Shewan, Molly. (2025). “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).January 10, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0094
On December 19, 2024, ECPS hosted the 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, titled “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries.” This session examined a number of key contemporary dynamics at the intersection of populism and authoritarianism in the Gulf region. A distinguished panel of experts presented on a wide range of topics, including the evolution of social contracts in Gulf states; autocratization processes; the environmental dimension of authoritarian leadership; and the role of religion in shaping both domestic and international politics. The session thus offered many key critical insights into both the nebulous features of populism itself and the importance of bringing the Gulf region into scholarly conversation regarding populism’s impact across the globe.
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted the 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, “Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries,” on December 19, 2024. The session explored the complex dynamics surrounding populism and authoritarianism across the Gulf region. Bringing together a distinguished panel of scholars and practitioners, the discussion focused on a number of key developments, including the environmental and religious dimensions of autocratic leadership in the Gulf States, as well as the evolution of the social contract, in order to examine the diverse causes, manifestations and impacts of populism and authoritarianism in the region.
Moderated by Dr. Courtney Freer, Assistant Professor at the Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies-Emory University, the panelists included Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber, Professor of Middle East at the Friedrich Alexander University, Erlangen-Nürnberg-Germany; Dr. Gail Buttorff, Hobby School of Public Affairs-University of Huston; Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel, senior researcher and lecturer at the Department for Human Geography at Heidelberg University-Germany; Mr. Kardo Kareem Rached, University of Human Development-Iraq, and Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington.
The panel made a multidisciplinary, wide-ranging, and insightful contribution to the scholarly exploration of populism and autocracy in the rapidly evolving social and political context of the Gulf region. Therefore, this session constitutes a significant and timely addition to the panel series overall, aiding in its goal of generating a more complete understanding of the diverse impact of populism and authoritarianism across the globe.
Panel Overview
Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber opened the panel with his presentation on “Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf Region.” Dr. Demmelhuber began by arguing that Gulf regimes are often much too complex to be neatly categorized into a binary division between democracy and authoritarian governance. Rather, he regards autocratization as a fluid, multifaceted process which can occur within a variety of regime types in notably different ways. Dr. Demmelhuber argued that autocratization is primarily driven through the actions of prominent elites at the domestic, regional and international levels.
At the domestic level, populist discourses can be utilized as a means of consolidating regime power, utilizing affective appeals to the citizenry as a united collective in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the regime. At the regional level, regimes often learn from one another and adapt their political strategies to mirror their neighbors, which is linked to the emergence of authoritarian gravity centers. On the international level, norm diffusion can occur through transnational networks, promoting authoritarian practices across the globe. Dr. Demmelhuber concluded his insightful presentation by flagging the need for greater scholarly interrogation of the non-material dimension of populist appeals, as well as of the populism which emerges “from below.”
Our second speaker, Dr. Gail Buttorff, a researcher of gender and political participation in the Middle East, followed with an engaging talk titled “The Evolving Social Contract in the GCC” with a particular focus on gender as a key factor. Dr. Buttorf began by offering a succinct overview of the social contract in the GCC up to the 2000s, which was heavily reliant upon strong wealth redistribution and a generous welfare state in exchange for limited political participation by the citizenry. She then went on to note a variety of factors that have put pressure on this institutional arrangement since then: declining oil rents, lower revenue, and growing populations, which led Gulf states to embrace austerity while unemployment was rising.
In an effort to renegotiate their social contracts in this new contemporary context, Gulf regimes have deployed policies of labor renationalization, which in turn resulted in a significant increase in female employment, as well as “vision statements” which explicitly emphasize “mutuality” between state and citizen responsibility. The gendered impact of these adjustments was particularly visible during the COVID-19 outbreak, as a number of states – including the UAE and Bahrain – passed legislation which illustrated the intersection between labor nationalization and women’s participation in public life.
Overall, Dr. Buttorff effectively explored the ways in which Gulf states have attempted to retain legitimacy in uncertain economic conditions by adjusting their social contracts, with particularly significant implications for women across the region.
Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel, who has written extensively on the environmental dimension of state power in the Gulf, turned to focus on the environmental dimension in his presentation: “The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership.” He, too, began by examining the social contract in the Gulf, emphasizing the enhanced role of provision and protection by regimes—made possible through the vast income generated by the oil and gas industries—in exchange for a lack of participation by their citizens. In the wake of growing pressures to lessen their dependence on fossil fuels, Dr. Zumbraegel argued that the emerging “Green Gulf Model” is characterized by strong, personalistic leadership, a techno-utopian vision which perhaps over-exaggerates the potential for new technologies to reverse environmental harm, strong emphasis on the continuing importance of fossil fuels; and a close alignment of environmental goals with other economic diversification projects, such as in sports and entertainment. Dr. Zumbraegel further sought to locate the role of these “green autocrats” in influencing global environmental governance, supported by a strong alliance of transnational corporations whose goals align with those of the Gulf regimes.
To conclude, Dr. Zumbraegel argued that autocratic regimes in the Gulf have embraced a top-down approach to sustainability. By gradually pivoting towards green energy yet continuing to protect their oil and gas interests, Gulf states are attempting to maintain the rentier welfare state system whilst neglecting the environmental and social justice dimensions of sustainability altogether.
Mr. Kardo Kareem Rashed, an expert on the intersection between religion and politics in the Middle East, discussed the intersection between religion and authoritarianism in his talk: “The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies.” Taking a historical-analytical approach, Mr. Rashed began by tracing the roots of Salafism back to Saudi Arabia, emphasizing its complex role in shaping Saudi Arabian domestic and international politics since 9/11 due to links with Jihadism. He went on to note the relevance of the political decision-making process in Saudi Arabia, a strictly patrimonial regime, wherein power flows downwards through a hierarchical model of authority from the King to tribal sheikhs and army leaders.
As Saudi Arabia evolved into a rentier state, Mr. Rached argues, Salafism became institutionalized; post-World War II, Salafism was a powerful tool used by Saudi King Faisal to oppose and suppress Arab nationalist movements, bolstered through the establishment of new educational institutions. The Gulf War marked a key turning point, however, as the Salafist movement rejected the presence of US troops on Saudi soil. As a result, the Saudi state began to tighten control over religious institutions and strengthened alliances with other nations on the basis of shared Islamist ideology. Overall, Mr. Rached argued, in a supposedly post-Salafi era, a complex relationship remains between the Saudi state and transnational religious dynamics.
Finally, Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan, a leading scholar on the politics of Arab Gulf States, presented on the topic “Populism in Gulf Monarchies: Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption,” concluding our discussion with a more direct interrogation of populism itself, its varying definitions and its contemporary manifestations across the Gulf region.
Dr. Diwan began by discussing salient conceptualizations of populism as a theory of international relations, an approach to economic policy, and a style of political leadership before arguing that populism appears particularly prominently as a discursive form of rhetoric in the Gulf region. Populist rhetoric frequently features direct appeals to “the people” as a virtuous citizenry and depicts a cultural, economic or political elite as a corrupt “establishment.” Dr Diwan aptly noted that populist rhetoric is also often tightly entwined with nationalism, as it punches both downwards, outwards the “undeserving” unproductive class, as well as outwards, targeting migrants and non-citizens too.
While it might be surprising to see populism emerge in the Gulf states, considering their strong track record of resource distribution, Dr. Diwan argued that both increasing wealth inequality and the emergence of communication technology – e.g. social media – are both important factors in explaining the emergence of populism from below. Detailing a number of examples of populist rhetoric by opposition figures, Dr. Diwan argued that different Gulf Monarchies have responded with varying strategies of suppression, cooptation and adoption. In a particularly interesting case, she noted that Saudi Arabian elites have deployed populist rhetoric from above in an attempt to consolidate their state power, emphasizing the fluid nature of populist discursive strategies.
Conclusion
The 18th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series provided an engaging examination of some of the key contemporary features of populism and authoritarianism in the Gulf region. Each speaker presented an insightful contribution to this theme, from conceptualizing autocratization to gendering the social contract to the intersection between autocracy, environmentalism, and religion. Overall, the panel highlighted the pressing need for greater scholarly attention on the region within the field of populism studies, owing largely to the rapidly evolving social, political and environmental landscape of the Gulf states. In particular, scholars emphasized the need to consider both the material and non-material causal factors at play in furthering populist or autocratic trends. For instance, changes in wealth redistribution and affective emotional or discursive appeals were both highlighted as particularly relevant.
The highly engaging and insightful analysis shared throughout the panel was, therefore, not only successful in representing a number of key developments within current scholarship on the region but also in signposting important avenues for further research.
Overall, this session constituted an effective contribution to ECPS’s broader goal of advancing our understanding of populism across the globe. It will undoubtedly prove a valuable resource for those looking to enhance their understanding of the way in which populism and autocracy manifest and interact within the Gulf region today.
Sithole, Neo. (2025). “What Do the US Election Results Tell Us about the Global Trajectory of Populism?” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0093
The ECPS panel provided an in-depth exploration of how the 2024 US Presidential Election reflects and impacts global populism. Experts analyzed key dynamics, including economic grievances, cultural shifts, and political polarization. Moderated by Ali H. Aslan, the discussion highlighted the role of evangelical populism, Trumpism’s transatlantic influence, and global democratic erosion. Distinguished panelists emphasized the need for liberal democracies to counter autocratic trends by offering compelling solutions and reinforcing institutions. This timely dialogue shed light on the interplay between economic, cultural, and institutional forces shaping contemporary populist movements worldwide.
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened an insightful panel discussion to analyze the implications of the 2024 US Presidential Election on the global trajectory of populism. This critical event, held on Thursday, November 14, 2024,featured leading scholars and experts exploring how the election results reflect shifting political dynamics in the United States and their ripple effects worldwide.
Moderated by Ali H. Aslan, a seasoned Washington-based journalist and former Washington correspondent for Zaman Daily, the panel brings together prominent voices in political science and sociology to dissect key themes shaping contemporary populism.Dr. Alan Abramowitz, Professor Emeritus of Political Science at Emory University, delves into the economic underpinnings of the election with his presentation, “It Was (Mostly) the Economy, Stupid: Explaining Trump’s Victory.” Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University and Research Affiliate at CEU’s Democracy Institute, examines the broader implications of the election for global populism in her talk, “Explaining the US Election Outcome and Its Implications for Global Populism.”Dr. Marcia Pally, a scholar at New York University and Humboldt University-Berlin, sheds light on the pivotal role of white evangelical voters in shaping the 2024 electoral landscape in her presentation, “The Role of White Evangelicals in the 2024 US Presidential Election: What We Know So Far.”Dr. Mabel Berezin, Distinguished Professor at Cornell University and Director of the Institute for European Studies, extends the discussion to transatlantic populist trends with her analysis, “Does Trumpism Cross the Atlantic?”Dr. Marina Nord, Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the V-Dem Institute at the University of Gothenburg, explores the long-term implications of Trump’s return to power for global democracy in her presentation, “The Return of Trump and the Future of Global Democracy.”
This timely panel offered a comprehensive examination of the US election’s domestic and international implications, emphasizing how populist movements and ideologies influence governance, democracy, and political discourse across the globe. Attendees gained valuable insights into the interplay of economic, cultural, and religious factors shaping contemporary populism and its global manifestations.
Mr. Aslan: ‘Trump’s Campaign Successfully Leveraged Anti-establishment Rhetoric, Economic Promises, and Nationalist Appeals’
Moderator Ali H. Aslan began by providing an overview of the constitutional, federal, and governmental structure of the United States, emphasizing that, while minor parties exist, the US predominantly functions as a two-party democracy, with the conservative-leaning Republican Party and the liberal-leaning Democratic Party as the primary contenders. He noted that the recent US elections marked a significant political shift, with voters replacing Democratic President Joe Biden with Republican nominee Donald Trump.
Mr. Aslan recounted growing concerns about Biden’s age and health, which led him to withdraw from the race months before the election and endorse Vice President Kamala Harris as the Democratic candidate. Trump’s victory over Harris was decisive, securing 312 Electoral College votes and winning the national popular vote by over 3 million. His campaign successfully leveraged anti-establishment rhetoric, economic promises, and nationalist appeals, expanding support among traditionally Democratic groups, including Hispanic, African American, and Muslim voters. The election also saw the Republican Party flipping the Senate with 53 seats and narrowly regaining control of the House of Representatives, consolidating significant political power.
Mr. Aslan noted that this consolidation raises concerns about the potential erosion of democratic institutions, given the Supreme Court’s conservative majority and Trump’s anti-establishment approach. He highlighted that critics warn of authoritarian risks, while others express confidence in the resilience of US constitutional traditions. Trump’s unpredictable leadership style adds further uncertainty as his administration begins shaping policies and making key appointments.
Professor Abramowitz: ‘Democrats’ Electoral Loss Was Primarily Driven by Economic Concerns’
The first contribution to this session was made by Professor Alan Abramowitz who analyzed how the 2024 US Presidential Election underscored critical dynamics shaped in part by Incumbent President Joe Biden’s low approval rating, with a net disapproval of -20%. He argued that the decisive factor in the Democratic Party’s defeat was largely economic, encapsulated in the phrase, “It was (mostly) the Economy, Stupid.” Professor Abramowitz pointed out that the Democrats’ electoral loss was primarily driven by economic concerns, particularly the high inflation that persisted throughout Biden’s term. This followed historical trends in which unpopular presidents often lead their parties to electoral defeats. While recent improvements in job growth, easing inflation, and a resilient labor market offered positive economic indicators, these developments failed to alter public perceptions of economic instability, which were deeply entrenched among key voting blocs and created fertile ground for demands for change.
Professor Abramowitz illustrated how President-elect Donald Trump effectively tapped into this discontent, narrowly winning the national popular vote by 1–2% and flipping pivotal swing states by razor-thin margins. His victory highlighted the enduring polarization of the American electorate, with turnout patterns reflecting deep demographic and geographic divides. While both parties continued to dominate their respective strongholds, competition in battleground states showcased the intensity of partisan loyalties. The election results reflected broader challenges in bridging ideological divides and navigating an electorate fractured along economic and cultural lines. Despite significant policy debates and contrasting visions for the country, economic perceptions and presidential approval ratings remained the dominant forces driving voter behavior, ultimately shaping the trajectory of this closely contested election.
Professor McCoy: ‘Economic Stress and Cultural Disruption Drive Political Shifts’
Professor Jennifer McCoy was the second panelist who explored how sustained duress—whether in the form of threats, economic hardship, or perceived loss—often fosters an “us vs. them” mentality. Professor McCoy highlighted that this psychological shift is a common human response, where the perceived source of harm becomes the target of suspicion and blame. Consequently, individuals may distance themselves from outsiders to protect their own group. This dynamic is particularly evident in populist movements, where economic stress and cultural disruption drive political shifts. She referenced a study of 800 elections across 20 democracies from the 1870s to 2014, demonstrating how financial crises have consistently resulted in significant gains for both far-right and left-wing populist parties. Under such conditions, people often turn to leaders who promise to restore security and address their fears, especially when threats are perceived as originating from outsiders.
Professor McCoy addressed the global trend of anti-incumbent voting, observing that in the US, this phenomenon has skewed rightward due to narrow electoral margins and the structure of the two-party system. She emphasized the need to distinguish between campaign rhetoric and actual policies, raising questions about who benefits from Republican agendas: upper-income earners or working-class voters. She characterized the Republican coalition as a mix of wealthy elites, middle-class supporters, and the religious right. In conclusion, Professor McCoy argued that the same anti-authoritarian and community-focused principles that once contributed to America’s vibrancy have, under current pressures, evolved into suspicion, division, and polarization.
Professor Pally: ‘Anti-authoritarianism, Theological Distrust of Government, and Perceived Cultural Losses Intensify White Evangelicals’ Alignment with Right-wing Populism’
Professor Marcia Pally delivered the third presentation and examined the historical, cultural, and political forces shaping American and white evangelical populism. Professor Pally explained that white evangelicals in the US are influenced by historical and doctrinal frameworks, such as Covenantal Political Theory, Aristotelian Republicanism, and Liberalism, which emphasize skepticism toward government, elites, and outsiders. These traditions, coupled with cultural and economic distress, have fostered deep distrust of authority. The Puritan and covenantal ideals brought to the US emphasized community governance and personal responsibility, with a strong reluctance to depend on external authorities. This perspective has been compounded by a sense of cultural and religious loss in the face of increasing secularism, leading white evangelicals to adopt a defensive “us vs. them” worldview, often perceiving secular government and liberal society as antagonistic.
Professor Pally identified economic stress, technological changes, demographic shifts, and cultural anxieties as key drivers of populism among white evangelicals. She highlighted their struggle with declining cultural dominance in an increasingly secular society, noting that legal changes, such as the legalization of same-sex marriage, have heightened fears of marginalization. For white evangelicals, a mix of anti-authoritarianism, theological distrust of government, and perceived cultural losses has intensified their alignment with right-wing populism. Professor Pally also pointed out the irony that evangelical values, once a force for community and anti-authoritarianism, now contribute to divisive rhetoric in a polarized political climate, further exacerbating challenges to American democracy.
Professor Berezin: ‘Trumpism Emboldened Paramilitary Groups, Fostering a Culture of Intimidation and Fear’
Following Professor Pally was Professor Mabel Berezin who delivered a presentation titled “Does Trumpism Cross the Atlantic?” Acknowledging the evolving nature of the discussion, Professor Berezin noted that the recent US election results had reframed many issues, leaving several aspects too early to fully assess. Reflecting on previous presentations, she traced the rise of anti-democratic, right-wing nationalist trends in Europe while emphasizing the distinct dangers posed by the American context.
Professor Berezin highlighted the global trend of democratic backsliding, where skepticism toward democracy is growing, but she pointed out that the US faces unique “dangerous pulse points.” These include the rise of paramilitary groups, judicial realignments, and intellectual movements advocating for social authoritarianism. She particularly emphasized the concerning legitimization of paramilitary groups under Trump, which had previously been relegated to the fringes of society. Trumpism emboldened these groups, fostering a culture of intimidation and fear. Recalling personal experiences in campaign areas marked by gun culture and economic hardship, Berezin underscored the growing normalization of such groups.
In addition, Professor Berezin warned about the rise of intellectual and institutional movements aimed at dismantling regulatory frameworks and traditional family structures. These movements, she argued, pose an even greater threat than paramilitary groups due to their organized and legally entrenched influence. She also highlighted the weakening of democratic protections and the erosion of international institutions. She cited Marine Le Pen’s call for Europe to defend its interests as an example of the broader challenges posed by Trump’s presidency, warning of its implications for global democratic stability.
Dr. Nord: ‘Many Countries Experience Rising Political Polarization, Disinformation, and Weakening Democratic Standards’
The final presentation was delivered by Dr. Marina Nord who discussed the decline of democracy in the United States, comparing it to global trends and the Liberal Democracy Index. She highlighted that while the US once ranked above the Western European and North American average for democracy, it now falls below, particularly after the Trump presidency. The sharp drop in democratic accountability since 2016 has not been fully reversed under Biden’s administration. Dr. Nord showcased declines in key indicators such as deliberative processes, electoral integrity, and the spread of misinformation, illustrating the significant challenges facing US democracy. She explained that globally, many countries—including the US—are experiencing rising political polarization, disinformation, and weakening democratic standards, all of which contribute to a broader trend of democratic erosion.
This shift aligns with the growing influence of autocracies, with countries like those in the BRICS bloc gaining economic and political power. Dr. Nord concluded by emphasizing the need for liberal democracies to counter populist and autocratic narratives by offering more persuasive solutions. She cited research on the dividends of democracy, particularly in areas like security and media freedom, underscoring the necessity for democracies to adapt to global challenges and strengthen their institutions to prevent further decline.
This ECPS panel highlighted how the 2024 election reflects broader global trends in populism, polarization, and democratic erosion. Through insightful presentations, scholars dissected the interplay of economic, cultural, and institutional factors shaping contemporary populist movements. From economic grievances driving political shifts, as Dr. Abramowitz explained, to the complex role of cultural identity and evangelical populism discussed by Dr. Pally, the event underscored the multifaceted nature of populist influence. The panelists collectively stressed the urgency for liberal democracies to adapt and counter autocratic narratives to safeguard democratic institutions worldwide.
Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). Authoritarian Populist ‘Civilization-States’ and Their Influence in Africa: Hard and Soft Powers of TRIC. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 11, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0092
Turkey, Russia, India, and China (TRIC) are reshaping the power dynamics in Africa, challenging Western dominance and promoting alternative development models. These nations leverage their untarnished histories with Africa and emphasize shared anti-colonial struggles to position themselves as allies of the Global South. However, their competition is far from altruistic. Beneath promises of “no-strings-attached” aid lies a strategic pursuit of resources, trade, and influence. While they share a common goal of diminishing Western power, TRIC nations also compete fiercely with each other, making Africa a critical battleground in the quest for a multipolar world order.
Africa has become the focal point of a new great power struggle, reminiscent of the Cold War but with a distinctly civilizational dimension. Unlike the colonial powers of the past, today’s major actors—Turkey, Russia, India and China (TRIC)—position themselves as allies of the Global South, presenting alternative paths to modernization that challenge Western dominance. This competition is driven by the pursuit of Africa’s vast natural resources, strategic geographic positions, and potential economic partnerships.
The new great power competition in Africa is reshaping the continent’s political, economic, and security landscape. Unlike the colonial era, this competition is characterized by a narrative of anti-Western solidarity, TRIC states present themselves as alternatives to the Western model of development. Each position itself as a partner of Africa, offering infrastructure investments, trade, and security assistance without the liberal democratic conditions often attached to Western aid. At stake are billions of dollars in trade, access to critical minerals, and influence over strategic regions.
Turkey leverages its Ottoman heritage and cultural ties, combining soft power initiatives like education and humanitarian aid with increasing defense exports. Russia, through its Wagner Group and strategic partnerships, combines military assistance with anti-colonial rhetoric. India emphasizes historical ties and South-South cooperation while expanding its trade and energy partnerships across Africa. China leads this competition with extensive infrastructure projects, debt financing, and its Belt and Road Initiative, offering a model of authoritarian modernization.
These nations share a common goal: diminishing Western influence and promoting a multipolar world order. Their efforts resonate in Africa, where Western powers are criticized for their colonial past and for attaching conditions to aid. However, the involvement of these new great powers is not purely altruistic. Their strategies often involve competing among themselves for resources, markets, and geopolitical influence, with some adopting hard power tactics that echo the imperialism of the past.
This report provides actionable recommendations for policy makers, NGOs, and academics in both liberal democracies and African nations, aiming to navigate this evolving geopolitical landscape while prioritizing Africa’s autonomy and development goals. It underscores the importance of collaboration, transparency, and shared values to ensure a balanced and equitable future for Africa in the global order.
Shared Motivations: Turkey, Russia, India and China seek to diminish Western influence, particularly that of the United States, in Africa. Each nation emphasizes a historical absence of colonial exploitation in Africa, contrasting their engagement with the imperialist history of the West.
Civilizational Narratives: China and Turkey assert the superiority of their civilizational values over Western norms, presenting themselves as models of development without liberal democratic constraints. Russia and India leverage their shared anti-colonial history with Africa, portraying themselves as partners in the broader fight against Western imperialism.
Strategies: Soft Power – All four nations employ development aid, infrastructure projects, and educational programs to gain influence. China leads in infrastructure, while Turkey and India focus on cultural and educational ties. Hard Power – increasing military engagements, such as China’s Djibouti base and Turkey’s defense agreements with African states, demonstrate a willingness to use force to secure interests. Russia’s Wagner Group and India’s naval presence underscore their strategic ambitions.
Opportunities and Risks: These powers offer no-strings-attached aid and economic partnerships, appealing to African leaders wary of Western conditionality. However, their growing use of hard power raises concerns about neo-imperialism, resource exploitation, and authoritarian influence, challenging the narrative of altruistic partnership.
Competing Interests: Despite a shared goal of diminishing US hegemony, China, Russia, Turkey, and India increasingly compete with one another for influence, creating potential flashpoints in regions like East Africa.
The new great power competition in Africa represents a complex struggle involving economics, geopolitics, and ideology. While China, Russia, Turkey, and India align in their opposition to Western dominance, they also vie against each other for strategic advantage. This competition challenges the liberal democratic order, offering Africans alternative development models rooted in authoritarian governance and civilizational narratives.
As these powers expand their presence, the risk of militarization and resource-driven exploitation grows, underscoring the complexity of Africa’s geopolitical landscape. For liberal democracies, this competition highlights the need for a recalibrated approach to African engagement. Transparent partnerships, infrastructure investments, and strengthened support for democratic institutions can counterbalance authoritarian models.
For African nations, this dynamic presents both opportunities and challenges. Leveraging this competition to secure fairer terms for trade, development aid, and security assistance is essential to preserving sovereignty and fostering sustainable growth. Engaging with these emerging powers could accelerate development, but it may also erode democratic governance and foster dependency.
Meanwhile, the United States and its allies must reassess their strategies to remain relevant in a multipolar Africa. This evolving contest reflects a broader global shift toward multipolarity, with Africa positioned as a pivotal arena in the battle to reshape the post-Cold War world order.
Statue of a child slave in Zanzibar. Photo: Shutterstock.
In the 19th century, the competition among Europe’s major powers led to the invasion and colonization of almost the entire African continent. However, drawing a direct analogy between today’s great power competition in Africa and the colonial era oversimplifies the dynamics at play. Unlike the previous scramble for Africa, the so-called “New Scramble for Africa” (The Economist, 2019) might bring tangible benefits to ordinary Africans.
Africa, despite being the poorest inhabited continent, remains a region of immense potential. Its vast oil and mineral wealth, coupled with significant agricultural resources, are juxtaposed with widespread poverty. Yet, there are reasons for cautious optimism about Africa’s future. The continent is increasingly recognized as a region of strategic importance by global powers such as China, Russia, and the United States, as well as regional actors like Turkey and India. Africa’s importance is rooted in its rapidly growing population—projected to be the largest globally by the end of the century—and its abundant natural resources, including minerals essential for emerging technologies like electric vehicles and mobile phones. While much of the developed world grapples with aging populations and declining fertility rates—some, like China, even confronting the paradox of growing old before achieving widespread prosperity—Africa’s demographic trends point to a youthful and dynamic future.
Between 2000 and 2020, African nations experienced stable economic growth (Zajączkowski & Kumar, 2020), a trend that has continued largely uninterrupted in sub-Saharan Africa, except during the COVID-19 pandemic. By the mid-2010s, Africa’s economic performance surpassed that of other developing regions such as Latin America and Southeast Asia (UNECA, 2015; African Development Bank, 2014, 2015). This growth has often been driven by internal demand, including private consumption, public infrastructure investment, and expanding trade ties with emerging markets (African Development Bank, 2019). Projections estimate that by 2060, Africa’s middle class will reach 1.1 billion people—approximately 50% of the continent’s population (UNECA, 2015; African Development Bank, 2012).
Despite these promising trends, Africa currently accounts for just 3% of global trade (African Development Bank, 2012; UNECA, 2013). However, the continent’s youthful population, rapid urbanization, and expanding educated middle class are transforming it into an increasingly attractive destination for foreign investment. Nations such as China, Russia, India, Turkey, the United States, and European powers are deepening their engagement with Africa, driven by a mix of strategic, economic, and geopolitical interests.
The competition among these major powers has the potential to create a win-win scenario for Africans. By leveraging rivalries, African nations could secure better investment deals and improved terms of engagement. However, there are risks. This competition could result in increased external support for corrupt or oppressive leaders as foreign powers prioritize their strategic goals over good governance. Nevertheless, the potential benefits are evident: increased investment can create jobs, improve infrastructure, and enhance Africa’s influence within global institutions. For emerging global powers, Africa represents an opportunity not only to boost national wealth and secure access to critical raw materials but also to expand their global influence and military reach, often at the expense of established powers like the United States.
China, Russia, Turkey, and India, in particular, are deepening their economic, diplomatic, and military ties with African states using a mix of soft power, sharp power, and, occasionally, hard power.
The civilizational populism promoted by emerging powers like Turkey, China, and others provides a distinct alternative to the Western liberal democratic model. These nations seek to position themselves as “civilization-states,” claiming to reconnect with the values and traditions that historically made their societies great. This strategic positioning not only challenges the hegemony of liberal democratic norms but also resonates with African states seeking development paths that reject Western-imposed conditions and values.
In Turkey, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) under Recep Tayyip Erdogan exemplifies this civilizational populism. Erdogan’s leadership employs a dual narrative: domestically, he positions himself as the defender of Islamic values against secularist elites, and internationally, he portrays Turkey as the protector of Muslim interests against Western dominance (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022). By framing Turkey as the heir to Ottoman-Islamic civilization, Erdogan not only consolidates his domestic support but also positions Turkey as a leader of the Muslim world (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). Central to this strategy is the AKP’s rhetoric, which invokes collective historical traumas and fears. This securitization narrative portrays Turkey as a nation under constant threat from internal and external enemies, including Western powers, secularists, and minority groups (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2021). By doing so, Erdogan legitimizes authoritarian measures, silences dissent, and garners support for Turkey’s active role in global anti-Western coalitions (Yilmaz, Shipoli, & Demir, 2021).
In addition, civilizational populism heavily relies on narratives of victimhood. Erdogan’s political strategy has evolved to incorporate both national and manufactured victimhood narratives, which resonate deeply with his base. These narratives amplify historical grievances and create a sense of solidarity among supporters, portraying the AKP and its leader as the only forces capable of defending the “true” Turkish identity (Morieson, Yilmaz, & Kenes, 2024). These strategies extend beyond domestic politics to foreign policy. By aligning with anti-colonial sentiments and emphasizing solidarity with historically marginalized nations, Turkey appeals to African states as a partner that understands their struggles. Unlike the West, which ties aid and investment to democratic reforms, Turkey offers “no-strings-attached” assistance, furthering its influence in regions seeking alternatives to Western conditionalities (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022). This model of civilizational populism not only undermines liberal democratic norms but also demonstrates the AKP’s ability to adapt its messaging to different audiences. By emphasizing shared grievances and cultural pride, the AKP constructs a narrative of unity and resistance that resonates globally while reinforcing its domestic authority (Yılmaz, 2021).
These civilization-states emphasize anti-colonial solidarity and highlight their success in achieving economic growth without adhering to Western norms. Their strategies are designed not only to challenge American hegemony but also to position their governance models as viable alternatives to liberal democracy.
This report examines the strategies employed by China, Russia, Turkey, and India in Africa, focusing on their use of soft and hard power and their framing of themselves as civilization-states offering alternatives to Western liberalism. By analyzing their approaches, this report seeks to understand how these powers influence Africa’s development trajectories and what this means for the future of global power dynamics.
The Turkish Islamist humanitarian aid foundation IHH serves as one of the key instruments of the Erdogan regime’s policies in Africa. African children participate in activities promoting IHH in Niamey, Niger, on December 20, 2017. Photo: Burak Tumler.
Turkey’s Erdogan-led AKP government has demonstrated unprecedented interest in Africa, establishing 26 new embassies and 12 consulates across the continent since 2010, bringing the total to 44 (The Economist, 2019). This outreach aligns with Erdogan’s increasingly anti-Western national ideology, which portrays Turkey as both a defender of Islam and the downtrodden peoples of the global south (Yilmaz and Morieson, 2023). For Erdogan, Africa represents a region with deep-seated resentment toward Western powers and a positive perception of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire, offering opportunities to cultivate trade partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international bodies, including the United Nations.
Historically, Turkey’s engagement with Africa was limited. While the Ottoman Empire maintained ties with North Africa, the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe until the 1990s (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This neglect was shaped by Africa’s colonial history, Turkey’s pro-European orientation under Kemalist rule, and Cold War dynamics that placed much of Africa under American or Soviet influence.
Erdogan has contrasted Turkey’s approach with that of Western powers, emphasizing solidarity over exploitation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, he criticized Europe’s failure to provide vaccines to Africa, contrasting it with Turkey’s medical aid (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023). He has frequently highlighted Europe’s selective application of universal values, pointing to the neglect of African refugees and Western double standards on human rights. According to Erdogan, “The EU is not in a position to defend all its self-proclaimed universal moral values while it turns a blind eye to sinking boats in the Mediterranean, building wire fences, and adopting a push-back policy” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023).
Erdogan positions Turkey as a country free from colonial baggage, committed to anti-imperialism, and sharing values with Africa. He frames Turkey’s engagement as rooted in sincerity, brotherhood, and solidarity, rejecting “old colonial practices with new methods” (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023). Erdogan’s rhetoric emphasizes a “unique economic and development model” that Turkey can export to help Africa prosper without adopting exploitative or neo-colonial practices.
This narrative blend promises of mutual economic growth with appeals to shared values and opposition to the West. Erdogan adeptly connects Europe’s colonial legacy with its modern policies, particularly in redistributive justice. For instance, he has contrasted Turkey’s pandemic aid with Europe’s vaccine withholding, presenting Turkey as a genuine partner in Africa’s development (Aydın-Düzgit, 2023).
Turkey’s African policy underwent a significant transformation in the post-Cold War era. After the European Union (EU) rejected Turkey’s membership, Ankara adopted a multidimensional foreign policy, moving away from exclusive Western alignment (Tepecikliogu, 2017). The “Opening to Africa Policy” of 1998 marked the beginning of this shift, with economic priorities playing a growing role. This approach intensified under the AKP government, which, after facing resistance to EU membership, turned to cultivating alliances in non-Western regions, including Africa.
In 2005, Erdogan’s government declared “The Year of Africa,” with Erdogan becoming the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa. Turkey’s economic growth under AKP leadership enabled the country to pursue a proactive foreign policy, focusing on the African continent as a region of strategic importance (Tepecikliogu, 2017). Today, Turkey positions itself as a reliable partner, offering an alternative to Western dominance while strengthening its presence in Africa through economic, cultural, and diplomatic initiatives.
Turkey’s soft power initiatives in Africa have been complex, leveraging humanitarian aid, education, religion, media, and infrastructure development. This aligns with President Erdogan’s increasingly anti-Western national ideology, which frames Turkey as both a defender of its people and Islam, as well as a spokesperson for the downtrodden peoples of the global south (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023). In Africa, Erdogan perceives a continent harboring understandable resentment toward Western powers and views it as a region where Turkey and the Ottoman Empire are remembered positively. This creates opportunities for Turkey to gain trade partnerships and secure diplomatic support in international organizations such as the United Nations.
Historically, the Ottoman Empire maintained close ties with North Africa, but the Republic of Turkey largely ignored the continent, focusing instead on Europe until the 1990s (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This neglect stemmed from Africa’s colonial history, Turkey’s pro-European orientation under Kemalist rule, and Cold War dynamics that left Africa under American or Soviet influence. However, Turkey’s interest in Africa increased following the Cold War, particularly as its relevance to the US and Europe waned and its bid for EU membership was rejected. In 1997, Turkey adopted a multidimensional foreign policy, diversifying its alliances beyond the West (Tepecikliogu, 2017). This shift included the 1998 “Opening to Africa Policy,” which coincided with the rise of a new Turkish bourgeoisie influencing foreign policy through economic priorities.
Under the Erdogan-led AKP government, which came to power in 2002, efforts to enhance trade and relations with non-Western states, including African nations, accelerated. When it became clear that the EU was reluctant to accept majority-Muslim Turkey, Erdogan sought to build alliances in regions like Africa. Economic growth under AKP rule enabled a proactive foreign policy, and 2005 was declared “The Year of Africa.” Erdogan became the first Turkish prime minister to visit Sub-Saharan Africa, signaling Turkey’s increasing focus on the continent.
In a 2011 speech in Mogadishu, Erdogan underscored Turkey’s commitment to Africa, describing the continent as “the cradle of civilization and one of the epicenters of the future of humanity.” He expressed support for “African ownership of African issues” and highlighted Turkey’s role as a “strategic partner of the rising Continent of Africa” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2011). This rhetoric emphasized Turkey’s distinction from Western powers often viewed as exploitative (Voice of America, 2024). Unlike Western nations, Turkey’s aid comes with few or no conditions regarding governance or human rights reforms, a stance that resonates with many African governments (GIS Reports, 2024). Erdogan has presented Turkey as an alternative to the West, emphasizing sincerity and partnership rather than exploitation (Voice of America, 2024).
Turkey’s engagement in Africa has primarily centered on humanitarian aid and development assistance, which complement its commercial interests (Tepecikliogu, 2017). Selin Gucum of the Observatory of Contemporary Turkey noted that Turkey has capitalized on African efforts to reduce reliance on former colonial powers for aid and security (Voice of America, 2024). Analysts like Teresa Nogueira Pinto highlight that Turkey avoids making its assistance conditional on governance or human rights, a key factor distinguishing it from Western aid models (GIS Reports, 2024).
Education has played a pivotal role in Turkey’s soft power strategy. Initially, the Gulen movement opened schools across Africa, but following the failed 2016 coup, which the AKP blamed on Gulen, these schools were replaced by the Maarif Foundation, which now operates 140 schools in Africa, educating 17,000 students (Daily Sabah, 2021). Additionally, approximately 60,000 African students currently study in Turkey, fostering cultural and educational ties (TRT Africa, 2023).
Religion is another significant element of Turkey’s approach, particularly in Muslim-majority countries or those with sizable Muslim minorities. Turkey-funded mosques and schools promote socially conservative values that resonate with many Africans, especially in opposition to Western liberal norms. Erdogan’s rhetoric against LGBTQ+ rights and his emphasis on traditional family values often find a receptive audience in Africa (Voice of America, 2024).
Media has become an avenue for Turkish influence, with state broadcaster TRT reaching African audiences in multiple languages, including local African dialects. This allows Turkey to promote pro-Turkish narratives and portray itself as a friend to Africa while casting its adversaries as enemies of the African people.
Turkey has also invested in diplomatic training to strengthen ties with African nations. Since 1992, its Diplomacy Academy has trained 249 African diplomats through its International Junior Diplomats Training Program, aimed at capacity building and enhancing human resources upon requests from African foreign ministries (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).
Infrastructure development further cements Turkey’s presence in Africa. Turkish Airlines (THY), for example, flies to 62 African cities, including Mogadishu, Somalia, where its planes land at an airport built with Turkish funds and expertise. This demonstrates Turkey’s commitment to connecting Africa with global markets and boosting tourism (Němečková & Varkočková, 2024).
Humanitarian aid, particularly disaster relief, has been another cornerstone of Turkey’s soft power. During Somalia’s 2011 famine, Turkey provided substantial aid, with Erdogan himself visiting the country to highlight the crisis and Turkey’s role in alleviating it. This not only improved Turkey’s image but also opened doors for Turkish businesses and NGOs to contribute to Somalia’s reconstruction. Somalia became a litmus test for Turkey’s Africa policy, with Ankara playing a mediating role in the country’s internal conflicts (Tepecikliogu, 2017).
Turkey’s initiatives extend beyond aid. It is exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coasts of Libya and Somalia in partnership with local governments (Daily Sabah, 2024). Like other rising powers, Turkey’s involvement in Africa is driven by both economic ambitions and a desire to expand its influence on the continent.
Erdogan’s rhetoric and policies have effectively positioned Turkey as a unique and reliable partner for African nations, contrasting sharply with Western approaches and emphasizing shared values, solidarity, and mutual growth. Through complex soft power initiatives, Turkey has carved a significant role for itself in Africa’s development narrative while pursuing its broader geopolitical and economic interests.
Turkey’s engagement in Africa extends well beyond disaster and famine aid. Today, Turkey is actively exploring oil and gas opportunities off the coasts of Libya and Somalia in collaboration with local governments (Daily Sabah, 2024). Like the BRICS group and Western powers, Turkey’s initiatives in Africa aim to achieve both economic gains and growing geopolitical influence on the continent.
Turkey has earned a reputation as a reliable partner in delivering major projects on time, which has enhanced its value across Africa. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey-Africa trade reached $34.5 billion annually in 2022, up from $5.4 billion in 2003—an extraordinary increase that underscores the economic rise of African nations and Turkey’s expanding interest in the region (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). President Erdogan’s anti-colonial rhetoric further positions Turkey as a trusted ally of Africa, contrasting its sincerity with the perceived exploitation by Western powers. Erdogan also emphasizes Turkey’s unique economic model as a potential roadmap for Africa’s development (Aydın-Düzgit 2023).
Turkey’s hard power approach became more prominent in the 2010s, particularly during the Arab Uprisings and subsequent conflicts. The 2020 Libyan civil war marked a significant shift in Turkey’s foreign policy, as Ankara supported the Tripoli-based government by deploying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and naval forces to counter Russian-backed factions. This intervention showcased the effectiveness of Turkish military technology, especially drones, which have since become highly sought after by African nations (GIS Reports, 2024).
The defense industry has been a major beneficiary of improved Turkey-Africa relations. Turkey has increasingly signed arms deals with African governments, leading to a fivefold growth in defense and aerospace exports to the continent—from $82.9 million in 2020 to $460.6 million in 2021 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022; Demirdirek & Talebian, 2022). While still a small fraction of total arms sales to African states, this growth highlights Turkey’s expanding role as a defense partner. Despite its focus on humanitarian assistance and economic partnerships, Turkey’s security and defense sectors see Africa as a growing market for military goods.
Turkey’s intervention in Libya likely had two main objectives: securing access to the Libyan coast and maritime boundaries, and countering Arab and Russian influence in the region. Turkey’s successful defense of the Tripoli government relied heavily on-air superiority and UAV technology, demonstrating both the effectiveness of its military prowess and the utility of its hardware in modern conflicts.
Following the Libya intervention, Turkish UAVs gained popularity in Africa. Analysts note that Turkish defense products offer significant advantages to African countries—they are affordable, reliable, and battle-tested in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine (GIS Reports, 2024). For nations grappling with insurgent movements, porous borders, and under-resourced armies—such as Togo, Niger, Nigeria, and Somalia—Turkey’s drones and counterterrorism expertise have become especially valuable.
Turkey is primarily a supplier of arms and military training rather than an active combatant in Africa’s wars. It has signed defense agreements with countries including Somalia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, and Rwanda, with expected agreements in Uganda and Mozambique. These agreements often encompass security provisions, technical support, and arms sales, though some, like the Mozambique deal, also involve sharing military intelligence (GIS Reports, 2024).
Somalia remains Turkey’s closest partner in Africa. In 2017, Turkey established a large foreign military base in Mogadishu and has since provided extensive training to Somali soldiers engaged in the fight against al-Shabaab, a terrorist group linked to al-Qaeda (Atlantic Council, 2024). Such defense agreements serve not only Turkey’s strategic interests but also reinforce its image as a significant ally of African stability. Alper Aktas, Turkey’s ambassador to Somalia, remarked, “[Turkey] never considered Somalia’s stability separately from our own country’s stability” (ADF, 2024). Erdogan describes Turkey as an “Afro-Eurasian” country, sharing common values and interests with African nations (Politics Today, 2022).
Turkey has positioned itself as a reliable alternative to Russia, China, France, and the United States in supplying arms to Africa. Abel Abate Demissie, an associate fellow at Chatham House, observes that “Turkey provides a means of actually purchasing military hardware” (DW, 2022a). African nations are particularly interested in Turkish-manufactured armored vehicles, naval equipment, infantry weapons, and drones (DW, 2022a).
By deepening its defense partnerships and increasing arms sales, Turkey not only enhances its influence in Africa but also pushes back against competing powers like Russia and China. These efforts underscore Turkey’s broader strategy to carve out its sphere of influence on the continent while presenting itself as a reliable and cooperative partner to African states.
T-shirts for sale at Windhoek Market alongside a portrait of Putin in Windhoek, Namibia, on March 26, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.
Russia developed strong relationships with African states during the Soviet era, competing with the United States to gain influence across the continent and spread its communist ideology. The Soviets offered development aid and, crucially, solidarity with leftist regimes fighting colonialism and Western imperialism, effectively capitalizing on widespread anti-Western sentiment in Africa (Bienen, 1982). After the collapse of communism, however, Russia struggled to compete with the United States in terms of soft and hard power, as it lacked the resources and global reach of its Soviet predecessor. Nonetheless, because Russia had minimal involvement in the colonization of Africa in the 19th and early 20th centuries, it continued to be perceived by many Africans as a friend to their people and an opponent of Western colonialism and exploitation.
In the post-Soviet era, Russia has consistently sought to maintain its influence in Africa, with efforts expanding significantly under Vladimir Putin’s regime. Putin’s government emphasizes Russia’s historic ties to Africa and its opposition to Western colonialism. For instance, at the second annual Russia–Africa Summit held in St. Petersburg in July 2023, Dmitry Medvedev, Deputy Chairman of the Security Council of Russia, declared that Russia would “pursue avenues that would liberate sovereign states from their colonial heritage.” This statement underscored Russia’s ongoing strategy of supporting anti-Western dictatorships and regimes that defy liberal norms. In exchange for Russian development and military aid, these regimes provide diplomatic backing for Russian initiatives in international bodies, including the United Nations Security Council.
In a 2022 speech in Moscow, Putin elaborated on his anti-Western narrative, blaming the “West,” particularly the “Anglo-Saxons,” for colonialism and the slave trade (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022). He portrayed the Soviet Union and Russia as leaders of the 20th-century anti-colonial movement—a legacy, he argued, that the West has never forgiven. Putin framed Russia’s current opposition to Western liberalism and atheism as a continuation of its historic resistance to colonialism. According to this narrative, the West seeks to eradicate traditional ways of living and religious practices, while Russia, as a civilization-state, stands as a protector of Orthodox Christianity, Islam, and other faiths (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022).
Putin further claimed that the promises of democracy and wealth from the West have consistently led to poverty, imperialism, and the erosion of cultural and religious traditions in societies they influence. He argued that the West’s quest for “total domination” drives it to eliminate “sovereign centers of global development,” even by force if necessary (Meduza, 2022; President of Russia, 2022). While this rhetoric may not carry the same ideological weight as it did during the Soviet era—when communism provided a compelling alternative to capitalism—it resonates in regions like Africa, where anti-Western sentiments remain strong, and where Western promises of democracy and development often fail to meet expectations.
In Africa, Putin’s anti-Western narrative finds an audience, particularly in areas with strong religious conservatism and enduring memories of colonial humiliation. Russia’s framing of itself as a champion of traditional values and a defender against Western imperialism bolsters its appeal, even as its actual resources and influence remain limited compared to its Soviet predecessor. This narrative continues to shape Russia’s engagement with African states, aligning with its broader geopolitical goals of challenging Western hegemony and asserting its role as a sovereign center of global influence.
The Putin regime does not, of course, rely solely on rhetoric to spread its influence across the African continent. Instead, it employs a range of soft and hard power programs designed to elicit support and back friendly nations in Africa. However, the institutions that Russia builds across Africa consistently promote a narrative blaming the West for Africa’s challenges and portraying Russia as an opponent of Western imperialism.
Russia’s overall strategy in Africa can be summarized as a combination of stabilizing the region to facilitate mineral extraction, opening alternative markets for its energy exports, and leveraging anti-colonial rhetoric and aid to win the support of African nations. While Russia does not actively seek to suppress democracy in Africa, the Putin regime has no qualms about supporting repressive regimes and often prefers dealing with authoritarian governments over democracies. Russia is particularly interested in competing with other global powers, including the United States, France, China, and Turkey, for influence in Africa. To this end, it portrays itself as a long-standing ally of the African people, emphasizing its history of supporting independence movements.
The Putin regime maintains ties with friendly African states by fostering collaboration between Russian and African educational institutions, building schools and training facilities, and assisting in securing mining operations and combating insurgencies. This latter aspect often involves the Wagner Group, whose activities in Africa have a mixed record. In 2024, the Wagner Group’s operations were incorporated into Russia’s Ministry of Defense’s African Corps.
Russia’s soft power efforts in Africa primarily focus on spreading Russian culture and language. Russian cultural centers operate in over 80 countries, including South Africa, Tanzania, and Ethiopia, offering Russian language courses and promoting Russian literature. Since 2019, Russia has expanded its language education initiatives to include 28 nations, with a goal of reaching at least 50. It also aims to follow the lead of China and France in admitting talented Africans to its universities to strengthen Africa-Russia ties.
Although Russia has succeeded in garnering support from some African states, including abstentions during votes condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it would be misleading to assume uniform support across the continent or consistent alignment with Russia in UN General Assembly voting (Carnegie Endowment, 2023). Russia’s popularity is not universal in Africa. Despite mostly positive relationships with some countries, it faces competition from wealthier nations better equipped to facilitate development.
Since 2003, Russia has established physical Russian language schools in Africa under the Russky Mir Foundation (Russian World Foundation). These schools teach Russian language and culture, often in collaboration with African governments and universities, such as those in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, and Namibia (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). In return, Russia has pledged to teach African languages in Moscow schools, signaling respect for African cultures and languages (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024).
Russia has also increased its engagement with higher education institutions in Africa, launching the Russian-African Network University consortium in 2023. This initiative includes agreements with various Malian institutions, such as the National School of Engineering, the University of Humanities and Social Sciences, and the Private University Ahmed Baba (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). These projects complement earlier Soviet-era initiatives, such as the university established in Egypt in 1960, underscoring Russia’s historical and ongoing interest in African education.
Olena Snigyr argues that Russian educational and cultural initiatives aim to expand a shared knowledge base and foster ideological alignment. Educational cooperation, Russian language and culture programs, and journalist training are central to Russia’s strategy of disseminating its narratives and ideas (FPRI, 2024). According to Snigyr, Russia’s narrative of “modernization with Russia” appeals to African nations struggling with poverty despite resource wealth, offering a partnership model distinct from the conditional aid frameworks of Western countries.
Russia positions itself as a protector of African interests, advocating for fairer representation in international organizations such as the UN, opposing foreign interference in political regimes, and supporting traditional values in African societies (FPRI, 2024). However, its impact remains limited. Only about 35,000 African students are currently enrolled in Russian universities, and the Russian-African Network University involves just 75 Russian and 27 African institutions, with significant participation from Zimbabwe (FPRI, 2024). Nonetheless, initiatives like the Consortium of Universities “Subsoil of Africa” at St. Petersburg Mining University, which includes over 130 organizations from 42 African countries, demonstrate Russia’s ambition to deepen collaboration with Africa on its own terms (FPRI, 2024).
In 2023, Russia diversified its educational initiatives, including courses in religion and journalism. For example, it signed an agreement with Burkina Faso to collaborate on secular and Islamic education to combat radical Islam (Russian Mufties Council, 2023). Additionally, partnerships with Nigeria focus on advanced technological education, such as robotics, microelectronics, and 3D printing, while negotiations with South Sudan involve constructing a refinery (African Digital Democracy Observatory, 2024). Events like robotics and astronomy workshops in Tanzania, which featured a cosmonaut and attracted 800 students, further underscore Russia’s investment in portraying itself as a technological power in Africa (RT, 2023; Daily News, 2023).
These soft power efforts, while not unique to Russia, are integral to its strategy of portraying itself as a non-imperialist, anti-colonial partner to Africa. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has emphasized Russia’s appreciation for African states that resist Western pressure, framing the partnership as one of mutual respect and shared interests (Kornegay, 2023). This rhetoric has helped Moscow persuade some African states to resist Western sanctions imposed on Russia after its invasion of Ukraine. However, many African states continue to trade with Russia out of necessity, as food and energy shortages leave them little choice but to prioritize their immediate needs over geopolitical alignments.
Russian use of hard power in Africa has become increasingly prominent since 2017, largely through the activities of the Wagner Group, a private military company advancing Russian interests across the continent, often in opposition to Western priorities. The Wagner Group has been active in several African states, most notably the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Libya.
The Wagner Group, founded by Yevgeny Prigozhin, gained prominence during Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea. While commonly referred to as a single entity, it is better described as a complex network of businesses and mercenary groups operating in conflict zones and even in alleged peacekeeping operations worldwide (Council on Foreign Relations, 2023). Before 2023, the Wagner Group operated somewhat independently of the Kremlin. However, following its apparent rebellion against the Putin regime and Prigozhin’s mysterious death in an air crash, the group has operated as an instrument of the Russian state, with much of its operations absorbed into the Ministry of Defense in 2024. Even prior to these events, the Wagner Group was closely aligned with Kremlin objectives, despite its profit-driven motivations.
In Africa, the Wagner Group has approximately 5,000 personnel, including former Russian soldiers, convicts, and foreign nationals (Council on Foreign Relations, 2024). Among its most significant campaigns is its involvement in CAR, where Wagner soldiers were deployed in 2018, initially as military instructors. Their numbers later swelled to 1,500–2,000, transforming into a fighting force tasked with securing the country’s lucrative mining industry and protecting the pro-Russian government from rebels (Granta, 2024).
In 2019, Wagner began stationing forces around gold mines in central and eastern CAR and later expanded its presence to the north. Russian officials claim their operations have brought “peace and security” to CAR, but these claims are contested. The US State Department reports that Wagner has engaged in indiscriminate killings, abductions, and sexual violence in its efforts to control mining areas near Bambari (US State Department, 2024). UN experts further accuse Wagner of harassing journalists, aid workers, and international peacekeepers (OHCHR, 2021).
For instance, in October 2024, Wagner forces reportedly executed at least a dozen civilians in the gold-mining town of Koki, allegedly targeting artisanal miners. Witnesses recounted how Russian paramilitaries arrived by helicopter, indiscriminately opening fire on locals (Al Jazeera, 2024). Such violence is not isolated; it aligns with a broader pattern of Wagner’s operations, where violence often accompanies lucrative mining agreements between Russian companies and the CAR government. For example, the CAR government revoked mining licenses from a Canadian company and awarded them to Midas Resources, a Wagner-affiliated entity (Al Jazeera, 2024).
At times, Wagner’s priorities in CAR appear more focused on securing mineral resources than protecting the government. Wagner reportedly collaborated with the rebel group Union for Peace (UPC) to ensure the safety of its mining operations but later turned against the group, launching a counteroffensive targeting both rebels and local civilians (Al Jazeera, 2024).
CAR’s former Prime Minister Martin Ziguele expressed regret over inviting Wagner into the country, describing the group as a “criminal organization” now dominating CAR’s economic, security, and political spheres (BBC, 2023). Despite these criticisms, many in CAR view Wagner’s presence favorably, believing it has brought a degree of stability. In Bangui, the CAR government erected a monument honoring Wagner forces, depicting Russian troops protecting a woman and her children, accompanied by tributes to Yevgeny Prigozhin (BBC, 2023).
The Wagner Group’s activities in CAR exemplify both the potential and the pitfalls of Russia’s paramilitary strategy in Africa. On one hand, it highlights the failure of US and European initiatives to bring security and democracy to the continent. On the other hand, it demonstrates how Russian soft power effectively garners local support for the presence of its hard power. This growing influence strengthens Russia’s alliances in Africa, securing votes in the UN General Assembly and helping to shield Russia from Western economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures. However, these developments also underscore the precarious balance between Russian objectives and the well-being of African states under Wagner’s shadow.
India’s Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi greets heads of delegations at the alighting point during the 3rd India-Africa Forum Summit in New Delhi on October 29, 2015. Photo: Shutterstock.
India’s relationship with post-colonial Africa is longstanding and predates that of many other nations, including Turkey. Since the 1950s, India has actively engaged with African nations, with Prime Minister Nehru famously describing Africa as a “sister” continent. The establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which included India and all African nations except South Sudan, further solidified this bond. Shared opposition to European colonialism provided a strong foundation for collaboration, fostering a sense of solidarity and shared purpose.
In the post-World War II period, India and African states were united by their mutual aspiration to chart independent foreign policies, a vision that became even more pronounced during the Cold War era (Kidwai, 2023: 359). During this time, both India and African nations sought to strengthen bilateral and regional ties to advance their collective interests. India has been a consistent partner, offering humanitarian aid, disaster assistance, and cooperating on defense and security matters. For example, as early as 1956, Emperor Haile Selassie requested India’s assistance in establishing a military academy in Harar, marking the beginning of India’s significant security cooperation with African states (Kidwai, 2023: 359).
Since the end of the Cold War, India’s engagement with Africa has deepened, especially under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who assumed office in 2014. Modi has portrayed himself as a leader of the ‘Global South’ and has positioned India as a steadfast ally of developing nations. This approach has been reflected in Modi’s initiatives, such as his advocacy for the African Union’s inclusion in the G20 during India’s presidency of the group. Modi’s rhetoric underscores the importance of Africa in India’s global strategy. “When we say we see the world as a family, we truly mean it,” Modi stated, emphasizing Africa’s significance in shaping a more inclusive global dialogue (CNN, 2023).
The inclusion of the African Union in the G20 was, according to Modi, a “significant stride towards a more inclusive global dialogue” (X., 2023). While this move demonstrated India’s commitment to amplifying African voices on the global stage, India’s interest in Africa is not purely altruistic. Like other major powers, India seeks to bolster its influence and expand trade relations with Africa to further its own strategic and economic interests.
Africa has become India’s fourth-largest trading partner among global regions. Trade between India and sub-Saharan Africa has grown significantly, rising from $47 billion in 2012 to nearly $90 billion in recent years (African Business, 2023). Total trade with all African nations reached $98 billion in 2024 (Confederation of Indian Industry, 2024). Energy is a cornerstone of this relationship, with African nations supplying roughly a quarter of India’s crude oil imports. Nigeria, in particular, has become India’s largest supplier of oil (African Business, 2023).
This increasing dependency on African energy resources underscores the continent’s importance to India’s economic security and growth. Consequently, the Indian government has prioritized building stronger ties with African nations through trade, security partnerships, and diplomatic initiatives. India’s strategy also seeks to challenge the influence of other powers, such as the United States, China, Europe, and Russia, in the region. Africa’s growing economic potential and its strategic significance make it a focal point for India’s foreign policy ambitions.
India’s soft power in Africa is rooted in a shared history of anti-colonialism, trade, and humanitarian assistance. While India has historically provided aid to African nations, its primary focus has been on neighboring countries or, paradoxically, on receiving aid itself, such as from Great Britain. However, under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India has increasingly directed aid to African nations, particularly Tanzania, Kenya, and Mozambique—countries where China also has a significant aid presence. This reflects growing competition between India and China for influence in Africa.
Prime Minister Modi emphasizes that India’s engagement in Africa is aimed at fostering cooperation rather than rivalry. He stated, “As global engagement in Africa increases, [India and Africans must work] together to ensure that Africa does not once again turn into a theatre of rival ambitions but becomes a nursery for the aspirations of Africa’s youth” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). This sentiment underscores India’s aim to position itself as a sincere partner to Africa, untainted by exploitative motives.
India’s foreign aid to Africa has grown significantly, with a compound annual growth rate of 22% over the past decade. Initiatives like the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) program exemplify this approach, offering training and education to leaders and scholars from developing countries. With 40,000 alumni globally, ITEC serves as a soft power tool to cultivate goodwill and a generation of leaders with favorable views of India.
India’s soft power also extends to trade. Modi has often emphasized that India’s development partnership with Africa will be guided by African priorities. For example, he remarked that India’s support will “liberate your potential and not constrain your future” (Nantulya, 2023). India seeks to leverage its expertise in areas like the digital revolution to support Africa’s development, including expanding financial inclusion, improving education and health services, and mainstreaming marginalized communities.
Although trade between India and Africa is growing, it remains overshadowed by China-Africa trade. In 2023, China-Africa trade amounted to $282 billion, significantly surpassing India’s $90 billion in trade with sub-Saharan Africa and $98 billion overall (Indian Confederation of Industry, 2024). Nevertheless, certain sectors illustrate the growing depth of India-Africa economic ties. India imports significant amounts of minerals from Africa, while African nations benefit from India’s mining expertise and investment. Conversely, African countries import pharmaceuticals from India, with $3.8 billion worth of medicines and healthcare products purchased in 2020-2021.
India’s trade imbalance with Africa, particularly in manufacturing, is utilized as a soft power advantage. Modi has promised to keep Indian markets open to African goods and to support Indian industries investing in Africa. Furthermore, India is making strides in exporting green energy technology to Africa, positioning itself as a valuable partner in addressing climate change.
One of India’s unique advantages in Africa is the presence of a significant Indian diaspora in countries like Seychelles, South Africa, and Mauritius. Modi’s visits to African countries with large Indian communities underscore this connection. Under Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) rule, India has sought to engage the diaspora to advance its foreign policy objectives, including addressing security concerns and facilitating trade. However, Modi’s message to African audiences diverges from his focus on Hindu civilizational rejuvenation for the diaspora. Instead, he portrays himself as a leader of the Global South, emphasizing solidarity with Africa in advocating for a “just, representative and democratic global order” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020).
In sum, India’s soft power in Africa is a mix of historical ties, developmental cooperation, and strategic engagement. While India’s initiatives are dwarfed by China’s influence, they are nonetheless significant in cultivating goodwill and expanding India’s footprint across the continent. Through trade, aid, and a focus on shared aspirations, India positions itself as a genuine partner and advocate for Africa on the global stage.
India is not a major military power in Africa. Instead, its strength lies in its soft power—the perception that India is a trustworthy and benevolent partner to African nations—which gives it an advantage over rivals like China and the United States. Nevertheless, as India’s economic power grows, so too does its military capacity, and it is increasingly likely that India will expand its hard power presence in areas of strategic importance, including parts of Africa.
India’s hard power in Africa is primarily focused on the Indian Ocean region, which acts as a strategic corridor between the African continent and the Indian subcontinent. Indian military facilities have been established in key locations, including Madagascar, which hosts a radar and listening facility; Oman, where Indian Navy vessels have docking rights; Mauritius, where India is constructing an airfield and facilities for stationing soldiers; and the Seychelles, where India has installed a surveillance system to monitor surrounding waters (Military Africa, 2023; Voice of America, 2024; Deccan Herald, 2024; The Geostrata, 2021). These facilities, while modest compared to the expansive presence of the United States or even Russia in Africa, serve critical functions. They help India secure its interests in the region, combat piracy, and contribute to the stability of vital maritime routes.
India’s hard power initiatives are deeply tied to its aspirations as an Indo-Pacific power. The Modi administration has emphasized the importance of securing Indian influence in the region to counter the expanding presence of China and, to a lesser extent, the United States. India’s strategic focus on the Indo-Pacific includes establishing partnerships with African nations along the eastern shores of Africa, particularly in areas near the Indian Ocean.
Indian military engagements in Africa also highlight its collaborative approach to regional security. Prime Minister Modi has underscored India’s commitment to addressing shared security concerns, stating that India will prioritize “strengthen[ing] …cooperation and mutual capabilities [between India and Africa] in combating terrorism and extremism; keeping our cyberspace safe and secure; and supporting the UN in advancing and keeping peace” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020). Modi’s rhetoric often emphasizes that Indian military activities are driven by the need for stability and collaboration rather than competition, asserting that “the world needs cooperation and not competition in the eastern shores of Africa and the eastern Indian Ocean” (Ministry of External Affairs, 2020).
While India’s military footprint in Africa is currently limited, its actions signal a gradual but deliberate increase in its regional hard power. India’s presence in the Indian Ocean is likely to expand further, as the country seeks to position itself as a key player in global maritime security and a counterbalance to Chinese and American influence in the region. Partnerships with African nations on counterterrorism, cybersecurity, and peacekeeping missions will likely be pivotal in shaping India’s military strategy in Africa.
A Chinese yuan placed on a map of Africa symbolizes trade, tourism, economy, and investment between China and African countries. Photo: Oleg Elkov.
China’s rise is arguably the most consequential event of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. Before the 2000s, it was commonplace in Western capitals to believe that China’s embrace of market capitalism would inevitably transform the country into a liberal democracy. This ahistorical and naïve belief shaped American policy towards China throughout the 1980s and 1990s, which facilitated China’s economic growth by dismantling barriers to trade. However, this approach failed to transform China into either a democracy or a reliable ally of the United States. Instead, following a period of economic reform and relative social liberalization under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping’s leadership has transformed China into a surveillance state governed by an authoritarian populist regime, which portrays itself as the culmination of “5,000 years of Chinese civilization” (Liu Qingzhu, 2023).
China’s growing economic strength, while it has created a large middle class, has not led to its transition into a liberal democracy. Although China’s middle class enjoys economic freedom, it remains either unwilling or unable to demand freedom of expression and other liberal reforms. From one perspective, it would seem irrational for Chinese citizens to challenge a regime that has delivered unprecedented prosperity. Indeed, China is arguably the world’s largest economic powers and its second greatest military power, giving its citizens a sense of prestige and influence not experienced for centuries. The Communist Party of China (CCP) continuously reinforces this narrative of national ascendancy, framing China’s increasingly assertive behavior in Asia—including its claims over maritime territories belonging to Vietnam and the Philippines—as part of a legitimate effort to reclaim territories historically taken from China by imperial powers (Zhang, 2019).
Simultaneously, China positions itself as a model for the Global South and is instrumental in building economic blocs such as BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), aimed at countering the influence of the US and EU in global economic affairs (Char, 2024). For the CCP and its supporters, China’s rise is evidence of the superiority of its civilizational model over Western civilization and proof that modernization can occur without Westernization (Char, 2024). The CCP adopts a deeply civilizational perspective on global affairs and has repeatedly urged the US to respect civilizational differences and cease imposing liberal democratic values on non-Western nations (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018).
China appears to recognize that liberal democracies tend to act peacefully toward one another but view the rise of non-liberal powers as existential threats, often responding with hostility. Xi Jinping has warned the US not to provoke a “clash of civilizations” by attempting to stifle China’s rise. Instead, he has called for an acceptance of China’s autocratic system and its hegemony in Asia as natural outcomes of its civilizational rejuvenation. To achieve harmony between civilizations, Xi advocates replacing “estrangement with exchange, clashes with mutual learning, and superiority with coexistence” (Zhang, 2019: 19).
China’s rise serves as an inspiration to many developing nations, particularly in Africa, as it demonstrates rapid development achieved without capitulating to Westernization. Aware of this, China leverages its position as a rising non-Western power through soft power initiatives, presenting itself as a non-Western civilization that has risen above the West. The CCP claims that China is inherently more peaceful and civilized, emphasizing that it has never colonized or invaded other nations. While this narrative is not entirely accurate, it resonates with many Africans who continue to feel the historical pain of colonization. China’s claim of never having invaded African territory is particularly appealing, as it contrasts sharply with the history of European colonial powers.
China’s relationship with Africa is shaped by this self-image. The CCP portrays China not merely as a nation-state but as a rejuvenated 5,000-year-old civilization capable of serving as a role model for other developing, non-Western societies. By positioning itself as an alternative to Western imperialism, China fosters goodwill and deepens its influence across the African continent.
Chinese soft power in Africa, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, is considerable. China has opened more than 50 embassies across the continent—more than the United States—and has become the most significant trade and aid partner for a variety of African nations (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).
China provides infrastructure, including roads and railways, in areas where the US often does not, and facilitates development through aid and debt forgiveness. However, China also offers a different path to development and modernity, one that does not insist on compliance with liberal democratic norms and at times challenges, rather than imitates, Africa’s former colonial masters.
China is heavily involved in infrastructure development in Africa. For instance, in Kenya, China was responsible for the construction of the Nairobi to Mombasa Standard Gauge Railway, a project costing $4.7 billion, with plans to build industrial parks connected by the railway, which was also supposed to extend to Uganda (BBC, 2023). However, the railway is underused and widely considered unnecessary, leading to accusations that China has deliberately trapped Kenya in unmanageable debt to gain influence over the African state (BBC, 2023). Despite this, only 19.4% of Kenya’s debt is owed to China (BBC, 2023).
In Ethiopia, China has invested in hundreds of projects valued at over $4 billion (Cabestan, 2019). China has been instrumental in constructing roads and railways. Beyond infrastructure, China supported the Ethiopian government in December 2021 by voting against a UN resolution condemning human rights abuses in the Tigray region (South China Morning Post, 2021).
China also constructed the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at a cost of $200 million (South China Morning Post, 2018). Unsurprisingly, the building was reportedly bugged, and its servers were regularly hacked by CCP operatives (South China Morning Post, 2018). Nevertheless, China continues to build critical infrastructure across the continent. In 2018, China announced plans to build the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) headquarters in Abuja, Nigeria (Xinhua, 2022). In 2022, China completed construction of the African Centre for Disease Control Headquarters (CIDCA, 2023). Additionally, Chinese-owned companies have built or financed dozens of presidential, prime ministerial, and other government buildings throughout Africa (Heritage Foundation, 2020).
China is also seeking control over African ports. For instance, Djibouti nationalized its Doraleh Container Terminal in 2018 (Bloomberg, 2018). However, China owns 25% of the port, gaining significant control over regional shipping. Chinese companies have also established large cargo facilities near the port, and hundreds of Chinese soldiers are stationed there. The People’s Liberation Army Navy uses the terminal for anti-piracy and anti-terrorism operations and likely other intelligence and power-projection activities (Bloomberg, 2018).
Reports suggest that China is looking to build a large maritime base, potentially in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, or Gabon (The Diplomat, 2024). Although these plans have not yet materialized, they indicate China’s intent to expand its military power in African waters to protect its lucrative fishing industry and extend its influence over African states (The Diplomat, 2024).
China has also invested in space programs in nine African states as part of its Belt and Road Space Information Corridor. China launches satellites for African states and trains Africans to work in the space industry (United States Institute of Peace, 2023).
Huawei, a Chinese telecommunications technology company, is thought to provide around 70% of Africa’s telecommunications and information infrastructure (DW, 2022; Feldstein, 2020). Across the continent, Chinese companies build telecommunication networks, including government networks. Nine African countries have adopted Chinese-designed and built surveillance projects as part of China’s “Smart City Surveillance” initiative, involving the installation of vast numbers of cameras. Whether the CCP has access to these cameras remains unclear (Financial Times, 2021; The Wall Street Journal, 2019).
China does not merely build infrastructure in Africa but also invites Africans to live and study in China, often at the Chinese state’s expense. This effort aims to create a generation of educated African elites with favorable opinions of China and its development model. For example, Xi Jinping’s approach to Africa, articulated in an editorial by China’s ambassador to the Seychelles, emphasizes “South-South cooperation” and building a China-Africa community based on “sincerity, real results, amity, and good faith” (Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Seychelles, 2023).
China’s efforts to develop relationships with emerging African elites align with its broader goal of exporting the “China model” of development, which emphasizes industrialization and modernization without democratization or the adoption of Western liberal values. Initiatives like the Sino-Africa Political Party Leaders program bring young African politicians to China for training in governance and economic development based on Chinese principles (Brookings, 2016). Additionally, in 2022, the CCP financed the Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Leadership School in Tanzania, which educates political leaders from six Southern African countries (FPRI, 2022).
Confucius Institutes, which aim to teach Chinese language and promote Chinese culture, are widespread in Africa, though they have been criticized for spreading CCP propaganda. China has overtaken the United States in hosting African students, making it the second most popular destination after France for Africans pursuing higher education.
China measures its success in Africa partly by examining voting patterns in international organizations. African states are increasingly aligning with China in the UN, with many voting against resolutions critical of Beijing’s policies, such as its South China Sea claims or human rights abuses in Xinjiang (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2022).
China’s growing popularity in Africa reflects its strategy of combining infrastructure development, educational outreach, and alignment with African priorities. Despite criticisms of its authoritarian model and accusations of debt-trap diplomacy, many Africans view China as a reliable partner offering an alternative path to development. As African nations increasingly adopt aspects of the “China model,” it becomes evident that China’s influence in Africa is reshaping the continent’s political and economic landscape.
Military relations between the People’s Republic of China and Africa began during the Cold War, as China sought to combat both Soviet and American influence across the continent and portray itself as a fellow non-white society resisting white global power. During this period, China encouraged national liberation and socialist movements in Africa. Although it no longer attempts to foment communist revolutions in Africa, China continues to present itself as a non-white power naturally aligned with and sympathetic to Africans.
Under Deng Xiaoping, China adopted a policy of “hiding our capabilities” and projecting a friendly or benign face to the world. This approach meant that, while China was a significant arms supplier to African nations, it rarely involved itself directly or indirectly in African conflicts. Xi Jinping has broken with this policy, declaring that “China now stands tall and firm in the East” and should “take center stage” in global affairs (Nantulya, 2019).
As a result, China has adopted a more assertive foreign policy, particularly in Southeast Asia and along its border with India, largely driven by efforts to reclaim land and maritime territories that once belonged to the Chinese Empire (e.g., Taiwan and the South China Sea). At the same time, China has long been involved in African conflicts and is eager to assert its military might in support of its national interests, as well as to “protect” ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals living in Africa. China’s use of hard power in Africa is deeply tied to the CCP’s civilizational rejuvenation project, its conception of all Chinese globally as belonging to the “Chinese people,” and its efforts to restore China to its rightful place at the center of global affairs. For example, Xi (2017) emphasizes China’s “more than 5,000 years of civilized history,” portraying the Chinese as a people who “created a brilliant civilization, made outstanding contributions to mankind, and became a great nation of the world.” Xi claims that the Chinese people are now being “rejuvenated” and will soon achieve a “moderately prosperous society” while becoming a global power.
Expanding its hard power influence in Africa helps China present itself as a global power and a civilization with its own development models and norms, which other nations may follow to achieve similar prosperity. Furthermore, this expansion allows China to protect friendly African regimes, prevent American-led coups or interventions, and secure its strategic interests.
China is also exporting its governance model to African states, most notably to Ethiopia, often referred to as the “China of Africa.” Many African countries, including Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Tanzania, have made “observable changes to their governance styles and models as a result of these deepening engagements.” These changes reflect the adoption of elements from the Chinese development model, including strong export-led growth, significant state involvement in the economy, and the promotion of labor-intensive industries (Nantulya, 2018). China is also believed to be exporting principles like “democratic centralism,” the establishment of special economic zones, and the concept that the military should remain loyal to the ruling party rather than the state or its citizens (Nantulya, 2018).
Despite considerable attention to China’s military footprint in Africa, it remains relatively small compared to that of the United States, which maintains military bases in 26 African nations under the auspices of the United States Africa Command. In contrast, China has just one military base in Africa, located in Djibouti. Nevertheless, given China’s global ambitions, it is likely to establish additional bases in Africa to defend its interests and challenge US, Russian, and Turkish influence in the region.
Though China has only one base in Africa, it has conducted military drills in Cameroon, Gabon, Ghana, and Nigeria. Its military medical units have collaborated with counterparts in Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zambia to improve combat casualty care as part of long-standing relationships involving arms sales and intelligence cooperation (Nantulya, 2019). China is also developing military ties with Burkina Faso, which recently ceased recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state (Nantulya, 2019).
In 2018, China held a Defense and Security Forum with officials from 50 African nations, resulting in a comprehensive security framework. Through this framework, China pledged to provide military and intelligence support to combat pirates, terrorists, and criminals, as well as to participate in peacekeeping operations. China committed $100 million toward building the African Union Standby Force and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis and contributed to the China-UN Peace and Development Fund and various training programs (ISPI, 2018).
China’s increasing interest in African security and defense reflects its desire to protect friendly regimes, facilitate trade, ensure the success of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and safeguard ethnic Chinese and Chinese nationals in Africa. While China’s actions often align with African interests, such as infrastructure development and security enhancement, the establishment of Chinese police stations and other security facilities across Africa is also part of projecting China as a civilization-state that protects Chinese people globally and maintains their loyalty to the CCP.
China has openly expressed its intentions in Africa. A 2015 Chinese policy paper emphasized “deepened military engagement, technological cooperation, and capacity building for Africa’s security sectors” (Nantulya, 2019). As a result, China has become sub-Saharan Africa’s largest weapons supplier (SIPRI, 2018). Its exports include not only small arms but also tanks, armored personnel carriers, maritime patrol craft, aircraft, missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, and artillery (Nantulya, 2019).
China is also deeply involved in educating African military officers. Approximately 2,000 African officers train annually with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), with an additional 500 attending the PLA Naval Medical University and another 2,000 receiving policing and law enforcement training at China’s People’s Armed Police (PAP) schools (Nantulya, 2023). The PLA and PAP, as extensions of the CCP, advance the party’s ideological and political goals in Africa.
While China avoids direct military intervention in Africa, it increasingly leverages UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKOs) to expand its influence. In West Africa, China has steadily increased the number and variety of personnel it contributes, including medics, engineers, and armed infantry. In Mali, China’s involvement in the MINUSMA mission is seen as symbolic but marks a new willingness to deploy combat troops (Merics, 2020). China’s peacekeeping activities are not politically neutral. Instead, they aim to promote a “Chinese approach” to peacekeeping, prioritizing regime stability and economic development while avoiding interventionism and democratization (Merics, 2020).
Not all Africans welcome China’s growing influence. For example, Khalil Ibrahim, leader of Sudan’s Justice and Equality Movement, once complained that “China is trading petroleum for our blood” (Pant & Haidar, 2017). Anti-China violence has occurred in Ethiopia, Mali, and other nations, demonstrating that China’s activities are not universally accepted. Nonetheless, China continues to strengthen its position in Africa, often at the expense of democratic norms. These developments are part of the CCP’s broader civilizational rejuvenation project, aimed at reshaping the global order in favor of a multipolar world with China at its center.
The Debswana Jwaneng Diamond Mine pit in Jwaneng, Botswana, on November 15, 2022. Photo: Bashi Kikia.
The new great power struggle for influence in Africa contains a distinct civilizational element. However, rather than claiming to bring civilization to Africa, each non-African nation involved in this struggle presents itself as a representative of a broader civilization in conflict with the West, offering a new, non-Western path to development. At stake in this competition are billions of dollars in trade revenue, access to vital minerals, and control over key military staging points and geographically strategic areas.
Turkey, Russia, India and China (TRIC) share a common goal: to expand their influence across the African continent and weaken Western—particularly American—power in Africa. Their advantage over the West lies in their relatively untarnished history with Africa, their lack of a colonial legacy tainted by bloodshed, and their ability to point to their own economic successes as evidence that nations can achieve wealth and power without adhering to Western norms and governance models.
Each of these nations offers Africa—often addressing it as though it were a monolithic culture—friendship and ostensibly “no-strings-attached” development aid and direct investment, something the liberal West has traditionally refused to provide. They frequently cite the evils of the colonial period and the West’s insistence that aid be contingent on liberal democratic reforms as examples of Western arrogance and imperialism.
Turkey and China claim that their own civilizations possess values superior to those of the West, demonstrated by their peaceful engagement with Africa. Meanwhile, Russia and India emphasize their shared anti-colonial struggle and present themselves as allies of the Global South in its resistance to Western imperialism. All four nations position themselves as voices for the Global South in its ongoing struggle against the global North.
Yet, these nations are not altruistic actors. They, too, seek Africa’s mineral wealth and view the continent as a key territory for expanding their influence. Although their methods are not as violent or oppressive as those of the European colonial powers, their actions reveal a similar underlying motivation. The increasing reliance on hard power by Turkey, Russia, India and China in Africa highlights that these “new” great powers are not so different from the old ones.
Ultimately, the competition for influence in Africa pits Turkey, Russia, India and China not just against the West but also against one another. Yet, these four nations share a critical objective: constructing a multipolar world in which American power is no longer hegemonic. Winning greater influence in Africa is integral to this project, as is persuading Africans to reject reliance on Western assistance for economic growth and infrastructure development. Instead, the emerging powers argue that Africans should turn away from the values of their former colonial masters and draw on the experiences of rising civilization-states to develop their economies and construct vital infrastructure. Given the West’s failure to facilitate African development and the ongoing challenges faced by liberal democratic societies globally, it would not be surprising if Africans began to distance themselves from liberal democratic norms.
However, the United States remains by far the most powerful foreign nation in Africa, capable of projecting hard power across the continent at a level unmatched by any other nation.
From an Anglo-American—and broadly Western—perspective, the competition between the West and its old and new rivals may appear to be a confrontation between democratic and autocratic regimes. To some extent, the language used by states like TRIC, when presenting themselves as “civilization-states” with unique values, serves to legitimize authoritarianism. However, these regimes perceive the competition differently. They view it as a struggle to construct a new world order in which the US is no longer the central power and the ancient civilizations of TRIC regain the power and prestige they enjoyed before.
These nations are serious about displacing the US and dismantling the liberal norms and global order that have defined the world since the end of the Cold War. They, along with their growing number of allies, believe this shift is desirable, marking the end of Western imperialism and the notion that Western values—such as liberal democracy—are universal. At the same time, they compete with one another in Africa. For instance, if China’s base in Djibouti signals plans to establish further bases in East Africa, India may feel compelled to respond by increasing its military presence to counter Chinese influence, lest it risk an East Africa dominated by China and potentially hostile to Indian interests.
While it is possible that TRIC could find avenues for cooperation in Africa, it is far more likely that their competition will intensify. Despite sharing the common goal of diminishing American power in Africa and globally, their conflicting interests are likely to make Africa a critical arena of rivalry among these new global powers.
– Liberal democracies should emphasize the unique value of transparent, accountable governance and rule of law as part of their development partnerships.
– Shift from conditionality-based aid to partnerships that prioritize mutual benefits without sacrificing democratic values.
Strengthen Infrastructure Investments!
– Compete with China and others by funding large-scale infrastructure projects with transparent terms to counter debt-trap diplomacy narratives.
– Prioritize renewable energy, digital infrastructure, and transport networks to align with Africa’s long-term goals.
Increase Support for Democratic Governance!
– Offer robust support for democratic institutions in Africa through capacity-building programs for judiciary, electoral, and civil society.
– Collaborate with African governments to counter the spread of authoritarian governance models, such as China’s “democratic centralism.”
Develop Cultural and Educational Ties!
– Expand scholarships and exchange programs for African students in liberal democracies to compete with Chinese and Turkish educational initiatives.
– Support local language media and cultural initiatives to counter disinformation and propaganda from authoritarian states.
Enhance Military Cooperation!
– Strengthen military partnerships focused on combating terrorism, piracy, and organized crime while avoiding neo-imperialist optics.
– Support African-led peacekeeping missions and regional security initiatives to offer alternatives to Russian mercenary involvement.
Collaborate with African Nations on Resource Management!
– Promote sustainable development models by partnering with African nations on equitable resource extraction and environmental conservation.
– Ensure that development initiatives include local community benefits to counter the exploitative practices of other powers.
Support Multipolar Engagement!
– Avoid framing the engagement as a “new Cold War”; instead, focus on inclusive global partnerships where African nations have agency in decision-making.
– Advocate for reforms in international institutions (e.g., UN, IMF) to increase African representation.
– Use the competition between great powers to negotiate better terms for aid, trade, and investment agreements.
– Insist on infrastructure projects that prioritize local employment, technology transfer, and long-term sustainability.
Diversify Economic Partners!
– Avoid over-reliance on any single country (e.g., China) by fostering diversified trade relationships with liberal democracies, BRICS nations, and regional blocs.
– Strengthen intra-African trade through the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to reduce dependence on external powers.
Protect Sovereignty and Avoid Dependency!
– Resist pressures to adopt authoritarian governance models in exchange for development aid.
– Develop robust legal frameworks to prevent resource exploitation and ensure fair terms for foreign investments.
Invest in Regional Security Cooperation!
– Strengthen African Union (AU) and regional security mechanisms to reduce reliance on external military support, such as Russia’s Wagner Group.
– Build partnerships with global allies that respect African sovereignty and promote peacekeeping capabilities.
Promote Transparency in Aid and Trade Deals!
– Publicize the terms of agreements with external powers to foster public accountability and prevent corruption.
– Work with civil society organizations to monitor the social and environmental impacts of foreign-funded projects.
Expand Educational and Technological Opportunities!
– Collaborate with all partners to build higher education institutions, vocational training centers, and tech incubators.
– Develop programs to train a new generation of African leaders who can engage strategically with global powers.
Strengthen Civil Society and Democratic Institutions!
– Support NGOs and academic institutions to monitor and counter authoritarian influences from foreign actors.
– Foster dialogue on governance models that prioritize African values while safeguarding individual freedoms.
Build Alliances with Liberal Democracies!
– Partner with liberal democracies to balance authoritarian influences and ensure that Africa’s development aligns with global democratic values.
– Engage in diplomatic efforts to ensure African nations have a greater voice in multilateral forums like the G20 and UN Security Council.
These recommendations aim to balance the opportunities presented by the new great power competition with safeguards against exploitation, authoritarianism, and loss of sovereignty. Both liberal democracies and African nations must work collaboratively to create a mutually beneficial, sustainable, and democratic framework for Africa’s development.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion and Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.
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This paper examines the intricate relationship between populism, culture wars, and fundamental rights. It explores how the rise of populist movements and the intensification of culture wars reshape the interpretation and implementation of fundamental rights, often polarizing societal values and threatening democratic principles. By delving into the mechanisms underlying these phenomena, the paper highlights how populism amplifies ideological divides, leveraging culture wars to contest principles of equality, freedom of expression, and social justice. The study categorizes populism into economic, political, and cultural strands, analyzing their combined effects with culture wars on the discourse and practices of democracy. Using examples such as the rollback of reproductive rights in the United States and the use of nationalist narratives in Brazil and India, the paper underscores the tangible consequences of these dynamics. This exploration reveals the challenges these contentious forces pose to the principles of democracy, human rights, and social cohesion, as well as their influence on competing democratic models: liberal, majoritarian, and minoritarian.
Keywords: populism, culture wars, fundamental rights, democracy.
By João Ferreira Dias
Introduction
Populism, characterized by its dynamic appeal to ‘the people’ against perceived elite or establishment forces, has gained significant traction worldwide, manifesting in diverse forms. These range from economic populism, with its emphasis on wealth redistribution and anti-establishment sentiments, to political populism, which focuses on governance and anti-elite narratives, and cultural populism, which capitalizes on identity politics and nationalistic sentiments. Each strand intersects uniquely with culture wars, conflicts that revolve around competing values, beliefs, and identities, deepening societal polarization.
The synergy between populism and culture wars presents substantial challenges to interpreting and protecting fundamental rights such as freedom of expression, equality, and the right to privacy—cornerstones of democratic and human rights principles. Within this polarizing framework, these rights are contested, their interpretation shaped by ideological biases that reflect broader political struggles.
Furthermore, this dynamic interplay fuels competing concepts of democracy. The traditional model of liberal democracy, defined by individual rights, checks and balances, and inclusive governance, now contends with majoritarian democracy, which emphasizes the will of the majority, and minoritarian democracy, which seeks to protect marginalized groups and their social identities over common ground.
This paper aims to explore the intricate connections between populism and culture wars and their collective impact on fundamental rights. By examining how these forces challenge the principles of democracy, human rights, and social cohesion, we provide a framework for understanding and addressing the threats they pose to safeguarding fundamental rights in an era marked by these ideological confrontations.
Please cite as: Koskina, Stavroula. (2024). The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism and Populism in the Southern Caucasus. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 9, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0091
The 16th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, hosted by the ECPS, critically examined the interplay of populism, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Featuring six distinguished scholars, the discussion focused on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, analyzing how populism drives democratic backsliding and institutional fragility in hybrid regimes. Common themes included the erosion of liberal norms and the entanglement of political and economic power among elites. Panelists also examined the influence of global power dynamics, particularly Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, on regional politics, highlighting how external pressures shape domestic strategies and policy orientations.
The 16th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series hosted by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) critically examined the interplay of populism, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Featuring insights from six distinguished scholars, the event focused on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, offering a detailed analysis of their respective political landscapes. Moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar, an Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS, this session underscored the broader implications of populist and authoritarian trends on regional stability and global democracy.
The panelists emphasized how populism contributes to democratic backsliding and institutional fragility in hybrid regimes. While each country reflects unique manifestations of populism, shared patterns include the erosion of liberal democratic norms and the increasing fusion of political and economic power within ruling elites. The discussions highlighted how regional actors navigate shifting global power structures, particularly under the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These external pressures exacerbate domestic challenges, influencing political strategies and policy orientations across the region.
Country-Specific Analyses
The presentation of Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region, provided a comprehensive analysis of Azerbaijan’s political trajectory and its broader implications for the South Caucasus. He highlighted Azerbaijan as a model of hegemonic authoritarianism, emphasizing its consolidation of power through a fusion of political and economic interests within the ruling elite. He noted Azerbaijan’s skepticism toward multilateral institutions and its alignment with illiberal regional actors like Russia and Turkey. De Waal underscored the Azerbaijani regime’s strategic use of sovereignty discourse to legitimize its dominance while curtailing civil liberties, media freedom, and opposition activity. He also addressed the geopolitical influence of the Ukraine war on the region, arguing that Azerbaijan’s approach reflects a broader trend of illiberalism gaining ground globally. Finally, he pointed to Azerbaijan’s vulnerabilities, including its reliance on declining oil revenues and the absence of mechanisms for political feedback, which pose challenges to the sustainability of its centralized authoritarian model.
The presentation of Dr. David Aprasidze,a Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University, critically assessed the damaging impact of populism on democracy in Georgia, particularly under the Georgian Dream Party. He argued that populism undermines democratization in hybrid regimes by eroding weak institutions, corrupting political actors, and suppressing opposition forces. Tracing the Georgian Dream’s transformation from a progressive, left-leaning populist movement into a conservative, nationalist entity, he highlighted its increasing alignment with illiberal models, such as Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. This shift has been accompanied by attacks on the European Union, restrictions on civil society and media, and the systemic manipulation of institutions to consolidate power. Dr. Aprasidze underscored that populism in hybrid regimes exacerbates public demoralization, weakens democratic resilience, and facilitates authoritarian consolidation. He concluded that the Georgian Dream’s trajectory exemplifies the broader risks of populism in hybrid regimes, portraying Georgia’s democratization as increasingly fragile and imperiled.
The analysis of Dr. David Matsaberidze, an Associate Professor at Department of International Relations at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, explored the evolution of populism in Georgia through the concept of the “empty signifier,” tracing its progression from nationalist mobilization during the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the current rule of the Georgian Dream Party. He identified a pattern in Georgian politics of leaders utilizing populist narratives to consolidate power, emphasizing shifts from Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist independence rhetoric to Eduard Shevardnadze’s focus on order and stability and later Mikheil Saakashvili’s anti-corruption-crusade. Dr. Matsaberidze highlighted the Georgian Dream’s strategic pivot from left-leaning populism to conservative nationalism, blending Orthodox Christian values with populist sovereignty discourse to challenge the European Union’s liberal framework. He also criticized the party’s institutional manipulation, drawing parallels with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and Vladimir Putin’s Russia, noting the use of restrictive legislation, anti-LGBTQ+ policies, and attacks on NGOs and academia to erode democratic spaces. The party’s success, he argued, lies in its ability to exploit public concerns while fostering ambiguity between aligning with Brussels or Budapest, thereby undermining Georgia’s pro-Western orientation. Concluding with a pessimistic outlook, Dr. Matsaberidze warned that the Georgian Dream’s populist tactics and institutional control present significant obstacles to democratization and resistance by the opposition.
The presentation of Dr.Jody LaPorte from Department of Politics and International Relations at University of Oxford, examined Azerbaijan’s political regime, categorizing it as a hegemonic authoritarian model distinct from competitive authoritarianism due to the absence of meaningful opposition or electoral competition. She highlighted how Azerbaijan’s leaders, particularly President Ilham Aliyev, consolidated this regime through the marginalization of inherited opposition parties, extensive use of formal and informal mechanisms to suppress political activities, and active repression of emerging opposition groups. The regime’s centralized political economy, heavily reliant on oil revenues and controlled by the ruling elite, has further entrenched its authority by linking economic opportunities and upward mobility to political loyalty. Dr. LaPorte also noted the regime’s proactive measures to adapt to changing circumstances, including investments in green energy and economic diversification, which aim to sustain its authoritarian model amid declining oil revenues. While discussing potential vulnerabilities such as socio-economic inequalities and the finite nature of hydrocarbon resources, she emphasized the regime’s strategic efforts to reinforce its stability. Reflecting on the populism theme, she argued that Azerbaijan’s case is characterized more by a disconnect between politics and the populace than by populist appeals, with citizens largely feeling unrepresented by any political party.
The presentation of Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan, a Professor and Chair of Political Science at Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University, analyzed the impact of hybrid populism on postwar Armenia, its democratization efforts, and European integration. He employed a theoretical framework rooted in post-Soviet populist studies, drawing from definitions by scholars like Cas Mudde and Ernesto Laclau to highlight populism’s ideological and moral dimensions. Dr. Aleksanyan emphasized the unique challenges faced by Armenia, including the lack of robust political party infrastructure, weak ideological foundations, and an underdeveloped civil society, all exacerbated by the fallout from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. He identified hybrid populism as a critical factor in Armenian politics, characterized by divisive rhetoric framing issues through binary oppositions such as war versus peace, pro-Western versus pro-Russian, and democracy versus authoritarianism. He also explored the influence of external factors like the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and regional pressures from Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, which have collectively hindered Armenia’s European integration and democratization. Using a textual analysis of political speeches and party rhetoric, Dr. Aleksanyan demonstrated how populist discourse destabilizes democratic institutions, undermines reform efforts, and fuels societal polarization. He concluded by stressing the importance of addressing Armenia’s geopolitical vulnerabilities and strengthening its political and societal structures to advance its European integration and democratic aspirations.
The presentation of Dr. Nerses Kopalyan, an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, analyzed the limited influence of populism in post-Velvet Revolution Armenia, emphasizing the country’s democratic resilience despite its challenging geopolitical environment. He highlighted three primary factors that have curtailed populism: a robust civil society acting as a safeguard, the development of a democratic political culture, and the transitional government’s deliberate avoidance of populist rhetoric and practices. Unlike other contexts where populism thrives on anti-establishment and nationalist narratives, Armenian leaders have refrained from scapegoating elites, ethnicization of conflicts, or exploiting societal cleavages for political gain. Instead, the government has pursued pragmatic, often unpopular decisions, such as emphasizing peace and concessions, which reinforce democratic consolidation. Dr. Kopalyan contrasted Armenia’s approach with illiberal populist leaders elsewhere, noting the absence of tactics like undermining institutions, exploiting nationalism, or promoting cultural wars. He concluded that Armenia’s unique governance model, anchored in civil society, democratic norms, and a refusal to weaponize populism, has strengthened its democratization process and served as a critical component of its security architecture amid external pressures from Azerbaijan and Russia.
Concluding Reflections
The panel provided critical insights into the destabilizing effects of populism and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Across the region, the confluence of weak institutions, contested sovereignty, and geopolitical pressures fosters environments where populism thrives, further undermining democratic governance and societal resilience.
The event underscored the need for targeted international engagement to bolster democratic institutions, support civil society, and promote regional cooperation. Recognizing the distinct challenges each country faces, panelists stressed the importance of tailored strategies that address domestic vulnerabilities and external influences.
Stamoglou, Anastasia. (2024). The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 9, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0090
On November 28, 2024, ECPS hosted the 17th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series, titled “The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey.” This session examined the transformative political strategies of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, exploring their impact on Turkey’s political and social fabric. A distinguished panel of experts discussed key topics, including the evolution of national identity, media manipulation, the gendered impacts of authoritarianism, and Turkey’s global influence through sharp power. The session offered critical insights, enriching the series’ mission to deepen understanding of populism’s global effects.
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted the 17th session of the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series, “The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey,”on November 28, 2024. The session explored the intricacies of populism, authoritarianism, and nationalism in Turkey. Bringing together a distinguished panel of scholars and practitioners, it delved into the transformative political strategies of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership, with a particular focus on how these strategies have reshaped Turkey’s political and societal landscapes.
Moderated by Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, an authority on religion and politics, the panelists included Dr. Spyros Sofos, whose research examines Turkish populism through a historical lens; Dr. Emre Erdogan, an expert on political participation and populist dynamics in contemporary Turkey; Hafza Girdap, a gender studies researcher focusing on the intersection of political Islam and patriarchy; Ergun Babahan, a veteran journalist with deep insights into Turkey’s media landscape; and Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska, who analysed Turkey’s use of sharp power in international relations. Together, they provided a comprehensive and multi-disciplinary exploration of the challenges posed by autocratic populism in Turkey.
The discussion critically examined topics ranging from the evolution of national identity and the strategic use of media to the gendered impacts of authoritarianism and Turkey’s sharp power influence on the global stage. This session contributed significantly to the series’ goal of fostering a comprehensive understanding of populism’s global impact.
Panel Overview
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University opened the discussion by contextualizing Erdogan’s rise within the broader trends of political Islam and populist ideologies. She highlighted the fluid interplay between nationalism and religion in Erdogan’s narrative, tracing its evolution from a seemingly democratic framework to an increasingly authoritarian model. Dr. Cesari emphasized how Erdogan’s governance reflects a strategic adaptation of populist tools, balancing appeals to religious identity with nationalist pride, in a bid to consolidate power while managing internal and external challenges.
Speaker Contributions
Dr. Spyros Sofos, Assistant Professor at Department of Global Humanities at Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada, initiated the panel with a presentation titled “In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape.” His analysis centered on the historical construction of “the people” in Turkish political discourse, which he described as a dualistic symbol of innocence and incapacity. Dr. Sofos traced this metaphor’s roots back to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk’s republican reforms, where the populace was envisioned as a collective in need of guidance and reformation. This patronizing approach to the masses, Dr. Sofos argued, established a political tradition in which the people are alternately celebrated and marginalized. Moving to the contemporary era, he examined how Erdogan has repurposed this narrative, framing the people as both sovereign and subservient, a dichotomy legitimizing autocratic governance. Dr. Sofos underscored how this discourse has facilitated the exclusion of perceived “enemies” of the state while deepening divisions within Turkish society, situating Turkey’s case within a broader global pattern of populist authoritarianism.
Dr. Emre Erdogan, Professor of Political Science at Istanbul Bilgi University, followed with a detailed exploration of Turkey’s recent electoral cycles in his presentation, “Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023–2024).” He provided a nuanced analysis of the dynamics that shaped the 2023 presidential and 2024 local elections, highlighting the persistence of populist rhetoric rooted in nationalism and religious symbolism. His discussion revealed how the opposition adopted elements of populism to challenge Erdogan’s dominance, a strategy that produced mixed results. Dr. Erdogan examined how economic instability, natural disasters, and the migration crisis became pivotal themes in political campaigns, serving as both challenges and opportunities for populist actors. He argued that while Erdogan has maintained his core narratives, the rise of new actors and shifting voter behavior reflect a changing political landscape. The presentation offered valuable insights into the mechanisms through which populism continues to shape governance, polarization, and political alliances in Turkey.
Hafza Girdap from Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Stony Brook University, New York brought a critical gendered perspective to the discussion with her presentation, “Autocratic Practices of the Gendered Regime in Turkey.”She dissected how the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has leveraged patriarchal and Islamist ideologies to consolidate power while systematically oppressing women and marginalized groups. Girdap traced the intersection of political Islam, nationalism, and patriarchy, demonstrating how these forces reinforce traditional gender roles and limit women’s participation in public life. Drawing on examples such as the withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, Girdap highlighted the state’s failure to address gender-based violence and its role in perpetuating systemic inequalities. She also explored the compounded discrimination faced by Kurdish women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and other minorities, emphasizing the use of gender as a tool of social control. Her analysis provided a powerful account of how authoritarian regimes exploit gendered hierarchies to maintain power and suppress dissent.
The presentation of Ergun Babahan, a veteran journalist, Former Editor-in-Chief of Sabah daily and Ahval news, “Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracy in Turkey,” offered a deep dive into the strategic manipulation of Turkey’s media landscape under Erdogan. Babahan, drawing from his extensive experience as a journalist, described how Erdogan has systematically co-opted both state and private media to serve his autocratic agenda. He traced this trend back to Erdogan’s early political career, highlighting his strategic alliances with media proprietors and the use of state resources to undermine journalistic independence. Babahan argued that Erdogan’s media dominance now rivals the control exerted by military regimes in Turkey’s past, enabling the administration to shape public discourse and marginalize opposition voices. His discussion illuminated the broader implications of media suppression for democracy and public accountability, situating Turkey within a global context of declining press freedoms.
Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska, Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, concluded the panel with her presentation, “Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power.” She introduced the concept of sharp power to describe Turkey’s growing influence on the international stage, particularly through technology, censorship, and diaspora politics. Dr. Spancerska analyzed how Erdogan’s regime has leveraged these tools to suppress dissent both domestically and abroad while projecting power internationally. She examined the strategic use of digital platforms and surveillance technologies to monitor and control political dissidents, as well as the mobilization of the Turkish diaspora to extend Erdogan’s ideological reach. By positioning Turkey as a counterweight to Western liberalism, Erdogan has crafted a narrative that appeals to nationalist sentiments while justifying his autocratic practices. Dr. Spancerska’s presentation offered a critical perspective on the intersection of domestic authoritarianism and global power dynamics, underscoring the implications for international relations and democratic governance.
Conclusion
The 17th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series provided a comprehensive examination of the mechanisms through which populism, Islamism, nationalism, and authoritarianism intersect in Turkey. Each speaker brought a unique perspective to the discussion, collectively painting a nuanced picture of how Erdogan’s leadership has transformed Turkey’s political, social, and international landscapes. The panel emphasized the broader implications of these trends for Turkey and the global struggle against populist authoritarianism.
Through its insightful analysis and interdisciplinary approach, the session reinforced ECPS’s commitment to fostering critical discourse on populism’s impact worldwide. The insights shared during the event will undoubtedly serve as a valuable resource for understanding the complexities of Turkey’s political trajectory and the challenges facing democratic governance in an era of rising authoritarianism.
Please cite as: Koskina, Stavroula. (2024). Populism, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0088
The 16th session of the Mapping Global Populism Panel Series hosted by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) critically examined the interplay of populism, democracy, and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Featuring insights from six distinguished scholars, the event focused on Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia, offering a detailed analysis of their respective political landscapes. Moderated by Professor Cengiz Aktar, this session underscored the broader implications of populist and authoritarian trends on regional stability and global democracy.
The 16th session of the European Center for Populism Studies’ (ECPS) “Mapping Global Populism” panel series, aimed at creating a comprehensive understanding of populism worldwide, was held online on October 31, 2024. Titled “The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism & Populism in Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan & Georgia),” the session featured insights from distinguished scholars on various manifestations of populism and authoritarianism and the state of democracy in these countries. This report provides an overview of the topics analyzed, with some accounts of each speaker’s contributions.
The panel was moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS. Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, discussed the level of autocracy in Azerbaijan and its regional implications. Dr. David Aprasidze, Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University, Georgia, explored the evolution of populism in Georgia, while Dr. David Matsaberidze, Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, presented on “The Rotating Populist Discourses of Post-Soviet Georgia – From Nationalist Populism to Conservative Populism.”
Dr.Jody LaPorte, from the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, analyzed hegemonic authoritarianism in Azerbaijan. Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan, Professor and Chair of Political Science at the Faculty of International Relations, Yerevan State University, focused on post-war Armenia’s democratization and European integration under the shadow of populism. Dr. Nerses Kopalyan, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, provided an overview of the state of democracy and populism in Armenia during the session.
The panelists emphasized how populism contributes to democratic backsliding and institutional fragility in hybrid regimes. While each country reflects unique manifestations of populism, shared patterns include the erosion of liberal democratic norms and the increasing fusion of political and economic power within ruling elites.
The discussions highlighted how regional actors navigate shifting global power structures, particularly under the shadow of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These external pressures exacerbate domestic challenges, influencing political strategies and policy orientations across the region.
Country-Specific Analyses
Tom de Waal’s presentation provided a comprehensive analysis of Azerbaijan’s political trajectory and its broader implications for the South Caucasus. He highlighted Azerbaijan as a model of hegemonic authoritarianism, emphasizing its consolidation of power through a fusion of political and economic interests within the ruling elite. He noted Azerbaijan’s skepticism toward multilateral institutions and its alignment with illiberal regional actors like Russia and Turkey. De Waal underscored the Azerbaijani regime’s strategic use of sovereignty discourse to legitimize its dominance while curtailing civil liberties, media freedom, and opposition activity. He also addressed the geopolitical influence of the Ukraine war on the region, arguing that Azerbaijan’s approach reflects a broader trend of illiberalism gaining ground globally. Finally, he pointed to Azerbaijan’s vulnerabilities, including its reliance on declining oil revenues and the absence of mechanisms for political feedback, which pose challenges to the sustainability of its centralized authoritarian model.
Dr. David Aprasidze’s presentation critically assessed the damaging impact of populism on democracy in Georgia, particularly under the Georgian Dream Party. He argued that populism undermines democratization in hybrid regimes by eroding weak institutions, corrupting political actors, and suppressing opposition forces. Tracing the Georgian Dream’s transformation from a progressive, left-leaning populist movement into a conservative, nationalist entity, he highlighted its increasing alignment with illiberal models, such as that of Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. This shift has been accompanied by attacks on the European Union, restrictions on civil society and media, and the systemic manipulation of institutions to consolidate power. Dr. Aprasidze underscored that populism in hybrid regimes exacerbates public demoralization, weakens democratic resilience, and facilitates authoritarian consolidation. He concluded that the Georgian Dream’s trajectory exemplifies the broader risks of populism in hybrid regimes, portraying Georgia’s democratization as increasingly fragile and imperiled.
Dr. David Matsaberidze’s analysis explored the evolution of populism in Georgia through the concept of the “empty signifier,” tracing its progression from nationalist mobilization during the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the current rule of the Georgian Dream Party. He identified a pattern in Georgian politics of leaders utilizing populist narratives to consolidate power, emphasizing shifts from Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s nationalist independence rhetoric to Eduard Shevardnadze’s focus on order and stability, and later Mikheil Saakashvili’s anti-corruption crusade. Dr. Matsaberidze highlighted the Georgian Dream’s strategic pivot from left-leaning populism to conservative nationalism, blending Orthodox Christian values with populist sovereignty discourse to challenge the European Union’s liberal framework. He also criticized the party’s institutional manipulation, drawing parallels with Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and Vladimir Putin’s Russia, noting the use of restrictive legislation, anti-LGBTQ+ policies, and attacks on NGOs and academia to erode democratic spaces. The party’s success, he argued, lies in its ability to exploit public concerns while fostering ambiguity between aligning with Brussels or Budapest, thereby undermining Georgia’s pro-Western orientation. Concluding with a pessimistic outlook, Dr. Matsaberidze warned that the Georgian Dream’s populist tactics and institutional control present significant obstacles to democratization and resistance by the opposition.
Dr. Jody LaPorte’s presentation examined Azerbaijan’s political regime, categorizing it as a hegemonic authoritarian model distinct from competitive authoritarianism due to the absence of meaningful opposition or electoral competition. She highlighted how Azerbaijan’s leaders, particularly President Ilham Aliyev, consolidated this regime through the marginalization of inherited opposition parties, extensive use of formal and informal mechanisms to suppress political activities, and active repression of emerging opposition groups. The regime’s centralized political economy, heavily reliant on oil revenues and controlled by the ruling elite, has further entrenched its authority by linking economic opportunities and upward mobility to political loyalty. Dr. LaPorte also noted the regime’s proactive measures to adapt to changing circumstances, including investments in green energy and economic diversification, which aim to sustain its authoritarian model amid declining oil revenues. While discussing potential vulnerabilities such as socioeconomic inequalities and the finite nature of hydrocarbon resources, Dr. LaPorte emphasized the regime’s strategic efforts to reinforce its stability. Reflecting on the populism theme, she argued that Azerbaijan’s case is characterized more by a disconnect between politics and the populace than by populist appeals, with citizens largely feeling unrepresented by any political party.
Dr. Ashot Aleksanyan’s presentation analyzed the impact of hybrid populism on postwar Armenia, its democratization efforts, and European integration. He employed a theoretical framework rooted in post-Soviet populist studies, drawing from definitions by scholars like Cas Mudde and Ernesto Laclau to highlight populism’s ideological and moral dimensions. Dr. Aleksanyan emphasized the unique challenges faced by Armenia, including the lack of robust political party infrastructure, weak ideological foundations, and an underdeveloped civil society, all exacerbated by the fallout from the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war. He identified hybrid populism as a critical factor in Armenian politics, characterized by divisive rhetoric framing issues through binary oppositions such as war versus peace, pro-Western versus pro-Russian, and democracy versus authoritarianism. He also explored the influence of external factors like the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and regional pressures from Russia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan, which have collectively hindered Armenia’s European integration and democratization. Using a textual analysis of political speeches and party rhetoric, Dr. Aleksanyan demonstrated how populist discourse destabilizes democratic institutions, undermines reform efforts, and fuels societal polarization. He concluded by stressing the importance of addressing Armenia’s geopolitical vulnerabilities and strengthening its political and societal structures to advance its European integration and democratic aspirations.
Dr. Nerses Kopalyan‘s presentation analyzed the limited influence of populism in post-Velvet Revolution Armenia, emphasizing the country’s democratic resilience despite its challenging geopolitical environment. He highlighted three primary factors that have curtailed populism: a robust civil society acting as a safeguard, the development of a democratic political culture, and the transitional government’s deliberate avoidance of populist rhetoric and practices. Unlike other contexts where populism thrives on anti-establishment and nationalist narratives, Armenian leaders have refrained from scapegoating elites, ethnicizing conflicts, or exploiting societal cleavages for political gain. Instead, the government has pursued pragmatic, often unpopular decisions, such as emphasizing peace and concessions, which reinforce democratic consolidation. Dr. Kopalyan contrasted Armenia’s approach with illiberal populist leaders elsewhere, noting the absence of tactics like undermining institutions, exploiting nationalism, or promoting cultural wars. He concluded that Armenia’s unique governance model, anchored in civil society, democratic norms, and a refusal to weaponize populism, has strengthened its democratization process and served as a critical component of its security architecture amid external pressures from Azerbaijan and Russia.
The panel provided critical insights into the destabilizing effects of populism and authoritarianism in the Southern Caucasus. Across the region, the confluence of weak institutions, contested sovereignty, and geopolitical pressures fosters environments where populism thrives, further undermining democratic governance and societal resilience.
The event underscored the need for targeted international engagement to bolster democratic institutions, support civil society, and promote regional cooperation. Recognizing the distinct challenges faced by each country, panelists stressed the importance of tailored strategies that address both domestic vulnerabilities and external influences.
Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia (Eds). (2024). 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 29, 2024. Brussels. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0059
Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has emerged as one of the most significant global political phenomenons, deeply affecting electoral politics in democracies across the globe, both new and consolidated. In Europe, populism has become a major force, reshaping the political landscape and discourse of the European Union and most of its member states in unprecedented ways. Over the years, the impact of populist parties has been felt both at the level of domestic and European politics, increasingly putting pressure on more established mainstream parties, particularly at the right of the political spectrum.
Populism is found in different locations in the party system, predominantly at the far-left and far-right of the spectrum. All available data of populist parties illustrates the rise in support for populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since the early 1990s. Such parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years. They have joined coalition governments in several countries, including Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria, more generally reflecting the mainstreaming of their ideas and themes in party politics and public opinion.
Populist performances typically vary across parties and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay between structural and contextual factors. The electoral support for radical parties is rooted in structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is conditioned by political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. While contemporary populism is generally seen as a response to a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural grievances and issues, it can also be seen as an expression of political discontent largely dependent on the national political cycle and the shorter-term country-specific opportunities produced for populist mobilization.
In this context, the analysis of the European Parliament elections in June 2024 provides a unique opportunity to assess the current wave of populism across all 27 European Union (EU) member states simultaneously. With elections occurring around the same time, we can examine this wave of pan-European populism more closely and comparatively, assessing its scale, dynamics, and impact on national politics and, ultimately, on the EU. Thus, this report by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) examines the electoral performance and influence of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing on country-specific analyses by local experts, the report evaluates populist party performance across all EU member states and discusses the challenges populist politics pose for European institutions and the future of Europe.
The ECPS report illustrates the diversity of populism and the variety of its manifestations across the political spectrum. The current trend is one of increasing mainstreaming and normalization of populist parties as a result of a dual process of modernization and moderation by populists, on the one hand, and accommodation of populist ideas and policies by mainstream parties, on the other hand. The report see that the modernization of populist politics concerns, in particular, the moderation and blurring of those parties’ positions regarding European integration, to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters and to foster collaboration with mainstream parties.
The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist phenomenon in Europe. In 2024, these parties won 263 of the 720 seats – approximately 36%. Populists came first in the elections in six countries, with radical right populists winning in four countries, while centrist populists topped the polls in another two countries. Such results reflect the rise in support for populism in recent national elections as well as the increase in the number and geographical spread of populist parties across Europe. No less than 60 populist parties across 26 EU member states gained representation in the European Parliament in June 2024. In comparison, a total of 40 populist parties had won seats in 22 EU countries in the 2019 election.
Populist party performances varied, however, across countries and different brands of populism. The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially attested to the consolidation of the populist right, while left-wing and centrist populist parties have received comparatively less support across Europe. Moreover, the new distribution of seats should not mask distortions due to the relative weight of national representations in the European Parliament.
The 2024 European elections have delivered a new European Parliament whose centre of gravity has clearly shifted to the right and where the presence of populist actors has increased. However, these parties remain divided in the European Parliament. With a few notable exceptions, such as Fico’s SMER in Slovakia and the German BSW, parties of the populist left are all found in the Left group in the European Parliament. Right-wing populists are currently distributed across three different groups – namely, the ECR, PfE, and ESN. Some populist parties are also found among the Non-inscrits (NI). Finally, somewhat reflecting the diversity in their ideological profile, centrist populist parties are scattered across different groups, including the EPP and Renew Europe.
With the increased representation of right-wing populists in the European Parliament, the report anticipates a growing influence on political debates and policy decisions in areas such as migration, climate change, EU enlargement, and support for Ukraine. It also foresees more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than cohesive positions and policy proposals. The legitimation of radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and national politics is expected to continue. While the current EP majority may effectively maintain a cordon sanitaire around both the far-right and far-left, an overall shift to the right, in both rhetoric and policy, is already evident.
Each chapter of the report provides background information about the main populist forces in the country of focus by examining their history, electoral support and political agenda. This includes populist parties across the spectrum where deemed relevant. With a focus on the 2024 European election, each country chapter looks at the ‘supply side’ of populism (i.e., the positions of populist parties towards the EU in general and vis-à-vis specific policies, such as migration and asylum, fiscal policy, the Schengen system, European citizenship and democracy, the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights, as well as external affairs, including policy towards the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts). Country analyses ask how populists used Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, ethnic culture, identity, xenophobia and religion during the 2024 EP election campaign and what their discourse was on the composition and working mechanisms of the European Parliament.
Additionally, each chapter examines the ‘demand side’ of populism by looking at how populist parties fared in the elections and which topics played a role in their success or failure. Wherever possible, the country chapters in this report provide public opinion data about critical political issues for populist voters and the characterization of crucial sociodemographics of populist voters across different parties and national contexts.
Finally, each country chapter assesses the impact of populist politics in their respective country and at the EU level (e.g., what kind of populist politics are the elected populist parties going to articulate in the EP and which may be their coalition strategy), allowing for the broader conclusions discussed in this report’s final section.
Please cite as: Ivaldi, Gilles & Zankina, Emilia. (2024). “Introduction: The ECPS Project ‘Populism and the European Parliament Elections 2024’.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0060
This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU. In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.
By Gilles Ivaldi*(Sciences Po Paris–CNRS (CEVIPOF), France) & Emilia Zankina* (Temple University, Rome, Italy)
Introduction
Throughout the first two decades of the 21st century, populism has emerged as one of the most significant global political phenomenons, deeply affecting electoral politics in democracies across the globe, both new and consolidated (Moffit, 2017; De la Torre, 2019). In Europe, populism has become a major force, reshaping the political landscape and discourse of the European Union and most of its member states in unprecedented ways. Over the years, the impact of populist parties has been felt both at the level of domestic and European politics, increasingly putting pressure on more established mainstream parties, particularly at the right of the political spectrum (FEPS, 2024).
Populism is found in different locations in the party system, predominantly at the far left and far right of the spectrum (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The PopuList database of populist parties illustrates the rise in support for populist, far-left, and far-right parties in Europe since the early 1990s (see Figure 1). Such parties have made significant electoral gains in recent years. They have joined coalition governments in several countries, including Italy, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Austria, more generally reflecting the mainstreaming of their ideas and themes in party politics and public opinion (Muldoon & Herman, 2018; Schwörer, 2021; Bale & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2021).
Populist performances typically vary across parties and contexts, reflecting the complex interplay between structural and contextual factors. As Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) show, electoral support for radical parties is rooted in structural factors, but their translation into electoral choice is conditioned by political discontent that originates in specific political dynamics. While contemporary populism is generally seen as a response to a wide range of socioeconomic and cultural grievances and issues (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021), it can also be seen as an expression of political discontent largely dependent on the national political cycle and the shorter-term country-specific opportunities produced for populist mobilization.
The analysis of the European Parliament elections of June 2024 thus provides a unique opportunity to simultaneously assess the current wave of populism across all 27 European Union (EU) member states. With European Parliament (EP) elections all taking place at about the same time, we can look more closely and comparatively at the current wave of pan-European populism, its size, dynamics and impact on national polities and, ultimately, on the EU.
This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU.
In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.
Mapping European populism(s)
Mudde (2004) defines populism as a ‘thin-centered ideology’ that ‘considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’. Populist parties champion the cause of the ‘common man’ against what is perceived as a detached and self-serving political elite. While there are other ontological approaches to populism – e.g., political discourse (Laclau, 2005), political strategy (Weyland, 2001), and performance (Ostiguy et al., 2020) – these different traditions of research generally converge towards the same common essential attributes underpinning populism (Olivas Osuna, 2021). Moreover, the ideational approach allows one to connect the supply and demand side of populism and to study the diversity of its manifestations across Europe.
In the European political landscape, populism manifests itself in a variety of parties across the political spectrum, from left to right (Ivaldi et al., 2017; Taggart & Pirro, 2021). In Eastern and Central Europe, populism may also be found across a range of ‘centrist’ anti-establishment parties located inside and outside the mainstream (Hanley & Sikk, 2016). Such diversity is shown in Table 1, which provides an overview of the leading populist parties in the current European political landscape.
Table 1 illustrates the diversity of populism. Overall, there were about 90 populist parties across all EU member states on the eve of the 2024 European election, with varying ideological profiles, backgrounds and electoral sizes. Essentially, populism was found both left and right of the European political spectrum, as well as at its centre, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
On the radical right, populism is typically combined with exclusionary nativism and authoritarianism, whereby the people and the elite are primarily defined along cultural lines (Mudde, 2007). Radical-right populist parties essentialize migration not only in their nativist rhetoric but also portray it with terrorism and crime, and in this way, it is put forward as a security issue, as was the case during the Paris and Brussels attacks in 2015–2016 (Mudde, 2019). Such populism is found in parties like France’s National Rally (RN), Lega (formerly Lega Nord) and Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia, FdI) in Italy, and the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). The nativist and authoritarian ideology of the PRR is also found in ‘radicalized’ conservative parties such as Poland’s Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and Hungary’s Fidesz, which have turned to a populist radical right strategy over time (Buštíková, 2017: 575).
The populist radical left has, on the other hand, a universalistic profile embracing a more socially inclusive notion of the people, who are essentially pitted against the economic elites (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018; Lisi et al., 2019). In Europe, left-wing populism has been particularly electorally successful in the wake of the 2008 global economic crisis (Katsambekis & Kioupkiolis, 2020). Economic issues, bailouts, and austerity programs were the main driving forces behind a transformation of the radical left emphasizing distributive issues in Eurosceptic populist directions (Gómez-Reino Cachafeiro & Plaza-Colodro, 2018).Parties such as the Spanish Podemos, SYRIZA in Greece, or Germany’s Die Linke (The Left) are examples of this phenomenon. In those countries, however, there has been a decline in the electoral support for parties of the populist left since 2019 (Ivaldi, 2020).
Finally, in CEE, populism often manifests itself in the form of ‘centrist’ anti-establishment parties (Učeň, 2007; Hanley & Sikk, 2016). Such parties operate in the more volatile party system of the former Communist bloc, where political instability is a long-term phenomenon. They focus on challenging the existing political elite and fighting corruption, and they can be found across the entire political spectrum, both within and outside the ideological mainstream (Engler et al., 2019). This type of populism is found in parties such as Slovakia’s Ordinary People and Independents (OL’aNO), the movement of Paweł Kukiz (Kukiz) in Poland and Change Continues (Prodalzhavame Promyanata, PP) in Bulgaria. Looking more specifically at the Czech Republic, Havlík (2019) sees the rise of the Action of Dissatisfied Citizens 2011 (ANO 2011) as a case of ‘centrist technocratic populism’ based on a denial of political pluralism, anti-partyism, resistance to constitutionalism and the embrace of majoritarianism. In Western Europe, the Italian M5S has been seen as a case of ‘centrist populism’, which does not display the typical ideological profile (Mosca & Tronconi, 2019; Pirro & Van Kessel, 2018).
The populism-Euroscepticism nexus
Given their inherent anti-elite and anti-established stance, populist parties in the European context are also often Eurosceptic. Kneuer (2018) emphasizes such a ‘tandem’ of populism and Euroscepticism as one unifying feature of all successful populist parties in Europe, reflecting in her view the formation of a new transnational cleavage cross-cutting the traditional left-right axis.
A recent study examining parties in 30 European countries from 2018 to 2024 (Szczerbiak & Taggart 2024) finds 77 parties to be both Eurosceptic and anti-establishment. Szczerbiak and Taggart argue that the growth of European integration and its association with a series of crises, such as migration, the Eurozone, Brexit and COVID-19, has bred discontent that fostered anti-establishment positions and the demonization of the EU. At the same time, the study found clusters of parties that are anti-establishment but not Eurosceptic and parties that are Eurosceptic but not anti-establishment, arguing that the link is not always straightforward.
Meijers and Zaslove (2021) also examine populist parties’ positions towards European integration, similarly arguing for a nuanced picture, with some populist parties rejecting the EU outright while others are taking a reformist position. According to their study, populist parties such as the Dutch Freedom Party (PVV) and Forum for Democracy (FvD), the Alternative for Germany (AfD), Golden Dawn in Greece and Lega in Italy are highly Eurosceptic. Populist left parties, on the other hand, tend to be more moderate, with the Five Star Movement (M5S) being moderately Eurosceptic and Podemos and SYRIZA having moderate pro-EU positions.
Similarly, Pirro, Taggart and Kessel (2018) find differences between left- and right-wing variants of populist Euroscepticism. Examining the economic and financial crisis (the ‘Great Recession’), the migrant crisis and Brexit, they find left-wing populists attacking the EU’s ‘neoliberal’ agenda and austerity measures, while right-wing populists criticizing the EU on account of increased immigration and multiculturalism. Brexit, on the other hand, is portrayed ‘by various kinds of populist parties as a victory for the ordinary people against unresponsive elites and a rejection of the undemocratic and technocratic decision-making process at the EU level’ (Pirro, Taggart and Van Kessel, 2018). While Euroscepticism is not limited to populist parties alone, neither are all populist parties Eurosceptic. We see a strong correlation between anti-EU positions and populist parties, which is more pronounced to the right than to the left.
More recently, however, there has been a moderating shift in populist Eurosceptic politics both left and right of the spectrum. In the wake of the Brexit referendum of 2016, many populist parties have strategically abandoned their previous plans to drop the Euro or leave the EU altogether, turning to more nuanced or ambiguous positions vis-à-vis European integration in order to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters, and to collaborate with mainstream parties. As Van Kessel et al. (2020) note, the difficulties in the Brexit process may have dampened public demand for leaving the EU elsewhere in Europe, thus reducing the viability of ‘exit strategies’. Other studies suggest that populist parties, particularly of the radical right, have been shying away from hard Eurosceptic positions. Right-wing nationalist populist parties have adopted ‘alt-Europe’ counternarratives reflecting ‘a conservative, xenophobic intergovernmental vision of a European “community of sovereign states”, “strong nations” or “fatherlands”, that abhors the EU’s “centralized” United States of Europe’ (McMahon, 2021: 10). ‘Taking back control from Brussels’ has been observed to be a common stand of radical right-wing populist parties on the way to the 2024 EP elections (Braun & Reinl, 2023).
As McDonnell and Werner (2018) argue, populist radical right parties ‘remain flexible to perform significant shifts’ on the issue of European integration because of its relatively limited salience. The dampening of their Euroscepticism by populist parties may also be associated with office-seeking strategies. As Ivaldi (2018b) suggests, in the case of the French FN, governmental credibility and coalition potential have been two strong incentives for the FN to tone down its Euroscepticism since the 2017 presidential election.
Drivers of populism: structural and short-term factors
The economic crises of the past decade, coupled with the perceived threats posed by globalization and immigration, have created circumstances that allow for a surge in populist sentiments across various European nations. Populism, characterized by a general distrust towards traditional political institutions and an increasing polarization of society, is fuelled by a complex interplay of socioeconomic, cultural and political factors (Norris & Inglehart, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021).
Different varieties of populism operate on different types of grievances and issues across the economic and cultural dimensions of electoral competition, however. Socioeconomic issues have traditionally been identified as critical factors of left-wing populism at both the party and the voter level (Charalambous & Ioannou, 2019) and have become increasingly relevant for right-wing populist parties since the 2008 financial crisis (Ibsen, 2019; Guriev & Papaioannou, 2020; Rodrik, 2021). Immigration has long been identified by research as a critical issue for populist radical right parties, and it is typically associated with authoritarian views of society (Mudde, 2007).
While sharing similar populist attitudes, populist voters diverge when it comes to the host ideologies to which their populism is attached (Van Hauwaert & Van Kessel, 2018). Populist radical right voters are primarily concerned with cultural issues of immigration and law and order and show stronger nativist and authoritarian attitudes. Voters on the populist radical left tend to embrace more egalitarian and universalistic values while often supporting a libertarian agenda on social issues. Finally, centrist populist voters exhibit strong anti-establishment attitudes and are primarily characterized by protest voting but do not generally show the nationalist attitudes found in right-wing populism (Ivaldi, 2020; 2021). Such parties in CEE often take an anticorruption stance, making this the focus of their electoral appeal (Haughton, Neudorfer & Zankina, 2024).
As Kriesi and Schulte-Cloos (2020) demonstrated, the effect of these different sets of long-term, structural determinants is also conditioned by short-term political discontent, most notably when populist parties are in opposition. Such short-term factors are particularly relevant to studying populism in European elections. EP elections are generally considered ‘second-order elections’ (Reif & Schmitt, 1980). That is, citizens give more weight to national elections than European ones on a range of different variables: political trust, interest in politics, attachment and complexity of politics. In European elections: (a) voters tend to trust national institutions instead of European ones; (b) they have a stronger connection to their own nation rather than the EU, and; (c) they think that European politics is too difficult to grasp and that domestic issues are more compelling than European ones (Braun, 2021).
Looking at party-level data from all European elections between 1979 and 2019, Ehin and Talving (2021) find that the second-order election model continues to wield significant explanatory power, with lower participation rates in EP elections compared with first-order national elections and incumbency being associated with electoral losses in most EP election years.
Because of the increasing politicization of European integration, however, the viability of the second-order election model has been called into question, reflecting the growing salience and resonance of EU-related issues in mass politics and party competition (Hutter et al., 2016). The recent analysis of EU issue voting in the 2019 EP election by Goldberg et al. (2024) concludes that such issues matter for all EP political groups under scrutiny (both mainstream and more radical), which speaks against the idea of conditional mobilization by Eurosceptic parties.
Moreover, while Ehin and Talving (2021) see the ‘second-order type as constituting a base for a fragmented parliament with a strong representation of populist and extremist parties, other studies, such as Wondreys (2023), find only limited evidence for a boost in electoral support for extreme parties in European elections. This finding is particularly salient when considering the size of those parties and their changing role and status in European party systems. As Wondreys (2023: 7) argues: ‘[G]iven the overall increase in size, the role of many extreme parties in their respective party systems may have changed…. Voters already vote for these parties in [first-order elections], and thus have fewer incentives to subsequently vote for them in [second-order elections] as well.’
At the same time, several European countries held elections at multiple levels concurrently from 7–9 June 2024. These included Belgium, which held federal elections alongside European Parliament elections; Bulgaria, which held another early national parliamentary election on the same date as the EP one; and several countries that held local elections alongside the European ones (i.e., Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Malta and Romania). In these cases, we can expect to see European issues merge, rendered secondary or disappear altogether as domestic issues take precedence.
Looking back at the 2019 EP elections
The 2019 EP elections took place in the wake of the migration crisis shaped by an unprecedented refugee flow to European countries, mainly from the Middle East and Africa, which peaked in 2014–2016. The crisis fed into the populist parties’ Eurosceptic, nativist and nationalist narratives, which were even embraced by mainstream parties (Mudde 2019; Capozzi et al., 2023; Rodi et al., 2023). With the associated cultural sensitivities and economic, social and demographic concerns, European public interest has always been high in the political discourses on migration. In this sense, how the EU managed the refugee influx stood at the heart of discussions between 2015 and 2019. In parallel with Eurosceptic and populist concerns around European integration and migration, the economic agenda remained prominent during the 2019 EP election (Braun & Schafer, 2022). Finally, Brexit remained an important issue, serving as a benchmark of evaluation for citizens to reflect on the benefits of European membership to their own countries (Hobolt et al., 2022). In this regard, debates on the legitimacy of supranational governance, as heightened in the framework of sovereignty, were the most exploited narrative by populists against the EU (Ruzza and Pejovic 2019).
However, the predicted surge in support for populism did not fully materialize in the 2019 EP elections (Ivaldi, 2020). Despite a slowdown of economic activity, the economic context was somewhat less favourable to populist mobilization, as unemployment and inflation remained relatively low across much of Europe. Meanwhile, the impact of the EU migration crisis that had fuelled support for right-wing nationalist populists seemed to wane: economic issues dominated the 2019 European election agenda, together with climate change and promoting human rights and democracy, while immigration ranked fifth (European Parliament, 2019).
Moreover, in a context of high political uncertainty, polls showed more substantial support for the EU across member states. In the Spring 2019 Eurobarometer survey, 61% of EU citizens said that EU membership was good for their country, a figure at its highest since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Eurobarometer, 2019). Meanwhile, interest in the election was much higher than in 2014, and voter turnout increased in 20 of the then-28 EU member states, most substantially in countries such as Poland (+22 percentage points), Romania (+19), Spain (+17), Austria (+15), and Hungary (+14).
In the 2019 elections, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) and centre-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) lost their majority for the first time since 1979, securing 182 and 154 seats, respectively. A significant number of voters dissatisfied with Europe’s ruling grand coalition turned to the Greens and Liberals. The Greens won a total of 74 seats, making significant gains in Western European countries such as Germany, France, Ireland and the UK. Pro-EU liberals secured 108 seats, which made Renew Europe the third largest group in the European Parliament.
Meanwhile, populist parties rose to a total of 241 seats, representing about a third (32%) of all 751 seats in the European Parliament at the time, as opposed to 211 seats (28%) five years earlier. However, the election showed mixed performances for populist party families across EU member states.
The outcome essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist right: together, these parties won 168 seats in 2019 – their best result ever – compared with 131 seats five years earlier. Support for right-wing populist parties significantly rose in Italy, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Sweden and Belgium and they dominated the polls in countries such as France, Italy and the UK. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s Lega was the big election winner, with 34.3% of the vote compared with only 6.2% in 2014. The National Rally (RN, formerly Front National) topped the polls in France with 23.3% of the vote. In the UK, Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party made an impressive breakthrough with 30.5% of the vote, taking over as the main Eurosceptic outfit, a role formerly held by the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).
In Eastern Europe, ruling conservative parties consolidated electorally: in Poland, Law and Justice (PiS) won 45.4% of the vote, increasing its previous support by 13.6%; in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz dominated the polls with no less than 52.6%. Smaller, extreme right-wing parties also made gains in Greece and Slovakia. In Greece, Golden Dawn retained two of its previous four seats. In Slovakia, the neo-nazi People’s Party Our Slovakia (L’SNS), headed by Marian Kotleba, won 12.2% of the vote and two seats. In Cyprus, the National Popular Front (ELAM) increased its support to 8.3% (+5.6 percentage points) but failed to secure one of the island’s six seats in the European Parliament.
In contrast, there was a significant drop in support for the populist left, from 43 seats in 2014 to 37 in the 2019 election. Left-wing populist parties had made substantial gains in the wake of the 2008 Great Recession, particularly in countries such as Greece and Spain, hit hardest by austerity policies (see Kriesi & Pappas, 2015: 23). In the 2014 elections, the populist radical left surged in Greece, Spain and Ireland and such parties made significant inroads in Portugal, Italy and France (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016). In 2019, against the backdrop of a timid economic recovery and lower unemployment, these parties lost ground across most EU member states, most notably in countries like Greece, Spain and France. In Eastern and Central Europe, the populist left remained relatively marginal electorally.
Finally, in 2019, centrist populist parties secured 32 of their previous 33 seats. Centrist populists lost momentum in countries of the former Communist bloc, such as Latvia, where Who Owns the State? (KPV) collapsed to less than 1% of the vote, as opposed to their 14.3% showing in the 2018 national elections. In Estonia, the Estonian Centre Party (EK) fell by 8.6%. In the Czech Republic, the governing ANO and its highly controversial leader, Andrej Babiš, took just 21.2% of the vote, down 8.4 percentage points from its previous result. In Bulgaria, electoral support for the ruling GERB fell by 2 percentage points, although Boïko Borissov’s party remained the most potent force in Bulgarian politics with 30.9% of the European election vote. Centrist populist parties also performed badly in Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania and Croatia. In Western Europe, the Five Star Movement (M5S) was the biggest loser of the 2019 Italian EP election, losing 15.6% compared to the 2018 national election.
With a specific reference to Euroscepticism, the 2019 elections were a real success. In almost all member states, except Luxembourg, Malta, Slovenia and Romania, anti-EU movements won seats. The 2019 elections formed a parliament where more than 28% of MEPs belonged to populist or Eurosceptic parties (Treib, 2021: 177).
The context of the 2024 EP elections
The 2024 EP elections were held in a context characterized by the repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic, concerns about the EU’s handling of migration and refugee issues, the deteriorating economic situation and inflation crisis in member countries, security challenges posed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the newly erupted Israeli–Hamas war in the Middle East.
The EU faced unprecedented challenges due to the COVID-19 crisis and is still dealing with its economic and social consequences. It adopted a €750 billion recovery fund called NextGenerationEU to support member states’ recovery efforts. However, the implementation of this fund was delayed by political disputes and legal challenges, potentially fuelling political discontent – an issue that also carried onto the 2024 EP elections.
Concerning migration and asylum policy reform, the EU has been struggling to find a common approach to address the influx of migrants and asylum seekers, especially from Africa and the Middle East. The current system, based on the Dublin Regulation, has been criticized for putting too much pressure on the frontline states, such as Greece, Italy and Spain and for failing to ensure solidarity and responsibility-sharing among member states. To address this, the European Commission proposed a new pact on migration and asylum to create a more balanced and comprehensive framework for managing migration flows (European Commission, 2024). The proposal took a long time to go through the necessary legislative process due to the opposition from some member states, such as Hungary, Poland and Austria, who rejected mandatory relocation quotas and favoured stricter border controls.
Challenges were not limited to domestic issues; the Russian invasion of Ukraine was a litmus test for the common foreign and security policy of the Union. The EU was confronted with a deteriorating security situation in Eastern Europe as Russia intensified its military aggression against Ukraine and threatened to cut off gas supplies to Europe. The EU imposed sanctions on Russia, but disagreement elicited among the member states on the extent of support and related issues like grain imports from Ukraine. The ECPS report on the impact of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on populism in Europe concluded that populist radical right parties exploited the war as an opportunity to voice their anti-EU rhetoric with sovereigntist arguments. In this vein, their common stance towards the sanctions had been hesitancy and scepticism, illustrating them as not really in line with economic and security-related national interests (Ivaldi & Zankina, 2023).
Furthermore, the recent terrorist attack of Hamas on Israel and the subsequent outbreak of the Israel–Hamas war bore high risks not only for the Middle East but also for other parts of the world, including Europe. Considering the heavy historical and political baggage the Israeli-Palestinian conflict held, it seemed like a convenient topic to be exploited by populist parties ahead of the elections. Instances such as the terrorist attack in Brussels, in which two Swedish citizens were killed in the days after the start of the war, provided room for populists’ rhetoric in the form of xenophobia, Islamophobia and anti-migration.
However, this ‘polycrisis’ was expected to play out differently in each country. The survey by Krastev and Leonard (2024a), which was conducted in September and October 2023 in 11 European countries (Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Switzerland), suggests that the crises of the economy, security, health, climate and migration, have created distinct political responses and opinions across Europe. While immigration was the key issue in Germany, France and Denmark, people in other European countries identified climate change as the most important crisis. Italians and Portuguese, in turn, pointed to global economic turmoil, while in Spain, Great Britain and Romania, the COVID-19 pandemic was the principal issue. Estonians, Poles and Danes considered the war in Ukraine to be the most serious of crises.
In such context, the 2024 European elections represented a crucial test for both the EU and national governments, as voters would evaluate their handling of the pandemic and the recovery and how they planned to address the long-term challenges of climate change, digital transformation, and social cohesion (Bassot, 2023).
However, public opinion data showed relatively positive views toward the Union among EU citizens. Trust in the EU has increased by 6 percentage points since 2019 and now stands at 49%. The perception of the situation of the European economy has improved since autumn 2023, with 47% of respondents rating it as ‘good’, the highest level since 2019. Nearly two-thirds (62%) also said they were optimistic about the future of the EU, which is a slight increase (+4 percentage points) compared to five years earlier. Feelings of being ‘citizens of the EU’ dominated for 74% of the respondents, the highest level in over two decades. Meanwhile, a majority of respondents said they were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (58%) and in the EU (57%) (Eurobarometer, 2024).
An anticipated rise in support for right-wing populists across the EU
Populist parties have gained traction in recent years, reflecting a broader trend of rising populism across the continent. This surge in popularity has been particularly noticeable among right-leaning populist parties (Ivaldi & Torner, 2023). Such rise in support has been exemplified by the Alternative für Deutschland’s (AfD) triumph in regional elections in eastern states of Germany, the remarkable success of Le Pen’s NR in the 2022 French elections, Giorgia Meloni’s FdI breakthrough in the 2022 Italian election, as well as by the performances of the Sweden Democrats and Finns Party in the last parliamentary elections, which all point to a further increase in the representation of right-wing populist parties in the next EP. In Italy, Meloni’s FdI and Salvini’s Lega, respectively part of the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists) and Identity and Democracy (ID), were also seen as potentially decisive actors in the alliance formation of the next European Parliament (Massetti, 2023; Maślanka, 2023).
Elsewhere in Europe, right-wing populist parties have become established in countries like Portugal and Spain, and they have topped the polls in Austria and Belgium. In CEE, right-wing populism has been on the rise in Estonia, Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria. In Hungary, Orbán’s Fidesz secured another term in government in the 2022 elections with a clear victory, putting the contested topics between the party and the EU, like the supremacy of the rule of law, immigration, the Russia–Ukraine War, on the agenda of the EP elections. Moreover, Fidezs’s suspension by the EPP and then its departure from this political group has led the party to search for new coalitions after the elections, with talks of joining the ECR group. In Poland, the October 2023 national elections resulted in the opposition parties’ coalition winning over the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) and the new government of pro-EU Prime Minister Donald Tusk. While such an outcome will undoubtedly improve relations between Poland and the EU, PiS has maintained its support at around 30% of the vote, together with Confederation, a heterogeneous extremist group at about 10% of the vote.
Analysts predicted ‘a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist radical right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU and centre-left and green parties losing votes and seats’ (Krastev & Leonard, 2024b). Anti-European populists were expected ‘to top the polls in nine member states (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia) and come second or third in a further nine countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden)’ (Ibid.)
The European Parliament and party groups
While reflecting the existing balance of strength across national contexts, populist party performances at the EU level may significantly impact the configuration of party groups within the EP, which is a key legislative body of the EU, working alongside the Council of the European Union to adopt European legislation following proposals by the European Commission. The EP comprises 705 members (MEPs) – 720 in the new EP – making it the second-largest democratic electorate in the world. These MEPs are elected every five years by the citizens of the EU through universal suffrage.
The structure and operation of the EP are governed by its Rules of Procedure, and the political bodies, committees, delegations and political groups guide EP activities. The representation of citizens is ‘degressively proportional’, with a minimum threshold of six members per member state and no member state having more than 96 seats. Degressive proportionality means that while seats are allocated based on the population of the member states, more populous member states agree to be under-represented to favour greater representation of less populated ones.
Political groups within the EP can be formed around a single European political party or can include more than one European party as well as national parties and independents. Prior to the 2024 EP elections, the existing political groups in the EP were the EPP, the Progressive Alliance of S&D, Renew Europe (previously ALDE), the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), ECR, The Left in the EP (GUE/NGL), and ID.
The outgoing EP was home to both left-wing and right-wing populist parties, that is, while Brothers of Italy (FdI), Vox of Spain, Sweden Democrats, Fidesz of Hungary, Law and Justice (PiS) of Poland, the Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), the AfD, the National Rally of France, stood on the right side of the spectrum, Podemos of Spain and SYRIZA of Greece represented left-wing populism in the 2019–2024 EP. Regarding political group membership, right-wing populist parties tend to choose different political groups, preventing them from having a common voice in the EP. After the 2019 elections, however, their seeking of collaboration has become more evident, especially under the umbrella of ID and ECR.
Questions addressed in the report
Under the auspices of the European Center for Populism Studies(ECPS), this report examines the electoral performances and impacts of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Based on a compilation of country-specific analyses by local experts, the report looks at populist party performances across all EU member states, and it discusses the challenges of populist politics for European institutions as well as for the future of Europe.
Each chapter provides background information about the main populist forces in the country of focus by examining their history, electoral support and political agenda. This includes populist parties across the spectrum where deemed relevant. With a focus on the 2024 European election, each country chapter looks at the ‘supply side’ of populism (i.e., the positions of populist parties towards the EU in general and vis-à-vis specific policies, such as migration and asylum, fiscal policy, the Schengen system, European citizenship and democracy, the COVID-19 pandemic, human rights, as well as external affairs, including policy towards the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts). Country analyses ask how populists used Euroscepticism, national sovereignty, ethnic culture, identity, xenophobia and religion during the 2024 EP election campaign and what their discourse was on the composition and working mechanisms of the European Parliament.
Additionally, each chapter examines the ‘demand side’ of populism by looking at how populist parties fared in the elections and which topics played a role in their success or failure. Wherever possible, the country chapters in this report provide public opinion data about critical political issues for populist voters and the characterization of crucial sociodemographics of populist voters across different parties and national contexts.
Finally, each country chapter assesses the impact of populist politics in their respective country and at the EU level (e.g., what kind of populist politics are the elected populist parties going to articulate in the EP and which may be their coalition strategy), allowing for the broader conclusions discussed in this report’s final section.
(*) Gilles Ivaldi is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research interests include French politics, parties and elections, and the comparative study of populism and the radical right in Europe and the United States. Gilles Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump : le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation?, 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.
(**) Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science and interim Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University and, since 2020, has served as the Dean of Temple University Rome. She holds a PhD in International Affairs and a Certificate in Advanced East European Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research examines East European politics, populism, civil service reform, and gender in political representation. She has published in high-ranking international journals, including West European Politics, Politics and Gender, East European Politics, Problems of Post-communism, and Representation, as well as academic presses such as the ECPR Press, Indiana University Press, and others. She frequently serves as an expert adviser for Freedom House, V-Democracy, and projects for the European Commission. In the past, Zankina has served as Provost of the American University in Bulgaria, Associate Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh and Managing Editor of East European Politics and Societies.
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The reconfiguration of the extreme right in the European Parliament reaffirms prior tendencies and analysis (i.e., that despite the increased representation of radical-right actors, they continue to be divided and unable to act as a united front). Hence, we can expect more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than united positions and policy proposals. What should not be neglected, although, is the legitimation of the radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and domestic politics.
This report has examined the electoral performances of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. The collection of country chapters provides a unique source of information to understand the electoral dynamics of populist parties across Europe, highlighting similarities and differences in the economic, social and political context of the European elections in the 27 EU member states. Here, we summarize the main findings from the individual chapters and provide some general conclusions.
The diversity of the European populist scene
The individual country chapters illustrate the diversity of populism in Europe and the variety of its manifestations across the political spectrum. The findings in this report corroborate the vast literature on populism, which has long identified the plurality of articulations between the ‘thin’ ideology of populism and the ‘thicker’ host ideologies to which it attaches itself. As suggested in the individual chapters, in Western Europe, populism is essentially found to the left and right of the spectrum, while in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), we see a more diverse array of populist actors.
Some individual countries provide a good illustration of such diversity. The Netherlands has long been a breeding ground for populism. Over the years, there has been a succession of populist parties, ranging from right-wing nativist and left-wing populist to agrarian populist. Similarly, Spain has experienced both left and right-wing populism with Podemos and Vox. In Belgium, there are two cases of populist radical parties to the left (PTB–PVDA) and right (VB) of the ideological spectrum. Italy has been described as nothing less than a ‘populist paradise’, hosting a wide range of populist parties. Such diversity is also found in countries like France and, more recently, Germany, with the rise of the BSW to the left of the party spectrum. While in Greece, left–populist parties have been dominant with Syriza and KKE, the populist radical right has long been present with parties such as Golden Dawn and, most recently, with EL and the Democratic Patriotic Movement or ‘Niki’.
There is even more diversity when looking at the populist scene in Central and Eastern Europe. Populists in the centre dominated the elections in Bulgaria, with GERB gaining over 24% of the vote, and in the Czech Republic, with ANO securing 26%. The centrist Prodalzhavame promyanata (PP) and ITN in Bulgaria also registered strong results, with 14% and 6% of the vote, respectively. In Slovakia, it was the left populists of SMER who carried the day, securing 25% of all votes cast. The radical right fared well in all three countries, with Vazrazhdane gaining over 14% in Bulgaria, Hnutie Republika attracting 13% in Slovakia, and Přísaha a Motoristé registering over 10% of the vote in the Czech Republic.
Diversity is also found in the interpretation of populism by populist parties. While populism is still seen as a core feature of the populist right across most cases, there seems to have been a shift away from populist narratives and themes in some parties of the populist left, such as Podemos in Spain, the SP in the Netherlands, and the SF in Denmark. In Spain, for instance, there has been a decline in the use of populist ideas by Podemos, which has turned more clearly to radical-left ones. Moreover, there seems to be less consensus about the populist nature of radical-left parties, as illustrated by Die Linke in Germany, the Left Wing Alliance (VAS) in Finland, the Left Party in Sweden, and the Left Bloc (BE) in Portugal, which may also signal a move away from populism towards a more classic radical-left agenda. The Bulgarian GERB has also significantly moved away from populist narratives, focusing primarily on pro-EU rhetoric. While the Romanian AUR remains Eurosceptic, it has been focusing on specific issues rather than on criticizing the European project itself.
Together with their different locations on the party spectrum, populist parties also diverge in their issue positions. As the country chapters show, this is particularly true of the populist right where substantial differences are found, for instance, in terms of those parties’ economic policies.
In a context marked by rising prices and the inflation crisis, right-wing populist parties have adopted a wide array of economic positions, reflecting diverging economic strategies and the adaptation by populist parties to different contextual opportunities. In France, for example, the RN has significantly moved to the economic left, advocating redistributive policies. In Denmark, the DF combines welfare-chauvinist positions with a good portion of nostalgia. In the Netherlands, the PVV takes a protectionist and welfare-chauvinist position aimed at voters with lower incomes who are most hit by high energy prices. In Cyprus, ELAM supports left-wing economic policies aimed at wealth redistribution and increased state intervention in market regulation. In Estonia, EKRE focuses on economic welfare and regional disparities, as does the EL in Greece, although it combines welfare chauvinism and government interventions with calls for low taxation. Welfare chauvinism and socialist nostalgia have been the trademarks of radical-right populist parties in Bulgaria, but they have also been explored by left populists such as SMER in Slovakia.
In contrast, other right-wing populist parties are found on the economic right. The Dutch FvD, for instance, is more free-market-oriented than the PVV and most other populist radical-right parties in Europe. In Finland, the Finns Party has recently turned to the right on the economy. In Luxembourg, the Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (ADR) exhibits a national-conservative profile and generally maintains a distrust of big government. In Greece, Niki is more free market and low taxation than EL. In Romania, AUR has increasingly introduced neoconservative elements.
Finally, the analysis in this report shows that populist parties differ widely with regard to their political status within their respective political systems. Parties such as the French RN and German Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) are still political pariahs. In Germany, the AfD remains deeply unpopular, and the party has faced strong criticism for its many controversial statements and positions regarding immigration, Islam and the Second World War. In France, despite Marine Le Pen’s de-demonization strategy, the persistence of the RN’s profile as a political pariah was exposed in the 2024 legislative elections where the traditional Republican Front – that is, ad hoc alliances of parties or voters (or both) across the spectrum whenever the RN is likely to win a decisive round – was revitalized. In contrast, Mélenchon’s populist left LFI has managed to establish itself as a coalition partner to the rest of the left. Another case of a cordon sanitaire around the populist radical right is that of Belgium, where leaders of the N-VA continue to close the door to the Vlaams Belang. In Central and Eastern Europe, extreme parties such as Revival in Bulgaria, AUR in Romania or Hnutie Republika in Slovakia are still kept outside mainstream politics despite growing electoral support.
Elsewhere, however, the current trend is one of increasing mainstreaming and normalization of populist parties as a result of a dual process of modernization and moderation by populists, on the one hand, and accommodation of populist ideas and policies by mainstream parties, on the other hand. Such dual process has been well documented in the recent populism literature (Akkerman, de Lange, and Rooduijn, 2016; Herman and Muldoon, 2019; Mondon and Winter, 2020; Mudde, 2019) and the country chapters in this report corroborate both the centripetal move by a number of populist parties from the margins to the centre of national politics and the accommodation of populism by mainstream actors.
Populist accommodation by parties of the mainstream is traditionally found in countries such as Italy and Austria. In CEE, such cooperation has been found in Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria during the 2017–2019 government. This has more recently been the case, for instance, in the Netherlands, where the change in VVD party leadership has produced a change of strategy towards the PVV, with the new VVD party leader Dilan Yeşilgöz openly suggesting that her party would no longer exclude a government with Wilders. In Sweden, the cordon sanitaire was breached before the 2022 parliamentary election when three of the centre-right parties expressed a more open stance towards the Sweden Democrats. In Cyprus, despite its radical positions and extreme right-wing roots, ELAM has managed to integrate into the political mainstream, collaborating with other parties on specific issues in the House of Representatives since 2016.
Populists against Europe? The strategic moderation of populist Euroscepticism
The modernization of populist politics concerns, in particular, the moderation and blurring of those parties’ positions regarding European integration. The country chapters illustrate such a dampening of Eurosceptic politics, both left and right of the populist spectrum. In many cases, the analysis shows that populist parties have recently abandoned their previous hard Eurosceptic plans to exit the Euro or the EU, often adopting ambiguous positions vis-à-vis European integration and a softer tone vis-à-vis the EU. As discussed in the introduction of this report, this represents a strategic move by populists to increase their appeal to moderate and pro-EU voters and to foster collaboration with mainstream parties.
In France, the RN has abandoned its previous policy of “Frexit”, while de-emphasizing European issues to increase its appeal to moderate voters. Like the RN, LFI has toned down its Euroscepticism in recent years, moving away from its previous call to leave the EU and that France should disobey the European treaties. In Sweden, the SD have moderated their Euroscepticism and dropped their demand for a referendum on EU withdrawal. Such a move has also been visible in the Netherlands, where Wilders has successfully presented himself as a more moderate candidate, no longer calling for a Nexit but promising to reform the EU from within. In Portugal, Chega has articulated some soft Euroscepticism in its European election manifesto. In Italy, Fratelli d’Italia advocates for national sovereignty over supranational integration while maintaining a relatively moderate stance on opposition to the European Union. A similar dampening of Eurosceptic policies and themes has been found in the Lega and M5S since 2018. In Finland, the Finns Party has abandoned its long-term goal of withdrawing from the EU. A stronger support for the EU is found in Luxembourg, where the ADR explicitly acknowledges the great advances the EU had given to Europe in terms of peace and prosperity in post-war Europe while praising the positive benefits the EU and immigration have brought to the country. In Greece, the left-populist Syriza put forward a version of soft Euroscepticism, criticizing the EU’s democratic deficit. The right-wing populist EL has been advocating for a Europe made of nation-states, but it has not been openly calling for Grexit, and neither has the other new right-wing populist party, Niki. The FPÖ clearly stated that it would not aim for an ‘Öxit’, although it called for cuts in the EU budget and institutions and a Union based on subsidiarity and federalism.
In Western Europe, the German AfD stands out for its hard Eurosceptic positions. The most radical faction has dominated the AfD since 2017. In the run-up to the 2024 European elections, the party initially called for the dissolution of the European Union in its manifesto but dropped this demand from the final manifesto after facing public backlash. The Dutch FvD similarly favours Nexit. In Greece, the communist KKE has similarly maintained a hard Eurosceptic stance (as well as an anti-NATO stance), supporting Greece’s exit from the EU and accusing it of being imperialistic, anti-democratic, capitalist and exploitative.
Populists in Central and Eastern Europe widely vary in their level of Euroscepticism. The Croatian right-populist DL, for example, exhibits a soft Eurosceptic orientation, framing the EU as a confederation of sovereign states and never advocating for closer relations with ‘alternative partners’ in global politics, such as Russia, China or the BRICS. The DL expresses a strong opinion against further EU enlargement due to Serbia’s candidacy status, while the Romanian AUR, on the contrary, advocates for EU memberships for Moldova. By contrast, the Bulgarian Vazrazhdane urges for an immediate exit from NATO and the EU, while centrist populist parties in Bulgaria, such as GERB and PP, are ardently pro-European. Czech populists from the centre and the right expressed different levels of criticism towards the EU. ANO, which has been in opposition since 2021, gradually shifted from a mildly pro-European stance towards soft Euroscepticism. The SPD, on the other hand, has sustained its uncompromisingly anti-immigration and hard Eurosceptic rhetoric, describing the EU as a ‘dictatorship in Brussels’ dominated by ‘non-elected bureaucrats’ who produce ‘directives that are against the interests of our state and our people’. Euroscepticism is extremely limited in Estonia, where 77–78% of the population supports EU membership.
Similarly, in Latvia, voters tend to support sober, politically experienced personalities to represent Latvia’s national (rather than party) interests in the European Parliament, leaving little room for Eurosceptic rhetoric. In Romania, AUR has softened its Euroscepticism, while the new SOS prides itself in being the first to advocate for a ‘Ro-exit’. In Slovakia, the ruling SMER claims to support EU membership despite its many shortcomings, while ĽSNS argues that the EU cannot be reformed. Consequently, its party leader promised to ‘lay the groundwork for Slovakia’s exit from the European Union and break the EU from within.’
Populist parties, particularly of the radical right, have been shying away from hard Eurosceptic positions, emphasizing an intergovernmental vision of a community of sovereign and independent states, now claiming to reform the EU ‘from within’ while opposing further enlargement of the EU. As the country chapters in this report show, right-wing populist parties across Europe continue to vilify a ‘bureaucratic EU’. ‘Taking back control’ from Brussels has become a common theme of right-wing populist narratives. In Belgium, the VB has been using the ‘taking back control’ tagline while denouncing EU leaders as ‘extremists’, bureaucrats and technocrats. In the Netherlands, the PVV’s European electoral program emphasized the need to reform the EU from within rather than to leave the Union. In Italy, while cooperating with the EU, Giorgia Meloni’s FdI continues to engage in ideological struggles on specific policies such as civil liberties, environmental issues, gender equality and EU constitutional matters. The Danish DF claims the EU needs to be strongly downsized to safeguard national sovereignty, a similar claim to that of the Denmark Democrats, which ask for ‘less EU’ and more national sovereignty.
Were the 2024 EP elections another ‘populist’ moment?
Rather than showing a new wave of populism, the results of the 2024 European elections have essentially confirmed the electoral consolidation of the populist phenomenon in Europe. In 2019, taking all groups together, populist parties had won 241 seats, representing about a third (32%) of all 751 seats in the European Parliament. In 2024, these parties won 263 of the 720 seats – approximately 36% (see Figure 1, Tables 1, 2 and 3).
Such results reflect the rise in support for populism in recent national elections as well as the increase in the number and geographical spread of populist parties across Europe. Based on the delineation of populism in the country chapters, no less than 60 populist parties across 26 EU member states gained representation in the European Parliament in June 2024. In comparison, a total of 40 populist parties had won seats in 22 EU countries in the 2019 election.
Populist party performances varied, however, across countries and different brands of populism. Moreover, the new distribution of seats should not mask distortions due to the relative weight of national representations in the European Parliament. In June 2024, the largest contingents of populist MEPs came mainly from the populist right in the more populated European countries, in particular from France’s Rassemblement National (30 seats), Fratelli d’Italia (24 seats), the Polish PiS (20 seats), the German AfD (15 seats) and Hungary’s Fidesz (11 seats). In the populist left, the largest contingent came from France’s LFI (9 seats). For centrist populist parties, the largest delegations were elected in Italy with the M5S (8 seats) and in the Czech Republic, where ANO received seven seats.
Asymmetrical populist performances
The results of the 2024 European elections have essentially attested to the consolidation of the populist right, while left-wing and centrist populist parties have received comparatively less support across Europe.
The populist right has established its presence in virtually all EU member states – there are no fewer than 50 such parties in Europe. Right-wing populist parties have done particularly well in countries such as France, Italy, Poland, Hungary, Belgium, Austria, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Netherlands; in many countries, the populist right-wing scene is made up of two, three and sometimes more parties.
There has also been a diversification of the populist right with the emergence of new actors. Alongside the major established players, new parties have emerged, including the Danish Democrats (DD), Latvia First (LPV), Chega in Portugal, the EL and Niki in Greece, the AUR and SOS in Romania, and the Czech Přísaha and PRO. In Lithuania, a populist radical-right politician and his party TSS made a breakthrough, gaining a seat in the EP for the first time.
Other movements have disappeared or been replaced by new populist parties. This is particularly true in Central and Eastern Europe, where party systems traditionally remain more fluid. The Bulgarian Ataka, long represented in the national assembly and the European Parliament, has all but disappeared since 2021, only to be replaced by Vazrazhdane. Golden Dawn, which came third in the 2015 elections in Greece, practically disappeared by 2019 when it failed to enter the national parliament. Its leadership was subsequently imprisoned following a prolonged trial on charges of running a criminal organization. Although the party disappeared, its ideology and electorate were easily picked up by EL, which has been represented since 2019 both in the national and in the European parliaments. Interestingly, small extreme right-wing-wing anti-immigration parties (i.e., the Irish Freedom Party, National Party, Ireland First and The Irish People) have surfaced in a country like Ireland, which has traditionally been more immune to far-right populism in the past, suggesting that the immigration issue has acquired more resonance in Irish politics in recent years.
Altogether, parties of the populist right won 177 seats, making up about a quarter (24%) of all 720 seats in the new European Parliament, an increase on their previous performances in 2019 –168 seats out of 751, that is about 22% (see Figure 1). Amongst the biggest winners were the French RN, the Italian Fratelli d’Italia, the FPÖ in Austria, the VB in Flanders, the Slovenian Democratic Party, the AUR in Romania and the National Alliance in Latvia, which all saw a significant rise in electoral support in the 2024 European elections. Let us also note that the 2024 elections have seen the rise of extreme right-wing nationalist parties across a number of EU member states, as illustrated by the electoral success of Vazrazhdane in Bulgaria, the Confederation in Poland, Hnutie Republika in Slovakia, ELAM in Cyprus, and Domovinski Pokret (DP) in Croatia. Altogether, parties that may be classified as ‘extreme right-wing’ won 15 seats in the European Parliament, significantly increasing their presence since the 2019 elections, where the extreme right-wing had received only 4 seats.
Such a wave of support for right-wing populists has been far from uniform, however, as a number of those parties have suffered losses across Europe. In Portugal, Chega lost nearly 783.000 votes from its general election tally, down to 9.8% of the vote. In Spain, while clearly improving its results from the 2019 EP elections, Vox lost significant support when compared with the 2023 general elections. In Sweden, the SD fell far behind the result of the 2022 parliamentary election. Fidesz in Hungary lost 2 seats despite winning the elections, facing a serious challenge by the new opposition party Tisza. Although PiS and Konfederacija collectively attracted almost half of the votes, PiS lost 9 seats in the EP – the biggest reversal in support in its history.
Compared with their right-wing counterparts, the parties of the populist left have been comparatively less successful, although they have somewhat improved their performance from five years ago. As Figure 1 shows, the populist left won a total of 46 seats in the new European Parliament in June, which represented just over 6% of all 720 seats. This result compared with 37 seats (about 5%) in the previous Parliament. As was the case for the populist right, left-wing populist party performances varied substantially across countries.
In countries such as Ireland, Greece, the Netherlands and Spain, there was a drop in support for the populist left, reflecting the more general decline in support for those parties since the 2008 financial crisis. In Ireland, Sinn Féin suffered significant losses, seeing much of his previous support going to independent or small-party candidates. In the Netherlands, the SP received a mere 2.2% of the vote, showing a decline since its success in 2014 when it had obtained almost 10% of the vote. The Spanish Podemos only received 3.3% of the vote, compared with 20% in 2016 –in alliance with Izquierda Unida (IU) at the time. In the case of Podemos, such decline reflected a variety of factors, including government participation and the recovery of macroeconomic indicators. In Greece, Syriza lost about 3 percentage points on its score in the June 2023 general election, down to 14.9% of the vote, although EKK maintained its 2 MEP seats, as well as representation in the national parliament.
In countries like Belgium and France, there were mixed performances for the populist left. The progress of the Belgian PTB–PVDA was asymmetrical, with the party making more significant gains on the Dutch-speaking side, almost doubling its score. In France, Mélenchon’s left-wing populist LFI won 9.9% of the vote, which represented a gain of 3.6 percentage points on its previous result in the 2019 EP elections, yet far lower than Mélenchon’s performance at 22% in the 2022 presidential election.
Support for the populist left rose, on the other hand, in Nordic countries such as Denmark and Finland. The Danish Red-Green Alliance won 7% of the vote (+2 percentage points compared to the legislative elections of November 2022). In Finland, the biggest surprise came from the Left Alliance (VAS), which came in second with 17.3% of the vote and three seats as opposed to one in the previous parliament. In Slovakia, SMER managed to regain political control in the 2023 national elections and increase its representation in the European Parliament from 3 to 5 seats – a major comeback for Robert Fico, who survived an assassination attempt just a month before the EP elections.
Finally, the 2024 European elections have confirmed centrist populism as a relatively marginal political phenomenon, essentially concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe. In June 2024, only 26 seats were won by centrist populist parties, making up just under 4% of all seats in the new European Parliament, which was very close to those parties’ performances five years ago (32 seats representing just over 4%).
While well-established centrist populist parties such as ANO in the Czech Republic and GERB in Bulgaria managed to secure their electoral support from the previous national elections, winning 7 and 5 seats, respectively, other centrist populist parties performed less well. In Bulgaria, PP lost heavily on their previous performance in the April 2023 elections and secured only two seats in the new European Parliament. This was also the case with the Darbo Partija in Lithuania, which lost most of its support from the last general election and failed to capture a single seat in the EP. Other parties’ results oscillated, such as for ‘There is Such a People’ in Bulgaria, which won the July 2021 early national elections, disappeared from the national parliament in the early national elections in 2022 and reappeared in 2023, gaining a single sear in the EP at the 2024 elections. New centrist populist parties, such as the Czech Přísaha, managed to surpass the threshold, sending one MEP to Brussels. Others, such as Stabilitātei! in Latvia and OL’aNO and SaS in Slovakia, failed to pass the threshold at the European Parliament elections despite gaining representation in the national parliaments in 2022 and 2023, respectively.
In Italy, the results of the 2024 elections have attested to the continuing electoral decline of the M5S. The party received 10% of the vote and eight seats, significantly losing ground from its previous performances in the 2019 European (17.1% of the vote cast) and 2022 general elections (15.4%).
A regional divide?
As mentioned earlier, the distribution of populism across Europe shows a regional divide (see Table 1). In the 2024 European elections, left-wing populism was primarily found in Western Europe, where 13 of those parties were in competition, as opposed to only 2 in Eastern and Central Europe (i.e., SMER in Slovakia and Levica in Slovenia). Conversely, centrist populism was essentially located in CEE countries, which had nine of those parties, as opposed to only two in Western Europe (i.e., the M5S in Italy and the BBB in the Netherlands). Populist radical-right parties were in the majority, and they were predominantly found in Western European countries (21 as opposed to 12 in CEE). Finally, the regional distribution of populism shows the rise of extreme right-wing parties in countries of the former Soviet Union, with no less than 11 of those parties competing in the 2024 European elections, as opposed to only one (ELAM in Cyprus) in the western part of the EU.
Table 1. Number of parties by populist family across Western and Eastern Europe
Countries
Left
Centrist
Right
Radical Right
Extreme Right
Total
Eastern
11
2
9
4
12
11
38
Western
15
13
2
2
21
1
39
26
15
11
6
33
12
77
Source:Compiled by the authors based on Rooduijn et al. (2023) and 2024 EP election data.
Such an uneven distribution of populism makes it difficult to accurately evaluate regional differences in populist party electoral support across Western and Central and Eastern Europe. As the country chapters clearly illustrate, there was a significant amount of variation in the electoral performances of populist parties in the 2024 European elections, both across and within regions. Moreover, no less than 27 populist parties were new parties that had not run in the 2019 European elections, thus rendering the analysis of change in populist party support even more difficult.
Table 2. Average electoral support by populist party family across Western and Eastern Europe
Average % of vote 2024 European elections and change from most recent national election
Left
Centrist
Right
Radical Right
Extreme Right
Eastern
29.5*
9.36
1.21
14.61
5.65
Change
(+1.1)
(–3.3)
(+0.9)
(+1.4)
(+1.8)
Western
7.28
7.69*
10.67*
11.63
11.19*
Change
(–0.2)
(–2.4)
(+2.0)
(+0.9)
(+4.4)
Source: Compiled by the authors based on 2024 EP election data.
* These results should be interpreted with caution due to the small number of parties (n ≤ 2).
Table 2 shows the mean electoral support for populist parties in the 2024 European elections and the change from the most recent general election. The data are broken down by region and populist party family. Because of such heterogeneity, the data in Table 2 should be taken with caution. These data confirm, however, that centrist and left-wing populist parties have lost ground on average in the 2024 European elections compared with their performances in the last general election in their respective country and that such decline was visible in both Eastern and Western European countries. On average, the populist radical right has made progress across both regions: +1.4 percentage points in CEE countries and +0.9 percentage points in Western Europe, again bearing in mind that there was substantial variation in party performances within each region. Finally, the data show that extreme right-wing ultra-nationalist movements have made gains in Eastern Europe, winning an additional 1.8 percentage points on average on their previous performance in the last general election.
Overall, with all limitations in mind, the data do not show a clear regional divide in terms of populist party performances in the 2024 European elections but rather point to the diversity of populist manifestations and variation of their electoral performances within each region. At the country level, the German case illustrates a more striking regional pattern as all three populist parties were much more successful in the eastern states, reflecting the multi-faceted legacy of the GDR and the political impact of the shock and aftermath of the transformation in the 1990s.
Diverse drivers of populism in the EP elections 2024
Across Europe, the popularity of populist movements is rooted in the ‘polycrisis’ to which EU citizens have been exposed since 2008 – the financial crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic and now the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. Fidesz’s electoral slogan, ‘No migration, no gender, no war!’ succinctly captures the division lines not only between populists and non-populists but also among populists from the left, the centre, and the right and even within those subcategories. In Austria, the polycrisis amalgam was perfectly summed up by the FPÖ’s slogan in the run-up to the vote: ‘Stop European chaos, the asylum crisis, climate terror, warmongering and Corona chaos’. In Italy, the multiple crises have led to increased opposition to the EU. In France, since 2012, support for the RN has been fuelled by feelings of economic alienation mediated by cultural concerns over immigration and strong anti-elite sentiments.
However, this polycrisis has played out differently in each country. Belgium illustrates such differences: the political debate in Flanders saw more focus on migration, law and order and public finances, whereas, in French-speaking Belgium, the focus was more on energy, civil rights and work. Immigration issues have become more salient in countries such as Cyprus, which is the first country in the EU to move to per capita applications for asylum. This has led to Euroscepticism and discontent in relation to the EU’s management of immigration. In contrast, in Sweden, immigration was less significant than it had been in both the previous European election and the Riksdag election of 2022. In Greece, domestic – rather than European – issues dominated the campaigns, including the economy, inflation and the cost-of-living crisis, with populists both from the right and the left cashing in on economic decline and regional disparities. In Austria, the FPÖ focused on migration, the war in Ukraine, climate change and, notably, the COVID-19 pandemic. Amongst those four, migration was the most important issue in the campaign. In Latvia, populist parties campaigned around the war in Ukraine, the Green Deal and its economic impact, and the defence of traditional family and Christian values, opposing progressive, liberal ideals in Brussels, including LGBTQ+ rights. Opposition to LGBTQ+ rights was typical for most of the radical-right populists, including in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovakia. LGBTQ+ rights were countered with arguments on religion and traditional family values, including criticisms of political correctness and limiting the freedom of speech. By contrast, some left–populist outfits (such as the Greek KKE) have been defenders of LGBTQ+ rights and socially progressive in general.
Economic uncertainty as a common driver of populism
Beyond such variation, the economic context has heavily weighed on public opinion and has fuelled frustration and anger around the rising cost of living in many countries. Economic fears clearly dominated the campaign in France, creating a propitious context for populist politics across the board. The Denmark Democrats have made significant inroads in rural areas where voters feel neglected and left behind. In Germany, the AfD continued to push their core issues — first and foremost immigration, but also the economic impact of the war on Germany, climate denialism and hard Euroscepticism. To the left, populist parties have also politicized the economic crisis. In Ireland, support for Sinn Féin rose in the 2010s as it adopted a more populist approach combined with a strong focus on economic issues. The acuteness of the housing crisis also helped the party. Sinn Féin had campaigned strongly on the housing issue, and it was this that brought it increased support among young progressive voters.
Luxembourg serves as a counterexample here. Public opinion data show that compared to the EU average, Luxembourgers were far more satisfied with their economic situation and the EU, and they felt much better off economically and also had much higher levels of trust in their national government and the EU. The fact that populists enjoyed more support in rural areas and among the less educated in the Czech Republic and Romania, among others, further indicates the importance of economic uncertainty as a driving factor.
Immigration and refugees
In many cases, the populist radical right has capitalized on insecurities linked to immigration and asylum seekers, which was a key issue in countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, Hungary, Poland and France. Germany had accepted more than a million Ukrainian refugees after the 2022 attack, which brought the issue of immigration back onto the agenda in 2023 after its salience had been low for several years. In France, next to inflation, immigration emerged as the second most salient issue, followed by law and order. In Flanders, the immigration agenda has been particularly favourable to the populist radical parties such as the VB. Immigration represented a key focus for all right-wing populists (EL, FL, and Niki) in Greece. In Austria, The FPÖ rejected the EU’s Pact on Migration and Asylum and the mandatory distribution of asylum seekers across the EU, calling instead for a ‘Pact on Re-Migration’. In Italy, the populist governing coalition of FdI, Lega, and Forza Italia prides itself on the migration deal signed with Albania that aims to relocate immigrants arriving in Italy to Italian-operated refugee centres in Albania. The Italian prime minister, Giorgia Meloni, has further succeeded in pushing for EU-wide agreements with North African countries that envision limiting the flow of migrants in exchange for financial assistance.
Immigration issues were also prominent in Eastern and Central European countries. In the Czech Republic, populists from the centre and the right framed migration in security terms, rejecting the EU Pact on Migration, highlighting the so-called “no-go zones” where women are at risk and Islamic minorities have brought crime, terrorism and the domination of Sharia law. In Poland, migration has been a major focus of both PiS and Konfederacija. The influx of refugees from Ukraine has provided fertile ground for populist discourses. While the PiS government had initially embraced Ukrainian refugees, the prolonged war and the sheer number of refugees resulted in a backlash with time and fervent opposition against the EU’s Migration Pact, which was labelled the ‘Trojan horse of Europe’. The governing SMER party in Slovakia has similarly criticized the Pact on Migration and Asylum and opposed compulsory relocation schemes, proposing measures in the country of origin instead.
Such rising salience of immigration issues may account for the decline in support for left-wing populism. In Ireland, for example, the 2024 European Parliament elections came on the back of a rise in the prominence of immigration as an issue. Sinn Féin’s falling support, then, can be seen as the party’s failure to address such issues despite trying to change its discourse on the pressure that recently arrived asylum seekers put on social services. Similarly, in the Netherlands, the inability of the SP to attract economically left-wing and welfare-chauvinist voters may be seen as a consequence of the party’s lack of commitment to an anti-immigrant stance. In Italy, similarly, M5S has lost support also due to its inability to address the migration problem.
Populist polarization over climate change and the green transition
There has also been a backlash against the European Green Deal, with populist radical-right parties attacking the environmental transition as being “punitive”. Right-wing populist parties’s scepticism about climate change and hostility to low-carbon energy policies has been well documented in the literature (Lockwood and Lockwood, 2022). The recent study by Forchtner and Lubarda (2023) suggests that right-wing populist parties generally claim that climate policies should not harm the economy and jobs and that such parties most effectively perform as defenders of the nation’s economic well-being.
In Flanders, the VB opposes further enlargement and positions itself against the interference of the EU in the national politics of illiberal democracies, as well as against EU policies in terms of climate and agriculture. In Luxembourg, the ADR party has prioritized the preservation of the combustion engine, more generally opposing green politics. The Finns Party has been the Eurosceptic party in Finnish EP elections, promoting an agenda opposed to the EU, immigration and climate change policies. In the Netherlands, the PVV vehemently called for opt-out possibilities for the Netherlands regarding asylum seekers and migration and relaxing obligations with respect to climate change, especially nitrogen. The Austrian FPÖ demands a stop to the European Green Deal, the EU Nature Restoration Law, and the scheduled ban on combustion engines. In Poland, the European Green Deal has been criticized both by PiS and Konfederacija as an ideological project of EU elites aimed against ordinary citizens. Both parties have highlighted the high prices of energy, transport and agriculture to ordinary Poles. The European Green Deal was similarly criticized by right-wing populists in Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, to name a few.
In contrast, left-wing populist parties have been taking up environmental issues, and they have endorsed an agenda of green transition (Duina and Zhou 2024). Parties such as LFI in France and Podemos in Spain have placed environmental issues at the core of their political platform while blaming political and economic elites for the environmental crisis. In Italy, Movimento 5 Stelle’s electoral platform emphasizes anti-austerity measures, public healthcare defence, anti-corruption efforts, environmental protection, and labour issues, including introducing a minimum wage and a 32-hour workweek. SMER is a notable exception in the left–populist camp, as it has vehemently criticized the Green Dea, labelling it an “extreme environmental initiative” pushed through by “Eurocrats with no accountability” and rejecting the target of reducing emissions by 55% by 2030.
Such a populist divide over climate change is most visible in France, where radical right-wing populist parties such as the RN and Reconquête clearly oppose the European Green Deal and play with climate-sceptic themes to sway voters most affected by the economic cost of the green transition. In contrast, the left-wing populist LFI has adopted an eco-socialist and ambitious green transition agenda, championing the fight against climate change (Chazel and Dain, 2024). We see a similar divide in Italy: Lega’s platform focuses on halting the EU’s technocratic and centralizing drift and restoring the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Key proposals include rejecting the Green Deal, ending austerity policies and protecting Italian production chains. In contrast, the M5S has put environmental protection and green transition policies at the core of its electoral platform. In Denmark, the left-wing populist SF has spearheaded the call to accelerate decarbonization efforts and implement policies to achieve concrete results quickly, given the urgency of the climate crisis. In contrast, the populist right-wing, led by the DF and the Denmark Democrats, opposed environmental regulations, which they believed would harm the competitiveness of Danish agricultural products in the European market.
In Germany, on the other hand, the government’s green transition policies are strongly opposed by populist parties across the board. These parties also sided with large-scale farmers’ protests against some cuts to agrarian subsidies that eventually forced a government U-turn. The AfD continued to push climate denialism and hard Euroscepticism. Both AfD and BSW will likely vote against any policies related to the ‘green transformation.’
Finally, the ecological divide is found across other types of populism. In the Netherlands, for example, the BBB typically pits ordinary citizens and farmers against ‘oat milk cappuccino drinking’ city dwellers and unresponsive politicians from the major cities in the west of the country (the so-called Randstad). BBB’s core issues centre around support for farmers and opposition to radical climate policies. Similarly, in Romania, the SOS emphasized the protection of farmers and agriculture workers, criticizing EU product regulations, advocating for Romanians’ rights to continue using traditional energy sources like firewood and natural gas, and demanding the reopening of coal mines. In the Czech Republic, the European Green Deal has been rejected by both the ANO and the SPD. While ANO accused Brussels of committing ritual suicide, the SPD attacked the reduction of combustion engines by placing a former racing driver at the top of its electoral list.
Gaza and the Israel–Hamas war
The Israel–Hamas war and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza have provoked diametrically opposed reactions among populists from across the political spectrum. The conflict has featured much more prominently in political discourse in Western Europe than in Central and Eastern Europe, where the war in Ukraine has taken precedence.
France is a good illustration of such a divide. French lead candidates show deep splits over recognition of a Palestinian state. Left-leaning contenders, from the Communists to the social democrats, are clearly in favour of a ‘two-state solution’, while the French far right, in a break with the past, now supports Israel. Marine Le Pen and RN President Jordan Bardella joined pro-Israeli protests, blaming left-leaning forces for allegedly failing to condemn the 7 October attacks. The LFI, by contrast, has taken a pro-Palestinain position, calling for sanctions against the Israeli government, an embargo on the shipping of weaponry and artillery, an end to the 2000 EU-Israel Association Agreement, and the immediate recognition of a Palestinian state. Mélenchon and members of LFI were accused of antisemitism for declining to condemn Hamas as a terrorist group.
Overall, voters of left-wing forces were more concerned about war in Palestine than Ukraine and were more likely to support the Palestinian cause. This concern was particularly visible among Podemos voters, as well as KKE supporters in Greece. Yet, some right-wing populists have also sided with Palestine and not with Israel, including the Belgian PTB–PVDA and the Irish PBP. Romanian SOS leader Șoșoacă has been accused of antisemitism for her controversial remarks. For instance, during a joint session of parliament dedicated to the Day of Solidarity and Friendship between Romania and Israel in May 2024, Șoșoacă complained that this day should serve to commemorate Romanian martyrs from communist prisons, criticizing what she viewed as an incorrect focus on antisemitism. She protested that Romania saved over 400,000 Jews during the Second World War. Vazrazhdane’s leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, has also been highly critical of Israel, although acknowledging the terrorist attack of Hamas and advocating for a two-state solution.
Other right-wing populists have firmly defended Israel. Chega claimed that Netanyahu’s government was entitled to ‘neutralize the threat’ and was the only parliamentary party to decline to join calls for a ceasefire. In Germany, a knife attack by an Afghan man left a police officer dead just days before the election, triggering a fresh debate about immigration, Islamism and the longstanding policy against deportations to Afghanistan. The anti-Islam stance was also important for the Czech SPD, which has been a stalwart defender of Israel.
Ukraine and Russia
The outbreak of the war in Ukraine resulted in diverse responses by populist parties. Many populists on the right, especially in Western Europe, initially distanced themselves from Putin and cooled off their usual pro-Russian stance. Others, on the contrary, became even more pro-Russian (Ivaldi and Zankina, 2023). Such diversity can be explained by specific geostrategic and historical factors, including geographical proximity to Russia, past conflicts, cultural proximity or trade relations.
Some of the most vehement defenders of Russia in the West have been the AfD and FPÖ, which have denounced their respective governments’ support for Kyiv, accusing them of ‘warmongering’. The AfD has a longstanding association with Russia, repeatedly voicing sympathy for Putin and his regime. Although the party toned down its statements immediately after the February 2022 attack, it has since highlighted the economic consequences of the war and the sanctions for Germany, reinventing itself as a party of “peace”, even adopting the classic dove symbol. The BSW took an even more pro-Russian stance than the AfD, with its leader Wagenknecht routinely claiming that the US and the collective Western block a peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine for reasons of their own. BSW’s 20-page manifesto mentions sanctions 14 times, depicting them as harmful to Germany while having no effect on Russia itself. The FPÖ criticized the EU’s support for Kyiv, calling for an immediate end to financial and military aid to Ukraine and abolishing sanctions against Russia due to their detrimental effects on the economy. The Austrian government, in turn, was criticized for a breach of the country’s constitutional obligation of neutrality. The Dutch FvD has also propagated a pro-Russia and pro-Putin line, as did the Swedish SD. SD’s leader Åkesson stated that there is an upper limit to how much support Sweden should give to Ukraine, while the party’s top candidate, Charlie Weimers, suggested that their own party group, ECR, should be open to cooperating with parties in the ID group, whose stance on Russia has been characterized as relatively friendly. The Irish PBP has taken positions that are less in tune with popular opinion and are often seen as pro-Russian, including calls for Ukraine to enter peace talks.
Putin has enjoyed even more support in Central and Eastern Europe, including in Hungary, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Orbán’s campaign made the war in Ukraine its centrepiece. He used fear-mongering to build a Manichean narrative where anybody failing to vote for Fidesz was part of the ‘pro-war’ camp, accusing the Hungarian opposition of carrying out the demands of its international financiers in Brussels and Washington. Orbán repeatedly blamed the EU for wrongdoing and claimed that because of the incompetent leadership in Brussels, ‘instead of peace, we have war, instead of security we have a rule-of-law ruckus, instead of prosperity we have financial blackmail’. The Bulgarian Vazrazhdane and its leader, Kostadin Kostadinov, have been stark defenders of Putin to the extent of reaching comical proportions. Kostadinv is widely known in the country as ‘kopeikin’, referring to the Russian coin currency. His rallies feature more Russian than Bulgarian national flags. He frequently travels to Moscow, and his party is known to be funded by Putin (Zankina, 2024). The Czech SPD has become one of the most vocal anti-Ukrainian voices following Russia’s 2022 invasion, as did the newly emerged SOS in Romania. SOS’s leader Șoșoacă was declared ‘Personality of the Year’ in 2021 by Sputnik. She asserted that Europeans and Americans aim to destroy Russia and argued that Ukraine illegally occupies territories, including some that rightfully belong to Romania. The left–populist SMER in Slovakia, in turn, has called for a halt of all military assistance to Ukraine in its defence against Russian aggression and for a more neutral stance toward Russia. SMER blamed the EU for ‘prolonging war in Europe’ by supporting Ukraine.
In contrast to such support for Putin, a number of parties across Europe have adopted a pro-Ukraine position. In Finland, for example, support for Ukraine has been almost unanimous, including by the Finns Party, which has criticized Putin’s Russia, expressing strong support for Ukraine. Similarly, the Danish People’s Party and the Denmark’s Democrats are declaredly pro-Ukraine. In Portugal, Chega also aligned with most mainstream parties, adopting a pro-Ukraine position. The Croatian DP has expressed firm solidarity with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people, drawing parallels between Croatia’s Homeland War (1991–1991) and Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Although Sinn Féin has often blamed the West for being unnecessarily aggressive toward Putin, with the invasion of Ukraine, the party stood firmly behind Ukraine, although it continued to abstain on aid packages in the EP.
Many parties struggled to take a clear stance, expressing ambiguous positions. The RN, for example, has significantly moderated its attitude. Le Pen said her only ‘red line’ on Ukraine was stopping France from becoming a ‘co-belligerent’ in the conflict via the use of long-range French missiles against targets on Russian soil. French far-right leader Jordan Bardella said he backed Ukraine’s right to defend itself against Russia, but if elected prime minister, he would not provide Kyiv with missiles that would allow it to strike Russia’s territory. He also said he would stand by France’s commitments to NATO if he became prime minister. In Germany, the Left’s manifesto for the European elections also reflected ambiguity.
On the one hand, the document is highly critical of the US and NATO and even claims that the eastern enlargement of NATO has “contributed to the crisis”. On the other, it highlights Ukraine’s right to self-defence, condemns the attack as a war crime, and demands the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory. The Dutch PVV supported the strengthening of defence, however, without singling out Russia as the main threat. Populists in Latvia took similarly ambivalent positions on Russia. S! refused to blame Russia for the invasion, arguing instead for ‘peace’. The LPV initially denounced Russia’s invasion of Ukraine but subsequently softened its stance, advocating for the need for negotiations, peace and the renewal of economic relations with Russia – a position also adopted by SV, which primarily appeals to Russian speakers. The Romanian AUR has taken nuanced positions. While denouncing Russia’s interference as a significant obstacle to unification with Moldova, the party also criticizes Ukrainian discrimination against ethnic minorities, particularly Romanians.
Multiple Factors of populist performances across EU member states
As the individual chapters illustrate, beyond differences in issue salience across countries, there were a variety of political factors that may account for differences in populist party electoral performances in the 2024 European elections.
National cycle
Such performances may be first related to the location of the EP elections in each country’s national political cycle. The analysis in this report corroborates studies that show that party performances in European elections are mediated by the time of these elections in the national electoral cycle, that government parties lose support in EU elections, especially during the midterm of a national parliamentary cycle, and that opposition parties may benefit from this (Hix and Marsh 2007).
In Germany, the 2024 European election saw devastating results for the governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), Greens, and Liberal Democrats (FDP). The so-called “progressive coalition” and its policies have been deeply unpopular, and the radical-right AfD was the main beneficiary of this discontent. In France, political protest and anti-incumbent sentiments were key to populist voting across the spectrum: over two-thirds of RN voters said they essentially voted to manifest their opposition to the President and the Government, and it was 53% among LFI voters. In the Netherlands, the results of the 2024 European elections for populist parties in the Netherlands were intimately related to the fall of the Rutte IV government in the Summer of 2023 and the outcome of the subsequent national elections on 22 November 2023, which saw a rise in support for the PVV. In Poland, the governing coalition, which managed to take power away from PiS in 2023, saw a decline in its support. While PiS lost 12 MEP seats, it did regain some of its support compared to the 2023 national election. In Slovakia, SMER, which managed to take back power from OL’aNO in the 2023 national election, lost some of its support in the EP elections, coming second after the liberal Progressive Slovakia (PS). In Hungary, while Fidesz won the elections, it lost some support and faced an unprecedented challenge by a new political party that reshuffled the power balance in the opposition.
The country chapters also find evidence of another key element of the ‘second order’ model that has been applied to European elections since the early 1980s, which is that voters typically make judgements about national political issues in those elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). In many countries, the 2024 European elections were fought over domestic rather than European issues and populist parties often played the national card. In Spain, for example, the number and relevance of ongoing national-level political issues often sidelined European ones during the 2024 campaign. In Portugal, Chega’s manifesto proposals were mostly domestic; European-level proposals were scarce despite a broader media agenda focused on European immigration, defence and EU enlargement. In Germany, domestic actors and attitudes dominated the campaign, with only a minority of populist voters saying that “Europe” was more important for their decision than “Germany”, particularly AfD supporters who were more inward-looking and more Eurosceptic than the BSW’s. In Greece, domestic issues dominated, with election results representing an anti-government protest vote. This was also the case in the Czech Republic, where many voters supported populist parties out of frustration with national politics and the government’s performance.
The European elections further coincided with national and local elections in Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Hungary, Italy, Ireland, Malta and Romania. The 2024 elections in Belgium were a triple election for the European, federal and regional levels. In this context, European elections were clearly second-order elections. In Bulgaria, the elections coincided with early national elections (the sixth in two years). Thus, European issues were subsumed by overall political instability and infighting, polarizing discourse and a record-low voter turnout.
Populists in government
Populists in government have had varying success in the 2024 European elections. While the FdL in Italy managed to maintain its dominance, including within the governing coalition, the Finns Party saw a sharp drop in support due to its participation in government. While Fidesz maintained its grip on power, it was challenged by a new opposition party, losing two seats in the EP.
In Italy, all the parties in the centre-right governing coalition (FdI, FI, Lega) improved their results compared to the 2022 general elections, thus enjoying a “honeymoon” period of the government elected two years before, reflecting a consolidation of the approval of the Meloni government at the domestic level. Meloni was heavily involved in the European campaign, enabling her party to benefit from her relatively intact popularity as the head of government since September 2022. In Croatia, the right-wing populist DP was already in the position of kingmaker after coming third in the national parliamentary elections in April 2024 and becoming part of the governing coalition. In the EP elections, the DP maintained its support, thus reaffirming its leverage in domestic and European politics.
Elsewhere, populists in government lost ground. In Hungary, despite Fidesz’s victory in the election, a new challenger, Tisza, posed significant challenges, attracting former Fidesz party member Péter Magyar and gaining seven seats in the EP, while Fidesz lost two. Although Fidesz came in first in the EP elections with 44.82% of the votes, the result was considered the party’s worst performance in an EP election. In Finland, the Finns Party paid for its participation in the government and fell back sharply, losing 6 points compared to 2019. The elections revealed voters’ deep distrust towards the government, in which the Finns Party had supported significant austerity measures and cuts to public spending through its leader and finance minister, Riikka Purra. In Sweden, the 2024 European Parliament election was the first election in which the Sweden Democrats participated while having formal influence over the government. The party performed the worst in mobilizing voters in the week leading up to the election, and its support for the centre-right government could possibly explain such an electoral setback.
Political discontent as a driver of populist voting
In countries where populists were in the opposition, these parties benefited from political discontent with national governments dealing with the aftermath of the pandemic, the energy and high inflation crisis, and the many political and economic ramifications of the war in Ukraine.
In Spain, Vox’s electoral campaign was essentially framed as a referendum against Sánchez. In France, both the RN and LFI sought to capitalize on political discontent by making the election a referendum for or against Emmanuel Macron and the government. In Belgium, populist radical parties, both left and right, positioned themselves as political outsiders and presented themselves as the alternative vote to an unpopular federal government. In Cyprus, ELAM strongly campaigned against corruption, entering the political scene as the new political force that would hold traditional parties accountable. In Portugal, Chega’s leader, André Ventura, nominated himself as ‘the real leader of the opposition’. In Germany, after the initial rally-round-the-flag effect following Russia’s fresh attack on Ukraine, the government’s popularity began to decline as a result of high inflation and worries about (energy) security, resulting in a protest vote in favour of populist actors such as the AfD and BSW.
Similarly, in Greece, there was a strong anti-government protest vote, with the key message of the election being political discontent and a general feeling of economic malaise. In Poland, PiS (now in opposition) criticized the government’s opposing measures to stop illegal migration adopted by the previous PiS government. In Romania, AUR has criticized the government and mainstream parties for being subservient to the EU and betraying national interests. In an interview for a Russian newspaper, the leader of the more radical SOS party declared that Romania is essentially a ‘colony within the EU.’
Populist competition
Another factor of varying populist performances was changes in the populist political scene across Europe and new patterns of competition between populists. The recent wave of populism has seen new parties challenge the more established players (Ivaldi, 2023). Such divisions began to appear in countries such as Austria and France in the late 1990s, and more recently, populist competition has been observed in a number of European countries but in different configurations.
While countries such as the Netherlands, Germany, France, Bulgaria and Italy have a variety of populist actors distributed across the political spectrum, there has also been an increasing fragmentation of the populist right in a number of countries in recent years, with two or three of those parties competing with one another for votes, possibly affecting the balance of forces within that party family.
Such a split of the populist right is illustrated in Spain, which has seen the emergence of a new populist radical-right party, Se Acabó La Fiesta (SALF), competing with Vox, which partly accounts for the latter’s loss of support in the 2024 EP elections when compared with the 2023 general elections. In the Netherlands, there has been an increase in parties competing for the populist vote, forcing these parties to profile themselves not only vis-à-vis mainstream parties but also each other. In Poland, the PiS lost 12 points and 8 seats in five years, suffering from competition from Confederation (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość), which established itself at the heart of the Polish right. In Hungary, Orbán’s party is facing competition from the far-right Our Homeland Movement (MHM). In Romania, AUR is competing for votes with the splinter party SOS. France now has two electorally relevant populist radical-right parties competing with one another, namely, Marine Le Pen’s RN and Éric Zemmour’s Reconquête! In Germany, the AfD is also facing competition on its left flank from the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW) on similar anti-immigration policies. In Denmark, the recently formed Denmark’s Democrats compete directly with the Danish People’s Party. As one final example, in Italy, there has been a clear shift in the balance of power between the Lega and FdI, with Meloni’s party taking over the right-wing bloc.
While populist competition essentially concerns the populist right, Ireland provides an interesting case of populist competition to the left of the political spectrum. As the Irish chapter shows, Aontú was in a position to soak up some of Sinn Féin’s collapsing coalition, and it did so by calling more clearly for controls on immigration and by opposing the EU migration pact.
Political profile and candidates
Other factors of variations in populist party performances in the 2024 European elections may be found in the political profile of those parties and lead candidates, as well as in specific campaign events that may have dampened or increased support for those parties.
While some of those parties have taken a path towards normalization, others have maintained a more radical ideology and discourse that may alienate moderate voters. In France, while Le Pen’s RN has been continuing its strategy of “de-demonization” in order to achieve governmental credibility and detoxify its far-right reputation, Zemmour’s Reconquête has come closer to the old extreme right. In Bulgaria, GERB has been moderating its populist appeal, while Vazrazhdane has bet on increasing polarization and extreme right-wing and populist rhetoric. In Ireland, Sinn Féin has transitioned to become a more credible party of government, taking more mainstream positions on a number of issues. In Italy, despite their historical roots in the neo-fascist milieu, Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia have successfully achieved their transformation into a party of government, taking over Forza Italia’s role as the dominant party within the right-wing bloc. As discussed earlier, other parties, such as the Dutch PVV and the Sweden Democrats, have recently undergone a modernization process to increase their coalition potential and increasingly win over the moderate electorate.
In countries like Spain and Finland, on the other hand, the campaign of the 2024 European elections was dominated by public concerns over the rise of the far right in Europe and its possible impact on future alliances in the European Parliament. In Finland, in particular, people’s fear of the rising far right in Europe was a salient theme in campaign debates, which may have contributed to diminished electoral support for the Finns Party.
As clearly illustrated in the country chapters, the choice of lead candidates in the 2024 European elections somewhat reflected such variation in the political pedigree of populist parties. In Denmark, for example, the DF nominated hardliner and former MEP Morten Messerschmidt despite his being still under investigation for fraud in the so-called MELD and FELD case concerning the misuse of EU funds. In Germany, the controversies surrounding the party’s ‘re-migration’ project and Maximilian Krah’s statements about the SS clearly outraged some voters. In Italy, the Lega’s campaign was further stirred by the controversial candidacy of General Vannacci, known for his homophobic, racist and sexist comments. In Portugal, Chega’s lead candidate, António Tânger Corrêa, was strongly criticized for endorsing conspiracy theories such as the ‘great replacement’ and for his using of antisemitic tropes, like accusing the Mossad of forewarning American Jews of terrorist attacks on 9/11. In Finland, the most successful Finns Party candidate, Sebastian Tynkkynen, represented the provocative and radical faction of the party. Another example of strong populist rhetoric and style is found in Romania, where former AUR leader and now a member of SOS Romania, Diana Șoșoacă, is taking her populist rhetoric to new extremes by using tough homophobic, ultra-nationalist, xenophobic and anti-European messages.
Finally, we should mention specific events that may have altered the course of the 2024 elections. One such example is the failed assassination attempt on Prime Minister Robert Fico of SMER, which took place in mid-May 2024, shocking the country and impacting the campaign and elections both directly and indirectly, as both SMER and SNS blamed the opposition and independent media for the attempt, claiming it resulted from a polarized political environment allegedly created by them.
At times, political scandals punctuated the 2024 EP election campaign. In Sweden, the election campaign took a new turn when, about a month prior to the election, it was revealed that the SD’s communications department was hosting a so-called troll factory in which anonymous social media accounts were spreading disinformation and derogatory portrayals of other politicians.
Populist parties and groups in the European Parliament
The 2024 European elections have delivered a new European Parliament whose centre of gravity has clearly shifted to the right and where the presence of populist actors has increased.
The mainstream forces of the European Parliament – the EPP, S&D, and Renew – have maintained a majority with just over 55% of the seats in the new parliament. The conservative right united within the EPP and reaffirmed its dominance within the European institutions, both in the EP and the Council, with 11 seats compared to only 4 for the left and 5 for Renew. Despite the economic crisis, the European left was unable to establish itself as an alternative force during the election. Finally, the Greens and Renew’s liberals emerged as the big losers of the June 2024 elections, with 53 and 77 seats, respectively, a sharp decline compared to 2019 (70 and 98 seats, respectively) (see Table 3).
Table 3. Political groups in the European Parliament as of July 2024
Political groups
Number of seats
Share of seats (%)
EPP–Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)
188
26.11
S&D–Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
136
18.89
PfE–Patriots for Europe
84
11.67
ECR–European Conservatives and Reformists Group
78
10.83
Renew Europe–Renew Europe Group
77
10.69
Greens/EFA–Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
53
7.36
The Left–The Left group in the European Parliament–GUE/NGL
Following the elections, the centre of gravity of the new parliament shifted to the right. In addition to the strong performances of conservative parties, the European election results confirmed the anticipated rise of populist and Eurosceptic right-wing parties.
However, these parties remain divided in the European Parliament, where they are currently distributed across three different groups – namely, the ECR (78 seats), PfE (49), and ESN (25), which have replaced the two previous right-wing populist groups, i.e., ECR and Identity and Democracy. Some populist parties are also found among the Non-attached (NA) (see Table 4).
Table 4. Populist parties by political groups in the 2024 European Parliament
Country
Type
Party
Seats won
% of vote
EP Group
Bulgaria
Centrist
Ima takav narod
ITN
1
6.20
ECR
Croatia
Extreme Right
Domovinski pokret
DP
1
8.84
ECR
Cyprus
Extreme Right
Ethniko Laiko Metopo
ELAM
1
11.19
ECR
Denmark
Radical Right
Danmarksdemokraterne
DD
1
7.39
ECR
Estonia
Radical Right
Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond
EKRE
1
14.86
ECR
Finland
Radical Right
Perussuomalaiset/Finns
PS/Finns
1
7.60
ECR
Greece
Radical Right
Elliniki Lysi
EL
2
9.30
ECR
Italy
Radical Right
Fratelli d’Italia
FdI
24
28.76
ECR
Luxembourg
Right
Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei (Alternative Democratic Reform Party)
ADR
1
11.76
ECR
Poland
Radical Right
Prawo i Sprawiedliwość
PiS
20
36.16
ECR
Romania
Radical Right
Alianța pentru Unirea Românilor
AUR
6
14.95
ECR
Sweden
Radical Right
Sverigedemokraterna
SD
3
13.19
ECR
Bulgaria
Centrist
Graždani za evropejsko razvitie na Bǎlgarija
GERB
5
24.30
EPP
Italy
Right
Forza Italia
FI
8
9.58
EPP
Netherlands
Centrist
BoerBurgerBeweging
BBB
2
5.40
EPP
Slovenia
Radical Right
Slovenska demokratska stranka
SDS
4
30.65
EPP
Bulgaria
Extreme Right
Vazrazhdane
Vazrazhdane
3
14.40
ESN
Czech Republic
Radical Right
Svoboda a přímá demokracie
SPD
1
5.73
ESN
France
Radical Right
Reconquête!
REC
5
5.46
ESN
Germany
Radical Right
Alternative für Deutschland
AfD
15
15.89
ESN
Hungary
Extreme Right
Mi Hazánk Mozgalom
MHM
1
6.75
ESN
Lithuania
Extreme Right
Tautos ir teisingumo sąjunga (The People and Justice Union)
TTS
1
5.45
ESN
Poland
Extreme Right
Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość
Konf
3
3,19
ESN
Slovakia
Extreme Right
Hnutie Republika
Hnutie Republika
2
12.53
ESN
Germany
Left
Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht
BSW
6
6.17
NA
Greece
Radical Right
Dimokratikó Patriotikó Kínima
NIKI
1
4.37
NA
Greece
Left
Plefsi Eleftherias
PE
1
3.40
NA
Greece
Left
Kommounistiko Komma Elladas
KKE
2
9.30
NA
Poland
Extreme Right
Nowa Nadzieja
Nowa Nadzieja
2
2.79
NA
Poland
Extreme Right
Ruch Narodowy
Ruch Narodowy
1
2.57
NA
Romania
Radical Right
S.O.S. România
SOS RO
2
5.04
NA
Slovakia
Left
SMER – sociálna demokracia
SMER-SD
5
24.77
NA
Spain
Radical Right
Se Acabó La Fiesta
SALF
3
4.59
NA
Austria
Radical Right
Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs
FPÖ
6
25.36
PfE
Belgium
Radical Right
Vlaams Belang
VB
3
22.94
PfE
Czech Republic
Centrist
Akce nespokojených občanů
ANO 2011
7
26.14
PfE
Czech Republic
Radical Right
Přísaha a Motoristé
Přísaha a Motoristé
2
10.26
PfE
Denmark
Radical Right
Dansk Folkeparti
DF
1
6.37
PfE
France
Radical Right
Rassemblement national
RN
30
31.47
PfE
Greece
Radical Right
Foni Logikis
FL
1
3.04
PfE
Hungary
Radical Right
Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség
Fidesz
11
44.69
PfE
Italy
Radical Right
Lega
Lega
8
8.98
PfE
Latvia
Radical Right
Latvija pirmajā vietā
LPV
1
6.23
PfE
Netherlands
Radical Right
Partij voor de Vrijheid
PVV
6
16.97
PfE
Portugal
Radical Right
Chega
Chega
2
9.79
PfE
Spain
Radical Right
Vox
Vox
6
9.63
PfE
Bulgaria
Centrist
Prodalzhavame Promjanata-Democratichna Bulgaria
PP-BD
2
14.45
Renew(PP)EPP(DB)
Belgium
Left
Parti du Travail de Belgique-Partij van de arbeid
PTB–PVDA
2
11.76
The Left
Denmark
Left
Enhedslisten – De Rød-Grønne
Enhl., Ø
1
7.04
The Left
France
Left
La France Insoumise
LFI
9
9.87
The Left
Germany
Left
Die Linke
Die Linke
3
2.74
The Left
Greece
Left
Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás
SYRIZA
4
14.92
The Left
Ireland
Left
Sinn Féin
SF
2
11.14
The Left
Italy
Centrist
Movimento 5 Stelle
M5S
8
9.98
The Left
Spain
Left
Podemos
Podemos
2
3.28
The Left
Sweden
Left
Vänsterpartiet
V
2
11.04
The Left
Source: Compiled by the authors based on election results data from the European Parliament (https://results.elections.europa.eu/en/). Notes: Blue indicates radical-right populist; pink radical-left populist; and white, centrist populist.
Such a reconfiguration of populist groups in the EP reflects a wide array of factors, from national and geopolitical issues to party strategies and political profiles and mutual populist exclusion. The case of Hungarian Fidesz illustrates such complexity. Despite one of the most significant victories across the EU, Orbán’s party faced the challenge of allying with others on the European scene. Initially, Orbán strived to join Meloni’s ECR but ultimately rejected this option to avoid coalescing with the anti-Hungarian AUR in Romania. Additionally, there was a cleavage on the Russia-Ukraine War with Meloni and Jarosław Kaczyński but also smaller members of the ECR from Finland, Latvia and Lithuania, holding diametrically opposed views to Orbán’s. After weeks of negotiations, Orbán succeeded in forming a new coalition based on the former Identity and Democracy group, initially with the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Czech ANO, which was ultimately led by the French National Rally (RN). Although the new Patriots for Europe (PfE) group is the third-largest faction in the European Parliament, it could not secure any significant positions, and thus, Fidesz’s political isolation continues.
Along with the new PfE and previous ECR groups, other right-wing populist parties have found political shelter in the newly formed Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) group. These are essentially extreme right-wing parties such as Our Homeland in Hungary, Reconquête! in France, Hnutie Republika in Slovakia, the Bulgarian Vazrazhdane and Czech SPD. The German AfD leads the group following its expulsion from the former Identity and Democracy faction in the EP in the lead-up to the European elections in May 2024, which was the result of the controversial statements made by the AfD’s lead candidate Maximilian Krah about members of the Nazi SS. The ESN currently has 25 members in the EP.
With a few notable exceptions, such as Fico’s SMER in Slovakia and the German BSW, parties of the populist left are all found in the Left group in the European Parliament. The Left currently has 46 seats, which represents a slight increase on its previous share of 37 seats in the outgoing parliament. After talks of creating a new group with the German BSW, the Italian M5S has joined the European Left, which, as the country analysis has shown, is consistent with the ideological and strategic move to the left by the party in Italian politics.
Finally, somewhat reflecting the diversity in their ideological profile, centrist populist parties are scattered across different groups. The Czech ANO has joined the new populist radical-right PfE along with Orbán’s Fidesz in Hungary and Le Pen’s RN in France. Other centrist populists, such as the Dutch BBB and GERB in Bulgaria, are found in the right-wing conservative EPP, while the Bulgarian ITN has joined Meloni’s ECR. ANO’s decision to leave the liberal Renew group and join the PfE alongside Fidesz and FPÖ poses a curious example. Since the PfE has been excluded from the allocation of posts in the EP committees and subject to cordon sanitaire by the EP majority, ANO is likely to have much less leverage in the new European Parliament.
The impact of populism on EU politics
With the increased representation of right-wing populists in the European Parliament, we can expect a growing impact on the political debate and policy decisions. We have already seen such impact in areas such as migration policy, where the ECR and the ID have already left their mark with policies on outsourcing immigration control through a series of agreements with neighbouring nations, particularly in Northern Africa, and with the securitization of the migration debate, framing it as a security threat with a primary focus on border control and deportations, as opposed an effective system of burden-sharing and protection of human rights for refugees and asylum seekers.
Climate change is another area where we may see rollback and obstructionism. Although the Green Deal has been finalized, implementation may be at risk, particularly in areas such as phasing out combustion engines, restoration of nature reserves and green energy investment. Such rollback is likely to impede the ability of the EU to act as a global leader in what is pronouncedly a transnational policy issue.
EU enlargement is another topic that may take the backseat, both when it comes to the Western Balkans, as well as Ukraine. Parties such as PVV, RN, FPÖ and AfD are strongly opposing further enlargement, as are many of the right-wing populists in Central and Eastern Europe. Exceptions are PiS and AUR and their support for EU membership for Ukraine and Moldova, respectively, due to historical and ethnic factors.
Foreign policy is expected to be a point of major contention for the far right in the EP, although the expected impact may be overestimated, at least in the short term. The 19 September 2024 resolution adopted by the European Parliament on lifting the restrictions on the use of Western weapons systems delivered to Ukraine against legitimate military targets on Russian territory presents a case in point. The resolution was passed with 425 votes in favour, 131 against and 63 abstentions. The EP majority, including the EPP, S&D, and Renew Europe, voted in support, with additional support from many members of the Green/EFA and the ECR. Dissenting voices came from the PfE and the ESN, but also from ECR’s FdI, as well as French leftists and Irish, Austrian and Maltese MEPs across the political spectrum reflecting their countries’ neutral (non-NATO) status.
The impact of the populist left is likely to have a more limited impact, given its modest representation, although there may be issues where we may see the populist left and right coalesce, such as the war in Ukraine, for example, or aspects of welfare policy. The BSW is a good illustration of this merging of left and right populism on specific policy topics.
The reconfiguration of the extreme right in the European Parliament reaffirms prior tendencies and analysis (i.e., that despite the increased representation of radical-right actors, they continue to be divided and unable to act as a united front). Hence, we can expect more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than united positions and policy proposals. What should not be neglected, although, is the legitimation of the radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and domestic politics. We have clearly seen this effect in Austria, where after winning the EP elections, the FPÖ increased its support even more, winning the national legislative elections. While the current EP majority may be able to effectively exercise cordon sanitaire over both the far right and the far left, an overall shift to the right, both in terms of rhetoric and policy, is already a reality. This prolonged tendency has the potential to contribute to the future growth of the far right in the subsequent European Parliament, as well as to the continued mainstreaming of far-right policies, as the current majority is trying to push through its priorities. The inclusion of Rafaele Fitto (FdI-ECR) as the Executive Vice-President for Cohesion and Reforms in the new European Commission signals such a tendency and is but one instance of attempts to draw the ECR closer.
(*) Gilles Ivaldi is researcher in politics at CEVIPOF and professor at Sciences Po Paris. His research interests include French politics, parties and elections, and thecomparative study of populism and the radical right in Europe and the United States. Gilles Ivaldi is the author of De Le Pen à Trump: le défi populiste (Bruxelles: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 2019), The 2017 French Presidential Elections. A political Reformation?, 2018, Palgrave MacMillan, with Jocelyn Evans. He has recently co-edited The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe, European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), 2023, with Emilia Zankina. His research has appeared in journals such as Electoral Studies, the International Journal of Forecasting, Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales, French Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique or Political Research Quarterly.
(**) Emilia Zankina is an Associate Professor in Political Science and interim Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University and, since 2020, has served as the Dean of Temple University Rome. She holds a PhD in International Affairs and a Certificate in Advanced East European Studies from the University of Pittsburgh. Her research examines East European politics, populism, civil service reform, and gender in political representation. She has published in high-ranking international journals, including West European Politics, Politics and Gender, East European Politics, Problems of Post-communism, and Representation, as well as academic presses such as the ECPR Press, Indiana University Press, and others. She frequently serves as an expert adviser for Freedom House, V-Democracy, and projects for the European Commission. In the past, Zankina has served as Provost of the American University in Bulgaria, Associate Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh and Managing Editor of East European Politics and Societies.
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Table 1 illustrates the diversity of populism. Overall, there were about 90 populist parties across all EU member states on the eve of the 2024 European election, with varying ideological profiles, backgrounds and electoral sizes. Essentially, populism was found both left and right of the European political spectrum, as well as at its centre, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
