Europe’s Energy Trilemma: How Affordability vs. Diversification Fuels Populist Politics

In this commentary, Nikoletta Syvak examines Europe’s energy trilemma—the competing imperatives of affordability, energy security, and environmental sustainability—and how tensions between diversification and rising energy costs fuel populist politics. As the European Union seeks to reduce its dependence on Russian fossil fuels and accelerate the green transition, populist actors exploit economic grievances by portraying Brussels’ energy policies as burdens imposed by distant elites on ordinary citizens. Drawing on developments in Slovakia, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Germany, Syvak explores how affordability concerns challenge European solidarity and create opportunities for populist mobilization. She argues that addressing this dilemma requires targeted household compensation, greater transparency about diversification costs, and pragmatic energy policies that balance strategic independence with economic affordability and public trust.

By Nikoletta Syvak*

Energy insecurity has become an increasingly important driver of populist mobilization in Europe, exposing tensions between technocratic policymaking, socioeconomic grievances, and democratic legitimacy. As the EU balances energy diversification, affordability, and environmental sustainability, populist actors frame rising energy costs as evidence that Brussels prioritizes geopolitical ambitions over ordinary citizens’ needs. Yet these grievances reflect genuine economic pressures rather than merely populist narratives. The challenge is to address these concerns without undermining European solidarity or long-term energy security.

On October 29, 2026, speaking to the press in Luxembourg on the sidelines of the EU Energy Council, Energy Commissioner Dan Jørgensen warned that the upcoming winter “will be a difficult period for many European citizens.” He noted that the situation had reached the point where EU citizens would simply be unable to pay their heating bills. The problem, he emphasized, lies not in a physical shortage, but in prices: if they cannot pay the bills, “then it doesn’t matter how much gas is available.”

 According to Jørgensen, the current crisis is more significant than the shock of 2022, because it now affects not only gas but also oil and petroleum products, which turned out to be a consequence not only of the war in Ukraine and the damaged energy infrastructure but also of the situation in the Middle East. In essence, the commissioner described the main contradiction of European energy policy: the EU seeks to reduce its strategic dependence on other countries; EU citizens want energy to be affordable. These two goals intersect, but they are not the same, and the gap between them has become one of the most fertile grounds for populist politics in Europe. 

This commentary asserts that it is not the populists who create the contradiction between affordability and diversification, but they can politicize this crisis. Whether the EU will be able to implement its energy security program depends on whether it manages to bridge this gap before the populists continue to exploit it.

Brussels Highlights This Dilemma

The European Commission’s assessment of the energy crisis currently unfolding in the EU can be judged by the meeting held in October 19 in Bratislava, which was attended not only by Jørgensen, a member of the European Commission for Energy, but also by the energy ministers of the Visegrád Group countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia). During the press conference, Jørgensen noted that the EU was dependent on Russia, but now the Union is getting rid of this dependence. However, the problem is that, as Jørgensen added, the EU now depends on the global market, so events in the Middle East affect the situation with the energy crisis in Europe. According to the Ember analytical center, due to the rise in prices caused by the war involving Iran, wholesale electricity futures in Central Europe have increased in price by more than 60% compared to the pre‑crisis level.

During the European Council meeting (October 15–16, 2026), ministers drew attention to their request: they asked to postpone the introduction of Emissions Trading System 2 (ETS2) until 2030, to allocate funds from the EU budget for the development of oil and gas infrastructure, and to provide greater flexibility in the phased withdrawal from Russian gas. Seven EU member states insisted on making amendments to ETS2, but the leaders only asked the European Commissionto analyze the consequences of these changes. On October 28, Jørgensen added that over the past two decades, a quarter of oil refineries in the EU have closed, which has led to a reduction in domestic production capacity by approximately 10%, and that the diesel fuel market will be under pressure until at least 2027.

The European Commission’s response is logical: support should be targeted and temporary, and it should not hinder the transition away from imported fossil fuels. While this position is reasonable, it also implicitly acknowledges a fundamental reality: ending energy agreements with Russia did not free Europe from the risks associated with fossil fuel imports; it merely shifted their source, leaving households to bear the costs of this transition.

Two Approaches to EU Energy Policy

The first logic is responsible for diversification: according to the European Commission’s report on the state of the Energy Union for 2025, Russia’s share of EU gas imports decreased from 45% in 2021 to 19% in 2024 and 12% by August 2025. Regulation (EU) 2026/261, adopted on January 26, 2026, turns this into law: supplies of Russian LNG should end by the end of 2026, and pipeline gas supplies by September 30, 2027, with a possible extension until November 1, 2027. The Law on Zero-Emission Industries and the Law on Essential Raw Materials apply the same logic to environmentally friendly technologies.

The second approach is affordability: Draghi’s report says that EU companies pay two to three times more for electricitythan US firms, and four to five times more for gas. Households are not deprived of attention: according to Eurostat, in the second half of 2025, the average price of electricity for households in the EU was 28.96 euros per 100 kWh, which is a stable indicator, but still significantly higher than the level that existed before 2022.

In policy research, this is called the energy trilemma: security, affordability, and sustainability cannot be achievedsimultaneously. Diversification is a long-term insurance policy, but insurance premiums are already being paid due to newinfrastructure, more expensive supply routes and carbon prices. These surcharges are borne by households and industry,and they are visible on every account.

Where Tensions Arise: Supply Chains in the Clean Technology Sector

The same need to find a compromise is once again evident in the very process of the energy transition. According to theInternational Energy Agency, China’s share in each stage of the production of solar panels: polysilicon, ingots, plates,cells and modules-exceeds 80%, production costs there are about 35% lower than in Europe, and Chinese economies ofscale have helped reduce the cost of solar energy by more than 80%.

However, these data are primarily a structural feature of the market, not a threat in themselves. China is an indispensablesupplier for Europe during the transition period, and cheap environmentally friendly technologies are one of the mostreliable ways to reduce electricity prices in the long term. However, the EU’s sustainable development program: benchmarks for domestic production in accordance with the Zero Net Profit Industry Act, trade protection tools, andsupply diversification – increases initial costs to reduce the risk of concentration.

Thus, the dilemma surrounding natural gas and solar power takes the same form. Environmental sustainability is expensive today; tomorrow’s most affordable energy supply carries the risk of concentration. Neither of these options is wrong, but each results in losers who can be mobilized.

Populist Narratives

According to the ideological definition of Mudde (2024), populism divides society into “pure people” and “corrupt elite”. With regard to energy, this turns a political compromise into a moral conflict: ordinary people pay the bills, while distant Brussels pursues geopolitics or ideology at their expense. As Huber et al. (2021) show, populists in power tend to persist in seeking concessions and abandonment of EU energy and climate policies, often in conjunction with governments with unpopular views. The European Commission is not a populist player in this case. This is a technocratic analogue, against which a populist story is told.

Robert Fico, the Prime Minister of Slovakia, is a prominent figure in the world of populism. His government maintainsthat cutting off Russian energy supplies would cause severe harm to households and businesses. Slovakia and Hungary were the only two countries to vote against Regulation 2026/261, and on April 24, 2026, Slovakia filed a lawsuit to have this regulation declared invalid in the Court of Justice of the European Union. Fico promised that in 2026, energy prices for 90% of households would remain unchanged. The pattern is clear: cheap energy is presented as a symbol of national independence, which is defended through vetoes and legal proceedings. 

Andrej Babiš, the Prime Minister of the Czech Republic, has taken a different approach. The Czech Republic has already reduced its reliance on Russian gas imports to 7% by 2023. The Babiš government has been more critical of the EU’s energy policy than its predecessor, and the Czech Republic has joined efforts to delay the implementation of ETS2. In areas where diversification has already been achieved, the focus has shifted from supply routes to climate and pricing instruments.

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) party represents an opposition position. Initially, its proposal to abolish the carbon dioxide emissions fee and the Building Energy Act was rejected, but in July 2026 it was reformed by the law on building modernization. The AfD speaker called the government’s policy “ineffective and inhumane”. Without accountability for the government’s actions, everything is simple: every euro spent on carbon fees is a cost imposed by the elites.

Hungary added a note: the Viktor Orbán administration filed a lawsuit against the gas ban in February 2026, but lost power in April. Nevertheless, in October, Hungary still supported the Visegrad Group’s call for flexibility regarding the Russian phase-out and the effort to modify the ETS2. The demand for affordability is not solely driven by populism: populists are simply the most successful entrepreneurs in this area.

Consequences for the European Union

The first risk is division: legal disputes, the threat of a veto, and demands for national exemptions, Italy reportedly soughta waiver from ETS2, similar to the one granted to Spain and Portugal in 2023, undermine the concept of a unified energy strategy, one exemption at a time.

The second risk is coalition-building: when it comes to affordability, populist governments are no longer isolated, they can join forces with mainstream governments under the pressure of fiscal and electoral considerations. 

The third risk is external: the EU, which is struggling to maintain its own diversification rules, weakens its credibility in dealing with Russia and its negotiating position with other suppliers, including LNG exporters and manufacturers of clean technologies.

The Commission’s proposal for targeted and temporary assistance is essential, but not sufficient. The success of diversification will depend on the willingness of all citizens to share the burden. 

To counter the appeal of populists, three measures are necessary: First, give priority to compensation. The funds from the Social Climate Fund and ETS2 should be distributed to low- and middle-income households, as the European Commission is already discussing with the European Investment Bank. 

Secondly, it is important to ensure transparency of security costs: importance to clearly identify the costs of security measures, as well as the additional costs associated with the 2022 crisis, in order to fully assess the benefits of diversification. 

Finally, it is necessary to apply a more practical approach to energy policy: reducing the risks of excessive dependence of the country on any one source, while ensuring access to imports at competitive prices, including from China. After all, Europe’s energy security depends not only on pipelines, terminals, and supply chains, but also on the support of its citizens.

In sum, the European Union’s energy dilemma is not merely a technical question of supply diversification, affordability, or environmental sustainability; it is also a political challenge with profound implications for democratic legitimacy and European integration. Populist actors do not create the structural tensions underlying energy policy, but they can transform economic grievances into narratives of elite indifference and national sovereignty. If the costs of diversification and the green transition remain unevenly distributed, public dissatisfaction may deepen political polarization and weaken support for common European policies. Addressing these risks requires transparent policymaking, targeted social protection, and a pragmatic approach to energy security. The EU’s long-term success will depend not only on reducing strategic dependencies but also on maintaining citizens’ trust and ensuring that the transition is socially sustainable.

(*) Nikoletta Syvak is a Graduate Student, Department of Political Science and International Relations, East China Normal University (ECNU). Email: syvaknikoletta@gmail.com