In an interview with ECPS, Professor Emilia Zankina explains that, despite the financial and mobility benefits of EU membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West” due to Bulgaria’s strong historic ties to Russia. The communist era deeply embedded Russian language, culture, and education in Bulgarian life, and “for many,” Professor Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator.” She observes that while the war in Ukraine initially reduced pro-Russian sentiment in the country, as the conflict continued, some Bulgarians have returned to their original views.
Interview by Selcuk Gultasli
In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Emilia Zankina, a leading expert in political science and Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University, delves into the intricate landscape of Bulgarian politics. Currently Dean of Temple University’s Rome campus, Dr. Zankina offers an in-depth analysis of Bulgaria’s shifting political dynamics, particularly highlighting the nation’s complex relationship with Russia, the rise of populism, and public sentiment toward the West.
In Bulgaria’s recent parliamentary election, the center-right GERB party secured first place, but will need a coalition partner to govern. GERB garnered 25.52% of the votes, with the reformist We Continue the Change (PP) party in second at 13.74%, and the ultra-nationalist Vazrazhdane (Revival) party in third with 12.92%.
Exploring Bulgaria’s historic affinity with Russia, Dr. Zankina explains that despite the financial and mobility benefits gained through European Union membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.” She attributes this sentiment to the powerful legacy of the communist era, during which Russian language, culture, and education were integral to Bulgarian life. “For many,” Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator, and this view endures across generations, who often make little distinction between Russian people and the government.” She describes how, initially, the war in Ukraine prompted a decline in pro-Russian sentiment, but as the conflict has continued, some Bulgarians have reverted to their original views.
Addressing Bulgaria’s “mushrooming” populist landscape, Dr. Zankina sheds light on why the country has faced seven elections since 2021. The rapid turnover of parties, she explains, is fueled by populism‘s promise of quick solutions and charismatic leadership, which attracts voters eager for change but dissatisfied with democratic processes’ slow pace. “This populist formula,” she says, “favors emotional appeals and big promises without real solutions.” In Bulgaria, populism has contributed to a “never-ending cycle” of new parties, each aiming to capture a portion of an electorate constantly shifting its support.
Dr. Zankina also highlights the unique dynamic of female representation within Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties, where women play a “strategic role” in appealing to female voters. However, the PRR remains largely male-dominated, reflecting broader perceptions of these parties as “Männerparteien.” As Bulgaria navigates its future in the EU amidst the influence of both Russian-aligned parties and anti-establishment movements, Dr. Zankina’s insights underscore the complexities of national identity, populism, and external influences in shaping Bulgarian democracy.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Emilia Zankina with some edits.
Populism Fuels Ongoing Volatility in Bulgaria’s Party System
Professor Zankina, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. With the fragmentation of the Bulgarian parliament and the presence of nine parties, what role does populism play in shaping public perception and voter alignment within Bulgaria’s complex political landscape? Could this be the primary reason why Bulgaria has gone to the polls seven times since 2021? Additionally, what role have populist parties specifically played in contributing to this political crisis?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Populism is a broad phenomenon that has contributed to developments in party systems, not only in Bulgaria but throughout Europe. What we see is that populist appeals favor easy solutions in Manichean rhetoric and salvation narratives that make voters less patient with the difficulty and complexity of the democratic process, making them eager to vote for the next "savior" and the next quick solution. So certainly, the growing penetration of populism, both as a discursive technique and a way of organizing parties, as well as a way of moving away from hardcore ideologies, has contributed to an overall expectation by voters that they could be offered a simple solution by the next new party.
So we have this combination of populism breeding a string of new parties that come in a never-ending cycle with new promises and a core body of voters who move from one new party to the next. There is certainly a lot to be said about populism contributing to an overall volatility of a party system which, in the case of Bulgaria, was never fully stable, as it is a relatively young party system. It’s been 35 years, and we have already seen populist appeals for the last 20 or so years making their way, and these have become even more prevalent in the past four years.
Eastern Europe Tries to Build Party Systems as Western Models Erode
How has the shift from traditional political parties to personalistic, charisma-centered leadership impacted Bulgaria’s democratic institutions, and what long-term effects do you foresee? What role do crises play in the rise of charismatic leaders in Bulgaria, and how have leaders like Simeon and Borisov utilized such moments to construct and sustain political charisma? What made GERB and Boyko Borisov so successful in Bulgarian elections since 2006?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Moving away from traditional parties is a significant shift for Western European countries. Central mobilizing themes—often described by the “frozen party thesis” with divisions such as rural versus urban or industrial versus agricultural—have become less relevant as new issues like migration, climate change, and economic crises come to the forefront. In Eastern Europe, however, moving away from traditional political parties holds less relevance because there isn’t a long history of such parties. Eastern Europe emerged from a one-party system that was far from democratic; it could hardly be called a party system—it was essentially an authoritarian regime masquerading as a party system.
In building a party system, Eastern Europe faces a situation where the systems it seeks to emulate in the West are gradually eroding. Now, trends between West and East are less discernible because we also see interparty connectedness, transnational party cooperation, European party families, and so forth, as well as the replication of organizational formulas or personalistic behavior formulas.
In Bulgaria, a major shift occurred with the arrival of Simeon, a charismatic figure with significant legitimacy who attracted a substantial share of votes. During his tenure, he accomplished much and fulfilled many of his promises. At the same time, he established a personalistic model of charisma that Boyko Borisov later emulated in a markedly different style. While the two differ greatly in character, objectives, and persona, Borisov managed to replicate Simeon’s success through his own personal appeal.
Borisov’s approach is less refined and graceful, focusing instead on the image of a “tough guy” capable of handling criminals due to his familiarity with such environments. This approach quickly earned him credibility, not only domestically but also with the European People’s Party, which endorsed him as soon as GERB was formed. In the 2007 elections—Bulgaria’s first for the European Parliament—he gained this support and has continued to benefit from it due to the predictability and stability he brought to Bulgaria.
Borisov’s electoral record is impressive: in 15 years and 11 parliamentary elections, he has only faced defeat twice. His success extends to presidential elections, with his candidates winning twice, as well as to local and European Parliament elections. However, his party, GERB, has been marred by associations with corruption, fueling opposition that combines grassroots protests with a series of populist parties and personalities riding this wave of discontent. This opposition has recently challenged Borisov’s hold on power, while also enabling numerous newcomers to rise on anti-corruption narratives and critiques of GERB. Not all of these actors are necessarily sincere in their appeals, as each has specific political objectives and aims to gain power.
How significant is Boyko Borissov’s ability to distance himself from far-right oligarch Delyan Peevski for GERB’s potential coalition-building efforts, and what does this suggest about the influence of corruption-related sanctions on Bulgarian politics?
Professor Emilia Zankina: He has not shown any willingness to distance himself, even in the aftermath of the elections. On Sunday night, in his speech, he did not exclude Peevski and the MRF(Movement for Rights and Freedoms)-New Beginning from potential coalition-building efforts. Although We Continue the Change-Democratic Bulgaria—the most likely and much-needed potential partner for Borissov—has called for a cordon sanitaire around Peevski, GERB remains one of the few parties in Parliament unwilling to join this exclusion. In fact, every other party has supported the cordon sanitaire except Borissov’s party, which suggests that there may be dependencies between Borissov and Peevski that are not apparent to the broader public. Whether it’s a question of financing or compromising information, he appears reluctant to sever that connection. This stance will undoubtedly create significant challenges in finding other coalition partners and establishing a viable governing coalition.
Far-Right Parties Gain from Alignment and Financial Support from Putin Regime
Given the rise of pro-Russian and far-right groups like Vazrazhdane, how do you interpret the current balance between Bulgaria’s pro-European aspirations and the growing appeal of populist, anti-Western ideologies? How might Bulgaria’s prolonged political instability impact its path towards EU integration, and do you foresee populist narratives either accelerating or hindering this process within the current coalition negotiations?
Professor Emilia Zankina: The nationalist vote in Bulgaria has traditionally accounted for around 10 to 12%, beginning with ATAKA in 2005. However, in the latest elections, Vazrazhdane and other new parties like March for Justice and Great Glory collectively gathered over 20% of the vote. It’s important to interpret this cautiously, as it doesn’t necessarily reflect purely nationalist sentiment—a significant portion of this vote is protest-driven. Nationalist parties have capitalized on widespread discontent regarding various issues, from the economic crisis to Bulgaria’s stance on the war in Ukraine, becoming a magnet for groups experiencing different types of dissatisfaction. Whether these supporters are genuinely nationalist or simply unhappy is, in some ways, beside the point. If these parties manage to gain power, nationalists, once in government, tend to govern as nationalists.
We have already seen these parties push through two pieces of legislation in the previous parliament: one against so-called LGBT “propaganda” in schools and another targeting “foreign agents,” similar to measures observed in Hungary and Georgia. Additionally, these parties benefit not only from alignment with the Putin regime but also, at times, from its financial support. Examination of their financial reports over the past 10 years reveals that around European elections, unexplained funds—though not substantial—appear in the records of these populist parties. This is particularly notable as the categorization of these funds often shifts from donations to memberships, showing a lack of consistency, which strongly suggests these funds may originate elsewhere.
While directly linking these funds to the Putin regime is complex, it is well-documented that Western parties like Rassemblement National (RN) in France have received similar support. We can therefore reasonably surmise that Russian support reaches these parties, not only financially but also through disinformation campaigns and internet trolls, which amplify their narratives while eroding others, including basic facts.
In your view, what are the primary challenges for pro-European coalitions such as PP-DB in countering populist narratives, especially regarding issues like judicial reform and anti-corruption efforts? Given the "top-down, externally driven" approach to reform in Bulgaria, what specific measures do you believe could enhance the sustainability and local ownership of these reforms?
Professor Emilia Zankina: It doesn’t help that the champions of judicial reform and pro-EU orientation have proven to be quite incompetent themselves and often rely on populist narratives. They also depend on swing votes from the right, left, and center. The first priority is to establish themselves as legitimate political figures capable of predictable political behavior, which they have yet to demonstrate. Despite the sound programmatic appeals behind many of their reforms, their behavior during the campaign has been one of endless bickering with Borisov, and the collapse of the government showed a lack of political experience and acumen. Their inability to inspire trust or project legitimacy and experience doesn’t help their cause.
Furthermore, they face a complex situation: the largest party is GERB, and they have run on an anti-GERB platform, yet now they are in the position of having to uphold the pro-European line, with GERB as their only viable partner. It’s not an easy position, as GERB is both their biggest opponent on corruption—after Peevski—and their strongest ally on European versus pro-Russian orientation. This is a very delicate balance and a difficult task.
They must attempt to form this pro-European coalition while pushing GERB to distance itself from Peevski and commit to anti-corruption reforms. Although complex and challenging, they have no other option but to try to take this difficult step.
Corruption Persists, Demanding Focused and Sustained Solutions
How have historical legacies and political choices shaped the challenges in Bulgaria’s public administration reform, particularly regarding transparency and accountability? What is the role of corruption in either consolidating or weakening populist parties in Bulgaria?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Corruption has been a major mobilizing factor, as there have been numerous corruption scandals involving key GERB figures, some of whom, like Tsvetan Tsvetanov, are no longer in power. Corruption remains a persistent problem, and it’s crucial to focus on and stay committed to solutions.
From experience in other former communist countries with similar bureaucratic legacies—a nomenklatura system, highly politicized, and, after the collapse of communism, highly corrupt—we know that one effective solution is electronic governance. Reforming public administration and expanding e-governance across more sectors and procedures have already made substantial strides in addressing corruption, particularly at lower levels. Currently, however, Bulgaria is dealing with political corruption at the highest levels, embodied by figures like Peevski. Peevski’s influence, demonstrated by his control over both the prosecution and the courts, also extends to swaying party behavior within other political groups.
The fact that he managed to secure more votes than party founder Ahmed Dogan, with only 25% of these votes coming from ethnic Turks and over 50% from the Roma population, suggests he has substantial resources for elections and vote-buying. Many of these votes are indeed purchased. Meanwhile, the splinter party Alliance for Freedom and Rights holds over 50% of the ethnic Turkish vote and the majority of the ethnic Turkish vote abroad, indicating that it is the party most recognized by ethnic Turks as their representative. Nonetheless, Peevski has managed to partially hijack the party, purchasing votes and accumulating around 280,000 votes—a considerable number and a significant financial investment.
How does voter perception of corruption differ from expert evaluations in Bulgaria, and what does this reveal about public tolerance for corruption among political parties? How does the relationship between ethnic identity and party support complicate anti-corruption voting behavior in Bulgaria? Furthermore, what role does voter apathy or ‘fatalism’ about corruption play in shaping the success of anti-corruption parties like "There Is Such a People"?
Professor Emilia Zankina: We have a political culture with low institutional trust, which opens opportunities for anti-establishment rhetoric and allows populist parties across the spectrum to benefit from this general distrust. At the same time, there is a dissonance between actual corruption, perceived corruption, and experienced corruption. Corruption is a significant problem in Bulgaria; at the highest levels, there is political control over prosecution and the distribution of EU funds—both serious corruption issues. These factors make it easy for new parties, like There Is Such a People, to exploit the issue. However, the question remains: what are the solutions, and which of these parties actually offers viable ones?
Judicial reforms were pushed by the last regular government with support from GERB, PP-DB, and Peevski; however, many of these reforms were poorly designed. They are often targeted at specific political situations or figures, and in 10 years, these reforms may prove as problematic as the current laws. We need to move away from witch-hunting and detach reform efforts from specific political figures when considering institutional solutions and mechanisms to combat corruption and prevent such opportunities from arising in the first place.
Pro-Russian Sentiment in Bulgaria Rooted in History and Soviet Legacy
How have the war in Ukraine and the Russian influence in the country affected populism and nationalism in Bulgaria?
Professor Emilia Zankina: This has certainly enabled parties like Vazrazhdane to increase their support tenfold over the past three years. In Bulgaria, there is a blend of genuine pro-Russian sentiment, rooted in the country’s long history, including its war for independence and a communist regime backed by Moscow. This regime benefited large portions of the population, though it also harmed many others. Nevertheless, deep-rooted support for all things Russian persists, embedded in families and generations who feel an affinity for the Russian language, culture, country, and worldview.
Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine has placed many people with moderate views—those who may be pro-European but not anti-Russian—in a difficult position, forcing them to choose between their progressive pro-European stance and their affinity for Russia. This dynamic has contributed to the growth of parties like Vazrazhdane.
Interestingly, another strongly pro-Russian party, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, has almost disappeared, losing over 1 million voters in just a few years and now falling below 8%, despite holding nearly 30% in the 2017 elections. This indicates a limit to the mobilizing power of both pro-Russian and anti-Russian rhetoric. Roughly a third of the population is likely strongly pro-Russian, while about half supports a position of neutrality in this war. For many Bulgarian voters, the stance of the European Union and the Western world on this conflict is challenging to accept.
How do you explain the mushrooming of populist parties in Bulgaria? What are the similarities and differences with other populist parties in Europe?
Professor Emilia Zankina: There are many similarities and differences, perhaps more than we might expect, with considerable variety. Across Europe—whether east or west, north or south—we see a proliferation of populist parties, and within each country, there is significant variation. In Bulgaria, populist parties emerge from the center and the right, while in other Eastern European countries, like Slovakia, they also emerge from the left.
What has become firmly established, however, is the populist formula: strong emotional appeals, a charismatic figure highlighting sharp divisions and real societal problems, yet offering no real solutions—only big promises and quick fixes that fail to materialize. In the long run, this erodes the foundations of democracy by creating voters who are less patient and loyal, making party identification and loyalty seem like luxuries.
Instead, we see an emphasis on responding to the mood and crisis of the day, with different charismatic figures performing almost in a TV show setting to attract more votes. This is a Europe-wide trend. In a country without a well-established party system, it’s even easier to erode what was never solidly in place to begin with.
Ethnic Turkish Minority in Bulgaria Endured Trauma from Forced Assimilation and Expulsions
Why have populist radical right parties significantly increased their share of the vote in the June 2024 European Parliament elections, and what key issues have driven their success? How has the Turkish minority influenced the mobilization of nationalist votes, and what role does ethnic and nationalist populism play in the strategies of Bulgarian political actors, particularly regarding the Turkish minority and the Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) party?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Bulgarian nationalism does exploit anti-Turkish rhetoric, but this is not its main mobilizing argument, as there is another minority in Bulgaria, the Roma minority, which actually has a far stronger mobilizing factor—much more so than the ethnic Turks or even external migrants. The Roma minority has traditionally been the primary target of such rhetoric, generating narratives around issues like welfare chauvinism, pensions, schooling, and healthcare, emphasizing access only for taxpayers.
Other issues, like the war in Ukraine and pro-Russian sentiments, also influence the discourse, particularly on topics such as energy policy—decisions around local refineries, the atomic power plant, and related matters. Regarding the ethnic Turkish minority, one key argument fueling nationalist parties is the portrayal of the Ottoman Empire in history books. The ongoing debate centers on whether Bulgaria was under the so-called “Turkish yoke” or merely experienced Turkish presence or dominance, making history books a battleground for these interpretations.
The ethnic Turkish minority, meanwhile, has faced significant historical trauma in Bulgaria, especially during the renaming process, when 800,000 ethnic Turks were forced to leave the country, and the entire minority was subjected to forced assimilation policies, including killings, expulsions, and restrictions on language, culture, and religion. This history has created a deep distrust within the ethnic Turkish community toward all parties, pushing them to continue supporting a corrupt party like the MRF, which understands their loyalty is rooted in a lack of trust for any other party.
Despite attempts from both left and right to reach out to the ethnic Turkish minority, the distrust runs deep, as the wounds are recent and severe, dating back only 30 to 40 years. Many people still hold passports with multiple names, reflecting the forced name changes. It will take time before the ethnic Turkish minority feels confident enough to vote outside an ethnically Turkish party and place their trust elsewhere.
In your recent article for the ECPS report, you note that prior to 2022, 58% of the population reported positive attitudes toward Russia and Putin, suggesting that the war in Ukraine has created fertile ground for PRR parties with strong pro-Russian stances. What are the main reasons behind this pronounced pro-Russian sentiment?
Professor Emilia Zankina: Immediately after the war began, this percentage dropped sharply, but it started climbing again as the conflict continued and Ukrainian refugees arrived in the country. The initial backlash and shift away from strong support for Russia were reversed as refugees from Ukraine came, and as the war extended into a second and third year, people gradually reverted to their original views. Here, we return to the powerful legacy of the communist regime and a party that had 1 million members, with many families still revering Russia regardless of its current regime. Little distinction is made between the Russian people and the Russian government, which becomes problematic; few people object to Russian culture and people, but many oppose Putin’s regime, including within Russia itself.
The historical legacy frames Russia as a liberator, followed by a communist regime that actively promoted Russian culture and language for many years. Many people studied in Russian schools, pursued professional development in Russia, and were raised with that cultural influence. Despite the benefits of the European Union—funds, improved living standards, and mobility—many people remain deeply skeptical of the West.
Populist Radical Right Parties Typically Remain “Men’s Parties”
How do you interpret the discrepancy between the low female representation in Bulgaria’s populist radical right (PRR) parties and the comparatively high level of activity on women’s issues among PRR women MPs? How might the presence of women in PRR parties in Bulgaria influence broader perceptions of these parties as "Männerparteien," and what factors contribute to this dynamic?
Professor Emilia Zankina: There is extensive research, not only mine but also by many other authors, showing that populist radical right parties are typically "men’s parties." They are represented by men, supported by men, and largely serve men’s interests. However, we have also seen a narrative of traditional family values promoted by women within these parties. This trend, while not dominant, has been firmly established, extending from the UK to France and across Eastern Europe.
These parties have also strategically positioned women as a tactic to appeal to female voters and as a more legitimate means of promoting specific policies. When addressing gender issues, reproductive rights, or family services, having a woman advocate for these policies lends greater legitimacy. Consequently, parties have co-opted and promoted more women to the forefront as part of this strategy. Yet, for the moment, the appeal remains predominantly directed toward male voters, and representation within these parties still skews male. Despite these efforts, if you examine the gender balance in these parties, on electoral lists and among MPs, it remains largely male-dominated.
