Several thousand protesters marched in Bristol, UK, on February 4, 2017, opposing President Trump's scheduled state visit to the UK and his executive order banning travel to the US from seven Muslim-majority countries. Photo: Dreamstime.

Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK

Please cite as:
Wathtuwa-Durayalage, Sudeshika. (2025). “Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK.”
Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). June 11, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000115



Abstract

This study investigates the impact of civilizational populism on intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the United Kingdom using quantitative analysis of British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021 data. The findings reveal significant correlations between exposure to populist rhetoric and heightened negative emotions, such as fear and anger, toward ethnoreligious and political minorities (r = 0.56). While political affiliation demonstrates a weaker direct influence (r = 0.14), perceptions of migration as culturally and economically beneficial are strongly associated with higher social cohesion (r = 0.69). Minority groups report elevated levels of exclusion and fear, yet national pride correlates with inclusive attitudes in some cases (r = -0.64, with prejudicial views). Civil society organizations play a critical role in mitigating divisive effects by fostering inclusivity and dialogue. These insights inform strategies to counteract the polarizing impacts of civilizational populism, emphasizing the importance of inclusive narratives and policy interventions to enhance social cohesion in diverse societies. The study’s limitations include reliance on secondary data and challenges in establishing causality, highlighting the need for further research using more direct measures of populism and contemporary datasets. Despite these constraints, the findings contribute empirical evidence to the growing literature on the social and emotional consequences of populism, offering a foundation for policies aimed at promoting harmony and reducing polarization in the UK.

Keywords: Civilizational populism, intergroup emotions, social cohesion, civility

 

By Sudeshika Wathtuwa-Durayalage

Introduction

This study investigates the influence of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions and attitudes towards ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK. Specifically, it examines the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility at the local and national levels, and how individuals and communities respond to and resist populist rhetoric. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the emotional responses elicited by civilisational populism, such as fear, anger, and resentment, and the strategies civil society organisations employ to mitigate its divisive effects. 

While there has been extensive research on the general impact of populism on political attitudes and intergroup relations, there is a significant gap in understanding the specific emotional and social consequences of civilisational populism, particularly in the UK context. Civilisational populism differs from other forms of populism by framing political discourse regarding civilisational identities and perceived existential threats to cultural values and ways of life. Current literature inadequately addresses how this form of populism shapes intergroup emotions, such as fear and resentment, and its implications for social cohesion. Furthermore, there is a paucity of research on how communities and civil society organisations respond to civilisational populism, especially in fostering social cohesion and civility in the context of rising divisive rhetoric. 

This research is significant as it aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how civilisational populism influences emotional and social dynamics within ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK. By focusing on emotional responses and community reactions to civilisational populism, this study offers critical insights into how populist rhetoric shapes social cohesion and civility in diverse societies. Additionally, identifying the coping mechanisms and resistance strategies employed by communities will contribute to policy and intervention strategies aimed at mitigating the divisive impacts of populism. Ultimately, this research could inform efforts to strengthen social cohesion and civility in increasingly pluralistic and politically polarised societies.

The research questions are as follows:

How does civilisational populism influence intergroup emotions and attitudes toward ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK?

What are the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility in local and national contexts?

How do individuals and communities respond to populist rhetoric, and what coping mechanisms or resistance strategies are employed to maintain social cohesion?

There are three research objectives aligned with this research, as follows:

To explore how civilisational populism impacts the emotional responses (e.g., fear, anger, and resentment) of different ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK.

To analyse the relationship between civilisational populism and social cohesion, focusing on the extent to which it promotes or undermines community trust and cooperation.

To identify the strategies utilised by civil society organisations and communities to counteract the divisive effects of populism and foster civility.

Civilisational populism, as defined in this research, uniquely frames political discourse around existential threats to cultural values, in contrast to general populism that targets the elite. This study explores its significant emotional and societal impacts on social cohesion, particularly among ethnoreligious and political minorities. The central argument posits that civilisational populism exacerbates fear, anger, and resentment toward minority groups, undermining local and national social cohesion. Civil society and communities can mitigate these divisive impacts by fostering civility and employing coping mechanisms. Through a robust quantitative approach utilising British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) data, this research seeks to empirically establish correlations between populist rhetoric and intergroup emotions.

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A woman votes at a polling station on general election day in Palma de Mallorca. Photo: Dreamstime.

Do Muslims Have Different Attitudes and Voting Behaviour Than the Majority Populations of France, Germany and the Netherlands?

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Please cite as: 

van Oosten, Sanne. (2025). “Do Muslims Have Different Attitudes and Voting Behaviour Than the Majority Populations of France, Germany and the Netherlands?” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). June 10, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00100

 

Abstract

The political preferences of Muslims are often the source of contention and misinformation. In continental Europe, there is not much data available on political preferences of Muslims due to strict privacy regulations, creating a knowledge lacuna allowing for misinformation to fester. In this report, I focus on three countries where privacy regulations are particularly longstanding: France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I use a novel sampling method that complies with privacy regulations while achieving a large enough sample of minority respondents to conduct statistical analyses. Regarding policy preferences, I find that respondents with a Muslim minority background have more conservative attitudes towards same-sex adoption, while showing very similar attitudes to white majority respondents when it comes to gender equality. Respondents with a Muslim minority background are, however, more progressive on immigration and religious freedoms for Muslims. Regarding voting preferences, Muslims show very similar patterns to their majority counterparts, with a few exceptions (La France Insoumise (FI) in France, and in the Netherlands DENK and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)). This paper seeks to put an end to persistent speculation about the political preferences of Muslims, particularly Muslims, in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

 

By Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at University of Oxford, COMPAS, sanne.vanoosten@compas.ox.ac.uk)

Introduction

The political preferences of Muslims in western countries are the subject of recurring speculation (Turnbull-Dugarte and Lopez, 2024; Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2025; van Oosten, 2025a; 2025b). Political leaders often claim that Muslims vote for them to present themselves as legitimate leaders of all people, while at the same time, some political leaders claim that Muslims and other minorities have been imported by elites to vote for pro-immigrant parties and change society from within (Bracke and Aguilar, 2022; van Oosten, 2025a). Political actors also often point to the attitudes of Muslims to justify their exclusion from national communities (Glas, 2023; Spierings, 2021; De Lange and Mügge, 2015). These claims focus on issues like opposition to gay rights (Puar, 2013), perceived sexism (Farris, 2017), antisemitism (van Oosten, 2024a) or animal cruelty (Backlund and Jungar, 2022; van Oosten, 2024b). Far-right parties use these examples to argue that Muslims do not share core liberal values, and therefore do not belong in liberal societies (van Oosten, 2024b; 2022). These claims, however, are rarely supported by data. This report examines whether Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands hold different political preferences from their white majority counterparts.

Standard sampling strategies do not yield enough minority participants for statistical analyses (Font and Méndez, 2013). Moreover, strict European privacy regulations limit the availability of sampling frames for racial/ethnic and religious minorities in the European context (Simon, 2017). To overcome these challenges, I surveyed a large sample of Kantar-panellists and used a mini-survey to oversample voters from France, Germany, and the Netherlands with a migration background in Turkey (France, Germany, and the Netherlands), North Africa (France), Sub-Saharan Africa (France), the Former Soviet Union (Germany), Surinam (the Netherlands), and Morocco (the Netherlands). I sampled a high number of minority respondents, with 1889 out of a total N of 3058 respondents having a migration background, of which 649 self-identify as Muslim. I asked these respondents for their propensity to vote (PTV) for all political parties in the French, German and Dutch parliament at the time of data collection, as well as their attitudes towards 8 key policy preferences spanning socio-cultural and socio-economic themes. 

In this paper, I test whether Muslims and other minority groups differ from majority voters in their support for political parties in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I find that Muslim voters are much less likely to support PVV in the Netherlands but are just as likely to vote for the RN in France or AfD in Germany (all three far right). Minority and majority voters are equally likely to support mainstream left parties, such as PS in France, the SPD in Germany, and PvdA in the Netherlands. Muslim minority voters are more likely to support left-populist parties DENK in the Netherlands and FI in France. In terms of policy preferences, respondents with a Muslim minority background hold more conservative views on same-sex adoption but show similar attitudes to majority respondents on gender equality. They are, however, more progressive on immigration and Muslim religious freedoms.

This report aims to contribute to the debate about the voting behaviour of Muslims in Western Europe, a debate that is often speculative and not based on data from academic scholars. Far right party leaders, thinkers and pundits have fuelled misunderstandings about minority voting patterns. In reality, the political preferences of Muslims, a minority, are very similar to the political preferences of the majority population. This report seeks to provide clarity and offer a data-driven response to counter the narrative that some political leaders might use to exploit the supposed voting behaviours of minorities for their political gain. Through empirical analysis, this study contributes to a more accurate understanding of ethnic minority political preferences and aims to challenge rhetoric with factual evidence.

Sampling Method and Sample Composition

I conducted this research in France (van Oosten et al., 2024a), Germany (van Oosten et al., 2024b) and the Netherlands (van Oosten et al., 2024c), three countries with key differences. In France, there is a strong emphasis on citizenship, secularism and a strong division between church and state (Kuru, 2008). In Germany, Christian political parties have had a longstanding presence (Ahrens et al., 2022) and the approach towards Muslims is characterised by the history of integration of guestworkers (Yurdakul, 2009). The Netherlands has a host of Christian parties (Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019), a tradition of high minority representation in politics (Hughes, 2016: 560), increased by the emergence of a political party run by Muslim parliamentarians and voicing Muslim interests in 2017, DENK (van Oosten et al., 2024d). All three countries have a history of parliamentarians from mainstream and populist radical right parties espousing Islamophobic rhetoric, with France and the Netherlands having a longer and more vociferous history of populist radical right parties and Germany being relatively new to the game and taking on a comparatively less strident tone (Brubaker, 2017).

I oversampled respondents with specific migration backgrounds to make group-specific statistical inferences (Font and Méndez, 2013: 48) and chose minoritised groups: numeric minorities that state experiencing discrimination to the largest extent (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 31). In France, the oversampled groups of ethnic minority citizens consist of French citizens with a North-African (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), Sub-Saharan African (Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo) and Turkish background. In Germany, I oversampled German citizens with a Turkish and Former Soviet Union (FSU) background. In the Netherlands, I oversampled Dutch citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese background. Some groups have come to France, Germany or the Netherlands as a result of the colonial ties between host and home country, some came as guest workers (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 93). I also oversampled French citizens with a Turkish background and German re-migrants from the FSU. Some, but not all, of the oversampled migration backgrounds are countries with Muslim-majority populations, making it possible to disentangle whether differences are either religiously or ethnically/racially driven. In this paper, I present data for the Muslim subgroup, but the data also includes other minoritised groups and analyses by these groups are also available for researchers. 

After running pilots and obtaining the ethics approval, (see appendix: van Oosten, 2025c), I gathered data between March and August of 2020 amongst 3058 citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands, administered by survey agency Kantar Public (for all replication materials and appendices, see van Oosten, 2025b). One important challenge in surveying ethnic/racial minority groups comes from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a European law legally restricting saving data on race and ethnicity (European Commission 2018). I overcame this challenge by employing a large-scale filter question to the representative Kantar-panels in all three countries. I asked a very large sample to participate in a mini survey. The first and only question of this mini survey asks where their mother and father were born. If either one of their parents were born in a country of origin I wanted to oversample, I redirected this respondent to the full survey. If not, I either terminated the survey or redirected a small percentage to the full survey. This enabled us to form sizable groups of minority citizens for our final survey, ensuring ample diversity, a feature so often missing from survey research (e.g. Coppock and McClellan, 2018). Though there is still a chance of selection bias (see van Oosten, 2025d for a discussion on the selection bias in this sample), I have variables to weight the data on gender, migration background, education, age, urbanisation and region, and the findings are broadly the same with and without weights.

Respondents received so-called ‘LifePoints’ (France and Germany) or ‘Nipoints’ (the Netherlands) for the completion of the survey. With these points, respondents can periodically convert their saved points to an online gift card. The survey took about fifteen minutes to complete, which translated to an equivalent of two euros in gift card value. I ended up with the following number of respondents in each group:

I assessed migration background by inquiring about the birthplaces of respondents’ mothers and fathers. It was necessary to ask this question first for sampling purposes. To minimise potential ordering effects on the data, I randomised the order in which respondents viewed the policy questions and experimental profiles (for the full questionnaire, see appendix in van Oosten, 2025c). To mitigate acquiescence bias, where respondents tend to agree with statements, I randomised the wording of the policy questions. For instance, one half of the sample saw the statement: “the taxes for this rich should be raised” and the other half saw “the taxes for the rich should be lowered” and I recoded the variables accordingly. I prepared the data using R-package ‘tidyr’ (Wickham, 2020, see all code and replication materials here: van Oosten, 2025c).

Minorities’ Policy Preferences

In the following section, I first present the policy preferences of two groups: non-religious ethnic majority respondents and Muslim ethnic minority respondents (for other subgroups see appendix at van Oosten, 2025c). I present the distribution of the responses in a histogram, with a black line indicating the mean score. I asked respondents to indicate their agreement with a series of policy statements using an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). The statements covered a broad range of topics, including attitudes towards state intervention, immigration, Islam, gender and sexuality. The attitudes towards state intervention are as follows: “The tax rate for the rich must be higher/lower,” “Our government should raise/lower support for the unemployed,” “Our government should do less/more to combat climate change than now,” and “Our government needs to lower/raise fuel prices.” Attitudes towards immigration and Islam are as follows: “Immigrants are a burden/an asset to our country,” “Islam should (not) be restricted by law.” I measure gender attitudes as follows: “That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should (not) be regulated by law,” and sexuality as follows: “Homosexual couples should (not) be allowed to adopt children.” 

I compared the responses of non-religious ethnic majority respondents with those of ethnic minority respondents who self-identified as practicing Muslims. Differences between the groups were negligible for most policy areas, including taxation, unemployment, climate policy, fuel prices, and gender equality. However, Muslim respondents were more likely to oppose adoption rights for same-sex couples, and more supportive of immigration and religious freedoms for Muslims.

Subsequently, I present data for voting preferences. I asked respondents about their willingness to vote for a wide range of political parties in their respective countries using so-called “Propensity to Vote” (PTV) questions. Respondents were asked: “Please indicate the likelihood that you will ever vote for the following parties. If you are certain that you will never vote for this party then choose 0; if you are certain to vote for this party someday, then enter 10. Of course you can also choose an intermediate position.” In France, the list of parties included LREM, LR, PS, MoDem, FI, PCF, RN (formerly Front National), and MR. In Germany, I asked about CDU, SPD, AfD, FDP, Die Linke, Grüne, and CSU. In the Netherlands, the full list consisted of CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FvD, GroenLinks, PvdA, PvdD, PVV, SGP, SP, and VVD. 

In the figures below, I present histograms of the responses for two parties per country: FI and RN in France, Die Linke and AfD in Germany, and DENK and PVV in the Netherlands. These pairs were selected to contrast parties often associated with the ethnic majority versus those associated with minority or immigrant support. Full results for all parties are available in the appendix (van Oosten, 2025c). Our findings show that there are relatively few differences in voting propensities between non-religious ethnic majority respondents and Muslim ethnic minority respondents in France and Germany. In France, Muslims are about as likely as non-religious majority respondents to consider voting for both RN and FI. Similarly, in Germany, I find little difference between these two groups in their willingness to vote for Die Linke or AfD. The Netherlands stands out in this regard: Muslim respondents are significantly more likely to consider voting for DENK, a party with strong minority and Muslim support, while being far less likely to vote for the PVV, a party known for its anti-Muslim rhetoric. This suggests that differences in vote propensity by group are more pronounced in the Dutch context than in France or Germany.

Minorities’ Voting Preferences

Conclusion

In terms of policy preferences, the differences between Muslims and non-religious ethnic majority respondents are generally small, except in a few areas. Muslims tend to be more supportive of immigration and Muslim rights and less supportive of same-sex couples adopting children. There are no major differences on issues like gender equality, though. When it comes to voting preferences, there are bigger differences in the Netherlands compared to France and Germany. In the Netherlands, Muslims are much less likely to vote for the PVV, but more likely to vote for DENK. In France and Germany, there are fewer differences between Muslims and non-religious ethnic majorities, with both groups showing similar preferences for parties like RN and FI in France, and AfD and Die Linke in Germany.

This paper addresses the ongoing speculations about the policy and voting preferences of Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Political leaders and commentators regularly spread misinformation; possibly unintentionally, possibly deliberately (van Oosten, 2025a). This false information about minority voting habits can mislead the public and fuel xenophobic views. In reality, Muslims often share similar political preferences with the majority population, though not always. This paper presents descriptive statistics to challenge false narratives. Combating misinformation is vital for the health of democracies, as it helps maintain informed discussions and trust in democratic institutions.

References

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Bracke, S., & Hernández Aguilar, L. M. (2020). “‘They love death as we love life’: The ‘Muslim question’ and the biopolitics of replacement.” British Journal of Sociology, 71(4), 680–701. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12742

Brubaker, Rogers. (2017). “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 40 (8): 1191–1226. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700.

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Glas, Saskia. (2023). “What Gender Values Do Muslims Resist? How Religiosity and Acculturation Over Time Shape Muslims’ Public-Sphere Equality, Family Role Divisions, and Sexual Liberalization Values Differently.” Social Forces, Volume 101, Issue 3, March 2023, Pages 1199–1229, https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soac004.

Hughes, Melanie M. (2016). “Electoral Systems and the Legislative Representation of Muslim Ethnic Minority Women in the West, 2000-2010.” Parliamentary Affairs 69: 548–68. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsv062.

Kešić, Josip, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. (2019). “The Nation under Threat: Secularist, Racial and Populist Nativism in the Netherlands.” Patterns of Prejudice 53 (5): 441–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2019.1656886.

Kuru, Ahmet T. (2008). “Secularism, State Policies, and Muslims in Europe Analyzing French Exceptionalism.” Comperative Politics 41 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041508×12911362383552.

de Lange, S. L., & Mügge, L. M. (2015). “Gender and right-wing populism in the Low Countries: Ideological variations across parties and time.” Patterns of Prejudice, 49(1–2), 61–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2015.1014199

Simon, Patrick. (2017). “The Failure of the Importation of Ethno-Racial Statistics in Europe: Debates and Controversies.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 40 (13): 2326–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1344278

Spierings, N. (2021). “Homonationalism and voting for the populist radical right: Addressing unanswered questions by zooming in on the Dutch case.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 33(1), 171–182. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa005

Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J., López Ortega, A., & Hunklinger, M. (2025). “Do citizens stereotype Muslims as an illiberal bogeyman? Evidence from a double-list experiment.” British Journal of Political Science, 55, e23. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123424000437

Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J., & López Ortega, A. (2024). “Instrumentally inclusive: The political psychology of homonationalism.” American Political Science Review, 118(3), 1360–1378. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000849

van Oosten, S. (2022) “What shapes voter expectations of Muslim politicians’ views on homosexuality: stereotyping or projection?” Electoral Studies, 80(December). Elsevier Ltd: 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102553   

van Oosten S., Mügge L., Hakhverdian A, Van der Pas D. and Vermeulen F. (2024a). French Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination. (EMMAVID) – EMMAVID Data France. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ULQEAY  

van Oosten S., Mügge L., Hakhverdian A., Van der Pas D. and Vermeulen F. (2024b). German Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination. (EMMAVID) – EMMAVID Data Germany. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GT4N9J  

van Oosten S., Mügge L., Hakhverdian A., Van der Pas D. and Vermeulen F. (2024c). Dutch Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination (EMMAVID) – EMMAVID Data the Netherlands. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BGVJZQ

van Oosten, S., Mügge, L., Hakhverdian, A., & van der Pas, D. (2024d). “What explains voting for DENK: Issues, discrimination or in-group favouritism?” Representation, 60(4), 601–623.https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2024.2387011

van Oosten, S. (2024a).” Judeonationalism: Calling out antisemitism to discredit Muslims.” ECPR The Loop, 2024(6). https://theloop.ecpr.eu/judeonationalism-antisemitism-for-the-discrediting-of-muslims/ (accessed on April 10, 2025).

van Oosten, S. (2024b). “Animeauxnationalism: ‘They are eating the pets’.” Digressions and Impressions.https://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/2024/10/animeauxnationalism-they-are-eating-the-pets-guest-post-by-sanne-van-oosten.html (accessed on April 10, 2025).

van Oosten, S. (2025a). “The Importance of In-group Favouritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 12, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0046

van Oosten, S. (2025b). “The ‘Awkward Alliance’ of the Left and the Right.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). https://www.populismstudies.org/the-awkward-alliance-of-the-left-and-the-right/ (accessed on April 10, 2025).

Yurdakul, Gökçe. 2009. From Guest Workers into Muslims: The Transformation of Turkish Immigrant Associations in Germany. Newcastle upon Tyne.

Urban graffiti depicting the face of a woman in a hijab, located in an immigrant-populated neighborhood on September 1, 2015. The urban area of Berlin, Germany—home to 4 million residents—ranks as the 7th most populous in the European Union. Photo: Dreamstime.

Evaluations of Female Muslim Politicians in a Populist Era: Measuring Intersectionality Using Interaction Effects and Conjoint Experiments

Abstract
How do voters evaluate female Muslim politicians? The literature mainly approaches voter evaluations of underrepresented groups from a unitary perspective, focusing on either female or minoritized politicians, leaving Muslim politicians out of the picture altogether. I take an intersectional approach and consider a finding intersectional when evaluations of a Muslim woman politician are significantly different from both non-religious women and Muslim men. I test this by running survey experiments amongst 3056 respondents in France, Germany, and the Netherlands and presenting 18,336 randomly constructed profiles of hypothetical politicians varying their religion, gender, and migration background. Voters have a strong negative bias against Muslim politicians. However, voters do not assess female Muslim politicians significantly differently than their male counterparts. These conclusions have implications for researchers studying intersectionality using conjoint experiments and researchers concerned with the electoral consequences of diversity in a political landscape increasingly influenced by populist radical right parties.

Keywords: Intersectionality, Muslims, Islamophobia, Muslim women, Descriptive representation

Please find all replication materials here: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/JZYR7

By Sanne van Oosten

Introduction

There are many examples of female Muslim politicians being targeted by politicians of the Populist Radical Right (see Farris, 2017; Oudenampsen, 2016), sometimes leading to female Muslim politicians receiving extraordinary amounts of discursive backlash (Saris & Ven, 2021; van Oosten, 2022). At the same time, Muslim women tend to outnumber Muslim men in politics (Hughes, 2016), especially in contexts where party selectors craft candidate lists: Muslim women tick two diversity boxes while also challenging stereotypes of Muslim women as oppressed, simply by being politicians (Dancygier, 2017). Despite these challenges and the unique positioning of Muslim women in politics, the question remains how voters evaluate them. Does being a female Muslim politician pose electoral challenges, or is there an electoral benefit? In this paper, I test whether intersectionality plays a role in how voters evaluate female Muslim politicians.

An intersectional analysis is distinct from a unitary or multiple one (Hancock, 2007). Where a unitary analysis foregrounds one background characteristic (race or gender) and a multiple analysis adds up the effects of multiple ones (race and gender), an intersectional analysis highlights the interaction between them (race interacts with gender) (idem). In order to study the intersectional position of minoritized women in politics quantitatively, many scholars call the use of interaction effects and candidate experiments viable methodological solutions (Block et al., 2023; Klar & Schmitt, 2021, p. 493, 495). This paper tests the limits of both the method of data collection (candidate experiments) and the method of analysis (interaction effects) by studying what is arguably a most-likely case: female Muslim politicians.

Though there has been much research on intersectionality and politicians in the US (Brown, 2014a, 2014b; Collins, 1998; Holman & Schneider, 2018; Lemi & Brown, 2019; Reingold et al., 2020), intersectionality and politicians in the European context is poorly understood. In Europe, Muslim women play a crucial role in many nationalist debates in western countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands (Dancygier, 2017; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2021). The general framing tends to imply that Muslim women are significantly different from both non-Muslim women and Muslim men because being Muslim influences what it means to be a woman and being a woman influences what it means to be Muslim. As Islam and gender are thus “mutually reinforcing”, an intersectional lens is indispensable (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1283). This is particularly apparent when female Muslim politicians attempt to enter politics (Dancygier, 2014; Hughes, 2016; Murray, 2016). However, whether female Muslim politicians face a “double disadvantage” or a “strategic advantage” (Gershon & Lavariega Monforti, 2021) depends heavily on the specific political and societal context in which they operate. In order to study this, I presented 3056 respondents in France, Germany, and the Netherlands a total of 18,336 short bios of hypothetical politicians while randomizing their religion, ethnorace and gender. I asked respondents to assess these politicians by asking evaluation and choice-questions. Candidate conjoint experiments rarely include Islam as an experimental condition and when they do, intersectional analyses are rarely conducted (one notable exception being Benstead et al., 2015).

In line with Hancock (2007), I analyze the results in a unitary, multiple and intersectional way. In the intersectional analysis I use interactions while controlling for direct (unitary) effects. Although I do not find voters assess women and ethnoracially minoritized politicians negatively, I find robust and consistent evidence that voters have a strong negative and unitary bias against Muslim politicians. However, this analysis did not garner any evidence for intersectional effects of religion and gender. Given the sizable sample and effect sizes, I do not consider a lack of statistical power the cause of these null results. Though I remain confident that interaction effects are the most fitting method of analysis, I argue that conjoint experiments are not the most fitting method of data collection due to the cognitive overload causing respondents to single out one attribute to base their choices on.

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Erdogan

The Transnational Diffusion of Digital Authoritarianism: From Moscow and Beijing to Ankara

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Please cite as:
Yilmaz, Ihsan; Mamouri, Ali; Morieson, Nicholas & Omer, Muhammad. (2025). “The Transnational Diffusion of Digital Authoritarianism: From Moscow and Beijing to Ankara.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). May 12, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0098



This report examines how Turkey has become a paradigmatic case of digital authoritarian convergence through the mechanisms of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence. Drawing on Chinese and Russian models—and facilitated by Western and Chinese tech companies—Turkey has adopted sophisticated digital control strategies across legal, surveillance, and information domains. The study identifies how strategic partnerships, infrastructure agreements (e.g., Huawei’s 5G and smart city projects), and shared authoritarian logics have enabled the Erdoğan regime to suppress dissent and reshape the digital public sphere. Through legal reforms, deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies, and coordinated digital propaganda, Turkey exemplifies how authoritarian digital governance diffuses globally. The findings highlight an urgent need for international accountability, cyber norms, and ethical tech governance to contain the expanding influence of digital repression.

By Ihsan Yilmaz, Ali Mamouri*, Nicholas Morieson & Muhammad Omer**

Executive Summary

This research explores the diffusion of digital authoritarian practices in Turkey as a prominent example of the Muslim world, focusing on the three mechanisms of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence, covering four main domains: Legal frameworks, Internet censorship, urban surveillance, and Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs). The study covers both internal and external diffusion based on a wide range of sources. These include domestic precedents, examples from authoritarian regimes like China and Russia, and the role of Western companies in spreading digital authoritarian practices.

The study had several findings. The key findings are detailed below:

Learning: Turkey, like other regional countries that experienced public unrest, has learned from previous experience in order to impose power and control on people using different digital capabilities. Countries like China and Russia played significant roles in this learning process across the region, including in Turkey. The research highlights the importance of both internal learning from past protest movements and external influences from state and non-state actors.

Emulation: Authoritarian regimes in Turkey and across the Muslim world have emulated China and Russia’s internet governance models in all four aforementioned domains. The Turkish government has developed its own surveillance and censorship techniques, influenced by the experiences of authoritarian states and bolstered by training and technology transfers from China and Russia, and certain western companies.

Cooperative interdependence: Turkey’s economic challenges have led it to forge closer ties with China, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This cooperation often comes with financial incentives, promoting the adoption of China’s digital governance practices, including urban surveillance systems and censorship technologies.

Role of private technology companies: Western companies have played a significant role in facilitating the spread of digital authoritarianism, often operating independently of their governments’ policies. Companies like Sandvine and NSO Group have provided tools that support the Turkish government’s digital control strategies, contributing to a complex landscape of censorship and surveillance.

Diffusion of SDIOs: The diffusion process of digital authoritarian practice is not limited to importing and using digital technologies. It also includes the spreading of legal frameworks to restrict digital freedom and also running Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs), including state propaganda and conspiracy theories that China and Russia had a significant role in.

Based on these findings, the study proposes several recommendations to counteract the spread of digital authoritarian practices:

– Strengthening international cyber norms and regulations to define and regulate digital governance, particularly in countries with strong ties to the West.

– Enhancing support for digital rights and privacy protections by advocating for comprehensive laws and supporting civil society organizations in Turkey.

– Encouraging responsible corporate behavior among technology firms to ensure compliance with human rights standards.

– Fostering regional and global cooperation on digital freedom to counter digital authoritarianism through joint initiatives and technical assistance.

– Leveraging economic incentives to promote ethical technology use and partnerships with human rights-aligned providers.

– Using strategic diplomatic channels to encourage Turkey to adopt responsible surveillance practices and align with global digital governance norms.

The research illustrates the dynamics of digital authoritarianism in Turkey, revealing a complex interplay of emulation, learning, and economic incentives that facilitate the spread of censorship and surveillance practices. The findings underscore the need for international cooperation and proactive measures to safeguard digital freedoms in an increasingly authoritarian digital landscape.

Photo: Hannu Viitanen.

Introduction

Research suggests that a significant number of countries in the Muslim world, specifically those in the Middle East, are often characterized by authoritarian governance (Durac & Cavatorta, 2022; Yenigun, 2021; Stepan et al., 2018; Yilmaz, 2021; 2025). The rise of the internet and social media during the late 2000s provided immense capacities to civil society and individual activists in the Muslim world. This development burst into political action during the late 2000s and the early 2010s in the instances of the Gezi protests in Turkey and other examples in the region, including the Green Movement in Iran and the Arab Spring protests across the Arab world (Iosifidis & Wheeler, 2015; Demirhan, 2014; Lynch, 2011; Gheytanchi, 2016). 

The fact that the protesters in all these cases have extensively used the internet and associated technologies (e.g., social media, digital messaging, and navigation) has led many observers to declare the latter as ‘liberation technology’ due to their role in facilitating anti-government movements across non-democratic countries (Diamond & Plattner, 2012; Ziccardi, 2012). Advocates of the internet as a liberation tool have also pointed to enhanced social capacity to mobilize and organize through the spread of dramatic videos and images, instigating attitudinal change, and countering government monopoly over the production and dissemination of information (Breuer, 2012; Ruijgrok, 2017). These qualities have been seen as giving the internet an equalizing power between the state and society. In the early 2000s, when the Internet and social media were spreading across the developing world, authoritarian governments were generally unable to control the digital sphere; they lacked the technical expertise and the digital infrastructure to curb the internet. So, they typically relied on completely shutting it down (Cattle, 2015; Gunitsky, 2020).

However, authoritarian regimes gradually learned how to use the digital space for empowering their control on the society and have even started using it for transnational repression and sharp power (Yilmaz, 2025, Yilmaz et al., 2024; Yilmaz, Akbarzadeh & Bashirov 2023; Yilmaz, Morieson & Shakil, 2025; Yilmaz & Shakil, 2024). Scholars such as Sunstein (2009) and Negroponte (1996) have warned against the capacity of the internet to fragment the public sphere into separate echo chambers and thus fundamentally impede ‘deliberative democracy,’ which is supposed to be based on debates of ideas and exchange of views. 

Furthermore, the breakthroughs in deep learning, neural network, and machine learning, together with the widespread use of the internet, have accelerated the growth of artificial intelligence (AI), providing more capability to authoritarian regimes to impose control on people. In a Pew poll, almost half of the respondents believed that the ‘use of [modern] technology will mostly weaken core aspects of democracy and democratic representation in the next decade’ (Anderson & Rainie, 2020). This pessimism is driven by an unprecedented degree of surveillance and digital control brought forward by digital technologies, undermining central notions of freedom, individuality, autonomy, and rationality at the center of deliberative democracy (Radavoi, 2019; Stone et al., 2016; Bostrom, 2014; Helbing et al., 2019; Damnjanović, 2015). Tools of the governments to digitally repress democracy include smart surveillance using facial recognition applications, targeted censorship, disinformation and misinformation campaigns, and cyber-attacks and hacking (Feldstein, 2019).

Research as to how digital technologies such as high-speed internet, social media, AI, and big data affect, enable or disable democracy, human rights, freedom, and electoral process is in its infancy (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019; Margetts, 2013; Papacharissi, 2009). Further, most of this scant literature is focused on Western democracies. The existing literature on Muslim-majority countries is mostly focused on traditional social media (Jenzen et al., 2021; Wheeler, 2017; Tusa, 2013). This is despite the fact that extensive digital capabilities, especially AI and big data, offer governments of these countries the capabilities to exert control over their citizens, with disastrous outcomes for democracy. Indeed, we may be facing the rise of a new type of authoritarian rule: digital authoritarianism, that is, ‘the use of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate domestic and foreign populations’ (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019; see also Ahmed et al., 2024; Akbarzadeh et al., 2024; 2025).

With the expansion of the internet in developing countries, authoritarian governments derive a similar benefit from technological leapfrogging with the capacity to selectively implement new surveillance and control mechanisms from the burgeoning supply of market-ready advanced AI and big-data-enabled applications. As one internet pioneer foreshadowed to Pew “by 2030, as much of 75% of the world’s population will be enslaved by AI-based surveillance systems developed in China and exported around the world” (Anderson & Rainie, 2020). Developing countries often experience technological leapfrogging; they shift to advanced technologies directly, skipping the middle, more expensive and less efficient stages because modern technologies, by the time of their implementation within those countries, become more economical and effective than the initial technology. This leapfrogging is demonstrated via the adoption lifecycle of mobile phones to that of landlines. It took less than 17 years, from the early 2000s to 2017, for mobile phones to be extensively adopted in Turkey, from 25% to 96%. (Our World in Data, 2021).

After the crises of the early 2010s, both democratic and authoritarian regimes worldwide started to invest heavily in sophisticated equipment and expertise to monitor, analyze, and ultimately crack down on online and offline dissent (Aziz & Beydoun, 2020; Feldstein, 2021). In addition to curtailing independent speech and activism online, authoritarian regimes have sought to deceive and manipulate digital environments in order to shape their citizens’ views. They have flooded the digital realm with propaganda narratives using trolls, bots, and influencers under their control (Tan, 2020). 

More importantly, thanks to authoritarian diffusion, governments in developing countries are learning from and emulating the experiences of their peers of surveillance technologies such as China and Russia. However, there has been limited research on the political mechanisms through which such digital authoritarian practices spread. Against this backdrop, this report examines the mechanisms through which digital authoritarian practices diffuse in Turkey as an example of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. We ask: What kind of authoritarian practices have the governments enacted in the digital realm? How have these practices diffused across the region? To address these questions systematically, we develop an analytical framework that examines the mechanisms of diffusion of digital authoritarian practices. Our framework identifies three mechanisms of diffusion: emulation, learning, and cooperative interdependence. We focus on four groups of digital authoritarian practices: legal frameworks, Internet censorship, urban surveillance, and Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs). We aim to show how emulation, learning and cooperative interdependence take place in each of these four digital authoritarian practices. In addition to the above, the report will explore the international dimension of this phenomenon, discovering how Western companies, in addition to totalitarian systems like Russia and China, played a role in empowering the Turkish government to claim the digital space. 

We first discuss our analytical framework which integrates the scholarship of digital authoritarian practices and authoritarian diffusion, and explain the concepts of learning, emulation, and as prominent diffusion mechanisms. We then move to the empirical section where we first identify convergent outcomes that are comparable between earlier and later adopters and then we will elucidate the mechanisms through which the diffusion process occurred by showing contact points and plausible channels through which decision-makers were able to adopt from one another.

Analytical Framework

To explore the phenomenon of diffusion, we follow best practices laid out in the literature (see Ambrosio, 2010; Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019; Bank & Weyland, 2020). We begin by identifying convergent outcomes that are comparable between earlier and later adopters. As part of this, we will also establish feasible connections between the two parties, which may take the form of physical proximity, trade linkages, membership in international organizations, bilateral arrangements, historical ties, cultural similarities, or shared language. Then, we will elucidate the mechanisms through which the diffusion process occurred by identifying contact points and plausible channels through which decision-makers were able to adopt from one another. 

We will follow three good practices that have been advised by scholars (e.g., Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019; Strang & Soule, 1998; Gilardi, 2010; 2012). First, we adopt a comparative design that involves four middle powers (see Strang & Soule, 1998). There are important similarities and differences among the four cases that make comparison a useful exercise. Second, we provide extensive data to showcase the workings of diffusion mechanisms despite the challenge of working on authoritarian settings. As Ambrosio and Tolstrup (2019: 2752) noted, “the relevant evidence needed can be hard to acquire in authoritarian settings.” It is much more likely to gain access to strong evidence in liberal democratic settings where much of the current diffusion research has accumulated. Our article contributes to the literature on diffusion in authoritarian settings with Turkey as a prominent example. Finally, we provide smoking gun evidence based on several leaked documents to support our assertions. 

In the empirical section, we follow the convention (see Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019) and start with identifying convergent outcomes among the major political actors in regard to the practices of restrictive legal frameworks, Internet censorship, urban surveillance and SDIOs. This section involves demonstrating the items that have been diffused between earlier and later adopters. Not only is there a substantial amount of similarity between the practices among these political systems, but also, we show a temporal sequence between earlier and later adopters that point at convergence. 

We then move on to explain plausible mechanisms of diffusion, following the model provided by Bashirov et al. (2025): Learning, Emulation, and Cooperative Interdependence. It’s important to highlight from the outset that these three mechanisms functioned together in Turkey settings. As was observed in other settings (see Sharman, 2008), it is not feasible to examine the impact of these mechanisms independently. Instead of existing as separate entities or operating in a simple additive manner, these mechanisms are inherently interconnected, and they do overlap. We follow this understanding in our empirical analysis and discuss how each mechanism worked in tandem with other mechanisms.

Types of Digital Authoritarianism

Illustration: Shutterstock / Skorzewiak.

We identified four main domains of digital authoritarianism in general, and examples of them could be found in Turkey’s case as well.

Restrictive Legal Frameworks

The legal framework includes a variety of practices. We identified the following:

1- Laws that mandated internet service providers to establish a system allowing real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks. These legislations mandated internet service providers to establish a system allowing real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks (Privacy International, 2019). Moreover, all censorship laws refer to national security and terrorism as vague criteria to enforce widespread censorship of undesirable content. In Turkey, a Presidential decree (No 671) in 2016 granted the government extensive power to restrict internet access, block websites, and censor media (IHD, 2017). Under the decree, telecommunications companies are required to comply with any government orders within two hours of receiving them. In recent years, the Turkish government also prosecuted thousands of people for criticizing President Erdogan or his government in print or on social media (Freedom House, 2021).

2- Laws that have converged around penalization of online speech, referring to concepts such as national identity, culture, and defamation. It is hard to miss similarities between the laws in Turkey among other regional countries and those enacted in China earlier. In 2013, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued a legal interpretation that expanded the scope of the crime of defamation to include information shared on the internet (Human Rights Watch, 2013). In 2022, the Turkish Parliament passed new legislation that criminalized “disseminating false information,” punishable by one to three years in prison, and increased government control over online news websites. Article 23 of the law was particularly controversial as it stated that “Any person who publicly disseminates untrue information concerning the internal and external security, public order and public health of the country with the sole intention of creating anxiety, fear or panic among the public, and in a manner likely to disturb public peace, shall be sentenced to imprisonment from one year to three years” (Human Rights Watch, 2022). This clearly shows the pattern of diffusion from China and Russia by leaving vague and broad provisions of what constitutes “national security,” “peace” and “order” (Weber, 2021: 170-171; Yilmaz, Caman & Bashirov, 2020; Yilmaz, Shipoli & Demir, 2023; Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2022). 

3-  Laws that ban or restrict the use of VPNs following China and Russia’s lead. In Turkey, VPNs are legal, but many of their servers and websites are blocked. China banned unauthorized VPN use in 2017 in a new Cybersecurity Law. Russia introduced a similar ban the same year. The Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK), national telecommunications regulatory and inspection authority of Turkey, issued a blocking order targeting 16 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). These VPNs, including TunnelBear, Proton, and Psiphon, are popular tools used by audiences seeking to access news websites critical of the government.

While entirely banning VPN access remains a challenge, governments can employ Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology to identify and throttle VPN traffic. Countries like Iran, China, and Russia are indulging in such practices. Users in Iran and Turkey, for example, have reported extensive blockage of VPN apps and websites since 2021. Engaging in efforts to access blocked content through a VPN can potentially result in imprisonment (Danao & Venz, 2023). Simon Migliano, research head at Top10VPN.com, acknowledges that blocking VPN websites in Turkey makes it harder to download and sign up for new services. Moreover, individual VPN providers like Hide.me, SecureVPN, and Surfshark confirm technical difficulties for their users in Turkey. Proton, on the other hand, maintains that their services haven’t been completely blocked. 

As such, the report “Freedom on the Net 2023” by Freedom House (2023) reflects the aforesaid harsh reality, ranking Turkey as “not free” in terms of internet access and freedom of expression. However, it is worth noting that the Turkish government’s censorship efforts are met with a determined citizenry. Audiences, even young schoolchildren according to Ozturan (2023), have become adept at using VPNs to access banned content. Media outlets themselves sometimes promote VPNs to help their audiences bypass restrictions. Examples abound: VOA Turkish and Deutsche Welle (DW), upon being blocked, directed their audiences towards Psiphon, Proton, and nthLink to access their broadcasts. Diken, a prominent news website, even maintains a dedicated “VPN News” section offering access to censored content dating back to 2014. 

4- Laws that tighten control on social media companies. While Western social media platforms remain accessible in Turkey, in recent years the government has introduced similar laws and regulations that increase their grip over the content shared on these platforms. They do so by threatening the social media companies with bandwidth restrictions and outright bans if they fail to comply with the governments’ requests. Moreover, in 2020, the Turkish Parliament passed a new law that mandated tech giants such as Facebook and Twitter (now X) to appoint representatives in Turkey for handling complaints related to the content on their platforms. Companies that decline to assign an official representative have been subject to fines, advertising prohibitions, and bandwidth restrictions that would render their networks unusable due to slow internet speeds. Facebook complied with the law in 2021 and assigned a legal entity in Turkey after refusing to do so the previous year (Bilginsoy, 2021). 

Since the early 2010s, many countries in the region including Turkey have enacted a series of legal reforms that converged around similar concepts and restrictions. As Table 1 shows, these laws follow the Chinese and Russian laws in temporal order. The table makes a comparison with some other countries in the region as well, in order to see Turkey’s position in this field.

Internet Shutdown

All governments in the region have resorted to shutting down the internet as a simple solution over the past 20 years, mostly during the times of mass protests, social unrest or military operations. In Turkey, in 2015, access to Facebook, Twitter and YouTube as well as 166 other websites were blocked when an image of a Turkish prosecutor held at gunpoint was circulated online. The internet was also cut off multiple times during the  July 15, 2016 coup attempt, as well as during the Turkish military’s operations in the Southeastern regions of the country. In many instances, the government has used bandwidth throttling to deny its citizens access to the internet. However, internet shutdown is costly as it affects the delivery of essential public and private services and has been dubbed as the Dictator’s Digital Dilemma. Therefore, even when it is practiced, the shutdown is limited to a certain location, mostly a city or a region, and would typically last only few days. According to Access Now (2022), an internet rights organization, no internet shutdown has taken place in Turkey in 2021. 

Given the high cost of switching off the internet and thanks to the rise of sophisticated technologies to filter, manipulate and re-direct internet content, censorship has become a more widely used digital authoritarian practice over the last decade. Countries have converged on the use of DPI technology. DPI is “a type of data processing that looks in detail at the contents of the data being sent, and re-routes it accordingly” (Geere, 2012). DPI inspects the data being sent over a network and may take various forms of actions, such as logging the content and alerting, as well as blocking or re-rerouting the traffic. DPI allows comprehensive network analysis. While it can be used for innocuous purposes, such as checking the content for viruses and ensuring the correct supply of content, it can also be used for digital eavesdropping, internet censorship, and even stealing sensitive information (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011).

Countries across the Muslim world including Turkey started in the mid-2010s to acquire DPI technology from Western and Chinese companies who have become important sources of diffusion. US-Canadian company Sandvine/Procera has provided DPI surveillance equipment to national networks operating in Turkey (Turk Telekom). This system operates over connections between an internet site and the target user and allows the government to tamper with the data sent through an unencrypted network (HTTP vs. HTTPS). Sandvine and its parent company Francisco Partners emerged at the center of the diffusion of DPI technology in the Middle East. Recent revelations show that the company has played significant role in facilitating the spread of ideas between countries. Through their information campaign, Sandvine contributed to learning by governments. As such, Sandvine and Netsweeper’s prominent engagement in provision of spying technology shows that it is not merely Chinese companies that enable digital authoritarianism. Western companies have been just as active.

Turkey made its first purchase from Sandvine (then Procera) in 2014 after the Gezi protests and corruption investigations rocked the AKP government the previous year. The government later used these devices to block websites, including Wikipedia, and those belonging to unwanted entities, such as independent news outlets and certain opposition groups in later years. The governments in the region including Turkey have gathered widespread spying and phishing capabilities sourced from mostly Western companies. For example, in Turkey, FinFisher used FinSpy in 2017 on a Turkish website disguised as the campaign website for the Turkish opposition movement and enabled the surveillance of political activists and journalists. FinSpy allowed the MIT to locate people, monitor phone calls and chats and mobile phone and computer data (ECCHR, 2023). This could link in with our discussion in emulation more clearly as well regarding private companies being key actors (Marczak et al., 2018).

Urban Surveillance

Three high-definition video surveillance cameras operated by the city police. Photo: Dreamstime.

With the advance of CCTV and AI technology, urban surveillance capabilities have grown exponentially over the past ten years. Dubbed as “safe” or “smart” cities, these urban surveillance projects are “mainly concerned with automating the policing of society using video cameras and other digital technologies to monitor and diagnose “suspicious behavior” (Kynge et al., 2021). The concept of Smart city captures an entire range of ICT capabilities implemented in an urban area. This might start with the simple goal of bringing internet connectivity and providing electronic payment solutions for basic services and evolve to establishing AI-controlled surveillance systems, as we have seen in many Chinese cities (Zeng, 2020). Smart cities deploy a host of ICT—including high-speed communication networks, sensors, and mobile phone apps—to boost mobility and connectivity, supercharge the digital economy, increase energy efficiency, improve the delivery of services, and generally raise the level of their residents’ welfare (Hong, 2022). The “smart” concept generally involves gathering large amounts of data to enhance various city functions. This can include optimizing the use of utilities and other services, reducing traffic congestion and pollution, and ultimately empowering both public authorities and residents.

The rapid development of smart city infrastructures across world has led to controversies as critics argued that the surveillance technology enables pervasive collection, retention, and misuse of personal data by everything from law enforcement agencies to private companies. Moreover, in recent years, China has been a major promoter of the ‘safe city’ concept that focuses on surveillance-driven policing of urban environments – a practice that has been perfected in most Chinese cities (Triolo, 2020). Several Chinese companies have been at the forefront of China’s effort to export its model of safe city: Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Zhejiang Dahua Technology, Alibaba, and Tiandy (Yan, 2019).

China has been a significant exporter of surveillance technology worldwide, including to countries like Turkey. Chinese firms such as Hikvision and Dahua have supplied surveillance equipment, including facial recognition systems, to various nations. Reports indicate that Turkey has utilized facial recognition software to monitor and identify individuals during protests (Radu, 2019; Bozkurt, 2021). 

Holistically, the global expansion of China’s urban surveillance model sparks significant concerns, particularly in relation to its potential to increase authoritarian practices in adopting countries. In the absence of robust counter mechanisms, the adoption of Chinese surveillance model by authoritarian states is only likely to augment. 

Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs)

Another interesting aspect of authoritarian regimes is the use of digital technologies in creating and spreading pro-regime propaganda and conspiracy narratives that benefit the regimes. This is happening extensively in the region, including Turkey, as a part of the manipulation of the people in order to impose control on them and silence the opposition. The pro-regime propaganda machine uses conspiracy theories with a dual strategy, defensive and offensive, to shape the public perception of the regime. Defensively, it seeks to portray the regime as a legitimate national authority, emphasising its adherence to the nation’s interests and well-being in a way that no legitimate alternative is imaginable. In these narratives, leaders are portrayed as heroic figures with exceptional qualities, and the system is presented as flawless and well-suited to the country’s needs. On the offensive front, the propaganda machine works to discredit any alternative to the current regime. Opposition figures are either assassinated, arrested or labelled as traitors, criminals, or foreign agents so they can be eliminated politically. To reach to this end, conspiracy theories link opposition figures to nefarious plots or foreign intervention, thus undermining the credibility of opposition narratives. 

In recent years, propaganda and conspiracy theories have played a significant role in Turkey’s political landscape, influencing political narratives and public opinion. The Turkish government, particularly under President Erdoğan and his ruling party (AKP), has been known for using state-controlled or pro-government media to push certain narratives. The government’s media strategy includes promoting nationalistic themes, highlighting Turkey’s achievements under AKP rule, and portraying the government as the protector of national interests against both internal and external threats. The government often emphasizes Turkey’s sovereignty and positions itself against perceived Western interference, such as criticisms from the European Union or the United States. By doing so, it strengthens a nationalist image, resonating with citizens who view Turkey as being unfairly targeted by foreign powers. Propaganda often incorporates Islamic and conservative values to appeal to the AKP’s core voter base. Erdoğan’s speeches and media outlets supportive of the government emphasize the defense of Islamic culture and values, framing the AKP as a protector of both religion and national identity. Government narratives frequently depict opposition groups as threats to national stability. This includes not only political rivals but also groups like the Kurdish population, the Gülen movement (which is accused by Erdogan regime of being behind the 2016 coup attempt), and the pro-Kurdish HDP party, who are often associated with terrorism or disloyalty. 

Additionally, conspiracy theories have been pervasive in Turkish political culture, often used to explain domestic unrest or justify political decisions. Here, pro-government media often propagate conspiracies about the opposition, portraying them as aligned with foreign powers or terrorist organizations. A persistent theme in Turkish political discourse is the idea that foreign powers or global financial institutions are working to undermine Turkey’s economy and political stability. Moreover, the failed coup attempt in July 2016 became a fertile ground for conspiracy theories. While the Turkish government attributed the coup attempt to Fethullah Gülen, a cleric who lived in exile in the United States for decades until his death, alternative theories continue to circulate. Some claim that foreign powers, particularly the US, were involved in the coup plot, while others suggest that elements within the Turkish government may have allowed the coup to proceed as a means to justify a subsequent crackdown on opposition. In the same vein, many conspiracy theories center around the idea that Western powers, particularly the US and Europe, are conspiring against Turkey to prevent it from becoming a major regional power. These theories often cite Turkey’s geopolitical location, its military interventions in the region, or its aspirations to become an independent economic powerhouse.

A significant portion of the mainstream media in Turkey is either directly controlled by the government or aligned with it. These outlets often echo government narratives, downplaying criticisms, and emphasizing government achievements or conspiracy-laden stories about opposition and foreign interference. Despite the dominance of pro-government media, social media platforms have become spaces for both opposition voices and pro-government voices. The government has sought to control these platforms through legal means, introducing laws to regulate social media and threatening to block access to platforms that do not comply with government requests to remove content.

Mechanisms of Diffusion

We observed that the diffusion of digital authoritarianism occurs in three main mechanisms: learning, emulation and cooperative interdependence.

Learning

It has been widely argued that countries across the globe learned from domestic and foreign experience to adopt various forms of digital authoritarian practices. This is more prominent in countries experiencing public unrest, like Turkey and Egypt. For example, they both have learned lessons from the Gezi Park and Tahrir Square protests, respectively. Despite many indications to this effect, for a long time there was a lack of smoking gun evidence pointing at this type of learning. In 2016, a series of leaked emails from Erdogan’s son-in-law and then Energy Minister Berat Albayrak’s account revealed that in the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests, the Erdogan regime identified its lack of control of digital space as a problem and sought solutions in the form of “set[ting] up a team of professional graphic designers, coders, and former army officials who had received training in psychological warfare” (Akis, 2022). In later years, the regime built one of the world’s most extensive internet surveillance networks on social media, particularly on X, according to Norton Symantec.

In regard to external learning, China (and Chinese companies) and Western private companies have been at the forefront of actors promoting internet censorship practices. China has been not only a major promoter but also a source of learning for middle powers when it comes to internet surveillance, data fusion, and AI. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a key vehicle that drives these efforts. For example, during the 2021 SCO summit, Chinese officials led a panel titled the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms, which trained the international audience that included many developing country representations on developing a “national data brain” that integrates various forms of financial and personal data and uses artificial intelligence to analyze it. The SCO website reported that 50 countries are engaged in discussions with the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms initiative (Ryan-Mosley, 2022). China has also been active in providing media and government training programs to representatives from BRI-affiliated countries. In one prominent example, Chinese Ministry of Public Security instructed Meiya Pico, a Chinese cybersecurity company, to train government representatives from Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and other countries on digital forensics (see Weber, 2019: 9-11). 

Moreover, the spread of internet censorship and surveillance technologies points to a highly probable learning event facilitated by western corporate entities. Specifically, Sandvine, NSO Group, and their parent company Francisco Partners, emerged at the center of the diffusion of DPI technology in most Middle Eastern countries except for Iran where the company is not allowed to operate. Recent revelations show that the company has played a significant role in facilitating the spread of ideas between countries. Alexander Haväng, the ex-Chief Technical Officer of Sandvine, explained in an internal newsletter addressed to the company’s employees that their technology can appeal to governments whose surveillance capacities are hampered by encryption. Haväng wrote that Sandvine’s equipment could “show who’s talking to who, for how long, and we can try to discover online anonymous identities who’ve uploaded incriminating content online” (Gallagher, 2022). 

The spread of DPI practices in general and Sandvine’s technology in particular is also evidenced by the chronology of acquisition by developing countries. The list of countries contracted to buy Sandvine’s DPI technology includes Turkey, Algeria, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Sudan, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan (Gallagher, 2022). There is a clear trend here, both in terms of regime susceptibility and chronology of adoption. Turkey purchased Sandvine’s DPI technology in 2014, Egypt in 2016, and Pakistan did so in 2018 (Malsin, 2018; Ali & Jahangir, 2019). 

It is highly likely that later adopters of this technology reviewed its performance in early adopters and decided upon their own adoption. We know from previous research that private companies can “influence the spread of state policies by encouraging the exchange of substantive and procedural information between states” (Garrett & Jansa, 2015: 391). Governments are required to understand details about the content of a technology and relevant institutional mechanisms to use it effectively. Corporations facilitate communication about these details. The existence of extensive links between Sandvine and authoritarian regimes, the similarities of how the tech has been used, and the sheer prominence of this company and its technology demonstrate a plausible argument for diffusion.

Using practice framework, we focus on ‘configurations of actors’ who are involved in enabling authoritarianism (Glasius & Michaelsen, 2018). In most instances, these actors are not states, but private companies (see Table 2). Moreover, contrary to perceived active role of Chinese companies, with the prime exception of Iran, it was Western tech companies that provided most of the high-tech surveillance and censorship capabilities to authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world including Turkey. These included, inter alia, US-Canadian company Sandvine, Israeli NSO Group, German FinFisher and Finland’s Nokia Networks. 

Emulation

There’s evidence that authoritarian countries in the region like Turkey have emulated major powers, as well as each other, when it comes to internet censorship practices. Among other things, homophily of actors played important role as actors prefer to emulate models from reference groups of actors with whom they share similar cultural or social attributes (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Political alignment and proximity among nations foster communication and the exchange of information (Rogers, 2010). We observe the influence of this dynamic between China and Russia, and political regimes in the Muslim world who are susceptible to authoritarian forms of governance to varying degrees.

Research noted that states tend to harmonize their policy approaches to align with the prevailing norms of the contemporary global community, irrespective of whether these specific policies or institutional frameworks align with local conditions or provide effective solutions. Notably, since most transfers originate from the core to the periphery, policy transfers to developing regions might be ill-suited and consequently ineffective. There’s evidence that adoption of city surveillance is driven by the desire for conformity rather than the search for effective solutions. China’s CCTV-smart city solutions are considered in the region to be “bold innovations” as they’ve gathered disproportionate attention from the developing countries across the world. However, there’s evidence that the countries adopt this technology because of their apparent promise rather than demonstrated success.  For example, there has been a controversy about whether Huawei’s safe city infrastructure actually helps to reduce urban crime. In a dubious presentation in 2019, Huawei claimed that its safe city systems have been highly effective in reducing crime, increasing the case clearance rate, reducing emergency response time, and increasing citizen satisfaction. However, research by CSIS revealed that these numbers have been grossly exaggerated if not completely fabricated (Hillman &  McCalpin, 2019).

Emulation and learning appear to be the major mechanisms through which such practices spread. First, by demonstrating the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns and propaganda – such as Russian interference in US presidential elections in 2016 and China’s propaganda around the Covid-19 pandemic – these countries have shown other regimes that similar tactics can be used to control their own populations and advance their interests (Jones, 2022). Second, China and Russia have acted as important sources of learning for authoritarian regimes. China has hosted thousands of foreign officials and members of media from BRI countries in various training programs on media and information management since 2017 (Freedom House, 2022). For example, in 2017, China’s Cyberspace Administration held cyberspace management seminars for officials from BRI countries. Chinese data-mining company iiMedia presented its media management platform which is advertised as offering comprehensive control of public opinion, including providing early-warnings for “negative” public opinions and helping guide the promotion of “positive energy” online (Laskai, 2019). 

The governments in the Muslim world learned how to use the social media and other digital technologies for ‘flooding,’ which helps strengthen and legitimize their political regime. This is a part of a broader objective of shaping the information environment domestically and internationally (Mir et al., 2022). At home, these governments are attempting to mold their citizens’ conduct online. They hired social media consultants and influencers to do their propaganda. They learned how to flood the information space with propaganda narratives using troll farms and bots. For example, in Turkey, the AKP government created a massive troll army in response to the Gezi Protests in 2013. A 2016 study published by the cyber security company Norton Symantec shows that among countries in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, Turkey is the country with the most bot accounts on Twitter (Akis, 2022). In 2020, Twitter announced that it was suspending 7,340 fake accounts that had shared over 37 million tweets from its platform. Twitter attributed the network of accounts to the youth wing of the ruling AKP. 

Through the aforementioned techniques, Turkey moved beyond strategies of “negative control” of the internet, in which the government attempt to block, censor, and suppress the flow of communication, and toward strategies of proactive co-optation in which social media serves regime objective. The opposite of internet freedom, therefore, is not necessarily internet censorship but a deceptive blend of control, co-option, and manipulation. As the public debate is seeded with such disinformation, this makes it hard for the governments’ opponents to convince their supporters and mobilize (Gunitsky, 2020).

Here, the practices appear to be a mixed bag of diffusion, convergence and even innovation on the part of some regional countries. There is some proof of learning on the part of the Turkish regime: Berat Albayrak’s emails reveal the government’s learning from the Gezi protests and intentional establishment of their own troll farms (Akis, 2022). Similarly, the Sisi regime learnt from the Arab Spring protests as well. While it is hard to find a smoking gun evidence of these regimes copying Russian or Chinese playbook, extensive links between some of these countries (such as Pakistan and Turkey), as well as between some of these countries and Russia/China (Turkey and Russia; China and Pakistan/Iran) brings some evidence of diffusion.

Cooperative Interdependence

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

We have observed that a cooperative interdependence has been at play when it comes to the diffusion of internet censorship practices from China to developing countries. Countries like Turkey are facing serious economic challenges and are in dire need of foreign direct investment. When tracing China’s technology transfer in these countries, a common thread emerges that tie most of the Chinese engagement to various forms of aid, trade negotiations, or grants. Prominently, China uses its Digital Silk Road (DSR) concept under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to push for adoption of its technological infrastructure and accompanying policies of surveillance and censorship in digital and urban environments (Hillman, 2021). For example, at the 2017 World Internet Conference in China, representatives from Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE signed a “Proposal for International Cooperation on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Digital Economy,” an agreement to construct the DSR to improve digital connectivity and e-commerce cooperation (Laskai, 2019). The core components of the DSR initiative are smart (or “safe cities”), internet infrastructure, and mobile networks.

We do not argue that China is “forcing” these countries to adopt internet censorship practices. Rather, a cooperative interdependence works through changing incentive structures of BRI-connected states where financial incentives by China, coupled with technology transfer, promote China’s practical approach to managing the cyberspace as well. Indeed, BRI’s digital dimensions include many projects such as 5G networks, smart city projects, fiber optic cables, data centers, satellites, and devices that connect to these systems. In addition to having commercial value in terms of expanding China’s business of information technology, these far-reaching technologies have strategic benefit as they help the country achieve geoeconomic and geopolitical objectives that involve promotion of digital authoritarian practices and Chinese model of internet governance (Malena, 2021; Tang, 2020). 

For example, Huawei’s growing influence in Turkey, and other regional countries such as Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and particularly in the context of building their 5G infrastructure, is tied to these countries’ involvement in DSR projects. As mentioned above, all the abovementioned countries have signed agreements to cooperate with Huawei to build their 5G infrastructure. The latter is not merely an advanced technology, but also a vehicle of promoting an entire legal and institutional infrastructure for China. In 2017 the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) released the “BRI Connectivity and Standards Action Plan 2018-2020” which aims at promoting Chinese technical standards and improving related policies among BRI-recipient states across technologies including AI, 5G, and satellite navigation systems (Malena, 2021).

Cooperative interdependence such as loans, commercial diplomacy and other state initiatives are prominent mechanisms through which China spreads its urban surveillance practices. The Table 2 also demonstrates this process.

In the Muslim world, countries converged on importing China’s smart city platforms in recent years. A close collaboration between Chinese technology companies and authoritarian governments has led to the development of smart city infrastructures in multiple urban settings. Several Chinese companies have been at the forefront of this endeavor: Huawei, Hikvision, ZTE Corporation, Alibaba, Dahua Technology, and Tiandy (Yan, 2019). Huawei is a key source of diffusion of urban surveillance practices.

Huawei has established partnerships with major Turkish telecom companies, Turkcell and Vodafone TR, to implement smart city technologies in Samsun and Istanbul, respectively (KOTRA, 2021). Additionally, Turkey hosts one of Huawei’s 19 global Research and Development centers. In 2020, Turkcell became the first telecom operator outside China to adopt Huawei’s mobile app infrastructure, a system developed by Huawei in response to US sanctions that limited the use of certain Google software on Huawei devices. In 2022, Turk Telekom signed a contract with Huawei to build Turkey’s complete 5G network (Hurriyet, 2022). This infrastructure, known as Huawei Mobile Services (HMS), encompasses a suite of applications, cloud services, and an app store, which Huawei describes as “a collection of apps, services, device integrations, and cloud capabilities supporting its ecosystem” (Huawei, 2022).

Countries have also emulated China as the role model when it comes to urban surveillance practices. Indeed, China’s influence was highly discernible in the area of urban surveillance, where it has emerged as a role model and a key provider of high-tech tools (Germanò et al., 2023). To begin with, there are extensive linkages between sender (mostly China) and adopter countries in political and economic areas. These include the growing presence of China in regional economies, participation in China-dominated organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and cooperation with China on internet governance issues such as the statement in the UN by several countries. Moreover, China has long acted as a laboratory to observe the results of its unique blend of high-tech authoritarianism that combined extensive urban surveillance with control of the internet under the pretext of national security and sovereignty (see Mueller, 2020). The perceived success of Chinese officials in curbing crime, ensuring stability and efficient management of urban settings, including their draconian measures to control the spread of COVID-19, have elevated China as a role model to be emulated by many authoritarian countries, including those in the Muslim world (Barker, 2021).

The table below demonstrates China’s role in the diffusion of digital authoritarianism in the region including Turkey:

Conclusion

This research illustrates how Turkey’s adoption of digital authoritarian practices—encompassing restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and strategic digital information operations—has been propelled by a combination of learning from domestic unrest, emulating paradigms set by major authoritarian players like China and Russia, and capitalizing on cooperative interdependence forged through economic and strategic partnerships. Despite Turkey’s NATO membership and other Western affiliations, the government has selectively borrowed from authoritarian models, integrating advanced surveillance technologies and normative frameworks that restrict civic freedoms in the digital realm. In this ecosystem, private Western companies, operating with limited oversight, have facilitated the supply of censorship and surveillance tools, challenging conventional expectations that illiberal digital governance is primarily state-driven.

These findings highlight the urgent need to establish robust international cyber norms and regulations that delineate clear boundaries on digital governance, particularly in states with deep ties to the West. Multilateral fora, including the United Nations and the Council of Europe, can take the lead by defining the scope of “digital authoritarianism,” instituting transparent guidelines on surveillance exports, and ensuring that technology providers are held accountable for the potential misuse of their products. Greater emphasis on privacy protections and digital rights is equally critical, calling for comprehensive legislation within Turkey that shields citizens from unwarranted data collection. Support from the international community—through funding, awareness campaigns, and legal assistance—can empower local civil society groups to advocate for these rights, educate citizens on online privacy, and hold authorities to account.

A second imperative is responsible corporate behavior, where companies must be compelled—via legal and reputational mechanisms—to adhere to human rights standards and disclose how their technologies are deployed in countries like Turkey. Establishing an independent monitoring entity to track repressive digital practices, publicize violations, and elevate them to international organizations can reinforce such accountability. Equally important, regional and global cooperation on digital freedom can help counter Turkey’s authoritarian trajectory; governments committed to open societies should launch joint initiatives aimed at improving cybersecurity, combating disinformation, and expanding transparent governance models that respect human rights. Technical assistance and knowledge-sharing will be particularly valuable where Turkey’s domestic institutions seek alternatives to purely repressive tools.

Moreover, economic incentives can be used strategically to steer Turkey away from partnerships that reinforce authoritarian tendencies. By prioritizing trade relationships and development aid tied to ethical technology practices, major economic powers and international financial institutions can encourage Turkey to align more closely with suppliers committed to democratic values. Such an approach has the added benefit of opening the market to innovators developing privacy-enhancing products, thus providing viable alternatives to invasive surveillance systems. Finally, the use of strategic diplomatic channels remains a powerful lever. Dialogue within NATO, discussions at the European Union level, and broader diplomatic engagements allow Turkey’s partners to advocate for transparent, responsible digital practices. Joint resolutions or multilateral condemnations of authoritarian behaviors can further raise the political costs of continued repression.

Taken together, these initiatives underscore that countering digital authoritarianism in Turkey requires a proactive, holistic strategy. While local factors—such as domestic protest movements and longstanding elite interests—play a crucial role, the role of international actors and private corporations is equally significant. Each dimension, whether it be legal reform, corporate accountability, economic leverage, or diplomatic pressure, offers a piece of the puzzle. Coordinated action that weaves these elements into a cohesive approach is essential not only for Turkey but for the broader effort to preserve the open, rights-respecting nature of the global digital landscape. By challenging the unchecked diffusion of repressive technologies and policies, the international community can mitigate the risks posed by an ever-expanding authoritarian playbook and ensure that the internet remains a domain of freedom and democratic possibility.


 

Funding: This work was supported by Australian Research Council [Grant Number DP230100257]; Gerda Henkel Foundation [Grant Number AZ 01/TG/21]; Australian Research Council [Grant Number DP220100829].


 

Authors

Ihsan Yilmaz is Deputy Director (Research Development) of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, where he also serves as Chair in Islamic Studies and Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations. He previously held academic positions at the Universities of Oxford and London and has a strong track record of leading multi-site international research projects. His work at Deakin has been supported by major funding bodies, including the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Victorian Government, and the Gerda Henkel Foundation.

(*) Ali Mamouri is a scholar and journalist specializing in political philosophy and theology. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University. With an academic background, Dr. Mamouri has held teaching positions at the University of Sydney, the University of Tehran, and Al-Mustansiriyah University, as well as other institutions in Iran and Iraq. He has also taught at the Qom and Najaf religious seminaries. From 2020 to 2022, he served as a Strategic Communications Advisor to the Iraqi Prime Minister, providing expertise on regional political dynamics. Dr. Mamouri also has an extensive career in journalism. From 2016 to 2023, he was the editor of Iraq Pulse at Al-Monitor, covering key political and religious developments in the Middle East. His work has been featured in BBC, ABC, The Conversation, Al-Monitor, and Al-Iraqia State Media, among other leading media platforms. As a respected policy analyst, his notable works include “The Dueling Ayatollahs: Khamenei, Sistani, and the Fight for the Soul of Shiite Islam” (Al-Monitor) and “Shia Leadership After Sistani” (Washington Institute). Beyond academia and journalism, Dr. Mamouri provides consultation to public and private organizations on Middle Eastern affairs. He has published several works in Arabic and Farsi, including a book on the political philosophy of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr and research on political Salafism. Additionally, he has contributed to The Great Islamic Encyclopedia and other major Islamic encyclopedias.

Nicholas Morieson is a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University. He was previously a Lecturer at the Australian Catholic University in Melbourne. His research interests include populism, religious nationalism, civilizational politics, intergroup relations, and the intersection of religion and political identity.

(**) Muhammad Omer is a PhD student in political science at the Deakin University. His PhD is examining the causes, ideological foundations, and the discursive construction of multiple populisms in a single polity (Pakistan). His other research interests include transnational Islam, religious extremism, and vernacular security. He previously completed his bachelor’s in politics and history from the University of East Anglia, UK, and master’s in political science from the Vrije University Amsterdam. 


 

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Authoritarian Diffusion in the Cyberspace: How Egypt Learns, Emulates, and Cooperates in Digital Authoritarianism

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Please cite as:
Yilmaz, Ihsan; Mamouri, Ali; Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Omer, Muhammad. (2025). “Authoritarian Diffusion in the Cyberspace: How Egypt Learns, Emulates, and Cooperates in Digital Authoritarianism.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). May 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0097



Egypt has emerged as a key adopter and regional diffuser of digital authoritarian practices. Once limited by weak digital infrastructure, the Sisi regime has transformed the country into a technologically repressive state through sweeping legal reforms, censorship mechanisms, and expansive surveillance networks. Drawing heavily from the models of China and Russia—particularly in urban monitoring and information control—Egypt actively emulates their approaches. Crucially, both Chinese and Western technology firms have facilitated this transformation, revealing a broader pattern of global complicity. This report demonstrates how Egypt’s trajectory illustrates the transnational diffusion of digital authoritarianism through mechanisms of learning, emulation, and interdependence—and offers a stark warning to democracies about the rising threat of state-enabled digital repression.

By Ihsan Yilmaz, Ali Mamouri*, Shahram Akbarzadeh**, Muhammad Omer***

Executive Summary

This report examines the rise and entrenchment of digital authoritarianism in Egypt, spotlighting how the regime systematically reclaims and militarizes the digital space to suppress dissent and erode democratic freedoms. Digital authoritarianism in Egypt spans four key domains: restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and strategic digital information operations (SDIOs).

Drawing on a wide array of sources—including academic literature, human rights reports, institutional data, and credible news coverage—the report demonstrates how the Egyptian government has aggressively expanded its control over digital life. This control includes deep surveillance tactics, the criminalization of online expression, and state-sponsored manipulation of digital discourse, all contributing to the shrinking of civic space and the violation of fundamental rights to privacy and free speech.

The regime employs advanced tools such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), widespread website blocking, and targeted internet shutdowns to neutralize opposition. These repressive tactics are reinforced by an expansive legal arsenal that frames digital expression as a threat to national security—penalizing dissent, limiting VPN use, and compelling tech companies to align with government mandates.

At the urban level, AI-driven CCTV networks and Smart City initiatives—often developed in partnership with Chinese and Western firms—create a pervasive surveillance infrastructure, enabling real-time monitoring of public behaviour. Meanwhile, through coordinated SDIO campaigns, the regime floods social media and state-aligned platforms with pro-government narratives, systematically silencing alternative viewpoints. These operations blend defensive strategies (legitimizing the regime and quelling criticism) with offensive disinformation that delegitimizes opposition groups.

The diffusion of these practices is not solely domestically engineered. Egypt’s digital authoritarian model is transnational in character, built through mechanisms of learning, emulation, and technological dependence. China has emerged as a central enabler, exporting both surveillance infrastructure and governance models. Yet, Western corporations—including Sandvine, NSO Group, FinFisher, and Nokia Networks—have also contributed significantly, supplying critical technologies that bolster Egypt’s repressive digital architecture, often with little regard for ethical implications.

Egypt’s model of digital control illustrates a dangerous global trend: the normalization and globalization of digital authoritarianism, where regimes exploit emerging technologies and international complicity to entrench power, silence dissent, and undermine democratic norms.

Recommendations

To effectively counter the growing threat of digital authoritarianism in Egypt and beyond, a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy must be adopted. The following recommendations highlight key interventions to safeguard digital freedoms, enhance democratic resilience, and hold both states and corporations accountable:

1. Strengthen International Cyber Norms and Regulatory Frameworks: Establish binding international standards and protocols to govern the use of digital technologies by states. These norms must explicitly prohibit mass surveillance, politically motivated internet shutdowns, and the deployment of spyware against civilians. Multilateral organizations—such as the United Nations, the European Union, and regional bodies—must play a central role in enforcing these norms through treaties, sanctions, and export control regimes that restrict the transfer of surveillance technologies to authoritarian regimes.

2. Defend Digital Rights and Data Privacy at the National and Global Levels: Push for robust data protection legislation that empowers individuals and protects them from arbitrary state surveillance. Promote digital literacy campaigns and citizen awareness programs to strengthen public understanding of online rights and safety. Support grassroots civil society organizations, independent media, and digital rights defenders who expose abuses and advocate for open, secure, and rights-respecting digital environments.

3. Enforce Corporate Accountability and Ethical Tech Governance: Hold technology firms—both domestic and transnational—legally and morally accountable for their role in enabling repression. Establish international watchdog bodies to investigate, name-and-shame, and penalize companies complicit in human rights violations through the export or maintenance of surveillance technologies. Implement mandatory human rights impact assessments for all technology exports to high-risk regimes and enhance supply chain transparency in the tech sector.

4. Promote Strategic International Collaboration to Safeguard Digital Democracy: Strengthen multilateral coalitions of democracies to share intelligence, technological tools, and policy approaches for combating disinformation, propaganda, and transnational repression. Support cross-border investigations into Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs) and develop joint early warning systems to detect digital repression tactics. Extend technical and legal support to countries resisting authoritarian encroachment into their digital spheres.

5. Leverage Economic Incentives to Deter Authoritarian Partnerships: Use trade agreements, investment flows, and development aid as tools to condition engagement with states on the basis of their digital human rights records. Encourage private and public institutions to divest from companies involved in digital repression and prioritize investment in technologies that strengthen democratic institutions, secure communications, and civil society networks.

6. Deploy Diplomatic and Legal Instruments to Challenge Repression: Utilize bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to pressure authoritarian regimes to reform their surveillance laws and practices. Sponsor UN resolutions, global forums, and high-level summits that spotlight digital repression and mobilize international consensus. Support international legal actions against regimes and actors who violate digital human rights, using forums such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and regional human rights courts.

7. Build Resilience Through Innovation and Empowerment: Invest in the development of privacy-preserving technologies, secure communication platforms, and censorship circumvention tools. Support the creation of local digital infrastructures that resist surveillance, especially in vulnerable democracies. Back innovation ecosystems that empower civic tech, independent media, and digital rights advocacy to thrive even under authoritarian pressure.

Addressing digital authoritarianism requires more than reactive measures—it demands proactive, coordinated, and sustained global action. The recommendations above provide a roadmap for governments, international institutions, civil society, and the private sector to reclaim the digital domain as a space of freedom, accountability, and democratic possibility.

Photo: Dreamstime.

Introduction

In recent years, scholars have increasingly focused on the diffusion of authoritarianism (Ambrosio, 2010; Bank, 2017), a process where authoritarian institutions, practices, policies, strategies, rhetorical frames, and norms spread from one regime to another (Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019). This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the Middle East and Muslim World, where many countries exhibit authoritarian governance (Durac & Cavatorta, 2022; Yenigun, 2021; Stepan et al., 2018; Ahmed et al., 2023; Akbarzadeh et al., 2024; Yilmaz et al., 2024).

The advent of the internet and social media in the developing world in the late 2000s significantly empowered civil society and individual activists in these regions, creating an equalizing power between the state and society (Breuer, 2012; Ruijgrok, 2017). The extensive use of these technologies by protesters led many to consider them as “liberation technology,” facilitating anti-government movements across non-democratic countries (Diamond & Plattner, 2012; Ziccardi, 2012). 

Initially, authoritarian governments struggled to control the digital sphere due to a lack of technical expertise and digital infrastructure. They often resorted to internet shutdowns, as seen in Egypt during the Arab Spring 2011 protests (Cattle, 2015). However, as digital technologies evolved, so did the capabilities of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, despite the internet’s potential as a tool for liberation, its use by authoritarian regimes to disseminate propaganda, conduct surveillance, and control information has led to a new form of authoritarianism (Polyakova, 2019). 

This transformation is driven by advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and the widespread use of the internet, which have enabled unprecedented levels of surveillance and control. As Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian activist, has reminded us: “The Arab Spring revealed social media’s greatest potential, but it also exposed its greatest shortcomings. The same tool that united [people] to topple dictators eventually tore [us] apart through echo-chamber polarization, misinformation, toxic hate speech” (Gardels, 2019).

Such widespread adoption of digital control measures has led to the emergence of “digital authoritarianism” literature (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019; Dragu & Lupu, 2021; Khalil, 2020; Lilkov, 2020; Mare, 2020; Feldstein, 2019; Ahmed et al., 2023; Akbarzadeh et al., 2024; Yilmaz et al., 2024). This literature posits that as regimes leverage AI and other digital tools to monitor and control dissent, the need for policymakers and civil society organizations to counter these practices has become critical. The pessimism surrounding the potential of modern technology to undermine democracy is growing, with concerns about misinformation, data collection, surveillance, spread of conspiracy theories and propagation of authoritarian governance models (Radavoi, 2019; Stone et al., 2016; Bostrom, 2014; Helbing et al., 2019; Damnjanović, 2015; Yilmaz et al., 2025; Yilmaz & Shakil 2025). In a poll conducted by Pew, almost half of participants believed that the “use of [modern] technology will mostly weaken core aspects of democracy and democratic representation in the next decade” (Anderson, 2020).

Extant literature mainly focuses on countries such as China and Russia and their technology companies facilitating and promoting digital authoritarian practices (Khalil, 2020; Taylor, 2022; Zhang, Alon, & Lattemann, 2020). Moreover, the literature has treated policies, norms, and technological tools in a general manner as phenomena analysing authoritarian regimes’ use of tools like filtering and digital surveillance (Hellmeier, 2016; Xu, 2021) and examining policies governing the internet (Kerr, 2018). However, policies, norms, and technologies cannot be separated as they are usually interlinked among government entities, private companies, and international organizations across global networks (Dragu & Lupu, 2021). Therefore, as Adler and Pouliot (2011: 5) stated, practices are “patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts,” this study chose a more holistic analysis, investigating norms, policies, and technologies employed by governments and non-state entities in an integrated manner. 

This report examines the digital authoritarian practices in Egypt (see Akbarzadeh et al., 2025) and the diffusion of these practices by investigating the norms, policies, and technologies employed by the Egyptian government. What we mean by diffusion is the process that Gilardi (2012: 454) describes as what “leads to the pattern of adoption, not the fact that at the end of the period, all (or many) countries have adopted the policy.” As such, diffusion refers to the use of digital technologies by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (Feldstein, 2021). Therefore, diffusion does not necessarily require an absolute convergence of practices; rather, an increase in policy similarity across countries generally follows diffusion processes (Gilardi, 2010; 2012), which we demonstrate here. Egypt, similar to other authoritarian regimes, utilize digital technology—often sourced from abroad, including from Western countries—such as the internet, social media, and artificial intelligence to maintain control and suppress dissent. 

We aim to understand how these practices spread and what can be done to counter them. Egypt, like other authoritarian regimes, have become adept at using sophisticated digital tools to monitor and control the internet rather than simply shutting it down. Technologies like DPI, “a type of data processing that looks in detail at the contents of the data being sent, and re-routes it accordingly” (Geere, 2012), allow for comprehensive network analysis and can be used for digital eavesdropping, internet censorship, and data theft (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011). This report will explore these dynamics in detail, providing a comprehensive analysis of the diffusion of digital authoritarianism in Egypt. 

Data Analysis of the Digital Space in Egypt

Egypt, with a total population of 116 million by mid-2024 and a USD476.7 billion GDP as of 2022 (Worldometer, 2024), is considered one of the most important countries in the Middle East and has a wide influence on the Arab world. It was among the first countries to witness the Arab Spring Movement and go through dramatic changes in the political system. The internet played a significant role in this period and also in the aftermath of the military’s cope in 2013. The table below shows the rise of internet usage in Egypt. 

The brief political openings in the late 2000s and the early 2010s were fuelled by the internet and social media’s empowerment of social mobilization and the authoritarian regimes’ inability to control the digital sphere as they lacked technical expertise and digital infrastructure to rein in on the internet (Cattle, 2015). However, as the use of the internet was on the rise in Egypt, the government’s efforts to control the digital space and impose more surveillance on people have been increasingly on the rise as well. Freedom House has reported a significant rise of government control on digital space in Egypt. The Freedom House Index shows that, on average, internet freedom has declined by about 40% in Egypt.

Freedom House’s World Index shows that Egypt has experienced declines in freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House, 2022). As a result, Egypt scored 26 on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free) in 2020, according to Freedom House (2021).

Tracing the pattern of practising digital authoritarianism in the world indicates that China and Russia play a significant role in leading this conduct, setting an effective example for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, including Egypt, to follow the same pathway. The table in Figure 4 shows how Egypt followed the pathway of Chinese and Russian legislation in imposing digital authoritarianism.

The diffusion of digital authoritarian practice in Egypt is not limited to China. Many Western companies have contributed to providing the Egyptian government with sufficient technologies to impose control on digital space. The table in Figure 5 provides details about the source of technologies used in Egypt. 

Digital Authoritarian Strategies, Policies, and Practices

In this section, we explore a variety of strategies and policies the Egyptian government has adopted to impose a digital authoritarian regime in the country. The Egyptian government worked on four domains: restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and SDIOs. By leveraging these four domains, the Egyptian government has constructed a comprehensive system of digital authoritarianism. This system not only fortifies its grip on power but also serves as a blueprint for other authoritarian regimes seeking to exploit digital technologies to suppress dissent and maintain control.

Restrictive Legal Frameworks

Digital authoritarian regimes implement four main types of legal restrictions, and examples of all of these can be found in Egypt. First, laws that mandate internet service providers to establish systems for real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks. This enables continuous surveillance of online activities. Second, legal frameworks that penalize online speech under the guise of protecting national identity, culture, and preventing defamation. This often results in the suppression of dissenting opinions and freedom of expression. Third, VPN Restrictions, which follow the lead of countries like China and Russia to ban or restrict the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). While VPNs are technically legal in Egypt, many VPN servers and websites are blocked, hindering their practical use. Fourth, control over social media companies in various methods. Although Western social media sites remain accessible in Egypt, the government has introduced laws that increase its control over the content shared on these platforms. This is achieved by threatening social media companies with bandwidth restrictions and outright bans if they fail to comply with government requests. Moreover, Egypt’s 2018 Cybercrime Law requires foreign companies handling personal data within the country to designate a representative located in Egypt (Fatafta, 2020).

Despite the Egyptian Constitution guaranteeing freedom of the internet to some extent (for example, Articles 57, 68, 71, and 72), by prohibiting blocking websites, surveilling digital space, and harassing and prosecuting journalists and activists, the authorities continued to develop legislation in this direction and implement it on a large scale. Multiple legislations have been passed and applied to reach above goals. 

The “cybercrime law” in Egypt, signed by President Sisi in 2018, legalizes and reinforces the existing censorship and blocking of websites (Freedom House, 2021). The new law treats all social media accounts with more than 5,000 followers as “media outlets,” making them eligible for censorship (RSF, 2018). The laws also mandated internet service providers to establish a system allowing real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks (Privacy International, 2019). The cybercrime law criminalizes any form of speech that is against ‘national security’ which is defined so broadly that it covers “all that is related to the independence, stability, and security of the homeland and its unity and territorial integrity” and anything to do with the president’s office and all defence and security departments. The law permits the search of citizens’ personal devices and social media accounts can be blocked without judicial authorization, ostensibly for disseminating “false” information or inciting unlawful activities (Manshurat, 2018). Article 2 mandates that service providers retain and store records of their information systems, including all user-related data, for a period of 180 days. This information must be made available to any government agency upon request. Article 7 outlines the procedure for blocking websites that publish content deemed threatening to national security or detrimental to the country’s security or economy. Article 9 grants the Public Prosecutor the authority to issue travel bans and bring individuals accused of violating Article 7 before the Criminal Court. 

The cybercrime law has led to increased penalties and harassment of journalists and activists on social media platforms (Freedom House, 2022). Consequently, there is minimal political opposition in Egypt, as expressing dissenting views on social media can lead to criminal prosecution and harsh punishments. Furthermore, there are significant restrictions and harassment of civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, and the press. Security forces also engage in widespread violations against marginalized groups, including homosexuals and minorities, under the guise of national security concerns.

 The Anti-Terrorism Law, passed in 2015, encompasses broad forms of criminalization and grants extensive powers to address electronic activities, including the arrest of journalists and activists, digital surveillance, and the closure and blocking of websites (Manshurat, 2020). Article 49 of this law empowers the Public Prosecution or relevant investigative authority to halt or block websites specified in Article 29 or any other aspect of online usage outlined in the legislation, as well as to confiscate devices and equipment used in the commission of such offenses. For instance, the Cairo Court of Urgent Matters issued an order to seize and freezethe assets, accounts, and properties of “Mustafa Mukhtar Mohamed Saqr,” the president of “Business News,” the company that owns the two Daily News Egypt websites.

Moreover, at the end of 2022, the Telecom Law amendments were made to expand telecommunication equipment restrictions (Rezk & Hashish, 2023). Now, not only is the importation, manufacturing, assembly of such equipment prohibited without a permit, but also possession, use, operation, installation, or marketing is prohibited without obtaining permission from relevant authorities like the NTRA (The National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority) and national security agencies. The penalty for violating these requirements has been increased to a fine ranging from 2 million to 5 million Egyptian pounds. 

Internet Censorship

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According to Access Now, a leading internet research organization, at least 182 internet shutdowns occurred in 34 countries in 2021 (Access Now, 2022). The Mubarak regime famously switched off the country’s internet during the mass protests in Cairo in January 2011. In recent years, however, internet shutdowns have been rare in Egypt. In 2018, the Egyptian Armed Forces ordered a region-wide shutdown of internet and telecommunication services in the Sinai Peninsula and adjacent areas during the army’s military campaign against ISIS-affiliated insurgents in the region (SMEX, 2018). One reason behind the reduction of internet shutdowns is that they are costly as they affect the delivery of essential public and private services and have been dubbed the Dictator’s Digital Dilemma (Hussain, Howard & Agarwal, 2011). Therefore, even when it is practised, the shutdown is limited to a certain location and typically lasts only a few days. According to Access Now (Hernández et al., 2023), no internet shutdown occurred in Egypt in 2021. 

Common methods of censorship, which Deibert et al. (2010) highlighted as “first generation” are filtering and site blocking, which became more common in the late 2000s. IP blocking/filtering and DNS tampering are the common methods of filtering. IP filtering is used to block or filter objectionable content by restricting access to specific IP addresses. Freedom House reported in 2022 that Egypt was a not-free country in relation to the use of digital technologies, ranking it 27 out of 100, identifying three major issues: obstacles to access, limits to contents, and violation of users’ rights (Freedom House, 2022). 

Since the imposition of a “state of emergency” in Egypt in 2017 (Atlantic Council, 2019), which directly granted the authorities the power to impose censorship and monitor all forms of online communication, Egypt blocked over 500 websites (AFTE Egypt, 2020). This includes independent news websites that publish articles criticising the Egyptian government, such as Mada MasrAl-Manassa and Daily News Egypt, in addition to international news websites, such as Al-Jazeera,  Al-Arabiya, and Huffington Post Arabic. The blocking also included well-known Egyptian blogs that had previously warned since Sisi took power that he was rebuilding an authoritarian regime. The banned blogs included Fahmi Huwaidi’s blog (including his column in Shorouk News), Jawdell’s blog, Manal’s blog, Alaa’s blog, Bahia’s blog, and Ahmed Gamal Ziada’s personal blog. Manal and Alaa had previously won awards (Welle, 2005) from Reporters Without Borders. The blocking expands websites that provide content related to human rights and civil society, such as the website of Reporters Without Borders, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, the Journalists Against Torture Observatory, and the website of Human Rights Watch, one day after the organisation released a report documenting the systematic use of torture in prisons in September 2017. The blocking was not limited to news sites only but also went on to block 261 VPN and proxy sites, including “Tunnelbear,” “CyberGhost,” “HotspotShield,” and messaging application Signal. 

Censorship sometimes occurs via prosecution measures, which come in conjunction with punishing the authors or contributors. Egyptian authorities severely undermined media freedom and the right to access information and punished the publication of opinions on news sites and social media posts. For example, in February 2023, the Public Prosecution referred three journalists (Welle, 2023) from Mada Masr to trial in a case related to publishing a report alleging corruption in the pro-Sisi “Nation’s Future Party,” and in June, the authorities blocked two independent news websites, “Egypt 360” and “The Fourth Estate” (Access Now, 2023). In September 2023, security forces arrested two individuals from their homes in Menoufia and Mansoura governorates after they published tweets on the “X” website, supporting Tantawi and democratic change. In October 2023, the Supreme Council for Media Regulation referred workers (“x.com,” n.d.) at the independent media website “Mada Masr” to the prosecution, with the charge of “practising media activities without a license” and “spreading false news without verifying its sources.”

Authoritarian regimes have tended to use more subtle and insidious forms of censorship, which also use surveillance techniques and rely on quasi-democratic legal mechanisms (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). This has included using DPI surveillance technology acquired from Western and Chinese companies, which have become essential sources of diffusion of authoritarian practices. Companies such as Sandvine Corporation, a US-Canadian company, have provided tech to over a dozen countries, including Egypt. DPI is “a type of data processing that looks in detail at the contents of the data being sent and re-routes it accordingly” (Geere, 2012). DPI inspects the data being sent over a network and may take various forms of action, such as logging the content and alerting, as well as blocking or rerouting the traffic. DPI allows comprehensive network analysis. While it can be used for innocuous purposes, such as checking the content for viruses and ensuring the correct supply of content, it can also be used for digital eavesdropping, internet censorship, and even stealing sensitive information (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011).

Urban Surveillance

In addition to digital monitoring, the government has significantly expanded its surveillance capabilities within urban areas. Advanced surveillance systems, including extensive CCTV networks equipped with facial recognition technology, have been deployed. These systems are integrated with AI-powered analytics capable of tracking and identifying individuals, monitoring public gatherings, and analysing behavioural patterns. This pervasive surveillance infrastructure not only deters public dissent but also enables the rapid identification and apprehension of activists and protesters.

Egypt has employed extensive surveillance technologies such as Smart City/Safe City platforms, facial recognition systems, and smart policing, as highlighted in the AI Global Surveillance (AIGS) Index. These technologies have been instrumental in suppressing democratic movements (Wheeler, 2017). During the 2010s, Egypt witnessed increased internet technology adoption and a concurrent decline in democratic practices. Data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) indicates a dramatic rise in internet usage in Egypt since 2019, which led the Egyptian government to more investment in urban surveillance.

The aforementioned DPI technology acquired from the American company Sandvine/Procera Networks enabled the Egyptian government to monitor citizens’ internet activities, hack accounts, and reroute internet traffic. This technology allows Telecom Egypt to spy on users and block human rights and political content (Marczak et al., 2018). Additionally, Egypt’s General Intelligence Service has conducted sophisticated cyber-spying operations on opposition and civil society activists by installing software on their phones, granting access to files, emails, GPS coordinates, and contact lists (Bergman, 2019).

Safe or smart cities are another policy that Egypt is undertaking in order to increase its urban surveillance capabilities. The “Smart” concept generally involves gathering large amounts of data to enhance various city functions. This can include optimizing the use of utilities and other services, reducing traffic congestion and pollution, and ultimately empowering both public authorities and residents. According to a Huawei report, “Safe cities are an essential pillar supporting the future development of smart cities” (Hillman & McCalpin, 2019). These cities deploy high-speed communication networks, sensors, and mobile apps to enhance mobility, connectivity, energy efficiency, service delivery, and overall resident welfare (Hong, 2022). Becoming “smart” typically involves harnessing troves of data to optimize city functions—from more efficient use of utilities and other services to reducing traffic congestion and pollution—all with a view to empowering public authorities and residents (Muggah, 2021). With the advance of CCTV and AI technology, urban surveillance capabilities have grown exponentially over the past ten years. Dubbed “safe” or “smart” cities, these urban surveillance projects are “mainly concerned with automating the policing of society using video cameras and other digital technologies to monitor and diagnose suspicious behaviour” (Kynge et al., 2021).

Egypt’s most significant smart city project under the Sisi government is the New Administrative Capital (NAC) east of Cairo (Al-Hathloul, 2022). The NAC is designed with a full suite of smart/safe city solutions, including 6,000 CCTV cameras and a surveillance system by American company Honeywell, which monitors crowds, traffic congestion, theft, and suspicious activities and triggers automated alarms during emergencies (Mourad & Lewis, 2021). Honeywell also has contracts for Saudi Arabia’s NEOM megaproject. Huawei’s presence in Egypt has also been growing. In 2018, Huawei signed a memorandum with Telecom Egypt to establish a $5 million data centre for a cloud computing network, aiming to develop one of the five largest cloud networks globally and the first in MENA. Egypt and Huawei are also negotiating to bring Huawei’s 5G infrastructure to the country (Blaubach, 2021). The surveillance infrastructure includes Schneider Electric’s EcoStruxure platform, which connects various systems for optimization and sustainability (Egypt Today, 2022). 

The development of smart city infrastructures has sparked controversies, with critics arguing that these technologies enable pervasive collection, retention, and misuse of personal data by law enforcement and private companies. The NAC, which is being built by China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) (Al-Hathloul, 2022), has been driven by an attempt by the authoritarian Sisi government to isolate and protect itself from a revolutionary scenario that befell the Mubarak regime in 2011. By moving government offices 50 km away from central Cairo and Tahrir Square, the regime aims to ensure its structures are safeguarded even during unrest. All the surveillance capabilities in the NAC will be further helpful in protecting the regime (see Middle East Monitor, 2021; Bergman & Walsh, 2021; Menshawy, 2021).

Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs)

Banners supporting Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi’s bid for a second term during the presidential elections, displayed along the crowded Al Moez Street in the Gamalia district of Cairo, Egypt, on March 25, 2018. Photo: Halit Sadik.

The Egyptian government employs a sophisticated network of SDIOs. SDIOs refer to “efforts by state and non-state actors to manipulate public opinion as well as individual and collective emotions by using digital technologies to change how people relate and respond to events in the world” (Yilmaz et al., 2023). Thus, the Egyptian government does not only rely on randomized acts of internet shutdowns but carefully manipulates and alters the information environment to serve its motives. 

Egypt has begun to move beyond strategies of ‘negative control’ of the internet, in which regimes attempt to block, censor, and suppress the flow of communication and toward strategies of proactive co-optation in which social media serves regime objectives. The opposite of internet freedom, therefore, is not necessarily internet censorship but a deceptive blend of control, co-option, and manipulation. Scholars call this phenomenon ‘flooding’ as the governments try to ‘flood’ the informational space with false, distracting or otherwise worthless pieces of information (Roberts, 2018; Mir et al., 2022). As the public debate is seeded with such disinformation, this makes it hard for the governments’ opponents to convince their supporters and mobilize.

The Egyptian government employs a robust propaganda machine to shape public perception and maintain control over the narrative. This involves the strategic use of state-controlled media, social media platforms, and online influencers to disseminate pro-regime content and discredit opposition. The regime propagates conspiracy theories that portray political dissenters as foreign agents or terrorists, thereby justifying its repressive measures. As Akbarzadeh et al. (2025) demonstrates, “President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi frequently talks about conspiracies against the Arab World and Egypt in particular, thanking Egyptians who stood against these conspiracies and prevented the country from falling in the direction of Iraq, Syria, and Libya, all that were intervened by the US and other Western allies.” In the same way “Sisi used the consequences of the Western role in Iraq, Syria, and Libya as a method to promote his rule in Egypt and scare Egyptians from seeking change in their country, which would lead them to get trapped in conspiracies undertaken in other Middle Eastern countries” (Akbarzadeh et al., 2025).

Egyptian officials commonly instil fear among citizens to ensure their loyalty to the current government, often by amplifying concerns about potential conspiracies against the nation. This rhetoric tends to escalate as elections approach (Akbarzadeh et al., 2025). State-run TV channels, newspapers, and online portals play a crucial role in this information warfare, ensuring that the regime’s message reaches a broad audience. The Sisi regime, for example, employs troll armies to be used in political astroturfing operations. In 2020, Twitter banned over 9,000 accounts that were spreading misleading information. Another report found that the Sisi government used automated/bot accounts to promote its popular hashtags on Twitter (DFRLab, 2023).

The regime usually employs defensive and offensive approaches in this regard. The dual strategy, seamlessly blending defensive and offensive tactics, creates a narrative that reinforces the regime’s image and marginalizes any alternatives, fostering an environment of public trust and unity under the existing leadership.

Defensively, it seeks to portray the regime as a legitimate national authority, emphasising its adherence to the nation’s interests and well-being in a way that no legitimate alternative is imaginable. In these narratives, government leaders are portrayed as heroic figures with exceptional qualities, and the system is presented as flawless and well-suited to the country’s needs. Like many examples Igor Golomstock provided in his book Totalitarian Art (1990), Egyptian propaganda presents the head of state as the father of the nation, and any attempt to criticise him or his authority is introduced as a betrayal to Egypt. Egyptian TV channels frequently host Arab leaders praising Sisi and portraying him as the savour of Egypt and the Arab nation. 

On the offensive front, the propaganda machine works to discredit any alternative to the current regime. Opposition figures or movements are subjected to character assassinations and labelled as traitors, criminals, or foreign agents. Conspiracy theories are propagated, linking opposition figures to nefarious plots or foreign interference, thereby undermining the credibility of opposing narratives. Additionally, the propaganda machine manipulates national unity sentiments to marginalise dissent, presenting the regime as a unifying force and framing opposition as divisive threats to the country’s unity. This comprehensive approach aims to fortify public support for the current regime while systematically diminishing the credibility of dissenting voices. In conjunction with the magnification and glorification of the president’s image, extensive work has been done to demonise the image of the opposition as a whole, generalising all under the unsightly titles of “traitors” cooperating with foreign enemies, “terrorism,” “riot” and “suspicious calls,” slamming all attempts of demonstrations or criticising the government. 

One significant rationale lies in the inherent lack of genuine legitimacy, coupled with a substantial disconnect between the state and society. Consequently, the fabrication of imaginary adversaries becomes a tool for fostering national unity and identity under the regime’s rule. A parallel goal of this strategy is the cultivation of a cult of leadership. Totalitarian regimes craft an image of leaders as defenders against external enemies, fostering a cult of personality that solidifies their control over the narrative and the populace. This narrative, in turn, rallies support for the militarization of both the state and society. Moreover, the identification of enemies becomes a rationale for increased militarization and defence spending. Totalitarian regimes leverage perceived external threats to justify allocating resources to the military, enhancing capabilities, and maintaining control over the security apparatus. Consequently, these regimes effectively maintain fear and control over the population. Ultimately, the perpetual portrayal of an external threat or identification of internal enemies sustains a climate of fear among citizens, discouraging challenges to the regime. 

In authoritarian regimes, conspiracy theories play a crucial role in consolidating power by channelling public discontent toward perceived external or internal threats. These narratives function as propaganda tools, allowing governments to justify repression, delegitimize critics, and deflect attention from governance failures. Unlike in democratic contexts, where conspiracy theories are often propagated by fringe actors, authoritarian regimes institutionalize them, presenting them as official truths that shape political realities. A key tactic involves accusing dissidents of affiliations with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to suppress freedom of speech, protest, and independent media. By framing opposition figures as existential threats to national unity, regimes cultivate public trust and reinforce their own legitimacy while silencing alternative voices (Akbarzadeh et al., 2025).

Collectively, the sophisticated implementation of SDIOs manipulate feelings of national unity to marginalise the opposition, presenting the regime as a unifying force and framing the opposition as a divisive threat to the country’s unity. This comprehensive approach aims to strengthen popular support for the current regime while systematically diminishing the credibility of opposition voices. The dual strategy, which seamlessly blends defensive and offensive tactics, creates a narrative that enhances the regime’s image and marginalises any alternatives, fostering an environment of public trust and unity under the current leadership.

Diffusion of Authoritarian Practices

Photo: Dreamstime.

Diffusion mechanisms are systematic sets of statements that provide a plausible explanation of how policy decisions in one country are influenced by prior policy choices made in other countries (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; 299). The literature on this topic often highlights areas of convergence and contact points between early and later adopters (see Kerr, 2018). Diffusion is any process where earlier adoption or practice within a population increases the likelihood of adoption among non-adopters (Strang, 1991: 325). It occurs when policy decisions in one country are systematically influenced by previous policy choices in other countries (Dobbin et al., 2007: 787; Gilardi, 2012). Traditionally, research on diffusion has focused on the spread of popular uprisings against autocratic leaders (Koesel & Bunce, 2013; Beissinger, 2007). However, more recently, scholars have shifted their focus to the diffusion of authoritarian practices (Ambrosio, 2010; Bank, 2017). The diffusion process occurs through three main mechanisms: learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence (Bashirov et al., 2025).

Learning

The process of learning can be driven internally, where actors learn from their own experiences, evaluating and adopting innovations based on the success of prior applications. It can also be externally driven, with an external actor facilitating the learning process. The role of the external actor can range from small, such as selling or installing technological tools, to extensive, involving large-scale activities like seminars and training programs to promote a policy or practice. Using a practice framework, we focus on ‘configurations of actors’ involved in enabling authoritarianism (Michaelsen, 2018). Often, these actors are private companies rather than states. 

Contrary to the perceived active role of Chinese companies, it was Western tech companies that provided most of the high-tech surveillance and censorship capabilities to authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world. Notable examples include the US-Canadian company Sandvine, the Israeli NSO GroupGerman FinFisher, and Finland’s Nokia Networks. Internet surveillance has been facilitated through the cooperation between adopter countries willing to purchase the technology and companies like Sandvine willing to sell it. Sandvine’s willingness is evidenced by the company’s chief technology officer, who stated, “We don’t want to play world police. We believe that each sovereign country should be allowed to set their own policy on what is allowed and what is not allowed in that country” (Gallagher, 2022). 

Regarding external learning, China, along with Chinese and Western private companies, has been leading the promotion of internet censorship practices. China has become a major advocate and a learning source for middle powers in internet surveillance, data fusion, and AI. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a crucial platform for these efforts. For instance, at the 2021 SCO summit, Chinese officials led a panel called the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms, training an international audience, including many representatives from developing countries, on creating a “national data brain” that integrates various forms of financial and personal data and employs artificial intelligence for analysis. According to the SCO website, 50 countries are involved in discussions with the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms initiative (Ryan-Mosley, 2022). China has also been proactive in offering media and government training programs to representatives from countries affiliated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A notable example includes the Chinese Ministry of Public Security directing Meiya Pico, a Chinese cybersecurity company, to train government representatives from Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and other nations on digital forensics (see Weber, 2019: 9-11).

Russia is another leading source of diffusion of digital authoritarianism in the Middle East. Russia’s brazen attempts at disinformation and propaganda lend support to the emergence of digital manipulation as an acceptable practice across authoritarian countries. By demonstrating the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns and propaganda – such as Russian interference in US presidential elections in 2016 – the country has shown other regimes that similar tactics can be used to control their own populations and advance their interests (Day, 2022). 

The role in the diffusion of digital authoritarian practice in the Middle East is not limited to China and Russia. Western countries, in fact, played significant roles as well. Despite Huawei’s involvement in projects like the $5 million data centre with Telecom Egypt and discussions about 5G infrastructure, Egypt has shown a preference for Western technology in its major smart city projects, like the New Administrative Capital (NAC). The adoption of urban surveillance capabilities in Egypt is thus a result of both internal and external learning mechanisms. The Sisi regime’s strategies, especially in the NAC, reflect an attempt to insulate the government from potential unrest. 

US-Canadian company Sandvine/Procera has provided DPI surveillance equipment (hardware and software) to national networks operating in Egypt (Telecom Egypt). This system operates over connections between an internet site and the target user and allows the government to tamper with the data sent through an unencrypted network (HTTP vs. HTTPS). Moreover, recent revelations show that the company has played a significant role in facilitating the spread of ideas between countries. In an internal newsletter sent to employees, Sandvine Chief Technical Officer Alexander Haväng wrote Sandvine’s equipment could “show who’s talking to who, for how long, and we can try to discover online anonymous identities who’ve uploaded incriminating content online.” Through their information campaign, Sandvine contributed to learning by governments. In Egypt, the government has been using Sandvine’s devices “to block dozens of human rights, political, and news websites, including Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, Al Jazeera, Mada Masr, and HuffPost Arabic” (Marczak et al., 2018: 8).

Emulation

Emulation can be defined as “the process whereby policies diffuse because of their normative and socially constructed properties instead of their objective characteristics” (Gilardi 2012: 467). Research has shown that in complex and uncertain environments, policymakers respond by emulating the structural models of recognized leaders in the domain (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005). This behaviour is primarily driven by the pursuit of legitimacy and harmonization. International organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, play a crucial role in spreading commonly accepted standards of behaviour and organizational structures among countries. 

Emulation has been significant in the diffusion of legal norms regarding internet restrictions and, to a lesser extent, in adopting Chinese urban surveillance infrastructures. Chinese corporations have established training hubs and research initiatives to disseminate expertise in artificial intelligence, internet surveillance, and digital space management (Kurlantzick, 2022). For instance, Huawei set up an OpenLab in Egypt in 2017, focusing on smart city, public safety, and smart government solutions. China has been a major promoter of the ‘safe city’ concept, which focuses on surveillance-driven policing of urban environments. This approach has been refined in many Chinese cities (Triolo, 2020). Companies such as HuaweiZTE CorporationHangzhou Hikvision Digital TechnologyZhejiang Dahua TechnologyAlibaba, and Tiandy are leading the export of this model (Yan, 2019). 

Moreover, homophily, in the form of cultural and political alignment, as well as China’s emergence as an authoritarian role model, contributed to the emulation process. Homophily among actors played an important role, as actors prefer to emulate models from reference groups with whom they share similar cultural or social attributes (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Political alignment and proximity among nations foster communication and the exchange of information (Rogers, 2010). This dynamic is observed between China and Russia and political regimes in the Muslim world including Egypt, which are susceptible to varying degrees of authoritarian governance. Loan conditionalities and trade negotiations within the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have also played a role in enabling the spread of censorship and surveillance technologies from China to the Muslim world. 

The Egyptian government has gathered widespread spying and phishing capabilities sourced from mostly Western companies. An obscure wing of the General Intelligence Directorate called the Technical Research Department (TRD) has purchased equipment from Finland-based Nokia-Siemens Networks (now Nokia Networks) that permits dial-up internet connection, enabling users to access the internet even if the primary national infrastructure is offline. Furthermore, Nokia Siemens Networks has provided the Egyptian government with an interception management system and a surveillance hub for fixed and mobile networks, granting the government mass surveillance capabilities to intercept phone communications (Privacy International, 2019). Another company involved in Egypt was the Italian surveillance technology company Hacking Team. In 2015, the latter was contracted by both the TRD (Technical Research Department) affiliated with Egyptian intelligence, and the Mansour Group (a conglomerate belonging to the second richest family in Egypt) to provide malware that grants the attacker complete control of the target computer (Privacy International, 2019). 

In a brazen example of emulation of the practices of other authoritarian states, the Egyptian government started a widespread phishing campaign called Nile Phish in 2016 against the country’s civil society organizations implicated in the Case 173 crackdown (Scott-Railton et al., 2017). The campaign involved sending predatory emails and text messages to members of civil society to hack into their devices and accounts. An Amnesty International Report (2020) revealed that the Egyptian government used spying technology called FinSpy supplied by German company FinFisher Gmbh. FinSpy is a computer spyware suite sold exclusively to governments to monitor and intercept internet traffic, as well as to initiate phishing attacks against targeted users. FinSpy Trojan has been in use in Egypt to spy on opposition movements and enable the surveillance of political activists and journalists (ECCHR, 2023). In addition, denial-of-service (DoS) or packet injection practices are common in Egypt. For example, between May and September 2023, former Egyptian MP Ahmed Eltantawy was targeted by Cytrox’s Predator Spyware via links sent on SMS and WhatsApp. Eltantawy had announced he would be running in the 2024 presidential elections. Citizen Lab found that the network injection attack could be attributed to the Egyptian government and Sandvine’s PacketLogic product (Marczak et al., 2018).

Cooperative Interdependence

The practice of cooperative interdependence in the context of digital technologies refers to how internet censorship and surveillance are enabled through collaboration among adopting countries and state actors and private companies like Sandvine and NSO Group. Both Sandvine and NSO Group have faced significant controversy in their home countries, the US and Israel, over selling surveillance products to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and beyond, Egypt in particular as explained in this report. NSO Group has been banned by the Israeli government from selling its products to major clients in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Staff, 2021). Similarly, Sandvine ceased operations in Russia following US sanctions after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and was forced to stop selling equipment to Belarus after reports revealed its technology was used by the Lukashenko regime to suppress protests in 2021 (Gallagher, 2022).

The broad process of digital authoritarian diffusion has created cooperative interdependence between the involved parties. Through cooperation with global actors, both corporate and state-level, Egyptian governments have imported sophisticated technologies enabling comprehensive internet and urban surveillance. Cooperative interdependence occurs when the policy choices of some governments create externalities that others must consider, leading to mutual benefits from adopting compatible policies (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). This dynamic incentivizes decision-makers to adopt policies chosen by others, enhancing efficiency and yielding mutual benefits. Here, China leverages its Digital Silk Road (DSR) under the BRI to promote the adoption of its technological infrastructure and accompanying surveillance and censorship policies (Hillman, 2021). 

For instance, at the 2017 World Internet Conference in China, representatives from Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE signed a “Proposal for International Cooperation on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Digital Economy” to construct the DSR, enhancing digital connectivity and e-commerce cooperation (Laskai, 2019). Core components of the DSR include smart cities, internet infrastructure, and mobile networks. Rather than forcing these countries to adopt internet censorship practices, China alters the incentive structures of BRI-connected states. Financial incentives, coupled with technology transfer, promote China’s practical approach to managing cyberspace. The DSR’s digital projects—such as 5G networks, smart cities, fibre optic cables, data centres, satellites, and connecting devices—have commercial value and strategic benefits, helping China achieve its geoeconomic and geopolitical objectives by promoting digital authoritarian practices and its internet governance model (Malena, 2021; Tang, 2020). 

Conclusion

Photo: Hannu Viitanen.

This research has demonstrated the mechanisms through which digital authoritarian practices diffuse in Egypt. We found that Egypt has enacted multiple policies, including restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and strategic digital information operations (SDIOs), to reclaim the digital space from opposition and civil society, thereby entrenching digital authoritarianism in the country. The models adopted by the Egyptian regime closely emulate China and Russia’s paradigms of internet sovereignty and information control. China’s extensive political and economic linkages with Egypt, its strategic role in regional economies, and its leadership in forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have facilitated this trend. Through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has exported its digital governance model while positioning itself as a global leader in information technology (Ryan-Mosley, 2022; Weber, 2019).

The diffusion of surveillance and censorship technologies also reflects a complex learning process involving both state and corporate actors. While China has played a critical role in promoting internet censorship practices, private Western companies have equally enabled Egypt’s digital authoritarian turn. Companies such as Sandvine, NSO Group, FinFisher, and Nokia Networks have supplied surveillance infrastructure independently of state policy, a departure from conventional diffusion literature that associates such practices with national strategic interests (Gallagher, 2022; Marczak et al., 2018; Privacy International, 2019). For instance, Sandvine’s DPI technology has been used in Egypt to block dozens of news and human rights websites, while its executives openly dismiss responsibility by deferring to national sovereignty (Gallagher, 2022). This corporate-led diffusion challenges the notion that digital authoritarianism is solely state-driven and reveals an under-regulated global market in repressive technologies.

Our findings have three broader implications. First, while Chinese influence is significant, the role of Western technology firms in enabling authoritarian diffusion should not be underestimated. Their operations in Egypt have not been directly aligned with their home states’ policies, contradicting earlier findings that firms facilitating authoritarian practices often act under state guidance (Arslan, 2022). Second, these private firms are not only exporters of tools but are actively involved in implementing government-sanctioned strategies, including malware distribution and interception systems (Appuhami et al., 2011; Teets & Hurst, 2014). Third, the study identifies the mechanisms of diffusion—learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence—as key to understanding how regimes adapt digital authoritarian tactics to shifting political and technological contexts (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin et al., 2007; Gilardi, 2012; Strang, 1991; Kerr, 2018).

Developing states may increasingly adopt practices such as national firewalls, smart city surveillance, and social credit systems modelled on early adopters like China and Russia. As they become embedded in transnational authoritarian networks—whether through SCO summits or Digital Silk Road initiatives—these regimes are incentivized to replicate practices that strengthen regime durability and evade democratic scrutiny (Hillman, 2021; Malena, 2021; Tang, 2020; Laskai, 2019).

Given these trends, addressing the entrenchment and diffusion of digital authoritarianism requires a coordinated, multi-level response. There is an urgent need to institutionalize international cyber norms and regulations that clearly define and prohibit practices such as mass surveillance, politically motivated internet shutdowns, and spyware exports. Multilateral institutions, including the United Nations and the European Union, must lead the effort to develop enforceable standards, promote transparency, and strengthen export control regimes. This would include holding corporations accountable through mandatory human rights due diligence, transparency disclosures, and legal sanctions when they contribute to repression.

Defending digital rights also requires robust national privacy protections and support for civil society organizations operating under authoritarian conditions. These groups need financial resources, digital tools, and international solidarity to resist surveillance, educate the public, and pursue legal redress where possible. Supporting democratic actors in repressive environments is essential for countering the normalization of authoritarian digital governance.

Private companies must no longer operate in a legal and ethical vacuum. Regulatory mechanisms should ensure that firms exporting surveillance technologies are held accountable for complicity in human rights violations. Public pressure campaigns and state-level policy interventions—such as targeted sanctions or procurement restrictions—can help enforce these norms. At the same time, incentives should be offered for ethical innovation and secure technology development that supports open societies.

International cooperation among democracies must deepen through the sharing of intelligence, technologies, and best practices in countering cyber repression and disinformation. Cross-national partnerships can create rapid response frameworks to detect and disrupt strategic digital information operations. Capacity-building programs should support governments seeking to manage their digital ecosystems in ways that uphold civil liberties and protect against authoritarian creep.

Economic leverage should be strategically employed. Trade policies, investment frameworks, and development aid must be conditioned on adherence to digital rights standards. This includes shifting financial relationships away from authoritarian technology providers and toward partners committed to democratic norms. Financial institutions and donor agencies must integrate digital governance benchmarks into their programming.

Diplomacy should play a more assertive role in exposing and isolating regimes that abuse digital technologies. Bilateral engagements, international resolutions, and public diplomacy should be used to condemn repressive practices, promote digital transparency, and advocate for global standards of accountability. Countries like Egypt must be pressured to reform not only through external criticism but through coordinated global action that combines legal, economic, and diplomatic tools.

In conclusion, the diffusion of digital authoritarianism is a multi-dimensional and complex phenomenon driven by both state and corporate actors, operating through networks of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence. The Egyptian case exemplifies how these processes work in practice and the urgent need for a sustained, global response. Confronting this challenge will require a blend of regulation and resistance, innovation and accountability, diplomacy and solidarity. Only through such an approach can the digital realm be reclaimed as a space of freedom, rights, and democratic resilience.


 

Funding: This work was supported by the Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.


Authors

Ihsan Yilmaz is Deputy Director (Research Development) of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, where he also serves as Chair in Islamic Studies and Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations. He previously held academic positions at the Universities of Oxford and London and has a strong track record of leading multi-site international research projects. His work at Deakin has been supported by major funding bodies, including the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Victorian Government, and the Gerda Henkel Foundation.

(*) Ali Mamouri is a scholar and journalist specializing in political philosophy and theology. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University. With an academic background, Dr. Mamouri has held teaching positions at the University of Sydney, the University of Tehran, and Al-Mustansiriyah University, as well as other institutions in Iran and Iraq. He has also taught at the Qom and Najaf religious seminaries. From 2020 to 2022, he served as a Strategic Communications Advisor to the Iraqi Prime Minister, providing expertise on regional political dynamics. Dr. Mamouri also has an extensive career in journalism. From 2016 to 2023, he was the editor of Iraq Pulse at Al-Monitor, covering key political and religious developments in the Middle East. His work has been featured in BBC, ABC, The Conversation, Al-Monitor, and Al-Iraqia State Media, among other leading media platforms. As a respected policy analyst, his notable works include “The Dueling Ayatollahs: Khamenei, Sistani, and the Fight for the Soul of Shiite Islam” (Al-Monitor) and “Shia Leadership After Sistani” (Washington Institute). Beyond academia and journalism, Dr. Mamouri provides consultation to public and private organizations on Middle Eastern affairs. He has published several works in Arabic and Farsi, including a book on the political philosophy of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr and research on political Salafism. Additionally, he has contributed to The Great Islamic Encyclopedia and other major Islamic encyclopedias.

(**) Shahram Akbarzadeh is Convenor of Middle East Studies Forum (MESF) and Professor of International Politics, Deakin University (Australia). He held a prestigious ARC Future Fellowship (2013-2016) on the Role of Islam in Iran’s Foreign Policy-making and recently completed a Qatar Foundation project on Sectarianism in the Middle East. Professor Akbarzadeh has an extensive publication record and has contributed to the public debate on the political processes in the Middle East, regional rivalry and Islamic militancy. In 2022 he joined Middle East Council on Global Affairs as a Non-resident Senior Fellow. 

(***) Muhammad Omer is a PhD student in political science at the Deakin University. His PhD is examining the causes, ideological foundations, and the discursive construction of multiple populisms in a single polity (Pakistan). His other research interests include transnational Islam, religious extremism, and vernacular security. He previously completed his bachelor’s in politics and history from the University of East Anglia, UK, and master’s in political science from the Vrije University Amsterdam. 


 

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Populism and EP Elections – Case Finland: Populism Gone Mad from Scissors and Chopping-board to Firing Guns and Latino Rush

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Please cite as:
Lahti, Yannick & Palonen, Emilia. (2025). “Populism and EP Elections – Case Finland: Populism Gone Mad from Scissors and Chopping-board to Firing Guns and Latino Rush.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0049

 

Abstract

After two relatively successful recent elections, the far-right Finns Party (FP) approached the early summer 2024 European Parliament elections amid a supranational atmosphere suggesting that these elections would mark a “turn for the far right” across both Europe and Finland. After successfully leading her party to a historic victory one year earlier in the national elections of Finland 2023, Riikka Purra was, according to polls and pundit opinions, heading toward a new election record—this time in the European Parliament. Facing a charged political atmosphere in national politics and due to her visible role as the national treasurer, Purra’s FP party adopted the populist radical right strategy of their ID and ECR fellows in the EU, and instead of loudly criticising the Union, as has traditionally been the case with far-right parties, they too adopted the tactic of aspiring to “change the European Union from the inside.” This led their whole campaign strategy to declare the FP as the “most pro-Europe party of Finland.” As neighbouring country Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine had left the FP with a united front, the question of whether to support Ukraine or not did not even enter the elections. FP in this regard was and still remains the most anti-Russian party of the far-right party families in Europe. With media coverage being favourable toward a positive outcome for the FP, the party’s concrete message left something to be desired. The cases of now former FP members Timo Vornanen and Teuvo Hakkarainen, not to mention the “Riikka scissors and chopping-board minister” case, undermined a more coherent message to the Finnish electorate, who just over a year ago had voted for the FP in great numbers. Partly, this led to an overwhelmingly poor result for the Finns Party, which took most politicians and spectators by surprise. The European Parliament elections of 2024 in Finland stand out as an interesting exception within the far-right in Europe, as FP steadily lost support in various constituencies.

Keywords: Finns Party (FP), Populist radical right, Far-right, European Parliament 2024, Riikka Purra, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Finnish populist radical right, populist influence.

 

By Yannick Lahti* & Emilia Palonen**

Introduction – Towards the Elections

The 2024 European Parliament elections were preceded by two intense national contests: the parliamentary elections in 2023 and the presidential elections in January 2024. The National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) emerged first in both but also witnessed a significant rise of the far-right Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset).

The first significant election result of the anti-elitist Eurosceptic party was in 2011 marking a change in the party landscape within the national scale of politics in Finland (Arter, 2011; Palonen 2020). In the subsequent elections, the two opposition parties emerged victorious, and the Finns Party (FP) became one of the key governing parties in the government led by Juha Sipilä from 2015 to 2019. However, the party’s rank and file were dissatisfied, and in 2017, the FP split after electing Jussi Halla-aho as its new leader, marking a radical shift toward a nativist direction. The former party elite and some marginal factions emerged as new splinter groups on the political spectrum and registering as political parties (Fagerholm, 2022; Lahti & Palonen, 2023). By 2021, Jussi Halla-aho had handed over the party leadership to Riikka Purra, who continued to advance a strong nativist agenda. Under her leadership, the party achieved its best-ever result in the 2023 parliamentary elections, becoming the second-largest party in the country with 20.1% of the vote (620,981 votes). The FP then entered government for the second time, this time in coalition with the NCP, the Christian Democrats, and the Swedish People’s Party of Finland. The FP currently holds seven ministerial posts. Purra’s predecessor, Jussi Halla-aho, came from the far-right organization Suomen Sisu, which had established a strong foothold within the FP. Although Halla-aho stepped down in 2021, his nativist line has continued (Palonen, 2021). 

Finland’s next-door neighbour, Russia, and its full-scale war in Ukraine have played a significant role for the Finns Party, even under the leadership of former chair—and current Speaker of the Finnish Parliament—Jussi Halla-aho, who completed his doctoral thesis at the University of Helsinki in Slavic studies. The party first marginalized its pro-Russian faction, notably removing MP Mika Niikko from his position as chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Finnish Parliament as early as December 2021, prior to the attack on Kyiv. In 2023, the Finns Party also shifted from the ID group to the ECR group in the European Parliament (Lahti & Palonen 2023).

According to Heinö (2024), the Finns Party’s move from the ID to the ECR group coincided with its entry into the new Finnish government. Party leader Riikka Purra aimed to avoid unnecessarily provoking the coalition partners—particularly the newly appointed Prime Minister Orpo of the National Coalition Party—by signalling a more moderate and less radical approach to the party’s EU policies. However, just ten days into the new government, one of the Finns Party ministers, Vilhelm Junnila, resigned due to allegations of fascist references and neo-Nazi connections (Kuokkanen, Horsmanheimo & Palonen, 2023). Interestingly, both Junnila and Mika Niikko were candidates on the party list in the 2024 European Parliament elections.

In the presidential elections of January 2024, the Finns Party candidate Jussi Halla-aho finished fourth, securing 18.99 percent of the total vote (615,802 votes). Green Party (Vihreät) MP and former Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto—running as an independent but backed by the Greens—and former National Coalition Party Prime Minister Alexander Stubb advanced to the second round, with Stubb ultimately winning by a narrow margin of 51.62 percent. Despite not making it to the runoff, Halla-aho maintained a strong presence on social media, and widespread opposition to the far right played a notable role in shaping the outcome.

The Finns Party largely fits into the Radical Right category as defined by Mudde (2019), who distinguishes between the anti-democratic Extreme Right and the Radical Right, which operates within democratic systems. However, Heinö (2024) notes that ideologically, the Finns Party is best described as a national conservative party—socially conservative while leaning left on economic issues. The party’s founder, Timo Soini, once famously referred to it as a “workers’ party without socialism” (Demokraatti, 2016). The party’s roots lie in the Finnish Rural Party, which challenged the Centre Party’s realpolitik under President Urho Kekkonen, Finland’s longest-serving president, particularly its friendly posture toward the Soviet Union (Palonen & Sunnercrantz, 2021).

Five new populist Radical Right parties emerged on the Finnish political scene since 2017 (Fagerholm, 2022). These include the Blue Reform movement (now known as the Finnish Reform Movement) and Suomen Kansa Ensin (Finnish People First), which has its origins in the anti-immigration Rajat Kiinni! (“Close the Borders!”) movement. Two personal splinters are on a more general populist line: Valta Kuuluu Kansalle (Power Belongs to the People, VKK), formed around Ano Turtiainen, a former FP member of Parliament, in 2021. The VKK has networks among the leaders and influencers of Finland’s digital pro-Russian counter public. Vapauden Liitto (Freedom Alliance), a splinter of the VKK, was founded in 2022 by a former FP activist, Ossi Tiihonen, who also ran for party chair and has been vocal against Finland’s COVID-19 measures. Ano Turtiainen and his Valta Kuuluu Kansalle party did not get re-elected in the 2023 parliamentary elections, and thus the party lost its only seat. 

In the EP elections, Vapauden Liitto received 0.9% of the total votes (16,717). Also ideologically distinct was the proto-fascist, ethnonationalist Sinimusta Liike (Blue-and-Black Movement), which was also founded in 2022. However, on April 23, 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland de-registered the movement. In its ruling, the court found that the party’s program was anti-democratic and disrespectful towards human rights, thus strictly contrary to the Finnish Constitution and the European Union’s Charter on Human Rights (Yle, 2024). In the following month, May 2024, the Blue-and-Black Movement re-applied to be re-registered into the official party register by preparing to collect the necessary 5,000 signatures that it would require, but it was not able to nominate candidates for the European parliamentary elections of summer 2024.

Also, the opposition party, Liike Nyt (“Movement Now”), is noteworthy due to its populist tendencies, even as it can by no means be regarded as a populist radical left nor right-wing party. It is an emerging force that fashions itself after Italy’s Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S), which successfully won seats outside the capital in the Finnish regional elections in 2021 (Yle, 2021). While a disproportionate number of the current leading figures of the FP hail from the universities and the teaching professions (Saresma & Palonen, 2022), Liike Nyt’s leadership consists of business elites that have been tied to Russian oligarchs (Luukka, 2022; Lahti & Palonen, 2023), which they now publicly disavow (Nalbantoglu, 2023). In the national elections of spring 2023, Liike Nyt managed to hold on to their one and only seat in the 200-seated parliament. The MP, co-founder, and chair Harry Harkimo also ran for president early 2024, arriving in last place out of 9 candidates with 0.53% of the votes (17,030). In the European Parliament elections, Liike Nyt had an electoral alliance with the Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit), who are serving in Orpo’s government. This alliance created a particular dynamic between an oppositional, rather liberal populist opposition party and a Christian conservative group serving in the government. The Christian Democrats’ candidate Eija-Riitta Korhola was clearly the most successful in this coalition, and with the exception of the multi-party debates, Liike Nyt was not very visible in the electoral campaigning.

Overall, with their two seats in the European Parliament and continuous representation since 2015—when then-party leader Timo Soini was elected—the Finns Party (FP) was the most relevant populist radical right party to observe in these elections.

The Finns Party in the European Parliament 

In the context of the European Parliament, the Finns Party belongs to the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists). The FP has traditionally been at least softly Eurosceptic; it has had a long-term goal of leaving the EU, but in the short term, it argues that Finland needs to remain in the union to defend Finnish interests. In the 2024 elections, this was contested, and the party seemed happy to remain in the EU in the long run. Initially, together with most of the Finnish population and parliamentary parties, the FP was also against NATO membership claiming the need for national sovereignty. The party changed its stance on this matter after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Lahti & Palonen, 2023) and is among the most anti-Russian of Europe’s populist parties (Heinö, 2024). In short, the FP has roots in strong anti-Soviet thinking and lacks the Russophilia of other far-right parties in Europe (e.g., France’s Rassemblement National and Italy’s Lega Nord). This is echoed in the current pro-Ukraine stance, which is also strengthened by the former party leader’s personal history. In this sense, their anti-Sovietism also turned them against Russia and for Ukraine. Finally, Halla-aho’s policy direction testifies to his emergence in the anti-immigration faction of his party (Vaarakallio, 2015). For these reasons, the question about Finland’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war was not a theme in the European Parliament elections of 2024, even though overall security was. The party leader repeatedly raised two issues during the campaigning: Ukraine and migration. The leading MEP candidate MP Sebastian Tynkkynen of the FP also visited Georgia quite prominently during his campaign for the EP.

The MEPs for the Finns Party have included party chairs like Timo Soini and Jussi Halla-aho, but in 2019 two MEPs were elected after significantly successful elections: Teuvo Hakkarainen and Laura Huhtasaari. Eurosceptic Laura Huhtasaari, MP in 2015–2019 and again from 2023, ran for president in 2018 and received 6.9 percent of the vote with over 200,000 personal votes. A year later, running for the EP, she received 92,760 votes, which is a fine score in Finland, where, in the Finnish preferential voting system, voters choose a candidate within a party list to vote for. Teuvo Hakkarainen (29,083 votes in 2019) is an owner of a sawmill in central Finland who originally rose to the national parliament in 2011. Despite his personal popularity among voters since his first days in politics, he has been in the spotlight for perceived problematic language and conduct. Many claimed to have believed he was representing the interests of the forest industry in the EP for Finland. In the most recent news before the 2024 elections, MEP Hakkarainen was presented as largely absent from the parliamentary work, and he admitted having moved to Honduras, South America, in 2020. Laura Huhtasaari returned to the Finnish national parliament and was replaced by Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, a long-term Finns Party activist, who became an MP already in 2007 in the Soini era, serving in the European Parliament from a deputy seat in 2015–2019 and again in 2023–2024.

Indistinct EU-agenda and Other Issues

Even as the political climate as a whole seemed to be fatalistic toward an upcoming far-right surge in the context of the European Parliament elections of 2024, one ruling element alongside this was the fact that the FP party seemed to lack a direct focus and message in the upcoming elections. Events that had little to do with traditional day-to-day politics also emerged, as did some specific incidents such as the shooting affair of FP MP, now former FP member, Timo Vornanen.

FP published its EP2024 election program called “Päätetään itse – Let’s decide for ourselves” on April 24, 2024. The opening paragraph was as follows: The Finns Party is Finland’s most pro-Europe party. The people’s movement which is the Finns Party is uncompromisingly committed to protecting European civilization and to solving the many challenges facing Europe. Just as the Finns Party sees Finland as a refuge for Finns, Europe must first and foremost be the home of European nations.

This turned around the whole Eurosceptic undertones. Riikka Purra was mentioning in election debates the way in which authority in the EU lies within the member states. Moving away from Euroscepticism to a ‘critical European’ stance, as identified by Herkman and Palonen (2024) in the 2019 elections, the Finns Party appeared Eurosceptic, and the Centre Party (Renew) was critical European at home. It is relevant to point out that the FP declared themselves the most pro-Europe—not the most pro-EU—party of Finland.

Also in Finland, the FP EP2024 election campaign for the Finns Party kicked off in a period of hype for the far right in Europe (only that the Finnish media translated it to laitaoikeisto) (De Fresnes & Stenroos, 2024; Yle, 2024; Sutinen, 2024). Some scholarly opinions that were openly sceptical about a “far right tsunami” also emerged, as it was pointed out that the discourse within the European liberal media had been repetitive in this regard, considering the EP elections of 2014 and 2019 (Vaittinen, 2024). Yet, the major narrative remained widely fatalistic towards a “far right landslide” both nationally in Finland and elsewhere within the European Union member states.

Three factors negatively affected the Finns Party’s results: the Cases Vornanen and Hakkarainen, the jubilant Thatcherism of the party chair Purra, and the party list.

By the end of the same week of the official EP24 campaign start, an unfortunate shooting incident happened outside a nightclub. It involved a Finns Party MP since 2023, previously a policeman, Timo Vornanen, who fired his (legal) firearm (illegally carried) outside a bar not far from the Finnish parliament during the early hours of a Friday morning (Toivonen et al., 2024). Vornanen was immediately taken into police custody and later released facing official criminal charges. The incident was the political top news of the weekend and the week to come as the party had their campaign cruise event. Almost a week later, on May 2, 2024, the FP party dismissed Vornanen from its parliamentary group, and on May 9 the governing body of the FP ousted Vornanen from the party altogether, which led to him forming his one-man group in the parliament’s opposition.

Simultaneously with the case Vornanen, some unfavourable news governed the media sphere around the sitting Finns Party MEP Teuvo Hakkarainen as investigative journalists from the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat wrote about Hakkarainen’s de facto absence and lack of fulfilling his duties in the European Parliament (Teittinen, 2024; Teittinen & Elo, 2024). Commenting on his absences, MEP Hakkarainen referred to his “Latinokiireet”—translating as something like “being busy with Latino-related things” or “Latino business.” The news around Hakkarainen led to the party secretary of FP, Harri Vuorenpää, announcing that Hakkarainen would not be among the party’s picks to seek re-election in the upcoming European Parliament elections; the official reasons for his dismissal were never clarified (Harju, 2024). Contrary to his party’s wishes, MEP Hakkarainen claimed that he was seeking re-election anyway as an independent candidate from the list of the above-mentioned splinter group: Vapauden liitto (Freedom Alliance). This move was ultimately too much and resulted in the governing body of FP firing Hakkarainen from the party altogether. Hakkarainen continued to criticize his former political home, claiming that “FP has turned into a beagle (lapdog) of prime minister Orpo’s Central Coalition Party” (Hakahuhta et al., 2024; Sutinen & Toivonen, 2024).

Within the context of national politics, the party chair Purra started to obtain growing criticism about her online behaviour regarding the austerity politics in Prime Minister Orpo’s government and her role as the national treasurer. Purra posted on social media a picture of a gift she had received: two wooden chopping boards in the shape of an axe, with her face and the text “now is the time to cut” printed on them. A few weeks later, an MP of Purra’s party posted another picture on social media with an unapologetic and smiley Purra holding a big pair of scissors. Promoting a tight austerity regime, Purra was heavily criticized for her perceived lack of empathy and even glee towards what were seen as some of the heaviest public sector and social welfare cuts in the history of Finland, leading even to foreign media headlines such as: “Finland’s Thatcher tests limits of local frugality” (Kauranen, 2024). This is in stark contradiction with the historical takes of the Finns Party and its predecessor as guardians of the ordinary and vulnerable people.

With Hakkarainen, Huhtasaari, nor Halla-aho no longer on the list, the Finns Party list for 2024 was composed of less prominent figures but also included the very popular social media politician Sebastian Tynkkynen. FP vice chair and second-term MP Sebastian Tynkkynen stands among the leading figures but was not a minister of the unpopular government. He announced already in February that he was running in the upcoming elections with an “ambitious plan” (STT, 2024). Tynkkynen has been known as a widely skilful and provocative politician in terms of social media. Online video content allows the far right to affectively articulate and perform socio-political identities and construct relations to targeted audiences, and the Finns Party and Tynkkynen have been pioneers in Finland in this (Ekman, 2014; Salojärvi et al., 2023). 

Tynkkynen, who proudly claims to have renewed his seat in the Finnish parliament in 2023 with a budget of 0€—relying only on creating online content—declared in his EP24 candidacy video that he intends to use the assistance money granted to members of the European Parliament in an unprecedented way for extensive framing. Tynkkynen’s bid and the rationale for it was an unprecedented case in Finnish politics, but it was not widely covered. In this case, the far-right politician’s goal was to act in the law-making parliament more as part of the journalists’ challenge and as a replacement for the media than as a legislator (Lahti & Mörttinen, 2024: 33). However, Tynkkynen was widely seen as one of the most potential winners of the upcoming elections, and the polls were favourable both to him and the FP, showing that the party might increase their seats from 2 to 3 (Hara, 2024; Hara & Särkkä, 2024).

Purra claimed the list was the best ever by the Finns Party. It included several figures known for their anti-immigrant and far-right stances, such as the short-lived minister of Orpo’s government in the summer scandal of 2023, MP Vilhelm Junnila. Even if Europe and Ukraine were Purra’s key issues, it also included Mika Niikko, who had been moved from party leadership for his earlier pro-Russian stances. None of these got questioned by the Finnish media. The most notable campaign ad by the FP during the late spring elections was one where traditionally masculine figures—two males working on construction—struggle to open a can of milk during their coffee break. The conclusion of the video is that due to EU regulation, the cork of the milk carton is an unnecessary nuisance. The punchline at the end of the video is the chosen FP party slogan: “Päätetään itse – Let’s decide for ourselves.” The realism behind this stance was also not much discussed. The public discussion around the campaign was focused mainly on the question of Ukraine and security, and the far right in the leadership of the European Parliament.

Given that the Finns Party was already the second party in the Finnish government, the EP elections also became a vote on the government. The opposition discourse was strong. SDP, the leading party of the previous government under PM Sanna Marin, was now the country’s main opposition party and, under the new leadership of MP Antti Lindtman, it was expected to do relatively well in the elections. Lindtman, facing the challenge of leading the SDP after the unprecedented Sanna Marin phenomenon, but also the historically most right-wing government of Finland in terms of fiscal policy since the Second World War, decided to embrace the so-called challenge of the “Rise of the European Far Right” and made the party’s entire campaign for the European Parliament in 2024 about repelling this rising.

Indeed, on May 4, 2024, the SDP announced that they would not collaborate with the far right in the European Parliament, promising that: “Every Finnish voter can be confident that the vote given to the SDP will definitely not promote the far-right’s rise to power in Europe.” Similarly to their self-stated political rivals, the SDP was also on the verge of getting their seat numbers increased from 2 to 3 inside the European Parliament. But they were not the only opposition party, and their party list was not as prominent as those for the Greens, the Left Alliance, or the Centre, who had several sitting or former MEPs and former party leaders. Even the Swedish People’s Party, who was slightly controversially in government again, now together with the Finns Party, had their party leader running for the European Parliament. The Sanna Marin phenomenon did contribute to these elections, boosting several former ministers of her cabinet and women into the Parliament. 

Results of the Election

The momentum and media hype were on their side, but the far-right takeover did not happen in Finland. The election results came almost as a shock to the Finns Party leadership. Even until the last days before the election, the predictions suggested that the party would increase its seats from 2 to 3, even though the exact opposite happened: it lost one of its two seats. The party gained barely over half of their previous results in 2019: 7.6% of the vote (139,160 votes in total) compared to EP2019, where the party received 13.8%. They lost one of their two seats in the European Parliament, with Sebastian Tynkkynen being elected as the only one of his party, and Ruohonen Lerner lost her seat with only 0.4% of the vote (6,902 votes), while Junnila, shortly a minister in Orpo’s government, received 0.9% of the vote (16,357 votes), the second highest for the Finns Party. This came as a surprise to journalists, some media pundits, and researchers, as well as the FP chair Riikka Purra herself, as she commented on the results on election night: “Äärettömän huono – Extremely bad” (Strömberg 2024).

Perhaps more surprising was the success of Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) chair and MP Li Anderson, who received personally a record number of 247,604 votes (13.5 percent of nationwide personal support), securing three seats for her party with 17.3% nationwide support (316,859 votes). The EPP’s Kokoomus won the elections, increasing their seats from three to four with 24.8% support (453,636 votes). The most popular candidate for Kokoomus was Mika Aaltola, an academic and leader of the Finnish Institute for Foreign Affairs known from his TV commentary, who had run as an independent candidate for president in January 2024: now he increased his personal votes to 95,757 votes, and a total of 5.2% national support. In the presidential elections, Aaltola had received 47,467 votes, a total of 1.5%. MP with expertise in military strategy, Pekka Toveri, with a similar public profile, was the second most popular. Curiously, the strategy adopted by the opposition leader Antti Lindtman for his party SDP did not bring the wished-for result, as the party had to settle for its two current seats without a poll-promised increase. The Greens lost one seat, but their two former party leaders and ministers secured seats in the EP, and the Centre and the Swedish People’s Party also retained two and one seats, respectively.

The splinter group Vapauden liitto (Freedom Alliance) got 0.9% (16,717 votes), with the former FP MEP Hakkarainen gaining 7,414 votes, thus not renewing his seat. Liike Nyt (Movement Now) received 0.5% of the vote share (9,641 votes altogether). Indeed, even though the FP did not do well due to a lack of a clear message, the message of opposing the far right and standing up for liberal democracy also did not resonate strongly with the voters of the SDP. However, the overall result can be seen as a victory for the opposition parties against those in government.

All Finnish citizens and EU citizens with permanent residency in Finland aged 18 and above were eligible to cast a vote. Similarly to the presidential elections, and contrary to the national parliamentary and municipal/regional elections, the entire country functioned as a single polling district. Voter turnout was 42.4%, a minor decrease from the previous elections, where the turnout was 42.7%.

In summary: the FP steadily lost support in various constituencies. In rural areas, where the support of the FP has been strong, the party’s percentage of support almost halved. It weakened significantly across the board in other ways as well, least of all in the core areas of large cities, where the FP generally gets little support.

Changes in electoral support for the FP can be observed as we compare the results of the previous European Parliament elections of 2019 to those of June 2024, gathered by the Suomen vaalidatapalvelu (Finnish election data service).

Outer frame area:                                2019: 16.8% vs. 2024: 9.4%

Inner frame area:                                2019: 14.5% vs. 2024: 8.2%

Countryside:                                       2019: 16.1% vs. 2024: 8.9% 

A suburb or suburban area:                2019: 14.0% vs. 2024: 7.7%

Local center:                                       2019: 10.9% vs. 2024: 5.9%

The core area of ​​big cities:                 2019: 6.7% vs. 2024: 4.2%

Further Analysis: “Smile, You Are in the EU!” – The Finns Party’s Government Participation and Its Potential Influence on the Results

As has been widely established, in recent decades a growing number of various populist parties have succeeded in entering government coalitions with mainstream political parties—or even with other populist parties in Western Europe, such as is the case in Italy, for example. In Finland, the governing National Coalition Party faced the EU elections with a sense of calm and optimistic campaigning, as the party has traditionally been successful in these elections and is often regarded as the so-called EU party. The fact that the second largest party in both parliament and government—the Finns Party—was also fully campaigning under a pro-Europe message cannot be disregarded without underlining the paradoxicality and ironies that political reality sometimes brings forward in our field of studies.

Even as it is evident that a coalition government such as that of Prime Minister Orpo could proceed with the pragmatic “business as usual” attitude from a national politics point of view during another election, the fact remains that the national treasurer Purra was at the same time advocating for a very different future for the European Union. One cannot overlook the fact that the roots of her Finns Party lie fundamentally in the populist discourse of anti-elitism and Euroscepticism. Indeed, the founder of the Finns Party, Timo Soini, coined the phrase “Missä EU, siellä ongelma – Where there is the EU, there is the problem” into the history books of Finnish political rhetoric. Additionally, as mentioned before, just in January of the same year, the National Coalition Party had won the presidential elections with their candidate, former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, who ran his campaign with a clear and steadfast angle on Finland being international, multilingual, and tolerant. It was also Stubb who, two decades ago, had launched his political career and risen to prominence as a young MEP with a famously unapologetic EU agenda for Finland. Stubb’s—back then still considered a progressive tool for political communication—blog was later published as a book: Hymyile, olet EU:ssa! Europarlamentaarikon päiväkirja – Smile, you are in the EU! A MEP’s Diary (Stubb, 2005; Lahti & Mörttinen, 2024).

This blatant conflict of interest between Prime Minister Orpo and Deputy Prime Minister Purra, as far as their parties’ EU policy was concerned, did not manifest itself publicly as a quarrel, but the undeniable tension on an ideological level politically requires further exploration—especially when analysing why the FP voters voted as they did (or as turned out to be the case: did not show up to vote). In general, when looking at the wide body of research investigating the changes in populist parties once they enter governmental positions, the question of populism’s moderation versus radicalization comes up for debate (Akkerman & de Lange, 2015; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2015; Krause & Wagner 2019).

Within the framework of the Finns Party and the surprising 2024 European Parliament election results, this scenario provides fruitful conditions to consider the weight of the contemporary argument which debates whether populist actors in government can exert a certain degree of influence on their coalition partners or if, conversely, they have to quit their populist and anti-system character under the impact of their “experience in office.” The questions proposed in these cases are often of the nature: “To what extent did populist parties succeed in influencing their government coalition partners, leading them to adopt a populist rhetoric and change their policy positions?” and “Have populist parties been successful in retaining their populist ‘outside mainstream politics’ identity, or have they been assimilated into mainstream parties?” 

In the case of the EP2024 elections, the government of Prime Minister Orpo had not been in power for more than a year, and it had already overcome its most acute crisis: the mentioned summer scandal of 2023, regarding then-Minister MP Vilhelm Junnila, who as a result resigned. During and after this incident, Orpo’s government—under his leadership and his visibly loyal deputy, FP’s chair Purra—became known for repetitively referring to their ironclad commitment to the government’s program in the media. According to a textual analysis using corpus-assisted discourse studies, the results showed that the program was, in fact, very strongly driven and based on policies traditionally imposed and held in high regard by Orpo’s Central Coalition Party, and that Purra’s Finns Party had been given leverage in issues that were important to their core supporters, such as immigration policy, citizenship restrictions, and foreign aid to third-world countries (Lahti & Mörttinen 2023). This ensured that neither party was willing to “rock the boat” unnecessarily. From a practical point of view, it also means that whether populistic influence or, vice versa, non-populist influence was spreading within the coalition partners, it was too early a stage to identify any credible indications of it.

In terms of influence, we can accept Robert Dahl’s definition of it: “a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actors to act in some way they would not otherwise act” (Robert Dahl 1973, in Biard et al., 2019: 5). More widely, the actual concept of “political contagiousness” finds its roots in the field of electoral competition studies (Van Spanje, 2010), and it is firmly associated with the strategies political parties might adopt towards their (newcoming) competitors in an attempt to attract more voters. Direct populist influence, however, can be defined as follows: Populist influence is the impact exerted by populist parties on their government coalition partners in terms of communication contagiousness (people-centrism, anti-elitism, and general will) and policy position change (depending on the populist ideological attachment) (Napoletano, 2022: 60–61).

When investigating whether the FP was somehow assimilated into the mainstream parties from the point of view of the voter, it is relevant to note what happened to the party a decade ago when, in 2015, it entered into a centre-liberal coalition with the result of “a dramatic loss of popular support because it was not able to keep its promises” (Blanc-Noël, 2019: 69). The then leader and founder of the party, Soini, was seen as appeasing the coalition partners by moderating his pre-election agenda. In general, when this type of moderation takes place (Akkerman et al., 2016), populist parties certainly do not succeed in exerting a real influence on their coalition partners and, more extremely, they risk disappearing from the political scenario. Of course, what happened to the FP in 2015 until their splitting into two and later the resurrection into nationwide electoral success again is not explicitly comparable with what happened in the EP 2024 elections, as the context differs, but ignoring the fact that the FP has suffered sufficient loss in support before due to perceived moderation in times of a coalition government cannot be overlooked. It is important to underline that we are not arguing that the FP seriously altered their EU policy or, more prudently, their campaigning in the EP2024 elections due to the fact of political contagiousness—in this case, being in a coalition government with the traditionally pro-EU party of Finland, the National Coalition Party. We, however, note that their incoherent campaigning strategy and unorthodox message for the flagship party of Finnish Euroscepticism affected their traditional voter base, which has historically not been keen on voting in European Parliament elections to start with.

This alternation with the FP’s electoral support also challenges yet again the stances of many researchers between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, as they declared populism in power to be an “episodic” phenomenon that was not bound to last for a significant period of time. Indeed, in 2015, Albertazzi and McDonnell were among the first to argue that this conclusion was inaccurate and that, as a phenomenon, populism in power is here to stay. More interestingly, in regard to this paper, they claimed that populism in power is a “contagious” phenomenon able to make a concrete difference within the Western European political landscape.

Furthermore, Albertazzi and McDonnell claimed that, once in power, populist parties behave according to a combination of “responsiveness and responsibility” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015: 170; Biard et al., 2019). As a consequence of this choice, part of the populist electorate will feel betrayed, although in the long run, populist parties succeed (to different degrees) in maintaining their electorate. Some authors have also tried to explain the variation of such success; Akkerman and De Lange (2012: 578) argued that post-incumbency electoral success of the populist radical right seems to depend on three main factors: 1. policy achievements, 2. the performance of populist radical right ministers, and 3. party strategies to maintain internal coherence. Especially factors 2 and 3 are important as we analyse what has contributed to the end result of the FP’s electoral success in the EP2024 election.

Conclusion

Throughout the elections, the contradiction was the fact that the political discourse and the analysis in the media seemed to concentrate on the unavoidable landslide victory of the far right in Europe as such. Considering first and foremost the diversity inside the so-called far-right family of party groups in Europe, we see that the starting point was missing the point from the get-go. The discourse always remained on a very general level, thus underplaying the different actors and variations which might come into play. In Finland, the populist radical FP was enjoying steady support, and yet the support and seats halved, while overall the national voting turnout remained more or less the same – a difference of 0.3%.

Confusion within the party due to the cases of Vornanen and Hakkarainen and the lack of a strong election strategy, narrative, and mission towards the European Parliamentary elections played a role. The political discourse around the FP was mostly on Purra’s provocative communication, the far-right threat in Europe, and the campaigning of the most successful online politician of the FP group, vice chair and now newly elected MEP, Sebastian Tynkkynen. His political supporters followed him and showed their loyalty during election day, but even his message was more about himself as a politician and his mission to broadcast more effectively and intensively, instead of commenting on what his contribution would be to the Finnish electorate.

As popular as Tynkkynen is among his online audiences and actual voters, it is reasonable to argue that his message might not have been that effective in mobilizing voters outside of the digital sphere. Considering that the FP’s main television ad also aired on various online platforms, with its milk carton EU-regulated corks and the declaration of the FP as the most pro-Europe party of the nation, contributed to the lack of a wholesome message. It is possible that in fact, in that regard, one of the variables in order to ensure party success—as mentioned earlier by Akkerman & De Lange (2012)—the FP did not successfully execute a comprehensive party strategy to maintain internal coherence, not at least from the point of view of the Finnish voter.

It is important to note again that the FP declared themselves the most pro-Europe—not the most pro-EU—party of Finland. This distinction is clear, and it can be hypothesized that this was created as an attempt to redefine what being pro-European and pro-EU meant in a Finnish political context. Whether or not this was a strategy and a bait by the FP, the fact remains that the whole EP election campaign theme went largely unnoticed by the media and political opponents. It bears mentioning that the FP party secretary Harri Vuorenpää had started his tenure by the end of August 2023 and was not as experienced as his predecessors. However, Vuorenpää’s role in the analysis on why the party underachieved in the EP2024 elections should not be overstressed.

Indeed, even as it can be argued that the FP did not moderate their stances on national policy issues towards those of their coalition partner, the National Coalition Party—as was indeed unnecessary from a voter-pleasing strategic point of view, since both parties had strongly committed to the government’s program—it was, however, unexpected and peculiar from a campaign strategy stance to attempt to overshadow the traditional pro-EU party by declaring itself superior in so-called Europe-positivity.

It can also be argued that the stance of being the most pro-Europe party in the country was considered an act of moderation as far as their EU policy was concerned. It is possible that the voters who loyally showed up for the FP during the parliamentary elections of 2023 and the presidential elections later were not convinced of this new direction—in addition to the fact that the FP voter base is the least interested in the EP elections, as is the case for the entire Finnish voter base.

Taking into consideration that the Finns Party candidate came in third place in Finland’s previous—and timewise very recent—presidential elections, all that can be stated at this point is that the zigzag, volatile, and effectively complete change in direction in terms of the rhetoric of the traditionally anti-EU party did not work. If anything, it remains a case in point of a populist party in a coalition government proving that their presence is not contagious to the non-populist parties, but on the contrary, the opposite happened. It is also a finding worthy of further research.

The hybrid threat posed by Russia, in terms of transporting immigrants and asylum seekers to Finland’s eastern border, was considered—and still is—more of a national and defence policy affair rather than something that directly concerns the EU. It should also be noted that the FP voter base prioritizes national, presidential, and lastly regional elections.

In conclusion, we suggest that the predicted far-right threat mobilized opposition party voters on a large scale. Even the Swedish People’s Party held on to their seat (which they were in danger of losing) at a time when their partnership in the Finnish government with the FP was widely criticized by their own electorate. The voter turnout in these elections—almost identical to the previous EP2019 elections—indicates that many FP voters stayed at home instead of casting their votes.

One of the interesting details to note is also the fact that the FP lost support in Lapland—an electoral district where they usually do well. The unprecedented electoral success of the Left Alliance leader Li Anderson also reflected in the results in the area, as she personally received 13.6% (7,049 votes). Additionally, the Centre Party (Keskusta) elected two female MEPs from Lapland, MP Katri Kulmuni and incumbent MEP Elsi Katainen. This can be seen as a less conservative move by the voters in Lapland.

As much as this result came as a surprise, even to the scholars who remained sceptical throughout the election about the so-called “Far right tsunami,” it should be noted that the FP still holds a strong position within national politics in the country and that these elections, with their surprising result, are too recent for us to draw any further conclusions about a far-right downfall in Finland.

Indeed, even as the FP faced the 2025 local and regional elections with challenges of a different nature (due to its core voter base and their unenthusiastic approach towards these elections) and even as they again underperformed greatly coming in at sixth place with an overall 7.6% vote share (overall 184 616 votes) and a 6.8% drop from previous elections it is not credible to announce a general degradation of the Finnish populist radical right, or even the Finns Party. As further analysis in upcoming research will show in greater detail whether these two elections the EP2024 and the following local and regional ones had any similarities as far as the FP party support is concerned, it has to be stated again that only as recently as in 2023 Riikka Purra led her party to an all-time victory in the parliamentary elections – an election which traditionally has been the one were the FP dominates. The future elections will provide more data for analysis in order to make conclusions of the Finnish far right in the long run. So far, there are no concrete indications which would lead us to state that a long-term demand for populist radical right parties would be fading away from the Finnish political landscape.

To conclude, the European Parliament elections of 2024 in Finland stand out as one of the interesting exceptions, as the FP steadily lost support in various constituencies against the most optimistic predictions. In the future, we researchers must remain in our current positions, where we do not feed the narratives often adopted by the liberal news media in which election X is either about the huge victory of the far right or the great defeat of liberal democracy, or vice versa. The issues leading to far-right support (steady and unsteady) are far more complex and multifaceted, as we know. The Finnish case also demonstrated a new emergence of the left in 2024.


 
The authors thank the Research Council of Finland (RCF) for co-funding the Trans-Atlantic Platform Consortium project “ENDURE: Inequalities, Community Resilience, and New Governance Modalities in a Post-Pandemic World” (funding number 352413).

 

(*) Yannick Lahti is a political scientist and a former postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Helsinki. Lahti obtained his PhD-degree in 2022 from the University of Bologna in Italy. In his research, he examined European populism, populist actors, and political communication during the European Union elections of 2019 within the Hybrid Media system. In his work Yannick Lahti departed from the consideration that as populism and populist rhetoric are challenging concepts to define – especially in relation to different media environments; they should be addressed and analyzed through the usage of a combination of methods and theoretical perspectives, namely Communication Studies, Corpus Linguistics, Political theory, Rhetoric and Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies. Recently Lahti was involved with Whirl of Knowledge project and until 2023 conducting research for the transatlantic ENDURE-project funded by the Finnish Academy (Suomen Akatemia). Now as an independent scholar with a funding of C. V. Åkerlund mediafoundation, Yannick Lahti is conducting further research on populist radical right politics and its impacts on democracy. Right now Lahti is also working together with award winning journalist Matti Mörttinen on their third collaboration: a book titled: Jäähyväiset demokratialle (A Farewell to Democracy) which will be published in spring 2026. The researcher-journalist pair has previously published two books called Populismin anatomia / The Anatomy of Populism (2023) and Politiikan pinnan vangit / The prisoners of political shallowness (2024) which both received critical and commercial acclaim in Finland.

(**) Emilia Palonen is Associate Professor, Senior University Lecturer in Political Science, University of Helsinki. Currently Emilia is on research leave as Programme Director in Datafication at the Helsinki Institute for Social Sciences and Humanities and as Leader of HEPPsinki research group. She is PI of Academy of Finland project WhiKnow (2019-2022), Kone Foundation project Now-Time Us Space (2020-24), European Commission funded DRad project (2020-2023), and Academy of Finland and other Trans-Atlantic Partnership project funders’ ENDURE exploring resilience in crisis (2022-2024). Palonen has been evaluated as fit for full and associate professor (2022). She received in 2015 a title of Docent (Adj./Ass. Prof.) in Political Science (spec. Cultural Politics), University of Jyväskylä, where has taught and collaborated in research projects.She is an engaged scholar in media and associations: She is an Executive Committee member and chair of the publications committee of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). She served in 2018-2022 as the Chair of the Finnish Political Science Association. She is a board member of the Finnish Federation of Learned Societies (2021-2023), and Treasurer of the Society of Scientists and Parliament Members, Tutkas ry. (2019-2023).Palonen is a discourse theorist and an expert on politics, polarisation and communication, populism and democracy, local participative governance and planning. She has been working on politics of memory in symbolic urban landscapes but also populist movements and even the far right. Besides her expertise on Hungary since 1999, she has been actively following Finnish politics and authors the EJPR Political Data Yearbook on Finland. Academically she is particularly interested in Europe but also engages worldwide.  She is an active and engaged scholar invited for talks. 


 

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German Scholars.

Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge

Please cite as:

Pretorius, Christo. (2025). “Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 26, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0096

 

Following Germany’s pivotal 2025 federal election, the ECPS hosted a high-level panel exploring the rise of the far-right AfD, democratic resilience, and the broader political shifts underway. Held on March 13, 2025, the event featured leading scholars, offering critical insights into the AfD’s electoral surge, its normalization and radicalization, and the East-West divide shaping German politics. Speakers examined key voter demographics—especially youth, working-class, and immigrant voters—and dissected issues like immigration, identity, gender, and economic anxiety that have fueled the far-right narrative. The session also addressed the implications for Germany’s transatlantic ties, institutional stability, and future party strategies. This report captures the panel’s core arguments, raising essential questions about how liberal democracies can respond to populist and authoritarian threats without compromising democratic norms or alienating significant voter blocs.

Report bChristo Pretorius

The 2025 federal election in Germany on February 23, 2025 marked a watershed moment in the nation’s postwar political landscape. Amid record-high voter turnout and deepening societal divides, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) achieved its most significant electoral gains to date. Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened a special panel titled “Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge” to assess the causes, consequences, and wider implications of the vote. Held online on March 13, 2025, the session brought together leading political scientists from Germany and beyond, each offering unique insights into one of Europe’s most closely watched political stories.

Moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member, the discussion delved into the normalization and radicalization of the AfD, the party’s growing impact on Germany’s democratic institutions, and the broader realignment of the country’s political and social order. The panel also explored the East-West divide in voting patterns, the role of identity politics, youth and working-class engagement, and how key issues—such as immigration, economic anxiety, and gender—have been instrumentalized by the far right.

Moreover, speakers raised concerns about foreign influence on German politics, the future of the transatlantic alliance, and whether traditional parties should seek to exclude or accommodate the AfD. With contributions from Dr. Eric Langenbacher, Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Dr. Kai Arzheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz, Dr. Hannah M. Alarian, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Dr. Conrad Ziller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, and Dr. Sabine Volk, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences at the University of Passau, the panel offered a comprehensive and sobering look at a country grappling with both internal polarization and global geopolitical uncertainty.

This report summarizes the session’s key discussions and analytical takeaways, providing an in-depth overview of the far-right surge in Germany and its implications for democracy, governance, and European politics at large.

To start off this special session off, Dr. Cengiz Aktar highlighted two major trends that he noticed within Germany’s 2025 federal election results. First, was the rise of populism itself in Germany, and second was the interference of American decision makers, ‘both elected and unelected,’ in the election. He then gave the floor to the first speaker.

How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?

Dr. Eric Langenbacher’s presentation on “The AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship” began with an overview of the election results which highlighted the East-West divide in the country, with the former primarily serving as the Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) voter base in the election. This was followed by a quick look at important factors that affected the final result, such as age demographics of voters, and pointing out that this was the highest turnout since 1987’s election. 

Turning to his own takeaways from the election result, Dr. Langenbacher notes that the AfD has normalized within German politics but also radicalized in their policies. He notes that although the AfD does not have a majority in the Bundestag, they now have a blocking minority, which will make any action requiring a super majority, such as amending the constitution, difficult to do. He also notes that the results show a clear divide in German politics stemming from the old Cold War divisions, and that on a smaller scale these divisions affect AfD candidates from both the East and West. Western members are, in Dr. Langenbacher’s opinion, more pragmatic and willing to compromise if it meant joining a coalition government, juxtaposing their more hardline eastern counterparts. 

Moving onto his analysis of the Transatlantic Relationship, Dr. Langenbacher highlighted Elon Musk’s intervention in German politics but points out that there is no evidence suggesting that his endorsement of AfD had any effect on the result. He questions the Republican Party and right-leaning individuals from the United States’ support of the AfD in general, especially as the party contains many anti-American politicians that speak out against what they see as US hegemony over Germany. Dr. Langenbacher theorizes that this might be due to similarities in the AfD and Trump’s policies, especially regarding Russia and the Ukraine, but it could just as likely be a strategy to weaken the EU’s geo-political power. To conclude, Dr. Langenbacher finds that German foreign policy towards the US has been damaged beyond the point of fixing, and elected officials now seek alternative means to strengthen Germany on the global stage without US support, especially as it remains uncertain whether or not the US will continue to maintain a military presence in Europe and/or support NATO moving into the future. 

How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD?

The next speaker was Dr. Kai Arzheimer, who investigated the question: “How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” Also pointing out the stark East-West divide in voter support for the AfD, Dr. Arzheimer notes the map most commonly used to highlight the political divisions within Germany is misleading – especially as East Germany is less populated with only one sixth of Germany’s overall population (without Berlin) and only made up a quarter of the total vote. The increase of AfD’s support in Western Germany is more important to analyze. Younger voters made up a significant proportion of the party’s support in the election, especially with young men, but this gender gap seems to be narrowing. The working class also supported the AfD more this time around, mobilizing 1.8 million former non-voters which joined the additional voters the AfD won from the Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats. 

Immigration was still the most important policy issue for voters, especially the rejection of Muslims who are often mistakenly linked to terrorism and an increase in crime. Dr. Arzheimer points out that the AfD tends to play up terrorism and crime as out of control, even though evidence shows that it has gone down. Other ‘Culture War’ issues such as gender and the green transformation also played a part in AfD’s success, but economic anxiety is what pushed many working-class voters towards the party.

According to Dr. Arzheimer, from a geo-political perspective, the AfD had a near monopoly on peace politics, especially as Russia’s renewed attack on Ukraine made it difficult to maintain their main pro-Russian narrative. To this end, they focused on the economy as an issue, and how it became worse after Germany’s involvement with the war, and how Germany’s energy security was being undermined. 

Unlike neighboring country’s right-wing parties, Dr. Arzheimer points out that the AfD is becoming ever more radical in their politics, using examples such as the party’s leader being convicted twice for using Nazi slogans during the European Parliament election campaign, and right-wing extremists from outside the party being staffed in the Bundestag. Identity politics has also radicalized, with some AfD members using the issue of immigration as a means to push their desired agenda of expelling Germans with a so-called ‘migration background’ from Germany. Despite this, their popularity has grown. 

Dr. Arzheimer went on to show a timeline of events in the last few years affecting the AfD’s popularity and concluded that he would estimate 50% of AfD voters have consistently voted for the party, and the other 50% of voters might still be swayable to other parties. He goes on to recommend that Germany’s other political parties should focus on their own policy issues, rather than compete with the AfD ‘on their field’ as they try to win back voters. 

Accommodation or Exclusion? 

The third presentation focused on “Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” and was presented by Dr. Hannah Alarian. Building on the previous presentations, she sought to investigate the question of what will happen after the election. Focusing once again on immigration as a key policy issue, Dr. Alarian highlighted the persistence of this issue for the electorate, with as many as one in six voters mentioning it as an important political problem. In the eastern states, more people favored greater restrictions on immigration, which correlates with their vote for AfD. Voters turned to the AfD as they were the party that was most eager to talk about the issue. The AfD’s 2021 party manifesto made more references to the issue than any other comparable party, and this trend continued into the 2025 election where most other parties seemed to have dismissed the issue altogether since they did not want to talk about it lest they draw attention to the AfD. This left a lot of voters to turn to the AfD as the only party addressing this key policy issue, and they controlled the narrative with various anti-migration media, some of which Dr. Alarian presents in her talk by sharing anti-immigration campaign posters used by the AfD. 

Looking forward, Dr. Alarian points out that the questions of democratic legitimacy, and party and government strategy are important – namely, do we accommodate, or do we exclude the AfD? By choosing to exclude the AfD, it excludes a large portion of the voting population, but inclusion allows the AfD access to the policy making space. Exclusionary tactics are already being used, such as the CDU’s refusal to enter a coalition with the AfD, but after the CDU relied on the AfD’s vote for an anti-migration measure, the people came out to protest in mass across the country. Dr. Alarian indicates that perhaps the people can be the ‘firewall’ then. However, according to her data, these made no real change towards people’s attitude of AfD. Similarly, AfD’s exclusion, nor other party’s adaptation to the political climate, also made no real change. 

To conclude, Dr. Alarian makes some recommendations for moving forward, including an acknowledgement of immigration as a political issue by other parties, and addressing socio-economic concerns of voters. In effect this will provide an alternative to the alternative vote. 

Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications

Dr. Conrad Ziller started his presentation on “The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by focusing on who are the new voters, and what motivates them to vote for the AfD. He repeated some of the information from the previous presentations as to why the AfD doubled their votes in a lot of places compared to the last election – mainly the non-voters and policy issues such as immigration, internal security and the economy. 

Three surprising allies who voted for the AfD include immigrant voters, blue collar workers and young men. 10.4% of immigrant voters and 40.2% of post-soviet re-settlers voted for AfD, doubling since the last election. The number of voters lost by the SPD correlates with the amount gained by the AfD, highlighting how the working class shifted to the party this election. Finally, young men aged 18-24 voted overwhelmingly for the AfD. Dr. Ziller highlighted some explanatory frameworks for why these three groups voted the way they did, including: Cultural backlash against universalism, lack of social recognition, nostalgic appeal of the far right, a declining middle, structural transformations in the knowledge economy, transformations of the left parties, and group identities and out-group perceptions. 

Focusing in-depth on some of these frameworks, Dr. Ziller highlights academic research that might explain why the three highlighted groups voted the way they did. Social identity could be a factor as research found that marginalized people didn’t feel that they gained as much from a redistribution party, but by voting of a nationalist one with anti-immigrant views, they believed they would achieve a higher status in society. Arguments made for social belonging highlights how people can find a sense of community in right wing groups, which in particular attracts young men. Progressive policies are found to alienate blue collar workers who often feel they stand to lose from such policies. And finally, those who feel left behind turn to alternative parties to show their discontent at established parties and politics. 

Dr. Ziller provides some empirical insights from a survey he ran on a website in the days leading up to and after the election. 2,568 people responded, and the results closely reflected the election results. Predictors of an AfD vote include a low level of social trust, threat perception particularly against Muslims, and people who felt left behind. How this correlated to the three groups in focus paints the picture that all three groups felt left behind and displayed Islamophobia, although each one had different underlining reasons for voting AfD. To conclude he suggests that investment in left-behind places could regain the trust of disenfranchised voters, but the underlining question is whether or not we can roll back the ‘need for chaos’ preference in radical right-wing populist and authoritarian politics. 

Germany’s Far Right and Antifeminism

The final speaker, Dr. Sabine Volk, focused on the topic “The German Far Right: Antifeminism Sells.” Highlighting that the AfD were already campaigning in 2013 that there is a clear gender divide between men and women, the talk focused on gender issues which became more prominent within the AfD over successive elections. Dr. Volk presented the clear gender gap within the AfD party, which is comprised roughly of 19% women members overall. In the new Bundestag only 11.8% of the AfD’s group are women, and Alice Weidel is the only female AfD member in the Bundesvorstand(Federal Executive Board). As the face of the AfD, Alice Weidel juxtaposes a lot of AfD’s stances on gender and family, especially as she has a same-sex partner. 

AfD’s antifeminist stances have partially modernized on gender equality and sexual diversity, reacting on the processes of emancipation and seeking to maintain heteronormative power relations. Their key messages are heteronormative family relations, ‘Trans panic,’ and the mobilization of masculinity. The topic of gender is important to the AfD, but there is regional diversity within the party, with some more extreme factions being located in eastern Germany. According to Dr. Volk, what is missing from the discussion is the idea of female nationalism and the mobilization of women’s rights as part of an anti-Islam agenda present in previous elections. This allows for antifeminist alliances to be built with conservative and religious actors and groups and appeals to people with antifeminist attitudes – mostly located in eastern Germany. Gender is therefore of particular importance, and Dr. Volk predicts that discussions surrounding this policy area will only grow in the coming years. 

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The Future Course of German and Japanese Capitalism in a Multipolar World under Trump 2.0

In his compelling analysis, Professor Ibrahim Ozturk explores how “Trumpism 2.0” and a multipolar world order are challenging the foundations of German and Japanese capitalism. As the US shifts toward protectionism, economic nationalism, and corporate oligarchy, both countries—once revitalized by American support after WWII—must now reassess their strategic and economic futures. Ozturk examines how trade wars, supply chain disruptions, and declining US cooperation threaten their export-driven models. From demographic decline to digital transformation, Germany and Japan face urgent structural reforms. This timely commentary not only maps the common and unique risks confronting these two economic giants but also outlines actionable strategies to maintain resilience in a fragmented world. 

By Ibrahim Ozturk 

I argued in my commentary that “Trumpism 2.0” marks a fundamental shift in global capitalism, blending nationalist protectionism, corporate oligarchy, and digital feudalism. The United States (U.S.) is transitioning from ‘neutral’ state capitalism to a model where government policies explicitly serve dominant private entities, eroding economic democracy and consolidating monopolistic power. This transformation deepens domestic inequality while driving international economic fragmentation, trade wars, and strategic decoupling. Meanwhile, the Global South is asserting greater autonomy, challenging Western dominance, and reshaping economic alliances. If these trends persist, escalating geopolitical tensions, supply chain disruptions, and financial instability may define the coming decades. Yet, this period of turbulence—reminiscent of the 1930s—also presents an opportunity for systemic change, though it raises the risk of large-scale global conflict.

This process will also challenge German and Japanese capitalism, distinct derivatives of America’s preferences after World War II and shaped by the demands and constraints of the Cold War context and the mentalities and cultural dynamics of German and Japanese societies. 

Considering new challenges, this commentary reveals a potential roadmap for German and Japanese capitalism. First, the article compares the characteristics of American and Japanese capitalism. Next, it examines the role of the US in revitalizing the struggling German and Japanese economies. The third section addresses the common and unique issues these countries face, along with the effects of the Trump Administration and a US-less world. The fourth section summarizes the possible responses from Germany and Japan.

Three Models of Capitalism under Flux

To compare Japanese, German, and American capitalism, one must examine their economic structures, government-business relations, corporate governance, labor markets, and cultural influences. As Robert Gilpin puts it, American, German, and Japanese capitalism embody distinct models shaped by historical, cultural, and institutional contexts. American capitalism, a Liberal Market Economy (LME), is highly market-driven and individualistic, characterized by minimal government intervention, shareholder-focused businesses, a flexible labor market, and a strong entrepreneurial culture, fostering innovation and financial dominance but also leading to corporate volatility, weaker social safety nets, and economic instability. 

On the other hand, German capitalism, a Coordinated Market Economy (CME), follows a stakeholder-oriented model with strong labor unions, long-term investment strategies, and an export-driven manufacturing sector, ensuring stability, high-quality production, and social welfare, though facing challenges in labor market rigidity, trade dependency, and adapting to disruptive technologies. 

Similarly, Japanese capitalism, a form of Developmental State Capitalism, is rooted in state-business coordination, the keiretsu corporate system, lifetime employment traditions, and a focus on incremental innovation, enabling industrial stability and technological leadership but struggling with an aging population, stagnant wages, and slow digital transformation.

Each capitalist model has distinct strengths and weaknesses: US capitalism is highly dynamic, fostering innovation and financial dominance but prone to volatility and inequality; German capitalism offers stability and social equity but lacks flexibility; and Japanese capitalism prioritizes long-term stability and industrial coordination but adapts slowly to change. While each system has trade-offs, nations often adjust their models over time. On the other hand, in the modern era, American influence played a significant role in shaping the German and Japanese models, and it is exerting pressure for change in another direction now.

America’s Revival of Japan and Germany

Germany’s assertive expansionism in Europe and Japan’s in Asia, driven by an obsession with becoming a leading global powerhouse during the first half of the 20th century, led both countries into the catastrophe of World War II. However, despite having inflicted severe defeats on them and initially signing humiliating surrender agreements that deeply restricted their rights to self-governance, independence, and sovereignty, the US, which emerged as the new hegemonic power—replacing Britain—did not choose to “punish” these nations after the war, due to the new global power contestations. Throughout the Cold War, the US considered the spread of communism the greatest threat to its hegemony and democracy, capitalism, and the free market economy. In response, it took steps to rebuild Europe, particularly Germany, and in Asia, Japan. By doing so, the US provided both nations a lifeline after the most devastating destruction in their histories, fundamentally changing their fate in favor of democracy and economic development.

Both countries were rebuilt through American economic aid, market access, and security guarantees, which allowed them to focus on economic growth rather than military spending. In terms of Japan, the US contributed to its economic development and industrialization via its post-war economic reconstruction through Marshall Aids, the war boom that came with the Korean War, and access to the US market with a Most Favored Nation status (MFN).

Starting with Japan, first under US occupation, led by General Douglas MacArthur’s SCAP (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers), Japan’s economic reconstruction period (1945–1952) involved

🛑 Structural reforms like the demilitarization and restructuring of its economy.

🛑Land reforms that redistributed land from landlords to tenant farmers improved agricultural productivity.

🛑 The dissolution of Zaibatsu, large conglomerates that supported Japanese atrocities in Asia, aimed to dismantle industrial monopolies; however, later, keiretsu networks emerged, but this time, contributed to the development of a civilian and trade-oriented economy through the formerly well-established discipline and perseverance.

🛑 Labor reforms promoted unionization and strengthened worker rights. However, that measure was reversed after Japan’s alliance with the US against the expansion of communism in Asia.

🛑 Implementing the Dodge Plan 1949 aimed at fiscal austerity to manage inflation and stabilize Japan’s currency. As a result, the plan established a fixed exchange rate (1 USD = 360 yen), making Japanese exports competitive.  

Second, the measures’ first significant and advantageous outcome emerged during the Korean War Boom (1950–1953), when the US war effort in Korea turned Japan into a vital supply base, leading to rapid industrial growth. In this context, heavy industries (steel, machinery, textiles) thrived as Japan became a supplier of military goods. Moreover, US military protection under the US-Japan Security Treaty (1951) freed Japan from defense spending, allowing it to focus entirely on economic growth.  

Third, the expansion of the Japanese production economy, characterized by a strong export focus, extended beyond the market established by the Allied forces in Korea. Notably, the MFN status allowed Japan access to the US market and supported its economic integration from the 1950s to the 1970s. In addition to full access to American markets, which enabled companies like Toyota, Sony, and Honda to grow globally, technology transfers and guidance from US firms helped Japan modernize its industries. Substantial US investment in Japanese sectors facilitated technological upgrades, and by the 1980s, Japan had become the world’s second-largest economy, challenging even the US in some areas. With government-industry coordination (MITI—Ministry of International Trade and Industry), Japan’s Economic Miracle (1955–1980s), focused on export-led growth and high-quality manufacturing, emerged prominently. 

In the case of Germany, first, American support for the war-thorned German economy included the Marshall Plan(1948–1952), which envisaged the disbursement of $1.4 billion (part of Europe’s $13 billion US aid package). The fund helped rebuild factories, roads, and energy infrastructure destroyed during the war. Like Japan, currency reform (1948) helped introduce the Deutsche Mark, replacing the unstable Reichsmark and stabilizing inflation.  

Second, West Germany’s membership in NATO (1955) allowed a US military presence and security umbrella, which meant Germany could spend less on defense and more on industry. The Cold War made West Germany a key US ally, ensuring sustained economic and military aid.  

The third significant contribution stemmed from Germany’s access to the U.S. market. The US encouraged trade with Europe (EEC in 1957, which later became the EU), integrating West Germany into global markets. Moreover, US investments in the German industry strengthened the growth of advanced manufacturing (e.g., Siemens, Volkswagen, BASF).  

Consequently, technological advancements and innovations enabled Germany to become an export powerhouse in manufacturing. They fueled GDP growth at 8–10% annually during the 1950s, culminating in the so-called West German Economic Miracle (Wirtschaftswunder, 1950s–1970s). This era, along with Ludwig Erhard’s free-market policies and US support, led to rising wages and improved living standards. By the 1970s, Germany had emerged as the world’s third-largest economy, boasting robust automobile, machinery, and chemical sectors.

Key Similarities & Differences in US Support for Japan and Germany.

 

The US Impact on specific industries in Japan and Germany

Automobile industry: After World War II, the US played a crucial role in rebuilding and shaping the economies of Japan and West Germany, particularly in industries like automobiles, technology, and finance. This support was driven by Cold War strategy—strengthening allies against communism—and economic pragmatism, ensuring both nations became stable markets and production hubs.  

Technology transfers, quality management, and access to the U.S. market were the three most critical contributions to the automotive industry. Among other factors, introducing modern management and production techniques, such as W. Edwards Deming’s quality control principles, formed the backbone of the Japanese Total Quality Management (TQM) revolution, which enabled Japanese automakers to dominate the global market. Additionally, the US opened its market to Japanese cars, allowing brands like Toyota and Honda to thrive with fuel-efficient, high-quality vehicles, particularly after the 1973 Oil Crisis when American consumers looked for alternatives to fuel-hungry domestic cars. However, Japan’s MFN status almost culminated with the Plaza Accord (1985), when the US pressured Japan to revalue the Yen, making exports more expensive and prompting Japan to establish factories in the US, which led to direct investment and job creation.  

Like Japan, the precise contribution of the US to the automobile industry in Germany originated from the partnership between Daimler-Benz and Ford. Also, American capital and expertise played a pivotal role in revitalizing companies such as Volkswagen, which had fallen into disrepair after WWII. Through transatlantic trade and global expansion, the US emerged as a crucial export destination, allowing German luxury brands like BMW and Mercedes to dominate the premium segment.  

Technology and Electronics: Japan’s electronics giants, such as Sony, Panasonic, and Toshiba, benefited from US military R&D spillovers and Cold War-era procurement. However, the US-Japan trade war in the 1980s later limited their dominance in the semiconductor market. Meanwhile, Germany’s industrial powerhouses, including Siemens and Bosch, regained global market access through US investment, with NATO and defense contracts fueling demand for their precision engineering.

Financial and Banking Sectors: The US tolerated Japan’s keiretsu system, where conglomerates like Mitsubishi and Sumitomo were linked to banks, enabling rapid industrialization. However, in the 1980s, it encouraged Japan to deregulate its banking sector, contributing to the asset bubble that burst in the 1990s. Similarly, the U.S. supported Germany’s financial reintegration by promoting Deutsche Bank’s global expansion and stabilizing the Deutsche Mark through the Bretton Woods system, aiding Germany’s integration into the international economy.

In conclusion, US economic support was crucial in transforming Japan and Germany into global industrial powerhouses, with Japan benefiting from technology transfers and market access. At the same time, Germany rebuilt its engineering and manufacturing sectors through US aid. Without US assistance, market access, and security guarantees, neither nation could have industrialized as rapidly post-WWII, highlighting a US-driven framework that still influences their economies today.

However, to understand how Trump and the emerging multipolar world—discussed in the next section—might shape the future of German and Japanese capitalism, it is crucial to recognize that the US approach to these economies reflects both global dynamics and America’s domestic interests. Since the 1980s, especially after the collapse of communism, the US has influenced the economic trajectory of these nations, which it began to see as “systemic rivals,” through trade disputes, financial pressures, and currency interventions. In the evolving, leaderless global order—often referred to as the “New Cold War Era”—changes in US strategy seem inevitable, bringing significant consequences for both Germany and Japan.

Germany and Japan under the Trump Administration and US-less World

Some of the problems and challenges facing the German and Japanese economies will be structural, some conjunctural, and some, it seems, will be Trump-related. Thus, the German and Japanese economies face a mix of common and unique challenges. Both countries struggle with similar demographic issues, such as aging populations and declining birth rates, leading to labor shortages, pressure on social welfare systems, and increasing healthcare costs, all of which impede long-term economic growth. Additionally, both nations face obstacles in modernizing their economies through digital innovation, with Germany contending with outdated infrastructure and excessive bureaucracy. At the same time, Japan wrestles with traditional work cultures and the slow adoption of AI and digital technologies. Furthermore, both economies heavily depend on exports, making them vulnerable to global slowdowns and geopolitical risks—Germany’s reliance on China and Japan’s exposure to US-China tensions exacerbate these vulnerabilities.

However, each country faces its distinct challenges. Germany’s energy crisis—from the shift away from Russian energy and delays in renewable infrastructure—has increased costs, impacting its industrial competitiveness. The transition to electric vehicles (EVs) and high manufacturing expenses have weakened Germany’s position amid fierce competition from China and the US. Meanwhile, bureaucracy hampers innovation, particularly in the public sector and among SMEs. In contrast, Japan is dealing with stagnant wages and deflation, which restrict consumer spending and hinder economic growth. The country also faces high debt levels, with government debt exceeding 250% of GDP, raising concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability. Additionally, Japan’s dependence on energy imports and raw materials and supply chain vulnerabilities, especially semiconductor disruptions, put its key industries at risk.

With Trump ascending to the presidency for a second time, Germany and Japan are confronted with significant economic and strategic challenges. Their concerns about the Trump administration stem from worries regarding the effects of his protectionist trade policies, geopolitical unpredictability, economic nationalism, and the sidelining of the rule of law in favor of contingency management. Additionally, there is a tendency to exert power and force while ignoring international norms and values.

🛑Trade wars and tariffs caused key economic fears for Germany and Japan. To remind you, Trump previously imposed 25% tariffs on European and Japanese steel and aluminum under national security grounds (Section 232). He has also threatened new tariffs on European and Japanese cars, which could severely hurt Germany’s auto industry (VW, BMW, Mercedes) and Japan’s car exports (Toyota, Honda, Nissan). He has also criticized US trade deficits with both countries, which could lead to harsher trade barriers.  

🛑 The second fear concerns the disruption of global supply chains. Trump’s “America First” policy prioritizes reshoring manufacturing to the US, which could pressure Japanese and German companies to shift production away from their home countries. If Trump weakens or removes from the World Trade Organization (WTO), global trade could become more chaotic and unpredictable.  

🛑 Security concerns are the most common fear in Japan and Germany. Trump has threatened to withdraw the US from NATO, forcing Germany to increase military spending significantly. If US security guarantees weaken, Germany may have to allocate more funds for defense rather than industrial investment. Russia could exploit this security gap, leading to economic instability in Europe. Similarly, Trump has repeatedly criticized Japan for not paying enough for US military protection. If the US reduces its military presence, Japan may have to massively boost defense spending, affecting government budgets and economic growth. 

Potential Economic Scenarios for Germany & Japan Under Trump

Germany and Japan’s Possible Responses

The problems of German and Japanese capitalism go beyond Trump’s negative impact and the rise of the new Cold War era under multipolarity. Germany faces significant structural challenges, including energy dependence, industrial competitiveness, demographic decline, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and gaps in digitalization. Addressing these issues requires comprehensive reforms, strategic investments, and policy changesto enhance long-term economic resilience and competitiveness.

🛑 The expansion of renewable energy should be accelerated while diversifying LNG and nuclear sources, and industries should support green hydrogen to strengthen energy security and industrial competitiveness.

🛑 Strengthening manufacturing demands increased R&D in AI and semiconductors, support for SMEs and startups, and investment in EV and battery production.

🛑 Addressing labor shortages necessitates streamlined immigration policies, expanded childcare and reskilling programs, and greater adoption of automation.

🛑 Reducing bureaucracy through digital public services, tax reforms, and faster permit approvals will improve business efficiency.

🛑 Finally, accelerating digital transformation with nationwide 5G, AI-driven innovation, and enhanced tech education will elevate Germany’s competitiveness in the global economy.

On the other hand, Japan also faces deep-rooted economic challenges, including an aging population, stagnant wages, deflation, high public debt, slow digital transformation, and supply chain vulnerabilities. Addressing these issues requires structural reforms, policy shifts, and innovation-driven strategies to ensure long-term economic resilience.

🛑 Japan must implement bold reforms to address its structural challenges and ensure long-term economic resilience.

🛑 To combat labor shortages and demographic decline, it should expand childcare support, streamline immigration policies, and invest in automation and AI.

🛑 Breaking stagnant wages and deflation requires tax incentives for wage growth, stimulating domestic consumption, and maintaining moderate inflation.

🛑 Reducing public debt calls for gradual fiscal consolidation, efficient public spending, and pension reforms.

🛑 Accelerating digital transformation through 5G expansion, AI adoption, and corporate modernization will enhance productivity and innovation.

🛑 Lastly, strengthening supply chains by diversifying energy sources, investing in domestic semiconductor production, and securing trade partnerships will improve economic stability. By tackling these issues, Japan can sustain its global competitiveness and long-term growth.

More recently, Trump has introduced new dimensions to these challenges in both countries. His return has resulted in increased tariffs, trade barriers, and geopolitical instability, putting pressure on the export-driven economies of Germany and Japan. Both nations must diversify trade, invest in strategic industries, and strengthen their regional alliances to reduce economic risks. The following measures and policy recommendations are plausible and foreseeable solutionsregarding conjunctural progress under the Trump administration and multipolarity. 

Strengthen Trade Ties with Other Regions.

🛑 Germany could deepen EU-China trade or increase ties with India and ASEAN.  

🛑 Japan could increase trade with Southeast Asia, Australia, and the EU. 

Accelerate Industrial and Technological Independence

🛑 Reduce reliance on US markets by boosting domestic demand and innovation.  

🛑 Invest in digital industries, AI, and green tech to diversify economies.  

Strategic Military and Security Adjustments

🛑 Germany may increase defense budgets and push for greater EU military cooperation.  

🛑 Japan may develop stronger regional security partnerships (e.g., with Australia, India, and South Korea).  

Conclusion

The resurgence of “Trumpism 2.0” and the evolving multipolar world are reshaping global capitalism, posing significant challenges for German and Japanese economic models. Historically shaped by American influence, both nations now face increasing pressure from protectionist policies, geopolitical uncertainty, and domestic structural issues. While Germany grapples with energy dependence, digital transformation, and industrial competitiveness, Japan contends with demographic decline, deflation, and technological adaptation. 

To navigate these shifts, both countries must pursue strategic diversification to navigate these shifts—strengthening trade alliances beyond the US, investing in innovation and industrial resilience, and adapting security strategies to new geopolitical realities. 

The coming years will test their ability to maintain economic stability and global influence amid rising fragmentation. However, this era of disruption also presents opportunities for transformation, pushing Germany and Japan toward greater economic autonomy and leadership in a rapidly changing world.

Disembarkation of 300 migrants from Libya from the German rescue ship Sea-Watch 3 in Pozzallo, Province of Ragusa, Italy, on June 9, 2022. Photo: Alec Tassi.

The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe

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Please cite as:
Yogo, Edouard Epiphane. (2025). “The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 4, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0048

 

Abstract
This research examines the influence of populism on the redefinition of citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. It explores how populist movements leverage anti-immigrant sentiments to shape political discourse, laws, and societal attitudes. The study combines qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants, and quantitative data from national surveys to analyze changes in citizenship laws and social inclusion challenges. Through case studies, it highlights variations in populist influence across European countries. The research concludes with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society amidst rising populism.

Keywords: Populism, citizenship, social inclusion, migration dynamics, European societies

 

By Edouard Epiphane Yogo*

Introduction 

The rise of populism in Europe has become one of the most significant political phenomena of the 21st century, fundamentally altering the political landscape and reshaping discussions surrounding citizenship and social inclusion for migrants. According to Arzheimer & Carter (2006), populist movements have emerged across various European countries, characterized by their anti-elite sentiments and a rhetoric that often scapegoats immigrants and minorities for societal issues (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006). As these movements gain traction, they exploit and amplify anti-immigrant sentiments, influencing political discourse, legislation, and societal attitudes toward migrants. This dynamic presents a critical need to explore how populism is redefining citizenship and the concept of social inclusion within the broader context of migration (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

At the heart of this inquiry lies a fundamental question: How does populism redefine the essence of citizenship? This question invites us to consider the shifts in legal frameworks, societal norms, and public perceptions surrounding the rights and identities of migrants in Europe (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018). The changing landscape of citizenship laws particularly the principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) illustrates how populist narratives can reshape notions of national belonging (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). Moreover, the impact of these changes on the social integration of migrants poses significant implications for the cohesiveness of European societies.

To investigate these pressing issues, this research adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative interviews with policymakers, activists, and migrants with quantitative data derived from national surveys. This comprehensive analysis aims to uncover not only the changes in citizenship laws but also the challenges to social inclusion faced by migrants in various European contexts. By examining the intersection of populism and migration, the study seeks to illuminate how populist movements influence citizenship policies and shape societal attitudes toward migrants.

One of the central themes of this research is the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions of migrants. In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping these perceptions (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Populist leaders and parties often utilize rhetoric that stigmatizes migrants, framing them as threats to national security, cultural identity, and economic stability (Talani, 2021). Such narratives contribute to the development of negative stereotypes and social divisions, making it increasingly difficult for migrants to achieve social integration in education, employment, and healthcare (Scheiring et al., 2024).

The first section of the study will examine how populist narratives reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship. By analyzing the rhetoric employed by populist movements, the research will highlight the ways in which these narratives seek to define and limit national belonging. Furthermore, it will explore case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries, illustrating how populism has influenced legislative reforms aimed at restricting migrants’ rights and opportunities.

The second section will focus on the challenges to social inclusion for migrants under the influence of populism. By investigating the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions, the study will analyze the stigmatization of migrants and the resulting impacts on their ability to integrate into society. The research will delve into how negative portrayals in the media can lead to societal attitudes that hinder access to essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, ultimately affecting migrants’ social standing and quality of life.

In exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion, the research will address the restrictive measures that impact integration efforts. These policies often prioritize the needs and rights of native citizens over those of migrants, resulting in systemic barriers that prevent meaningful social inclusion. The study will also incorporate case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of populist policies based on varying economic and historical contexts across European countries. This analysis aims to demonstrate how local conditions shape the outcomes of populist approaches to social inclusion and migration dynamics.

To interpret these dynamics effectively, this research will utilize the phenomenological constructivism framework proposed by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (Berger & Luckmann, 2011). According to Berger and Luckmann (2011), this theoretical approach posits that social reality is constructed through human interactions and is deeply influenced by the contexts in which these interactions occur. By applying this framework, the study will explore how populist narratives and policies are socially constructed and how they influence perceptions of citizenship and social inclusion (Mudde, 2014). This perspective will allow us to examine the processes through which migrants are categorized, marginalized, and included or excluded from the social fabric of European societies.

Using Berger and Luckmann’s insights, the research, based on phenomenological constructivism, will analyze how societal constructs surrounding nationality and belonging are negotiated and redefined in the context of populism (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). It will facilitate a deeper understanding of the ways in which individual and collective identities are shaped by populist discourse, as well as the implications of these construct s for migrants’ experiences of citizenship and social integration. By situating our analysis within this theoretical framework, we aim to highlight the significance of social constructions in shaping the realities of migrants in Europe. In addition to phenomenological constructivism, this research will also employ François Thual’s geopolitical method to provide a comprehensive understanding of the interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Thual’s approach emphasizes the importance of contextual factors such as geography, history, and socio-political dynamics in shaping political behavior and policy decisions. This method allows us to analyze how populist movements are not only a response to immediate political conditions but are also deeply rooted in historical and geographical contexts that influence their evolution and impact (Thual, 1996). 

Thual’s geopolitical method will guide the exploration of how different European countries experience and respond to populism in distinct ways (Loyer, 2019). By examining the geographical and historical backgrounds of specific case studies, we can uncover the localized factors that drive populist sentiments and how these sentiments manifest in citizenship laws and social inclusion policies (Zajec, 2018). This analytical lens will enhance our understanding of why certain countries adopt more restrictive policies while others may strive for inclusivity in the face of populism. 

As the research unfolds, it will emphasize the need for inclusive policies that can counteract the negative effects of populism on citizenship and social inclusion. By synthesizing the findings, the study will conclude with policy recommendations aimed at fostering a more inclusive European society in the face of rising populism. These recommendations will focus on strategies that promote equitable access to rights and opportunities for migrants, thereby enhancing social cohesion and countering the divisive narratives propagated by populist movements.

In summary, this research seeks to illuminate the complex interplay between populism, citizenship, and social inclusion for migrants in Europe. By examining the influence of populist narratives on public perceptions and legislative reforms, the study will provide valuable insights into the challenges migrants face in achieving social integration. Ultimately, the findings will underscore the importance of developing inclusive policies that address the needs and rights of all members of society, fostering a more equitable and cohesive European community amidst the challenges posed by populism.

The Impact of Populism on the Redefinition of Citizenship

In the current global landscape shaped by the rise of populism, discussions around citizenship and national identity have gained renewed significance. Recent changes in citizenship laws reflect the increasing influence of populist movements that seek to redefine national belonging. This document will examine two key aspects: Changes in citizenship laws and principles under populist influence (A) and the relationship between populism and the concept of national identity (B), highlighting the tensions and redefinitions that arise.

Changes in Citizenship Laws and Principles Under Populist Influence

Discussing on changes in citizenship laws and principles leads us to examine two key areas. Firstly, the shifts in jus soliand jus sanguinis citizenship principles (1) and secondly, the influence of populist discourse on recent legislative reforms (2). 

Analysis of Shifts in Jus Soli and Jus Sanguinis under Populist Influence

The principles of jus soli (right of the soil) and jus sanguinis (right of blood) are long-established frameworks that define how individuals acquire nationality (Retailleau, 2024). Jus soli grants citizenship to those born within a country’s territory, promoting inclusion and diversity, while jus sanguinis bases citizenship on parentage, linking it to lineage and heritage. Many countries have historically blended both principles to accommodate social and political contexts. However, the rise of populist movements has altered how these principles are applied, with significant implications for citizenship laws (El País, 2024).

Populism, characterized by its anti-immigration and nationalist rhetoric, has shifted the conversation toward more restrictive definitions of citizenship, often challenging jus soli by framing it as too inclusive (Giugni & Grasso, 2021; Le Monde, 2024). Populist leaders argue that automatic birthright citizenship allows individuals with no cultural or historical ties to the nation to gain full membership. For example, in the United States, under the Trump administration, jus solicame under scrutiny, with arguments about “anchor babies” used to portray birthright citizenship as a loophole exploited by immigrants (Schmidt, 2019).

Similarly, in Europe, populist movements have pushed for limiting or abolishing jus soli to preserve national identity. Germany, for instance, had integrated jus soli to respond to globalization, but recent populist pressures aim to reverse these changes.

While jus soli face restrictions, populist leaders have embraced jus sanguinis. This principle aligns with their focus on ethnicity, heritage, and national purity, promoting a more exclusionary form of citizenship based on ancestral ties (Le Monde, 2024). In Hungary, for instance, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s policies prioritize ethnic Hungarian identity, offering citizenship to ethnic Hungarians abroad while maintaining a rigid stance against immigrants and refugees. Likewise, Italy emphasizes jus sanguinis, granting citizenship to individuals of Italian descent but placing increasing scrutiny on migrants and refugees (Le Monde, 2024; Kymlicka, 2001).

The preference for jus sanguinis reflects a broader trend of ethno-nationalism under populist regimes. By favoring bloodline-based citizenship, populists create a narrower definition of national identity, excluding individuals without ancestral ties to the country (Joppke, 2010). This shift has serious consequences for social cohesion, as it marginalizes immigrants and minorities, potentially deepening societal divides.

The erosion of jus soli particularly affects children born to immigrant families, who may face statelessness or legal obstacles to full integration. Meanwhile, the reinforcement of jus sanguinis perpetuates exclusionary notions of citizenship, creating a tiered system where only those with ethnic or cultural ties to the state are considered full citizens (Le Monde, 2024). This dynamic threatens to alienate large segments of the population, especially in multicultural societies, contributing to increased social tensions.

The changes to jus soli and jus sanguinis driven by populist movements illustrate a shift toward restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies. These alterations not only affect individuals directly impacted by more rigid laws but also have broader implications for the social and political stability of nations grappling with diversity and globalization (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). As populist ideologies continue to shape political discourse, the future of citizenship laws remains a contentious issue.

Influence of Populist Discourse on Legislative Reforms

Populism has significantly impacted global politics, shaping discourse and driving legislative reforms. Defined by its appeal to “the people” against perceived elites, populism thrives on nationalism, anti-globalization, anti-immigration, and protectionism (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019). Populist leaders push simplified solutions to complex issues, leaving lasting effects on policies related to immigration, citizenship, labor laws, and the judiciary. 

Populism views politics as a battle between the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elites, positioning populist leaders as defenders of the common citizen against established institutions. Exploiting grievances over economic inequality, cultural alienation, or fears of losing national identity, populists advocate for radical reforms (Olivas Osuna, 2020). Their emotionally charged rhetoric resonates with voters who feel marginalized, fostering a political environment that supports swift, often divisive, legislative changes.

One of the most significant areas of populist influence is immigration and citizenship policy. Populists frame immigration as a threat to national identity and economic security, pushing for stricter controls. In the US, Donald Trump’s administration implemented controversial policies such as the Muslim Ban and attempted to end birthright citizenship (Inglehart, 2016). These moves, rooted in populist rhetoric, sought to restrict immigration and tighten borders, casting immigrants as burdens on the system. Similarly, in Europe, populist leaders like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán have championed anti-immigration laws, presenting migrants as threats to national security and Christian identity (Dahlgren, 2006). These legislative changes, shaped by populism, have led to a more hostile environment for migrants and refugees, contributing to growing xenophobia.

Economic protectionism is another key area influenced by populism. Populist leaders, responding to fears of globalization and job displacement, advocate for policies that protect domestic industries. Trump’s “America First” rhetoric resulted in tariffs aimed at protecting American jobs, leading to trade wars with countries like China (Jones, 2019). While these policies offered short-term relief to certain industries, they also raised consumer prices and strained international trade relations. In Europe, populist figures like Marine Le Pen in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy have similarly pushed for economic protectionism, though such policies often hinder long-term growth and international cooperation (Destradi & Plagemann, 2019).

Populists also target the judiciary, portraying it as an elitist institution disconnected from the people. This view justifies legislative reforms that increase executive control over the judiciary, undermining democratic checks and balances (Bauer & Becker, 2020). In Poland, the populist Law and Justice Party (PiS) introduced reforms giving the government greater control over judicial appointments, weakening judicial independence. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan similarly used populist discourse to justify constitutional changes that consolidated executive power and diminished the judiciary’s role (Blokker, 2019). These reforms, driven by populist ideals, threaten democratic governance by reducing the separation of powers and weakening the rule of law.

Cultural nationalism is another area where populist discourse drives legislative changes. Populist leaders often promote national culture while resisting multiculturalism. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government enacted the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) of 2019, which grants citizenship to non-Muslim refugees, marginalizing Muslims and promoting Hindu nationalism (Adamidis, 2021). This, along with the National Register of Citizens (NRC), exemplifies how populist rhetoric can shape exclusionary legislative reforms, reshaping national identity along religious lines (Tushnet, 2020).

Populism’s influence on legislative reforms is profound, particularly in immigration, economics, judiciary control, and national identity. Although populists claim to represent the will of the people, their policies often lead to restrictive, exclusionary measures that challenge democratic principles (Löfflmann, 2022). As populism continues to grow, its influence on legislative processes will likely persist, raising concerns about the future of democratic governance and civil liberties worldwide.

Populism and the Concept of National Identity

This section delves into the relationship between populism and national identity, focusing on two critical aspects: The use of anti-immigrant rhetoric to reinforce exclusive notions of citizenship, highlighting how such discourse seeks to define and limit national belonging (1) and Case studies of citizenship policy adjustments in select European countries (2). 

The Use of Anti-immigrant Rhetoric to Reinforce Exclusive Citizenship

Populist leaders frequently employ anti-immigrant rhetoric to portray immigrants as existential threats to a nation’s cultural, economic, and social fabric. This rhetoric becomes a powerful tool to shape national identity in exclusionary terms, typically casting immigrants as outsiders based on racial, ethnic, or religious differences (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017). Through this discourse, populist movements argue that immigrants dilute national culture, displace native workers, and strain public resources, all while posing threats to national security. By framing immigration in such stark terms, populist rhetoric fosters fear and division, creating a political climate in which restrictive and exclusionary citizenship policies can be justified (Mudde, 2014).

At the core of populist anti-immigrant rhetoric lies the concept of an “authentic” national identity one that is rooted in historical, cultural, and sometimes religious heritage. This identity is portrayed as under siege by foreign influences, particularly immigrants who are seen as incapable of integrating into the national fabric (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). Populist leaders often evoke a sense of nostalgia for a perceived golden age when national culture was more “pure” or homogeneous, untainted by external influences. This idealized past is contrasted with the present, where immigration is depicted as eroding the cultural unity and social cohesion of the nation (Talani, 2021). By appealing to this notion of cultural purity, populist leaders can present themselves as defenders of the nation’s true identity, rallying support from those who feel alienated or threatened by globalization and multiculturalism.

Immigrants, particularly those from non-Western or non-Christian backgrounds, are often depicted as fundamentally different from and incompatible with the values, traditions, and way of life of the host country (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This portrayal not only amplifies existing prejudices but also legitimizes exclusionary policies. In many populist narratives, immigrants are scapegoated for a range of societal problems from unemployment and housing shortages to crime and the perceived decline of national values. This scapegoating simplifies complex socio-economic issues, presenting immigration as the primary cause of these challenges and offering a convenient target for public anger and frustration (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

The distinction between “us” (native citizens) and “them” (immigrants) is a central feature of populist rhetoric. This binary division serves to reinforce a sense of national unity among the “native” population while casting immigrants as a threatening “other” (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). This division is often racialized, with immigrants from non-European or non-Christian backgrounds portrayed as more dangerous or culturally alien. In some cases, populists draw on religious differences, framing Muslim immigrants, for example, as a threat to secular or Christian values (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2015). 

These distinctions are used to justify policies that restrict immigrants’ access to citizenship, limit their rights, and reduce their opportunities for social and economic integration (Manatschal et al., 2020). One of the most prominent ways in which this rhetoric translates into policy is through reforms aimed at restricting immigration and tightening citizenship requirements. Populist leaders often advocate for measures that make it more difficult for immigrants to acquire legal status, obtain work permits, or access public services (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). In some cases, they push for the revocation of citizenship for naturalized immigrants who are deemed to have violated national norms or values. These policies are framed as necessary steps to protect the nation’s identity and security, resonating with voters who feel that their cultural heritage and economic opportunities are being undermined by immigration.

This anti-immigrant rhetoric also extends to asylum seekers and refugees, who are often portrayed as economic migrants in disguise, seeking to exploit the nation’s welfare system rather than fleeing genuine persecution (Talani, 2021). By blurring the lines between refugees and economic migrants, populist leaders erode public sympathy for those seeking asylum and create a narrative in which all forms of immigration are seen as illegitimate or dangerous. This narrative provides political cover for policies that deny refugees access to asylum processes, push them back at borders, or place them in detention centers with limited legal rights (Hammar, 1990).

Beyond shaping immigration and asylum policies, populist rhetoric also influences broader social attitudes. By constantly framing immigrants as threats to national security and culture, populist leaders normalize xenophobic and exclusionary attitudes (Löfflmann, 2022). This not only stokes fear and resentment among the native population but also creates an environment in which discrimination against immigrants and minorities is more likely to be tolerated or even encouraged. In some cases, this rhetoric has been linked to increases in hate crimes and other forms of violence against immigrant communities (Varga & Buzogany, 2020).

Moreover, populist anti-immigrant rhetoric undermines the principles of equality and inclusion that are foundational to democratic citizenship. By advocating for policies that exclude certain groups based on their race, religion, or ethnicity, populist leaders challenge the idea of universal citizenship and equal rights for all individuals within a nation (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). Instead, they promote a hierarchical vision of citizenship, where some individuals are deemed more deserving of rights and protections than others based on their cultural or ethnic background.

Anti-immigrant rhetoric serves as a key tool for populist leaders to shape national identity in exclusionary terms. By portraying immigrants as threats to culture, economy, and security, populists legitimize policies that restrict immigration, deny citizenship, and limit the rights of minorities (Talani, 2021). This rhetoric not only fuels fear and division but also reshapes public policy in ways that undermine the principles of equality and inclusion, leading to a more fragmented and polarized society. As populist movements continue to gain traction globally, the challenge of balancing national identity with inclusivity and tolerance remains a pressing issue for modern democracies (Muis & Immerzeel, 2017).

Case Studies of Citizenship Policy Adjustments in Select European Countries

Across Europe, populist movements have played a pivotal role in shaping national identity and citizenship policies, often pushing for more restrictive laws that make it harder for immigrants to gain citizenship or legal residency. This shift reflects the growing influence of populist rhetoric, which frames immigration as a threat to national culture and security. By examining the cases of Hungary, Italy, and France, it becomes evident how populist leaders have redefined national identity and driven legislative reforms that reflect exclusionary views of citizenship.

In Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, the government has adopted a strongly anti-immigrant stance, particularly targeting Muslim-majority countries. Orbán’s administration has positioned itself as the defender of Hungary’s Christian identity, presenting immigration as an existential threat to the nation’s cultural and religious fabric (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). The construction of border fences to block refugees, along with Hungary’s refusal to participate in EU refugee resettlement programs, demonstrates the government’s commitment to preventing the settlement of immigrants (Palonen, 2018). This emphasis on exclusion is further reflected in the tightening of citizenship laws, which aim to maintain a homogenous national identity, rooted in ethnic and religious purity.

A key piece of legislation that encapsulates Hungary’s approach to immigration is the “Stop Soros” law, named after Hungarian-American philanthropist George Soros, who has supported pro-migrant policies (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). The law criminalizes aid to asylum seekers and organizations working with immigrants, reinforcing the idea that immigrants are unwelcome in Hungary. Orbán’s government has used this law to portray immigrants as threats to the nation, while redefining Hungarian national identity along ethnically and religiously exclusionary lines. By positioning itself as the protector of a pure, Christian Hungary, the government has marginalized anyone perceived as foreign or different, particularly those from Muslim backgrounds (Pappas, 2019).

Italy, another example of populist influence on citizenship policies, has seen significant changes under the leadership of Matteo Salvini, head of the right-wing League party. Salvini, who served as Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister, built his political platform around the idea of protecting Italy’s national identity from the perceived dangers of immigration (Varshney, 2021). His “Italians First” campaign emphasized limiting immigration, particularly from Africa and the Middle East, as a way to safeguard Italy’s cultural and economic interests.

Salvini’s government enacted several legislative changes that made it harder for immigrants to gain legal residency and citizenship. For example, the “security decree” introduced during his tenure tightened residency requirements and made it easier for the government to revoke asylum status. These policies were framed as necessary for maintaining public safety and reducing the immigrant population (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). By casting immigrants as criminals or economic burdens, Salvini tapped into public anxieties about national identity and security, securing popular support for more restrictive immigration and citizenship laws. His efforts also extended to children born to foreign parents in Italy, for whom gaining citizenship became increasingly difficult under the new regulations.

France, under the influence of Marine Le Pen and her National Rally party, has similarly witnessed a rise in populist-driven immigration policies. Le Pen has long advocated for a reduction in immigration and the protection of French identity, positioning herself as a defender of the nation’s cultural heritage (Mayer, 2013). Her party has pushed for laws that would end birthright citizenship, making it harder for children born in France to immigrant parents to acquire citizenship (Soffer, 2022). This approach reflects a broader desire to redefine French citizenship in exclusive terms, prioritizing the interests of native-born citizens over those of immigrants.

Le Pen’s framing of national identity is closely tied to the preservation of France’s cultural and historical legacy, often in opposition to immigration from Muslim-majority countries. During her 2017 and 2022 presidential campaigns, Le Pen emphasized the need to protect French values from external influences, linking immigration to issues of national security, cultural erosion, and economic instability (Bonikowski et al., 2018). While she has not won the presidency, her influence has pushed mainstream political parties in France to adopt stricter stances on immigration and citizenship, showing the broader impact of her populist rhetoric.

In all three countries, populist leaders have successfully reshaped public discourse around immigration and citizenship, using anti-immigrant rhetoric to justify more restrictive policies. By framing immigrants as threats to national identity and security, they have fostered a climate of fear and division, where exclusionary measures are seen as necessary to protect the cultural and social fabric of the nation (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This dynamic not only makes it more difficult for immigrants to integrate and gain citizenship but also redefines what it means to be a member of the nation, often in ways that marginalize racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.

Clearly, populist movements across Europe have significantly influenced citizenship policies by promoting exclusionary definitions of national identity. Whether in Hungary, Italy, or France, populist leaders have used anti-immigrant rhetoric to push for legislative reforms that limit immigration, restrict access to citizenship, and reinforce a narrow conception of national belonging. These changes reflect broader concerns about preserving cultural homogeneity in an increasingly globalized world, where immigration is often framed as a threat rather than a source of enrichment.

Challenges to Social Inclusion for Migrants Under Populism

In today’s polarized political climate, media representations play a crucial role in shaping public perceptions of migrants. These portrayals can significantly influence societal attitudes and policies. This study will explore two key areas: Media representations and public perceptions of migrants (A) and the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion (B), examining how these narratives and policies interact and impact marginalized communities.

Media Representations and Public Perceptions of Migrants

In this section, we investigate the critical role of media in shaping public perceptions of migrants. We focus on two key aspects: first, the influence of populist narratives on the stigmatization of migrants, examining how these narratives contribute to negative stereotypes and social divisions; and second, the impacts of these perceptions on social integration in education, employment, and healthcare, highlighting the challenges migrants face in accessing essential services and opportunities in society.

Influence of Populist Narratives on Migrant Stigmatization

Populist narratives have a powerful influence on the stigmatization of migrants, shaping public perceptions in ways that often fuel fear, division, and hostility. These narratives simplify complex social issues by framing migrants as threats to national identity, economic stability, and security, which amplifies existing societal tensions. In many countries, populist leaders use anti-immigrant rhetoric to galvanize political support, constructing migrants as scapegoats for various social and economic challenges (Abrajano & Hajnal, 2015). This stigmatization has far-reaching consequences, reinforcing negative stereotypes and shaping public policy in exclusionary ways.

At the heart of populist narratives is the concept of “otherness,” where migrants are depicted as fundamentally different from the native population. This otherness is often framed along ethnic, racial, or religious lines, with migrants presented as a homogeneous group that poses a threat to the nation’s cultural identity. In Europe, for instance, populist parties frequently depict Muslim migrants as unwilling or unable to assimilate into Western societies, associating them with extremism or radicalism (Hawley, 2016). This portrayal suggests that migrants are not merely different but incompatible with the nation’s values and way of life. Populist leaders, such as Marine Le Pen in France or Viktor Orbán in Hungary, leverage these fears of cultural erosion to rally support, positioning themselves as protectors of the nation’s authentic identity (Wojczewski, 2019).

Populist rhetoric often goes beyond cultural concerns to frame migrants as economic threats, claiming that they steal jobs, exploit social services, and drain public resources. This portrayal is particularly prevalent during economic downturns, when populist leaders can channel public anxieties about unemployment and financial insecurity into anti-immigrant sentiment (Steele & Homolar, 2019). Migrants are depicted as competitors for scarce resources, pitting them against native citizens in a zero-sum game where the prosperity of one group is seen as coming at the expense of the other. The media plays a significant role in perpetuating this narrative by sensationalizing stories of migrants benefiting from welfare or engaging in criminal activities, often without providing context or balance (Betz, 1994). This selective reporting reinforces the perception that migrants are a burden on society, even when evidence shows their positive contributions to the economy.

In addition to cultural and economic threats, populist narratives often link migrants to security risks, portraying them as potential criminals or terrorists. This is particularly pronounced in countries that have experienced terrorist attacks, where populist leaders frequently draw direct connections between immigration and security (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). By framing migrants as dangerous outsiders who pose a threat to national safety, populist leaders can justify restrictive immigration policies and securitization measures. In the United States, for example, President Donald Trump used rhetoric that depicted migrants (Becker, 2019), especially those from Latin America, as criminals and rapists, capitalizing on fears of crime to promote his anti-immigration agenda (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). This rhetoric resonates with portions of the electorate who are already concerned about safety and security, amplifying support for exclusionary policies.

Populist leaders skillfully use media platforms to spread these narratives, particularly in today’s highly polarized media landscape. Traditional news outlets, social media, and even political advertisements become conduits for anti-immigrant rhetoric, allowing populist leaders to reach broad audiences with messages that vilify migrants. In this environment, misinformation and sensationalism thrive (Kubin & von Sikorski, 2021). False or exaggerated stories about migrant crime rates, welfare fraud, or cultural clashes circulate widely, reinforcing negative perceptions of migrants. Social media, in particular, has proven to be a fertile ground for these narratives, where algorithms amplify divisive content and create echo chambers that reinforce preexisting biases (Gidron & Bonikowski, 2013).

The consequences of this stigmatization are profound and far-reaching. As populist narratives gain traction, public opinion shifts toward greater hostility and mistrust of migrants, making it easier for populist leaders to enact exclusionary policies. This shift in public sentiment often leads to increased support for policies that restrict immigration, limit access to citizenship, and curtail the rights of refugees and asylum seekers (Mudde, 2019). For example, in Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s government has passed a series of laws that severely limit immigration and criminalize activities that support asylum seekers, framing these measures as necessary to protect Hungary’s Christian identity. In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s anti-immigrant rhetoric helped fuel the passage of laws that tightened residency requirements and made it easier to revoke asylum statuses, reflecting a broader European trend of hardening immigration policies.

Beyond policy, the stigmatization of migrants has deep social consequences. It fosters an environment where xenophobia and discrimination become normalized, affecting the daily lives of migrants and their ability to integrate into society (Wodak, 2015). Migrants face prejudice in the workplace, in schools, and in public spaces, often experiencing social exclusion and hostility based on their perceived status as outsiders. This stigmatization also fuels tensions between native populations and migrant communities, deepening social divisions and undermining efforts toward inclusion and cohesion.

Impacts on Social Integration in Education, Employment, and Healthcare

The stigmatization of migrants, fueled by populist narratives, significantly impacts their social integration in key areas such as education, employment, and healthcare. These effects not only hinder the ability of migrants to contribute to society but also exacerbate social divisions, perpetuating cycles of marginalization and exclusion (Varga & Buzogany, 2020). By examining these three critical sectors, we can better understand how negative perceptions of migrants shape their experiences and opportunities in host countries.

In the realm of education, migrant children often face significant challenges that hinder their ability to integrate successfully. Populist rhetoric can create an environment of hostility in schools, where migrant students may be perceived as outsiders or even blamed for the struggles faced by the local population (Palonen, 2018). This stigma can lead to bullying, discrimination, and social isolation, significantly impacting the emotional and psychological well-being of these children (Hutter & Kriesi, 2019). Additionally, language barriers and differences in educational backgrounds can further complicate their integration. Schools may lack the necessary resources and training to support non-native speakers, resulting in disparities in academic achievement and engagement (Mayer, 2013). Consequently, many migrant children may fall behind their peers, limiting their educational opportunities and long-term prospects.

Furthermore, the negative perceptions of migrants can influence the attitudes of teachers and school administrators, leading to biased expectations and treatment. In environments where populist sentiments prevail, educators may unconsciously lower their expectations for migrant students, perpetuating a cycle of disadvantage (Soffer, 2022). This systemic bias can result in fewer opportunities for advanced coursework or extracurricular activities, limiting the social networks that are crucial for future success. As a result, the educational system, instead of serving as a vehicle for social mobility, can reinforce existing inequalities, ultimately affecting the broader societal fabric.

In the employment sector, stigmatization often manifests in barriers to job opportunities and professional advancement for migrants. Populist narratives typically portray migrants as competitors for jobs, leading to negative stereotypes that they are less qualified or less committed than native workers (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). This perception can result in discriminatory hiring practices, where employers may favor native candidates over equally qualified migrants. Studies have shown that migrants, particularly those from non-Western backgrounds, often face significant hurdles in securing employment, despite possessing relevant skills and qualifications (Pappas, 2019). They may be relegated to low-wage jobs or sectors characterized by high turnover and job insecurity, limiting their economic mobility and integration.

Moreover, even after securing employment, migrants may encounter challenges in the workplace stemming from stigma. They might face harassment, exclusion from social networks, or limited access to professional development opportunities (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This can create a hostile work environment that not only affects job satisfaction but also impacts overall mental health and well-being. The lack of upward mobility can lead to a sense of disillusionment and alienation, reinforcing feelings of being an outsider in their host society (Kymlicka, 2001). 

In terms of healthcare, the stigma surrounding migrants can create significant barriers to accessing essential services. Fear of discrimination or negative treatment can deter migrants from seeking medical care, even when needed (Goodman, 2010). Populist narratives often frame migrants as burdens on public health systems, perpetuating the idea that they are undeserving of resources and services. This perception can lead to healthcare providers exhibiting implicit biases, resulting in inadequate treatment or care (Joppke, 2010). Migrants may experience delays in receiving necessary medical attention, contributing to poorer health outcomes.

Additionally, cultural differences and language barriers can further complicate healthcare access for migrants. Many may struggle to navigate complex healthcare systems or communicate their needs effectively, leading to misunderstandings and misdiagnoses. In some cases, these barriers can prevent migrants from receiving preventive care, increasing their vulnerability to chronic health conditions and exacerbating existing health disparities. 

The impact of these challenges extends beyond individual migrants; it affects families and communities as well. When migrants struggle to integrate into education, employment, and healthcare systems, it creates a cycle of disadvantage that can perpetuate intergenerational poverty and marginalization (Bauer & Becker, 2020). Children of migrants may inherit these challenges, facing compounded obstacles in their own efforts to integrate and succeed. This can lead to a lack of social cohesion, where communities become polarized along lines of nationality, ethnicity, or immigration status. 

To end, the stigmatization of migrants, largely driven by populist narratives, has profound impacts on their social integration across education, employment, and healthcare sectors. These negative perceptions hinder the ability of migrants to access opportunities, contribute to society, and achieve their full potential. The consequences of this marginalization are far-reaching, not only affecting the lives of migrants but also undermining the social fabric of host communities. To foster greater social integration, it is essential to combat harmful stereotypes and promote inclusive policies that recognize and value the contributions of migrants. By addressing these barriers, societies can work towards a more equitable and cohesive future, benefiting everyone involved.

Consequences of Populist Policies on Social Inclusion

Exploring the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion compels us to understand the restrictive measures that impact inclusion and integration. Additionally, it invites us to examine case studies that illustrate the differentiated effects of these policies based on varying economic and historical contexts.

Restrictive Policies on Inclusion and Integration

The rise of populist movements across various countries has led to the implementation of restrictive policies that significantly impact social inclusion and integration, particularly for migrants and marginalized communities (Varshney, 2021). These policies are often framed as necessary measures to protect national identity, security, and the interests of the native population, but they frequently create barriers that hinder the full participation of individuals from diverse backgrounds in society.

One of the most significant aspects of restrictive policies is the tightening of immigration laws, which can result in limited pathways for legal residency and citizenship for migrants. Many populist governments have introduced measures that require higher income thresholds, extensive documentation, or language proficiency tests that disproportionately disadvantage less affluent or non-native speakers (Blokker, 2019). Such requirements not only exclude potential immigrants but also create an environment of uncertainty and fear among those already residing in the country (Adamidis, 2021). The fear of deportation or legal repercussions can deter migrants from seeking essential services, including healthcare, education, and employment, thereby exacerbating their marginalization.

Moreover, these policies often reinforce negative stereotypes about migrants, portraying them as potential threats to public safety or as burdens on social services. Populist rhetoric frequently capitalizes on economic anxieties by suggesting that migrants take jobs from locals or strain public resources (Tushnet, 2020). This narrative is particularly powerful during times of economic downturn, where competition for jobs and services is heightened. As a result, policies that restrict access to social benefits for migrants can lead to a situation where these individuals are excluded not only from economic opportunities but also from social protections that are essential for integration (Hammar, 1990).

In many countries, populist leaders have also targeted specific groups of migrants, often based on their nationality, ethnicity, or religion. For example, anti-immigrant laws may specifically affect those from predominantly Muslim countries or refugees fleeing conflict (Schmidt, 2019). This targeted exclusion fosters a climate of division, where certain communities are systematically marginalized. In schools, workplaces, and neighborhoods, this can lead to increased tension and hostility, making it challenging for migrants to form connections with the broader community and hindering their ability to integrate socially (Ruhs & Vargas-Silva, 2015). 

Furthermore, restrictive policies on inclusion are often accompanied by a lack of investment in programs that promote social cohesion and integration. For instance, funding for language classes, job training, and cultural exchange initiatives may be cut or deprioritized in favor of enforcement mechanisms aimed at controlling immigration (Giugni & Grasso, 2021). This lack of support means that even those migrants who wish to integrate and contribute to their new communities face significant obstacles (Rannikmäe et al., 2021). The absence of inclusive policies sends a clear message that diversity is not welcomed, further entrenching social divisions.

In addition to impacting migrants, these restrictive policies can have broader societal implications. By promoting exclusion rather than inclusion, populist policies undermine the social contract that binds communities together (Bonikowski et al., 2018). This erosion of trust can lead to increased polarization within society, where divisions based on nationality, ethnicity, and class are exacerbated. The resultant societal fragmentation can hinder collective action and diminish the capacity for communities to address common challenges, ultimately impacting national cohesion and stability.

To counteract the negative impacts of these policies, it is crucial for governments and civil society to advocate for more inclusive approaches to social integration. This involves not only reforming immigration laws to create fair and accessible pathways to residency and citizenship but also investing in programs that promote understanding and collaboration among diverse communities (Manby, 2018). By fostering an environment of inclusivity, societies can harness the potential contributions of migrants and build resilient communities that thrive on diversity rather than fear.

Case Studies on Differentiated Effects Based on Economic and Historical Contexts

The consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform; they vary significantly based on the economic and historical contexts of different countries (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017). Examining case studies from diverse regions provides valuable insights into how populism shapes social inclusion and reveals the complexities of these dynamics.

One notable example is the case of Hungary under PM Orbán. Hungary’s historical context, shaped by its post-communist transition and ongoing struggles with national identity, has made it particularly susceptible to populist rhetoric (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Orbán’s government has employed a narrative that frames immigration as a threat to Hungary’s Christian identity and cultural homogeneity (Becker, 2019). As a result, restrictive policies have been implemented, including the construction of border barriers and the introduction of laws aimed at criminalizing support for asylum seekers.

These measures have had profound effects on social inclusion in Hungary. The narrative of an “us versus them” mentality has resulted in a climate of fear among migrants and refugees, many of whom have faced violence and discrimination (Győrffy, 2018). The historical context of Hungary’s tumultuous past has contributed to a national discourse that prioritizes ethnic homogeneity, leading to the marginalization of diverse groups. Consequently, the restrictive policies have not only limited the rights and opportunities of migrants but have also created a polarized society where fear and hostility thrive (Bugaric & Kuhelj, 2018).

In contrast, the case of Canada illustrates a different approach to populism and social inclusion. While Canada has experienced populist movements, its historical context of multiculturalism and immigration has shaped a more inclusive national identity (Triandafyllidou, 2015). Policies that promote diversity and integration, such as the Multiculturalism Act, have fostered an environment where immigrants are seen as valuable contributors to society (Kymlicka & Banting, 2006). While populist rhetoric has attempted to challenge this narrative, the overall economic and historical framework has led to a more resilient approach to social inclusion.

Canada’s commitment to welcoming refugees and immigrants has resulted in positive economic outcomes, as diverse groups bring varied skills and perspectives that enrich the workforce. However, challenges remain, particularly in addressing the needs of marginalized communities and combating discrimination (Granovetter, 1973). The contrasting experiences of Hungary and Canada underscore how historical narratives and economic conditions influence the outcomes of populist policies on social inclusion.

Another significant case study is Italy, where the rise of populism under leaders like Matteo Salvini has led to restrictive immigration policies that have profoundly affected social integration. Italy’s historical context, marked by economic challenges and high unemployment rates, has fueled a perception of migrants as competitors for scarce resources (UNHCR, 2012). Salvini’s “Italians First” campaign sought to capitalize on these anxieties, leading to policies that restrict access to social services and legal residency for migrants.

The effects of these policies have been particularly pronounced in regions where economic struggles are most acute. Migrants in Italy often face discrimination in the job market, and many are relegated to precarious employment (OECD, 2020). Additionally, populist rhetoric has fostered an environment where xenophobia is normalized, leading to increased violence against migrant communities (ECRI, 2024). This case illustrates how economic conditions, combined with populist narratives, can exacerbate the challenges faced by marginalized groups, resulting in significant barriers to social inclusion.

In summary, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are shaped by a complex interplay of economic and historical factors. Case studies from Hungary, Canada, and Italy reveal how these dynamics can lead to divergent outcomes in terms of social integration. Understanding these contexts is crucial for addressing the challenges posed by populism and developing strategies that promote inclusivity and social cohesion in increasingly diverse societies. By recognizing the differentiated effects of these policies, stakeholders can work towards creating environments that foster belonging and participation for all members of society.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the role of populism in redefining citizenship and social inclusion for migrants in Europe reveals a complex and often troubling landscape. The emergence of populist movements has significantly influenced citizenship laws and principles, shifting the focus toward more exclusionary practices that prioritize ethnonational identity over inclusive citizenship. Through an analysis of changes in jus soli and jus sanguinis, it is evident that populist rhetoric has led to legislative reforms that reinforce a narrow definition of national belonging, marginalizing migrant communities and reshaping the fabric of European societies.

The implications of these changes extend beyond legal frameworks to the societal level, where public perceptions of migrants are increasingly shaped by populist narratives. These narratives often stigmatize migrants, portraying them as threats to national identity and social cohesion. As a result, migrants face considerable challenges in accessing essential services, such as education, employment, and healthcare, hindering their social integration and reinforcing systemic inequalities.

Furthermore, the consequences of populist policies on social inclusion are not uniform across Europe; they vary significantly based on historical and economic contexts. Case studies from countries like Hungary, Italy, and Canada illustrate the divergent effects of populism on social inclusion, revealing how economic anxieties and historical narratives shape the experiences of migrants. While some nations adopt restrictive measures that foster division and exclusion, others maintain more inclusive approaches that recognize the contributions of migrants to society.

Ultimately, this exploration underscores the pressing need for a reevaluation of citizenship and social inclusion policies in the face of rising populism. Addressing the challenges posed by exclusionary practices and fostering a more inclusive understanding of citizenship can enhance social cohesion and resilience in diverse societies. To achieve this, it is essential for policymakers, civil society, and communities to work collaboratively in promoting narratives that celebrate diversity, combat discrimination, and advocate for equitable access to rights and opportunities for all individuals, regardless of their background. In doing so, Europe can navigate the complexities of globalization while ensuring that its commitment to fundamental human rights and social justice remains unwavering. 


(*) Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo is a lecturer of political science and Executive Director of the Bureau of Strategic Studies (BESTRAT). He teaches at the University of Yaoundé II and has over 20 years of experience as a leading consultant in peace, security, and defense. With 11 books and more than 30 academic articles, his research focuses on security dynamics in Central Africa and the Lake Chad Basin, addressing issues like terrorism and conflict management. His expertise has contributed to numerous international peacebuilding efforts, and he regularly consults for organizations such as the United Nations System. Email: edouardyogo@yahoo.fr  


 

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Melting icebergs along Greenland's coast.  Photo: Shutterstock.

Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by PiS, AfD, and SD

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Lewis, Morgan. (2025). “Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by PiS, AfD, and SD.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 6, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0047



Abstract

Two major global challenges of recent decades are climate change and populism. While there is a strong scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, social science research highlights how climate change and policy reforms have provoked significant backlash within populist discourse. Despite the clear intersection of these phenomena and the threats they pose to modern democracy, limited literature explores this relationship. This article examines the mechanisms by which right-wing populist (RWP) parties promote climate skepticism or hostility to climate policies. Focusing on the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, the Sweden Democrats (SD), and Alternative for Germany (AfD), this study conducts a rhetorical analysis of their climate communication to investigate how RWP positions align with shifting ideological and electoral contexts. The research employs Scott Consigny’s (1974) rhetorical situation framework and integrates Wodak’s (2015) interdisciplinary approach to populism, establishing a novel methodology for analyzing populist rhetoric. Findings reveal that RWP parties deploy rhetorical strategies such as framing an antagonism between the “elite” and “the people,” prioritizing national self-interest over climate concerns, and using anti-intellectual rhetoric. However, notable differences in rhetorical strategies emerge among the parties due to varying ideological and political contexts, demonstrating the adaptability of populist rhetoric around its ideological ‘center’. This study highlights the interplay between ideological and rhetorical facets of populism in shaping climate communication. By offering a nuanced understanding of how RWP parties engage with climate discourse across contexts, this research provides a foundation for further exploration of climate communication within populist narratives.

Keywords: Climate change, climate skepticism, right-wing populism (RWP), climate communication, anti-intellectualism, Euroscepticism

 

By Morgan Lewis*

Introduction

Contemporary international relations have been increasingly dominated by two salient challenges over recent decades: populism and climate change (Buzogány & Mohammad-Klotzbach, 2021). As right-wing populism (RWP) is on the rise, it has become an increasingly formidable presence in European politics, epitomized by results such as the Brexit referendum and strong electoral performances by Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) in 2024 (Angelos & Nöstlinger, 2024), French National Front (RN) (Forchtner & Lubarda, 2022), and Swedish Democrats (SD) (Diehn, 2022). 

This notable rise in RWP is paralleled by a climate crisis the genesis of which lies at the heart of our economic system. Climate change, as a paradigmatic example of a crisis that demands cosmopolitan and internationally orchestrated action, is contrasted by the fragmentary and nationalist discourse of RWP parties (Mudde, 2004; Huber, 2020). Thus, the global mushrooming of RWP and its congruence to climate skepticism and hostility to action poses a serious threat to global climate targets, as evidenced in a recent report by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, which found that rising populist opposition to climate policies is jeopardizing plans to achieve net zero emissions (Campanela & Lawrence, 2024). 

Indeed, as the more confrontational and transformative decisions on climate change increasingly lie fore front of political debate, understanding how RWP parties promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to action through their rhetoric is essential for generating an appropriate response that allows for a continuation (and acceleration) of decarbonization efforts (Lockwood, 2018). Despite the importance of understanding RWP climate communication, the specific rhetorical mechanisms through which this occurs remains largely unexplored (Lockwood, 2018; Marquardt et al., 2022). It is this lacuna in the relevant literature that forms the basis of this thesis. 

Literature Review

RWP is a longstanding feature of European politics and has attracted considerable interest from social scientists and political commentators. This has been engendered by the recent uprising of RWP movements across Europe (Sandrin, 2021; Ortu, 2014; Greven, 2016; Abromeit, 2017). While the impacts and potential ramifications of the growth of RWP across Europe have been heavily debated, there is a noticeable dearth of literature on how RWP parties promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to action on climate change. The most current literature suggests that climate skepticism is associated with conservative ideological positions, with many studies findings a correlation to institutional distrust, a preference for a small state, and the belief that environmentalism is stereotypically feminine (Huber, 2020; Atanasova & Koteyko, 2017; Jylha et al., 2020). In line with this, the literature on right-wing environmental communication also details how right-wing actors cast doubt over climate science to legitimize normative claims about climate change for ideological and political purposes (Carvalho, 2007; McCright & Dunlap, 2008).

However, few accounts directly interrogate the nature of the relationship between populism and climate skepticism. Mudde’s (2004) article interprets populism broadly as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology in which the fundamental cleavage in society is framed as between a ‘corrupt elite’ and ‘pure people,’ evoking a sovereign demos. More recent scholarship has conceptualized RWP as being marked by themes such as democratic backsliding and the erosion of institutions of the ‘liberal order,’ such as feminism or pacifism (Moghissi, 2016; Klein, 2018). The congruence of RWP and hostility to climate action is argued to be a consequence of both the ideological composition of RWP, which frames the ‘climate agenda’ as elitist and antithetical to national interest, and the changing structural conditions in many countries that have ‘left behind’ portions of the population. Indeed, within this framing, climate policies are conveyed as further extension of these processes of modernization and globalization that reflect the interests of an elite class that do not serve the population at large (Lockwood, 2018). Many recent examples illustrate this point, such as the AfD’s opposition to the Green New Deal, arguing it would harm farmers (Chatham House, 2024), and the Spanish Vox party’s claims that climate policies are part of a globalist agenda aimed at damaging Spain while benefiting China (Mathiesen, 2022). 

However, there are severe limitations to the current literature on this connection between RWP and climate skepticism. Limited research has examined the specific rhetorical devices used by populist parties to promote these views, despite their importance in understanding the dynamics of this relationship. Moreover, much of the literature does not differentiate between distinct RWP parties, often treating them as part of a broader regional or global phenomenon. An exception is Gemenis et al. (2012), who, after surveying 13 RWP parties across 12 EU countries, concluded that “party positions on this issue [anthropogenic global warming] are clearly anti-environmental.” My research addresses these cleavages in the literature, and in doing so will contribute to the literature by establishing a framework to better understand the linkages between the expansion and deepening of populist rhetoric in political discourse and climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate action. To best do this, I will analyze how this rhetoric is shaped by domestic political contexts, how these rhetorical devices differ between party contexts, and the implications for future climate change communication in the context of continued RWP electoral success. 

Methods and Structure

Regarding the chosen method for this study, I will undertake a qualitative, comparative analysis of three European populist parties. The relevant primary data I will be assessing will be speeches, interviews, or statements regarding climate change/climate policies, with a broader investigative framework also considering party manifesto transcripts and member magazines. Secondary sources will include monographs and academic journals. Due to language barriers, much of my primary data will be translated or collected via English-speaking media outlets/journals. 

This choice of methods is appropriate for two reasons: first, as I intend to perform a rhetorical analysis to inductively examine populist climate communication, a quantitative research approach is unnecessary as I am not seeking to quantify or provide a value for how populist leaders espouse hostility to climate policies. Second, a comparative research design enables me to assess RWP parties in relation to one-another, providing more insight into how domestic political contexts affect rhetorical choices as-well as mitigating the danger of individual examples reducing the more general applicability of my results (Clark et al., 2019).

I will be examining Poland’s PiS, Germany’s AfD, and Sweden’s SD. I have chosen these European parties as they provide a broad range in terms of the vehemence of their opposition to climate mitigating policies, with all members categorized as either ‘denialists/skeptical’ or ‘disengaged/cautious’ on their climate policies by Schaller and Carious’s (2019) study. Moreover, I have selected all European parties, with all three operating within EU states that share similar constitutional structures as this allows me to gain greater insight into the similarities and differences of populist rhetoric in broadly similar contexts.

My research project will be structured as follows: Section two will outline my methodology, through which my qualitative framework will be employed to answer my research question. Through doing so I will elucidate Consigny’s ‘rhetorical situation,’ an assessment of Wodak’s interdisciplinary interpretation of populism, and an analysis of the association between nationalism, climate change and RWP. Section three will implement a rhetorical analysis of each chosen political party. Section four, following the rhetorical analysis, will discuss the results and outline the implications of this research.

Methodology

In this section, I will outline the methodology employed in this thesis. By examining Scott Consigny’s theory of the rhetorical situation, I will demonstrate why this theoretical lens is the most suitable for the analysis. Additionally, I will evaluate and justify the selected methodology for studying populism, which aligns with Ruth Wodak’s interdisciplinary approach, highlighting its effectiveness for analyzing RWP positions on climate policy. Finally, this section will conclude with a summary of the intersection between populism, nationalism, and climate change.

The Rhetorical Situation

This study will use Scott Consigny’s notion of the rhetorical situation – referring to a determinate situation fueled by a problem – as a theoretical prism to inform and frame the later rhetoric analysis (Consigny, 1974). This framework provides an excellent foundation for interpretively understanding the rhetoric of the chosen right-wing populist (RWP) parties as it considers both the context and constraints that shape the construction of rhetoric, and the creative agency of the speaker to shape audiences’ perspectives in indeterminate situations. 

According to Consigny, there are three core aspects of the rhetorical situation: i) The Exigence/Urgency: which is a problem than can be modified by the audience; a defect of the status quo to which the rhetor responds. ii) The Audience:those with the capacity to act on the speaker’s message and mediate change. iii) Constraints: The limitations that shape the rhetorical situation and influence how the speaker responds, these can encompass cultural, social, historical, political, and technological factors.

Consigny’s theory initially came as an instructive intermediary between two theories of rhetorical political analysis: the positivist approach of Bitzer (1968) which emphasizes the importance of the situation in compelling the speaker to act on an exigence; and the constructivist approach of Vatz (1973) who emphasizes the agency of the speaker in actively shaping the situation through rhetoric. These origins of birth provide the strength of this framework for this thesis as its epistemological underpinnings balance the dual concerns of the poststructuralist and positivist rhetorical traditions that preceded it. Thus, by considering both the agency of the speaker to maneuver within their context, and the constraints created by their context, this approach offers a more complete understanding of how rhetoric is formulated and its implications (Consigny, 1974). 

Martin (2013) describes how overall, rhetorical analysis can be understood as an examination of how political actors’ ‘appropriate’ situations through interventions in which they deploy ideas that reorient the audiences’ perspective (Martin, 2013). Rhetoric, in this framework, can be considered akin to projectile-like ideas that move outward and displace the surrounding context (Consigny, 1976; Vatz, 1973). This is particularly useful for analysis of climate policy since how an audience comprehends climate change/policy is central to gaining the mass momentum required to reach net-zero. 

The importance of rhetoric in climate communication is supported by the most recent literature. As Nordensvard and Ketola (2021) note, the ambiguity surrounding climate change creates considerable space—what Consigny identifies as the ‘existential dimension’—for rhetors to creatively restructure the situation and reshape the electorate’s perspectives on climate change and policy. This is done as the rhetors—in this case, politicians—select argumentative structures (what Consigny identifies as ‘topics’) that are germane to the situation, enabling them to determine the form of persuasion that best fits the particularities of the issue (Lanham, 1991). Therefore, the actor can creatively resituate the situation, granting them considerable agency to construct narratives relating to the exigence—in this case, climate change and policy. 

This theoretical lens is also uniquely suited for assessing populist ideology, which is operationalized via a communication style that relies on established ideological focal points, namely nationalism and anti-elitism, which form a restricted core morphology (Mudde, 2004; Canovan, 2001). Accordingly, within this study, this theoretical framework will allow us to comparatively assess the narrative frames or ‘topics’ used by RWP party politicians, while also accounting for the contextual and structural constraints faced by each party and the creative agency of each actor. Thus, this interpretative approach emphasizes the value of historical and cultural context while also considering the rhetor’s agency to navigate their situation.

This framework of analysis is superior to other forms of hermeneutics for this analysis. An oft-used approach in reference to RWP is Critical Discourse Analysis as it provides an approach that embeds language in power and social inequality, thus utilizing a broader theoretical scope (Fairclough, 2013; Krotofil & Motak, 2018). However, as a mechanism for rhetorical meaning-making it is too broadly focused, taking as its object the “general domain of signs and symbolic exchanges [while] rhetoric specifies quite determinate techniques, devices and strategies” (Martin, 2022: 170). Consigny’s rhetorical situation rigorously assesses how language is used to influence an audience by identifying which rhetorical strategies are being employed, creating a more focused framework for comparative political analysis.

Having established a theoretical framework for rhetorical political analysis, I can move on to outlining a methodological understanding of populism.

How to Analyze Right-Wing Populism: An Interdisciplinary Approach

The contemporary literature on populism has posed significant methodological questions regarding how it should be interpreted, as De Cleen (2012: 1) notes, “one of the most used and abused terms inside and outside academia is undoubtedly populism.” The central focus of populist movements is regarded broadly as an emphasis on the inadequacy of the ‘corrupt governing elite’ to effectively respond to ‘general will’ of the ‘pure people’ (Huber at al., 2020; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). However, the marked increase in the prominence of populism globally has brought about significant debate on the potential causes and implications of its recent resurgence (Abromeit, 2017). These methodological debates have resulted in a significant breadth of literature on how to evaluate RWP, which I will now interrogate to demonstrate the applicability of this thesis for studying RWP.  

Scholars such as Jagers & Walgrave (2007) define populism as a political communication style devoid of any coherent or consistent ideological content or principles that guide it, the essence of which exists in its performative rhetoric and communication. This rhetoric appeals to abstract notions of ‘the people’, villainizes the establishment, and embellishes certain emotional tropes (Moffit, 2016; Nordensvard & Ketola, 2021). 

Others such as Laclau (2006) shift the focus to the ontology of populism, arguing that populism represents a method of articulating those demands via a performative structuring logic that discursively constructs collective identities between groups. Another dominant school of thought in the literature focuses on the ideologically substantive aspects of populism (Freeden, 2017; Stanley, 2008). In this view, populism is conceived as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology which views of politics as an “expression of the volonté généale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). Thus, populism is interpreted as an existing ideology, which operates through a severely restricted but identifiable morphology that utilizes a small number of core concepts oriented around ‘people-centrism,’ anti-elitism and often an inclination toward authoritarianism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). 

In view of these competing methodologies, truly interdisciplinary approaches to analyzing populism have been lacking (Marquardt et al., 2022). Recent literature has sought to remedy these blind spots. Following this, populism will be interpreted in line with Wodak’s discourse-historical approach, outlined in The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (Wodak, 2015). This study interprets RWP as a dynamic mixture of both style (the rhetorical devices being deployed) and substance (the ideological focal points around which RWP operates). Wodak’s approach establishes a methodology for studying populism that acknowledges the ideological content of RWP discourse, without reducing it to a “frivolity of form, prose and style” (Wodak, 2015: 3) which would downplay important aspects of how RWP resonates with the audience (Pels, 2012). This methodology for populism creates an interpretation of populism that “does not only relate to the form of rhetoric but to its specific contents” (Wodak, 2015: 1). 

Wodak’s interpretation is well-equipped for this thesis because it acknowledges how populism is both a form of communication and an ideology, which utilizes rhetorical devices to mobilize political support around certain ideas. Populist modes of communication thus help to “form expectations [and] shore up confidence” (Beckert & Bronk, 2018: 1-2), by helping guide people’s sensemaking facilities around the climate issues. Moreover, her study is primarily focused on Europe, therefore the ideological content she identifies is applicable to the ideologically ‘thick’ established politics of Germany, Poland and Sweden around which the ‘thin-centered’ populist ideology wraps itself. This enables a point of departure for my rhetorical analysis that is easily operationalized into a European context. One of the central content areas of populism identified by Wodak is nationalism. As such, this study will now turn to the intersection between nationalism, RWP and climate change to gain a more complete picture of its relevance for understanding climate skepticism. 

RWP, Nationalism and Climate Change: Patterns of Association

Wodak argues that, while there is no overarching explanation for the resurgence of RWP within Europe, certain phenomena transcend the ‘micro-politics’ of RWP, thereby providing a suitable framework for broader political analysis. The primary trend she identifies is the creeping ‘renationalization’ of EU politics (Wodak, 2015; Abromeit, 2017). As the ‘nation-state’ remains the dominant context for democratic political representation, populism operates via the vector of nationalism as the previously sharp distinction between nationalism and RWP becomes increasingly blurred (Brubaker, 2019; De Cleen, 2017). For Wodak (2015), RWP parties offer clear-cut answers for the electorate by constructing scapegoats and common enemies, as Pelinka (2013: 8) argues, “populism simplifies complex developments by looking for a culprit.” Which groups are selected depends largely on local political, economic, and historic contexts due to the adaptive plasticity of populist ideology. 

Contemporary RWP mobilizes less against a common enemy, and more against a (perceived) enemy from abroad by strategically selecting the ‘other.’ The ‘elites,’ in this view, play a key role as the secondary defining ‘others,’ who are represented as responsible for the modernizing trends that threaten the nation (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). These elites exist at regional and global stages, with organizations such as the EU and the United Nations being central to European RWP rhetoric (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). This results in a proclivity for conspiratorial thinking, with phenomena deemed to be damaging to the ‘nation-state’ being easily dismissible as elitist projects. Climate change here is reflective of a threat to the innately territorial and bordered nature of nationalism as a fundamentally borderless phenomenon. In this sense, the canopy comfort of a nationalist morphology encourages skepticism (Conversi, 2020; Ghosh, 2018). 

In summary, this section has outlined the theoretical framework of the rhetorical situation, its relevance for this study, and how it can be operationalized for analysis of RWP rhetoric. This section then explained the chosen methodology for populism, the usefulness of an interdisciplinary approach and the importance of nationalism as an ideological focal point for populist discourse. In sum, it has established a unique and valuable approach for analysis of RWP rhetoric.

Research and Analysis

Following the inductive question motivating this research, this study will now examine the selected RWP parties to uncover the rhetorical strategies they use to promote climate skepticism and/or hostility toward action on climate change. Drawing on our operational methodology for populism, the chosen primary and secondary sources are well-suited for analysis. To perform my analysis, I have accessed primary data through interview transcripts, conference statements, and parliamentary proposals/statements. Due to language barriers, a broader investigative framework will include quotes from online newspapers, articles, and academic journals.                        

This section outlines the context of each political party to inform the rhetorical political analysis, followed by an exploration of how the different rhetorical devices employed promote certain views on climate policy. This analysis is based on the notion that the statements made by various politicians within the chosen parties are interconnected, allowing the process of meaning-making to extend to the entire party.  

The Law and Justice Party (PiS)

Context

Poland is widely perceived as a laggard within the EU in terms of its climate ambitions. Identified as ‘disengaged/cautious’ by Carius & Schaller’s (2019) study of European climate agendas, the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) has prioritized economic development and energy security over climate protection (Biedenkopf, 2021; Lockwood, 2018; Judge & Maltby, 2017). Its strong opposition towards climate-friendly policies is illustrated through it being one of the last nations to put forth a decarbonization plan at the recent COP26 negotiations, after it reversed its decision to phase out coal by 2030 (Burki, 2021). Moreover, on a European level, its opposition to climate treaties such as the European Green Deal and the EU emissions trading scheme evidence its lack of ambition (Szulecki & Ancygier, 2015; KPMG, 2021). An important context for the PiS’s energy policies is Poland’s high reliance on indigenous coal supplies – which forms upwards of 70% of its energy supply (Notes From Poland, 2022). 

The PiS is an interesting case as it is the only selected party that has enjoyed complete political power after being elected in 2015, and again in 2019, while losing power in 2023, and enjoying the support of incumbent President Andrej Duda throughout (Cadier & Szulecki, 2020). Żuk & Szulecki (2020) argue that the PiS is a clear example of a RWP party, with an ideology that blends support for conservative ‘traditional’ values, nativist objection to immigration and nationalism (Kulesza & Rae, 2017). These form the ‘thick’ ideological bases around which the PiS construct a populist layer via a style of communication juxtaposing the ‘elites’ and Polish ‘people’ (Wodak, 2015).

Analysis 

These topics form the key narratives used by the PiS, acting as nodal points through which climate change rhetoric is oriented: i) Anti-intellectualism and scientific dissent over the existence of climate change. ii) Climate policy as elitist and a threat to national sovereignty and economic competitiveness

Scientific Dissent and Anti-intellectualism

A key layer of Wodak’s ideological micro-politics of populism is the construction of scapegoats and enemies via a discourse of an untrustworthy elite. This theme, as anticipated, was evident in PiS rhetoric with anti-elite frames being used to promote skepticism over the validity of climate science/climate policy (Faiola, 2016). Anna Zalewska, former PiS Minister of Education, when proposing the removal of anthropogenic climate change from school curriculums, claimed: “There is really no global warming because ice should melt in the Arctic, and it is growing. Why do they tell us otherwise? Because it’s cosmic money; ecologists earn such money on this warming” (via Nowak, 2016).

Furthermore, PiS leader and former deputy PM Jaroslaw Kaczyński has said that: “At least some of this so-called green policy is madness, [it is based on] theories without evidence” (Notes from Poland, 2021). He further argued that: “The climate is changing, but it’s not our fault. We’re not going to kill our industry just because some people in Brussels think they know better than us” (Reuters, 2018). 

Additionally, former PiS Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski attempted to draw a more overt connection between pro-climate politics and Marxism, claiming that PiS’s predecessors acted “according to a Marxist model which has to automatically develop in one direction only—a new mixture of cultures and races, a world made up of cyclists and vegetarians who only use renewable energy” (Żuk & Żuk, 2018).

Disputing the viability of science and their motives is an important element of PiS discourse. 

Throughout the primary data, terms such as ‘Brussels,’ the ‘EU,’ ‘Ecologists’ and ‘Marxists’ were used interchangeably (based on the context) to denote an external and elitist enemy. Behind these quotes, a hidden ideology underpins RWP’s tendency toward conspiratorial thinking, which is the view that knowledge is always reflective of a form of power projection. Thus, by clearly defining the nation’s ‘enemies,’ the ‘people-elite’ dichotomy is re-emphasized while climate policy is presented as a means through which artificially constructed enemies exert power over the Polish nation (Wodak, 2015). 

This is exacerbated by the ambiguous and complicated nature of climate change, in addition to most climate communication being top-down from prestigious scientific institutions or government bodies which provides considerable space for RWP politicians to portray these issues as sinister elitist projects. This topic invokes nationalist and anti-EU sentiment as the foreign origins of climate policy is rhetorically foregrounded, inviting the audience to view climate policy and its proponents as similarly foreign. Pelinka (2013) observes that contemporary populist anti-elitism does not purely mobilize against an enemy, but a foreign enemy who are seen to be responsible for Europeanization and globalization. As noted by Laclau (2006: 648), “populism displaces the imminent social antagonism into the antagonism between the unified people and its external enemy.”

Another facet of this rhetoric topic is that it effectively illustrates what Wodak (2015: 2) identifies as the “arrogance of ignorance,” which refers to how RWP “appeals to common sense and anti-intellectualism [marking] a return to pre-modernist or pre-enlightenment thinking.” Phrases such as “some people in Brussels think they know better than us,”“because ice should melt in the arctic and it is growing” (see above quotations) communicate how expert views are framed as another mechanism through which elites seek to centralize authority to the disadvantage of the people (Brewer, 2016; Merkley, 2020).

Climate Policy as a Threat to Polish Sovereignty and Economic Competitiveness 

The EU’s institutions and political processes, while not the exclusive target of PiS, are typically in the firing line when attempts are made to undermine climate-friendly policies (Fuksiewicz & Klein, 2014). This rhetorical strategy occurs through a prism of national self-interest. As Wodak argues, the ‘renationalization’ of European politics is a core feature of RWP, with the nationalist leanings of PiS evidenced by the Health, Work and Family Programme (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2014), which stated: “We will not lead Poland into any voluntary arrangements increasing the extent of European integration that do not meet the criterion of being clearly beneficial for Polish interests.” This rhetorical topic is commonly operationalized around the notion that climate policy unjustly threatens Polish sovereignty, and in particular the long-term viability of the Polish coal industry (Biedenkopf, 2021). 

Krzysztof Szczerski, former PiS head of office, speaking on the EU’s Energy Union, stated: “Can it be called anything else than the death of Polish coal?… So, we eliminate our own energy resource and become even more addicted to imports” (wPolityce, 2015). Furthermore, in 2018, at COP24, Andrzej Duda stated: “There is no plan to abandon coal in Poland. Coal is our strategic raw material. We have supplies for 200 years, and it is difficult to give up coal, thanks to which we have sovereignty.” He followed this by claiming: “As long as I am president, I will not allow anyone to murder the coal industry. It’s because we have such deeply ingrained traditions in this industry, of which St. Barbara’s Day is a part—a part that is actually included in the list of our heritage” (TVP World, 2018).

These quotations effectively demonstrate an important intersection between climate change and the nationalist ideology – resource nationalism. This phenomenon is evident in PiS rhetoric and is employed by many RWP parties as a strategy that sacralizes soil-rooted national resources as a suggested common good, despite the small proportion of people that reap the benefits of their exploitation (Conversi, 2020). As fossil fuels are often framed as part of Poland’s cultural heritage and a source of sovereignty and economic growth, not only is coal extraction justified, but any proposals threatening its viability are presented as a threat to collective Polish well-being. However, this discourse rarely addresses the inherent contradiction of the intergenerational national catastrophe that continued coal exploitation and associated emissions will cause (Kim, 2019).

This argumentative strategy links PiS rhetoric directly to my methodology, as national self-interests form the ideological substance around which the thin ideology of populism wraps itself. While more recent PiS rhetoric contains frequent references to their intent to overhaul the coal industry and make it harmonious with global climate ambitions, as stated by Andrzej Duda in 2018: “[The coal industry] must be kept, although it needs modernisation and reform” (TVP World, 2018). These can be viewed as attempts to reappropriate and manage the rhetorical situation in the context of the growing pressures to decarbonize through attempts to align Polish industry with modern climate commitments, despite the fanciful notion that Poland can achieve carbon neutrality while reliant on coal (Wójcik-Jurkiewicz et al., 2021). 

Closely linked to discourse on energy security, the PiS also invoked the supposed threat climate-friendly policies pose to Polish economic competitiveness. The PiS Party Programme (2014) stated: “The biggest obstacle in the field of electricity production is the climate policy imposed by the European Union” and went on to state they will not lead Poland into any European climate arrangements “which do not meet the criterion of being clearly beneficial for Polish interests”(Fuksiewicz & Klein, 2014). Dismissing climate policies for economic reasons constitutes what Forchtner & Lubarda (2022) identify as the imagined economic pragmatism existing in far-right political discourse. In this sense, the PiS objection to climate policies can be embedded in a wider theme within their rhetoric that challenges the suggested unfair economic arrangements brought by globalization and European integration (Marquardt et al., 2022). 

Although, seeming contrary to what was outlined in my above methodology, PiS rhetoric on the economic cost of climate policies is far from cohesive. This is demonstrated through statements such as that of Konrad Szymanski, Minister for European Affairs, who stated that: “We should take into account not only the costs of the transformation in themselves but also the costs of the lack of transformation…there is the impression that the lack of transformation generates zero costs for the economy” (Biedenkopf, 2021). While the majority of PiS rhetoric villainizes climate policy, these important exceptions to the rule demonstrate that PiS climate communication is not monolithic, with a range of differing constraints and contexts shaping the rhetoric of individual speakers. In this case, there is an acknowledgement of the gravity of the crisis, and the long-term benefits of climate action, differing from the short-term and reactionary rhetoric of many RWP parties (Antonio, 2019). This acknowledgment also has important implications for policy decisions, evidenced by the PiS support for developing smaller scale renewable energy forms, such as solar panels (Lockwood, 2018). 

In summary, analysis of this rhetoric shows how PiS discourse on climate change can be distilled into several key rhetorical devices that employ some of the central aspects of Wodak’s interpretation of populism. The PiS consistently frame climate policy as an elitist conspiracy, with anti-intellectual rhetoric utilized to invite the listener to view climate policy/science as a means of power projection and a threat, alluded to via references to ‘Marxists’ ‘ecologists’ or ‘Brussels’ which represent a foreign enemy to the rhetorical audience (Polish electorate). This topic intersects with the broader villainization of pro-climate policies and its proponents, with organizations such as the EU and/or UN cast as elitist in a Manichean worldview. Furthermore, PiS rhetoric portrays climate policy as a threat to Polish sovereignty and economic competitiveness via a discourse of resource nationalism. While several PiS actors have produced rhetoric that demonstrates an appreciation of the long-term economic benefit of integration, the majority remains insular and nationalist. 

Swedish Democrats (SD)

Context

The Swedish Democrats (SD) are the second largest party in the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) after gaining 20.5% of the vote in the 2022 Swedish general election, their best ever electoral performance (Diehn, 2022). A former pariah party associated with fringe neo-Nazi movements, the SD has seen an astonishing rise in recent years after denounced its extremist roots and pursuing more populist dimensions. The SD, through taking a broadly Eurosceptic and anti-establishment stance, has sought to profile itself as a party free from elitism and ideological constraints, and thus free to represent the true will of ‘the people’ (Mudde, 2004; Wodak, 2015; Tomson, 2020). The SD’s ideology, which is rooted in nativism, nationalism, and social conservativism, has also integrated climate change/climate policy into their broader populist frame as it becomes an increasingly salient political issue (Emilsson, 2018). 

The SD’s official stance is that climate change is a real and pressing issue; however, the party’s rhetoric has frequently disputed scientific findings and is categorized as “deniers and skeptics” in Carius and Schaller’s 2019 study (Vilhma et al., 2021). The SD was the only Swedish party not to vote in favor of ratifying the Paris Climate Agreement, and they have strongly opposed the government’s climate strategy, particularly regarding wind power development and environmental taxes, as illustrated by their 2019 vote against increasing the aviation fuel tax (Bierbach, 2019; Hofverberg, 2022).

An important context for the SD climate change rhetoric is Sweden’s history as a global leader in environmental politics. Sweden is ranked 5th on the Environmental Performance Index and, as Lockwood (2018) notes, Nordic political discourse at large contains less outright climate denial compared to Anglophone countries due to climate denial carrying less political capital, which can be considered a limitation on Swedish climate skeptical rhetoric (EPI, 2022; Bäckstrand & Kronsell, 2015). 

Analysis 

These rhetorical topics have been identified as the central argumentative structures used to promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate action: i) Climate nationalism and eco-populism; ii) Promoting ambivalence and challenging universalized forms of knowledge production; ii) Climate policy as a threat to traditional lifestyles.

Climate Nationalism and Eco-populism  

As climate change has been getting more space in SD discourse following extreme weather events, in particular widespread wildfires in June 2018, the SD have sought to manage this changing context – or ‘exigence’ – by utilizing a variety of rhetorical strategies. One such topic has been to acknowledge the crisis, while simultaneously denying Sweden’s responsibility to make drastic emissions cuts. 

This topic was evident in the SD 2022 manifesto, which stated: “Sweden does not contribute to reduced emissions by raising fuel prices and making it more expensive for companies to operate in Sweden if China can increase its emissions every year by more than what all of Sweden emits” (Party Programme, 2022: 24). Moreover, in a 2020/21 motion the SD claimed: “In many places, there is a lack of basic insight that Sweden or the EU alone can control global carbon dioxide emissions to a significant extent.” And that: “When the EU decided on the burden sharing, Sweden was given the most ambitious emission reduction requirements by all countries. This is strange in light of the fact that Sweden’s emissions of greenhouse gases per capita are already well below the average for industrialized countries” (Motion 2020/21: 727). 

This topic demonstrates an acceptance of the scientific consensus, while refocusing issues of climate reform onto developing nations, such as China, while framing Sweden as having already serviced its debt and ‘done its share’ (Wodak, 2015). This climate nationalist rhetoric has been identified by the literature as a key strategy of RWP actors to recenter discussions of decarbonization away from their nation by inviting the listener to view it as both ineffectual and unjust (Bang & Schreurs, 2010; Kashwan et al., 2022). As Dubash (2019) notes, the “turn toward nationalism…has created a short-term, looking-out-for-our-own mentality that is inimical to the global collective action needed to address climate change.” This rhetoric not only centralizes Swedish national interest, but also normatively reasserts the nation-state as the primary actor when setting climate policy by inviting the listener to view it as an issue to be addressed by siloed and self-serving nations, instead of intergovernmental institutions (Forchtner & Kølvraa, 2015). 

This embeds SD rhetoric firmly into my previously outlined methodology as it promotes a populist framing of ‘us versus them’ wrapped around a nationalist ideology. Sweden’s environmentally progressive context and the mainstream presentation the SD are trying to establish could have limited the effectiveness of more overt climate denial. However, this rhetorical strategy still establishes a discourse that is antithetical to the collective climate action that is needed (Margulies, 2021). 

This topic of climate nationalism closely linked to another rhetorical strategy to promote hostility to climate action identified in my analysis: eco-populism. While not anticipated in my methodology, the ecological inclination of RWP parties has been heavily discussed in recent literature (Forchtner, 2019; Sconfienza, 2022). This narrative was present in the SD’s 2018 manifesto which stated that: “Sweden alone cannot solve the world’s environmental problems, so we want to protect our unique natural environment and take our share of responsibility for the global challenges, while our environmental considerations are based on love and care for our own homeland” (Party Programme, 2018: 18).

The SD romanticization of the local environment is identified by Fochtner (2019) as a form of “ethno-nationalist imagery according to which ‘the people’ is rooted, and emerged from, a particular space.” By attributing value to the symbiotic relationship between the ‘nation’ and the ‘homeland,’ the SD promote a nature-nation-purity nexus. This rhetorical strategy crafts a narrative in which support for the local environment via domestic governance and traditions stands in opposition to global environmental issues such as climate change, which are supported by cosmopolitan institutions/elites and supported by a range of foreign traditions, considered as ‘other,’ embedding this topic into a populist frame (Sconfienza, 2022). As the audience is invited to view ecological purity as an important facet of Swedish nationalist imagery, the importance of a nationalist environmentalist frame is reified while less importance is placed on climate change and global climate cooperation, which is dismissible as a transient issue (Hultgren, 2015).

Promoting Climate Ambivalence and Challenging Universalized Forms of Knowledge Production

The SD’s approach to climate change is characterized by ambiguity, as seen in statements such as: “The debate among researchers is alive about the consequences of different levels of temperature increase” (Motion 2020/21: 727). This quote underpins how the SD seeks to sow doubt over the scientific consensus by emphasizing the ‘aliveness’ of the climate change ‘debate.’

Moreover, this argumentative structure demonstrates how the SD questions the notion of universalized mechanisms of knowledge production for political means. Marquardt et al. (2022) argue that RWP parties utilize not only anti-elitist and anti-cosmopolitan arguments but also question the forms of knowledge production and experience upon which climate action is based. This was illustrated by Josef Fransson, an SD Politician, who emphasized the benefits of CO2 emissions in a 2015 article, claiming: “The soil [will] become greener, and crops grow larger due to the plants’ greater access to carbon dioxide” (Hultman et al., 2020). More recently, SD politician Elsa Widding, when denying the severity of climate change, argued that: “The last time that was the case was in the 1960s when summers either stopped or became so short that we couldn’t produce a harvest” (The Local, 2022). 

Parallel to the SD, online far-right media within Sweden also employ these rhetorical tools to sow distrust around climate science, with media sites such as Nya Tider claiming “climate threat-sceptics have identified a series of basic problems with climate science as it is presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Among these are deviations from the scientific method, the accuracy of climate models, modelling of the carbon cycle and questionable data adjustments” (Björklund, 2018a). Promotion of ambivalence around the scientific method reflects how the Swedish far-right utilize these rhetorical topics to frame science and the scientific method as a tool of cosmopolitan, supranational institutions or secondary ‘others,’ dismissing these institutions and forms of knowledge production as both fallible and the product of a corrupt elite.

This constitutes what Jasanoff (2010) argues is the prioritization of subjective and local experiences over the apolitical and universal imaginary of bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The SD, by strategically creating tension between these competing epistemic worldviews – the local and the cosmopolitan – makes climate change a politicized and contestable issue as the epistemology being prioritized reflects a broader worldview. By reframing climate change with an emphasis on subjective personal experiences regarding ‘past short summers’ or ‘the positive effects of carbon,’ the SD are also posing a challenge to the forms of knowledge that bolster the scientific consensus and justify climate reform (Marquardt et al., 2022). This topic leads to personal experience constituting knowledge that is valued higher than the positivist knowledge claims of climate policy proponents. Wodak’s concept of the “arrogance of ignorance” (2015: 2) underscores this phenomenon, referring to the tendency of RWP communication to legitimize forms of truth conceived as the ‘common-sense’ of the people, while delegitimizing climate science.

Climate Policy as a Threat to Traditional Lifestyles  

The SD have often utilized a rhetorical pattern portraying climate policy, and its advocates as a cavalry of elites that threaten traditional lifestyles and industries. Wodak, (2015), as outlined previously, identifies RWP’s proclivity for scapegoating elites as the process of creating secondary defining ‘others,’ who are villainized based off their apparent responsibility for the modernizing policies and trends that threaten the nation-state and its traditions.  

This is evident throughout SD climate communication, as seen when stating: “The goal of a more environmentally friendly society should be achieved primarily through awareness raising, technological development, and positive incentives…not through a one-sided focus on punishing ‘undesirable’ lifestyles” (Sverigedemokraternas principprogram, 2019). This notion was also evidenced when claiming: “There is no indication that free people [should] refrain from travel and a good standard of living, nor should it be the aim of politics” (Motion 2019/20: 2682). As evidenced, SD climate rhetoric invites the listener to view climate policy as a threat to people’s lifestyle, thus creating a dichotomous perspective that positions climate reform as antithetical to the interests of the citizens. In this case, the ruling government is positioned as the ‘elites,’ reflecting the SD’s position as an opposition party in the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament). 

This topic is made more evident when the SD discuss specific policy issues, such as the petrol/diesel and carbon tax: “Aggressive taxation and policies focused on cities have turned the car into a class issue…for the vast majority of people the car is not a luxury but a necessity.” Moreover, the SD argued that: “Today, environmental taxes far exceed the cost of emissions. The car has become a cash cow for the government” (Party Programme, 2022: 27). These quotes demonstrate how climate policy is framed as antagonistic to aspects of modern life, such as individual car ownership, which are simultaneously portrayed as unproblematic. These discursive appropriations are supported by Hultman et al. (2020), who argue that RWP hostility to climate change is partly rooted in a refusal to recognize the inherent issues in modern lifestyles, rates of consumption, and capitalist modes of production which in part caused the current ecological crisis (Pulé & Hultman, 2019). This argumentative structure links to Wodak (2015) argument that RWP utilizes/constructs a ‘politics of fear’ to mobilize support around their party as the vindicators of these ‘harmless’ lifestyles, and therefore as the only truly representatives of ‘the people.’

Outside of direct party sources, parallels can be drawn here to Swedish anti-COVID discourse, with Önnerfors (2024) noting how similar rhetorical devices are employed in a range of so-called protest songs. One example includes Swedish artist Christoffer Lundquist’s, whose song ‘Vi är fria’ employed distinct rhetorical devices to promote skepticism about the role of the government in pushing vaccinations and COVID restrictions by urging brave truthtellers who “have truth and meaning” (Lundquist, 2021) to take back control as a unified grassroots movement against a suggested evil and overreaching state (Hughes et al, 2021: 7). The rhetorical devices emphasizing subjective ‘common sense’ knowledge are contrasted with the machinations of a vaguely defined elite, which threaten the freedom and lifestyles of the ‘people.’ Similar to the SD’s, these rhetorical topics position the government as a malicious elite in a quest to return the freedoms and traditional lifestyles which they claim have been lost. This wider discourse speaks to how RWP seeks to position the policies of a corrupt elite – such as through climate or pro-vaccination policy – against the suggested interest of the ‘people’ and diffuse claims of freedom and tradition.  

In summary, the SD employ various rhetorical devices to promote ambivalence and/or hostility to climate action. While important constraints limit the SD’s ability to formulate rhetoric, such as Sweden’s strong environmentally progressive ethos, SD actors creatively employ rhetorical devices to promote hostility to climate policy in ways that demonstrate some fundamental aspects of Wodak’s interpretation of RWP, while also differing in some unexpected ways. One such topic was climate nationalism, which directed the focus of the rhetoric audience away from domestic reform onto developing nations. Interestingly, this topic also intersected with eco-populism which was prevalent in SD climate discourse and sought to promote ecological purity within a nationalist frame, thereby positioning climate change and international climate cooperation as secondary to the importance of securing the ‘homeland’ ecology. 

SD’s rhetoric challenged the epistemologies underpinning climate science and in doing so, delegitimizing climate policy/expertise and its associated worldview while prioritizing subjective and local ‘common-sense’ knowledge forms. Moreover, closely associated with this topic, the SD depicted climate policy as an elitist threat to the lifestyles of the Swedish people, as suggested by Wodak (2015), invoking the suggested ‘elitism’ of climate science is a common strategy of RWP, however the defense of the free-market and modern consumerist lifestyles demonstrates how the rhetorical devices being employed shift in relation to ideological/contextual factors. 

Alternative for Deutschland (AfD)

Context 

The Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party is a right-wing populist (RWP) party holding an influential position within the German political system after gaining 10.3% of the vote share in 2021, with 83 seats in the German Bundestag (parliament), and winning its first state election in the German state Thuringia in 2024 (Kirby & Parker, 2024; Laumond, 2023). Founded in 2013 in reaction to the European Central Bank (ECB) and European Commission’s bailout of Greece, the AfD has been characterized by extreme Euroscepticism and identarian nationalism as well as being in favor of a free-market economy (Boecher et al., 2022). Its radical political positions are paralleled by its position on climate change with the AfD vigorously opposing Germany’s ambitious plan to reach carbon-neutrality by 2045 (The German Energiewende) (Kurmayer, 2023). 

The AfD is an important case within this thesis as it is the only chosen party that has made climate policy as one of its key issues, only following immigration and the Euro in salience (Arzheimer, 2015). Categorized as ‘deniers and sceptics’ by Carius and Schaller’s 2019 study, the AfD have acknowledged a warming trend, however, dispute its anthropogenic origins. This attribution skepticism has become a key feature of its political profile and has mobilized voters around the suggested elitism and corruptness of climate policy (Grimm, 2015). In line with this, the AfD has voted against all EU climate and energy policy proposals tabled in the European Parliament and is opposed to the proposed phasing out of the fossil fuel industry while supporting nuclear development (Waldholz, 2019). 

For many of the quotes used in this analysis, articles from the AfD membership magazine (AfD Kompakt) were utilized. This is appropriate as these articles are written by AfD politicians and, although typically brief, provide a more detailed analysis of AfD policy positions and rhetorical strategies due to their frequent publication.

Analysis

These two topics were identified as the central rhetorical devises used to promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate action: i) Portraying climate science as false and elitist; ii) Promoting technological innovation as the solution.

Portraying Climate Science as False and Elitist 

A central mechanism through which the AfD promote doubt over climate change is by frequently highlighting the beneficial effects of carbon emissions, epitomized by AfD candidate Guido Reil declaring that: “Carbon Dioxide is good for plants [and is having] no impact on the climate” (Farand, 2019). Moreover, the AfD’s manifesto (2017: 78) claims: “[The] IPCC and German government conveniently omit the positive influence of COon plant growth and world nutrition.” By emphasizing the benefit of carbon emissions, the AfD strategically reframed climate change from a less contestable situation, to one of ambivalence in which the listener is invited to challenge the epistemic authorities that underpin knowledge on climate change (Boecher et al., 2022). 

Prioritizing alternative or experiential knowledge over expertise is a common mechanism through which RWP reframes climate science within an ‘elite’ versus the ‘people’ dichotomy. By radically simplifying the issue, and challenging the knowledge foundations that support it, an antagonism between the ‘folk’ or experiential and scientific knowledge foundations is created, demonstrating Wodak’s (2015) notion of the ‘anti-intellectualism.’ 

In addition, contrary to what one might expect from RWP parties such as the Polish PiS, which typically promote conspiracist arguments claiming that scientists manipulate evidence, a dominant theme used by the AfD to invoke climate skepticism is that the establishment—primarily the German media, government, and the EU—is alarmist and employs scare tactics. Karsten Hilse, AfD spokesman for environmental policy, stated in AfD Kompakt that: “On the occasion of the terrible forest fires that rage in Sweden, the colleagues from Heute Journal [one of Germany’s main news programs] […] deemed it appropriate to once again produce a panic program on (man-made) climate change” (Hilse, 2018). Moreover, Professor Ingo Hahn, science policy spokesman for the AfD, claimed that: “The radicalization of the climate ideologues continues to increase. The main blame lies with the established parties and the mainstream media, which have been spreading fictitious horror scenarios about ‘climate change’ for years” (Hahn, 2023). 

While this rhetorical strategy differed from the other chosen parties, it does entail a topic which firmly embeds climate rhetoric into the AfD’s populist core by inviting the audience to perceive climate change/climate policies as a project orchestrated by a cosmopolitan elite, detached from the workings of everyday people that are defined within a nativist frame (Wodak, 2015; Lockwood, 2018). This is evident when AfD politician Alexander Gauland in an AfD Kompakt article claimed in 2017 that: “While more and more money is being pulled out of the pockets of the hard-working people, electric cars are to be subsidized” (Gauland, 2017). Another article claimed that “with the plans to deliberately increase the price of the staple food, meat, the old parties show that they are out of touch with the ‘little guy’” (Chrupalla, 2019).

Outside of the mainstream party discourse, a corpus of far-right German blogs and magazines have echoed this rhetorical device. For example, the far-right blog Politically Incorrect, which argued that climate change policy was leading to the suppression of “serious [scientific] voices” and resulted in the creation of blacklists of “climate deniers” (PI News, 2007). This discourse, while not produced directly by official AfD sources, speaks to the wider rhetorical approach of these ideological positions to the exigence of climate change and the characterization of scientific reasoning as fundamentally antagonistic to the interests of the people. Reflecting on these wider discourses underscores how the apparent ‘people-centrism’ of the AfD reorients the rhetorical situation into one in which the AfD are the defenders of the taxpayers from the machinations of a corrupt cosmopolitan enemy or a foreign ‘other’ which is juxtaposed against the ‘little guy,’ or German public who is framed as paying the consequences of policies such as electric var subsidies or meat taxes (Küppers, 2022).

This topic thus centers AfD rhetoric into our methodology for populism, as it centers a suggested ‘antagonism between the ‘people’ and ‘elite,’ using it to promote hostility to climate policy.

Technological Innovation as the Solution

The AfD frequently attempt to reorient discourse on the German energy transitions via a topic claiming that technological breakthroughs are the solution to energy/environmental issues. The AfD are outspoken champions of alternatives to renewables, citing vaguely described energy alternatives, arguing that: “Promising new developments such as the thorium high-temperature reactor in Hann Uentrop or the fast breeder in Kalkar were prematurely terminated. Thus, these ground-breaking ideas could never be fully developed” (Manifesto for Germany, 2017: 79). When discussing issues associated with nuclear expansion, such as nuclear waste, the AfD claimed that radioactive residues should be stored and catalogued “in order to recycle them when technical progress permits” (Manifesto for Germany, 2017: 79), underscoring the technological optimism in AfD energy policy. 

This topic is utilized to reframe the exigence of proposed climate reforms away from more ideologically threatening state-led reforms, such as carbon tax, by conjuring optimism over vaguely defined and abstract technological solutions created by the market. This strategy reflects the AfD’s right-wing conservative ideology, with several studies demonstrating the link between climate skepticism and pro-market attitudes (McCright & Dunlap, 2008; Cann & Raymond, 2018). As Küppers (2022) argues, the AfD’s support for a free market economy under its ‘ordo-liberal’ ideology informs its contemporary neoliberal economic position. Indeed, a primary reason stated for its rejection of the German Renewable Energy Act was that it is “akin to a state-directed economy and a departure from German social-market economy”(Manifesto for Germany, 2017: 79). Thus, by placing the onus of reform onto technological advancement, the status quo is fortified as any necessary changes to modern consumption patterns or lifestyles are circumvented in line with the AfD’s radical pro-market ideology (Damico et al., 2023). 

Another mechanism through which this rhetorical strategy promotes hostility to climate policy, particularly the German Energiewende, is by asserting that interests and power struggles determine science-policy relations. By painting academic/scientific findings as political positions, the listener is encouraged to view renewable energy as only being prioritized due to a corrupt, wealthy elite reaping the benefits of subsidies, while fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and alternative advanced technologies are rejected for political, instead of practical, considerations (Boecher et al., 2022). This sentiment was evident when Alice Weidel, Chairperson of the AfD parliamentary group, claimed: “The planned shutdown of the last German nuclear power plants is an ideologically insane act against all economic and political reason and against the will of a majority of German citizens” (Weidel, 2023). The AfD also argued, in reference to the Energiewende policy’s planned phasing out of nuclear energy, that: “Truly civilian nuclear concepts such as the liquid-salt reactor have never been seriously tested, although their feasibility has long been proven. Since the 1970s, no development has taken place, not least because money was invested in unrealistic visions such as renewable energy sources” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020).

This topic thus reorients the audience away from the real concerns surrounding nuclear and fossil-fuel power generation, instead inviting the listener to view renewable development and climate policy as political ploys. As outlined in Wodak’s methodology for populism, the AfD evoke the antagonistic relation between the ‘elite’ and the ‘people,’ as the former are framed as the beneficiaries of renewable energy development and Germany’s Energiewende, thus promoting hostility to climate policy. This can be interpreted as the rhetor looking to structure an indeterminate situation, utilizing the complicated and nature of energy production and how it interfaces with the climate to promote doubt and hostility towards climate reform.

In summary, several central rhetorical topics are visible that promote hostility to climate change/policy. The party portrays climate science as false and elitist, while promoting technological innovation as the solution. Moreover, by employing mechanisms to challenge the knowledge foundations of climate science, an antagonism between experiential and scientific knowledge and a dichotomy between an ‘elite’ versus the ‘people’ frames climate policy as an elite-orchestrated project. The AfD’s rhetoric embeds climate change/policy into its populist core, while also making subtle changes given contextual differences, with key factors for the AfD being both the ambitious scale of the German Energiewende, and the AfD’s radical subscription to market economics. 

Comparative Analysis

All three RWP parties (PiS, SD and AfD) portray climate change as an agenda orchestrated by a self-interested and corrupt cosmopolitan elite. While each case demonstrated varying degrees of climate skepticism, all emphasized the injustice of climate reform on everyday people, thereby reframing the climate issue within a worldview defined by an antagonism between ‘the people’ and the ‘elites,’ as outlined in my preceding methodology. Which ‘elites’ are selected as the rhetorical focus depends largely on the context, with the AfD/SD parties primarily targeting the national government, while the PiS, as a former governing party, emphasizes regional/supranational groups such the EU/UN (Biedenkopf, 2021). PiS rhetoric was also less cohesive than the other parties, with some pro-climate frames being deployed, potentially reflecting what their constraints were during their position as a leading party to adhere to global and regional climate targets and expectations. 

Moreover, differences in how these argumentative strategies were utilized was evident with the AfD party, which invoked climate skepticism by suggesting climate predictions were an elite-driven scare tactic, while the SD/PiS primarily claim that climate change is an ideologically driven conspiracy that lacks evidence. These anti-establishment narratives are underpinned by a strong nationalist agenda among each party, with a discourse prioritizing national sovereignty over climate ambitions being readily apparent throughout the findings. 

The topic of climate nationalism was present in all three parties, which depicted climate-friendly policy as contrary to national sovereignty and/or economic interests, although how this topic was expressed differed based on party context. The PiS utilized a narrative of resource nationalism, arguing that climate reforms would have extreme economic ramifications given Poland’s high reliance on indigenous coal supplies, as-well as the traditional cultural value of coal as a source of sovereignty. The AfD party similarly primarily sought to discredit climate reform strategies under the German energy transition (Energiewende) by arguing climate policy is akin to a state-led economy designed to disadvantage Germany, thereby embedding anti-elitist sentiment in the AfD’s ideological underpinnings (Arzheimer, 2015). Following these ideological contexts, the AfD party also demonstrated an optimistic belief in the ability of future technological advancements to solve energy and climate issues, reflecting both its ‘ordoliberal’ enthusiasm for the free-market, and its support of nuclear energy advancement, which is planned to be rapidly phased out under the German Energiewende (Rechsteiner, 2021). This topic was also present in PiS rhetoric to a lesser extent, which made arguments for the development of ‘clean coal.’

The SD’s climate nationalism took a different form than that of the other chosen parties. While still portraying climate change as an undue economic burden, the party argued that Sweden has no responsibility to make further emissions cuts due to its relatively low emissions and that such cuts would be inconsequential. Instead, they advocated for higher-emitting nations to take greater responsibility. The SD’s nationalist ideology also took the form of eco-populist rhetoric which was less apparent in the other cases and promoted a symbiosis between the ‘nation’ and local environment, while dismissing international environmental issues like climate change.

Closely related to this topic, another rhetorical device used in each case was anti-intellectualism via prioritizing localized and experiential forms of knowledge over the scientific and positivist epistemologies that necessitate climate action. This crafting of an epistemic tension was utilized similarly by each party, demonstrating its centrality to RWP climate communication. 

Conclusion

Discussion of Findings

The starting point for this article, supported by a literature review, was that relatively little attention has been paid to the specific rhetorical mechanisms through which right-wing populism (RWP) promotes climate change skepticism and/or hostility to climate action. Thus, the chief aim has been to analyze the rhetorical choices of RWP parties regarding climate change/policy and offer new insights into how RWP positions reshuffle and adapt in line with shifting ideological considerations and contexts. By focusing on a range of relatively contemporary quotes from official party programmes, policy proposals and individual politicians, and buttressing my findings with supportive secondary data, I have demonstrated real examples of how RWP parties promote skepticism and/or hostility to climate change policy by deploying argumentative strategies, or topics, conceived within a rhetorical situation (Consigny, 1974)

In doing so, this study advances knowledge in the field in three ways. First, while nationalist discourse has long been understood as an ideological focus for RWP, as outlined in my methodology, the results of the study show how nationalist opposition to climate change shifts depending on each parties’ unique context. This demonstrates how nationalist ideology forms the ‘thick’ substantive base around which RWP articulates opposition to climate policy. 

Second, RWP opposition to climate policy is rhetorically promoted through a discourse of ‘the elites’ versus ‘the people,’ which serves as the central frame around which various forms of climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate change are articulated. Multiple narrative frames were deployed to undermine the scientific consensus on climate change, either by dismissing it as a scare tactic or outright conspiracy, or by claiming that climate policy threatens economic competitiveness and citizens’ lifestyles, often associating it with a socialist command economy. Given the varying ‘elite’ groups targeted depending on context, the adaptive plasticity of RWP climate communication is fully evident.

Third, it is also evident that European RWP parties frequently seek to disqualify scientific expertise by utilizing anti-intellectual rhetoric, while prioritizing local, experiential sources of knowledge. This was a core feature of RWP identified by Wodak (2015), these interpretative findings reveal by how this epistemic challenge to the universal, scientific epistemologies that support climate action is a shared strategy across European RWP parties. By focusing on the utilization of scientific knowledge, this study contributes to recent literature on populist climate communication. 

Furthermore, these findings are broadly supportive of Wodak’s (2015) methodology for populism, with both ideological substance and rhetorical style coalescing to form climate communication strategies. Indeed, much of the current literature interprets populism as isolated from the broader contexts in which it arises, resulting in theoretical and methodological assumptions (Mudde, 2004; Jagers & Walgrave, 2004). By emphasizing the importance of different contexts in shaping rhetoric, the way in which rhetorical devices shift in accordance with different conditions is evident while shared tendencies between parties can also be seen. 

This theoretical research builds upon the work of Stanley (2008: 95), who identified populism as an existing ideology that varies considerably based on the societal context as its ‘thin’ ideological base which can be found in “combination with established ‘full’ ideologies.” These findings are compatible with this thesis, however by emphasizing both the ideological and stylistic/rhetorical facets of populism, and how this differs between contexts, a more updated relationship between populism and climate change is apparent.

Limitations and Implications 

One limitation of my research was that all parties chosen were European. This could limit the applicability of my knowledge claims due to the potential bias inherent in only assessing Western-centric normative viewpoints on climate change. While this choice of methods allowed for a more focused interpretive research frame for analyzing European RWP discourse, the applicability of this study is arguably limited when examining the RWP in non-Western regions, such as Jair Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party in Brazil. Moreover, populism is a far more ideologically extensive and heavily debated issue than was presented in this study, and while some extent of the most contemporary debates on the issue is interrogated, a more extensive investigation into the relationship between other forms of populism, such as Left-wing populism, and the climate issue, is beyond the scope of this article (Gamble, 2018). 

In outlining how RWP parties promote skepticism/hostility to climate action, this article provides an investigative framework for future study on climate change communication. The impact of these findings on future climate change communication, and how it can more effectively circumvent populist anti-science rhetoric is valuable given the relevance of public opinion for climate politics (Huber et al., 2020). RWP primarily positions climate change and its policies as elitist and disconnected from the true interests of the ‘people,’ utilizing anti-science frames to dismiss the epistemologies that underpin climate policy. Thus, the top-down nature of climate communication, which primarily occurs in international settings and is negotiated by elites disconnected from the interests of local communities, could undermine public support.

These findings suggest that climate communication should take place more frequently in settings that foster community engagement and local participation to reach individuals exposed to RWP attitudes. This study finds that more inclusive modes of climate communication, such as messaging through local representatives and business owners, could be effective in conveying that climate reform is in the interest of all. Additionally, emphasizing the impact of climate change on local communities and ecologies would help contextualize it as a tangible and relevant issue, preventing it from being framed as an abstract and elite-led phenomenon.


 

(*) Morgan Lewis recently earned an MSc in International Business and Strategy from the University of Bristol, graduating with Distinction and receiving the Dean’s Award for Outstanding Academic Performance. His dissertation, Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by the Polish Law and Justice Party, German Alternative for Deutschland, and Swedish Democrats, examined the rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist parties to shape climate discourse. He also holds a First-Class BSc in Politics and International Relations from the same institution. His academic interests include political theory, contemporary European populism, and sustainability discourse.


 

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