The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.
The rise of J.D. Vance in American politics signifies a critical juncture in the Republican Party, underscoring the entrenchment of right-wing populism and culture wars within its agenda. While seemingly modern, this phenomenon has deep roots in political history (Hicks, 1931) and must be understood within the broader context of populism and the moral conflicts that characterize contemporary American society.
Populism: A Brief Overview
Populism is a multifaceted and highly debated concept in political science, with various scholars offering different interpretations and definitions. At its core, populism can be understood as a political approach that frames politics as a struggle between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” a conceptualization popularized by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). However, this definition, while widely accepted, does not capture the full complexity of the phenomenon.
Mudde’s (2004) characterization of populism as a “thin-centered ideology” suggests that populism lacks the comprehensive nature of other ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, and instead attaches itself to various political doctrines. This view is further explored by Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2017), who emphasize the ideational approach, focusing on the content of populist rhetoric and its distinction from mainstream political discourse. However, some scholars argue against categorizing populism strictly as an ideology. For instance, Aslanidis (2016) refutes the notion of populism as an ideology, proposing instead that it be seen as a discursive frame or a political strategy that can be employed by various ideological camps.
The debate extends to whether a minimum definition of populism is necessary for its study. De la Torre and Mazzoleni (2019) argue that a clear, minimal definition helps to prevent conceptual stretching, while others, like Benveniste, Campani, and Lazaridis (2016), suggest that the concept’s fluidity is essential to capturing its diverse manifestations across different contexts.
Furthermore, populism is often discussed in relation to its opposition to globalization and elite-driven policies. Steger (2019) maps the rise of anti-globalist populism, highlighting its ideological underpinnings and its appeal to those who feel disenfranchised by global economic and cultural changes. Similarly, Abts and Laermans (2018) explore the relationship between populism and the crisis of political parties, particularly in the context of Europe’s far-right movements.
Peter Diehl (2022) advocates for a more nuanced understanding of populism, acknowledging its complexity and the various forms it can take. This perspective aligns with the broader literature that sees populism as a reaction to perceived political failures, often articulated through a rhetoric of exclusion and opposition to the status quo (Taggart, 2018; Fukuyama, 2017). Anselmi (2017) and Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) provide further insights into the adaptability of populism across different political contexts, reinforcing the idea that populism is not a fixed ideology but a versatile tool in the hands of diverse political actors.
United States, Populism, and Culture Wars
In the American context, populism has historically manifested in various forms, from the agrarian populism of the late 19th century to the right-wing populism of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The latter, exemplified by figures like Donald Trump and, more recently, J.D. Vance, capitalizes on cultural and economic anxieties, often framing issues in terms of a struggle between ordinary, hardworking citizens and a corrupt, out-of-touch elite. This form of populism erodes democratic norms by exploiting resentment to foster political and social polarization, embodying the adage “divide and conquer.”
The term “culture wars” refers to the ideological and moral conflicts that have increasingly defined political discourse in many Western democracies, particularly the United States. These conflicts revolve around issues such as abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, immigration, gun control, and the role of religion in public life (Hunter, 1991, 1993; Hartman, 2019). Culture wars are not merely debates over policy; they are battles over a society’s very identity and values. They tap into deep-seated beliefs and emotions, often leading to highly polarized and intractable conflicts. As Ezra Klein (2020) notes, these cultural and moral divisions have become so entrenched that they now shape political preferences and social identities. Political affiliation has become a proxy for a broader cultural identity, making compromise and dialogue increasingly difficult.
The convergence of populism and culture wars has significant implications for contemporary politics. Populist leaders often weaponize cultural issues to mobilize their base, framing themselves as defenders of traditional values against the perceived threats of liberal elites and progressive movements. This strategy is evident in J.D. Vance’s political trajectory.
Senator from Ohio and author of the bestseller Hillbilly Elegy, a work that depicts the reality of poor white populations in non-urban America, J.D. Vance, 39, is the face of a new generation of politicians who have embraced conservative populism as a successful political strategy, transitioning from a critic to a proponent of Trumpism. Vance’s rise and his involvement in the so-called “culture wars”—advocating for more restrictive immigration policies, being a fierce critic of progressive education in schools and universities (such as critical race theory and gender studies), defending the traditional American family by opposing abortion and same-sex marriage, and emphasizing that Hollywood is an industry destroying the “good old American values”—reflect a profound shift in the identity and priorities of the Republican Party, raising questions about the future of the party and American politics as a whole.
Vance’s transformation from a critic of Trump to an advocate of Trumpist populism reflects a broader trend within the Republican Party, where cultural conservatism has become a central pillar of political strategy. Vance’s positions on immigration, education, and family values are not merely policy preferences but are presented as part of a larger cultural battle to “save” America from moral decay. By emphasizing issues like opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage and critiquing progressive education and Hollywood’s influence, Vance taps into the anxieties of a conservative base that feels alienated by the rapid cultural changes of the past few decades.
This fusion of populism and culture wars has transformed the Republican Party’s identity, moving it away from its traditional focus on free-market economics and foreign policy and toward a more nationalistic, culturally conservative agenda. Traditionally marked by a commitment to free-market policies, military interventionism, and fiscal conservatism, the Republican Party is now undergoing a “Trumpification.” This shift aligns the party with nationalist agendas that evoke the nostalgic imagery of a bygone era, appealing to a working-class white electorate that yearns for the “happy golden days” of baseball games and hot dogs. Political scientists Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter (2020) have highlighted how this focus on a particular electorate was crucial for Trump’s victory and the success of Brexit.
However, this agenda, rooted in ideological nostalgia, poses a significant threat to American republicanism. By undermining liberal democratic principles—such as the separation of powers, freedom of the press, and protection of fundamental rights—this brand of politics could irreversibly alter the landscape of American democracy. The risks are heightened when cultural conflicts are involved, as these issues often carry a zero-sum mentality, where compromise is seen as a betrayal of core values. The parallels with countries like Hungary under Viktor Orbán are stark, suggesting that the US may be on a path toward illiberal democracy, potentially ushering in an era of recycled authoritarianism.
The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.
Implications for American Democracy
The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party poses significant challenges to American democracy. The populist rhetoric of defending “the people” against “the elite” often undermines democratic norms, as it tends to delegitimize political opposition and erode trust in institutions. Furthermore, the emphasis on cultural and moral issues exacerbates societal polarization, making it difficult to find common ground on even the most basic issues of governance.
As Daniel Ziblatt and Steven Levitsky argue (2019), the erosion of democratic norms is a gradual process, often facilitated by populist leaders who, once in power, seek to weaken institutional checks and balances. The risks are heightened when cultural conflicts are involved, as these issues often carry a zero-sum mentality, where compromise is seen as a betrayal of core values.
J.D. Vance’s rise within the Republican Party, therefore, is not just a personal political success but a symptom of broader trends that could have long-lasting consequences for American democracy. The intertwining of populism and culture wars represents a shift toward a more divisive and potentially authoritarian political landscape, where the foundational principles of liberal democracy—such as the rule of law, protection of minority rights, and respect for institutional norms—are increasingly under threat.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the rise of J.D. Vance within the Republican Party underscores a significant transformation in American politics, where populism and culture wars have become central to political identity and strategy. This shift reflects broader trends within conservative movements globally, where appeals to cultural nostalgia and opposition to progressive values are increasingly shaping political discourse. While these dynamics have proven effective in mobilizing certain segments of the electorate, they also pose substantial risks to the stability of liberal democratic principles, fostering division and eroding the common ground necessary for effective governance.
As the Republican Party continues to evolve under the influence of figures like Vance, the future of American democracy may hinge on how these tensions are navigated. The intertwining of populism and culture wars raises critical questions about the direction of American politics and the resilience of democratic institutions in the face of growing polarization. As these issues continue to unfold, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric remain exceedingly high, demanding careful consideration and active engagement from all corners of society.
References
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Anselmi, M. (2017). Populism: An introduction. Routledge.
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Universities, akin to the judiciary, media, and civil society organizations, assume a vital role in the preservation of democratic principles. Inability to safeguard their independence from external influences like governmental interventions and corporate interests hampers universities’ capacity to uphold the rights of their constituents internally or advocate for public interests outside their precincts. Brazil is among the nations that have witnessed a notable decrease in academic freedom over the past decade. Instances of political turmoil or authoritarian rule, like Bolsonaro’s in Brazil, have resulted in constraints on academic pursuits and the imposition of censorship.
By Gulsen Dogan*
Why and how antiscientific fake news and discourse have gained momentum in the last decade while academics and scientific experts faced opposition? After the COVID-19 crisis (Galanopoulos & Venizelos, 2022), the phenomenon of populism, dissemination of misinformation, propagation of conspiracy theories, and dissemination of fake news have coalesced into what is known as ‘post-truth populism,’ a concept that disregards verifiable truths and manipulates public sentiment by capitalizing on emotions and uncertainties. The phenomenon of ‘post-truth populism’ has had the effect of diminishing academic freedom, particularly because right-wing populist movements perceive academic institutions as integral components of the elite ruling class that they oppose. These movements often direct their efforts towards curtailing academic freedom by undermining the independence of universities and stifling the voices of scholars, as academic freedom facilitates the unrestricted exchange of ideas and critical analysis, elements that have the potential to challenge the narratives and policies put forth by these groups (Ignatieff, 2018).
The decline in academic freedom on a global scale, as indicated by the Freedom House Report (Prelec et al., 2020), is attributed to the oppression and arrest of academics and students for their research endeavors. Moreover, there has been a notable increase in the implementation of the corporate governance model within universities worldwide. This shift can be linked to the growing influence of private enterprises’ agendas on the research activities pursued by academics, particularly in light of the proliferation of neoliberal policies. The transformation of knowledge into a techno-scientific paradigm has been observed, accompanied by the dominance of a narrow culture of expertise in the era of neoliberalism. Consequently, there has been a reduction in the financial and institutional independence of universities, leading to greater collaboration with governmental bodies and a subsequent constriction of the space for freedom of expression and critical thinking.
Brazil is among the nations that have witnessed a notable decrease in academic freedom over the past decade (V-DEM, 2024). The contemporary discourse on educational policy involves a variety of stakeholders such as NGOs, political consultative bodies, and lobbyists in the legislative branch, signaling a transition from conventional participants to a more heterogeneous group of actors (Miceli, 2018). Constitutionally, there exist provisions for academic freedom, enabling universities to function independently in their educational, research, and outreach endeavors (Miceli, 2018). However, instances of political turmoil or authoritarian rule have resulted in constraints on academic pursuits and the imposition of censorship.
Primarily, individuals aligned with right-wing populism tend to portray scientists and experts as members of a corrupt elite, juxtaposing them with the virtuous “people” (Bellolio, 2024). This group tends to censor “truth” and scientific knowledge, preferring conspiracy theories while harboring distrust towards scholars and academic institutions (Haltinner& Sarathchandra, 2020). Notably, there is a tendency to overlook social sciences and humanities by providing limited funding opportunities and imposing constraints on research topics and publications to diminish diversity of thought and promote uniformity in ideas (EPRS, 2023; Folha De S. Paulo, 2022). The spread of misinformation through social media platforms has further rationalized the targeted harassment faced by state universities during Bolsonaro’s administration (Ares et al. 2022). Particularly during the COVID-19 crisis, there was an upsurge in disinformation and fake news disseminated through Brazilian media channels and platforms like WhatsApp, which exacerbated the divide between populist narratives and scientific discourse (Pereira & de Oliveira, 2024; Batista de Oliveira et al., 2022; Gagnon-Dufresne et al., 2023).
Secondly, right-wing populist administrations have emerged as regulatory mechanisms for the content disseminated, studied, and debated within academic institutions. Authorities tend to utilize universities and research institutions to advance their own political agendas. The content of academic research is supervised, subject to censorship to some degree, and is heavily reliant on the approval of those in power. Additionally, extracurricular activities and the selection of guest speakers on campus are scrutinized, thereby restricting the scope for independent thinking. Moreover, individuals offering critical evaluations on topics such as the global health crisis and authoritarian governance risk facing legal action. Those who engage in such critiques may face expulsion from academic institutions. Similarly, Bolsonaro’s opposition to public universities entailed unconstitutional government interference, financial cutbacks, and the targeting of dissenters, all of which propagated a conservative right-wing outlook and challenged the prevailing left-leaning cultural dominance within public higher education (Fiori & Fiori Arantes, 2023). The reductions in funding were linked to neoliberal policies aimed at commercializing social benefits, undermining the public education system established by the Federal Constitution of 1988, consequently leading to direct interference in the appointment of university leadership and a disregard for the preferences of the academic community in financial, administrative, and political matters (Lima & Iamamoto, 2022; Honorato & Souza, 2023).
Figure 1 compares the independence of institutions from the government control and measures the extent of universities ability to establish their own policies for education and research in Brazil. Figure 1 illustrates the level of autonomy of institutions in Brazil from governmental influence, as well as the capacity of universities to formulate their own regulations regarding education and research. Brazilian universities exhibit a moderate degree of autonomy. The level of autonomy remained relatively consistent between 2010 and approximately 2018. However, there has been a notable decrease in autonomy after 2018, particularly evident from around 2022. This trend indicates a substantial decrease in institutional autonomy, potentially signaling alterations in policies, financial support, or administrative authority affecting universities in Brazil.
Compiled from V-Dem Data 2024, Variable Graph, https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/
In Figure 2, the academic freedom also shows a consistent yet modest level across the timeframe, implying persistent restrictions in this domain. There is a gradual decrease observed until 2020, succeeded by a notable increase in 2021 regarding freedom of academic expression and dissemination. It is at times susceptible to constraints such as censorship, self-restraint, or other forms of limitation. The abrupt rebound after 2022 might suggest alterations in policies or transformations within the academic sphere in Brazil subsequent to the election of President Lula.
Compiled from V-Dem Data 2024, Variable Graph, https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/
Universities, akin to the judiciary, media, and civil society organizations, assume a vital role in the preservation of democratic principles. Inability to safeguard their independence from external influences like governmental interventions and corporate interests hampers universities’ capacity to uphold the rights of their constituents internally or advocate for public interests outside their precincts (Valiverronen & Saikkonen, 2021). The discussion heavily involves social media platforms, which enable the fast proliferation of anti-intellectual content. Social media’s growth has enabled Artificial Intelligence (AI) to produce content that closely resembles authentic material. Utilizing these platforms, populists formulate and disseminate “fake news,” often distorting or twisting expert insights to suit their motives (Hameleers,2022). This phenomenon points out the rising power of misinformation and strategic utilization of social media platforms to influence public conversations, frequently fostering division and eroding trust in scientific knowledge and democratic values in the era of “post-truth populism.”
(*) Gulsen Dogan is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Koc University in Istanbul, Turkey. She earned her M.A. in International Relations from Koc University, where her thesis focused on the institutional and ideological conditions for executive aggrandizement in Turkey and Brazil over the past decade. Her research interests include populism, democratic backsliding, political economy, governance, political parties, migration diplomacy, and disaster diplomacy. Geographically, her work focuses on Turkey, Brazil, and the European Union. Currently, Dogan is a project researcher at MiReKoc (Migration Research Center at Koc University) for the Horizon Europe Twinning project: BROAD-ER (Bridging the Migration and Urban Studies Nexus).
Ares, G.; Villen, G.; Caira Gitahy, L. M. & Tessler, L. R. (2022). “Memória e desinformação: Os ataques da extrema-direita às universidades públicas brasileiras.” Relações Internacionais, 73, 53–66. https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2022.73a05
Batista de Oliveira, M.; Said Vieira M.; Synesio Alves Monteiro, M. & Akerman, M. (2022). “Covid-19 en Brasil: Controversias políticas por las medidas de aislamiento social para controlar la pandemia. ¿Una disputa entre ciencia y anticiencia?” Razón Y Palabra, 26(114).
Fiori, J. & Fiori Arantes, P. (2023). “Brazil’s Cultural Battleground: Public Universities and the New Right.” Latin American Perspectives, 50(1), 197–217. https://doi.org/10.1177/0094582X221147594
Gagnon-Dufresne, M.-C.; Azevedo Dantas, M.; Abreu Silva, K.; Souza Dos Anjos, J.; Pessoa Carneiro Barbosa, D.; Porto Rosa, R.; de Luca, W.; Zahreddine, M.; Caprara, A.; Ridde, V. & Zinszer, K. (2023). “Social Media and the Influence of Fake News on Global Health Interventions: Implications for a Study on Dengue in Brazil.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 20(7), 5299-. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20075299
Galanopoulos, A. & Venizelos, G. (2022). “Anti-populism and Populist Hype During the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Representation (McDougall Trust), 58(2), 251–268. https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2021.2017334
Hameleers, M. (2022). “Empowering the People’s Truth Through Social Media? (De)Legitimizing Truth Claims of Populist Politicians and Citizens.” Politics and Governance, 10(1), 210–219. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v10i1.4726
Honorato, D. & Souza, K. R. (2023). “Escolha ‘democrática’ de dirigentes das Universidades Federais Brasileiras: As nomeações no Governo Bolsonaro.” Revista Hipótese, e023005-. https://doi.org/10.58980/eiaerh.v9i00.428
Lima, V. & Iamamoto, S. (2022). “‘Culture War’ against Brazilian universities: how budget cuts and changes in tertiary education policies are affecting the academic community.” Alternautas, 7(2). https://doi.org/10.31273/alternautas.v7i2.1108
Pereira, F. H. & de Oliveira, R. S. (2024). “Journalists and scientists together: the public problem of science disinformation in Brazil.” Journal of Science Communication, 23(3), 1-. https://doi.org/10.22323/2.23030204
Valiverronen, E. & Saikkonen, S. (2021). “Science communicators intimidated: researchers’ freedom of expression and the rise of authoritarian populism.” Journal of Science Communication, 20(4), 1-. https://doi.org/10.22323/2.20040208
Varriale, Amedeo. (2024). “Populism and the Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective: The French Rassemblement National and the Italian Forza Nuova.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). August 12, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0036
Abstract
Populism, especially “radical right-wing populism,” and the Extreme Right are often explicitly or implicitly conflated or at least observed together (see Ignazi, 2000; Mudde, 2000; Rydgren, 2005; Carter, 2005; Griffin, 2018; Stavrakakis et al., 2019). While this contribution acknowledges that these two sets of ideas may occasionally overlap, they should still be understood as distinct concepts. Therefore, any deliberate and forceful conflation of their academic definitions, political histories, or traditions is usually misleading and inappropriate. Although many political scientists have recently attempted to clearly distinguish between the two phenomena by proposing separate definitions, some still suggest that populism and the extreme right are essentially two sides of the same coin (see Passarelli and Tuorto, 2018). To shed more light on this issue (or “war of words,” as Cas Mudde once called it) and to provide a better understanding of these two important ideologies—one that has greatly impacted the last century and another that will likely continue to influence the current one—this article will compare and contrast right-wing populism and the extreme right from an entirely ideational perspective. This will be done by borrowing from a theoretical framework originally adopted by senior scholar Marco Tarchi (2015) and taking his approach one step further by empirically testing his theories through discourse and manifesto analysis of two contemporary European parties—one supposedly belonging to the populist (or “neopopulist”) party family and the other to the extreme right (or “neofascist”) family. Specifically, the positions of the French Rassemblement National (“National Rally” – RN) and the Italian Forza Nuova (“New Force” – FN) will be examined to determine whether there are more similarities or differences between the two ideologies. The analysis will focus on the RN’s and FN’s discourse and policies related to the role of the people, the nation, the state, society, the individual, the leader, the elite, democracy, and the market.
By Amedeo Varriale*
Introduction: Generic Reflections, Theoretical Framework, and Method
Generic Reflections
In 1992, the academic experts Piero Ignazi and Colette Ysmal (1992) wrote that the Italian MSI (Movimento Sociale Italiano – Italian Social Movement) and the French Front National (National Front) “are the most significant parties of the extreme right in Europe” (Ignazi & Ysmal, 1992: 101). At the time, this was not only an accurate statement, but it was also an incredibly important and influential one for the field of political science, as it provided scholars with two archetypal case studies that could be empirically treated for reference. Today, this claim would be – to say the least – contentious. One issue is that the MSI no longer exists, and its direct successor(s) AN (Alleanza Nazionale – National Alliance) and FDI (Fratelli d’Italia – FDI) can hardly be categorized as “extreme right” parties. In 2003, AN’s leader, Gianfranco Fini, visited Yad Vashem in Israel and repeatedly declared that fascism as an ideology was “an absolute evil in history” (Corriere della Sera, 24 November 2003; Caretto, 2022). Whereas, more recently, FDI’s leader, Giorgia Meloni (currently Italian Prime Minister) has clearly stated that her party is incompatible with anyone nostalgic of the fascist regime (also calling them “useful idiots for the Left”) and that she is committed to not only democracy but pro-Western, anti-authoritarian, liberal conservatism[1] (Bracalini, 2021; Farrell, 2022). Taking this into account, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, some of the “old guards” of the MSI gradually developed neofascist movements relying on the political vacuum left by the defunct MSI giving birth to much more extreme subjects (see Broder, 2023: 118-141) such as Fiamma Tricolore, CasaPound, and of course – FN (Forza Nuova – FN) which will be later examined in-depth. I shall return to this point in the following sections.
The same argument can be made regarding the French Front National. This party no longer exists under that banner, as it has been recently renamed RN (Rassemblement National – RN) in an open effort from Marine Le Pen to “detoxify” (and expel extremists) from what use to be an extreme right party, in order to turn it into a more respectable “right-wing” populist force (Gaffney, 2012). In fact, some popular commentators argue she has (to some extent) successfully managed this operation (see Murray, 2017). Therefore, not only are the parties Ignazi and Ysmal mentioned and studied no longer existent, but their heirs are usually no longer considered as full-fledged extreme right parties. Not to mention, in Europe there are very few (if any) truly extreme right/neofascist parties that are electorally relevant to this day – the German Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) perhaps being an exception.
Another factor that might challenge Ignazi’s and Ysmal’s claim, if reconsidered today and applied to the successors of the MSI and Front National by scholars of radical parties, is the emergence of a new populist zeitgeist over the last twenty to thirty years (see Mudde, 2004). This public mood of disenchantment with traditional politics has contributed to the success of several parties that were originally isolated on the fringes of the spectrum. Almost suddenly, once marginalized groups such as the Lega Nord,FPÖ, and the Sweden Democrats, became electorally relevant and more mainstream (Tarchi, 2002). Their “mainstreaming” makes it considerably more difficult for the “extreme” label to be attached to them. Moreover, not all parties that once belonged to the extreme right can be considered exclusively “right-wing” today; some, like Jobbik, have adopted syncretic populist positions. As the Italian scholar Marco Tarchi (2015) contends, their current populist forma mentis often takes them ideologically beyond the Right-Left dichotomy (Tarchi, 2015: 52). Nonetheless, casting aside those organizations that Luke March (2008: 3-4) classifies as “social populist” or “socialist populist,” many of these newly successful parties or rising movements are said to be either populist, or extreme right, or both at the same time (e.g. Backes, 1991; Betz, 1994; Ignazi 2000; Carter 2005; Mudde, 2000; Griffin, 2018).
Taking this into account, it is precisely this ambiguous conflation that has become a problem. In fact, as Mudde (2000) states: “All in all, most definitions of (whatever) populism do not differ that much in content from the definitions of right-wing extremism…with the various terms often used synonymously and without any clear intention” (Mudde, 2000: 13). While extreme right parties that are unequivocally neofascist are largely being ignored in scholarly literature, a growing number of scholars are erroneously labeling populist right parties as “extreme right” parties (for example, see Passarelli & Tuorto, 2018). In any event, the objective of this article is not to engage in an exhaustive – and sometimes counter-productive – debate originating from academic circles which Cas Mudde (1996) famously termed the “war of words.” This complex debate has aimed to describe the various political subjects that have monopolized the political space to the right of liberal-conservative forces and to especially determine the most appropriate term to define these “new” populist parties (Mudde, 2000: 11-16). Some of the terms proposed in the past include “progress-hostile forces” (Hartmann et al., 1985), “right-wing extremism” (Macridis, 1989; Mudde; 1995; 2000); “right-wing radicalism” (Oswalt, 1991; Weinberg, 1993), “radical-right” (Sprinzak, 1991), “radical right-wing populism” (Betz, 1993; Mudde, 2007), “post-industrial extreme right” (Ignazi, 2000), “New Populism” (Taggart, 1996), “neopopulism” (Yoshikazu, 2018), “national populism” (Eatwell & Goodwin, 2018), and finally, the most misleading of all – “extreme right-wing populism” (Rydgren, 2005; Stavrakakis et al., 2019). If all those terms were utilized to label different parties, such as either the ones that have a substantially populist core ideology and the ones that have a substantially fascist (or neofascist) one, this would by now be a non-substantive issue or a false dilemma. However, over the course of the last decades, all those terms have been applied to the same or a remarkably similar set of parties in Western Europe and the Americas, when in reality populism and extreme right (neofascism) are – ideologically speaking – mutually exclusive (Tarchi, 2015: 117-126). New academic research should instead be dedicated to distinguishing between the parties that belong to either one party family (e.g. the “populist” one) or the other (the “extreme right” one).
Regardless, the objective of this article is to compare the positions of the French Rassemblement National (RN) and the Italian Forza Nuova (FN) from an entirely ideational perspective and offer comprehensive insight on the key differences between the two ideologies. To maintain clarity, I shall utilize the words populism (but I also use “right-wing populism” or “populist right” for the RN interchangeably), and extreme right (but I also use “right-wing extremism” or “neofascism” for the FN interchangeably) to describe two distinct ideological phenomena. A full-fledged and in-depth analysis of the populist and extreme right ideological positions will be present in the second part of the contribution; however, I will first provide some generic preliminary information that is equally important.
In essence, populism (or even “right-wing populism”) and right-wing extremism are not identical. In fact, it has already been recognized that they substantially differ in a number of ways (Taggart, 1996: 35). As a primary example, Paul Taggart (1996) has argued that neofascist parties “tend to have some direct link to the fascist parties of the previous era while New Populist parties appear to lack such a historical link” (Taggart, 1996: 35). This is especially true for active extreme right organizations in countries like Britain, France, Spain, Greece and elsewhere in Europe. For instance, in Britain, the contemporary National Front (NF) is a result of a gradual political evolution that saw the party come into being after a merger of two older extremist factions – the neo-Nazi British National Party (BNP) active in 1960 and the League of Empire Loyalists (LEL). The BNP and LEL were themselves preceded by movements that revolved around pre-war (and post-war) fascist leaders like Sir Oswald Mosley and A.K. Chesterton. Another example relating to the differences between populism (or “New Populism” as Taggart calls it) and neofascism regards the issue of immigration (Taggart, 1996: 36). Certainly, both the populist right and the extremist right are anti-immigration(-ist), however, the former are not as fixated with the issue as the latter (Taggart, 1996: 36). Populists rarely (if ever) resort to ultra-authoritarian policies that may lead to ethnic cleansing or political violence through paramilitarism (Finchelstein, 2019: 45; Eatwell, 2017: 365). Parties like the Lega Nord (Northern League) in Italy serve as a perfect example of this non-violent attitude as they have a vast program that (apart from anti-immigration) also comprises fiscal federalism, anti-tax measures for small business, and the legalization of prostitution (Programma di Governo Salvini Premier, 2018). These are all issues completely unrelated to immigration. Hence, whilst this contribution acknowledges that the two sets of ideas may occasionally appear alike[2] – as scholars like Taggart (1996: 36) recognize – the two should still be understood as overall distinct concepts. Thus, any deliberate and forceful conflation of their academic definitions, political history, or tradition is per se usuallymisleading and inappropriate.
Theoretical Framework and Method
The most appropriate way to differentiate between (right-wing) populism and extreme right is not by merely providing the most popular definitions of the two ideologies by the most prominent academics. Instead, it is to carefully observe the distinct views both ideologies maintain of politics overall. Disregarding the fact that populism is rather “unpolitical” (refer to Taggart’s reflections on unpolitics[3]) and extreme right/neofascism is highly political by design, populist parties (in this case the RN) and extreme right parties (in this case FN) hold specific views on the people, the nation, the state, society, the individual, the leader, the elite, democracy, and the market that make the two ideologies – as we shall see – more incompatible than compatible (Tarchi, 2015: 125). The specifics of this theoretical framework, which were originally put forward in a seminal text on populism by Tarchi (2015), will be discussed throughout the next section. Taking this into consideration, after briefly touching upon the generic issues surrounding the academic definitions of populism and extreme right and providing a short historical account of both parties under scrutiny, the core of this article will focus on a discourse and manifesto analysis (which will occur concomitantly) of the RN and FN parties, respectively. Subsequently, all findings will be discussed conjunctly, to produce conclusive statements on both populism and extreme right.
For the RN, as for the FN party, the discourse analysis will include statements made by their leaders (Marine Le Pen and Roberto Fiore, respectively) over the course of the last five to ten years. The reason for this is that populist and extremist parties of the right are often structured in a highly centralized manner with a pre-eminence of key individuals (Taggart, 2003: 6), therefore it makes sense to give higher relevance to the statements and opinions of those directly in charge. Regarding the manifesto analysis, the manifestos chosen for analysis are the ones obtainable through the RN’s and FN’s websites (rassemblementnational.fr and forzanuova1997.it, respectively) as they can easily be located by the reader, and this is beneficial for transparency. Even if they have been released over a year ago, they still largely reflect their current positions. In any event, the RN’s manifesto is simply named “Les 22 Mesures” (“22 Measures”) whilst FN’s one is called “8 punti” (“8 points”). However, as FN’s manifesto is much shorter, during the analysis sporadic mention is also made to the party’s older political program for the important (post-debt crisis) Italian general election that took place in February 2013. This document (also easily accessible online) was named “Programma Per Le Elezioni Politiche 2013 Di Forza Nuova E Di Nomina Del Capo” (“Program for The Political Elections of 2013 of Forza Nuova and Its Appointed Head”). For clarity, each time I refer to this above-mentioned document using in-text citations I shall refer to it simply as: “FN general elections program, 2013.” Overall, the manifesto analysis occupies a dominant position in relation to the discourse analysis, this is because party programs and manifestos in general are “considered to represent and express the policy collectively adopted by the party” (Borg, 1966: 97; see also Anckar & Ramsted Silén, 1981). Fundamentally, not only are manifestos or programs (the second are generally more detailed and promoted before an election) officially endorsed by the members of a party – as Mudde reminds us – but are also widely utilized in academia as a form of data to determine party ideology (Mudde, 2000: 20).
Defining Populism and Extreme Right
Populism
Photo: Shutterstock.
Objectively defining this protean and unusual concept commonly known as “populism” has never been simple. To this day, scholars disagree on whether it is a political strategy, a form of discourse/performance or effectively an ideology (Moffitt, 2020: 25-26), thus, let alone do they agree on a fixed definition. To add to the confusion, some scholars state that “populism has many of the attributes of an ideology, but not all of them” (Taggart, 2000: 1). Notwithstanding, it must be recognized that lately the so-called ideational approach has garnered a significant amount of traction in academia to the point of replacing old economic notions (e.g. populism as state intervention, “overspending,” or a set of neoliberal financial policies) of the phenomenon that 20th century scholars (especially in the Latin American cases) insisted upon (Weyland: 2017: 51). This is why Taggart (2018) argues that today the ideational approach is “winning” from a theoretical standpoint (Taggart, 2018a).
One of the foremost pioneers of the ideational approach is the prominent Dutch scholar Cas Mudde (2004) who defines populism “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale(general will) of the people”(Mudde, 2004: 543). Whilst it must be acknowledged that this definition is fundamental to any in-depth and scientific understanding of modern populism, in this contribution abiding by a generic definition of the phenomenon per se is not as important as considering specific aspects of populism which make it a distinct ideology possessing its very own weltanschauung. After all, considering diverse cases globally, contemporary populism appears to have both a comprehensive program of political change and “staying power,” making it effectively resemble other “thick”[4] ideologies founded in past centuries (e.g. liberalism, communism, fascism) (Schroeder, 2020: 13, 27-28). Taking this into account, instead of focusing on the ideational approach’s concepts of “the people,” “the elite,” and “general will” alone, we encompass – as mentioned earlier – other elements of its ideological repertoire that go beyond those three.
In summary, at this point in history, Tarchi (2002) contents that populism represents an entirely “alternative model” to the extreme right. According to Tarchi, in populist ideology, the people represent a cohesive and virtuous community which functions as the basis of legitimation for government action (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Whereas the nation is the product of the cultural traditions of a people to whom it provides a stable identity (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Instead, when it comes to the conceptualization of the state,this is understood to be the administrator of the public interest subordinated to the will of the people who must control its action (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Moreover, for populists, society itself is nothing more than the natural context in which the life of the people unfolds, it is autonomous from the state and is prioritized in respect to it (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Populists also have a specific view of the individual, as they believe this is the cornerstone of social life whichfinds the natural context of its needs within the people (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Whereas in populist ideology the leader is perceived as a spokesperson for the people, an interpreter of their needs, endowed with ordinary qualities in extraordinary measures (Tarchi, 2015: 125). At the same time, the elite is (as expected) negatively regarded as a power block that must be kept under control by the people to protect their rights (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Also, populists hold a definite opinion of democracy, where democracy is considered anideal regime to be implemented entirely through tools of direct popular expression and without institutional mediation (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Ultimately, the conceptualization of the market is that of somethingpositive, to be tempered through protective measures reserved for the indigenous population – essentially, welfare chauvinism (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Subsequently, it will become clearer how all these concepts directly related to populism will apply to a right-wing populist party like the RN but not to a right-wing extremist party like FN.
Extreme Right
Demonstration of the political movement called “Forza Nuova” held in Rome in the EUR zone on November 4, 2017. Photo: Shutterstock.
In academic discourse, the term “extreme right” is frequently employed to describe parties or movements encompassing a range of political orientations, which renders the study of this subject particularly complex and nuanced. For instance, scholars – who have observed the phenomenon consistently – such as Elisabeth Carter (2005; 2018), provide a useful minimal definition of the term but are too inclusive (regarding classification), and tend to include subjects that are neither “extreme” nor truly “right-wing” in the party family. To exacerbate the ambiguity, even if only as a secondary element, Carter adds populism in the mix as an element to consider when describing extreme right ideology (see Carter, 2005: 21-23, 56-60). Given the circumstances, the definition Carter provides is an optimal starting point to understand the key features of extreme right ideology – authoritarianism, anti-democracy, and exclusionary and/or holistic nationalism(Carter, 2018: 157). However, if one abides by this definition, it already becomes clear that extreme right politics are not all that similar to populist politics, given the latter does not reject democracy altogether, and does not necessarily have to be authoritarian or exclusionary in terms of nationalism. In simple terms, “populism is pro-democracy but anti-liberal democracy” (Mudde, 2021: 579). Historically, we have witnessed the rise of “liberal” or libertarian populist parties (as well as socialistic ones, see March, 2007) that are only civically nationalist and view forms of plebiscitarian (direct) democracy as a real promise (e.g. PDL in Italy, and Lijst Dedecker in the Netherlands).
More specifically, excessive breadth given to the terminology certainly becomes an issue when you group together (under the same umbrella term “extreme right”) parties that outrightly reject the democratic system (e.g. NPD, now renamed Die Heimat) with parties that accept the rules of democracy but want to reform it by making it either more democratic and less statist (e.g. Lega dei Ticinesi, Lega Nord) or less democratic and more statist (e.g. Vlaams Blok, now renamed Vlaams Belang) (see Carter, 2005: 45). Ideally the parties that are anti-democratic and illiberal cannot be part of the same family as those that are illiberal but at the same time still democratic. Also, it is a problem to cluster ultra-authoritarian Neo-Nazi and neo-fascist parties with others that are simply neoliberal (but still xenophobic and anti-immigrant, according to Carter) or “neo-liberal populist” that do not adhere to any form of biological or cultural racism but are – in Carter’s own words – “not racist” whatsoever (Carter, 2005: 50-51).
Carter is not the only author who associates the neofascist extreme right with (elements of) populism. Indeed, one of the most renowned scholars of fascism, Roger Griffin (2018), explicitly identifies populism as a distinctive feature of the ideology, defining fascism as a “political ideology whose mythic core in its various permutations is a palingenetic form of populist ultranationalism” (Griffin, 2018: 46). Although Griffin embraces populism in his definition of fascism, he is more careful to not narrow the gap between fascist or neofascist parties and populist parties in his work. Notwithstanding, the distinction to be made between populism and extreme right is an essential one, because although populism is today more often associated with the political right, it is not inherently right-wing but is chameleonic (Taggart, 2003: 9) to the point that it can also manifest itself alongside left-wing ideologies (Hudson & Shah, 2022).
Using Tarchi’s theoretical scheme, it has been established in the section above what the generic views of populism are in relation to important aspects of society, such as the role of the state, the role of the elites and so forth. Unlike in populist ideology, in the extreme right the general (elitist) view of “the people” is more negative than positive (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In fact, the people are a mass to be educated under the guidance of the elite and merged with the nation and the nation itself is a spiritual community that has the task of forming and directing the people by assigning them a common destiny (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Also, according to extreme right neofascist ideology, the state represents the embodiment of the principle of authority, the fundamental principle of social organization superordinate to both the people and nation (Tarchi, 2015: 125).Uncoincidentally, it was the Italian dictator Benito Mussolini himself who famously stressed “Everything in the State, nothing outside the State, nothing against the State!” (Delzell, 1988: 127). This would be the exact opposite worldview to that of some neoliberal (pro-capitalism and pro-market) right-wing populist parties present in the European political sphere during the last decades (see Taggart, 1996: 34).
Beyond the state, society is according to right-wing extremists a raw material that must be formed, controlled, and guided by the state to which it is subordinated (Tarchi, 2015: 125). When compared to populism, the extreme right also has a much more negative or pessimistic view of the individual – which is merely considered a component of the nation whose needs must conform to avoid manifesting selfish interests (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In regard to the central ideological tenet of the leader right-wing extremists believe this figure to be the guide of the people and of the nation, to whom he indicates the destiny, and is endowed with extraordinary and charismatic qualities (Tarchi, 2015: 125). When it comes to how they view the elite, it said that these extremists believe the elite is a spiritual aristocracy that supervises the people and directs them to fulfill their duties (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Moving on to their conceptualization of democracy,Tarchi posits that they believe it is a regime that is criticizable because it reverses the principle of authority and is subject to the fickleness of the masses (Tarchi, 2015: 125). Last but not least, the market is deemed as something negative that must be subordinated to the needs of the nation and controlled through nationalizations or state-guided corporatism (Tarchi, 2015: 125).
Rassemblement National (RN): A History
Jean-Marie Le Pen during the meeting of his daughter Marine Le Pen for the celebration of May 1, 2011 in Paris, France. Photo: Frederic Legrand.
The Beginnings (1970s)
The history of the RN is complex. Or better, the history of the RN’s directly related predecessor (Front National) is both long and complex. Nevertheless, it is essential to outline this party’s historical background in order to comprehend why today it is more often treated as a “right-wing” populist party rather than an extreme right one by scholars (see Ivaldi & Pineau, 2022; Genga, 2017; Stockemer & Barisione 2016; Tarchi & De Feudis, 2015). Undeniably, the old Front Nationalwas an extreme right party (Tarchi, 2022: 12) – which occasionally even made use of esoteric fascist propaganda; symbols[5], myths, and imagery (Eatwell, 2017: 365). The party was born out of marginalized (and neofascist) Ordre Nouveau movement, when on October 5, 1972 its Mussolini-sympathizing leader Alain Robert joined forces with former Poujadist[6] MP and Algeria War veteran Jean-Marie Le Pen to form what became officially known as the Front National pour l’Unité Française. As Le Pen had more institutional experience and was perceived as more “moderate” by the public, he would eventually become the sole leader of the political group (Stockemer, 2017: 10). This early Front National was a haven for the whole French extreme right, from miscellaneous nationalists (of Bonapartist, Boulangist, Petainist, Poujadist or even Tixierist[7] extraction) to ex pro-French Algeria “freedom fighters” and anti-system extremists (from the movements Occident, Europe-Action, Jeunesses Patriotes, etc.) who idolized a form of internationalist or Europeanist “new fascism” (Stockemer, 2017: 8-11; Ignazi, 2000: 180-186).
The more than 50-year-old history of the Front National/Rassemblement National can essentially be divided into six phases (which sometimes overlap) – The Beginnings (1970s), The Minor Successes Phase (1980s), The Reaganite-Neoliberal Phase (1982-1993), The Crossroads Phase (late 1990s), The Apex Phase (early 2000s, 2002) and the Dédiabolisation / ‘New Front’ Phase (2012-). In the first phase, during the whole of the 1970s, the Front was completely marginalized and trapped in what Kurt Weyland (2017) would define as the extreme right “ideological ghetto” (Weyland, 2017: 62-63). In fact, no real electoral gains were made by the early “Le Penist” Front (Ignazi, 2000: 186-190). The 1973 legislative and 1974 presidential elections were a complete failure, with the party counting less than 300 members and never even achieving one percent of the vote. In the 1978 legislative ones, a similar trend recurred, with a mere 0.33% obtained in the first round (Genga, 2017: 36). Throughout the 1970s, the Front only manifested “an ideology that included racism, militarism, anti-democracy[8], and virulent anti-communism” (Stockemer, 2017: 12). Taking this into account, Le Pen was mainly interested in the small businessmen and craftsmen vote, therefore he combined authoritarian policies on crime, state security, and immigration with a more flexible (not typically neofascist) anti-tax approach on the economy.
The Minor Successes Phase (1980s)
Only in the 1980s, during the second phase, did Le Pen’s mixed political positions begin to bear fruit. De facto, in 1983 (more than 10 years after its formation) the Front performed positively in supplementary local elections achieving more than 16% in certain municipalities of northern France (such as Dreux) and as far as 12% in others in a nearby region (Genga, 2017; 38-38). One year later, in 1984, another electoral breakthrough occurred, as Le Pen’s party achieved 11% in the European elections (Stockemer, 2017: 16). This was an “outstanding” result for an extreme right fringe party. Some scholars attribute the (minor) successes of the Front in the 1980s (from 1982-83 onwards) to the bad decision-making of D’Estaing’s and Mitterrand’s – respectively centrist and socialist governments – on law-and-order (e.g. the unpopular amnesty reforms), a spike in immigration, alongside a heightened sensitivity against Islam and an economic crisis (two oil shocks in 1973 and 1979) that included an increase in unemployment, public debt, and inflation (see Perrineau, 1996; 1997; Genga, 2017). All of these issues, in tandem with Le Pen’s recurring invitations to speak on television[9], helped the Front to reach out to a wider (and less ideologically motivated) audience. By the late 1980s, Le Pen could finally cast himself as the politician to represent the working and middle classes who felt France was changing for the worse. Also, in 1987 Le Pen publicly stated that “gas chambers were a minor detail in the second world war” (Genga, 2017: 55). Surprisingly, this highly controversial statement did not backfire on him at all, but perhaps attracted even more attention and votes from the angry and disillusioned electorate (Genga, 2017: 55-56). Ultimately, in the important 1988 presidential elections Le Pen garnered almost 14.38 % of the vote in the first-round alone (Stockemer, 2017; Genga, 2017).
The Reaganite-Neoliberal Phase (1982-1993)
It must be noted that between 1982 (after the VI party congress) and 1993, Le Pen began to take a different approach towards fiscal policy, setting aside the state interventionism, economic nationalism, and protectionism that had been ever present within the Front to incorporate laissez faire positions that are alien to the neofascist corporatist and dirigiste tradition (Genga, 2015: 95). The expert Nicola Genga (2015) summarizes Le Pen’s views during this period as favorable to a “natural order based on inequality, which justifies the existence of a capitalist system of production” (Genga & Algisi, 2015). During the Reaganite-Neoliberal Phase – which partially overlapped with the 1980s Minor Successes Phase – Le Pen self-described his party as “socially left-wing but economically right-wing” (Genga & Algisi, 2015). Notwithstanding this peculiar (and contradictory) statement, it is evident that this shift was more tactical than ideological given during this period the best way for the Front to succeed was to present itself as a direct alternative to the socialists/communists in power (Genga & Algisi, 2015). To be sure, Le Pen’s picture taken with US President Ronald Reagan perfectly encapsulates this neoliberal phase (Tarchi, 2015). Within scholarship, the consensus is that this phase came to an end abruptly in 1993 when Le Pen turned his back on economic liberalism, in order to return to more welfare chauvinist and statist policies (Genga, 2017: 97) that resemble those of his daughter Marine Le Pen today (some go as far as suggesting Marine is a “social populist,” see Ivaldi & Pineau, 2022).
The Crossroads Phase (late 1990s)
In the fourth phase, the Front found itself at a crossroads due to internal squabbles (see Déze, 2012: 125). The (almost) unquestioned chief Le Pen was challenged by the “moderate” wing of the party led by the delegate Bruno Megret (Taggart, 2002: 78, 87). This politician had an alternative and opposite vision for the future of the party, and convinced part of the membership that the only way forward to achieve serious electoral relevance was to leave the “ideological ghetto” and marginalization once and for all (Stockemer, 2017: 21). Essentially, Mégret argued that only by shifting its attitudes on most issues the Front would become a respectable center-right party that could form alliances with other parties – especially the neo-Gaullists (Stockemer, 2017: 21). As a result, Mégret and other MPs who backed him, were thrown out by Le Pen, and forced to form a smaller party that had no real leverage (Whitney, 1998; Stockemer, 2017: 22).
The Apex Phase (early 2000s, 2002)
This takes us to the Apex Phase. In April 2002, by softening some of his positions temporarily, and concomitantly reworking his discursive patterns through more populistic and “inclusive” appeals to French people “of all socio-economic backgrounds,” “of all religions,” and “of all skin colors,” Le Pen made it to the run-off of the presidential election (Tarchi, 2015: 135). By this point, he was perceived by the public as the only real anti-establishment candidate who had a chance at the presidency. Strikingly, he managed to obtain nearly 18% of the vote. Although incumbent President Jacques Chirac refused to share a platform with the Front’s leader and to officially debate him (see Henley, 2002) he still beat Le Pen. Nevertheless, the year 2002 marked the highest point for Le Pen and his extreme right party.
The Dédiabolisation / ‘New Front’ Phase (2011 –)
After subsequent years of worse performances, in January 2011 during the Front’s Congress of Tours Jean-Marie’s daughter Marine Le Pen is finally confirmed as official president of the party after beating her opponent (who was also close to her father) Bruno Gollnisch (Genga, 2017). From thereafter the dédiabolisation era begins, this culminates with Jean-Marie being expelled from the party by M. Le Pen herself after making inappropriate comments regarding the holocaust and WW2 (Genga, 2017: 171; BBC News, 20 August 2015). Synchronously, many more extremist figures (especially deriving from the youth wing) are distanced from the party in the hope to build a new moderate image (Genga, 2017). As M. Le Pen’s favorite advisor – the libertarian crypto-technocrat Florian Philippot – had anticipated, this major repositioning proved to be electorally successful (Genga, 2017: 175). Although some (such as political advisor and analyst Patrick Buisson) argue the brand of Marine’s party is still far too “toxic” to rule the country (Samuel, 2016), she has still come closer than her father when it comes to winning the presidency. Her electoral result at the 2022 Presidential elections was overall regarded as positive by her supporters, because even if she lost to Emmanuel Macron for the second time consecutively, in the second round she garnered 31.7 % of the vote (Voce & Clarke, 2022). Prior to that, in the run-off of the 2017 Presidential elections she had performed even better, given she obtained 33.9% of the vote against the same opponent (Statista Research Department, March 11, 2024).
Under M. Le Pen, the party’spolitical project took shape as a means to provide French voters with an ideological alternative to the “mainstream parties” – namely (the neo-Gaullist) Les Républicains, the Socialist Party, President Macron’s En Marche! (subsequently Renaissance party), and the radical left/green groupings. Whereas some scholars highlight that there has been a degree of continuity between this new party and her father’s old Front National (see Mammone, 2015; Stockemer, 2017), others argue there has been a clear philosophical demarcation of the “new Front” from its extreme right past (see Gaffney, 2012; Genga, 2017; Tarchi, 2022). For instance, the specialist on lepénismeDaniel Stockemer (2017) explains that there are specifically three aspects that have improved (or “softened”) the party’s image as M. Le Pen took over its leadership (Stockemer, 2017: 39-40). First, she has regularly repudiated the “extreme right” label (Stockemer, 2017: 39). The evidence suggests that all intellectual references to thinkers like MauriceBarrès, Charles Maurras, Robert Brasillach and others have suddenly disappeared from the party’s discourse (Stockemer, 2017: 39). Second, any comments made by her father that could be deemed as intolerant, antisemitic, or generically racist, have also been instantly disavowed with fervor (Stockemer, 2017: 39-40). When it comes to antisemitism particularly, M. Le Pen’s discreet realignment in favor of Israel on foreign policy speaks volumes about the party’s moderation (Abboud, 2023). Third, she has embraced a traditional(-ist) form of French republicanism (a French version of neo-conservative American exceptionalism) that has its intellectual foundations in post-1789 universalist, liberal (although M. Le Pen opposes economic liberalism) and secular thought (Stockemer, 2017: 40). This approach is philosophically distant from the anti-intellectualist and anti-bourgeois ideological mapping of fascism and neofascism that often pushed for a return to pre-French revolution moral codes (see Paxton, 2005; Dagnino, 2016). Amid 2018, the party was officially renamed Rassemblement National in a move to put the organization’s distant past and father’s legacy behind once and for all.
Rassemblement National (RN): Ideological Profile
Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.
Populist, “right-wing” or both?
M. Le Pen’s party has a comprehensible ideological profile. Whilst the RN still fails to meet the criteria to be evaluated as a (classical) “center-right” party – as it is not Atlanticist enough nor does it abide to the values of free-market capitalism or consider the liberal rule of law one of its core tenets (see Trippenbach & Johannès, 2022) – the party can instead be classified as “right-wing” populist. If the primary (and paramount) ingredient in the RN’s political cocktail is populism, the secondary one is a form of nationalist social conservatism. On one hand, at the center of its ideology and discourse we first find a commitment to popular sovereignty (the will of the people, volonté générale) inextricably linked to a heavy critique of national and international – both political and financial – “corrupt elites.” On the other hand, adjacent[10] to its anti-elitist ethos, we also find a strong nationalist rhetoric (although state nationalist[11] instead of ethnic nationalist[12]) that can be simplified by the slogan “Les Français d’abord!” (“The French First!”) (see Fraser, 2011). This slogan alone explains the RN’s positions against mass immigration and in favor of a strong interventionist state that regularly distributes resources (but to the native French only) in the name of an inter-classist welfare chauvinism.
If one considers the definition Norberto Bobbio (1994) confers to the political right, where he suggests right-wing movements (unlike leftist ones) accept the existence of societal hierarchies and inequalities and may even consider them as positive, both as a premise and as a natural outcome to social and economic competition, then we can deduce that the RN is only partially “right-wing.” After all, many of M. Le Pen’s statist-interventionist policies (anathema to center-right liberal-conservatives) are quintessential of populist formations with a social conscience that aim to foremostly represent the lower classes and ameliorate living and working conditions for them through redistribution (Moffitt, 2020). This is where the welfare chauvinism derives from a complex ideological synthesis between nationalist populism, cultural conservatism, and economic socialism (see Ivaldi & Pineau, 2022). It is no coincidence that M. Le Pen once said: “we are absolutely not a rightist party; those who believe it make a colossal interpretation error” (Le Pen as cited in Stockemer, 2017: 39).
The People and the Elite
In any event, the RN’s populist weltanschauung becomes evident if we consider the nine important aspects from Tarchi’s theoretical framework. As explained above, populists view “the people” as a cohesive and virtuous community which functions as the basis of legitimation for government action. This view is coherently reflected in the RN’s party manifesto (the “22 Measures” on its website), given we find within it not only the promotion of private property (essentially “facilitation of access” to it), but also that of social housing for French citizens – excluding immigrants (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 17). Government action is justified on the basis that large infrastructure developments, and the construction of 100,000 (plus 20,000 for young people) new social housing units, will only be provided for those struggling citizens who are legally French (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 17). Under these circumstances, immigrants/foreigners are not a priority, as they are considered to be part of an “outgroup”[13] that is neither “cohesive” (as migrants in France may originate from distinct “non-homogeneous” countries) nor “virtuous” (as populists perceive them as a burden to the public resources system). The idea is that regarding economic state protection they do not deserve to have the same rights of the French, who are part of an “organic community” (Zanatta, 2016: 65-80), thus supposedly both cohesive and virtuous at the same time. Moreover, even if M. Le Pen states that she “has nothing against foreigners,” her party clearly opposes free education to the children of illegal immigrants (The Guardian, December 8, 2016). Supposedly under foreign influence, French elites (the “UMPS[14] system”) have disproportionately provided privileges (such as social housing) to immigrants that should have never been welcomed into France initially (Dézé, 2014: 24).
This takes us to the negative view of the elite these right-wing populists hold. According to M. Le Pen, it is “time to free the French people from arrogant elites” (see Acton, 2017). Even though the RN’s manifesto currently lacks explicitly anti-EU statements—aside from the aim to “protect the economy” from “unfair competition” and to revise EU trade agreements—one of its major immigration policies is tied to the inherently anti-elitist principle of direct democracy. Through constant referendums, “the people” will be able to put an end to “settlement immigration/reunification” (of immigrant families), scrap residence permits for those who have not worked for a year and decide whether the processing of asylum applications should (or should not) occur in French territory (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 1). In summary, for the RN, anti-elitism primarily involves “giving people a voice.” While the manifesto conveys a positive view of popular decision-making, it simultaneously portrays professional politicians and technocratic elites in a very negative light. As previously mentioned, in populism, elites are seen as a dangerous power bloc that must be kept in check by the people through instruments of direct democracy (Tarchi, 2015: 125).
The Nation and the State
As Tarchi argues (and as we already know), in populist ideology the concept of people and nation are inextricably interconnected though the nation comes after the people (both as “hard-working” individuals and as a “homogenous” collective) given the nation is simply product of the cultural traditions of a people to whom it provides a stable identity(Tarchi, 2015: 125). In other words, it is the people and their cultural traditions that form the nation and not vice-versa. Interestingly, in the RN’s latest manifesto the concept of nation becomes conveniently – but also ideologically – almost indistinguishably linked and blurred with that of the state. As outlined earlier, the state is understood as nothing more an administrator of public interest that is entirely subordinate to the will of the people (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In fact, within the manifesto it is the state that works for the nation because a virtuous homogenous community composes the nation: theFrench people. Thus, the RN’s ideal state is people centric. Similarly to the American proto-populist Gettysburg Address – “government of the people, by the people, and for the people.” This longing for an active and interventionist state becomes apparent in the RN’s policies regarding Islam. In the manifesto, a new strict law is proposed to combat Islamism (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 2). Islam itself is not regarded as French but is instead perceived as alien to the “cultural tradition” of French secular Republicanism (in the sense that this religion cannot be assimilated within it), and therefore is also an enemy to the nation-state (Genga, 2017). Nor is Islam regarded as something able to provide a “stable identity,” given populists suspect the presence of Muslims and Christians (as well as atheists) within the country concomitantly may stir religious and racial tensions among the populace. From a populist perspective, a populace should be monolithic and homogenous (Hameleers & Vliegenthart, 2019: 22).
Proceeding to economic matters, all the anti-tax proposals the RN includes in its 22-point manifesto are aimed at French businesses owned by French businessmen (rassemblementnational.fr, Measures 4, 5, 8, and 12). The RN’s pledge to “support French families” through the removal of inheritance tax for low-middle income families (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 8), as well as its proposals to increase welfare support for French mothers with one or more children (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 8), is particularly symbolic of a strong state (that intervenes to improve people’s lives) for two reasons. The first has to do directly with populism and the second with social conservatism. Firstly, the RN wishes to present itself as a populist party therefore is required to pursue economic policies (such as subsidies and tax cuts) that favor the petite bourgeoisie and especially the working-class (see Kyle & Gultchin, 2018). Although the old Front National (like its successor today) was overall an inter-classist party, experts such as Nonna Mayer (1998) have pointed out that the vote for Le Pen in the 1995 Presidential elections was effectively a “class vote” – with several youngsters moving away from the PCF[15] towards the Front’s pseudo-socialist nationalism (Surel, 2002: 143-144). This author later coined the term “worker Le Penism” (Mayer, 1994). Following the same conceptual lead, Pascal Perrineau (1995) referred to this same phenomenon as “left Le Penism” (Perrineau, 1995: 243-261). These observations remain relevant today, as M. Le Pen enjoys broad consensus among the working classes from whom she consistently courts political support. Secondly, the RN is also inherently socially conservative (partially right-wing) and is therefore expected to financially assist single-mothers or larger families with children to promote a “battle for births”[16], which is allegedly necessary to demographically boost the so-called “pure people” (term borrowed from Cas Mudde) of France.
Society, the Individual, and the Leader
Moving on from the populist view of nation intertwined with that of state to that of society, it must be stressed that the RN’s positions on this matter are rather specific. M. Le Pen herself has notoriously stated that “multi-cultural societies are multi-conflict societies” (see Viscusi, 2017). This party is known to take a more (typically populist) exclusionary than inclusionary stance when it comes to society and its collectivist communitarian features. Parties like the RN view their country, its rural towns, metropolitan districts, provinces, and regions, as essentially constituting not only a sacred homeland, but also something of a heartland. Taggart defines a heartland as “a territory of the imagination…the heartland is that place, embodying the positive aspects of everyday life” (Taggart, 2002: 95). It is self-evident who belongs and who does not belong to this heartland (and society) (Taggart, 2002: 96-98). In this case, immigrants, religious fanatics, career politicians (M. Le Pen was a lawyer before entering politics), left-wing (anti-RN) activists, plutocrats with internationalist vocations, fifth columnists and foreign bodies, are certainly not part of the populist heartland (Taggart, 2002: 94). As a result, they are not included in the broader vision for French society that the RN upholds.
However, paradoxically, by observing the party’s manifesto for an ideal society we are also confronted with a more “liberal” or libertarian aspect of populist ideology. For example, populists recognize that people’s lives should often come before politics and the state. People are allowed to flourish economically and intellectually, to unleash their individual potential – “Voila, we’re all molded by our personal paths, which forge our sensibilities” argues the RN’s leader (see Gourevitch, 2015). M. Le Pen is supposedly pro-abortion (as long as it occurs within 14 weeks of pregnancy), pro-divorce, and pro-gay rights (as long as civil unions do not become marriage) (see Poirer, 2017). Contrastingly, she has also spoken out against a purely consumerist neoliberal individualism from an economic standpoint: “Our project is based on rejecting individualism and the power of money” (Smith, 2018).
Furthermore, closely observing the RN, one can deduce that the party acknowledges individuals are the cornerstone of social life. M. Le Pen ardently defends the civil individual rights of the French people. For instance, unlike Jean-Marie’s old Front, the RN’s positions are now – to a limited extent – sometimes feminist (see Schurts, 2024). On one occasion, the RN’s leader expressed that utilizing a headscarf to meet an Islamic leader (the Grand Mufti of Lebanon) would be in conflict with the values of French republicanism and those of a free (liberal egalitarian) society, where both sexes enjoy equal rights (see Balkiz & Masters, 2017). “I will not cover myself up” M. Le Pen stressed while referring to her meeting, which eventually was cancelled (Balkiz & Masters, 2017). For the same reasons, she proposes a complete ban on headscarves and burkas in public spaces (see France24, April 7, 2022). Populist crypto-individualism also played a role in her decision to not support a ban on abortion – any mention to this issue is absent in her “22-measures” as well as in her self-authored books (Tarchi, 2022: 13). Also, M. Le Pen unequivocally condemned those religious fundamentalists who despise gay people (Wildman, 2017).
Taking this into account, to cast herself as a spokesperson and interpreter of the needs of the people, her leadership style embodies the populist ideal. The policies outlined for the RN not only position her as a leader close to the people, but her personal traits, which emphasize “ordinary qualities” like “common sense” and a “strong work ethic” (see Ivaldi & Mazzoleni, 2019: 1), also resonate positively with the populace. Moreover, in order to appeal to a more moderate base of working-class conservative supporters, she often reiterates that she is (like many others in France) a woman and a mother (Geva, 2020: 13-14). In the eyes of the many, M. Le Pen has become a “woman in a captain’s suit,” just as popular as Margaret Thatcher and Evita Peron in the past (Geva, 2020: 6,14). In a typically populist fashion, this female politician wants to demonstrate that she has both ordinary and extraordinary qualities that can both represent and lead the populace at the same time. As a natural guide, it is common for her to remind her potential voters that “Peuple de France, l’heure est venue de te lever” (Le Pen, April 21, 2022, Twitter). This is an invitation for “the people” of the French nation to rise-up. To rise not only against the neoliberal elite in France, but also against the diktats of the elite-backed European Union that are supposedly promoting and funding mass immigration, and finally against the traditional parties (neo-Gaullists, socialists, and communists) that are engaged in destroying the social fabric of the “homogenous” French nation.
Democracy and the Market
Marion Marechal Le Pen at the European election campaign launch meeting of the far-right “Reconquete” party in Paris, France, on March 10, 2024. Photo: Victor Velter.
To conclude this section, the relationship that M. Le Pen’s party has with democracy and the market is ambiguous, to say the least. Like all populists, the RN has an impatience with checks and balances (the formalities of liberal constitutionalism – e.g., political mediation and procedural legitimacy) that are an essential aspect of liberal democracy (see Bickerton & Invernizzi Accetti, 2017: 327). Nevertheless, this party does not reject representative democracy overall. The RN’s view of democracy is simply of one that is direct and majoritarian. In its manifesto, referendums and plebiscites occupy the first position (in terms of “22 measures” to be taken). Accordingly, people will be able to decide on issues that affect their lives, ranging all the way from immigration to social housing and labor regulation (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 1).
Regarding the market, the sociologist Lorenzo Cattani (2017) has appropriately suggested that M. Le Pen’s party is a “bearer of neoliberal values regarding the national economy but at the same time also strongly critical of globalization and the more internationalist principles of neoliberalism.” Following this logic, it can be assumed that even though M. Le Pen’s technically opposes both unrestricted free trade and autarky, she still considers the market an overall as “somethingpositive”and therefore advocates for protectionism as a middle-way (Cattani, 2017). Her economic positions have been significantly influenced by the French Eurosceptic economist Maurice Allais (1911-2010), which explains her past critique of the single currency, European integration, and the European constitution. Similarly, M. Le Pen’s niece and (now former) important party representative, Marion-Maréchal Le Pen, has very clearly expressed that “a form of protectionism should be enforced at a national level, at least on strategic areas such as agriculture” (The Sydney Morning Herald, August 3, 2013).
The RN accepts (and even welcomes) the existence of private property, entrepreneurship, and a social-market economy, given the party is not fully anti-capitalist. Notwithstanding, the core idea is that small and medium businesses should be taxed much less and allowed to operate under a diminished amount of bureaucracy and regulation (especially EU regulation) whereas large, delocalized business (especially multinationals, a product of so-called “rootless capitalism”) should be increasingly taxed and monitored by the state (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 18; see also Cattani, 2017). The latter are suspected to conspire against the interests of the working people (and their small-medium businesses) and the French nation (rassemblementnational.fr, Measure 18). In the RN’s rhetoric, the evils of globalized capitalism are juxtaposed to the virtues of national-capitalism (Cattani, 2017), practiced day-to-day by the petite bourgeoisie – mainly craftsmen, tradesmen, fishermen, landowning farmers, and smaller-scale (local) entrepreneurs. They are ultimately considered to be the only “pure people” (to borrow Mudde’s term once more) of the nation.
Forza Nuova (FN): A History
Anti-fascist demonstration against the Candidate in the Primaries of the fascist part of Forza Nuova in Turin, Italy on March 1, 2018. Photo: Stefano Guidi.
The Early Years
Unlike the French populists, the extreme right party Forza Nuova (FN) does not have a particularly long or complex history. True to its name, this party can be considered a “new force” with a relatively brief history. This history is deeply embedded in the tradition of Italian Fascism and appears quite transparent and straightforward to external observers. However, the brevity of its history does not make it unremarkable. On the contrary, being an organization founded by two alleged “terrorists”—Roberto Fiore and Massimo Morsello (also a musician alongside his political activism)—FN has attracted significant interest from journalists and political analysts who study the European extreme right. In 1980, both Fiore and Morsello fled Italy to seek political asylum in Britain as they were being investigated for the Bologna Massacre (August 2, 1980, which resulted in 85 deaths and 200 injuries), one of the darkest moments in the political history of the Italian Republic (Corriere della Sera, October 10, 2021; Nazzi, 2021).
In London, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Fiore had the opportunity to develop political and economic networks with British neofascist groups, supposedly with the help of BNP frontman Nick Griffin, and to establish successful businesses in the hospitality sector before returning to Italy without facing prosecution (Biondani et al., 2017). Due to these factors, along with the fact that the organization and its leader, Fiore, are openly fascist, FN represents an atypical example of an extreme right party. Founded in late September 1997, on the feast day of St. Michael the Archangel (Nazzi, 2017), FN aimed to reflect a niche form of Italian neofascism that was clerical (and fervently Roman Catholic) rather than secular (unlike CasaPound, another Italian neofascist movement) and traditionalist rather than futurist (Albanese, 2022: 317-318). Thus, ideologically, FN can be unequivocally placed on the ultra-authoritarian extreme right. More importantly, since its inception, FN has refused to adopt the ideological syncretism and flexibility of other 1990s Italian neofascist movements, such as Pino Rauti’s Fiamma Tricolore. This is why it positions itself on the far right of the artificial spectrum of Italian neofascism, which, as writer Giano Accame (1990) argues, includes both “right-wing” and “left-wing” elements. In any case, with FN, both Fiore and Morsello—who “cut their teeth” during the dark days of the Anni di Piombo through participation in violent actions of extra-parliamentary groups like Terza Posizione (“Third Position”) and the Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari (“Armed Revolutionary Nuclei” – NAR)—aimed to project fascism into the third millennium (Nazzi, 2017; Albanese, 2022: 317).
First Set of Elections: Failure in Pursuit
Like many European neofascists who wish to compete electorally, their primary objective was (and still is, as Fiore is alive, unlike Morsello) to turn their ideology in an “incubator for a new political model based on an old-fashioned design” – as the scholar Matteo Albanese (2002: 321) posits. However, if we solely consider FN’s electoral results, and compare them to other contemporary parties who have instead evolved from extreme right to moderate right (such as Alleanza Nazionale or FDI in the recent past) FN failed miserably. The only times it competed at a national level (in 2001, 2006, 2008, 2013, 2018) it merely achieved less than one percent (the highest score was in 2006 with 0.67% in the Chamber of Deputies of Italy) with none of its candidates ever entering parliament (Ministero dell’Interno, Eligendo L’Archivio, 2024). Only in the 2004 European elections, by presenting a joint list of candidates alongside Alessandra Mussolini’s (the granddaughter of the Duce) Alternativa Sociale did FN perform slightly better, managing to obtain 1.23% (Ministero dell’Interno, Eligendo L’Archivio, 2024). Notwithstanding, the only seat available in the EU Parliament went to the most prominent figure from the grouping – Mussolini herself.
Alliances, Assaults, and Attempts
However, Fiore eventually managed to become a Member of the European Parliament (MEP) through FN and its alliances, serving in Brussels and Strasbourg from May 2008 to July 2009. Fiore’s activism at a supranational level involved consolidating his ties with other European neofascists within the EU Parliament. Together with the notorious Nick Griffin, he founded an ultra-nationalist group called the Alliance for Peace and Freedom (APF), which was also pan-European and “anti-Zionist.” The APF included the extreme right United Romania Party, the Romanian-Moldovan Noua Dreaptă (New Right), several Spanish Falangist parties, and Neo-Nazi organizations from Germany, Greece, Czechia, and Slovakia (see www.memri.org, April 18, 2024).
Nonetheless, throughout the 2010s, FN remained on the fringes of Italian and European politics. However, the party gained attention after some of its members, including Fiore, were involved in violent acts, such as the assault on the Italian General Confederation of Labour (CGIL), the country’s oldest and most important trade union, on October 9, 2021. This incident brought FN back into the spotlight, drawing scrutiny from the public, media, police, judiciary, and other authorities (Il Sole 24 Ore, December 20, 2023). As a result, in the winter of 2023, Fiore and others involved were sentenced to over eight years in prison, though FN itself was not disbanded (Il Sole 24 Ore, December 20, 2023; Girardi, 2022). In an interview following a small political gathering in Isernia, Molise, where he was praised by supporters, Fiore stated that despite his criminal charges, FN would attempt to participate in the 2024 European Elections (Fiore, TVI Molise, December 23, 2023). He emphasized the importance of this period for Italy, possibly hinting at a resurgence of fascism with a pseudo-populist tone (Fiore, TeleRegione TV, December 23, 2023). However, FN failed to gather enough preliminary signatures to present a candidates list for the EU elections in June 2024. With Fiore’s sentencing, the future of FN and Italian militant neofascism remains uncertain.
Forza Nuova (FN): Ideological Profile
Hitler and Mussolini in Munich, Germany, June 18, 1940. Photo: Everett Collection.
Marginal and Controversial, but not Irrelevant
Forza Nuova (FN) is an extreme right party that is both marginal and controversial in Italian politics. It is marginal because, despite consistently participating in Italian general elections since 1997, FN has never reached the four percent threshold required to enter parliament. It is controversial due to its semi-personalist leadership and historical ties to the militant, violent, and subversive Italian neofascist movement active during the “Anni di piombo” (“Years of Lead”) (Biondani et al., 2017). Fiore, the party’s leader, openly expresses admiration for Mussolini’s twenty-year dictatorship and the Italian Social Republic (RSI), as well as for other authoritarian leaders like Juan Perón in Argentina (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012). In a 2012 television appearance discussing fascism and neofascism, Fiore admitted, “I’ve always defended fascism; every time I was asked whether I would have sided with the Americans or the RSI (during WWII), I’ve always responded – with the RSI” (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012). Despite differentiating his ideology from National Socialism, he also refused to distance himself from Neo-Nazi movements like Golden Dawn when questioned during the same show (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012).
Taking all of this into account, FN’s electoral marginality does not render it irrelevant in the political arena or diminish its potential threat to a liberal-democratic polity. First and foremost, some party members have engaged in premeditated attacks on immigrants over the years—between November 2012 and November 2013, there were more than fifty racially motivated assaults (Fiano and redazione Roma Online, 2016). Second, in addition to Fiore, two key FN representatives—Giuliano Castellino and Luca Castellini—along with five other extreme right activists indirectly connected to the party, were officially charged for their violent assault on the CGIL in October 2021 (Il Sole 24 Ore, December 20, 2023). This incident was taken very seriously by Italian public opinion, politicians, the judiciary, and other state authorities. Graphic images of the violent protest circulated in the press, raising concerns among parts of the population about a possible resurgence of neofascism, even if on a limited scale.
Authoritarian, Anti-democracy, and Nationalist?
If we reconsider the three/four elements that Carter (2005) argues constitute the ideological core of the extreme right, it becomes clear that FN is unequivocally an extreme right party, as these elements are integral to its ideological repertoire. First, FN is explicitly authoritarian, advocating for the forced repatriation of all immigrants, regardless of their legal status in Italy (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 3). Second, it is anti-democratic because the majority of its policies are impossible to implement within a rule-of-law system upheld by Italian (anti-fascist) constitutionalism, where the parliament plays a crucial role. Third, FN embraces both exclusionary and holistic nationalism. Its recurring propaganda posters, which depict black people as “rapists” or sub-human, exemplify exclusionary nationalism (see Il Fatto Quotidiano, September 2, 2017). In contrast, its calls for an “organic state”—a statist and corporatist model where the state, nation, religion, people, and “blood and soil” are so interwoven that they cannot be separated—demonstrate holistic nationalism (see Vercelli, 2018). Any reformulation that separates the Italian nation-state from its people’s religion, culture, territory, and biological characteristics would, in FN’s view, lead to the decay and eventual death of the nation. After all, fascists have always been obsessed not only with the idea of palingenesis (see Griffin, 1996) but also with that of decay or decadence (for a full account, see Schulman, 2006). Moreover, when adapting FN’s manifesto and discourse (primarily that of leader Fiore) to Tarchi’s (2015: 125) comprehensive scheme that examines nine aspects of party ideology—such as the people, nation, state, and society—it becomes undeniably clear where Fiore’s organization stands politically.
The People, the Nation, and the State
To begin this party’s analysis by observing its view of the people, it should be noted that – as a party influenced by fascism – FN unsurprisingly does not hold a particularly optimistic perspective of human nature or the masses per se. In Mussolini’s words: “The Fascist conception of the State is all embracing; outside of it no human or spiritual values can exist, much less have value…the Fascist State – interprets, develops, and empowers the whole life of a people” (Mussolini & Gentile, 1932: 847). In FN’s case, although people are functional to its long-term statist political aspirations, unless they are forcefully guided, either by a charismatic leader or a strong state’s elite, they can never be trusted to willingly find their path or positively serve the country. Ironically, it was the proto-liberal Rousseau (in 1762) and not a fascist intellectual that stated, “people need to be forced to be free,” still this appears to be FN’s idea if we observe its policies such as the nationalization of banks (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 5). If such policy is carried forward, the forzanovisti[17] insist that “all the people of the earth can be free from their usurpers” (Ibid). This phrase is present in their online manifesto and appears to contain an implicit reference to the centenarian Jewish world-domination conspiracy theory. A much more explicit reference can, however, be found in a 2019 la7 (private television network) interview provided from FN’s “National Vice-Secretary” Luca Castellini who claims that “they control the world” when Jews are mentioned in relation to a rise in antisemitism (Castellini, La7, October 18, 2019).
Another conception of the people that FN’s appears to have is that all European nations (hence also Italian people) should be freed from the shackles of the European Union (EU), which is to be replaced with a much more authoritarian confederation loosely based around the ethics of Blut und Boden (“Blood and Territory”) but also with inspiration from the Romano-Greek classical model (Fiore, Forza Nuova, YouTube, March 9, 2011). As a proud fascist, Fiore inevitably sees Italy as a direct cultural (and perhaps even political) product of that millenarian historic tradition and perceives Italians as the direct descendants of Ancient Romans and Ancient Greeks (Ibid). In essence, FN’s ideal Europe is a “Europe of free peoples” (FN general elections program, 2013, point 18). He goes into more detail throughout an interview closely preceding the 2019 European elections where he states that “we cannot have a liberal-masonic Europe with no values at the heart of it…we cannot have a neo-internationalism which is a re-formulation of Marxism in a European form, we need patriotism, we need religious values, but more importantly: we cannot destroy the family because family is the primary cell for the national and European re-construction” (Fiore, Porta a Porta, May 16 2019).
FN’s idea of a (culturally, morally, spiritually and perhaps racially) purified and independent nation explains its decades-old anti-globalist campaign. According to FN, leaving the EU, NATO, the UN, and other strategic alliances and international bodies means liberating Italy from the influence of inimical foreign powers that do not share the same destiny with Italy (FN general elections program, 2013, point 18). Not merely the Germans and the French who supposedly run the neoliberal and market-oriented EU, but especially the Americans (sworn enemies of the fascists since WW2) who serve the interests of their own military-industrial complex (FN rejects US-led war campaigns abroad) but also prone to the whims of big capitalists (e.g. Wall Street) who are – following an antisemitic conspiratorial “logic” – mostly Jewish (Fiore, ANSA,January 20, 2024; Berizzi, 2023). Nevertheless, a monist homogenous nation cannot exist without a strong authoritative state. FN unapologetically supports corporatism (in all areas of the economy) to “defend workers” (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 8). Also, protectionist measures and economic nationalism in general are recommended by the forzanovisti and its leadership. FN is averse to neoliberalism (both cultural and economic) and condemns the EU for embracing several aspects of the neoliberal economy, especially the third sector which is not regarded as highly as the first (raw materials, agriculture) and second (manufacturing) sectors of the economy (FN general elections program, 2013, point 12).
Society: “God, Homeland, and Family”
Regarding society,the societal vision of FN encompasses the “God, Homeland, and Family” value triad (Berizzi, 2019). This was popularized under Mussolini’s regime however the slogan itself is much older as it was coined by the philosopher-activist Giuseppe Mazzini as he and his men forged Italy as one nation (Gnocchi, 2022). God as FN was founded under the supposed protection of St. Michael the Archangel (on the day of the recurring religious feast) with the intent of being a party with a robust attachment to Christianity and the Roman Catholic Church (Albanese, 2022: 317; Il Cittadino, September 30, 2017). FN’s online manifesto includes a restoration of the Concordat between Catholic Church and Italian State, where Church and State are not entirely divided, and the former serves the purpose of positively influencing future generations (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 8). In such context, Christianity itself is presented as something identitarian (rather than purely religious) as it is the unifying trait of this morally pure “Europe of the free people.” It serves the person of uniting[18] (white) Europeans for a new crusade against everything deemed “Un-European” (see Albanese, 2022: 321). Currently, particularly Islam, but also Judaism. More specifically, Fiore considers Islam excessively “archaic and fundamentalist” (Fiore, Forza Nuova YouTube, March 10, 2011). Homeland is also included in the triad becauseFN strongly believes that the primary purpose of any Italian political party should be that of fostering Italian culture and defending the rights and access to state resources of all native Italians (viewed as more important and perhaps even “superior”[19]) when juxtaposed to (non-European) foreigners (La Gazzetta di San Severo, May 6, 2017).
Last but not least, family occupies an important position in FN’s ideology as it is clearly tied to the fascist obsession with national rebirth (see Griffin, 1995). In fact, the term “national rebirth” unequivocally appears in FN’s manifesto (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 2). In the forzanovisti mindset, like in the animal kingdom, a people’s (or species’) survival (and “civilizational greatness”) depends on its ability of reproduction and survival. The Darwinian conception at the core of fascist ideology (see Hawkins, 2009) equates human society with the animal kingdom, where the strong prey upon the weak, and only the fittest survive. This “survival of the fittest” notion was even more pronounced in German National Socialism than in Italian Fascism (see Menton, 1994). In fact, 19th-century Prussian proto-fascists like Friedrich von Bernhardi argued that war was a “biological necessity” (Menton, 1994). As history unfolded, the Nazis began to idolize societies like Sparta, which strictly regulated births (favoring males while rejecting those with congenital defects) and was effectively a war-oriented society—a model admired by Nazi Joseph Goebbels (see Roche, 2013; Sciarri, 2020). Spartans were always ready to defend themselves but were also prone to clash with other civilizations. Similarly, the traditionalist society that FN envisions is one with rigid hierarchies, modeled after the nuclear family unit, where a woman’s role is confined to household chores, reproduction, and motherhood (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 2).
The Individual and the Leader
Moving on from society to the individual, it is certain that FN sees consumerism, hedonism, and egotistic individualism (supposedly encouraged by multi-cultural societies like the US) as abnormal and decadent (for an account of FN’s “anti-Americanism,” see Centin, 2020). Unsurprisingly, from this perspective, homosexuality is also considered abnormal and should be rebuked. One FN local propaganda poster from a small town in Tuscany (Lajatico) reads: “Lajatico needs children, not homosexuals” (La Nazione, February 28, 2023). Moreover, to protect a presumed social “order against chaos” (as another propaganda leaflet states) a country where there is a strong state that limits excess freedoms (especially of those considered abnormal) and individual rights is envisaged (Bologna Today, September 24, 2015). For instance, FN argues that abortions in all circumstances should be banned (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 1). Fiore himself is a devout Catholic and a father to 11 children (Fiore, as cited in Madron, 2015).
This takes us to FN’s fascistic idea that, regardless of what the circumstances are, a nation revolves around its leader. In a Weberian sense, as far as his supporters are concerned, Fiore is semi-charismatic. In a British documentary[20] he was defined as “highly charismatic” by British neofascists who knew him personally. He is generally perceived as a virile and stereotypically Mediterranean man who contributed to the national cause by fighting for a “third way” (Eatwell, 2017: 372-374; Bhen-Ghiat, 1996: 293) and a “new state” (a fascist one, purified from the sins of post-war capitalism and communism) and also by producing many offspring. Also, notwithstanding his age, Fiore has shown dedication to his militant street squads as he actively participates in the anti-globalist protests hosted by FN where clashes with groups of anti-fascists (the Italian branch of “Antifa”) and the police are expected (Journeyman Pictures, YouTube, December 10, 2018). Naturally, there is a fascistic aesthetic of violence in these demonstrations as FN’s representatives like Castellino claim that they use their “bodies as shields” against the political enemy (Castellino, La7, October 17, 2021), namely anti-fascists, communists, but also the Italian police working for the institutions neofascists repudiate.
Democracy and the Market
Given FN’s stance on democracy, it’s unsurprising that such a relationship is essentially nonexistent. Although FN participates in elections (unlike Fiore’s earlier subversive movement Terza Posizione), its leader has publicly stated, “we respect fascism” (Fiore, YouTube, February 19, 2018). This explains the manifesto’s policies, which are permeated with nostalgia for dictatorship and aim to eliminate the anti-fascist Scelba and Mancino Laws (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 7). The Scelba Law, established in 1952, was designed to constitutionally prevent the formation of a new fascist party that might attempt to reestablish Mussolini’s Partito Fascista Nazionale (PNF) and instill a dictatorship through revolutionary and violent means. The Mancino Law (1993) is broader, condemning any incitement of hatred based on racial, religious, or sexual discrimination. For evident reasons, FN opposes both laws (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 7).
Remaining on the issue of democracy, it’s notable that direct democracy and referendums are not mentioned even once in FN’s recent party manifestos (see forzanuova1997.it; FN general elections program, 2013). Furthermore, it’s evident that the Forzanovisti view freedom of association with suspicion. The manifesto outlines FN’s plan to ban all secret societies or sects, particularly those of a Masonic nature (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 4). These groups are seen as being in collusion with internationalist interests, ranging from Jewish financiers to high-end magnates like Carlo De Benedetti and George Soros, and other so-called “corrupt” (anti-Italian) elite groups—labeled as the “traitors of the homeland” (La Voce Del Trentino, August 26, 2022). Despite this, FN, as (neo-)fascists, aim to forge a “new man” and a new elite (Eatwell, 2010). This spiritual aristocracy, based on the theories of the reactionary intellectual Julius Evola, is expected to emerge from Fiore’s small but loyal group of supporters, including his close associates Castellino, Cabras, and Taormina (Berizzi, 2021). In fact, during and after the Covid-19 pandemic, FN’s alarming plan was to form an emergency “shadow government for national liberation,” with Fiore as “Foreign Secretary,” to replace the elite from the Giuseppe Conte government and potentially put on trial those politicians (mainly left-leaning) who served in it (Berizzi, 2021).
Ultimately, when it comes to the market, FN’s positions are – as mentioned earlier – fully protectionist. According to this party, free markets are dangerous, since they are prone to the control of neoliberal elite interests and of the US, through Wall-Street (Fiore, Il Sole 24 Ore, January 20, 2024). Of course, alongside the US, Israel is also a sworn enemy (Berizzi, 2023). These anti-market tendencies are also displayed in FN’s 2013 program where it is postulated that there should be a “special court for crimes of financial (banking) nature” (FN general elections program, 2013, point 6). FN’s affinity for the concept of economic sovereignty emerges from their anti-ECB, anti-IMF, and anti-international “debt collectors” positions (forzanuova1997.it, point 5). The older 2013 program also states that there should be full state “control of the strategic sectors of the economy” (FN general elections program, 2013, point 4). However, even whilst FN is a pro-state illiberal party that yearns to control the Italian economy thoroughly, it does include in its agenda measures to tackle excessive bureaucracy to please the (national) small-medium businesses belonging to the first two sectors of the economy (FN general elections program, 2013, points 2, 14). Hypothetically, these anti-bureaucracy and anti-tax policies are listed in the hope of attracting a minority of lower-middle-class voters who remain nostalgic for fascism and the era when the trains supposedly “ran on time.”
Discussion and Conclusion: Why Populism and Extreme Right Differ
Discussion
As the emeritus professor Roger Eatwell (2017) appropriately argues “of all the major ‘-isms’, fascism and populism are the most elusive” (Eatwell, 2017: 363). Taking this into account, both are not elusive to the point that scholars would not be able to discern their distinctive and incongruous features. Specifically, as it has been demonstrated in previous paragraphs, even if the RN and FN do hold minor ideological similarities, the two parties have major conflicting views on how the state, society, and other aspects of politics per se should function. For the RN, the people are a cohesive group of free individuals who should always be given a voice, given they are considered to be at the center of political decision-making processes, regardless of whether such processes take place at a national or supranational (e.g. the EU) level. The direct democracy ideal that M. Le Pen’s party promotes (see Quencez and Michelot, 2017: 6) is an evident demonstration of the French populist’s attachment to a majoritarian form of popular sovereignty and traditional republican principles. “Direct democracy permits a true exercise of democracy itself” is what M. Le Pen exclaimed on one occasion (Finchelstein, 2017). In essence, as right-wing populists harbor a positive sentiment towards the populace, they believe people can be vertically integrated into the legislative and executive spheres of governance (see Mohrenberg et al., 2019). The people are trusted to make the correct (“common-sense”) decisions when asked to vote on critical issues concerning the EU, immigration policy, and/or taxes.
Contrastingly, being clearly located on the extreme right fringe of the spectrum, Fiore’s FN does not give the same amount of attention to popular sovereignty. In this Italian case, the people are not a primary aspect of politics and are overall viewed in a subtly more negative light. References to direct democracy practices are not present in FN’s discourse and electoral manifesto(s). In a classical fascist (but also neofascist) worldview, people (as an indifferent, “plebian and insubordinate mass”) can rarely be trusted to make the correct decisions (see Landa, 2018). Fully statist, authoritarian measures, from the “top-down” are usually preferred to the “bottom-up” instruments of direct democracy on a regular basis. It is no coincidence that historically fascists used to ban elections rather than expand them through referenda (Finchelstein, 2017). However, on rare occasions, fascist regimes did support plebiscites when popular consensus was already on their side, in order to further consolidate their power, when in reality important political decisions had already been made from a nationalist elite at the top (Finchelstein, 2017; Ben-Ghiat, 2023). This explains Fiore’s intentions to put in place an unelected “emergency government” (with a pre-defined elite taken from FN’s ranks) to set the country’s direction.
In fact, theelite is fundamental to the extreme right’s long-term political project, as it must dictate the correct path for the masses. Unlike right-wing populists, right-wing extremists do not aim to replace the elite with popular rule and tend to despise any form (primitive or modern) of ochlocracy (Landa, 2018). Naturally, from this perspective, both direct democracy and representative democracy are viewed as dangerous and decadent liberal (post-French revolution) bourgeois inventions. In the past, scholars like Mudde have argued that there are two opposites to populism: pluralism and elitism (Mudde, 2017: 34). For obvious reasons, the extreme right is not pluralist (and under this specific aspect it is similar to populism), but it is instead elitist (Mudde, 2015), and this is where right-wing extremism diverges from right-wing populism.
Furthermore, although it may appear that RN’s and FN’s idea of nation is similar, as both promote a homogenous community with a stable cultural identity that resists the fast-paced changes of modernity brought about by neoliberalism, multi-culturalism, and social progressivism, even on this matter FN’s positions are more extreme. M. Le Pen’s party is opposed to multi-culturalism as accordingly there should only be one defining culture in France shared by all French people, and this should directly derive from the country’s historical republican tradition (Genga, 2017). Such tradition may be old-fashioned or partially conservative but is also distinctly democratic and anti-fascist. Thus, the cultural traditions of the people occupy a paramount position in the idea of what the French nation should appear like. Instead, FN’s vision of nation is necessarily minoritarian, mainly because fascism in Italy (unlike republicanism in France) is not embraced by the majority of the populace, but merely by a small authoritarian minority of dictatorship nostalgics (Senatore, YouTrend, March 24, 2018). Constitutionally, with its many checks and balances,Italy remains a staunchly anti-fascist country (D’Ascenzo, 2018).
Regarding the RN, the “Français d’abord!” slogan essentially implies that second and third generation immigrants who were born in France are effectively part of “the people” and community (or heartland) hence it is not required of them to leave (see Lesueur, 2024). Additionally, whilst under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s management the party’s principal slogan was “France belongs to the French!” it appears that under M. Le Pen another slogan has become predominant (Fini, La7, November 13, 2015). This would be the more moderate (and somewhat neo-Gaullist) motto “France belongs to those who love it!” (Fini, La7, November 13, 2015). Interestingly, under this aspect the FN differs from the RN as well. It transpires from the agenda and discourse of the former party that even those who were born in Italy to foreign parents should be repatriated, as they are not considered Italian due to their ethnicity (FN online manifesto: forzanuova1997.it, point 3). One can deduce that while right-wing populist parties (as the RN) oppose multi-culturalism but not necessarily multi-racialism(e.g. someone with foreign parents but who is born in France is considered French), extreme right parties (as FN) object to both multi-culturalism and multi-racialism (see Berizzi, 2017). Uncoincidentally, Fiore’s party campaigned against the Ius Soli[21] and is only in favor of the Ius Sanguinis[22]when it comes to citizenship (Fiore, la Nuova Provincia, 2013). Slogans and posters of FN (such as those where African males are seen raping women) do not exist in the propaganda of M. Le Pen’s RN as this party does not stand for biological racism. Whilst right-wing populists may be “culturist” (see Taguieff, 1993: 101), and believe that some cultures (supposedly Western democratic liberalism) are “superior” to others, unlike right-wing extremists they will rarely ever express that certain races are (genetically) superior to others. Nevertheless, FN appears less concerned about immigration from white-majority Christian countries perceived to be similar to Italy (Fiore, la Nuova Provincia, 2013).
According to the RN’s ideology, the state occupies an important position and should intervene where and whenever necessary. However, in its populist (and “non-fascist”) conception, the state is always subordinate to the volonté générale (Tarchi, 2015: 125). In other words, the state should only mediate to ameliorate the living and working conditions of the people (especially working class and lower-middle class citizens) when free market fails to do so. This occurs through “social-populist” measures such as state-funded healthcare programs, public welfare benefits, and state subsidies or tax cuts for poorer families and individuals. Like the RN, FN envisions an actively interventionist state. However, FN takes this concept further, as fascists see the state as superordinate to both the people and the nation. In other words, the state shapes the nation, even artificially, if necessary, as historically seen in classical fascism, and grants the people only a limited set of rights. This is different from populist ideology as in populism the existence of people’s rights precedes that of the formation of a state. Unlike in populism – where individuals are expected to remain unpolitical and “get on with their lives” – in fascist ideology the individual (both men and women, in distinct ways) is expected to participate in politics and public life. In fact, Italian fascist philosopher Giovanni Gentile, who wrote one of fascism’s foundational texts alongside Mussolini, spoke of an ethical state to “teach core values to the new man, unlike the liberal state with its relativist distinction between private and public spheres” (Eatwell, 2017: 372).
The neofascists of the FN want a corporatist state that controls most (if not all) areas of the economy. Whereas the populists of the RN expect the state to control only certain strategic sectors and support interventionism (under the form of protectionism) in areas such as agriculture supposedly under threat from the EU’s bureaucratic regulation. This RN outlook may be considered authoritarian but is not as authoritarian as FN’s. After all, as one historian wrote, populism awkwardly lies “between democracy and dictatorship” but is still not dictatorial (Finchelstein, 2017: 175). To be sure, FN does not support globalization and free markets at all. In relation to the market, it takes on a crypto-autarchic (Fiore’s admiration for Iceland’s economy speaks volumes) and corporatist tradition of economic self-sufficiency (especially in terms of agriculture, construction, manufacturing) that is inspired by classical fascism (Fiore, Porta a Porta, May 29, 2009). As shown before, FN is extremely critical of internationalist capitalism. Instead, the RN’s position towards free markets and trade is more flexible and less negative than FN’s. However, in similar fashion to FN it does advocate for protectionism and state dirigisme in certain strategic areas of the economy, principally the first sector. Nonetheless, both right-wing populist and right-wing extremist parties believe in forms of taxation that cannot be considered fully socialist.
Overall, right-wing populists and right-wing extremists also hold different views when it comes to society. The society RN envisions is more liberal than FN’s. Even critiques to immigration (particularly Islamic immigration) derive from a universalist, republican, and partially liberalist standpoint (Genga, 2017; see also Brubaker, 2017, who defines this stance “civilizationism”). For example, the defense of women’s rights and those of the “LGBTQ+” community occupies a relevant position in the RN’s political-societal agenda. The same thing cannot be said about FN, a party that – unlike the RN – is not at all secular and is openly hostile to homosexuality. In fact, it is interesting to note that apart from sporadic statements claiming certain aspects of Islam are “archaic” the Italian neofascists do not give much attention to Islam or criticize it excessively. One hypothesis is that they derive this attitude directly from classical fascist ideology. It is known that Mussolini self-proclaimed himself the “protector of Islam” after he was granted a sword from the chief of a Libyan Berber tribe (Alpozzi, 2017). Although there were Muslims detained in Nazi Germany’s concentration camps (see Starr, 2020), Hitler, too, was not always Islamophobic, and allowed many Muslim soldiers to be recruited in the Waffen-SS(Trigg, 2012; Bougarel, 2017). In more recent times, FN and Fiore have been strong supporters of not only the pro-Palestine movement (also unapologetically defending Hamas, see Berizzi, 2023) but have also championed countries that are Arabic and Islamic (e.g. Assad’s Syria) or not Arabic but still Islamic (e.g. Iran), as they see them as potential allies in the struggle against Americanism and Zionism (Strickland, 2018). In any case, paradoxically, this does not mean that the forzanovisti welcome immigration from Muslim countries (Il Fatto Quotidiano, January 10, 2015). Fiore’s FN is vehemently anti-Atlanticist, whilst under M. Le Pen the RN has undergone an ideological mutation becoming less hostile to the Atlantic alliance compared to her father, who supported Reagan’s domestic policy (Tarchi, 2015: 123) but not US foreign policy.
Based on the analysis, we can also infer that whilst populism is understood to be a much more communitarian (and sometimes even collectivist) ideology rather than an individualistic one (see Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017: Chapter 1). Populists do not expect to control individuals through the state and acknowledge the fact that party and politics should not be involved in all aspects of private life (Taggart, 2002: 97; 2018). As already mentioned, as a peculiar populist party, the RN tolerates abortion, divorce, homosexuality (to some degree) and certain feminist positions (for an account of M. Le Pen’s “new feminism” see Shurts, 2024). Instead, as an extreme right and/or neofascist party, the FN accepts none of those things. FN’s ideological attachment to the ultra-conservative “God, Homeland, and Family” triad means that if individuals do not actively practice their Christian religion, serve their nation, and engage in heterosexual relationships that through social conformism lead to the birth of children, they cannot ever be a positive “component of the nation.” Therefore, they automatically become part of an (unwanted and unnecessary) “outgroup.”
When it comes to leadership, both the right-wing populist RN and right-wing extremist FN have semi-charismatic leaders. Evidently, without M. Le Pen in charge, the RN would be a very different party reflecting different positions. It is possible (or even likely) that having a divorced female and mother as leader, the RN has been able to expand its message to attract the votes of French women, but also of those segments of the electorate that do not identify as “right-wing” but are not located on the left either. With her semi-personalist leadership (but also relying on the advice of loyal subordinates like Bardella and Philippot) holds a firm grip on her party (governing with an “iron fist”) and determines most of its policies (Stockemer, 2017: 47-48). Currently, she faces almost no challenge from the minoritarian Catholic-Conservative faction of the party that feels closer to her niece Marion-Maréchal Le Pen (Genga, 2017: 209), as since May 2017 Marion has not been part of the RN but has lately joined a rival party on the right called Reconquête! (Darmanin, 2022).
Similarly, within FN Fiore faces no internal competition, and is considered to be (as one of the veterans of the 1970s neofascist militias) the only one able to guide the Italian nation and put an end to its (supposed) cultural and economic decay. However, there is an important distinction to be made, M. Le Pen is understood to be herself part of the ordinary people who as well as possessing ordinary qualities (such as being a mother to three children) is also blessed with the gift of being able to be a political animal and influence France’s current affairs – by being a bulwark against the elitist neo-Gaullist and socialist parties. Contrastingly, non-populist extreme right parties like FN are generally unable to attract a large number of followers, therefore rely only on winning over “converts” or “fervid disciples” (see Weyland, 2017: 63-65). Within his organization Fiore (who is understood to possess fascist extraordinary qualities, rather than populist ordinary ones) plays essentially the same role Mussolini played within the 1920s PNF. He is expected to spiritually inspire and guide both the nation and the people to indicate a common destiny for all Italians. A destiny that according to the FN’s leader will have to necessarily lie outside the boundaries of the EU and the American (NATO) sphere of influence (Fiore, ANSA, January 20, 2024).
Conclusion
In this contribution, Tarchi’s theoretical framework, along with a manifesto and discourse analysis methodology, was utilized to compare the ideological positions of a French populist party and an Italian extreme right party. Results of the manifesto and discourse analysis palpably show that while Forza Nuova (FN) is unequivocally a neofascist party belonging to the extreme right, the position of the Rassemblement National (RN) on the political spectrum is slightly more difficult to discern. While the RN certainly embraces a radical understanding of politics – incompatible with center-right neoliberal and center-left social-democratic parties – it is also undeniably more moderate ideologically compared to the Italian FN. In all circumstances, when it comes to specific attitudes towards the people, the nation, the state, society,the individual, the leader, the elite, democracy, and the market, “right-wing” populism is less extreme than “right-wing” neofascism. De facto, Mudde recently highlighted that populism may simply be “an illiberal democratic response to undemocratic liberalism” (Mudde, 2021: 5).
Thus, we can deduce that even if some of the RN’s political positions may theoretically be “illiberal” and authoritative (or even semi-authoritarian, particularly on immigrant rights), they are not altogether undemocratic. In contrast, FN is not only illiberal and resolutely authoritarian but also undemocratic. This comes as no surprise, as fascism and neofascism are inherently undemocratic. Nonetheless, under M. Le Pen’s leadership, the RN has transformed from an extreme right party to a populist right party in an attempt to become more moderate, even embracing the universalist values of republicanism and democratic conservatism, as stressed by Genga (2017: 176-180). The RN is embarrassed by its “toxic” past and wants to gradually overcome it. On the other hand, under Fiore, FN has maintained an ideological attachment to the political history, culture, myths, and symbols of Italian Fascism, proudly emphasizing its links to the Republic of Salò and Mussolini’s twenty-year dictatorship.
It is apparent that M. Le Pen’s party occupies a middle position peculiarly between those European parties like FN on the extreme right and those much more liberal-oriented on the center-right. This relatively new and complex position on the spectrum should today be understood as “right-wing populism” or “radical right-wing populism” (for those who prefer a slightly older or more precise academic terminology) and is occupied not only by M. Le Pen’s RN but also by many other parties on the European political landscape, such as the FPÖ, Lega Nord, PVV, Reform UK, Fidesz, and many others. All the parties mentioned are significantly more ideologically “moderate” compared to parties from the extreme (neofascist) right-wing family, such as FN itself, as well as CasaPound, España 2000, the NPD (now called Die Heimat), the BNP, Golden Dawn, Ergue-te and the “National Bolshevik” neo-Nazi groups present in modern-day Russia.
In conclusion, to comprehend the implications for liberal-democratic settings worldwide during and after this new wave of populism, it is crucial to first distinguish how populism differs from its outdated (and more revolutionary) “predecessor,” fascism. Future comparative studies ideally could involve detailed analysis of how populist parties and extreme right parties similarly or distinctly affect a democratic country’s rule of law and individual rights when in power.
(*) DR. AMEDEO VARRIALE earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. He previously obtained a Bachelor of Arts with Honors in Politics and International Relations from Kingston University in 2016 and a Master of Arts from the University of Westminster. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism. During his academic career, Dr. Varriale contributed as a research assistant to the development of a significant textbook project on the global resurgence of nationalism, titled “The New Nationalism in America and Beyond,” co-authored by Robert Schertzer and Eric Taylor Woods. He has written for ECPS before but has also been published by other academic outlets ranging from the Journal of Dialogue Studies to UEL’s Crossing Conceptual Boundaries
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Footnotes
[1] In fact, she has often expressed affinity for Anglo-Saxon versions of liberal-conservatism, particularly Sir Roger Scruton and G.K Chesterton in her speeches (see Esposito for la Repubblica in October 2002).
[2] Tarchi (2015: 122) has even argued that there have been so-called borderline cases (such as the old Front National, the British National Party, and the old Vlaams Blok) where it has not been clear whether the parties in question were ultimately populist or extreme right. This is a debatable but also plausible argument.
[3] Taggart (2018b) asserts that unpolitics is “the repudiation of politics as the process for resolving conflict” (Taggart, 2018b: 3)
[4] The opposite argument would be found in Mudde’s work (2017; 2021). The Dutch scholar argues that populism is actually a “thin-centered ideology” (Mudde, 2021: 578) and very much unlike other 19th and 20th century ideologies (liberalism, socialism, etc.) given it cannot exist by itself and is dependent upon a combination of its people-centric anti-elitism with other more sophisticated “…normative and normative-related ideas about the nature of man and society as well as the organization and purposes of society” (see also Sainsbury, 1980: 8).
[5] The party’s logo itself reflects the tricolor flame (with the colors of the French flag), but the idea was copied from the MSI in neighboring Italy (Kauffmann, 2016). This esoteric symbol was chosen purposely as it was meant to represent the idea of rebirth or “palingenesis,” the flame of fascism which either never fully extinguishes itself or a new fascism that rises from the ashes (for an account of fascism and the idea of rebirth, see Griffin, 1996).
[6] Pierre Poujade’s populist party (active in the 1950s) was called L’Union de défense des commerçants et artisans (UDCA).
[7] “Tixierist” as in pertaining to the politics of the former Parisian lawyer (and right-wing firebrand) Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour.
[8] This is the “anti-democracy” of the extreme right which is clearly distinct from the “illiberal (and direct) democracy” of the populist right (see Mudde, 2018).
[9] On February 13, 1984, Jean-Marie Le Pen made his official debut on French public television. He was invited by the political debating show L’Heure de Vérité after President François Mitterrand put pressure on the Communications Minister to give Le Pen some airtime. In this context, Mitterrand’s behavior was influenced both by an ideological attachment to liberalism (particularly to freedom of speech) and a broader political strategy to destabilize and divide the national right-wing vote (between the neo-Gaullists and Le Penists) so the French left could win.
[10] This is an indirect reference to Michael Freeden’s (1996) famous theoretical approach where ideologies are considered to function through “core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts.”
[11]State nationalist: “Within a state nationalist view the state precedes the ethnic community (they generally use the term ‘nation’), in the sense that the nation is not a fixed entity. One can either be born into it, by being born on the territory of the state or by having two (or one) parents with that nationality, or one can become a member of the nation” (Mudde, 2000: 131).
[12]Ethnic nationalist: “As is typical for ethnic nationalists, the ethnic community is placed over the state: the state should serve the interests of the ethnic community and not the other way around” (Mudde, 2000: 96).
[13] For the concepts of “ingroups” and “outgroups” in sociology (but still applicable to political science) refer to Howard Giles and Jane Giles (2013).
[14] Historically, both Jean-Marie Le Pen and M. Le Pen frequently criticized the traditional political establishment in France by referring to the “UMPS,” implying that both the UMP (Union for a Popular Movement) and the Socialist Party are indistinguishable in their policies and governance. However, this critique has been more difficult to make since 2015, as the UMP was succeeded (hence changed its name) by les Républicains (LR).
[15] This is an abbreviation for the French Communist Party (PCF).
[16] The “battle for births” was a government sponsored pro-natalist campaign in Mussolini’s Fascist Italy during the 1920s and 1930s (see Forcucci, 2010). However, similar pro-natalist efforts have been carried forward more recently not only by right-wing dictatorships but also by conservative governments working within the sphere of liberal democracy.
[17]Forzanovisti is an Italian term used to refer to Forza Nuova’s members, supporters, or active militants.
[18] This is also why FN maintains strong links with other European neofascists, and in Poland rallied in the company of Eastern European Neo-Nazis carrying flags with Celtic crosses, swastikas, and other political symbols as they protested against the status quo (see La7 Attualità, YouTube, November 26, 2017).
[19] Although Fiore rejects this proposition, articulating that the difference between fascists and nazis is exactly linked to this idea of racial superiority that parties like FN apparently deny (Fiore, La7, October 28, 2012).
[21]Ius Soli: “in legal theory, the rule of law that provides that cirtizenship is acquired by birth within the territory of the state, regardless of parental citizenship” (Rafferty, 2024).
[22]Ius Sanguinis: “right of blood, which grants citizenship on the basis of the citizenship possessed by one’s parent or parents” (Rafferty, 2024).
Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera: Maduro will not concede, recognize his defeat, or agree to any outcome other than his reelection. I think we are going to see a lot more violence coming from the government. Unfortunately, I don’t think Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico understand that their efforts are not enough. They are not going to convince Maduro. The fundamental issue is not just Maduro and his coalition, but the military, which is keeping Maduro in power. The only way Maduro can leave power is if the military turns on him, and that’s not happening. Maduro’s main concern is not power for its own sake but remaining protected to avoid facing justice, both internationally and in the United States, where he faces very serious charges. This is the crux of the issue—Maduro cannot leave power without facing justice.
In an interview on Friday with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera, a political scientist at Valencia College, US, assessed the recent controversial elections in her homeland Venezuela and stated that “Maduro has lost support, not just in terms of popularity, but also in the Chavista strongholds that historically voted overwhelmingly for Chavismo and Chavez. He lost these key areas, which were once solidly pro-Chavez, and they now voted against Maduro. As a result, he has decimated whatever was left of the Chavista movement as a popular political force. I’m confident that the movement is pretty much lost. Maduro, who was the heir to Chavez’s legacy, is likely the reason why the movement will not survive.”
Professor Puerta Riera shared her insights into the increasing repression under Maduro’s regime. “What I’m seeing now is an escalation of repression. For example, they are going to the homes of poll watchers and poll workers, taking them into custody without clear charges. These individuals are opposition members.” She continued, “What we are witnessing now is beyond the usual repression and persecution. Our impression is that Maduro is radicalizing. He will not concede, recognize his defeat, or agree to any outcome other than his reelection. I think we are going to see a lot more violence coming from the government.”
Highlighting the international dynamics, Professor Puerta Riera remarked, “Unfortunately, I don’t think Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico understand that their efforts are not enough. They are not going to convince Maduro. The fundamental issue is not just Maduro and his coalition, but the military, which is keeping Maduro in power.” She further emphasized that the only way Maduro could leave power is if the military turns on him, which she does not see happening. “Maduro’s main concern is not power for its own sake but remaining protected to avoid facing justice, both internationally and in the United States, where he faces very serious charges. This is the crux of the issue—Maduro cannot leave power without facing justice.”
In discussing the socioeconomic collapse of Venezuela, she painted a grim picture, “Poverty has now reached the middle class, and we essentially no longer have a middle class. The wealth gap and socioeconomic structure in Venezuela have deteriorated to the point of widespread malnutrition, lower life expectancy and very limited access to health services and education.”
With nearly 8 million people having left the country, she questioned, “How does a country sustain itself with an aging population, no social security, and no access to medicines or doctors?” She concluded by emphasizing the dire economic and social scenario, “There’s no way to invest in Venezuela, not just because of the political situation, but also because there is no consumption. The population is decreasing and those who remain have no means to even have a meal.”
Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera, a political scientist at Valencia College, Orlando, Florida, US.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera with some edits.
Chaves Created an Illusion That the People Had Power over the Economy
Professor Maria Puerta Riera, thank you so very much for your time. Let me start right away with the first question. What were the key socio-economic conditions and political dynamics in Venezuela that led to the rise of Hugo Chavez and the Chavismo?
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: I think there was a very complex scenario for Hugo Chavez and his political movement when the political system was under a lot of stress. The political elites and parties faced a significant lack of trust, not only from the poor and underprivileged but also from the middle class and some socioeconomic elites. They were essentially giving up on the status quo.
The Venezuelan electorate was convinced that the establishment elites and political parties had failed to introduce major reforms, not just in the economy but also in addressing the wealth disparity and corruption. The lack of trust and the shortsightedness of political parties and leadership led people to consider a different option, one that had some history.
Chavez’s attempted coup shouldn’t be overlooked. Many saw it as a credential, thinking he aimed to eliminate corruption and inefficiency. The failed coup gave him notoriety and elevated his profile, although he wasn’t initially part of the democratic process. He later abandoned his call for electoral abstention and became a candidate himself. This marked the point where Venezuelan democracy was compromised, as the belief emerged that someone with Chavez’s background could be a savior.
How would you describe the political and economic legacy of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela? What were the major successes and failures of his policies?
The former president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez (L) and Nicolas Maduro (R) in Cumana, Venezuela, April 17, 2009. Photo: Harold Escalona.
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, I think he came with a message that aimed to close the gap between those who controlled the wealth associated with the government and the state. His message was one of inclusion and participation, although when it came to policy, it was essentially about replacing one elite group with another. They quickly dismantled the state after the new constitution passed.
It was not just a power grab, even though he won elections; it was about cutting any institutional limitations or basic checks and balances. These were diminished through legal means. Every election became an opportunity to remove any obstacles or limits to his power.
Chavez turned to oil income not just to redistribute wealth but also to create dependence. Clientelism is not new to Venezuelan politics, but under Chavez, it became so prominent that it was almost impossible for people, especially towards the end of his last term, to participate politically and socially without aligning with the government.
All the social programs he designed early on made it nearly impossible for people to benefit without identifying with and becoming part of what the government could control. The economy became an instrument for Chavez to gain more control, as he not only controlled state agencies, companies and corporations like the oil industry but also targeted private sector industries, bringing them to their knees.
He created the illusion that the people had power over the economy, but in reality, he weakened the entire economic system through legal means and controlled participation. The current deplorable state of Venezuela’s economy is often attributed to sanctions, but that is not the full explanation for the crisis.
Venezuela Joins a Group of Nations That Represents the Antithesis of Democracy
How does the Chavismo movement in Venezuela compare with other left-wing populist movements in Latin America? Are there common patterns or significant differences?
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: There are some similarities, especially now with other closed autocracies. Venezuela has been inevitably linked to Cuba, not just because of the close ties with Castro, both Castros and Miguel Díaz-Canel, but because of similar patterns in legislation, state control, social monitoring, constraints on political and civic participation, and human rights violations. If we were to establish a category, we should start at the top with Cuba and Nicaragua. Venezuela joins a small group of nations that can be considered the antithesis of any democracy in the region.
There are leftist governments that are democracies, such as Chile and Colombia under Gustavo Petro. Despite challenges, Petro hasn’t done what Nicaragua and Venezuela have done, which is to dismantle the Constitution and legal framework to ignore basic democratic institutions and mandates. More critically, there is the suppression of the opposition and that’s where we are right now.
Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua are regimes that do not recognize the opposition’s space and place in their political systems because they are not formal democracies. They are closed autocracies. That’s what we’re seeing right now.
How has Nicolas Maduro’s leadership differed from Hugo Chavez’s? In what ways has Maduro’s regime become more autocratic compared to his predecessor?
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, I think it’s important to establish a key difference. Chavez had charisma, which we can criticize alongside his populist approach to power. While his methods can be contentious, they were sometimes effective in advancing certain agendas. He also had some authoritarian tendencies.
The problem for Maduro is that he has no military background. In Venezuela, there has historically been an attraction to strong men and Chavez, as a military commander, embodied that appeal. He was seen as a man of power, which resonated with the people.
Maduro, on the other hand, has no military background and lacks charisma. He inherited political assets and a regime built around the myth of Hugo Chavez and Chavismo. However, he has essentially destroyed Chavez’s legacy, not just because of the economic collapse and humanitarian catastrophe resulting from his inability to govern, but more importantly, due to the complete disengagement with the political base Chavez left behind.
We just received the second bulletin from the Electoral Council and the numbers don’t add up. Despite this, we understand that Maduro has lost support, not just in terms of popularity, but also in the Chavista strongholds that historically voted overwhelmingly for Chavismo and Chavez. He lost these key areas, which were once solidly pro-Chavez, and they now voted against Maduro.
As a result, he has decimated whatever was left of the Chavista movement as a popular political force. I’m confident that the movement is pretty much lost. Maduro, who was the heir to Chavez’s legacy, is likely the reason why the movement will not survive.
It Was a Fraudulent Election
Venezuelans received the candidate for the opposition primary elections, María Corina Machado in the populous sector of Santa Lucia Venezuela-Maracaibo on August 11, 2023. Photo: Humberto Matheus.
There is wide-spread speculation that the presidential election in Venezuela was rigged. What is your assessment of the elections process and the re-election of Nicolas Maduro for another six years as president?
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, I think it was a fraudulent election. It was always going to be very difficult for the opposition to win, given all the obstacles they faced. Despite the challenges in terms of participation, the tallies and reports from credible sources, like the Carter Center, indicate that the election was not free and fair. The results being issued cannot be trusted.
The tallies from the voting machines tell a different story. Several experts have confirmed that the numbers the government is trying to validate through the highest court are unreliable. We believe that the opposition, led by Mundo Gonzalez, won overwhelmingly, as indicated by polls, exit polls and the published tallies, which cannot be easily falsified.
There have been calls from the international community, including Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, to show the true tallies. The election results being certified do not reflect what actually happened on Sunday and a majority of Venezuelans believe there was fraud, not in the voting itself, but in the results the government is presenting, which do not match the supporting evidence.
Massive crowds took to the streets to protest the results of the election and according to New York Times at least 17 people have been killed. It is not the first time that people took to streets to show their anger. Do you think the protests could yield any result this time? In light of the elections and widespread protests, how do you think the political landscape in Venezuela might change? What impact could these elections and protests have on Maduro’s hold on power?
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, repression has always been the reaction, not just under Maduro but under Chavez as well. What I’m seeing now is an escalation of repression. For example, they are going to the homes of poll watchers and poll workers, taking them into custody without clear charges. These individuals are opposition members.
What we are witnessing now is beyond the usual repression and persecution. Our impression is that Maduro is radicalizing. He will not concede, recognize his defeat, or agree to any outcome other than his reelection. I think we are going to see a lot more violence coming from the government.
Unfortunately, I don’t think Brazil, Colombia and Mexico understand that their efforts are not enough. They are not going to convince Maduro. The fundamental issue is not just Maduro and his coalition, but the military, which is keeping Maduro in power.
The opposition leader, María Corina Machado, released data on Tuesday that she said showed Mr. Edmundo González, the candidate she backed, winning the presidency in a landslide. The opposition’s updated results, using paper tallies observers collected from 81 percent of the nation’s voting machines, showed that Mr. Gonzalez had won 7.1 million votes, or 67 percent, versus 3.2 million, or 30 percent, for Mr. Maduro. Do you think these figures could be true?
Opposition leaders Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzales Urrutia seen waving to thousands of Venezuelans in the streets in Caracas, Venezuela, July 30, 2024. Photo: Jonathan Mishkin.
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, I am inclined to believe what they are showing because María Corina Machado has extensive expertise in electoral processes that no one else in Venezuela can match. They have the infrastructure and the knowledge and I can confidently say they are not falsifying results.
We also have experts, not just those close to the opposition but also academics here in the US and Europe, who have reviewed the tallies. They confirm what we all know: that Gonzales won overwhelmingly. The problem for the government is that they have waited so long without providing verification or audits and they have turned to the Supreme Court.
This delay and reliance on the highest court do not instill trust in what the regime says. People’s trust lies with the opposition, because Maduro and his government have eroded trust in themselves.
Just look at the process: how they blocked every candidate, even the one elected in a primary. They thought they would win or that if they lost, it would be manageable. What we are seeing is that they can’t manage the loss.
Maduro Cannot Leave Power without Facing Justice
Venezuela’s foreign minister announced that the country was expelling diplomatic missions from seven Latin American countries that had condemned the official election results. Do you think the external pressure will persuade Mr. Maduro to accept the result of the polls? Do you think Venezuela under Maduro risks being diplomatically isolated?
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: I think Maduro is not going to follow any recommendations that involve conceding or recognizing his loss. He simply won’t do it. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, who are the ones negotiating with Maduro, are trying to find a way for him to take an action that will resolve this situation. Unfortunately, the only viable option would be for him to recognize the results.
The problem for these three countries is that if the results do not recognize Gonzales’ victory, it will trigger another wave of Venezuelan migrants. Colombia, Mexico and Brazil will be the most affected by this. Their primary interest is not necessarily in upholding democracy or even keeping Maduro in power, but in preventing another migrant crisis. Unfortunately, this doesn’t seem possible.
The only way Maduro can leave power is if the military turns on him, and that’s not happening. Maduro’s main concern is not power for its own sake but remaining protected to avoid facing justice, both internationally and in the United States, where he faces very serious charges. This is the crux of the issue—Maduro cannot leave power without facing justice.
It’s not just Maduro; the top military brass also faces serious charges in the United States, including corruption, drug charges and human rights violations. They will remain in power unless they receive guarantees of immunity. However, we have not yet reached that point.
I think most countries that have withdrawn their diplomatic representation, such as Argentina and Chile, will continue to antagonize Maduro. Figures like Gabriel Boric (Chile) or Javier Milei (Argentina) will likely do the same, so they won’t be helpful.
Colombia, Brazil and Mexico are trying to maintain a back channel and avoid further isolation for Venezuela, but I think that’s inevitable. Maduro understands there is no way out. He entered this election seeking some form of legitimacy to convince the US to lift sanctions, regardless of the outcome. However, the international community is not going to recognize him as the legitimate president.
The Carter Center has been very forceful in its assessment, so Maduro lacks the legitimacy he thought would be enough to secure resources. He needs money, but he’s not going to get it. The sanctions are not going to be lifted. I’m not sure if there are any other sanctions the US can impose, as the country is already under heavy constraints and limitations.Maduro made his decision knowing that he, his regime and the country will become more and more isolated. I don’t think the region is ready for what is coming.
Maduro Believes He Can Survive Isolation
Mr. Maduro did receive support from allied leaders in Cuba, Serbia, Nicaragua, Russia, Bolivia and Honduras together with China and Iran, who applauded the results. Maduro has been hailed by the autocrats globally. How do you think this support will help Mr. Maduro as a populist to cement his rule? What roles have international and regional actors who show solidarity with Maduro played in shaping the trajectory of Chavismo and Maduro’s regime? How have possible US sanctions and other international pressures impacted Venezuela?
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: It’s clear that Maduro has made his choice, as I said. He is no longer seen as part of a democratic system and is not recognized as such. It makes sense for him to double down on his alliance with other illiberal, anti-democratic, closed autocracies. He has no other choice; he doesn’t belong in a regional or global community of democracies.
Maduro is likely seeking protection within this alliance. Yes, he will be isolated from democracies in the region and around the world, but he may find support from China and Russia, which could help him maintain his regime. We don’t know if China will support Maduro financially, but there might be possibilities once Venezuela settles its oil debt with China. This could lead to further investments from China, which is something he can’t expect from Russia. Strengthening ties with Iran is another strategy they have used to survive.
My guess is that Maduro believes he can survive this isolation, but it will be very hard for him to gain any financial breathing room. The challenges are immense, not just because of the huge debt, but also because the economic forecast in Venezuela is dire. With GDP, inflation, over 80% of the population in poverty, and more than 50% in extreme poverty, the socioeconomic structure has deteriorated to the point where people make approximately $130 a month. This situation is unsustainable. Maduro may stay in power, but it will not be due to popular support. The people are not willing to accept his mandate. It will be very difficult, and we will likely see a lot of repression because it is clear that the Venezuelan people do not recognize him as their leader.
In your article titled Venezuela: The Decline of a Democracy you wrote back in 2018 you argued that the economic imbalance has increased the chances of social disintegration while government focuses on holding to power. Six years after your article what can you tell us about the nature of democracy in the country and the looming possibility of social disintegration?
There were lots of Venezuelans crossing the border into the land of Colombia. This was captured in La parada, Colombia. Photo: Shutterstock.
Professor Maria Puerta Riera: I think, unfortunately, the situation has worsened. Poverty has now reached the middle class, and we essentially no longer have a middle class. The wealth gap and socioeconomic structure in Venezuela have deteriorated to the point of widespread malnutrition, lower life expectancy and very limited access to health services and education.
We have a country where nearly 8 million people have left. How does a country sustain itself with an aging population, no social security and no access to medicines or doctors? Young doctors and teachers are leaving the country. The workforce is either too old to work or the very young are just waiting to finish school—if they finish—only to leave the country.
How does the population sustain itself with an economic structure where people have no jobs? There’s no way to invest in Venezuela, not just because of the political situation, but also because there is no consumption. The population is decreasing, and those who remain have no means to even have a meal. That’s what I refer to as a dire scenario, and we are already in that scenario.
Valev, Radoslav. (2024). “Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism across Central Asia.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0058
The fourteenth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism (MGP) panel series, titled “Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism Across Central Asia,” convened online on June 20, 2024. This event delved into the evolving autocratic political landscape of Central Asian countries. Moderated by Dr. David Lewis, a respected professor of Politics at the University of Exeter, the panel featured insightful presentations that dissected various aspects of autocracy and authoritarianism from multiple disciplinary perspectives.
In a comprehensive examination of Central Asia’s political landscape, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted the fourteenth and final event of its academic year in the monthly Mapping Global Populism (MGP) panel series. Titled “Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism Across Central Asia,” this online event convened on June 20, 2024, bringing together a distinguished panel of scholars to discuss the region’s evolving dynamics. Moderated by Dr. David Lewis, a respected professor of Politics at the University of Exeter, the panel featured insightful presentations that dissected various aspects of autocracy and authoritarianism from multiple disciplinary perspectives.
Dr. Lewis set the stage by reflecting on the evolving discourse around authoritarianism and democracy in Central Asia. He noted the increasing complexity of political systems influenced by populism and regional dynamics, underscoring the shift in international engagement shaped by geopolitical factors rather than clear democratic promotion strategies. Dr. Lewis emphasized the importance of understanding the nuanced aspects of authoritarian regimes, including informal economics, clan politics, and power struggles, beyond mere repression.
The subsequent presentations offered deep dives into specific manifestations of autocracy in the region. Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova, a Postdoctoral Researcher at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient, analyzed Sadyr Japarov’s rise to power in Kyrgyzstan, attributing his sustained popularity to his portrayal as a “man of the people” and his strategic adaptation to different cultural contexts despite authoritarian measures. Dr. Dinissa Duvanova, Associate Professor at Lehigh University, examined Kazakhstan’s shift towards populism under President Tokayev, arguing that it is a strategic adaptation to maintain autocratic rule by balancing elite interests with popular demands. Oguljamal Yazliyeva, a Ph.D. researcher at Charles University, explored how Turkmenistan’s autocratic system, influenced by Soviet legacy and tribal traditions, cultivates a personality cult around its leaders through controlled media and traditional respect for authority.
Although one of the speakers, Dr. Diana T. Kudaibergen(ova), could not join due to connectivity issues, the panel provided a rich exploration of Central Asian political systems. Dr. Lewis concluded by highlighting the value of this nuanced approach to understanding governance in the region, moving beyond simplistic binaries of democracy and autocracy, and expressed enthusiasm for the ongoing research in this complex field.
Moving Beyond Simplistic Binaries of Democracy and Autocracy
Dr. David Lewis, the moderator of the panel, gave an overview of the context of the topic of the panel. He began by reflecting on the evolution of discourse surrounding authoritarianism, democracy, and liberal values in Central Asia over the past two decades. Initially, in the early 21st century, liberal democracy was seen as the dominant global paradigm, but this has been increasingly challenged. The rise of populism in Western democracies and a more nuanced understanding of political systems in regions like Central Asia have contributed to a more complex view of authoritarianism and democracy.
Dr. Lewis noted that populism, once associated with revolutionary movements, is now also prevalent in regime politics and authoritarian systems. He highlighted the shift in international engagement with Central Asia, often driven by geopolitical factors rather than a clear strategy for promoting democracy. Dr. Lewis emphasized the importance of understanding the complexities of authoritarian regimes beyond simple repression. This includes examining informal economics, clan politics, regional dynamics, and power struggles that persist even in non-democratic systems.
He remarked that the new generation of political scientists in Central Asia is providing more nuanced insights into these political systems, contributing to a more complex body of literature on the topic. Dr. Lewis concluded by expressing enthusiasm for the panel’s focus on this subject, seeing it as an opportunity to explore the latest research on Central Asian political systems. He emphasized the value of this more intricate approach to understanding governance in the region, moving beyond simplistic binaries of democracy and autocracy.
Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova: “Clean Politics: Kyrgyzstan between Informal Governance and Democracy”
Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova discussed Sadyr Japarov’s rise to power in Kyrgyzstan following the October 2020 revolution. She began by arguing that despite implementing authoritarian measures, Japarov has maintained popularity by portraying himself as a “man of the people” and leveraging his personal history of suffering and injustice. Japarov has demonstrated a talent for speaking the language of local people and using simple language that resonates with them. Dr. Ismailbekova argued that Japarov’s success lies in his ability to wear “several hats” simultaneously. He presents himself as a simple man, a Native Son, while proposing authoritarian power.
The presentation by Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova discussed Sadyr Japarov’s rise to power in Kyrgyzstan following the October 2020 revolution. She began by arguing that despite implementing authoritarian measures, Japarov has maintained popularity by portraying himself as a “man of the people” and leveraging his personal history of suffering and injustice. Kyrgyzstan has experienced three revolutions in recent history (2005, 2010, and 2020), driven by public dissatisfaction with government corruption, fraudulent elections, and mismanagement. The 2020 revolution, sparked by the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, led to the overthrow of President Jeenbekov and the rise of Japarov to power.
According to Dr. Ismailbekova, Japarov, who was released from prison during the 2020 protests, quickly seized the opportunity to become acting president and prime minister. He criticized previous leaders for corruption and mismanagement while promising justice. However, he soon began consolidating power by amending the constitution to increase presidential authority, restricting media freedom, and taking control of the judiciary and foreign policy. Dr. Ismailbekova attributed this to Japarov’s ability to mobilize mass support by playing on emotions and using strategies of kinship. His personal suffering and tragic life story have become key elements in his political narrative, allowing many Kyrgyz citizens to identify with him.
Japarov’s biography plays a crucial role in his political appeal. In 2013, he organized protests to nationalize a gold company, leading to criminal charges and forcing him into exile. He often refers to this experience, claiming to understand the hardships faced by millions of Kyrgyz migrants, primarily in Russia. Dr. Ismailbekova emphasized how Japarov has become an “embodiment of injustice” in Kyrgyzstan. His attempted suicide in prison, which he claimed was a protest against the corrupt court system, resonated with many citizens. Furthermore, Japarov’s personal tragedies, such as losing his son and parents while in prison, have garnered sympathy and support from the public.
Dr. Ismailbekova underscored that Japarov’s suffering has been translated into political capital. He is perceived as more relatable than other candidates, someone who has experienced the injustices of the system firsthand. This narrative of suffering has been cultivated as a necessary virtue for being a good president. Dr. Ismailbekova noted that Japarov has positioned himself as the “hope of the nation” in a failed democracy. This narrative has been well-received by many of his constituents.
Interestingly, since Japarov became president, historians have begun searching for his ancestors to legitimize his right to lead Kyrgyzstan. Some claim that Japarov is a direct descendant of the Khans (a title historically given to rulers and military leaders in Central Asia), suggesting that the search for justice is “in his blood.” Dr. Ismailbekova highlighted how Japarov adapts his image to different situations. For example, when visiting southern Kyrgyzstan, he wore the hat of Iskhak Razzakov, the first Secretary of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, appealing to villagers and relatives by claiming to continue Razzakov’s mission.
Japarov has demonstrated a talent for speaking the language of local people and using simple language that resonates with them. Dr. Ismailbekova argued that Japarov’s success lies in his ability to wear “several hats” simultaneously. He presents himself as a simple man, a Native Son, while proposing authoritarian power.
The international media has taken notice of Japarov’s rise to power, with many articles focusing on his journey “from prison to presidency.” This narrative reinforces his image as someone who has overcome adversity.
In conclusion, Dr. Ismailbekova suggested that the popularity of Japarov stems from citizens’ identification with his tragic life story and his ability to tap into the emotional experiences of the Kyrgyz people. Japarov’s political strategy involves constantly referring to his personal history, particularly during elections. Dr. Ismailbekova concluded that Japarov’s approach has maintained his popularity. His ability to understand cultural nuances and to present himself as one of the people have been key to his success.
Dr. Dinissa Duvanova: “Autocracy’s Past and Present in Kazakhstan”
Dr. Dinissa Duvanova argued that the seeming populist pivot in Kazakhstan is better understood as a strategic adaptation within a stable autocratic framework. The balance between elite interests and popular demands, mediated through regulatory constraints and economic management, continues to define the country’s political landscape. The increase in state capacity and regulatory oversight, influenced by economic conditions, highlights the nuanced strategies employed by the regime to maintain its authority.
Dr. Dinissa Duvanova began her presentation by stating that in Kazakhstan, the link between the autocratic nature of its political regime and populism appears tenuous compared to other cases. After the January 2022 protests, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed the joint session of the Senate and Mazhilis (The Lower House of the Parliament in Kazakhstan) via a Zoom call. In his speech on January 11, 2022, he criticized powerful elites and profitable companies in Kazakhstan, suggesting it was time they paid their dues to the people. Tokayev proposed establishing a National Fund to collect these debts and redistribute them to the population. Dr. Duvanova suggested that this can be seen as a potential shift towards a populist style of governance, though it may also reflect a continuation of established strategies to maintain autocratic stability.
Following the protests, Tokayev initiated a crackdown on elite leaders behind the unrest, leading to the imprisonment and asset seizure of key figures. However, the extent of asset seizures varied significantly; for instance, only a small fraction of the estimated wealth of members of former President Nazarbayev’s family was confiscated. This indicates that while there was a response to popular demands, it may not represent a deep-rooted commitment to populism but rather a tactical move within a broader autocratic framework.
Dr. Duvanova added that in her research, detailed in her book “Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats,” she argued that what appears as a populist pivot in Kazakhstan is actually another iteration of maintaining stable autocratic power perfected during Nazarbayev’s era. This involves strengthening and institutionalizing authoritarian state mechanisms, balancing elite interests with those of the masses. This balance is crucial for autocrats to sustain their rule, ensuring both elite support and popular acquiescence.
Moreover, Dr. Duvanova argued that one way to think about state-building by autocrats is the need to balance the particularistic demands of elites with the promotion of collective goods. Neglecting the latter can lead to economic decline, intensifying competition for rents and destabilizing the regime. Therefore, autocrats must invest in economic performance, benefiting the national economy and, by extension, the populace.
A notable quote from Tokayev’s January 11, 2024 speech highlights this balancing act: “For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law.” This saying, originally attributed to Latin American politician Oscar Benavides, encapsulates the Kazakh autocracy’s approach to governance, rewarding loyal elites while maintaining a facade of legal accountability for others.
The concept of a regulatory authoritarian state, which Dr. Duvanova explored in her research, involves the systematic construction of formal regulatory constraints on state agencies. These constraints ensure more predictable and accountable bureaucratic behavior. Data from Kazakhstan show a significant increase in formal regulatory constraints since the mid-2000s, driven primarily by ministerial orders rather than legislative statutes. This regulatory expansion corresponds with fluctuations in oil revenues, with more stringent regulations emerging during times of declining oil rents and vice versa.
Popular protests, such as those in January 2022, often prompt autocrats to streamline state institutions to improve responsiveness and effectiveness. Additionally, declining resources necessitate a focus on enhancing economic performance to maintain regime stability. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, leading to rising oil prices, provided Kazakhstan with increased resources, potentially alleviating some pressures to pursue populist policies aggressively.
Dr. Duvanova’s quantitative research demonstrates that in times of economic difficulty, characterized by declining state resources, there is an increase in regulatory oversight to curb bureaucratic opportunism. Overall, Kazakhstan has emerged as a high-capacity autocracy, evidenced by its regulatory quality and state capacity ratings. This increase in state capacity has occurred alongside systemic corruption and favoritism towards regime associates. Despite the heavy-handed use of regulations to manage economic activity, these regulations are often biased towards private interests.
The signs of liberalization under Tokayev can also be seen as the rise of digital authoritarianism, with increased digitalization of state services improving efficiency and state capacity. However, there is little evidence of reliance on transparency, public accountability, and oversight, as restrictions on press freedom and an independent judiciary persist.
In conclusion, Dr. Duvanova argued that the seeming populist pivot in Kazakhstan is better understood as a strategic adaptation within a stable autocratic framework. The balance between elite interests and popular demands, mediated through regulatory constraints and economic management, continues to define the country’s political landscape. The increase in state capacity and regulatory oversight, influenced by economic conditions, highlights the nuanced strategies employed by the regime to maintain its authority.
Oguljamal Yazliyeva: “Autocracy in Turkmenistan and the Role of Media in Cultivating Personality Cult”
Oguljamal Yazliyeva argued that Turkmenistan’s autocratic system is deeply entrenched, supported by a tightly controlled media apparatus that perpetuates a strong personality cult. The government’s use of historical tribal traditions recycled Soviet methods, and modern media techniques has created a robust system of authoritarian control. While this system appears stable, the lack of alternative media and independent information sources poses significant challenges for potential democratic development in the country.
Oguljamal Yazliyeva began her presentation by stating that Turkmenistan’s autocratic system and the role of media in cultivating a personality cult is a complex topic that intertwines historical, political, and cultural elements. The country, one of the five Central Asian republics, gained independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, it has developed into one of the most isolated nations in the region, with a political system characterized by authoritarianism and a strong personality cult surrounding its leaders.
Yazliyeva argued that the foundations of Turkmenistan’s current political culture can be traced back to two main sources: the recycling of the Soviet system and the historical tribal traditions of the Turkmen people. The first president of independent Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, promised to develop the country towards democracy but emphasized that it would be a step-by-step process. In reality, this approach led to the state maintaining control over every aspect of life, including the media system.
The Turkmen government has utilized various strategies to legitimize its power and consolidate its authoritarian rule. One such method is the use of national symbols, such as the five patterns on the Turkmen flag representing the country’s five provinces. This symbolism serves to connect the current political system with the tribal history of the Turkmen people.
Yazliyeva also importantly noted that the media plays a crucial role in strengthening and consolidating the authoritarian regime in Turkmenistan. All media channels, including television, radio, print media, and the internet, are under strict state control. The constitution of Turkmenistan nominally guarantees freedom of speech and prohibits censorship, but in practice, the government exercises complete control over all media outlets.
Television remains a significant platform for the government to disseminate information about its policies. A survey conducted by Yazliyeva among Turkmen people revealed that more than 25% of media consumption is through television. Interestingly, over 50% of respondents prefer Russian-language media, which the government also uses to spread its message.
The Turkmen government employs the media to create a cult of personality around its leaders. This is particularly evident in the use of specific epithets and phrases to glorify the president, such as “Father of the Nation, be healthy.” In news broadcasts, these glorifying phrases are repeated multiple times, even in short reports about mundane events like sports.
According to Yazliyeva, the media landscape in Turkmenistan is characterized by repression, propaganda, and suppression. Academic literature on the subject is limited, but existing studies describe a system where all media channels are under state control. Even the single platform considered “private” was launched under government leadership and remains under strict official control.
Yazliyeva added that the government uses media to consolidate its power through various means. One strategy involves broadcasting content that instills fear in the population. For example, television shows often depict the wrongdoings and subsequent imprisonment of individuals who deviate from government policy. Another tactic involves showcasing acts of extreme deference to the leader, such as hand-kissing or bowing, which are not traditional in Turkmen culture.
Yazliyeva underscored that the personality cult surrounding Turkmenistan’s leaders is a central feature of the country’s political culture. This phenomenon takes root in the historical tribal conditions, the legacy of Soviet communist control, and the idiosyncratic personality of the state leaders. The media consistently promotes the key role of the state leader in Turkmen society by glorifying them on various platforms.
Interestingly, Yazliyeva argued that the consolidation of this authoritarian regime is not solely the work of the political elite. Ordinary citizens also participate in and accept this system, partly due to traditional respect for patriarchal structures and tribal kinship. This acceptance makes it easier for the government to maintain its grip on power.
The development of Turkmenistan’s political system and media landscape since independence has resulted in a unique model of political culture. This model, based on authoritarianism and one-man rule, has played a significant role in building and maintaining the cult of personality around the country’s leaders, from the first president Saparmurat Niyazov to his son and current president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov.
In conclusion, Yazliyeva argued that Turkmenistan’s autocratic system is deeply entrenched, supported by a tightly controlled media apparatus that perpetuates a strong personality cult. The government’s use of historical tribal traditions recycled Soviet methods, and modern media techniques has created a robust system of authoritarian control. While this system appears stable, the lack of alternative media and independent information sources poses significant challenges for potential democratic development in the country. As such, the introduction of alternative media could be crucial in providing Turkmen citizens with diverse perspectives and information about their country and the world at large.
By analyzing the recent electoral success of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK Party (RUKP) as a representative of European PRR parties, Professor Tim Bale emphasized that “mainstream parties who oppose them have to learn to live with this fact and realize that while they can be beaten at elections, they can’t be eradicated.” Discussing the broader political climate, Professor Bale warned of the challenges posed by both right-wing and left-wing populism. He pointed out that left-wing populism, while lacking the xenophobic and Islamophobic elements of its right-wing counterpart, often proposes overly simplistic solutions that could threaten good governance and economic stability.
In an interview on Tuesday with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Tim Bale, a renowned scholar from the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London, provided deep insights into the enduring presence of populist radical right (PRR) parties in the UK and European politics. Reflecting on his earlier predictions, Professor Bale emphasized that “mainstream parties who oppose them have to learn to live with this fact and realize that while they can be beaten at elections, they can’t be eradicated.”
Professor Bale analyzed the recent electoral successes of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK Party (RUKP), highlighting the demographic trends underpinning its support. Unlike in many European countries, where far-right support often comes from younger voters, in the UK, it is generally middle-aged or older individuals who are drawn to these parties. These supporters, many of whom left school at 16 or earlier, are not necessarily deprived but often feel uneasy about cultural changes and harbor nostalgia for a bygone Britain. RUKP has skillfully expanded its appeal beyond immigration to include resistance to “woke” politics and rapid environmental policies, positioning itself as a defender against perceived excessive social liberalism and fast-tracked net-zero targets.
The interview explored the potential implications of the Labour Party’s recent electoral victory on far-right parties. Professor Bale noted that Labour’s handling of immigration would be crucial. While a reduction in legal migration might temper some support for RUKP, ongoing issues such as illegal Channel crossings could still provide fertile ground for Farage’s rhetoric. “Nigel Farage and RUKP will be able to capitalize on that particular problem and Labour’s inability to stop them completely,” he observed.
Discussing the broader political climate, Professor Bale warned of the challenges posed by both right-wing and left-wing populism. He pointed out that left-wing populism, while lacking the xenophobic and Islamophobic elements of its right-wing counterpart, often proposes overly simplistic solutions that could threaten good governance and economic stability. “While left-wing populism has its downsides, it may not be as dangerous for minority communities as right-wing populism has proven to be,” he concluded.
In reflecting on the Conservative Party’s strategy, Professor Bale highlighted the ongoing internal debate about how to address the rise of RUKP. He suggested that the Conservatives’ move towards populist radical right policies has so far been counterproductive, potentially perpetuating a vicious cycle. The party faces a crucial decision: whether to embrace Farage and his supporters or to reaffirm its commitment to centrist, economically focused policies.
Overall, Professor Bale’s insights underscore the complex and enduring nature of PRR parties in the UK and Europe. His assertion that these parties are now a permanent fixture in the political landscape serves as a sobering reminder for mainstream parties of the challenges they face in addressing and countering populist narratives.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Tim Bale with some edits.
Farage Has Majority Shareholder at the Limited Company “Reform UK”
Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.
Professor Bale, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. Can you provide a brief overview of the historical roots of populist far-right movements in the UK and how they have evolved over the past few decades?
Professor Tim Bale: After the Second World War, there was very little support for far-right organizations in the UK. They were very much marginal to the political process. That began to change in the late 1960s and early 1970s when mass migration first became very apparent in the UK, with the founding of an organization called the National Front, which, at least at a local level, challenged some of the main parties’ candidates.
The National Front, however, seemed to have gone effectively underground from the 1970s into the 1980s, when it was in some ways reconstituted by an organization called the British National Party (BNP). The BNP didn’t actually have much success until the late 1990s and early 2000s, when it began to fight European Parliament elections and actually had a couple of MEPs. That, however, was in the end sidelined because it was seen to be too extreme and too racist.
To some extent, it was overtaken by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), which had no roots at all in the kind of extremist or neo-fascist, violent underground in the same way the National Front or the BNP had. If UKIP was a far-right party, it was very much a Populist Radical Right (PRR) party, not an extreme right party. UKIP became more and more popular, particularly when led by Nigel Farage, and in 2015 it won approximately 4 million votes, but only because of the first-past-the-post system did it secure one MP in Parliament.
Then it transformed itself into the Brexit Party, which did very well at the European elections of 2019, when it took 30% of the vote and came first, beating the Conservatives into fifth place. The Conservatives responded by electing Boris Johnson, and in the 2019 election, the Brexit Party was reduced to just 2% of the vote and no MPs.
However, since then it has rebuilt itself to become Reform UK, very much a PRR party again. In the 2024 election, it was led once again by Nigel Farage. It performed very creditably, taking 14% of the vote, for which it won five MPs—the first RUKP MPs we’ve ever had in this country, one of whom is Nigel Farage.
So, it is seen to be on the rise at the moment. It is an unusual organization, however, in that it is not a political party in the way that most political parties would be recognized. Rather similarly, in some ways, to Geert Wilders’ PVV in the Netherlands, it is very much a kind of leadership-directed organization. It doesn’t have members and is a limited company with shareholders, with Nigel Farage as the majority shareholder.
Immigration, Opposition to “Woke” Politics and Resistance to Net Zero Environmental Policies
In your view, what are the main socio-economic drivers behind the support for far-right parties in the UK? How do these parties capitalize on issues like immigration, economic disparity, crime and national identity?
Professor Tim Bale: Well, immigration has probably been the main appeal of these parties. When the far-right in this country was more extreme, there was a degree of biological or genetic racism—the idea that people from certain ethnicities were somehow inherently inferior. I think that has largely disappeared. However, the racism exhibited by the populist radical right today tends to be more of a “new variety,” whereby people from different ethnicities are not seen as biologically inferior but are perceived as having a culture that does not easily integrate with the majority culture.
Support for these parties depends partly on concerns about cultural integration and the numbers of people coming to the UK. Any increase in immigration, either legally or, as they would define it, illegally (such as asylum seekers arriving outside recognized government routes), is associated with a rise in support for these parties.
Demographically, the support for radical right parties in the UK, unlike in many European countries, does not come much from young people. Their support is generally located among middle-aged or older individuals, including those who are retired. Many of these supporters left school at the age of 16 or even earlier and are not necessarily deprived; some are quite comfortably off but are uncomfortable with cultural change and have a degree of nostalgia for how Britain was when they were younger.
However, immigration isn’t their only appeal. They have also begun to expand their repertoire to include resistance to what they call “woke” politics—any kind of social liberalism they see as excessive. Additionally, they campaign against too rapid a progress towards net zero on the environmental front. So, RUKP pitches its appeal on three main issues: immigration, opposition to “woke” politics, and resistance to net zero environmental policies.
Labour Party leader Sir Keir Starmer speaking and gesturing in the House of Commons, UK Parliament, at Westminster Palace in London, UK, on February 7, 2024. Photo: Tennessee Witney.
How do you think the recent victory of the Labour Party impacts the political landscape for far-right parties in the UK? Do you foresee a decline in their influence, or could it potentially galvanize their base?
Professor Tim Bale: I think, in part, the answer to that question depends on how Labour deals with and delivers on immigration. If Labour manages to preside over a drop in immigration numbers, then that will, to some extent, suppress the support for RUKP. However, it will likely not be able to stop people from making the crossing in the English Channel from France to the UK to claim asylum. This is something that successive British governments have found very difficult to combat, and given that Nigel Farage and RUKP make a great deal out of that particular route into the country, it’s going to be difficult for Labour to completely suppress support for RUKP that arises from anxiety about those crossings.
We will have to see how things unfold. The numbers will probably go down when it comes to legal migration anyway, because fewer people will be coming from Ukraine and Hong Kong, which have been significant contributors to the increase in numbers. The previous government also made it more difficult for people to bring their families with them when they come on the study route into the UK. So, numbers will probably go down as a result of that as well.
However, as I mentioned, that’s only legal migration. The small boat crossings will likely continue, and therefore Nigel Farage and RUKP will be able to capitalize on that particular problem and Labour’s inability to stop them completely.
Labour’s Social Liberalism May Become a Point of Attack for RUKP
Given the current political climate, what potential threats do you think far-right parties pose in the UK? How might they adapt their strategies in response to the Labour Party’s resurgence and the broader political environment? Do you think they will continue to rely heavily on populist Euroscepticism, or might they shift their focus to other issues?
Professor Tim Bale: Euroscepticism is indeed an interesting topic. There is a conspiracy theory on the right of British politics, with RUKP being the main carrier of this idea, that Labour is ultimately interested in rejoining the European Union, or at the very least, getting much closer to it and “reversing Brexit.” Any move by the Labour government in that direction will likely encourage pushback from RUKP, potentially leading them to emphasize Europe more than they have recently. Interestingly, Brexit was not a major part of the general election campaign or RUKP’s campaign; they focused more on immigration, “woke” politics, and net zero.
Given that the Labour government will almost certainly need to try and move closer to Europe to reduce trade friction, it could find itself under attack from RUKP on that basis. Additionally, since the Labour government is fully committed to rapid progress towards net zero carbon emissions, RUKP will likely attack it on those grounds. They will also presumably criticize Labour for not making as big an issue of so-called cancel culture or trans rights as the Conservative government did. Labour’s inherent social liberalism may also become a point of attack for RUKP.
What I predict will happen is that RUKP will argue that both the Conservatives and Labour have tried and failed, particularly on immigration, and now it is time to give RUKP a chance.
Farage to Be a Very Important Part of PRR Politics in the UK for Decades to Come
Nigel Farage has been a significant figure in British politics, particularly in the rise of UKIP and the Brexit movement. Given the current political landscape, how do you assess Farage’s continuing influence on far-right politics in the UK?
Professor Tim Bale: Well, in some ways, Nigel Farage is far-right politics in the UK. There is no one, really, at least electorally competitive to the right of RUKP, and he is very much the undisputed leader of that party. He is a consummate communicator, incredibly persistent and patient. He was elected to Parliament on his eighth attempt, having tried and failed seven times before. His doggedness has paid off, and he’s not going away anytime soon. Despite looking older, he is actually only in his late fifties or possibly just about sixty, so he has plenty of political life left in him.
One potential issue with Farage is his tendency to fall out and argue with colleagues who challenge him in any way. This has been a recurring story with UKIP and, to some extent, the Brexit Party, and it may indeed become true of RUKP. It remains to be seen whether RUKP will be able to institutionalize and become a normal political party if that means diluting Farage’s authority. It will be interesting to see if RUKP becomes a genuinely membership-based organization. Currently, its “members” are essentially subscribers or donors with no real say or rights within the party.
As a Member of Parliament, Farage will be able to use that platform in addition to his media presence. Whether he will continue to present his nightly weekday show on GB News, a new streaming platform that has become quite important in the center-right and right-wing media ecosystem, remains to be seen. However, he is undoubtedly “box office” in media terms. Journalists are charmed by him, obsessed with him, and give him much more airtime than RUKP’s vote share or number of MPs would typically warrant.
I would expect Nigel Farage to be a very important part of populist radical right politics in the UK for years, possibly even decades, to come.
Reform is the party that increased its vote the most, by 14% and got 4 million votes. Can you elaborate on the success of Nigel Farage’s RUKP as a populist party like its peers in continental Europe? Can you explain the similarities and differences between RUKP and the continental populist parties? How has his rhetoric and political strategy managed to resonate with a significant portion of the electorate?
Professor Tim Bale: I think Nigel Farage has to be seen as very much the British representative of the populist radical right in Europe. I would use that phrase to classify RUKP rather than the phrase “extreme right.” This differentiates him from parties like France’s National Rally, which has its roots in the extreme right despite its detoxification process. Similar histories can be found in the Sweden Democrats in Sweden and the Brothers of Italy, which evolved out of the fascist movement in that country.
In some ways, Farage is more like the populists seen in other Scandinavian countries, which don’t necessarily have roots in the anti-democratic, sometimes violent, fascist underground. This places him on the more moderate side of far-right parties in Europe.
In terms of techniques, Farage employs familiar populist strategies seen across Europe. He positions himself as the tribune of the people against the elite, who he claims have betrayed the people, particularly on issues like mass migration. He is also prepared to use language regarding Islam that mainstream politicians avoid. Farage talks about the supposed dangers Islamist subcultures present to mainstream national culture, and his rhetoric has become more Islamophobic and xenophobic over the years, which is also true of many populist parties in Europe. So, Farage is not a unique British archetype; he is very much a familiar figure to anyone who has followed populist parties in Europe.
The Conservative Party’s Strategy Proves Counterproductive
British PM Rishi Sunak shaking hands with supporters at a meet and greet in Leigh-on-Sea, UK, on January 15, 2024. Photo: Tennessee Witney.
Will this moment of triumph for RUKP prove a temporary upset to Britain’s long tradition of largely centrist rule? Or will RUKP’s explosive arrival in Westminster bring a fundamental realignment of British politics along the lines seen elsewhere for populist parties across the globe?
Professor Tim Bale: This is the million-dollar question and relates to how the Conservative Party, the mainstream center-right party in the UK, deals with Nigel Farage from now on. One can argue that the Conservative Party has been moving from the mainstream towards the populist radical right over the last decade, partly because it believed that to suppress support for RUKP, and before that the Brexit Party and UKIP, it had to adopt some of the rhetoric and measures proposed by the populist radical right.
However, that strategy doesn’t seem to have worked. Just as in Europe, it often proves counterproductive, simply increasing the salience of the issues on which those populist radical right parties thrive. So, the Conservative Party has moved towards the populist radical right, yet the populist radical right has become just as, if not more, popular than before.
The Conservative Party is now debating within itself, as it chooses a new leader, whether that new leader should welcome Nigel Farage into the party or at least into some sort of alliance to “unite the right,” or whether they should continue to hold Farage at arm’s length to differentiate themselves and not alienate more moderate voters. This conversation will likely continue within the Conservative Party for some time to come.
The impact of RUKP is limited by the UK’s electoral system. Because we have a first-past-the-post system, RUKP is not rewarded with a fair proportion of seats in Parliament for the votes it receives. Given that it got about 14% of the vote this time around, you would expect it to have something like 75-80 seats in the UK Parliament, which has 650 in the lower chamber, but it only has 5.
However, Nigel Farage has a significant media presence and appeals to both Conservative voters and Conservative members. When polling is done among Conservative Party members, they often cite Farage as one of their favorite politicians. This has led some to conclude that if Farage were ever to join the Conservative Party, he would stand a good chance of leading it, given that the decision on who becomes the leader is up to grassroots members with whom he is very popular.
Do you think RUKP’s success will push the Tories more to the populist right, a trend we see in continental Europe as we already hear calls by some Tory heavyweights to include RUKP among their ranks?
Professor Tim Bale: I think that is entirely possible, because the Conservatives, as I’ve already mentioned, are somewhat obsessed with Nigel Farage and RUKP. They focus more on the voters they have lost to him and that party than on those they have lost to Labour and the Liberal Democrats on their left or centrist flank.
An analysis of the election results suggesting that the Conservative Party did poorly because the right was split might encourage Conservatives to move even further to the right to try and bring back some of those voters from RUKP. However, as examples from Europe indicate, this doesn’t seem to be a particularly successful strategy. That doesn’t mean, of course, that the Conservative Party won’t adopt this strategy, because parties aren’t always as rational as they should be.
Conservative Party Acts More Like a Populist Radical Right Party
In your article “Who leads and who follows? The symbiotic relationship between UKIP and the Conservatives – and populism and Euroscepticism,” you discuss how the Conservative Party initially fused populism and Euroscepticism, which UKIP later capitalized on. How do you see this symbiotic relationship evolving now, especially with the Labour Party’s resurgence and the success of Farage’s party?
Professor Tim Bale: Well, in that piece, I argued that the Conservative Party talked up themes that resonate with voters for the populist radical right and then elected a leader who chose to abandon those policies and that rhetoric, allowing Nigel Farage to come in and fill that vacuum. At that point, the Conservative Party began to try and bring those who had defected to his party back by adopting his rhetoric. This creates a continual cycle where the Conservative Party begins to act more like a populist radical right party, and the populist radical right begins to do quite well.
The Conservative Party’s analysis often leads them to believe they need to act even more like a populist radical right party, perpetuating a vicious cycle. I expect this to continue unless and until the Conservative Party elects a leader who decides to break this pattern. Such a leader would need to refocus the party on being a mainstream center-right entity, with an appeal based on their ability to manage the economy and provide a welfare safety net for those who need it. Until that happens, this cycle will likely continue.
The Conservative Party now faces a significant decision. Whether they will elect such a leader this time around or after potentially losing another election, remains to be seen.
Populist Radical Right Parties Can’t Be Eradicated
In your article titled ‘Cinderella and Her Ugly Sisters: The Mainstream and Extreme Right in Europe’s Bi-polarising Party Systems’ that you penned back in 2010, you stress that there is every chance, that such parties (far-right parties) will indeed ‘succeed in securing a permanent niche in Western Europe’s emerging political market.’ How do you evaluate your statement that was made almost 15 years ago looking at both Europe and Britain in 2024?
Professor Tim Bale: Well, I think it sounds rather immodest to say, but it has been borne out by the facts. It is clear now, as scholars like Cas Mudde would emphasize, that the far right is very much a part of normal politics in many countries, including the UK. The populist radical right, as part of the far right, is also well-entrenched. These parties have an appeal to a certain section of the electorate who are frustrated with the mainstream’s inability to deliver what they want, whether it be immigration control, a better standard of living, or a halt to cultural changes.
I see no reason why this shouldn’t continue. However, at the moment, in most countries—perhaps with the exception of France, Italy, and Austria—the populist radical right tends to hit a ceiling of around 15 to 20% in most countries. It will be interesting to see what happens in the upcoming Austrian elections, where the far right is expected to do very well again.
We also have examples like Hungary, where the populist radical right is in power, even though it didn’t necessarily come to power as such a party but has become one under Viktor Orbán and Fidesz. Anyone interested in the populist radical right must accept that these parties are a permanent part of Europe’s party systems. Mainstream parties who oppose them have to learn to live with this fact and realize that while they can be beaten at elections, they can’t be eradicated.
And lastly, second round parliamentary elections in France show that far-left has beaten the far-right National Rally. Do you consider left-wing populism as problematic as right-wing populism?
Professor Tim Bale: Left-wing populism tends not to carry the xenophobic and Islamophobic overtones that are prevalent in the populist radical right. In this sense, it is somewhat less dangerous to multicultural societies than its right-wing counterpart. However, left-wing populism often proposes very radical solutions that are simplistic and likely not feasible, posing a significant threat to good governance and economic growth.
So, while left-wing populism has its downsides, which include potential harm to economic dynamism and governance, it may not be as dangerous for minority communities as right-wing populism has proven to be.
Professor Jean-Yves Camus emphasizes that the social and economic policies of President Emmanuel Macron have driven many voters to the National Rally (NR). However, he cautions against viewing this merely as a protest vote. “When a party remains strong for over 50 years, it cannot be solely due to protest,” he notes. According to Camus, NR’s support base reflects a society grappling with increasing inequalities, where many citizens feel deprived of fair opportunities. This sentiment is compounded by a growing resentment towards foreigners, particularly those from North African, West African and Middle Eastern backgrounds.
In an era marked by the rising influence of far-right movements across the globe, the unprecedented success of France’s National Rally (NR) in both the European Parliament elections in early June and the first round of national elections on June 30, 2024, has captured widespread attention. Scholars, politicians and citizens are keenly observing this seismic shift in French politics. To delve deeper into this phenomenon, we are joined byProfessor Jean-Yves Camus, a political analyst and Associate Research Fellow at The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), who is also a distinguished expert on far-right movements.
Reflecting on NR’s recent successes, Professor Camus emphasizes that the social and economic policies of President Emmanuel Macron have driven many voters to the National Rally. However, he cautions against viewing this merely as a protest vote. “When a party remains strong for over 50 years, it cannot be solely due to protest,” he notes. According to Camus, NR’s support base reflects a society grappling with increasing inequalities, where many citizens feel deprived of fair opportunities. This sentiment is compounded by a growing resentment towards foreigners, particularly those from North African, West African and Middle Eastern backgrounds. NR voters often believe in a clash of civilizations, perceiving a lack of proper assimilation into French society, especially among Muslim immigrants.
In this interview, Professor Camus provides historical context, current dynamics and future projections for the National Rally. He discusses how the NR’s appeal transcends mere protest, touching on deep-seated issues within French society, such as economic disparities, social mobility and national identity. Camus also explores how the NR’s messaging resonates across various demographics, indicating widespread discontent with traditional political parties. He examines the party’s evolution under Marine Le Pen’s leadership, particularly its ‘normalization’ process, which has made it more palatable to a broader segment of voters.
Additionally, Camus sheds light on the influence of cultural and historical factors, including the legacy of France’s colonial past and the Gaullist tradition of national sovereignty, in shaping contemporary far-right and populist movements. He addresses the complexities of European nationalist parties forming cohesive alliances within the European Parliament and the role of external influences, notably from the US and Russia, on the NR and similar movements.
As France stands on the brink of potentially significant political change, this interview offers a thorough analysis of the forces driving NR’s rise and what its continued success could mean for the future of French politics. Professor Camus’s insights are invaluable for understanding the broader implications of this shift and the underlying currents shaping the political landscape.
Professor Jean-Yves Camus, a political analyst and Associate Research Fellow at The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS).
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Jean-Yves Camus with some edits.
NR Has Been “Normalized” with Marine Le Pen
Professor Camus, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. What is the significance of National Rally’s success in the history of the 5th French Republic? What awaits France if NR wins the second round of elections which will, probably, lead to ‘co-habitation’?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The significance of this situation, where the Nationally Rally (NR) was voted more than 30% on the first of an election to the lower House of Parliament, is huge. It’s the first time in the history of the Fifth Republic that the extreme right has achieved such success. Back in the 1980s, we used to say in political science that the extreme right was dead. It was believed to have ended in 1945 with the victory against fascism and Nazi Germany and most political scientists considered that it would not be able to resuscitate because there was so much anger from citizens at what fascism stood for.
In spite of this, what we have seen, especially during the time of Jean-Marie Le Pen, between 1972 and 2011, is the re-emergence of the extreme right with some very extreme people and statements. It slowly transitioned from a small fringe movement to parties that initially polled 10%, then 15% and eventually 20%. The National Front even made it to the second round of the Presidential election in 2002 and more or less normalized with Marine Le Pen. Today, it is seen as a far-right party, especially on immigration issues and law and order.
However, the legacy of fascism and the historical extreme right is no more. The generation of people who experienced the Second World War is now deceased. The current members of the party are very young, with figures like Jordan Bardella, who is only 28 years old. For most French people, this is simply a far-right party with a law and order and anti-immigration agenda.
It Would Be a Mistake to Think This Is Only a Protest Vote
How do you explain the enormous success of National Rally both in the European Parliament elections on June 9 and in the first round of French parliamentary elections held on June 30?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: What is particularly striking is that the National Rally came out ahead among all segments of the population, from people aged 18 to 25 to elderly pensioners and from the upper-middle class to the working class. This indicates that the party has support across almost all segments of French society.
The success of the National Rally can be partly explained by the disaffection of voters with mainstream parties. Whether it be the Socialist Social Democrat left, Macron’s party—which was clearly sanctioned by the voters—or the mainstream conservative right party, Les Républicains, which garnered only 10% of the votes. You have to realize that the party of Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy and François Fillon, which used to be a major conservative force, is now practically dead.
The social and economic policies of Macron have driven many voters to the National Rally. However, it would be a mistake to think this is only a protest vote. When a party remains strong for over 50 years, it cannot be solely due to protest.
First of all, the vote reflects the reality that our society is becoming less and less egalitarian. In France, we have a passion for equality, which doesn’t mean everyone should earn the same wage or have the same education. Instead, it means the Republic should enable anyone from any walk of life to climb the social ladder. For example, someone from the working class should be able to see their children rise to the middle class and then to the upper class and so on. However, this social mobility is becoming less and less possible. Inequalities in terms of income and education are now greater than they were in the 1980s.
The second point is that many citizens feel they do not have fair access to opportunities. They perceive that there is an elite—a political elite, a media elite and an economic elite. On the other side, there are the common people and the gap between these two groups is widening.
To National Rally voters, it seems that democracy is not truly democratic because power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of people. That’s their perspective. While I am not claiming this is the absolute truth, it is the way most National Rally voters see French society.
There is also a wider resentment against foreigners, particularly those from North African, West African and Middle Eastern backgrounds. National Rally voters often believe in a kind of clash of civilizations. They think that assimilation into French society, especially of Muslim immigrants, is not happening as it should.
It is true that France has suffered many terror attacks from radical Islamic groups, which has played a very significant role in shifting many conservative voters, who used to vote for the Republicans, towards more hardline stances on immigration and national identity issues. Many of these voters initially moved to Eric Zemmour’s Reconquête party, but since that party received only 0.7% of the vote in the parliamentary elections, many of those votes have shifted to the National Rally. These voters believe that the country is overwhelmed by immigration and advocate for halting it altogether.
French People Are Longing for the Past
The crowd and supporters with French flags during the campaign meeting (rally) of French presidential candidate Eric Zemmour, on the Trocadero square in Paris, France on March 27, 2022. Photo: Victor Velter.
In what ways has the Gaullist tradition and its emphasis on national sovereignty shaped the contemporary far right and populist radical right movements in France?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: Sovereignty is a key word here. You might remember that during the era of Charles de Gaulle, sovereignty was a central aspect of his policy. At that time, we had the Common Market, not the EU, which was essentially a loose association of nation-states cooperating on selected issues and projects. This arrangement preserved each country’s sovereignty over foreign policy and the economy and there was no common currency. French legislation was not superseded by EU regulations.
Today, however, around 80% of what is voted in our Parliament must align with standards set by the EU. Consequently, our sovereignty is somewhat limited. While we retain the freedom to send or withhold our troops as we see fit, many citizens feel that the EU imposes constraints on our sovereignty. We now have a common currency and we must often agree with our European partners on important issues, relying on EU funding for various projects. The EU project, to some extent, aims at superseding the sovereignty of member states.
This passion for sovereignty, rooted in the Gaullist era, resonates with the far right and populist radical right movements in France. It also ties into the historical perception of France as a global superpower with colonies around the world. France once saw itself as one of the most important countries globally in terms of budget, military forces and influence.
Nowadays, our influence is less. This doesn’t mean that France cannot send a message to the world in terms of values or that we account for nothing on the international scene. We are now a medium-sized power and this status can bring many positive aspects. However, if you speak to National Front voters, they lament that we used to be one of the biggest countries in the world and have lost our colonial empire. They have a sense of decadency, longing for the past, which I personally do not share.
Given the current political landscape and the shift towards illiberalism, how do you assess the role of cultural and historical factors in shaping the political agendas of far-right movements in France today?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The National Rally is a good example of what an illiberal democracy would be like if it were in power.
Cultural factors are significant. The first cultural factor is the notion that in France, becoming French means assimilating to a set of values. Unlike Canada, the United States, or the United Kingdom, where individuals can retain part of their cultural or religious background and still identify as Italian American, Afro-American, Arab American or Jewish American, in France, we do not think that way. We have a set of values that require assimilation, which essentially means forgetting about your past identity and embracing the French way of life. This includes the principle of laïcité or the separation of church and state, which is very important in our secular state.When populations from non-European countries with different sets of values arrived, many French people resented this as an attack on our cultural model.
Then comes history. In France, history inevitably involves reflecting on our colonial past. Our relationships with Algeria and, to a lesser extent, Morocco are rooted in this colonial history. Algeria, for instance, gained independence in 1962 after a war that began in 1954. This conflict, which was a civil war both in Algeria and in mainland France, included an attempted coup in 1961 and resulted in many casualties on both sides. The French army was sent to Algeria to combat the pro-independence movement. How can we have a constructive relationship with Algeria when we have not yet overcome the burden of this past? This remains a significant issue. So, this is the challenge we face.
Of course, we also have issues with other countries from our former colonial empire. The burden of the past may be less pronounced with West African countries, but it still exists. These nations were colonized, and some of them are now asking for apologies for the colonization. For instance, if you look at the National Rally’s voter base, about 99% are nostalgic for the France of the colonial era. They do not support the idea of apologizing or paying reparations. Thus, we are still a country that needs to do a lot of introspection and work regarding our colonial past.
Less Than 50% of the French Think the National Rally Is a Threat
How do you assess the evolution of the National Rally (formerly National Front) under Marine Le Pen’s leadership, particularly in terms of its ‘normalization’ process and its success in attracting voters from Les Républicains? Can you provide us a historical perspective? Has the ‘normalization’ or ‘mainstreaming’ of National Rally been successful in attracting the votes of French middle class?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The so-called normalization of the National Rally can be seen in the fact that today, opinion surveys show less than 50% of the French think the National Rally is a threat to democracy. In the past, under Jean-Marie Le Pen’s leadership, more than 70% of the French viewed the party as a threat to the democracy.
Why has this perception changed? First of all, when Marine Le Pen became chairperson in 2011, it was clear she did not share her father’s ideology. She is not anti-Semitic, does not believe in racial inequality, and does not deny the harms that Nazi Germany did to France. Compared to her father, Marine Le Pen is more moderate.
However, she remains the only political leader who wants to stop immigration and make France a fortress closed to any kind of immigration. While she is still radical, she is less so than her father was. This normalization process grew gradually as new generations joined the National Rally, generations that had no political activity during Jean-Marie Le Pen’s era. They are not as obsessed with the party’s past and are drawn to it out of disillusionment with the mainstream political spectrum and resentment towards immigration, albeit in a different way than Jean-Marie Le Pen’s followers.
As a result, the party has slowly become more mainstream. Le Pen is perceived by many French citizens as a relatable political leader, someone who resonates deeply with the everyday struggles of the average person. This perception contrasts sharply with the widespread criticism of politicians who are seen as too detached and distant from the daily concerns of ordinary people.
Marine Le Pen’s appeal lies in her focus on issues such as the spending power of citizens, job losses and factory closures. She is seen as empathetic towards the struggles of the working and middle classes, who are often overlooked by the political elite. This perception makes her particularly attractive to the middle class, a demographic that feels the brunt of economic stagnation. This group, responsible for paying a substantial portion of taxes, sees their income either stagnating or growing very slowly. They are also the ones unable to assure their children of a better future than their own.
The middle class finds itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, a segment of the French population benefits greatly from globalization and financial markets. On the other hand, the working class receives social benefits and often pays minimal taxes due to lower incomes. Those in the middle, however, feel the weight of heavy taxation and perceive a lack of representation and support.
Main Challenge Far Right Parties Face in the EP Is Their Division
The transnational connections of illiberal movements have been in the spotlight for a considerable amount of time. Do you think trans-European strategies have been successful so far for European illiberal groups and their leaders? In your opinion, what challenges do they face in maintaining a cohesive front within the European Parliament?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: The main challenge they face in the European Parliament is their division into two political factions: the Identity and Democracy Group (ID Group), led by Marine Le Pen, and the European Conservatives and Reformers (ECR Group), led by Giorgia Meloni. Other figures, such as Viktor Orbán, do not currently belong to any particular group but may join one in the future.
These nationalist parties often do not prioritize establishing strong links with foreign groups due to potential clashes over national interests. For example, putting Hungarian and Romanian nationalists in the same room could lead to disagreements over the Hungarian minority in Romania. Similarly, Italian and Austrian nationalists might clash over territorial issues like South Tyrol.
So, the truth is that in every Parliament around the world, you have to belong to a group. This affiliation provides you with significant benefits: funding, jobs, the ability to convene meetings at the headquarters of the European Parliament and opportunities to travel and meet with fellow nationalists. Without group membership, you are essentially isolated in Parliament. Even when it comes to speaking time, those not affiliated with a group receive very limited opportunities to speak. In contrast, groups are allocated speaking time proportional to the number of seats they hold, enhancing their visibility and influence.
Therefore, it is crucial for members to put aside ideological and national differences to sit in the same room. By doing so, they gain the capacity to speak on the floor, increase their visibility and enhance their overall influence within the Parliament.
There is ongoing discussion about the potential merging of the ECR and ID groups into a supergroup of illiberal nationalist parties. However, personal ambitions and ideological differences make this challenging. For instance, deciding the leading figure among Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni or Orban could be contentious.
So, I think in the next legislature at the European Parliament, we will have at least the two existing groups, ID and ECR, and probably a third one. The German AfD can no longer sit with Marine Le Pen’s French National Rally, as Le Pen does not want her party associated with the AfD. Consequently, the AfD is working on building another, more far-right group with the Hungarians from the Mi Hazánk Mozgalom party and some parties from Eastern Europe, which may include the Forum for Democracy in the Netherlands.
The difficulty in forming a group in the European Parliament lies in meeting the required criteria: having at least 25 members and representing at least one-third of the member countries. While gathering 25 members might be straightforward, assembling members from diverse countries can be challenging.
NR and Putin Regime Stands for the Same Values
An activist of the NLM Katasonova Maria holds a poster with the image of Vladimir Putin, Marine Le Pen, and Donald Trump at the press conference in Moscow, Russia on December 23, 2016. Photo: Shutterstock.
Given the historical context of foreign influences on European politics, how do you view the role of US and Russian influences on the National Rally and other far-right movements in France today? Can you elaborate especially on the role of Putin regime in consolidating the role of far-right parties and illiberal movements?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: When it comes to the National Rally, one very important piece of their agenda is the desire for France to withdraw from the military command of NATO. This is significant because, despite French troops being sent abroad, we saw in Sahel in West Africa, under French command, they often have to rely on intelligence gathered by the United States and sometimes the UK. This reliance illustrates the complexities of their stance.
The second point is: What does the National Rally want regarding the Ukraine-Russia war? Marine Le Pen has stated that Russia is a multidimensional enemy. She made this claim a week ago during a TV debate. However, shortly after, she clarified her stance, saying, “Russia is an enemy, but I will not send French troops to train and help Ukrainian soldiers. I shall not allow France to sell missiles to Ukraine because those missiles might kill Russian civilians in Russian cities.”
In terms of strategy, usually when a country is labeled as an enemy, there is an implicit expectation to support the opposing side. In this context, if Russia is deemed the enemy, support should go to Ukraine. However, if Le Pen asserts that Russia is the enemy but simultaneously refuses to send troops or provide essential weapons to Ukraine, she indicates a reluctance to fully back Ukraine. This position effectively means turning her back on Ukraine and showing a preference for Russia over Ukraine.
It’s not only a matter of National Rally having relied on Russian money in the past to run the party. Of course, they did borrow money from a Russian bank, but money does not dictate their relationship with Russia. They are supportive of Russia because they believe the Russian regime stands for the same values. These values include authoritarian democracy, a very strong leader and a firm, vertical way of ruling the country. They claim that Russia stands for traditional family values, a multipolar world and law and order. Russia also fights Islamism, even within its borders. In their view, Russia represents a country where traditional European values are still upheld by the government. In other words, they believe the West is too liberal and that Russia is the most traditional country on our continent.
In an article you wrote for Le Monde Diplomatique back in 2014 with the title ‘Not your father’s far right,’ you argue that extensive research into far-right populism over the last 30 years has yet to find a precise, workable definition for this catch-all term, and we need more information on the political category it covers. Revisiting the debate in 2024, do you think we now have a workable definition for populism?
Professor Jean-Yves Camus: We are still in a similar position as we were back in 2002. There is no consensus on a common definition of populism. Broadly speaking, populism can be divided into two different strands: left-wing populism and right-wing populism. In France, for example, left-wing populism is embodied by figures like Jean-Luc Mélenchon and La France Insoumise, while right-wing populism includes parties like the National Rally.
The only similarity between them is their desire to bypass representative democracy in favor of direct democracy, advocating for referenda on major issues. However, what is specific to the far right is their xenophobic agenda. They scapegoat foreigners, immigrants and refugees for everything that goes wrong in the country. In contrast, the far left does not advocate for different rights for native citizens versus documented immigrants or naturalized citizens. For the far right, this xenophobia is the cornerstone of their agenda, which is the fundamental difference between the two.
While the AfD has contributed to the widely expected shift towards the right in the new European Parliament by winning four additional seats, this is unlikely to make a significant political difference. However, the impact of this result in Germany is difficult to underestimate. Paradoxically, as the AfD has become more radical, it has also become an almost normal part of political life in Germany. Unlike in many other European countries, German mainstream parties still choose to ignore that the radical right “owns” the immigration issue. Any attempts by mainstream parties to publicly take a tough stance on immigration will likely further benefit the AfD.
By Kai Arzheimer*
The result of the 2024 European election was a devastating blow to Germany’s mainstream parties. Collectively, the Social Democrats, Greens, and Liberals that make up the “traffic light” coalition won just 31% of the vote. The Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), for decades Germany’s natural party of government, won 30%. While this is a modest improvement of 1.1. percentage points on their 2019 result and significantly better than the 24.1% they won in the 2021 federal election; this is still disappointing given the CDU/CSU’s historical record and the fact that the government is so unpopular.
15.9 %, or almost half of the remaining votes, went to the populist radical right “Alternative for Germany” (AfD). While the tally was almost exactly in line with pre-election polls, and while the AfD’s vote share remained well below those of the Rassemblement National or the Fratelli d’Italia in their respective countries, this is still a remarkable result that send shockwaves through Germany and Europe, and rightfully so.
Who are “Alternative for Germany”?
In the 2010s, Germany was one of the few West European countries where the so-called “third wave” of far-right mobilization, which had begun in the 1980s, had apparently failed on the national level. However, this changed in 2013 when a new party called “Alternative for Germany” founded just months before the federal election, came tantalizingly close to the electoral threshold. AfD won its first seats in the 2014 European elections and was successful in just about every state-level and national election that followed.
AfD initially started out as a softly Eurosceptic, socially conservative, market liberal party fueled by the rejection of the various “bail outs” aimed at keeping the southern member states within the Eurozone. From 2015, it quickly transformed into a typical radical right party focused on immigration and multiculturalism, a process speeded up by the so-called refugee crisis of 2015/16 and the political opportunities it offered.
However, the AfD differs from most other successful European far-right parties in one important way. Parties like the Rassemblement National, the Fratelli or even the Sweden Democrats strive to cut or downplay any ideological ties with historical and contemporary right-wing extremism they had or have. While this does not necessarily render them respectable, it makes them at least acceptable to a wider spectrum of potential voters and coalition partners.
The AfD initially followed a similar strategy by billing itself as “liberal-conservative” and presenting a reassuring front row of politicians that mostly could have been or even had been members of center-right parties. But from the very beginning, the party also harbored other right-wingers that were not just radical in their rejection of immigration and minority rights but also sympathetic to right-wing extremist ideas and openly anti-democratic actors outside the party proper. Over time, this faction (for a time formally organized under the label “the wing”) became the most influential force within the party and already dominated the AfD when they first entered the national parliament in 2017.
At long last, these developments attracted the attention of the “Office for the Protection of the Constitution,” Germany’s domestic intelligence agency that is tasked with monitoring extremist threats. Three state parties, the AfD’s youth wing, and several individual politicians have already been classified as right-wing extremist by the authorities. The party as a whole is under surveillance as a “suspected right-wing extremist organization,” a legal designation that the party has repeatedly challenged in court to no avail.
Remarkably, all but two of the thousands of the documents the Office presented in court as evidence are from open sources that anyone could access. The AfD’s caucus in the Bundestag has hired more than a hundred known right-wing extremists as staffers, funneling public money into their organizations. Dozens of AfD politicians, up to the honorary party president, are on the record arguing that some Germans could never be considered full citizens because of their ethnicity (a claim that contravenes the constitution). Others were uncovered as members of extremist chat groups, and one former MP, a sitting judge, is currently standing trial on charges of terrorism and high treason. She had used her parliamentary pass to bring some of her co-conspirators into parliament for reconnaissance and was slated as the minister for justice in the future revolutionary government.
The party also has longstanding ties with Russia. State-level and federal MPs have repeatedly travelled to Russia, but also to Crimea and to the occupied oblasts in eastern Ukraine to serve as “election monitors” as late as September 2022.
Why Do They (Still) Vote for AfD?
At the end of 2023, the AfD rose above 20% in the polls for the first time in its history, bolstered by concerns about inflation, immigration, energy supplies, and a general sense of discontent. However, January 2024 marked the beginning of a chain of events that trounced the party. In the early weeks of the new year, investigative journalists released footage of a meeting between AfD members including the co-leaders bureau chief, representatives of the right-wing extremist Identitarian Movement, and potential donors. The attendants had discussed plans for the expulsion of millions of Germans from minority backgrounds. The report triggered mass protests on a scale not seen in many years that lasted well into March and still have not fully subsided. The story also marked the beginning of a public rift between the AfD on the one hand and Marine Le Pen and her ID group in the EP at the other.
Over the course of April, Czech media and authorities released footage which documents that Petr Bystron, the AfD’s second-from-the-top candidate for the EP, had accepted tens of thousands of Euros from the pro-Russian propaganda outlet “Voice of Europe.” As vote buying and selling is illegal in Germany, Bystron became the object of a full criminal investigation that was still ongoing at the time of the election. Just a couple of days later, Belgian police raided the offices of Maximilian Krah, the AfD’s Spitzenkandidat for the EP, and arrested one of his aides as an alleged spy for China. Krah himself was not charged, but German prosecutors launched a pre-investigation (still ongoing) into allegations that he too accepted money from China and Russia. The party made further negative headlines in May, when one of the party’s most notorious hardliners was sentenced for (repeatedly) using the banned slogan of the NSDAP’s paramilitary wing at party conferences. Just two days later, an appellate court confirmed once more that the party’s observation by the intelligence agency was legal and justified. To cap this disastrous campaign off, the AfD was finally expelled from the ID group after Krah had tried to downplay the crimes of the Waffen SS in an interview with an Italian newspaper.
And yet, against this backdrop, 15.9% of the electorate still voted for the AfD. It is hard to frame this as some sort of content-free protest, as the AfD has a very clear and widely publicized ideological profile. There can be no more doubt that they are fervently anti-immigration, anti-European and anti-Ukrainian, linked to domestic insurrectionists, friends with foreign dictators: too far-right even by Marine Le Pen’s standards.
Pre- and post-election surveys have once more confirmed what has been known all along. The AfD’s voters are primarily driven by a (highly emotional) rejection of immigrants in general and Muslims in particular. Backlash against the ecological transformation and the Green party, gender issues, and German support for Ukraine provide secondary motives. Reports about extremist tendencies within the AfD are regularly dismissed or priced in by these voters, and even concerns about Chinese and Russian influence are minimized. It is difficult to see how other parties could win these voters back in the short and medium term.
What Are the Likely Consequences for Europe and in Germany?
While the AfD has numerically contributed to the widely expected shift towards the right in the new EP by winning four additional seats, it looks like this will make no big political difference. Even after they excluded Krah from their delegation, the remain excluded from the ID group. Right now (June 25, 2024), the AfD is approaching a number of smaller far-right parties, mostly from Central and Eastern Europe, in a bid to form a parliamentary group of their own. Whether they succeed in bringing together at least 23 MEPs from at least seven members states and whether that impacts the co-operation amongst the parties in the ECR and ID groups remains to be seen.
However, it is difficult to underestimate the impact of the result in Germany. Somewhat paradoxically, while the AfD has become more and more radical, it has also become an almost normal fact of political life in Germany. Compared to the 2019 EP and the 2021 federal election, the party has gained considerably more support amongst younger voters (a group where the AfD struggled in the past) and has also made inroads in many areas in the western states.
Nonetheless, the AfD’s support remains geographically lopsided, with levels in the East on average twice as high as in the West. At 30% or more, this makes the AfD the biggest party in large swathes of the eastern states, three of which will go to the polls in September. If the AfD’s levels of support remain where they are now, and if some of the smaller parties fail to clear the electoral threshold in these elections (almost a certainty for the FDP and not unlikely in the case of the Greens, the Left, and the SPD), the AfD will necessitate a very awkward cooperation of the Christian Democrats and the new, left-authoritarian populist BSW. They may win enough seats to block the appointment of judges in state constitutional courts and other officials. The AfD may even end up forming a minority government in one or more of these states that would be, amongst other things, be in charge of the school curriculum and the state police force. The consequences for the respective states, but also for Germany’s normally consensual and highly interdependent system of federal policy making would be dramatic.
But even outside (state) government, the AfD’s influence can already be felt. In the last week of the EP campaign, the Social Democrats made a desperate U-turn and came out in support of the repatriation of criminals to Afghanistan and Syria. The Christian Democrats (especially those in the eastern states) and even the Liberals have long argued that only the promise of tougher rules on immigration and immigrants can curb support for the AfD. And immediately after the election, the Chancellery, the Home Office, and the state premiers agreed that they would explore the legal feasibility of arrangements akin to the British deal with Rwanda.
Contrary to the evidence from many other European countries, German mainstream parties still choose to ignore that the radical right “owns” the immigration issue. In all likelihood, any attempts to publicly go tough on immigration will only further benefit the AfD.
(*) Kai Arzheimer is Professor of German Politics and Political Sociology at the Johannes Gutenberg University in Mainz, Germany. He has published widely on voting behaviour and political attitudes and is particularly interested in Far Right parties and their voters.
The 2024 election was the least free and fair election in India’s history. Just days after India’s nationalist-populist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed a government for the third time, Delhi’s BJP Lieutenant Governor, V.K. Saxena, proceeded to charge the writer Arundhati Roy, a fierce critic of Modi, under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) 2019 for a speech she gave in 2010. The already draconian law was amended in 2019 to allow the government more extraordinary powers to designate individuals and organizations as terrorists without a formal judicial process. BJP leaders accused Roy of being a traitor backed by the Congress party. This strongly indicates that some version of authoritarian populism, with its attacks on dissent, undermining of institutions, and social polarization, will likely continue to shape governance under the new government.
By Priya Chacko* and Kanchan Panday**
Introduction: India’s Unfree and Unfair 2024 Election
India’s nationalist-populist Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) has formed government for the third time. The 2024 election was the least free and fair election in India’s history. For much of its history as an independent state, India has been an electoral democracy, defying the ‘Lipset hypothesis’ that democratic institutions and cultures usually only thrive in affluent societies. Barring a period of Emergency rule in the 1970s when elections were suspended, India has met the threshold for free and fair elections. Its voter turnout has typically been high at around 70%, and a complex electoral structure involving phased voting, a Model Code of Conduct (MCC), travelling electoral and security officials seek to reach all voters, and electronic voting has been put in place to prevent fraud. Since 2018, however, there has been a steep decline in the quality of India’s electoral democracy. The V-Dem Institute now regards India as an electoral autocracywithout sufficient freedoms and safeguards to ensure free and fair elections.
The BJP went to the polls supported by a pro-government mainstream media and with vastly more resources than other parties. This was thanks to an opaque electoral financing system it introduced, which was belatedly declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in February. Opposition leaders allege the Modi government is misusing state agencies to target them on charges of money laundering and tax violations. Before the election, two prominent opposition Chief Ministers, Arvind Kejriwal of the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and Hemant Soren of the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), were arrested on charges of corruption.
However, even though Modi is embarking upon a third term, and despite the lack of a level electoral playing field, his party has been denied a majority for the first time in a decade. To continue to govern, he must rely on two veteran regional leaders who are a part of the NDA, Nitish Kumar of the Janata Dal (United) (JD) and Chandrababu Naidu of the Telegu Desam Party (TDP).
In this article, we discuss India’s decade-long descent into authoritarian populism – following its praxis and its traces in the 2024 campaign discourse. We probe into the increasingly authoritarian character of India’s state under Modi, which includes the growing prevalence of Islamophobic rhetoric, the suffocation of dissent, the curbing of critical spaces, and the capture of institutions by the Sangh Parivar or Hindutva movement. We conclude with a discussion on the limits and the future of India’s authoritarian populism following the election results.
A Decade of Authoritarian Populist Rule
In the last decade, the Modi government has used nationalist-populist discourses and strategies to legitimise and facilitate increasingly authoritarian and exclusionary forms of governance. The government has promoted discourses and policies aimed at marginalising and stigmatising India’s Muslim population and propagating Hindu upper-caste social norms, exposing the most vulnerable groups, Muslims, Dalits, and Adivasis, to vigilante violence. Its economic policies favoured the private sector and trickle-down economic growth, increasing economic inequality. It has enabled institutional disintermediation, concentrating power in the executive and eroding institutional independence and federalism. It grew increasingly intolerant of dissent, using laws against sedition, defamation and anti-terrorism as well as tax and corruption investigations to jail and intimidate journalists, activists and political opponents. India was always a flawed democracywith draconian laws applied particularly to restive regions with large numbers of minorities, inadequate public goods, overly centralised governance structures and a Hindu bias in its Constitution. However, the Modi government’s inherently authoritarian nationalist-populist politics of Hindutva has intensified these pre-existing illiberal and anti-democratic features of governance.
Hindutva is an organicist nationalism that draws on religious concepts from ancient texts from the Vedic era (1500-500 BCE) to construct India as a living organism. Hindutva ideologues like Deendayal Upadhyaya and M.S. Golwalkar conceptualised India as Virat Purusha (Cosmic Man) – with a Hindu soul (chitti) and limbs that are analogous to the caste order of Brahmins (head), Kshatriyas (arms), Vaishyas (abdomen) and Shudras (legs). This organic national unity underpinned by the caste order is seen as threatened by religious, political, caste and class conflict. To create a unified Hindu nation and stigmatise dissent, Hindutva leaders have utilised populist political strategies to construct an aspirational Hindu people, privileging upper caste forms of Hinduism while encouraging caste pride to secure acceptance for an unequal status quo. These Hindu ‘people’ were pitted against ‘anti-national’ secular, liberal-left elite and religious minorities, particularly Muslims, who are characterised as dangerous and disloyal because they adhere to foreign religions and ideologies. In the past decade, so-called elites – opposition leaders, university students, activists, intellectuals, bureaucrats, independent journalists – were accused of being anti-national, corrupt and ‘appeasing’ Muslims who were posed as threats to the Hindu people in various ways. Modi fashioned himself as a representative of God with divine origins who embodied the common people and was sent to rescue the poor and restore India’s (Hindu) civilisational greatness.
Such discourses framed the government’s policies and its institutional capture. For instance, the government’s welfare policies, consisting of small cash transfers, small loans, food rations, and subsidies for private goods like toilets and insurance, have been communicated as superior to previous programs, which were constrained in their delivery by elite corruption and as ‘guarantees’ of a better life from Modi. Yet their limited nature means the considerable onus is placed on personal duty to pursue ‘empowerment’ through market participation, which is consistent with Hindutva’s emphasis on swadharma (own duty) for the upholding of social order rather than transformation. Nationalist-populist discourses underpinned the introduction of policies targeting and stigmatising Muslims, such as curtailing interreligious marriage – on the grounds they often involve religious conversion and the coercion or tricking of Hindu women by Muslim men – and the promotion of Hindu upper caste behavioural norms, for instance, banning beef production and consumption. Both religious conversion (termed ‘love jihad’) and beef production, the BJP claimed, permitted establishment elites to cultivate Muslim ‘vote banks.’ Liberal universities were targeted as full of ‘anti-national’ elites, and their administrations were filled with pro-government leaders. Courts increasingly favoured the executive, including by adopting its rhetoric. The mainstream media became increasingly uncritical of the government, while the independent media were subject to censorship, defamation charges and tax investigations to stifle their dissent.
Authoritarian Populism and the 2024 Election Campaign
People wait in queues to cast votes at a polling station during the 3rd phase of Lok Sabha polls, in Guwahati, India on May 7, 2024. Photo: Hafiz Ahmed.
Authoritarian populism also framed the 2024 election campaign. In the lead-up to the election, the largest party of INDIA block, the Congress, which the BJP alleges is led by corrupt elites, accused the government of instigating the income tax department to freeze its accounts for late tax filings, leaving it unable to effectively campaign.
Modi’s initial campaigning revolved around his welfare ‘guarantees’ for improving the lives of the poor and the building of a temple marking the birthplace of the god Rama on the site of a mosque demolished by Hindutva activists in 1992. This campaigning emphasised aspirational nationalist-populism, tinged with anti-Muslim resentment. Modi has sought to represent himself as an aspirational leader, leaving the espousal of anti-Muslim rhetoric to colleagues like Amit Shah, vigilante groups and his supporters. During the inauguration of the Ram Temple in January, for instance, while Modi declared the temple a symbol of religious unity, his supporters filled public spaces, both virtual and physical, with anti-Muslim rhetoric.
As the campaign wore on, however – perhaps due to low voter turnout and negative internal polling – Modi resorted to explicitly Islamophobic and anti-elite rhetoric. Modi declared the Congress Party manifesto as having an “imprint of Muslim League” (The party often blamed for the partition of India in 1947). He also accused the Congress Party, which pledged to of wanting to snatch away affirmative action benefits of lower castes to satisfy the ‘Muslim vote bank.’ In the state of Bengal, ruled by prominent regional party and Congress ally Trinamool Congress’s Mamata Banerjee, the Prime Minister evoked the fears of infiltrators (implicitly Muslims) snatching away resources of the Hindu people of Bengal. He also alleged the Congress’s emphasis on redistribution meant that it wanted to snatch away the mangal sutras (an ornament worn by married Hindu women) and buffalos of Hindus to give to Muslims. The Election Commission failed to adequately enforce the Model Code of Conduct with respect to these comments.
In several fawning interviews with pro-government legacy media channels, Modi sought to respond to charges that he is cultivating a dictatorship by invoking a victimised ‘common man’ persona. In one such interview, he said, “People used to slap me if they feel they have been given cold tea, so I am accustomed to accusations and harassments. As I am a common man, I know these people in higher echelons of society abuse the common man.” Though social media and especially YouTubeemerged as a site of alternative and critical news coverage, it was also targeted with censorship.
During the long seven phases of polling, numerous reports of voter suppression and intimidation emerged. In Uttar Pradesh’s Muslim-dominated constituency of Sambhal, Muslim voters were beaten up, their voter IDs snatched, effectively barred from voting. BJP officials were caught on camera bribing the polling officials to intimidate Muslim voters. The election commission stayed silent on most accounts of polling irregularities, and also delayed voter turnout data for first two phases of polling raising questions on the sanctity of voting process.
The Limits of Authoritarian Populism
Modi had begun his election campaign proclaiming his intention to win more than 400 seats and media pollsters predicted him to win by a substantial margin. However, signs of discontent were visible. A pre-poll survey conducted by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) from mid-March to early April showed significant voter discontent about inflation and unemployment. While 44% of respondents want the government to return to power, a sizeable 39% did not want the government to be re-elected. Interviews by independent media organisations with voters during the campaign reflected this discontent. There is visible distress in India’s rural economy, where wages have been stagnant for the past ten years. Rural growth rates were on the decline even before Modi took office, but they have only worsened since then, contrary to his promises. The “Ache Din (Good days)” rhetoric has fallen deaf after ten years. Reports also indicated a lack of enthusiasm among BJP party workers, who have been important vote mobilisers in previous elections and strong campaigning by the opposition Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA).
Taking advantage of repeated claims by BJP leaders about needing to change the Constitution, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s speeches highlighted a commitment to protecting the Constitution, addressing caste-based injustice by undertaking a caste census to reveal the extent of disadvantage and the concentration of wealth. Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD)’s Lalu Prasad Yadav, an important ally of the INDIA block, warned the BJP intended to change the Constitution to end caste-based affirmative action. Though this was denied by Modi, the allegation was plausible given that BJP leadersoften spoke of the need to change the Constitution and seemed to strike a chord with voters. Caste presents a dilemma for Modi’s Hindutva politics, which is dominated by upper-caste leaders and valorises upper-caste Hindu practices and behaviour while relying on support from the lower-caste majority to win elections. The BJP has sought to ameliorate this tension by promoting welfare schemes. In the lead-up to the election, Modi, who often emphasises his lower caste background, claimed to have replaced traditional forms of caste stratification with four castes of welfare ‘beneficiaries’ – women, farmers, youth and the poor. However, the government’s welfare schemes only compensate for the stagnation of incomes and the lack of jobs. Its spending on health and education, which could have transformative effects on social mobility, has languished.
Ultimately, the BJP was reduced to 240 seats, the NDA won 293 seats, and INDIA performed much better than pollsters had predicted, winning 232 seats. Modi’s victory margin in his seat of Varanasi dropped to about 150,000 votes from 500,000 in 2019, and a post-poll survey indicated stagnation in his popularity. The BJP lost one-third of its rural seats. The Congress Party almost doubled its tally, winning 99 seats and made gains in Rajasthan, Haryana and Maharashtra, taking advantage of discontent among rural voters and particular caste communities like Jats and Rajputs. The Samajwadi Party (SP), a regional party, won 37 seats and made a comeback in Uttar Pradesh. The SP previously dominated Uttar Pradesh politics by fashioning a voter base of lower caste ‘Other Backward Class’ (OBC) Yadavs and Muslims. This politics, however, generated resentment among non-Yadav and Dalit voters, which the BJP exploited to make gains in the state in the 2014 national election and win the state election in 2017. In this election, the SP fashioned a new broader caste coalition, including Dalit and non-Yadav OBC candidates. Other important parties in the INDIA bloc, including the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) as well as the Trinamool Congress (TMC), also made sweeping regional gains in their respective states of Tamil Nadu and West Bengal, respectively.
The euphoria over the Ram temple did not result in votes, with the BJP even losing the seat of Faizabad, where the Ram temple is located, to a Dalit candidate, Awadhesh Prasad, of the SP, who may have benefitted from discontent over the construction process which displaced and dispossessed poor residents and the failure of promised jobs to materialise.
The CSDS post-poll survey revealed that 69% of voters decided who to vote for during the campaign or shortly before voting. Hence, Modi’s anti-Muslim campaign statements may have backfired, encouraging a consolidation of Muslim voters (92%) for INDIA in Uttar Pradesh, where they constitute 20% of the population, and increasing concerns among voters about communal conflict. Modi lost in 20 of the 22 constituencies where he made anti-Muslim speeches. While in the CSDS pre-poll survey, 3% of voters listed communalism and religious conflict as the most disliked aspect of the government’s performance issues, in its post-poll survey, this rose to a total of 9% of voters.
The lessons from the 2024 election are that regional political parties and caste politics remain potent forces in Indian politics and that even when elections are unfree and unfair, opposition parties can dent the dominance of ruling parties by presenting a united front and sticking to a consistent message reflecting specific issues of voter discontent.
Conclusion: The Future of Authoritarian Populism
Mira Bortakhur Goswami congress party candidate of Guwahati constituency during door to door election campaign ahead of Lok Sabha Election 2024 in Guwahati, India on April 7, 2024. Photo: Dasarath Deka.
While the BJP now needs coalition partners to govern, it remains India’s dominant political party, losing only one per centof its vote share. Moreover, it has made inroads in new regions and retains its broad-based caste and class voter coalition. It swept the state of Odisha, taking advantage of high anti-incumbency against the 20-year-old state government of the regional Biju Janata Dal led by Naveen Patnaik. It consolidated its presence in Madya Pradesh and Gujarat, where no strong regional opposition exists. It increased its vote share in the southern state of Tamil Nadu and won its first seat in Kerala, where it won support from upper caste and OBC voters in particular.
While there was a significant rise in the youth vote share for the Congress’s allies, and the BJP’s support has declined among the older voters, it has kept its lure among young voters (below 25 years), with 39% of young voters supporting it, despite high unemployment and irregularities in the selection process of public sector jobs. Modi’s ‘development man’ image, associated with a higher standard of living and its social media outreach, might be the reason for the voting pattern among youngsters.
Among women voters, we see a marginal increase in the vote share of Congress and allies, with a 2% increase for Congress and a 5% increase for its allies. Both the INDIA bloc and NDA centred their campaign on wooing women voters through welfare schemes. Meanwhile, the women’s vote share has remained stagnant for NDA. While the BJP claimed that the Lakhpati Didi scheme has successfully curbed unemployment by creating 10 million Lakhpati Didi, grounds reports by independent media organisations showed a rather grim image of the implementation. Survey trends suggest that women vote for immediate improvement in household conditions, which has been showing stagnation in recent years. In states such as Odisha and Chhattisgarh, a reverse trend has also been observed, where women voters have pushed the BJP’s victory, though this may reflect broader factors like high anti-incumbency in the former and a lack of regional party alternatives in the latter.
Upper castes remain a reliable vote bank for the BJP. It has also made noticeable inroads among the Adivasi voters, broadening its caste network of voters with few deviations. It is the other backward castes (OBC) and Dalits who more significantly stand opposed to BJP’s financial and political governance. It also needs to be mentioned that though the Muslim vote has aggregated against the BJP, 10% of Muslims voted for BJP in 2024.
Recent allotments of portfolios show that ministers and officials at the forefront of the authoritarian populist agenda, such as Amit Shah, whose Home Affairs ministry is responsible for discriminatory citizenship laws and drives the intimidation of civil society, continue to occupy positions of power. Only 26 Muslim legislators are part of the 18th Lok Sabha, the second lowest ever in the lower house. For the first time, the Indian cabinet does not have any Muslim representatives.
Moreover, in the past ten years, many aspects of the Hindutva agenda have become mainstream. Opposition parties have been shying away from openly appealing to Muslims for fear of being labelled appeasers and anti-Hindu. Both pre-poll and post-poll surveys show that the building of the Ram temple, a core Hindutva issue, has been popular with voters and that Modi still remains India’s most popular leader.
Much focus has been given to the coalition aspect of the new government, but it remains to be seen whether regional parties in the NDA will hinder the BJP’s governance. Chandrababu Naidu and Nitish Kumar consider Muslim voters partof their electoral coalition; both have previouslycriticised the BJP for its authoritarian governance. However, both also have their own agendas that require support from the BJP and the central government. Naidu intends to revive his Amravati capital city project for Andhra Pradesh, which has been a long-standing issue since the state’s bifurcation in 2014. The cost of building a smart city has been increasing, and it will need the central government’s financial support. Although the NDA won the most seats in the state of Bihar, Nitish Kumar’s party, the JD(U), lost its vote share to the Rashtriya Janata Dal, a regional caste-based party, which commanded the highest vote share as a single party. Nitish Kumar needs greater national government assistance to appeal to voters for the upcoming 2025 state legislative election and may downplay issues on which he diverges from the BJP. Additionally, both Naidu and Kumar want special category status for their respective states, which will perhaps make them more amenable to the BJP’s Hindutva agenda.
Just days after the new government was sworn in, Delhi’s BJP Lieutenant Governor, V.K. Saxena, proceeded to charge the writer Arundhati Roy, Modi’s fierce critic, under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) 2019 for a speech she gave in 2010. The already draconian law was amended in 2019 to allow the government more extraordinary powers to designate individuals/organisations as terrorists without a formal judicial process. BJP leaders accused Roy of being a traitor backed by the Congress party. This is a strong indication that some version of authoritarian populism, with its attacks on dissent, undermining institutions and social polarisation, will likely continue to shape governance under the new government.
Professor Claudia Wiesner voices her concerns regarding the troubling trend of the European People’s Party (EPP) and Ursula von der Leyen, showing a preference for collaborating with populist far-right groups over the Greens. Professor Wiesner argues that this strategy is fraught with risks for the European Union. She questions the strategic interest behind such alliances, emphasizing, “These parties would not support strong European integration. They favor a weaker Europe, whereas the Greens support a stronger Europe. It would be in the interest of a strong European Commission to align with parties favoring a stronger European Union.” Wiesner further highlights the potential legitimacy crisis the EU might face if it continues down this path.
In an intriguing interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Claudia Wiesner, Jean Monnet Chair and Professor for Political Science at Fulda University of Applied Sciences, discussed the concerning trend of the European People’s Party (EPP) and its leader, Ursula von der Leyen, showing a preference for collaborating with far-right groups such as Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia over the Greens. Professor Wiesner argued that this strategy is fraught with risks for the European Union. She questioned the strategic interest behind such alliances, emphasizing, “These parties would not support strong European integration. They favor a weaker Europe, whereas the Greens support a stronger Europe. It would be in the interest of a strong European Commission to align with parties favoring a stronger European Union.”
Wiesner further highlighted the potential legitimacy crisis the EU might face if it continues down this path. “If the major faction in the European Parliament collaborates with groups that have previously acted against these principles and the rule of law, it will create a legitimacy problem for the EU,” she warned. She raised critical concerns about how citizens could trust von der Leyen’s commitment to defending democracy when she collaborates with leaders like Meloni, who has been accused of undermining media liberty in Italy, or the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS), known for driving democratic backsliding in Poland.
The issue of coalition-building in the European Parliament is another significant challenge. According to Wiesner, the volatility of majorities necessitates a coalition of at least four political groups, including Conservatives, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Greens, to achieve consensus. However, current debates suggest the possibility of excluding the Greens in favor of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which could further complicate efforts to foster a unified and strong European Union.
Professor Wiesner’s insights underscore the complexities and potential pitfalls of current political maneuvers within the EU. Her critique serves as a stark reminder of the importance of adhering to the EU’s foundational values and the risks involved in straying from these principles for short-term political gains. “If the European Union wants to be credible in defending its values, it needs to defend these values internally as well,” she concluded, highlighting the need for consistency and integrity in EU governance and policymaking.
Dr. Claudia Wiesner, Jean Monnet Chair and Professor for Political Science at Fulda University of Applied Sciences.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Claudia Wiesner with some edits.
Rising Populist Parties Seek to Redefine European Identity or Values
How do you define European identity? Is there a European identity? What are the problems and contradictions when we try to define a European identity? Has the EU been successful in constructing a European identity?
Professor Claudia Wiesner: This is a difficult question to answer briefly. So, let me start with a yes or no. The answer isn’t strictly no, but it does resemble the “glass half full or half empty” perspective.
There are elements of European identity. For instance, people identify with the European Union (EU) as a polity, participate in European elections, and the relatively high turnout in the last European Parliament (EP) elections shows that people find the EU politically relevant. Additionally, events like the current football competition in Germany, with participants from all over Europe and coverage by the German tabloid Bild calling Europe a great country, indicate elements and dimensions of European identity. Eurobarometer data shows that EU citizens feel European and believe that membership in the EU is beneficial. These indicators suggest there is something to this concept of European identity.
Early research on European identity often compared it to national identity, a comparison I believe is unattainable. The question isn’t whether people would die for the European Union, as they might for a nation-state. We must recognize that identification with the EU differs from identification with a nation-state. European identity is a dual identity; people might say, “I’m a German and a European,” or even, “I’m from Frankfurt, I’m German, and I’m European.”
In conclusion, the answer is complex. Despite this complexity, there is a certain degree of European identity.
How does the rise of populist movements within the EU challenge the formation of a cohesive European identity, and what strategies can be employed to mitigate these challenges while promoting democratic values?
Row of EU Flags in front of the European Union Commission building in Brussels. Photo: VanderWolf Images.
Professor Claudia Wiesner: You mentioned three key points here: the rise of populism, European identity and the defense of democratic values. The rise of populism has multiple causes and is a significant field of research, with contributions from many colleagues. There are various triggers for the rise of populism, including social inequality, dissatisfaction with the government, a surge of nationalism and an anti-migration stance.
The success of populist parties and actors generally mobilizes a feeling of “us versus them,” often articulated in nationalist terms. I am currently leading a work package in a Horizon project on resilient social contracts and we recently finished data collection on the European elections. We collected TikTok videos, revealing how populist arguments work. In Germany, a strong right-wing extremist/populist party uses mobilization to emphasize this “us versus them” narrative. In their rhetoric, “us” represents the hardworking German citizens, the taxpayers, and the average citizen, while “them” includes governmental allies portrayed as incompetent or corrupt, and sometimes the European Union.
Interestingly, the “others” are no longer other nations, like the French, the Greeks, or the Belgians, but everyone who doesn’t fit into a right-wing populist worldview. This conflict is not necessarily against European identity but is about defining a different European identity. This is where values come into play. The European Union’s values, outlined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union, include liberal representative democracy, freedom, the rule of law, human rights and equality between men and women.
Right-wing extremists or populists criticize these values to some extent but mainly attempt to reformulate them. They might say, for instance, that they support democracy, but it should be democracy as they define it. Or they might claim to support equality between men and women but insist on traditional gender roles, arguing that women staying at home to care for children is natural and doesn’t mean inequality.
Therefore, rising populist parties do not necessarily oppose European identity or values but seek to redefine them, arguing that current practices are not in favor of the good citizens or hardworking people and need reformation.
They would add that this perspective doesn’t mean treating women and men unequally but recognizing their differences. So, rising populist parties wouldn’t explicitly state that they are against European identity or values. Instead, they would seek to redefine these values, arguing that their current enactment is not beneficial for good citizens or hardworking people and thus needs reformation.
Viktor Orban Engages in Conceptual Politics
Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission arrives for a EU Summit, at the EU headquarters in Brussels, on June 30, 2023. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.
In the light of your article titled “Actors, concepts, controversies: the conceptual politics of European integration,” how do the conceptual politics of European integration influence the formation of a European identity, especially in the context of increasing populism across member states?
Professor Claudia Wiesner: Conceptual politics is a well-established concept and a significant research focus. It provides a way of looking at and analyzing phenomena in the political realm. Conceptual politics involves being sensitive to how people frame, use, describe and contest political concepts.
For example, the reinterpretation of European values, such as democracy within the European Union, is a case of conceptual politics. It involves the EU claiming certain meanings for concepts like democracy, while others, such as Victor Orban, argue that these concepts should mean something else.
Orban is a case in point. The European Court of Justice has numerous rule of law cases and infringement procedures against Hungary based on the values outlined in Article 2 of the EU Treaty. The Court has ruled against Hungary in many of these cases, questioning Hungary’s adherence to these values.
Orban engages in conceptual politics by claiming he is not against democracy but upholds it more robustly than the EU bureaucrats. He redefines democracy, coining the term “illiberal democracy,” suggesting this is the true form of democracy. Whether he personally believes this or not, his actions exemplify conceptual politics by presenting an alternative idea of democracy. This contestation around the concept of democracy is a common feature in current populism.
In what ways do populist movements challenge the existing conceptual frameworks of EU integration, and how does this affect the EU’s ability to foster a cohesive European identity? Could you please elaborate on the role historical narratives and past conceptual controversies play in shaping current debates on identity and populism within the EU?
Professor Claudia Wiesner: I think it’s okay if we leave out the historical context for a moment and start with a concrete example. I just read about the debate regarding the alignments and collaborations in the next European Parliament. Specifically, there is a discussion on whether the European People’s Party (EPP), the classical Conservatives, will collaborate with the right-wing populists or the very conservative fringe of the Conservatives, such as the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), which includes the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) and Giorgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia. Broadly speaking, they can be classified somewhere between very conservative and right-wing populist.
The European Conservatives and Reformists, along with the even more right-wing Identity and Democracy (ID) group, have voted jointly with the European People’s Party on issues like the NextGenerationEU and REPowerEU, the two main policy packages currently in focus. This suggests the emergence of a de facto coalition between the classical conservatives and right-wing populists when it comes to energy policy. They have voted against harsh climate conditions and measures for energy transformation.
There is also a debate on whether all these measures against climate change are necessary. Right-wing populists often argue against climate change measures, pointing out the economic challenges of restructuring industries. These arguments are evident in the ongoing debates.
The challenge for the European Union is clear: the Commission, led prominently by Ursula von der Leyen, has put forward the idea that the EU needs to become the leading world region in climate protection. To achieve this, the EU must change the way its economy is organized, promoting more green industries. This approach faces opposition, especially from the German car industry, which will need to undergo significant changes. Interestingly, this opposition comes from within von der Leyen’s own camp. The European People’s Party wants to dilute this goal, mixing classical populist arguments against climate protection.
I would say it’s a very new cleavage around climate change and climate protection that we see at work here. This cleavage and the debates around it obviously impact the EU and its policies because the EU has promoted this goal and it has been concluded. However, when it comes to the nitty-gritty details, the laws that follow from it, we see a watering down in the European Parliament.
No Tension between National and European Identities
How do the conceptual politics of EU integration address the issues raised by populist rhetoric, especially regarding sovereignty and national identity and what role do these politics play in either exacerbating or alleviating the tensions between national and European identities?
Professor Claudia Wiesner: The interesting thing is that I don’t see many tensions between national and European identities at the moment. Interestingly, not even Marine Le Pen or Giorgia Meloni want to leave the European Union. Viktor Orbán doesn’t want to leave the European Union either, as it is too beneficial.
What we see is that political actors like these tend to say “Hungary first,” “France first,” or “Italy first.” It’s not exactly placing national identity against European identity but rather establishing a priority, saying “Italy first” and then the European Union or “Italy first” meaning Italy needs to lead the European Union.
For instance, Giorgia Meloni would make strong claims for a restrictive migration policy, advocating that the European Union should adopt a policy modeled after Italy’s approach. This is essentially an Italian model, driven by Meloni as the current leader of Italy, suggesting the EU should adopt policies reflecting Italy’s stance.
So, the conceptual politics here don’t create an opposition but rather establish priorities, implying that national identity and interests come first, followed by European interests.
Regarding historical parallels, this prioritization of national identity over European interests is not new. It has been a recurring theme ever since European integration began.
If the EU Wants to Be Credible, It Should Defend Its Values Internally as Well
How would you assess the recent European Parliament elections compared to former elections of EP? Do the results of the EP elections point to a serious crisis of the EU in terms of legitimation?
Professor Claudia Wiesner: Yes and no.
On one hand, we have a very high turnout with many people genuinely interested in European Parliament elections. There isn’t a majority of anti-EU voices in the European Parliament. The estimates regarding the outcome of the European Parliament election were initially much more critical for the Democratic camp. For instance, prognoses predicted a higher percentage for Identity and Democracy than what they actually achieved. So, we have a pro-European majority in the European Parliament, composed of a multi-party coalition.
Given the volatility of majorities in the European Parliament, it is necessary to have four political groups in this majority, which raises difficulties in finding consensus. This coalition would need to bring together Conservatives, Social Democrats, Liberals, and Greens under one common roof. Alternatively, the current debate suggests excluding the Greens in favor of the European Conservatives and Reformists.
This brings me to the challenges these parliamentary elections present. It’s a dangerous game, seemingly still pursued by von der Leyen and the European People’s Party, which shows strong sympathies for collaborating with Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia rather than with the Greens. I struggle to understand the strategic interest behind this, as these parties would not support strong European integration. They favor a weaker Europe, whereas the Greens support a stronger Europe. It would be in the interest of a strong European Commission to align with parties favoring a stronger European Union.
Additionally, the European Union is based on the principles outlined in Article 2 and there are existing rule of law conflicts. If the major faction in the European Parliament collaborates with groups that have previously acted against these principles and the rule of law, it will create a legitimacy problem for the EU. How can citizens trust von der Leyen’s commitment to defending democracy when she collaborates with Giorgia Meloni, who is undermining media liberty in Italy or with Polish PiS, which has driven democratic backsliding in Poland?
Obviously, this idea of defending the rule of law might even appear as a lie. People recognize this issue. I have been in many public discussions and it’s something that even average citizens—not just EU scholars—realize: there is a problem. My point is that if the European Union wants to be credible in defending its values, it needs to defend these values internally as well.
In your book “Politicisation, Democratization and the European Identity,” you argue that the EU appears as a kind of defective democracy. Where do these deficiencies stem from and how can they be fixed? What can be done to reduce democratic deficiency of the EU?
Professor Claudia Wiesner: This is a crucial question. The concept of a “defective democracy” doesn’t originate from EU research but from political science research on the quality of democracy. It refers to a system that falls between fully fledged representative democracies and autocracies. A defective democracy lacks some of the criteria of a fully functioning liberal representative democracy.
An EU politician famously stated that if the EU were to apply for membership, it would have to decline because it doesn’t meet its own rule of law standards. There’s a long-standing debate on the democratic deficit in the European Union, with many criticisms still valid.
My main point at the moment is the lack of transparency and accountability within the European Union (EU). The EU is too complicated and complex, which is a recurring issue. Citizens often don’t understand what’s going on, leading to a legitimacy problem. How can a political system be considered legitimate if people don’t understand how it works? Additionally, this complexity creates an accountability problem because it’s unclear who is responsible for decisions. To support this, I need several research projects that examine citizen views on the European Union.
Brussels, as a political hub, houses many actors, making it challenging to identify who exactly makes decisions. There’s also a transparency deficit, with many political decisions made behind closed doors during negotiations. This lack of visibility makes it difficult for citizens to oversee EU decisions.
One main point is the need to increase transparency and accountability in the EU. This isn’t just about formal accountability but about visible transparency that citizens can perceive. People feel that if they wanted to hold someone accountable, they wouldn’t know where to start.
The remedy would be treaty reform, which is an optimistic perspective at present and fostering more public reasoning and debates within EU institutions.
Critics: “EU Does Not Adhere to Its Own Ideals”
In your article, “The War Against Ukraine, the Changing World Order and the Conflict Between Democracy and Autocracy,” you argue that a world structured around a maximum of two hegemonic great powers has been successively replaced by a world order in which several poles of larger and smaller states confront and compete with each other—politically, territorially, economically, militarily and ideologically. For the EU, this means that its previous global political strategy, which focused strongly on ‘change through trade’ and its role as a ‘normative power Europe,’ no longer looks promising. In this multi-order world, what should EU do to regain its clout and stay relevant?
Professor Claudia Wiesner: In the lecture series that I conduct every winter term, I invite politicians and academics to discuss various topics with my students. About a year ago, we had a Green MEP from Germany who remarked that the European Union must decide whether it wants to “sit at the table or be on the menu.” While this is a harsh way of putting it, the point is significant.
The EU has lost importance, economic power and ideological influence in the world and there isn’t an easy solution to regain it. This challenge encompasses ideological, economic and geopolitical battles. If the EU wants to regain influence, it needs to be attractive and convincing across all these policy fields.
I think this is quite a challenge without an easy answer. A key issue is credibility. Many students from the Global South at my university are strongly critical of the EU. Interestingly, even my German and other European students share this critical view, believing the EU lacks credibility in its defense of democracy and human rights.
When discussing the EU’s role in non-EU countries, former developing countries and the Global South, there is significant criticism and dissatisfaction with the EU’s actions. They argue that the EU does not adhere to its own ideals and is unconvincing in its efforts.
To regain confidence, the EU needs to address this issue. They must work diligently to appear convincing and uphold their promises.
In the same article, you argue that there are several signs that liberal democracy is under threat, not only from outside the EU, but from within the EU itself. What does the recent EP elections tell us about the internal challenges of EU against the liberal democratic order?
Professor Claudia Wiesner: I believe I made my point quite strongly. One internal challenge is the democratic backsliding in several EU member states. Today, I read about a new law passed in Slovakia that restricts media freedom. They dissolved the public TV station and created a new one to replace journalists who did not report favorably on the government. This is similar to what we’ve seen in Hungary and Poland. Interestingly, the government in Slovakia is of a different political color than those in Poland or Hungary.
The European Commission addresses these issues through rule of law reports and, if necessary, infringement procedures, with the Court of Justice of the European Union stepping in. This highlights why the EU and any incoming European Commission and Commission President need to be highly attentive in this area.
In Germany, there is currently a debate about maintaining a “firewall” against right-wing extremists, emphasizing that conservative parties should not collaborate with them. This principle is crucial for the European Union. Right-wing populists, such as Giorgia Meloni in Italy, often limit media freedom and pose significant internal challenges to democracy in the EU.
If centrist politicians, including the European People’s Party (EPP), disregard this firewall and collaborate with right-wing extremists, it becomes more than a matter of political color. It supports democratic backsliding and strengthens the internal threats to democracy in the EU, which is very dangerous for anyone who supports liberal democracy.
Possible Implications of a Probable Le Pen Victory
Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the end of a polical meeting in Marseille for Rassemblement National party on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.
How do you think a likely victory of Le Pen in France would change the EU and EP in particular?
Professor Claudia Wiesner: A likely victory of Le Pen in France would not change the European Parliament immediately because it has just been elected, and its composition is set. Le Pen’s potential victory wouldn’t affect this.
I’m not certain about a likely victory for Le Pen except for the next Presidential elections in France, which are in three years. The next parliamentary elections in France are more uncertain.
I, along with many French commentators, don’t understand why Emmanuel Macron called for snap elections. It seemed like a bad moment for his party, which performed poorly in the EP elections, especially when right-wing extremists in France are strong.
Interestingly, the left in France united very quickly, within four days, forming joint lists and joint candidacies. This sets up an intriguing opposition between Le Pen, Jordan Bardella and the “Nouvelle Union Populaire.” We might see a victory for the left or the extreme right, but it’s unlikely we’ll see a strong showing from Macron’s camp.
If we look at the election results in France, they are not very strong in the French Parliament because the French Parliament is elected through a majority voting system based on constituencies. This means that to win a seat in the National Assembly, you need to win a constituency. Even in this scenario, it’s going to be difficult for Rassemblement National (RN) to win a majority of the constituencies because they are alone. They don’t have many experienced partners with them, except probably the party of Éric Zemmour. So, really, we’ll have to see because there is a right-wing extremist potential of between 35 and 50% in France. Yes, but you need to realize it in every constituency. And I’m not 100% sure this will be the case, so I wouldn’t set my thoughts entirely on a victory of the right-wing extremists.
But, if they win, there would be a Prime Minister from Rassemblement National. I think it wouldn’t be Le Pen, it would be Jordan Bardella, so, the young president of Rassemblement National. It would mean that there would be another right-wing populist government in Europe, in a big founding member state along with Italy. So, probably they would work very well together.
Interestingly, what we see is that collaboration in the European Union has a kind of moderating influence even on those right-wing populists. So, as long as there is no right-wing populist majority in the Council, there wouldn’t be such a massive effect. There would be some effect, but it would be moderated, especially because there is no right-wing majority in the European Parliament.