In a wide-ranging interview with ECPS, renowned political scientist Professor Arend Lijphart warns that the design of democratic institutions plays a decisive role in democratic resilience or erosion. Drawing from over 50 years of comparative research, Professor Lijphart argues that presidential and majoritarian systems—as seen in the US, India, and the UK—enable dangerous concentrations of power. “Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely,” he states. In contrast, parliamentary systems with proportional representation foster inclusion, accountability, and stability. His core message is urgent: consensus democracy is not just more effective—it’s essential in resisting authoritarian backsliding. “Strong governments may decide faster,” he notes, “but they often decide wrongly.”
Interview by Selcuk Gultasli
Giving a wide-ranging interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Arend Lijphart, one of the most influential political scientists of the past and present century and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, San Diego, offers a sobering diagnosis of the institutional roots of intensifying democratic backsliding. Drawing on over five decades of comparative research, Professor Lijphart—one of the signatories of the “International Declaration Against Fascism,” published on June 13, 2025, alongside Nobel laureates, public intellectuals, and leading scholars of democracy and authoritarianism—revisits his foundational distinction between majoritarian and consensus democracies to illuminate why authoritarian populism so often flourishes in systems that concentrate political power. At the heart of his critique lies a stark warning: “Presidentialism creates a greater risk of democratic collapse.”
Throughout the interview, Professor Lijphart argues that the structural design of presidential and winner-takes-all electoral systems—such as those in the United States, India, and the United Kingdom—facilitates the erosion of liberal democratic norms. “Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely,” he warns. “In presidential systems—such as the United States—we currently see a significant concentration of executive power.” Even parliamentary democracies are not immune, especially when paired with majoritarian electoral rules like first-past-the-post. These systems, he explains, enable governments to take power without majority support and to gradually expand their authority unchecked.
Professor Lijphart draws a direct connection between these institutional flaws and the rise of what he calls “strongman rule”—a hallmark of modern authoritarianism. “It is about trying to organize the entire society in such a way that civil society is weakened—anything that can challenge the authority of the single-person ruler or a single-party ruler.” From Trump’s attacks on journalists and universities to Modi’s and Erdoğan’s efforts to centralize power, Professor Lijphart sees a global pattern enabled by institutional design.
But he also offers a proven alternative: consensus democracy. Based on parliamentary systems and proportional representation (PR), these arrangements, he argues, are “much, much better” not only at ensuring inclusive governance but at resisting authoritarian encroachment. “Consensus systems do just as well—or even a little bit better” than majoritarian ones in terms of performance, he says, while also producing lower levels of terrorism, greater satisfaction with government, and stronger representation for women and minorities.
While Lijphart acknowledges that no democratic system offers perfect safeguards, his message is clear: “Strong governments may make decisions more easily than coalition or power-sharing governments—but those decisions are often the wrong ones.” His long-standing mantra—parliamentary government and proportional representation—emerges not simply as a technical preference, but as a democratic imperative in an age of global authoritarian drift.
Here is the transcript of our interview with Professor Arend Lijphart, edited lightly for readability.
Majoritarian Systems Invite Authoritarian Drift
Professor Arend Lijphart, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In your typology of democratic systems (1968), you contrast majoritarian and consensus models. To what extent do majoritarian systems—especially those lacking robust institutional checks, as seen in Hungary and India—enable the concentration of power that facilitates the rise of authoritarian or fascistic regimes?
Professor Arend Lijphart: I think this seems to be happening in many places—not everywhere, but in lots of places—that a government comes into power and then gradually expands its power step by step.
You’re specifically talking about the judicial system. It’s important that the system is strong, but in democratic systems, that depends very much on other factors. I think more important—and I guess that’s the main message of my book Patterns of Democracy—is that there should be more sharing of power, so that we do not get a concentration of power.
Some electoral systems make the concentration of power much more likely. For example, in presidential systems—such as the United States—we currently see a significant concentration of executive power. The same can occur in parliamentary systems, as in the United Kingdom. This typically happens when the electoral system is what the British call “first past the post,” or what is known in the US as the plurality system. That system creates a concentration of power.
In Britain, for instance, power can end up in the hands of a party that did not win a majority of the vote. The same happened in the 2016 US presidential election, where Donald Trump was elected despite receiving significantly fewer votes than Hillary Clinton. This, in my view, highlights a key weakness of both presidential systems and parliamentary systems that employ majoritarian electoral rules. But perhaps I’m circling around your question rather than addressing it directly.
Fascism Weakens Civil Society to Centralize Power
My second question is: The recent declaration you signed warns of a global authoritarian drift. How do you view the contribution of majoritarian democratic structures—particularly those favoring winner-takes-all outcomes, such as in the United Kingdom or the United States—to this resurgence of fascistic traits in contemporary politics?
Professor Arend Lijphart: I consider fascism to involve, among other things, strongman rule. It is about trying to organize the entire society in such a way that civil society is weakened—anything that can challenge the authority of the single-person ruler or a single-party ruler. Weakening civil society means targeting independent institutions and external sources of power.
In the United States, for instance, the federal system—because of its decentralization—provides some protection against the concentration of power. That’s one safeguard. The judicial system and the rest of civil society are also crucial. Yet we are currently seeing efforts to undermine these very institutions. Under President Trump, we’ve seen attempts to weaken universities, to attack journalists, and to discredit lawyers who may oppose the government. This all contributes to a dangerous concentration of power.
And what can we do about it? I signed that declaration to call attention to the danger. The declaration itself may not have any immediate or specific effect, but it is important that people become more aware of the threats we are facing in democratic systems today.
Consensus Democracies Are More Resilient
In your co-authored article with Matt Qvortrup (2013), you demonstrate that majoritarian democracies are significantly more prone to fatal domestic terrorism. Do similar institutional vulnerabilities—like those evident in the United States post-January 6 or in Brazil under Bolsonaro—help explain the susceptibility of these systems to authoritarian populist mobilization today?
Professor Arend Lijphart: Actually, my entire work—specifically Patterns of Democracy—shows that consensus democracies work better than majoritarian democracies. The old wisdom in political science was that you need majoritarian democracy in order to have a strong enough government to run things effectively. But what I found in a comparative study of 36 countries is that the idea of a strong and effective government is not the province only of majoritarian systems. Consensus systems do just as well—or even a little bit better.
Moreover, consensus systems are much, much better at doing other things. For example, when there is consensus in government, there’s likely to be less danger of terrorism. And there are many other advantages—better representation of women, better representation of minorities, greater public satisfaction with government, and so on. So it really all kind of boils down to that.
And then the question is—and perhaps I’m making this answer too long—is how do you create a consensus system? I think there are two mechanisms that are especially important: parliamentary government rather than presidential government, and proportional representation rather than majoritarian elections. Now, those two things are not, if installed, a guarantee of success. It’s not a sufficient condition for success—but I would say it’s a necessary one. It doesn’t guarantee that it will work, but it is more likely to work than the alternative.
No System Offers Absolute Guarantees
In “Democracy in the 21st Century,” you argue that democracies that ignore the institutional superiority of parliamentary government and proportional representation risk degradation. In the light of backsliding cases like Tunisia, Turkey, and Israel, what constitutional reforms would be most effective in preventing the kind of democratic erosion outlined in the declaration?
Professor Arend Lijphart: I suppose there’s really no guarantee—take Israel, for example. It essentially has a parliamentary government. Turkey, on the other hand, began with a parliamentary system but later shifted to presidentialism. Still, I’m not entirely sure. There’s simply no assurance that any given system will succeed. That said, I recall listening to a lecture by one of the authors of the important book How Democracies Die, and their central argument, as I understand it, is that democracies often collapse gradually.
That can happen in both systems. In a presidential government, it could be the president that decides, with the aid of the armed forces, to take over power—or the armed forces simply take over power. And I asked the author, does it make a difference whether you have a presidential or parliamentary government? And he said, “Oh, I see there is a political scientist in the audience”—that was me—but he said, yes, in presidential government you have a greater chance that this will happen than in parliamentary government. But there’s obviously just no guarantee whatsoever to ward off this danger.
Proportional Representation Could Have Prevented the Rise of the BJP
Your 1985 work on electoral rules illustrates the democratic benefits of proportional representation (PR). Given the rise of exclusionary populism in countries with first-past-the-post systems—such as the UK, the US, and India—how might PR systems act as a structural safeguard against democratic backsliding?
Professor Arend Lijphart: Well, I think in the case of the US, it would help to have proportional representation. Right now, even though it’s a presidential system, the president effectively controls the legislature. If you had proportional representation, there would likely be a multiparty system, and there would be much less chance that the president could control the legislature to the extent we see now in the United States.
In fact, this past week you could see a similar dynamic in India. I wrote about India and the possible dangers for Indian democracy in the 1990s, and I said the danger is that an authoritarian party—namely, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)—could come to power. How can you prevent that? The BJP does not have a popular majority. What the Congress Party should have done when they were in power was introduce proportional representation. I think that would have—again, there’s no guarantee— made it less likely for the BJP to emerge as the strongest party in India. The BJP has been engaged in democratic backsliding. Minorities have not been adequately protected, and so on. We know what is going on, and India has shifted from a liberal democracy to what is now an illiberal democracy. It’s no longer the kind of shining example of a big country in Asia that manages to be a stable democracy.
When Power Is Shared, Democracy Stands Stronger
Given your long-standing critique of power concentration in majoritarian systems, how can electoral reform—particularly the adoption of PR or mixed-member systems, as seen in Germany or New Zealand—disincentivize authoritarian tendencies and promote institutional pluralism in increasingly polarized democracies?
Professor Arend Lijphart: Well, again, you mentioned Germany and New Zealand—they basically have mixed-member systems that are fundamentally proportional. It’s just less likely that an extreme party will come to power. I mean, it’s kind of amazing to think about Germany in the early 1930s. How did Hitler come to power? Hitler never won an election. He was defeated in the presidential election by Hindenburg, and in the last free parliamentary election, the Nazi Party won more than 40% of the vote. But there were other conservative parties. The president then appointed Hitler to be chancellor, and that, of course, was the beginning of the complete end of democracy in Germany. But the important thing to remember is that—even in a time of severe crisis in Germany—and with the Nazi Party claiming they would solve everything, they still did not win a majority. And obviously, under proportional representation, parties can still win a majority, but it’s just less likely that it will happen.
Your 2010 research on democratic quality highlights the representational benefits of consensus systems for women and minority groups. In the light of resurgent anti-gender and exclusionary rhetoric in countries like Poland, Italy, Turkey and the US, how crucial is electoral system design in sustaining democratic inclusiveness and resilience?
Professor Arend Lijphart: Yes, indeed what proportional representation does is make it more likely that women and members of minority groups get representation—and if they get representation, they gain a political voice and some political power. I remember being in New Zealand and listening to an interview with the woman Prime Minister. This was after the change to proportional representation, and there was a proposal by her party to introduce some limits on proportional representation. She was asked, “Do you favor that?” And she said, “Well, just wait a minute. Proportional representation has made it easier for women to get representation,” and she pointed to the larger number of women in her own party. So, she said, “Well, let’s just wait a bit with limiting proportional representation,” because she was then thinking of protecting the women members of her own party. So, when women and minority group members gain representation, it is more likely to lead to policies and outcomes that advance the interests of women and minorities.
Social Media Amplifies Extremes—Just Like Primary Elections
In an era marked by digital disinformation and epistemic fragmentation—phenomena actively weaponized in democratic erosion cases like India, Brazil, and Hungary—how must electoral and media institutions evolve to uphold the rational, inclusive discourse central to your model of consensus democracy?
Professor Arend Lijphart: I guess I don’t have a good answer to that. What do you do about social media, when so many voices—especially extreme ones—dominate the space? It reminds me of what has happened with primary elections in the United States. The idea was to give more influence to voters. But in practice, turnout tends to be very low, and those who do vote are often the most passionate and extreme. So instead of improving representation, the primary system has become a vehicle for amplifying more radical views.
I think something similar is happening with social media: extreme voices gain disproportionate attention. And honestly, I don’t know what to do about that. Shutting down social media isn’t an option—people wouldn’t accept it. But the potential, and I think real, danger of extremism spreading through these platforms remains a serious concern.
Proportional Representation and Federalism Help Diffuse Power
The declaration, you signed, warns that fascism historically erodes the separation of powers. How can the institutional diffusion of authority in consensus democracies serve as a bulwark against executive aggrandizement, especially in light of how Erdoğan in Turkey and Modi in India have centralized power?
Professor Arend Lijphart: If you have—and again, I always come back to the same answer—a parliamentary government and proportional representation, you’re more likely to have a diffusion of power. But of course, in India they do not have proportional representation, which they really should have.
Now, you’re talking about an institutional diffusion of authority. For instance, a presidential system with separation of powers and a federal system with considerable decentralization. I think a federal system with a high degree of decentralization is one way of decreasing the danger of fascism and the concentration of power.
The problem with federalism, for instance in the United States—but also in countries like Brazil and Argentina—is that it means giving special representation to the states. In the case of the United States, it’s equal representation of the states of the federation, and this results in huge inequality of population. So you have a problem that is not a necessary element of federalism, but it often goes together with it.
In the case of Germany, also, Germany is a federal system, and I think that is helpful for its democracy. There is some inequality there too, but not as extreme as in the United States, Brazil, and Argentina.
Inclusion Weakens Extremists by Exposing Their Incompetence
In systems where populist leaders have weakened judicial independence and neutralized parliamentary oversight—as seen in Israel’s controversial judicial overhaul and Hungary’s court packing—how might consociational design principles be leveraged to insulate democratic institutions from authoritarian encroachment?
Professor Arend Lijphart: I could come back to saying there are just no absolute instruments that will do—it is just less likely when you have a good proportional representation system and a parliamentary government. But, as you see in the case of Israel, they have a parliamentary government, and they do have proportional representation. Yet there is one party and its allies that has power, and it’s using it to slowly erode this.
That’s the idea in the book How Democracies Die—if you have a group, a party, or a president that has this power and aims to undermine the system, aims to concentrate power in one party’s or one person’s hands, then it’s not a guarantee that democracy will be preserved. But again, I think it’s all just less likely in parliamentary systems with proportional representation.
Your functionalist rationale for consensus democracy emphasizes broad-based inclusion. How can inclusive, multiparty coalitions help depolarize political discourse and counteract the “us-versus-them” narratives instrumentalized by authoritarian populists in cases like Venezuela or El Salvador?
Professor Arend Lijphart: If you have a highly divided and potentially polarized society, it’s important to include a broad range of parties and to foster compromise, even with those holding very different points of view. I often think it is better, when extreme parties are present—as in Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands—to try to include them in government rather than to enforce what is known in Belgium as the cordon sanitaire, which excludes such parties.
In the Netherlands, for example, the tendency has been to include these parties, and doing so has often revealed that they are not particularly effective in governance—they lack qualified people to serve in government roles. In that sense, inclusion can become a way of letting them destroy themselves. Most recently, the Dutch cabinet collapsed after Wilders’s party—arguably the main extreme party—was part of the government but has since withdrawn. According to current opinion polls, they are now likely to lose votes. By being included and then shown to be ineffective, these parties have weakened themselves.
We Need a Broader Cultural Shift Toward Consensus and Inclusion
And lastly, Professor Lijphart, the anti-fascist declaration urges stronger international institutions. How might the core principles of consensus democracy—such as proportionality, minority protection, and power-sharing—inform the reform of multilateral bodies like the UN, EU, or African Union to more effectively resist authoritarian influence and erosion of global democratic norms?
Professor Arend Lijphart: I wish I knew. One thing I can say is that international organizations like the United Nations have increasingly shifted toward a preference for proportional representation—particularly to enhance minority representation. That was the case in Iraq, and I think it marks a significant change in the general attitude toward government and electoral reform.
Historically, the individuals who had influence in politics and governance tended to admire the British system. But in the case of the United Nations, for example, they advocated for proportional representation in Iraq. While Iraq is clearly not a well-functioning democracy, this still reflects a broader institutional endorsement of such reforms.
Of course, I would argue that these organizations should listen to experts who understand the specific context of each country and can guide them away from the assumption that strong governments are synonymous with good governance. Strong governments may make decisions more easily than coalition or power-sharing governments—but those decisions are often the wrong ones.
What we need, clearly, is a broader cultural shift. There’s an important relationship between culture and structure: if a society has a more consensual culture, it is more likely to develop consensual institutional structures. Conversely, introducing consensual structures—again, I always return to my mantra of parliamentary government and proportional representation—makes it more likely that consensus-oriented norms will take root.
