Dr. Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany.

Professor Roesel: FPÖ Will Remain a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Highlighting that the success of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with origins tracing back to the post-World War I period, Professor Felix Roesel argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence both before and after World War II. According to Professor Roesel, the continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany, provides an in-depth analysis of the political landscape in Austria, specifically focusing on the rise and entrenchment of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Professors Roesel argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He discusses how the FPÖ has effectively capitalized on Austria’s distinct historical context, conservative traditions, and societal anxieties to secure its place in the Austrian parliament for decades.

Professor Roesel highlights that the FPÖ’s success is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with its origins tracing back to the post-World War I period. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence before and after World War II. The continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.

Moreover, Professor Roesel emphasizes the FPÖ’s anti-establishment and anti-immigration rhetoric as key factors in its continued success. During the 1980s, under the leadership of Jörg Haider, the FPÖ transformed from a minor political party into a significant force, gaining widespread support through its anti-establishment stance. This approach resonated with Austrians who felt disillusioned by the two dominant parties—the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP)—which had controlled Austrian politics since the post-1945 period. Haider’s populist strategy of appealing to those excluded by the political mainstream, combined with anti-immigration narratives, positioned the FPÖ as a viable alternative for disaffected voters.

Professor Roesel also sheds light on Austria’s unique political system, known as ‘Proporz,’ which historically ensured that both major parties were represented in various aspects of everyday life, creating the perception that there was little difference between them. This lack of differentiation provided the FPÖ an opportunity to position itself as an outsider and criticize the system, further appealing to voters dissatisfied with the status quo.

Looking ahead, Professor Roesel foresees that the FPÖ will remain a significant and permanent force in Austrian politics, as its deep-rooted historical connections, strategic adaptations, and appeal to nationalist sentiments continue to resonate with a substantial portion of the Austrian electorate.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Felix Roesel with some edits.

Many Post-War Parties in Austria Had Direct Links to the Nazi Party

You argue that right-wing populism in Austria has deep historical roots. What historical factors have contributed to the enduring appeal of far-right populism in Austria, and how do these differ from populist movements in other European countries? Could you also elaborate on these historical roots and how they have shaped the modern-day FPÖ?

Professor Felix Roesel: That’s a very good question. Austria is quite distinct compared to other European countries. While many countries have seen a rise in far-right parties, what sets Austria apart is its long-standing tradition of far-right politics. Even during Austria’s first democratic period, following World War I, there was a significant far-right camp. At that time, there was a Conservative camp mainly aligned with the Catholic Church and the Workers’ Party on the left, but also a very strong far-right camp that advocated for Austria’s annexation into Germany, envisioning a larger pan-German state.

This far-right tradition was already well-established before World War II, with the Nazi Party being part of this camp. After World War II, many of those who established the new party structure in Austria had direct links to the Nazi Party. For instance, the first leader of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) after the war was a former SS member. This continuity from the pre-war period is significant and distinguishes Austria from other countries, such as France’s Rassemblement National or Italy’s Lega, which are more modern parties without predecessors in the pre-war era.

If we compare voting results before and after World War II, we see strong connections and a continuity of far-right influence. In Austria, there has consistently been a far-right party in Parliament in every election since World War II, which is quite different from other countries where far-right parties have only surged recently.

How has the rise of populism in Austrian politics over the past few decades impacted the country’s political landscape, particularly with regard to the success of far-right parties like the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)? 

Professor Felix Roesel: The FPÖ has successfully dominated the political agenda for several years, particularly with its focus on immigration, which has been its most significant topic since the 1980s. A unique aspect of Austria is that, in the 1970s and 1980s, the two major parties—the Conservative Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)—were incredibly dominant. They were influential in all aspects of society, even down to sports clubs, which were often aligned with either party. You had to take a stand, either supporting the center-right or the center-left, and those unwilling to identify with either were left behind. There was a growing perception that the country was ruled by these two parties, creating a sense of exclusion among those who didn’t align with them.

The FPÖ capitalized on this sentiment by effectively introducing an anti-establishment narrative. They positioned themselves as the alternative to the two main parties, and this anti-mainstream, populist rhetoric resonated with many people. The two main components of the FPÖ’s success are its strong stance on anti-immigration and its anti-establishment messaging—classic populist elements.

This approach proved effective, influencing even the moderate right-wing party, the ÖVP, under Sebastian Kurz, who shifted their policies further to the right, especially on immigration. The FPÖ has had a significant impact on the political debate in Austria, pushing the entire political spectrum to address these populist themes.

The ‘Proporz’ System May Have Contributed to the Rise of the Far-Right

Could you please explain what ‘Proporz’ stand for and how do you think it evolved in the past several decades?

Professor Felix Roesel: ‘Proporz’ is a specific Austrian system where both major parties were historically represented across all aspects of everyday life. This ranged from sports clubs to institutions like workers’ associations. Essentially, there was always a “red” (Social Democrat) and a “black” (Conservative) representation. Moreover, Austria had all-party governments at the state and local levels, though not at the federal level. In these cases, council elections determined the composition of the government, with all parties represented rather than forming classic coalitions. This ensured that both major parties had a share—if you will—of influence and positions in local and state governments.

This system created the impression that it didn’t matter who people voted for because, in the end, both major parties were guaranteed representation in the government. This lack of differentiation between the two parties may have contributed to the rise of the far-right, as parties like the FPÖ could criticize the ‘Proporz’ system and position themselves as the true alternative to the established order.

You argue that Austria’s main far-right party FPÖ is one of the most successful and prominent cases worldwide. Could you elaborate on the peculiar reasons why FPÖ has been so successful?

Professor Felix Roesel: There are several reasons but let me highlight a few. First, there are the historical roots. Austria had a strong far-right camp even before World War II, and it was easy for the FPÖ to connect with this legacy after the war. Secondly, Austria is a very traditional and conservative country, making it easier for a far-right party to resonate by promoting traditional values such as family.

Additionally, Austria has a long history of immigration, including workers from Germany and other countries, long before Germany itself experienced such immigration waves. This made immigration a significant issue in Austrian politics early on, and the FPÖ has consistently leveraged this topic to gain support.

Lastly, Jörg Haider played a pivotal role in the FPÖ’s success. He was instrumental in popularizing populist ideas in the 1980s by combining an anti-establishment stance with anti-minority rhetoric. While the specific minority groups targeted have changed over time, the anti-establishment narrative remained a constant. Haider was a political entrepreneur who identified and filled a gap left by other parties, which explains why this development happened in Austria earlier than in many other countries.

Jörg Haider’s Focus on Immigration Built a Broader Voter Base

Jörg Haider, ex-leader of the FPÖ, delivering a speech at Viktor Adler Markt in Vienna, Austria, on June 11, 2004. Photo: Shutterstock.

You underline that the two main and dominant Austrian parties in the post-1945 period are the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP). Both parties accounted for up to 95% of all votes until the early 1980s, but their vote shares have declined significantly since then. What happened in 1980s that led to the rise of FPÖ? 

Professor Felix Roesel: I would really emphasize the role of Jörg Haider. He understood how to effectively use populist slogans, transforming the FPÖ from a small party with around 4-6% of the vote into one that gained 20-25% from election to election. It was Haider who made the FPÖ a major political force.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, immigration began increasing, or at least reached levels where it became visible to the general public, making it an accessible topic for political mobilization. However, in the very beginning, Haider didn’t focus much on immigration. Instead, he concentrated on an anti-establishment message: if you didn’t want to align with one of the two big parties, the FPÖ was the alternative, positioning itself as outside the system. This message was very attractive at the time.

It’s also important to note that, before this period, there were hardly any other coalitions other than grand coalitions between the two dominant parties at the federal level. This created a perception among many people that there was no way to avoid the dominance of these two big parties in government. The FPÖ’s anti-establishment stance appealed to those who felt disillusioned with this arrangement.

Later, Haider incorporated anti-immigration rhetoric, which became a central theme. Interestingly, early on, there were some connections or references to the Nazi era, but Haider quickly realized this did not gain widespread support. He found that focusing on immigration was much more effective in building a broader voter base.

In what ways have populist and far-right parties in Austria influenced the mainstream political parties like SPÖ and ÖVP? Have these influences led to shifts in policy or political discourse?

Professor Felix Roesel: Yes, certainly. In particular, the immigration issue has seen a significant shift. The Conservative party, especially under the leadership of former party leader Sebastian Kurz, heavily changed its stance in response to the success of the FPÖ. Kurz adopted policies similar to those promoted by the FPÖ, making it clear that the far-right party had a substantial impact in this area.

As for the government, the FPÖ has been part of the coalition several times. However, when it comes to actual policy impact during their time in government, we do not see major policy shifts. While their involvement led to political consequences, such as scandals—many of which are still unresolved—their influence on concrete policy changes was limited, primarily because they served as a junior partner in these coalitions. The real question now is what will happen in Austria moving forward.

FPÖ’s Nazi History Occasionally Resurfaces, Highlighting Its Roots

Nazis parade in Vienna, Austria, on May Day, 1938. Photo: Shutterstock.

How do you assess the link between the Nazi ideology and FPÖ? How much has FPÖ been influenced by Nazism?

Professor Felix Roesel: The FPÖ was founded in the mid-1950s, and its predecessor, the VdU, was also a right-wing movement with strong personal connections to the Nazi era. As I mentioned, the first FPÖ party leader was a former SS leader. So, there were clear ties in terms of personnel, as well as ideology.

Initially, if you were confirmed as a Nazi, you were ineligible to vote in the very first post-war election. However, by the second election, those restrictions were lifted, and many former Nazis turned to support the FPÖ. This shows the strong connections from the voter base as well.

In terms of ideology, Jörg Haider, for example, would sometimes use phrasing that was reminiscent of Nazi slogans—close enough to evoke the connection but vague enough to avoid direct accountability. The party has often played with these boundaries.

Even today, local FPÖ politicians occasionally become embroiled in scandals involving connections to Nazi symbolism, such as singing Wehrmacht songs. These are things you don’t see with other parties, which indicates a lingering influence. 

However, it’s important to note that the FPÖ has now evolved into a more modern populist party, focusing primarily on anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric rather than Nazi ideology. Despite this shift, the party’s history occasionally resurfaces, reminding us of its roots.

FPÖ Links Sieges of Vienna by Ottoman Turks to Contemporary Issues

A pastry shop in Vienna displays a picture of Ottoman soldiers and tents on the wall to commemorate the Ottoman siege of Vienna (German: Cafe Bäckerei, Zum Türkenloch) on April 5, 2013. Photo: Fatih Yavuz.

How have the two sieges of Vienna by Ottoman Turks resonated with the Austrian public and how have collective memories and historical narratives played a role in the ideology of FPÖ? How did FPÖ instrumentalize these historical tools against the Turkish and Muslim population in Austria?

Professor Felix Roesel: My co-author and I have a paper on this topic. We observed that some villages around Vienna, which were besieged by Ottoman forces in the 16th and 17th centuries, still carry traces of that history. You can find street names like “Türkenschanz” or “Türkenstraße,” which are reminders of those times when these villages suffered; houses were burned down, and there were significant losses. These events are embedded in the local memory.

For centuries, however, these memories remained dormant. As we demonstrated in our paper, it wasn’t until the FPÖ began campaigning against Muslims that this historical context became politically effective. We found that in those areas that had experienced the Turkish invasions 300 years ago, support for the far-right FPÖ increased significantly compared to areas that had not been affected by the sieges. This suggests that the FPÖ was able to reawaken and instrumentalize these collective memories for political gain.

This is a common strategy among populists—they often invoke the past, whether glorious or traumatic, to mobilize support. In Austria, the FPÖ has connected these historical events to contemporary issues. One former FPÖ leader even referred to the need to prevent a “third siege of Vienna” in response to the growing Turkish and Muslim population, playing on these historical fears and sentiments to gain political advantage.

How have the immigration crisis and other recent socio-economic challenges contributed to the rise of far-right populism in Austria, and what parallels can be drawn with similar movements in other parts of Europe?

Professor Felix Roesel: Let me refer to two studies on this topic. One study has shown a robust correlation between immigration and increased votes for the far-right in Austria. The data indicates that as immigration levels rise, support for far-right parties also increases.

A second study specifically examined the large influx of migrants in 2015. It found that areas along the Austrian-German border, which were most affected by this wave of migration, also saw a significant rise in far-right votes. Interestingly, the study noted that in areas where residents had direct, personal contact with refugees in 2015, there was actually a decrease in support for the FPÖ. This suggests that direct interaction with migrants can reduce anti-immigrant sentiment and far-right support.

In comparison, similar patterns have been observed in other countries, such as Germany, where studies show a clear link between increased immigration and a backlash among native populations, leading to a rise in votes for anti-immigration parties. However, findings differ across Europe, and the picture is not entirely uniform.

Overall, at least in Austria and Germany, there is consistent evidence that higher levels of immigration are associated with increased support for far-right populist parties.

Whether FPÖ Can Form a Coalition Remains the Pressing Question

What is the significance of FPÖ’s victory in the parliamentary elections, that were held last week, in terms of far-right parties both in Austria and Europe?

Professor Felix Roesel: The significance of the FPÖ’s victory really depends on the ultimate outcome of the election, particularly on the formation of the next Austrian government. While the far-right FPÖ won the election by a narrow margin—just one or two percentage points—making it the largest party with around 30% of the vote, it’s important to remember that 70% of voters did not choose the far right. Being the largest party does not guarantee leadership of the next government.

The FPÖ’s status as the number one party certainly can’t be ignored, but the real test lies in whether they can successfully form a coalition. There are significant challenges ahead: other parties, including the Conservatives, have already ruled out any coalition with the far right. Additionally, the Conservative Party, traditionally accustomed to having Chancellors for many years, may be reluctant to join as a junior partner in a coalition led by the FPÖ.

The possibility of a grand coalition between the two former main parties remains, but such arrangements have lost favor in Austria, as they are perceived as ineffective in solving problems. If the FPÖ manages to form a coalition, it would signal to other far-right parties across Europe that it is possible to reach government status even without an absolute majority.

Another challenge is the role of Austria’s President, who has considerable influence. The current President is from the Green Party, which is ideologically opposed to the far-right FPÖ. In fact, the Green Party has even refused to support a parliamentary president from the FPÖ. It remains to be seen whether a Green Party President would appoint a far-right Chancellor. The President’s stance will be crucial as coalition discussions unfold. It’s unclear which direction this will take—whether it’s truly possible to form a coalition with the far right or seek an alternative beyond it. This remains the pressing question at the moment.

Criticizing a Third of the Voters Isn’t a Productive Approach

European Union’s reaction to FPÖ’s victory in 1999 and 2024 are quite different. This time around EU has not reacted to the victory of FPÖ in alarmist terms. Do you think far-right parties have been mainstreamed in Europe in the last couple of years?

Professor Felix Roesel: Yes, that’s certainly one point. Another is that we’ve become somewhat accustomed to these kinds of election results. We’ve learned that criticizing a third of the voters, as is the case in Austria, isn’t a productive approach. Moreover, it’s still possible to form a coalition without the FPÖ.

Additionally, there have been previous elections in Austria where the FPÖ was even more successful. For instance, in the last presidential election, there was a head-to-head race between the Green candidate and the far-right candidate, with the latter gaining almost 50% of the vote. We’ve also seen similar outcomes in other countries, such as France, where far-right candidates have garnered a significant share of votes beyond the traditional far-right base.

These factors might explain the EU’s more restrained response. We’ve also learned that outside intervention isn’t particularly effective, especially in a complex political landscape like Austria’s.

There are experts who believe that Herbert Kickl, the leader of FPÖ, would inevitably moderate, à la Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the far-right Brothers of Italy, who has taken a more pragmatic course than most expected since becoming Italy’s prime minister two years ago. Do you think we can witness a ‘Melonization of Kickle’ as FPÖ has now won the elections?

Professor Felix Roesel: That’s an interesting question. The difference is that Meloni had the advantage of a clear alliance and a majority in Parliament, which is not yet certain for Herbert Kickl. However, I wouldn’t underestimate him. Kickl has been the mastermind of the FPÖ for the past 20 years, designing many of its campaigns and having significant influence, even when he wasn’t the frontman.

Since stepping into the spotlight after the major scandals of 2019, when the coalition in Austria collapsed, he has shown his strategic acumen. He is very smart and will undoubtedly do everything in his power to form a coalition under his leadership.

As for whether his leadership would look different, it’s uncertain. He has already served as Minister of the Interior and, during that time, implemented tough, anti-immigration policies, though much of it was rhetoric. The real question is whether things would change if the FPÖ were to lead a coalition. But again, I wouldn’t underestimate him; he will certainly do everything possible to secure his place in the next coalition.

FPÖ Remains a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

And lastly, looking ahead, what trends do you see in the future of Austrian populism and far-right movements? Do you expect these movements to gain further traction, or are they likely to diminish in influence?

Professor Felix Roesel: Typically, when the FPÖ enters government, there is a significant drop in their support, as people often become disillusioned soon after they join coalitions. However, after a short period, they tend to recover and often come back stronger. While I can’t say if this is a consistent pattern, it’s worth noting that nearly 50% of the population has, at some point, voted for the far right in Austria, as seen in the recent presidential elections. So, there is certainly a solid base of support to build upon.

There’s also the incumbency advantage to consider. Once a party leads as the Chancellor, they may gain additional votes from those who rally around the flag. It makes strategic sense for the FPÖ to aim for the Chancellor position and lead a coalition to solidify their role as an established part of the Austrian parliamentary system.

Whether this will require the FPÖ to change its policies, I’m skeptical. Herbert Kickl himself has expressed that one of the mistakes made by Jörg Haider, after his significant successes, was not taking on a leadership role within the government. Kickl seems well aware of past errors and will likely try to avoid them. Thus, it’s very probable that we will see the FPÖ remain a permanent and strong force in Austrian politics, at least for the next few years.

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor McCoy: A Trump Victory to Embolden Populist Movements and Authoritarian Regimes Globally 

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an interview with ECPS, Professor Jennifer McCoy warns that a Donald Trump victory in the November 5th US presidential elections could embolden populist movements and authoritarian regimes worldwide. Professor McCoy asserts that Trump is unlikely to prioritize reinforcing democracy in countries where leaders are consolidating power or undermining democratic norms. “Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China,” she explained, highlighting the potential global consequences of another Trump term.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, predicts that a Trump victory in the November 5th elections will embolden populist movements and authoritarian regimes worldwide. “I think it will embolden populist movements globally because Trump will likely support them,” McCoy stated. She explained that Trump would not prioritize reinforcing democracy in countries where leaders are concentrating power or eroding democratic norms. “Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China,” McCoy argued, highlighting Trump’s differing stances on global powers.

Professor McCoy, an expert on democratic decline and polarization, also delved into the broader effects of pernicious polarization on democracies. She explained how polarization, especially the extreme form she terms as “pernicious,” divides societies into hostile camps that undermine democratic institutions. “Pernicious polarization involves a perception of threat and a zero-sum mentality, which leads people to cut off communication with those on the other side,” McCoy said. ‘‘This kind of division complicates governance, reduces the capacity for compromise, and fosters deep social and political rifts.’’

Drawing from her research, McCoy emphasized that this destructive form of polarization often leads to a weakening of democratic systems. Historically, the resolution of such polarization has required significant systemic upheavals, such as wars, colonial transitions or authoritarian regime changes. However, McCoy warned that relying on such extreme disruptions today would be detrimental. Instead, she advocates for addressing polarization by restoring the ability of democracies to govern effectively without resorting to such drastic measures.

When asked about the rise of far-right parties in Europe and advanced democracies, Professor McCoy pointed to economic dislocation and political convergence around market-based policies as significant factors. “Globalization was rising and many people felt left behind,” Professor McCoy noted, explaining that traditional parties’ failure to address these concerns opened the door for populist outsiders. These leaders, often using divisive rhetoric, scapegoat marginalized groups—especially immigrants—offering simplistic answers to complex socio-economic issues.

As Professor McCoy sees it, the challenge for democracies lies not just in addressing the root causes of polarization but in mitigating its effects before democratic institutions are irreparably damaged. In her analysis, both electoral reforms and changes in political strategy are essential to restore stability in deeply divided societies.

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Jennifer McCoy with some edits.

Negative Emotions Are Generally More Powerful Than Positive Ones

Professor McCoy, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. In your study, you found that negative emotions, such as anger and resentment, can increase populist attitudes. Could you elaborate on the specific emotional triggers that are most effective in activating populist sentiments?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Negative emotions are generally more powerful than positive emotions, which makes them harder to counteract. The negative emotions that populists often tap into are related to feelings of unfairness and injustice. They highlight situations that seem unjust or unequal, which can generate resentment and anger—sometimes even anxiety or fear. But anger and resentment, in particular, drive people to seek someone to blame. Populists are very skilled at identifying scapegoats or “enemies,” which provides their supporters with a sense of control.

While populists can also evoke enthusiasm, especially for themselves as leaders, it’s the distrust of others that becomes particularly dangerous. Populists encourage trust in themselves, but simultaneously foster deep distrust in those outside their group.

In your research on democratic decline, what specific factors have you identified as the most critical in driving polarization in the United States and other democracies? What is the relationship between polarization and democratic decline? How are these two phenomena interrelated?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Well, we’ve found that increases in what we call extreme or “pernicious polarization”—which occurs when societies split into two mutually distrustful and antagonistic camps—are particularly significant. In this context, politics is seen as a zero-sum game, where one side’s gain is perceived as the other side’s loss. When people feel threatened by the prospect of the opposing side being in power, they may support politicians or actions that sacrifice democratic principles in order to gain or maintain control.

We’ve observed a strong correlation between rising political polarization at extreme levels and declining scores in liberal democracy. This correlation may reflect a causal relationship, where heightened perceptions of mutual existential threat from the other side lead people to become more willing to undermine democracy in order to protect their interests.

Populist Leaders Deliberately Use Polarization to Divide Society

What are the root causes of polarization in the contemporary world and how can we measure and compare its severity across different cases?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: The kind of polarization I’m referring to is difficult to measure. Traditionally, scholars have used terms like ideological polarization, which is measured through surveys that assess individuals’ positions on issues or their placement on a left-right or liberal-conservative scale. Another growing area in the literature is affective polarization, which measures people’s feelings—specifically how much they dislike other political parties, leaders or supporters of opposing parties.

However, what I find crucial is the perception of threat. It’s not just about dislike but about people feeling threatened by another political camp. This might not even be tied to a specific party—it could be centered around a leader. For example, in Venezuela, there was deep devotion to Hugo Chavez, a populist leader and strong opposition to him without necessarily supporting an alternative party. We see this in other countries, like Hungary with Viktor Orbán or Turkey with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. So, polarization can exist even without clear divisions between two political parties.

At the national, systemic level, polarization is a process of dividing society. A single measure to capture this is almost impossible to develop. However, we’ve used tools like the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database, which relies on expert surveys to assess the extent to which societies are divided into hostile camps. This gets close to what we’re discussing. Additionally, we can look at perceptions of threat in surveys among voters and analyze the rhetoric used by political leaders.

Leaders play a critical role in polarization. Polarizing, populist leaders often identify enemies and use divisive “us vs. them” rhetoric. When we see leaders discrediting their opponents—calling them traitors, disloyal to the country or questioning their citizenship—that’s a clear sign of polarization and a deliberate strategy used to divide.

You often refer to “pernicious polarization” as a threat to democracy and its role in fostering autocratization. How do you define “pernicious polarization” and how does it differ from regular political polarization in a democratic society? What makes it particularly dangerous for democratic systems?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Our definition of political polarization refers to the process of simplifying politics to the point where society becomes divided into two mutually distrustful and antagonistic camps—an “us versus them” dynamic. This leads to a perception of politics as a zero-sum game, where one side’s gain is perceived as the other side’s loss and both sides feel an existential threat from the other.

In political science, the term polarization is often used to describe the differentiation of political parties. For example, when parties distinguish themselves by saying, “We are different from the others—vote for us because we’re better at this,” they are merely differentiating their platforms. As these differences grow, it can be considered polarization. In this sense, some level of polarization is beneficial because it provides voters with cues about where parties and leaders stand, which helps them make informed choices.

However, when this differentiation becomes more toxic, we enter the realm of pernicious polarization, which is harmful to democracy. Our definition goes beyond affective polarization—which is focused on feelings of like and dislike—because it’s not just about emotions. Pernicious polarization involves a perception of threat and a zero-sum mentality, which leads people to cut off communication with those on the other side. It results in a bifurcated society, where political identities become intertwined with social relationships and people retreat into their own silos, unable or unwilling to engage with opposing views.

Solutions That Avoid Systemic Interruptions Are Needed

Presidential Election 2024 in the United States. Photo: Andrew Angelov.

You argue that “we have compelling historical reasons to worry about the pernicious consequences of polarization for democracy.” Could you elaborate on these historical examples and their relevance?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: We’ve seen societies divide throughout history. If we look at episodes of pernicious polarization dating back to the 1900s—more than a century ago—many of these arise in certain contexts. For example, during the interwar period in Europe, we saw the extreme “us versus them” strategies employed by fascist leaders. We’ve also seen polarization increase during struggles for independence in the colonial world, both before and after post-colonialism, as countries fought for self-determination. In some cases, these conflicts escalated into civil war.

What we’ve observed is that, historically, episodes of pernicious polarization have often been resolved through major systemic disruptions. These include coming out of a war and reaching a peace agreement, transitioning from colonialism to post-colonial independence or moving from authoritarianism to democracy. These types of solutions—war, independence struggles or regime changes—are drastic and disruptive.

However, today we face a different challenge. We don’t want to rely on such extreme solutions to resolve polarization. The issue now is that existing democracies are becoming deeply divided, which threatens their ability to govern effectively. When polarization hampers a democracy’s capacity to compromise, negotiate and solve collective problems—things that democratic politics should enable—we need to find solutions that don’t involve the systemic interruptions we’ve seen in the past. We need to address polarization within the framework of maintaining and strengthening democracy.

Polarization Eliminates the Cross-Cutting Ties Essential to Democracies

Once the harmful form of polarization takes root, how can it be avoided or reversed? What strategies or institutional reforms do you believe are most effective in mitigating polarization and restoring democratic stability in deeply divided societies? 

Professor Jennifer McCoy: This is a really difficult question to answer, and I’m working on research with Murat Somer from Turkey on this. We’re currently writing a book, trying to look at historical examples. What have countries that have been democracies done to overcome this? Unfortunately, we do not have many good examples of established democracies from the past that have reached these levels of polarization and successfully come out of it in peaceful ways. So, we don’t have many strong examples, but we do have some instances.

We’ve identified several key principles that need to be addressed. First, think of polarization as the division of society that simplifies politics into two opposing camps, an “us versus them” mentality. This eliminates the cross-cutting ties that are so important in democracies. In healthy democracies, people have different identities and can relate to others based on those diverse identities and interests, despite differing political views. With extreme polarization, however, people’s social identities and their patterns of interaction begin to align with their political identities. As a result, they lose those cross-cutting ties with people from other political camps.

We need to restore these cross-cutting ties and create spaces for people to come together. A lot of work has been done on this in terms of bridging divides, bringing people together to work on projects at the local level—one effective way to foster connection. In neighborhoods, for example, people working together on local issues allows them to know one another first through social relationships. They begin to see their shared humanity and common concerns, such as the safety and well-being of their children. Once that foundation is established, they can start discussing politics and political solutions.

A second approach involves moving away from zero-sum perceptions toward positive, win-win perceptions of politics and economic issues. This shift requires better information and changes in how the media reports on issues. In the United States, for example, media often focuses on the “horse race” during elections, presenting the competition between candidates without providing in-depth analysis of policy solutions or the real impact on people’s lives. One candidate may even threaten democracy by refusing to accept election results, but if the media only focuses on the competition, people may lose sight of the broader consequences. Highlighting positive news, accomplishments and win-win solutions can help people see that not everything is a zero-sum game.

The third point I want to mention is changing incentives—particularly for politicians, but also for voters—to engage in less polarizing strategies. Politicians know that appealing to anger, resentment, and unfairness with divisive, blame-oriented rhetoric can be a highly effective electoral strategy. However, they also need to understand that appealing to positive emotions, offering a vision of hope and fostering enthusiasm can also be a winning strategy. We’ve seen examples of this recently in Turkey during local elections, where politicians successfully used more positive appeals.

Changing incentives for politicians may also involve electoral reforms. In countries like the United States, the UK, Canada and India—former British colonies with winner-takes-all electoral systems—single-member districts create disproportionate representation for larger parties. This system reinforces the two-party model, making it difficult for third or fourth parties to break through and have a voice. By contrast, countries in Europe and Latin America that use proportional representation allow parties to gain representation based on their share of votes, which encourages coalition-building and a broader range of voices. 

In winner-takes-all systems, politicians are incentivized to turn out their base rather than broadening their appeal to a larger group. They don’t need to form coalitions, so they rely on polarizing appeals to mobilize their supporters. Reforming electoral systems to encourage broader representation could help reduce polarization by incentivizing politicians to appeal to a wider range of people, rather than simply energizing their base with negative rhetoric.

Transformative Repolarization Can Help Strengthen Democracy

In an article, you mention that polarization can sometimes contribute to democratic deepening under certain conditions. Can you explain the mechanisms by which polarization might strengthen democracy, and what factors differentiate constructive polarization from destructive polarization?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: There are two ways I want to highlight. One is simply building political party identity, which requires differentiation. Here, I’m referring to polarization as the differentiation of political parties, not the extreme or pernicious form we’ve been discussing. For instance, Adrienne LeBas focuses on cases in Africa where differentiation helps to build and mobilize citizens in new parties that can challenge long-dominant parties. This type of polarization can be positive because it helps to mobilize people.

In our research, Murat Somer and I argue for what we call constructive polarization or transformative repolarization. This occurs when a country is already perniciously polarized around a divisive issue that a polarizing leader has emphasized, such as immigration or “the people versus the elites.” In these cases, challenging leaders and parties can attempt to shift the axis of polarization. There are many possible axes of polarization—religious versus secular, urban versus rural or nationalism versus cosmopolitanism (e.g., the EU versus national identity in Hungary).

One important axis we’ve observed is democracy versus authoritarianism. In a country experiencing democratic backsliding or sliding into autocracy, identifying a new dividing line—centered on the values of democracy, integrity and anti-corruption—can be a constructive form of polarization. This approach works as long as the focus remains on values and ideas, rather than demonizing individuals or voters who may support an authoritarian leader. By focusing on democratic principles, this can serve to correct democratic deficits and address social injustices.

For example, during the US civil rights movement, the focus was on correcting racial injustice, promoting equality and inclusion and erasing discrimination and subordination of particular races. This kind of transformative repolarization can help strengthen democracy by addressing fundamental injustices.

How do you explain the rise of far-right parties in Europe, particularly in some of the most developed democracies? Why do citizens in seemingly advanced political systems feel powerless and turn to support far-right populist parties?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: I think there was a convergence of political parties in the 1990s and early 2000s toward market-based economic solutions. Globalization was rising and many people felt left behind. At the same time, there was a sense that political parties weren’t responding to the needs of ordinary citizens. In Europe, in particular, Social Democratic parties started to lose their anchoring in society, especially through labor unions. In the United States, labor unions have been decimated, only now showing early signs of recovery.

Without strong social anchors and a clear programmatic vision, particularly on the left, people began to feel that the major parties were indistinguishable and unresponsive to their needs—especially those who felt excluded from the benefits of globalization. In addition to this, we’ve seen other global systemic changes, such as technological advances, which have led to automation and job losses. Information technology has also changed how people receive their news and political messages.

Moreover, we’ve seen the impacts of climate change, which has influenced the movement of people. Wars and civil conflicts have also contributed to significant migration flows, including immigrants and refugees. All these factors converged, especially following the global financial crisis of 2008–2010. Traditional political systems struggled to respond effectively, leaving a gap for outsider populist leaders and far-right parties to step in.

Far-right parties often exploit these issues by using divisive rhetoric, blaming particular groups for society’s problems and identifying enemies that need to be eliminated. In Europe, this rhetoric is usually centered around anti-immigrant sentiments, though it can also target other groups.

US Electoral System Creates a Disproportionate Representation

What role did polarization play in Donald Trump’s victory in 2016? Could you elaborate on how polarization contributed to Trump’s appeal among American voters?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Many of the same factors were at play in the US as in other parts of the world. There was a strong convergence between the Democratic and Republican parties around globalization measures, but there wasn’t enough compensation for workers and industries that were negatively impacted by these changes in the 1990s and early 2000s.

However, polarization in the US has been rising for several decades, stemming from long-standing, unresolved debates in American history. One of the major divides is racial—the ongoing struggle over inclusive and equal citizenship, which dates back to the founding of the nation when slavery was legal. At that time, enslaved African peoples were not considered fully human, women were second-class citizens and Indigenous Native Americans were not included. These unresolved issues have persisted as the US has attempted to address injustices and become more inclusive over the past 200 years.

The country has gone through several tumultuous cycles, including the Civil War in the 1860s and, more recently, the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s and the Women’s Movement in the 1970s. These movements have been disruptive but necessary for democratic progress. Each time democracy moves forward to include new or previously excluded groups—such as LGBTQ individuals—there is often backlash. In the US, this backlash has grown since the Civil Rights Movement, as some dominant white groups, particularly men, have felt that their identities and positions as community leaders and economic providers were being threatened.

Additionally, we’ve seen changes in media and communication technology. Cable news, talk radio and the proliferation of social media have created a vast array of information sources that people can turn to. Since the 1990s, the Republican Party has employed a polarizing, confrontational political strategy. All of these factors contributed to the rise of Donald Trump in 2016.

Trump was able to sense these underlying grievances—many still reeling from the 2008 financial crisis—and the anxieties triggered by demands for new rights and greater inclusion, which are essential for democracy. His instinctive use of bullying and blame tactics allowed him to galvanize support by identifying enemies and railing against political correctness. Many people, feeling tired of having to be cautious about their words and how they identified others, were drawn to his message.

Trump presented himself as an outsider and a successful businessman, someone who could “save” the economy and democracy. He also employed a strong anti-immigrant message. It’s important to note, however, that Trump did not win the majority of the popular vote—Hillary Clinton did. The US has a unique system with an Electoral College, an indirect presidential election process and a Senate that creates a disproportionate system of representation. Rural areas, which tend to lean more Republican due to polarization and political sorting, hold more weight in this system, which also contributed to Trump’s victory.

Trump’s Victory Will Empower Authoritarian Regimes

Caricatures of US President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un. Photo: Willrow Hood.

How do you think American democracy and its institutions will respond to another Trump administration if he wins the election on November 5? Some scholars and institutions argue that American democracy might not survive another Trump term—where do you stand on this debate?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: I am concerned and I fall on the more worried side of the debate. While I don’t think democracy will completely collapse, I do believe it could be significantly damaged and become extremely unstable.

One major concern is that, during his first term, Trump was unprepared. He didn’t expect to win and as a result, he didn’t have a team ready to support him or fully understand how to wield executive power. There were still institutional guardrails in place that could stop him at various points. For example, Democrats frequently resorted to lawsuits to challenge many of his autocratic tendencies and the courts were used extensively during his first term.

However, over those four years, Trump was able to make numerous judicial appointments, which have since politicized the courts to a significant degree. In the US, you can sometimes choose which court or district to bring a case to and certain courts are known for being more conservative than others. This, combined with the fact that Trump was able to appoint three Supreme Court justices by pushing the limits of constitutional legality, has weakened the judicial guardrails that were once stronger.

More importantly, both Trump and his supporters have had time to prepare. People looking to use his presidency for their own agendas have spent time developing legal strategies that could allow him to assert even more executive power than he already has. They’ve also focused on placing loyalists in key positions throughout the federal government and bureaucracy, which could further erode the civil service guardrails.

Additionally, the US is increasingly divided along state lines. There are more Republican-dominated states than Democratic ones and many states are fully controlled by one party. What used to be institutional safeguards are now weakening under these partisan divisions.

If Trump wins, the country will be even more divided. A significant portion of the population—around 30%—is deeply entrenched in their support for him, while another 30% is firmly aligned with the Democratic side. There is also a large group in the middle, around 40%, that remains unaffiliated but leans one way or the other. The concern is that those strong Trump supporters may react very negatively if he loses and surveys suggest that around 10% of the population supports the idea of political violence in response to an election loss. Trump himself is likely to claim the election was rigged if he loses.

On the other hand, if he wins, Democrats and those who oppose him will do everything they can to prevent further curtailment of rights. While I don’t foresee them resorting to violence, they will certainly push back against any attempts to undermine democratic institutions.

If Trump wins the elections on November the 5th, how do you think this victory will impact the populist movements worldwide?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: I think it will embolden populist movements globally because Trump will likely support them. He won’t push to reinforce democracy in areas where leaders may be concentrating power or eroding democratic norms. Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China. While Trump has maintained a strong anti-China stance, he’s shown a more favorable approach to Putin and Russia. So, overall, I believe a Trump victory will embolden these movements and regimes.

A homeowner displaying their political affiliation and religious devotion on their front lawn in Forest, Virginia, USA, on August 21, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Pally: Evangelicals Face a ‘Double Loss’—Both Socio-Economic and as a Religious Community—Positioning Them to Find Trump Appealing

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In exploring the socio-political dynamics behind white Evangelicals’ support for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States, Professor Marcia Pally of New York University identifies what she calls a “double loss” experienced by this group. She explains that white Evangelicals face both economic and societal losses—challenges shared by many Americans—which are further intensified by their distinct struggles as a religious community. This “double loss,” Pally argues, is coupled with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”: a widespread American distrust of centralized authority, minorities, and new immigrants, paired with a doctrinal suspicion rooted of priestly and other authorities in Evangelical religious beliefs.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Marcia Pally of New York University delves into the socio-political dynamics driving the support of white Evangelicals for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States. Highlighting what she describes as a “double loss” experienced by this demographic, Professor Pally explains how both economic and societal losses—shared by many Americans—are compounded by the unique religious challenges facing white Evangelicals. This sense of loss, she argues, is accompanied by a “double suspicion” of government and of “outsiders” (minorities and new immigrants): a general American wariness of centralized authority, alongside a doctrinal distrust of priestly and other authorities and of “outsiders’ rooted in Evangelical religious teachings.

Professor Pally, an expert in theology and political culture, teaches at New York University and was awarded the Mercator Professorship in the Theology Faculty at Humboldt University, where she is an annual guest professor. She has authored several influential books, including White Evangelicals and Right-wing Populism: How Did We Get Here?; From This Broken Hill I Sing To You: God, Sex, and Politics in the Work of Leonard Cohen; and Commonwealth and Covenant: Economics, Politics, and Theologies of  Relationality. Her work focuses on the intersection of religion, politics and society, making her a leading voice in understanding the socio-cultural underpinnings of right-wing populism in the US.

Throughout the interview, Professor Pally unpacks the role of white Evangelicals in American right-wing populism, tracing their political engagement to a deep-seated suspicion of government and of “outsiders” and to a perceived erosion of cultural influence. She elaborates on the phenomenon of “Christian nationalism,” a relatively recent term describing a political movement that uses particular readings of Christianity to justify nationalist goals. However, she notes, Christian nationalism is not truly a form of Christianity but rather a form of nationalism that taps into the anger that arises from significant socio-economic losses and cultural marginalization.

Professor Pally also addresses how Trump’s rhetoric and policies—particularly on immigration and national identity—resonate with white Evangelicals, drawing on long-standing cultural anxieties about “outsiders” and threats to community. Finally, she explores the global implications of Trump’s potential re-election, predicting that right-wing populist movements around the world would likely adapt his strategies and rhetoric to their own contexts.

In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Pally provides a nuanced understanding of the political and cultural forces shaping the white Evangelical electorate and their continued support for Donald Trump’s populist rhetoric in the United States.

Professor Marcia Pally is an expert in theology and political culture, teaches at New York University and was awarded the Mercator Professorship in the Theology Faculty at Humboldt University, where she is an annual guest professor.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Marcia Pally with some edits.

Populism as a Response to Duress: Loss, Threat, Fear or Anxiety about Change

What key differences do you observe between left- and right-wing populisms in the US, in particular the role of Evangelicals in American right populism, and how do these movements draw differently from America’s religio-cultural history? Could you elaborate on the American religio-political background from which populist beliefs emerge, and explain how this historical and cultural trajectory influenced Trump’s election in 2016?

Professor Marcia Pally: That’s a series of very complex questions. Let me take them step by step. You asked about the differences between left-wing and right-wing populism. Let me begin by saying that, following prominent research, I’ve developed a minimal core definition of populism. Then we can talk about left, right, strong and weak variants. The core definition of populism is that it’s a response to duress: loss, threat, fear of loss or anxiety about changes in economic situations, ways of life, technology, demographics, gender roles, etc.

When these losses or fears accumulate, people naturally shift their focus outward. They move away from their usual preoccupations—family, friends, schools, teams—and focus instead on identifying a “them” who is perceived to be causing harm to “us.” This shift to an “us versus them” mentality is a normal human response. It’s not specific to Europe, America or any particular ideology—it’s a species-wide reaction to perceived threats.

The third prong in this response to duress is identifying “them.” Populist movements—especially right-wing ones—seek to identify those they see as causing the harm. This identification usually draws from culturally familiar “others,” which can differ from culture to culture or even subculture to subculture. For instance, in the US, we don’t hear much about the Roma people because they play a negligible role in American history. But in other parts of the world, the Roma people have been historically singled out as a “them” responsible for certain fears or harms.

The “them” in the “us versus them” dynamic draws from historical and cultural ideas about society–who is “in” and who is “out”– as well as beliefs about the proper role and size of government.

To sum up, we can define populism as driven by duress, leading to an “us versus them” binary, where the “them” is identified based on long-standing cultural and historical factors. The key difference between left-wing and right-wing populism lies in who the “thems” are. Right-wing populism traditionally identifies the “them” as outsiders—new immigrants, religious and racial minorities and sometimes a corrupt government.

Left-wing populism, on the other hand, doesn’t usually target the government, as the left often views democratic governments as representatives of the people and legitimate agents of governance. Instead, left-wing populism tends to focus on economic exploitation, rather than identity politics, and identifies “them” as those responsible for economic inequality rather than as racial, ethnic or religious minorities. So, one key difference is that the right is more suspicious of government, while the left sees it as a potential agent of positive change.

I should also note that populism is not a static concept; it exists on a continuum. On one end, you have softer forms of populism, which align more closely with the normal agonistic aspects of democratic processes. For example, Bernie Sanders or Martin Luther King Jr. could be considered proponents of “soft” populism, which stays within the realm of democratic debate.

As you move along the continuum, populism can grow stronger, characterized by a much sharper “us versus them” binary and a diminished tolerance for ambiguity. In softer populism, someone can be an ally on one issue and an opponent on another. For instance, a corporation might support climate change action but oppose raising the minimum wage, and soft populism would recognize this complexity as part of politics.

In stronger populism, however, the “us versus them” division becomes much more rigid, often framing the struggle as a battle between good and evil, with existential stakes. This can lead to more extreme and uncompromising solutions.

The second part of your question, about cultural history and its impact, was quite broad. Could you narrow it down so I can address it more specifically?

The Problems People Face Are Often Real and Justified

Can you elaborate on the role of Evangelicals in American right-wing populism?

Professor Marcia Pally: Sure. I’m going to break this down by distinguishing between white Evangelicals and Evangelicals of color, because their histories in the US are very different. Evangelicals of color have a rich and vibrant history that really deserves its own study. Since my research focuses on white Evangelicals, I’ll focus on them here.

White Evangelicals—and their ancestors—have been coming to the US since the 17th century. They’ve contributed to and participated in the development of the country and contributed to three of the most foundational aspects of American political culture.

First, there’s covenantal political theory, which views the governed as a covenanted community. In this theory, sovereignty rests with the people, not the king or a ruler. If the leader—what we might now call the President or Prime Minister—violates the covenant with the governed, it is seen as legitimate to remove them. This is a productive heritage, and the ancestors of today’s Evangelicals played a significant role in introducing this idea to the United States.

Second, they contributed to republicanism—with a small “r”—which comes from Aristotelian thought. It emphasizes that citizens run the polis or state. This idea also centers around community engagement and governance, with sovereignty rooted in the people themselves.

Third, Evangelicals played a role in shaping liberalism, which, while less focused on the community aspect, emphasizes individual opportunity. However, like the other two traditions, liberalism maintains a strong suspicion of any government or ruler that abuses power. This suspicion runs through all three aspects: A leader who violates the covenant with the people; a tyrant who attempts to take control of the republic; and a ruler who tries to constrain individual freedoms.

Evangelicals, like other immigrants, contributed to all three of these foundational elements of American political culture. Additionally, two other important factors shaped their current position on the right wing of American politics.

First, their doctrinal belief that all governments are flawed and imperfect—none embody the Kingdom of God—leads them to be wary of authority. Each person, they believe, must determine how to live a moral life and foster a moral society, reinforcing their suspicion of centralized authority.

The Evangelicals we’re discussing are Protestants, heirs of the Protestant Reformation, which emphasized the individual conscience in developing a moral life and society. They are skeptical of priestly authority and instead trust the individual’s conscience. This, again, amplifies their wariness of government. This may foster the fear that the government could violate their covenant, their republic, their liberal rights and their doctrinal obligation to uphold the moral life. This suspicion also extends to outsiders who might interfere with their way of life.

This skepticism can be positive: a healthy distrust of government can guard against authoritarianism, bolster democracy and promote individual opportunity. Their strong sense of community has been a key factor in local development and community engagement. This commitment to community and localism is part of a long tradition in the US, especially within Evangelical circles.

However, under duress, things change. The usual focus on community and democratic localism can shift outward, leading to suspicion and fear of outsiders. Under pressure, the commitment to community may flip into an “us vs. them” mentality, where outsiders are perceived as threats to the community. Similarly, a healthy suspicion of autocratic government can morph into a blanket distrust of all government. Under stress, people tend to look for a “them” to blame for their problems, and nuanced thinking can give way to simplistic explanations.

Under these conditions, a suspicion of autocracy turns into a general suspicion of government, except when government is used to constrain outsiders. This shift makes it difficult for society to function effectively—if government is distrusted and outsiders are seen as threats, collaboration and compromise are stifled. If the government itself is seen as inherently suspect and if outsiders—who often bring talent, innovation, and entrepreneurialism—are also viewed with suspicion, a final tragedy emerges. This shift in perception, from community cohesion to distrust of outsiders and from a healthy skepticism of tyrants to a blanket suspicion of all government, leads to a loss of nuance in understanding the original sources of duress.

In today’s interconnected global economy, with its complex networks of transportation, communication and technology, problems such as economic hardship or changes in ways of life often have multiple, intertwined causes. This complexity can be overwhelming, leaving individuals feeling powerless to address the issues. In this context, the “us vs. them” mentality offers a simple explanation by blaming an identifiable group for the strain.

However, this appealing simplification can prevent people from recognizing the more intricate, systemic causes behind the challenges they face. In my research, I have found that the problems people experience are often very real and justified—people are generally aware when they are being impacted. The tragedy is that, if they can’t properly identify the true causes of their struggles, they may misdirect their frustration and fail to address the root issues.

Nothing Trump Said Is New in the American Cultural or Political Context

Former US President Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

We know that it is not only Trump but other Republicans as well addressed economic and way-of-life duress but what made Trump’s policies so effective and ‘persuasive’ in garnering the votes? In what ways does the evangelical sense of cultural and political marginalization influence their embrace of Trump’s rhetoric and policies on immigration and national identity?

Professor Marcia Pally: This is a complex question but let me address it step by step.

First, it’s crucial to recognize that nothing Donald Trump said was new in the American cultural or political context. His identification of the “deep swamp,” the insider elite in Washington and the so-called elite media or “fake news,” is not new. It’s an expression of the long-standing suspicion of government in the US. As I’ve mentioned, this suspicion has a healthy, democratic side but can also morph into a general distrust of government. Trump was able to tap into this long-standing element of American political culture.

Similarly, regarding outsiders—whether new immigrants, religious minorities like Muslims or occasionally even anti-Semitic themes—Trump was able to activate these entrenched cultural anxieties. When you ask why he was so effective, it’s because he tapped into sentiments that had existed for a long time. In the 2015–2016 campaign, he experimented with different slogans to see what resonated, and when he received applause for certain themes, he kept using them.

When a political message touches on a long-standing concern—one that feels familiar or “right” to people—it’s likely to gain traction. Trump successfully tapped into both anti-government and anti-outsider sentiments and he continued to use those themes because they worked. But it’s important to emphasize that these ideas were not new.

For example, “America First” was not Trump’s invention. Woodrow Wilson used the phrase in 1916 in his efforts to keep the US out of World War I. Senator William Borah from Idaho also used it to argue against US involvement in the League of Nations after the war.

Similarly, “Drain the Swamp” was not Trump’s creation either—it was a campaign promise used by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.

Now, for the second part of your question regarding evangelicals, could you clarify what specifically you’d like me to follow up on?

In what ways does the evangelical sense of cultural and political marginalization influence their embrace of Trump’s rhetoric and policies on immigration and national identity?

Professor Marcia Pally: Thank you for that. Let’s return to our core definition: duress and the “us vs. them” shift through culturally familiar themes.

The pressures that white Evangelicals face are real and legitimate concerns. White Evangelicals experience the same duress many Americans do. There has been a loss of purchasing power since the 1980s, a decline in unionization and the disappearance of jobs for which Americans had been trained, alongside insufficient training for new jobs emerging from new technologies. Health care, housing, education, day care, senior care are all expensive for middle- and working class- Americans. Rapid technological advancements and changes in gender roles have also contributed to the sense that life today is harsher and more difficult than it was for their parents or grandparents. 

There’s a growing sentiment that life has become less fair. People work hard, yet they lose their jobs or find themselves underemployed and communities are devastated when factories close or, more significantly, when technological changes increase productivity, reducing the need for workers. These are legitimate, very real hardships and neither political party did much to address them—until the Obama and Biden administrations, which took several productive steps, though not enough.

In addition to these economic hardships, Americans face “way of life” losses. By this, I mean the sense that one’s standingas respectable, middle-class individuals is being eroded or undermined. They feel powerless to change this, as policies are made by distant decision-makers who seem out of reach and unaccountable. These complaints are quite real.

On top of that, white Evangelicals have suffered a demographic loss. In 2004, they made up about 23–25% of the population; today, they are roughly 13%. They are the most aged of all religious groups in America, with an average age of around 56, and there is a growing fear of losing cultural influence in the US.

White Evangelicals once held more “soft power,” or cultural sway, in American life. As society has become more secular, urbanized and socially progressive, they’ve seen a decline in their influence. These demographic and cultural losses are felt as real and painful, compounding the economic and social changes that many in the middle and working classes are experiencing.

In summary, Evangelicals face a “double loss”: the economic and societal losses many Americans endure and the unique losses faced by their religious group. This double loss is paired with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”—both the general American wariness of centralized authority and “others” (minorities, new immigrants) and the religious, doctrinal suspicion of priestly and other authorities.

This combination of double loss and double suspicion, particularly under duress, creates a volatile situation. When people are under pressure, they look for a “them” to blame and they turn to familiar explanations for their very real difficulties—ones that are culturally familiar, understandable, and resonate with their lived experiences.

You underline that in late 2019, the influential, mainstream evangelical publication, Christianity Today, ran an editorial calling for Trump’s removal from office. Yet in the 2016 presidential election, 81 percent of white evangelicals voted for Trump. How do you explain this strong bond despite forceful Evangelical reservations?

Professor Marcia Pally: It’s important to remember that Americans, in general, are suspicious of authority and evangelicals are doubly so. While Christianity Today is an influential magazine, an editorial it publishes doesn’t dictate how evangelicals across the country will respond. Evangelicals are likely to make up their own minds, based on their individual assessments of the situation, their personal sense of duress, loss or threat, and their views on the root causes of these challenges.

I’m not at all surprised that a major, influential magazine would criticize Donald Trump and declare him unfit for office, while at the same time, a substantial portion of evangelicals make their own decisions, grounded in their own perspectives and evaluations.

Christian Nationalism Is Not a Form of Christianity, but a Form of Nationalism

Christian singer Sean Feucht hosts a “Worship Protest” on the National Mall in Washington, DC, during the COVID-19 pandemic on October 25, 2020. Photo: Nicole Glass.

Can you elaborate on the concept of “Christian nationalism” and how it has been employed by White Evangelicals to justify their support for Trump and right-wing populism?

Professor Marcia Pally: Christian nationalism is a relatively recent term and it’s an important one, developed by colleagues of mine who have done excellent work. However, I’m not convinced that white evangelicals are actively using Christian nationalism. It might be more accurate to say that Christian nationalism is using white evangelicals. Let me explain.

First of all, Christian nationalism is not a form of Christianity; it is a form of nationalism. The core of it—the noun—is nationalism.

Christian nationalism aims to implement specific political, economic and social policies. It is a political position, not a faith tradition that aligns, for instance, with the teachings in Matthew 25, which calls for caring for “the least of these.” Rather, Christian nationalism is a political ideology that its proponents claim is justified by their particular readings or interpretations of Christianity.

Adherents of Christian nationalism argue that their political stances are rooted in their understanding of Christian doctrine and the Bible. However, it’s crucial to note that many Christians in the US have vastly different interpretations of Christianity. These Christians are working tirelessly to promote other understandings of the faith. This includes 20–25% of white evangelicals, whose voices are often underrepresented in mainstream media. They are actively advocating for alternative interpretations of the Bible and the Christian doctrine.

It’s also important to point out that Christian nationalism is not a uniquely white evangelical invention or “brand.” The movement extends far beyond white evangelicals, encompassing individuals from the broader religious right, including Catholics and mainline Protestants. So, while some white evangelicals may identify with Christian nationalism because they align with its “us vs. them” themes, it is a much broader political movement that goes beyond just one group.

How do you think right-wing populism will be affected globally if Trump gets elected on November 5?

Professor Marcia Pally: Right-wing movements around the world communicate with one another. Of course, this is not unique—left-wing movements, centrist movements, governments and NGOs also communicate globally. This is to be expected.

Given that right-wing populist movements exchange ideas and strategies, closely observing each other’s successes and failures in order to learn from them, if Trump is re-elected in November, I expect right-wing groups and leaders—or those aspiring to leadership on the right—to examine the strategies, rhetoric and promises of Trump’s campaign. They will likely try to adapt and apply these approaches within their own political contexts. 

Professor Dr. Reinhard Heinisch, a leading expert on Austrian politics from the University of Salzburg.

Professor Heinisch: If You Don’t Want the FPÖ in Government, Hope They Come in First in Austria Polls

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

As Austrians head to the polls on Sunday, Professor Reinhard Heinisch contends that “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope they come in first.” He explains this paradoxical statement by noting, “If the FPÖ comes in first, there’s a much greater probability that no other party would want to join a government led by someone as radical as Herbert Kickl. The Conservative Party (ÖVP) would have several options available—they could form a coalition with either the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party, or with the FPÖ. But why would the ÖVP want to be the junior partner in a coalition under Kickl when they could be the senior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ?”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Austrians head to the parliamentary elections on Sunday, September 29, 2024, the political landscape is tense, with the far-right, anti-immigration Freedom Party (FPÖ) potentially poised to achieve an unprecedented success. Although the FPÖ is unlikely to secure an outright majority in the 183-seat Nationalrat (National Council), the implications of their potential rise to power have sparked widespread debate and concern. 

In a timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dr. Reinhard Heinisch, a leading expert on Austrian politics from the University of Salzburg, provides critical insights into the possible outcomes of this election. Professor Heinisch offers a paradoxical yet intriguing perspective: “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope that they come in first.” He elaborates on this by explaining that if the FPÖ wins, there is a greater chance that other parties, particularly the Conservative Party (ÖVP), will refuse to join a coalition led by such a radical figure as FPÖ lider Herbert Kickl. “The ÖVP could form a coalition with the Social Democrats (SPÖ) instead, avoiding the complications of being a junior partner under Kickl,” Professor Heinisch notes.

However, Professor Heinisch also highlights the risks if the ÖVP comes in first and the FPÖ follows closely behind. In this scenario, the likelihood of an ÖVP-FPÖ coalition increases, with potentially significant implications for Austria and the European Union (EU). Professor Heinisch warns that Kickl, unlike some other far-right leaders who moderate once in power, has a clear agenda to fundamentally alter Austria and its position within the EU. “I take him seriously when he speaks about his goals,” Professor Heinisch asserts, pointing to Kickl’s past actions and statements that suggest a deep commitment to his radical agenda.

The interview with Professor Heinisch delves into the historical factors that have shaped the FPÖ, the party’s impact on Austria’s political dynamics and the broader European implications of its rise. Heinisch’s analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the potential consequences of the upcoming election, making it essential reading for anyone interested in the future of Austrian and European politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Reinhard Heinisch with some edits.

FPÖ Poised to Emerge as Leading Party in Sunday’s Elections

Professor Heinisch, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Can you elaborate on the historical factors that have contributed to the rise of populist radical right movements in Austria? How far back can we trace these influences?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: That’s a very good question. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a populist radical right party, formed after World War II. However, it inherited a tradition that dates back to the Austrian Empire and the monarchy. Because Austria was not part of the German Empire during the reunification process in the 19th century, some people in Austria became German nationalists who wanted the German-speaking regions of Austria to join Germany. This sentiment laid the groundwork for what would later become the Freedom Party.

The FPÖ was founded after World War II and represented the aspirations of Austrians who identified themselves as Germans, including a significant number of former Nazis. Many of these former Nazi party members, once allowed to vote, did not align with the dominant conservative (Catholic) or socialist/social democratic parties. This led to the creation of a new party—the FPÖ—which was a German nationalist party that initially never exceeded more than 5% of the vote. It was a minor player in a political system dominated by two major parties: the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), a Christian Democratic party and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), which together controlled 95% of the electorate.

Over two generations, as the impact of the war receded, the FPÖ underwent a period of liberalization, attracting new members. In the early 1980s, it even partnered with the Social Democrats in government. However, the party was internally divided and during this time, a charismatic young leader from one of Austria’s provinces, Jörg Haider, recognized that future success depended on transforming the FPÖ from a nationalist, radical right party into a populist party.

A populist party, as Haider understood, positions itself against the elites, claiming that they have robbed ordinary people of their sovereignty. Under Haider’s leadership, the FPÖ rapidly grew, moving from 5-6% of the vote to 27%, largely on the strength of its populist appeal. Populist parties, even those on the right, are often less dogmatic than other radical right parties. For example, the FPÖ was initially pro-European integration, then turned against it; it was initially anti-Catholic, but later defended Europe against Islam. The party was highly flexible, adapting its platform to address societal grievances and attract voters.

Austria’s integration into Europe and the accompanying issues of borders, identity, immigration, globalization and European integration became increasingly important to the FPÖ. This focus allowed the party to capitalize on voter discontent with the dominant parties, particularly during times of political change, uncertainty and insecurity. Events such as the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the war in Yugoslavia—during which Austria, as a border country, experienced significant immigration—further fueled the FPÖ’s rise.

By 2000, the FPÖ had gained 27% of the vote and joined a conservative-led government, which caused a stir in Brussels and led to sanctions against the Austrian government. This was the first time a radical right populist party had become a junior partner in government. However, the FPÖ, as an opposition party, was ill-equipped to govern and its voters quickly became disillusioned. The party split, imploded and the government ended prematurely. After another round of elections, the coalition continued briefly before imploding again. The party split into a more moderate faction and a fundamentalist faction led by Haider. However, after Haider’s death in a car accident, his faction essentially disappeared.

The FPÖ reemerged and moderated itself when seeking office, but radicalized when rebuilding in opposition. In 2017, the FPÖ, once again seeking office, formed a government with the conservatives under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz, a young leader from the People’s Party. However, this government also ended prematurely due to the infamous Ibiza video, in which the FPÖ leader was seen offering influence to someone posing as a Russian oligarch. This scandal led to the collapse of the government and the FPÖ returned to opposition, where it had to reinvent itself once more.

Thanks to issues like the pandemic and problems within the government, the FPÖ rebuilt itself impressively and is now in a position where it is likely—or at least highly probable—that it will emerge as a leading party in the upcoming elections on Sunday, September 29 or at least finish as a close second. That, in a nutshell, is the situation.

FPÖ Takes Inspiration from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary

Protesters gather outside as the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) joins the coalition government in Vienna, Austria, on December 18, 2017. Photo: Shutterstock.

To what extent do socioeconomic issues like unemployment, immigration, economic inequality and globalization contribute to the appeal of the populist radical right in Austria? How do populist attitudes and attitudes based on populist radical right and left host ideologies affect citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: The Freedom Party (FPÖ), if we imagine political contestation along two axes—the socioeconomic and the sociopolitical—traditionally aligns more to the center-left on socioeconomic issues. This alignment has enabled them to form coalitions with the Social Democrats on economic matters. However, on sociocultural issues, they are quite far to the right, which currently gives them a unique selling position.

Both factors, socioeconomic and sociocultural, are important, but Freedom Party voters are probably more concerned with cultural issues, particularly questions of identity and immigration. You cannot completely separate these concerns from socioeconomic factors because the Freedom Party engages in welfare chauvinism. They often mobilize against immigrants or asylum seekers using socioeconomic arguments, such as advocating for cuts to subsidies and benefits for non-citizens, while emphasizing support for native Austrians. This approach is sometimes echoed by the Conservatives, making it a broader discourse that encompasses both socioeconomic and sociocultural issues.

Structurally, the overarching concern among Freedom Party voters is a fear of change and a sense of decline in their future prospects. This anxiety is encapsulated in the party’s election slogan, “Fortress Austria,” which speaks directly to these fears. What makes Austria unique is its historical difficulty in defining national identity, particularly in relation to Germany. In the past, German-speaking Austrians often considered themselves as Germans living in Austria-Hungary, where “Austria” referred to the Habsburg Empire’s territory, not to an ethnicity. It wasn’t until after World War II that Austrians began to see themselves as distinct from Germans.

Given this complex identity, Austrians often define themselves through lifestyle, traditions and customs. In the context of globalization and immigration, these customs and traditions feel particularly under siege. For example, in Vienna, the Freedom Party has mobilized support by highlighting issues such as schools no longer serving pork schnitzel due to the dietary restrictions of Muslims and Jews. While this might seem trivial, these identity issues resonate strongly with those who view their way of life as an authentic expression of Austrian culture. This divides the population, with elites and educated people defining themselves differently from those who see lifestyle as central to their identity.

This debate is not particularly intellectual, but it significantly affects Austria. The Freedom Party, however, is not as radical as the Alterantive for Germany (AfD) in Germany. Unlike in the past, the Freedom Party today does not philosophize about the “Germanness” of Austria. Instead, it is more pragmatic, drawing inspiration from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and aiming to create an Austrian version of that model, rather than engaging in debates about national identity.

The Freedom Party Poses a Particular Challenge to the Conservatives

You argue that radical right fringe parties often act as agenda setters, with main parties responding by accommodating and adopting their most salient issues. How do you think radical right fringe parties affect the main parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Well, I think it’s important to distinguish between Central Europe—those countries that were under communism—and those that were not. The main issue in Eastern European countries that were once communist is the contestation over cultural issues. There is very little debate over economic policy because the only consensus is on European Union (EU) integration and foreign investment. There’s not a significant difference in what center-left and center-right parties can offer their voters in economic terms, which is why center-left parties in Eastern Europe are often weak and underdeveloped. Where we do see substantial debate is around identity issues. Many unresolved identity issues exist and centrist conservative parties in these countries must constantly guard their right flank. Fringe parties often mobilize people on identity issues, positioning themselves to the right of mainstream parties. This is why we see so much identity-based populism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

In contrast, Austria has a more developed party system that spans economic and social fault lines. However, identity issues still play a significant role and the discourse around identity is particularly intense. On the right, we have the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria and while there are smaller parties trying to establish themselves, they may not make it into Parliament this time. On the other end of the spectrum, we have the Greens and a small liberal party occupying the left.

The contestation on the identity axis often influences the socioeconomic debate. Traditional parties like the Social Democrats would prefer to focus on social issues, but they are constrained by internal divisions. They must appeal to both progressive urban voters and more traditional constituencies, which often splits the party. The Conservatives face a similar problem, having experienced a split that led to the formation of the small The New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS) party.

The radical right poses a particular challenge to the Conservatives, pulling them further to the right. The future of democracy in Europe may well depend on how Conservatives handle this challenge. In Austria, the typical response has been co-option—embracing the radical right and bringing them into the fold. This strategy has led to the Freedom Party’s implosion on three occasions, but it has also validated the Freedom Party’s agenda. When the Freedom Party makes a comeback, they can point to the Conservatives and say, “We’re not saying anything different from what they said five years ago.”

So the question is: What are the risks of validating these parties versus trying to neutralize them through co-option? The verdict is still out, at least in the Austrian context.

As a Hard Eurosceptic Party, the FPÖ Would Advocate for Leaving the EU

How did the radical-right populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) construct its sovereignty claims, and how did the mainstream right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) adopt these claims? In doing so, how did the ÖVP significantly narrow the gap with the far-right FPÖ on the national and economic dimensions of sovereignty and largely renounce its previously pro-European and anti-sovereigntist positions?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: The Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a hard Eurosceptic party. We distinguish between hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism refers to a stance where a party, if it had the opportunity, would advocate for leaving the European Union. However, the FPÖ knows this is a difficult and still a minority position, as two-thirds of Austrians want to remain in the EU, even if Austria is not a particularly enthusiastic member state.

To navigate this, the FPÖ hedges its bets, a strategy we described as “equivocal Euroscepticism” in an article in the Journal of Common Market Studies. They push their critique of the EU to the brink but stop short of calling for an outright exit. Instead, they vaguely advocate for major reforms and restoring sovereignty to nation-states. The FPÖ aligns itself with European groups like the “Patriots for Europe,” which includes parties like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and figures like Viktor Orbán. They are comfortable in this coalition and aim to weaken the EU as much as possible.

For the FPÖ, sovereignty means that decisions should be made within Austria. They advocate for weakening international judicial bodies like the European Court of Human Rights and the EU Courts, arguing that any international involvement should be strictly voluntary and based on national decision-making. This understanding of sovereignty is almost exclusivist and they push it as far as they can. For example, regarding the Sky Shield initiative—a missile defense system being developed by Austria, Switzerland, Germany and others—the FPÖ claims it’s a backdoor attempt to join NATO, illustrating their strict interpretation of sovereignty.

In contrast, the Conservatives (ÖVP) are fundamentally pro-European. While they might exhibit what we call “soft Euroscepticism,” this typically involves negotiating hard on behalf of national interests, as seen with the “frugal” alliance of countries. The Conservatives are far from the FPÖ’s stance, although they have shifted from their earlier, more enthusiastic pro-European position.

Historically, the ÖVP was the driving force behind Austria’s accession to the EU, even branding themselves as the “Europe party” in Austria. They were the main architects of Austria’s EU membership. However, over time, the ÖVP has moved away from this position. While they are still where most Austrian parties are in terms of EU support, they have significantly distanced themselves from their early 1990s stance. Today, the most pro-European party in Austria is NEOS, a small liberal party that consistently defends the EU. Meanwhile, the ÖVP often adopts a stance of blaming Brussels when things go wrong, while taking credit for EU successes.

Austria: From Islam-Friendly to Islamophobic

Activists from the Identitarian Movement Austria block the access road to the Hungary-Austria border at Nickelsdorf on October 17, 2015. Photo: Johanna Poetsch.

Austria was one of the first European states to officially recognize Islam in 1912. How has the rise of right-wing populism and party competition changed Austria’s policies toward Islam? What role did FPÖ play in this change of policy toward Islam?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Yes, that’s a very interesting question. Austria has historically had a progressive relationship with Islam, dating back to the monarchy. Islam has been a fully recognized and equal religion, sanctioned by the courts and rooted in the inclusion of Bosnian Muslims in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Traditionally, the Austrian military even had imams, rabbis and Catholic priests. These protections have been carried over and reinforced by the Islam Law of 1912, making it difficult for anyone to weaken the role of Islam in Austria.

Interestingly, Austrian Conservatives and other political parties historically defended the role of Islam and the autonomy of religious institutions. Austria has a tradition of autonomous interest associations, where the state allows these groups to self-govern within their areas of jurisdiction. This applies to labor markets as well as to religious institutions. For instance, religious communities in Austria have the autonomy to organize their own school curricula, appoint teachers, imams and other religious leaders, all within the framework of their contract with the government.

Initially, religion wasn’t a major issue for the FPÖ. Their focus was more on immigration rather than religion. For quite some time, the FPÖ even maintained strong, positive relationships with several Arab countries, such as the ties between Jörg Haider, the FPÖ leader and figures like Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. Even after 9/11, Austrians, including the FPÖ, differentiated between Islam and terrorism, seeing them as two separate issues.

However, as the FPÖ began competing with a splinter party led by Haider, they sought new ways to differentiate themselves. This led to an increasing focus on Islam and Islamophobia began to take root. The existing Islam Law became a focal point of controversy, and identity issues were increasingly linked to it.

At some point, these issues were picked up by the Conservative Party (ÖVP), which was locked in competition with the radical right, particularly in areas with larger concentrations of immigrants. Gradually, these ideas went mainstream. Meanwhile, the Greens and Social Democrats distanced themselves from the issue of religion, leaving it to the Conservatives, who were more traditionally aligned with religious matters.

While in a coalition government with the Social Democrats, the Conservatives began rewriting the Islam Law, largely under pressure from the radical right. Around this time, several Islamist terrorist attacks occurred in different European countries, heightening the sense of insecurity and driving a securitization of the new law. The focus shifted toward “Austrianizing” Islam, which included requirements for official translations of the Quran, preaching in German and school curricula reflecting these changes. The Islamic community was pressured to be more proactive in cooperating with government authorities, as outlined in the new version of the Islam Law.

By the 2016 election campaign, when Sebastian Kurz emerged as the strongman of the ÖVP, the question of Islam and “political Islam” became a central campaign issue for both the Conservatives and the FPÖ. Ironically, the Conservatives amplified this issue so much that the FPÖ had to remind voters that they were the first to raise these concerns. Since then, the ÖVP has continued to use the issue of Islam, even establishing a committee and a website to investigate “political Islam,” though the exact nature of this remains unclear. It became a political tool for them, although recently they seem to have stepped back from this focus, possibly realizing it benefits the radical right more than themselves. However, there remains a faction within the Conservative Party that continues to see Islam as a key issue and uses it opportunistically when they believe it can garner votes.

President’s Potential Actions Remain a Significant Unknown That Could Influence the Outcome

Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen during an interview with Russian television in Vienna on April 26, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

How do you assess the significance of the September 29 elections for the populist radical right in Austria? What are the key factors that could influence their performance this time? Most pundits in the media argue that FPÖ could make a comeback and can win elections on Sunday? What is your take on the elections in terms of the potential success of populist parties?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: I want to start with a paradoxical statement: If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope that they come in first. Let me explain this.

If the FPÖ comes in first, there’s a much greater probability that no other party would want to join a government led by someone as radical as Herbert Kickl. The Conservative Party (ÖVP) would have several options available, as they could form a coalition with either the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party or with the FPÖ, but why would the ÖVP want to be the junior partner in a coalition under Kickl when they could be the senior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ?

Kickl has very far-reaching ideas about transforming the state, heavily influenced by the Hungarian model, which are not aligned with the interests of the ÖVP. This would likely result in constant conflict, with the ÖVP being forced to explain the radical actions of the FPÖ, as they have had to do in the past. ÖVP leader Karl Nehammer has ruled out such a coalition so many times that it seems almost impossible for him to go back on that promise—unless he is forced out, which I don’t see happening.

If the ÖVP comes in first and the FPÖ is a close second, the likelihood of a coalition between the ÖVP and the FPÖ increases. In that scenario, Kickl might not insist on becoming Chancellor since his party didn’t win, and he could remain the head of the faction in Parliament while playing both an opposition and government role. The FPÖ is not monolithic; there are members who could be appointed to government positions. In fact, in two Austrian states, including Salzburg, the FPÖ is already in coalition with the Conservatives, so there are experienced individuals who could step up at the national level.

Regardless of what happens, the FPÖ would need to enter a coalition, which would likely dilute its agenda. However, if the FPÖ were to secure the Chancellorship and the Foreign Ministry, it would have significant implications for the European Union. Although Austria is not a major power, a government led by the FPÖ, alongside other like-minded governments such as those of Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Robert Fico in Slovakia, could complicate EU policymaking, particularly on issues like sanctions against Russia, which the FPÖ opposes, or the Green Deal. The more governments embrace FPÖ-like positions, the more difficult it becomes to achieve consensus on critical European policies.

At this stage, I see the radical right as spoilers rather than as architects or agenda setters, at least not on the European level. They can disrupt important initiatives and use certain issues as bargaining chips to extract concessions. The FPÖ could potentially leverage Austria’s role in the EU, although I don’t see that as a likely scenario.

One unknown factor that could play a significant role is the Austrian President. The President has powers comparable to those of the French President, although he typically does not exercise them. However, President Alexander Van der Bellen, who is in his second term and has a popular mandate, has already announced that he would not appoint Kickl as Chancellor and that he would insist on a pro-European government. These declarations could factor heavily into the calculations of the different parties. Since Van der Bellen is from the Green Party and not aligned with the parties likely to emerge on top in the elections, his potential actions remain a significant unknown that could greatly influence the outcome.

FPÖ’s Success Would Be Seen as a Positive Signal by Putin

Media outlet Politico argues that ‘most worryingly, an FPÖ win would establish a populist, Russia-friendly Central European bloc stretching from Ukraine’s border with Slovakia and Hungary to Austria’s frontier with Switzerland, making it easier for President Vladimir Putin to sow discontent at the heart of Europe.’ Do you think a win by FPÖ will create for Putin to make more inroads to EU?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: I would say yes, but with some qualifications. For this scenario to fully materialize, the FPÖ would need to gain 50% of the vote, which I don’t see happening. Additionally, I don’t see any coalition partner the FPÖ could align with that would fully support a pro-Russia stance. Even the Conservatives have defended Ukraine and criticized Russia, so the FPÖ wouldn’t be able to push this agenda on its own.

However, the election or success of a pro-Russian party, or a party friendly to Russia, would certainly be seen as a positive signal by Putin. It would be another piece in the puzzle for Russia, absolutely. If this trend continues, it could indeed lead to closer alignment with Putin.

That said, the upcoming US election is likely to be a much bigger issue on the global stage and will likely overshadow whatever happens in Austria. Given the lengthy negotiations that typically follow Austrian elections, it’s possible that the US election will be over before a new Austrian government is even formed. While the potential for increased Russian influence is there, the FPÖ would need to become much stronger to significantly impact EU-Russia relations. There would also be considerable pushback within Austria against such a shift.

FPÖ Leader Kickl: The Law Must Follow Politics

Some in Austria’s establishment believe that Herbert Kickl, the leader of FPÖ, would inevitably moderate should the FPÖ gain power, à la Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the far-right Brothers of Italy, who has taken a more pragmatic course than most expected since becoming Italy’s prime minister two years ago. Do you think we can witness a ‘Melonization of Kickle’ should FPÖ win the elections?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Generally, I’m not an alarmist, and I’ve always viewed the radical right as a more heterogeneous group. I should also disclose that one of the radical right leadership figures was a student of mine and I’ve known her for a long time. I’m not suggesting that we’re dealing with pure evil here. However, I do think we should take people at their word. I’m very much persuaded that when people make certain announcements, they mean what they say. When it comes to Kickl, we don’t know much about him, which is surprising for a political figure with his longevity and standing. He has no close allies within the party and we can’t look into his soul.

That said, he is one of the best communicators in Austrian politics. He’s extremely clever and was once known as the brain behind the previous party leader, the architect of many of the hard-right slogans. He skillfully peddles conspiracy theories and uses them to his advantage, but he’s also extremely disciplined. Kickl can tailor his message and say tough, often troubling things with a calm and reflective demeanor.

I believe he has an overarching agenda, one that involves fundamentally changing Austria and the European Union, if given the chance. I don’t think he’s simply interested in power for its own sake. Unlike other leaders who are content with a bit of glory and power, Kickl seems to have a mission. I take him seriously when he speaks about his goals.

If given the opportunity, I think he would go as far as he could to implement his agenda. If not, he might easily shift his stance and claim that his intentions were misunderstood. His brief tenure as Minister of the Interior was quite chilling; for instance, he once stated that “the law must follow politics,” rather than politics adhering to the Constitution. This gives us some insight into his mindset.

So, I believe it’s legitimate to be concerned about the extent of power Kickl might attain. He has surrounded himself with ideologically driven individuals who have become quite dogmatic. He has also used Nazi-era terminology, such as describing himself as a “Volkskanzler” (People’s Chancellor) and claims to represent a silent majority of Austrians. Despite the FPÖ garnering only around 27% of the vote, and survey after survey showing that the majority of Austrians are opposed to the Freedom Party being in government— with Kickl consistently ranking at the bottom of public trust indices—his discourse creates a distinctly different impression.

MGP15

Mapping Global Populism — Panel XV: Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeMultimediaVideos

Moderator

Dr. Simon P Watmough (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS).

Speakers

“Counter-extremism and Authoritarian Governance in Tajikistan,” by Dr. Hélène Thibault (Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan).

“The Taliban’s Totalitarian Regime: Governance, Extremism, and Control,”  by Dr. Zakia Adeli (Deputy Minister of Justice of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kabul University (2018-2021) before joining East-West Center).

“The Rise of Populism in Iran: Inequality, Class Conflict, and Nationalist Authoritarianism,” by Amir Hossein Mahdavi (Ph.D. candidate at Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut).

 

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

Professor Abramowitz: Signs Indicate Polarization in the US Could Lead to Violence If Trump Loses

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Reflecting on the deeply polarized political landscape in the US, Professor Alan Abramowitz warns, “As we approach the 2024 election, there are signals that this polarization could again lead to violence, particularly if Trump loses the election.” His concerns stem from Donald Trump’s rhetoric, where Trump has already suggested that any loss would be due to fraud, effectively claiming the election would be stolen from him. Looking ahead to the 2024 election, Professor Abramowitz predicts a tight race, with Kamala Harris likely to win by a narrow margin. However, he cautions that the dynamics of the Electoral College could result in a repeat of 2016, where the popular vote and the electoral outcome diverge.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a compelling interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), political scientist Dr. Alan I. Abramowitz, Alben W. Barkley Professor Emeritus at Emory College of Arts and Sciences, sheds light on the critical state of American democracy as the 2024 election approaches. Reflecting on the deeply polarized political landscape, Professor Abramowitz warns, “As we approach the 2024 election, there are signals that this polarization could again lead to violence, particularly if Trump loses the election.” His concerns are grounded in the rhetoric of Donald Trump, who has already suggested that any loss would be due to fraud, effectively claiming the election would be stolen from him. “This kind of rhetoric raises serious concerns about the potential for another outbreak of violence,” Abramowitz notes, emphasizing that while the events may not mirror January 6, the risk remains substantial, fueled by the provocative language of Trump and his allies, including his vice-presidential candidate, J.D. Vance.

Professor Abramowitz’s analysis highlights the unprecedented challenges facing American democracy. He points to the January 6, 2021, Capitol attack as a stark example of the violent potential of current political divisions, but he also expresses concern about other disturbing trends, including assassination attempts on former President Trump. These incidents, while rooted in complex motivations, are symptomatic of a nation deeply divided. “We tend to see things like that in times of deep division and polarization,” Abramowitz observes, adding that the normalization of such extreme actions is a dangerous precedent.

Looking ahead to the 2024 election, Professor Abramowitz predicts a tight race, with Kamala Harris likely to win by a narrow margin. However, he cautions that the dynamics of the Electoral College could result in a repeat of 2016, where the popular vote and the electoral outcome diverge. “There’s a real possibility that Harris could win the national popular vote but lose the electoral vote,” he states, underscoring the uncertainty and tension that will define the upcoming election.

Through his detailed examination of the current political climate, Professor Abramowitz provides a sobering assessment of the threats to American democracy. His insights offer a crucial perspective on the risks posed by heightened polarization and the potential consequences of another Trump presidency.

Political scientist Dr. Alan I. Abramowitz is an Alben W. Barkley Professor Emeritus at Emory College of Arts and Sciences.


Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Alan Abramowitz with some edits.

Trend Towards Heightened Polarization and Negative Partisanship to Continue

Professor Abramowitz, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me begin right away with the first question. In your work, you’ve emphasized the growing influence of negative partisanship in American politics, where voters are increasingly motivated by opposition to the other party rather than support for their own. You’ve particularly noted the significant role of racial resentment in shaping the voting behavior of white working-class voters in the 2016 election. Given the current demographic trends, how do you see this dynamic evolving in the upcoming 2024 election, especially considering the increasing diversity of the American electorate?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Well, I believe we’ll continue to see a trend towards heightened polarization and negative partisanship. The polling data for the 2024 election already indicates this, and I expect we’ll see even more evidence as post-election data becomes available. It’s quite evident that the messaging from the two major party candidates, particularly from Donald Trump, is heavily focused on negative attacks. Trump emphasizes opposition to the other party, portraying figures like Kamala Harris as dangerously radical and painting the Democratic Party as being far to the left. Trump aims to depict Democrats as a threat to the way of life for ordinary Americans, particularly those who support him.

On the other side, we also see a fair share of negativity. While Harris’s messaging has included more positive elements as she introduces herself to the American electorate, given that she isn’t as well-known as Trump, there is still a substantial amount of negative content. This includes strong criticisms of Trump’s positions on various issues, as well as of Trump himself—his personality, behavior and the fact that he has been convicted of criminal behavior, among other things.

Given the negative attacks from both sides, the deep mistrust and the intense dislike that each side has for the opposing party and its candidates, I think we’re likely to see a continuation and possibly even an intensification, of this trend toward negative partisanship.

Polarization Could Lead to Violence If Trump Loses

Can you give us a historical perspective into periods of intense political polarization in US history? What was so different in the Trump presidency?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: We’ve certainly experienced periods of intense division and polarization in American history. The Civil War era is an obvious example—perhaps the most well-known—where the nation was deeply divided, especially over the issue of slavery, which ultimately led to several states seceding from the Union and resulted in a very bloody civil war.

Even earlier, the post-Revolutionary period was marked by intense polarization, with leaders of the two major parties at the time—the Democratic-Republicans and the Federalists—deeply mistrusting and disliking each other. However, the Civil War era stands out as a time when the country was so profoundly split that it led to an actual conflict.

In the last 20 to 30 years, American politics has entered another period of intense polarization. While this polarization has not resulted in a civil war, it has led to a significant rise in intense dislike and vilification of the opposing party and its leaders. Negative attacks against party leaders are common, and we also see a very divided media landscape, which exacerbates this polarization. Supporters of the two major parties often rely on different sources of information that reinforce their existing beliefs, leading to a lack of a common base of knowledge—something we had more of 30 or 40 years ago.

One of the most alarming developments from this polarization has been the outbreaks of violence. The most notable example is the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol, where supporters of President Trump, incited by his rhetoric, stormed the Capitol and engaged in violent confrontations with law enforcement, resulting in numerous injuries and several deaths.

While that is the most obvious example, there have been other troubling signs, such as recent assassination attempts on former President Trump. Though the motives behind these attempts are not entirely clear, they reflect the intense divisions within the country.

As we approach the 2024 election, there are signals that this polarization could again lead to violence, particularly if Trump loses the election. Trump has already indicated that he may not accept the election results, claiming that the only way he could lose is through fraud, effectively saying that the election would be stolen from him. This kind of rhetoric raises serious concerns about the potential for another outbreak of violence. While it may not take the exact same form as the events of January 6, given that the federal government and security forces will be better prepared, the risk of violence remains significant, driven by the rhetoric of Trump and some of his political allies, including his vice-presidential candidate, J.D. Vance.

Your research mentions the role of partisan media in reinforcing negative partisanship. With the rise of social media and alternative news platforms, how do you see media influence evolving in shaping voter behavior? Are there any interventions that could mitigate the polarizing effects of media?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: The media environment today remains highly polarized. We see that supporters of Republican and Democratic candidates generally receive their information from very different sources. For example, supporters of Vice President Harris and other Democratic candidates tend to rely on mainstream media outlets, such as the major news networks and CNN, as well as outlets with a clear liberal slant, like MSNBC. In contrast, supporters of former President Trump and other Republican candidates disproportionately get their information from sources with a strong conservative slant, particularly Fox News, but also from other online platforms like Newsmax and similar sites with a clear conservative bias.

This creates an environment where voters’ perceptions and views of the election and the candidates are continually reinforced by the media messages they consume. This is especially true with right-wing media outlets, where Fox News plays a significant role, but even more extreme sources are also contributing. A concerning aspect of this is the spread of misinformation, which we currently see disproportionately coming from the right in the United States. This misinformation includes false claims, such as those advanced by Trump about the 2020 election being stolen or the dangers posed by immigrants—claims that are not only untrue but also potentially dangerous.

While there is certainly slanted news coverage from some media outlets on the left, such as MSNBC and other liberal-leaning platforms, we don’t see the same level of misinformation, particularly the kind that could incite violence, to the extent that we do on the right. The intensity and potential consequences of misinformation from right-wing sources are far more pronounced.

‘Electoral College Roulette’ Could Result in a Repeat of 2016

US presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Photo: Shutterstock.

You argue that Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election was one of the most shocking upsets in American electoral history. Can you elaborate on why you describe it as one of the most shocking?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Well, heading into the 2016 election, the available polling data indicated that Hillary Clinton was a strong favorite. Nationally, she appeared to have a solid lead and she was also ahead of Trump, albeit by a narrow margin, in almost all of the key swing states that would ultimately decide the election in the Electoral College.

However, the outcome defied these expectations. The polls in several crucial swing states, particularly Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania, were off, showing Clinton with a lead of 2 to 4 points when, in reality, those states swung to Trump by narrow margins. These unexpected shifts in the swing states are what ultimately tilted the Electoral College in Trump’s favor.

This situation highlights a phenomenon I refer to as “Electoral College roulette.” When the national popular vote margin is relatively close—within 2, 3 or even 4 points—the election’s outcome hinges on a small number of swing states. This was true in both 2016 and 2020. Even though Joe Biden won the national popular vote by about 4.5 points in 2020, which would normally suggest a comfortable victory in the Electoral College, his actual Electoral College margin was much narrower due to the close results in those same swing states—Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona, Nevada and North Carolina. These are the same states likely to determine the outcome in the next election.

As we approach the 2024 election, Kamala Harris appears to have a modest lead nationally—about 3 points on average. But, as in 2016, the margins in the key swing states are extremely tight, making the outcome unpredictable. Harris could potentially win the popular vote by a comfortable margin, yet Donald Trump could still emerge as the winner in the Electoral College. So, while we’re not predicting this outcome, there’s a significant chance that something similar to 2016 could happen again.

Do you consider Trump’s presidency (2016-2020) caused irreparable damage to American democracy?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Yes, I believe Trump’s presidency has inflicted significant damage on American democracy. In modern times, no other defeated presidential candidate has refused to accept the results of an election to the extent that Trump did. Not only did he refuse to concede after the election, but he also actively sought to overturn the results. He encouraged his supporters in swing states to challenge the election outcomes, pushed for the creation of slates of false electors in several of those states and, most notably, incited the violent attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021.

These actions were unprecedented in modern American history. We have never seen a defeated presidential candidate behave in this manner. And now, as we approach another election, Trump is once again signaling that he might refuse to accept the results if he loses. His rhetoric often includes violent language, raising concerns that he could incite his supporters to act violently if the election doesn’t go his way.

While the deep divisions in American society and politics didn’t begin with Trump, they have certainly been exacerbated by him. Over the past several decades, the two major parties have grown increasingly divided along ideological lines, with highly emotional and divisive issues like abortion and gay rights, in addition to traditional economic issues, fueling this conflict. Trump capitalized on these divisions to gain control of the Republican Party and win the presidency in 2016. His presidency, and now his post-presidency, particularly the type of campaign he’s running for 2024, have further deepened these divisions, greatly increasing the risk that they could lead to violence.

Trump’s Rhetoric Marks a Significant Shift from the Republican Party’s Traditional Stance

Can you explain how racial resentment, negative partisanship and polarization under Trump’s presidency shaped the US politics and democracy?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: One of the key factors behind Trump’s appeal to a significant segment of white working-class voters in the United States is the dramatic transformation the country has been undergoing over the past several decades, particularly in terms of its racial and ethnic makeup. The US population is becoming increasingly diverse and the proportion of non-Hispanic whites in the population—and the electorate—has been steadily declining. It’s projected that within the next decade or two, non-Hispanic whites will make up less than 50% of the population, a threshold already crossed in several states like California and Texas.

This demographic shift is perceived as threatening by some members of the white population, which is no longer growing and may soon begin to decline. There’s a fear among this group that the country is being taken over by people who do not look like them or share their values. Trump has capitalized on these fears, using them to deepen divisions and present them as existential threats.

For instance, when discussing immigration, Trump often portrays immigrants in a highly negative light, characterizing them as criminals or individuals coming from prisons and mental institutions who are taking over cities and contributing to high levels of violence. He has even made outlandish and entirely false claims, such as Haitian immigrants in Ohio killing and eating people’s pets. Despite the absurdity of these claims, Trump continues to promote them and his vice-presidential candidate, J.D. Vance, along with other Republican figures, either echo these falsehoods or refuse to contradict them.

These kinds of divisive and fear-mongering messages resonate with a significant, though not majority, portion of the American electorate—those who score high on measures of racial resentment. Racial resentment in this context isn’t just about attitudes toward African Americans; it’s also about anxiety over the broader transformation of American society, particularly as it relates to immigration. Over the last several decades, the US has seen a large influx of immigrants, which has caused strains similar to those observed in Europe. Trump and other right-wing populist leaders have exploited these fears, portraying immigration as a threat to the economic well-being, values and even physical safety of the formerly dominant white population, especially those with lower levels of education.

This rhetoric marks a significant departure from the Republican Party’s stance 30 or 40 years ago. Even conservative politicians like Ronald Reagan did not talk about immigration in such negative terms. Historically, the Republican Party had a more favorable stance toward immigration, but under Trump’s influence, this has dramatically changed, with racial resentment and negative partisanship becoming central elements of the party’s messaging. 

Given your concerns about the risks of democratic backsliding in the United States, particularly under the influence of increasing polarization, what specific institutional reforms do you believe could help strengthen democratic norms and reduce the likelihood of further erosion?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Some important steps have already been taken, such as the reforms enacted to improve the process of counting the electoral vote, aiming to ensure that it occurs more smoothly and is less vulnerable to the kinds of attacks and disruptions we witnessed after the 2020 election. However, additional measures are necessary, particularly at the state and local levels, to further safeguard our democracy.

Protecting election workers, ensuring that elections are conducted safely and guaranteeing that votes are counted accurately are critical steps. Additionally, efforts to counteract the threat of violence during the election process are essential.

In the longer run, one significant reform that could help minimize the chances of disruptions would be to abolish the Electoral College entirely and move to a direct popular election of the President. This is something the US has come close to considering in the past, but it now seems quite distant. Establishing a more direct connection between the popular vote and the choice of the President would, in my view, reduce the opportunities for manipulation and attacks on the democratic process, as we’ve seen in recent elections.

New Assassination Attempts Could Potentially Target Leaders on Both Sides

Headlines in New York newspapers report on the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump on July 14, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Do you attribute the reason of two assassination attempts on Trump to the affective polarization in American politics? What role did Trump play in deepening the polarization?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Yes, I believe Trump has been a significant factor in deepening polarization, particularly through his rhetoric. He has heavily emphasized portraying the opposition party and its leaders as existential threats to democracy and to the way of life of his supporters. This has greatly exacerbated the divisions that were already present in American society.

It’s difficult to say exactly what motivated the individuals behind the assassination attempts, but such actions tend to occur during times of deep division and polarization. Trump is undeniably a very divisive and polarizing figure, but we shouldn’t assume that future assassination attempts will be limited to him. Once the idea takes hold that it’s possible to target and attempt to kill a political leader, it could potentially happen to leaders on either side of the political spectrum.

This is a very dangerous situation and it underscores the importance of ensuring adequate security for political candidates. There have been efforts to enhance security measures to protect candidates when they are in public, but it’s worth noting that the United States has a long history of assassination attempts, some of which have been successful, dating back many years. What’s new is the sophistication of the weaponry available today. The accessibility of high-powered, military-style weapons increases the risk because someone no longer needs to be in close proximity to carry out an assassination. As we’ve seen in these recent attempts, an assailant could potentially strike from several hundred yards away if they have a clear line of sight.

There are pundits who argue that a second Trump administration will damage more seriously the American democracy than the first one. Where do you stand in this debate?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: I absolutely agree with that assessment. We’re already seeing clear signs from Trump and his supporters indicating that a second Trump administration would involve serious attempts to undermine American democracy. During his first term, Trump made efforts to target his political opponents, even pushing for their prosecution. However, he was often restrained by key individuals around him, including his own advisers, the Attorney General and the heads of agencies like the FBI, who refused to carry out his more extreme demands.

In a second Trump presidency, I believe this restraint would be far less likely. Trump and his allies have been actively seeking individuals who would be more willing to go along with his wishes, individuals who would not stand in his way if he returned to the White House. His primary motivation seems to be revenge—against his political enemies—and I think he would be much less restrained in pursuing that agenda.

There’s a very real risk that we could see serious attempts to prosecute individuals simply for opposing Trump politically. This threat wouldn’t just be limited to leaders of the opposition party but could also extend to media outlets that have been critical of Trump. 

Harris Is Expected to Win the Election by a Very Narrow Margin

There are institutions like V-Dem which argue that American democracy may not survive a second Trump administration? What will happen to American democracy and its liberal order if Trump re-elected on November 5? 

Professor Alan Abramowitz: As I mentioned earlier, there’s a great risk that a second Trump administration would seriously undermine American democracy. This could manifest in attempts to erode free and fair elections and misuse the powers of the presidency and the executive branch to target political opponents and intimidate those who oppose him.

While I believe there would be strong pushback against such efforts—it’s unlikely these actions would be met with passive acceptance—the potential consequences are worrisome. One of the biggest risks is that this situation could escalate into some form of violence, which is a deeply concerning prospect.

It’s difficult to predict the exact outcome, but I don’t necessarily believe it would mean the outright end of American democracy. However, it would certainly pose serious threats to the integrity of our elections, the Justice Department and other key government agencies. These institutions could become highly politicized, which would undermine their ability to function independently and effectively.

For instance, even something like the Federal Reserve, which is supposed to operate independently, could be at risk. Trump has indicated a desire to exert control over the Federal Reserve, preferring someone who would follow his directives rather than making independent decisions about critical issues like interest rates. It could have severe implications for the future of the American economy.

You accurately predicted the result of the 2020 presidential election by modifying the time-for-change model. What is your prediction for the upcoming November 5 election, perhaps using the incumbent-referendum model?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: In fact, I have used the original model to predict both the popular vote and the electoral vote for the upcoming election. According to my prediction, Kamala Harris is expected to win the election by a very narrow margin—somewhere between 2.5 and 3 points in the national popular vote, and with 280 to 290 electoral votes. This is a close margin, which means there is a significant amount of uncertainty in the prediction. When you have a margin this tight, whether in a poll or a forecasting model, it’s difficult to have a high degree of confidence in the outcome.

I would say the chances are better than 50-50 that Kamala Harris will win, but not significantly higher than that. If we were choosing the president based solely on the national popular vote, I would estimate a 90% chance of Harris winning. However, since the election is decided by the Electoral College and given that the swing states are more competitive than the nation as a whole, there’s a real possibility that Harris could win the national popular vote but lose the electoral vote. I’m not predicting that this will happen, but I do think there’s a reasonable chance it could.

Volunteers of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on Vijyadashmi festival, a large gathering or annual meeting during Ramanavami a Hindu festival in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh on October 19, 2018. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.

Saffron Republic – Hindu Nationalism and State Power in India

by Book ReviewsEditor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeHuman Rights

Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “Saffron Republic – Hindu Nationalism and State Power in India.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. September 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0019

 

The book edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Srirupa Roy offers a critical examination of the rise and entrenchment of New Hindutva as a dominant force in Indian politics, providing an in-depth analysis of its implications for democracy, social cohesion, and the secular fabric of the nation. By critically examining the ideological foundations and practices of New Hindutva, the authors reveal the complexities and contradictions inherent in its project of constructing a Hindu majoritarian state. Ultimately, Saffron Republic serves as an essential resource for understanding the broader implications of Hindu nationalism’s ascendancy, particularly its impact on the erosion of democratic principles, the marginalization of minority communities, and the reconfiguration of Indian national identity. The book’s scholarly rigor and interdisciplinary approach make it an indispensable contribution to contemporary debates on populism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and the future of democracy in India.

Reviewed by Bulent Kenes

The book Saffron Republic – Hindu Nationalism and State Power in India, edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Srirupa Roy, examines the phenomenon of contemporary Hindu nationalism or ‘new Hindutva’ that is presently the dominant ideological and political-electoral formation in India. There is a rich body of work on Hindu nationalism, but its main focus is on an earlier moment of insurgent movement politics in the 1980s and 1990s. In contrast, new Hindutva is a governmental formation that converges with wider global currents and enjoys mainstream acceptance. To understand these new political forms and their implications for democratic futures, a fresh set of reflections is in order. This book approaches contemporary Hindutva as an example of a democratic authoritarianism or an authoritarian populism, a politics that simultaneously advances and violates ideas and practices of popular and constitutional democracy. Therefore, this volume is crucial for understanding the ideological and political transformations within India since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and Narendra Modi came to power in 2014. 

The book seeks to explore and explain key questions surrounding the rise of Hindutva and its impact on India’s electoral democracy. It examines the causes and consequences of the ascent of Hindu nationalist organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) within a competitive democratic framework. The book also investigates the transition from nationalist mobilization to authoritarian populist governance, questioning what changes when Hindu nationalism becomes the mechanism of rule rather than protest. Additionally, it delves into how civilizational boundaries are defined, the nature of the Indic identity, and what constitutes the Indian way of life—a central concept in civilizational discourse. The book further explores how the core tenets of Hindutva have become ingrained in everyday common sense and widespread sentiment, enabling the BJP to maintain and expand its influence across northern, central, and western India for over three decades. 

The authors, Hansen and Roy, structure the book around four key themes: rule, articulation, inclusion, and violence, each representing a facet of New Hindutva. The discussion of “rule” highlights how the BJP, since coming to power in 2014, has engaged in practices of institutional capture and bypass, filling key positions with ideologically loyal individuals and undermining democratic checks and balances. The theme of “articulation” explores how Hindutva has become embedded in the social and spatial fabric of India, particularly in regions where anti-minority sentiments have been normalized. The “inclusion” theme examines the strategic incorporation of marginalized groups into the Hindutva fold, while “violence” addresses the central role of anti-Muslim violence in the project of Hindu nationalism.

The opening chapter of Saffron Republic, titled “What Is New about ‘New Hindutva’?” by Thomas Blom Hansen and Srirupa Roy, offers a deep exploration of the evolution of Hindu nationalism into a dominant ideological force in contemporary India. Hansen and Roy argue that New Hindutva marks a shift from a movement-based identity project to an institutionalized form of governance embedded within state structures. The chapter traces the transition from the insurgent mass mobilizations of the 1980s and 1990s—often centered around temple-building and religious identity—to the present-day governmental formation known as New Hindutva, which has gained significant institutional power and mainstream acceptance.

The authors emphasize that contemporary Hindu nationalism under New Hindutva differs markedly from its earlier versions. While cultural and religious identity remain central, the movement now also prioritizes economic and foreign policy initiatives. Hansen and Roy contend that New Hindutva embodies a form of democratic authoritarianism or authoritarian populism, paradoxically advancing and undermining democratic principles simultaneously. This governance style utilizes the mechanisms of constitutional democracy to legitimize and entrench its power, while gradually eroding the foundational norms of democratic governance.

The chapter reflects on the scholarly engagement with Hindu nationalism over the decades, noting that earlier studies primarily focused on the movement’s role in social engineering and identity formation. In contrast, the current scholarly focus has shifted to understanding how Hindu nationalism, now embedded in state power, seeks to transform India into a Hindu state. This transformation has led to the consolidation of Hindutva ideology across various societal domains, effectively blurring the distinction between a secular democracy and a majoritarian Hindu state. Overall, this chapter provides a compelling framework for understanding the multifaceted nature of New Hindutva, offering valuable insights into its ideological underpinnings and its efforts to reshape Indian society and politics. The authors’ analysis is both thorough and timely, making it an essential read for anyone interested in the current political landscape of India.

In Chapter 2, “New Hindutva Timeline: September 2013–October 2020” by Ashwin Subramanian, provides a detailed timeline of key events that have shaped the trajectory of New Hindutva, focusing on the period from September 2013 to October 2020. Subramanian highlights significant policy changes, legal reforms, and major incidents that have reinforced the BJP’s ideological project. This chronological overview serves as a useful reference for understanding the political and social milestones of Hindutva’s ascent to power.

In the chapter titled “Normalizing Violence: Lessons from Hindu Nationalist India,” Amrita Basu offers a compelling analysis of the evolving nature and growing normalization of violence under Hindu nationalism in contemporary India. Basu highlights how the RSS and its affiliates, which once orchestrated communal riots through carefully engineered rumors, now rely on decentralized acts of violence fueled by grassroots Hindutva sentiment. This shift reflects a broader societal acceptance of violence, particularly against religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians, as well as Dalits, women, and intellectuals who challenge the prevailing orthodoxy.

Basu argues that this normalization is deeply rooted in the current political environment, where the BJP under Modi has effectively blurred the lines between state and religion. By promoting leaders who endorse violence and enacting laws that implicitly encourage it, the BJP has created a climate where violence is not only tolerated but also justified as a defense of Hindu identity. Basu emphasizes that this violence serves to enforce upper-caste dominance and align Hindu nationalism with Indian nationalism, thereby redefining the boundaries of citizenship and nationhood. The chapter effectively illustrates how this modality of violence impacts not only the immediate targets but also the broader social fabric, signaling to minorities and dissenters that their place in society is conditional on their adherence to Hindu norms. Basu’s analysis is crucial for understanding the implications of Hindutva violence on the reconstitution of social identities and the erosion of democratic principles in India.

In Chapter 4, “Hindutva Establishments: Right-Wing Think Tanks and the Mainstreaming of Governmental Hindutva,” Srirupa Roy examines the transformation of Hindu nationalism into a governing ideology since the BJP’s rise to power in 2014. Roy highlights the pivotal role of right-wing think tanks in this shift, arguing that they have been instrumental in legitimizing and embedding Hindutva within India’s political mainstream. These think tanks function by translating Hindutva themes into the language of governance, connecting nationalist actors with existing power structures, and using strategic visibility and secrecy to advance their agenda. Roy also discusses the concept of “civilizational power,” used by these think tanks to subtly reframe Indian identity around Hindu values while marginalizing non-Hindu communities. This approach allows Hindutva to present itself as both modern and rooted in tradition, appealing to a broad spectrum of the Indian elite. The chapter offers a critical analysis of how Hindu nationalism has moved from the fringes to the center of Indian politics, raising concerns about the implications for democratic governance. Roy’s insights provide a deep understanding of the institutionalization of right-wing populism in contemporary India.

In Chapter 5, titled “New Hindutva and the ‘UP Model,’” Srirupa Roy and Thomas Blom Hansen present a revealing interview with journalist Neha Dixit and filmmaker Nakul Sawhney, exploring the institutionalization of Hindu nationalist ideologies in Uttar Pradesh under Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath. Dixit and Sawhney discuss the normalization of anti-minority violence, the politicization of law enforcement, and the consolidation of a Hindu majoritarian state in the region. The chapter illuminates how previously fringe practices, such as the “Love Jihad” narrative, have become formalized, and how state power is used to target dissenters, particularly Muslims, Dalits, and other marginalized groups. The interview highlights the growing complicity of the police in enforcing Hindutva agendas, the suppression of free speech, and the normalization of media censorship and self-censorship. These insights underscore the broader implications of the “UP Model” as a microcosm of authoritarian populism in India, raising critical concerns about the erosion of democratic principles and civil liberties under the guise of governance.

In Chapter 6, “The Making of a Majoritarian Metropolis: Crowd Action, Public Order, and Communal Zoning in Calcutta,” Ritajyoti Bandyopadhyay explores the historical processes that have transformed Calcutta into a majoritarian city, where Hindu dominance over urban space has become normalized. The chapter traces the marginalization and ghettoization of Muslims following the Partition of India in 1947 and examines how these developments laid the groundwork for the rise of Hindutva in the city. Bandyopadhyay argues that communal zoning and the systematic exclusion of Muslims from key areas have created a “majoritarian common sense” that shapes everyday urban life. The chapter reveals how long-standing societal divisions and tacit violence have facilitated the contemporary rise of Hindutva, making it an integral part of Calcutta’s socio-political landscape. The chapter offers a critical approach on how historical segregation and the normalization of communal identities continue to influence urban governance and electoral politics in the city today.

In Chapter 7, “Social Segregation and Everyday Hindutva in Middle India,” Thomas Blom Hansen provides a nuanced exploration of how Hindutva ideology has been deeply embedded in the everyday life and social structures of northern and western India, particularly in the city of Aurangabad. Through longitudinal fieldwork, Hansen examines the historical and contemporary processes that have led to the spatial and social segregation of Muslims and Hindus, highlighting how the rise of Hindu nationalism has co-opted and amplified pre-existing social divisions. The chapter emphasizes the role of industrial growth in reinforcing these divisions, as Muslims and Dalits were systematically excluded from economic opportunities, further entrenching their marginalization. Hansen argues that Hindutva’s success lies in its ability to adapt to local contexts, merging historical narratives of conflict with contemporary political agendas. This chapter offers a nuanced analysis of how Hindu nationalism has permeated the socio-economic and cultural fabric, as well as the everyday life, of middle India.

In Chapter 8, titled “‘Mitakuye Oyasin – We Are All Related’: Hindutva and Indigeneity in Northeast India,” author Arkotong Longkumer explores the intersection of Hindutva ideology with indigenous traditions in Northeast India and its international dimensions. Longkumer examines how Hindutva seeks to co-opt indigenous identities by aligning them with Hindu cultural and religious frameworks, thereby integrating them into a broader Hindu universe. The chapter delves into the strategic use of indigenous symbols, land, and rituals to strengthen Hindu nationalist narratives, particularly through organizations like the RSS, RIWATCH, and the International Center for Cultural Studies (ICCS), which operate both domestically and internationally. The ICCS, for example, is involved in fostering connections between Hindu nationalism and indigenous movements globally, promoting the idea that Hinduism shares common ground with various indigenous and pagan traditions around the world. This alignment is presented as a form of cultural nationalism that supports a universalizing narrative of Hindutva, while simultaneously challenging the distinctiveness of indigenous practices. Longkumer provides critical insights into how these international linkages reinforce Hindutva’s ideological expansion and cultural appropriation, complicating the relationship between indigenous identities and the homogenizing impulses of Hindu nationalism.

In Chapter 9, “From Castes to Nationalist Hindus: The Making of Hinduism as a Civil Religion,” Suryakant Waghmore explores how Hindutva has transformed Hinduism into a civil religion that merges religious identity with nationalist ideology. Waghmore critiques the common distinction between Hinduism and Hindutva, arguing that Hindutva has not only survived but thrived by integrating caste into a broader nationalist project. The chapter emphasizes how Hindutva strategically co-opts elements of Hinduism, particularly by downplaying caste hierarchies and promoting Hindu solidarity against external threats, such as Muslims and Christians. This transformation aims to create a unified, modernized Hindu identity that aligns with the values of nationalism, equality, and progress. However, Waghmore notes the inherent contradictions in this project, as caste remains deeply entrenched in Hinduism’s social fabric. 

In Chapter 10, “When Hindutva Performs Muslimness: Ethnographic Encounters with the Muslim Rashtriya Manch,” Lalit Vachani provides a critical analysis of the RSS’s Muslim outreach initiative through the formation of the Muslim Rashtriya Manch (MRM, Muslim National Forum). Vachani argues that the MRM’s primary function is not genuine inclusion but rather a performative strategy aimed at projecting a sanitized, compliant version of Indian Muslims that aligns with the RSS’s Hindu nationalist agenda. This chapter highlights how the MRM stages symbolic acts of Muslim participation in Hindu cultural practices to create a narrative of “inclusive Hindutva,” while simultaneously reinforcing the marginalization and secondary citizenship of Muslims. Vachani emphasizes that these performances are primarily designed for a Hindu audience, serving to legitimize the RSS’s broader majoritarian projects and deflect criticism. The chapter exposes the instrumentalization of Muslim identity within the framework of Hindutva, highlighting the complexities and contradictions inherent in the RSS’s outreach efforts.

In Chapter 11, “Violence after Violence: The Politics of Narratives over the Delhi Pogrom,” Irfan Ahmad critically examines the terminology used to describe communal violence, specifically focusing on the events of February 2020 in Delhi, which he argues should be accurately termed a “pogrom” rather than a “riot.” Ahmad challenges the pervasive nationalist epistemology that often equalizes Hindu and Muslim violence, thereby obscuring the significant power imbalances between these communities. He contends that this false equivalence perpetuates a biased narrative that overlooks the systematic nature of anti-Muslim violence in India. By engaging with historical and contemporary examples, Ahmad illustrates how this nationalist framework shapes both academic discourse and public perception, ultimately contributing to the ongoing marginalization of Muslims. The chapter is a powerful critique of the ways in which language and narrative are manipulated to serve political ends, emphasizing the need for precise terminology to understand and address the root causes of communal violence.

In Chapter 12, “Development: India’s Foundational Myth,” Mona Bhan critically explores the Indian government’s abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A in August 2019, which stripped Jammu and Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status. Bhan argues that this move was justified under the guise of promoting development, yet it is deeply rooted in a settler-colonial agenda aimed at erasing Kashmir’s Muslim-majority identity. The chapter challenges the myth that Kashmir is economically backward and dependent on India, revealing how this narrative has historically been used to legitimize Indian occupation and control. Bhan delves into how development has been weaponized as a tool of demographic warfare, with the intent to displace Kashmiri Muslims and alter the region’s cultural and religious landscape. Through a detailed examination of the economic, political, and ecological impacts of India’s policies in Kashmir, the chapter exposes the broader implications of India’s authoritarian turn under the Modi regime, which seeks to transform Kashmir into a Hindu-majoritarian state.

Although it contains editorial weaknesses, such as unnecessary and lengthy details about the weird speaking style of a Hindu peasant who built a shrine on land that a Muslim saint (pir), who frequently appeared in his dreams, claimed to belong to him in the past, Parvis Ghassem-Fachandi’s Chapter 13, titled “Pratikriya, Guilt, and Reactionary Violence,” offers a critical examination of the 2002 Gujarat pogrom. The chapter focuses on the politics of narrative, particularly the use of terms like “riot” and “pratikriya” (natural reaction) to downplay the severity of anti-Muslim violence. Ghassem-Fachandi argues that such terminology obscures the organized and premeditated nature of the violence, reframing it as a spontaneous response to the Godhra train incident. This narrative shift, he suggests, absolves Hindu perpetrators while placing collective blame on the Muslim community. The chapter also explores the broader socio-political implications, highlighting how this framing facilitated Narendra Modi’s rise to power by exploiting communal tensions and solidifying a majoritarian Hindu identity in Gujarat. Ghassem-Fachandi contends that the lack of public discourse on guilt and accountability has entrenched social divisions and normalized violence in the state’s political landscape.

Overall, Saffron Republic offers a critical examination of the rise and entrenchment of New Hindutva as a dominant force in Indian politics, providing an in-depth analysis of its implications for democracy, social cohesion, and the secular fabric of the nation. The contributors to this volume illuminate how Hindu nationalism have evolved from a fringe movement into a governmental ideology, now deeply embedded within state structures and mainstream political discourse. Through a comprehensive exploration of various regional and national contexts, the book highlights the pervasive influence of Hindutva on India’s socio-political landscape, including the normalization of violence, communal segregation, and the strategic manipulation of narratives that obscure state complicity in acts of violence.

By critically examining the ideological foundations and practices of New Hindutva, the authors reveal the complexities and contradictions inherent in its project of constructing a Hindu majoritarian state. Ultimately, Saffron Republic serves as an essential resource for understanding the broader implications of Hindu nationalism’s ascendancy, particularly its impact on the erosion of democratic principles, the marginalization of minority communities, and the reconfiguration of Indian national identity. The book’s scholarly rigor and interdisciplinary approach make it an indispensable contribution to contemporary debates on populism, nationalism, authoritarianism, and the future of democracy in India.

 

Thomas Blom Hansen & Srirupa Roy. (2022). Saffron Republic – Hindu Nationalism and State Power in India. Cambridge University Press. 330 pp. $99.99, ISBN: 978-1009100489, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009118873

Illustration: Design Rage.

A World of Insecurity: Democratic Disenchantment in Rich and Poor Countries

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Nguijoi, Gabriel Cyrille. (2024). “A World of Insecurity: Democratic Disenchantment in Rich and Poor Countries.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. September 19, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0018

 

In this book, Professor Pranab Bardhan examines the complex interplay between economic and cultural insecurities through a mixture of empirical data and comparative case studies covering different socio-political backgrounds. It emphasizes populist politics by capitalizing on widespread feelings of vulnerability and disenchantment with traditional democratic institutions. Bardhan argues that populists tend to adopt a simplified, emotive rhetoric that appeals to fears of economic displacement, cultural loss, and existential threats, thereby circumventing nuanced, evidence-based discussions on the actual causes of insecurity. Unlike many studies that narrowly focus on economic inequality as the sole driver of populism, Bardhan’s work explores the broader spectrum of insecurities-economic, cultural, and existential-that foster democratic disenchantment. This book makes a significant contribution to the literature by providing a comprehensive, interdisciplinary analysis that enhances our understanding of the multifaceted challenges facing democracies today.

Reviewed by Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi 

How do global societies navigate the increasing complexities and contradictions inherent in democratic governance amidst rising insecurity? What roles do economic anxieties, and cultural tensions play in shaping populist movements across the world? Why is understanding the multifaceted forms of insecurity essential to diagnosing the current democratic crisis? What drives citizens, particularly in diverse socio-political contexts, to place their trust in authoritarian figures who promise stability and protection? 

These are the pressing questions that Pranab Bardhan, Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, addresses in his critical work, A World of Insecurity: Democratic Disenchantment in Rich and Poor Countries. Published by Harvard University Press in 2022, Bardhan’s book offers a comprehensive exploration of the factors driving democratic backsliding and the erosion of civic norms across both developed and developing countries. Drawing on a wealth of empirical data and comparative case studies, Bardhan challenges the prevailing assumption that rising inequality is the sole driver of democratic disenchantment, proposing instead that a broader and deeper sense of insecurity-economic, cultural, and existential is at the core of this global phenomenon. Through a rigorous interdisciplinary approach, Bardhan offers a nuanced analysis that bridges the divide between the experiences of rich and poor countries, demonstrating that the threats to democracy are both universal in their essence and unique in their manifestation.

Bardhan’s exploration begins with an incisive critique of the commonly held belief that economic inequality is the predominant cause of democratic erosion. While acknowledging the importance of inequality, Bardhan shifts the focus toward a more complex web of insecurities that underlie the current discontent with democratic governance. He argues that economic insecurity, which includes job loss, wage stagnation, and the erosion of social safety nets, has fundamentally altered the political landscape in both wealthy and poorer nations. Drawing from recent data from the V-Dem Institute, Freedom House, and other democratic indexes, he notes that the world is witnessing a dramatic rise in “autocratization” with liberal democracies declining in number and influence. Autocracies now govern the majority of the world’s population, and only a small fraction of people live in countries that are becoming more democratic. The author’s argument is that this is not simply the result of increased economic inequality but is deeply tied to broader insecurities that extend beyond the economic domain, encompassing cultural, social, and even existential dimensions.

The book meticulously dissects the interplay between economic insecurity and cultural anxieties. Bardhan emphasizes that the economic anxieties triggered by globalization, automation, and technological disruptions have been compounded by cultural insecurities related to immigration, national identity, and perceived threats to social cohesion. He examines the populist backlash against globalization, noting that while there has been some decline in international trade due to geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions, the more significant issue is the perceived cultural threat posed by immigrants and minorities. Bardhan draws on case studies from various countries, including the United States, India, Brazil, and European nations, to illustrate how populist leaders exploit these insecurities to foster support for authoritarian measures. He highlights how figures like Donald Trump, Narendra Modi, Jair Bolsonaro, Viktor Orbán, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have utilized nationalist rhetoric, historical grievances, and cultural myths to galvanize support and undermine democratic norms. By framing their leadership as a defense against external and internal enemies, these leaders create a narrative of existential threat that justifies the erosion of democratic institutions and civil liberties.

Bardhan’s analysis is particularly compelling in its examination of the dynamics of “majoritarianism” and the way populist leaders manipulate democratic processes to entrench their power. He provides a thorough critique of how elected leaders in countries such as India, Hungary, Turkey, and the United States have systematically undermined judicial independence, curtailed press freedom, and eroded checks and balances to consolidate authority. He argues that these leaders exploit cultural insecurities, presenting themselves as defenders of the “real” people against corrupt elites and dangerous minorities. This tactic resonates strongly with populations experiencing rapid social and economic change, who feel their traditional ways of life are under threat. The author presents evidence that these populist strategies are often successful in garnering mass support, especially in environments where economic insecurities are compounded by cultural fears of displacement and loss.

In addition to his analysis of populism and majoritarianism, Bardhan also tackles the growing attraction to authoritarian capitalism, particularly the “China model.” He explores how China’s perceived economic success has led to a fascination with authoritarian governance in many parts of the world, both among political elites and ordinary citizens who are disillusioned with democratic performance. He critiques the simplistic binary of democracy versus authoritarianism, arguing that the success of the Chinese model is not purely a result of its authoritarian nature but is also due to specific historical, institutional, and policy factors that are not easily replicable elsewhere. He points out that many democratic countries have adopted elements of state-led capitalism, such as strategic state investments in key industries, without abandoning democratic governance. Bardhan thus challenges the notion that authoritarianism is necessary for economic development, arguing instead for a democratic governance model that incorporates strong state capacity and effective public policies to promote social and economic stability.

Throughout the book, he skillfully combines theoretical insights with empirical data to support his arguments. He uses a wealth of examples from different regions to illustrate the universality and specificity of democratic disenchantment. For instance, he draws parallels between the cultural nationalism of Modi’s (India), which seeks to marginalize religious and ethnic minorities, and Trump’s (America), where the rhetoric of “America First” has been used to justify exclusionary policies and undermine democratic norms. The author’s global perspective is one of the major strengths of the book, as it allows him to highlight both the commonalities and differences in the experiences of democratic backsliding across various contexts.

The interdisciplinary approach is another notable feature of Bardhan’s book. He draws on insights from economics, political science, sociology, and cultural studies to provide a comprehensive understanding of the forces driving democratic erosion. His discussion of the economic dimensions of insecurity, such as the impact of globalization and automation on job security and wages, is particularly illuminating. Bardhan also explores how cultural insecurities are intertwined with economic anxieties, as people who feel left behind by economic changes often perceive themselves to be culturally marginalized as well. This dual focus on economic and cultural insecurity provides a more nuanced understanding of the populist challenge to democracy, as it shows how these two forms of insecurity reinforce each other to create a fertile ground for authoritarianism.

His discussion of potential solutions to the democratic crisis is just as thorough and well-founded. He advocates for a rejuvenation of social democracy as a viable alternative to both unfettered capitalism and authoritarian populism. Bardhan argues that social democracy, with its emphasis on social justice, economic security, and democratic participation, offers a path forward that can address the insecurities driving democratic discontent. He suggests that social democrats must reorient their policies to better address the needs of those who feel left behind by globalization and technological change. This includes advocating for policies such as universal basic income, progressive taxation, and public investment in education, healthcare, and infrastructure. He also emphasizes the importance of strengthening democratic institutions and promoting civic engagement to counter the influence of populist narratives and rebuild trust in democratic governance.

However, Bardhan does not shy away from acknowledging the challenges and limitations of his proposed solutions. He recognizes that the revival of social democracy will require significant reforms in welfare states, labor markets, and public finance, which may be politically difficult to achieve, especially in contexts where democratic institutions are already weakened. He also discusses the challenges of implementing social democratic policies in countries with weaker state capacity and more polarized political environments. He provides a critical examination of the obstacles to policy implementation, including resistance from powerful vested interests, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and the complexity of coordinating policy efforts across different levels of government. The author’s recognition of these challenges adds depth to his analysis and prevents it from becoming overly idealistic.

The book concludes with a reflection on the future of democracy in an age of insecurity. Bardhan reiterates his argument that the current crisis is not merely a result of economic inequality but is rooted in deeper insecurities that cut across economic, cultural, and social dimensions. He calls for a renewed commitment to democratic values and institutions, emphasizing that the solution to democratic disenchantment lies not in abandoning democracy but in reimagining it to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century. Bardhan’s call for a rejuvenation of social democracy is both a critique of current democratic practices and a hopeful vision for the future. He argues that by addressing the insecurities that fuel populism, democracies can be revitalized and made more resilient to the challenges they face.

Overall, Bardhan’s book A World of Insecurity: Democratic Disenchantment in Rich and Poor Countries is a thought-provoking and timely contribution to the literature on democratic erosion and populism. It offers a fresh perspective on the current democratic crisis by shifting the focus from inequality to insecurity and provides a nuanced analysis of the complex forces driving democratic disenchantment around the world. The book’s comparative approach, interdisciplinary method, and focus on both developed and developing countries make it a valuable resource for scholars, policymakers, and anyone interested in understanding the future of democracy. While Bardhan’s call for a revival of social democracy is compelling, his analysis also serves as a sobering reminder of the challenges involved in achieving such a transformation. The book is a must-read for those seeking to understand the underlying causes of democratic backsliding and the potential pathways to democratic renewal in an age of uncertainty and insecurity.

 

Bardhan, P. (2022). A World of Insecurity: Democratic Disenchantment in Rich and Poor Countries. Harvard University Press. 240 pp. Hardcover €25.95, ISBN 9780674259843

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Professor Mounk: Second Trump Presidency Could Be Even More Dangerous Than His First

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Professor Yascha Mounk observes that many Americans perceive the Democratic Party as being out of sync with mainstream values and believe that Kamala Harris is too progressive, while fewer think Donald Trump is too conservative. He suggests that Democrats should consider making cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails. Mounk presents two very different scenarios in the event of Trump’s victory on November 5. On one hand, he notes that Trump’s first term, though damaging and chaotic, was perhaps less consequential than some, including Mounk himself, feared in 2016. On the other hand, Mounk offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the US.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Tuesday, Dr. Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion—an online magazine dedicated to defending the values of free societies—delivers a compelling analysis of the rise of populism and its implications for the future of democracy. Professor Mounk identifies three key drivers that have contributed to the rise of populism in the United States: the stagnation of living standards for ordinary citizens, rapid cultural and demographic transformations, and the rise of the internet and social media. These factors, he argues, have collectively fueled a sense of disillusionment and alienation among significant segments of the population, creating fertile ground for populist leaders like Trump to thrive.

As the November 5, 2024, US presidential election approaches, the stakes have never been higher. With Donald Trump’s re-election campaign gaining momentum, Professor Mounk states that ‘there are two very different prognostications. On one hand, you could argue that Trump was in power for four years, which turned out to be damaging and chaotic, but perhaps less consequential than some of us, including myself, feared in 2016’. He also offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the United States. He reflects on the evolution of Trump’s political influence, noting that “Trump now has about a 45% chance, according to betting markets, of regaining power,” highlighting the tight race and the potential consequences of his victory. Touching on the potential consequences of a second Trump presidency, Professor Mounk warns that while Trump’s first term was damaging, his probable second term could be even more dangerous given his increased experience, a loyal base within the Republican Party and a desire for retribution against institutions he believes hindered his first administration. The risks to American democracy, Professor Mounk suggests, are substantial, and the outcome of the 2024 election could have long-lasting implications for the country’s political landscape.

Reflecting on the broader debate about the resilience of democracies in the face of populist threats Professor Mounk acknowledges the strengths that have allowed American democracy to endure, while he also cautions against complacency, noting that the challenges posed by populism are far from over. Mounk points out that Trump’s four years in office, while chaotic, were mitigated by the resilience of American institutions, including the federal system and the economy. 

One of the central themes of the discussion in the interview is the impact of the changing demographic landscape on American politics. Professor Mounk notes that while immigration and demographic change are related, they are conceptually distinct phenomena. He argues that frustration over perceived loss of control—over borders and the cultural direction of the country—has been a significant driver of populist sentiment. This has been particularly evident in the case of Trump, whose appeal to voters is deeply rooted in cultural identity politics rather than purely economic concerns. Professor Mounk explains that Democrats had once banked on demographic shifts securing their electoral future, assuming that as the number of non-white voters increased, so too would their dominance. However, this assumption has not played out as expected. “The leftward drift of the Democratic Party has pushed many of these voters away,” Professor Mounk notes, underscoring the complex dynamics that have kept Trump competitive.

Professor Mounk also delves into the evolving media landscape, highlighting the profound shift from traditional broadcast networks to a more fragmented and polarized media environment dominated by social media, podcasts and independent platforms. He expresses concern over the term “misinformation” and how it has been used to suppress certain viewpoints, urging a more nuanced approach to the concept in public discourse. Professor Mounk’s insights provide a timely and critical perspective on the future of democracy in the United States and beyond.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Yascha Mounk with some edits.

Dr. Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion—an online magazine dedicated to defending the values of free societies.

Professor Mounk: Second Trump Presidency Could Be Even More Dangerous Than His First

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Professor Yascha Mounk observes that many Americans perceive the Democratic Party as being out of sync with mainstream values and believe that Kamala Harris is too progressive, while fewer think Donald Trump is too conservative. He suggests that Democrats should consider making cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails. Mounk presents two very different scenarios in the event of Trump’s victory on November 5. On one hand, he notes that Trump’s first term, though damaging and chaotic, was perhaps less consequential than some, including Mounk himself, feared in 2016. On the other hand, Mounk offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the US.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Tuesday, Dr. Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion—an online magazine dedicated to defending the values of free societies—delivers a compelling analysis of the rise of populism and its implications for the future of democracy. Professor Mounk identifies three key drivers that have contributed to the rise of populism in the United States: the stagnation of living standards for ordinary citizens, rapid cultural and demographic transformations, and the rise of the internet and social media. These factors, he argues, have collectively fueled a sense of disillusionment and alienation among significant segments of the population, creating fertile ground for populist leaders like Trump to thrive.

As the November 5, 2024, US presidential election approaches, the stakes have never been higher. With Donald Trump’s re-election campaign gaining momentum, Professor Mounk states that ‘there are two very different prognostications. On one hand, you could argue that Trump was in power for four years, which turned out to be damaging and chaotic, but perhaps less consequential than some of us, including myself, feared in 2016’. He also offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the United States. He reflects on the evolution of Trump’s political influence, noting that “Trump now has about a 45% chance, according to betting markets, of regaining power,” highlighting the tight race and the potential consequences of his victory. Touching on the potential consequences of a second Trump presidency, Professor Mounk warns that while Trump’s first term was damaging, his probable second term could be even more dangerous given his increased experience, a loyal base within the Republican Party and a desire for retribution against institutions he believes hindered his first administration. The risks to American democracy, Professor Mounk suggests, are substantial, and the outcome of the 2024 election could have long-lasting implications for the country’s political landscape.

Reflecting on the broader debate about the resilience of democracies in the face of populist threats Professor Mounk acknowledges the strengths that have allowed American democracy to endure, while he also cautions against complacency, noting that the challenges posed by populism are far from over. Mounk points out that Trump’s four years in office, while chaotic, were mitigated by the resilience of American institutions, including the federal system and the economy. 

One of the central themes of the discussion in the interview is the impact of the changing demographic landscape on American politics. Professor Mounk notes that while immigration and demographic change are related, they are conceptually distinct phenomena. He argues that frustration over perceived loss of control—over borders and the cultural direction of the country—has been a significant driver of populist sentiment. This has been particularly evident in the case of Trump, whose appeal to voters is deeply rooted in cultural identity politics rather than purely economic concerns. Professor Mounk explains that Democrats had once banked on demographic shifts securing their electoral future, assuming that as the number of non-white voters increased, so too would their dominance. However, this assumption has not played out as expected. “The leftward drift of the Democratic Party has pushed many of these voters away,” Professor Mounk notes, underscoring the complex dynamics that have kept Trump competitive.

Professor Mounk also delves into the evolving media landscape, highlighting the profound shift from traditional broadcast networks to a more fragmented and polarized media environment dominated by social media, podcasts and independent platforms. He expresses concern over the term “misinformation” and how it has been used to suppress certain viewpoints, urging a more nuanced approach to the concept in public discourse. Professor Mounk’s insights provide a timely and critical perspective on the future of democracy in the United States and beyond.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Yascha Mounk with some edits.

There Are Broad Commonalities in the Rise of Populism Across the World

Professor Mounk, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me dive right in with the first question. In your analysis, what are the key historical events that have contributed to the rise of populism in the US and how do they compare it to similar movements in other democracies?

Professor Yascha Mounk: I think the best way to approach this topic is by comparing different countries. While different factors play varying roles in different places, there are broad commonalities. In my book The People versus Democracy, published in 2018, I focused on three key factors.

First, there is the stagnation of living standards for ordinary citizens in many democracies, particularly in Western Europe and North America. In the immediate post-war era, people in these democracies felt that their life opportunities were vastly different from those of their parents. That sense of progress is no longer true for most citizens today.

Second, I highlighted the rapid cultural and demographic transformations in many of these countries. This includes ethnic diversification and, for example, the significantly larger role of women in society and greater acceptance of sexual minorities. While these are positive developments, they have also triggered fears among some segments of the population who feel that their social status has declined—they can no longer take for granted the status they once enjoyed.

Third, I discussed the rise of the internet and social media, which has made it easier for populist parties and candidates to build political movements. Social media has also shifted public opinion by making it easier to spread hatred and misinformation.

Today, I would add a fourth factor, which is partially mediated by social media but also relates to a deterioration in governance. This is the perceived distance between ordinary people and the elite. Many citizens feel that elites are not only corrupt in some places but also culturally distant. They live in separate circles and seem to look down on average citizens. This is a factor I didn’t emphasize as much initially, but now I would give it greater weight.

You’ve written extensively about the erosion of democratic norms. How has the US’s unique political culture contributed to the vulnerability of its institutions to populist movements?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, again, this is something we’re witnessing in many different countries at the same time, which suggests that a universally relevant factor—social media—plays a significant role. The ability to reach voters directly through social media platforms and make emotional, polarizing appeals has largely contributed to the breakdown of democratic norms. Social media platforms have been instrumental in this process.

When we look specifically at the United States, polarization plays a significant role. The primary system, in particular, makes most Congress members and many Senators more dependent on keeping the goodwill of the 5 to 10% of the population that are decisive in primary elections, rather than appealing to the median voter who decides elections in closely contested seats or states, of which there are not many. This has had a significant impact as well.

Economic inequality is often cited as a driver of populism. To what extent do you believe the economic policies of the last few decades have fueled populist sentiments in the US?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Certainly, the economy plays a role. As I mentioned earlier, it helps explain the erosion of what political scientists call “output legitimacy.” In the past, people might have said, “I don’t fully understand or trust politicians, but they seem to be delivering for us.” Now, many people feel that politicians are not delivering, leading them to question why they should trust them and consider trying something new. The sentiment of “how bad could things get?” is increasingly common.

However, I believe cultural factors likely play a bigger role than economic ones. If economic factors were the primary drivers, you would expect people to vote for populist parties that focus mainly on the economy, perhaps even those on the left. We’ve seen this in Greece with Syriza, where economic concerns were paramount and more recently in Argentina with Javier Milei, where hyperinflation fueled the rise of a right-wing populist movement.

But for the most part, this isn’t the case with leaders like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Narendra Modi and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While they do talk about the economy and make economic promises, their primary appeal is cultural. They position themselves as defenders of the moral and religious traditions of a supposed majority—often a real majority—that feels sidelined and believes its preferences haven’t sufficiently shaped the public culture of the country.

Democrats Hold False Assumptions About Demographic Groups in the US

A Trump supporter engages in conversation with a pedestrian at Columbus Circle on October 17, 2020, in New York City. Photo: Ron Adar.

How has the changing demographic landscape in the US influenced the rise of populism and what role does identity politics play in this phenomenon?

Professor Yascha Mounk: We need to distinguish between immigration and demographic change. Immigration plays a significant role in the United States, as well as in many European countries. Most Americans and Europeans are willing to see the benefits of migration and recognize that countries need highly qualified migrants for economic reasons, acknowledging the real benefits they bring. However, opinion polls have shown that, for several decades now, majorities in these populations have preferred less, rather than more, migration. They feel that moderate and established political parties have ignored this preference. The frustration isn’t necessarily with the presence of immigrants but with the sense of having no control over who enters the country and no control over borders. This sentiment has been a big part of Donald Trump’s appeal. In the US, Trump is currently building his case for re-election not only on inflation during the Biden administration but also on the inflow of migrants in recent years. This is a real vulnerability for moderate political parties and a significant reason they’ve lost credibility among ordinary voters.

Demographic change is, of course, related to immigration, but it is conceptually distinct. Here, I would say the problem for moderate political parties, particularly the left in the US, has been a more roundabout one. Democrats had a very demographic view of the electorate, especially during the years when George W. Bush seemed dominant. They latched onto the hope that as the demographic balance in the country shifted, with the number of white voters declining and non-white voters growing, this would ensure inevitable electoral victories for them. However, this hasn’t turned out as expected. It was supposed to secure Hillary Clinton’s win in 2016, yet Donald Trump won the electoral college, even if he didn’t win the popular vote. The same assumption was expected to shift the electorate towards Biden in 2020. While Biden did improve his share of the white vote, Trump significantly increased his share among non-white voters, particularly among Latinos.

This false assumption—that victory was just going to fall into their lap—has been a real strategic problem for Democrats. They believed they could avoid making difficult trade-offs, thinking non-white voters were their base and were very progressive, which led them to think they didn’t need to moderate on any unpopular issues to win. However, this failed to recognize that historically, non-white voters in the Democratic electorate have been more moderate or even conservative than white voters. For instance, conservative white voters likely supported Republicans, but conservative Black or Latino voters often supported Democrats because they didn’t feel welcome in the Republican party. The leftward drift of the Democratic party has pushed many of these voters away and the anticipated demographic majority has not materialized. In fact, many working-class Latinos, some working-class Asian Americans and an increasing number of working-class African Americans are now tempted to vote for the Republican party, which is one of the reasons why Trump continues to be competitive.

This phenomenon isn’t unique to the US. In Brazil, for example, which is majority non-white, if non-white voters systematically refused to vote for Jair Bolsonaro, he would never have won the presidential election. His competitiveness was partly due to strong backing from evangelical non-white voters, including some of the less affluent segments of Brazilian society.

The Term ‘Misinformation’ Should Be Treated with More Skepticism

In your writings, you discuss the role of misinformation and media in the spread of populist ideas. How has the US media landscape, particularly the rise of social media, impacted the populist narrative?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Certainly, there’s been a significant structural transformation in the media landscape, particularly with the diversification of media sources. Fifty or sixty years ago, there were just a few major broadcast networks and most people got their news from them. Then came the introduction of cable news, which began to polarize information sources and made it much easier to broadcast purely partisan opinion programs. This was an important shift.

Then, of course, we saw the rise of social media, podcasts, YouTube channels and even talk radio, which really grew in importance. Today, Fox News isn’t as dominant as it once was. For example, in prime time, Fox News might have an audience of 300,000 to 400,000 viewers, whereas the Joe Rogan podcast can reach 5 to 6 million listeners per episode. Tucker Carlson appears to have even increased his audience since leaving Fox News and distributing his show independently on platforms like YouTube and X (formerly Twitter). This shift helps explain the irresponsible and partisan nature of much of our media today.

At the same time, I’m concerned about the profligate use of the term “misinformation.” Often, we refer to something as misinformation simply because it presents a worldview we disagree with or have misgivings about. Some positions that were censored as misinformation in recent years have turned out to have some truth to them, or at least some plausibility. For example, during the pandemic, scientists who speculated about the possibility that COVID originated from gain-of-function research in labs, potentially due to an inadvertent lab leak, were heavily censored. Now, this theory is taken seriously by mainstream news outlets and many federal agencies in the United States. This was perhaps the most prominent instance where the term “misinformation” was used to shut down a debate, and it should make us more self-critical about how we define and apply the term.

I believe we would benefit from treating the term “misinformation” with more skepticism than it currently receives.

Populism in the US has been linked to a growing distrust in traditional institutions. What socio-political factors do you believe are most responsible for this erosion of trust?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, we’ve touched on this issue throughout our discussion. It ties back to several key factors. First, there’s the lack of output performance—people feel that institutions are no longer delivering the results they expect. Then there’s the sense among some segments of the population that they’ve been deprived of the social status they once had and believe they naturally deserve.

Social media also plays a significant role. It’s now easier to highlight the actual failings of governing elites, who have always been imperfect, but whose flaws are much more visible now than in the past. Additionally, social media makes it easier for irresponsible actors to gain influence, to distort the failings of institutions, or to take decisions out of context, making them appear horrendous or obviously incompetent when there might be valid reasons for those actions.

In essence, the factors contributing to the loss of trust in institutions are the same as those driving the rise of populism.

Liberal Democracy Is Still the Only Legitimate Regime

In your article, “The End of History Revisited,” you argue in the conclusion, “It follows that the tempting phrase ‘the end of the end of history’ is, for now, premature.” It seems that you give credit to the thesis of The End of History, do you think the thesis is still valid?

Professor Yascha Mounk: In that article, I argue that it’s important to distinguish between two claims made in Francis Fukuyama’s seminal work. The first claim is that, during the mid-20th century, genuine ideological competitors to liberal democracy existed—namely fascism and communism. Each, in its own way, posed a serious challenge to liberal democracy and presented a consciously articulated alternative vision for legitimate governance. However, these alternatives ultimately failed and they failed catastrophically. By the time Fukuyama was writing, he argued that the only remaining grand theory of legitimate government with genuine international appeal was liberal democracy. This, for him, was the “end of history.” The second, more implicit claim was that liberal democracies would be particularly adept at solving their internal problems and would, therefore, prove to be more stable than those alternative regime forms.

On the first point, I think Fukuyama has largely been proven right—at least so far. I can’t say with certainty that we’ll never see another regime form that can genuinely compete with liberal democracy, but when we look around the world today, it’s clear that liberal democracy remains the only genuinely legitimate regime form. The alternatives each have significant limitations. For example, you have a form of Shia theocracy in Iran, but that doesn’t appeal to anyone outside of the Muslim world, or even outside of the Shia world, and it’s facing significant trouble even within Iran.

You also have strongman leaders like Vladimir Putin in Russia, who might appeal to some authoritarian-leaning individuals around the world, but there’s no global movement to adopt a “Russian model” of governance. Similarly, China is a genuine geopolitical and economic competitor to the West and perhaps a cultural one at some point. However, while the Chinese model might work well in theory, it’s a mess in practice and it’s entirely unclear how it could ever be exported. For instance, would people in Zimbabwe agree to be governed the way China is governed if it meant achieving the same level of wealth and development? Probably yes. But would they agree to let their leaders implement the Chinese model? Likely not, because it’s unclear what that would entail. While they might trust their leaders to centralize power in the way the CCP has in Beijing, they wouldn’t trust them to deliver the same results.

The Chinese model is built on 3,000 years of Mandarin meritocracy, 100 years of a centralized Communist Party and 30 years of a peculiar form of capitalism that claims to be socialist or communist while actually marketizing everything, including retirement and healthcare. It’s entirely unclear what it would mean to replicate this model elsewhere.

This situation highlights the continuing legitimacy of liberal democracy, as even clearly non-liberal and non-democratic regimes often pretend to embody both. There’s currently a lot of intellectual effort in China to argue why China is the true democracy, which you wouldn’t see if there were a self-conscious ideological alternative to the prevailing liberal democratic paradigm.

Where Fukuyama might have been overly optimistic, however, is in his predictions about the stability of liberal democracy at home. While liberal democracy remains the only legitimate regime form with genuine mass appeal worldwide, it is much more embattled and less popular domestically than it was in the past. This, I think, helps explain some of the chaos and uncertainty we are experiencing in our political moment.

In the same article you underline that “While there has of late been extensive speculation about the future of liberal democracies, there has been far less reflection on how dictatorships that issue from populism may fare in the long run.” In the year 2024 where populist movements all over Europe are on the rise, do you think we can now predict the future of populist parties more accurately or is it still very difficult?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, it’s clear that populism has become one of the dominant modes of politics today. Populist political parties, particularly those on the right, are now some of the largest political families around the world. In the European Parliament, for example, various incarnations of right-wing populism form a significant bloc and this is mirrored in national parliaments, which are even more consequential.

The critical question is what happens when populists actually win elections and begin to govern. Over the past decades, we’ve seen very different paths in different countries. On one side, you have countries like Venezuela and perhaps Turkey, where populist leaders have undermined democratic institutions to such an extent that free and fair elections are either nonexistent, as in Venezuela, or are in serious doubt, as in Turkey, where it’s questionable whether the opposition can still oust the sitting leader by democratic means.

Secondly, there are countries where populist movements have significantly damaged democratic institutions—limiting free speech, decimating independent institutions—but where elections remain meaningful, though perhaps no longer entirely fair. India, the world’s largest democracy, might be an example of this.

Lastly, there are countries where populists have, at least for now, failed to maintain power. Despite efforts to handicap the opposition, the opposition was able to remove them through elections. This has been the case in Brazil, in Poland and, at least in 2020, in the United States. However, as the American case indicates, this doesn’t necessarily mean it’s the end of the story. For example, betting markets currently give Trump about a 45% chance of regaining power through the ballot box.

So, what we need to recognize is that there is a large variance in outcomes when populists take over. We also need to move away from thinking of democracy in binary terms—either perfect or completely destroyed. Populist victories don’t necessarily mean the imminent death of democracy, but they do often cause serious damage. The extent and lasting impact of that damage depend on a variety of complex social factors.

In your article written back in 2017, “European Disunion- What the rise of populist movements means for democracy,” you argue: “We’ve made real progress in understanding the nature of populism, moderate progress in analyzing its causes, and barely any progress in identifying its potential remedies.” In the year 2024, do you think we now have some remedies or are we at a total loss?

Professor Yascha Mounk: I don’t remember writing that article or that specific line, but I stand by it a hundred percent. Unfortunately, I don’t think much has changed since 2017.

Many Americans Feel the Democratic Party Is Out of Touch with the Mainstream

Before the presidential debate last Tuesday, you wrote that “Americans view Harris as too progressive. Tonight, may be her last best chance to course correct…Harris is on track to lose the election.” What do you think now, after the debate? Will she win the elections or lose it?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, as I mentioned earlier, betting markets, the last time I checked, gave Trump about a 45% chance of winning and Harris about a 55% chance. Harris did quite well in the debate. It always helps to remind the American electorate of just how irresponsible and chaotic Donald Trump can be. While he still has a base of supporters, most Americans do not like that approach.

Kamala Harris came across as competent and composed, while Trump made a series of outrageous claims, lost his temper and didn’t control himself well. This certainly helped her significantly. However, the election remains very close and I still believe there are actions Harris and the Democrats could take to increase their chances of victory in November. 

More importantly, to put an end to Donald Trump’s political career and the broader danger posed by his MAGA-inspired politics, we need to build a much broader electoral coalition. This coalition must be strong enough to win a series of elections decisively, forcing the Republican Party to transform itself. And the same is true inversely—if Republicans move to a more moderate stance, they could push Democrats to do the same.

I think it’s fine for Democrats to lean somewhat to the left on economic issues. Most Americans, like most Europeans, want a robust welfare state and policies that ensure wage growth for lower earners, even as they also believe in a market economy and care about economic growth. These priorities can be combined.

However, on cultural issues, it’s clear that many Americans feel the Democratic Party is out of sync with the mainstream. While I don’t personally share that opinion, more Americans believe Kamala Harris is too progressive than think Donald Trump is too conservative. To address this, Democrats, I believe, need to champion the values of inclusion and tolerance, which are non-negotiable. However, they should also make some cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails.

A Second Trump Presidency Could Be Even More Dangerous Than the First

Former US President Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

What will happen to American democracy if Donald Trump is re-elected on November 5?

Professor Yascha Mounk: There are two very different prognostications. On one hand, you could argue that Trump was in power for four years, which turned out to be damaging and chaotic, but perhaps less consequential than some of us, including myself, feared in 2016. America has certain strengths compared to other democracies, such as the federal system, which distributes power to governors—many of whom would still be Democrats. The system also includes numerous veto points in the legislative process, which made it possible for Democrats, especially after the 2018 midterm elections, to block much of what Trump wanted to do. Additionally, the US economy is sufficiently robust and the media landscape is developed enough that it’s difficult for the state to fully capture it, reducing the incentives to comply with the executive’s dictates. These strengths would likely remain in place.

However, there are also ways in which Trump could be more dangerous now than he was in 2016. Back then, he had no political experience, lacked a trusted team of people who shared his worldview and had limited control over the Republican Party, which at the time included many representatives and senators who were publicly ambivalent and privately disdainful of him. Moreover, Trump did not have a clear sense of the institutional changes he wanted to make.

Now, things are different. He has four years of experience in the executive office, has built a deep bench of loyalists willing to do his bidding from day one and the Republican Party has transformed itself. Many of the people currently in the House of Representatives and a significant number in the Senate ran as Trump Republicans and are much more aligned with his political agenda. Those who weren’t initially aligned have often made a political turn toward him, as it has become a necessity for survival in Republican politics. Trump also has loyalists who served with him in lower positions and now understand how the federal bureaucracy works. Lastly, Trump is out for revenge—he believes the institutions hampered his efforts during his first term and targeted him after he left office. He may now aim to dismantle those institutions to ensure that what he calls the “deep state” can no longer contain him.

These factors suggest that a second Trump presidency could be more dangerous than the first. How much damage he might manage to inflict is difficult to predict and could ultimately depend on various circumstances, including how much discipline he applies to transforming the system—something that, thankfully, remains uncertain.

Academicians like Steven Levitsky and Kurt Weyland argue that democracies have shown, time and again, resilience on the face of populist threat however institutions like V-Dem strongly argue that democracy is under serious threat. Where do you stand in this debate?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Perhaps somewhere in between. It’s interesting to note that some objective metrics for measuring how democratic a country is seem to be holding up better than subjective ratings from institutions like V-Dem or Freedom House. For instance, if you look at how many journalists are in jail, the duration of governments in office, or how often term limits have been repealed, there doesn’t appear to be a significant change. The best research on this topic, in my view, comes from political scientists like Daniel Treisman and Sergei Guriev.

However, these statistics might not fully capture the extent of polarization, the breakdown of informal political norms, or the potential dangers on the horizon. In a country like the United States, for example, we’re certainly not at the point where journalists are being jailed, but we might be two or three steps away from a scenario where newspapers start to fall in line with more authoritarian tendencies.

This recent research provides a necessary and helpful corrective to some of the pessimism in the field, encouraging us to analyze the situation more carefully and perhaps with a bit more optimism that we can navigate through this moment. However, it’s certainly not a reason to stop being alarmed altogether.