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ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Dr. Giulio Pugliese: The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics

As Europe deepens its engagement with the Indo-Pacific, the region has become far more than a distant theatre of economic opportunity—it has emerged as a central arena where geopolitical competition, technological innovation, supply-chain resilience, and strategic autonomy intersect. In this insightful lecture, Dr. Giulio Pugliese demonstrated how the Indo-Pacific evolved from a Japanese strategic narrative into a defining framework for understanding twenty-first-century international politics. Examining the growing rivalry between the United States and China, Taiwan’s geopolitical and technological significance, and the implications of Washington’s increasingly transactional alliance strategy, he argued that Europe must move beyond traditional regional perspectives and formulate a coherent Indo-Pacific policy rooted in its own interests. The lecture offered participants a nuanced understanding of how Europe’s future security and prosperity are becoming increasingly intertwined with developments across Asia.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The third day of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 continued its exploration of Europe’s changing geopolitical environment by shifting attention beyond the Atlantic theatre to the increasingly consequential dynamics unfolding across the Indo-Pacific. Held under the overarching theme, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” the sessions examined how the European Union is recalibrating its external relations amid intensifying strategic competition between the United States and China. Following discussions on strategic autonomy, de-risking, and economic security, the sixth lecture broadened the analytical horizon by investigating Europe’s evolving engagement with Asia and the conceptual transformations that increasingly shape international politics. Against this backdrop, Dr. Giulio Pugliese, Director of the EU–Asia Project at the European University Institute and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali and King’s College London, delivered a stimulating lecture entitled “The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics.” Combining insights from international relations, strategic studies, and Asian regional politics, the lecture challenged participants to rethink the Indo-Pacific not merely as a geographical designation but as a politically constructed strategic space whose emergence has profoundly influenced European foreign policy. <

The session was thoughtfully introduced by Anita Tusor, doctoral researcher at Charles University and Staff Officer at NATO’s Allied Command Transformation, who situated the discussion within one of the defining strategic dilemmas confronting contemporary Europe. She observed that the European Union increasingly finds itself navigating between its two most important economic partners—the United States and China—at a time when their rivalry is reshaping both global trade and international security. Rather than portraying the Indo-Pacific as a distant theatre of commercial interest, Tusor argued that recent geopolitical developments, particularly Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, have fundamentally altered European strategic thinking. The conflict has created direct linkages between the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security theatres, compelling European policymakers to recognize that developments in East Asia now carry direct implications for Europe’s own security calculations. She further suggested that Europe’s growing interest in Japan’s experience of managing long-standing US–China tensions provides valuable opportunities for policy learning as Brussels seeks to navigate an increasingly polarized international environment. Her introduction effectively framed the lecture by emphasizing that Europe’s engagement with Asia is no longer peripheral but has become an integral component of its broader strategy for managing geopolitical competition. 

Reimagining the Indo-Pacific: Strategic Narratives and Europe’s Asian Turn

Dr. Giulio Pugliese.
Dr. Giulio Pugliese is Director of the EU–Asia Project at the European University Institute and Associate Fellow at the Istituto Affari Internazionali and King’s College London.

Connecting live from Taipei, Dr. Pugliese began by explaining that his primary objective was not simply to review recent European policy initiatives toward Asia but to unpack the intellectual foundations of one of the most widely used yet insufficiently examined concepts in contemporary international relations: the Indo-Pacific. While the term has rapidly entered the vocabulary of policymakers, diplomats, and scholars alike, he argued that it should not be understood as a politically neutral geographical label. Instead, it represents what strategic communication scholars describe as a strategic narrative—a carefully constructed story designed to simplify complex geopolitical realities, define particular challenges, identify preferred actors, and legitimize specific policy responses. Seen through this lens, the Indo-Pacific is not merely a map but a political project that reflects competing visions of regional order, international leadership, and global governance. Dr. Pugliese invited participants to appreciate that language itself constitutes an instrument of power, capable of shaping perceptions, legitimizing alliances, and influencing strategic behavior. 

At the heart of Dr. Pugliese’s analysis lay the argument that the Indo-Pacific concept originated not in Washington but in Tokyo. Drawing extensively upon his own research on Japanese foreign policy, he demonstrated that the contemporary understanding of the Indo-Pacific owes much to the strategic vision developed by the late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and a relatively small circle of policymakers who sought to redefine Asia’s geopolitical architecture during the late 2000s and early 2010s. Their objective was to present an alternative regional order capable of responding to China’s expanding economic and strategic influence, particularly the growing prominence of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By advancing the concept of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), Japan deliberately expanded the geographical imagination of Asia beyond a China-centered perspective. Rather than viewing Asia exclusively through East Asia and the Western Pacific, the Indo-Pacific connected the Pacific and Indian Oceans into a single strategic theatre stretching from East Africa to the western shores of the Americas, encompassing India, Australia, Southeast Asia, and maritime democracies across the region. In doing so, the concept challenged what Pugliese described as the increasingly Sinocentric geographical narrative embedded within Beijing’s own regional initiatives. 

Dr. Pugliese explained that each element of the FOIP formulation carried important political meaning. “Free” referred not only to democratic governance but also to the provision of alternatives to Chinese-led infrastructure financing and development initiatives. “Open” emphasized freedom of navigation, overflight, and the maintenance of open sea lanes that remain indispensable for international commerce. Collectively, the concept sought to portray the Indo-Pacific as a region characterized by openness, connectivity, transparency, and respect for international law, thereby implicitly contrasting it with perceptions of China’s expanding strategic influence. While acknowledging that such narratives inevitably simplify reality, Dr. Pugliese argued that their political effectiveness lies precisely in their capacity to mobilize coalitions of like-minded states around a shared strategic vision. The Indo-Pacific therefore functions simultaneously as a geographical concept, a diplomatic framework, and a normative narrative through which states articulate competing understandings of regional order. 

The lecture further traced the intellectual genealogy of this strategic narrative to earlier Japanese initiatives, including Abe’s conception of an “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” and the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) involving Japan, Australia, India, and the United States. Dr. Pugliese argued that these initiatives reflected a sustained Japanese effort to cultivate a network of maritime democracies capable of balancing China’s growing influence without necessarily resorting to overt containment. Behind these policy innovations stood a relatively small but highly influential group of Japanese officials and strategic thinkers who consistently sought to integrate economic policy, diplomacy, security cooperation, and strategic communication into a coherent foreign policy vision. Their efforts, he suggested, represented one of the most successful examples of middle-power agenda-setting in contemporary international relations, demonstrating that states need not possess overwhelming material capabilities to shape global strategic discourse. 

According to Dr. Pugliese, Japan’s most remarkable achievement was its ability to persuade the United States to adopt this conceptual framework during the first Trump administration. He described this as an exceptionally rare case in which a close ally effectively exported a foreign policy narrative to Washington rather than merely adapting to American strategic preferences. Following intensive diplomatic engagement, the United States officially embraced the Indo-Pacific concept in 2017, replacing the long-established Asia-Pacific terminology within its strategic vocabulary. The subsequent declassification of the US Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific further illustrated how the concept had become integrated into American grand strategy, where it served not only to strengthen partnerships among regional democracies but also to provide an overarching framework for managing strategic competition with China. Dr. Pugliese emphasized that this represented far more than a semantic adjustment; it marked the institutionalization of a new geopolitical imagination that would subsequently influence the policies of numerous allies, including those within Europe. 

Thus, Dr. Pugliese had fundamentally reframed participants’ understanding of the Indo-Pacific. Rather than accepting it as a self-evident geographical reality, he demonstrated that the concept itself constitutes an important arena of strategic competition, reflecting broader struggles over regional leadership, international legitimacy, and the future architecture of global order. This conceptual foundation established the basis for the remainder of the lecture, which would examine how the intensifying rivalry between Washington and Beijing has increasingly drawn Europe into this evolving strategic landscape, compelling the European Union to rethink both its relations with Asia and its own geopolitical identity.

Europe’s Strategic Recalibration: From the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific

Indo-Pacific
Flags of the Quad countries—Japan, Australia, the United States, and India—alongside a chess king, symbolizing strategic competition and the Quad’s evolving role in balancing China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Illustration: Sameer Chogale / Dreamstime.

Having established that the Indo-Pacific is fundamentally a strategic narrative rather than a neutral geographical designation, Dr. Pugliese proceeded to examine how this conceptual innovation gradually reshaped the foreign policies of the world’s leading powers. His central argument was that strategic narratives matter not merely because they influence political discourse but because they can fundamentally alter the way governments define interests, identify partners, and formulate grand strategy. The Indo-Pacific, he argued, evolved from a Japanese diplomatic initiative into the dominant geopolitical framework guiding American policy toward Asia before eventually being embraced—albeit in modified form—by the European Union and several of its member states. Understanding this process, he suggested, is essential to explaining why Europe increasingly views developments in East Asia as directly relevant to its own security and prosperity. 

Dr. Pugliese argued that the decisive turning point came during the first Trump administration. While previous American administrations had pursued engagement with China alongside regional balancing, President Donald Trump’s first term marked a more explicit shift toward strategic competition. Rather than viewing China’s rise as an opportunity for deeper integration into the liberal international order, Washington increasingly came to regard Beijing as a systemic rival whose growing technological, economic, and military capabilities required active counterbalancing. The trade war initiated against China, restrictions on Chinese technology firms such as Huawei, and growing concern over supply-chain vulnerabilities all reflected a broader transformation in American strategic thinking. Crucially, however, Dr. Pugliese emphasized that the conceptual vocabulary through which this shift was articulated had largely originated in Tokyo. Japan’s success in persuading Washington to officially adopt the Indo-Pacific framework represented, in his view, one of the rare instances in modern diplomacy where a middle power successfully influenced the grand strategy of the world’s leading superpower. 

Particularly significant was Dr. Pugliese’s discussion of the United States Strategic Framework for the Indo-Pacific, a document declassified at the conclusion of the first Trump administration. Unlike carefully crafted public statements, this internal strategic document revealed with unusual candour the objectives underpinning Washington’s regional policy. It openly framed China as the principal strategic competitor and explicitly identified the promotion of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as a means of strengthening alliances while countering Beijing’s expanding influence. Dr. Pugliese drew participants’ attention to the informational dimension of this strategy, noting that the Indo-Pacific narrative was designed not only to organize military and diplomatic cooperation but also to compete with China’s own strategic messaging surrounding the BRI. Strategic communication, public diplomacy, and the contest over international narratives thus emerged as integral components of contemporary great-power competition. 

This observation led Dr. Pugliese to one of the lecture’s broader conceptual contributions: the growing importance of information politics within international relations. Great-power competition today extends well beyond military deployments and economic sanctions to encompass competing stories about the international order itself. He pointed to narratives portraying China’s BRI as “debt-trap diplomacy” as examples of what he termed informational contestation. Such narratives sought to shape international perceptions by presenting Chinese infrastructure investment not as development assistance but as a mechanism for creating political dependency. Whether entirely accurate or not, these narratives significantly influenced public debates across Europe, North America, and Asia, reinforcing broader geopolitical efforts to limit China’s expanding influence. The Indo-Pacific, therefore, functions not simply as a strategic framework but also as a powerful communicative device through which competing powers seek to legitimize their preferred regional order. 

Against this backdrop, Dr. Pugliese turned to the question of why Europe gradually embraced the Indo-Pacific concept despite its initial reluctance. He recalled that, during its early years, the term carried uncomfortable political connotations within many European capitals because it appeared closely associated with American efforts to contain China. For governments seeking to preserve productive economic relations with Beijing, openly endorsing a framework perceived as anti-Chinese seemed diplomatically unwise. Consequently, European policymakers initially preferred the more familiar Asia-Pacific terminology and avoided language that could be interpreted as aligning Europe too closely with Washington’s increasingly confrontational posture.

Several developments, however, fundamentally altered European calculations. According to Dr. Pugliese, one important factor was the gradual deterioration of EU–China relations driven by persistent trade imbalances, concerns over market access, investment reciprocity, technology transfer, and broader disagreements regarding human rights and political governance. These tensions had already encouraged European institutions to adopt a more cautious approach toward Beijing before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic further exposed vulnerabilities associated with dependence on global supply chains concentrated in China. The pandemic reinforced concerns regarding economic resilience, strategic dependencies, and the security implications of excessive reliance on external suppliers, thereby lending greater credibility to calls for diversification and de-risking. 

The most decisive catalyst, however, was Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Dr. Pugliese argued that the war fundamentally transformed European perceptions of China, not primarily because Beijing directly participated in the conflict but because of its increasingly close relationship with Moscow. Although China formally maintained neutrality, European policymakers became increasingly concerned by evidence suggesting that Beijing had provided Russia with critical dual-use technologies and economic support that helped sustain its war effort. From a realist perspective, Dr. Pugliese explained, such behaviour reflected China’s strategic interest in preventing the emergence of a weakened or pro-Western Russia that might leave China strategically isolated. Yet for many Europeans, China’s unwillingness to distance itself from Moscow significantly weakened confidence in the possibility of a stable strategic partnership.  

At the same time, Dr. Pugliese cautioned against interpreting Europe’s Indo-Pacific engagement exclusively through the lens of ideological confrontation with China. Instead, he proposed a more nuanced explanation rooted in strategic bargaining within the transatlantic alliance. Following Russia’s invasion, Europe became even more dependent upon the United States for military assistance, intelligence sharing, energy supplies, and broader security guarantees. This asymmetry inevitably strengthened Washington’s leverage over European foreign policy. In return for sustained American support in Ukraine, the United States increasingly expected its European allies to align more closely with broader American strategic priorities in Asia. Support for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and other regional partners thus became part of a wider process of transatlantic strategic coordination extending well beyond the European continent itself. Europe’s growing Indo-Pacific engagement should therefore be understood not only as a response to developments in Asia but also as an indirect consequence of the changing political economy of the transatlantic alliance. 

Yet Dr. Pugliese repeatedly emphasized that European alignment with the United States also reflected Europe’s own interests. Asia’s extraordinary economic dynamism provides compelling incentives for deeper European engagement irrespective of American preferences. The Indo-Pacific contains many of the world’s fastest-growing economies, leading centers of technological innovation, and increasingly important markets for advanced manufacturing and defense industries. European firms have substantial commercial interests in expanding cooperation with countries such as Japan, South Korea, India, and Taiwan, particularly in sectors related to semiconductors, green technologies, digital infrastructure, and advanced manufacturing. Consequently, Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy cannot be reduced to alliance politics alone; it also reflects a broader recognition that the center of gravity of the global economy continues to shift toward Asia. 

Dr. Pugliese illustrated this economic dimension by highlighting Europe’s growing interest in securing access to high-end semiconductors produced by Taiwan’s globally significant manufacturing sector. The political signaling directed toward Taipei should therefore be understood not solely as an expression of democratic solidarity but also as part of a broader strategy aimed at attracting investment, diversifying technological supply chains, and supporting Europe’s twin digital and green transitions. The Indo-Pacific thus emerges simultaneously as a security theatre, a technological ecosystem, and a vital economic space whose importance transcends traditional geopolitical categories.

By the conclusion of this section, Dr. Pugliese had demonstrated that Europe’s embrace of the Indo-Pacific reflects the convergence of multiple structural forces: intensifying US–China rivalry, deteriorating EU–China relations, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, changing transatlantic dynamics, and the growing economic significance of Asia itself. Rather than representing a sudden strategic pivot, Europe’s Indo-Pacific policy emerged as the cumulative product of shifting geopolitical realities that increasingly blur the boundaries between European and Asian security. The lecture therefore invited participants to reconsider the European Union not as a passive observer of Indo-Pacific developments but as an increasingly active participant in the evolving strategic architecture linking the Atlantic and Pacific worlds.

Taiwan, Economic Security, and the Geopolitics of Interdependence

The flags of Taiwan, the United States, and China.
The flags of Taiwan, the United States, and China displayed on semiconductor chips, symbolizing intensifying global competition over advanced chip production, technological leadership, and strategic supply chains. Illustration: Korn Vitthayanukarun / Dreamstime.

Building upon his analysis of Europe’s gradual embrace of the Indo-Pacific framework, Dr. Pugliese devoted the third section of his lecture to what he described as one of the most consequential developments in contemporary international politics: the growing strategic centrality of Taiwan. While public debate often portrays Taiwan primarily through the lens of cross-Strait tensions or democratic solidarity, Dr. Pugliese argued that the island has acquired a far broader geopolitical significance. Taiwan today occupies the intersection of military strategy, technological competition, global supply chains, and great-power rivalry, making it one of the principal theatres through which the evolving balance of power in the Indo-Pacific is increasingly contested. For the European Union, he suggested, Taiwan represents not merely a distant regional issue but an increasingly important component of its own economic security and technological resilience. 

Dr. Pugliese encouraged participants to move beyond simplified narratives that portray cross-Strait relations as an inevitable confrontation between democracy and authoritarianism. Instead, he situated recent developments within a longer historical trajectory. The election of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government in 2016 marked an important turning point because the new administration rejected the political understandings that had underpinned earlier efforts to stabilize relations with Beijing. From the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party, this shift fundamentally altered the trajectory of cross-Strait relations by diminishing prospects for eventual peaceful reunification under previously accepted political formulas. Beijing consequently intensified diplomatic, economic, and military pressure designed to isolate Taiwan internationally while discouraging further movement toward a distinct Taiwanese political identity. Rather than interpreting these developments solely through ideological categories, Dr. Pugliese invited participants to recognize the complex interaction of historical memory, nationalism, domestic politics, and strategic calculation that continues to shape Chinese policy. 

The deterioration of cross-Strait relations coincided with a profound transformation in American grand strategy. As the first Trump administration adopted a more confrontational approach toward China, Taiwan assumed an increasingly important position within Washington’s broader strategy of balancing Chinese power. Dr. Pugliese argued that Taiwan gradually evolved into what he repeatedly described as a strategic chess piece within the wider architecture of US–China competition. This characterization did not diminish Taiwan’s own agency or democratic achievements; rather, it reflected the reality that major powers increasingly viewed the island through the prism of broader regional military calculations. Maintaining the status quo across the Taiwan Strait became essential not only because of Taiwan itself but because of its location within the broader maritime geography of East Asia and its implications for regional power projection. 

To explain this strategic importance, Dr. Pugliese introduced participants to the concept of the First Island Chain, a geographical arc extending from northern Japan through Okinawa and Taiwan to the Philippines and onward toward Southeast Asia. Far from representing a mere cartographic feature, this chain constitutes one of the most strategically significant maritime corridors in the contemporary international system. Control over—or access through—these waters shape naval mobility, intelligence gathering, anti-submarine warfare, and the broader military balance in the Western Pacific. Dr. Pugliese illustrated how the deployment of advanced surveillance systems, missile capabilities, radar installations, and underwater sensors throughout this maritime corridor has increasingly transformed the region into a densely monitored strategic environment. In this context, Taiwan occupies a uniquely sensitive position because any alteration to the status quo would fundamentally affect the operational environment of both China and the United States, as well as their regional allies. 

This strategic logic, he explained, has profoundly reshaped alliance structures throughout East Asia. The United States has pursued what contemporary defense planners describe as integrated deterrence, strengthening operational cooperation with Japan, the Philippines, Australia, and other regional partners while enhancing interoperability, logistical coordination, and joint contingency planning. Japan, in particular, has assumed a much more prominent role within this evolving security architecture, expanding defense cooperation with Washington and adapting its own military posture to the possibility of a Taiwan contingency. The Philippines has similarly increased cooperation by providing greater access to military facilities, while Australia has deepened its participation in regional security initiatives. According to Dr. Pugliese, these developments illustrate that Taiwan has become embedded within a much broader regional deterrence strategy extending well beyond the island itself. 

Yet Dr. Pugliese was equally careful to avoid reducing Taiwan’s significance to military considerations alone. One of the lecture’s central themes was the growing fusion of security and economics in contemporary international relations. Taiwan’s extraordinary technological capabilities—particularly its globally dominant semiconductor industry—have elevated the island from a regional security concern to a cornerstone of the global digital economy. Advanced semiconductor manufacturing has become indispensable for artificial intelligence, telecommunications, defense systems, electric vehicles, and countless other technologies underpinning modern industrial production. Consequently, disruptions to Taiwan’s manufacturing ecosystem would carry profound consequences far beyond East Asia, affecting supply chains, industrial production, and technological innovation across Europe and the wider international economy.

For Europe, these developments have acquired increasing policy relevance through the emerging concept of economic security. Dr. Pugliese explained that the European Union’s efforts to diversify supply chains and reduce strategic dependencies have naturally directed attention toward Taiwan’s semiconductor industry. European governments have actively sought to attract investment from leading Taiwanese firms, recognizing that securing access to advanced chip production has become essential for the continent’s digital transformation, industrial competitiveness, and technological sovereignty. Europe’s growing diplomatic engagement with Taiwan should therefore be understood not merely as an expression of support for democratic values but also as a pragmatic effort to strengthen resilience within strategically vital industrial sectors. 

This convergence of economic and security considerations extended beyond semiconductors to encompass defense industrial cooperation more broadly. Dr. Pugliese observed that both Europe and East Asia have experienced a dramatic expansion in defense expenditure following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the intensification of geopolitical competition. Rising military budgets have created new opportunities for collaboration in defense technologies, weapons systems, logistics, maintenance, and industrial production. European defense manufacturers increasingly view Indo-Pacific markets as important destinations for exports, co-development projects, and long-term industrial partnerships. At the same time, such cooperation contributes to reducing production costs and strengthening Europe’s own defense industrial base. Security cooperation, therefore, increasingly reflects not only strategic necessity but also significant commercial incentives. 

Throughout this discussion, Dr. Pugliese repeatedly cautioned against simplistic explanations of Europe’s growing engagement with Taiwan and the wider Indo-Pacific. While democratic values undoubtedly play an important role in shaping European discourse, he argued that material interests remain equally significant. Taiwan matters because it is democratic, but it also matters because it occupies a pivotal position within global technology supply chains, financial markets, and maritime trade routes. Likewise, Europe’s Indo-Pacific strategy reflects concern over regional stability, but it also reflects the continent’s own industrial ambitions, technological needs, and economic future. These multiple motivations coexist rather than compete, producing a more complex picture than narratives centered exclusively upon ideology or security.

An equally important contribution of the lecture lay in Dr. Pugliese’s application of the concept of the security dilemma to contemporary US–China relations. He suggested that many of the military deployments, alliance expansions, and deterrence measures currently unfolding across East Asia are driven by reciprocal perceptions of insecurity. Measures intended by one side to preserve stability may be interpreted by the other as preparations for confrontation, thereby generating self-reinforcing cycles of strategic competition. Taiwan, in this sense, is both an object of genuine political concern and a symbol of broader geopolitical rivalry. Understanding these action–reaction dynamics, Pugliese argued, is essential for avoiding overly deterministic interpretations of current tensions while appreciating the structural pressures confronting policymakers on all sides.

By the conclusion of this section, participants were presented with a nuanced portrait of Taiwan as far more than a regional flashpoint. Instead, the island emerged as a focal point where questions of technological leadership, economic resilience, alliance politics, military deterrence, and strategic communication converge. For Europe, Taiwan increasingly embodies the wider challenges of navigating an international environment in which economics and security have become inseparable. The European Union’s growing interest in the Indo-Pacific, therefore, cannot be understood solely as an extension of transatlantic solidarity or support for democratic partners. Rather, it reflects the recognition that Europe’s own prosperity, technological competitiveness, and strategic autonomy are becoming progressively intertwined with developments unfolding thousands of kilometers beyond its traditional neighborhood.

Transactional Alliances, Strategic Autonomy, and Europe’s Indo-Pacific Future

In the concluding section of his lecture, Dr. Pugliese turned to the question that ultimately linked every preceding discussion: how should the European Union position itself in an Indo-Pacific increasingly shaped not only by intensifying US–China competition but also by profound changes within the United States itself? While much of the strategic debate over the past decade has focused on China’s growing influence, Dr. Pugliese argued that Europe’s most immediate challenge now lies in responding to the transformation of American grand strategy under Donald Trump’s second administration. The issue confronting European policymakers, he suggested, is no longer simply how to manage China’s rise but how to navigate an international environment in which the reliability, priorities, and strategic commitments of the United States have themselves become less predictable. 

Dr. Pugliese observed that the second Trump administration has introduced a noticeably more transactional approach to international alliances than its predecessors. While the broader American national security establishment—including the Department of Defense, the State Department, and the defense-industrial sector—continues to regard strategic competition with China as the defining challenge of twenty-first-century international politics, the White House has increasingly emphasized burden-sharing, domestic priorities, and the reduction of costly foreign commitments. Rather than fundamentally abandoning America’s alliances, Washington has sought to redefine them according to a logic that requires allies to assume substantially greater responsibility for their own security. In this sense, Dr. Pugliese suggested, contemporary American strategy reflects not isolationism in the traditional sense, but a recalibration of alliance management designed to reduce American costs while preserving strategic influence. 

This changing approach has had profound implications for both Europe and East Asia. Throughout the lecture, Dr. Pugliese repeatedly emphasized that Washington now expects its allies to devote considerably larger shares of national resources to defense. European governments have been encouraged to expand military expenditure well beyond previous commitments, while similar expectations have been directed toward Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and other Indo-Pacific partners. Such demands are presented not merely as financial obligations but as evidence of political resolve and strategic credibility. In practical terms, this means that allies are increasingly expected to shoulder a greater proportion of deterrence, procurement, logistics, and operational planning, thereby allowing the United States to preserve flexibility while maintaining its broader strategic posture toward China. 

Dr. Pugliese also highlighted the important economic dimension underlying these developments. Rising defense expenditure is not simply a matter of military preparedness; it has become an increasingly significant component of industrial policy on both sides of the Atlantic. The expansion of defense production stimulates investment, creates manufacturing demand, and contributes to broader efforts at industrial revitalization. Referring to developments in Germany and elsewhere in Europe, Dr. Pugliese observed that defense procurement has increasingly been linked to debates surrounding reindustrialization, technological innovation, and economic competitiveness. Former civilian manufacturing facilities are gradually being adapted to defense production, while military industries have assumed renewed importance within national economic strategies. The security agenda, therefore, cannot be separated from wider questions concerning employment, industrial policy, and technological modernization. 

The lecture nevertheless cautioned against interpreting contemporary alliance politics exclusively through the lens of burden-sharing. Dr. Pugliese argued that Washington’s approach toward China has itself become increasingly complex. Although the strategic framework established during the first Trump administration continues to shape American policy, recent developments suggest a greater willingness on the part of the White House to pursue tactical accommodation with Beijing where domestic political or economic interests require it. He pointed to the temporary stabilization of US–China relations following the escalation of tariff disputes and China’s restrictions on exports of rare earth minerals as evidence that geopolitical rivalry increasingly coexists with selective negotiation and pragmatic compromise. Great-power competition, therefore, does not unfold as a linear process of confrontation but rather through continuous cycles of competition, bargaining, and limited cooperation. 

Rare earths emerged as a particularly revealing illustration of the changing character of economic statecraft. China’s restrictions on exports of strategically important minerals exposed the extent to which advanced industrial economies remain dependent upon Chinese production in sectors essential to digital technologies, renewable energy, and defense manufacturing. Dr. Pugliese noted that these measures affected not only civilian industries but also the American defense-industrial base itself, demonstrating that economic interdependence continues to constrain even the world’s most powerful states. The resulting negotiations between Washington and Beijing therefore reflected mutual vulnerabilities rather than unilateral leverage. For Europe, this episode underscored the urgency of diversifying critical supply chains while avoiding simplistic assumptions that complete economic disengagement from China remains either feasible or desirable. 

Turning once more to Taiwan, Dr. Pugliese argued that recent American policy illustrates the increasingly transactional character of alliance politics. While Washington has continued to announce substantial arms packages and reaffirm its interest in maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait, implementation has often proven uneven. Delays in weapons deliveries, greater pressure on Taipei regarding trade and tariff issues, and adjustments to diplomatic engagement all suggest a more flexible approach shaped by immediate political considerations, including domestic electoral calculations. Nevertheless, Dr. Pugliese cautioned against interpreting these developments as evidence of strategic disengagement. Beneath the political rhetoric of the White House, the broader American national security apparatus continues to deepen military cooperation with Japan, Australia, the Philippines, and other regional partners. Defense planning, alliance coordination, and operational integration initiated during earlier administrations have largely continued, illustrating the considerable institutional continuity that often characterizes foreign policy despite changes in political leadership. 

One of the lecture’s most insightful observations concerned the coexistence of continuity and change within American strategy. Although presidential rhetoric may fluctuate considerably, longstanding institutional commitments frequently persist beneath the surface. Military exercises continue, defense partnerships expand, and strategic planning remains oriented toward balancing China’s growing capabilities. This distinction between political leadership and institutional strategy, Dr. Pugliese argued, is essential for understanding current international developments. It also cautions against interpreting individual diplomatic episodes in isolation from the deeper structural forces that continue to shape US–China competition.

Throughout this concluding discussion, Dr. Pugliese consistently returned to the position of the European Union. Europe, he argued, increasingly finds itself compelled to pursue a delicate balancing act. On one hand, the continent shares important strategic concerns with the United States regarding China’s growing military capabilities, technological ambitions, and economic influence. On the other hand, Europe possesses significant commercial interests in maintaining productive relations with Asian economies, including China itself. Simultaneously, the unpredictability associated with American foreign policy reinforces longstanding European aspirations for greater strategic autonomy. Rather than blindly aligning with either Washington or Beijing, the European Union must therefore cultivate the capacity to pursue its own interests while preserving constructive partnerships across the Indo-Pacific.

Importantly, Dr. Pugliese rejected simplistic narratives portraying Europe as either an unquestioning follower of American strategy or an independent geopolitical pole entirely detached from transatlantic cooperation. Instead, he depicted European policymaking as a process of continuous negotiation among competing priorities: maintaining alliance solidarity, preserving economic competitiveness, protecting critical technologies, strengthening defense capabilities, and avoiding unnecessary escalation with China. The Indo-Pacific strategy adopted by the European Union reflects precisely this balancing effort. Its deliberately inclusive language seeks to strengthen engagement with democratic partners while avoiding explicit endorsement of comprehensive containment strategies. Europe, in other words, is gradually seeking to develop a distinct Indo-Pacific identity that remains compatible with transatlantic cooperation without being wholly defined by it.

As the lecture drew to a close, Dr. Pugliese emphasized that understanding Europe’s evolving role in Asia requires abandoning narrow regional perspectives. The Indo-Pacific and the Euro-Atlantic can no longer be treated as separate strategic theatres. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, China’s growing global influence, technological competition, supply-chain vulnerabilities, and alliance politics have created an increasingly interconnected geopolitical landscape in which developments in one region inevitably reverberate across the other. Europe’s future prosperity, security, and strategic autonomy will therefore depend upon its ability to engage effectively with both theatres simultaneously.

Taken as a whole, Dr. Pugliese’s lecture provided participants with a remarkably nuanced framework for understanding the European Union’s evolving engagement with Asia. Rather than presenting the Indo-Pacific as merely the latest geopolitical slogan, he demonstrated how strategic narratives, alliance politics, economic interdependence, technological competition, and shifting global power structures have become deeply intertwined. By tracing the intellectual origins of the Indo-Pacific concept, examining the evolution of US–China rivalry, analyzing Taiwan’s strategic significance, and exploring the implications of America’s increasingly transactional alliance policy, the lecture illuminated the profound transformation currently underway in international politics. Most importantly, it underscored that Europe’s future “between oceans” will not be determined solely by the choices of Washington or Beijing but by its own ability to formulate a coherent, strategically autonomous, and globally engaged vision capable of navigating an increasingly contested international order.

The iconic euro (€) sculpture.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Assoc. Prof. Reuben Wong: Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

The European Union’s pursuit of strategic autonomy has emerged as one of the defining geopolitical debates of the twenty-first century, reflecting the growing convergence of security, economics, technology, and global power competition. In this intellectually stimulating lecture, Associate Professor Reuben Wong examined how Europe’s search for greater strategic independence has been reshaped by an increasingly volatile international environment marked by intensifying US–China rivalry, Russia’s revisionism, and rapid technological transformation. Challenging conventional assumptions about Europe’s transatlantic relationship and its approach toward China, he argued that strategic autonomy requires not only stronger defense and economic security instruments but also a fundamental reassessment of Europe’s place within an emerging multipolar order. The lecture offered participants a provocative and nuanced framework for understanding the future of European geopolitics.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The third day of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 marked a decisive transition from examining the political economy of international trade toward confronting the broader geopolitical forces reshaping Europe’s external relations. Convened under the overarching theme, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” the programme explored how the European Union is increasingly compelled to navigate an international environment characterized not only by intensifying strategic rivalry between the United States and China but also by the erosion of long-standing assumptions about globalization, security, and the liberal international order. Against this backdrop, Associate Professor Reuben Wong of the National University of Singapore delivered a thought-provoking lecture entitled “Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools,” inviting participants to reconsider Europe’s geopolitical position through an analytical lens that combined European integration studies with the strategic realities of contemporary international politics.

From the outset, Assoc. Prof. Wong made clear that his objective was not merely to catalogue the European Union’s emerging economic security instruments or explain the technical dimensions of de-risking. Rather, he sought to interrogate the underlying assumptions shaping European strategic thinking at a moment when the continent finds itself simultaneously confronting geopolitical uncertainty, technological transformation, and shifting distributions of global power. Drawing upon his long-standing scholarship on European foreign policy, as well as his experience observing both European and Asian strategic debates, Assoc. Prof. Wong encouraged participants to move beyond familiar policy slogans and instead examine the deeper questions surrounding Europe’s identity, capabilities, and long-term strategic interests.

One of the lecture’s distinguishing features was the perspective from which it was delivered. Speaking from Singapore—a country whose foreign policy has long depended upon balancing relations among competing major powers—Assoc. Prof. Wong approached debates over European strategic autonomy with a degree of analytical distance rarely encountered within discussions dominated by either Brussels or Washington. Rather than treating Europe’s geopolitical dilemmas as uniquely European, he situated them within a broader transformation of the international system, where established powers increasingly confront rising competitors, traditional alliances are being reassessed, and economic interdependence has itself become a source of strategic vulnerability. This external vantage point enriched the discussion by encouraging participants to question assumptions that often remain implicit within European policy circles.

Assoc. Prof. Wong also began by highlighting the conceptual ambiguity surrounding two of the most frequently invoked expressions in contemporary European policy discourse: strategic autonomy and de-risking. Although both terms have become central to debates on European foreign and economic policy, they often carry different meanings depending upon the context in which they are employed. Assoc. Prof. Wong observed that discussions of de-risking almost invariably evoke Europe’s increasingly complex relationship with China. The concept reflects growing concerns regarding excessive dependence on Chinese supply chains, critical raw materials, strategic technologies, intellectual property protection, and infrastructure deemed essential to European economic resilience. De-risking, therefore, does not necessarily imply economic decoupling from China but rather seeks to reduce strategic vulnerabilities while preserving mutually beneficial commercial relations.

By contrast, Assoc. Prof. Wong suggested that strategic autonomy has historically been associated less with China than with Europe’s relationship with the United States. At its core lies the question of whether the European Union possesses the political, military, and institutional capacity to pursue its own foreign policy independently of American strategic preferences. While the expression has acquired renewed prominence following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and amid renewed uncertainty surrounding American global leadership, Assoc. Prof. Wong reminded participants that the debate itself stretches back to the end of the Cold War. Since the early 1990s, European leaders have repeatedly grappled with the challenge of transforming the Union from an economic giant into a credible geopolitical actor capable of defending both its interests and its values.

Rather than presenting these concepts as separate policy debates, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that they should be understood as interconnected responses to a rapidly changing international environment. Strategic autonomy addresses Europe’s dependence on external security guarantees, while de-risking reflects growing awareness of economic dependencies that may equally constrain political decision-making. Together, they illustrate the European Union’s broader search for resilience in a world where geopolitical competition increasingly extends beyond military affairs to encompass trade, technology, investment, industrial policy, and digital infrastructure.

Throughout this opening section of the lecture, Assoc. Prof. Wong established the intellectual framework that would guide the remainder of his presentation: understanding Europe’s future requires examining not only the policies it adopts, but also the assumptions it holds about power, alliances, and the changing architecture of the international system. By placing strategic autonomy and economic security within this wider geopolitical context, he invited participants to reconsider whether Europe’s existing conceptual frameworks remain adequate for navigating an era defined by intensifying great-power competition and accelerating technological transformation.

The Long Search for Strategic Autonomy: From European Aspirations to Geopolitical Reality

Associate Professor Reuben Wong.
Associate Professor Reuben Wong is Deputy Head of the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore.

Having established the conceptual foundations of strategic autonomy and de-risking, Assoc. Prof. Wong proceeded to examine the historical evolution of Europe’s quest for greater geopolitical independence. Rather than portraying strategic autonomy as a recent response to heightened tensions with China or the return of Donald Trump to the White House, he situated it within a much longer trajectory of European integration that has unfolded since the end of the Cold War. His historical reconstruction demonstrated that contemporary debates over European defense, foreign policy, and economic security are best understood not as abrupt policy innovations but as the latest chapter in a decades-long effort to reconcile Europe’s political ambitions with its enduring strategic dependencies.

At the center of Assoc. Prof. Wong’s discussion stood a deceptively simple definition of strategic autonomy: the ability of a state—or, in the European Union’s unique case, a union of sovereign states—to pursue its preferred foreign policy and defend its interests without excessive dependence on external powers. Although straightforward in formulation, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that this definition immediately exposes one of the European Union’s most enduring dilemmas. Unlike conventional nation-states, the EU has long aspired to exercise geopolitical influence while lacking many of the instruments traditionally associated with great-power status, particularly unified military capabilities and a fully integrated foreign policy apparatus. Consequently, strategic autonomy has remained as much an aspiration as an accomplished reality.

This ambition has shaped European foreign policy thinking since the early 1990s, when the collapse of the bipolar international order appeared to create new opportunities for Europe to emerge as an independent strategic actor. The establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) represented one of the most ambitious manifestations of this aspiration. By seeking to coordinate foreign policy among member states, the EU hoped to complement its growing economic integration with greater diplomatic coherence and international influence. Yet, as Assoc. Prof. Wong reminded participants, translating institutional innovation into effective geopolitical action proved considerably more difficult than its architects had anticipated.

To illustrate this challenge, Assoc. Prof. Wong revisited one of the defining moments in post-Cold War European diplomacy: the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. At the outset of the crisis, European leaders famously declared that the conflict represented “the hour of Europe,” signaling their confidence that the continent possessed both the responsibility and the capability to resolve security crises in its own neighborhood. Events quickly exposed the limitations of that ambition. As the conflicts escalated into prolonged warfare, ethnic cleansing, and genocide, European diplomatic initiatives failed to prevent violence, while decisive military intervention ultimately depended upon the United States and NATO. For Assoc. Prof. Wong, the Yugoslav wars became an enduring reminder that Europe’s geopolitical aspirations remained constrained by its continued reliance on American military power.

This lesson profoundly shaped subsequent debates over European defense integration. Assoc. Prof. Wong devoted particular attention to the 1998 Saint-Malo Declaration, jointly issued by British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, which called for the European Union to develop autonomous military capabilities capable of responding to regional crises. Although frequently celebrated as a milestone in the evolution of European security policy, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that the declaration also revealed fundamental differences regarding the meaning of strategic autonomy itself.

France, he explained, traditionally viewed strategic autonomy through the lens of genuine strategic independence. Rooted in Gaullist thinking and reinforced by decades of skepticism toward excessive reliance on Washington, successive French governments argued that Europe should possess independent military capabilities, autonomous command structures, and the political freedom to undertake operations without depending upon NATO. Strategic autonomy, from this perspective, required Europe to become a fully-fledged geopolitical actor capable of acting on its own behalf.

Britain’s interpretation differed significantly. While London supported stronger European defense cooperation, it remained firmly committed to preserving NATO as the cornerstone of European security. British policymakers generally understood strategic autonomy not as an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance but as a complementary mechanism that would enable European states to contribute more effectively to collective defense without duplicating NATO structures. As Assoc. Prof. Wong noted, this more Atlanticist understanding was shared by many other European governments, particularly those in Northern and Central Europe, which regarded American security guarantees as indispensable to continental stability.

These competing interpretations, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued, help explain why European defense integration has repeatedly advanced in incremental rather than transformative ways. Although successive crises—including the Arab Spring, Russia’s intervention in Georgia, the annexation of Crimea, and ultimately Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine—have reinforced calls for greater European strategic capacity, member states have continued to differ over the extent to which strategic autonomy should supplement or gradually replace dependence on the United States.

Drawing upon his own experience as a diplomat and scholar observing European capitals, Assoc. Prof. Wong enriched this historical analysis with comparative reflections on how different countries interpreted the post-Cold War strategic environment. He recalled that policymakers in Paris were already contemplating a future in which American reliability could no longer be taken for granted, prompting early efforts to strengthen European defense capabilities. By contrast, officials in London, Bonn, and many other European capitals struggled to imagine a European security architecture detached from American leadership. These contrasting strategic cultures, he suggested, continue to shape debates over European defense to this day.

The return of Donald Trump to the White House has injected renewed urgency into these long-standing discussions. While strategic autonomy had often been treated as an ambitious long-term objective, changing transatlantic dynamics have increasingly transformed it into what many European leaders now perceive as an immediate strategic necessity. Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong cautioned against viewing contemporary developments solely through the lens of personalities or electoral cycles. The deeper issue, he argued, concerns whether Europe has sufficiently adapted to a changing international system in which alliances can no longer be assumed to be permanent or unconditional.

In one of the lecture’s most intellectually provocative moments, Assoc. Prof. Wong introduced a distinctly realist interpretation of contemporary international politics. Reflecting upon the evolution of European strategic thinking, he suggested that the European Union had spent much of the post-Cold War era operating under liberal assumptions regarding the durability of democratic solidarity and the permanence of the rules-based international order. Those assumptions, he argued, increasingly require reconsideration. States, including democratic allies, ultimately pursue their own interests, and alliances endure only so long as they continue to serve mutually beneficial strategic purposes. From this perspective, expecting the United States to indefinitely shoulder the burden of European security irrespective of its own changing priorities may represent less a realistic strategic assessment than an increasingly untenable political assumption.

By tracing the historical evolution of strategic autonomy through successive geopolitical crises, Assoc. Prof. Wong demonstrated that Europe’s present predicament is neither accidental nor entirely new. Rather, contemporary debates reflect the culmination of unresolved tensions that have accompanied European integration for more than three decades. The challenge facing the European Union today, therefore, is not simply to devise new policy instruments, but to determine whether it is finally prepared to align its strategic ambitions with the capabilities required to sustain genuine geopolitical autonomy.

Between Washington and Beijing: Reassessing Europe’s Strategic Environment

Photo: Dreamstime.

Having traced the historical evolution of strategic autonomy, Assoc. Prof. Wong shifted the discussion toward the rapidly changing international environment within which the European Union must now pursue that ambition. Rather than treating Europe’s security dilemmas as the product of a single crisis, he situated them within a broader transformation of global politics marked by shifting power balances, intensifying great-power competition, and the gradual erosion of assumptions that had underpinned the post-Cold War international order. Throughout this section of the lecture, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that Europe’s strategic predicament cannot be understood solely through its relations with either Washington or Beijing; instead, it emerges from the increasingly complex triangular relationship among the European Union, the United States, and China.

Assoc. Prof. Wong began by observing that Europe finds itself confronting an unprecedented convergence of external pressures. Relations with Russia have deteriorated dramatically following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, fundamentally altering Europe’s security landscape. At the same time, the return of Donald Trump to the American presidency has reopened longstanding questions regarding the reliability of the transatlantic alliance, while relations with China have become increasingly complicated by disputes over trade imbalances, technological competition, industrial policy, human rights, and concerns over Beijing’s growing strategic partnership with Russia. Rather than confronting a single geopolitical rival, Europe now faces the far more demanding challenge of managing simultaneous tensions with multiple major powers whose interests increasingly intersect.

The lecture devoted particular attention to the implications of changing transatlantic relations. Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that the debate over European strategic autonomy has acquired renewed urgency not simply because of Russia’s military aggression but because uncertainty regarding American strategic commitments has become significantly more pronounced. Referring to the early months of Trump’s second presidency, he recalled disputes over tariffs, trade policy, and even Washington’s controversial rhetoric regarding Greenland. These developments, he suggested, reinforced concerns among European policymakers that the United States was becoming an increasingly unpredictable partner whose strategic priorities might diverge from those of its European allies.

Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong was careful to emphasize that such developments should not be interpreted merely as the consequence of one administration or one political leader. Instead, he invited participants to consider whether Europe has been too slow to recognize broader structural changes in international politics. Drawing upon a realist understanding of international relations, he argued that great powers do not maintain costly alliances indefinitely out of sentiment or historical loyalty alone. Rather, alliances endure because they continue to serve concrete strategic and material interests. From this perspective, the expectation that the United States will remain permanently committed to underwriting European security regardless of shifting geopolitical priorities may no longer represent a sustainable assumption.

This argument marked one of the lecture’s most provocative departures from conventional European policy discourse. Assoc. Prof. Wong suggested that, for much of the post-Cold War period, European strategic thinking had been shaped by liberal assumptions concerning democratic solidarity, institutional cooperation, and the durability of the rules-based international order. While these assumptions contributed significantly to European integration itself, he argued that they have become increasingly difficult to reconcile with contemporary geopolitical realities. The resurgence of great-power rivalry, growing economic nationalism, and renewed emphasis on national interest all point toward a more competitive international environment in which states, including democratic allies, increasingly prioritize their own strategic calculations.

It was within this broader realist framework that Assoc. Prof. Wong introduced what was arguably the lecture’s most controversial proposition. Contrary to prevailing narratives within many European political circles, he suggested that the United States, rather than China, has increasingly become the principal source of strategic uncertainty confronting Europe. Several years earlier, such an assessment might have appeared implausible. Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that recent developments require a reassessment of long-held assumptions about the respective roles of Washington and Beijing within the international system.

To support this contention, Assoc. Prof. Wong contrasted the behavior of the two powers in relation to the international rules-based order. While acknowledging the numerous disagreements that continue to characterize relations between Europe and China, he nevertheless argued that Beijing has, in several important respects, sought to operate within existing international institutions and norms established after the Second World War. By contrast, he suggested that recent American policies have increasingly challenged many of the very principles that Washington itself had historically championed, including support for multilateral institutions, international trade regimes, and predictable alliance commitments. In Assoc. Prof. Wong’s assessment, the paradox of the current international order lies in the fact that the principal architect of the post-war liberal system now appears increasingly willing to revise or abandon elements of that system, while China often presents itself as a defender of institutional stability and economic globalization.

This interpretation naturally challenged participants to reconsider familiar geopolitical narratives. Assoc. Prof. Wong acknowledged that many European policymakers continue to view China primarily through the lenses of strategic competition, human rights concerns, and systemic rivalry. Nevertheless, he encouraged his audience to distinguish between legitimate concerns regarding China’s growing influence and broader assumptions that automatically portray Beijing as the principal disruptor of the international order. Historical experience, institutional inertia, and deeply embedded transatlantic political cultures, he suggested, have made it difficult for many Europeans to recognize the extent to which the geopolitical landscape has evolved.

At the same time, Assoc. Prof. Wong cautioned against reducing international politics to a simplistic binary competition between Washington and Beijing. Instead, he argued that Europe’s strategic interests require a far more nuanced understanding of both powers. China should neither be romanticized nor automatically treated as an adversary whose rise inevitably threatens European prosperity. Equally, the United States should not be assumed to remain an unchanging guarantor of European security simply because of decades of successful transatlantic cooperation. Strategic autonomy, therefore, demands that Europe develop the analytical capacity to evaluate both relationships on the basis of its own interests rather than inherited geopolitical assumptions.

The lecture also situated China’s rise within the longer trajectory of global power redistribution. Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that China should no longer be understood merely as an emerging power but rather as a fully-fledged superpower whose influence increasingly shapes international politics, global markets, technological innovation, and diplomatic agendas. Referring to recent high-level interactions between Washington and Beijing, he suggested that historians may ultimately identify the latest summit between the two governments as a symbolic moment in which the United States implicitly acknowledged China as a strategic peer. The absence of unequivocal American dominance in these negotiations reflected, in his view, a broader transition toward a more multipolar international system.

Within such a system, Europe can no longer rely upon geopolitical habits formed during the Cold War or the immediate post-Cold War decades. Instead, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that the European Union must cultivate a more independent strategic identity grounded in realistic assessments of its own capabilities, interests, and external environment. This requires moving beyond reflexive alignments with either superpower while simultaneously preserving constructive relations with both. For Europe, the challenge is not to choose between Washington and Beijing, but to develop sufficient strategic confidence to cooperate, compete, and disagree with each according to its own long-term interests.

By the conclusion of this section, Assoc. Prof. Wong had fundamentally reframed the strategic autonomy debate. Rather than presenting it as a defensive response to external threats alone, he portrayed it as a process of intellectual and political maturation through which the European Union must redefine its place within an increasingly fragmented international order. Strategic autonomy, in this sense, is less about distancing Europe from particular partners than about equipping it with the capacity to navigate a world in which geopolitical certainty has become the exception rather than the rule.

Normative Power, Market Power, and Europe’s Technological Challenge

Photo: Maryna Kushnarova / Dreamstime.

Having examined Europe’s shifting geopolitical environment, Assoc. Prof. Wong turned to one of the lecture’s central analytical questions: whether the European Union still possesses the capacity to shape the international order through its traditional strengths. Rather than focusing exclusively on military capabilities or diplomatic influence, Assoc. Prof. Wong explored Europe’s changing position as a producer of international norms, regulatory standards, and market rules. In doing so, he revisited two of the most influential concepts in European Union scholarship—Normative Power Europeand Market Power Europe—before questioning whether the material foundations that once sustained these forms of influence remain sufficiently robust in an era of accelerating technological competition and shifting global economic power.

Assoc. Prof. Wong began by discussing the influential work of political scientist Ian Manners, whose concept of Normative Power Europe has long occupied a central place in debates on the European Union’s international role. Manners argued that the EU’s distinctive influence derives not primarily from military power but from its capacity to define what constitutes legitimate behavior in international politics. Through the promotion of democracy, human rights, rule of law, multilateralism, environmental protection, and good governance, the Union has sought to exercise influence by shaping norms rather than imposing coercion. This vision has become deeply embedded within both academic literature and European policymaking, reinforcing the idea that the EU represents a unique kind of international actor whose strength lies in persuasion rather than force.

While acknowledging the significance of this intellectual tradition, Assoc. Prof. Wong encouraged participants to distinguish between aspiration and empirical reality. The European Union undoubtedly seeks to project normative influence, he argued, but successful norm entrepreneurship requires willing audiences capable of accepting and internalizing those standards. In practice, the EU has proven most effective when engaging countries that aspire to join the Union or maintain exceptionally close institutional and economic ties with it. The accession process itself illustrates the remarkable power of European conditionality, whereby candidate states undertake extensive political, legal, and economic reforms in exchange for eventual membership. Beyond this sphere of attraction, however, Europe’s capacity to shape political norms becomes considerably more limited.

To illustrate this point, Assoc. Prof. Wong referred to states that possess sufficient political autonomy, demographic weight, or strategic leverage to resist European pressure. Russia represented the clearest example of a country unwilling to organize its domestic or foreign policy according to European expectations. Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong also cited Turkey, Iran, and other significant regional powers that, despite maintaining important economic relationships with the EU, have repeatedly demonstrated their willingness to reject European normative preferences when these conflict with domestic political priorities or broader strategic interests. Such examples, he argued, reveal that normative influence ultimately depends upon underlying distributions of political and economic power rather than normative appeal alone.

If Europe’s ability to export political values has become increasingly constrained, Assoc. Prof. Wong suggested that its more enduring source of influence has historically resided elsewhere. Here he introduced Chad Damro’s concept of Market Power Europe, which shifts attention from political ideals to economic scale. Unlike normative power, which rests upon persuasion and legitimacy, market power derives from the size, wealth, and regulatory sophistication of the European single market. As one of the world’s largest integrated economic areas, the EU has long possessed the ability to establish product standards, environmental regulations, competition rules, labor protections, and consumer safety requirements that multinational corporations frequently adopt worldwide. Access to the European market has thus encouraged firms and governments alike to conform to European regulatory frameworks, extending the Union’s influence well beyond its territorial borders.

For Assoc. Prof. Wong, however, even this formidable source of influence can no longer be taken for granted. Market power ultimately depends upon economic dynamism, technological leadership, and sustained commercial relevance. Here he painted a considerably more cautious picture of Europe’s future. While the European Union remains one of the world’s largest economies, its relative share of global trade has steadily declined over recent decades as emerging economies—particularly China and increasingly India—have assumed a larger role in global production, investment, and innovation. Whereas Europe once accounted for roughly a quarter of world trade, its share has gradually diminished, reflecting broader structural changes in the global economy.

This decline carries consequences extending well beyond trade statistics. Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that countries which dominate emerging industries also acquire disproportionate influence over the standards governing those industries. Historically, Europe’s industrial strength enabled it to shape international regulations across numerous sectors, from manufacturing and pharmaceuticals to environmental protection and consumer rights. Yet leadership in future technologies increasingly belongs elsewhere. As innovation shifts toward artificial intelligence, advanced semiconductors, electric vehicles, renewable energy systems, and digital infrastructure, regulatory influence will increasingly follow technological leadership rather than historical institutional prestige.

Artificial intelligence emerged as perhaps the most illustrative example of this transformation. Assoc. Prof. Wong observed that Europe possesses world-class universities, research institutions, and highly skilled scientific communities. Nevertheless, these strengths have not translated into globally dominant AI platforms capable of competing directly with American and Chinese technological giants. While companies such as OpenAI, Google, Anthropic, DeepSeek, Alibaba, Tencent, and Baidu increasingly shape the global AI ecosystem, Europe has yet to produce comparable commercial champions operating at similar scale. Consequently, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued, Europe risks finding itself in the position of regulating technologies whose fundamental architecture, commercial logic, and technical standards are being established elsewhere.

The discussion then broadened to encompass the wider technological transformation underway in China. Assoc. Prof. Wong challenged participants to reconsider widespread perceptions that continue to portray China primarily as a manufacturing economy dependent upon copying foreign technologies. Drawing upon personal experiences from his recent visits, he described a society that has rapidly become one of the world’s foremost laboratories of technological innovation. Cashless payment systems, integrated digital platforms, sophisticated logistics networks, and autonomous delivery technologies illustrated the extent to which China has advanced in areas where many developed economies still rely upon older infrastructures. These examples were not presented merely as anecdotes but as evidence of China’s growing capacity to shape future technological ecosystems.

Particularly striking was Assoc. Prof. Wong’s discussion of China’s digital economy. Recounting his surprise when physical cash and even international credit cards proved largely unusable during his visits, he highlighted how mobile payment platforms such as Alipay and WeChat Pay have fundamentally transformed everyday economic life. Likewise, China’s extensive deployment of automated logistics—including robotic delivery services in hotels and urban environments—served to illustrate the speed with which technological innovation has been integrated into ordinary commercial practice. Such developments, he argued, underscore the increasingly significant gap separating technological adoption in parts of Asia from prevailing assumptions still common in Europe.

These observations naturally fed into Assoc. Prof. Wong’s broader concern regarding Europe’s future competitiveness. If technological innovation increasingly determines not only economic prosperity but also the capacity to establish international standards, Europe faces a narrowing window within which it can preserve meaningful regulatory influence. Regulatory excellence alone cannot indefinitely compensate for declining industrial leadership. Without stronger innovation ecosystems and greater participation in frontier technologies, Europe’s capacity to shape global governance may gradually erode despite its sophisticated legal and institutional frameworks.

The lecture also encouraged participants to place China’s contemporary rise within a broader historical context. Assoc. Prof. Wong reminded his audience that Chinese strategic thinking continues to be profoundly shaped by the historical memory of the so-called Century of Humiliation, during which successive unequal treaties, foreign occupations, and imperial interventions severely constrained Chinese sovereignty. Although China escaped formal colonization in the manner experienced by many Asian and African societies, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that nineteenth-century European and Japanese interventions nonetheless left enduring historical scars. The visible architectural legacies of foreign concessions in cities such as Shanghai continue to serve as reminders of a period during which external powers exercised extraordinary influence over Chinese territory and governance.

By invoking this historical perspective, Assoc. Prof. Wong sought neither to justify nor to excuse contemporary Chinese policies. Rather, he encouraged participants to appreciate how historical memory informs present-day strategic behavior. European concerns regarding China’s growing global influence are undoubtedly significant, he acknowledged, yet Chinese policymakers likewise interpret international politics through a historical narrative centered upon sovereignty, national rejuvenation, and the determination never again to experience external subordination. Understanding these competing historical narratives, Assoc. Prof. Wong suggested, constitutes an essential prerequisite for developing more sophisticated European engagement with China.

From De-risking to Strategic Partnership: Reimagining Europe’s Economic Security

Stacks of euro coins placed before the flag of the European Union.
Stacks of euro coins placed before the flag of the European Union, symbolizing the euro currency and European economic integration. Photo: Marian Vejcik / Dreamstime.

In the concluding section of his lecture, Assoc. Prof. Wong shifted from diagnosing Europe’s strategic predicament to exploring the policy choices available to the European Union as it seeks to strengthen its economic resilience in an increasingly contested geopolitical environment. Returning to the second concept introduced at the beginning of the session—de-risking—he examined how the EU’s emerging economic security agenda fits within the broader pursuit of strategic autonomy. Rather than viewing economic security solely through the lens of defensive measures against perceived external threats, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued that Europe’s long-term success will depend upon combining resilience with openness, regulation with innovation, and strategic caution with international cooperation.

Although he acknowledged that discussions surrounding de-risking are frequently associated with reducing Europe’s dependence on China, Assoc. Prof. Wong cautioned against equating de-risking with comprehensive economic decoupling. Such an approach, he implied, would neither be economically sustainable nor strategically desirable. Instead, he presented de-risking as an effort to identify and mitigate vulnerabilities in areas where excessive dependence on external suppliers could undermine Europe’s political autonomy or economic stability. Critical raw materials, advanced semiconductors, digital infrastructure, strategic technologies, and resilient supply chains have all become central components of this emerging economic security agenda. Yet, Assoc. Prof. Wong argued, the effectiveness of these policies ultimately depends upon whether they enhance Europe’s own competitiveness rather than merely restrict external actors.

The discussion naturally turned to the policy instruments increasingly available to the European Union. While Assoc. Prof. Wong did not provide an exhaustive catalogue of individual legislative measures, he emphasized that Europe has gradually assembled a more sophisticated economic security toolbox capable of responding to external coercion and strategic pressure. These instruments include mechanisms to scrutinize foreign investment, strengthen supply-chain resilience, regulate emerging technologies, protect critical infrastructure, and respond collectively to economic coercion by third countries. Such measures, he suggested, represent an important evolution in European policymaking, reflecting the growing recognition that economic interdependence can generate strategic vulnerabilities as well as mutual benefits.

A particularly revealing illustration of this evolving approach emerged from Assoc. Prof. Wong’s discussion of the tensions that followed the return of Donald Trump to the White House. Referring to disputes surrounding Greenland and the renewed threat of punitive tariffs against European partners, Assoc. Prof. Wong observed that these developments produced an unusually unified response from several EU member states. He highlighted the symbolic decision by a number of European governments to express support for Denmark following Washington’s increasingly assertive rhetoric regarding Greenland. Although these gestures carried limited immediate military significance, they nevertheless reflected an important political signal: European solidarity could no longer be assumed to operate only against external competitors traditionally perceived as strategic rivals. For perhaps the first time in NATO’s history, Assoc. Prof. Wong noted, several European governments found themselves collectively signaling resistance to political pressure originating from the United States itself.

This episode, he argued, underscored the growing relevance of Europe’s economic security instruments. Faced with the prospect of American tariffs and economic coercion, the European Union demonstrated its willingness to contemplate robust countermeasures capable of imposing significant economic costs in return. Assoc. Prof. Wong referred to the Union’s capacity to deploy powerful retaliatory trade instruments, observing that although such measures would inevitably entail substantial economic consequences for both sides, they nevertheless constitute an increasingly important source of European strategic leverage. Economic statecraft, in other words, has become an indispensable complement to traditional diplomacy within the EU’s broader pursuit of strategic autonomy.

Yet Assoc. Prof. Wong was equally careful to stress that Europe’s future cannot be secured through defensive instruments alone. Protection, regulation, and retaliatory capabilities may reduce vulnerability, but they cannot substitute for technological dynamism or sustained economic competitiveness. It was at this point that he introduced what emerged as one of the lecture’s most forward-looking themes: digital sovereignty. Rather than understanding digital sovereignty as an attempt to isolate Europe from global technological ecosystems, Assoc. Prof. Wong presented it as the capacity to shape the governance of technologies that increasingly underpin modern economies. Artificial intelligence, digital platforms, data governance, and algorithmic regulation have all become critical arenas in which geopolitical competition increasingly unfolds.

For Assoc. Prof. Wong, Europe continues to possess a valuable—albeit narrowing—opportunity to influence the regulatory architecture governing these emerging technologies. Although European firms have not produced global AI champions comparable to those found in the United States or China, the Union still retains considerable regulatory authority through the size and attractiveness of its internal market. By establishing clear standards concerning transparency, accountability, privacy, competition, and digital governance, Europe may continue to shape aspects of global technological development even where it no longer leads in technological innovation itself. However, Assoc. Prof. Wong repeatedly emphasized that this window of opportunity is unlikely to remain open indefinitely if Europe’s technological capabilities continue to lag behind those of its principal competitors.

This concern naturally led to one of the lecture’s most distinctive policy recommendations. Rather than seeking to insulate European markets from external technological leaders, Assoc. Prof. Wong advocated a more pragmatic strategy centered on selective international cooperation. In particular, he argued that Europe should deepen engagement with technologically advanced partners across Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and other innovation-driven economies. Such partnerships, he suggested, would enable Europe to participate more actively in emerging technological ecosystems while simultaneously strengthening its own competitiveness.

In advancing this argument, Assoc. Prof. Wong challenged approaches that rely primarily upon restrictive regulation or defensive protectionism. Attempting to legislate foreign technologies out of European markets, he argued, risks isolating Europe from the very innovations that are reshaping the global economy. Instead, Europe should seek opportunities for collaboration with market leaders, recognizing that technological leadership increasingly depends upon interconnected networks of research, investment, industrial production, and commercial cooperation rather than purely national capabilities.

To illustrate this point, Assoc. Prof. Wong referred to developments within the global electric vehicle industry. He observed that successful firms increasingly pursue partnerships across national boundaries rather than relying exclusively upon domestic production or political protection. As an example, he pointed to the willingness of companies such as Tesla to cooperate with leading Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers, demonstrating that commercial realities often encourage collaboration even amid broader geopolitical competition. Europe, he suggested, should draw lessons from such developments. Instead of viewing technological interdependence solely as a source of vulnerability, policymakers should also recognize its potential to accelerate innovation and strengthen long-term competitiveness.

Underlying this recommendation was Assoc. Prof. Wong’s broader conviction that Europe must cultivate a more confident understanding of its own strategic interests. Throughout the lecture, he consistently argued against framing international politics in rigid ideological or binary terms. Europe need not choose between unconditional alignment with Washington and comprehensive confrontation with Beijing. Nor should strategic autonomy be interpreted as strategic isolation. Rather, genuine autonomy requires the capacity to cooperate, compete, and disagree with multiple partners according to Europe’s own evolving interests and priorities.

As the lecture drew to a close, Assoc. Prof. Wong returned to the central theme that had connected each stage of his analysis: the European Union’s search for strategic autonomy in an era of profound geopolitical transformation. He suggested that this search cannot be reduced to military capability alone, nor can it be achieved solely through economic regulation or institutional reform. Strategic autonomy ultimately demands a broader intellectual shift in how Europe understands power itself. In a world where technological leadership, supply chains, innovation ecosystems, and digital infrastructure increasingly determine geopolitical influence, economic security has become inseparable from foreign policy and strategic decision-making.

The lecture concluded on a cautiously optimistic note. While Assoc. Prof. Wong openly acknowledged Europe’s relative decline in several domains—including demographic growth, technological innovation, and global market share—he rejected narratives of inevitable European marginalization. The Union continues to possess significant assets: one of the world’s largest integrated markets, highly developed regulatory institutions, advanced research capacities, and an enduring commitment to multilateral cooperation. Whether these strengths can be translated into sustained geopolitical influence, however, will depend upon Europe’s willingness to adapt to an international environment that increasingly rewards flexibility, innovation, and strategic pragmatism rather than reliance upon inherited assumptions.

Taken as a whole, Assoc. Prof. Wong’s lecture offered far more than an assessment of the European Union’s emerging economic security policies. It presented a comprehensive reflection on Europe’s place within a rapidly evolving international order, urging participants to reconsider established geopolitical narratives and to approach strategic autonomy not as a slogan but as an ongoing process of political, economic, and intellectual adaptation. By combining insights from European integration studies, international relations theory, and an Asian perspective on global power shifts, the lecture challenged participants to think beyond conventional dichotomies and to appreciate the complexity of Europe’s strategic choices in what is becoming an increasingly multipolar and geoeconomically contested world.

Conclusion

Associate Professor Reuben Wong’s lecture offered a sophisticated and timely examination of one of the European Union’s most pressing strategic dilemmas: how to preserve political autonomy, economic resilience, and regulatory influence amid an increasingly fragmented international order. Moving beyond conventional policy debates, he challenged participants to reconsider Europe’s assumptions about alliances, power, and globalization through a realist yet forward-looking analytical framework. 

By juxtaposing strategic autonomy with de-risking, normative influence with market power, and geopolitical competition with technological transformation, Assoc. Prof. Wong demonstrated that Europe’s future will depend not only on strengthening its economic security instruments but also on redefining its strategic identity in a rapidly evolving multipolar world. Perhaps the lecture’s greatest contribution lay in its distinctly Asian perspective, which encouraged participants to look beyond transatlantic paradigms and appreciate the profound shifts taking place in global power distribution. 

Ultimately, the session reinforced the Summer School’s central message that Europe’s future between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific will be determined not by choosing between competing great powers, but by developing the confidence, capabilities, and strategic vision necessary to engage an increasingly interconnected and contested world on its own terms.

Image: Paulus Rusyanto / Dreamstime.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Prof. Alasdair Young: Populism Trumped Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Can the transatlantic trading order survive the rise of populism? In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Alasdair Young argues that Donald Trump’s second presidency marks a fundamental break with more than seventy years of EU–US trade cooperation. Moderated by Dr. Jessica Lawrence, the session explores how populist narratives, protectionism, geopolitical rivalry, and legal innovation are transforming the politics of international trade. Combining historical perspective with international political economy and trade law, Professor Young demonstrates that the future of transatlantic relations will depend not only on commercial negotiations but also on reconciling economic openness with democratic legitimacy, strategic autonomy, and global stability.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The transformation of transatlantic trade relations has become one of the defining features of the contemporary international political economy. For more than seven decades, the economic partnership between the European Union and the United States served as one of the principal pillars of the liberal international order, underpinning global trade liberalization, multilateral governance, and unprecedented levels of economic integration. Although the relationship periodically experienced disputes over agricultural regulation, industrial subsidies, market access, and monetary policy, these conflicts were generally managed within a shared commitment to rules-based cooperation and institutional compromise. Today, however, intensifying geopolitical rivalry, the resurgence of economic nationalism, the growing politicization of trade, and the rise of populist politics have fundamentally altered the assumptions that long sustained transatlantic economic cooperation. Understanding this transformation therefore requires moving beyond conventional analyses of tariffs and trade balances to examine the deeper political, institutional, and ideological forces reshaping the global trading system.

These questions lay at the heart of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the theme “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition.” Bringing together leading scholars and participants from around the world, the programme explored how geopolitical competition, strategic autonomy, democratic polarization, and technological rivalry are redefining Europe’s external relations and the future of global governance. Within this broader intellectual framework, Professor Alasdair Young, Neal Family Chair at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology, delivered a historically grounded and theoretically sophisticated lecture entitled “Populism Trumped Transatlantic Trade Cooperation.” Drawing upon decades of research on European Union trade policy and international political economy, Professor Young argued that the second Trump administration represents not simply another period of transatlantic commercial tension but a fundamental break with the cooperative logic that has characterized EU–US trade relations since the creation of the post-war trading order. By situating recent tariff disputes within the longer evolution of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the broader history of transatlantic economic integration, he demonstrated that contemporary protectionism reflects a deeper transformation in the politics of international trade itself.

The session was expertly moderated by Dr. Jessica Lawrence, Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law, whose scholarship on international economic law, World Trade Organization governance, European Union internal market regulation, and the intersection of trade with broader public policy objectives provided an ideal intellectual point of departure for the discussion. Her introductory remarks effectively framed the lecture by emphasizing that recent developments—from the so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs and regulatory disputes to growing tensions over sustainability standards, digital governance, and industrial policy—should be understood not as isolated trade disagreements but as manifestations of broader geopolitical and institutional change. By encouraging participants to consider whether transatlantic trust has been fundamentally weakened, whether the WTO can continue to anchor the global trading system, and whether regional arrangements may increasingly displace multilateral governance, Dr. Lawrence situated Professor Young’s lecture squarely within the Summer School’s overarching exploration of geoeconomics, populism, and strategic competition.

Combining historical analysis, international political economy, trade law, and comparative politics, Professor Young challenged participants to rethink the relationship between populism and international commerce. He argued that Donald Trump’s protectionist agenda cannot be adequately explained through conventional accounts centered on sectoral interests or geopolitical competition alone. Instead, it reflects a distinctive populist conception of trade in which imports, trade deficits, and international economic interdependence are interpreted as evidence of exploitation by foreign actors enabled by domestic political elites. Equally significant was his analysis of the European Union’s response, which demonstrated that Europe’s acceptance of an asymmetrical trade agreement reflected not diplomatic weakness, but the complex strategic constraints imposed by wider security considerations, including NATO and the war in Ukraine. Offering a rich synthesis of historical perspective and contemporary policy analysis, the lecture provided participants with a compelling analytical framework for understanding how populism, protectionism, legal innovation, and geopolitical rivalry are collectively reshaping one of the world’s most consequential economic partnerships and, with it, the future of the liberal international economic order.

The Transatlantic Economy: A Relationship Built on Deep Integration Rather Than Simple Trade

Professor Alasdair Young.
Professor Alasdair Young is Neal Family Chair at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology.

Professor Young began his lecture by challenging one of the most common misconceptions surrounding EU–US economic relations: that the relationship can be adequately understood through bilateral trade balances alone. Public debate, particularly under Donald Trump’s second administration, has become heavily dominated by discussions of merchandise trade deficits, tariff levels, and market access. While these indicators undoubtedly matter politically, Professor Young argued that they provide only a partial—and often misleading—picture of the transatlantic economy. To appreciate the significance of recent policy changes, it is first necessary to understand the extraordinary depth and complexity of economic integration that has developed across the Atlantic since the end of the Second World War. 

Presenting a series of comparative economic indicators, Professor Young demonstrated that the transatlantic economy remains unparalleled in both scale and intensity. Together, the European Union and the United States account for roughly one-third of global gross domestic product and a similar proportion of world imports, while also representing approximately one-quarter of global exports. Yet these aggregate trade figures reveal only part of the relationship. The defining characteristic of transatlantic economic integration, he argued, is not merchandise trade but investment. Cross-Atlantic foreign direct investment (FDI) constitutes the largest bilateral investment relationship anywhere in the world, creating dense networks of production, ownership, finance, research, and innovation that extend far beyond conventional trade statistics. 

Professor Young therefore encouraged participants to reconceptualize the Atlantic economy as an integrated production system rather than merely a trading relationship. American companies operating within Europe generate enormous sales through their European subsidiaries, while European firms maintain similarly extensive operations throughout the United States. Consequently, many goods and services exchanged across the Atlantic are produced within multinational corporate structures whose operations transcend national boundaries. This level of economic interdependence means that political decisions affecting trade frequently influence investment, employment, production networks, and technological cooperation simultaneously.

Beyond the Trade Deficit: Understanding the Real Structure of EU–US Economic Relations

One of Professor Young’s central analytical interventions concerned the political misuse of bilateral trade statistics. Throughout Donald Trump’s political career, trade deficits—particularly deficits in manufactured goods—have occupied a central place in his criticism of international trade. According to Professor Young, however, this emphasis ignores essential dimensions of the transatlantic economy.

The Trump administration’s narrative focuses almost exclusively on the American merchandise trade deficit with the European Union. Yet Professor Young demonstrated that this perspective neglects two equally important realities. First, the United States enjoys a substantial trade surplus in services, reflecting American comparative advantages in finance, technology, digital services, consulting, education, and intellectual property. Second, and even more importantly, American multinational corporations generate significantly higher commercial sales through their European affiliates than European firms achieve through comparable operations in the United States. When investment-related economic activity is incorporated alongside conventional trade flows, the transatlantic relationship appears considerably more balanced than merchandise trade statistics alone would suggest. 

This distinction carries significant political implications. Populist narratives frequently portray trade as a zero-sum competition in which one country necessarily benefits at another’s expense. Professor Young argued that the transatlantic economy instead illustrates the opposite principle: sustained investment integration creates mutual dependence and shared prosperity that cannot be captured through simple import-export calculations. Policies designed exclusively to reduce merchandise trade deficits therefore risk disrupting broader economic relationships that generate substantial benefits for both partners.

Equally significant was Professor Young’s observation that more than half of all transatlantic trade in goods occurs within multinational corporations themselves. Parent companies and subsidiaries routinely exchange components, intermediate goods, technologies, and specialized services across national borders as part of integrated production processes. Even transactions occurring formally between separate firms frequently take place within long-established supply chains characterized by stable contractual relationships rather than anonymous market exchanges. Consequently, imports often function not as substitutes for domestic production but as indispensable complements to it. Restricting such trade through tariffs may therefore increase production costs for domestic firms rather than protecting them from foreign competition.

From Cooperation to Conflict: The Historical Evolution of Transatlantic Trade Relations

Having established the exceptional nature of the transatlantic economy, Professor Young turned to its historical evolution, emphasizing that economic interdependence has historically been accompanied by extensive institutional cooperation. While disagreements have periodically emerged, they rarely displaced the broader commitment to multilateral governance that characterized EU–US relations for most of the post-war era. Understanding today’s tensions therefore requires distinguishing between recurring commercial disputes and the more fundamental transformation currently underway. 

The earliest major disruption occurred during the Nixon Shock of 1971, when President Richard Nixon suspended the convertibility of the US dollar into gold, effectively bringing the Bretton Woods monetary system to an end. Simultaneously, the administration imposed a temporary ten-percent surcharge on imports as leverage to encourage trading partners to revalue their currencies. Professor Young emphasized that although these measures represented a dramatic departure from previous American policy, they remained explicitly temporary. Once negotiations concluded successfully through the Smithsonian Agreement, the additional tariffs were promptly removed. The episode therefore illustrates an important historical pattern: earlier trade conflicts sought to resolve specific macroeconomic problems without fundamentally challenging the legitimacy of multilateral cooperation itself. 

A second period of tension emerged during the 1980s, when the United States increasingly adopted what became known as “aggressive unilateralism.” Rather than relying exclusively upon multilateral negotiations, successive American administrations identified what they regarded as unfair foreign trade barriers and threatened unilateral retaliation to secure market access. While controversial, these policies nevertheless remained focused on particular commercial disputes rather than rejecting the broader institutional framework governing international trade.

Institutionalizing Trade Disputes: The WTO Era

The World Trade Organization (WTO) headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland—the only international organization responsible for setting and overseeing the rules governing trade between countries. Photo: Hector Christiaen.

Professor Young argued that the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 fundamentally transformed the management of transatlantic trade tensions. Under the WTO’s institutional framework, disputes increasingly became subject to formal legal procedures rather than unilateral political bargaining. This institutionalization helped contain conflicts while preserving the broader cooperative relationship between the European Union and the United States. 

Several disputes discussed during the lecture illustrate this pattern. Long-running disagreements over hormone-treated beef and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) reflected American objections to European regulatory standards that restricted access for US agricultural exports. Although politically contentious, these cases remained confined to specific sectors and were ultimately addressed through established WTO dispute-settlement procedures.

Similarly, the prolonged conflict between Boeing and Airbus over alleged government subsidies generated years of litigation without fundamentally destabilizing transatlantic economic cooperation. Each side accused the other of unfairly supporting its domestic aircraft manufacturer, yet both accepted the legitimacy of resolving the dispute through multilateral legal mechanisms rather than abandoning the institutional framework altogether.

Professor Young also recalled the American safeguard tariffs on steel imports introduced during the early 2000s, which prompted measured European retaliation. Once again, despite political tensions, the dispute remained limited in scope and duration. Such episodes demonstrated the resilience of transatlantic cooperation precisely because both parties continued to recognize the authority of common international rules.

Cooperation as the Defining Characteristic of the Atlantic Partnership

Against this historical background, Professor Young advanced one of the lecture’s central arguments: although individual disputes frequently attracted media attention, they represented exceptions rather than the defining characteristic of EU–US trade relations. Throughout the post-war period, cooperation overwhelmingly outweighed conflict. He illustrated this point by tracing the joint leadership exercised by Europe and the United States in constructing the post-war trading system itself. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) emerged largely from Anglo-American cooperation, while the subsequent creation of the World Trade Organization likewise depended heavily upon sustained collaboration between Washington and Brussels. Rather than competing institutional visions, Europe and the United States shared a common commitment to progressively liberalizing international trade through mutually agreed multilateral rules. 

Even beyond formal multilateral negotiations, successive initiatives sought to deepen bilateral cooperation. Following the end of the Cold War, the New Transatlantic Agenda and related initiatives attempted to strengthen regulatory coordination and reduce unnecessary barriers to commerce. Although many of these efforts achieved only modest practical success, they reflected an enduring political commitment to managing differences cooperatively.

Professor Young highlighted data privacy as one of the most notable examples of successful regulatory accommodation. European data-protection legislation imposed strict conditions governing transfers of personal information outside the European Union, while American national security legislation following the September 11 attacks required extensive intelligence access to private data. Rather than allowing these competing legal frameworks to disrupt broader economic relations, both sides repeatedly negotiated compromise arrangements that sought to reconcile European privacy protections with American security requirements. Although challenged before European courts on several occasions, these agreements demonstrated a continuing willingness to preserve cooperation even under difficult legal circumstances.

The Promise and Failure of TTIP

Professor Young concluded this historical overview by examining the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, which represented the most ambitious attempt to deepen transatlantic economic integration in recent decades. Contrary to many public perceptions, TTIP did not seek sweeping regulatory harmonization. Instead, negotiations focused primarily on eliminating remaining industrial tariffs, liberalizing selected service sectors, improving public procurement access, and reducing unnecessary regulatory duplication through mutual recognition where appropriate. 

Nevertheless, TTIP ultimately failed—not because of Donald Trump’s election alone but because political resistance had already emerged on both sides of the Atlantic. Within Europe, widespread public protests reflected fears that the agreement might weaken environmental, consumer, and food safety standards. In the United States, meanwhile, domestic regulatory agencies proved reluctant to accept European standards as functionally equivalent, while individual states resisted commitments concerning public procurement. Professor Young therefore emphasized that TTIP was already experiencing significant political difficulties before Trump’s first administration formally abandoned the negotiations.

Yet, despite TTIP’s failure, Professor Young argued that its broader significance lies elsewhere. Even unsuccessful negotiations reflected a continuing commitment to expanding transatlantic cooperation through negotiated institutional mechanisms. It is precisely this cooperative tradition, rather than any individual agreement, that distinguishes the historical transatlantic relationship from the confrontational and unilateral approach that has emerged under Donald Trump’s second presidency.

The Second Trump Administration: A Fundamental Departure from Post-War Trade Policy

Donald Trump.
Donald Trump’s first presidential campaign rally at the Phoenix Convention Center, where thousands gathered to hear him speak as protesters demonstrated outside. Photo: Danny Raustadt.

Having situated contemporary developments within the broader historical evolution of transatlantic economic cooperation, Professor Young turned to the central argument of his lecture: the trade policy pursued during Donald Trump’s second presidency represents not merely another episode of protectionism but a profound departure from the principles that have guided American trade policy since the Second World War. While previous disputes had largely concerned specific sectors, regulatory disagreements, or temporary macroeconomic adjustments, the current administration has challenged the very logic of post-war trade liberalization. According to Professor Young, this transformation cannot be adequately explained through traditional political economy models emphasizing industrial lobbying, sectoral interests, or changes in the structure of the American economy. Instead, it reflects the distinctive political worldview of Donald Trump himself and the growing influence of populist narratives within American trade politics. 

To illustrate this shift, Professor Young presented evidence showing the dramatic increase in American tariff levels during 2025. Although subsequent negotiations and exemptions moderated some of the initially announced tariff rates, the broader trend remained unmistakable. For the first time in decades, the United States had reversed the long historical trajectory toward progressively lower trade barriers that had characterized American policy since before the Second World War. Importantly, Professor Young emphasized that this reversal occurred without any comparable structural transformation within the American economy itself. There had been no sudden collapse of industrial competitiveness, no dramatic surge in demands for protection from domestic manufacturers, nor any major economic shock capable of explaining such a radical policy change through conventional economic reasoning. The explanation therefore lay elsewhere—in politics rather than economics.

Populism and Trump’s Understanding of International Trade

Professor Young argued that understanding Trump’s trade policy requires appreciating how he conceptualizes international commerce. Unlike earlier administrations, which typically focused on removing specific foreign trade barriers or expanding export opportunities for American firms, Trump’s approach is characterized by a far broader skepticism toward trade itself. Throughout his political career, extending back to the 1980s, Trump has consistently portrayed international trade as inherently disadvantageous to the United States. His concern is directed less toward individual regulatory disputes than toward imports generally, particularly manufactured imports that contribute to the American merchandise trade deficit. 

Professor Young described this perspective as fundamentally populist. Within Trump’s narrative, trade deficits are not the product of complex patterns of comparative advantage, global production networks, or consumer preferences. Rather, they are presented as evidence that foreign governments—assisted by corrupt domestic political elites—have systematically exploited ordinary American workers. This interpretation transforms international trade from a mutually beneficial economic exchange into a moral struggle between “the people” and a coalition of foreign competitors and domestic elites.

The lecture explored several possible explanations for Trump’s enduring commitment to protectionism. Professor Young noted that Trump’s hostility toward trade predates his entry into electoral politics by several decades, suggesting that it reflects deeply held personal convictions rather than short-term political calculation. He referred to the work of political scientist Diana Mutz, whose concept of the “drawbridge-up worldview” offers one possible interpretation. According to this perspective, individuals who perceive the outside world primarily as a source of threat are naturally inclined to oppose immigration, globalization, and international trade alike. Such a worldview provides a coherent psychological foundation for Trump’s consistent preference for tariffs and economic nationalism. 

Professor Young also discussed alternative scholarly interpretations. Some analysts, including Stacie Goddard and Abraham Newman, have argued that Trump’s trade policy reflects a form of neo-royalism, whereby tariffs serve principally to enhance presidential discretion by allowing the executive selectively to reward allies and punish opponents. While acknowledging that tariff authority undoubtedly strengthens presidential power, Professor Young questioned whether neo-royalism adequately explains Trump’s motivations. In his assessment, Trump’s long-standing commitment to tariffs predates the acquisition of executive authority itself. The concentration of political power resulting from tariff policy is therefore better understood as a consequence rather than the original objective of his protectionist agenda.

Geopolitics or Protectionism? Reassessing Trump’s Tariff Strategy

Another important theme addressed during the lecture concerned the relationship between trade policy and geopolitics. Many contemporary observers interpret Trump’s tariffs primarily as instruments of strategic coercion designed to advance broader foreign-policy objectives. Professor Young challenged this interpretation by distinguishing between exceptional geopolitical cases and the administration’s broader trade strategy.

He acknowledged that tariffs had occasionally been employed to exert diplomatic pressure—for example, threatening Colombia over the acceptance of deported migrants or Brazil concerning judicial proceedings involving former President Jair Bolsonaro. Yet these cases remained relatively limited and, in several instances, the threatened tariffs were either quickly withdrawn or never implemented. Similarly, despite political disagreements with European governments over issues such as Greenland, defence cooperation, or support for Ukraine, the administration generally refrained from imposing the sweeping punitive tariffs that many observers anticipated. 

For Professor Young, these examples demonstrate that geopolitics alone cannot explain the administration’s overall trade policy. Rather than using tariffs primarily as instruments of foreign policy, Trump continues to view them principally as solutions to what he perceives as structural problems within international trade itself. His administration’s protectionism is therefore rooted fundamentally in a populist understanding of economic exchange rather than in a coherent geopolitical grand strategy.

The Legal Architecture of Trump’s Trade Policy

A particularly illuminating aspect of Professor Young’s lecture concerned the legal mechanisms through which the second Trump administration implemented its trade agenda. Rather than seeking comprehensive new trade legislation from Congress, the administration relied extensively upon creative reinterpretations of pre-existing statutory authorities. This strategy reflected both political calculation and institutional constraint. As Professor Young observed, the absence of congressional legislation suggests that the administration lacked sufficient political support to enact its protectionist programme through ordinary legislative channels. Instead, it expanded presidential authority by drawing upon emergency powers and older trade statutes originally intended for very different circumstances. 

The most significant of these measures were the Liberation Day tariffs, introduced under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Initially imposing a twenty-percent tariff on European Union imports before temporarily reducing the rate to facilitate negotiations, the administration subsequently threatened to increase duties further if satisfactory agreements were not reached. Simultaneously, tariffs under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act were justified on national security grounds, extending earlier measures on steel and aluminium while adding automobiles, pharmaceuticals, and potentially aircraft and semiconductors to the list of targeted sectors.

Professor Young carefully distinguished between these various legal instruments. Section 232 investigations required formal administrative procedures and national security justifications, whereas Section 301 of the Trade Act addressed unfair foreign trade practices. Meanwhile, Section 122 provided temporary authority to respond to balance-of-payments crises. The administration’s increasing reliance upon multiple overlapping statutory provisions reflected its determination to preserve tariff authority even as judicial challenges intensified.

A particularly significant development occurred when the United States Supreme Court ruled that the administration had exceeded its authority under the IEEPA by imposing sweeping tariffs unrelated to genuine national emergencies. Professor Young explained that this decision forced the administration to reconstruct its trade policy through slower and more procedurally constrained legal mechanisms. Without IEEPA authority, the president could no longer credibly threaten immediate tariffs at will. Instead, future protectionist measures increasingly depended upon formal investigations under Sections 232 and 301, reducing executive flexibility while preserving significant scope for continued intervention.

Europe’s Response: Why the European Union Accepted an Unequal Agreement

European Commission headquarters with waving EU flags in Brussels. Photo: Viorel Dudau.

Professor Young then turned to one of the lecture’s most consequential questions: why did the European Union ultimately accept a trade agreement widely perceived as asymmetrical? At first glance, Europe’s willingness to tolerate higher tariffs while making extensive concessions on investment, liquefied natural gas purchases, defense procurement, and market access appeared surprising. Yet Professor Young argued that the agreement can only be understood within the broader geopolitical environment confronting European policymakers. 

The decisive factor, he suggested, was American escalation dominance. European leaders recognized that retaliatory tariffs might provoke not merely commercial countermeasures but broader strategic consequences affecting NATO, military support for Ukraine, and wider transatlantic security cooperation. Under such conditions, trade negotiations became inseparable from security considerations. Unlike China, which responded to American tariffs through symmetrical retaliation, the European Union confronted a much more complex strategic calculus in which commercial interests could not be isolated from defense and foreign policy.

Domestic economic considerations further reinforced this cautious approach. European governments also understood that tariffs impose significant costs upon importing countries themselves. Unlike President Trump, who consistently maintained that foreign exporters bear the burden of tariffs, European policymakers accepted the mainstream economic consensus that tariffs raise costs for domestic consumers and producers. Consequently, there was insufficient political support among member states for an escalatory strategy that risked both economic harm and geopolitical instability.

Professor Young emphasized that the resulting agreement should therefore not be interpreted simply as diplomatic weakness. Rather, it reflected a constrained strategic choice shaped by the intersection of trade policy, security dependence, domestic political calculations, and broader geopolitical uncertainty. The episode vividly illustrates how the second Trump administration has fundamentally altered the relationship between economics and security within the transatlantic partnership, making future trade negotiations inseparable from wider questions concerning the political future of the Atlantic alliance itself.

The Future of Transatlantic Trade: Between Strategic Adjustment and Structural Transformation

In the concluding section of his lecture, Professor Young shifted from diagnosing the contemporary crisis in transatlantic trade relations to assessing its longer-term implications for the liberal international economic order. While acknowledging that Trump’s second presidency has fundamentally disrupted established patterns of cooperation, he cautioned participants against interpreting current developments either as the complete collapse of globalization or as a temporary political aberration that will inevitably disappear with a future change of administration. Instead, he argued that the transatlantic trading relationship is entering a period of structural adaptation in which both the United States and the European Union are reassessing longstanding assumptions concerning openness, interdependence, and economic security. The precise trajectory of this transformation remains uncertain, yet its implications are likely to extend well beyond the current political cycle. 

Professor Young emphasized that contemporary trade conflicts cannot be understood simply through the language of winners and losers. Much of the public debate surrounding tariffs assumes that protectionist measures primarily harm foreign exporters while benefiting domestic industries. Throughout the lecture, however, he repeatedly challenged this assumption by drawing upon well-established principles of international economics. Tariffs are collected by the importing country and are generally borne—at least in substantial part—by domestic consumers, firms, and downstream producers through higher prices and increased production costs. While particular industries may receive temporary protection from foreign competition, the broader economy typically experiences reduced efficiency, increased inflationary pressures, and declining competitiveness.

This distinction is particularly important because it exposes the tension between economic analysis and populist political narratives. Professor Young observed that President Trump consistently presents tariffs as payments made by foreign governments, a characterization that enjoys considerable political resonance despite contradicting mainstream economic understanding. Such narratives simplify complex international production networks into easily understandable stories of national victimhood and economic exploitation, thereby reinforcing broader populist appeals centered upon sovereignty, fairness, and national renewal. The persistence of these narratives demonstrates that trade policy increasingly functions as a symbolic political instrument as much as an economic policy tool.

Is the World Entering an Era of Peak Protectionism?

Professor Young invited participants to consider whether the extraordinary escalation of tariff measures witnessed during 2025 might ultimately represent the high-water mark of contemporary protectionism rather than the beginning of an indefinite upward trajectory. He avoided making deterministic predictions but suggested several reasons for cautious optimism.

One important constraint derives from the institutional environment itself. Judicial scrutiny has already limited some aspects of presidential tariff authority, most notably through court decisions questioning the administration’s expansive interpretation of emergency powers under the IEEPA. Future administrations may therefore encounter greater legal obstacles should they attempt similarly broad exercises of executive trade authority. Moreover, reliance upon alternative statutory mechanisms such as Sections 232 and 301 requires more extensive investigations, administrative procedures, and opportunities for legal challenge, thereby reducing the flexibility that initially characterized Trump’s trade strategy. 

Economic realities may also impose practical limits upon sustained protectionism. As tariffs increasingly affect production costs, inflation, investment decisions, and consumer prices, domestic political support may weaken among sectors previously expected to benefit. Large multinational corporations operating integrated transatlantic supply chains face particularly complex adjustment costs, while export-oriented industries risk retaliatory measures from trading partners. These economic constraints do not eliminate the political appeal of protectionism but complicate its long-term sustainability.

Professor Young nevertheless cautioned against assuming that any future American administration will simply restore the pre-2016 status quo. Concerns regarding industrial resilience, supply-chain security, technological competition, and strategic dependence now extend across much of the American political spectrum. Although future governments may adopt less confrontational methods, greater emphasis upon industrial policy and economic security is likely to remain an enduring feature of American trade policy. Consequently, Europe must prepare for a transatlantic relationship in which strategic economic considerations occupy a far more prominent position than they did during the era of liberal globalization.

The WTO and the Resilience of Multilateral Governance

The lecture concluded with an assessment of the WTO and the broader future of multilateral trade governance. Professor Young acknowledged that the WTO currently confronts one of the most serious crises in its history. The paralysis of the Appellate Body, the increasing use of unilateral trade measures, and growing geopolitical rivalry have significantly weakened the institution’s capacity to enforce common rules. Yet he resisted suggestions that the multilateral trading system has become irrelevant.

Instead, Professor Young argued that the WTO continues to provide the essential legal and institutional framework within which the overwhelming majority of international trade still occurs. Even governments that increasingly resort to unilateral measures frequently justify their actions through existing WTO provisions or seek to preserve the broader institutional architecture. This paradox illustrates both the organization’s current weaknesses and its continuing importance. States may increasingly contest particular rules, yet relatively few advocate abandoning the multilateral trading system altogether. 

The relationship between the United States, the European Union, and China will be especially significant in determining the future evolution of the WTO. Professor Young suggested that effective reform will require accommodating new patterns of state intervention, industrial policy, technological competition, and strategic rivalry while preserving the core principles of predictability, reciprocity, and rules-based cooperation that have historically distinguished the multilateral trading system. Achieving such reforms will undoubtedly prove difficult, but abandoning institutional cooperation altogether would likely generate even greater instability.

Concluding Reflections

Professor Alasdair Young’s lecture offered participants a historically informed, theoretically sophisticated, and policy-relevant examination of one of the defining transformations currently affecting the international political economy. By tracing the evolution of EU–US trade relations from the immediate post-war period to Donald Trump’s second presidency, he demonstrated that contemporary tensions cannot be understood merely as another episode within a familiar cycle of transatlantic disagreement. Rather, they represent a more profound reorientation of American trade policy, one rooted in populist politics, growing skepticism toward globalization, and the increasing fusion of economic and security considerations.

A particularly significant contribution of the lecture was its insistence upon historical perspective. Throughout more than seventy years of transatlantic cooperation, disputes over agriculture, aircraft subsidies, steel, regulatory standards, and exchange-rate policy repeatedly emerged without fundamentally undermining the broader institutional relationship. By situating today’s conflicts within this longer historical trajectory, Professor Young showed precisely why the current moment differs. The second Trump administration has challenged not merely individual policies but many of the assumptions that previously sustained the transatlantic economic partnership itself.

Equally valuable was his nuanced interpretation of the European Union’s response. Rather than portraying European restraint as diplomatic weakness, Professor Young demonstrated that policymakers confronted a far more complex strategic environment in which trade negotiations were inseparable from wider concerns regarding NATO, Ukraine, and transatlantic security. His analysis illustrated how contemporary geoeconomics increasingly blurs the boundaries separating commercial policy, foreign affairs, and national defense.

Perhaps the lecture’s most enduring insight concerned the interaction between populism and international trade. Protectionism, Professor Young argued, derives much of its political power not from economic evidence but from compelling narratives of national decline, external exploitation, and sovereign recovery. These narratives increasingly shape democratic politics on both sides of the Atlantic, ensuring that trade policy will remain deeply politicized regardless of future changes in leadership.

For participants in the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, the lecture provided far more than an overview of current tariff disputes. It offered a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding how populism, legal innovation, geopolitical rivalry, and institutional change are collectively reshaping one of the world’s most important economic relationships. By integrating historical scholarship, international political economy, trade law, and contemporary policy analysis, Professor Young demonstrated that the future of transatlantic trade will ultimately depend not only upon commercial negotiations but also upon the broader capacity of liberal democracies to reconcile economic openness with political legitimacy, strategic resilience, and an increasingly contested international order.

Photo: Dreamstime.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Prof. Erik Jones: The Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

What happens when the political foundations of the transatlantic partnership begin to erode? In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Erik Jones argues that Europe is entering a “post-Atlantic” era in which the assumptions that sustained EU–US cooperation since the Second World War are being fundamentally reconfigured. Moderated by Professor Elaine Fahey, the session examines how globalization, democratic polarization, populism, and geopolitical rivalry are reshaping transatlantic trade relations, European strategic autonomy, and the liberal international order. Combining historical perspective with political economy, the lecture offers a compelling framework for understanding Europe’s changing role in an increasingly fragmented world.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The rapid transformation of the transatlantic relationship has become one of the defining developments of the contemporary international political economy. For much of the post-war period, the partnership between Europe and the United States rested upon a remarkably durable combination of shared democratic values, expanding economic integration, multilateral cooperation, and common strategic interests. While periodic disagreements over security, trade, and foreign policy repeatedly tested the alliance, they rarely challenged its underlying political foundations. Today, however, intensifying geopolitical rivalry, democratic polarization, the uneven consequences of globalization, and the resurgence of populism have fundamentally altered the assumptions that long sustained the Atlantic order. As questions of economic security, industrial policy, strategic autonomy, and democratic resilience increasingly intersect, understanding the future of EU–US relations requires moving beyond traditional analyses of trade disputes or diplomatic disagreements to examine the deeper structural transformations reshaping both societies and the international system.

These questions stood at the center of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the title “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition.” Bringing together leading scholars and participants from across the world, the programme explored how geopolitical competition, economic fragmentation, democratic backsliding, and the changing architecture of globalization are redefining Europe’s place in an increasingly contested international order. Within this broader intellectual framework, Professor Erik Jones delivered a thought-provoking lecture, “The Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations,” in which he challenged conventional understandings of the contemporary transatlantic partnership. Rather than interpreting recent tensions as merely another cyclical crisis in EU–US relations, Professor Jones argued that Europe is entering what he described as a “post-Atlantic”era, in which many of the political, economic, and strategic assumptions underpinning the post-war transatlantic relationship are being fundamentally reconfigured. Combining historical analysis, international political economy, European integration studies, and comparative politics, he demonstrated that the current rupture extends far beyond disagreements over tariffs, NATO burden-sharing, or trade negotiations, reflecting instead a deeper erosion of domestic political solidarity, institutional trust, and the liberal consensus that historically sustained transatlantic cooperation.

The session was expertly moderated by Professor Elaine Fahey, Professor of EU Law at City Law School, City St George’s, University of London, whose distinguished scholarship on European Union external relations, international economic governance, cybersecurity, and transatlantic legal cooperation provided an ideal intellectual setting for the discussion. Her own research, situated at the intersection of European law and global governance, closely complements many of the themes explored throughout Professor Jones’s lecture, particularly the evolving legal and institutional architecture of EU–US relations. 

Opening the session, Professor Fahey warmly welcomed participants and underscored Professor Jones’s long-standing contributions to the study of European politics, international political economy, and transatlantic relations. She highlighted his extensive body of scholarship, noting that his work has profoundly shaped contemporary understanding of European integration, economic governance, and the changing dynamics of the Atlantic partnership. Describing his research portfolio as both extensive and intellectually influential, she emphasized that his lecture would offer participants a valuable opportunity to engage with one of the foremost scholars examining Europe’s evolving international position. Her moderation helped situate the discussion within the broader challenges confronting Europe as it navigates an era of geoeconomic rivalry, democratic uncertainty, and strategic realignment.

Drawing on decades of research into European integration, globalization, and international political economy, Professor Jones argued that the future of transatlantic relations will depend less on repairing individual policy disagreements than on rebuilding the domestic political foundations that have historically enabled international cooperation. His lecture offered participants not only a penetrating reinterpretation of EU–US trade relations but also a broader analytical framework for understanding how globalization, democracy, strategic autonomy, and geopolitical competition collectively reshaping Europe’s role in the twenty-first-century international order are.

The Myth of the “Permanent Crisis”: Reinterpreting the Transatlantic Relationship

 

Erik Jones is Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute and Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe.

Professor Jones began his lecture by challenging one of the most deeply embedded assumptions in the study of transatlantic relations: the notion that contemporary tensions between Europe and the United States represent merely another cyclical crisis that, like many before it, will eventually pass. Drawing upon more than two decades of scholarship on European political economy and transatlantic relations, he argued that while crises have repeatedly punctuated the Atlantic partnership since the end of the Second World War, the current rupture differs fundamentally in both its origins and implications. Previous periods of discord occurred within a shared strategic, ideological, and institutional framework that ultimately enabled reconciliation. Today, however, it is precisely those underlying foundations that are being called into question. Consequently, Europe is not simply experiencing another episode of diplomatic disagreement with Washington but entering what Professor Jones described as a “post-Atlantic Europe,” a fundamentally different geopolitical and economic environment requiring a profound reassessment of Europe’s strategic assumptions. 

To illustrate this argument, Professor Jones reflected upon his own scholarly trajectory, recalling that throughout his academic career he had repeatedly written about crises in transatlantic relations. Whether during the presidency of George W. Bush, the economic tensions of the Obama years, or the debates preceding Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, earlier analyses had consistently been met with reassuring responses from more senior scholars who regarded such crises as temporary disturbances rather than existential challenges. Each previous period of tension, they argued, eventually gave way to renewed cooperation because the Atlantic alliance rested upon enduring political commitments that transcended short-term policy disagreements. Professor Jones acknowledged the historical validity of this interpretation while simultaneously arguing that it no longer adequately explains contemporary developments. The historical pattern of recurring crisis followed by reconciliation, he suggested, has now been fundamentally disrupted. 

Historical Crises and the Resilience of Atlantic Cooperation

To demonstrate why the present moment represents a qualitative rather than merely quantitative change, Professor Jones guided participants through several defining episodes in the history of post-war transatlantic relations. His purpose was not simply to catalogue historical disagreements but to show that previous crises unfolded against a backdrop of shared political purpose that consistently enabled institutional recovery.

The first example was the Suez Crisis of the 1950s, when Britain and France launched military operations against Egypt without American support. Rather than standing alongside its closest European allies, the United States openly opposed their intervention, producing one of the earliest and most serious political ruptures within the Atlantic alliance. At precisely the same time, the Soviet Union’s successful launch of Sputnik dramatically transformed strategic calculations by demonstrating its growing missile capabilities, thereby raising profound doubts concerning the credibility of American nuclear protection for Europe. These simultaneous developments generated widespread uncertainty regarding the future of NATO and the reliability of the United States as Europe’s principal security guarantor. Yet despite these tensions, the alliance endured because both sides remained committed to the broader objective of defending liberal democracy against Soviet communism. 

Professor Jones enriched this historical discussion by referring to contemporary cultural representations of Cold War anxieties, including the films Fail Safe and Dr. Strangelove. Far from being mere cinematic references, these works illustrated the profound uncertainties surrounding nuclear deterrence, strategic credibility, and American leadership that characterized the period. They also demonstrated that European concerns regarding the reliability of the United States are by no means unprecedented. Indeed, fears of abandonment have accompanied the Atlantic alliance since its earliest years.

The lecture then turned to the 1960s and 1970s, another period frequently described as a crisis of transatlantic relations. The Vietnam War generated inflationary pressures throughout the international economy, while President Richard Nixon’s unilateral suspension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold effectively dismantled the Bretton Woods monetary system without prior consultation with America’s European allies. These decisions profoundly unsettled European governments, who viewed them as evidence of Washington’s willingness to prioritize domestic interests over alliance coordination. Nevertheless, cooperation ultimately resumed because disagreements remained confined to specific policy issues rather than challenging the fundamental legitimacy of the Atlantic partnership itself. 

Reagan, Yugoslavia, Iraq, and the Persistence of Strategic Solidarity

Ronald Reagan
Former US President Ronald Reagan. Photo: Joe Sohm / Dreamstime.

Professor Jones proceeded chronologically through later episodes of transatlantic tension, further reinforcing his argument that historical crises consistently differed from the present rupture. During the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan’s assertive rhetoric toward the Soviet Union and debates concerning the deployment of nuclear weapons generated considerable anxiety among European governments. Simultaneously, divergent macroeconomic policies produced additional economic friction between Europe and the United States. Ironically, however, these disagreements also encouraged deeper European integration, particularly through the Single European Act and the ambitious project of completing the European Single Market by 1992. In this sense, earlier transatlantic tensions often stimulated European cooperation rather than undermining it. 

The 1990s brought another difficult period as violence engulfed the former Yugoslavia. Europeans increasingly perceived the United States as reluctant to assume leadership in resolving conflicts on their own continent. Although the Balkan wars exposed important weaknesses within European foreign and security policy, they did not fundamentally weaken transatlantic solidarity. Instead, subsequent cooperation during the Kosovo intervention reaffirmed NATO’s central role in European security.

Similarly, the Iraq War under President George W. Bush produced perhaps the most visible political divisions within the Atlantic alliance since the Suez Crisis. Major European governments openly opposed the American-led invasion, while disagreements concerning international law, multilateralism, and preventive war generated intense diplomatic conflict. Yet, as Professor Jones observed, these disagreements remained disputes among partners who continued to share fundamental commitments to liberal democracy, NATO, and the broader institutional architecture established after 1945. The first Trump administration likewise represented a period of significant tension, yet many Europeans interpreted it as a temporary deviation that would eventually be corrected through subsequent electoral change. President Joe Biden’s election appeared to reinforce precisely this expectation by restoring more conventional forms of diplomatic engagement. 

The historical lesson emerging from these examples was clear. Each previous crisis, however serious, ultimately remained manageable because Europeans and Americans continued to accept common assumptions concerning democratic values, European integration, multilateral cooperation, and collective security. Those shared assumptions acted as institutional anchors that limited political conflict and enabled eventual reconciliation.

Why This Time Is Different: The Domestic Roots of Transatlantic Rupture

Having demonstrated the resilience of earlier crises, Professor Jones introduced the central analytical proposition of his lecture: the current deterioration of transatlantic relations differs because it originates not primarily in foreign policy disagreements but in profound transformations occurring within domestic political systems on both sides of the Atlantic.

According to Professor Jones, globalization undoubtedly generated remarkable economic achievements. Hundreds of millions of people were lifted out of poverty, international trade expanded dramatically, and global prosperity increased to an unprecedented degree. As an economist, he acknowledged having enthusiastically defended these developments for many years. Yet experience has demonstrated that globalization also produced consequences insufficiently anticipated by its strongest advocates. While aggregate prosperity increased, the distribution of economic gains became increasingly unequal, generating social fragmentation, political dissatisfaction, and declining confidence in democratic institutions. 

Professor Jones emphasized that the central challenge lies not in globalization itself but in its uneven domestic consequences. Economic liberalization transformed labor markets, altered patterns of industrial production, weakened local communities, and intensified socioeconomic inequalities. These developments gradually undermined domestic political solidarity, creating fertile conditions for populist movements across both Europe and the United States. Publications that Professor Jones discussed during the lecture—including his work on democracy without solidarity, European populism, and political disintegration—represent sustained attempts to understand precisely these domestic transformations.

This perspective marked an important departure from conventional analyses of transatlantic relations. Rather than portraying populism as an external shock disrupting otherwise stable institutions, Professor Jones argued that domestic political fragmentation has become the principal driver of international instability. Governments increasingly struggle to sustain international commitments because they face electorates that no longer perceive globalization, multilateral cooperation, or European integration as serving their interests. Consequently, the crisis of the Atlantic partnership reflects the erosion of domestic political consensus rather than merely disagreements between national leaders.

TTIP and the Failure of Domestic Political Consensus

Perhaps the clearest illustration of this broader transformation was Professor Jones’s discussion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Originally conceived during the Obama administration as an ambitious effort to deepen economic integration between the European Union and the United States, TTIP appeared, from an economic perspective, to represent an exceptionally promising initiative. High-level expert groups identified numerous opportunities for reducing unnecessary regulatory barriers, improving investment conditions, and creating employment through enhanced transatlantic cooperation. Economists widely regarded the agreement as “low-hanging fruit” capable of generating mutual gains with relatively limited political cost. 

Yet precisely the opposite occurred. Rather than receiving broad public support, TTIP provoked widespread political resistance on both sides of the Atlantic. Large demonstrations took place throughout Europe, particularly in Germany, while substantial opposition also emerged within the United States. Professor Jones emphasized that this reaction profoundly surprised policymakers and scholars alike. The agreement’s failure revealed that domestic political divisions had become so deep that even initiatives promising mutual economic benefit could no longer command democratic legitimacy.

For Professor Jones, TTIP’s collapse represented a critical turning point. It demonstrated that repairing transatlantic relations could no longer be achieved solely through diplomatic negotiation or economic cooperation. Unless domestic political cohesion could first be restored, international agreements would continue to encounter growing public resistance. Instead of healing these domestic divisions, however, subsequent political developments—including the rise of increasingly assertive populist movements and Donald Trump’s return to office—would deepen them further, thereby transforming domestic fragmentation into an enduring crisis of the Atlantic partnership itself.

Trump’s Second Presidency and the Emergence of a “Post-Atlantic Europe”

Donald Trump.
Donald Trump’s first presidential campaign rally at the Phoenix Convention Center, where thousands gathered to hear him speak as protesters demonstrated outside. Photo: Danny Raustadt.

Having established that the current transatlantic crisis originates in deepening domestic political fragmentation rather than temporary diplomatic disagreement, Professor Jones turned to the question that lies at the heart of his lecture: why does Donald Trump’s second presidency represent a fundamentally different moment in the history of EU–US relations? While cautioning against attributing all contemporary tensions exclusively to Trump himself, Professor Jones argued that the current administration has exposed—and significantly accelerated—structural transformations that had already begun reshaping the Atlantic partnership. Trump’s return to office, he suggested, should be understood less as the cause of the crisis than as its most visible manifestation, reflecting profound changes within American politics that have altered Washington’s understanding of Europe and the wider liberal international order.

Unlike previous episodes of transatlantic disagreement, which generally revolved around particular policy disputes, the present rupture challenges the normative foundations upon which post-war cooperation was built. Professor Jones argued that three developments occurring during the early months of Trump’s second administration illustrate the magnitude of this transformation. Individually, each appears to concern a discrete policy issue; collectively, however, they signal a fundamental redefinition of the political, institutional, and strategic assumptions that have governed the Atlantic alliance for more than seventy years.

Three Signals of Strategic Rupture

The first illustration concerned the speech delivered by Vice President J. D. Vance at the Munich Security Conference in early 2025. Rather than focusing primarily on Russia, China, or conventional security threats, Vance criticized European governments for marginalizing the German far-right party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) and argued that the greatest threat to European democracy stemmed from restrictions on political speech rather than from extremist political movements themselves. Professor Jones emphasized that Europeans interpreted these remarks very differently from their American authors. From Washington’s perspective, the speech reflected concerns about freedom of expression. From Europe’s perspective, however, it appeared to repudiate decades of shared commitment to defending liberal democracy against anti-democratic political forces.

The second example concerned President Trump’s repeated assertion that the European Union had been created to exploit—or, in his own blunt formulation, to “screw”—the United States. Professor Jones argued that such statements represent much more than rhetorical provocation. They directly challenge one of the central pillars of post-war American foreign policy: sustained support for European integration. Since the Marshall Plan, successive American administrations—Republican and Democratic alike—had consistently viewed European integration as essential for securing peace, prosperity, and democratic stability on the continent. To portray the European Union as fundamentally hostile to American interests therefore represents a striking reversal of decades of bipartisan strategic thinking.

The third illustration came from remarks delivered by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, who suggested that European governments should assume primary responsibility for their own conventional defense while the United States concentrated increasingly upon nuclear deterrence and strategic competition elsewhere. Although debates over NATO burden-sharing are hardly new, Professor Jones argued that this formulation implied something much more significant: the gradual disengagement of the United States from the conventional military commitments that have underpinned European security since the beginning of the Cold War. Together, these three developments questioned the legitimacy of liberal democracy, the value of European integration, and the credibility of American security guarantees—the three institutional foundations of the post-war Atlantic order.

Liberal Democracy as the Original Foundation of the Atlantic Partnership

Professor Jones next explored the historical origins of these three pillars, beginning with liberal democracy itself. One of the lecture’s most thought-provoking contributions was its insistence that the transatlantic relationship was never merely an alliance of convenience organized around military cooperation or economic exchange. Rather, from its inception, it represented a normative project centered upon the defense and consolidation of liberal democratic values. The Atlantic partnership emerged not simply to contain Soviet military power but to safeguard democratic political systems against both communist and fascist alternatives.

Professor Jones reminded participants that this commitment often required active American involvement in European domestic politics. During the immediate post-war decades, Washington consistently encouraged European governments to exclude explicitly anti-democratic political movements from executive power, regardless of their electoral strength. Communist parties in countries such as Italy and France were regarded not simply as ordinary political competitors but as potential threats to the democratic order itself. Consequently, successive American administrations openly intervened—politically, diplomatically, and sometimes covertly—to preserve liberal democratic institutions across Western Europe.

To illustrate this point, Professor Jones discussed the example of Richard Gardner, the United States ambassador to Italy during the late 1970s, who openly described preventing the Italian Communist Party from entering government as one of his principal diplomatic achievements. From today’s perspective, such intervention may appear extraordinary. Yet it reflected the prevailing understanding that the transatlantic alliance rested upon shared commitments to a particular model of constitutional democracy, one that required defending democratic institutions against forces regarded as fundamentally hostile to liberal constitutionalism.

Against this historical background, Vice President Vance’s Munich speech acquired a significance extending well beyond debates concerning freedom of expression. By criticizing European efforts to isolate parties widely regarded as extremist, the speech appeared to repudiate one of the central political principles upon which transatlantic cooperation had historically been built. Europeans interpreted this not merely as disagreement over electoral competition but as evidence that the United States itself was reconsidering its long-standing commitment to defending liberal democracy as a foundational value of the Atlantic community.

European Integration and the Political Economy of Atlantic Cooperation

Professor Jones then turned to the second pillar of the Atlantic relationship: European integration. Here again, he challenged simplistic interpretations that portray integration as an exclusively European project. Instead, he demonstrated that American support proved indispensable throughout its historical development.

Following the Second World War, the United States sought to stabilize Europe by encouraging forms of economic cooperation capable of reducing interstate conflict while preserving democratic self-government. Although early American proposals for extensive economic planning attracted only limited enthusiasm, European leaders gradually developed alternative institutional arrangements beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community, later expanding through the European Economic Community and ultimately the European Union. Throughout each stage of this process, successive American administrations consistently treated European integration as a strategic asset rather than an economic threat.

Professor Jones emphasized that American support extended beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Washington negotiated directly with European institutions, particularly the European Commission, recognizing them as legitimate representatives of a progressively integrated European economy. Far from disadvantaging the United States, integration generated enormous economic opportunities. American firms accumulated roughly $19 trillion in investments across Europe, while European investment in the United States reached approximately $9 trillion, creating one of the most deeply integrated economic relationships in world history. Such figures underscore Professor Jones’s central point: European integration has long benefited both sides of the Atlantic.

Against this historical record, President Trump’s characterization of the European Union as an organization designed to exploit the United States appeared fundamentally inconsistent with the historical evolution of transatlantic political economy. Rather than reflecting objective economic realities, such claims illustrate how contemporary populist narratives increasingly reinterpret long-established institutions through the lens of nationalist political grievance.

NATO, Deterrence, and the Transformation of European Security

NATO
NATO headquarters and monument in Brussels, Belgium, the political and administrative center of the North Atlantic Alliance. Photo: Dreamstime.

The lecture’s third major theme addressed the evolution of European security architecture. Professor Jones reminded participants that NATO was never simply a military alliance; it represented a carefully constructed institutional framework designed simultaneously to reassure European states, constrain renewed German militarism, and deter Soviet expansion. American military commitments formed the indispensable foundation of this arrangement.

Particularly important was Professor Jones’s explanation of the evolution of nuclear deterrence strategy. During the early Cold War, the United States relied heavily upon the doctrine of massive retaliation, threatening overwhelming nuclear response to any Soviet aggression. As strategic realities evolved, however, NATO gradually adopted the doctrine of flexible response, later conceptualized as extended deterrence. Under this framework, deterrence depended not merely upon nuclear weapons but upon credible American participation at every stage of military escalation—from conventional forces through tactical nuclear capabilities to strategic deterrence.

Professor Jones argued that recent suggestions that Europe should assume primary responsibility for conventional defense while the United States concentrated largely upon nuclear capabilities fundamentally undermine this strategic logic. If American conventional forces withdraw from Europe, the credibility of subsequent stages of deterrence becomes increasingly uncertain. European governments therefore interpret such proposals not simply as burden-sharing adjustments but as indications that the United States may no longer regard European security as an essential strategic priority.

From Domestic Disintegration to International Fragmentation

Throughout this section of the lecture, Professor Jones consistently returned to the relationship between domestic political change and international institutional transformation. The weakening of liberal democratic consensus within the United States has simultaneously altered American attitudes toward European integration, multilateral cooperation, and collective security. International fragmentation thus mirrors domestic political disintegration.

The cumulative consequence, Professor Jones argued, is the gradual emergence of a “post-Atlantic Europe.” This does not imply the complete disappearance of transatlantic cooperation or the collapse of NATO. Rather, it suggests that Europe can no longer assume the permanence of institutional arrangements that once appeared almost immutable. As shared democratic values weaken, domestic political divisions deepen, and American strategic priorities evolve, European governments increasingly recognize the necessity of developing greater strategic autonomy across trade, industrial policy, defense, and technological innovation.

Accordingly, the current transformation extends well beyond temporary diplomatic disagreement. It represents the beginning of a new political economy in which Europe must increasingly redefine its international role under conditions of diminished American leadership and growing geopolitical uncertainty. The challenge confronting European policymakers is therefore not simply how to repair relations with Washington but how to adapt the European project itself to an international order that no longer guarantees the stability upon which post-war integration was originally constructed.

Globalization’s Unintended Consequences: From Economic Integration to Political Disintegration

In the concluding section of his lecture, Professor Erik Jones shifted from historical diagnosis to broader structural explanation, asking why the transatlantic partnership has become increasingly vulnerable despite decades of unprecedented economic integration. His answer challenged one of the central assumptions underpinning the liberal international order: that expanding globalization would naturally reinforce both prosperity and political stability. While acknowledging that globalization generated extraordinary economic gains and contributed to lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, Professor Jones argued that its domestic political consequences proved far more disruptive than policymakers and economists had anticipated. The crisis confronting the Atlantic partnership, therefore, cannot be understood without examining the social and political transformations produced by globalization itself.

Reflecting on his own intellectual evolution, Professor Jones candidly acknowledged that, like many economists of his generation, he had long defended free trade as an almost unequivocal public good. The promise of globalization rested on a persuasive logic: greater openness would increase efficiency, expand markets, stimulate innovation, and ultimately improve living standards across societies. In aggregate terms, this prediction proved remarkably accurate. Yet aggregate success concealed profound distributive consequences that gradually undermined domestic political cohesion. The benefits of globalization, while substantial, were distributed unevenly across regions, industries, firms, and social groups. As inequalities widened and local communities experienced industrial decline, economic insecurity increasingly translated into political dissatisfaction.

Crucially, Professor Jones argued that these developments should not be interpreted merely as the inevitable “losers” of globalization resisting economic change. Instead, they reflected structural distortions within the organization of global production itself. Global trade increasingly became concentrated around highly integrated logistics networks, dominant shipping companies, large-scale retailers, and sophisticated infrastructure managers capable of exercising considerable market power. While globalization appeared to promote open competition, in practice it often strengthened large multinational corporations at the expense of smaller firms embedded within local economies.

One of the lecture’s most illuminating illustrations concerned the transformation of retail competition in the United States. Large corporations such as Walmart could exploit global supply chains on terms unavailable to smaller businesses. Their purchasing power enabled them to obtain lower prices, preferential shipping arrangements, and economies of scale that local retailers simply could not match. Consequently, globalization altered competitive conditions not only internationally but also within domestic markets, contributing to the decline of independent businesses and weakening local economic ecosystems. Similar processes unfolded across Europe, where increasing market concentration reinforced regional inequalities and accelerated socioeconomic polarization.

Professor Jones therefore invited participants to reconsider globalization not simply as an international phenomenon but as a force fundamentally reshaping domestic political economy. The erosion of local economic resilience gradually weakened social solidarity, increased distrust toward governing institutions, and created fertile political opportunities for populist entrepreneurs promising to restore national control over markets, borders, and economic policy. In this sense, domestic political fragmentation became an unintended consequence of the very international economic integration that the transatlantic partnership had so successfully promoted.

Europe’s Strategic Response: From Atlantic Integration to European-Centered Geoeconomics

Photo: Dreamstime

If globalization weakened the domestic foundations of Atlantic cooperation, Professor Jones argued, Europe’s contemporary policy response reflects a growing recognition that previous assumptions concerning international economic openness can no longer be taken for granted. European policymakers increasingly accept that they cannot simply wait for future American administrations to restore earlier patterns of transatlantic cooperation. Instead, they have begun constructing a more autonomous economic and strategic framework capable of protecting European interests irrespective of political developments in Washington.

Importantly, Professor Jones emphasized that this transformation did not begin with Donald Trump’s second presidency alone. Several initiatives emerged during the later years of the first Trump administration and expanded significantly following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Recent American political developments have accelerated rather than initiated Europe’s broader strategic reorientation. The essential objective is not to abandon the Atlantic partnership but to reduce Europe’s structural dependence upon external political decisions over which Europeans exercise little influence.

This shift is particularly visible in the field of industrial policy and public procurement. Professor Jones highlighted the emergence of local content requirements within European defense procurement; whereby publicly funded contracts increasingly favor production located within Europe itself. Initially confined to defense industries, this principle subsequently expanded through policy initiatives such as the Draghi Report on European Competitiveness and later legislative proposals including the Industrial Accelerator Act. Together, these developments illustrate the emergence of a distinctly European approach to geoeconomic governance in which industrial resilience, supply-chain security, and technological sovereignty increasingly complement traditional commitments to market openness.

The significance of these reforms extends well beyond procurement rules. Local content requirements encourage firms operating within Europe—including subsidiaries of American multinational corporations—to source components, technologies, and services increasingly from European suppliers. Likewise, European firms operating in North America will become progressively integrated into North American production networks. As a result, transatlantic corporations may remain formally multinational while becoming economically embedded within increasingly separate regional production systems.

Professor Jones argued that this gradual regionalization of global value chains represents one of the most important structural transformations currently reshaping the international political economy. Rather than a complete reversal of globalization, it signals the emergence of a more fragmented form of globalization organized around competing regional economic blocs. Europe, North America, and China increasingly seek to secure critical technologies, strengthen domestic industrial capacity, and reduce strategic dependence upon external actors. The consequence is not economic autarky but a more compartmentalized global economy in which geopolitical considerations increasingly shape commercial relationships.

A Fragmenting International Order

Professor Jones further suggested that these developments should not be interpreted as unique to Europe. Similar tendencies are already visible across other major economies, particularly China, which has likewise introduced increasingly restrictive policies governing foreign investment, technology transfer, and participation within strategically significant sectors. Across the global economy, governments are placing greater emphasis upon resilience, redundancy, and strategic control rather than efficiency alone.

This transformation represents a profound departure from the assumptions that guided globalization during the final decades of the twentieth century. For much of that period, policymakers regarded expanding interdependence as both economically desirable and politically stabilizing. Contemporary governments, by contrast, increasingly perceive excessive dependence itself as a strategic vulnerability. Economic openness therefore becomes conditional rather than universal, shaped by concerns regarding national security, technological competition, and geopolitical rivalry.

Professor Jones described this evolving landscape as one in which the West itself is becoming rewired. The United States and Europe will undoubtedly remain close economic partners, yet the institutional mechanisms through which they cooperate are likely to differ substantially from those characterizing the post-war Atlantic order. Firms operating on opposite sides of the Atlantic may increasingly participate in separate regulatory frameworks, production systems, technological ecosystems, and industrial strategies despite maintaining shared ownership structures. The Atlantic partnership thus survives, but in a significantly altered institutional form.

Conclusion

Professor Erik Jones delivered an intellectually ambitious and historically grounded examination of one of the defining transformations confronting Europe in the twenty-first century. Rather than interpreting current tensions between Europe and the United States as another temporary diplomatic dispute, he argued persuasively that the Atlantic partnership is entering a qualitatively new phase shaped by domestic political fragmentation, declining social solidarity, and the geopolitical restructuring of the global economy. His concept of a “post-Atlantic Europe” offers an important analytical framework for understanding why contemporary challenges extend beyond disagreements over tariffs, defense spending, or trade negotiations to encompass the very political foundations of transatlantic cooperation.

One of the lecture’s greatest strengths lay in its ability to integrate historical perspective with contemporary political analysis. By tracing successive crises from the Suez intervention and the collapse of Bretton Woods through the Cold War, the Iraq War, and the Trump presidencies, Professor Jones demonstrated that previous periods of tension unfolded within an enduring consensus concerning liberal democracy, European integration, and collective security. The current moment differs precisely because these shared assumptions are themselves increasingly contested. This insight represents a significant contribution to contemporary debates concerning European integration, transatlantic relations, and international political economy.

Equally compelling was Professor Jones’s explanation of how domestic political developments reshape international institutions. Rather than portraying globalization solely as a story of expanding prosperity, he highlighted its unintended distributive consequences, demonstrating how widening inequalities, concentrated market power, and declining local economic resilience gradually undermined democratic solidarity. Populism, in this account, emerges not simply as a reaction against international cooperation but as a political response to structural transformations embedded within globalization itself.

The lecture also provided participants with an important conceptual framework for interpreting Europe’s evolving pursuit of strategic autonomy. European industrial policy, procurement reform, technological resilience, and regional supply-chain development are not isolated policy innovations but components of a broader effort to adapt to an international environment characterized by geopolitical competition and declining certainty regarding American leadership. Europe is increasingly seeking to preserve openness while simultaneously strengthening its capacity to act independently when necessary.

Perhaps the lecture’s most enduring message was that the future of Europe will depend less upon restoring an earlier version of the Atlantic partnership than upon successfully navigating a profoundly altered international landscape. The transatlantic relationship is unlikely to disappear; however, it will increasingly operate within a fragmented global economy marked by competing centers of production, differentiated regulatory systems, and more regionally organized value chains. Understanding this transition, Professor Jones argued, is essential for scholars and policymakers alike.

For participants in the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, Professor Jones’s lecture provided far more than an analysis of EU–US trade relations. It offered a sophisticated reinterpretation of the evolving relationship between globalization, democracy, European integration, and geopolitical order. Combining historical depth, theoretical sophistication, and contemporary relevance, the lecture challenged participants to rethink some of the most enduring assumptions of post-war international politics while providing a compelling analytical lens through which to understand Europe’s changing place in an increasingly fragmented world.

Illustration of the global economic impact of US tariff policies. Photo: Matthew Fowler / Dreamstime.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Prof. Kent Jones: Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

As international trade becomes increasingly entangled with geopolitical rivalry, democratic legitimacy, and populist politics, understanding the future of the rules-based trading order has never been more urgent. In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Kent Jones examines how the resurgence of populism—particularly under Donald Trump’s second presidency—is reshaping the World Trade Organization (WTO) and challenging the legitimacy of multilateral trade governance. Moderated by Dr. Neo Sithole, the session combines international economics, institutional theory, and political economy to explore why the future of global trade depends not only on markets and tariffs but also on trust, shared norms, and the political foundations of international cooperation.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The accelerating politicization of international trade has emerged as one of the defining features of the contemporary global political economy. Once regarded primarily as a technocratic domain governed by multilateral rules, reciprocal market access, and the pursuit of economic efficiency, international trade has increasingly become an arena where questions of national sovereignty, democratic legitimacy, geopolitical rivalry, and populist mobilization converge. Rising protectionism, strategic competition among major powers, disruptions to global supply chains, and the growing tendency of governments to weaponize economic interdependence have fundamentally challenged the assumptions underpinning the post-war liberal trading order. Understanding contemporary trade politics therefore requires moving beyond conventional economic analysis to examine its broader political, institutional, and ideological foundations.

These themes were at the heart of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the title “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition.” Bringing together leading scholars and participants from across the globe, the programme explored how geoeconomic rivalry, democratic backsliding, populism, and the erosion of the liberal international order are reshaping both European integration and global governance. Within this broader intellectual framework, Professor Kent Jones‘s lecture, “Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade,” offered a timely and theoretically rich examination of the profound political transformation currently affecting international trade governance. 

The session was thoughtfully moderated by Dr. Neo Sithole, Non-resident Research Fellow at the ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group, whose introduction effectively situated Professor Jones’s lecture within the broader objectives of the Summer School. By highlighting Professor Jones’s distinguished scholarship on international trade, globalization, and the political economy of multilateral institutions, Dr. Sithole prepared participants to engage with the lecture’s central themes while emphasizing the growing importance of examining trade through the interconnected lenses of populism, democratic legitimacy, and international governance. 

Drawing on international economics, political economy, institutional theory, and constructivism, Professor Jones argued that the contemporary crisis confronting the World Trade Organization (WTO) extends far beyond disputes over tariffs or market access. Instead, it reflects the gradual erosion of the shared political commitment that has historically sustained the rules-based trading system. By connecting the resurgence of populism to the weakening of institutional legitimacy and the fragmentation of multilateral cooperation, the lecture provided participants with a sophisticated analytical framework for understanding one of the most consequential transformations in the contemporary international political economy. 

Populism, Trade, and the Erosion of Multilateral Legitimacy

Dr. Kent Jones, Professor Emeritus of International Economics at Babson College and author of Populism and Trade: The Challenge to the Global Trading System.

Professor Kent Jones opened his lecture by situating contemporary trade politics within the extraordinary transformation brought about by Donald Trump’s second presidency. While acknowledging that many of the structural challenges confronting the World Trade Organization (WTO) predated the current administration, he argued that the return of Donald Trump to the White House has accelerated and deepened a crisis that had been developing gradually for more than two decades. The principal concern, he suggested, is no longer simply the rise of protectionism or the proliferation of tariffs. Rather, the international trading system is confronting a far more profound challenge: the weakening of the political legitimacy upon which multilateral economic governance ultimately depends.

Professor Jones emphasized that discussions of contemporary trade policy often focus narrowly on economic indicators—tariff rates, trade balances, market access, or industrial competitiveness. While these variables remain important, they fail to capture the political transformation now underway. Trade policy has increasingly become an instrument of domestic political mobilization, ideological conflict, and electoral strategy. Consequently, understanding today’s international economic order requires moving beyond conventional economic analysis toward a broader examination of political narratives, institutional trust, and the changing relationship between domestic politics and global governance.

This shift, Professor Jones argued, is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the evolution of American trade policy under Donald Trump. Whereas previous administrations generally accepted the WTO as the principal institutional framework through which trade disputes should be managed, Trump’s second administration increasingly treated international trade rules as obstacles to national political objectives rather than mutually beneficial commitments. In doing so, trade policy became deeply intertwined with broader populist narratives concerning sovereignty, national decline, foreign competition, and elite betrayal.

Trump II and the Politicization of Trade Policy

A central theme of Professor Jones’s lecture was that Donald Trump’s second administration represents what he described as an “advanced stage” of populist trade policy. While Trump’s first presidency had already challenged important elements of the post-war trading order, the second administration has pursued a considerably more systematic effort to redefine both the legal and political foundations of American trade policy.

Professor Jones observed that Trump’s political strategy closely mirrors classical theories of populism. Like many populist leaders, Trump constructs politics around a moral division between a virtuous and victimized people on one side and corrupt domestic and international elites on the other. International trade occupies a central place within this narrative because it provides a highly visible explanation for economic grievances experienced by many citizens. Trade deficits, factory closures, industrial decline, and employment insecurity are presented not as the product of complex structural transformations but as the direct consequence of betrayal by political elites and exploitation by foreign governments.

According to Professor Jones, this political framing fundamentally alters the purpose of trade policy. Rather than serving as an instrument for promoting mutual economic gains through cooperation, tariffs become highly visible political symbols demonstrating governmental willingness to defend national interests against external threats. Their economic effectiveness becomes secondary to their political value as expressions of sovereignty and national strength.

Trump’s well-known enthusiasm for tariffs therefore reflects more than a preference for protectionism. Professor Jones argued that tariffs have become one of the administration’s principal instruments of political bargaining. By abandoning uniform tariff schedules and introducing country-specific measures, the administration sought to maximize American leverage in bilateral negotiations while simultaneously demonstrating decisive political leadership to domestic audiences. The resulting approach departs significantly from the multilateral principles that have governed international trade since the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947.

Redefining National Security in International Trade

One of the lecture’s most significant analytical contributions concerned Professor Jones’s discussion of how the Trump administration has reinterpreted the concept of national security within international trade law. Traditionally, Article XXI of the GATT has been understood as a narrowly defined exception permitting governments to restrict trade under exceptional circumstances involving genuine security emergencies, wartime conditions, or other extraordinary threats to national survival.

Professor Jones argued that the Trump administration fundamentally expanded this interpretation by redefining economic concerns—including employment levels in strategic industries such as steel—as matters of national security. This considerably broader understanding enabled the administration to justify protectionist measures under legal provisions originally intended for exceptional geopolitical circumstances rather than routine economic policy.

Such reinterpretations carry consequences extending well beyond the immediate disputes surrounding particular tariff measures. If national security becomes an elastic concept encompassing virtually any domestic economic concern, the distinction between exceptional emergency measures and ordinary commercial policy effectively disappears. Professor Jones suggested that this development threatens one of the central normative foundations of the multilateral trading system by making international commitments increasingly contingent upon unilateral political interpretation.

Liberation Day Tariffs and the Challenge to WTO Rules

3D illustration: Lightspring.

Professor Jones devoted considerable attention to the so-called “Liberation Day” tariffs introduced during Trump’s second administration, presenting them as perhaps the clearest illustration of the growing politicization of international trade. These measures were implemented under emergency executive authority through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), enabling the administration to bypass many of the institutional constraints traditionally associated with American trade policy. The significance of these tariffs, Professor Jones argued, lies not merely in their economic effects but in the legal and institutional precedents they establish. By unilaterally departing from previously negotiated tariff schedules, the administration effectively challenged one of the WTO’s most fundamental operating principles: that tariff commitments constitute binding international obligations rather than temporary political preferences.

Equally important was the administration’s decision to impose different tariff levels on different countries. Professor Jones explained that this directly conflicted with the WTO’s Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle, which requires members to extend equivalent tariff treatment to all trading partners except under carefully defined exceptions. The move from universal rules toward individualized bilateral bargaining represented, in his assessment, a profound shift away from multilateral governance toward a more explicitly power-based conception of international economic relations.

From Trump’s perspective, this approach significantly increased American bargaining leverage by allowing the United States to negotiate separately with each trading partner. However, Professor Jones noted that such bilateralism comes at the expense of predictability, legal certainty, and institutional trust—the very qualities the WTO was originally designed to provide. The transition from collectively negotiated rules to discretionary bilateral bargaining fundamentally alters both the operation and the legitimacy of the international trading system.

Populist Narratives and Economic Misrepresentation

Professor Jones further explored the relationship between populist communication strategies and trade policy by examining the administration’s repeated claims regarding tariffs themselves. Throughout the political debate, President Trump consistently argued that tariffs would be paid by foreign exporters rather than American consumers. From an economic perspective, Professor Jones noted, this assertion contradicts established principles of international trade economics, according to which tariffs are collected from importers and are frequently passed on, at least partially, to domestic consumers through higher prices.

Yet the persistence of this narrative illustrates an important feature of populist politics. The political effectiveness of such claims depends less upon their economic accuracy than upon their symbolic resonance. By portraying tariffs as costs imposed upon foreign competitors rather than domestic citizens, the administration reinforced broader narratives depicting international trade as a contest between national winners and losers rather than a system of reciprocal economic exchange.

Similarly, Professor Jones highlighted Trump’s frequent depiction of foreign countries as having “ripped off” the United States through unfair trade practices. This language transformed complex structural phenomena—such as persistent trade deficits, changing comparative advantages, and global supply-chain integration—into morally charged political narratives centered upon victimization and betrayal. Such rhetoric strengthens populist appeals by simplifying complicated economic relationships into emotionally accessible stories involving identifiable heroes and villains.

Throughout this discussion, Professor Jones repeatedly emphasized that these narratives are not merely rhetorical devices but active components of contemporary trade policy itself. The politicization of international commerce has therefore altered not only the substance of economic governance but also the language through which trade is understood, debated, and legitimized within democratic politics. As trade becomes increasingly embedded within broader conflicts over national identity, sovereignty, and political authority, the future of the multilateral trading system will depend as much upon rebuilding political legitimacy as upon negotiating new commercial agreements.

Constructivism and the Institutional Foundations of the World Trade Organization

Moving beyond the immediate controversies surrounding Donald Trump’s tariff policies, Professor Jones devoted the second half of his lecture to a broader theoretical question: why do international trade institutions command obedience in the first place? Rather than explaining the World Trade Organization (WTO) solely through the lens of economics or power politics, he adopted a constructivist institutional perspective, arguing that the effectiveness of international organizations ultimately depends upon shared beliefs, common expectations, and the willingness of states voluntarily to comply with collectively accepted rules. This analytical shift allowed participants to view the current crisis of the multilateral trading system not merely as a policy dispute but as a deeper crisis of institutional legitimacy.

Drawing upon the constructivist work of the philosopher John Searle, Professor Jones presented the WTO as a social institution built upon what he termed collective intentionality—the shared understanding among states that mutually accepted rules generate benefits greater than unilateral action. In this interpretation, institutions are not sustained primarily through coercion or legal enforcement but through the widespread belief that cooperation serves the long-term interests of all participants. Compliance therefore derives not simply from fear of sanctions but from confidence in the legitimacy and predictability of the institutional framework itself.

This perspective represented an important departure from purely realist interpretations of international trade. While material power undoubtedly shapes negotiations, Professor Jones argued that the durability of the post-war trading system depended equally upon a collective commitment to rules-based cooperation. States accepted temporary constraints upon unilateral action because they expected reciprocal benefits through expanded market access, reduced uncertainty, and lower transaction costs. The WTO, therefore, should be understood as an institutional embodiment of mutually shared expectations rather than merely a legal framework governing tariffs and commercial exchanges.

Collective Intentionality, Embedded Liberalism, and Pooled Sovereignty

Professor Jones further explained that collective intentionality within the WTO was historically reinforced by the broader political philosophy of embedded liberalism, originally articulated by John Ruggie. According to this post-war compromise, governments accepted greater openness in international trade while simultaneously preserving sufficient domestic policy autonomy to protect their societies against the disruptive consequences of globalization. Trade liberalization was never intended to eliminate national sovereignty; rather, it sought to reconcile international openness with domestic political stability.

This balance between openness and domestic autonomy formed one of the lecture’s recurring themes. Professor Jones emphasized that membership in the WTO does not require governments to abandon sovereignty altogether. Instead, participation involves what he described as a form of pooled sovereignty, whereby states voluntarily coordinate aspects of their trade policies in exchange for reciprocal access to foreign markets. Rather than surrendering authority, governments collectively exercise it through commonly negotiated rules. 

Such arrangements reduce uncertainty for economic actors by establishing predictable commercial environments. Exporters gain confidence that market access will not suddenly disappear, investors can make long-term decisions under stable regulatory conditions, and governments themselves avoid costly cycles of retaliatory protectionism. These institutional benefits explain why the multilateral trading system contributed not only to expanding international commerce but also to broader post-war economic stability.

Professor Jones argued, however, that the contemporary resurgence of populism places this delicate balance under considerable strain. As political leaders increasingly portray international institutions as constraints upon national sovereignty rather than expressions of shared governance, the very concept of pooled sovereignty becomes politically contested. Consequently, the legitimacy of multilateral institutions weakens even before their formal legal structures begin to deteriorate.

Institutional Output: Negotiation, Dispute Settlement, and Rule-Based Governance

Professor Jones then examined the principal functions through which the WTO translates collective intentionality into practical governance. He identified three core institutional outputs: multilateral trade negotiations, rule-making, and dispute settlement. Together, these mechanisms transform abstract commitments to cooperation into concrete institutional practices that regulate international commerce. 

Trade negotiations constitute the organization’s legislative function, enabling member states collectively to update commercial rules in response to changing economic conditions. The rulebook itself provides predictability by defining acceptable policy behaviour, thereby reducing uncertainty for both governments and private economic actors. Finally, the dispute settlement system offers an institutional mechanism for resolving disagreements peacefully rather than through unilateral retaliation or escalating trade wars.

Professor Jones emphasized that these three functions are mutually reinforcing. Negotiations produce rules, rules guide behaviour, and dispute settlement preserves confidence that agreed commitments will be respected. When any one component begins to weaken, the legitimacy of the entire institutional framework is gradually undermined.

From this perspective, contemporary challenges confronting the WTO cannot be understood merely as isolated legal disagreements. Instead, they represent cumulative pressures affecting every stage of institutional governance—from negotiating new agreements to maintaining existing commitments and enforcing compliance. Populist politics accelerates this process by encouraging governments to prioritize immediate domestic political gains over longer-term institutional stability.

The Historical Evolution from GATT to the WTO

The World Trade Organization (WTO) headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland—the only international organization responsible for setting and overseeing the rules governing trade between countries. Photo: Hector Christiaen.

Having established the conceptual foundations of institutional legitimacy, Professor Jones turned to the historical evolution of the multilateral trading system itself. He reminded participants that the GATT emerged directly from the catastrophic experience of the interwar period, particularly the destructive protectionism associated with the Great Depression and the Smoot–Hawley tariffs. The architects of the post-war order sought to prevent future economic nationalism by embedding international trade within a stable rules-based institutional framework.

During the GATT era, international trade governance remained relatively modest in institutional design. Negotiations primarily focused upon reducing tariffs, while dispute settlement relied heavily upon diplomatic consultation rather than judicial enforcement. Professor Jones recalled his own experience studying in Geneva during the late 1970s, describing a diplomatic culture in which negotiators frequently knew one another personally and approached disagreements through consensus-building rather than legal confrontation. This atmosphere of professional trust contributed significantly to the resilience of the early trading system.

Despite numerous commercial disputes—including disagreements between the United States and the European Community over agriculture and industrial subsidies—the GATT succeeded in preventing conflicts from escalating into full-scale trade wars. Professor Jones argued that this diplomatic ethos constituted one of the institution’s most underappreciated achievements. Even when negotiations proved difficult, participants generally remained committed to preserving the broader legitimacy of the system itself.

The establishment of the WTO in 1995 represented both a continuation and an expansion of this institutional project. The new organization extended multilateral governance beyond tariffs to encompass services, intellectual property rights, agriculture, and numerous regulatory issues. It also introduced a significantly stronger dispute settlement mechanism featuring judicial panels and an Appellate Body capable of issuing binding legal decisions. While these reforms reflected growing confidence in rules-based governance, Professor Jones suggested that they also introduced new political complexities that would later contribute to institutional tensions.

Why the WTO Entered Crisis Before Trump

Importantly, Professor Jones cautioned against attributing the WTO’s current difficulties exclusively to Donald Trump. Although Trump’s trade policies undoubtedly accelerated institutional erosion, many of the organization’s structural challenges had emerged much earlier. The expansion of membership from twenty-three founding participants under GATT to 166 members within the WTO fundamentally transformed the dynamics of multilateral negotiation.

The increasing diversity of economic interests among developed and developing countries made consensus considerably more difficult to achieve. Negotiations became more complex as new issues—including agriculture, services, intellectual property, environmental regulation, and investment—were incorporated into the multilateral agenda. The WTO’s consensus decision-making procedures, originally designed to preserve sovereign equality among members, increasingly slowed negotiations to the point of institutional paralysis.

Professor Jones identified the collapse of the Doha Development Round as the clearest illustration of these structural limitations. Launched in 2001 with ambitious objectives, the negotiations ultimately failed to generate comprehensive agreements because the growing diversity of member interests rendered consensus extraordinarily difficult. While limited sectoral agreements were eventually concluded, the broader legislative function of the WTO largely stalled.

China’s accession to the WTO introduced additional challenges. Professor Jones noted that China’s distinctive model of state capitalism did not fit comfortably within institutional rules originally designed for predominantly market-oriented economies. Debates surrounding industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, technology transfer, and intellectual property increasingly exposed limitations within the existing rulebook. These tensions further complicated efforts to maintain broad political consensus regarding the legitimacy of multilateral trade governance.

Populism as an Institutional Disruptor

Against this historical background, Professor Jones argued that populism should be understood not merely as another political actor participating within the WTO framework but as a force capable of disrupting the institutional logic upon which multilateral cooperation depends. By framing international institutions as manifestations of elite control, populist leaders encourage citizens to question the legitimacy of rules themselves rather than merely particular policy outcomes.

The result is a gradual transformation of international economic governance from a rules-based order emphasizing reciprocity, predictability, and mutual gains toward a more transactional system driven by unilateral bargaining, political symbolism, and national advantage. Professor Jones warned that such a transformation carries implications extending well beyond trade policy. If states increasingly abandon voluntarily accepted rules whenever domestic political incentives change, the foundations of institutional cooperation become progressively more fragile.

Accordingly, the crisis confronting the WTO reflects not only disagreements over tariffs or institutional reform but also a broader contest concerning the future of multilateral governance itself. Whether international institutions can continue to command legitimacy in an age of rising populism remains one of the defining political questions confronting the contemporary international order.

Reimagining the Future of the Multilateral Trading System

In the concluding section of his lecture, Professor Jones turned from diagnosis to prescription, inviting participants to consider how the international trading system might recover its legitimacy in an era increasingly characterized by geopolitical rivalry, economic nationalism, and populist politics. While acknowledging the severity of the challenges confronting the WTO, he resisted deterministic narratives predicting the inevitable collapse of multilateral trade governance. Instead, he argued that the future of the WTO depends on whether governments can reconstruct the political foundations of international cooperation while adapting institutional arrangements to the realities of a transformed global economy.

Professor Jones stressed that despite the unprecedented disruption generated by the United States under Trump’s second administration, the broader multilateral trading system has demonstrated greater resilience than is often assumed. Although Washington has increasingly challenged the organization’s rules, the overwhelming majority of WTO members have continued to conduct their trade relations according to established multilateral principles. In other words, while the United States has become the principal source of institutional disruption, most other countries have deliberately chosen continuity over confrontation, signalling their continued belief in the value of a predictable, rules-based trading order.

This distinction is crucial because it suggests that the WTO’s crisis is not simply one of legal enforcement but of political leadership. The institution itself continues to provide an internationally recognized framework for commercial relations, yet its effectiveness depends heavily upon the willingness of its largest and most influential members to demonstrate commitment to its principles. As Professor Jones repeatedly emphasized throughout the lecture, institutions derive authority not merely from legal texts but from the behaviour of those expected to uphold them.

American Leadership and the Crisis of International Authority

Silhouette of US President Donald Trump attending a conference. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Jones devoted particular attention to the changing role of the United States within the post-war international economic order. Historically, the United States had been the principal architect, sponsor, and guarantor of the liberal trading system, championing both the GATT and later the WTO as essential pillars of international economic stability. This leadership role reflected not only American economic power but also a broader strategic commitment to multilateral cooperation after the Second World War.

The contemporary situation, however, represents a striking historical reversal. Rather than defending the institutions it helped create, the United States has increasingly questioned their legitimacy and sought to reshape them according to unilateral political priorities. Professor Jones noted that this transformation has profound symbolic consequences. When the system’s founding sponsor openly challenges its own institutional architecture, confidence among other participants inevitably weakens, even when they remain committed to preserving the rules themselves.

Yet Professor Jones stopped short of concluding that American disengagement must necessarily become permanent. Political leadership changes, electoral outcomes evolve, and institutional preferences may shift over time. Consequently, he suggested that the possibility of renewed American engagement with multilateral trade governance should not be dismissed. Nevertheless, any future return would almost certainly require difficult negotiations concerning the institutional principles that currently divide Washington from much of the international community.

Reforming the WTO: Three Alternative Pathways

Professor Jones concluded his substantive analysis by examining several possible pathways for institutional reform, drawing upon proposals advanced within contemporary scholarship on international political economy. Recognizing that the existing institutional framework faces significant political and practical obstacles, he outlined three broad scenarios through which multilateral trade governance might evolve in the coming years.

The first possibility involves reforming the WTO from within. Under this scenario, member states would retain the existing institutional framework while updating its rules to reflect contemporary realities. Such reforms would need to address issues that have become increasingly important since the WTO’s establishment, including digital trade, environmental sustainability, industrial subsidies, state capitalism, human rights considerations, and other policy areas that increasingly intersect with international commerce. Rather than abandoning multilateralism, this approach seeks to restore its legitimacy through institutional adaptation.

The second scenario envisions a more decentralized architecture built upon cooperation among major regional trade organizations. Professor Jones referred to the possibility of closer coordination between entities such as the European Union, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), ASEAN, Mercosur, and other regional frameworks. Together, these institutions could potentially create a networked system of global trade governance even if universal consensus within the WTO remains difficult to achieve. Such an arrangement would preserve many benefits of international cooperation while recognizing the growing importance of regional economic integration.

A third possibility involves greater reliance on plurilateral agreements among smaller groups of willing WTO members. Rather than requiring unanimous agreement from all 166 members, subsets of countries could negotiate agreements concerning specific policy areas while remaining within the broader WTO framework. This flexible approach might allow progress where comprehensive multilateral negotiations have stalled. However, Professor Jones also acknowledged that even such reforms encounter procedural difficulties because changes to WTO decision-making itself frequently require the very consensus that has become increasingly difficult to achieve.

Between National Sovereignty and International Cooperation

Underlying Professor Jones’s discussion of institutional reform was a broader normative question concerning the relationship between national sovereignty and international cooperation. Throughout the lecture, he challenged simplistic portrayals that treat these objectives as fundamentally incompatible. Instead, he argued that the post-war trading system historically succeeded precisely because it reconciled sovereign decision-making with collectively negotiated rules.

The contemporary challenge, therefore, is not to choose between national autonomy and multilateral governance but to redefine their relationship under conditions of intensified geopolitical competition and domestic political polarization. Governments understandably seek greater resilience, economic security, and strategic autonomy in an increasingly uncertain international environment. Yet if every state pursues these objectives exclusively through unilateral action, the resulting fragmentation may ultimately undermine the stability upon which international prosperity depends.

Professor Jones thus encouraged participants to think beyond immediate political controversies and consider the longer-term institutional consequences of contemporary policy choices. Trade agreements are not simply technical economic arrangements; they are political compacts reflecting shared commitments concerning cooperation, reciprocity, and peaceful conflict resolution. Their durability ultimately depends upon maintaining public confidence that international institutions continue to serve broadly legitimate purposes.

Concluding Reflections

Professor Kent Jones’s lecture offered participants an intellectually rich and theoretically sophisticated examination of one of the defining challenges confronting the contemporary international order: the growing politicization of international trade. By integrating insights from international economics, institutional theory, political science, and the study of populism, he demonstrated that current disputes surrounding tariffs, trade wars, and WTO reform cannot be understood solely through economic analysis. Instead, they reflect a deeper transformation in the political foundations of international cooperation itself.

A particularly important contribution of the lecture was its insistence that institutional legitimacy lies at the heart of contemporary trade governance. While tariffs and commercial negotiations often dominate public attention, Professor Jones showed that the more fundamental issue concerns whether governments remain willing to accept collectively negotiated rules as legitimate constraints upon unilateral action. Once that shared commitment begins to erode, the effectiveness of even the most carefully designed institutions becomes increasingly uncertain.

Equally significant was his demonstration that populism operates not merely as an electoral phenomenon but as a force capable of reshaping the operation of international institutions. By framing multilateral organizations as instruments of distant elites rather than expressions of mutually beneficial cooperation, populist leaders alter public perceptions of international governance itself. Trade policy consequently becomes embedded within wider struggles over sovereignty, democratic representation, national identity, and political legitimacy.

At the same time, Professor Jones avoided both nostalgia for an idealized past and pessimism about the future. His historical analysis acknowledged that the WTO has long confronted structural challenges arising from expanding membership, increasingly complex negotiations, and changing patterns of global economic power. Trump’s second presidency has undoubtedly intensified these pressures, but it has not created them from nothing. Recognizing this longer historical trajectory enables a more balanced assessment of both the institution’s vulnerabilities and its continuing strengths.

Perhaps the lecture’s most enduring message was that international institutions survive not because they eliminate political disagreement but because they provide legitimate frameworks through which disagreement can be managed peacefully and predictably. The future of the multilateral trading system will therefore depend less upon technical revisions of tariff schedules than upon rebuilding the political trust and collective intentionality that originally made rules-based cooperation possible.

For participants in the ECPS Academy Summer School, Professor Jones’s lecture offered far more than an overview of contemporary trade policy. It provided a comprehensive framework for understanding how globalization, populism, democratic politics, and institutional legitimacy have become increasingly interconnected in the twenty-first century. At a time when international cooperation is being tested by rising geopolitical competition, economic nationalism, and ideological polarization, his analysis served as a timely reminder that the future of global governance ultimately depends not only on economic interests but also on the shared political commitment to sustain institutions capable of mediating them.

The sea port of Barcelona in Spain.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 – Prof. Arlo Poletti: The Evolution of EU Trade Policy and the Global Trade Order

How has the European Union’s trade policy evolved from championing liberal multilateralism to pursuing strategic autonomy in an era of geopolitical rivalry? In his opening lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition,” Professor Arlo Poletti examines the historical transformation of EU trade policy against the backdrop of globalization, China’s rise, populist contestation, and the growing weaponization of economic interdependence. Moderated by Dr. Sonali Chowdhry, the session demonstrates that contemporary trade policy can no longer be understood solely through the lens of market liberalization but must increasingly be viewed as an instrument of geopolitical strategy, economic resilience, industrial policy, and European strategic autonomy.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The accelerating transformation of the international political economy has fundamentally reshaped the role of trade in global affairs. Once understood primarily as a vehicle for market integration, economic efficiency, and multilateral cooperation, trade policy has increasingly become intertwined with geopolitical competition, technological rivalry, economic security, and democratic politics. The resurgence of great-power rivalry, the weaponization of economic interdependence, the fragmentation of global supply chains, and the rise of populist and nationalist movements have challenged many of the assumptions underpinning the post-war liberal trading order. As governments increasingly employ tariffs, industrial policy, sanctions, export controls, and investment screening as instruments of strategic statecraft, understanding contemporary trade policy requires a broader analytical perspective that integrates economics, international relations, and political science.

These developments provided the intellectual backdrop for the opening lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2026, held under the theme “Europe Between Oceans: The EU in the Age of Geoeconomics, Populism, and Strategic Competition.” Bringing together leading scholars and participants from around the world, the programme explored how profound geopolitical, economic, and political transformations are reshaping Europe and the wider international order. Within this context, Professor Arlo Poletti delivered a wide-ranging lecture, “The Evolution of EU Trade Policy and the Global Trade Order,” examining how the European Union has evolved from one of the principal architects and defenders of the liberal multilateral trading system into an increasingly geoeconomic actor seeking to balance openness with resilience, strategic autonomy, and economic security. Combining insights from international political economy, European integration studies, and comparative political economy, Professor Poletti demonstrated that contemporary EU trade policy can no longer be understood solely through the lens of market liberalization but must increasingly be analyzed as an instrument of foreign policy, industrial strategy, and geopolitical influence. 

The session was thoughtfully moderated by by Dr. Sonali Chowdhry, Research Associate at DIW Berlin and Fellow at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, whose own scholarship on global value chains, international trade, sanctions, and the distributional consequences of trade policy provided an ideal intellectual framework for the discussion. She observed that the rules-based multilateral trading order that had long provided the foundation for European prosperity could no longer be taken for granted. Rising geopolitical rivalry, intensifying technological competition with China, increasingly protectionist trade policies emanating from the United States, and the disruption of global energy markets following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have collectively transformed the strategic environment within which European trade policy operates. 

She further explained that understanding Europe’s response requires looking beyond individual trade agreements or tariff disputes. Instead, participants needed to appreciate the historical trajectory through which European trade policy evolved—from an instrument primarily concerned with market liberalization into one increasingly intertwined with questions of industrial policy, technological competitiveness, economic resilience, and national security. This broader perspective, she argued, would enable participants to understand not only contemporary EU trade policy but also the wider transformations affecting the international economic order itself. 

By situating Professor Poletti’s presentation within the broader transformations affecting the global political economy, Dr. Chowdhry emphasized why the evolution of European trade policy has become central to understanding Europe’s strategic position in an era marked by intensifying geopolitical competition and growing uncertainty. Her moderation effectively established the conceptual foundations for a lecture that encouraged participants to rethink trade not merely as an economic policy domain, but as one of the principal arenas through which power, security, and international order are increasingly contested. 

Understanding EU Trade Policy as an Interaction of Institutions, International Structure, and Domestic Politics

Professor Arlo Poletti.
Arlo Poletti is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento.

Professor Poletti began by proposing a conceptual framework through which the entire historical evolution of European trade policy could be understood. Rather than presenting trade policy as a sequence of isolated policy choices, he argued that its development reflected the interaction of three fundamental dimensions: the institutional architecture governing European trade policy, the changing international environment, and the domestic political coalitions shaping policy preferences. 

Although institutional rules have evolved over time, Professor Poletti explained that they have remained relatively stable compared to the profound transformations experienced by international politics and domestic political competition. Consequently, while institutional arrangements provide the structural foundation for European trade policy, it is primarily shifts in the international distribution of power and changes in domestic political conflict that explain the major strategic transformations observed over the past seven decades.

He therefore encouraged participants to think historically rather than episodically. Trade policy, in his view, represents the product of continuous interaction between relatively stable institutional structures and dynamic political and economic environments. Understanding this interaction, he argued, allows scholars to explain why the European Union has repeatedly redefined its external economic strategy while preserving many of its institutional foundations.

The Institutional Foundations of European Trade Power

Before turning to the historical evolution itself, Professor Poletti briefly examined the institutional foundations that have historically made the European Union one of the world’s most influential trade actors.

He identified three institutional characteristics that have consistently strengthened the Union’s negotiating position. First, trade policy has constituted a supranational competence almost since the very beginning of European integration. Member states delegated authority to negotiate external trade agreements to the European Commission, thereby allowing Europe to speak with a single voice in international negotiations. This institutional arrangement significantly enhanced Europe’s bargaining power compared with what individual member states could have achieved independently. 

Second, the creation of a common external tariff transformed the European Community—and later the European Union—into one of the largest integrated markets in the global economy. Market size itself became a powerful source of leverage. Foreign governments seeking access to the European market faced strong incentives to negotiate with European institutions, enhancing the Union’s capacity to influence international trade rules.

Finally, Professor Poletti discussed what scholars have described as the “paradox of weakness.” Although European trade negotiations require extensive consensus among member states and often involve complex decision-making procedures with multiple veto points, this apparent institutional rigidity has paradoxically strengthened the Union’s negotiating position internationally. Because European negotiators are constrained by member-state mandates, foreign governments often recognize that the Commission has limited flexibility during negotiations. Rather than weakening the Union, this constrained bargaining position has frequently increased its credibility and leverage.

From Embedded Liberalism to Globalization: The European Union as a Regime Shaper

Having established the institutional foundations of European trade policy, Professor Poletti proceeded to examine the historical circumstances under which the European Union emerged as one of the principal architects of the post-war liberal trading order. He argued that the trajectory of European trade policy cannot be understood without first appreciating the broader political and economic settlement that emerged after the Second World War. Rather than viewing trade liberalization as an isolated economic objective, policymakers embedded it within a wider institutional architecture designed simultaneously to promote economic openness, domestic stability, and international peace. 

Professor Poletti explained that the postwar international order rested upon what political economist John Ruggie famously described as “embedded liberalism.” Unlike the laissez-faire globalization of the late 19th century, the post-1945 order sought to reconcile international market openness with governments’ capacity to pursue domestic social protection and macroeconomic stability. International trade was therefore promoted not as an end in itself but as one component of a broader political compromise that recognized the legitimacy of state intervention while preventing the return of destructive economic nationalism.

Within this emerging international framework, Western Europe became one of the principal beneficiaries of expanding multilateral trade. The creation of the European Economic Community complemented rather than challenged the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Professor Poletti emphasized that European integration itself should be understood as a regional manifestation of the broader liberal international order, with both projects reinforcing one another through reciprocal commitments to openness, rules-based cooperation, and institutionalized dispute resolution.

Rather than pursuing protectionism, European governments increasingly viewed economic interdependence as a source of prosperity and political stability. Trade liberalization reduced barriers among member states while simultaneously strengthening Europe’s position within the broader multilateral trading system. This institutional convergence, Professor Poletti argued, allowed Europe gradually to evolve from a collection of national economies into one of the world’s most influential commercial actors.

Trade Policy as Foreign Policy

Professor Poletti noted that European trade policy gradually acquired significance beyond commercial negotiations alone. As European integration deepened, access to the common market became an increasingly valuable diplomatic resource that allowed the European Community—and later the European Union—to project influence well beyond its borders.

Trade agreements increasingly incorporated political conditionality, regulatory convergence, environmental provisions, labor standards, and development objectives. Commercial policy thus became an important instrument of external governance through which the European Union sought to diffuse its regulatory preferences internationally. This gradual expansion of policy objectives reflected Europe’s growing confidence in the attractiveness of its own institutional model. Rather than relying upon traditional military power, the European Union increasingly exercised influence through economic incentives and regulatory standards. Professor Poletti observed that access to the European market became one of the Union’s most powerful foreign policy instruments, encouraging neighboring countries and trading partners alike to adopt European regulatory norms.

This process, frequently described as the “Brussels Effect,” enabled the European Union to shape global markets even without formal international agreements. Firms seeking access to Europe’s large consumer market often adopted European standards voluntarily, subsequently applying those standards globally because maintaining multiple regulatory systems proved economically inefficient.

The European Union as a Defender of Multilateralism

European Commission headquarters with waving EU flags in Brussels. Photo: Viorel Dudau.

Professor Poletti argued that throughout much of the post-Cold War period the European Union increasingly came to view itself as the principal defender of the multilateral trading order. While the United States had initially played the dominant leadership role during the creation of GATT, Europe gradually assumed greater responsibility for maintaining and expanding international trade institutions.

The establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 represented the culmination of decades of multilateral cooperation. Unlike GATT, the WTO created stronger legal mechanisms for dispute settlement, broader institutional competencies, and more comprehensive commitments covering services, intellectual property, and investment-related measures. Professor Poletti emphasized that the European Union enthusiastically supported this institutional strengthening because multilateral rules protected medium-sized powers by reducing arbitrary exercises of economic power by larger states.

For Europe, multilateralism was never merely an abstract normative preference. It served concrete strategic interests. A predictable, legally binding trading system protected export-oriented European economies while reducing uncertainty for firms deeply integrated into global production networks. Stable rules also prevented major powers from using unilateral economic coercion to secure political concessions.

Consequently, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, European trade policy remained firmly committed to expanding and deepening the multilateral trading order. Successive enlargements of the European Union reinforced this orientation, bringing additional member states into a shared institutional framework built around openness, legal predictability, and international cooperation.

Globalization and the Expansion of European Trade

Professor Poletti then situated European trade policy within the broader acceleration of globalization that characterized the final decades of the twentieth century. Falling transportation costs, advances in information technology, financial liberalization, and the fragmentation of production processes transformed the structure of the world economy. Trade increasingly consisted not simply of finished products crossing national borders but of complex global value chains in which production stages were distributed across multiple countries. European firms became deeply embedded within these international production networks, relying upon cross-border investment, intermediate goods, and integrated supply chains.

This transformation substantially altered the political economy of trade. Large multinational firms became increasingly supportive of trade liberalization because their competitiveness depended upon efficient international production networks. Export-oriented industries similarly benefited from expanding foreign market access. Professor Poletti observed that under these conditions, globalization appeared largely compatible with both European economic interests and broader political objectives. The dominant policy consensus therefore viewed further liberalization as both economically efficient and politically desirable.

Emerging Political Tensions beneath the Surface

Yet Professor Poletti cautioned participants against interpreting this period as one of uncontested globalization. Even while international trade expanded rapidly, underlying political tensions gradually accumulated within many advanced industrial democracies. The benefits of globalization were distributed unevenly across regions, industries, and social groups. Highly skilled workers, internationally competitive firms, and urban export-oriented regions often experienced substantial gains. Conversely, workers employed in import-competing industries, economically vulnerable regions, and sectors exposed to international competition frequently experienced economic insecurity, employment losses, or stagnant wages.

Although these distributional tensions remained politically manageable for much of the 1990s, Professor Poletti argued that they gradually eroded domestic support for trade liberalization. Economic globalization increasingly became associated—not universally but among significant segments of the population—with deindustrialization, inequality, declining economic security, and reduced national policy autonomy.

Importantly, these emerging tensions did not initially transform European trade policy itself. Institutional commitments to multilateralism remained robust, and mainstream political parties largely continued supporting economic openness. Nevertheless, Professor Poletti suggested that the foundations of the postwar liberal consensus had begun to weaken long before they became politically visible.

Domestic Politics and the Rise of Contestation

Professor Poletti emphasized that trade policy can never be understood independently from domestic political coalitions. Governments negotiate internationally, but they remain accountable to domestic constituencies whose preferences evolve over time. As globalization generated increasingly uneven outcomes, political entrepreneurs began mobilizing those left behind by economic transformation. New political cleavages emerged that extended beyond traditional divisions between labor and capital or left and right. Questions concerning globalization, national sovereignty, migration, identity, and international integration increasingly became interconnected within broader political conflicts. This development proved especially significant because it fundamentally altered the political context within which European trade policy operated. Whereas trade liberalization had previously attracted broad cross-party consensus, it now became increasingly contested by populist movements questioning both globalization and European integration itself.

Professor Poletti stressed that this transformation should not be understood merely as an economic phenomenon. Rather, it reflected the interaction of material grievances with broader political narratives concerning sovereignty, democratic accountability, and national identity. These domestic changes would eventually intersect with profound shifts in the international system itself, creating an environment fundamentally different from the one that had sustained Europe’s multilateral trade strategy for decades.

Professor Poletti had demonstrated that the European Union’s emergence as a regime-shaping trade power rested upon a unique historical constellation: a stable liberal international order, expanding globalization, broad domestic support for openness, and institutional mechanisms that amplified European bargaining power. Yet the very forces that had enabled this success were beginning to generate new political tensions whose consequences would become increasingly visible during the following decade. These developments, he suggested, marked the beginning of a much more contested era in which Europe’s longstanding commitment to liberal multilateralism would face unprecedented political and geopolitical challenges. 

The Crisis of the Liberal Trade Order and the Rise of Geoeconomics

Having traced the European Union’s emergence as one of the principal architects and defenders of the postwar liberal trading order, Professor Poletti turned to what he described as the most significant transformation in contemporary international political economy: the gradual erosion of the assumptions that had sustained globalization for more than three decades. The world that had allowed Europe to pursue trade liberalization as both an economic and political project, he argued, had fundamentally changed. The result was not merely an adjustment of trade policy but a profound reconceptualization of trade itself—from an instrument of economic integration into an increasingly strategic component of geopolitical competition. 

Professor Poletti emphasized that this transformation did not occur suddenly. Rather, it emerged through the interaction of multiple structural developments that gradually undermined confidence in the liberal international order. These included the changing distribution of global economic power, the rise of China as a systemic competitor, the weakening of multilateral institutions, growing skepticism toward globalization within advanced democracies, and the increasing tendency of states to view economic interdependence through the prism of national security rather than economic efficiency. Rather than representing isolated developments, these trends collectively altered the very logic underlying international trade governance.

China’s Rise and the Transformation of Global Competition

Photo: Shutterstock.

Among these developments, Professor Poletti identified the spectacular rise of China as perhaps the single most consequential structural change affecting the international economic system during the twenty-first century. China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 had originally been interpreted by many Western policymakers as confirmation that expanding economic integration would gradually encourage political liberalization and reinforce the rules-based international order. Economic engagement was expected to produce convergence—not only economically but eventually politically. Reality unfolded rather differently.

Professor Poletti explained that China’s remarkable economic transformation dramatically altered global patterns of production, investment, and technological competition without producing the anticipated political convergence. Instead, China’s state-capitalist model demonstrated that rapid economic modernization could coexist with strong state intervention, industrial policy, and centralized political authority. This development fundamentally challenged many assumptions underpinning the liberal trading system.

Unlike earlier emerging economies, China rapidly became both an indispensable trading partner and an increasingly formidable geopolitical competitor. European firms benefited enormously from access to Chinese markets and production networks, yet simultaneously faced growing competitive pressures from Chinese industrial expansion supported by extensive state intervention. The consequence was a growing tension between economic interdependence and strategic competition.

Professor Poletti stressed that European policymakers increasingly found themselves confronting a dilemma for which traditional trade policy offered few satisfactory solutions: how could Europe remain committed to open markets while responding to the strategic implications of China’s expanding technological, industrial, and geopolitical influence?

The Growing Politicization of Global Value Chains

A second major theme of Professor Poletti’s lecture concerned the transformation of global value chains from purely economic arrangements into objects of strategic political concern. For decades, increasingly fragmented international production had been celebrated as evidence of globalization’s efficiency. Firms located different stages of production wherever costs were lowest or capabilities strongest, creating highly integrated transnational production systems that substantially increased productivity. However, Professor Poletti argued that recent crises fundamentally altered perceptions of these global production networks.

The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the vulnerabilities associated with excessive dependence upon geographically concentrated supply chains. Medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and numerous intermediate goods suddenly became difficult to obtain as production disruptions spread across international markets. Shortly thereafter, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further demonstrated how energy dependence and commodity supply could become instruments of geopolitical coercion. These experiences fundamentally changed the political discourse surrounding globalization. Where policymakers had previously emphasized efficiency, they increasingly began discussing resilience. Where cost minimization had previously dominated policy debates, security of supply emerged as an equally important objective. Trade policy therefore became inseparable from broader discussions concerning economic security.

Professor Poletti observed that concepts such as friend-shoring, near-shoring, de-risking, and strategic resilience rapidly entered the vocabulary of both policymakers and scholars. Each reflected an important conceptual shift: globalization would no longer be evaluated solely according to economic efficiency but also according to geopolitical reliability.

Populism and the Domestic Politics of Trade

Professor Poletti next examined how international structural changes interacted with domestic political transformations across Europe and other advanced democracies. Trade policy, he emphasized, increasingly became entangled with broader political debates surrounding sovereignty, immigration, national identity, democratic accountability, and economic inequality. The globalization consensus that had characterized much of the 1990s and early 2000s gradually weakened as populist movements successfully mobilized constituencies who believed themselves disadvantaged by economic integration. 

Professor Poletti carefully distinguished between legitimate socioeconomic grievances and the political narratives through which these grievances were interpreted. Many communities genuinely experienced industrial decline, employment insecurity, or reduced economic opportunities resulting from structural economic transformation. Yet populist actors frequently reframed these complex developments through simplified political narratives that attributed responsibility to globalization, supranational institutions, international trade agreements, or political elites. 

Trade therefore ceased to function as a largely technocratic policy domain.Instead, it became highly politicized. Economic openness increasingly symbolized broader questions concerning national sovereignty and democratic control. This politicization significantly constrained policymakers’ room for maneuver. Whereas earlier governments often negotiated trade agreements with relatively limited public attention, contemporary trade negotiations increasingly generated intense political contestation. Professor Poletti suggested that understanding contemporary European trade policy requires recognizing this changing domestic political environment as much as the evolving international system.

The Decline of Multilateralism

Photo: Dreamstime.

Another central theme of the lecture concerned the weakening of the multilateral institutions that had previously governed international trade. Professor Poletti noted that the WTO experienced increasing difficulties in fulfilling its traditional functions. Negotiations under the Doha Development Round effectively stalled. Consensus among an expanding membership became increasingly difficult to achieve. Perhaps most significantly, the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism encountered severe institutional paralysis following disagreements over judicial appointments. For a political entity such as the European Union—whose prosperity had long depended upon predictable international rules—this institutional weakening represented a profound strategic challenge.

Professor Poletti emphasized that Europe remained rhetorically committed to multilateralism. However, policymakers increasingly recognized that defending multilateral principles alone would prove insufficient if other major powers adopted more unilateral or coercive approaches. Consequently, European trade policy gradually began adapting to a world characterized by greater geopolitical competition and weaker international institutions. Rather than abandoning multilateralism altogether, Europe increasingly supplemented multilateral commitments with bilateral trade agreements, new defensive instruments, and broader industrial policy initiatives.

Strategic Autonomy as a New Policy Paradigm

Professor Poletti devoted considerable attention to the emergence of strategic autonomy as perhaps the defining concept shaping contemporary European economic policy. He explained that strategic autonomy should not be interpreted as economic isolation or protectionism. Rather, it reflects an effort to preserve openness while simultaneously reducing excessive dependence upon potentially unreliable external partners. The objective is therefore selective resilience rather than comprehensive disengagement. 

This distinction, Professor Poletti argued, is crucial. Europe remains deeply integrated within the global economy. Its prosperity continues to depend upon international trade, investment, and technological exchange. Yet policymakers increasingly acknowledge that complete dependence upon external suppliers in strategically important sectors creates vulnerabilities that cannot be ignored. Strategic autonomy therefore seeks to reconcile two objectives that increasingly appear in tension: i) maintaining economic openness; and ii) strengthening geopolitical resilience. Professor Poletti suggested that this balancing act will likely define European trade policy for years to come.

From Liberal Trade Policy to Geoeconomic Statecraft

Perhaps the most important conceptual contribution of Professor Poletti’s lecture was his argument that Europe is witnessing not merely a revision of trade policy but a broader transformation toward geoeconomics. Trade, investment, technology, industrial policy, export controls, sanctions, and supply-chain governance increasingly operate as interconnected instruments of strategic competition. Economic policy itself has become an instrument of foreign policy.

Professor Poletti emphasized that this transformation does not necessarily imply abandoning liberal economic principles. Rather, it reflects recognition that economic relations now operate within a far more competitive geopolitical environment than the one that characterized the immediate post-Cold War decades. Consequently, policymakers must simultaneously pursue prosperity, security, resilience, and political influence. These objectives often complement one another—but increasingly they also generate difficult trade-offs.

Throughout this section of the lecture, Professor Poletti encouraged participants to move beyond simplistic binaries opposing free trade and protectionism. The more significant transformation, he argued, concerns the changing purposes assigned to trade policy itself. Where European trade policy once primarily sought efficiency, market access, and rule-based cooperation, it must now also address technological rivalry, supply-chain resilience, industrial competitiveness, economic coercion, and geopolitical uncertainty. This evolution represents one of the most important structural transformations currently reshaping both the European Union and the international political economy more broadly.

The European Union’s Emerging Geoeconomic Toolbox

In the concluding substantive part of his lecture, Professor Poletti examined how the European Union has begun translating its changing understanding of international political economy into concrete policy instruments. Having demonstrated that trade policy has evolved from a predominantly liberalizing enterprise into an increasingly strategic one, he explained that this conceptual transformation has been accompanied by the gradual development of a new geoeconomic toolkit. These instruments, he argued, reflect Europe’s attempt to reconcile its long-standing commitment to an open global economy with the realities of an increasingly competitive and fragmented international system. 

Professor Poletti emphasized that this policy evolution should not be interpreted as a wholesale abandonment of liberal trade principles. Rather, it represents an effort to update the Union’s external economic strategy to meet challenges that did not exist when the contemporary multilateral trading system was established. In today’s international environment, governments increasingly employ economic instruments not simply to pursue prosperity but also to advance geopolitical objectives, secure technological leadership, protect critical infrastructure, and influence the strategic behavior of other states. Against this backdrop, the European Union has sought to develop instruments capable of responding to economic coercion while remaining broadly consistent with its preference for rules-based international cooperation.

One of the most notable developments discussed during the lecture was the adoption of the Anti-Coercion Instrument, designed to provide the European Union with mechanisms to respond collectively when third countries seek to pressure individual member states through economic means. Professor Poletti explained that this initiative reflects lessons drawn from recent international experiences, particularly instances in which economic dependence was deliberately weaponized to influence sovereign political decisions. The emergence of such instruments illustrates how economic security has become inseparable from broader questions of European strategic autonomy. Rather than assuming that commercial interdependence automatically generates political stability, policymakers increasingly recognize that asymmetric dependencies can themselves become sources of vulnerability.

Balancing Openness and Security

Throughout this part of the lecture, Professor Poletti repeatedly returned to what he identified as the central dilemma confronting contemporary European policymakers: how can Europe remain one of the world’s most open economies while simultaneously protecting itself against strategic risks? He argued that simplistic solutions—whether complete protectionism or unrestricted globalization—fail to capture the complexity of today’s international environment. Europe’s prosperity continues to depend fundamentally upon international trade, investment, technological exchange, and participation in global production networks. Attempts to disengage from globalization entirely would therefore impose enormous economic costs and undermine European competitiveness.

At the same time, recent crises have demonstrated that excessive dependence in strategically sensitive sectors may expose governments to unacceptable political and economic risks. The challenge, Professor Poletti suggested, lies not in choosing between openness and security but in designing policies capable of balancing both objectives simultaneously. This balancing exercise increasingly shapes European debates concerning semiconductors, artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, critical raw materials, pharmaceuticals, energy security, telecommunications, and advanced manufacturing. Across these sectors, policymakers are seeking to strengthen resilience without undermining the economic benefits generated by international integration.

Professor Poletti emphasized that such decisions inevitably involve difficult political trade-offs. Measures that improve resilience frequently impose higher economic costs. Conversely, policies maximizing efficiency may increase geopolitical exposure. Contemporary trade policy therefore requires continuous negotiation between competing priorities rather than straightforward pursuit of a single objective.

Industrial Policy Returns to the Center of European Strategy

Another significant theme concerned the renewed importance of industrial policy within the European Union. For much of the post-Cold War era, industrial policy occupied a relatively modest place within mainstream European economic thinking. Market competition, regulatory harmonization, and trade liberalization were generally viewed as the principal drivers of competitiveness. Professor Poletti argued that this intellectual consensus has shifted considerably. Governments increasingly recognize that technological leadership, innovation capacity, and industrial resilience cannot always be left exclusively to market forces, particularly when competing powers actively employ industrial subsidies, state investment, and strategic planning. The European Union’s recent industrial initiatives therefore represent not merely economic policy but components of a broader geoeconomic strategy.

Professor Poletti cautioned, however, against viewing industrial policy simply as a return to traditional state intervention. Contemporary industrial strategy seeks to strengthen technological competitiveness while remaining compatible with European competition rules, environmental objectives, and international commitments. Achieving this balance remains one of the central policy challenges confronting the Union.

Europe’s Position Between the United States and China

Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Poletti also reflected on Europe’s increasingly delicate position between the world’s two largest economic powers. Unlike the Cold War bipolar system, today’s international economy remains characterized by deep commercial interdependence even as geopolitical rivalry intensifies. Europe consequently faces pressures from multiple directions. The United States increasingly encourages closer coordination among democratic allies in areas such as technology controls, investment screening, and supply-chain security. China remains simultaneously an indispensable economic partner, a major export market, an important source of investment, and an increasingly significant strategic competitor.

Professor Poletti argued that navigating these overlapping relationships requires a high degree of strategic flexibility. Rather than aligning unconditionally with either pole, the European Union seeks to preserve its own capacity for independent decision-making while maintaining productive economic relationships with both. This aspiration partly explains the growing emphasis placed upon strategic autonomy throughout recent European policy documents.

Conclusion

Professor Arlo Poletti concluded his lecture by demonstrating that the evolution of European Union trade policy reflects far more than successive changes in commercial strategy. Rather, it mirrors the transformation of the international political economy itself. From the postwar embedded liberal order through the expansion of globalization to today’s era of geopolitical rivalry and geoeconomic competition, European trade policy has continuously adapted to changing domestic, institutional, and international conditions.

A central message of the lecture was that the European Union’s identity as a trade power has fundamentally evolved. While Europe remains committed to international openness and multilateral cooperation, these objectives are increasingly pursued alongside concerns for resilience, strategic autonomy, technological competitiveness, and economic security. Trade policy has therefore become inseparable from broader questions of foreign policy, industrial strategy, and geopolitical positioning.

Professor Poletti cautioned against simplistic narratives portraying either globalization or deglobalization as inevitable historical trajectories. Instead, he encouraged participants to recognize that the current period is characterized by selective reconfiguration rather than wholesale retreat from international economic integration. The challenge confronting Europe is not whether to participate in globalization but how to shape globalization under conditions of growing strategic competition.

In sum, the lecture offered participants a sophisticated framework for understanding one of the defining transformations of contemporary international political economy. By integrating institutional analysis, historical development, domestic political dynamics, and geopolitical change, Professor Poletti demonstrated that European trade policy now occupies the intersection of economics, security, and global governance. His presentation underscored that the future of the European Union’s external economic strategy will depend upon its ability to preserve the benefits of openness while developing the resilience necessary to navigate an increasingly uncertain and contested international order. Under Dr. Sonali Chowdhry’s thoughtful moderation, the session provided participants with both a rich historical perspective and an analytical toolkit for understanding how trade has become one of the principal arenas through which power, security, and political authority are exercised in the twenty-first century. 

Dr. Gino Pauselli.

Asst. Prof. Pauselli: LGBTQ+ Rights Have Become a Symbolic Boundary in Global Politics

Authoritarian governments, populist movements, and rising powers are increasingly challenging the liberal international order not only by contesting specific human rights norms but also by questioning the institutions that create and enforce them. In this interview with the ECPS, Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign examines how international norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped in an era of geopolitical rivalry and democratic uncertainty. Drawing on research spanning LGBTQ+ rights, migration, border securitization, China’s influence in global governance, international organizations, and civil society, he argues that contemporary struggles over human rights are fundamentally contests over political authority, sovereignty, and the power to define international law itself.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Throughout the post-Cold War era, the international human rights regime has often been understood as one of the defining pillars of the liberal international order. Built upon the principles of universality, multilateral cooperation, and the progressive expansion of international legal protections, this order has contributed to significant advances in the promotion of civil liberties, minority rights, and transnational accountability. Yet, in recent years, these foundations have come under mounting pressure. Across both established and emerging democracies, populist leaders, authoritarian governments, and rising powers have increasingly challenged not only specific human rights norms but also the institutions and legal processes through which those norms are produced, interpreted, and enforced. Far from being confined to domestic politics, contemporary conflicts over sovereignty, migration, borders, LGBTQ+ rights, and civil society have become central battlegrounds in a broader contest over the future of global governance and the legitimacy of liberal universalism.

It is precisely these transformations that lie at the heart of the scholarship of Dr. Gino Pauselli, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Combining insights from international relations, comparative politics, and human rights scholarship, Dr. Pauselli examines how international norms emerge, diffuse, and are contested through interactions among states, international organizations, NGOs, and transnational advocacy networks. His research offers an original perspective on the contemporary struggle between liberal and illiberal visions of international order, moving beyond simplistic accounts of democratic decline to reveal the complex political processes through which global norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Pauselli argues that contemporary disputes over LGBTQ+ rights are ultimately less about sexuality than about political authority itself. As he puts it, “the ostensible subject is LGBT rights, but the deeper objection concerns who gets to make international law and how.” In his view, sexual orientation and gender identity have become powerful symbolic markers through which states signal their position in an increasingly polarized international order. Consequently, “LGBT rights have become the issue through which states perform that boundary—a way of signaling which side of a supposed civilizational divide a state stands on.”

Dr. Pauselli also offers important insights into the changing dynamics of authoritarian and populist politics. While acknowledging that anti-LGBT rhetoric often serves to divert attention from policy failures, he argues that it represents something more ambitious: “an active project to reshape society or build society around a notion of a heteronormative state.” Similarly, his research on border securitization demonstrates that restrictive migration policies can generate unintended human rights consequences. Rather than rhetoric alone, he finds that visible state projects such as border walls communicate heightened threat perceptions to border officials, thereby increasing the likelihood of abuse.

The interview further explores China’s growing influence within international institutions, the contestation surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, the emergence of illiberal NGO networks, and the evolving relationship between populism and international human rights governance. Throughout the conversation, Dr. Pauselli challenges conventional assumptions that rising powers necessarily reject global governance altogether. Instead, he argues that they increasingly seek to reshape existing institutions from within, because they “do value order and global governance,” while contesting the liberal content of the norms that sustain them.

Despite documenting an increasingly coordinated transnational backlash against liberal human rights norms, Dr. Pauselli remains cautiously optimistic about the future of the human rights project. Resistance to human rights, he observes, is hardly new; what is new is “the transnational coordination of this opposition at both the state and non-state levels.” Yet he also insists that attacks on the postwar human rights regime cannot ultimately succeed without offering a compelling alternative. The greatest challenge for liberal actors, he concludes, is not simply defending abstract legal principles but demonstrating, through people’s lived experiences, how universal human rights meaningfully improve everyday life. In an era increasingly shaped by populism, geopolitical rivalry, and normative contestation, this interview offers a timely and sophisticated examination of the future of democracy, international law, and the global human rights order.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Opposition to LGBT Rights Is Ultimately a Contest Over International Authority

Homophobic counter-protesters from Malopolscy Patrioci organization, during manifestation against Krakow Equality March (Pride parade) at Main Market Square in Krakow, Poland on August 29, 2020.

Dr. Pauselli, welcome! Let me begin with your recent research on LGBTQ+ rights and authoritarian politics. You suggest that opposition to LGBTQ+ rights is often embedded within broader resistance to the liberal international order. Why have sexual orientation and gender identity issues become such powerful symbols in contemporary struggles over sovereignty, nationalism, populism, and global norms?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: First, international law has historically been understood through consent. Sexual orientation and gender identity norms, by contrast, expanded rapidly at the international level, largely through the interpretive work of courts, treaty bodies, and non-state actors rather than through explicit state agreement. That makes them an almost ideal target for a sovereigntist critique: they can be portrayed as obligations imposed without consent by unelected actors, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of international institutions. The ostensible subject is LGBT rights, but the deeper objection concerns who gets to make international law and how.

The second reason is that these issues rest upon the symbolic material that nationalism mobilizes: the family, reproduction, the gender order, and the continuity of the nation across generations. That makes them a clear boundary marker. In my own work, I think about this in terms of ingroups and outgroups. Criticism over human rights tends to produce compliance among states that see the critic as one of their own and backlash among those that see the critic as an adversary. LGBT rights have become the issue through which states perform that boundary—a way of signaling which side of a supposed civilizational divide a state stands on.

Third, opposition is cheap. Restricting these rights carries little material cost and threatens no powerful economic interests, while yielding a high identity return. It is a low-cost, highly visible signal of standing apart from the liberal international order.

Many authoritarian governments portray LGBTQ+ rights as foreign impositions or manifestations of “Western values.” How much does this rhetoric overlap with contemporary populist narratives that oppose cosmopolitanism, globalization, and transnational human rights norms in the name of national sovereignty?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is exactly what I was mentioning. It is true that populist and conservative governments have used anti-LGBT rhetoric to challenge what is perceived as a foreign imposition. But this rhetoric, as I mentioned before, is itself borrowed from transnational actors, including both non-state actors and organized state actors abroad.

Economic Growth Can Strengthen, Rather Than Weaken, Anti-LGBT Projects

To what extent do anti-LGBTQ+ campaigns serve as political instruments through which populist and authoritarian leaders mobilize conservative constituencies, manufacture moral panics, and divert public attention from governance failures or economic grievances?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is a very common interpretation of the instrumentalization of anti-LGBT rhetoric. I wouldn’t say that this is not the case. This powerful strategy of opposing LGBT rights and LGBT norms does, indeed, divert attention away from economic grievances. But in the research that I’m conducting with a graduate student at the University of Illinois, what we’ve been observing is that this is not the full story. There’s also an active project to reshape society or build society around a notion of a heteronormative state and heteronormative norms.

So, on the one hand, it is true that there’s the scapegoating thesis, which basically argues that anti-LGBT rhetoric is useful for leaders because it diverts attention from the failures of their own policies. But at the same time, there is some evidence that, during periods of economic growth and economic development, this rhetoric actually becomes even more powerful in strengthening the state and reinforcing certain ideas about the state. In other words, it is precisely when the state has the resources to impose and advance these anti-LGBT projects that this rhetoric becomes most effective.

The Real Contest Is Over Who Has the Authority to Shape International Law

The UN Human Rights Council has become a major arena for disputes over sexual-minority rights. What do the debates surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI) resolutions reveal about the changing nature of global human rights governance and the growing contest between liberal and illiberal visions of international order?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: The idea of sexual orientation and gender identity being discussed and debated at global international institutions, especially human rights organizations, is relatively new. In the UN Human Rights Council, the first attempt to pass a SOGI resolution occurred in 2003, while the first resolution to be voted on and adopted came only in 2011. So, this is a very recent development—less than two decades old. And every time these initiatives have emerged, we have observed strong opposition from a bloc of countries. Although this bloc has changed over time, SOGI resolutions have consistently been among the most contested issues before the UN Human Rights Council.

So, this leads to the question that I’m essentially reframing from your question: Why is this the case, and what does it tell us about the contestation between liberal and illiberal visions of the international order?

One of the things that has become much clearer recently, especially after the many interviews I conducted in Geneva last summer, is that many states—particularly liberal states—are deeply concerned about the ability of multiple international institutions to reshape international law independently. The concern is that—or at least the way many states frame it—non-state actors, including the Human Rights Council and treaty bodies, have modified or reinterpreted international law beyond the consent of states. This challenges the basic, traditional understanding of international law, which has historically rested primarily on state consent.

What many states argue is that they never signed up for this. They basically say that they never consented to incorporating sexual orientation as one of the categories protected by international human rights law. They’re not necessarily contesting that these rights should not be protected. Rather, they do not accept this as part of the international human rights project because they never consented to it.

There is no international human rights treaty that explicitly includes it, and it is not part of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. So, the concern is deeper than sexual orientation and gender identity themselves. It is fundamentally about the ability of these bodies—these non-state actors—to reshape international law and then hold states accountable for standards to which they have never consented.

But there is also concern about these norms empowering domestic actors who are currently repressed and who might use these international frameworks to challenge the domestic status quo. For authoritarian rulers, this is particularly threatening. They fear allowing advances and changes at the international level that domestic actors could subsequently invoke to challenge their own rule.

Political Anxiety, Not LGBT Rights Themselves, Drives Much of the Conflict

Helsinki Pride parade.
Helsinki Pride parade on July 2, 2010. Photo: Dreamstime.

Looking ahead, do you expect conflicts over LGBTQ+ rights to remain one of the principal battlegrounds between liberal and authoritarian visions of international order, or are other human rights issues likely to supersede them?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is very hard to tell. It’s very difficult to predict the future, and every time social scientists have tried to do that, they usually fail because we’re not trained to know what’s going to happen. But one thing I’ve been observing is that the transnational LGBT movement is learning how to counteract the conservative backlash. Actors who have been promoting and protecting LGBT rights have been thinking very carefully about the frameworks and strategies that might be most helpful and effective in preventing the conservative backlash from gaining further ground. If these actors ultimately succeed in limiting the conservative backlash, then conservatives will probably find another issue to politicize. In that case, LGBT rights would gradually move away from the center of this contestation over the international liberal order.

At the end of the day, societies care about their well-being. The lack of progress and the anxieties generated by technological change have probably led many individuals to embrace anti-LGBT rhetoric as a way of resisting change and channeling their own anxieties. But the current challenge for the conservative side is that it ultimately needs to start delivering results and providing answers to those anxieties. If opposition to LGBT rights fails to do that, then they may find themselves in some trouble. They may need to turn to another issue or rely on something else to maintain their political power.

Rising Powers Prefer to Reshape Existing Institutions Rather Than Replace Them

In your research on China’s influence within the UN Human Rights Council, you show that Beijing’s presence systematically affects the voting behavior of other states. What does this finding tell us about how rising powers can reshape international norms from within existing institutions rather than by creating alternative ones?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: There are many things that are relevant to this issue. One is that, when we observe China being effective or successful in undermining international legal norms through its participation in the UN Human Rights Council, the first thing that comes to mind is that creating new institutions and providing them with legitimacy is very difficult. So, many authoritarian or illiberal states that oppose the international liberal order may find it much easier to advance their own agenda—even if it is an illiberal one—from within existing institutions that already enjoy high levels of legitimacy than through creating new institutions that few people know about and that may lack legitimacy in the eyes of the international community.

But, to address your question directly, the first thing this tells us is that rising powers like China are deeply interested in global governance. They’re not after anarchy, per se. So, by opposing the international liberal order, they are not opposing order itself. They do value order and global governance, but they may object to the content of the current norms that sustain that order. As China rises to the top of the global power hierarchy, it does not isolate itself. On the contrary, it actively participates in international institutions that help build and sustain order at the global level. It works through these institutions to advance its own goals.

Secondly, the other point I want to make is that international organizations are very important actors in shaping international norms. These norms essentially delineate what constitutes appropriate state behavior and what does not. They may not have teeth. We know that there is no global police force, and there is no United Nations army. But the norms that are developed and shaped within international organizations create a context—a normative structure—in which certain forms of state behavior become more or less costly. That normative environment may benefit some countries more than others. That is precisely where the contestation lies.

Independent Expert Bodies Are More Resistant to Political Contestation

Your research challenges the assumption that participation in international institutions necessarily socializes rising powers into liberal norms. Based on the case of China, under what conditions can international institutions instead become vehicles for norm revision, contestation, and the diffusion of illiberal ideas?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is a very interesting question, and it’s a very difficult one for me to answer. I don’t think I have a definitive answer. What I would say is that, based on research conducted by colleagues, it seems that institutions with broad participation—especially those characterized by direct state participation, where governments send representatives who ultimately decide whether to approve an institutional outcome, and where there are no independent experts or autonomous bureaucracies—are the institutions most likely to be used by illiberal states to challenge and contest international liberal norms. That’s the case with the UN Human Rights Council, for example. Every state has one vote, and every resolution is adopted if a simple majority of states votes in favor of it.

That is not the case, for example, with treaty bodies, where decisions are made by independent experts who adjudicate the cases brought before the institution. In those settings, states cannot—or at least do not necessarily—directly influence the outcomes through official channels.

Opposition to Human Rights Is Old—Its Transnational Coordination Is New

Turkish women rallied in Istanbul to protest proposed anti-abortion laws by then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan on June 18, 2012 in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Sadık Güleç.

How do you interpret the growing convergence between right-wing populist movements and authoritarian governments in their critiques of international human rights institutions? Are we witnessing the emergence of a transnational backlash against liberal universalism, and if so, what are its implications for the future of global human rights governance?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: One thing that I find very revealing when I teach international human rights to my students is that resistance to international human rights—and even to liberal conceptions of rights—has been with us for a long time, almost since the beginning of the universal human rights project in the post-war era. What I would say is that norms that provide tools for marginalized individuals, communities, and other actors to resist power, abuse, and the arbitrary exercise of power will always be resisted and criticized by those who benefit from the existing status quo.

What I do think is somewhat new in recent years, or perhaps over the past few decades, is the transnational coordination of this opposition at both the state and non-state levels. This coordinated opposition to the international liberal order and its norms—especially human rights—is something that is genuinely new. The opposition itself has always existed, but the coordination of that opposition is new.

I’m not sure what the future of the human rights project will be. But I would be very surprised if attacks on the human rights project were successful without offering an appealing alternative. What I do think is that, in the short run, attacking the international liberal order may be politically appealing to some individuals or actors, but, at the end of the day, something else has to replace it. I don’t see that happening right now. Nor do I think such an alternative would be particularly appealing to most actors.

Fear Flourishes Where Diversity Is Least Experienced

Your research on intergroup contact suggests that exposure to diversity can increase support for human rights. How should we understand this finding in light of the success of many contemporary populist movements that thrive on anti-immigrant, anti-minority, and exclusionary narratives?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: It’s actually quite consistent with what we’ve been observing regarding the success of these movements in advancing anti-group rhetoric and exclusionary visions of society. If we think about Brexit, or about some research that I’ve conducted on the LGBT-free zones in Poland, the areas that have embraced this rhetoric most strongly are precisely those that have had the least contact with these perceived outgroups. So, these movements tend to be particularly successful in areas—and among individuals—with relatively little exposure to migrants, minorities, or other perceived outgroups.

Securitization Changes How Border Agents Perceive Threats

In your work with Beth Simmons, you demonstrate that border hardening can increase allegations of torture and abuse by border and immigration officials. What does this reveal about the unintended human rights consequences of securitization policies in contemporary states?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: What we find in our research is that the construction of border walls predicts, in the short run—between one and four years—an increase in allegations of torture committed by border and immigration officials. Importantly, this effect is limited to that specific subset of state agents. We do not observe a corresponding increase in torture allegations against other state agents, such as the police or the military, but only among those tasked with enforcing the border.

What these findings tell us is that there is a human cost to promoting securitization projects. Expensive and highly visible initiatives, such as border walls, which are designed to restrict the entry of individuals into a given country or territory, may signal to the state agents responsible for border enforcement that there is a serious threat out there—even if, in reality, there is not.

The presence of these highly visible and costly projects may also signal that these agents need to rely on more extreme measures to protect the nation or its territory. This ultimately translates into concrete actions in the form of more cases of physical abuse and human rights violations. It’s not necessarily that border walls constitute a direct instruction from political authorities to torture individuals. Rather, these projects are interpreted by border agents in two ways: first, that there is a heightened threat, and second, that they should rely on a broader range of tools to prevent that threat from affecting their own country.

Border Walls Transform Political Messages into Enforcement Practices

Ramallah, Palestine, surrounded by the controversial Israeli wall that separates the State of Israel from West Bank. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

Many governments justify stricter border controls in the language of security and sovereignty. To what extent has the rise of populism transformed migration governance by legitimizing policies that may undermine international human rights protections while claiming democratic legitimacy?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: What we actually find in our research is very interesting in terms of the connection between populist movements and rhetoric. Rhetoric alone—whether expressing anxiety over borders or anger about migration—does not predict greater abuse. Simply having a leader speak publicly about the border, migrants, and the need to protect the nation from an external threat does not, by itself, translate into border agents committing more acts of torture. This is conceptually and theoretically related to the idea that security and sovereignty are not necessarily at odds with human rights, or at least with sovereign border control. In principle, they can coexist.

The real risk lies in how this rhetoric is interpreted by the agents tasked with enforcing the border. The situation changes when this rhetoric is combined with a costly signal. One thing is for an agent simply to hear the leader talking about the border. But it is something quite different to hear the leader talking about the border while also observing a massive border wall that has cost millions of dollars. That is a much more concrete signal that this is a serious issue, that it is a priority for the state, and that there is a serious threat out there.

Human Rights Monitoring Depends on Networks of Trust

Your research on international organizations and NGOs emphasizes the importance of trust-based relationships in the production of credible human rights information. Why are some NGOs more influential than others in shaping international responses to rights violations?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: Here’s where we move to the micro level of these actors. As political scientists, we’ve traditionally thought about international organizations and NGOs as actors. We call them non-state actors, but, in reality, they are made up of individuals. NGOs do not walk down the street by themselves. We cannot observe an NGO in the same way we observe a person. An NGO doesn’t have a conscience, nor do international organizations. Individuals do. They are the staff of these organizations, and they are the ones who actually carry out their work. So, trust between organizations is often built through trust between the individuals who belong to those organizations.

In our research, we find that interactions between NGO members and international organization staff over time increase the likelihood that the international organization will later speak out about issues in the countries those NGOs care about. For example, during a hearing before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, certain NGOs participate in the proceedings. They interact with Commission members, have conversations, and even share coffee with them. Then, months or even a couple of years later, because they now have their WhatsApp number or email address, they can contact the Commission and say, “Look, this is what’s happening in this country right now.”

It’s not that the Commission would have been unaware of those violations if the NGO staff had not reached out. Rather, because the information comes from an NGO with which Commission members have already established a relationship, that information is trusted—or at least trusted more—than the same information arriving through other channels, where they may not have the same ability to assess the credibility of the source.

This is how interactions between NGOs and international organizations can shape the monitoring role of international organizations in holding states accountable to international norms. It’s not that NGOs are the only providers of this information. Rather, because of prior contacts and repeated interactions, the information they provide carries greater credibility and is therefore more likely to influence the organization’s response.

Illiberal Regimes Are Building Their Own NGO Networks

Across Europe and the Americas, populist leaders frequently frame international organizations, NGOs, and human rights advocates as unelected elites disconnected from ordinary citizens. How has this populist critique affected the legitimacy and effectiveness of global human rights institutions?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: That’s a very interesting question. At the moment, I’m not aware of research that provides a clear answer to it. But I can imagine a few ways in which we might approach it. I think rhetoric is a very powerful tool for advancing political goals. But at the same time, these same populist and authoritarian leaders have also used NGOs themselves to boost their own legitimacy and advance their own agendas. So, while they argue that nobody elected these organizations and that it is unclear whom these NGOs actually represent, they also send their own NGOs abroad and rely on the credibility of the broader NGO community to shield themselves from international criticism.

I am currently developing research with a colleague, Sarah Bush, in which we examine what we call “illiberal NGOs,” or “cheerleader NGOs.” These organizations essentially participate in international institutions to praise authoritarian governments. We’re still not sure whether this is an effective strategy, but these populist and authoritarian regimes are clearly relying on NGOs to advance their own rhetoric. At the same time, whenever NGOs say things these governments don’t like, they respond by arguing that nobody elected them. That they do not necessarily represent or enjoy the support of society.

Norms Are Contested Because They Redistribute Power

A young woman on street enjoy holding gay pride banner during a protest. Photo: Dan Rentea.

Across your scholarship, a recurring theme is that international norms are not simply imposed from above but are contested, negotiated, and reshaped through interactions among states, international organizations, and civil society actors. How should we rethink the process of norm diffusion in an increasingly multipolar world where populist, nationalist, and sovereigntist actors challenge the universality of human rights norms?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: This is a tough question. I’d like to begin by saying that we should think about norms and international norms as not being value-free. They’re not value-free. At their core, a norm is an expectation of appropriate behavior. The content of these norms may reflect liberal ideas, but they can also generate expectations about illiberal behavior. It’s not the case that, simply because a norm exists, it is, by definition, a liberal one.

At the end of the day, norms are about what constitutes appropriate or expected behavior for states, actors, or individuals in general. That behavior may be either consistent or inconsistent with the status quo. The expectation may be for individuals or actors to behave differently from how they have behaved in the past, or to behave in ways that challenge the existing distribution of power.

Because norms create expectations about certain forms of behavior over others, multiple actors naturally become interested in how those norms are developed, diffused, or resisted, since they affect the status quo in one way or another. They either reinforce it or challenge it. The contestation and negotiation that you’re asking about are really about the content of these norms. Norm diffusion should be understood as the diffusion of normative frameworks that benefit certain groups over others, depending on the content of the norm.

The Future of Human Rights Depends on Their Relevance to Everyday Life

And lastly, Professor Pauselli, taken together, your work examines authoritarian resistance, rising powers, borders, human rights, international organizations, and civil society. Do you see contemporary populism as primarily a challenge to specific liberal policies, or as a broader challenge to the universalist foundations of the postwar human rights regime? What does this imply for the future of democracy and global human rights protection in the twenty-first century?

Asst. Prof. Gino Pauselli: Many colleagues might not agree with this, but the way I understand populism, or the concept of populism, is that it is, by definition, at odds with liberal conceptions of the polity and of how societies are organized. In terms of what populism implies for the future of this project, populism is the latest effective tool that certain sectors of the elite have found for gaining and maintaining power. I’m not sure whether they even think about the future of the international human rights regime. Populism is simply instrumental for them in maintaining or gaining power. It is effective because of the contemporary anxieties that societies face—anxieties that many members of society do not necessarily see being addressed by liberal democracy or liberal norms.

So, basically, there are two things going on here. On the one hand, we have the supply side, where elites find populist strategies and rhetoric effective for gaining or retaining power. On the other hand, we have the demand side, where members of society are looking for alternatives that can reduce their anxieties over issues such as economic development, progress, and inequality in general. And this is why populism is so effective right now.

Now, turning specifically to the human rights project, those actors who are engaged—or have long been engaged—in promoting and protecting human rights, the liberal actors, in some way, should be thinking about developing and strengthening tools that effectively communicate, through people’s lived experiences, how these norms—how human rights—positively affect their lives. Their everyday lives, in the areas and issues they care most about. I know this is very difficult. It is very hard for a human rights NGO to communicate to rural communities, or even marginalized urban communities, that an abstract text signed 70 or 80 years ago is relevant to them if they cannot see exactly how it connects to their own lives, especially when their lives lack so many basic things. This is the main challenge if the human rights project is to survive in the future: for constituents, broadly speaking—not just elites—to understand the value of that project for their own lives.

Thomas de Waal,

Thomas de Waal: European Support for Armenia Must Be an Endorsement of Process, Not Personality

In this ECPS interview, Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe and one of the leading scholars of the South Caucasus, examines Armenia’s post-Karabakh transformation following the 2026 parliamentary elections. Reflecting on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s renewed mandate, de Waal explores the interplay between populist leadership, democratic resilience, geopolitical diversification, and regional peacebuilding. While describing Pashinyan’s political style as remaining “very populist,” he argues that Armenia’s long-term democratic future depends less on charismatic leadership than on the strength of institutions. The interview discusses Armenia’s evolving relationship with Russia, prospects for normalization with Azerbaijan and Turkey, the role of the European Union, and the challenges of constructing a new national identity after the end of the Karabakh era.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The South Caucasus is undergoing one of the most consequential geopolitical transformations since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Armenia’s devastating defeat in the 2020 war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023, Russia’s declining credibility as a security guarantor, and the emergence of new opportunities for regional connectivity have collectively reshaped the country’s strategic outlook. At the center of this transformation stands Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, whose government has sought to redefine Armenia’s foreign policy, normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and deepen ties with Europe and the United States. Yet these developments raise profound questions about democratic resilience, institutional consolidation, populist leadership, and the risks of excessive personalization in periods of political transition.

To explore these issues, we spoke with Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe and one of the foremost scholars of the South Caucasus. Through influential works such as Black Garden and decades of research on conflict, democratization, and regional geopolitics, de Waal has established himself as one of the most authoritative interpreters of the region’s complex political landscape.

The interview comes in the wake of Armenia’s June 2026 parliamentary elections, in which Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party secured a renewed mandate. While many observers interpreted the result as a geopolitical endorsement of Armenia’s movement away from Russia and toward Europe, de Waal offers a more nuanced assessment. The election, he argues, was simultaneously “a kind of referendum” on peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey, on Armenia’s foreign-policy diversification, and on Pashinyan’s domestic record. Rather than representing a simple choice between Russia and the West, Armenia’s evolving strategy reflects what de Waal describes as a broader effort to avoid renewed dependence on any single patron.

A central theme of this conversation concerns the relationship between democratic resilience and personalized leadership. Although de Waal describes Armenia as remaining “a democratic country, if a flawed one,” he warns that troubling trends should not be ignored. In particular, he notes that Armenia’s democratic checks and balances remain weak internally, making external democratic conditionality from Europe and, to a lesser extent, the United States especially important.

It is in this context that de Waal offers one of the interview’s most important observations. Drawing lessons from Georgia’s post-Rose Revolution trajectory, he cautions Western governments against treating Armenia as a geopolitical project centered on a single leader. While welcoming unprecedented European attention to Armenia, he warns that such support can unintentionally reinforce personalized rule. As he puts it, international engagement can “feed the ego of a leader who may begin to feel that he can do no wrong.” Consequently, he argues that “this is not a personal endorsement of one man; it is a broader endorsement of a process,” emphasizing that any durable democratic transformation “needs to be grounded in institutions rather than in personalized government.”

The conversation also examines Armenia’s changing relationship with Russia, the prospects for peace with Azerbaijan, the strategic significance of the TRIPP corridor, Turkey’s role in regional normalization, the growing gap between diaspora nationalism and domestic political realities, and the long-term challenge of forging a new Armenian identity after the end of the Karabakh era.

In an era marked by democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and the return of great-power competition, de Waal offers a measured and deeply informed assessment of Armenia’s uncertain future. His reflections remind us that democratic resilience depends not merely on elections or charismatic leaders, but on the gradual construction of institutions capable of surviving political transitions and geopolitical shocks alike.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Thomas de Waal, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Armenians Endorsed Pashinyan’s Vision Despite the Karabakh Trauma

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrives for a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 19, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

Thomas de Waal, welcome! To begin, Armenia’s 2026 election has been widely interpreted as a public endorsement of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s strategic reorientation away from Russia and toward Europe. Do you see the result primarily as a geopolitical choice, a democratic mandate for peace, or a vote of confidence in Pashinyan’s leadership despite the trauma of Nagorno-Karabakh?

Thomas de Waal: This election was many things at once. Obviously, like all elections, it had its domestic aspects. The Armenian economy has been doing quite well in recent years, so that was one reason Mr. Pashinyan secured a third term in office. But, as you say, it was also a kind of referendum on his vision of peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey, following through on the peace agreement and recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, which basically means saying goodbye to Nagorno-Karabakh.

It was also a referendum on his foreign policy, which has been slightly misinterpreted as a complete shift from reliance on Russia to the West. I would say it is more of a diversification policy, maintaining some connections with Russia, particularly economic ones. Armenia remains, for example, part of the Eurasian Economic Union, while also strengthening its political and economic ties with both Europe and the United States.

So, he won a mandate, albeit with a reduced number of votes compared to last time. We can discuss why it was the case.Pro-Russian parties also performed better than they did previously, but again, not well enough to prevent him from securing a full mandate. Mr. Pashinyan’s party, Civil Contract, received around 50 percent of the vote, while the pro-Russian opposition parties won around 37–38 percent.

Pashinyan’s Style Remains Populist, but His Political Base Has Changed

Pashinyan emerged from the 2018 Velvet Revolution as an anti-establishment reformer challenging entrenched elites. Does he still fit within the broader category of populist leadership, or has his project evolved into something fundamentally different as he has shifted from revolutionary mobilization to statecraft?

Thomas de Waal: It’s a very interesting question. His style remains very populist. He is very much a man of the street. He came to power, as you mentioned, in 2018 on the wave of street protest—people’s protest—what Armenians then called the Velvet Revolution of 2018. He likes talking to crowds, dresses informally, and travels on the Yerevan Metro. He has a very personal, personalized style of government, which is also a bit problematic.

But, for sure, he no longer appeals to the younger urban electorate that swept him to power in 2018. In this election, he cast himself very much as the stability candidate—the candidate for peace rather than war, for continuity rather than change. He actually received support from outside the capital city, Yerevan, including from villages and government workers—the kind of constituencies from which a traditional ruling party in the post-socialist world typically draws its support.

Armenia Remains Democratic, but There Are Worrying Trends

In your recent writings, you describe Armenia as the most democratic state in the South Caucasus while simultaneously warning about Pashinyan’s highly personalized style of governance. How should scholars reconcile democratic resilience with concerns about excessive personalization of political power?

Thomas de Waal: This is a tricky issue. Armenia certainly remains a democratic country, albeit a flawed one. There is a fairly free and competitive media. There were, obviously, problems with this election, but voters definitely had a choice and could vote freely for the opposition, which many of them did. This is in contrast to Georgia, which we always considered the most democratic and pluralist country in the region, but which has experienced a rapid decline over the last two or three years, with many people in jail and so on. 

What I am talking about here is more of a concern about trends. For example, several opposition candidates were detained during the election. Some faced allegations of vote-buying and so on, but others were detained with less justification. The main opposition leader was under house arrest for the duration of the election. Mr. Pashinyan also makes some quite fierce remarks about the opposition, saying that they need to know their place. 

So, what we are looking at is actually something similar to what we used to have in Georgia: a moderately democratic government where the checks and balances are not so much internal, because the judiciary is still very weak and under government control. Instead, the checks and balances are external. It is the conditionality we are seeing from Europe in particular, and to some degree from the United States, that will check what could otherwise become a tendency toward less democratic and more personalized rule on the part of Prime Minister Pashinyan.

The Georgian Experience Offers an Important Warning for Armenia

Mikheil Saakashvili addresses supporters during a political rally in central Zaporizhzhia, Ukraine, on September 21, 2017. Photo: Surov Dmytro / Dreamstime.

You have cautioned Europe against treating Armenia as a geopolitical project centered on a single leader. How serious is the risk that Western support for Pashinyan could inadvertently reproduce the mistakes made in other post-Soviet democracies, where institution-building lagged behind leader-centered reform?

Thomas de Waal: For sure, this is an issue, and it is not an easy one to deal with. We have the example of Georgia in the mid-2000s. There was also a peaceful revolution led by a young, charismatic leader. There are some obvious parallels there: Mikheil Saakashvili and the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003. What followed, however, was both a highly personalized regime in Georgia—where you can clearly see the parallels—and a gradual retreat from democratic norms. Because of the geopolitical stance that Saakashvili adopted, namely joining Western institutions in opposition to Russia, he received very enthusiastic support, particularly from the United States. In the process, some of the more problematic aspects of his government were overlooked. So, I think there is a lesson there.

Fortunately, some of Armenia’s European partners, the French in particular, understand these issues. We have seen unprecedented European attention focused on Armenia, first at the European Political Community Summit in Yerevan and then at the EU summit in May. That is obviously a positive development. And it was not only European leaders who attended—we also saw Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy there.

That is all good, but such attention can also feed the ego of a leader who may begin to feel that he can do no wrong. So, it is important to convey the message that this is not a personal endorsement of one man; it is a broader endorsement of a process. And if that process is to endure, it needs to be grounded in institutions rather than in personalized government.

The South Caucasus Is More Complex Than a Russia–West Contest

Many observers have described Armenia’s election as a contest between competing geopolitical orientations. Yet you have characterized the South Caucasus as a “geopolitical marketplace” rather than a binary struggle between Russia and the West. How does this framework alter conventional understandings of regional politics?

Thomas de Waal: There is a paradigm that you see in some of the Western media, where Armenia is portrayed as making a pivot to the West. Certainly, the Russian way of thinking is also very zero-sum and binary. President Putin actually said that Armenia should hold a referendum on whether it chooses the Eurasian Economic Union or the European Union. Prime Minister Pashinyan does not want that. He does not want to make that choice. He wants a diversification strategy. The Eurasian Economic Union has actually been very helpful to Armenia during the Ukraine war because Russia needed its traditional economic partners when its economic links with the West were cut off.

For those reasons, if he has a choice—and perhaps the Russians will force him to make one—Mr. Pashinyan is looking not only to the European Union and the United States, but also to India as a partner. India is selling weapons to Armenia, and you see many Indian guest workers in the country. The Gulf states are another option, as are countries such as Kazakhstan.

What Mr. Pashinyan rightly says is that what led Armenia to military defeat and isolation was its sole reliance on one patron, namely Russia. Russia became the security patron, with its border guards and military base; the economic patron, owning large parts of the economy; and also the energy patron, because Armenia is reliant on Russian gas. Around 90 percent of its gas comes from Russia.

For all those reasons, Armenia was relying on a partner that turned out to be unreliable. And I think one reason why he continues to enjoy support from the population, despite all the other issues they may have with him, is that he is the only one articulating that vision—that Armenia should not return to sole reliance on Russia.

Threatening Armenia May Further Weaken Moscow’s Position

Russia’s attempts to influence Armenian politics appear increasingly overt, ranging from economic pressure to disinformation campaigns. Does the Kremlin’s approach toward Armenia represent a broader transformation in how Russia manages its influence in the post-Soviet space?

Thomas de Waal: Objectively, Russia is not doing very well if you look at recent elections. Take Moldova last year. Hungary is a bit further afield, but they were clearly betting on Prime Minister Orbán there as well. So, Russia is not doing particularly well in its attempts to influence electoral politics. You could say that securing 36–37 percent of the vote through a group of parties in Armenia was not a bad result. But this is also a country in which many people are economically reliant on Russia, so some level of support is to be expected.

Russia’s problem is that it has responded to the Pashinyan government by threatening economic punishment. That is more likely to alienate voters than encourage them to wish they were closer to Russia. We have seen bans on agricultural exports and various others rather threatening statements coming from Moscow.

The Russian elite faces a choice. Does it adopt the kind of neo-imperialist stance we see in Ukraine—the idea that it must plant the flag and that countries essentially belong to Russia or to its sphere of influence? Or does it seek to get the best out of a partnership with a sovereign state, one based on economic cooperation, which of course works both ways? If Russia is banning imports from Armenia, that is not only bad for Armenia; it is also not good for Russia. And, we can see elements of both approaches in Russian policy toward Armenia: the more emotional one and the more pragmatic one.

I would like to think that, with Russia focused on other priorities and deeply preoccupied with its confrontation with the West and the war in Ukraine, it simply does not have the time or capacity for a neo-imperialist push toward Armenia. Instead, it may ultimately default to the previous relationship—perhaps not a happy one, but a relatively pragmatic one.

Most Armenians Want New Partnerships Without Severing Old Ones

Yerevan.
Souvenir T-shirts displayed at a market in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, on July 5, 2017. Photo: Matyas Rehak / Dreamstime.

You have said that most Armenians seek diversification rather than divorce from Russia. How sustainable is Armenia’s current balancing strategy, especially given its economic dependence on Russia and its growing political engagement with the European Union?

Thomas de Waal: Obviously, the plan of this ruling party, now returned to office, is to continue pursuing this course. Whether it can do so successfully depends, really, on what Russia decides to do. Will Russia, for example, choose to inflict economic punishment on Armenia? We have seen previous instances of Russia attempting this with Georgia and Moldova. In both cases, there was short-term pain, with people losing their jobs and facing economic hardship. But, ultimately, it accelerated a process of economic diversification.

Armenia’s situation is more complicated. I think Armenia is more economically reliant on Russia. But this is also a question for Armenia’s partners, especially the European Union, in terms of whether they are willing and able to provide financial assistance.

It is also a question for Azerbaijan and Turkey. If the border opens—particularly the border with Turkey—that would provide Armenia with significantly more economic options. Such a development would also be beneficial for eastern Turkey. So, this issue of Armenia’s relationship with Russia really puts the spotlight on Ankara in particular. What kind of policy, and what kind of relationship, does Turkey want to have with Armenia?

The Message of Peace Has Resonated More Than Many Expected

The trauma of Nagorno-Karabakh continues to shape Armenian politics. To what extent has Pashinyan successfully reframed the loss of Karabakh as a foundation for a new national project rather than a symbol of national humiliation?

Thomas de Waal: This depends on which Armenians you’re talking to, obviously. For almost 40 years, going back to the late 1980s, the Armenians of Karabakh and the Karabakh cause were a kind of central idea for Armenians: the belief that Karabakh had been unjustly given to Azerbaijan in the 1920s and should instead be part of Soviet Armenia or, later, independent Armenia. The war of the 1990s was fought with Azerbaijan on that basis and was won by Armenia, which held on to Karabakh at great cost. Then, in 2020 and again in 2023, Azerbaijan used military force to recover the territories it had lost and, in 2023, to take over Karabakh entirely, causing the exodus of the entire Karabakh Armenian population of around 100,000 people.

The question, then, was how Armenians would respond to what was obviously a huge trauma. Many people expected, particularly in the Armenian diaspora, that voters would punish Pashinyan for his handling of the issue. But actually, what we see now is that Karabakh had a kind of dual meaning for Armenians in the Republic of Armenia. On the one hand, it was indeed a very important holy cause. On the other hand, it was also a millstone around their necks. It was a reason why sons and brothers went to fight and sometimes lost their lives. It was a reason why borders were closed. It was a drain on the economy. It was a problem internationally for Armenia. 

So, to many people’s surprise, after losing Karabakh and hearing Pashinyan’s message that now that this place had been lost, Armenia needed to move on, many Armenians actually responded cautiously but positively. And he has consistently hammered home the message that there is no alternative—that Armenia must make peace with its neighbors, and that peace means no more war. I think that message resonates with a large part of the electorate, if not all of it. Certainly not all of it, but it does resonate with a large part of it.

The Constitution Has Become a Powerful Instrument of Political Leverage

Azerbaijan insists that Armenia amend its constitution before a final peace agreement can be concluded. Do you see this demand primarily as a legitimate security concern, a diplomatic bargaining tool, or a mechanism for maintaining leverage over Armenia’s domestic political trajectory?

Thomas de Waal: That’s a great question. When you talk to Azerbaijani officials, they are very insistent on this issue. The reference is actually quite indirect, but it is there. The current Armenian constitution refers to the Declaration of Independence, and the Declaration of Independence from 1990 refers to the union of Armenia and Karabakh. So, the Azerbaijani position is essentially that Armenia should not have a constitution which, even indirectly, constitutes a territorial claim over Azerbaijan. They want to see proof that the people of Armenia are rejecting any territorial claim over Karabakh, and therefore they want to see a new constitution.

You can see the logic of that argument, but it is not something that people had particularly noticed before. It is definitely being used as an instrument of leverage over the Armenian government—a way of signaling that Armenia should not ask for too much and that Azerbaijan still retains this instrument of pressure. The problem we have now is that Mr. Pashinyan’s party has won around 64 out of 101 seats, and he needs a few more than that to secure a constitutional majority. He needs two-thirds of the seats in parliament to call a referendum on a new constitution. That now looks pretty difficult.

We should also note that even if a referendum were called, there appears to be considerable opposition to it within Armenia. So it is quite possible that, even if he somehow managed to initiate a referendum, the voters would reject it. So, the question becomes this: Azerbaijan has made this a prerequisite for signing a peace agreement and moving forward. How do we get out of this particular impasse?

This issue is currently under active discussion in all sorts of places—in Baku, Ankara, Yerevan, Europe, and the United States. Some people are suggesting that perhaps a signed peace agreement is not immediately necessary. Instead, the parties could move forward on practical measures. They could, for example, open the border. Many things could be done without establishing formal diplomatic relations, which would normally follow from a peace agreement.

This is particularly a question for Turkey. For many reasons, Turkish officials want to normalize relations with Armenia and open the border. They believe they have a uniquely useful partner in Prime Minister Pashinyan, and they see a window of opportunity while Russia is distracted—a window that may eventually close. I hope we will see a greater sense of urgency on the Turkish side, given that Ankara has largely outsourced its decision-making on this issue to Azerbaijan.

Two of my colleagues—and their commentary is well worth reading—Garo Paylan, the well-known former parliamentarian and Armenian-Turkish citizen now based in the United States, and Alper Coşkun, a former Turkish diplomat who is also with us in the United States, wrote a commentary last week that I would strongly recommend. Their argument is that Turkey should move forward, in particular by enabling trade with Armenia, even if the political issues have not yet been fully resolved.

Peace Agreements Endure Only When Societies Embrace Them

You have repeatedly emphasized that peace agreements require societal buy-in, not merely elite bargains. Given the deep historical grievances and mutual distrust between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, how fragile is the current peace process beneath its diplomatic successes?

Thomas de Waal: There is a well-known finding among scholars of peace processes: roughly half of all peace agreements fail within five years. The agreements that fail are generally those that lack societal buy-in and broader inclusion, and are instead negotiated exclusively at the elite level. When elite calculations change, those agreements can quickly unravel.

I am fairly optimistic, in general, about the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan for two reasons. First, both societies are tired of conflict. They do not want their sons and brothers to fight. Second, there is now a significant level of engagement from both the United States and Europe. The projected rail route connecting Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenia even bears Donald Trump’s name. It is called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which suggests a degree of personal investment in the success of a peace agreement.

What worries me, however, is the possibility that we will not achieve a properly signed agreement and that societies—particularly Azerbaijani society—will continue to receive highly propagandistic messages about Armenians through schools and the media. If that continues, progress will inevitably slow. Even if there is meaningful progress in the short term, over the next few years, the political landscape could look very different in five or ten years’ time. I do not think we will return to full-scale war. But there could still be recurring tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan around the border, around the so-called Trump Route, and on other issues, simply because societies have not been brought along at the same pace as their leaders.

TRIPP Could Transform Geography Into Economic Interdependence

Donald J. Trump, the 47th President of the United States, at his inauguration celebration in Washington, D.C., on January 20, 2025. Photo: Muhammad Abdullah.

The proposed TRIPP corridor has become one of the most ambitious geopolitical projects in the region. Beyond its economic significance, do you see TRIPP as a mechanism for building lasting interdependence and reducing the likelihood of future conflict?

Thomas de Waal: That’s the idea, and I think TRIPP has progressed fairly well. It has managed to square the circle of the competing demands of the two sides: Armenia’s insistence that any route crossing its territory fully respect Armenian sovereignty, and Azerbaijan’s desire for quick and easy access to its exclave of Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. I think the modalities have been sorted out, the financing is there, and the United States is working on that. The Iran war definitely slowed things down and complicated matters. But hopefully, we now have a ceasefire in Iran, which means that construction can begin.

There are obviously some question marks about how much private-sector investment can be attracted to this route, given that it passes through a rather strategically vulnerable and remote area. But I am sure the Americans are working on that as well. So, I think it is going pretty well. And this gets back to my previous point: we may see cargo beginning to flow along this route within three or four years, creating an important trading link. But if there is not a proper peace agreement, then the local communities may not be as involved, and it could prove more problematic for passengers to use the route.

The Key Obstacle Remains Erdoğan’s Deference to Aliyev

Turkey appears increasingly interested in normalization with Armenia, yet remains closely aligned with Azerbaijan. How much strategic autonomy does Ankara actually possess in shaping Armenian-Turkish relations, and what obstacles still stand in the way of a historic breakthrough?

Thomas de Waal: Of course, Turkey has as much strategic autonomy as it chooses to exercise. It is a much larger and more powerful country than Azerbaijan. What we are seeing is very much the result of a personal decision by President Erdoğan not to move faster than President Aliyev on the peace and normalization track. This is despite the fact that many officials at the medium and upper levels of the Turkish government, as I have already mentioned, see significant strategic advantages in normalizing relations with Armenia and opening the border. Such a move would weaken Russian influence, strengthen Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus, and benefit the Kars-Iğdır region in eastern Turkey, among many other areas. It would also help neutralize many of the difficulties Turkey faces in its relations with the Armenian diaspora in France and the United States. 

So, there are plenty of reasons to move forward. However, the decisive factor up to now has been President Erdoğan’s determination to keep his personal commitment to President Aliyev and not move ahead of him. Now, if there is a moment that could prompt a reassessment of that policy, it is this one. The rather inconclusive outcome of the Armenian election may provide such an opportunity.

It will be interesting to see whether this issue is discussed at the upcoming NATO summit in Ankara, particularly among European and American officials. I suspect we will not see much of those discussions publicly, but we will be relying on informed journalists and analysts to shed light on them. Because, for sure, this is the moment when Turkey—perhaps not toward full normalization, but certainly toward a more proactive approach—needs to pick up speed.

European Support Must Be Accompanied by Democratic Expectations

Armenia-EU
Photo: Dreamstime.

Some critics argue that the European Union has largely overlooked democratic shortcomings within Armenia because it prioritizes the country’s geopolitical reorientation away from Russia. How would you assess the tension between strategic interests and democratic conditionality in the EU’s approach to Armenia?

Thomas de Waal: That’s a good question. Obviously, the European Union is not a monolith. There are different opinions within the EU, and even within different parts of the Brussels institutions. There is a feeling that, for geopolitical reasons, it is important to invest in this government and in its tilt toward Europe—even if it is not a complete shift—and, more broadly, to invest in Armenia. People on the ground have no illusions that this is not a fully democratic government.

That said, I think some degree of conditionality would be beneficial. The question, really, is how that conditionality is presented to the Armenian side. One particularly problematic area is the judiciary. There have been appointments of judges without due process. And, as in many countries of the region, the prosecutor’s office remains far too powerful and can be used as an instrument by the governing party against its opponents. That is certainly something to watch. 

France is a key partner in this regard. If anyone has replaced Russia as Armenia’s principal patron, it is definitely France. President Macron clearly has a strong interest in Armenia. And I think the French are also aware of these concerns. Hopefully, the message to Mr. Pashinyan is: congratulations on your victory, but now do not do anything stupid. We support you, but our support is not unconditional.

The Diaspora and Armenia Are Increasingly Speaking Different Languages

The Armenian diaspora has historically played a powerful role in shaping national narratives, particularly regarding Nagorno-Karabakh and relations with Turkey. How significant is the growing divide between diaspora nationalism and Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” agenda?

Thomas de Waal: When we talk about the Armenian diaspora, we have to be a bit careful, because there are obviously millions of Armenians outside Armenia, mainly descendants of Armenians from the Ottoman Empire who fled in 1915 and 1916 during what later became known as the Armenian Genocide. These communities are concentrated in places such as the Middle East, France, and the United States. Many of those people are not particularly political. However, there are powerful diaspora political organizations, particularly those associated with the Dashnak Party, the traditional nationalist Armenian party, and groups such as the ANCA in the United States. It is within these circles that we see a significant break with Pashinyan. There have been very critical commentaries directed at his government, with many expressing outrage at what they perceive as his abandonment of territorial claims relating to Turkey and Azerbaijan.

So, there is undoubtedly a substantial divide. What is striking, however, is how little influence this appears to have on political developments inside Armenia itself. The Dashnak Party in Armenia, I do not think, even contested this election, or, if it did, it received a very small share of the vote. Armenians inside Armenia were voting on other issues—certainly not on the questions that much of the diaspora continues to hold particularly dear. So, I think this may be a moment when diaspora organizations need to reassess and reconfigure their own understanding of reality. What exactly do they want from Armenia when the government of Armenia is articulating such a different vision of the country’s future?

It Is Still Too Early to Call Armenia a Success Story

More broadly, does Armenia represent a new model of post-Soviet transformation—one in which democratic consolidation, geopolitical diversification, and conflict resolution reinforce one another—or is that interpretation still premature?

Thomas de Waal: I think it is still premature. If you look at what happened in Georgia, there was a general assumption—including on my part—that democracy was fairly well consolidated and that the country’s pro-European trajectory was firmly established. Yet both of those assumptions have since been challenged, and quite dramatically so. So, it is always possible that Armenia could follow a different course than many currently expect.

The governing party did not win this election by a landslide. It secured many votes by default, largely because there was no credible democratic—or, indeed, any other credible—opposition. For that reason, we need to be cautious about drawing firm conclusions regarding Armenia’s future. It is entirely possible that a new third force could emerge, one that is neither aligned with the ruling party nor with Russia. It could even be a populist movement, perhaps resembling the Georgian Dream phenomenon that emerged in Georgia in 2012.

So, there remain many uncertainties. I do not think Armenian voters are yet fully consolidated in their support for the transformation the country has undergone. Things could still change, for sure.

Forging a New National Identity Will Be a Generational Project

Looking ahead, if Armenia succeeds in normalizing relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey while reducing dependence on Russia, what do you believe will be the most difficult challenge: institutionalizing democracy at home, managing external geopolitical pressures, or forging a new national identity after the end of the Karabakh era?

Thomas de Waal: Wow, I mean, all of those things are obviously difficult. Some of them will take years, perhaps even decades, to accomplish. A new national identity does not emerge overnight, and institution-building is a long-term process. And, of course, learning to live alongside former adversaries and adjusting to open borders with countries once regarded as enemies is not easy either. For all of those reasons, Armenians are understandably cautious about change.

That is precisely why change needs to be gradual and steady rather than abrupt. If the border is opened, for example, it should not be thrown fully open overnight to a large influx of people from across the border, which could trigger negative reactions.

But I suppose the good news is that Armenia is a small country receiving unprecedented levels of international attention. That, in itself, is a positive development. There are powerful and wealthy countries willing to support Armenia.  And, just let’s hope that the government understands properly how to utilize that help for good purposes.

Richard Giragosian

Giragosian: Russia Is Increasingly Seen as Part of the Problem by Armenians Rather Than the Solution

As Armenia navigates the aftermath of war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and a far-reaching geopolitical realignment, one question looms large: Can democratic resilience survive amid regional insecurity and great-power competition? In this compelling ECPS interview, Richard Giragosian—Founding Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan—examines Armenia’s evolving relationship with Russia, the democratic implications of Nikol Pashinyan’s populist leadership, and the country’s strategic turn toward Europe. Giragosian argues that many Armenians now view Russia as “part of the problem rather than part of the solution,” while emphasizing that Armenia’s recent election represented a mandate for peace, normalization, and democratic continuity. The conversation explores populism in power, post-war identity transformation, Armenia–Turkey normalization, democratic institution-building, and the future of the South Caucasus. Ultimately, Giragosian suggests that Armenia may be less a model than “an accidental exception” in an era of democratic backsliding and geopolitical upheaval. 

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Armenia emerges from one of the most turbulent periods in its modern history, the country stands at the intersection of democratic resilience, geopolitical realignment, and post-war transformation. The aftermath of the 2020 war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, deepening estrangement from Russia, and ongoing normalization efforts with Turkey and Azerbaijan have profoundly reshaped Armenian politics and strategic thinking. Against this backdrop, the 2026 parliamentary elections have been widely interpreted as a referendum not only on Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s leadership but also on Armenia’s future place between Russia, Europe, and the wider region.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Richard Giragosian—Armenian-American academic, security analyst, and Founding Director of the Regional Studies Center (RSC) in Yerevan—examines the forces driving Armenia’s remarkable political trajectory. He argues that the election result reflected far more than a geopolitical choice. It represented a mandate for democratic continuity, political stability, and the pursuit of diplomatic normalization with Armenia’s neighbors. As Giragosian notes, the vote marked Armenia’s “third consecutive genuinely free and fair vote,” underscoring the country’s democratic consolidation despite war, insecurity, and external pressure.

A central theme of the conversation concerns the evolution of populism in power. Emerging from the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan embodied a rare case of successful anti-establishment mobilization driven by nonviolent popular protest. Yet Giragosian argues that the qualities that enabled Pashinyan’s rise have not necessarily translated into effective governance. While acknowledging the historic significance of the revolution as “a rare victory of nonviolent people power,” he contends that Pashinyan remains “as impulsive as ever, as emotional, and sometimes reckless,” while public policy continues to be “overly centralized in the Prime Minister’s office.” In Giragosian’s assessment, the populist style that propelled Pashinyan to power now coexists with persistent institutional weaknesses and governance challenges.

The interview’s most striking insights, however, concern Armenia’s changing relationship with Russia. According to Giragosian, the war of 2020 and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh fundamentally altered Armenian perceptions of Moscow. Russia is no longer widely viewed as Armenia’s indispensable protector. Instead, he argues, many Armenians increasingly regard Russia as “dangerously unreliable,” adding that the conflict has led them to see Russia “as part of the problem rather than part of the solution.” This shift reflects not simply a foreign policy adjustment but a broader reassessment of Armenia’s security assumptions and strategic dependencies.

The discussion also explores Armenia’s efforts to balance relations with Europe and Russia, prospects for peace with Azerbaijan, normalization with Turkey, democratic institution-building, and the emergence of a more civic and pragmatic understanding of patriotism. Yet Giragosian remains cautious about presenting Armenia as a model for others. Indeed, he suggests that Armenia may be “less of a lesson and more of an accidental exception”—a rare convergence of democratic mobilization, geopolitical opportunity, and regional recalibration. Whether that exception can endure may prove to be one of the defining questions for the future of the South Caucasus.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Richard Giragosian, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Armenians Endorsed Peace, Stability, and Democratic Continuity

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrives for a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 19, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

Mr. Giragosian, welcome! To begin, the 2026 Armenian election has been widely interpreted as a public endorsement of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s strategic reorientation away from Russia and toward Europe. Do you see the result primarily as a geopolitical choice, a democratic mandate for peace, or a vote of confidence in Pashinyan’s leadership despite the trauma of Nagorno-Karabakh?

Richard Giragosian: That’s a very good opening question. The answer is actually all of the above, to varying degrees. In other words, there was undeniably a geopolitical context to this election. But I do think there are two other important elements behind the re-election of the Pashinyan government in Armenia. 

First, it is an important mandate for sustaining the positive momentum of the Armenian government’s policies of diplomatic engagement and normalization with its neighbors. This represents a significant post-war adjustment to a new reality. 

Second, and this is often underestimated, the election marked the country’s third consecutive genuinely free and fair vote. That is extremely important for the further deepening of democracy and the consolidation of these democratic gains. 

So, basically, yes, there was a geopolitical context. But this election was much more a mandate for the government to move forward.

Public Policy Remains Too Centralized in the Prime Minister’s Office

Pashinyan emerged from the 2018 Velvet Revolution as an anti-establishment reformer challenging entrenched oligarchic networks. To what extent does he still embody a populist political project, and how has governing transformed the character of his populism?

Richard Giragosian: What we see, as you correctly identified, is a specific aspect of populism in practice. In 2018, we witnessed a rare victory of nonviolent people power in Armenia. Nonviolence is wonderful, but it usually fails. In this context, it was a unique achievement.

However, Prime Minister Pashinyan’s advantages, assets, and political acumen that allowed him to come to power do not necessarily serve him well in governing the country. In other words, as leader of Armenia, Prime Minister Pashinyan remains as impulsive as ever, as emotional, and sometimes reckless. There is also a degree of inefficiency in governance. Public policy remains overly centralized in the Prime Minister’s office and in the Prime Minister’s hands. So, in this regard, the element of populism that swept him into power does not necessarily make him an effective leader.

Nationalism No Longer Resonates as Strongly in Armenian Politics

Comparative studies often suggest that military defeat weakens incumbents and fuels political backlash. How do you explain Pashinyan’s ability to survive the 2020 war, the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the subsequent political crises while still securing electoral legitimacy?

Richard Giragosian: The re-election of the Armenian government under Prime Minister Pashinyan, despite losing the war, is difficult to explain. But I do have an observation. And it is an observation that remained relevant in the recent election. Simply put, the reality is that there is no alternative to Pashinyan or his government. The opposition then, and the opposition now, remains deeply unpopular, discredited, and too closely tied to the previous authoritarian government. It is also rather weak, given its inability, as an opposition force, to propose any alternative strategy. Simply opposing normalization requires the presentation of an alternative strategy, and that is something the opposition has been unable to offer.

The opposition also reflects the reality that nationalism no longer resonates in Armenia. There are a pronounced acceptance and recognition of the need to normalize relations with Turkey and to engage in diplomatic negotiations with Azerbaijan. Nevertheless, the surprising re-election of the Pashinyan government after losing the war remains an impressive achievement and has sparked a degree of jealousy among many Western leaders.

Armenia Has Passed the Point of Returning to the Pre-War Status Quo

Yerevan.
Souvenir T-shirts displayed at a market in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, on July 5, 2017. Photo: Matyas Rehak / Dreamstime.

You have argued that Armenia has embarked on its most decisive strategic reorientation since independence. Following the election, how irreversible is this shift toward Europe, and what factors could still derail it?

Richard Giragosian: Very good question, Selçuk. What we see is that Armenia has now gone past the tipping point. There is little real risk or danger of returning to the old reality, to pre-war arrogance and a pre-war aggressive posture. We are past that danger. However, it is not necessarily a matter of embracing the Western European model versus escaping the Russian orbit. It is more about Armenia seeking, delicately and under conditions of fragility, to strike a balance within the West-versus-Russia paradigm. This is driving Armenia to diversify and to seek a number of security partners. For example, the only arms procurement deal since the war of 2020 was with India. Very much on purpose—not with the West, but with a partner that is less provocative to Russia. What Armenia is seeking to do is risky, because it may fail. But it would be a greater failure not to try. That means seeking to challenge Russia, while avoiding an overreaction from Russia and carefully choosing its battles.

At the same time, it represents a return to the region. It is a realization that Armenia, like every country, does not choose its neighbors. We have no choice, no alternative, but to build a relationship with Azerbaijan, to normalize relations with Turkey, and to deal with Iran to the south and Georgia to the north. There is no real alternative to geography.

Russian Influence Has Changed, Not Disappeared

You have described Russia as suffering from both geopolitical distraction and declining power projection following its invasion of Ukraine. Has the recent election confirmed the erosion of Russian influence in Armenia, or does Moscow retain significant leverage through economic, security, and social channels?

Richard Giragosian: The short answer is both. The longer answer is yes. Russia remains overwhelmed and distracted by its failed invasion of Ukraine. But that is rather temporary. We do expect a resurgent Russia to return to the South Caucasus and seek to regain its diminished power and influence.

In the case of Russia-Armenia relations, Russian leverage remains strong, although it is different from what it was in the past. Previously, Russian leverage was based on security dependence, with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict serving as an instrument of influence. Now, however, Armenia’s vulnerability to Russia lies primarily in economics and trade. Russia is Armenia’s largest import-export partner. Armenia also remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, to cite two examples.

But if we look at Armenia-Turkey normalization, it underscores the importance and necessity of reopening that border—not only to lower transit costs, but also to create new economic opportunities capable of countering Russian dominance. At the same time, I do think Armenia has an advantage: a rare degree of legitimacy and stability, unlike many countries within the Russian orbit.

The Armenian Sense of Betrayal by Russia Is Deeply Entrenched

Critics of Pashinyan accuse him of fostering anti-Russian sentiment, while supporters argue that Armenia is simply responding to Russia’s failure to honor its security commitments. Is Armenia witnessing the rise of genuine Russophobia, or merely a more realistic assessment of Russia’s reliability as an ally?

Richard Giragosian: To be quite honest and candid, I think the Armenian government is quite correct, as is the majority of Armenian public opinion, in recognizing the threat from Russia. Russia has, belatedly but now quite markedly, come to be seen as dangerously unreliable. There is a deeply entrenched Armenian sense of betrayal by Russia. The war of 2020 and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh have led many Armenians to view Russia as part of the problem rather than part of the solution. I think this is a realistic assessment. 

I also think the lessons from the relationship with Russia illustrate the absence of any real choice or contest. For example, the European Union and the broader West are engaging with Armenia on the basis of attraction and persuasion. Russian policies toward Armenia, by contrast, have been rooted in coercion and pressure. There is really no contest here.

At the same time, I do think Russia’s arrogance, and its tendency to take Armenia for granted, actually contributed to this pre-existing tension in the relationship. I think Armenia’s future is much more closely tied to self-sufficiency, independence, and its regional role, and much less to being a Russian client, as it was in the past.

Russia’s Election Interference Failed to Deliver the Outcome It Wanted

Reports surrounding the election suggested attempts by Moscow and pro-Russian actors to influence public opinion. How should we understand Russian influence operations in Armenia today, and why did they fail to prevent a pro-Western electoral outcome?

Richard Giragosian: That’s a good question because there is an interesting paradox. Russia’s interference in the election generally failed to achieve any meaningful impact or result. However, we do see a vehemently pro-Russian political opposition garnering seats in the new Armenian Parliament. Two specifically pro-Russian parties were able to secure a significant minority share of the vote. This is an indication that we cannot become complacent about overcoming Russian influence, and that we must also recognize the challenge from within. The old-guard nationalist opposition, which continues to look to Russia, will undermine Armenian independence and challenge its policies toward its neighbors. So, we should not be overly complacent.

At the same time, I do think Russia is quite satisfied with the election result. There was little direct Russian support for the opposition, which would have been a much riskier move. But, for example, Russia is reassured that Armenia remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, while Armenia’s room to maneuver toward the West remains relatively limited and constrained. For that reason, I think the next challenge for Armenia will be to succeed in managing this new transactional relationship with Russia.

The European Union Has Become an Important Anchor for Reform

Armenia-EU
Photo: Dreamstime.

In your writings, you have emphasized that Armenia’s democratic development and European engagement are deeply interconnected. Can the European Union become a genuine democratic anchor for Armenia, or does Brussels still lack the strategic commitment necessary for long-term influence?

Richard Giragosian: I would say this is a rare example of the success of the European Union on the ground in Armenia. Certainly, it has served as an anchor for reform. But even more than that, we are witnessing an unprecedented level of EU engagement in Armenia. We see the deployment of EU monitors along the Armenian border with Azerbaijan to help stabilize the security situation. We also see unprecedented security assistance being provided to Armenia through the European Peace Facility (EPF).

What makes this so remarkable is that Armenia still hosts a Russian military base, remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, and is also part of the Russian-dominated Collective Security Treaty Organization. Despite these three realities, none of them has prevented the EU from deepening its engagement.

Part of the reason is the reality that Armenia has overtaken Georgia as the leading democracy in the region. There is also, to some degree, a European Union expectation that Armenia—and Armenia’s normalization with its Turkish partner—could help the EU achieve a broader geopolitical objective. In other words, Armenia–Turkey normalization is seen as a positive game changer not only for Armenia, but for the European Union as well.

And finally, Armenia has to be careful not to be used by the European Union or drawn into the broader paradigm of conflict between the EU and Russia that has intensified since the war in Ukraine. Armenia has to be somewhat cautious. But yes, the European Union’s engagement represents an important new element for Armenia.

The South Caucasus Is Unlikely to Remain a Long-Term US Priority

The United States has become increasingly involved in Armenian-Azerbaijani diplomacy. How do you assess Washington’s growing role in the South Caucasus, and could Armenia emerge as a new arena of strategic competition between the United States and Russia?

Richard Giragosian: I’m rather skeptical. I am skeptical about Armenia and the South Caucasus being a sustainable priority within the American national interest. Moreover, if we consider the unpredictability of the Trump administration, I also question the durability of its commitment to, and interest in, the region.

At the same time, Armenia’s diplomatic achievements with Azerbaijan owe much more to the leadership in both Armenia and Azerbaijan and to their bilateral efforts. They were not solely the result of Western or American involvement. In fact, Armenia and Azerbaijan, acting on their own—without Russia and without the West—were able to achieve much more than before.

That said, there has been one very important achievement in terms of the American connectivity initiative. This modestly named Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity envisions road and rail connections through southern Armenia, linking Azerbaijan with its exclave of Nakhchivan and onward to Turkey. This is important not only for the restoration of trade and transportation, but also for the return of deterrence, changing the strategic calculus and significantly reducing the risk of renewed hostilities.

So, when looking at American engagement, the record is mixed. But overall, it is a net positive. For Armenia and Azerbaijan, however, it would be a mistake to assume or rely too heavily on American involvement going forward.

Free Elections Are Necessary, but They Are Not Sufficient

You have often argued that democratic legitimacy is itself a strategic asset. To what extent has Armenia’s democratic trajectory strengthened its international standing, especially when compared with the authoritarian models represented by Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Russia?

Richard Giragosian: There are two concrete and practical advantages that we have seen emerge from Armenia’s legitimacy and democratic credentials. First, there has been a significant improvement in the investment climate. This helps explain the breakthrough agreements in the IT sector, Armenia’s establishment of data centers, its growing use of artificial intelligence, and advances in chip production. AI and chip diplomacy are a direct result of this improved investment climate.

A second notable achievement is that Armenia has come to be recognized as a predictable and reliable interlocutor. That is important both for Ankara and Baku—for Turkey and Azerbaijan. Armenia is increasingly accepted as a dependable, reliable, and predictable partner. In this part of the world, that is a rare achievement, and in many ways, it is even more important than democratic credentials alone.

Now, the bad news. Armenia’s institutional weakness in terms of democracy still needs to be addressed, and strengthening those institutions is just as important as holding free and fair elections. An election is not the answer, nor is it the complete recipe for democracy. Armenia still needs to strengthen its democratic institutions.

Concessions Can Contribute to Peace, but They Cannot Be Unilateral

Aliyev and Erdoğan.
President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan attend TEKNOFEST in Istanbul, Turkey, on April 29, 2023. Photo: Evren Kalinbacak / Dreamstime.

Pashinyan has presented peace with Azerbaijan as a prerequisite for Armenia’s future security and prosperity. Does the election provide him with a stronger mandate to finalize a peace agreement, or do major domestic and external obstacles remain?

Richard Giragosian: Clearly, yes. The government’s re-election provides a renewed mandate to continue engaging with Azerbaijan and to move the process forward. However, there are still significant challenges, especially regarding the Azerbaijani demand that Armenia amend its constitution, as well as the fact that the bilateral peace treaty has been initialed but not yet signed.

The real difference here, however, is that Armenia has been willing to accept its weakness and embrace its defeat, while also turning the page and moving forward with a much less provocative and much less aggressive posture toward all of its neighbors. So, there is reason for justified optimism. But it also takes two countries to achieve bilateral peace and stability.

Therefore, the next move will have to come first from Azerbaijan and then from Turkey in terms of normalizing relations. Armenian concessions and compromises are important, but they should not be unilateral.

The Constitution Will Remain a Potential Source of Friction

One of the unresolved issues concerns constitutional changes sought by Azerbaijan as part of a final settlement. How politically feasible are such reforms after the election, and do they risk creating a new wave of nationalist mobilization inside Armenia?

Richard Giragosian: That’s a very good point, because despite the re-election of the government, with a working majority and a renewed mandate, the government still fell short of a two-thirds majority in Parliament. That would have been much more helpful for constitutional amendments. The government’s working majority will therefore present a challenge in moving forward with a referendum on constitutional change.

However, we do see a demonstrable climbdown on the Azerbaijani side. They have retreated from their previously maximalist position, and the Azerbaijanis have become much more patient and far less demanding regarding the constitutional change requirement. It is no longer such an immediate prerequisite, which suggests there may be some flexibility, as well as an understanding in Baku that the Armenian government lacks the parliamentary majority necessary to guarantee this demand. So, I do think there is room for flexibility. But yes, it will remain a potential source of friction going forward.

Azerbaijan Continues to Shape the Limits of Turkish Policy

You have argued that normalization between Turkey and Armenia represents a rare opportunity for regional stabilization and economic development. Has the election increased the prospects for genuine rapprochement, or does Azerbaijan remain the decisive variable shaping Ankara’s policy?

Richard Giragosian: To be quite honest, despite the positive re-election of the Armenian government, there had already been notable progress before the election between Armenian and Turkish officials in moving incrementally closer to reopening the border. In this regard, when it comes to Armenian-Turkish normalization, the physical border has not yet opened. But the mental border has, and the issue has become much less poisonous and politically toxic within Turkey. 

However, unfortunately, the Turkish side remains hostage to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s approval and consent remain necessary for the fulfillment of normalization. Much to the frustration of the Erdoğan government, it is Azerbaijan that continues to limit Turkish options in the region. That reality is also rooted in the economic and commercial influence of SOCAR, the Azerbaijani State Oil Company, within the Turkish economy.

Nevertheless, we are seeing growing support and broader constituencies on the Turkish side in favor of reopening the border. And this is not about the Turkish economy in general. It is about the regional economy of eastern Turkey, particularly the underdeveloped and largely Kurdish-populated areas of the east. For the Turkish state, reopening the border is important not only for economically stabilizing the region but also for countering the PKK through jobs and economic opportunity rather than relying solely on police action. So, there is a clear security dimension as well. 

At the end of the day, even for Azerbaijan, Armenia-Turkey normalization represents a rare positive game changer—a genuine win-win.

Armenia May Influence Its Neighbors More Than Its Neighbors Influence Armenia

Armenia’s normalization efforts necessarily involve deeper engagement with two increasingly centralized and authoritarian neighboring states. Do you have concerns that closer political, economic, and institutional ties with Turkey and Azerbaijan could contribute to democratic erosion in Armenia? More specifically, just as Russia has long sought to project its political influence and governance model across the post-Soviet space, is there a risk that Ankara and Baku may also seek to export elements of their own illiberal political models to Armenia? Or do you believe that Armenia’s democratic institutions and growing engagement with Europe are sufficiently resilient to prevent such authoritarian diffusion?

Richard Giragosian: I’m less worried about the potential risk posed by neighboring Turkey or Azerbaijan in terms of eroding the Armenian democratic model, simply because it would be very difficult for Armenia’s population to accept any kind of role for either Turkey or Azerbaijan in shaping Armenia’s political development. The greater risk comes from Russia’s potential external interference.

At the same time, Armenia’s institutions remain rather fragile, vulnerable, and not yet sufficiently resilient. But I do think we are on a positive trajectory. And I also believe that the development of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as between Armenia and Turkey, can contribute positively to the democratic outlook of those countries.

So, I would reverse the question and focus on Armenia’s potential positive influence on its neighbors, rather than on the risk of intervention, interference, or democratic erosion emanating from Armenia’s neighbors and affecting Armenia itself.

Normalization Is Only the Foundation for Future Reconciliation

The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh has forced Armenia to reconsider long-standing assumptions about identity, security, and statehood. Are we witnessing the emergence of a new civic understanding of Armenian nationalism, and how might this reshape populist politics in the future?

Richard Giragosian: We are witnessing a sea change in terms of identity. And in this regard, it is not nationalism that resonates. Rather, it is a more mature evolution toward a new concept of patriotism. Specifically, from an Armenian perspective, nationalism can also be very negative, rooted in hatred of the enemy. Patriotism, in contrast, is much more positive. It is based on pride in history rather than hatred of rivals, opponents, or enemies. So, I do think there is a healthy and constructive movement in the right direction.

Nevertheless, it is still grounded in a painful reminder that Armenia was dangerously arrogant, especially in relation to Azerbaijan. There were too many missed opportunities for diplomacy. But Armenia is now cutting its losses and learning painful lessons. And I think the outlook moving forward remains positive. Because for Armenia, the first challenge was recognizing the problem. And that was the first stage in this evolution toward patriotism. It is also about normalization, and understanding what normalization with neighbors is—and is not. For example, in relation to both Turkey and Azerbaijan, this is not reconciliation. It is not even a rapprochement. It is normalization. It is the first step. It is also the basic currency of neighborly relations and the foundation for subsequent reconciliation.

This is why much of the past, including the events of 1915 and the genocide issue, is not part of the normalization process. These issues are not relevant to normalization. They will come later, once that foundation has been put in place.

Armenia May Be Less a Model Than an Accidental Exception

And lastly, at a time when democratic backsliding, authoritarian populism, and geopolitical revisionism are reshaping international politics, Armenia remains one of the few competitive democracies in the post-Soviet space. What lessons does the Armenian experience offer for understanding democratic resilience under conditions of war, external pressure, and geopolitical uncertainty?

Richard Giragosian: To be quite honest, I’m not sure. Armenia may be less of a lesson and more of an accidental exception. In other words, beginning with the change of government in 2018, it was a rare victory of nonviolence, of people power. Despite everything, despite later losing a war, despite Russia, what was the recipe for Armenia? I’m not quite sure. It could have been almost an accident of history.

But theoretically, we would say, sadly, that it took the loss of the war and the subsequent loss of Nagorno-Karabakh before Armenia could begin to rebound. At the same time, much of this opportunity also exists because Russia was distracted by its failed invasion of Ukraine. So, it is somewhat of an accidental convergence of interests.

At the same time, we do see Ankara, Yerevan, and Baku accidentally sharing similar concerns about Russia. There is an understanding that a regional identity, without any third-party involvement, is perhaps the real key to stability in terms of post-war adjustment. 

So, the short answer is: I’m not quite sure I have the answer.

Professor Cengiz Aktar.

Prof. Aktar: The EU Is Systematically Giving False Hopes to Armenia

In this timely ECPS interview, Professor Cengiz Aktar examines the political, geopolitical, and democratic implications of Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections. While acknowledging Armenia’s democratic resilience in an authoritarian neighborhood, he challenges prevailing narratives about the country’s westward turn, arguing that Armenia’s economic, energy, and security dependence on Russia remains profound. Describing the European Union as “the greatest populist actor in this game,” Professor Aktar contends that Brussels is fostering expectations it cannot realistically fulfill. The interview explores Nikol Pashinyan’s evolving populism, post-Karabakh politics, democratic backsliding, normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, Russian influence, and the enduring significance of historical memory. At its core lies a fundamental question: how can a fragile democracy survive amid competing geopolitical pressures?

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Armenia’s 2026 parliamentary elections have been widely interpreted as a pivotal moment in the country’s post-Karabakh trajectory. Taking place amid the aftermath of military defeat, the forced displacement of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, ongoing normalization efforts with Turkey and Azerbaijan, and growing tensions between Russia and the West, the elections raised fundamental questions about democratic resilience, populism, sovereignty, and geopolitical realignment in the South Caucasus.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Cengiz Aktar—adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens, guest lecturer at Yerevan State University, and one of the foremost analysts of Turkey-Armenia relations, memory politics, and regional geopolitics—offers a provocative assessment of Armenia’s democratic future and its increasingly complex international environment.

While acknowledging Armenia’s democratic achievements, Professor Aktar stresses the extraordinary constraints under which the country operates. As he observes, Armenia remains “the only democracy in the Caucasus, indeed in the region,” a small, landlocked state surrounded by authoritarian neighbors and exposed to intense geopolitical pressures. Yet he warns that many assumptions currently shaping discussions of Armenia’s future rest on unrealistic expectations regarding Europe’s role and capacity.

The most striking theme of the interview concerns Armenia’s growing rapprochement with the European Union. Contrary to prevailing narratives that portray Armenia’s recent political direction as a decisive shift toward Europe, Professor Aktar argues that Armenia’s economic, energy, and security dependence on Russia remains overwhelming and cannot be easily replaced. In his view, European policymakers are encouraging expectations that they cannot realistically fulfill. “None of this can be replaced by the European Union,” he argues. “Yet the EU is systematically giving false hopes to Armenia. In that sense, the greatest populist actor in this game is Europe. Because Europe is offering hopes that it simply cannot fulfill.”

Professor Aktar is equally skeptical of assumptions that Armenia faces a straightforward geopolitical choice between Russia and Europe. While recognizing the country’s genuine democratic aspirations and strong cultural connections with Europe, he contends that geography, energy dependence, trade networks, and security realities continue to bind Armenia closely to Moscow. For this reason, he warns that unrealistic promises of European integration may ultimately prove counterproductive, potentially undermining Armenia’s stability while provoking Russian backlash.

The interview also explores Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s evolving populism, the politics of peace and normalization with Turkey and Azerbaijan, democratic backsliding, Russia’s continuing influence, historical memory, and the unresolved legacy of the Armenian Genocide. Throughout, Professor Aktar returns to a central dilemma confronting Armenia today: how a fragile democracy can preserve its autonomy and democratic character while navigating an increasingly hostile regional environment shaped by authoritarian power politics and great-power competition.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Cengiz Aktar, lightly edited for clarity, readability, and publication.

Armenians Were Tired of War, and Pashinyan Successfully Capitalized on That Fatigue

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrives for a meeting of the Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (EAEU) in Yerevan, Armenia, on November 19, 2021. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Aktar, welcome! You recently argued that the 2026 elections would reveal the direction of Armenian democracy after the trauma of Karabakh and the pressures of regional geopolitics. How should we interpret Nikol Pashinyan’s re-election? Does it represent a democratic endorsement of his peace agenda, or merely a choice of the “least risky” option in a constrained political environment?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Before going into the details of the Armenian political microcosm, we should underline that this small country— less than 30,000 square kilometers after all—completely landlocked and surrounded by two enemy nations, Azerbaijan and Turkey, is the only democracy in the Caucasus, indeed in the region. This is something that people tend to forget. They are doing their best to remain a democracy. It is not easy because they have to deal with anti-democracies. But so far, they have been doing all right.

We will see how the final results of these elections play out. They are not final yet, and there are many issues—we will come to them. We will see the outcome and how the authorities address some of the serious questions that have arisen after the elections.

That being said, the people have re-elected the Prime Minister and, at the end of the day, endorsed his views. This is quite a remarkable achievement because, normally, when a leader loses a war and, moreover, loses a territory—which is the case with Nagorno-Karabakh, a historic Armenian land that was given by the Soviets to Azerbaijan and later reclaimed by Azerbaijan through war with Armenia, openly and extensively supported by the Turkish armed forces—the political consequences are severe. The reality was therefore quite harsh for a prime minister seeking a new mandate. Yet he succeeded. Of course, this may seem contradictory or paradoxical, but it is not.

There are two elements at play here. We could talk for hours about this. As you know, I have written extensively on the subject in Turkish for Agos, the Armenian newspaper published in Turkey in both Turkish and Armenian.

The first and foremost reason is that the people of Armenia are tired of fighting. There is a clear war fatigue. Although we cannot compare it to what is happening in our region, in Mesopotamia and elsewhere, this sense of insecurity has been very real. The Prime Minister used—and abused—this feeling extensively, essentially saying: if you do not vote for me, we will go to war. That was, of course, highly manipulative and a very populist way of dealing with such a sensitive issue as peace and security. Nevertheless, it worked.

The second element is that this country is virtually unrecognizable. I have been going there since 1990, and today Armenia is experiencing a boom in personal spending and consumption. It is becoming a mass-consumption society of the kind we saw in Western Europe after 1945. This, of course, is music to the ears of the Armenian public. I visit regularly, but this time I was genuinely amazed by the number of brand-new cars. There are hardly any old cars left in the city. Everybody seems to have a new one. Where does this money come from? Of course, no one asks such questions. But the main source of these finances, as in other countries of the region—including Turkey, Georgia, and others—comes from sanctions-busting.

The West—the United States and the European Union—sanctioned Russia, first after the annexation of Crimea and then following the full-scale war against Ukraine. Yet many countries have been circumventing these sanctions. This is not speculation. There are extensive reports on the matter, including in leading newspapers such as the Financial Times, documenting the flow of goods and cash to and from Russia. Russian gold, for example, moves through the South Caucasus and then to China and India, where it is processed and made marketable before returning to Russia. As one can imagine, this trade is extremely lucrative, and we see its effects in the economy of Yerevan.

So, all in all, the people have voted—although not for a full majority, and we will come to that. They voted for a different type of future. That is understandable. But is it sustainable? I think that is the real question.

Who Is Not Populist When Seeking Re-Election?

Pashinyan originally emerged from the 2018 Velvet Revolution as an anti-establishment figure challenging entrenched oligarchic networks. To what extent can he still be understood as a populist leader, and how has his populism evolved from opposition mobilization to governing power?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Who is not populist, Selçuk? Especially when one is running for re-election. It is almost compulsory to be a populist, unfortunately. Nikol Pashinyan was in full swing when it came to populist moves, actions, speeches, and narratives. That is all true. But it worked. The question is whether he really represents a future for the country. Some observers say so, but at what price? That is the real issue, the real problem that Armenians will have to confront sooner or later.

What he has managed to achieve with Turkey and Azerbaijan—two longstanding foes of Armenia—is not yet fully accomplished, but it is on track; it is in the pipeline. However, it has been pursued through, once again, a very populist way of handling highly sensitive matters. It has been achieved by making huge concessions to both countries, without really receiving anything in return. This is very dangerous in the sense that one cannot ignore the imbalance involved.

I often think of a famous observation by Henry Kissinger, who was not exactly a commendable figure. He used to say that the best and most sustainable peace deals are those concluded by parties that leave the negotiating table equally dissatisfied with the outcome. That is very true. Yet in the case of Armenia and Azerbaijan—and also Turkey—that did not happen, and it will not happen, because Azerbaijan and Turkey do not have much to offer in return, except perhaps opening the border in Turkey’s case, and maybe Azerbaijan’s as well.

Even then, there are enormous conditions attached before anything concrete can happen. As you may have noticed, there has been much discussion in the Turkish media about the possibility that the two land border crossings could open during the summer. We will see whether Azerbaijan will allow Turkey to move forward with this symbolic—or perhaps concrete—opening of the border, which has been closed since 1993. That is a very long time.

As of today, the 12th of June, only five days after the elections, there remains a great deal of uncertainty. The Prime Minister did not get everything he wanted, and the opposition actually performed quite well. Does that mean that those who voted for the opposition are pro-Russian or anti-Western? I do not think so. That would be far too hasty a conclusion.

Frankly, I remain quite skeptical about the future, and there are some very unpleasant developments unfolding at the moment. But we will come to those in due course. 

People Were Willing to Sacrifice Almost Anything for Peace

Armenia protest.
Anti-government protesters gather in front of the Armenian government building in Yerevan on December 9, 2020, demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan following the Nagorno-Karabakh war. Photo: Corneius Brandt / Dreamstime.

Comparative scholarship often suggests that military defeats weaken populist governments. Yet Pashinyan survived both the 2020 war and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. What explains his resilience, and what does it tell us about the relationship between populism, accountability, and democratic legitimacy?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Democratic legitimacy is a big word. But frankly, as I said at the beginning, the appeal of a consumer society and the symbolic peace narrative played a major role. Pashinyan used this message effectively, even adopting the little heart as the symbol of his campaign, which is totally un-Armenian. It is not something that is commonly used in Armenia, nor in the Caucasus. Anyhow, these two elements—peace and consumption apparently worked. That is the reality. But again, are they sustainable? That is the question.

It worked perfectly. Elderly people were appearing on television, in street interviews and similar formats, saying remarkable things about the importance of peace at any cost. They were prepared to give up almost anything in exchange for peace and greater consumption. So, once again, the question remains: is it sustainable? I do not think so.

The Dominant Geopolitical Orientation Remains Russia, Not Europe

Many observers described the election as a referendum on Armenia’s geopolitical orientation. Do you think Armenian voters primarily voted on domestic democratic concerns, or was this fundamentally a choice between Russia and Europe?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: In Armenia, since the Velvet Revolution of 2018, there has been a genuine sense of democratic aspiration within society. Of course, not every individual is pro-democracy or democratic—that exists nowhere in the world—but overall, the aim, the tendency, and the willingness are there. Armenians want to build a democratic society.

But there are major impediments. It is a very small and a very dependent country. Despite the strong Western tropism that developed during the election campaign, particularly through the major event that took place in Yerevan at the beginning of May—the annual meeting of the so-called European Political Community, which was revived by Macron after an earlier French initiative had been abandoned in 1954—the reality remains quite different. The European Political Community is not a binding European institution; it is essentially a talk shop. Yet during this gathering, the whole of Europe was present, along with Canada, and they all delivered very warm messages to the Armenians. The message was essentially: “You are now part of Europe. You are welcome,” and so on.

But the reality is not quite that. The dominant and determining geopolitical orientation of Armenia remains Russia, not the West. Everything that happened during May before the elections—including these Western visits and those from the United States as well; the Vice President was there in March, carried the same message: “Armenia, we love you, and you are one of us.”

What explains this sudden affection? It is rooted in the anti-Russian policies of the West. In a sense, Armenia has been used for that purpose. Now tensions are emerging with Russia, which remains by far Armenia’s most influential neighbor. Armenia depends on Russia on an unbelievable scale. This dependence cannot be replaced or superseded by any European initiative, however well-intentioned. Geographically, historically, politically, and economically, it is impossible.

You have read what I have written about this dependency. More than 82 percent of Armenia’s gas and energy needs are covered by Russia, at an extraordinarily low price—$177.5 per 1,000 cubic meters of gas. There is nothing comparable anywhere else. If Russia were to change that arrangement unilaterally, Armenia would face tremendous difficulties. Not to mention Metsamor, the country’s only nuclear power plant, located near the Turkish border. It was built by the Russians, and Rosatom supplies its fuel. Nor should we forget the petrol and oil products that Armenians use every day in their new cars. There is also the enormous Russian market for Armenian products such as fruits, vegetables, and flowers.

None of this can be replaced by the European Union. Yet the EU is systematically giving false hopes to Armenia. In that sense, the greatest populist actor in this game is Europe. Because Europe is offering hopes that it simply cannot fulfill. People are now even talking about future EU membership for Armenia. But that is out of the question. One of the indispensable conditions for EU membership is territorial continuity. So where is the territorial continuity? It simply does not exist. It will not happen. There is no realistic chance whatsoever. Yet people are buying into this rhetoric without fully understanding the realities involved, and in the process they are jeopardizing the country’s relations with Russia. That is where we find ourselves today.

Russia Remains the Ultimate Game Changer in Armenia

You have repeatedly emphasized Moscow’s declining credibility in Armenia after its failure to prevent the loss of Karabakh. Has Russia now lost its position as Armenia’s primary external reference point, or does it still possess significant instruments of influence inside the country?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Of course, as I said, yes. Russia remains the game changer in Armenia. Armenians are certainly not in love with Russia, particularly since the Russians did nothing to stop the Azeris and the Turks from taking back Nagorno-Karabakh. So, every Armenian has reason to be unhappy about what Russia did. But, the reality is something else. As I explained, the country remains highly dependent on Russia, and that dependence will not change from one day to the next.

Moscow May Have Felt No Need to Interfere

Yerevan.
Souvenir T-shirts displayed at a market in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, on July 5, 2017. Photo: Matyas Rehak / Dreamstime.

Several reports suggested Russian attempts to influence the election through economic pressure, disinformation, and support for pro-Russian actors. How should we understand these efforts within the broader framework of transnational authoritarian influence and democratic resilience?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) was there. The ODIHR has a specialized body that monitors elections in OSCE member states, and it was present during these elections as well. According to ODIHR, there was no interference whatsoever. There was a great deal of fake news on the subject, but neither the Electoral Commission nor the independent media found any substantial evidence of vote-buying or influence operations orchestrated by Russia.

On the contrary, there were reports concerning officials from Civil Contract, Nikol Pashinyan’s party, exerting pressure on civil servants to vote for Civil Contract. A civil servant is, after all, an obedient servant, so if the boss says, “Go and vote for me,” he or she generally will. These kinds of irregularities were noted.

Overall, however, I do not think that Russia intervened in the Armenian elections. If I put myself in the position of Russian decision-makers, I would say that they are probably so confident in their leverage over the Armenian economy that they felt no need to intervene directly in order to influence the outcome of the elections.

European Tropism Is a Myth and a Pipe Dream

The election result appears to strengthen Armenia’s rapprochement with Europe. In your view, is this shift primarily strategic and security-driven, or does it also reflect a deeper normative commitment to liberal democracy and European political values?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: No, as I said, this European tropism is a myth. It is a myth. Armenians are not discovering Europe. Armenia is, in a way, a very European country. Just look at the diaspora. The European Armenian diaspora is very strong and remains highly present in Armenia itself. If you compare the two countries, for instance Azerbaijan and Armenia, Armenia is by far more European than Azerbaijan, which has virtually no connection to Europe whatsoever. There is no significant Azeri diaspora in Europe. That is not the case with Armenia. Armenia knows what Europe means, in a way.

But, having said that, I repeat: this European tropism is a pipe dream. It is a personal choice, but it will not have any real consequences for the development of Armenian democracy in the foreseeable future. They are not there, and they will not be there.

The Americans are another matter altogether. They are much more focused on transactionalism. They buy and sell, and they do not care at all about the democratic future of any country in the world—including their own.

Autocratic Tendencies Are Clearly Visible

Some critics argue that Pashinyan has displayed increasingly personalized leadership tendencies and a growing concentration of power. Do you see signs of democratic erosion under his government, or are such concerns exaggerated given Armenia’s broader regional context?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: The trend is troubling. There have been some anti-democratic and illegal actions directed against the opposition, but not only against the opposition. Let me give you the example of the director of the Genocide Museum in Yerevan. This lady offered a book to the American Vice President during his visit to Yerevan. The book dealt with the fate of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians. As you know, 150,000 Armenians were forced to flee Nagorno-Karabakh. She was subsequently sanctioned by the Prime Minister, who forced her resignation. This is far from any democratic way of handling public affairs. The lady was compelled to resign and was replaced by a bureaucrat close to the Prime Minister who has no real understanding of the history of the Armenian genocide.

He is also challenging the role of the Church. Etchmiadzin, the Holy See, is systematically under pressure from the government. That is not the role of a government—to intervene in the affairs of the Church, whatever the circumstances. There may be all sorts of accusations against the head of the Church, Karekin, involving embezzlement and other matters, but that is not the role of a government.

During the campaign as well, there were some quite worrisome developments targeting opposition figures, and these developments are still continuing.

Moreover, the election results are not yet entirely clear, because we still do not know whether a fourth party will make it into Parliament. Unfortunately, since the closure of voting on the night of the 7th June, there has been considerable pressure on election officials to ensure that this fourth party remains below the 4 percent threshold and does not enter Parliament. By cheating, of course. 

And now the scandal is completely out in the open. All opposition parties are protesting loudly. They are taking the matter to the Electoral Commission and will probably proceed to the Constitutional Court afterwards in order to seek a proper resolution, because this party’s votes have been cancelled. The objective has been to ensure that it does not enter Parliament and remains below the 4 percent threshold. We cannot call this democratic. It is anti-democratic, it is illegal, and it challenges the principle of free and fair elections. So, are there autocratic tendencies? Yes, definitely. They are very much there. Are they widespread? No. But the danger is there.

Concessions Without Reciprocity Create Fragile Peace

Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey flags.
Photo: Dreamstime.

Pashinyan campaigned explicitly on a message of peace with Azerbaijan and normalization with Turkey. Is this the emergence of a new political cleavage in Armenia between peace-oriented pragmatism and nationalist revisionism?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: It is a good question. National revisionism, okay—but revise what? Those who challenge the Prime Minister’s positions, policies, actions, and narratives are saying something that is very meaningful. They say: “We are not against peace.” After all, who can be against peace? Who can be in favor of war? That is a form of universal wisdom. But they are asking a different question: How did you achieve that peace? What do you receive in return when you make concessions to Azerbaijan and Turkey? 

That is the real question. It is fascinating to observe that a very similar dynamic is unfolding in Turkey with the Kurds. The Kurds speak about peace, a peace process here and a peace process there. But what do they receive in return from the Turkish state? In line with their longstanding demands—for example, the freedom of the Kurdish language and the recognition of Kurdish as an official language in Turkey—they receive nothing.

It is the same in Armenia. The practice is exactly the same. Everybody talks about peace, but when you ask what they receive in return for their concessions, the answer is: nothing. They say they receive peace. But this peace exists entirely under the shadow and control of the other parties, who can challenge it at any moment. They have not given anything themselves, and therefore they can always come back and say: “No, we want more.”

That is precisely what is happening now. As you may know, before the elections—more specifically on May 15—there was an important development. The Azerbaijani ambassador to Ankara openly and quite happily declared that the opening of the border between Turkey and Armenia was directly linked to the so-called peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and that Baku and Ankara were coordinating their moves and policies. 

He was speaking on behalf of Baku, and the condition for this so-called peace process was—and still is—a change to the Armenian Constitution. Specifically, Azerbaijan wants the removal of the provision concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, which is referred to in the Armenian Constitution as an Armenian territory, or as a territory inhabited by Armenians. In other words, Baku wants Yerevan to eliminate this provision, and this remains the principal condition for accepting a lasting peace with its neighbor.

The problem is that, in order to do that, the Prime Minister needs a two-third qualified majority in Parliament, which he did not obtain. Now, with all the controversy surrounding vote-rigging and alleged manipulation concerning the fourth party I mentioned earlier, I do not see how he can satisfy the Azerbaijani demand by amending the Constitution and removing the reference to Nagorno-Karabakh. This means that the prospects for peace with Azerbaijan—and, consequently, with Turkey—are in serious difficulty.

They are compromised, and no one can foresee the outcome at this stage because we still do not have the final count, nor do we know exactly how many parties will ultimately enter Parliament. But in any case, even if the fourth party fails to enter Parliament, the ruling Civil Contract party still lacks the necessary majority to amend the Constitution. So, we are facing a deadlock, and no one really knows how it will evolve.

The Perversion of Justice Starts With the Denial of Memory

Professor Aktar, you have often argued that Turkey cannot become a fully democratic society without confronting its historical crimes, particularly the Armenian Genocide. How does the current normalization process affect questions of historical justice, memory, and democratic reconciliation?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: This is a question that really deserves a separate discussion, but in a nutshell, I can offer an example. Turkey is in dire straits. Turkish democracy does not exist. In fact, I would argue that it never truly existed. But the rule of law, for which Turks have struggled since 1923—and especially since the end of the Second World War—is now gone as well.

These are structural problems, even structural diseases. I do not particularly like using that term, but this is what we are dealing with: a dysfunction that goes back to the founding sin of the state—the Armenian Genocide and the Syriac Genocide, which are inseparable and which occurred more than a century ago.

A country that does not come to terms with such a painful and sinful past can easily digest other sins, as is the case today, including sins that are far less serious and far less painful than what happened 111 years ago.

What I am saying is not abstract. I am not talking about ghosts. I am talking about the perversion of the sense of justice in this country. And I am quite sure that Turkey will not make it through the remaining decades of the twenty-first century without recognizing, reflecting upon, and recalling this tragic past, which ultimately resulted in the disappearance of the entire non-Muslim population of Anatolia. We are talking about three million people.

So, it is really a matter of either-or. What is the significance of an embezzlement scandal involving a Turkish politician—for instance, Erdoğan—when compared with genocide? It is nothing. It is peanuts.

Therefore, a population, a polity, a society, and a state that do not wish to remember what happened a century ago—which was carried out by Turks and Kurds —can easily digest, accept, and live with far less serious wrongdoings, as we see happening today.

This is simply a normal consequence of this absence of memory, or rather this voluntary loss of memory and de-memorization of the past. It is very dangerous, and it is very unhealthy.

False European Hopes May Push Armenia Back Into Moscow’s Orbit

Armenia-EU
Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Professor Aktar, at a time when much of the post-Soviet space is characterized by authoritarian consolidation, Armenia remains one of the few competitive democracies in the region. What lessons does the Armenian experience offer for understanding democratic resilience, populism, and geopolitical pressure in the twenty-first century?

Professor Cengiz Aktar: Interestingly, we began our discussion with this point, and we will conclude with it as well. Armenia remains the only country in its immediate neighborhood that is genuinely trying to remain a democracy. The next democratic country, after all, is Greece, which is quite far away.

It is doing its best to preserve democratic governance. But it is extremely difficult to survive in a non-democratic, and even anti-democratic, environment when you are surrounded by countries that do not share the values, principles, and norms of democracy.

This is not merely a theoretical issue; it is a practical one. Non-democracies and anti-democracies can conclude agreements with democratic countries, sign them, and then simply ignore their commitments. Because they are not accountable. A non-democratic or anti-democratic regime is not accountable to its population. It simply does not care.

Take Russia, for example. I mentioned earlier the figure of $177 for 1,000 cubic meters of natural gas. That gas is supplied under an agreement between Moscow and Yerevan. But Moscow, as a non-democratic—indeed, a totalitarian—state, can simply say: “We are no longer bound by that agreement. We are raising the price to the international market level of $600. Take it or leave it.” This illustrates the difficulty of operating—and indeed surviving—in such an environment. I sincerely hope that the Armenians will manage and succeed.

The problem is that the false hopes offered by European countries and by the European Union itself are not helpful. In fact, they indirectly push Armenia back into Moscow’s orbit and deeper into Russia’s sphere of influence. The Russians are already deeply upset with the Europeans, not least because of what is happening in Ukraine. And they are unlikely to tolerate what they would perceive as a second strategic setback in their immediate neighborhood. After all, the Caucasus is their backyard.

There is one final point. Anyone interested in the South Caucasus should take a serious and analytical look at what happened in Georgia. Georgia went through a very similar process—loosening its ties with Russia and moving closer to the West. In the end, it failed. The country ended up with two portions of its territory effectively invaded and, while not formally annexed, indirectly administered by Russia. Meanwhile, all the Western hopes and aspirations of eventually joining the European Union have faded away. They are gone. Finished. Today the country is governed by a tycoon who is completely infatuated with Moscow.

This, unfortunately, is the reality of the South Caucasus. We will see how things evolve. I wish the very best to Armenia, but the task before it is not easy at all.