Israel’s October 27 elections have exposed a profound paradox: Netanyahu’s governing coalition has lost its parliamentary majority, yet the opposition remains unable to form an alternative without cooperation from Arab parties. In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Associate Professor Noam Gidron of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem examines the implications of rising Arab electoral participation, entrenched affective polarization, and the resilience of Netanyahuism. He explores Likud’s increasing convergence with European radical-right populism, the long-term decline of Israel’s mainstream left, and persistent vulnerabilities in democratic institutions. Gidron argues that the opposition’s reluctance to cooperate with Arab parties reflects deeper political divisions that complicate coalition formation and prospects for democratic renewal in Israel.
Interview by Selcuk Gultasli
Israel’s October 27, 2026, parliamentary elections have produced a fragmented political landscape, exposing the limits of both Netanyahu’s governing coalition and the opposition’s capacity to translate electoral gains into political power. Although Likud emerged as the largest party with 27 seats, Netanyahu’s religious-nationalist bloc secured only 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset, while the predominantly Jewish-led opposition won 48. The Joint List and Ra’am together captured 19 seats, potentially placing Arab political representation at the center of Israel’s coalition negotiations. Yet the reluctance of major opposition parties to cooperate with Arab factions has created a parliamentary deadlock, raising fundamental questions about political inclusion, democratic representation, and the future of Israeli governance.
In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Associate Professor Noam Gidron of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem examines this impasse through the interconnected dynamics of affective polarization, nationalist politics, and democratic backsliding. Highlighting the significance of increased Arab electoral participation, Professor Gidron observes that “the rising turnout among Arab citizens of Israel is one of the major developments in these elections, if not the most important one.” He emphasizes that this dramatic mobilization is “reshaping the Israeli political landscape,” while Arab parties remain politically marginalized within mainstream coalition calculations.
The central paradox, Gidron argues, is that Netanyahu has lost his parliamentary majority without the opposition acquiring a viable alternative. As he explains, “the opposition’s unwillingness to work with the Arab parties means that it also lacks a majority.” Consequently, “as long as the bloc opposing Netanyahu refuses to work with the Arab parties,”securing a Knesset majority remains exceptionally difficult. The opposition’s internal divisions compound this dilemma: while the progressive Democrats favor cooperation with Arab factions, more hawkish figures, including Avigdor Lieberman, reject such arrangements.
Beyond coalition arithmetic, Professor Gidron identifies affective polarization as a crucial explanation for Netanyahu’s enduring electoral resilience. Despite the October 7 attacks, the Gaza war, and controversies surrounding the judicial overhaul, emotional hostility between political blocs continues to constrain electoral realignment. He further argues that Likud has become increasingly populist, observing that, on relevant measures, it is “more similar to Alternative for Germany (AfD) than to the mainstream center-right Christian Democrats (CDU).”
The interview also explores the long-term decline of Israel’s mainstream left, the political marginalization of Palestinian citizens, and the institutional vulnerabilities of Israeli democracy. While changes in coalition composition could moderate pressures on judicial independence, Professor Gidron cautions that deeper structural weaknesses persist. Ultimately, he captures the democratic dilemma confronting Israel: “fighting for democracy, particularly liberal democracy, is itself polarizing. But it is still a fight worth fighting.”
Here is our interview with Associate Professor Noam Gidron, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.
Intense Animosity Between Political Blocs Helps Explain Netanyahu’s Enduring Electoral Support
Professor Gidron, thank you for joining us. Despite the political fallout from October 7, the Gaza war, and the judicial overhaul, Likud remains Israel’s largest party. How do you explain Netanyahu’s enduring electoral appeal? Does this result demonstrate the resilience of Netanyahuism as a personalized form of populist politics?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: That’s a big question. We are now just a couple of days after the elections, and the issues you raise will be examined over the coming weeks, months, and years. I want to be honest and say that we still don’t have the most recent data on voting patterns in these elections, and we will continue debating these issues.
Just to share some initial thoughts, we knew before these elections that the Israeli electorate was deeply polarized, specifically affectively polarized. There is intense dislike and animosity between the political blocs. Of course, the more strongly you dislike your political opponents, the less likely you are to defect to the opposing political bloc. The Israeli electorate is so deeply divided, with such a strong emotional divide between the two main camps, that it is much harder for voters to move to the opposing bloc.
Now, we should note that Likud is the largest party, but the governing coalition has lost support overall. It previously held a majority in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, but that is no longer the case. So, something has changed.
Who exactly were the voters who switched? That question will be examined over the coming months and years, and I suspect that levels of dislike and animosity between the political blocs will be one explanatory factor in understanding which voters were more willing to switch parties.
Israel Faces Three Possible Scenarios: A Unity Government, Arab-Backed Opposition, or New Elections
With neither Netanyahu’s religious-right bloc nor the predominantly Jewish-led opposition securing a clear majority in the provisional results, what governing alternatives are realistically available? Could an Eisenkot-led coalition overcome its ideological divisions, or might coalition deadlock ultimately prolong Netanyahu’s premiership?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: We are now at a moment when the situation remains unclear, and discussions about what the future may hold are ongoing. We can suggest three scenarios for future political developments, keeping in mind that unexpected events can sometimes occur.
At the moment, one very likely scenario appears to be a unity government in which Netanyahu remains prime minister but adds one of the opposition parties to his coalition, probably from the more centrist elements of the opposition. That would mean Netanyahu remains in power, but with a different, more centrist coalition that does not lean as heavily toward the far right as the current government.
Another scenario, although its chances seem slim at the moment, is that the opposition decides to work formally or informally with the Arab parties, or elements within those parties, to form a government, perhaps even for the short term. This would require some actors within the opposition to break their promise not to work with the Arab parties. However, a unity government would also require them to work with Netanyahu, something they have promised not to do. So, it is hard to know exactly how things will play out.
A third possibility is another election in several months. The chances of this do not seem particularly high, considering that some political actors have a lot to lose from another round of elections. It is not clear whether the opposition could harness the same level of energy again in three or four months in an effort to beat Netanyahu once more. Nevertheless, that remains an option.
Against the background of these political developments, we need to keep in mind that the geopolitical situation in the Middle East is highly unstable. We are hearing some discussion about the potential for another Israeli strike on Iran, perhaps together with the US. Of course, any change in the geopolitical environment could also lead to unexpected political developments here in Israel.
Even the October 7 Massacre Did Not Reduce Affective Polarization
In your recent research with Omer Yair and colleagues, you find that affective polarization persisted despite the exceptional security threats following October 7. How does this finding illuminate the election results? Has hostility toward political opponents become more decisive than assessments of Netanyahu’s performance?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Oftentimes, we have this implicit or explicit expectation that an external threat would increase domestic cohesion—that different members of a community would come closer together when facing an external security threat. One implication is that, following such a severe security threat, we might expect a decrease in levels of affective polarization—that is, deep animosity across political divides.
The October 7 massacre provided us with an opportunity—a tragic opportunity, of course—to examine whether such a drastic change in the security environment would indeed lead to lower levels of affective polarization. This is not what we find in the data. We analyzed data collected just before and after October 7, in which Israeli respondents reported how they felt toward political opponents.
While we have seen this pooling of civic engagement and collective efforts to help communities affected by October 7 and the war that followed, these efforts did not translate into lower levels of affective polarization.
This suggests that perhaps we need to rethink the expectation that an external threat increases domestic cohesion, or at least consider the scope conditions: Under what conditions should we expect such an effect, and why didn’t we see it in the Israeli case?
In any case, this provides further evidence of how deeply affectively polarized Israeli society has been over the last four years. It also provides important context for understanding what happened in this election, as we discussed earlier, including the current government’s ability to retain support even under such difficult circumstances.
The Decline of Israel’s Mainstream Left Is a Long-Term Development
Israel’s principal electoral competition increasingly occurs among different forms of nationalist, conservative, secular-right, and religious-right politics. Why has the conventional left–right divide been displaced by rival conceptions of right-wing leadership? Does this represent a lasting ideological realignment or a temporary consequence of security politics?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: That’s a difficult question to answer. I would note that we have seen a long-term decline in support for the mainstream left in Israel. This is not just a temporary reaction to October 7 or the war that followed. Rather, it is a process that has been unfolding for the last 30 years or so.
We therefore need to consider long-term developments at both the mass level, in terms of changes in the composition of the electorate, and the elite level, in terms of the willingness of parties left of center to present voters with a clear vision for the future and fight for it against these populist forces on the right.
The answer to what we have seen—the long-term decline of the Israeli mainstream left—lies somewhere in the interaction between these mass- and elite-level factors. This is definitely not a temporary development.
I would also note that those interested in these questions can consult the book I co-edited, The Elections in Israel 2022, in which we analyzed the long-term decline of the Israeli Labour Party from 1992 to the present. We show how this decline unfolded step by step, with each successive election bringing the defection of another constituency from the party.
Likud Today Is More Similar to Germany’s AfD Than to the Mainstream CDU
Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit and Bezalel Smotrich’s Religious Zionism retain significant parliamentary representation. How should we distinguish their religious-nationalist radicalism from Netanyahu’s populism? Have these movements transformed Israel’s ideological mainstream, even when their individual electoral strength remains limited?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Yes, that’s another good question. There was some expectation that Ben-Gvir and his far-right parties would achieve great success in these elections. They haven’t really failed, but I don’t think the election results met their expectations.
To a certain degree, this is because Likud, Netanyahu’s party and the largest party on the right, has become more similar to these far-right elements, narrowing the differences between them. Netanyahu has such strong electoral appeal within the right-wing bloc that he managed to prevent right-wing supporters from defecting to parties further to the right. At the same time, we have seen Likud become increasingly populist over time.
Here, we have evidence from V-Dem, the Varieties of Democracy dataset, and CHES, the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, suggesting that Likud today is as populist as radical-right parties in Europe, rather than resembling mainstream Christian Democratic or conservative parties.
If we look specifically at these measures of populism, Likud is, in a way, more similar to Alternative for Germany (AfD) than to the mainstream center-right Christian Democrats (CDU). This is how we should understand the dynamics within the Israeli right-wing bloc.
Military Exemptions Did Not Appear to Be a Decisive Issue for Right-Wing Voters
Shas and United Torah Judaism remain important coalition actors, despite growing controversy over military exemptions for ultra-Orthodox men. Could the conscription dispute fundamentally reshape Israel’s party alignments? Is the secular–religious cleavage becoming more consequential than traditional economic or security divisions?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Over the years, these ultra-Orthodox parties that you just mentioned have become an integral part of the right-wing bloc and are considered natural members of Netanyahu’s coalition government.
Following October 7 and the subsequent wars in Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, there was an expectation that the question of conscription for ultra-Orthodox men would become a defining issue in these elections. I’m not sure that’s what actually happened.
Again, we should be cautious because the election took place only this week, and we still lack direct data to understand voters’ considerations and which parties they switched between. At the moment, however, it doesn’t seem that many voters defected from the right-wing bloc because they were dissatisfied with the exemption of ultra-Orthodox men from military service. So, at least for now, this issue does not appear to have been particularly salient in shaping right-wing voters’ decisions.
Interestingly, these parties did not gain support in the latest elections, even though demographic trends might lead us to expect an increase in their share of the vote.
This also raises questions about where they are heading next. The previous government was supposed to be their dream deal—one in which they could get whatever they wanted. Yet that did not really happen, and the question of military exemptions remained unresolved.
Perhaps some of their voters were disappointed by this, although other factors may also have played a role. We will have more information about these factors in the future. For now, it seems that these elections were something of a disappointment for the ultra-Orthodox parties.
Labour Party Has Been in Gradual Electoral Decline Since the Early 1990s
The once-dominant Israeli Labour Party now survives politically within the Democrats alliance. What explains this profound electoral decline? Has Labour’s association with the Oslo peace process undermined its legitimacy, or have demographic change, class realignment, and the growing salience of national identity been more decisive?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Yes, this goes back to what we were discussing earlier about the decline of the mainstream left in Israel. There have definitely been demographic shifts, but we also need to be cautious about assuming that demography is destiny. The question is whether parties can attract new constituencies and expand their base of support as some of their traditional constituencies decline demographically. We haven’t really seen that happen. Again, this is not a temporary development. It is not something that emerged in the last five years or following October 7. Rather, it has been a gradual decline since the early 1990s.
These parties are also competing with other opposition parties considered more centrist or liberal. However, it is not clear that there is a distinct ideological difference between the more liberal parties and the Democrats, who represent the more leftist elements of the opposition. It seems that this political bloc is still in flux, searching for its final configuration. But so far, that has not happened.
Mizrahi Jews Remain Underrepresented in Multiple Arenas of Israel’s Elite
In Populism as a Problem of Social Integration, co-authored with Peter Hall, you emphasize social marginalization and perceived status loss. Can this framework help explain the enduring appeal of Likud among sections of the Mizrahi electorate and the attraction of radical-right parties? How are historical grievances reproduced across generations?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: The lack of social recognition comes up frequently in the political discourse among supporters of the current government and the coalition that has just lost the election but may remain in power, with Netanyahu continuing as prime minister, as we discussed earlier. We hear many arguments about what is sometimes referred to as the “Second Israel,” suggesting that voters within the right-wing bloc are undervalued and misrecognized by Ashkenazi political elites.
There is certainly something to this. We know that Mizrahi Jews are underrepresented in multiple arenas of the Israeli elite, including academia, business, and other relevant spheres.
At the same time, in our paper with Peter Hall, we assumed that this sense of misrecognition reflects people’s life circumstances and how well they are integrated into society. Perhaps we should also have paid more attention to how messages from political elites can intensify this sense of lower subjective social status—the feeling that opposing elites treat people unfairly or undervalue certain segments of society.
There is something important to be said about how political elites can actively fuel this sense of misrecognition among the electorate. That is something we did not examine in this paper. Hopefully, someone will explore it in the future.
Rising Arab Voter Turnout Is Reshaping Israel’s Political Landscape
The Joint List and Ra’am have emerged as potentially decisive parliamentary actors. Yet major Jewish-led parties remain reluctant to depend on their support. Does this exclusion reveal a structural limitation of Israeli coalition democracy? Could Arab parliamentary participation become essential to overcoming the Netanyahu–anti-Netanyahu deadlock?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: I feel we could have an entire discussion devoted to this specific issue. Certainly, the rising turnout among Arab citizens of Israel is one of the major developments in these elections, if not the most important one. Traditionally, electoral participation has been lower within this sector, but in this election, we have seen a dramatic increase in turnout that is reshaping the Israeli political landscape. The direct outcome is that we now have much larger Arab parties in the Knesset.
It is also important to note that these Arab parties do not constitute a uniform bloc. There are ideological differences between them, and they represent different groups within the Arab sector. Nevertheless, they are often treated as a single bloc in Israeli politics.
Currently, the opposition parties face a significant challenge. On the one hand, the governing coalition has lost its majority, meaning Netanyahu cannot form another government with exactly the same coalition he had before the election. On the other hand, the opposition’s unwillingness to work with the Arab parties means that it also lacks a majority.
We should also recognize the differences among the opposition parties themselves. You mentioned earlier the Democrats, the leftist, progressive part of the opposition. They openly call for a formal coalition with elements of the Arab parties.
By contrast, more hawkish actors within the opposition, such as Avigdor Lieberman, insist that they will never cooperate with Arab parties, either formally or informally. Some of the more centrist elements try to remain vague on this issue, leaving themselves room to maneuver, although this does not currently seem to be a particularly successful strategy.
So, there are clear differences within the opposition. However, as long as the bloc opposing Netanyahu refuses to work with the Arab parties, particularly given the high turnout among Arab citizens in these elections, it is difficult to see how it can secure a majority in the Knesset.
Rising Violent Crime in Arab Communities May Help Explain the Surge in Electoral Turnout
In your research on Israel’s Nation-State Law, you examine how majority-nationalist legislation shapes perceptions of minority citizenship. How do these findings help us interpret the stronger Arab electoral mobilization in 2026? Can increased parliamentary representation translate into substantive political equality for Palestinian citizens of Israel?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: One of the findings I presented with colleagues in the study you mentioned is that the Basic Law declaring Israel a Jewish nation-state had a stronger impact on how Arab citizens of Israel perceive their citizenship than on how Jewish Israeli citizens perceive theirs. This law also left its mark on how Arab citizens perceive their role in Israeli society.
That being said, I’m not sure it was a direct driver of the increased turnout we have seen in these elections, particularly since some time has passed. Again, I want to be cautious because, at this point, we are just speculating. We do not yet have clear data explaining the electoral trends observed in these elections.
One common explanation for the high turnout, however, is the sharp increase in violent crime in Arab communities over the last four years. Crime has become a deeply destabilizing factor in the lives of far too many Arab communities, affecting numerous individuals, families, and neighborhoods.
One common argument is that the increased turnout reflects a reaction to this situation and a demand to replace the minister responsible for the police, currently the far-right Itamar Ben-Gvir, who does not seem particularly concerned about what is happening in the Arab sector.
Security Threats and National Identity Have Dominated Israeli Electoral Politics
Your recent work with Moses Shayo examines how national identity competes with class, ethnicity, and other collective attachments. Does the dominance of Jewish national identity help explain why social-democratic appeals struggle electorally? Under what conditions could economic inequality regain political salience across Israel’s ethnic and religious divisions?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Asking under what conditions economic inequality could reclaim dominance assumes that it was once a dominant issue, and that is itself open to debate. Different people have different views on the matter, and there are different interpretations of this question.
One dominant argument suggests that, in Israeli politics, questions of security threats and the closely related issue of national identity have consistently dominated other issues and shaped electoral behavior. This has been particularly true since October 7 and the wars we have experienced here.
There is also an alternative argument, although I don’t necessarily find it very convincing. This argument suggests that much of the support for Netanyahu’s right-wing bloc comes from middle-class and lower-middle-class cities and neighborhoods, while upper-middle-class and more affluent voters tend to support centrist and more progressive parties.
According to this interpretation, it is the opposition’s unwillingness to present a social-democratic vision that makes it more difficult for these parties to attract voters from the right-wing bloc.
I’m not sure this argument is particularly convincing, as it is difficult to find evidence supporting this thesis. Nevertheless, it is certainly being debated in the aftermath of the election, particularly because the data show a clear correlation between more affluent, upper-middle-class communities and support for the opposition.
So, this remains a contested question.
Lieberman May Stand Further to the Right Than Some of Netanyahu’s Coalition Partners
Secular nationalist parties such as Yisrael Beytenu challenge ultra-Orthodox privileges while maintaining hardline positions on national security. Does this illustrate a distinctive form of secular right-wing politics? Can secularization advance equal citizenship and institutional liberalism without fundamentally transforming Israeli nationalism or attitudes toward Palestinians?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: Exactly as you noted, there are elements within the opposition that hold rather hawkish views on the conflict, Israel’s place in the Middle East, and related issues. You mentioned Avigdor Lieberman. On some of these issues, his positions may actually place him further to the right than some of Netanyahu’s coalition partners. At the same time, however, he holds a more secular worldview and opposes some of the positions taken by the ultra-Orthodox parties, which creates tensions with important elements of the right-wing bloc.
This suggests that opposition to Netanyahu can bring together different political actors over different issues. At the same time, however, it creates a highly heterogeneous and divided opposition that struggles to agree on many issues beyond its opposition to certain elements within the right-wing bloc.
So, you have actors like Lieberman alongside the Democrats, the more progressive leftist party. Both oppose Netanyahu, but on different grounds. This, of course, makes the opposition very difficult to manage.
Lack of a Constitution Makes Its Democratic Institutional Framework Rather Fragile
In “Israel – Populism, Polarization and the Crisis of Democracy,” co-authored with Yaniv Roznai, you examine the institutional vulnerabilities associated with Netanyahu’s political project. Does the 2026 election suggest a potential democratic recovery, or could Netanyahu’s continued influence sustain pressures on judicial independence and constitutional checks?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: There are long-term structural weaknesses in Israeli democracy. Perhaps the most obvious is that Israel does not have a constitution. Instead, it has Basic Laws, most of which are relatively easy to change. This makes the basic institutional framework within which Israeli democracy operates rather fragile.
These structural weaknesses will not disappear simply because of these elections. However, as we discussed earlier, the current government no longer holds a majority in parliament.
One potential outcome could be some form of unity government between Likud and the more centrist elements of the opposition. In that case, these opposition parties might demand, as a condition for joining Netanyahu’s government, that certain elements of the judicial overhaul—that is, his government’s plan to reshape Israeli democracy—be taken off the table.
So, while the structural weaknesses are here to stay, the immediate threats to the system of checks and balances may diminish as a result of changes in the composition of the next government.
People Adapt Their Understanding of Democracy to the Political Leaders They Support
Your recent study “Resistance to Backsliding: The Role of Democratic Conceptions” finds that citizens with a substantive understanding of democracy were especially inclined to oppose the judicial overhaul. Have these democratic commitments translated into a coherent electoral alternative? Why has the protest movement struggled to produce a stronger liberal-left political realignment?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: There’s a lot to unpack here, so let me highlight two interrelated points. First, the study you mentioned examined participation in protests against the judicial overhaul presented to the Israeli public immediately following the previous elections. We are going back several years, to when the Justice Minister announced a plan to weaken the system of checks and balances, particularly the courts. Immediately afterward, we witnessed the emergence of the largest protest movement in Israel’s history.
In this study, together with colleagues, we examined what explains participation in protests against the judicial overhaul, which we understand as a measure of democratic backsliding. Indeed, as you noted, we found that a thicker understanding of democracy—one that is not purely majoritarian but also recognizes the importance of additional democratic components, such as checks and balances—helps explain not only opposition to the judicial overhaul but also active participation in the protest movement against it.
Our study focused on a relatively narrow timeframe: conceptions of democracy before the plan was announced and participation in the protest movement immediately afterward. We found a strong relationship between the two.
In data we are currently analyzing, we also find that conceptions of democracy are relatively stable. At the same time, however, people adapt their understanding of democracy based on how they feel toward the political leader advancing the backsliding measure—in this case, Netanyahu—and toward their political opponents.
For example, if I supported the previous government and initially held a rather thick understanding of democracy, I might, over time, adopt a more majoritarian understanding because I follow my leader and adapt my conception of democracy to what my political side is advocating. In other words, people adjust how they think about democracy.
This brings me to your question about why the protest movement has not given rise to a larger liberal bloc. As I mentioned, it was the largest protest movement in the country’s history, which also meant that it was highly diverse.
It brought together people with different foreign policy views and different perspectives on the conflict between Israel and its neighbors. What united them was a shared, thicker understanding of democracy.
However, following October 7 and the subsequent war, attitudes toward the conflict became increasingly salient, making it more difficult to keep the protest movement together.
So, when you want to oppose democratic backsliding, you need to build a broad coalition. The challenge is that such a coalition may be divided on other issues, and once those issues become extremely salient, maintaining that broad coalition becomes much more difficult.
An Eisenkot Government Could Respond Differently to Settler Violence in the West Bank
Much of the anti-Netanyahu opposition remains committed to security-centered nationalism and is reluctant to endorse Palestinian statehood. Would an Eisenkot-led government represent a substantive departure from Netanyahu’s approach to Gaza and the West Bank, or primarily a change in leadership? What political conditions could reopen a credible path toward Palestinian self-determination?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: That’s a big question, and I’ll do my best to address it. Let me begin by noting that politics can be unpredictable, and unexpected developments do occur. To give an example from Israeli history, during or immediately after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, it would have been very difficult to imagine that Israel and Egypt would sign a peace treaty in less than a decade. No one could have foreseen that.
So, when we try to make strong claims about the future, we should keep in mind that geopolitical developments can surprise us in ways that are difficult to anticipate. I want to place my comments on this issue within that broader context.
I think your point is well taken. A change in government, which currently does not seem very likely given the election results, as we discussed earlier, may not drastically change Israel’s policy in Gaza.
I do think there could be some changes, for instance, in how Israel responds to violent attacks by settlers against Palestinians in the West Bank. There could be a shift in that regard. However, I don’t think it was very likely that a transition from Netanyahu to Eisenkot would be accompanied by a complete rethinking of what Israel should do in Gaza.
I would also note that President Trump has approximately two more years in office, and we have seen that he is able to influence how Israeli leaders deal with their neighbors.
I don’t think it is entirely impossible that Trump might try to facilitate certain developments in the Middle East, including some that currently seem far-fetched. That is one potential factor that could lead to a change in Israeli policy. However, such a change could also occur under Netanyahu’s government rather than necessarily under Eisenkot’s leadership.
Fighting for Liberal Democracy Is Polarizing, but It Is Still a Fight Worth Fighting
And finally, Professor Gidron, your research demonstrates how polarization, national identity, and coalition arrangements shape democratic politics. Looking beyond the immediate coalition negotiations, do the 2026 results suggest a durable restructuring of Israel’s party system? What developments would indicate meaningful democratic renewal rather than another cycle of personalized rivalry, nationalist competition, and institutional confrontation?
Assoc. Prof. Noam Gidron: I wish I had a good answer to that. Looking at the current state of Israeli politics, the deep divide between the political blocs is perhaps the most dominant feature of contemporary Israeli politics. Israeli society is paying a real price for this polarization. At the same time, fighting for democracy, particularly liberal democracy, is itself polarizing. But it is still a fight worth fighting.
So, how can we navigate the tension between these two ways of thinking about polarization in Israeli politics? This is a major challenge for all actors in the Israeli political arena, especially those invested in securing Israeli democracy.
