Rory Truex is Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University.

Assoc. Prof. Truex: We Need the GOP to Reclaim Its Role as a Check on Trump

“We Need the GOP to Reclaim Its Role as a Check on Trump,” argues Associate Professor Rory Truex of Princeton University in a wide-ranging interview with ECPS. He warns that the United States is “in the middle stages of democratic backsliding,” driven by Trump’s effort to “capture the referees” through loyalist appointments across the DOJ, FBI, and Department of Defense. Dr. Truex cautions that framing opponents as “enemies from within” is a classic precursor to authoritarian repression, even as recent mass protests—“the largest in American history”—underscore civic resilience. While electoral results in New Jersey, Virginia, California, and New York signal public fatigue with Trumpism, Dr. Truex maintains that meaningful reversal hinges on Republican elites: “We need the Republican Party to come back to its senses.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

“We Need the GOP to Reclaim Its Role as a Check on Trump” — this stark warning from Associate Professor Rory Truex of Princeton University underscores the fragility of institutional constraints in the United States amid the continued rise of Trumpist politics. In an extended conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Truex situates the contemporary US experience within a comparative framework, drawing on scholarship on democratic backsliding, authoritarian power consolidation, and the erosion of norms.

An expert on authoritarian governance—particularly in China— Dr. Truex argues that the United States is currently “in the middle stages of a process political scientists call democratic backsliding,” a trajectory in which formally democratic institutions are gradually transformed into mechanisms of asymmetric competition that systematically disadvantage opponents. While he stops short of declaring the US an autocracy, Dr. Truex emphasizes that Trump should be seen as “a proto-autocrat—someone with authoritarian ambitions whose ability to realize them remains uncertain.”

The most distinctive and dangerous dimension of the current moment, Dr. Truex suggests, is Trump’s systematic personalization of power—particularly his effort to sweep aside neutral bureaucratic oversight in favor of loyalists. Appointments at the DOJ, FBI, and Department of Defense reflect what Dr. Truex calls a classic strategy of “capturing the referees.” As he notes, “You really can’t have people around you who are going to stand up to you and check your power.” These dynamics have intensified under a second Trump administration.

The danger, however, is not limited to institutional subversion. Dr. Truex identifies a rhetorical shift that strikes at the heart of democratic culture: the demonization of political opposition. He warns that branding rivals “enemies from within” constitutes a foundational step toward authoritarian politics: “Anytime you see a phrase like ‘enemies from within’ or ‘enemy of the people,’ this is usually a precursor to some form of political violence or authoritarian crackdown.”While mass demonstrations in response—remarkably “the largest protest in American history”—have illustrated the resilience of civil society, the stakes remain high.

Against this backdrop, Dr. Truex underscores the critical role of Republican elites in determining the country’s democratic trajectory. The 2024 elections in New Jersey, Virginia, California, and New York (notably Zohran Mamdani’s victory) demonstrate, in his view, public “dissatisfaction with Trump and the Trump policy agenda.” These results also raise the possibility of a strategic recalibration within the GOP. As Dr. Truex puts it, the key question is “at what point [Republican members of Congress] will begin to try to distance themselves from Trump.” His appeal is unambiguous: “We need the Republican Party to come back to its senses. We need people to begin to check Trump.”

Whether such realignment will occur remains uncertain. But as Dr. Truex stresses, US democracy’s fate hinges not only on electoral outcomes but also on whether the institutional and normative guardrails that once constrained executive overreach can be rebuilt—and restored.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Associate Professor Rory Truex, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

A Proto-Autocrat in the White House?

Donald Trump delivers a victory speech after his big win in the Nevada caucus at Treasure Island Hotel & Casino, flanked by his sons Eric (right) and Donald Jr. (left) in Las Vegas, NV. Photo: oe Sohm.

Professor Rory Truex, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How would you characterize the Trump administration’s current trajectory in comparative perspective—does it resemble a transition toward competitive authoritarianism, or does it constitute a novel form of “autocracy” adapted to US institutions?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: I would characterize the US right now as being in the middle stages of a process political scientists call democratic backsliding. This is when the level of democracy erodes in some meaningful direction toward autocracy. Typically, in a case like the United States—where you have a well-consolidated democracy—the backsliding would be toward what we would call competitive authoritarianism, competitive autocracy, or electoral autocracy. There are different labels, but it essentially refers to a non-democratic system that nevertheless maintains elections. The key issue is that the ruling party uses the tools of power to make those elections fundamentally not free and fair—tilting the electoral playing field and using other instruments of power to erode the opposition in fundamentally anti-democratic ways.

I think the Trump administration is moving in this direction, and there is debate in political science over how exactly we should label it. On the one hand, this is a leader who did try to overturn the results of a democratic election in 2020, so we know he has authoritarian impulses and ambitions. On the other hand, we continue to have vocal opposition in the United States. We had elections last week that went off without a hitch. We saw large-scale protests. So there is a substantial degree of pushback.

Thus, I would characterize him as a proto-autocrat—someone with authoritarian ambitions whose ability to realize them remains uncertain. As for whether this is novel, I would say this process unfolds differently in every case; there is no single path. We can look at analogs—Hungary is a common example—but many other countries, roughly 30 in the last 20 or 30 years, have gone through some version of this process. So while there are aspects unique to the United States, I don’t think the overall process is especially unusual.

Purging the Referees: A Classic Authoritarian Strategy

Recent actions targeting the DOJ, civil service, and military leadership suggest an attempt to dismantle institutional autonomy. To what extent do these moves reflect classic authoritarian strategies of purging neutral bureaucracies and creating personalist control?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: In general, what we observe in the authoritarian world is that checks and balances erode pretty darn fast, and these leaders’ style of governance does not really tolerate independent centers of power. That might manifest in the military, the judiciary, or the civil service. There just needs to be a tight relationship between the leader and all aspects of the bureaucracy. And we’ve observed that personalization of power under Trump. More so than any other president, you could argue that he’s really prioritized political loyalty, and the people he’s appointing to key positions—whether it’s in the DOJ, or Kash Patel in the FBI, or Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense—are individuals who have essentially pledged loyalty to him. This contrasts with the first Trump administration, where there were more independent centers of power around him.

So yes, I think this is a fairly well-defined, non-democratic strategy. It’s particularly important in institutions that would reasonably check his power and that are central to coercion. To be more precise, the judiciary is really important—the Department of Justice, anything associated with the legal apparatus—but also the military and police apparatus as well. This is a well-established authoritarian strategy that they’ve been quite successful at implementing over the last several months.

Managed Participation Without Democracy: Mobilizing Support, Marginalizing Dissent

Torn American flag with Democratic and Republican party symbols, representing political division in the United States. Photo: Dreamstime.

Your research on consultative authoritarianism shows how regimes create participation channels to consolidate legitimacy. How does Trumpism employ similar “managed participation”—e.g., rallies, online mobilization—to consolidate loyalty while delegitimizing dissent?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: That’s a great question. I’m a China scholar by trade, so most of my research is on the Chinese case, and one thing we’ve observed in China is that the CCP, over time, has created channels for public participation—things like mayor’s mailboxes, the petition system, the parliament—that fall well short of democracy and real, meaningful democratic channels, but nevertheless allow the CCP regime to learn something about the population and respond. That allows them to keep things stable and stay in power. This is an example of what we would call a closed authoritarian system with no elections, no opposition parties, creating some mechanisms to be just slightly more responsive. Now, in the US setting, I wouldn’t actually say that these are terribly comparable, because we have a robust democracy and civil society that is going through this authoritarian moment.

What’s happening is, unfortunately, the political system has become so bifurcated into two different communities that the overlap between them has really diminished. In political science, we talk about something called affective polarization, which is the difference between how someone feels about their own party versus the other party. Over the last three decades, people have increasingly loathed the other party and are now operating in different media ecosystems and increasingly different social ecosystems. They are living in different parts of the country; they’re not socializing across party lines. That’s how I view what’s happening. Obviously, the far right or the American right has its own media ecosystem centered around a lot of different platforms and podcasters, and there is a high degree of mobilization. Trump has a personal charisma for a lot of people in the United States, and he’s able to captivate audiences, and did that a lot on the campaign trail. So, that’s part of it, but I would say it’s quite different from what I would call consultative authoritarianism.

Labeling Rivals ‘Enemies’ as a Prelude to Crackdown

Trump and senior advisers have framed political opponents as “enemies from within.” How significant is this reframing in eroding the democratic norm of loyal opposition, and does it constitute a foundational step toward autocratic rule?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: This language—“enemies from within” is deeply troubling. Again, I’m a China scholar, so anytime you see a phrase like “enemies from within” or “enemy of the people,” this is usually a precursor to some form of political violence or authoritarian crackdown. So it’s really problematic language.

In a democracy, parties need to recognize each other as legitimate opposition and treat one another with a degree of respect, even if there is some underlying disdain. The minute you start talking about people as enemies of the American population, or link them to terrorist groups—using words like “terrorist” or “foreign government”—that’s a significant escalation in rhetoric. What we saw in the US was that this escalation occurred just prior—it’s been ongoing, but it really ramped up—in the lead-up to the No Kings protest of mid-October.

What was notable is that, in turn, those protests wound up being overwhelmingly peaceful—and the largest protest in American history. I don’t think people fully grasp that. The estimates are anywhere from 5 to 7 million people; whatever number you use, it’s the largest protest in American history. It wasn’t a bunch of violent Antifa people running around throwing Molotov cocktails. It was a bunch of normal people out with signs, wearing costumes, playing guitars, and it was quite beautiful. I was there with my family in Connecticut, and it was quite a striking moment.

So, one notable development is that the Trump administration is trying to paint the opposition as anti-American, disloyal, an enemy of the people—and trying to paint them as violent. The reality is quite different, and the protest event just a couple of weeks ago revealed the Trump narrative to be fundamentally off-base, and hopefully that was a turning point.

Emergency as Strategy: How Autocrats Exploit Chaos

Memorial for Charlie Kirk outside Turning Point USA Headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, on September 13, 2025, following his fatal shooting while speaking at Utah Valley University in Orem, Utah. Photo: Dreamstime.

The administration’s weaponization of crises—such as the assassination of Charlie Kirk—as pretexts for expanding executive power evokes comparisons to the Reichstag Fire. How does this align with historical and theoretical models of emergency-driven authoritarian consolidation?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: We know that instability is good for a would-be autocrat. This is a general historical pattern where a lot of these guys try to create, foment, or exploit some form of instability or threat to justify crackdowns. And crackdowns are usually done in the name of national security, peace and stability. Anytime violence emerges, or a foreign conflict emerges, it really plays into the hands of these leaders, because they appeal to a broader feeling among some of the population that you need a strong ruler to keep the peace and maintain law and order. That’s a very classic authoritarian trope. We’ve seen this play out, as you alluded to.

Nazi Germany—I don’t think that’s the best comparison for the United States—but we saw it this past year in South Korea, when there was a brief declaration of martial law on the grounds that the country had been infiltrated by communists and other groups. And in El Salvador, the drug war provided the pretext for Bukele’s consolidation of power. So it is a very common strategy.

I think the killing of Charlie Kirk was a national tragedy, not because I particularly agree with Charlie Kirk on many issues, but because once we start to see violence really emerge, violence tends to spiral. I was quite worried, in the aftermath of that event, that we would see retaliatory killings going back and forth, leading to greater violence and potentially consolidation of control through Trump. Surprisingly, to date, we have not seen that emerge. In fact, the protests—their overwhelmingly peaceful nature—and then the election result, which is also a bit of a rebuke to Trump, may have broken the cycle and poked a hole in this narrative, and that is noteworthy.

So anyway, it’s something to keep an eye on. I worry about Venezuela and the kind of emerging security narrative there. I worry about the use of the National Guard in our cities and how that’s being deployed. Then, of course, the big foreign threat they’ve been discussing is illegal immigration, which has been used to justify the augmentation of ICE and other measures. So there are plenty of threats to go around for this administration to use. I don’t think they’ve been 100% successful quite yet on this front.

Can Institutional Resistance Survive Political Militarization?

The politicization of the US military or militarization of US politics, including calls to deploy troops domestically against supposed internal enemies, signals erosion of military neutrality. Based on your work, how likely is institutional resistance to remain effective under escalating partisan pressure?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: This is really important, and what we know, again, about authoritarian governments is they need to have a tight relationship with the military to be able to control domestic opposition, especially when it spills out into the streets. The US military is a very highly respected organization in American society, and it has a long tradition of neutrality and staying out of politics. This is not a military that stages coups like we see in much of the world. This is a military that does its job and has extremely high standards of professionalism. We’ve seen pretty dramatic efforts to bring them to heel. We saw this meeting with Pete Hegseth and basically the top military brass from all over the world, which was unprecedented, bringing them all into one space. And he gave them a talking-to about fitness and DEI issues and many other things. So I think there is an effort to rein the military in. The fact that you have someone like Hegseth in charge, who’s a tried-and-true loyalist, is notable.

There’s a difference between that and the really dirty stuff of putting down a protest, potentially using violence against the people. You see these images in American streets where you have these National Guard people deployed in places like D.C. or other places. They’re normal people; they don’t really want to be there. They’re maybe away from their families, and then you see normal Americans interacting with them, telling jokes and stuff. So I don’t think there is that sense that this is an authoritarian military force that’s going to crack down on the American people. I don’t see that in the National Guard in particular.

ICE is slightly different, because ICE has been deliberately augmented under the Trump administration. There’s an ideological component to working for ICE. I don’t mean to disparage the integrity of the folks working for ICE—I’m sure it’s an extremely hard job, and there are many dedicated civil servants. But I also think there’s a deliberate effort to recruit folks into that organization right now who are loyal to Trump, and that is a little bit more concerning to me.

But in general, I don’t think we’re quite there yet, where the American military is going to do Trump’s bidding, especially if it does come to putting down mass mobilization like we’ve seen militaries do in other parts of the world.

Capturing the Referees: Purges as a Path to Power

To what extent do recent attempts to purge “disloyal” military officers, federal prosecutors, and civil servants reflect a broader effort to replace professional staff with patronage networks typical of personalist authoritarian regimes?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: We’ve already talked a little bit about this. I think there’s a well-established pattern—what Steve Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt, in their book How Democracies Die, call “capturing the referees.” And again, if you’re going to be engaging in norm-violating behavior, potentially even illegal behavior, you really can’t have people around you who are going to stand up to you and check your power.

Trump has been very deliberate in firing large numbers of lawyers from the military. He fired a lot of JAGs from the military. He fired a lot of lawyers in the DOJ, and then has either not rehired those folks or put people into power like Kash Patel or Pam Bondi, or many of these other figures who are fully loyal to him. So I do think they’ve been successful on that front.

The other thing to note is, of course, with the advent of the Trump administration, we saw this massive effort to downsize the federal bureaucracy and spending in a very haphazard way. I know folks who work for the US government, and that type of capacity isn’t rebuilt overnight. I think part of the purpose of those moves was just to destroy.

So if you destroy the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), or if you destroy the Department of Education, and all these people who have been working there for decades leave, they’re not coming back in four years—or if they do, it’s going to take a while for them to come back online and rebuild. So I do think part of the underlying goal of Project 2025 and the broader conservative movement with respect to government is just to destroy. So, it didn’t matter, really, that it was so haphazard. That was, in some sense, part of the point.

A Two-Tier State: Punishing Blue America

How do you interpret the Trump administration’s systematic punitive strategies—such as withholding federal funds from Democratic states—as a mechanism to cultivate a two-tiered partisan state? Could this accelerate democratic fragmentation?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: I think it’s disgusting. I tend not to use hyperbole, but the fact that if a disaster occurs in your state and your state voted for Biden, that could affect whether you get relief from FEMA is disgusting, and it’s a completely inappropriate use of power.

I do think there’s an undercurrent in American society right now of, as I said, polarization, but the more extreme version of that would be: can the system hold together at all? And if you have blue states, which are feeding a lot of tax dollars into the federal government, and those funds are now being withheld and funneled elsewhere—and being withheld as a punishment—that’s not a sustainable equilibrium.

I personally think that quite a lot of what’s going on under the Trump administration is revealing fundamental issues within the American political system. It’s revealing the role of money in politics, the ease with which we can politicize the judiciary and other institutions, and how broken our two-party system really is.

So my hope, perhaps irrational, is that when this chapter is over—it might be over in three years, it might be over in 15 or 16; these spells often last longer than people think—there will be a period of rebuilding and reform. The practice you just referenced is obviously heinous and inappropriate, and the American people will see that and hopefully put better institutional guardrails in place to prevent this type of behavior moving forward.

Threats, Fear, and the Future of Free Expression

Members of the Writers Guild of America protest the suspension of Jimmy Kimmel outside ABC headquarters in New York City on September 19, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have written on self-censorship under repressive systems. Do current patterns in the US—media intimidation, citizen fear, legal retribution—suggest the emergence of similar dynamics of preference falsification?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: “Preference falsification” is a very academic word, and it’s basically the situation where people don’t feel comfortable saying how they really feel about politics. For that reason, they would not speak out, or they might even affirm the regime or the government, even if they don’t really feel it in their heart of hearts. That disconnect between what you say in public and what you feel in private—that’s preference falsification or self-censorship.

We know that in authoritarian systems, this behavior can take hold. I often think of authoritarianism as a chill, where people learn that speaking up about politics and criticizing the leader of the government gets you in trouble. Once that chill takes hold, it can be hard to reverse, and it can spread quite quickly.

What I’ve noticed, though—and I find it very inspiring—is that this is America. We have a long tradition of democracy. We are an unruly people, and we don’t like to be told what to do or think. We’ve seen efforts by the administration to intimidate the American people. You could interpret the National Guard deployments as a form of intimidation.

We’ve seen prominent people—they’ve tried to silence people like Jimmy Kimmel, who’s a very prominent comedian here. It’s backfired. People rallied behind Jimmy Kimmel, they put pressure on Disney, he’s back on the air. I don’t see many comedians on late-night TV self-censoring about what they think about what’s going on. Then you saw the largest protest in American history—normal people out there, and they weren’t wearing masks. They were out there with their friends and family in full view, and I was really inspired by that. There has been an attempt at intimidation. Because we have such a vibrant democracy, our people don’t know that, and they reacted the other way, becoming more vocal and more critical. That’s not to say it will forever be that way.

The other thing I would keep an eye on is violence. There’s an undercurrent, as we talked about, of political violence in the US, where a lot of judges, congresspeople, prominent writers, thinkers are being threatened with violence on a regular basis. We don’t observe it because the violence doesn’t usually come to fruition. But the fact that if you speak out, if you oppose Trump, you might be subjected to violent threats—and your family might have to spend Thanksgiving in a hotel—that is noteworthy, and that is actually the more likely force that would create self-censorship.

But to date, I would say there’s pretty darn vibrant opposition, and that’s been really inspiring, frankly.

Trumpism Without Borders: The Making of a Far-Right Network

The global diffusion of authoritarianism often takes place through ideological and strategic alliances. How is Trumpism embedding itself within a transnational far-right ecosystem—collaborating with illiberal leaders in Europe, Russia, China, and elsewhere?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: This is a big story, and people like Anne Applebaum have written about this network of authoritarian leaders that are becoming more assertive on the global stage. It’s important to remember, Trump is a certain type of proto-autocrat, whatever we want to call him, and he naturally has affinity for people like Viktor Orbán, Jair Bolsonaro, or Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Even Vladimir Putin—obviously, we know there has been an unusually close relationship between Putin and Trump over the years. That doesn’t extend all the way to Xi Jinping; their relationship is more fraught, for many reasons that I’m happy to talk about. What I’m trying to say is that there is a natural affinity here, and what is interesting is this diffusion of tactics across the backsliding world. We know that there was a close relationship between Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party and Project 2025. Orbán has spoken at CPAC in Hungary. It’s noteworthy that these illiberal leaders are operating out in the open with their friendship and affinity. We know that Trump has extended support to Bolsonaro while he faces his own criminal investigations.

These guys are learning from each other, and they’re providing moral support for each other. That’s the shortest way to say it. That matters and that leaves the democratic world—in much of Europe, and I spent time in Taiwan this summer, places like Japan, Korea, Australia—wondering what to do here. Who can we count on? Can we count on the United States in particular? What is the normative commitment of the Trump administration to helping the democratic world, helping traditional allies and partners? So there’s a bigger-picture foreign policy implication there.

Flooding the Zone: Trump’s Most Notable Innovation

Donald Trump appears on Eyewitness News at the ABC Times Square studio in Manhattan, NY, promising: “I will build a great, great wall on our southern border, and I will have Mexico pay for it.” Photo: Mira Agron.

In your view, does Trumpism export an actionable governance model—expanding beyond rhetoric to institutional templates—that could assist foreign autocrats in consolidating power?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: That’s a great question. I think he’s using the model of others.  So it’s not the Trump model; it’s a model that your institute studies quite well, which is this sort of populist authoritarian model, where these leaders project masculinity, charisma, strength, talk in the language of “enemies of the people,” fight against some corrupt elite, and speak the language of nationalism and national rejuvenation. That’s a compelling pitch, and it tends to take hold in a lot of different places, in a lot of different historical moments. So, Trump could be understood as just one of many leaders in that mold.

But then there’s also the question of what he has innovated—what he has done differently that could be used elsewhere. So, for some would-be Trump in another country 10 or 15 years from now, what could they learn from him? We’ll see how the story unfolds, but I think one thing we’ve noticed in political science—I run a small podcast called The Civic Forum, and I had Steve Levitsky, Daniel Ziblatt, Sue Stokes, and Adam Sheingate on, who are some of the most significant scholars of authoritarianism and democracy—is the pace at which this is unfolding in the United States.

We are only 10 months into this thing, and the rapid, blitzkrieg nature of what the Trump administration has done is deliberate. This is not an accident. Steve Bannon, among others, has talked about “flooding the zone,” the idea that you overwhelm the opponent by doing so many different things at once that they don’t know how to respond. So, they’ve been quite brazen. If you had asked me a year ago, “Are we gonna see troops in the streets by November?” I’d have said we probably won’t. “Are we going to see them attempt to take prominent comedians off the air?” No, we’re not going to see that. But they’ve been quite brazen, going on all these different fronts at once.

I do think there’s a degree to which it has overwhelmed folks. The opposition and the institutional checks are starting to kick in. What Garry Kasparov has called the “democratic immune system” is starting to fire up, so we’ll see. But, if I were to point to one thing the Trump administration has really been innovative about, it’s just the pace and the boldness of what they’re doing. Maybe it’s because this is not his first time in office. He was in office for four years; he had four years to prepare for this. So, in some sense, it’s part of a longer arc.

Strongmen in Parallel: A Cooler US–China Rivalry?

How do you foresee a second Trump administration shaping US-China relations? Could intensified ideological confrontation—coupled with domestic authoritarian drift—produce a more unstable bilateral equilibrium, or might mutual illiberal tendencies paradoxically enable pragmatic coordination?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: This is actively unfolding. So whatever I say could be irrelevant in the next few days. But, there have been a few notable developments. The first is that the Trump administration hasn’t prioritized the China issue overall like it did in the first go-around. When the Trump administration first came in, there was a concerted effort to shift US-China relations in a very new direction. That direction has largely remained constant, even under the Biden administration, so there’s not the same need to break—or disrupt—US-China relations as there was the first time. Now, they view China as just another thing to be dealt with—another object of this trade war. So that’s one notable development.

The second notable development is that they haven’t really been effective in doing this, and China has pushed back in a much stronger way. The Chinese government learned from the first go-around and figured out how to target the Trump administration politically, whether through soybeans or the more extreme measure of rare earths. So I don’t think the trade war has gone well for Trump, and he’s trying to get out of it now—minimize damage to the economy but still claim a win.

On the other side, it’s not as if Xi Jinping is doing particularly well. He’s getting older; there are rumors about health issues; he’s got a party congress coming up; and the Chinese economy is fine, but it’s not doing particularly well. Reports say youth unemployment is upwards of 20%, and the Communist Party does not like large numbers of angry young people.

So, in some sense, both of these leaders have this nationalistic, strongman style, which means there’s an upper bound to how much they can cooperate—they have to represent their respective nations. But they’re also both in a pinch, and they probably both just want to be done with each other and focus on domestic issues. Both governments are very focused on domestic stability and power consolidation.

So I actually would expect, especially given the last couple of weeks, that US-China relations stabilize a little bit. I don’t think there’s going to be war; I don’t think there’s going to be an invasion of Taiwan. I know many people are worried about that—and I care a lot about Taiwan—but I’m more confident that general stability will hold and the relationship will just muddle through. I don’t think it’s going to be some grand friendship between Trump and Xi. There’s too much skepticism among both national security communities and the people around those leaders. But I’m more confident that things will stabilize and we won’t see that level of global conflict.

How Far Will Democratic Erosion Go?

National Guard troops on standby during a downtown protest against expanded ICE operations and in support of immigrant rights in Los Angeles, US on June 8, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Looking ahead, what scenarios do you see for US political institutions? Are we observing a temporary democratic recession, a stable competitive-authoritarian equilibrium, or a longer-term path toward democratic disintegration? What factors could reverse the current trajectory?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: The answer is we don’t know yet. We don’t know how this story will unfold. It’s clear that we’re in the middle stages of democratic backsliding or erosion, and the question is: how deep does that go, and how long does it last? That will depend on events; it will depend on the strength of the opposition. The Democrats had a good week. They got multiple electoral results they wanted, including governorships in New Jersey and Virginia.

So, it will depend, and a lot rides on the upcoming midterms—whether those go off without a hitch, and whether the Democrats are able to regain a bit of footing in Congress. And then, of course, there’s a presidential election two years later. So, we will see.

In general, it’s quite difficult to heal in this type of setting. Some people might think, if Trump leaves power, it’s all over. No, not really. You have a political party that has embraced a fundamentally authoritarian figure; you have large numbers of people who deny the legitimacy of the 2020 election at the mass level and among Republican politicians. And they’ve learned a governance style and practice that’s going to be hard to unwind. We know that democracies rely on civility, forbearance, respecting the other side—how do we come back from this?

So, my hope—and maybe we can end on an optimistic note—is that this moment teaches us something about the issues with our system: the level of corruption, the influence of money in politics, the problems of polarization, the toxicity in our discourse. And that there’s a healing in American society, and by extension in our political system, that unfolds over the next decade. Maybe that will be what the next decade holds—this kind of rejuvenation—and that will require some political reform.

I will say, people are more engaged in politics than they’ve ever been right now, at least among the centrist and progressive side. It has re-energized our civil society. You could argue that that had been in decline, and people were becoming more and more atomized because of social media. But people care about politics again and are doing things. They’re protesting, they’re voting, they’re getting more involved—and that’s a good sign.

So, we have a long road back to being a fully functional, healthy democracy. I hope it’s a short road—but we don’t quite know yet.

Election Results Show Growing Backlash Against Trumpism

And one last question, Professor Rory Truex: what does the election of Mamdani, together with the election results in New Jersey, Virginia, and California, tell us about the trajectory of Trumpist policies?

Assoc. Prof. Rory Truex: It’s definitely a rebuke for Trump, and the margins of victory in all of these places—especially New Jersey and Virginia are much higher than people expected. And then, of course, Mamdani winning. New York politics are different than the rest of the country. But it’s definitely a sign that there’s real dissatisfaction with Trump and the Trump policy agenda.

Then the question is, among the Republican Party establishment—congresspeople running for re-election—at what point will they begin to try to distance themselves from Trump? Frankly, that’s what we need. We need the Republican Party to come back to its senses. We need people to begin to check Trump. Congress is not really checking Trump. The Republicans in Congress are not a meaningful check on his power, but if they realize that their electoral fates are getting worse and worse because Trump is so incompetent and corrupt and authoritarian, maybe they will turn.

People are already basically going to be campaigning in the next few months. The elections are coming up in a year, and so that means the electoral cycle is already starting to begin. So we’ll see. The last three weeks have been a shift in momentum back toward the opposition, and that’s been good. My guess is the pendulum will swing back; we’ll see more counter-moves from the Trump administration, but the economic costs are mounting. The pain that is being inflicted by this administration, and the cruelty being inflicted by this administration, is really front and center.

If you’re a Hispanic voter—these voters swung toward Trump in the last election—and then we’ve seen American citizens of Hispanic descent detained by ICE. We’ve seen communities destroyed by ICE. So that’s just one example, but the kind of cruelty inflicted by the Trump administration is becoming harder and harder to deny. And I do have confidence that the majority of the American people understand that and don’t want to live this way, and so hopefully we’ll see some swing back.

Geert Wilders (PVV) in House of Representatives during a debating at the Tweede Kamer on April 5, 2023 in Den Haag, Netherlands. Photo: Jeroen Meuwsen.

Professor de Lange: D66’s Victory in Dutch Elections Cannot Be Presented as a Victory over Populism

In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Professor Sarah de Lange of Leiden University cautions that “D66’s victory in Dutch elections cannot be presented as a victory over populism.” While the liberal centrist D66 led by Rob Jetten revitalized the political center, Professor de Lange stresses that “the total size of the radical right-wing bloc has not diminished—it’s just more fragmented.” She argues that Dutch politics is shaped less by populism than by nativism, which has “seeped so much into the mainstream.” Despite the PVV’s exclusion from government, Professor de Lange warns that illiberalism remains a significant threat, while the defense of liberal democracy has only recently become “more salient for mainstream parties and more visible to citizens.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Sarah de Lange, Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University’s Institute for Political Science, offers a sharp and nuanced interpretation of the 2024 Dutch elections, warning that “D66’s victory in Dutch elections cannot be presented as a victory over populism.” While the liberal centrist D66 emerged as the largest party, Professor de Lange argues that this outcome reflects both a revival of the political center and the continuing normalization of populist discourse within Dutch democracy.

According to Professor de Lange, the election results underscore a complex duality: “We can conclude that both things are happening at the same time.” Although centrist and Christian Democratic parties gained ground, the radical right bloc remains as strong as before—only more fragmented. This persistence, she notes, illustrates not the decline of populism but its adaptation: “The total size of the radical right-wing bloc has not diminished; it’s as strong as it was in the 2023 elections—it’s just more fragmented.”

Professor de Lange cautions against the view that the PVV’s losses signal a populist retreat. Instead, she interprets them through “traditional political science theories about governing and negative incumbency effects.” Geert Wilders’ participation in government, she explains, produced electoral backlash, but his influence on mainstream parties remains unmistakable—particularly regarding migration and national identity, now central themes even for the conservative-liberal VVD. “The VVD moved so close to the PVV in the campaign that it even supported some proposals by the radical right that had anti-constitutional implications,” she observes, underlining how populist narratives have reshaped the Dutch mainstream.

What truly defines this political transformation, Professor de Lange insists, is not merely populism but nativism. “It is this nativism that has seeped so much into the mainstream, rather than the populism,” she explains, pointing to the xenophobic nationalism that has become a structural feature of Dutch political discourse.

Reflecting on the broader European context, Professor de Lange rejects the notion that populism has been “domesticated.” Despite Wilders’ exclusion from coalition talks, she warns that illiberalism remains deeply entrenched. “There is still clearly a threat of illiberalism,” she notes, citing violent demonstrations and political intimidation during the campaign. Yet, she also detects a countermovement: “Defending liberal democracy and the rule of law has become more salient for mainstream parties… making citizens more aware of how vulnerable liberal democracy actually is.”

Ultimately, Professor de Lange’s analysis situates the Dutch case within the wider European struggle between liberal resilience and populist endurance, emphasizing that the current equilibrium represents neither populism’s decline nor liberalism’s triumph—but rather, a tense coexistence shaping the future of democratic politics in Europe.

Sarah de Lange is a Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University’s Institute for Political Science.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Sarah de Lange, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

The Radical Right-Wing Bloc Has Not Diminished—Only Fragmented

Professor Sarah de Lange, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: The October 29 Dutch elections resulted in a striking balance between D66’s liberal centrism and Wilders’ populist radical right. From a comparative perspective, how should we interpret this outcome—does it mark a recalibration of Dutch democracy or the normalization of populism within it?

Professor Sarah de Lange: I think we can conclude that both things are happening at the same time. On the one hand, we’ve seen in the Dutch elections a revival of the center. Not only has the social-liberal D66 gained a lot of seats, but so have the Christian Democrats, and the two parties will be needed for any coalition government that will be formed. At the same time, we also see that Geert Wilders’ PVV has lost seats due to its government participation, but it has lost those seats to other radical right-wing populist competitors, namely JA21 and Thierry Baudet’s Forum for Democracy. So, the total size of the radical right-wing bloc has not diminished; it’s as strong as it was in the 2023 elections—just more fragmented.

Do you view the PVV’s losses as evidence of a populist retreat, or rather as a transformation of its discourse into the mainstream—particularly given the centrist parties’ increasing emphasis on migration and national identity?

Professor Sarah de Lange: The loss of the PVV should really be seen from the perspective of traditional political science theories about governing and negative incumbency effects. Geert Wilders’ PVV governed together with three other parties in the cabinet, and all four parties have lost to some extent in these elections. The loss of the PVV was significant, but perhaps not as large as one would expect for a party that participated in government. There’s a saying in politics that “the breaker pays,” and in this case, Geert Wilders did indeed pay—he did lose voters—but most of those he lost were voters who had joined his party only in 2023, when the VVD opened the door to the PVV.

Many previous non-voters turned out to support the PVV, given that there was finally a chance that the party would govern. So, it’s the newest voters of the PVV who have left again. But interestingly, although some of them came from the mainstream in 2023, few have returned to the mainstream in these elections. Some have—for example, to the conservative-liberal VVD—but in relatively small numbers, which explains why the radical right populist bloc is as strong as it was in 2023.

There’s also a second way in which Geert Wilders’ PVV has had a significant impact on these elections. All mainstream parties, and especially the conservative-liberal VVD, have taken up migration as the core theme of their campaigns and have advocated for a clear reduction in immigration, meaning stricter immigration regulations. 

That has especially been the case for the conservative-liberal VVD of former Prime Minister Mark Rutte, now NATO Secretary General. The party moved so close to the PVV during the campaign that it even supported some proposals by the radical right with anti-constitutional implications. For example, Forum for Democracy, a smaller radical right-wing populist party, proposed during the campaign in Parliament that there should be a motion to designate Antifa as a terrorist organization—very much inspired, of course, by Donald Trump’s proposal to do the same. Even though Dutch legislation is very clear on this point—namely that it is up to the judiciary to designate organizations as terrorist organizations and not to Parliament—the conservative-liberal VVD nevertheless supported this proposal.

So, in that way too, the influence of radical right-wing populist parties in the Netherlands remains significant. What I’ve seen in much of the international press is that the victory of D66 has been presented as a victory over populism, but I certainly do not think it should be interpreted that way.

Nativism, Not Populism, Defines the Radical Right in the Netherlands

Photo: Dreamstime.

To what extent does the Dutch experience illustrate the idea of a “stabilized populism,” where populist rhetoric persists even as its organizational strength fluctuates?

Professor Sarah de Lange: It’s a clear case where we see a potential for the populist radical right that cannot be easily accommodated by the mainstream parties, in the sense that it’s very difficult for mainstream parties to win back voters who, at some point, have turned to the radical right. But I would also highlight that we tend to discuss this very much in terms of populism, while what has really been key to the transformation of Dutch politics—more than populism—is nativism.

What truly defines Geert Wilders’ political platform, as well as those of other radical right parties in the Netherlands, is their nativism, their xenophobic nationalism, and their othering of groups perceived as non-native—which, in the Dutch context, for the PVV, refers mostly to Muslims but more broadly includes anyone with a migration background, even extending to the third generation now living in the Netherlands.

It is this nativism that has seeped so deeply into the mainstream, rather than the populism. In fact, in this particular campaign, populism was not as pronounced in some of the radical right parties. Take, for example, JA21, which picked up a significant number of former PVV voters and could be involved in the coalition negotiations. The party remained clearly nativist in the campaign but was far less outspokenly populist, as a way to be more acceptable as a coalition partner—a serious partner—to mainstream parties.

Populism in Europe Has Not Been Domesticated or Contained

Looking beyond the Netherlands, what do these results reveal about the broader European and global trajectory of populism? Are we witnessing its institutional domestication or the emergence of a new post-populist equilibrium?

Professor Sarah de Lange: What we’re seeing is not its domestication. What was also very clear, already from the start of the campaign, was that Geert Wilders would not be acceptable as a coalition partner to mainstream parties for the next government. Some Dutch mainstream parties have said they don’t want to work with him on principle, because his program contains proposals that are not in line with freedom of religion and that conflict with the rule of law.

Other parties don’t want to work with him again because they don’t find him a trustworthy coalition partner, as he has now toppled two Dutch governments—the last one from which he withdrew, as well as the minority government that ruled the Netherlands from 2010 to 2012 with PVV support. It was therefore very clear to him that he would not be included in the government coalition again, and he immediately reverted to his strong populist and nativist rhetoric. Any moderation that existed during the coalition government—and there was very little of it—disappeared as soon as the coalition collapsed. So, certainly no domestication.

I also don’t necessarily think that we’re in a post-populist age. As I indicated, the radical right in the Netherlands remains as strong as ever, and what was particularly notable in the first survey data from the election is that the group of voters considering support for one of the radical right parties in the Netherlands has actually grown. The potential for the radical right to expand even further in future elections is therefore certainly there.

Wilders’ Personal Control Over the PVV Is Both His Strength and His Weakness

Election posters near the Binnenhof featuring Geert Wilders of the PVV in the foreground, The Hague, the Netherlands, October 12, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Building on your research on party agency and leadership, how do you assess the contrasting political performances of Rob Jetten and Geert Wilders—one mobilizing optimism and inclusivity, the other polarization and grievance?

Professor Sarah de Lange: These are two very different parties, of course, in terms of ideology but also in terms of party organization, and this is a very important part of the story for the Netherlands—one that sets it apart from other countries in Western Europe when it comes to the radical right.

Geert Wilders’ PVV joined the government in 2024, having had no significant experience with governing at the local or regional level. Why is that the case? For two reasons. First of all, Geert Wilders’ party does not have a traditional membership base. It is organized exclusively around the figure of Geert Wilders, who runs the party himself. It doesn’t have a membership base or a cadre. Even the representatives in the national parliament are not members of the party.

This means, first, that it is very difficult for him to participate in many municipal elections. He only participates in a select number of municipal elections, so there is very little opportunity for him to gain experience there. Secondly, it also means that people within the party have no executive experience—no experience with heavy management functions, etc.—and that there is no support staff within the party to assist those who need to take up government responsibility.

It was very evident in the cabinet that the PVV ministers, in particular, performed quite poorly on average. They didn’t know what their role was as ministers or junior ministers, how to deal with the bureaucracy, or how to bring legislation to a successful conclusion—meaning legislation that would be accepted by parliamentary parties and would actually be feasible, without including any anti-constitutional elements. So overall, quite poor performance.

That contributed to the early collapse of the government, because Geert Wilders saw that voters noticed this, and it is plausible that he withdrew from the government to avoid further electoral losses that might occur if voters became even more aware of how weak his pool of ministers was.

This really sets the Netherlands apart from other countries where the radical right can actually govern quite successfully because they have a trained cadre and local or regional experience. In that respect, if we compare the Netherlands to Italy, it is a completely different case.

Jetten’s Positive Campaign Reclaimed Hope and Unity

Rob Jetten attends the New Year’s Reception hosted by the King of the Netherlands in Amsterdam on January 3, 2025. Photo: Robert van T. Hoenderdaal.

Jetten’s campaign drew on emotionally resonant, populist-style messaging—“het kan wél” (“yes, we can”)—without embracing populist antagonism. Does this signal that centrist liberalism is learning to compete in the emotional arena that populists once dominated?

Professor Sarah de Lange: Yes, this is a very interesting development that we’ve seen. D66 ran a campaign that was very positive in tone, speaking of hope and unity, and even went so far as to reclaim the Dutch flag as a symbol—quite surprising for a party that, in its stances, is extremely cosmopolitan and progressive, very pro-European Union, for example.
It seems that this approach worked, as it drew voters from other left-wing, progressive, and centrist parties. One explanation for this is that research shows having a genuinely positive atmosphere around a party can be beneficial in electoral campaigns.

Has Wilders’ long-standing personalistic leadership become both a strategic advantage and a constraint—particularly in terms of coalition-building and sustaining voter trust?

Professor Sarah de Lange: Yes, as I already explained, it’s certainly a disadvantage in one sense, as it makes it very difficult for the party to be ready for government—to have qualified and experienced people who can take up ministerial and junior ministerial positions. However, at the same time, it also offers him an advantage, in that he has full control over his members of parliament. So even though his parliamentary group grew significantly, since he controls which parliamentarians can speak to the media and on what topics, and in which debates they participate and in which they don’t, his parliamentary group didn’t experience any major scandals despite this massive growth in its size. Of course, one important element made this possible: Geert Wilders was not an acceptable prime minister to the parties with which his PVV governed, and he was therefore forced to stay in parliament as leader of the parliamentary group. Had that not been the case, it would have been much more difficult for him to control his members of parliament.

Current Exclusion of Wilders Is Pragmatic, not a Principled Cordon Sanitaire

In New Alliances,” you analyze why mainstream parties sometimes collaborate with the populist radical right. Given the refusal of other parties to govern with Wilders, do current coalition negotiations represent a reinvigorated ‘cordon sanitaire’ or a temporary tactical alignment?

Professor Sarah de Lange: This is a very good question, because my research in the past showed that once radical right parties are large enough to help mainstream right parties achieve a majority, those mainstream parties are often inclined to govern with them, even if they might have said in advance that they were not interested or thought the radical right was too extreme to govern with.

What we’re seeing now in some countries—and that’s not only in the Netherlands but also, for example, in Austria—is that, on the basis of previous coalition experiences with the radical right, the picture has become more complex. There are a number of mainstream right parties that have had such bad experiences governing with the radical right that they are no longer willing to do so.

However, I think this is very different from a cordon sanitaire, because a cordon sanitaire is motivated by a principled rejection of the radical right on the basis of its stances—because the manifestos of the radical right contain nativism and proposals that are anti-constitutional or in conflict with the rule of law. What we see here, in both the Austrian and Dutch cases, is that the reluctance is based more on the fact that previous experiences have shown that radical right parties are unreliable partners. And of course, that is a more pragmatic argument, which can also be abandoned—for example, if the radical right gets a new leader who is believed to be more trustworthy, or if the mainstream right changes leadership and feels differently about cooperating with the radical right.

So, in that sense, we should really keep these pragmatic reasons separate from the more principled exclusion represented by a cordon sanitaire.

Exclusion Strengthens Wilders’ Anti-Elite Narrative Among Supporters

Election posters of all Dutch political parties displayed at the Binnenhof in The Hague, the Netherlands, in March 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.

What are the long-term risks and benefits of excluding the PVV from coalition governance? Could such exclusion paradoxically reinforce its anti-establishment narrative, as observed in other European contexts?

Professor Sarah de Lange: This is a very valid question. Of course, the advantage is that there will be no negotiations about plans that are anti-constitutional. If we look at the previous cabinet, of which the PVV was part, that cabinet tried to declare an asylum crisis in order to introduce emergency legislation that would partially circumvent Parliament. That would have been a clear sign of democratic backsliding if it had happened. Luckily, some of the government parties changed their minds at the last minute, and it never came to fruition—but the idea was clearly on the table. Without the radical right in government, there is, of course, far less likelihood of these kinds of plans being implemented.

The downside, however, is equally clear. Excluding the PVV makes the rhetoric of the radical right more believable—namely, the idea that there is an elite governing the country that is out of touch with what citizens want because it excludes the radical right, which also represents a part of the population. In the Netherlands, this risk is particularly real, because the only four-party coalition capable of securing a majority would be a very broad ideological alliance, ranging from the Green Labour Party to the social-liberal D66, the Christian Democratic CDA, and the conservative-liberal VVD. Such a coalition, both on socio-economic issues and on matters like immigration, would have very different positions and would need to compromise extensively—only reinforcing the PVV’s narrative that it alone stands outside an isolated political elite.

The Netherlands Could Learn from Scandinavia’s Clear Left–Right Blocs

How might a centrist, multi-party coalition led by D66 influence the structure of competition in Dutch politics? Could it serve as a model for containing populist disruption in fragmented systems elsewhere?

Professor Sarah de Lange: I don’t think it’s a model to be emulated; it’s a model that exists only because the Dutch parliament is so fragmented. The largest parties are very small— even D66, which became the largest party in the elections, holds less than 20% of the votes and seats. The same applies to the other parties likely to join the coalition, each of which has around 15% of the vote. This makes the structure of the Dutch party system highly untenable in the long term, as it requires four- or five-party coalitions, which would have been necessary even if the PVV had not been excluded. Such coalitions are very likely to be unstable, leading to short-lived governments and limited policy output.

So, I think it’s actually the other way around. Looking across Western Europe, the Netherlands could benefit greatly from having a structure more like a Scandinavian party system, with a clear left-wing and right-wing bloc, rather than the highly fragmented system it currently has to manage.

Weak Party–Society Links Drive Extreme Electoral Volatility

Your work on party–civil society linkages shows that strong organizational ties stabilize voter support. Does D66’s success suggest that centrist parties can rebuild civic connections that were eroded by decades of depoliticization? Conversely, how does the PVV sustain long-term voter loyalty despite its limited organizational infrastructure and weak civic embedding?

Professor Sarah de Lange: Let’s start by observing that in the Netherlands, political parties generally have weak linkages to civil society organizations, and this partly explains why Dutch elections are so extremely volatile—they are among the most volatile in Europe.
What’s interesting is that the two largest parties in the elections, D66 and the PVV, are both known for lacking many of these traditional ties. This indicates that while they may be very successful in a given election, they could just as easily lose that support again. This applies especially to D66, which has always been a party marked by very high highs but also very deep lows. It has an extremely volatile electorate that also considers many other left- and right-wing progressive parties at election time.

The PVV is slightly different. It has no ties to civil society organizations at all, yet it has a remarkably loyal electorate that remains faithful to the party for several reasons. First, PVV voters genuinely believe that Wilders is the only person who can change immigration policy in the way they want. Election surveys show that 90% of PVV voters view immigration as the biggest social challenge the Netherlands faces, and they see Geert Wilders as the most competent and trustworthy politician to act on that issue. Second, these voters tend to have relatively high levels of political distrust, which makes them unlikely to return from the PVV to mainstream parties.

PVV Support Is Strongest Outside the Cosmopolitan Randstad Region

Women cycle through the historic Kerkebuurt (Church District) in Soest, Netherlands, known for its old farms and streets such as Eemstraat. Photo: Inge Hogenbijl.

How much of the PVV’s enduring appeal still stems from regional and class-based resentment, and how much from broader cultural anxieties related to immigration and demographic change?

Professor Sarah de Lange: I think both are connected. We see that Geert Wilders’ PVV is more successful outside the big cosmopolitan cities in the Randstad—the central area enclosed by major cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and Utrecht. The PVV performs better beyond that region. This is partly due to a sense of regional resentment—the perception that people in areas where the PVV is strong are not being taken seriously by the political, economic, and cultural center of the Netherlands; that they are not adequately represented; and that there is little respect for their norms, values, and traditions.

These feelings are also partly rooted in real developments in these regions, such as economic decline, the out-migration of young citizens, and the erosion of public and private services. So, even though there may not be many migrants in these areas, these socio-economic developments feed into anti-immigrant sentiment—not least because Wilders consistently draws links between immigration and other social problems.

Jetten to Become the Netherlands’ First Openly Gay Prime Minister

In your co-edited volume Gender and Populist Radical-Right Politics,” you highlight the gendered dimensions of populist leadership. How do you interpret the symbolic contrast between Wilders’ assertive, masculine populism and Jetten’s inclusive liberal masculinity?

Professor Sarah de Lange: That’s a very interesting question, because the Netherlands will, with Rob Jetten, have its first openly gay prime minister, who is about to marry his male partner. He has always been very open about this, and it was an important element in the campaign, where he frequently spoke about his upcoming wedding. This stands in stark contrast to the traditional masculinity promoted by Wilders, and even more so by Forum for Democracy’s Thierry Baudet.

Interestingly, in terms of voter base, we see that the PVV—now that it has become such a large party—is actually quite representative of the Dutch population as a whole, including in terms of gender. We don’t see a strong gender gap among its voters, unlike with the more extreme Forum for Democracy led by Baudet. It therefore seems that female voters are not put off by Wilders’ masculine leadership style, nor by a party program that is not particularly outspoken on gender issues.

LGBTQ Acceptance Is Central to the Dutch National Self-Image

Does the normalization of openly gay political leadership in the Netherlands challenge the gendered and heteronormative foundations of populist radical-right discourse, or does it reflect a uniquely Dutch liberal exceptionalism?

Professor Sarah de Lange: This is quite an interesting question. During the campaign, it was clear that Geert Wilders could not realistically attack Jetten on the basis of his sexuality or the fact that he is marrying his male partner. This is because a core part of the Dutch national self-image is its perceived tolerance toward the LGBTQ community.

That does not mean, however, that PVV supporters share this perspective. They have very mixed attitudes when it comes to LGBTQ issues. Of course, since same-sex marriage has been legal for a long time, there is little resistance to it. But when questions turn to more contemporary sexuality issues—such as trans rights or stances on non-binarity—you can see that these voters tend to hold a very heteronormative outlook.

Radical Right Strength Shows Illiberalism Remains a Persistent Threat

Anti-Islam demonstration in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, on January 20, 2017. Protesters carry signs opposing “Islamization.” Photo: Jan Kranendonk.

And finally, Professor de Lange, does the Dutch election signal that liberal democracies are learning to integrate populist affect without embracing its illiberal impulses—or are we entering a phase of hybrid politics where the emotional grammar of populism becomes a permanent feature of democratic life?

Professor Sarah de Lange: The elections show that, because the radical right remains so strong, illiberalism is still present—and it was very visible in the campaign as well. There were incidents involving extreme-right demonstrations that turned violent, and numerous cases where politicians were threatened by political opponents or ordinary citizens with different political opinions. So, in that sense, there is still clearly a threat of illiberalism.

At the same time, this particular campaign also demonstrated that defending liberalism—or liberal democracy, and the rule of law has become more salient for mainstream parties, especially among more progressive forces. The issue is now more openly discussed, making citizens more aware of how vulnerable liberal democracy actually is, and that it is something that must be safeguarded rather than taken for granted.

Dr. Simon Otjes, Assistant Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University.

Dr. Otjes: The 2025 Dutch Elections Marked Not Populism’s Decline, but Its Reconfiguration

In an in-depth interview with the ECPS, Dr. Simon P. Otjes, Assistant Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University, argues that the 2025 Dutch elections signaled not the decline but the reconfiguration of populism. “What was previously very strongly concentrated on the PVV has now dissipated into three different parties, representing three different ways of doing politics,” he notes. While JA21 seeks governmental influence and FvD appeals to conspiratorial electorates, the overall radical-right bloc remains stable. Dr. Otjes warns that a broad centrist coalition could “reproduce the very disaffection it seeks to contain,” fueling further populist resurgence. Far from a post-populist era, he concludes, “we’re still very much inside this populist moment.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)Dr. Simon Otjes, Assistant Professor of Dutch Politics at Leiden University, offers a penetrating analysis of the evolving dynamics of populism, centrism, and democratic governance in the Netherlands and Europe. His reflections, delivered in the aftermath of the 2025 Dutch elections on October 29, illuminate the cyclical nature of populist mobilization and the institutional resilience of liberal democracy in an era of fragmentation and recalibration.

For Dr. Otjes, the Dutch political landscape exemplifies a persistent alternation between “almost technocratic, centrist governments… being interrupted by brief periods of radical right-wing governments,” a pattern visible over the past three decades. He observes that while populist radical-right parties such as PVV, JA21, and FvD have become structurally entrenched, their participation in government remains precarious and short-lived. “Populists enter government, those governments prove to be unstable, and then there’s a response from the center,” he notes, emphasizing that this oscillation does not represent a post-populist phase but rather “an enduring populist moment.”

The 2025 elections, in Dr. Otjes’s view, marked not the decline but the reconfiguration of populism. “What was previously very strongly concentrated on the PVV has now dissipated into three different parties, representing three different ways of doing politics,” he explains. While JA21 seeks policy influence within coalition frameworks, FvD appeals to conspiratorial electorates “in news environments very different from the mainstream media.” This diversification, Dr. Otjes warns, “is the key explanation of why [the radical right] remains so stable—their ability to attract very different electorates by diversifying their offerings.

At the same time, Dr. Otjes cautions that a centrist grand coalition—combining GroenLinks–PvdA, D66, VVD, and CDA—could inadvertently deepen democratic alienation. Such an arrangement, he argues, would lead to “quite centrist compromises that lack the change these parties promised,” thereby driving dissatisfied voters back to the populist right. While this centrist stability may project pragmatism, it risks “reproducing the very disaffection it seeks to contain.”

On the European front, Dr. Otjes underscores that despite D66’s pro-European rhetoric under Rob Jetten, Dutch European policy is unlikely to shift dramatically. “The Netherlands won’t necessarily be a particularly progressive government on this issue,” he remarks, given the enduring influence of conservative fiscal and migration stances within the coalition.

Ultimately, Dr. Otjes’s analysis situates the Netherlands within a broader European pattern: an ongoing alternation between pragmatic centrism and reactive populism, rather than a linear progression beyond it. In his words, “We’re still very much inside this populist moment.”

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Simon P. Otjes, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Dutch Populism Has Stabilized, Not Declined

Geert Wilders (PVV) during an interview at the Plenary Debate in the Tweede Kamer on June 4, 2024, in The Hague, Netherlands. Photo: Orange Pictures.

Professor Simon Otjes, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: The October 29 elections produced a near tie between D66 and the PVV—symbolizing not a populist collapse, but a recalibration of its appeal. From your perspective, does this outcome signify a stabilization of populism within an institutionalized party system, or rather its transformation into a normalized mode of political contestation across Europe?

Dr. Simon Otjes: What I think is very important to note about the election results is that although the PVV lost more than 10 seats, the other populist parties that we have in the Netherlands—we have two other populist radical right-wing parties in the Dutch parliament—both won. So, if you look at the combined share of seats for the populist parties, they have really stabilized. In the previous elections, the votes were heavily concentrated on one party, the PVV, but now they are more evenly spread among the PVV, the radical right-wing populist JA21—which in some respects is more right-wing on economic issues but more moderate in its use of anti-Islamic and anti-elite rhetoric—and Forum for Democracy, a party that, according to specialists, is an extreme-right party bordering on anti-democratic. Some of its members have been sanctioned for inciting violence within parliament, and others have recently been found to be involved in plots to assassinate politicians. In that sense, we can see overall stabilization, but with movements both toward more moderate versions of the radical right and toward more extreme ones.

You have described the Dutch system as one of “fragmented pluralism.” How does this structural fragmentation affect both the endurance and the moderation of populist actors such as the PVV and JA21? Could the Dutch case exemplify how fragmentation simultaneously limits and sustains populist influence?

Dr. Simon Otjes: In the Netherlands, we had a government with populist parties between 2024 and 2025, which fell because of internal instability. But that doesn’t mean populism won’t play a role in the new government formation. There are two possible coalitions that people are discussing. One would be a coalition of all the parties in the center, from the Green Left Labour Party on the center-left to the VVD on the center-right. The other alternative would be what the Liberal Party calls a center-right government, which would involve Jason Sester, a center-left party, the CDA, a center-right party, the VVD, also a center-right party, and then JA21, the more moderate radical right-wing populist party in the Netherlands.

That option is a serious contender—it’s a question of whether they can secure 75 or 76 seats. It’s the first preference of the Liberal Party, their favored option. And that means that even though Rob Jetten proudly declared on election night that he had beaten Geert Wilders and that this was the end of the Wilders era, in reality, there is a strong chance that another radical right-wing populist party will enter government, even governing alongside the social liberals who so proudly claimed to have defeated the populists on election night.

Jetten’s Success Was Built on Progressive Patriotism, Not Populism

Rob Jetten attends the New Year’s Reception hosted by the King of the Netherlands in Amsterdam on January 3, 2025. Photo: Robert van’t Hoenderdaal.

As mainstream parties increasingly adopt affective, emotionally resonant campaign styles—such as Rob Jetten’s “positive populism”—do we witness the diffusion of populist communication logics into liberal centrism, and what might this imply for the future boundaries of populism as a concept?

Dr. Simon Otjes: I would note that I don’t think Jetten is a populist, nor did he really operate with populist rhetoric. What was striking was that he adopted a “yes-we-can” kind of orientation from the Obama campaign, which still resonates deeply with a segment of Dutch voters. But what he did do was position his party much more conservatively on the division between cosmopolitans and nationalists, taking a far more centrist stance compared to his party previously—a change that was more rhetorical than policy-based.

You could see him speaking out against asylum seekers who break the law, while also positioning himself in debates between the far left and the far right on this issue. On election night, the room celebrating his success was filled with little Dutch flags. So, you can see that the system felt the need to adopt a more nativist tone—a less extremely cosmopolitan tone—in its positioning. It’s not necessarily nativist, but more akin to a kind of progressive patriotism.

That was instrumental in how they won, because they were able to appeal to center-right voters by no longer positioning Jetten’s party as a very extreme representative of the cosmopolitan side, but rather as a party that’s centrist on this dimension. This shows that the discussion about immigration and the importance of cultural dimensions in the Netherlands have not been swept away by the defeat of the populists. In fact, the only way the social liberals were really able to win the elections was by co-opting part of the flag-waving and the more anti-immigration rhetoric, particularly when it comes to asylum seekers.

Excluding the PVV Risks Deepening Democratic Dissatisfaction

In your work on government alternation and satisfaction with democracy, you argue that meaningful alternation underpins democratic legitimacy. Given the repeated exclusion of the PVV and its allies from governing coalitions, could this exclusionary dynamic paradoxically reinforce perceptions of elite closure and deepen democratic alienation?

Dr. Simon Otjes: When it comes to the voters of the PVV, they’ve been able to access government only twice in the last 20 years—that is, between 2010 and 2012, when the PVV tolerated a center-right government, and between 2024 and 2025, when they were part of a radical government. In that sense, these voters are largely excluded from government participation, and we know that this is not good for their satisfaction with democracy.

We also know that this means the PVV increasingly attracts people who are dissatisfied with how democracy functions, which, from the perspective of the future of democracy, is seen by political scientists as a very important variable in sustaining legitimacy.

On the other hand, we saw that when they governed, they didn’t necessarily undermine institutions like the courts, but they did undermine coalition cooperation. So, in that sense, it is a very difficult bargain. On one side, co-optation of the radical right into government is a way to signal to their voters that their choice matters, but on the other, their involvement in government also risks undermining democratic principles.

A Grand Centrist Coalition Could Drive Frustrated Voters Back to the Radical Right

Relatedly, your research on coalition governance and “frustrated majorities” suggests that complex multiparty arrangements can generate their own legitimacy deficits. Might a centrist, D66-led coalition risk reproducing the very disaffection it seeks to contain, despite its pluralist intentions?

Dr. Simon Otjes: A centrist government—a government that would include GroenLinks–PvdA, D66, the VVD, and the CDA—although on substance they might be able to negotiate very well, because these are all parties with government experience, carries a danger in terms of what it would mean in the long term for where dissatisfied voters can go.

These parties will need to make compromises, and because they’re so broad, those will end up being quite centrist compromises that lack the change these parties promised in their coalition manifestos. In turn, that would mean that voters will grow frustrated, and in the Netherlands, given that the largest opposition party will be the PVV, frustrated voters will likely flock to the PVV.

So, in many ways, a large government of the center might seem promising now—and it’s certainly what D66 wants, because they want both left-wing and right-wing parties in government—but it’s very unattractive in the long term, because dissatisfied voters can only flock toward the radical right under those conditions. Rather, you would want a situation where at least one of the traditional parties of government is in opposition, because that can attract some of the voters dissatisfied with the government.

An Endless Cycle of Centrist Compromise and Populist Backlash

Dick Schoof attends the New Year’s Reception hosted by the King of the Netherlands in Amsterdam on January 3, 2025. Photo: Robert van ’t Hoenderdaal.

Drawing on your findings on anti-elitism and local political space, do the 2025 elections reveal a contest between technocratic centrism—embodied by D66—and localized anti-elitism, expressed through populist and regionalist currents? How do such competing modes of representation reshape the Dutch democratic fabric?

Dr. Simon Otjes: It’s important to note that in the study about localism and populism, we didn’t find—at least at the party manifesto level—that those two were necessarily strongly related. I didn’t find that. So, I want to stay away from a picture where anti-elitism is concentrated in some regions. Rather, what we find is that there is political dissatisfaction both in major cities and in more rural areas. While we do find evidence for specific forms of regionalized dissatisfaction, what seems much more likely now is that general political dissatisfaction played a major role in why voters supported the PVV.

In that sense, I would want to avoid an image where one is more local and one is more national. However, I do agree with the idea that we are seeing two different modes of governance in the Netherlands. One is the centrist governments that end up being quite technocratic, making compromises—quite gray compromises—where all the different colors are mixed together, leaving no clear political expression or policy choices made by the government. These are then alternated by brief periods of radical right-wing populist government.

That would be a good way to describe the Netherlands over the last 30 years: a centrist coalition between 1994 and 2002, followed by a populist moment in 2002 with the LPF (Pim Fortuyn List), which couldn’t govern and fell apart. Then we had different centrist governments until 2010, when the VVD was willing to govern with the PVV in the 2010–2012 minority government, which also collapsed. It was followed by the centrist Liberal–Labour coalition, and then more centrist governments until 2024, when we had the Dick Schoof government.

So, basically, what we have are periods of rather gray, technocratic, centrist government, alternated by radical right participation in 2002, 2010–2012, and 2024–2025—very short periods, because they have so far proven to be unreliable partners. This seems to be the pattern the Netherlands is caught in: an alternation between uninspiring centrist governments and brief bursts of radical right-wing dissatisfaction, which fail to make lasting changes because of their inherent instability.

Voters Shift from PVV to JA21 for Real Policy Impact on Migration

Your research with Green-Pedersen shows how party competition drives issue salience. Have the 2025 elections further diffused the immigration debate across the party spectrum, eroding the PVV’s ownership of the issue? If so, what new issues might sustain populist mobilization going forward?

Dr. Simon Otjes: Although I don’t really have the numbers right now, because students are only going to start coding manifestos for 2025, I don’t think the PVV has lost its issue ownership on migration. Rather, if you asked voters, a large share of them would still say that the PVV has the most credible and promising positions on migration.

Instead, voters shifted to different parties mainly because the PVV was excluded from government, and therefore, voters who wanted to influence government policy could no longer vote for the PVV—it became more of an expressive vote on immigration. That meant that, in particular, JA21, which is much more likely to enter a government coalition than the PVV, was a good alternative for voters who, on one hand, wanted a change in migration policy, and on the other, wanted to have a chance to influence government policy.

So, that is essentially why that party gained support—because of its ability to attract voters dissatisfied with migration policy but still eager to have a real impact on government decisions, something the PVV currently seems unlikely to achieve.

Populism Persists by Adapting to Different Electorates

Election posters near the Binnenhof featuring Geert Wilders of the PVV in the foreground, The Hague, the Netherlands, October 12, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have observed that populism adapts rather than disappears. Does the simultaneous decline of the PVV and rise of smaller radical-right parties like JA21 and FvD represent ideological splintering, or a strategic diversification ensuring the persistence of the populist bloc?

Dr. Simon Otjes: It would be difficult to really assign a strategy to it, but what we can see is that what was previously very strongly concentrated on the PVV has now dissipated into three different parties, representing three different ways of doing politics. There is JA21, which still has radical right-wing positions, but we can really debate to what extent this party is populist. Does it really use the logic of populism? Does it really appeal to this idea of a united, virtuous population versus a corrupt elite? Rather, these groups want to be part of the government, so they don’t really use this kind of anti-elite rhetoric, but they have very clear anti-immigration stances.

So, that is a party that at least appeals to voters who want to influence government policy. That’s still a large segment. It’s still the second party of the Netherlands, despite their inability to govern. In many ways, that party performed well among voters who were dissatisfied with migration and politics, mobilizing a very traditional radical-right electorate.

And then the third party is FvD, which is much more extreme, as I pointed out at the beginning, and also appeals to a different segment of the electorate—one that has ended up in news environments very different from the mainstream media, where conspiracy theories are much more common. It’s particularly notable and worrying from a democratic perspective that FvD grew this much. They were shunned by traditional media under their previous leader, Thierry Baudet, and then they changed their leadership without changing their manifesto or distancing themselves from, for instance, the MP who was sanctioned for inciting violence. When they changed their leader to a more acceptable face, suddenly the media cordon that Baudet had faced disappeared. That is really worrying. This party has now more than doubled its seat total, despite taking very extreme positions and harboring a membership that seeks to undermine democracy.

So, in that sense, I wouldn’t necessarily talk about strategy here, but I would emphasize that there are different parties on the radical right that appeal to different groups, and that is the key explanation of why they remain so stable—their ability to attract very different electorates by diversifying their offerings.

Religious and Cultural Attitudes No Longer Align in Dutch Politics

In light of your work on religious parties and immigration attitudes, how do you interpret the enduring moral and cultural anxieties that underpin populist narratives in an increasingly secular and urbanized Netherlands?

Dr. Simon Otjes: So, the question is, what is the relationship between religion and these cultural attitudes? And there, I have to be a little bit skeptical, in the sense that in the Netherlands, religious attitudes and cultural attitudes aren’t strongly coherent, and we can also see that in the party landscape. There are three Christian democratic parties currently in Parliament—that is, the SGP, which is a very conservative Protestant party; the CDA, the mainstream Christian democratic party that did quite well in the elections; and the ChristenUnie, a more center-left Christian party, particularly when it comes to environmental and economic issues.

On migration, the SGP isn’t really differentiable from the radical right. They take very clear radical-right positions without being populist—very strongly anti-immigration, anti-Islam, and believing that Christianity is superior to Islam. Then the CDA takes much more centrist positions. They favor measures against migration, particularly citing that the Netherlands can’t really handle that many migrants, without veering into nativist territory, but they are quite conservative when it comes to migration. They, for instance, supported the principles of the far-reaching migration bill that was introduced by the previous government. They voted against it for a few amendments, but not because they disagreed with the principles in it.

And then there’s the ChristenUnie, which is much more progressive on migration. It really is a party of the kind of churches that want to help refugees in this country. So, this diversity shows that in the Netherlands, there isn’t necessarily a strong relationship between migration attitudes and voting for different Christian democratic parties. Rather, Christian democracy shows different shades.

The Netherlands Won’t Necessarily Be a Particularly Progressive Government on EU Issues

In “From Eurorealism to Europhilia,” you trace D66’s evolution toward a more assertive pro-Europeanism. Does Rob Jetten’s victory reflect a genuine societal re-legitimization of the EU in Dutch political discourse, or is it a contingent reaction to populist overreach?

Dr. Simon Otjes: We have to really note here that Jetten didn’t win the election because the population in the Netherlands changed its opinion. Public opinions about migration or about the European Union in the Netherlands are surprisingly stable, and rather, if anything, we can see that Jetten appealed to voters by becoming more centrist on this issue. This traditionally very pro-European party decided to have a big Dutch flag during their party conference, signaling that they wanted to move away from the cosmopolitanism that was associated with them. So, I wouldn’t necessarily see his victory as a change in opinion about the European Union or even about migration. Rather, it’s about a party strategically positioning itself on these issues to appeal to a larger segment of voters.

That doesn’t necessarily mean that Dutch policy on the EU won’t change. We’ve had a very Eurosceptic government—also a government that was really unable to influence European policy because the Prime Minister wasn’t tied to one of the major party families and was an unknown in Brussels. And so, the Netherlands will play a more active role in the European Union.

Depending on how the government formation turns out, it could also play a more positive role, particularly on issues where the Netherlands has been quite conservative, such as budgetary expansion. At the same time, despite D66’s entry into government, it seems very likely that the VVD will also be in government. And a government with the VVD will mean a government that inevitably moves against too large an increase in European budgets or too expansionary policies. They are fighting a rearguard battle against an increasing role for the EU in these matters. So, in that sense, the Netherlands won’t necessarily be a particularly progressive government on this issue.

Your study of Volt highlighted the rise of transnational “Europhile populism.” Could D66’s success, with its emotionally charged yet pro-European message, indicate a broader continental trend toward the hybridization of populism and cosmopolitanism?

Dr. Simon Otjes: I really want to emphasize that both in the study about Volt and in the study about D66, I did not claim that these parties are populist. I wouldn’t necessarily call them populist. They don’t make this differentiation between “the people” and “the elite.” D66 is rather a traditional party of government that was able to mobilize dissatisfaction with the current government, but not necessarily by appealing to broader dissatisfaction with democracy. So, no, I don’t think there’s any basis for calling these parties populist. These parties are—I mean, D66 was quite good at running its campaign and adopted a more patriotic, progressive patriotic message—but there’s nothing about them that makes them populist. The same is true for Volt.

D66’s Appeal Is Governmental, Not Populist

Billboard of D66 featuring Rob Jetten with the slogan Het Kan Wel in Amsterdam, the Netherlands on October 28, 2025. Photo: Robert van ’t Hoenderdaal.

How might the Dutch election reshape the EU’s political equilibrium—particularly in debates over migration, democratic reform, and responses to illiberalism? Is the Netherlands now positioned to play a normative role in defending liberal democratic values within the Union?

Dr. Simon Otjes: We really have to differentiate migration from the debate about liberalism. When it comes to migration, all the parties in Parliament, perhaps with the exception of very small ones, support the European Migration Pact, and that is even seen by the parties of the left, such as D66 and PvdA, as a solution to their migration problem. They really make it a European problem. So, there’s broad support for those kinds of measures, including dealing with refugees in third countries and making deals with third countries—although legal scholars seriously doubt whether those measures comply with refugee conventions. But that’s what they see as a solution to the migration problem.

When it comes to the discussion about illiberalism, the Netherlands doesn’t really play any major role, because the issue is largely shaped by the fact that several countries, particularly in Eastern Europe, are willing to tolerate each other’s illiberalism, and moves against illiberalism within the EU require unanimity. So, in that sense, the change of government in the Netherlands hasn’t really changed anything.

I think the Schoof government might perhaps be a little more accepting of illiberalism than previous governments, but it’s important to note that both NSC and VVD, which are in that government, are parties that favor maintaining the rule of law and supporting actions against illiberalism. So, in that sense, I don’t think a change in government will mean much for these discussions—particularly because this debate really centers on Hungary, Slovakia, and soon also Czechia, and increasingly Poland, which continue to allow an area of illiberalism within the European Union. So, in that sense, I don’t think the change in government will necessarily affect this issue at the EU level.

No Major Democratic Changes Expected

Building on your research with Bedock et al. (2022) on the populist challenge to democracy reform, how do you interpret the PVV’s brief period in power? Has it intensified mainstream reflection on the tension between majoritarian responsiveness and liberal constraint in Dutch democracy?

Dr. Simon Otjes: No, I don’t think that the PVV’s participation in government has really changed views about democracy. What we can see is that the NSC, which was one of the government parties, pushed an agenda of government reform, including changes to the electoral system. The previous government was quite open to the introduction of a referendum in the Netherlands.

The interesting question now is what will happen with those portfolios, particularly because the PVV and the VVD are quite skeptical—especially about freezing the introduction of a referendum. There was quite an ambitious reform agenda that was stalled because the government lasted such a short time, and it really is uncertain what kind of reform agenda they will adopt.

What you can see in the centrist part of Dutch politics is an understanding that democracy needs reform, but there isn’t a clear or united agenda around how to do it. What is notable, particularly about the participation of NSC in the previous government, is that they had a very clear reform agenda, but it is now closely associated with them. So, I don’t expect that the next government will do anything in terms of major changes like electoral reform.

I have sincere doubts about whether the referendum bill that had already progressed to Parliament will move forward—it’s likely to be stalled even longer. So, I don’t think this will lead to any major changes in the way democracy functions in the Netherlands.

Centrist Governments and Radical Right Experiments Will Keep Alternating

Billboard featuring the main candidates in the Dutch elections on June 9, 2010, in Amstelveen, the Netherlands. Photo: Dreamstime.

Across Europe, we observe a convergence between adaptive liberal centrists and fragmented populist right formations. Do you see this dynamic producing a long-term hybridization of democratic politics—where populist affect and centrist rationality coexist as dual pillars of contemporary representation?

Dr. Simon Otjes: This description, where you have an alternation between almost technocratic centrist governments—often including parties from the center-left and the center-right—having to govern together, leading to compromises where you can’t really see the course of the party anymore, being interrupted by brief periods of radical right-wing governments because the radical right has become governable, is quite accurate. That is a pattern we can now see, at least for the last 30 years. And that seems—I can see no basis for another path than that. You would continually have these centrist governments that try to deal with the issues, but because of their breadth inside the coalition, aren’t really able to deliver very clear either left- or right-wing policy solutions, and then being interrupted by different forms of government with the radical right. We saw the government with the LPF in 2002, the tolerated government in 2010, and now this whole experiment, and we’ll just continue to have this alternation between these two options.

The Netherlands Remains in an Enduring Populist Cycle

And finally, Professor Otjes, when viewed globally—from Trump’s America to Milei’s Argentina and Meloni’s Italy—do the Dutch elections signify the emergence of a post-populist phase characterized by ideological diffusion and strategic normalization, or do they mark merely another turn in populism’s enduring cycle of reinvention?

Dr. Simon Otjes: I don’t think we can talk about a post-populist phase. What we see here fits a pattern that we’ve observed before: populists enter government, those governments prove to be unstable, and then there’s a response from the center, which seeks to govern together again. They do that for a while until, once more, the populists become so large that they can’t be ignored. That’s the pattern I’m seeing, so I wouldn’t call this a post-populist phase—we’re still very much inside this populist moment.

When it comes to diffusion, I really don’t think that populism has spread very strongly among mainstream parties. You could argue that mainstream parties have moved to the center, or sometimes to more conservative positions—as with the VVD on migration. So, we can clearly see that populism, and particularly the radicalizing influence of populist parties, is shaping how other parties make policy.

But that doesn’t mean we’re now in a post-populist phase. Rather, we’ll continue to see this alternation—radical right-supported governments briefly interrupting a more general pattern in which the parties at the center have to govern together.

President Javier Milei bans the use of inclusive language and all gender-related terminology in public administration documents, declaring it part of his “cultural battle” against what he calls Marxist indoctrination. Photo: Fernando Petrucelli.

Professor Lucca: Milei Is Ultra-Neoliberal in Economics but Ultra-Populist in Rhetoric

In an exclusive interview with ECPS, Professor Juan Bautista Lucca of the National University of Rosario (UNR) analyzes Argentina’s shifting political landscape under President Javier Milei. He argues that Milei’s project represents “a radicalized hybrid—ultra-neoliberal in economics but ultra-populist in rhetoric.” For Professor Lucca, Milei has transformed neoliberalism into a moral crusade, “sacralizing the market” while turning politics into “a permanent apocalyptic theater.” He views Milei’s alliance with Donald Trump as part of a broader “geopolitics of Trumpism in the Global South,” where sovereignty is redefined through ideological, not strategic, ties. Following Milei’s sweeping midterm victory—with La Libertad Avanza winning 41% of the vote—Professor Lucca warns that Argentina stands in a Gramscian “interregnum,” facing both consolidation and disillusionment.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Juan Bautista Lucca, a leading political scientist at the National University of Rosario (UNR) and Independent Researcher at CONICET, offers a comprehensive analysis of the Javier Milei phenomenon, situating it within Argentina’s longer populist tradition while revealing its radical departures from the past.

Reflecting on Milei’s sweeping midterm victory, Professor Lucca rejects the idea that the results represent a referendum on economic policy. Rather, he sees them as “an expression of the president’s capacity to maintain a narrative of radical rupture and moral regeneration.” For Professor Lucca, Milei’s strength lies not in delivering material results but in sustaining an affective narrative of moral renewal, one that continues to mobilize polarized sectors of society while leaving centrist voters disengaged. “People in the center,” he observes, “are not very motivated to vote… participation was one of the lowest in the last 40 years of democracy in Argentina.”

Professor Lucca identifies a deeper “normalization of populist discourse” in Argentina’s political mainstream, in which neoliberal orthodoxy is now “celebrated as an act of moral courage.” Unlike past neoliberal leaders such as Carlos Menem or Mauricio Macri, who concealed their economic programs, Milei “doesn’t want to hide this economic agenda; he even sacralizes it.” This, Professor Lucca argues, represents the sophistication of neoliberal populism, where austerity and moral regeneration are fused into a coherent political language.

Asked whether Milei’s libertarian project fits within existing typologies, Professor Lucca insists it marks a qualitative rupture: “He is ultra-neoliberal in economics but ultra-populist in rhetoric.” Milei’s “libertarian populism,” he explains, blends market maximalism and anti-establishment radicalism with “messianic performativity.” His leadership, characterized by a “rock-star persona and apocalyptic imagery,” transforms politics into what Professor Lucca calls “a permanent apocalyptic theater,” where representation depends less on programs than on emotional intensity.

From a geopolitical perspective, Professor Lucca sees Milei’s alliance with Donald Trump and symbolic alignment with Israel as evidence of a “geopolitics of Trumpism in the Global South”—a transnational ideological coordination that redefines sovereignty through shared cultural codes rather than strategic alliances. In this worldview, “external financial dependence is reframed as liberation,” an inversion of Argentina’s traditional narratives of autonomy and self-determination.

Looking ahead, Professor Lucca warns that Argentina stands “in an interregnum—what Gramsci called the time when monsters appear.” Whether Milei’s Leviathan endures or gives rise to “a Behemoth from populist Peronism” remains uncertain. Yet, he notes, the greatest danger lies in a growing “third Argentina”—a disenchanted electorate that “simply doesn’t want to participate in politics.”

Milei’s midterm triumph underscores the urgency of Professor Lucca’s diagnosis. With La Libertad Avanza capturing nearly 41% of the vote, securing 13 of 24 Senate seats and 64 of 127 lower-house seats, Argentina’s president has consolidated his grip on power. The landslide—hailed by supporters as a rejection of Peronism and condemned by critics for deepening inequality—marks a pivotal moment in Argentina’s democratic experiment: one where chainsaw economics meets populist spectacle, reshaping both the country’s political grammar and its social contract.

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca is a leading political scientist at the National University of Rosario (UNR) and Independent Researcher at CONICET.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Juan Bautista Lucca, slightly revised for clarity and flow. 

Milei’s Victory Is Not an Economic Referendum, but a Moral One

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In light of Javier Milei’s surprising midterm victory, how do you interpret this result as a referendum on two years of libertarian governance amid economic contraction, corruption scandals, and low turnout? What does it reveal about the resilience and transformation of right-wing populism in Argentina?

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca: It’s a complex question, so I’ll try to answer as much as I can. First of all, I have to say that it’s not surprising—the number of people who support Milei. But even if I say that, I could also say that this is a kind of referendum for them, or a referendum on concrete economic results. I would say that the result of the last election is more an expression of the president’s capacity to maintain a narrative of radical rupture and moral regeneration. 

Even if in the 2023 election he didn’t campaign against Kirchnerism as much, he opposed the idea of la casta. But now, he incorporates the idea of anti-Kirchnerism, and it was very effective in nationalizing the election—turning what was essentially a provincial or local contest into a national one. He was able to make it a national debate. So, it’s not a referendum on economic policy. 

I also have to add that the low electoral turnout, in a way, shows that those who went to vote are mostly the highly polarized ones. People in the center, who don’t agree with either side of Argentina’s antinomic populist politics—with Peronism and Kirchnerism on one side, and La Libertad Avanza or Mileism on the other—are not very motivated to vote. People in the center of the ideological spectrum, or those distant from this cleavage, tend to stay home. That’s why participation was so low—one of the lowest in the last 40 years of democracy in Argentina.

Argentina Is Witnessing the Normalization of Neoliberal Populism

To what extent does this electoral outcome signal the normalization of populist discourse within Argentina’s political mainstream—especially when neoliberal prescriptions are wrapped in anti-elitist and moralizing rhetoric?

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca: We are facing an unsettling but truly effective normalization. This normalization started more or less three years ago, when the mainstream right accepted that Milei is not just an outsider, and their debate, discourse, and programmatic perspective—or their ideological propositions on policies—were no longer as radicalized as they had been maybe ten years ago. So, the normalization of Milei’s discourse really began three or four years ago.

During the pandemic period, this discursive operation represented the sophistication of neoliberal populism as we knew it in Argentina with Menem or Macri in the past, because they no longer need to hide their economic program. In the past, we could see that Macri and Menem tried to conceal their programmatic preferences. They didn’t openly express the idea that we were in the midst of a new or renewed Washington Consensus. But now, Milei doesn’t want to hide this economic program; they even celebrate it as an act of moral courage, perhaps.

This is important for Argentina’s political imagination, where Washington Consensus prescriptions were always very unpopular but are now gaining more and more popular legitimacy. That’s why we are witnessing the normalization of this radical discourse. We could see it in the last two elections, this year and in 2023, when the idea of controlling debt and the state deficit was celebrated by all participants in the election—even the Peronist candidate, Massa.

Right now, other candidates on the Peronist side have decided to accept the idea of controlling the deficit and reducing not only social policies but also other kinds of spending—the amount of money wasted on unproductive policies, especially at the provincial and subnational levels. Governors have decided to accept Milei’s neoliberal restrictions on spending for policies, infrastructure, and other kinds of initiatives. And when they accept these ideas and policies, they are normalizing the programmatic perspective of our president.

Milei and Trump Share a Cultural, Not Just Political, Alliance

Protesters march through the streets of Argentina’s capital during demonstrations against the G20 summit in Buenos Aires, Nov. 30, 2018. Photo: Gabriel Esteban Campo.

Given the US bailout and Donald Trump’s open political intervention, how do you evaluate this episode as an instance of transnational populist coordination? Does it point to a new geopolitical articulation of Trumpism in the Global South?

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca: It’s a complex question. Of course, there is a strong link between Trump’s administration and Milei’s administration, but I also have to note that it is a strong relationship between both individuals, not merely an administrative connection. This shows that Trump is not supporting Milei as a conventional geopolitical ally, since in Latin America there are other countries that are more powerful or geopolitically significant—perhaps nations in the Caribbean or Brazil. The link between Trump and Milei is more about companionship within a global and established movement that shares certain cultural codes, symbolic enemies, and a specific vision of the world—particularly the defense of Western civilization.

We could see this in Milei’s administration when he chose Israel as the first country to visit as president, breaking a long-standing tradition in Argentine administrations since the return of democracy. Traditionally, the first country an Argentine president visited was Brazil. Milei broke with that, and this reflects not only his stance toward Israel but also his affinity with Trump. This is not a geopolitical expression but rather a relationship rooted in cultural codes and a shared worldview.

This effectively points toward geopolitics of Trumpism in the Global South, where national sovereignties are paradoxically redefined through transnational ideological alliances. In this case, the alliance is supported not only by ideological affinities but also by shared cultural representations of how they enact their policies. For example, the recent government shutdown in the Trump administration is more or less the same as what has been experienced since the beginning of the Milei administration with the shutdown of the budget—used as a political strategy.

If we look not only at the link between Trump and Milei’s administrations but also at the policies they are implementing in both countries, they are largely similar. This convergence shows how they choose to express their alliance not only at the geopolitical level but also in domestic politics.

Milei Redefines Dependence as Liberation and Sovereignty as Submission

How might such external dependencies—both financial and ideological—reshape Argentina’s historical narrative of sovereignty and national autonomy, central tropes within both Peronist and anti-Peronist imaginaries?

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca: That’s a fantastic question, because it can be answered through the lens of the Milei administration, which is presenting—or perhaps performing—a radical act of resignification. With Trump’s support and the effort to stabilize the financial system, Milei frames external financial dependence as a form of liberation. It’s a contradiction in terms, but it’s highly effective in gaining support from the electorate. He has also reframed integration into the global neoliberal order as an authentic expression of individual sovereignty. It’s a deeply paradoxical move: he presents liberty where there is dependence and defends sovereignty while effectively handing over the keys to the Trump administration on one of Argentina’s most critical issues—the financial question, debt control, and inflation rates.

Milei Doesn’t Defend the Market—He Sacralizes It

Javier Milei casts his vote in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on November 19, 2023. Photo: Fabian Alberto De Ciria.

In your studies of ideological structures in Argentine and Latin American politics, you have discussed how right-wing projects often recode neoliberal rationality through affective populist idioms. How does Milei’s “anarcho-capitalism” fit within, or rupture, that ideological tradition?

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca: We see both continuities and ruptures in the idea that Milei is an anarcho-capitalist. How can we analyze that in relation to your question? It represents continuity because it effectively reintroduces neoliberal rationality through an affective populist medium. Sometimes we saw this in more moderate forms with Menem and Macri. However, the Argentine right has traditionally expressed anti-populism in its discourse while employing populism in its strategy. For example, Macri opposed the populism of Kirchnerism, yet in his strategy, he created a sharp distinction or cleavage between one side and the other—constructing a Manichean narrative that was entirely populist, even if he never admitted to being one.

If we use Pierre Ostiguy’s framework, for instance, Macri’s administration was led by elites at the top, but at the subnational level—in the provinces—it relied heavily on “low culture,” which Ostiguy defines as populist.

In Milei’s case, however, there is a rupture with this tradition because he takes the operation to an unprecedented extreme. He radicalizes it. He doesn’t merely defend the market; he sacralizes it. He doesn’t simply criticize the state, as Macri or Menem did; he demonizes it. He presents a more apocalyptic vision. His anarcho-capitalism functions less as a coherent economic doctrine and more as a political mythology. That’s why he promises redemption through the destruction of the existing order. He often says that we need to “burn Rome once again”—in this case, Argentina.

The idea is to push this populist narrative to its limits, portraying society as living in hell, with him as the only one capable of leading it to paradise. It is framed in a far more apocalyptic and radicalized way than in previous expressions of the right in Argentina, such as those of Menem and Macri.

Milei’s Libertarian Populism Blends Market Maximalism with Messianic Performativity

Can we analytically conceive Milei’s project as a form of neoliberal populism, or does its radical libertarianism, combined with moral anti-statism, constitute a novel ideological hybrid that transcends earlier typologies such as the “New Right” of Menem or Macri?

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca: It is, once again, a very complex question, and I think we need more time—or at least we need to see the full picture of Milei’s administration—to provide a more conceptually precise answer. But if I had to give a quick one, I would say that while the neoliberal populism of Menem and Macri sought a certain pragmatic balance between market logic and popular demands, in Milei’s case, he radicalizes both poles simultaneously. He is ultra-neoliberal in economics but ultra-populist in rhetoric.

His libertarianism is not merely technical; he moralizes it. As I mentioned in the previous question, he presents it as a religious issue. This kind of libertarian populism—if I may use that term—is an ideological configuration that combines market maximalism and anti-establishment maximalism with messianic performativity.

It’s like old wine in a new bottle served in a new kind of cup: something broadly familiar but with a completely different flavor. It is presented as a revelation, almost mythological—something that doesn’t fit easily within earlier categories like the New Right or neoliberal populism. It is genuinely new in the sense that Milei adds this messianic, performative, almost religious dimension to the mix of market ideology and anti-establishment maximalism in his politics.

Milei Reverses the Latin American Populist Tradition

Murals of Eva Perón and Juan Domingo Perón in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on October 30, 2016. Photo: Dreamstime.

Considering your engagement with Torcuato di Tella’s work on national-popular coalitions and Bonapartism, how might Milei’s project be situated within—or against—that lineage of Latin American populisms that sought to reconcile mass incorporation with elite hegemony?

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca: The comparison with di Tella is very productive, because di Tella knew the Peronist strategies intimately and how they evolved over time. He was present at every table where Peronism sought to articulate its power, at least during the last democratic period.

The classical national-popular populism that di Tella analyzed aimed to build coalitions under charismatic leadership that mediated between elites and the masses. It was a kind of reinterpretation of Maurice A. Finocchiaro’s idea of leadership. Di Tella saw this leadership in a positive light, while Finocchiaro viewed it as something negative for democracy.

In Milei’s case, however, he inverts this logic. He builds an anti-distributive coalition under charismatic leadership. He takes di Tella’s framework and completely reverses it—turning it upside down, so to speak. Milei not only inverts the logic that di Tella described but also preserves the Bonapartist structure characterized by concentrated power and a direct, plebiscitary relationship with the people. In this context, he relies heavily on new technologies like social media, which played a far greater role in the 2023 election than in this one.

This is partly because we are now in a midterm election where President Milei himself was not a candidate, so each candidate had to express their allegiance to Milei’s narrative through their own social media channels. As a result, the power and potential of social media became fragmented across multiple actors.

To conclude, Milei’s rise represents both an appropriation and a distortion of the traditional Latin American populist model that di Tella described—pushed toward radically opposite ends, the ultimate outcome and final shape of which remain uncertain.

Milei Turns Politics into a Permanent Apocalyptic Theater

The performative excess of Milei’s leadership—his rock-star persona and apocalyptic imagery—has become central to his political grammar. From your theoretical perspective, how does this form of charismatic performativity reconfigure the populist relation between representation, spectacle, and crisis?

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca: Milei is an outsider from the political elites in Argentina, but he’s also someone who came from the media, and he realized very quickly that in the era of spectacularized politics, representation is not based on programs but rather on affective intensity. The performativity that Milei embodies is not ornamental—it is constitutive of Milei and Mileism itself.

The insults, the rock aesthetic, the apocalyptic references—even the hair, in a kind of Boris Johnson or The Cure singer (Robert James Smith) way—are not simply part of a communication strategy. They are the cornerstone of his political force. His charismatic performativity produces what we could call a politics of permanent event, and he uses social networks to sustain it every day. He sends more tweets and posts than the time he spends sleeping.

He reconfigures populism away from institutional constraints into a logic of pure messianic events. It is a populism—a permanent apocalyptic theater. And Milei, more than anyone, understood that very quickly and very clearly. That’s why it was so effective during the election period.

Milei’s Leviathan May Soon Face a Behemoth from Populist Peronism

The colorful facade of a building in the iconic neighborhood of El Caminito in Buenos Aires, Argentina, featuring figures of Maradona and the Perón couple. Photo: Alexandre Fagundes De Fagundes.

And the last question is: Looking ahead, do you foresee Argentina entering a phase of libertarian-populist consolidation, or are we witnessing the incipient exhaustion of a political model whose moral and economic contradictions may soon reinvigorate a re-articulated Peronism or left-populist alternative?

Professor Juan Bautista Lucca: It’s not easy. If I could see the future, I would say that we are in the middle of a transitional period—an interregnum, as Antonio F. Gramsci might say. And, Gramsci said that in these transitional moments, monsters tend to appear, and Milei is one of those monsters. But the question is what will come after—I don’t know. And whether Milei will be the only monster in town, maybe, I don’t know either. I think we are entering a future where this kind of Leviathan that Milei is now creating will be confronted by a Behemoth from populist Peronism. They are trying to reorganize their forces and establish new leaderships in the absence of Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

From my perspective, the only critical scenario we could foresee in the near future is if the policies that Milei has presented, expressed, and implemented produce bad results and outcomes. At the moment, there is no antagonistic opposition capable of confronting and defeating Milei. The only one who could defeat Milei is Milei himself. But this is not an unrealistic scenario, because Milei is an outsider. He is not part of la casta, so he must go through a long and complex process of learning—how to debate, how to build consensus, and how to uphold the informal institutions of Argentine political culture. He needs to understand this background and learn to engage with the other elites who have governed Argentina for maybe twenty or more years in every province. The territorial power of governors in Argentina is very strong, so he needs to negotiate and reach consensus with them.

So, I don’t know what’s going to happen, but I don’t anticipate a simple return of traditional Peronism. It’s more likely that we will see the emergence of a new political articulation—perhaps a renewed form of left-wing populism that learns from Milei’s capacity to connect affectively. Because this is key in Argentina right now: polarization is not ideological—it’s affective. People are divided by emotions and feelings that bring them closer to or further from Milei. That’s why, as I said before in your first question, this election expressed a position of fear that is not linked to either pole of this antagonistic populist divide. There is a third Argentina that is not represented in this election. And it is not expressed because these people don’t want to show their hatred or opposition to Milei’s policies—they simply don’t want to participate in politics. This is something completely new in Argentina. Even during the pandemic, when people were angry or opposed to Alberto Fernández’s government and its policies, they still voted for new parties. But now, more than 30% of people don’t want to participate; they don’t want to belong to either pole of Argentina’s polarization. This is a completely new phenomenon that we must interpret and analyze carefully when the time comes.

Professor Ivan Llamazares is a leading scholar of political science at the University of Salamanca.

Prof. Llamazares: Authoritarianism Is Very Weak in Argentina, Whose Popular Culture Is Deeply Democratic

In this exclusive interview with the ECPS, Professor Ivan Llamazares of the University of Salamanca analyzes Argentina’s shifting political landscape under President Javier Milei, whose recent midterm victory consolidated his power and emboldened his radical austerity agenda. Professor Llamazares argues that while Milei’s libertarian populism intensifies Argentina’s ideological divisions, it does not fundamentally alter them. “It’s a modification, an intensification—but the underlying structure is still there,” he explains. Rejecting comparisons to Bolsonaro’s authoritarianism, he insists that “authoritarianism is very weak in Argentina, whose popular culture is deeply democratic.” For Professor Llamazares, Milei’s experiment embodies an “extreme illustration” of global right-wing populism—yet remains distinctly Argentine, rooted in enduring social cleavages, economic crises, and democratic resilience.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Argentina’s President Javier Milei has consolidated his grip on power after his party, La Libertad Avanza, won nearly 41% of the vote in the midterm elections, securing 13 of 24 Senate seats and 64 of 127 lower-house seats. The landslide victory marks a major political endorsement of Milei’s radical austerity program, dubbed “chainsaw politics,” defined by deep spending cuts, deregulation, and free-market reforms. The results will allow him to advance his agenda more easily after facing frequent legislative resistance in his first two years in office. Supporters have hailed the win as a rejection of decades of Peronist economic management, while critics warn of deepening poverty, unemployment, and inequality as a result of sweeping cuts to education, healthcare, pensions, and social programs. Despite stabilizing inflation and restoring investor confidence, Milei’s reforms have sparked widespread hardship and a risk of recession. Meanwhile, a record-low turnout of 67.9% reflects rising public apathy and disillusionment with Argentina’s political class.

Against this backdrop of economic turbulence and populist consolidation, Professor Ivan Llamazares, a leading scholar of political science at the University of Salamanca, reflects on the deeper ideological and institutional dynamics shaping Argentina’s political transformation in an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Known for his research on ideological structuring and party system dynamics in Latin America, Professor Llamazares situates Milei’s rise within Argentina’s longstanding ideological fault lines—the enduring struggle between Peronist interventionism and neoliberal technocracy.

Professor Llamazares cautions against viewing Milei’s ascent as a structural rupture. “It’s a modification, an intensification,” he explains, “but the underlying structure is still there.” In his view, Mauricio Macri’s victory in 2015 marked a more significant political realignment, introducing a coherent center-right, pro-business coalition that shifted the ideological balance of Argentine politics. Milei, he argues, has merely intensified this trajectory, infusing it with “a new rhetoric, a new style,” and a libertarian flair.

While comparisons to Bolsonaro and Fujimori are unavoidable, Professor Llamazares stresses the limits of authoritarianism in Argentina. “Authoritarianism is very weak… even the authoritarian project itself must be very weak,”he observes. This weakness, he suggests, is rooted in Argentina’s deeply democratic popular culture, shaped by the trauma of the last dictatorship and the political learning processes that culminated in the country’s 1983 democratic restoration. Unlike Bolsonaro, Milei “hasn’t taken significant steps toward building authoritarian institutions.”

At the same time, Professor Llamazares acknowledges that Milei represents “an extreme illustration” of a global populist trend that merges moral populism, economic deregulation, and cultural grievance. Yet, he underscores that many aspects of Milei’s project are “very typically Argentine,” reflecting specific socio-economic tensions—between export-oriented elites and protectionist sectors, between dollarization and social protection, and between a cosmopolitan upper class and the working poor.

Ultimately, Professor Llamazares interprets Milei’s moment not as a new ideological paradigm, but as a cyclical populist insurgency within Argentina’s enduring political structure. “Milei represents something new in style,” he concludes, but the deeper ideological foundations of Argentine politics remain intact.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Ivan Llamazares, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

Milei’s Victory Reflects Fear, Not Consensus

Javier Milei casts his vote in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on November 19, 2023. Photo: Fabian Alberto De Ciria.

Professor Ivan Llamazares, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How would you interpret Javier Milei’s midterm victory in light of Argentina’s ongoing economic downturn, corruption scandals, and record-low voter turnout? What does this outcome reveal about the contemporary resonance and adaptability of right-wing populist discourse within contexts of socioeconomic precarity and institutional distrust?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: It’s a very complex issue; there are many interconnected themes, but one has to interpret this victory in the context of Argentina’s economic and political situation and the dynamics of the last decade. First of all, there is an ongoing and deep division in Argentine society in terms of economic and political projects. On the one hand, we have Peronism and Kirchnerism as a particular and dominant current with internal divisions, and on the other hand, a more market-oriented, right-wing approach that focuses on control, authority policies, favoring market mechanisms, integrating the Argentine economy into the world, less protectionism, and so on. This has been the structural basis of Argentine politics over at least the last decade.

Then there is also the current economic situation. All the problems you mentioned are very acute and very important. In fact, they also led to the defeat of Milei’s party in the Buenos Aires elections a few weeks ago. But, on the other hand, there is also fear—particularly among those sectors that endorse a more liberal economic project. There was fear that the defeat of Milei would entail economic collapse, devaluation, and an uncertain political scenario that could even lead to his removal.

That helps explain the solidification of the coalition in favor of Milei. He received 40% of the vote—40% of the 68% of people who voted—so, in total, it’s probably less than 30% of all eligible voters, about 29% of Argentine society. It’s a majority of votes, but that’s the basic picture. There are, of course, other elements. That doesn’t mean, by the way, that everyone in this coalition is happy about Milei, or likes or trusts him, but they may have preferred the continuation of his project to the uncertainties that would follow his defeat. These, in my view, are the basic elements.

Trump’s Support Boosted Milei’s Momentum, But Interests May Diverge

To what extent might Milei’s electoral resilience be contingent upon exogenous political and financial scaffolding, particularly from Donald Trump and the US Treasury? Could this episode signify the emergence of a transnational populist alliance that fuses neoliberal governance with nationalist rhetoric across hemispheres?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: The answer to the first question is “yes”—it has helped Milei very clearly. It has moved him to the upper bound of the survey projections. It is also clear that the situation of the peso, the chances of devaluation, and so on, improved over the last week due to these commitments by the Trump administration. So it has helped. I don’t know exactly how much, but it must have helped reassure people who perhaps had some doubts yet wanted to avoid the victory of Peronism, and they must have thought ‘at least we have the support of the US, which is the major economic player, and that means the project can continue in this way for a time’. So I think it has been important.

In terms of the alliance, I am not so sure. Of course, there are some ideological, personal, and political affinities—they are close to each other in some respects. But I’m not sure this is going to be so important in the future, in the sense that there are the interests of the US government and the interests of the Argentine government. The Argentine government is dependent, of course, on the US government, not the other way around. But in a situation where US policymakers make a different evaluation in terms of their calculations, they can change. Also, in this case, people refer to ideological proximity, but there are also some economic interests that may have played a role in this support. People close to the Trump political coalition, to the Trump government, also had some interests at stake in the devaluation, investments, and so on. So I would expect some connections and affinities, but I wouldn’t overemphasize them. Each government has its own interests, for sure.

The US Rescue Deepens Argentina’s Ideological Polarization

The US-engineered bailout has been widely interpreted as politically instrumental rather than economically rational. How do such interventions reconfigure Argentine imaginaries of sovereignty, dependency, and anti-elitism, which have long underpinned populist mobilizations from Peronism to Milei’s “anarcho-capitalism”?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: This is complex. On the one hand, this basically reinforces the interpretations that both Peronists and anti-Peronists have about the economic world. In the case of people who are pro-market, export-oriented, and anti-protectionist, who want to integrate the Argentine economy into global capitalism, this confirms that it is better to be associated with the major economic powers of the world, with the US market. So, it works well in that respect.

With regard to the ideological core of Kirchnerism and Peronism, in the same way, this shows that the Argentine government—this anti-Kirchnerist, anti-Peronist government—is just a puppet of international capitalism. So it doesn’t defend the Argentine economy or Argentine society, and it puts Argentina in a situation of total dependency. In fact, they could make the point, and it was a strong one, that this government has increased Argentina’s debt and that we will not be able to pay it. This is just short-term reassurance, but in the end, we face huge problems. We are in a mess.

So, in that sense, it reinforces everything. Perhaps, for people who are doubtful, this is somewhat favorable toward the right because, in this case, they have saved us. Perhaps there are some advantages in being close to these people. And that may be a little similar to the Menem situation. Menem changed Peronist policies, adopted a strategy of being very close to the United States, to international markets, privatization, and so on, and for a while, it worked. Menem won the 1995 elections. So, it works well in terms of Argentine narratives. One has to wait until the end to see how this finishes. Let’s see what happens in a year and a half—what will be the situation of the peso, the economy, whether it will be in recession or not.

Milei Won the Election, but Not ‘the People’

Given the severe austerity measures, deep welfare retrenchment, and widening inequality, how do you account for Milei’s capacity to sustain an affective and symbolic identification with “el pueblo” while advancing a project grounded in radical market orthodoxy?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: He has been successful in solidifying his coalition in order to win against the Peronists and other contenders. I don’t think this means he can portray himself as the leader and representative of a unified Argentine people. I don’t think that is possible. I think the anti-elite populist discourse had more credibility in the presidential elections, to some extent. But right now, the situation is clear. He represents a social coalition that is more middle class. If you look at the electoral results by municipality, he has performed much better in districts where income is higher than in those where income is lower, in contrast to Peronism. He has won, but the idea that “I represent the people, and Peronism represents the elite” cannot work very well right now.

Peronism is weak, but it represents many people—poor people, working-class people, those who have informal jobs, and so on. So I don’t think it works very well in terms of political rhetoric. It worked fine to win the election, but the idea of casta or anti-elite discourse doesn’t work so well right now, actually.

A New Rhetoric, not a New Structure

Crowd of protesters during the cacerolazos—the pots and pans demonstrations—against President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on November 8, 2012. Photo: Dreamstime.

In your earlier work on ideological dimensions and spatial models of Latin American politics, you emphasized the structuring role of ideology in mediating citizen preferences. How does Milei’s “anarcho-capitalist” imaginary, with its libertarian anti-statism and anti-political moralism, reconfigure Argentina’s traditional ideological continuum between Peronist interventionism and neoliberal technocracy?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: What he represents is rooted in the existing structure of ideological and programmatic confrontation. He’s not departing from it; he’s transforming it slightly—rhetorically and in terms of the social coalition. But he draws his strength from this division. In that sense, I don’t think he’s a radical transformer. He hasn’t changed the parameters of these conflicts, which have a long history in Argentina and became particularly solidified under the Kirchner governments—both Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.

He hasn’t altered that dynamic drastically; rather, he has given it a new flavor, emphasizing the freedom associated with the market. He has managed to appeal to young people outside formal markets—self-employed workers, young males. But he hasn’t changed the ideological structuring of the Argentine party system. That’s my impression. In a way, he has intensified everything.

This could also be seen, in a similar way, in the election that Macri won. But Macri had a more moderate profile and was more of an establishment politician or leader. Milei is disruptive, but this also has to do with the depth of the Argentine crisis and the depth of Argentina’s conflicts.

Not a Break, but an Escalation of Neoliberal Populism

Can Milei’s experiment be analytically classified as a form of “neoliberal populism,” or do its discursive, moral, and performative elements constitute a qualitatively distinct libertarian-populist hybridity that challenges conventional typologies of populist economics?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: He fits under the first label, but with a new level of intensity and new rhetorical devices. Clearly, it’s pro-market, pro–export-oriented, and neoliberal in an extreme way, with rhetoric that is much more radical. I don’t think he departs from that, but he gives it a libertarian flavor and a highly ideological tone. He draws on obscure economic theoreticians from the Austrian school, speaks in a vulgar way, is rude and disrespectful, and does not represent the elites—the cultural elites—in that sense.

However, he remains rooted in the same neoliberal populist approach. In some respects, he’s also close to Bolsonaro. So I don’t think it’s a total break with the past. By the way, this trend began before Milei, as during the Néstor Kirchner period there were already segments of the Argentine right clearly moving in this direction.

Global Resonance, Local Specificity: Milei’s Unique Populism

How does the Milei-Trump ideological affinity, which is a fusion of moral populism, economic deregulation, and cultural grievance, reflect broader transformations in the grammar of global right-wing populism, particularly its capacity to reconcile anti-establishment rhetoric with financial globalization?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: He represents this trend in a way; he’s an extreme illustration of it—very powerful in rhetorical terms, for instance. Milei embodies something clear and substantive in international terms. I also have the impression that some of these characteristics are very specific to Argentina. I don’t think this ultra-liberal, pro–financial markets, pro–export-oriented, pro-dollarization approach works as well for the radical right in other contexts. I don’t expect or see anything similar when we look at France, Italy, or Germany and when we focus on the radical right.

In some respects, he reflects a distinctly Argentine situation—for instance, the tension between export-oriented and social protection models, the importance of the dollarization process, and the fact that Argentina is an economy where many Argentines hold billions of dollars and have different concerns. There is also the need for the Argentine upper and upper-middle classes to remain strongly connected to international economic markets in different ways—financially and through exports. That’s very Argentinian.

Some elements are similar—pro-market attitudes, certain liberal ideas, anti-elitism, anti-left sentiment, an emphasis on social order, work ethic, discipline, crime and punishment, and punitive policies. But in terms of economic globalization—anti-tax sentiment, by the way, strongly anti-tax—in this respect, many aspects are very typically Argentine.

A Divided Peronism Searching for Renewal

Large crowds march nationwide in defense of public universities and state education in Argentina — one of the largest demonstrations of President Javier Milei’s government, with attendance estimates ranging from 100,000 to 500,000. The building with the image of Eva Perón can be seen in the background in Buenos Aires on April 23, 2024. Photo: Dreamstime.

Peronism has historically embodied a polyvalent synthesis of populism, nationalism, and social justice. How is the Peronist opposition reconstructing its ideological and discursive identity in the face of Milei’s anti-Peronist moral crusade and his attempt to redefine “the people” as entrepreneurial individuals rather than collective actors?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: A good question. First of all, one has to say that Peronism is in the process of reconstruction. It is deeply divided, and there is no clear national leadership. On the one hand, we have Cristina Fernández de Kirchner; on the other, other possible leaders, in particular Axel Kicillof, the governor of the province of Buenos Aires. And there might be other figures within Argentine Peronism who could move in different directions because Peronism is a very plastic, very flexible political creature. So, we don’t know exactly how it is going to evolve over the next couple of years. It’s clear that it has to change.

Historically, it has been the dominant force in Argentine politics, and it has now suffered a very humiliating defeat. The analysis of why this has happened is very complex. I would say that they will have to stick to the idea of social justice and reject many elements of the Milei platform. They don’t have alternatives in that respect. Otherwise, they will lose their reason for being, because if they are going to defend entrepreneurship and individual economic freedom, for that purpose people already have Macri, Milei, PRO, Libertad Avanza, and others. That is not possible.

They also have to appeal to trade unionists, organized labor, and new social sectors that are now more Peronist than in the past—or to sectors that are close to some elements of the Peronist platform, such as people who work at universities. So, they cannot change dramatically, but they must find a new balance, for sure. And that doesn’t mean that, when the situation is ripe, they won’t win. They could easily win future elections.

It depends on Milei’s economic performance, but it’s also true that they must find an economic platform to make national policy—and that is very difficult. Alberto Fernández totally failed. He was divided between different currents and tendencies and didn’t find an economic balance. It is possible that someone more pragmatic—let’s think, for instance, of Sergio Massa—someone very pragmatic, who might even be close to the center-right in some respects, could eventually win. This person could maintain some elements of Peronism but move in a more orthodox direction. That is possible.

But one must also keep in mind that Argentine economics and politics are highly volatile. We have many experiences of very drastic changes, and Peronism has the structure and the network to build something new on that basis.

Authoritarianism Is Weak in Argentina’s Political DNA

In comparative perspective, do you discern substantive parallels between Milei’s “chainsaw politics” and other neoliberal-populist experiments in Latin America—such as Fujimori’s authoritarian neoliberalism or Bolsonaro’s reactionary anti-globalism? How do Argentina’s institutional legacies and socio-political cleavages inflect these trajectories?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: There are some shared elements, for instance with Bolsonaro, in terms of rhetoric and economic direction. They clearly share certain themes—also with Fujimori, in his attempts to reshape the Peruvian economic framework and redefine the role of the state. On the other hand, there are important differences.

One of them is that authoritarianism in Argentina—and this is just an intuition, as there is not enough empirical evidence to confirm it definitively—is very weak. I would say so. Even the authoritarian project itself must be very weak. In fact, despite all the excesses, problems, and exaggerations, Milei hasn’t taken significant steps toward building authoritarian institutions.

That may have to do with Argentine popular culture, which is deeply democratic. It may also stem from the intensity of the trauma of the last authoritarian experience—the violence, the suffering, and the learning processes that led Argentine society to bid farewell to authoritarianism in 1983. It could also be related to the characteristics of Argentine civil and political society.

So, I don’t think an authoritarian transformation is taking place right now, and I don’t think it’s very likely. Bolsonaro attempted to do this; he failed. He failed, but at least he tried. I don’t imagine Milei doing the same. I’m not sure if he’s powerful enough, structurally speaking, within the broader right. The argument could be made that some social and economic sectors are using him, but they are not very strongly connected to him. The Argentine right is plural—there are other actors operating there—so I don’t see this happening.

A Cyclical Insurgency, Not a Structural Rupture

Inauguration ceremony of President Javier Milei at the National Congress in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on December 10, 2023. Photo: Fabian Alberto De Ciria.

Based on your long-standing research on party system dynamics and ideological structuring in Latin America, does Milei’s ascent represent a critical juncture in Argentina’s cleavage structure—a durable reconfiguration of the left–right and populist–technocratic axes—or rather a cyclical populist insurgency within an enduring Peronist framework?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: I would go for the second interpretation. It’s a modification, an intensification—there are significant changes—but the underlying structure remains the same. In that respect, my impression is that Macri’s victory was more important. Until Macri, you had the Peronists and the Radicals—Alfonsín, a Radical; then the Peronists; then Menem; then De la Rúa, who was a Radical, although he led a broad and plural coalition—and then again, the Peronists. With Macri, you had the emergence of a center-right coalition. It was not Radicalism; it was a new actor, one that was very strongly pro-business, pro-market, and so on.

So, Macri brought about a more important and enduring change, and Milei has intensified this in a way—with a new rhetoric, a new style, representing something different. But the structure of pro-market, pro–export-oriented versus protectionist, social-expenditure-driven, inflationary policies represented by Peronism remains in place. I don’t think that has changed.

Populist Style Loses Credibility Once in Office

How might we interpret the performative and aesthetic dimensions of Milei’s leadership, such as his rock-star persona, symbolic aggression, and social media theatrics, as mechanisms of discursive populist construction, mobilizing affective resonance in a post-institutional political environment?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: They are mechanisms—populist elements, populist styles—and shifts in that direction. I have no doubt about it. These elements are more powerful and usually more effective for politicians who are outside of power. They made much more sense and were more impactful in electoral terms when Milei was an outsider contending for the presidency.

Right now, I doubt that they contribute much to his success. The credibility of these elements tends to erode once a president has been in office for three or four years. So, I don’t think this will add much in the next presidential elections. He represents a different style, but it is not as credible. Now the economic alternatives are clear, and that’s what led to Milei’s triumph—not so much that he gave a concert saying, “I’m the Lion,” and so on. That’s my impression.

And who knows—perhaps in two years we will have a Peronist with a very disruptive style. It’s possible. By the way, in Argentine politics, Peronists are often disruptive in style, while the right and the Radicals tend to be more established figures. Milei has changed that, but Menem was also a disruptor—someone who represented something new in terms of style. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was as well, in the way she spoke and mobilized. Eva Perón, too, in the past. Peronism has a long tradition in that respect, and it is interesting that Milei has taken it and transformed it in a different way, of course.

Peronism Will Likely Re-Emerge as Argentina’s Next Political Force

Murals of Eva Perón and Juan Domingo Perón in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on October 30, 2016. Photo: Dreamstime.

And the final question is: looking forward, do you foresee a durable transformation of Argentina’s political field toward a libertarian-populist realignment, or will economic contradictions, institutional inertia, and popular backlash catalyze the re-emergence of a renewed progressive or Peronist counter-populism capable of reclaiming “the people” from the right?

Professor Ivan Llamazares: A very ambitious question. We cannot predict the future, for sure. Many things can happen. We could also imagine that Milei is successful—it’s a possibility—that the macroeconomy begins to work in a Chilean way in the future. That’s a possibility. We don’t know.

But if I had to make a bet, I would say that this libertarian coalition will also face strong economic problems. I’m saying that not on the basis of any future anticipation, but on the basis of previous experiences. This might be wrong, but recent experiences since the 1970s suggest that it is very difficult for such complex economic and social systems to function smoothly. That’s why Argentine economists say it is very difficult to find a virtuous balance—a virtuous cycle—in Argentine economics, and that sooner or later governments face imbalances and bottlenecks that lead to reconfigurations.

So, I would expect—though I’m not sure if in two years or in four years—a crucial change, an oscillation. And I would assume that Peronism will play a key role in that change, that it will be able to lead a different coalition, and that coalition will have to represent something quite distinct from Milei’s policies. Will they, in the end, pursue the same policies as Cristina Fernández de Kirchner or Néstor Kirchner? Probably not. They would probably have to find a different policy. But I would expect a change in the next two to four years in Argentina’s economic policy.

Professor Sean Wilentz is one of America’s most prominent historians and the George Henry Davis 1886 Professor of American History at Princeton University.

Professor Wilentz: We’re No Longer Living in a Truly Democratic Regime & the Rule of Law in the US

In an in-depth and sobering interview with the ECPS, Princeton historian Professor Sean Wilentz warns that the United States has moved “beyond a constitutional crisis” into a state of “constitutional failure.” He argues that the Supreme Court’s presidential immunity ruling has “turned the presidency into a potential hotbed of criminality,” effectively dismantling the rule of law. “We’re no longer living in a truly democratic regime,” he cautions. Linking America’s democratic decline to a “highly coordinated global problem emanating from Moscow,” Professor Wilentz calls for a “democracy international” to counter what he terms a “tyranny international.” Despite his grim assessment, he expresses cautious faith that “most Americans will vindicate America itself” before it is too late.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a sobering and wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Sean Wilentz, one of America’s most prominent historians and the George Henry Davis 1886 Professor of American History at Princeton University, delivers a stark assessment of the United States’ political trajectory under Donald Trump’s renewed presidency. “We’re no longer living in a truly democratic regime,” he warns, adding that “we’re no longer living under the rule of law, that’s for sure.”

Tracing the roots of this democratic unraveling, Professor Wilentz argues that the United States has moved beyond a constitutional crisis into what he calls “constitutional failure.” In his words, “The Constitution has failed to withstand the attacks upon it that are undermining certain basic American values and basic American rights.” At the center of this failure, he identifies the Supreme Court’s presidential immunity ruling—an “extraordinary” and “completely invented”doctrine that grants the president near-total impunity for acts committed in office. The decision, he contends, “fundamentally changed the character of the federal government,” turning the presidency “into a potential hotbed of criminality.”

For Professor Wilentz, this crisis is not merely legal or institutional but global in scope. He situates America’s democratic backsliding within a “highly coordinated global problem” emanating from Moscow. “You lift the lid and you see Putin’s influence everywhere—whether it’s Marine Le Pen or others, there he is. And certainly in the case of Trump… there are strong intimations that this is what’s happening.” He describes this network as a “tyranny international”—a transnational front of illiberal collaboration linking figures like Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orbán, and Donald Trump. To counter it, Professor Wilentz calls for a “democracy international” built on solidarity among democratic societies: “We can no longer afford to be divided… We have to think of this as something like an NGO, perhaps—a movement, an expression of something we’ve never needed before, but now, we truly do.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Wilentz situates Trumpism within a long American tradition of minority rule and reactionary politics, connecting today’s populist-authoritarian coalition to the legacies of Reconstruction’s overthrow and the racialized backlash against the Voting Rights Act. Yet, he also stresses the unprecedented nature of the current moment: “What we’re seeing today is unparalleled in American history… the authoritarians, the reactionaries, have actually taken power and are holding it.”

Still, despite his grim diagnosis, Professor Wilentz insists on retaining a measure of faith in the endurance of democratic habits. “It’s an enormous test,” he concedes, “but I still believe most Americans will vindicate America itself.”

This interview stands as one of the most forceful scholarly warnings yet about the erosion of democracy in the United States—and the urgent need for a coordinated, global democratic response.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Sean Wilentz, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

What We’re Seeing Today Is Unparalleled in American History

Model of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment (First Black Regiment) Civil War Monument by Augustus Saint-Gaudens, dedicated in 1847. National Gallery, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, DC. Photo: William Perry.

Professor Sean Wilentz, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let’s start right away with the first question: As a historian of American democracy who has closely tracked the Trump presidency, how do you assess the current political moment in the United States—particularly the resurgence of Trumpism in 2025—within a broader global pattern of populist and authoritarian movements? What parallels or divergences do you observe between the American case and the democratic backsliding seen elsewhere?

Professor Sean Wilentz: That’s a very good question. First of all, as an American historian, as well as an American, what we’re seeing today is unparalleled in American history. There’s been nothing like it. The closest comparison you could make is the Confederate secession over slavery that led to the Civil War—which is not, of course, a happy example or a happy parallel. But it’s also different, because here you don’t see a secession; you see the authoritarians, the reactionaries, actually taking power and holding it. They don’t have to secede to get it.

And yes, it’s frightening. There are certain direct connections to what’s going on in Europe. Some of the people who have been most instrumental in pushing the authoritarian aspect of this have had very close connections with Viktor Orbán in Hungary—actually spending time in Budapest learning how to transform a country into a kind of authoritarian regime, much like what we’re seeing Trump try to do here, and in many ways succeeding.

What strikes me most is how rapidly this has all occurred. It’s true that Trump had his first administration, which was then interrupted by the Biden interregnum. Nevertheless, since January (2025), it’s been stunning how quickly he has gone about dismantling basic American institutions and the rule of law—with the aid of the Supreme Court of the United States as well.

I can’t think of anything comparable, apart from the generalized populist wave you mentioned—a kind of revolutionary current running through the West. It’s present in every country to some degree. Nevertheless, the United States is different, and it’s happening here with remarkable speed. Because of America’s unique place in the world, that makes it all the more frightening for everyone else.

Trump Has Brought Violence to the Very Center of His Political Machinery

Donald Trump at rally in support of Kansas Secretary of State Kris Kobach who is the Republican candidate for governor in Topeka Kansas, USA on October 6, 2018. Photo: Mark Reinstein

In your recent comments, you warned that Trump and his circle act as though “provoking and inflicting violence” are integral to their politics. How do you interpret this in light of your historical understanding of political violence as a state and populist strategy in the US?

Professor Sean Wilentz: I mean violence has always been at the forefront of American life and American politics. The best example I can think of is what happened in the 19th century, when the Union had won the Civil War and slavery was abolished. There were efforts to adjust the political system—particularly in the South—to the reality of freedom for the formerly enslaved. A period called Reconstruction was entered into, which was a kind of revolution in American democracy, expanding its possibilities to include people who had been enslaved.

That effort was undone. It was overthrown, and it was overthrown violently by groups—you may know some of the names. The Ku Klux Klan is the most famous of them—but they used violence strategically, in concert with political leaders. It wasn’t just the hoi polloi out there burning crosses and attacking people. It was very much coordinated with political elites. Violence was at the forefront of it, and without it, the effort to destroy Reconstruction would not have succeeded.

Now, we’re not seeing the same kind of systematic violence, but there’s a great deal of it—and it’s mostly being deployed by the government itself. It’s the unleashing of agencies like ICE—the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency—which has been rounding up people on the streets. It’s the presence of national troops, the National Guard, in American cities, which in itself is an act of violence just to have them there. It creates the atmosphere, the feel, of martial law—and that is what the administration is trying to encourage or build up.

So yes, violence is very much present. The climate of opinion is completely permeated by this atmosphere of violence and potential violence, almost all of it coming from the government itself. There was the assassination of Charlie Kirk, which was a very strange episode—because who knows exactly who did it. It doesn’t seem to have been particularly politically motivated, but that, of course, becomes a means for the administration to turn him into a martyr right away—a martyr for their own cause—and to use that as a pretext to further suppress, or threaten to suppress, the opposition in all kinds of ways. So that’s violence of a different kind, but it nevertheless lies at the heart of what’s going on right now. They’ve brought it to the very center of their political machinery.

The Court’s Immunity Ruling Paved the Way for Authoritarian Rule

Your essay “The ‘Dred Scott’ of Our Time” draws parallels between the current Supreme Court’s presidential immunity decision and the 1857 Dred Scott case. Could you expand on how this analogy helps us understand the Court’s transformation of constitutional meaning in the Trump era?

Professor Sean Wilentz: Just to fill in, the Dred Scott decision of 1857 was a very important one in American history—perhaps the most important until now, or at least the most notorious. The then–Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Roger Taney, wrote a decision in which he basically said that the government could do nothing to prevent the spread of slavery into the territories of the United States, that slaves were property according to the Constitution, and then went on to declare that Black people had no rights which white people were bound to respect.

It was a notorious decision because it was—ironically—based on the method we now associate with so-called originalism: going back to the framers of the Constitution, interpreting what they said and meant, and then coming up with your own, essentially distorted, idea of their intentions. That was certainly the case with Roger Taney, and it played a fundamental role in hastening the coming of the American Civil War.

So that’s why it was so notorious. Now, what we see in the current Court is somewhat different. It’s interesting—they claim to be originalists, much as Roger Taney was an originalist, which is a kind of bogus judicial theory. But what they have done is to give the president absolute immunity from criminal action for anything he does in office, so long as he can describe it as an official act.

That, in many ways, is a more dangerous decision than Dred Scott, because it grants the president extraordinary power to do all the kinds of things that Trump is doing now. The decision was just as threadbare, just as weak, just as poorly reasoned as Taney’s ruling. But unlike Taney’s decision, it simply invented things—there is no constitutional basis whatsoever for that immunity ruling.

They simply asserted the need for presidential authority and did so in such a sweeping way that it has paved the way for what we’re seeing now. I liken the two because both were dramatic decisions that changed the character of the political situation—decisions that, in the first case, led to Civil War, and in the second, I hope will not, but that have nonetheless had a comparably destabilizing effect.

Both are, to put it plainly, intellectually barren and corrupt—beneath contempt, really—for anyone who studies these matters seriously as a question of law. And the fact that the Supreme Court has gotten away with this is another example of what we’re up against, because it’s not simply coming from the White House—it’s also coming from the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, from a supine Congress and a complicit Supreme Court.

What We’re Seeing Is Not a Crisis but a Constitutional Collapse

The US Supreme Court building at dusk, Washington, DC. Photo: Gary Blakeley.

You have described the immunity rulings and the Supreme Court’s handling of the Fourteenth Amendment as “a historic abdication,” arguing in “The Constitution Turned Upside Down” and “A Historic Abdication” that the Court has effectively inverted the amendment’s logic. Do you believe this moment represents a constitutional breaking point—or a severe but reversible deviation—and what does this inversion reveal about the evolving relationship between federalism, judicial power, and democratic accountability?

Professor Sean Wilentz: I’m a historian and I don’t want to predict, but there’s no question that this is a fundamental break with what constitutional precedent has been. And it’s kind of draped around a particular theory, which is not originalism, which was there before, but this idea of the unitary executive. The unitary executive is another kind of right-wing, fake philosophical or judicial principle, which says that basically the president can do whatever he wants in administering the executive branch, including interfering with agencies that have been established by Congress, not by the executive, to administer the laws that Congress has passed and the president has signed.

This is, again, another break from what has been present in the United States for centuries. This is something completely novel, and it’s something extremely destructive. So, to that extent that originalism helped bring us some of the more cockeyed decisions that we’ve seen over the last 20 years even—this theory now has thrown the Constitution up for grabs as to what the Constitution actually means. It no longer has the stability that it had before. Things are very unstable with this Court.

There was another point that I wanted to make regarding the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fourteenth Amendment is a crucial document in American history. It was one of the Reconstruction Amendments—I was earlier talking about the Reconstruction period in American history—that involved the passage of three basic amendments: the abolition of slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment, the guarantee of equal protection under the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, and then the guarantee of suffrage rights in the Fifteenth Amendment.

The Fourteenth Amendment came up for discussion when the state of Colorado wanted to keep Trump off the ticket in 2024 because he had engaged in insurrection on January 6th. In the aftermath of the Civil War, in the Fourteenth Amendment, there’s a section that said quite explicitly that anyone who had engaged in an insurrection against the government of the United States should be ineligible for any future office, both state and federal.

It couldn’t have been plainer, couldn’t have been clearer. And the fact that Trump had engaged in the insurrection meant that states control election laws—this gets back to the federalism issue. The states control who gets to be on the ballot in their particular state and who doesn’t. It’s not a national decision. Colorado perfectly had the right to do so. The Colorado courts, the Supreme Court, decided that Trump had engaged in insurrection and therefore he was in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Supreme Court Has Dismantled the Foundation of American Citizenship

What the Supreme Court did was basically gut the Fourteenth Amendment. It came up with this completely—I won’t go into details; it’ll bore your listeners—but a bogus explanation for why the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be adhered to, and basically let Trump stay on the ballot. It then went even further in basically saying that in order to have anything like this happen, Congress would have to pass a law to enact the amendment into effect. Because Congress had not done so, therefore the amendment was not in effect.

This is an extremely dangerous way of looking at these important amendments, because by that logic, slavery has never actually been abolished in the United States, because Congress never passed a law to enact the Thirteenth Amendment. Now, that’s an extreme way of looking at it, but we’re in extreme times. Let me make that clear to everyone. I don’t think that slavery is about to be brought back to the United States, but nevertheless, the logic of their decision was one where that would have been possible.

So the Constitution—and especially those amendments, the Fourteenth Amendment in particular, which was kind of the linchpin of what one historian has called the “Second Founding”, the post-slavery founding—involved not just the rights of the freed former slaves being protected and expanded, but, more generally, rights being extended to the American people as a whole, because the revolution that got rid of slavery was revolutionizing the entire idea of American citizenship.

Which brings me to my final point, which is that another feature of the Fourteenth Amendment was what we call birthright citizenship, which stated that anyone who was born in the United States is automatically a citizen of the United States. This was a way to protect the rights of the former slaves, to be sure, but it also—and this was explicitly stated by the people who framed this amendment at the time—meant that anyone from around the world, in this asylum of freedom that the United States is supposed to be, who is born here, is actually a citizen here.

The Supreme Court is on the brink of getting rid of that—of nullifying it, or severely modifying it—to say that if you’re here illegally, or you don’t have the proper papers, therefore you’re not a citizen. This is a complete gutting of what the Fourteenth Amendment was all about.

So, in these ways, yes, it’s a constitutional crisis—but it’s beyond a constitutional crisis. We’re now in a case of constitutional failure. The Constitution has failed to withstand the attacks upon it that are undermining certain basic American values and basic American rights.

The Supreme Court Has Turned the Presidency into a Hotbed of Criminality

White House captured from the south side. Photo: Dreamstime.

In your writings on “The Immunity Con,” you suggest that legal arguments for presidential immunity constitute a deliberate distortion of constitutional tradition. How do you assess the intellectual and political origins of this distortion?

Professor Sean Wilentz: Ideological zealotry and a kind of—I don’t want to say corruption in the sense of people being bought off or something—but a kind of intellectual corruption, aimed at creating a different kind of political order. These are the hard-line conservatives on the Court—Justices Thomas and Alito, and to a certain extent, Justice Gorsuch. They hold a very radical view of what the United States ought to look like—a radical, reactionary view—and they are imposing it. They have enough support from the rest of the Court—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Barrett and Kavanaugh—to prevail. This is something they believe reflects the framers’ intent, but it is, in fact, a fundamental departure from it.

The immunity decision, as I said, is not based on any constitutional principle whatsoever. It’s completely made up—out of thin air—and it has fundamentally changed the character of the federal government. If you have a three-branch government that’s supposed to be based on checks and balances—in other words, the president is not all-powerful; his powers can be checked by Congress and by the Supreme Court, and vice versa—it’s a system very delicately designed to prevent the kind of tyranny and demagoguery we’re seeing now, to ensure that no one can be all-powerful.

They have found a way because they have a supine Congress—a Congress that will never defy the maximum leader, Trump—and a Supreme Court that’s going along with it for its own reasons. So we end up with something like the immunity decision, which gives the president, as I said, virtually complete power—to the extent that, as came up in opening arguments in the case, if the president deemed it an official action to assassinate one of his political rivals, he could not be prosecuted for that crime. That’s extraordinary by any stretch of the imagination in a Western democracy—that you can literally murder your political opponents because you consider it an official act. That’s giving away the ballgame. We’re no longer living in a truly democratic regime. We’re no longer living under the rule of law, that’s for sure. And that’s the power the immunity decision gave to the president.

So, quite apart from even the checks and balances, just in terms of the basic ideas of the rule of law, it’s turned the presidency into a potential hotbed of criminality. And depending on who is in the White House, we’re seeing right now how criminality, if given a chance, can metastasize like a cancer.

The Cultural Roots of Trumpism Run Deep

Do you see Trump’s authoritarian populism as primarily a legal-constitutional threat, or as a deeper sociopolitical phenomenon anchored in culture, identity, and media ecosystems?

Professor Sean Wilentz: It’s both. But the cultural underpinnings of this have been around for a very long time. This is part of the broad sweep of American history—forever, really, but certainly since the 1960s. What some of us think of as the advances of the 1960s was a sort of second Reconstruction, if you will, which sought to undo what had gone wrong the first time around and give Blacks in particular—but not just African Americans—equal rights. This is a reaction against that. And it has to do most fundamentally with the issue of voting—trying to repeal the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which was a great breakthrough, really an extension of the 15th Amendment, to guarantee Black rights. So the sweep was always there. Those cultural and political aspects have been present for a long time. What’s happened now, though, is that what the Trump people—and the people behind Trump—have done is tap into those resentments, seize power with them, and turn it into a constitutional issue.

Now they’re trying to undermine the Constitution. Before, you had plenty of politicians in the Republican Party in particular—the Democrats had other problems—but the Republican Party especially was tapping into these resentments, which showed up in all kinds of ways: in religious politics, in deregulation politics, in attempts to combine what was a traditional conservative agenda—basically pro-business, low taxes, deregulation, breaking down the New Deal, which was our sort of weak version of social democracy—trying to get rid of that. But now it’s become much more radicalized.

Under Trump, that tapping in is the same; it’s just been heightened because Trump is a demagogue unlike anything we’ve ever had before. We had George Wallace from Alabama, a segregationist racist who ran for president and tapped into similar sentiments, but he didn’t succeed. We’ve had difficult presidents, like Richard Nixon, for example, but even Nixon, for all his excesses, still understood the constitutional order in a very different way than Trump does. Trump has no use for the constitutional order at all. What we’ve seen—just to answer your question again—is that these cultural and social forces essential to Trumpism, though present all along, have now been turned into a true constitutional crisis unlike anything we’ve ever seen.

Minority Rule Is Now the GOP’s Central Strategy

In “The Tyranny of the Minority, from Calhoun to Trump,” you trace a lineage of minority rule in American history. How does Trumpism fit within this long tradition of counter-majoritarian politics, from John C. Calhoun’s antebellum theory to the modern GOP?

Professor Sean Wilentz: The modern GOP has been—this is part of what I was saying earlier about the reaction against the Second Reconstruction. The modern Republican Party managed, under Ronald Reagan, to do an extraordinary thing: to create a national majority that swept to power twice in crushing elections in 1980 and 1984. They believed that they had created a political coalition that would last forever and could never be undone. But it did get undone, and as a result, the Republicans launched a process whereby they realized they were not going to be the majority, so they were going to have to do what they could to install minority rule. In other words, a minority was going to have to rule the country—and how do you go about doing that? In all sorts of ways, even before the current Trump regime, the Republicans had been doing their best to make sure that the minority would rule.

They did so in all kinds of ways, but the most fundamental one was to suppress the vote—by getting rid of the provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and using whatever powers were available to them to redistrict. In the United States, each state gets to draw its own districts—its congressional as well as state legislative districts. And these days, with computers, you can draw those lines very precisely, so that even though a majority might, in fact, be against you, you can draw the lines of the congressional districts and so forth to keep the overall minority in power, having an overwhelming majority of congressional representation. It’s less the case with the presidency, because the presidency is elected in a very different way, but there are ways to suppress the vote there as well. For example, requiring voters to provide all sorts of documentation that they are citizens—something that was never necessary before. Ordinarily, in the United States, you sign up to register to vote, and you get to vote. Now, you’re expected to show all kinds of documents that most students, younger people, minorities, and less well-off people—many of whom are Hispanic and Black—don’t have. They don’t have passports, for example. They don’t have the kinds of documents that are now required in order to vote. These laws have been brought in to make it much more difficult for people to vote, so that, quite apart from redistricting, it’s suppressing democracy. It’s anti-democratic.

These are things that the Republicans have been doing for some time. It’s just that now, under Trump, they’ve been magnified and made even more obvious. In the old days, conservatives running for office would never say they were trying to suppress the vote. Trump is absolutely unashamed about it. He says, “We don’t like Democrats. We think Democrats are communists. We think Democrats are not loyal citizens, and we are against them.” And so they’re not going to make any bones about what they’re doing.

The Normalization of Martial Law Threatens the 2026 Elections

National Guard troops on standby during a downtown protest against expanded ICE operations and in support of immigrant rights in Los Angeles, US on June 8, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

What’s truly alarming in the wake of what’s happened recently—we have an election coming up in 2026, what we call our midterm elections: not a presidential election, but the entire House of Representatives and one-third of the Senate, the upper house, are up for re-election. In anticipation of that, there’s been all kinds of wild gerrymandering going on—redrawing of districts to boost the Republican vote. But once you start sending the National Guard into American cities under completely phony pretexts—that crime has gotten out of hand, or that there’s some great mob action going on—it’s all lies. But once you’ve sent troops into American cities, you’re normalizing, in effect, martial law—or the precursor to martial law. 

When you think about the fact that an election is coming down the pike in just about a year’s time, you worry about whether this normalization of a military presence in cities is going to be used to try to suppress the vote. Either through the presence of the National Guard in cities—and these are Democratic cities, with large Black populations and liberal white populations—or through the presence of federal or National Guard troops with guns and all of that, as well as ICE, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, which is rounding up and pulling Hispanic people off the streets and terrorizing them. And you can imagine what they could do in terms of intimidating people from going to the polls. So this goes beyond the more traditional voter suppression that we’ve been used to for a long time and have tried our best to fight. 

This now becomes a military or violent situation—suppressing the vote in a way that’s not unlike what I was talking about earlier with Reconstruction and the use of violence then. The Ku Klux Klan, those hooded vigilantes, were most effective in trying to suppress the vote. They didn’t want newly freed Blacks to vote, and so they would intimidate them in all kinds of ways. That’s voter suppression in the late 1860s and early 1870s. Now we’re seeing it in a different form in 2025. And if Trump goes through with what I fear he’ll go through with, then we will not have an honest election in 2026. One thing about Trump is—almost psychological—you can always assume that whatever he is doing, he’s going to accuse you of doing. So if he’s accusing you of rigging elections, you can be sure that he’s trying to rig an election. If he’s accusing you of voter suppression, you can be sure that he’s intending voter suppression. This is not just a psychological tic; this is, in fact, how he operates in many ways. He does something and then accuses you of having done it. Which makes me all the more nervous. So, these are not happy times. These are gloomy times, for the most part. I don’t want to sound as if we’re hopeless—not at all. Trump is a very unpopular president.

The Republican Party is not very popular. We’re in the middle of a government shutdown now, basically over healthcare, where the Republicans won’t budge on making major cuts to American healthcare provisions. And most Americans are blaming the administration and the Republicans in Congress for that shutdown, which is affecting people—and will affect them more and more. Those are public opinion polls; that’s not power, but it’s an indication of just how unpopular he is.

If Goebbels Had Fox News, He’d Have Been the Happiest Man Alive

Fox News Channel signboard at the News Corporation headquarters in Manhattan, New York City, July 10, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.

Now, we all know there have been plenty of unpopular regimes that have been very powerful and have done world-historic damage to Europe in particular—but not just to Europe. And you don’t have to have the majority behind you in order to rule. That is quite true. The United States, however, unlike many of the democracies in Europe—if you go back to the 1930s, say, the Weimar Republic was a very new thing, and democracy was not very well rooted—we do have a 250-year history behind us, and these are institutions that he has shown to be much more vulnerable than people thought they were. But there are still—I don’t want to cite de Tocqueville all the time—but we have “habits of the heart,” as he put it. There are ways in which Americans have certain assumptions about what democracy is and ought to be that I still don’t think have been completely wiped out.

It is true, I’m somewhat amazed, for example, to watch Trump tear down part of the White House—a great symbol to Americans of democracy—and do so arrogantly, installing a kind of dictator chic with this gigantic new ballroom he’s building and all the rest of it. It’s an assault on the American Republic, on the aesthetic of the American Republic, on a building we think of as belonging to the people, not to him. To be doing that in symbolic ways is a wrenching experience. However, there’s no crowd outside, no demonstrations. We have these “No Kings” demonstrations every once in a while, but that’s about it. There’s an eerie kind of acceptance of what’s going on, which is also historically reminiscent of things that have happened elsewhere—where either people just don’t believe what they’re watching, what’s before their very eyes, or they don’t see it. 

They also lack historical understanding. In Europe, you have a much clearer sense of history than we do. Americans are always living in the present, and social media doesn’t help in that respect. So we don’t have an instinctual reaction to all of this. But still, nevertheless, I think that when push comes to shove, I hope and expect that the American people will vindicate America itself. And that things have not become so distorted—either by propaganda media, Goebbels-like media. If Goebbels had Fox News, he would have been the happiest man in the world. There’s nothing better than that—television, social media. Can you imagine if he had more than radio, which the Nazis used so effectively in the 1930s? Imagine what they’d have now.

This is all a gigantic obstacle. Nevertheless, I still have the feeling that most Americans are not going to fall for this stuff when push finally comes to shove. How it’s going to be expressed politically is another issue, and that gets into the Democratic Party and other questions, but I’m still kind of hopeful.

We’re No Longer in Normal Politics—That Illusion Must Be Broken

You’ve written that the events of January 6, 2021, were not aberrations but logical outcomes of institutional structures favoring minority rule. How can historians help the public understand that such crises are systemic rather than episodic?

Professor Sean Wilentz: With January 6th, that was a break in many ways, because what you saw was systemic, but it was more the result of the Trump phenomenon—of Trump’s hold over this very violent and very angry segment of the population that has no respect whatsoever for constitutional norms. So I think of January 6th as having echoes in American history, but it was a defiance of everything we’ve thought of. I mean, what president has ever tried to reclaim power after losing an election? Some may have extended their terms or contested results through legal means every once in a while, but one of the aspects of the genius of American politics has always been that there is opposition, but it’s a loyal opposition—that you’re loyal to the Constitution. 

Even if you are disappointed in your own political efforts, you nevertheless respect the Constitution, and your loyalty remains there. You give way with the expectation that, down the line, you’ll be able to defeat your opponent and take power back. That’s not what’s going on here. The insurrection in 2021 was an indication of how different this was from anything we’ve seen before. So, for a historian, it’s more a question of marking the difference than looking for some sort of similarity or institutional basis for what’s going on here. There is no institution. The norms are broken at every step. The courts were actually completely against what Trump was trying to do, which was to steal an election. Again, it goes back to this: he accuses you of stealing an election because he’s stealing an election.

Yes, it’s different. But the aftermath of that is extraordinary. Now that he has power, now that he took that power, he has pardoned them all. And the court has upheld all of those pardons—an extraordinary use of pardon power, again a perversion of what the framers had in mind. So here’s really the point. I think that there are many Americans—I don’t know if it’s most Americans anymore—but many still think that we’re in normal politics, in normal times. That this is a Republican president who is perhaps a little unorthodox, a little extreme, perhaps, but nevertheless just a normal politician, a normal party. That is a great demobilizing illusion that has to be broken.

By pointing out what January 6th was all about, we can try to break that illusion—to show that, in fact, these people are basically, some of them at any rate—and they’ve actually announced as much—out to overthrow the United States government, period. And that’s what they’re doing, bit by bit, in fits and starts. They’re keeping the Constitution—or their own idea of it—although a Constitution with an immunity decision behind the president is no longer the Constitution we knew. It’s just not. People have to understand that. And to say it the way I just said it, even now, alarms a lot of people—even those who are already alarmed—but to hear that the stakes are that high makes people think I’m kind of nutty or extreme in my own view. I don’t believe I am, at least as far as intentions are concerned. 

I do think there are people in the Trump camp who want to overthrow the government. They won’t call it that. They may have Leninist or Bolshevik techniques, where the end justifies the means, but no one’s going to call themselves Vladimir Lenin—they’re going to call themselves George Washington. But they’re going to overthrow the government in the name of the government. That’s really the key to this kind of authoritarian move: you’re not doing it to destroy anything, but to vindicate what you claim the government actually means. Yet, in doing so, you completely abolish the government as it existed previously.

Trump’s Populism Is a Tool of Oligarchy, Not a Voice of ‘the People’

Anti-Trump protest during the Labor Day Parade in New York City on September 6, 2025. Demonstrators gathered on Fifth Avenue across from Trump Tower during the annual parade in Midtown Manhattan. Photo: Dreamstime.

As you note, Trump’s movement invokes populism yet depends on entrenched minority power. How do you reconcile this paradox—of populism serving oligarchic and exclusionary ends?

Professor Sean Wilentz: It’s exclusionary of certain people, to be sure. It’s classic in terms of authoritarian regimes: you have a despised other, as it were. In this case, it’s the immigrants, particularly Hispanic immigrants. So you focus a lot of popular rage on that group. Now, that group’s very large. But populism here is not about all of the people; it’s about some of the people—and some of the people having advantages over, or directing their anger and rage at, another part of the people. That’s what modern populism is about. It’s not very different from what we might have talked about in the 19th century. 

But there’s also the alliance—this is classic—using populist methods to stir up discontent and anger, some of it quite understandable, even justified. People are not doing so well in many parts of the country. History has not been on their side economically in many parts of the country, and that breeds all kinds of resentments and anger, and that’s perfectly understandable. But the question is, in what direction do you take that? And it’s been exploited. In a more normal situation, it was exploited by certain corporate elites. You see them all the time—the Koch brothers, for example, that deregulation family. Conservative, right-wing businessmen with enormous resources use this populist rhetoric to enrich themselves greatly. That’s an old pattern—the elite use of populist rhetoric to give themselves more power than ever—and that’s what we’re seeing, that’s what we have seen.

The danger, though, is when you have a political manifestation that is not simply interested in increasing inequality, which is a very real problem, but in doing so in a way that will not only entrench an oligarchy—which is what we’re seeing—but also destroy American democracy full bore. And that’s what we’re seeing now. It’s the same kind of alliance. Look at all the people supporting Trump. Someone told me that Kamala Harris expressed surprise that the titans of American industry would throw in with Trump. I’m not surprised at all. 

If you look at the people helping to support, for example, the rebuilding of the White House—Amazon, and you go down the list—it’s just one large corporation after another. They now see in Trump the future for themselves. They may, behind the scenes, be saying, “Oh, this man’s a little bit too much, I’m not really for him.” Nevertheless, they’re going to go along with him because they think their interests are going to be better served. That’s what gets very, very dangerous—when that kind of populist movement of the corporate elite, the very rich, powerful private institutions, taps into what you think of as the demos, the people, in order to destroy democracy. That’s what we’re seeing. I’ve never seen that before.

We Need a ‘Democracy International’ to Counter the ‘Tyranny International’

And finally, Professor Wilentz, as a historian of American democracy, do you believe the American experiment still possesses its self-corrective capacities—or have structural inequities and partisan realignments permanently undermined them?

Professor Sean Wilentz: That’s a good question. I wish I knew the answer. I said before that I have faith, but we might call it a faith-based initiative in some ways. It’s not quite religious, but it’s certainly more spiritual than institutional. Still, it’s not just that. I think the institutions have shown themselves to be far more vulnerable than we ever expected or could have imagined—not just in terms of domestic affairs, but in foreign policy as well. The speed with which the U.S., for example, dismantled the Agency for International Development—the USAID—which did extraordinary work around the world, was shocking. It was destroyed in the twinkling of an eye. So we realize not only that they are more powerful, but that we are more vulnerable as democrats, with a small “d.”

As a historian, I must say this moment reveals vulnerabilities we’ve never seen before in American history. There have been moments—you have to go back, actually, to the 1790s, when the country was just getting started—when there was a question about whether militaristic or reactionary forces would end up controlling the government. But they were beaten back then. It’s interesting—one of the laws that Trump has invoked is among the last of the great repressive laws from 1798, a period Thomas Jefferson called the “Reign of Witches.” The fact that Trump has had to reach that far back is telling. So there have been precedents, but nothing on this scale.

It’s an enormous test. I hate to sound inconclusive—I wish I had a firmer sense of things—but as a historian, I can only say that what we’re facing is something we’ve never seen before. My great hope, actually, is not only with the American people but also with Europe. We’re going to have to find a way to establish a democracy international, it seems to me. The communists had their international—we need one of our own, a democratic international—built on much closer coordination between you in Brussels, in Paris, throughout Europe, and us here. Because this is an international, even global, problem. 

It’s a highly coordinated global problem, and much of it emanates from Moscow. You lift the lid and you see Putin’s influence everywhere—whether it’s Marine Le Pen or others, there he is. And certainly in the case of Trump, while one can’t know for sure, there are strong intimations that this is what’s happening. That’s a kind of tyranny international. We need to establish a democracy international to counter it. It’s something we all ought to be thinking about much more seriously, because there is strength in numbers. We have to coordinate our activities. We can no longer afford to be divided. We can no longer rely solely on our governments. We have to think of this as something like an NGO, perhaps—a movement, an expression of something we’ve never needed before, but now, we truly do.

Dr. Mariana Sendra is a  Postdoctoral Researcher in Social and Human Sciences at the University of Deusto.

Dr. Sendra: Milei May See His Victory as a Blank Check to Override Institutions

In a wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Dr. Mariana Sendra, Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Deusto, examines the endurance and contradictions of Javier Milei’s populist-neoliberal experiment in Argentina. She interprets Milei’s strong midterm showing as “an endorsement of his government—but not a blank check,” warning that he and his followers “might interpret this electoral support as a green light to override institutional constraints.” Dr. Sendra highlights the exhaustion of Peronism, the influence of US backing, and Milei’s alignment with transnational far-right networks. While his administration remains formally democratic, she cautions that Argentina’s “democratic coexistence” is under pressure from rising intolerance and exclusion, calling on observers to “remain vigilant.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In the wake of Argentina’s pivotal midterm elections—widely regarded as a referendum on President Javier Milei’s two years in office—Dr. Mariana Sendra, Postdoctoral Researcher in Social and Human Sciences at the University of Deusto, offers a penetrating analysis of Argentina’s evolving political landscape in her interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).

Dr. Sendra explains that Milei’s strong electoral performance, with La Libertad Avanza securing over 40 percent of the national vote, can be seen as “an endorsement of Milei’s government and of the future reforms that at least part of society considers necessary.” Yet, she cautions, “this is not, of course, a blank check for Milei.” According to her, many voters sought to avert economic instability following US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s suggestion that Washington’s financial support might be withdrawn if Milei performed poorly.

In assessing the opposition’s weakness, Dr. Sendra highlights the exhaustion of Peronism and its credibility crisis. After years of alternating rule and recurring scandals, “the movement does not have the legitimacy to point out Milei’s own mistakes,” she notes, arguing that “people simply do not see them as a credible alternative.”

The interview delves into Milei’s fusion of radical market liberalism and populist rhetoric, a dynamic Dr. Sendra explored in her co-authored study “Is Milei a Populist?” She calls this a conceptual “puzzle,” since neoliberalism “dismantles the idea of ‘the people’ as a collective subject,” whereas populism depends on it. Milei, she observes, reframes the shrinking of the state “not as a loss, but as a way to make room for individual initiative.”

Addressing Milei’s international alignments, Dr. Sendra underscores the significance of “the Trump factor” and US financial intervention, which she describes as “a form of foreign interference.” However, she distinguishes Milei from nativist far-right leaders, arguing that “his ideology is not nativist” but rooted in a nostalgic vision of Argentina’s 19th-century prosperity.

At the institutional level, Dr. Sendra warns that Milei’s growing concentration of power and confrontational leadership style could erode democratic safeguards. “Milei and his followers might interpret this electoral support as a green light—or a kind of blank check—to override institutional constraints,” she cautions. Still, she notes that Argentinian civil society and political elites retain “the institutional resources to push back if he crosses certain lines.”

Looking ahead, Dr. Sendra predicts that Milei’s model could endure if inflation continues to decline and middle-class sectors remain shielded from austerity. Yet she foresees long-term risks: “His policies will produce inequality and exclusion,” she concludes, “but we will see that in the long term.”

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Mariana Sendra, revised for clarity and flow.

Milei’s Victory Is an Endorsement—but Not a Blank Check

Ultra-right-wing Argentine politician Javier Milei during the PASO elections in Buenos Aires, Argentina on August 13, 2023. Photo: Facundo Florit.

Dr. Mariana Sendra, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In Sunday’s midterm elections, widely viewed as a de facto referendum on Javier Milei’s two years in power, La Libertad Avanza secured over 40% of the national vote — defying expectations amid deep economic hardship, rising unemployment, and corruption scandals involving top officials, including Milei’s sister. How do you interpret this surprisingly strong performance? Does it reflect an enduring popular mandate for Milei’s shock-therapy reforms, or a more complex realignment within Argentina’s populist political culture?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: I think these results could indeed be interpreted as an endorsement of Milei’s government and of the future reforms that at least part of society considers necessary. But this is not, of course, a blank check for Milei. I believe there is support for certain reforms that people feel are needed, but it was also partly a response to the US government’s support and an attempt by society to prevent economic chaos after election day. There was considerable fear generated both by the government itself and by public statements from US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, suggesting that if Milei failed to achieve a strong electoral performance, that support could be withdrawn.

As in every election in Argentina, when the incumbent fails to secure the necessary performance to maintain a solid majority in Congress, market indicators — such as interest rates and the dollar exchange rate — tend to rise, which can trigger economic turmoil. So, yes, I think society voted to prevent that scenario and to give Milei a mandate for the second half of his term, though certainly not a blank check.

Peronism No Longer Seen as a Credible Alternative to Milei’s Rule

Despite economic hardship and declining living standards, the Peronist opposition under Fuerza Patria failed to convert public discontent into electoral gains, securing barely a third of the national vote. How do you explain the opposition’s limited capacity to mobilize against Milei’s populist-neoliberal project? Does this signal an ideological exhaustion within traditional Peronism, or a broader crisis of progressive representation in Argentina?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: The poor results of Peronism — around 30% of the vote — can be explained by the fact that, even though they are now in opposition, there is a certain exhaustion among the people. Peronism governed for 12 years under the Kirchners’ administrations, then there was a short alternation with Macri in 2015, and they returned to power in 2019.

The memory of that last administration is still very fresh. It’s important to remember that they were the ones managing the pandemic, and that period left a very negative mark. There were serious mistakes. Even though they did well in some aspects of pandemic management, there were symbolic failures that deeply affected public perception — for example, the VIP vaccination scandal and the president himself breaking lockdown rules within the official residence.

Additionally, by the end of that government, Argentina was on the verge of hyperinflation. In this election, moreover, Peronism did not present new faces, new candidates, or new ideas.

We should also not forget that the movement is still burdened by corruption scandals. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was recently sentenced to house arrest because of such allegations. So, right now, Peronism as a party and as a movement lacks the credibility to point out Milei’s own mistakes and corruption scandals, because people simply do not see them as a credible alternative. So, yes, that would be the explanation for Peronism’s weakness in opposition.

Washington’s $40 Billion Bailout Gave Milei a Crucial Boost

Argentine peso banknotes in various denominations. Photo: Tetiana Chernykova.

To what extent did Donald Trump’s $40 billion bailout and open endorsement shape the electoral outcome? Do you see this as a case of foreign populist interference or a new model of transnational illiberal collaboration?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: The Trump factor and the bailout were definitely significant. It can certainly be seen as a form of foreign interference. It’s worth noting that this kind of US involvement in Argentina’s domestic politics has only one precedent in the country’s history — in 1945, during Perón’s re-election campaign. But never before had Washington shown such explicit support for a candidate.

By mid-October, the mood within the government was rather pessimistic because of the corruption scandals, the economic recession, and growing public discontent. But everything shifted — or at least partially shifted — after Milei’s visit to the White House, when Trump openly announced a $20 billion financial assistance package, which was, of course, conditional on Milei winning the election.

As I mentioned earlier, the message of “Milei or economic chaos” really resonated with parts of society. Washington’s support also had a tangible impact: it helped stabilize the currency and prevented the dollar from skyrocketing in the final days before the vote. So yes, it had a significant effect and was indeed perceived as a form of foreign interference in Argentina’s domestic politics.

Reconciling Neoliberalism and Populism Remains a Conceptual Puzzle

In your recent work on “Is Milei a Populist?”, you explore the hybridization between libertarian economics and populist discourse. How does Milei reconcile anti-statist neoliberalism with the populist logic of representing “the people” against “the elite”?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: This is a puzzle in my research, which I co-authored with Hugo Marco Marne, and one that we have not yet fully solved, because we need to conduct further research incorporating other cases like Milei. But of course, if we conceive populism as a unique set of ideas where the homogeneity of “the people” is a crucial element, this makes us wonder to what extent neoliberalism and populism can actually be compatible.

Neoliberalism, as we know, is committed to dismantling the idea of “the people,” understood as a form of collective subjectivity that interferes with the natural order created by the market. So, when Milei was a challenger, during his presidential campaign, he occasionally referred to the will of the majority and romanticized the idea of “good Argentinians.” For him, “good Argentinians” are those who are earnest, hardworking, and have been harmed by la casta — the political elites.

However, the key point is that Milei doesn’t try to speak to “the people” as a single or homogeneous group. Even when he romanticizes “good Argentinians,” he does not consistently apply this strategy. In the Argentinian context, addressing “the people” would mean engaging especially with the low-income sectors and explaining why public services are being cut and why they are not benefiting from his policies — which is very difficult.

So, how does he resolve this tension? He tries to frame the reduction of public services not as a loss, but as a way to make room for individual initiative — for people’s effort, their own income, and their personal tools and abilities. His argument is that the state has mismanaged scarcity, and therefore it should be reduced in order to return power and resources to individuals rather than to inefficient bureaucracies.

Each Country Is Now Pursuing Its Own Survival Strategy

Can Milei’s “chainsaw” policies—mass privatization, deregulation, and fiscal shock therapy—be understood as a continuation of the neoliberal wave in Latin America, or do they constitute a qualitatively new populist-neoliberal synthesis?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: Honestly, I wouldn’t say that these policies, even if they are fully implemented, can be understood as a new neoliberal wave in Latin America. In my view, the regional context today doesn’t work like that — it no longer operates in waves or cycles as it once did. For example, in the 1990s there was a clear regional turn toward neoliberalism, and in the 2000s we saw the so-called pink tide. Back then, there was a certain degree of coordination among governments across the region, but that is no longer the case.

Today, each country is more or less trying to survive on its own, pursuing its own domestic strategy. Political systems or governments swing to the left or to the right, but not in a coordinated pattern. Some countries seek to maintain alignment with the United States, while others deepen their trade and economic ties with China.

In Milei’s case, yes, there is a clear ideological alignment with the US and, of course, with the broader global far-right current. But I would be cautious about calling this a neoliberal wave. We’ll have to see what happens in places like Chile and Colombia, where the far right is also gaining ground. Still, I don’t see this as part of a regional trend — rather, it reflects the increasingly fragmented and uncoordinated nature of Latin American politics today.

Milei as a Reloaded Version of Menemism

What similarities and divergences do you see between Milei’s governance and earlier populist experiments in the country and region, such as Menem’s market populism or Bolsonaro’s hybrid of neoliberalism and moral authoritarianism?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: Of course, this combination of neoliberalism and populism is not new. In Latin America, we have several examples from the 1990s, such as Fujimori in Peru, Collor de Mello in Brazil, and Menem in Argentina — and of course, more contemporary examples like Bolsonaro in Brazil.

The thing with those populist leaders in the 1990s was that there was also a deep economic crisis at the end of the 1980s. These leaders managed to win elections by blaming the elite for the country’s dire situation and by claiming that the people were being robbed — though each framed that narrative differently.

However, the main divergence I see between Milei and Menem — because Milei is, in a sense, a reloaded version of Menemism — is that Menem, at the time, did not develop clear programmatic stances on how to confront the economic crisis. He never really said what he was going to do; in fact, he promised some highly redistributive policies and then completely reversed course once in office.

That, for me, as an observer of Argentinian politics, is very striking. This is the first time that a politician openly announces massive cuts and austerity measures during a campaign, wins the election, implements exactly what he promised, displays even a certain cruelty toward those suffering from these cuts — and still manages to retain popular support, at least among part of the electorate.

Of course, the electorate is quite heterogeneous, and we should carefully analyze the distribution of votes by sector, since not all groups are being equally affected by the cuts. Some sectors are actually benefiting from Milei’s policies. But there are still many people willing to endorse him because they have been promised change. Unlike many leaders in the 1990s, this form of populism does not conceal the magnitude of the sacrifice that society will need to make to achieve those changes — and that, for me, is truly remarkable.

Milei’s Neoliberalism Sets Him Apart from Protectionist Peers

The American flag and the Argentinian flag are both made from textures. Photo: Dreamstime.

The ideological and financial linkages between Milei, Trump, Elon Musk, and European far-right actors like Giorgia Meloni or Nigel Farage suggest a coordinated illiberal front. How should scholars conceptualize these transnational populist networks?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: What really connects all these leaders you’ve mentioned is their discursive irreverence — this deliberate rejection, at the rhetorical level, of what is considered, in their terms, politically correct. They employ highly extreme rhetoric when talking about minorities, for example, or when addressing the major challenges the world is facing today.

We are living globally through a time of enormous change — demographic, technological, productive, and environmental. What these leaders do is to offer citizens a sense of orientation in this changing and uncertain world, where it increasingly feels like future generations will have fewer opportunities compared to their parents, in terms of stability or prosperity. They position themselves against those they portray as decision-makers — those they identify as responsible for these transformations — although who is held responsible varies depending on each national context.

At the same time, Milei’s case is quite particular within the Argentinian economic context, which is extremely fragile, marked by economic crisis and chronic inflation. So, his situation is very specific. Ideologically speaking, in the economic realm, he is almost the opposite of what we see in Trump or Brexit. While those movements lean toward economic protectionism, Milei represents the opposite — he embodies an open economy and proposes an uncompromising neoliberalism.

‘Make Argentina Great Again’ Evokes a 19th-Century Nostalgia

Do you see the US bailout and Milei’s pro-Washington orientation as a reconfiguration of dependency—what some have called “illiberal neoliberalism”—in which populist regimes rely on global capital while claiming nationalist sovereignty? How do Milei’s symbolic gestures—such as echoing “Make Argentina Great Again”—fit into the global grammar of far-right populist performativity?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: This is actually a very good question, because Milei’s ideology is not nativist, unlike the radical right in Europe or the US. This means that he’s not trying to embody the idea of sovereignty or defend a national community against an external threat—whether that threat comes from immigration or from the influence of supranational institutions like the European Union over nation-states.

So, when Milei speaks of “Make Argentina Great Again,” I think he’s invoking a nostalgic vision of Argentina that we can trace back to the 19th century, when the country was in the early stages of nation-building. At that time, Argentina was seen as a land of opportunity, welcoming thousands of migrants seeking economic advancement. That was a long time ago, and Milei evokes that period—but not in the nativist way or with the nationalist vision of sovereignty that defines much of the radical right in Europe or the US.

We can identify this nostalgic tone, which is characteristic of right-wing populism, but it’s not the same—it’s not expressed in the same way.

Despite His Style, Milei Still Operates Within Democratic Boundaries

Inauguration ceremony of President Javier Milei at the National Congress in Buenos Aires, Argentina, on December 10, 2023. Photo: Fabian Alberto De Ciria.

Given the concentration of power around Milei and his sister Karina, how do you interpret the institutional dynamics of his presidency? Are we witnessing a shift from populist mobilization toward personalized authoritarianism?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: So far in his administration, Milei has shown some tendencies that push against the rule of law. For instance, there have been attempts to censor the media by prohibiting the publication of material related to the corruption scandal involving his sister, or through the excessive use of presidential vetoes after Parliament approved certain laws to assist people suffering from the financial and fiscal cuts.

That said, Milei is still operating within the boundaries of democratic rule. And now, with these results—having increased his representation from 37 seats to 80 or 82 in the Chamber of Deputies, and from about 8 seats in the Senate to 16 or 18—and with the additional seats that could come from other center-right parties, such as PRO, which holds 24 seats, he could potentially reach a quorum and build a majority in Parliament to advance key reforms.

In that sense, I would say the government is not necessarily moving toward personalized authoritarianism, because now he has the institutional numbers to pursue reforms through the legislative process. However, because of his eccentric and confrontational leadership style, there is reason for concern. Milei and his followers might interpret this electoral support as a green light—or a kind of blank check—to override institutional constraints. So yes, we should remain vigilant.

Argentina’s Institutions and Elites Still Have the Power to Push Back

The judiciary, media, and opposition have faced increasing pressure under Milei. What risks does this pose to Argentina’s democratic resilience compared with other Latin American cases, such as El Salvador under Bukele or Brazil under Bolsonaro?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: On this point, I would say Milei’s influence over the judiciary or the media is much smaller than many people think. It’s true that now, in his cabinet, there are people linked to economic interests, and he’s aligned with Trump, who in many ways represents corporate interests and global financial elites. But in Milei’s case, given his background, I see him more as an outsider who is being used as a vehicle for these interests rather than a political actor with the capacity to influence major power structures.

It’s true that he has recently adopted a very aggressive discourse toward the press whenever he’s criticized. But we can see that even in the past few days, as Argentina has begun facing several economic problems, such as unemployment and new corruption scandals around his party, the main media outlets in the country—the more hegemonic ones—that once treated him favorably have now started to openly criticize Milei.

So, I don’t think his attacks on the media or the opposition will go much further than rhetoric, in my opinion. And of course, this is connected to the fact that Argentinian society and traditional political elites are deeply empowered when it comes to rights and institutional resources to push back if Milei were to cross certain lines.

Economic Faith Turns Into Political Intolerance Among Milei’s Base

In your co-authored work on “Presidential Approval, Tolerant Attitudes and Economic Performance,” you examine how tolerance mediates citizens’ evaluation of executives. How might this framework help explain Milei’s endurance amid economic hardship?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: Indeed, what we are seeing with these results is that those who rate the president’s performance positively—who approve of his leadership and feel he’s doing a good job—continue to support him even when the economic indicators are not particularly strong in areas such as unemployment, consumption levels, or purchasing power. Inflation is coming down, that is true, but objectively speaking, the government’s overall economic performance is far from solid.

That said, this group of people continues to support him. But even beyond their support, they are also starting to show, even before the election, certain intolerant attitudes toward those who disagree with Milei or who do not approve of the government’s performance. This is very dangerous and is highly visible on social media, but also in the streets and daily interactions.

There is a growing tendency among his supporters to delegitimize or discredit anyone who thinks differently. For example, anyone who suggests that the state should take some responsibility in certain key areas is immediately labeled a communist or a collectivist, and their views are dismissed. Even more dangerous is the notion that such ideas should not belong in the country or should be eliminated. That kind of reaction reflects an increasingly intolerant attitude, and it endangers what we call Argentina’s democratic coexistence.

The Social Costs of Milei’s Model Will Become Visible Over Time

And finally, Dr. Sendra, looking ahead, do you foresee Milei’s Argentina as a durable model for the global far right—or as another short-lived experiment in authoritarian neoliberal populism destined for crisis and collapse?

Dr. Mariana Sendra: That’s a difficult question to answer. My view is that if, over the next two years—until 2027—the government manages to bring inflation under control to the point where it is no longer perceived as the major problem, and if the sectors currently benefiting from its policies, or at least those with stable employment who are not being severely affected, remain a majority compared to those who are losing out, it is quite possible that Milei could be re-elected for another term.

However, I also think that the consequences of his policies will become more visible in the long run. Perhaps over the next five years or so, we are likely to start seeing their structural weaknesses—particularly the social costs for segments of the population that are now being excluded from Milei’s model. That could eventually trigger social unrest, manifested in protests and mobilizations. And that, of course, will have an impact. I think Milei’s policies will produce inequality and exclusion, but we will see that in the long term.

Professor Gijs Schumacher is a Professor of Political Psychology in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam and founding co-director of the Hot Politics Lab.

Professor Schumacher: The Netherlands Is Moving into a Post-Populist Era 

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Gijs Schumacher of the University of Amsterdam argues that Dutch politics may be entering a “post-populist era.” As the Netherlands approaches yet another general election, Professor Schumacher highlights growing fragmentation across left, right, and radical-right blocs, noting that “many voters no longer perceive meaningful differences between centrist parties.” While populism’s anti-establishment appeal remains psychologically powerful, he observes that this sentiment is now spreading “more evenly across the political spectrum.” According to Professor Schumacher, the Netherlands’ long tradition of elite cooperation could allow a shift toward “pragmatic governance,” provided that “the mainstream left and right tone down their toxic rhetoric.” The post-populist phase, he suggests, reflects not decline but recalibration.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As the Netherlands heads toward its third general election in just five years, the country’s political landscape appears more fragmented and volatile than ever. To understand the deeper psychological and structural undercurrents behind this instability, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) spoke with Professor Gijs Schumacher, Professor of Political Psychology in the Department of Political Science at the University of Amsterdam and founding co-director of the Hot Politics Lab. In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Schumacher reflects on the fragmentation of Dutch politics, the endurance of populist discourse, and what he calls the emergence of a “post-populist era.”

According to Professor Schumacher, the defining feature of contemporary Dutch politics is fragmentation across three major blocs — the left, the right, and the radical right. Yet despite the proliferation of parties, he notes that “people don’t travel much between blocs … the only real possibility for governments is through the middle.” This narrowing of viable coalitional options, he argues, leaves voters disillusioned and searching for alternatives: “Many voters no longer perceive meaningful differences between these centrist parties … and they often end up supporting either other parties within the same bloc or more radical alternatives.”

Populism, Professor Schumacher emphasizes, remains central to understanding this dynamic — particularly its anti-establishment appeal. He observes that this instinct is deeply rooted in human psychology: “It’s a powerful psychological tendency to be skeptical of leadership — to doubt whether those in power are there for your good or their own fortune.” However, Professor Schumacher points out that the Dutch left has largely abandoned its own anti-establishment roots, creating a political vacuum that figures like Geert Wilders have exploited: “Historically, the left had a strong anti-establishment agenda … but in opposing the populist radical right, they’ve completely muted that stance.”

Despite this, Professor Schumacher does not foresee a permanent populist capture of Dutch democracy. Instead, he suggests the country may be entering what he calls a “post-populist era” — a phase in which anti-establishment politics no longer belongs exclusively to the radical right but becomes “more evenly distributed across the political spectrum.” In his words: “The Netherlands has a long history of deep affective polarization — even though we didn’t use that term at the time — but it was never a major problem because, at the elite level, there was greater cooperation. The mainstream left and right don’t need to fight each other; there’s little to gain from it. If their rhetoric were less toxic, there would be no real barrier to a return to pragmatic governance.”

For Professor Schumacher, this shift signals neither a triumph of populism nor its total eclipse but rather a recalibration — a search for equilibrium in a political system that remains both fragmented and remarkably resilient.

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Gijs Schumacher, revised for clarity and flow.

Non-Policy Issues Now Matter Much More

Geert Wilders (PVV) in House of Representatives during a debating at the Tweede Kamer on April 5, 2023 in Den Haag, Netherlands. Photo: Jeroen Meuwsen.

Professor Gijs Schumacherthank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: As the Netherlands approaches its third general election in just five years, how would you characterize the current political landscape? What structural and psychological factors — fragmentation, voter volatility, or declining partisan loyalty — best explain this ongoing electoral instability?

Professor Gijs Schumacher: The best characterization is indeed fragmentation. If you look at the party system, there are, roughly speaking, three different blocs of parties: the left bloc, the right bloc, and the radical right bloc. The last bloc has grown the most over the past 10 to 20 years, but there’s also a great deal of fluctuation within it.

In fact, there’s a lot of fluctuation across all the blocs. However, on average, people don’t move much between them. In that sense, voters tend to shift from one right-wing party to another, or from one left-wing party to another. Ultimately, the only real possibility for forming governments lies in the middle — between the left and the right.

The problem with that is that many voters no longer perceive meaningful differences between these centrist parties. This frustrates them, and they often end up supporting either other parties within the same bloc or more radical alternatives. Of course, the last government was an exception to this, as it was a right–radical right coalition, but it was so short-lived that, in a sense, it only demonstrated how difficult such a government would be.

If you ask about the psychological characteristics — that’s a very complex question. One key factor is that voter loyalty is very low. In contrast to the 1980s, people identify far less with a particular party and therefore move more easily between them. Voters today are less loyal, which is not necessarily a bad thing; you could also say they’re more critical.

Because there are multiple parties that are ideologically close to each other within each bloc, and because there is competition within blocs, non-policy issues start to matter much more — things like how a particular leader performs in election debates or in the media. Do we like this party because they were in government, or not? These considerations are becoming increasingly important compared to policy-based reasons.

Overall, this calls for a research agenda focused on political psychology — one that specifically studies these non-policy-related factors. I think the leader of D66 put it quite aptly — although I’m not entirely sure whether he meant it ironically — when he said: “Policy is less important; it’s more about the vibe you’re getting with a party.”  That’s exactly the point. But what is this vibe? How can we study it? How can we analyze it?

The PVV Leads a Parade of Dwarfs

Despite Geert Wilders’ authoritarian leadership style and his role in repeated government collapses, the PVV continues to lead in the polls — how do you interpret this enduring voter support, and what does it reveal about Dutch citizens’ tolerance for personalist populism and their affective attachment to strong, anti-establishment leadership?

Professor Gijs Schumacher: Yes, they are the party leading the polls, but it’s basically leading a parade of dwarfs. All the parties are small now. So, the size that the PVV has in the polls — about 30 seats, or 20% of the vote — is actually a very low number for the largest party. I sometimes like to turn it around. I don’t think the question is why the radical right is so large, but why the middle is so small. Because in the middle, the centrist parts of the left-wing and right-wing blocs — there are parties that are very similar. If you added their votes together, they would be much larger than the Freedom Party. It’s just that they choose not to join hands in these elections, and that’s why they end up as the second, third, or fourth party. Now, there’s one footnote to make: for the second time, they are running with a joint list, and also, formally, these parties are on track to merge with each other. Still, there are many other parties they could potentially merge that are ideologically quite close.

Then, more specifically about Wilders. There’s something about populism that is extremely powerful psychologically, and that’s the anti-establishment aspect. There are other things that are also psychologically very powerful about populism, but I want to focus on this one because I think it’s important. An anti-establishment stance is one of the defining features of populism, and this is very firmly rooted in human psychology — to be critical of leadership, skeptical even, doubtful whether the people in power are actually there for your good or for the general good, as opposed to their own personal fortune. That’s a very powerful human psychological tendency, and it’s actually a very good one. It has been an extremely important feature of the survival of humans as groups.

The Left Has Abandoned Its Own Anti-Establishment Agenda

So, the question I want to raise is this: one of the problems of the left and the right blocs — particularly the left-wing bloc — is why they have dropped their own anti-establishment agenda. They have adopted the position of being the power. In the Netherlands, the media continuously speak of the “left-wing media” or the “left-wing church,” as they call it. This “left-wing church” is supposedly so influential, but it doesn’t make any sense — the left barely has a third of the votes. They don’t get more airtime or anything. And the left adopts this narrative, accepting its role as being elitist. That makes for a very strange political dynamic because they’re not the elite, they’re not in government, and they haven’t been in government for a while. They’re not particularly politically powerful. Historically, the left has always had a very strong anti-establishment agenda — for example, critiques of capitalism — and this now seems so muted. In their opposition to populist radical right parties, they have completely abandoned their own anti-establishment stance, and that’s really a pity because it’s a powerful psychological force that really sways voters. Therefore, part of this group of people is really moved by this anti-establishment approach to politics.

Election sign of the Leefbaar Party and statue of its murdered founder, Pim Fortuyn, in Rotterdam, the Netherlands. Photo: André Muller.

Now, the other reason why they face large support is through another mechanism — that’s the more authoritarian, anti-immigrant type of agenda. There’s always been strong support for anti-immigration policies in the Netherlands. In that sense, there’s been absolutely no change since the 1990s. The difference is that political parties are now doing something with it. This already started in 2001 with the rise of Pim Fortuyn, so it’s not new at all. The only new thing is the degree to which mainstream parties are also adopting anti-immigration stances. By doing so, they legitimize the radical right and make it more normal, which also affects voters. The party becomes less tainted, and people become more likely to vote for it.

So, it’s really this mix — on the one hand, the anti-establishment stance, and on the other, authoritarianism — that makes the party popular. But it’s not necessarily the same type of people. It’s the combination of one group that finds the authoritarian route appealing and another group that is in the anti-establishment camp. If you want to think about how we can systematically change the distribution of votes across these three blocs, then my suggestion would be to look in the anti-establishment direction.

Affective Contagion Works Differently in Politics

We have seen the normalization of populist rhetoric across the political spectrum — from immigration and national identity to housing and cost of living. To what extent do you think populist narratives now define the terms of political competition in the Netherlands? Are mainstream parties engaging in what you’ve described as “affective contagion” from populist discourse?

Professor Gijs Schumacher: That’s a good question. So, starting with how pervasive populist narratives are in politics — I think they’ve always been there, and they’ve been present on both the left and the right. I’m particularly referring to anti-establishment stances. I mean, D66, one of the most centrist parties in the Netherlands, emerged from a populist agenda — a very strong anti-establishment position. Some of that critique is still there, but much of it has been watered down or disappeared from their platform. Populist narratives are always pervasive, and sometimes also very useful, because they can bring about innovation in the party system — which is a good thing. When we talk about representation, sometimes old ideas need to go, and new ideas need to enter. It also means, of course, that sometimes bad ideas enter the political system — that’s also true.

If we talk about anti-immigration policies, as I already mentioned earlier, the party system has shifted toward a much more critical stance than before. People are associating problems with housing and immigration. But that’s really just the radical right; I don’t see other parties making that argument. It’s interesting in this election that the Farmers’ Party, which started a few years ago really trying to represent agricultural interests, has now completely adopted radical-right rhetoric as well. But, they were already in the radical-right camp, so that’s not surprising. For a while, they looked like a more centrist alternative, but they turned out not to be.

To put it differently, I do think a lot of politicians believe it’s necessary to talk about immigration because there’s a strong idea that it’s the most important topic in the elections. The thing is, though, that this idea is not true. If you ask Dutch citizens what the most important issues are in Dutch politics, you get a whole list of issues — and they are all equally important. The problem is that there’s a lot of fragmentation in the answers. Lots of people find different issues important: cost of living, housing, climate change, the international situation, and immigration, of course. In that sense, the populist narrative around immigration has been extremely successful — in the sense that media and politicians believe they need to talk about it so much.

Now, whether there’s affective contagion — it’s funny that you use this term in this context, because the word affective contagion comes more from interpersonal psychology. It’s about whether the emotion of person A is adopted by person B, who is listening to person A. In politics, the model of affective contagion is very complex because whether I take over the emotion that person A has depends very much on what my beliefs are about person A. So, if person A is a politician from a party I like, I will probably listen more carefully. If person A is a politician from an out-party, I will be incensed, angry, or upset. I will actively try to think about arguments for why this person is talking nonsense.

But there’s also another, slightly different, and older use of the word — one that comes from earlier work on political parties in sociology: “contagion from the left.” The idea was that right-wing parties adopted all kinds of ideas from left-wing parties in the early 20th century. For example, the mass organization of left-wing parties was adopted by right-wing parties as a way to counter the electoral threat of the left.

So, if you interpret contagion in this sense, then without a doubt, the Dutch political system has been very much influenced by the success of different radical-right parties in the Netherlands — LPF, PVV, initially also the so-called Leefbaar parties, and, of course, the latest ones like Forum for Democracy and JA21.

The Debate Fixates on Asylum Seekers Instead of Real Solutions

People on the street near the National Monument in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, on April 14, 2018. Undocumented migrants selling shoes. Photo: Elena Rostunova.

Housing shortages, migration management, and rising living costs dominate the campaign. In your view, how do these issues interact with emotional and identity-based appeals in shaping voter preferences? Are material concerns or cultural grievances more decisive in the current moment?

Professor Gijs Schumacher: Yes — that’s the short answer. In the Netherlands, the traditional left–right economic dimension has effectively collapsed into a largely cultural one.

When it comes to housing, the problem with the immigration debate is that there are many different forms of immigration. Typically, the type that is politically sensitive involves asylum seekers — and that’s what all the fuss is about. People don’t want to have a center in their municipality where asylum seekers are housed.

That’s what the PVV rallies behind: reducing asylum seekers. But this group represents a very small share of total immigration — I think only a few percent. So even if we somehow magically got rid of asylum seekers, we would still have massive immigration.

The point is that other forms of immigration — for example, seasonal immigration — make up a large share. There are many seasonal immigrants in the Netherlands; in fact, the entire agricultural sector essentially depends on them. They’re not politically problematic because the right doesn’t want to make an issue out of them — the companies that support these parties need these workers and can’t do without them. How would our apple farms function — how would those apples be picked — if there were no people from Eastern Europe coming here? The same goes for asparagus and other high-value vegetables.

And then there’s, of course, the more “expat” type — high-profile professionals with high salaries coming in, particularly to Amsterdam for well-paid jobs. Nobody’s complaining about them in any cultural sense, although their impact on the labor market is much greater than that of asylum seekers. Here in Amsterdam, housing prices are also extremely high because of people coming from abroad — people who receive relocation allowances from their companies and can therefore outbid Dutch buyers. But that’s not how the discussion is framed. The focus is on asylum seekers. So, it’s a really strange — or rather, a really striking — discussion in the sense that the way it is shaped isn’t meaningfully directed toward the real solution.

Voters Now Choose Parties Like Beers in a Bar

Given the widespread refusal of other parties to enter a coalition with Wilders, yet his continued dominance in the polls, what does this suggest about the representational capacity of the Dutch party system? Are we witnessing a deepening crisis of coalition politics — or an evolution toward a new equilibrium shaped by populist pressure from the margins?

Professor Gijs Schumacher: There are two things. About 20% — or maybe a bit more — goes to Wilders. But also, something like 20% goes to about eight political parties that each have just a few seats. And then you’re left with 60% of large dwarfs, let’s call them that. That’s where the coalition mostly needs to come from. So that makes it super complicated. It basically means the traditional large Dutch political parties — the Christian Democrats, Labour (now merged with the Green Party), and the Liberal Party, VVD — essentially need to cooperate. So, you get these governments that are well known in Germany as “Grand Coalitions.” But we also know from those experiences that these governments are always very unpopular because people don’t really see differences between the parties anymore. Then again, this gives rise to splinters — or not-so-small parties now, actually — on both the left and the right.

But the question is: what is the representational capacity of the Dutch party system? If we define that as the distance between the party you vote for and what that party stands for, then with so many parties, you actually have excellent representational capacity. In terms of government policy, you would just have something in the middle, which would always be relatively close to a large group of people. The problem lies in the manageability of such large coalitions — large both in terms of the number of parties and the range of policy differences between them.

Secondly — coming back to the point about the “vibes” that I mentioned earlier — Jock Robiette, the leader of D66, once said that vibes are the reason people vote for parties. I agree with him. Vibes are very important, but they’re a distraction from representational capacity because they have little to do with policy, to some extent. In the Netherlands, it sometimes feels like voters are in a supermarket or a bar, handed a list of 25 different kinds of beer. They spend a long time thinking about which specific type to choose — a New England IPA or a double IPA? That’s the kind of choice Dutch voters are making now. But, of course, politics isn’t a bar. You need to combine beers to get a majority. That’s where the real problem lies.

The Party Landscape Has Changed Too Much to Compare Over Time

Election posters of all Dutch political parties displayed at the Binnenhof in The Hague, the Netherlands, in March 2017. Photo: Dreamstime.

Based on your work on affective polarization, do you observe rising emotional hostility between Dutch party blocs — or is the Netherlands still characterized by pragmatic, cross-partisan attitudes?

Professor Gijs Schumacher: I’m not sure whether this is increasing or stable over time. It’s actually a pretty tricky research question because the parties themselves change over time. For example, if you go back to 2010, there was no Forum for Democracy, no JA21, and the PVV had basically just started — it was a very minor party. So, if we had asked in 2010 what people felt about different political parties and compared it to now, when we have all these parties that are much more radical, you can’t really compare the two periods.

That makes it difficult to know for sure whether affective polarization is actually increasing. In general, I don’t think the Netherlands is all that dramatic in this regard. Everybody hates the radical right — that’s almost the uniting factor. What has been more problematic is that the right —mainly the Liberal Party — has been polarizing by labeling Labour–Green as a radical extremist party, which, by any standards, it’s not. By introducing this kind of language — and of course, what politicians say has an effect on people — they may cause voters to become more polarized and more hostile toward the left.

The PVV Relies So Heavily on One Person That It Can’t Grow Strong

Wilders’ one-man party structure is unique in Western Europe. How does this extreme centralization of authority affect voter perceptions of accountability, competence, and representation?

Professor Gijs Schumacher: I think the real problem with the PVV is that, since it relies so heavily on a single person, it struggles to become a genuinely strong and influential party. Essentially, its only way to influence politics is by shouting bizarre things — and, in fact, that works quite well for them. But the party lacks the capacity to effectively propose or implement policies that could actually address the issues it highlights.

This weakness stems from the fact that the PVV is structurally too weak. It has no detailed policy proposals beyond slogans like “all foreigners out.” When they are in government, they basically have to rely on civil servants to come up with plans to execute this — which, of course, is complicated and slow. Then they end up blaming the civil servants for blocking their ideas. But a good political party would not only have a slogan but also a set of coherent policies to realize it. The PVV simply doesn’t have this to any meaningful extent.

The second problem is the training of talent. Traditionally, political parties were expected to develop policy ideas through their connections to civil society, but the PVV doesn’t do that either. When they had ministers for the first time, almost none of them had any executive experience — perhaps none at all — and it was evident. The Minister for Immigration, for instance, had real difficulty even hiring a spokesperson. They couldn’t manage the most basic tasks.

That was really problematic. If you look at Wilders’ list, you’d expect his ministers or vice ministers — the most recognizable figures after him — to be ranked high. They’re not. The most prominent one, Ahmed, isn’t even on the list. De Vries is placed somewhat lower, and Madlener is also very low. This was hardly a vote of confidence in them. We’ve seen many times in the PVV that whenever someone begins to stand out, their head immediately comes off — and that person ultimately leaves the party. So, yes, this is a real problem. The PVV does represent a segment of the Dutch population, but if it cannot effectively formulate and implement policy, then the issues its voters care about will never truly be addressed.

If Rhetoric Were Less Toxic, Pragmatic Governance Could Return

And finally, Professor Schumacher, do you see the Netherlands as entering a post-populist phase where affective polarization stabilizes and institutional pragmatism returns, or are we witnessing a longer-term transformation in the emotional foundations of Dutch democracy?

Professor Gijs Schumacher: I think we’re moving into a post-populist era. If anything, we might be entering a phase where anti-establishment politics becomes more evenly distributed across the entire political spectrum, rather than being concentrated mainly on the radical right.

The Netherlands has a long history of deep affective polarization — even though we didn’t use that term at the time — but it was never a major problem because, at the elite level, there was a greater degree of cooperation. And that’s ultimately where the goal should lie.

The mainstream left and right don’t need to fight each other; there’s little to gain from it. They’re not going to win many more votes that way. If their rhetoric were less toxic toward one another, there would be no real barrier to a return to pragmatic governance.

Professor Richard H. Pildes is the Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law at New York University School of Law and one of the foremost scholars of constitutional and democratic theory.

Professor Pildes: Effective Government Is the Forgotten Pillar of Democracy

In an interview with the ECPS, Professor Richard H. Pildes, one of America’s leading constitutional scholars, warns that democracy’s survival depends not only on equality and participation but also on its capacity to deliver effective governance. “Democracy,” he says, “rests on two simple promises: equal voice and better lives. When governments fail in that second task, it profoundly undermines democracy itself.” Professor Pildes argues that excessive focus on participation, coupled with digital fragmentation and weakened political parties, have eroded governments’ ability to act decisively. The rise of “free-agent politicians,” algorithmic outrage, and social media-driven polarization, he cautions, threaten to make democracy less capable of solving problems. “Effective government,” Professor Pildes insists, “is the forgotten pillar of democracy.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Richard H. Pildes, the Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law at New York University School of Law and one of the foremost scholars of constitutional and democratic theory, reflects on one of the most neglected yet urgent dimensions of democratic life: the capacity to govern effectively.

Professor Pildes argues that modern democracies have grown dangerously unbalanced by emphasizing participation and representation—the “inputs” of democracy—while neglecting its “outputs,” namely the ability of governments to deliver results that improve citizens’ lives. As he puts it, “I often think of democracy, and what justifies it, as resting on two simple promises. First, democracy promises to treat citizens as equals—with equal standing, equal voice, and equal moral worth. Second, it promises to make their lives better.” When democratic governments fail at that second task, he warns, “it profoundly undermines the justification and purpose of democracy itself.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Pildes develops this theme of effective government as democracy’s forgotten pillar, linking it to rising polarization, social media dynamics, and the fragmentation of political authority. “Neglecting the value of effective government,” he observes, “is one of the greatest challenges of our time. Perhaps the fundamental challenge for contemporary democracies is to demonstrate that they can once again deliver for their citizens.”

Professor Pildes identifies digital fragmentation as one of the defining forces reshaping democratic governance. The communications revolution, he explains, has made it “incredibly easy to mobilize opposition to whatever government is doing,” eroding the stability of political institutions and making compromise more elusive. Social media and algorithmic amplification have “flattened political authority,” giving rise to spontaneous, leaderless movements but also fueling paralysis in democratic decision-making.

He also traces how the decline of strong political parties has weakened democracy’s capacity to build coalitions and sustain coherent governance. Whereas parties once mediated between citizens and the state, today’s hyper-pluralist media ecosystems and privatized campaign finance systems have encouraged the rise of “free-agent politicians”—performative figures who bypass party structures to cultivate online followings and raise funds directly from polarized small donors.

Looking ahead, Professor Pildes cautions that the structural fragmentation produced by digital media cannot be easily reversed: “The genie is out; you can’t really go back.” Yet, he insists that democracies must learn to manage these forces more effectively if they are to regain public trust and legitimacy. “Democracy,” he concludes, “must prove that it can still deliver—by governing effectively, addressing citizens’ needs, and meeting the great challenges of our time.”

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Richard H. Pildes, revised for clarity and flow.

Democracy Must Deliver

Photo: Iryna Kushnarova.

Professor Richard H. Pildesthank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your recent work, you highlight the “neglected value of effective government” as central to democratic stability. How do disinformation and fragmented information ecosystems undermine the capacity of democratic institutions to deliver effective governance, and how should legal theory integrate these challenges?

Professor Richard H. Pildes: First of all, thank you very much for having me. Let me begin with the first part of your question, which concerns my writings on what I call the neglected value of effective government. The challenge many democracies across the West have been facing over the last 10 to 15 years is that a large portion of their citizens have become increasingly dissatisfied with what government is producing—with its ability to deliver on the major economic and cultural issues that people care most about.

When democratic systems fail to deliver over sustained periods of time on the issues their citizens value most, that creates a very dangerous situation. It breeds anger, alienation, frustration, and withdrawal. Worse still, it can lead people to yearn for strongman figures who promise to cut through paralysis and dysfunction and to deliver what democratic institutions appear incapable of achieving.

In my view, much of legal and political theory focuses on issues like political equality, deliberation, or participation, but pays too little attention to the outputs of democracy—to whether democracy is actually delivering for people. Neglecting the value of effective government is, in fact, one of the greatest challenges of our time. Perhaps the fundamental challenge for contemporary democracies is to demonstrate that they can once again deliver for their citizens.

I often think of democracy, and what justifies it, as resting on two simple promises. First, democracy promises to treat citizens as equals—with equal standing, equal voice, and equal moral worth. Second, it promises to make their lives better. When democratic governments are perceived by many of their citizens as failing in that second task, it profoundly undermines the justification and purpose of democracy itself.

That’s why I believe those of us who work on democratic and legal theory must focus more on how governments can become effective again—just as they were for many decades after World War II—at delivering meaningful results on the issues that matter most to their citizens.

Democracy’s Dilemma: Openness vs. Effectiveness

Your scholarship has long examined how democratic values can come into tension—such as openness versus effectiveness. In the digital era, how do these tensions manifest between free expression online and the state’s ability to govern effectively in an environment saturated with disinformation?

Professor Richard H. Pildes: As an initial matter, one of the points I try to make in emphasizing the importance of effective government as a democratic value is that it helps us recognize the trade-offs between various things we want democracy to achieve—between competing democratic values. For example, some of the reforms introduced over the past 20 or 30 years around political accountability or transparency are, of course, important democratic values. So are participation and voice for citizens. All of these are valuable goals.

But if we push too far along those dimensions, we can make it much harder for democratic governments to deliver. To make this concrete, consider the clean energy transition. There are many things governments need to do to enable a shift to cleaner forms of energy production. In the United States, for instance, we must build many more transmission lines to carry electricity from where there’s abundant sun or wind across multiple states. Yet, that’s extremely difficult because so many local communities and local governments have the ability to veto the passage of power lines through their territory.

What I mean to emphasize by highlighting the value of effective government is that democracy inevitably involves trade-offs. Not all democratic values can always be realized simultaneously. Sometimes, we must balance them, and we’ve given too little weight over the last few decades to the importance of effectiveness in government.

Turning to the second part of your question—how social media has made effective governance more difficult—one of the most striking developments of the last 10 or 15 years, particularly visible in Europe, is the increasing fragmentation of political systems. In many European countries, the traditionally dominant center-right and center-left parties have collapsed. They’ve lost voters in dramatic numbers to new parties—especially those of the far right—which have proliferated across the continent.

This reflects public dissatisfaction with democratic governments, a search for alternatives, and a growing willingness to consider more extreme options. But it also makes it much harder for parliamentary systems to deliver on core issues. Take France, for example. France has become almost ungovernable because its political system is so fragmented. With such a wide range of parties and interests represented in the National Assembly, it’s extremely difficult to form stable majorities to act on major issues.

So one of the perverse dynamics democracies face today is that ongoing dissatisfaction leads people to seek new, often more extreme, alternatives. That breaks down major parties and fragments parliaments, which, ironically, makes it even harder for governments to deliver what citizens demand.

Social media amplifies all of this. The communications and technology revolution—apart from issues like disinformation or hate speech—has made it incredibly easy to generate and sustain opposition to whatever the government is doing. Sometimes that opposition is legitimate; sometimes it’s not. But we now live in a world where groups can be mobilized instantly, new parties can be organized rapidly, and even individuals can wield enormous influence.

Some of that is positive—it encourages engagement and participation—but in a political environment where power can be constantly undermined and opposition endlessly mobilized, it becomes increasingly difficult for democratic governments to deliver on the economic and cultural issues people care most about.

Democracy’s Input-Output Imbalance

You have argued that modern democracies often focus excessively on input legitimacy (participation, representation) at the expense of output legitimacy (governing effectively). To what extent has the rise of social media deepened this imbalance by privileging participatory noise over institutional capacity?

Professor Richard H. Pildes: That’s a very good question. This goes back to our earlier discussion about how democratic theory and political theory tend to focus heavily on values associated with the process of democracy—what we might call its inputs—such as political equality, participation, and representation.

What often receives far less attention is whether democratic governments are actually able to deliver on the issues people care most intensely about, or that large segments of society care most deeply about. As I’ve said before, this imbalance poses a real risk for democracies, and we’re experiencing that risk now. When democratic systems are repeatedly perceived by citizens as unable to address the major challenges of the era—whether economic or cultural—that perception corrodes confidence in the system itself.

Social media, in many ways, has intensified this problem. In the United States, for instance, it has enabled what I call the rise of “free-agent politicians.” Lawmakers today can reach a national audience in a way that was unthinkable even a generation ago. Previously, new members of Congress were virtually invisible; they had to build expertise and move up gradually through the political hierarchy. Now, through social media, even first-year members can cultivate a national following almost instantly.

Because of this, and because campaigns in the US are privately financed, these politicians can raise significant sums of money online without relying on their political parties. The result is that many of them have become independent actors—no longer beholden to party discipline or structure. Unless political parties can assemble enough strength in the legislature to move legislation forward, you end up with hundreds of atomized individuals who are difficult to organize and coordinate.

This dynamic contributes to the paralysis and dysfunction we see in many legislatures today. As a result, more power shifts to chief executives—presidents or prime ministers—because the legislative or parliamentary process has become so gridlocked.

This is a major danger we need to confront. It requires serious reflection on how we can structure democratic processes and institutions in ways that make it more likely they can actually deliver the outcomes that large numbers of citizens are demanding.

The Leveling of Political Authority

French President Emmanuel Macron at the Cotroceni Palace in Bucharest, Romania on August 24, 2017. Photo: Carol Robert.

Scholars like Fukuyama argue that digital technologies have fundamentally reshaped political fragmentation across Western democracies. How do you see algorithmic amplification and social media platforms interacting with existing institutional fragmentation to exacerbate polarization and weaken democratic mediation?

Professor Richard H. Pildes: Francis Fukuyama’s point is very nicely captured by a phrase Emmanuel Macron used a while back. Macron, who is more philosophically inclined than most political leaders, said—translated into English—that there has been a “leveling of political authority.” I think that description captures well what the technological revolution and social media have done.

In both good and bad ways, these changes have made it much harder for political authority to be legitimate, to be marshaled, and to be organized in a way that allows for effective governance. As I mentioned earlier, it is now incredibly easy to mobilize opposition to whatever government is doing. The mobilizations that social media enables are often composed of large groups that are not formally organized, and the demonstrations are frequently spontaneous.

If you look at recent examples—the Canadian Truckers Movement opposing COVID policies, the Yellow Vests in France, the Indignados in Spain, or the Occupy movement in the US—these movements have no clear leaders and are not hierarchically structured. This makes it very difficult for governments to know who to negotiate with, who to engage in dialogue with, or even what some of these movements specifically want.

There are both positive and negative aspects to this. On the positive side, more people are able to express themselves and make their voices heard. But the downside, as I’ve been emphasizing, is that it makes it increasingly difficult for governments to function effectively.

We have to pay close attention to this dynamic because when people begin to feel alienated from democracy itself—when they perceive it as failing to deliver for them—that becomes a very risky situation.

Moreover, in this era, we also have, looming in the background, the example of authoritarian China, which many people believe is delivering more—whether they are right or wrong about that. Things can be built faster in China; they have high-speed rail, massive infrastructure growth, and so forth. President Biden has spoken frequently about this, saying that his goal is to demonstrate that democracies can work again in the face of the challenges posed by China’s rise.

That’s why I keep emphasizing the need to focus not just on whether democracies can deliver, but on how we can structure—or, if necessary, restructure—their institutions and processes to make it more likely that democratic governments will actually be able to do so.

The Economics of Outrage

The rise of digital platforms has dramatically expanded the reach and speed of small-donor mobilization, often through emotionally charged and polarizing content. How do you see the interaction between algorithmic amplification and small-donor dynamics shaping candidate incentives, campaign rhetoric, and party polarization in the medium term?

Professor Richard H. Pildes: This is particularly an issue in the United States because we finance our elections through private funding. That means individual donors—or sometimes very large billionaires who now spend vast amounts of money in elections. It can also be small donors, whom the internet now enables campaigns to reach very cheaply, and who can make donations with almost no transaction costs—very easily.

We went through an era in which the internet was celebrated as the democratization of information—a wonderful new age. But we have since come to recognize the darker side of that transformation: social media rewards outrage. The algorithms, as you mentioned, amplify outrage. The content that gets the most attention is often the most extreme. We’ve learned that lesson well.

The same dynamic applies to political fundraising online, especially from small donors. How do you get attention as a politician—again, this is a particularly American problem—in the attention economy we now live in? The more extreme or outrageous you are, the more likely you are to attract attention. In the United States, that attention translates directly into small-donor contributions.

So, the rise of online fundraising mirrors what we’ve come to understand about the internet more generally: it rewards those who take more extreme positions. This dynamic fuels polarization in the United States. Donations flow in response to viral moments on social media—moments that often depend on outrage or confrontation.

One small example illustrates this point. A number of years ago, when President Obama was delivering his State of the Union address to Congress—which is supposed to be a very dignified, if partisan, occasion—a congressman shouted, “You lie!” It was an extraordinary breach of decorum, and he was rightly criticized by major newspapers and commentators. Yet, in the days that followed, he raised a tremendous amount of money from small donors online.

That episode shows how the amplification and cultivation of outrage can turn on the flow of money. The result is that we get politicians who are more performative—more focused on attracting attention than on governing—and who are encouraged by these dynamics to be more extreme. I do think this has significantly contributed to polarization in the United States.

The Collapse of Democratic Mediation: The Disappearance of Gatekeepers

In this photo illustration, a smartphone screen displays an image of US President Donald Trump’s Truth Social app on July 8, 2024, in Washington, D.C., United States. Photo: Charles McClintock Wilson.

In your broader work on political fragmentation and effective governance, you emphasize the importance of institutions that mediate between citizens and the state. To what extent do current campaign-finance reforms and unregulated social media ecosystems undermine these mediating structures, and what kinds of institutional or legal interventions might restore equilibrium without unduly restricting participation or speech?

Professor Richard H. Pildes: That’s a very hard question. I’ll give you an example of probably the most dramatic change we’ve made to the structures of American democracy in the last 50 years—one that most people in the United States have long forgotten.

For 170 years, presidential nominees for the major parties were chosen primarily by elected party figures from across the country during political conventions. In the 1970s, that system was abandoned in favor of the current one, in which voters, through presidential primaries, effectively decide who each party will nominate for the presidency. 

So, for 170 years, we had this mediating device—call it the political convention—in which elected party figures from throughout the country would choose the nominee. These were often people with direct experience working with the potential candidates; they knew them much better than those without that experience. They sought to find candidates who would best represent the range of factions and interests within the party. 

All of that was eliminated when we shifted to using primary elections to select presidential nominees. That was the removal of a mediating institution—the political convention—and of certain gatekeepers, namely, the elected political figures.

At the time we made this change, some political scientists warned that it would make it easier for demagogic figures—those able to gain popular attention by stirring up hatreds and divisions—to rise to prominence. They cautioned that the new system would reward such candidates. I’ll let people decide for themselves how true that prediction has turned out to be in the United States, but it certainly marked the dismantling of an important mediating structure.

As you know, many democracies in Europe still retain these mediating roles. For example, in the Conservative Party in the UK, members of Parliament first winnow down the possible party leaders to two candidates. Then, it’s those two individuals whom the party’s broader membership votes between to choose the leader. That’s a gatekeeping role—a mediating institution.

We eliminated mechanisms like that, which is why I believe we’ve seen more populist-type figures rise to the presidency in the years since we abandoned the political convention as a meaningful device.

And this is precisely what social media does as well. The main thing social media does is eliminate gatekeepers. It dismantles mediating institutions and bypasses the structures that have long been part of democracy—at least in the US—for more than 200 years. That’s what Macron is referring to when he says the technological revolution is creating a “leveling of authority.” Some of that is good, and some of it is very bad. But that’s the nature of the democracy we are living in today.

When Parties Lose Power, Democracies Lose Direction

In your analysis of political fragmentation, how do decentralized, hyper-pluralist media ecosystems affect coalition-building and compromise, which are traditionally central to democratic governance?

Professor Richard H. Pildes: These are very challenging questions. When you have strong political parties—parties that have real authority in the sense that they can develop policy agendas and communicate those clearly to voters—they can then implement those agendas once in office. If they have a majority, or if they form a governing coalition, they can steer that coalition in a coherent direction. All of that depends on having strong political parties.

A big part of what’s happened across many democracies is that political parties have become much weaker than they used to be. And that’s for a variety of reasons. The parties used to be anchored in institutions—like labor unions on the left or churches on the right—that themselves have lost power over time. As those institutions have weakened, so have the parties.

And although we love to complain about political parties—and we love to hate political parties—strong parties are actually essential to making democracy work effectively. They organize the legislative agenda, craft the messages to voters, structure what people campaign on, and, when they gain political power, they have the cohesion needed to push policies through.

When political parties are weak, it becomes much harder for them to perform all of these functions. That, in turn, makes it harder to build coalitions, harder to sustain compromise, and harder to form stable governing majorities in parliaments. I think this is very much part of the situation we face today.

The Genie Is Out: Social Media and the Future of Democracy

Illustration by Ulker Design.

Given your emphasis on institutional design, do you view the structural fragmentation induced by online media as something that can be mitigated through legal or regulatory reform, or is it now a constitutive feature of contemporary democracies?

Professor Richard H. Pildes: The short answer is that it’s the latter. We’ve had a lot of discussion about social media’s effects on democracy that focus on issues like disinformation or misinformation, as we talked about earlier. But my view is that the challenges social media poses to democracy are much deeper than that.

Even if we could somehow fix those problems—through legal reforms, or if the platforms were to self-regulate—I still don’t think we would have addressed the major ways social media is transforming democracy. The real impact lies in how it contributes to the fragmentation of political power and authority more broadly: the greater ease of creating new political groups and parties, the greater ease of mobilizing opposition to what government is doing, and the greater ease of spreading—not necessarily disinformation—but very different interpretations of what to do with accurate information.

This is constitutive, to use the term you raised, of democracy today. There’s no way to put social media back in the bottle—the genie is out, and we can’t go back. The real question is whether democracies, political parties, and political leaders can learn to manage these forces in a way that still enables government to deliver effectively—so that democracy continues to do what it promises to do: respond to citizens’ needs and address the major challenges they face, as they understand them.

Defending Democracy in the Age of Global Disinformation

And finally, Professor Pildes, given the globalized nature of disinformation operations (e.g., Russia, China, Iran), how do existing US constitutional and regulatory frameworks—designed for domestic actors—struggle to address transnational information threats?

Professor Richard H. Pildes: This is a very big challenge. It’s not, of course, the first era in which foreign actors have tried to influence elections in other countries. The United States did this after World War II when it was trying to prevent countries like Italy or France from electing communist governments.

But in the social media age, all of this can now be done much more cheaply and at a far greater scale. One positive feature in the US is that we have a highly decentralized system for our national elections. That makes it more difficult for a hostile foreign actor to capture control of the election system because it is so dispersed across states and localities.

Still, when it comes to foreign influence and efforts to manipulate public opinion, this is a very difficult challenge. Legally speaking, even with our strong First Amendment, the US government does have significant authority—if Congress chooses to act—to address some of these issues. We already ban foreign contributions in our campaigns because of the fear of foreign influence.

So, I think there is legal authority to do more. The harder question is whether it’s possible, as a practical matter, to implement effective measures in the digital age. That remains a very open question.

Sri Lankan protesters storm the prime minister's office in Colombo on July 13, 2022, demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

Professor Goldstone: The World’s Descent into Authoritarianism May Trigger a Revolutionary Movement

In this insightful interview, world-renowned revolution scholar Professor Jack A. Goldstone warns that we are witnessing both “a descent into an authoritarian pattern across much of the world” and “the beginning of a revolutionary movement.” Professor Goldstone argues that today’s global instability—rising inequality, elite overproduction, populist anger, and democratic decay—signals the breakdown of the post–World War II liberal order. “The global and national institutions of the last 50 years,” he notes, “are falling apart.” Yet he remains cautiously hopeful: while “the next ten years will be very difficult,” he foresees that by the late 2030s, a new generation will “demand more accountability, more freedom, and use new technologies to build a better world.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a wide-ranging and thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Jack A. Goldstone—one of the world’s foremost scholars of revolutions and social change—offers a sobering yet ultimately hopeful assessment of the current global order. As the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Chair Professor of Public Policy at George Mason University, senior fellow at the Mercatus Center, and director of Schar’s Center for the Study of Social Change, Institutions and Policy (SCIP), Professor Goldstone brings decades of comparative historical insight to bear on today’s crises of democracy, capitalism, and governance. His diagnosis is clear and unsettling: “We are in a kind of descent into an authoritarian pattern across much of the world. That’s also the beginning of a revolutionary movement.”

According to Professor Goldstone, the present era is marked by the unraveling of the political and institutional order that defined the last half-century. “The global and national institutions of the last 50 years,” he explains, “are falling apart—they’ve come under strain for decades and are now being picked apart by both elite groups seeking advantage and populations deeply dissatisfied with financial crises, cultural clashes, and stagnant mobility.” This confluence of forces, he argues, signals not simply democratic backsliding but the early stirrings of a new revolutionary epoch.

Professor Goldstone situates these developments within the long cycles of political upheaval he has mapped throughout his career. His structural-demographic theory identifies three recurring stressors that produce revolutionary moments: rising government debt, the overproduction of elites, and mass grievances rooted in inequality and declining opportunity. Today, all three are present—governments are overextended, elites are multiplying faster than elite positions, and younger generations across the world are losing faith in social mobility. As he observes, “Failure of mobility is becoming the expectation… and that has huge effects on people’s optimism for the future and confidence in government. It creates the kind of anger that fuels a revolutionary moment.”

Yet, Professor Goldstone warns, the contemporary landscape also differs profoundly from past revolutionary ages. New technologies—from algorithmic media to artificial intelligence—are reshaping how truth, mobilization, and resistance operate. “The internet,” he notes, “was once seen as a tool of democracy, but governments have learned to weaponize it. They don’t shut down dissent; they drown it in misinformation.” In this digital ecosystem, both democratic discourse and authoritarian control are being transformed, deepening uncertainty about the trajectory of change.

Still, Professor Goldstone’s long-view perspective tempers despair with cautious optimism. While he predicts that “the next ten years will be very difficult,” he insists that revolutionary renewal remains possible: “From the late 2030s onward, we will see the next generation demanding more accountability, more freedom, and using new technologies to build a better world for themselves.” For Professor Goldstone, the world’s descent into authoritarianism may, paradoxically, set the stage for its next great democratic transformation.

Professor Jack A. Goldstone, one of the world’s leading scholars of revolutions and social change, holds the Virginia E. and John T. Hazel, Jr. Chair in Public Policy at George Mason University. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Mercatus Center and Director of the Center for the Study of Social Change, Institutions and Policy (SCIP).

Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Professor Jack Goldstone, revised for clarity and flow.

The World Is Entering an Authoritarian Phase—but Also the Dawn of a New Revolution

Professor Jack Goldstone, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Throughout your career, you’ve explored how demographic pressures, elite fragmentation, and structural crises shape political transformation. In today’s world—marked by democratic erosion, rising authoritarianism, populist polarization, and a weakening rules-based order—how would you define this historical moment? Are we in a phase of democratic recalibration, a descent into authoritarian consolidation, or the early stirrings of a new revolutionary epoch? And what do these trajectories mean for the future of human rights, freedom, and global democracy?

Professor Jack Goldstone: Well, as a theme I will come back to during several of your questions, I’d say the answer is both—not either/or. That is, yes, we are in a kind of descent into an authoritarian pattern across much of the world. But that’s also the beginning of a revolutionary movement.

Revolutions are long processes. What we are seeing is a situation in which the global and national political institutions of the last 50 years are falling apart. They’ve come under strain for decades and are now being picked apart by both elite groups seeking advantage and by populations deeply dissatisfied with what has happened in terms of global financial crises, economic growth, social mobility, cultural clashes, and global migration.

All these pressures have overwhelmed both mainstream political parties and even the post–World War II liberal consensus institutions. So, yes, it’s the beginning of a revolutionary movement. It’s taking the form of a rejection of democracies increasingly seen as corrupt, self-serving, and ineffective for ordinary citizens.

Where that ends remains to be seen. Revolutions are long processes. We may go through a decade of authoritarian consolidation, but then that may turn around. In the long term, the world is going to move toward democracy—that’s the outcome consistent with growing education and increasing demands for autonomy.

But before we get there, we may experience a period of authoritarian distress, not unlike the 1930s. I hope we avoid wars on the scale of the 1940s, but we’re already seeing conflicts larger than any since that time. So, I do fear we’re entering a phase of authoritarianism and war. Yet, on the other side of that, there’s a good chance the world will emerge on a new path toward greater democracy and prosperity—much as it did after World War II.

Dictatorships Always Appear Stronger Than They Really Are

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Ankara, Turkey on August 30, 2014. Photo: Mustafa Kirazlı.

In some of your recent articles, you argue that democratic breakdowns and the re-emergence of dictatorships have reignited revolutionary cycles. How do you interpret this paradox in an era where regimes such as those in Russia, Turkey, and China appear to have mastered new techniques—digital surveillance, managed populism, and algorithmic governance—to pre-empt revolt and consolidate authoritarian rule?

Professor Jack Goldstone: I’d simply say that regimes have always appeared stronger than they really are. Before the Arab Spring, there was a widespread conviction among Middle East specialists that the region’s autocracies were stable, entrenched, and inherently suited to authoritarian rule. People forgot that the Middle East had been convulsed by revolutions in the 1950s and 1960s. But because from the 1980s to the early 2000s there were stable dictatorships that lasted for decades, many observers thought these regimes had found some key to survival. It wasn’t true. 

The same was said of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. They had crushed multiple uprisings in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia during the 1950s and 1960s. And yet, in the 1970s, when Gorbachev admitted that the Soviet Union was struggling economically—that the consumer sector was terrible, industries were falling behind, and reforms were needed—nobody imagined that would lead to the total collapse of communism within a decade.

Again, many autocratic regimes appear stronger than they are. They may be strong, but they’re also brittle. And that’s because politics, at the end of the day, is driven by one of two emotions: fear or anger. If people are fearful that the government will come after them if they protest, then protest will be suppressed. That’s how authoritarian regimes survive for decades. But if people become sufficiently angry—if they sense that the government is showing signs of weakness and that collective action might succeed—they can be remarkably courageous. The crowds that filled the streets in Moscow and Leipzig had no assurance they wouldn’t face violence, but they sensed widespread discontent and believed that acting together could bring change. The same thing happened in Cairo’s Tahrir Square.

So yes, there is new digital surveillance, and yes, regimes look tough. But if people truly feel compelled to challenge their government, they will. Digital surveillance is only an incremental advantage. Regimes have been targeting, imprisoning, and torturing dissidents for decades. China was just as harsh on opposition leaders after Tiananmen Square as it is today.

So, I don’t think we can say we’ve entered a fundamentally new era that makes dictators far more powerful. They do have new technologies at their disposal, but those don’t change the game entirely. They’re simply the latest tools in the ongoing struggle between governments and the people—a contest that has been unfolding for centuries.

Populism as a Prelude to Revolution?

Building on your structural-demographic theory, could the surge of populist movements across both developing and advanced democracies be viewed as pre-revolutionary signals of systemic stress? How does elite overproduction and the manipulation of anti-elite sentiment by insiders fit within your model of cyclical instability and regime decay?

Professor Jack Goldstone: The structural-demographic theory points to three major weaknesses or vulnerabilities that precipitate a revolutionary situation. One is government debt. That is, when government is unable to raise revenues because of resistance to taxation or economic difficulties, but expenses keep growing. And in the West, the aging of the population and the demand for retirement and healthcare and so on has kept expenses rising as the population’s gotten older. Meanwhile, the population is not growing as fast as it used to. So, the labor force is stagnating, and tax revenues are stagnating. So, we’ve seen Britain, France, Germany, the United States, China—all of these countries are dealing with problems of financing their government and growing government debt. So that’s one major element that no one seems able to escape, because they can’t find the rapid growth that would be necessary to balance the books against the growth in government spending that the populations demand. Plus, the rich are seeking more tax cuts for themselves wherever they can. That’s one element. 

Second element, what you mentioned, the overproduction of elites. This is something that’s a little hard to understand, because it’s not just that more people are becoming qualified for elite positions. During times of economic growth and population expansion, that can be a good thing. As long as there’s a growing demand for more doctors, lawyers, accountants, financiers, engineers—after all, China blew its economy up four or five-fold increases—part of that was growing population, growing number of college graduates, growing number of engineers.

Overproduction of elites occurs when you have a growth in the number of people who consider themselves entitled to elite positions, but the number of elite positions that society is providing starts to stagnate or decline. And that leads to kind of a pileup, with more and more people hoping to obtain elite positions and unable to do so. So the visible sign of this is a sharp decline in social mobility—the number of people who are able to move from middle or working or lower class into upper-class positions that declines, because the number of upper-class positions starts to stagnate, and those who are already in those positions try and protect that status for themselves and their families.

For example, universities throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and even the 1970s were engines of social mobility. People went to college, earned degrees, secured white-collar jobs in government, finance, or the private sector, and contributed to sustained economic growth. But from the 1980s and 1990s onward, we began to see wealth becoming more concentrated. The elite universities gradually turned into what I call “the elites’ universities.” It became increasingly difficult for ordinary people to gain admission, as applicants were required to navigate meritocratic hoops that were increasingly dominated by families already entrenched in the upper echelons of the elite.

Declining Mobility, Rising Fury

Many Nepali citizens join Gen Z–led protests in Bhojpur, Nepal on September 9, 2025, showing solidarity with nationwide demonstrations. Photo: Dipesh Rai.

It’s the decline of social mobility that’s really the marker of overproduction of elites. And we see this everywhere. Japan, China—you have the hikikomori in Japan, you have the lie-flat phenomenon in China. In Western Europe and in the United States, you have young people who are increasingly frustrated and angry that they’re not seeing the kind of expected gains in quality of life and lifestyle that their parents enjoyed.

We have data for the United States that shows for cohorts that were born in the 1940s and 50s, their rate of social mobility was almost 85% plus. Whereas for the cohorts that were born in the 1990s, early 2000s, their rate of social mobility—that is, earning a higher income in their 20s than their parents did—has dropped below 50%. Now, failure of mobility is becoming the expectation, and that has huge effects on people’s sense of optimism for the future and confidence in government. It creates the kind of anger that fuels a revolutionary moment. With the government continually burdened by excessive finance, financial debt, there’s not much the government can do to expand employment or provide alternatives. Governments are in debt, elites are getting stacked up, and social mobility is declining.

Then the third element is that the labor force grew with the baby boom. That was amplified by a big surge of immigration in the 1960s and 70s, and then again in the 2000s. The result of all of that is that the wage structure has stratified. That is to say, at the high end, professionals have continued to enjoy rising wages, but for the non-college-educated worker, especially non-college-educated men, real wages have stagnated or even declined over the last 30 years. That creates the sense of popular grievances among a majority of the population that is taking their anger out on those dominant elites who are pulling up the ladder and reducing social mobility.

Structural-demographic theory, in a word: government debt, elite overproduction and excess competition, and popular grievances about declining living standards and loss of opportunity. You put those three together, you have a collapse of faith in the existing government and institutions. That creates a revolutionary situation that can be exploited by leaders who want to lead a group of people who are interested in blowing everything up. People who are angry, frustrated, feel the government is not working in their interests, hasn’t done so for a while, and if they don’t create a dramatic change, they see their situation as only getting worse. That’s a revolutionary moment.

AI, Algorithms, and the Erosion of Reality

3D render of an AI processor chip on a circuit board. Photo: Dreamstime.

You have warned that unregulated social media “floods the zone” with disinformation, eroding democratic consensus. How do emerging technologies—especially artificial intelligence and algorithmic content curation—reshape the conditions for mobilization and revolution? Do these tools empower new forms of collective agency or primarily strengthen authoritarian regimes’ capacity for control and pre-emption?

Professor Jack Goldstone: Any new communications method—whether it was the printing press, radio, television, or now the internet—sets off a struggle between popular groups and governments to see who can control that medium more effectively to create and empower communities. In the beginning, radio and TV were hailed as great opportunities for popular education and strengthening democracy. But of course, whether it was in Germany with radio or in the Soviet Union with television, governments quickly figured out how to use those media and turn them into tools of propaganda. This, of course, happened even earlier with print censorship and government control of public publications. Wherever you see governments controlling media—whether newspapers, radio, or television—it inevitably becomes an outlet for propaganda.

Now, the idea behind the internet was that everyone could publish—that there was no way for the government to take it over. Bill Clinton famously said that if China wanted to run the internet, it would be like trying to nail Jell-O to the wall. The Chinese figured out how to use staples and glue guns. They managed to take control of the internet by creating their own workforce and bots so that if something appears online that Chinese authorities dislike, they don’t try to shut it down—since that would trigger backlash. Instead, they flood social media with contradictory or countering stories. Whatever the original truth or complaint was gets buried under waves of conflicting information, making it nearly impossible for the truth to emerge if there’s no trusted source that people believe.

Instead of having one or two major networks or print publications, we now have thousands. Everyone has their own podcast or internet channel, and people can say whatever they like. It’s completely unregulated. Anyone can lie—and have those lies widely distributed. The President of the United States can spread falsehoods on his own platform, Truth Social—ironically named. It’s reminiscent of how the Soviet Union had Pravda (“Truth”) as its flagship publication, and now the United States has Truth Social as the flagship for whatever stories a president wishes to tell.

The fact that AI can now fabricate visuals and stories at zero marginal cost—and spread them instantly—adds to the problem. But even without AI, the internet itself provides countless channels for misinformation. Originally, people thought the internet would be a great tool for mobilizing citizens against governments, a tool for democracy, because you couldn’t stop people from communicating with each other.

Yet communication for mobilization can also be undermined by a flood of false information. Even if the internet can build communities of resistance, it doesn’t provide the flesh-and-blood courage and solidarity that emerge from physical bonds of community, neighborhood, or religion. If you want to see effective resistance to authoritarian regimes, it still comes from those real-world ties, not just online chat groups.

Where the internet is truly dangerous, in my view, is in its distortion of reality. It makes it difficult for people to be certain of what is true and what is not, which in turn undermines the shared foundation needed to say: This is the truth we must defend. This is the goal we all want to work toward. When that shared reality fractures, complacency, passivity, and anxiety take hold. That’s the greatest danger I see in the social media world.

Still, people will overcome it—just as we’re beginning to rebuild real human bonds in schools, for example, with policies that require students to leave their cell phones in lockers during the school day. For eight hours, they must engage with friends, play real sports, read real books, and talk to one another. That’s a big improvement, and people will increasingly hunger for that kind of genuine connection. But over the last 10 or 15 years, we’ve seen real personal connections, genuine bonds, and confidence in truth significantly eroded by the easy access and superficial engagement fostered by social media. Still, I don’t think that’s permanent.

When Winning Becomes Losing

Protest against Bidzina Ivanishvili on Rustaveli Avenue, Tbilisi, Georgia — November 8, 2020. Demonstrators gather to voice opposition to the ruling party and its leader. Photo: Koba Samurkasov.

In “The Paradox of Victory” (with Bert Useem), you describe how movements that achieve short-term success often fail to institutionalize durable change. Could the Arab Spring, Occupy, and various anti-establishment populist movements exemplify this paradox—where mobilization triumphs are followed by democratic regression or authoritarian backlash? What determines whether such moments yield reform or re-entrenchment?

Professor Jack Goldstone: We’ve seen wild swings back and forth in many policy domains, largely because we’ve become so polarized. And by “we,” I mean the West—the United States, Europe, even Japan. When you look at governments today, instead of opposing parties working to hammer out compromises that could serve as the basis for broad, lasting agreement, you have factions trying to win narrow victories—ramming their views down the throats of the opposition and declaring, “We’re in power now, so we’re going to pass this law or push this policy.” The problem is that as soon as power shifts and the other faction takes control, they respond, “We’re going to repeal everything our opponents did and push our own agenda.” But that doesn’t endure either, because there’s no broad consensus to sustain it.

If we look back at the transformative actions of the 1960s in the United States—building the Great Society, advancing the Civil Rights Movement—leaders then tried to bring on board a broad coalition of different actors. For example, Social Security was not presented as a socialist-style welfare state. In the US, Social Security—pension payments to seniors—was framed as something individuals earned through their contributions.

What other countries saw as a welfare state, American politicians presented as a fair return on an individual’s labor. That framing created broad public consent, so much so that people now consider Social Security payments a basic right of American citizenship. Yet those same people will say, “We reject socialism, but Social Security is something I earned.” It was all in the presentation—a deliberate effort to build compromise and a shared foundation.

If you look at other policies, healthcare—Obamacare, for instance—was a narrow Democratic victory, and Republicans have been trying to dismantle it ever since. Affirmative action once had broader support for a few decades, especially in areas like housing, where people agreed that discrimination was wrong. But school integration—especially when it involved busing students far from home—was never widely accepted. Affirmative action, in general, has always been marginal. America never fully embraced the idea of creating broad-based justice for minorities. It was always piecemeal — “a little bit here for this group, a little bit there for that one.” And now, it has become deeply unpopular, to the point that most affirmative action policies have been or are being rolled back.

This kind of policy instability is damaging. It’s hard for people to plan for the future if policy changes radically every four, six, or eight years. It’s hard for businesses, it’s hard for families, and it erodes public confidence in government when governance itself becomes a football kicked back and forth between two opposing teams. It makes it look like each party is just in it for itself. People start asking, “Who’s looking out for me? Who’s watching out for the ordinary citizen?”

If government doesn’t have a widely accepted set of goals to lift everyone up, then what’s the purpose of it? It just becomes my faction versus your faction. So, when I talk about “the paradox of victory,” what I mean is that you can win something by a narrow margin in the short term—but those narrow, short-term victories often turn into long-term failures for society as a whole. Because without stability, consensus, or shared values, each side’s win just breeds more polarization, more backlash, and more chaos. Each victory overturns what came before, creating insecurity and uncertainty. It might feel good in the moment to say, “We won this year,” but that’s not a victory for society.

Capitalism: From Engine of Progress to Source of Revolt

In “The Handbook of Revolutions in the 21st Century,” you identify global capitalism and corrupt elites as key drivers of revolutionary pressure. How do you interpret the global resurgence of state capitalism—from China’s digital authoritarianism to Western neo-industrialism—as both a mechanism for managing inequality and a source of renewed instability within the international political economy?

Professor Jack Goldstone: In general, I am an enthusiastic supporter of capitalism. By that, I mean there’s no better way than free market competition and the price mechanism for encouraging enterprise and rewarding effort. That is to say, as long as the rules of the game encourage competition, fair dealing, open information, and open opportunity, capitalism can be effective in promoting social mobility, economic growth, higher productivity, and innovation. But, as we all know, capitalism is also prone to control by monopolies and oligopolies.

When oligopolies and monopolies start to dominate, when elites monopolize the key positions in society, you no longer get those benefits for the average person. Instead, you see growing inequality, less social mobility, more difficulties for the average worker, and greater political and economic influence for those who control the largest corporations and main financial institutions. So, while I’m in favor of capitalism, if it becomes too unregulated and allows excessive concentration of wealth and power, it tends to produce revolutionary pressures—fueled by the anger and frustration of those left behind.

During the Cold War, capitalist countries were on the defensive, and capitalist elites tolerated higher taxation on the rich. They accepted stronger unions. All of that was seen as necessary to respond to the challenge of communism, which promised a worker’s paradise and claimed to put workers first. The response to communism since the 19th century has always been to give workers better wages, greater benefits, and more opportunities.

But after the Cold War, when communism seemed defeated and gone, capitalism was unleashed. It was like, “We’ve won this fight—capitalism is clearly the better system—so let it rip.” Globalization accelerated. The market was left to “do its thing.” Profits were good. Greed was good. Unions and regulations were portrayed as obstacles. And what did that bring us? The speculative bubble of the dot-com boom, followed by the unrestrained credit excesses that led to the Great Recession of 2007–2008, which devastated small homeowners.

Those two crises showed that letting capitalism run unchecked leads to instability, wealth concentration, and periodic crises. Look at the United States today: the economy seems to be doing well, but more than half of all private consumption comes from just the top 20% of earners. We’re seeing taller penthouses, bigger yachts, and greater private art collections—but not more investment in public parks, schools, or health systems. Public goods that help ordinary citizens gain security are being weakened, while systems that help the very rich accumulate even more wealth are being strengthened.

At that point, capitalism shifts from being a powerful engine of progress to something that actually undermines the social bonds, confidence, optimism, and shared values that sustain social cohesion and a well-functioning democracy. That’s why I think so many of today’s democracies are in a revolutionary situation that’s opening the way for authoritarian leaders. We’ve allowed capitalism to go too far in the direction of wealth concentration. That’s a normal cycle, but I believe it always has to be regulated to some degree.

From Liberal Order to Ethno-Nationalist Empire

“No Kings” protest against the Trump administration, New York City, USA — June 14, 2025. Demonstrators march down Fifth Avenue as part of the nationwide “No Kings” movement opposing President Donald Trump and his administration. Photo: Dreamstime.

And lastly, Professor Goldstone, your comparative work on historical state crises suggests that revolutionary waves accompany periods of hegemonic decline. Does the erosion of the liberal, rule-based order—through geopolitical fragmentation, trade nationalism, and elite polarization—mark the onset of a new world-systemic revolutionary cycle comparable to those surrounding 1789, 1848, or 1917?

Professor Jack Goldstone: Yes, I think they do. There’s no question that today we are in a worldwide pattern of ethno-nationalist populism. It has already triumphed in Russia and China, where there’s a very strong emphasis on national and ethnic identity as the basis for national cohesion, and that identity is embodied by a strong leader—whether it’s Putin or Xi Jinping. That pattern was once seen as the antithesis of Western democratic values but has actually turned out to be the leading edge of a global ethno-nationalist authoritarian movement.

We see this with the rise of anti-immigration parties. They’ve taken power in Hungary, briefly in Poland, and they’re becoming a larger part of coalitions across European countries. And clearly, in the United States, we now have a government willing to enact authoritarian measures against foreigners—against immigrants if they are suspected of being illegal. We’re bombing fishing boats on the high seas in an act of war to protect our borders from drugs.

The motivating idea now behind the American government is “America First.” “America for Americans”. There’s even a movement to end birthright citizenship and say that you can’t just be born on American territory—you have to be born of American citizens. I don’t know if that will become law or not—it has never been the case—but the fact that we now have a government pursuing that goal, restricting citizenship, becoming more hostile to foreigners, and becoming harshly militarized against suspected illegal immigrants, shows we’re in a worldwide wave of ethno-nationalist populism that has gained power because of the ineffectiveness, turmoil, and collapse of trust in democratic institutions.

Now, you ask, is this like other waves of revolution? Yes—and all waves of revolution are eventually succeeded by a period of consolidation, but then often change. The French Revolution went through phases of republican, authoritarian, and Napoleonic empire—even the restoration of the monarchy. But then, a couple of decades later, there was another revolution to promote constitutional rule. And after several cycles, the French government eventually settled into democracy after 1870.

Across Europe in the 1930s, you had ethno-nationalist authoritarian leaders. This was true of Eastern European states, Germany, of course, and the countries Germany conquered. There were a few exceptions, but for the most part, Europe was given over to dictatorship and ethno-nationalist ideology. After World War II, that reversed.

Hope Beyond the Authoritarian Tide

Now we’re in another wave that reminds me very much of the 1930s—weak democracies accused of being corrupt, elites under attack, and popular strongman authoritarian leaders rising while mainstream parties are cast aside. The mainstream parties have failed in France. Right now, Labour looks very weak in Britain—even after winning a huge majority, they seem ineffective. The ethno-nationalist British Reform Party looks like it’s gaining strength. In France, it looks like the National Rally will be effective.

So, we have a global populist authoritarian movement—and they’re aware of it. These authoritarian leaders meet at The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), share notes, encourage one another, and actively support each other in their quest to create ethno-nationalist authoritarian states.

I’m worried that the 2020s will look like the 1930s in that regard. And, as I say, there may be wars as a result. I don’t rule out the possibility that America and China may go to war over Taiwan. We already see this endless war in Ukraine. I don’t know where others may break out, but ethno-nationalism tends to breed conflict because, by its nature, it’s exclusionary and often hostile.

So, I expect the next ten years to be very difficult. But I’m hopeful that from the late 2030s onward, we will see the next generation of young people demanding more accountability, more freedom, and wanting to use new technologies to build a better world for themselves. So, I remain optimistic in the long run, even though pessimistic, unfortunately, for the next five to ten years.