Thumbnail Dr. Othon Anastasakis

Dr. Anastasakis: Biggest Risk in the EU is Far-right Parties Deciding to Unite in the EP

by MultimediaVideos

From a historical perspective, Dr. Othon Anastasakis acknowledged that the rise of far-right parties in the European elections does not represent a significant rupture from the past. The mainstream political context still dominates European politics, which he finds reassuring. However, he sees two main risks for the future: the unification of far-right parties within the European Parliament and the potential alliance of center-right parties with far-right elements, which could normalize extremist rhetoric.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Following the European Parliament elections, Dr. Othon Anastasakis gave an interview to ECPS, discussing the risks confronting the European Union and European liberal democracies. Dr. Anastasakis, the Director of the European Studies Centre and South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) at St Antony’s College, Oxford University, stated, “What I see in Europe today is a process of securitization and the geopoliticization of the European Union. This shift is largely a response to the wars in neighboring regions, especially Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the face of these realities and a multipolar global environment, there is a turn towards a defense-oriented agenda.” He emphasized that this process of geopoliticization is shaping the EU’s future direction.

Dr. Anastasakis underscored the significant risk to the EU’s normative agenda, noting that the EU, as a democratic club, shares specific values, rules, and procedures. He expressed concern that as the EU faces increased geopolitical and security challenges, it may struggle to maintain its commitment to these normative values, particularly in external relations, trade, and foreign policy decisions. He highlighted the risk that the EU might compromise its democratic credentials to bring in countries that may not yet be ready for membership.

Another risk Dr. Anastasakis highlighted is the potential for far-right parties in Europe to unite within the European Parliament to create obstacles on issues such as migration and climate change. He also pointed out the risk that center-right parties, particularly those in the Christian Democrat bloc, might be tempted to ally with far-right parties on certain issues or adopt parts of their discourse, leading to the mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric. He noted that this has already been observed in the field of migration, where mainstream parties are often influenced by far-right narratives.

However, from a historical perspective, Dr. Anastasakis acknowledged that the rise of far-right parties in the European elections does not represent a significant rupture from the past. The mainstream political context still dominates European politics, which he finds reassuring.  Overall, Dr. Anastasakis cautioned that while the current situation does not mirror the catastrophic rise of far-right movements in the early 20th century, it poses significant challenges that require vigilant attention to safeguard the EU’s democratic values and stability.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Othon Anastasakis with some edits.

A rally on the main square of Bishkek. Photo: Omurali Toichiev.

Mapping Global Populism — Panel XIV: Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism Across Central Asia 

by Past Events

Date/Time: Thursday, June 20, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)

 

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Moderator

 Dr. David Lewis (Professor of Politics at University of Exeter).

Speakers

“Autocracy’s Past and Present in Kazakhstan,” by Dr. Dinissa Duvanova (Associate Professor at Lehigh University).

“Nationalising Authoritarianism in Uzbekistan,” by Dr. Diana T. Kudaibergen(ova) (Assistant Professor at Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge and Fellow in Sociology, Homerton College).

“Autocracy in Turkmenistan and The Role of Media in Cultivating Personality Cult,” by  Oguljamal Yazliyeva (Ph.D. Researcher in International Area Studies at the Department of Russian and East European Studies of the Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague).

“Clan Politics: Kyrgyzstan between Informal Governance and Democracy,” by Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova (Postdoctoral Researcher, Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient).

 

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Brief Biographies and Abstracts

Dr. David Lewis is a Professor of Politics at the University of Exeter. He teaches and conducts research on international relations and peace and conflict studies, with a focus on the politics of authoritarian states. His regional research primarily covers post-Soviet politics, particularly in Russia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus. From 2019 to 2022, he was on secondment as an ESRC-AHRC Fellow at the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office in London. He is also a Senior Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in London and was awarded an OBE in the New Year Honours List 2023.

Dr. Lewis completed his PhD in the Department of Government at the London School of Economics and subsequently worked in political risk analysis in the private sector. He also spent several years with the Brussels-based think tank, the International Crisis Group, focusing on research programs in Central Asia and South Asia (Sri Lanka). Before joining the University of Exeter in September 2013, he was a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford.

Autocracy’s Past and Present in Kazakhstan

Dr. Dinissa Duvanova is an Associate Professor in International Relations at Lehigh University. She received her Ph.D. from the Ohio State University. Her research focuses on the political economy, bureaucratic politics, interest group politics, and technology-enabled forms of political participation in Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Her book Building Business in Post-Communist Russia, Eastern Europe and Eurasia (Cambridge UP 2013) was awarded the Hewett Prize for outstanding publication on the political economy of Russia, Eurasia and/or Eastern Europe.

Nationalising Authoritarianism in Uzbekistan

Dr. Diana T. Kudaibergenova studies different intersections of power relations through realms of political sociology dealing with concepts of state, nationalising regimes, and ideologies. Dr. Kudaibergenova received her PhD in 2015 from the Department of Sociology at the University of Cambridge. Her first book, Rewriting the Nation in Modern Kazakh Literature (Lexington, 2017) deals with the study of nationalism, modernisation, and cultural development in modern Kazakhstan. Her second book Toward Nationalizing Regimes. Conceptualizing Power and Identity in the Post-Soviet Realm focuses on the rise of nationalising regimes in post-Soviet space after 1991 with a prime focus on power struggles among the political and cultural elites in democratic and non-democratic states (Pittsburgh University Press, 2020).

Autocracy in Turkmenistan and The Role of Media in Cultivating Personality Cult

Oguljamal Yazliyeva is a Ph.D. researcher in International Area Studies at the Department of Russian and East European Studies of the Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University. Her research interest is Central Asian Studies, focusing on Turkmenistan, Mass Media, Education Policy, Languages, and Translation. Previously, she was the director of RFE/RL’s Turkmen service, based in Prague, Czech Republic. She worked at Turkmen State University as vice dean of the Faculty of Law and International Relations, Dean of the Faculty of International Business and Management, and Chair of the Department of Foreign Languages at Turkmen State University, Turkmenistan. Yazliyeva received a Hubert Humphrey Fellowship from the US Department of State in 2002 and spent a year at Penn State University working on her research project on higher education policy in Turkmenistan. Oguljamal Yazliyeva holds a bachelor’s and a master’s degree in Linguistics and a Post-graduate degree (Candidate of Sciences) in Contrastive Linguistics from the Turkmen State University. Email: oguljamal.yazliyeva@fsv.cuni.cz

Abstract: Since its independence after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Turkmenistan has evidently demonstrated a high tendency toward autocracy. It established a national development model, recycling old Soviet systems of authoritarian control. On the other hand, its autocratic evolution runs deep. In this connection, it is essential to consider Turkmenistan’s historical conditions and look at the evolution of Turkmen’s political culture from “serdars” and “khans” (tribal leaders) up to presidents. This approach may be justified by the fact that the political culture of “one-man rule” in contemporary Turkmenistan takes its roots from the tribal traditions of the Turkmen people’s ancestors. In the process of consolidating autocracy, the media has a central position and plays a crucial role in building the personality cult of the state leaders. This paper assesses the development and preservation of authoritarian political culture in Turkmenistan through a close examination of building personality cults. The analysis suggests that authoritarian political powers control the media system totally and use it to bolster the glorification of the state leaders. Consequently, the historical legacy and behavioral patterns of Turkmen society contribute to the evolution of the authoritarian political culture created and developed in Turkmenistan.

Clan Politics: Kyrgyzstan between Informal Governance and Democracy

Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova is a research fellow at Leibniz-Zentrum-Moderner Orient (ZMO). Her research work focuses on kinship, ethnicity, patronage, conflict and gender in Kyrgyzstan. Dr. Ismailbekova completed her dissertation at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle, Germany. Based on her PhD dissertation, she wrote her monograph Blood Ties and the Native Son: Poetics of Patronage in Kyrgyzstan, which was published by Indiana University Press in 2017. She has also been a collaborator of the Basel Institute on Governance on two research projects: “Informal Governance and Corruption” funded by the British Academy Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme (2016-2018) and “Harnessing Informality” (2018-2020) funded by the Global Integrity Anti-Corruption Evidence Programme.

A general view of the hemicycle during of a plenary session on BREXIT vote of the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium on January 29, 2020. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

ECPS Panel: Where Is Europe Heading?

by EventsPast Events

Date/Time: Tuesday, June 18, 2024 / 15:00-17:00 (CET)

 

Click here to register!

 

Moderator

Irina von Wiese (ECPS Honorary President; Affiliate Professor at European Business School, the ESCP, and former MEP).

Speakers

“European Democracy’s Resilience to Populism’s Threat,” by Dr. Kurt Weyland (Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts at University of Texas).

“A Far-right Tipping Point? The Impact of the 2024 European Elections in France,” by Dr. Gilles Ivaldi (Senior Researcher in Politics at CEVIPOF and Professor at Sciences Po Paris).

“The Populist Rebellion of the Young,” by Dr. Albena Azmanova (Professor of Political and Social Science at University of Kent).

“EP Elections in Austria: Between ‘So What’ and the New Normal,” by Dr. Robert A. Huber (Professor of Methods at the University of Salzburg and Co-editor in Chief of Political Research Exchange).

“Beyond the Cordon Sanitaire: Normalization of Far-right and Racist Politics,” by Dr. Ulrike M. Vieten (Assistant Professor in Sociology at Queen’s University Belfast).

Click here to register!

 

Scope and Purpose

The recent European Parliament (EP) elections saw significant gains for Christian Democrats, the mainstream left, and liberal freethinkers. This suggests a parliament that will uphold and defend European peace and the liberal multilateral world order established after World War II, which is a positive development for democratic values and norms.

However, relying solely on EP seat distribution to understand the far-right threat is insufficient. The saying “What happens in Italy repeats in Europe” rings true. Far-right and populist radical right (PRR) parties, with steady support growth, emerged as the leading force in the EP elections in France, Italy, and Austria. They also secured the second-largest party position in Germany and the Netherlands. In France, the far-right party’s significant first-place finish could foreshadow a final victory in upcoming elections, depending on various factors. In the Netherlands, Geert Wilders’ anti-immigration party saw a sixfold increase in votes compared to the previous election.

Aligned with its mission of fostering European and global peace, ECPS is organizing a special panel discussion on June 18, 2024, from 3:00 PM to 5:00 PM CET. The discussions will move beyond merely identifying the threat; the panel aims to explore “where the solution and hope lie.” ECPS invites you to participate in this two-hour event, featuring five expert panelists and a distinguished moderator. The panel aims to engage attendees in a thoughtful and solution-oriented discussion, contributing to a more informed and proactive approach to the challenges Europe faces today.

Dr.Cornejo

Professor Cornejo: Sheinbaum’s Democratic Background Contrasts with Her Actions That Erode Mexican Democracy

by MultimediaVideos

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo says Claudia Sheinbaum’s government in Mexico is set to begin in October, and it will be a period of significant interest as both the current president and the president-elect navigate this transition. He noted that Sheinbaum has a democratic trajectory, having worked as a scholar and scientist before joining López Obrador’s movement and stated that “Given her background, one might expect her government not to pose a threat to democracy. However, recent signs indicate she supports measures that could further erode Mexican democracy. We will need to wait until her government starts to see if these policies are implemented.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

General elections were held in Mexico on June 2, 2024, marking a significant moment in the nation’s political landscape. Voters elected a new president to serve a six-year term, alongside all 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies and all 128 members of the Senate. The election saw Claudia Sheinbaum, a member of the left-wing National Regeneration Movement (Morena), secure the presidency. This result underscores a continuity in the political direction established by the outgoing president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO).

In an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell and Associate Director of the UMass-Lowell Center for Public Opinion, discussed Sheinbaum’s political trajectory and the implications of her victory. Professor Cornejo highlighted that Sheinbaum actively supported López Obrador’s transformation agenda throughout her campaign, aligning herself closely with his policies. This raised questions about whether she would carve out her own positions once in office or continue on the path set by her predecessor.

Professor Cornejo pointed out that Sheinbaum recently reiterated her support for controversial reforms, such as electing judges by popular vote, which suggests a continuation of policies that may weaken checks and balances. This stance has raised concerns about potential democratic erosion under her administration.

Sheinbaum’s government is set to begin in October, and it will be a period of significant interest as both the current president and the president-elect navigate this transition. Professor Cornejo noted that Sheinbaum has a democratic trajectory, having worked as a scholar and scientist before joining López Obrador’s movement and stated that “Given her background, one might expect her government not to pose a threat to democracy. However, recent signs indicate she supports measures that could further erode Mexican democracy. We will need to wait until her government starts to see if these policies are implemented.”

As we delve into this interview, Professor Cornejo sheds light on the historical development of populist movements in Mexico, the impact of populist rhetoric on voter behavior, and the potential long-term implications for Mexican society and governance. Join us as we explore these critical issues and gain a deeper understanding of the current political dynamics in Mexico.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo with some edits.

Dr. Othon Anastasakis is the Director of the European Studies Centre and South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) at St Antony’s College, Oxford University.

Dr. Anastasakis: Biggest Risk in the EU is Far-right Parties Deciding to Unite in the EP

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

From a historical perspective, Dr. Othon Anastasakis acknowledged that the rise of far-right parties in the European elections does not represent a significant rupture from the past. The mainstream political context still dominates European politics, which he finds reassuring. However, he sees two main risks for the future: the unification of far-right parties within the European Parliament and the potential alliance of center-right parties with far-right elements, which could normalize extremist rhetoric.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Following the European Parliament elections, Dr. Othon Anastasakis gave an interview to ECPS, discussing the risks confronting the European Union and European liberal democracies. Dr. Anastasakis, the Director of the European Studies Centre and South East European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) at St Antony’s College, Oxford University, stated, “What I see in Europe today is a process of securitization and the geopoliticization of the European Union. This shift is largely a response to the wars in neighboring regions, especially Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the face of these realities and a multipolar global environment, there is a turn towards a defense-oriented agenda.” He emphasized that this process of geopoliticization is shaping the EU’s future direction.

Dr. Anastasakis underscored the significant risk to the EU’s normative agenda, noting that the EU, as a democratic club, shares specific values, rules, and procedures. He expressed concern that as the EU faces increased geopolitical and security challenges, it may struggle to maintain its commitment to these normative values, particularly in external relations, trade, and foreign policy decisions. He highlighted the risk that the EU might compromise its democratic credentials to bring in countries that may not yet be ready for membership.

Another risk Dr. Anastasakis highlighted is the potential for far-right parties in Europe to unite within the European Parliament to create obstacles on issues such as migration and climate change. He also pointed out the risk that center-right parties, particularly those in the Christian Democrat bloc, might be tempted to ally with far-right parties on certain issues or adopt parts of their discourse, leading to the mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric. He noted that this has already been observed in the field of migration, where mainstream parties are often influenced by far-right narratives.

However, from a historical perspective, Dr. Anastasakis acknowledged that the rise of far-right parties in the European elections does not represent a significant rupture from the past. The mainstream political context still dominates European politics, which he finds reassuring.  Overall, Dr. Anastasakis cautioned that while the current situation does not mirror the catastrophic rise of far-right movements in the early 20th century, it poses significant challenges that require vigilant attention to safeguard the EU’s democratic values and stability.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Othon Anastasakis with some edits.

Populism and the Far-Right Are Broad Umbrella Concepts

How do you see the historical evolution of populism and far-right movements in Europe influencing current political landscapes, particularly in the context of the recent European Parliament elections?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: Populism and the far right are two broad umbrella concepts that encompass a wide variety of parties and formations. Due to their broad nature, they are understood in different ways and include many different far-right parties and movements. This makes it very challenging to group them together or understand them as a single entity.

Far-right parties themselves are not united as a whole. Their intrinsic nationalism means they have very specific goals related to their own nation-states. When observed collectively, especially in contemporary Western and European politics, they can be highly disruptive and reactionary to mainstream democratic politics, which has been the norm in Europe for the past eight decades or so.

Far-right politics are also evolving, often softening their positions when they are close to power. As long as nationalism and the nation-state remain central in international politics, far-right parties will continue to advocate their extreme nationalistic, racist and populist discourse. They are particularly influential during times of low economic growth and increasing economic inequality, as they find audiences receptive to their messages.

Finally, when democratic leadership is weak or lacks determination, it creates an environment where far-right parties can infiltrate, penetrate and promote their ideas.

What happened in the European Parliament elections regarding populism and the far-right? Is this a watershed moment in European history?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: I wouldn’t call it a watershed moment. Yes, there was an expectation and a lot of publicity about the rise of far-right politics during these European elections. However, the outcomes showed no massive change overall. While there was some rise of far-right parties in various national European settings, the Christian Democrats managed to increase their position in the Parliament, the Liberals lost somewhat, and the Social Democrats remained more or less the same. Mainstream parties maintained their numbers and power within the European Parliament.

That said, what we did see was significant: the rise of the far right in two particularly influential countries in Europe. In France, the far right gained ground, impacting national politics and leading to immediate elections under Macron. Similarly, in Germany, the AfD’s rise weakened the Social Democratic Party. These developments in France and Germany, which are often pivotal in shaping European politics, are more indicative of the rise of the far right than the overall European Parliament spectrum.

One Lesson from History Is the Danger of Appeasement

Poster of Vladimir Putin looking like Hitler in a demonstration against the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in Valencia, Spain on February 27, 2022. Photo: Shutterstock.

Considering the rise of far-right parties across Europe as proved once again by EP elections, can we draw parallels with similar movements in the early 20th century? What historical lessons should we keep in mind to understand and address these modern developments?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: First, let me say that history never repeats itself in exactly the same way, which is important to keep in mind. We never encounter identical circumstances that produce the same outcomes repeatedly. However, understanding what happened in the past helps us comprehend why the present has unfolded as it has.

Given that history doesn’t repeat itself precisely, we can still draw valuable lessons from it. One common question we face today is whether we are seeing a repeat of the 1930s with the rise of the far right, and to what extent. The 1930s were unique in European history due to the circumstances that led to the rise of many fascist parties, especially the Nazi party in Germany.

One lesson from history is the danger of appeasement during moments of aggressive behavior. The 1938 appeasement of Hitler serves as a lesson not to follow a similar path with someone like Putin, who has invaded Ukraine. Negotiating with aggressive behavior can lead to further territorial ambitions.

Another lesson is that persistent economic inequality, especially during times of economic crisis, can bolster the strength of far-right parties. This was evident in the 1930s following the 1929 economic crisis. These historical insights remind us to address economic disparities and avoid appeasement to prevent similar political outcomes today.

In your 2001 article “Post-communist extremism in Eastern Europe: The nature of the phenomenon,” you discussed the emergence of far-right parties in Eastern Europe, particularly in Poland and Hungary, years before the governments of Kaczynski and Victor Orbán. Do you think the dynamics that led to the rise of far-right parties have changed in Eastern Europe? What patterns can you identify?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: First, let me say that while far-right politics is a wider European phenomenon, it is not exclusively a Central European issue. In my reading of the European continent, three main factors may create divergences between Western Europe and Eastern Europe.

First, there is the Communist legacy. This long and totalitarian history has created circumstances that can sometimes lend themselves to a lingering appeal of authoritarianism. The Communist legacy remains a significant point of reference in these regions.

Second, we must consider the legacy of empires versus those who were colonized. When discussing post-Empire Europe, we often assume all countries were colonizers, which is not the case. Western European countries like Britain, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands had overseas empires. In contrast, many Eastern European countries, from Poland down to Greece, were part of empires. This division affects the development of politics, particularly nationalistic politics.

Third, connected to the second point, is the division between civic and ethnic nationalism. The understanding of national development and the way citizens are embedded within this context vary significantly. In Western Europe, there is often a more civic understanding of nationalism, whereas, in Eastern Europe, there is a longer historical experience of ethnic nationalism. This influences how far-right nationalism behaves and forms its ideology in these regions.

How has the narrative and strategy of far-right parties evolved from the post-communist era in Eastern Europe to the present day? Are there historical factors that continue to play a significant role in their resurgence?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: Even in Eastern Europe, where we can roughly divide nationalism into civic versus ethnic types, history plays a very important role in the development of far-right parties and politics in general. The national experiences of these countries significantly impact how their politics evolve.

For example, Hungary, part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, became a nation-state after World War I, leaving many ethnic Hungarians outside its borders. This created a unique brand of Hungarian nationalism. In contrast, Poland, which also faces issues with the rule of law similar to Hungary, has a different historical background. Poland, often caught between Russia and Germany, has experienced its territory being divided and annexed by these powers. This historical context results in a far-right experience that can be either anti-German or very much anti-Russian.

Thus, the historical experiences of these countries influence how far-right parties develop and form their own versions of nationalism.

Meloni Is Not Mussolini, the AfD Is Not Comparable to Hitler’s Germany

Giorgia Meloni, Italy’s prime minister, speaks at the Atreju convention in Rome, Italy on December 16, 2023. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.

In the same article, you discuss four theses about the rise of far-right extremism, one of which is the revival of the fascist era. With the rise of Giorgia Meloni in Italy and her party, Brothers of Italy, and the rise of the AfD in Germany, do you see a revival of the fascist era?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: Not in the way that it happened in the 1930s. As I mentioned earlier, history doesn’t repeat itself exactly. There are lessons to be learned, but the context is always different. In the 1930s, the aftermath of World War I played a significant role. The experience of being winners or losers, especially in Germany’s case, where it was a clear loser, defined how the country developed during the turbulent interwar period. This era saw the testing and eventual failure of liberal politics, leading to the authoritarian regimes of the 1930s.

Today, the background is very different. We have the European Union, which provides a unique context of political and economic integration among its member countries. Any attempt by far-right parties or anti-European, protectionist forces to gain power would first have to involve dismantling the EU, which is not an easy task.

In this sense, we are in a different historical moment. Meloni is not Mussolini, and the AfD is not comparable to Hitler’s Germany. However, these parties do contain elements that make them susceptible to fascist ideas, language, and rhetoric.

One important and common issue that enables these parties to develop their discourses is migration. Unlike in the 1930s, today’s migration context has been developing for a few decades, but under conditions of crisis, it becomes a significant scapegoat. Migration is an issue that many far-right parties across Europe use to their advantage.

In your article “Europeanization of the Balkans,” you underline how the EU membership process has transformed Balkan countries in terms of consolidating democracy and the rule of law. When you consider the surge of far-right populism in Western Europe, can we talk about the Balkanization of Europe?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: Overall, I don’t use the term “Balkanization” because I think it’s a stereotypical and simplistic way of understanding a region. It doesn’t accurately reflect the true complexity of the area. My thesis back then was that the conditionality imposed by the European Union, particularly in the political context, was crucial. This conditionality made the countries accept and adopt certain norms required for EU membership. In this sense, Europeanization—a much broader concept—was able to take root in those countries.

What I see in Europe today is not Balkanization, but a process of securitization and the geopoliticization of the European Union. This shift is largely a response to the wars in neighboring regions, especially Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. In the face of these realities and a multipolar global environment, there is a turn towards a defense-oriented agenda. This shift could change the nature and spirit of the EU, moving it beyond its historical focus on economic integration and soft power.

One significant risk I see is the potential impact on the EU’s normative agenda. The EU is a democratic club, a group of countries that share specific values, rules and procedures. As the EU faces increased geopolitical and security challenges, it may struggle to maintain its commitment to these normative values. This concern is particularly relevant in its external relations, trade and foreign policy decisions. Even with the enlargement agenda, there is a risk that the EU may compromise some of its democratic credentials to bring in countries that may not yet be ready for membership.

So, while I do not fear Balkanization, I do see a process of geopoliticization that is shaping the future direction of the European Union.

In your doctoral thesis “Authoritarianism in 20th Century Greece,” you examine the authoritarian ideology and educational policy of two dictatorial regimes in 20th century Greece: the Metaxas dictatorship of 1936-1941 (the 4th of August regime) and the military junta of 1967-1974 (the 21st of April regime). What interactions do you observe between these two periods and the rise of Golden Dawn in the 2010s and the Greek Solution party now?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: Dictatorships, particularly in the Greek context, belong to the past and do not present themselves as viable alternatives for political power and governance after the transition from dictatorship to democracy in 1974. The periods of the 1930s and 1960s were different as the military was a significant force in Greek politics. During political or party crises, the military often positioned itself as an alternative, intervening in politics multiple times. For instance, Metaxas, a military man, managed to influence politics in the interwar years, and the colonels in 1967 abruptly halted the democratic process.

The rise of far-right parties like Golden Dawn in Greece is not reminiscent of those military interventions. Golden Dawn, which gained prominence during the severe economic crisis in Greece, is also a criminal organization and most of its members are now imprisoned, rendering it unable to operate as a political party. Other nationalistic and far-right parties, such as the Greek Solution, exist but are often not sustainable. Over the past three decades, we have seen how some far-right parties have managed to raise their percentages. For instance, the Orthodox Popular Rally led by Georgios Karatzaferis in the 1990s and early 2000s, and the Independent Greeks, who cooperated with Syriza during the mid-2010s crisis. These far-right parties experienced a rise but eventually descended, demonstrating a pattern of emergence and decline.

These parties tend to be disruptive, reactionary and extremely nationalistic. They often gain support during times of political crisis or when mainstream parties struggle to address issues. This pattern of rise and fall is evident in the Greek Solution and two other extreme nationalist parties that secured seats in recent elections. The fact that these three far-right parties collectively garnered around 18-19% of the vote is concerning, indicating a particular situation in the Greek political context.

Populism and Populist Leaders Will Continue to Exist

In your research on authoritarian regimes in Greece, what historical patterns do you see re-emerging in contemporary European politics? What impact do you think, as an historian, the resurgence of far-right populism will have on the future of European integration and the EU’s democratic values? Are we witnessing a cyclical pattern of populist surges similar to previous historical periods?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: Populism and populist leaders will continue to exist, whether they are on the far-right, far-left or somewhere in between. Populism, as a broad umbrella term, encompasses various parties and movements, making it an enduring feature of the political landscape. A specific example of this is Brexit, which was a significant populist moment in Europe. Brexit challenged the European edifice as the UK, driven by populist sentiments, decided to leave the EU. This move was representative of both Euroscepticism and Europhobia.

Brexit demonstrates both the potential and the drawbacks of populism. On one hand, it successfully led a country out of the EU, showcasing populism’s power. On the other hand, it highlighted the immense challenges and turbulence associated with such a move. This experience serves as a lesson to other Eurosceptic parties that exiting the EU is not a straightforward endeavor.

Today’s far-right parties, which are often very Eurosceptic and reactionary, face a dual challenge. They must navigate their national political landscapes, creating an environment of opposition to their own elites while also dealing with the supranational context of Europe. They are limited in how reactionary they can be because pushing too hard against the EU could lead to their countries leaving the union, something that most populations do not desire. This tension makes it difficult for far-right parties to fully adopt their reactionary, nationalistic and racist rhetoric.

From a historical perspective, how concerned are you about the rise of far-right parties in the European elections? Many pundits argue that the center-right and center-left have held strong, and there is not much to worry about. Do you agree with these pundits?

Dr. Othon Anastasakis: I agree that this is not a significant rupture from the past. We haven’t seen a massive surge that could radically change the landscape. The mainstream context still dominates European politics, which is reassuring. However, I see two risks for the future.

The first risk is whether far-right parties in Europe will decide to unite within the European Parliament to create obstacles on issues such as migration or climate change. While it’s challenging for them to achieve unity, it is not entirely out of the question.

The second risk involves the extent to which center-right parties, particularly those in the Christian Democrat bloc, might be tempted to ally with far-right parties on certain issues or adopt parts of their discourse. This could lead to the mainstreaming of far-right rhetoric. We have already seen this in the field of migration, where mainstream parties are often influenced by far-right narratives.

A notable example is the European People’s Party (EPP), which for many years included Hungary’s Fidesz party. Although they eventually decided to expel Viktor Orbán’s party, they tolerated his presence for some time to maintain their numbers and votes. This indicates a potential risk where center-right parties might seek alliances with far-right parties to further their own interests.

Illustration by Ulker Design.

Techno-Populism: The Youth Electorate in Europe and the Interplay Between Social Media and Populism

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

As proven by a 2021 European Parliament Youth survey, which supported that people rely primarily on the web, whether this is social media or online news outlets to be informed for political and societal developments. This ultimately explains why politicians gradually turn to social media – it broadens their electoral base as they attempt to connect to younger voters but has the negative consequence of popularizing populism. 

By Konstantina Kastoriadou

Social media has become integral to our lives, profoundly influencing our political landscape. While its pervasive presence is undeniable, there is often little analysis of how it shapes electoral campaigns, which are increasingly prevalent across Europe. Political advertisements and activities are widely disseminated on social media platforms, subtly and overtly shaping public opinion. This article delves into the complex interplay between contemporary politics and social media, drawing inspiration from Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti’s (2021) work, Techno-populism — The New Logic of Democratic Politics. It explores how this dynamic interaction (sub)consciously affects our political preferences and contributes to rising populist parties and figures globally. 

Almost 400 million people all over Europe were eligible to vote in the 2024 European Elections. Several parties across Europe have tried their best to engage longtime supporters and attract new ones, securing their votes either way, under the light of the pressuring events that have surrounded Europe for the last two years.  However, the most complex war is fought during the pre-electoral period on social media platforms, where parties, party leaders and candidates try to engage the most difficult-to-convince audience – the youth. For years, the younger generations proved challenging to engage with as it was widely believed that they abstained from politics, yet some researchers claim this was never the case. More specifically, they support the idea that the youth has always been politically engaged. Still, this engagement is taking many forms, with one notable case being social media (Del Monte, 2023: 3). According to Flew and Iosifidis (2020), the internet allows social, political or cultural movements to form alliances and communities internationally (For example, BLM, and the equal rights movement), as people now exchange opinions and experiences with other people from across the globe which helps shape opinions about situations and problems that appear in different parts of the world. 

Social media users, as of 2024, were estimated to be roughly around 5.17 billion globally, with the most active users being the youngest generation (Shewale, 2024). The significant number of users and the popularity of some social media platforms decisively reshaped political communication. As proven by a 2021 European Parliament Youth survey, which supported that people rely primarily on the web, whether this is social media or online news outlets to be informed for political and societal developments (Del Monte, 2023: 3). This ultimately explains why politicians gradually turn to social media – it broadens their electoral base as they attempt to connect to younger voters but has the negative consequence of popularizing populism. This turn of events in the political reality is of enormous interest as it shows a dismissal of the traditional political divide of the left/right axis, which now, according to Bickerton & Accetti (2021), was transformed into a dipole between populism and technocracy which are better understood as “modes of political action” rather than solid ideological systems. 

Techno-populism is “the new logic of political action based on the combination of populist and technocratic traits,” somehow like the definition of techno-populism by Lorenzo Castellani, who defines the latter as a “political regime” characterized by “an interaction between global capitalism, technocratic institutions and new polarizing populist political movements” (Bickerton & Accetti, 2021: 18). Techno-populism is also a relatively new phenomenon, as there has been a steadily growing appeal to the concept of the “people” during recent years, that did not exist during the 20th century. Political parties, especially after World War II, had their target group (For example, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, etc.) and therefore did not appeal to the masses in general. Compared to contemporary politics, more and more politicians claim to represent the people, as in mainstream political parties, there wasn’t a notion of the “people” as we know it, but society consisted of different groups and classes that each party represented (Bickerton & Accetti, 2021: 7).

Many scholars argue that populism is a mainstream phenomenon. Roitman et al. (2023) argue that: “The rise of populist discourses in many countries in the last decades may have been due to changes in political communication.” This argument is strongly supported by data that show the rise of political and party participation on social media platforms. As argued by Bickerton and Accetti (2021: 21), this shift in political communication is an attempt for parties to become more attractive towards the youth, helping themselves to secure more votes, as the sole goal of political competition in all electoral democracies is the rise to power (Accetti & Bickerton, 2021: 21).

A strong case of this trend is presented in the work of Cervi et al., (2021: 269 – 270), who examined the interplay between TikTok and political communication. As a primary example, the Spanish populist parties, Vox and Podemos, seem to have claimed the most significant gains out of the other mainstream established parties, as most of their supporters come from the youngest generation. Podemos is the most followed (191.400 followers) and the most active party on social media, having gathered more than 3.1m likes. The youngest generation represents the bulk of the supporters gathered on the platform.

In Podemos’ case, social media is tightly interwoven into the very existence of the party, as they broadly use it as a means in its political strategy – mobilizing its audience both online and offline (Cervi et al., 2021: 271). Similarly to Podemos is the case of the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy. The M5S, undoubtedly classified as a populist party, claims to have an unmediated relationship with the people, especially by utilizing the internet. By accessing the internet and mobilizing the citizens by creating cyberspaces in which they interact with their electoral base, the M5S claims that it can offer more efficient government by utilizing the “collective intelligence” it gathers through the web. M5S use the internet to access ordinary citizens’ competence, making the web a means to provide a better quality of public policy. This is described by Accetti and Bickerton (2021) as: “techno-populism from below” (Bickerton & Accetti, 2021: 4). 

Another case that proves the rising power of social media in politics is the example of Ireland, where the current Prime Minister (Irish term: Taoiseach) of the Fine Gael party, Simon Harris, is characterized as the first TikTok Prime Minister of the country, and coincidently also the youngest leader of the nation, rising to the chair of the party thanks to his TikTok popularity (Pogatchnik, 2024). Such cases can be observed in every established democracy in the Western world – not exclusively by populist leaders but also by the traditionally established parties’ leaders, who try to expand their electoral base to the young electorate. 

Social Media and the New Reality of Politics

As mentioned above, politics have been transformed since the mid-20th century, and society catalyzes this change. Bickerton & Accetti (2021: 35) argue that society is far more complex than in the 20th century when society seemed more homogenized. This complexity makes societal formations more fragile and fluid than they used to be, therefore making the electoral appeal of contestants for office harder than before. Perhaps due to this fragmentation and fragility, it is more effective for political contestants to appeal to emotion and, therefore, adopt post-truth tactics than to rely on the old ways of political communication to secure people’s support. According to data, 97% of world leaders use Twitter, being the first and leading social media platform for political communication (Munoz, Ripolles, 2020).

The importance of social media is also reflected in the enormous sums of money parties have spent advertising on social media during this European Electoral Campaign. Based on Google and Facebook data, such examples are Fidesz with €60.000 spent on one single ad; the separatist Flemish party Vlaams Beelang spent around €50 – 60.000 as well; and Macron’s party seems to have spent approximately €50.000 (Shickler, 2024). However, the most shocking numbers come from Greece, where the governing right-wing party New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία) has spent €192.000 on Google ads alone, while the total amount of spending of the country is €321.800 for 5.753 digital ads (Μπογιόπουλος, 2024a). New Democracy’s spending on Facebook accounts for €31.430, while €17.276 of this was spent on the advertisement of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (Μπογιόπουλος, 2024b). Such amounts show that the presence on social media is now necessary, as parties won’t survive in the new political reality without them since society now prefers to be more active than passive news consumers (Putmans, 2017: 2). 

Post-Truth, Propaganda and Skepticism

Although one use of social media platforms is for advertisement, for most, social media serves primarily as a source of information and the exchange of opinions, which shapes everyday life. Yet, social media has a “dark side” as they are closely linked to the spread of fake news and post-truth politics (Flew & Iosifidis, 2020). Misinformation and post-truth political rhetoric are commonalities and apply firmly to pre-electoral campaigns. The BBC found plenty of misleading content on social media platforms during the pre-electoral campaign in the UK. The content is AI generated (Spring, 2024) and could be passed as accurate, especially by people who are not so familiar with the newly introduced technologies.

Post-truth politics is widely associated with populist parties and personas. According to ECPS’ (n.d.) dictionary of populism, post-truth is: “a political culture in which debate is framed largely by appeals to emotion disconnected from the details of policy, and by the repeated assertion of talking points to which factual rebuttals are ignored.” Taş (2021: 169) further supports that post-truth politics are in fact: “a reliance on assertions that ‘feel true’ but have no basis in fact” – therefore minimizing the importance of facts in the process of shaping the public opinion. As social media lacks supervision or strict political guidelines, which is more likely to happen to television, radio or press, communication among peers is loose and emotionally charged, as they mostly share their opinions and experiences. This makes social media the most appropriate medium for “disseminating” meta-truth, affecting politics and everyday life.

In the Western sphere, the truth can be explained – proved scientifically, so the truth is perceived as objective. However, since the 20th century, the perception of truth has changed again taking Nietzsche, or the post-structuralists like Foucault as an example – who highlighted the relevance of truth, making it a subjectivity and therefore contradicting the previous perception of truth as objectivity. Finally, the digital era reshaped the perception of truth, as misinformation and fake news became a common incident in our era (Youvan, 2024: 4). Post-truth, therefore, comes directly in contrast with the primary perception of “the truth” being objective, as it is based on the 20th-century revision on the objectivity of the truth highlighting the subjective nature of it. This, combined with the rise of social media, made people in advanced democracies more skeptical towards democracy and governments and even questioned the integrity of the press industry, which overall is boosted by a generalized discontentment created by the declining quality of life. 

For many political and social analysts, social media is a reason of high significance that democracies are in decline. According to research conducted in 19 countries by the Pew Research Center in 2022, social media seems to be perceived overall as a good thing for democracy, with the exception being the US, where the survey concluded that social media are perceived as a bad thing for democracy with 64%. This trend seemed popular among Republicans and Republican-leaning supporters, as they proved to be the social group more likely to be critical and negative towards social media (Wike et al., 2022). 

Additionally, 84% of the questioned people across the 19 countries believe that social media and the internet made people more accessible to manipulate with false information and/or news. 70% of them support that fake news is the second biggest threat globally, just after climate change. Another interesting finding is that across the 19 countries that participated in the Survey, people agree that social media had a positive impact on people in terms of information about worldwide and domestic events, which is believed to make people good citizens of the world – and work in favor of acceptance of different races and religions. Yet, they find that they contribute negatively to how people talk about politics, finding that 46% of individuals believe social media makes people less civil in the way they talk about politics. Maybe this is related to the fact that 65% support the idea that social media has made people divided on their political opinions (Wike et al., 2022). 

In this framework of division, confusion and growing disappointment are where the populists flourish the most. If we were to hypothesize that fear is constantly generated within our societies, through our everyday lives, then a feeling of powerlessness may occur. According to Müller (2022), fear is a medium for populist leaders, who invoke fear to provoke a revolt against the “corrupt establishment.” However, he finds that fear must not exceed a certain point, for populist leaders do not want their societies to live in fear. If this happens, populist personas will betray their promise of “being better democrats.” Wike et al. (2022) found that social media can affect people’s psychological stance, making them feel less powerless as they grow more informed about international and domestic situations. Maybe here, the fact that social media are a place where people can form alliances and exchange their views and experiences is the most critical factor contributing to a growing feeling of empowerment. 

This empowerment may stem from consumption and people’s identification with populistic agendas promoted on social media, leveraging the dissatisfaction of the masses. As populism is traditionally based on the emotional stance of society, post-truth political rhetoric is the most efficient medium to secure support and broaden their electoral base. This trend has been evident since the 2016 US Presidential election when people seemed to believe and identify more with fake news than facts. As Dan (2023) supports, populism is a force that can change the collective memory and shape peoples’ opinions and ideas, which in this case is the primarily exclusionary right-wing populism stands for identity. It promotes the protection of the mass identity, which is being attacked by various factors such as economic, class, or alternative ethnicity. Hayes defines identity politics as: “a phrase that has come to signify a wide range of political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups. Rather than organizing solely around belief systems, programmatic manifestos, or party affiliation, identity political formations typically aim to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context” (Heyes, 2020).

Even from the definition, it shows that identity politics is a phenomenon of a strong psychological and emotional background that is the backbone of its very existence (Dan, 2023). Maybe that’s an essential factor that makes people in the Western sphere more critical of social media and democracy. It’s found that nativists are the most skeptical among citizens. Usually, they are dissatisfied with electoral outcomes, regardless of being on the winning or losing end of the electoral process (Kokkonen & Linde, 2022).

Conclusion

Political reality has been drastically transformed over the past years, and populism can be considered both the result and the cause of the new political reality, which depends on the latest technologies for the political actors to secure support from their peers. To this progress and change of political reality, Bickerton & Accetti’s book is a perfect and realistic approach to the new way of political action, as techno-populism seems to be a phenomenon that explains precisely the current state of politics, with people growing dissatisfied with democracy due to the existing economic struggles and with populism, that will not cease. 

This transformation could be the outcome of the “win” of capitalism at the end of the Cold War Era, which established capitalism as the dominant, unchallenged system and gradually made the distinction between left and right irrelevant and outdated. It’s not a coincidence that populist figures have continuously risen and taken over globally since the 2000s. However, the most critical factor lies in this societal transformation of recent years that made society more fragmented and fragile than before, making the electoral appeal of contestants for office harder than it was during the 20th century. 

To the latter, social media are an essential factor, as they shape the opinions and dissatisfaction of the masses because they provide them with the opportunity to have almost complete access to everything. This free flow of information can also justify the rising skepticism of people towards their governments, as nowadays, it is more feasible to identify aberrant and reprehensible actions, such as institutional corruption. Also, with the free flow of experiences and opinions, people grow even more critical of their political, social or economic situation, as they can easily compare their reality with the reality of citizens from different parts of the world and are more susceptible to populistic agendas. Most importantly, on many occasions, social media presents the truth compared to television. In many instances, there is proof that television is under governmental or special interests’ control, contributing to the growth of skepticism inside liberal democracies. 

Politically speaking, this may be a strong reason why social media seem to have such overwhelming approval overall, as people see it as a positive asset for democracy, with the only exception being the US, where mostly the conservatives were more prone to rejecting social media as a beneficial factor for democracy. While people generally agree that social media made them more accepting towards different cultures and races, there is an explicit acknowledgement that social media generates a lot of negative emotions and affects people’s way of expressing political opinions, as there is a consensus that social media makes people politically divided. This could be attributed to the success of populism, which penetrated society, and the accessibility to information provided by the internet. This is the combination that Bickerton & Accetti discussed. In contemporary politics, the fight over political power doesn’t revolve around the traditional divide between right and left, but how the already established political parties with either the left or right use both populism and technocracy to their benefit. 

It’s sensible that people feel vulnerable to fake news, as the populist mode of communication seems to be the predominant one, with post-truth politics spreading steadily over the internet. Their anger and frustration can be amplified or soothed, and due to the structure of social media platforms, they can be controlled and guided in a specific direction. This controlled environment makes a “safer” framework for the contestants to power to survive and adapt. Youth engagement seemed to be the ulterior motive for political personas to turn to the web for promotion. Still, this move is undoubtedly populistic, as it builds rapport with the base, creating the illusion of closeness to the people. However, the youth is committed and politically active, and with all the necessary equipment, they seem ready to claim the change for a better tomorrow. 

 

References

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Μπογιόπουλος, Γ. (2024a, June 3). Νέα Δημοκρατία: Ο καλύτερος πελάτης της Google στην πολιτική διαφήμιση, παρά το εξωφρενικό χρέος της. Documento. https://www.documentonews.gr/article/nea-dimokratia-o-kalyteros-pelatis-tis-google-stin-politiki-diafimisi-para-to-exofreniko-xreos-tis/ (accessed on June 15, 2024). 

Μπογιόπουλος, Γ. (2024b, June 4). Προσωπική διαφήμιση 401.000 ευρώ ο Μητσοτάκης στο Facebook και… μόνο 377.000 η Νέα Δημοκρατία. Documento. https://www.documentonews.gr/article/prosopiki-diafimisi-401-000-eyro-o-mitsotakis-sto-facebook-kai-mono-377-000-i-nea-dimokratia/ (accessed on June 15, 2024). 

Bickerton, J. C., & Accetti, I. C. (2021). Technopopulism – The new logic of democratic politics (1st ed.). Oxford University Press. 

Cervi, L.; Tejedor, S. & Marín Lladó, C. (2021): “TikTok and the new language of political communication: The case of Podemos. “Cultura, Lenguaje y Representación, XXVI. 267-287. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.6035/clr.5817

Dan, P. (2023, May 18-20). “The Consequences of Populism: Truth Decay and the Fact Free Society.” [Conference Paper]. ASN Convention. Columbia University, New York. Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/370934507_Truth_decay (accessed on June 15, 2024).

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EP

EP Elections and the Connection Between Populism and Identity Politics in the EU

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

The 2024 EU parliament election polls show the populist right and far-right as the main winners. The tendency of voters to choose populist parties could push the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far-right. This could be an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the other and creates further social conflicts. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation now.

By Katharina Diebold

The mostly expected European Parliamentary elections results and the next presidency of the Council of the EU, Hungary, will likely be contentious issues for the European Community (Henley, 2024). The 2024 EU elections and the Hungarian presidency polls have indicated a rise of right-wing and anti-Europe populist parties. These tendencies fuel the transformation of the EU towards the right and conservativism (Wax & Goryashko, 2024). 

The 2024 EU parliament elections has showed the populist right and far right as the main winners. The fact that voters tend to choose populist parties could increase the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far right as an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the “other” and creates further social conflicts (Henley, 2024; Suiter, 2016; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Therefore, we must ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation and what predictions can be made for the post-2024 elections.

In this essay, it will be argued that recently adopted EU legislation—the Green New Deal (including the Nature Restoration Regulation and Deforestation Regulation) and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum—is influenced by populist rhetoric and identity politics, which ultimately harms the EU. In connection with this, populist candidates driven by identity politics will be shown to threaten the future of the EU. 

Theoretical Framework 

Populism is a thin ideology comprising three key elements: the people, the general will and the elite, (Zulianello & Larsen, 2021; Mudde, 2004). Additionally, it incorporates the dimension of the “dangerous others,” often represented by migrants, positioned in contrast to the people (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015).

Previous research suggests that populism, taken as a framework for populist communication and rhetoric (Aalberg et al., 2017), is also used by mainstream parties to improve their relationship with voters on social media (Lin et al., 2023). Key themes identified are people-centrism, anti-elitism, restoring popular sovereignty and exclusion (Aalberg et al., 2017; Engesser et al., 2017). Additionally, specific negative and emotional populist communication styles on social media correlate with a positive increase in relationships between mainstream parties and their voters (Lin et al., 2023, p. 608). This analysis will use populism as a guide for identifying potential populist rhetoric. 

Even though populism in Western Europe is often associated with the right, the left has increasingly adopted populist strategies, specifically in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which was covered in the media as “the rise of leftist populism” (Gross, 2022). The negligence of academic research about the populist left could be responsible for the recent findings. This seems even more relevant when we consider the electoral performance of populist left parties compared to populist right parties for the elections of the European Parliament in 2019, such as Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and Sinn Féin in Ireland (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2021; Statista, 2024). For example, the Greek Syriza Party (founded in 2004) and the Irish Sinn Féin Party (founded in 1905) were only recognized as left-wing populist parties in 2014 (O’Malley & Fitzgibbon, 2014;Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Nevertheless, Syriza’s populism has been questionable throughout its government term and recent opposition in 2021 (Markou, 2021). Recently, the focus on populism in Western countries shifted again towards right-wing populist parties (Bartel, 2023; Morison, 2023). 

Identity is a set of labels describing persons distinguished by attributes (Noury & Roland, 2020). Identity politics is the belief that identity is a fundamental focus of political work, which can be connected to lifestyle and culture (Bernstein, 2005). Politicizing immigrants as the “other” is an example of that. In Europe, identity politics is referred to as the protection of the “silent majority” from harmful consequences of immigration, which is used by right-wing populists (Noury & Roland, 2020). 

The effect of rising populism within the EU on the right- and left-wing can be recognized by looking at EU-party campaigns or populist candidates for the recent EP elections. Similar to the right-wing, the left-wing populists also employ identity politics. Leftist-populism can be seen promoting marginalized identities, such as racial and ethnic identities and seeking to transform the shame previously associated with these identities into a point of pride (Salmela & Von Scheve, 2018). Accordingly, these protests generate “others,” including people who abide by a different value system and also the privileged “elite” who overlook intersectional identities as a threat. While promoting human rights, advocacy for intersectional identities can also fall into the trap of populism among leftist groups and other advocates (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). However, intersectionality may not be the only advocacy that can turn into a populist movement in the name of advocacy. Climate and human rights activists can also be politicized and positioned as polarized identities (Mackay et al., 2021). 

Inherent Populism in EU Legislation

Environmental politics presents a point of contention for both the right- and left-wing parties. Both sides instrumentalize newly adopted legislation to increase the public appeal of voters (European Commission, 2023). This can be exemplified in the recent regulations. The newest adopted legislation, the European Green New Deal, including its Deforestation Regulation and its Regulation on Nature Restoration, and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, have elements of this otherization and marginalization of identities. 

A closer examination of de jure analysis and how these laws, as portrayed in political language, unearths the need for more interest in realizing the general goals of protecting nature. It looks like nature is wiped of its identity within the hands of humans who instrumentalize nature as a theme broadly advocated by large swaths of society. Therefore, identity politics exploiting nature must be identified and widely discussed to protect nature and the shared values of humanity, not to sacrifice basic human dignity for politics. 

The European Green New Deal

The European Green New Deal, including the Deforestation Regulation, entered into force on June 29, 2023, and the provisional agreement for the Regulation on Nature Restoration was accepted on November 9, 2023. These legislations gaining the left’s support have also been instrumentalized to boost the attention and sympathy of left-wing parties.

The populist rhetoric surrounding the Nature Restoration Regulation can be approached as a case exemplifying populist politics appealing to the left (The EU #NatureRestoration Law, 2023). The left uses advocacy of this legislation, especially the Greens/EFA, in the elections for greenwashing purposes and voter accumulation. However, this law focused more on economic benefits than actual environmental protection and lost its progressiveness throughout the legislative procedure. Therefore, it is based on the misconception that this regulation substantially improves nature restoration and indigenous rights protection (Pinto, 2023). Moreover, the conservative European People’s Party (EPP) claims this law increases the financial burden for the forestry, fishery, and farming sectors (Weise & Guillot, 2023). However, these realities are dismissed in the political language of environmental advocacy. 

We can assess that the Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) campaign for 2024 EP elections utilised populist rhetoric by defining the people as the “citizens, farmers, fishers and business in the EU;” The elite as “the conservatives, far right and some liberals” who “try to tear down a new EU law to restore nature;” and The general will of the people could be characterized as focussing on tackling biodiversity and the climate crisis (Greens/EFA, 2023b). The campaign by the Greens/EFA for this regulation played into identity politics as the party used a language claiming to advocate for the protection of marginalized Indigenous and local communities. While this claim remains to be only a discourse, regardless, it boosts the popularity of the Greens. Examined closely, the ostensibly evergreen legislation advocating biodiversity protection promotes local cartels and exploitative companies that benefit and take advantage of the EU partnerships (Euronews, 2023). The hypocrisy and the tact in the use of language can be seen in the advocacy language of the party, which left these cartels out intentionally.

Deforestation Regulation 

The Greens/EFA campaign for the Deforestation Regulation shows characteristics of populist rhetoric (European Commission, 2023). The Greens/EFA emphasize the importance of “the people,” for example, by the quote “The rights of people and nature must always come before profit,” which could be interpreted as people-centrism (Greens/EFA, 2023c). 

Another example of anti-elitism could be identified by emphasizing the misinformation and fake news campaign against the nature restoration law in a video by the Greens/EFA (Greens/EFA, 2023d). The misinformation campaign was conducted before the 2024 EP elections in multiple EU countries, including Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland by political parties, Member of the European Parliament (MEP)-candidates and farming groups such as the Dutch National Farmers Party (BoerBurgerBeweging-BBB), the Dutch far-right fringe party (Forum voor Democratie) and the polish Earth farmer’s support foundation (Greens/EFA, 2023d; Carlile, 2023). 

The MEP negotiator for the nature restoration law, Jutta Paulus, mentions the agriculture lobby as a factor that made the legislation less progressive and ambitious and prevented meaningful, sustainable EU laws, such as laws regarding agricultural goods (Paulus, 2023a). Paulus mentions in another video about the nature restoration law that, specifically, the conservatives and the far-right are responsible for preventing and decreasing the effectiveness of the new legislation (Paulus, 2023b). Those examples do not mention misinformation campaigns by politicians, farming groups, the agriculture lobby, or the far-right elite. However, it can be argued that this language and framing emphasizing the element of conspiring groups could be interpreted as populist rhetoric.

This connects to other findings that suggest that left parties connect political anti-elitism to economic anti-elitism and the argument that hardworking, ordinary citizens are betrayed by the political-economic power elite (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015). Additionally, the new regulation on deforestation will only prevent EU customers from buying products derived from deforestation. However, deforestation and sales of deforested products to other customers worldwide can continue (Greenpeace, 2021). The regulation also lost its progressive and ambitious character throughout the legislation procedure (Fairtrade.net, 2022).

New Pact on Migration and Asylum 

The left and the right used identity politics as a tool to increase sympathy for the EP elections through the usage of marginalized identities such as “migrants” and “asylum seekers” (Greens/EFA, n.d.). The recent pact on migration can be shown as an example of populist identity politics transcending the right and left binary, uniting the voters around the so-called threat posed by the influx of migrants and asylum seekers. 

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum reinforces the topic of illegal migration and thus supported the right-wing campaigning for the European Elections 2024. The political language on this regulation is laden with populist elements. Firstly, the right-wing European Peoples Party defines “the people” as “European citizens” or “our citizens” who deserve security, safety and protection in times of migration (EPP Group, 2023; EPP, 2016). Secondly, von der Leyen specifically points out in her New Pact on Migration statement that smugglers and traffickers control illegal migration (Press Statement von der Leyen, 2023). This can be understood as a symptom of a “corrupt elite” in government that allows smugglers and traffickers to run unhampered (Rusev, 2013). Thirdly, a comment by the leader of the EPP, Manfred Weber, could give insight into how his party wants to respond to the “general will” of the people (including the voters for the EP elections). He said the EPP would be “crystal clear about its desire to reduce immigration in the campaign for European elections” (O’Carroll, 2024). The populist language forebears the identity politics around migration, appealing to both the right and the left. The New Pact and statements by the EU Commission play into identity politics through the terminology of the “bad migrants,” positioning them as “dangerous others.” Unfortunately, the New Pact has been under debate in the EU since 2020 and was used as a promotional tool for the EP elections to attract voters on both the left and right (Georgian, 2024). 

The New Pact has also been used by the Greens/EFA populist campaign for the European Elections 2024, reinforced the idea of a unified peace union. In this instance, we can deduce that “the people” could be defined as “us and the migrants and asylum seekers, that we do not leave behind;” “the general will” could be characterized as ” upholding human rights and international law” (Greens/EFA, 2023a). 

The Greens/EFA shadow rapporteur for the new asylum and migration management regulation (which is part of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum), Damien Carême, emphasized in a post on his social media that EU interior ministers and the European Commission adopted vocabulary regarding migration that pleases the far right only to gain popularity and votes for the EU elections (Carême, 2024). In his view, this rhetoric compromises the truth and neglects migrants (Carême, 2024). Another post criticizes the former director of the European Border and Coast Guard agency (FRONTEX), Fabrice Leggeri, for spreading fake news and lies about the new pact on migration (Carême, 2024b). Those examples do not specifically mention politicians or the far-right as elites. However, it can be argued that this language and framing emphasize an element of conspiring groups spreading fake news to increase distrust. This could be interpreted as constituting populist rhetoric, which characterizes an “elite.”

Additionally, another shadow rapporteur of the Greens/EFA responsible for the crisis and force majeure regulation (also part of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum), Damian Boeselager, emphasizes yet more rhetoric element connected with populism – the element of populist sovereignty. In one of his posts, he claims that the EU asylum system can only be tackled on the EU level if the EU regains its sovereignty (Boeselager, 2024). Moreover, he claims that if “we” want to win sovereignty back, we must do this at the EU level (Boeselager, 2024). Concerning the New Pact on migration, specifically migration agreements with Tunis, Libya and Egypt are increasingly scrutinized in the media and by the Greens/EFA (Greens/EFA, 2023e; Carême, 2024c).

Another interesting element is that research suggests that an “emotional” populist communication style positively increases the relationship between mainstream parties and their voters. By looking at postings by the Greens/EFA and their MEPs, it can be argued that dramatic music, pictures of migrants in boats at sea, in refugee and asylum camps and centers used by Carême, as well as the main Greens/EFA page could be identified as emotional communication style. Additionally, the new Migration Pact favors the reinforcement of border controls, returns and re-admissions over legal migration opportunities. Those stay symbolic, vague, and distant policy goals. Recent reviews of policy documents show that the EU prioritizes regulating irregular migration, and despite its rhetoric for “strengthening legal migration,” concrete action is missing (Sunderland, 2023). 

Identity Politics and Candidates 

Introducing inexperienced candidates tailored to resonate with particular social groups was a common strategy employed by both left and right populist parties to garner support. This practice is another instance of identity politics shaping the European political landscape. Following in the footsteps of their forerunners, like Marie Le Pen or Hugo Chávez from the past, these charismatic political figures engage in populist rhetoric, addressing a diverse range of social and legal issues in their political discourse—from environmental protection to EU identity and migration (Serra, 2017).

Examples for the European Parliament elections 2024 included Nicola Gehringer, promoted by the German right-wing party CSU (Christian Social Union), on place nine. Gehringer is a successful executive assistant of a big corporation, “Neoloan AG,” with the potential to attract successful business owners. Another figure is the farmer and agriculture expert Stefan Köhler, who run for the CSU on place six to attract farmers (Zeit Online, 2023). Farmers have become increasingly crucial in the European discourse, with the recent increase in farmer protests in Germany, France, and the Netherlands (Trompiz & Levaux, 2024). 

Legal and security experts also run with public appeal to the voters across political divides. Carola Rackete, the German candidate for “Die Linke,” a leftist Party, is a human rights activist fighting for better refugee rights and asylum laws, run for the second position (MDR.DE., 2023). The human rights activist as a candidate were expected to increase the number of radical voters from the left. The German Green Party was heading with a policeman on place eighteen in the EP elections, tried to include more right-leaning social groups in the Green voter repertoire since police officers tended to vote for conservative and right-wing parties (Papanicolaou & Papageorgiou, 2016).

In Austria, the first candidate for the Greens party was Lena Schilling, a climate activist of “Fridays-for-future.” Schilling had a high chance of attracting young voters as she was the only young female top candidate among all running top party candidates in Austria (Völker, 2024). The second place was Thomas Waitz, a sustainable and organic farmer who aimed to attract sustainable farmers in Austria (Waitz, 2023; Schweighofer, 2024).

The references to the people vs. lying or misinformation-spreading groups blurred the lines between right and left ideologies and connected these figures around a shared sentiment: fighting for the people against a designated other. 

Conclusion 

The increasing populist rhetoric of left and right parties in the EU and the fanatism of those who want to increase their share of voters for the EU elections are responsible for the outcomes of recent EU legislation. The populist rhetoric before and after the adoption of new EU legislation shows how parties instrumentalize the outcomes of EU legislation procedure instead of trying to find real compromises and long-term, future-oriented solutions for the problems of unregulated migration and the climate crises. 

Regulated migration is still almost not touched upon in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which has been part of discussions in the EU since 2020. The Green New Deal, especially with the Nature Restoration and Deforestation Regulations, was a proper start to increase sustainability, environmental protection, and indigenous rights. However, both proposals lost their progressiveness and lacked ambition and actual help for developing countries outside of the profit-making fetishism of the EU. If the upward trend of populist communication persists on both the left and right, EU politics and legislation may increasingly adopt populist and voter-driven approaches, potentially jeopardizing the democratic and compromise-oriented decision-making process within the EU. This heightened polarization between parties could further contribute to a bashing climate and hinder cooperative efforts.

Remarkably, identity politics has not only permeated the populist rhetoric of EU party politics but also extended to the selection of candidates for the EP elections. If identity politics continues to embed itself deeply within the strategic political framework of EU parties, the shift towards prioritizing short-term voter turnout and popularity contests over substantive and long-term democratic considerations seems inevitable. This trend risks undermining EU values by leveraging EU legislation for immediate political gains rather than establishing enduring goals for the European Community. It is imperative to educate voters about this form of political manipulation that compromises EU values for short-term advantages. No political gain should supersede long-term EU objectives, as such a scenario would entail the erosion of EU values and identity.

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Peter Magyar, a popular opposition politician of celebrity status meeting the press at the site of a soccer arena and miniature train station in Viktor Orban's village in Felcsut, Hungary. on May 24, 2024. Photo: Blue Corner Studio.

Shifting Political Landscapes: The Rise and Fall of Opposition Parties Amidst Fidesz’s Dominance in Hungary

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeMONITOR

The EP election results in Hungary indicate interesting dynamics. The governing Fidesz party achieved a somewhat pyrrhic victory. Although it won 44.82% of the votes, making it the winner, this result is the worst the party has ever achieved in its EP election history. The big winner of the EP election is Magyar’s Tisza party, which received 29.6% of the votes and may send seven representatives to the EP. Given that the party practically did not exist in the minds of voters a few months prior, becoming the largest opposition party was a significant success. A big question now is, in which faction of the EP will the Hungarian parties find their political home?

By Robert Csehi* 

For the first time in history, the European Parliamentary elections in Hungary were held simultaneously with local municipal elections. This dual campaign posed a unique challenge for political actors, as they had to address both local and European issues in their messages. However, in this summary, I will focus solely on the results of the European Parliamentary election.

The governing party, Fidesz, in coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), launched its European Parliament campaign in late April and Prime Minister Viktor Orbán encapsulated the party’s core message with the slogan: ‘no migration, no gender, no war.’ This slogan was supposed to reflect an antagonistic relationship between the position of Fidesz and that of ‘Brussels.’ Orbán claimed to stop illegal migration into Hungary despite the EU’s alleged liberal policies and called for resistance against ‘gender ideology’ in the name of safeguarding Hungarian children against the alleged LGBTQ+ propaganda. While these two elements featured in the social media messages of the governing party in the beginning, the third message, ‘no war,’ gained ever-increasing attention in Orbán’s campaign and ultimately eclipsed the other two. 

Orbán, relying on a populist discourse, crafted an artificial cleavage between the ‘pro-peace’ (Fidesz) and ‘pro-war’ (practically everybody else) political actors. He and his party used this differentiation not only domestically but also extended it to the European political scene, claiming that most European leaders were suffering from ‘war psychosis.’ He appealed to the most basic fears of the population, constantly portraying the European Parliamentary elections as a decisive battle between war and peace, life and death. The party messages often featured European politicians, from Emmanuel Macron and Manfred Weber to Ursula von der Leyen, as war propagators, along with their alleged domestic alliances with relevant opposition figures like former prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, MEPs Klára Dobrev, Anna Donáth, and Katalin Cseh, and new political actor Péter Magyar. Interestingly, the social media campaign of the governing party never mentioned Russia as responsible for the war in Ukraine but rather blamed European actors and NATO for escalating the conflict by supporting Ukraine with money and weapons. Throughout the campaign, it was unclear what Orbán and his party meant by ‘peace’ and how they intended to achieve it once their candidates appeared in the European Parliament.

The greatest challenger to Fidesz and Orbán proved to be a completely new political actor, Péter Magyar, and his party, Tisza (Respect and Freedom). Magyar, a former bureaucrat and the ex-husband of Orbán’s former Justice Minister, Judit Varga, gained attention following a political scandal. This scandal arose after the former Hungarian President Katalin Novák and Varga granted clemency to a convicted paedophile accomplice, with Varga supposed to lead Fidesz’s EP list.

Magyar’s EU program remained somewhat vague during the election campaign. However, it was known that he wanted Hungary to join the European Public Prosecutor’s Office, aimed to gain access to the suspended EU funds for Hungary, and supported a strong Europe of strong nations rather than a European federation. He consistently blamed the government for making Hungary the second most corrupt and second-poorest country in the EU despite the substantial funds received from the union since 2004. As a newcomer, the Tisza party did not invest much in online campaigns but relied on Magyar’s countrywide tour and his social media platform.

The leftist-environmentalist coalition (DK-MSZP-P) led by Klára Dobrev campaigned with a federalist view of Europe, claiming to be the most Europeanist party in Hungary, and focused on European wages, pensions, and welfare. The liberal Momentum built its EP campaign around the two MEPs, Anna Donáth and Katalin Cseh, highlighting their contributions. They claimed to have played a role in the suspension of EU funds to Hungary to limit corruption but also stressed that, thanks to them, Hungarian SMEs, CSOs, and municipalities can now apply for more EU funds directly, bypassing the corrupt channels of the Hungarian government. They also contributed to the Media Freedom Act, which combats political interference in editorial decisions. 

Finally, the radical right party, Our Homeland, campaigned with negative messages about the EU. László Toroczkai blamed the EU for its undemocratic nature, globalist agenda, and corrupt dealings.

The EP election results indicate interesting dynamics. Fidesz has achieved a somewhat pyrrhic victory. Although it won 44.82% of the votes, making them the winners, this result is the worst the party has ever achieved in its EP election history. Pro-government commentators are quick to highlight that the party received over two million votes, more than it ever received before, thanks to the higher-than-average turnout due to the double election. However, this does not change the fact that the governing party-coalition has lost two mandates in the EP and will send 11 representatives this time.

It is also noteworthy that Orbán promised to achieve a mobilization record and pushed the campaign to the extreme by appealing to the electorate’s greatest fears, equating the election with a choice between life or death, war and peace. Additionally, the governing party spent an enormous amount of money on the campaign, both online and offline, compared to its main challenger, Magyar’s Tisza party. Overall, support for Fidesz has decreased, and it is not yet clear how Orbán will manage the situation with looming economic and acute political challenges. Nevertheless, one cannot underestimate the strength of Fidesz.

The big winner of the EP election is Magyar’s Tisza party, which received 29.6% of the votes and may send seven representatives to the EP. Given that the party practically did not exist in the minds of voters a few months prior, becoming the largest opposition party was a great success. Although about 10% of Tisza supporters came from Fidesz, according to surveys, the party had a more devastating impact on the existing opposition parties. 

The leftist-environmentalist coalition (DK-MSZP-P) managed to secure only two seats, compared to their previous five (DK: 4, MSZP-P: 1). In the 2019 EP election, DK received 16.05% of the votes, whereas now the coalition managed only 8.03%. While the leftist coalition survived Tisza’s challenge, the liberal Momentum did not. The party received only 3.7% of the votes, losing its two mandates in the EP. 

Another winner of the election was the radical Our Homeland party (Jobbik), which secured one seat in the EP with a vote share of 6.71%. However, this should not be overestimated, given that Jobbik, the previously far-right party, also had one representative in the EP during its last term. While eleven parties competed for mandates, in the end, only four parties (or party coalitions) will represent the Hungarian people in the EP.

A big question is, in which faction of the EP will these parties find their political home? It is clear that the leftist-environmentalist coalition will continue within the S&D faction. Magyar recently met with Manfred Weber, the leader of the European People’s Party (EPP), and both seemed pleased with the prospect of joining political forces. As a result, KDNP, Fidesz’s coalition partner which remained in the EPP after Fidesz left the center-right bloc in 2021, announced they will also leave the EPP. The governing parties appear to strive to join the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group led by Italy’s Georgia Meloni, despite potential friction over certain policies. For instance, Meloni, Kaczynski, and smaller Finnish, Latvian, and Lithuanian members within the ECR have diametrically opposed views on the Ukraine war and voted overwhelmingly for financial assistance to Ukraine. The Identity and Democracy (ID) faction, with Le Pen and Salvini, voted against this measure, but other policies seem to keep Orbán away from this faction.

The far-right Our Homeland party planned to create a new faction with Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), whose leader visited Hungarian counterpart László Torockai before the election. However, AfD officials have already signaled their aim to return to the ID faction. If Torockai decides to join this faction as well, it is questionable whether Fidesz MEPs would then join. This situation illustrates how far Fidesz has drifted from its center-right position on European matters. Consequently, it is unlikely that Fidesz will tone down its Eurosceptic populist voice in the coming years.

(*) Dr. Robert Csehi is an Assistant Professor at Corvinus University of Budapest.

European Union flags against European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium.

The Populist Radical Right in the New European Parliament

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeMONITOR

The 2024 European Parliament elections have justified fears of the rise of the populist radical right (PRR) and a potential shift towards more right-wing policies over the next five years. While pro-European parties will still maintain a majority in the new parliament, the populist radical right has registered significant gains, however with varied performances across countries and regions.

By Emilia Zankina & Gilles Ivaldi

The 2024 European Parliament elections have justified fears of the rise of the populist radical right (PRR) and a potential shift to more right-wing policies over the next five years. While pro-European parties will still maintain a majority in the new parliament, the populist radical right has registered significant gains, however with varied performances across countries and regions.

A Good Day for the Populist Radical Right

Overall, populist radical right forces have won nearly 180 seats, making up 25% of all seats in the new European parliament. The largest contingents come mainly from France’s Rassemblement National (National Rally, RN), Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy), the Polish Law and Justice (PiS), the German AfD and Hungary’s Fidesz. These five parties alone account for more than half of all far-right elected representatives.

Notwithstanding such magnifying effects, these results reflect the electoral consolidation and increasingly the mainstreaming of those parties across Europe. The current popularity of the populist radical right is rooted in the multiple crises to which EU citizens have been exposed since 2008 – the financial crisis, the 2015 refugee crisis, the Covid-19 pandemic and now the war in Ukraine and cost of living.

Ironically, some of the largest gains have come from the EU founding countries. Most striking is the win of National Rally (RN) in France with over double the votes of President Macron’s coalition. As a result, Marcon called snap parliamentary elections in an attempt to reaffirm a pro-European majority – a risky strategy that is already bringing political chaos that analysts compare to madcap reality TV– strikingly resembling David Cameron’s political gamble on Brexit 10 years ago.

In Germany, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) has come in second ahead of Chancellor Scholz’s social democrats. The Christian Democrats have registered a decisive victory, but at a cost of shifting their rhetoric to the right, especially on topics such as migration. 

As expected, Brothers of Italy registered a resounding victory, cementing prime-minister Giorgia Meloni’s position at home and making her a key player at the European level, a few days before hosting the G7 summit. While she has upheld a firm pro-European position on security and foreign policy matters, she has been critical of EU’s policies on climate, migration, and social issues.

Following the formation of a new coalition government, Geert Wilders Party for Freedom (PVV) in the Netherlands also placed second, just 4% behind the leading Green and Labor party. The Freedom Party of Austria (FPO) was the winner in the elections with a slight advantage over the Christian Democrats. Austria and the Netherlands have for long been a fertile ground for the populist radical right who have enjoyed not only representation in parliament, but also in government.

In Hungary, Viktor Orbán gained the most votes in a system that is ever less democratic, though, his Fidesz party showed the worst ever results in a European parliament election. Orban’s dominance was challenged by a former party member who ran on an anti-corruption platform. Péter Magyar’s Tisza party scored almost 30%, giving hope for democracy in Hungary. More to the right, Fidesz was also challenged by the rise of Our Homeland Movement (MHM) about 7% of the vote.

In Poland, the fragile government majority managed to maintain its upper hand over the Law and Justice party (PiS) which has systematically eroded democratic institutions over the past decade. Such good news notwithstanding, PiS will be sending a solid 20 MEPs to the European parliament, making it the second largest member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) after Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia (24 seats).

In addition to these big wins, we witnessed a surge in the representation of smaller populist radical right parties across Europe. The Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) came second (although far behind the leading pro-European grand coalition), as did the Latvian National Alliance and the Cypriot National Popular Front. The Slovak Republica and the Croat Homeland Movement came third, as did the Spanish VOX and the Portuguese Chega. In Bulgaria the Revival party surpassed the social democrats – the oldest party in the country, and the Swedish Democrats (SD) gained an additional seat. 

Together these parties could shift the European Parliament further to the right. The saving grace for the pro-European majority is that they are not united and split across three groups in the European parliament – the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) led by Meloni and the Polish PiS, the Identity and Democracy (ID) around Le Pen and Wilders, and the non-attached. Orbán, whose party was expelled from the European People’s Party (EPP), has urged Le Pen (ID) and Meloni (ECR) to join forces with his non-attached Fidesz party and form what would be the second largest group in the European parliament. The dynamics and negotiations in the coming weeks among these populist radical right actors will determine their overall leverage and likely impact on policy matters.

A Real Threat or Politics as Usual

The clear winner of the elections is the European People’s Party (EPP), which gained 12 seats for a total of 190. The Socialists and Democrats (S&D) secured 136 seats, only a few seats below their representation in the previous parliament. The big losers of the election are the liberals with Renew Europe losing 22 seats and the Greens who lost 20 seats. Still this gives the pro-European parties a majority of over 400 seats in the new 720-seat parliament.

Despite such majority, the populist radical right is likely to have greater influence over key policy matters. Although divided over security questions, economics, and the war in Ukraine, populist radical right parties are much more united in their positions on climate change, migration, and enlargement. While Ursula von der Leyen speaking on behalf of the EPP vowed to create “a bastion against the extremes,” it remains to be seen whether the EPP will seek support from the radical right on certain policy matters and whether we might notice an overall shift to the right in the European Parliament’s agenda.

Dr. Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell and Associate Director of the UMass-Lowell Center for Public Opinion.

Professor Cornejo: Sheinbaum’s Democratic Background Contrasts with Her Actions That Erode Mexican Democracy

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsMONITOR

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo says Claudia Sheinbaum’s government in Mexico is set to begin in October, and it will be a period of significant interest as both the current president and the president-elect navigate this transition. He noted that Sheinbaum has a democratic trajectory, having worked as a scholar and scientist before joining López Obrador’s movement and stated that “Given her background, one might expect her government not to pose a threat to democracy. However, recent signs indicate she supports measures that could further erode Mexican democracy. We will need to wait until her government starts to see if these policies are implemented.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

General elections were held in Mexico on June 2, 2024, marking a significant moment in the nation’s political landscape. Voters elected a new president to serve a six-year term, alongside all 500 members of the Chamber of Deputies and all 128 members of the Senate. The election saw Claudia Sheinbaum, a member of the left-wing National Regeneration Movement (Morena), secure the presidency. This result underscores a continuity in the political direction established by the outgoing president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO).

In an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell and Associate Director of the UMass-Lowell Center for Public Opinion, discussed Sheinbaum’s political trajectory and the implications of her victory. Professor Cornejo highlighted that Sheinbaum actively supported López Obrador’s transformation agenda throughout her campaign, aligning herself closely with his policies. This raised questions about whether she would carve out her own positions once in office or continue on the path set by her predecessor.

Professor Cornejo pointed out that Sheinbaum recently reiterated her support for controversial reforms, such as electing judges by popular vote, which suggests a continuation of policies that may weaken checks and balances. This stance has raised concerns about potential democratic erosion under her administration.

Sheinbaum’s government is set to begin in October, and it will be a period of significant interest as both the current president and the president-elect navigate this transition. Professor Cornejo noted that Sheinbaum has a democratic trajectory, having worked as a scholar and scientist before joining López Obrador’s movement and stated that “Given her background, one might expect her government not to pose a threat to democracy. However, recent signs indicate she supports measures that could further erode Mexican democracy. We will need to wait until her government starts to see if these policies are implemented.”

As we delve into this interview, Professor Cornejo sheds light on the historical development of populist movements in Mexico, the impact of populist rhetoric on voter behavior, and the potential long-term implications for Mexican society and governance. Join us as we explore these critical issues and gain a deeper understanding of the current political dynamics in Mexico.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo with some edits.

Populism in Mexico Is Essentially Embodied by AMLO

Thank you very much, Professor Cornejo, for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. Can you provide an overview of the historical development of populist movements in Mexico? How have these movements evolved over the past few decades? Especially, how do left-wing and right-wing populism manifest differently in Mexico, and what are the unique characteristics and strategies of each within the Mexican political context?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: It’s an interesting moment in Mexican politics because there was a presidential election just a few days ago. Populism in Mexico is essentially embodied by Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), the current president. He first ran for the presidency in 2006, then in 2012, and finally won in 2018. Throughout his campaigns, he has consistently divided Mexican society in a populist manner, framing the former mainstream political parties as a corrupt elite and his movement, The National Regeneration Movement (Morena), as the representative of the “good” people.

Mexico experienced a non-democratic hegemonic regime from the 1930s until 2000, eventually transitioning to democracy in 2000. López Obrador was always critical of this transition, not because he opposed democracy, but because he believed it wasn’t a true democracy—it was a neoliberal democracy that served only a few people and political parties. He was especially critical of the neoliberal reforms approved between 2012 and 2015 and the massive corruption scandals during the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) government of that period. These events significantly boosted his political career, allowing him to tap into the public’s anger and ultimately win the presidency in 2018 with more than 50% of the vote, a historic achievement in Mexico.

In 2024, López Obrador couldn’t campaign for re-election as it is constitutionally banned in Mexico. However, his loyal ally, Claudia Sheinbaum, the former mayor of Mexico City, won the presidential election with almost 60% of the vote. She campaigned on continuing the policies and direction set by López Obrador over the past six years.

Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexican President and Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico City Governor, in an event in judiciary city in Mexico on September 4, 2019. Photo: Octavio Hoyos.

What has been the impact of populist rhetoric and strategies on recent Mexican elections? How have populist leaders and their discourses influenced voter behavior? What are the long-term implications of these policies and discourses on Mexican society and governance?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: I think populism, especially in the last decade and most notably in the past six years, has played a significant role in Mexican politics. It has influenced day-to-day politics and voter behavior. In some of my studies, I found that affective polarization, particularly negative partisanship against the PRI, is a main driver of voting behavior. People are making decisions at election time not necessarily based on the future but on their independent judgment, particularly against the PRI, which is perceived as a highly corrupt government. Even though the PRI has not governed in the past six years, they are still being punished for their previous performance.

López Obrador has been very strategic about this. He holds daily press conferences, sometimes for up to two hours every morning, where he frequently criticizes the PRI government of six, twelve, or even eighteen years ago. He rarely discusses the current policies of his own government, focusing instead on the past. This strategy has been very useful for him, allowing him to divert attention from current issues such as public insecurity, drug cartel-related violence, and his government’s poor handling of the pandemic. Mexico had one of the worst excess death rates during the pandemic, but López Obrador kept talking about the past rather than addressing current problems.

People are not evaluating his actual performance; instead, they are looking at the past and his rhetoric. This populist rhetoric has been very important for his government.

Affective Polarization and Negative Partisanship Are Significant Factors Driving Voter Behavior

In your article titled “The AMLO Voter: Affective Polarization and the Rise of the Left in Mexico,” you suggest that affective polarization played a crucial role in López Obrador’s victory in the 2018 presidential election. Can you elaborate on how the use of populist rhetoric contributed to this affective polarization in Mexican politics and influenced voter behavior in recent elections and contributed to the electoral success of Claudia Sheinbaum?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: Yeah, it’s interesting. Normally, you would expect a lot of retrospective voting, especially given the huge corruption scandals, the struggling economy before 2018, and the ongoing public insecurity in Mexico. You’d think these issues would dominate voters’ decisions. But when I analyzed the data, I found that while people do consider retrospective assessments, the influence of party identification and, more importantly, affective polarization, is much stronger.

When you control for these factors, you see that traditional variables influencing voting behavior are less significant. People assess the economy, corruption, and public insecurity through the lens of their party loyalties and biases. My research shows that negative partisanship against the established political parties, particularly the PRI, was a main driver of López Obrador’s victory in 2018. Another significant factor was the perception that the National Action Party (PAN) and PRI were essentially the same, especially after they approved several neoliberal legislative reforms before his victory. This convergence in their policies helped López Obrador by making them seem indistinguishable to voters.

These elements—economic struggles, political scandals, and the perceived similarity between the PAN and PRI—were very advantageous for López Obrador in 2018. Although I don’t have data for the most recent election, it’s likely that affective polarization and negative partisanship against the PAN and PRI continue to be significant factors driving voter behavior, potentially contributing to Claudia Sheinbaum’s success as well.

Your article titled “Who Believes in Fraud in the 2006 Mexican Presidential Election? Election Denialism, Partisan Motivated Reasoning, and Affective Polarization,” emphasizes the role of affective polarization in sustaining the belief in electoral fraud during the 2006 Mexican presidential election. Could you elaborate on how affective polarization interacts with partisan identification to reinforce these misperceptions over time and in recent elections?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: It’s an interesting moment in Mexican politics, particularly since the 2006 presidential election when López Obrador first ran for the presidency. Despite a lack of substantial evidence, he claimed he lost due to electoral fraud. This allegation became a political myth that fueled his movement. At that time, he was part of the PRD, Mexico’s traditional leftist party. Eventually, he founded his own party, Morena.

López Obrador’s narrative has been particularly effective during these years, framing the PAN and PRI as not only neoliberal and corrupt but also responsible for creating widespread poverty in Mexico. He has also perpetuated the myth that the presidency was stolen from him in 2006, which has been a powerful tool for mobilizing support.

In his second presidential campaign in 2012, his claims of fraud were less successful since he lost by a wider margin (more than 5% of the vote) compared to the less than 1% margin in 2006. However, this narrative continued to shape his populist rhetoric, activating grievances among the electorate not just about the economy and corruption but also about the perceived injustice of the stolen presidency.

This strategy of targeting and activating grievances has been central to his success, particularly in the 2018 presidential election and in the most recent elections. By constructing an in-group against the PAN and PRI, López Obrador has effectively used populist rhetoric to galvanize support for himself and his party, Morena.

People Fail to Hold Their Own Party Leaders Accountable

Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador during an Indigenous ceremony as part of ceremony of the takeover as the new President of Mexico on December 1, 2018 in Mexico City. Photo: Carlos Tischler.

Your 2023 study finds that emotions, particularly anger, significantly influence how voters perceive corruption involving their co-partisan candidates. How can political campaigns either mitigate or exploit these emotional responses to influence voter behavior, and what are the broader implications for political accountability in Mexico?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: It’s interesting because anger is a main driver of political behavior. When people feel aggravated by issues like corruption, which was rampant during the years before López Obrador, they become angry. López Obrador capitalized on this anger, blaming mainstream political parties for the country’s structural problems, particularly corruption. This strategy led people to react against these scandals and support López Obrador as a way to punish corruption.

However, my research shows a problem with accountability. While people may be angry and willing to punish opposition parties for corruption, they are less likely to do the same when it comes to corruption within López Obrador’s Morena party. In experiments where I manipulated the source of a corruption scandal, participants were less likely to punish the scandal if it involved their own party’s politicians. This has been evident over the last six years in Mexico. Despite numerous corruption scandals within his government, including those involving his own family, López Obrador’s approval ratings have remained remarkably stable around 60%, which is very high for a Latin American democracy.

This stability persists despite ongoing violence, economic struggles, and a poor pandemic response. The issue is that in a world of affective polarization combined with populist rhetoric, people are likely to overlook the flaws within their own party. They use partisan bias as a shield, becoming immune to scandals, and fail to hold their co-partisan leaders accountable.

Your article titled “How Do Campaigns Matter? Independents, Political Information, and the Enlightening Role of Campaigns in Mexico,” discusses how campaigns help voters align with candidates that match their underlying political predispositions. How do populist candidates in Mexico leverage campaign strategies to appeal to independents and low-information voters, and what role does populist rhetoric play in shaping these voters’ political alignments?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: It’s interesting because in Mexico, over the last 20 years, around 50% to 60% of people have shown strong party identification, which is quite high for Latin America. Typically, about a third to 40% of the electorate is independent, varying by election. This independent group is what politicians aim to target. For instance, in 2006 and 2012, when López Obrador lost the presidential elections, he did not win the independent vote. During those campaigns, the PAN and PRI successfully portrayed him as a threat to Mexican democracy and the economy, suggesting that if he won, both would collapse.

However, by 2018, due to the poor performance and numerous scandals of the mainstream parties, López Obrador was able to win the independent vote for the first time. Independents are generally more responsive to current political events than partisans, who view everything through their partisan biases. When independents see corruption scandals or poor economic performance, they react accordingly, which was beneficial for López Obrador in 2018.

The 2024 campaign has been one of the most stable in recent history regarding polling. Claudia Sheinbaum started with about 50% support, while the opposition candidate from PAN and PRI, Bertha Xóchitl Gálvez Ruiz, had around 30%. This remained largely unchanged over the three months of the campaign, reflecting the highly polarized and partisan nature of Mexican politics today. With a high level of party identification, people’s political orientations and voting intentions did not shift much during the campaign.

López Obrador’s influence remains strong, with Morena winning the independent vote once again. However, these so-called independents are less independent than in previous campaigns, likely due to the successful positioning of Morena under López Obrador’s leadership in Mexican politics.

The study suggests that political campaigns serve an enlightening role, particularly for independents. How does this enlightenment process impact the support for populist candidates who often rely on broad, anti-establishment messages? Do these campaigns reinforce or weaken the appeal of populist rhetoric as election day approaches?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: Exactly. This last presidential campaign differed from previous ones because this time, Morena was the party in government, with Claudia Sheinbaum and López Obrador having completed six years of leadership. They couldn’t solely rely on stirring anger against the PAN and PRI, although they did so successfully. Instead, they also focused on promoting their achievements.

A significant part of Sheinbaum’s rhetoric was about the better economy under their administration. They emphasized that they represented the people, a theme that was very common in their political communication. They highlighted the creation of social programs, increases in the minimum wage, and other economic improvements as contrasts to the previous neoliberal policies of the PAN and PRI.

However, they also had to downplay the criticisms regarding democratic erosion. The opposition parties, particularly the PAN and PRI, accused them of trying to capture the Supreme Court, eroding democracy, and undermining electoral authorities. Despite these criticisms, Sheinbaum’s campaign focused on the positive changes over the last six years and continued to activate anger against the mainstream political parties.

Overall, the strategy was to highlight their accomplishments while maintaining the narrative that the PAN and PRI were responsible for past issues, ensuring voters remained focused on the supposed improvements and continued to distrust the previous governments.

Most People Endorsed “Reforms” That Ultimately Undermined Democracy in Mexico

Your study titled “Do (Perceptions of) Electoral Polling Affect the Vote? Campaign Effects, Partisan Bias, and Strategic Voting in Mexico” highlights the role of partisan bias in shaping voter perceptions of electoral polling information. From a populism perspective, how do populist leaders in Mexico exploit or reinforce these biases to galvanize their base, and what impact does this have on strategic voting behavior among their supporters?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: In the last few years of López Obrador’s government, he has consistently emphasized his mandate. Almost weekly, if not daily, he has highlighted that he won over 50% of the vote, claiming a majority of the electorate’s support. He often cited high presidential approval ratings, with some surveys showing nearly 80% approval, though the average was closer to 60%. He used these numbers in his daily press conferences to argue that he represented the people and had a mandate to pursue his policies.

From a political perspective, high approval ratings can indeed help push through economic and political reforms by pressuring opposition parties. However, this rhetoric also extended to justifying actions that eroded democratic institutions. For example, he argued that the Supreme Court was obstructing his administration and therefore needed reform. Similarly, he claimed that the electoral authority was not fair to his government, justifying attempts to weaken its independence.

Over the past few years, López Obrador sought constitutional reforms to undermine the independence of electoral authorities and to exert control over the Supreme Court. He justified these actions by citing his electoral victory and high approval ratings, claiming democratic legitimacy. However, this has been problematic as it has actively eroded democratic norms and institutions in Mexico.

Due to the partisan bias we discussed earlier, many people supported these measures, believing that the Supreme Court and electoral authorities were indeed obstructing the government. This significant portion of public opinion endorsed reforms that ultimately undermined democracy in Mexico.

Your article titled “Anti-Democratic Attitudes, the Winner-Loser Gap, and the Rise of the Left in Mexico,” indicates that López Obrador’s supporters showed increased satisfaction with democracy after his victory, yet also exhibited a willingness to support anti-democratic interventions. How do populist leaders like López Obrador reconcile or exploit this apparent contradiction between promoting satisfaction with democracy while simultaneously undermining democratic norms and institutions?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: It’s interesting because, normally, you would expect that voters whose party won the last presidential election would be more satisfied with democracy. This expectation was met in the 2018 presidential election, where López Obrador’s partisans were very happy about his victory and their satisfaction with democracy increased significantly.

However, these same voters were also the most likely to endorse measures that could actively erode democracy. The question is why. From López Obrador’s perspective, he would argue that these measures are not about undermining democracy but about creating a true democracy that represents the people. He portrays the judiciary and the Supreme Court as corrupt entities that do not represent the public.

One of the proposed reforms, likely to be discussed in Congress in September, involves having judges in Mexico, including those on the Supreme Court, elected by popular vote. The argument is that this will ensure judges represent the people. However, this could politicize the judiciary further, making judges more responsive to political interests rather than the public.

So, how do people reconcile these two views? Partisan bias plays a significant role. Supporters of López Obrador trust his discourses and narratives. Additionally, if democracy hasn’t brought tangible benefits, measures that claim to ensure representation, such as electing judges, can seem appealing to the public. Thus, these kinds of reforms might gain support among the public, even if they undermine democratic norms.

Sheinnbaum’s Government May Not Pose a Threat to Democracy

Claudia Sheinbaum, candidate for the presidency of Mexico, celebrates at Zocalo square the significant advantage that makes her the virtual winner in Mexico City, Mexico on June 2, 2024. Photo: Paola Garcia.

During the campaign, Claudia Sheinbaum backed many of Obrador’s most contentious policies, including a slate of constitutional changes that critics say would severely undermine democratic checks and balances. Do you think she would continue the populist streak Obrador started?

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: I think so. That was always one of the questions. During the campaign, Claudia Sheinbaum actively campaigned for the continuity of López Obrador’s transformation agenda, as he often refers to his government’s efforts to transform Mexican politics. She consistently supported continuing his policies.

The question was whether she was being strategic during the campaign, appearing to fully support López Obrador but planning to establish her own positions once in office. Recently, she reiterated her support for reforms like the one proposing that judges be elected by popular vote. This suggests a strong likelihood of continuing policies that weaken checks and balances and erode democratic norms.

Her government begins in October, and it will be an interesting period with both the current president and the president-elect in the spotlight. She may strategically maintain her successful political alliance with López Obrador initially, but there is a possibility she will develop her own positions over time.

Sheinbaum has a democratic trajectory, having worked as a scholar and scientist before joining López Obrador’s movement. Given her background, one might expect her government not to pose a threat to democracy. However, recent signs indicate she supports measures that could further erode Mexican democracy. We will need to wait until her government starts to see if these policies are implemented.

How do you think a possible win by Donald Trump in the US could affect populist movements in Mexico and in Latin America? 

Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: It’s interesting because López Obrador and Donald Trump had a surprisingly good relationship, despite their differing ideologies—Trump from the right and López Obrador from the left. They found common ground in their populist approaches, albeit to different extents.

This relationship proved functional for both Mexico and the US in recent years. Under both the Trump and Biden administrations, the primary US expectation has been for Mexico to curb immigration from Central America. Mexico has done this, though often in ways that have raised significant human rights concerns. This arrangement has been somewhat successful for the Biden administration, with Mexico acting as a de facto wall between the two countries.

In exchange, it seems that the US has largely overlooked issues of democratic erosion in Mexico. The primary concern for the US has historically been stability over democracy. This was evident even during the 70 years of the hegemonic party regime in Mexico last century. While there has been some interest in promoting democracy, political stability has always been the main priority.

Even if López Obrador didn’t fully respect some NAFTA agreements, these disagreements were eventually negotiated. Ultimately, the most critical issue for both the Trump and Biden administrations has been immigration control. López Obrador’s administration has been astute in not criticizing the US on its democratic standards, focusing instead on maintaining a stable relationship that aligns with their interests.