In this commentary, Dr. Lilliam Arrieta examines how Nayib Bukele’s rise in El Salvador illustrates the speed with which elected populist leadership can evolve into authoritarian consolidation. Focusing on the erosion of judicial independence, she traces how the removal of Supreme Court justices, forced judicial retirements, and the weakening of constitutional safeguards have concentrated power in the executive. Dr. Arrieta situates these developments within a broader Latin American pattern in which populist leaders undermine courts, militarize public security, and weaken checks and balances in the name of popular sovereignty and order. While Bukele’s security policies have attracted “international admiration,” the article highlights their deeper institutional costs for fundamental rights, judicial protection, democratic accountability, and the long-term resilience of constitutional democracy.
By Lilliam Arrieta*
El Salvador is a clear example of how quickly and extensively populist rulers can consolidate power and move towards authoritarianism once democratically elected. In the last two decades, across Latin America, several populist presidents gained office through elections but rapidly took steps to undermine democracy, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, or Evo Morales in Bolivia. These types of leaders often present themselves as messianic figures—outsiders and saviors—claiming to be the only solution to the problems created by traditional political actors: corruption, nepotism, insecurity, inflation, to name a few, and often the more pressing issues for a concrete population. Aside from being or claiming to be outsiders, a second common trait that these strong individual politicians share is their communication skills. They do not merely communicate with the public; they claim to speak for the people, asserting that they embody the largely forgotten majorities themselves (Temelkuran, 2019). Finally, a third distinctive trait is the disregard for traditional checks and balances, especially for judicial review of the Executive’s policies.
El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele embodies these three elements. One of the most pressing examples is the quick measures taken after winning the majority of seats in congress during the 2021 elections. Having obtained a large majority of congressional seats (Martinez, 2021), Bukele’s party quickly enacted laws that undermined democracy and dismissed all opposition as his party claimed to do so in the name of “the people.” During the inaugural session of that legislature, Nueva Ideas (New Ideas) party members voted to remove five justices of the Supreme Court without due process of law or any attempt to conduct a proper impeachment procedure (Arauz, 2021). This unconstitutional removal gave Bukele control over the three branches of government. In the following 2024 congressional elections, after having passed legislation to reduce congressional seats from 84 to 60, the ruling party won 57 of them, consolidating total control over the three branches of Government.
This quick overview of the Salvadoran experience shows that Bukele seems to have followed the same patterns as other Latin American populist leaders. Experiences from Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela had already demonstrated that, to consolidate and maintain power, populist leaders seek control over two main institutions. In no particular order, first, controlling the Armed Forces—and the Police—allows presidents to suppress dissent and instill fear among the population (Bernal, 2021; Infodefensa, 2021; EFE, 2021). Second, reducing the autonomy of the Judiciary.
Authoritarian leaders often seek to dominate the courts, especially the Supreme Court, to bypass legal constraints on their power (Foa, 2021). Checks and balances are considered obstacles, making the dismantling of judicial independence a priority; for example, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2008, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 2010, and Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2017 were able to extend their time in office beyond the constitutional limit thanks to Supreme Court rulings (Sala de lo Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, 2008; Sala de lo Constitucional, sentencia No.06 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Managua, 2010; Sala Plena del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2017). However, before obtaining control of the judiciary, authoritarian populists often target this branch and accuse it of corruption or ineptitude to prevent unelected public officers from obstructing the Executive’s policies.
The undermining of judicial independence in El Salvador occurred especially through two actions taken as soon as the president gained congressional majority. First, on May 1 of 2021, Nuevas Ideas’ representatives voted to remove five Supreme Court justices without due process of law (Arauz, 2021). Their terms were not set to expire until 2027, but they were arbitrarily removed because of a few previous rulings that were averse to some presidential measures (DW, 2020). It was a power-grab move that violated the Constitution and existing legislation. The ruling party justified it by claiming to have acted on the people’s behalf and accordingly to their will. That same day, congress appointed five new justices whose rulings have since consistently favored the President (BBC, 2021). One of those rulings was the landmark decision that removed a corner stone of Salvadoran constitutional democracy which for more than 35 years prevented presidents from seeking reelection creating a way for Bukele to seek his second term.
Second, early retirement and transfers of career judges. On August 3, 2021, Congress passed a law forcing over 150 judges into early retirement, violating article 182 of the Salvadoran Constitution, which grants the Supreme Court the exclusive authority to appoint and discipline members of the Judiciary. Following this legislation, the Supreme Court appointed a group of new judges (Cornejo, 2021), many of whom have already reversed rulings against political opponents of the President. A few independent judges that were not removed through the early retirement act resigned due to pressures or were transferred to less influential positions (Oliva, 2022; Calderón, 2021).
An assessment by the Latinobarómetro Corporation in 2021 noted that “Bukele has shown that democracy exists only as long as it serves his needs. When it fails to do so, he imposes his will by force. El Salvador is on the verge of becoming a populist autocracy, with significant public support, reminiscent of the early days of Hugo Chávez” (Latinobarómetro Corporation, 2021). The resulting control over the three branches of government has not only undermined democracy or judicial independence in an abstract or institutional manner, but it has also affected citizens’ rights in very concrete ways, as shown by the overwhelming number of people detained under the state of exception, some for over three years, without having had their day in court.
Almost 100,000 people have been detained in El Salvador during a four-year long state of exception, but practically no one has been sentenced, and according to human rights organizations, many of these arrests can be considered arbitrary detentions under international standards (WOLA, 2024). The Constitutional Chamber has failed to rule on over 3,000 habeas corpus petitions it has received since the declaration of the state of exception in March 2022 (El Salvador.com, 2024), effectively neglecting the one judicial protection citizens have against arbitrary detentions in El Salvador (DPLF, 2024).
In May 2025, two prominent lawyers, Ruth López and Enrique Anaya Barraza,—widely recognized for their outspoken criticism of government corruption, human rights violations, and systemic abuses—were detained on charges of embezzlement and money laundering. These charges appear to have been used as a means of silencing dissent and creating a climate of intimidation among other critics and independent voices. The lack of judicial independence has had a profoundly adverse impact on their situation (EDH, 2025). Bail was denied, and both lawyers were remanded in custody pending trial. Their legal representatives have reported serious obstacles to maintaining regular and confidential communication with them. At present, no effective judicial review exists to challenge these apparently politically motivated arrests, as no judge has thus far been willing to issue rulings contrary to what are widely understood to be measures directed by the President or the Executive Branch.
Many countries today appear eager to replicate President Nayib Bukele’s approach to reducing crime and violence, often citing El Salvador’s dramatic decline in homicide rates as evidence of the effectiveness of his policies. What is less frequently acknowledged, however, is the institutional and normative cost underlying these outcomes: the dismantling of checks and balances, the erosion of judicial independence, the weakening of safeguards against human rights violations, and the expansion of a heavily militarized security apparatus. The risks of these developments have been repeatedly illustrated in recent Latin American history.
Importantly, such concentrations of authoritarian power and sustained violations of fundamental rights cannot occur without the curtailment of judicial autonomy, as independent courts constitute a central mechanism for constraining executive authority and enforcing constitutional limits. At the same time, the broader societal significance of judicial independence often remains difficult to communicate to the public, owing to a range of historical, institutional, and sociopolitical factors that lie beyond the scope of this commentary but help explain the relative ease with which judicial erosion can proceed.
These are not abstract concerns; they are lived realities in El Salvador. While the model may appear effective in the short term, its long-term implications for freedom, independent justice, and democratic governance are profound and reverting its impact may take a long time and more than one generation
(*) Dr. Lilliam Arrieta is a Salvadoran lawyer and law professor who has dedicated most of her professional career to teaching and researching topics related to the rule of law and, most recently, gender studies. Dr. Arrieta holds a PhD in Law.
References
Agencia EFE. (2021). “Miles de salvadoreños marchan contra Bukele cuando se acerca a su medio mandato.” EFE.10.18.2021. https://www.efe.com/efe/america/sociedad/miles-de-salvadorenos-marchan- contra-bukele-cuando-se-acerca-a-su-medio-mandato/20000013-4654153
Arauz, S. y otros (2021). “Bukele usa a la nueva Asamblea para tomar control de la Sala de lo Constitucional y la Fiscalía.” El Faro, 05.02.2021. https://elfaro.net/es/202105/el_salvador/25451/Bukele-usa-a-la-nueva-Asamblea-para-tomar-control-de-la-Sala-de-lo-Constitucional-y-la-Fiscal%C3%ADa.htm
BBC (2021). “El Salvador: la nueva Asamblea Legislativa, afín a Bukele, destituye a los jueces del Constitucional y al fiscal general.” 05.02.2021. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-56953799
Bernal, D. y otros (2021) “El Ejército, el que más crece en presupuesto.” La Prensa Gráfica. 10.02.2021, https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/El-Ejercito-el-que-mas-crece-en-presupuesto-20211001-0109.html
Calderón, B. (2021). “Juez Juan Antonio Durán denuncia acoso de la Policía afuera de su casa: ‘Y dice que no es dictadura. No nos detendrán’.” LPG. 19.09.2021. https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Juez-Juan-Antonio-Duran-denuncia-acoso-de-la-Policia-afuera-de-su-casa-Y-dice-que-no-es-dictadura.-No-nos-detendran-20210919-0061.html
Cornejo, I. (2021). “Magistrados sustitutos revierten arresto domiciliar para Ernesto Muyshondt.” El Mundo. 10.02.2021. https://diario.elmundo.sv/magistrados-sustitutos-revierten-arresto-domiciliar-para-ernesto-muyshondt/
DPLF. (2024). “Desprotección judicial: la respuesta de la Sala de lo Constitucional durante el régimen de excepción en El Salvador.” June 2024. https://back.dplf.org/es/resources/desproteccion-judicial-la-respuesta-de-la-sala-de-lo-constitucional-durante-el-regimen-d-1?_gl=1*d714ok*_ga*MjkzNTkyOTIyLjE3MzQxMTAyODQ.*_ga_5EQV0E6PSH*MTc0MzA5NDM1Ny41LjEuMTc0MzA5NDM5Ni4wLjAuMA
DW. (2020). “Supremo salvadoreño anula decreto de Bukele que rige cuarentena por COVID-19.” 09/06/2020. https://www.dw.com/es/supremo-salvadore%C3%B1o-anula-decreto-de-bukele-que-rige-cuarentena-por-covid-19/a-53739072
EDH. (2025). “Alargan detención de abogados Ruth López y Enrique Anaya.” El Diario de Hoy. 12.12.2025. https://www.eldiariodehoy.com/opinion/alargan-detencion-de-abogados-ruth-lopez-y-enrique-anaya/51961/2025/
El Salvador.com. (2024). “MOVIR y Tutela Legal piden a Corte Suprema agilizar respuestas de habeas corpus.” 13.08.2024. https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/regimen-de-excepcion-tutela-legal-movir-piden-respuestas-corte/1161744/2024/
Foa, R. “Why Strongmen Win in Weak States.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 32, no. 1, Jan. 2021, pp. 52-65. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-strongmen-win-in-weak-states/
Latinobarómetro Corporation, Informe 2021: Adiós a Macondo, Santiago, Chile, October 2021, p. 23 (Bukele ha demostrado que la democracia llega hasta donde le funciona para lo que él necesita. Y cuándo esta no hace lo que el necesita, se impone por la fuerza. El Salvador es un candidato serio a transformarse en una autocracia populista, con altos niveles de apoyo del pueblo. Algo parecido a las características iniciales de Hugo Chávez), at https://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp
Martinez, L. (2021). ”¿Quiénes son los diputados de la nueva Asamblea Legislativa de El Salvador?” El Salvador.com, 05.05.2021, at https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/asamblea-legislativa/834750/2021/
Oliva, X. (2022). “Denuncian hostigamiento e intimidación contra juez que llevó caso de masacre de El Mozote.” GatoEncerrado. 18.04.2022. https://gatoencerrado.news/2022/04/18/denuncian-hostigamiento-e-intimidacion-contra-juez-que-llevo- caso-de-masacre-de-el-mozote/
Redacción de Infodefensa. “El Salvador duplicará sus efectivos militares de 20.000 a 40.000 en cinco años.” 07.05.2021. https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3110862/salvador-duplicara-efectivos-militares-20000-40000-cinco-anos
Temelkuran, E. (2019). Como perder un país, Anagrama, Barcelona, capítulo 2: Trastoca la lógica y atenta contra el lenguaje, pp. 52.
Sala de lo Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, December 11, 2008, reference 08-1610. https://supremainjusticia.org/test/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/N%C2%B0-20-TSJ-aval%C3%B3-%E2%80%9Csegundo%E2%80%9D-referendo-sobre-la-reelecci%C3%B3n-indefinida-de-Ch%C3%A1vez.pdf
Sala de lo Constitucional, sentencia No.06 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Managua, 09.30.2010. https://www.poderjudicial.gob.ni/pjupload/rp/pdf/Sentencia_N%C3%BAmero_6_30_Sep_2010_Reelecci %C3%B3n.pdf
Sala Plena del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional de Bolivia, SENTENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL PLURINACIONAL 0084/2017, Sucre, 28 de noviembre de 2017, at https://edwinfigueroag.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/sentencia-0084-2017-tcp-bolivia-reeleccion-evo- morales.pdf
WOLA (2024). “Régimen de Excepción en El Salvador: de una medida de seguridad a un política de Estado.” Diciembre 2024, at https://www.wola.org/es/analysis/regimen-de-excepcion-el-salvador-medida-seguridad-politica-estado/
The Bukele Model: Populist Power, Judicial Erosion, and Authoritarian Consolidation in El Salvador
In this commentary, Dr. Lilliam Arrieta examines how Nayib Bukele’s rise in El Salvador illustrates the speed with which elected populist leadership can evolve into authoritarian consolidation. Focusing on the erosion of judicial independence, she traces how the removal of Supreme Court justices, forced judicial retirements, and the weakening of constitutional safeguards have concentrated power in the executive. Dr. Arrieta situates these developments within a broader Latin American pattern in which populist leaders undermine courts, militarize public security, and weaken checks and balances in the name of popular sovereignty and order. While Bukele’s security policies have attracted “international admiration,” the article highlights their deeper institutional costs for fundamental rights, judicial protection, democratic accountability, and the long-term resilience of constitutional democracy.
By Lilliam Arrieta*
El Salvador is a clear example of how quickly and extensively populist rulers can consolidate power and move towards authoritarianism once democratically elected. In the last two decades, across Latin America, several populist presidents gained office through elections but rapidly took steps to undermine democracy, such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, or Evo Morales in Bolivia. These types of leaders often present themselves as messianic figures—outsiders and saviors—claiming to be the only solution to the problems created by traditional political actors: corruption, nepotism, insecurity, inflation, to name a few, and often the more pressing issues for a concrete population. Aside from being or claiming to be outsiders, a second common trait that these strong individual politicians share is their communication skills. They do not merely communicate with the public; they claim to speak for the people, asserting that they embody the largely forgotten majorities themselves (Temelkuran, 2019). Finally, a third distinctive trait is the disregard for traditional checks and balances, especially for judicial review of the Executive’s policies.
El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele embodies these three elements. One of the most pressing examples is the quick measures taken after winning the majority of seats in congress during the 2021 elections. Having obtained a large majority of congressional seats (Martinez, 2021), Bukele’s party quickly enacted laws that undermined democracy and dismissed all opposition as his party claimed to do so in the name of “the people.” During the inaugural session of that legislature, Nueva Ideas (New Ideas) party members voted to remove five justices of the Supreme Court without due process of law or any attempt to conduct a proper impeachment procedure (Arauz, 2021). This unconstitutional removal gave Bukele control over the three branches of government. In the following 2024 congressional elections, after having passed legislation to reduce congressional seats from 84 to 60, the ruling party won 57 of them, consolidating total control over the three branches of Government.
This quick overview of the Salvadoran experience shows that Bukele seems to have followed the same patterns as other Latin American populist leaders. Experiences from Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela had already demonstrated that, to consolidate and maintain power, populist leaders seek control over two main institutions. In no particular order, first, controlling the Armed Forces—and the Police—allows presidents to suppress dissent and instill fear among the population (Bernal, 2021; Infodefensa, 2021; EFE, 2021). Second, reducing the autonomy of the Judiciary.
Authoritarian leaders often seek to dominate the courts, especially the Supreme Court, to bypass legal constraints on their power (Foa, 2021). Checks and balances are considered obstacles, making the dismantling of judicial independence a priority; for example, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 2008, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua in 2010, and Evo Morales in Bolivia in 2017 were able to extend their time in office beyond the constitutional limit thanks to Supreme Court rulings (Sala de lo Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, 2008; Sala de lo Constitucional, sentencia No.06 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Managua, 2010; Sala Plena del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2017). However, before obtaining control of the judiciary, authoritarian populists often target this branch and accuse it of corruption or ineptitude to prevent unelected public officers from obstructing the Executive’s policies.
The undermining of judicial independence in El Salvador occurred especially through two actions taken as soon as the president gained congressional majority. First, on May 1 of 2021, Nuevas Ideas’ representatives voted to remove five Supreme Court justices without due process of law (Arauz, 2021). Their terms were not set to expire until 2027, but they were arbitrarily removed because of a few previous rulings that were averse to some presidential measures (DW, 2020). It was a power-grab move that violated the Constitution and existing legislation. The ruling party justified it by claiming to have acted on the people’s behalf and accordingly to their will. That same day, congress appointed five new justices whose rulings have since consistently favored the President (BBC, 2021). One of those rulings was the landmark decision that removed a corner stone of Salvadoran constitutional democracy which for more than 35 years prevented presidents from seeking reelection creating a way for Bukele to seek his second term.
Second, early retirement and transfers of career judges. On August 3, 2021, Congress passed a law forcing over 150 judges into early retirement, violating article 182 of the Salvadoran Constitution, which grants the Supreme Court the exclusive authority to appoint and discipline members of the Judiciary. Following this legislation, the Supreme Court appointed a group of new judges (Cornejo, 2021), many of whom have already reversed rulings against political opponents of the President. A few independent judges that were not removed through the early retirement act resigned due to pressures or were transferred to less influential positions (Oliva, 2022; Calderón, 2021).
An assessment by the Latinobarómetro Corporation in 2021 noted that “Bukele has shown that democracy exists only as long as it serves his needs. When it fails to do so, he imposes his will by force. El Salvador is on the verge of becoming a populist autocracy, with significant public support, reminiscent of the early days of Hugo Chávez” (Latinobarómetro Corporation, 2021). The resulting control over the three branches of government has not only undermined democracy or judicial independence in an abstract or institutional manner, but it has also affected citizens’ rights in very concrete ways, as shown by the overwhelming number of people detained under the state of exception, some for over three years, without having had their day in court.
Almost 100,000 people have been detained in El Salvador during a four-year long state of exception, but practically no one has been sentenced, and according to human rights organizations, many of these arrests can be considered arbitrary detentions under international standards (WOLA, 2024). The Constitutional Chamber has failed to rule on over 3,000 habeas corpus petitions it has received since the declaration of the state of exception in March 2022 (El Salvador.com, 2024), effectively neglecting the one judicial protection citizens have against arbitrary detentions in El Salvador (DPLF, 2024).
In May 2025, two prominent lawyers, Ruth López and Enrique Anaya Barraza,—widely recognized for their outspoken criticism of government corruption, human rights violations, and systemic abuses—were detained on charges of embezzlement and money laundering. These charges appear to have been used as a means of silencing dissent and creating a climate of intimidation among other critics and independent voices. The lack of judicial independence has had a profoundly adverse impact on their situation (EDH, 2025). Bail was denied, and both lawyers were remanded in custody pending trial. Their legal representatives have reported serious obstacles to maintaining regular and confidential communication with them. At present, no effective judicial review exists to challenge these apparently politically motivated arrests, as no judge has thus far been willing to issue rulings contrary to what are widely understood to be measures directed by the President or the Executive Branch.
Many countries today appear eager to replicate President Nayib Bukele’s approach to reducing crime and violence, often citing El Salvador’s dramatic decline in homicide rates as evidence of the effectiveness of his policies. What is less frequently acknowledged, however, is the institutional and normative cost underlying these outcomes: the dismantling of checks and balances, the erosion of judicial independence, the weakening of safeguards against human rights violations, and the expansion of a heavily militarized security apparatus. The risks of these developments have been repeatedly illustrated in recent Latin American history.
Importantly, such concentrations of authoritarian power and sustained violations of fundamental rights cannot occur without the curtailment of judicial autonomy, as independent courts constitute a central mechanism for constraining executive authority and enforcing constitutional limits. At the same time, the broader societal significance of judicial independence often remains difficult to communicate to the public, owing to a range of historical, institutional, and sociopolitical factors that lie beyond the scope of this commentary but help explain the relative ease with which judicial erosion can proceed.
These are not abstract concerns; they are lived realities in El Salvador. While the model may appear effective in the short term, its long-term implications for freedom, independent justice, and democratic governance are profound and reverting its impact may take a long time and more than one generation
(*) Dr. Lilliam Arrieta is a Salvadoran lawyer and law professor who has dedicated most of her professional career to teaching and researching topics related to the rule of law and, most recently, gender studies. Dr. Arrieta holds a PhD in Law.
References
Agencia EFE. (2021). “Miles de salvadoreños marchan contra Bukele cuando se acerca a su medio mandato.” EFE.10.18.2021. https://www.efe.com/efe/america/sociedad/miles-de-salvadorenos-marchan- contra-bukele-cuando-se-acerca-a-su-medio-mandato/20000013-4654153
Arauz, S. y otros (2021). “Bukele usa a la nueva Asamblea para tomar control de la Sala de lo Constitucional y la Fiscalía.” El Faro, 05.02.2021. https://elfaro.net/es/202105/el_salvador/25451/Bukele-usa-a-la-nueva-Asamblea-para-tomar-control-de-la-Sala-de-lo-Constitucional-y-la-Fiscal%C3%ADa.htm
BBC (2021). “El Salvador: la nueva Asamblea Legislativa, afín a Bukele, destituye a los jueces del Constitucional y al fiscal general.” 05.02.2021. https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-56953799
Bernal, D. y otros (2021) “El Ejército, el que más crece en presupuesto.” La Prensa Gráfica. 10.02.2021, https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/El-Ejercito-el-que-mas-crece-en-presupuesto-20211001-0109.html
Calderón, B. (2021). “Juez Juan Antonio Durán denuncia acoso de la Policía afuera de su casa: ‘Y dice que no es dictadura. No nos detendrán’.” LPG. 19.09.2021. https://www.laprensagrafica.com/elsalvador/Juez-Juan-Antonio-Duran-denuncia-acoso-de-la-Policia-afuera-de-su-casa-Y-dice-que-no-es-dictadura.-No-nos-detendran-20210919-0061.html
Cornejo, I. (2021). “Magistrados sustitutos revierten arresto domiciliar para Ernesto Muyshondt.” El Mundo. 10.02.2021. https://diario.elmundo.sv/magistrados-sustitutos-revierten-arresto-domiciliar-para-ernesto-muyshondt/
DPLF. (2024). “Desprotección judicial: la respuesta de la Sala de lo Constitucional durante el régimen de excepción en El Salvador.” June 2024. https://back.dplf.org/es/resources/desproteccion-judicial-la-respuesta-de-la-sala-de-lo-constitucional-durante-el-regimen-d-1?_gl=1*d714ok*_ga*MjkzNTkyOTIyLjE3MzQxMTAyODQ.*_ga_5EQV0E6PSH*MTc0MzA5NDM1Ny41LjEuMTc0MzA5NDM5Ni4wLjAuMA
DW. (2020). “Supremo salvadoreño anula decreto de Bukele que rige cuarentena por COVID-19.” 09/06/2020. https://www.dw.com/es/supremo-salvadore%C3%B1o-anula-decreto-de-bukele-que-rige-cuarentena-por-covid-19/a-53739072
EDH. (2025). “Alargan detención de abogados Ruth López y Enrique Anaya.” El Diario de Hoy. 12.12.2025. https://www.eldiariodehoy.com/opinion/alargan-detencion-de-abogados-ruth-lopez-y-enrique-anaya/51961/2025/
El Salvador.com. (2024). “MOVIR y Tutela Legal piden a Corte Suprema agilizar respuestas de habeas corpus.” 13.08.2024. https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/regimen-de-excepcion-tutela-legal-movir-piden-respuestas-corte/1161744/2024/
Foa, R. “Why Strongmen Win in Weak States.” Journal of Democracy. Vol. 32, no. 1, Jan. 2021, pp. 52-65. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/why-strongmen-win-in-weak-states/
Latinobarómetro Corporation, Informe 2021: Adiós a Macondo, Santiago, Chile, October 2021, p. 23 (Bukele ha demostrado que la democracia llega hasta donde le funciona para lo que él necesita. Y cuándo esta no hace lo que el necesita, se impone por la fuerza. El Salvador es un candidato serio a transformarse en una autocracia populista, con altos niveles de apoyo del pueblo. Algo parecido a las características iniciales de Hugo Chávez), at https://www.latinobarometro.org/lat.jsp
Martinez, L. (2021). ”¿Quiénes son los diputados de la nueva Asamblea Legislativa de El Salvador?” El Salvador.com, 05.05.2021, at https://www.elsalvador.com/noticias/nacional/asamblea-legislativa/834750/2021/
Oliva, X. (2022). “Denuncian hostigamiento e intimidación contra juez que llevó caso de masacre de El Mozote.” GatoEncerrado. 18.04.2022. https://gatoencerrado.news/2022/04/18/denuncian-hostigamiento-e-intimidacion-contra-juez-que-llevo- caso-de-masacre-de-el-mozote/
Redacción de Infodefensa. “El Salvador duplicará sus efectivos militares de 20.000 a 40.000 en cinco años.” 07.05.2021. https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3110862/salvador-duplicara-efectivos-militares-20000-40000-cinco-anos
Temelkuran, E. (2019). Como perder un país, Anagrama, Barcelona, capítulo 2: Trastoca la lógica y atenta contra el lenguaje, pp. 52.
Sala de lo Constitucional del Tribunal Supremo de Justicia de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela, December 11, 2008, reference 08-1610. https://supremainjusticia.org/test/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/N%C2%B0-20-TSJ-aval%C3%B3-%E2%80%9Csegundo%E2%80%9D-referendo-sobre-la-reelecci%C3%B3n-indefinida-de-Ch%C3%A1vez.pdf
Sala de lo Constitucional, sentencia No.06 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Managua, 09.30.2010. https://www.poderjudicial.gob.ni/pjupload/rp/pdf/Sentencia_N%C3%BAmero_6_30_Sep_2010_Reelecci %C3%B3n.pdf
Sala Plena del Tribunal Constitucional Plurinacional de Bolivia, SENTENCIA CONSTITUCIONAL PLURINACIONAL 0084/2017, Sucre, 28 de noviembre de 2017, at https://edwinfigueroag.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/sentencia-0084-2017-tcp-bolivia-reeleccion-evo- morales.pdf
WOLA (2024). “Régimen de Excepción en El Salvador: de una medida de seguridad a un política de Estado.” Diciembre 2024, at https://www.wola.org/es/analysis/regimen-de-excepcion-el-salvador-medida-seguridad-politica-estado/
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