The entrance of Athens Polytechnic University.

The Politics of Forgetting: Populism and the Rewriting of Greece’s Dictatorial Past

In this Voices of Youth (VoY) Commentary for the ECPS, Emmanouela Papapavlou examines how populist narratives reshape Greece’s collective memory of the 1967–1974 military dictatorship. Focusing on the November 1973 Athens Polytechnic uprising, she explores the political implications of historical revisionism, authoritarian nostalgia, and selective national remembrance. By revisiting the dictatorship’s repression and its role in the Cyprus crisis, Papapavlou demonstrates how nationalist narratives can minimize authoritarian crimes while selectively invoking patriotism and national betrayal. Drawing on contemporary theories of populism, she argues that historical memory becomes a political weapon when documented facts are subordinated to ideological loyalties. Her commentary underscores the importance of historical accountability, critical remembrance, and democratic vigilance in confronting authoritarian revisionism.

By Emmanouela Papapavlou*

There is something deeply unsettling about the way a nation remembers its past. We celebrate certain moments, commemorate certain struggles and build our national identity around stories of resistance and courage. Yet, sometimes, the same history becomes uncomfortable when it challenges the image we have constructed of ourselves. And when that happens, remembering can become selective.

In Greece, few historical events carry the symbolic weight of the Athens Polytechnic uprising of November 1973. More than five decades later, it remains a defining moment in the country’s transition towards democracy. Yet, the meaning of the uprising, the crimes of the military dictatorship and even the historical record itself continue to be questioned. The issue is no longer simply how Greece remembers its past, but how that past is used in contemporary political discourse.

To understand this, we must first return to what happened. 

Three Days That Challenged a Dictatorship

On November 14, 1973, students from different faculties gathered at the National Technical University of Athens and began occupying the Polytechnic. What initially developed as a student protest soon grew into a broader uprising against the military dictatorship, which had ruled Greece since the coup of April 21, 1967. The regime, led by Georgios Papadopoulos, Stylianos Pattakos and Nikolaos Makarezos, had suspended democratic institutions, restricted political freedoms, imposed censorship and persecuted those who opposed it.

The occupation quickly became more than a protest over university affairs. Students organized themselves through a coordinating committee, while anti-dictatorship slogans began to fill the building and surrounding streets. Their demands were increasingly political: freedom, democracy and an end to authoritarian rule.

By November 15, the movement had acquired a voice of its own. An improvised radio station began broadcasting messages from inside the Polytechnic, calling on Athenians to support the students. Its broadcasts carried beyond the university walls, turning the occupation into a focal point of resistance. People began gathering outside, bringing food and medical supplies and expressing their solidarity. The Polytechnic was no longer an isolated student movement. It had become a public challenge to the regime.

On November 16, demonstrations spread across central Athens. Students were joined by workers and ordinary citizens, transforming the protest into a mass mobilization. The response of the authorities was violent. Police forces confronted demonstrators, tear gas was used, and gunfire was reported as clashes intensified throughout the city. The situation escalated rapidly, and the military was called in.

During the night of November 16 and the early hours of November 17, tanks surrounded the Polytechnic. Shortly after 2 a.m., an armored vehicle advanced towards the central gate. At approximately 3 a.m., a tank broke through it, while students and other people remained inside the grounds. Military forces entered the university and brought the occupation to an end. The violence, however, did not remain confined to the Polytechnic. Clashes and shootings continued in the streets of Athens, leaving people dead and injured.

Historical research by Leonidas Kallivretakis at the National Hellenic Research Foundation has documented 24 deaths connected to the November 1973 events. It is important to distinguish between the location of those deaths and the events themselves: no death has been conclusively documented within the Polytechnic grounds, but this does not mean that nobody was killed during the uprising and its violent suppression. The victims were part of a wider crackdown across Athens.

The distinction matters because historical accuracy should clarify the past, not provide an excuse to diminish it. The absence of a confirmed death inside the university does not erase the deaths outside it, the wounded, the arrests or the violence inflicted by the dictatorship.

Nor did the uprising immediately bring the regime down. On November 25, 1973, Papadopoulos was overthrown in an internal coup led by Ioannidis, and the dictatorship continued. It eventually collapsed in July 1974, following the catastrophic events in Cyprus. The Polytechnic, however, had exposed the regime’s vulnerability and become a lasting symbol of resistance.

The Contradiction of Authoritarian Nostalgia

Today, the historical record exists alongside a different narrative: that life under the dictatorship was orderly, that the economy was better, that the leaders were patriots, or that, at least, people had enough to eat. Such statements are often presented as harmless nostalgia or as an alternative interpretation of history.

But what exactly is being remembered when the repression is left out?

The dictatorship was not simply a different political administration with a different economic approach. It was a regime that abolished democratic government, censored the press, imprisoned and tortured opponents, and denied citizens fundamental political freedoms. Economic performance, even where particular indicators may be debated, cannot be used to cancel these realities.

This is where historical revisionism becomes politically significant. It does not always require denying every documented event. Sometimes, it works by changing the emphasis: repression becomes an unfortunate detail, resistance becomes exaggeration, and authoritarian rule is recast as a period of national discipline. The contradiction becomes even clearer when we consider Cyprus.

Patriotism, Cyprus and Selective National Memory

The Greek military regime repeatedly invoked patriotism and national unity. Yet, on July 15, 1974, the junta backed a coup against the elected government of Cyprus, carried out by the Cypriot National Guard under the direction of Greek officers. Five days later, Turkey launched its military operation on the island. The subsequent Turkish offensives resulted in the occupation of a substantial part of Cyprus, mass displacement and the division of the island. Greece’s dictatorship collapsed amid the crisis.

The coup and the Turkish invasion must be understood as distinct actions, with distinct responsibilities. Turkey bears responsibility for its military intervention and the occupation that followed. But the Greek junta’s role in overthrowing the legitimate government of Cyprus remains an essential part of the historical record. This raises an uncomfortable question: how can a regime that claimed to defend the nation be remembered without confronting its role in the Cyprus catastrophe?

A similar selectivity can be observed in debates surrounding the 2018 Prespa Agreement. The agreement with what is now North Macedonia remains a legitimate subject of political criticism and public debate. Yet, in some nationalist narratives, it was presented as an unforgivable surrender of national interests, while the junta’s responsibility for the events that led to the Cyprus disaster receives far less attention. The point is not that the two events are equivalent, or that criticism of the Prespa Agreement is illegitimate. It is that national sensitivity appears to be applied selectively. Some political narratives treat certain compromises as historical betrayals while allowing other, far more consequential failures to fade from collective memory.

When History Becomes a Political Weapon

This selective approach to the past connects to a broader feature of contemporary politics: populism. Political scientist Cas Mudde defines populism as a “thin-centered ideology” that divides society into two supposedly homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite.” Populist movements claim to represent the authentic will of the people, often portraying their opponents as illegitimate or disconnected from the nation.

Populism can emerge on both the left and the right. However, its radical-right manifestation often combines this division with nationalism and an exclusionary understanding of national identity. In such narratives, patriotism becomes something that one political camp can claim to own, while opponents are portrayed as insufficiently loyal, dangerous or even hostile to the nation.

History becomes particularly useful in this process. Evidence that challenges the preferred national narrative can be dismissed as political propaganda. Accounts of repression become ideological exaggerations. Historical debate is reduced to a confrontation between those who supposedly defend the nation and those accused of undermining it.

The danger is not that people disagree about history. Disagreement is necessary for historical inquiry and democratic debate. The danger emerges when documented facts are treated as matters of political preference, and when acknowledging the crimes of an authoritarian regime is presented as an act of disloyalty. A democracy cannot afford to remember only the parts of its history that make it proud. It must also confront the parts that expose its failures, contradictions and responsibilities.

The Polytechnic is not merely a date in the Greek calendar, nor is its significance dependent on the political identity of those who commemorate it. It is a historical event, with documented victims, a clear context of authoritarian repression and a lasting place in Greece’s democratic history. Perhaps the most dangerous thing a society can do is not forget its past entirely but remember it selectively. Because once history becomes whatever serves the politics of the present, the line between remembering and rewriting begins to disappear. 


 

(*) Emmanouela Papapavlou is a student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com

Doctoral researcher Fabiola Ermer.

Fabiola Ermer: Illiberal Political Ideas Become Socially Embedded Through Less Visible Mechanisms

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Fabiola Ermer, doctoral researcher at the Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, discusses her comparative research on right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, the role of education in shaping ethno-national belonging, and the importance of looking beyond political leaders to understand how illiberal ideas become embedded in society. Examining educational programmes, transnational ideological networks, and the societal infrastructures of illiberalism, Ermer highlights the less visible mechanisms through which political narratives acquire legitimacy and become normalized. She also distinguishes illiberalism from democratic backsliding, reflects on the methodological challenges of comparative research, and emphasizes scholarly independence, international collaboration, and critical engagement with education’s role in reproducing political identities and sustaining ideological influence beyond electoral change.

Interview by Natalia Crane

In an era of democratic backsliding and increasingly interconnected illiberal movements, understanding how political ideas become embedded in society requires looking beyond electoral competition, political leaders, and formal institutions. Education, ideological networks, and the construction of national belonging constitute less visible but consequential dimensions of contemporary populism.

Fabiola Ermer is a doctoral researcher at the Ben-Gurion Chair for Israel and Middle Eastern Studies at the Heidelberg University of Jewish Studies and a doctoral fellow of the Ernst Ludwig Ehrlich Scholarship Foundation (ELES). Her doctoral research examines right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary, focusing on how their educational programmes for young adults contribute to the construction of ethno-national conceptions of belonging and form part of broader infrastructures of illiberalism.

In this ECPS Voice of Youth interview, Ermer reflects on the development of her academic interests, the relationship between populism and democracy, and the methodological challenges of comparative research. She also discusses international academic collaboration, education’s role in reproducing political ideas, and the mechanisms through which political narratives become socially embedded.

Drawing on comparative research in Israel and Hungary, Ermer emphasizes the importance of studying the ideological infrastructures operating between governments and society. “We need to look more beyond parties, campaigns, and individual leaders,” she argues, calling for closer examination of how political ideas acquire institutional durability and social legitimacy.

Central to her research is the recognition that education is not inherently democratic or emancipatory. As Ermer explains, “education can also reproduce particular worldviews and ideas of belonging.” She therefore encourages researchers to examine who provides education, which values are communicated, and how educational programmes relate to broader political structures.

Ermer also challenges the tendency to equate illiberalism with democratic backsliding, emphasizing the analytical distinction between rejecting liberal values and the deterioration of democratic institutions. Her comparative approach highlights how think tanks, transnational networks, and educational initiatives contribute to constructing the boundaries of political belonging.

Regarding scholarly responsibility, she advocates methodological transparency, analytical independence, and greater public engagement. Researchers, she argues, should “make complex developments understandable, challenge misleading assumptions, and provide the necessary context.”

Ermer hopes her research will illuminate “the less visible mechanisms through which political ideas become socially embedded and politically normalized, without the need for coercion,” offering a perspective on the societal foundations of illiberalism and the challenges facing contemporary democracies.

Interview with Fabiola Ermer lightly edited for clarity and flow.

From Israel’s Judicial Reform to Comparative Research on Hungary

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv against Netanyahu’s Judicial Coup in Israel. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, and explain how your research interests developed? What initially drew you to your studies, and why do you believe these areas of research are particularly significant in today’s global political environment?

Fabiola Ermer: Thanks for the invitation again. I’m currently a PhD student at the Ben-Gurion Chair for Israel and Middle Eastern Studies at Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, and also at Heidelberg University. I’m supervised by two professors: Professor Johannes Becke, who is based at Heidelberg University for Jewish Studies, and Professor Dani Filc, who is a professor at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel.

I studied Jewish Studies, Political Science, and Semitic Languages, mostly in Germany, in Düsseldorf and Heidelberg. My interest in this particular topic, and in Israel and Hungary, actually started with an internship in Israel in 2023, before October 7. At that time, judicial reform dominated public and political debates in Israel. There were constant comparisons with Orbán’s judicial changes in Hungary. I became increasingly intrigued by this, and I was looking for a topic for my master’s thesis. I thought it was a perfect opportunity because it was such a current issue. So, I asked whether Hungary could serve as a role model for an illiberal transformation in Israel.

To make it very short, Orbán’s mechanisms would have been quite difficult to replicate in Israel for several reasons. One important difference is that Israel has no constitution, whereas Hungary’s constitutional changes in 2012 played a major role in its transformation.

What I realized while researching was how closely connected many actors, especially those on the right-wing spectrum, were between Hungary and Israel. They were working together, sharing interests, and organizing conferences together. I became very interested in the topic and decided that I wanted to pursue a PhD in this field, maintaining the comparison between Hungary and Israel.

Now I’m researching how right-wing conservative think tanks in Israel and Hungary use educational programmes, mostly for young adults, to construct ethno-national conceptions of belonging. I’m also asking how and why these programmes may become part of a broader infrastructure of illiberalism. I’m not saying that they are the reason illiberalism is happening, but they are one element within a much broader process.

Populism, Illiberalism, and the Construction of Belonging

Your doctoral research examines think tanks in Israel and Hungary, particularly their role in shaping political and civic understandings of the people. How does your work intersect with broader debates in populism studies? How do you define populism in your own research, and why have you adopted that particular approach? Has your understanding of populism evolved since you began your academic career?

Fabiola Ermer: I’m working mostly with a broad approach to populism, particularly the definition by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. They define populism as a thin-centered ideology that sees society as divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: the pure people” and the corrupt elite. It holds that politics should express the general will of the people. This approach is useful for me because it focuses on the content, which is exactly what I’m researching: how actors construct the idea of “the pure people” and, in this case, who belongs and who is excluded.

However, I’m not actually looking at leaders or campaigns. I’m looking more at the structures behind them, such as think tanks and educational programmes. In my framework, populism is therefore one element rather than the whole story. I’m working with four connected dimensions. The first is illiberalism and democratic backsliding as a broader process. The second is ethno-national and national-populist construction. The third is content and hegemony, particularly in a Gramscian sense. And the fourth is education as the medium through which these ideas are transmitted.

I would say that my understanding has changed. Before, I was more focused on how populism is articulated through governments and at the governmental level. Now I’m looking at it from different perspectives. I remember reading about the idea that populism works along a vertical axis, with the people positioned against the elite, while nationalism works along a horizontal axis. I’m essentially combining these two axes. I’ve realized that it isn’t always easy to define them strictly as two separate groups. They are much more interconnected. I think that’s where my understanding has changed most over the last year. I’ve just finished my first year of PhD research, so everything is still developing, but that is probably the biggest shift in my thinking about populism.

The Relationship Between Populism and Democracy

Photo: Shutterstock.

Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Given your research, which theoretical debates would you consider most consequential for the future of the field? What misconceptions about populism, illiberalism, and democratic backsliding do you encounter most frequently?

Fabiola Ermer: One of the most important debates we are still facing, both in academia and in public discussions, concerns the relationship between populism and democracy. We need to ask how we deal with populism and to what extent it can even nurture democracy by raising questions that might otherwise not be asked. However, especially now, with increasing polarization, illiberal actors are managing more and more to present themselves as the true defenders of democracy, mostly understood through elections and majority rule. Courts, liberal elites, and supranational institutions, such as the European Union, are increasingly framed as obstacles imposed from above.

To connect this, I think of Adam Przeworski, whose work I really admire. He discusses one of the key questions we face when defending democracy: Are we defending democracy itself, or the values we personally attach to it? And what happens when different people attach different values to democracy? This is where the tension between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy becomes much more decisive. From a minimalist perspective, the erosion of liberal safeguards may become visible much later, when democratic backsliding is already happening. Hungary was quite a good example of this. There may now be a change, but it is still far too early to say whether there will be a shift from minimalist to maximalist ideas of democracy.

As for misconceptions, I think one of the most common ones, especially in public debate rather than academia, is that illiberalism and democratic backsliding are treated as synonymous. But technically, they are not the same. Democratic backsliding refers to the deterioration of democratic qualities, such as less competitive elections or restricted participation. We have seen this in Hungary and Serbia, for example. Illiberalism itself refers to the rejection of liberal values. From a minimalist understanding of democracy, an illiberal system may still be considered a valid form of democracy, even if it is not necessarily the form of democracy we personally want. This also raises the question of whether liberal democracy is the only form of democracy we should defend, or whether it is a more Western idea that we sometimes try to impose on systems that may work differently.

Another misconception is that we focus too much on governmental levels and not enough on the population or the actors behind governments. These actors still receive comparatively little attention.

Methodological Challenges in Comparing Israel and Hungary

How do you operationalize populism in your research? What challenges arise when comparing different national contexts, such as Hungary and Israel? And how do you balance qualitative and quantitative approaches?

Fabiola Ermer: I’m still working on my methodology, so there are some things that are changing. At the moment, I have a qualitative and comparative research design, with the individual organization as the unit of comparison. Instead of measuring populism quantitatively, I’m combining two procedures with separate tasks. One is a structured qualitative content analysis, which captures what the programmes actually communicate.

I have four main categories: the construction of the people, identity and belonging, concepts of democracy, and enemies and demarcations. These are closely connected to the populist narrative of “us versus them.” Another important category is the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland, which is relevant to both Israel and Hungary, although in different ways.

The subcategories I will use are likely to be developed from the material itself. In addition, I’m using discourse-analytical reading to capture how meaning is produced, particularly through language, metaphors, and implicit assumptions that make belonging appear natural and apolitical.

One of the main challenges is that both political systems are changing. Another is that the two cases are neither a most-similar nor a most-different design, so I had to look more closely at what makes them comparable in a qualitative analysis. I think I’ve now figured out how to frame this well enough for my PhD. I’m using the distinction between ethnic belonging and formal citizenship, which is anchored in the legal frameworks of both countries. Israel does not have a constitution, but it has a Basic Law with a somewhat ambiguous constitutional character. The distinction is also anchored in the Hungarian constitution. That is where the two cases are most similar. 

They differ, however, in how they draw their boundaries. Following other political scientists, Israel can be classified as an ethnic democracy. We also see this in other countries, such as Slovakia and Estonia. Hungary, on the other hand, is not generally considered an ethnic democracy. It is one of the most homogeneous countries in the European Union. Its inclusive boundary extends to ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, such as Slovakia and Romania, while its exclusive boundary is drawn against more constructed threats. That is one of the limitations I have to deal with when comparing the two systems.

Do you plan to conduct fieldwork in these countries, particularly by speaking with people about ethnic belonging and related issues?

Fabiola Ermer: I do. The question now is whether I might shift more towards interviews. The difficulty with my research is that I won’t be able to make claims about the effects of these programmes. It would be too broad, and I don’t think it would be academically rigorous to say that someone attended classes at a think tank for a year, for example, and consequently developed more illiberal ideas. I can’t really speak about that effect. 

Instead, I’m looking more at why people, such as the heads of organizations, construct these courses in particular ways. Why are certain topics included? Even the names of subjects and the literature used to frame them can already provide hints. For example, in the Hungarian case, when organizations offer classes about Hungarian minorities, they may use Hungarian terminology for countries that have not been part of Hungary for more than a hundred years. That already communicates a particular idea before the lecture even begins. So, I will conduct fieldwork in the sense that I will speak with people and try to gather as much material as possible.

Digital Research and the Importance of Archiving

Social Media
Photo: Sujin Surakoon / Dreamstime.

The study of populism and contemporary political movements increasingly relies on digital data, social media, and computational methods. Given the importance of political communication and transnational networks in your area of research, what role have these tools played in your own work? How might they help scholars better understand political ideas and the development of movements?

Fabiola Ermer: Computational methods are not necessarily at the center of my methodology, but digital work matters in a different way. I actually didn’t expect this before, but with the changes in Hungary, I’ve become quite experienced in archiving websites. Websites and programmes are often digitalized, and they are among the most important sources for my research. When I want to understand how a class is framed beforehand, for example, and an organization has a Moodle course, I would really like to know how that course is presented. However, with the political changes, some materials are disappearing, particularly when organizations come under political pressure. So, I’ve started archiving relevant websites at regular intervals and working with earlier versions through web archives.

In general, digital methods have expanded considerably. They make it possible to analyze communication across large datasets and trace how messages travel across networks and platforms, sometimes even across countries and continents. But I think we need to be careful not to treat digital visibility directly as political influence. There are many more factors involved. Social media data tell us a lot about communication and mobilization, and they help us identify certain trends. But they do not necessarily tell us how ideas become embedded in institutions or in everyday understandings of society.

There is also the danger of being in certain bubbles all the time. Ideas can suddenly seem more natural, or it can seem as though everybody is saying something, when in reality, you’re only seeing a small bubble that appears much bigger than it is. Nevertheless, I don’t think any academic research field can ignore digital methods completely. They are important sources of data, but we should approach them carefully and make sure to bring other perspectives into the analysis.

Unexpected Discoveries and Changing Research Assumptions

What has been the most surprising finding in your work so far? Have you encountered any evidence that fundamentally challenged your original assumptions or shifted your thinking?

Fabiola Ermer: When I started my PhD, Hungary was still under Orbán’s government, while the Israeli political system was relatively stable, despite the elections and other developments. There was nothing fundamentally changing in the way we have now seen in Hungary. Orbán still had a two-thirds majority and was firmly in power. I think even many political scientists in Hungary would not have expected Magyar to win with such a strong majority in April.

One of my hypotheses was that institutions, once established, could endure even through political changes, particularly if they had been in place for a long time. But I hadn’t really considered what would happen if one two-thirds-majority system shifted into another two-thirds-majority system. With new legislation, defunding, and the creation of new foundations in Hungary, everything became very chaotic. That was one of my main surprises. Perhaps I should have considered it beforehand, but it was so hypothetical that even in April, many people thought such a fundamental change was unlikely.

Another interesting discovery came from comparing the organizations themselves. I’m currently looking at two or three Israeli think tanks, mostly on the right-wing spectrum, that are structured somewhat similarly to the Mathias Corvinus Collegium in Hungary. They offer classes for young adults, mostly between 18 and 26, with the aim of building a new intellectual elite.

What I found particularly interesting was how differently these organizations are structured. Hungary has, in a way, perfected the model of putting everything under one roof: a think tank, an educational sector, and other activities within one institution. In Israel, these activities are more divided between different think tanks, but the organizations are still closely connected. They may have the same lecturers or receive funding from the same organizations.

At first, I wasn’t sure whether this asymmetry would be a problem for comparing the cases. But after discussing it with my supervisor, I decided to approach it as two distinct modes of hegemonic articulation: direct pedagogical formation on one side and mediated ideological dissemination on the other.

I was also surprised by how little political foundations, and their non-governmental activities have been researched. We know quite a lot about institutions such as the Mathias Corvinus Collegium and their role within the Orbán regime, but there is still much less research on what they actually do at the non-governmental level. This is important because democratic backsliding and illiberalism do not necessarily happen only at the highest political level. They can also develop at an intermediary level, between the population and the government.

Researching Politically Sensitive Topics

Viktor Orbán campaign poster ahead of Hungary’s 2026 elections. Photo: Bettina Wagner / Dreamstime.

Populism often operates in politically polarized environments characterized by disinformation campaigns and contested narratives. Do you foresee these dynamics affecting your ability to collect data, access reliable resources, and conduct research? How do you navigate politically sensitive topics while maintaining scholarly rigor and analytical distance?

Fabiola Ermer: These dynamics have mainly affected the actors I’m researching. Internal teaching materials are particularly difficult to obtain, especially when they belong to organizations operating in a system that is undergoing political change. The situation in the Hungarian parliament is still quite heated and polarized, and access requests are currently being declined, often without any explanation.

Some of the materials in the Israeli cases are also difficult to obtain. Think tanks are generally not very willing to share their materials, and the broader polarization of the Israeli political system, as well as the international context, makes this even more complicated. Everything seems to be becoming more exclusive, and organizations are less willing to include outsiders.

Another substantive challenge is that the organizations I’m studying sometimes describe their work in ideological terms. Some openly state what they want to achieve, which can make certain questions easier to answer. But when programmes are presented as civic education, leadership training, or academic excellence, it becomes more difficult to understand their underlying purpose. I also don’t think it is academically sound to assume that because an organization describes its work in a certain way, that is necessarily what happens in practice. That’s why I’m trying to look more closely at why these programmes are constructed, not only how they are constructed.

With polarization more generally, I think it will become increasingly difficult for scholars to access materials. People are also becoming less willing to talk to those who may not share their ideas or worldviews, and this affects journalists and researchers alike.

The Responsibility of Scholars in Public Debate

When controversial topics such as populism generate intense public debate, do you believe scholars have a responsibility not only to produce research but also to intervene in these discussions? How can academics communicate complex findings to policymakers, journalists, civil society, and broader audiences?

Fabiola Ermer: Scholars have a responsibility to take part in public debate, especially when political concepts are used in simplified or highly polarized ways. However, I wouldn’t say our task is necessarily to provide political solutions. We are more the people who provide the facts and the analytical perspective.

The most important thing is that we are able to make complex developments understandable, challenge misleading assumptions, and provide the necessary context. I feel that this is actually a problem in political science. We talk so much about theory that people outside the field, or even people who work in a different academic discipline, sometimes ask themselves: What is actually happening? We need to adapt more to different settings and accept that each format requires something different. Policy advice is fundamentally different from writing about elections for a political journal or having a discussion within a political party and explaining what is happening in a particular country. Each format requires something different. In general, an audience needs a clear argument and a concrete example, so we should make our work as accessible as possible.

I think this is also one reason why populist narratives can be so effective. They are often very simple: they do this, everything else is bad, and we are here. There is no room for anything in between. But there are people in between, and we need to explain why things are not as simple as they may appear. This is where academia should intervene more. At the same time, academia should remain a place where fundamental disagreements can be discussed openly and where discussions are based on evidence and argument.

The debates surrounding Israel, in particular, show how polarization can reach into academic agenda-setting. It can affect which questions are considered legitimate and which perspectives are heard. We should not allow political positions to determine in advance which questions can even be asked. People sometimes misunderstand academia as a place where researchers are necessarily political activists. That can be true for some individuals, but academia should remain grounded in facts, evidence, and arguments rather than feelings.

The Broader Impact of Research on Democracy and Education

Photo: Iryna Kushnarova.

Beyond academic publications and your doctoral thesis, what kind of impact would you ideally like your research to have? How would you like scholarly work to contribute to our understanding of democratic challenges while avoiding becoming politicized itself?

Fabiola Ermer: Ideally, I would like my research to help explain how illiberal ideas become established beyond formal institutions. Democratic backsliding is still usually studied through constitutional reforms, judicial independence, or electoral cycles. All of these things matter, of course, but we also need to understand the societal infrastructures that make such challenges possible or acceptable. That’s where I would really like to contribute. With the Hungarian case, my research is also shifting towards a new question: How durable are these infrastructures once they have become well established? And how durable are they when there is an actual change in government or a fundamental political transformation?

The topic of education is also very personal to me. I would like to encourage a more critical perspective on education because, especially in Western democracies, education is often assumed to be democratic or emancipatory by nature. But we tend to forget that education can also reproduce particular worldviews and ideas of belonging. I don’t want to say that every politically oriented programme is inherently problematic. That’s not what I’m trying to argue. It is important, however, to pay attention to who provides education, which values it communicates, and how it relates to wider political structures. We should also ask why people feel the need to seek out alternative educational infrastructures rather than considering the existing government structures sufficient.

Regarding politicization, it is quite difficult to avoid it completely with my topic. But, in the end, I’m conducting academic research, and I distinguish between political advocacy and academic intervention. Research can contribute to democratic debate by making the mechanisms in both countries visible and hopefully providing evidence. But I’m not telling people what they should think. I’m stating what I have found, and then it is up to them to process that information.

The best protection I know is to be transparent about your methods, your materials, and the limitations of your research. It is also important to take seriously evidence that contradicts your expectations or even your results. In science, it is entirely possible that in ten years everything will have changed so fundamentally that our current findings no longer hold. But they are relevant to the period we are studying now.

International Collaboration and Academic Exchange

How has cooperation with other scholars, academic networks, and transnational initiatives such as the ECPS Early Career Researchers Network influenced your research, professional development, and intellectual outlook? How important are international dimensions to your work?

Fabiola Ermer: As you said, my whole project is international by design. It is co-supervised in Israel, and my co-supervisor primarily researches right-wing populism in Israel. He has already become a very important reference for me. This has shaped certain narratives, questions, and programmes that I’m looking at, particularly in the Israeli context. But it also means constantly moving between two academic environments, with different debates and assumptions.

What I learned quite quickly is that scholars are generally very open to helping if you ask them. Although I’m based in Germany, I speak with professors in Hungary and researchers in Israel. Even when you spend only a few weeks in a country and engage with people there, you can gain new insights, challenge assumptions, make connections, and meet people. Everybody knows someone who might be able to help, and that’s a great benefit of academia.

I also attended the ECPS Summer School, and it was a good example of this. We worked on a policy paper or policy advice in an interdisciplinary group, with people whose backgrounds were very different from my own. It encouraged communication across disciplines and helped us think in policy terms. I found it very enriching, and the connections we made continued even after the course finished. These international connections and regular opportunities to discuss ongoing work help prevent projects from becoming too narrow or one-sided.

To return to populism, it is generally a transnational phenomenon. The actors themselves work across borders, particularly when we look at right-wing networks. Studying populism therefore also requires transnational exchange.

Challenges Facing Early-Career Researchers

US Dollar
Photo: Mar Tas / Dreamstime.

Are there any personal or professional challenges you have faced while pursuing your research, particularly as an early-career scholar? What has enabled you to overcome these challenges? Has working on politically sensitive subjects presented any additional difficulties?

Fabiola Ermer: In general, one of the biggest challenges when starting a PhD or becoming an early-career researcher is the financial aspect. I’m very lucky to have a scholarship now, but in the beginning, there is a period when you don’t know whether your research will actually be financed or whether the funding will be sufficient.

For me, the first six months were particularly challenging because I was trying to obtain a scholarship and applying for different opportunities. Applications are very time-consuming, especially because every foundation wants something different. You write and rewrite applications, and sometimes you suddenly need another recommendation letter when you thought two would be enough.

Another challenge is balancing theoretical ambition with empirical feasibility. My project touches on so many theoretical dimensions: populism, illiberalism, democratic backsliding, nationalism, and education. At some point, it becomes tempting to cover everything, but that’s simply not possible. You sometimes have to overcome your own perfectionism and accept that you need to focus on a particular subject, even if there are many other interesting things you would like to explore. Otherwise, you could easily end up with enough material for several PhDs.

In the beginning, I wanted to compare three countries. Austria was one of the cases I considered because it offered a different ethno-national conception from Israel and Hungary. I thought it would be interesting to include a third case to show the contrast. But I realized quite quickly that the differences would make the comparison very difficult. Focusing on Israel and Hungary would actually make the project stronger.

I think that not losing focus is one of the most challenging things, at least based on my first year of experience. There are so many interesting things happening that it is easy to get lost in the details and become overwhelmed.

The Most Rewarding Aspects of Academic Research

What has been the most rewarding aspect of your work so far during your first year? Is there anything you would approach differently?

Fabiola Ermer: One of the most rewarding things has been starting to feel that people are actually interested in what I’m doing. I’ve been invited to talk about my research, present my ideas, and exchange views with other researchers.

Over the last year, I was invited to speak about the Hungarian system and the changes taking place there. Previously, I had been looking more at right-wing networks in Hungary and how they cooperate with other networks globally. It was really great to be invited and to have people interested in hearing me talk about it. I felt very honored.

I’m also grateful that I can work on something I’m genuinely interested in. I have to admit that when I first started studying Political Science, I hated it. I really didn’t like it. Perhaps I was too young when I started, but many things didn’t make sense to me, particularly political theory and democratic theory. That changed during my master’s degree. Now I’m doing my PhD in this field, and I genuinely look forward to reading and working on these topics. I think being able to work in a field that interests me so much is one of the best things I could have.

If I could start again, I would try to work more systematically with my materials from the beginning. I’m still at an early stage, so I have time to improve things, but the Hungarian case has become particularly challenging because of all the political changes. I suddenly have to archive as much material as possible, as quickly as possible.

I would also have liked to understand earlier that a dissertation does not need to address an enormous number of questions. It needs to address two or three fundamental questions that are important for the research and that ultimately help develop a clear and convincing argument.

Scholars and Ideas That Have Influenced Her Research

Professor Adam Przeworski.
Professor Adam Przeworski is Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University (NYU).

Are there any particular scholars, theoretical traditions, books, or experiences that have fundamentally shaped your thinking about populism, ethno-nationalism, democratic backsliding, or the relationship between education and politics?

Fabiola Ermer: So far, the most important experience was probably the internship I had in Israel in 2023. That’s where everything started to develop, and I’m pretty sure I wouldn’t have chosen this topic if I hadn’t been there at that particular time.

My supervisors have also been very influential, especially my first supervisor. He brought me back into the political science part of my research when I presented my first draft for what would become my master’s thesis. He later encouraged me to pursue a PhD and supported me throughout the process.

On a theoretical level, Adam Przeworski has been particularly important. He’s a Polish political scientist who has lived in the United States for decades. His distinction between minimalist and maximalist conceptions of democracy is quite simple and logical when you first read it. But it changed a lot for me, especially in terms of the question of what we do with people who attach different values to democracy. It changed not only how I approached my own research topic but also how I engage with political debates when presenting my research and encountering different ideas.

It’s such a fundamental question: how do we deal with people who attach different values to democracy? Perhaps this is also one reason why we are becoming more polarized. We have started to neglect the question of how to deal with different values, and we sometimes assume that the values we attach to democracy are the only ones that matter. Przeworski essentially framed much of the theoretical framework of my PhD.

Other influential scholars include Fareed Zakaria, who helped popularize the distinction between democracy and constitutional liberalism, as well as Wolfgang Merkel and Aurel Croissant, particularly their work on formal and informal institutions.

For the Israeli context, the concept of ethnic democracy has also been important, particularly how it is understood in different countries and compared with European contexts. My second supervisor’s work on how Jewish populism has changed over the centuries has also influenced how I developed my own thinking.

Skills and Advice for the Next Generation of Scholars

As universities become increasingly internationalized and research more competitive, what skills do you believe young political scientists need most in order to thrive? What advice would you offer to the next generation of scholars entering populism studies?

Fabiola Ermer: There are quite a few things, although I’m still figuring them out myself. First, it’s important to be very precise about the definitions you use at the beginning of your research. You need to clearly explain what a concept captures and what it doesn’t. Rather than adopting a new term on every page, you should be clear about the concepts you’re working with.

I also think language skills are extremely important. We live in a world that is so globally connected, and even with AI and translation tools, linguistic skills remain essential. You can understand so many more nuances when you know the language and understand why a particular word is being used instead of another. This is particularly important in populism studies because different forms of populism can be quite subtle. When you’re not researching in your native language, having at least some basic language skills can be extremely helpful.

If there is an opportunity to receive a scholarship or participate in an academic exchange, I would also encourage researchers to spend time in the country they are studying and immerse themselves in its context. That’s one of the best skills we can develop.

Finally, being able to ask for help is an important skill. During bachelor’s and master’s programmes, you’re often expected to work independently, and it may not feel natural to approach your professors with questions all the time. But during a PhD, the expectations change. People ask why you didn’t seek help earlier. It’s important to develop the habit of asking questions and seeking guidance early, rather than continuing in one direction without knowing whether it is the right one.

The Future of Populism Studies

Photo: Dreamstime.

Looking ahead, where do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Which research questions or neglected areas deserve greater scholarly attention than they currently receive?

Fabiola Ermer: From an academic perspective, I’m quite optimistic that the topic won’t disappear. We need to look more beyond parties, campaigns, and individual leaders. We should ask more systematically how these ideas become embedded, rather than simply describing that they are becoming embedded.

Transnational networks are another important area. There are increasingly more mapping studies, and this kind of research will continue to develop. Social media also helps connect people globally and can facilitate the spread of populist narratives.

Another question that deserves more attention is what happens when populist governments lose power. Why do people become dissatisfied with the ideas these governments promote? Are they dissatisfied because those governments were populist, or are there other reasons why they decide to vote them out? We should also ask what happens to the infrastructures built during those years. Do they disappear, adapt, move somewhere else, or remain in the background? I think we will have more case studies to explore these questions, and they will become increasingly important.

We are also seeing populism become a much more prominent part of political debates in Western European countries. It will be interesting to compare countries where populist governments are losing power with those where populist movements are gaining influence.

The times are changing very quickly, and developments can be quite surprising. But these are some of the directions in which populism studies could develop.

Looking Beyond Israel and Hungary

If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue? Would you be interested in expanding your comparative research beyond Israel and Hungary or exploring other dimensions of transnational national-conservative networks? More broadly, what do you hope will ultimately be the lasting contribution of your work to scholarship and public understanding?

Fabiola Ermer: I would actually like to continue working on both countries, perhaps not necessarily as a direct comparison, but within a broader comparative project on how ideas of national belonging are transmitted across borders.

I would also like to focus more on diaspora programmes, transnational political networks, and how these different elements work together. This is particularly interesting in the Israeli case, but perhaps even more significant in Hungary, where these ideas are much more deeply embedded. For example, the whole idea of mystifying or romanticizing Hungarian history, and how that has become embedded in Hungarian society, is something I find very interesting. This is one of the lasting effects of the Orbán regime. The idea of Treaty of Trianon has become much more visible over the last fourteen years. You can see it in monuments standing in small villages, including those near Hungary’s former borders. It is very visible, and it also plays a role in how the idea of the people is constructed.

There is a similar phenomenon in Israel, although it operates in a different and less pronounced way.

I would really like to research the broader idea of romanticizing history and how it is narrated through political contexts. There are so many connected dimensions that could also be explored, such as how schoolbooks are designed and which vocabulary is used. These things are closely connected to my current topic, but there are so many nuances that I cannot examine all of them at the moment without making the project far too broad.

Ultimately, my hope is that my work can contribute to understanding the less visible mechanisms through which political ideas become socially embedded and politically normalized, without the need for coercion, and how these mechanisms shape the transformations taking place in our democracies today.

Khayyam Rzazade.

PopuliVerse Founder Rzazade: Populism Must Be Studied as a Global Political Logic, not a Regional Pathology

In this interview for the ECPS Voice of Youth series, Khayyam Rzazade, Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa and founder of PopuliVerse, argues that populism must be understood as a global political logic rather than a regional pathology. Drawing on his research into Europe’s foreign and defense policies, he examines how populist actors selectively politicize international affairs while often maintaining established strategic commitments. Introducing his concept of foreign policy activation, Rzazade explores the conditions under which foreign policy becomes a site of people-versus-elite contestation. He also discusses PopuliVerse, an innovative research platform connecting fragmented scholarly debates, and advocates a comparative, methodologically rigorous approach that takes citizens’ political motivations seriously across diverse geographical and ideological contexts.

Interview by Natalia Crane

As populist movements increasingly influence international relations, security debates, and defense policy, understanding their political logic has become essential to contemporary political scholarship. In this interview for the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) Voice of Youth (VoY) series, Khayyam Rzazade, founder and editor of PopuliVerse,argues that populism must be approached as a dynamic political phenomenon transcending ideological and geographical boundaries. Reflecting on his experiences across the post-Soviet space and Europe, Rzazade emphasizes that “populism needs to be studied as a global political logic, not a regional pathology.”

Originally from Azerbaijan, Rzazade is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa, participating in IDEoPOP, an EU-funded doctoral network examining populism’s international dimensions. Supervised by Professor Fabrizio Coticchia and co-supervised by Professor Christian Lequesne at Sciences Po Paris, he has studied at institutions including Baku State University, Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, and the College of Europe. His professional experience spans parliamentary work, European institutions, and university teaching.

Drawing on Ernesto Laclau, Benjamin Moffitt, and Cas Mudde, Rzazade conceptualizes populism not as a fixed ideology but as “a way of constructing politics around a fundamental division between ‘the people’ and an elite that is said to betray them.” His approach identifies three interconnected repertoires: plebiscitarian mobilization, antagonistic identity construction, and crisis performance. Crucially, these practices vary across political contexts, allowing the same actors to adopt populist rhetoric selectively.

This framework informs his doctoral research on how populist actors shape Europe’s foreign and defense policy, particularly amid Russia’s war against Ukraine, European rearmament, and uncertainty in transatlantic relations. Challenging assumptions that populist governments necessarily overturn established international commitments, Rzazade observes that “they pick their battles, making a loud people-versus-elite argument on one foreign policy issue and remaining entirely conventional on the next.”

His concept of foreign policy activation examines when governments transform international questions into populist political conflicts. Despite growing domestic contestation, he argues that institutional commitments to NATO and the European Union frequently constrain radical policy departures. Consequently, populist governments often produce “change within orientation rather than change of orientation.”

Beyond his doctoral research, Rzazade discusses PopuliVerse, an initiative connecting fragmented scholarly conversations through a research library containing more than 8,000 academic works, a monitoring publication, and a commentary platform. His ambition reflects a commitment to making comparative populism research accessible across disciplines and regions.

Ultimately, Rzazade advocates methodological openness and greater attention to understudied political contexts, particularly the post-Soviet world, Asia, and Africa. Rejecting both the pathologization and romanticization of populism, he argues that scholarly rigor requires recognizing that “the people populists speak to are not a research problem. They are citizens with reasons.”

The interview with Khayyam Rzazade is lightly edited to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

From European Foreign Policy to the International Dimensions of Populism

Photo: Dmitry Demidovich.

To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, and explain how your research interests developed? Why do you believe your area of research is particularly significant in today’s global political environment?

Khayyam Rzazade: I am a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Candidate at the University of Genoa, working within IDEoPOP, an EU-funded doctoral network on the international dimensions of populism. My research is supervised by Professor Fabrizio Coticchia in Genoa and co-supervised by Professor Christian Lequesne at Sciences Po Paris. I also founded and edit PopuliVerse, a platform for populism research, or as I like to call it, “the universe of populism.”

I come from Azerbaijan, and my studies have taken me from Baku State University to Ca’ Foscari University of Venice, the European Academy of Diplomacy in Warsaw, and the College of Europe in Bruges, with an exchange year in Minsk in between. I have also interned at the Parliament of Azerbaijan, assisted a Member of the European Parliament, and taught Political Theory and Political Analysis to undergraduates at Baku State University and International Security to master’s students at ADA University. It has been quite a journey, and each of these experiences has left its mark on how I think.

My interests began with European foreign and security policy, particularly how the European Union builds a common response to threats such as Russia. The longer I worked on these questions, the clearer it became that foreign policy is not made only in Brussels or in ministries. It is also contested in parliaments, in the media, and around kitchen tables, and populist parties were frequently the actors challenging the established consensus. When the IDEoPOP position was announced, it felt as if it had been written with me in mind. This is how I arrived at my current research on how populist actors shape foreign and defense policy in Europe.

I believe this research matters a great deal today. Foreign and defense policy were long treated as areas of elite agreement, relatively sheltered from party competition, and that is no longer the case. Populist parties now govern or share power in several European countries, while Europe faces the war in Ukraine, a major debate over rearmament, and an uncertain transatlantic relationship.

These are decisions with long-term consequences, and citizens increasingly expect a say in them. As someone who studies populism, I try never to forget that the word begins with the people. Understanding how populists speak to citizens about security, and why so many citizens listen, is essential if Europe wants its foreign policy to remain both coherent and democratic.

Intellectual Influences: From Political Theory to Personal Experience

Who or what has most profoundly influenced your intellectual development? Are there particular scholars, books, experiences, or even unexpected sources of inspiration that have fundamentally shaped your thinking?

Khayyam Rzazade: My intellectual development has been shaped as much by places as by texts. Growing up in Azerbaijan, a young state in a difficult neighborhood, taught me early that foreign policy is never an abstraction. It touches borders, families, and daily life. Later, working at the European Parliament, I saw from the inside how slowly and carefully common European positions are built, and how fragile they can be. These two experiences still frame how I read everything else.

Among scholars, three have influenced me most. Ernesto Laclau taught me to treat populism as a political logic rather than a fixed set of policies, which is the starting point of my own conceptual framework. Benjamin Moffitt’s work on populism as a political style, and especially on the performance of crisis, showed me that how populists speak and behave matters as much as what they claim to believe. Cas Mudde’s ideational approach, even where I depart from it, gave the field a shared vocabulary without which comparative work would hardly be possible. I would also add my supervisor, Fabrizio Coticchia, whose work on Italian defense policy convinced me that defense is a domain of party politics and public opinion, not only of strategy.

The less expected sources are sport and teaching. Long-distance running and cycling have taught me more about patience and consistency than any methods course, and a doctorate is above all a test of both. Teaching undergraduates in Baku taught me that if I cannot explain an idea to a twenty-year-old in plain words, I probably do not understand it well enough yet. I still apply that test to my own writing.

Studying International Politics Across Different Academic and Cultural Contexts

Having studied and worked in several countries, how have different academic environments and cultural contexts shaped your understanding of international politics? Have these experiences challenged any of your earlier assumptions about the subjects you study?

Khayyam Rzazade: Studying in Baku, Minsk, Venice, Warsaw, Bruges, and now Genoa and Paris have given me something no single institution could: the habit of noticing how differently the same event looks from different parts of the world.

In Baku, international politics was taught and discussed as a matter of survival for a small state between large neighbors. In Minsk, I saw a political system where the gap between official discourse and everyday conversation was wide, and where people had learned to read between the lines. Venice introduced me to the Italian tradition of thinking about politics historically and theoretically. Warsaw taught me how real the Russian threat feels on the EU’s eastern border. Bruges and Brussels showed me the European Union from the inside, with its achievements and its endless compromises. Each place shifted my vantage point a little, and I think that is exactly what a scholar of international politics needs.

These experiences challenged two assumptions I once held. The first was that there is a single “European” view of security. There is not. What looks like excessive caution in Rome looks like dangerous naivety in Warsaw, and both positions are held by serious and well-informed people. This is one reason why I became interested in the domestic contestation of foreign policy.

The second assumption was that populism is mostly a Western phenomenon tied to recent economic or cultural grievances. Coming from the post-Soviet space, where appeals to “the people” against corrupt elites have a long and complicated history, I became convinced that populism needs to be studied as a global political logic, not a regional pathology.

On a more personal level, moving between academic cultures also taught me humility. Each system values different things: the argument in one place, the data in another, the elegance of the prose in a third. I have tried to take a little from each. And I have learned that a good espresso and a long walk solve more research problems than one might expect.

Understanding Populism as a Political Logic

How do you conceptualize populism in your own research, and what led you to adopt that approach? Has your understanding of the concept changed as your research has developed?

Khayyam Rzazade: In my research, I treat populism as a political logic rather than as a fixed ideology or a particular family of parties. By political logic, I mean a way of constructing politics around a fundamental division between “the people” and an elite that is said to betray them.

What makes this logic observable is how it is enacted. Here, I work with three repertoires that actors can deploy to a greater or lesser degree. The first is plebiscitarian mobilization, which means appealing directly to the people over the heads of institutions and intermediaries. The second is antagonistic identity construction, which means defining who belongs to the people and who stands against them. The third is crisis performance, which means presenting the political moment as an emergency that only the populist actor can resolve. I treat all three as gradational, so a party can be more or less populist across time and across issues.

I adopted this approach for a practical reason. My empirical domain is foreign and defense policy, where populist parties often say very little or say contradictory things, and where the question is not whether a party “is” populist but whether it chooses to make a given issue populist. A binary classification of parties cannot capture that. A gradational and issue-sensitive approach can. It also lets me work across quite different cases, from Podemos in Spain to PiS in Poland, without pretending they share an ideology.

My understanding has certainly changed. I began, like many students, with the ideational definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology, which is clear and easy to apply. Working with real speeches and real governments made me less comfortable with it. The same party can be fiercely populist on migration and entirely mainstream on NATO, and I wanted a framework that treats this variation as the interesting part rather than as noise.

I have also become more modest about what any definition can do. Populism is a concept scholars use to make sense of a messy reality, and I try to hold it lightly enough to let the cases surprise me.

The Future of Populism Studies: Beyond Competing Definitions

Populism remains one of the most contested concepts in political science. Which theoretical debates—whether over ideology, discourse, strategy, political style, or something else—do you consider most consequential for the future of the field, and what misconceptions do you encounter most frequently both inside and outside academia?

Khayyam Rzazade: The classic debate between the ideational, discursive, strategic, and stylistic approaches has been enormously productive, but I am not sure it is the one that will matter most in the coming years.

The four camps now largely agree on the core, which is the opposition between the people and the elite, and disagree mainly on where populism “lives”: whether in beliefs, language, organization, or performance.

The debate I consider more consequential is whether populism should be treated as a stable attribute of actors or as something that varies in degree across issues, moments, and audiences. This choice shapes everything downstream. If populism is a property of parties, we label a party populist once and then ask what populist parties do. If populism is instead a property of political action, the same party can be populist on one issue and entirely conventional on another, and the question becomes when and why an actor chooses to make a particular issue populist. 

My own work takes the second view. I think the field is moving in that direction too, partly because text-as-data methods now allow us to measure populism speech by speech rather than party by party.

A second debate that deserves more attention concerns the relationship between populism and its host ideology. We still know surprisingly little about which outcomes are driven by populism itself and which are driven by the nationalism, socialism, or conservatism it travels with. In foreign policy, this question is unavoidable, because the “populist” and the “nationalist” explanation often predict the same behavior. Separating them is difficult.

As for misconceptions, outside academia the most common one is that populism simply means the far right, or that it is a polite word for demagogy. This misses left-wing populism entirely and turns an analytical concept into an insult.

Inside academia, the misconception I encounter most often is the assumption that populists have no real foreign policy. My research suggests the opposite. Populist governments frequently have quite coherent foreign policy goals, and the interesting question is why they choose to politicize some of them loudly and leave others untouched.

And perhaps one more, which I say with affection for my own field: we sometimes forget that the people populists speak to are not a research problem. They are citizens with reasons.

How Populist Actors Shape European Foreign and Defense Policy

Your doctoral research examines how populist actors influence foreign and defense policy in Europe, with a particular focus on Italy, Spain, and France. What have you found most interesting about the relationship between populism and foreign policy, and to what extent can populist movements fundamentally change a country’s international orientation once they enter government?

Khayyam Rzazade: What I have found most interesting is how selective populist actors are once they govern. The common expectation is that populists bring their anti-elite style into everything, including foreign policy. Looking closely at populist governments across Europe suggests something more deliberate. They pick their battles, making a loud people-versus-elite argument on one foreign policy issue and remaining entirely conventional on the next.

My current research theorizes this process, which I call foreign policy activation, and asks under what conditions a populist government chooses to turn a foreign policy issue into a populist one.

Two conditions appear central. A government needs the capacity to frame the issue, meaning a credible elite to blame and a leader able to carry the message. It must also not be trapped by its own authorship. A party that has signed a procurement contract or approved a mission while in office cannot later denounce it as an elite betrayal without contradicting itself.

On the broader question, my view is that populist governments rarely change a country’s international orientation in a fundamental sense, at least in Europe. NATO, the EU, and treaty commitments are heavy anchors, and most populist parties, once in office, discover that they value the room for maneuver these frameworks provide.

What populists do change is the politics around foreign policy. They turn settled issues into contested ones, alter the tone of alliances, and make certain commitments harder to deepen even when they do not reverse them. In some cases, such as Poland under PiS, this contestation went quite far.

But the overall picture is change within orientation rather than change of orientation. Whether that holds as populists govern for longer and in more countries at once is, frankly speaking, the question that keeps me working.

From Researching Populism to Building PopuliVerse

PopuliVerse

How did your interest in populism develop from your early academic studies into your current research, and what eventually led you to take on a more active role in supporting the wider research community through PopuliVerse?

Khayyam Rzazade: My interest in populism grew slowly and then all at once. As a student of international relations in Baku, I was trained to think about states, alliances, and power, and populism barely appeared in the curriculum.

It entered my thinking through the back door. I studied in Italy while the Five Star Movement was in government and wrote my master’s dissertation there on Brexit. Then, in Bruges, I kept running into the same puzzle. The European foreign policy I was studying in seminars was being contested at home by parties who claimed to speak for the people against the elites in Brussels, and the textbooks had little to say about it.

The pattern became impossible to ignore while I was writing my recently published article on the EU’s collective securitization of Russia between 2014 and 2022, which began as my thesis for the advanced master’s degree. National positions on sanctions and defense were shaped by domestic political struggles, and populist parties were often at the center of them. By the time the IDEoPOP position was announced, populism had moved from the margin of my interests to the center.

PopuliVerse came from a more practical frustration. When I began my doctorate, I spent months on a literature review and discovered that research on populism is enormous, scattered across political theory, comparative politics, international relations, communication studies, and sociology, and often invisible from one subfield to the next.

Every doctoral student working on populism was drawing the same map from scratch, alone, and that seemed a pity. I also noticed that populist actors do something new every week, and that there was no single place to follow those developments with a scholarly eye. 

So, I decided to build the place I wished had existed when I started. I call it the universe of populism, partly as a joke and partly because I mean it. If it saves one early-career researcher a few of the months it cost me, it will have been worth building.

PopuliVerse: Addressing the Research and Information Gap

What inspired you to create PopuliVerse? Did you identify a gap in the resources available to researchers studying populism, or did your own research experiences reveal particular challenges that you wanted the platform to address?

Khayyam Rzazade: Both, really, and the two are connected. The gap I identified was not a shortage of research on populism but the opposite. There is a vast literature and no good way into it.

A search on any scholarly database returns thousands of results with no indication of which definition of populism a paper uses, which region it covers, or which “populism and X” debate it belongs to. A student interested in populism and foreign policy has to wade through work on populist communication, populist attitudes, and populist economics before finding what they need.

That is the problem the PopuliVerse Library tries to solve. It currently holds more than eight thousand academic works; each tagged along two axes: the approach to populism a piece adopts and the field it connects populism to. This allows someone to filter down to exactly the corner of the literature they care about. We do not host anyone’s PDFs. We point to the published version and let the authors and publishers keep what is theirs.

My own research revealed two further challenges. The first is speed. Populist actors generate news constantly, and scholars rarely have time to follow developments outside their own case. The PopuliVerse Monitor addresses this with a regular issue that records what populist actors did around the world, organized by region, alongside what was published in the field that month.

The second challenge is the distance between academic writing and public argument. There are very few places where doctoral candidates or more senior researchers can publish a short and well-argued scholarly piece. PopuliVerseCommentary is meant to be that place, published quarterly.

All of it is free, carries no advertising, and is designed to be citable, with DOIs and an ISSN application underway. I wanted it to be the kind of resource a serious scholar could cite without embarrassment, and a curious citizen could read without dealing with complicated language.

Building a Research Library Around a Contested Concept

Building a database of populism research involves decisions about which publications to include and how to categorize such a contested concept. How do you approach these methodological challenges, and how do you balance the need for a systematic resource with the diversity of theoretical perspectives within populism studies?

Khayyam Rzazade: The inclusion rule is simple. A work enters the Library if populism is a central object of analysis, not a passing reference, and if it has appeared in a peer-reviewed journal, an academic press, or a recognized policy institution.

I do not screen for theoretical approach, region, or conclusion. The moment a curator starts deciding which understanding of populism is the “right” one, the resource stops being a library and becomes an argument. My job is to make the field visible, and I have no intention of settling it.

The categorization is where the contested nature of the concept actually helps. Rather than imposing a single definition, the Library records the approach each work adopts, whether ideational, discursive, strategic, stylistic, or something else, as one of its tags. That turns the disagreement in the field into a filter.

A reader who works within the ideational tradition can find their colleagues, and a reader who wants to compare traditions can do so in a few clicks. The second axis tags the field populism is connected to, such as foreign policy, communication, or welfare.

Where a work resists classification, and many do, it carries more than one tag rather than being forced into one box. I will not pretend the system is perfect. Tagging eight thousand works involves judgement, and I correct errors as readers point them out. But I would rather have a transparent and improvable structure than no structure at all, and I think most scholars who have spent time drowning in search results would agree.

International Collaboration and the Importance of Academic Networks

Your work on PopuliVerse brings together perspectives from across the international research community. How have collaborations and academic networks influenced your intellectual development, your research, and your experience as an early-career scholar? What role do you think these networks play in advancing populism studies more broadly?

Khayyam Rzazade: I would not be doing this work without networks, and I mean that quite literally. IDEoPOP is itself a network: a group of doctoral candidates spread across several European universities and disciplines, all working on different aspects of populism’s international dimensions.

Having colleagues at the same stage who study the same phenomenon from other angles, such as communication or comparative politics, has corrected many of my assumptions before they reached paper. My supervisors in Genoa and Paris have been generous with their time, which is what an early-career scholar actually needs.

Co-authoring with Fabrizio Coticchia and colleagues in Genoa taught me how a paper is really built, and I am looking forward to a research stay at Monash University to work with Benjamin Moffitt, whose approach to populism has shaped my own. Each of these relationships began with an email I was nervous about sending.

For the field, I think networks do two things that individual scholars cannot. They move knowledge across the subfields that populism research is divided into, and they build the shared vocabulary that makes comparison possible.

Populism studies has grown very quickly and sometimes feels like several conversations happening in parallel rooms. Networks, whether formal projects, conference sections, or something like PopuliVerse, open the doors between those rooms.

That matters most for early-career researchers and for scholars outside the main Western European and North American centers, who often have excellent cases and limited access to the conversation. Bringing them in is not only fair; it is how the field gets better.

Connecting Academic Research with Public Understanding

Beyond academic publications and resources for other researchers, what impact would you ideally like your work to have? How can populism research contribute to understanding and addressing democratic challenges while maintaining scholarly rigor and independence?

Khayyam Rzazade: The impact I would most like to have is on how people talk about populism, inside and outside the seminar room. In public debate, the word is used either as an alarm or as an insult, and neither helps anyone understand what is happening.

If my research can help journalists, policymakers, and citizens see populism as a recognizable political logic with identifiable conditions and consequences, rather than a fever that strikes democracies from nowhere, I will consider that a real contribution.

The question of rigor and independence is one I take seriously, because populism is a field where it is easy to lose both. There is a pull towards treating populism as a pathology, which flatters the researcher and misreads the voters, and an opposite pull towards romanticizing it as the authentic voice of the people. Neither is scholarship.

The protection, in my view, is methodological honesty. Define your concept clearly, measure it transparently, let the cases contradict you, and publish the results even when they are inconvenient for your own politics.

PopuliVerse follows the same principle. It publishes work from every theoretical camp and does not take any editorial position on which is right. A field that studies the people-versus-elite divide should be the last to behave like an elite that already knows the answer.

Skills and Advice for the Next Generation of Political Scientists

Khayyam Rzazade advises young scholars to protect their lives outside the office, as he does through running, cycling, practicing yoga, playing ultimate frisbee, and teaching.

As academic research becomes increasingly international and competitive, which intellectual and practical skills do you believe young political scientists need most? What advice would you offer to early-career researchers entering the field today?

Khayyam Rzazade: I think young political scientists need three things. First, a method they can really do, not just describe. Pick one method and learn it well. Second, the ability to write clearly. Most good ideas in our field are lost in bad sentences. If a reader cannot follow your argument on the first try, the problem is usually the writing, not the reader.Third, patience with theory. It is tempting to jump to data, but a paper with no clear concept behind it will not survive review, and it should not.

On the practical side, my advice is simple. Find a niche where two fields meet and few people stand. Mine is populism and defense policy. It is a small corner, but it is mine.

Send the email you are nervous about. Almost every opportunity I have had began with a message to someone I did not know. Build something that helps others, whether a dataset, a reading list, or a platform, because it teaches you the field faster than reading alone, and people remember you for it.

And protect your life outside the office. I run, cycle, practice yoga, play ultimate frisbee, and teach. A doctorate is a long race, and you cannot sprint the whole way.

The Future of Populism Studies: New Questions and Understudied Regions

Looking ahead, how do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade? Which research questions, geographical contexts, or neglected areas deserve greater scholarly attention?

Khayyam Rzazade: I expect the field to move from asking what populism is to asking what it does and under which conditions. The definitional debates of the last twenty years were necessary, but they have reached the point of diminishing returns.

The more productive questions now concern populism in power over long periods. Most of our theories were built on populists in opposition or in their first term. We know much less about what happens when they govern for a decade, as in Hungary or Poland, or return to office after losing it.

Foreign policy is part of this shift. For a long time, it was a footnote in populism studies, and I think it will become one of the main chapters because the international consequences of populist government are now impossible to ignore.

Methods will change too. Text-as-data tools and large language models will let us measure populism at a scale and precision we could not reach before. This will test many claims that have so far rested on a few well-chosen quotations.

Geographically, the field is still too centered on Western Europe, the United States, and Latin America. The post-Soviet space, where I come from, has a long history of appeals to the people against corrupt elites that fits our definitions poorly and deserves its own theorizing. South and Southeast Asia and much of Africa are similarly understudied.

One more neglected area is the voters. We have thousands of studies of populist leaders and far fewer that take seriously the reasons ordinary people give for supporting them. For a field named after the people, that is an odd gap, and I hope the next decade closes it.

A Global Observatory of Populist Discourse

On your personal website, you describe how increasing your intellectual capacity and learning bring you happiness. If resources, time, and institutional constraints were no obstacle, what research project would you most like to pursue in the future? More broadly, what do you hope will ultimately be the lasting contribution of your work to both scholarship and public understanding?

Khayyam Rzazade: If nothing stood in the way, I would build a global observatory of populist discourse. Imagine every parliamentary speech, party manifesto, and leader’s address in every democracy, continuously collected, translated, and measured for populist framing with transparent methods, and open to anyone who wants to use it.

We would finally be able to see populism rise and fall across issues, countries, and decades in something close to real time, and to test our theories against the whole world rather than a handful of cases we happen to know.

A project of that size needs a team, funding, and years, which is why I say it is a dream. But PopuliVerse is, in a modest way, a first step towards it, and I have learned that first steps tend to lead somewhere if you keep taking them.

As for a lasting contribution, I would be happy with two things. In scholarship, I hope to leave behind a clear theory of when populist actors turn foreign policy into a people-versus-elite struggle and when they leave it alone.

I also hope that my way of defining populism, which is deliberately eclectic and borrows from the ideational, discursive, strategic, and stylistic traditions rather than picking one, proves useful to others who find the camps too narrow for the cases in front of them. Alongside that, I hope to leave a resource that helps the next generation of scholars find their way into the field faster than I did.

In public understanding, I hope people will one day use the word populism more carefully, as a description of a way of doing politics rather than a verdict on the people who vote for it.

That line on my website is true. Learning is what makes me happy, and I would like my work to leave others a little more curious than they were before.

The Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protest.

Populism Without a Populist: India’s New Experiment in Protest Politics

India’s Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) has transformed a satirical identity into a vehicle for political mobilization outside conventional party structures. Its emergence raises a question about contemporary protest populism: can a movement construct a political people without a dominant leader, and who exercises authority in their name? In this ECPS Voices of Youth (VoY) commentary, Saurabh Raj examines how the movement connects diverse grievances through a shared anti-establishment identity while confronting dilemmas of leadership, representation, and democratic accountability. Drawing on theories of populism and counter-democracy, Raj argues that successful mobilization does not automatically confer representative legitimacy. The movement’s democratic test ultimately concerns whether participants can hold those acting on their behalf accountable.

By Saurabh Raj*

In July 2026, a youth-led movement called the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) celebrated the resignation of India’s Education Minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, following weeks of protests over examination irregularities. Three months later, its founder, Abhijeet Dipke, was detained ahead of another demonstration. Anticipating his detention, he had recorded a video designating a colleague to lead the protest in his absence (The Hitavada, 2026; India Today, 2026). The contrast is revealing. A movement that emerged through political satire had acquired the capacity to challenge powerful institutions without becoming an electoral party. Yet its collective identity could not independently determine who should negotiate, decide or lead. 

CJP is part of a wider movement of youth-led anti-establishment mobilization. From Kenya and Bangladesh to Nepal, specific grievances over taxation, employment and corruption have developed into broader challenges to political authority. Their outcomes differ, but they raise a common question about the relationship between popular mobilization and institutional representation. I argue that CJP’s innovation lies in constructing a popular political identity without a conventional party or dominant charismatic leader, while its democratic challenge lies in making the authority exercised in that identity accountable to those it claims to represent.

Understanding Protest Populism

Populism is often associated with charismatic leaders claiming to embody the will of ordinary citizens against established elites. Yet this represents only one understanding of the phenomenon. Laclau (2005) conceptualizes populism as a political logic through which separate social demands become connected in opposition to an established order. Through this process, the people emerge as a political identity rather than a pre-existing, homogeneous constituency. A symbol, slogan or demand can function as an empty signifier, bringing different grievances together without eliminating their differences. Gerbaudo’s (2023) analysis of the populist turn in social movements extends this understanding. Movements such as Occupy Wall Street and France’s Yellow Vests constructed broad popular identities capable of mobilizing citizens across established ideological boundaries.

Here, protest populism refers to this mode of political mobilization: connecting heterogeneous grievances through a shared identity that challenges established authority without necessarily seeking electoral power. This differs from Mudde’s (2004) definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology dividing society between a virtuous people and a corrupt elite. CJP does not consistently demonstrate that moral division. It is therefore more useful to examine its populist mode of political articulation than to assign it a fixed ideological label.

The relevant distinction is between the construction of a popular identity and the institutions through which that identity is subsequently represented.

When a Name Becomes a Political People

Cockroach Janata Party.
Photo: Screenshot from CJP website.

CJP’s most distinctive political innovation may be its name. Following a controversy involving Chief Justice Surya Kant’s use of the term cockroaches, activists appropriated the expression and transformed it into a symbol of citizens refusing to be dismissed by powerful institutions (Reuters, 2026b). Unlike conventional party identities, cockroaches carry no defined ideological programme. Its ambiguity is its political strength. Students concerned about examination irregularities and citizens questioning electoral administration can identify with the same movement without sharing a comprehensive political ideology. CJP’s transition from examination protests in July to electoral-roll disputes in October illustrates this process. Different institutional controversies became connected through a common accusation of unresponsiveness to ordinary citizens.

In Laclau’s (2005) terms, these demands form a chain of equivalence. Their distinct concerns acquire collective meaning through opposition to an establishment perceived as insufficiently accountable. CJP thus offers a qualified example of populism without a conventional populist figure at its center. Dipke remains a prominent leader, but the movement’s identity is not reducible to his personality. The cockroach symbol performs part of the unifying function often associated with charismatic leadership. Yet symbolic unity has limits. A shared identity can mobilize citizens around grievances, but it cannot determine which demands should prevail, who should negotiate or what constitutes an acceptable political settlement.

The problem of representation emerges precisely where popular identification must become collective decision-making.

Political Victories and the Legitimacy of Leadership

CJP’s July negotiations make this contradiction visible. Its spokespersons, Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka, negotiated with Union Ministers J. P. Nadda and Jitendra Singh over examination reforms, compensation and withdrawal of cases against protesters. The negotiations preceded government concessions and the conclusion of the agitation (The Hitavada, 2026).

The movement had mobilized through a broad popular identity, but achieving a settlement required identifiable representatives to interpret demands and participate in decisions affecting the wider collective. Scharpf’s (1999) distinction between input legitimacy, derived from participation and procedures, and output legitimacy, derived from performance, offers a useful analogy. Political victories can strengthen confidence in representatives even when the processes authorizing them remain less visible.

This does not establish that CJP’s negotiators lacked a democratic mandate. Public reporting provides insufficient evidence about its internal procedures. The episode nevertheless demonstrates how political effectiveness and representative accountability raise different questions. 

October 2026 presented another institutional setting. CJP demanded the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar over electoral-roll revisions. Unlike an elected minister, the Chief Election Commissioner occupies a constitutionally protected office intended to function independently of government. The Election Commission rejected allegations of political bias (Reuters, 2026).

Police restrictions and repeated detentions complicated the protests. Das and Ranka were detained on October 13 and subsequently remanded to judicial custody, which was extended by two days on October 19 (Jha, 2026; Mathur, 2026). Dipke was detained again ahead of an October 16 demonstration (Reuters, 2026).

Anticipating detention earlier on October 10, Dipke had designated Ajinkya Shinde, CJP’s organization in-charge, to lead the protest through a pre-recorded video (India Today, 2026). Shinde himself was subsequently detained alongside Das and Ranka, although he was later released (Jha, 2026). The succession arrangement demonstrated preparation rather than organizational failure. Yet publicly visible leadership authority was conferred through the founder’s designation, rather than a participant-led process identifiable in available reporting.

July demonstrated the movement’s negotiating influence; October exposed the practical importance of leadership continuity. Neither episode proves that CJP is internally undemocratic. Together, however, they raise the question of how representative authority is constituted beyond political victories and individual prominence.

Freeman’s (1972) The Tyranny of Structurelessness provides an important caution: rejecting formal hierarchy does not eliminate power; it can make its exercise less visible. For CJP, the democratic question is not whether leaders should exist, but whether participants can meaningfully influence and hold them accountable.

A Watchdog, Not Another Political Party?

Must successful protest movements eventually enter electoral politics? India’s anti-corruption movement of 2011 confronted this dilemma. One section eventually formed the Aam Aadmi Party in 2012, concluding that institutional reform required participation in electoral competition. CJP has chosen a different course, at least for now.

Its demands concern accountability rather than governmental power. Ministerial resignations, examination reforms and electoral scrutiny are claims directed at public authorities, not proposals to govern in their place. Rosanvallon’s (2008) concept of counter-democracy offers a useful framework. He argues that citizens exercise democratic influence beyond elections through oversight, prevention and judgment. CJP can therefore be understood not as an incomplete political party, but as a potential institution of civic vigilance.

International experiences demonstrate different possibilities. Kenyan protesters secured the withdrawal of a finance bill without entering government (Reuters, 2024). Some organizers of Bangladesh’s student uprising subsequently established the National Citizen Party (Reuters, 2025). In Nepal, the political opening following youth protests was channeled through elections, with the Rastriya Swatantra Party winning 182 of 275 parliamentary seats in March 2026 (Sharma, 2026).

These contrasting trajectories demonstrate that protest mobilization has no predetermined institutional destination. Remaining outside electoral politics is not necessarily a weakness; it can represent a different means of exercising democratic influence. But civic vigilance carries its own responsibility. Unlike electoral parties, which seek mandates from voters, movements derive legitimacy from public participation, credibility and their ability to articulate collective demands. When a small group negotiates on behalf of a wider constituency, the accountability of that representation becomes consequential. A movement scrutinizing public authority must also confront the question of accountability within itself.

Beyond the Populist Moment

CJP’s significance extends beyond its immediate political victories. It illustrates how a shared symbol can connect fragmented grievances and construct a political constituency without the machinery of an established party.

For populism studies, the case suggests the importance of looking beyond exclusively leader-centered accounts of mobilization. A shared name can perform the unifying work often associated with a charismatic figure, but symbolic identification alone cannot authorize decisions or resolve competing demands. This is the central tension of CJP’s experiment. Its political identity is constructed collectively, while the exercise of authority necessarily involves representatives whose legitimacy must be established and sustained.

A movement is tested not only on the day thousands arrive, but also on the day its leaders cannot. CJP has demonstrated that a shared identity can bring people together without a party. Its more demanding democratic test is whether those people can exercise meaningful authority over the politics conducted in their name.


 

(*) Saurabh Raj is a core team member at the Indian School of Democracy and a contributor to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). His work focuses on political leadership, democratic institutions and governance in India.


 

References

Freeman, J. (1972). “The tyranny of structurelessness.” The Second Wave, 2(1).https://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm

Gerbaudo, P. (2023). “From Occupy Wall Street to the Gilets Jaunes: On the populist turn in the protest movements of the 2010s.” Capital & Class, 47(1), 107–124. https://doi.org/10.1177/03098168221137207

India Today. (2026, October 10). “CJP shares Plan B sans Dipke, Ranka, Das. It features a pre-recorded video.”  https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/cjp-abhijeet-dipke-video-detention-ajinkya-shinde-lead-movement-saurav-das-ashutosh-ranka-protest-jantar-mantar-3013979-2026-10-10

Jha, P. (2026, October 14). “Delhi court sends CJP’s Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka to judicial custody for 5 days.” Bar & Bench. https://www.barandbench.com/amp/story/news/delhi-court-sends-cjps-saurav-das-ashutosh-ranka-ajinkya-shinde-to-judicial-custody-for-5-days

Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. Verso. https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/1941-on-populist-reason

Mathur, A. (2026, October 19). “CJP leaders Saurav Das, Ashutosh Ranka get 2 more days in jail: What does law say.” India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/law-news/story/cjp-leaders-saurav-das-ashutosh-ranka-custody-surety-rejections-3021021-2026-10-19

Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Reuters. (2024, June 26). “Kenyan president Ruto rejects finance bill.”  https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenyan-president-ruto-rejects-finance-bill-2024-06-26/

Reuters. (2025, February 24). “Bangladeshi students, who ousted former PM Hasina, set to launch political party.”  https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladeshi-students-who-ousted-former-pm-hasina-set-launch-political-party-2025-02-24/

Reuters. (2026a, October 10). “From ‘cockroach’ post to protest leader: India’s Dipke tests Modi government.”  https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cockroach-post-protest-leader-indias-dipke-tests-modi-government-2026-10-10/

Reuters. (2026b, October 16). “Indian police detain ‘cockroach’ founder, student leaders ahead of Delhi rally.”  https://www.reuters.com/world/india/security-stepped-up-indias-capital-cockroach-movement-rally-2026-10-16/

Reuters. (2026c, October 19). “Indian court extends custody of ‘Cockroach’ movement leaders, local media says.”  https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-court-extends-custody-cockroach-movement-leaders-local-media-says-2026-10-19/

Rosanvallon, P. (2008). Counter-democracy: Politics in an age of distrust (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755835

Scharpf, F. W. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? Oxford University Press.https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295457.001.0001

Sharma, P. (2026, March 17). “From victory to responsibility: Can the RSP deliver in Nepal?” (ISAS Insights No. 779). Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ISAS-Insights-779hk-hs.pdf

The Hitavada. (2026, July 26). “Govt accepts all CJP demands.”  https://www.thehitavada.com/Encyc/2026/7/26/govt-accepts-all-cjp-demands.html

Caricature of Italian politicians Beppe Grillo, Matteo Renzi and Matteo Salvini in carnival parade of floats and masks, on January 2018 in Viareggio, Tuscany, Italy. Photo: Kokophotos.

Europe’s Democratic Blind Spot: Who Selects the Candidates?

In this Voice of Youth (VoY) commentary, Filippo Palmieri examines a critical blind spot in the European Union’s democratic resilience agenda: how political parties select their candidates. Drawing on Italy’s new electoral law and comparative research on political recruitment, Palmieri argues that protecting elections from foreign interference, disinformation, and financial manipulation is insufficient if candidate selection remains opaque and concentrated in party leaderships. Comparing recruitment practices among Italy’s major populist parties, he demonstrates that political turnover does not necessarily indicate democratic renewal. Rather than advocating EU intervention in internal party affairs, Palmieri proposes greater transparency, comparative research, and national reporting requirements to strengthen political accountability and democratic resilience.

By Filippo Palmieri*

On October 8, 2026, the Italian Chamber of Deputies gave final approval to a new electoral law, published the next day as Law No. 180 and in force from October 24. Seats will be allocated proportionally, with a bonus for any list or coalition that wins 42 percent of the vote. In each multi-member district, parties will present lists of seven names, and voters may express up to three preferences among the last six. The first name is fixed by the party and has first claim on any seat the list wins. The 70 bonus seats in the Chamber go to candidates on separate lists, all of whom are elected if the bonus is triggered. When Italians next vote, expected in 2027, a significant part of the choice will have been made by whoever compiles the lists.

European resilience policy says little about that stage, and one rule marks the boundary with unusual precision. Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2025/2445 on European political parties and foundations, in force since December 2025, counts among the tasks of European political foundations “capacity building to support the formation of future political leaders in the Union.” Article 27(2), which bars foundations from funding elections, parties or candidates, allows them to train people “up to the date on which they become a candidate in accordance with national rules or up to the date of their nomination in the national party, whichever is earlier.”

The rule concerns funding, and the line it draws is legitimate: candidate selection is a matter for national law and for parties, and the ban keeps European money out of national campaigns. But it shows where European attention stops. The instruments examined below, the core of the Union’s resilience agenda, protect parties from interference and regulate their money; none of them asks how parties decide who will govern, a function whose results vary with how parties are organized.

Protect, Regulate, Train

The European Democracy Shield, presented by the European Commission and the High Representative on November 12, 2025, mentions political parties in a single section, on the fairness and integrity of electoral processes. There they appear in connection with foreign interference, party financing, a level playing field among competitors and voluntary commitments on the responsible use of artificial intelligence; candidates appear chiefly as people whose safety needs protecting. The section on civic participation relies on citizens’ panels, civic technology and civil society organizations, and parties do not feature in it. 

The European Centre for Democratic Resilience, which began its work in February 2026, is designed to detect threats, coordinate early warnings and counter disinformation and foreign information manipulation. The Commission’s 2023 Recommendation on inclusive and resilient electoral processes comes closest to the inner life of parties, asking them to encourage gender balance on their electoral lists. On how candidates are chosen, it says nothing.

An early assessment of the Shield on Verfassungsblog observed that its focus on external threats tends to obscure the domestic sources of democratic weakness. Parties belong to what Jan-Werner Müller has called democracy’s “critical infrastructure,” and selection is the part of that infrastructure that produces the people who will run institutions.

Why Selection Matters

Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt describe parties as gatekeepers whose task is to keep would-be authoritarians away from power. Much of that gatekeeping happens when candidates are chosen. The evidence suggests parties can select well when they have reasons to. Working with Swedish population registers, Ernesto Dal Bó and colleagues found that politicians score above the population they represent on the cognitive and leadership tests taken by men at military conscription, and that selection on ability is stronger where electoral competition is more intense. In Italy, Vincenzo Galasso and Tommaso Nannicini showed that between 1994 and 2001, when most seats were won in single-member districts, parties placed better-educated candidates with local government experience in the districts that either side could win. These studies show that incentives to select carefully matter. They do not show that long careers are better in themselves.

Procedure matters as well. Reuven Hazan and Gideon Rahat’s comparative study of candidate selection shows that methods trade participation, representation, competition and responsiveness against one another, and that narrow selectorates tend to produce more cohesive and disciplined groups. A more inclusive procedure is not better on every count. Writing about Italy, Piero Ignazi found parties largely closed to the decentralization of selection seen elsewhere in Europe, in some cases more centralized than before 1994, and warned that appeals to the membership over the heads of intermediate cadres introduce a plebiscitary dynamic.

Same Turnover, Different Careers

Italy’s 2018 election is usually told as a story about populism. The data on selection tell a more precise one. In the Chamber of Deputies, 65.9 percent of members had not sat in the previous legislature, almost the same share as in 2013 (65.5 percent), while electoral volatility was lower (26.7 against 36.7 percent). Eugenio Salvati and Michelangelo Vercesiconcluded that much of the renewal was decided before the vote, by party leaderships that controlled the drafting of lists.

The turnover rate hides who came in. The League, led by Matteo Salvini, renewed 87.8 percent of its group in the Chamber. Yet in a study of the new Chamber, Bruno Marino, Nicola Martocchia Diodati and Luca Verzichelli found an “extremely low” share of League deputies without any previous local, party or parliamentary position, against more than half of the Five-Star Movement’s. The Movement let enrolled members put themselves forward online, subject to a binding veto by its political leader, who also picked the candidates for single-member seats. Both parties are classified as populist in the PopuList, an expert-based database of populist, far-left and far-right parties in Europe.

A different indicator, measured after the 2022 election, points the same way. According to Openpolis, 81 percent of the League’s parliamentarians had served in local councils or executives, as had 68 percent of those of Brothers of Italy, the party of Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, also classified as populist. For the Five-Star Movement the figure was 22.5 percent. Parties that share the populist label can recruit in very different ways, and the label alone does not describe them.

What to Look For

None of this makes political experience a measure of democratic quality. A seasoned local administrator may depend entirely on a leader; a newcomer may widen representation. Biographies cannot settle the question. What matters for resilience is the process: whether nominations are transparent, whether they can be contested inside the party, how concentrated the power to nominate is, and how open candidacies are. These features decide to whom elected representatives owe their seats, and so whether they can act as a check on their own leadership.

What Could Be Done

This does not call for European rules on how parties pick their candidates. Three proposals follow, at different levels.

At the European level, the Commission has already used soft law on the composition of electoral lists when it encouraged gender balance in 2023. A future recommendation could invite Member States to make parties disclose how each candidate was chosen: by which body, under which rules, with what room for challenge.

Within the Union’s own structures, the Stakeholder Platform of the European Centre for Democratic Resilience is meant to bring researchers, academia and civil society into its work. Comparative research on candidate selection belongs there as much as research on disinformation.

At the national level, some rules already exist. Since 2013, Italian law has required parties seeking the “2 per mille,” a share of income tax that taxpayers can assign to a party, to set out in their statutes how they select candidates. The commission that reviews those statutes looks at their content: in 2021 it turned down the Five Star Movement’s request, and, according to the party, the changes it asked for included its rules on candidacies. Parliament could go further and require parties to report, after each election, how those procedures were applied. Under the new electoral law, such reports would tell voters who chose the names they cannot change.

Europe will pay to train a future Italian deputy until the day her party puts her name at the top of a list. What happens on that day is where its resilience policy goes quiet.


 

(*) Filippo Palmieri holds a master’s degree in International and Diplomatic Sciences, specializing in Politics and International Security, from the University of Bologna. His research focuses on democratic theory, populism, political representation, the transformation of political parties and the effects of digital communication on contemporary democracy. His master’s thesis examined the changing analytical value of the concept of populism in twenty-first-century democracies. He has presented research on democracy, populism and illiberalism at academic events hosted by the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, the Italian Political Science Association and Venice International University. Email: filippo.palmieri3@studio.unibo.it

PTI supporter at Jinnah Cricket Stadium during a political rally of cricketer turned politician Imran Khan on March 23, 2012 in Sialkot, Pakistan. Photo: Jahanzaib Naiyyer.

Leader-Centrism and Polarization: Tracing the Determinants of Youth Voting Behavior 

This Voice of Youth (VoY) piece examines the growing influence of leader-centrism, political polarization, and digital mobilization on youth voting behavior in Pakistan. Drawing on a survey of 200 students from two major public universities in Lahore, Hamza Wyne identifies a pronounced shift from institutional party platforms toward personalized political loyalties. Findings reveal that 73.5% of respondents voted primarily because of party leadership, while 72% assign responsibility for political accountability to party leaders. Meanwhile, 68% follow political parties through social media, highlighting the expanding influence of digital political engagement alongside traditional mobilization. Deep ideological divisions persist, particularly regarding religious parties, with 38.5% opposing and 26.5% supporting religiously aligned voting. Against Pakistan’s substantial youth demographic, the study raises critical questions about charismatic leadership, democratic accountability, ideological fragmentation, and the future of electoral politics.

By Hafiz Hamza Wyne*

Across South Asia, young voters are increasingly shaping the frontiers of democratic survival and political polarization. In Pakistan, where university students represent a hyper-engaged and volatile demographic, understanding what drives electoral choices is critical to predicting the country’s political trajectory. Focusing on the metropolitan hub of Punjab Province, this study analyzes the behavioral and political determinants of public sector university students in Lahore. 

The sites of the research are the public sector universities of Punjab, namely the University of the Punjab (PU) and Government College University (GCU). The two universities are among the big public sector universities of Lahore. About 200 respondents who voted in Pakistan’s general elections were included in this study. The survey method is used for this study due to its efficiency in collecting a broad range of data incorporating diverse responses. Data are gathered through a close-ended questionnaire, and a Likert scale is used to measure respondents’ attitudes based on the gathered data.

The findings reveal a stark reality: traditional party manifestos and institutional platforms are increasingly sidelined by a deeply personalized, leader-centric political culture. The youth potential in Pakistan is one of the highest, with 67% of Pakistan’s population under the age of 30. This translates into a voting pattern in which the number of young voters has drastically surged, making youth voters more important.

Prior research focuses on the social determinants of voting behavior in the province of Punjab, which were centered on rural and urban populations (Ahmad, 2012). It has failed to take into account a particular set of voters, namely university students, whom this piece intends to target and keenly analyze. This study focuses solely on students from two major government universities, with a focus on their beliefs and opinions, which stimulate them to vote for a particular political party.

Pakistan is a fragile democratic state. Since 1947, it has experienced three military takeovers, which show that it has a weak democracy. The stability of its political system depends on its massive youth bulge. Yet, a fundamental problem persists, while young citizens are mobilized, their engagement is taking place in an environment deeply polarized by narrative warfare. By analyzing how this student demographic processes electoral choices, we can observe whether higher education fosters institutional democratic stability or instead accelerates the personalization of political power. Political determinants are those factors that are politically motivated. In this study, the political determinants are electoral campaigns, party affiliation, and political ideology.

In a great part of Asia, caste or baradari (brotherhood), personality, and personal relations with candidates are the determinants of voting behavior (Akhter & Sheikh, 2014; Badshah et al., 2018). Of course, many voters still vote on an ideological basis. It could be religious, feminist, nationalist, socialist, or any other ideology. We have seen religious extremism not just in the form of pressure groups, but these groups are so strong that they are now forming governments in different countries, as we can see in India, the biggest democracy in the world (D’Ambrogio, 2014). 

Demographic Segments / Generation Z and Household Profiles of Urban Punjab: 70.5 percent of the sampled population falls directly within the 20-to-23 age range. Academic stratification across the sample spans from undergraduate BS tracks (90 percent) to advanced M.Phil (7 percent) and PhD levels (3 percent), reflecting a broad cross-spectrum consensus. Although the dataset includes representation from students native to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and Azad Jammu and Kashmir, the majority—92 percent—reside in Punjab, ensuring the study’s high generalizability across the province.

The Mediatized Campaign / Digital Echo Chambers and Populist Rhetoric: Modern campaigns in Pakistan function as mediatized spheres. This study demonstrates that traditional public mobilization still retains weight; 54 percent of surveyed students follow political rallies to directly decide their votes, while 56.5 percent (combining the agree and strongly agree options) explicitly read and evaluate official party manifestos before casting their ballots. Over 56.5 percent of students declare a strong emotional affinity for specific party slogans (such as “Corruption ka Khatma (End of Corruption),” “Tabdeeli (Change),” or “Sher (Lion)”), proving that punchy, populist rhetoric plays a key role in youth movements. A whopping 68 percent of respondents actively followed their preferred political parties online.

Leader-Centrism, Ideological Rifts, and Accountability: In present times, people remain connected with their parties through social media and consume their party’s narrative. Our observations also assert the cardinal role that the party leader plays in increasing followership and garnering support for his own party. A large proportion, amounting to 73.5% of the students, had voted for a political party because of its leader. The leader, as a centralized figure, is reckoned to be an indispensable part of the political party. But youth loyalty is far from blind; it is highly conditional. A whole 72% of voters consider holding the party leadership accountable to be the responsibility of the leadership itself. 

Similarly, deep-seated ideological fragmentation exists. About 26.5% agree and 38.5% disagree when it comes to voting for a religious party. While a single leader can temporarily unite a youth movement under one banner, the urban youth demographic remains deeply fractured beneath the surface.

Conclusion

The findings suggest that youth voting behavior in Pakistan is increasingly shaped by charismatic leadership, digital engagement, and ideological polarization. While leader-centric politics dominates electoral choices, young voters also emphasize political accountability, indicating that their loyalty is not unconditional. The coexistence of personalized political allegiances, social media influence, and ideological divisions raises important questions about democratic consolidation. In sum, Pakistan’s democratic future will depend partly on whether its expanding youth electorate moves beyond charismatic leadership toward greater institutional accountability, substantive political engagement, and more inclusive democratic participation.


(*) Hafiz Hamza Wyne is a Pakistan-based empirical political researcher. His research focuses on youth political participation, electoral behavior, leader-centric politics, and political polarization, with particular emphasis on the dynamics of democratic engagement in Pakistan.


 

References 

Ahmad, M. (2012). “Voting behaviour in rural and urban areas of Punjab.” Journal of Political Studies, 14, 45-56.

Akhter, Z. & Sheikh, Y. A. (2014). “Determinants of voting behaviour in India: Theoretical perspective.” Public Policy Administration Research, 4(8), 104-108.

Badshah, L.; Rehman, A. U. & Muhammad, N. (2018). “Political determinants of voting behaviour in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.” Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal, 2(1), 1-10.

D’Ambrogio, E. (2014). “India: The biggest democracy in the world.” European Parliamentary Research Service.

ECPS ECRN member Andrei Gheorghe is a PhD student pursuing a joint doctorate at the University of Bucharest and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris.

Andrei Gheorghe: Populism May Define the 21st Century, Yet Romania Remains an Understudied Case

In this inaugural interview of the ECPS Youth Program’s new interview series, ECPS-ECRN member Andrei Gheorghe discusses his comparative research on populism, illiberalism, and nationalism in Romania and Hungary. He conceptualizes populism through the construction of “the people,” examining how populist actors define belonging, exclusion, and collective identity. Gheorghe highlights the contrast between Hungary’s historically rooted nationalist discourse and Romania’s comparatively understudied populist politics, arguing that “national populism in Romania is very poorly studied and researched.” He also reflects on the challenges facing early-career scholars, including limited funding, differing academic traditions, and the importance of international scholarly networks. For Gheorghe, populism may define the twenty-first century, yet Romania remains insufficiently integrated into comparative international research.

Interview by Natalia Crane*

In this inaugural interview of the ECPS Youth Program’s new interview series, designed to introduce a younger generation of scholars working on populism and related fields, ECPS Early Career Researchers Network (ECRN) member Andrei Gheorghe reflects on the conceptual, comparative, and professional dimensions of researching populism in Central and Eastern Europe. The series aims to provide emerging researchers with a platform to present their work, explain their methodological choices, and bring greater visibility to new research agendas in populism, illiberalism, nationalism, and democratic politics.

Gheorghe is a PhD student pursuing a joint doctorate at the University of Bucharest and the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales in Paris. His research focuses on populism, illiberalism, and nationalism in Eastern Europe, particularly Romania and Hungary, while his doctoral thesis examines how “the people” are constructed in populist discourse in the two countries between 2010 and 2020. He has also published on the political instrumentalization of collective memory in Romania and currently holds a French Government Scholarship.

At the heart of the interview is Gheorghe’s concern that Romania remains significantly understudied in international scholarship on populism. While Hungary has generated extensive academic attention, he argues that “there are very few studies of Romanian populism and Romanian politics on the international stage, and also very few in Romania.” For Gheorghe, this imbalance helps explain his comparative research design: “that is why I chose to compare the two countries: national populism in Romania is very poorly studied and researched.”

His intervention also speaks to a broader diagnosis of contemporary politics. Drawing on Pierre Rosanvallon’s Le siècle du populisme, Gheorghe observes that the twenty-first century may become “the century of populists” amid the decline of traditional ideological formations and the rise of both left- and right-wing populism. “And until now,” he adds, “he has been right.”

The interview further explores Gheorghe’s understanding of populism as a process of constructing “the people,” his comparison of Hungarian and Romanian populist discourse, and the different historical resources mobilized in each case. He also discusses the practical challenges confronting early-career researchers, including limited funding, navigating different academic traditions, and building international scholarly networks—making his reflections especially pertinent to the ambitions of the ECPS Youth Program itself.

Here is our interview with ECRN member Andrei Gheorghe, lightly edited to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

National Populism Rose Even as Living Conditions Improved After EU Accession

People display Qanon messages on cardboards during a political rally in Bucharest, Romania on August 10, 2020. Photo: M. Moira

Thank you so much, Andrei, for joining me for my first interview for this ECPS Voice of Youth project. I have a couple of questions for you about your research. To my understanding, your research interests primarily lie in populism in Romania and Hungary between 2010 and 2020. To begin, could you introduce yourself, outline your academic journey, explain how your research interests developed, and why you believe this research is significant in today’s global environment?

Andrei Gheorghe: Thank you for the question. I am a PhD student in a program under double coordination. It is a PhD program hosted by the University of Bucharest and École des Hautes Études des Sciences Sociales in Paris. I have two coordinators, one Romanian and one French.

I also teach seminars in political science at the University of Bucharest. I have published several articles and one chapter concerning my particular interest in sports and politics, especially how memory is used by the football gallery from my natal town. So, it is a particular interest in politics and sports.

I also work on populism, as you already said. My PhD thesis is on how the people are constructed in populist discourse in Romania and Hungary between 2010 and 2020. I am also a researcher at the National Council for the Study of the Securitate Archives. You know about the Securitate Archive—what the Securitate was and what Securitate means? It was the political police during the communist regime in Romania.

This political police produced roughly three million files, including files on dissidents, people who were watched by the Securitate and who were against the communist regime, but also files concerning collaborators of the Securitate. It is a public governmental institution. I am a researcher at this institution.

My interest in the topic of national populism comes from my childhood because I grew up during the transition. My parents, friends, and all my relations also grew up during the transition. So, I want to understand why this resurrection of national populism occurred, why this ascension of national populism happened after accession to the European Union, basically after 2008. Because, it was a much more problematic period during the transition after the fall of communism.

Then both countries, Hungary and Romania, became members of the European Union, and living conditions and life in general became much better than during the transition. So, I want to understand what triggered this ascension. 

Populism Begins with Constructing a Narrow Definition of “the People”

That’s very interesting. I loved hearing about that. My next question for you is: how do you define populism in your own research, and why have you adopted that particular conceptual approach? And has your definition of populism changed throughout your academic career?

Andrei Gheorghe: Actually, I don’t have a personal definition of populism. What I observe in my research is that populism involves a narrow definition of “the people.” Populists define and construct the people, and that is also the focus of my research.

Basically, all populists try to construct a people and give that construction a particular image, with specific traits and symbolic values. They also seek to exclude “the enemies” and draw the boundaries of the ideal people. In this sense, populism is a kind of amalgam—an arrangement of ideology, populist logic, and artistic representation. But all these elements converge around the idea of “the people” because populists seek to imagine and define who that people is. This is particularly evident in right-wing populism.

As for left-wing populism, we do not really have it in Romania or Hungary. Although my research examines speeches by a prime minister from the Social Democratic Party, the Romanian Social Democratic Party is not particularly social democratic. It is more nationalistic because it inherited old communist networks and communist nationalism, and it is more nationalistic and traditionalistic than socialist.

Hungarian Populism Looks to a Heroic Past, While Romanian Populism Targets Contemporary Elites

Romanian citizens demand an end to a corrupt system. Photo: Constantin Opriș.

My next question is: how do you measure populism in your own work, especially when comparing two different countries? Given that the definition and representation of populism can vary from country to country, how do you balance different research approaches?

Andrei Gheorghe: I start with the definition of populism and apply a qualitative research approach. From this starting point, I analyze speeches and discourses, including through automated analysis. I extract the most important and relevant semantic elements in these speeches and compare the historical and social resources they draw on, as well as the ways in which they seek to construct “the people.”

We can see that Viktor Orbán, in his speeches, constructs the Hungarian people by appealing to the Hungarian nation and its historical existence. He speaks about the millennial state, the millennial nation, the Hungarian nation, the Christian nation, and the Hungarian Christian nation. Hungarians resisted multiple empires, including the Habsburg Empire, the Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. They have always been in the Pannonian Basin. So, in this narrative, they will also resist Brussels, which is compared with the old imperial capital, Vienna.

This is an appeal to the historical roots of the Hungarian people. Orbán invokes the national revolution of 1848 and the 1956 spring revolution against the Soviets. When he speaks about his 2010 revolution, when he won the elections, he presents it as a new transformation, a new revolution for a new generation, while drawing on earlier Hungarian revolutions fought in the name of freedom.

His victory in 2010 was therefore presented as a new revolution, but again through an appeal to history. His speeches and the constitution are full of historical references and appeals to ethnic and cultural identity. This concerns all Hungarians beyond the country’s borders. He presented himself as the prime minister of all Hungarians, not only those living in Hungary. So, it is a transborder community.

In Romania, by contrast, appeals to nationalism, the nation, and history are less prominent in populist discourse. Instead, populists define “the people” as working people, poor people, enslaved people—Romanian people betrayed by Western elites and by Romanian elites who believe in Western values. In their speeches, they portray Romania as a second-class citizen within the European Union.

So, this discourse does not rely as heavily on history or on the idea of a great nation. This began to change after 2020, with the rise of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and George Simion. After 2020, the nationalist-populist movement AUR—whose acronym means “gold” in Romanian—entered Parliament. In 2024, they doubled their score. They have 20% of Parliament, and now they are estimated at 40%. It is an astonishing rise.

They now emphasize this nationalistic discourse. They speak about the Romanian people and the great achievements of the Romanian people during communism, including industrial development and other achievements from that period, despite the fact that they are not communist.

So, my comparison is thematic: it is a thematic and qualitative analysis. That is my main approach. I have also conducted a brief quantitative analysis because I wanted to highlight the differences between Hungarian and Romanian discourse. Hungarian discourse is deeply historical and densely populated with references to history and to the ancient past of the Hungarian people.

They try to construct the Hungarian people by referring to their heroic past, when Hungary was an independent kingdom and included regions that are now part of Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Croatia—the idea of Greater Hungary. In Romania, by contrast, there is more of an appeal after 2020 to the recent past, particularly to the communist period, although my research stops in 2020. Before 2020, the discourse was directed against foreigners, international companies, globalism, liberalism, and multiculturalism, while portraying Romanian people as second-class.

ECPS-ECRN Helped Turn Academic Networking into Concrete Research Collaboration

It’s very interesting to look at the comparative approach in the speeches and how frequently you use qualitative analysis. I found that really compelling. Thank you for that. For my next question, I’d like to shift gears a little and ask about your cooperation with other scholars. Contemporary research increasingly depends on international collaboration. How has cooperation with other scholars, academic networks, and initiatives such as the ECPS Early Career Researchers Network (ECRN) influenced your research, professional development, and intellectual outlook?

Andrei Gheorghe: Actually, before becoming a member of the ECPS-ECRN Network, collaboration with other scholars was virtually non-existent. Despite participating in quite a few international conferences—not so many, around nine or ten, but for me that is a lot—I tried to develop my network, but it did not really happen.

After joining the ECPS-ECRN Network, however, I connected with an Italian scholar, and we decided to work together, collaborate, and write an article comparing Italy and Romania.

So yes, I think ECPS is a very good network. It has been a very positive factor in this kind of development. 

Romanian Scholars Face Serious Barriers to Participating in International Academic Life

Photo: Shutterstock / GagoDesign

That’s really great to hear. Thank you for answering that question. My next question is: throughout your academic journey, what professional challenges have you faced, and what have been some of the most rewarding moments in your research?

Andrei Gheorghe: The most challenging thing for me was the transition between the French type of analysis and research and the English, Anglo-Saxon type of research, because the French approach is relatively less empirical. Despite being a PhD student in France, my participation in French academia has been quite limited, even though I want to participate more.

My work can be seen as too empirical and not sufficiently elaborate or theoretically sophisticated. But it is also very extensive because I compare two countries, while French scholars often take much narrower subjects for their analysis and go very deeply into a specific topic. So, this transition between French and Anglo-Saxon research has been one major challenge.

Another challenge is that, for Romanian scholars, it is very difficult to participate in academic events outside Romania because funding is almost nonexistent. You often have to pay all the expenses yourself, which is very challenging. There is also the question of how your work is appreciated in Romania.

As a PhD student, you also have to work to make a living. You cannot dedicate all your time to research, so you have to make sacrifices from this point of view.

On the other hand, one major achievement was publishing a chapter in a book edited by Routledge. That was a big achievement for me, as were publishing my articles and participating in conferences.

Romanian Populism Still Remains on the Margins of International Research

That’s great. Thank you so much. And I do agree with you when you say that there are challenges when studying in different countries and adapting to the different approaches that academic cultures take. I completely agree. I’ve experienced it myself. I’m going to give you one last question because, since this is my first interview for this project, I think I overestimated how many questions I would be able to fit in, but I’m getting a good sense of the time frame now. So, let me ask you one final question. Looking ahead, where do you see populism studies evolving over the next decade, especially regarding Hungary and Romania? What areas remain neglected and deserve much more attention?

Andrei Gheorghe: It’s a good question because, in his book Le siècle du populisme (The Century of Populism), Pierre Rosanvallon argues that the 21st century will be the century of populists because of the decline of traditional ideologies—the left, the right, especially the left—and the rise of populism, both left-wing and right-wing populism. But it will essentially be the century of populism. And until now, he has been right.

Concerning Hungary and Romania, Hungary is very well studied. There are many studies and a great deal of research on Hungarian populism. But there are very few studies of Romanian populism and Romanian politics on the international stage, and also very few in Romania. So, that is why I chose to compare the two countries: national populism in Romania is very poorly studied and researched.

I think that my research, and perhaps my participation in international conferences outside Romania, will make more researchers interested in Romanian politics and Romanian populism. To make a confession, when I participated in international conferences outside Romania dedicated to populism, illiberalism, and nationalism, I was the only Romanian, and they looked at Romania and my research as rather exotic. They know about Hungary, they know about Poland and Bulgaria. They know much more about Serbia because of the Yugoslav Wars. What about Romania? 

That’s wonderful that you are bringing attention to a subject that is not so widely researched internationally, introducing it at different conferences, and giving it more traction. I think that’s really great for academia. So, I want to thank you very much for talking to me today and for helping me with my project. I think your research is very interesting, and I was really glad to be able to talk to you about it. I really appreciate you taking the time.

Andrei Gheorghe: Thank you, Natalia.


(*) Natalia Crane is currently serving as a Grant Writer at Femme Incroyable ASBL and as a Research Assistant at the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), where she contributes organizational and writing skills to support impactful initiatives. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and Germanic Studies, with a focus on International Relations and Global Security, from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. She also completed a Master’s degree in International Politics at KU Leuven, further deepening her expertise in international relations. Her previous roles include research and teaching positions at esteemed institutions, reflecting a strong commitment to analyzing and addressing global political challenges. She is fluent in Polish and English and proficient in German.

Photo: Dreamstime.

From Mass Parties to Digital Bubbles: How Young Europeans Encounter Politics

In this commentary, Filippo Palmieri examines how digital platforms are reshaping the political socialization of young Europeans. As mass parties decline, politics is increasingly encountered through personalized feeds, influencers, recommendation systems, and fragmented online publics. Palmieri argues that this transformation does not make populism inevitable, but it creates an environment in which populist appeals to immediacy, personalization, and distrust of intermediaries can travel more easily. Drawing on the concepts of “mass individualism” and “bubble democracy,” the commentary explores how digital participation can broaden political engagement while weakening durable forms of representation and accountability. The central democratic challenge, Palmieri suggests, lies in the growing gap between political expression, collective organization, and meaningful representation.

By Filippo Palmieri*

A political message on TikTok rarely arrives alone. It appears between a song, a comic sketch and a creator’s account of an ordinary day. On Instagram, a carousel explaining an election may be followed by an advertisement or a friend’s holiday photograph. For many young Europeans, this is no longer a secondary route into politics. It is where politics is first encountered.

The European Parliament’s Youth Survey 2024 gives a measure of the change. Among Europeans aged 16 to 30, 42 percent name social media as a main source of information on political and social issues. Television follows at 39 per cent (European Parliament, 2025). These figures do not prove that young people have lost interest in public affairs. They tell us something more precise: a generation is forming its political habits inside spaces built around personal profiles, recommendation systems and an endless competition for attention.

The consequences reach beyond communication. Politics learned through a feed has a different pace, different intermediaries and a different sense of proximity. This helps explain why populist language often moves easily across digital platforms. It does not mean that social media manufacture populists. The relationship is less direct, and more interesting, than that.

What the Party Used to Provide

The decline of mass parties is often measured through membership figures or electoral volatility. Those indicators matter, but they capture only part of what has disappeared. A party once offered a place where separate experiences could be translated into common claims. It trained activists, selected leaders and connected local disputes to an interpretation of society. The process was slow. It was also unequal: hierarchies were rigid, internal dissent could be suppressed, and many citizens remained outside the organizations that claimed to represent them. Yet the intermediary was visible. It had offices, rules, officials and a name.

Mauro Calise describes the new configuration as “mass individualism.” The collective actor once organized by party machines has broken into a multitude of connected individuals (Calise, 2025). The phrase is deliberately paradoxical. Users act through personal accounts, but they do so before mass audiences. They can speak and mobilize at a scale that would once have required an organization, while the content reaching each of them is increasingly personalized.

This distinction matters most for those who did not acquire political habits before the digital turn. A twenty-year-old may discover a housing protest through a short video, learn its vocabulary from a creator, share it with friends and join a demonstration organized in a group chat. Information, expression and participation take place on the same device, sometimes within a few hours. As Ohme and his colleagues observe, digital environments have brought exposure to news and political action unusually close together (Ohme et al., 2022).

That can produce real participation. Climate strikes, campaigns against gender violence and mobilizations over university costs have travelled through networks that traditional parties struggled to reach. But the same mobilization may dissolve when attention moves to another issue. A hashtag can assemble a public without building an organization able to negotiate, decide or remain accountable after the peak of visibility has passed.

There is no single European “digital generation” either. A study covering nine countries found marked class differences among young people’s conventional, community-based and online participation (Grasso & Giugni, 2022). Education, resources and political confidence still shape whose voice becomes public. Cheap access to a platform does not make political influence equally available.

Disintermediation Without the Disappearance of Intermediaries

Social media are regularly described as instruments of disintermediation. The term suggests that parties, journalists and associations have been removed from the relationship between citizens and power. Only half of that story is true. Older gatekeepers have weakened; mediation itself has not vanished. It has changed hands.

TikTok’s recommendation system decides which political clip travels beyond its original audience. Instagram gives visual advantage to claims that can be compressed into a reel or a sequence of cards. Influencers translate public controversies into the language of personal experience, while visible counts of likes and shares make some positions appear socially dominant before a user has examined them. None of these mechanisms is politically neutral, even though none resembles a party headquarters or a newspaper editorial meeting.

Damiano Palano’s notion of “bubble democracy” offers a useful description of the result. Palano argues that the public associated with earlier forms of representative democracy is fragmenting into multiple, partly self-referential audiences (Palano, 2019). A bubble is not a sealed room. Users still meet disagreement, and content moves unpredictably between networks. The deeper change concerns the distribution of attention. A controversy that feels unavoidable on one feed may be almost absent from another. Citizens do not simply reach different conclusions; they may begin from different political events.

This is why the familiar image of the echo chamber is insufficient. The problem is not only that people prefer information consistent with their beliefs. Platform publics are temporary and uneven. They gather around an election, a scandal or a war, then rearrange themselves. Public opinion begins to resemble the intermittent convergence of several streams rather than a single national conversation.

Representative politics has always involved distance. Nadia Urbinati argues that representation does not require citizens and representatives to become identical. It depends on a continuing relationship in which decisions can be judged, contested and revised (Urbinati, 2010). Social media create the impression that this distance has closed. A leader speaks from a phone, replies to followers and comments on events before the evening news. The tone is intimate. Power may remain highly concentrated.

Why Populist Narratives Travel Well

Populism fits this environment because it turns representation into a promise of direct presence. A leader speaks as the authentic voice of “the people”; whoever stands between the two can be presented as an obstacle. Parties distort. Experts complicate. Journalists hide. Procedures delay. These accusations long predate TikTok and Instagram, but platforms allow them to be repeated daily, adapted to audience reactions and attached to an individual face.

Personalization is part of the advantage. A recognizable leader circulates more easily than an organization with competing factions and a detailed programme. Speed matters too. Every event can be framed as an urgent test of whether institutions are listening. Conflict completes the pattern: the distinction between an authentic community and those allegedly frustrating its will is well suited to systems that reward reaction.

Still, there is no universal digital law favoring populists. Davidson and Enos examined more than 400 European parties between 2010 and 2020. Populist parties received more engagement than their competitors on Facebook, but the same advantage did not appear consistently on Twitter. It also varied between countries and was concentrated especially among right-wing populists (Davidson & Enos, 2025). Platform architecture matters. So do political culture, party strategy and national context.

Research from the Netherlands adds another complication. People with populist attitudes were more likely to react to political content, yet their use of social media did not consistently trap them in a populist electoral funnel (Jeroense et al., 2022). A feed is not a machine with a predetermined political output. It changes the incentives under which politics is communicated: some claims become easier to circulate, some actors become more visible, and directness acquires a persuasive value of its own.

For young citizens, this is also a question of familiarity. If politics is first experienced through personal profiles and short cycles of attention, the leader’s direct appeal may not look like a rebellion against ordinary democratic practice. It may look like ordinary democratic practice. Bargaining, party organization and institutional compromise then appear distant and evasive, even though they remain necessary whenever a demand must be converted into a collective decision.

A Different Experience of Democracy

It would be misleading to tell this story as a fall from a democratic golden age. Mass parties often demanded obedience and filtered out inconvenient voices. Digital media have allowed experiences once ignored by established organizations to enter public debate. They have made rapid mobilization across cities and borders possible. Young Europeans have used them to force climate change, racial justice, gender equality and economic insecurity onto political agendas.

What has become fragile is the link between expression and representation. A post shared hundreds of thousands of times shows intensity, not necessarily durability or representativeness. A creator can become an influential political interpreter without accepting the obligations normally attached to political leadership. A digital campaign may be remarkably effective at naming a problem and much less able to determine who can legitimately negotiate in its name.

Young Europeans have not abandoned politics. They are learning it in a public sphere whose boundaries move from one issue to the next and whose most powerful intermediaries seldom present themselves as political institutions. This does not make populism inevitable. It makes the populist promise of immediacy easier to recognize and the suspicion of mediation easier to understand.

The relevant question, then, is not whether young people are democratic enough. It is what democracy comes to mean when it is first encountered as a stream of personalized messages rather than as membership in a collective organization. The passage from mass parties to digital bubbles is therefore more than a shift in political communication. It is a change in the everyday experience through which representative politics becomes intelligible.


 

(*) Filippo Palmieri holds a master’s degree in International and Diplomatic Sciences, specializing in Politics and International Security, from the University of Bologna. His research focuses on democratic theory, populism, political representation, the transformation of political parties and the effects of digital communication on contemporary democracy. His master’s thesis examined the changing analytical value of the concept of populism in twenty-first-century democracies. He has presented research on democracy, populism and illiberalism at academic events hosted by the Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, the Italian Political Science Association and Venice International University. Email: filippo.palmieri3@studio.unibo.it


 

References

Calise, M. (2025). Opinione pubblica e individualismo di massa. Il Mulino, 74(4). https://doi.org/10.1402/118619

Davidson, T. R. & Enos, J. (2025). “Engaging populism? The popularity of European populist political parties on Facebook and Twitter, 2010–2020.” Political Communication, 42(1), 171–199. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2024.2369118

European Parliament. (2025). Youth survey 2024. Eurobarometer. https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3392

Grasso, M. & Giugni, M. (2022). “Intra-generational inequalities in young people’s political participation in Europe: The impact of social class on youth political engagement.” Politics, 42(1), 13–38. https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957211031742

Jeroense, T.; Luimers, J.; Jacobs, K. & Spierings, N. (2022). “Political social media use and its linkage to populist and postmaterialist attitudes and vote intention in the Netherlands.” European Political Science, 21(2), 193–215. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-020-00306-6

Ohme, J.; Andersen, K.; Albæk, E. & de Vreese, C. H. (2022). “Anything goes? Youth, news, and democratic engagement in the roaring 2020s.” The International Journal of Press/Politics, 27(3), 557–568. https://doi.org/10.1177/19401612221093008

Palano, D. (2019). La democrazia alla fine del “pubblico”: Sfiducia, frammentazione, polarizzazione: verso una “bubble democracy”? Governare la paura, 35–92.

Urbinati, N. (2010). La democrazia non ha un altrove. Il Mulino, 59(2), 225–241. https://doi.org/10.1402/31572