Anti-Trump protest in London.

Long Read — Trump and the European Right: A Strained Relationship

In this long-read analysis, Dr. Amedeo Varriale examines the increasingly strained relationship between Donald Trump and Europe’s right-wing and far-right leaders, focusing on Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel. Despite enduring ideological affinities over nationalism, immigration, and opposition to progressive liberalism, Dr. Varriale identifies four sources of divergence: Trump’s declining popularity, protectionist trade policies, controversial foreign-policy interventions, and the institutional constraints limiting the transferability of Trumpism to European political systems. Through comparative analysis of Italy, France, Britain, and Germany, he demonstrates how national interests, electoral calculations, and geopolitical considerations increasingly override transatlantic ideological solidarity. The study suggests that future cooperation between Trump and Europe’s nationalist right and far right may become more pragmatic and transactional than ideologically driven.

By Amedeo Varriale

This extensive commentary explores the relationship between US President Donald J. Trump and political figures from the European right who are currently polling strongly in Italy, France, Britain, and Germany. 

The first part of the piece will focus on how and why key right-wing and far right leaders such as Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel have, to varying degrees, recently been distancing themselves from Trump, while simultaneously analyzing their ideological convergences and divergences with him, and speculating about how their relationship may evolve as these leaders exercise, or potentially come to exercise, political power. 

The second part will argue that presently the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is straineddue to a series of factors, ranging from the unpopularity of the President (at home and abroad), and his tariff dispute with the European Union (EU), to his unconventional foreign policy (particularly concerning Iran and Ukraine) and the limitations of reproducing his political model in the European context. 

The investigation is meant to be timely and pertinent in a moment of broad opposition towards Trump’s second presidency across Europe. In fact, it attempts not only to shed light on the present condition of international right-wing conservatism and populism but also indirectly contributes to ongoing debates surrounding the new right’s domestic and foreign policy vis-à-vis transatlantic relations.

Giorgia Meloni 

Giorgia Meloni.
Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy and leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, speaks at an electoral rally ahead of the national elections in Turin, Italy, September 13, 2022. Photo: Antonello Marangi / Dreamstime.

As a right-wing leader Meloni’s relationship with Trump (and “Trumpism”) has always been ambivalent and has been previously defined as one of only “partial harmony” (Lazar, 2026: 56). While the Italian Prime Minister expressed her support for Trump on several occasions — she attended his second Presidential inauguration, spoke at CPAC 2025, and referred to his politics as “a model for Italy’s center-right” (Valenti, 2020) — her political vision and Italian concrete interests (as interpreted by Meloni’s government) do not always align with the American President’s. 

One reason why Meloni has been accused by political analysts and opponents of being excessively close to Trump is that JD Vance (a staunch promoter of the MAGA/America First platform) prefaced the English version of Meloni’s book (Giorgia’s Vision) as he saw affinities between Trumpism and Meloni’s agenda revolving around national identity, anti-immigration(-ism), and Judeo-Christian values. Actually, clear convergences between Meloni and Trump do not go beyond their opposition to illegal immigration and woke ideology. In fact, the former does not aspire to create an “illiberal democracy” (like Viktor Orbàn’s in Hungary) nor has she resorted to methods like those utilized by Trump’s ICE to tackle immigration in Italy. 

Also, while remaining a fervent sovereigntist, Meloni is substantially aligned with the EU’s elite and is in particularly good terms with Ursula von der Leyen (Alli, 2025: 4) and Manfred Weber’s European People’s Party (EPP) — a liberal-conservative group that does not share Trump’s radical views on globalization, trade, and immigration. To be sure, Meloni distanced herself from Trump on more than one occasion. First, she criticized Trump’s verbal attack on Pope Leo XIV, calling it “unacceptable” (Le Monde with AFP, 2026). Second, Meloni called Trump’s tariffs threat against the European countries that objected to his plans concerning Greenland “a mistake” (AFP & Rapporteur, 2026). Third, Meloni’s unequivocal pro-Ukraine stance is in conflict with Trump’s transactional approach, which is more conciliatory towards Russia. Fourth, Meloni’s government refused to allow Trump’s US to utilize the Italian airbase at Sigonella in Sicily for offensive military operations correlated to the war against Iran (Giuffrida, 2026). 

Together, these incidents led to a gradual deterioration of the relationship between Meloni and Trump. In fact, Trump accused Italy of not doing enough to support the US against Iran (Mazza, 2026) and claimed in an interview that Meloni “begged” for a photo with him at the G7 summit (also calling her unpopular) (Amante & Balmer, 2026; Cheetham, 2026). Trump also shared a meme of Meloni with the caption “restraining order needed” on his social media Truth Social (Duso, 2026). While in the first case Meloni responded to Trump calling him out for making up the story and stating “…neither I nor Italy ever beg” (Amante & Balmer, 2026), in the second case she decided to ignore Trump.

In the following months, personal relations between Meloni and Trump may even worsen, mainly as a consequence of Trump’s unpredictable character. However, they are more likely to stabilize, with the US and Italy continuing to cooperate strategically, as Meloni will possibly do her best to avoid new personal confrontations and prevent any significant diplomatic rupture. In fact, although with some flexibility, Meloni continues to support higher defense spending at a NATO level (Ciriaco & Colombo, 2026; Gagliardi, 2026), and this aligns with Trump’s long-standing demand regarding Europe. 

Even if the relationship between Meloni and Trump remains somewhat strained and they never become full-fledged political and ideological allies, under Meloni the Italian government will maintain the Atlanticist and Europeanist foreign policy pursued since 1945, entailing “a duty to remain close to America and to be among its most reliable and zealous allies” (Lazar, 2026: 55). This will occur regardless of the political color of temporary US administrations and Trump’s behavioral patterns. 

Moreover, Italy’s position at the heart of the Mediterranean exposes it to Russian military and intelligence threats, making continued US support essential for its defense. Concomitantly, the current conservative government fears that reduced US commitment may result in Italy being more dependent on the EU, possibly steering the country towards deeper integration and an additional loss of sovereignty. This scenario is not desirable to Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI) party and most of her political class. Therefore, Italy seeks to balance strong bonds with both the United States and the European Union.

Marine Le Pen

Marine Le Pen
Marine Le Pen delivers a speech at a gathering of European far-right party representatives in Wenceslas Square, Prague, April 25, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

For several years, the relationship between Le Pen and Trump has been a positive one underpinned by mutual respect and (limited) reciprocal support. In fact, Le Pen was the only French Presidential candidate to openly endorse Trump in the 2016 American electoral competition and was the first to congratulate the tycoon before his victory against Hillary Clinton was even officialized (McAuley, 2016). Similarly, Le Pen’s right-hand man, Jordan Bardella, praised Trump’s nationalist politics, stating his success represented “a wind of freedom, of national pride blowing all over Western democracies” (Gozzi, 2025). Bardella also argued that Trump won because he “defended America’s interests” (Bardella, 2025). More recently, after Le Pen’s conviction in early 2025, Trump expressed his solidarity to the French politician by writing the message “FREE MARINE LE PEN,” and referring to the court’s ruling as a “Witch Hunt” on Truth Social (Solmaz, 2025).

However, a long-standing anti-American sentiment deeply ingrained both within the French general public (81% think Trump is dangerous) (see Odoxa, 2026) and in the ideology and political tradition of the National Rally (RN) (formerly National Front) has prevented Le Pen (and Bardella) from embracing Trump’s program fully. While the RN’s agenda on topics such as immigration, climate change, and the “culture war” against woke and gender ideology perfectly aligns with Trump’s, the French far right has disassociated itself from the American President’s foreign policy, particularly on trade and security. 

Regarding trade, although both Trump and Le Pen are protectionists, the former’s wide-ranging tariffs on imports — including French goods such as wine, luxury products, aerospace components — significantly damage French economic interests as an exporting country. 

Regarding security, while Trump wants European allies to spend much more on defense within the NATO framework, Le Pen instead promotes French strategic independence, calling for a reduced involvement and integration within NATO’s military command. Actually, once the conflict in Ukraine ceases, Le Pen aims to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command altogether (Besch & Varma, 2025: 19). Notwithstanding, it was mainly Trump’s threats to Greenland, his hostile demeanor towards Volodymyr Zelensky’s Ukraine, his overthrow of Nicolás Maduro, and his military actions against Iran that marked a turning point in relations between the US administration, the RN, and much of the European right. 

For example, concerning Iran, Le Pen declared: “Nobody knows what Donald Trump’s ultimate goal is in Iran. Today, this war has taken proportions that were not foreseen, affecting many Gulf countries, and with consequences that directly impact us: the increase in energy prices” (Roundtable, 2026). Instead, concerning Ukraine, Le Pen denounced the “brutality” of Trump’s decision to freeze US aid to the Eastern European country (Guillou, 2025). 

Allegedly, Le Pen even told officials within her party to maintain a distance from Trump as he has turned into a political liability (Caulcutt & Nöstlinger, 2026). The same reasoning had previously led Bardella to cancel his appearance at CPAC after the MAGA ideologue, Steve Bannon, supposedly made a Nazi salute on stage (Reuters, 2025). 

Le Pen’s cautious distancing from Trump may result in a substantial change of the nature of their relationship, making it more withdrawn in public but more transactional — on farming, trade, defense spending, and military activities — in the event of a future Le Pen presidency. This transactional disposition seems very appropriate and likely to prevail since American and French interests do not always align in those areas. However, this does not necessarily mean that Le Pen and Trump will be openly antagonistic towards each other. After all, the two still share a common enemy identified by both in “the international(-ist) left” operating at an elite level within supra-national institutions such as the European Commission, Council of Europe, United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Trade Organization (WTO). 

Given this, if Trump’s foreign policy shifts back to a more isolationist/non-interventionist one especially with regards to the Middle East (while simultaneously not abandoning Ukraine), there are stronger possibilities of an open rapprochement between Le Pen’s RN and Trump before the next Presidential elections in France and the US. Even so, in the more distant future it will be JD Vance (even more[1] nationalist, populist, and isolationist than Trump himself) who will play a key role in redefining the relationship between the American Republicans and European far right parties such as the RN and others. 

Nigel Farage

Nigel Farage.
Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

Farage and Trump have been friends and essentially political allies since the latter’s rise to power in 2016. The two partially share a weltanschaaung revolving around capitalism, the defense of borders, law and order, Western exceptionalism, and the preservation of national cultural identity. Moreover, both have always been skeptical of (if not opposed to) the gradual development of the European Union as a political and economic power, and its strategic relationship with China. 

Farage has spoken favorably about Trump on distinct occasions. For instance, he has stressed that Trump is a role model for him (and his party Reform UK) because the American President stands for “national interest” and keeps the promises made to his electorate (Bloomberg, 2025). Also, during a rally in the US, Farage has praised Trump as the “most resilient” and “bravest person” he has ever met (BBC, 2020). Undeniably, Trump holds a positive view of Farage as well, given he has expressed an interest in having him as UK ambassador to the US (Langfitt, 2016) and has always supported the Brexit project (Langlois, 2018: 7).

Against this backdrop, the relationship between the two became colder between late 2025 and early 2026. Today, it appears Farage does not have the same privileged access to Trump, and — at least on one occasion — the American President did not meet the British politician who had purposely traveled to the US expecting to reinforce their “special relationship” (Gross et al., 2026; Cobham, 2026). Since then, not only have Trump’s priorities shifted (he currently focuses on domestic issues rather than securing alliances abroad) but Farage himself discreetly distanced himself from Trump (Gibbons, 2026). 

One reason for this is Trump continues to be very unpopular among voters in Britain (Schofield, 2026; The Economist, 2025), including part of Reform UK’s electoral base (Mitchell, 2025). Research indicates that a significant portion of potential Reform voters — especially women — have trouble understanding why Farage associates with Trump (Dawson, 2026). While they may support the party on other policy issues, this perceived closeness to Trump could dissuade them from voting for Reform UK. After all, Trump’s hardline approach on “law and order,” exemplified by the Minnesota immigration raids (carried out by ICE), may have limited appeal among many moderate voters in Britain and continental Europe (see Wike et al., 2025). 

Another issue that has certainly (negatively) influenced the relationship between the two leaders is the Iran war. Although Farage has refrained from unequivocally condemning Trump’s campaign in the Middle East (which he initially supported) and has even stated Iran is a “bigger danger than Putin” (Mason, 2026), concomitantly, he has warned against British involvement in the war (White, 2026). The conflict with Iran has been devastating for the British economy,[2] mainly due to the sharp rise in oil and gas prices alongside general inflation. Thus, while Farage remains strongly opposed to the Iranian regime for pragmatic reasons, he has also had to state that Trump was badly advised on the war (Elliot, 2026) and that the UK should remain out of the conflict, inevitably distancing himself from the US administration’s position. 

The divergences vis-à-vis the Iran war have been exacerbated by broader economic and foreign policy disagreements. While Farage has always praised free markets, Trump is a pro-tariff protectionist. Additionally, over the years, Farage has endorsed the West supplying weapons to Zelensky’s government more explicitly than Trump. Perhaps these differences have further contributed to the increasing distance between the two political figures. 

Nonetheless, considering a circumstance where Trump remains US President and Farage becomes UK Prime Minister, it is likely the relationship between the two would be largely amicable, with their respective countries expanding collaboration in certain policy areas.By way of illustration, a Trump-Farage synergy is expected to lead to a large-scale UK-US free trade agreement and a general reduction of barriers and regulation for bilateral trade. 

Given this, America and Britain will presumably continue to cooperate at a NATO-level as — notwithstanding his confrontational statements — Trump does not have a concrete plan to withdraw from the transatlantic organization. Actually, it is possible that a Farage-led Britain could embrace Trump’s position on “burden-sharing” and pressure European allies (especially France, Germany, and Italy) to increase expenditure on defense. 

Similarly, Farage and Trump’s agreement on the immigration issue is very likely to result in greater cooperation on intelligence, security, and border control. 

Ultimately, their skepticism regarding climate change and policies to protect the environment could lead them to economize on climate policy and instead pursue an increase of oil and gas production. 

Alice Weidel

Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD).
Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), displayed during the 2025 German federal election campaign. Such posters are reportedly often torn down or vandalized. Photo: Dreamstime.

Before 2025, direct contact between Trump and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) was relatively limited and intermittent, and to this day, a close relationship between Trump and the AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, does not appear to have fully developed at either a personal or a direct political level. Be that as it may, in the weeks preceding and months following the 2025 German federal election, high-profile figures from the Trump administration such as Elon Musk, Marco Rubio, and JD Vance have publicly defended or openly expressed support for Weidel’s party. In fact, while interviewing Weidel online, Musk proclaimed, “only AfD can save Germany, end of story” (Le Monde with AFP, 2025). In the same context, Weidel reiterated (as she had previously stated during a Bloomberg interview[3]) that it caused her “physical pain” to see Trump and his entire family “disparaged” by the mainstream media (Alice Weidel, 2025). 

Instead of explicitly endorsing the AfD as Musk did, US Secretary of State, Rubio, disputed Germany’s domestic intelligence agency’s classification of Weidel’s party as “right-wing extremist” (Wertheimer, 2025). The US Vice-President JD Vance went even further, meeting Weidel at the margins of the Munich Security Conference (February 14-16, 2025) to discuss issues ranging from the war in Ukraine to freedom of speech and German politics (Reuters, 2025). Vance’s decision to meet Weidel can be interpreted as an act of legitimization by the Trump administration. 

Beyond pro-AfD statements, Trump’s officials have engaged with AfD politicians/lawmakers through private meetings in Washington D.C. (Pfeifer, 2025). For example, the more “moderate” national-conservative wing of the German party, which includes the popular Beatrix von Storch, is known to have had repeated contacts not only with Vance’s staff but also with representatives of the US State Department and National Security Council (Pfeifer, 2025). Although there are substantial differences between Trump’s distorted form of American exceptionalism and the anti-American latent Eurasianism promoted by the most radical faction of the AfD (mainly led by Björn Höcke), this did not prevent Trump’s loyalists from seeking ties with the AfD and inviting them to the US After all, until recently, Weidel, von Storch, and the AfD’s establishment have looked upon Trump favorably due to his campaign (or “culture war”) against woke ideology, immigration, Islam (Pfeifer, 2025) and liberal-progressivism in general. This alignment was broadly reciprocal. As the Anglo-German journalist Henry Donovan (2026) posits: “In MAGA World, the AfD was increasingly spoken of as Germany’s conservative insurgency – a mirror image of how Trump sees his so-called revolt against liberal elites” (Donovan, 2026).

Weidel and Trump hold common beliefs on several issues. First, both leaders have centered their platform on opposing immigration. Second, Weidel and Trump share a skepticism towards climate change policy and the introduction of renewable energy sources. Third, the two leaders embrace supply-side (or even “trickle-down”) economics and selective forms of protectionism simultaneously — and can be (paradoxically) described as “liberal-protectionist” (for an account of the AfD’s economics, see Cattani, 2016). 

Nevertheless, the ideological affinities between Trump’s MAGA movement and Weidel’s AfD were not sufficient to impede an almost sudden break between the American and German far right earlier this year. Trump’s unpredictability and risky political moves such as armed conflict with Iran, regime-change operation in Venezuela, and repeated threats to Greenland forced AfD leaders and key figures — including co-chair of the party Tino Chrupalla and Weidel herself — to markedly distance themselves from both the tycoon and the “Grand Old Party” (GOP). It was especially the strikes on Iran (highly unpopular among the German electorate[4]) that led Weidel to ask her party’s senior lawmakers to cut back on their trips to the US where they would regularly meet pro-MAGA Republicans (Pitel, 2026). Condemnation of Trump’s actions came from both Weidel and Chrupalla who in a joint statement remarked “renewed destabilization of the Middle East is not in the German interest and must end” (Hoyer, 2026). The fears of the AfD’s elite, particularly Chrupalla, is that Trump — who apparently “started off as a peace president” — would become another American president known for war campaigns and neoconservative interventionism (Hoyer, 2026). 

Overall, far-right parties like the AfD remain largely skeptical about US interventionism (sometimes described as “US imperialism”) due to its economic and migratory consequences, such as recession, higher gas prices, and mass migration towards Europe. This is the main reason why Weidel (sounding like her opponents from the pacifist far-left) also referred to the Iran War as “a catastrophe” (Pitel, 2026). However, the party appears divided, as there have been prominent figures within the AfD — especially Maximilian Krah and (to a lesser extent) Markus Frohnmaier — who continue to unequivocally support Trump despite the Iran war (Pitel, 2026). In early April 2026, the former expressed his opinion on social media: “a break with Trump would be harmful to the AfD in all sorts of ways. It must not be allowed to happen” (Pitel, 2026).

Surprisingly, as of this writing, Trump has not reconsidered his predominantly positive opinion concerning the AfD. In fact, the American President welcomed the AfD’s striking 44% electoral victory in the Saxony-Anhalt region in early September by stating (on Truth Social) “Wow! The Populist Party in Germany just had a really big night” and congratulated the party (Zakharova, 2026). In any case, although a near future (unlikely) scenario where an AfD-led Germany is simultaneous to a Trump-led America is still technically possible, predicting the type of relationship the two countries would have in such a context remains a difficult and problematic endeavor. 

In essence, as the political scientist Marco Tarchi explains, the AfD has three ideological currents: the first, is the national-conservative one, which is also economically liberal and is currently the majoritarian faction in the party led by Weidel; the second, is the “old-school” nationalist one, unfairly (according to Tarchi) labelled as neo-Nazi; the third, is the social-national one which was very successful in the recent elections occurring in the Eastern region(s) of the country and could possibly engage in dialogue with Sahra Wagenknechts’s party (BSW) (Tarchi as cited in Boezi, 2026, my translation). 

Currently, with the party on the rise electorally, it is unclear which one of these three factions will politically prevail and in which manner and degree they will interact with Trump in the event they obtain power. For example, AfD’s “national conservatives” could rekindle their relationship with Trump (especially if the Iran war ends abruptly) and be strongly backed by the latter when they pursue hardline “law and order” policies, including their signature policy, Remigration,[5]which may put Germany at odds with the European Union and part of the international community. Also, notwithstanding some of Weidel’s anti-American rhetoric, the AfD and Washington can have a transactional transatlantic partnership that stems from sovereigntism, meaning Germany would spend more on defense and rearm but buy American weapons (and American LNG[6]). How this very pragmatic settlement would fit in a major bilateral or multi-lateral framework is still uncertain. 

For instance, would the present NATO agreements remain the strategic “umbrella” for Germany yet? Regarding such potential developments from Trump’s perspective, providing AfD’s Germany with preferential treatment, in terms of both security and bilateral trade, America would be promoting the party’s sovereigntist ideology and at the same time even encourage Weidel government’s gradual distancing from the European Union. 

Reversely, in contrast with the EU’s common foreign policy, Weidel’s AfD could pressure an already Ukraine-skeptic Trump administration to realign with Russia, leaving Ukraine to its own fate. The predictability of the above-described scenario — it has to be recognized — is highly dependent on a series of factors, the main of which is the capacity and the will of the most anti-American views in the party to compromise with the idea of a new partnership with the US. Weidel herself should revise some previous hostile attitudes towards the military American presence on German soil.

Why Trump’s Relationship with the European Right and Far Right Is Strained: Four Factors

The relationship between President Trump and significant segments of the European right and far right has become increasingly strained. While — as mentioned previously — a substantial ideological overlap endures (especially opposition towards immigration and progressivism), several developments have resulted in tensions between Trump’s “America First!” agenda and the national interests of the European right-wing and far right parties led by Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel. Today, Trump is no longer the ideological lodestar for Europe’s right and far right: with Meloni, relations are cold at best, while Le Pen keeps the MAGA movement at arm’s length, similarly, Farage is now more cautious in publicly expressing support for the tycoon, and Weidel has distanced herself and limited her party’s contacts with the US administration.

More specifically, there are four factors that have contributed to alienating Trump’s US from the European right and far right. First, Trump’s popularity has significantly declined both domestically and internationally (Hartig & Kiley, 2026; Dionne, Jr., 2025). A recent study shows his approval rating at a very low 32% in America, losing 15 percentage points since the beginning of his second term in January 2025 (Lange, 2026). At the same time, Trump’s approbation among the Republican electorate has also declined, standing at 73% (Lange, 2026). 

Considering the wider context, a YouGov survey (from October 2026) found that 85% of Italians have an unfavorable opinion of Trump, against 83% in France, 86% in Britain, and 85% in Germany (YouGov, 2026). After all, Trump’s political brand has become so toxic for the global right that nearly every time he became directly or indirectly involved in a country’s election — either by threatening annexation, tariffs, or by endorsing a candidate — his engagement has backfired on the candidates he endorsed. 

This occurred in the last Canadian election in April 2025, as Trump suggested Canada could become the US’s “51st state” while concurrently increasing tariffs against the country, and resulted in a Liberal Party victory and an unexpected defeat of the conservative pro-Trump candidate Pierre Poilievre (Dionne Jr., 2025). 

It also occurred in Hungary, precisely a year later, as Vance attended a Viktor Orbàn rally in Budapest with 1,000 supporters on behalf of Trump (Spike, 2026). However, this strategy did not produce the intended outcome as elections were ultimately won by Orbàn’s opponent, Péter Magyar. 

As simply put by two experts — Jeremy Shapiro and Zsuzanna Vegh (2025) — “His [Trumps’s] growing unpopularity means aligning with him may not appear politically advantageous for these forces” (Shapiro & Vegh, 2025). 

Second, Trump’s protectionism, which has taken the form of tariffs as a trade policy against EU nations, has led to an escalation of tension between the US administration and some of its rightist “allies” in Europe. In essence, while far right forces such as the RN and the AfD may embrace economic nationalism or protectionism theoretically, and even practically when it suits their own national economies, they instead wholeheartedly oppose it when US tariffs[7] on European goods risk damaging their own countries’ businesses, industries, and workers. After all, for years populists have presented themselves as the main defenders of rural and blue-collar workers, who now form their core constituency. 

Thus, aligning with Trump over his tariffs and trade measures (even if for purely ideological reasons) would be counter-productive and self-sabotaging for the European right and far right, as they ultimately damage artisans, luxury craft producers, exporters, farmers, manufacturers, and small-medium businesses in general, located in Italy, France, Britain, Germany and so forth. While there have been examples of populist politicians (e.g. Le Pen and Matteo Salvini) on the right defending Trump’s economic strategy (especially anti-China tariffs) the majority of rightists have either awkwardly ignored or condemned his course of action contra the EU. 

Among those who originally supported Trump but criticized him on anti-EU tariffs are Le Pen (who spoke of the American’s “brutal approach”) and Weidel (who called them “far too aggressive and self-defeating” and “fundamentally bad for free trade”) (Pitel, 2025). Instead, the conservative PM Meloni, simply called Trump’s tariffs “a mistaken choice” (Pitel, 2025). In fact, one commentator, writing for The Guardian has shrewdly suggested that “analysts have long noted the difficult challenge that Trump’s policies pose to nationalists in the EU: while they may agree with some of them principle, MAGA is ‘America first’ – while they are ‘France first,’ ‘Germany first’ or ‘Spain first’” (Henley, 2025). 

Third, Trump’s foreign policy — especially regarding Iran — emerged as increasingly at odds with the crypto-isolationist, selectively non-interventionist (see Greene, 2024) and sovereigntist foreign policy stances of the nationalist right in Europe. Trump’s involvement (alongside Israel) in a conflict that expanded beyond the initial strikes (February 2026) and targeting of Iran’s nuclear program became viewed as an indirect threat to Europe by part of the right and far right. This is due to the costs of the war, its negative economic consequences to international trade and oil, gas, and fuel prices, as well as its wider impact on mass migration and population displacement. For evident reasons, a large-scale war in Iran could result in a new wave of migration and increase in the influx of refugees in the Old Continent.

Also, the European nationalist right (but also part of the mainstream right) wants to avoid getting involved in an American-Israeli War that would potentially result in hardship for European soldiers and taxpayers. As discussed previously, far right leaders like Le Pen and Weidel have shown their disdain for Trump’s actions against Iran, whilst Farage called in question Trump’s judgement (Coates, 2026). In essence, Trump’s move against Iran (like the one against Maduro’s Venezuela beforehand) did not consolidate Trump’s “transatlantic alliance” with the European right and far righ but actually contributed to its deterioration (Riccardi & Spike, 2026).

Instead, regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the situation is more complex. Whilst some right-wing parties — inspired by Eurasianists ranging from Alexander Dugin to Alain de Benoist[8] — have remained staunchly pro-Putin and pro-Russia (e.g. AfD) others have shifted to more “mainstream” pro-Ukraine positions (e.g. FdI, RN, Reform UK). Unlike specifically extreme right parties (e.g. AfD), today, conservative (e.g. FdI) and populist radical right parties (e.g. RN, Reform UK) and leaders in Europe are increasingly skeptical of Trump’s conciliatory approach towards Russia. 

Unsurprisingly, Meloni often calls Russia an “aggressor” (Hook Global, 2026) and has clearly criticized Trump’s deal with the Russian President (to import a significant amount of Russian diesel fuel and temporarily lift US sanctions) calling it “a very risky choice” that legitimizes Moscow (Barbati, 2026). In the Italian Parliament, her party has consistently voted to aid Ukraine militarily. 

More surprisingly, the — once Russophile — RN has reassessed its position on Russia, because although the party has opposed sending French troops and military aid (for long-range strikes) both Le Pen and Bardella have publicly supported Ukraine’s right to defend (and recover) its sovereignty (Sandford, 2022; Par Le Parisien avec AFP, 2025; Crone & Klinke, 2025: 24, 44). Also, the RN supposedly interrupted all contacts with the Kremlin after 2022 (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 44). This shift towards more liberal-conservative positions has been prompted by the increasing influence of a new generation of identitarian, Gaullist, and civilizationist thinkers that advise the higher ranks of the party — such as Pierre-Romain Thionnet and few others (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25). The “new” RN no longer considers Russia a bastion for traditional Christianity and European identity but instead views it as a multicultural melting pot (a “Eurasian empire” with a considerable Islamic population) that represents a menace to the sovereignty of a white, Christian, and Western, “Fortress Europe” (see Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25, 27, 40, 44). 

Shifting the focus to Britain, even Farage — possibly the greatest admirer and supporter of Trump in Europe — has recently spoken against Trump’s new Russian deal (Henrys, 2026) and now is more inclined to back Ukraine (even suggesting NATO adherence) (Keate, 2025) at the cost of disagreeing with the American President. 

It is difficult to say whether these parties and leaders are ideologically or strategically (as some are close to obtaining governmental power) driven to support Ukraine over Russia. However, what is evident is that whilst the US-Iran War is viewed as something occurring far from Europe’s borders and involving a nation that is culturally very distinct and of little interest to the Old Continent, the Russia-Ukraine War is a conflict at the heart of Europe involving a nation that has been invaded by an “alien” superpower. 

Moreover, far right and right-wing parties are much more comfortable with Ukrainian immigration than with Iranian immigration resulting from the War, as the former are perceived as “white” and “Christian” and the latter as “non-white” and “Muslim.” A further concept worth exploring is that introduced by the French political analyst Thibault Muzergues (2026): many of these right-wing and/or far right parties in Europe are presently led by a younger generation of politicians who have become increasingly wary of aligning with Putin’s Russia (France 24 English, 2026). Essentially, this new political elite adopts a different stance towards Russia than its predecessors did fifteen to twenty-five years ago (France 24 English, 2026).

Fourth, Trump’s political model, especially his modus operandi of leadership and exercise of executive power, is difficult (if not impossible) to reproduce in Europe. The particular institutional structure and political-cultural context of the US confer the American President significantly more decisional autonomy, power, and freedom of maneuver compared to the numerous checks and balances, political fragmentation, and institutional constraints characterizing systems such as the European Union. 

In the event that they assume office, leaders such as Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel would operate in a very distinct context from Trump — one that involves specifically European parliamentary mechanisms, proportional electoral frameworks, coalition administrations, independent constitutional tribunals, and supranational regulatory bodies. 

Contrastingly, Trump’s institutional environment is shaped by a two-party system where — although restrained by courts, Congress, and the states — the executive is directly elected by the people and is able to exercise substantial authority without having to necessarily depend on a parliamentary majority. For instance, the American President has the right to pull out from most international agreements without the approval of Congress. Furthermore, Trump utilized executive orders to make US immigration policy stricter (also enforcing mass deportations) without always relying on new legislation. 

In summary, the impracticality of replicating Trump’s model in Europe ineluctably contributed to an increasing estrangement between the American President and the European right. 

Conclusion

This commentary examined the complex political and relational dynamics surrounding President Trump and successful right-wing and far right party leaders in Europe. The analysis revealed that although — overall — the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is significantly strained, it has yet to reach a breaking point, nor does such an outcome appear imminent. After all, given the American and European economies are largely interconnected, especially considering trade and supply chains, finance, military security, intelligence, energy, and technology, a full rupture between the US and Europe’s major nations (and its potential future leaders) such as Italy, France, Britain, and Germany appears both undesirable and unrealistic. 

In any case, the main takeaway is that although there is strong ideological affinity between at least three of the four leaders discussed and Trump — Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel (more so than Meloni) are closely aligned to the US President’s views on state authority to combat globalization, immigration, woke, and modern liberalism — realpolitik combined with Trump’s trade and foreign policy have forced these parties/leaders to distance themselves from his actions and emerging legacy, primarily to defend their own national interests. 

Considering political realism, Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel have all understood the political cost of aligning too closely with a foreign President who is experiencing a sharp decline in public support (both domestically and internationally) and who always prioritizes pursuing his own national agenda to satisfy his electoral base at home (MAGA) rather than strengthening transatlantic alliances. 

Furthermore, these leaders evidently see no benefit in attempting to imitate or replicate Trump’s failing political model in their own parliamentary (Italy, Britain, Germany) and semi-presidential (France) democracies. Considering Trump’s policies, all of the rightist and far right leaders mentioned above have no choice but to object to the President’s hazardous maneuvers on trade and foreign policy that damage their economies and long-term societal plans. Today, American tariffs on European goods, Russian “appeasement,” and new wars (e.g. Iran) (potentially causing an increase in global immigration), are not looked upon favorably by the leaders of parties who are — above all — sovereigntist (and except for the AfD — FdI, RN, and Reform UK, view Russia as a foreign threat to national sovereignty), nativist, culturally and economically nationalist, and partially isolationist. 

After Trump’s failed midterms election, it is likely the European right will distance itself from him and his political paradigm (namely “Trumpism”) even further. However, it is only natural that — if they take office — the European right and far right will seek coordination and cooperation with Trump’s America on most of the issues mentioned above (trade, security, intelligence, energy, etc.). Nevertheless, such cooperation is likely to become increasingly pragmatic, transactional and driven by strategic considerations rather than ideological affinity. 

As already stated, Trump is no longer considered an ideological point of reference or natural ally by any of the leaders and parties under scrutiny. On the contrary, Trump is perceived as an erratic, precarious, and unpredictable interlocutor whose imperatives and core aims usually diverge significantly from their own, especially on topics such as commercial policy and foreign policy. Ideally, future studies could shift the focus towards other right-wing political actors (e.g. Santiago Abascal, Péter Magyar, and Geert Wilders) and assess their affinity with Trump from a political-strategic and ideological standpoint.


 

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Footnotes

[1] For detailed accounts of JD Vance’s political views refer to Benjamin Wallace-Wells (2024), and Swapna Venugopal Ramaswamy (2025).

[2] For an in-depth account on how the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict has negatively impacted the UK economy, see Daniel Harari (2026). 

[3] The interview mentioned above can be found online at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IeYB_Hmsu84.

[4] A recent survey shows that most Germans disapprove of Trump’s actions against Iran (and Maduro in Venezuela) — see Claudia Müller (2026).

[5] This particular AfD policy is concisely (yet comprehensively) discussed in a book chapter written by the scholar Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli (2026: 149-151). 

[6] Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 

[7] Especially the 20% levy on all EU imports (see Hernández-Morales et al., 2025).

[8] Alain de Benoist is not strictly Eurasianist in the Duginist sense. While he supports multipolarity (objecting to American dominance and liberal universalism) and calls for an ethno-pluralist “Europe of the peoples”, he also believes Russia’s role is central in any anti-American, anti-Atlanticist, and illiberal continental project. 

Khayyam Rzazade.

PopuliVerse Founder Rzazade: Populism Must Be Studied as a Global Political Logic, not a Regional Pathology

In this interview for the ECPS Voice of Youth series, Khayyam Rzazade, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa and founder of PopuliVerse, argues that populism must be understood as a global political logic rather than a regional pathology. Drawing on his research into Europe’s foreign and defense policies, he examines how populist actors selectively politicize international affairs while often maintaining established strategic commitments. Introducing his concept of foreign policy activation, Rzazade explores the conditions under which foreign policy becomes a site of people-versus-elite contestation. He also discusses PopuliVerse, an innovative research platform connecting fragmented scholarly debates, and advocates a comparative, methodologically rigorous approach that takes citizens’ political motivations seriously across diverse geographical and ideological contexts.

Interview by Natalia Crane

As populist movements increasingly influence international relations, security debates, and defense policy, understanding their political logic has become essential to contemporary political scholarship. In this interview for the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) Voice of Youth (VoY) series, Khayyam Rzazade, founder and editor of PopuliVerse,argues that populism must be approached as a dynamic political phenomenon transcending ideological and geographical boundaries. Reflecting on his experiences across the post-Soviet space and Europe, Rzazade emphasizes that “populism needs to be studied as a global political logic, not a regional pathology.”

Originally from Azerbaijan, Rzazade is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa, participating in IDEoPOP, an EU-funded doctoral network examining populism’s international dimensions. Supervised by Professor Fabrizio Coticchia and co-supervised by Professor Christian Lequesne at Sciences Po Paris, he has studied at institutions including Baku State University, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, and the College of Europe. His professional experience spans parliamentary work, European institutions, and university teaching.

Drawing on Ernesto Laclau, Benjamin Moffitt, and Cas Mudde, Rzazade conceptualizes populism not as a fixed ideology but as “a way of constructing politics around a fundamental division between ‘the people’ and an elite that is said to betray them.” His approach identifies three interconnected repertoires: plebiscitarian mobilization, antagonistic identity construction, and crisis performance. Crucially, these practices vary across political contexts, allowing the same actors to adopt populist rhetoric selectively.

This framework informs his doctoral research on how populist actors shape Europe’s foreign and defense policy, particularly amid Russia’s war against Ukraine, European rearmament, and uncertainty in transatlantic relations. Challenging assumptions that populist governments necessarily overturn established international commitments, Rzazade observes that “they pick their battles, making a loud people-versus-elite argument on one foreign policy issue and remaining entirely conventional on the next.”

His concept of foreign policy activation examines when governments transform international questions into populist political conflicts. Despite growing domestic contestation, he argues that institutional commitments to NATO and the European Union frequently constrain radical policy departures. Consequently, populist governments often produce “change within orientation rather than change of orientation.”

Beyond his doctoral research, Rzazade discusses PopuliVerse, an initiative connecting fragmented scholarly conversations through a research library containing more than 8,000 academic works, a monitoring publication, and a commentary platform. His ambition reflects a commitment to making comparative populism research accessible across disciplines and regions.

Ultimately, Rzazade advocates methodological openness and greater attention to understudied political contexts, particularly the post-Soviet world, Asia, and Africa. Rejecting both the pathologization and romanticization of populism, he argues that scholarly rigor requires recognizing that “the people populists speak to are not a research problem. They are citizens with reasons.”

The interview with Khayyam Rzazade is lightly edited to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

From European Foreign Policy to the International Dimensions of Populism

Photo: Dmitry Demidovich.

To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, and explain how your research interests developed? Why do you believe your area of research is particularly significant in today’s global political environment?

Khayyam Rzazade: I am a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa, working within IDEoPOP, an EU-funded doctoral network on the international dimensions of populism. My research is supervised by Professor Fabrizio Coticchia in Genoa and co-supervised by Professor Christian Lequesne at Sciences Po Paris. I also founded and edit PopuliVerse, a platform for populism research, or as I like to call it, “the universe of populism.”

I come from Azerbaijan, and my studies have taken me from Baku State University to Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, the European Academy of Diplomacy in Warsaw, and the College of Europe in Bruges, with an exchange year in Minsk in between. I have also interned at the Parliament of Azerbaijan, assisted a Member of the European Parliament, and taught Political Theory and Political Analysis to undergraduates at Baku State University and International Security to master’s students at ADA University. It has been quite a journey, and each of these experiences has left its mark on how I think.

My interests began with European foreign and security policy, particularly how the European Union builds a common response to threats such as Russia. The longer I worked on these questions, the clearer it became that foreign policy is not made only in Brussels or in ministries. It is also contested in parliaments, in the media, and around kitchen tables, and populist parties were frequently the actors challenging the established consensus. When the IDEoPOP position was announced, it felt as if it had been written with me in mind. This is how I arrived at my current research on how populist actors shape foreign and defense policy in Europe.

I believe this research matters a great deal today. Foreign and defense policy were long treated as areas of elite agreement, relatively sheltered from party competition, and that is no longer the case. Populist parties now govern or share power in several European countries, while Europe faces the war in Ukraine, a major debate over rearmament, and an uncertain transatlantic relationship.

These are decisions with long-term consequences, and citizens increasingly expect a say in them. As someone who studies populism, I try never to forget that the word begins with the people. Understanding how populists speak to citizens about security, and why so many citizens listen, is essential if Europe wants its foreign policy to remain both coherent and democratic.

Intellectual Influences: From Political Theory to Personal Experience

Who or what has most profoundly influenced your intellectual development? Are there particular scholars, books, experiences, or even unexpected sources of inspiration that have fundamentally shaped your thinking?

Khayyam Rzazade: My intellectual development has been shaped as much by places as by texts. Growing up in Azerbaijan, a young state in a difficult neighborhood, taught me early that foreign policy is never an abstraction. It touches borders, families, and daily life. Later, working at the European Parliament, I saw from the inside how slowly and carefully common European positions are built, and how fragile they can be. These two experiences still frame how I read everything else.

Among scholars, three have influenced me most. Ernesto Laclau taught me to treat populism as a political logic rather than a fixed set of policies, which is the starting point of my own conceptual framework. Benjamin Moffitt’s work on populism as a political style, and especially on the performance of crisis, showed me that how populists speak and behave matters as much as what they claim to believe. Cas Mudde’s ideational approach, even where I depart from it, gave the field a shared vocabulary without which comparative work would hardly be possible. I would also add my supervisor, Fabrizio Coticchia, whose work on Italian defense policy convinced me that defense is a domain of party politics and public opinion, not only of strategy.

The less expected sources are sport and teaching. Long-distance running and cycling have taught me more about patience and consistency than any methods course, and a doctorate is above all a test of both. Teaching undergraduates in Baku taught me that if I cannot explain an idea to a twenty-year-old in plain words, I probably do not understand it well enough yet. I still apply that test to my own writing.

Studying International Politics Across Different Academic and Cultural Contexts

Having studied and worked in several countries, how have different academic environments and cultural contexts shaped your understanding of international politics? Have these experiences challenged any of your earlier assumptions about the subjects you study?

Khayyam Rzazade: Studying in Baku, Minsk, Venice, Warsaw, Bruges, and now Genoa and Paris have given me something no single institution could: the habit of noticing how differently the same event looks from different parts of the world.

In Baku, international politics was taught and discussed as a matter of survival for a small state between large neighbors. In Minsk, I saw a political system where the gap between official discourse and everyday conversation was wide, and where people had learned to read between the lines. Venice introduced me to the Italian tradition of thinking about politics historically and theoretically. Warsaw taught me how real the Russian threat feels on the EU’s eastern border. Bruges and Brussels showed me the European Union from the inside, with its achievements and its endless compromises. Each place shifted my vantage point a little, and I think that is exactly what a scholar of international politics needs.

These experiences challenged two assumptions I once held. The first was that there is a single “European” view of security. There is not. What looks like excessive caution in Rome looks like dangerous naivety in Warsaw, and both positions are held by serious and well-informed people. This is one reason why I became interested in the domestic contestation of foreign policy.

The second assumption was that populism is mostly a Western phenomenon tied to recent economic or cultural grievances. Coming from the post-Soviet space, where appeals to “the people” against corrupt elites have a long and complicated history, I became convinced that populism needs to be studied as a global political logic, not a regional pathology.

On a more personal level, moving between academic cultures also taught me humility. Each system values different things: the argument in one place, the data in another, the elegance of the prose in a third. I have tried to take a little from each. And I have learned that a good espresso and a long walk solve more research problems than one might expect.

Understanding Populism as a Political Logic

How do you conceptualize populism in your own research, and what led you to adopt that approach? Has your understanding of the concept changed as your research has developed?

Khayyam Rzazade: In my research, I treat populism as a political logic rather than as a fixed ideology or a particular family of parties. By political logic, I mean a way of constructing politics around a fundamental division between “the people” and an elite that is said to betray them.

What makes this logic observable is how it is enacted. Here, I work with three repertoires that actors can deploy to a greater or lesser degree. The first is plebiscitarian mobilization, which means appealing directly to the people over the heads of institutions and intermediaries. The second is antagonistic identity construction, which means defining who belongs to the people and who stands against them. The third is crisis performance, which means presenting the political moment as an emergency that only the populist actor can resolve. I treat all three as gradational, so a party can be more or less populist across time and across issues.

I adopted this approach for a practical reason. My empirical domain is foreign and defense policy, where populist parties often say very little or say contradictory things, and where the question is not whether a party “is” populist but whether it chooses to make a given issue populist. A binary classification of parties cannot capture that. A gradational and issue-sensitive approach can. It also lets me work across quite different cases, from Podemos in Spain to PiS in Poland, without pretending they share an ideology.

My understanding has certainly changed. I began, like many students, with the ideational definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology, which is clear and easy to apply. Working with real speeches and real governments made me less comfortable with it. The same party can be fiercely populist on migration and entirely mainstream on NATO, and I wanted a framework that treats this variation as the interesting part rather than as noise.

I have also become more modest about what any definition can do. Populism is a concept scholars use to make sense of a messy reality, and I try to hold it lightly enough to let the cases surprise me.

The Future of Populism Studies: Beyond Competing Definitions

Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Which theoretical debates—whether over ideology, discourse, strategy, political style, or something else—do you consider most consequential for the future of the field, and what misconceptions do you encounter most frequently both inside and outside academia?

Khayyam Rzazade: The classic debate between the ideational, discursive, strategic, and stylistic approaches has been enormously productive, but I am not sure it is the one that will matter most in the coming years.

The four camps now largely agree on the core, which is the opposition between the people and the elite, and disagree mainly on where populism “lives”: whether in beliefs, language, organization, or performance.

The debate I consider more consequential is whether populism should be treated as a stable attribute of actors or as something that varies in degree across issues, moments, and audiences. This choice shapes everything downstream. If populism is a property of parties, we label a party populist once and then ask what populist parties do. If populism is instead a property of political action, the same party can be populist on one issue and entirely conventional on another, and the question becomes when and why an actor chooses to make a particular issue populist. 

My own work takes the second view. I think the field is moving in that direction too, partly because text-as-data methods now allow us to measure populism speech by speech rather than party by party.

A second debate that deserves more attention concerns the relationship between populism and its host ideology. We still know surprisingly little about which outcomes are driven by populism itself and which are driven by the nationalism, socialism, or conservatism it travels with. In foreign policy, this question is unavoidable, because the “populist” and the “nationalist” explanation often predict the same behavior. Separating them is difficult.

As for misconceptions, outside academia the most common one is that populism simply means the far right, or that it is a polite word for demagogy. This misses left-wing populism entirely and turns an analytical concept into an insult.

Inside academia, the misconception I encounter most often is the assumption that populists have no real foreign policy. My research suggests the opposite. Populist governments frequently have quite coherent foreign policy goals, and the interesting question is why they choose to politicize some of them loudly and leave others untouched.

And perhaps one more, which I say with affection for my own field: we sometimes forget that the people populists speak to are not a research problem. They are citizens with reasons.

How Populist Actors Shape European Foreign and Defense Policy

Your doctoral research examines how populist actors influence foreign and defense policy in Europe, with a particular focus on Italy, Spain, and France. What have you found most interesting about the relationship between populism and foreign policy, and to what extent can populist movements fundamentally change a country’s international orientation once they enter government?

Khayyam Rzazade: What I have found most interesting is how selective populist actors are once they govern. The common expectation is that populists bring their anti-elite style into everything, including foreign policy. Looking closely at populist governments across Europe suggests something more deliberate. They pick their battles, making a loud people-versus-elite argument on one foreign policy issue and remaining entirely conventional on the next.

My current research theorizes this process, which I call foreign policy activation, and asks under what conditions a populist government chooses to turn a foreign policy issue into a populist one.

Two conditions appear central. A government needs the capacity to frame the issue, meaning a credible elite to blame and a leader able to carry the message. It must also not be trapped by its own authorship. A party that has signed a procurement contract or approved a mission while in office cannot later denounce it as an elite betrayal without contradicting itself.

On the broader question, my view is that populist governments rarely change a country’s international orientation in a fundamental sense, at least in Europe. NATO, the EU, and treaty commitments are heavy anchors, and most populist parties, once in office, discover that they value the room for maneuver these frameworks provide.

What populists do change is the politics around foreign policy. They turn settled issues into contested ones, alter the tone of alliances, and make certain commitments harder to deepen even when they do not reverse them. In some cases, such as Poland under PiS, this contestation went quite far.

But the overall picture is change within orientation rather than change of orientation. Whether that holds as populists govern for longer and in more countries at once is, frankly speaking, the question that keeps me working.

From Researching Populism to Building PopuliVerse

PopuliVerse

How did your interest in populism develop from your early academic studies into your current research, and what eventually led you to take on a more active role in supporting the wider research community through PopuliVerse?

Khayyam Rzazade: My interest in populism grew slowly and then all at once. As a student of international relations in Baku, I was trained to think about states, alliances, and power, and populism barely appeared in the curriculum.

It entered my thinking through the back door. I studied in Italy while the Five Star Movement was in government and wrote my master’s dissertation there on Brexit. Then, in Bruges, I kept running into the same puzzle. The European foreign policy I was studying in seminars was being contested at home by parties who claimed to speak for the people against the elites in Brussels, and the textbooks had little to say about it.

The pattern became impossible to ignore while I was writing my recently published article on the EU’s collective securitization of Russia between 2014 and 2022, which began as my thesis for the advanced master’s degree. National positions on sanctions and defense were shaped by domestic political struggles, and populist parties were often at the center of them. By the time the IDEoPOP position was announced, populism had moved from the margin of my interests to the center.

PopuliVerse came from a more practical frustration. When I began my doctorate, I spent months on a literature review and discovered that research on populism is enormous, scattered across political theory, comparative politics, international relations, communication studies, and sociology, and often invisible from one subfield to the next.

Every doctoral student working on populism was drawing the same map from scratch, alone, and that seemed a pity. I also noticed that populist actors do something new every week, and that there was no single place to follow those developments with a scholarly eye. 

So, I decided to build the place I wished had existed when I started. I call it the universe of populism, partly as a joke and partly because I mean it. If it saves one early-career researcher a few of the months it cost me, it will have been worth building.

PopuliVerse: Addressing the Research and Information Gap

What inspired you to create PopuliVerse? Did you identify a gap in the resources available to researchers studying populism, or did your own research experiences reveal particular challenges that you wanted the platform to address?

Khayyam Rzazade: Both, really, and the two are connected. The gap I identified was not a shortage of research on populism but the opposite. There is a vast literature and no good way into it.

A search on any scholarly database returns thousands of results with no indication of which definition of populism a paper uses, which region it covers, or which “populism and X” debate it belongs to. A student interested in populism and foreign policy has to wade through work on populist communication, populist attitudes, and populist economics before finding what they need.

That is the problem the PopuliVerse Library tries to solve. It currently holds more than eight thousand academic works; each tagged along two axes: the approach to populism a piece adopts and the field it connects populism to. This allows someone to filter down to exactly the corner of the literature they care about. We do not host anyone’s PDFs. We point to the published version and let the authors and publishers keep what is theirs.

My own research revealed two further challenges. The first is speed. Populist actors generate news constantly, and scholars rarely have time to follow developments outside their own case. The PopuliVerse Monitor addresses this with a regular issue that records what populist actors did around the world, organized by region, alongside what was published in the field that month.

The second challenge is the distance between academic writing and public argument. There are very few places where doctoral candidates or more senior researchers can publish a short and well-argued scholarly piece. PopuliVerseCommentary is meant to be that place, published quarterly.

All of it is free, carries no advertising, and is designed to be citable, with DOIs and an ISSN application underway. I wanted it to be the kind of resource a serious scholar could cite without embarrassment, and a curious citizen could read without dealing with complicated language.

Building a Research Library Around a Contested Concept

Building a database of populism research involves decisions about which publications to include and how to categorize such a contested concept. How do you approach these methodological challenges, and how do you balance the need for a systematic resource with the diversity of theoretical perspectives within populism studies?

Khayyam Rzazade: The inclusion rule is simple. A work enters the Library if populism is a central object of analysis, not a passing reference, and if it has appeared in a peer-reviewed journal, an academic press, or a recognized policy institution.

I do not screen for theoretical approach, region, or conclusion. The moment a curator starts deciding which understanding of populism is the “right” one, the resource stops being a library and becomes an argument. My job is to make the field visible, and I have no intention of settling it.

The categorization is where the contested nature of the concept actually helps. Rather than imposing a single definition, the Library records the approach each work adopts, whether ideational, discursive, strategic, stylistic, or something else, as one of its tags. That turns the disagreement in the field into a filter.

A reader who works within the ideational tradition can find their colleagues, and a reader who wants to compare traditions can do so in a few clicks. The second axis tags the field populism is connected to, such as foreign policy, communication, or welfare.

Where a work resists classification, and many do, it carries more than one tag rather than being forced into one box. I will not pretend the system is perfect. Tagging eight thousand works involves judgement, and I correct errors as readers point them out. But I would rather have a transparent and improvable structure than no structure at all, and I think most scholars who have spent time drowning in search results would agree.

International Collaboration and the Importance of Academic Networks

Your work on PopuliVerse brings together perspectives from across the international research community. How have collaborations and academic networks influenced your intellectual development, your research, and your experience as an early-career scholar? What role do you think these networks play in advancing populism studies more broadly?

Khayyam Rzazade: I would not be doing this work without networks, and I mean that quite literally. IDEoPOP is itself a network: a group of doctoral candidates spread across several European universities and disciplines, all working on different aspects of populism’s international dimensions.

Having colleagues at the same stage who study the same phenomenon from other angles, such as communication or comparative politics, has corrected many of my assumptions before they reached paper. My supervisors in Genoa and Paris have been generous with their time, which is what an early-career scholar actually needs.

Co-authoring with Fabrizio Coticchia and colleagues in Genoa taught me how a paper is really built, and I am looking forward to a research stay at Monash University to work with Benjamin Moffitt, whose approach to populism has shaped my own. Each of these relationships began with an email I was nervous about sending.

For the field, I think networks do two things that individual scholars cannot. They move knowledge across the subfields that populism research is divided into, and they build the shared vocabulary that makes comparison possible.

Populism studies has grown very quickly and sometimes feels like several conversations happening in parallel rooms. Networks, whether formal projects, conference sections, or something like PopuliVerse, open the doors between those rooms.

That matters most for early-career researchers and for scholars outside the main Western European and North American centers, who often have excellent cases and limited access to the conversation. Bringing them in is not only fair; it is how the field gets better.

Connecting Academic Research with Public Understanding

Beyond academic publications and resources for other researchers, what impact would you ideally like your work to have? How can populism research contribute to understanding and addressing democratic challenges while maintaining scholarly rigor and independence?

Khayyam Rzazade: The impact I would most like to have is on how people talk about populism, inside and outside the seminar room. In public debate, the word is used either as an alarm or as an insult, and neither helps anyone understand what is happening.

If my research can help journalists, policymakers, and citizens see populism as a recognizable political logic with identifiable conditions and consequences, rather than a fever that strikes democracies from nowhere, I will consider that a real contribution.

The question of rigor and independence is one I take seriously, because populism is a field where it is easy to lose both. There is a pull towards treating populism as a pathology, which flatters the researcher and misreads the voters, and an opposite pull towards romanticizing it as the authentic voice of the people. Neither is scholarship.

The protection, in my view, is methodological honesty. Define your concept clearly, measure it transparently, let the cases contradict you, and publish the results even when they are inconvenient for your own politics.

PopuliVerse follows the same principle. It publishes work from every theoretical camp and does not take any editorial position on which is right. A field that studies the people-versus-elite divide should be the last to behave like an elite that already knows the answer.

Skills and Advice for the Next Generation of Political Scientists

Khayyam Rzazade advises young scholars to protect their lives outside the office, as he does through running, cycling, practicing yoga, playing ultimate frisbee, and teaching.

As academic research becomes increasingly international and competitive, which intellectual and practical skills do you believe young political scientists need most? What advice would you offer to early-career researchers entering the field today?

Khayyam Rzazade: I think young political scientists need three things. First, a method they can really do, not just describe. Pick one method and learn it well. Second, the ability to write clearly. Most good ideas in our field are lost in bad sentences. If a reader cannot follow your argument on the first try, the problem is usually the writing, not the reader.Third, patience with theory. It is tempting to jump to data, but a paper with no clear concept behind it will not survive review, and it should not.

On the practical side, my advice is simple. Find a niche where two fields meet and few people stand. Mine is populism and defense policy. It is a small corner, but it is mine.

Send the email you are nervous about. Almost every opportunity I have had began with a message to someone I did not know. Build something that helps others, whether a dataset, a reading list, or a platform, because it teaches you the field faster than reading alone, and people remember you for it.

And protect your life outside the office. I run, cycle, practice yoga, play ultimate frisbee, and teach. A doctorate is a long race, and you cannot sprint the whole way.

The Future of Populism Studies: New Questions and Understudied Regions

Looking ahead, how do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Which research questions, geographical contexts, or neglected areas deserve greater scholarly attention?

Khayyam Rzazade: I expect the field to move from asking what populism is to asking what it does and under which conditions. The definitional debates of the last twenty years were necessary, but they have reached the point of diminishing returns.

The more productive questions now concern populism in power over long periods. Most of our theories were built on populists in opposition or in their first term. We know much less about what happens when they govern for a decade, as in Hungary or Poland, or return to office after losing it.

Foreign policy is part of this shift. For a long time, it was a footnote in populism studies, and I think it will become one of the main chapters because the international consequences of populist government are now impossible to ignore.

Methods will change too. Text-as-data tools and large language models will let us measure populism at a scale and precision we could not reach before. This will test many claims that have so far rested on a few well-chosen quotations.

Geographically, the field is still too centered on Western Europe, the United States, and Latin America. The post-Soviet space, where I come from, has a long history of appeals to the people against corrupt elites that fits our definitions poorly and deserves its own theorizing. South and Southeast Asia and much of Africa are similarly understudied.

One more neglected area is the voters. We have thousands of studies of populist leaders and far fewer that take seriously the reasons ordinary people give for supporting them. For a field named after the people, that is an odd gap, and I hope the next decade closes it.

A Global Observatory of Populist Discourse

On your personal website, you describe how increasing your intellectual capacity and learning bring you happiness. If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue in the future? More broadly, what do you hope will ultimately be the lasting contribution of your work to both scholarship and public understanding?

Khayyam Rzazade: If nothing stood in the way, I would build a global observatory of populist discourse. Imagine every parliamentary speech, party manifesto, and leader’s address in every democracy, continuously collected, translated, and measured for populist framing with transparent methods, and open to anyone who wants to use it.

We would finally be able to see populism rise and fall across issues, countries, and decades in something close to real time, and to test our theories against the whole world rather than a handful of cases we happen to know.

A project of that size needs a team, funding, and years, which is why I say it is a dream. But PopuliVerse is, in a modest way, a first step towards it, and I have learned that first steps tend to lead somewhere if you keep taking them.

As for a lasting contribution, I would be happy with two things. In scholarship, I hope to leave behind a clear theory of when populist actors turn foreign policy into a people-versus-elite struggle and when they leave it alone.

I also hope that my way of defining populism, which is deliberately eclectic and borrows from the ideational, discursive, strategic, and stylistic traditions rather than picking one, proves useful to others who find the camps too narrow for the cases in front of them. Alongside that, I hope to leave a resource that helps the next generation of scholars find their way into the field faster than I did.

In public understanding, I hope people will one day use the word populism more carefully, as a description of a way of doing politics rather than a verdict on the people who vote for it.

That line on my website is true. Learning is what makes me happy, and I would like my work to leave others a little more curious than they were before.

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva walks among supporters on Augusta Street at São Paulo on the eve of the brazillian election on October 1, 2022. Photo: Yuri Murakami.

Lula’s Historic Comeback: Implications for Brazilian Democracy and the Emerging Global Order

In this commentary, Dr. Prerna Chahar examines the domestic and geopolitical implications of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s historic comeback in Brazil’s October 25, 2026, presidential runoff. Overcoming a first-round deficit, Lula secured a fourth presidential mandate with 51.79 percent of the vote, defeating Flávio Bolsonaro amid persistent polarization and contested electoral legitimacy. Dr. Chahar argues that this outcome underscores both Brazil’s democratic resilience and the continuing challenges posed by political division and institutional distrust. Internationally, Lula’s victory reinforces Brazil’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, multilateralism, and a more representative global order. Particular attention is devoted to BRICS, the G20, South–South cooperation, and relations with the United States, China, and India, highlighting Brazil’s evolving position within an increasingly multipolar international system.

Dr. Prerna Chahar*

Brazil’s presidential election of October 25, 2026, has implications extending far beyond Latin America. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva won an unprecedented fourth presidential mandate, defeating conservative challenger Flávio Bolsonaro with 51.79 percent of valid votes against 48.21 percent. The result has renewed debates about democratic legitimacy, US influence in the Western Hemisphere, Brazil’s strategic autonomy, and the future of BRICS, the G20 and South-South cooperation. It also demonstrates how domestic electoral choices can influence the foreign-policy orientation of an important emerging power.

Lula’s political career reflects Brazil’s democratic transformation. Born into poverty in northeastern Brazil, he worked as a metalworker before emerging as a trade union leader during labor mobilizations against military rule in the late 1970s. He subsequently helped establish the Workers’ Party (PT), which became associated with labor rights, social inclusion and economic redistribution.

After several unsuccessful presidential campaigns, Lula won the presidency in 2002 and was re-elected in 2006. His governments from 2003 to 2010 prioritized social welfare, poverty reduction and Brazil’s international engagement. His political career was later disrupted by corruption investigations and imprisonment. His convictions were subsequently annulled, restoring his eligibility to contest the presidency. He returned to office after defeating Jair Bolsonaro in 2022. His 2026 victory marks his fourth successful presidential election, following those of 2002, 2006 and 2022.

Timing, Scope and Significance of the Election

Brazil’s general elections took place on October 4, 2026, with a presidential runoff on October 25 because neither candidate secured an absolute majority in the first round. The elections covered the presidency, state governorships, the National Congress and state legislatures. The results therefore determine not only executive leadership but also the legislative balance that will shape the next government’s ability to implement its agenda.

In the first round, Flávio Bolsonaro received 47.03 percent of valid votes, ahead of Lula’s 45.16 percent. Lula subsequently reversed this deficit, becoming the first candidate in Brazil’s current two-round presidential system to finish second in the first round and win the presidency in the runoff. He received 64,256,232 votes against Bolsonaro’s 59,826,041. 

Lula’s victory marks the first time in Brazil’s modern democratic history that a presidential candidate has overturned a first-round deficit to win the presidency. Since the adoption of the two-round presidential election system in 1989, every candidate who led the first round had gone on to win the runoff until Lula’s historic comeback in 2026.

Reactions from Bolsonaro and Trump

Following his defeat, Flávio Bolsonaro initially refused to concede and called for the election to be annulled. He challenged a two-hour extension of voting at some polling stations, authorized to address transport difficulties affecting voters. However, the extension itself did not establish electoral fraud. His position subsequently shifted towards pursuing a legal challenge over alleged abuse of incumbency. Meanwhile, Brazil’s electoral authorities confirmed Lula’s victory. The episode recalls the response of his father, Jair Bolsonaro, to his 2022 defeat. Jair Bolsonaro was subsequently convicted over an attempt to overturn the electoral order and sentenced to 27 years in prison.

The central democratic question is whether electoral disputes are resolved through evidence, judicial review and constitutional procedures rather than unsupported allegations that undermine public confidence. Lula’s victory demonstrates the functioning of electoral competition, but Brazil’s democratic resilience will depend on institutional independence, transparency and the treatment of political opposition.

US President Donald Trump added an international dimension to the controversy by describing Brazil’s election on October 26 as appearing to be “another rigged election,” without providing evidence of irregularities. His comments reflected the ideological proximity between the Trump administration and the Bolsonaro political movement.

Lula’s victory preserves a government committed to an independent Brazilian foreign policy. His assertion that Brazil would not be anyone’s backyard captures its ambition to maintain strategic autonomy while engaging with the United States, China and other major powers.

BRICS, the G20 and South-South Cooperation

Lula’s fourth victory provides continuity for Brazil’s role in BRICS, where it has advocated greater representation for developing economies in global governance, stronger development financing and reform of international financial institutions. Brazil’s engagement with China will remain important for trade, infrastructure, agriculture and energy, without necessarily requiring alignment against Washington.

The G20 offers a broader platform for cooperation between advanced and emerging economies on climate finance, food security, debt sustainability and development. While BRICS can deepen coordination among emerging powers, the G20 can facilitate negotiations across different political and economic groupings. Neither forum, however, guarantees reform; progress depends on members translating shared commitments into practical outcomes.

For India, Brazil is an important partner in both institutions. Stronger India–Brazil cooperation could advance agricultural research, biofuels, renewable energy, digital technologies and climate action. More broadly, Lula’s mandate offers an opportunity to strengthen South–South cooperation through reciprocal trade, technology sharing, development finance and institutional capacity-building. Such cooperation must deliver measurable benefits rather than remain a declaration of political solidarity.

Lula’s fourth presidential victory represents a consequential moment for Brazilian democracy and its international orientation. It preserves Brazil’s commitment to strategic autonomy, multilateral engagement and cooperation through BRICS and the G20, while exposing the challenges of governing a divided electorate.

Ultimately, Brazil’s global influence will depend on economic performance, coalition-building and its ability to translate diplomatic ambitions into practical partnerships. The broader lesson for the emerging global order is that multipolarity depends not simply on resistance to established powers, but on democratic choice, national policy autonomy and effective international cooperation.


 

(*) Dr. Prerna Chahar is a scholar of International Relations whose research focuses on US foreign policy, inter-American relations, regional cooperation, and India’s foreign policy. She holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the Centre for the Study of the Americas (CSA), School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India.

MEP Hanna Gedin.

MEP Gedin: The EU Is Losing Its Voice When It Comes to Upholding International Law

MEP Hanna Gedin argues that the EU’s credibility as a defender of democracy, human rights, and international law is being weakened by political double standards and the growing normalization of radical-right ideas. In this ECPS interview, she warns that “the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law” and points to inconsistencies in migration policy and relations with Israel and Turkey. Gedin also urges the European left not to adapt to the far right, but to build its own agenda around inequality, housing, energy, and the cost of living. “You need to have your own agenda,” she says, and to “make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Hanna Gedin, Member of the European Parliament for Sweden’s Vänsterpartiet (Left Party, V) and Vice-Chair of The Left Group, reflects on Sweden’s post-election political deadlock, the normalization of radical-right ideas in European policymaking, the erosion of international law, and the strategic dilemmas facing the democratic left. Gedin, who works on the internal market, industry, energy, women’s rights, and gender equality, situates these questions within a broader critique of inequality, restrictive migration policy, and the weakening of Europe’s normative credibility. 

The interview begins with the struggle to translate Sweden’s new parliamentary majority into a viable center-left government. Gedin rejects the idea that Vänsterpartiet should once again support a government from outside, insisting that “if our votes are needed, if our mandates are needed, of course we should be in the government.” She argues that the Center Party (C) “needs to choose,” because “there is no middle way.” At the same time, she acknowledges the deep economic divide between the two parties but maintains that cooperation remains possible on issues ranging from feminism and climate to international law and support for communities outside major cities.

A central theme of Gedin’s remarks is the extent to which the radical right has reshaped mainstream political agendas. She argues that Swedish parties have been “adapting and moving closer to the Sweden Democrats,” while politics has increasingly shifted away from “bread and butter” concerns toward culture-war issues. For Gedin, the answer is not imitation but political differentiation: “For the left, it’s really important not to adapt.” Instead, she insists, “You need to have your own agenda,” centered on the cost of living, inequality, housing, and material security.

This concern extends to migration policy at both Swedish and European levels. Gedin describes a “shift and an adaptation to the radical right” in EU migration politics and recalls far right and right-wing MEPs cheering “Send them back, send them back” during a vote on return hubs. Yet she also points to Sweden’s debate over teenage deportations as evidence that public attitudes can shift when abstract migration categories acquire “names and faces.”   

The interview’s sharpest normative critique concerns international law. Gedin argues that “the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law” and warns of “a complete erosion of international law” driven by double standards. She contrasts the EU’s firm response to Russia’s war against Ukraine with what she sees as a much weaker approach toward Israel, arguing that such inconsistency undermines European credibility globally.    

Ultimately, Gedin presents a distinctly materialist response to the rise of the far right. She argues that the left must make politics concrete: reduce inequality, address rents and energy costs, tax the very rich, and “make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.”

MEP Hanna Gedin. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Here is our interview with MEP Hanna Gedin, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

The Center Party Needs to Choose

Ms. Gedin, welcome. Let me begin with the tension between Vänsterpartiet (Left Party) and the Center Party and the prospects for forming a new red-green government. Sweden’s 2026 election produced a parliamentary majority for S, V, C, and MP, but that majority has so far proved difficult to turn into a government. Vänsterpartiet (V) insists that it must be part of the next government, while the Center Party (C) still refuses to accept V in government. Magdalena Andersson has now received a second opportunity to form an administration, and the four parties have at least begun talking together. Where, concretely, do you see a way out of this deadlock?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I’m not stressed or concerned because we have had this situation before, during the 2018 election, and it took a couple of months before we had a government. My party’s position is quite normal. If they want our votes, if they want our support for the government, of course we should, like every other party, be in the government. That’s a very normal position.

The Center Party has not really done its homework because they have said absolutely no to the Sweden Democrats, while at the same time they say absolutely no to us, and then there is no majority. So, they need to choose. There is no possibility in the middle, as they seem to think.

They have also been very clear and vocal in saying that Magdalena Andersson is their prime minister candidate, just as we have been. Then they need to show that and to choose. There is no middle way, and in the end, we will see this government forming.

V Wants a Stable Center-Left Government

The Center Party says it can support Magdalena Andersson as prime minister but draws a red line against Vänsterpartiet entering government. Why should the Left accept supporting a government from outside after an election in which its votes are indispensable to the new majority? And is there any compromise—cabinet participation, a formal cooperation agreement, budget influence—that V could realistically accept?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I’m not part of the negotiating team; I must start by saying that. But our demand is clear. We have been clear for many years now: if our votes are needed, if our mandates (seats) are needed, of course we should be in the government. We can’t support the government from the outside.

We have seen what that did before, in the 2018 election, when we were supposed to support the government from the outside. It became a very weak government. They did not have a majority for their budgets, and in the end, when they proposed a marketisation of the rent system in Sweden, we actually had to vote the government down. We don’t want that situation. We want a stable center-left government. This is our position.

The Ideological Divide Between V and C

Behind the dispute over cabinet seats lies a much deeper ideological conflict. The Center Party remains economically liberal, while Vänsterpartiet wants stronger welfare provision, greater redistribution, public investment, and tighter constraints on market power. If a red-green government is eventually formed, which of these substantive economic disagreements could become more difficult than the present argument over who gets to sit in government?

MEP Hanna Gedin: It is true that the Center Party and the Left Party have quite opposite economic politics. I would even say that the Center Party is quite extreme when it comes to economic politics. However, I have understood for several years now that they might be needed in the government, and we might sometimes have to undertake some very hard negotiations and find some kind of solution on these issues.

We do believe it’s possible, and we also think that we have a lot of issues that unite us—for example, when it comes to support for communities outside the big cities, feminism, international law, and climate. So, we do think that there are a lot of issues that we have in common.

The SD Is Now Seen as an Establishment Party

Sweden Democrats’ Square Meeting in Umeå. Jimmie Åkesson speaks to the people on the city square where opposition left-wingers have formed a chain and protest in Umeå, Sweden on August 14, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Vänsterpartiet entered the election promising to help remove a government whose policies were heavily dependent on the Sweden Democrats. If the parties that won the parliamentary majority cannot agree on a government, is there a danger that the post-election dispute itself strengthens SD’s argument that the established parties are incapable of governing—and gives the radical right another opening?

MEP Hanna Gedin: What we saw in the Swedish election was that the Sweden Democrats, for the first time since they entered the National Assembly, actually decreased. They had quite a bad election, and this is, in a way, due to the fact that they are now seen as an establishment party. Even though they have not been part of the Tidö government, they have been the biggest party supporting this government.

When it comes to economic issues, they have shown that they are a right-wing party. They support the economic politics of the right-wing parties. So, I don’t think they have a case for saying that they are anything other than an established party nowadays.

I also think that the election results, where our party, the Swedish Left Party, had a very good election and where we can see that the left side actually got stronger, show that people want something else than the politics we have seen from the Tidö government. And I do think that we will be able to form a government.

Mainstream Parties Moving Toward the Sweden Democrats

You argued earlier that the Sweden Democrats, even without formally entering government, exercised enormous influence over migration, crime, and ethnicity, and that ideas once considered politically unthinkable had moved into government policy. After four years of Tidö government, how deeply has SD changed the political center of gravity in Sweden? Is the larger story now less about SD itself than about mainstream parties adopting parts of its agenda?

MEP Hanna Gedin: We have seen in Sweden a lot of parties adapting and moving closer to the Sweden Democrats, and that is something we see in many countries. It’s extremely dangerous. It’s dangerous when politics focuses on things that are not bread and butter. It’s not about the cost of living or what people really feel in everyday life, but about culture-war issues, and what that has done to society in Sweden is very dangerous.

During the Tidö government, the government put forward, and we adopted, snitch laws, so you should snitch on your neighbors or coworkers if they come from a different country. This is quite extreme. We have seen it even when it comes to criminal issues and so on—this kind of obsession that if you are from another country, you should go away, you should go out of Sweden. It’s also linked to the notion of criminality being colored, in a way. It has been quite an extreme development in Sweden.

What the election showed is that people do not want this kind of policy. During the election campaign, we talked about bread and butter. We talked about people’s cost of living. We talked about the skyrocketing rise in rent, for example. We did canvass. We knocked on almost half a million doors, and when we met people, they were not talking about snitch laws or the need to be tougher on criminals. They were talking about things that affected them in their ordinary lives.

A lot of people also said that. I met a woman who said, “You know, I have stomachache. They don’t want me here. They want to throw me out. What this government has done to me and my neighbors is horrible, and I can’t vote for them. I will vote for you.”

So, in a way, it has affected us. But I do think that what we have seen during these four years—this obsession with people of a different color of skin, or criminals, and so on—is not what people want. I really feel a bit like it’s easier to breathe now. It’s like opening a window, and I think a lot of people in Sweden agree with me.

And I think that’s also very important: the first thing these four parties did, even before forming a government, was to stop the deportation of young people that was planned under the Tidö government. We stopped it.

How the Left Should Confront the Far Right

You have described the far right as particularly effective at finding scapegoats, offering simple answers to complex problems, and forcing its issues to the center of public debate. Across Europe, far-right, radical-right, and populist radical-right parties are increasingly shaping policy even where they are not governing. Why has the democratic left struggled to set the agenda with the same effectiveness—and what has it failed to understand about voters attracted to these parties?

MEP Hanna Gedin: In politics, it’s easier to make people vote for something they are afraid of than for something they hope for. If we have been living for several years with this repressive politics and the right-wing agenda, people also forget what solidarity is and what equality is, and you need to be reminded of it sometimes.

But for the left, it’s really important not to adapt, not to only talk about the Sweden Democrats or the right, the extremist parties, and not to adapt to them. What the Social Democrats did in Sweden, mainly during the election campaign—talking about the Sweden Democrats—did not work. You need to have your own agenda, and you need to put forward reforms about the cost of living, for example. That was what we did, and we were rewarded by the election results in Sweden.

Gender, Migration, and the Far Right

Celebrating Sweden’s National Day in Norrköping, Sweden, on June 6, 2014. Immigrants and native Swedes participate together in National Day celebrations. Sweden’s National Day is an official public holiday. Photo: Dreamstime.

The far right increasingly presents itself not only as anti-immigration but as the defender of a particular European cultural order, often combining nationalism with opposition to abortion rights, LGBTQ rights, and gender equality. As an MEP working on women’s rights and gender equality, do you see these struggles as separate policy battles, or as parts of a broader political project to redefine who belongs and whose rights are considered legitimate?

MEP Hanna Gedin: We see these attacks every day in the European Parliament, and you can see them in a lot of countries as well. The struggles are connected, and you can’t just take one struggle; you need to see the fight as a common fight.

In this Parliament, we see attacks from the right-wing parties on trans people and on migrants, for example. We don’t yet see the same number of attacks on abortion rights, but I’m sure it will come if they are successful.

Stopping Teenage Deportations Is a Very Important Step

You recently raised the issue of what you called Sweden’s “teenage deportations”—young people who have grown up in Sweden but face removal when they turn 18. Sweden has moved toward some of Europe’s most restrictive migration policies. If a new Social Democratic-led government takes office, what specific changes would V demand on asylum, deportation, and family reunification, and which policies introduced during the Tidö period should be reversed first?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I’m not a parliamentarian in Sweden, I work mainly with EU policies. But I think it’s very interesting that, in 2015, something changed in Sweden. It was when there was a big migration to Sweden, and we started having these repressive laws.

During the last government, the Tidö government, something changed last year when we first had a mayor in the city of Jokkmokk (a small municipality and town in Norrbotten County, northern Sweden, in Swedish Lapland / S.G.) saying, “I don’t want you to deport my people living in my city,” and a lot of mayors started saying the same: “We don’t accept this kind of very repressive policy.”

Then we had the teenage deportations. As you said, we saw many deportations of teenagers who spoke perfectly good Swedish, who had grown up in Sweden, and who were deported from their families. And the debate started shifting. Instead of saying, “Yes, people should go out, we should send them out, we should have more oppressive laws,” people were saying, “These are my neighbors, these are my coworkers, these are my friends.” They had names and faces, and the debate changed and shifted.

The first thing the four parties—the Swedish Left Party, the Centre Party, the Social Democrats, and the Green Party in Sweden—have been doing, even though we have not yet formed the government, is to stop these deportations. I think this is a very important step.

EU Migration Policy and the Radical Right

EU Commission.
Berlaymont Building, headquarters of the European Commission, Brussels, Belgium. Constructed between 1963 and 1969, the building has become the iconic symbol of the European Commission, the executive branch of the European Union. Photo: Wiktor Wojtas / Dreamstime.

At EU level, the Migration and Asylum Pact entered into application in June, while the new Return Regulation creates faster return procedures and opens the possibility of “return hubs” outside the Union. Governments are now discussing even tougher measures. Are we witnessing the normalization at EU level of ideas that only a few years ago were associated primarily with the radical right? And where should the legal and moral limits of European migration policy be drawn?

MEP Hanna Gedin: Yes, we are witnessing a shift and an adaptation to the radical right when it comes to migration, even at the EU level. I was present in the chamber when the return hubs were voted on, and what happened was that the radical right stood up and cheered together with the right-wing parties when they voted this through. They cheered and screamed, “Send them back, send them back.” This would not have been possible a couple of years ago.

This is a situation that we’re actually seeing, and that is why it’s quite hopeful to see what happened in Sweden and how the debate shifted with the teenagers who were deported. I do hope that we will see the same shift in Europe as well.

I also think you need to see the positive things happening in Europe when it comes to the Swedish election, but also the election in Berlin, where you had a very big left-wing party; the election in Copenhagen, a city close to where I live, where the biggest party was the Left Party; and Mamdani in New York. You do have these positive things happening as well.

You have also criticized the prolonged border controls between Sweden and Denmark and warned about allegations of racial profiling. Governments increasingly justify exceptional border measures through migration, crime, or national-security arguments. At what point does a supposedly temporary security measure become a permanent restriction on free movement and equal treatment within the EU?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I live in Malmö, a city close to Denmark. I take the train between Denmark and Sweden almost every week, and there is still this border control that was put in place in 2015. I would say that this is a permanent restriction. It is not allowed according to EU law, and it still goes on and on and on. So, yes, this is a permanent restriction, and that should not be allowed.

The EU Should Show Some Backbone

The EU has traditionally presented itself internationally as a normative power built around democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Yet critics increasingly point to restrictive migration policies, cooperation with authoritarian governments to stop migration, and inconsistency in the application of international law. Is the EU losing credibility as a normative role model—and how much of that erosion reflects the growing influence of the populist and radical right on mainstream European policy?

MEP Hanna Gedin: Absolutely, the EU is losing its voice when it comes to upholding international law. It’s very important to see that there have always been double standards, in a way, when it comes to the EU, because a lot of countries are still colonial powers.

But now, when you can see the very correct way of handling Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine—adopting sanction packages and being tough on Russia—that is good. Why do we see this double standard when it comes to Israel? I’m absolutely sure that people see this all around the world, and countries not being part of the EU are then saying, “If the EU does this, why should we adhere to international law?”

We see a complete erosion of international law now, and with the sanctions from the US against the International Criminal Court (ICC), I think the EU should immediately activate the Blocking Statute, show some backbone, and not be as cowardly as we have seen.

One Must Be Critical Toward NATO While Not Being Naive

NATO
NATO headquarters and monument in Brussels, Belgium, the political and administrative center of the North Atlantic Alliance. Photo: Dreamstime.

On Ukraine, you have been unequivocal that Russia’s invasion must be resisted, that Ukraine deserves continued support, and that Europe should stop financing Russia through energy purchases. At the same time, Vänsterpartiet historically opposed Swedish NATO membership. How does the European left build a security policy that is credible against Russian aggression without accepting an open-ended militarization of Europe or abandoning its traditional critique of NATO?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I think one must be able to be critical toward NATO while, at the same time, not being naive. Of course, we live in a very dangerous world, and we need cooperation between countries when it comes to defending ourselves.

My party is not against the augmentation that we have seen in Sweden when it comes to military spending. This should not be taken from schools or hospitals and so on, but we want to impose a wealth tax instead. We also want cooperation between countries, the Nordic countries, and parts of the EU.

I don’t think it’s a smart way to militarize the EU as a side project to NATO and then increase military spending there as well. So, one must be able not to be naive while still being able to criticize the notion of building defense on nuclear bombs and so on. You must be able to do both.

Gaza, Israel, and International Law

You have been one of the European Parliament’s most outspoken critics of Israel’s conduct in Gaza and have called for suspension of the EU–Israel trade relationship, sanctions, and support for international accountability. You and Jonas Sjöstedt were also denied entry by Israel in August. What did that episode tell you about Europe’s leverage over Israel—and why, in your view, has the EU struggled to translate its language of international law into a common policy toward Gaza and the West Bank?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I think that the Swedish government and the EU have been too weak when it comes to Israel. As I said earlier, you need to uphold international law wherever you see crimes against humanity, whether it comes to what happens in Ukraine or what happens in Gaza.

What we see in Gaza is actually a genocide, and you can’t just wait for the ICC or the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to say, “This is a genocide.” You have a responsibility, as countries and as politicians, to prevent genocide, and this has not been done at the EU level.

I find it quite appalling that the EU keeps trading with Israel as if nothing has happened and that there are no consequences when you breach international law. Benjamin Netanyahu has an arrest warrant against him. This should, of course, be reflected in EU relations toward Israel.

Economic Cooperation with Turkey Makes the EU Quite Weak on Human Rights

Women and LGBTQ+ activists in İzmir, Turkey, rally for the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, highlighting femicide and the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. Photo: Idil Toffolo.

Your parliamentary work has also addressed repression in Iran, women and girls under Taliban rule in Afghanistan, and the imprisonment of journalists and opposition figures in Turkey. How can the EU demand democratic standards from Iran, Afghanistan, or Turkey while avoiding accusations of selectivity when its economic, migration, or security interests lead it to cooperate with governments accused of serious rights violations?

MEP Hanna Gedin: This is also a problem with double standards. The EU’s economic cooperation with Turkey when it comes to migration, of course, makes the EU quite weak in also pushing for the upholding of human rights in Turkey. So, this is a problem with EU politics that you can see toward many countries—being hijacked when it comes to how to handle these countries.

Focusing on the Cost of Living Is the Only Way

You have repeatedly argued that Europe’s market-liberal framework restricts the public investment needed for the green transition, while rising rents, electricity prices, and living costs have intensified inequality. Radical-right parties have often converted economic insecurity into cultural and anti-migrant grievances. Does the left have to win the material argument—on housing, wages, energy, and welfare—before it can successfully challenge the far right’s politics of identity and resentment?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I think this is the only way, and we saw it in the Swedish election as well. My party, the Swedish Left Party, focused mainly on the cost of living, on issues related to bread and butter, and that is what made us the party that gained the most. That was the biggest success for us. We see it when it comes to EU policies as well. This right-wing environment that we’re living in at the EU level and in many countries, which focuses on cultural issues, makes people poor. You need to be able to focus on the cost of living instead.

In Sweden, during these last years, we have seen an explosion of inequality. We have 46 people in Sweden who own as much as eight million Swedish people, and we have 700,000 poor people in Sweden. The number of poor people has doubled in just a couple of years. This is the reality people are living in, and, of course, for the left, it is about focusing on those real issues—on how to make life nice and good and possible to live, and on reducing inequalities.

Rebuilding a Credible European Left

Finally, the European left faces a strategic dilemma. It wants to confront the radical right without simply reproducing its polarizing style, while also distinguishing itself from centrist parties associated with austerity, market liberalism, and restrictive migration policies. What would a credible European left project look like today—one capable of rebuilding working-class support, defending migrants and minorities, advancing gender equality and climate justice, and at the same time persuading voters who have drifted toward populist and radical-right parties that democratic politics can still materially improve their lives?

MEP Hanna Gedin: I think you need to be very concrete about what you want to change in society. When we talk about taxing the very rich, we get a very good response. For example, we see rising inequalities everywhere, and we need to focus on reducing those inequalities by also focusing on the cost of living, on what people pay in rent, on rising electricity bills, and on the fact that a lot of people are struggling to pay for their food. So, you need to be able to make life a good life without adapting to the far right and their narrative.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

MEP Brando Benifei.

MEP Benifei: An Alliance of Interests Between the Extreme Right and Techno-Oligarchs Threatens Our Democracies

MEP Brando Benifei warns that Europe’s struggle for technological sovereignty is inseparable from the defense of democracy. In this ECPS interview, he argues that the EU must strengthen its technological capacity while preserving its regulatory autonomy against external pressure and concentrated corporate power. Benifei stresses that “regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans” and warns that the extreme right has moved closer to “techno-oligarchs,” forging “a form of alliance and mutual support.” He describes this convergence as “an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.” Beyond regulation, Benifei calls for “a democratic reaction” and a “new social contract” capable of making European societies “more equal and freer.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

In an era in which technological power, geopolitical rivalry, and democratic vulnerability are increasingly intertwined, the European Union faces a double challenge: strengthening its strategic autonomy while defending the institutional and normative foundations of liberal democracy. Few policy areas illustrate this convergence more clearly than artificial intelligence, digital regulation, platform governance, and transatlantic relations. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States and a central parliamentary figure in the development of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act, reflects on Europe’s technological dependencies, regulatory sovereignty, Big Tech power, disinformation, and the growing political relationship between digital oligarchies and the popuplist radical right.    

At the center of Benifei’s analysis is the argument that Europe’s struggle for sovereignty cannot be reduced to economic competitiveness or technological capacity alone. It also concerns who has the power to establish the rules governing digital societies. He insists that Europe must develop its own technological capabilities while preserving its regulatory autonomy, arguing that “regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans” and describing this principle as “an absolute red line.” At the same time, he warns that Europe cannot remain merely a regulatory power without developing the technological infrastructure necessary to sustain that role. As he puts it, the EU “can’t remain a regulatory reference if it doesn’t also develop the technological power that is needed today.”    

The interview becomes particularly significant when Benifei turns to the political consequences of concentrated technological power. He argues that the rise of the extreme right is increasingly connected to powerful actors within the technology sector. “The extreme right has been getting closer and closer to these techno-oligarchs,” he says, adding that they have “forged a form of alliance and mutual support.” For Benifei, this convergence now constitutes “an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.”    

His response is not limited to regulation. Benifei calls for what he describes as “a democratic reaction” and “the proposal of a new social contract” capable of making societies “more equal and freer.” In his account, inequality and declining freedoms can provide “fertile ground” for an alliance between the extreme right and techno-oligarchs and for what he characterizes as a “hateful and democracy-demolishing approach.”

Against this backdrop, the conversation explores the broader implications of AI governance, algorithmic amplification, digital enforcement, disinformation, transatlantic pressure, and European sovereignty. Benifei’s remarks ultimately frame the contemporary digital struggle not merely as a debate over innovation or regulation, but as a deeper contest over democratic authority, economic power, and the institutional capacity of Europe to determine its own political and technological future.

MEP Brando Benifei is the Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States and a central parliamentary figure in the development of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Here is our interview with MEP Brando Benifei, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Europe Needs to Have a More United Voice

Brando Benifei, welcome! As Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States, you have repeatedly defended a strong transatlantic relationship, while also arguing that Europe must become more capable of defending its own interests. Following renewed US pressure on trade, technology, defense, and digital regulation, has the transatlantic relationship entered a fundamentally more transactional phase? And what would a genuinely more sovereign—but still cooperative—European approach to the United States looks like?

MEP Brando Benifei: I think it’s important to consider that the relationship between the European Union and the United States is based on strong economic integration that has been developing over decades, but also on security, cultural exchange, and social interconnections. In fact, the economic interchange is the biggest between two areas of the world. The EU and the US have not only trade, but also a direct economic presence of EU companies in the US and US companies in the EU. That goes beyond any other similar comparison we could make between the EU and other parts of the world, or the US and other parts of the world, even compared with neighboring South America.

So, this transatlantic relationship is rooted in values and history, but also in economic interests at the moment. We always need to consider that when we look at what has been happening in these last months, where objectively the European Union has been pushed by the US administration to accept certain conditions, for example on trade, based on pressure and on profiting from the fact that the EU is not very united.

The truth is that the European Union is made up of countries that have been divided on issues such as different economic interests. So, the US was able to profit from these divisions to actually push for a relatively punitive regime for trade, which, in the end, was stabilized and ameliorated. It’s not, in the end, what was initially foreseen by President Trump, and it’s something that is viable today, but it’s the result of these pressures. We have also seen pressures regarding environmental legislation and digital legislation.

My point is very clear: we need this relationship. It’s very important that we work in the transatlantic context for various reasons. I tried to mention a few, but we need to demand respect. We need to have a more united voice. The United States doesn’t speak with the voices of its various individual states; it speaks with the federal voice of the United States, the federal administration. The EU should find its own voice, which today is not there.

This is crucial to having a healthier transatlantic relationship, based on respect and equal footing, which today is being put under pressure and called into question by the attitude of President Trump toward the Europeans.

The So-Called Kill Switch Has Already Been Pressed

You have argued that US restrictions on advanced AI chips amount to a direct challenge to Europe’s economic resilience and technological sovereignty, and that dependence on semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, computing power, and critical raw materials can become geopolitical leverage. Does Europe now need to treat AI infrastructure in much the same way it treats energy or defense—as a strategic capability that cannot safely remain overwhelmingly dependent on external powers?

MEP Brando Benifei: It’s crucial that we build more sovereignty on these topics because we have already seen that the so-called kill switch has already been pressed. In fact, the US has restricted the use of advanced models for cybersecurity objectives to the European Union from one day to another, and this was a clear challenge to our sovereignty and our capabilities because we were depending on systems that revealed themselves to be in the hands of another political actor that could really stop us from using them at any moment.

So, today technological sovereignty is one of the crucial points in how we can build a more autonomous EU, which can guarantee the future of its citizens in terms of security and economic prosperity. But this also means using resources today to develop this capability, which means deciding to devote some expenditure to it.

That’s why I support the idea of having a common plan of investment like the one we had after Covid. That’s also the idea in the Draghi report that has not been picked up by the member states, but that’s a very big mistake because we need that leverage today to invest in accelerating innovation for sovereignty and to guarantee that the EU has its own alternatives.

This doesn’t mean we need autarky or protectionism. It means we need the European Union to always be able to have alternatives when it becomes unviable to continue with the existing technological solutions.

Photo: Bustiuc Dumitru / Dreamstime.

Europe Can’t Remain a Regulatory Reference Without Technological Power

In your 2026 report on AI and EU trade, you argue that Europe must combine competitiveness, openness, and strategic autonomy rather than relying on regulation alone. Yet the EU still trails the United States and China in computing capacity, investment, cloud infrastructure, and AI scale. Can Europe realistically remain a global regulatory power if it does not also become a substantially stronger technological and industrial power?

MEP Brando Benifei: My opinion is that it can’t. It can’t remain a regulatory reference if it doesn’t also develop the technological power that is needed today, and this is a crucial point on which a lot of our efforts should be concentrated. In fact, the European Commission has taken some steps with the proposal of a digital sovereignty package, which was something that we could not imagine before. It’s the result of a new situation, and this package addresses important issues like semiconductors, cloud infrastructure, and open-source models. So, it goes deep into our present dependencies and tries to build an alternative.

But to pursue this agenda, we need political resolve. We need the willingness to actually go down a road that will create some tension with the US, with China, and with other powers. We need to know that. We need to be ready to sustain that through dialogue, obviously keeping a door open for discussion with all our counterparts, but having a clear objective of creating more European autonomy and sovereignty.

This is something that our citizens also want. If you look at the polling and surveys, our citizens are saying, “We want a more sovereign Europe. We do not want to depend on foreign technology.” It’s important that our governments listen to our citizens, who are saying this very clearly.

Regulatory Sovereignty as a Red Line

You have criticized US tariff pressure as potentially targeting not only European economic interests but also the regulatory and social model itself. Where should the EU draw the line between legitimate transatlantic negotiation and external pressure to dilute European rules on digital markets, food safety, environmental protection, data, or fundamental rights? Can regulatory sovereignty become one of the defining fault lines in future EU-US relations?

MEP Brando Benifei: Maintaining the principle that regulations are decided in Europe, by Europeans, for Europeans is an absolute red line. We cannot negotiate on legislation that is based on democratic processes. This is something that the US must understand, and I have to say that they have understood it at this moment. They knew that this attempt—to actually convince us to change legislation based only on their pressure—would be difficult for them.

We need to look realistically at the content of these pressures because, in some cases, they reflect existing dynamics in the European political scenario. I give you an example: the pressures to change some of the EU’s environmental legislation were, in fact, already sustained by legitimate political decisions inside the EU by political actors. So, this is a topic where we have seen some things changing in a way that the US liked, but it was, in fact, based on a political positioning inside the EU that was not related to US pressure.

On other topics, like digital legislation, however, there are clearly greater differences between what the US is asking of the EU and what the EU is ready to do based on its regulatory autonomy. This must be understood, this must be accepted, and we need to keep this as a clear red line because we cannot negotiate on our regulatory autonomy.

The Brussels Effect, at Least at the Company Level, Is Already Happening

European Parliament offices and European flags in Brussels, Belgium on July 20, 2020. Photo: Lena Wurm.

You were one of the central parliamentary architects of the AI Act, and you continue to argue that Europe should promote a human-centric, risk-based model internationally. After several years of implementation debates, do you still believe that the so-called “Brussels effect” can shape global AI governance, or are divergent US, Chinese, and other models making regulatory convergence increasingly unrealistic?

MEP Brando Benifei: Clearly, regulatory divergence is an obstacle to this kind of convergence through the so-called Brussels effect. But let’s look at the data. We have researchers from important European foundations who have conducted scientifically sound surveys with American companies, showing that the AI Act has been taken as a reference point for voluntary compliance schemes, including by companies operating only inside the US.

So, the Brussels effect, at least at the company level, is already happening. That’s one of the dimensions of the Brussels effect, because it’s not only governments taking the same stances, but also companies voluntarily adopting ways of acting that reflect legislation that is not present in their internal jurisdiction but is, in fact, taken from the EU.

The decision could be linked to various reasons: operating in a global market or wanting to have easy-to-apply schemes that can be replicated globally. In fact, this is happening with US companies developing and deploying AI. The data are clear, and this shows that our approach has not been very bureaucratic or extremely complex, but rather quite company friendly.

I want to underline that a significant role for self-assessment has been built into the regulatory framework of the AI Act. Companies are entrusted with responsibility, but they are not asked to undergo a lot of third-party assessments, which is instead the case for other product-safety legislation, because we wanted to maintain some flexibility in this AI legislation, considering the quickly changing technological scenario.

So, I see some Brussels effect happening. Obviously, we are also looking more specifically—this is a slower process—at the adoption of similar legislation in other parts of the world. This is also happening. There are many parts of the world that, in recent months, have adopted legislation on AI content transparency, copyright protection, and countering AI abuse for mass surveillance that has been taken quite directly from the EU AI Act.

The AI Act and European Competitiveness

You have warned against presenting deregulation as the principal route to European competitiveness, arguing instead for investment, industrial policy, stronger European AI institutions, and better support for start-ups and Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). How do you respond to the growing political argument that the AI Act and other digital regulations have become a competitive burden that Europe can no longer afford?

MEP Brando Benifei: In my opinion, we should listen to those who develop AI in Europe, because otherwise we are talking in a very abstract way. Those who develop AI in Europe tell us what their problems are and why they are not growing enough. One issue is access to capital, so we need an integrated capital market where more risk capital is flowing. They also face a lack of access to computational infrastructure. We are dealing with that through AI factories and AI gigafactories, but we need to accelerate.

They also say they have an issue with regulatory complexity, but this relates mainly to data legislation—the use of data—which is not linked to the AI Act. In general, they recognize that the AI Act protects them from abuses by bigger companies, often non-European ones, that do not want to share information and want to avoid transparency.

In fact, the AI Act is generally supported by those companies. When they look at the regulatory burden, they are more concerned about the overall amount of legislation, and more specifically about data, where they want further reform. This is what we are also working on at the EU level at the moment: simplifying data legislation.

They also want clearer, more harmonized enforcement. The problem today with the EU is very fragmented enforcement, where we still have rules that are too dependent on national implementation. This is something that I see as one of the crucial priorities.

And I don’t understand how we can sustain the argument that the problem would be the AI Act, considering that the AI Act applies to all companies that operate in Europe and sell products in Europe. This means that it is overwhelmingly more applicable to non-European companies, which make up the majority of those operating in the EU today on AI matters.

Open-Source AI and Digital Sovereignty

Image: Wrightstudio / Dreamstime.

You have described open-source AI as a “structural response” to the concentration of compute, cloud, and data in a handful of firms. Could open-source AI become a genuine pillar of European digital sovereignty, or is Europe still too dependent on non-European hardware, cloud providers, foundation models, and capital for open-source ecosystems alone to materially change the balance of power?

MEP Brando Benifei: We are still too dependent on these closed systems, and in fact, we need to build a better balance with open-source and open-weights models. This is something that is now a focus, and the EU’s open-source strategy will also deal with that. We are working on this, starting from the European Commission’s sovereignty package, and the EU is now concentrating more on it.

We are building some alternatives. We are working on this in terms of adoption, but also in terms of development in Europe, and that’s a way we need to pursue to rebalance the situation.

This is also something where we need to build more consciousness, more awareness, and more training on how to deal with this among our operators, our public administrations, and our entrepreneurs, because this is a way to rebalance power and to avoid the concentration of resources and power that we see today. That is an objective risk in how our AI is being developed today.

The Rules Need to Be Applied More Forcefully

Your interventions repeatedly emphasize that rules in the digital sphere will exist one way or another—the question is whether they are created democratically or effectively dictated by large technology companies. Have major digital platforms and monopolistic Big Tech actors acquired a form of quasi-constitutional power over speech, information visibility, political mobilization, and even democratic participation? If so, is existing EU law sufficient to constrain this concentration of private power?

MEP Brando Benifei: Many of the laws of the European Union are already capable of constraining this, but they need to be applied more forcefully. The point is the political will to apply the rules in a way that is not constrained by other political considerations, such as avoiding retaliation or political problems.

This means that we need more independence in how the rules are applied, and this is something we are discussing in the European Parliament. There is a discussion about building a digital enforcement agency that could bring more independent enforcement of the rules and depoliticize their application.

Today, this means overcoming the restraint on applying the rules in the right way and in the strong way needed to actually pursue this objective: having the rules really applied, not only conceived abstractly, but applied by democratic powers, and not decided among themselves by the strongest private actors, mostly non-European.

We Should Tackle Both Disinformation and the Algorithmic Structure

In discussing the European Democracy Shield, you argued that “democracy does not fall in one day” but can be dismantled “one post at a time,” and you stressed that the problem is not only foreign interference but also the platform business model itself, in which algorithms reward anger and polarization. Should Europe therefore stop treating disinformation primarily as a problem of false content and focus more directly on the underlying algorithmic architecture that systematically amplifies polarizing material?

MEP Brando Benifei: I think we should look at both sides because disinformation content can be extremely harmful even if we do not have addictive-design algorithms. So, we need to look at the content, but also, obviously, at the risks of the addictive construction of algorithms, which is being targeted by new legislation: the Kids Act for minors, but also the Digital Fairness Act for adults at large.

The way we are leading on this is extremely important, and this is something where we need this new legislation to be in place and integrated with the existing norms that focus more on disinformation content rather than on the algorithmic structure. The algorithmic structure also needs to be tackled with clear action, like these new proposals that are on the table. 

One of them is already there, the Kids Act. The Digital Fairness Act, which is getting through very soon, will deal with these issues and should be an important piece in completing our digital regulation architecture.

Democratic Reaction Needed Against the Alliance Between the Extreme Right and Techno-Oligarchs

Anti-Trump protesters.
Anti-Trump protesters gather across from Trump Tower on Fifth Avenue during the annual Labor Day Parade in Midtown Manhattan, New York City, on September 6, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have explicitly warned that platform ownership and algorithmic amplification can assist far-right actors, citing Elon Musk’s intervention in German politics as an example. To what extent is the contemporary rise of the populist and radical right inseparable from the transformation of the digital information environment? Are we looking at a political phenomenon that traditional party competition alone can no longer adequately explain?

MEP Brando Benifei: There is clearly a link to these phenomena because we see that the extreme right has been getting closer and closer to these techno-oligarchs, and they have forged a form of alliance and mutual support. This is where we are standing now: an alliance of interests that is threatening our democracies.

I think it’s important that we react not only with rules, obviously, and with actions to tackle the most pernicious practices, but also with a democratic reaction, with the proposal of a new social contract where we are able to allow our societies to become more equal and freer. Because this is the context—with more unequal societies and less free societies—in which we see the nurturing of this hateful and democracy-demolishing approach that has become the fertile ground for this alliance between the extreme right and techno-oligarchs.

AI Companies Don’t Want to Be Regulated

And lastly, Mr. Benifei, populist radical right and far-right parties increasingly frame EU digital regulation, anti-disinformation measures, judicial independence, minority protections, and constraints on majoritarian power as forms of censorship or technocratic control. Is the central struggle now becoming one over the very meaning of democracy—between a liberal-constitutional conception based on rights and institutional restraints and a more plebiscitary or majoritarian conception of popular sovereignty?

MEP Brando Benifei: I find it honestly ridiculous, and I have said it many times, with a frank attitude toward my American interlocutors, that we hear from certain institutions or think tanks, especially American ones, that we are censoring and that there is no freedom of expression in Europe, while we have seen censorship happening very explicitly in the US. At the same time, we haven’t seen any of these kinds of actions and attacks from the US toward countries where there is no freedom of expression, there are no elections, there are limitations on anything that can be said, and you can end up in jail for real.

This has been a clear contradiction in the approach from the US, which makes it clear that, in this very extreme representation of the issue, there is instead a specific economic interest—a specific interest coming from companies that just don’t want to be regulated.

We need to take the discussion about freedom of expression seriously and avoid rules that also create, involuntarily, forms of censorship that are not needed. I take that very seriously. But the way this topic has been framed by American interlocutors, especially by the Trump administration has not been credible, and I’ve been very clear with them that they need to make a better case for us to be convinced of the benefit.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Dr. Semir Dzebo.

Dr. Dzebo: Dayton Accomplished Peace in Bosnia, but It Has Not Been Great at Democracy

In this interview with ECPS, Dr. Semir Dzebo, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford, examines Bosnia and Herzegovina’s October 4 elections through the lenses of populism, nationalism, secessionism, and ethnic politics. He argues that Bosnia remains marked by “stable instability”: Dayton secured peace but has struggled to function as a democratic constitution. Dr. Dzebo discusses “populist secessionism,” the erosion of anti-elite appeals under long incumbency, competing constructions of “the people,” Croat and Bosniak representation, foreign influence, disinformation, and the limits of territorial revisionism. Rather than expecting dissolution or a sweeping constitutional settlement, he points toward incremental reform, EU integration, stronger state capacity, desegregated schooling, cross-ethnic electoral incentives, and improved economic conditions.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

Bosnia and Herzegovina approaches its October 4 elections amid renewed strain on the political architecture established by the Dayton Peace Agreement. More than three decades after the end of the 1992–95 war, questions of statehood, entity autonomy, ethnic representation, foreign influence, and the legitimacy of shared institutions remain deeply intertwined. Political competition continues to be structured less by a conventional left–right divide than by competing understandings of sovereignty, citizenship, collective rights, and of who constitutes the legitimate political community. Against this fragmented backdrop, the elections are not simply about who will govern Bosnia and Herzegovina, but about the character and durability of the post-Dayton state itself.

In this interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Semir Dzebo, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Oxford, examines these tensions through the lenses of populism, nationalism, secessionism, and ethnic politics. He argues that electoral competition in Bosnia carries unusually high constitutional stakes because “whatever coalition gets formed after the October 4th elections is, in a way, a choice about the state itself.” In this sense, the election resembles “a de facto referendum” on the country’s future political architecture.

A central theme of the conversation is what Dr. Dzebo conceptualizes as “populist secessionism.” Whereas ordinary nationalism operates along a horizontal axis of competition between national communities, populist secessionism introduces a vertical, moral division between an allegedly authentic people and corrupt or illegitimate elites. In this framework, political disagreement becomes morally charged: as Dr. Dzebo puts it, disputes that might otherwise be negotiated can acquire “this moral dimension that turns them into treason,” making compromise appear as capitulation.

The interview also explores the limits of this strategy. Dr. Dzebo’s research suggests that support for secession in Republika Srpska is driven less by populist attitudes than by ethnonational identification, ingroup bias, deteriorating intergroup relations, and economic grievance. Long incumbency, moreover, can erode the credibility of anti-elitism: voters predisposed against elites may increasingly view Milorad Dodik himself as part of the elite.

The broader diagnosis culminates in Dr. Dzebo’s assessment of Dayton itself. Bosnia, he argues, lives in a condition of “stable instability.” Dayton “has really accomplished the first task” of securing peace, but “has not really been great at the second task” of functioning as a democratic constitution. Yet he rejects both expectations of imminent dissolution and hopes for a sweeping constitutional reset, instead pointing toward incremental reform, EU integration, implementation of Strasbourg judgments, stronger state capacity, desegregated schooling, cross-ethnic electoral incentives, and improved economic conditions as the more plausible path toward a more cohesive democratic order.

Here is our interview with Dr. Semir Dzebo, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Bosnia’s Elections Are De Facto Referendums on the State

Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Dzebo, welcome! Bosnia and Herzegovina enters the October 4 elections with its post-Dayton political order under considerable pressure, and the central political divisions concern not simply left and right but competing understandings of statehood, sovereignty, entity autonomy, citizenship, and ethnic representation. Looking at the campaign as a whole, are these elections fundamentally about who governs Bosnia and Herzegovina—or about what kind of political community and state Bosnia and Herzegovina should be?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: Before I start responding, thank you very much for the invitation to be part of the series. With regard to your question, it’s very hard to separate those two things, especially in Bosnia. Whatever coalition gets formed after the October 4th elections is, in a way, a choice about the state itself. It’s a little bit like a de facto referendum on what kind of coalition architecture we’re going to have after the elections.

There’s the option of continuing the Troika model, then potentially the return of SDR, or strengthening the entity-focused axis of SNSD and HDZ. And there’s maybe a larger question looming there about the pardon of Milorad Dodik, depending on what kind of coalition is formed.

I think it’s a little bit unusual because, in most other countries, elections are just about elections and who’s going to govern, without necessarily thinking these elections are going to change the nature of the state itself. But in Bosnia, it’s always a little bit intertwined when it comes to those things.

Certainly, what I really liked in your introduction about the elections was that you said it’s really less about issues that are considered in other countries’ elections, where it’s liberal versus conservative, it’s left versus right. There’s very little sort of program being announced and promoted by parties. Some of the people who have done research on these elections have found that not even 10% of social media content by parties has been about anything but a program.

It’s more about these traditional ethno-national tensions, and that’s why the tension is on top of everything. It’s not necessarily what ordinary voters care about, but, in a way, it’s omnipresent, so they’re almost forced to think about those things.

Then we recently had the death of Ratko Mladić, the convicted war criminal, which was almost a gift for those wishing to stoke the flames of nationalism again, and it forced itself into these elections again as something to really be considered.

Populist Secessionism Turns Disagreement into Treason

Your recent work introduces the concept of “populist secessionism” to describe the fusion of anti-elite populism with ethnonational claims to territorial separation. In Republika Srpska, how should we distinguish ordinary Serb nationalism from specifically populist secessionism? What changes when the claim that Republika Srpska must defend its national autonomy is reframed as a struggle of a morally authentic “people” against corrupt domestic elites, Sarajevo institutions, and international authorities?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: I followed the line of thinking of people who have done earlier work on the distinctions between nationalism and populism and the fusion of those two, like Rogers Brubaker, and then my PhD advisor at Central European University, Erin Kristin Jenne, who writes about ethno-populism. They tried to differentiate them as having two different axes.

I would say that ordinary Serb nationalism would be a horizontal axis, where claims of rights and autonomy of the Serb nation relative to other nations are made in this comparative sense, and the goals of that nationalism can be pursued through institutions. It is acceptable, in that view, that there will be those who disagree on the best course of action and the best way to pursue the goals of Serb nationalism within Serb people.

But populist secessionism has a vertical or moral axis, where the nation has a singular will. The leader is the one who embodies it, and everyone who presents an obstacle is part of the corrupt elite. In my paper, I thoroughly analyzed the discourse of Milorad Dodik. I find that he has three types of elites that he targets.

The first one is the domestic opposition, the Serb political parties within Republika Srpska that are his opposition, the ones that run for votes, that he used to run for votes against; now he’s technically not a part of these elections. Then you have the Bosniak elite in Sarajevo, whom he also targets within the country. Then there’s also the element of what he presents as a neo-colonial international community that he sees as standing in the way of the will of the people and imposing these external decisions without, according to him, any legitimacy to do so.

So, what happens is that some of these disagreements that could happen and could be debated get this moral dimension that turns them into treason. It almost prohibits any sort of compromise, because it sees it as capitulation to the interests of those who wish to harm the Serb national project in Bosnia.

Dodik Uses Populism to Redirect Discontent

Milorad Dodik.
Milorad Dodik greets supporters in Pale, Bosnia and Herzegovina, following a meeting and referendum on Republika Srpska’s National Day, September 25, 2016. Photo: Vladimir Stanisic / Dreamstime.

One of the most intriguing findings of your research is that Milorad Dodik’s populist-secessionist discourse appears to function more effectively as an elite political strategy than as a direct reflection of mass attitudes: stronger anti-elitism was actually associated with lower support for both secession and Dodik’s party, while ethnic identification, ingroup bias, and economic grievances were stronger predictors. Does this suggest that analysts have overestimated the popular foundations of secessionism in Republika Srpska? And if so, why does the rhetoric remain politically so persistent?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: Partly, it really does. There’s definitely support for secession in Republika Srpska. It’s real support, and it tends to vary a great deal. But in a survey that I’ve done, I found that it has almost nothing to do with populist attitudes. In fact, those who really hold populist attitudes, and we see them as a combination of anti-elitism, pro-people, and a Manichaean element, are actually the ones who have lower support for both Dodik’s party and secession.

Those who support secession are actually motivated by other, more traditional motivations, like just a sense of distinct ethnonational identity, just a sense that intergroup relations in the country are already poor, that the country is really not a unified whole.

But again, the reason why this populist secessionism exists, and the reason why Dodik uses it, is because it really enables him to have a tool and a discursive arsenal to attack domestic opposition, the Bosniak elite, and the international presence in the country. It really helps him to try to mobilize against all of these elites in pursuit of goals, because he can’t mobilize the anti-elite discourse.

What it shows is that, among people living in Republika Srpska, those who are predisposed to dislike elites are the ones who think of elites in Banja Luka; those are the ones they directly live under. So those who are dissatisfied with elites tend to think of Dodik as elite, while Dodik essentially wants them to think of the Bosniaks in Sarajevo or the international presence in the Office of the High Representative as the elite.

It’s a discursive move to try to shift attention from his long-standing incumbency and the things that people might be dissatisfied with, and to get the people’s attention onto other targets where he can fare more favorably in competition with.

Anti-Elite Voters Increasingly See Dodik as the Elite

That finding also creates an apparent paradox: populists normally mobilize against entrenched elites, yet SNSD has exercised power for many years while continuing to present itself as a resistance movement against Sarajevo, international bureaucrats, and external interference. Does prolonged incumbency eventually exhaust the credibility of populist anti-elitism? Or can ethnonationalism compensate for that contradiction by continually redefining the incumbent elite as the defender of the community against more distant and allegedly more threatening elites?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: Exactly. At the mass level, it really shows that long incumbency is going to exhaust the appeal of anti-elitism. As I said in response to the previous question, those who are predisposed to have anti-elite attitudes are less likely to vote for Dodik or his party because they think of him as the elite. So, if they have an anti-elite predisposition, they’re going to think negatively of him and his party.

This also shows, and is in line with other work, that it’s a bit of a methodological question for all of us working on populism whether standard attitude scales work for predicting support for populists once they are in power for a long time. Sebastian Jungkunz and his colleagues had a paper on this, where it shows that these scales predict support really well when populists are in opposition, but once they hold on to power for a long time, the predictive power of populist attitude scales for support for populists actually vanishes.

This is something that the field still needs to try to figure out better: How do we measure this once populists are in power for a bit longer? What you also see in this campaign for these elections is that those who are really appealing to anti-elitism in the sense of intra-ethnic competition are the opposition in Republika Srpska. They’re saying, we need justice back. We’ve seen them accuse Milorad Dodik of being a false patriot who’s just willing to sell national interests for personal gain, or just asking him to let the reins of power go so the people can finally live.

So, the opposition is really trying to mobilize this anti-elitism against Dodik and his party. What he tries to do is, like you said, shift this anti-elitism from intra-ethnic competition towards the High Representative, towards the Bosniak politicians, and present themselves, the SNSD, as really the savior, the defender of the interests of Republika Srpska.

Weakening SNSD Would Not Weaken Serb Nationalism

How important is it to separate dissatisfaction with SNSD and Dodik from attitudes toward Serb national autonomy itself? Much of the opposition in Republika Srpska challenges corruption, patronage, and personalized rule but remains strongly committed to Serb national interests. If SNSD were significantly weakened in these elections, would that represent a decline of ethnonational politics—or merely a change in who is considered the most credible representative of the Serb national project?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: I would say it’s the latter. If you look at recent examples, such as the death of Ratko Mladic, opposition politicians were present at memorial services, showing that they remain aligned with these ideas and the national project. Some opposition members also went to Belgrade for the commemoration and praised Ratko Mladic and everything that he has done.

So, while they are willing to challenge Dodik on issues such as corruption, the rule of law, and the use of his position for personal gain, they are not going to make a major shift in how they view the position of Republika Srpska or the project of Republika Srpska vis-à-vis the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

If SNSD is significantly weakened, as you say, it would be more a statement about the electorate no longer trusting Dodik with the national project and wanting to select someone else because of fears or dissatisfaction that he is willing to compromise or sell out vital parts of this national project for personal gain. You can sometimes see this in decisions regarding the non-recognition of the decisions of the Office of the High Representative, which were later reversed in exchange for the lifting of personal sanctions imposed by the US on Dodik.

That is what the opposition is trying to do: attack him on this basis. If the result is as such, it can certainly signal that people no longer trust him with the national project.

Bosnia’s Ethno-Populist Axes Are Almost Fused

Bosnia and Herzegovina contains several rival constructions of “the people”: the Serb people of Republika Srpska, a historically vulnerable Bosniak community closely associated with the defense of the Bosnian state, the Croat constituent people demanding “legitimate representation,” and a civic conception centered on citizens irrespective of ethnicity. Does this plurality make Bosnia a particularly distinctive case of populism, because political actors compete not only over who represents “the people” but over who the legitimate people actually are? 

Dr. Semir Dzebo: It’s a valuable case for all the work on ethno-populism, in particular, because there is no singular people. In the Constitution, it’s defined as three constituent peoples, and then we have others. As a result, the vertical and horizontal axes that I talked about earlier are almost fused and confused everywhere.

One good example of this is the concern that has existed for years within the Croat community over the issue of legitimate representation: whether the way elections are set up allows Bosniaks, because of their sheer larger numbers, to choose the Croat representative to the presidency, and whether this is what they call legitimate representation.

You see the Bosniak member, Bakir Izetbegović, who is the candidate for presidency, borrowing this a little bit and saying that if the member of Troika is elected to be part of the presidency, that will almost be like token Muslim representation, but that wouldn’t be legitimate.

Then, within the elections for the Croat member of the presidency, the opposition, instead of using anti-elitism, is saying, “Hey, you have the same people who have been running the country for a very long time, and we need change.”

So, it’s quite a distinctive case when it comes to who the people are. It’s really valuable for those of us who study ethno-populism to devote attention to the unique dynamics that we have in Bosnia.

Mladić’s Death Mobilized Pride, Grievance, Fear, and Anger

Ratko Mladić.
Ratko Mladić is depicted on a Serbian flag during a political rally in Belgrade, Serbia, on May 29, 2011. Mladić is a former Bosnian Serb military leader. Photo: Dreamstime.

The funeral and commemorative ceremonies for Ratko Mladić appear to have reactivated sharply divergent memories of the 1992–95 war. What emotions and forms of political mobilization did they generate among Serbs, Bosniaks, and Croats? From a populism perspective, did political actors use these ceremonies to reinforce boundaries between “our people” and rival communities or elites, revive narratives of victimhood and betrayal, and frame contemporary conflicts as continuations of unresolved wartime struggles?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: Reactions were obviously different. Among Serbs in Republika Srpska, the official reaction, as well as the reaction by most of the opposition, was, in a way, one of pride, but also of mourning and grievance. There were tribute gatherings across the cities and across the entity, including in Srebrenica itself. Certain politicians were trying to present his imprisonment as suffering endured by the entirety of the Serb people. The resulting events related to it in Serbia were intended to send the message that Serbia and Republika Srpska are as one.

Obviously, for Bosniaks, the emotions were quite different. They were ones of humiliation, fear, and anger. Some of the events, like at the football game, when the fans of Crvena zvezda at the Belgrade Stadium had a banner saying, “Pravac Potočari (Straight to Potočari),” which is an infamous saying by Ratko Mladić, were like a clear invocation of genocide. So, there has also been a lot of mobilization on the part of ordinary people trying to report these to the relevant authorities in order to deal with the rise of genocide-denial sentiment through potentially legal channels.

Bosniak Outbidding Takes the Form of Defending the State

The Bosniak political field is itself fragmented between national-conservative, social-democratic, liberal, and civic currents. Can Bosniak political fragmentation weaken ethnonational polarization by preventing one actor from monopolizing national representation, or does electoral competition instead create incentives for rival parties to demonstrate that they are the more credible defenders of Bosnia, Bosniak security, and the integrity of the state?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: Yes, there’s a good side to this fragmentation, and that is democratic accountability. Because there are multiple legitimate options, there’s a way for the electorate to hold those in power accountable and vote them out once they’re not happy with their performance. But outbidding still happens. In particular, it depends on the level of perceived danger to the state and to the existence of Bosniaks within it.

So, let’s say Bakir Izetbegović has been saying that we might not have a country if, again, Troika and Denis Bećirović are elected to power, and that governing with SNSD and HDZ BiH is really a humiliation. Again, it’s like this populist logic: you cannot really compromise on this; otherwise, you’re selling out the people.

I think everything that’s happened with Dodik also gave Troika an opportunity to try to act as defenders of the nation and maybe make some moves that would make them appear tougher when it comes to matters of security and inter-ethnic relations.

But there is also restraint. For example, I’ve read some analysis of the elections saying that it’s actually been quite subdued, that it’s been unusually quiet when it comes to the elections for the Bosniak presidency. I think Bećirović has said that he doesn’t want to campaign on quarrelsome politics. He said he wants to focus on jobs and crime.

So, one thing that’s different, obviously, is that when it comes to Bosniak outbidding, it takes the form of trying to defend the state. But when it comes to outbidding in the case of Republika Srpska, it goes into the realm of separatism.

The Croat Representation Grievance Is Very Real

A comparable tension exists around Croat demands for “legitimate representation.” Supporters see collective representation as necessary to prevent a numerically larger community from determining who represents Croats, while critics fear that further institutionalizing such principles would deepen ethnic territorialization. Is this ultimately a conflict between two democratic logics—individual political equality and collective national representation—and has the Dayton framework reached the limits of its ability to reconcile them?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: It is really a conflict between two democratic logics. From the standpoint of the Croats in Bosnia, their idea is that the representative of the people in the presidency should be chosen by them. If it’s the Croat representative, it should be chosen only by Croats. Obviously, the Dayton Agreement has different prescriptions, and it’s written into the Constitution that what happens is one person, one vote. So, everyone living in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina has the right to choose whom they want to vote for.

The ruling in the case of Sejdić-Finci has pushed more towards this idea of individual equality, where they’re more sympathetic towards the first option, while the Constitutional Court has a different idea of what the decision should be. The grievance in the case of the Croat community is very real because Željko Komšić won the seat four times, each time with a substantial amount of non-Croat support. The discourse on it is still very much the same.

Bosnia Is More Ethno-Populist than Religiously Populist

Religion in Bosnia is often intertwined with national identity rather than operating as a wholly independent ideological cleavage: Islam with Bosniak identity, Serbian Orthodoxy with Serb identity, and Catholicism with Croat identity. Would you therefore characterize Bosnia as a case of religious populism, or is it more accurate to speak of ethnonational populism in which religious institutions, symbols, sacred geography, and memories of collective suffering provide legitimacy and emotional reinforcement to political projects whose primary logic remains national?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: I think it’s the latter. It’s more about ethno-national populism. I don’t think there’s much there in terms of sacred reinforcement along religious lines. Because of the nature of how ethnicity works in Bosnia in terms of identity, and because it’s a bit fused with religion, it works as this boundary marker of where one belongs or is supposed to belong. But I don’t see much religious doctrine infused into the way populism or ethno-populism works.

Economic Support Is Far More Popular than Territorial Revision

US Dollar
Photo: Mar Tas / Dreamstime.

Your work on kin-state politics in Serbia finds that nationalist appeals can increase support for cultural and economic assistance to co-ethnics abroad, while public resistance to more aggressive territorial revision remains considerably more robust. What does this tell us about Serbia’s relationship with Republika Srpska? Should we distinguish carefully between popular support in Serbia for protecting or assisting Bosnian Serbs and actual public willingness to endorse secession, territorial revision, or destabilizing intervention?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: What it tells us is that, when it comes to matters of irredentism, there are two very different sides to it. One is assistance in terms of economic and cultural support, and what I found is that people are much more willing to support those in the first place. They can also be convinced to either increase or decrease their support through rather minimal framing.

If you frame it as support being costly—that those are funds we could invest here at home in Serbia—then they will decrease their support. If you convince them that there is this duty to support their ethnic brethren, their ethnic kin in Bosnia, then you can convince them to increase their support.

But when you start talking about changing borders, which would likely result in conflict, people will, as a baseline, be less likely to support that. You are also less likely to convince them to either increase or decrease their support, no matter how you try to frame it.

It means that there is really a limit to how much you can engage in this irredentism, and that as long as it’s economic or cultural, you can work with that, you can increase it if you wish to, and you can try to mobilize support for it. But changing borders is really just not something that people will change their minds about, and it does not seem to be something that is as popular as economic and cultural support.

Kin-State Engagement Must Be Transparent and Neutral

More broadly, how should we distinguish legitimate kin-state engagement from political interference in Bosnia’s elections? Serbia and Croatia have obvious constitutional, ethnic, and historical connections to Bosnian Serbs and Croats, while Russia, Turkey, Hungary, the European Union, and the United States possess very different political, strategic, religious, and economic interests. At what point does diplomatic, cultural, religious, financial, or media engagement cease to be ordinary external influence and begin to distort domestic democratic competition?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: What needs to happen, not just in the case of Bosnia, but also anywhere where there is this ethnic kin element of states having ethnic kin abroad, is that, according to the recommendations of the 2001 Venice Commission report on kin-states and the OSCE prescriptions, any engagement of states with their ethnic kin abroad should, first of all, be transparent in terms of the fact that it is occurring.

It should, in the best-case scenario, be channeled through the institutions of the host state, but if that’s not the case, at least the host state institutions should be made well aware of it. Then, it should not be used for the purposes of mobilizing voters, which we often find to be the case, but it should really be aimed at communities at large.

It shouldn’t be timed to the electoral calendar, but should really be sustained long-term support and engagement. And lastly, it should be neutral to the constitutional order of what we call the host state, where the ethnic kin lives.

If these conditions are not satisfied, then you tend to have friction, which can also result in a worsening of the situation of the co-ethnics that live within the host state.

International Inconsistency Feeds Secessionist Opportunities

Foreign influence is frequently narrated through the same populist vocabulary as domestic conflict: external actors can be represented either as protectors of a threatened community or as illegitimate elites overriding popular sovereignty. In Republika Srpska in particular, opposition to the Office of the High Representative and international intervention has become integral to political mobilization. Does international involvement unintentionally strengthen populist secessionism by allowing domestic elites to present constitutional constraints as foreign domination?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: I talked about it quite a bit in the first part of our interview. It really gives a convenient target for Dodik. For example, one of the things related to the elections now is that these are going to be the first elections with the introduction of new election technology and machines. What is supposed to be a technical safeguard against fraud, Dodik is calling the will of unelected foreigners who are trying to impose this technology for the purposes of potentially defrauding the election.

It’s a very convenient target, and throughout his career, he has always targeted the Office of the High Representative, the previous US administration’s ambassador, the US Embassy, and the other European embassies. But I don’t think that this international involvement really causes secessionism. There are all of these other domestic motivations that translate into support for secession. Even if international involvement feeds or gives potential targets for anti-elitism, we also see from this that anti-elitism doesn’t really translate into support for secession.

What, in the case of Bosnia, feeds secession is the opening of potential opportunities to advance secessionist causes because of the inconsistency of the international actors in Bosnia. We have the former High Representative announcing his resignation, and then there’s a bit of disagreement over who the new High Representative is going to be. There might be changing opinions on the mandate of the High Representative in Washington, D.C., as opposed to the opinions in the EU.

So, the inconsistency, the disagreement within the international community, is providing these openings for those who might favor secession in Republika Srpska to try to advance it a bit more, but not involvement per se.

Bosnia Is Highly Vulnerable to Disinformation

Illustration: Shutterstock / Skorzewiak.

Information politics seems especially important in this election. ODIHR is explicitly monitoring social-media campaigning as well as foreign and domestic misinformation, disinformation, and interference. In a society where media spaces are already fragmented along political, territorial, and ethnonational lines, how vulnerable is Bosnia and Herzegovina to coordinated information campaigns? And is their principal danger that they persuade citizens of entirely new ideas, or that they intensify pre-existing fears, historical grievances, and perceptions of ethnic threat?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: Structurally, when it comes to disinformation, Bosnia is very vulnerable. The media space is very fragmented, and there is also a wide reach of media from Serbia and Croatia. A lot of people also get their information from Facebook. There’s been great work done by people at organizations like Istinomjer and Raskrinkavanje, who have documented bot networks and Facebook pages that have been used to smear the opposition and politicians, as well as fabricated posts and a lot of AI-generated content.

Polarization is omnipresent, with ethnic polarization also omnipresent in the coverage of the news, and I don’t think the current fines for any misuse of media are really meaningful. I also don’t think that there’s any danger that it’s going to convert people who weren’t nationalists into nationalists, but there is a danger that it’s just going to amplify nationalist sentiment among those who were already predisposed to it.

One particular danger that I talked about just a while ago is the denial of results. Dodik has already planted the seeds with his comments on the new technology—that the international community is doing it so they could defraud SNSD and him, and that it’s a Western tool of fraud, as he calls it. The danger is that, through the media that is co-opted by SNSD, there’s going to be a rejection of the results, or some of it happening even in advance, whatever the results turn out to be.

The Challenge Is Separating Populism from Antagonism

You have also worked on computational approaches to identifying populist discourse, including research suggesting that large language models can detect context-sensitive people-versus-elite framing with accuracy approaching expert human coding. Could such tools help us map the 2026 Bosnian campaign across Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian language environments—identifying when ordinary nationalism becomes populist, when religious or historical symbolism is mobilized, and how narratives travel between domestic political actors and external information ecosystems? What methodological cautions would be necessary in such a deeply context-dependent political setting?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: It’s a good question. Having worked in this area, there’s promise there, but I would still say that, for a place as complicated as Bosnia, especially when it comes to distinguishing all of the things that you said from one another, I don’t think we are that close to doing all of it.

But some of the work that I’ve done with my colleagues in Team Populism has really managed to use large language models to replicate the work of human coders when it comes to recognizing populism. As part of all of the testing that we have done, some of it included speeches from Montenegro in Montenegrin, and the results there were really encouraging. Obviously, that would also work in the case of Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian texts.

One of the cautions that I had from similar work on these computational approaches is that it’s sometimes hard to separate populism from just antagonism. The hostility between ethnic groups is everywhere, but not all of it has these elements of populism, like people-centrism, anti-elitism, and Manicheanism. So that would be my primary concern. It’s also about some of the contextual elements—the extent to which those would work.

One other thing that we should try doing is looking at how a lot of the campaign has moved on to digital things like songs, video, and symbols. So, for scholars of populism who work on those things, that would be another interesting thing to look at.

Bosnia Lives in Stable Instability

And finally, Dr. Dzebo, thirty-one years after Dayton, is Bosnia and Herzegovina approaching a point at which the original peace-making consensus can no longer provide a sustainable democratic equilibrium? Dayton successfully institutionalized safeguards against domination, but it also entrenched ethnicity as a central principle of political representation. Looking beyond October 4, do you see a plausible path toward a renewed constitutional settlement that preserves collective security while expanding civic equality and cross-ethnic political competition—or is the more likely trajectory a continued fragmentation in which competing national communities increasingly interpret sovereignty, democracy, and even the legitimacy of the state itself in incompatible ways?

Dr. Semir Dzebo: Hard question. I’ve heard someone once say that the best compromise is the one that leaves everybody unhappy, or at least a peace settlement. In a way, that’s the case in Bosnia, in that it’s a peace settlement that is also supposed to work as a democratic constitution. It has really accomplished the first task. It has not really been great at the second task.

We have this stable instability in Bosnia. There’s no active armed conflict, but there’s always, underneath the surface, some inter-ethnic tension. And also, the Dayton Agreement, the way it was framed, has created this self-reinforcing loop. The institutions, because they’re set up in a way that makes ethnicity the primary political identity, strengthen all these things that I found to also be feeding into secessionism in Republika Srpska, like in-group bias, which I found to be the strongest predictor of support for secession.

I don’t think we’re going to have, anytime soon, some grand settlement, but we’re also not going to have, at least in my opinion, dissolution. The most plausible path is one of incremental moves towards EU accession. Implementing the Strasbourg judgments would be a plausible path forward. Trying to strengthen state capacity through the reform agenda would be a plausible path forward.

In the slightly longer term, the priority should also be ending segregated schooling, because that would produce very positive societal benefits, as well as trying to add some electoral incentives that would emphasize winning votes across communities. Those incremental steps would have a very positive effect on the state of politics in the country.

One thing that I found in my paper on secessionism and populism is economic grievance. So I said in-group bias was the strongest predictor. Economic grievance was the second strongest driver of secessionist sentiment. And this really gives reason for some cautious optimism, because material conditions can change, in a way, more easily than all of the prescriptions of Dayton and the Constitution.

Trying to address the fact that more than half of young people are interested in leaving the country is really a pressing problem, and trying to improve economic conditions should be the priority of both domestic politicians and the international community. That has the potential to have very positive knock-on effects for societal cohesion and interethnic dynamics.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Underground platinum and palladium mining operations and machinery in Johannesburg.

Green Colonialism or Green Sovereignty? Africa’s Critical Minerals and the Politics of the Energy Transition

Africa’s centrality to the global energy transition rests increasingly on its vast reserves of critical minerals, yet mineral abundance alone does not guarantee developmental sovereignty. Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja’s commentary argues that the key challenge is whether African states remain low-value extractive peripheries or convert geological advantage into industrial capacity, technological learning, regional value chains, ecological accountability, and democratic bargaining power. It develops the concept of transition sovereignty to capture the ability of resource-rich societies to shape extraction, processing, governance, knowledge, finance, and value distribution on their own terms. Rather than rejecting foreign investment, the article calls for strategic interdependence, stronger regionalism, and accountable institutions capable of ensuring that decarbonization produces not only cleaner technologies, but also more equitable and developmentally transformative outcomes for African societies.

By Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja

The global energy transition is frequently framed as a clean break from the extractive political economy of fossil fuels. But decarbonization technologies such as digital infrastructure, electricity grids, electric vehicles, batteries, and wind turbines rely on another extractive frontier—critical minerals. Strategic materials such as lithium, cobalt, copper, manganese, graphite, and rare earth elements are emerging as essential materials for a low-carbon economy. In Africa, this transition is dominated, yet its importance is underutilized: the continent provides substantial amounts of minerals needed by clean-technology industries. Still, it receives only a small share of the value (IEA, 2025). The big question is not whether Africa will provide the green transition, but what it will look like and whether African societies have the political, industrial, and technological capacity to define its terms.

This is different from green colonialism and what this commentary calls transition sovereignty. Green colonialism is not just the extraction of African minerals by foreign companies. It describes a larger political-economic trend that is creating a material geography of global decarbonization where the rents of processing, technological control, knowledge, finance, and supply chains lie disproportionately elsewhere, particularly in Africa. The language of the commodity shifts, from oil to coal, lithium to cobalt and copper—but so does the underlying asymmetry. The threat is not the exclusion of Africa from the green transition. It is that Africa will be represented on conditions that mirror its historical role as a low-value exporter of ecological wealth.

A new yardstick exists for measuring Africa’s involvement: transition sovereignty. It means the ability of resource-rich societies to decide on the extraction, processing, governance and distribution of transition minerals, as well as to develop their own and regional skills and expertise in industry, technology, knowledge, financing and ecological regulation. It’s less restrictive than state ownership and less strict than local content rules. A country has transition sovereignty if mineral wealth increases its bargaining power, builds productive capacity, benefits society, safeguards ecological and community interests, and lets African actors shape the organization of global green value chains. The issue is not only who owns the mine, but who decides and has the power to make the decisions and technologies that start underground and end up at the surface of the decarbonization technologies.

Beyond Resource Control: Building Productive and Technological Capacity

But Africa is starting to challenge the conditions of the transition. The African Union’s Green Minerals Strategy focuses on value addition at source, regional industrialization, climate resilience, and integrated value chains, rather than relying on raw mineral exports (African Union, 2025). National export controls also indicate a clear direction of travel. Since 2023, Africa has implemented at least 14 measures to limit the export of raw or semi-processed minerals, and in February 2026, Zimbabwe banned the export of all raw minerals and lithium concentrates to encourage in-country beneficiation and accountability (Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 2026; Reuters, 2026a). Such measures cannot be idealized as definitions of sovereignty. They are better understood as efforts to renegotiate where value exits African economies.

Zimbabwe provides a revealing illustration of both the possibilities and limits of resource sovereignty. The action was directly tied to in-country value addition, accountability and beneficiation (Reuters, 2026a) in its February 2026 suspension of exports of raw minerals and lithium concentrates. This policy reflects a well-known model in which upstream mining companies in Africa export concentrates, and downstream processing and value-added manufacturing occur elsewhere. But restricting exports is just the first step. An export ban can generate ‘protected extraction without transformative industrialization’ without reliable electricity, transport, finance, processing technologies, skilled labor, industrial demand and credible institutions. The real question is: Does export restraint build productive capabilities, or does it merely shift rents at the mine gate?

Thus, the Zimbabwean example illustrates an overarching lesson in the theory of transition sovereignty: control of the commodity is not enough if it is not matched by control over the capabilities attached to it. Industrialization does not need to be confined within the national boundaries. It needs to develop, process, create, capitalize, and integrate mineral production resources into local economies. The IEA sees Africa’s opportunity in spreading the transition’s economic value across the global value chain, because its economic value is distributed unevenly along the chain (IEA, 2025). In this sense, sovereignty is not realized by stopping the extraction; it is realized by transforming a geological advantage into a sustainable productive capacity.

Knowledge Sovereignty and the Regionalization of Green Value Chains

Another aspect of the issue is related to knowledge sovereignty, as demonstrated in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In September 2026, the Congolese government stepped up its efforts to centralize geological information by creating a national geological databank, along with new aerial surveys and digital mapping. The goal is to strengthen state control, reduce the information imbalance, and boost the state’s negotiating leverage in mining deals (Reuters, 2026b). This is important because mineral sovereignty is also epistemic (knowledge-based). Information on the location, quality, access, and strategic value of deposits shapes investment, licensing, negotiation, and long-term planning. Formal ownership of mineral deposits can coexist with informational dependency, as long as geological intelligence, technical standards, and data infrastructures are externally dominated.

The DRC case also reminds us to see transition sovereignty beyond the state. If enhancing the bargaining power of government is to produce “public value,” “transparency” in contracts, “environmental accountability,” and “meaningful benefits” to “communities” and “workers,” then sovereignty is becoming “developmental.” It’s not just a matter of African States regaining control from foreign companies. It is the extent to which mineral control is institutionalized in institutions capable of making mineral governance socially accountable. Otherwise, the language of sovereignty can be used to justify a transfer of control from an outside entity to domestic elites, without changing who gets the benefits and who bears the costs.

The DRC-Zambia battery and electric-vehicle project provides a better regional prospect. Instead of treating copper and cobalt as a commodity that must leave the region before higher-value use can begin, the two nations have worked to develop a cross-border value-chain model that includes mineral processing, battery production, and industrial capabilities. The UN Economic Commission for Africa and other regional institutions have technically supported the activity. In 2025, measures were taken to strengthen engagement by firms, financial institutions, and other actors in the battery and electric-vehicle value chain. This is not limited to battery production. It shows how mineral-rich countries can be viewed as hubs of regional industrial coordination, not just sources of raw materials being bid for by foreign extractors.

Regionalism matters because many constraints to African benefaction are too great for individual states to overcome alone. Processing plants need stable energy, transport tie-ups, technical expertise, markets, capital, and volume. A regional strategy can then transform uncoordinated mineral resources into coordinated industrial systems. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) initiative on environmentally and socially responsible energy-transition mineral value chains also aims to keep mineral wealth within the region and encourage livelihoods and industrialization in several southern African nations (UNECA, 2026). This requires a multi-level understanding of transition sovereignty at the national, regional, and continental levels.

Strategic Interdependence: Partnerships on Whose Terms?

But the new mineral race reveals a more profound paradox. African minerals are now being talked about in terms of partnership, supply-chain security and strategic cooperation with powers, many of them global, who seek them out. The US, EU and China have legitimate reasons to acquire access to critical minerals. For instance, in September 2026, the US government announced its support for developing critical mineral processing in Kenya, including the proposed development of the Mrima Hill resource, while stressing the importance of local processing and value-added production (Reuters, 2026c). These partnerships could be real opportunities. Diversifying external partners is not sovereignty. African countries may expand the number of buyers of their products but not substantially alter the nature of their political economy if they switch from one big buyer to a few smaller ones and they still export their low-value resources.

That is why the question “with whom?” has to be asked alongside a deeper question: “with whom for?” or “with whom on whose terms?” Colonial elements in external capital, technology, and markets are not the same. The developmental consequences relate to bargaining power, institutional design, ownership structures, local linkages, environmental protection, and rent distribution. Hence, the target should not be autarky or opposition to foreign investment. Strategic interdependence means the ability to involve global partners without giving up control over the developmental paths of mineral societies.

From Mineral Abundance to Developmental Sovereignty

The politics of critical minerals also reveal the boundaries of a technologically driven view of decarbonization. A battery can have a range of emissions during its use, whereas its material components can include land dispossession, unsafe mining practices, water stress, labor exploitation, or ecological degradation. Thus, the environmental legality of green technologies cannot be judged solely by their carbon performance. This transition is likely to result in a “cleaner” global economy, but at the cost of African communities in the mining sector. The political feasibility of green development lies in jointly considering the costs of extraction and the benefits of decarbonization.

This will expand to include community and labor. Foreign ownership does not inevitably mean environmental damage, and state ownership does not necessarily mean that it is socially just. The key is whether the rights of people living and working around the mineral frontiers are meaningful and include access to information, voice, and benefits of extraction. Artisanal and small-scale miners are important in this context. Formalization cannot be used to criminalize informal miners; it should provide avenues to formalize their lives, safety, skills, and value addition. Otherwise, the switch could perpetuate the traditional scenario where people near the source of value bear the risk of extraction, while value is generated further up the chain.

The strategic question for Africa is then no longer whether to accept or reject the green transition, but rather how to do so. It’s a choice between engaging in it as an extractive periphery and as an industrial, technological, and political actor. The latter requires reliable and affordable energy, transport infrastructure, mineral-processing capacity, regional markets, skills, research and development, transparent contracts, accountable institutions, and effective protections for communities and workers. It also demands that governments differentiate between resource nationalism and transformation. National control may be a tool for development, but it is not development.

Decarbonization on Africa’s Terms

The green colonialism and transition sovereignty binary should thus be viewed as a spectrum of political-economic options. An African country can boost state bargaining power without excluding communities from the benefits; it can boost local processing but remain highly technology-dependent; or it can attract several foreign investors but keep exporting the bulk of the value contribution of its minerals. On the other hand, through mineral policy, a country can pursue regional industrialization, develop its own capacities and skills, improve ecological governance, and increase democratic involvement. The shift is therefore not necessarily green, just, sovereign, or developmental. Its character is being politically constructed.

This is therefore a both-and situation for the developing critical-mineral economy. Africa’s strategic position, which it could use to renegotiate its role in global geopolitics, will not create sovereignty if it is merely geologically abundant. The important question is whether mineral extraction becomes a basis for industrial potential, technological learning, fiscal independence, ecological responsibility, and democratic negotiating strength. The question is no longer just whether the world can decarbonize, but how. It’s about who has the power to decide, who receives the value created along the chain, who pays the environmental and social costs, and who controls the material foundations of decarbonization.

If Africa is the source of the mines, then others are the source of the manufacture, and the color of colonialism can vary without its political economy changing. The energy transition may be more than just a change in energy systems if Africa’s mineral wealth is translated into regional industrial capability, technological capability, ecological responsibility, and democratic bargaining power. It may be a chance to reimagine Africa’s economics in the international arena. This is the true measure of transition sovereignty—whether Africa provides the green transition or whether Africa can help regulate the transition.


 

References

Africa Center for Strategic Studies. (2026). Reciprocal and resilient mineral supply chains: Lessons from the Nacala Corridor. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mineral-supply-chains-nacala-corridor/

African Union. (2025). Africa’s Green Minerals Strategy (AGMS). African Union Commission.https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/44539-doc-AGMS_Final_doc.pdf

International Energy Agency. (2025). Stepping up the value chain in Africa. IEA, Paris.https://www.iea.org/reports/stepping-up-the-value-chain-in-africa

Reuters. (2026a, February 25). “Zimbabwe bans exports of all raw minerals and lithium concentrates, cites malpractices.” https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/zimbabwe-bans-exports-all-raw-minerals-lithium-concentrates-2026-02-25/

Reuters. (2026b, September 8). “Congo extends state control over mining with bid to lock down geological data.” https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/congo-extends-state-control-over-mining-with-bid-lock-down-geological-data-2026-09-08/

Reuters. (2026c, September 9). “US says it will help develop Kenya’s critical minerals processing.” https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/us-says-it-will-help-develop-kenyas-critical-minerals-processing-2026-09-09/

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2024, April 15). “Zambia and DRC to implement an innovative transboundary battery and electric vehicle Special Economic Zone.” https://www.uneca.org/stories/zambia-and-drc-to-implement-an-innovative-transboundary-battery-and-electric-vehicle-special

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2025, September 11). “ECA capacitates micro, small and medium enterprises in DRC and Zambia to tap battery and electric vehicle value chain opportunities.” https://www.uneca.org/stories/eca-capacitates-micro-small-and-medium-enterprises-in-drc-and-zambia-to-tap-battery-and

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa. (2026, June 2). “SADC launches landmark initiative to build sustainable energy transition mineral value chains.” https://www.uneca.org/stories/sadc-launches-landmark-initiative-to-build-sustainable-energy-transition-mineral-value

Imran Bayoumi is Deputy Director and Resident Fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. From 2024 to 2025, he served as a policy advisor at the US Department of Defense.

Imran Bayoumi: The Decline of Multilateralism Rewards Both Populism and Authoritarian Powers

In this interview, Imran Bayoumi examines how the weakening of multilateral institutions and the rise of transactional diplomacy are reshaping global power in ways that often favor authoritarian and populist governments. He argues that authoritarian middle powers benefit from greater flexibility to hedge between competing blocs, while democracies remain constrained by alliances, institutions, and domestic accountability. Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan emerges as a key example: Ankara has “managed to play and interact with both realms at the same time,” using populist nationalism to present strategic balancing as the defense of national interests. Bayoumi also warns that weakening Western cohesion benefits revisionist powers, while calling for a “retooled American leadership” capable of rebuilding democratic cooperation in a more fragmented international order.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli*

In an era of intensifying geopolitical fragmentation, weakening multilateral institutions, and increasingly transactional diplomacy, authoritarian and populist governments may find themselves unusually well positioned to exploit the emerging international disorder. In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Imran Bayoumi, Deputy Director and Resident Fellow with the GeoStrategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, examines how the erosion of the rules-based international order is altering the balance between democratic constraints and authoritarian flexibility. His central argument is not that autocracies are inherently stronger, but that a fragmented system can reward governments able to hedge between competing powers, bypass institutional constraints, and personalize foreign policy. As Bayoumi puts it, authoritarian middle powers “have experience with hedging” and are less constrained by the institutions and alliances that shape the choices of democratic states. 

The decline of multilateralism is particularly consequential because it lowers the costs of defying established rules. According to Bayoumi, states increasingly feel comfortable “bypassing multilateral bodies,” ignoring treaties and challenging norms because the prospect of meaningful punishment has diminished. Yet he cautions against reducing this transformation simply to populism: “It’s a mix of both things: populism and power.” At the same time, the personalization of diplomacy associated with contemporary populist politics is becoming increasingly significant, as foreign policy becomes more closely tied to leaders themselves rather than institutions and professional bureaucracies. 

Turkey provides one of the interview’s clearest illustrations of this emerging geopolitical flexibility. Still embedded in NATO and Western institutions, Turkey under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has simultaneously cultivated relations across competing geopolitical blocs. Bayoumi describes Turkey as a country that has “managed to play and interact with both realms at the same time.” Populist nationalism, he argues, has been crucial to legitimizing this strategy domestically: “Erdogan has been able to sell this balancing strategy as a way of being able to secure Turkey’s interests first.” The willingness to purchase Russian air-defense systems while remaining within NATO exemplifies how Ankara combines alliance membership with strategic hedging. 

More broadly, Bayoumi warns that weakening Western alliances and institutional cohesion ultimately benefits revisionist authoritarian powers. “Every action that undermines the strong ties between the United States and its allies is a benefit for them,” he argues, pointing to the growing cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Yet he rejects the idea that authoritarian ascendancy is inevitable. Instead, he calls for “some sort of retooled American leadership” capable of accommodating the growing autonomy of middle powers while rebuilding institutions and democratic cooperation. The challenge, therefore, is not simply to restore the old international order, but to construct a more resilient one capable of reconciling democratic values, strategic power, and an increasingly multipolar world.

Here is our interview with Imran Bayoumi, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Authoritarian Middle Powers Are Better Equipped to Hedge

Figure from the V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026.
Figure from the V-Dem Institute Democracy Report 2026.

Mr. Bayoumi, welcome! In “Why Today’s Global Disorder Rewards Authoritarians,” you argue that autocratic middle powers are particularly well placed to benefit from today’s fragmented international system because they can hedge between larger powers and pursue highly transactional relationships. What is it specifically about authoritarian government that gives these countries greater room for maneuver than democratic middle powers? Could democratic states adopt similar strategies without weakening their democratic principles?

Imran Bayoumi: In the article, I lay out two factors that I’ve identified. The first is that these autocratic middle powers have experience with hedging. They’ve balanced between different blocs of great powers for a lot longer than these democratic middle powers are now trying to. They’re not constrained by these broader institutions and alliances that are now seeming more and more like a burden.

The second factor is that they are adept at these kinds of personalist politics that we’ve seen really dominate the second Trump administration and the broader political deal-making space. You saw Qatar donate the Boeing 747 for the new Air Force One at the start of the second Trump administration. In terms of hedging, I talk about it in the article, but Kazakhstan, for example, has signed up to both China and Washington’s flagship AI programs.

Therefore, these states are really better in this kind of disruption. They know how to gain influence in ways that democratic states would struggle with. If a democratic state was to donate a jumbo jet, there would probably be some sort of parliamentary pushback, discussions in the media, and potential repercussions that I don’t think authoritarians would be subject to.

So, can democratic states adopt these traits? Sure, it’s just harder for them to do so. There’s nothing stopping them from having a more personalist foreign policy. Nothing’s stopping them from hedging, but they face constraints. I don’t think their populations may want that. It’s harder to leave treaties if you have to have a parliament approve that. I think norms are a big thing, too. I can’t imagine that the Canadian public, for example, would be happy if Prime Minister Carney donated a large amount of military equipment to the United States in exchange for a trade deal. So, there’s nothing in theory stopping them, but the institutions and norms that they adhere to are a real limit.

Alliances Remain an Asset, but New Risks Are Emerging

You suggest that democratic middle powers such as Canada, Australia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom are constrained partly because their economies and security systems were deeply integrated into the US-led postwar order. By contrast, authoritarian middle powers were often less integrated into that system. Has the very institutional dependence that once protected democracies now become a strategic weakness in a more unstable world?

Imran Bayoumi: I’m not sure I would say that it’s a weakness. I don’t think the NATO alliance is a weakness. That’s still the most successful alliance in history, and there’s still great value to states being part of it, regardless of how disruptive and unpredictable they might see Washington as acting.

That being said, it also exposes them to new risks. I think you’ve seen the United States talk about annexing Greenland, making Canada the 51st state, putting kind of ad hoc tariffs in place, and all of this really weakens the strength of those institutions. So, I wouldn’t go so far as to say being part of them is a weakness right now, but it’s certainly a factor that undermines the security, economic interests, and sovereignty of some of these states in the current moment.

If we were really to see full-out great power war, and NATO was attacked and responded, Article 5 was invoked, I don’t think any of these states would see that as a weakness. They would see the alliance as a great benefit. So, these institutions still have great potential and promise. The problem is that we’re actively undermining them, and we need to change that course.

Bilateral Diplomacy Thrives as Institutional Constraints Weaken

Populist leaders often present international institutions, treaties, courts, and alliances as restrictions imposed by distant elites on national sovereignty. Does the weakening of the rules-based international order therefore create a particularly favorable environment not only for authoritarian governments but also for populist leaders who prefer bilateral deals and leader-to-leader diplomacy over multilateral institutions?

Imran Bayoumi: I think the current moment does. When we saw the rules-based international order with bodies like the UN supported by the US and backed by other countries, there were real costs to defying these major institutions and going against global norms. The threat of sanctions was real, as were the loss of market access and diplomatic isolation. What we’ve seen is that now states of all sizes feel more comfortable bypassing multilateral bodies to get action, ignoring treaties, ignoring what they previously signed, and maybe bucking norms because they think that the threat or possible punishment is lesser. There’s no cost associated with their revisionist actions. These bilateral deals are peaking because of that.

The stronger state can now enforce a deal that it wants and get its outcome. But, there are a few interesting threads also to pick up. One is that even though these multilateral institutions maybe are not as strong, the value and the brand of them are still strong. We still see populist autocratic leaders traveling to the UN every September to make a speech. So, there’s still value in that brand and in that address. Maybe the institution is not strong, but the broader value is and could be resurrected.

I touched on this earlier, but to return to your original question, I’m not sure it favors populist leaders so much as actors with power. Looking back, even before the Trump administration, if the United States pursued a bilateral deal with a less powerful populist leader, it would still be able to dictate the terms of that deal largely because of its relative power. So, it’s a mix of both things: populism and power.

Populism Is Accelerating the Personalization of Foreign Policy

Photo: Shutterstock.

Your argument focuses heavily on increasingly personalized and transactional diplomacy. This also seems characteristic of populist politics, where leaders frequently claim that personal strength and negotiating skill can replace institutions and professional bureaucracies. Do you see a connection between the global rise of populism and the wider shift from institutional diplomacy toward personalized diplomacy?

Imran Bayoumi: Yes, similar to my previous answer, that as populism rises and the foreign policy of countries increasingly becomes about the personalities of those leaders themselves, you do start to see this trend. People start to meet their partners where they are. I think there are some good examples here. King Charles gifted President Trump a bell from a naval submarine that bore his name. We’re even starting to see democracies meet this kind of populist trend. But I’d go back to the power thing. I think power really underpins this system. So, I’m not sure that personal strength and negotiating skill are any better than multilateral institutions if you’re still negotiating, arguing, or dealing with a more powerful state. Military and economic power are two constant underpinnings that exist regardless of the broader dynamic.

Democracies Still Face Constraints That Autocracies Escape

You write that autocratic governments are primarily concerned with regime survival rather than electoral accountability. But democratic populist governments can sometimes develop similar priorities by weakening courts, attacking independent media, politicizing the bureaucracy, and concentrating authority around the executive. Should we therefore think of the advantage you describe as belonging strictly to authoritarian regimes, or more broadly to highly centralized and personalized political systems?

Imran Bayoumi: I think it applies to both, but with the caveat that, in these still highly centralized systems that are maybe partially free democracies, the party can still lose power. If you look at Hungary, there was an election and there was a change in government.

I really tried to focus on autocratic states in my article, arguing that they don’t have to worry about these kinds of institutional checks and balances that highly centralized liberal democracies may have to worry about to a lesser extent, but that are still there. There’s still media, there are still courts, and there are still other ways that they can pressure the government.

Whereas in autocracies, they don’t have to worry about that. So, I think it applies to both, but there’s that caveat that it could change. Political systems change, and in these highly centralized, personalized systems, the media ecosystem, the justices, and the courts could be a vector for that change.

Washington Has Fully Embraced Personalized Foreign Policy

The Trump administration itself raises an important question for your argument. Trump has repeatedly criticized international organizations and alliances, emphasized personal relationships with foreign leaders, and favored transactional bargaining over traditional diplomatic institutions. To what extent has the United States under Trump begun to practice the kind of personalized foreign policy that you associate with authoritarian states?

Imran Bayoumi: Two things here. First, Washington has fully embraced this personalized approach to foreign policy. The diplomacy between President Trump and Kim Jong-un of North Korea during Trump’s first term is a good example. It involved exchanging letters and Trump addressing Kim Jong-un personally. I don’t think it was particularly successful, although it did result in a few summits. Tensions between the two countries remain high, but that kind of personalized diplomacy has clearly carried over into the second administration.

I would, however, push back somewhat on the idea that this approach is associated solely with authoritarian states. At the moment, authoritarian states may be better suited to handle it because they have more experience with this kind of diplomacy and know how to make it work. But over the longer term, they are unlikely to be the only states to practice or utilize personalist foreign policy.

Democratic Backsliding Could Carry Strategic Costs Abroad

Following from that, could there be an authoritarian dimension to the transformation of American foreign policy under Trump? I do not mean that the United States has simply become an authoritarian state, but rather whether the weakening of institutional constraints, the personalization of executive power, and the preference for loyalty and bilateral bargains are making American statecraft resemble some features traditionally associated with authoritarian governance.

Imran Bayoumi: The literature and public discourse around this topic are pretty clear. There is a very real risk of democratic backsliding in the United States, and there are concerns there. Ultimately, whatever US foreign policy looks like over the next decade, the next five years, or whatever timeframe you want to look at, there is a real risk that the kinds of factors you laid out—the personalization of executive power, the preference for blind loyalty, and bilateral deals—will weaken US foreign policy and national security writ large, rather than simply making the United States resemble an autocratic foreign policy.

I think the bigger challenge is not so much what it looks like, but what results it achieves for Washington and for American citizens. The risk is that it will produce a more dangerous world, one where we have more shaky, bilateral, ad hoc deals that are not built on these broad, treaty-bound alliances.

It would be a world where American interests are harder to define and therefore harder to defend, and where American power has lost some credibility. So, revisionist states feel more comfortable challenging it, undermining it, and acting against it. That’s a real challenge. How do we stop that? How do we change that? And what does a new, more powerful, newly designed American foreign policy look like to meet the challenges of the 21st century, deal with revisionist autocracies that are challenging Washington’s power, and also recognize the growing power of these smaller middle-power countries?

Fragmentation Rewards States That Can Move Faster and Hedge More Freely

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney attends a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy on Ukraine’s Independence Day in Kyiv, Ukraine on August 24, 2025. Photo: Vladyslav Musiienko / Dreamstime.

In “Don’t Fall for the Middle-Power Mirage,” you question Mark Carney’s hope that democratic middle powers can build an alternative multilateral order. Democratic states appear divided over how far they should distance themselves from Washington, while authoritarian middle powers can cooperate selectively with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, and regional powers at the same time. Does this mean that fragmentation itself structurally favors governments that are less committed to fixed alliances and common political values?

Imran Bayoumi: In the current moment, 100%. That article really talks about two factors. One is that democratic middle powers, even if they were to answer the call that Prime Minister Mark Carney laid out at the Davos World Economic Forum earlier this year, can’t agree on the approach to doing so. In that article, I talk about then-UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer and Mark Carney. The week after Carney’s speech, Starmer had a different approach. He said, we don’t have to choose; we can balance all sides, play all sides, something to that effect. So that’s the first challenge. Democratic middle powers are not even on the same page.

I think that, in this era of disruption and upheaval, countries that don’t have these long-standing institutional ties and alliances can play both sides. They’re more nimble and can move faster. It goes back to the other article we talked about, where their populations may not want leaders to stay committed to these institutions, or, if they do, the leaders can ignore the will of their population. So, they’re more comfortable making these deals that might invite media blowback.

They don’t necessarily have to get parliamentary approval, or, if they do, it could be rubber-stamped. So, they’re more nimble and can act in different ways. The challenge for them is that they still recognize that there’s value in alliances and in this broader dynamic. Even if you look at Canada, which under Carney is trying to advocate for this new kind of vision of the international system, it’s not about abandoning NATO or totally pulling out of NORAD, the binational command here.

Therefore, there’s still a recognition that alliances are valuable and that these kinds of treaty-bound obligations are strong for a reason. These bilateral deals may be a temporary boon, but I don’t think they should be read as an indication of long-term success.

Revisionism and Pragmatism Increasingly Coexist

You distinguish between authoritarian states that actively seek to revise the international order and those that simply exploit its weakening. But is “pragmatic opportunism” really politically neutral? When governments such as Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Kazakhstan benefit from weaker democratic norms, looser conditionality, and more transactional great-power competition, do they not also have an interest in preserving—and perhaps deepening—the erosion of the rules-based order, even if they do not openly seek to replace it?

Imran Bayoumi: This is a really important point. These states—their erosion, or actions contributing to the erosion, of the current international order—are a real risk. Going back to my previous answer, I don’t think they’re trying to build what comes next. There’s not a clearly defined broader international architecture that they’re building toward. They’re more taking advantage of the current disruption.

In the long-term, I don’t know what they will try to build. Even though they’re now preying on this disruption, it would be a mistake to say that they didn’t benefit in some way from the previous international order as well. So, even though Carney’s vision might be incredibly tough to achieve, he’s at least trying to figure out what comes next.

To your point, I think they have an interest in both sides. In some areas and sectors, they want to weaken the current international order and advance their own interests. On some topics, however, they want to strengthen it.

China, for example, is still very committed to this idea of international standard-setting when it comes to telecoms and, potentially, artificial intelligence. These are the broad multilateral structures, forums, and venues that we associate with the previous international order. But in other ways, China and other states are quite revisionist. They don’t want to cede sovereignty; they want to achieve their own goals.

So, I think it’s this balancing act, and part of this tension is a realization that there’s a real question of what comes next. You will have to build what comes next, and that might be harder than merely reacting to the current disruption.

Turkey Shows How Populist Nationalism Can Legitimize Geopolitical Hedging

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made the opening of the Natural Gas Pipeline (Turkstream) in Istanbul, Turkey on November 19, 2018.

Turkey seems to present an especially difficult case for your argument. It remains a NATO member and benefits from Western security and economic institutions, while under Erdogan it has also experienced severe democratic backsliding, increasing authoritarianism, and a highly personalized and populist foreign policy. Is Turkey effectively benefiting from both worlds—using its place inside the Western institutional order while simultaneously exploiting the strategic flexibility associated with authoritarian middle powers? And to what extent has populist nationalism enabled Erdogan to present this balancing strategy not as dependence or inconsistency, but as evidence of multi-directional foreign policy, sovereignty, and national strength?

Imran Bayoumi: Turkey’s a very interesting case, and it’s one of those countries that has really managed to play and interact with both realms at the same time. The most recent kind of development there, with President Trump talking about lifting sanctions on Turkey that he himself put in place in his first term, is really a testament to the kind of power of personalized diplomacy and the strides in relations that Turkey has developed with the Trump administration in this second term.

To the second part of your question, in terms of populist nationalism, I think that’s key. Erdogan has been able to sell this balancing strategy as a way of being able to secure Turkey’s interests first. If that means buying Russian air defense systems while also being part of NATO, that’s what it takes. But, it goes back to my earlier point, where these kinds of illiberal, partially free democracies that still have elections, these leaders are still susceptible at some stage. So, there’s still, even if it’s limited, kind of opposition media in and out of the country that can pressure these leaders, and that maybe be a weakness. Therefore, there’s also a recognition that they need to work with everyone or work to sell the message more so than true authoritarian states that may not even communicate these foreign policy decisions.

Turkey’s Dual Alignment Reflects Strategic Geography and Diplomatic Flexibility

The recently signed Mecca Joint Defense Agreement between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan seems to take this strategy a significant step further by creating a collective-defense arrangement among three important regional powers, while Turkey simultaneously remains inside NATO. Do you see the Mecca Pact as another example of Ankara hedging within an increasingly fragmented order, or does it represent something more consequential—the beginning of an alternative security architecture that could gradually reduce Turkey’s dependence on the Western alliance system? And what does Turkey’s ability to participate in both arrangements tell us about why today’s global disorder may particularly reward authoritarian or highly personalized middle powers?

Imran Bayoumi: I actually think the Mecca Pact is more about regional security. I don’t think it should be read as an attempt by Turkey, Pakistan, or Saudi Arabia to build a true international order alternative to the US-led alliance system, or to China or Russia. For these three countries, it reflects a recognition that the Middle East will remain markedly different after the conclusion of the Iran war, whenever that might be. They’ve seen that Iran may be weakened in some respects. Its economy has certainly taken a beating. The Supreme Leader was killed, but at the same time, it remains quite disruptive when it wants to be. It has control of the Strait of Hormuz and has launched attacks on a lot of the Gulf countries.

This is really about ensuring these countries’ own security in the region. You have Iran on one side, and then there’s also a recognition that the long-term presence of the United States in the region can no longer be guaranteed. No one knows what that will look like. It could be a substantial drawdown, and without the US there, there are all these other long-standing security threats that may emerge.

So, I see this pact more as strengthening the security of these three countries within the Middle East, within a volatile region that all three of them occupy. It’s a long-term bet that the region will remain unstable and that there’s value in having these alliances and partnerships.

The question with the Mecca Pact in particular is: how far does it go? What does it look like when a state is actually challenged? Is there an Article 5-style response, like you would see with NATO, where other nations commit troops and commit to fighting? Or is there just the provision of economic aid or military equipment, without necessarily joining the conflict with troops on the ground?

What Turkey’s ability to participate in both arrangements tells us is that Turkey has been able to play this system well. It understands that it occupies a geographically strategic and relevant location. It’s able to maintain ties and communications with key global players, and there’s recognition among the US and other NATO countries that it’s perhaps in their interest to have Turkey able to hold discussions with Russia and facilitate that channel, while also having a strong ally in the Middle East that can represent the alliance’s interests there.

So, as much as I think it’s a testament to Turkey’s ability to navigate this disruption, there’s also probably a bit more give than we may want to admit on Washington’s side, London’s side, and Berlin’s side. It’s helpful to have states that can both be your ally and talk to other still powerful, if not revisionist, countries.

Revisionist Autocracies Benefit Whenever Western Cohesion Weakens

In your New Statesman article on the “axis of autocracies,” you emphasize that China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea do not constitute anything like an authoritarian NATO. Their interests differ, and their cooperation remains limited and transactional. Yet you argue that they can still benefit from American strategic mistakes. Is it therefore misleading to focus too much on whether authoritarian states form a coherent alliance, when the more important issue may be that they benefit from the same weakening of Western institutions?

Imran Bayoumi: That’s right. To be clear, they’re working very closely together. Russia, for example, is providing targeting data to Iran to assist with Iran’s war that the United States is fighting. China has been an economic lifeline to Russia during its full-scale invasion of Ukraine and North Korea is providing troops to Russia to fight in Ukraine. Even though there’s no formal alliance system, these kinds of levers of cooperation and ties are deepening between these states.

You’re also right that we don’t need to focus on, or wait for, them to sign a formal alliance before being worried about the threat they pose. Every action that undermines the strong ties between the United States and its allies is a benefit for them. Tariffs against Washington’s trading partners that force them to look to new sources, such as China, are a weakness. Actions that undermine alliance cohesion, like threatening to take Greenland, are also a weakness, and the beneficiaries are really these revisionist autocracies.

So, we don’t need to wait for them to form a formal alliance and sign a treaty. We can be worried in the short term. I’m not sure they’ll ever get to that place, and that doesn’t mean we should wait to counter that threat.

Without Clear Goals, Tactical Victories Can Undermine Long-Term Power

Iran-US war.
Photo: Pavel Kusmartsev / Dreamstime.

Your analysis of the Iran war makes an important distinction between tactical success and strategic success. The United States might weaken Iran militarily while simultaneously increasing Russian energy revenues, diverting American military resources away from Asia, and creating tensions with European allies. Does this reflect a wider problem in American strategy—an ability to win individual confrontations while gradually weakening the alliances and resources that underpin its long-term power?

Imran Bayoumi: This has been a recurring challenge for the United States since it launched the 2003 Iraq War. It has been hard for the US to win decisively, and looking back to the first Trump administration, there was more of a recognition of that. This administration—the second Trump administration—may have been somewhat falsely emboldened by the relatively well-executed operation to remove Nicolas Maduro, the president of Venezuela, and bring him back to the United States to face trial. Militarily and tactically, that was quite a spectacular operation, with no lives lost. You can debate whether there has really been a transition to democracy or whether the lives of Venezuelan people have markedly improved, but more broadly, this was seen as a success and may have given a false sense of security moving into the Iran war.

One interesting thing to note about the Iran war, and this demonstrates that values still matter, is that if you look at the start of the war and German Chancellor Merz’s statements, he was initially in support of it when President Trump was framing the war as an opportunity for the Iranian people to rise up and overthrow their leaders. Then, once we saw the United States abandon that goal—though it was never really clear whether that was one of the core goals to begin with—and there was a recognition that this was going to be a longer-term conflict, you then saw Merz and other leaders come out against it.

There are a few things here. First, there is definitely a difference between tactical military success on the battlefield and translating that into strategic success in the long term. That’s a long-standing challenge. But the other point that’s maybe a bit more interesting and harder to tease out is that there is still support for these broad values-based interventions. The problem is that, in Iran specifically, I don’t think the war is being executed with a level of strategy and clear goals that would allow allies to support it.

That’s the challenge. Now we’re in this stalemate where both Iran and the United States increase leverage week over week. Sometimes one has more than the other, and there’s no clear off-ramp. That undermines US power and credibility and raises the question, in the eyes of allies: what does the US want here?

Rebuilding Allied Trust Will Take Much Longer Than Losing It

There may also be a populist dimension to this problem. Populist foreign policy often favors highly visible demonstrations of strength—tariffs, military strikes, threats, sanctions, territorial claims—because they can be presented domestically as proof of decisive leadership. But can policies that are politically attractive at home produce strategic costs abroad that only become visible years later?

Imran Bayoumi: That’s a real challenge, and we’re starting to see that now. With the Iran war—and more broadly with the actions this administration has taken—it will take a long time to rebuild the trust that the US had with its allies and partners. That trust still exists on some level. I don’t think it’s totally gone, but it has diminished. The next administration—or this administration, if it decides to change course going forward—will face a key question: how do we manage our relationships with allies, recognizing that they will now want more? They’ve diversified, they’ve taken steps to increase their defense spending, and they want to ensure their sovereignty as well. So what does this broader dynamic look like going forward? That’s a real challenge that I’m not sure many are thinking about.

What the future of the international order looks like is going to be a real challenge. I don’t think everything we’ve taken for granted over the past 80 years can continue to be taken for granted. Things will have to change. Some of these challenges might not be evident in the immediate future.

China Gains Influence by Showing Up Where Democracies Do Not

Map: Shutterstock.

In your work on China’s policing partnerships in the Pacific, you show that Beijing gains influence not simply through military power but through police training, surveillance systems, security assistance, infrastructure, and relationships with political elites. Does authoritarian influence spread partly because authoritarian governments are particularly willing to connect foreign policy with internal security and regime protection? And how should democracies compete without supporting similar forms of political control?

Imran Bayoumi: I think that’s certainly part of it. There is this recognition in authoritarian states that the technology China is selling can help preserve their power. But in the Pacific specifically, it’s more about the fact that China showed up and is willing to offer these goods for cheap. Public safety is a real concern for these governments, and if China is the one offering to help with policing when the US, Australia, or New Zealand is not there, most countries would take that offer of help.

The broader challenge is for the US and its allies to show up and offer cheap or affordable solutions and policies. In terms of what can be done differently, the Pacific is actually almost a success story now. You’ve seen Australia really invest in deepening its security ties across the region, and I’m focusing on that since that was the starting point of this article, or this question. It’s built out these broad security deals. It’s providing police training. There’s a big Pan-Pacific policing initiative, security initiative, and Australia has invested in cultural ties as well. Fore example, it’s used rugby as a way to strengthen support and ties and really build those stronger connections.

So, I don’t think democracies can’t compete or can’t still be attractive partners. The challenge, though, is that they have to offer something as good or better at a competitive price point. It’s hard when that can’t be underwritten by the state.

Democracy Remains a Valuable Organizing Principle

You have also criticized Washington for overlooking democratic backsliding or human-rights violations when dealing with strategically important partners. But if great-power competition gives authoritarian governments more alternatives, American pressure becomes harder to apply because governments can threaten to turn toward China or Russia. How can democracies defend democratic standards without pushing strategically important states toward authoritarian powers?

Imran Bayoumi: I’ll focus specifically on the US here. The United States still has a ton to offer, and countries still want to partner with it, regardless of how disruptive it may be in the current moment. It’s partly about the United States being comfortable using its leverage and its power. We’re seeing it use that power and leverage in ways that undermine its relationships and weaken them writ large. So I would pull that back and instead focus on how we build stronger relationships and how we present the US as a still attractive partner especially in terms of economic and military power.

Then, what are the conditions for partnering with the US? I don’t think that’s really any different from the past. There are opportunities to condition arms sales, trade agreements, and broad diplomatic agreements. So, Washington still has this kind of draw. Even though authoritarian states may be able to hedge better, they’re still hedging, which means there are still two powers—or multiple great powers. They’re not blindly allying themselves with Russia or China, or some combination of that. There’s still something they want from Washington.

It’s all about how we use what Washington has to incentivize changes in behavior. One last point: Democracy is still a valuable organizing principle. You could look at Madagascar last year, which had a youth movement that toppled the government and helped push it toward what may be some sort of democratic transition. So, there is still support for these values, and Washington needs to find a way to elevate that and try to create conditions for that change.

Renewed American Leadership Must Accommodate a More Decentralized World

Finally, you do not argue that authoritarian victory is inevitable. Russia and China have serious economic and demographic weaknesses, and authoritarian partnerships remain much less reliable than democratic alliances. If today’s disorder currently rewards authoritarian and populist forms of politics, what changes would be necessary for the international system to reward democratic cooperation again? And does that require simply restoring American leadership, or developing a new model in which democratic middle powers have much greater autonomy?

Imran Bayoumi: I’m not sure I know the answer to what changes the international system needs to make. But one important point, which I’ve touched on before and which you picked up in the question, is that the international system will look different going forward. What we will have to grapple with—we being the United States, or policymakers here in the United States—is that middle powers, both democratic and authoritarian, will have more power. They might not be able to build a whole new international system, but they will have the power to advance their interests in certain sectors, on certain topics, and in certain regions. So, the new international system will have to deal with their desire for autonomy.

That being said, I still think there is value in having a hegemon. The system still needs one strong power that can draw all of these states together, make them work together, and enforce the rules of the system while maintaining and growing it. Going forward, what we’ll need is some sort of retooled American leadership—one that recognizes the growing power of smaller states and the defining challenges of the moment, whether those come from revisionist states or from non-state threats such as climate change and the challenge of dealing with technology. It also needs to be able to build new institutions or revitalize existing ones in order to spur cooperation and continue that momentum.


 

(*) This interview was academically curated and edited by Dr. Bulent Kenes.

Tsipras, Orban and Trump.

Mandate Inflation: How Populists Claim Authority to Challenge Global Constraints

Please cite as:
Aslam, Muhammad Faizan. (2026). “Mandate Inflation: How Populists Claim Authority to Challenge Global Constraints.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). August 24, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000130   



Abstract

Populist leaders often say they are restoring popular sovereignty against treaties, courts, trade rules, migration regimes, expert bodies, and international organizations. Yet their behavior toward international order varies. They may withdraw, renegotiate, obstruct, selectively comply, or perform public defiance while remaining inside institutions. This article explains that variation through mandate inflation: a process of turning a vote into a broader political claim in which an election or referendum is recast from a limited permission to govern into wider authority to challenge constraints in the name of the people. A structured comparison of Trump’s ‘America First’ politics, Brexit’s ‘take back control’ discourse, and Viktor Orbán’s conflict with EU constraints shows four recurrent moves: mandate condensation, construction of ‘the real people,’ reframing of constraints as anti-democratic obstruction, and assertion of special authority to act. The argument does not replace material, institutional, or nationalist explanations. It shows how leaders present these strategies as the will of the people; it does not assume that audiences accepted those claims or that rhetoric alone caused policy choices. The article contributes to recent debates on global populism by showing why exit is only one possible outcome of populist constraint politics.

Keywords: Populism, mandate, global governance, international institutions, sovereignty, Brexit, Trump, Viktor Orbán

 

By Muhammad Faizan Aslam*

Introduction

Populist leaders rarely challenge international order by saying only that a treaty, court or organization is inefficient. They often say something stronger. They argue that constraints on government action stand between the people and democratic control (Dijkstra & Ghassim, 2025). Trade agreements become “bad deals” made by globalist elites (Finbow, 2023). Courts become “foreign” or “unelected bodies.” Migration rules become “imposed commands.” Expert advice becomes “technocratic obstruction.” The point is not only policy disagreement. The point is authority (Wajner et al., 2024).

This creates a puzzle for international relations as populist leaders do not respond to global constraint in a single way. Some withdraw from agreements. Some seek better terms. Some stay inside institutions while blocking decisions. Some comply with parts of a regime while attacking other parts. Some use defiant language even when policy change is limited. Recent research on global populism has made this variation clear (Pacciardi et al., 2024; Wajner & Giurlando, 2024). It has also shown that populist foreign policy is now a serious research programme rather than a side question for domestic politics (Ozdamar & Yanik, 2024; Wajner & Giurlando, 2024). What remains underdeveloped is the democratic authorization mechanism that makes such varied strategies appear legitimate to supporters.

This article calls that process of turning a vote into a broader political claim “mandate inflation.” Mandate inflation is the process through which a populist leader recasts an election or referendum from a limited permission to govern into a wider claim of authority to challenge, override or rewrite constraints in the name of the people. The concept is deliberately narrow. It is not a synonym for nationalism, anti-globalism, sovereignty talk or ordinary treaty renegotiation. It is present when four claims appear together: a complex vote is condensed into one clear mandate; that mandate is attached to “the real people”; international or EU-level constraints are described as illegitimate barriers to that people; and the leader claims authority to act against those constraints. Mandate inflation is therefore observed in actors’ claims; whether those claims generate public acceptance or independently cause policy outcomes is a separate empirical question.

The argument matters because global constraints are not self-explanatory objects, and their political effects depend on observable factors such as legal form, institutional location, economic impact and domestic visibility. They can be legal commitments, institutional procedures, market pressures, treaty obligations, policy standards, rights regimes or expert rules. Many have been voluntarily accepted by elected governments. Some are popular because they provide security, market access, rights protection or credibility. Others are weakly accountable, socially unequal or politically remote. Populist leaders exploit this mixed character. They do not need to prove that a constraint is legally invalid. They need to make it look democratically suspect (Ecker-Ehrhardt et al., 2025; Tallberg & Zürn, 2019).

This is why the argument avoids a simple defense of global governance. It does not assume that international institutions are always democratically healthy or that popular control is a false problem. Many voters experience international commitments through job loss, austerity, migration pressure, border disputes, legal complexity or distant expert language (Bellodi et al., 2024; Scheiring et al., 2024a). The issue is not whether these concerns should be dismissed. The issue is how a leader turns them into an exclusive claim to speak for the people against constraints that may also have democratic authorization of their own.

This article compares three cases: Trump’s “America First” politics, Brexit’s “take back control” discourse and Viktor Orbán’s confrontation with EU constraints. The cases are not treated as identical. Trump shows presidential mandate inflation in a great power setting, with exit, renegotiation and symbolic defiance. Brexit shows how a referendum can be converted into a mandate to leave a regional legal order. Orbán shows that mandate inflation can also work from inside an institution through obstruction, selective compliance and public defiance. The cases vary by mandate source, institutional location and strategy toward constraint. This variation is useful because the argument does not predict one outcome. It explains how different strategies are justified through a similar claim about the people. The relevant actors are the Trump administration, the Leave-to-government coalition centered on the May government, and the Orbán government; campaign rhetoric, official government claims, legal acts and institutional responses are treated as distinct forms of evidence.

The article makes three contributions. First, it adds a mechanism to recent work on populism and international affairs. Existing scholarship shows that populist governments affect foreign policy, international institutions, trade, migration, security and world order visions in uneven ways (Brusenbauch Meislova & Chryssogelos, 2024; Destradi & Plagemann, 2024; Wajner & Giurlando, 2024). Mandate inflation explains how this unevenness can still share a common democratic grammar. Second, it connects populism research to work on international institutions and unilateral challenges. Institutions face not only legal non-compliance, but also domestic struggles over whether their constraints count as legitimate democratic commitments (Walter & Plotke-Scherly, 2025). Third, it separates voter-side causes from leader-side authorization. Economic insecurity, status grievance, territorial loss and backlash against globalization may help explain why populist appeals resonate(Carter & Pop-Eleches, 2025; Koenig & Mendelberg, 2026; Scheiring et al., 2024b). They do not by themselves explain how leaders turn a vote into authority to contest courts, treaties or international organizations.

The article proceeds in five steps. It first places the argument in recent literature on global populism, foreign policy and international institutions. It then defines “mandate inflation” and its boundary conditions. The empirical sections trace the mechanism in the United States, the United Kingdom and Hungary. The comparative discussion explains why the same authorizing logic supports different strategies toward constraint. The conclusion draws implications for scholars and policy practitioners who face populist challenges to global governance.

Read the Full Article

SummerSchool

ECPS Academy Summer School — Europe Between Oceans: The Future of the EU Trade Between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific (July 6-10, 2026)

CASE COMPETITION INFO-PACK


Are you interested in global trade politics and the future of Europe in a shifting world order? Do you want to understand how populism, great-power rivalry, and geopolitical tensions are reshaping EU trade between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific? The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 offers a unique five-day program where leading scholars and policymakers explore the EU’s role in an era of economic uncertainty and strategic competition. Participants will engage in interactive lectures, small-group discussions, and a dynamic simulation game on EU trade strategy, gaining hands-on experience in policy analysis and recommendation drafting. Join an international, multidisciplinary environment, exchange ideas with peers worldwide, earn ECTS credits, and become part of a global network studying populism, political economy, and international relations.

Overview

In today’s rapidly shifting global order, the European Union can no longer afford to think in one direction. For decades, the transatlantic relationship has been the backbone of global trade, built on shared institutions, economic interdependence, and liberal values. Yet this foundation is no longer stable. As highlighted in the ECPS report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, domestic political polarization and the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic are reshaping trade policy, weakening trust, and challenging the very principles of open markets and multilateralism. The EU now faces a critical question: how to remain a global trade power when its closest partner is becoming less predictable.

At the same time, the center of gravity of global trade is shifting toward the Indo-Pacific. This region has become the epicenter of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition, where the future of global trade rules is increasingly being contested. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is not only a security issue but also a trade and technological struggle shaping supply chains, investment flows, and regulatory standards. As the US adopts more unilateral and strategic approaches to trade, moving away from traditional multilateralism, the EU must navigate a complex environment where cooperation, competition, and coercion coexist. Ignoring the transpacific dimension would mean missing where the future of global trade is being written.

For the European Union, the challenge and opportunity lie in managing both arenas simultaneously. The transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for economic scale, regulatory cooperation, and political alignment, while the transpacific region is crucial for diversification, resilience, and strategic autonomy. As scholars increasingly argue, the EU is no longer just a “junior partner” but an actor that must define its own role within a triangular system shaped by US–China competition. To lead in international trade today means mastering this dual engagement: stabilizing relations with the United States while actively shaping the Indo-Pacific order. This requires not only policy innovation but also a new generation of thinkers who understand trade through a geopolitical lens.

Against this backdrop, ECPS Academy Summer School-2026 brings together leading scholars and policymakers to examine how populism and great-power competition are reshaping EU trade policy across both transatlantic and transpacific arenas. 

It offers a unique opportunity to explore:

  • The future of EU–US trade relations in an era of populism
  • The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the US–China trade rivalry for the EU
  • How global trade is being reshaped by geopolitics, security, and ideology
  • The populist discourse around trade, policy, and power, and its implications for the EU’s trade relations
  • It also allows participating in an enjoyable and dynamic simulation game on the EU’s trade relations, trying to bring policy suggestions.

You will learn and actively engage in discussions, develop your own policy ideas, take part in simulation games, have the opportunity to publish on ECPS venues, and become part of an international network working at the intersection of political economy, international relations, and populism studies.

Tentative Program

Day 1 – Monday, July 6, 2026

Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics

This opening day sets the conceptual stage. It introduces how EU trade policy evolved from embedded liberalism to strategic autonomy, and how trade is now intertwined with security and geopolitics. It also establishes the role of populism and domestic politics in reshaping trade preferences and legitimacy crises in Europe and beyond.

Lecture One: (15:00-16:30) – Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order

Lecturer: Arlo Poletti (Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento).

Moderator: Sonali Chowdhry (Ph.D., Research Associate, DIW Berlin, Fellow, Kiel Institute for the World Economy).

Lecture Two: (17:30-19:00) – Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

Lecturer: Kent Jones (Professor Emeritus of Economics, Babson College).

Moderator: Dr. Neo Sithole (Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group).

Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism

Focuses on the transatlantic pillar, still central but increasingly unstable. It examines tariff disputes, regulatory divergence, and how populist and protectionist politics in the US and Europe challenge long-standing cooperation and WTO-based norms.

Lecture Three: (15:00-16:30) –  Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

Lecturer: Erik Jones (Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute and Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe).

Moderator: Elaine Fahey (Professor of EU Law, City Law School, City St. Georges, University of London).

Lecture Four: (17:30-19:00) – Populism Trumped Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Lecturer: Alasdair Young (Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech).

Moderator: Jessica Lawrence (Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law).

Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026 

Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy

This session introduces the triangular dynamic (EU–US–China) and how the EU navigates between partnership and rivalry. It highlights de-risking, economic security, supply chains, and competing models of globalization.

Lecture Five: (14:00-15:30) – Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

Lecturer: Reuben Wong (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore).

Moderator: TBC.

Lecture Six: (16:00-17:30) – The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics

Lecturer: Giulio Pugliese (Director of the EU-Asia Project, European University Institute + Associate Fellow Istituto Affari Internazionali, and King’s College London).

Moderator: Anita Tusor (Researcher in International Relations, Charles University, Prague). 

Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026

Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre

This session shifts focus to the transpacific dimension, emphasizing that the future of trade is increasingly shaped in the Indo-Pacific. It explores how US strategies toward China and the region reshape global trade, and how the EU responds through diversification and partnerships.

Lecture Seven: (15:00-16:30) – US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications

Lecturer: Kristi Govella (Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations in the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies and the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford). 

Moderator: Andrea Carteny (Professor of History of International Relations, Sapienza University of Rome). 

Lecture Eight: (17:30-19:00) – EU-Japan Relations and Populism

Lecturer: Axel Berkofsky (Associate Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at ISPI).

Moderator: Sebastien Goulard (Ph.D., Manager of Cooperans, Consultant in EU-Asia connectivity projects).

Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026

Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership

This session will ask whether the EU can become a global trade power amid fragmentation, populism, and great-power rivalry. It also allows for normative and policy-oriented discussions.

Lecture Nine: (15:00-16:30) Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Lecturer: Markus Kotzur (Professor of European and International Law, Vice Dean for International Relations and Chair for Public Law, European and International Public Law, Hamburg University).

Moderator: Camille Nessel (Ph.D., Lecturer in Political Science Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-CEVIPOL). 

Methodology

The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.

The final program with the list of speakers will be announced soon.

Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a simulation game will be organized on a pressing theme within the broader topic to identify solutions to issues related to the future of the EU trade relations.

Who should apply?

This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for application submissions has been extended to June 26, 2026. As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.

The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.

We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds. 

Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance

Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.

Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.

Credit

This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.

 


 

Brief Biographies and Abstracts

Day One: Monday, July 6, 2026

Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics

Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order

Arlo Poletti is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento. He obtained a PhD from the University of Bologna, was a post‐doctoral researcher at the University of Antwerp (2009-2013), and held positions as an Assistant professor at the LUISS Guido Carli (2013-2016) and the University of Bologna (2016). His research interests are in the area of International Political Economy, with particular emphasis on the politics of trade and investments, transnational advocacy at the global and EU-levels, and international regulatory cooperation. Recently, he expanded his research agenda to include analyses of how globalization-induced economic distress affects individual- level preferences and political behavior. He is the author of five monographs and his research has been published in journals such as International Organization, Regulation & Governance, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, the Journal of European Public Policy, Review of International Studies, the European Political Science Review and Review of International Organizations.

Reading List

Bauerle Danzman, S., and Meunier, S. (2024), ‘The EU’s Geoeconomic Turn: From Policy Laggard to Institutional Innovator’,  Journal of Common Market Studies, 62: 1097–1115

De Bièvre D. and Poletti A. (2014), ‘The EU in trade policy: From regime shaper to status quo power’, in Falkner, G. and Müller, P. (eds.), EU Policies in a Global Perspective: Shaping or taking international regimes? London and New York: Routledge

Dür A., Eckhardt J. and Poletti A. (2020), ‘Global Value Chains, the Anti-Globalization Backlash and EU Trade Policy: A Research Agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy, 27(6): 944-956.

Poletti A. (2025), ‘Trade‘, in Lucarelli S. and Sperling J. (eds.), Handbook of European Union Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Dr. Sonali Chowdhry is a trade economist and Research Associate (tenure-track) based at the Firms and Markets Department, DIW Berlin. Her research investigates global supply chains, firm heterogeneity and the distributional implications of trade policy shocks. To study these issues, she analyses detailed transactions-level customs databases using modern econometric methods.

She also teaches international trade at the Hertie School in Berlin as a Guest Lecturer. In 2025, she was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Harvard Growth Lab and has been affiliated with the Trade Policy Research Centre at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy since 2019. Over 2022-2023, she was awarded the Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellowship by the European University Institute to analyse the effect of sanctions on global trade networks.

She completed her PhD in Economics (with distinction) from LMU Munich in 2022, funded by the EU’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions programme. Prior to this, she worked as a Junior Economist with the Ifo Institute’s Center for International Economics and pursued the MPhil in Economics from University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar from India.

Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

Kent Jones, Dr. es sci. pol. (international economics), Graduate Institute of International Studies/University of Geneva, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Babson College, where he taught from 1982 until his retirement in 2023. He continues his academic interests in trade policy and trade institutions, having published several books and articles on these topics, including Populism and Trade (2021). His teaching also included visiting appointments at Brandeis University, the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and the University of Innsbruck, Austria. In addition, he served as a visiting senior economist at the U.S. Department of State.

Abstract:  The GATT-WTO trading system emerged during the post-World War 2 period as a multilateral institution led by the United States that supported mutually recognized rules of trade policy, negotiations for trade liberalization, day-to-day contact among trade diplomats and dispute settlement among participants through third-party adjudication.  These functions generated positive externalities in trade relations based on coordination, cooperation, reciprocity, and a mutual recognition of the goals and benefits of trade liberalization. The system fostered eight successful rounds of trade negotiations from 1947 to 1994.  Yet the increasing diversity of its participants, along with globalization-driven adjustment crises in many countries, rapidly advancing technology and geopolitical conflict, began to erode the legitimacy of GATT-WTO rules.  Compounding these challenges, the trade policy of populist US President Donald Trump precipitated a major crisis as he abrogated numerous GATT-WTO system rules and norms, weakening its legitimacy.  Unilateral nationalist protectionism replaced multilateral cooperation as the US abandoned the core principle of non-discrimination in trade relations and abandoned previously negotiated tariff levels with its trade partners.  The shock was all the more devastating as the US had been the erstwhile leader and champion of the GATT-WTO system.  As President Trump approaches the mid-term elections of his second and final term in office, supporters of a rules-driven trading system are contemplating the possibilities and challenges of restoring the WTO’s legitimacy through reforms and initiatives, new leadership and increased flexibility in liberalizing trade in a diverse and divided world economy.

Reading List

Kent Jones (2023), Populism, Globalization, and the Prospects for Restoring the WTO, Politics and Governance, vol. 11 (1): 181-192).

Judith Goldstein and Alan Sykes (2025).  The Perils of Institutional Rigidity, or How the WTO Helped to Sow the Seeds of Trump.  World Trade Review, vol. 24: 481-489.

Patrick Low and George Riddell (2025).  Trump’s Trade Policy and the World Trade Organization.  World Trade Review, vol. 24: 489-497.

Bernard Hoekman (2025). Plurilateral cooperation in response to aggressive unilateralism?  Asia and the Global Economy, vol. 5 (2).

Dr. Neo Sithole is a non-resident research fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group. His Ph.D. at the University of Szeged, Hungary, examines the history and trends of populism and political communication in sub-Saharan Africa. Sithole has contributed to publications on democracy, the influence of populism on Western liberal democracies, democratic legitimation and populism possibilities for alternative kinds of democratic imaginings. His academic interests span African and European populism, Afro-European diplomacy, foreign policy, regional and global security, and promoting international solidarity. Sithole also serves as an ambassador for the Doktoranduszok Országos Szövetsége (DOSZ), the Hungarian Association of Doctoral Students, working to foster an inclusive and integrated scientific community.

Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism

Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

Erik Jones is Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Instituteand Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe. Professor Jones is author of The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union (2002), Economic Adjustment and Political Transformation in Small States (2008), Weary Policeman: American Power in an Age of Austerity (2012 — with Dana H. Allin), The Year the European Crisis Ended (2014), and From Club to Commons: Enlargement, Reform, and Sustainability in European Integration (2025 — with Veronica Anghel). He is editor or co-editor of more than thirty books and special issues of journals on topics related to European politics and political economy, including reference works like The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (2012) and The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics (2015). Professor Jones is also co-editor of Government and Opposition.

Elaine Fahey is Professor of EU Law at the City Law School, City St. Georges, University of London and Deputy Head of Department (academic programmes). She is co-convener of the Institute for the Study of European Law (ISEL), City Law School. She has been a Senior Land Steiermark Fellow of Law and Innovation at the University of Graz, Austria, a visiting Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington DC, Emile Noël Fellow at New York University (NYU) Law School and a visiting professor at Keio University Law School, Tokyo, Japan as well as other visiting positions. She has worked as a Senior Postdoctoral Researcher at Amsterdam Centre for European Law & Governance (ACELG), University of Amsterdam, as a Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute (EUI), Florence and Assistant Lecturer and Lecturer in Law in Ireland (Dublin Institute of Technology; Trinity College Dublin). She has practised as a Barrister and was Chairperson of the Irish Society for European Law. She has been a stagiaire at the CJEU, Luxembourg, a Judicial Research Assistant, Four Courts, Dublin and a Judicial Extern, Los Angeles Federal District Court (9th Circuit). Her research interests span the relationship between the EU as a global digital actor, EU external relations, EU law and global governance, trade, transatlantic relations, cybersecurity and the EU’s AFSJ.

Populism Trumped Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Alasdair Young is Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is Director of the School’s Center for Research on International Strategy and Policy and is Interim Associate Dean for Faculty Development for Georgia Tech’s Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts. He was Co-editor of JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2017– 2022) and was Chair of the European Union Studies Association (USA) (2015– 2017). Before joining Georgia Tech in 2011 he taught at the University of Glasgow for 10 years. Prior to that he held research posts at the European University Institute and the University of Sussex. He has written extensively on EU trade policy and transatlantic economic relations and performed consultancy work for the United States and United Kingdom governments and for the European Commission.

Abstract: Since the end of the Second World War the United States and Europe have pursued trade liberalization, initially through multilateral negotiations and subsequently through less successful bilateral cooperation.  As a result, the transatlantic economy is very valuable and deeply interpenetrated.  The transatlantic economic relationship has periodically been characterized by tensions and disputes, but these were of limited duration or narrowly contained.  During President Trump’s second term the US has reversed the process of closer economic integration and coerced the European Union into a lopsided trade agreement.  Trump ran in part on a populist anti-trade message and his policy ostensibly pursues that agenda, but the populist message on trade has been complicated by the perceived adverse impact of higher tariffs on consumers.  This lecture will situate recent US transatlantic trade policy in historical perspective, making clear what a departure from past practice it has been in both substance and form.  It will also explain why the EU accepted a lopsided agreement and assess whether the policy has realized US objectives.  It will also consider where transatlantic economic relations might go from here.

Reading List

Baldwin, R. (2026), World War Trade: Conflict, Containment, and the Emergent World Trading Order, Rapid Response Economics 7, CEPR Press, pp. 7-14

Mutz, D.C. (2021), “How Americans Think About Trade: Winners, Losers, and the Psychology of Globalization,” Foreign Affairs, 30 July.

Young, A.R. (2025), “From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations During Trump 2” in M. Riddervold, G. Rosen, & J.R. Greenberg, (2026). Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026, 128-141.

Moderator: Prof Jessica Lawrence, Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law

Jessica Lawrence is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law. Dr Lawrence’s research focuses on issues relating to international economic integration, including at the WTO, in regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements, and within the EU internal market. She has a particular interest in the interaction between economic and non-economic public policy goals, and in the ways in which trade and investment agreements take into account their impacts on human rights, labour, sustainable development, environmental protection, and gender. Her work often takes a critical perspective, applying tools drawn from constructivist international relations theory, post-Foucauldian governmentality studies, and other strands of post-positivist thought to examine the impact of discourses and framing devices on politics and law. Prior to joining the University of Essex, Dr Lawrence was Associate Professor at Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. She holds a PhD in Transnational Legal Studies from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and a JD in Law from the University of Georgia in the United States. In addition to her academic work, Dr Lawrence has held various positions at NGOs, think tanks, and universities in the US, EU, India, New Zealand, and Costa Rica, and continues to provide research and training for governmental and non-governmental organizations on issues related to trade and investment agreements and their impact on social policy goals.

Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026 

Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy

Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

Reuben Wong is Deputy Head of the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore. Reuben held the first Jean Monnet Chair in Singapore (2013–2016) and was NUS’ Associate Vice-President, Global Relations (2021– 2023). His publications have focused on EU foreign policy. They include The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), National and European Foreign Policies (co-edited with Christopher Hill, Routledge, 2011), and journal articles in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Politique Européenne, the Asia Europe Journal, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, and the EU External Affairs Review. He has held visiting positions at Cambridge University, the LSE European Institute, the Stimson Center (Washington, D.C.), the East Asian Institute (Singapore), and Humboldt University. He consults and teaches summer school in Paris and Beijing. Reuben raises four children to help arrest Singapore’s declining total fertility rate.

Abstract: I will trace the EU’s search for strategic autonomy and how it has been challenged by both the U.S. and China.  I will also suggest how Europe could be more strategic in its dealings with the U.S. and China, and work on better understanding its own identity/interests and those of its interlocutors. 

Reading List

European Parliament (2021), EU Strategy for cooperation in the Indo-Pacific – Council conclusions (16 April 2021), in “A Stronger Europe in the World” https://www.europarl.europa.eu/legislative-train/theme-a-stronger-europe-in-the-world/file-indo-pacific-strategy

R. Wong (2026) “EU–US–China Security Relations”, in Riddervold, Marianne; Rosén, Guri & Greenberg, Jessica R. (eds), Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS, January 20), pp.71-83. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00140 | https://www.populismstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/DOWNLOAD-CHAPTER-3.pdf 

ECFR 2026 video- https://ecfr.eu/event/beijing-holdem-2-0-european-cards-against-chinese-coercion/

Brice Didier, The European Union’s navigation of the United States–China rivalry: muddling through, or strategizing?, International Affairs, Volume 102, Issue 3, May 2026, Pages 767–785, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiag030⁠https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/102/3/767/8550802

DGAP (2026) Report on Allies and Partners; the future of Relations with China. on https://dgap.org/system/files/article_pdfs/DGAP%20Report_No-3_MAR-2026_15pp._1.pdf?utm_source=copilot.com

The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics

Dr. Giulio Pugliese is Lecturer in Strategic Communications at King’s College London and the Director of the EU-Asia Project at the European University Institute. He specialises in the international politics of the Asia-Pacific with a focus on Japan, China and the United States. He has presented and published on academic, policy-oriented and commercial themes, including in International Affairs, The Australian Journal of International Affairs, The Asia-Pacific Journal, East Asian Policy, Pacific Affairs, The Pacific Review, Defence Strategic Communications. He is a regular contributor to Asia Maior, Italy’s leading journal on contemporary Asian affairs, and author of Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds (Palgrave MacMillan, 2017, also available in Korean).

Dr Pugliese earned a Laurea (B.A.) in Political Science and East Asian Studies at the University of Naples, “L’Orientale” (cum laude), an M.A. in International Economics and International Relations (concentrating on East Asian Studies) at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, graduating with Honors and passing the final exam with Distinction. He completed his Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge. He was a Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter at the Department of Chinese Studies in Heidelberg University, a Lecturer in War Studies at King’s College London, a Lecturer in Japanese Politics at the University of Oxford, and a recipient of a British Academy post-doctoral fellowship. He has held visiting scholar positions at GRIPS, Johns Hopkins University SAIS, and George Washington University. In 2023, he was awarded the Nakasone Incentive Award for his research on Japanese diplomacy.

Abstract: How best to explain the EU and member states’ quiet security and economic recalibration of relations vis-à-vis China and Asia? Reactiveness to Chinese assertiveness, the need to achieve economic security, as well as the emergence of interlinkages between the East Asian and European security theatres following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is accompanied by economic interests in what is the region that is fast becoming the locomotive of the world economy, including in its procurement market. US demand signals and the emulation of practice from local players, such as Japan, have also driven the process.  As the Transatlantic alliance faces a rupture under the second Trump administration, this lecture also probes the tenability of alternative routes to salvage Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation and engagement towards the so-called “Indo-Pacific”, suggesting potential solutions and ways to manage policy expectations.

Reading List

Angela Pennisi di Floristella and Giulio Pugliese. “The Historical Evolution of Relations between the European Union and Asia”, in Thomas Christiansen, Evi Fitriani, Emil Kirchner, and Youngah Guahk [eds.], The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations (2nd Edition), Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2026, Chapter 1.

Giulio Pugliese and Aurelio Insisa, “How to use the maximum of potential for the EU-Taiwan cooperation – what can the EU learn from the US and other actors?”, in-depth policy study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), 26 November 2025: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2025)754482

Giulio Pugliese, “The European Union and an ‘Indo-Pacific’ Alignment”, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 31 (4), 2024, pp. 17-44.

Giulio Pugliese. “Japan’s China Grand Strategy: A Blueprint for Transatlantic Players?” in Rogier E. Creemers, Silvia Menegazzi, Neysun A. Mahboubi [eds.] Transatlantic Perspectives on China, London and New York: Routledge, 2026, Chapter 6.

Giulio Pugliese short interview – March 2026, Japan and Europe in the Face of US-China Geopolitical Rivalry https://cgpbalancingact.substack.com/p/japan-and-europe-in-the-face-of-us

Anita Tusor is a PhD Student in International Relations at Charles University, Prague, specializing in security and strategic studies. She holds a Double Master’s Degree in Asian and European Affairs from King’s College London and Renmin University of China, as well as an MA in Applied Linguistics and a BA in Hungarian and Chinese Studies. Her professional experience includes research and policy work with NATO Allied Command Transformation, the Institute of International Relations in Prague, the European Center for Populism Studies, and the European Values Center for Security Policy. Her research interests focus on Chinese cognitive warfare, foreign malign influence operations, populist constitutionalism, and Asia-Pacific security.

 

Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026

Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre

US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications

Kristi Govella is Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Govella specializes in the intersection of economics, security, and governance, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region and Japan. Her research has examined topics such as economic statecraft, government-business relations, regional institutional architecture, military alliances, non-traditional security, and the governance of the global commons. Prior to joining the University of Oxford, Dr. Govella held positions at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Harvard University, and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley.

Abstract: Over the past two decades, the United States has intensified its focus on Asia due to the region’s strategic importance for both economics and security. In 2011, the “pivot to Asia” was announced, and during the course of the Obama, Trump 1.0, and Biden administrations, the U.S. gradually redefined the region as the “Indo-Pacific” and attempted to enhance its engagement. However, the role of trade in U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has become increasingly complex, as “America first” concerns about trade deficits, reshoring, and industrial revitalization have gradually weakened the economic pillar of U.S. regional policy. This lecture will examine the evolution of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy with particular attention to the changing role of economic engagement and implications for regional and global trade.

Reading List

U.S. Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision” (November 2019). Available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf

The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States” (February 2022). Available at https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (November 2025). Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Andrea Carteny is a Professor at Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, where he teaches International Relations History, Nationalisms and Minorities at the SARAS (History Anthropology Religions Arts Spectacle) Department. He is a Fullbright Alumni and Director of the Hungarian Studies Review (RSU) and he focused his research on national minorities, nationalities and nationalisms in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area during the 19th- 20th Centuries. He is a member of the Italian Society of International History (SISI) and a participant in the main conventions and conferences on nation studies, national minorities and nationalisms history. He is author of many articles and books in this field, among them the editions Il Mar Nero. Identità nazionali e dinamiche di sicurezza (with G. Natalizia, 2023), Il Pan-nazionalismo in Eurasia e il mito del Turan (with P. Pizzolo, 2023), A New Continent Called Europe (2005), and the monographs La questione transilvana nel periodo interbellico (2020) and Dal micro-nazionalismo all’Europa (2011).

EU-Japan Relations and Populism

Axel Berkofsky is Associate Professor at the University of Pavia, Italy and Senior Fellow/Senior Advisory at the Asia Centre at the Milan-based Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). Axel Berkofsky is also Chairman of the Selection Committee and Vice-Chairman Executive Committee of the Canon Foundation Europe, Executive Committee Board Member at the Stockholm-based European Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN) and Research Affiliate at the European Institute of Japanese Studies at the Stockholm School of Economics. Previously, Dr. Berkofsky was Senior Policy Analyst, Associate Policy Analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre (EPC) and Research Fellow at the Brussels-based European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS). At the EPC in Brussels, Axel Berkofsky has – in his capacity as the Director of the EPC’s former EU-Asia programme – worked and interacted on a de facto daily basis with EU officials, policymakers and diplomats. Furthermore, Dr. Berkofsky has in the recent years been involved – as scholar, researcher and moderator – in numerous panels, workshops and seminars on EU-Japan relations, EU-China relations and EU-Asia relations. In his capacity as Board Member of the Stockholm-based Europen Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN), Dr. Berkofsky has since 2008 co-organized numerous conferences, seminars and workshops on EU-Japan relations at numerous think tanks and universities in Europe and Japan. Dr. Berkofsky is a fluent Japanese speaker and has altogether lived three years in Japan. Furthermore, Dr. Berkofsky has taught and lectured at numerous universities and think tanks in Japan, Mainland China, Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea, The Philippines, Singapore etc. In addition, Axel Berkofsky has for several years worked as freelance journalist at the Hong Kong-based Asia Times. Axel Berkofsky has published and edited numerous books and has authored and published more than 250 journal articles, newspaper articles, essays, policy papers and policy briefings. Prof. Berkofsky is a regular consultant, speaker and presenter at conferences, seminars and workshops organized and sponsored by the European Union (EU).

Dr. Sebastien Goulard is the manager of Cooperans, a public affairs and project management consultancy specialized in EU-Asia connectivity projects. Sebastien Goulard is also the editor of the Global Connectivities platform which aims to analyse the development of corridors around the world. During his doctoral studies at EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences), Paris Sebastien Goulard participated in several European research programs dealing with sustainable urbanization in China. Sebastien Goulard holds a BA (hons) degree in international politics (ESE, Nottingham Trent University), a MA degree in international relations (IRIS, France) and a MA degree in social sciences (EHESS).

Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026

Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership

Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Prof. Dr. Markus Kotzur, LL.M. (Duke Univ.) studied law in Freiburg and Bayreuth. In 1993, he passed the First State Examination and subsequently obtained the title “Legum Magister” (LL.M.) at Duke University (North Carolina). In 2002, after completing his legal traineeship, he received his doctorate from the University of Bayreuth. This was followed in 2002 by his habilitation with a thesis on “Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe”. In 2005, he was appointed Professor of European and International Law and Public Law at the University of Leipzig. Since 2011, he has been head of the Master’s programme “European and European Legal Studies” and since 2018 president at the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg. Since 2012, he has held the professorship for Public Law, European and International Law at the University of Hamburg and is Deputy Director of the Institute for International Affairs. From October 2015 to March 2020 he was vice Dean for Studies and Teaching and since April 2020 Vice Dean for International relations of the Faculty.

Abstract: This lecture ties in with the current debate surrounding the so-called ‘strategic autonomy’ of the European Union. It aims to critically examine, on the one hand, whether the EU possesses the political capacity to act autonomously in strategic matters and, on the other hand, whether the constitutional framework of primary Union law provides the necessary normative foundations for this. In particular, the question will be raised as to whether the Union’s self-description as a ‘normative power’ is tenable and is underpinned by appropriate policy tools. Finally, a possible transformation from ‘normative power’ to ‘military power’ will be examined from a legal perspective.

Camille Nessel holds a Ph.D. in political science and is currently a lecturer at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), teaching within the Centre d’étude de la vie politique (Cevipol). Her research focuses on EU perceptions in trade, particularly regarding the EU’s relations with Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as on the “China threat” construction in EU economic security strategy. Camille was awarded a doctoral fellowship from FNRS and is now preparing a postdoctoral project on the construction of the “China threat” in EU economic policies. Having gained research experience in Southeast Asia while living in both Indonesia and Vietnam, she has acquired valuable expertise in the region. She has also worked for the European Commission, served as a political advisor for the Chair of the International Trade Committee in the European Parliament, and gained experience in the NGO sector, combining theory and practice in her teaching and research.