Brazil’s democracy faces one of its greatest stress tests with former President Jair Bolsonaro sentenced to 27 years for plotting a coup. In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. André Borges, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Brasília, warns that Brazil is “becoming more like American politics, where affective polarization drives citizens to see opponents as existential threats.” Such polarization, he argues, risks normalizing democratic rule-breaking. Yet Dr. Borges also highlights Brazil’s resilience, rooted in its “institutional mix that deconcentrates authority”—federalism, separation of powers, fragmented parties, and an autonomous Supreme Court. This paradox defines Brazil today: resilient institutions confronting dangerously eroding democratic norms.
Interview by Selcuk Gultasli
The conviction of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro to 27 years in prison for plotting a coup has plunged Brazil into one of the most turbulent chapters of its democratic history. While Bolsonaro’s allies denounce the ruling as political persecution, and international far-right figures echo claims of “lawfare,” Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) has defended the trial as a necessary step to safeguard democracy.
Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Dr. André Borges, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Brasília, whose research focuses on party systems, coalition formation, and right-wing populism. Dr. Borges warns that Brazil is “becoming more like American politics, where affective polarization drives citizens to see opponents as existential threats.” In his view, such dynamics risk normalizing democratic rule-breaking, as voters increasingly rationalize the repression of political adversaries in the name of survival.
At the same time, Dr. Borges stresses that Brazil retains significant institutional defenses against authoritarian capture. “In comparative terms, if I look at other Latin American countries, I would say that Brazilian institutions are, in a sense, more resilient to this kind of attack. The reason for this has to do with several factors, one of which is that Brazil has an institutional mix that deconcentrates authority. It has a federal system, a presidential constitution with separation of powers, and a very fragmented party system. On top of that, there is a relatively autonomous Supreme Court.”
This “institutional mix,” he argues, explains why Bolsonaro could not consolidate authoritarian rule in the style of leaders such as Nayib Bukele in El Salvador or Viktor Orbán in Hungary. Since 1989, no Brazilian president has commanded a legislative majority, forcing presidents—including Bolsonaro—to rely on fragile coalitions with clientelistic parties that are reluctant to rewrite rules that benefit them. “Doing so would simply empower Bolsonaro and his family to the detriment of traditional politicians—and that is not something they would like to see happening,” Dr. Borges notes.
By situating Bolsonaro’s downfall in the tension between institutional resilience and intensifying polarization, Dr. Borges highlights a central paradox: while Brazil’s democracy has thus far resisted authoritarian capture, the country’s deepening affective divides may yet erode the very democratic norms its institutions have preserved.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Dr. André Borges, lightly edited for clarity and readability.
The Supreme Court Stepped In Where Congress Was Lenient
Professor Borges, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Jair Bolsonaro’s conviction for plotting a military coup marks an unprecedented moment in Brazilian democracy, with the Supreme Court framing his conspiracy as an attempt to “annihilate” the democratic rule of law. How do you see this outcome reshaping the balance of power between elected executives and judicial institutions, and how does it fit within your account of Brazil’s long-run party-system de-institutionalization, where shifting alliances eroded voters’ ability to distinguish governing alternatives and opened space for an authoritarian outsider?
Assoc. Prof. André Borges: That’s a great question. In my view, the Bolsonaro administration was unmistakably illiberal. It deliberately sought to weaken checks and balances, empower the military, and expand the role of the armed forces in national politics. This was evident throughout Bolsonaro’s years in power, as his government aimed to restore to the military some of the authority it had previously lost. For example, the military significantly increased its control over national security institutions.
Because of the Bolsonaro administration’s attacks on democracy, the Supreme Court became more activist. I believe its heightened role in recent years is also a consequence of Congress’s leniency toward Bolsonaro’s anti-democratic agenda. This is crucial to note: on several occasions, Supreme Court could have acted to obstruct this illiberal project. For example, during the pandemic, evidence emerged that top government officials were involved in corruption scandals tied to vaccine purchases. Yet, dominated by center-right, right-wing, and far-right parties, Congress largely sided with Bolsonaro—leaving the Supreme Court to step in.
With regard to party institutionalization, Bolsonaro’s rise to power is closely tied to the weakening of mainstream center-right forces, particularly the Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB). Initially a centrist—indeed, at times even center-left—party, the PSDB gradually shifted rightward. Prior to Bolsonaro, it was the principal center-right alternative. Yet over time the PSDB experienced a profound collapse: its electoral base eroded, key leaders departed, and internal fractures deepened. Bolsonaro capitalized on this weakening of the mainstream right.
This is not unique to Brazil. In other countries in the region, such as Chile, we see a similar dynamic: major rival parties like the UDI and National Renovation have lost ground to the far right. More broadly, across Latin America, the mainstream right is losing parts of its conservative electorate. There are many reasons for this, but once conservative sectors no longer feel represented by traditional right-wing parties, it opens opportunities for anti-system, far-right alternatives. This trend is reinforced by a broader climate of distrust in political parties. People feel unrepresented and believe that all parties and politicians are corrupt. That sense of disillusionment creates the conditions in which far-right populist voices can gain ground.
Brazil’s Institutional Mix Makes Democratic Backsliding Harder
In your research on party system erosion and right-wing populism, you highlight the fragility of institutional constraints under populist rule. Does Bolsonaro’s sentencing suggest that Brazil’s institutions have developed greater resilience compared to other cases you have studied, or might this verdict deepen polarization and fuel narratives of political persecution?
Assoc. Prof. André Borges: That’s a great question as well. My take on this is the following. In comparative terms, if I look at other Latin American countries, I would say that Brazilian institutions are, in a sense, more resilient to this kind of attack. The reason for this has to do with several factors, one of which is that Brazil has an institutional mix that deconcentrates authority. It has a federal system, a presidential constitution with separation of powers, and a very fragmented party system. On top of that, there is a relatively autonomous Supreme Court.
In this scenario, it is harder for a far-right populist like Bolsonaro to implement a democratic backsliding project. In this respect, Brazil is different from El Salvador. If you look at what is going on there with Nayib Bukele, it is very clear that El Salvador is no longer a functional democracy: checks and balances have been eroded, the Supreme Court was packed with political allies, and the legislature no longer acts as a check on presidential power. But it would be very difficult to reproduce that in Brazil.
One reason is that illiberal backsliding is more likely when executives can rely on supermajorities—when the president’s party holds a very large majority in the legislature. This is very unlikely in Brazil. Since 1989, none of the presidents elected has had a majority; in reality, all have been minority presidents. Bolsonaro, when elected in 2018, had a party with only 10% of the seats. This makes Brazil very different from cases like Hungary, where Fidesz under Viktor Orbán held a supermajority, making it much easier to implement constitutional changes.
In Brazil, a far-right populist who comes into power is forced to forge a coalition with right-wing parties. Many of these parties are essentially office-seeking, clientelistic organizations rather than programmatic ones. It seems to me that the traditional politicians within these parties are not willing to change the rules of the game, for a very simple reason: the rules of the game benefit them. If you look at Brazil’s recent history, the political right has always held a plurality of the vote in legislative elections for the lower chamber. Considering that the right consistently wins, why would they change the rules of the game? It does not make sense. In the end, doing so would simply empower Bolsonaro and his family to the detriment of traditional politicians—and that is not something they would like to see happening in the coming years. So in this sense, yes, Brazilian institutions are probably more resilient compared to other cases.
Portraying Trials as Persecution Is a Familiar Populist Script
Bolsonaro and his allies have framed the trial as political revenge, echoing claims of ‘lawfare’ often made by populist leaders across Latin America. To what extent does the framing of accountability as persecution resonate with broader patterns you have identified in multiparty presidential systems?
Assoc. Prof. André Borges: There is nothing new in this kind of narrative. It has been used by different types of populists from both sides of the ideological spectrum. This is the usual script when they face trial: they portray it as political persecution. In the case of Bolsonaro in Brazil, this framing seems likely to resonate mainly with his hardcore supporters. Depending on how you measure it, the so-called Bolsonaristas—Bolsonaro’s followers—represent between 20–25% of voters. That is significant, but it is not enough to win a presidential election, because in Brazil you have runoff rules, and you can only win with 50% plus one of the valid votes. So that base is insufficient.
If Bolsonaro—or another far-right candidate—plans to take over national government, he will need to build an electoral coalition that goes beyond far-right voters. In this sense, I do not think this narrative will help Bolsonaro much, especially given that rejection of him and his family has grown among the electorate. The latest polls show that about 64% of Brazilian voters would never vote for Bolsonaro. When other names are considered, such as his wife, Michele Bolsonaro, or his son, rejection rates are even higher. This makes me think that this narrative will not be enough to gain support beyond the far-right, more extremist space.
Bolsonaro Reinforced a Preexisting Trend of Militarization in Brazilian Politics
The trial revealed detailed evidence of conspiracy, including potential plans to assassinate political rivals. From your perspective, does this reinforce arguments about the militarization of Brazilian politics—an area you have explored in your work on authoritarian inheritance—or does it reflect a unique rupture under Bolsonaro’s leadership?
Assoc. Prof. André Borges: On this question, I must say first that I am not a specialist in military politics, but with that being said, I do think there has been a process of militarization in Brazil, in the sense that civilian control over the military has always been weak. Brazil has not been as successful as other Latin American countries, for instance, in convicting military officers involved in human rights crimes during the dictatorship. In this regard, Brazil differs from Argentina or Uruguay, where there were truth commissions, trials, and many convictions of former officials.
Even before Bolsonaro’s administration, we had already seen an increasing presence of top military officers in civilian posts, especially in the area of public security. This reflects the fact that crime is a major concern among Brazil’s population, as in many other Latin American countries. As a result, there has been a gradual militarization of public security. Brazil’s constitution allows for military intervention in public security under certain circumstances, and one such intervention occurred during the Temer government, which was an interim government just before Bolsonaro, from 2016 to 2018. That intervention took place in Rio de Janeiro, the country’s third-largest state and one with particularly high levels of crime.
It is notable that the general who commanded this intervention, Braga Netto, was later nominated as Bolsonaro’s vice-presidential candidate in the last election. For this reason, I would say that the Bolsonaro government reinforced and accelerated a preexisting trend of greater military involvement in national political affairs. One clear piece of evidence is that no other government since the transition to democracy appointed as many military ministers as Bolsonaro did. He built a cabinet with a very high proportion of military officers—something highly unusual for a consolidated democracy. While this might be politics as usual in a country like Pakistan, it is striking in a country that is classified as a democracy.
There has also been concern about the politicization of the armed forces. This is the main concern, because since the end of the military dictatorship there has been a strong effort by the armed forces toward professionalization, ensuring that the army, navy, and marines would not become involved in politics. That is not the role of the military; they should remain separate from politics. The Bolsonaro government, however, represented a kind of return to the past, as we saw some active generals appointed to political office. This also triggered debate in Congress, because the Brazilian constitution and legislation on military affairs are very clear: if you are part of the military and want to run for political office, or if you wish to be appointed to a ministry or a secretary position at the state level, you must first retire. You cannot serve while remaining active military. Congress even approved a law on this issue to reinforce that rule and prevent such situations.
But yes, the concern is not only the politicization of the armed forces but also the politicization of the police. In Brazil, unlike in many other countries, we have two police branches: the military police, which has a more repressive function, and the civil police, which is responsible for investigating crimes. The military police has close ties to the armed forces, and existing research, as well as events during the Bolsonaro government, show that many police officers are in fact Bolsonaro supporters. Support for Bolsonaro is particularly strong among the lower ranks of the police forces.
This is troubling, because these officers are ultimately responsible for maintaining law and order during protests—for instance, when far-right supporters take to the streets. We saw what happened in January 2023, when a mob of Bolsonaro supporters invaded Congress and the Supreme Court. It was so easy for them because the police of the Federal District—which, while technically a city, has the status of a state and is home to Brazil’s capital—was responsible for overseeing the demonstration and preventing violence. Yet they were lenient; they essentially allowed the protesters to invade public buildings. As a result, it took considerable time before the situation was brought under control.
Bolsonarismo Could Survive Through Party Deals
Given your work on electoral coalitions and incentives in presidential systems, what implications might Bolsonaro’s conviction have for the future strategies of Brazil’s right-wing parties and actors? Could sidelining Bolsonaro encourage institutionalized conservative alternatives, or will his movement continue to dominate the right despite his imprisonment?
Assoc. Prof. André Borges: That’s an excellent question, and one I have asked myself in recent years. I don’t think I have a definitive answer. But what I can say is that Bolsonarismo, if we think of it as a far-right movement, is already rooted in society. Bolsonaro was able to mobilize an electoral base comprised of ultra-conservative voters who support him because they share the same agendas and policy preferences he expressed during his campaign. So, in a sense, the connection is not only based on charisma. In political science, we usually distinguish between two types of linkages between voters and leaders, or between voters and parties: charismatic linkages, which rest on exceptional qualities of the leader and emotional attachment, and programmatic linkages. In the case of Bolsonarismo, I think you have both. There is an emotional connection to Bolsonaro, but also a programmatic one.
This makes me think that even if Bolsonaro is imprisoned and forced to step away from national politics—because, if everything goes as planned, he will not be able to run for office again in his lifetime, having been sentenced to 27 years in prison plus another 8 years of ineligibility—Bolsonarismo will endure. Bolsonaro is now 70 years old, which means he would be over 100 before being eligible again. In this sense, other right-wing leaders could inherit his movement, since the electoral constituency of far-right, extremist voters will remain.
I see two possible scenarios. In one, the political right divides: a candidate from Bolsonaro’s family—his son or his wife—runs, while the rest of the right supports another candidate, most likely Tarcísio de Freitas. This would split the right into a Bolsonarista wing led by his family and a non-Bolsonarista wing. In this scenario, it will be harder to consolidate a strong right-wing party.
The reason is that Bolsonaro and his family have never been able to build a party of their own. Bolsonaro is currently in the PL (Liberal Party), which today represents the far right but was previously a typical office-seeking, clientelistic party. Crucially, the PL is not controlled by Bolsonaro, but by traditional mainstream politicians like Valdemar da Costa Neto. That is the core problem: to create a strong Bolsonarista party, you need an organizational structure, and building one takes time and resources. I doubt the Bolsonaro family has either the capacity or the will to do that. They would likely need to take over an existing party, but all the major right-wing parties are controlled by traditional politicians.
The only feasible path would be some kind of agreement between Bolsonaro’s family and the more radical factions of the PL, which is itself divided between legislators loyal to Bolsonaro and more independent figures. Such a power-sharing arrangement could keep Bolsonarismo politically alive. At this moment, though, I don’t see how that would be possible—but perhaps I am wrong.
Affective Polarization in Brazil Risks Eroding Democratic Norms
In your recent work on the illusion of electoral stability, you discuss how party system erosion paved the way for Bolsonaro. Does his conviction close that cycle, or could institutional breakdown re-emerge in new forms?
Assoc. Prof. André Borges: It’s hard to know what is going to happen. For now, what I can say is that Brazil today is an increasingly polarized society. Brazilian politics is becoming more like American politics, in the sense that people’s political preferences are starting to interfere with their personal lives. This is very unusual for us Brazilians but has been happening in the United States for a long time. For example, you might see a situation in which someone who is a strong Democrat will not accept that his daughter marries a Republican. This is a clear case in which political preferences affect personal life—things that should normally be separate from politics.
The same pattern is now emerging in Brazil, where there is a lot of hatred and stereotyping on both sides. On one side, you have the petistas, supporters of the Workers’ Party, the largest left-wing party in Brazil, which governs the country today. On the other side, you have the Liberal Party and Bolsonaro supporters. The result is a deep clash between these two groups.
I think this is bad for democracy, because when you have this kind of affective polarization, it often leads to the politicization of democratic rules. This is very dangerous, because people start to calculate what is acceptable or not acceptable in day-to-day politics. When two groups hate each other and you have this us-versus-them logic, it becomes easier for voters to rationalize a situation in which, for instance, a president from my party takes action to repress supporters of the other party. Then I might say, “Well, the people on the other side are dangerous, they represent a threat, so why should we respect their political rights? Maybe it is justifiable to break the rules of democracy, because in the end, the other side is evil, and we should not respect their rights.”
I think we are reaching that point in Brazil, which in my view is dangerous. But as for knowing what will happen in the coming years—I don’t know. It wouldn’t be fair to say that I have the answer.
Trump Treated Brazil as If It Were an Enemy State, Not an Ally
Trump’s use of tariffs and sanctions to pressure Brazil on Bolsonaro’s behalf highlights an unusual case of international populist solidarity. Does this signal a shift in how external pressures operate on Latin American democracies compared to past US interventions?
Assoc. Prof. André Borges: My impression is that, yes, this represents a departure from US foreign policy in recent decades. It is very unusual for an American president to try to interfere with judicial decisions in another country. I can’t think of any other recent example of this. So, this is very serious. But surely, it has to do with Donald Trump and the more radical wing of the Republican Party. This is worrying.
If we think about what happened during the 2022 elections, support from the Biden government was very important to ensure that we did not have a coup attempt or some kind of mobilization to discredit electoral results. The Biden administration was very quick in recognizing Lula’s victory. In addition, US military officers made very clear in public statements that the United States would not support any kind of military intervention aimed at overturning electoral results. So, it is obvious that this had an impact, especially because military forces in Brazil and in the United States have been collaborating for several decades.
The fact that we now have an American president who is not committed to democracy and the rule of law in countries that are supposedly allies of the United States is alarming. I used to think that Brazil and the United States were allies, and they had been allies for a long time. But the way Donald Trump has been treating Brazil and its top government officials suggests that Brazil is no longer an ally. It is as if Brazil has become like Iran or another country placed by the United States in the so-called “axis of evil,” to use George Bush’s phrase.
This is very strange. We don’t have an atomic bomb. Brazil does not represent a threat to other countries. We never said that we wanted to drop bombs on Argentina, destroy it, or wipe out its population. Brazil is, in the end, a peaceful country. So everything that is going on is just because of politics—because of this transnational far-right network. Trump is using US foreign policy to help Bolsonaro, to help a political ally, which is obviously absurd. I am no specialist in American constitutional law, but I suspect this alone would be grounds for impeachment. This is very serious. So, yes, I think what is going on is very worrying.
The Far Right Is Now a Transnationally Connected Movement
Finally, considering your comparative research on coalition formation and right-wing populism, how should scholars understand the interplay between domestic party realignments in Brazil and the broader international networks of illiberal leaders, from Trump to Orbán and Erdogan?
Assoc. Prof. André Borges: That’s a good question. I have the impression that these transnational far-right, illiberal networks have been very important in the sense that they provide resources to far-right leaders across different regions of the world. There is a kind of mimicking going on: when Viktor Orbán succeeds in weakening checks and balances in Hungary, this becomes an example for other far-right populists in Latin America, Asia, and beyond. I feel this dynamic contributes to introducing new axes of conflict. In the end, once you recognize that there is a far-right international movement, it becomes clear that this is not a local phenomenon. It is something happening across the world, and these actors are connected.
In the case of Brazil, we know that some of these far-right leaders from abroad are trying to interfere in national affairs. Obviously, this is going to affect political divisions and how party systems organize around conflict. In the end, parties and politicians have to take a position and ask themselves: “What do I think about Trump trying to interfere in national political affairs?” Because ultimately, this is about national sovereignty. The whole idea of nationalism is that we cannot accept this. Such interference can have a very substantial impact, especially within the political right, where parties will have to decide where—and with whom—they stand. This could certainly reshape the party system in Brazil, particularly since opinion polls show that a very broad majority of the population is against Trump’s use of sanctions to meddle in internal political affairs. So this raises a clear question for far-right politicians: maybe they have gone too far.
