As South Korea’s Constitutional Court reviews President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his martial law declaration, Dr. Meredith Shaw highlights the deep-rooted issues plaguing the nation’s politics. Speaking with the ECPS, Dr. Shaw explains that a “tit-for-tat dynamic” of political retaliation has hindered systemic reforms, while populist appeals during economic crises fuel disillusionment. Drawing on South Korea’s history of authoritarian rule, she emphasizes the need for reform-minded leadership to restore public confidence. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” Dr. Shaw remarked, urging systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions amid this critical moment for South Korea’s democracy.
Interview by Selcuk Gultasli
As South Korea’s Constitutional Court begins reviewing President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his controversial attempt to impose martial law on December 3, 2024, Dr. Meredith Shaw highlights that both sides of South Korean politics have failed to inspire public confidence. According to Dr. Shaw, a tit-for-tat dynamic continues to hinder systemic reforms while entrenching disillusionment with establishment politicians.
South Korea’s political landscape, shaped by its history of authoritarian rule and rapid democratization, faces persistent challenges rooted in populism, economic inequality, and geopolitical tensions. In an interview with European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Shaw, a leading expert on East Asian politics, shared her invaluable insights into South Korea’s current crisis, historical patterns, and the implications for its democracy.
“South Korea has significant experience with authoritarian, particularly military, regimes,” Dr. Shaw noted, referencing the martial law imposed under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan that lasted nearly 15 years. These experiences, she explained, left a lasting legacy on political and social movements. “The so-called ‘386 generation,’ who fought courageously against martial law, still lean left-wing and remain deeply skeptical of right-wing leaders.”
Dr. Shaw also addressed the cycles of political retaliation and corruption that have plagued South Korea’s governance. “There’s a historical pattern of people in power helping friends and family in ways that most would consider corrupt, followed by the opposition prosecuting and jailing members of the previous administration,” she explained, adding that this dynamic has obstructed meaningful reform.
Economic instability further complicates the political landscape. “South Korea, like most places, tends to be drawn to populist appeals during times of economic crisis and change,” Dr. Shaw observed. Recent backlash against gender equality movements and perceptions of economic inequality have also fueled populism and anti-feminist sentiment.
Geopolitical narratives amplify these issues. “North Korea is always in the background—not just as a security threat but as a perceived economic burden,” Dr. Shaw remarked. She noted that South Korea’s emphasis on national identity often intertwines anti-communism with anti-Japanese sentiment, allowing political leaders to exploit these narratives.
As South Korea navigates the aftermath of Yoon’s impeachment, Dr. Shaw emphasized the importance of reform-minded leadership. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” she said, calling for systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions. With the Constitutional Court set to hold its first public hearing on December 27, 2024, this interview offers a comprehensive analysis of South Korea’s ongoing political challenges and the lessons that could shape its future.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Meredith Shaw with some edits.
South Korea’s Struggles with Populism, Retributive Politics, and the Legacy of Authoritarianism
Professor Shaw, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How have South Korea’s historical experiences with authoritarian regimes, such as those under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, shaped the contemporary interplay between populism and authoritarianism in its political landscape?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: South Korea has significant experience with authoritarian, particularly military, regimes. As you know, it has had considerable experience with martial law in the past. Martial law was imposed under the Park Chung-hee dictatorship in 1972 and continued almost continuously for about 15 years until 1987.
People over 50 in Korea today would have some memory of this period, particularly the generation that was in college during the last years of martial law, the so-called “386 generation.” They remember fighting very courageously against martial law. As a result, they tend to lean left-wing, are generally very skeptical of right-wing leaders, and oppose the current Yoon administration, which is associated with the right-wing People Power Party (PPP). The real leaders of the anti-martial law movement from that generation, now in their sixties, along with younger activists, often continue to hold these views.
On a deeper level, South Korea has a historical pattern of people in power helping friends and family members in ways that most would consider corrupt. Then, after those individuals are removed from power, the opposition conducts prosecutions and jails members of the previous administration. This has normalized the idea of a tit-for-tat dynamic, where each power shift from left to right (and vice versa) results in retaliatory prosecutions. While one might hope this cycle would encourage honesty, it instead perpetuates an ongoing issue of retributive justice on both sides, which has become particularly problematic in recent years.
Finally, the legacy of authoritarian regimes has contributed to the development of a strong leftist coalition in South Korea, consisting of unions, student activists, and agricultural cooperatives. This coalition retains the ability to quickly mobilize mass protests in response to public outrage. However, while one might expect such a coalition to strengthen democratic institutions, it often seizes on emotional triggers—such as the Itaewon tragedy, the Sewol Ferry disaster, or similar incidents—rather than pushing for systemic reform.
As a result, we often see massive protests, sometimes involving a million people in the city square, yet these demonstrations rarely translate into meaningful systemic changes. This creates a puzzle: the legacy of South Korea’s authoritarian past has left.
To what extent do economic factors, such as income inequality or economic crises, contribute to the rise of populist and authoritarian leaders in South Korea? Are these patterns similar to those seen in other countries?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: I think South Korea, like most places, tends to be drawn to populist appeals during times of economic crisis and change. There have been some economic struggles and downturns in recent years.
Thinking most recently, President Yoon rose to power partly on a wave of male South Korean backlash against the gender equality movement and the perception that men are being left out of the economy as the feminist movement secures more opportunities for women. This has led to a strong anti-feminist and men’s rights backlash, which can inevitably be tied to economic inequality and uncertainty.
On the other hand, South Korea faces serious issues of opportunity and equality, particularly regarding access to higher education and career advancement. The opposition Leftist Democratic Party tends to champion these issues more, but they haven’t offered real solutions during their time in power. They often seem to get bogged down in expensive programs related to North Korea, which has not inspired much confidence.
Additionally, leaders from both parties tend to be beneficiaries of the entrenched institution of crony capitalism. As a result, many Koreans have lost faith in establishment politicians on both sides, making them more susceptible to populist appeals.
How Anti-Communism and Anti-Japanese Sentiment Shape South Korean Politics
How does South Korea’s emphasis on national identity, often tied to anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment, influence the populist rhetoric of political leaders? Are these cultural narratives being manipulated to consolidate power?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: In South Korea, I would say North Korea is always in the background as a political presence—not just as a security threat, but also due to the perceived economic damage caused by lost investment as a result of that threat and past administrations’ massive aid projects, which often went nowhere and cost taxpayers a lot of money. This contributes to a sense of grievance, a strong sense of anti-communism, and the belief that things would be better if North Korea didn’t exist.
On one hand, the ongoing threat from North Korea makes it very difficult for South Korea to eliminate some of the legacy Cold War legal institutions designed to crack down on alleged pro-North Korean elements in society. These include still fairly draconian laws against distributing North Korean materials or making statements perceived as pro-North Korean. These laws can be easily abused by the political right wing, but it’s hard to remove them because North Korea is undeniably a real and persistent threat.
More so than European countries, South Korea struggles to shed this Cold War legacy. For example, President Yoon referenced “anti-state forces” in his declaration of martial law, which is essentially a euphemism for pro-North Korean forces. The fact that he was even able to declare martial law in the first place is partly due to these legacy institutions that grant the government stronger powers when it perceives or claims there is a threat from North Korea. In an ideal democratic society, the government shouldn’t have the ability to do such things, but this is a reality South Korea continues to grapple with.
On the other side, because North Korea exists and is often associated with the left being more sympathetic to it, the leftist opposition has difficulty countering that rhetoric without invoking a similar boogeyman of their own. This is where Japan sometimes comes into play. The right is often perceived as being too forgiving of Japan, and the left can exploit this by emphasizing that Japan has historically been a serious enemy and arguing that its history with South Korea needs to be addressed more strongly.
These two historical narratives—anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment—often play off each other in South Korean politics. President Yoon, for instance, has been seen as particularly pro-Japan and has made some rhetorical gaffes that reinforce this perception. However, because he has so many other scandals and gaffes unrelated to Japan, the opposition hasn’t focused on this issue in recent years. Still, anti-Japan sentiment could easily become a factor if the opposition needs further ammunition against him.
Considering South Korea’s history of democracy emerging from periods of anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment, what historical and socio-political factors have contributed to the rise of populism and authoritarian tendencies in the country? How might the current crisis surrounding President Yoon influence these trends?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: The rise of populism and authoritarian tendencies in South Korea, I would say, is influenced primarily by the strong role of personalities in South Korean politics. The most powerful politicians on both sides often have family histories tied to being pro-Japan or associated with past dictatorships.
South Korea, more than most countries, tends to focus on who is related to whom, whose patronage a politician has received, and how those relationships might make them beholden to special interests. This scrutiny often leads people to become extraordinarily skeptical of legacy politicians and more inclined to support newcomers with less experience who claim to be anti-establishment. However, once those newcomers gain power, they quickly become part of the establishment themselves, almost immediately losing the anti-establishment appeal they once had.
If you look at President Yoon’s career trajectory, this pattern is clear. He comes from a very unusual background—he was never a legislator but a former prosecutor who was heavily involved in prosecuting the last conservative presidential scandal. This gave him a degree of independence from the political groups involved in that scandal and allowed him to claim he was anti-establishment.
When the liberal Moon administration became deeply unpopular, people wanted conservative leadership again. However, the mainstream conservatives were still tainted by connections to the previous scandal involving Park Geun-hye. This allowed Yoon to set himself apart and win the presidency. But now, as the establishment leader, he is at the center of scandals himself and appears to be rapidly losing support, even within his own party.
This situation could provide an opportunity for the conservative People Power Party to rebrand itself, though it’s hard to predict what will happen. The broader trend, however, remains consistent: the "outcast" or anti-establishment politician tends to gain popularity initially but loses that appeal very quickly once in power.
Lessons from South Korea’s Struggle to Preserve Democracy
From a historical perspective, how have populist and authoritarian tendencies impacted democratic institutions in South Korea, including governance, civil liberties, the rule of law, and the broader democratic framework? Given South Korea’s history of overcoming authoritarian regimes, what lessons from its political and social movements can inform the response to the current crisis and safeguard democratic governance?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: There is a legacy of suspending civil liberties in the name of defending against the communist threat from North Korea. This legacy, however, has also been retroactively intertwined with the idea of high economic growth. South Korea experienced its highest economic growth during the period of military dictatorship, and some people have come to associate authoritarian, somewhat imperialist leadership with stability and economic prosperity.
When economic concerns arise, or when instability is seen as driving away investment, there is a tendency to believe that a stronger president with more powers is necessary to overcome gridlock in the National Assembly. This perspective is linked to the fact that South Korea’s high economic growth coincided with its period under military dictatorship.
In contemporary times, South Korea has a very strong and evenly matched political competition between the left and the right. However, both sides have a tendency to use the tools of the Justice Ministry and the National Intelligence Service for political retaliation when in power. As a result, almost all surviving ex-presidents—if they don’t pass away soon after leaving office—end up in prison at some point. It has almost become an expectation, and the current president seems likely to face a similar fate.
The current crisis can be seen as part of this ongoing pendulum shift, swinging from right to left. We can likely anticipate more tit-for-tat prosecutions, but unfortunately, no real systemic reform to address this underlying issue. That said, one possible legacy of the current crisis is that no South Korean president is likely to attempt declaring martial law again for quite some time.
South Korea’s President, or rather, we should say, former President Yoon, declared martial law to save the country from what he called anti-state opposition parties, accusing them of using their legislative majority to paralyze the nation. Who are these anti-state parties, and what specific actions or strategies have they allegedly employed to paralyze the government?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: No, Yoon is still the President. He has been impeached by the National Assembly, but he remains President until the Constitutional Court removes him from power. When he made this announcement, referring to what you mentioned as “anti-state parties,” this is essentially code for leftists and those perceived as pro-North Korea.
In fact, I believe it’s enshrined in the Constitution that “anti-state” essentially refers to individuals or groups supporting North Korea or advocating for the overthrow of the democratic government in the name of communism. That’s the understood meaning of the term.
In his subsequent speech, President Yoon clarified further, and it seems he is primarily targeting the Democratic Party majority in the National Assembly. Since the last election, they have held a sizable majority, and they’ve been blocking his budget proposals, his appointees, and generally making it difficult for him to govern. Additionally, they have been prosecuting the President’s wife for bribery scandals that have been following him for quite some time.
Moreover, President Yoon has been attempting to investigate the National Election Commission (NEC) over allegations that his opposition somehow rigged the last election. He appears to be partially justifying his actions as necessary to uncover the truth about what happened at the NEC. However, the idea of using martial law as a solution to these challenges is, frankly, bizarre. I believe it stems from Yoon’s background as a former prosecutor. He seems inexperienced in dealing with the National Assembly and appears to have little patience for the normal gridlock expected in a democratic system—especially when the opposition holds such a significant majority in the Assembly.
There is also speculation about whether martial law was initially President Yoon’s idea or if it was suggested to him by the Defense Minister. This is something that will likely be explored in the court cases over the coming months.
Ultimately, martial law is supposed to be reserved for instances of imminent crisis, such as a genuine threat from anti-state actors or pro-North Korean forces actively working to undermine democracy. It’s not a tool meant to resolve legislative disagreements or to push through a budget. This entire episode suggests inexperience and a fundamental misunderstanding of democratic governance. By associating his political opposition with North Korea, President Yoon appears to be attempting to justify his actions.
Comparing Yoon Suk Yeol’s Declaration to Past Dictatorships
Martial law declarations in South Korea have been tied to periods of dictatorship and significant political upheaval. How does Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law declaration compare with past instances under leaders like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: In the past, during that 15-year period of martial law under military leaders like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the declarations meant full military government with no functioning National Assembly. For ordinary people, it meant curfews imposed at night, harsh crackdowns on any form of student activism or gatherings, and strict state control of the media. The government provided the media with official talking points, and there was no deviation from them until the transition to democracy.
This most recent martial law declaration by Yoon Suk Yeol is extremely tame in comparison, although it was too short-lived to fully understand where it might have headed. Essentially, it amounted to a few hours of trying to seize control of the National Assembly and block legislators from voting, as well as an attempt to take control of the Election Commission, which the President wanted to investigate. There was no effort to restrict the media, the internet, or public gatherings, and only a few hundred troops were involved.
President Yoon is now retroactively trying to portray the martial law declaration as a mere warning rather than an actual implementation, claiming it was symbolic rather than substantive. However, it was martial law, and there was a serious attempt to prevent legislators from voting it down. How long he intended it to last, or what he hoped to achieve, is hard to say.
The key difference, in my mind, lies in the backgrounds of the leaders. Previous dictators like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were former military officers. They understood the military chain of command and thought in military terms. Yoon, on the other hand, is a prosecutor and a lawyer with no command experience. He seemed to lack a clear understanding of what he was doing, and the enforcement of the declaration was extremely inept.
For example, the commander of South Korea’s martial law command claimed he had not been given any advance notice and did not know what the military was supposed to be doing during those six hours. It seems the Defense Minister was effectively in charge of the situation, which is not how it is supposed to work. In several ways, this declaration was destined to fail. It’s hard to discern what it was meant to accomplish, and it doesn’t compare in scale or severity to the martial law of the past era.
What factors contributed to the rapid collapse of martial law? What roles did political parties and the broader public play in ending military rule?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: First of all, the immediate response from the lawmakers was crucial. The declaration occurred on a weeknight around 6 PM, so many lawmakers were still in town. They quickly rallied to do their jobs, backed by public support and local residents who, upon hearing the news, gathered to break down police barricades.
This was coupled with what I would describe as lukewarm participation by the troops involved. Political science has an entire branch of theorization about when troops will follow orders to fire on a crowd or choose to defy those orders. This situation will likely become an interesting case study for that field. In this instance, the words “martial law” elicited such a strong and visceral reaction in the South Korean public that opposition was immediate and resolute. The troops didn’t appear to fully support the declaration, and there was no indication they would fire on the crowd. It’s puzzling to consider what the administration’s expectations were in this scenario.
Yoon’s own political party, the People Power Party, did not seem to rally around him either. In fact, they now appear to be distancing themselves significantly, as evidenced by the impeachment vote. While his party might prefer for him to step down voluntarily rather than endure a drawn-out impeachment process in court, their support for him has been far weaker than one might expect if this were simply a party-line issue.
South Korea’s Democratic Institutions Face a Critical Test
And lastly, Professor Shaw, now that President Yoon has been impeached by the South Korean Parliament, what perspectives do you foresee for the stability of democratic institutions, and what is the significance of this impeachment in the history of South Korea’s democratization process?
Dr. Meredith Shaw: For South Korea, this is the third time a President has been impeached. The most recent one was just eight years ago. I was in South Korea at the time, and I vividly remember it. They’ve survived this before, and they will survive it again.
I think this will be an opportunity for both parties to get their houses in order. Both major parties have recently gone through a phase of populist leadership, with Yoon on the conservative side and Lee Jae-myung leading the Democratic Party. Both leaders have become extremely unpopular. While it’s still a bit too early to predict, I believe the public might now be looking for steadier, more establishment-oriented leadership—especially with the uncertainty surrounding the incoming Trump administration and North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable behavior over the past year. Nobody seems to want a rabble-rousing, anti-establishment leader to emerge from this situation.
If this process unfolds similarly to the last impeachment, we can expect a winter of continuous protests. However, protests in South Korea often have the character of a peaceful, celebratory demonstration of democracy, almost like a festival. There will likely be a police presence to maintain safety, but not to crack down on crowds. If the Constitutional Court chooses to remove President Yoon from power, a snap election will follow. I believe there’s a short period—perhaps two or three weeks, though it could be longer—for parties to organize their campaigns and select candidates.
Currently, the Conservative Party is very splintered, which may result in multiple contenders vying for leadership. Meanwhile, their main rival, the Democratic Party, is also embroiled in scandals, and its leadership is highly unpopular. In fact, one reason some people hesitate to support impeachment is because the current leader of the Democratic Party is himself extremely unpopular.
Given this, we may see lesser-known figures emerge, and hopefully, some steadier leadership will arise as a result of these latest shocks. That said, South Korea fundamentally needs a strong left-wing party to address systemic inequalities in society and a strong right-wing party to defend against the very real threat from North Korea.
Unfortunately, in recent years, both sides have behaved in ways that fail to inspire confidence. I expect a much needed reckoning in the upcoming election, which I anticipate will take place in the spring.
