A demonstration against the Czech government, high energy prices, the Green Deal, and the EU took place in Prague on September 3, 2022. Protesters demanded a change of government amidst the crises. Photo: Helena Zezulkova.

The Race of Populists: The 2024 EP Elections in the Czech Republic

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Please cite as:

Havlík, Vlastimil & Kluknavská, Alena. (2024). “The Race of Populists: The 2024 EP Elections in the Czech Republic.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0066

 

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Abstract

The chapter analyses the performance of populist political parties in the 2024 EP election in the Czech Republic. The election ended with a significant increase in support for several populist parties: Action of Dissatisfied Citizens, Freedom and Direct Democracy and the Oath and Motorists. All populist parties used radical-right rhetoric before the election, expressing different levels of criticism of the European Union, strong anti-immigration attitudes and negative attitudes toward the Green Deal. The preliminary data show that the electoral support for the populists was based on a higher level of mobilization in so-called peripheral areas of the Czech Republic, potentially affected by recent inflation and austerity policies pursued by the government. All in all, the 2024 EP election in Czechia significantly increased support for populist political parties.

Keywords: populism; Czech Republic; Euroscepticism; far right; radical right

By Vlastimil Havlík*  (Department of Political Science, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic) & Alena Kluknavská** (Department of Media Studies and Journalism, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic

Introduction

The EP election took place three years into the Czech Republic’s four-year parliamentary electoral cycle, making it an important test of support for both governing parties and the populist opposition. After the 2021 general elections, five political parties built two electoral coalitions, both of which advanced an anti-populist platform: the right-wing Spolu (Together) and the centrist coalition between the Pirates party and Mayors and Independents (Starostové a Nezávislí, STAN). They agreed to form a new government, effectively ending eight years of governments with a significant populist presence.

Yet populists made a comeback in the 2024 EP election. The campaign leading up to the 9 June polls was dominated by the issues of immigration and the European Green Deal, and all the populist parties tried to frame the election as a referendum on the incumbent government’s performance. Historically, in line with the second-order elections theory (Reif & Schmitt, 1980), Czech voters have often taken elections as an opportunity to punish the government by voting for the parliamentary opposition or even for new political parties (Charvát & Maškarinec, 2020). The 2024 election did not depart from this trend, and populist parties came out on top: besides two ‘established’ populist parties – Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO) and Freedom and Direct Democracy (Svoboda a Přímá Demokracie, SPD) – the electoral coalition of the populist ‘Přísaha a Motoristé’ (Oath and Motorists, AUTO) gained representation in the European Parliament. While many voters may have voted for populist parties out of frustration with national politics and the incumbent government’s performance (Mahdalová & Škop, 2024), the message to the European Parliament from the Czech Republic is unequivocal: populist voices are stronger and more radical than ever before.

Background

Similarly to other European countries, the Czech Republic has witnessed a proliferation of populist political parties over the past 15 years. This expansion has been precipitated by the 2008 economic crisis and a series of political scandals, which have resulted in a decline in support for the established political parties (Havlík, 2015). The largest populist party, consistently polling around 30% of the vote, is ANO, founded in 2011 and led by the billionaire industrialist Andrej Babiš. The party is typically characterized as a technocratic or centrist populist party lacking clearly defined ideological foundations. The party initially gained traction by appealing to voters through an emphasis on communicating expertise and the ability to run the state effectively while blaming the established political parties for incompetency and corruption (Havlík, 2019).

However, it has recently shifted both rhetorically and electorally towards the economic centre-left combined with nativist and authoritarian attitudes, moving closer to the programmatic formula typical for other far-right political parties in contemporary Europe (De Lange, 2007).

ANO initially became part of the coalition government in 2013 as a junior partner to the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Christian Democrats. Following the 2017 election, it became the leading government party in a minority coalition with the SD, which was supported for the majority of the term by the communists (Komunistická Strana Čech a Moravy, KSČM). After the 2021 general election, ANO assumed the role of the leading opposition party. Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the party adopted a stance of ambivalent support for Kyiv while simultaneously advancing a criticism of Ukrainian policies as well as welfare-chauvinist arguments (i.e., the idea that welfare benefits and social services should be reserved primarily or exclusively for the native population of a country, rather than being extended to immigrants or non-citizens) (Havlík & Kluknavská, 2023). Additionally, it has taken a pro-Israel stance during the Israel–Hamas conflict.

Concerning its position towards the EU and EU policies, ANO has shifted from a mildly pro-European stance (Havlík & Kaniok, 2016) towards soft Euroscepticism over time. Initially, the party defended Czechia’s membership of the EU, and Babiš even offered lukewarm support for the country adopting the euro. Subsequently, ANO began to emphasize the need to safeguard Czech national sovereignty vis-à-vis the EU, utilizing anti-elitist populist rhetoric targeting ‘European elites’ and attributing the EU’s ineffectiveness in migration policy to incompetence in Brussels. The party’s stance towards the EU became increasingly aligned with that of populist radical-right parties in other EU member states.

In its manifesto for the 2024 European Parliament election, ANO adopted a clear intergovernmentalist position, presented in a populist manner. It called for the ‘need to restore the decisive role of the national states in the EU’. It also opposed decisions taken by European institutions and ‘non-elected bureaucrats’ who are ‘disconnected from the reality of everyday life’ (ANO, 2024). The party criticized the EU Pact on Migration, framing it as a security concern and warning the Czech Republic not to ‘take the path of Western Europe, where no-go zones have sprung up in many cities, where people are afraid to go out at night, and women are at risk of violence’ (ANO, 2024). ANO also promised to reform the European Green Deal passed ‘in defiance of common sense’, claiming that ‘Brussels has decided to commit ritual suicide’ (ANO, 2024). ANO rejected the idea of the ban on combustion engines and even dedicated a chapter in its manifesto to the issue, contributing to the high salience of the issue in the electoral campaign. ANO also criticized the EU for the supposed ‘restrictions on freedom of expression that are now taking place under the guise of fighting disinformation. In reality, however, this term often masquerades as the EU’s desire to regulate and restrict the publication of alternative opinions’ (ANO, 2024). Even more, ANO blamed ‘both domestic and Brussels elites’ for ‘wanting to control, dominate and re-educate people in various ways’ (ANO, 2024), comparing it to the oppression of human rights and freedom during the communist regime before 1989.

SPD is a populist radical-right party led by Tomio Okamura. The party, along with its predecessor, Dawn of Direct Democracy (also founded by Okamura), has been represented in the national parliament since the 2013 general elections, consistently garnering around 10% of the vote. The party’s initial success was tied to Okamura’s popularity as a TV personality (he was president of the Czech Association of Travel Agencies, performed in a reality show, and gained media attention with his project of a toy travel agency). The party has capitalized on its potent anti-establishment appeal and, with the onset of the immigration crisis, adopted xenophobic, uncompromisingly anti-immigration and hard Eurosceptic rhetoric. SPD has become one of the most vocal anti-Ukrainian voices following Russia’s 2022 invasion (Havlík & Kluknavská, 2023). Due to its anti-Islam stance, SPD has been a stalwart defender of Israel during the Israel–Hamas conflict. Unlike ANO, SPD has never been part of the government.

In mid 2023 SPD formed an electoral alliance with Tricolour, another populist radical-right outfit, ahead of the 2024 EP elections. The two parties continued to co-operate in the run-up to the polls. A first glance at SPD’s EP manifesto reveals a striking similarity with ANO’s rhetoric. The major difference lies in SPD’s more radical language, a generally more sceptical attitude towards the EU (including a demand for a membership referendum), and a stronger emphasis on immigration policy. SPD was highly critical of the EU, describing it as a ‘dictatorship in Brussels’ dominated by ‘non-elected bureaucrats’ who produce ‘directives that are against the interests of our state and our people’ (SPD, 2024).

The party framed the issue of migration primarily in security terms, rejecting the EU Pact for Migration, claimed that the EU supports ‘mass migration and multiculturalism’, and stated that ‘[m]any Western European cities have already been Islamised, resulting in huge crime, terrorism, and the domination of Sharia law in so-called no-go zones’ (SPD, 2024). SPD also rejected the Green Deal, vehemently opposing ‘any attempt to reduce car transport and combustion engines’ (SPD, 2024). The party criticized political correctness, accusing the EU of censorship and a disingenuous campaign against disinformation. Overall, among the Czech political parties represented in the EP, SPD was closest to ‘hard Euroscepticism’, challenging the current trajectory of the EU and even questioning the Czech Republic’s membership.

In addition to the existing populist political parties with representation in the Czech parliament, several new populist radical-right parties have emerged since the 2021 election. These parties have capitalized on discursive opportunities related to the high level of inflation (at times the highest among EU member states), the government’s austerity policies, and, to some extent, the war in Ukraine. In 2022, Jindřich Rajchl, a former member of Tricolour and an organizer of anti-COVID-19 measures demonstrations, founded the Law, Respect, Expertise (Právo, Respekt, Odbornost, PRO) party. Rajchl co-organized several anti-government demonstrations, the largest of which drew around 70,000 participants. However, he and his party lost momentum as the Czech economy gradually recovered and public support for pro-Russian stances remained limited.

Conversely, the political party Oath, founded in 2021 by former police chief Róbert Šlachta, whose anti-organized crime unit led a corruption investigation that toppled the right-wing cabinet in 2013, stabilized its support. Despite receiving 4% of the votes in the 2021 general election and polling below the 5% electoral threshold, the party saw an uptick in support before the election, according to some opinion polls. One reason for the increasing support was the electoral coalition Oath formed with Motorists for Themselves (formerly named Referendum on the EU, later the Party for the Independence of the Czech Republic).

The coalition leveraged the opportunity to campaign against the government, took an anti-immigration position and strongly criticized the European Green Deal, especially the planned ban on cars with combustion engines. Although many political parties made similar claims, the coalition gained credibility in the fight to preserve combustion engines by placing Filip Turek, a former racing driver, luxury car collector and social media influencer, at the top of its electoral list. Despite consistently polling around 5%, the coalition saw a growth in support shortly before the election. Some analysts attributed this boost to Turek’s increased media visibility, which included allegations of his use of Nazi symbols (which Turek downplayed) and the fact that the party and Turek himself became a target of negative campaigning from some of the government and opposition parties. For instance, the electoral leader of Mayors and Independents, one of the government parties, challenged Turek to a TV debate, framing him as a major threat to Czech democracy. This debate, which took place just a few days before the election, recorded significant viewership and may have impacted the result of the party in the election.

Electoral results

Populist parties gained 10 of the 21 MEP seats allocated to the Czech Republic. ANO took poll position with 26.1% of the vote (electing seven MEPs), increasing its support by 5 percentage points compared to the 2019 EP elections. The SPD and Tricolour list secured 5.7% of the votes and one seat, a decline of more than 3 percentage points compared to 2019. The biggest surprise of the election was the 10.3% of the votes and two seats won by AUTO. By including the votes received by other protest parties, such as the coalition Stačilo (Enough) led by the KSČM, with those received by populist parties, the protest camp secured a majority of 55% of the votes.

Despite the government’s low popularity, the incumbent parties scored relatively well, collectively gaining almost 37% of the votes (compared to 43% in the 2021 general election). The right-wing Spolu coalition (22.3% and 6 MEPs) achieved a fair result, and Mayors and Independents (STAN) met the expectations set by the public opinion polls (8.7% of votes and 2 MEPs). Among the governing parties, only the Pirates performed poorly (6.2% and 1 MEP). The election did not signal a revival for the SPD, once a defining pole in the party system. Having remained just below the electoral threshold in the 2021 general election and losing parliamentary representation after more than 30 years, the SPD received less than 2% of the votes, continuing their decline into irrelevance.

As with the previous EP elections in Czechia, the results were marked by low electoral turnout. However, turnout increased significantly to 36%, the highest in the history of EP elections in the Czech Republic (up from 29% in 2019). According to an analysis of aggregated data published shortly after the election, the increase in turnout was likely linked to mobilization in peripheral areas, including the so-called inner peripheries (Grim, 2024). These are less developed areas with lower levels of infrastructure, higher unemployment and a higher proportion of low-educated people. It should be noted that peripheral status is not defined exclusively by economic factors; it also has vital historical, social, and cultural dimensions (Bernard & Šimon. 2017). Previous studies have shown that people living in peripheral areas are more likely to hold populist attitudes (Dvořák et al., 2024), and populist parties tend to be more successful in areas characterized by economic hardship or an ageing population (Dvořák & Zouhar, 2022; Lysek et al., 2021). Early analyses of the aggregated data indicate that the 2024 EP election followed this pattern. ANO, AUTO, SPD and Stačilo were most successful in the peripheral areas. The notable results of ANO, which benefited the most from increased turnout in these areas, confirm the transformation in the character of support for the once-centrist populist party (Havlík & Voda, 2018). The success of populists in the areas may stem from the harsh impact of the recent inflation and austerity policies introduced by the government on the people living in peripheral areas. However, historically, the peripheral regions have always been more critical of the EU, and their Euroscepticism may also have played a notable role (Plešivčák, 2020).

Data from opinion surveys conducted a few weeks before the election reveal important similarities and some differences in the socio-demographics of the electorates of the three populist parties that crossed the electoral threshold. Support for ANO spanned various socio-demographic groups but primarily relied on voters without high school diplomas (37% declared they would vote for ANO) and those aged 60 or older (34%). Conversely, only 9% of voters with a university degree and 11% of those aged 18–29 supported ANO. SPD supporters were mostly men and individuals with elementary education, with younger voters less likely to support SPD compared to those aged 45–59. Due to the small number of respondents supporting AUTO, identifying a clearer voter profile is challenging, although there was slightly higher support among men and younger voters (STEM, 2024).

Despite the lack of data on the ideological profiles of populist party voters, it is evident that, on average, populist parties were more attractive to less educated voters and were more successful in peripheral areas. The spatially uneven growth of electoral turnout suggests that the overall rise of populist parties can be attributed to higher mobilization in areas favourable to them. Nevertheless, the differing changes in support for various populist parties (notably the growth of AUTO and Stačilo versus the decline of SPD) indicate limited spillover across government and opposition camps. The ‘populist race’ is further evidenced by data from another pre-election opinion poll, where voters were asked to cast votes (preferences) for two parties. Only a limited number used ‘split votes’ in the sense of supporting one populist (opposition) party and one governing party. This finding relates to the high level of political polarization between populist and anti-populist forces recently observed (Hrbková et al., 2024). In other words, the results of the EP election in Czechia point to the ongoing transformation of the party system from a relatively stable unidimensional competition between the left and the right into a contestation between populist and anti-populist forces (Havlík & Kluknavská, 2022).

Discussion

The EP election in Czechia has resulted in a majority of votes for populist (and protest) parties. Despite their ideological differences, all of these parties share a critical attitude towards the supranational principles underpinning the EU’s functioning and call for strengthening the role of national states in the EU decision-making process. SPD even advocates a reconsideration of Czech membership in the EU. Consequently, Czech populist parties will likely oppose any attempts to strengthen the powers of supranational EU institutions. Similarly, their criticism of the Green Deal and the regulation of cars with combustion engines suggests they will seek to revise the legislation or at least slow down its implementation.

However, the success and real impact of the Czech populists at the EP level will be affected by their membership in EP groups. Given ANO’s ideological shift and the departure of its former liberal pro-European MEPs, ANO decided to leave the liberal Renew group and initiated the formation of a new populist radical-right Eurosceptic group, Patriots for Europe (PfE) alongside Fidesz and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). Despite AUTO expressing their willingness to join the European Conservatives and Reform group (ECR), the governing Civic Democratic Party (ODS), one of the ECR’s founders, did not support its inclusion, and AUTO eventually joined PfE. Although ANO and AUTO have become members of the third-largest EP group, which includes parties such as France’s far-right National Rally (RN), the Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang, VB), Spain’s Vox or Italy’s Lega, the first votes in the EP have already indicated that the PfE’S influence on policy in the current legislature will be constrained. For example, PfE representatives have been excluded from the allocation of posts in EP committees). SPD, the most radical populist party, formed a new far-right Europe of Sovereign Nations group (ESN) alongside the Alternative for Germany or the French Reconquest. ESN is the smallest of the EP groups in the 2024–2029 legislature, and – similarly to PfE – the EP majority has applied a cordon sanitaire to the group, significantly reducing the effective power of ESN in the EP.

The results of the 2024 election in Czechia indicate a strengthening of the populist radical-right and Eurosceptic voices in the EU. First, AUTO gained representation in the EP as a new populist radical-right party. Second, the share of MEPs held by populist parties increased compared to the previous EP elections. Third, given the radicalization of ANO’s ideology and its elected MEPs, the populist voices from Czechia will be more Eurosceptic and generally more radical than ever before. Although their membership in EP groups outside the mainstream of EU politics may tone down the volume of these voices significantly, the 2024 EP election delivered a clear message of a strengthened position of populist political parties in Czechia.

 

This research was supported by the NPO ‘Systemic Risk Institute’ project number LX22NPO5101, funded by the European Union–Next Generation EU (Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, NPO: EXCELES).

 

(*) Vlastimil Havlík is associate professor at Masaryk University and the National Institute for Research on Socioeconomic Impacts of Diseases and Systemic Risks (SYRI) (https://www.syri.institute/). His research focus includes populism and political parties in Central and Eastern Europe. He is also editor-in-chief of the Czech Journal of Political Science (czechpolsci.eu). [ORCID: 0000-0003-3650-5783]

(**) Alena Kluknavská is assistant professor at Masaryk University and the National Institute for Research on Socioeconomic Impacts of Diseases and Systemic Risks (SYRI) (https://www.syri.institute/). Her research focuses on political communication and public and political discourses on migration and minority issues. She is also interested in understanding the communication strategies and successes of the populist radical-right parties and movements in Central and Eastern Europe. Recently, her work has focused on truth contestation and polarization in political discourse, particularly on social media. [ORCID: 0000-0002-3679-3335]

 

References

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Charvát, J., & Maškarinec, P. (2020). Volby do Evropského parlamentu v Česku v roce 2019: stále ještě druhořadé volby?. Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury.

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Dvořák, T., Zouhar, J., & Treib, O. (2024). Regional peripheralization as contextual source of populist attitudes in Germany and Czech Republic. Political Studies, 72(1), 112–133.

Grim, J. (2024). Kde uspěli Turek a Konečná? ‚Noví populisté‘ mobilizovali v krajských zákoutích a u lidí se základním vzděláním, Český rozhlas. https://www.irozhlas.cz/zpravy-domov/novi-populiste-turek-a-konecna-bodovali-na-hranicich-kraju-a-u-lidi-se-zakladnim_2406110500_jgr

Havlík, V. (2015). The Economic Crisis in the Shadow of Political Crisis: The Rise of Party Populism in the Czech Republic. In Kriesi, H. & Pappas, T. S. (Eds.), European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession. ECPR Press: 199–216.

Havlík, V., & Kluknavská, A. (2022). The Populist Vs Anti‐Populist Divide in the Time of Pandemic: The 2021 Czech National Election and its Consequences for European Politics. Journal of Common Market Studies, 60(S1), 76–87.

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Hrbková, L., Voda, P., & Havlík, V. (2024). Politically motivated interpersonal biases: Polarizing effects of partisanship and immigration attitudes. Party Politics, 30(3), 450–464.

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Anti-government protest organized by Alliance for the Union of Romanians against the increase in energy prices in Bucharest, Romania on October 02, 2022. Photo: Shutterstock.

Charting Populist Pathways: Romanian Populism’s Journey to the European Parliament

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Please cite as:

Soare, Sorina. (2024). “Charting Populist Pathways: Romanian Populism’s Journey to the European Parliament.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0081

 

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Abstract

This report examines the landscape of the far right in Romania within the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Two Romanian far-right parties secured seats in the European Parliament: the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and SOS Romania (SOS), receiving 14.9% and 5% of the valid votes, respectively. Both parties emphasize the defence of Romanian sovereignty and promote nativist and authoritarian rhetoric. However, over the past year, the AUR has increasingly incorporated neoconservative elements into its platform. Consequently, the 2024 campaign has revealed notable differences in programs, candidates, styles of political campaigning and alliance strategies.

Keywords: far right; Romania; European Union; conservatism; sovereignty; political alliances

By Sorina Soare* (Department of Political and Social Sciences, University of Florence, Florence, Italy)

Introduction

In the December 2020 legislative elections in Romania, the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) performed surprisingly well despite being established only a few months prior, in September 2019. Since then, the AUR has increasingly positioned itself as a significant opposition party, engaging critically with the state of Romanian democracy. Central to its political platform is the defence of Romanian sovereignty. The party utilizes populism to mobilize support, often framing society in stark terms: the pure and genuine Romanian people (‘us’) versus the corrupt elites (‘them’), namely, mainstream political parties, cosmopolitan intellectuals, NGOs and similar entities. This division is further reinforced by nativist rhetoric, which emphasizes the organic nature of the Romanian community and underscores various threats posed by non-native elements. While Western societies often view these threats as originating from migrants, in Romania, ethnic minorities such as Hungarians are frequently singled out in this narrative. As such, the AUR’s ideological stance incorporates nativism, authoritarianism and populism, which aligns with what Mudde (2007) identifies as a populist radical right party.

The AUR’s radical dimension (Pirro, 2023) manifests in its opposition to key features of liberal democracy, particularly aspects related to personal liberties. However, the AUR does not seek to undermine democratic institutions but rather draws an ideological boundary with the liberal pillar of liberal democracy, delineating the frontier between the in-group and the out-group (Kauth & King, 2020). Specifically, the in-group comprises Romanian natives and their families, guided by the Christian faith and traditions (Program of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians, 2020).

Political parties are not monolithic entities; they often accommodate multiple political projects within one organization. The AUR exemplifies such diversity, where the original dual leadership represented at least two compatible ideological strands: one primarily oriented towards a unionist platform integrated with populist radical right features; the other focused on conservatism as a cultural, social and political vision opposing cosmopolitan and liberal values, while emphasizing traditional forces such as nature, God, and historical heritage (Drolet & Williams, 2018). A significant convergence point between these strands is their opposition to aspects of the established socio–cultural order characteristic of post-communist liberal democracy. In this context, the European Union (EU) is directly targeted as a source of disruptive values for the Romanian organic community. Criticisms are focused on a wide range of policies and norms perceived to limit national sovereignty, such as the recognition of homosexual families and restrictions on personal liberties like the use of cash.

Beyond the AUR, the landscape of Romanian politics features various actors challenging the status quo. One such prominent figure is Diana Șoșoacă, who emerged as an extremely vocal political leader. Elected on the AUR list in the 2020 legislative elections, Șoșoacă was later expelled and joined SOS Romania, a party whose name viscerally reflects its core narrative: the urgent need to save Romania. Nativist, authoritarian and populist dimensions resonate in her discourse, echoing the need to defend national sovereignty against the EU and other foreign interests. However, there are differences in intensity and content compared to the AUR. Her communication style is characterized by a highly confrontational manner and a narrative of perpetual crisis. Șoșoacă’s unconventional performance serves as a substitute for party organization and autonomous political identity, making both her political style and messages potentially disruptive to the democratic status quo. From this perspective, SOS Romania embodies the potential for extremism.

Romania’s political landscape appears complex in the aftermath of the 2024 European Parliament elections. While it is acknowledged as a bastion of political stability and pro-EU sentiment, with the coalition of mainstream parties – the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the National Liberal Party (PNL) – securing a significant victory with 48.5% of the valid votes (See Table 1 below), there is also notable representation of MEPs from parties advocating radical right stances. This report analyses the historical trajectories of two Romanian parties embodying such views, scrutinizing their campaigns for the EP, evaluating their electoral platforms and profiling their candidates.

The far right strikes back: Romanian insights

Following a period of dormancy in the early 2000s, the far right (Pirro, 2023) made a significant resurgence in Romania’s political landscape. Initially operating outside parliament, the Romanian far right gained considerable momentum following the 2020 legislative elections. While the AUR secured substantial parliamentary representation, it also became a focal point for nativist, authoritarian and populist discourses. In parallel, the AUR has faced several internal challenges, marked by the departure of key figures like Șoșoacă, who has since become the leading figure in the rival SOS Romania party.

Additionally, other members of the AUR have splintered off to establish their own political entities. For example, Smaranda Lup, once influential within the AUR’s Cluj branch, cofounded the RO-EXIT party. This new party explicitly advocates for Romania’s withdrawal not only from the EU but also from organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, despite these developments, the electoral potential of these smaller parties remains relatively limited.

Two projects in one

Founded out of a blend of activism, AUR’s founding leadership focused on two main lines of mobilization associated with the political figures George Simion and Claudiu Târziu, who jointly led the party from 2019 to 2022 (Soare & Tufiș, 2023). Since the early 2000s, George Simion has been deeply engaged in grassroots activism, particularly focusing on anti-communist and pro-union causes. Over time, he emerged as the primary spokesperson for the party. Meanwhile, Claudiu Târziu leveraged his journalism background and connections within right-wing networks. Through his blog, Târziu consistently advocated for preserving Christian conservative values within contemporary Romanian democracy. Simion and Târziu jointly advocated for the defence of Romanian identity, sharply underlining its historical heritage as a bulwark against perceived threats from both domestic and international influences.

These principles were fundamental to the AUR’s platform, which was organized around four conservative pillars: faith, nation, family and liberty. Their platform aimed to counter what they viewed as the erosion of traditional values since the communist era. Integral to their approach was a robust anti-establishment stance and a communication strategy that fostered closeness with the Romanian populace. For instance, AUR voters have been invited to participate in personal milestones such as George Simion’s marriage, which aimed to strengthen their connection with supporters on a personal level.

Against this backdrop, two distinct roles emerged among the AUR’s leading figures. George Simion embodies a functional role akin to a modern tribunus plebis, an elected representative tasked with vocally defending Romanians against corrupt and abusive politicians. Conversely, Claudiu Târziu pursues an intellectual specialization in close collaboration with prominent conservative intellectuals such as Sorin Lavric.

Looking for international/European partners

Târziu’s role as the party’s intellectual leader involved networking with conservative and far-right parties across Europe and globally. This role became pivotal in preparing for the 2024 EP elections, with the AUR strategically targeting membership in the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. This strategy received support from grassroots engagements between the AUR extraterritorial branches and local politicians from parties like Vox and Brothers of Italy (Soare & Tufiș, 2023). Concurrently, the party bolstered official political networking efforts, exemplified by George Simion’s participation in Italy’s Atreju festival organized by Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). While some encounters, such as Simion’s reportedly contentious reception at Vox’s Madrid meeting in January 2022 – purportedly due to objections from Fidesz over anti-Hungarian statements – were framed in the media as setbacks, these engagements remained integral to AUR’s strategic outreach.

By October 2022, the AUR had established the Mihai Eminescu Conservative Political Studies Institute in Bucharest. As the institute’s director, Claudiu Târziu expanded its influence through political networking and international conferences. These gatherings hosted a spectrum of international political representatives and intellectuals, providing a platform to articulate conservative visions for Europe and advocate for national sovereignty. One notable event, titled ‘Make Europe Great Again’, took place in Bucharest in April 2024. Explicitly referencing Donald Trump’s ‘MAGA’ slogan, the conference aimed to address concerns about Europe’s perceived decline. It featured prominent intellectuals, politicians, journalists and activists from Europe, Israel, the United States, Canada and Latin America.

Cristian Terheș, a former MEP with the ECR group, played a pivotal role in this context. In December 2023, he joined the Romanian National Conservative Party (PNCR) and soon became its president. The PNCR subsequently forged alliances with the Republican Party of Romania, the Peasant National Alliance, the National Identity Force and the National Renaissance Alliance, forming a coalition with AUR for the European Parliament elections. The gate towards the ECR was definitely open.

The topics of reference

Since its electoral breakthrough in 2020, the AUR has championed the defence of Romania’s political, economic and sociocultural interests. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the AUR emerged as a prominent advocate for personal liberties, staunchly opposing mandatory vaccination, with some representatives endorsing anti-vaccination conspiracy theories. Additionally, the party has criticized European bureaucracy, portraying mainstream parties as subservient to the EU and betraying national interests. AUR has also voiced concerns over EU values, particularly regarding LGBTQ+ rights, advocating for the traditional family as a defence against what they perceive as European intrusions.

Simultaneously, the AUR has consistently emphasized the protection of Romanian communities in neighbouring states and the rights of nonresident economic migrants. Party representatives regularly accuse the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (UDMR) of being a ‘chauvinistic entity’ that promotes ‘terrorism against Romanians’ while also criticizing mainstream parties for their perceived political subservience (Fati, 2024).

In the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the AUR has taken nuanced positions. While denouncing Russia’s interference as a significant obstacle to unification with Moldova, the party also criticizes Ukrainian discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly Romanians.

Emerging competitor: The origins of the SOS Romania party

Despite its young age, the AUR has become a fertile breeding ground for more radical and extremist platforms, exemplified in primis by Șoșoacă, a Romanian lawyer whose political career was boosted by her election as a Romanian senator on the AUR lists in 2020. During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Șoșoacă became one of the most well-known faces of the antivaccine movement, regularly criticizing the government’s defensive measures (Arun, 2024). More generally, Șoșoacă has pushed populist rhetoric to new extremes with tough homophobic, ultra-nationalist, xenophobic and anti-European messages. She proudly presents herself as the first Romanian MP to advocate for a ‘Ro-exit’, stating, “Since we have been in the European Union, we have ruined ourselves! And, under these circumstances, all I can say is RO-Exit! If you relinquish all industry to the European Union, That’s what you did with the PNRR [i.e., National Recovery and Resilience Plan, supported by the EU’s post-COVID-19 recovery fund]! You made fun of all the state companies in Romania! You sacrificed our sovereignty for this! Never! The Romanian Constitution must never be subordinated to EU treaties. Shame on those who have betrayed Romania and its people!” (SOS Romania, 2022).

Her theatrical, patriotic speeches are characterized by aggressive gestures and coarse vocabulary, in which she regularly denounces the ruling parties and emphasizes her proximity to the people. She regularly dresses in traditional popular costumes and voices concerns for Romanian traditions and values at risk of extinction. Șoșoacă has also emerged as one of the most vocal supporters of pro-Russian stances in Romania. She was declared ‘Personality of the Year’ in 2021 by Sputnik, a Russian broadcaster and purportedly sought to promote her messages on Vkontakte, the Russian social media platform (Arun, 2024). In March 2022, Șoșoacă and other MPs paid a high-profile visit to the Russian embassy in Bucharest to present a position of neutrality regarding the ongoing war. One year later, she sparked significant controversy with an interview given to a Russian publication, in which she claimed that Romania is essentially a ‘colony’ within the European Union. She further asserted that Europeans and Americans aim to destroy Russia and argued that Ukraine illegally occupies territories, including some that rightfully belong to Romania (Despa & Vovesz, 2024).

Regarding the armed conflict between Israel and Hamas-led Palestinian militant groups taking place in the Gaza Strip since 7 October 2023, Șoșoacă distinguished herself from the establishment by not participating in the pro-Israel rally organized in Bucharest in the aftermath of Hamas’ 7 October attack. Her position was motivated as less connected to foreign policy choices and more about her fear of drawing Romania into the war. Furthermore, media reports have highlighted her controversial remarks, including instances of antisemitism. For instance, during a joint session of parliament dedicated to the Day of Solidarity and Friendship between Romania and Israel in May 2024, Șoșoacă complained that this day should serve to commemorate Romanian martyrs from communist prisons, criticizing what she viewed as an incorrect focus on antisemitism. She protested that Romania saved over 400,000 Jews during the Second World War (Cotidianul, 2024).

The pursuit of consensus for the European Parliament elections

The AUR presented a strong list of 43 candidates for the European Parliament elections in June 2024, with Cristian Terheș and Claudiu Târziu featuring prominently at the top. The list included notable figures such as Gheorghe Piperea, known for bringing large class-action lawsuits against commercial banks over abusive credit contract commissions, and Georgiana Teodorescu, a vocal advocate for traditional family values. Also included were Adrian Axinia, an AUR MP closely associated with George Simion and serving as one of AUR’s vice presidents. The list comprised various AUR members, lawyers, entrepreneurs, Monica Iagăr, a former athlete, the actress Mara Nicolescu and several academics.

Although the extent of its territorial organization within Romania or abroad remains unclear, SOS Romania succeeded in fielding 43 candidates for the European Parliament elections, including lawyers, a journalist, local councillors and other party members. The first two positions on the party list were occupied by Șoșoacă herself, followed by Luis Lazarus, a journalist trained at the TV stations owned by the controversial former journalist and populist politician Dan Diaconescu.

Regarding the mood of Romanian citizens in the context of the European elections, the Parliament’s Spring 2024 Eurobarometer reveals strong interest among Romanian citizens, fully aligned with the European average (EP Spring 2024 Survey). However, Romanian citizens express a more critical and nuanced view towards different aspects of the European arena, particularly concerning the EU’s impact on their daily lives. While almost three-quarters of European citizens state that EU actions impact their daily lives, only 65% of Romanians share this opinion. Similarly, although a large majority of Europeans (71%) agree that their country benefits from EU membership, only 65% of Romanians share this view. On the eve of the election, this indicates that there is a fertile breeding ground for parties voicing concerns and criticisms of the EU.

The AUR’s campaign focus

Since its electoral breakthrough in 2020, the AUR has been an ardent advocate in defence of Romania’s political, economic and sociocultural interests. Unsurprisingly, the party’s campaign for the EP elections emphasized Romania’s Christian identity and safeguarding the family as the cornerstone of society. The party’s platform notably advocated for the Republic of Moldova’s accession to the EU, viewing it as a strategic step towards uniting the Romanian states. AUR’s 11-point manifesto addressed a wide array of issues, from EU relations to specific sectors such as youth, poverty and environmental policies. Conducted concurrently with the local elections, the AUR’s EP election campaign echoed Euroscepticism, targeting specific policies rather than the EU project itself.

AUR has a dedicated website (https://europarlamentari2024.ro/candidati-aur/) and a Facebook page (Europarlamentari AUR, 2024) to disseminate its message. Central to the AUR’s European vision was a staunch opposition to cosmopolitanism and globalism, advocating instead for European integration rooted in sovereign national identities. The party endorsed Poland’s model of preserving national languages, cultures and traditions as exemplary.

Among its key policy points, AUR emphasized the need to stimulate the return of Romanian migrants by combating poverty and facilitating access to European funds for small rural businesses. A recurrent argument was the reduction of administrative rigidity and an open fight against the double standards that penalize Eastern member states.

During the campaign, AUR candidates urged Romanian voters to choose between defending Romanian sovereignty or succumbing to what they termed ‘Romanian vassalage.’ Symbolically, AUR’s program insisted that politics should reflect the general will, specifically the will of national voters: “Politics in Romania must be done at home, not in Brussels or in Moscow. Although alliances with our strategic partners, both European and international, must be consolidated, AUR wants a different approach, one of alliances for the benefit of the country, not for the interests of the parties” (AUR’s Plan for the European Parliament, 2024).

SOS Romania party’s campaign

SOS Romania’s campaign primarily focused on Șoșoacă, highlighting concrete measures outlined in a very concise program. The program advocated for Romanians’ rights to continue using traditional energy sources like firewood and natural gas, reopening coal mines, and demanded compensation from the European Commission for the costs and side effects associated with COVID-19 vaccines. The program vigorously denounced perceived breaches of national sovereignty and criticized what it viewed as double standards in EU product regulations while emphasizing the protection of Romanian farmers and agriculture.

Aligned with AUR, SOS Romania advocated resisting digital or centralized financial systems (e.g., supporting the continued use of cash for consumer payments) and, in general, supported simpler fiscal regulations from Brussels. Șoșoacă also called for Romania to adopt neutrality in geopolitical matters, opposing the country’s involvement in the Ukraine conflict. The candidate and the party program staunchly defended the supremacy of Romania’s constitution over any international or European institution. SOS Romania also championed Christian values and traditions, opposed imposed globalism and the LGBTQ+ agenda, and advocated for prohibitive measures against gender education, sex change operations and same-sex marriage in Romania.

The electoral results

In the 2024 European Parliamentary elections, the far right emerged as the second political force in Romania, closely trailing the coalition of PSD and PNL (Table 1). Combining the votes for AUR and SOS Romania, these two parties collectively secured almost one-third of the votes. While AUR’s result represents a contraction from the 20% voting intentions registered in the preceding year, SOS Romania’s final outcome came as a surprise. Initial exit polls had placed the party below the threshold, a trend confirmed by early official national results. The turnout among nonresident voters was the decisive factor in overturning the initial forecasts.

Table 1. 2024 European election results for Romania

PartyVotesShare of votes (%)MEPs (out of 33)Parliamentary group affiliations (number of MEPs affiliating)
PSD-PNL Alliance4,341,68648.519S&D (11)EPP (8)
AUR Alliance1,334,90514.96ECR (6)
United Right Alliance778,9018.73Renew (2)EPP (1)
Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania579,1806.52EPP (2)
SOS Romania450,0405.02NA (2)
Ștefănuță Nicolae Bogdănel (independent)275,7963.01Greens/EFA (1)
Sources: Central Electoral Bureau (2024) and European election results (2024).

Interestingly, despite their focus on unification processes, the mobilization of AUR and SOS was notably lower in the Republic of Moldova, particularly in comparison to mainstream parties. Nonresident voters awarded AUR the highest number of votes in five countries with substantial migrant communities: Spain, Belgium, France, Austria and the United States. Șoșoacă’s leadership notably attracted voter support in the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy (Central Electoral Bureau, 2024). The election results thereby validated AUR and SOS as the primary opposition forces. SOS Romania secured as many MEPs as the liberal Save Romania Union, while AUR doubled the representation of the United Right Alliance.

Benefiting from extensive pre-election networking efforts and Terheș’ previous affiliation with the ECR, AUR MEPs have joined this group. The official announcement was made ten days after the elections, coinciding with the news that the ECR had become the third-largest group in the new European Parliament. On the same day, Hungary’s Fidesz announced via X that it no longer sought to join the ECR, citing explicit concerns over AUR’s extreme anti-Hungarian positions.

Notably, AUR’s inclusion in the ECR group came with an agreement to support the Ukrainian cause. This agreement is particularly significant given that George Simion has been deemed persona non grata in both Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova due to his irredentist views. Șoșoacă and Lazarus, the two SOS MEPs, remained isolated from alliances at the European level. Despite approaching the emerging Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group in the EP, their candidacy was rejected by the Alternative for Germany (AfD), the group’s founding member. Șoșoacă’s opposition to conventional politics became visible in her maiden speech in Parliament in July, where she accused the EU of ruining Romania by providing aid to Ukraine and called for stopping the supply of weapons to Kyiv. In a move laden with symbolism, she was eventually escorted out of the Strasbourg chamber after repeatedly disturbing Valerie Hayer during the debate following a speech by the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen. On this occasion, she wore a dog’s muzzle on her face (Starcevic, 2024).

Conclusions

This report has explored the landscape of the far right in Romania against the backdrop of the 2024 EP elections. The emergence of AUR and SOS Romania as significant political players underscores the growing influence of populist narratives in Romanian politics. With its increased emphasis on a conservative platform and Romanian sovereignty, AUR positioned itself within the ECR group, aligning with softer Eurosceptic stances. In contrast, SOS Romania, led by the outspoken Diana Șoșoacă, projected a more confrontational stance, challenging mainstream narratives with outspoken critiques of EU policies and advocating for nationalist agendas, including calls for territorial revisionism.

Despite facing rejection from the main EP groups, SOS Romania’s representation in the European Parliament alongside AUR highlights the diversity of strategies employed by the far right in contemporary politics. Their campaigns resonated with segments of the electorate disillusioned with traditional political parties, including a significant proportion of young voters, capitalizing on issues such as national identity, sovereignty and cultural preservation. Looking forward, the impact of AUR and SOS Romania in shaping Romanian and European Union policies will depend on their ability to navigate internal cohesion challenges and establish meaningful (and stable) alliances within the EP.

 

(*) Sorina Soare is a Senior Lecturer at the University of Florence. She holds a PhD in political science from the Université libre de Bruxelles and previously studied political science at the University of Bucharest. She serves as a co-chair of the Council for European Studies (CES) Network on Political Parties, Party Systems and Elections and is co-editor of the Annual Review of the Journal of Common Market Studies. In addition, she is a co-editor of Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review. Her work focuses on comparative politics, with research interests including political parties and party systems, populism, migrants’ political participation and the role of gender and women in politics. Email: sorinacristina.soare@unifi.it

Acknowledgements: The author would like to express her sincere gratitude to Emilia Zankina, Azize Sargin, and the entire ECPS team for their kind invitation to write this piece and for all their valuable comments and suggestions. A special acknowledgement to Simon P. Watmough for his excellent comments.

 

References

Arun, G. (2024, March 19). Opinie: Care e călcâiul lui Ahile al Dianei Șoșoacă. Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/ro/opinie-care-e-c%C4%83lc%C3%A2iul-lui-ahile-al-dianei-%C8%99o%C8%99oac%C4%83/a-68611162

AUR’s Plan for the European Parliament (2024), Planul Aur pentru Parlamentul European. Alegeri Europarlamentare 9 iunie 2024, https://europarlamentari2024.ro/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/AUR-program-alegeri-Parlamentul-European-2024.pdf

Central Electoral Bureau (2024), Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://europarlamentare2024.bec.ro/rezultate

Cotidianul (2024, May 14). Șoșoacă şi Lasca: Ziua trădării naționale! Este inacceptabil. Cotidianul. https://www.cotidianul.ro/sosoaca-14-mai-2024-ziua-tradarii-nationale/

Despa, O., & Vovesz, T. (2024, June 3). România & partidele ei radicale. Ziariști, avocați, profesori, teologi–candidați pentru Bruxelles. Ce se întâmplă în Ungaria și Bulgaria. Deutsche Welle. https://romania.europalibera.org/a/aur-parlament-european/32970598.html

Drolet, J. F., & Williams, M. C. (2018). Radical conservatism and global order. International Theory, 10(3), 285–313. https://doi.org/10.1017/S175297191800012X

EP Spring 2024 Survey. Use your vote–Countdown to the European elections (2024), Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3272

European Elections (2024), Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/romania

Europarlamentari AUR (2024). Facebook. Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://www.facebook.com/p/Europarlamentari-AUR-100095358306817/

Fati, S. (2024, May 21). Opinie: Cum au rămas ungurii ‘dușmanii’ noștri permanenți? Deutsche Welle. https://www.dw.com/ro/opinie-cum-au-r%C4%83mas-ungurii-du%C8%99manii-no%C8%99tri-permanen%C8%9Bi/a-69136839

Kauth, J. T., & King, D. (2016). Illiberalism. European Journal of Sociology, 61(3), 365–405. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975620000181

Mudde, C. (2007). Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037

Pirro, A. (2023). Far right: The significance of an umbrella concept. Nations and Nationalism, 29(1), 101–112. https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12860

Program of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians. (2020). Retrieved August 22, 2024 from https://partidulaur.ro/program/

Soare, S., & Tufiș, C. D. (2023). Saved by the diaspora? The case of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians. European Political Science, 22, 101–118. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-022-00408-3

Sosro.ro. (2022, September 26). Pentru prima data in istorie, un parlamentar a cerut RO-Exit! De cand suntem in Uniunea Europeana! Ne-am Distrus! Nu pot să spun decât RO-Exit!. SOS. https://sosro.ro/pentru-prima-data-in-istorie-un-parlamentar-a-cerut-ro-exit-de-cand-suntem-in-uniunea-europeana-ne-am-distrus-nu-pot-sa-spun-decat-ro-exit-video/

Starcevic, S. (2024, July 17). Far-right MEP vows to have priest rid European Parliament of ‘devils’. Politico. https://www.politico.eu/article/far-right-mep-diana-sosoaca-vows-to-bring-priest-to-cleanse-the-european-parliament-of-devils-romania-sos-party/

 

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Rising discontent with the EU, the Rise of the Right and the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Cyprus

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Please cite as:
Theophanous, Andreas & Varda, Mary. (2024). “Rising discontent with the EU, the Rise of the Right and the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Cyprus.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024.https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0065

 

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Abstract

The objective of this chapter is to discuss the causes of rising discontent in Cyprus and assess the political outcomes. Within this framework we briefly assess how the EU has dealt with various crises in the last few years. Perceptions in Cyprus about the EU have changed over time. In the 9 June European elections, a member of the extreme right-wing party, National People’s Front (Ethniko Laiko Metopo, ELAM), was elected for the first time to the European Parliament. Understanding the circumstances in Cyprus that have gradually led to disillusionment with the national political system and the EU is essential to making sense of these developments.

Keywords: Cyprus; extreme right; economic crisis; voter disillusionment; European elections

 

By Andreas Theophanous* (Department of Politics and Governance, University of Nicosia, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, Cyprus) & Mary Varda** (Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, University of Nicosia, Cyprus)

Introduction

Undoubtedly, the EU currently faces multiple challenges. In addition to Euroscepticism, we are also faced with populism, which at times may lead to dangerous outcomes (Katsambekis, 2014). Yet, despite much criticism on multiple themes, the EU remains one of, if not the most desirable places in the world to live. The objective of this chapter is to discuss the causes of rising discontent in Cyprus and the political outcomes. Within this framework we briefly refer to how the EU dealt with some of the crises in the last few years.

Perceptions of the EU in Cyprus have changed over time. It is essential to understand the circumstances in this island state that have gradually led to disillusionment with the Cypriot political system and the EU. This disillusionment is one of the reasons that has led to the rise of populist trends across all Cypriot parties. Through recourse to populism, parties across the political spectrum have attempted to get closer to voters. For the purposes of this chapter, we will be focusing essentially on the case of rising right-wing rhetoric.

When Cyprus applied for membership in the EU on 4 July 1990, there were very high expectations. The principal perception was that the EU institutions and value system would eventually contribute to the termination of the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus and to a just solution to the problem. At the same time, there were high expectations regarding socioeconomic modernization and a new era. According to polls taken during the accession negotiations, Cyprus had the most favourable attitude towards the EU.

Eventually, these perceptions gradually changed, with the initial optimism fading (Katsourides, 2014). Indeed, retrospectively, Cypriots now view their initial perceptions as illusions. There were some specific issues which led to these changes. During the negotiations to resolve the Cyprus problem, which coincided with the period leading to accession, pressures were exerted on the Greek Cypriot side by the United Nations (UN), the United States and the United Kingdom, the former colonial power on the island. The EU more or less followed their lead. When Professor Shlomo Avineri of the University of Jerusalem and Ex-Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel read the UN’s Annan Plan, he noted that it amounted to ‘the favourite occupation of the EU and the UN’ (Avineri, 2004). Yet, the Greek Cypriots were demonized for rejecting this plan.

It is instructive to compare and contrast the EU stance towards Russia and Turkey. Although by definition each case is unique, there are also some common characteristics. In both cases, there have been violations of international law. When Russia invaded Ukraine on 24 February 2022, there was a strong reaction on the part of the West. As Theophanous (2023: 205) notes: ‘The response of the EU was firm and punitive’. Russia soon became the most sanctioned country in the world, while Ukraine has received massive economic and military aid. ‘In the case of Cyprus, however’, Theophanous further reminds us, ‘Turkey has been tolerated and accommodated. This is because Russia is considered a foe, while Turkey is perceived as a strategic partner’ (Ibid.).

In the case of Cyprus, the West (including the EU) has more or less adjusted to the fait accompli created by Turkey’s occupation of 37% of the territory of Cyprus. The West (including the EU) tolerates this occupation and its entailing colonization and Islamization, the usurpation of Greek Cypriot properties in the north, as well as its systematic violations of the Cypriot exclusive economic zone (EEZ) by Turkey. In addition, the EU has not made economic aid to the Turkish Cypriots conditional, which would incentivize co-operation. Understandably, Greek Cypriots are not pleased with these policies and practices. As a result, the way the EU is perceived has changed in the eyes of most Cypriots.

When Cyprus faced a significant economic crisis in 2013, the EU’s treatment was rather punitive and irrational. There is no doubt that there was a need for a major restructuring of the Cypriot economy. However, the way it was promoted unnecessarily entailed a huge socioeconomic cost.

These developments, coupled with the ongoing economic turmoil caused by rising inflation, have made Cypriot voters susceptible to populist rhetoric. These conditions made the far-right and anti-systemic rhetoric of the National People’s Front (Ethniko Laiko Metopo, ELAM) appear as a viable way out of the crises for some voters. Others turn to ELAM as a form of protest against the current political system (Knews Kathimerini, 2023). This is demonstrated through ELAM’s electoral success at the 2024 European elections, where the party, which was founded in 2008, managed to secure its first seat in the European Parliament.

The historical context of right-wing politics in Cyprus

Right-wing politics in Cyprus has a long and complex history, deeply intertwined with the island’s political and social developments (Charalambous, 2018). The roots of right-wing ideology can be traced back to the early twentieth century, during the struggle against British colonial rule and the pursuit of enosis (union with Greece). This period saw the rise of nationalist sentiments and the establishment of right-wing political organizations such as the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA), which played a significant role in the anti-colonial movement and Cyprus’ subsequent independence from Britain in 1960.

Following independence, right-wing politics continued to be influential. This trend persisted after the Turkish invasion of 1974 as well. In 1976 the Democratic Rally (DISY) was founded and gradually emerged as a major political force. It has long advocated a market-oriented economy, closer ties with the West and a pragmatic stance on the Cyprus issue. Over time, however, the political landscape began to shift, particularly in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis that followed. These economic challenges, which entailed high unemployment rates, austerity measures and corruption, fuelled public discontent and created fertile ground for the resurgence of far-right rhetoric (Katsourides, 2014).

Most Cypriots believe that the EU did not treat Cyprus rationally and with solidarity when the country found itself in a difficult economic condition in 2013. The Cypriot economic crisis had both endogenous and exogenous causes. Cyprus’ treatment by the Troika – the European Commission, the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – was harsh and punitive. Several politicians and analysts indicated that Cyprus was used as a guinea pig (Žižek, 2014). Many Cypriots feel that it is doubtful whether the Troika would have treated a Catholic or a Protestant country in the same way as Cyprus and Greece were treated. In the process the Cypriot banking system was in essence destroyed. Currently, the banking system essentially belongs to foreign capital. Furthermore, the cost of services has increased while quality has declined. Cyprus Airways closed down, with foreign carriers taking over its routes. Inequality grew and the Cypriot economic structure changed. Despite the Troika, Cyprus recovered, albeit at a high socioeconomic cost (Theophanous, 2018). Cypriots also feel that the EU is currently not exhibiting adequate solidarity in relation to the immigration crisis. Cyprus is the top EU country in terms of per capita asylum applications.

Inevitably, these issues have led to Euroscepticism and discontent concerning the EU. At the same time, critics feel that the mainstream political parties have not successfully addressed the significant challenges Cyprus faces. Discontent with the Cypriot political system has been growing, given that there have been serious incidents of corruption on several occasions, and the country has failed to cope successfully with multiple challenges.

Considering all these factors, it is hardly surprising that voter turnout has declined as more and more Cypriots disengage from politics. At the same time, according to polls and actual election results, ELAM’s public support has been growing. It could be said that many of those who support it are expressing a protest on the one hand and a warning on the other. These voters are part of a broader trend of far-right populism gaining traction across Europe, driven by economic insecurities, cultural anxieties and disillusionment with mainstream politics. Despite its radical positions, ELAM has managed to integrate into the political mainstream to some extent, collaborating with other parties on specific issues while maintaining its distinct far-right identity. For example, Annita Demetriou (DISY), the president of Cyprus’ parliament, was elected thanks to the votes of the MPs of ELAM and another small centrist party, Democratic Alignment (DiPa), who voted with her party. The historical presence of right-wing politics in Cyprus and the contemporary rise of ELAM illustrate the dynamic and evolving nature of political ideologies on the island, shaped by historical legacies and current sociopolitical challenges.

The political context of the 2024 European Parliament elections

When a country faces occupation, existential issues, difficult socioeconomic conditions, corruption, high immigration flows and identity issues and the political system cannot respond adequately, extreme tendencies at some point become inevitable. Even before the European parliamentary election results were announced, there was a widespread belief that the political system required much improvement. Thus, the rise of right-wing rhetoric, especially in the case of Cyprus, did not come as a surprise, and its representation in the European Parliament was expected.

Furthermore, even though two elections were held concurrently on 9 June 2024 – for the European Parliament and local government – the voter turnout was dismally low at 50.5% (Philenews, 2024). The low turnout rates indicate the disillusionment of the Cypriot electorate towards both national and European politics. It is worth noting that the Cypriot electorate has never demonstrated particularly high levels of engagement with European politics, which has fallen even lower since the Eurozone crisis in 2013 (see Figure 1). As mentioned earlier, its significant social impact on Cyprus seemed to alter citizens’ views towards the EU during this period (Katsourides, 2013).

In recent years, voters have repeatedly warned the political system in various ways, but the response has not been satisfactory. As mentioned earlier, the EU’s stance on several issues has been inadequate, requiring member states to pick up the slack in many instances, such as on the issue of asylum seekers. Even before the 2024 elections, the political system and the three major political parties – DISY, the Democratic Party (DIKO) and the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL) – faced crisis and our brief overview shows there were already plenty of warning signs (Theophanous, 2024a; Theophanous, 2024b; Theophanous, 2024c). Citizens also gave politicians many warnings and opportunities to change course. Because they did not see any real change, their messages were much stronger at the 9 June elections. It would not be an exaggeration to describe the results (the election of an extreme right-wing candidate and an independent candidate with no prior political experience) as a political earthquake.

It should be noted that, firstly, during the European election campaign, there was not much discussion on the challenges facing the EU or the candidates’ positions. Most notably, Fidias Panayiotou, the independent candidate with no background in politics or social issues, made it clear in his pre-election campaign that he had yet to formulate any political opinions on matters such as the Cyprus question or the role of the EU. Nor was there any discussion of the role of Cyprus in the European project (Theophanous, 2024e). Secondly, a vital objective of the local government reform preceding the June elections was to reduce the cost of running it. However, fears have already been expressed that there will probably be an increase in costs. This has further deepened the grievances of the Cypriot electorate with the current political system and the parties responsible for this reform. The disillusionment of the electorate and their preference for ‘apolitical politics’ was also evident in the latest presidential elections in Cyprus, where the incumbent president, Nikos Christodoulides, won even though he focused more on his public image than on policies to address fundamental issues. This strategy proved highly successful as it enabled him to stand apart from the established political parties of the island, which Cypriot citizens have long accused of corruption (Triga et al., 2023).

The results of the 2024 European elections

It is also important to assess the election results, even if only briefly, concerning the performance of the political parties. A brief introduction of the main political parties of Cyprus – DISY, DIKO and AKEL – is thus necessary. DISY is a Christian Democratic party with a liberal–conservative ideology, while DIKO is a nationalist–centrist political party, and AKEL is Cyprus’ communist party.

In June, DISY recorded its lowest percentage vote share ever (24.8%). Despite the decline in support, it was the party that paid the smallest price. Furthermore, while it may not have had satisfactory results in the local government elections, retaining the two seats in the European Parliament was a tremendous boon.

After losing three presidential elections and considering the difficult socioeconomic conditions, one would have expected AKEL to recover and present itself as a leading force. This did not happen. Despite the relatively positive performance in the local government elections, the result for the European elections (21.5%) and the loss of one seat constitute a major defeat for the party. Obviously, the causes of this result run deeper than the election campaign. AKEL’s leadership should, among other things, ask itself why citizens expressed their disdain for the current state of political affairs by supporting a candidate without a political background and concrete policy proposals, among other candidates, rather than the largest opposition party.

Inevitably, its showing (9.7% of the vote) was also a defeat for DIKO, even though it retained its seat in the European Parliament. The fact that the party’s share fell below 10% while ELAM surpassed it contains both substantive and symbolic messages. We should recall that one of DIKO’s campaign slogans was ‘vote DIKO for effective governance’. Obviously, the electorate did not respond. Nor is it a coincidence that the other two parties that supported President Nicos Christodoulides also saw their electoral strength decline.

During the election campaign, one of the top priorities of almost all parties was the need to contain ELAM. Nevertheless, ELAM continued to grow, securing a double-digit share of the vote (11.2%), surpassing DIKO and securing one EP seat. The political system should also ask itself what would have happened to ELAM’s percentage if not for the candidacy of the independent, Fidias Panayiotou, who gained 19.4% of the votes.

One of the most important advantages of ELAM is its ability to resonate strongly with younger voters, something the traditional parties have been struggling to do. Indeed, ELAM’s voter base is disproportionately made up of young male voters (Knews Kathimerini, 2023). ELAM’s strength, much like Fidias Panayiotou’s, came from its ability to mobilize younger voters who failed to show up in large numbers in previous elections. However, unlike ELAM, Panagiotou did not present any specific policy positions. From this observation, we can see how Cyprus’ political system has cultivated an apolitical mentality, fostering a climate for the advent and strengthening of populism (Theophanous, 2024d). Panayiotou took advantage of this state of affairs – the disdain and disappointment of thousands of citizens, especially young people – to secure a seat in the European Parliament.

Obviously, there is an urgent need to redefine the political system and public life in Cyprus. The parties and the political system should take stock of recent developments and look for new ideas, novel approaches and fresh faces. Cyprus and its people are facing serious challenges. It is crucial to get politics back on track.

The National People’s Front’s appeal and political trajectory

As touched on above, ELAM was founded in 2008 as the Cypriot sister party of the Golden Dawn, a neo-Nazi party in Greece. The group that founded the party sought to register it under the same name (Golden Dawn), but the authorities denied this request (Charalambous and Christoforou, 2018; Katsourides, 2013). ELAM, however, passed through a transitional period, during which it shaped a new public face in the political landscape, escaping from the shadow of Golden Dawn. What prompted and necessitated this change was the fact that Golden Dawn and its leaders were convicted and imprisoned for operating a criminal organization that was tied to murder and criminal violence. In addition, in an attempt to become accepted as part of the Cypriot political system and cast off its image as an extremist organization, ELAM proceeded to distance itself from other extreme European right-wing parties and organizations – such as the National Democratic Party (NPD) in Germany, Forza Nuova in Italy, and the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) in Russia – with which they had previously advertised their close ties. ELAM, for example, ensured that links to the websites of the above European parties were deleted from its website. In addition, it removed all documents and text it shared with the Golden Dawn website.

ELAM’s political positions have relied on principles and policies adopted by both parties on the left and right. Their practices were determined by both ideological and tactical motives. In its early steps, it appeared increasingly difficult for ELAM to make a breakthrough in the Cypriot political scene as its program transcended mainstream party politics. In addition to the Cyprus problem, the advent of the economic crisis of 2011 and the austerity measures imposed by the Troika in 2013, along with the severe budget cuts, the ‘haircut’ uninsured depositors had to take on balances above €100,000, as well as political corruption, gave ELAM the opportunity to establish itself as a legitimate political force. It could do so because, unlike the traditional parties deemed responsible for such crises, ELAM was a novel political force untarnished by corruption at the time. It could thus enter the political scene as the new political force that would hold traditional parties accountable.

All of ELAM’s policies have the underlying principle of protecting the Greek Cypriots. ELAM narrowly identifies the issues to be addressed by and for the Greek Cypriots (mostly the Turkish occupation of the northern part of Cyprus, the neoliberal policies of the EU and illegal immigration). Identifying explicit threats against the interests of the Greek Cypriots enables ELAM to propose clear solutions (regardless of whether they are pragmatic or not). This simplicity of ELAM’s discourse seems to appeal to many voters. The success of this discourse is reflected in the gradual and steady rise in ELAM’s votes from 663 votes in the 2009 European Parliament elections to 4.056 in the Cyprus parliamentary elections of 2011, 13.040 in 2016 and 24.255 in May 2021, becoming the fourth largest party on the island. During the 2024 European Parliament elections, ELAM secured its first seat in the European Parliament with 41.215 votes (Cyprus Mail, 2024). Currently, ELAM is the third-largest party on the island.

ELAM promotes a narrative emphasizing support for families, youth, vulnerable populations, low-income workers, and pensioners, proposing measures to aid these groups (Chatzistylianou, 2019). Within this framework, it often contrasts this support with the assistance given to Turkish Cypriots, migrants and asylum seekers, advocating for policies favouring native Greeks.

Although ELAM criticizes other political parties as corrupt and accountable for the country’s problems, its anti-establishment stance becomes ambiguous following its entry into the House of Representatives in 2016. It has co-operated with the ruling Democratic Rally to pass budgets and, as mentioned, elect the president of the parliament in 2021. In a political landscape where mainstream parties, including DISY, adopt anti-immigration stances, ELAM distinguishes itself as the authentic representative of these views.

ELAM supports left-wing economic policies aimed at wealth redistribution and increased state intervention in market regulation. It advocates for social protection measures, reduced business taxes in rural areas, incentives for technology and innovation, and various forms of business support.

The economic crisis which started in 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic provided ELAM with opportunities to develop its strategy, focusing on aiding those in need while distinguishing between natives and non-natives. The party’s approach involves reallocating state aid from migrants and asylum seekers to native Greeks, thereby positioning itself as a champion of vulnerable groups (Charalambous & Christoforou, 2018). This strategy helped ELAM differentiate itself from other populist parties, as it capitalized on the public’s discοntent with systemic parties blamed for the crises, allowing ELAM to emerge as a perceived saviοur.

Concluding remarks

The rise of right-wing rhetoric in Cyprus, exemplified by the success of ELAM, reflects broader regional and global trends of populist movements. The fact that the EU has been unable to respond effectively to pressing issues plaguing the Union (immigration and economic crises as well as the war in Ukraine) allowed for the rampant spread of Euroscepticism. Cypriot citizens have an additional reason for their Eurosceptic attitude as their expectations of the EU regarding the Cyprus problem have not been met. Inevitably, many citizens adopted the Eurosceptic stance of ELAM. In addition, the failure of the Cypriot political system and the mainstream parties to effectively address issues has been a significant factor in the rise of ELAM.

This article has traced the historical roots and contemporary dynamics of right-wing politics in Cyprus, highlighting that the support for such ideologies is deeply embedded in the country’s political history. Indeed, it can even be argued that if the extreme right were not associated with the disaster of 1974, perhaps its support would have been even higher. The recent electoral success of ELAM underscores the urgent need for the political system to address the underlying causes of this trend and redefine its approach to public life and governance. Likewise, it is essential to assess how this climate of discontent can be ameliorated both in the EU as a whole and in the member states.

 

(*) Andreas Theophanous, Professor, Head of the Department of Politics and Governance, School of Law, University of Nicosia, President, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, theophanous.a@unic.ac.cy.

(**) Mary Varda, Research Fellow of the Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs, varda.m@unic.ac.cy

 

References

Charalambous, G. (2018). Constructing ‘The People’ and its ‘Enemies’ in the Republic of Cyprus: A country of populist frames but not fully fledged populism. Cyprus Review, 30(2), 25–41.

Charalambous, G., & Christoforou, P. (2018). Far-right extremism and populist rhetoric: Greece and Cyprus during an era of crisis. South European Society and Politics, 23(4), 451–477. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2018.1555957

Chatzistylianou, M. (2019, 27 May). ELAM has begun to grow. Philenews. Retrieved 26 May 2020, from https://philenews.com/europeanunionleuroeklooes2019/article/709451t-lm-rhsna

Cyprus Mail. (2024, 10 June). Cyprus’ six MEPs: ELAM and Fidias win seat, AKEL loses one. Cyprus Mail. Retrieved from https://cyprus-mail.com/2024/06/10/cyprus-six-meps-elam-and-fidias-win-seat-akel-loses-one/

European Parliament. (2024). European elections results 2019–2024: Cyprus national results. https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/national-results/cyprus/2019-2024/constitutive-session/

Knews Kathimerini. (2023, 19 June). ELAM’s surge is shaking up Cyprus politics. Knews Kathimerini. Retrieved from https://knews.kathimerini.com.cy/en/news/elam-s-surge-is-shaking-up-cyprus-politics

Katsambekis, G. (2014). Populism against democracy or Europe against itself? Populism, political ecology and the Balkans pp. 43–56.

Katsourides, Y. (2013). Determinants of extreme right reappearance in Cyprus: The National Popular Front (ELAM), Golden Dawn’s sister party. South European Society and Politics, 18(4), 567–589. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2013.798893

Ministry of the Interior. (2024). European Elections 2024–Islandwide results. Retrieved from http://results.elections.moi.gov.cy/english/european_elections_2024_163/Islandwide

Katsourides, Y. (2014). Negative images of Europe in an era of crisis: The media and public opinion in Cyprus. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 24(1), 61–85. https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2014.986440

Shlomo Avineri. (2004, 29 February). A deeply flawed peace plan for Cyprus. Jerusalem Post.

Theophanous, A. (2018). Cyprus in search of a new economic paradigm. Cyprus Review, 30(2), 213–242.

Theophanous, A. (2023) The Cyprus Problem, The EU and the UN: An Overall Assessment and the Way Forward. The Cyprus Review (A Journal of Social Science), 35(2), pp.195–216.

Theophanous A. (2024a, 31 March). I krisi tou politikou sistimatos ke o dimokratikos sinagermos (in Greek). Philenews. Retrieved from https://www.philenews.com/politiki/article/1454084/i-krisi-tou-politikou-sistimatos-ke-o-dimokratikos-sinagermos/

Theophanous, A. (2024b, 7 April). I krisi tou politikou sistimatos ke to AKEL. Philenews. Retrieved from https://www.philenews.com/politiki/article/1456286/i-krisi-tou-politikou-sistimatos-ke-to-akel/

Theophanous A. (2024c, 14 April). I krisi tou politikou sistimatos ke to DIKO (in Greek). Philenews. Retrieved from https://www.philenews.com/politiki/article/1459049/i-krisi-tou-politikou-sistimatos-ke-to-diko

Theophanous, A. (2024d, 22 May). Chypre, l’UE à la croisée des chemins. Confrontations Europe. Retrieved from https://confrontations.org/chypre-lue-a-la-croisee-des-chemins/

Theophanous, A. (2024e, 10 June). Kambana gia tin anavathmisi toy politikou sistimatos (in Greek). Philenews. Retrieved from https://www.philenews.com/apopsis/paremvaseis-ston-f/article/1480254/kampana-gia-tin-anavathmisi-tou-politikou-sistimatos

Triga, V., Ioannidis, N., & Djouvas, C. (2023). The waning of ideology? Presidential elections in the Republic of Cyprus, 5 February 2023. South European Society and Politics, 28(2), 177–206. https://doi.org/10.1080/13608746.2024.2304445

Žižek, S. (2014). Breaking our eggs without the omelette, from Cyprus to Greece. In What Does Europe Want? The Union and Its Discontents (pp. 1–11). Columbia University Press.

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Campaign poster for the Chega party in downtown Lisbon ahead of the national elections on March 9, 2024, in Lisbon, Portugal. Photo: Lars Hoffmann.

The 2024 European Elections and Right-wing Populism in Portugal

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Please cite as:

Biscaia, Afonso & Salgado, Susana. (2024). “The 2024 European Elections and Right-wing Populism in Portugal.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0080

 

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Abstract

Unlike previous European elections, the 2024 European election brought the discussion of European issues to the media and political agendas in Portugal, a country where most voters hold a positive image of the EU. Despite managing to elect its first two MEPs, the European election was not fertile terrain for Chega, as it stopped Chega’s continuous electoral growth since 2019 and its objectives were not fully achieved. Poor candidate selection, overambitious goals, a disconnect between Chega’s soft Euroscepticism and its supporters’ mostly enthusiastic view of the EU, ambiguity about which European party group it would join, and intermittent support from its popular leader, André Ventura, were relevant factors influencing Chega’s campaign and ensuing results. A relatively low turnout and overrepresentation of constituencies that are unlikely to vote for the populist radical right compounded the scenario.

Keywords: Portugal; Chega; populism; European elections; António Tânger Corrêa; André Ventura.

By Afonso Biscaia* & Susana Salgado** (University of Lisbon)

Introduction

The 2024 European election represented the first setback for right-wing populist politics in Portugal after five years of growth. Just three months previously, a snap general election gave the largest-ever representation for right-wing populist Chega (Enough). In this context, Chega publicly set its sights on winning the European elections outright, but poor candidate selection, a lacklustre campaign, a lack of clarity about Chega’s preferences regarding European party groups, and a manifesto that did not conform to its own supporters’ preferences contributed to hampering its goals. Thus, on 9 June, the dominant right-wing populist party in Portugal received around 783,000 fewer votes than it had in March while still electing its first two MEPs.

Growth and reorganization of right-wing populist politics in Portugal (2019–2024)

In the 2019 European elections, the National Renovation Party (Partido Nacional Renovador, PNR) and the Basta coalition (‘Basta’ is a synonym of Chega) were the right-wing populist options. PNR is older and more radical, while Basta was a coalition of small conservative parties and movements led by André Ventura, the leader of Chega, then a splinter group from the centre-right Social Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata, PSD). Both candidacies were unsuccessful, garnering a combined tally of around 65,000 votes.

Nevertheless, 2019 would turn out to be a pivotal year for Portuguese right-wing populism. In the general election held in October, Chega became the first right-wing populist party to achieve a parliamentary breakthrough, attaining 1.29% of the vote. Chega enhanced its position in two subsequent (snap) elections, in 2022 and 2024, increasing its vote share to 7.18% and 18.07%, respectively, becoming the dominant radical right-wing populist party and third largest overall.

Chega’s agenda has focused on typical radical right-wing populist issues, such as corruption, immigration and security (Biscaia & Salgado, 2022; Mendes, 2022), as well as on the rhetorical construction of an in-group of ‘righteous Portuguese’ in opposition to out-groups and the political elite (Biscaia & Salgado, 2022). Foreign policy has not been Chega’s priority. Its stances on the matter are often instrumental. Regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Chega adopted a pro-Ukraine position, aligned with most mainstream parties (Biscaia & Salgado, 2023). On the Israel-Palestine conflict, it was clearly pro-Israel, claiming Netanyahu’s government was entitled to ‘neutralize the threat’, and was the only parliamentary party that declined to join calls for a ceasefire (Agência Lusa, 2024a).

The sovereign debt crisis of the 2010s and subsequent austerity policies drove some voters out of the electoral market and cleared the way for smaller parties to make gains by bringing new issues to the fore (Lisi et al., 2020). Chega was the most successful party in capitalizing on these opportunities and managed to mobilize voters who had abstained in previous elections and maintain their vote, but also attracted voters who had previously voted for PSD and the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista, PS) in previous elections (ICS–ISCTE Surveys, 2024b). Anti-Roma sentiment and welfare chauvinism were key issues in Chega’s growth even before its official founding, as Ventura’s first run for local office, still with PSD, leant heavily on Romaphobia (Bugalho, 2017). Similarly, Afonso (2021) has found that electoral support for the radical right in the 2021 presidential election in Portugal was disproportionately higher in those localities with greater concentrations of Roma populations and welfare beneficiaries. However, as concerns about immigration have intensified in Portugal, with support for restrictive migration policies reaching a slight majority (55%) in 2023–2024 (ICS–ISCTE Surveys, 2024c), migrants – especially Muslims – have become a more prominent target in Chega’s rhetoric (e.g., Matos, 2024).

Other parties tried to emulate Chega’s quick growth. The PNR rebranded as Ergue-te (Rise Up) shortly after Chega’s success in 2019, but the move proved ineffectual, as it received a paltry 0.09% of the vote in the 2024 general election. The Democratic Republican Party (Partido Democrático Republicano, PDR), a centrist populist party (Salgado & Zúquete, 2017), also rebranded, taking on the name Democratic National Alternative (Alternativa Democrática Nacional, ADN) and establishing connections with ultra-conservative Brazilian evangelical groups (Vasco, 2024). The ADN baffled pundits in the 2024 general election by multiplying its previous election tally tenfold and qualifying for state funding despite narrowly failing to elect a single MP; the result was interpreted as a product either of influential political evangelicalism (Henriques, 2024) or confusion between its name and that of the Democratic Alternative (AD), a centre-right coalition composed of the PSD, the CDS–People’s Party and the People’s Monarchist Party (PPM) (Camilo, 2024).

European election: candidates, manifestos and the campaign

Chega’s lead candidate in the European election was António Tânger Corrêa, a party vice president and former diplomat. A month before the election, 71% of poll respondents said they did not know who he was (CESOP Surveys, 2024a), and a few days before the election, 22% of survey respondents who had voted for Chega in March said they were still undecided about the European election (CESOP Surveys, 2024b). The candidate was perceived as eccentric, which was reinforced by his endorsement of conspiracy theories such as ‘the great replacement’ and use of antisemitic tropes, like accusing the Mossad of forewarning American Jews of terrorist attacks on 9/11 (e.g., Chagas, 2024; Malhado, 2024). Ventura, much more popular among Chega supporters, seemed not to prioritize the European election, spending significant time campaigning for regional elections in Madeira; he only joined Tânger Corrêa in the last stretch of the campaign, trying to ensure improved media coverage.

Tânger Corrêa was also ambiguous about Chega’s membership in European political groups, refusing to address the issue and, at one point, saying voters did not need to know how the party would behave in the European Parliament (Oliveira Martins et al., 2024). Nevertheless, Chega had been a member of the Identity and Democracy group (ID) since 2020. Its views on European issues were generally aligned with those expressed on ID’s program, such as its opposition to ‘any supranational construction’ and demand for stricter immigration control (Identity and Democracy Party, n.d.) as well as in drawing a ‘sharp distinction between Europe and the European Union’ and emphasis on intergovernmental cooperation mechanisms, as advocated for in ID’s ‘Declaration of Antwerp’ (Identity and Democracy Party, 2022). However, only 5% of Portuguese Eurobarometer respondents have a negative image of the EU (Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, 2024), and Chega supporters are only slightly less enthusiastic. On average, they express positive views of EU and Eurozone membership, as well as further European integration. They differ from the mainstream mainly in expressing more disillusionment about the bloc’s democratic nature: 46% of surveyed Chega supporters were ‘reasonably’ or ‘extremely’ satisfied with it, compared to 56% of PS supporters and 67% of those who identify with PSD (ICS–ISCTE Surveys, 2024a).

Aware of the EU’s popularity in Portugal and among its supporters, Chega articulated some soft Euroscepticism in its European election manifesto: ‘A Europa Precisa de uma Limpeza’ (Europe Needs a Clean Up). Thus, the document conceded that EU membership had ‘served the [Portuguese] national interest’ (Chega, 2024: 3) but defined Chega as ‘a deeply sovereigntist, pro-European, and Atlanticist’ party (Chega, 2024: 3) and claims that European institutions have been ‘overtaken by a narrow bureaucratic oligarchy that disregards member states’ identities and history and meddles in practically every dimension of life (Chega, 2024: 3–4). The manifesto envisioned intergovernmental cooperation guided by an ‘uncompromising’ defence of each member state’s national interest as the main policy mechanism and dismissed further integration (Chega, 2024: 6–7). Migration was presented as the foremost policy priority, arguing that it threatened ‘member states’ identity and security’ by pointing at ‘the situation in Germany, Italy, Greece, France, and Sweden’ (Chega, 2024: 7–8). Other stated priorities were expanding member states’ military capabilities to end ‘military reliance on the United States’ (Chega, 2024: 10) while urging that Portugal meet the minimum NATO commitment of 2% of GDP for annual defence spending (Chega, 2024: 10), and fighting corruption.

However, reinforcing the second-order nature of European elections in Portugal, Chega’s manifesto proposals were mostly focused on domestic policy, like abandoning the UN’s Global Compact for Migration, revoking the CPLP (Community of Portuguese Language Countries) mobility agreement, and establishing stricter rules for Portuguese naturalization. European-level proposals were scarce but included reinforcing the Frontex mechanism (Chega, 2024: 8), ending assistance for ‘NGOs that support illegal immigration’ and, vaguely, the ‘generalized adoption of the [immigration] models the UK has been implementing’ (Chega, 2024: 8). Despite Ventura having called for further sanctions on Russia in the past (Biscaia & Salgado, 2023), no specific course of action was proposed regarding ongoing wars.

Regarding the other populist parties’ lead candidates in the European election, ADN’s lead candidate was Joana Amaral Dias, a well-known former MP of Left Bloc (Bloco de Esquerda, BE), and Ergue-te selected Rui Fonseca Castro, a controversial former judge. ADN’s European election manifesto articulated what could be described as a denialist ideology. It urged peace between Russia and Ukraine, lamenting the loss of access to ‘cheap Russian energy’ (ADN, 2024: 4) and urging an end to sanctions (ADN, 2024: 25), opposed green transition initiatives as ‘turning science into a dogma’ and ‘making life impossible for European businesses’ (ADN, 2024: 7). ADN castigated ‘the failure of integration’ and demanded restrictive migration policies (ADN, 2024: 39). Ergue-te’s hard Eurosceptic manifesto ‘Libertar a Europa da União Europeia’ (Freeing Europe from the European Union) predicted and advocated for the ‘inevitable implosion’ of the EU (Ergue-te, 2024: 4), but recognized that Portugal’s exit from the bloc was ‘for now, impossible’ (Ergue-te, 2024: 2). It denounced migration, including of ‘so-called refugees’ (Ergue-te, 2024: 5) and proposed the reversal of same-sex marriage laws (Ergue-te, 2024: 7). Regarding national defence, Ergue-te stance is akin to Chega’s, advocating for European ‘military emancipation’ from the United States, through the creation of a more robust defence industry (Ergue-te, 2024: 7).

Debates provided opportunities to set the agenda. In past European election campaigns, the media had been criticized for focusing excessively on domestic issues, but that was not the case in 2024, as debates focused on issues like immigration, defence, EU enlargement, and the potential nomination of the former prime minister, António Costa, as president of the European Council (Ribeiro, 2024; Ribeiro Soares & Martins, 2024). Apart from Costa’s – at the time putative – nomination, the issues roughly corresponded with the electorate’s assessment of the most important issues facing the EU, of which the war in Ukraine, the internal situation, immigration, and the economy came out on top (Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, 2024). Tânger Corrêa participated in the mainstream televised debates but did not prove appealing to TV audiences, as his appearances were estimated to be the least watched (Borges Ferreira, 2024), and his assertions frequently fact-checked (e.g., Leal, 2024) and derided as too weird. ADN and Ergue-te participated in a single debate between smaller parties without parliamentary representation. However, these parties failed to seize the opportunity to reverse their image as fringe candidates.

The election

In Portugal, as in other member states, European elections are considered second-order elections, and the 2024 European elections came at the uncertain beginning of a new political cycle in Portugal. PS, led by António Costa, had governed since 2015 and remained fairly popular throughout most of its long tenure, but several scandals deteriorated its image, and the AD coalition, led by PSD, narrowly won the 2024 snap general election. Its slim parliamentary plurality – 80 MPs to PS’s 78 and Chega’s 50 – means the new government must negotiate in parliament, including over the state budget. Pointing to similarities between PS and PSD, Ventura designated himself as ‘the real leader of the opposition’ and announced that Chega would not vote AD legislation through (Carrapatoso & Figueiredo, 2024). Tânger Corrêa’s candidacy was launched at this time, which partly explains Ventura’s statement of Chega’s objectives: to win the election, avoid a centrist majority in the European Parliament and Ursula von der Leyen’s re-election, and spearhead a ‘grand European coalition, from Hungary to Lisbon’ (Figueiredo, 2024).

The aftermath of the general election was still an important topic during the European Parliamentary election campaign and despite a slight increase in participation from the previous two elections (2014: 33.84%; 2019: 30.73%), only 36.47% of eligible voters deposited ballots on 9 June, compared to 59.84% in the March general election. Ultimately, PS, whose lead candidate, Marta Temido, owed her popularity to having been health minister during the COVID-19 pandemic, reversed the earlier results, narrowly beating AD, whose list was led by TV pundit Sebastião Bugalho. Both achieved vote shares of around 30% and fewer than 40.000 votes separated them. Similarly, left-wing parties’ results were akin to those in March, and the Portuguese Communist Party (Partido Comunista Português, PCP), the BE, and Livre (Free) all tallied at around 4%. However, only the former two managed to elect an MEP.

The most significant differences in results happened on the right: despite lower participation, Liberal Initiative (Iniciativa Liberal, IL) gained nearly 40,000 votes more than in the general election, up to 9.08%, and elected two MEPs. Conversely, Chega lost nearly 783.000 votes from its general election tally despite holding on to third place and also electing two MEPs, with 9.79% of the total vote. Chega’s losses were greater than any other party’s, and, unlike in the general election, it failed to capture first or second place in any electoral district in Portugal. However, it did repeat wins in constituencies abroad, like Switzerland or Brazil.

Chega’s loss can also be partially explained by a more challenging context in this election, namely concerning voter demographics, since older and more educated voters, who are more likely to vote in low-turnout elections and less likely to vote for the right-wing populist party, were estimated to have been overrepresented (Magalhães, 2024). On the night of 9 June, Tânger Corrêa described the day as ‘not good’, and Ventura admitted Chega ‘did not achieve its goals’ but found comfort in obtaining more votes than in 2019 and electing MEPs (Camilo, 2024b). The ADN and Ergue-te failed to elect any MEPs, attaining 1.37% and 0.16% of the total vote, respectively. Despite the ADN’s similar vote share compared to March, it lost nearly half of its votes, reigniting the debate over its previous result. Additionally, Ergue-te’s marginal result seems to confirm its fringe status once again, but also that of hard Euroscepticism.

Conclusion

The 2024 European election capped a cycle of uninterrupted growth for Chega that started at its launch in the 2019 European elections. During that period, Chega managed to go from parliamentary breakthrough to 50 MPs, sparking the reorganization of its area of the political field, namely the rebranding of extant parties that Chega overtook and the appearance of new players interested in replicating its success in mobilizing non-voters. Chega’s expectations were high in the 2024 European elections, and Ventura publicly set the win as Chega’s goal.

Nevertheless, the nomination of the eccentric António Tânger Corrêa and enhanced media scrutiny weakened the campaign. For the first time since its foundation, Chega received fewer votes than in the previous election despite electing its two first MEPs, Tânger Corrêa and Tiago Moreira de Sá. It is too early to predict whether this result will have any lingering effects on the party at the national level, as Ventura’s popularity among Chega supporters and media visibility remain undiminished.

Similarly, it is not straightforward to predict what the Chega MEPs’ main legislative priorities will be. The party joined the new Patriots for Europe (PfE) group along with other right-wing populist mainstays like France’s National Rally (RN) and the Freedom Party of Austria (both formerly in ID), as well as Spain’s Vox, part of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group until July 2024, and Fidesz, which left the European People’s Party (EPP) in 2021. The new group’s manifesto advocates for similar principles as the ID’s, asserting that the EU has ‘turned against Europeans and now pursues interests contrary to the will of the Nations, Regions, and small communities that constitute our European home’ (Patriots for Europe, n.d.), while pledging to ‘prioritize sovereignty over federalism’ (Patriots for Europe, n.d.). Chega MEPs will likely join initiatives designed to restrict immigration and bolster European military–industrial capacity, as both were presented as priorities in Chega’s manifesto.

However, it is less clear how Tânger Corrêa’s views on the invasion of Ukraine will influence his voting record. On 17 July, he abstained on a resolution recommitting the EU to ongoing support for Ukraine (Antunes & Figueiredo, 2024). However, attempts to block further financial and military aid to Ukraine would put him at odds with Chega’s official position. Regardless, Chega’s MEPs will almost certainly not prove decisive in defining PfE’s priorities. Despite Tânger Corrêa’s nomination as one of its vice presidents, the group looks set to be steered by more influential players in the European right and the radical right-wing populist milieu.

 

(*) Afonso Biscaia is a PhD candidate in Comparative Politics at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais–Universidade de Lisboa. His main research interests include radical right-wing populism and digital political communication.

(**) Susana Salgado (PhD, 2007) is a political communication scholar. She coordinates research projects, teaches, and publishes on democracy, populism, disinformation, hate and online extremism, and political polarization. Salgado is currently Principal Research Fellow at the Instituto de Ciências Sociais–Universidade de Lisboa and the principal investigator of externally funded research projects, including “(The Matrix of) Populist and Denialist Attitudes towards Science” (PTDC/CPO- CPO/4361/2021) and “Depictions and Politicization of the Truth in Democratic Politics (2020.04070.CEECIND/CP1615/CT0007).

 

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Right-wing political rally in Zagreb's main square, featuring men dressed in black waving Croatian, black and anti-EU flags Croatia on June 23, 2019. Photo: Shutterstuck.

Between ‘Kingmakers’ and Public Indifference: Croatia’s National Conservative Right in the European Elections of 2024

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Please cite as:

Petsinis, Vassilis. (2024). “Between ‘Kingmakers’ and Public Indifference: Croatia’s National Conservative Right in the European Elections of 2024.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0064

 

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Abstract

This chapter focuses on Croatia and deals with the national conservative Domovinski Pokret/Homeland Movement (DP) party. In the latest European elections, the DP garnered a percentage of 8.82% (65,383 votes and one seat), taking third spot after the ruling (centre-right) Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the ‘Rivers of Justice’ coalition spearheaded by the (centre-left) Social Democrat Party (SDP). I begin the present chapter by sketching a typology of the constituent segments along the broad spectrum of the European right wing and situate the DP within it. I then offer a summary of the DP’s founding principles vis-à-vis further European integration and clarify the extent to which these principles were reflected in the party’s stances and active engagement in the latest European elections. I then identify the main catalysts behind the DP leadership’s success in mobilizing target groups and galvanizing electoral support for the party.

Keywords: Radical Right, National Conservatives, European Elections, Euroscepticism, Croatia, Ukraine

 

By Vassilis Petsinis* (Institute of Global Studies, Corvinus University of Budapest)

Introduction

The results of the European elections (6–9 June 2024) have generated diverse political repercussions on the national, European and global levels. On the one hand, the parties of the centre-right, grouped under the European People’s Party (EPP), and the parties of the centre-left, rallying behind the banner of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) group, succeeded in maintaining the top and the second spot, respectively, at the European level. On the other hand, the landscape became hazier concerning the political forces clustered along the broader right-wing spectrum beyond the EPP – namely, the parties of the national conservative as well as the populist and radical right in the European Parliament (EP).

One catalyst that has complicated the precise assessment of those parties’ performance is that the political forces beyond the conservative centre-right were scattered among different coalitions such as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID) groups – also including powerful non-attached (NA) political actors including Hungary’s Fidesz party. Nevertheless, it appears that these parties succeeded in one of three ways in the latest European elections. First, some consolidated their already preeminent positions in the domestic politics of their respective states, such as the National Rally (RN) in France, or enhanced their positions significantly, as in the case of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, the Freedom Party (PVV) in the Netherlands, and the Law and Justice party (PiS) in Poland. A second set expanded and augmented, to varying degrees, their public appeal, including Vox in Spain, Chega in Portugal, and the Hellenic Solution (EL) in Greece. A third, smaller group saw their support erode due to the emergence of new contenders, most notably the ruling Fidesz party in Hungary, which has ceded popularity to the centre-right Respect and Freedom party (Tisza).

In Central and Southeast Europe, the voter turnout in the latest European elections ranged from relatively high (e.g., Hungary, 59.46%) to relatively low (e.g., Poland, 40.65%; Slovakia, 34.38%) and meagre (e.g., Lithuania, 28.35%) (European Parliament, n.d.). This article casts its lens on Croatia, one of the new member states where the turnout rate was the lowest in the EU (21.35%) (Ibid).

Despite the lack of voter interest, the EU is a significant benefactor for Croatia, which has been heavily dependent on financial support from Brussels since it joined the Union in 2013. In particular, the EU’s Structural and Cohesion Funds have been of crucial significance in upgrading the local infrastructure in the less-developed regions of the country (e.g., certain parts of Eastern Slavonia and Dalmatia). Moreover, especially following the country’s accession to the Schengen Area (1 January 2023), employment opportunities within the EU have provided both ‘white collar’ and ‘blue collar’ professional categories with a vital ‘lifeline’. As an aggregate of these sociopolitical realities, the primary concerns and expectations of the Croatian electorate during the latest European elections predominantly revolved around the economy, and public Euroscepticism was not noticeably high. At the same time, global and regional crises generated shockwaves within the Croatian public and among the country’s political elites. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is a particular case in point, with several political actors across the political divide seeking to draw tentative analogies between this weighty geopolitical moment and Croatia’s Domovinski Rat (‘Homeland War’) from 1991 to 1995.

As a consequence of the Domovinski Rat, Croatia has several parties that oscillate between the categories of the radical and the extreme right. While formed between the early 1990s and the early 2000s, these parties – including the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP), the Croatian Pure Party of Rights (HČSP) and the Autochthonous Party of Rights (A–HSP) – tend to claim roots in the same nineteenth-century nationalist Hrvatska Stranka Prava or Croatian Party of Rights.

Nevertheless, since not one of these older parties has been represented either in the Croatian Sabor (national assembly) or the EP for longer than a decade, this article focuses on the national conservative party, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement, DP), which in the short period since its formation has become the most vocal opposition party of the right. In the 2024 European elections, the DP garnered 8.82% of the vote, taking one seat and securing the third spot after the ruling, centre-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the ‘Rivers of Justice’ coalition spearheaded by the centre-left Social Democrat Party (SDP) (Table 1). Launched on 29 February 2020, the DP has set its principal objective to antagonize the ruling HDZ from the right. This aim acquires a greater significance, considering that roughly one month earlier, under the leadership of Ivan Penava, the DP secured third place in the Croatian parliamentary elections (17 April 2024) with a percentage of 9.56%, taking 14 seats (Table 2). This result, in turn, upgraded the party’s leverage in the negotiations for the formation of a new government after the elections and rendered the DP a ‘kingmaker’ until its official inclusion in the governing coalition with the HDZ in May 2024 (Tesija, 2024; Hajdari, 2024).

I begin the present chapter by sketching a typology of the constituent segments along the broad spectrum of the European right wing and situate the DP within it. I then offer a summary of the DP’s founding principles vis-à-vis further European integration and clarify the extent to which these principles were reflected in the party’s stances and active engagement in the latest European elections. I then identify the main catalysts behind the DP leadership’s success in mobilizing target groups and galvanizing electoral support for the party.

Situating the Homeland Movement within the European populist and radical right

This schematic categorization pays primary attention to political origins, evolutionary trajectories, and patterns of (active) political engagement (Petsinis, 2019: 166–167). Parties of the populist and radical right tend to scrutinize constitutional order while striving to promote their political cause(s) principally via parliamentary and democratic institutions and procedures. Populist and radical right-wing parties may often be by-products of top-level formation processes (so-called ‘cadre’ parties) that have come into being after (a) the reformation or merger of already existing parties, as with the Sweden Democrats (SD), the Finns Party in Finland, and the Conservative People’s Party (EKRE) in Estonia; or (b) the secession of ‘splinter groups’ from larger parties such as the cases of the Independent Greeks (ANEL) and, more recently, EL in Greece.

Attention must also be paid to one more subcategory of right-wing parties beyond the centre right – the national conservatives. The political platforms of such parties maintain ethnonationalist and nativist components, as well as occasional pledges to protect ‘naturally ascribed’ gender norms and religious values, but their populist and anti-establishment tones appear somewhat less intense. A few representative examples from Central and Eastern Europe are (to a certain extent) Fidesz in Hungary, PiS in Poland and the National Alliance in Latvia.

By contrast, parties of the extreme right may actively challenge (or even attempt to temporarily substitute) the operation of state institutions (e.g., by organizing party militias or youth wings into self-styled ‘street patrols’). Such parties have usually come into being due to processes spearheaded by a grassroots nucleus often aided by semi-paramilitary groupings, therefore regularly opting for a more militant engagement. Parties of this subgroup with a non-negligible public appeal have become active across Central and Southeast Europe – notable cases during the last 10–15 years include the ‘old’ Jobbik in Hungary, ‘Our Slovakia’ (ĽSNS), Bulgaria’s ‘Ataka’, and the Golden Dawn in Greece (Ellinas, 2015; Sygkelos, 2015; Drábik, 2022).

‘Uncompromising opposition’ from the right: Where does the Homeland Movement stand on the issues?

As early as 2020, the DP leadership has set as top priorities: (a) safeguarding of national and Christian values; (b) stricter control of immigration and tougher ‘law and order’ measures, and; (c) revision of certain clauses in legislation protecting minority rights (Domovinski Pokret, 2020a). Regarding the ethnonationalist component of its political agenda, the party objects to the adoption of the ‘fixed’ quota arrangement toward the representation of ethnic minorities in the Sabor (i.e., the so-called ‘electoral district 12’), the ethnic Serb minority in particular (Domovinski Pokret, 2020b: 32). In addition, DP contends that ‘this arrangement has mostly enabled certain individuals and groups to serve their private interests’ (Ibid.: 31) and calls for this model to be abolished (Ibid).

Regarding gender-related issues, DP pledges to ‘respect and safeguard traditional family values’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2020a: 2), whereas the full party manifesto defines ‘marriage as the union between a man and a woman, as stipulated by the Constitution … [T]his guideline must be respected by the Croatian institutions’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2020b: 20). As far as the DP’s nativist principles on immigration are concerned, the party holds that ‘the protection of borders and citizens from potential threats must be assigned primarily to the authorities of sovereign states within the European Union’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2020b: 29).

In their rhetoric, the leader Ivan Penava and other high-ranking members have regularly accused political opponents of ‘incompetence and irresponsibility’, including in attacks on the HDZ for its ongoing cooperation with the ethnic Serb Independent Democratic Party (SDSS) as well as the ‘relentless promotion of pro-LGBT agendas and woke culture’ by the SDP and above all the Green-left coalition of Možemo (‘We Can!’). Nevertheless, the speed with which the current governing coalition between the HDZ and the DP was concluded and the relative flexibility with which any noteworthy obstacles were bypassed hint at a party ostensibly keener on engaging from within the halls of power instead of uncompromisingly opposing the mainstream establishment. Therefore, despite the occasional display of paraphernalia associated with the wartime fascist Ustaše (‘Insurgents’) regime (1941–1945) in public events co-ordinated by the DP (Hajdari, 2024; Novakov & Čolić, 2024), based on top-level decision-making and political values, the DP seems to fit more closely the prototype of a national conservative party. This observation is reinforced by the DP’s joining the ECR group in the EP after the European elections.

The Homeland Movement and the process of European integration

Soon after it was founded and against a backdrop of soft Euroscepticism and concerns over interethnic relations, the DP began expressing discontent with longstanding external pressures from the Venice Commission (Council of Europe) and the EU. This discontent centred on the pre-accession push (in 2000–2002) for Croatia to adopt the ‘fixed’ quota arrangement for ethnic minority representation in the Sabor (Domovinski Pokret, 2020b: 32).

On a macropolitical level, the soft Eurosceptic stance of the DP leadership is reflected in its framing of the European Union as ‘a confederal union of sovereign states and not as a supranational, federal, state with the prospects of becoming unitary’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2020a: 3). Along the same lines, the DP prescribes that Croatia must develop closer relations with the Visegrad Four (Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) because of ‘the shared historical experiences, as well as the similar positions and outlooks on the European and global developments’ with this group of countries (Domovinski Pokret, 2020b, p. 30). Herein, it should be underlined that, despite its soft Eurosceptic orientation, the DP never advocated for the development of more extensive relations between Croatia and ‘alternative partners’ in global politics, like Russia, China or the BRICS. In this light, the DP seems to align with the staunchly and idiosyncratically sovereigntist stances regarding relations with both the West and non-Western powers that characterize parties to the right of the HDZ in Croatian politics (Petsinis, 2024).

Seizing the geopolitical moment: The Homeland Movement’s reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

The DP leadership has been quick to seize the geopolitical moment occasioned by Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Aligning with a more general tendency across Croatia’s political divide, the party’s leader, Ivan Penava, and other high-ranking members have drawn (at times oblique) links between the legacies of Croatia’s Domovinski Rat (1991–1995) and Ukraine’s struggle to resist Russian aggression.

On 24 February 2022, Penava stated, ‘Our party expresses its firm solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people … we hope that this conflict will last as shortly as possible with as few human and material losses as possible’ (Ibid.). He also urged the state authorities to organize the accommodation of Ukrainian refugees in Croatia and efficiently allocate the material resources required. In addition to highlighting the commonalities between the Homeland War and the developments in Ukraine, Penava cast doubts on the competence of the government to manage a migration crisis in Croatia (Ibid.). More emphatically, on 6 April 2022, the party’s MP Stipo Mlinarić praised Volodymyr Zelenskyy for dealing with the ‘fifth column’ in Ukraine and deplored the fact that ‘the HDZ-led government has not done the same with the ‘fifth column’ that operates from within the Serb Democratic Independent Party’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2022b).

Nevertheless, between Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the end of 2023, the DP suffered a plateauing, if not a significant decline, in its popularity vis-à-vis the HDZ and other minor contenders on the right. As indicated in several public surveys conducted by the Promocija Plus, 2X1 Komunikacije and Ipsos polling agencies between March and December 2022, the DP had been lagging behind both Možemo and the centre-right, conservative Most (‘The Bridge’) party (Europe Elects, 2024). Therefore, to reverse this decline in popularity, the DP started putting greater stress on the rapidly increasing cost of living and the government’s alleged incompetence in dealing with galloping inflation (Domovinski Pokret, 2022c).

Due to this change of course and the party’s gradual adoption of a strategy more focused on domestic policy, which persisted until the Croatian parliamentary and the European elections, no extensive or concrete references were made to the war in Ukraine. On the contrary, the DP’s Ustani i Ostani! (‘Stand Up and Remain!’) political program, which the party launched for both the national and the European elections, cites Ukraine only on one occasion: in the section about national defence and the need to upgrade the equipment of the Croatian armed forces – the navy, in particular. In greater detail, the program stresses that: ‘Ukraine demonstrated how the use of new military technologies, such as drones, can paralyse even the naval forces of global superpowers (namely, Russia)’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2024a: 23). Otherwise, any references by DP to the EU during its campaign for the European elections concentrated on more general aspects of European politics in accordance with the party’s founding principles regarding the process of European integration.

The Homeland Movement’s campaign in the 2024 European elections

Right at the beginning of the Ustani i Ostani! policy document, the DP underlines its fundamental stance on state sovereignty within the EU: “Many types of crises during the last years (e.g., the financial crisis, Brexit, the migration crisis, and the COVID-19 crisis) have demonstrated that the EU reacts in a slow and non-coordinated manner whereas, at the same time and under these irregular circumstances, the member states prioritize their own interests exclusively. This is why Croatia must prioritize its own interests, too (Croatia comes first!)” (Domovinski Pokret, 2024a: 26).

At a later point in the same policy document, the DP leadership reiterates that it is a sovereigntist party which primarily views the EU as ‘a community of equal and sovereign states and nations rooted in Christian foundations and principles … the detachment of the EU from its Christian roots has resulted in great identity confusion’ (Ibid). Furthermore, the party contends that ‘decisions about Croatia should be taken by Croatian politicians in Zagreb and not by Brussels-based officials’ (Ibid). With specific regard to the area of national defence and the prospects for the EU’s strategic autonomy, DP holds that any projects designed to bolster EU defence policy must not be misused by Brussels in order to weaken further the sovereignty of nation-states (Domovinski Pokret, 2024a: 26).

In addition, DP adamantly opposes Serbia’s accession to the EU, in no small part due to the legacies of the wars of the 1990s in which Serbia is seen as the aggressor against Croatia. Contrarywise, the party underlines that ‘the things that Croatia must demand without compromise from Serbia, which committed aggression on Croatian territory, are payment of war reparations, a thorough search for disappeared persons, and the return of cultural treasures that were stolen during the war’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2024a: 28). At the same time, the party accuses the Serbian government of ‘promoting the ideology of Greater Serbia and openly endorsing Russian aggression against Ukraine’ (Ibid).

Apart from Ustani i Ostani!, individual MPs reiterated these standpoints concerning major policymaking areas on the EU level, both in the Croatian and the European Parliaments, on numerous occasions. Regarding immigration, in the aftermath of a knife attack in Mannheim, Germany, in May 2024, Ivo Čaleta-Car, a DP deputy in the Sabor, warned in a speech that:

The EU is slowly turning into a unitary supranational state. The EU is trying to create an unnatural federation of states that will be held together by migrants and their descendants through mixing with the indigenous populations (Domovinski Pokret, 2024b).

In the same speech, he stressed: ‘Yes to the EU as a community of sovereign nations! No to the EU as a superstate!’ (Ibid.). Moreover, DP concisely but effectively publicized and summarized its main standpoints on European politics through the party’s official pages on social media (e.g., X and Instagram). On the party’s Instagram page, for instance, its main slogans for the European elections feature as follows: “‘Croatia comes first!’, ‘We stop the extension of the Brussels’ jurisdiction!’, ‘For a counteraction to the globalist agendas!’, ‘No to the propagation of gender ideology! We do not want gender ideology in our schools!’, ‘For the protection of national borders!’, ‘For the demographic rebirth of Croatia and Europe!’, ‘Rebirth of the village for the rebirth of Croatia and Europe!’, ‘For a Europe that respects its Christian foundations!’” (Domovinski Pokret, 2024c).

Here, it should be noted that several party candidates incorporated slogans related to policies on the EU level into their campaigns for both the national and the European elections. Stipe Mlinarić, for instance, reiterated that ‘Serbia cannot join the EU before it pays Croatia war reparations for the villages and towns that it destroyed’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2024d), Meanwhile, other party candidates pledged to fight for ‘a Europe that respects its Christian foundations’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2024e), reiterated that ‘Croatia must retain its sovereignty in Europe’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2024f), and underlined that ‘Christianity is the foundation of the EU’ (Domovinski Pokret, 2024g).

Embedding the European in the national: A contextual analysis of the Homeland Movement’s political strategy in the European elections of 2024

With a turnout rate of 21.35%, Croatia had the lowest voter participation among all EU member states in the most recent European elections. Croatians’ lack of interest is underscored if we compare this turnout with the much higher rate of 62.30% in the Croatian parliamentary elections that took place on 17 April 2024 (Republika Hrvatska, n.d.). With European elections held shortly after the parliamentary ones, it is clear that Croatia’s major political leaders prioritized the latter. This was especially true for DP, which emerged as a ‘kingmaker’ after the national elections. Faced with a choice between continuing its role as a perennial gadfly berating the HDZ establishment from opposition or seeking real power on the inside, DP leader Ivan Penava chose the latter, aligning his party with the HDZ and joining it in a governing coalition. 

Considering the relatively more ‘parochial’ outlook of the Croatian electorate on global and European politics, the DP’s leadership has since 2020 been rather eclectic and places primary stress on those developments that, due to sociocultural catalysts, might resonate more directly with the ‘collective subconscious’ of the party’s target groups. This appears to have been a fairly commonplace practice for right-wing political actors in Croatia. For instance, between 2018 and 2019 (two years prior to the formation of the DP), the ‘right-wing faction’ within the ruling HDZ extensively capitalized on public grievances vis-à-vis the guidelines of the ‘Istanbul Convention’ for LGBTQ+ rights and gender equality (Milekic, 2018). Along comparable lines, the DP sought to capitalize on the shockwaves that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine generated across Croatian society by drawing tentative links between Ukrainian resistance and the Croatian Domovinski Rat in the 1990s. However, after 2023, the party leadership switched to a more domestic-focused strategy, emphasizing the rapidly increasing cost of living and Croatia’s galloping inflation as part of the endeavour to reverse its declining popularity.

Consequently, in its political program and the individual campaigns of its candidates and the party’s social media, the DP adopted an even more eclectic pattern of engagement for the European elections that consisted of (a) frequent and repetitive use of ‘catchphrase’ slogans (e.g., ‘Croatia comes first!’) and (b) a paramount, yet synoptic, stress on these aspects of European politics that resonated the most with the party’s founding principles and the dominant trends on identity politics among its target groups in the electorate. Therefore, primary importance was placed on (a) the purported need to safeguard Croatia’s state sovereignty from any extension of the EU’s jurisdiction; (b) calls to veto Serbia’s accession to the EU; (c) opposition to the alleged propagation of ‘gender ideology’ and counter-proposals in increase birthrates in Croatia and the rest of Europe, and; (d) the effective protection of national borders and stricter regulation of immigration from ‘third’ countries outside of Europe.

In the long run, it appears that this more eclectic strategy, which prioritized the embedment of the European in the national, facilitated the DP’s galvanizing of the groupness of its electorate, especially in the strongholds of Eastern and Western Slavonia (i.e., the IV. and V. electoral districts) and claim the third spot behind the HDZ and the SDP (but ahead of Most and Možemo) in both the parliamentary and European elections. Slavonia, as a whole, is a region that was heavily scarred by protracted warfare during the first half of the 1990s. In particular, Vukovar, an Eastern Slavonian town on the border with Serbia along the western bank of the Danube, has been established as a ‘master symbol’ of resistance to the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) in Croatian nationalist imagery. Most importantly, Vukovar is the town of which Ivan Penava has been the local mayor since 2014. The long-term evolution of the HDZ–DP coalition will demonstrate whether the party leadership is keener on (a) alleviating its stances on Euroscepticism and identity politics to secure its status more firmly inside the halls of power or (b) seeking a ‘new’ pact with the ideologically compatible ‘right-wing faction’ within the ruling HDZ in an attempt to trigger a more decisive swing of the governing coalition towards the right.

 

(*) Vassilis Petsinis (PhD Birmingham UK) is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the Corvinus University (Institute of Global Studies) in Budapest, Hungary. He is a political scientist with expertise in European Politics and Ethnopolitics. His Marie Skłodowska-Curie (MSCA-IF) individual research project at the University of Tartu (2017–19) was entitled: ‘Patterns and management of ethnic relations in the Western Balkans and the Baltic States’ (project ID: 749400-MERWBKBS). Vassilis Petsinis is a specialist in the politics of Central and Eastern Europe. He is the author of the monographs National Identity in Serbia: The Vojvodina and a Multiethnic Community in the Balkans (Bloomsbury, 2020) and Cross-regional Ethnopolitics in Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons from the Western Balkans and the Baltic States (Palgrave Macmillan, 2022), as well as other academic publications that cover a range of countries as diverse as Serbia, Croatia, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Greece.

 

References

Domovinski Pokret. (2020a). Parlamentarni Izbori 2020: Zašto Što Svoje Volim. Domovinski Pokret.

Domovinski Pokret. (2020b). Program Delovanja, lipanj 2020. Domovinski Pokret.

Domovinski Pokret. (2022a, February 24). ‘Penava: Domovinski Pokret Iskazao Solidarnost s Ukrajinom i Ukrajinskom Narodom’. Retrieved 22 September 2024 from https://www.dp.hr/blog/Penava_Domovinski_pokret_iskazao_solidarnost_s_Ukrajinom_i_ukrajinskim_narodom/544

Domovinski Pokret. (2022b, April 6). ‘Mlinarić: Za razliku od Ukrajine, mi se Još Nismo Obračunali sa Svojom Petom Kolonom’. Retrieved 22 September 2024 from https://www.dp.hr/blog/Mlinaric_Za_razliku_od_Ukrajine__mi_se_jos_nismo_obracunali_sa_svojom_petom_kolonom/553

Domovinski Pokret. (2022c, September 8). ’Kada je Država Skupa i Neučinkovita, Nema te Mjere Koja Je Može Spasiti!’ Retrieved 22 September 2024 from https://www.dp.hr/blog/Kada_je_drzava_skupa_i_neucinkovita__nema_te_mjere_koja_je_moze_spasiti/593

Domovinski Pokret. (2024a). Politički Program: Ustani i Ostani! Domovinski Pokret.

Domovinski Pokret. (2024b). ‘Ćaleta-Car: EU kao zajednica suverenih nacija da, EU kao nadnacionalna naddržava ne!’, https://www.instagram.com/p/C8XZBJDCYO1/

Domovinski Pokret. (2024c). ‘Hrvatice i Hrvati, izađite na izbore za EU parlament i podržite program Domovinskog pokreta’, https://www.instagram.com/p/C7vxzG6iyXz/

Domovinski Pokret. (2024d). ‘Mlinarić: Srbija ne može ući u EU dok ne plati ratnu odštetu Hrvatskoj za porušena sela i gradove!’, https://www.instagram.com/p/C7d41zDK7vo/

Domovinski Pokret. (2024e). ‘Bartulica: Za Europu koja poštuje svoje kršćanske temelje!’, https://www.instagram.com/p/C7jE99YC8gX/

Domovinski Pokret (2024f). ‘Vaš suverenistički glas u Europi!’ https://www.instagram.com/p/C7PSe2iCcNz/

Domovinski Pokret (2024g). ‘Lozo: U Europskom parlamentu zauzimat ćemo se za zaštitu tradicionalnih vrijednosti i očuvanje Europe na kršćanskim osnovama’, https://www.instagram.com/p/C7zTI0rCA8u/?img_index=1

Drábik, J. (2022). ‘“With Courage against the System”. The Ideology of the People’s Party Our Slovakia’. In Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 30 (3), p.p.417–434.

Ellinas, A. (2015). ‘Neo-Nazism in an Established Democracy: The Persistence of Golden Dawn in Greece’. In South European Society and Politics, 20(1), pp.1–20.

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Hajdari, U. (2024). ‘Croatia Election Winner Cozies up with Far Right in New Government’ in Politico, 9 May 2024, https://www.politico.eu/article/croatia-forms-far-right-government-homeland-movement-croatian-democratic-union-andrej-plenkovic/

Milekic, S. (2018). ‘Croatian Conservatives Protest Against Anti-Violence Treaty’ in Balkan Insight, 13 April 2018, https://balkaninsight.com/2018/04/13/anti-istanbul-convention-protesters-turn-against-croatian-pm-04-13-2018/

Novakov, S. and Čolić, N. (2024). ’Ekstremna Desnica Postaje Krojač Sudbine Hrvatske’ in NIN, 20 April 2024, https://www.nin.rs/svet/vesti/48239/domovinski-pokret-kao-tas-na-vagi-ko-ce-formirati-vladu-u-hrvatskoj

Petsinis, V. (2019). ‘Hijacking the Left? ‘The Populist and Radical Right in Two Post-Communist Polities’. In G. Charalambous & G. Ioannou (Eds.), Left Radicalism and Populism in Europe (pp. 156–180). Routledge.

Petsinis, V. (2024). ‘National Conservative, Radical, and Extremist Right-wing Parties in Croatia: A Critical Retrospective Overview’ in Péter Marton, Gry Thomasen, Csaba Békés and András Rácz (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Non-State Actors in East-West Relations (pp. 1–17). Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Republika Hrvatska. (n.d.). Konačni rezultati izbora. Retrieved 22 September 2024 from https://www.izbori.hr/sabor2024/rezultati/

Sygkelos, Y. (2015). ‘Nationalism versus European Integration: The Case of ATAKA’, In East European Quarterly, 43(2–3), pp.163–188.

Tesija, V. (2024). ‘Croatia’s HDZ Secures Third Govt Term in Alliance with Far-Right’ in Balkan Insight, 8 May 2024, https://balkaninsight.com/2024/05/08/croatias-hdz-secures-third-govt-term-in-alliance-with-far-right/

 

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March of a Million Hearts. Hundreds of thousands march in anti-government protest to show support for democracy in Warsaw, Poland on October 1, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

Dashed Hopes and the Success of the Populist Right: The Case of the 2024 European Elections in Poland

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Please cite as:

Lipiński, Artur. (2024). “Dashed Hopes and the Success of the Populist Right: The Case of the 2024 European Elections in Poland.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0079

 

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Abtstract

The European Parliament elections of 9 June 2024 were the next stage in the electoral marathon started by parliamentary elections in 2023 and local elections earlier in 2024 and ended with a good result for the populist Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the radical-right Confederation of Freedom and Independence (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość), confirming the relevance of right-wing populist parties in Poland. The combined electoral outcome of both PiS (36.16%) and Confederation (12.08%) is only slightly below 50%. The hopes of all those who treated the 2023 parliamentary elections in Poland as a victory over populism, paving the way for more victories, were thus dashed. The report aims to highlight the political and social context that led to these results and offer arguments supporting the classification of PiS and Confederation as populist communicators. The subsequent sections analyse the political communication strategies employed by both parties, emphasizing the intricacies of their discursive articulations concerning national and European themes. Lastly, the report explores the correlation between the political agendas of PiS and Confederation and the thematic preferences of their electorate, offering a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play.

Keywords: Law and Justice; Confederation; populism; EP elections; right wing

By Artur Lipiński* (Department of Political Science and Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań, Poland)

The European Parliament elections on 9 June 9 2024, the next stage in the electoral marathon started by last year’s parliamentary elections and this year’s local elections, ended with a good result for the populist Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the radical-right Confederation of Freedom and Independence (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość) usually referred to simply as Confederation (Konfederacja). The hopes of all those who treated the 2023 parliamentary elections as a victory over populism, paving the way for more victories, were thus dashed. Although Prime Minister Donald Tusk and the ruling Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) framed this election as a contest between his coalition and all parties – including PiS – over the fate of the EU, PiS was still able to secure 36.16% of the vote despite low turnout in the countryside, where voters disproportionately favour PiS.

The elections also confirmed several findings by researchers that consider the EP elections to be ‘second-order’ elections. First, these elections are assumed to be less salient for voters as they do not influence national government formation. In fact, in Poland, the high turnout from the 2023 elections, mainly due to young people coming out to vote, led to the success of the liberal opposition at the time, was not repeated and mainly a hardcore electorate went to the polls. Second, the assumption that these elections favour parties of the radical right was confirmed, as they provide a credible and adequate context for articulating Eurosceptic and nationalist views. In the case of Poland, this meant the relative success of the radical-right Confederation, which has made explicit criticism of the European Union its hallmark. Third, there is the question of whether national themes predominate over pan-European ones in elections for the European Parliament. The assumption is that EP elections tend to reflect conflicts and rivalries within the domestic political arena rather than issues dealt with by the European Parliament. However, as this report details, it was not necessarily so in the 2024 EP elections in Poland, as national and European issues were articulated together, contributing to the larger discourse on Europe, its institutions, values and policies.

The main populist actors and their results

 The results of the 2024 EP elections confirmed the relevance of right-wing populist parties in Poland. The combined electoral result of both PiS (36.16%) and the Confederation (12.08%) is only slightly below 50%. Out of these two, PiS constitutes a ‘quintessentially populist’ party (Stanley, 2023), not only with respect to its discourse but also in promoting and subsequently implementing policy solutions. If one adopts the widely shared view that populism is a kind of discursive logic that pits the people against immoral and corrupted elites, then PiS definitely has a populist character. PiS constructs a moralized dichotomy by positioning the traditional Christian nation against the ‘post-communist’ or ‘liberal’ elites (Bill, 2022). A significant element of PiS’s agenda includes anti-migration themes, which have contributed to the politicization and discursive shift in the public sphere since the so-called ‘migration crisis’ of 2015. This shift has led to the normalization of racist discourse and the securitization of migration issues (Krzyżanowska & Krzyżanowski 2018; Krzyżanowski 2020).

At the level of political action, populism combines colonization of the state with mass clientelism and discriminatory legalism (Müller 2016). Accordingly, after taking power in 2015, PiS immediately started dismantling institutional checks and balances, including the Constitutional Tribunal and Supreme Court and transformed the public broadcaster into the government’s mouthpiece (Sadurski, 2019). At the economic level, the party promoted generous social transfers, which not only allowed it to garner the support of beneficiaries but also to accuse political opponents of neglecting the people’s interests.

Such a populist formula allowed PiS to win a number of elections. In 2015, the party gained 37.5% of the votes, translating into 235 seats in the 460-member parliament, enabling the party to form a majority government that introduced all the changes it promised during the campaign. The expensive social transfers made after 2015 and further financial promises, as well as the rhetoric of threats targeted against LGBTQ+ people, secured PiS very good electoral results in the European Parliamentary elections in 2019, namely 45.4% of votes and 27 seats in the EP. The parliamentary elections held the same year brought PiS another victory; the party secured 43.6% of the votes and took 235 seats. It was exceptional not only in terms of the vote share, the highest for any political actor after 1989, but also in terms of the reelection for the second term with the overall majority (Szczerbiak, 2023). The ruling of the Constitutional Tribunal, an institution widely perceived as fully controlled by PiS, to introduce further restrictions into already harsh abortion law coupled with the series of financial and legal irregularities of PiS’s politicians systematically revealed by the media as well as the growing inflation contributed to the visible drop in public opinion polls. Although in the next parliamentary elections held on October 2023, PiS obtained 35.4% of the votes, it did not translate into the majority of the votes in the Sejm (the lower chamber of parliament), and the party was not able to form a government.

The second of the relevant right-wing actors is Confederation. Its classification poses decisively more challenges. Although The PopuList (Rooduijn et al. 2019) classifies the grouping as far right and Stanley (2023) adds that it is of libertarian rather than populist orientation, two caveats should be made here. Formally, the Confederation is a coalition of several parties that represent diverse views and target different segments of the population. New Hope, led by Sławomir Mentzen, is a libertarian party with a strong focus on economic issues, advocating for tax system simplification, tax cuts and neoliberal economic freedoms. Confederation also includes the National Movement, led by Krzysztof Bosak and the Confederation of the Polish Crown, founded by Grzegorz Braun. These groups combine (ethno)nationalism with moral and cultural conservatism, Euroscepticism, antisemitism and anti-Ukrainian sentiments. At least the latter two promote a nationalistic vision that merges anti-establishment rhetoric with the demonization of various groups. Additionally, as strategically calculating organizations, these political groupings adapt their communication strategies to the evolving political landscape and emerging challenges (Van Kessel & Castelein, 2016).

Since 2019, Confederation has slowly and consistently moderated its agenda, foregrounded free market aspects of its identity and economic discourse, dropped its antidemocratic messages and backgrounded or removed its most controversial figures. One crucial step was replacing the controversial leader Janusz Korwin-Mikke with Mentzen, a 35-year-old businessman and lawyer, and changing the name of one of the coalition parties ‘KORWiN’ to New Hope. Moreover, broadening the palette of the party communication with populist themes combined with populist performative strategies (like ‘beer with Mentzen’, a series of events organized across Poland when one of the leaders takes the stage with a mug of beer and talks about his political views emulating relaxed convention of stand up comedy genre) plus the skilful usage of the social media (with his 40 million views and 700,000 followers, Mentzen was the most popular Polish politician on Tik Tok) allowed the party to cross electoral threshold and to slowly build its popularity, particularly, among youngest cohorts of the electorate.

Confederation’s initial attempts to win public support through radical and controversial messages underpinned by antisemitism (Mentzen’s so-called Five Points: ‘we don’t want Jews, homosexuals, abortion, taxes and the EU’) did not bring the party satisfactory results in the 2019 EP elections. The grouping fell below the electoral threshold, receiving only 4.6% of the votes (see Figure 1 below). That led to significant moderation in the October 2019 parliamentary elections and 2020 presidential elections, with communication that emphasized the economic agenda and radical background content, which enabled Confederation to get 6.8% of the vote and win 11 seats in the 460-member Sejm. In the middle of 2022 the party experienced a slump in public support due to its implicit anti-Ukrainian agenda, manifested in references to the dramatic and sensitive aspects of Polish–Ukrainian history (the Volhynian massacre, in particular) and emphasis on the differences in the two states’ national interests. Confederation also chided the PiS government for its overly generous aid for Ukraine. This stance – alongside the extreme polarization between PiS and PO that left no space for smaller actors and the (social) media activity of critical journalists that exposed the radically conservative and exclusionary programmatic assumptions of Confederation – may have influenced the lower-than-expected double-digit result in the 2023 parliamentary elections, which ultimately saw Confederation take 7.2% of the vote (see Figure 1 below).

Confederation nearly doubled its support in the subsequent 2024 European Parliament elections. This increase was attributed not only to the ‘second-order’ nature of the elections, which in many countries bolsters the radical right, but also to the favourable opportunity structure created by various contextual events related to European and domestic affairs in Poland.

Campaign communication, populism and 2024 European Parliamentary election

The international and domestic context

At the international level, a few key issues have been heavily politicized and used as campaign themes by PiS and Confederation. First is the European Green Deal, introduced in 2019, which aims to achieve climate neutrality in the EU by 2050. This policy package is ripe for political exploitation due to its likely uneven impacts on the budgets of households, businesses, industries, regions and member states. Secondly, the European climate and energy agenda might be easily represented as led by the European elites against the sovereign decision of the member states. Additionally, being the result of very complex decision-making based on even more complex scientific expertise makes it even more vulnerable to political exploitation and populist argumentation.

Another important issue which affected the Polish public debate was the European Council’s approval in May 2024 of the EU Pact for Migration. The most controversial aspect of that was the so-called ‘solidarity mechanism’, which Poland’s populist right framed as a false choice between accepting an unspecified number of immigrants or paying €20,000 per immigrant. This framing ignored the option of negotiating alternative forms of support.

The backlash was further fuelled by the tense situation at the Polish–Belarusian border, where Belarusian President Alexandr Lukashenko’s regime transported foreigners from Africa and Asia to the border and forced them to cross. Both attempted and actual illegal crossings were met with a harsh and legally questionable response from the previous PiS government, a policy continued by the PO-led government after October 2023. This response included pushbacks, the introduction of the state of emergency, but also the idea of building the 187-kilometre-long physical wall and the electronic barrier equipped with cameras and motion detectors. These measures were justified by a strong anti-Muslim and orientalist discourse, introduced and normalized by PiS during the 2015’ migration crisis’, which reduced refugees to stereotypes of illegal Muslim migrants intent on imposing their values or posing a terrorist threat.

The outbreak of the war in Ukraine in February 2022 and the resulting influx of refugees, of which approximately 1.5 million have stayed in Poland, constitutes another dimension of context for the campaign communication (Duszczyk, Górny, Kaczmarczyk & Kubisiak, 2023). First, the populist right-wing government expressed a welcoming attitude towards Ukrainian refugees, granting them temporary protection, including access to the Polish healthcare system, schools and the job market, which stands in stark contrast with the Islamophobic and anti-migration discourse targeting refugees from the Polish–Belarusian border. Secondly, however, with the lapse of time, sociologists have observed some signs of growing compassion fatigue towards refugees staying in Poland yet in the second half of 2022, which makes the Ukrainian issue extremely vulnerable to politicization by radical populist parties (Sadura & Sierakowski, 2022; Baszczak, Winckiewicz & Zyzik, 2023).

Finally, two events preceded election day and strongly affected the discourse of the opposition. First, Onet, a leading news website, reported on 5 July that at the end of March and early April, three soldiers were detained after firing warning shots around a group of 50 people who were trying to cross the Polish–Belarusian border (Wyrwał & Żemła, 2024). The media information about detention coincided with the death of a Polish soldier on the same border, stabbed through the border fence with a knife attached to a pole and thrust in the direction of the soldiers by an unidentified man from the Belarusian side. The incident was part of a series of attacks and a surge in attempts at illegal crossings by migrants supported and forced by Belarussia and Russia. It created the discursive opportunity for the right-wing opposition, which accused the Tusk government of detaining the Polish soldiers responsible for the protection of the border and creating the freezing effect regarding the use of firearms for self-defence, which allegedly led to the death of the soldier.

The political communication of PiS

PiS was consistent in keeping its ambivalence towards the EU, which was determined by the still strong popular support for EU membership, but on the other hand, it was blackmailed by the Eurosceptical, if not Eurorejectionist, agenda of Confederation. The tone of the campaign was set at the party convention on 27 April 2024, during which Jarosław Kaczyński declared that: “We are Poles, and we have Polish responsibilities. Our red and white team is entering this election, this great undertaking, with full conviction and full determination that we must defend Polish values, Polish interests and the Polish raison d’etat. This means taking up the issues of the Green Deal, the migration pact, the change of treaties, the euro, the protection of the Polish countryside, security and, finally, what is the essence of Polishness – freedom” (Kaczyński 2024).

It clearly reveals the basic premise, lists the key issues of the campaign and informs about the master frame, providing the angle from which each of the listed issues was to be perceived. The contradictory relationship between national and European interests was perceived as a threat to freedom, which in the majority of contexts was understood as a right to absolute, exclusive sovereignty. During the convention inaugurating the campaign, the party presented a declaration containing a series of negative slogans exhibiting its attitude toward the EU: “We will cancel the Green Deal, stop the migration pact, stop the new treaty, defend the zloty, defend the interests of the Polish countryside in the EU, strengthen Poland’s security and armaments, and defend Polish freedom. […] The most important values to us are the welfare of the Fatherland and a better life. We are going to the European Parliament to defend the Polish national interest’” (aja/X, 2024).

At the forefront of the listed issues was the European Green Deal, which the party portrayed in its communication as an ideological project of the EU elites aimed against ordinary citizens. As the party has argued, higher energy and transport prices will raise costs for ordinary Poles as well as for businesses and housing construction. Further, it will have a substantial impact on agriculture: ‘Imposing so many different burdens on agriculture will lead to it first being in a very deep crisis, and in the long run, it will simply disappear’ (Tak dla polskiego rolnictwa, 2024).

The construction of crisis and the politics of fear, discursive mechanisms typical for the populist right, were also employed to represent the Pact on Migration, which was labelled as a ‘Trojan horse introduced to Europe’, a ‘particularly dangerous’ solution, and an ‘ideological project’ that would allow the EU elites to impose any number of migrants or punish Poland with financial penalties. It was further claimed that the Pact on Migration would lead to uncontrolled, massive immigration that would eventually change the demographic structure of Europe, destroy national cultures and adversely affect the security of Poles. As Kaczyński claimed: “Wherever this phenomenon of illegal immigration appears, but also where this immigration has been legal for many years, we are dealing with such zones where basically no law applies, where one is afraid to leave his house even during the day” (PiS, 2024a).

Moreover, campaign communication also contained many warnings regarding European treaty changes, which, if implemented, would lead to the centralization of the EU (conceived as German domination), complete erasure of Polish sovereignty and a threat to the national security and personal freedoms of ordinary people. Occasionally, the communication adopted a hyperbolic tone with the supposed adverse developments represented as part of the large plan of Western states, elites, ideologues, bureaucrats and lobbyists in collaboration with national elites to control weaker states in order to change their culture and exploit their economy: ‘Poland will no longer be a state, but simply an area of inhabitation of Poles. An area of inhabitation of Poles managed from outside’ (PiS, 2024d).

Interestingly, being aware that such communication exposed the party to the accusations of merely negative campaigning and planning to withdraw Poland from the EU, PiS attempted to reframe its message in a positive way. In particular, in the second part of the campaign, it promoted a series of ‘Yes’ slogans, for example: ‘#Yes for Poland!’, ‘#Yes for the Polish countryside’, ‘#Yes for investments’ or ‘‘#Yes for the defence of Polish borders’ (PiS, 2024b).

The party also explicitly declared its attachment to the EU and distanced from the Eurorejectonist slogans by emphasizing its vision of the Europe of Fatherlands as opposed to the populist perception of Europe as the elitist project targeted at the sovereignty and freedoms of ordinary people. Interestingly, although the security issue was an important part of the agenda, the war in Ukraine did not feature prominently in the campaign. In the end, the party used the incidents on the Polish–Belarusian border to articulate this issue together with the anti-migration discourse, legitimize its decision to build a fence and attack Civic Platform for criticizing this idea when it was in opposition.

The political communication of Confederation

The electoral agenda of Confederation is best captured by the Facebook message posted two days before the elections, which deploys the visual metaphor of war to portray the relationship between the grouping and the EU and its policies (see Figure 3). The list of the issues mentioned in the picture to be fought with includes the European Green Deal, Fit for 55 (the EU’s plan to reduce carbon emissions), the Pact for Migration, banning combustion engine cars, European taxes, restricting the use of cash, and the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive.

The post neatly captures the Eurorejectionist attitude towards the EU, which is represented as a structure inimical to the national interests and the interests of ordinary Poles. Similarly to PiS, the main focus of attention was the European Green Deal, conceived as a prominent example of the madness of the EU elites driven by the socialist inclination to overregulate and the ideology of ‘climatism’. The EU is a bureaucratic structure with the tendency to go beyond its legal treaty limitations and is conceived as detached from normal people. As the grouping claimed, ‘We are going to the Europarliament to stop these absurd and harmful crazies coming from Brussels, because #WeWantToLiveNormally!’ (Konfederacja, 2024a).

The essence of the grouping’s stance is neatly captured by one of its leaders, Krzysztof Bosak: “I don’t know if you’ve noticed the new platitude promoted by the Eurofederalist lobby in Poland: they call the principle of unanimity in the EU by the term ‘liberum veto’ and suggest that it is some kind of systemic gangrene. Thus, they admit that it is the EU and not Poland that is the new state reference point for them. It’s power and decisiveness they care about. What they don’t add is that the more prerogatives in Brussels, the less in Warsaw. This is a zero-sum game. The sovereignty being shifted to Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg is being lost in Poland. Our influence on the vector of the evolution of EU policies oscillates around zero, and the veto is the last hard tool that can influence anything in this organization. Instead of further strengthening the Eurocracy, we need to regain control!” (Konfederacja, 2024b).

Such a vision of European relations underpins the radically anti-establishment discourse of the Confederation, which allows the presentation of all the political elites as traitors of the Polish national interests. Contrary to the PO, which was conceived as representative of the interests of Germany, PiS’s agenda was attacked for its hypocrisy or for stealing programmatic ideas from the Confederation.

The EU environmental policy solutions were attacked for detrimental effects on the development of the economies of EU member states and led to the drastic deterioration of the standards of living for ordinary Poles: “The entire policy of the European Union will lead to the poor becoming even poorer, and the process of weakening nation-states will gain even more momentum! That’s why I’m going to the European Parliament to stop this madness and stand up for the interests of ordinary citizens!” (Zajączkowska, 2024).

Populist strategies were used to articulate other ideological themes. In line with the libertarian currents of the Confederation’s profile, the EU policies were also framed as illegitimate, ideological interference in ordinary people’s lives. According to the Confederation, poor people will be forced, for example, to conduct costly renovations of their houses to fulfil energy standards of the EU’s Energy Performance of Buildings Directive.

Another key issue on the campaign agenda was the rejection of the EU Pact on Migration. Confederation did not shy away from using racist and Islamophobic rhetoric, portraying migrants as a dangerous threat to security, demographics and culture and as a burden on welfare systems. They not only supported strengthening existing borders but also advocated for amending laws to permit more liberal use of firearms against migrants. Although less prominent, they also criticized the so-called ‘privileges’ granted to Ukrainian refugees, portraying them as undeserving. Additionally, Confederation leveraged the incidents at the Polish–Belarusian border to promote its hardline stance on migration.

The resonance of the campaign issues and the electoral support

The results of the European Parliament’s Spring 2024 Eurobarometer sheds some light on the list of campaign topics of particular significance to Polish voters. According to the survey, the EU’s defence and security policy and public health ranked highest, 37% and 36%, respectively, among Polish voters. Support for the economy and creating new jobs (28%) and agricultural policy (22%) are of secondary interest. There is also a potential disconnect between the migration issue, one of the most potent topics for the political communication of the right-wing populists, and the interests of the voters. As the survey shows, migration and asylum scored only 16% despite extreme politicization of the issue and extensive media coverage, particularly just before the elections when the incidents on the Polish–Belarusian border took place. The timing of the survey might provide some explanation; in Poland, it took place in February, long before the campaign started. Second, the migration issue was embedded in the larger security narrative, a topic the voters recognized as the most important one. Interestingly, support for the actions against climate policy ranked at 16%, whereas at the EU level, the score was at 27%, which might explain why populist actors paid so much attention to the rejection of the European Green Deal and the Fit for 55 package.

The elections confirmed the structure of support for the right-wing populist electorate. First, PiS confirmed its support in rural areas (46.36% of voters) than in cities (30.67% of voters), among the elderly (only 16.2% of votes of those aged 29 and over and 46.1% of those over 60) and among less educated voters (TVN24, 2024). The Confederation was different, with as many as 30.1% voting for the group in the 18–29 age bracket. The breakdown by gender was also important: 16.5% of male eligible voters and 8.1% of female voters voted for the Confederation (very significantly, in this case, 0.3% more than for the Left). It is also worth noting the high loyalty of the PiS electorate, with only 8% of its 2023 voters supporting other groups. In the case of the Confederation, it was 16% (Katkowski, 2024). Interestingly, Confederation gained the support of the 165,000 PiS supporters (Machowski, 2024). Finally, the electoral turnout was significantly lower than during previous national elections (40.65% to 74.38%) but still relatively high if compared to the elections before 2023.

Conclusions

Although the elections confirmed the strength of polarization and the importance of the PO and PiS divide, with the two largest parties winning a combined 73.22% of the electoral vote, this did not prevent the Confederation from gaining an important third place in the electoral competition. Discursive structures of opportunity related to the dramatic situation in the east resonated with the Confederation’s securitized, anti-immigrant message. Moreover, as the oppositional actor, the grouping has greater credibility in proclaiming radical slogans than PiS, who previously held power.

Second, it appears that both parties will seek to slow down (PiS) or undermine (Confederation) the process of European integration and use the issues of immigration and environmental EU policies as important parts of the Eurosceptic agenda. Yet during the campaign, The Confederation announced that it would seek to establish a special commission in the European Parliament to investigate illegal immigration.

Third, the division on the right side of the political scene and the competition over the conservative electorate is also reflected at the European level as two actors joined different political groups in the European Parliament. Being part of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, PiS was courted by Viktor Orbán to join his new alliance called Patriots for Europe (PfE). Initially, it seemed a very probable option for PiS if one takes public declarations of its politicians at face value.

Yet at the end of June, former Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki suggested in an interview with Politico that the option of joining Viktor Orbán was 50/50. As he declared, ‘It’s quite obvious that we could be united on a geographical platform and not [an] ideological platform. I’m less and less interested in all those ideological elements of the jigsaw’ (cited in Wax, 2024). Nevertheless, it turned out it was part of the protracted negotiation strategy over the distribution of the posts in the group. Ultimately, the longstanding relations between PiS and Fidesz were not translated into an alliance with the party, which adopts an entirely different stance on Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the effectiveness of sanctions and the significance and scale of assistance for Ukraine. On 3 July 2024, it was announced that PiS would remain within ECR and renew its alliance with Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia.

The decision of which EP group to join was equally difficult for the Confederation, leading finally to internal divisions within the grouping. Only three out of six of the Confederation MEPs decided to join the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group led by the pro-Russian Alternative for Germany (AfD). Stanisław Tyszka, one of the MEPs who joined the group, admitted the differences but also listed commonalities: ‘opposing the EU’s crazy climate policy, the immigration policy that threatens the stability of our countries and Europe, and attempts to build a European superstate’ (Tyszka, 2024). Interestingly, all three politicians come from Sławomir Mentzen’s New Hope, one of the groups that form part of the Confederation alliance. Two other MEPs from the National Movement (Ruch Narodowy) refused to join the group and started negotiations with PfE.

(*) Artur Lipiński is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and Journalism, at Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland. He has participated in several international and Polish research projects and networks related to the representation of migrants in discourse (MEDIVA) and populist political communication (COST Action). From 2019 to 2022, he was a leader of the Polish team within DEMOS ‘Democratic Efficacy and the Varieties of Populism in Europe’, a collaborative H2020 Research & Innovation project. Currently, he is the leader of the Polish team within the Horizon Europe project MORES ‘Moral emotions. How they unite, how they divide.’ His research interests are focused on political communication and Polish right-wing politics. He has published on the uses of the historical past in political discourse in Poland and populist and right-wing political communication in Problems of Post-Communism, American Behavioral Scientist and the Journal of Contemporary European Studies.

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Members and supporters of nationalist organizations participate in Lukovmarch procession - a march in commemoration of general Hristo Lukov in Sofia, Bulgaria on February 16, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

Populism and Polycrisis in Bulgaria on the Eve of the 2024 European Parliament Elections

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Please cite as: 
Zankina, Emilia. (2024). “Populism and Polycrisis in Bulgaria on the Eve of the 2024 European Parliament Elections.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0063

 

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Abstract

The 2024 European Parliament election in Bulgaria took place amidst a prolonged political crisis and economic uncertainty. The EP elections, for the first time, coincided with national legislative elections – the sixth parliamentary elections in just three years. This two-in-one vote led to a complete overshadowing of the debate on Europe by domestic issues and concerns over the composition of the next national parliament and the likelihood of forming a stable government. The centre-populist GERB convincingly won the elections, although the populist radical right increased its representation by one MEP. Like many European countries, Bulgaria has had to contend with the rise of populism and nationalism, in addition to its continued struggle against corruption and, as a result of the war in Ukraine, with a population divided in attitudes towards Russia. This polycrisis has led to continued political fragmentation and polarization with little prospect of stable government and a growing disillusionment among voters.

Keywords: European Parliament elections; populism; polycrisis; Bulgaria; new parties

 

By Emilia Zankina* (Temple University, Rome, Italy)

Introduction

The 2024 European Parliament election in Bulgaria took place amidst a prolonged political crisis and economic uncertainty. The EP elections, for the first time, coincided with national legislative elections – the sixth parliamentary elections in just three years. This two-in-one vote led to a complete overshadowing of the debate on Europe by domestic issues and concerns over the composition of the next national parliament and the likelihood of forming a stable government. The centrist populist GERB convincingly won the elections, although the populist radical right (PRR) increased its representation by one MEP. Like many European countries, Bulgaria has had to contend with the rise of populism and nationalism, in addition to its continued struggle against corruption and, as a result of the war in Ukraine, with a population divided in attitudes towards Russia. This polycrisis has led to continued political fragmentation and polarization with little prospect of stable government and a growing disillusionment among voters.

Anatomy of a polycrisis: Between economic uncertainty and political turmoil

The past four years in Bulgaria have been characterized by political instability, turmoil and never-ending electoral campaigning. A string of caretaker governments, six parliamentary elections (with a seventh one scheduled for October 2024), a presidential election and a local election have led to politicizing every issue in society for electoral gain. During this period, a number of new parties have appeared with varied success dramatically changing the configuration of political actors and patterns of voter support, while voter turnout has steadily decreased (Figure 1). This political uncertainty is unfolding in the context of multiple pressing issues: 1) economic downturn and slow recovery from the pandemic, coupled with lack of political consensus on economic priorities; 2) geostrategic uncertainty as a result of the war in Ukraine and the escalating conflict in the Middle East with the war in Israel, Gaza, and now also in Lebanon; 3) deepened divisions among political actors and voters along the long-standing pro-Russian/anti-Russian divide; 4) rising nationalist sentiments stirred by deteriorating relations with Russia and North Macedonia (Zankina 2024b). 

With the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, Bulgaria plunged into a period of economic uncertainty and political turmoil. Four years later, Bulgaria still struggles with economic recovery and is unable to effectively absorb and utilize funds from the European Recovery and Resilience Facility. Prolonged anti-government protests that started in July 2020 unleashed a never-ending cycle of parliamentary elections and a mushrooming of new political formations. 

Between April 2021 and June 2024, Bulgaria held six parliamentary elections and had two short-lived regular governments. Interim governments appointed by President Radev became the norm while a series of parliaments failed to agree on a governing formula. Thus, early elections were held in July 2021, November 2021, October 2022, April 2023 and June 2024. The leading parties have changed significantly compared with just a few years ago. Although Citizens for European Development (GERB), which has dominated domestic politics since 2007 and has led three governments, still attracted the most votes in the elections of October 2022, April 2023 and June 2024, it lost over half a million votes (or more than half of the voter support it had in 2017). The centre-left Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the oldest political party in the country and the heir to the former communist party, saw its vote share drop to 7% in June 2024 compared to 28% in 2017. 

In the meantime, new parties emerged as dominant political forces—namely Prodalzhavame Promyanata (PP—We Continue the Change), a new anti-corruption and pro-European party, and Vazrazhdane (Revival), a starkly nationalist and pro-Russian party. More new parties have come and gone, with some managing to register momentary success, such as the populist party headed by prominent folk-pop singer and television showman Slavi Trifonov, Ima Takav Narod (ITN—There Is Such a People), which won the July 2021 early elections with 24% of the vote, but failed to form a government and has since oscillated around the parliamentary threshold. Others, such as, Izpravi se! Mutri vŭn! (Stand Up! Mafia, Get Out!) led by a former ombudswoman, Maya Manolova, managed to pass the threshold in April and July of 2021 but then disappeared altogether. The democratic centre-right witnessed yet another reconfiguration in a new collation called Demokratichna Balgariya (Democratic Bulgaria, DB), bringing together Demokrati za Silna Balgariya (Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria, DSB) and Da Bulgariya (Yes, Bulgaria) and a new nationalist formation called Velichie (Glory) surprised political analysts with 4.65% at the national elections in June 2024. 

Within this period, Bulgaria had two short-lived regular governments. A new coalition government was formed in December after the November 2021 elections, under the premiership of Kiril Petkov, uniting the winner of the election PP (25.67%) with three coalition partners—BSP, ITN and the DB alliance. The government survived until June 2022, when it was removed by a parliamentary vote of no confidence initiated by GERB after ITN ended its support for the government and withdrew its members from ministerial posts. The Petkov government had the difficult task of dealing with the war in Ukraine, which erupted in February 2022 and divided public opinion in Bulgaria. With a large pro-Russian population, the war enabled parties like Vazrazhdane to thrive while constraining the government to maintain a delicate balance between the country’s commitment to its Euro-Atlantic partners and pressure from pro-Russian groups. Although Bulgaria enforced EU sanctions on Russia, phased out Russian oil deliveries, and provided military support for Ukraine, there has been continuous opposition from both inside and outside the National Assembly to these actions (Zankina, 2023).

The second regular government was formed following the April 2023 elections. In these elections, GERB placed first, with 26.5% of the votes and 69 seats, closely followed by an alliance between PP and DB, which obtained 24.6% of the votes and 64 seats. GERB sought to form a coalition government with PP–DB. After several rounds of difficult negotiations and a second mandate granted by President Radev, the two alliances agreed on a technocratic government with a rotating prime minister. Despite the strong antagonism and competition between the two leading blocs in parliament, GERB and PP–DB recognized as a greater threat the continued rise in electoral support for Vazrazhdane and the growth in pro-Russian sentiments in the country. Hence, a government headed by Nikolai Denkov of PP–DB was approved by the National Assembly. Denkov was to be replaced by the Deputy Prime Minister and minister of foreign affairs and former European Commissioner, Mariya Gabriel of GERB, after a period of nine months. As expected, the rotation did not take place, and the coalition partners slid into political bickering and mutual accusations. The government collapsed in March 2023, and two-in-one elections (European parliament plus early parliamentary elections) were scheduled for June 2024. 

Populism in Bulgaria

Populism has been a permanent feature of Bulgarian political life since the early 2000s, expressing itself both in the centre and the radical right. While there have not been left populist parties in Bulgaria, both centre and radical-right populists have been noted for advocating various left and extreme left policies, from significant increases in pensions to nationalization of entire industrial sectors. In addition to the PRR, which has had a permanent presence in the national parliament since 2005, Bulgaria is also notable for having populists in government who have held power almost uninterruptedly between 2009–2021 and, most recently, in 2023–2024. 

Centre populism

Centrist populists have had much greater success than radical-right populists in Bulgaria, all of them having led or participated in governing coalitions. This participation makes the Bulgarian case rather unique. Unlike radical-right populists who represent varying combinations of authoritarianism, nativism and nationalism, centrist populists in Bulgaria have been decidedly pro-European. The main mobilizing factor in their success has been a mix of charismatic leadership and anti-corruption appeals. 

Populism made its grand entrance on the Bulgarian political scene in 2001 when the former Bulgarian king, Simeon Sakskoburggotski (King Simeon II from 1943–1946), who had been in exile for nearly six decades, made a dramatic reappearance. Heading the National Movement Simeon the Second (NDSV), the former king convincingly won the 2001 parliamentary elections and became prime minister. A typical personalist and populist party, NDSV had loose structures based on circles of associates, proclaiming itself to be not a party but a “coalition of like-minded individuals”. Capitalizing on disillusionment with the transition and established elites, NDSV relied on a vague platform and ambitious promises such as “fixing the country in 800 days” (Gurov and Zankina, 2013). The NDSV government firmly pushed the country towards the Euro-Atlantic alliance and oversaw Bulgaria’s entrance into NATO. Despite such success, in the subsequent 2005 elections, NDSV lost its leading position, taking part instead in a BSP-led coalition government. By 2009, NDSV had all but disappeared from the political scene, only to be replaced by another personalist and centrist populist party – GERB. The short-lived success of NDSV marked the birth of populism in post-communist Bulgarian politics and legitimized the personalist party model, which dominates politics to the present day.

GERB was formed in late 2006 by Boyko Borisov, while he was mayor of Sofia. Shortly after its establishment, GERB gained the endorsement of the European People’s Party (EPP) at the first European Parliament elections in Bulgaria after the country joined the EU in 2007 and secured 5 of the 18 Parliament seats allocated to Bulgaria. By the time of the July 2009 Bulgarian legislative elections, GERB had established itself as a major political force and received over 40% of the votes. Boyko Borissov became the dominant figure in Bulgarian politics, serving as prime minister three times (Spirova and Sharenkova-Toshkova, 2021).

Replicating Sakskoburggotski’s formula, GERB at first lacked an established party structure and ideological coherence. GERB’s program consisted of elusive and symbolic issues, such as ‘corruption’ and ‘crime’, which appealed to a discontented electorate, while its party officials represented a hastily and often apparently randomly selected group of experts and people from Borisov’s personal circle. In the course of its long and successful rule, GERB developed dense structures throughout the country, penetrating the national, regional and local governments and establishing a loyal electoral base. These structures have been crucial in securing GERB’s almost uninterrupted hold on power for over a decade and the party’s continued success in every parliamentary and European election since 2007.

GERB’s rule ultimately became associated with the corrupt status quo, provoking prolonged anti-government protests on several occasions. The 2020–2021 anti-government protests posed the greatest challenge to GERB’s hold on power, with demands that Borissov and the prosecutor-general, Ivan Geshev, resign, calls that were backed by President Radev. The protests gave birth to a string of new political formations, the most notable of which was ITN.

Electorally, the most significant party to emerge and achieve success from the anti-government protests was founded and led by the prominent singer and long-standing television showman Slavi Trifonov: Ima Takav Narod (There Is Such a People, ITN). Although his party was new, Trifonov was not new to politics; most notably, he had been a driving force behind the 2016 referendum on reform of the electoral system. Trifonov used his media appearances, including his own TV station and virtual concerts, to spread his anti-corruption and anti-status quo message to voters at home and abroad alike, striking a chord of homeland undertones (Haughton, Neudorfer and Zankina, 2024). In the July 2021 elections, ITN garnered 24.1% of the votes and 65 seats and succeeded in narrowly defeating GERB, which only managed to attract 23.5% and 63 seats, marking the first time since 2007 that GERB or a GERB-led coalition had not been placed first in elections. ITN failed to form a government and was eclipsed by yet another populist party from the centre, Prodalzhavame Promyanata (We Continue the Change, PP). Formed by entrepreneurs and Harvard graduates Kiril Petkov and Assen Vassilev, PP reaped the popularity its leaders had gained as ministers in the outgoing caretaker government. PP placed first in the November 2021 legislative elections with 25.7% of the vote and 67 seats. Running on an anti-corruption platform and declaring to “promote left politics with right instruments”, PP managed to undercut other new protest parties, including ITN. A new coalition government was formed, headed by Kiril Petkov, with three coalition partners – BSP, ITN and DB. Since its appearance in the fall of 2021, PP has already lost more than half of its electoral support, although its coalition with DB has managed to remain among the top three political formations in the national parliament. Most importantly, the PP–DB alliance managed to return to government in coalition with GERB in 2023 on a pro-European and reform-oriented platform. Coalescing with GERB proved disastrous for the PP–DB coalition, which lost over half of its support in the concurrent national and EP elections of June 2024.

Radical-Right Populism

In 2005, Bulgaria witnessed the firm establishment in politics of the populist radical right (PRR), which since then has been represented in parliament as well as in the European Parliament. Radical-right populism in Bulgaria emerged relatively late compared to other East European countries. Since 2005, various configurations of nationalist populist radical-right parties have been represented in parliament and, between 2017–2021, even in government. Those include Ataka, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (VMRO), the National Front for Salvation of Bulgaria (NFSB), and, more recently, Revival (Vazrazhdane) and Greatness (Velichie). In the decade and a half before 2021 and the cycle of early parliamentary elections, around one in ten voters cast their ballots for nationalist parties (Haughton, Neudorfer and Zankina, 2024). 

Most recently, the PRR vote has significantly increased, reaching over 18% in the June 2024 elections, a function also of the historically low voter turnout (Figure 1). The PRR vote has been extremely volatile and shifting between various PRR parties and new protest parties. In the July 2021 election, for instance, IMRO–Bulgarian National Movement, the Volya Movement and NFSB came together under the umbrella of Bulgarian Patriots. But during the November 2021 election, all three of those parties and Ataka ran separately, yielding no seats for any of them, at the expense of Vazrazhdane, which increased its support tenfold from March 2017 to April 2023 (ibid., 2024).

PRR parties rely on the usual repertoire of dividing issues. Bulgaria’s sizeable ethnic Turkish and Roma minorities, as well as a string of migration crises in Europe, have provided fertile ground for nationalist rhetoric and mobilization. Most of those actors are clearly anti-elite, anti-West, and even antidemocracy (Zankina, 2023). PRR parties have cashed in on the overall discontent with politics and political elites, as well as on particular issues such as ethnic minorities, LGBTG+ rights, social provisions and welfare chauvinism, as well as criticism of NATO and EU memberships. With 58% of the population reporting positive attitudes towards Russia and Putin before 2022, the war in Ukraine has provided a fertile ground for PRR parties who have been pronouncedly pro-Russian (Zankina, 2023). Vazrazhdane has been particularly successful in benefiting from the polycrisis, combining anti-vax, anti-NATO and anti-EU rhetoric. 

The war in Ukraine provided an unprecedented opportunity for Vazrazhdane’s leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, to broadcast his pro-Russian views and stage eccentric activities, attracting ever more votes with each subsequent early election (Zankina, 2024a). In the combined June 2024 elections for the national parliament and the European Parliament, Vazrazhdane scored close to 14%, becoming the third largest party in the Bulgarian parliament with 38 MPs, coming in fourth in the European Parliament elections and sending 3 MEPs to Brussels. While most parties have adopted a cordon sanitaire towards Vazrazhdane, the party has become a key factor in Bulgarian politics and an actor to reckon with. Just like Vazrazhdane managed to steal the votes from early PRR formations, Velichie has managed to grab enough votes to enter parliament. Its party group dissolved only a couple of weeks after entering parliament, and the party is unlikely to pass the threshold in the October 2024 election. Velichie’s success illustrates what we observe at the European level – that the radical right has a permanent and growing presence, yet it is highly divided.

The 2024 European Parliament elections

Centrist and radical-right populists have been represented at the European Parliament since the first EP elections in Bulgaria in 2007 (See table 2). GERB is considered an important partner for the EPP, sending five to six MEPs in each parliament. Populist radical-right parties, in turn, have been represented among the Non-attached (NA), the ECR and now also the ESN. 

The 2024 EP elections are the first EP elections in Bulgaria to coincide with national legislative elections. Analysts expected a higher voter turnout due to the mobilizing effect of national elections. While voter activity in 2024 was about 1% higher than in 2019 (33.78% and 32.64%, respectively), the voter turnout for the national elections dropped to 34.41% from 40.69% in April 2023. This record-low voter turnout due to the multiple early parliamentary elections in the past three years did not have the expected mobilizing effect. Of those who did not vote, 40% indicated a lack of trust in politics as their reason to abstain – almost double the EU average (Eurobarometer, 2024). Yet, Bulgaria was not the one with the lowest voter turnout, as Lithuania and Croatia registered the lowest figures at 28.97% and 21.35%, respectively. 

More importantly, the two-in-one elections significantly shifted the debate towards domestic issues. Opinion polls indicated corruption (59%), low income (57%), and healthcare (45%) to be the top three issues of voter concern (Alpha Research 2024a), while poverty and equality were singled out as the top priorities the EU should focus on (Trend 2024). Rising prices and increased cost of living (56%) along with the economic situation (53%) were the main motivators for Bulgarian voters – much more so than the EU average of 42% and 41%, respectively (Eurobarometer 2024). 

In the context of six national legislative elections and a string of caretaker governments, the European debate was completely overshadowed by preoccupations over the composition of the future national parliament and the likelihood of forming a stable government. Even pressing topics such as expanding Schengen to land borders and joining the Eurozone remained in the background. The former coalition partners GERB and PP–DB, the two most pronouncedly pro-European parties in the country, were caught in political bickering and mutual accusations, failing to effectively articulate their priorities for the next European Parliament. In the meantime, Vazrazhdane ran an aggressive anti-EU campaign with the slogan “Out of the EU and NATO”. Less Eurosceptic parties like ITN advocated for national sovereignty and energy security, opposing the European Green Deal and the closing of coal electric plants. The Green Deal is strongly criticized by Vazrazhdane as well. The war in Ukraine prominently featured in the campaign, dividing political parties over support for Ukraine (GERB, PP–DB, and DPS) vs. maintaining neutrality and spending the money on other priorities (BSP, Vazrazhdane and ITN). The division perfectly aligns with the anti-Russian and pro-Russian attitudes of the respective parties and their supporters – one of the key dividing issues in Bulgarian society for the past two centuries. 

Although there was little debate about Europe, Bulgarian voters remain starkly pro-European, with over 60% approving EU membership and only 16% having negative attitudes (Figure 2), while 60% are optimistic about the future of Europe (Eurobarometer, 2024). A study by Trend further indicates that 41% of respondents think that Bulgaria has benefitted from EU membership, with free travel and EU funds being singled out as the top benefits (Trend, 2024). The same study found that 45% of respondents feel safer in the current geostrategic situation thanks to EU membership, and 41% think membership also contributes to greater economic and social stability. 

GERB convincingly won the 2024 European Parliament elections with 23.55% of the votes and five seats. Second came Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi (Movement for Rights and Freedoms, DPS) with 14.66% of the votes and three seats, closely followed by the PP–DB alliance, with 14.45% and the same number of seats, and Vazrazhdane (Revival) with 13.98% and also three seats. While pro-EU parties received the majority of the votes in the election, the results of Vazrazhdane and the increase of radical-right MEPs from 2 to 3 are a cause for great concern amidst an overall rise of the populist radical right in the European Parliament. 

Similarly, GERB won the national elections with 24.7% of the votes, which made little difference in terms of forming a government. Parties in the fragmented and polarized parliament failed to agree on a governing formula, and subsequently, a seventh legislative election is scheduled for 27 October 2024. Early forecasts predict seven political formations in the subsequent parliament with little prospect for a governing coalition. In fact, 53% of voters do not believe that the new parliament will be able to produce a regular government (Alpha Research 2024b). Who benefits from yet another round of early elections, although, is Vazrazhdane who will have more opportunities to broadcast their pro-Russian, anti-EU and anti-NATO rhetoric and attract more disillusioned voters. Bulgaria’s future remains uncertain – politically, economically and geostrategically.

 

(*) Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in political science, Dean of Temple University Rome Campus and Vice Provost of Global Engagement at Temple University. Her research focuses on populism and political parties, politicization and public administration reform, gender representation and East European politics.

 

References

Alpha Research. (2024a). Public Opinion at the Start of the Electoral Campaign for National and European Parliament [Обществени нагласи на старта на предизборната кампания за Национален и Европейски парламент]. May 2024. https://alpharesearch.bg/post/1021-obshtestveni-naglasi-na-starta-na-predizbornata-kampania-za-nacionalen-i-evropeiski-parlament.html 

Alpha Research. (2024a). At the start of the campaign: seven political forces in the future parliament [На старта на кампанията: седем политически сили в бъдещия парламент]. September 2024. https://alpharesearch.bg/post/1025-na-starta-na-kampaniata-sedem-politicheski-sili-v-budeshtia-parlament.html 

Eurobarometer. (2024). Special Eurobarometer 101.5: Country Results: Bulgaria. European Parliament, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/api/deliverable/download/
file?deliverableId=94206

Gurov, Boris and Emilia Zankina. (2013). “Populism and the Construction of Political Charisma: Post-transition Politics in Bulgaria”. Problems of Post-Communism, 60(1), pp. 3–17.

Haughton, Tim, Natascha Neudorfer and Emilia Zankina. (2024). “There Are Such People: The Role of Corruption in the 2021 Parliamentary Elections in Bulgaria”. East European Politics, 40(3), pp. 521–546.

Spirova, Maria and Radostina Sharenkova-Toshkova. (2021). “Juggling Friends and Foes: Prime Minister Borissov’s Surprise Survival in Bulgaria”. East European Politics 37 (3): 432–447. https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2021.1883589. 

Trend. (2024). Attitudes towards EU policies at the forenight of EP elections [Нагласи на българите спрямо политиките на ЕС в навечерието на изборите за Европейски парламент]. April 2024. https://rctrend.bg/project/attitudes 

Zankina, Emilia. (2023). “Pro-Russia or anti-Russia: political dilemmas and dynamics in Bulgaria in the context of the war in Ukraine”. In Ivaldi and Zankina (eds.), The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe. European Center for Populisms Studies. Brussels, pp. 48–63. 

Zankina, Emilia. (2024a). “The Consequences of the War in Ukraine in Bulgaria: Political, Economic, and Cultural Divides”. In Mörner, Ninna (ed.), A World Order in Transformation? A Comparative Study of Consequences of the War and Reactions to These Changes in the Region. CBEES State of the Region Report 2024, pp. 82–90. https://sh.divaportal.org/smash/record.jsf?pid=diva2%3A1846696&dswid=1173 

Zankina, Emilia. (2024b). “Bulgaria: History”. In Europa Publications (ed.) Central and South-Eastern Europe 2025 (25th Edition), Routledge, pp. 115–120.

 

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People walk in the center of Luxembourg City on June 19, 2024. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Right-wing Populism in Luxembourg During the 2024 EP Election

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Please cite as: 
Carls, Paul. (2024). “Right-wing Populism in Luxembourg During the 2024 EP Election.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0078

 

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Abstract

Right-wing populism in Luxembourg is largely confined to the Alternative Democratic Reform Party (Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei, ADR). The name is, however, a bit of a misnomer. While ideologically, the ADR maintains national–conservative positions consistent with other European right-wing populist parties, its views are not as extreme. The party retains relatively constant support, consistently gaining around 10% of the vote in national elections; in the 2023 election for the Chamber of Deputies, it gained 9.3%, while in the 2019 European Parliament election, the party gained 10%, just short of enough to obtain a seat. Given the rise in support for right-wing populist parties in other European countries (e.g., the AfD in Germany or the National Rally in France), the ADR was optimistic about its chances of gaining its first-ever seat in the European Parliament, which would require about 12% of the vote total. This contribution will investigate the results of the European Parliament election in Luxembourg, focusing on the ADR. It will discuss any ideological shifts in the party as well as its positioning on a host of issues where one finds a prominent voice for right-wing populist parties in Europe, including NATO, the war in Ukraine, migration, COVID-19 or the functioning of the European Union. The entry will also address the results of the election to determine how strong support for right-wing populism in Luxembourg is. Other relevant aspects of the election (e.g., campaign events, media coverage) will be discussed if they featured prominently in the campaign.

Keywords: ADR; Luxembourgish; European integration; transnational migration; Luxembourg Compromise

By Paul Carls (Independent Researcher, PhD Université de Montréal)

Background

Luxembourg is not a country known for right-wing populism. With a population of 672,000, roughly half of whom hold foreign nationality (STATEC, 2020), it is a small and internationally integrated country that benefits greatly from the trends of globalization that many right-wing populists denounce; the country is highly integrated politically in the European Union, its economy is heavily dependent on international financial and economic integration, and its economy similarly is heavily dependent on an international and transnational worker base, many of whom travel daily to Luxembourg from neighbouring countries (Carls, 2023; de Jonge, 2021; Fetzer, 2011). Luxembourg does, nevertheless, have a party that maintains a right-wing populist profile and that has had electoral success, the Alternative Democratic Reform Party (Alternativ Demokratesch Reformspartei, ADR). The party formed in 1987 as the Aktiounskomitee 5/6 Pensioun fir jiddfereen (Action Committee 5/6ths–Pensions for Everyone) to campaign on the single issue of pension reform and in 1992, changed its name to Aktiounskomitee fir Demokratie a Rentegerechtegkeet (Action Committee for Democracy and Pension Justice). In 1999 the party received its greatest success to date in the national general election with 11.3% of the vote, although pension reforms in 1998 and 2002 made the single issue of pension reform less pressing (Schulze, 2006). The ADR then evolved into a catch-all party, adopting its current name in 2006.

In 2015 it gained prominence in the campaign surrounding a referendum to amend the constitution to allow, among other things, non-Luxembourgish residents to vote in general elections for the Chamber of Deputies, Luxembourg’s national legislative body. The election result showed that between 70% and 80% of the population rejected the proposed constitutional modifications. The ADR was notably the only elected party to oppose the proposed reforms (Carls, 2023). In the 2019 European Parliament (EP) election, the party gained 10%, just short of enough to obtain a seat, while in the most recent general election in 2023, the party received 9.27% of the vote and gained 5 seats in the 60-seat Chamber of Deputies.

Ideologically the party maintains a national–conservative profile with flavours of classical liberalism that seeks a broad appeal, including to the working class. In the 2023 general election, for example, the party criticized ‘gender ideology’ or the push for transgender recognition but also supported legalizing prostitution. The party generally maintains a distrust of big government, whether economically or in terms of individual freedom, consumer rights or bodily autonomy, as was the case during the COVID-19 pandemic (ADR, 2023), but also supports government protection of special working privileges for Luxembourgers, which sees well-paid government jobs going only to those with a high proficiency of Luxembourgish, a position with broad appeal among the electorate (Carls, 2023).

There is no consensus as to whether the ADR is a right-wing populist party, with some saying yes (Blau, 2005; Carls, 2023; Zulianello, 2020) (although these authors generally note that the variety of populism exhibited by the ADR is mild or atypical in comparison with other European cases) and some saying no (Camus, 2017; Poirier, 2012). Such confusion stems from the fact that, due to Luxembourg’s specific socioeconomic situation, a right-wing populist party in the style of the National Rally or the Freedom Party of Austria is likely electorally impossible, leading the ADR to adopt comparatively softer stances on important issues. The ADR is by no means in favour of an exit from the EU, for example, and while it is in many respects critical of both the EU and multiculturalism, such critiques are often modulated by words of praise for the positive benefits the EU and immigration have brought to Luxembourg (Carls, 2023; de Jonge, 2021).

Nevertheless, it shares many of the same positions and preoccupations as other right-wing populist parties in Europe (including migration, Covid policies, free speech, retaining national sovereignty within an EU institutional framework, etc.) and is a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group in the EP, which includes the well-known Law and Justice Party (PiS) from Poland, the Brothers of Italy (led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni), and the Sweden Democrats (Carls, 2023; Lamour & Carls 2022). These facts, coupled with the lack of a suitable alternative, suggest that any exploration of right-wing populism in Luxembourg must focus on the ADR.

Heading into the 2024 EP election, the ADR’s lead candidate was Fernand Kartheiser, a former military officer and diplomat and a member of the Luxembourgish Chamber of Deputies for the ADR since 2009. The party prioritized several issues: the functioning of EU institutions, maintaining the 1966 Luxembourg Compromise or the veto power of countries regarding decisions deemed of vital national interest, migration policies, the preservation of the combustion engine or the opposition to green politics more generally, and concerning the war in Ukraine, a politics of peace in Europe.

ADR positioning during the election: The supply side

Following a minimalist definition according to which populism is ‘an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde, 2017: 29), the ADR’s framing of issues during the 2024 election was broadly populist. Right-wing populism contains a further nationalist dimension (de Cleen, 2017; Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2007; 2017; Taguieff, 2015), also present in the ADR’s electoral framing. This additional element leads to a set of exclusions on the vertical axis (people–elite) and the horizontal axis (people–outsiders) that is characteristic of right-wing populist discourse and was visible in the ADR’s advocacy for a ‘Europe of sovereign nations’ (ADR, 2024a: 1).

Much of the ADR’s policy positions and profile as a right-wing populist party in the EP election can be summed up in a passage from their EU electoral program: “The ADR must note with regret that the EU has also fundamentally changed politically in recent years. Obvious violations of the rule of law in the Covid Crisis, the war in Ukraine with sanctions against Russia that drive up energy prices and destroy European competitiveness, the high inflation that is also linked to the monetary policy of the ECB, a militant and harmful green policy in the field of energy and industry, a still massive and unbridled illegal immigration in Europe, accusations of corruption, including against the President of the European Commission, a diffuse and contradictory accession policy, limitations of freedom of expression and institutional threats not only from the EU institutions but also from increased German and French hegemonic efforts are only a few of the many challenges we face. These and many other problems have progressively made it more and more difficult for the European Union to present a facade of unity to the outside world. The European institutions have not caught up with how far they have already moved away from the people” (ADR, 2024a: 17).

This passage encapsulates the vertical and horizontal exclusions typified by right-wing populism and remains consistent with the ADR’s positions in past years. Luxembourgers and other European nations are represented by the idea of the ‘people’. They are opposed vertically by a left-wing dominated and increasingly autocratic EU and horizontally by ‘unbridled illegal immigration’ from the third world.

The vertical exclusions pitting the ‘people’ against elites was the most salient aspect of the campaign positioning and was visible on the following issues, which the ADR emphasized during its campaign. The first is federalism. The ADR fundamentally opposed efforts at EU federalism or a strongly centralized federal EU state that takes competencies away from the member states. The party notably criticized ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ who take power away from ‘the people’ in their nation-states (ADR, 2024a: 1). In line with its opposition to a federal state and support for national sovereignty, the ADR strongly supported the unanimity principle or the veto power of countries in the European Council regarding decisions deemed of vital national interest. Of note is the importance of this principle as it concerns Luxembourg’s financial and taxation systems.

The ADR also condemned Brussels’ attempts to isolate member countries with which it has important conflicts. Such conflicts surround refugee and migration policies, family policies and changes in national legal procedures. They have often involved members of the Visegrad Group, most notably Poland and Hungary. The ADR framed such conflicts as a result of a clash of wills – namely, that of ‘the people’, which democratically elects politicians to enact specific policies, and that of the ‘unelected’ EU (ADR, 2024a: 7).

The ADR strongly supported the principle of free speech and saw it under threat from left-wing activists and EU regulation. It spoke specifically of the Digital Services Act, an EU regulation designed to promote transparency of online services. While such efforts aimed to fight disinformation and defend democracy, the ADR argued that such measures actually demonstrated that the EU was increasingly less tolerant of voters who have the ‘wrong’ opinions or vote for the ‘wrong’ politicians (ADR, 2024a: 7).

The ADR also equated the EU with ‘experts’ who push a radical green–left ideology onto member states in an undemocratic way. The ADR saw such policies as a way to grant ever-greater competencies to the EU, arguing that decisions around environmental regulation should be left to national states (ADR, 2024a: 9). EU policies in this area, the party argued, have led to economic hardship and undermined innovation. The party made a particular point of the EU’s decision to ban the sale of internal combustion engines by 2035, a decision it called ‘extremist’ (ADR, 2024a: 21).

While the ADR strongly condemned the Russian attack on Ukraine (ADR, 2022), the party took a position of peace concerning the war in Ukraine. Recognizing the complexity of the situation and the relevance of Ukraine geopolitically, the party called on the EU not to intensify a conflict that would only serve to destroy Ukraine. It also criticized Brussels for not abiding by the Minsk Accords and reproached the EU for utilizing the conflict to push a federalist agenda, in this case concerning European defence (ADR, 2024a: 4). The party was also somewhat sceptical of Ukraine’s ability to join the EU, noting that it fulfilled none of the Copenhagen criteria and should not be accepted without an exhaustive accession process (ADR, 2024a: 36).

The ADR was critical of continued, uncontrolled migration to Europe from largely third-world or war-torn countries. In this respect, the EU has been leading a failed migration policy since 2015, which has led to a significant loss of trust in the EU and substantial illegal immigration, including economic migrants masquerading as refugees. The ADR called for a humane policy that granted asylum but reduced migratory flows and prevented illegal immigration.

Another point that the ADR made during the campaign was to advocate for the recognition of Luxembourgish as an official EU language. Such recognition was important as it would recognize Luxembourg as a unique country with its own history and culture. As such, the ADR appealed to Luxembourgish national pride.

Despite their criticisms of the EU, the ADR nuanced its positions on many points. The ADR made it clear that it supported the EU. It noted the great advances the EU had given to Europe in terms of peace and prosperity in post-war Europe (ADR, 2024a: 3). The party was thus concerned that so many people had lost their trust in the project and stated that their goal was ‘to stabilize Europe in these times and rebuild it at the same time so that the idea of a European Union remains attractive for the next generations in as many countries as possible’ (ADR, 2024a: 2). On these points, the ADR made a clear distinction between itself and other right-wing populist parties. As Alexandra Schoos, president of the ADR at the time of the EU election, stated in an interview: “The intention of the ADR is certainly not to destroy the European project from within. As Luxembourg, we need Europe and a European Union. The ADR is therefore certainly not on the same line as defended by certain parties which are opposed to the EU” (Schoos, 2024).

The ADR similarly struck a positive tone on the issue of migration (or at least legal migration within EU borders, of which there is a great deal in Luxembourg): ‘The ADR is expressly of the opinion that the legal migration of persons in the internal market can bring many advantages and should continue to be encouraged’ (ADR, 2024a, pp. 3–4). These nuances were also visible in the ADR’s campaign posters, which also served as social media posts. The image in Figure 1 from the party’s Facebook page states, ‘Don’t ban the combustion engine’ Below the image is the ADR’s EU campaign slogan: Fir e staarkt Lëtzebuerg an Europa (‘For a strong Luxembourg in Europe’). This slogan clearly indicated that the ADR saw Luxembourg’s destiny as closely tied to that of the EU.

These nuanced positions are consistent with the brand of right-wing populism the ADR embodies, which offers moderate critiques of the EU, all while distancing itself from the more radical positions taken by other European right-wing populist parties (Carls, 2023).

The ADR performed its message in a variety of ways. Party leaders such as Fernand Kartheiser, Fred Keup, and Alexandra Schoos made media appearances for interviews or debates with other candidates in national print newspapers, on national radio stations such as Radio Television Luxembourg (RTL) or Radio 100.7, and on TV, for example, on RTL’s Kloertext or Table Ronde programs. The party was also active on social media, posting content on Facebook, X, Instagram and TikTok. ADR candidates and party representatives were also present at stands at local street markets and events throughout the country in the weeks and months leading up to the election.

Election results: The demand side

The election results can be found in Figure 2. The Christian Social People’s Party (CSV), a member of the European People’s Party (EPP) group, came in first with 22.91% of the vote and obtained two EP seats. The ADR tied with the Greens at 11.76%, an improvement of 1.72 percentage points over their showing in 2019 and also higher than their performance in the 2023 general election, allowing them to obtain their first-ever EP seat, which was filled by Fernand Kartheiser. All remaining elected parties received one seat in the EP. All the main issues the ADR campaigned on likely contributed to their success, with none standing out. Figure 3 shows the trends in the ADR’s electoral support since its founding and shows that this support has grown only marginally since 1989. While there was talk of a Rechtsruck or strong shift to the right in many European countries, it would be wrong to claim this was the case in Luxembourg. Support for the ADR has remained relatively steady between 8–10% over the decades, and while the 2024 EP election result was the party’s highest showing yet, the party remains a relevant but junior player in Luxembourgish politics. Nevertheless, the result allowed the ADR, for the first time, to be represented at all levels of government in Luxembourg and marked a high point in the party’s history.

The media landscape of Luxembourg is quite distinctive. Print publications receive generous state subsidies to preserve media plurality and many such publications have a direct link to established political parties. The largest and oldest newspaper, the Luxemburger Wort, has connections to the CSV, while the second largest, the Tageblatt, has connections to the Luxembourg Socialist Workers’ Party (LSAP). The country is also very small, leading to a high degree of familiarity between journalists and political actors. As a result, the media landscape generally reflects the moderate views of the country’s political elites (de Jonge, 2021, pp. 159–163). That said, the print mostly reported on the election results in a mostly neutral way, simply noting the results and that it was a historic night for the ADR. Such was the case with the article in the Luxemburger Wort, which also included quotes from many ADR politicians (Javel, 2024). One exception came from the Tageblatt, which noted in their coverage that the ADR was among the ranks of ‘right-wing populists’ (Rechtspopulisten). The article also noted that the ADR would caucus with the ECR, which was led by the ‘post-fascist’ Giorgia Meloni and would likely soon include Hungary’s Fidesz party, whose leader Viktor Orbán was an ‘outspoken friend’ of Vladimir Putin (Kemp, 2024). Apart from such exceptions, print media reporting on the ADR leading up to the election was also mostly neutral.

The situation was similar regarding radio and television leading up to the election, with coverage mostly neutral and the ADR being invited, as with all other parties, to debates, interviews and other events hosted by, for example, RTL, the country’s main radio and television station. Unlike in other countries where there is a Brandmauer (firewall) or cordon sanitaire surrounding right-wing populists, no such impediments to presenting their positions on a general media platform existed for the ADR during the election.

While there exists no exit-poll data with which to analyse the election results, a Eurobarometer report from the winter of 2024 by the European Commission (2024) sheds light on the particularities of Luxembourg that contributed to the success or lack thereof of the ADR. The report looks at Luxembourgers’ views on topics such as the EU and their economic situation, and it shows that compared to the EU average, Luxembourgers were far more satisfied with their economic situation and the EU.

As Figures 4, 5, 6 and 7 demonstrate, those living in Luxembourg felt much better off economically and also had much higher levels of trust in their national government and the EU. These are generally indicators of success for right-wing populist parties and populist parties in general. That Luxembourg had strongly divergent responses compared to the EU 27 indicates the lack of demand for a right-wing populist party that is aggressively anti-EU or anti-immigration. These poll results also show the limited demand for a party like the ADR, which nuanced its criticisms of the EU with praise but also presented itself as an ‘outsider’ to the political establishment.

Discussion and perspectives

An aggressive or radical right-wing populist party seen in other European countries is not electorally viable in Luxembourg, a well-off, highly international and economically interconnected country. As a result, the ADR modulates its discourse to appeal to a population that is largely optimistic about its general economic situation and its place within the EU (see also Carls, 2023). For this reason, it represents a more moderate form of right-wing populism and will likely be among the most moderate and pragmatic members of the ECR group in the EP.

In the EP, the ADR will likely prioritize the core issues it campaigned on: maintaining the right of veto on the European Council, opposition to federalist tendencies in the EU, opposition to the Green New Deal, a politics of peace in the Ukraine war, defending free speech and finding a solution to the migration crisis. In this respect, the ADR will not be much different than most other right-wing populist parties in Europe, especially those within the ECR. What will distinguish the ADR is its advocacy for the Luxembourgish language. Luxembourgish holds a special place in Luxembourgish politics not only as a cultural marker of national identity but also because C1 level (basically native fluency) is a requirement for almost all public sector jobs. These jobs are extremely well paid and ensure many Luxembourgers a good standard of living. Abolishing this requirement would remove Luxembourgers’ special access to this range of jobs (Carls, 2023). Having Luxembourgish recognized as an official European language in the EU would solidify its status in Luxembourg. This issue will likely be a top priority of Fernand Kartheiser.

Ultimately, political parties represent the views of those who support them. In Luxembourg there is little appetite for a right-wing populist party that is aggressively anti-immigration or anti-EU. Quite simply, the country benefits too much from these aspects of European integration. Looking at trends in the EU more widely, Luxembourg seems quite exceptional in this sense. It is therefore difficult to extrapolate any recommendations or generalities from the Luxembourgish case.

 

(*) Paul Carls holds a PhD in political science from the Université de Montréal and completed a post-doctoral research assistantship at the Luxembourg Institute of Socio-Economic Research (LISER). He has published on the topics of multiculturalism and right-wing populism in Germany, Luxembourg and France.

 

References

ADR (2022). Ukrain. https://adr.lu/ukrain/

ADR (2023). ADR-Walprogramm fir d’Chamberwalen, den 8.Oktobe 2023.

ADR (2024a). Fir e staarkt Lëtzebuerg an Europa Walprogramm fir d’Europawalen 2024.

ADR (2024b, 1 June). De Verbrennungsmotor net ofschafen. Facebook https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=874381084714804&set=a.301892138630371

Blau, L. (2005). Histoire de l’extrême-droite au Grand-Duché de Luxembourg au XXe siècle. 2nd edition. Le Phare.

Camus, J. (2017). Extremismusforscher Jean-Yves Camus: ‘Die ADR ist nicht rechtspopulistisch’. Luxembuger Wort. 29 January: https://wort.lu/de/politik/extremismusforscher-jean-yves-camus-die-adr-ist-nichtrechtspopulistisch-588e44c7a5e74263e13a9c53

Carls, P. (2023). Approaching right-wing populism in a context of transnational economic integration: Lessons from Luxembourg. European Politics and Society 24(2): 265–283. https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2021.1993056

De Cleen, B. (2017). Populism and Nationalism. In C. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (pp. 342–362), Oxford University Press

De Jonge, L. (2021). The Success and Failure of Right-wing Populist Parties in the Benelux Countries. Routledge

European Commission (2024) Flash Eurobarometer: Public opinion in the EU region, Luxembourg. European Union.

Fetzer, J. (2011). Luxembourg as an Immigration Success Story: The Grand Duchy in Pan-European Perspective. Lexington Books.

Kemp, G. (2024). ‘Glücklose Gewinner, zufriedene Verlierer’, Tageblatt, 10 June: https://www.tageblatt.lu/headlines/gluecklose-gewinner-zufriedene-verlierer/

Javel, F. (2024). ‘ADR sichert sich zum ersten Mal Sitz im EUParlament’, Luxemburger Wort, 9 June: https://www.wort.lu/politik/adr-sichert-sich-zum-ersten-mal-sitz-im-eu-parlament/13746916.html

Lamour, C. and P. Carls (2022). When COVID-19 circulates in right-wing populist discourse: The contribution of a global crisis to European meta-populism at the cross-border regional scale. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, pre-print: https://doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2022.2051001

Mudde, C. (ed.). (2017b). The Populist Radical Right. Routledge.

Poirier, P. (2012). L’ADR: de la recherche de l’équité à la construction inachevée d’un mouvement conservateur et souverainiste. https://adr.lu/ladr-de-la-recherche-de-lequite-a-la-construction-inachevee-dun-mouvement-conservateur-et-souverainiste/

Rydgren, J. (2007). The Sociology of the Radical Right. Annual Review of Sociology vol. 33: 241–262. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131752

Schoos, A. (2024) Alexandra Schoos: Notre intention n’est pas de détruire le projet européen. Le Quotidien. 30 May. https://lequotidien.lu/a-la-une/elections-europeennes-alexandra-schoos%E2%80%89-notre-intention-nest-pas-de-detruire-le-projet-europeen/

Schulze, I. (2006). Luxembourg: an electoral system with panache. In E. Immergut, K. Anderson, & I. Schulze (eds.), The Handbook of West European Pension Politics (pp. 804–853). Oxford University Press.

STATEC. (2020). Population Structure. https://statistiques.public.lu/stat/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=12853&IF_Language=eng&MainTheme=2&FldrName=1

Taguieff, P. (2015). La revanche du nationalism: Néopopulistes et xenophobes à l’assaut de l’Europe. Presses Universitaires de Frane.

Zulianello, M. (2020). Varieties of Populist Parties and Party Systems in Europe: From State-of-the-Art to the Application of a Novel Classification Scheme to 66 Parties in 33 Countries. Government and Opposition 55: 327–347. https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2019.21

 

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Demonstration by the Flemish far-right party Vlaams Belang in Brussels, Belgium, on May 29, 2023. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Populist Radical Parties in Belgium and the 2024 European Elections

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Please cite as:
van Haute, Emilie. (2024). “Populist Radical Parties in Belgium and the 2024 European Elections.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0062

 

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Abstract

In 2024 elections in Belgium were concurrently held for the European, federal and regional levels. For that reason, the European elections were clearly second-order elections. As the main opposition parties at the federal level, populist radical parties of the right (Vlaams Belang, VB) and the left (the Workers’ Party of Belgium, PTB–PVDA) approached the 2024 elections in a strong position. They were portrayed as clear favourites in the polls and the media. From 2019 to 2024 they managed to set the agenda on their issues: migration and law and order for the VB, socioeconomic issues and civil liberties and rights for the PTB–PVDA. Both parties came out of the elections with more votes and seats. Part of the reason for this success is that their program matched with voters’ priorities. Their populist, anti-elite rhetoric also permeated public opinion. Yet they were perceived as having underperformed electorally. Moreover, because they were not politically indispensable, they were quickly sidelined. At the European level, the VB and the PTB–PVDA will likely continue directly pushing their respective populist, Eurosceptic and radical agendas. They are also likely to have a real indirect contamination effect through mainstream parties and public opinion integrating part of their programmatic positions and priorities.

Keywords: Belgium; radical parties; populism; voting behaviour; European elections

By Emilie van Haute* (Department of Political Science, Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Brussels, Belgium)

Introduction

The 2024 European elections in Belgium appeared distinctly like the ‘mother of all elections’. Voters were called to cast ballots concurrently in three separate elections (European, federal and regional) held on the same day. Additionally, it had been five years since Belgian voters had faced a single election. Consequently, it was also a test of the balance of power between the numerous parties that form the two separate party systems operating in the country.

Belgium has a highly fragmented multiparty system. Since the split of traditional party families along the linguistic divide, Belgium has been characterized by two party systems operating separately (Table 1): Flemish parties compete in Flanders (the north of the country), whereas Francophone parties compete in Wallonia (in the south). Parties only compete together in Brussels. 

Among these parties, two are clear cases of populist radical parties based on the PopuList categorization (https://popu-list.org): the radical-left Workers’ Party (Parti du Travail de Belgique–Partij van de arbeid, PTB–PVDA), the only relevant national party in Belgium (Delwit, 2014; 2022), and the radical-right Flemish Interest (Vlaams Belang, VB), a party that competes only in Flanders and in Brussels (van Haute & Pauwels, 2016). On the French-speaking side, the populist radical-right parties have always had a hard time anchoring themselves structurally in the political landscape (De Jonge, 2021b; Delwit & van Haute, 2021). The present chapter therefore analyses the electoral performance of the PTB–PVDA and the VB at the 2024 EP elections.

Background

After a series of electoral setbacks after 2007 caused by the emergence of an alternative Flemish nationalist vote with the N–VA and internal tensions around the dominance of the party elite from Antwerp (van Haute & Pauwels, 2016), the populist radical-right VB returned to success at the 2019 European, federal and regional elections. The VB won a substantial number of seats: from 3 seats in the House of Representatives at the federal level in 2014 to 18 seats in 2019. More generally, 2019 saw a substantial shift in party preferences towards radical populist parties (Goovaerts et al., 2020) since the PTB–PVDA also won a significant number of seats (from 2 in 2014 to 12 seats in 2019). These results contributed to a fragmented and polarized political landscape, with VB gaining grounds in Flanders and PTB–PVDA winning in Walloon constituencies. These trends also characterized the concurrent European elections (Figures 1 and 2).

The profile of VB and PTB–PVDA voters in 2019 presented similarities. Data from the 2019 Belgian panel survey (Michel et al., 2024) show that both parties attracted a younger, more male voter group with lower levels of education and a protest component, and displaying lower levels of trust and satisfaction with the government, but also higher levels of anger (Gallina et al., 2020; Jacobs et al., 2024). Populist radical parties thus clearly capitalized on voters seeking an alternative. But they also attracted issue-based voting on their core respective issues (Goovaerts et al., 2020; Walgrave et al., 2020).

VB voters position themselves furthest to the right on the left–right axis and PTB–PVDA furthest to the left. For the PTB–PVDA, this positioning reflects the salience of socioeconomic issues for its voters, whereas for the VB, cultural issues are most salient (Pilet et al., 2020). What explains this difference in the success of populist radical parties across the linguistic divide is not so much the differences in attitudes between French- and Dutch-speaking voters. The average position on socioeconomic and migration issues, for instance, are very similar (Walgrave et al., 2019). 

Rather, it is the structure of the party system and the salience of issues that make a difference. The weakness of the radical-right party organizations in French-speaking Belgium is patent (Close & Ognibene, 2021); in contrast to the VB, such parties lack local anchorage, links with civil society organizations and leadership. Partly due to the cordon sanitaire in the French-speaking media (De Jonge, 2021a), radical-right parties are not able to push their issues on top of the political agenda. While migration was the top priority among voters in Flanders in 2019, it only ranked fifth in Wallonia, where socioeconomic issues dominated (Walgrave et al., 2019).

The 2019–2024 legislature was particularly difficult at the federal level. The polarized results of 2019 put centrifugal pressures on parties in the two political sub-systems. Despite the extended period of minority caretaker government after the N–VA withdrew from the federal government in December 2018, the negotiations to form a new government after the 2019 elections quickly stalled. The position of the two main parties on each side of the linguistic border, the N-VA and the PS, proved irreconcilable as they were both pushed by the pressure of their respective radical challengers, the VB and the PTB. In March 2020, the COVID-19 crisis was an accelerator, and the caretaker government was given six months of full power as a minority government. In October 2020, sixteen months after the elections, a full government was finally formed, composed of seven parties: the two liberal parties (OpenVLD and MR), the two socialist parties (Vooruit and PS), the two green parties (Groen and Ecolo), and the Dutch-speaking Christian Democrats (CD&V). The new government had to deal with COVID-19 and its aftermath, as well as Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the consequent influx of refugees, the energy crisis and high inflation. With seven parties around the table, it was very difficult to agree on major reforms.

The challenge made it easy for opposition parties to capitalize on the weakness of the federal government. On the Dutch-speaking side, the main opposition came from the VB, as the N-VA was leading the Flemish regional government, which was also facing difficulties. On the French-speaking side, the main opposition came from the PTB and Les Engagés.

An analysis of the communication of all 13 parties represented in the federal parliament and their leaders on Twitter (now X) between 1 January 2022 and 31 March 2023 (N=16,330 tweets) reveals that populist radical parties were much more active on social media than mainstream parties (Close et al., 2023; see also Delwit & van Haute, 2021).

The content of this communication provides insights into the saliency and ownership of issues. Overall, the public debate in Flanders and French-speaking Belgium revolved around different issues. Flanders saw more focus on migration, law and order issues (crime, justice), and finance, whereas in French-speaking Belgium, the focus was more on energy, civil rights and liberties, and work (Close et al., 2023). Despite the international context, European issues and foreign affairs were not dominant.

This agenda was particularly favourable to the populist radical parties. Close et al. (2023) have shown that the VB positions itself clearly on the most salient issues in Flanders. They come up first in terms of mentions of migration, law and order (including terrorism), but also lifestyle and religion. Interestingly, the party also comes second on EU issues after the Dutch-speaking Liberals (who held the federal prime ministership) and on animal welfare. They come up third in agriculture.

The PTB also position itself also on the most salient issues in Wallonia (Close et al., 2023), especially civil rights and liberties. The difference in discourse between the two branches of the party is striking in that regard. The results also show that the party avoids any mention of migration issues. Conversely, it clearly owns socioeconomic issues. The party ranks first in terms of mentions of employment, work, pensions, finances, and disasters (on the French-speaking side, linked to the floods of 2021). It ranks second on economy and foreign affairs.

Populist radical parties thus approached the 2024 elections in a strong position. They occupied the position of outsiders and alternative vote to an unpopular federal government. They owned the most salient issues in their respective polarized political landscapes. In Flanders, the VB was systematically polling first after autumn 2022 (VRT, 2023), and the PVDA was for the first time also showing anchorage in Flanders. In Wallonia, the PTB was polling third from March 2020, and the gap with the first two parties, the Socialists and the Liberals, was closing in after March 2022.

An electoral victory portrayed as a political defeat

The European elections in Belgium were marked by a change in the electoral rules, allowing 16- and 17-year-olds to vote. After a controversy, voting was also made compulsory for this segment of the electorate. More generally, with no elections held in Belgium since 2019, the 2024 electorate comprised more than a million first-time voters, including 268,000 voters aged 16–17 for the EP elections, which had the potential to weigh on the results.

Radical parties performed extremely well electorally on 9 June (see Figures 1 and 2). At the European level, the VB ranked first in the Dutch-speaking group with 22.9% of the votes, representing an increase of almost 4 percentage points. Given the low number of seats allocated to the Dutch-speaking group (13 out of 22 for Belgium), the party failed to gain an additional seat and therefore tied with N-VA. The progress of the PTB–PVDA was asymmetrical. On the Dutch-speaking side, the party almost doubled its vote share, from 4.9% in 2019 to 8.1% in 2024. It allowed the party to get its first seat in the European Parliament in the Dutch-speaking group. On the French-speaking side, the PTB also confirmed progress. With 15.4% of the votes in the French-speaking group, it gained about 1 percentage point and climbed from the fourth (2019) to the third position. Again, given the low number of seats allocated (8), this symbolic progress did not see the party gain any additional representatives, again taking just one seat in the EP in the French-speaking group.

However, these good electoral performances were overshadowed by what happened at the federal and regional levels. On the Dutch-speaking side, even if the VB progressed and the N-VA lost votes and seats, the latter managed to remain the first party at these levels. The VB underperformed compared to expectations based on the pre-election polling, possibly due to the large number of undecided voters, which makes accurate polling difficult (Pilet et al., 2024). Also, politically, Bart De Wever, leader of the N-VA, clearly closed the door to the VB a couple of days before the elections and encouraged voters to vote for the N-VA, saying that a vote for the VB would be a lost vote. This call for strategic voting seems to have paid off, as N-VA remained the first party at the regional and federal levels but not at the European level, where voters had a lower incentive for strategic voting.

Another element that may have weighed is the performance of De Wever in a new popular TV show, ‘Het conclaaf’ (‘The Conclave’), where he spent a weekend locked away with the VB leader Tom Van Grieken. De Wever clearly dominated the exchanges. Finally, together, N–VA and VB did not come out of the elections with a majority of seats in the Flemish parliament, which de facto excluded this only coalition option. Vlaams Belang was thus quickly portrayed as the underperformer; N-VA managed to frame these results as a victory, and VB was excluded from the negotiations for government formation at the regional and federal levels. The PTB–PVDA also gained votes and seats. At the federal level they progressed in Flanders (from three seats in 2019 to six in 2024, now getting at least one seat in each constituency) and in Brussels (from two to three seats). In Brussels, the PTB mainly gained voters from the socialist party PS and came top among first-time voters (Biesemans et al., 2024). However, the party lost seats in the Walloon constituencies (one at the federal level, two at the regional level). It did not manage to steal as many former PS voters, and it did not convince the first-time voters who turned more massively to the Liberals (MR) and the former Christian Democrats (LE) (Close et al., 2024). As for the VB, the party underperformed compared to what the polls had created regarding expectations, which overshadowed its other victories. The leadership of right-wing parties in the negotiations for government formation in Brussels and Wallonia also meant that the party was directly excluded from the equation.

A program and communication in tune with voters’ priorities

Vlaams Belang presented a classic populist radical-right manifesto for the 2024 elections. Titled ‘Flanders Back to Us’ (VB, 2024), the program puts ethnonationalism first, advocating for Flanders’ independence from Belgium, power to the people, a stop to immigration and a strong take on law and order. Socioeconomic, fiscal and cultural issues are framed in ethnonationalistic terms. In a classic welfare chauvinist approach, national preference is portrayed as the solution to poverty and high housing prices and better health care services; independence is painted as the solution to fiscal and budgetary issues, as the party denounces fiscal transfers to French-speaking Belgium and asks for the return of ‘Flemish money in Flemish hands’ (VB, 2024: 10).

Since elections were held concurrently for three levels, more local issues were covered first, while Europe was discussed in detail only on the last two pages of the VB manifesto (VB, 2024: 96–97). The party uses the ‘taking back control’ tagline and denounces EU leaders as ‘extreme’ (and overly bureaucratic/technocratic), hallmarks of a populist radical-right platform. The party opposes further enlargement and positions itself against EU interference in the national politics of illiberal democracies (e.g., Hungary), as well as EU policies on climate, agriculture and migration. The party’s list of specific proposals includes stifling the European Parliament, reducing Belgium’s budget contribution, negotiating a package of opt-outs from certain EU policies and legislation, defending Western values and promoting the subsidiarity principle and member states’ sovereignty. Interestingly, the manifesto avoids concrete topics related to foreign affairs, such as the Russia–Ukraine War and the war in Gaza.

PTB–PVDA also presented a classic populist radical-left program for the 2024 elections. Titled ‘The Choice to Break Away’ (PTB, 2024), the program puts socioeconomic issues first, advocating for fiscal justice, more social policies and purchasing power for households, better jobs, the right to healthcare, the end of political privileges, and a social climate policy. Highly active on university campuses, the party also tailored its message to young people, which was also likely driven by an interest in mobilizing first-time voters. Similarly, the party takes a notably progressive position on rights and liberties, especially racial discrimination, feminism and LGBTQ+ issues.

The concurrent elections also blurred the VB’s specific positions regarding the EU. The party developed a separate program for the European elections, which did not contribute to making it visible. This program reflected the VB’s populist orientation, with an explicit equation of Europe with a distant class of wealthy and privileged elites. Nevertheless, while the VB mobilizes cultural values and identities to underpin its populist rhetoric, the PTB–PVDA mobilizes a socioeconomic discourse that denounces a capitalist Europe imposing austerity on the poor through nondemocratic rules. The party takes a clear stance against austerity, privileges, inequalities, poverty, punitive environmental taxes, social dumping and the logic of profit and the market. It advocates addressing the root causes of migration, such as poverty in the Global South. Regarding external affairs, the party justify its nonalignment and rejection of NATO in terms of a commitment to striving for peace. On the Israel–Hamas war, it takes a clear position in favour of Palestine, denouncing acts of genocide as against international law and human rights.

The parties’ programs were heavily relayed online. Vlaams Belang is the absolute leader in online communication in Belgium. The party spent €1.5 million during the four months preceding the elections (Ryckmans, 2024). PVDA ranked fourth, spending €708,933. While the PTB had been very present during the legislature, it took a step back during the campaign.

The content of their respective communication reveals the saliency of issues they own (Figure 3). The VB clearly made migration the salient issue in its communication during the campaign. More than a quarter of its communication on X is on this issue. The gap with other parties is massive. The party also over-communicated on crime but to a lesser extent. The PTB–PVDA clearly stands out with its focus on finance, the economy, pensions, work and all socioeconomic issues. Europe is not central to these parties; they mention it less than other parties.

While the content reveals the ideological focus of these parties, the tone of their communication connects to their populist core. Both parties heavily rely on attacks as a mode of communication. Previous studies have shown that personal or programmatic attacks represent 26.5% of the total communication of the VB on X (first party in Belgium) and 25% for the PTB–PVDA (Close et al., 2023).

These programmatic priorities match voters’ priorities. The 2024 Belgian voter panel survey asked voters an open-ended question: ‘What is the most important issue in Belgium at the moment?’ The question was asked in wave 2 of the survey during the campaign. Results show that, in Flanders, three issues stand out: budget and finances, as well as migration and political representation, a category that refers to trust, competence, extremism, and populism (Table 2). These issues match populist radical-right demands. In Brussels and Wallonia too, migration and political representation rank high, together with the economy. Crime and Justice, Employment and institutional reforms form a second block of priorities. These priorities match populist demands towards a change in political elites and institutions, as well as the socioeconomic agenda of the radical left. The populist, anti-elite rhetoric of the two parties also permeated public opinion.

Conclusion

The 2024 elections in Belgium saw voters casting ballots for three separate levels: European, federal and regional. In this context, the EU elections were clearly second-order elections. As main opposition parties at the federal level, populist radical parties of the right (VB) and the left (PTB–PVDA) approached the 2024 elections in a strong position. They were portrayed as clear favourites in the polls and the media. During 2019–2024 they managed to set the agenda on their issues, among other things, via a robust online presence.

Both parties came out of the elections with more votes and seats. Part of this success is because their programs matched voters’ priorities. Yet they were perceived as having underperformed. And because they were not politically indispensable, they were quickly sidelined from negotiations at the regional and federal levels. At the European level, the Belgian delegation is limited, and the fragmentation of the party systems leaves the VB and the PTB–PVDA with a very limited number of seats to weigh in on policies. Nevertheless, they are expected to continue pushing their respective populist, Eurosceptic and radical agendas. As has been the case at the national level in Belgium, their programmatic positions and priorities have contaminated public opinion and the mainstream parties, which feel pressured by their success, something that is a significant source of concern.

 

(*) Emilie van Haute is Francqui Research Professor at SciencePo ULB (Centre d’étude de la vie politique – Cevipol). Her research interests focus on political parties, political participation and representation, elections and democracy. Her work has appeared in numerous international journals, including Comparative European Politics, the European Journal for Political Research, the Journal of Elections, Party Politics, Public Opinion and Parties, Representation and West European Politics. She is the co-editor of Acta Politica. Email: emilie.van.haute@ulb.be

 

References

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Close, C., & Ognibene, M. (2021). Les droites radicales en Belgique francophone. In P. Delwit & E. van Haute (eds.), Les partis politique en Belgique. Brussels : Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 4th edition.

Close, C., Delwit, P., Vandeleene, A., & van Haute, E. (2024). Les dynamiques du vote en Wallonie le 9 juin 2024. Premiers éléments. Note du Centre d’étude de la vie politique. https://cevipol.phisoc.ulb.be/fr/les-dynamiques-du-vote-en-wallonie-le-9-juin-2024-premiers-elements

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Gallina, M., Baudewyns, P., & Lefevere, J. (2020). Political Sophistication and Populist Party Support. The Case of PTB–PVDA and VB in the 2019 Belgian Elections. Politics of the Low Countries, 2(3), 265–288. doi:10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003003

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Jacobs, L., Close, C., & Pilet, J.-B. (2024). The angry voter? The role of emotions in voting for the radical left and right at the 2019 Belgian elections. International Political Science Review, Online First. doi.org/10.1177/0192512123122452

Michel, E., Feitosa, F., Lefevere, J., Pilet, J.-B., van Erkel, P., & van Haute, E. (2024). Studying Dimensions of Representation: Introducing the Belgian RepResent Panel (2019–2021). European Political Science, 23, 199–217. doi.org/10.1057/s41304-023-00430-z

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Lithuania and EU flags waving under a cloudy sky. Photo: Andy Liu.

Lithuanian Populist Far-right (In)security Discourse During the European Parliament Elections in the face of Russia’s War Against Ukraine

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Please cite as:

Ulinskaitė, Jogilė. (2024). “Lithuanian Populist Far-right (In)security Discourse During the European Parliament Elections in the face of Russia’s War Against Ukraine.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024.https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0077

 

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Abstract

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia has disrupted the previously perceived stability in Central and Eastern Europe (CCE) and exacerbated the prevailing sense of insecurity. The evolving circumstances are reshaping the political terrain and presenting avenues to mobilize support for the populist far right. However, to date, the far-right populist parties in Lithuania have not been successful in either national or European Parliament (EP) elections, as they have failed to surpass the required thresholds. However, the most recent European Parliament elections were an exception, with the election of a long-standing far-right politician in Lithuania as an MEP. This study delves into an analysis of the discourse employed by Lithuanian far-right populists throughout the 2024 EP election campaign, with a specific focus on the narratives pertaining to (in)security that they propagated. The investigation seeks to ascertain whether the far right capitalized on the situation to fuel discussions on crisis with the aim of attracting support and identifying the strategies utilized in constructing the narratives surrounding (in)security.

Keywords: populist far right, European Parliament election, insecurity, immigrants, European Green Deal, traditional values

By Jogilė Ulinskaitė (Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania)

Introduction

The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 disrupted the sense of stability in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), exacerbating existing widespread insecurity and evoking memories of Soviet repression. Although the unyielding support of the Lithuanian political elite and society for Ukraine has cultivated a rally around the flag effect, the prolonged conflict has underscored the critical importance of defence solutions. These conditions create a conducive environment for the far right to mobilize support. Although far-right populists thus far have been unable to surpass the 5% threshold required to secure seats in the national legislature, shifting circumstances provide the far right with opportunities to advocate for increased security measures and criticize the political establishment for its perceived inaction. The election of far-right politician Petras Gražulis to the European Parliament (EP) in 2024 signifies a change in the reception of contentious political discourse. The central question of this chapter concerns whether the far right is leveraging these conditions to acquire backing and the methodologies utilized to mould narratives of (in)security.

In this chapter, I define the populist far right as political agents who adhere to the procedural norms of democracy and are situated at the extreme right end of the left–right ideological spectrum. Their rhetoric is distinguished by populism and nativism, where the nation is viewed as a homogeneous entity that needs to be defended from both a corrupt political elite and perceived external threats (Wodak, 2019). The populist far right portrays the political elite as corrupt, acting against the populace’s interests and advancing the agenda of the European Union (Golder, 2016; Buštíková & Kitschelt, 2009; Wodak, 2019). Finally, they place a strong emphasis on traditional family values and a nostalgic yearning for an idealized past (Wodak, 2019).

This article analyses the discourse of three populist far-right political organizations. The National Alliance (Nacionalinis susivienijimas, NS) failed to secure any parliamentary seats in the 2020 elections but gained 3 out of 51 seats on the Vilnius City Council in 2023. The People and Justice Union (Tautos ir teisingumo sąjunga, TTS) held one parliamentary seat in a single-mandate constituency until late 2023. The third party, the Christian Union (Krikščionių sąjunga, KS), aligned with the Lithuanian Family Movement (Lietuvos šeimų sąjūdis, LŠS) in the 2024 EP election. LŠS, known for organizing the ‘Great March in Defence of the Family’ and other anti-government protests, won five seats across various municipal councils in spring 2023 on the ballots of different political parties. The analysis draws on electoral manifestos, official election debates and communications via official Facebook pages and websites during the EP election campaign.

In this chapter, I present the results of the EP elections in Lithuania and then examine the rhetoric employed by Lithuanian far-right populists during the election campaign, focusing particularly on articulated narratives of (in)security. The analysis looks at whether the campaign focused more on leveraging the crisis – a tactic often used by the Lithuanian far right – or if it instead tried to offer ideas for creating security in a volatile situation.

European Parliament election campaign and results

The 2024 EP elections in June marked the third time Lithuanian voters had been to the polls within six weeks, leading to an intertwining of election debates across different institutions. The preceding presidential election had dominated both public and political agendas, with some candidates leveraging it to boost their popularity ahead of the EP elections. Additionally, national parliamentary elections scheduled for autumn compelled many candidates to focus their campaigns on domestic issues. As a result, EP election debates were heavily dominated by national concerns, such as social benefits and employment, rather than EU-specific policies. The compressed electoral timeline and emphasis on national issues may have contributed to voter fatigue, as evidenced by the low turnout for the EP elections (28.94%), which was significantly lower than in previous years when it coincided with the presidential runoff (53.48% in 2019 and 47.35% in 2014).

The 2024 EP elections in Lithuania saw voters lean towards mainstream candidates and a significant degree of continuity, with five of the country’s eleven elected MEPs retaining their seats from the previous term. Moreover, two of the new MEPs had previously served as European Commissioners, further reinforcing the presence of experienced EU-level politicians on the Lithuanian slate. The most successful parties were the Homeland Union–Lithuanian Christian Democrats, who won three seats and 20.92% of the vote. The Social Democratic Party of Lithuania came second with two seats and 17.63% of the vote. The following political parties shared the remaining six seats, taking one each: Lithuanian Farmers and Greens Union (8.95%), Freedom Party (7.94%), the Union of Democrats ‘For Lithuania’ (5.84%), Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania–Christian Families Alliance (5.67%), the People and Justice Union, TTS (5.34%), Liberals’ Movement (5.31%).

The notable exception to the support for the mainstream was electing Petras Gražulis, a leader of TTS, with 5.45 % of votes. TTS is itself an amalgam of several outfits, including the Centrists–Nationalists, Gražulis’ political movement ‘For Lithuania, Men!’ (Už Lietuvą, vyrai!), and the Union of Lithuanian Nationalists and Republicans. Lacking a cohesive ideological core, TTS has been predominantly associated with the persona of its leader, Gražulis, since 2021. Gražulis, a figure of notable controversy, has garnered international attention, including recognition on Politico’s list of the most eccentric MEPs (Wax & Cokelaere, 2024). His political profile is characterized by determined opposition to the LGBTQ+ community, particularly evident in his contentious engagement with ‘Pride’ events. The controversy surrounding Gražulis extends beyond rhetoric into legal domains. He is currently facing criminal prosecution for alleged defamation of LGBTQ+ individuals (Steniulienė et al., 2024), which led to him being denied joining and questioning by the EP party of his choice – the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group. Eventually, he joined the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group.

Gražulis, who served as a member of the Seimas (Lithuania’s parliament) from 1996 to 2023, has consistently secured his position through single-mandate constituency victories. His political career reached a critical juncture in the winter of 2023 when he was impeached by the Seimas. The impeachment process, triggered by his unauthorized voting on behalf of another MP, culminated in a ruling by the Constitutional Court that the politician had broken his oath of office and violated the constitution (Gaučaitė-Znutienė et al., 2023). During election debates, Gražulis strategically reframed this decision as political persecution to express his indignation and to present himself as a victim of censorship and political repression. The election outcomes indicate that his party achieved significant success in the regions outside the major cities of Lithuania. A decline in voter turnout, the dissolution of the right-wing populist party Order and Justice (Andrukaitytė, 2020), and the absence of other ideologically similar political leaders (such as Remigijus Žemaitaitis, another controversial right-wing politician) in the EP elections all contributed to the backing received by this politician.

In general, the populist far-right parties in Lithuania experienced limited electoral success. Only one such party surpassed the 5% threshold necessary for representation. Despite conducting an intensive campaign, the National Alliance expressed disappointment with its performance, garnering only 3.79% of the vote. In a post-election press conference, one of the party’s leaders, Vytautas Sinica, posited that their programmatic provisions and discourse might have been too complex for the electorate, suggesting a potential reconsidering of their campaign strategy ahead of the national elections. The Christian Union’s even less favourable outcome, securing only 1.37% of the votes, further underscores the challenges far-right parties face in Lithuania.

Prioritizing culture wars over the war in Ukraine: Fighting the usual suspects

Despite the prevalent focus in Lithuanian public discourse on the war against Ukraine (and the Russian threat) and broader defence and security matters, the far-right narrative gives precedence to Lithuania’s internal security. All scrutinized political parties emphasize the nation’s sovereignty over EU federalism and express a dedication to shielding the nation from the ‘dictates of EU bureaucrats’ and the so-called ideologies promoted by the EU, such as genderism and multiculturalism. Safeguarding the nation and traditional family values serves as the foundation and primary perspective through which all other matters are examined.

For example, the Christian Union asserts that Lithuania encounters a dual threat: ‘Our country and the entirety of European civilization face the threat of war, while internally Lithuania is undermined by an ideology that is hostile to the natural family, the Lithuanian language, culture and traditions, Christian values and scientific truths’ (Central Electoral Commission, 2024). Nevertheless, every other section of the manifesto highlights the importance of safeguarding family and traditional values. Similarly, the National Alliance’s campaign material prominently features the threat of war but as a backdrop. The primary focus of the National Alliance’s propositions is the defence of traditional European cultural values against EU bureaucrats and their supposed intentional effort to push Europe toward a multicultural identity to undermine the authority of nation-states.

These so-called ideological dangers are linked to the Istanbul Convention, an international agreement to prevent and combat violence against women, which is yet to be ratified in Lithuania and is vehemently opposed by far-right political groups. The Istanbul Convention is labelled as the ideology of genderism – a foe deemed worthy of resistance by A. Rusteika (Jursevičius, 2024) or a social engineering venture rooted in Marxist ideology, aiming to dismantle the family structure in Europe by Radžvilas (Jursevičius, 2024).

Another identified adversary is the LGBTQ+ community. The EP elections coincided with Vilnius Pride – a fact not overlooked by the National Alliance. The party noted that the demands from the LGBT community are endless, starting from recognition and parades to gender transition rights, marriage, and adoption (Sinica, 2024).

The spectre of communism is continuously brought up by the far right to evoke cultural trauma from the Soviet era. The character and magnitude of this threat were most eloquently articulated by the elected MEP: “Europe today is simply a poison that brings genderism, drugs and everything else that destroys the idea of the founding fathers, whether Schuman or Adenauer, who created this Europe. Now, they are destroying all values, Christian values, by introducing Leftism, same-sex marriage and all these perversions. I want to tell you that we are going backwards; in fact, Europe has returned to the ideas of Russia or even Lenin…. If these values return, the family will be destroyed; with what they are doing, there will be no more Europe [in the future]” (Pumprickaitė, 2024).

In addition to these internal threats emanating from the EU, migration is another usual suspect in the list of far-right threats. The image of migrant flows, so characteristic to the discourse of the EU’s far-right politicians, is also articulated in Lithuania, with a particular focus on Russian-speaking migrants. The unprecedented influx of immigrants in 2022, primarily driven by the reception of Ukrainian refugees, and the subsequent 15% increase in the foreign population in 2023 have catalysed the securitization of discourse.

The far right’s strategic focus on Russian-speaking migrants from Belarus and Central Asia suggests selective targeting of specific groups of immigrants. Migrants, both those trying to cross the border illegally and those who have obtained visas to work in Lithuania (mainly from Central Asian countries and Belarus), are portrayed as a homogenous group and as ‘invaders’, disloyal to the Lithuanian government and a threat to Lithuanian identity. Meanwhile, refugees from Ukraine are rarely mentioned by the far right. In a society that still actively supports Ukraine and Ukrainian refugees – some 89% of Lithuanians agree that Ukrainian refugees fleeing the war should be accepted (European Commission, 2024) – it is difficult to portray them as malicious intruders. Although the governing political parties have taken stringent measures to restrict migration across the Belarus–Lithuania border, the far right has also criticized the government for being insufficiently restrictive and ‘kept the borders open until the European Commissioner for Migration herself came to Lithuania and authorised the turnarounds’ (Radžvilas & Sinica, 2024).

The European Green Deal is a new usual suspect emerging in the rhetoric of the Lithuanian far right. The Green Deal and renewable energy policies are framed as ‘extremist’ and examples of ideological ‘fanatism’ emanating from Brussels aimed at burdening ordinary citizens with regulations and fines (Radžvilas, 2024a). While nominally supporting environmental protection, they advocate for a ‘rational’ approach (Central Electoral Commission, 2024: 21) that does not ‘ruin the European economy’ (Central Electoral Commission, 2024: 18).

This stance allows the far right to position themselves as pragmatic defenders of national economic interests against perceived EU overreach. First, the EU environmental policies are portrayed as a threat to Lithuanian farmers, who are purportedly already disadvantaged by lower EU subsidies than their counterparts in the West. Secondly, it is argued that environmental restrictions impose undue burdens on businesses, potentially compromising competitiveness (Tapinienė, 2024). The far right’s unexpected positioning as defenders of both business and agricultural interests during the EP election campaign represents a strategic adaptation of their rhetoric.

Security issues: bridging defence and social conservatism

Security and defence issues, already prominent in the CEE region, have come to dominate Lithuania’s public discourse, not least because of the election of the president of Lithuania in the spring, the official who is the commander-in-chief of the Lithuanian armed forces. Security and defence issues dominated the election debates and are also at the forefront of public opinion: a recent Eurobarometer survey shows that 60 % of Lithuanians (in contrast to 37 % of EU citizens) argue that the EU should focus more on defence and security issues to reinforce its position globally (European Parliament, 2024). In response to perceived security challenges, the Lithuanian government has implemented a series of proactive measures, including augmenting defence expenditure, planning strategic military acquisitions and initiating reforms to the conscription system.

Within this heightened security context, far-right political organizations find themselves compelled to engage with international security issues. Their security discourse is characterized by a multifaceted narrative that interweaves the concepts of national defence, national identity and traditional family values. This rhetorical strategy positions these parties as unique defenders of both conservative societal norms and robust national security.

Gražulis, the People and Justice Union leader, presented a forceful critique of the West. He asserted that the root cause of conflicts, including the current war, is the accommodating stance of US President Biden and the Western powers more broadly (Tapinienė, 2024). Furthermore, he censured the Lithuanian government, alleging that it is stoking tensions and provoking Putin. Gražulis’ proposed remedy for the prevailing insecurity is the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States. He revealed that his outfit had opened an electoral campaign office in Lithuania supporting Trump, emphasizing the former US president’s purported dedication to peace and traditional values: ‘We support Trump’s views on the traditional family and traditional values. We trust Trump’s promise to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours, at the expense of Russia’ (ALFA.LT, 2024).

Within the discourse of the National Alliance, a distinct sentiment of distrust towards international partners in the West is evident. Vytautas Radžvilas, the National Alliance leader, portrays Lithuania as positioned within the ambiguous sphere situated between the two competing geopolitical forces of Russia and the West. While advocating for the development of the defence industry at the national level and financial support at the EU level in the party manifesto, Radžvilas simultaneously contends that in the event of a conflict, no NATO or European allies would intervene to protect Lithuania (Radžvilas, 2024b). Specifically, he underscored a sense of mistrust towards the United States in light of the shift in US strategic focus toward the Pacific Ocean region (Beniušis et al., 2024). Conversely, the Western European allies are depicted as engaging in friendly interactions with Russia. Even the deployment of a German army brigade to Lithuania, although welcomed, does not instil complete confidence, and the primary focus remains on bolstering Lithuania’s national defence capabilities (Ibid.). The proposed solution is two-fold. Firstly, to enhance sovereignty and national security for self-defence, Lithuania must strive for independence from Brussels (Radžvilas, 2024b). Secondly, Lithuania should rally a coalition comprising Central Eastern European and Scandinavian nations to advocate for reforms within EU policy (Beniušis et al., 2024).

All analysed political parties endorse the European integration of Ukraine. It appears inevitable in a country where, as of May 2024, 77% of Lithuanians supported granting Ukraine candidate status (European Commission, 2024). However, even this pro-European stance is exploited by the far right to advance their political agenda. Gražulis and the Christian Union advocate for Ukraine’s accession, citing its potential to combat ‘genderism’ and uphold Christian principles. Nevertheless, there are lingering reservations. Aurelijus Rusteika, one of the leaders of the Lithuanian Family Movement, highlights concerns that the European project entails a loss of national sovereignty, prompting questions about Ukraine’s willingness to relinquish its autonomy to Brussels (Jursevičius, 2024). Additionally, the National Alliance posits that the integration decision will be a pivotal choice between the major geopolitical players, namely the West and Russia (Jursevičius, 2024). Even in cases where unequivocal public backing exists, the far right manages to cultivate an environment characterized by scepticism and lack of clarity.

Conclusion

The European Parliament election in 2024 marked a significant milestone as the populist far right in Lithuania managed to surpass the 5% electoral threshold for the first time. Factors such as support from regions outside major cities, low voter turnout, the disbandment of the right-wing populist party Order and Justice, and the absence of similar ideological leaders in the EP elections all contributed to the rise of politician Petras Gražulis. Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that current circumstances have seen political parties engaging in debates that reinforce narratives of insecurity in society.

The party led by Petras Gražulis, along with other political entities under scrutiny, navigate their rhetoric by considering prevailing societal attitudes towards Ukraine and Ukrainians while also fuelling discontent towards familiar targets such as the Istanbul Convention and the LGBTQ+ community. However, notwithstanding the difficult security situation prevailing in the region, the primary focus of policymakers has centred on the cultural wars within the state. This year, the influx of migrants originating from Belarus and Central Asia, as well as the implications of the European Green Deal on farmers and businesses in Lithuania, have been underscored as potential threats to the nation. Although the analysed political parties emphasize their commitment to the security and defence of Lithuania, their discourse primarily reflects a deep-seated scepticism towards international partners, emphasizing the pivotal role of upholding Lithuania’s sovereignty and implementing national defence strategies as the key to ensuring security both at the global level and domestically. However, the European elections in June are not the end of the story; the national parliamentary elections in autumn will be another opportunity for far-right populist parties in Lithuania to repeat established and articulate new (in)security narratives.

 

(*) Jogilė Ulinskaitė is Associate Professor at the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University. She defended her PhD thesis on the populist conception of political representation in Lithuania in 2018. Since then, she has been researching the collective memory of the communist and post-communist past in Lithuania. As Joseph P. Kazickas Associate Research Scholar in the Baltic Studies Program at Yale University in 2022, she focused on reconstructing emotional narratives of post-communist transformation from oral history interviews. Her current research integrates memory studies, narrative analysis and the sociology of emotions to analyse the discourse of populist politicians. Email: jogile.ulinskaite@tspmi.vu.lt

 

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