SummerSchool

ECPS Academy Summer School — Europe Between Oceans: The Future of the EU Trade Between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific (July 6-10, 2026)

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Are you interested in global trade politics and the future of Europe in a shifting world order? Do you want to understand how populism, great-power rivalry, and geopolitical tensions are reshaping EU trade between the Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific? The ECPS Academy Summer School 2026 offers a unique five-day program where leading scholars and policymakers explore the EU’s role in an era of economic uncertainty and strategic competition. Participants will engage in interactive lectures, small-group discussions, and a dynamic simulation game on EU trade strategy, gaining hands-on experience in policy analysis and recommendation drafting. Join an international, multidisciplinary environment, exchange ideas with peers worldwide, earn ECTS credits, and become part of a global network studying populism, political economy, and international relations.

Overview

In today’s rapidly shifting global order, the European Union can no longer afford to think in one direction. For decades, the transatlantic relationship has been the backbone of global trade, built on shared institutions, economic interdependence, and liberal values. Yet this foundation is no longer stable. As highlighted in the ECPS report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, domestic political polarization and the rise of populism on both sides of the Atlantic are reshaping trade policy, weakening trust, and challenging the very principles of open markets and multilateralism. The EU now faces a critical question: how to remain a global trade power when its closest partner is becoming less predictable.

At the same time, the center of gravity of global trade is shifting toward the Indo-Pacific. This region has become the epicenter of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition, where the future of global trade rules is increasingly being contested. The growing rivalry between the United States and China is not only a security issue but also a trade and technological struggle shaping supply chains, investment flows, and regulatory standards. As the US adopts more unilateral and strategic approaches to trade, moving away from traditional multilateralism, the EU must navigate a complex environment where cooperation, competition, and coercion coexist. Ignoring the transpacific dimension would mean missing where the future of global trade is being written.

For the European Union, the challenge and opportunity lie in managing both arenas simultaneously. The transatlantic relationship remains indispensable for economic scale, regulatory cooperation, and political alignment, while the transpacific region is crucial for diversification, resilience, and strategic autonomy. As scholars increasingly argue, the EU is no longer just a “junior partner” but an actor that must define its own role within a triangular system shaped by US–China competition. To lead in international trade today means mastering this dual engagement: stabilizing relations with the United States while actively shaping the Indo-Pacific order. This requires not only policy innovation but also a new generation of thinkers who understand trade through a geopolitical lens.

Against this backdrop, ECPS Academy Summer School-2026 brings together leading scholars and policymakers to examine how populism and great-power competition are reshaping EU trade policy across both transatlantic and transpacific arenas. 

It offers a unique opportunity to explore:

  • The future of EU–US trade relations in an era of populism
  • The strategic importance of the Indo-Pacific and the US–China trade rivalry for the EU
  • How global trade is being reshaped by geopolitics, security, and ideology
  • The populist discourse around trade, policy, and power, and its implications for the EU’s trade relations
  • It also allows participating in an enjoyable and dynamic simulation game on the EU’s trade relations, trying to bring policy suggestions.

You will learn and actively engage in discussions, develop your own policy ideas, take part in simulation games, have the opportunity to publish on ECPS venues, and become part of an international network working at the intersection of political economy, international relations, and populism studies.

Tentative Program

Day 1 – Monday, July 6, 2026

Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics

This opening day sets the conceptual stage. It introduces how EU trade policy evolved from embedded liberalism to strategic autonomy, and how trade is now intertwined with security and geopolitics. It also establishes the role of populism and domestic politics in reshaping trade preferences and legitimacy crises in Europe and beyond.

Lecture One: (15:00-16:30) – Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order

Lecturer: Arlo Poletti (Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento).

Moderator: Sonali Chowdhry (Ph.D., Research Associate, DIW Berlin, Fellow, Kiel Institute for the World Economy).

Lecture Two: (17:30-19:00) – Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

Lecturer: Kent Jones (Professor Emeritus of Economics, Babson College).

Moderator: Dr. Neo Sithole (Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group).

Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism

Focuses on the transatlantic pillar, still central but increasingly unstable. It examines tariff disputes, regulatory divergence, and how populist and protectionist politics in the US and Europe challenge long-standing cooperation and WTO-based norms.

Lecture Three: (15:00-16:30) –  Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

Lecturer: Erik Jones (Professor of European Studies and International Political Economy, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute and Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe).

Moderator: Elaine Fahey (Professor of EU Law, City Law School, City St. Georges, University of London).

Lecture Four: (17:30-19:00) – Populism and the Erosion/Reconfiguration of Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Lecturer: Alasdair Young (Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Tech).

Moderator: Jessica Lawrence (Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law).

Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026 

Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy

This session introduces the triangular dynamic (EU–US–China) and how the EU navigates between partnership and rivalry. It highlights de-risking, economic security, supply chains, and competing models of globalization.

Lecture Six: (14:00-15:30) – Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

Lecturer: Reuben Wong (Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore).

Moderator: TBC.

Lecture Five: (16:00-17:30) – The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics

Lecturer: Giulio Pugliese (Director of the EU-Asia Project, European University Institute + Associate Fellow Istituto Affari Internazionali, and King’s College London).

Moderator: Anita Tusor (Researcher in International Relations, Charles University, Prague). 

Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026

Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre

This session shifts focus to the transpacific dimension, emphasizing that the future of trade is increasingly shaped in the Indo-Pacific. It explores how US strategies toward China and the region reshape global trade, and how the EU responds through diversification and partnerships.

Lecture Seven: (15:00-16:30) – US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications

Lecturer: Kristi Govella (Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations in the Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies and the Oxford School of Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford). 

Moderator: Andrea Carteny (Professor of History of International Relations, Sapienza University of Rome). 

Lecture Eight: (17:30-19:00) – EU Engagement in the Indo-Pacific (FTAs, Partnerships, Strategic Positioning)

Lecturer: Axel Berkofsky (Associate Professor at the University of Pavia and Co-Head of the Asia Centre at ISPI).

Moderator: Sebastien Goulard (Ph.D., Manager of Cooperans, Consultant in EU-Asia connectivity projects).

Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026

Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership

This session will ask whether the EU can become a global trade power amid fragmentation, populism, and great-power rivalry. It also allows for normative and policy-oriented discussions.

Lecture Nine: (15:00-16:30) –  Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Lecturer: Markus Kotzur (Professor of European and International Law, Vice Dean for International Relations and Chair for Public Law, European and International Public Law, Hamburg University). 

Moderator: Camille Nessel (Ph.D., Lecturer in Political Science Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB)-CEVIPOL). 

 

Methodology

The program will take place on Zoom, consisting of two sessions each day and will last five days. The lectures are complemented by small group discussions and Q&A sessions moderated by experts in the field. Participants will have the opportunity to engage with leading scholars in the field as well as with activists and policymakers working at the forefront of these issues.

The final program with the list of speakers will be announced soon.

Furthermore, this summer school aims to equip attendees with the skills necessary to craft policy suggestions. To this end, a simulation game will be organized on a pressing theme within the broader topic to identify solutions to issues related to the future of the EU trade relations.

Who should apply?

This course is open to master’s and PhD level students and graduates, early career researchers and post-docs from any discipline. The deadline for application submissions has been extended to June 26, 2026. As we can only accept a limited number of applicants, it is advisable to submit applications as early as possible rather than waiting for the deadline.

The applicants should send their CVs to the email address ecps@populismstudies.org with the subject line: ECPS Summer School Application.

We value the high level of diversity in our courses, welcoming applications from people of all backgrounds. 

Evaluation Criteria and Certificate of Attendance

Meeting the assessment criteria is required from all participants aiming to complete the program and receive a certificate of attendance. The evaluation criteria include full attendance and active participation in lectures.

Certificates of attendance will be awarded to participants who attend at least 80% of the sessions. Certificates are sent to students only by email.

Credit

This course is worth 5 ECTS in the European system. If you intend to transfer credit to your home institution, please check the requirements with them before you apply. We will be happy to assist you; however, please be aware that the decision to transfer credit rests with your home institution.

 

 

Brief Biographies and Abstracts

Day One: Monday, July 6, 2026

Theme: The EU in the Global Trade Order: From Liberalism to Geoeconomics

Evolution of EU Trade Policy and Global Trade Order

Arlo Poletti is a Professor of International Relations at the Department of Sociology and Social Research of the University of Trento. He obtained a PhD from the University of Bologna, was a post‐doctoral researcher at the University of Antwerp (2009-2013), and held positions as an Assistant professor at the LUISS Guido Carli (2013-2016) and the University of Bologna (2016). His research interests are in the area of International Political Economy, with particular emphasis on the politics of trade and investments, transnational advocacy at the global and EU-levels, and international regulatory cooperation. Recently, he expanded his research agenda to include analyses of how globalization-induced economic distress affects individual- level preferences and political behavior. He is the author of five monographs and his research has been published in journals such as International Organization, Regulation & Governance, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, the Journal of European Public Policy, Review of International Studies, the European Political Science Review and Review of International Organizations.

Reading List

Bauerle Danzman, S., and Meunier, S. (2024), ‘The EU’s Geoeconomic Turn: From Policy Laggard to Institutional Innovator’,  Journal of Common Market Studies, 62: 1097–1115

De Bièvre D. and Poletti A. (2014), ‘The EU in trade policy: From regime shaper to status quo power’, in Falkner, G. and Müller, P. (eds.), EU Policies in a Global Perspective: Shaping or taking international regimes? London and New York: Routledge

Dür A., Eckhardt J. and Poletti A. (2020), ‘Global Value Chains, the Anti-Globalization Backlash and EU Trade Policy: A Research Agenda’, Journal of European Public Policy, 27(6): 944-956.

Poletti A. (2025), ‘Trade‘, in Lucarelli S. and Sperling J. (eds.), Handbook of European Union Governance, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Dr. Sonali Chowdhry is a trade economist and Research Associate (tenure-track) based at the Firms and Markets Department, DIW Berlin. Her research investigates global supply chains, firm heterogeneity and the distributional implications of trade policy shocks. To study these issues, she analyses detailed transactions-level customs databases using modern econometric methods.

She also teaches international trade at the Hertie School in Berlin as a Guest Lecturer. In 2025, she was a Visiting Research Fellow at the Harvard Growth Lab and has been affiliated with the Trade Policy Research Centre at the Kiel Institute for the World Economy since 2019. Over 2022-2023, she was awarded the Max Weber Postdoctoral Fellowship by the European University Institute to analyse the effect of sanctions on global trade networks.

She completed her PhD in Economics (with distinction) from LMU Munich in 2022, funded by the EU’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions programme. Prior to this, she worked as a Junior Economist with the Ifo Institute’s Center for International Economics and pursued the MPhil in Economics from University of Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar from India.

Populism, Legitimacy, and the Politicization of Trade

Kent Jones, Dr. es sci. pol. (international economics), Graduate Institute of International Studies/University of Geneva, is Professor Emeritus of Economics at Babson College, where he taught from 1982 until his retirement in 2023. He continues his academic interests in trade policy and trade institutions, having published several books and articles on these topics, including Populism and Trade (2021). His teaching also included visiting appointments at Brandeis University, the Fletcher School at Tufts University, and the University of Innsbruck, Austria. In addition, he served as a visiting senior economist at the U.S. Department of State.

Abstract:  The GATT-WTO trading system emerged during the post-World War 2 period as a multilateral institution led by the United States that supported mutually recognized rules of trade policy, negotiations for trade liberalization, day-to-day contact among trade diplomats and dispute settlement among participants through third-party adjudication.  These functions generated positive externalities in trade relations based on coordination, cooperation, reciprocity, and a mutual recognition of the goals and benefits of trade liberalization. The system fostered eight successful rounds of trade negotiations from 1947 to 1994.  Yet the increasing diversity of its participants, along with globalization-driven adjustment crises in many countries, rapidly advancing technology and geopolitical conflict, began to erode the legitimacy of GATT-WTO rules.  Compounding these challenges, the trade policy of populist US President Donald Trump precipitated a major crisis as he abrogated numerous GATT-WTO system rules and norms, weakening its legitimacy.  Unilateral nationalist protectionism replaced multilateral cooperation as the US abandoned the core principle of non-discrimination in trade relations and abandoned previously negotiated tariff levels with its trade partners.  The shock was all the more devastating as the US had been the erstwhile leader and champion of the GATT-WTO system.  As President Trump approaches the mid-term elections of his second and final term in office, supporters of a rules-driven trading system are contemplating the possibilities and challenges of restoring the WTO’s legitimacy through reforms and initiatives, new leadership and increased flexibility in liberalizing trade in a diverse and divided world economy.

Reading List

Kent Jones (2023), Populism, Globalization, and the Prospects for Restoring the WTO, Politics and Governance, vol. 11 (1): 181-192).

Judith Goldstein and Alan Sykes (2025).  The Perils of Institutional Rigidity, or How the WTO Helped to Sow the Seeds of Trump.  World Trade Review, vol. 24: 481-489.

Patrick Low and George Riddell (2025).  Trump’s Trade Policy and the World Trade Organization.  World Trade Review, vol. 24: 489-497.

Bernard Hoekman (2025). Plurilateral cooperation in response to aggressive unilateralism?  Asia and the Global Economy, vol. 5 (2).

Dr. Neo Shithole is a non-resident research fellow at ECPS Foreign Policy Research Group. His Ph.D. at the University of Szeged, Hungary, examines the history and trends of populism and political communication in sub-Saharan Africa. Sithole has contributed to publications on democracy, the influence of populism on Western liberal democracies, democratic legitimation and populism possibilities for alternative kinds of democratic imaginings. His academic interests span African and European populism, Afro-European diplomacy, foreign policy, regional and global security, and promoting international solidarity. Sithole also serves as an ambassador for the Doktoranduszok Országos Szövetsége (DOSZ), the Hungarian Association of Doctoral Students, working to foster an inclusive and integrated scientific community.

Day 2 – Tuesday, July 7, 2026

Theme: EU–US Trade Relations under Pressure: Cooperation, Conflict, and Populism

Political Economy of EU–US Trade Relations

Erik Jones is Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Instituteand Non-resident Scholar at Carnegie Europe. Professor Jones is author of The Politics of Economic and Monetary Union (2002), Economic Adjustment and Political Transformation in Small States (2008), Weary Policeman: American Power in an Age of Austerity (2012 — with Dana H. Allin), The Year the European Crisis Ended (2014), and From Club to Commons: Enlargement, Reform, and Sustainability in European Integration (2025 — with Veronica Anghel). He is editor or co-editor of more than thirty books and special issues of journals on topics related to European politics and political economy, including reference works like The Oxford Handbook of the European Union (2012) and The Oxford Handbook of Italian Politics (2015). Professor Jones is also co-editor of Government and Opposition.

Elaine Fahey is Professor of EU Law at the City Law School, City St. Georges, University of London and Deputy Head of Department (academic programmes). She is co-convener of the Institute for the Study of European Law (ISEL), City Law School. She has been a Senior Land Steiermark Fellow of Law and Innovation at the University of Graz, Austria, a visiting Professor at Washington College of Law, American University, Washington DC, Emile Noël Fellow at New York University (NYU) Law School and a visiting professor at Keio University Law School, Tokyo, Japan as well as other visiting positions. She has worked as a Senior Postdoctoral Researcher at Amsterdam Centre for European Law & Governance (ACELG), University of Amsterdam, as a Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute (EUI), Florence and Assistant Lecturer and Lecturer in Law in Ireland (Dublin Institute of Technology; Trinity College Dublin). She has practised as a Barrister and was Chairperson of the Irish Society for European Law. She has been a stagiaire at the CJEU, Luxembourg, a Judicial Research Assistant, Four Courts, Dublin and a Judicial Extern, Los Angeles Federal District Court (9th Circuit). Her research interests span the relationship between the EU as a global digital actor, EU external relations, EU law and global governance, trade, transatlantic relations, cybersecurity and the EU’s AFSJ.

Populism and the Erosion/Reconfiguration of Transatlantic Trade Cooperation

Alasdair Young is Professor and Neal Family Chair in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He is Director of the School’s Center for Research on International Strategy and Policy and is Interim Associate Dean for Faculty Development for Georgia Tech’s Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts. He was Co-editor of JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies (2017– 2022) and was Chair of the European Union Studies Association (USA) (2015– 2017). Before joining Georgia Tech in 2011 he taught at the University of Glasgow for 10 years. Prior to that he held research posts at the European University Institute and the University of Sussex. He has written extensively on EU trade policy and transatlantic economic relations and performed consultancy work for the United States and United Kingdom governments and for the European Commission.

Abstract: Since the end of the Second World War the United States and Europe have pursued trade liberalization, initially through multilateral negotiations and subsequently through less successful bilateral cooperation.  As a result, the transatlantic economy is very valuable and deeply interpenetrated.  The transatlantic economic relationship has periodically been characterized by tensions and disputes, but these were of limited duration or narrowly contained.  During President Trump’s second term the US has reversed the process of closer economic integration and coerced the European Union into a lopsided trade agreement.  Trump ran in part on a populist anti-trade message and his policy ostensibly pursues that agenda, but the populist message on trade has been complicated by the perceived adverse impact of higher tariffs on consumers.  This lecture will situate recent US transatlantic trade policy in historical perspective, making clear what a departure from past practice it has been in both substance and form.  It will also explain why the EU accepted a lopsided agreement and assess whether the policy has realized US objectives.  It will also consider where transatlantic economic relations might go from here.

Reading List

Baldwin, R. (2026), World War Trade: Conflict, Containment, and the Emergent World Trading Order, Rapid Response Economics 7, CEPR Press, pp. 7-14

Mutz, D.C. (2021), “How Americans Think About Trade: Winners, Losers, and the Psychology of Globalization,” Foreign Affairs, 30 July.

Young, A.R. (2025), “From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations During Trump 2” in M. Riddervold, G. Rosen, & J.R. Greenberg, (2026). Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026, 128-141.

Moderator: Prof Jessica Lawrence, Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law

Jessica Lawrence is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Essex School of Law. Dr Lawrence’s research focuses on issues relating to international economic integration, including at the WTO, in regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements, and within the EU internal market. She has a particular interest in the interaction between economic and non-economic public policy goals, and in the ways in which trade and investment agreements take into account their impacts on human rights, labour, sustainable development, environmental protection, and gender. Her work often takes a critical perspective, applying tools drawn from constructivist international relations theory, post-Foucauldian governmentality studies, and other strands of post-positivist thought to examine the impact of discourses and framing devices on politics and law. Prior to joining the University of Essex, Dr Lawrence was Associate Professor at Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. She holds a PhD in Transnational Legal Studies from the Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, the Netherlands, and a JD in Law from the University of Georgia in the United States. In addition to her academic work, Dr Lawrence has held various positions at NGOs, think tanks, and universities in the US, EU, India, New Zealand, and Costa Rica, and continues to provide research and training for governmental and non-governmental organizations on issues related to trade and investment agreements and their impact on social policy goals.

Day 3 – Wednesday, July 8, 2026 

Theme: The EU Between the US and China: Trade, Power, and Strategic Autonomy

Strategic Autonomy, De-risking, and EU Economic Security Tools

Reuben Wong is Deputy Head of the Political Science Department at the National University of Singapore. Reuben held the first Jean Monnet Chair in Singapore (2013–2016) and was NUS’ Associate Vice-President, Global Relations (2021– 2023). His publications have focused on EU foreign policy. They include The Europeanization of French Foreign Policy: France and the EU in East Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), National and European Foreign Policies (co-edited with Christopher Hill, Routledge, 2011), and journal articles in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Politique Européenne, the Asia Europe Journal, The Hague Journal of Diplomacy, and the EU External Affairs Review. He has held visiting positions at Cambridge University, the LSE European Institute, the Stimson Center (Washington, D.C.), the East Asian Institute (Singapore), and Humboldt University. He consults and teaches summer school in Paris and Beijing. Reuben raises four children to help arrest Singapore’s declining total fertility rate.

The EU’s Policy Towards Asia Amidst Changing US–China Security and Trade Dynamics

Abstract: How best to explain the EU and member states’ quiet security and economic recalibration of relations vis-à-vis China and Asia? Reactiveness to Chinese assertiveness, the need to achieve economic security, as well as the emergence of interlinkages between the East Asian and European security theatres following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine is accompanied by economic interests in what is the region that is fast becoming the locomotive of the world economy, including in its procurement market. US demand signals and the emulation of practice from local players, such as Japan, have also driven the process.  As the Transatlantic alliance faces a rupture under the second Trump administration, this lecture also probes the tenability of alternative routes to salvage Transatlantic and Indo-Pacific cooperation and engagement towards the so-called “Indo-Pacific”, suggesting potential solutions and ways to manage policy expectations.

Reading List

Angela Pennisi di Floristella and Giulio Pugliese. “The Historical Evolution of Relations between the European Union and Asia”, in Thomas Christiansen, Evi Fitriani, Emil Kirchner, and Youngah Guahk [eds.], The Palgrave Handbook of EU-Asia Relations (2nd Edition), Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2026, Chapter 1.

Giulio Pugliese and Aurelio Insisa, “How to use the maximum of potential for the EU-Taiwan cooperation – what can the EU learn from the US and other actors?”, in-depth policy study requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), 26 November 2025: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/EXPO_IDA(2025)754482

Giulio Pugliese, “The European Union and an ‘Indo-Pacific’ Alignment”, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. 31 (4), 2024, pp. 17-44.

Giulio Pugliese. “Japan’s China Grand Strategy: A Blueprint for Transatlantic Players?” in Rogier E. Creemers, Silvia Menegazzi, Neysun A. Mahboubi [eds.] Transatlantic Perspectives on China, London and New York: Routledge, 2026, Chapter 6.

Giulio Pugliese short interview – March 2026, Japan and Europe in the Face of US-China Geopolitical Rivalry https://cgpbalancingact.substack.com/p/japan-and-europe-in-the-face-of-us

Anita Tusor is a PhD Student in International Relations at Charles University, Prague, specializing in security and strategic studies. She holds a Double Master’s Degree in Asian and European Affairs from King’s College London and Renmin University of China, as well as an MA in Applied Linguistics and a BA in Hungarian and Chinese Studies. Her professional experience includes research and policy work with NATO Allied Command Transformation, the Institute of International Relations in Prague, the European Center for Populism Studies, and the European Values Center for Security Policy. Her research interests focus on Chinese cognitive warfare, foreign malign influence operations, populist constitutionalism, and Asia-Pacific security.

 

Day 4 – Thursday, July 9, 2026

Theme: The Indo-Pacific Turn: EU Trade Strategy in a Shifting Global Centre

US Indo-Pacific Strategy and Its Trade Implications

Kristi Govella is Associate Professor of Japanese Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and Senior Adviser and Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Govella specializes in the intersection of economics, security, and governance, with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region and Japan. Her research has examined topics such as economic statecraft, government-business relations, regional institutional architecture, military alliances, non-traditional security, and the governance of the global commons. Prior to joining the University of Oxford, Dr. Govella held positions at the University of Hawai‘i at Mānoa, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, Harvard University, and the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley.

Abstract: Over the past two decades, the United States has intensified its focus on Asia due to the region’s strategic importance for both economics and security. In 2011, the “pivot to Asia” was announced, and during the course of the Obama, Trump 1.0, and Biden administrations, the U.S. gradually redefined the region as the “Indo-Pacific” and attempted to enhance its engagement. However, the role of trade in U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy has become increasingly complex, as “America first” concerns about trade deficits, reshoring, and industrial revitalization have gradually weakened the economic pillar of U.S. regional policy. This lecture will examine the evolution of U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy with particular attention to the changing role of economic engagement and implications for regional and global trade.

Reading List

U.S. Department of State, “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision” (November 2019). Available at https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Free-and-Open-Indo-Pacific-4Nov2019.pdf

The White House, “Indo-Pacific Strategy of the United States” (February 2022). Available at https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf

The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (November 2025). Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf

Andrea Carteny is a Professor at Sapienza University of Rome, Italy, where he teaches International Relations History, Nationalisms and Minorities at the SARAS (History Anthropology Religions Arts Spectacle) Department. He is a Fullbright Alumni and Director of the Hungarian Studies Review (RSU) and he focused his research on national minorities, nationalities and nationalisms in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area during the 19th- 20th Centuries. He is a member of the Italian Society of International History (SISI) and a participant in the main conventions and conferences on nation studies, national minorities and nationalisms history. He is author of many articles and books in this field, among them the editions Il Mar Nero. Identità nazionali e dinamiche di sicurezza (with G. Natalizia, 2023), Il Pan-nazionalismo in Eurasia e il mito del Turan (with P. Pizzolo, 2023), A New Continent Called Europe (2005), and the monographs La questione transilvana nel periodo interbellico (2020) and Dal micro-nazionalismo all’Europa (2011).

EU Engagement in the Indo-Pacific (FTAs, Partnerships, Strategic Positioning)

Axel Berkofsky is Associate Professor at the University of Pavia, Italy and Senior Fellow/Senior Advisory at the Asia Centre at the Milan-based Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI). Axel Berkofsky is also Chairman of the Selection Committee and Vice-Chairman Executive Committee of the Canon Foundation Europe, Executive Committee Board Member at the Stockholm-based European Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN) and Research Affiliate at the European Institute of Japanese Studies at the Stockholm School of Economics. Previously, Dr. Berkofsky was Senior Policy Analyst, Associate Policy Analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre (EPC) and Research Fellow at the Brussels-based European Institute for Asian Studies (EIAS). At the EPC in Brussels, Axel Berkofsky has – in his capacity as the Director of the EPC’s former EU-Asia programme – worked and interacted on a de facto daily basis with EU officials, policymakers and diplomats. Furthermore, Dr. Berkofsky has in the recent years been involved – as scholar, researcher and moderator – in numerous panels, workshops and seminars on EU-Japan relations, EU-China relations and EU-Asia relations. In his capacity as Board Member of the Stockholm-based Europen Japan Advanced Research Network (EJARN), Dr. Berkofsky has since 2008 co-organized numerous conferences, seminars and workshops on EU-Japan relations at numerous think tanks and universities in Europe and Japan. Dr. Berkofsky is a fluent Japanese speaker and has altogether lived three years in Japan. Furthermore, Dr. Berkofsky has taught and lectured at numerous universities and think tanks in Japan, Mainland China, Taiwan, Vietnam, South Korea, The Philippines, Singapore etc. In addition, Axel Berkofsky has for several years worked as freelance journalist at the Hong Kong-based Asia Times. Axel Berkofsky has published and edited numerous books and has authored and published more than 250 journal articles, newspaper articles, essays, policy papers and policy briefings. Prof. Berkofsky is a regular consultant, speaker and presenter at conferences, seminars and workshops organized and sponsored by the European Union (EU).

Dr. Sebastien Goulard is the manager of Cooperans, a public affairs and project management consultancy specialized in EU-Asia connectivity projects. Sebastien Goulard is also the editor of the Global Connectivities platform which aims to analyse the development of corridors around the world. During his doctoral studies at EHESS (School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences), Paris Sebastien Goulard participated in several European research programs dealing with sustainable urbanization in China. Sebastien Goulard holds a BA (hons) degree in international politics (ESE, Nottingham Trent University), a MA degree in international relations (IRIS, France) and a MA degree in social sciences (EHESS).

Day 5 – Friday, July 10, 2026

Theme: The Future of EU Trade Power: Between Fragmentation and Leadership

Can the EU lead? Policy Tools, Regulatory Power, and Global Influence

Prof. Dr. Markus Kotzur, LL.M. (Duke Univ.) studied law in Freiburg and Bayreuth. In 1993, he passed the First State Examination and subsequently obtained the title “Legum Magister” (LL.M.) at Duke University (North Carolina). In 2002, after completing his legal traineeship, he received his doctorate from the University of Bayreuth. This was followed in 2002 by his habilitation with a thesis on “Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe”. In 2005, he was appointed Professor of European and International Law and Public Law at the University of Leipzig. Since 2011, he has been head of the Master’s programme “European and European Legal Studies” and since 2018 president at the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg. Since 2012, he has held the professorship for Public Law, European and International Law at the University of Hamburg and is Deputy Director of the Institute for International Affairs. From October 2015 to March 2020 he was vice Dean for Studies and Teaching and since April 2020 Vice Dean for International relations of the Faculty.

Abstract: This lecture ties in with the current debate surrounding the so-called ‘strategic autonomy’ of the European Union. It aims to critically examine, on the one hand, whether the EU possesses the political capacity to act autonomously in strategic matters and, on the other hand, whether the constitutional framework of primary Union law provides the necessary normative foundations for this. In particular, the question will be raised as to whether the Union’s self-description as a ‘normative power’ is tenable and is underpinned by appropriate policy tools. Finally, a possible transformation from ‘normative power’ to ‘military power’ will be examined from a legal perspective.

Camille Nessel holds a Ph.D. in political science and is currently a lecturer at the Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), teaching within the Centre d’étude de la vie politique (Cevipol). Her research focuses on EU perceptions in trade, particularly regarding the EU’s relations with Indonesia and Vietnam, as well as on the “China threat” construction in EU economic security strategy. Camille was awarded a doctoral fellowship from FNRS and is now preparing a postdoctoral project on the construction of the “China threat” in EU economic policies. Having gained research experience in Southeast Asia while living in both Indonesia and Vietnam, she has acquired valuable expertise in the region. She has also worked for the European Commission, served as a political advisor for the Chair of the International Trade Committee in the European Parliament, and gained experience in the NGO sector, combining theory and practice in her teaching and research.

Internship

Internship Positions at the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHome

DOWNLOAD ANNOUNCEMENT

Duration: 6 months 

Commitment: Part-time(10 hours per week) 

Location: Remote internship

Description

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) is looking for motivated interns to join our team. As an intern, you will have the opportunity to enhance your analytical thinking, academic writing, research skills, and organizational and networking abilities in a dynamic multicultural environment. The internship will begin at the end of February and willlast for six months.

Main Tasks

•     Conduct academic research (primarily desk research) and write essays, commentaries, and articles on topicscovered by ECPS research programs, including authoritarianism, digital populism, economics, gender, migration, environment and climate, extremism and radicalization, foreign policy, human rights, global peace and order, and leadership.

•     Prepare briefs and reports summarizing monthly and annual activities (such as panels, seminars, and conferences) for publication on the ECPS website.

•     Assist ECPS experts in organizing various events (including book talks, seminars, panels, summer schools, and symposiums).

•     Support the ECPS team with communication activities, such as preparing the online newsletter and managing social media accounts.

•     Contribute to project applications (e.g., EU-funded projects).

•     Help implement ongoing projects, including data collection, report writing, dissemination, communication activities, and event organization, depending on ECPS’s role in the project.

Who We Are

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) is an independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization based in Brussels dedicated to researching and analyzing the challenges posed by rising political populism. ECPS promotes anopen society by adhering to the principles of liberal democracy, including the rule of law, human rights, pluralism, freedom of speech, gender equality, social and environmental justice, transparency, and accountability. We facilitate collaboration among networks of academics, practitioners, policymakers, media, and other stakeholders. We offer a platform for exploring policy solutions related to rising populism and provide insights for effective policymaking and critical analysis. To achieve this, ECPS produces research publications, policy reports, white papers, and commentaries, conducts interviews with experts, and organizes events, seminars, workshops, and conferences.

Qualifications and Experience

Essentials

•     Possess at least a master’s degree in social sciences (applications from master’s students at the stage of dissertation writing will be accepted)

•     Knowledge and/or interest in global politics and populism-related topics, particularly in, but not limited to, the European context

•     Knowledge and experience in academic writing

•     Knowledge of scientific methodology (qualitative or quantitative research methods)

•     Fluency in the English language (both verbal and written)

•     Excellent influencing, facilitation and communication skills (both orally and in writing)

•     Being able to work, organize and prioritize autonomously

•     Being competent in off-the-shelf software (MS Excel, Word, Outlook and PowerPoint)

•     A collaborative team member

•     Experience of work/study in a multicultural environment

•     Possess a creative, proactive and open mindset with high respect for deadlines.

What We Offer

•     Enlarge your network with academics, policymakers, project experts and other stakeholders across Europe

•     Learn about populism and gain a deeper insight into contemporary issues in European and global politics

•     Publish your research product and related outputs through ECPS

•     Take part in the EU events, academic conferences, seminars, workshops, project preparation and implementation activities in Brussels

•     Improve your organizational, communication and networking skills through actively taking part in ECPS events

•     Opportunity to be a permanent member of the ECPS Youth

•     Gain invaluable experience in an international and multicultural environment

Internship Conditions

The internship is unpaid, remote and part-time for 6 months starting at the end of September 2026.

How to Apply?

If you are interested in joining us and making ECPS your next professional experience, please send your CV and cover letter (a maximum of one page) to Seyma Celem at scelem@populismstudies.org midnight CET on September 15, 2026, with the subject line “Internship at ECPS.”

Unfortunately, we cannot respond to every application; only short-listed candidates will be contacted. However, allapplications will be kept in file, and candidates will be contacted if a suitable opportunity arises. The information provided in the applications is subject to EU legislation on the protection of personal data and confidentiality of information.

ECPS is committed to diversity and inclusion to ensure that everyone has equal opportunities for employment, advancement, and retention, regardless of their gender, age, nationality, ethnic origin, religion or belief, cultural background, sexual orientation, or disability.

Amsterdam, Muslims.

Part IV — Rethinking the Nexus of Racialization and Populism: Lessons from the Study

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

In the concluding installment of her series, Lianne Nota offers a theoretically and empirically grounded reassessment of the relationship between populism and racialization. Moving beyond conventional assumptions, she demonstrates that while racialization is central to certain forms of right-wing populism, it is not an inherent feature of populism itself but contingent upon broader ideological configurations. By foregrounding the role of “new racism” and the discursive linking of categories such as migration, religion, and security, Nota reveals how exclusionary boundaries can be constructed without explicit reference to race. At the same time, the analysis highlights the possibility of de-racializing political discourse through more inclusive articulations of “the people.” The article thus advances a nuanced framework for understanding how language shapes political belonging and exclusion.

By Lianne Nota*

This series set out to explore a question that is often overlooked in populism research: how and under what conditions does racialization shape the construction of the populist ‘people’? By analyzing parliamentary debates in the Netherlands, the findings point to a clear but nuanced conclusion. While racialization plays a significant role in right-wing populism, it is not an inherent feature of populism as such.

Is Racialization Inherent to Populism?

A key takeaway from this study is that populist actors do not automatically produce racialized understandings of ‘the people.’ Both Dutch populist parties under examination relied on a populist logic separating ‘the people’ from ‘the elite,’ yet only one consistently constructed these categories in racialized terms.

This suggests that the presence of racialization depends less on populism itself, and more on the ideological context in which populism is articulated. In the case examined here, right-wing populist discourse constructed ‘the people’ through exclusionary boundaries that essentialized cultural and religious differences, while left-wing populist discourse emphasized inclusivity and resisted such essentialization.

At the same time, this finding should not be taken to mean that left-wing populism is inherently immune to racialization. Rather, it highlights the importance of examining these dynamics empirically, rather than relying on a priori assumptions regarding the presence (or absence) of racialization in populism.

New Racism

Another important insight is that racialization often operates indirectly. Throughout this study, explicit references to race were absent. Instead, references to culture, religion, and civilization performed a similar function. By presenting religious and cultural differences as fixed and immutable, the discourse created boundaries that closely resemble racial hierarchies, without ever using the language of race itself. 

This reflects what scholars have called ‘new racism,’ where cultural differences replace biological difference as the basis for exclusion. Another word to describe this type of racism is cultural racism. Cultural or new racism is not necessarily less innocent than ‘traditional’ biological racism, for the cultural boundaries that separate people from each other are presupposed to be absolute, meaning no ‘outsider’ can ever be assimilated into ‘the people (MacMaster, 2001: 194-195). In other words, “cultural racism as a discourse performs the same task as biological racism, as culture functions in the same way as nature, creating closed and bounded cultural groups,” (Wren, 2001: 144). 

Understanding racialization in this broader sense is especially important in contexts like the Netherlands. As mentioned in the first article, discussions of racism are often avoided by a majority of academics and policymakers in the Netherlands (Grosfoguel & Mielants, 2006). However, this does not mean that racism is absent from the Netherlands. In fact, as Weiner (2014) argues, racism takes a peculiar form in the Netherlands, rooted in the denial of race as significant and the particular Dutch history of colonization. Building on this, this study shows us how exclusionary logics can persist even in the absence of explicit references to race or racism.

The Importance of Discursive Linkages

The analysis also shows how racialization does not occur only through how ‘the people’ are described, but also through how different categories are linked together.

In right-wing discourse, groups such as Muslims, migrants, and terrorists were frequently connected, forming a broader threatening ‘Other.’ This process can be understood as kind of a discursive chain, where distinct categories are treated as equivalent.

This finding builds on existing scholarship on populism. While scholars have used the idea of a ‘chain of equivalence’ to explain how demands are linked together (Laclau, 2005), this study suggests that a similar logic can operate in the construction of perceived threats. By linking different groups into a single category, the boundaries of ‘the people’ become sharper and can exclude large portions of society from ‘the people’.

Looking Forward

Taken together, these findings draw attention to how processes of (de-)racialization are implied in the construction of the populist ‘people.’ In doing so, this study suggests that race, racism, and racialization are concepts that should be considered more systematically in relation to populism. Societally, this study demonstrates (again) that discourse has real consequences for real people. How something or someone is talked about has real-world implications that can affect the inclusion or exclusion of particular groups from society. In particular, this study warrants us to pay attention to how exclusion is naturalized through language and how groups of people are systemically excluded even in absence of terms like ‘race.’

At the same time, this article series also suggests that such exclusionary discriminatory framings are not inevitable. By emphasizing inclusivity, the protection of human rights, and the rule of law, more pluralistic understandings of ‘the people’ can be advanced. 

However, like any study, this analysis has its limitations. It has focused on a single country, a specific time period, and a limited number of political actors. As such, the findings cannot be generalized to all cases of populism across the world. 

This opens up avenues for future research. Comparative research across different countries could help determine whether similar patterns emerge elsewhere. It would also be interesting to analyze less traditional platforms like social media networks in order to examine whether racialization plays out differently depending on the platform of choice. Finally, future research could link the discursive dimension of racialization more to the material or institutional dimensions of racialization, for example, by examining how racializing or de-racializing discourse translates into policy decisions and institutional practices. 

Ultimately, this article series highlights a broader point: how we talk about ‘the people’ matters. The boundaries drawn through language shape who is included and who is excluded. Paying attention to these boundaries is therefore not only an academic exercise, but also a necessary step in understanding and potentially challenging the dynamics of exclusion in contemporary politics.

 

(*) Lianne Nota is an ECPS intern and Research Master’s student in International Relations at the University of Groningen, with a focus on identity, populism, ontological security, and the ethics of global affairs. These article series is based on her paper “Constructing ‘The People’: The Role of Racialization in Dutch Populist Discourse” that she wrote for her specialization phase at RUG.

 

References

Grosfoguel, R., & Mielants, E. (2006). “Introduction: Minorities, Racism and Cultures of Scholarship.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 47(3–4), 179–189. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715206065780

Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason (1st edn). Verso.

MacMaster, N. (2001). Racism in Europe, 1870-2000. Palgrave. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-4033-9

Weiner, M. F. (2014). “The Ideologically Colonized Metropole: Dutch Racism and Racist Denial.” Sociology Compass, 8(6), 731–744. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12163

Wren, K. (2001). “Cultural racism: Something rotten in the state of Denmark?” Social & Cultural Geography, 2(2), 141–162. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649360120047788

See other parts of the series

Part 1 — Constructing ‘The People’: The Role of Racialization in Dutch Populist Discourse

Part 2 — Studying “the People”: A Discourse-Analytical Approach to Populism

Part 3 — (De-)racializing ‘the People’: Who Is the Dutch Populist ‘People’?

Geert Wilders

Part III — (De-)racializing ‘the People’: Who Is the Dutch Populist ‘People’?

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

In the third installment of her series, author Lianne Nota presents a nuanced comparative analysis of how “the people” are constructed within Dutch populist discourse. Drawing on parliamentary debates, she demonstrates that right- and left-wing populist actors do not merely differ in tone but articulate fundamentally distinct logics of political belonging. While the Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) constructs a homogeneous and exclusionary “people” through the racialization of a Muslim “other,” the Socialistische Partij (SP) advances a more inclusive, civic conception that actively resists such boundary-making. By juxtaposing processes of racialization and de-racialization, Nota offers a compelling empirical contribution that challenges prevailing assumptions about populism’s relationship to exclusion, highlighting instead the contingent and discursive nature of political community formation.

By Lianne Nota*

In the previous parts, we outlined the project in terms of literature, method, and data. In this part, the findings of the analysis will be shared. To reiterate, this study analyzed parliamentary debates about migration, Islam, terrorism, and radicalization in the Netherlands during the 2015 refugee crisis. Through a comparison of how a right- and left-wing populist party spoke about ‘the people’ and various Others, the role of racialization in the construction of ‘the people’ was analyzed. What emerged is not just a difference in tone or emphasis, but a fundamentally different understanding of who belongs and who doesn’t.

PVV: The Homogenous Judeo-Christian People, the Tacialized Muslim Other and the Culpable Elite

The Construction of ‘the People’

PVV consistently presented itself as the party for the ordinary, hardworking, overlooked people. For example, in the debate on the terrorist attacks in Paris at the beginning of January 2015, frontman Geert Wilders stated that “I am [emphasis added] one of the victims, and not just me, but the entirety of the Netherlands and lots of others” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a). As part of the common Dutch people, the PVV thus insisted on representing their voice.

For the PVV, ‘the people’ consisted of an innocent Judeo-Christian community that is being threatened by ‘Islamization.’ For example, one speaker expressed that “Islam is alien [‘wezensvreemd’] to the Judeo-Christian and humanist norms, values and traditions on which the Dutch society is based” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015b). In the context of the terrorist attacks in Paris, Wilders stated that he was “furious that, because of Islam, innocent victims fell again: jews, Islam critics and innocent people” and that “Islam simply does not belong to the Netherlands and is a danger to it,”(Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a).

Islam was portrayed as slowly taking over and threatening ‘our’ culture, for example, through an expression like “we are having to put our [emphasis added] Christian culture with the garbage” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015c).Wilders even explicitly mentions that he does not see the encounter with Islam as a clash of civilizations, but rather as “a clash, a confrontation, between civilization and barbarism” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a). Entire population groups (primarily Muslims) are thus systematically excluded from ‘the people’ along civilizational lines.

The Construction of ‘the Other’ and ‘the Elite’

The construction of ‘the people’ by PVV happened also through constructing a foreign Other. In this regard, PVV speakers positioned themselves as warriors for freedom fighting against Islam, and simultaneously as experts in Islam. For example, Wilders declared that “I am standing here to fight the root of all evil. That root of all evil is called Islam. I-s-l-a-m. Islam,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015d). At the same time, one of the PVV speakers portrayed an SP opponent as ignorant in claiming that “it takes a lot of work to know exactly what Islam represents and how you can recognize it. I’m not going to give a lecture about it. To Ms. Karabulut of the SP, I say: bury yourself in the books, in the Quran, in hadith, and in the sira. Then you have enough to read and maybe you’ll find out,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015b). This signaled the PVV’s anti-Islam and anti-Muslim position in the debates, while at the same time bolstering their claims as authoritative speakers.

For PVV, the boundaries between Muslims, immigrants, and terrorists were fundamentally blurred. This becomes most clear in the debate about the terrorist attacks in Paris, where Wilders claimed that “of course not all Muslims are terrorists, but almost all terrorists nowadays are Muslims,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a). He continued, “For decades, mass immigration has brought hundreds of thousands of people with an alien culture into Europe, into our country. Why do we import all this misery? Islam brings hate and violence everywhere it goes,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a).

In passages like these, it is assumed that terrorism stems from Islam, and through mass immigration, we are inviting Islamist terrorists to our country. Importantly, PVV speakers also linked these categories discursively through attributing physical features. Immigrants were portrayed as “masses of young men of around 20 years with beards” singing “allahu akbar-like songs” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015c). This obviously refers to young Muslim men. But in the data, terrorists were described by Wilders as “people who scream allahu akbar” as well, linking terrorists to immigrants and Muslims (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015d). 

As for the elite, PVV speakers depicted political opponents and ruling parties not only as failing to address issues like terrorism and migration, but also as actively enabling them. For example, in the context of the Paris terrorist attacks, Wilders starts by saying that “of course the government is not responsible for every attack.” Still, he continues that “if someone who could have been stopped from returning to the Netherlands, if someone who the government has stopped from returning to Syria, if someone from another Schengen country comes to the Netherlands and commits a terrorist attack, then this government has blood on its hands,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a). Statements like these elevate responsibility into moral blame. 

These kinds of accusations were blended with portrayals of political opponents as “the political elite who look away,”(Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a), “incompetent” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a) and “scandalously neglecting its duty” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a). 

PVV speakers also frequently used a kind of rhetoric that was meant to ridicule political opponents, for example declaring that “I was scared for a moment that clown Bassie [a famous clown in a children’s tv programme] was standing in front of me, but it was mister Kuzu” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015b). As opposed to these political opponents, PVV was depicted as telling the uncomfortable but necessary truth. For example, Wilders mentions that “it’s an awkward truth, but one that must be told: we are talking today about an invasion, an Islamic invasion of Europe, of the Netherlands,”(Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015c). The mixing of these strategies creates a sharp moral divide between ‘the people’ as represented by the PVV and the elite who are portrayed as detached from or indifferent to concerns of ‘ordinary’ Dutch people.

Presence of Racialization in the Discourse

The framing of ‘the people’ by the PVV can be seen as an instance of racialization. There is a boundary that is drawn very clearly between ‘us,’ ‘the people,’ and ‘them,’ Islam or Muslims. In addition, Islam is constructed not merely as a set of beliefs, but as an essentialized and homogeneous category that is incompatible with ‘our’ Dutch identity. In this regard, ‘we’ are clearly presumed superior vis-à-vis ‘them.’ 

Furthermore, the PVV construction of ‘the elite’ did not directly racialize ‘the people’ but could indirectly reinforce how racialization happens. The strong moral opposition between ‘the elite’ and ‘the people’ heightens the sense of urgency and crisis, which indirectly strengthens the exclusionary boundaries drawn between ‘people’ and ‘other.’ Overall, the PVV thus constructed a threatening racialized ‘other’ which, in turn, sharpened the boundaries of ‘the people’ as a homogeneous collective. 

SP: The Inclusive People, the De-racialized Other and the Irresponsible Elite

The Construction of ‘the People’

In contrast to the PVV, the SP tried to portray itself as the protector of the rule of law and individual freedoms by emphasizing “the freedom to think, believe, draw, and write whatever you want” as a central part of ‘our’ democracy (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a). SP speakers also stressed that they represented the ‘ordinary’ people in terms of wealth. For example, a speaker assertively stated that “nothing is shared fairly. Everything is for the rich, and those who are poor are screwed” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015e). 

SP members also emphasized that the Netherlands is generally a rich country, such as claiming that “in a rich country like the Netherlands, nobody sleeps under a bridge and we don’t eat from trash bins” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015f). SP thus positioned itself as defenders of the law and the less wealthy.

The ‘people’ constructed by SP was also a far more inclusive category compared to PVV. For example, regarding the terrorist attacks in Paris, the frontman of SP at the time, Emile Roemer, stated that “I am also here to protect the freedom of all [emphasis added] Dutch people. That means I have a lot of trouble with Mr. Wilders describing 1 million Dutch people with an Islamic background as potential terrorists,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a). 

In the other debates as well, it becomes clear that, for the SP, Muslims are explicitly included in their understanding of ‘the people.’ For example, in one debate, a SP member stated that “I want to clarify that we should all stand firm for the freedoms and fundamental rights of all people, whether it concerns Islamic people, non-religious people, or people of a different religion,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015b). In this way, ‘the people’ is constructed not as a homogeneous entity but as a diverse collective united by the law.

The Construction of ‘the Other’ and ‘the Elite’

As for the construction of a foreign Other, the SP presented itself as a protector of vulnerable communities and their human rights, often explicitly opposing the PVV. For example, Roemer expressed that “people fear attacks in the Netherlands and wonder how they can defend themselves when terror comes so close. But people also fear that divisions between population groups are growing, between Muslims and non-Muslims, and that people of good will are being pitted against each other,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a).

SP also expressed their involvement in these communities by positioning itself as an eyewitness to the experiences of these minorities, especially migrants. For example, Roemer stated that “my party members have seen with their own eyes how vulnerable children are who are in the region of Syria, Libanon or Turkey,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015g). SP thus saw itself as defender of the human rights and safety of vulnerable people, especially migrants.

For the SP, the boundaries between Islam, migrants, and terrorists were very clearly maintained. While SP speakers also addressed issues such as terrorism, they did so mostly from a legal point of view, describing terrorism as “a horrible form of criminality” or terrorists as “people who try to overthrow or harm the legal order here or in other parts of the world,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015h). SP speakers were adamant that terrorists should be seen as “extremists that attack our freedoms under the flag of Islam,” instead of ordinary Muslims (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015a). As such, rather than Islam or Muslims being framed as ‘other,’ terrorists are the clear ‘other’ of a ‘people’ that expressly includes Muslims.

As implied before, migrants and refugees were frequently constructed as vulnerable individuals rather than a potential threat. This was done, for example, by explicitly including children in descriptions of migrants. In this regard, Roemer talked about “children of 3, 4, 5 years old selling flowers in those camps to be able to buy something like a slice of bread,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015g). Thus, just like ‘the people’ are seen as victims of terrorism, refugees and migrants are seen as victims of war and conflict, similarly in need of protection by the government.

As for their attitude towards the elite, the SP was markedly less aggressive and condemning towards the ruling parties and the government than the PVV. The SP did frame political elites as naïve and detached, such as in statements like “the prime minister is bailing again” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015g) or calling on a minister to “do his job better” and asking whether “he still has all his ducks in a row” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015h). However, in general, SP discourse was fairly institutional and targeted towards policy effectiveness. Rather than accusing the government of betraying the people, it was (constructively) criticized for not doing enough or not taking the right actions.

Presence of De-racialization in the Discourse

As a result, the framing of ‘the people’ as including multiple diverse population groups could be seen as an act of de-racialization that can be summed up by the following contribution: “Whether it concerns people who are black or white, whether they are being persecuted because of their race or their religion; people are people, European or not, and they remain people,” (Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, 2015e). Here, race and religion are both explicitly invoked to argue that they should not be used as discriminatory bases. Therefore, the SP’s discourse constructs ‘the people’ largely in a more inclusive and civic way, rather than drawing divisions between groups of people in society.

Two Logics?

Taken together, the analysis demonstrates that the constructions of ‘the people,’ ‘the other,’ and ‘the elite’ are combined in different ways with different effects by PVV and SP. While PVV consistently constructed a homogeneous ‘people’ through racializing a threatening ‘other’ reinforced by a strongly antagonistic ‘elite,’ SP constructed a more inclusive understanding of ‘the people’ by resisting the racialization of out-groups. These findings highlight not only important differences between right- and left-wing populist actors but also raise important questions about the relationship between populism and racialization in general. In the following and final part, we will therefore reflect on what these findings mean for how we understand the relationship between populism and racialization more broadly.

 

(*) Lianne Nota is an ECPS intern and Research Master’s student in International Relations at the University of Groningen, with a focus on identity, populism, ontological security, and the ethics of global affairs. These article series is based on her paper “Constructing ‘The People’: The Role of Racialization in Dutch Populist Discourse” that she wrote for her specialization phase at RUG.

 

References

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2015a). “De aanslag in Parijs.” https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2014-2015/41#40d004c2. 

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2015b). “Komst moskee in Gouda.” https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2014-2015/95#b73a0f77. 

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2015c). “Gemeenschappelijk asielbeleid in Europa.” https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2014-2015/111#07cd76b4. 

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2015d). “Aanslagen in Parijs.” https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2015-2016/27#d0f39abf.  

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2015e). “Instroom asielzoekers.” https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2014-2015/68#e3e2931c. 

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2015f). “Uitkomsten onderhandelingen inzake bed, bad en brood.” https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2014-2015/83#ae18d915. 

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2015g). “Gemeenschappelijk asielbeleid in Europa.” https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2014-2015/111#d573540e. 

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal. (2015h). “Ontnemen van het Nederlanderschap bij terroristische misdrijven.” https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/plenaire_verslagen/detail/2014-2015/60#9ad08f9e. 


See other parts of the series

Part 1 — Constructing ‘The People’: The Role of Racialization in Dutch Populist Discourse

Part 2 — Studying “the People”: A Discourse-Analytical Approach to Populism

Part 4: Rethinking the Nexus of Racialization and Populism: Lessons from the Study

Amsterdam, people.

Part II — Studying ‘the People’: A Discourse-Analytical Approach to Populism

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

In the second installment of her series, the author Lianne Nota advances the analysis by developing a rigorous methodological framework for studying the construction of “the people” in populist discourse. Moving beyond abstract theorization, she introduces a discourse-analytical approach grounded in Critical Discourse Analysis and the Discourse-Historical Approach (DHA), emphasizing the interplay between language, power, and historical context. By operationalizing racialization through boundary-making, essentialization, and moral differentiation, Nota provides a precise analytical toolkit for identifying how political actors construct inclusion and exclusion—even in the absence of explicit racial references. Focusing on Dutch parliamentary debates during the 2015 refugee crisis, this contribution bridges conceptual and empirical inquiry, offering a nuanced pathway for examining how populist narratives produce and legitimize social hierarchies.

By Lianne Nota*

To analyze how and if Dutch populist actors have constructed ‘the people’ in racialized terms, we are in need of an empirical approach to actually study these processes in practice. This approach needs to be attentive to how ‘the people’ is not a concept determined a priori, but how they are actively constructed by populist parties in particular contexts. This is where a discourse-analytical perspective comes in.

Adopting a Discursive Approach

While discourse is a notoriously hard concept to define, for this article series, it is enough to understand that discourse refers to how language use in speech and writing functions as a form of ‘social practice.’ This means that a discourse constitutes situations, people, and objects of knowledge, but is also socially conditioned by them (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997: 258). In other words, discourse treats language not as a neutral medium, but as a form of social practice. Language does not merely reflect social and political reality but also constitutes it.

To capture these dynamics, this series draws on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and more specifically on the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) in order to analyze racialization in populist discourse.

The Discourse-Historical Approach

The DHA is particularly well-suited for studying questions of racialization because the original purpose of the DHA was to examine racism and discrimination in the context of antisemitism (Reisigl, 2017: 44-45). What distinguishes DHA from other types of CDA is that it links linguistic analysis to broader political and historical contexts (Wodak & Reisigl, 2016: 583). 

In practice, this means that DHA combines three levels of analysis: (1) identifying key topics within a discourse, (2) examining discursive strategies through which different groups are constructed, and (3) analyzing the linguistic means through which these strategies are realized (Reisigl & Wodak, 2016). This means paying close attention to how political actors name certain groups, what characteristics they attribute to them, how they justify these attributions, and how they position themselves in relation to them.

The Data

Empirically, the analysis focuses on parliamentary debates in the Netherlands that have as their main topic migration, Islam, terrorism, or radicalization, because these debates are most salient in terms of racialized constructions of ‘the people’ (de Koning, 2020; Silverstein, 2005; Selod & Embrick, 2013; Woodbridge et al., 2025). In terms of periodization, I look at the year 2015 when debates surrounding these topics were highly relevant due to the 2015 refugee crisis. 

The analysis will be organized around two distinct but interrelated categories: ‘the people’ and “the Other.” These ‘Others’ can be further divided into two categories: the elite and the foreign Other. While the foreign Other typically only plays a role in right-wing populism (which is assumed to be exclusionary), it is included here as a separate category to allow for a systematic comparison between PVV and SP. This structure allows for a distinction between how ‘the people’ themselves are directly constructed, how ‘the people’ are (or are not) constructed in contrast to a foreign Other, and how ‘the people’ are constructed in opposition to ‘the elite’.

Identifying Racialization in Practice

Building on the earlier discussion of racialization (see the first article in this series), this study operationalizes it through three criteria.

  1. Boundary-making: a distinction is drawn between ‘the people’ and others;
  2. Essentialization: groups are portrayed as homogenous and defined by fixed characteristics;
  3. Moral differentiation: these groups are evaluated in normative terms (e.g. as good, dangerous, inferior etc.) 

By analyzing how these elements appear in populist discourse, it becomes possible to identify whether and how racialization happens, even without explicit mentions of race.

Looking Ahead

What happens when we apply this approach in practice?

In the next article, we turn to the empirical analysis and examine how Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), a Dutch right-wing populist party, and Socialistische Partij (SP), a Dutch left-wing populist party, constructed ‘the people’ in parliamentary debates. By looking closely at how groups are named, described, and contrasted with others, we begin to see how different versions of ‘the people’ take shape. As we will see, while both parties drew on a populist logic separating ‘the people’ from ‘the elite,’ they constructed these boundaries in fundamentally different ways, raising important questions about how and when racialization enters populist discourse.

 

(*) Lianne Nota is an ECPS intern and Research Master’s student in International Relations at the University of Groningen, with a focus on identity, populism, ontological security, and the ethics of global affairs. These article series is based on her paper “Constructing ‘The People’: The Role of Racialization in Dutch Populist Discourse” that she wrote for her specialization phase at RUG.

 

References

de Koning, M. (2020). “The racialization of danger: Patterns and ambiguities in the relation between Islam, security and secularism in the Netherlands. “Patterns of Prejudice, 54(1–2), 123–135. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2019.1705011

Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R. (1997). “Critical discourse analysis.” In: Discourse as Social Interaction (pp. 258–284). SAGE.

Reisigl, M. (2017). “The Discourse-Historical Approach.” In: J. Flowerdew & J. Richardson (Eds), The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Studies (pp. 44–59). Routledge. https://www-taylorfrancis-com.proxy-ub.rug.nl/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315739342-4/discourse-historical-approach-martin-reisigl?context=ubx&refId=5b29f8d0-009b-41bb-863b-946150a3bfc4

Reisigl, M., & Wodak, R. (2016). “The discourse-historical approach (DHA).” In: R. Wodak & M. Meyer (Eds), Methods of Critical Discourse Studies (3rd edn, pp. 23–61). SAGE.

Selod, S., & Embrick, D. G. (2013). “Racialization and Muslims: Situating the Muslim Experience in Race Scholarship.” Sociology Compass, 7(8), 644–655. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.12057

Silverstein, P. A. (2005). “Immigrant Racialization and the New Savage Slot: Race, Migration, and Immigration in the New Europe.” Annual Review of Anthropology, 34(Volume 34, 2005), 363–384. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.34.081804.120338

Wodak, R., & Reisigl, M. (2015). “Discourse and Racism.” In: D. Tannen, H. E. Hamilton, & D. Schiffrin (Eds), The Handbook of Discourse Analysis (pp. 576–596). John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118584194.ch27

Woodbridge, E., Vanhouche, A.-S., & Lechkar, I. (2025). “The racialization of radicalization and terrorism: Belgian political language on Muslims and Islam.” Ethnicities, 25(5), 701–723. https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968251329926

See other parts of the series

Part 1 — Constructing ‘The People’: The Role of Racialization in Dutch Populist Discourse

Part 3 — (De-)racializing ‘the People’: Who Is the Dutch Populist ‘People’?

Part 4: Rethinking the Nexus of Racialization and Populism: Lessons from the Study

People skating on the frozen canals at the crossing of Leidsegracht and Keizersgracht in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Amsterdam’s canals rarely freeze, allowing residents and visitors to walk and skate on the ice. Photo: Wessel Cirkel.

Part I — Constructing ‘The People’: The Role of Racialization in Dutch Populist Discourse

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

In this incisive opening to a multi-part series, ECPS intern Lianne Nota interrogates one of the most taken-for-granted concepts in populism studies: “the people.” Moving beyond conventional definitions that treat the category as self-evident, she foregrounds racialization as a critical—yet often neglected—dimension in its construction. By shifting the analytical lens from race as a fixed attribute to racialization as a dynamic process of boundary-making, the study offers a conceptually rigorous and empirically grounded intervention. Focusing on the Dutch case, Nota situates populist discourse within broader debates on “new racism,” identity, and political representation. The series promises to advance the field by systematically examining how both right- and left-wing populist actors construct “the people” through implicit and explicit forms of differentiation.

By Lianne Nota*

Populism is everywhere in contemporary politics, from Europe to the Americas. At its core lies a simple but powerful idea: ‘the people’ should be at the center of politics (Canovan 1999). But who exactly are ‘the people’ and how are they constructed?

This question is more complicated than it seems. In much of academic literature, populism is understood as a ‘thin ideology’ that divides society into two camps: the ‘pure’ people and the ‘corrupt’ elite (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). While this understanding captures something important, it often takes ‘the people’ for granted, overlooking the essentially contested and flexible nature of that category.

This four-part article series explores a crucial but often overlooked dimension of the construction of ‘the people’: racialization.

Beyond Race: Why Racialization Matters

While much has already been written on the people-centeredness of populism, this article series aims to focus the discussion on the construction of the populist ‘people’ through racialization. Using racialization as a concept instead of race, this series aims to avoid reifying race and emphasizes the inherent social constructedness of race (Small, 1994).

As such, racialization refers above all to a process through which differences between groups are constructed, whether cultural or biological. This understanding of racialization draws on the understanding that, nowadays, ‘new racism’ often uses culture and religion as proxies for race to create orders that resemble racial hierarchies, even in the absence of any explicit biological references (MacMaster, 2001). In addition, racialization often serves to subordinate a specific group (Woodbrige et al., 2025). This article series therefore uses racialization to refer to the discursive process of boundary-making by which (political) subjects are constituted and morally differentiated through the attribution of racial meanings, whether those are explicitly biological or not.

What Has Already Been Said?

Existing research on race and populism reflects the assumption that right-wing populism is inherently exclusionary while left-wing populism is inherently inclusionary (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013). As such, the relationship between race and right-wing populism has been addressed by numerous scholars (Krzyżanowski, 2018; Krzyżanowski, 2020; Thorleifsson, 2021; Mondon & Winteri, 2020), while the relationship between race and left-wing populism has been largely overlooked. 

Following existing literature, this series does not make any assumptions about the conduciveness of either right- or left-wing populism to racialization. Instead, it asks the open-ended question: how do different populist actors construct ‘the people’ and to what extent does racialization play a role in that process?

Case Study: The Netherlands

To explore this question, we turn to the Netherlands, a country with a long history of both left- and right-wing populism. Interestingly, Dutch political discourse often avoids explicit references to race, favoring terms like ‘ethnicity’ or ‘culture’ (Essed & Trienekens, 2008). This makes the Netherlands a particularly interesting case study for studying how racialization can operate indirectly through seemingly neutral language.

What This Series Will Show

In the upcoming articles, we will work towards answering the puzzle of how Dutch populist actors construct ‘the people’ and, if so, how racialization plays a part in that process. Drawing on a series of Dutch parliamentary debates held in 2015 during the height of the refugee crisis, this series compares how/if Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV), a right-wing populist party, and Socialistische Partij (SP), a left-wing populist party, constructed ‘the people’ in racialized terms. The findings suggest that, while both parties mobilized a populist divide between ‘the people’ and ‘the elite,’ they differed significantly in how they constructed ‘the people,’ and only one party constructed the ‘people’ in racialized terms. 

Let’s dive into existing literature on the role of race in populist politics first. 

Where Is Race in Populism Studies?

We have already asked a deceptively simple question: who are ‘the people’ in populist politics? Surprisingly, within mainstream populist research, this question is not often framed in terms of race or racialization. To illustrate, let us take a look at the major handbooks on populism in scholarly literature. For example, the Oxford Handbook of Populism, contains no chapter on race, racism, or racialization, despite dedicating large parts of the book to ‘issue-centred’ discussions surrounding populism (Kaltwasser et al., 2017). Similarly, the Research Handbook on Populism and the Palgrave Handbook of Populism also do not systematically address race as a core issue in populist politics (Oswald, 2022). This relative silence suggests that race, racism, and racialization have not been regarded as central elements of populism within mainstream (theoretical) debates.

When research on the relationship between race and populism does exist, it mostly focuses on right-wing populist parties and movements. For example, Krzyżanowski (2018, 2020) argues that racist and xenophobic ideas have become normalized in Poland as a result of anti-refugee and anti-immigration rhetoric introduced by the Polish PiS party, a right-wing populist and nationalist party. This kind of research shows that culture and religion are often used as proxies for race to create orders that resemble racial hierarchies, even in the absence of any explicit biological references. This kind of cultural racism is sometimes called ‘new racism,’ to distinguish it from the biological racism that characterized the pre-1945 era (MacMaster, 2001). While this body of work has been crucial in drawing more attention to the role of race and racialization in populist ideology, it has also contributed to a relative neglect of how similar processes might (or might not) unfold beyond right-wing populist parties.

Two notable exceptions in this regard are worth mentioning. A study by Chazel and Dain (2021) found that left-wing populist movements may also draw on notions like ‘the homeland,’ albeit in more inclusive ways than their right-wing counterparts do. Drawing on narratives about belonging and national identity always engages in some exercise of boundary-making, introducing the possibility for racialization. In their study of Hugo Chávez’s political rhetoric, this leads Barreto and Maldonado (2025) to conclude that left-wing populism can also include racial rhetoric. 

Therefore, rather than assuming a priori that left-wing populism is immune to racialization, this article series critically examines the role racialization plays in left-wing populism and whether this role differs from how racialization operates in right-wing populism. The next article turns to how we can study racialization empirically by outlining a discourse-analytical approach to this process.

 

(*) Lianne Nota is an ECPS intern and Research Master’s student in International Relations at the University of Groningen, with a focus on identity, populism, ontological security, and the ethics of global affairs. These article series is based on her paper “Constructing ‘The People’: The Role of Racialization in Dutch Populist Discourse” that she wrote for her specialization phase at RUG.

 

References

Barreto, A. A., & Maldonado, D. (2025). Race and populism on the left: Political rhetoric in Hugo Chávez’s Venezuela. Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies, 20(3), 387–402. https://doi.org/10.1080/17442222.2024.2393506

Chazel, L., & Dain, V. (2021). “Left-Wing Populism and Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis of the Patriotic Narratives of Podemos and France insoumise.” Journal for the Study of Radicalism, 15(2), 73–94. https://www-jstor-org.focus.lib.kth.se/stable/48642382

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184

Essed, P., & Trienekens, S. (2008). ‘Who wants to feel white?’ Race, Dutch culture and contested identities. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 31(1), 52–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870701538885

Kaltwasser, C. R., Taggart, P., Espejo, P. O., & Ostiguy, P. (Eds). (2017). The Oxford Handbook of Populism. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198803560.001.0001

Krzyżanowski, M. (2018). Discursive Shifts in Ethno-Nationalist Politics: On Politicization and Mediatization of the “Refugee Crisis” in Poland. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, 16(1–2), 76–96. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2017.1317897

Krzyżanowski, M. (2020). Discursive shifts and the normalisation of racism: Imaginaries of immigration, moral panics and the discourse of contemporary right-wing populism. Social Semiotics, 30(4), 503–527. https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2020.1766199

MacMaster, N. (2001). Racism in Europe, 1870-2000. Palgrave. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4039-4033-9

Mondon, A., & Winter, A. (2019). Whiteness, populism and the racialisation of the working class in the United Kingdom and the United States. Identities, 26(5), 510–528. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2018.1552440

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2013). Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America. Government and Opposition, 48(2), 147–174. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2012.11

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. (1378915). https://research.ebsco.com/linkprocessor/plink?id=0a98f106-01e2-39bf-9f0c-7ff265fff45d

Oswald, M. (Ed.). (2022). The Palgrave Handbook of Populism. Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-80803-7

Small, S. (1994). Racialised Barriers: The Black Experience in the United States and England in the 1980s. Routledge.

Thorleifsson, C. (2021). In pursuit of purity: Populist nationalism and the racialization of difference. Identities, 28(2), 186–202. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2019.1635767

Woodbridge, E., Vanhouche, A.-S., & Lechkar, I. (2025). The racialization of radicalization and terrorism: Belgian political language on Muslims and Islam. Ethnicities, 25(5), 701–723. https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968251329926

See other parts of the series

Part 2 — Studying “the People”: A Discourse-Analytical Approach to Populism

Part 3 — (De-)racializing ‘the People’: Who Is the Dutch Populist ‘People’?

Part 4: Rethinking the Nexus of Racialization and Populism: Lessons from the Study

Martin Luther King Jr.

I Have a Dream

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeLeadership & PersonaVoice of Youth

In this compelling Voice of Youth (VoY) contribution, Emmanouela Papapavlou revisits the enduring moral and political legacy of Martin Luther King Jr. in an age of populist authoritarianism, reflecting on the contemporary erosion of empathy, solidarity, and human dignity. Blending personal reflection with normative critique, the piece interrogates how exclusionary attitudes and everyday discrimination have become normalized across societies. It calls for renewed civic courage, emphasizing the role of individuals—especially youth—in resisting injustice and sustaining democratic values. Framed as both a reflection and a call to action, the article underscores that transformative change often begins with principled minorities who refuse to accept injustice as the status quo.

By Emmanouela Papapavlou*

Decades ago, a man stood behind a podium and spoke to a world that was not ready to hear him. He spoke about justice in a time when injustice was normal. He spoke about love in a time when hatred had become routine. He spoke about equality in a society that had learned to live with division. And yet, he spoke anyway. He spoke with a vision that was bigger than the world in front of him.

“I have a dream. I have a dream today.  
A dream of freedom, a dream of peace, a dream of people walking together, without fear, without hate, without walls in between them.  
I have a dream that one day, no one will be judged by the color of their skin, but by the kindness in their heart.  
I have a dream that every child, black or white, rich or poor, will have the same chance to grow, to learn, to dream.  
I have a dream that love will speak louder than anger, that truth will shine brighter than lies, that hope will be stronger than fear.  
This dream is not mine. It belongs to everyone who still believes that tomorrow can be better than today.  
I know the road is long, I know the fight is hard, but I also know that justice always rises, even after the darkest night.  
So I will keep walking, I will keep believing, I will keep dreaming.  
These dreams are the beginning of change, and change is the proof that hope is alive.  
I have a dream, and I will not stop until that dream becomes real.”

Martin Luther King stood on that podium delivering a speech to a world that had grown comfortable with cruelty, a world that had learned to live with hate instead of love.

He knew all those things.

And yet he stood there anyway, standing up for what he believed every person is entitled to: freedom, equality, acceptance, and love, no matter the circumstances.

If you feel something when reading those words, you belong to a community of humans who have risen above the noise of propaganda, power, and profit. You belong to the quiet but powerful group of people who still believe that human rights are not negotiable.

You belong to a community that believes that color, sexuality, ethnicity, or religion do not determine whether a person deserves to be heard, to be accepted, or to be treated as equal.

And let me tell you something, as someone who belongs to that community: it has become incredibly rare.

Today, it is rare to openly stand up for every human being, even the ones you do not know, even when there is nothing to gain from doing so. It is rare to refuse to laugh at the joke made about a woman. Rare to speak up when someone mocks a person of color. Rare to challenge the comment made about someone’s religion, their sexuality, or where they come from.

Somehow, it has become normal to mock people for the very things that make them human. The way they look. The place they were born. The language they speak. The beliefs they hold. And because this behavior has become normal, the people who refuse to participate suddenly appear unusual.

So if you are reading this, and you are someone who stands up for people, even when it is uncomfortable, even when it makes you stand out, then yes, I am talking to you.

You who refuse to shrink your values just to fit in with your age group.
You who speak up even when it would be easier to stay quiet.
You who defend someone even when it brings you no reward.

You are not naive. You are not unrealistic. You are necessary. 

You are part of the reason the world is still capable of changing. Because change has never started with the majority. It has always started with the few people who were willing to look at injustice and say: this is not normal.

People will call you idealistic.
They will call you naive.
They will call you unrealistic.

But those words are often used by people who have simply grown comfortable with a world that should never have been acceptable in the first place.

Believing in human dignity should not make someone stand out. Defending someone’s humanity should not be controversial.  Speaking up for fairness should not be considered radical.

And yet, here we are. So maybe my dream is not just about equality or justice. Maybe my dream is about reaching a world where basic decency is no longer extraordinary. A world where standing up for another human being is not brave, it is simply the standard.

Until that day arrives, the dream still belongs to all of us. And as long as there are people willing to believe in it, to speak for it, and to live by it, hope is still alive.

 

(*) Emmanouela Papapavlou is a high school student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com

Ice Hockey Women’s Team USA warms up before its preliminary round Group B match against Finland at the Milano Ice Park in Rho, Milan, during the 2026 Milano–Cortina Winter Olympics. The United States defeated Finland 5–0. Photo: Walter Arce | Dreamstime.

March 8th: For Every Victory That Was Not Considered Important

by Editor’s ChoiceGenderHomeVoice of Youth

In this reflective Voice of Youth (VoY) commentary for International Women’s Day, Emmanouela Papapavlou examines how gender hierarchy persists not only through overt exclusion but through the subtle normalization of unequal recognition. Using the contrasting reactions to the US men’s and women’s hockey gold medals at the 2026 Winter Olympics, she argues that women’s athletic success is still too often treated as supplementary rather than self-evidently equal. The issue, she suggests, lies less in explicit insult than in the quiet cultural codes that frame male achievement as the default and female achievement as the exception. By focusing on laughter, tone, and seemingly minor acts of dismissal, Papapavlou offers a sharp critique of how misogyny survives in normalized everyday reactions, revealing the distance that still separates formal equality from genuine social recognition.

By Emmanouela Papapavlou*

At the 2026 Winter Olympic Games, the United States won two gold medals in hockey. One by the men’s team. One by the women’s team. Same sport, same flag on the chest, same summit. A few hours later, in a conversation with the President of the United States, it is announced that the men’s team will be invited to the White House to be honored for their victory. And in the flow of the conversation, comes the phrase, “we have to invite the women too.” The players burst into laughter. A spontaneous, collective, light laugh.

It was not an insult. It was not an attack. Nothing explicitly degrading or offensive was said. And yet, in those few seconds, something deeper was revealed. Because the women’s victory entered the sentence as a footnote. As a reminder. As something that “also” happened.

A gold medal has no gender. The flag is raised the same way, the anthem sounds the same, while on paper, in official statements, in medal tables, the two achievements are absolutely equal. And yet, in our collective reaction, they are not. The men’s category is considered the default version of sport. The women’s is the special category. The men’s is the prototype, while the women’s is treated as its variation.

And this was not born in that room. It did not begin with a joke. It is the product of a culture that has learned to treat male success as a given and female success as an exception. As something worthy of congratulations, but not of the same unquestioned recognition. As something that “it would be good to honor as well.”

We live in 2026 and sport remains deeply male-dominated. Not only in terms of funding and visibility, but in symbolism. The hero, the captain, the leader, the warrior. Think about it. The images that accompany these words are still male. When a woman wins, we often describe her journey as “inspiring,” her endurance as “moving,” her presence as a “role model.” When a man wins, we speak of dominance, power, greatness. One victory moves us. The other confirms expectations.

What is most troubling, however, is not the difference in adjectives. It is that the laughter caused no discomfort. There was no pause. No split second of silence suggesting something was off. It felt natural. And that sense of naturalness is the problem. So why did it feel so natural in the first place?

Misogynistic mentality today rarely appears through shouting. It does not openly declare that “women are worth less.” It shows up in subtle tones. In inflections. In glances. In “jokes” that pass unnoticed. In the familiar “come on, don’t take it so seriously.” In an invitation framed like an obligation. In an achievement treated as an addition rather than as an unquestioned equal.

These small things, which seem insignificant, are what sustain the larger structure. As with every form of gender inequality, the root does not lie only in extreme incidents. It lies in what we have learned to consider normal. In the fact that unequal treatment no longer surprises us. In the fact that it does not bother us enough to react. In the fact that we laugh too or remain silent.

That is how hierarchy is built without ever naming it. Through small concessions. Through subtle diminishments. Through a society that speaks of equality on paper, yet in practice continues to place the male experience at the center and the female one at the margins. If the medal is equal, why isn’t the reaction?

And today, on International Women’s Day, we will once again speak about rights, achievements, and struggles that were fought to get us here. We will honor the women who fought to stand on fields that did not want them, in competitions that did not count them, in societies that preferred them silent. For every woman who spent countless hours training, who endured doubt, mockery, less funding, less coverage, less recognition. For every woman who reached the top knowing that even there she would have to prove her worth all over again, only for the very country she represented to remind her, the next day, with a laugh, that her effort and her victory were not quite as important.

This is not about oversensitivity. It is not about “political correctness.” It is about value. If a woman’s success requires a reminder in order to be acknowledged, then it is not considered self-evident. If inclusion provokes laughter, then equality has not taken root. It has merely been legislated.

So the question is not whether someone had bad intentions. The question is why diminishment fits so easily inside a joke. Why the idea that “we have to invite the women too” sounds like an add-on rather than an obvious part of the sentence. Why, even today, female success requires clarification.

Perhaps because our sense of normal has not changed as much as we think. Perhaps because the equality we proclaim has not yet moved from law into consciousness. And until it does, we will continue to encounter misogyny not only in the loud and blatant moments, but in the small, smiling ones.

The issue is not to stop laughing. The issue is to start asking ourselves what exactly we find funny.

(*) Emmanouela Papapavlou is a high school student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com

Photo: Dreamstime.

To Where? On Language, Identity, Belonging, and the Cost of Silence

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

In this reflective essay, 15-year old Sojoud Al-Hjouj interrogates the intimate relationship between language, identity, and authenticity in contemporary life. Framed through the evocative figure of the “Ajji”—the individual orphaned from their mother tongue—the piece argues that abandoning one’s native language entails a deeper estrangement from the self. Moving between personal memory, cultural critique, and existential inquiry, Al-Hjouj shows how performative speech, social expectation, and fear of misunderstanding erode sincerity and belonging. Language, she contends, is not merely a communicative tool but the homeland of the soul, the medium through which memory, emotion, and identity are formed. Loyalty to language thus emerges as an existential act: a form of resistance, self-recognition, and true civilization.

By Sojoud Al-Hjouj

Speaking of one’s identity has become everyone’s business. Consequently, the intellectual and the eloquent no longer dare to oppose others’ opinions—not for a lack of argument, but because their tongues itch with truth. So, we let them speak like a burning fire that craves more wood to blaze higher.

As one philosopher once said: “Man was created with two eyes and one tongue.” One must realize that what the first eye might miss, the second will surely notice in the words we utter.

By nature, humans love to speak and learn, like a child learning the alphabet. However, one often stops at the boundaries of their own language, which separates them from the world—and other languages they must discover. Here, the story begins.

It is a story unlike any other; it is a reality we live and evolve through. But why? Humans have started expressing their feelings in a language that consumes their very thoughts and emotions. It does not allow them to honestly convey what burns in their hearts or what occupies their minds. They live beautiful moments under a self-invented illusion: “We are ashamed of our feelings.”

When will man realize, in this vanishing world, that his life will not happen twice? When will he realize that loved ones are like drifting dust, lost at any moment without permission?

But most importantly: Why? Why doesn’t man use the language he was raised with, the one he mastered since childhood? Instead, he abandons it, deceiving himself into becoming an “Ajji” (a person orphaned from their mother tongue) in this life.

We live in a world that values appearance over essence and the surface over the depth. Thus, many choose to hide their true voices behind carefully filtered words, as if truth itself has become a danger, and sincerity a rare currency. Man fears showing weakness or love, dreading being misunderstood, forgetting that language is the bridge between his heart and the world. To abandon it is to abandon oneself.

In the silence of the night, when one sits with themselves, they remember the first word they spoke, the first letter they drew, the first story they heard from their mother. The image of their inner child appears, fascinated by the alphabet, with boundless curiosity, without fear or shame. This child is the essence of freedom and the core of belonging to a language that both protects and reveals. If this child loses their language, they lose the deepest part of who they are.

How often do we see people choosing a language their hearts do not understand? A language that pleases others but suffocates their souls? How often do they laugh while their hearts weep? This is the tragedy of the modern human: to be a stranger in their own language and an alien to their own feelings.

Language is the homeland of the soul; it is where memories are stored and identities are built. Whoever leaves their language leaves their internal home and becomes homeless. Each forgotten word and each suppressed feeling is a step toward loss.

The concept of the “Ajji” here is not just a poetic image; it is a reality. If language is the mother, then abandoning it leaves one as an “Ajji”—orphaned and vulnerable before the noise of the world. Anyone who does not realize this will never know the meaning of loyalty or what it means to be true to oneself and others.

In every moment, we face choices: Do we speak what we feel or what people expect? Do we write what reflects our essence or what pleases those around us? This constant struggle is what makes life real, but also what makes it bitter. Silence is sometimes more dangerous than speech, for speech at least proves your existence.

Loyalty to language, identity, and true feelings is an existential necessity. Your language is the first mirror in which you see your true self. To ignore it is to lose the most profound thing you own.

And here, we return to the story: a reality lived moment by moment. The story that doesn’t repeat, made of our words, hearts, and minds. It makes us faithful to the child we were—to the “Ajji” within us who still seeks his mother’s embrace, his internal home, and his true self.

Woe to the man who abandons his language to please another. True civilization is to stay faithful to one’s roots, for if the language withers, the soul follows. This is true loyalty.

 

Sojoud Al-Hjouj is an award-winning young writer and thinker from Jordan, recognized as a “World Youth Essay Ambassador. She possesses a literary voice that blends philosophical depth with social critique. Her work focuses on themes of identity, the sanctity of the mother tongue, and the emotional challenges of the digital age and she is 15 years old.

Protest against ICE following the killing of Renee Nicole Good, a 37-year-old Minneapolis woman fatally shot by a US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent during a federal operation, in Foley Square, Manhattan, NYC, USA on January 8, 2026. The fatal encounter has sparked national outrage and protests demanding accountability and reform of ICE use-of-force policies. Photo: Dreamstime.

Law, Order and the Lives in Between

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeHuman RightsMigrationVoice of Youth

In this Voice of Youth (VoY) article, Emmanouela Papapavlou delivers a powerful reflection on state violence, immigration enforcement, and the fragile boundaries of democratic accountability. The article critically examines the fatal shooting of a civilian woman by US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents in Minneapolis on January 7, 2026. Moving beyond official narratives of “self-defense,” Papapavlou situates the incident within broader patterns of institutional violence, racialized enforcement, and the erosion of human rights under the banner of security. By drawing historical parallels to the killing of George Floyd and interrogating the politics of “law and order,” the piece challenges readers to reconsider whose lives are protected—and whose are rendered expendable—in contemporary democracies.

By Emmanouela Papapavlou*

In a world where the concept of “security” weighs increasingly heavily on public policy, the use of state violence remains one of the most contentious and polarizing issues. In recent days, news that an agent of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) shot and killed a 37 year-old woman in Minneapolis has reignited the debate over the limits of state power, institutional impunity, and human rights in one of the world’s most developed democracies.

The incident took place on January 7, 2026, during a large-scale operation aimed at enforcing immigration law in the city. Official statements from government authorities described the shooting as an act of self-defense, claiming that the woman attempted to “strike officers” with her vehicle. At the same time, however, video footage and eyewitness accounts contradict this version of events, suggesting that the gunshot was fired as the driver was attempting to leave the scene, without an evident and immediate threat to the officers’ lives.

The government’s effort to justify the action, even employing language such as “domestic terrorism operation,” has sparked outrage and skepticism among local officials, human rights organizations, and ordinary citizens. The mayor of Minneapolis openly stated that the self-defense arguments were “false” and called for ICE to withdraw from the city altogether. Many have described the killing as a clear example of excessive use of force by state authorities, particularly within the context of a large enforcement mission that disproportionately targets vulnerable communities.

But can this case truly be treated as an isolated incident? Or does it represent yet another link in a growing chain of violent encounters that follow a disturbingly familiar pattern? The Minneapolis killing is already being described as at least the fifth fatal outcome of similar federal operations over the past two years, suggesting that law enforcement strategy has evolved into an aggressive and dangerous form of violence, often exercised without meaningful accountability or transparency.

Social scientists and activists point out that the use of force by state authorities, whether in immigration enforcement or neighborhood policing, frequently activates deeper structures of social inequality. When the rhetoric of “law and order” is prioritized over human safety, trust between state institutions and the communities they serve erodes rapidly. And this raises a fundamental question: is the principle of “legality” applied equally to everyone, or is it selectively deployed as a tool of control and discipline over specific social groups?

This case cannot be examined outside its broader historical context. In 2020, in the same city of Minneapolis, George Floyd was killed as a police officer pressed a knee into his neck, turning a routine arrest into a public execution witnessed by the world. That moment became a global symbol of systemic police violence and racial injustice, igniting mass protests and exposing how deeply embedded power, race, and state violence are within modern societies.

And yet, how much has truly changed since then? Even today, the way state violence is addressed, whether through policing or immigration enforcement, continues to be shaped by the same logic that transforms people into threats and human lives into acceptable risks. The stories of those killed become symbols not only of injustice, but of a persistent institutional indifference toward the protection of life and dignity.

The Minneapolis case therefore serves as a reminder that violence exercised by institutions is not merely a “tragic mistake” or an “unfortunate exception.” It is part of a broader relationship between power and vulnerability that tests the very foundations of democracy and human rights. And just as in the aftermath of George Floyd’s killing, a new generation is once again refusing to accept narratives that normalize violence in the name of security. A generation that insists on asking the same uncomfortable question: what does security really mean, when preserving it requires the loss of human life?

 

(*) Emmanouela Papapavlou is a high school student from Thessaloniki, Greece, deeply passionate about social and political issues. She has actively participated in Model United Nations and other youth forums, serving as a chairperson in multiple conferences and winning awards in Greek debate competitions. Writing is her greatest passion, and she loves using it to explore democracy, civic engagement, and human rights. Her dream is to share her ideas, inspire action, and amplify the voices of young people who want to make a difference. Email: emmanpapapavlou@gmail.com