Sinn Féin leader Mary Lou McDonald meets with supporters at the Cost of Living Coalition protest in Dublin, Ireland, on September 24, 2022. Photo: Liam Murphy.

Populism in Ireland: Sinn Féin and the Alternative to Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s Political Dominance

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Please cite as:

Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “Populism in Ireland: Sinn Féin and the Alternative to Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0039       

 

Abstract

This article seeks to investigate populism in Ireland, but more specifically the populist left-leaning party Sinn Féin. Although having a checkered past, in the last decade the party has seen a surge in popularity as the alternative voting option. Up until now academic literature discussing the populist nature of Sinn Féin often struggles to define it as such, and so, using political psychology and a clear definition of populism, this article not only categorizes the party as a populist, but also discusses its history and what effect it has had (or lack thereof) on its popularity in the leadup to the last few elections. Furthermore, the article concludes by investigating why the momentum the party had as the alternative choice slowed down, and how this vacuum allowed other fringe populist parties to see greater success during the 2024 elections. 

Keywords: Populism, Ireland, Sinn Féin, Irish elections

 

By Christo Pretorius

Introduction

On the periphery of Europe is the small island nation of Ireland – often overlooked due to its much larger, and arguably more internationally important neighbor, the United Kingdom (UK). Despite this overshadowing, Ireland is no less important when studying the rise of populism on the European continent. Having faced numerous issues since the 2008 economic crisis, particularly with the provision of healthcare, housing, and more recently immigration, dissatisfaction with the two historically important rival parties – Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil – has boosted the popularity of the populist alternatives. One such party on the left of the political spectrum is People Before Profit – Solidarity (PBP-S), contrasted by the parties Aontú and Independent Ireland on the right. However, the best-case study for the growth of populism in the lead up to the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections is Sinn Féin – a controversial left-leaning populist party who has a long history of relevance in the Republic, but only recently has begun shaking off its connection to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a paramilitary organization seeking Irish reunification with Northern Ireland.

Delving into the history of Sinn Féin will highlight why a generational divide exists between voters, and why the party is considered controversial. Building on this, the article will primarily focus on Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric and campaigning using political psychology to analyze how they have used emotionally provocative language to sway the electorate to vote for them. As PBP-S and Aontú failed to make any significant gains in the 2020 and 2024 elections, they will only briefly be looked at. The new Independent Ireland party, founded as of December 2023, does however require a longer investigation at the end of this article, as they managed to gain one seat in the EU Parliament elections in 2024. Finally, while independent politicians are politically relevant in Ireland, this article will focus solely on Irish political parties. Analyzing independents in depth would require a separate, dedicated piece of work.

Historical Context of Sinn Féin

It might seem odd to those outside of Ireland that to understand modern Sinn Féin one must first return to 1913 when Ireland was still a part of the UK. In this year the Irish Volunteers, a paramilitary organization of Irish nationalists and republicans, was founded in direct response to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (Martin, 2013: 1-4). Whilst the latter sought to oppose domestic self-government on the island, the Irish Volunteers sought to secure and maintain the ‘rights and liberties common to the whole people of Ireland’ (Martin, 2013: 4). After a failed military coup in 1916 by rebels, who were predominantly Irish Volunteers, widespread dissatisfaction with British rule began to emerge across the island, both in the response to the British execution of the revolutionaries, but specifically to the Conscription Crisis of 1918 which sought to impose a British military draft within Ireland during the First World War (WWI) (Irish Times, 2017; Laffan, 1999: 122-168). 

Sinn Féin, founded in 1905 as a conservative party advocating for a dual monarchy with the UK, saw many of its members join the Irish Volunteers during the 1916 Easter Rising, resulting in the Irish Times (1917) dubbing it the ‘the Sinn Féin Rebellion.’ Various republicans across the political spectrum flocked to the party thereafter, and in 1918 Sinn Féin changed political direction – now committed to achieving an independent Irish republic (Laffan, 1999: 4). The first post-WWI (and post-Rising) election in 1918 saw Sinn Féin win a landslide victory with 46.9% of the vote on the island, whilst in the north only securing 19% of the vote (de Bromhead et al., 2020: 890). In 1919, the independent Irish state sought by the rebels of 1916, became a step closer to reality with the formation of the elected Irish assembly named the Dáil Éireann (Farrell, 1971).

Figure 1: A 1918 electoral map of Ireland. Green are Sinn Féin seats, orange are Unionist seats and white represents the Irish Party (RTÉ, 2015).

 

Following the brutal Irish War of Independence, peace negotiations between the members of the Dáil and the British government concluded in 1921 with a treaty that saw the partition of the island between the republican south and the unionist north, the latter of whom was to remain within the UK (Saorstát Eireann, 1922). Amongst other terms, Ireland would also remain within the British Commonwealth under a Dominion status, similar to that of Canada, and required members of the Dáil to swear an oath of allegiance to the British monarch. Both Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, was split on whether or not to accept the treaty. More hardline elements argued that the fight should continue until the entire island was free from British rule and recognized as a free and independent republican nation. However, a narrow vote of 64 votes to 57 saw the treaty ratified in the Dáil, resulting in a nearly yearlong bloody civil war between the pro-treaty IRA (reorganized as the ‘Defense Forces’) and the anti-treaty IRA. Sinn Féin had been marred by the civil war as anti-treaty politicians abstained from partaking in the Dáil, whilst pro-treaty politicians founded the new political party Cumann na nGaedheal (which would later merge with two other organizations in 1933 to form Fine Gael). Sinn Féin disintegrated thereafter, losing all relevance once its anti-treaty leader, Éamon de Valera, left the party to found Fianna Fáil – primarily abandoning their abstentionist stance towards the Dáil (Laffan, 1999: 441). 

A surprise victory by Fianna Fáil in 1932 put the remaining IRA on the backfoot, as initially Fianna Fáil legalized the organization and freed all the post-civil war prisoners, but ultimately refused to dispute the partitioned north and failed to declare a republican Ireland (Coogan, 2008: 29). De Valera criminalized the IRA once again in 1936 following high profile murders, but at this stage the organization was a shadow of its former self (Laffan, 1999: 448). During the 1930’s the more left-leaning IRA had founded their own rival organization, the Republican Congress, and the fascist right-wing members joined with Cumann na nGaedheal and their ‘Blueshirts’ modelled on the Italian fascist paramilitary militia nicknamed the ‘Blackshirts’ (Laffan, 1999: 448). IRA numbers decreased even more significantly when a large majority of its republic seeking members left the organization once Fianna Fáil introduced a republican constitution in 1937, abolishing the Oath of Allegiance to the British monarchy, introducing an elected president as head of state, and making a territorial claim to Northern Ireland (Constitution of Ireland, 1937).

Although the remaining members of the IRA were unified by the goal of ending the partition in Northern Ireland, they were on the fringes of both the left- and right-wings of the political spectrum. As is evident by members leaving to form their own political parties in the previous decade, in the aftermath of the Second World War the IRA was struggling to maintain its numbers and believed political organization was necessary to rebuild. Its leadership voted and passed the resolution instructing IRA members to join the irrelevant Sinn Féin party, and repurpose it as the political party of the IRA (Maillot, 2015: 128). With such a wide range of political beliefs amongst its remaining members, the party’s nearly sole political priority was that of reunification. Thereafter, the IRA began conducting armed operations in Northern Ireland, initially receiving political support from the south which most evident in the election of four new Sinn Féin TDs to the Dáil in 1957 (Maillot, 2015: 10). 

This militaristic momentum was ultimately lost by the 1961 election with the introduction of internment without trial, both in Northern Ireland and the Republic. The failed military campaign was called off and the IRA became dominated by new, younger, left-leaning members, which cumulated in the election of the Marxist Cathal Goulding as Chief of Staff. These left-wing members split from Sinn Féin to establish the Worker’s Party following disagreements over how to frame the struggle for unification in Northern Ireland. The more traditional Northern ‘Provisional IRA’ sought to frame the conflict through a nationalist and religious lens, as Catholic Irish against Protestant British, whilst the socialist/communist ‘Official IRA’ of the Republic sought to frame it through class warfare, and believed unification could be solved through political means (Gregory, 2010; Maillot, 2015: 169). The Provisionals would continue in the same year to conduct a thirty-year armed campaign against what they described as a British occupation of Northern Ireland, today known as ‘the Troubles.’ The conflict only officially ended in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, claiming the lives of roughly 3,532 individuals, with the IRA being responsible for more than half this number (CAIN, n.d.).

Figure 2: Distribution of Catholics, at ward level, across Northern Ireland in 2001 (Prasannan, 2003).

 

Methodology

Defining ‘populism’ is often a difficult endeavor. For this article the widely accepted ‘the people’ vs ‘the elite’ narrative used by populist parties will be the primary qualifier to defining a party as populist. This theory argues that populists present “‘the people’ as a morally good force and contrasts them against ‘the elite,’ who are portrayed as corrupt and self-serving” (ECPS, n.d.). Investigating how modern Sinn Féin use this type of language against their rivals, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, will therefore be paramount in establishing them as one such populist party. But what type of language can be considered populist, especially when one man’s populist can be another man’s regular definition of a politician? In this case, the use of emotionally charged language will be used as the basis for investigation, primarily built on the ideas of political psychology that study the affect that emotions have of political mobilization (Aytac et al., 2024). Guillem Rico, Marc Guinjoan and Eva Anduiza’s article of how anger is mobilized will be the baseline for judging whether or not a statement or claim is populist (Rico et al., 2017). In their words: “Anger is linked to the perception that a frustrating event is certain, externally caused, and unfair… chiefly, the external attribution of blame and its fierce moral and confrontational outlook” (Rico et al., 2017: 445).

Using this foundation, we can deduce that Sinn Féin’s populist messaging revolves around being anti-establishment and anti-corporate, most evident in blaming the previous Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil governments for Irelands political issues by being ‘beholden to corporate interests’ (Sinn Féin, 2019). This article will only consider discourse that explicitly highlights an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ narrative as populist, meaning that which does not only state something a former government did, but actively generalizes and paints the opposition as the enemy in some manner. The following example highlights what this means: “In addition, the maintenance grant was cut and restricted under Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael Governments during the economic downturn and no sufficient attempts have been made by either party to restore them. Our third-level education system is simply not accessible to all. It is becoming less accessible to many on the basis of financial means” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 36).

In this paragraph arguing for free education in Sinn Féin’s 2020 manifesto, it is clearly stated that the party believes that previous governments are at fault for making education less accessible. However, while some may consider there to be populist undertones to this paragraph, there is no explicit discourse used that can be considered as emotionally charged. Compared to this paragraph from the same manifesto: “Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing, how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 25).

We can clearly see that it uses a strong anti-establishment and anti-corporate message to evoke an emotional response by broadly claiming corporations only wish to make money from crises. This supports the previous definition of ‘anger’ which includes ‘moral evaluations constitut[ing] a key component of the populist belief system’ (Rico et al., 2017: 449). To this end, an appendix will be included at the end of this article to show which pieces of texts were considered to be populist. Some researchers may argue that Sinn Féin’s manifestos and campaigns contain more (or less) populist language, but the key issue is that it is present in the first place—and, as will be shown, to a much greater extent than in the other two mainstream political parties in Ireland.

When investigating the demographic details of supporters for populist parties, exit polls often provide the best answer. Yet, to support this information, this article will also delve into the opinion pieces written by party supporters as they often give a more personal and grounded view on what issues they find pressing, and why they urge other voters to vote the same way. This is yet another attempt to gauge the emotions that populist parties tap into during their campaigns. Readers must be made aware that Ireland has a unique system of voting which is termed the ‘single transferable vote’ (STV), which is even used for the European Parliamentary elections. In summary, this voting system allows individuals to rank politicians on the ballot and, in theory, seeks to ensure that the electorate has at least some representation in government (Electoral Reform Society, n.d.). 

STV most often results in coalition governments, sometimes even excluding the party with the most votes if they fail to form a coalition with the various other parties and independent politicians elected to parliament. An extreme example of this was the first Irish inter-party government following the 1948 general election which saw a grand coalition of five different political parties, and independent politicians, all led by Fine Gael to keep de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party out (McCullagh, 1998). Here, Fianna Fáil was six seats short of a majority, and up to then had been winning successive elections since 1932. For this reason, the popular vote is often gauged by the first preference of voters, not by the coalition government that claims majority in the Dáil. 

The Popular Populist Leftist Party

Sinn Féin’s populist anti-establishment and anti-corporate messaging is clearly seen in the party’s manifestos. Particularly looking at when Mary Lou McDonald took over the party, there are blatant examples such as in the 2019 EU election manifesto: “EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people;” the 2020 general election manifesto: “Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power;” and the 2024 EU election manifesto: “There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States. Sinn Féin’s vision, in contrast, is for a European Union that works better for the people of Europe, that focuses on common challenges which we are best dealing with collectively – the cost-of-living crisis, food security, regional development, and climate change.”

Counting the number of times, we see the clear use of emotionally provocative and ‘us’ vs ‘them’ language being used, 10 instances can be found in their 16 paged 2019 EU Parliament election manifesto, 19 instances in their 110 paged 2020 general election manifesto, and three instances in their 27 paged 2024 EU Parliament election manifesto (See Appendix). Comparatively, there was no similar language used in both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’s manifestos from the same time (See Manifesto section in the bibliography for sources).

Manifestos only provide one avenue of investigation, their annual Ard Fheis, or annual party conference, is rife with emotionally charged discourse that portray Sinn Féin as the best party for the people to fight back against a corrupt elitist government. Take this example from McDonald’s speech in 2021: “I know you have had it with governments giving tax breaks to millionaire executives while homeless children eat dinner off cardboard on the street. Governments for the developers and bankers, for the cozy club and the insiders. It’s time now for a government for you and your family” (McDonald, 2021). Similarly, in 2023: “We ask for our chance. The others have had theirs. The longer they remain in power the worse things get. I’m asking you to back Sinn Féin. To back change and the future that you and your family deserve” (McDonald, 2023)

Such discourse builds into the larger political campaign that seeks to win votes by tapping into the ‘angry vote,’ the vote that seeks to disrupt the status quo, or as one voter puts it: “to send a message to the establishment” (Frayer, 2024). The younger generation played a key role in Sinn Féin’s strategy, which naturally involved leveraging social media to boost their popularity. Through various platforms, they were able to sustain the narrative that they represented the best chance for real change:

Figure 3: Screenshot example of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in Facebook posts (Sinn Féin, 2024).

 

Sinn Féin in a Post-Troubles Ireland

Clearly meeting the definition of populism, Sinn Féin’s use of emotionally provocative language attracts angry voters. However, the party is still affected by its historic links to the IRA. For instance, during his 2017 trial over his involvement in the killing of David Byrne a year earlier, Sinn Féin Teachta Dála (TD) Jonathan Dowdall was found guilty of membership in the IRA (BBC, 2017). Sinn Féin had already begun distancing itself from Dowdall after his resignation from the party in 2014—a move he attributed to bullying but could be seen as the party proactively managing the issue (Fegan, 2015).

On February 10, 2018, in a further attempt to shake off its bloody past, Mary Lou McDonald succeeded the controversial Gerry Adams, an individual who may have been a leading member of the IRA, despite his continuous denial of these allegations (O’Neill, 2019). McDonald differs from other leading members of Sinn Féin as she is a career politician with seemingly no ties to the paramilitary organization and was once part of Fianna Fáil but left the party due to policy differences and a strong support for Irish Unity – the latter issue of which she seemed to be undecisive about during Brexit (McCormack, 2020). More recently, during a televised national RTÉ’s Prime Time leaders’ debate a month before the 2020 election, McDonald was confronted with a question regarding a murder investigation that the victim’s family strongly claims was perpetrated by the IRA (BBC, 2020b). In the same election, after finding out he had been elected to the Dáil, Sinn Féin’s David Cullinane celebrated by ending his speech with: “Up the Republic, Up the ‘Ra. Tiocfaidh ár Lá” – the latter translating to ‘our day will come,’ a popular IRA slogan, alongside the show of support to the IRA that “Up the ‘Ra” displays (McGee & Leahy, 2020). 

Since the Good Friday Agreement and their decision to end its support for the IRA’s armed struggle, Sinn Féin’s popularity has been steadily increasing (Adams, 1996). Within the national elections Sinn Féin obtained 2.55% of the vote in 1997, 6.5% in 2002, 6.94% in 2007, 9.94% in 2011, and 13.85% in 2016. The targeting of ‘those left behind’ has been the cornerstone of their campaigning in the post-2008 political climate, as affordable housing and accessible healthcare became the pressing issues over the last decade (Brennan, 2023).

Despite lingering links to the IRA, modern support for Sinn Féin comes from three primary sources. Staunch grassroot supporters of the party still have the primary goal of a united Ireland, dissatisfied that Northern Ireland is still part of the UK. The Irish Times investigated how these supporters viewed the change of leadership in 2018, and found they were excited by the prospect of McDonald offering a fresh new perspective, as long as policy remained the same – “…Irish unity, reconciliation, a shared republic, a big change in social conditions” (McGee, 2018). In an election exit poll conducted by The Irish Times, RTÉ, TG4 and University College Dublin after the 2020 general election, it was found that new Sinn Féin voters were predominantly younger, aged between 18-35, showing the effectiveness of Sinn Féin’s described strategy of ‘playing down the paramilitary legacy but without irking the republican base’ (Boyce, 2024; Collins, 2020). This could explain how the party can draw younger generations to vote for the party, as they do not have the same connection to ‘the Troubles’ that older generation might have, whilst retaining their ultimate goal of reunification. Polls and opinion pieces highlight that younger people feel let down by the continued dominance of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in Irish politics – with housing and cost of living being the dominant pressing issues for this generation (IPSOS, B&A & The Irish Times, 2024; Haverty, 2022; Irish Times, 2022; Taylor, 2024). Finally, ‘those left behind’ also includes the working class that support the party’s leftist policies and have been one of the long-time supporters of Sinn Féin. The Think Ireland 2024 election poll provides concrete evidence of this as 61% of Sinn Féin voters described themselves as working class – the second highest group of working-class voters, right behind the ‘other right’ voters (Cunningham, 2024).

Sinn Féin During the Irish 2020 General Elections – The Time for Change?

In the lead up to the Irish general election of 2020 the fallout from Brexit had been one of the dominant political situations, but surprisingly it had very little impact on the campaign trail (Murphy, 2021). Instead, domestic issues—namely housing and healthcare—were the primary focus for all Irish parties. In healthcare, waiting times for appointments and admittance to inpatient hospital beds were at an all-time high, having increased year by year since 2016 (Department of Health, 2019). Housing is an issue resulting from rising rent and house prices. In 2020 the Irish Times explained: “Since 2012, house and apartment prices in Dublin have risen by 90 percent and 80 percent respectively (a little less in the country at large), while wages have increased by only 18 percent” (McWilliams & Taylor, 2020). Too few new housing builds, high prices for lower-priced apartments, all compound this issue (Tedin & Faubert, 2020). 

The Irish general election of 2020 took place on February 8, roughly a month before the country-wide Covid-19 lockdown (Carroll, 2020). In a surprising turn, Sinn Féin received 24.5% of first preference votes, more than Fianna Fáil (22.2%) and Fine Gael (20.9%), and was set to form a majority coalition government if they could find allies to do so (Robertson, 2020). Ultimately Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, together having 72 of the 81-seat required for majority, formed a coalition alongside the Green Party. This kept Sinn Féin from governing, much to the party’s outrage and protests (BBC, 2020a). But why did Sinn Féin surge in popularity in this particular election? 

The tipping point came from young people, especially those in the 18-35 year demographic that voted primarily with the housing issue in mind (Collins, 2020; Ní Aodha, 2020). This, coupled with dissatisfaction with how Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil had been running the country since the financial crisis, offered Sinn Féin an opportunity as the alternative vote. One analysis indicates that in the leadup to the election, the decision of RTÉ to initially exclude Sinn Féin in the televised Leader’s Debate, coupled with the refusal of the other two parties to form a coalition with Sinn Féin in case they gained enough votes, help to form a self-fulfilling prophecy that Sinn Féin was being excluded by the ‘old boys club’ of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’ (BBC, 2020b; Brennan & McConnell, 2020). The issues, the generational shift, coupled with the traditional left-leaning voting base of Sinn Féin, all paved the way for the party to receive the most first preferential votes in the election. The question now was whether they could keep this momentum going into the 2024 EU Parliament and local elections.

Sinn Féin and Europe Before 2024

Sinn Féin’s stance towards European integration started in 1967 with deep distrust – believing that Ireland should align itself with ‘the third world’ rather than the “inward-looking, protected, monopoly dominated group of rich industrial countries.” They also believed: “If Ireland joined the [common market] with Britain we would thus have to recognize the territorial frontiers of the United Kingdom. Yet the Constitution lays claim to part of the territorial area of the UK. Is the Dublin Government wiling to abandon also its claim for a politically united Ireland?” (Irish Left Archive, 2011).

By the 2004 European Parliament elections Sinn Féin had softened their approach to a ‘Eurocritical, not Eurosceptic’ stance. They supported EU expansion, but ensured voters knew the party stood ‘for change in the EU,’ placing emphasis on nation’s rights to self-determination and promising to ‘argue our case for a United Ireland and for an end to all military occupation in the EU’ (Sinn Féin, 2004). They also highlight: “Critical engagement is not an anti-European approach. Indeed, Irish republicanism has its origins in a broader European democratic movement. Today Sinn Féin continues to build cooperative links with like-minded democratic movements throughout Europe and beyond.”

The 2024 election continues this trend, but by now Ireland is firmly committed to the EU, a fact Sinn Féin realizes in a post-Brexit landscape: “It is time for the EU to focus on what matters to workers and families: the cost-of-living crisis, improving wages and conditions, regional development, and economic development. It’s time for the EU to play its part in advocating for and planning for Irish unity” (Sinn Féin, 2024). It should be no surprise that the second item mentioned in the manifesto is ‘Standing up for Irish Unity’ and a call for the ‘EU institutions to become advocates for Irish reunification, consistent with their position on Cyprus.’

Sinn Féin can be seen using populist language once again in their manifesto for the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections, but this time to a lesser extent than previous elections. Of the three instances of populist language being used to aggravate voters, all three have a stark anti-corporate, anti-elitist message (Sinn Féin, 2024). The media campaign online mirrors this: 

Figure 4: Examples of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in the leadup to the elections (Sinn Féin, 2024).

 

One video posted by Sinn Féin explicitly states that Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, and the Green Party are ‘the party of homelessness, the party of rising house prices, rising rents, the party of institutional investors and vulture funds,’ and Sinn Féin is the one to ‘deliver tens of thousands of genuinely affordable homes’ if you vote for them (Sinn Féin, 2024). 

Sinn Féin During the Joint 2024 EU Parliamentary Elections and Local Elections – Steady as She Goes?

In the lead-up to the 2024 election, Ireland’s national public service broadcaster, RTÉ, highlighted that the key issues facing Ireland in 2024 are health, housing, migration, cost of living, the economy, and climate change (Cunningham, 2023). Sinn Féin’s 2024 European Parliament manifesto continues to address these challenges while also highlighting other issues considered important to Ireland at the European level, including Irish neutrality, Ireland’s stance on the Israel–Hamas conflict and the Ukraine war, human and workers’ rights, migration, and the environment (Sinn Féin, 2024). 

During the same election, voters would be asked to vote in the local elections, which would see individuals elected to local government positions across the country. Unlike the 2020 general elections which saw a turnout of 62.88%, the 2024 elections only had 50.65% of the population turn up to vote (European Parliament, 2024; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, n.d.). Sinn Féin managed to secure 11.8% of the first preference votes in the local elections, compared to Fine Gael’s 23%, and Fianna Fáil’s 22.9%, a performance nearly echoed by the EU Parliament elections which saw the parties receive 11.8%, 29.6%, and 16.6% respectively (RTÉ, 2024). To Sinn Féin this came as a shock, with party member Matt Carthy stating during a radio interview: “There was a sense over the last number of weeks that there was a drop coming. To be quite frank nobody saw these results” (Halpin, 2024a). Despite the results Sinn Féin still managed to have two candidates elected to the European Parliament where they opted to join The Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL Group with other leftist European populist parties such as the Italian Five Star Movement and France’s La France Insoumise (European Parliament, 2024).

Commentators point to one leading cause of Sinn Féin’s less-than-stellar performance: immigration (O’Doherty, 2024; Pogatchnik, 2024). On November 24, 2023, three children and one woman were injured in a knife attack outside a Dublin school (Kwai & Satariano, 2023). Although Irish news outlets did not identify the man, rumors quickly spread online that he was an Algerian immigrant, escalating into a call to action that resulted in “tens of millions of euro worth of criminal damage” following an anti-immigration riot (Foy, 2023; Lally et al., 2023). Subsequently, there was the ongoing removal of “tent cities,” where migrants had gathered in tents due to the ongoing housing crisis and the government’s inability to find accommodation for the 1,780 unhoused migrant men as of May 14 (Figure 4) (Ehl, 2024). Taoiseach Simon Harris of Fine Gael supported these removals, stating: “We do not live in a country where makeshift shantytowns are allowed to just develop” (Halpin, 2024a). Reportedly, Sinn Féin failed to “reflect the concerns of ordinary people on immigration,” with reports suggesting that McDonald warned party members not to post anything contrary to her immigration stance, which remained unclear for a long time (Halpin, 2024b). Immigration became one of the key issues leading up to the 2024 elections, exacerbated by the housing crisis and the UK’s hardline immigration stance, which saw 80% of new applicants crossing the border from Northern Ireland (Finnegan & Conlon, 2024). UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak claimed this was due to the successful deterrent effect of his Rwanda deportation plan.

Figure 5: Asylum seekers’ tents near the International Protection Office and Refugee Legal Service on Lower Mount Street, Dublin, Ireland, on July 7, 2023. Photo: Derick P. Hudson.

However, this is not the only reason support for Sinn Féin has declined. Since the 2020 election, Sinn Féin has flip-flopped on many of its policy positions, losing “angry” supporters as a result of the decisions they made. Beginning with the coalition talks post-election, Sinn Féin alienated many grassroots voters by considering the possibility of forming a government with either Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil (Allen, 2023). This, combined with increased interaction with businesses, has led many to comment that their policies have been drifting economically more toward the center, thereby alienating their traditional left-leaning supporters (Brennan, 2023; Weckler, 2022). The party’s focus on the “wrong” social issues has also been problematic. They supported the “Family” and “Care” referendums, which aimed to modernize two articles within the constitution (39th and 40th) to be more vague about what constitutes a family unit and to remove a reference to a woman’s role within the home (University College Dublin, 2024). Before the referendum, Sinn Féin vowed to re-run them should they fail, but they did not anticipate that both acts would be resoundingly rejected, with 67% and 74% of voters casting a “No” vote on the amendments, respectively (O’Connell, 2024).

Adding to this, despite accusing “billionaire media moguls of pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists, and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power,” Sinn Féin has pursued a campaign of silencing critics, including The Irish Times and its political correspondent, Harry McGee, as well as the national broadcaster RTÉ (The Journal, 2023). The international community responded directly, with several journalist organizations and academics signing a joint letter to Sinn Féin and McDonald expressing their concerns about censorship (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). Additionally, Sinn Féin overestimated its success in the 2024 elections and fielded too many candidates, causing a split in the vote (McClafferty, 2024). These issues combined led supporters to turn to other populist options, namely PBP-Solidarity, Aontú, and Independent Ireland.

The Alternative to the Alternative Vote

Immigration has become the word du jour and many voters during the 2024 election that would have voted for Sinn Féin decided to turn to parties who are unapologetic in their hardline stance against immigration. Self-described as ‘a “comfortable alternative” to Sinn Féin,’ Independent Ireland was founded to focus on rural voters, but quickly became the right-wing populist party that attracted anti-immigration voters alongside Aontú (Ryan, 2023). The populism in both party’s stances on migration is clear: Independent Ireland states “We will secure Ireland’s borders by enforcing our immigration laws and end profiteering by vested interests at the expense of the Irish taxpayer” (Independent Ireland, n.d.); Whereas Aontú, ‘The Only Party Listening To The People,’ wish to solve the issue by tackling the various other crises facing Ireland, compensating communities where asylum seekers are moved into, and enforce stronger border control policies that will include more deportations (Aontú, n.d.). 

Of the three alternative populist parties, only a candidate from Independent Ireland was elected to the EU Parliament, but divisions and criticisms quickly started to appear as MEP Ciaran Mullooly opted to join the liberal Renew Europe group (Independent Ireland, 2024). On a local level Independent Ireland preformed the best, gaining 2.8% of the first preference vote in their first election year, compared to PBP-S’ 1.2% and Aontú’s 2.1%. Overall, all three parties have seen an increase of seats on a local level, with each party now having 23, 13, and 8 seats respectively. Sinn Féin also gained 21 seats for a total of 102 during the local election, but with only 11.8% of the first preference votes, clearly their momentum from 2020 has slowed down (Irish Times, 2024). 

Whether or not Sinn Féin will experience a resurgence in next year’s general election remains uncertain. Their historical connection to the IRA is now nearly irrelevant to most younger voters, and it appears that any news of Sinn Féin’s ties to the paramilitary organization primarily affects older voters who have a living connection to the violence. This generational divide is evident in a letter exchange between Irish Times readers discussing younger voters’ preference for Sinn Féin (Irish Times, 2022).

As for the other populist parties in the nation, while politically irrelevant and on the fringes for now, they stand to gain the most from Sinn Féin’s loss. Independent Ireland’s Ciaran Mullooly’s decision to join a pro-European parliament group despite the party’s Eurosceptic stance has raised the eyebrows of many, which might negatively affect the party’s ability to win over disgruntled voters in the next election. PBP-S continually fails to make any headway during elections, although left-leaning working-class voters may cast their lot in with PBP-S should they decide to stop supporting Sinn Féin. Most of all, Aontú stands to gain the most, offering disgruntled voters a new alternative to the alternative Sinn Féin, and attracting working class voters away from Independent Ireland, particularly given that The Think Ireland 2024 election poll suggests that this group predominantly support ‘other right’ parties (Cunningham, 2024). 

However, Sinn Féin shouldn’t be counted out just yet, as they currently hold the majority in the Northern Irish Assembly—an unprecedented result that may drive further election promises in the Republic advocating for reunification (Pogatchnik, 2024). If Sinn Féin successfully refines its policies and regains public support, it could have a chance at making gains in the upcoming general election, reversing its currently declining popularity in polls, which now place them behind Fine Gael for the first time since September 2021 (REDC & Business Post, 2024). That said, Fine Gael’s response to immigration could explain their rise in the polls, a trend that might continue into the next election if the momentum persists (Clarke, 2024). While predicting the results of the next election may be futile, it is certainly one to watch closely.

Appendix: Populist Language Used in Sinn Féin’s Manifestos

2019 European Parliament Election Manifesto

Quote Page
“Our MEPs now need to continue that fight – for communities, for ordinary working people and families.”  4
“In contrast, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael belong to the Right-wing EPP and ALDE groups which want to create a Superstate centralizing power in Europe far away from ordinary people. These groups are also determined to create an EU army with more military spending rather than investing to tackle the cost of living and provide quality public services. They are advocates of austerity and beholden to corporate interests.”  5
“Sinn Féin reject increased militarization and related spending and will fight for ordinary people.”  5
“It is only by voting for Sinn Féin that you will get credible and effective MEPs who will fight for ordinary Irish people’s interests in Europe, challenge vested interests and insiders and work for a radically and progressively reformed European Union.”  5
“EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people.”  7
“The ECB’s quantitative easing programme is pumping billions into the banks to the benefit of corporations and major polluters.”  7
“Sinn Féin is opposed to PESCO and to Irish money being used to fund companies who are exporting arms and fueling conflicts around the world.”  10
“We call for a State Aid exemption for rural areas in light of Brexit and urge the reduction of bureaucracy so that a greater portion of EU funding for things like broadband actually reaches the intended beneficiaries instead of being pocketed by middlemen.”  10
“Local fisheries are suffering while profit-driven super-trawlers controlled by multi-nationals devastate our environment, fish stocks and coastal communities.”  11
“Sinn Féin MEPs oppose the Commission’s proposal to invest in militarization by plundering Regional Development Funding.”  11

2020 General Election Manifesto

Quote Page
“In that time, we have had Governments for the wealthy, Governments for the privileged, Governments for the property developers, Governments for the banks. Sinn Féin believes that it’s time that we had a government for the people.” 3
“Successive governments have delivered for their friends and cronies. They have delivered for big business, for vested interests and for golden circles. In Government, Sinn Féin will deliver for the people.”  4
“Sinn Féin wants to be in Government to deliver for ordinary, working people. But we don’t want to be part of the system. We want to change the system.”  4
“Sinn Féin will take on the cartel-like beef processing sector that is pushing family farms out of business, reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) so that it supports the farmers who need it the most and ensure farmers are assisted in the transition towards a greener, more sustainable agriculture sector.”  13
“Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing – how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet.”  25
“Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power.”  30
“Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labor are the yes men of Europe. Whatever Brussels and Frankfurt propose, they support. Their MEPs are the EU’s representatives in Ireland, promoting the agenda of the EU institutions rather than the interests of people in Ireland in the EU.”  44
“It is time to stand up for Ireland and the interests of all of the people who share this island. It is time to end the Brussels power grab, to reign in the Commission, and return powers to the member states. It is time to halt the attack on the wages and conditions of working people and to promote a basic threshold of decency for all. It is time to rebuild our public services and defend our public utilities.”  44
“Sinn Féin will build a fairer and more democratic European Union that works for the people of Europe, not for the EU insiders, middlemen and corporate interests.”  44
“Sinn Féin are determined that ordinary people in working class and rural communities must be protected from criminals… “Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil before them have abandoned working class and rural communities to organized crime gangs. They both starved the Gardaí of the resources they need to protect communities and they both failed to tackle garda corruption. They have not taken the necessary steps to ensure consistent and appropriate sentencing by judges. They are both soft on crime.”  69
“Sinn Féin in Government will demand probity and accountability from all who hold positions of power and responsibility. We will take on white collar crime and we will uphold the common good.”  71
“To make matters worse, the Fine Gael Government, supported by Fianna Fáil, have hitched their wagon to costly, risky Public Private Partnerships. This is despite the fact that we know they do not provide value for money. The Government knows this too, which is why we have no published reports on the value for money of these initiatives.”  91
“Sinn Féin in Government would not tolerate such abuse of political power, and our proposals set out to restore confidence in politics and ensure that those in power are working for the people and not for money or the vested interests of the golden circle establishment.”  96
“The public have lost confidence in the Dáil, this must be a priority focus for political reform.”  96
“For years, the insurance industry has pursued an aggressive campaign to portray sky-high premiums as the result of claims and fraud. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil have served the industry by peddling their spin.”  104
“It is only a decade since the banks of this state crashed our economy. Poor regulation, an arrogant banking class, and a parasitic relationship between the banks and Government of the time created a dangerous climate for customers, taxpayers, and our democracy.”  105
“It is time the banks gave something back to the Irish people. Government must be vigilant and hold the banks to account.”  105
“Sinn Féin will challenge the arrogance and contempt for customers that persists at the core of our banking system. We do not believe that banks should exist only to increase their profits and deliver handsome dividends and bonuses for their managers. Banks should exist to support Irish society, its customers and businesses.”  105
“The effects of the economic crisis and property crash still live with us today. Our housing and property sector should have been rebuilt in the interests of citizens, renters and homeowners. Instead, Fine Gael rolled out the red carpet to vulture funds and international investors, allowing them to hoover up assets from distressed families and buy up commercial property in our towns and cities. They have allowed these vultures and funds to transfer wealth out of Ireland to hidden international investors using low-tax arrangements.”  106

2024 European Parliament Manifesto

Quote Page
“There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States.”  5
“We have already seen worrying levels of de-regulation brought in with these crises used as an excuse. Lessons that had been learnt about the need for regulation of the financial sector seem to have been forgotten. Some like Fine Gael are openly pushing for further rules to help vulture funds and banks. Only Sinn Féin can be trusted to stand up to this agenda.”  13
“Focus to be placed on those large corporate interests that are responsible for the climate crisis rather than undue burdens being imposed on ordinary citizens.”  19

 

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Manifestos

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Figure Sources

Figure 1: https://www.rte.ie/centuryireland/index.php/articles/election-results-in-irish-voters-favour-an-independent-republic

Figure 2: https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/images/maps/map12.htm

Figure 3: https://www.facebook.com/sinnfein/videos/rt%C3%A9-to-exclude-sinn-f%C3%A9in-from-leaders-debate/459587158067050/

Figure 4: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1484509658817817 // https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=857897529506644 // https://www.facebook.com/reel/776873617923511

 

Funeral of a Turkish soldier who was martyred. Photo: Shutterstock.

Blame Avoidance through Necropolitics and Religious Populism: Autocratic Responses to Nationwide Crises in an Authoritarian Islamist Polity

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Please cite as:
Erturk, Omer; Yilmaz, Ihsan and Smith, Chloe. (2024). “Blame Avoidance through Necropolitics and Religious Populism: Autocratic Responses to Nationwide Crises in an Authoritarian Islamist Polity.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 3, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0038      

 

Abstract

Blame avoidance, a strategic distancing from culpability following events resulting in the deaths of citizens of a country, has often been studied in democratic contexts, yet its manifestation in authoritarian scenarios remains understudied. This study addresses this gap by scrutinizing empirical data derived from Turkey’s party in power, the AKP, and their political narratives and policies concerning these fatalities. Synthesizing the concepts of blame avoidance and necropolitics, it investigates how Turkey’s ruling competitive authoritarian party uses blame-shifting strategies to account for deaths resulting from negligence. Employing a conceptualization of martyrdom intertwined with religious populism, the party appeals to both religious and nationalistic sentiments and succeeds in sidestepping responsibility and accountability for these tragic incidents.

Keywords: religious populism, death, martyrdom, accountability, blame avoidance, competitive authoritarianism, elections, AKP, Turkey

 

By Omer Erturk*, Ihsan Yilmaz and Chloe Smith

Introduction

Accidents or violent conflicts resulting in fatalities have a profound impact on individuals, communities, and societies, especially when these tragedies are linked to government failure or negligence. Such events often provoke significant criticism and challenge the government’s legitimacy. To manage the fallout and sustain their position, incumbents typically employ several strategies: controlling the media, calling for national unity, appealing to patriotism, using nationalistic rhetoric, promoting solidarity, implementing censorship, or putting the blame on others and so on. These methods are used to deflect criticism, manage public perception, and maintain authority in the face of government shortcomings, a practice commonly known as blame avoidance.

Blame avoidance generally refers to any actions taken by leaders and officials to distance themselves from situations that could result in blame or jeopardize their objectives (Hinterleitner, 2017: 243). This behavior can be observed across various levels, ranging from national governance to community leadership (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017; Li et al., 2021). Numerous studies have analyzed blame avoidance behaviors and strategies in both democratic and authoritarian or competitive authoritarian contexts, particularly during administrative, financial, security, or electoral crises (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002, 2011; Hood et al., 2015; Ellis, 1994; Mortensen, 2012). This strategy is important because it helps leaders—whether autocrats or democrats—deflect public criticism, ease social tensions, and legitimize their prolonged rule, ultimately turning such crises to their advantage. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding how autocrats use necropolitics, martyrdom, and religious populism narratives as a strategy of blame avoidance in response to nationwide accidents, catastrophes, and conflicts resulting in fatalities.

Specifically, while blame avoidance has emerged as a strategic tool frequently employed by Turkey’s competitive authoritarian ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), limited attention has been given to this phenomenon within the Turkish context. Only a handful of studies, such as those by Aytac (2021) and Soylemez & Angin (2023), have examined blame avoidance, focusing on economic and financial crises. Zahariadis, on the other hand, analyzed its role during the COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrating how leaders deflected government responsibilities (Zahariadis et al., 2020; Aytac, 2021; Soylemez-Karakoc & Angin, 2023). While necropolitics has been studied independently within the Turkish political landscape (Bargu, 2016; Akinci, 2018; Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Islekel, 2017), its intersection with blame avoidance remains underexplored. 

In this research, we will focus on how autocrats use necropolitics and religious martyrdom narratives alongside blame avoidance to navigate nationwide calamities, such as accidents or violent conflicts resulting in fatalities, to shape public perceptions and deflect government accountability. This article aims to bridge this gap by examining empirical data derived from the political populist narratives and policies of Turkey’s current leadership. By integrating the concepts of blame avoidance and necropolitics and applying this combined framework to the data, the paper reveals the strategies used by Turkey’s ruling competitive authoritarian party, the AKP. It assesses the extent to which these strategies are effective in a competitive authoritarian context and explores how the party seeks to avoid blame, evade responsibility, and deflect accountability for fatalities resulting directly from its negligence.

Turkey’s political trajectory under the ruling AKP has witnessed a notable shift from undemocratic responses to the Gezi Park protests in 2013 towards what many scholars now characterize as an Islamist populist competitive authoritarian regime (Yilmaz, 2018; 2021a). Scholars have given an understanding of the role of religion in shaping the party’s populist appeal, evident in analyses of Friday sermons and the strategic mobilization of diverse populist movements. These academic works insightfully map out Turkey’s socio-political landscape, particularly scrutinizing the dynamics within Erdogan’s tenure. By fusing elements of personal identity, political leadership, and national and religious affiliation, Erdogan orchestrates a narrative wherein allegiance to his policies is associated with religious devotion. This elevates Erdogan beyond the realms of conventional political figures, positioning him as a symbolic embodiment of Turkish identity itself. The mix of political leadership and religious identity engenders a transformative shift, fundamentally altering the contours of Turkish identity and governance. This recalibration fosters a symbiotic relationship between political allegiance and religious identity (Yilmaz, 2021a; Yilmaz, 2021b; Yilmaz et al, 2021; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021a; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021b; Yilmaz et al, 2021a). 

In this article, we argue that the incumbent party adopts a strategic approach by framing deaths from accidents, clearly under its own responsibility, as acts of martyrdom, thereby deflecting accountability while appealing to both the religious and nationalistic sentiments of the Turkish populace. This tactic serves to deflect blame by recontextualizing fatalities as acts of martyrdom, intertwining them with religious and patriotic ideologies. In doing so, the party attempts to distance itself from culpability and obfuscate its accountability for these incidents. Through this lens of blame avoidance and the incorporation of necropolitics, the article sheds light on the strategies employed by the incumbent party to navigate and manipulate public perceptions surrounding these sensitive and politically charged events.

A structured approach is used in this paper to illustrate this argument. Initially, we look at the realms of the blame avoidance theory, establishing the theoretical and conceptual framework guiding our exploration. This foundation serves as a crucial backdrop for the subsequent analysis. Moving forward, the focus shifts to a comprehensive explanation of necropolitics and martyrdom, focusing on the definitions, characteristics and scholarly discourse surrounding these concepts. We add depth to this analysis by offering a brief yet impactful examination of martyrdom’s significance within Islam and its historical utilization by political figures in the Turkish context.

In the empirical analysis section, we focus our attention on evaluating how the AKP strategically integrates necropolitics with two pivotal blame avoidance strategies in incidents that result in fatalities. First, we delve into the AKP’s utilization of the presentational strategy, elucidating how they manipulate narrative presentation to deflect culpability and evade accountability. We then shed light on the AKP’s engagement in bargaining via rewards as another tactic employed to circumvent blame, showcasing how the party navigates and manages public perception amidst tragic events leading to fatalities. Through this empirical examination, we aim to provide concrete examples and critical insights into the AKP’s strategic maneuvering to avoid blame, supporting our argument regarding the convergence of necropolitics and blame avoidance strategies used in the Turkish political landscape.

Blame Avoidance Theory and Necropolitics

Politicians opportunistically highlight their successful policies to gain or maintain favor. However, they also often attempt to deflect blame when their failures come under scrutiny, especially in regimes with competitive but flawed electoral processes. This strategy is crucial for politicians, as voters are more likely to remember experiences of loss and suffering than instances of progress or success (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002; 2011). This is described in psychological studies which indicate a human inclination towards remembering adverse, harmful, or traumatic events over positive ones, a phenomenon commonly termed as negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Kanouse & Hanson, 1987). For those in office, shouldering blame can lead to significant political setbacks and, especially in contexts with multiple competing political parties, could even result in a loss of power (Hansson, 2015).

In his seminal work, The Politics of Blame Avoidance (1986), Weaver identifies eight strategic approaches that politicians utilize to evade responsibility in the face of potential blame. These strategies encompass agenda limitation, issue redefinition, resource investment after failure, delegation of blame-inducing decisions, scapegoating, aligning with popular alternatives, diffusing blame among multiple actors, and persisting in harmful actions despite recognition of their detrimental consequences.

First, agenda limitation serves as an attempt by policymakers to suppress blame-generating issues from gaining prominence in public discourse. However, when such issues cannot be entirely suppressed, issue redefinition becomes a secondary strategy, where policymakers introduce new policy narratives that obscure potential political damage. In scenarios where attempts to avoid loss have already failed, the strategy of “throwing good money after bad” is employed, whereby policymakers inject further resources into problematic situations in an effort to offset negative outcomes.

Moreover, when facing blame for undesirable outcomes, political leaders often seek to delegate decision-making authorityfor controversial matters to other actors, thereby distancing themselves from accountability. In cases where delegation is not feasible, they may resort to scapegoating—shifting the blame onto individuals or groups perceived as responsible. Another tactic commonly observed is blame diffusion, which involves dispersing accountability across multiple actors, thereby diluting personal culpability.

Finally, despite recognizing the wrongful nature of certain actions, policymakers may choose to persist in their course of action to avoid publicly acknowledging their mistakes. These interrelated strategies illustrate the multifaceted nature of blame avoidance and underscore the lengths to which political leaders will go to maintain their standing by deflecting or mitigating accountability in politically sensitive situations (Weaver, 1986).

Christopher Hood’s concept of the presentational strategy adds another dimension to the array of techniques political actors employ to navigate blame avoidance. This strategy revolves around the deliberate manipulation of information, spin, and persuasive rhetoric to deflect responsibility for blameworthy outcomes (Hood, 2011). As studied by some other scholars, these presentational strategies serve as crafty tools wielded by policymakers to manipulate the public narrative in several ways. Firstly, they succeed in redefining, reshaping, and spinning issues, working to divert public attention away from the heart of the matter. These strategies delve deeper into the realms of information control and manipulation, where policymakers impose restrictive measures on dissenting voices within the media landscape, effectively diminishing oppositional views and reinforcing the government’s narrative. Often, they craft narratives that border on fabrication, using these persuasive stories to evade responsibility (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017: 428). Alternatively, storytelling can be employed to portray governmental actions or responses as commendable or necessary, with the acceptance of blame serving as a strategic move to maintain political legitimacy or rationalize policy decisions (Hood, 2011: 47–49; Weaver, 1986: 385–86).

In authoritarian regimes, presentational strategies often hinge on secrecy, involving the restriction of information flow and stringent control over media outlets to influence how incidents are accessed and perceived. In contrast, in democratic settings, these strategies may manifest through media priming, where incumbents manipulate public perception by leveraging media platforms to frame issues favorably (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017: 428).

The presentational strategy aims to reframe what might be perceived as a blameworthy issue into a strategic advantage—for instance, by portraying short-term crises as catalysts for long-term benefits (Hood, 2011: 17). Particularly in authoritarian regimes, incumbents often suppress oppositional voices and control the narrative surrounding incidents, transforming situations that might otherwise attract blame into justifications for their continued political rule (Hood, 2011: 18). Through these efforts, political actors shape public perceptions and influence how blame is assigned, ultimately using these strategies to safeguard their legitimacy and maintain control in the face of political adversity.

Building on this literature, our exploration reveals the AKP’s concerted efforts to intertwine necropolitics with two primary strategies in evading blame amid incidents that have resulted in fatalities: First, the presentational strategy and second, the technique of turning blame into credit and bargaining via rewards (an extension of Weaver’s ‘throwing good money’ after a bad situation). Before establishing these strategies empirically, it’s crucial to first establish a foundational understanding of necropolitics and martyrdom. Necropolitics, a concept that intertwines governance and death, demands comprehensive exploration. This theoretical framework demonstrates how power structures manifest in controlling not just lives of the citizenry, but also the circumstances of death, and how this can be wielded as a tool for political agendas. 

Moreover, within the context of Islam, martyrdom holds profound significance, deeply embedded in religious narratives and revered as a noble sacrifice. Historically, martyrdom has resonated within Islamic cultures, serving as a powerful symbol to unite and galvanize communities. In modern times, however, martyrdom has been popularized primarily by violent Islamic groups in their armed struggles at both local and global levels, often within a jihadist framework. This contemporary use emphasizes the sacrifice of the self, devaluing life while highlighting the rewards of the afterlife. Understanding its significance within Islamic faith, alongside its current pro-Sharia and jihadi associations (Yilmaz, 2019a; 2019b; 2021b; Yilmaz et al., 2023), is crucial to grasping its utilization by AKP politicians in Turkey, given their historically close ideological and organic ties with these movements (See Erturk, 2002; 2023). Politicians in Turkey, aware of the emotional and ideological power of martyrdom, have strategically harnessed its symbolism to reinforce their narratives, influence public opinion and attack the opposition (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2022). This practice intertwines religious sentiments with political aims, leveraging the reverence for martyrs within society to consolidate power and garner support.

Necropolitical Use of Martyrdom by the AKP and Popularization of Death

Necropolitics, as defined by Mbembe (2003; 2019), refers to the sovereign’s authority to control both the lives and deaths of individuals, encompassing the power to decide who lives and who dies. This concept has found application in various contexts, notably within the Turkish landscape, as described in works by Ahmetbeyzade (2008), Bargu (2016; 2019), Zengin (2016), and Islekel (2017). These contributions have broadened the understanding of necropolitics, introducing novel dimensions that demonstrate its complexity and influence in contemporary political landscapes (Bargu, 2019: 5-6).

Within the realm of Turkish politics, the AKP has strategically harnessed martyrdom narratives, employing them as powerful tools that normalize and celebrate death when the deaths are perceived or explained as being on behalf of the masses (Carney, 2018; Bakiner, 2019; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021a; 2021b; 2023). In the AKP’s discursive and representational necropolitics, the notion of death for the nation – epitomized through martyrdom – is elevated to a fetishized status (Carney, 2018: 94, 101). This fusion of necropolitical discourse with martyrdom narratives by the AKP indicates a calculated effort to both celebrate and sanctify the notion of death, evoking profound emotional responses within the populace, and intertwining cases of death with nationalist and religious fervor. 

The Evolution of Martyrdom and Its Contemporary Application by the AKP

Funeral of a Turkish soldier killed by PKK militants on December 12, 2009, in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Thomas Koch.

The concept of martyrdom has a rich etymological and cultural history, with roots that trace back to the Greek word “martus” or “martyr,” meaning “witness.” While the term initially held a broader significance, it gradually acquired a religious connotation, coming to represent the act of sacrificing one’s life for God, especially within Christianity and Judaism (Freamon, 2003: 319). In the Islamic tradition, this concept is mirrored by the Arabic term “shahadah,” which also translates to “to witness.” The individual who carries out this act is known as a “shahid,” a title bestowed not just in Arabic but in many non-Arab Muslim societies as well (Hatina, 2014: 19). This evolution of the term across linguistic and religious boundaries highlights the profound and universal significance of martyrdom as a symbol of ultimate commitment to faith and principles.

Historically, martyrdom is deeply rooted in ancient civilizations such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Greece, evolving across religious and cultural landscapes throughout time. This archetype of the warrior-hero finds expression in diverse ideologies and conflicts, from kamikaze pilots in World War II to self-immolating Buddhist monks protesting the American occupation of Vietnam, and from Irish Republican Army (IRA) hunger strikers to freedom fighters in Middle Eastern liberation movements (Hatina, 2014: 2). Christianity and Islam significantly shaped the archetype of the martyr, offering promises of immortality, absolution, exemption from Judgment Day, and even direct communication with prophets as rewards for their sacrifice (Hatina, 2014: 2). These religious incentives imbue martyrdom with powerful emotional and spiritual weight, further solidifying its role in political and military narratives.

Scholars across disciplines have examined martyrdom’s global manifestations, emphasizing how this concept transcends cultural and religious boundaries. Martyrdom serves as a powerful mythological figure, often invoking revolutionary goals and legitimizing struggles, both secular and religious (Hatina, 2014: 7; Szyska, 2004). The adaptability of martyrdom across diverse contexts is particularly significant—it functions not only as a religious ideal but also as an emotional and motivational resource in secular struggles, helping individuals endure sacrifice for nationalistic or political causes (Sluka, 2000: 49; Anderson, 1983: 15). Whether in national liberation movements, ideological conflicts, or religious wars, martyrdom emerges as a central narrative that justifies extreme sacrifice.

In the Turkish context, martyrdom assumes a multifaceted role. It serves as a tool for mythmaking, helping to shape collective memory, ignite religious populism and nationalistic fervor, promote militarism, and facilitate collective mobilization (Altinay, 2006; Azak, 2007; Degirmencioglu, 2014a; 2014b). In particular, as our research explores, the ruling AKP has employed the concept of martyrdom as a form of blame avoidance. By assigning martyrdom to deaths that occur under contentious circumstances—such as accidents or conflicts—the AKP not only deflects blame but also reframes these tragedies as noble sacrifices for the nation or religion. 

This paper establishes that assigning martyrdom also provides the AKP with an opportunity to manipulate public narratives and shift accountability, thus enhancing its political legitimacy. By intertwining religious symbolism with political agendas, the AKP leverages the revered status of martyrs in Turkish society to maintain public support and consolidate power in times of crisis. This rhetorical maneuver serves to bolster the regime’s legitimacy, blending religious sentiment with political strategy to maintain public support in the face of adversity.

The Co-optation of Religion by the Secular State

Turkish Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks in Van province of Turkey as holding a holy Quran on April 14, 2015. Photo: Shutterstock.

Despite its officially secular stance, the leadership of Turkey has long intertwined Islam with state operations at multiple levels since its foundation (Cagaptay, 2006; Yegen, 2007; Sakallioglu, 1996; Kaplan, 2002: 665; Yilmaz, 2021a). A key example of this is the state’s efforts to cultivate a devout and patriotic military force, which might seem contradictory to the secular image of the state (Kemerli, 2015: 282; Kaplan, 2002; Gurbey, 2009).

Rather than discarding the historical religious associations tied to soldiering, the Turkish state has effectively co-opted Islamic notions such as jihad and martyrdom to foster a sense of duty and militarism within society (Yilmaz, 2021a). These religious concepts have been reinterpreted to serve the goals of secular nationalism (Kemerli, 2015: 282), and more recently, have been redirected towards advancing an Islamist populist agenda. During times of national crisis, even secular leadership has sporadically invoked religious discourse to bolster public support. For instance, during the Cypriot intervention of 1974, the use of Islamic terminology such as “jihad,” “mujahids,” and “martyrs” revealed how religion could be tactically deployed to legitimize military actions. This paradoxical use of religious language by a state that claims to uphold secularism has conferred substantial religious legitimacy on the Turkish military, traditionally regarded as the staunch protector of secularism. Furthermore, since the 1980s, this religious rhetoric has also bolstered public support for conscription, even amid the protracted Turkish-Kurdish conflict, where significant loss of life continues to be a reality (Kemerli, 2015: 282). The integration of religion into state affairs—especially in the military sphere—demonstrates how the Turkish state has consistently navigated the tension between secularism and religious symbolism to achieve political and military objectives.

Beyond the historical military context, the AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has strategically re-focused its discourse on martyrdom, particularly in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in July 2016. During this period, martyrdom became not only a symbol of national and religious sacrifice but also a powerful political tool to legitimize authoritarian populist and repressive measures and consolidate the ruling party’s authority (Yanik & Hisarlioglu, 2019: 57; Baykan et al., 2021). Erdogan and the AKP capitalized on the emotionally charged symbolism of martyrdom, aligning it with their broader political objectives, which allowed them to reframe public perceptions around death in a manner that reinforced their narrative of religious populism, resilience and divine purpose.

Building upon this shift, the AKP expanded the traditional understanding of martyrdom beyond the military realm, reimagining it to encompass civilian spheres. The party’s redefinition of martyrdom demonstrates a broader and more calculated approach to managing social and political realities. As Bakiner (2019) outlines, the AKP has employed four distinct strategies in controlling the narrative surrounding death. First, the party broadened the scope of martyrdom, extending its definition to include civilian deaths, with material benefits being provided to survivors through both formal laws and informal state mechanisms. Second, they normalized untimely deaths by framing them as natural consequences of citizens’ occupational, socioeconomic, or gender positions, thereby reducing the likelihood of public dissent. Third, the AKP actively depoliticized death to suppress any mobilization of opposition, particularly in the wake of state-linked fatal incidents. Finally, the party tightly controlled public discourse, ensuring that the narrative surrounding martyrdom remained aligned with the AKP’s ideological objectives and reinforced its discursive dominance (Bakiner, 2019).

Category One: Religious Narratives and Strategic Blame Avoidance—Redefining, Reshaping, Spinning, and Manipulating Death-Related Incidents

A coal mine in the Soma district of Manisa province, Turkey, exploded on May 13, 2014. This disaster remains the deadliest labor catastrophe in Turkish history, claiming the lives of 301 miners. Photo: F. Polat.

The AKP’s initial reaction to tragic incidents resulting in loss of life typically involves absorbing the immediate shock within society, followed by a narrative that attempts to normalize such events. The Soma mining disaster in Manisa on May 13, 2014, stands as a poignant example, marking the deadliest labor catastrophe in Turkish history, which claimed the lives of 301 miners. Revelations surrounding the incident indicated the role of governmental corruption within the AKP, with media reports highlighting close ties between the mining company’s owners and the AKP, along with documented safety concerns that had been circumvented by the company (Yetkin, 2014). Instead of assuming responsibility, Erdogan attempted to downplay the incident’s severity by characterizing the catastrophe as a typical ‘work accident,’ and ‘the nature of the work’ by asserting that mine explosions are common throughout the world (Cumhuriyet, 2014; Daloglu, 2014). This strategy aimed to evade liability and minimize the government’s role in the disaster in the eyes of the public.

The AKP adopted a similar presentational blame avoidance strategy following the tragic Aladag boarding girls’ Qur’anic school fire in 2016, which resulted in the deaths of eleven students and a teacher. Revelations indicated that the dormitory had not been subjected to the required comprehensive inspections, primarily due to its management by a pro-AKP religious community. The AKP again sought to diminish its responsibility, by labelling the catastrophe as an ‘act of fate’ (Shafak, 2016). This narrative tactic attempted to deflect accountability by framing the incident as an unforeseeable and uncontrollable occurrence, to sidestep the deeper scrutiny of the regulatory oversights or negligence that might have contributed to the tragedy.

The AKP once again employed a blame avoidance strategy in the aftermath of two Turkish soldiers losing their lives in 2018. The soldiers died due to freezing conditions in the eastern province of Tunceli (Dersim), a situation that occurred outside of wartime and sparked extensive debate and media coverage within Turkish politics. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of main opposition Republican People Party (CHP), demanded the responsibility of ruling party officials and bureaucrats for this failure, prompting criminal complaints alleging negligence against top government figures including President Erdogan and other key ministers (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018).

In response, Erdogan employed the presentational strategy to deflect accountability for the government’s shortcomings in safeguarding these soldiers’ lives. He sought to normalize the soldiers’ deaths caused by hypothermia by equating it with the risks faced in martyrdom, remarking that “in martyrdom, there are bullets to be taken, as well as freezing” (Erdogan, 2018). To justify this narrative, Erdogan referenced his grandfather’s freezing to death during World War I, attempting to craft a narrative that would diminish the significance of soldiers succumbing to freezing temperatures (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). These comments demonstrate a discursive effort to reshape the narrative about these tragic deaths. They dilute the government’s accountability by placing the deaths within the context of martyrdom and divert attention from any potential governmental oversights or failures in safeguarding soldiers’ safety. 

Erdogan also invoked the concept of martyrdom to undermine the credibility of the main opposition leader, Kilicdaroglu, and to discredit his criticism. Erdogan accused Kilicdaroglu of not believing in martyrdom and publicly chastised him, stating, “You have no right to devalue this nation and this country. You already lack any belief in martyrdom. But the families [of the fallen soldiers] believed in martyrdom. You, however, have no such sense” (BBC, 2018).

The case of the captured, tortured, and then murdered soldiers by ISIS terrorists in 2016 provides another example of how the AKP’s blame avoidance strategy. In this case, instead of taking any responsibility for its failure to save the two soldiers or providing details of any efforts to save them, the AKP manipulated (‘spun’) how the event was communicated to the public on social media and conventional media, which is under its control. After ISIS streamed the video of killing the soldiers, the AKP immediately restricted access to social media and related news. After, the AKP proclaimed that the footage was fabricated (Sputnik, 2016; Hurtas, 2017). An AKP lawmaker, Samil Tayyar, also declared that the murdered soldiers were members of ISIS, and they had voluntarily joined the group (Sputnik, 2016). Almost a year later, the AKP informed the murdered soldiers’ fathers they would be rewarded with martyrdom privileges and their murdered sons would be bestowed with official martyrdom status.

As part of its presentational strategy, the AKP government promptly enforces media bans and restricts news that could potentially incite dissent, opposition, or mass protests. In the incidents described above, journalistic reporting was prohibited with the government reasoning that coverage might incite disruptive acts and protests, posing threats to the peace, safety, and public order throughout the country (BBC Turkce, 2016).

The restriction of opposing voices was highlighted again following the tragic deaths of high-ranking Turkish Air Force (TAF) officers, including two intelligence officers, in Libya. Traditionally, in situations where blame is attributed to groups like the PKK, the AKP government orchestrates official funeral ceremonies. These ceremonies often draw the upper echelons of military and political power, who strategically deliver speeches that transform the funeral into a moment of national credit and sympathy, and then broadcast live on television for public viewing. However, in this instance, the bodies of the officers were clandestinely interred without any public funeral rites.

Adding to the clandestine nature of this burial, journalists who reported on this event faced immediate repercussions. They were swiftly arrested the day after the incident, and their homes were raided in early morning police operations, severely restricting the ability to disseminate news regarding the incident (BBC Turkce, 2020). Media outlets critical of the government were branded disloyal and treasonous by pro-AKP media (Sabah, 2020). When details of the deaths eventually surfaced in the media, widespread complaints and criticisms targeting the AKP government ensued. The public discourse questioned the fundamental reason for Turkish soldiers’ involvement in Libya, labelling it ‘unnecessary’ and ‘adventurous’ (Euronews, 2020).

In response to the mounting criticisms, President Erdogan again instrumentalized martyrdom, acknowledging the fatalities by stating, “We have a few martyrs [in Libya]” (Euronews, 2020). He also attempted to normalize the deaths in his comment, “My brothers and sisters, we should never forget that the martyrs’ hill (cemetery) will not be empty” (Euronews, 2020). Contextualizing the fatalities through the language of martyrdom represents an attempt to shift public perception away from scrutiny and critique of the government’s decisions and actions by elevating the status of the deaths and assigning them with religious significance. 

The night of July 15, 2016, marked a pivotal political moment as the AKP was targeted during the attempted coup, ostensibly becoming its victim. However, opposition parties raised pertinent questions about the neglectful stance and actions of the AKP government both preceding and following the event. The suspicion surrounding the coup led the leader of the main opposition to characterize it as a ‘controlled coup,’ insinuating that Erdogan and a select few, including the Head of National Intelligence Service (MIT) and the Chief of General Staff, were aware of the attempt and instead of thwarting it, orchestrated it in a manner to derive maximum advantage. The AKP hindered a comprehensive investigation into the coup attempt, barring the Head of MIT and the Chief of General Staff from testifying before the parliamentary committee, and withheld the committee’s report from publication, despite AKP lawmakers forming the majority and chairing the committee. The opposition contends that Erdogan and his close circle knowingly permitted the coup attempt, resulting in civilian casualties that night (Tas, 2018).

Moreover, rather than engaging with critical inquiries or allowing an open, thorough investigation, the AKP consistently employs these narratives to steer attention away from potential negligence or failures. This tactic serves to not only evade responsibility but also to maintain a strong grip on the public discourse, framing the narrative in a manner that aligns with the party’s interests and political survival.

In the subsequent section, we will examine how religious narratives and strategic blame avoidance are leveraged not only to deflect blame but also to transform it into a form of political credit. Building on Weaver’s and Hood’s theories, we will explore how these strategies are integrated into the broader context of necropolitics and martyrdom. This analysis will reveal how the AKP employs religious and political narratives to shift public perception, turning criticisms into affirmations of political legitimacy. Additionally, we will delve into how these narratives are coupled with mechanisms of bargaining and rewards, further extending traditional theories of blame avoidance. This exploration will provide insight into the complex interplay between religious symbolism and political strategy in the AKP’s approach to maintaining power amidst crises.

Category Two: Religious Narratives and Strategic Blame Avoidance—Transforming Blame into Credit and Bargaining via Rewards

Turkish soldiers on patrol during winter on January 3, 2017. Photo credit: Shutterstock.

The second category of strategies explored in this article delves into how the AKP transforms blame into credit and leverages bargaining rewards through religious narratives. A key tactic involves the use of martyrdom to reshape public perceptions of fatal incidents for which the government is solely responsible. By elevating certain deaths to the status of martyrdom—a revered religious honor—the AKP reframes these tragedies as symbols of triumph and honor, effectively turning blame into a form of credit.  

This approach not only alters the narrative surrounding the victims but also influences how society and the victims’ families perceive these events. The popularization and necropolitical use of martyrdom make the results of these incidents more palatable to the public, allowing them to digest and accept the government’s role in these events. Instead of addressing criticisms or facilitating impartial investigations, the AKP employs a strategic discourse to deflect blame, suppress opposition, and galvanize support. By embedding martyrdom narratives into the political and social fabric, the AKP consolidates its legitimacy and mitigates dissent.

The transformation of blame into credit was evident in the case of the death of Eren Bulbul. In August 2017, the local 15-year-old boy lost his life at the hands of the outlawed PKK while in the presence of Turkish military officers, who had reportedly employed him as an informant. The boy’s grieving mother publicly declared the responsibility to belong to the government, prime minister, ministers, and other authorities for the tragic loss of life (Gazete Duvar, 2017). In response to the outcry, President Erdogan publicly praised Bulbul’s mother during a mass gathering and praised her for mothering thirteen children: “You have fulfilled the order of Allah and His messenger [by giving birth to many Muslims]. What a beautiful mother you are!” (Beyazgazete, 2017). This praise, steeped in religious and moral overtones, demonstrated a clear attempt to pacify the mother and to create a public perception of unity between the leader and the grieving mother. 

Erdogan also drew on martyrdom, communicating to Bulbul’s mother that she possessed greatness due to her son’s status as a ‘martyr’: “Thanks to the ‘martyr’ Eren, you are guaranteed to enter Heaven together with your thirteen children”(Beyazgazete, 2017). This rhetoric served to divert attention from the failure to protect the boy, reframing the tragedy as a sacrifice for a higher cause and transforming the mourning mother into a figure of honor within a religious context.

In another instance, Erdogan conveyed to the mother of a soldier, captured and killed during a rescue operation, that she had attained an exceptional honor: “Not every mother can have such an honor, but you have this honor now as a neighbor of the Prophet and the martyrs in the hereafter” (Sozcu, 2021). This religious rhetoric attempts to transform the loss into a revered status, offering solace through the lens of martyrdom.

The AKP’s prolonged dissemination of martyr stories serves as a deliberate effort to embed a specific narrative within the public consciousness. This has allowed the party to solidify its political stance while strategically mitigating any potential scrutiny or dissenting views. It also serves to leverage emotional connections to nationalistic sentiments and a reverence for sacrifice.

By emphasizing the martyrs’ sacrifices and portraying their deaths in a manner that exalts their devotion to the nation, the AKP manipulates the collective memory and perception of these events. This deliberate and ongoing narrative construction aims to create a shield against any potential scrutiny or doubts about the party’s actions or policies.

Co-optation and Cooperation in Blame Avoidance: Bargaining via Rewards

In this segment, we delve into the AKP’s necropolitical strategy of deflecting blame through a technique we term “bargaining via rewards,” an extension of Weaver’s “throw good money after a bad situation” approach. This strategy involves the strategic use of various incentives—referred to as carrots—to co-opt the families of victims and bolster the party’s narrative. The AKP strategically employs these incentives, which include financial aid, assurances, privileges, and promises of elevated social standing, to align with its broader necropolitical agenda. 

A notable element of this strategy is the official designation of martyrdom. This status is often conferred upon civilians whose deaths occur in incidents where the government is implicated in preventing such tragedies. By granting martyrdom status, the AKP not only elevates the victims’ families with unique material rewards but also integrates these incidents into a revered national narrative. This designation serves to mollify and placate the affected families, while simultaneously deflecting criticism and managing public perception, thereby reinforcing the government’s position and mitigating the fallout from its actions.

In the Turkish legal framework, the designation of ‘martyrdom’ (şehitlik) lacks an explicit definition or criteria for who qualifies as a ‘martyr’ (şehit). The Turkish Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 outlines specific guidelines that primarily pertain to support for the families of individuals (both military and civilian servants) who have been wounded or lost their lives due to terrorist acts. The authority to declare someone officially a martyr typically resides with the Turkish Armed Forces or the Turkish Judiciary (Yilmaz & Erturk, 2023).

During the AKP’s tenure, this authority appears to have been utilized more liberally. Notably, in 2012, the AKP government revised the regulations related to martyrdom, allowing civilians who lost their lives due to terrorist attacks to be classified as martyrs. This definition was subsequently expanded by the AKP to encompass victims of natural disasters, large-scale incidents resulting in fatalities, and the COVID-19 pandemic (Yilmaz & Erturk, 2023).

An illustrative instance was observed following the Soma mining accident, where an immediate announcement declared the deceased as ‘civil martyrs’ or ‘martyrs of the mine.’ Their direct relatives were then granted the benefits outlined in Terror Law No. 3713, entailing financial support, employment opportunities, and educational scholarships. In another instance, President Erdogan announced that the annual proceeds from the newly inaugurated Eurasia Tunnel would be directed to the families of the martyrs, exemplifying the government’s priority towards supplying financial benefits to these families.

It is crucial to recognize the selective application of this law in the Turkish context. Law 3713 was not invoked uniformly for families of mining incident victims. Instead, the AKP selectively used the legal framework in those incidents which garnered widespread public attention. This emphasizes the AKP’s propensity to utilize the notion of martyrdom for specific populist purposes, rather than as a consistent response to the death of Turkish employees.

The mechanisms overseeing financial aid, and its allocation predominantly fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services. Under the AKP’s tenure, there has been a noticeable elevation in the stature of the Presidency of Relatives of Martyrs and Veterans, which was upgraded to the status of a General Directorate. Minister Zehra Zumrut Selcuk highlighted a significant surge in employment, revealing that as of December 2020, the ministry had provided jobs for 44,781relatives in the civil service, a substantial increase from the 6,315 recorded before the AKP assumed office in 2002 (Aile ve Sosyal Hizmetler Bakanligi, 2020). 

In addition to the customary rewards associated with legal martyrdom, policymakers have gone so far as to pledge homes to these families. Shockingly, reports emerged revealing instances where veterans and martyr families signed documents and petitions relinquishing the pursuit of compensation cases against the government in exchange for these promised residences. This unsettling revelation underscores how the assurance of housing was leveraged to dissuade families from seeking rightful recourse through legal avenues.

Bargaining via rewards thus emerges as a deliberate strategy employed by the government to publicly reward the families of ‘martyrs’. The term ‘martyrdom’ itself holds significant weight, not merely as a religious attribution but as a symbol bolstered by official and tangible assurances. Without material guarantees, martyrdom alone may not suffice for these families. Therefore, policymakers reinforce the revered status of martyrdom with a rewarding strategy, offering substantial monetary or material resources. This serves multiple aims including appeasing the affected families, fostering or solidifying their allegiance to the ruling authority, and pre-empting any potential dissent they may express online, via the media, or by aligning with oppositional political parties. 

These endeavors underscore how necropolitical blame avoidance is reinforced by financial provisions, rewards, and the bestowment of privileged status, effectively elevating the status of victims’ families within societal ranks. This strategic utilization of martyrdom and its accompanying rewards serves as a mechanism through which families absorb blame in a way that diminishes blame toward the government. This bargaining process is often conducted in a public setting, frequently covered by the media, and broadcast on television. By presenting these ‘bargaining’ exchanges as transparent, equitable, and mutually agreed upon between the government and the affected families, it is possible for public blame to be neutralized, and criticism deflected. 

Combined, the strategy of turning blame into credit and bargaining via rewards sees the AKP not only absolving itself of direct responsibility but also maneuvering the narrative by portraying these losses as emblematic of sacrifice for the nation’s greater good. By offering these rewards and privileges, particularly the esteemed status of martyrdom, the government aims to forge an emotional connection with the affected families while simultaneously solidifying its narrative in the eyes of the public. This strategy effectively co-opts the victims’ families, aligning their sentiments with the AKP’s narrative, thereby furthering the party’s blame avoidance tactics.

Conclusion

This study explores the underexamined dynamics of blame avoidance in political contexts marked by fatal incidents, using the Turkish incumbent government as a case study. It addresses the gap in scholarly attention regarding governmental responses to deaths, focusing on how the ruling competitive authoritarian party employs strategic blame avoidance tactics within an authoritarian setting.

Our findings reveal that in a Muslim-majority country, a populist electoral authoritarian Islamist party can effectively use religious elements—such as martyrdom, belief in the hereafter, and the devaluation of worldly life—to craft compelling narratives that bolster its blame avoidance strategies. The Turkish ruling party strategically combines these religious concepts with Weaver’s and Hood’s presentational strategies, including redefinition, reshaping, spinning, manipulation, and rewarding victims’ families. By bestowing martyrdom status and offering material rewards such as financial aid, social privileges, and promises of elevated standing, the AKP transforms blame into credit, deflecting responsibility for fatal incidents.

This approach not only mitigates the emotional and political implications of blame but also strengthens the party’s political legitimacy amidst crises. The AKP’s tactic of “bargaining via rewards” aligns with necropolitical principles, offering incentives to victims’ families to suppress dissent and deflect calls for accountability. This strategic use of religious and material rewards serves to shift public perception, making government-induced fatalities more palatable to the public.

This research bridges existing literature by applying blame avoidance theories to authoritarian regimes and integrating them with necropolitical and martyrdom discourses. It uncovers deliberate strategies employed by the Turkish ruling party to evade accountability for deaths caused by government negligence, highlighting how authoritarian and populist strategies can exploit religious elements and rewards to maintain power and legitimacy in the face of fatal crises.


 

(*) Omer Erturk is working as an Independent Researcher in Berlin, Germany with interests in Turkish politics, Islamist movements in Turkey, relations between politics and religion, radicalism, and autocracy.


 

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Hayrettin Karaman, a prominent Islamic law professor and columnist for the pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak, has become one of the most influential figures in supporting Erdogan’s parallel legal system. Karaman is pictured here on January 5, 2012. Photo: Shutterstock.

Fatwas as Tools of Religious Populism: The Case of Turkish Islamist Scholar Hayrettin Karaman

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Kenes, Bulent & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Fatwas as Tools of Religious Populism: The Case of Turkish Islamist Scholar Hayrettin Karaman.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 1, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0037     

 

Abstract

This paper investigates the entanglement of religious authority, religious populism, political narratives, and societal transformation within the complex terrain of Turkish politics, through the influential role of Hayrettin Karaman, an Islamist scholar closely aligned with the AKP government under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through various media channels, have significantly impacted AKP supporters, fostering a radicalization that manifests in hate speech, intimidation, and reported acts of aggression toward political dissenters. The fusion of religious interpretations with political discourse has been crucial in legitimizing controversial governmental actions and policies, extending beyond domestic issues to global dynamics and defense strategies, including Karaman’s advocacy for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.

Keywords: religious populism, radicalism, Islamism, fatwas, unofficial law, Turkey, Erdogan, AKP, Hayrettin Karaman

 

By Bulent Kenes & Ihsan Yilmaz

Introduction: AKP’s Religious Populism and Radicalization 

Recent scholarly works have explored the convergence of authoritarianism, democracy, and Islamic movements across diverse regions. These studies delve into religious and pro-violence populism and assess the societal impacts of various far-right Islamist movements. Additionally, there’s a significant emphasis on the collaboration between Islamist populist parties and secularist far-right parties, examining how these partnerships influence and shape political landscapes. Further academic investigations have probed the relationship between populism, violence, and the stability of authoritarian regimes, including consideration of the concept of necropolitics within specific national contexts. Studies also dissect the role of religion in generating populist appeal, examining, for instance, the impact of the Friday sermons and the utilization of diverse populist narratives for political mobilization (Barton et al., 2021a; Barton et al., 2021b).

The Erdogan regime has cultivated a parallel legal system underpinned by unofficial and clandestine fatwas. To appease its religious constituents, the regime seeks validation for its actions from Islamist legal scholars. This article uses the case study of one such scholar, Hayrettin Karaman, to demonstrate how these Islamist figures can generate an ideological defense and validation for repressive Erdoganist policies, appeals and practices. 

The Legitimizing Role of Hayrettin Karaman for the AKP

Hayrettin Karaman, a prominent Islamic Law professor and columnist for the pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak, has become one of the most influential figures in supporting the Erdogan’s parallel legal system. Karaman serves as an Islamist authority issuing fatwas which often legitimize illicit and corrupt practices among Islamist politicians and businessmen. These fatwas are connected to a range of political and social agendas, such as obtaining interest-based credit from banks and funneling substantial donations to politicians’ charities in exchange for lucrative public tenders and contracts.

Aligned with Karaman, numerous pro-Erdogan Islamist preachers espouse the belief that Turkey exists within a dar al-harb, an un-Islamic territory where their activities are considered jihad. In light of this argument, they argue for the circumvention of Islamic rules out of necessity, and they disregard official laws, which they perceive as products of the “infidel West.” They assert that the Erdogan’s AKP is the sole political representation of Islam in Turkey, and argue it is a religious duty for Muslims to vote for the party to prevent the division (fitnah, tafriqa) of the ummah, which is seen as being a graver offence than killing a fellow Muslim. The preachers propagate the idea that winning elections is akin to winning a jihad.

Political observers recognize the significant influence of figures like Karaman and the preachers supporting him within the AKP government and Erdogan’s inner circle. His fatwas and policy recommendations are perceived as authoritative in Islamic contexts, giving his statements substantial weight and warranting serious consideration. The remainder of this article presents and analyzes various statements, fatwas, and opinions provided by Karaman, which have helped legitimize and entrench Islamist ideas in Turkish society and support the Islamist populist agenda of the ruling AKP and authoritarian Erdogan regime.

Karaman’s support for the AKP and Erdogan extends to justifying even their controversial or morally contested actions, using interpretations of Islamic principles that benefit the ruling party. An illustrative instance is the 2010 incident involving Deniz Baykal, the former leader of the main opposition party, Republican People Party (CHP), and the release of a purportedly scandalous sex video he participated in. The surfacing of this scandal provoked reactions and criticisms from both sides, but significantly from those with the view that prying into an individual’s private life contradicts Islamic values.

The AKP and Erdogan defended the video’s release and were interestingly supported by Karaman, who stepped in to provide religious legitimacy to their defense. Karaman’s argument revolved around the idea of prioritizing the state’s interests over individual rights to privacy, aligning with the AKP’s stance that the exposure of such scandalous content was warranted for the greater good. Karaman wrote in his column: 

If one committing a sin in secret is a public office holder or trying to be one, in this case, ‘the duty of protecting people from its harm’ forestalls the duty of concealing of dishonor. The related people should be informed regarding the scandal. This sin and dishonor should not be concealed. If the law, without permission, forbids the prying and recording of the private activity, this law must be respected, unless there is no state of necessity (zaruret). According to Islamic ethic, it is also forbidden to attempt for prying and disclosing the secret behaviors of the individuals. However, if the concealed sin and misconduct bear upon the public and the act of concealing harms the public, the state of necessity becomes effective. In this case, this sin or misconduct can be released and publicized within the limits of the state of necessity allows” (Karaman, 2011).

His interpretation offered religious legitimacy by emphasizing the preservation of Islamic values within the context of governance and the political landscape. 

Karaman’s Defense for the AKP During the 2013 Corruption Probe

Hundreds protest in Istanbul on December 22, 2013, against the country’s worst corruption scandal in years, which was linked to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: Sadık Gulec.

During the notorious corruption probe of December 17-25, 2013 Karaman staunchly supported Erdogan and the AKP, fabricating religious fatwas in favor of the party’s politicians (Karaman, 2014a). Under this proposed system, elected Islamist officials may receive bribes, such as a 10—or 20 percent commission on billion-dollar public tenders from construction contractors, a practice Karaman likens to the share of “alms collectors” in the early days of Islamic civilization.

Karaman’s articles following the December 17-25, 2013, graft and bribery investigations take an intriguing turn, openly addressing the bribery and corruption associated with Erdogan. In an apparent effort to sway religious Erdogan supporters, Karaman endeavored to portray these actions not as personal misconduct but as contributions to the Islamic cause – a form of dawah and jihad, ostensibly carried out for the Islamist movement rather than Erdogan’s personal gain. Karaman defended the AKP’s actions in his minimizing statement that “corruption is not theft” (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

Karaman’s Framing of the 2017 Referendum as a Religious Obligation

Intensifying his explicit support for the AKP and Erdogan, Karaman was also notably involved in discriminating against voters based on their political choices before the April 2017 referendum on Turkey’s Constitution, which facilitated the shift to an executive presidential system. His statements aligned voters’ preferences with fatwas, adding a religious connotation to the political decision. Karaman disseminated the view that casting a “yes vote” was not just a political act but also an Islamic obligation, intertwining religious obligation with the referendum. In another article, he openly states that Naysayers are those who are standing against the Islam (Karaman, 2017f). 

This stance concurred with that of Erdogan and his affiliated media outlets, who emphatically emphasized that a devout Muslim should support the “Yes” vote, and that “No voters will go to hell.” The entanglement of religious authority and political discourse was crucial to the public debate, with religious rhetoric explicitly influencing the referendum’s outcome (Yayla, 2017). According to Karaman, since Erdogan’s actions are aimed at fulfilling a religious obligation (to form an Islamic state), “every action that brings us closer to this goal is a religious obligation (fardh), including a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum.”

Karaman as a Key Agitator Against the West

Karaman has been outspoken in his disdain and distrust towards the West. Karaman utilizes his platform to critique the behavior of Western countries, particularly regarding their interactions with Turkey under Erdogan regime, and has become an important figure in broader discussions on international relations and perceptions of Turkey within global contexts (O’Brien, 2017).

In a statement attributed to the scholar, Karaman blames the US for employing strategies that contradict conscience, religious values, and legal principles (Karaman, 2017b). He reflects on the perceived intentions and actions of the US in the Middle East and globally, suggesting that the US sought dominance over the Middle East and the entire world, driven by insatiable interests. Karaman implies that any entity attempting to challenge or impede US interests faced coercion, manipulation, and subjugation through various, potentially unethical means (Karaman, 2017b). He accuses the US of using alliances and collaborations within different countries to incite unrest, create chaos, provoke conflicts, propagate terrorism, and manipulate perceptions to serve its agenda (Karaman, 2017b).

Karaman is also a vocal critic of Western countries, particularly in Europe, for their negative attitudes towards Turkey and Islam. In an online post for instance, Karaman addressed Christian countries in the West, accusing them of egotism and racism and claiming their negative sentiments towards Turkey have been rapidly escalating (O’Brien, 2017). In another statement, Karaman (2017a) shares his perspective on Europe’s attitude toward religion, particularly Islam, and the economic aspects associated with it. He portrays Europe as a continent disconnected from a fulfilling religion that guides human life in both this world and the afterlife. He criticizes Europe for rejecting its original religion, conforming religious beliefs to fit personal desires, and even embracing atheism when conformity fails.

Karaman also alleges that Europe does not welcome Islam as a potential replacement for this void in religious guidance. He draws parallels between historical exploitation, mentioning the use of workers from Muslim countries for labor-intensive jobs, and a contemporary narrative where Europe, facing economic decline, turns its attention to the assets of Muslims residing in the continent (Karaman, 2017a). 

Pushing an Islamist Agenda for Turkey, the Muslim World and the Ummah

Karaman has also disseminated a range of Islamist ideas that often align with or presumably generate interest in Erdoganist Islamist populism. He portrays Turkey under Erdogan rule as representing an Islamic movement that can liberate the Ummah from various forms of perceived oppression and take a stance against exploitation and subjugation (Karaman, 2017b). Karaman has also made statements that deepen religio-political tensions in society, such as in his writing about the Gulen movement, when he insinuated that the movement acts against the state’s interests, fostering division (fitnah), thus legitimizing state intervention to counter it (Yilmaz, 2015b).

Moreover, a sense of Islamist victimhood is identifiable in the scholar’s statements. His statements evoke a sense of crisis, which helps justify the Islamist agenda in Turkish politics and beyond. In one statement, for example, he claims, “the opposition and enmity that began when our prophet openly started to invite people to Islam in Mecca, has, to date, found members from almost all corners of the world, and their destructive activities are ongoing. They have tried everything to destroy Islam and Muslims or to deviate the religion from its original form to achieve their aims. One of their methods was to divide Muslims and ensure that the divided parts consume each other” (Karaman, 2017d). 

Promoting the View that Turkey Should Strengthen Its Military and Acquire WMDs

The Turkish Army and Free Syrian Army operated in Afrin, Syria, on February 23, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

 

Karaman’s discourse reflects a strong belief in the need for Turkey to strengthen its military capabilities. He underscores the necessity for Turkey to maintain comprehensive power, including a robust military, to safeguard its interests. Karaman expresses hope that Turkey will become powerful across various domains, emphasizing the importance of strength in addressing geopolitical challenges (Karaman, 2017c).

Karaman pushes his view that Turkey needs to achieve a balance with the Western and non-Muslim world, and this will be achieved in part by matching or attaining comparable weaponry to counter potential adversaries (Karaman, 2017c). He envisions the unification of all Muslims, the ‘ummah,’ as a force to deter external threats, particularly those stemming from the West (Karaman, 2017c). 

Concerningly, the Islamist scholar has expressed a deep interest in Turkey acquiring nuclear capabilities, which he positions a a means of establishing a balance of power against imperialist forces and as a deterrent against oppression (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman’s stance, as articulated in the Yeni Safak daily, strongly advocates for Turkey’s acquisition and production of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including nuclear arms, to counter the perceived dominance of Western powers (Karaman, 2017c). He emphasizes the need for Turkey to consider creating these weapons autonomously, disregarding any opposition or constraints from Western entities (Karaman, 2017c).

In a notable example, Karaman not only sanctioned the government’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) but also urged Turkish leadership to pursue this path. The gravity of his statements shouldn’t be underestimated, considering their potential impact on policy directions, especially concerning the alarming proposal for WMDs (Bozkurt, 2017).

Karaman justifies this perspective by advocating for a realist approach in world politics, suggesting that smaller states with nuclear arsenals can exert considerable influence over larger populations (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman claims that the US and the West have attempted to control or restrict Muslim nations like Pakistan (possessing nuclear weapons) and have concerns about Iran acquiring similar capabilities. However, Karaman highlights a perceived shift in Turkey’s approach under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He presents Erdogan as a determined leader who seeks to resist oppression and support the oppressed. Indeed, in 2018 President Erdogan expressed Turkey’s initiative in producing similar military capabilities as Western nations (El, 2018). 

Conclusion

The context of Turkey’s political landscape involves a multifaceted interplay between religious authority, political narratives, and societal dynamics. Hayrettin Karaman’s influential role as an Islamist scholar and his ideological alignment with the AKP government under Islamist authoritarian populist Erdogan underscore a significant fusion of religious interpretation and political discourse. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through media channels, have wielded substantial influence, particularly among the supporters of the Erdogan regime.

The influence of excommunicative fatwas and the narratives propagated by Islamist figures like Karaman within the media have had a notable impact on AKP/Erdogan followers. Karaman’s interpretations have bolstered the Erdogan regime’s stance on contentious issues and contributed to a radicalization of AKP/Erdogan followers. This radicalization is evident in the propagation of hate speech, intimidation tactics, and reported instances of physical aggression toward those holding opposing political affiliations. 

Furthermore, Karaman’s narratives have extended beyond domestic matters, delving into geopolitical dynamics, defense strategies, and international relations. His assertions advocating the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and narratives concerning global powers highlight a vision of Turkey reliant on a robust stance against perceived adversaries.

The significance and widespread impact of Karaman’s controversial religious fatwas and recommendations within Islamist circles in Turkey and among Muslims should not be underestimated. They also have the potential to influence Turkey’s foreign policy and its relationships with other nations, particularly in defense and regional dynamics.


 

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SummerSchool

ECPS Summer School 2024 — Populism and Foreign Policy: How Does Populist Politics Influence Foreign Affairs?

ECPS organized its fourth virtual Summer School on July 1-5, 2024, focusing on the relationship between populism and foreign policy. The five-day program offered young participants a dynamic, engaging, and interdisciplinary learning environment. Presented by world-class scholars of populism, this intellectually stimulating program helped participants develop as future academics, intellectuals, activists, and public leaders. It also provided an opportunity to gain valuable cross-cultural perspectives and foster knowledge exchange beyond European borders, preparing them for future endeavors.

By Radoslav Valev

ECPS organized its fourth virtual Summer School on July 1-5, 2024, focusing on the relations between populism and foreign policy. The goal was twofold: to examine the theories related to the influence of populism on international relations and analyze case studies such as the US, Turkey, India, Brexit, and Israel to see how leaders use populist instruments in external politics. 

Populism has often been studied as a subject of political science and investigated as a topic of domestic affairs, namely party politics and elections. Nevertheless, a growing body of literature suggests that this phenomenon is not confined to the borders of nation-states; it interferes with international relations thanks to populist leaders’ desire to shape foreign affairs with a populist and mostly revisionist view. Trump’s threats to withdraw the US from NATO, Modi’s handling of India’s relations with Pakistan, Erdogan’s diaspora politics towards European countries, Orbán’s instrumentalization of migration in the EU, Netanyahu’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Johnson’s management of the Brexit process and numerous attempts by populist leaders to undermine or subvert international or supranational organizations, such as the UN, WTO, and EU, are among many examples that showcase how external relations can be blended with populism. 

Considering the current political landscape in which the number of populist figures is on the rise, we may witness more similar instances in the international political arena in the period to come. Populism in international relations has the potential to complicate existing problems, create new ones and bring about repercussions for the multilateral liberal global system. In this light, this year, the summer school examined the theoretical background of the interplay between populism and foreign affairs and examined a number of case studies from different parts of the world with a view to see similarities as well as differences between the ways populist leaders craft external politics.

The lecturers for this year’s summer school were Professor Sandra Destradi, Associate Professor Angelos Chryssogelos, Associate Professor Jessica Greenberg, Dr. Thorsten Wojczewki, Dr Georg Loefflman, Professor Cengiz Aktar, Professor Emeritus Louis Kreisberg, Professor Bertjan Verbeek, ECPS President Irina Von Wiese, Professor Craig Calhoun and Professor Joanna Dyduch. Each session was moderated by a scholar. Hence, the moderators were Dr Rubrick Biegon, Dr Gustav Meibauer, Dr Jonny Hall, Professor Ana E. Juncos Garcia, Professor Franco Zappettini, Professor Allison Carnegie, Dr Ajay Gudavarthy, Dr Aleksandra Spancerska, Professor Alexandra Homolar and Dr Andrei Zaslove.

The opening lecture by Professor Destradi examined the international implications of populism, first by outlining how populism has been conceptualized in comparative politics and political theory. It also introduced the current state of research on the global effects of populism, particularly its potential impact on foreign policy, international disputes, contributions to global public goods, participation in multilateral institutions, and the formation of partnerships with authoritarian and populist governments. The following lecture by Dr Angelos Chryssogelos examined the global rise of populism and how it sparked debate about its impact on the liberal international order. He argued that a deeper understanding of populism is needed to appreciate its varied effects on the international system. 

On the second day, the first lecture by Dr Jessica Greenberg explored the paradox of increasing reliance on international legal institutions to address conflict and bolster governance while populists use these same institutions to authorize antidemocratic policies. The lecture discussed the conditions under which this paradox emerged and how to address it, examining the relationship between populism and the rule of law and how populists subvert the law from within. 

The following two lectures by Dr Georg Loefflman and Dr Thorsten Wojczewski examined the practical manifestations of populism on foreign policy in the cases of the United States and India. 

On the third day, Professor Cengiz Aktar examined another practical populist case, namely Turkey. The following lecture by Professor Louis Kriesberg examined populism as non-governmental actions aimed at changing the conduct of resistant groups, often influencing established institutions. The presentation also examined such actions in the US, Europe, and other countries, assessing their constructiveness or destructiveness based on conflict resolution research, including factors like persuasion, promised benefits, and coercion.

On the fourth day, Professor Bertjan Verbeek and Irina Von Wiese’s lectures examined the role of populism in the EU’s foreign policy and what the EU could do as a foreign affairs actor. 

On the final fifth day, the opening lecture by Professor Craig Calhoun examined Britain’s withdrawal from the EU in the context of populist politics and argued that it stemmed from contingent circumstances, mobilizations, and deeper political shifts, notably influenced by national conservatism and English nationalism prioritizing ethnonationalist identity. The final lecture by Professor Joanna Dyduch gave insights on populism and foreign policy based on the example of Israel, distinguishing between ‘liberalist’ and ‘historicist’ orientations, highlighting how historical memory drives state actions, with ‘Foreign Policy Historicism’ emphasizing a hawkish, emotionally charged approach tied to national identity and othering.

This year’s program was enriched by the participation of around 60 attendees from diverse backgrounds and various parts of the world. They found the opportunity to engage in discussions with the lecturers on the topics mentioned, and they networked with each other in small groups and practiced peer-to-peer learning in a truly international environment.

The Summer School also featured a unique learning opportunity in the form of a case competition, held over five days from 1-5 July. The competition was designed to help participants transform their academic knowledge into practical policy suggestions, providing a hands-on learning experience. 

The competition tackled a real-life problem within the broad topic of populism, specifically populism and US foreign policy. The groups were expected to focus on a specific foreign policy or action Trump has carried out during his past presidency, or that he may carry out if he were to be re-elected in Autumn. These included the withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, the renegotiation of NAFTA to USMCA, the trade war with China, immigration policies and the border wall, North Korea diplomacy, the withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), NATO relations and defense spending, the response to the Syrian civil war, and US relations with Russia. 

The participants could position themselves as think tank members preparing policy suggestions for the US Department of State, the EU, or NATO; advisors to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense or the Vice President; lobbyists aiming to change a policy in a particular direction; or academics drawing policy suggestions from their research on a specific foreign policy topic.

Participants were divided into teams to work together on solving the case and were expected to prepare policy suggestions. The proposals of the participants were then rigorously evaluated by an assessment committee composed of scholars and experts. The committee assessed the proposals based on criteria such as creativity, feasibility, and presentation skills, ensuring a high standard of competition. On the first day of summer school, ECPS provided the groups with an information pack that included documents and sources that outlined the case and its context. Moreover, each day, a one-hour-long consultation session was arranged for the competitors when the teams could discuss their progress and partake in the case-solving activity together. On the final day of the competition, short presentations were carried out and thoroughly evaluated by the assessing committee, which gave valuable feedback to the attendees.

The participants were divided into ten working groups, each named after a US state, and examined the various populist policies enacted by Trump. Two teams, the Texas group and the Utah-Kansas group, finished with the same number of points. Utah-Kansas group (Chiara Cerisola, Martina Micozzi, Muhammad Muhammad, Junsoek Lee, Adriana Duthon, Mohammad Shakib, Sana Akhter, Syed Waqas Bokhari) positioned themselves as a think-thank, examined the populist aspects of US migration policy and designed national and regional policy suggestions to address migration issue and brought recommendations to ensure the continuity of policies across different administrations. Texas group (Anton Miguel De Vera, Olivia Gheyselinck, Giada Pasquettaz, Reka Koleszar, George Kutty, Viktoriia Hamaiunova, M. Fahmi Asshidgy, Sara Torabian) brought suggestions for the EU to strengthen its technology security resilience in light of US technology policy towards China during Trump administration. Taking this opportunity, ECPS congratulates the teams for their diligence and professionalism in research and great talent in presenting their policy suggestions. 

All in all, our five-day schedule provided young people with a dynamic, engaging, and interdisciplinary learning environment. This intellectually challenging program, presented by world-class scholars of populism, allowed them to grow as future academics, intellectuals, activists, and public leaders. Participants had the opportunity to develop invaluable cross-cultural perspectives and facilitate a knowledge exchange beyond European borders, empowering them for their future endeavors.

ECPS Academy Summer School 2024

People wait in a long line to receive food donations for lunch on a downtown street in São Paulo, Brazil, during a severe economic crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic on June 2, 2020. Photo: Nelson Antoine.

Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism: Lessons from Brazil

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism: Lessons from Brazil.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. August 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0017


The book, edited by Professor Natália Sátyro, provides a comprehensive examination of how neoliberal and populist radical right ideologies and politicians have reshaped Brazil’s social policy landscape. Through a detailed analysis of various policy areas, the contributing authors reveal the destructive impact of these ideologies on social protections and democratic institutions. For scholars and policymakers, this book is an essential resource for understanding the interplay between austerity, populism, and social policy in Brazil, as well as its broader implications for the global rise of the populist radical right. While the book is dense with figures, statistics, and technical financial and economic data, it remains essential reading for anyone interested in these critical issues. Sátyro and her Brazilian colleagues offer valuable insights that are well worth attention.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism: Lessons from Brazil,” edited by Natália Sátyro, provides a comprehensive analysis of the significant shifts in Brazil’s social policies during the turbulent period spanning Michel Temer’s and Jair Bolsonaro’s presidencies. Beginning with Dilma Rousseff’s impeachment in 2016 and concluding with Bolsonaro’s departure in 2022, this era was marked by profound changes driven by neoliberal economic policies and the rise of populist radical right ideologies. As the title suggests, the book explores the intersection of radical right populism and austerity measures in Brazil, particularly under Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency. Featuring cutting-edge research by Brazilian scholars, previously inaccessible to English-speaking audiences, the book offers a timely and authoritative multidisciplinary examination of social policies during Temer’s austerity measures and Bolsonaro’s populist rule. 

The diverse range of policies analyzed in the book provides critical insights into the political agenda, preferences, and strategies that shaped this tumultuous chapter in Brazil’s history. Therefore, readers encounter concepts from various disciplines throughout the book such as ‘distributive deservingness,’ ‘disinformation order,’ ‘disinformation,’ ‘misinformation,’ ‘malinformation,’ ‘infodemic,’ ‘social inclusion,’ ‘retrenchment populism,’ and ‘bancarization,’ among many others, reflecting the complexity and breadth of the topics addressed. However, this review focuses solely on the perspectives of neoliberalism and populist radical right approaches, highlighting how these ideologies have influenced the dismantling and reconfiguration of social policies in Brazil. Specifically, it examines how Bolsonaro’s populist radical right policies contributed to the erosion of social protections, mirroring trends seen among right-wing populist leaders globally. The review deliberately omits technical discussions on economic, financial, and social policies not directly related to the core theme of populism.

The book tackles several critical questions within the Brazilian context, such as whether there has been a deliberate effort to dismantle or reshape social policies. It explores whether populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Brazil are genuinely distinct from the mainstream right, particularly in their stance on the welfare state, and if so, how they differ. The book also delves into how political parties’ positions on state intervention, redistribution, and social policymaking differentiate the left from the right in Brazil. Furthermore, it examines the ways in which the populist radical right diverges from the traditional right on economic, cultural, and social issues.

Given the success of the leftist Workers’ Party (PT) governments in politicizing inequality, the book investigates how right-wing actors have responded, particularly in terms of expanding or reducing the welfare state. It also considers how emerging anti-system, radical right forces have distinguished themselves from the traditional right in their approaches to redistribution, social policies, and increasingly significant cultural issues. Additionally, the book explores the impact of populist radical right parties on family policies, among other related topics. Overall, the book addresses a wide range of social policies, including social security, healthcare, education, environmental protection, indigenous rights, and gun control. Each chapter is grounded in empirical research, providing in-depth analysis of the effects of Bolsonaro’s policies.

Sátyro’s work is divided into four parts, focusing on social policy changes in Brazil, particularly from 2015 to 2022. The first section, “Contextualization,” offers an overview of Brazil’s political and economic conditions leading up to Bolsonaro’s presidency. It highlights the influence of the neoliberal agenda—marked by fiscal austerity, deregulation, and market-driven policies—on the transformation of social policies. The analysis begins with austerity measures under Temer, setting the stage for further cutbacks under Bolsonaro. The introduction discusses the political shift from the PT to Temer’s right-wing coalition after Rousseff’s impeachment, initiating significant reductions in social welfare. It also covers Bolsonaro’s rise in 2018, driven by populist rhetoric, anti-corruption campaigns, and support from neo-Pentecostal groups. His government further dismantled social policies, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbating the crisis through denialism and poor coordination. Sátyro frames the erosion of Brazil’s social protection system within neoliberal and authoritarian values under both Temer and Bolsonaro, raising questions about the dismantling of the welfare state and the role of right-wing populism in these processes. The introduction chapter sets the stage for the book’s exploration of how right-wing governments have reshaped social protection in Brazil.

In Chapter 2, “Social Policies in Brazil: An Introduction,” Natália Sátyro discusses the foundations of social protection in Brazil since the 1988 Federal Constitution (CF88), which followed the return to democracy in 1985. She places Bolsonaro’s actions within the broader context of global right-wing populism and highlights the ongoing exclusion of informal workers, particularly descendants of enslaved Africans, from social and political rights—a legacy of Brazil’s history as the last country in the Americas to abolish slavery. Sátyro also examines the complexities of Brazil’s federal system, where smaller states have disproportionate influence, complicating national policymaking and limiting presidential power. She critiques the fragmented implementation of policies across Brazil’s 26 states, particularly in education, due to the lack of a unified system. The chapter also addresses the Bolsonaro administration’s inconsistent approach to social policies during the COVID-19 pandemic, which worsened the crisis due to a lack of national coordination. It concludes by outlining the central themes of Bolsonaro’s government plan, including his use of religion and patriotism to appeal to conservative voters, supported by neo-Pentecostal leaders. This sets the stage for the book’s detailed exploration of specific policy areas impacted by these political shifts.

Chapter 3, “Political Parties, Ideological Preferences and Social Policy: Accounting for Right-Wing Strategies in Brazil after the Left Turn,” by André Borges, maps the political landscape, focusing on the interactions between the Executive and Legislative branches and the rise of right-wing influence. Borges draws parallels between Bolsonaro and populist leaders like Donald Trump and Viktor Orbán, highlighting their use of populist rhetoric to dismantle social protections and undermine democratic institutions. The chapter explains how the populist radical right’s emphasis on cultural issues allows them to avoid direct conflict with neoliberal policies, which might alienate their base. Traditionally, Latin American politics has focused more on economic issues due to high inequality, but recent years have seen a shift toward cultural issues, driven in part by the growing influence of evangelical churches in electoral politics. This shift facilitated the rise of far-right populist leaders, including Bolsonaro in 2018.

Borges divides Brazil’s right-wing into two groups: the mainstream right and the populist radical right (PRR). Through statistical analysis, he shows that while both groups align on economic issues, they differ sharply on cultural matters, with the PRR adopting more extreme conservative positions. The chapter illustrates how the Brazilian right has reorganized around religious and anti-political movements, leading to the successful mobilization of diverse electoral coalitions. Bolsonaro’s rise is linked to this realignment, with his campaign centered on cultural conservatism and anti-establishment rhetoric, mirroring broader trends in Latin America.

Chapter 4, “The Political Economy of the Brazilian Economic Crisis (2014–2022): Economic Policy, Ideas, and the Limits of Neoliberal Austerity Measures,” by Alexandre Queiroz Guimarães and Marco Flávio da Cunha Resende, explores the limitations of neoliberal austerity measures in Brazil. Although these policies reduced public spending, they failed to achieve sustainable economic growth, resulting in increased inequality and social unrest. This discontent set the stage for Bolsonaro’s rise, as his populist rhetoric appealed to a population weary of economic hardship. The chapter traces the backlash against neoliberal reforms, which initially led to the rise of center-left governments in Latin America, including Brazil’s PT. Despite initial successes under Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil struggled with high interest rates and domestic debt. Bolsonaro’s 2018 election brought a radical liberal agenda of privatization and austerity, but the COVID-19 pandemic forced a policy shift toward increased public spending to bolster his reelection chances. His administration’s poor governance, especially in social and environmental areas, contributed to his defeat in 2022. The chapter concludes with Lula’s return to power in 2023, highlighting his focus on social spending, environmental reforms, and economic recovery.

Chapter 5, “Disinformation and Democracy,” authored by Eliara Santana and Isabele Mitozo, examines the use of disinformation as a political strategy of obfuscation, highlighting the significant threat it poses to democracy and, specifically, to social policies. They delve into how disinformation was institutionalized in Brazil during Bolsonaro’s presidency (2018–2022) and used as a strategy to dismantle democratic institutions. The chapter highlights the establishment of a coordinated disinformation ecosystem, which became particularly evident during the 2018 election and the COVID-19 pandemic. This ecosystem was aligned with the federal government and fueled distrust in traditional media, while promoting misinformation, especially regarding public health measures. Bolsonaro’s administration actively undermined democratic institutions by leveraging disinformation, notably through social media platforms like WhatsApp and Telegram. The chapter also discusses the role of Bolsonaro’s “Hate Cabinet,” a group that spread misinformation to attack critics and destabilize democratic processes. This systemic disinformation campaign helped consolidate Bolsonaro’s power and left a lasting impact on Brazilian democracy. Even after Bolsonaro’s 2022 electoral defeat, the disinformation network remains a significant challenge, requiring a concerted effort to restore credibility to institutions and reliable information sources. The authors underscore that any current analysis of PRRPs must consider fake news as a deliberate tool with specific political objectives. 

Chapter 6, authored by Pedro H. G. Ferreira de Souza, examines income inequality and poverty in Brazil since its re-democratization in the 1980s. The 1988 Federal Constitution marked a significant shift in Brazil’s political landscape, emphasizing poverty eradication and inequality reduction as core goals. Despite these ambitions, progress has been uneven. While Brazil has made notable strides in reducing poverty, addressing income inequality has proven more challenging. The country experienced significant poverty reduction and narrowing inequality from the early 2000s until the mid-2010s, but these gains were undermined by the 2014–2016 recession and the COVID-19 pandemic. Under the rule of Bolsonaro, welfare spending reached unprecedented levels, particularly through the expansion of the Auxílio Brasil program in 2022. Despite Bolsonaro’s conservative stance, electoral incentives drove this welfare expansion. The Lula administration, taking office in 2023, continued this trajectory by rebranding the program as Bolsa Família and introducing new benefits. Sustaining these improvements may be difficult without further budget expansions.

The second part of the book, focusing on Compensatory Policies, examines the impact of key events like the 2014–2015 economic crisis, the Temer administration’s New Fiscal Regime, Bolsonaro’s rise, and the COVID-19 pandemic. Chapter 7, by Arnaldo Provasi Lanzara and Fernanda Pernasetti, explores the dismantling of Brazil’s social security system under Bolsonaro within the context of authoritarian populism and fiscal austerity. Despite facing congressional opposition, Bolsonaro implemented significant reforms that mirrored and expanded upon Temer’s unapproved proposals, particularly targeting pension systems. The chapter employs Nadia Urbinati’s concept of “authoritarian populism” to describe Bolsonaro’s approach, which combined populist rhetoric with strict fiscal discipline to gain market confidence while undermining social security. According to the authors, Bolsonaro’s strategy involved exploiting divisions within society, using austerity as a justification to reduce labor and social security benefits, and promoting privatization. The authors argue that, although the reform did not achieve its intended financial savings, it prompted a shift toward private pension plans. This reform, rooted in fiscal austerity, disproportionately impacted low-income workers and the elderly, reflecting a broader trend where economic efficiency was prioritized over social justice. This “expansionist dismantling” weakened essential income supports for poor wage-earner families. The long-term impact of these policies underscores the enduring threat posed by authoritarian populist regimes to social rights and democratic institutions. 

Chapter 8, authored by José Angelo Machado and Mauro Lúcio Jerônymo, discusses the significant risks posed to Brazil’s Unified Health System (SUS) during Bolsonaro’s presidency, particularly in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic response highlighted how neoliberal policies, when coupled with populist denialism, can devastate public health infrastructure, particularly for marginalized communities. Bolsonaro’s administration was marked by a blatant disregard for scientific and technical guidelines, instead promoting disinformation, ineffective treatments, and delaying vaccine acquisition. This strategy, driven by a “parallel cabinet” around Bolsonaro, undermined the cooperative federalism that had traditionally guided SUS operations. The Ministry of Health, under successive ministers, saw increased militarization, disregard for expert advice, and a breakdown in coordination with state and municipal governments. These actions led to severe institutional damage, including the erosion of public trust, loss of qualified personnel, and weakened epidemiological surveillance. According to the authors, Bolsonaro’s administration, with its focus on “deconstructing” existing systems, left a lasting negative impact on Brazil’s public health infrastructure, exacerbating the challenges faced during the pandemic and undermining the foundations of the SUS.

Chapter 9, written by Natália Sátyro, Eleonora Schettini Martins Cunha, Bruno R. Pinheiro, and Fernanda Silva, explores the detrimental effects of austerity and political changes on socio-assistance services in Brazil, particularly under far-right populist leadership. The chapter reveals how these essential services, especially for vulnerable populations, have been progressively undermined since 2014. Initially impacted by budget cuts during Rousseff’s presidency, socio-assistance services faced further challenges under Temer’s administration, which introduced a long-term spending cap that severely limited social spending. The situation deteriorated further under Bolsonaro, whose administration neglected these services and dismantled social participation mechanisms. Bolsonaro’s approach to governance involved discrediting social programs as corrupt or inefficient, using this narrative to justify deep cuts that exacerbated poverty and inequality. The chapter also identifies six distinct social welfare regimes across Brazil’s municipalities, reflecting varying levels of social protection. The COVID-19 pandemic compounded these challenges, intensifying poverty and food insecurity. Overall, the chapter highlights the vulnerability of socio-assistance services to political and economic shifts, particularly under right-wing governments.

Chapter 10, written by Joana Mostafa, analyzes the evolution of Brazil’s two main non-contributive cash transfer programs: Bolsa Família (PBF) and Continuous Benefit Programme (BPC). The chapter tracks changes from the impeachment of Rousseff in 2016 through to Lula’s narrow victory in 2022, highlighting how these programs were affected by political and economic shifts. PBF designed to alleviate poverty by supplementing household incomes, faced discrediting campaigns and reductions in coverage under Bolsonaro’s government, which sought to undermine the program’s structure. Bolsonaro’s administration introduced Auxílio Brasil, a replacement for PBF, emphasizing merit and privatization over social rights, while sidelining social assistance policies and increasing financial vulnerability for beneficiaries. The chapter underscores how Bolsonaro’s government used populist rhetoric to manipulate public perception of poverty, while altering the foundational elements of social assistance, turning the program into a vehicle for neoliberal and conservative ideologies.

The third part of the book, “Social Investment Policies,” includes Chapter 11, where Sandra Gomes and Catarina Ianni Segatto examine Bolsonaro’s symbolic strategies in education policy and how they reinforced his ideological agenda. Elected in 2018 with a far-right populist platform, Bolsonaro framed education as a cultural battleground against leftist ideologies, targeting higher education with budget cuts and promoting conservative values. Despite his rhetoric, Bolsonaro’s administration achieved limited success in enacting structural changes, as many proposals faced resistance in Congress. While minor policy changes occurred, Brazil’s educational framework, rooted in the 1988 Constitution, largely withstood his attempts at a conservative shift. The chapter concludes that Bolsonaro struggled to build a coalition capable of implementing radical education reforms.

Bolsonaro’s populist radical right ideology extended beyond economic policies to cultural and moral issues, particularly in family policies. In Chapter 12, Gabriel Penna and Natália Sátyro explore how his administration reshaped Brazilian family policies under far-right neo-conservatism. The chapter highlights Bolsonaro’s promotion of a traditionalist family structure, opposing gender equality and LGBTQ rights championed by previous governments. His approach emphasized reinforcing patriarchal norms, reducing state involvement in care services, and increasing privatization. By diminishing federal influence and shifting responsibilities to local governments, Bolsonaro’s policies weakened support for non-traditional families and expanded the privatization of childcare services. This reflects the populist radical right’s strategy of aligning social policies with an exclusionary, nationalist vision. The chapter warns that far-right ideologies may continue to obstruct policies supporting sexual and gender minorities and non-traditional families even after Bolsonaro’s presidency.

Chapter 13, by Regina Coeli Moreira Camargos and Pedro M. R. Barbosa, examines labor market policy changes in Brazil from 2015 to 2022, focusing on the erosion of labor protections. The chapter investigates whether this reflects a broader trend of welfare state retrenchment in Brazil. Following Temer’s pro-market reforms, Bolsonaro continued similar policies, especially with the 2019 Social Security reform. However, Bolsonaro prioritized budgetary control to secure legislative support rather than pursuing full austerity. The deterioration of labor conditions disproportionately impacted vulnerable groups, particularly Black women, who faced rising unemployment, poverty, and hunger. Although Bolsonaro sought to further deregulate the labor market, his administration mainly extended the policies initiated under Temer, including weakening labor protections and halting minimum wage increases. Neglect of both active and passive labor market policies deepened workforce inequalities, with the authors highlighting how these reforms reflected a strong neoliberal agenda, increasing risks for workers.

The fourth part of the book, “Policies Outside the Traditional Welfare State Scope,” includes Chapter 14 by Maria Dolores Lima da Silva and Ana Luiza Martins de Medeiros, which examines the strategic dismantling of Brazilian environmental policies under Bolsonaro, particularly targeting forests and indigenous populations. Building on actions from Rousseff and Temer’s governments, Bolsonaro aggressively weakened environmental protections and indigenous rights through financial defunding, regulatory rollbacks, and bureaucratic changes. His administration promoted deregulation, undermined institutions like FUNAI, and appointed ideological allies to key positions, further eroding protections. The use of symbolic and low-visibility strategies catered to powerful economic sectors by dismantling regulatory barriers to economic expansion. The chapter concludes that these policies have caused significant, potentially irreversible damage to Brazil’s environmental protections and indigenous territories, with long-term consequences that will be difficult and costly to address.

Chapter 15, by Ludmila Ribeiro, Valéria Oliveira, Rafael Rocha, and Alexandre Diniz, explores the deterioration of gun control policies in Brazil, particularly under Bolsonaro. Supported by the firearms industry and the “bullet caucus” in Congress, Bolsonaro significantly weakened the Disarmament Statute, leading to a surge in firearms. His administration issued decrees that relaxed restrictions, including increasing the number of firearms civilians could own and removing the need to justify purchases. These changes likely worsened violent crime, with firearms already accounting for over 70% of homicides in Brazil. In 2023, President Lula began reversing these policies, reinstating stricter gun control. However, the authors stress that addressing the weapon proliferation from Bolsonaro’s era will require more than just reverting to previous laws.

In sum, between 2015 and 2022, Brazil’s democracy faced significant challenges, especially in social policy, leading to major shifts in the welfare state. The administrations of Rousseff, Temer, and Bolsonaro each influenced the evolution of social protection differently. The book highlights a departure from the inclusive welfare state established after the 1988 Constitution, which had reduced poverty and inequality until the mid-2010s. From 2015 onward, poverty and inequality rose, particularly under Bolsonaro, who prioritized dismantling policies, reducing equality, and weakening social protections through austerity, deregulation, and erosion of key programs like pensions and healthcare. While some welfare elements, like non-contributory cash transfers, remained resilient, the overall impact was a weakened welfare system, greater inequality, and significant social costs.

In a sense, Brazil stands as a compelling case of resilience, with its institutions having endured significant challenges. Despite the current state of Brazilian democracy being far from ideal, it has withstood a violent and explicit attack. However, more time is needed to fully assess the resilience of the system as a whole and the long-term consequences of the processes analyzed in this book. The authors underscore the urgent need to defend social protections against the encroachment of authoritarian and neoliberal agendas, highlighting the dangers posed by the populist radical right to democracy and social welfare worldwide. While the book is overly dense with figures, statistics, and technical financial and economic information, it is an essential reading for anyone interested in understanding these critical issues. Natália Sátyro and her Brazilian colleagues offer valuable insights that deserve attention.


 

Natália Sátyro. (2024). Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism: Lessons from Brazil. Routledge. 412 pp.Paperback £36.99, Hardback £135.00, ISBN 9781032758374 

A sign for the Apartheid Museum stands next to the entrance. The exhibition is dedicated to the apartheid regime and the 20th-century history of South Africa. Artistic retouching was done in Johannesburg, South Africa, on March 30, 2016. Photo: Shutterstock.

Peacemaking & Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994 

Sithole, Neo. (2024). “Peacemaking & Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. August 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0016

 

In her book, Reverend Dr. Liz Carmichael unpacks the events, personalities, and socio-cultural, political, and economic realities during South Africa’s peace and transition negotiations from 1990 to 1998. She details the challenges faced by the country’s early popular mass movements and provides insights into the Manichean divide between political organizations. Through a reflective lens, Carmichael addresses the often-overlooked high emotions, ethnic-based societal cleavages, and split-second decisions that characterized the politics of the time. Crucially, the work demonstrates that the discussions surrounding the National Peace Accord were vital not only for bringing a decisive end to the political violence of that period but also for other significant reasons.

Reviewed by Neo Sithole

Violence in South Africa reached a zenith in 1990,  the culmination of internal progressive active resistance carried out by civic society, workers unions, religious bodies and then-banned political organizations in the forms of mass protests, strikes, marches or sit-ins. Former President P.W. Botha’s notions of ‘total onslaught,’ that South Africa was under siege by militarized communist forces that threatened the security of Apartheid South Africa and the white political domination and privilege it upheld and its counterpart ‘total strategy,’ the required combination of reform and repression made necessary the formation of military wings ties to banned liberation movements. In a move to douse socio-political tensions, State President de Klerk decides to lift the ban on political parties and release political prisoners. Instead of introducing calm South Africa saw a shift of violence from the domain brutal Apartheid regime to adversarial political parties the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. From massacres on trains and to wars between rival township settlements, ‘black on black’ violence was quickly spreading. Prompted by the scale and absurdity of mass violence various churches galvanized, organizing themselves to bring political parties together to engage in peace talks, a step that would see the adoption of the National Peace Accord, a linchpin document in South Africa’s relatively peaceful transition to a full democracy. 

Due to its examination of political life influenced by some of South Africa’s earliest and largest popular movements (even being viewed as populist by scholars of transitioning South Africa) Reverend Dr. Liz Carmicheal’s work subtly examines themes of direct interest to populist scholars such as the Manichean ‘good vs evil’ and an inclusionary Left battling against an exclusionary Right. Additionally, the book offers examples of ethnic divides that materialize politically often seen in populist rhetoric or strategies. 

In the introduction, author Carmichael offers the book’s aim as being “first full account of the Peace Accord” (pg.1) and how under NPA structures South Africans took part in directly birthing and developing peace and contributing to what would be seen globally as a remarkable transition from a horrific Apartheid regime to an inclusive and uplifting non-racial democracy. Upon review, this is somewhat misleading. Not because the text doesn’t fulfil this, but because when reading what is presented is an extensive detailing of the socio-political environment(s) that surrounded the accord generated continuous shifts in peace talks, the people and personalities that for better or worse had an immediate impact on the outcomes of negotiations, objectives that influenced informed decisions taken by political parties and civic/religious organizations, and the how agreed upon political configurations relied upon principles cooperation between ordinary citizens for their functionality. There exists a reflective habit to ‘telescope’ the period between the unbanning of political parties in 1990 and 1994 when the country held its first, closely watched free and fair elections which is often done by spotlighting a few key moments based on the discretion of who something the book aids in rectifying.

As the title suggests, the book’s central themes are peace-making and peacebuilding, providing what these meant and looked like in South Africa during the peak of internal conflict. A third theme not explicitly mentioned but vividly shown is ‘peace-selling,’ where we see the extent to which the state, in cooperation with business and political parties, knowing that for peace to take root the notion of peace needs to be circulated by means that would be far-reaching and see peace be synonymous with the popular culture to subvert still existing political, regional and racial tensions. Outside of these, there are additional themes that, decades after South Africa transitioned into a democracy, remain salient and prominent within the country’s political, social and economic sphere like the dire need for enduring political tolerance, the touchy relationship between the government, political organizations, and businesses, how realpolitik can supersede ideological cleavages, how political expansion often generates animosity between parties that may hold similar ideological foundations or how certain political organizations built legacies on the kind of support/opposition received from the Apartheid government. 

Carmichael informs readers about how the people at the national level responded to what was very visibly aimed to be a shift in South Africa’s political dispensation and while doing so recognizes some who may not have been immortalized by previous works as being concerned with the business of peacemaking and peacebuilding on the ground. 

The book places significant emphasis on the dynamic between the African National Congress (ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the Apartheid government, primarily due to their pivotal roles in the ongoing political violence of the time. The IFP, initially a cultural organization, transformed into a quasi-political party after the ANC was banned, with the intention of continuing the ANC’s work. However, tensions arose between the IFP and the ANC over ideological differences. The main points of contention included the ANC’s shift toward violent resistance, its calls for intensified boycotts and sanctions against the South African economy (which IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi believed would harm Black South Africans the most), and its increasing alignment with communist influences, which the IFP strongly disapproved of. 

The disputes, primarily stemming from friction between the IFP leadership—centralized around Zulu Chief and party leader Buthelezi—and the ANC leadership in exile, created a complex and multifaceted tension between the two organizations. These disagreements not only served as significant obstacles to peace during the period of violence but also influenced the negotiations leading up to South Africa’s first democratic election. The book highlights key aspects of the ANC-IFP conflict, including the controversial linkages between the IFP and the apartheid regime, which led many to view Inkatha as an extension of the regime’s security apparatus and collaborators in maintaining racial segregation. Additionally, the ANC’s refusal to disband its military wing, which the IFP viewed as a private army and thus a violation of peace accords, further fueled the strain between the two parties.

International sanctions, some in place since the instalment of the National Party in 1948, boycotts had limited the reach of South Africa goods and had caved under mounting internal pressure (notably the student movements) to leave Apartheid South Africa. These mirrored the economic forces internally that demanded change, spurred on by massive losses in profits brought on by stunted productivity, a shrinking market to sell to and crippling hikes in taxes introduced by the government in attempts to boost internal revenue and stave off total economic collapse. The widespread political violence and instability across the country significantly discouraged workers from attending their shifts, as they risked being attacked by rival political factions or killed by an elusive group of unknown assailants. Later in the text, Carmichael reveals that this shadowy group, commonly referred to as the ‘Third Force,’ was a combination of rogue elements within state security, members of political parties, and former liberation militants.

The recurring display of the ANC-IFP rivalry is recounted to have played out in forms across numerous occasions, the rivalry played out reinforces the understanding that for peace to be realistically achieved both parties needed to find themselves politically satisfied with their visions of the space they held in the country’s present and its future.  

Ahistorical oversimplifications of the Left-Right divide present in South Africa at the time are also tackled by the text. The book unpacks the various political parties and organizations that fell across the Left-Right spectrum, in line with their role and relevance during that moment/event and shares their ideological underpinnings or contextualizes any conflicts between them where necessary, and it often is. 

The deep ideological divide that shaped attitudes toward the peace process is thoroughly explored in the text. Dr. Carmichael highlights a notable example during the negotiations of the Peace Accord, where extreme right-wing factions rejected the Accord, labeling it a “communist trap” and a dangerous step toward handing over power to communist forces. They argued that there could be no peace without freedom for their respective “nations” (pg. 135). This rejection was mirrored on the far left by parties such as the Pan-African Congress and the Azanian People’s Organization, along with their allied unions. Initially participating in the peace negotiations as observers, these groups later withdrew from both the peace and future constitutional negotiations, believing that engaging with those they saw as the primary perpetrators of violence against the Black majority undermined the broader struggle for freedom.

Carmichael recounts some of the significant challenges of the peace process, noting that while getting all the necessary parties into the same room was difficult, an even greater challenge was getting leaders to genuinely communicate rather than talking past each other to score political points with their constituencies. On one occasion, a member of the far-right stood up during negotiations and argued that if the talks were truly open to dialogue, they must also entertain the possibility of allowing those who wished to remain segregated to do so.

The involvement of foreign organizations, including the United Nations and the Commonwealth Organization of African Unity, was strongly opposed by the South African government, as many of these entities had, in principle, sided with the ANC, which had called for the continuation of sanctions. Another theme explored in the book is the negotiations that took place outside the official talks. Away from their constituents and the media, where official positions often hindered progress, political leaders would engage in informal discussions at family homes, churches, or even during tea breaks, allowing them to clear disputes and build relationships more freely.

The National Peace Accord (NPA) was primarily a response to the widespread political violence in South Africa, aiming to prevent further bloodshed. Carmichael effectively breaks down how the Accord, once signed, was made functional and enforced. He details the evolution of the NPA, noting that the final agreement included chapters focused on addressing the structural issues contributing to national instability. These included socio-economic development, the restructuring of security forces to better represent the forthcoming democratic South Africa, and, crucially, the establishment of a code of conduct for political parties, the government, and unions.

Carmichael notes that for parties emphasizing consultative consensus with their constituents, there was discomfort with the ‘top-down’ approach taken in the accord negotiations. However, he cites that due to the immediacy and decisiveness demanded by the situation, it was the only viable option. That said, the book highlights that the real work for the NPA and the peace process occurred at the grassroots level, particularly in regions where violence had become entrenched, such as KwaZulu-Natal. This underscores an appreciation for the acknowledgment by NPA officers (many of them volunteers) of the need for varied approaches, as success in some areas relied on personalities and relationships for the effective establishment of NPA structures.

In discussing the sporadic nature of the clashes between party members, the book reveals that much of the political violence was either denied by political leadership or was the result of communities trying to defend themselves, taking pre-emptive action, or retaliating against previous political violence. It also addresses the challenges in finding effective ways to consolidate political cohesion between parties and their leaders on the ground, noting the frequent disruptions to negotiations caused by outbreaks of violence or retaliatory actions. Along these lines, sentiments of skepticism towards the accords are highlighted. Despite the accords being welcomed, there was widespread concern, particularly at the grassroots level, about whether the agreement would be adhered to. This skepticism was fueled by instances where signatories violated the principles of earlier peace agreements, thereby undermining both their commitment to peace and the accord as a whole.

It is shown that the NPA and surrounding discussions proved vital for a reason other than bringing a decisive end to the political violence; it was the prelude to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations that painted the blueprint for what the post-Apartheid South Africa would look like. For many in attendance, the peace accord talks presented chances to vent frustrations as well a platform for political maneuvering- in both of these cases, the underlying logic was that it was becoming increasingly clear that political and economic power was rapidly restructuring and that involved parties needed to actively mark their places to avoid being left out. 

Critically, the book clarifies how churches and businesses (capital) became pillars not only of the accords themselves but also of sustaining the negotiation process as early as 1990. These two groups, either independently or jointly, were pivotal in breaking down negotiation or communication deadlocks. They served as points of contact in violence-prone areas where neutrality was essential for quelling conflicts, highlighting the significance of churches, religious organizations, and collective businesses in facilitating the entire NPA process. The book provides insight into how large business groups shouldered much of the administrative burden behind the negotiations, offering resources such as boardrooms, cars, office buildings, and private jets. Regarding religious leaders, it reveals their shrewdness and acute understanding of the relative goodwill and reduced hostility afforded to them by their positions. They leveraged this to counsel political leaders, cool heated tensions, and, in some cases, bring political leaders of different denominations together through interfaith initiatives, thus bypassing the political divisions that would typically hinder such interactions.

While South Africa’s foreign policy and international presence have become characterized by principles of peace, universal human rights, and the need for dialogue, the book provides a background on the young democracy’s history of negotiation, highlighting its role in quelling international conflicts and paving the way for sustained peace and collective development. Dr. Carmichael contributes to crafting a holistic account of earlier populist movements by examining South Africa’s Manichean divides and ethnic-turned-political societal cleavages. Through reflective and detailed accounts of the events leading up to the peace talks, the relationships between key figures, and the short timeline between events, Carmichael illustrates that the period from 1990 to 1994 can be considered the most politically intense in the country’s recent history.


 

Liz Carmichael. (2023). Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994. Boydell and Brewer. 518 pp. $36.95, ISBN: 9781847013682

President Nicolas Maduro

Once Dictators Seize Power, They’re Hard to Remove: Venezuela’s Elections

Some observers believe Nicolás Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.

By Imdat Oner*

“Lacking personal charisma and booming oil revenues, Nicolás Maduro has struggled to obtain his predecessor’s popular support and failed to legitimize his rule at the polls. Instead, Maduro consolidated his power through sharing it with elites and the military.” 

In a profile I wrote about Nicolás Maduro three years ago, I emphasized that his grip on power was not rooted in broad popular support but rather in strategic alliances with elites and the military. This reality has been starkly highlighted by the recent presidential election in Venezuela, which revealed Maduro’s limited base of popular support.

The National Electoral Council (CNE) officially declared Maduro the winner, claiming he secured 52 percent of the vote compared to 43 percent for his main challenger, Edmundo González. However, despite Maduro’s declaration of victory three weeks ago, the CNE has yet to present credible evidence to substantiate this claim. In contrast, Venezuela’s opposition, represented by the Unitary Platform (PUD), has challenged the outcome by publishing a detailed vote count online. This data shows that Edmundo González actually received more than 7.3 million votes—approximately 67% of the total. The opposition’s numbers indicate that González is ahead by over 4 million votes, with Maduro losing in every state. Some reports are even calling this election manipulation one of the biggest electoral frauds in Latin American history. Although Maduro has faced similar allegations of election fraud before, the evidence against him has never been as overwhelming as it is now.

Lacking popular support, Maduro has resorted to familiar tactics. Instead of transparently sharing election results table by table, he requested that the Electoral Chamber of Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) review and certify the official results. The government is attempting to present the TSJ as a neutral body to resolve the controversy. Yet, Venezuela’s judiciary has long been co-opted by Maduro, functioning more as a tool to preserve his legitimacy than as an independent institution. Although the court has yet to announce its decision, it’s highly likely it will support the results from Maduro’s controlled CNE.

As the government delays the process to buy time, Maduro continues to rely on military support. His legitimacy has always been anchored in alliances with domestic elites, particularly the military, whose loyalty is crucial to the regime’s survival. The military, having historically shaped Venezuela’s political landscape, remains key to any potential transition of power. Following the disputed elections, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino reaffirmed the military’s “absolute loyalty” to Maduro, further solidifying their role as a pillar of his regime. Opposition leaders have called on the army to intervene, but this seems unlikely. Since taking power, Maduro has worked to ensure the military remains staunchly pro-government. Those officers who showed even slight disloyalty have been imprisoned, while loyalists have been generously rewarded with significant economic and political favors.

With the military solidly behind Maduro, along with the backing of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Supreme Court, Venezuela is going to slide further into dictatorship. Since Maduro’s 2013 election, the country has gradually grown more authoritarian, with opposition politicians, activists, and journalists consistently targeted by his regime. Yet, in recent days, the repression has intensified significantly. The government’s rhetoric and the actions of its security services signal to tighten its authoritarian grip further on the country, even at the cost of becoming a pariah in the region.

Some observers believe Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.

Venezuela’s elections once again serve as a warning to other authoritarian populist regimes that once dictators seize power, they become extremely difficult to remove—though not entirely impossible.


 

(*) Dr. Imdat ONER is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University (FIU). He holds a Ph.D. from FIU, where he completed a dissertation titled “Great Power Competition in Latin America Through Strategic Narrative.” Prior to joining FIU, he served as a Turkish diplomat, most recently at the Turkish Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, where he was the Deputy Head of Mission and Political Officer. His expertise lies in International Relations, with a primary focus on Latin American politics. Dr. Oner has published extensively on Venezuelan politics and Turkish foreign policy, with articles appearing in War on the Rocks, The National Interest, Americas Quarterly, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, and the Miami Herald. He is also a frequent contributor to Global Americans. His analyses have been featured in international media outlets, including Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, Miami Herald, and Agencia EFE.

Hagia Sophia was converted into a mosque by the Erdogan regime in Turkey on July 10, 2020. Following the decision, several groups gathered in front of Hagia Sophia to celebrate. Photo: Ugur Ferhat Baloglu.

Claiming the People’s Past: Populist Politics of History in the Twenty-First Century

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Claiming the People’s Past: Populist Politics of History in the Twenty-First Century.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. August 21, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0015

 

The book examines the populist use of history through a blend of case studies and thematic analyses spanning various geographical and socio-cultural contexts. It highlights how populist politics often adopt an anti-elitist stance, particularly against academic historians. Populists tend to favor simplified, decontextualized, or ambiguous historical narratives infused with strong emotional appeals—such as pride, anger, fear, or nostalgia—over the rigorous, evidence-based approach of professional historiography. Despite populism’s strong orientation toward the past, the academic exploration of its relationship with history has been relatively sparse so far. This book makes a notable contribution to addressing and bridging that gap.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

How do populists relate to history and address the past? How do they represent history and frame particular historical events, periods, or the dimensions of the past, present, and future? Why is the politics of history an important aspect of populism? What drives populists to engage in the politics of history, and what exactly is the appeal of history for populist politics? How do practices of ‘past presencing’ facilitate a populist political logic? What political and emotional mechanisms facilitate the mobilization of historical knowledge in populism? How do emotions like patriotism, fear, guilt, comfort, and indifference contribute to this mobilization, and what role do they play in populist narratives? Conversely, what emotions are avoided, and why? These are the questions that the editors and authors of the comprehensive volume “Claiming the People’s Past: Populist Politics of History in the Twenty-First Century” seek to answer.

The book edited by Berber Bevernage, Eline Mestdagh, Walderez Ramalho and Marie-Gabrielle Verbergt offers a rich array of concepts related to its central themes, including ‘fake history,’ ‘fictionalization of politics,’ ‘historiographic emotivism,’ ‘emotive historiography,’ ‘collective emotions,’ ‘collective narcissism,’ ‘past presencing,’ ‘presentism,’ ‘teleological presentism,’ ‘emotivism,’ ‘emotional truth,’ ‘memorial populism,’ ‘Manichean nostalgia,’ ‘progressive nostalgia,’ ‘nostalgia for the future,’ ‘reactionary nostalgia,’ ‘moral remembrance,’ ‘chronosophies,’ ‘updatism,’ ‘historical Russia,’ ‘deep people,’ ‘mutual deception,’ and ‘identity fusion,’ among many others.

The book explores the populist politics of history through a combination of case studies and thematic analyses across diverse geographical and socio-cultural contexts. Divided into two parts, the first part presents case studies that examine how specific populist parties, movements, or leaders engage with history. These cases cover a range of populisms globally, including the AfD in Germany, Islamic populism in East Africa, Vox and Podemos in Spain, and populists in power such as the Kirchners in Argentina, the Awami League in Bangladesh, Erdogan in Turkey, Trump in the US, Bolsonaro in Brazil, and Putin in Russia.

The second part focuses on thematic reflections that highlight key aspects of populist historical politics. These include the emotional and affective dimensions of populism’s approach to history, the use of ‘affective repertoires’ to promote specific historical narratives, and the role of emotions like nostalgia in right-wing mobilization. The book also examines the concept of ‘historiographic emotivism’ and the intertwined relationship between ethnic nationalism and populism. Additionally, it discusses how populists claim or reject epistemic authority, often showing a disregard for academic historiography. 

Ensuring consistency in an edited volume is challenging, as it can be difficult to review such collections from a unified perspective. However, the editors of this book have successfully met that challenge, distilling the essence of 16 articles that combine case studies with thematic and theoretical discussions. The editors also successfully overcome the ‘Atlantic bias’ in populism studies by offering a global perspective with case studies from the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Europe. The book also effectively represents both right- and left-wing populisms, as well as those in opposition and in power. From the case studies and conceptual analyses, the editors identify five recurring features of how populists engage with history: (a) vagueness and decontextualization, (b) a logic of equivalence, (c) antagonism, (d) moral and emotional appeals, and (e) rejection of representational pluralism.

As Jan-Werner Müller noted in the book’s foreword, populists often invoke specific historical events or figures to represent their vision of ‘the people’ while also signaling exclusions. They rewrite history textbooks, invest in monuments, and reshape the built environment to evoke past glories and reinforce symbolic exclusions—such as Erdogan’s transformation of Turkish urban landscapes in the Seljuk-Ottoman style. The book provides numerous examples of this glorification of the past, including populist reinterpretations by Narendra Modi, the AfD, PiS, and Donald Trump. Many right-wing populists promise a “rebirth” through these historical re-imaginings.

The book notes that it is common for politicians to engage with history to support their policies, and this is true for both right-wing populists like Narendra Modi and left-wing populists like Evo Morales. Despite their differing agendas, they share a similar approach: using history in the name of the people, against the elite, to divide society into opposing camps. From Holocaust revisionism in Germany to anti-communism in Viktor Orban’s Hungary and PiS’s Poland, far-right populists frequently push controversial historical interpretations. In the US and Brazil, Trump and Bolsonaro’s populist uses of the past have drawn criticism from historians. Similarly, left-wing populist leaders in Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia have used history to focus on the legacies of colonialism and military dictatorships.

According to the editors, populists present the past in a decontextualized and vague manner, drawing equivalences between otherwise unrelated historical events while antagonistically representing history and historians. Their relationship to the past is driven by emotion, and they reject pluralism in historical representation. Populist references to history are often anachronistic, too. Additionally, the book argues that populists do not present history chronologically. Instead, they organize a heterogeneous mix of events, periods, and figures around empty signifiers like ‘heroism,’ ‘resistance,’ ‘foreignness,’ and ‘threat,’ weaving them into a narrative of equivalence. Unlike ideologies such as nationalism or socialism, which invest heavily in creating their own historiographies, populists generally show little interest in developing distinct historical narratives. Notable exceptions include Hindutva in India and PiS’s authoritarian conservative populism in Poland, where there is significant investment in historiographical production. However, even in these cases, the book finds that populist historical revisionism relies more on judicial or physical repression of dissent than on scholarly debate. 

The book underscores that most populist depictions of history revolve around morally charged binaries of ‘us’ versus ‘them.’ Populists often claim to protect history from being stolen, corrupted, or erased, or they present themselves as restoring a glorious past. For instance, the book cites a comic published by Austria’s FPÖ that depicts Heinz-Christian Strache alongside 17th-century Prinz Eugen defending Vienna from the Turks in 1683, echoing similar rhetoric seen in the Brexit campaign, which invoked Britain’s resistance to ancient Roman invasion. Donald Trump accused those advocating of the removal of Confederate statues of erasing history, positioning himself and his supporters as defenders of American heritage. Similarly, Erdogan regime claims to ‘give back’ history to the people, suggesting it was stolen by the West and previous governments. The book highlights how both left- and right-wing populists engage in this narrative hijacking, often targeting ‘the elite’ as the culprits behind the neglect or corruption of historical consciousness.

Populist politics of history frequently involve an anti-elitist stance against academic historians. According to the book, populists prefer unambiguous, decontextualized, or vague histories filled with strong emotional overtones such as pride, anger, fear, or nostalgia, rather than engaging with the fact-finding mission of professional historiography. For example, Pawel Machcewicz’s chapter discusses how Poland’s PiS promotes narratives of Polish heroism in helping Jews during World War II to counteract the negative affects of critical historiography. Populists often frame themselves as liberators, returning a glorious past to the people, making pride and nostalgia key elements in their historical narratives.

The book highlights how populist people, leaders and parties, such as Rodrigo Duterte, Lega Nord, Vox, and the Kirchnerists, often reject pluralism in historical representation. The book reminds readers that populists tend to mythologize history, rejecting alternative narratives not because they are factually incorrect, but because they conflict with the moral and emotional narratives they promote. Beyond tales of heroism, stories of victimhood and suffering are also effective tools for populists to moralize politics. Decontextualized narratives of historical victimhood can emphasize the innocence of ‘the people’ and highlight the evilness of the enemy, helping populist leaders maintain an underdog status even while in power. For example, the book discusses the reconversion of Hagia Sophia into a mosque, showing how Erdogan and his regime use decontextualized narratives of historical victimhood to legitimize their rule and distract from present-day human rights abuses.

The empirical chapters of the book offer numerous examples of how right-wing populists selectively and effectively use the past. For instance, Klaus Neumann’s chapter on the AfD shows that their approach to history is driven by two aims: to create a genealogy for themselves and to contrast the problematic present with an idealized past that promises a better future. To achieve this, the AfD downplays the Nazi past, instead aligning themselves with the Conservative Revolution and claiming the legacy of Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, who attempted to assassinate Hitler in 1944. Despite this, they still attack Germany’s Holocaust memorial culture.

Chintia Bale and Gustavo Guille emphasize in their chapter on Argentina that memory plays a crucial role in power struggles, defining who belongs on each side of the political divide. They describe “memorial populism” as a subtype where the memory of a specific event is emptied of its original meaning, and a past charismatic leader is resurrected as the “eternal sovereign,” akin to the sovereignty of God in theocratic populism. 

Julian Kuttig and Bert Suykens, in their chapter on Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, highlight how the manipulation of history and memory is central to Bangladeshi politics. According to the chapter, Mujib’s personal legacy (body personal) has been downplayed, allowing a populist memory of his political legacy (body politics) to dominate.

Pawel Machcewicz’s chapter on Poland illustrates how PiS has used history as a key tool to shape political and emotional narratives, defining enemies and rallying grassroots support. Central to PiS’s cultural agenda is the portrayal of Poland’s glorious past as under constant threat from corrupt elites and external foes who undermine Polish martyrdom and heroism. PiS’s “politics of history” involves accusing liberal elites and professional historians of promoting a “pedagogy of shame,” which critically examines darker episodes of Polish history, particularly Polish wrongdoings against other nationalities like Jews, Germans, and Ukrainians.

Neeladri Bhattacharya, in his chapter on the Hindu right, argues that populist regimes worldwide seek to reshape what is considered history. He describes how, under nationalist pressure, authors and publishers have faced attacks leading to apologies, book destructions, and increasing hostility since Modi and the Hindu right came to power in 2014. The assault extends beyond professional history writing to all academic institutions. Violence, including book burnings, online abuse, physical attacks, and even killings of thinkers and journalists, has become commonplace. According to the chapter, while secular nationalism in India aimed to create a multicultural memory, the Hindu right builds its nationalism on memories of religious antagonism. Professional historians are seen as obstacles to the Hindutva agenda, raising inconvenient questions and offering counter-narratives. As a result, they face sustained attacks, stigmatization, and accusations of being anti-national. This new regime of “historical truth” silences intellectual inquiry, normalizes censorship, and forges a connection between the populist ‘savior’ and the people.

Yagmur Karakaya, in her chapter on Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman nostalgia, argues that nostalgic populism is a common feature of populist historicities. Focusing on Erdogan’s speech during the reopening of Hagia Sophia as a mosque, Karakaya identifies three key discursive elements of nostalgic populism in Turkey: the legalization of history, the monopolization of history, and the revival of a “stolen” past. This analysis provides insight into the deeply rooted and comprehensive authoritarian Islamist populism of Erdogan.

In her chapter, Felicitas Becker notes that in East Africa, particularly in Tanzania and Kenya, most populist Islamist spokespeople are outsiders to the political establishment. 

In Oz Frankel’s chapter on the Trump era, right-wing populists accuse elites of betraying the American people and erasing the nation’s glorious past, fostering shame and guilt among the young, particularly white Americans. The chapter explores Trump’s populist portrayal, linking him to biblical figures, prophecies, and conspiracy theories. Frankel also examines key works of racist, far-right, and alt-right literature.

In their chapter, Mateus Henrique de Faria Pereira and Valdei Lope de Araujo explore the “updatist” use of history, a key element of Bolsonarist populism that underpins its historical denialism and spread of fake news. According to the authors, Bolsonaro’s far-right authoritarian populism in Brazil relies on denying and falsifying history, labeling all political opponents as ‘leftists’ or communists. This approach revives Cold War-era rhetoric, allowing Bolsonaro’s supporters to falsely depict Nazism as a left-wing movement and portray any opposition as communist.

Andrey Oleynikov’s chapter on Vladimir Putin’s Russia highlights the conservative and presentist use of history, centered on the concept of “historical Russia.” Oleynikov argues that Putin legitimizes his rule by claiming a mandate from a supposed “thousand-year-old historical state,” positioning contemporary Russia as the successor to both pre-revolutionary and Soviet Russias. This construction of “historical Russia” also serves foreign policy interests, justifying actions like the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Additionally, Putin’s regime has crafted the notion of a “deep people” to reinforce the belief that the nation is on the right path under his leadership.

In his chapter on Spain, Pablo Sanchez Leon examines the relationship of left-wing populist Podemos and right-wing populist Vox, which has voiced fears of an Islamic reinvasion of Andalusia, a region with a significant North African Muslim immigrant population, with the past and history. Leon argues that Vox’s historical narratives shed light on the overlap between nationalism and populism, two distinct yet often intertwined ideologies. Vox actively promotes counter-narratives against the so-called Black Legend, which highlights Spain’s cruelties in America. Leon also emphasizes that understanding populism requires attention to its use of historical narratives.

Laurajane Smith, in the first chapter of the thematic section, highlights nostalgia as a central emotion in the mobilization of revisionist history. She argues that nostalgia is key to the appeal and expression of various forms of populism, particularly right-wing populism. By invoking revisionist, mythologized, or selective histories that emphasize heroism and national pride while avoiding ambiguity, these narratives manage present-day emotions. Heritage, too, plays a similar role by historicizing emotions to legitimize contemporary ideologies. Alongside nostalgia, fear is also crucial for right-wing populism, which often rejects nuance to avoid feelings of shame and guilt.

Aviezer Tucker, in his chapter titled “Historiographic Populist Emotivism,” argues that populists view historiography as a narrative driven by passions rather than facts. For populists, the more emotionally charged a historical narrative, the more “authentic” it is. Tucker contends that populists lack the will to control their passions, leading to self-destructive policies. This is evident in the rise of “post-truth” (old “wishful thinking”) where beliefs are shaped by strong emotions rather than evidence. As a result, populist historiography cannot be evaluated through traditional historiographic methods. Populists may exert power by dismissing professional historians, as seen in Hungary, or by inciting social media “lynch mobs.” According to Tucker, to advance their agendas, populist leaders encourage historical amnesia, erasing inconvenient truths. In her chapter, Lea David echoes this sentiment, noting that official memory requires both the art of forgetting and remembering to be effective.

Allan Megill notes in his chapter that academic historians rarely attract the attention of populists, who typically use “the past” to evoke emotions that unite “the people” and motivate them toward action. Another chapter’s author, Chris Lorenz, adds that populist leaders, consistently framing the present as a time of crisis, aim to restore their people’s supposed past greatness. Leaders like Trump, Putin, Orban, and Erdogan frequently invoke a narrative of past glory, recent decline, and future resurrection, shaping a populist timeline of rise, fall, and redemption.

As we look at the other (namely critical) side of the coin, the editors of the book adopt Ernesto Laclau’s formal definition of populism as a ‘political logic’ and allowed the chapter authors to choose the approach that best suited their case studies. As a result, many chapters are preoccupied with lengthy and repetitive discussions on the definition of populism, alongside deep philosophical deliberations that can feel excessive. Additionally, since some chapters were written in 2020 and 2021, the book does not address the most recent political developments in countries like Brazil, US and Argentina, where the situation has changed dramatically. Furthermore, as Megill points out in his chapter, some of the empirical studies in the book focus more on nationalist ‘historicity’ than on populist narratives. 

As one of the chapter authors notes, although populism is ‘essentially past-directed,’ the academic literature on its relationship with history has remained limited so far. From an overall perspective, this book represents a significant attempt to address and fill that gap.

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Berber Bevernage, Eline Mestdagh, Walderez Ramalho and Marie-Gabrielle Verbergt. (2024). Claiming the People’s Past: Populist Politics of History in the Twenty-First Century. (Cambridge University Press). 343 pp. $110, ISBN: 978-1-009-45363-9

Former US President Donald Trump at a rally with VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

J.D. Vance, Populism, and Culture Wars

The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.

By João Ferreira Dias

The rise of J.D. Vance in American politics signifies a critical juncture in the Republican Party, underscoring the entrenchment of right-wing populism and culture wars within its agenda. While seemingly modern, this phenomenon has deep roots in political history (Hicks, 1931) and must be understood within the broader context of populism and the moral conflicts that characterize contemporary American society. 

Populism: A Brief Overview

Populism is a multifaceted and highly debated concept in political science, with various scholars offering different interpretations and definitions. At its core, populism can be understood as a political approach that frames politics as a struggle between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” a conceptualization popularized by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). However, this definition, while widely accepted, does not capture the full complexity of the phenomenon.

Mudde’s (2004) characterization of populism as a “thin-centered ideology” suggests that populism lacks the comprehensive nature of other ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, and instead attaches itself to various political doctrines. This view is further explored by Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2017), who emphasize the ideational approach, focusing on the content of populist rhetoric and its distinction from mainstream political discourse. However, some scholars argue against categorizing populism strictly as an ideology. For instance, Aslanidis (2016) refutes the notion of populism as an ideology, proposing instead that it be seen as a discursive frame or a political strategy that can be employed by various ideological camps.

The debate extends to whether a minimum definition of populism is necessary for its study. De la Torre and Mazzoleni (2019) argue that a clear, minimal definition helps to prevent conceptual stretching, while others, like Benveniste, Campani, and Lazaridis (2016), suggest that the concept’s fluidity is essential to capturing its diverse manifestations across different contexts.

Furthermore, populism is often discussed in relation to its opposition to globalization and elite-driven policies. Steger (2019) maps the rise of anti-globalist populism, highlighting its ideological underpinnings and its appeal to those who feel disenfranchised by global economic and cultural changes. Similarly, Abts and Laermans (2018) explore the relationship between populism and the crisis of political parties, particularly in the context of Europe’s far-right movements.

Peter Diehl (2022) advocates for a more nuanced understanding of populism, acknowledging its complexity and the various forms it can take. This perspective aligns with the broader literature that sees populism as a reaction to perceived political failures, often articulated through a rhetoric of exclusion and opposition to the status quo (Taggart, 2018; Fukuyama, 2017). Anselmi (2017) and Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) provide further insights into the adaptability of populism across different political contexts, reinforcing the idea that populism is not a fixed ideology but a versatile tool in the hands of diverse political actors.

United States, Populism, and Culture Wars

In the American context, populism has historically manifested in various forms, from the agrarian populism of the late 19th century to the right-wing populism of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The latter, exemplified by figures like Donald Trump and, more recently, J.D. Vance, capitalizes on cultural and economic anxieties, often framing issues in terms of a struggle between ordinary, hardworking citizens and a corrupt, out-of-touch elite. This form of populism erodes democratic norms by exploiting resentment to foster political and social polarization, embodying the adage “divide and conquer.”

The term “culture wars” refers to the ideological and moral conflicts that have increasingly defined political discourse in many Western democracies, particularly the United States. These conflicts revolve around issues such as abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, immigration, gun control, and the role of religion in public life (Hunter, 1991, 1993; Hartman, 2019). Culture wars are not merely debates over policy; they are battles over a society’s very identity and values. They tap into deep-seated beliefs and emotions, often leading to highly polarized and intractable conflicts. As Ezra Klein (2020) notes, these cultural and moral divisions have become so entrenched that they now shape political preferences and social identities. Political affiliation has become a proxy for a broader cultural identity, making compromise and dialogue increasingly difficult.

The convergence of populism and culture wars has significant implications for contemporary politics. Populist leaders often weaponize cultural issues to mobilize their base, framing themselves as defenders of traditional values against the perceived threats of liberal elites and progressive movements. This strategy is evident in J.D. Vance’s political trajectory.

Senator from Ohio and author of the bestseller Hillbilly Elegy, a work that depicts the reality of poor white populations in non-urban America, J.D. Vance, 39, is the face of a new generation of politicians who have embraced conservative populism as a successful political strategy, transitioning from a critic to a proponent of Trumpism. Vance’s rise and his involvement in the so-called “culture wars”—advocating for more restrictive immigration policies, being a fierce critic of progressive education in schools and universities (such as critical race theory and gender studies), defending the traditional American family by opposing abortion and same-sex marriage, and emphasizing that Hollywood is an industry destroying the “good old American values”—reflect a profound shift in the identity and priorities of the Republican Party, raising questions about the future of the party and American politics as a whole.

Vance’s transformation from a critic of Trump to an advocate of Trumpist populism reflects a broader trend within the Republican Party, where cultural conservatism has become a central pillar of political strategy. Vance’s positions on immigration, education, and family values are not merely policy preferences but are presented as part of a larger cultural battle to “save” America from moral decay. By emphasizing issues like opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage and critiquing progressive education and Hollywood’s influence, Vance taps into the anxieties of a conservative base that feels alienated by the rapid cultural changes of the past few decades.

This fusion of populism and culture wars has transformed the Republican Party’s identity, moving it away from its traditional focus on free-market economics and foreign policy and toward a more nationalistic, culturally conservative agenda. Traditionally marked by a commitment to free-market policies, military interventionism, and fiscal conservatism, the Republican Party is now undergoing a “Trumpification.” This shift aligns the party with nationalist agendas that evoke the nostalgic imagery of a bygone era, appealing to a working-class white electorate that yearns for the “happy golden days” of baseball games and hot dogs. Political scientists Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter (2020) have highlighted how this focus on a particular electorate was crucial for Trump’s victory and the success of Brexit.

However, this agenda, rooted in ideological nostalgia, poses a significant threat to American republicanism. By undermining liberal democratic principles—such as the separation of powers, freedom of the press, and protection of fundamental rights—this brand of politics could irreversibly alter the landscape of American democracy. The risks are heightened when cultural conflicts are involved, as these issues often carry a zero-sum mentality, where compromise is seen as a betrayal of core values. The parallels with countries like Hungary under Viktor Orbán are stark, suggesting that the US may be on a path toward illiberal democracy, potentially ushering in an era of recycled authoritarianism.

The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.

Implications for American Democracy

The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party poses significant challenges to American democracy. The populist rhetoric of defending “the people” against “the elite” often undermines democratic norms, as it tends to delegitimize political opposition and erode trust in institutions. Furthermore, the emphasis on cultural and moral issues exacerbates societal polarization, making it difficult to find common ground on even the most basic issues of governance.

As Daniel Ziblatt and Steven Levitsky argue (2019), the erosion of democratic norms is a gradual process, often facilitated by populist leaders who, once in power, seek to weaken institutional checks and balances. The risks are heightened when cultural conflicts are involved, as these issues often carry a zero-sum mentality, where compromise is seen as a betrayal of core values.

J.D. Vance’s rise within the Republican Party, therefore, is not just a personal political success but a symptom of broader trends that could have long-lasting consequences for American democracy. The intertwining of populism and culture wars represents a shift toward a more divisive and potentially authoritarian political landscape, where the foundational principles of liberal democracy—such as the rule of law, protection of minority rights, and respect for institutional norms—are increasingly under threat.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the rise of J.D. Vance within the Republican Party underscores a significant transformation in American politics, where populism and culture wars have become central to political identity and strategy. This shift reflects broader trends within conservative movements globally, where appeals to cultural nostalgia and opposition to progressive values are increasingly shaping political discourse. While these dynamics have proven effective in mobilizing certain segments of the electorate, they also pose substantial risks to the stability of liberal democratic principles, fostering division and eroding the common ground necessary for effective governance.

As the Republican Party continues to evolve under the influence of figures like Vance, the future of American democracy may hinge on how these tensions are navigated. The intertwining of populism and culture wars raises critical questions about the direction of American politics and the resilience of democratic institutions in the face of growing polarization. As these issues continue to unfold, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric remain exceedingly high, demanding careful consideration and active engagement from all corners of society.


 

References 

Abts, K. & Laermans, R. (2018). “Populism: Definitions, questions, problems, and theories.” In: C. de la Torre, & O. Mazzoleni (Eds.), Populism, populists, and the crisis of political parties: A comparison of Italy, Austria, and Germany, 19950-2015 (pp. 1-25). Springer.

Anselmi, M. (2017). Populism: An introduction. Routledge.

Aslanidis, P. (2016). “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective.” Political Studies, 64(1_suppl), 88–104. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12224

Benveniste, A.; Campani, G. & Lazaridis, G. (2016). “Introduction: Populism: The concept and its definitions.” In: A. Benveniste, G. Campani, & G. Lazaridis (Eds.), The rise of the far right in Europe: Populist shifts and “othering” (pp. 1-23). Springer.

Darts, D. (2006). “Art Education for a Change: Contemporary Issues and the Visual Arts.” Art Education (Reston), 59(5), 6–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/00043125.2005.11651605

De la Torre, C. & Mazzoleni, O. (2019). “Do We Need a Minimum Definition of Populism? An Appraisal of Mudde’s Conceptualization.” Populism (Leiden, Netherlands), 2(1), 79–95. https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02011021

Diehl, P. (2022). “For a complex concept of populism.” Polity, 54(3), 509-518.

Fukuyama, F. (2017). What is populism? Tempus Corporate.

Hartman, A. (2019). A war for the soul of America: A history of the culture wars (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press.

Hawkins, K. A. & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). “The Ideational Approach to Populism.” Latin American Research Review, 52(4), 513–528. https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.85

Hicks, J. D. (1931). The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party. University of Minnesota Press.

Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics in America. New York: Basic Books.

Hunter, J. D. (1993). Covering the culture war: before the shooting begins. Columbia Journalism Review, July/August, 29-32.

Hunter, J. D. (1996). “Reflections on the culture wars hypothesis.” In: J. L. Nolan Jr. (Ed.), The American Culture Wars (pp. 243-256). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Klein, E. (2020). Why we’re polarized. Simon and Schuster.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2019). How democracies die. Crown.

Mondon, A. & Winter, A. (2020). “Whiteness, populism and the racialisation of the working class in the United Kingdom and the United States.” In: Whiteness and Nationalism (pp. 10-28). Routledge.

Mudde, C. (2004). “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition (London), 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2014). “Populism and political leadership.” In: R. C. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of populism (pp. 376-388). Oxford University Press.

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

Steger, M. B. (2019). “Mapping Antiglobalist Populism: Bringing Ideology Back In.” Populism (Leiden, Netherlands), 2(2), 110–136. https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02021033

Taggart, P. (2018). “Populism and ‘unpolitics’.” In: C. de la Torre (Ed.), Populism and the crisis of democracy (pp. 79-87). Routledge.

Wuthnow, R. (1996). Christianity and Civil Society. Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International.

Crowds protest against education cuts in Brazil. Students and teachers from hundreds of universities and colleges gathered on Paulista Avenue in São Paulo, Brazil, on May 15, 2019. Photo: Dado Photos.

Right-Wing Populist Backlash: How Bolsonaro’s Brazil Targeted Academics

Universities, akin to the judiciary, media, and civil society organizations, assume a vital role in the preservation of democratic principles. Inability to safeguard their independence from external influences like governmental interventions and corporate interests hampers universities’ capacity to uphold the rights of their constituents internally or advocate for public interests outside their precincts. Brazil is among the nations that have witnessed a notable decrease in academic freedom over the past decade. Instances of political turmoil or authoritarian rule, like Bolsonaro’s in Brazil, have resulted in constraints on academic pursuits and the imposition of censorship.

By Gulsen Dogan*

Why and how antiscientific fake news and discourse have gained momentum in the last decade while academics and scientific experts faced opposition? After the COVID-19 crisis (Galanopoulos & Venizelos, 2022), the phenomenon of populism, dissemination of misinformation, propagation of conspiracy theories, and dissemination of fake news have coalesced into what is known as ‘post-truth populism,’ a concept that disregards verifiable truths and manipulates public sentiment by capitalizing on emotions and uncertainties. The phenomenon of ‘post-truth populism’ has had the effect of diminishing academic freedom, particularly because right-wing populist movements perceive academic institutions as integral components of the elite ruling class that they oppose. These movements often direct their efforts towards curtailing academic freedom by undermining the independence of universities and stifling the voices of scholars, as academic freedom facilitates the unrestricted exchange of ideas and critical analysis, elements that have the potential to challenge the narratives and policies put forth by these groups (Ignatieff, 2018).

The decline in academic freedom on a global scale, as indicated by the Freedom House Report (Prelec et al., 2020), is attributed to the oppression and arrest of academics and students for their research endeavors. Moreover, there has been a notable increase in the implementation of the corporate governance model within universities worldwide. This shift can be linked to the growing influence of private enterprises’ agendas on the research activities pursued by academics, particularly in light of the proliferation of neoliberal policies. The transformation of knowledge into a techno-scientific paradigm has been observed, accompanied by the dominance of a narrow culture of expertise in the era of neoliberalism. Consequently, there has been a reduction in the financial and institutional independence of universities, leading to greater collaboration with governmental bodies and a subsequent constriction of the space for freedom of expression and critical thinking.

Brazil is among the nations that have witnessed a notable decrease in academic freedom over the past decade (V-DEM, 2024). The contemporary discourse on educational policy involves a variety of stakeholders such as NGOs, political consultative bodies, and lobbyists in the legislative branch, signaling a transition from conventional participants to a more heterogeneous group of actors (Miceli, 2018). Constitutionally, there exist provisions for academic freedom, enabling universities to function independently in their educational, research, and outreach endeavors (Miceli, 2018). However, instances of political turmoil or authoritarian rule have resulted in constraints on academic pursuits and the imposition of censorship. 

Primarily, individuals aligned with right-wing populism tend to portray scientists and experts as members of a corrupt elite, juxtaposing them with the virtuous “people” (Bellolio, 2024). This group tends to censor “truth” and scientific knowledge, preferring conspiracy theories while harboring distrust towards scholars and academic institutions (Haltinner& Sarathchandra, 2020). Notably, there is a tendency to overlook social sciences and humanities by providing limited funding opportunities and imposing constraints on research topics and publications to diminish diversity of thought and promote uniformity in ideas (EPRS, 2023; Folha De S. Paulo, 2022). The spread of misinformation through social media platforms has further rationalized the targeted harassment faced by state universities during Bolsonaro’s administration (Ares et al. 2022). Particularly during the COVID-19 crisis, there was an upsurge in disinformation and fake news disseminated through Brazilian media channels and platforms like WhatsApp, which exacerbated the divide between populist narratives and scientific discourse (Pereira & de Oliveira, 2024; Batista de Oliveira et al., 2022; Gagnon-Dufresne et al., 2023).

Secondly, right-wing populist administrations have emerged as regulatory mechanisms for the content disseminated, studied, and debated within academic institutions. Authorities tend to utilize universities and research institutions to advance their own political agendas. The content of academic research is supervised, subject to censorship to some degree, and is heavily reliant on the approval of those in power. Additionally, extracurricular activities and the selection of guest speakers on campus are scrutinized, thereby restricting the scope for independent thinking. Moreover, individuals offering critical evaluations on topics such as the global health crisis and authoritarian governance risk facing legal action. Those who engage in such critiques may face expulsion from academic institutions. Similarly, Bolsonaro’s opposition to public universities entailed unconstitutional government interference, financial cutbacks, and the targeting of dissenters, all of which propagated a conservative right-wing outlook and challenged the prevailing left-leaning cultural dominance within public higher education (Fiori & Fiori Arantes, 2023). The reductions in funding were linked to neoliberal policies aimed at commercializing social benefits, undermining the public education system established by the Federal Constitution of 1988, consequently leading to direct interference in the appointment of university leadership and a disregard for the preferences of the academic community in financial, administrative, and political matters (Lima & Iamamoto, 2022; Honorato & Souza, 2023).

Figure 1 compares the independence of institutions from the government control and measures the extent of universities ability to establish their own policies for education and research in Brazil. Figure 1 illustrates the level of autonomy of institutions in Brazil from governmental influence, as well as the capacity of universities to formulate their own regulations regarding education and research. Brazilian universities exhibit a moderate degree of autonomy. The level of autonomy remained relatively consistent between 2010 and approximately 2018. However, there has been a notable decrease in autonomy after 2018, particularly evident from around 2022. This trend indicates a substantial decrease in institutional autonomy, potentially signaling alterations in policies, financial support, or administrative authority affecting universities in Brazil.

Compiled from V-Dem Data 2024, Variable Graph, https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/

In Figure 2, the academic freedom also shows a consistent yet modest level across the timeframe, implying persistent restrictions in this domain. There is a gradual decrease observed until 2020, succeeded by a notable increase in 2021 regarding freedom of academic expression and dissemination. It is at times susceptible to constraints such as censorship, self-restraint, or other forms of limitation. The abrupt rebound after 2022 might suggest alterations in policies or transformations within the academic sphere in Brazil subsequent to the election of President Lula.

Compiled from V-Dem Data 2024, Variable Graph, https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/

Universities, akin to the judiciary, media, and civil society organizations, assume a vital role in the preservation of democratic principles. Inability to safeguard their independence from external influences like governmental interventions and corporate interests hampers universities’ capacity to uphold the rights of their constituents internally or advocate for public interests outside their precincts (Valiverronen & Saikkonen, 2021). The discussion heavily involves social media platforms, which enable the fast proliferation of anti-intellectual content. Social media’s growth has enabled Artificial Intelligence (AI) to produce content that closely resembles authentic material. Utilizing these platforms, populists formulate and disseminate “fake news,” often distorting or twisting expert insights to suit their motives (Hameleers,2022). This phenomenon points out the rising power of misinformation and strategic utilization of social media platforms to influence public conversations, frequently fostering division and eroding trust in scientific knowledge and democratic values in the era of “post-truth populism.”


 

(*) Gulsen Dogan is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Koc University in Istanbul, Turkey. She earned her M.A. in International Relations from Koc University, where her thesis focused on the institutional and ideological conditions for executive aggrandizement in Turkey and Brazil over the past decade. Her research interests include populism, democratic backsliding, political economy, governance, political parties, migration diplomacy, and disaster diplomacy. Geographically, her work focuses on Turkey, Brazil, and the European Union. Currently, Dogan is a project researcher at MiReKoc (Migration Research Center at Koc University) for the Horizon Europe Twinning project: BROAD-ER (Bridging the Migration and Urban Studies Nexus).


 

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Batista de Oliveira, M.; Said Vieira M.; Synesio Alves Monteiro, M. & Akerman, M. (2022). “Covid-19 en Brasil: Controversias políticas por las medidas de aislamiento social para controlar la pandemia. ¿Una disputa entre ciencia y anticiencia?” Razón Y Palabra, 26(114).

Bellolio, C. (2024). “An inquiry into populism’s relation to science.” Politics (Manchester, England), 44(3), 486–500. https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957221109541

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Gagnon-Dufresne, M.-C.; Azevedo Dantas, M.; Abreu Silva, K.; Souza Dos Anjos, J.; Pessoa Carneiro Barbosa, D.; Porto Rosa, R.; de Luca, W.; Zahreddine, M.; Caprara, A.; Ridde, V. & Zinszer, K. (2023). “Social Media and the Influence of Fake News on Global Health Interventions: Implications for a Study on Dengue in Brazil.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 20(7), 5299-. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20075299

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Pereira, F. H. & de Oliveira, R. S. (2024). “Journalists and scientists together: the public problem of science disinformation in Brazil.” Journal of Science Communication, 23(3), 1-. https://doi.org/10.22323/2.23030204

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Valiverronen, E. & Saikkonen, S. (2021). “Science communicators intimidated: researchers’ freedom of expression and the rise of authoritarian populism.” Journal of Science Communication, 20(4), 1-. https://doi.org/10.22323/2.20040208