Populism Without a Populist: India’s New Experiment in Protest Politics
Students participate in a peaceful nighttime protest organized by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) in New Delhi, India. Demonstrators sit together on the road, holding placards and posters, chanting slogans, and expressing their demands. Photo: Kamlesh Kumar / Dreamstime.
India’s Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) has transformed a satirical identity into a vehicle for political mobilization outside conventional party structures. Its emergence raises a question about contemporary protest populism: can a movement construct a political people without a dominant leader, and who exercises authority in their name? In this ECPS Voices of Youth (VoY) commentary, Saurabh Raj examines how the movement connects diverse grievances through a shared anti-establishment identity while confronting dilemmas of leadership, representation, and democratic accountability. Drawing on theories of populism and counter-democracy, Raj argues that successful mobilization does not automatically confer representative legitimacy. The movement’s democratic test ultimately concerns whether participants can hold those acting on their behalf accountable.
In July 2026, a youth-led movement called the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) celebrated the resignation of India’s Education Minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, following weeks of protests over examination irregularities. Three months later, its founder, Abhijeet Dipke, was detained ahead of another demonstration. Anticipating his detention, he had recorded a video designating a colleague to lead the protest in his absence (The Hitavada, 2026; India Today, 2026). The contrast is revealing. A movement that emerged through political satire had acquired the capacity to challenge powerful institutions without becoming an electoral party. Yet its collective identity could not independently determine who should negotiate, decide or lead.
CJP is part of a wider movement of youth-led anti-establishment mobilization. From Kenya and Bangladesh to Nepal, specific grievances over taxation, employment and corruption have developed into broader challenges to political authority. Their outcomes differ, but they raise a common question about the relationship between popular mobilization and institutional representation. I argue that CJP’s innovation lies in constructing a popular political identity without a conventional party or dominant charismatic leader, while its democratic challenge lies in making the authority exercised in that identity accountable to those it claims to represent.
Populism is often associated with charismatic leaders claiming to embody the will of ordinary citizens against established elites. Yet this represents only one understanding of the phenomenon. Laclau (2005) conceptualizes populism as a political logic through which separate social demands become connected in opposition to an established order. Through this process, the people emerge as a political identity rather than a pre-existing, homogeneous constituency. A symbol, slogan or demand can function as an empty signifier, bringing different grievances together without eliminating their differences. Gerbaudo’s (2023) analysis of the populist turn in social movements extends this understanding. Movements such as Occupy Wall Street and France’s Yellow Vests constructed broad popular identities capable of mobilizing citizens across established ideological boundaries.
Here, protest populism refers to this mode of political mobilization: connecting heterogeneous grievances through a shared identity that challenges established authority without necessarily seeking electoral power. This differs from Mudde’s (2004) definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology dividing society between a virtuous people and a corrupt elite. CJP does not consistently demonstrate that moral division. It is therefore more useful to examine its populist mode of political articulation than to assign it a fixed ideological label.
The relevant distinction is between the construction of a popular identity and the institutions through which that identity is subsequently represented.
When a Name Becomes a Political People
Photo: Screenshot from CJP website.
CJP’s most distinctive political innovation may be its name. Following a controversy involving Chief Justice Surya Kant’s use of the term cockroaches, activists appropriated the expression and transformed it into a symbol of citizens refusing to be dismissed by powerful institutions (Reuters, 2026b). Unlike conventional party identities, cockroaches carry no defined ideological programme. Its ambiguity is its political strength. Students concerned about examination irregularities and citizens questioning electoral administration can identify with the same movement without sharing a comprehensive political ideology. CJP’s transition from examination protests in July to electoral-roll disputes in October illustrates this process. Different institutional controversies became connected through a common accusation of unresponsiveness to ordinary citizens.
In Laclau’s (2005) terms, these demands form a chain of equivalence. Their distinct concerns acquire collective meaning through opposition to an establishment perceived as insufficiently accountable. CJP thus offers a qualified example of populism without a conventional populist figure at its center. Dipke remains a prominent leader, but the movement’s identity is not reducible to his personality. The cockroach symbol performs part of the unifying function often associated with charismatic leadership. Yet symbolic unity has limits. A shared identity can mobilize citizens around grievances, but it cannot determine which demands should prevail, who should negotiate or what constitutes an acceptable political settlement.
The problem of representation emerges precisely where popular identification must become collective decision-making.
Political Victories and the Legitimacy of Leadership
CJP’s July negotiations make this contradiction visible. Its spokespersons, Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka, negotiated with Union Ministers J. P. Nadda and Jitendra Singh over examination reforms, compensation and withdrawal of cases against protesters. The negotiations preceded government concessions and the conclusion of the agitation (The Hitavada, 2026).
The movement had mobilized through a broad popular identity, but achieving a settlement required identifiable representatives to interpret demands and participate in decisions affecting the wider collective. Scharpf’s (1999) distinction between input legitimacy, derived from participation and procedures, and output legitimacy, derived from performance, offers a useful analogy. Political victories can strengthen confidence in representatives even when the processes authorizing them remain less visible.
This does not establish that CJP’s negotiators lacked a democratic mandate. Public reporting provides insufficient evidence about its internal procedures. The episode nevertheless demonstrates how political effectiveness and representative accountability raise different questions.
October 2026 presented another institutional setting. CJP demanded the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar over electoral-roll revisions. Unlike an elected minister, the Chief Election Commissioner occupies a constitutionally protected office intended to function independently of government. The Election Commission rejected allegations of political bias (Reuters, 2026).
Police restrictions and repeated detentions complicated the protests. Das and Ranka were detained on October 13 and subsequently remanded to judicial custody, which was extended by two days on October 19 (Jha, 2026; Mathur, 2026). Dipke was detained again ahead of an October 16 demonstration (Reuters, 2026).
Anticipating detention earlier on October 10, Dipke had designated Ajinkya Shinde, CJP’s organization in-charge, to lead the protest through a pre-recorded video (India Today, 2026). Shinde himself was subsequently detained alongside Das and Ranka, although he was later released (Jha, 2026). The succession arrangement demonstrated preparation rather than organizational failure. Yet publicly visible leadership authority was conferred through the founder’s designation, rather than a participant-led process identifiable in available reporting.
July demonstrated the movement’s negotiating influence; October exposed the practical importance of leadership continuity. Neither episode proves that CJP is internally undemocratic. Together, however, they raise the question of how representative authority is constituted beyond political victories and individual prominence.
Freeman’s (1972) The Tyranny of Structurelessness provides an important caution: rejecting formal hierarchy does not eliminate power; it can make its exercise less visible. For CJP, the democratic question is not whether leaders should exist, but whether participants can meaningfully influence and hold them accountable.
A Watchdog, Not Another Political Party?
Must successful protest movements eventually enter electoral politics? India’s anti-corruption movement of 2011 confronted this dilemma. One section eventually formed the Aam Aadmi Party in 2012, concluding that institutional reform required participation in electoral competition. CJP has chosen a different course, at least for now.
Its demands concern accountability rather than governmental power. Ministerial resignations, examination reforms and electoral scrutiny are claims directed at public authorities, not proposals to govern in their place. Rosanvallon’s (2008) concept of counter-democracy offers a useful framework. He argues that citizens exercise democratic influence beyond elections through oversight, prevention and judgment. CJP can therefore be understood not as an incomplete political party, but as a potential institution of civic vigilance.
International experiences demonstrate different possibilities. Kenyan protesters secured the withdrawal of a finance bill without entering government (Reuters, 2024). Some organizers of Bangladesh’s student uprising subsequently established the National Citizen Party (Reuters, 2025). In Nepal, the political opening following youth protests was channeled through elections, with the Rastriya Swatantra Party winning 182 of 275 parliamentary seats in March 2026 (Sharma, 2026).
These contrasting trajectories demonstrate that protest mobilization has no predetermined institutional destination. Remaining outside electoral politics is not necessarily a weakness; it can represent a different means of exercising democratic influence. But civic vigilance carries its own responsibility. Unlike electoral parties, which seek mandates from voters, movements derive legitimacy from public participation, credibility and their ability to articulate collective demands. When a small group negotiates on behalf of a wider constituency, the accountability of that representation becomes consequential. A movement scrutinizing public authority must also confront the question of accountability within itself.
Beyond the Populist Moment
CJP’s significance extends beyond its immediate political victories. It illustrates how a shared symbol can connect fragmented grievances and construct a political constituency without the machinery of an established party.
For populism studies, the case suggests the importance of looking beyond exclusively leader-centered accounts of mobilization. A shared name can perform the unifying work often associated with a charismatic figure, but symbolic identification alone cannot authorize decisions or resolve competing demands. This is the central tension of CJP’s experiment. Its political identity is constructed collectively, while the exercise of authority necessarily involves representatives whose legitimacy must be established and sustained.
A movement is tested not only on the day thousands arrive, but also on the day its leaders cannot. CJP has demonstrated that a shared identity can bring people together without a party. Its more demanding democratic test is whether those people can exercise meaningful authority over the politics conducted in their name.
(*) Saurabh Raj is a core team member at the Indian School of Democracy and a contributor to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). His work focuses on political leadership, democratic institutions and governance in India.
Gerbaudo, P. (2023). “From Occupy Wall Street to the Gilets Jaunes: On the populist turn in the protest movements of the 2010s.” Capital & Class, 47(1), 107–124.https://doi.org/10.1177/03098168221137207
Rosanvallon, P. (2008). Counter-democracy: Politics in an age of distrust (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755835
Populism Without a Populist: India’s New Experiment in Protest Politics
India’s Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) has transformed a satirical identity into a vehicle for political mobilization outside conventional party structures. Its emergence raises a question about contemporary protest populism: can a movement construct a political people without a dominant leader, and who exercises authority in their name? In this ECPS Voices of Youth (VoY) commentary, Saurabh Raj examines how the movement connects diverse grievances through a shared anti-establishment identity while confronting dilemmas of leadership, representation, and democratic accountability. Drawing on theories of populism and counter-democracy, Raj argues that successful mobilization does not automatically confer representative legitimacy. The movement’s democratic test ultimately concerns whether participants can hold those acting on their behalf accountable.
By Saurabh Raj*
In July 2026, a youth-led movement called the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) celebrated the resignation of India’s Education Minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, following weeks of protests over examination irregularities. Three months later, its founder, Abhijeet Dipke, was detained ahead of another demonstration. Anticipating his detention, he had recorded a video designating a colleague to lead the protest in his absence (The Hitavada, 2026; India Today, 2026). The contrast is revealing. A movement that emerged through political satire had acquired the capacity to challenge powerful institutions without becoming an electoral party. Yet its collective identity could not independently determine who should negotiate, decide or lead.
CJP is part of a wider movement of youth-led anti-establishment mobilization. From Kenya and Bangladesh to Nepal, specific grievances over taxation, employment and corruption have developed into broader challenges to political authority. Their outcomes differ, but they raise a common question about the relationship between popular mobilization and institutional representation. I argue that CJP’s innovation lies in constructing a popular political identity without a conventional party or dominant charismatic leader, while its democratic challenge lies in making the authority exercised in that identity accountable to those it claims to represent.
Understanding Protest Populism
Populism is often associated with charismatic leaders claiming to embody the will of ordinary citizens against established elites. Yet this represents only one understanding of the phenomenon. Laclau (2005) conceptualizes populism as a political logic through which separate social demands become connected in opposition to an established order. Through this process, the people emerge as a political identity rather than a pre-existing, homogeneous constituency. A symbol, slogan or demand can function as an empty signifier, bringing different grievances together without eliminating their differences. Gerbaudo’s (2023) analysis of the populist turn in social movements extends this understanding. Movements such as Occupy Wall Street and France’s Yellow Vests constructed broad popular identities capable of mobilizing citizens across established ideological boundaries.
Here, protest populism refers to this mode of political mobilization: connecting heterogeneous grievances through a shared identity that challenges established authority without necessarily seeking electoral power. This differs from Mudde’s (2004) definition of populism as a thin-centered ideology dividing society between a virtuous people and a corrupt elite. CJP does not consistently demonstrate that moral division. It is therefore more useful to examine its populist mode of political articulation than to assign it a fixed ideological label.
The relevant distinction is between the construction of a popular identity and the institutions through which that identity is subsequently represented.
When a Name Becomes a Political People
CJP’s most distinctive political innovation may be its name. Following a controversy involving Chief Justice Surya Kant’s use of the term cockroaches, activists appropriated the expression and transformed it into a symbol of citizens refusing to be dismissed by powerful institutions (Reuters, 2026b). Unlike conventional party identities, cockroaches carry no defined ideological programme. Its ambiguity is its political strength. Students concerned about examination irregularities and citizens questioning electoral administration can identify with the same movement without sharing a comprehensive political ideology. CJP’s transition from examination protests in July to electoral-roll disputes in October illustrates this process. Different institutional controversies became connected through a common accusation of unresponsiveness to ordinary citizens.
In Laclau’s (2005) terms, these demands form a chain of equivalence. Their distinct concerns acquire collective meaning through opposition to an establishment perceived as insufficiently accountable. CJP thus offers a qualified example of populism without a conventional populist figure at its center. Dipke remains a prominent leader, but the movement’s identity is not reducible to his personality. The cockroach symbol performs part of the unifying function often associated with charismatic leadership. Yet symbolic unity has limits. A shared identity can mobilize citizens around grievances, but it cannot determine which demands should prevail, who should negotiate or what constitutes an acceptable political settlement.
The problem of representation emerges precisely where popular identification must become collective decision-making.
Political Victories and the Legitimacy of Leadership
CJP’s July negotiations make this contradiction visible. Its spokespersons, Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka, negotiated with Union Ministers J. P. Nadda and Jitendra Singh over examination reforms, compensation and withdrawal of cases against protesters. The negotiations preceded government concessions and the conclusion of the agitation (The Hitavada, 2026).
The movement had mobilized through a broad popular identity, but achieving a settlement required identifiable representatives to interpret demands and participate in decisions affecting the wider collective. Scharpf’s (1999) distinction between input legitimacy, derived from participation and procedures, and output legitimacy, derived from performance, offers a useful analogy. Political victories can strengthen confidence in representatives even when the processes authorizing them remain less visible.
This does not establish that CJP’s negotiators lacked a democratic mandate. Public reporting provides insufficient evidence about its internal procedures. The episode nevertheless demonstrates how political effectiveness and representative accountability raise different questions.
October 2026 presented another institutional setting. CJP demanded the resignation of Chief Election Commissioner Gyanesh Kumar over electoral-roll revisions. Unlike an elected minister, the Chief Election Commissioner occupies a constitutionally protected office intended to function independently of government. The Election Commission rejected allegations of political bias (Reuters, 2026).
Police restrictions and repeated detentions complicated the protests. Das and Ranka were detained on October 13 and subsequently remanded to judicial custody, which was extended by two days on October 19 (Jha, 2026; Mathur, 2026). Dipke was detained again ahead of an October 16 demonstration (Reuters, 2026).
Anticipating detention earlier on October 10, Dipke had designated Ajinkya Shinde, CJP’s organization in-charge, to lead the protest through a pre-recorded video (India Today, 2026). Shinde himself was subsequently detained alongside Das and Ranka, although he was later released (Jha, 2026). The succession arrangement demonstrated preparation rather than organizational failure. Yet publicly visible leadership authority was conferred through the founder’s designation, rather than a participant-led process identifiable in available reporting.
July demonstrated the movement’s negotiating influence; October exposed the practical importance of leadership continuity. Neither episode proves that CJP is internally undemocratic. Together, however, they raise the question of how representative authority is constituted beyond political victories and individual prominence.
Freeman’s (1972) The Tyranny of Structurelessness provides an important caution: rejecting formal hierarchy does not eliminate power; it can make its exercise less visible. For CJP, the democratic question is not whether leaders should exist, but whether participants can meaningfully influence and hold them accountable.
A Watchdog, Not Another Political Party?
Must successful protest movements eventually enter electoral politics? India’s anti-corruption movement of 2011 confronted this dilemma. One section eventually formed the Aam Aadmi Party in 2012, concluding that institutional reform required participation in electoral competition. CJP has chosen a different course, at least for now.
Its demands concern accountability rather than governmental power. Ministerial resignations, examination reforms and electoral scrutiny are claims directed at public authorities, not proposals to govern in their place. Rosanvallon’s (2008) concept of counter-democracy offers a useful framework. He argues that citizens exercise democratic influence beyond elections through oversight, prevention and judgment. CJP can therefore be understood not as an incomplete political party, but as a potential institution of civic vigilance.
International experiences demonstrate different possibilities. Kenyan protesters secured the withdrawal of a finance bill without entering government (Reuters, 2024). Some organizers of Bangladesh’s student uprising subsequently established the National Citizen Party (Reuters, 2025). In Nepal, the political opening following youth protests was channeled through elections, with the Rastriya Swatantra Party winning 182 of 275 parliamentary seats in March 2026 (Sharma, 2026).
These contrasting trajectories demonstrate that protest mobilization has no predetermined institutional destination. Remaining outside electoral politics is not necessarily a weakness; it can represent a different means of exercising democratic influence. But civic vigilance carries its own responsibility. Unlike electoral parties, which seek mandates from voters, movements derive legitimacy from public participation, credibility and their ability to articulate collective demands. When a small group negotiates on behalf of a wider constituency, the accountability of that representation becomes consequential. A movement scrutinizing public authority must also confront the question of accountability within itself.
Beyond the Populist Moment
CJP’s significance extends beyond its immediate political victories. It illustrates how a shared symbol can connect fragmented grievances and construct a political constituency without the machinery of an established party.
For populism studies, the case suggests the importance of looking beyond exclusively leader-centered accounts of mobilization. A shared name can perform the unifying work often associated with a charismatic figure, but symbolic identification alone cannot authorize decisions or resolve competing demands. This is the central tension of CJP’s experiment. Its political identity is constructed collectively, while the exercise of authority necessarily involves representatives whose legitimacy must be established and sustained.
A movement is tested not only on the day thousands arrive, but also on the day its leaders cannot. CJP has demonstrated that a shared identity can bring people together without a party. Its more demanding democratic test is whether those people can exercise meaningful authority over the politics conducted in their name.
(*) Saurabh Raj is a core team member at the Indian School of Democracy and a contributor to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). His work focuses on political leadership, democratic institutions and governance in India.
References
Freeman, J. (1972). “The tyranny of structurelessness.” The Second Wave, 2(1).https://www.jofreeman.com/joreen/tyranny.htm
Gerbaudo, P. (2023). “From Occupy Wall Street to the Gilets Jaunes: On the populist turn in the protest movements of the 2010s.” Capital & Class, 47(1), 107–124. https://doi.org/10.1177/03098168221137207
India Today. (2026, October 10). “CJP shares Plan B sans Dipke, Ranka, Das. It features a pre-recorded video.” https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/cjp-abhijeet-dipke-video-detention-ajinkya-shinde-lead-movement-saurav-das-ashutosh-ranka-protest-jantar-mantar-3013979-2026-10-10
Jha, P. (2026, October 14). “Delhi court sends CJP’s Saurav Das and Ashutosh Ranka to judicial custody for 5 days.” Bar & Bench. https://www.barandbench.com/amp/story/news/delhi-court-sends-cjps-saurav-das-ashutosh-ranka-ajinkya-shinde-to-judicial-custody-for-5-days
Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. Verso. https://www.versobooks.com/en-gb/products/1941-on-populist-reason
Mathur, A. (2026, October 19). “CJP leaders Saurav Das, Ashutosh Ranka get 2 more days in jail: What does law say.” India Today. https://www.indiatoday.in/india/law-news/story/cjp-leaders-saurav-das-ashutosh-ranka-custody-surety-rejections-3021021-2026-10-19
Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x
Reuters. (2024, June 26). “Kenyan president Ruto rejects finance bill.” https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/kenyan-president-ruto-rejects-finance-bill-2024-06-26/
Reuters. (2025, February 24). “Bangladeshi students, who ousted former PM Hasina, set to launch political party.” https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladeshi-students-who-ousted-former-pm-hasina-set-launch-political-party-2025-02-24/
Reuters. (2026a, October 10). “From ‘cockroach’ post to protest leader: India’s Dipke tests Modi government.” https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/cockroach-post-protest-leader-indias-dipke-tests-modi-government-2026-10-10/
Reuters. (2026b, October 16). “Indian police detain ‘cockroach’ founder, student leaders ahead of Delhi rally.” https://www.reuters.com/world/india/security-stepped-up-indias-capital-cockroach-movement-rally-2026-10-16/
Reuters. (2026c, October 19). “Indian court extends custody of ‘Cockroach’ movement leaders, local media says.” https://www.reuters.com/world/india/indian-court-extends-custody-cockroach-movement-leaders-local-media-says-2026-10-19/
Rosanvallon, P. (2008). Counter-democracy: Politics in an age of distrust (A. Goldhammer, Trans.). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755835
Scharpf, F. W. (1999). Governing in Europe: Effective and democratic? Oxford University Press.https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198295457.001.0001
Sharma, P. (2026, March 17). “From victory to responsibility: Can the RSP deliver in Nepal?” (ISAS Insights No. 779). Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore. https://www.isas.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/ISAS-Insights-779hk-hs.pdf
The Hitavada. (2026, July 26). “Govt accepts all CJP demands.” https://www.thehitavada.com/Encyc/2026/7/26/govt-accepts-all-cjp-demands.html
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