In a compelling interview with ECPS, political sociologist Dr. Josh Roose unpacks the 2025 Australian federal election, arguing it marked “a resounding rejection of Trumpist-style populism.” Dr. Roose explores how Liberal leader Peter Dutton’s strongman image backfired, while Labor’s inclusive yet grounded masculinity resonated with urban voters—especially women. He warns, however, of far-right undercurrents and rising generational and economic divides. Reflecting on political masculinities, Islamophobia, and online extremism, Dr. Roose calls for educational and legislative reforms to bolster democratic resilience. A timely deep dive into Australia’s populist landscape—and a must-read for scholars and studenst of global politics.
Interview by Selcuk Gultasli
In a sweeping analysis of Australia’s 2025 federal election results, Dr. Josh Roose—a political sociologist and Associate Professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation—offers a compelling assessment of what he calls “a rejection of Trumpist-style populism in Australia.” Speaking to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Roose contextualizes the electoral defeat of Liberal Party leader Peter Dutton within a broader international trend, noting, “What we saw in Canada—where Trump backed the right and attacked Canada, and people mobilized against that and favoured the political left—played out in a very similar vein here.”
Throughout the interview, Dr. Roose explores the dynamics of Australia’s right-wing populism, which has been notably influenced by US political discourse. He underscores how attempts to “personalize Trump through Dutton” and flirt with alt-right masculinity narratives—such as “strong men create good times, weak men create tough times”—largely backfired, particularly among urban professionals and women voters. In this context, he points to Anthony Albanese’s reelection as emblematic of a political style that is both masculine and inclusive: “He doesn’t walk away from traditional working-class masculinity… but he does so in a way that is far more popular and acceptable to women.”
While the Labor Party’s landslide victory marks a historic realignment, Dr. Roose also cautions against complacency. He observes that far-right parties, including Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and the pro-Trump “Trumpet of Patriots,” collectively garnered 10–12% of the vote in some electorates—indicating persistent, if marginalized, populist undercurrents.
Dr. Roose also situates these electoral shifts in the context of deeper transformations in political legitimacy and authority. “The traditional authoritarian mode of politics with a strongman leader… is being resoundingly rejected,” he argues, especially by younger and more diverse electorates. However, he notes that Australia’s deeply masculinist political culture is only gradually giving way to more inclusive norms, catalyzed in part by pandemic-era changes to work and caregiving.
Drawing on his expertise in counter-extremism, Dr. Roose concludes with a call for civic and institutional interventions, from regulating online hate speech to embedding models of “healthy masculinity” in educational curricula. “We need a masculinity that is strong, but also nurturing… capable of moving beyond the ego,” he asserts.
Dr. Roose’s analysis offers both an in-depth case study of Australia’s evolving political terrain and a timely contribution to the global debate on the future of populism, masculinity, and democratic resilience in the post-Trump era.
Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Josh Roose.
It’s a Rejection of Trumpist-Style Populism Here in Australia
Professor Josh Roose, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In the light of your work on populist political masculinities, how do you interpret the electorate’s resounding rejection of Peter Dutton’s leadership? Does this signify a critical juncture for the trajectory of right-wing populism in Australia?
Dr. Josh Roose: Great question. There’s a lot to unpack from this election, and we are nowhere near having all the data necessary to do so. My broad take on this comes down to two or three main points. First, it’s a rejection of Trumpist-style populism here in Australia. What we saw in Canada—where Trump backed the right and attacked Canada, leading people to mobilize against that and favor the political left—played out in a very similar vein here.
Australia hasn’t been immune to, for example, Trump-style tariffs, nor to the influence of members of the right faction of the Liberal opposition. For clarity, in Australia, the Liberal Party is the political right, unlike the US. Elements of Trumpist populist politics were embraced. For instance, one of the key figures, Jacinta Price—a prominent Aboriginal politician opposed to the Voice referendum, which would have given Indigenous Australians a voice to Parliament—was seen wearing “Make Australia Great Again” hats. She said this slogan publicly on the campaign trail.
There was also an effort to personalize Trump through Dutton. He even spoke about bringing in a DOJ-style department in Australia. That went down like an absolute lead balloon, particularly in urban areas with educated professionals.
That said, and somewhat concerningly, there was a surge to the far right that hasn’t yet been fully unpacked. In many seats, the One Nation Party—led by Pauline Hanson, a well-known figure on the populist right—performed strongly. They have, in some ways, become a more mainstream right-wing party, gaining more votes.
Additionally, the embarrassingly pro-Trump party called “The Trumpet of Patriots,” led by a mining billionaire, didn’t gain seats but still garnered 2–3% of the vote in many electorates. Combined with One Nation, that amounts to roughly 10–12% in a lot of areas.
So, while there was a surge toward the governing Labor Party, there was also a push to the right. The Liberal Party now finds itself wedged between its hard-right base and its more centrist, slightly progressive wing. Just today, they held a post-election leadership vote. The result was 28 to 25 in favor of the Moderates. The Australian Liberal Party now has its first female leader in the party’s history.
There Was a Strong Repudiation of Trumpist Politics
To what extent can Albanese’s re-election be read as a repudiation of the rhetorical and symbolic frameworks commonly associated with ‘strongman’ populism, or does it rather suggest a recalibrated centrism in response to global political volatility?
Dr. Josh Roose: Another good question. In many ways, Peter Dutton, the opposition leader, really struggled to overcome his past as a strongman. He had various portfolios when the Liberal Party was in government—Home Affairs, among others—and he was a former policeman who spoke extremely firmly about crime and other areas, which are traditional fodder for the political right and the populist right. So he struggled to overcome that.
Albanese paints himself very much as a centrist, moderate leader—the everyman. He shows up at Rugby League games, so he doesn’t walk away from masculinity or distance himself from traditional working-class masculinity. He seeks to embrace it, but he does so in a way that is far more popular and acceptable to women. Female voters, in particular, really turned significantly against the Liberal opposition in this election.
So, in the context of what’s going on globally, that played an important role. We’re yet to determine—based on the data, interviews, and upcoming research—just how important it was. But I do think there was a strong repudiation of Trumpist politics. Trump’s done more in his first 100 days to unite the world, in many respects—particularly among people in countries with elections coming up. You could argue that the conclave and the new Pope are also, to some extent, potentially indicative of this.
So, I think we’re seeing a reaction and a backlash to Trumpist politics in the developed world. And it will be really interesting to see how that plays out in the developing world.
No Appetite for Trumpism Even Amid a Cost-of-Living Crisis
Given the transnational dimensions of populism, particularly the re-election of Donald Trump in the US, how do you assess the ‘Trump effect’ in shaping Australian political sensibilities and its potential backfire in this electoral cycle?
Dr. Josh Roose: Trump has a strong following among segments of the political right here. They embrace not only the ultra-nationalist, self-interested approach, but also a nostalgia for a long-lost past that he successfully mobilized in the US election—this idea that men are being hard done by, the notion of “woke” politics, and so on. There’s still a strong element of that in Australian politics. By no means has that gone away.
In fact, elements of the opposition party have talked about needing to double down, arguing that the only reason they didn’t win the election was because they weren’t strong enough in embracing that extreme rhetoric. But I think, for the most part, there is no appetite for it—which is quite amazing given that we’re facing a significant cost of living crisis here, a global phenomenon at the moment. Housing is increasingly unaffordable; the average price of a house in Sydney and Melbourne now hovers around a million dollars. We’ve got a younger generation locked out of the housing market.
But what we’re seeing is that the older generation—the so-called boomer generation—is effectively becoming a minority in the electorate. We’re seeing younger people come through who are looking for more progressive policies and politics that speak to them, that resonate with their concerns about building a better life, having a chance of owning a home, starting a family, and so on.
So, it’s going to be really interesting to see how this plays out. But, it’s fair to say that, unless something quite incredible happens, this is now a two-term Labor government. Given their majority—I think it’s 91 seats in Parliament, which is just about historically unprecedented—we could be looking at at least three terms, possibly four. That gives the governing Labor Party a real chance to institute a progressivist agenda. They’ve got to play their cards right—they can’t come across as radical or overly focused on dramatic change. This could shape Australian politics for the next 20 to 30 years if things continue on their current trajectory.
Strongman Model Is Being Rejected by Young and Female Voters
Considering your research on political identity and citizenship, how might the 2025 election result reshape our understanding of political legitimacy and representative authority in the context of populist decline?
Dr. Josh Roose: If we’re talking about authority, we’ve got to look at what resonates with young people, because young people are increasingly shaping political outcomes—and women are increasingly shaping political outcomes. So, this authoritarian, hierarchical decision-making model, which has defined Australian politics since Federation—over a hundred years—is becoming less viable.
In a world of social media, where everyone is a publisher, where everyone has an opinion and demands to be heard, especially in a society with an education system that encourages critical thinking and resilience, I don’t think there’s an appetite for the traditional authoritarian mode of politics with a strongman leader. I think people resoundingly reject it.
Ironically, those who are most susceptible to such narratives tend to be the weakest and most vulnerable—the people who feel dispossessed, marginalized, alienated, disrespected, who experience humiliation and shame. They’re looking for someone strong to get behind, to pull them out of their challenges. But Australia appears to be navigating economic crises, international security, and other key issues reasonably well while keeping people onside.
So, while we do have an increase in extremism—particularly among young people—on a par with what we’re seeing in the UK, it is not necessarily playing out as mass mobilization toward a strongman leader.
This Is Labor’s Moment in Australia
Does the resurgence of major-party dominance and marginalization of the populist right suggest a broader democratic correction, or might it risk complacency in addressing the socio-economic grievances that often underline populist support?
Dr. Josh Roose: Good question. I think in the context of our preferential voting system—first and foremost—voting is compulsory, which is a real strength of Australian democracy. You line up, you vote, and then you go get what we call a “democracy sausage,” which is a sausage on a slice of bread, and people post photos of that to show they voted. You get fined if you don’t vote, so while people can vote informally, voting is really a requirement of all citizens. To that extent, you get much better buy-in to the political debate and the campaign, because people have to show up. It’s a key part of the responsibility of citizenship here.
That said, there’s been a lot of talk about the rise of minority parties. The vote for major parties has been falling year on year. The Labor Party used to hover in the mid-40s, then dropped to around 40%, and is now hovering at about 33% of the vote. The Liberal Party slipped below them. The National Party, which is more of a regional party, and the Liberal Party tend to combine—so it’s called the Liberal National Coalition—and they form government.
Labor has typically had to work with the Greens. But over the last three years, the Australian Greens have taken a more extreme bent. They’ve sought to consolidate real political power. The environment has been put on the back burner, and they’ve embraced social issues. For example, they’ve come out very strongly and worked with Muslim communities on the issue of Gaza and recognition. That might have alienated some among their base.
But for many Australians, there is a broad resistance to extremism at either end of the political spectrum. Some of the rhetoric and aggression from certain politicians proved detrimental. As a result, the Greens failed to gain any seats at the federal level and, in fact, may have lost three. The Labor Party’s victory in this election is historically unprecedented in terms of its strength. They no longer need the Greens to govern. While there had been serious talk of a minority government requiring Green support to pass legislation, Labor now holds full control in the Lower House—though they still need Green backing in the Senate.
Despite the major parties’ overall decline in vote share, this appears to be Labor’s moment. They’ve spoken of becoming the “natural party of governance”—a mantle once claimed by the Liberal Party. Their ambition is to remain in power for 10, 15, even 20 years, much like the Menzies government of the 1960s and 1970s. That is their goal.
Dutton Tried to Tap into ‘Alt-Right Masculinity’
Your scholarship explores ‘protest masculinities’ as fertile ground for right-wing mobilization. In what ways did Peter Dutton’s campaign draw on, or fail to effectively deploy, gendered narratives of crisis and control?
Dr. Josh Roose: Very early on in the campaign, Peter Dutton referenced a dominant trope seen frequently in more extreme right masculinity spaces that I’ve studied—a narrative I haven’t seen cited elsewhere. It’s the saying: “strong men create good times, weak men create tough times,” and so on. You’ve probably heard the narrative. It’s this idea that when times are good, men become weak, and only in tough times do strong men come to the fore and shape society. He adopted some of that language—alt-right type masculinity that’s been prominent online. It was clear he was tapping into it and attempting to mobilize it.
To be fair, however, the Liberal Party also came out incredibly strongly against anti-Semitism—not in a “Trumpian” way, but in a clear and firm manner. There has been a significant rise in anti-Semitism here. They also came out strongly against neo-Nazis.
There’s a neo-Nazi movement in Australia that’s attempting to grow. They’ve been hijacking public events like Anzac Day, trying to mobilize and exploit young men on the margins. While their numbers haven’t grown exponentially—maybe from a few dozen to around 100—they are very loud, very active, and there was a resounding rejection of that type of extreme right from the mainstream right-wing political party. That helps explain why some people have been pushed further right—why those fringes have been radicalized even more.
But where is this going? I think, ultimately, when you have a government with this kind of majority, they can implement meaningful changes over time—changes that will directly target extremism, particularly the far right. We’ve already seen strong legislative actions, such as banning the Nazi salute, the swastika, and other hate symbols. We know there’s likely to be further action in that space—positive action, to that extent.
Australia’s Deeply Masculinist Politics Is Starting to Shift
How do you situate the performance of masculine-coded populism—often framed through control, toughness, and sovereignty—in a political environment increasingly shaped by demands for inclusivity and post-pandemic care politics?
Dr. Josh Roose: There’s a lot of moving parts to that question. I think what we see—even on the left side of politics here—is an embrace of masculinity as a mobilizing factor. Let me take a step back. Australia produces some of the world’s leading scholars in both masculinity and feminist studies. Think of figures like Germaine Greer, or in the field of masculinity, people like R.W. Connell, Michael Flood, and others. Our gender politics are incredibly dynamic and prominent in public life.
While Indigenous Australians have lived here for 60,000 to 70,000 years, the modern nation-state is relatively young. In this modern context, gender politics are very much at the forefront. Because of that, we’ve seen strong resistance—not just from the right, but also from elements of the left, particularly the trade union movement—toward what is perceived as being too soft, too aligned with femininity, or too accepting of a "masculinity of care." There’s some valuable literature on this, also written by Australian scholars.
It’s a complex issue, but I think the dichotomy is beginning to be challenged. It’s a process that will take time. Historically, Australia has had overwhelmingly masculine political leadership. For much of the 20th century, we were governed under the White Australia Policy. Multiculturalism only came into effect in the 1970s and 1980s. We’ve had only one female Prime Minister, and she came to power through what we call “knifing” the previous leader. She received a level of abuse for that which no male leader has ever experienced.
So, we do have a deeply masculinist political culture. However, the COVID-19 pandemic—working from home, the rise in care responsibilities—has begun to shift things. These changes are happening in ways we haven’t fully studied or understood yet.
But I do think, with three or four potential terms of a left-leaning government—and a Cabinet that is, for the first time in Australian history, made up of more than 50% women—we’re likely to see the political landscape change significantly over the next decade, particularly as younger generations rise. Exactly how that will unfold remains to be seen.
We’re Seeing the Beginnings of a New Class Divide in Australia
With economic precarity and housing affordability at the center of public concern, how might evolving expressions of masculine discontent shift political alignments among traditionally right-leaning working-class male voters?
Dr. Josh Roose: I think we’re seeing it—and I’ve discussed this elsewhere. People have shifted away from the Liberal Party and are increasingly critical of it. The Liberals have just elected a moderate as their leader—the first female leader and a moderate in the party’s history. That happened today (May 13, 2025), and it’s a pretty significant event.
It was also a very close vote within the party room, highlighting internal divisions. We know that men in Australia—much like in the rest of the world—are increasingly shifting to the political right. There was stronger support for far-right-style politics. While still a small minority, about 10% of the vote is not negligible and must be taken seriously.
At the same time, there’s growing tension within the major opposition party about its stance on economic precarity and working-class issues. The opposition has talked about becoming the party of the outer suburbs—areas where real economic struggle is concentrated. These are people who own homes and cars, are trying to put their kids through school, but can’t keep up with mortgage payments and are stuck in long commutes. The party assumed it would automatically capture that demographic—but it failed. It didn’t do enough to make the race competitive, let alone win government.
So, I think we’re witnessing a shift in political alignment. Smaller far-right parties are emerging. There was even talk from neo-Nazi groups about forming a political party, though they were far too late to register and, realistically, would never be allowed to register in Australia. Still, the fact that the idea was floated is notable.
We’re also seeing the emergence of a significant generational and economic cleavage in Australia—something I never thought I’d see. A new class system appears to be forming. Australia has long prided itself on being an egalitarian society, at least in principle. But increasingly, if you’re not born into a family that owns property, it’s incredibly difficult to enter the housing market at all.
So yes, I think we’re seeing the beginnings of a new class divide—one that will reshape the political landscape, including the major parties, while populist politicians on the fringes will continue to try and exploit the resulting anger and anxiety.
Anti-Muslim Racism Has Shifted—But It’s Still There
To what extent does Islamophobia remain a structuring logic within Australian right-wing populist discourse, and how has it evolved in the context of declining electoral returns for its chief proponents?
Dr. Josh Roose: It was a really interesting political campaign because the Muslim community became very active—I’ve written about this. They argued that neither major political party was representing their interests, particularly around the issue of Gaza.
A number of Labor Party politicians were campaigning in seats that had previously been somewhat marginal and were now being targeted on the basis of their stance on Gaza, due to high Muslim population concentrations—around 35 to 40% in some areas. There was an attempt to mobilize a Muslim vote, with three or four different groups emerging under names like “Muslim Votes Matter.” In some cases, these groups gained 15–20% of the vote. So, while they didn’t shape the overall outcome, they were influential.
Racism is embedded in Australia as a settler-colonial society with a long history of exclusion and discrimination. It persists in institutions, structures, parliaments, and businesses. However, the type of racism evolves over time. What we’re seeing now is more of an effort by the far right to put migration and immigration at the center of political debate. There’s this narrative—though factually unsupported—that Australia is being "flooded" by Indians, Chinese, or others.
With regard to Muslims, the evolution has been particularly interesting. For the first 10–15 years post-9/11, anti-Muslim racism was at a peak—especially during the rise of Islamic State (IS), when young men were going off to fight abroad. There was a lot of tabloid coverage and moral panic. But now, we’re looking at second-, third-, even fourth-generation Australian Muslims—highly culturally literate, deeply embedded in the fabric of society, business owners, homeowners, building wealth. That integration has shifted public perception.
There’s been a noticeable political alignment between Muslim communities and the Greens, despite some ideological contradictions. So, while Islamophobia or anti-Muslim racism is still present and remains problematic—and likely always will be to some extent—I think we’ve seen a marked shift away from its peak in the last 5 to 10 years in the Australian context.
“We Need a Masculinity That Is Strong—But Also Nurturing”
And finally, drawing from your work on countering right-wing extremism, what institutional, educational, or civic interventions would you prioritize to consolidate democratic resilience and pre-empt future cycles of cultural backlash politics?
Dr. Josh Roose: To me, there are a number of layers. Social media is a massive issue here, and I know that there are various cases ongoing around that. We’ve got to hold social media companies accountable for what they’re allowing on their platforms. We need more responsive laws that prohibit, for example, unregulated anonymity—where people can say and do what they like and get away with it. Why can someone publish hate in Australia, from their home or in a public space on their phone, share it online, threaten, abuse, harass, and humiliate others, and not be held accountable? If they said the same things in a physical public space, they’d be arrested under our laws. So, there are significant issues around what people can say, do, and publish online. That’s not to say I want to get caught up in the freedom of speech debate, but where it crosses the threshold into hate and violence, it must be better regulated and enforced.
In terms of education, I think resilience is a key element of the Australian curriculum—there are entire units dedicated to teaching resilience to young people. But I think the construction of healthy masculinity is critical. A masculinity that, on the one hand, is strong, resistant to shock, capable of dealing with difficulty and challenge, embraces physicality, and even a bit of stoicism—but on the other hand, is caring, nurturing, loving, and capable of moving beyond the ego: doing housework, allowing vulnerability, and so on.
There’s a lot of really good work being done in that space, but it’s not systematic. It’s not embedded at a curriculum level. And wherever it does pop up, there’s always resistance from some parents claiming that it’s an attempt to "turn children woke."
We’re still seeing this Americanization of our right-wing politics. The sooner that stops—when the right develops some maturity and a bit of introspection, and rejects this Americanized, extreme-right style politics, including Trumpism—the sooner they’ll reconnect with people. But honestly, the chances of that happening are low.
