toward Serb national autonomy itself? Much of the opposition in Republika Srpska challenges corruption, patronage, and personalized rule but remains strongly committed to Serb national interests. If SNSD were significantly weakened in these elections, would that represent a decline of ethnonational politics—or merely a change in who is considered the most credible representative of the Serb national project?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: I would say it’s the latter. If you look at recent examples, such as the death of Ratko Mladic, opposition politicians were present at memorial services, showing that they remain aligned with these ideas and the national project. Some opposition members also went to Belgrade for the commemoration and praised Ratko Mladic and everything that he has done.
So, while they are willing to challenge Dodik on issues such as corruption, the rule of law, and the use of his position for personal gain, they are not going to make a major shift in how they view the position of Republika Srpska or the project of Republika Srpska vis-à-vis the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
If SNSD is significantly weakened, as you say, it would be more a statement about the electorate no longer trusting Dodik with the national project and wanting to select someone else because of fears or dissatisfaction that he is willing to compromise or sell out vital parts of this national project for personal gain. You can sometimes see this in decisions regarding the non-recognition of the decisions of the Office of the High Representative, which were later reversed in exchange for the lifting of personal sanctions imposed by the US on Dodik.
That is what the opposition is trying to do: attack him on this basis. If the result is as such, it can certainly signal that people no longer trust him with the national project.
Bosnia’s Ethno-Populist Axes Are Almost Fused
Bosnia and Herzegovina contains several rival constructions of “the people”: the Serb people of Republika Srpska, a historically vulnerable Bosniak community closely associated with the defense of the Bosnian state, the Croat constituent people demanding “legitimate representation,” and a civic conception centered on citizens irrespective of ethnicity. Does this plurality make Bosnia a particularly distinctive case of populism, because political actors compete not only over who represents “the people” but over who the legitimate people actually are?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: It’s a valuable case for all the work on ethno-populism, in particular, because there is no singular people. In the Constitution, it’s defined as three constituent peoples, and then we have others. As a result, the vertical and horizontal axes that I talked about earlier are almost fused and confused everywhere.
One good example of this is the concern that has existed for years within the Croat community over the issue of legitimate representation: whether the way elections are set up allows Bosniaks, because of their sheer larger numbers, to choose the Croat representative to the presidency, and whether this is what they call legitimate representation.
You see the Bosniak member, Bakir Izetbegović, who is the candidate for presidency, borrowing this a little bit and saying that if the member of Troika is elected to be part of the presidency, that will almost be like token Muslim representation, but that wouldn’t be legitimate.
Then, within the elections for the Croat member of the presidency, the opposition, instead of using anti-elitism, is saying, “Hey, you have the same people who have been running the country for a very long time, and we need change.”
So, it’s quite a distinctive case when it comes to who the people are. It’s really valuable for those of us who study ethno-populism to devote attention to the unique dynamics that we have in Bosnia.
Mladić’s Death Mobilized Pride, Grievance, Fear, and Anger
Ratko Mladić is depicted on a Serbian flag during a political rally in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 29, 2011. Mladić is a former Bosnian Serb military leader. Photo: Dreamstime.
The funeral and commemorative ceremonies for Ratko Mladić appear to have reactivated sharply divergent memories of the 1992–95 war. What emotions and forms of political mobilization did they generate among Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats? From a populism perspective, did political actors use these ceremonies to reinforce boundaries between “our people” and rival communities or elites, revive narratives of victimhood and betrayal, and frame contemporary conflicts as continuations of unresolved wartime struggles?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: Reactions were obviously different. Among Serbs in Republika Srpska, the official reaction, as well as the reaction by most of the opposition, was, in a way, one of pride, but also of mourning and grievance. There were tribute gatherings across the cities and across the entity, including in Srebrenica itself. Certain politicians were trying to present his imprisonment as suffering endured by the entirety of the Serb people. The resulting events related to it in Serbia were intended to send the message that Serbia and Republika Srpska are as one.
Obviously, for Bosniaks, the emotions were quite different. They were ones of humiliation, fear, and anger. Some of the events, like at the football game, when the fans of Crvena zvezda at the Belgrade Stadium had a banner saying, “Pravac Potočari (Straight to Potočari),” which is an infamous saying by Ratko Mladić, were like a clear invocation of genocide. So, there has also been a lot of mobilization on the part of ordinary people trying to report these to the relevant authorities in order to deal with the rise of genocide-denial sentiment through potentially legal channels.
Bosniak Outbidding Takes the Form of Defending the State
The Bosniak political field is itself fragmented between national-conservative, social-democratic, liberal, and civic currents. Can Bosniak political fragmentation weaken ethnonational polarization by preventing one actor from monopolizing national representation, or does electoral competition instead create incentives for rival parties to demonstrate that they are the more credible defenders of Bosnia, Bosniak security, and the integrity of the state?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: Yes, there’s a good side to this fragmentation, and that is democratic accountability. Because there are multiple legitimate options, there’s a way for the electorate to hold those in power accountable and vote them out once they’re not happy with their performance. But outbidding still happens. In particular, it depends on the level of perceived danger to the state and to the existence of Bosniaks within it.
So, let’s say Bakir Izetbegović has been saying that we might not have a country if, again, Troika and Denis Bećirović are elected to power, and that governing with SNSD and HDZ BiH is really a humiliation. Again, it’s like this populist logic: you cannot really compromise on this; otherwise, you’re selling out the people.
I think everything that’s happened with Dodik also gave Troika an opportunity to try to act as defenders of the nation and maybe make some moves that would make them appear tougher when it comes to matters of security and inter-ethnic relations.
But there is also restraint. For example, I’ve read some analysis of the elections saying that it’s actually been quite subdued, that it’s been unusually quiet when it comes to the elections for the Bosniak presidency. I think Bećirović has said that he doesn’t want to campaign on quarrelsome politics. He said he wants to focus on jobs and crime.
So, one thing that’s different, obviously, is that when it comes to Bosniak outbidding, it takes the form of trying to defend the state. But when it comes to outbidding in the case of Republika Srpska, it goes into the realm of separatism.
The Croat Representation Grievance Is Very Real
A comparable tension exists around Croat demands for “legitimate representation.” Supporters see collective representation as necessary to prevent a numerically larger community from determining who represents Croats, while critics fear that further institutionalizing such principles would deepen ethnic territorialization. Is this ultimately a conflict between two democratic logics—individual political equality and collective national representation—and has the Dayton framework reached the limits of its ability to reconcile them?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: It is really a conflict between two democratic logics. From the standpoint of the Croats in Bosnia, their idea is that the representative of the people in the presidency should be chosen by them. If it’s the Croat representative, it should be chosen only by Croats. Obviously, the Dayton Agreement has different prescriptions, and it’s written into the Constitution that what happens is one person, one vote. So, everyone living in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has the right to choose whom they want to vote for.
The ruling in the case of Sejdić-Finci has pushed more towards this idea of individual equality, where they’re more sympathetic towards the first option, while the Constitutional Court has a different idea of what the decision should be. The grievance in the case of the Croat community is very real because Željko Komšić won the seat four times, each time with a substantial amount of non-Croat support. The discourse on it is still very much the same.
Bosnia Is More Ethno-Populist than Religiously Populist
Religion in Bosnia is often intertwined with national identity rather than operating as a wholly independent ideological cleavage: Islam with Bosniak identity, Serbian Orthodoxy with Serb identity, and Catholicism with Croat identity. Would you therefore characterize Bosnia as a case of religious populism, or is it more accurate to speak of ethnonational populism in which religious institutions, symbols, sacred geography, and memories of collective suffering provide legitimacy and emotional reinforcement to political projects whose primary logic remains national?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: I think it’s the latter. It’s more about ethno-national populism. I don’t think there’s much there in terms of sacred reinforcement along religious lines. Because of the nature of how ethnicity works in Bosnia in terms of identity, and because it’s a bit fused with religion, it works as this boundary marker of where one belongs or is supposed to belong. But I don’t see much religious doctrine infused into the way populism or ethno-populism works.
Economic Support Is Far More Popular than Territorial Revision
Photo: Mar Tas / Dreamstime.
Your work on kin-state politics in Serbia finds that nationalist appeals can increase support for cultural and economic assistance to co-ethnics abroad, while public resistance to more aggressive territorial revision remains considerably more robust. What does this tell us about Serbia’s relationship with Republika Srpska? Should we distinguish carefully between popular support in Serbia for protecting or assisting Bosnian Serbs and actual public willingness to endorse secession, territorial revision, or destabilizing intervention?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: What it tells us is that, when it comes to matters of irredentism, there are two very different sides to it. One is assistance in terms of economic and cultural support, and what I found is that people are much more willing to support those in the first place. They can also be convinced to either increase or decrease their support through rather minimal framing.
If you frame it as support being costly—that those are funds we could invest here at home in Serbia—then they will decrease their support. If you convince them that there is this duty to support their ethnic brethren, their ethnic kin in Bosnia, then you can convince them to increase their support.
But when you start talking about changing borders, which would likely result in conflict, people will, as a baseline, be less likely to support that. You are also less likely to convince them to either increase or decrease their support, no matter how you try to frame it.
It means that there is really a limit to how much you can engage in this irredentism, and that as long as it’s economic or cultural, you can work with that, you can increase it if you wish to, and you can try to mobilize support for it. But changing borders is really just not something that people will change their minds about, and it does not seem to be something that is as popular as economic and cultural support.
Kin-State Engagement Must Be Transparent and Neutral
More broadly, how should we distinguish legitimate kin-state engagement from political interference in Bosnia’s elections? Serbia and Croatia have obvious constitutional, ethnic, and historical connections to Bosnian Serbs and Croats, while Russia, Turkey, Hungary, the European Union, and the United States possess very different political, strategic, religious, and economic interests. At what point does diplomatic, cultural, religious, financial, or media engagement cease to be ordinary external influence and begin to distort domestic democratic competition?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: What needs to happen, not just in the case of Bosnia, but also anywhere where there is this ethnic kin element of states having ethnic kin abroad, is that, according to the recommendations of the 2001 Venice Commission report on kin-states and the OSCE prescriptions, any engagement of states with their ethnic kin abroad should, first of all, be transparent in terms of the fact that it is occurring.
It should, in the best-case scenario, be channeled through the institutions of the host state, but if that’s not the case, at least the host state institutions should be made well aware of it. Then, it should not be used for the purposes of mobilizing voters, which we often find to be the case, but it should really be aimed at communities at large.
It shouldn’t be timed to the electoral calendar, but should really be sustained long-term support and engagement. And lastly, it should be neutral to the constitutional order of what we call the host state, where the ethnic kin lives.
If these conditions are not satisfied, then you tend to have friction, which can also result in a worsening of the situation of the co-ethnics that live within the host state.
International Inconsistency Feeds Secessionist Opportunities
Foreign influence is frequently narrated through the same populist vocabulary as domestic conflict: external actors can be represented either as protectors of a threatened community or as illegitimate elites overriding popular sovereignty. In Republika Srpska in particular, opposition to the Office of the High Representative and international intervention has become integral to political mobilization. Does international involvement unintentionally strengthen populist secessionism by allowing domestic elites to present constitutional constraints as foreign domination?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: I talked about it quite a bit in the first part of our interview. It really gives a convenient target for Dodik. For example, one of the things related to the elections now is that these are going to be the first elections with the introduction of new election technology and machines. What is supposed to be a technical safeguard against fraud, Dodik is calling the will of unelected foreigners who are trying to impose this technology for the purposes of potentially defrauding the election.
It’s a very convenient target, and throughout his career, he has always targeted the Office of the High Representative, the previous US administration’s ambassador, the US Embassy, and the other European embassies. But I don’t think that this international involvement really causes secessionism. There are all of these other domestic motivations that translate into support for secession. Even if international involvement feeds or gives potential targets for anti-elitism, we also see from this that anti-elitism doesn’t really translate into support for secession.
What, in the case of Bosnia, feeds secession is the opening of potential opportunities to advance secessionist causes because of the inconsistency of the international actors in Bosnia. We have the former High Representative announcing his resignation, and then there’s a bit of disagreement over who the new High Representative is going to be. There might be changing opinions on the mandate of the High Representative in Washington, D.C., as opposed to the opinions in the EU.
So, the inconsistency, the disagreement within the international community, is providing these openings for those who might favor secession in Republika Srpska to try to advance it a bit more, but not involvement per se.
Bosnia Is Highly Vulnerable to Disinformation
Illustration: Shutterstock / Skorzewiak.
Information politics seems especially important in this election. ODIHR is explicitly monitoring social-media campaigning as well as foreign and domestic misinformation, disinformation, and interference. In a society where media spaces are already fragmented along political, territorial, and ethnonational lines, how vulnerable is Bosnia and Herzegovina to coordinated information campaigns? And is their principal danger that they persuade citizens of entirely new ideas, or that they intensify pre-existing fears, historical grievances, and perceptions of ethnic threat?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: Structurally, when it comes to disinformation, Bosnia is very vulnerable. The media space is very fragmented, and there is also a wide reach of media from Serbia and Croatia. A lot of people also get their information from Facebook. There’s been great work done by people at organizations like Istinomjer and Raskrinkavanje, who have documented bot networks and Facebook pages that have been used to smear the opposition and politicians, as well as fabricated posts and a lot of AI-generated content.
Polarization is omnipresent, with ethnic polarization also omnipresent in the coverage of the news, and I don’t think the current fines for any misuse of media are really meaningful. I also don’t think that there’s any danger that it’s going to convert people who weren’t nationalists into nationalists, but there is a danger that it’s just going to amplify nationalist sentiment among those who were already predisposed to it.
One particular danger that I talked about just a while ago is the denial of results. Dodik has already planted the seeds with his comments on the new technology—that the international community is doing it so they could defraud SNSD and him, and that it’s a Western tool of fraud, as he calls it. The danger is that, through the media that is co-opted by SNSD, there’s going to be a rejection of the results, or some of it happening even in advance, whatever the results turn out to be.
The Challenge Is Separating Populism from Antagonism
You have also worked on computational approaches to identifying populist discourse, including research suggesting that large language models can detect context-sensitive people-versus-elite framing with accuracy approaching expert human coding. Could such tools help us map the 2026 Bosnian campaign across Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian language environments—identifying when ordinary nationalism becomes populist, when religious or historical symbolism is mobilized, and how narratives travel between domestic political actors and external information ecosystems? What methodological cautions would be necessary in such a deeply context-dependent political setting?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: It’s a good question. Having worked in this area, there’s promise there, but I would still say that, for a place as complicated as Bosnia, especially when it comes to distinguishing all of the things that you said from one another, I don’t think we are that close to doing all of it.
But some of the work that I’ve done with my colleagues in Team Populism has really managed to use large language models to replicate the work of human coders when it comes to recognizing populism. As part of all of the testing that we have done, some of it included speeches from Montenegro in Montenegrin, and the results there were really encouraging. Obviously, that would also work in the case of Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian texts.
One of the cautions that I had from similar work on these computational approaches is that it’s sometimes hard to separate populism from just antagonism. The hostility between ethnic groups is everywhere, but not all of it has these elements of populism, like people-centrism, anti-elitism, and Manicheanism. So that would be my primary concern. It’s also about some of the contextual elements—the extent to which those would work.
One other thing that we should try doing is looking at how a lot of the campaign has moved on to digital things like songs, video, and symbols. So, for scholars of populism who work on those things, that would be another interesting thing to look at.
Bosnia Lives in Stable Instability
And finally, Dr. Dzebo, thirty-one years after Dayton, is Bosnia and Herzegovina approaching a point at which the original peace-making consensus can no longer provide a sustainable democratic equilibrium? Dayton successfully institutionalized safeguards against domination, but it also entrenched ethnicity as a central principle of political representation. Looking beyond October 4, do you see a plausible path toward a renewed constitutional settlement that preserves collective security while expanding civic equality and cross-ethnic political competition—or is the more likely trajectory a continued fragmentation in which competing national communities increasingly interpret sovereignty, democracy, and even the legitimacy of the state itself in incompatible ways?
Dr. Semir Dzebo: Hard question. I’ve heard someone once say that the best compromise is the one that leaves everybody unhappy, or at least a peace settlement. In a way, that’s the case in Bosnia, in that it’s a peace settlement that is also supposed to work as a democratic constitution. It has really accomplished the first task. It has not really been great at the second task.
We have this stable instability in Bosnia. There’s no active armed conflict, but there’s always, underneath the surface, some inter-ethnic tension. And also, the Dayton Agreement, the way it was framed, has created this self-reinforcing loop. The institutions, because they’re set up in a way that makes ethnicity the primary political identity, strengthen all these things that I found to also be feeding into secessionism in Republika Srpska, like in-group bias, which I found to be the strongest predictor of support for secession.
I don’t think we’re going to have, anytime soon, some grand settlement, but we’re also not going to have, at least in my opinion, dissolution. The most plausible path is one of incremental moves towards EU accession. Implementing the Strasbourg judgments would be a plausible path forward. Trying to strengthen state capacity through the reform agenda would be a plausible path forward.
In the slightly longer term, the priority should also be ending segregated schooling, because that would produce very positive societal benefits, as well as trying to add some electoral incentives that would emphasize winning votes across communities. Those incremental steps would have a very positive effect on the state of politics in the country.
One thing that I found in my paper on secessionism and populism is economic grievance. So I said in-group bias was the strongest predictor. Economic grievance was the second strongest driver of secessionist sentiment. And this really gives reason for some cautious optimism, because material conditions can change, in a way, more easily than all of the prescriptions of Dayton and the Constitution.
Trying to address the fact that more than half of young people are interested in leaving the country is really a pressing problem, and trying to improve economic conditions should be the priority of both domestic politicians and the international community. That has the potential to have very positive knock-on effects for societal cohesion and interethnic dynamics.
Africa’s centrality to the global energy transition rests increasingly on its vast reserves of critical minerals, yet mineral abundance alone does not guarantee developmental sovereignty. Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja’s commentary argues that the key challenge is whether African states remain low-value extractive peripheries or convert geological advantage into industrial capacity, technological learning, regional value chains, ecological accountability, and democratic bargaining power. It develops the concept of transition sovereignty to capture the ability of resource-rich societies to shape extraction, processing, governance, knowledge, finance, and value distribution on their own terms. Rather than rejecting foreign investment, the article calls for strategic interdependence, stronger regionalism, and accountable institutions capable of ensuring that decarbonization produces not only cleaner technologies, but also more equitable and developmentally transformative outcomes for African societies.
The global energy transition is frequently framed as a clean break from the extractive political economy of fossil fuels. But decarbonization technologies such as digital infrastructure, electricity grids, electric vehicles, batteries, and wind turbines rely on another extractive frontier—critical minerals. Strategic materials such as lithium, cobalt, copper, manganese, graphite, and rare earth elements are emerging as essential materials for a low-carbon economy. In Africa, this transition is dominated, yet its importance is underutilized: the continent provides substantial amounts of minerals needed by clean-technology industries. Still, it receives only a small share of the value (IEA, 2025). The big question is not whether Africa will provide the green transition, but what it will look like and whether African societies have the political, industrial, and technological capacity to define its terms.
This is different from green colonialism and what this commentary calls transition sovereignty. Green colonialism is not just the extraction of African minerals by foreign companies. It describes a larger political-economic trend that is creating a material geography of global decarbonization where the rents of processing, technological control, knowledge, finance, and supply chains lie disproportionately elsewhere, particularly in Africa. The language of the commodity shifts, from oil to coal, lithium to cobalt and copper—but so does the underlying asymmetry. The threat is not the exclusion of Africa from the green transition. It is that Africa will be represented on conditions that mirror its historical role as a low-value exporter of ecological wealth.
A new yardstick exists for measuring Africa’s involvement: transition sovereignty. It means the ability of resource-rich societies to decide on the extraction, processing, governance and distribution of transition minerals, as well as to develop their own and regional skills and expertise in industry, technology, knowledge, financing and ecological regulation. It’s less restrictive than state ownership and less strict than local content rules. A country has transition sovereignty if mineral wealth increases its bargaining power, builds productive capacity, benefits society, safeguards ecological and community interests, and lets African actors shape the organization of global green value chains. The issue is not only who owns the mine, but who decides and has the power to make the decisions and technologies that start underground and end up at the surface of the decarbonization technologies.
Beyond Resource Control: Building Productive and Technological Capacity
But Africa is starting to challenge the conditions of the transition. The African Union’s Green Minerals Strategy focuses on value addition at source, regional industrialization, climate resilience, and integrated value chains, rather than relying on raw mineral exports (African Union, 2025). National export controls also indicate a clear direction of travel. Since 2023, Africa has implemented at least 14 measures to limit the export of raw or semi-processed minerals, and in February 2026, Zimbabwe banned the export of all raw minerals and lithium concentrates to encourage in-country beneficiation and accountability (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2026; Reuters, 2026a). Such measures cannot be idealized as definitions of sovereignty. They are better understood as efforts to renegotiate where value exits African economies.
Zimbabwe provides a revealing illustration of both the possibilities and limits of resource sovereignty. The action was directly tied to in-country value addition, accountability and beneficiation (Reuters, 2026a) in its February 2026 suspension of exports of raw minerals and lithium concentrates. This policy reflects a well-known model in which upstream mining companies in Africa export concentrates, and downstream processing and value-added manufacturing occur elsewhere. But restricting exports is just the first step. An export ban can generate ‘protected extraction without transformative industrialization’ without reliable electricity, transport, finance, processing technologies, skilled labor, industrial demand and credible institutions. The real question is: Does export restraint build productive capabilities, or does it merely shift rents at the mine gate?
Thus, the Zimbabwean example illustrates an overarching lesson in the theory of transition sovereignty: control of the commodity is not enough if it is not matched by control over the capabilities attached to it. Industrialization does not need to be confined within the national boundaries. It needs to develop, process, create, capitalize, and integrate mineral production resources into local economies. The IEA sees Africa’s opportunity in spreading the transition’s economic value across the global value chain, because its economic value is distributed unevenly along the chain (IEA, 2025). In this sense, sovereignty is not realized by stopping the extraction; it is realized by transforming a geological advantage into a sustainable productive capacity.
Knowledge Sovereignty and the Regionalization of Green Value Chains
Another aspect of the issue is related to knowledge sovereignty, as demonstrated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In September 2026, the Congolese government stepped up its efforts to centralize geological information by creating a national geological databank, along with new aerial surveys and digital mapping. The goal is to strengthen state control, reduce the information imbalance, and boost the state’s negotiating leverage in mining deals (Reuters, 2026b). This is important because mineral sovereignty is also epistemic (knowledge-based). Information on the location, quality, access, and strategic value of deposits shapes investment, licensing, negotiation, and long-term planning. Formal ownership of mineral deposits can coexist with informational dependency, as long as geological intelligence, technical standards, and data infrastructures are externally dominated.
The DRC case also reminds us to see transition sovereignty beyond the state. If enhancing the bargaining power of government is to produce “public value,” “transparency” in contracts, “environmental accountability,” and “meaningful benefits” to “communities” and “workers,” then sovereignty is becoming “developmental.” It’s not just a matter of African States regaining control from foreign companies. It is the extent to which mineral control is institutionalized in institutions capable of making mineral governance socially accountable. Otherwise, the language of sovereignty can be used to justify a transfer of control from an outside entity to domestic elites, without changing who gets the benefits and who bears the costs.
The DRC-Zambia battery and electric-vehicle project provides a better regional prospect. Instead of treating copper and cobalt as a commodity that must leave the region before higher-value use can begin, the two nations have worked to develop a cross-border value-chain model that includes mineral processing, battery production, and industrial capabilities. The UN Economic Commission for Africa and other regional institutions have technically supported the activity. In 2025, measures were taken to strengthen engagement by firms, financial institutions, and other actors in the battery and electric-vehicle value chain. This is not limited to battery production. It shows how mineral-rich countries can be viewed as hubs of regional industrial coordination, not just sources of raw materials being bid for by foreign extractors.
Regionalism matters because many constraints to African benefaction are too great for individual states to overcome alone. Processing plants need stable energy, transport tie-ups, technical expertise, markets, capital, and volume. A regional strategy can then transform uncoordinated mineral resources into coordinated industrial systems. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiative on environmentally and socially responsible energy-transition mineral value chains also aims to keep mineral wealth within the region and encourage livelihoods and industrialization in several southern African nations (UNECA, 2026). This requires a multi-level understanding of transition sovereignty at the national, regional, and continental levels.
Strategic Interdependence: Partnerships on Whose Terms?
But the new mineral race reveals a more profound paradox. African minerals are now being talked about in terms of partnership, supply-chain security and strategic cooperation with powers, many of them global, who seek them out. The US, EU and China have legitimate reasons to acquire access to critical minerals. For instance, in September 2026, the US government announced its support for developing critical mineral processing in Kenya, including the proposed development of the Mrima Hill resource, while stressing the importance of local processing and value-added production (Reuters, 2026c). These partnerships could be real opportunities. Diversifying external partners is not sovereignty. African countries may expand the number of buyers of their products but not substantially alter the nature of their political economy if they switch from one big buyer to a few smaller ones and they still export their low-value resources.
That is why the question “with whom?” has to be asked alongside a deeper question: “with whom for?” or “with whom on whose terms?” Colonial elements in external capital, technology, and markets are not the same. The developmental consequences relate to bargaining power, institutional design, ownership structures, local linkages, environmental protection, and rent distribution. Hence, the target should not be autarky or opposition to foreign investment. Strategic interdependence means the ability to involve global partners without giving up control over the developmental paths of mineral societies.
From Mineral Abundance to Developmental Sovereignty
The politics of critical minerals also reveal the boundaries of a technologically driven view of decarbonization. A battery can have a range of emissions during its use, whereas its material components can include land dispossession, unsafe mining practices, water stress, labor exploitation, or ecological degradation. Thus, the environmental legality of green technologies cannot be judged solely by their carbon performance. This transition is likely to result in a “cleaner” global economy, but at the cost of African communities in the mining sector. The political feasibility of green development lies in jointly considering the costs of extraction and the benefits of decarbonization.
This will expand to include community and labor. Foreign ownership does not inevitably mean environmental damage, and state ownership does not necessarily mean that it is socially just. The key is whether the rights of people living and working around the mineral frontiers are meaningful and include access to information, voice, and benefits of extraction. Artisanal and small-scale miners are important in this context. Formalization cannot be used to criminalize informal miners; it should provide avenues to formalize their lives, safety, skills, and value addition. Otherwise, the switch could perpetuate the traditional scenario where people near the source of value bear the risk of extraction, while value is generated further up the chain.
The strategic question for Africa is then no longer whether to accept or reject the green transition, but rather how to do so. It’s a choice between engaging in it as an extractive periphery and as an industrial, technological, and political actor. The latter requires reliable and affordable energy, transport infrastructure, mineral-processing capacity, regional markets, skills, research and development, transparent contracts, accountable institutions, and effective protections for communities and workers. It also demands that governments differentiate between resource nationalism and transformation. National control may be a tool for development, but it is not development.
Decarbonization on Africa’s Terms
The green colonialism and transition sovereignty binary should thus be viewed as a spectrum of political-economic options. An African country can boost state bargaining power without excluding communities from the benefits; it can boost local processing but remain highly technology-dependent; or it can attract several foreign investors but keep exporting the bulk of the value contribution of its minerals. On the other hand, through mineral policy, a country can pursue regional industrialization, develop its own capacities and skills, improve ecological governance, and increase democratic involvement. The shift is therefore not necessarily green, just, sovereign, or developmental. Its character is being politically constructed.
This is therefore a both-and situation for the developing critical-mineral economy. Africa’s strategic position, which it could use to renegotiate its role in global geopolitics, will not create sovereignty if it is merely geologically abundant. The important question is whether mineral extraction becomes a basis for industrial potential, technological learning, fiscal independence, ecological responsibility, and democratic negotiating strength. The question is no longer just whether the world can decarbonize, but how. It’s about who has the power to decide, who receives the value created along the chain, who pays the environmental and social costs, and who controls the material foundations of decarbonization.
If Africa is the source of the mines, then others are the source of the manufacture, and the color of colonialism can vary without its political economy changing. The energy transition may be more than just a change in energy systems if Africa’s mineral wealth is translated into regional industrial capability, technological capability, ecological responsibility, and democratic bargaining power. It may be a chance to reimagine Africa’s economics in the international arena. This is the true measure of transition sovereignty—whether Africa provides the green transition or whether Africa can help regulate the transition.
In this interview, Imran Bayoumi examines how the weakening of multilateral institutions and the rise of transactional diplomacy are reshaping global power in ways that often favor authoritarian and populist governments. He argues that authoritarian middle powers benefit from greater flexibility to hedge between competing blocs, while democracies remain constrained by alliances, institutions, and domestic accountability. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerges as a key example: Ankara has “managed to play and interact with both realms at the same time,” using populist nationalism to present strategic balancing as the defense of national interests. Bayoumi also warns that weakening Western cohesion benefits revisionist powers, while calling for a “retooled American leadership” capable of rebuilding democratic cooperation in a more fragmented international order.
In an era of intensifying geopolitical fragmentation, weakening multilateral institutions, and increasingly transactional diplomacy, authoritarian and populist governments may find themselves unusually well positioned to exploit the emerging international disorder. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Imran Bayoumi, Deputy Director and Resident Fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, examines how the erosion of the rules-based international order is altering the balance between democratic constraints and authoritarian flexibility. His central argument is not that autocracies are inherently stronger, but that a fragmented system can reward governments able to hedge between competing powers, bypass institutional constraints, and personalize foreign policy. As Bayoumi puts it, authoritarian middle powers “have experience with hedging” and are less constrained by the institutions and alliances that shape the choices of democratic states.
The decline of multilateralism is particularly consequential because it lowers the costs of defying established rules. According to Bayoumi, states increasingly feel comfortable “bypassing multilateral bodies,” ignoring treaties and challenging norms because the prospect of meaningful punishment has diminished. Yet he cautions against reducing this transformation simply to populism: “It’s a mix of both things: populism and power.” At the same time, the personalization of diplomacy associated with contemporary populist politics is becoming increasingly significant, as foreign policy becomes more closely tied to leaders themselves rather than institutions and professional bureaucracies.
Turkey provides one of the interview’s clearest illustrations of this emerging geopolitical flexibility. Still embedded in NATO and Western institutions, Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has simultaneously cultivated relations across competing geopolitical blocs. Bayoumi describes Turkey as a country that has “managed to play and interact with both realms at the same time.” Populist nationalism, he argues, has been crucial to legitimizing this strategy domestically: “Erdogan has been able to sell this balancing strategy as a way of being able to secure Turkey’s interests first.” The willingness to purchase Russian air-defense systems while remaining within NATO exemplifies how Ankara combines alliance membership with strategic hedging.
More broadly, Bayoumi warns that weakening Western alliances and institutional cohesion ultimately benefits revisionist authoritarian powers. “Every action that undermines the strong ties between the United States and its allies is a benefit for them,” he argues, pointing to the growing cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Yet he rejects the idea that authoritarian ascendancy is inevitable. Instead, he calls for “some sort of retooled American leadership” capable of accommodating the growing autonomy of middle powers while rebuilding institutions and democratic cooperation. The challenge, therefore, is not simply to restore the old international order, but to construct a more resilient one capable of reconciling democratic values, strategic power, and an increasingly multipolar world.
Here is our interview with Imran Bayoumi, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Authoritarian Middle Powers Are Better Equipped to Hedge
Figure from the V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026.
Mr. Bayoumi, welcome!In “Why Today’s Global Disorder Rewards Authoritarians,” you argue that autocratic middle powers are particularly well placed to benefit from today’s fragmented international system because they can hedge between larger powers and pursue highly transactional relationships. What is it specifically about authoritarian government that gives these countries greater room for maneuver than democratic middle powers? Could democratic states adopt similar strategies without weakening their democratic principles?
Imran Bayoumi: In the article, I lay out two factors that I’ve identified. The first is that these autocratic middle powers have experience with hedging. They’ve balanced between different blocs of great powers for a lot longer than these democratic middle powers are now trying to. They’re not constrained by these broader institutions and alliances that are now seeming more and more like a burden.
The second factor is that they are adept at these kinds of personalist politics that we’ve seen really dominate the second Trump administration and the broader political deal-making space. You saw Qatar donate the Boeing 747 for the new Air Force One at the start of the second Trump administration. In terms of hedging, I talk about it in the article, but Kazakhstan, for example, has signed up to both China and Washington’s flagship AI programs.
Therefore, these states are really better in this kind of disruption. They know how to gain influence in ways that democratic states would struggle with. If a democratic state was to donate a jumbo jet, there would probably be some sort of parliamentary pushback, discussions in the media, and potential repercussions that I don’t think authoritarians would be subject to.
So, can democratic states adopt these traits? Sure, it’s just harder for them to do so. There’s nothing stopping them from having a more personalist foreign policy. Nothing’s stopping them from hedging, but they face constraints. I don’t think their populations may want that. It’s harder to leave treaties if you have to have a parliament approve that. I think norms are a big thing, too. I can’t imagine that the Canadian public, for example, would be happy if Prime Minister Carney donated a large amount of military equipment to the United States in exchange for a trade deal. So, there’s nothing in theory stopping them, but the institutions and norms that they adhere to are a real limit.
Alliances Remain an Asset, but New Risks Are Emerging
You suggest that democratic middle powers such as Canada, Australia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom are constrained partly because their economies and security systems were deeply integrated into the US-led postwar order. By contrast, authoritarian middle powers were often less integrated into that system. Has the very institutional dependence that once protected democracies now become a strategic weakness in a more unstable world?
Imran Bayoumi: I’m not sure I would say that it’s a weakness. I don’t think the NATO alliance is a weakness. That’s still the most successful alliance in history, and there’s still great value to states being part of it, regardless of how disruptive and unpredictable they might see Washington as acting.
That being said, it also exposes them to new risks. I think you’ve seen the United States talk about annexing Greenland, making Canada the 51st state, putting kind of ad hoc tariffs in place, and all of this really weakens the strength of those institutions. So, I wouldn’t go so far as to say being part of them is a weakness right now, but it’s certainly a factor that undermines the security, economic interests, and sovereignty of some of these states in the current moment.
If we were really to see full-out great power war, and NATO was attacked and responded, Article 5 was invoked, I don’t think any of these states would see that as a weakness. They would see the alliance as a great benefit. So, these institutions still have great potential and promise. The problem is that we’re actively undermining them, and we need to change that course.
Bilateral Diplomacy Thrives as Institutional Constraints Weaken
Populist leaders often present international institutions, treaties, courts, and alliances as restrictions imposed by distant elites on national sovereignty. Does the weakening of the rules-based international order therefore create a particularly favorable environment not only for authoritarian governments but also for populist leaders who prefer bilateral deals and leader-to-leader diplomacy over multilateral institutions?
Imran Bayoumi: I think the current moment does. When we saw the rules-based international order with bodies like the UN supported by the US and backed by other countries, there were real costs to defying these major institutions and going against global norms. The threat of sanctions was real, as were the loss of market access and diplomatic isolation. What we’ve seen is that now states of all sizes feel more comfortable bypassing multilateral bodies to get action, ignoring treaties, ignoring what they previously signed, and maybe bucking norms because they think that the threat or possible punishment is lesser. There’s no cost associated with their revisionist actions. These bilateral deals are peaking because of that.
The stronger state can now enforce a deal that it wants and get its outcome. But, there are a few interesting threads also to pick up. One is that even though these multilateral institutions maybe are not as strong, the value and the brand of them are still strong. We still see populist autocratic leaders traveling to the UN every September to make a speech. So, there’s still value in that brand and in that address. Maybe the institution is not strong, but the broader value is and could be resurrected.
I touched on this earlier, but to return to your original question, I’m not sure it favors populist leaders so much as actors with power. Looking back, even before the Trump administration, if the United States pursued a bilateral deal with a less powerful populist leader, it would still be able to dictate the terms of that deal largely because of its relative power. So, it’s a mix of both things: populism and power.
Populism Is Accelerating the Personalization of Foreign Policy
Photo: Shutterstock.
Your argument focuses heavily on increasingly personalized and transactional diplomacy. This also seems characteristic of populist politics, where leaders frequently claim that personal strength and negotiating skill can replace institutions and professional bureaucracies. Do you see a connection between the global rise of populism and the wider shift from institutional diplomacy toward personalized diplomacy?
Imran Bayoumi: Yes, similar to my previous answer, that as populism rises and the foreign policy of countries increasingly becomes about the personalities of those leaders themselves, you do start to see this trend. People start to meet their partners where they are. I think there are some good examples here. King Charles gifted President Trump a bell from a naval submarine that bore his name. We’re even starting to see democracies meet this kind of populist trend. But I’d go back to the power thing. I think power really underpins this system. So, I’m not sure that personal strength and negotiating skill are any better than multilateral institutions if you’re still negotiating, arguing, or dealing with a more powerful state. Military and economic power are two constant underpinnings that exist regardless of the broader dynamic.
Democracies Still Face Constraints That Autocracies Escape
You write that autocratic governments are primarily concerned with regime survival rather than electoral accountability. But democratic populist governments can sometimes develop similar priorities by weakening courts, attacking independent media, politicizing the bureaucracy, and concentrating authority around the executive. Should we therefore think of the advantage you describe as belonging strictly to authoritarian regimes, or more broadly to highly centralized and personalized political systems?
Imran Bayoumi: I think it applies to both, but with the caveat that, in these still highly centralized systems that are maybe partially free democracies, the party can still lose power. If you look at Hungary, there was an election and there was a change in government.
I really tried to focus on autocratic states in my article, arguing that they don’t have to worry about these kinds of institutional checks and balances that highly centralized liberal democracies may have to worry about to a lesser extent, but that are still there. There’s still media, there are still courts, and there are still other ways that they can pressure the government.
Whereas in autocracies, they don’t have to worry about that. So, I think it applies to both, but there’s that caveat that it could change. Political systems change, and in these highly centralized, personalized systems, the media ecosystem, the justices, and the courts could be a vector for that change.
Washington Has Fully Embraced Personalized Foreign Policy
The Trump administration itself raises an important question for your argument. Trump has repeatedly criticized international organizations and alliances, emphasized personal relationships with foreign leaders, and favored transactional bargaining over traditional diplomatic institutions. To what extent has the United States under Trump begun to practice the kind of personalized foreign policy that you associate with authoritarian states?
Imran Bayoumi: Two things here. First, Washington has fully embraced this personalized approach to foreign policy. The diplomacy between President Trump and Kim Jong-un of North Korea during Trump’s first term is a good example. It involved exchanging letters and Trump addressing Kim Jong-un personally. I don’t think it was particularly successful, although it did result in a few summits. Tensions between the two countries remain high, but that kind of personalized diplomacy has clearly carried over into the second administration.
I would, however, push back somewhat on the idea that this approach is associated solely with authoritarian states. At the moment, authoritarian states may be better suited to handle it because they have more experience with this kind of diplomacy and know how to make it work. But over the longer term, they are unlikely to be the only states to practice or utilize personalist foreign policy.
Democratic Backsliding Could Carry Strategic Costs Abroad
Following from that, could there be an authoritarian dimension to the transformation of American foreign policy under Trump? I do not mean that the United States has simply become an authoritarian state, but rather whether the weakening of institutional constraints, the personalization of executive power, and the preference for loyalty and bilateral bargains are making American statecraft resemble some features traditionally associated with authoritarian governance.
Imran Bayoumi: The literature and public discourse around this topic are pretty clear. There is a very real risk of democratic backsliding in the United States, and there are concerns there. Ultimately, whatever US foreign policy looks like over the next decade, the next five years, or whatever timeframe you want to look at, there is a real risk that the kinds of factors you laid out—the personalization of executive power, the preference for blind loyalty, and bilateral deals—will weaken US foreign policy and national security writ large, rather than simply making the United States resemble an autocratic foreign policy.
I think the bigger challenge is not so much what it looks like, but what results it achieves for Washington and for American citizens. The risk is that it will produce a more dangerous world, one where we have more shaky, bilateral, ad hoc deals that are not built on these broad, treaty-bound alliances.
It would be a world where American interests are harder to define and therefore harder to defend, and where American power has lost some credibility. So, revisionist states feel more comfortable challenging it, undermining it, and acting against it. That’s a real challenge. How do we stop that? How do we change that? And what does a new, more powerful, newly designed American foreign policy look like to meet the challenges of the 21st century, deal with revisionist autocracies that are challenging Washington’s power, and also recognize the growing power of these smaller middle-power countries?
Fragmentation Rewards States That Can Move Faster and Hedge More Freely
Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney attends a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Ukraine’s Independence Day in Kyiv, Ukraine on August 24, 2025. Photo: Vladyslav Musiienko / Dreamstime.
In “Don’t Fall for the Middle-Power Mirage,” you question Mark Carney’s hope that democratic middle powers can build an alternative multilateral order. Democratic states appear divided over how far they should distance themselves from Washington, while authoritarian middle powers can cooperate selectively with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and regional powers at the same time. Does this mean that fragmentation itself structurally favors governments that are less committed to fixed alliances and common political values?
Imran Bayoumi: In the current moment, 100%. That article really talks about two factors. One is that democratic middle powers, even if they were to answer the call that Prime Minister Mark Carney laid out at the Davos World Economic Forum earlier this year, can’t agree on the approach to doing so. In that article, I talk about then-UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Mark Carney. The week after Carney’s speech, Starmer had a different approach. He said, we don’t have to choose; we can balance all sides, play all sides, something to that effect. So that’s the first challenge. Democratic middle powers are not even on the same page.
I think that, in this era of disruption and upheaval, countries that don’t have these long-standing institutional ties and alliances can play both sides. They’re more nimble and can move faster. It goes back to the other article we talked about, where their populations may not want leaders to stay committed to these institutions, or, if they do, the leaders can ignore the will of their population. So, they’re more comfortable making these deals that might invite media blowback.
They don’t necessarily have to get parliamentary approval, or, if they do, it could be rubber-stamped. So, they’re more nimble and can act in different ways. The challenge for them is that they still recognize that there’s value in alliances and in this broader dynamic. Even if you look at Canada, which under Carney is trying to advocate for this new kind of vision of the international system, it’s not about abandoning NATO or totally pulling out of NORAD, the binational command here.
Therefore, there’s still a recognition that alliances are valuable and that these kinds of treaty-bound obligations are strong for a reason. These bilateral deals may be a temporary boon, but I don’t think they should be read as an indication of long-term success.
Revisionism and Pragmatism Increasingly Coexist
You distinguish between authoritarian states that actively seek to revise the international order and those that simply exploit its weakening. But is “pragmatic opportunism” really politically neutral? When governments such as Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kazakhstan benefit from weaker democratic norms, looser conditionality, and more transactional great-power competition, do they not also have an interest in preserving—and perhaps deepening—the erosion of the rules-based order, even if they do not openly seek to replace it?
Imran Bayoumi: This is a really important point. These states—their erosion, or actions contributing to the erosion, of the current international order—are a real risk. Going back to my previous answer, I don’t think they’re trying to build what comes next. There’s not a clearly defined broader international architecture that they’re building toward. They’re more taking advantage of the current disruption.
In the long-term, I don’t know what they will try to build. Even though they’re now preying on this disruption, it would be a mistake to say that they didn’t benefit in some way from the previous international order as well. So, even though Carney’s vision might be incredibly tough to achieve, he’s at least trying to figure out what comes next.
To your point, I think they have an interest in both sides. In some areas and sectors, they want to weaken the current international order and advance their own interests. On some topics, however, they want to strengthen it.
China, for example, is still very committed to this idea of international standard-setting when it comes to telecoms and, potentially, artificial intelligence. These are the broad multilateral structures, forums, and venues that we associate with the previous international order. But in other ways, China and other states are quite revisionist. They don’t want to cede sovereignty; they want to achieve their own goals.
So, I think it’s this balancing act, and part of this tension is a realization that there’s a real question of what comes next. You will have to build what comes next, and that might be harder than merely reacting to the current disruption.
Turkey Shows How Populist Nationalism Can Legitimize Geopolitical Hedging
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the opening of the Natural Gas Pipeline (Turkstream) in Istanbul, Turkey on November 19, 2018.
Turkey seems to present an especially difficult case for your argument. It remains a NATO member and benefits from Western security and economic institutions, while under Erdogan it has also experienced severe democratic backsliding, increasing authoritarianism, and a highly personalized and populist foreign policy. Is Turkey effectively benefiting from both worlds—using its place inside the Western institutional order while simultaneously exploiting the strategic flexibility associated with authoritarian middle powers? And to what extent has populist nationalism enabled Erdogan to present this balancing strategy not as dependence or inconsistency, but as evidence of multi-directional foreign policy, sovereignty, and national strength?
Imran Bayoumi: Turkey’s a very interesting case, and it’s one of those countries that has really managed to play and interact with both realms at the same time. The most recent kind of development there, with President Trump talking about lifting sanctions on Turkey that he himself put in place in his first term, is really a testament to the kind of power of personalized diplomacy and the strides in relations that Turkey has developed with the Trump administration in this second term.
To the second part of your question, in terms of populist nationalism, I think that’s key. Erdogan has been able to sell this balancing strategy as a way of being able to secure Turkey’s interests first. If that means buying Russian air defense systems while also being part of NATO, that’s what it takes. But, it goes back to my earlier point, where these kinds of illiberal, partially free democracies that still have elections, these leaders are still susceptible at some stage. So, there’s still, even if it’s limited, kind of opposition media in and out of the country that can pressure these leaders, and that maybe be a weakness. Therefore, there’s also a recognition that they need to work with everyone or work to sell the message more so than true authoritarian states that may not even communicate these foreign policy decisions.
Turkey’s Dual Alignment Reflects Strategic Geography and Diplomatic Flexibility
The recently signed Mecca Joint Defense Agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan seems to take this strategy a significant step further by creating a collective-defense arrangement among three important regional powers, while Turkey simultaneously remains inside NATO. Do you see the Mecca Pact as another example of Ankara hedging within an increasingly fragmented order, or does it represent something more consequential—the beginning of an alternative security architecture that could gradually reduce Turkey’s dependence on the Western alliance system? And what does Turkey’s ability to participate in both arrangements tell us about why today’s global disorder may particularly reward authoritarian or highly personalized middle powers?
Imran Bayoumi: I actually think the Mecca Pact is more about regional security. I don’t think it should be read as an attempt by Turkey, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia to build a true international order alternative to the US-led alliance system, or to China or Russia. For these three countries, it reflects a recognition that the Middle East will remain markedly different after the conclusion of the Iran war, whenever that might be. They’ve seen that Iran may be weakened in some respects. Its economy has certainly taken a beating. The Supreme Leader was killed, but at the same time, it remains quite disruptive when it wants to be. It has control of the Strait of Hormuz and has launched attacks on a lot of the Gulf countries.
This is really about ensuring these countries’ own security in the region. You have Iran on one side, and then there’s also a recognition that the long-term presence of the United States in the region can no longer be guaranteed. No one knows what that will look like. It could be a substantial drawdown, and without the US there, there are all these other long-standing security threats that may emerge.
So, I see this pact more as strengthening the security of these three countries within the Middle East, within a volatile region that all three of them occupy. It’s a long-term bet that the region will remain unstable and that there’s value in having these alliances and partnerships.
The question with the Mecca Pact in particular is: how far does it go? What does it look like when a state is actually challenged? Is there an Article 5-style response, like you would see with NATO, where other nations commit troops and commit to fighting? Or is there just the provision of economic aid or military equipment, without necessarily joining the conflict with troops on the ground?
What Turkey’s ability to participate in both arrangements tells us is that Turkey has been able to play this system well. It understands that it occupies a geographically strategic and relevant location. It’s able to maintain ties and communications with key global players, and there’s recognition among the US and other NATO countries that it’s perhaps in their interest to have Turkey able to hold discussions with Russia and facilitate that channel, while also having a strong ally in the Middle East that can represent the alliance’s interests there.
So, as much as I think it’s a testament to Turkey’s ability to navigate this disruption, there’s also probably a bit more give than we may want to admit on Washington’s side, London’s side, and Berlin’s side. It’s helpful to have states that can both be your ally and talk to other still powerful, if not revisionist, countries.
Revisionist Autocracies Benefit Whenever Western Cohesion Weakens
In your New Statesman article on the “axis of autocracies,” you emphasize that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea do not constitute anything like an authoritarian NATO. Their interests differ, and their cooperation remains limited and transactional. Yet you argue that they can still benefit from American strategic mistakes. Is it therefore misleading to focus too much on whether authoritarian states form a coherent alliance, when the more important issue may be that they benefit from the same weakening of Western institutions?
Imran Bayoumi: That’s right. To be clear, they’re working very closely together. Russia, for example, is providing targeting data to Iran to assist with Iran’s war that the United States is fighting. China has been an economic lifeline to Russia during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and North Korea is providing troops to Russia to fight in Ukraine. Even though there’s no formal alliance system, these kinds of levers of cooperation and ties are deepening between these states.
You’re also right that we don’t need to focus on, or wait for, them to sign a formal alliance before being worried about the threat they pose. Every action that undermines the strong ties between the United States and its allies is a benefit for them. Tariffs against Washington’s trading partners that force them to look to new sources, such as China, are a weakness. Actions that undermine alliance cohesion, like threatening to take Greenland, are also a weakness, and the beneficiaries are really these revisionist autocracies.
So, we don’t need to wait for them to form a formal alliance and sign a treaty. We can be worried in the short term. I’m not sure they’ll ever get to that place, and that doesn’t mean we should wait to counter that threat.
Without Clear Goals, Tactical Victories Can Undermine Long-Term Power
Photo: Pavel Kusmartsev / Dreamstime.
Your analysis of the Iran war makes an important distinction between tactical success and strategic success. The United States might weaken Iran militarily while simultaneously increasing Russian energy revenues, diverting American military resources away from Asia, and creating tensions with European allies. Does this reflect a wider problem in American strategy—an ability to win individual confrontations while gradually weakening the alliances and resources that underpin its long-term power?
Imran Bayoumi: This has been a recurring challenge for the United States since it launched the 2003 Iraq War. It has been hard for the US to win decisively, and looking back to the first Trump administration, there was more of a recognition of that. This administration—the second Trump administration—may have been somewhat falsely emboldened by the relatively well-executed operation to remove Nicolas Maduro, the president of Venezuela, and bring him back to the United States to face trial. Militarily and tactically, that was quite a spectacular operation, with no lives lost. You can debate whether there has really been a transition to democracy or whether the lives of Venezuelan people have markedly improved, but more broadly, this was seen as a success and may have given a false sense of security moving into the Iran war.
One interesting thing to note about the Iran war, and this demonstrates that values still matter, is that if you look at the start of the war and German Chancellor Merz’s statements, he was initially in support of it when President Trump was framing the war as an opportunity for the Iranian people to rise up and overthrow their leaders. Then, once we saw the United States abandon that goal—though it was never really clear whether that was one of the core goals to begin with—and there was a recognition that this was going to be a longer-term conflict, you then saw Merz and other leaders come out against it.
There are a few things here. First, there is definitely a difference between tactical military success on the battlefield and translating that into strategic success in the long term. That’s a long-standing challenge. But the other point that’s maybe a bit more interesting and harder to tease out is that there is still support for these broad values-based interventions. The problem is that, in Iran specifically, I don’t think the war is being executed with a level of strategy and clear goals that would allow allies to support it.
That’s the challenge. Now we’re in this stalemate where both Iran and the United States increase leverage week over week. Sometimes one has more than the other, and there’s no clear off-ramp. That undermines US power and credibility and raises the question, in the eyes of allies: what does the US want here?
Rebuilding Allied Trust Will Take Much Longer Than Losing It
There may also be a populist dimension to this problem. Populist foreign policy often favors highly visible demonstrations of strength—tariffs, military strikes, threats, sanctions, territorial claims—because they can be presented domestically as proof of decisive leadership. But can policies that are politically attractive at home produce strategic costs abroad that only become visible years later?
Imran Bayoumi: That’s a real challenge, and we’re starting to see that now. With the Iran war—and more broadly with the actions this administration has taken—it will take a long time to rebuild the trust that the US had with its allies and partners. That trust still exists on some level. I don’t think it’s totally gone, but it has diminished. The next administration—or this administration, if it decides to change course going forward—will face a key question: how do we manage our relationships with allies, recognizing that they will now want more? They’ve diversified, they’ve taken steps to increase their defense spending, and they want to ensure their sovereignty as well. So what does this broader dynamic look like going forward? That’s a real challenge that I’m not sure many are thinking about.
What the future of the international order looks like is going to be a real challenge. I don’t think everything we’ve taken for granted over the past 80 years can continue to be taken for granted. Things will have to change. Some of these challenges might not be evident in the immediate future.
China Gains Influence by Showing Up Where Democracies Do Not
Map: Shutterstock.
In your work on China’s policing partnerships in the Pacific, you show that Beijing gains influence not simply through military power but through police training, surveillance systems, security assistance, infrastructure, and relationships with political elites. Does authoritarian influence spread partly because authoritarian governments are particularly willing to connect foreign policy with internal security and regime protection? And how should democracies compete without supporting similar forms of political control?
Imran Bayoumi: I think that’s certainly part of it. There is this recognition in authoritarian states that the technology China is selling can help preserve their power. But in the Pacific specifically, it’s more about the fact that China showed up and is willing to offer these goods for cheap. Public safety is a real concern for these governments, and if China is the one offering to help with policing when the US, Australia, or New Zealand is not there, most countries would take that offer of help.
The broader challenge is for the US and its allies to show up and offer cheap or affordable solutions and policies. In terms of what can be done differently, the Pacific is actually almost a success story now. You’ve seen Australia really invest in deepening its security ties across the region, and I’m focusing on that since that was the starting point of this article, or this question. It’s built out these broad security deals. It’s providing police training. There’s a big Pan-Pacific policing initiative, security initiative, and Australia has invested in cultural ties as well. Fore example, it’s used rugby as a way to strengthen support and ties and really build those stronger connections.
So, I don’t think democracies can’t compete or can’t still be attractive partners. The challenge, though, is that they have to offer something as good or better at a competitive price point. It’s hard when that can’t be underwritten by the state.
Democracy Remains a Valuable Organizing Principle
You have also criticized Washington for overlooking democratic backsliding or human-rights violations when dealing with strategically important partners. But if great-power competition gives authoritarian governments more alternatives, American pressure becomes harder to apply because governments can threaten to turn toward China or Russia. How can democracies defend democratic standards without pushing strategically important states toward authoritarian powers?
Imran Bayoumi: I’ll focus specifically on the US here. The United States still has a ton to offer, and countries still want to partner with it, regardless of how disruptive it may be in the current moment. It’s partly about the United States being comfortable using its leverage and its power. We’re seeing it use that power and leverage in ways that undermine its relationships and weaken them writ large. So I would pull that back and instead focus on how we build stronger relationships and how we present the US as a still attractive partner especially in terms of economic and military power.
Then, what are the conditions for partnering with the US? I don’t think that’s really any different from the past. There are opportunities to condition arms sales, trade agreements, and broad diplomatic agreements. So, Washington still has this kind of draw. Even though authoritarian states may be able to hedge better, they’re still hedging, which means there are still two powers—or multiple great powers. They’re not blindly allying themselves with Russia or China, or some combination of that. There’s still something they want from Washington.
It’s all about how we use what Washington has to incentivize changes in behavior. One last point: Democracy is still a valuable organizing principle. You could look at Madagascar last year, which had a youth movement that toppled the government and helped push it toward what may be some sort of democratic transition. So, there is still support for these values, and Washington needs to find a way to elevate that and try to create conditions for that change.
Renewed American Leadership Must Accommodate a More Decentralized World
Finally, you do not argue that authoritarian victory is inevitable. Russia and China have serious economic and demographic weaknesses, and authoritarian partnerships remain much less reliable than democratic alliances. If today’s disorder currently rewards authoritarian and populist forms of politics, what changes would be necessary for the international system to reward democratic cooperation again? And does that require simply restoring American leadership, or developing a new model in which democratic middle powers have much greater autonomy?
Imran Bayoumi: I’m not sure I know the answer to what changes the international system needs to make. But one important point, which I’ve touched on before and which you picked up in the question, is that the international system will look different going forward. What we will have to grapple with—we being the United States, or policymakers here in the United States—is that middle powers, both democratic and authoritarian, will have more power. They might not be able to build a whole new international system, but they will have the power to advance their interests in certain sectors, on certain topics, and in certain regions. So, the new international system will have to deal with their desire for autonomy.
That being said, I still think there is value in having a hegemon. The system still needs one strong power that can draw all of these states together, make them work together, and enforce the rules of the system while maintaining and growing it. Going forward, what we’ll need is some sort of retooled American leadership—one that recognizes the growing power of smaller states and the defining challenges of the moment, whether those come from revisionist states or from non-state threats such as climate change and the challenge of dealing with technology. It also needs to be able to build new institutions or revitalize existing ones in order to spur cooperation and continue that momentum.
Please cite as: Aslam, Muhammad Faizan. (2026). “Mandate Inflation: How Populists Claim Authority to Challenge Global Constraints.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). August 24, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000130
Abstract
Populist leaders often say they are restoring popular sovereignty against treaties, courts, trade rules, migration regimes, expert bodies, and international organizations. Yet their behavior toward international order varies. They may withdraw, renegotiate, obstruct, selectively comply, or perform public defiance while remaining inside institutions. This article explains that variation through mandate inflation: a process of turning a vote into a broader political claim in which an election or referendum is recast from a limited permission to govern into wider authority to challenge constraints in the name of the people. A structured comparison of Trump’s ‘America First’ politics, Brexit’s ‘take back control’ discourse, and Viktor Orbán’s conflict with EU constraints shows four recurrent moves: mandate condensation, construction of ‘the real people,’ reframing of constraints as anti-democratic obstruction, and assertion of special authority to act. The argument does not replace material, institutional, or nationalist explanations. It shows how leaders present these strategies as the will of the people; it does not assume that audiences accepted those claims or that rhetoric alone caused policy choices. The article contributes to recent debates on global populism by showing why exit is only one possible outcome of populist constraint politics.
Keywords: Populism, mandate, global governance, international institutions, sovereignty, Brexit, Trump, Viktor Orbán
By Muhammad Faizan Aslam*
Introduction
Populist leaders rarely challenge international order by saying only that a treaty, court or organization is inefficient. They often say something stronger. They argue that constraints on government action stand between the people and democratic control (Dijkstra & Ghassim, 2025). Trade agreements become “bad deals” made by globalist elites (Finbow, 2023). Courts become “foreign” or “unelected bodies.” Migration rules become “imposed commands.” Expert advice becomes “technocratic obstruction.” The point is not only policy disagreement. The point is authority (Wajner et al., 2024).
This creates a puzzle for international relations as populist leaders do not respond to global constraint in a single way. Some withdraw from agreements. Some seek better terms. Some stay inside institutions while blocking decisions. Some comply with parts of a regime while attacking other parts. Some use defiant language even when policy change is limited. Recent research on global populism has made this variation clear (Pacciardi et al., 2024; Wajner & Giurlando, 2024). It has also shown that populist foreign policy is now a serious research programme rather than a side question for domestic politics (Ozdamar & Yanik, 2024; Wajner & Giurlando, 2024). What remains underdeveloped is the democratic authorization mechanism that makes such varied strategies appear legitimate to supporters.
This article calls that process of turning a vote into a broader political claim “mandate inflation.” Mandate inflation is the process through which a populist leader recasts an election or referendum from a limited permission to govern into a wider claim of authority to challenge, override or rewrite constraints in the name of the people. The concept is deliberately narrow. It is not a synonym for nationalism, anti-globalism, sovereignty talk or ordinary treaty renegotiation. It is present when four claims appear together: a complex vote is condensed into one clear mandate; that mandate is attached to “the real people”; international or EU-level constraints are described as illegitimate barriers to that people; and the leader claims authority to act against those constraints. Mandate inflation is therefore observed in actors’ claims; whether those claims generate public acceptance or independently cause policy outcomes is a separate empirical question.
The argument matters because global constraints are not self-explanatory objects, and their political effects depend on observable factors such as legal form, institutional location, economic impact and domestic visibility. They can be legal commitments, institutional procedures, market pressures, treaty obligations, policy standards, rights regimes or expert rules. Many have been voluntarily accepted by elected governments. Some are popular because they provide security, market access, rights protection or credibility. Others are weakly accountable, socially unequal or politically remote. Populist leaders exploit this mixed character. They do not need to prove that a constraint is legally invalid. They need to make it look democratically suspect (Ecker-Ehrhardt et al., 2025; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019).
This is why the argument avoids a simple defense of global governance. It does not assume that international institutions are always democratically healthy or that popular control is a false problem. Many voters experience international commitments through job loss, austerity, migration pressure, border disputes, legal complexity or distant expert language (Bellodi et al., 2024; Scheiring et al., 2024a). The issue is not whether these concerns should be dismissed. The issue is how a leader turns them into an exclusive claim to speak for the people against constraints that may also have democratic authorization of their own.
This article compares three cases: Trump’s “America First” politics, Brexit’s “take back control” discourse and Viktor Orbán’s confrontation with EU constraints. The cases are not treated as identical. Trump shows presidential mandate inflation in a great power setting, with exit, renegotiation and symbolic defiance. Brexit shows how a referendum can be converted into a mandate to leave a regional legal order. Orbán shows that mandate inflation can also work from inside an institution through obstruction, selective compliance and public defiance. The cases vary by mandate source, institutional location and strategy toward constraint. This variation is useful because the argument does not predict one outcome. It explains how different strategies are justified through a similar claim about the people. The relevant actors are the Trump administration, the Leave-to-government coalition centered on the May government, and the Orbán government; campaign rhetoric, official government claims, legal acts and institutional responses are treated as distinct forms of evidence.
The article makes three contributions. First, it adds a mechanism to recent work on populism and international affairs. Existing scholarship shows that populist governments affect foreign policy, international institutions, trade, migration, security and world order visions in uneven ways (Brusenbauch Meislova & Chryssogelos, 2024; Destradi & Plagemann, 2024; Wajner & Giurlando, 2024). Mandate inflation explains how this unevenness can still share a common democratic grammar. Second, it connects populism research to work on international institutions and unilateral challenges. Institutions face not only legal non-compliance, but also domestic struggles over whether their constraints count as legitimate democratic commitments (Walter & Plotke-Scherly, 2025). Third, it separates voter-side causes from leader-side authorization. Economic insecurity, status grievance, territorial loss and backlash against globalization may help explain why populist appeals resonate(Carter & Pop-Eleches, 2025; Koenig & Mendelberg, 2026; Scheiring et al., 2024b). They do not by themselves explain how leaders turn a vote into authority to contest courts, treaties or international organizations.
The article proceeds in five steps. It first places the argument in recent literature on global populism, foreign policy and international institutions. It then defines “mandate inflation” and its boundary conditions. The empirical sections trace the mechanism in the United States, the United Kingdom and Hungary. The comparative discussion explains why the same authorizing logic supports different strategies toward constraint. The conclusion draws implications for scholars and policy practitioners who face populist challenges to global governance.
Are you interested in global trade politics and the future of Europe in a shifting world order? Do you want to understand how populism, great-power rivalry, and geopolitical tensions are reshaping EU trade between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific? The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 offers a unique five-day program where leading scholars and policymakers explore the EU’s role in an era of economic uncertainty and strategic competition. Participants will engage in interactive lectures, small-group discussions, and a dynamic simulation game on EU trade strategy, gaining hands-on experience in policy analysis and recommendation drafting. Join an international, multidisciplinary environment, exchange ideas with peers worldwide, earn ECTS credits, and become part of a global network studying populism, political economy, and international relations.
Overview
In today’s rapidly shifting global order, the European Union can no longer afford to think in one direction. For decades, the transatlantic relationship has been the backbone of global trade, built on shared institutions, economic interdependence, and liberal values. Yet this foundation is no longer stable. As highlighted in the ECPS report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, domestic political polarization and the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic are reshaping trade policy, weakening trust, and challenging the very principles of open markets and multilateralism. The EU now faces a critical question: how to remain a global trade power when its closest partner is becoming less predictable.
At the same time, the center of gravity of global trade is shifting toward the Indo-Pacific. This region has become the epicenter of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition, where the future of global trade rules is increasingly being contested. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is not only a security issue but also a trade and technological struggle shaping supply chains, investment flows, and regulatory standards. As the US adopts more unilateral and strategic approaches to trade, moving away from traditional multilateralism, the EU must navigate a complex environment where cooperation, competition, and coercion coexist. Ignoring the transpacific dimension would mean missing where the future of global trade is being written.
For the European Union, the challenge and opportunity lie in managing both arenas simultaneously. The transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for economic scale, regulatory cooperation, and political alignment, while the transpacific region is crucial for diversification, resilience, and strategic autonomy. As scholars increasingly argue, the EU is no longer just a “junior partner” but an actor that must define its own role within a triangular system shaped by US–China competition. To lead in international trade today means mastering this dual engagement: stabilizing relations with the United States while actively shaping the Indo-Pacific order. This requires not only policy innovation but also a new generation of thinkers who understand trade through a geopolitical lens.
Against this backdrop, ECPS Academy Summer School-2026 brings together leading scholars and policymakers to examine how populism and great-power competition are reshaping EU trade policy across both transatlantic and transpacific arenas.
It offers a unique opportunity to explore:
The future of EU–US trade relations in an era of populism
The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the US–China trade rivalry for the EU
How global trade is being reshaped by geopolitics, security, and ideology
The populist discourse around trade, policy, and power, and its implications for the EU’s trade relations
It also allows participating in an enjoyable and dynamic simulation game on the EU’s trade relations, trying to bring policy suggestions.
You will learn and actively engage in discussions, develop your own policy ideas, take part in simulation games, have the opportunity to publish on ECPS venues, and become part of an international network working at the intersection of political economy, international relations, and populism studies.
Tentative Program
Day 1 – Monday, July 6, 2026
Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics
This opening day sets the conceptual stage. It introduces how EU trade policy evolved from embedded liberalism to strategic autonomy, and how trade is now intertwined with security and geopolitics. It also establishes the role of populism and domestic politics in reshaping trade preferences and legitimacy crises in Europe and beyond.
Lecture One: (15:00-16:30) –Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order
Lecturer:Arlo Poletti (Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento).
Moderator:Sonali Chowdhry (Ph.D., Research Associate, DIW Berlin, Fellow, Kiel Institute for the World Economy).
Lecture Two: (17:30-19:00) –Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade
Lecturer:Kent Jones (Professor Emeritus of Economics, Babson College).
Moderator: Dr. Neo Sithole (Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group).
Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026
Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism
Focuses on the transatlantic pillar, still central but increasingly unstable. It examines tariff disputes, regulatory divergence, and how populist and protectionist politics in the US and Europe challenge long-standing cooperation and WTO-based norms.
Lecture Three: (15:00-16:30) – Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations
Lecturer: Erik Jones (Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute and Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe).
Moderator:Elaine Fahey (Professor of EU Law, City Law School, City St. Georges, University of London).
Lecturer: Alasdair Young (Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech).
Moderator: Jessica Lawrence (Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law).
Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026
Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy
This session introduces the triangular dynamic (EU–US–China) and how the EU navigates between partnership and rivalry. It highlights de-risking, economic security, supply chains, and competing models of globalization.
Lecture Five: (14:00-15:30) – Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools
Lecturer:Reuben Wong (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore).
Moderator: TBC.
Lecture Six: (16:00-17:30) – The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics
Lecturer:Giulio Pugliese (Director of the EU-Asia Project, European University Institute + Associate Fellow Istituto Affari Internazionali, and King’s College London).
Moderator:Anita Tusor (Researcher in International Relations, Charles University, Prague).
Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026
Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre
This session shifts focus to the transpacific dimension, emphasizing that the future of trade is increasingly shaped in the Indo-Pacific. It explores how US strategies toward China and the region reshape global trade, and how the EU responds through diversification and partnerships.
Lecture Seven: (15:00-16:30) –US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications
Lecturer:Kristi Govella (Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations in the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies and the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford).
Moderator:Andrea Carteny (Professor of History of International Relations, Sapienza University of Rome).
Lecture Eight: (17:30-19:00) – EU-Japan Relations and Populism
Lecturer:Axel Berkofsky (Associate Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at ISPI).
Moderator:Sebastien Goulard (Ph.D., Manager of Cooperans, Consultant in EU-Asia connectivity projects).
Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026
Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership
This session will ask whether the EU can become a global trade power amid fragmentation, populism, and great-power rivalry. It also allows for normative and policy-oriented discussions.
Lecture Nine: (15:00-16:30) Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence
Lecturer:Markus Kotzur (Professor of European and International Law, Vice Dean for International Relations and Chair for Public Law, European and International Public Law, Hamburg University).
Moderator:Camille Nessel (Ph.D., Lecturer in Political Science Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-CEVIPOL).
Methodology
The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.
The final program with the list of speakers will be announced soon.
Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a simulation game will be organized on a pressing theme within the broader topic to identify solutions to issues related to the future of the EU trade relations.
Who should apply?
This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for application submissions has been extended to June 26, 2026. As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.
The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.
We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds.
Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance
Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.
Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.
Credit
This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.
Brief Biographies and Abstracts
Day One: Monday, July 6, 2026
Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics
Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order
Arlo Poletti is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento. He obtained a PhD from the University of Bologna, was a post‐doctoral researcher at the University of Antwerp (2009-2013), and held positions as an Assistant professor at the LUISS Guido Carli (2013-2016) and the University of Bologna (2016). His research interests are in the area of International Political Economy, with particular emphasis on the politics of trade and investments, transnational advocacy at the global and EU-levels, and international regulatory cooperation. Recently, he expanded his research agenda to include analyses of how globalization-induced economic distress affects individual- level preferences and political behavior. He is the author of five monographs and his research has been published in journals such as International Organization, Regulation & Governance, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, the Journal of European Public Policy, Review of International Studies, the European Political Science Review and Review of International Organizations.
Reading List
Bauerle Danzman, S., and Meunier, S. (2024), ‘The EU’s Geoeconomic Turn: From Policy Laggard to Institutional Innovator’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 62: 1097–1115
De Bièvre D. and Poletti A. (2014), ‘The EU in trade policy: From regime shaper to status quo power’, in Falkner, G. and Müller, P. (eds.), EU Policies in a Global Perspective: Shaping or taking international regimes? London and New York: Routledge
Dür A., Eckhardt J. and Poletti A. (2020), ‘Global Value Chains, the Anti-Globalization Backlash and EU Trade Policy: A Research Agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy, 27(6): 944-956.
Poletti A. (2025), ‘Trade‘, in Lucarelli S. and Sperling J. (eds.), Handbook of European Union Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Dr. Sonali Chowdhryis a trade economist and Research Associate (tenure-track) based at the Firms and Markets Department, DIW Berlin. Her research investigates global supply chains, firm heterogeneity and the distributional implications of trade policy shocks. To study these issues, she analyses detailed transactions-level customs databases using modern econometric methods.
She also teaches international trade at the Hertie School in Berlin as a Guest Lecturer. In 2025, she was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Harvard Growth Lab and has been affiliated with the Trade Policy Research Centre at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy since 2019. Over 2022-2023, she was awarded the Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellowship by the European University Institute to analyse the effect of sanctions on global trade networks.
She completed her PhD in Economics (with distinction) from LMU Munich in 2022, funded by the EU’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions programme. Prior to this, she worked as a Junior Economist with the Ifo Institute’s Center for International Economics and pursued the MPhil in Economics from University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar from India.
Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade
Kent Jones, Dr. es sci. pol. (international economics), Graduate Institute of International Studies/University of Geneva, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Babson College, where he taught from 1982 until his retirement in 2023. He continues his academic interests in trade policy and trade institutions, having published several books and articles on these topics, including Populism and Trade (2021). His teaching also included visiting appointments at Brandeis University, the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and the University of Innsbruck, Austria. In addition, he served as a visiting senior economist at the U.S. Department of State.
Abstract: The GATT-WTO trading system emerged during the post-World War 2 period as a multilateral institution led by the United States that supported mutually recognized rules of trade policy, negotiations for trade liberalization, day-to-day contact among trade diplomats and dispute settlement among participants through third-party adjudication. These functions generated positive externalities in trade relations based on coordination, cooperation, reciprocity, and a mutual recognition of the goals and benefits of trade liberalization. The system fostered eight successful rounds of trade negotiations from 1947 to 1994. Yet the increasing diversity of its participants, along with globalization-driven adjustment crises in many countries, rapidly advancing technology and geopolitical conflict, began to erode the legitimacy of GATT-WTO rules. Compounding these challenges, the trade policy of populist US President Donald Trump precipitated a major crisis as he abrogated numerous GATT-WTO system rules and norms, weakening its legitimacy. Unilateral nationalist protectionism replaced multilateral cooperation as the US abandoned the core principle of non-discrimination in trade relations and abandoned previously negotiated tariff levels with its trade partners. The shock was all the more devastating as the US had been the erstwhile leader and champion of the GATT-WTO system. As President Trump approaches the mid-term elections of his second and final term in office, supporters of a rules-driven trading system are contemplating the possibilities and challenges of restoring the WTO’s legitimacy through reforms and initiatives, new leadership and increased flexibility in liberalizing trade in a diverse and divided world economy.
Reading List
Kent Jones (2023), Populism, Globalization, and the Prospects for Restoring the WTO, Politics and Governance, vol. 11 (1): 181-192).
Judith Goldstein and Alan Sykes (2025). The Perils of Institutional Rigidity, or How the WTO Helped to Sow the Seeds of Trump. World Trade Review, vol. 24: 481-489.
Patrick Low and George Riddell (2025). Trump’s Trade Policy and the World Trade Organization. World Trade Review, vol. 24: 489-497.
Bernard Hoekman (2025). Plurilateral cooperation in response to aggressive unilateralism? Asia and the Global Economy, vol. 5 (2).
Dr. Neo Sithole is a non-resident research fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group. His Ph.D. at the University of Szeged, Hungary, examines the history and trends of populism and political communication in sub-Saharan Africa. Sithole has contributed to publications on democracy, the influence of populism on Western liberal democracies, democratic legitimation and populism possibilities for alternative kinds of democratic imaginings. His academic interests span African and European populism, Afro-European diplomacy, foreign policy, regional and global security, and promoting international solidarity. Sithole also serves as an ambassador for the Doktoranduszok Országos Szövetsége (DOSZ), the Hungarian Association of Doctoral Students, working to foster an inclusive and integrated scientific community.
Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026
Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism
Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations
Erik Jones is Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Instituteand Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe. Professor Jones is author of The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union (2002), Economic Adjustment and Political Transformation in Small States (2008), Weary Policeman: American Power in an Age of Austerity (2012 — with Dana H. Allin), The Year the European Crisis Ended (2014), and From Club to Commons: Enlargement, Reform, and Sustainability in European Integration (2025 — with Veronica Anghel). He is editor or co-editor of more than thirty books and special issues of journals on topics related to European politics and political economy, including reference works like The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (2012) and The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics (2015). Professor Jones is also co-editor of Government and Opposition.
Elaine Fahey is Professor of EU Law at the City Law School, City St. Georges, University of London and Deputy Head of Department (academic programmes). She is co-convener of the Institute for the Study of European Law (ISEL), City Law School. She has been a Senior Land Steiermark Fellow of Law and Innovation at the University of Graz, Austria, a visiting Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington DC, Emile Noël Fellow at New York University (NYU) Law School and a visiting professor at Keio University Law School, Tokyo, Japan as well as other visiting positions. She has worked as a Senior Postdoctoral Researcher at Amsterdam Centre for European Law & Governance (ACELG), University of Amsterdam, as a Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute (EUI), Florence and Assistant Lecturer and Lecturer in Law in Ireland (Dublin Institute of Technology; Trinity College Dublin). She has practised as a Barrister and was Chairperson of the Irish Society for European Law. She has been a stagiaire at the CJEU, Luxembourg, a Judicial Research Assistant, Four Courts, Dublin and a Judicial Extern, Los Angeles Federal District Court (9th Circuit). Her research interests span the relationship between the EU as a global digital actor, EU external relations, EU law and global governance, trade, transatlantic relations, cybersecurity and the EU’s AFSJ.
Alasdair Young is Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is Director of the School’s Center for Research on International Strategy and Policy and is Interim Associate Dean for Faculty Development for Georgia Tech’s Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts. He was Co-editor of JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2017– 2022) and was Chair of the European Union Studies Association (USA) (2015– 2017). Before joining Georgia Tech in 2011 he taught at the University of Glasgow for 10 years. Prior to that he held research posts at the European University Institute and the University of Sussex. He has written extensively on EU trade policy and transatlantic economic relations and performed consultancy work for the United States and United Kingdom governments and for the European Commission.
Abstract: Since the end of the Second World War the United States and Europe have pursued trade liberalization, initially through multilateral negotiations and subsequently through less successful bilateral cooperation. As a result, the transatlantic economy is very valuable and deeply interpenetrated. The transatlantic economic relationship has periodically been characterized by tensions and disputes, but these were of limited duration or narrowly contained. During President Trump’s second term the US has reversed the process of closer economic integration and coerced the European Union into a lopsided trade agreement. Trump ran in part on a populist anti-trade message and his policy ostensibly pursues that agenda, but the populist message on trade has been complicated by the perceived adverse impact of higher tariffs on consumers. This lecture will situate recent US transatlantic trade policy in historical perspective, making clear what a departure from past practice it has been in both substance and form. It will also explain why the EU accepted a lopsided agreement and assess whether the policy has realized US objectives. It will also consider where transatlantic economic relations might go from here.
Reading List
Baldwin, R. (2026), World War Trade: Conflict, Containment, and the Emergent World Trading Order, Rapid Response Economics 7, CEPR Press, pp. 7-14
Mutz, D.C. (2021), “How Americans Think About Trade: Winners, Losers, and the Psychology of Globalization,” Foreign Affairs, 30 July.
Young, A.R. (2025), “From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations During Trump 2” in M. Riddervold, G. Rosen, & J.R. Greenberg, (2026). Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026, 128-141.
Moderator: Prof Jessica Lawrence, Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law
Jessica Lawrence is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law. Dr Lawrence’s research focuses on issues relating to international economic integration, including at the WTO, in regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements, and within the EU internal market. She has a particular interest in the interaction between economic and non-economic public policy goals, and in the ways in which trade and investment agreements take into account their impacts on human rights, labour, sustainable development, environmental protection, and gender. Her work often takes a critical perspective, applying tools drawn from constructivist international relations theory, post-Foucauldian governmentality studies, and other strands of post-positivist thought to examine the impact of discourses and framing devices on politics and law. Prior to joining the University of Essex, Dr Lawrence was Associate Professor at Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. She holds a PhD in Transnational Legal Studies from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and a JD in Law from the University of Georgia in the United States. In addition to her academic work, Dr Lawrence has held various positions at NGOs, think tanks, and universities in the US, EU, India, New Zealand, and Costa Rica, and continues to provide research and training for governmental and non-governmental organizations on issues related to trade and investment agreements and their impact on social policy goals.
Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026
Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy
Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools
Reuben Wong is Deputy Head of the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore. Reuben held the first Jean Monnet Chair in Singapore (2013–2016) and was NUS’ Associate Vice-President, Global Relations (2021– 2023). His publications have focused on EU foreign policy. They include The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), National and European Foreign Policies (co-edited with Christopher Hill, Routledge, 2011), and journal articles in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Politique Européenne, the Asia Europe Journal, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, and the EU External Affairs Review. He has held visiting positions at Cambridge University, the LSE European Institute, the Stimson Center (Washington, D.C.), the East Asian Institute (Singapore), and Humboldt University. He consults and teaches summer school in Paris and Beijing. Reuben raises four children to help arrest Singapore’s declining total fertility rate.
Abstract: I will trace the EU’s search for strategic autonomy and how it has been challenged by both the U.S. and China. I will also suggest how Europe could be more strategic in its dealings with the U.S. and China, and work on better understanding its own identity/interests and those of its interlocutors.
The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics
Dr. Giulio Pugliese is Lecturer in Strategic Communications at King’s College London and the Director of the EU-Asia Project at the European University Institute. He specialises in the international politics of the Asia-Pacific with a focus on Japan, China and the United States. He has presented and published on academic, policy-oriented and commercial themes, including in International Affairs, The Australian Journal of International Affairs, The Asia-Pacific Journal, East Asian Policy, Pacific Affairs, The Pacific Review, Defence Strategic Communications. He is a regular contributor to Asia Maior, Italy’s leading journal on contemporary Asian affairs, and author of Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds (Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, also available in Korean).
Dr Pugliese earned a Laurea (B.A.) in Political Science and East Asian Studies at the University of Naples, “L’Orientale” (cum laude), an M.A. in International Economics and International Relations (concentrating on East Asian Studies) at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, graduating with Honors and passing the final exam with Distinction. He completed his Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge. He was a Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Department of Chinese Studies in Heidelberg University, a Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London, a Lecturer in Japanese Politics at the University of Oxford, and a recipient of a British Academy post-doctoral fellowship. He has held visiting scholar positions at GRIPS, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, and George Washington University. In 2023, he was awarded the Nakasone Incentive Award for his research on Japanese diplomacy.
Abstract: How best to explain the EU and member states’ quiet security and economic recalibration of relations vis-à-vis China and Asia? Reactiveness to Chinese assertiveness, the need to achieve economic security, as well as the emergence of interlinkages between the East Asian and European security theatres following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is accompanied by economic interests in what is the region that is fast becoming the locomotive of the world economy, including in its procurement market. US demand signals and the emulation of practice from local players, such as Japan, have also driven the process. As the Transatlantic alliance faces a rupture under the second Trump administration, this lecture also probes the tenability of alternative routes to salvage Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation and engagement towards the so-called “Indo-Pacific”, suggesting potential solutions and ways to manage policy expectations.
Reading List
Angela Pennisi di Floristella and Giulio Pugliese. “The Historical Evolution of Relations between the European Union and Asia”, in Thomas Christiansen, Evi Fitriani, Emil Kirchner, and Youngah Guahk [eds.], The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations (2nd Edition), Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2026, Chapter 1.
Giulio Pugliese and Aurelio Insisa, “How to use the maximum of potential for the EU-Taiwan cooperation – what can the EU learn from the US and other actors?”, in-depth policy study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), 26 November 2025: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2025)754482
Giulio Pugliese, “The European Union and an ‘Indo-Pacific’ Alignment”, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 31 (4), 2024, pp. 17-44.
Giulio Pugliese. “Japan’s China Grand Strategy: A Blueprint for Transatlantic Players?” in Rogier E. Creemers, Silvia Menegazzi, Neysun A. Mahboubi [eds.] Transatlantic Perspectives on China, London and New York: Routledge, 2026, Chapter 6.
Giulio Pugliese short interview – March 2026, Japan and Europe in the Face of US-China Geopolitical Rivalry https://cgpbalancingact.substack.com/p/japan-and-europe-in-the-face-of-us
Anita Tusor is a PhD Student in International Relations at Charles University, Prague, specializing in security and strategic studies. She holds a Double Master’s Degree in Asian and European Affairs from King’s College London and Renmin University of China, as well as an MA in Applied Linguistics and a BA in Hungarian and Chinese Studies. Her professional experience includes research and policy work with NATO Allied Command Transformation, the Institute of International Relations in Prague, the European Center for Populism Studies, and the European Values Center for Security Policy. Her research interests focus on Chinese cognitive warfare, foreign malign influence operations, populist constitutionalism, and Asia-Pacific security.
Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026
Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre
US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications
Kristi Govella is Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Govella specializes in the intersection of economics, security, and governance, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region and Japan. Her research has examined topics such as economic statecraft, government-business relations, regional institutional architecture, military alliances, non-traditional security, and the governance of the global commons. Prior to joining the University of Oxford, Dr. Govella held positions at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Harvard University, and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley.
Abstract:Over the past two decades, the United States has intensified its focus on Asia due to the region’s strategic importance for both economics and security. In 2011, the “pivot to Asia” was announced, and during the course of the Obama, Trump 1.0, and Biden administrations, the U.S. gradually redefined the region as the “Indo-Pacific” and attempted to enhance its engagement. However, the role of trade in U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has become increasingly complex, as “America first” concerns about trade deficits, reshoring, and industrial revitalization have gradually weakened the economic pillar of U.S. regional policy. This lecture will examine the evolution of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy with particular attention to the changing role of economic engagement and implications for regional and global trade.
Reading List
U.S. Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision” (November 2019). Available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf
The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States” (February 2022). Available at https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf
The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (November 2025). Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf
Andrea Carteny is a Professor at Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, where he teaches International Relations History, Nationalisms and Minorities at the SARAS (History Anthropology Religions Arts Spectacle) Department. He is a Fullbright Alumni and Director of the Hungarian Studies Review (RSU) and he focused his research on national minorities, nationalities and nationalisms in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area during the 19th- 20th Centuries. He is a member of the Italian Society of International History (SISI) and a participant in the main conventions and conferences on nation studies, national minorities and nationalisms history. He is author of many articles and books in this field, among them the editions Il Mar Nero. Identità nazionali e dinamiche di sicurezza (with G. Natalizia, 2023), Il Pan-nazionalismo in Eurasia e il mito del Turan (with P. Pizzolo, 2023), A New Continent Called Europe (2005), and the monographs La questione transilvana nel periodo interbellico (2020) and Dal micro-nazionalismo all’Europa (2011).
EU-Japan Relations and Populism
Axel Berkofsky is Associate Professor at the University of Pavia, Italy and Senior Fellow/Senior Advisory at the Asia Centre at the Milan-based Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). Axel Berkofsky is also Chairman of the Selection Committee and Vice-Chairman Executive Committee of the Canon Foundation Europe, Executive Committee Board Member at the Stockholm-based European Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN) and Research Affiliate at the European Institute of Japanese Studies at the Stockholm School of Economics. Previously, Dr. Berkofsky was Senior Policy Analyst, Associate Policy Analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre (EPC) and Research Fellow at the Brussels-based European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS). At the EPC in Brussels, Axel Berkofsky has – in his capacity as the Director of the EPC’s former EU-Asia programme – worked and interacted on a de facto daily basis with EU officials, policymakers and diplomats. Furthermore, Dr. Berkofsky has in the recent years been involved – as scholar, researcher and moderator – in numerous panels, workshops and seminars on EU-Japan relations, EU-China relations and EU-Asia relations. In his capacity as Board Member of the Stockholm-based Europen Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN), Dr. Berkofsky has since 2008 co-organized numerous conferences, seminars and workshops on EU-Japan relations at numerous think tanks and universities in Europe and Japan. Dr. Berkofsky is a fluent Japanese speaker and has altogether lived three years in Japan. Furthermore, Dr. Berkofsky has taught and lectured at numerous universities and think tanks in Japan, Mainland China, Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea, The Philippines, Singapore etc. In addition, Axel Berkofsky has for several years worked as freelance journalist at the Hong Kong-based Asia Times. Axel Berkofsky has published and edited numerous books and has authored and published more than 250 journal articles, newspaper articles, essays, policy papers and policy briefings. Prof. Berkofsky is a regular consultant, speaker and presenter at conferences, seminars and workshops organized and sponsored by the European Union (EU).
Dr. Sebastien Goulard is the manager of Cooperans, a public affairs and project management consultancy specialized in EU-Asia connectivity projects. Sebastien Goulard is also the editor of the Global Connectivities platform which aims to analyse the development of corridors around the world. During his doctoral studies at EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences), Paris Sebastien Goulard participated in several European research programs dealing with sustainable urbanization in China. Sebastien Goulard holds a BA (hons) degree in international politics (ESE, Nottingham Trent University), a MA degree in international relations (IRIS, France) and a MA degree in social sciences (EHESS).
Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026
Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership
Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence
Prof. Dr. Markus Kotzur, LL.M. (Duke Univ.) studied law in Freiburg and Bayreuth. In 1993, he passed the First State Examination and subsequently obtained the title “Legum Magister” (LL.M.) at Duke University (North Carolina). In 2002, after completing his legal traineeship, he received his doctorate from the University of Bayreuth. This was followed in 2002 by his habilitation with a thesis on “Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe”. In 2005, he was appointed Professor of European and International Law and Public Law at the University of Leipzig. Since 2011, he has been head of the Master’s programme “European and European Legal Studies” and since 2018 president at the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg. Since 2012, he has held the professorship for Public Law, European and International Law at the University of Hamburg and is Deputy Director of the Institute for International Affairs. From October 2015 to March 2020 he was vice Dean for Studies and Teaching and since April 2020 Vice Dean for International relations of the Faculty.
Abstract:This lecture ties in with the current debate surrounding the so-called ‘strategic autonomy’ of the European Union. It aims to critically examine, on the one hand, whether the EU possesses the political capacity to act autonomously in strategic matters and, on the other hand, whether the constitutional framework of primary Union law provides the necessary normative foundations for this. In particular, the question will be raised as to whether the Union’s self-description as a ‘normative power’ is tenable and is underpinned by appropriate policy tools. Finally, a possible transformation from ‘normative power’ to ‘military power’ will be examined from a legal perspective.
Camille Nessel holds a Ph.D. in political science and is currently a lecturer at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), teaching within the Centre d’étude de la vie politique (Cevipol). Her research focuses on EU perceptions in trade, particularly regarding the EU’s relations with Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as on the “China threat” construction in EU economic security strategy. Camille was awarded a doctoral fellowship from FNRS and is now preparing a postdoctoral project on the construction of the “China threat” in EU economic policies. Having gained research experience in Southeast Asia while living in both Indonesia and Vietnam, she has acquired valuable expertise in the region. She has also worked for the European Commission, served as a political advisor for the Chair of the International Trade Committee in the European Parliament, and gained experience in the NGO sector, combining theory and practice in her teaching and research.
Professor Markus Kotzur’s lecture explored one of the defining questions of contemporary European integration: can the European Union translate its regulatory influence into genuine geopolitical leadership? Rejecting conventional measures of power centered solely on military capability, he argued that the EU’s comparative advantage lies in its constitutional foundations, legal authority, and capacity to shape global norms through regulatory governance. Examining concepts such as Normative Power Europe, the Brussels Effect, and strategic autonomy, the lecture demonstrated how Europe’s economic strength, legal order, and institutional resilience remain essential assets amid intensifying geopolitical competition. Combining European constitutional law with international relations and political economy, Professor Kotzur offered a compelling vision of an EU capable of reconciling values with strategic responsibility in a fragmented international order.
Reported by ECPS Staff
The concluding lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the overarching theme “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” addressed one of the most consequential questions confronting European integration today: Can the European Union exercise genuine geopolitical leadership in an increasingly fragmented international order? While much contemporary debate focuses on Europe’s economic competitiveness, military preparedness, or strategic autonomy, the lecture by Professor Markus Kotzur, Professor of European and International Law at the University of Hamburg and Vice Dean for International Relations, invited participants to examine a more fundamental issue. Before asking whether the European Union possesses sufficient power to lead, it is necessary to clarify what leadership itself means for a political entity that is neither a sovereign state nor a conventional international organization. Drawing upon constitutional law, international law, and European integration studies, Professor Kotzur argued that the future of European leadership depends not merely on accumulating material capabilities but on reconciling legal legitimacy, regulatory influence, political integration, and strategic purpose within a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment.
The session was introduced by Dr. Camille Nessel, who situated the discussion within the European Union’s broader geopolitical transformation initiated during Ursula von der Leyen’s first Commission. Recalling von der Leyen’s ambition to create a “geopolitical Commission” in 2019, Dr. Nessel explained how this initiative fundamentally altered scholarly and policy debates surrounding the European Union’s external role. Whereas previous decades had largely conceived European integration through the lenses of market integration and regulatory governance, recent developments increasingly emphasize economic security, strategic partnerships, critical raw materials, and geopolitical competition. Trade policy, environmental regulation, and technological governance have progressively become instruments of geopolitical influence rather than merely vehicles of economic integration. In this context, concepts such as open strategic autonomy, economic security, and regulatory sovereignty have emerged at the center of European policymaking, raising new questions about how the Union can exercise influence while remaining committed to multilateralism and the constitutional values upon which European integration has historically rested. Dr. Nessel’s introduction effectively framed the lecture by illustrating that Europe’s external policies can no longer be understood independently of broader geopolitical transformations, particularly the rise of China, renewed great-power competition, and increasing skepticism toward globalization.
Can the European Union Lead? Reconceptualizing Power, Political Community, and Global Actorship
Professor Markus Kotzur is a Professor of European and International Law at the University of Hamburg and Vice Dean for International Relations.
Building upon this context, Professor Kotzur proposed that discussions of European leadership often begin from an inadequate premise. Much contemporary commentary measures geopolitical influence primarily through traditional indicators of state power—military capability, coercive capacity, or hegemonic dominance. Such perspectives, strongly associated with realist approaches to international relations, inevitably portray the European Union as structurally disadvantaged when compared with major powers such as the United States or China. Yet Professor Kotzur argued that this comparison overlooks the Union’s distinctive political character. Rather than attempting to evaluate the European Union as though it were an ordinary nation-state, he suggested conceptualizing it as a political community—a unique form of political organization that transcends the conventional distinction between sovereign state and international organization. This conceptual shift, he maintained, fundamentally alters how European leadership should be understood.
For Professor Kotzur, describing the European Union as a political community emphasizes that European integration extends far beyond economic cooperation or market regulation. The Union embodies an ongoing process of political integration grounded in shared constitutional values, institutional cooperation, and collective decision-making. Consequently, Europe’s capacity for leadership cannot be reduced solely to military capabilities or traditional notions of sovereignty. Instead, its influence derives from the interaction of legal authority, regulatory capacity, democratic legitimacy, and institutional resilience. The European Union therefore exercises a form of political leadership fundamentally different from that of conventional great powers—a leadership rooted less in coercion than in governance, coordination, and the production of international norms.
This argument naturally led Professor Kotzur to distinguish between different conceptions of power itself. Realist perspectives traditionally associate leadership with material capabilities, particularly military strength and the ability to impose outcomes through coercive means. Judged according to these criteria alone, the European Union undoubtedly faces significant limitations. Defense remains primarily the responsibility of individual member states, while security has historically depended upon NATO and, above all, the strategic umbrella provided by the United States. Compared with the military capabilities of Washington or Beijing, the European Union possesses only limited autonomous coercive capacity. Yet Professor Kotzur cautioned participants against equating these limitations with geopolitical irrelevance. Power, he argued, also assumes regulatory, legal, institutional, and normative forms that have become increasingly important within an interconnected global economy.
Indeed, one of the lecture’s central themes was that the European Union has historically developed precisely these alternative forms of influence. Rather than aspiring to classical hegemonic dominance, Europe has sought to shape international behavior by establishing legal standards, promoting regulatory convergence, and embedding international cooperation within institutional frameworks. This distinctive mode of influence reflects the constitutional foundations of the Union itself. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, which enshrines democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as the Union’s foundational values, provides not only an internal constitutional framework but also the normative basis for Europe’s external engagement. In Professor Kotzur’s view, these legal principles have enabled the European Union to become a global standard-setter whose influence often extends far beyond its territorial borders.
At the same time, the lecturer acknowledged that the international environment sustaining this model has changed profoundly. For much of the post-Cold War period, a functional division of labor characterized transatlantic relations. While the United States largely assumed responsibility for military security through NATO, the European Union concentrated on economic integration, regulatory governance, and the promotion of multilateral norms. This arrangement allowed Europe to exercise considerable international influence without developing equivalent military capabilities. However, shifting geopolitical realities—including Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, intensifying strategic competition with China, and growing uncertainty regarding American security commitments under Donald Trump’s second presidency—have increasingly exposed the limitations of this model. Europe can no longer assume that military security will remain permanently outsourced while it focuses exclusively on regulatory leadership.
These developments, Professor Kotzur suggested, require a fundamental reconsideration of European leadership itself. Rather than abandoning its normative foundations, the European Union must determine how legal authority, economic strength, and strategic capability can be combined within a coherent geopolitical strategy. Leadership in today’s international order demands more than the capacity to regulate markets; it increasingly requires resilience, institutional coordination, technological innovation, and credible security capabilities. Yet Europe’s comparative advantage continues to reside in the constitutional and legal traditions that distinguish it from more conventional great powers. The challenge therefore lies not in replacing normative power with military power but in integrating both within a broader conception of strategic actorship.
By framing the discussion in this manner, Professor Kotzur established the analytical foundation for the remainder of the lecture. The central question was no longer simply whether Europe possesses sufficient power to compete with other global actors, but whether its unique combination of law, regulation, political integration, and democratic legitimacy can provide the basis for effective geopolitical leadership in an era increasingly defined by strategic rivalry and geoeconomic competition. This perspective would subsequently guide his examination of the European Union’s normative influence, the Brussels Effect, and the evolving concept of strategic autonomy.
Normative Power Europe, the Brussels Effect, and the Evolution of Strategic Autonomy
European Union flags against European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium.
Having established that the European Union should be understood as a distinctive political community rather than a conventional nation-state, Professor Kotzur turned to the sources of Europe’s international influence. If the Union lacks the military capabilities traditionally associated with great-power politics, how has it nevertheless managed to shape global governance and international economic relations? Professor Kotzur argued that the answer lies in Europe’s longstanding role as a normative and regulatory power, a form of influence that derives not from coercion but from the ability to establish legal standards that increasingly structure international political and economic behavior. This regulatory capacity, he suggested, remains one of the European Union’s greatest strategic assets, even as the geopolitical environment becomes more competitive and uncertain.
Central to Professor Kotzur’s argument was the concept of Normative Power Europe, which has occupied a prominent place in European integration scholarship for more than two decades. Unlike traditional powers that project influence primarily through military or economic coercion, the European Union has historically sought to shape international conduct through the diffusion of legal norms, constitutional principles, and regulatory standards. Democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and sustainable development constitute not merely internal constitutional values but also external objectives guiding European foreign relations. According to Professor Kotzur, these principles provide the normative foundation upon which the Union’s international influence has long rested. Rather than compelling other actors to follow European preferences, the Union seeks to encourage convergence by making adherence to these standards increasingly advantageous for states wishing to deepen political or economic cooperation with Europe.
Professor Kotzur explained that this normative influence operates through two complementary mechanisms. The first ispositive conditionality, whereby closer cooperation with the European Union—including association agreements, neighborhood partnerships, accession negotiations, and preferential trade arrangements—is linked to the adoption of European legal and constitutional standards. Countries aspiring to strengthen relations with the Union are encouraged to improve democratic governance, judicial independence, human rights protection, and the rule of law. This “more for more” approach reflects the belief that regulatory convergence strengthens both political cooperation and legal certainty. In this sense, European integration has historically functioned not only as an economic project but also as an instrument for promoting constitutional transformation beyond the Union’s borders.
The second mechanism operates through market access. Access to the European Union’s vast internal market increasingly depends upon compliance with European regulatory requirements. Firms wishing to export products, provide services, or invest within the European market must satisfy standards relating to product safety, environmental protection, digital governance, consumer rights, competition policy, and increasingly artificial intelligence. Compliance therefore becomes not merely a legal obligation but an economic necessity. Through this process, European regulations frequently extend far beyond the Union’s territorial jurisdiction, influencing commercial practices across global markets without relying upon traditional forms of extraterritorial coercion.
This phenomenon, Professor Kotzur observed, is most commonly described as the Brussels Effect. Building upon the influential scholarship surrounding this concept, he explained that the European Union’s enormous market size, combined with its sophisticated regulatory framework, often incentivizes multinational corporations to adopt European standards globally rather than maintaining separate regulatory systems for different jurisdictions. Because complying with a single high regulatory standard is often more efficient than producing multiple versions of the same product, firms frequently extend European rules to operations beyond Europe itself. Consequently, regulations adopted in Brussels may shape business practices in Asia, Latin America, Africa, and North America despite the absence of formal international legal obligations.
Professor Kotzur highlighted several contemporary illustrations of this regulatory influence. The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) fundamentally reshaped global approaches to privacy and digital governance by establishing one of the world’s most comprehensive data protection regimes. Similarly, the Artificial Intelligence Act seeks to position Europe at the forefront of regulating emerging technologies through a risk-based legal framework that may influence legislative developments far beyond the European Union. Environmental policies associated with the European Green Deal, including sustainability standards and climate-related regulations, likewise demonstrate how domestic European legislation increasingly generates significant international repercussions. These examples illustrate that regulatory power has become an important dimension of contemporary geopolitics, particularly as technological innovation and global supply chains become progressively integrated.
Yet Professor Kotzur also emphasized that the Brussels Effect should not be understood simply as a technocratic process driven by legal expertise. Rather, it reflects a broader transformation in the relationship between markets and political authority. Regulation itself has become an instrument of geopolitical influence. By determining the conditions under which access to one of the world’s largest consumer markets is granted, the European Union exercises considerable leverage over international commercial behavior. This capacity enables Europe to project influence internationally even where its military capabilities remain comparatively limited. Regulatory governance thus constitutes an alternative form of power, rooted in economic interdependence rather than territorial coercion.
Nevertheless, Professor Kotzur argued that recent geopolitical developments increasingly challenge the sufficiency of normative power alone. The relative stability that once enabled Europe to rely primarily upon regulatory influence has gradually eroded under the pressures of great-power competition, technological rivalry, and economic coercion. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China, and growing uncertainty surrounding transatlantic relations have all demonstrated that legal standards alone cannot guarantee geopolitical resilience. The European Union therefore faces the difficult task of preserving its identity as a normative power while simultaneously developing greater strategic capacity.
This challenge has given increasing prominence to the concept of strategic autonomy, which Professor Kotzur approached through both linguistic and political analysis. Returning to the Greek origins of the concept, he explained that autonomia signifies the capacity to live according to one’s own laws, while strategy refers to the ability to lead and direct collective action. Strategic autonomy therefore implies far more than economic independence or military capability. It represents the capacity of a political community to formulate and pursue its own objectives independently while remaining faithful to its underlying constitutional values. Europe, in this conception, seeks neither isolation nor disengagement but the ability to make sovereign strategic decisions without excessive dependence upon external actors.
Importantly, Professor Kotzur deliberately omitted the increasingly fashionable adjective “open” from his presentation’s title in order to stimulate critical reflection. Rather than accepting “open strategic autonomy” as an uncontested policy objective, he encouraged participants to consider whether genuine strategic autonomy can remain fully open under conditions of intensifying geopolitical rivalry. This question reflects one of the European Union’s most fundamental contemporary dilemmas. Europe seeks simultaneously to preserve openness, defend multilateralism, strengthen economic resilience, and reduce excessive strategic dependencies. Reconciling these objectives requires careful balancing between economic integration and geopolitical prudence.
By the end of this section, Professor Kotzur had demonstrated that Europe’s future leadership cannot depend exclusively upon either normative influence or strategic power in isolation. The Brussels Effect continues to provide the European Union with remarkable global regulatory reach, yet contemporary geopolitical realities increasingly demand that this regulatory capacity be complemented by greater strategic resilience. Rather than abandoning its identity as a community founded upon law and multilateralism, Europe must learn to integrate regulatory influence with a more comprehensive understanding of geopolitical actorship. In doing so, the Union seeks to transform legal authority into a broader form of strategic leadership capable of navigating an international order that is becoming simultaneously more interconnected and more contested.
From Outsourced Security to Strategic Responsibility: Institutional Limits and the Future of European Defense
Photo: Pavlo Lys.
Having examined the European Union’s regulatory influence and the conceptual foundations of strategic autonomy, Professor Kotzur shifted the discussion toward one of the Union’s most persistent structural challenges: the relationship between legal competence, political will, and military capability. Rather than delivering a purely expository lecture, Professor Kotzur transformed this section into an interactive dialogue, inviting participants to reflect upon whether the existing constitutional framework of the European Union is capable of supporting meaningful geopolitical leadership. Their questions and observations became an integral component of the discussion, illustrating precisely the kind of interdisciplinary debate that the ECPS Academy Summer School seeks to foster.
Professor Kotzur began by emphasizing that discussions surrounding European defense cannot be separated from the constitutional architecture established by the EU Treaties. Unlike sovereign states, whose governments exercise inherent authority across the full spectrum of foreign and security policy, the European Union operates according to the principle of conferral, whereby it may act only in areas where competencies have been explicitly transferred by its member states. This legal principle, fundamental to European constitutional law, continues to shape every debate concerning the Union’s geopolitical ambitions. While economic integration has become highly supranationalized, foreign policy and defense remain areas in which national governments retain extensive authority. Consequently, the question confronting Europe is not simply whether it desires greater strategic autonomy, but whether its constitutional framework currently permits such ambitions to be fully realized.
Rather than providing an immediate answer, Professor Kotzur invited participants to consider whether the existing treaty framework already contains sufficient legal instruments for the European Union to become a more significant geopolitical actor or whether meaningful strategic autonomy would ultimately require comprehensive treaty reform. This interactive approach encouraged students from diverse disciplinary backgrounds to engage directly with questions that are often confined to specialist legal scholarship.
Several participants offered observations that significantly enriched the discussion. One participant suggested that European defense integration had historically remained underdeveloped precisely because military security had long been outsourced to the United States through NATO. As long as Washington guaranteed Europe’s security, the incentives to construct genuinely autonomous European defense capabilities remained relatively weak. Professor Kotzur broadly agreed with this historical assessment. He recalled that attempts to establish European defense structures date back to the earliest years of post-war integration but repeatedly encountered political resistance. One recurring concern was that independent European military structures might duplicate—or even weaken—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Consequently, NATO became the principal framework for collective defense, while European integration concentrated largely upon economic and political cooperation.
At the same time, Professor Kotzur stressed that the situation has evolved considerably since the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, which significantly expanded the legal foundations for cooperation in foreign and security policy. Although the Treaties do not currently permit the creation of a fully-fledged European army, they nevertheless provide important mechanisms through which member states can deepen defense cooperation. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) establish institutional frameworks for joint action, while initiatives such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) demonstrate that considerable progress remains possible without immediate treaty revision. From a legal perspective, therefore, the European Union already possesses greater flexibility than is often assumed, even if important constitutional limitations remain.
The discussion subsequently broadened to consider whether recent geopolitical developments have fundamentally altered the political incentives surrounding European defense integration. Professor Kotzur suggested that two historic developments have acted as powerful catalysts. The first was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which fundamentally transformed European perceptions of security by demonstrating that large-scale interstate war had returned to the European continent. The second was the return of Donald Trump to the American presidency, which further intensified doubts regarding the long-term reliability of the United States as Europe’s principal security guarantor. Together, these developments have accelerated debates over strategic autonomy far more rapidly than decades of academic discussion ever achieved.
Drawing upon Germany’s own experience, Professor Kotzur pointed to the profound transformation in domestic political attitudes toward defense spending. The concept of Zeitenwende, introduced following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, symbolizes a broader shift in German political culture regarding military responsibility. Political parties traditionally associated with pacifism, most notably the Green Party, have increasingly accepted that preserving peace may require greater investment in defense capabilities. This evolution illustrates how external geopolitical shocks can reshape democratic consensus, generating political support for policies that previously appeared unimaginable. What had once seemed politically controversial has increasingly become regarded as a necessary response to changing strategic realities.
Yet Professor Kotzur cautioned that military capability alone cannot create effective European leadership. Institutional legitimacy remains equally important. Another participant questioned whether Europe’s remarkable political diversity—comprising twenty-seven democracies with distinct historical experiences, domestic electorates, and strategic priorities—might itself constitute an obstacle to coherent foreign policy. Professor Kotzur acknowledged this challenge while rejecting the conclusion that diversity necessarily precludes collective action. The European Union’s legal personality under international law, established by the Treaty of Lisbon, enables it to conclude international agreements, participate in international organizations, and exercise meaningful diplomatic influence. Although foreign policy frequently requires consensus among member states, this institutional complexity should not be mistaken for institutional incapacity.
The discussion also addressed the politically sensitive question of hegemonic leadership. Professor Kotzur noted that, unlike the United States or China, European political discourse has historically regarded the very concept of hegemony with considerable suspicion, reflecting the continent’s experience of imperialism, nationalism, and colonial domination. Yet participants observed that even the European Union’s normative ambitions contain elements of hegemonic influence insofar as Europe seeks to encourage—or at times require—other countries to adopt its legal and regulatory standards. Professor Kotzur accepted this observation but distinguished between coercive hegemony and normative leadership. The European Union’s objective, he argued, should not be domination but persuasion, exercising influence through law, cooperation, and mutually beneficial partnerships rather than through military coercion.
Questions concerning Germany’s expanding military role further highlighted the complexity of European defense integration. Participants noted that increasing German defense expenditures inevitably evoke historical sensitivities among neighboring countries. Professor Kotzur acknowledged these concerns but suggested that today’s context differs fundamentally from earlier periods of European history. Germany’s rearmament takes place within dense multilateral institutions—NATO, the European Union, and an extensive network of constitutional safeguards—that substantially reduce the risks traditionally associated with unilateral military expansion. Contemporary defense integration therefore represents not a return to historical rivalries but an attempt to strengthen collective European security within established democratic frameworks.
Ultimately, this interactive exchange illustrated one of the lecture’s central insights: Europe’s future as a geopolitical actor depends not simply upon acquiring greater military capabilities but upon successfully integrating constitutional legitimacy, democratic support, institutional coordination, and strategic purpose. The European Union already possesses important legal foundations for deeper security cooperation, yet translating these possibilities into effective geopolitical leadership requires sustained political commitment from its member states. Strategic autonomy, Professor Kotzur suggested, is therefore neither exclusively a legal project nor solely a military one. It represents an ongoing constitutional and political process through which Europe seeks gradually to assume greater responsibility for its own security while remaining faithful to the principles of democracy, multilateralism, and the rule of law that have long defined the European project.
Europe Between Values and Power: Strengthening the EU’s Global Leadership in an Era of Geopolitical Fragmentation
The European Union’s AI Act introduces restrictions on high-risk artificial intelligence applications and requires greater transparency from companies regarding data use and algorithmic practices. Photo: Dreamstime.
In the final section of his lecture, Professor Kotzur moved beyond diagnosing the European Union’s geopolitical challenges to outlining a constructive vision of how the Union might strengthen its global leadership without abandoning the constitutional principles that have long defined the European project. Rather than advocating a radical transformation into a traditional military power, Professor Kotzur argued that Europe’s future influence depends upon building strategically upon its existing strengths while adapting to an international environment increasingly characterized by geopolitical rivalry, technological competition, economic coercion, and the erosion of multilateral institutions. His concluding reflections therefore sought to reconcile realism with legal idealism, arguing that effective European leadership requires neither the abandonment of normative values nor naïve reliance upon them alone, but rather a careful integration of power and principle.
Central to Professor Kotzur’s concluding argument was the proposition that the European Union should “strengthen its strengths.” Throughout the history of European integration, the Union’s greatest comparative advantage has not been military capability but economic integration, regulatory governance, and legal certainty. Attempting to imitate the geopolitical behavior of traditional great powers would therefore be both unrealistic and strategically counterproductive. Instead, Europe should continue to capitalize upon the assets that have already made it one of the world’s most influential political actors: its single market, its sophisticated regulatory framework, its institutional stability, and its capacity to shape international standards. These resources remain significant sources of geopolitical influence even within an increasingly competitive international system.
Accordingly, Professor Kotzur argued that revitalizing multilateral trade should remain one of the European Union’s foremost strategic priorities. While acknowledging the growing dysfunction of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—particularly the paralysis of its dispute-settlement mechanism—he maintained that Europe possesses both the credibility and the economic weight necessary to champion the renewal of rules-based international commerce. The European Union’s continued commitment to reducing barriers to trade, supporting predictable legal frameworks, and defending multilateral economic governance reflects not only economic interests but also broader constitutional values rooted in openness, cooperation, and legal certainty. In an era when many major powers increasingly employ tariffs, sanctions, and industrial policy as geopolitical instruments, Europe’s defense of an organized multilateral trading system constitutes both a strategic necessity and an expression of its normative identity.
At the same time, Professor Kotzur rejected any suggestion that Europe should distance itself fundamentally from the United States despite recent political tensions. Although the return of Donald Trump and growing uncertainty surrounding American foreign policy have accelerated debates over strategic autonomy, transatlantic relations, he argued, remain an indispensable pillar of European security and prosperity. What requires reconsideration is not the partnership itself but its internal balance. Europe should assume greater responsibility for its own defense while preserving the broader Atlantic alliance. In this sense, strategic autonomy complements rather than replaces transatlantic cooperation. A stronger European defense capability would ultimately reinforce NATO by enabling a more balanced distribution of responsibilities between European allies and the United States. Strategic autonomy should therefore be understood as a process of maturation rather than separation.
Professor Kotzur likewise emphasized that Europe’s geopolitical credibility increasingly depends upon technological innovation and industrial competitiveness. Regulatory leadership alone will prove insufficient if Europe gradually loses its capacity to innovate in emerging sectors. Artificial intelligence, semiconductors, digital infrastructure, renewable technologies, and advanced manufacturing have become decisive arenas of international competition. Should Europe fall behind technologically, its ability to establish global standards through instruments such as the AI Act or environmental regulation will inevitably diminish. Normative influence cannot be sustained indefinitely without corresponding scientific, technological, and economic capacity. Consequently, investment in innovation represents not merely an economic policy but a strategic imperative essential to maintaining Europe’s long-term geopolitical relevance.
Environmental leadership occupied a similarly prominent place within Professor Kotzur’s concluding reflections. The European Green Deal, together with the broader objective of achieving climate neutrality, exemplifies the European Union’s aspiration to combine economic modernization with global environmental responsibility. Yet Professor Kotzur cautioned that successful climate leadership requires greater sensitivity toward historical inequalities and the needs of developing countries. Drawing upon principles of international environmental law, particularly the doctrine of common but differentiated responsibilities, he argued that industrialized European states bear special responsibilities in supporting sustainable development across the Global South. Financial assistance, technological cooperation, and equitable climate partnerships are therefore indispensable if European environmental policies are to retain international legitimacy rather than being perceived as protectionist or neo-colonial instruments.
This emphasis on partnership naturally extended to Professor Kotzur’s discussion of the Global South. One of the lecture’s most forward-looking arguments concerned the need for Europe to diversify its international relationships beyond its traditional geopolitical partnerships. If strategic autonomy ultimately seeks to reduce excessive dependence upon any single external actor, the European Union must cultivate broader and more balanced global networks. Emerging economies in India, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia should therefore be viewed not merely as markets but as long-term strategic partners capable of contributing to a more resilient and diversified international order. Agreements such as the EU–Mercosur trade agreement, although politically controversial, illustrate the broader strategic logic underpinning this approach. Similarly, Africa’s rapidly expanding population and economic potential present opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation founded upon equality rather than paternalism. Professor Kotzur stressed that such partnerships require honest engagement with Europe’s colonial legacy while simultaneously focusing upon future-oriented cooperation based on mutual respect and shared interests.
Importantly, Professor Kotzur argued that Europe’s normative commitments should continue to shape these partnerships, albeit in a more dialogical manner. Rather than presenting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law as unilateral prescriptions imposed upon others, the European Union should promote these principles through sustained dialogue and cooperative engagement. Such an approach recognizes that constitutional values remain central to the European project while acknowledging the increasingly pluralistic nature of contemporary international politics. Europe’s credibility, he suggested, depends less upon moral preaching than upon demonstrating that liberal democracy, legal certainty, and multilateral cooperation provide practical advantages in addressing common global challenges.
As the lecture drew to a close, Professor Kotzur returned to the question posed in its opening moments: Can the European Union lead? His answer was neither unequivocally optimistic nor unduly pessimistic. Europe possesses significant assets—economic strength, regulatory influence, constitutional legitimacy, and institutional resilience—that continue to distinguish it from other global actors. Yet these advantages cannot be taken for granted. Sustaining European leadership will require continued investment in innovation, stronger defense capabilities, renewed commitment to multilateralism, and deeper partnerships with emerging regions of the world. Above all, the European Union must avoid the false choice between values and power. Its greatest comparative advantage lies precisely in its ability to combine legal legitimacy with strategic purpose, transforming constitutional principles into instruments of effective international leadership.
Taken together, Professor Kotzur’s lecture offered a sophisticated synthesis of European constitutional law, international relations, and geopolitical strategy. By demonstrating that leadership in the twenty-first century increasingly depends upon the interaction of regulatory authority, economic resilience, technological innovation, institutional legitimacy, and strategic responsibility, he challenged simplistic conceptions of power based solely upon military capabilities. Instead, he argued that Europe’s future role in an increasingly fragmented international order will depend upon its capacity to strengthen its existing advantages while adapting pragmatically to new geopolitical realities. In doing so, the lecture encapsulated one of the central messages of the ECPS Academy Summer School: that Europe’s place “between oceans” will ultimately be determined not only by external competition but also by its own ability to reconcile openness with resilience, values with interests, and normative ambition with geopolitical responsibility.
Japan has long been regarded as an outlier in comparative studies of populism, distinguished by political stability, Liberal Democratic Party dominance, and limited immigration. In this thought-provoking lecture, Professor Axel Berkofsky challenged that conventional wisdom, arguing that Japan has entered its own delayed populist moment. Examining the rise of the Sanseito party, demographic decline, labor shortages, identity politics, and the evolution of conservative nationalism, he demonstrated how structural economic pressures and political discourse are reshaping Japanese democracy. The lecture also assessed the resilience of EU–Japan relations, highlighting the enduring importance of the Economic Partnership Agreement despite growing geopolitical uncertainty. Combining comparative politics with international political economy, Professor Berkofsky offered a nuanced framework for understanding populism beyond its traditional European context.
Reported by ECPS Staff
While much scholarly and policy attention has focused on the rise of populism across Europe and North America, Japan has long appeared to constitute a notable exception to this global political trend. For decades, the country’s remarkable political stability, the electoral dominance of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and its comparatively homogeneous social structure appeared to insulate it from the anti-establishment movements that transformed politics elsewhere. Yet recent developments suggest that this exceptionalism may no longer hold. The emergence of overtly populist and anti-immigration political actors, coupled with growing public anxiety over demographic decline, economic stagnation, inflation, and national identity, indicates that Japan is increasingly experiencing many of the political tensions reshaping advanced democracies more broadly.
Against this backdrop, the eighth lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the overarching theme “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” explored the evolving relationship between domestic political transformation and international economic cooperation through the lens of EU–Japan relations and populism. Delivered by Professor Axel Berkofsky, Full Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), the lecture combined comparative politics, international political economy, and East Asian studies to examine whether Japan is witnessing the emergence of its own variant of populism and how these developments may shape one of the European Union’s most important strategic partnerships in Asia.
Japan’s Late Encounter with Populism
Professor Axel Berkofsky is Full Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at the Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI).
The session was introduced by Dr. Sébastien Goulard, Manager of Cooperans and an expert on EU–Asia connectivity projects, who situated the lecture within the broader comparative study of populism. He observed that while populism has become a defining feature of European politics over the past three decades—manifesting itself through movements ranging from Brexit in the United Kingdom to the electoral successes of radical-right and radical-left parties across the continent—its development in Asia has followed a more uneven trajectory. Dr. Goulard briefly pointed to examples such as Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India and Rodrigo Duterte’s presidency in the Philippines before posing the central question that would animate the lecture: Does Japan, long regarded as politically exceptional, now face its own populist moment? Equally important, he asked whether any rise of Japanese populism could affect the EU–Japan partnership, particularly given that many populist movements elsewhere have been deeply skeptical of international trade agreements and economic integration. His framing effectively connected domestic political developments in Japan to broader debates surrounding globalization, regional cooperation, and the future of liberal international order.
Rethinking EU–Japan Relations in an Age of Political Discontent
Professor Berkofsky started his lecture by underscoring that Japan has long represented something of a puzzle within comparative studies of populism. While right-wing populist movements expanded across much of Europe during the 1990s and 2000s, and Donald Trump’s election transformed American politics, Japan appeared remarkably resistant to similar developments. Unlike many Western democracies, where established party systems fragmented under the pressure of anti-establishment mobilization, Japanese politics continued to be dominated by the Liberal Democratic Party, whose uninterrupted rule—interrupted only briefly on two occasions since 1955—provided an extraordinary degree of institutional continuity. This prolonged political stability, Professor Berkofsky suggested, delayed rather than prevented the emergence of populist politics.
The lecturer explained that understanding Japan’s political exceptionalism requires appreciating the unique character of the LDPitself. Rather than functioning as a narrowly ideological organization, the LDP historically operated as a broad catch-all party composed of multiple internal factions representing diverse constituencies. Through an intricate system of intra-party bargaining, factional competition, and clientelist networks, the party successfully incorporated competing interests while maintaining overall political dominance. Prime ministers changed frequently, often every twelve to eighteen months, yet the governing party remained the same. Consequently, political stability did not depend upon individual leaders but upon the institutional resilience of the LDP as Japan’s dominant governing organization. This remarkable continuity, Professor Berkofsky argued, insulated Japan from many of the political ruptures experienced elsewhere, reducing opportunities for anti-system movements to gain electoral traction.
Nevertheless, Professor Berkofsky contended that important changes have gradually emerged beneath this surface stability. The watershed moment, in his view, came with the 2025 lower house elections, during which the overtly populist and xenophobic Sanseito (“Japan First”) party secured representation in Japan’s parliament by winning approximately 7.4 million votes and fifteen parliamentary seats. Although modest by European standards, Professor Berkofsky regarded this breakthrough as historically significant because it marked the first time that an explicitly populist, anti-immigration movement had established a meaningful parliamentary presence in post-war Japan. The country’s long-standing immunity to global populist currents had, he argued, effectively come to an end. Japan had become, in his words, a “latecomer” to the global populist wave rather than a permanent exception to it.
Importantly, Professor Berkofsky cautioned participants against interpreting this development as an abrupt rupture with Japan’s political past. Instead, he argued that contemporary populism has developed gradually within an existing political environment where elements of nationalism, cultural conservatism, and skepticism toward immigration had long been present, albeit often in implicit rather than explicit form. Japanese society itself, he stressed, should not be characterized as inherently xenophobic or racist. Having lived and worked extensively in Japan, Professor Berkofsky emphasized both his personal admiration for the country and the openness of Japanese society in everyday life. Yet beneath this generally welcoming social environment there had always existed what he described as a latent distinction between “the Japanese” and “the outsiders.” This distinction did not automatically translate into exclusionary politics, but it provided fertile political ground upon which more overt nationalist narratives could subsequently be constructed.
According to Professor Berkofsky, this gradual normalization of exclusionary political discourse accelerated significantly during the premiership of Shinzo Abe. While Abe remained firmly within the mainstream LDP tradition rather than representing an anti-system outsider, his administration increasingly legitimized political rhetoric that portrayed foreigners with greater suspicion and framed questions of national identity more prominently within public debate. Professor Berkofsky carefully distinguished between Abe’s policies and those of contemporary European radical-right leaders, noting that Japan under Abe did not become a populist regime. Rather, Abe expanded the boundaries of politically acceptable discourse by making previously marginal nationalist themes more mainstream. Discussions surrounding immigration, cultural identity, and national sovereignty became increasingly visible within Japanese political life, creating opportunities for more explicitly populist actors to advance even stronger versions of these arguments in subsequent years.
This trajectory, Professor Berkofsky argued, reached a new stage under Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, whom he described as representing a more assertive and uncompromising version of the conservative nationalism associated with Abe. Although Takaichi continues to govern through the institutional framework of the LDP rather than through a newly created populist movement, her political rhetoric increasingly revolves around themes familiar to observers of European populism: identity politics, concerns over immigration, anxieties regarding national cohesion, and skepticism toward globalization. Professor Berkofsky drew explicit comparisons with leaders such as Giorgia Meloni in Italy, arguing that although important historical and institutional differences remain, contemporary conservative discourse in Japan increasingly resembles broader international trends evident across numerous advanced democracies. Populism, he suggested, has become a genuinely global phenomenon whose ideological vocabulary increasingly transcends regional boundaries.
One of the lecture’s central analytical contributions lay in Professor Berkofsky’s insistence that Japan’s emerging populism cannot be understood simply by borrowing European categories. Unlike many European countries, Japan remains one of the world’s least immigrant-intensive societies. Foreign residents account for only around three percent of the total population, an extraordinarily low proportion compared to most advanced industrial democracies. Consequently, anti-immigration narratives claiming that foreigners threaten employment opportunities, overwhelm welfare systems, or fundamentally transform Japanese society rest upon empirical foundations that Professor Berkofsky repeatedly described as highly questionable. Indeed, one of the striking paradoxes emphasized throughout the lecture was that Japan’s populist discourse has emerged despite the absence of the large-scale immigration flows typically associated with the rise of anti-immigration politics elsewhere. This paradox would become one of the central themes explored during the remainder of the session, as Professor Berkofsky examined how demographic decline, labor shortages, and economic stagnation have created political opportunities for populist entrepreneurs despite Japan’s continued need for greater levels of immigration.
National Identity, Immigration, and the Political Mainstream: The Gradual Normalization of Populist Discourse
Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Photo: Dreamstime.
Having argued that Japan has entered what he described as its own delayed populist moment, Professor Berkofsky devoted the second part of his lecture to explaining why this transformation has occurred despite the country’s long-standing reputation for political moderation and institutional stability. Rather than attributing Japan’s changing political landscape to a sudden surge of anti-establishment sentiment, he argued that contemporary populism has emerged through a gradual process of ideological normalization within the political mainstream itself. This process, he suggested, differs significantly from the trajectories observed in many European democracies, where populist parties frequently arose in opposition to established political elites. In Japan, by contrast, important elements of nationalist and identity-based politics developed from within the governing establishment before eventually creating opportunities for more explicitly populist actors to flourish.
Central to Professor Berkofsky’s analysis was the political legacy of Shinzo Abe, whose nearly eight years in office made him Japan’s longest-serving post-war prime minister. Professor Berkofsky was careful to reject simplistic characterizations of Abe as a populist in the European or American sense. Abe neither campaigned as an anti-system outsider nor sought to dismantle existing political institutions. Instead, he remained firmly embedded within the LDP and governed through established institutional channels. Nevertheless, Professor Berkofsky argued that Abe played a pivotal role in shifting the boundaries of acceptable political discourse. Under his leadership, themes of national identity, patriotism, constitutional revision, security normalization, and historical memory acquired far greater prominence within public debate than they had during previous decades. Although these themes remained largely compatible with mainstream conservative politics, they also contributed to the gradual legitimization of rhetorical strategies that later proved advantageous for more overtly populist movements.
According to Professor Berkofsky, Abe’s greatest political innovation lay not in introducing entirely new ideas but in redefining the political center of gravity. Issues that had previously occupied the margins of political discussion gradually entered mainstream discourse. Questions concerning immigration, cultural cohesion, and the preservation of Japanese identity increasingly became legitimate subjects of electoral competition rather than peripheral concerns associated with fringe nationalist organizations. This evolution mirrored broader developments observable across many advanced democracies, where mainstream conservative parties increasingly incorporated elements of populist rhetoric in response to shifting public attitudes. Professor Berkofsky emphasized that such developments should not be interpreted as evidence that Japan had become fundamentally xenophobic. Rather, they reflected the gradual politicization of issues that had previously remained relatively insulated from electoral contestation.
The lecturer then turned to the administration of Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, whom he presented as representing a further stage in this ideological evolution. While Takaichi continues to govern through the institutional framework of the LDP, Professor Berkofsky suggested that her political style places greater emphasis on themes of national sovereignty, cultural identity, and immigration control than many of her predecessors. Her rhetoric increasingly resonates with narratives familiar from contemporary European conservative politics, particularly those stressing the need to protect national traditions against the perceived pressures of globalization and demographic change. Although important contextual differences remain, Professor Berkofsky drew comparisons with political figures such as Meloni, arguing that conservative politics across advanced democracies increasingly shares a common vocabulary centered upon nationhood, identity, borders, and sovereignty.
Yet Professor Berkofsky repeatedly cautioned participants against assuming direct equivalence between Japan and Europe. One of the lecture’s most important comparative insights concerned the striking disparity between the intensity of anti-immigration rhetoric and the actual scale of immigration into Japan. Unlike Germany, France, Sweden, or Italy, Japan has experienced relatively limited immigration. Foreign nationals constitute only a small proportion of the overall population, and immigration has historically remained tightly regulated. Consequently, political narratives portraying Japan as overwhelmed by immigration bear little resemblance to empirical reality. Professor Berkofsky described this disconnect as one of the defining paradoxes of contemporary Japanese politics: anti-immigration discourse has intensified despite the absence of mass immigration itself.
Demographic Decline, Economic Anxiety, and the Rise of Sanseito
A campaign poster for the right-wing populist Sanseito party in Tokyo, Japan. The slogan *Nihon o Nameruna* (“Don’t underestimate Japan” or “Don’t look down on Japan”) reflects the party’s nationalist political message. Tokyo, July 11, 2025. Photo: Hiroshi Mori / Dreamstime.
Having demonstrated how nationalist discourse gradually entered Japan’s political mainstream, Professor Berkofsky turned to the structural conditions that have enabled explicitly populist movements to gain electoral traction. Central to this discussion was the emergence of Sanseito, which he identified as the clearest expression of right-wing populism in contemporary Japanese politics. Although the party remains considerably smaller than the dominant LDP, its parliamentary breakthrough marked a significant turning point, establishing an institutional foothold for political narratives long associated with European and American populism. Rather than dismissing Sanseito as a temporary protest movement, Professor Berkofsky argued that its electoral success reflects deeper socioeconomic and demographic transformations reshaping Japanese politics.
Sanseito has positioned itself as a challenger to Japan’s political establishment by combining nationalism, economic protectionism, skepticism toward globalization, and particularly strong opposition to immigration. Presenting itself as the defender of “ordinary people” against detached political elites and international influences, the party’s slogan, “Japan First,” echoes nationalist rhetoric that has become increasingly familiar across advanced democracies. Yet Professor Berkofsky stressed that Japanese populism should not be viewed simply as an imitation of its European or American counterparts. Rather, it represents the adaptation of broadly similar narratives to Japan’s distinctive political institutions, demographic realities, and historical experience.
Immigration occupies the center of Sanseito’s political message. The party attributes rising crime, economic insecurity, and social fragmentation to increasing numbers of foreign workers. Professor Berkofsky challenged these claims as empirically unsupported. Japan remains one of the least immigrant-intensive societies among advanced economies, and available crime statistics provide no evidence that foreigners constitute a disproportionate burden on public safety. Likewise, labor-market data indicate that migrant workers overwhelmingly fill positions in sectors experiencing chronic labor shortages rather than displacing Japanese employees. Agriculture, construction, manufacturing, hospitality, logistics, and elderly care increasingly depend upon foreign labor simply to maintain existing levels of production and service provision. Far from undermining Japanese society, immigration has become an indispensable component of economic sustainability.
This disconnect between political rhetoric and demographic reality formed one of the lecture’s central arguments. Professor Berkofsky emphasized that Japan’s principal challenge is not excessive immigration but the opposite: an insufficient inflow of foreign workers to offset rapid population ageing, persistently low fertility rates, and a shrinking workforce. Employers across the economy increasingly struggle to recruit labor, while long-term demographic projections point toward further decline. Under these conditions, reducing immigration would almost certainly deepen Japan’s economic difficulties rather than alleviate them.
The paradox, Professor Berkofsky argued, illustrates a broader characteristic of contemporary populism. Its political effectiveness derives less from empirical accuracy than from its ability to simplify complex structural problems into emotionally compelling narratives. Long-term economic stagnation, weak wage growth, inflation, declining purchasing power, and demographic decline are multifaceted challenges rooted in economic, technological, and demographic change. Yet populist actors frequently attribute these developments to more visible political targets such as immigration, globalization, or detached elites. Even in a country where immigration remains comparatively limited, these narratives resonate because they tap into broader anxieties surrounding national identity, cultural continuity, and social cohesion.
Professor Berkofsky nevertheless cautioned against reducing Japan’s political transformation solely to economic grievances. While acknowledging that many citizens have experienced genuine economic insecurity after decades of slow growth and rising living costs, he argued that concerns about immigration also reflect deeper questions of identity and national belonging. Public unease cannot simply be dismissed; however, it should not be mistaken for an accurate description of Japan’s demographic realities. Policymakers therefore face the challenge of balancing legitimate concerns over social integration with the country’s undeniable economic need for greater international labor mobility.
Japan’s experience, Professor Berkofsky concluded, offers an important comparative perspective on the global evolution of populism. Unlike many European countries, where anti-immigration movements emerged following sustained immigration, Japan has witnessed the rise of similar political narratives despite maintaining exceptionally low levels of foreign residents. This demonstrates that identity politics need not depend upon large-scale migration alone but can also emerge from broader demographic anxieties, economic uncertainty, and shifting political discourse. By distinguishing carefully between rhetoric and empirical evidence, Professor Berkofsky showed that Japan’s encounter with populism reflects a complex interaction of demographic decline, economic pressures, identity politics, and institutional change rather than a straightforward rejection of globalization itself
The lecture also highlighted the increasingly important role of digital communication in facilitating populist mobilization. Like many contemporary populist movements elsewhere, Sanseito has proven particularly effective at utilizing social media platforms to disseminate simplified political messages, challenge mainstream media narratives, and cultivate direct communication with supporters. Professor Berkofsky noted that such strategies have enabled relatively small political organizations to achieve levels of visibility that would previously have required far greater organizational resources. The digitalization of political communication has therefore lowered barriers to electoral competition while simultaneously amplifying emotionally charged narratives concerning immigration, national identity, and political distrust. Although Japan’s media environment differs significantly from those found in many Western democracies, similar technological dynamics increasingly shape political discourse across advanced industrial societies.
Throughout this section, Professor Berkofsky consistently urged participants to distinguish between the political success of populist narratives and their analytical validity. Anti-immigration rhetoric may resonate with segments of the electorate experiencing economic anxiety, yet demographic evidence overwhelmingly suggests that Japan’s long-term prosperity depends upon attracting—not excluding—greater numbers of foreign workers. Likewise, blaming globalization or immigration for structural economic challenges risks obscuring deeper issues relating to productivity, demographic ageing, labor-market reform, and fiscal sustainability. Populism, in this sense, offers politically powerful narratives but rarely provides comprehensive solutions to the complex problems confronting advanced industrial democracies.
By examining the rise of Sanseito within this broader structural context, Professor Berkofsky demonstrated that Japan’s political transformation reflects far more than the emergence of a new political party. It illustrates how demographic decline, economic insecurity, identity politics, and digital communication increasingly interact to reshape democratic competition across advanced societies. Japan may have entered the global populist era later than Europe or the United States, but the underlying dynamics driving this transition reveal striking similarities. The country’s experience therefore offers valuable comparative insights into how populism adapts to distinct national contexts while drawing upon an increasingly shared repertoire of political narratives, grievances, and electoral strategies.
Populism, Free Trade, and the Future of EU–Japan Relations
Photo: Marian Vejcik / Dreamstime.
In the concluding section of his lecture, Professor Berkofsky shifted from analyzing Japan’s domestic political transformation to assessing its implications for one of the European Union’s most important strategic partnerships in Asia. Returning to the question posed at the beginning of the session, he asked whether the gradual emergence of populist politics in Japan might ultimately undermine the deepening economic and political cooperation between Tokyo and Brussels. His answer was deliberately cautious. While acknowledging that populist narratives are becoming increasingly visible within Japanese politics, Professor Berkofsky argued that there remains little evidence to suggest that Japan is on the verge of abandoning its long-standing commitment to international economic openness. Unlike many European and North American populist movements, whose electoral success has often been accompanied by hostility toward free trade agreements and multilateral institutions, Japanese populism has thus far developed within a political environment where broad elite consensus continues to support international economic engagement. Consequently, the future of EU–Japan relations appear considerably more resilient than many observers might initially assume.
Professor Berkofsky reminded participants that the EU–Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), which entered into force in 2019, remains one of the most comprehensive bilateral trade agreements ever concluded by either party. Negotiated against the backdrop of growing protectionist tendencies elsewhere, the agreement represented a powerful political statement in favor of rules-based trade, multilateral cooperation, and open markets. Covering approximately one-third of global GDP and creating one of the world’s largest free trade areas, the EPA extended well beyond tariff reductions to encompass regulatory cooperation, government procurement, intellectual property, environmental standards, and sustainable development. For both Brussels and Tokyo, the agreement symbolized a shared commitment to preserving an international economic order increasingly challenged by geopolitical rivalry and economic nationalism.
At the same time, Professor Berkofsky cautioned against viewing the partnership through overly idealized lenses. Despite its considerable achievements, the EPA has not eliminated all commercial frictions between the two economies. Agricultural market access, sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, public procurement, automotive trade, and steel safeguard measures continue to generate periodic disagreements. European exporters frequently seek greater access to Japanese agricultural markets, while Japanese firms remain attentive to European trade defense measures affecting industrial products. These issues, Professor Berkofsky suggested, should not be interpreted as evidence of weakening relations but rather as normal features of a mature economic partnership between two highly developed economies with occasionally divergent commercial interests. Importantly, such disagreements continue to be managed through institutional dialogue and negotiated compromise rather than escalating into broader political conflict.
This institutional resilience, Professor Berkofsky argued, distinguishes EU–Japan relations from many contemporary trade relationships increasingly characterized by unilateral tariffs, retaliatory sanctions, and economic coercion. Both parties continue to view predictable rules, legal certainty, and multilateral governance as essential foundations of international economic cooperation. Even as governments around the world increasingly embrace industrial policy, supply-chain diversification, and strategic competition, Brussels and Tokyo remain committed to maintaining a broadly liberal trading relationship. In this respect, the EU–Japan partnership has acquired significance extending beyond bilateral commerce itself, serving as an important example of how advanced democracies can continue supporting international economic openness while adapting to a more uncertain geopolitical environment.
The lecture nevertheless acknowledged that domestic political developments could gradually complicate this picture. Should populist parties expand their electoral influence, trade agreements may become increasingly vulnerable to broader political debates concerning sovereignty, globalization, and national identity. Professor Berkofsky noted that this pattern has already become familiar across Europe, where opposition to international trade agreements often extends beyond economic concerns to encompass wider anxieties regarding immigration, democratic accountability, environmental regulation, and cultural identity. While Japan has not yet experienced comparable levels of political contestation surrounding trade policy, the emergence of more vocal nationalist actors suggests that similar debates may become increasingly prominent in future electoral campaigns. The challenge for policymakers will therefore be to preserve public support for economic openness while addressing legitimate concerns regarding inequality, regional disparities, and economic insecurity.
One of Professor Berkofsky’s most important observations concerned the relationship between economic performance and political stability. He argued that Japan’s experience demonstrates how prolonged economic stagnation, declining real incomes, and demographic pressures can gradually erode confidence in established political institutions even where those institutions remain highly stable by international standards. Populist movements frequently gain support not because they offer comprehensive policy solutions but because they provide emotionally compelling narratives that identify clear causes for complex structural problems. Consequently, defending liberal economic cooperation requires more than simply emphasizing the aggregate benefits of free trade. Governments must also demonstrate that globalization generates broadly shared prosperity capable of maintaining democratic legitimacy. Failure to address the distributive consequences of economic change risks creating political opportunities for movements seeking to replace nuanced policy discussions with simplified nationalist narratives.
Professor Berkofsky further suggested that the European Union may itself draw valuable lessons from Japan’s experience. Although Europe and Japan differ substantially in terms of immigration levels, demographic structures, political institutions, and historical development, both confront remarkably similar long-term challenges: ageing populations, labor shortages, technological competition, slowing productivity growth, and increasing geopolitical uncertainty. Both have also sought to balance economic openness with greater strategic resilience without abandoning their commitment to rules-based international cooperation. In this sense, EU–Japan relations increasingly extend beyond traditional trade diplomacy to encompass broader cooperation on economic security, digital governance, technological innovation, supply-chain resilience, and the defense of multilateral institutions. These shared interests provide a strong foundation upon which the partnership can continue to develop despite evolving domestic political landscapes.
Throughout his concluding remarks, Professor Berkofsky repeatedly resisted alarmist interpretations of Japan’s political trajectory. While acknowledging that the country’s immunity to populism has weakened, he argued that contemporary Japanese politics remains fundamentally different from the highly polarized environments observed in several Western democracies. The LDP continues to dominate national politics, institutional continuity remains strong, and broad elite consensus in favor of international engagement persists. Populist actors have undoubtedly entered the political arena, but they have not displaced the established structures that continue to shape Japanese policymaking. Consequently, the emergence of parties such as Sanseito should be understood less as evidence of systemic political rupture than as an indication that Japan is gradually experiencing political dynamics already familiar elsewhere.
As the lecture concluded, Professor Berkofsky returned to the broader comparative perspective that had framed his analysis from the outset. Japan, he argued, should no longer be viewed as an exceptional democracy somehow insulated from the social and political transformations affecting other advanced industrial societies. Rather, it represents a particularly instructive case illustrating how populism adapts to distinctive national contexts while responding to common structural pressures. Demographic decline, economic uncertainty, globalization, identity politics, and digital communication increasingly interact across democratic systems in ways that transcend regional boundaries. Yet Japan’s experience also demonstrates that institutional resilience, pragmatic policymaking, and sustained international engagement can moderate these pressures without eliminating them entirely.
Taken as a whole, Professor Berkofsky’s lecture offered participants a sophisticated comparative framework for understanding the evolving relationship between domestic political change and international economic cooperation. By tracing Japan’s gradual encounter with populism while simultaneously examining the resilience of EU–Japan relations, he demonstrated that contemporary debates surrounding globalization, immigration, and national identity cannot be separated from wider questions of demographic transformation, economic governance, and strategic competition. In doing so, the lecture reinforced one of the central themes of the ECPS Academy Summer School: that Europe’s future “between oceans” will increasingly depend upon its ability to cultivate resilient partnerships with like-minded democracies facing many of the same political, economic, and geopolitical challenges.
