Editor’s Choice

Prabowo Subianto sings during a grand campaign at GBK Stadium in Jakarta on March 23, 2014. After four attempts, Prabowo was finally elected President of Indonesia in 2024. Photo: MRNPic.

Please cite as:
Watmough, Simon P. (2021). “From Political Pariah to President: Prabowo Subianto and the Perils of Populism in Indonesia.” ECPS Leader Profiles. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 24, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/lp0011

Prabowo Subianto’s victory in Indonesia’s February 2024 presidential election marks a pivotal moment in the nation’s democratic evolution, echoing a global shift towards nationalist populism. As Indonesia’s eighth president, Prabowo’s political journey and ideological stance have sparked concerns about the future of the country’s democratic institutions. His controversial military past, including allegations of human rights abuses in East Timor and Aceh during the 1990s, continues to raise alarms about the potential for authoritarianism under his leadership. Critics fear his presidency may signal a return to repressive practices, with threats to civil liberties and increased polarization. Prabowo’s background as a former military general adds to concerns about a consolidation of power and the erosion of democratic checks and balances in one of the world’s largest democracies.

By Simon P. Watmough

Introduction

Prabowo Subianto’s^[1] stunning victory in Indonesia’s presidential elections in February marks a significant moment in the country’s democratic journey, reflecting a global trend towards authoritarian nationalist populism. As he assumes the presidency of the world’s third-largest democracy, Prabowo’s political career and ideological stance have ignited conversations about the potential implications for Indonesia’s democratic institutions and pluralistic society, prompting observers at home and abroad to scrutinize the trajectory Indonesia might take under his administration. This profile joins that conversation, asking: Who is Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s eighth president?

If the “peculiarity of populist discourse is to frame politics as an antagonistic confrontation between the people and the oligarchy” (de la Torre, 2007: 389), then Prabowo hits the mark. Known for his assertive rhetoric and strongman persona, Prabowo – a retired lieutenant general in the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) – has successfully tapped into a vein of nationalist sentiment in Indonesia, promising robust leadership in the face of mounting economic and security challenges.

It is scarcely surprising that Prabowo embodies all the qualities of a “warrior populist” in the vein of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, as he has publicly declared his admiration for the late Venezuelan general-turned-dictator (Aspinall, 2015: 2). Equally, as the brother of one of Indonesia’s richest men (and a multimillionaire in his own right), we can see him as the paradigmatic “pluto-populist” in the vein of Donald Trump, the late Silvio Berlusconi and of course, Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra, whom Prabowo openly admires (ibid.).

The country itself is no stranger to populism, which has “deep roots in Indonesia” (Aspinall, 2015: 3). “Diffuse” forms of populist mobilization have played an outsized role in the country’s mass politics since the beginning, even during the “Guided Democracy” of the founding president, Sukarno, and the authoritarian “New Order” period under Suharto (ibid.). Some have even located the roots of Indonesian populism in the country’s birth as an independent nation (van Klinken, 2020). However, Indonesia’s current “populist moment” reflects conditions that have emerged in the 21st century, not least the attenuation of party functioning in the campaigns of political actors and the rise of “media-based populism,” which is “now the default mode of electioneering” (Gammon, 2023: 442). The allure of authoritarian nationalist populism, with its promise of decisive action and appeal to traditional values, poses questions about the future of Indonesia’s open and inclusive political climate. Critics argue that this could lead to a regression in human rights, freedom of the press and minority protections, elements that are foundational to Indonesia’s democratic framework.

This profile offers a comprehensive overview of the factors that have shaped Prabowo’s outlook and approach, including his early life, his military career (including his close links with the Suharto regime and his role in the transition to democracy in 1998) as well as his subsequent business and political ventures, all of which have led him to the seat of ultimate power. Charting his move from political pariah to perennial contender and now president, it sketches the key influences that have shaped his authoritarian populist outlook and the controversies that continue to devil him and give his critics pause for concern. Ultimately, it suggests he is likely to work to centralize power in the hands of the presidency, undermine Indonesia’s independent institutions, take the country backwards and possibly threaten to ignite conflicts far and wide.

A Cosmopolitan “Third Culture Kid” Forged in Exile

Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto greets the public during a 2024 general election campaign in Bengkulu City, Indonesia, on January 11, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo was born on 17 October 1951, in Jakarta, Indonesia, into an aristocratic Javanese family “line that goes back centuries” (Connelly & Laksmana, 2018). His grandfather, Margono Djojohadikusumo (1894–1978), a prominent economist and founder of Bank Negara Indonesia (also serving as its first president), was a leading figure in Indonesia’s independence movement, while his father, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917–2001), held key positions as Indonesia’s minister of trade and industry. Growing up amidst this political and economic elite exposed Prabowo to the inner workings of government and economics from a very young age (Purdey, 2016).

In the late 1950s, at just seven years of age, Prabowo was forced into exile with his family, his father and grandfather having been central players in an internal rebellion against Sukarno. Exile took the family first to Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, then Switzerland and later to the United Kingdom, where Prabowo studied, graduating from the prestigious American School in London (ASL) in 1968 (Tanu, 2004). This international journey at a young age had a profound impact on Prabowo, exposing him to a wide range of cultures and shaping him into a “third culture kid” (Pollock & Reken, 2009), one who learned precisely how to navigate elite cosmopolitan circles (Tanu, 2004).

After the fall of Sukarno and the rise of the New Order regime in 1966 (headed by Suharto), the family were no longer political exiles. As Aspinall (2015: 3) notes, Prabowo returned to Indonesia “more comfortable speaking English than Indonesian, yet with powerful ambitions” to make something of himself in the country of his birth. Indeed, from a young age, Prabowo displayed a natural aptitude for strategy and a strong aspiration to the grand exercise of political power – a particular fascination in his youth was the Turkish general-turned-founding father Kemal Mustafa Ataturk (Friend, 2003: 323). Recognizing his teenage son’s leadership potential, Sumitro encouraged Prabowo to attend the military academy and pursue a career in the armed forces.

Military Career and Accusations of Human Rights Abuses

Understanding Prabowo’s military career is central to understanding both his outlook and style and the controversies that have dogged him in politics since 2004. His military journey began in 1970 when he enrolled in the Indonesian Military Academy in Magelang. He graduated in 1974, alongside fellow cadets who would go on to hold senior leadership positions, including Indonesia’s sixth president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (widely known as SBY).

After graduation, Prabowo served in elite regiments of the TNI, first in the Indonesian Special Forces (known as Kopassus), which he joined in 1976 and where he gained experience in counterinsurgency operations (Aspinall, 2015: 6). Indeed, during his several tours of East Timor after the Indonesian invasion in December 1975, he was responsible for many human rights violations. At just 26 years old, Prabowo became the youngest commander of a key commando unit operating in East Timor and was implicated in the execution of East Timor’s first prime minister and freedom fighter, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, in December 1978 (van Klinken, 2014).

Prabowo’s career took off after his marriage to Siti Hediati Hariyadi (“Titiek”) – the daughter of Indonesia’s strongman President Suharto – in 1983. His marriage to Titiek further elevated his status within the ruling political elite and gave him access to important networks and resources, allowing him to rise through the ranks of the Indonesian military more swiftly than many of his peers.

In the early 1990s, Prabowo, now a Major General, led Kopassus Group 3 in its attempts to suppress the East Timorese independence movement. His methods included using irregular troops, known as “ninja” gangs, and militias directed by Kopassus commanders, leading to a rise in human rights abuses. He has also been implicated in killings in Indonesia’s restive province of West Papua, particularly targeting the region’s independence activists (Nairn, 2024). During the dying days of his father-in-law’s regime, “Prabowo emerged as the leader of a palace guard of generals most willing to use coercion to defend the regime” (Aspinall, 2015: 6). In March 1998, Prabowo was appointed as the head of the 27,000-strong Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) – a position Suharto himself once held, which he used to topple Sukarno and propel himself to power in 1965.

Just three months into this role, during the May 1998 riots, Prabowo sought to deploy Kostrad units to restore order in Jakarta. This move was met with controversy as it involved hundreds of individuals trained by Kopassus, Prabowo’s former command. Accusations of importing trouble and seeking to discredit rivals were raised, with some arguing that Prabowo was putting pieces in place for a military coup in which he would assume command of Indonesia. These events escalated tensions and played a role in the resignation of President Suharto on May 21, 1998 (Aspinall, 2005: 212).

In the aftermath of the 1998 riots, investigations revealed allegations of human rights abuses and kidnappings involving Prabowo’s troops, including the torture of democracy activists. He acknowledged responsibility for the abductions (although he continues to deny any role in the activists’ deaths), leading to his discharge from military service in August 1998 (Nairn, 2024).

Second Exile and Business Empire

As soon as he was expelled from the military, Prabowo again went into exile (this time self-imposed), residing in Jordan (Prabowo is reportedly close to King Abdullah). During this time, he downplayed involvement in the 1998 riots and maintained that he was not responsible for betraying his country or its leaders (Tesoro, 2000). On his return to Indonesia in 2004, he immediately began to plot a path to the presidency (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 352).

At the same time, Prabowo ventured into the business world, collaborating with his younger brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo. His business interests reflect a pattern endemic to Indonesia’s “oligarchic” political economy (Winters, 2013). Today, Prabowo’s Nusantara Group oversees an extensive portfolio of 27 companies operating both within Indonesia and internationally. These companies cover a diverse range of sectors, including Nusantara Energy (focusing on oil, natural gas, and coal), Tidar Kerinci Agung (engaged in palm oil plantations), and Jaladri Nusantara (operating in the fishery industry) (Purdey, 2016).

From Political Pariah to Perennial Presidential Candidate

Even as a solider, Prabowo Subianto had established a reputation as a political player, leveraging his connections with President Suharto in the 1990s to engage in efforts to suppress critics in the journalistic and political spheres. In the dying days of the New Order, Prabowo attempted to sway Goenawan Mohamad to sell his controversial Tempo magazine (a leading mouthpiece of popular dissent) and warned various influential figures, including Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur, who served as Indonesia’s fourth president from 1999 to 2001) and Nurcholish Madjid, against taking a public stand against the regime (Friend, 2003: 203).

By 2004, Prabowo’s political aspirations led him to vie for the Golkar party’s presidential candidacy, but he received minimal support. He speaks of this campaign as a “trial run” that gave him the experience he needed to move forward. In this period, he also began to create grassroots networks, especially among farmers, small traders, and a wide range of other organizations, including “veterans’ associations, labor unions and organizations of village heads, which could provide him with access to a mass base” (Aspinall, 2015: 9) on which to ground a populist political movement.

In 2008, Prabowo’s inner circle established the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), supporting his presidential run in 2009. Hashim Djojohadikusumo serves as party chairman. Despite not winning enough parliamentary seats, Prabowo ran as a vice-presidential candidate alongside Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Sukarno. The pair, known as Mega–Pro, lost to SBY, who succeeded Megawati as Indonesia’s sixth president on 20 October 2004. Unbowed by this failure, Prabowo doubled down on building up Gerindra, his business interests, and his populist networks (Mao, 2024).

The 2014 Presidential Election: The “Battle of the Populists”

President-elect Prabowo Subianto with the 7th President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, at the 79th Indonesian National Armed Forces Anniversary in Jakarta, Indonesia, on October 5, 2024. Photo: Donny Hery.

By 2014, Indonesian politics had reached a critical juncture, one that was ripe for populist mobilization. While SBY’s ten years in office had seen the country bed down several important reforms, recover fully from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and resolve some longstanding regional conflicts, they were largely seen as a lost opportunity, mainly due to the vacillating leadership of President Yudhoyono himself (Aspinall et all., 2015: 1–2). The period of political indecision and policy stagnation that characterized the last years of his presidency set the stage for the rise of a “populist challenger” in Indonesian politics, something “political scientists had been predicting for years” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 351; see also Anugrah, 2020: 5). Indeed, as Aspinall has rightly noted, “The rise of an authoritarian populist challenger like Prabowo was almost overdetermined in contemporary Indonesia” (Aspinall, 2015: 3)

Scholars widely agree that 2014 was a “watershed” and a “turning point” in Indonesian democracy in the post-Suharto era (see, for example, Anugrah, 2020: 6; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 347). It was the year that saw Indonesia join “the new wave of illiberal populist mobilization in both established and newer democracies” (Anugrah, 2020: 11). The result was an epic “battle of the populists” – Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), the incumbent governor of Jakarta, and Prabowo – in the presidential elections in July. While both were clearly populist, each had a distinctive populist style that contrasted with the other. For his part, Jokowi showcased a provincial “everyman” populist style (he promised to meet Yudhoyono’s do-nothing elitism with workaday governance on a platform of good governance and populist policies like cheap healthcare and education). As Aspinall & Mietzner (2014: 351) have noted: “In Jokowi, Indonesians found someone who possessed a popular touch that was the antithesis of Yudhoyono’s wooden formality.” In stark contrast stood Prabowo, who instead offered “‘firm leadership’ as the antidote to Yudhoyono’s hesitant style of leadership” (Ibid.). Despite his impeccable establishment credentials, Prabowo cast himself in classical populist terms as an “outsider” ready to take on the Indonesian elite.

Prabowo ran a lavish campaign funded mostly by his brother, Hashim, a wildly successful businessman and one of Indonesia’s dollar billionaires. Notwithstanding his claims of wanting to fight a corrupt oligarchy, Prabowo’s campaign was “organized using a pattern of cash-driven informal networking” (Aspinall, 2015: 3) that drew in many constituencies. Despite a campaign levelled at “corrupt elites,” Prabowo managed to perfect the game of “patronage democracy” that Indonesia has become known for (Van Klinken, 2009).

Consistent with a turn to “media-based populism” in Indonesia (Gammon, 2023: 442), Prabowo campaigned “with relentless media advertising and set piece mass rallies all stressing a simple message: Prabowo was the man Indonesia needed to lead it towards a desperately needed national renaissance” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 357). Prabowo’s appeal was enhanced by a “widespread – though diffuse – mood of nostalgia for the certainties of the New Order” regime of his father-in-law Suharto, Indonesia’s longest-serving president (Aspinall, 2015: 3).

His campaign adopted classic populist discursive frames, and he cast himself as Indonesia’s “savior” with promises to rescue the country from a rapacious elite in cahoots with foreigners seeking to exploit Indonesia’s vast natural resources (Hellmann, 2019: 13). His style was avowedly nationalist and sought to both burnish his credentials as a “strong leader” and draw on the symbolism of the populist Sukarno era: “His campaign appearances had a highly theatrical character, with lots of uniforms, marching, and fiery oratory, and with much of the styling obviously based on that of Sukarno and other nationalist leaders from the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 352).

Moreover, despite his claims to be the answer to the corruption and money politics of the Indonesian campaign system, Prabowo himself marshalled a wide range of constituencies through vote buying. In this way, he was able to galvanize Islamic groups, small businessmen and other mass constituencies. As Aspinall & Mietzner (2014: 359) note, “like his Thai role model Thaksin Shinawatra,” Prabowo “appealed mainly to the rural poor for support” (although in the end, he garnered as much or more urban support). Despite his mass appeal and backing from the outgoing SBY (the president reportedly held Prabowo “unfit to be president” but bowed to pressure and opinion polling to swing his weight behind the former general at the last minute), Jokowi won with 53% of the vote, after a late scramble to get out his base of his voters to the polls.

In the aftermath of the elections, both candidates declared victory. Jokowi’s claim was backed by most independent quick counts, showing a slight lead over Prabowo. The latter, however, citing different polls, also claimed victory, a strategy he would repeat in 2019. However, he withdrew from the race on the day the official tally was to be announced, citing “massive cheating” and declaring the election unconstitutional, a move that sparked legal and political controversies, culminating in an appeal to the Constitutional Court alleging significant voting irregularities, which the court unanimously rejected.

The 2019 Rematch: Islamic Populism and a Promise to “Make Indonesia Great Again”

Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto at a campaign event in Jakarta, Indonesia, on April 4, 2014. Photo: Simon Roughneen.

The 2019 campaign set up a “rematch” between the two populists and was even more divisive than their 2014 contest (Arifianto, 2019: 46). As had been the case in 2014, Prabowo’s participation in the 2019 campaign was contentious. He initially claimed victory despite independent counts favoring Jokowi (he was eventually declared the winner with 55.5% of the vote), who later faced violent protests from his supporters challenging the results, which were ultimately upheld by the Constitutional Court (Jakarta Globe, 2019). During the campaign, Prabowo was accused of emulating the tactics used by Donald Trump in his 2016 bid for the US presidency, particularly in emphasizing economic inequalities and foreigners ripping the country off. In a speech given in October 2018, Prabowo echoed Trump’s infamous slogan by declaring his desire to “Make Indonesia Great Again.”

In a pattern that has recurred across his presidential campaigns, Prabowo reinvented himself going into the election campaign, in this case as a pious Muslim, appearing at religious festivals and Islamist rallies and actively courting Muslims: “Unlike in the 2014 election, when the Islamists were just a small contingent of Prabowo’s mainly ultranationalist coalition, the Islamists had now become an integral part of his campaign team” (Arifianto, 2019: 47). He made much of his connections with hardline Muslim groups, notably exemplified by his relationship with Muhammad Rizieq Shihab of the Islamic Defenders Front. Rizieq, in self-imposed exile in Mecca at the time, was a vocal critic of Jokowi and supporter of Prabowo. The former general pledged to facilitate Rizieq’s return to Indonesia if he won the election. Prabowo’s courting of the populist Islamic vote shifted the entire tenor of the campaign, forcing Jokowi to select the “conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin” (Arifianto, 2019: 46) as his running mate.

Amidst a rancorous campaign, voter turnout in the 2019 elections reached record highs, fueled largely by the populist mobilization of Islam by the two leading contenders: “Religious-based polarization conducted by both sides during their campaigns helped boost total voter turnout to 154 million—approximately 80% of the electorate” (Arifianto, 2019: 49). This was up from the 69% who turned out to vote in the 2014 presidential poll (Anugrah, 2020: 9).

Rapprochement, Political Reinvention, and “Digital Populism” in the 2024 Presidential Campaign

Despite the bitterly fought campaign and Prabowo’s alleged role in violent post-election riots in Jakarta that killed six people (Soeriaatmadja & Chan, 2019), the ex-general opportunistically sought a rapprochement and approached Megawati and Jokowi to see if Gerindra could be included in the governing coalition (Indonesia’s party system is highly cartelized and parties often bandwagon in exchange for spoils; see Slater, 2018). In turn, and notwithstanding the rancor that had characterized their relations for half a decade, Jokowi appointed Prabowo his defense minister in October 2019 “as a gesture of national unity” (Anugrah, 2020: 1). Moreover, “[d]espite earlier tensions, Prabowo and Jokowi found common ground in a nationalist vision that emphasized sovereignty, defense, food security and energy security” (Utama, 2023).

His appointment as defense minister resurfaced criticisms of his past human rights abuses and comments praising charismatic populists who later became dictators, such as Hugo Chavez. Dogged by these criticisms, Prabowo sought to shed his image as a firebrand strongman (see below) in the run-up to the 2024 campaign, which culminated in a landslide win on February 14 (Prabowo took over 58% of the vote with another record turnout of 82%; Strangio, 2024).

Prabowo’s 2024 triumph after successive failed attempts rested on three central (and interrelated) dimensions, all of which contributed to his landslide win. The first was the backing of President Jokowi and the full force of the Indonesian state, which deployed a mix of “retail corruption” and “wholesale coercion” on a scale not seen in Indonesia since the 1970s (Nairn, 2024). This approach was coupled with a populist policy of offering one free meal to every child of school age in order to address malnutrition and stunting. A laudable policy on the face of it, it remains to be seen whether the US$30 billion price tag can be met from Indonesia’s strained central budget (Lindsey, 2024). Jokowi, who was term-limited, saw in Prabowo a chance to “carry forward his plans for a political dynasty and, with it, continued influence” (Utama, 2023). In late 2023, Prabowo skillfully wooed the president, offering the second spot on his ticket to Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, whose constitutional ineligibility for the office was overruled by Indonesia’s Supreme Court, headed by none other than Gibran’s maternal uncle, Anwar Usman, in October 2023. Secondly, Prabowo had the backing of Indonesia’s elite, in particular his brother and “an alliance of mining oligarchs and several giant capitalists who … supported the pair behind the scenes” (Hermawan, 2024).

Finally, Prabowo reinvented himself yet again – this time as a “gemoy” (cute) grandpa – and launched a campaign of “digital populism” on social media (primarily the video platform TikTok), featuring him “dad dancing” on campaign stages and adopting an approach vaguely reminiscent of Trump’s rally antics. This “reinvention tour” appealed to thrill Indonesia’s GenZ and millennial voters, who make up the majority of the country’s electorate and have little or no memory of Indonesia’s authoritarian past or Prabowo’s role in the violent end to the New Order in 1998. Here, too, Jokowi’s backing was also critical, not only in furnishing the young Gibran as Prabowo’s campaign sidekick. As Ary Hermawan (2024) has noted, “Prabowo’s new persona as a ‘cuddly grandpa’ [was] manufactured by an army of cybertroopers,” the majority of which were inherited from Jokowi’s political outfit and which the Prabowo camp deftly used to blunt “campaigns targeting the former general’s checkered human rights record—a key issue in the 2014 election” that Prabowo, ironically enough, lost to Jokowi (Ibid.)

Political Style and Controversies

Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto and vice-presidential candidate Gibran Rakabuming Raka deliver a speech to their supporters in Jakarta, Indonesia, on February 14, 2024. Photo: Prayoga Nugroho.

Prabowo has been famously described as a chameleon, presenting different colors depending on the audience. As one profile put it on the eve of the 2014 presidential campaign, “The pro-business cosmopolitan who can ‘knock Indonesia together’ is the one who shows up to events at posh Jakarta hotels with diplomats and investors. The fist-shaking demagogue is the one who appears in front of the voters” (Tanu, 2004). Prabowo’s past has been a subject of scrutiny, particularly during his presidential campaigns in 2014, 2019 and 2024, with many organizations calling for investigations into his actions during this period. As far as personality is concerned, he is often described as “temperamental,” with “a propensity for outbursts of rage that sometimes involve physical violence, with reports circulating widely of him throwing cellphones, ashtrays, and even punches when angered by his associates or underlings” (Aspinall, 2015: 8–9).

His political style is emblematic of a broader global trend towards authoritarian nationalist populism, a mode of governance characterized by strong leadership, assertive nationalism, and, often, a skepticism towards liberal democratic norms. In Indonesia, Prabowo has cultivated an image of a decisive leader, one who promises to restore order, enhance national pride and protect Indonesian interests from foreign encroachment. This approach has garnered substantial support, particularly among voters disillusioned with the perceived inefficacies of previous administrations.

Despite his impeccable elite credentials (he descends from Javanese aristocracy on his father’s side and is the scion of one of Indonesia’s wealthiest and best-connected families), Prabowo loves to style himself as an “outsider” and a “maverick.” The latter is not actually far from the truth, a personality trait that has been in evidence since his days at the military academy in the early 1970s, where — despite his impressive mastery of military lore and practice — he quickly developed a reputation for independence (his graduation was delayed because he spent some time AWOL), most likely a reflection of his experience as a “third culture kid” in exile around the world in the 1960s.

However, this same political style raises concerns about the potential erosion of democratic principles, including checks and balances, freedom of speech and minority rights. Prabowo’s emphasis on nationalism and sovereignty taps into deep-seated sentiments among the populace, yet it also risks inflaming divisions within Indonesia’s ethnically and religiously diverse society. The manifesto of his Gerindra Party calls for a rollback of the post-Suharto constitutional reforms and a return to Indonesia’s original 1945 Constitution, which Indonesia’s first two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, had used to establish authoritarian regimes over five decades.

Prabowo’s approach to governance also reflects a skepticism towards liberal internationalism, favoring instead a more insular, Indonesia-first policy. This stance is evident in his critiques of foreign investment and his proposals to reevaluate Indonesia’s participation in international trade agreements, which he argues disadvantage Indonesian workers and compromise national sovereignty. Such positions resonate with nationalist sentiments within Indonesia, promising economic sovereignty and the protection of local industries against global market forces. However, this economic nationalism has sparked debates about the practical implications for Indonesia’s economy, with critics cautioning that protectionist policies could isolate Indonesia from global supply chains and hinder economic growth.

Conclusion: What Can We Expect from a Prabowo Presidency?

After decades of aspiring to lead Indonesia, we can be sure that Prabowo has a clear idea of where he wants to take the country and a clear plan of how to do so. Volatile and mercurial, he is equally pragmatic and will almost certainly be looking to cut deals and build alliances, not least with his major opponent, Megawati’s Indonesian Party of Struggle (PDI–P), which has the largest number of seats in Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR). But at 72 years of age and in less-than-robust health, time is not on his side, and he is likely to quickly lose patience with Indonesia’s messy consensus-building approach or overt political opposition, be it in the DPR or on the streets.

Throughout his political career, Prabowo Subianto has faced numerous controversies, many of which stem from his tenure in the Indonesian military, as detailed above. Allegations of human rights abuses during his leadership of the special forces in the 1990s, particularly in regions like East Timor and Aceh, have dogged him, casting a long shadow over his subsequent political endeavors. While Prabowo has consistently denied any wrongdoing, these allegations have been a focal point for critics who argue that his presidency could signal a return to the repressive practices of Indonesia’s past. This history, combined with his current political rhetoric, feeds into fears of an authoritarian drift should Prabowo consolidate power, potentially leading to a curtailment of civil liberties and a crackdown on dissent.

Prabowo’s casual disregard for democracy has also been on display during his successive presidential bids. For example, his 2014 campaign “espoused an authoritarian populist message suggesting he wanted to recentralize power and dismantle key democratic institutions” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 347). He has also floated the idea that “the country to do away with direct elections of executive government leaders—which he described as a Western product inappropriate for Indonesia” (Ibid.: 352). Before constitutional reforms in the 2000s instituted popular elections of Indonesia’s president and regional governors, they were appointed by their respective legislatures. As Tim Lindsey (2024) has recently pointed out, much of the work of dismantling the reforms of the last 30 years has already been accomplished: “Many of the elements of the New Order are already in place. Much of the work of dismantling Indonesia’s liberal democracy has already been done by the outgoing president” Jokowi, who has overseen an “illiberal turn in Indonesian democracy” over the last decade (Anugrah, 2019).

These points underscore concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and the potential for increased polarization within one of the world’s most diverse countries. Prabowo’s background as a former military general with a controversial record further compounds fears about the centralization of power and the undermining of checks and balances in governance. As this profile shows, these fears are hardly overblown – Prabowo’s record offers clear pointers as to how he is likely to attempt to govern.

Indonesia now stands at a crossroads. President Prabowo’s leadership will test the resilience of the country’s democratic institutions and its capacity to navigate the tension between strongman governance and pluralistic values. Prabowo’s tenure could bring decisive action on issues like economic sovereignty and national security, but at what cost to civil liberties and political freedoms? His legacy will be determined not just by the policies he enacts but by how he handles the delicate balance between authority and accountability, nationalism and inclusivity. The question that now lingers is whether Prabowo’s leadership will unite Indonesia under a shared vision or deepen the divisions that have long shaped the nation’s complex political landscape.

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^[1] Indonesian naming conventions differ significantly from the Western model of first, middle and last names. Names may consist of one or more words, with one-word names particularly common among the Javanese (e.g., Suharto). Prabowo Subianto is commonly referred to by his first name, “Prabowo,” which aligns with Indonesian naming conventions, where individuals with multiple names are often identified with a single, unique personal name. Thus, he does not generally use the family name “Djojohadikusumo,” in contrast to his father and brother, Hashim. In this profile I introduce each politician with his or her first and second names and refer subsequently to their most commonly used one-word identifier.

An Afghan woman in a burqa and locals are seen on the streets of Kabul. Photo: Shutterstock.

Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan

October 18, 2024

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Home Reports

Please cite as:

Bottura, Beatrice. (2024). Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 18, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0089

“Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan” was the 15^th session of the “Mapping Global Populism” panel series hosted by the European Center for Populism Studies’ (ECPS). The session was held online on the 26^th of September and was moderated by Dr. Simon P. Watmough. The panel featured an extensive and diverse analysis on the manifestations of authoritarianism, extremism, and populism from distinguished scholars.

Report by Beatrice Bottura

The 15th session of the European Center for Populism Studies’ (ECPS) “Mapping Global Populism” panel series, aimed at creating a comprehensive understanding of populism worldwide, was held online on September 26, 2024. Titled “Theocracy, Radicalism, and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan,” the session featured insights from distinguished scholars on various manifestations of authoritarianism, extremism, and populism in these countries. This report provides an overview of the topics analyzed, with detailed accounts of each speaker’s contributions.

The panel was moderated by Dr. Simon P Watmough, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Leipzig and a non-resident research fellow in ECPS’ research program on authoritarianism. Dr. Hélène Thibault, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Nazarbayev University, illustrated the authoritarian nature of Tajikistan’s anti-extremism policies. Dr. Zakia Adeli, former Deputy Minister of Justice of Afghanistan and a professor at Kabul University (2018–2021), explored the Taliban regime’s government structure and impositions in Afghanistan. Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani, Assistant Professor in Political Science at Lovely Professional University, focused his presentation on gender issues under Taliban rule. Finally, Amir Hossein Mahdavi, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Connecticut, discussed the potential rise of populist actors in Iran. Originally, Dr. Kathleen Collins, a Professor in the Department of Political Science and a faculty affiliate in Islamic Studies at the University of Minnesota, was scheduled to present on “Radical Islamism vs. Extremist Secular State in Tajikistan.” However, due to her absence, Dr. Thibault covered several key aspects of her colleague’s presentation during the session.

Dr. Hélène Thibault: “Counter-extremism and Authoritarian Governance in Tajikistan”

Having discussed the repressive aspect of counter-extremism policies in Tajikistan, Dr. Thibault then proceeded to cover its performative facet. She described how anti-extremism is used as a tool to promote lifestyles considered “safe” and “in line with national traditions.” To this end, she discussed how the regulation of female clothing is utilized to ensure the secularization of the state. She provided examples such as the ban on the hijab in schools and state institutions, as well as the prohibition of wearing, importing, or selling “foreign clothing” in public places, which international organizations have recognized as a violation of religious rights. She also mentioned restrictions on religious education.

Dr. Hélène Thibault commenced her presentation by addressing the presence and extent of extremism in Tajikistan, with the aim of depicting an accurate picture of the evolution of Islamic radicalization since independence in 1991. She began by demonstrating that the level of radical Islamization in Central Asia is, in practice, less extensive than originally predicted by the media and scholars. Citing works by Edward Lemon (particularly a 2018 report), she highlighted that most recruitment and attacks occur abroad. Based on this information, Dr. Thibault argued that the threat of extremism is exaggerated to create a perception of danger and is used to “eliminate political opponents of all allegiances,” including Islamist parties or other political mobilizations. In other words, the threat of extremism has been used to “sideline all sorts of political mobilization” in a repressive and authoritarian manner, which has become characteristic of politics in Tajikistan.

Dr. Thibault provided examples to support her case. First, the classification of the legally registered Islamic Revival Party as an extremist organization in 2015 led to the imprisonment, persecution, or exile of party members, their families, and lawyers. Second, she cited the harsh repressions and imprisonments during protests in the autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan.

Having discussed the repressive aspect of counter-extremism policies in Tajikistan, Dr. Thibault then proceeded to cover its performative facet. She described how anti-extremism is used as a tool to promote lifestyles considered “safe” and “in line with national traditions.” To this end, she discussed how the regulation of female clothing is utilized to ensure the secularization of the state. She provided examples such as the ban on the hijab in schools and state institutions, as well as the prohibition of wearing, importing, or selling “foreign clothing” in public places, which international organizations have recognized as a violation of religious rights. She also mentioned restrictions on religious education. By analyzing these aspects, Dr. Thibault addressed the concept of “authoritarian secularization,” central to Dr. Kathleen Collins’ work, thus connecting her presentation to that of her colleague.

Dr. Thibault concluded her presentation by stating that the exploitation of the concept of extremism, used as a tool for authoritarian and repressive politics, does not address the root causes of extremism—namely unfairness and feelings of exclusion from socio-economic well-being—which she also discussed in one of her 2018 publications.

Dr. Zakia Adeli: “The Taliban’s Totalitarian Regime: Governance, Extremism, and Control”

Dr. Zakia Adeli emphasized how the Taliban’s removal of democratic processes—such as the suppression of elections and political opposition, along with a shift toward decision-making concentrated in the hands of a small religious group—has established a theocratic totalitarian system. This system is characterized by the complete control of the leader, the erosion of human rights, and the restriction of individual and civil freedoms. Examples include the detention, torture, and intimidation of journalists and activists, as well as control over the media and women’s bodies and activities.

Dr. Zakia Adeli introduced her lecture by providing an overview of its core themes, particularly focusing on how the Taliban regime has “systematically centralized power, without any electoral process or legal accountability,” and the consequences of this trend. Hence, the subtitle of her lecture: “Analyzing the Features and Impact of the Taliban’s Rule in Afghanistan.”

The presentation outlined the characteristics of the Taliban’s totalitarian regime: centralization of power, suppression of dissent, the use of ideology to control public and private life, strict censorship, media control, and the homogenization of people. Dr. Adeli expanded on this last point by addressing the enforcement of uniformity through fear and violence, control over institutions (media, civil society, education, and culture), and the imposition of ideological conformity through decrees.

She then described the processes undertaken by the regime to dismantle democratic institutions, including the abolition of:

– Constitutional Law, the core framework of democracy ensuring legal representation and civil rights;

– Parliament, representing the removal of legislative authority;

– The Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution;

– The Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan;

– The Ministry of Women’s Affairs;

– Political Parties.

The author explained that, by doing so, the Taliban ensured a lack of checks and balances within the country, which allowed them to centralize power. Under the regime, there are no democratic processes to elect officials, and power is “centralized under the exclusive authority of Hibetullah Akhundzada” (the Taliban’s religious leader), who alone makes and ratifies all political and legal decisions. The institutions and individuals involved in governance—such as ministers—act under the direct orders of the Taliban leader. This structure enforces a “highly centralized and non-electoral regime” with no transparency or accountability, as power is concentrated in one individual, excluding citizens from governance.

Having provided an overview of the Taliban regime’s governance structure, Dr. Adeli focused on the monopolization of power, particularly analyzing the abolition of all political activities. She described how Afghanistan is now a one-party state, with the Taliban controlling media and communication while suppressing political opposition. She noted that in 2022, the Taliban approved a decree banning gatherings not previously approved, leading to the breakup of over 100 peaceful protests, with some individuals disappearing. These practices are enforced with religious justifications, often accompanied by extremist tactics, such as public executions of both previous political actors and individuals not conforming to the Taliban Regime’s ways.

Following this, the presentation covered the importance of ideology in the totalitarian Taliban regime. Ideology is used as a tool to justify the extreme concentration of power, the elimination of opposition, and the enforcement of obedience from the population. In practice, this destruction of cultural diversity in favor of a singular way of life is executed through:

– Cultural suppression: replacing traditional cultural symbols with their own […];

– Destruction of Historical Heritage: eliminating ancient statues and monuments;

– Ban on Music and Arts: suppressing music, dance, and other forms of artistic expression.

This “homogenization of the people” comprises the core aspects of the Taliban regime, which the speaker carefully outlined throughout the presentation: the enforcement of unity through fear and violence, control of institutions (media, society, education, and culture), and the imposition of ideological conformity. These practices allow the Taliban regime to control both public and private life, depriving people of individual freedoms. In this context, Dr. Adeli highlighted the condition of women under the regime, providing examples such as mandatory dress codes and restrictions on women appearing in public spaces without men.

Dr. Adeli concluded with a brief summary of the main aspects of her presentation. She emphasized how the Taliban’s removal of democratic processes—such as the suppression of elections and political opposition, along with a shift toward decision-making concentrated in the hands of a small religious group—has established a theocratic totalitarian system. This system is characterized by the complete control of the leader, the erosion of human rights, and the restriction of individual and civil freedoms. Examples include the detention, torture, and intimidation of journalists and activists, as well as control over the media and women’s bodies and activities.

Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani: “Gender Dynamics and the Plight of Afghan Women under Taliban Rule”

Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani emphasized the role of external powers and how their attempts to maintain an imperial presence contribute to understanding the complexity of the region’s cultural, economic, and military heritage. He argued that these external actors destabilized social, tribal, and customary practices in a nearly Manichean manner, leading to decades of conflict, which form the backdrop to the current regime. Dr. Wani continued his historical approach by describing the systematic discrimination faced by Afghan women throughout history, often exacerbated by war and social norms influenced by foreign involvement in national conflicts.

Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani’s presentation consisted of a brief history of Afghanistan, aimed at providing context for his analysis, followed by a description of the characteristics of external intervention in Afghanistan and their relation to the current regime, and concluding with an analysis of how language affects the social condition of women.

Dr. Wani began by discussing Afghanistan’s location, describing it as a crossroads in Central Asia and highlighting how this has given the country a crucial multicultural and multiethnic background. He explained how the high level of cultural and ethnic diversity across regions—intrinsically tied to Afghanistan’s geography—has shaped the complexity of external relations, as outsiders often required different, sometimes conflicting, approaches to connect with various regions. This factor, according to the speaker, has made Afghanistan a frequent site of “geopolitical entanglements” and internal conflicts, evidenced by the presence of different internal and external powers throughout history.

Dr. Wani emphasized the role of external powers and how their attempts to maintain an imperial presence contribute to understanding the complexity of the region’s cultural, economic, and military heritage. He argued that these external actors destabilized social, tribal, and customary practices in a nearly Manichean manner, leading to decades of conflict, which form the backdrop to the current regime.

Dr. Wani then asserted that, within this political context shaped by “historical diversity and ongoing struggles for power,” one of the most pressing issues has always been the inequality between men and women. He continued his historical approach by describing the systematic discrimination faced by Afghan women throughout history, often exacerbated by war and social norms influenced by foreign involvement in national conflicts. Dr. Wani focused on the importance of terminology, referencing Richard Rorty’s “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” (1979), explaining how identity is socially constructed through language. He emphasized how this applies to the current Taliban regime, where both policy and informal institutions (social norms, customs, and discursive narratives) shape the daily lives of women.

Note: Due to connection issues, a more in-depth reporting of Dr. Wani’s presentation was challenging.

Amir Hossein Mahdavi: “The Rise of Populism in Iran: Inequality, Class Conflict, and Nationalist Authoritarianism”

Mr. Amir Hossein Mahdavi’s presentation began with an overview of how left-wing and right-wing populism can be defined in the Iranian context.He first associated left-wing populism with Iran’s past politics, particularly following the 2005 elections and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and right-wing populism as a possibility in today’s politics in Iran. The speaker contends that, given Iran’s current political context, right-wing populism is more likely to develop. Mr. Mahdavi argues that due to the current government’s limited capacity and resources, left-leaning rhetoric on redistribution may be less credible to the public.

Mr. Amir Hossein Mahdavi’s presentation began with an overview of how left-wing and right-wing populism can be defined in the Iranian context. He first associated left-wing populism with Iran’s past politics, particularly following the 2005 elections and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and right-wing populism as a possibility in today’s politics in Iran. Mr. Mahdavi then proceeded with an in-depth analysis of both left- and right-wing populism and how they could manifest in the current Iranian context.

Mr. Mahdavi defined left-wing populism as focusing on “anti-austerity measures, social justice, opposition to economic inequality, and the perceived dominance of large corporations and financial elites.” Consequently, its main ideas are economic equality, social justice, opposition to neoliberalism and austerity policies, advocacy for the rights of marginalized groups, and criticism of global capitalism and large corporations.

He then explained how these ideas could manifest in the current Iranian context and how left-wing populists might leverage them:

Economic inequality and social justice: Left-wing populists could exploit the growing socio-economic inequalities in Iran. The combination of economic sanctions, particularly those tied to Iran’s nuclear program that have intensified since Donald Trump’s presidency, and poor domestic management has increased inequality. Currently, the ratio of income in the top 1% compared to the bottom 10% is among the highest in the world. Meanwhile, 25-30% of the population lives in severe poverty, unable to secure 2,000 calories per day.
Opposition to neoliberalism and austerity policies: Left-wing populists could tie the rising inequalities to neoliberalism and austerity measures. The speaker emphasized the skyrocketing inflation, now over 40%, as a potential target for linking mismanagement and government deficit to neoliberal policies.
Advocacy for the rights of marginalized groups: The economic disparities have prompted marginalized groups to form active social movements, such as the “labor and teacher movement,” which seeks greater political representation and rights—potential support bases for left-wing populist rhetoric.
Criticism of global capitalism and large corporations: In Iran, major corporations are government-controlled, but privatization has been on the rise. Left-wing populists could now tie labor issues to capitalist policies and actions, attributing problems to both private corporations and the government.

To conclude on left-wing populism, the author pointed out how the neglect of fundamental rights, such as those of gender and sexual minorities, could increase people’s receptiveness to any form of left-wing populism that may emerge from the current Iranian context.

Concerning right-wing populism, the author defined it as often emphasizing “nationalism, anti-immigration policies, and a strong stance against political elites, globalism, and multiculturalism.” Its main ideas are: “nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments, opposition to political elites and globalism, preservation of traditional cultural values.”

The speaker then explained how these ideas manifest in the current Iranian context and how right-wing populists might leverage them:

Nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments: The large influx of Afghan migrants and refugees after the Taliban came to power has sparked heated debate in Iran. Many images and videos showing the presence of these immigrants and refugees in public spaces (such as streets, schools, and health settings) have fueled this debate further, especially in the context of employment and tax contributions. Right-wing populists could exploit these fears to fuel anti-immigration sentiments and gain support.
Opposition to political elites and globalism: Public disenchantment with political elites is widespread in Iran, evidenced by the lowest voter turnout in 46 years during the June presidential elections. The speaker argues that in this context, right-wing populists could present themselves as a “new political voice” against established political elites, gaining momentum and power.
Preservation of traditional cultural values: The author suggests that right-wing populists could appeal to the era before the Islamic regime to gather voter support. Instead of upholding the current state-enforced values, they could draw on older traditions to gain influence.

Finally, the speaker contends that, given Iran’s current political context, right-wing populism is more likely to develop. Mr. Mahdavi argues that due to the current government’s limited capacity and resources, left-leaning rhetoric on redistribution may be less credible to the public.

Dr. Mabel Berezin, Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Cornell University.

Professor Mabel Berezin: The People Behind Trump Are Scarier Than He Is

October 18, 2024

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Home Interviews

The potential re-election of Donald Trump on November 5, 2024, raises significant concerns for American democracy, according to Professor Mabel Berezin. While she acknowledges that Trump is a troubling figure, she emphasizes that it is the individuals surrounding him who are especially dangerous. “What makes him even more dangerous is the group of people around him—J.D. Vance, Elon Musk, and the Project 2025 people. I think American democracy will be in serious danger if these people come into power. They are smart, they have a project, and they’re going to push it through,” she explains.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The re-election of Donald Trump on November 5, 2024, would pose serious concerns for American democracy, warns Dr. Mabel Berezin, Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Cornell University. In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Berezin makes it clear that while Trump himself is concerning, it’s the people surrounding him that she finds truly alarming. “What makes him even more dangerous is the group of people around him—J.D. Vance, Elon Musk, and the Project 2025 people. I think American democracy will be in serious danger if these people come into power. They are smart, they have a project, and they’re going to push it through.”

The interview touches on how populism in the United States differs from its historical and European counterparts. Professor Berezin explains that while American populism has always been defined by class differences, particularly between urban elites and rural populations, there is now a stronger emphasis on white Protestant nationalism. “There’s a much stronger emphasis on white American Protestant nationalism, which has become more public, especially evident at Trump rallies,” she notes.

Fascism and its relation to contemporary populism are key themes in Professor Berezin’s work. She highlights the “epistemic plasticity” of the term fascism and how its application can obscure more than it reveals. However, she emphasizes that what makes today’s political climate dangerous is not just rhetoric but the infiltration of far-right ideologies into American institutions. “What I call an institutional creep has begun, and this concerns me the most—particularly the courts and issues like free speech and social changes, such as abortion laws.”

Professor Berezin also points to the rise of paramilitary groups in the US, noting their similarities to those that fueled fascist movements in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. “These groups are much more organized and mobilizable today,” she warns, drawing a parallel between historical fascism and current threats to American democracy.

As the conversation turns to the economic and social forces driving populism, Professor Berezin highlights inequality and economic insecurity as fundamental factors. “People don’t think about cultural issues until basic security—like having a place to live or food to eat—is shattered,” she explains. According to Berezin, these economic grievances are often exploited through cultural and racial divisions, further fueling populist movements.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Mabel Berezin with some edits.

The United States Has Always Been Somewhat Exceptional

Crowds at Coney Island, NY, on July 4, 1936. Photo: Everett Collection.

Professor Berezin, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How does the contemporary populist movement in the United States differ from historical populist and far-right movements, such as those of the early 20th century, and what continuities, if any, do you observe?

Professor Mabel Berezin: First, I think it’s important to note that when you talk about the early 20th century, people tend to think about Europe—and for good reason. I do think there are significant differences between the movements.

In the American instance, one of the key issues is the focus on significant class differences in the United States, particularly between the so-called elites who live in multi-racial and multi-ethnic cities, and those who live in more rural areas. It highlights those who feel left behind.

Second, the contemporary populist movement has a specific focus, which has grown since Donald Trump first descended his golden elevator—it is hard to remember exactly when that was, in 2015. There is now a much stronger emphasis on white American Protestant nationalism. While that sentiment was always present as an underlying factor, it has become much more public, especially evident at Trump rallies.

Many historians have written about the American neo-Nazi movement in the 1930s, which shared a similar focus. A famous example is the rally at Madison Square Garden in New York, where participants wore Nazi uniforms, and the leader talked about the need for a white Christian America. Some themes from the 1930s are still present today. Trump does not get on television and say those things explicitly, but it’s part of the underlying message.

I think the European case in the 1920s and 1930s was more complex, with multiple factors at play that were distinct to the European context. The United States has always been exceptional. In many European countries of that era, there was less experience with democracy, and distinct cultural features influenced their political movements.

The US has a more consistent narrative, with a strong emphasis on radical individualism, which is not as central to the political culture of Europe. In America, there has always been this idea of the individual moving westward and expanding the nation, which has been a defining feature of American political culture. I think that radical individualism has been an important factor, which is not part of the political culture of Europe.

The Growing Threat of Institutional Reshaping in the US Mirrors Historical Fascism

In recent years, the term ‘fascism’ has been increasingly used to describe certain political dynamics in the US. In your article “Does the Fascism Debate Matter for Understanding 2024 American Politics?” you argue that the term ‘fascism’ has an ‘epistemic plasticity’ that may obscure more than it reveals when applied outside its historical context. How do you suggest scholars navigate this challenge while addressing contemporary threats to democracy in the United States?

Professor Mabel Berezin: First, as events change, a scholar working on the present should also change their view of things, and I have changed my view, or the way I would argue, considering events. So, it is an extremely plastic term, and I think the historiography supports that. Colleagues, whom I respect enormously, have worked on this issue, but I would say there are two things about fascism that need to be noted, and then I will point to the change.

First, there are a series of qualities or characteristics that characterize fascism: violence, paramilitary suppression of speech, performativity, spectacles, and so on. These are qualities that, when taken in isolation, are found in various kinds of politics. Performativity, for example, is not unique to fascist politics. When these qualities come together in different ways, they can lead to anti-democratic forms of politics.

What I think is really important—and I say this in the article and am even more convinced of it now, which is why I am more worried than before—is that there has always been a total institutional synthesis around fascism as it existed in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe. It wasn’t simply performativity or violence; it was the combination of those elements with the ability to control a state. This was the case in both Germany and Italy.

Fascism is a plastic term, and I am old enough to remember when people thought Richard Nixon was a fascist. The concern now, and something I addressed in that article, is that fascism becomes truly dangerous when it infiltrates institutional structures—and that is what we are seeing in the United States today. After January 6th, my alarm grew. Watching those events unfold on television, it was clear to me that this was a crime against the Constitution—an attack on the American state and the Capitol. However, when I saw arguments defending it, with people embracing Trump’s narrative that the election had been stolen, alarm bells went off in my head. This was the point where I began noticing a seepage into institutions, something we had not observed during Trump’s first administration. There had been anti-democratic actions and rhetoric, but nothing that started to coalesce like it did after January 6th.

Since then, what I call an institutional creep has begun, which I find extremely frightening. The areas that concern me most are the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, and the institutional rearrangements happening around them. The second concern is the increasing salience of free speech issues. The third is related to social issues, like the changes in abortion laws. These institutional shifts are rethinking and redefining both social and political life in ways that were not possible before. Trump himself was not able to reshape these institutions, but now we are seeing a body of people willing and capable of doing so—people who are much smarter and more focused on making these changes.

So, I see J.D. Vance as very dangerous because he can think these things through. I see similar traits in people like Elon Musk. Years ago, I had a science fiction fantasy about techno-geniuses taking over, never imagining it would happen because they had the money to make it a reality. And now, who is campaigning in Pennsylvania as we speak? Elon Musk. I believe he just spent $60 million on a super-pac contribution to Trump’s campaign yesterday. This is extremely frightening. I do not want to dwell too much on it, but I have always thought Trump was clearly a racist. He has a history of that—with his real estate dealings and his infamous 1989 ad about the Central Park Five, if I recall correctly.

But Trump does not have the synthetic mind that his new collaborators do. And their synthetic mind is not moving in a democratic direction, in my view, which is frightening. To me, this marks a new stage. It is not just about calling them fascists or pointing to their fascist or violent tendencies, which they certainly have. This is something that has the potential—it is not there yet, but it is on a path to take over the American state.

This is absolutely frightening because these are people with the mental capacity to make it happen, and we must not underestimate their brainpower. There are not really guardrails against this, especially with the current state of the Supreme Court. Maybe some local courts will push back on some of this, but yes, I maintain that fascism is a plastic term. It has flexibility as a concept, but I think it matters when we start seeing how fascism in the 1920s and 1930s reshaped institutions. And I think we are seeing the potential for that to happen in the United States now in a much more real way than eight years ago, when Trump first emerged.

And that, I think, is dangerous.

Religion Is a Major Definer of Americanism

A protester carries a large wooden cross during the annual March for Life at the US Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 19, 2024. Photo by Philip Yabut.

In the same article, you highlight the differences between American nativism and European fascism, suggesting that the two phenomena should not be conflated. What are the key distinctions between these two, and how do they shape the political landscape in the US differently than in Europe?

Professor Mabel Berezin: I think, as I said earlier, and I know people are using the term “nativism” now to talk about Europe, they tend to think of it as, you know, a “people who are already there” kind of thing. But I do think that the United States is much more racially focused than Europe.

When I say this, I mean it needs to be nuanced. It does not mean that I think different groups don’t live in Europe—different religious groups, etc.—but the focus on race has defined the United States in ways that perhaps haven’t been adequately acknowledged. If you look at historical books on populism published in the early 1900s,they focused on ethnic immigrants coming into the country—those from Southern and even Northern Europe, like Irish Catholics. Religion was a big definer of Americanism, and what it meant to be American.

People spoke about nativism in terms of keeping these groups out, or, if they were already here, regarding them as somehow different. These groups may have had white skin, but they were not considered white. They were Catholics, not Protestants. This is a very different situation from Europe, which has a much more complicated religious and ethnic landscape.

I would even argue that race plays out differently in Europe. There is a kind of singular focus to American prejudices, I guess you could say. And then, of course, we have the history of slavery, Black Americans, Indigenous peoples, and so on. Our complications are unique in the sense that America is more singularly focused on the things it rejects.

In your article “Fascism and Populism: Are They Useful Categories for Comparative Sociological Analysis?” you highlight the importance of examining institutional contexts when analyzing the emergence of populist and fascist movements. Could you elaborate on which institutional factors are most influential in either constraining or facilitating these movements in contemporary democracies?

Professor Mabel Berezin: Well, I think I’ve already touched on this in the first part. You want to look at the courts, freedom of speech, First Amendment issues, and freedom of religion—at least when examining the United States. You also want to look at how the government operates. These are things that, in my imagination when I wrote that article, I never thought would be at risk of breaking down in the US, but now I do think they are extremely important.

These factors vary depending on the country. One thing I have not mentioned yet is the presence or growth of paramilitary groups, which were important in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. The ability to recruit paramilitary groups was crucial for Mussolini in Italy. In the US, it is well-known that there have always been paramilitary groups in various parts of the country, and today, these groups are much more organized and mobilizable.

These are the kinds of institutional arrangements I would look at. Most of them are constitutive of the breakdown of democracy. You need the Constitution, the courts, the press, freedom of religion, etc. And you do not want organizations that can be mobilized in the same way as the military or police—what Max Weber would call “extra-organizational agents of legitimate violence.” In the 1930s European context, these factors were more prominent.

In terms of populism, specifically in Europe, another key issue is how people perceive and interact with the European Union—whether they see it as doing or not doing enough for its citizens. This has been a major institutional player in the rise of populism, alongside immigration, which is closely tied to perceptions of the EU.

A Lack of Security Can Be Exploited in Various Ways

Old Mailboxes in west United States. Photo: Andrey Bayda.

To what extent do you think economic insecurity and inequality contribute to the rise of far-right movements in the US, and how do these factors intersect with cultural grievances to shape contemporary populist rhetoric?

Professor Mabel Berezin: The rise of inequality is actually key. I do not always like the word “inequality” because sometimes I find it a euphemism for the things people lack—and there are serious lacks in the United States. There are people who cannot find places to live, and the homelessness in some major cities is staggering. Even in Ithaca, where Cornell University is located, which is a rural part of the United States, when you leave the university, the inequality and absence of basic needs are quite astonishing. This has been well documented, and there is a lot of social science data that supports what I am saying.

So, it is absolutely key. People do not think about cultural issues until basic security—like having a place to live or food to eat—is shattered. Security is more than just the absence of threats; it provides stability. You know where you are going to live, what you are going to eat, or that you can afford food. That sense of security has broken in many ways, both in the United States and Europe, and I think it is one of the major driving forces behind these movements.

When there is a lack of security, it can be exploited in different ways, especially through cultural differences. You can tell people, “Those people have what you don’t,” which fuels the feeling of being left behind. This has become a common narrative, but the major driving factor is the absence of basic expectations of stability in the places where people live.

Place is an important part of this equation. People do not need to live in cities to feel secure. We often say cities offer more opportunities, which drove people out of rural areas, but security can exist anywhere if there’s stability. Most people do not have that stability anymore.

One interesting thing I have noticed, based on informal conversations in Ithaca, is how people define happiness. Many people who do not live in Ithaca anymore—because they cannot afford it—work in service occupations and live outside the city. I have had conversations with these people who have told me that, for them, the right to go home at night and work on building their own little wood cabin is what makes them happy. That is not something you hear in an urban environment.

This divide is not just about culture or politics—it is about basic expectations and what makes people feel secure. For instance, I once saw a sign on a car in a parking lot in Ithaca that read, “How many ways will you show contempt for me today?” It was a big station wagon covered in American flags, parked at a food place in Ithaca. I almost took a picture of it, but I did not want to violate that person’s sense of dignity. Instead of tough guys with guns coming out, two middle-aged women, clearly country folk, got into the car.

And I said to myself, you know, this is what we are missing somehow. This is what Trump is tapping into. It is not just about culture, although they obviously believe different things than I do. I believe in the country, too, even though I do not have flags on my car. But there is a gap there, and these are the things we need to pay attention to, I think.

A Dangerous Mix of Misinformation and Inefficacy Could Propel Trump’s Return

Given the rise of populist leaders with authoritarian tendencies, how resilient do you think American democratic institutions are to such challenges, and what measures could be taken to safeguard democracy against far-right incursions?

Professor Mabel Berezin: Well, I do not even think that is the right framing at this moment, in the sense that I think what we have… If you look at Project 2025, which you have probably heard a lot about, I assume—maybe the people who read this know about it. It is basically a 900-page document from the Heritage Foundation about how to completely restructure the American state and political institutions. It is very frightening. These are people with, I would almost say, totalitarian visions rather than authoritarian, in the sense that they want to redefine the entire way of being in the world, in the state, and in the culture.

Now, what would safeguard against that? Well, certainly, we need to reaffirm and convince people that the institutions we have were well-designed, are functioning well, and that people can participate in the political sphere. In other words, there needs to be an emphasis on civic education in schools. People do not understand what the government is for. They think it is only about how their life was better a few years ago, so they vote accordingly—without understanding the larger role of government.

For example, people often do not see the connection between government and their lives beyond immediate concerns. They forget that government provides social security, Medicare, and the right to participate in democracy. There is a lack of understanding, and I believe this is partly due to the deficiency of civic education. If I had the capacity to influence policy, that is where I would focus. And I am not the only one arguing this at the moment.

Local organizing, getting people to vote, and increasing participation are crucial. But restoring a sense of efficacy is also important—people need to believe that if they participate, their actions matter. When you see someone with a car sign that says, “How many ways can you show contempt for me today?” it is clear they don’t feel like they matter. One thing Trump has been particularly good at is convincing people that they matter to him, at least, and that is a political gift.

I do not think we focus enough on that. Policies are important, but they are not what the average person really wants from their politicians. The lack of understanding about what government and civil society are, combined with a feeling of inefficacy, creates a toxic brew. And it is not just Trump’s core supporters who would elect him again; a whole group of other people would push him over the threshold, and that’s another concern.

The Real Threat Lies with the Powerful Figures Behind Trump

Former US President Donald Trump at a rally with VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

What do you think will happen to American democracy and its democratic institutions if Trump gets elected on November the 5th?

Professor Mabel Berezin: I am deeply concerned. I mean, I am deeply concerned because of the group that he has around him. I am not as deeply concerned about Trump himself.

I do not see him as someone who thinks deeply about politics. I recognize him as a certain type—a criminal type, a con artist—who has seized the moment, as it were. But that does not mean he isn’t dangerous. He is dangerous in multiple ways, primarily because he is more interested in power than politics.

What makes him even more dangerous is the group of people around him—J.D. Vance, Elon Musk, and the Project 2025 people. I think American democracy will be in danger if these people come into power. As I said earlier, they are smart, they have a project, they have an idea, and they are going to push it through. It will be quite different. Look at the recent Supreme Court decisions about the power of the presidency.

There are others who share these concerns. If I were writing this as an academic paper with footnotes, I could cite several people who agree. Project 2025 has a website, and anyone can access it—that alone should scare you. These people are not kidding. This is not the same Trump administration as before. To me, Trump is not the main issue right now. He may get elected, and that is scary, but I’m more afraid of the people behind him.

Dr. Francesco Tamburini, a Professor of Political Science at Department of Political Sciences, Università di Pisa, Italy.

Professor Tamburini: The Absence of Ennahda Is a Bleeding Wound for Tunisian Politics

October 17, 2024

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Home Interviews

The re-election of Kais Saied on October 6, 2024, has sparked debates about the future of Tunisia’s democracy and the legacy of the Arab Spring. With only 28.8% voter turnout, the result reflects a growing disillusionment among Tunisians. Professor Francesco Tamburini examines the wider impact of Saied’s actions, drawing comparisons between Tunisia’s path and other post-revolutionary autocratic regimes in the MENA region. He emphasizes that “the absence of Ennahda is a significant loss for Tunisian politics,” noting that the lack of a moderate Islamic voice has left a deep void in the country’s political landscape.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The re-election of Kais Saied on October 6, 2024, has ignited discussions about the future of Tunisia’s democracy and the remnants of the Arab Spring. With a turnout of only 28.8%, the election result signals a growing disillusionment among the Tunisian people. As Dr. Francesco Tamburini, a Professor of Political Science at Department of Political Sciences, Università di Pisa, points out in his interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Thursday, the problem is not necessarily one of legitimacy, but rather a reflection of widespread political disaffection. “The country is in a state of economic suffering, with young people struggling to find proper jobs. Tunisia is being suffocated by a relentless economic crisis that Saied cannot solve and at the moment, no one seems to be able to address it,” Professor Tamburini notes.

A key theme of this interview is the absence of Ennahda, which Tamburini considers a “bleeding wound” for Tunisian politics. Following the 2011 Revolution, Ennahda and its leader, Rached Ghannouchi, had the opportunity to shape a vision of modern Islam combined with democratic principles. Yet, due to internal divisions and lack of experience, the party failed to govern effectively. Today, Ennahda has been sidelined and many of its intellectuals are now excluded from political life, largely due to Kais Saied’s declaration that the party is illegal. “The absence of Ennahda is a great loss for Tunisian politics. The lack of a moderate Islamic voice is a significant wound for Tunisian politics today,” Professor Tamburini asserts.

In this wide-ranging interview, Professor Tamburini delves into the broader implications of Saied’s actions, comparing Tunisia’s trajectory with other post-revolutionary autocratic consolidations in the MENA region. He explores how Tunisia, once an exception in the Arab Spring, now faces the challenge of maintaining democratic institutions amidst growing authoritarian tendencies.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Francesco Tamburini with some edits.

The Colonial Influence Remains Deep in the MENA Region

Professor Tamburini, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your research on African and Middle Eastern politics, how do you see colonial legacies influencing contemporary political structures and governance challenges in these regions?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: The impact of colonial legacies in the Maghreb and Mashreq—that is, Northern Africa and the Middle East (MENA)—is profound and continues to shape the nations in these areas. In many cases, there was a lack of a true watan (nation-state) before colonialism, and this absence has left a mark. To this day, tribal identities often take precedence over national ones, as we see in places like Libya or Iraq. Take Libya, for example: before the Italian invasion during the colonial era, Libya did not exist as a unified state. Later, Muammar Gaddafi attempted to establish a Jamahiriya, but it never became a real state in the traditional sense.

Many countries, after independence, relied on the French Fifth Republic and its semi-presidential form of government. Even Morocco, a constitutional monarchy, heavily relied on French law. The colonial influence is still very deep, even today, starting from the former government structures and, for example, the influence of civil law. This is a fundamental creation of Western culture and Western jurisprudence.

You have examined authoritarian regimes and their role in state stability. In your view, what are the key factors that sustain authoritarian rule in some states while leading to collapse in others?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: I would start by saying that all regimes are very different and have very few common patterns. What is certain is that many regimes use Islam as a source of legitimation and even stability. The fear of anarchy and disorder, instilled by these regimes, works as a deterrent. For example, in Tunisia and Algeria, you have to consider that Algeria has enshrined in its constitution the concept of Fitna—civil strife. Constitutional law in Algeria forbids Fitna, so the government is seen as a protection against civil war and disorder. Islam serves as a way of avoiding this kind of chaos—institutional chaos.

However, sometimes this form of legitimation is not enough. The masses can overwhelm regimes that fail to provide a minimum level of welfare. So, it is very difficult for regimes to rely solely on Islam for their legitimacy.

How do international powers, such as the European Union, the United States and China, influence the political dynamics and conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East, and what are the long-term implications of their involvement?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: Well, each international actor has a different purpose, of course. The European Union, as we all know, does not have a real foreign policy because it was primarily established as an economic union. When the European Union attempts to have a unified foreign policy, it often fails due to the many differing voices within it, which generally lead to chaos. Take, for example, Viktor Orban in Hungary—his concept of the European Union is very different from that of France or northern countries like Sweden or Norway.

The main issue for the European Union is immigration. On the other hand, China is primarily interested in commerce and economic penetration. The United States is gradually retreating from the MENA region, although it remains interested in maintaining stability and preventing foreign enemies from gaining influence in the area.

Long-term foreign policy is now characterized by multiple factors. Western countries will have to face the emergence of new political and military powers, both small and medium-sized, which will reshape international relations not only in the MENA region but globally.

The State of Emergency Legitimizes an Autocratic Regime in Tunisia

In your analysis in the article titled “The Ghost of the Constitutional Review in Tunisia: Authoritarianism, Transition to Democracy, and Rule of Law,” you discuss the historical challenges Tunisia has faced in establishing an effective constitutional review system. What do you believe are the primary obstacles that have prevented Tunisia from building a stable and functional constitutional court, especially in light of its transition to democracy?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: I would divide the question into three periods: before, during and after 2011. During the Bourguiba era, from 1956 to 1987, Tunisia and Bourguiba established a constitutional control that was deemed unnecessary. The Supreme Court was considered the guarantor of the Constitution. This perception also influenced the regime of Ben Ali, who only created a constitutional court in the final period of his rule, but it was merely an advisory body. Its rulings were not binding.

After 2011, the main challenges were the lack of a working majority in the legislative branch and instability in Parliament. I would also point to the lack of a judicial tradition in constitutional control and the political immaturity in handling such a delicate issue. Essentially, Tunisia lacked the legitimacy and maturity to establish effective constitutional oversight. Even today, the Saied presidency does not support the establishment of a constitutional control system.

In your analysis in the article titled “The State of Emergency and Exception in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia: The ‘License to Kill’ the Rule of Law,” you mention that emergency powers have often been extended indefinitely in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia, sometimes becoming the norm rather than the exception. What are the long-term impacts of such prolonged states of emergency on the rule of law and democratic institutions in these countries?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: At the moment, only Tunisia is under the pressure of a state of emergency, which deeply limits its ability to develop a true democratic regime. Under a state of emergency or exception, executive power can easily bypass many of the checks and balances designed to protect citizens. Moreover, civil and political rights are heavily compromised by this state of emergency.

I would recall that the state of emergency originated in France during the Fourth and Fifth Republics, but in France, it was limited by checks and balances within the Republic. Tunisia, however, does not possess these safeguards. As a result, the state of emergency legitimizes an autocratic regime, which will severely impact the country’s ability to develop a true democracy.

Kais Saied Has Free Rein to Act as He Pleases

The President of Tunisia, Kais Saied at the press conference with new Libyan Presidential Council head, Mohamed MenfiTripoli, Libya 17 March 2021

In your article “How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Autocracy: Kais Saied’s ‘Constitutional Self-Coup’ in Tunisia,” you describe Kais Saied’s use of Article 80 of the Tunisian constitution as a ‘constitutional self-coup.’ To what extent do you believe this move was justified within the framework of constitutional legitimacy, and what precedent does it set for the future of Tunisian governance?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: Article 80 is a controversial article because it empowers the President of the Republic to take measures imposing the state of emergency (Istithna’ in Arabic) in the event of an imminent danger threatening the institutions of the nation, the security and independence of the country, or hindering the regular functioning of public powers. The President can take the necessary measures to address this exceptional situation after consulting the head of the government and the president of the Assembly of the Representatives of the People and informing the Constitutional Court. The President must then announce these measures in a statement to the people. That’s the theory.

The aim of these measures is to ensure the return to the regular functioning of public authorities as soon as possible. However, the broad wording of Article 80 has always raised concerns, especially due to the absence of a clear definition of what constitutes “imminent danger.” What exactly is an imminent danger? Even the nature of the measures taken remains unclear.

Moreover, was Tunisia’s political, economic, social and health crisis comparable to an imminent danger? The actions taken by the Tunisian government are difficult to reconcile with the spirit of Article 80, which explicitly denies the President the power to dissolve Parliament. Yet, Kais Saied dissolved the Parliament without any substantial obstacle. According to Article 80, the President should have consulted the Constitutional Court before such actions, but the court was not functioning at the time.

As a result, Saied had free rein to do as he pleased. Even now, without a functioning Constitutional Court, the executive power is unchecked and able to act as it desires. This is why establishing a Constitutional Court is crucial to determining what kind of misconduct can occur in the country.

Given your argument that Tunisia’s state institutions were unable to prevent Saied’s power consolidation, what are the long-term implications for Tunisia’s democratic institutions, and what measures could have been taken to reinforce these institutions against autocratic shifts?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: The legacy will be far-reaching. Tunisia is now experiencing a new form of leadership, which could be translated as “chieftainism,” emulating the regimes of Bourguiba and Ben Ali. It’s a new kind of authoritarian regime, combined with a version of direct democracy that will likely be out of control for the reasons I explored a few moments ago.

Islamic High Councils in the Maghreb Are Part of the Bureaucratization of Religion

In your analysis at your article titled “The Islam of the Government: The Islamic High Councils in Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Tunisia,” you discuss how governments in the Maghreb use Islamic High Councils to consolidate power and strengthen national identity. How effective have these councils been in maintaining political legitimacy and control over religious discourse, especially in the face of rising Islamist movements?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: They were and have always been, fundamental in promoting a national form of Islam—the “real Islam,” as they call it. This national Islam is specific to each country, such as the “real Islam” in Algeria or Morocco, for example. These councils are part of the bureaucratization of religion, with their main task being to control religious practices and combat radicalism. They act as the state’s mouthpiece and propagate a moderate form of Islam that controls mosques, imams and religious discourse across the country.

Their primary purpose is to fight radical ideas in the religious sphere, which is crucial for preventing the spread of external religious ideologies like Shi’ism, Salafi movements or the Muslim Brotherhood—ideas seen as a counterculture to the state’s version of Islam. These external influences challenge the state’s national idea of Islam.

The Absence of Ennahda Is a Great Loss for Tunisian Politics

A large group of Tunisians gathered outside the White House in Washington, DC, on February 27, 2022, to protest the erosion of democracy in Tunisia under President Kais Saied’s administration. Photo: Phil Pasquini.

Your article discusses Tunisia’s unique trajectory as an ‘exception’ among Arab countries post-Arab Spring. How does Kais Saied’s releection and recent actions compare to other examples of autocratic consolidation in post-revolutionary contexts, particularly in the MENA region?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: Tunisia’s exception clearly emerges in its use of populism and direct democracy, which were trademarks of the propaganda during the electoral campaign. There was a strong criticism of parliamentarism and an instrumental use of religion, which attracted votes from Islamist parties, such as Ennahda. It is the use of a conservative agenda for the sake of maintaining power. That is the main distinction between Kais Saied’s trajectory and other autocratic consolidations in North Africa.

What does the re-election of Kais Saied on October 6 tell us about the future of Arab Spring? The turn-out at the election was only 28.8% which shows the overwhelming part of the population did not support Kais Saied, do you think this creates a serious problem of legitimacy?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: In my opinion, it’s not a problem of legitimacy. It’s mainly a problem of disaffection towards politics and politicians by the Tunisian population. There is a growing disillusionment with elections as a tool to solve the everyday problems of ordinary citizens. The country is in a state of economic suffering with young people struggling to find proper jobs. Tunisia is being suffocated by a relentless economic crisis that Saied cannot solve and at the moment, no one seems to be able to address it.

How do you view the role of Annahda and Gannushi in Tunisia’s transition to democracy right after the Arab Spring and then in the election of Kais Saied?

Professor Francesco Tamburini: Ennahda and Ghannouchi, immediately after the Revolution, had a very powerful chance to address Tunisia’s problems and to give the country a vision of modern Islam combined with a truly democratic spirit. They proposed the concept of Madania—a civil state that was neither an Islamic state nor a secular state, but something in between. Unfortunately, Ennahda was not able to govern the country properly due to its lack of experience. The party was and still is, very divided.

Nowadays, unfortunately, Ennahda no longer exists as a political force. Many intellectuals who were part of the party are now outside of politics, largely because Kais Saied declared the party illegal. The absence of Ennahda is a great loss for Tunisian politics, in my opinion. The lack of a moderate Islamic voice is a significant wound for Tunisian politics today. It’s a bleeding wound for the Tunisian politics.

Tom Ginsburg is the Leo Spitz Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, working on comparative and international law from an interdisciplinary perspective.

Professor Ginsburg: The Search for a ‘Strongman’ to Fix Everything Is a Naive Approach

October 16, 2024

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Home Interviews

Professor Tom Ginsburg warns against the simplistic notion that a “strongman” can solve complex political and social problems, arguing that such leaders often weaken democratic institutions by eroding trust. He discusses how authoritarian regimes manipulate international law to shield themselves from scrutiny. Despite these trends, Ginsburg remains cautiously optimistic, believing that well-established democracies can endure with vigilance and strong institutions. However, he emphasizes the need for constant global cooperation to prevent the further erosion of democratic norms and institutions.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, discusses global democratic backsliding and the rise of authoritarianism. He cautions against the simplistic notion that a “strongman” can solve complex political and social issues, emphasizing that such leaders often undermine democratic institutions and erode public trust, ultimately weakening nations rather than strengthening them. Ginsburg highlights the importance of safeguarding democracy and the critical role of strong institutions.

Professor Ginsburg underscores the importance of institutions in preserving democracy, noting that while democracies may experience backsliding, complete breakdowns are rare. He also warns of the manipulation of international law by authoritarian regimes to entrench power and diminish democratic principles. Reflecting on historical examples, Professor Ginsburg points out that many authoritarian regimes, during their first term, often present themselves as relatively moderate, only to erode institutions more effectively once they learn how to wield power. He notes that although democracies, especially established ones like the United States and France, are resilient and unlikely to break down completely, they are vulnerable to backsliding, particularly when polarization intensifies. When political opponents are seen as existential threats, the foundations of democracy can weaken.

In discussing the impact of rising authoritarianism on international law, Ginsburg highlights how authoritarian regimes are increasingly manipulating international institutions to protect themselves from scrutiny and criticism. He warns that authoritarian regimes are using international law strategically to legitimize their rule and repress opposition through tactics like exploiting vague terms such as “extremism” or “separatism.” He also mentions how some authoritarian governments have hijacked institutions like Interpol to target political opponents under the guise of legal protocols.

Despite these troubling trends, Professor Ginsburg remains cautiously optimistic about democracy’s survival in well-established systems. While authoritarianism poses serious challenges, he believes that, with vigilance, democracies will continue to endure and that the resilience of their institutions can help them weather periods of backsliding. Nonetheless, he calls for constant awareness and global cooperation to prevent the further degradation of democratic norms and international institutions.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Tom Ginsburg with some edits.

Rising Polarization Is a Major Cause of Democratic Backsliding

Professor Ginsburg, thank you so very much for joining our interview series.

Professor Tom Ginsburg: It’s my pleasure to be here. I think the work you’re doing is important.

Thank you. Let me start with the first question. You argue that there is a strong possibility that the twenty-first century will be known more as an authoritarian century than a democratic one. What are the reasons for this assumption and what impact rising authoritarianism will have on international law? Additionally, what do you think are the primary factors contributing to the global trend of democratic backsliding and constitutional erosion, and how do you see it impacting the future of global constitutionalism?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: Well, that’s quite a lot of questions! Let me start by saying that over the last three decades, wehave tended to think of democracy as something that naturally emerged through modernization theory. We haveacknowledged that throughout most of human history, governments have been undemocratic and authoritarian. But after the Cold War, it seemed like democracy was on the rise—what Samuel Huntington called the ‘Third Wave of Democratization.’

At the time, democracy appeared to be the only game in town, as people used to say. However, from where we stand now, that seems not only like a naive assumption but also quite mistaken. Democracies now seem more like a historical blip in some sense, as the world appears to be reverting to its more common state of violent conflict and authoritarianism.

Now, I would disagree with the simplicity of that assumption. I still believe that the richest, most powerful, and successful countries—those that deliver public goods to their citizens—are grounded in the will of the people. While there are a few high-performing non-democracies or limited democracies, like Singapore, which would be an excellent place to be born, these are exceptions. In such cases, there exists a kind of responsive authoritarianism.

However, in general, if you had the choice, you would want to be born in a democracy. Despite all their flaws and challenges, democracies allow us to express disappointment in our leaders, which can create a sense of existential crisis. Yet, when we look at most performance indicators, democracies still excel. Sometimes there’s a naive belief that we just need a dictator to “make the trains run on time.” But for every Singapore, there’s a Cambodia in 1975 or something equally disastrous. For every high-performing authoritarian regime, there are plenty of terrible ones. The search for a “strongman” to fix everything is almost always a naive solution, and this ties into your question about populism. The desire for a strongman rarely leads to the outcomes people hope for.

Take Tunisia, for example. It now has a weak strongman—who, ironically, was a constitutional lawyer—who took power following widespread disappointment with the democracy’s economic performance. But the result is stagnation, and people are not better off. So, overall, I support democracy and believe it will persist in countries where it is well-established. However, it is fraying, and there’s a sense of existential concern.

You also asked about the causes of democratic backsliding. There are many factors to consider, but one major cause is rising polarization. When political opponents are seen not just as people with differing opinions but as existential threats, it escalates democratic competition, eroding the institutions necessary to make democracy work. Polarization is a significant factor, fueled in part by social media, which places people into ideological bubbles.

In the United States, for example, I’m encouraged that the public seems less polarized than its leaders. Many areas of policy actually enjoy broad agreement among citizens. So, I’m not one of the more alarmist analysts who predict civil war in the US—that’s not going to happen. Most of us have family or friends on the other side of the political spectrum and we’re not going to kill each other over Donald Trump or something similar.

Finally, you asked about the impact of rising authoritarianism on international law. Indeed, this is changing rapidly before our eyes. A few years ago, I wrote about Authoritarian International Law and published a book called Democracies in International Law. In it, I pointed out that democracies and authoritarians use international law differently. Europe, for example, has built the European Union on an international legal framework that has provided public goods and fostered cross-border cooperation, including the commitment to human rights. Authoritarians, on the other hand, are less interested in these principles because they don’t trust each other and struggle with deep cooperation.

What we see in international law today is a pattern where democracies innovate—through mechanisms like transparency laws, citizens’ assemblies and administrative reforms—while authoritarians copy these innovations and repurpose them for their own ends. This repurposing is happening in international law too. Authoritarian regimes have taken over bodies like the Human Rights Council, where their main goal is to avoid criticism of themselves. Similarly, the General Assembly now has a majority of authoritarian states and this shift degrades some of the highest ideals of international law.

We also see double-speak, like Russia’s claim that its invasion of Ukraine is a defense against genocide by the Ukrainians. These kinds of manipulations are meant to confuse citizens and degrade the potential for genuine international cooperation.

I know I’ve answered many questions quickly, but I hope this provides a useful overview.

Indeed, Professor Ginsburg, thank you. In your article “The Value of ‘Tyrannophobia’,” you mention the blurred distinction between democratic backsliding and breakdown. How important is it for scholars and policymakers to clearly differentiate between the two and what criteria should be used to make this distinction effectively?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: That’s a great question. I think even talking now in 2024 compared to six years ago, our perspective has to shift somewhat. Democratic backsliding, as it turns out, is fairly common. Many democracies experience degradation in the quality of their institutions and their self-perception. However, a full democratic breakdown—meaning the end of democracy—is actually quite rare for countries like yours and mine, those that are wealthy and have long democratic histories.

Adam Przeworski, the great scholar at NYU, calculated that the probability of a wealthy country with a strong democratic history, like the United States, seeing its democracy end is infinitesimally small. And I think he’s right. Democracies like the US and France will persist; the electoral mechanisms will continue to function and the basic components of the rule of law will remain, even if they become degraded. However, the quality of democracy can decline and we may experience what is known as subnational authoritarianism in federal systems like the US.

We have seen this before. Between the end of the Civil War and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the entire southern United States was not a democracy because Black citizens were disenfranchised by various legal mechanisms. So, while the US as a whole may have been a democracy, significant regions within it were not. This kind of subnational authoritarianism could happen again because states are very powerful in our system.

But as for a full breakdown? When we look at history, democracies typically break down due to war, revolution or military coups. I don’t see any of those happening in the US or in countries like France. There are certainly revolutionaries, but they don’t have a social base and military coups are extremely unlikely in countries like ours. Civil-military relations are well-controlled here. Even with all the discussion about figures like Donald Trump, I don’t see any scenario where he or anyone else would order the military to stop an election.

In short, the oldest and strongest democracies are certainly subject to backsliding, but I don’t believe they are at serious risk of breakdown.

European Union Failed to Develop a Demos

In your article ‘How Authoritarians Use International Law,’ you underline that democracies have produced the grandest legal achievements including the European integration and the development of the global trade regime. You clearly see European Union as a great success. How do you explain the rise of far-right parties and their recent successes in elections in the founding members of EU like France, Italy and the Netherlands?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: That’s a great question. By the way, I happened to be living in Europe when the euro was introduced in 2000. It was fascinating because, for most ordinary people, there wasn’t much public discussion about it. I was living in the Netherlands and I found that many ordinary folks didn’t like the euro; it led to inflation and there was a sense of resentment because the decision seemed to have been made by the government without much public input.

A lot of people talk about the failure of Europe to develop a demos—a true sense of a continent-wide polity. The project, in some ways, felt technocratic and elitist. I think that’s right. It doesn’t work to have someone like Valéry Giscard d’Estaing pronounce a constitution from on high; people rejected that and rightly so. It lacked the social base necessary to sustain it.

At the same time, economically, the EU has been massively successful. It is a major global regulatory power and it has made people wealthier than they would have been otherwise. But politically, it hasn’t quite gained the legitimacy it needs. The nation-state, the idea that it would fade away, was naive. I remember reading scholars like Anne-Marie Slaughter in the late 1990s and early 2000s who celebrated the European project and thought it would lead to an ever-closer union, as if it were an unstoppable machine. I was skeptical, especially because I study East Asia, where national consciousness is still very strong. There’s no sense that China or Japan, for example, would ever give up their national identities.

Even in Europe, I was somewhat skeptical. When I visited, I noticed a lack of a European identity—people still identified as Italians, French or Dutch. No one, aside from EU bureaucrats in Brussels, introduced themselves as European.

So, what does that mean? The nationalist backlash we’re seeing is healthy and we need to admit that. It’s not some kind of pathology; it reflects real feelings in society. This is important when studying populism. We shouldn’t view populism as a disease to be cured. It’s a natural political development, particularly when elites are out of touch. That’s why we’re seeing the rise of far-right parties across Europe.

The key thing is not that populist parties are running for office. In fact, in the United States, there’s a long tradition of running as a populist—every politician runs against Washington, DC. George W. Bush did it, Barack Obama did it and of course, Trump did as well. But running as a populist is different from governing as a populist. Once in office, you can’t govern like a populist.

Take Italy, for example. Giorgia Meloni leads a far-right party and she ran as a populist. But from what I see, while she pursues some far-right policies, she isn’t governing as a populist in the sense of trying to dismantle the institutional structure of the country. In fact, Italy’s institutional structure constrains her, as it has constrained every post-war leader. Italy’s constitutional order has many pathologies, and it will constrain her too.

So, the key point here is that we need to distinguish between running as a populist, which is healthy and governing as a populist, which can degrade democratic institutions.

In my book with Aziz Z. Huq, How to Save a Constitutional Democracy (2018), we talk about the forces leading to democratic backsliding. One of those forces is what we call partisan degradation, but the key one relevant to this discussion is charismatic populism. Donald Trump embodies this—the idea that “I alone can fix everything” and that anyone or any institution that stands between me and the people must be eliminated. That kind of rhetoric can lead to actions that destroy institutions and the fact is, for constitutional democracy to succeed, you need strong institutions.

That’s why I’m against governing as a populist.

Authoritarian Constitutional Systems Are Incredibly Diverse

The concept of ‘authoritarian constitutionalism’ has gained traction in the academic literature, describing regimes that use constitutional tools to consolidate power. How do you distinguish between genuine constitutionalism and its authoritarian use and what role do international and domestic actors play in challenging or supporting these regimes?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: Hmm! That’s an interesting question. First of all, I think the term authoritarian constitutionalism is valid. It can represent a genuine form of constitutionalism. For instance, Britain, until the Reform Act of 1832, had a constitutional system, albeit a non-democratic one. So, we shouldn’t assume that constitutionalism only applies to liberal democracies. Just because a system isn’t a liberal constitutional democracy—which is itself a rare phenomenon—doesn’t mean there isn’t constitutionalism. Power can still be constrained in meaningful ways.

Take Thailand, for example. It’s not a strong democracy—certainly not at the moment, with political parties being banned and other such measures. Yet, the military-backed leader stepped down after eight years, as required by the Constitution. This means the text constrained the power holder, which is a form of constitutionalism, even though it’s not liberal constitutionalism. So, I tend to think of authoritarian constitutionalism as a broader category where power is constrained, even in non-democratic settings.

Mark Tushnet wrote about authoritarian constitutionalism, using Singapore as a case. But I wasn’t entirely convinced by that example. What he meant was a regime that is still authoritarian but not too bad. However, true constitutionalism requires a deeper examination of the actual mechanisms in place—such as the role of constraining institutions. It’s fascinating to study because there are so many variations. The famous Tolstoy quote comes to mind: “Every happy family is alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.” Similarly, authoritarian constitutional systems are incredibly diverse—perhaps even more so than constitutional democracies.

Now, when it comes to the role of the international community, I hold a fairly thin view of international law. I don’t believe there’s a right to democracy under international law. States are required to observe basic human rights, but there’s no legal obligation for them to be democratic. It would be problematic if international law insisted on democracy, as it would render many members of the international community illegitimate. Historically, the majority of governments have not been democratic.

What can international law do, then? There are examples of international efforts to keep backsliding democracies from completely derailing or to hold authoritarian regimes accountable to some degree. One example is Poland under the Law and Justice Party (PiS). Since they took power, they’ve engaged in institutional takeovers, especially of the courts, which created friction with European law. The EU has mechanisms like Article 7 and Article 2 processes, and while they didn’t stop the PiS from consolidating power, they helped prevent things from going too far off the rails. Being part of the EU gave the Polish opposition space to organize, and they eventually won the recent election. PiS may return to power, but the point is that democracy didn’t completely collapse in Poland.

Hungary is a different story. Of course, we don’t really know for sure, but the playing field there seems extremely tilted and it’s plausible that Viktor Orbán may remain in power for the rest of his life. Fortunately, it seems the European Union has become more aware of the situation. However, you also see examples in Latin America and Africa where courts play a role on the margins. While they may not save democracy entirely, they help keep space open for opposition to organize and prevent the worst outcomes, stopping the country from devolving into one of the truly oppressive dictatorships wehave seen too many times throughout history.

Constant Vigilance Needed to Prevent Authoritarian Hijacking of International Legal Institutions

The symbol of United Nations Human Rights Council. Photo: Shutterstock.

In your article “How Authoritarians Use International Law,” you discuss how authoritarian regimes are increasingly using international law to legitimize their rule and shield themselves from criticism. How effective has this strategy been in reshaping international norms and what can democratic states do to counter this manipulation?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: I do think we are seeing the manipulation of international law. One clear example is explicitly authoritarian cooperation, like in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or the Eurasian institutions that Vladimir Putin set up as counterweights to the European Union.

One of the key tactics these organizations use is cooperation on internal security issues. In my article, I mention the creation of new international norms, such as labeling crimes like extremism and separatism. These terms have been defined by authoritarian regimes in a way that can criminalize anything from advocating for LGBT rights to seeking greater autonomy for regions like Tibet. These are now international norms in those regions, with enforcement mechanisms. If I, as a government, label you an extremist or separatist, other countries in the group are obligated to arrest and extradite you. These terms are vague, but they have real teeth and are being used to reinforce domestic dictatorships while binding them more closely in their shared projects.

Another concern is the degradation of human rights norms, such as the rise of concepts like human rights with Chinese characteristics. I previously mentioned the Human Rights Council and the kinds of cases they focus on. A while back, there was a proposal before the Human Rights Council for a norm against the defamation of religion. Traditionally, defamation is an individual-level crime—if you say something false about me, I can seek legal recourse. But this proposal aimed to extend defamation protections to religions themselves. The driving force behind this was the desire to prevent the denigration of Islam, though it included other religions as well. This is inconsistent with democratic norms of free speech.

Suddenly, the focus of human rights shifts from humans to religions. That’s a profound shift—what does it even mean? Who speaks for the religion? These are subtle but significant changes in international law that deserve close scrutiny.

Another example is the abuse of institutions like Interpol. Authoritarian regimes have been using Interpol’s red notices to target political opponents who haven’t committed any real crimes, forcing them to be arrested internationally under the guise of legal protocol. This is a clear abuse of international systems and it shows just how important it is to pay attention to who controls institutions like Interpol. The Chinese government, for instance, had made significant inroads into influencing Interpo and Western powers were somewhat asleep at the wheel. Fortunately, they have started to wake up to the risk of such institutions becoming politicized and used for authoritarian purposes.

This is why it requires constant vigilance, advocacy, and awareness from democratic states. We need to ensure that international legal institutions are not hijacked by authoritarian regimes for their own ends.

Democracy Will Endure Under Another Trump Administration

How could a possible Trump victory on November the 5th impact American democracy? There are those who are very concerned and there are those who argue that American democracy will survive another Trump administration. Where do you stand at this debate?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: I have two views on this. First, we in the United States tend to not look much at the rest of the world—we’re quite inward-looking and sometimes a bit arrogant in that sense. But if we did pay attention to global experiences, we’d have reasons to be very concerned.

If you look at other countries where democracy has been eroded, many leaders had a first term that wasn’t so bad. Some people say, “We survived Trump once; it’s no problem, the institutions held.” But look at examples like Viktor Orbán in Hungary. His first term was relatively moderate—he governed as a reasonable nationalist. Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland didn’t show clear signs of trying to dismantle the country’s institutions initially. Even Narendra Modi’s BJP had a more normal first term in government under Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

The pattern is that during their second time in power, these leaders learn how to use the machinery of government more effectively to consolidate power and undermine institutions. So from that perspective, I think we should be very worried about a second Trump administration.

But here we have to think about who this character is and what his motivations are. The Supreme Court has been very helpful to Trump. They have given him a very expansive notion of immunity and they allowed him to remain on the ballot despite some efforts by certain states to remove him. They’re not going to be much of a constraint on him.

Now, what exactly is he threatening to do? I think it’s clear he’s going to use the justice system to go after his political opponents. He’s said he will, so we might as well believe him. The key question then becomes: is the justice system capable of withstanding that kind of politicization? In the end, I think it is, but I certainly wouldn’t want to be one of his political opponents.

The way it works here is that Trump can direct national prosecutors. While they have norms of independence, those are just norms. He can tell them, “I want you to prosecute Biden, or I’ll fire you,” and if they refuse, they get fired and someone else is appointed who is willing to do it. I think that’s likely to happen. The question is, will it work? It will definitely cost those prosecuted a lot of money and cause harassment and it will degrade public confidence in the legal system. It’s a terrible situation.

But at the end of the day, in this country, you need judges and a jury to secure a conviction. I don’t see fake charges getting very far. Yes, Trump has appointed a lot of judges, but so has Biden. Biden has been very quick in appointing judges and right now, about half of the appeals court judges are appointed by Democrats and half by Republicans. The lower courts lean more towards Democratic appointees. So, judges are not partisan to the point where they will just do whatever Trump says.

I also don’t expect him to try to stay in power after another four years. He’s old, and he might want his children to run for office. If he tries to stay on, that would ruin their chances, so I don’t see that being part of his motivation.

So, what are my biggest fears? My biggest concerns are policy-related, particularly around immigration. It’s going to be very, very ugly. They have promised to establish large detention camps for immigrants and round people up. That will be terrible to witness. While it’s a human rights issue, it’s not necessarily anti-democratic since it’s a popular policy with a segment of the electorate.

I also worry about the administrative state. They may discourage career bureaucrats, especially those working in agencies like the EPA, to the point where they quit, reducing state capacity. That would be very bad for democracy.

But I don’t see democracy itself ending. So, in some sense, I have a mixed answer. I’m certainly not the biggest Trump fan and I do worry about American democratic institutions. I think Trump is bad for them, but I don’t believe he will end them.

That being said, it still requires vigilance. One last point to mention is that we are a federal country, which means most law enforcement is local and state-run. The states are very divided. For example, California has a bigger economy than France and there’s very little Trump could do to change what happens there in any significant way.

So yes, democracy will survive.

State-Level Prosecutions of a President Can Set a Dangerous Precedent

Former US President Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

In your recent article ‘Trump is gearing up for lawfare,’ you argue that Trump, if elected, will instrumentalize and politicize the prosecution. In a system of solid check-and-balance, how can Trump possible achieve his goal?

Professor Tom Ginsburg: That’s a great question. I touched on this a bit earlier, but let me go into more detail.

During President Richard Nixon’s time in office, specifically around the Watergate scandal where he was caught spying on his opponents, he sought to control the prosecutors. Nixon fired people until he found someone willing to follow his orders. Eventually, after Nixon resigned, a new Attorney General came in and aimed to restore dignity to the office, putting in place very detailed internal rules before prosecutions could happen at the federal level. These rules became internal norms at the Justice Department, helping to regulate the prosecution process.

Now, a president like Trump has the authority to hire and fire an Attorney General at will. I believe he will appoint someone willing to overrule some of these norms to carry out certain key prosecutions, for example, going after Biden. However, the law itself still constrains what can be done and there are limits. That said, even though a president has the power to appoint a compliant Attorney General, there are checks in place that would make this difficult to pull off effectively on a large scale.

One of my bigger fears, though, is something we’ve already seen on the Democratic side. In New York State, for example, the Attorney General ran for office on a platform that included prosecuting Trump and she did manage to get a judgment against him. Then, there was Alvin Bragg, the New York City District Attorney, who prosecuted Trump on fraud charges and won. Trump is now a convicted criminal, which is unprecedented for someone running for office.

However, I’m not a big fan of that prosecution. If you ask the average American what Trump was prosecuted for, they likely wouldn’t be able to explain it and even many lawyers would find the legal theory behind the case to be a stretch. Technically, yes, it was a violation of the law, but my concern is that state-level prosecutions, especially involving a president or former president, can set a dangerous precedent. Even when presidents commit wrongdoing, I believe they should be subject to a different standard than the average citizen.

This is controversial to say, but I think presidents deserve a bit more leeway because there is another mechanism of accountability—political accountability. The law should not be a substitute for political accountability, and sometimes pursuing legal accountability can undermine it. If the public wants to elect someone who has committed a crime, like Donald Trump, they will. When prosecutions are poorly understood or seem politically motivated, they can damage public trust in the justice system.

I worry about these state-level prosecutions and if Trump’s attempts to prosecute Biden are unsuccessful, you may still see state-level prosecutions being weaponized. That’s not good. It further politicizes the justice system, and in many countries, once this starts, it’s hard to reverse. So, yes, I do worry about this.

Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider, Assistant Professor at the Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna.

Professor Ausserladscheider: Austria Is an Exceptional Case Where Neoliberalism Was a Project of Far-Right Politics

October 10, 2024

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Home Interviews

Underscoring that Austria represents a unique case where neoliberalism has been driven by far-right politics—a phenomenon not commonly seen in other European contexts—Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider reflects on the FPÖ’s historical trajectory. She explains how the party, initially founded by former National Socialists, positioned itself as a pro-business, liberal alternative to the dominant Socialist and Conservative parties. This liberal economic stance was integrated into government policies when the FPÖ gained power, particularly during its coalition government in the early 2000s, introducing neoliberal measures such as deregulation and market liberalization. “What we’ve seen in Austria,” Professor Ausserladscheider notes, “is an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an engaging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider, Assistant Professor at the Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna, delves into the complex dynamics of far-right populism and neoliberalism in Austria. She underscores that Austria represents a unique case where neoliberalism has been driven by far-right politics, a phenomenon not commonly seen in other European contexts.

Reflecting on the historical trajectory of the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ), Professor Ausserladscheider explains how the party, initially founded by former National Socialists, positioned itself as a pro-business, liberal alternative to the dominant Socialist and Conservative parties. This liberal economic stance was carried into government policies when the FPÖ entered power, especially during its coalition government in the early 2000s, introducing neoliberal policies such as deregulation and market liberalization. “What we’ve seen in Austria,” she notes, “is an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking.”

The professor also addresses the normalization of far-right parties across Europe, emphasizing the shift in the political spectrum, where far-right positions have become increasingly mainstream. She points to recent electoral successes of the FPÖ, mirroring trends seen in Italy, France, and the Netherlands, which indicate a broader European shift that raises concerns about the effectiveness of measures like the cordon sanitaire. “The FPÖ has long been a role model for other far-right populist movements, influencing the political landscape far beyond Austria,” Professor Ausserladscheider states.

Professor Ausserladscheider also highlights the strategic use of economic nationalism and socioeconomic insecurities by far-right parties, which integrates cultural and economic factors to mobilize support effectively. She warns of the dangers of these developments, noting that while far-right populism often challenges liberal democratic values, it simultaneously adopts neoliberal policies, creating what she terms “exclusionary neoliberalism.” This duality, as she explains, is both a tool for political mobilization and a mechanism for reshaping the economic landscape.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider with some edits.

Rise in FPÖ Votes Most Evident in ‘Left-Behind’ Areas

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: What role do economic inequality and social marginalization play in the appeal of populist and far-right movements in Austria, and how have these factors been exploited by political parties like the FPÖ?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think socioeconomic insecurities and inequalities play a huge role in any kind of party competition and electoral turnout. And, of course, this is also the case for the FPÖ in Austria. Rather than calling it economic inequality and social marginalization, I would frame it under the term socioeconomic insecurities because, very often, it’s a complex set of intertwining factors. Some of these factors might be related to a generally unstable economic situation, which leads to increased perceived insecurities among voters. This means they might be more easily targeted by the FPÖ’s mobilization efforts.

Geography is actually a very good indicator for this. In the recent Austrian elections, we observed a significant gap between people who voted in rural areas versus those who voted in urban places. As some new political science studies suggest, there are “left-behind” places that experience various issues, such as inequality, marginalization, or infrastructural poverty. It’s precisely in these areas that you see a rise in FPÖ votes.

What the FPÖ does is target these specific areas strategically. For example, you’ll see significantly more campaign posters in these areas than in some districts in Vienna because they see a greater chance of mobilizing these electorates. This strategy works well in their favor, and they often suggest that all of these insecurities and economic dissatisfactions are the fault of the centrist parties, political elites, and, very often, migrants. In the FPÖ’s case, this is their key mobilization strategy. The targeting and strategic mobilization are very effective for them, unfortunately.

Connections Between Populism and Business Elites

Signboard of “Bank Austria” in Vienna, January 29, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

What is the relationship between populism and business elites in the context of the global rise of populist parties and actors? How do you perceive the relationship between populism and business elites in Austria? Has the rise of populist parties influenced the strategies and behaviors of Austrian businesses?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: The link between populism and business is an important one, and I think we see this particularly well in the US, especially with the way Trump is supported by various business elites. The most recent example is Elon Musk’s very open support for the Trump campaign. We see this kind of support across the board, but I don’t think it’s a straightforward phenomenon. It’s not simply that all businesses are pro-populism. In fact, it’s much more complicated. Some businesses are actively opposed to the far-right and explicitly express that stance.

Here, we observe a clear rift, particularly among businesses interested in international and transnational trade. They are concerned that if far-right populist leaders like Donald Trump come into power and implement trade tariffs, it could create significant problems for their businesses.

In the specific case of Austria, we have seen in the past that there are links between business and the FPÖ. However, as I mentioned, it’s not as pronounced or tangible as in the American context, which is a representative example. But these links do exist. One of the best examples is the recent announcement that Barbara Kolm will be in Parliament for the FPÖ. Barbara Kolm is the leader of the Hayek Institute in Vienna and was previously the president of several important economic organizations in Austria. As such, she is an important figure within the business network. So yes, there are connections.

In your analysis, you mention that right-wing populism can lead to policy decisions that both challenge and benefit business interests. Could you elaborate on how this duality has manifested in Austrian politics, particularly in relation to the FPÖ?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think we can go back roughly 20 years, to the second time the FPÖ was in power, from 2000 until 2006. Within that coalition with the Conservatives, the FPÖ implemented many business-friendly regulations and also deregulated some sectors, which were beneficial for businesses. This instance shows a significant internationalization of some market sectors within Austria, partially due to Austria’s entry into the European Union in the late nineties, becoming a member of the common market. However, the FPÖ also pushed for business-friendly policies during this period.

At the same time, when the FPÖ entered the government, it was still a novelty to have far-right populists in power, which is, unfortunately, no longer the case today. This novelty led many European member states to impose barriers on trade cooperation with Austria because they found it unacceptable to engage in bilateral or multilateral agreements with a country led by a far-right populist government.

So, the impact can go both ways. However, times have changed, and we have seen a significant mainstreaming and normalization of far-right actors in power. Therefore, I no longer expect this duality to be as pronounced as it was at the beginning of the 2000s.

Neoliberalism as a Far-Right Project in Austria

How and to what extent does far-right populism impact the nation-specific implementation of neoliberal policymaking? What role do far-right populists play in economic policy change? On this topic what does Austrian experience (FPÖ) tell us?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think there are several facets to this, making it quite a complex phenomenon. In economic sociology and political economy, we discuss institutional change—how institutions change, and specifically, how institutions like the state change. The state is a key institution in any political economy. As soon as new governing parties implement different economic policies, you will ultimately see economic policy change. This is not specific to any particular party; it’s inherent to the structure of our liberal democracy.

However, what we have not quite understood until recently, or what has been overlooked, is the power of parties and political forces perceived to be at the margins of the political spectrum—those at the edges. This is no longer entirely true, as we are now witnessing a significant mainstreaming and shift in the political spectrum’s center, which I am happy to discuss further later on.

When the FPÖ came to power in Austria, we saw an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking in a European country. I describe this as neoliberalization. In the early 2000s, partly due to Austria’s entry into the European Union but also because of the FPÖ’s leadership in government, particularly in the Finance Ministry, we saw immense deregulation and the neoliberalization of markets driven by the FPÖ. Until that point, we only understood neoliberalization as a force coming from the center-right rather than the far-right. Austria presents an exceptional case where neoliberalism was a project of far-right politics.

Given your focus on the supply-side of political strategies, how do you see far-right parties in Austria using economic nationalist discourse to frame their policies and mobilize voter support differently than other European countries?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: The way I describe economic nationalism is as a combination of cultural and economic factors that are often tied to economic policies presented as being in the national interest or aligned with national identities. Since nationalism is nation-specific, I would expect that economic nationalism in Italy, for example, would look different from economic nationalism in Austria. It doesn’t necessarily have to be different; similar policies can be described as being in the national interest of any country.

However, because of the national specificity within economic nationalism, it differs in the sense that Austria’s economic nationalism will have its unique characteristics. This is related to what we call methodological nationalism. Of course, we also observe similarities across different cases, such as the resurgence of policy instruments like trade tariffs—long thought to be obsolete in our globalized economy—that are now being implemented again. So, while economic nationalism doesn’t have to differ drastically between nations, discursively, it is distinct as it appeals to the unique national characteristics of each country.

How do you analyze the link between the rise of far-right parties and economic nationalism beyond economic insecurity and cultural backlash?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: One key development, particularly after the great financial crisis of 2008, is that many political economies, especially in cases like Austria, have used economic nationalism as a means to, in a way, rescue neoliberalism. Shortly after the crisis, many countries implemented Keynesian-style demand-side economics, indicating a strong return to demand-side strategies to support economic recovery.

In far-right populist terms, these strategies have often been framed as, or have taken the form of, economic nationalism. Thus, economic nationalism can also be seen as a tool for neoliberal policymaking to maintain stability and persist, even in times of crisis.

Links Between Socioeconomic Insecurities and Cultural Backlash

Jörg Haider, ex-leader of the FPÖ, delivering a speech at Viktor Adler Markt in Vienna, Austria, on June 11, 2004. Photo: Shutterstock.

You argue that the existing literature often separates cultural and economic explanations for far-right support. What methodological approaches would you recommend to better capture the interconnectedness of these factors in studying far-right populism?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think one approach is to examine the supply side of political strategies. If you listen to far-right populists and read their programs, you can clearly see that their cultural backlash arguments—such as claims of losing national identity, displacing traditional norms and values, or losing the Austrian way of life—are often tied to economic visions. For example, anti-immigration slogans are frequently justified through economic concerns like resource scarcity or the potential loss of jobs for Austrians. These discursive and rhetorical constructs effectively integrate cultural and economic values as part of their mobilization discourse.

On the other hand, examining the demand side through public opinion studies, such as surveys and electoral polls, can also be insightful. Researchers in this area have shown links between socioeconomic insecurities and sentiments that may relate to cultural backlash. For instance, Noam Gidron and Peter Hall´s study on the politics of social status highlight the economic-cultural linkages in voters’ opinions. These connections become clearer when viewed in relation to one another. However, many supply-side studies still tend to separate these factors. I believe that demonstrating their interconnection can reveal these concurrent effects more effectively.

In your newly published book ‘Far right populism and the making of exclusionary neoliberal state,’ you basically argue that neoliberalism appeared first as a project of the far right. We study populism as the embodiment of illiberal values which at the first glance seems to be contradictory with your assessment. Can you explain how neoliberalism has been a product of far-right populism?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: Neoliberalism has indeed been a product of far-right populism, at least in the case of Austria, although this may not be true across the board. In Austria, you can see quite clearly that after the Second World War, the FPÖ was founded by former National Socialists, who mobilized as a liberal counterweight to the two other core parties at the time: the Conservatives, who were focused on conserving the status quo, and the Socialists, who represented the workers’ interests. The FPÖ sought to provide this liberal counterweight and promoted pro-business policies that the Conservatives were not advocating for. They also supported European integration, which was a novel position in the Austrian political spectrum at that time.

When neoliberalism began to rise in the 1980s, particularly in the US and the UK, it was actually the FPÖ in Austria that adopted these ideas and brought them into government in 1983. For a brief period in that year, they were the junior coalition partner to the Socialists, who had lost their majority after 12 years in power due to the economic impact of the oil crisis. This opened the door for the FPÖ to introduce neoliberal ideas into Austrian politics.

In contrast, in the UK, it was Margaret Thatcher, a Conservative, who championed neoliberalism, and in the US, it was Ronald Reagan, a Republican. So, while these classic conservative forces brought neoliberalism to power in other countries, in Austria, it was the FPÖ.

I think this is the story of Austria that they have adopted these ideas. Yes, it might seem contradictory in the sense that we describe far-right populists as illiberal when they actually promote neoliberal policies. However, when we refer to these forces as illiberal, we mean that they pose a threat to liberal democracy, which is, of course, true. There is evidence of them implementing policies that clearly contradict the foundations of liberal democracies.

What I think we’ve overlooked, though, is that this also includes an economic ideology, and that ideology can indeed be neoliberal. Some authors describe this as “authoritarian neoliberalism,” while I use the term “exclusionary neoliberalism.” You see this specific strain of exclusion when neoliberalism is promoted by far-right populists.

What is the significance of FPÖ’s victory in the parliamentary elections in terms of far-right parties both in Austria and Europe? Do you think ‘cordonne sanitaire’ still holds?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: I think it’s a very important development. For a long time, especially since the 1980s and 1990s, the FPÖ has been a role model for far-right parties across Europe. The leader of the Austrian Freedom Party at the time, Jörg Haider, who took leadership in 1986 and led the FPÖ to significant electoral success in the 1990s, was instrumental in this. We even talked about the “Haiderization” of Europe—a concept referring to this new brand of populism that was adopted by other populist parties beyond Austria.

In many ways, the Austrian Freedom Party has been, and continues to be, a model for far-right populism across Europe. Austria’s recent electoral success mirrors what we’ve seen in Italy, the Netherlands, France, and increasingly in regional elections in Germany. This indicates a broader shift occurring in Europe, which is particularly concerning, especially considering efforts to block these parties have not been very effective.

The Far-Right Becoming Normalized and Mainstream

European Union’s reaction to FPÖ’s victory in 1999 and 2024 are quite different. This time around EU has not reacted to the victory of FPÖ in alarmist terms. Do you think far-right parties have been mainstreamed in Europe in the last couple of years?

Professor Valentina Ausserladscheider: Yes, massively. We’ve seen several things happening simultaneously. To talk about the socioeconomic context, ever since the great financial crisis of 2008, there has been a lot of economic instability across various countries. That instability was further exacerbated by several events, particularly in 2014-2015 when there was a significant influx of migrants, which far-right parties used as a mobilizing tool. Then we had the pandemic, inflation, and now a slight recession. This context has created fertile ground for far-right populists to mobilize.

At the same time, there has been a shift in party competition, with more and more conservative politicians seeking to attract far-right voters. They tried to win votes on far-right issues, but the problem with that strategy is that people tend to choose the original. If voters want a nationalist, exclusionary party, they are likely to go for the FPÖ, AfD, Marine Le Pen, and others like them. This shift in party competition has effectively moved the entire political spectrum to the right, even leading centrist parties to try and mobilize on similar issues, such as immigration, though often unsuccessfully.

This rightward shift in the entire political spectrum has made the far-right appear less extreme. We have seen a huge normalization of far-right powers in government, starting with Austria as a role model, as I mentioned earlier, and then spreading to other countries. We saw Brexit, influenced heavily by Nigel Farage and UKIP; Trump’s presidency in the US; Giorgia Meloni governing in Italy; and three separate instances of the FPÖ governing in Austria.

As a result, the far-right now seems more normalized and mainstream, particularly as countries like Austria are still considered liberal democracies. If we can conceive of a far-right populist government operating within a liberal democracy, it contributes to the perception that these movements are more normal and mainstream.

Dr. Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany.

Professor Roesel: FPÖ Will Remain a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

October 7, 2024

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Home Interviews

Highlighting that the success of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with origins tracing back to the post-World War I period, Professor Felix Roesel argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence both before and after World War II. According to Professor Roesel, the continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany, provides an in-depth analysis of the political landscape in Austria, specifically focusing on the rise and entrenchment of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). Professors Roesel argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He discusses how the FPÖ has effectively capitalized on Austria’s distinct historical context, conservative traditions, and societal anxieties to secure its place in the Austrian parliament for decades.

Professor Roesel highlights that the FPÖ’s success is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with its origins tracing back to the post-World War I period. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence before and after World War II. The continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.

Moreover, Professor Roesel emphasizes the FPÖ’s anti-establishment and anti-immigration rhetoric as key factors in its continued success. During the 1980s, under the leadership of Jörg Haider, the FPÖ transformed from a minor political party into a significant force, gaining widespread support through its anti-establishment stance. This approach resonated with Austrians who felt disillusioned by the two dominant parties—the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP)—which had controlled Austrian politics since the post-1945 period. Haider’s populist strategy of appealing to those excluded by the political mainstream, combined with anti-immigration narratives, positioned the FPÖ as a viable alternative for disaffected voters.

Professor Roesel also sheds light on Austria’s unique political system, known as ‘Proporz,’ which historically ensured that both major parties were represented in various aspects of everyday life, creating the perception that there was little difference between them. This lack of differentiation provided the FPÖ an opportunity to position itself as an outsider and criticize the system, further appealing to voters dissatisfied with the status quo.

Looking ahead, Professor Roesel foresees that the FPÖ will remain a significant and permanent force in Austrian politics, as its deep-rooted historical connections, strategic adaptations, and appeal to nationalist sentiments continue to resonate with a substantial portion of the Austrian electorate.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Felix Roesel with some edits.

Many Post-War Parties in Austria Had Direct Links to the Nazi Party

You argue that right-wing populism in Austria has deep historical roots. What historical factors have contributed to the enduring appeal of far-right populism in Austria, and how do these differ from populist movements in other European countries? Could you also elaborate on these historical roots and how they have shaped the modern-day FPÖ?

Professor Felix Roesel: That’s a very good question. Austria is quite distinct compared to other European countries. While many countries have seen a rise in far-right parties, what sets Austria apart is its long-standing tradition of far-right politics. Even during Austria’s first democratic period, following World War I, there was a significant far-right camp. At that time, there was a Conservative camp mainly aligned with the Catholic Church and the Workers’ Party on the left, but also a very strong far-right camp that advocated for Austria’s annexation into Germany, envisioning a larger pan-German state.

This far-right tradition was already well-established before World War II, with the Nazi Party being part of this camp. After World War II, many of those who established the new party structure in Austria had direct links to the Nazi Party. For instance, the first leader of the FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) after the war was a former SS member. This continuity from the pre-war period is significant and distinguishes Austria from other countries, such as France’s Rassemblement National or Italy’s Lega, which are more modern parties without predecessors in the pre-war era.

If we compare voting results before and after World War II, we see strong connections and a continuity of far-right influence. In Austria, there has consistently been a far-right party in Parliament in every election since World War II, which is quite different from other countries where far-right parties have only surged recently.

How has the rise of populism in Austrian politics over the past few decades impacted the country’s political landscape, particularly with regard to the success of far-right parties like the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)?

Professor Felix Roesel: The FPÖ has successfully dominated the political agenda for several years, particularly with its focus on immigration, which has been its most significant topic since the 1980s. A unique aspect of Austria is that, in the 1970s and 1980s, the two major parties—the Conservative Party (ÖVP) and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ)—were incredibly dominant. They were influential in all aspects of society, even down to sports clubs, which were often aligned with either party. You had to take a stand, either supporting the center-right or the center-left, and those unwilling to identify with either were left behind. There was a growing perception that the country was ruled by these two parties, creating a sense of exclusion among those who didn’t align with them.

The FPÖ capitalized on this sentiment by effectively introducing an anti-establishment narrative. They positioned themselves as the alternative to the two main parties, and this anti-mainstream, populist rhetoric resonated with many people. The two main components of the FPÖ’s success are its strong stance on anti-immigration and its anti-establishment messaging—classic populist elements.

This approach proved effective, influencing even the moderate right-wing party, the ÖVP, under Sebastian Kurz, who shifted their policies further to the right, especially on immigration. The FPÖ has had a significant impact on the political debate in Austria, pushing the entire political spectrum to address these populist themes.

The ‘Proporz’ System May Have Contributed to the Rise of the Far-Right

Could you please explain what ‘Proporz’ stand for and how do you think it evolved in the past several decades?

Professor Felix Roesel: ‘Proporz’ is a specific Austrian system where both major parties were historically represented across all aspects of everyday life. This ranged from sports clubs to institutions like workers’ associations. Essentially, there was always a “red” (Social Democrat) and a “black” (Conservative) representation. Moreover, Austria had all-party governments at the state and local levels, though not at the federal level. In these cases, council elections determined the composition of the government, with all parties represented rather than forming classic coalitions. This ensured that both major parties had a share—if you will—of influence and positions in local and state governments.

This system created the impression that it didn’t matter who people voted for because, in the end, both major parties were guaranteed representation in the government. This lack of differentiation between the two parties may have contributed to the rise of the far-right, as parties like the FPÖ could criticize the ‘Proporz’ system and position themselves as the true alternative to the established order.

You argue that Austria’s main far-right party FPÖ is one of the most successful and prominent cases worldwide. Could you elaborate on the peculiar reasons why FPÖ has been so successful?

Professor Felix Roesel: There are several reasons but let me highlight a few. First, there are the historical roots. Austria had a strong far-right camp even before World War II, and it was easy for the FPÖ to connect with this legacy after the war. Secondly, Austria is a very traditional and conservative country, making it easier for a far-right party to resonate by promoting traditional values such as family.

Additionally, Austria has a long history of immigration, including workers from Germany and other countries, long before Germany itself experienced such immigration waves. This made immigration a significant issue in Austrian politics early on, and the FPÖ has consistently leveraged this topic to gain support.

Lastly, Jörg Haider played a pivotal role in the FPÖ’s success. He was instrumental in popularizing populist ideas in the 1980s by combining an anti-establishment stance with anti-minority rhetoric. While the specific minority groups targeted have changed over time, the anti-establishment narrative remained a constant. Haider was a political entrepreneur who identified and filled a gap left by other parties, which explains why this development happened in Austria earlier than in many other countries.

Jörg Haider’s Focus on Immigration Built a Broader Voter Base

You underline that the two main and dominant Austrian parties in the post-1945 period are the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Conservatives (ÖVP). Both parties accounted for up to 95% of all votes until the early 1980s, but their vote shares have declined significantly since then. What happened in 1980s that led to the rise of FPÖ?

Professor Felix Roesel: I would really emphasize the role of Jörg Haider. He understood how to effectively use populist slogans, transforming the FPÖ from a small party with around 4-6% of the vote into one that gained 20-25% from election to election. It was Haider who made the FPÖ a major political force.

In the late 1970s and 1980s, immigration began increasing, or at least reached levels where it became visible to the general public, making it an accessible topic for political mobilization. However, in the very beginning, Haider didn’t focus much on immigration. Instead, he concentrated on an anti-establishment message: if you didn’t want to align with one of the two big parties, the FPÖ was the alternative, positioning itself as outside the system. This message was very attractive at the time.

It’s also important to note that, before this period, there were hardly any other coalitions other than grand coalitions between the two dominant parties at the federal level. This created a perception among many people that there was no way to avoid the dominance of these two big parties in government. The FPÖ’s anti-establishment stance appealed to those who felt disillusioned with this arrangement.

Later, Haider incorporated anti-immigration rhetoric, which became a central theme. Interestingly, early on, there were some connections or references to the Nazi era, but Haider quickly realized this did not gain widespread support. He found that focusing on immigration was much more effective in building a broader voter base.

In what ways have populist and far-right parties in Austria influenced the mainstream political parties like SPÖ and ÖVP? Have these influences led to shifts in policy or political discourse?

Professor Felix Roesel: Yes, certainly. In particular, the immigration issue has seen a significant shift. The Conservative party, especially under the leadership of former party leader Sebastian Kurz, heavily changed its stance in response to the success of the FPÖ. Kurz adopted policies similar to those promoted by the FPÖ, making it clear that the far-right party had a substantial impact in this area.

As for the government, the FPÖ has been part of the coalition several times. However, when it comes to actual policy impact during their time in government, we do not see major policy shifts. While their involvement led to political consequences, such as scandals—many of which are still unresolved—their influence on concrete policy changes was limited, primarily because they served as a junior partner in these coalitions. The real question now is what will happen in Austria moving forward.

FPÖ’s Nazi History Occasionally Resurfaces, Highlighting Its Roots

Nazis parade in Vienna, Austria, on May Day, 1938. Photo: Shutterstock.

How do you assess the link between the Nazi ideology and FPÖ? How much has FPÖ been influenced by Nazism?

Professor Felix Roesel: The FPÖ was founded in the mid-1950s, and its predecessor, the VdU, was also a right-wing movement with strong personal connections to the Nazi era. As I mentioned, the first FPÖ party leader was a former SS leader. So, there were clear ties in terms of personnel, as well as ideology.

Initially, if you were confirmed as a Nazi, you were ineligible to vote in the very first post-war election. However, by the second election, those restrictions were lifted, and many former Nazis turned to support the FPÖ. This shows the strong connections from the voter base as well.

In terms of ideology, Jörg Haider, for example, would sometimes use phrasing that was reminiscent of Nazi slogans—close enough to evoke the connection but vague enough to avoid direct accountability. The party has often played with these boundaries.

Even today, local FPÖ politicians occasionally become embroiled in scandals involving connections to Nazi symbolism, such as singing Wehrmacht songs. These are things you don’t see with other parties, which indicates a lingering influence.

However, it’s important to note that the FPÖ has now evolved into a more modern populist party, focusing primarily on anti-immigration and anti-Islam rhetoric rather than Nazi ideology. Despite this shift, the party’s history occasionally resurfaces, reminding us of its roots.

FPÖ Links Sieges of Vienna by Ottoman Turks to Contemporary Issues

A pastry shop in Vienna displays a picture of Ottoman soldiers and tents on the wall to commemorate the Ottoman siege of Vienna (German: Cafe Bäckerei, Zum Türkenloch) on April 5, 2013. Photo: Fatih Yavuz.

How have the two sieges of Vienna by Ottoman Turks resonated with the Austrian public and how have collective memories and historical narratives played a role in the ideology of FPÖ? How did FPÖ instrumentalize these historical tools against the Turkish and Muslim population in Austria?

Professor Felix Roesel: My co-author and I have a paper on this topic. We observed that some villages around Vienna, which were besieged by Ottoman forces in the 16th and 17th centuries, still carry traces of that history. You can find street names like “Türkenschanz” or “Türkenstraße,” which are reminders of those times when these villages suffered; houses were burned down, and there were significant losses. These events are embedded in the local memory.

For centuries, however, these memories remained dormant. As we demonstrated in our paper, it wasn’t until the FPÖ began campaigning against Muslims that this historical context became politically effective. We found that in those areas that had experienced the Turkish invasions 300 years ago, support for the far-right FPÖ increased significantly compared to areas that had not been affected by the sieges. This suggests that the FPÖ was able to reawaken and instrumentalize these collective memories for political gain.

This is a common strategy among populists—they often invoke the past, whether glorious or traumatic, to mobilize support. In Austria, the FPÖ has connected these historical events to contemporary issues. One former FPÖ leader even referred to the need to prevent a “third siege of Vienna” in response to the growing Turkish and Muslim population, playing on these historical fears and sentiments to gain political advantage.

How have the immigration crisis and other recent socio-economic challenges contributed to the rise of far-right populism in Austria, and what parallels can be drawn with similar movements in other parts of Europe?

Professor Felix Roesel: Let me refer to two studies on this topic. One study has shown a robust correlation between immigration and increased votes for the far-right in Austria. The data indicates that as immigration levels rise, support for far-right parties also increases.

A second study specifically examined the large influx of migrants in 2015. It found that areas along the Austrian-German border, which were most affected by this wave of migration, also saw a significant rise in far-right votes. Interestingly, the study noted that in areas where residents had direct, personal contact with refugees in 2015, there was actually a decrease in support for the FPÖ. This suggests that direct interaction with migrants can reduce anti-immigrant sentiment and far-right support.

In comparison, similar patterns have been observed in other countries, such as Germany, where studies show a clear link between increased immigration and a backlash among native populations, leading to a rise in votes for anti-immigration parties. However, findings differ across Europe, and the picture is not entirely uniform.

Overall, at least in Austria and Germany, there is consistent evidence that higher levels of immigration are associated with increased support for far-right populist parties.

Whether FPÖ Can Form a Coalition Remains the Pressing Question

What is the significance of FPÖ’s victory in the parliamentary elections, that were held last week, in terms of far-right parties both in Austria and Europe?

Professor Felix Roesel: The significance of the FPÖ’s victory really depends on the ultimate outcome of the election, particularly on the formation of the next Austrian government. While the far-right FPÖ won the election by a narrow margin—just one or two percentage points—making it the largest party with around 30% of the vote, it’s important to remember that 70% of voters did not choose the far right. Being the largest party does not guarantee leadership of the next government.

The FPÖ’s status as the number one party certainly can’t be ignored, but the real test lies in whether they can successfully form a coalition. There are significant challenges ahead: other parties, including the Conservatives, have already ruled out any coalition with the far right. Additionally, the Conservative Party, traditionally accustomed to having Chancellors for many years, may be reluctant to join as a junior partner in a coalition led by the FPÖ.

The possibility of a grand coalition between the two former main parties remains, but such arrangements have lost favor in Austria, as they are perceived as ineffective in solving problems. If the FPÖ manages to form a coalition, it would signal to other far-right parties across Europe that it is possible to reach government status even without an absolute majority.

Another challenge is the role of Austria’s President, who has considerable influence. The current President is from the Green Party, which is ideologically opposed to the far-right FPÖ. In fact, the Green Party has even refused to support a parliamentary president from the FPÖ. It remains to be seen whether a Green Party President would appoint a far-right Chancellor. The President’s stance will be crucial as coalition discussions unfold. It’s unclear which direction this will take—whether it’s truly possible to form a coalition with the far right or seek an alternative beyond it. This remains the pressing question at the moment.

Criticizing a Third of the Voters Isn’t a Productive Approach

Professor Felix Roesel: Yes, that’s certainly one point. Another is that we’ve become somewhat accustomed to these kinds of election results. We’ve learned that criticizing a third of the voters, as is the case in Austria, isn’t a productive approach. Moreover, it’s still possible to form a coalition without the FPÖ.

Additionally, there have been previous elections in Austria where the FPÖ was even more successful. For instance, in the last presidential election, there was a head-to-head race between the Green candidate and the far-right candidate, with the latter gaining almost 50% of the vote. We’ve also seen similar outcomes in other countries, such as France, where far-right candidates have garnered a significant share of votes beyond the traditional far-right base.

These factors might explain the EU’s more restrained response. We’ve also learned that outside intervention isn’t particularly effective, especially in a complex political landscape like Austria’s.

There are experts who believe that Herbert Kickl, the leader of FPÖ, would inevitably moderate, à la Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the far-right Brothers of Italy, who has taken a more pragmatic course than most expected since becoming Italy’s prime minister two years ago. Do you think we can witness a ‘Melonization of Kickle’ as FPÖ has now won the elections?

Professor Felix Roesel: That’s an interesting question. The difference is that Meloni had the advantage of a clear alliance and a majority in Parliament, which is not yet certain for Herbert Kickl. However, I wouldn’t underestimate him. Kickl has been the mastermind of the FPÖ for the past 20 years, designing many of its campaigns and having significant influence, even when he wasn’t the frontman.

Since stepping into the spotlight after the major scandals of 2019, when the coalition in Austria collapsed, he has shown his strategic acumen. He is very smart and will undoubtedly do everything in his power to form a coalition under his leadership.

As for whether his leadership would look different, it’s uncertain. He has already served as Minister of the Interior and, during that time, implemented tough, anti-immigration policies, though much of it was rhetoric. The real question is whether things would change if the FPÖ were to lead a coalition. But again, I wouldn’t underestimate him; he will certainly do everything possible to secure his place in the next coalition.

FPÖ Remains a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

And lastly, looking ahead, what trends do you see in the future of Austrian populism and far-right movements? Do you expect these movements to gain further traction, or are they likely to diminish in influence?

Professor Felix Roesel: Typically, when the FPÖ enters government, there is a significant drop in their support, as people often become disillusioned soon after they join coalitions. However, after a short period, they tend to recover and often come back stronger. While I can’t say if this is a consistent pattern, it’s worth noting that nearly 50% of the population has, at some point, voted for the far right in Austria, as seen in the recent presidential elections. So, there is certainly a solid base of support to build upon.

There’s also the incumbency advantage to consider. Once a party leads as the Chancellor, they may gain additional votes from those who rally around the flag. It makes strategic sense for the FPÖ to aim for the Chancellor position and lead a coalition to solidify their role as an established part of the Austrian parliamentary system.

Whether this will require the FPÖ to change its policies, I’m skeptical. Herbert Kickl himself has expressed that one of the mistakes made by Jörg Haider, after his significant successes, was not taking on a leadership role within the government. Kickl seems well aware of past errors and will likely try to avoid them. Thus, it’s very probable that we will see the FPÖ remain a permanent and strong force in Austrian politics, at least for the next few years.

Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor McCoy: A Trump Victory to Embolden Populist Movements and Authoritarian Regimes Globally

October 3, 2024

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Home Interviews

In an interview with ECPS, Professor Jennifer McCoy warns that a Donald Trump victory in the November 5th US presidential elections could embolden populist movements and authoritarian regimes worldwide. Professor McCoy asserts that Trump is unlikely to prioritize reinforcing democracy in countries where leaders are consolidating power or undermining democratic norms. “Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China,” she explained, highlighting the potential global consequences of another Trump term.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an extensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, predicts that a Trump victory in the November 5th elections will embolden populist movements and authoritarian regimes worldwide. “I think it will embolden populist movements globally because Trump will likely support them,” McCoy stated. She explained that Trump would not prioritize reinforcing democracy in countries where leaders are concentrating power or eroding democratic norms. “Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China,” McCoy argued, highlighting Trump’s differing stances on global powers.

Professor McCoy, an expert on democratic decline and polarization, also delved into the broader effects of pernicious polarization on democracies. She explained how polarization, especially the extreme form she terms as “pernicious,” divides societies into hostile camps that undermine democratic institutions. “Pernicious polarization involves a perception of threat and a zero-sum mentality, which leads people to cut off communication with those on the other side,” McCoy said. ‘‘This kind of division complicates governance, reduces the capacity for compromise, and fosters deep social and political rifts.’’

Drawing from her research, McCoy emphasized that this destructive form of polarization often leads to a weakening of democratic systems. Historically, the resolution of such polarization has required significant systemic upheavals, such as wars, colonial transitions or authoritarian regime changes. However, McCoy warned that relying on such extreme disruptions today would be detrimental. Instead, she advocates for addressing polarization by restoring the ability of democracies to govern effectively without resorting to such drastic measures.

When asked about the rise of far-right parties in Europe and advanced democracies, Professor McCoy pointed to economic dislocation and political convergence around market-based policies as significant factors. “Globalization was rising and many people felt left behind,” Professor McCoy noted, explaining that traditional parties’ failure to address these concerns opened the door for populist outsiders. These leaders, often using divisive rhetoric, scapegoat marginalized groups—especially immigrants—offering simplistic answers to complex socio-economic issues.

As Professor McCoy sees it, the challenge for democracies lies not just in addressing the root causes of polarization but in mitigating its effects before democratic institutions are irreparably damaged. In her analysis, both electoral reforms and changes in political strategy are essential to restore stability in deeply divided societies.

Dr. Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Jennifer McCoy with some edits.

Negative Emotions Are Generally More Powerful Than Positive Ones

Professor McCoy, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. In your study, you found that negative emotions, such as anger and resentment, can increase populist attitudes. Could you elaborate on the specific emotional triggers that are most effective in activating populist sentiments?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Negative emotions are generally more powerful than positive emotions, which makes them harder to counteract. The negative emotions that populists often tap into are related to feelings of unfairness and injustice. They highlight situations that seem unjust or unequal, which can generate resentment and anger—sometimes even anxiety or fear. But anger and resentment, in particular, drive people to seek someone to blame. Populists are very skilled at identifying scapegoats or “enemies,” which provides their supporters with a sense of control.

While populists can also evoke enthusiasm, especially for themselves as leaders, it’s the distrust of others that becomes particularly dangerous. Populists encourage trust in themselves, but simultaneously foster deep distrust in those outside their group.

In your research on democratic decline, what specific factors have you identified as the most critical in driving polarization in the United States and other democracies? What is the relationship between polarization and democratic decline? How are these two phenomena interrelated?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Well, we’ve found that increases in what we call extreme or “pernicious polarization”—which occurs when societies split into two mutually distrustful and antagonistic camps—are particularly significant. In this context, politics is seen as a zero-sum game, where one side’s gain is perceived as the other side’s loss. When people feel threatened by the prospect of the opposing side being in power, they may support politicians or actions that sacrifice democratic principles in order to gain or maintain control.

We’ve observed a strong correlation between rising political polarization at extreme levels and declining scores in liberal democracy. This correlation may reflect a causal relationship, where heightened perceptions of mutual existential threat from the other side lead people to become more willing to undermine democracy in order to protect their interests.

Populist Leaders Deliberately Use Polarization to Divide Society

What are the root causes of polarization in the contemporary world and how can we measure and compare its severity across different cases?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: The kind of polarization I’m referring to is difficult to measure. Traditionally, scholars have used terms like ideological polarization, which is measured through surveys that assess individuals’ positions on issues or their placement on a left-right or liberal-conservative scale. Another growing area in the literature is affective polarization, which measures people’s feelings—specifically how much they dislike other political parties, leaders or supporters of opposing parties.

However, what I find crucial is the perception of threat. It’s not just about dislike but about people feeling threatened by another political camp. This might not even be tied to a specific party—it could be centered around a leader. For example, in Venezuela, there was deep devotion to Hugo Chavez, a populist leader and strong opposition to him without necessarily supporting an alternative party. We see this in other countries, like Hungary with Viktor Orbán or Turkey with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. So, polarization can exist even without clear divisions between two political parties.

At the national, systemic level, polarization is a process of dividing society. A single measure to capture this is almost impossible to develop. However, we’ve used tools like the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) database, which relies on expert surveys to assess the extent to which societies are divided into hostile camps. This gets close to what we’re discussing. Additionally, we can look at perceptions of threat in surveys among voters and analyze the rhetoric used by political leaders.

Leaders play a critical role in polarization. Polarizing, populist leaders often identify enemies and use divisive “us vs. them” rhetoric. When we see leaders discrediting their opponents—calling them traitors, disloyal to the country or questioning their citizenship—that’s a clear sign of polarization and a deliberate strategy used to divide.

You often refer to “pernicious polarization” as a threat to democracy and its role in fostering autocratization. How do you define “pernicious polarization” and how does it differ from regular political polarization in a democratic society? What makes it particularly dangerous for democratic systems?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Our definition of political polarization refers to the process of simplifying politics to the point where society becomes divided into two mutually distrustful and antagonistic camps—an “us versus them” dynamic. This leads to a perception of politics as a zero-sum game, where one side’s gain is perceived as the other side’s loss and both sides feel an existential threat from the other.

In political science, the term polarization is often used to describe the differentiation of political parties. For example, when parties distinguish themselves by saying, “We are different from the others—vote for us because we’re better at this,” they are merely differentiating their platforms. As these differences grow, it can be considered polarization. In this sense, some level of polarization is beneficial because it provides voters with cues about where parties and leaders stand, which helps them make informed choices.

However, when this differentiation becomes more toxic, we enter the realm of pernicious polarization, which is harmful to democracy. Our definition goes beyond affective polarization—which is focused on feelings of like and dislike—because it’s not just about emotions. Pernicious polarization involves a perception of threat and a zero-sum mentality, which leads people to cut off communication with those on the other side. It results in a bifurcated society, where political identities become intertwined with social relationships and people retreat into their own silos, unable or unwilling to engage with opposing views.

Solutions That Avoid Systemic Interruptions Are Needed

Presidential Election 2024 in the United States. Photo: Andrew Angelov.

You argue that “we have compelling historical reasons to worry about the pernicious consequences of polarization for democracy.” Could you elaborate on these historical examples and their relevance?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: We’ve seen societies divide throughout history. If we look at episodes of pernicious polarization dating back to the 1900s—more than a century ago—many of these arise in certain contexts. For example, during the interwar period in Europe, we saw the extreme “us versus them” strategies employed by fascist leaders. We’ve also seen polarization increase during struggles for independence in the colonial world, both before and after post-colonialism, as countries fought for self-determination. In some cases, these conflicts escalated into civil war.

What we’ve observed is that, historically, episodes of pernicious polarization have often been resolved through major systemic disruptions. These include coming out of a war and reaching a peace agreement, transitioning from colonialism to post-colonial independence or moving from authoritarianism to democracy. These types of solutions—war, independence struggles or regime changes—are drastic and disruptive.

However, today we face a different challenge. We don’t want to rely on such extreme solutions to resolve polarization. The issue now is that existing democracies are becoming deeply divided, which threatens their ability to govern effectively. When polarization hampers a democracy’s capacity to compromise, negotiate and solve collective problems—things that democratic politics should enable—we need to find solutions that don’t involve the systemic interruptions we’ve seen in the past. We need to address polarization within the framework of maintaining and strengthening democracy.

Polarization Eliminates the Cross-Cutting Ties Essential to Democracies

Once the harmful form of polarization takes root, how can it be avoided or reversed? What strategies or institutional reforms do you believe are most effective in mitigating polarization and restoring democratic stability in deeply divided societies?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: This is a really difficult question to answer, and I’m working on research with Murat Somer from Turkey on this. We’re currently writing a book, trying to look at historical examples. What have countries that have been democracies done to overcome this? Unfortunately, we do not have many good examples of established democracies from the past that have reached these levels of polarization and successfully come out of it in peaceful ways. So, we don’t have many strong examples, but we do have some instances.

We’ve identified several key principles that need to be addressed. First, think of polarization as the division of society that simplifies politics into two opposing camps, an “us versus them” mentality. This eliminates the cross-cutting ties that are so important in democracies. In healthy democracies, people have different identities and can relate to others based on those diverse identities and interests, despite differing political views. With extreme polarization, however, people’s social identities and their patterns of interaction begin to align with their political identities. As a result, they lose those cross-cutting ties with people from other political camps.

We need to restore these cross-cutting ties and create spaces for people to come together. A lot of work has been done on this in terms of bridging divides, bringing people together to work on projects at the local level—one effective way to foster connection. In neighborhoods, for example, people working together on local issues allows them to know one another first through social relationships. They begin to see their shared humanity and common concerns, such as the safety and well-being of their children. Once that foundation is established, they can start discussing politics and political solutions.

A second approach involves moving away from zero-sum perceptions toward positive, win-win perceptions of politics and economic issues. This shift requires better information and changes in how the media reports on issues. In the United States, for example, media often focuses on the “horse race” during elections, presenting the competition between candidates without providing in-depth analysis of policy solutions or the real impact on people’s lives. One candidate may even threaten democracy by refusing to accept election results, but if the media only focuses on the competition, people may lose sight of the broader consequences. Highlighting positive news, accomplishments and win-win solutions can help people see that not everything is a zero-sum game.

The third point I want to mention is changing incentives—particularly for politicians, but also for voters—to engage in less polarizing strategies. Politicians know that appealing to anger, resentment, and unfairness with divisive, blame-oriented rhetoric can be a highly effective electoral strategy. However, they also need to understand that appealing to positive emotions, offering a vision of hope and fostering enthusiasm can also be a winning strategy. We’ve seen examples of this recently in Turkey during local elections, where politicians successfully used more positive appeals.

Changing incentives for politicians may also involve electoral reforms. In countries like the United States, the UK, Canada and India—former British colonies with winner-takes-all electoral systems—single-member districts create disproportionate representation for larger parties. This system reinforces the two-party model, making it difficult for third or fourth parties to break through and have a voice. By contrast, countries in Europe and Latin America that use proportional representation allow parties to gain representation based on their share of votes, which encourages coalition-building and a broader range of voices.

In winner-takes-all systems, politicians are incentivized to turn out their base rather than broadening their appeal to a larger group. They don’t need to form coalitions, so they rely on polarizing appeals to mobilize their supporters. Reforming electoral systems to encourage broader representation could help reduce polarization by incentivizing politicians to appeal to a wider range of people, rather than simply energizing their base with negative rhetoric.

Transformative Repolarization Can Help Strengthen Democracy

In an article, you mention that polarization can sometimes contribute to democratic deepening under certain conditions. Can you explain the mechanisms by which polarization might strengthen democracy, and what factors differentiate constructive polarization from destructive polarization?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: There are two ways I want to highlight. One is simply building political party identity, which requires differentiation. Here, I’m referring to polarization as the differentiation of political parties, not the extreme or pernicious form we’ve been discussing. For instance, Adrienne LeBas focuses on cases in Africa where differentiation helps to build and mobilize citizens in new parties that can challenge long-dominant parties. This type of polarization can be positive because it helps to mobilize people.

In our research, Murat Somer and I argue for what we call constructive polarization or transformative repolarization. This occurs when a country is already perniciously polarized around a divisive issue that a polarizing leader has emphasized, such as immigration or “the people versus the elites.” In these cases, challenging leaders and parties can attempt to shift the axis of polarization. There are many possible axes of polarization—religious versus secular, urban versus rural or nationalism versus cosmopolitanism (e.g., the EU versus national identity in Hungary).

One important axis we’ve observed is democracy versus authoritarianism. In a country experiencing democratic backsliding or sliding into autocracy, identifying a new dividing line—centered on the values of democracy, integrity and anti-corruption—can be a constructive form of polarization. This approach works as long as the focus remains on values and ideas, rather than demonizing individuals or voters who may support an authoritarian leader. By focusing on democratic principles, this can serve to correct democratic deficits and address social injustices.

For example, during the US civil rights movement, the focus was on correcting racial injustice, promoting equality and inclusion and erasing discrimination and subordination of particular races. This kind of transformative repolarization can help strengthen democracy by addressing fundamental injustices.

How do you explain the rise of far-right parties in Europe, particularly in some of the most developed democracies? Why do citizens in seemingly advanced political systems feel powerless and turn to support far-right populist parties?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: I think there was a convergence of political parties in the 1990s and early 2000s toward market-based economic solutions. Globalization was rising and many people felt left behind. At the same time, there was a sense that political parties weren’t responding to the needs of ordinary citizens. In Europe, in particular, Social Democratic parties started to lose their anchoring in society, especially through labor unions. In the United States, labor unions have been decimated, only now showing early signs of recovery.

Without strong social anchors and a clear programmatic vision, particularly on the left, people began to feel that the major parties were indistinguishable and unresponsive to their needs—especially those who felt excluded from the benefits of globalization. In addition to this, we’ve seen other global systemic changes, such as technological advances, which have led to automation and job losses. Information technology has also changed how people receive their news and political messages.

Moreover, we’ve seen the impacts of climate change, which has influenced the movement of people. Wars and civil conflicts have also contributed to significant migration flows, including immigrants and refugees. All these factors converged, especially following the global financial crisis of 2008–2010. Traditional political systems struggled to respond effectively, leaving a gap for outsider populist leaders and far-right parties to step in.

Far-right parties often exploit these issues by using divisive rhetoric, blaming particular groups for society’s problems and identifying enemies that need to be eliminated. In Europe, this rhetoric is usually centered around anti-immigrant sentiments, though it can also target other groups.

US Electoral System Creates a Disproportionate Representation

What role did polarization play in Donald Trump’s victory in 2016? Could you elaborate on how polarization contributed to Trump’s appeal among American voters?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: Many of the same factors were at play in the US as in other parts of the world. There was a strong convergence between the Democratic and Republican parties around globalization measures, but there wasn’t enough compensation for workers and industries that were negatively impacted by these changes in the 1990s and early 2000s.

However, polarization in the US has been rising for several decades, stemming from long-standing, unresolved debates in American history. One of the major divides is racial—the ongoing struggle over inclusive and equal citizenship, which dates back to the founding of the nation when slavery was legal. At that time, enslaved African peoples were not considered fully human, women were second-class citizens and Indigenous Native Americans were not included. These unresolved issues have persisted as the US has attempted to address injustices and become more inclusive over the past 200 years.

The country has gone through several tumultuous cycles, including the Civil War in the 1860s and, more recently, the Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s and the Women’s Movement in the 1970s. These movements have been disruptive but necessary for democratic progress. Each time democracy moves forward to include new or previously excluded groups—such as LGBTQ individuals—there is often backlash. In the US, this backlash has grown since the Civil Rights Movement, as some dominant white groups, particularly men, have felt that their identities and positions as community leaders and economic providers were being threatened.

Additionally, we’ve seen changes in media and communication technology. Cable news, talk radio and the proliferation of social media have created a vast array of information sources that people can turn to. Since the 1990s, the Republican Party has employed a polarizing, confrontational political strategy. All of these factors contributed to the rise of Donald Trump in 2016.

Trump was able to sense these underlying grievances—many still reeling from the 2008 financial crisis—and the anxieties triggered by demands for new rights and greater inclusion, which are essential for democracy. His instinctive use of bullying and blame tactics allowed him to galvanize support by identifying enemies and railing against political correctness. Many people, feeling tired of having to be cautious about their words and how they identified others, were drawn to his message.

Trump presented himself as an outsider and a successful businessman, someone who could “save” the economy and democracy. He also employed a strong anti-immigrant message. It’s important to note, however, that Trump did not win the majority of the popular vote—Hillary Clinton did. The US has a unique system with an Electoral College, an indirect presidential election process and a Senate that creates a disproportionate system of representation. Rural areas, which tend to lean more Republican due to polarization and political sorting, hold more weight in this system, which also contributed to Trump’s victory.

Trump’s Victory Will Empower Authoritarian Regimes

Caricatures of US President Donald Trump and North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un. Photo: Willrow Hood.

How do you think American democracy and its institutions will respond to another Trump administration if he wins the election on November 5? Some scholars and institutions argue that American democracy might not survive another Trump term—where do you stand on this debate?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: I am concerned and I fall on the more worried side of the debate. While I don’t think democracy will completely collapse, I do believe it could be significantly damaged and become extremely unstable.

One major concern is that, during his first term, Trump was unprepared. He didn’t expect to win and as a result, he didn’t have a team ready to support him or fully understand how to wield executive power. There were still institutional guardrails in place that could stop him at various points. For example, Democrats frequently resorted to lawsuits to challenge many of his autocratic tendencies and the courts were used extensively during his first term.

However, over those four years, Trump was able to make numerous judicial appointments, which have since politicized the courts to a significant degree. In the US, you can sometimes choose which court or district to bring a case to and certain courts are known for being more conservative than others. This, combined with the fact that Trump was able to appoint three Supreme Court justices by pushing the limits of constitutional legality, has weakened the judicial guardrails that were once stronger.

More importantly, both Trump and his supporters have had time to prepare. People looking to use his presidency for their own agendas have spent time developing legal strategies that could allow him to assert even more executive power than he already has. They’ve also focused on placing loyalists in key positions throughout the federal government and bureaucracy, which could further erode the civil service guardrails.

Additionally, the US is increasingly divided along state lines. There are more Republican-dominated states than Democratic ones and many states are fully controlled by one party. What used to be institutional safeguards are now weakening under these partisan divisions.

If Trump wins, the country will be even more divided. A significant portion of the population—around 30%—is deeply entrenched in their support for him, while another 30% is firmly aligned with the Democratic side. There is also a large group in the middle, around 40%, that remains unaffiliated but leans one way or the other. The concern is that those strong Trump supporters may react very negatively if he loses and surveys suggest that around 10% of the population supports the idea of political violence in response to an election loss. Trump himself is likely to claim the election was rigged if he loses.

On the other hand, if he wins, Democrats and those who oppose him will do everything they can to prevent further curtailment of rights. While I don’t foresee them resorting to violence, they will certainly push back against any attempts to undermine democratic institutions.

If Trump wins the elections on November the 5^th, how do you think this victory will impact the populist movements worldwide?

Professor Jennifer McCoy: I think it will embolden populist movements globally because Trump will likely support them. He won’t push to reinforce democracy in areas where leaders may be concentrating power or eroding democratic norms. Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China. While Trump has maintained a strong anti-China stance, he’s shown a more favorable approach to Putin and Russia. So, overall, I believe a Trump victory will embolden these movements and regimes.

A homeowner displaying their political affiliation and religious devotion on their front lawn in Forest, Virginia, USA, on August 21, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Pally: Evangelicals Face a ‘Double Loss’—Both Socio-Economic and as a Religious Community—Positioning Them to Find Trump Appealing

October 3, 2024

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Extremism & Radicalisation Home Interviews

In exploring the socio-political dynamics behind white Evangelicals’ support for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States, Professor Marcia Pally of New York University identifies what she calls a “double loss” experienced by this group. She explains that white Evangelicals face both economic and societal losses—challenges shared by many Americans—which are further intensified by their distinct struggles as a religious community. This “double loss,” Pally argues, is coupled with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”: a widespread American distrust of centralized authority, minorities, and new immigrants, paired with a doctrinal suspicion rooted of priestly and other authorities in Evangelical religious beliefs.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Marcia Pally of New York University delves into the socio-political dynamics driving the support of white Evangelicals for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States. Highlighting what she describes as a “double loss” experienced by this demographic, Professor Pally explains how both economic and societal losses—shared by many Americans—are compounded by the unique religious challenges facing white Evangelicals. This sense of loss, she argues, is accompanied by a “double suspicion” of government and of “outsiders” (minorities and new immigrants): a general American wariness of centralized authority, alongside a doctrinal distrust of priestly and other authorities and of “outsiders’ rooted in Evangelical religious teachings.

Professor Pally, an expert in theology and political culture, teaches at New York University and was awarded the Mercator Professorship in the Theology Faculty at Humboldt University, where she is an annual guest professor. She has authored several influential books, including White Evangelicals and Right-wing Populism: How Did We Get Here?; From This Broken Hill I Sing To You: God, Sex, and Politics in the Work of Leonard Cohen; and Commonwealth and Covenant: Economics, Politics, and Theologies of Relationality. Her work focuses on the intersection of religion, politics and society, making her a leading voice in understanding the socio-cultural underpinnings of right-wing populism in the US.

Throughout the interview, Professor Pally unpacks the role of white Evangelicals in American right-wing populism, tracing their political engagement to a deep-seated suspicion of government and of “outsiders” and to a perceived erosion of cultural influence. She elaborates on the phenomenon of “Christian nationalism,” a relatively recent term describing a political movement that uses particular readings of Christianity to justify nationalist goals. However, she notes, Christian nationalism is not truly a form of Christianity but rather a form of nationalism that taps into the anger that arises from significant socio-economic losses and cultural marginalization.

Professor Pally also addresses how Trump’s rhetoric and policies—particularly on immigration and national identity—resonate with white Evangelicals, drawing on long-standing cultural anxieties about “outsiders” and threats to community. Finally, she explores the global implications of Trump’s potential re-election, predicting that right-wing populist movements around the world would likely adapt his strategies and rhetoric to their own contexts.

In this wide-ranging conversation, Professor Pally provides a nuanced understanding of the political and cultural forces shaping the white Evangelical electorate and their continued support for Donald Trump’s populist rhetoric in the United States.

Professor Marcia Pally is an expert in theology and political culture, teaches at New York University and was awarded the Mercator Professorship in the Theology Faculty at Humboldt University, where she is an annual guest professor.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Marcia Pally with some edits.

Populism as a Response to Duress: Loss, Threat, Fear or Anxiety about Change

What key differences do you observe between left- and right-wing populisms in the US, in particular the role of Evangelicals in American right populism, and how do these movements draw differently from America’s religio-cultural history? Could you elaborate on the American religio-political background from which populist beliefs emerge, and explain how this historical and cultural trajectory influenced Trump’s election in 2016?

Professor Marcia Pally: That’s a series of very complex questions. Let me take them step by step. You asked about the differences between left-wing and right-wing populism. Let me begin by saying that, following prominent research, I’ve developed a minimal core definition of populism. Then we can talk about left, right, strong and weak variants. The core definition of populism is that it’s a response to duress: loss, threat, fear of loss or anxiety about changes in economic situations, ways of life, technology, demographics, gender roles, etc.

When these losses or fears accumulate, people naturally shift their focus outward. They move away from their usual preoccupations—family, friends, schools, teams—and focus instead on identifying a “them” who is perceived to be causing harm to “us.” This shift to an “us versus them” mentality is a normal human response. It’s not specific to Europe, America or any particular ideology—it’s a species-wide reaction to perceived threats.

The third prong in this response to duress is identifying “them.” Populist movements—especially right-wing ones—seek to identify those they see as causing the harm. This identification usually draws from culturally familiar “others,” which can differ from culture to culture or even subculture to subculture. For instance, in the US, we don’t hear much about the Roma people because they play a negligible role in American history. But in other parts of the world, the Roma people have been historically singled out as a “them” responsible for certain fears or harms.

The “them” in the “us versus them” dynamic draws from historical and cultural ideas about society–who is “in” and who is “out”– as well as beliefs about the proper role and size of government.

To sum up, we can define populism as driven by duress, leading to an “us versus them” binary, where the “them” is identified based on long-standing cultural and historical factors. The key difference between left-wing and right-wing populism lies in who the “thems” are. Right-wing populism traditionally identifies the “them” as outsiders—new immigrants, religious and racial minorities and sometimes a corrupt government.

Left-wing populism, on the other hand, doesn’t usually target the government, as the left often views democratic governments as representatives of the people and legitimate agents of governance. Instead, left-wing populism tends to focus on economic exploitation, rather than identity politics, and identifies “them” as those responsible for economic inequality rather than as racial, ethnic or religious minorities. So, one key difference is that the right is more suspicious of government, while the left sees it as a potential agent of positive change.

I should also note that populism is not a static concept; it exists on a continuum. On one end, you have softer forms of populism, which align more closely with the normal agonistic aspects of democratic processes. For example, Bernie Sanders or Martin Luther King Jr. could be considered proponents of “soft” populism, which stays within the realm of democratic debate.

As you move along the continuum, populism can grow stronger, characterized by a much sharper “us versus them” binary and a diminished tolerance for ambiguity. In softer populism, someone can be an ally on one issue and an opponent on another. For instance, a corporation might support climate change action but oppose raising the minimum wage, and soft populism would recognize this complexity as part of politics.

In stronger populism, however, the “us versus them” division becomes much more rigid, often framing the struggle as a battle between good and evil, with existential stakes. This can lead to more extreme and uncompromising solutions.

The second part of your question, about cultural history and its impact, was quite broad. Could you narrow it down so I can address it more specifically?

The Problems People Face Are Often Real and Justified

Can you elaborate on the role of Evangelicals in American right-wing populism?

Professor Marcia Pally: Sure. I’m going to break this down by distinguishing between white Evangelicals and Evangelicals of color, because their histories in the US are very different. Evangelicals of color have a rich and vibrant history that really deserves its own study. Since my research focuses on white Evangelicals, I’ll focus on them here.

White Evangelicals—and their ancestors—have been coming to the US since the 17th century. They’ve contributed to and participated in the development of the country and contributed to three of the most foundational aspects of American political culture.

First, there’s covenantal political theory, which views the governed as a covenanted community. In this theory, sovereignty rests with the people, not the king or a ruler. If the leader—what we might now call the President or Prime Minister—violates the covenant with the governed, it is seen as legitimate to remove them. This is a productive heritage, and the ancestors of today’s Evangelicals played a significant role in introducing this idea to the United States.

Second, they contributed to republicanism—with a small “r”—which comes from Aristotelian thought. It emphasizes that citizens run the polis or state. This idea also centers around community engagement and governance, with sovereignty rooted in the people themselves.

Third, Evangelicals played a role in shaping liberalism, which, while less focused on the community aspect, emphasizes individual opportunity. However, like the other two traditions, liberalism maintains a strong suspicion of any government or ruler that abuses power. This suspicion runs through all three aspects: A leader who violates the covenant with the people; a tyrant who attempts to take control of the republic; and a ruler who tries to constrain individual freedoms.

Evangelicals, like other immigrants, contributed to all three of these foundational elements of American political culture. Additionally, two other important factors shaped their current position on the right wing of American politics.

First, their doctrinal belief that all governments are flawed and imperfect—none embody the Kingdom of God—leads them to be wary of authority. Each person, they believe, must determine how to live a moral life and foster a moral society, reinforcing their suspicion of centralized authority.

The Evangelicals we’re discussing are Protestants, heirs of the Protestant Reformation, which emphasized the individual conscience in developing a moral life and society. They are skeptical of priestly authority and instead trust the individual’s conscience. This, again, amplifies their wariness of government. This may foster the fear that the government could violate their covenant, their republic, their liberal rights and their doctrinal obligation to uphold the moral life. This suspicion also extends to outsiders who might interfere with their way of life.

This skepticism can be positive: a healthy distrust of government can guard against authoritarianism, bolster democracy and promote individual opportunity. Their strong sense of community has been a key factor in local development and community engagement. This commitment to community and localism is part of a long tradition in the US, especially within Evangelical circles.

However, under duress, things change. The usual focus on community and democratic localism can shift outward, leading to suspicion and fear of outsiders. Under pressure, the commitment to community may flip into an “us vs. them” mentality, where outsiders are perceived as threats to the community. Similarly, a healthy suspicion of autocratic government can morph into a blanket distrust of all government. Under stress, people tend to look for a “them” to blame for their problems, and nuanced thinking can give way to simplistic explanations.

Under these conditions, a suspicion of autocracy turns into a general suspicion of government, except when government is used to constrain outsiders. This shift makes it difficult for society to function effectively—if government is distrusted and outsiders are seen as threats, collaboration and compromise are stifled. If the government itself is seen as inherently suspect and if outsiders—who often bring talent, innovation, and entrepreneurialism—are also viewed with suspicion, a final tragedy emerges. This shift in perception, from community cohesion to distrust of outsiders and from a healthy skepticism of tyrants to a blanket suspicion of all government, leads to a loss of nuance in understanding the original sources of duress.

In today’s interconnected global economy, with its complex networks of transportation, communication and technology, problems such as economic hardship or changes in ways of life often have multiple, intertwined causes. This complexity can be overwhelming, leaving individuals feeling powerless to address the issues. In this context, the “us vs. them” mentality offers a simple explanation by blaming an identifiable group for the strain.

However, this appealing simplification can prevent people from recognizing the more intricate, systemic causes behind the challenges they face. In my research, I have found that the problems people experience are often very real and justified—people are generally aware when they are being impacted. The tragedy is that, if they can’t properly identify the ~~true~~ causes of their struggles, they may misdirect their frustration and fail to address the root issues.

Nothing Trump Said Is New in the American Cultural or Political Context

We know that it is not only Trump but other Republicans as well addressed economic and way-of-life duress but what made Trump’s policies so effective and ‘persuasive’ in garnering the votes? In what ways does the evangelical sense of cultural and political marginalization influence their embrace of Trump’s rhetoric and policies on immigration and national identity?

Professor Marcia Pally: This is a complex question but let me address it step by step.

First, it’s crucial to recognize that nothing Donald Trump said was new in the American cultural or political context. His identification of the “deep swamp,” the insider elite in Washington and the so-called elite media or “fake news,” is not new. It’s an expression of the long-standing suspicion of government in the US. As I’ve mentioned, this suspicion has a healthy, democratic side but can also morph into a general distrust of government. Trump was able to tap into this long-standing element of American political culture.

Similarly, regarding outsiders—whether new immigrants, religious minorities like Muslims or occasionally even anti-Semitic themes—Trump was able to activate these entrenched cultural anxieties. When you ask why he was so effective, it’s because he tapped into sentiments that had existed for a long time. In the 2015–2016 campaign, he experimented with different slogans to see what resonated, and when he received applause for certain themes, he kept using them.

When a political message touches on a long-standing concern—one that feels familiar or “right” to people—it’s likely to gain traction. Trump successfully tapped into both anti-government and anti-outsider sentiments and he continued to use those themes because they worked. But it’s important to emphasize that these ideas were not new.

For example, “America First” was not Trump’s invention. Woodrow Wilson used the phrase in 1916 in his efforts to keep the US out of World War I. Senator William Borah from Idaho also used it to argue against US involvement in the League of Nations after the war.

Similarly, “Drain the Swamp” was not Trump’s creation either—it was a campaign promise used by Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.

Now, for the second part of your question regarding evangelicals, could you clarify what specifically you’d like me to follow up on?

In what ways does the evangelical sense of cultural and political marginalization influence their embrace of Trump’s rhetoric and policies on immigration and national identity?

Professor Marcia Pally: Thank you for that. Let’s return to our core definition: duress and the “us vs. them” shift through culturally familiar themes.

The pressures that white Evangelicals face are real and legitimate concerns. White Evangelicals experience the same duress many Americans do. There has been a loss of purchasing power since the 1980s, a decline in unionization and the disappearance of jobs for which Americans had been trained, alongside insufficient training for new jobs emerging from new technologies. Health care, housing, education, day care, senior care are all expensive for middle- and working class- Americans. Rapid technological advancements and changes in gender roles have also contributed to the sense that life today is harsher and more difficult than it was for their parents or grandparents.

There’s a growing sentiment that life has become less fair. People work hard, yet they lose their jobs or find themselves underemployed and communities are devastated when factories close or, more significantly, when technological changes increase productivity, reducing the need for workers. These are legitimate, very real hardships and neither political party did much to address them—until the Obama and Biden administrations, which took several productive steps, though not enough.

In addition to these economic hardships, Americans face “way of life” losses. By this, I mean the sense that one’s standingas respectable, middle-class individuals is being eroded or undermined. They feel powerless to change this, as policies are made by distant decision-makers who seem out of reach and unaccountable. These complaints are quite real.

On top of that, white Evangelicals have suffered a demographic loss. In 2004, they made up about 23–25% of the population; today, they are roughly 13%. They are the most aged of all religious groups in America, with an average age of around 56, and there is a growing fear of losing cultural influence in the US.

White Evangelicals once held more “soft power,” or cultural sway, in American life. As society has become more secular, urbanized and socially progressive, they’ve seen a decline in their influence. These demographic and cultural losses are felt as real and painful, compounding the economic and social changes that many in the middle and working classes are experiencing.

In summary, Evangelicals face a “double loss”: the economic and societal losses many Americans endure and the unique losses faced by their religious group. This double loss is paired with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”—both the general American wariness of centralized authority and “others” (minorities, new immigrants) and the religious, doctrinal suspicion of priestly and other authorities.

This combination of double loss and double suspicion, particularly under duress, creates a volatile situation. When people are under pressure, they look for a “them” to blame and they turn to familiar explanations for their very real difficulties—ones that are culturally familiar, understandable, and resonate with their lived experiences.

You underline that in late 2019, the influential, mainstream evangelical publication, Christianity Today, ran an editorial calling for Trump’s removal from office. Yet in the 2016 presidential election, 81 percent of white evangelicals voted for Trump. How do you explain this strong bond despite forceful Evangelical reservations?

Professor Marcia Pally: It’s important to remember that Americans, in general, are suspicious of authority and evangelicals are doubly so. While Christianity Today is an influential magazine, an editorial it publishes doesn’t dictate how evangelicals across the country will respond. Evangelicals are likely to make up their own minds, based on their individual assessments of the situation, their personal sense of duress, loss or threat, and their views on the root causes of these challenges.

I’m not at all surprised that a major, influential magazine would criticize Donald Trump and declare him unfit for office, while at the same time, a substantial portion of evangelicals make their own decisions, grounded in their own perspectives and evaluations.

Christian Nationalism Is Not a Form of Christianity, but a Form of Nationalism

Christian singer Sean Feucht hosts a “Worship Protest” on the National Mall in Washington, DC, during the COVID-19 pandemic on October 25, 2020. Photo: Nicole Glass.

Can you elaborate on the concept of “Christian nationalism” and how it has been employed by White Evangelicals to justify their support for Trump and right-wing populism?

Professor Marcia Pally: Christian nationalism is a relatively recent term and it’s an important one, developed by colleagues of mine who have done excellent work. However, I’m not convinced that white evangelicals are actively using Christian nationalism. It might be more accurate to say that Christian nationalism is using white evangelicals. Let me explain.

First of all, Christian nationalism is not a form of Christianity; it is a form of nationalism. The core of it—the noun—is nationalism.

Christian nationalism aims to implement specific political, economic and social policies. It is a political position, not a faith tradition that aligns, for instance, with the teachings in Matthew 25, which calls for caring for “the least of these.” Rather, Christian nationalism is a political ideology that its proponents claim is justified by their particular readings or interpretations of Christianity.

Adherents of Christian nationalism argue that their political stances are rooted in their understanding of Christian doctrine and the Bible. However, it’s crucial to note that many Christians in the US have vastly different interpretations of Christianity. These Christians are working tirelessly to promote other understandings of the faith. This includes 20–25% of white evangelicals, whose voices are often underrepresented in mainstream media. They are actively advocating for alternative interpretations of the Bible and the Christian doctrine.

It’s also important to point out that Christian nationalism is not a uniquely white evangelical invention or “brand.” The movement extends far beyond white evangelicals, encompassing individuals from the broader religious right, including Catholics and mainline Protestants. So, while some white evangelicals may identify with Christian nationalism because they align with its “us vs. them” themes, it is a much broader political movement that goes beyond just one group.

How do you think right-wing populism will be affected globally if Trump gets elected on November 5?

Professor Marcia Pally: Right-wing movements around the world communicate with one another. Of course, this is not unique—left-wing movements, centrist movements, governments and NGOs also communicate globally. This is to be expected.

Given that right-wing populist movements exchange ideas and strategies, closely observing each other’s successes and failures in order to learn from them, if Trump is re-elected in November, I expect right-wing groups and leaders—or those aspiring to leadership on the right—to examine the strategies, rhetoric and promises of Trump’s campaign. They will likely try to adapt and apply these approaches within their own political contexts.

Professor Dr. Reinhard Heinisch, a leading expert on Austrian politics from the University of Salzburg.

Professor Heinisch: If You Don’t Want the FPÖ in Government, Hope They Come in First in Austria Polls

September 28, 2024

by ECPS_admin Editor’s Choice Extremism & Radicalisation Home Interviews

As Austrians head to the polls on Sunday, Professor Reinhard Heinisch contends that “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope they come in first.” He explains this paradoxical statement by noting, “If the FPÖ comes in first, there’s a much greater probability that no other party would want to join a government led by someone as radical as Herbert Kickl. The Conservative Party (ÖVP) would have several options available—they could form a coalition with either the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party, or with the FPÖ. But why would the ÖVP want to be the junior partner in a coalition under Kickl when they could be the senior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ?”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As Austrians head to the parliamentary elections on Sunday, September 29, 2024, the political landscape is tense, with the far-right, anti-immigration Freedom Party (FPÖ) potentially poised to achieve an unprecedented success. Although the FPÖ is unlikely to secure an outright majority in the 183-seat Nationalrat (National Council), the implications of their potential rise to power have sparked widespread debate and concern.

In a timely interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Dr. Reinhard Heinisch, a leading expert on Austrian politics from the University of Salzburg, provides critical insights into the possible outcomes of this election. Professor Heinisch offers a paradoxical yet intriguing perspective: “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope that they come in first.” He elaborates on this by explaining that if the FPÖ wins, there is a greater chance that other parties, particularly the Conservative Party (ÖVP), will refuse to join a coalition led by such a radical figure as FPÖ lider Herbert Kickl. “The ÖVP could form a coalition with the Social Democrats (SPÖ) instead, avoiding the complications of being a junior partner under Kickl,” Professor Heinisch notes.

However, Professor Heinisch also highlights the risks if the ÖVP comes in first and the FPÖ follows closely behind. In this scenario, the likelihood of an ÖVP-FPÖ coalition increases, with potentially significant implications for Austria and the European Union (EU). Professor Heinisch warns that Kickl, unlike some other far-right leaders who moderate once in power, has a clear agenda to fundamentally alter Austria and its position within the EU. “I take him seriously when he speaks about his goals,” Professor Heinisch asserts, pointing to Kickl’s past actions and statements that suggest a deep commitment to his radical agenda.

The interview with Professor Heinisch delves into the historical factors that have shaped the FPÖ, the party’s impact on Austria’s political dynamics and the broader European implications of its rise. Heinisch’s analysis provides a comprehensive understanding of the potential consequences of the upcoming election, making it essential reading for anyone interested in the future of Austrian and European politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Reinhard Heinisch with some edits.

FPÖ Poised to Emerge as Leading Party in Sunday’s Elections

Professor Heinisch, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: Can you elaborate on the historical factors that have contributed to the rise of populist radical right movements in Austria? How far back can we trace these influences?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: That’s a very good question. The Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a populist radical right party, formed after World War II. However, it inherited a tradition that dates back to the Austrian Empire and the monarchy. Because Austria was not part of the German Empire during the reunification process in the 19th century, some people in Austria became German nationalists who wanted the German-speaking regions of Austria to join Germany. This sentiment laid the groundwork for what would later become the Freedom Party.

The FPÖ was founded after World War II and represented the aspirations of Austrians who identified themselves as Germans, including a significant number of former Nazis. Many of these former Nazi party members, once allowed to vote, did not align with the dominant conservative (Catholic) or socialist/social democratic parties. This led to the creation of a new party—the FPÖ—which was a German nationalist party that initially never exceeded more than 5% of the vote. It was a minor player in a political system dominated by two major parties: the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP), a Christian Democratic party and the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ), which together controlled 95% of the electorate.

Over two generations, as the impact of the war receded, the FPÖ underwent a period of liberalization, attracting new members. In the early 1980s, it even partnered with the Social Democrats in government. However, the party was internally divided and during this time, a charismatic young leader from one of Austria’s provinces, Jörg Haider, recognized that future success depended on transforming the FPÖ from a nationalist, radical right party into a populist party.

A populist party, as Haider understood, positions itself against the elites, claiming that they have robbed ordinary people of their sovereignty. Under Haider’s leadership, the FPÖ rapidly grew, moving from 5-6% of the vote to 27%, largely on the strength of its populist appeal. Populist parties, even those on the right, are often less dogmatic than other radical right parties. For example, the FPÖ was initially pro-European integration, then turned against it; it was initially anti-Catholic, but later defended Europe against Islam. The party was highly flexible, adapting its platform to address societal grievances and attract voters.

Austria’s integration into Europe and the accompanying issues of borders, identity, immigration, globalization and European integration became increasingly important to the FPÖ. This focus allowed the party to capitalize on voter discontent with the dominant parties, particularly during times of political change, uncertainty and insecurity. Events such as the collapse of the Iron Curtain and the war in Yugoslavia—during which Austria, as a border country, experienced significant immigration—further fueled the FPÖ’s rise.

By 2000, the FPÖ had gained 27% of the vote and joined a conservative-led government, which caused a stir in Brussels and led to sanctions against the Austrian government. This was the first time a radical right populist party had become a junior partner in government. However, the FPÖ, as an opposition party, was ill-equipped to govern and its voters quickly became disillusioned. The party split, imploded and the government ended prematurely. After another round of elections, the coalition continued briefly before imploding again. The party split into a more moderate faction and a fundamentalist faction led by Haider. However, after Haider’s death in a car accident, his faction essentially disappeared.

The FPÖ reemerged and moderated itself when seeking office, but radicalized when rebuilding in opposition. In 2017, the FPÖ, once again seeking office, formed a government with the conservatives under the leadership of Sebastian Kurz, a young leader from the People’s Party. However, this government also ended prematurely due to the infamous Ibiza video, in which the FPÖ leader was seen offering influence to someone posing as a Russian oligarch. This scandal led to the collapse of the government and the FPÖ returned to opposition, where it had to reinvent itself once more.

Thanks to issues like the pandemic and problems within the government, the FPÖ rebuilt itself impressively and is now in a position where it is likely—or at least highly probable—that it will emerge as a leading party in the upcoming elections on Sunday, September 29 or at least finish as a close second. That, in a nutshell, is the situation.

FPÖ Takes Inspiration from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary

Protesters gather outside as the far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) joins the coalition government in Vienna, Austria, on December 18, 2017. Photo: Shutterstock.

To what extent do socioeconomic issues like unemployment, immigration, economic inequality and globalization contribute to the appeal of the populist radical right in Austria? How do populist attitudes and attitudes based on populist radical right and left host ideologies affect citizens’ conceptions of democratic decision-making?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: The Freedom Party (FPÖ), if we imagine political contestation along two axes—the socioeconomic and the sociopolitical—traditionally aligns more to the center-left on socioeconomic issues. This alignment has enabled them to form coalitions with the Social Democrats on economic matters. However, on sociocultural issues, they are quite far to the right, which currently gives them a unique selling position.

Both factors, socioeconomic and sociocultural, are important, but Freedom Party voters are probably more concerned with cultural issues, particularly questions of identity and immigration. You cannot completely separate these concerns from socioeconomic factors because the Freedom Party engages in welfare chauvinism. They often mobilize against immigrants or asylum seekers using socioeconomic arguments, such as advocating for cuts to subsidies and benefits for non-citizens, while emphasizing support for native Austrians. This approach is sometimes echoed by the Conservatives, making it a broader discourse that encompasses both socioeconomic and sociocultural issues.

Structurally, the overarching concern among Freedom Party voters is a fear of change and a sense of decline in their future prospects. This anxiety is encapsulated in the party’s election slogan, “Fortress Austria,” which speaks directly to these fears. What makes Austria unique is its historical difficulty in defining national identity, particularly in relation to Germany. In the past, German-speaking Austrians often considered themselves as Germans living in Austria-Hungary, where “Austria” referred to the Habsburg Empire’s territory, not to an ethnicity. It wasn’t until after World War II that Austrians began to see themselves as distinct from Germans.

Given this complex identity, Austrians often define themselves through lifestyle, traditions and customs. In the context of globalization and immigration, these customs and traditions feel particularly under siege. For example, in Vienna, the Freedom Party has mobilized support by highlighting issues such as schools no longer serving pork schnitzel due to the dietary restrictions of Muslims and Jews. While this might seem trivial, these identity issues resonate strongly with those who view their way of life as an authentic expression of Austrian culture. This divides the population, with elites and educated people defining themselves differently from those who see lifestyle as central to their identity.

This debate is not particularly intellectual, but it significantly affects Austria. The Freedom Party, however, is not as radical as the Alterantive for Germany (AfD) in Germany. Unlike in the past, the Freedom Party today does not philosophize about the “Germanness” of Austria. Instead, it is more pragmatic, drawing inspiration from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary and aiming to create an Austrian version of that model, rather than engaging in debates about national identity.

The Freedom Party Poses a Particular Challenge to the Conservatives

You argue that radical right fringe parties often act as agenda setters, with main parties responding by accommodating and adopting their most salient issues. How do you think radical right fringe parties affect the main parties in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Well, I think it’s important to distinguish between Central Europe—those countries that were under communism—and those that were not. The main issue in Eastern European countries that were once communist is the contestation over cultural issues. There is very little debate over economic policy because the only consensus is on European Union (EU) integration and foreign investment. There’s not a significant difference in what center-left and center-right parties can offer their voters in economic terms, which is why center-left parties in Eastern Europe are often weak and underdeveloped. Where we do see substantial debate is around identity issues. Many unresolved identity issues exist and centrist conservative parties in these countries must constantly guard their right flank. Fringe parties often mobilize people on identity issues, positioning themselves to the right of mainstream parties. This is why we see so much identity-based populism in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.

In contrast, Austria has a more developed party system that spans economic and social fault lines. However, identity issues still play a significant role and the discourse around identity is particularly intense. On the right, we have the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in Austria and while there are smaller parties trying to establish themselves, they may not make it into Parliament this time. On the other end of the spectrum, we have the Greens and a small liberal party occupying the left.

The contestation on the identity axis often influences the socioeconomic debate. Traditional parties like the Social Democrats would prefer to focus on social issues, but they are constrained by internal divisions. They must appeal to both progressive urban voters and more traditional constituencies, which often splits the party. The Conservatives face a similar problem, having experienced a split that led to the formation of the small The New Austria and Liberal Forum (NEOS) party.

The radical right poses a particular challenge to the Conservatives, pulling them further to the right. The future of democracy in Europe may well depend on how Conservatives handle this challenge. In Austria, the typical response has been co-option—embracing the radical right and bringing them into the fold. This strategy has led to the Freedom Party’s implosion on three occasions, but it has also validated the Freedom Party’s agenda. When the Freedom Party makes a comeback, they can point to the Conservatives and say, “We’re not saying anything different from what they said five years ago.”

So the question is: What are the risks of validating these parties versus trying to neutralize them through co-option? The verdict is still out, at least in the Austrian context.

As a Hard Eurosceptic Party, the FPÖ Would Advocate for Leaving the EU

How did the radical-right populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) construct its sovereignty claims, and how did the mainstream right Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) adopt these claims? In doing so, how did the ÖVP significantly narrow the gap with the far-right FPÖ on the national and economic dimensions of sovereignty and largely renounce its previously pro-European and anti-sovereigntist positions?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: The Freedom Party (FPÖ) is a hard Eurosceptic party. We distinguish between hard and soft Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism refers to a stance where a party, if it had the opportunity, would advocate for leaving the European Union. However, the FPÖ knows this is a difficult and still a minority position, as two-thirds of Austrians want to remain in the EU, even if Austria is not a particularly enthusiastic member state.

To navigate this, the FPÖ hedges its bets, a strategy we described as “equivocal Euroscepticism” in an article in the Journal of Common Market Studies. They push their critique of the EU to the brink but stop short of calling for an outright exit. Instead, they vaguely advocate for major reforms and restoring sovereignty to nation-states. The FPÖ aligns itself with European groups like the “Patriots for Europe,” which includes parties like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and figures like Viktor Orbán. They are comfortable in this coalition and aim to weaken the EU as much as possible.

For the FPÖ, sovereignty means that decisions should be made within Austria. They advocate for weakening international judicial bodies like the European Court of Human Rights and the EU Courts, arguing that any international involvement should be strictly voluntary and based on national decision-making. This understanding of sovereignty is almost exclusivist and they push it as far as they can. For example, regarding the Sky Shield initiative—a missile defense system being developed by Austria, Switzerland, Germany and others—the FPÖ claims it’s a backdoor attempt to join NATO, illustrating their strict interpretation of sovereignty.

In contrast, the Conservatives (ÖVP) are fundamentally pro-European. While they might exhibit what we call “soft Euroscepticism,” this typically involves negotiating hard on behalf of national interests, as seen with the “frugal” alliance of countries. The Conservatives are far from the FPÖ’s stance, although they have shifted from their earlier, more enthusiastic pro-European position.

Historically, the ÖVP was the driving force behind Austria’s accession to the EU, even branding themselves as the “Europe party” in Austria. They were the main architects of Austria’s EU membership. However, over time, the ÖVP has moved away from this position. While they are still where most Austrian parties are in terms of EU support, they have significantly distanced themselves from their early 1990s stance. Today, the most pro-European party in Austria is NEOS, a small liberal party that consistently defends the EU. Meanwhile, the ÖVP often adopts a stance of blaming Brussels when things go wrong, while taking credit for EU successes.

Austria: From Islam-Friendly to Islamophobic

Activists from the Identitarian Movement Austria block the access road to the Hungary-Austria border at Nickelsdorf on October 17, 2015. Photo: Johanna Poetsch.

Austria was one of the first European states to officially recognize Islam in 1912. How has the rise of right-wing populism and party competition changed Austria’s policies toward Islam? What role did FPÖ play in this change of policy toward Islam?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Yes, that’s a very interesting question. Austria has historically had a progressive relationship with Islam, dating back to the monarchy. Islam has been a fully recognized and equal religion, sanctioned by the courts and rooted in the inclusion of Bosnian Muslims in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Traditionally, the Austrian military even had imams, rabbis and Catholic priests. These protections have been carried over and reinforced by the Islam Law of 1912, making it difficult for anyone to weaken the role of Islam in Austria.

Interestingly, Austrian Conservatives and other political parties historically defended the role of Islam and the autonomy of religious institutions. Austria has a tradition of autonomous interest associations, where the state allows these groups to self-govern within their areas of jurisdiction. This applies to labor markets as well as to religious institutions. For instance, religious communities in Austria have the autonomy to organize their own school curricula, appoint teachers, imams and other religious leaders, all within the framework of their contract with the government.

Initially, religion wasn’t a major issue for the FPÖ. Their focus was more on immigration rather than religion. For quite some time, the FPÖ even maintained strong, positive relationships with several Arab countries, such as the ties between Jörg Haider, the FPÖ leader and figures like Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi. Even after 9/11, Austrians, including the FPÖ, differentiated between Islam and terrorism, seeing them as two separate issues.

However, as the FPÖ began competing with a splinter party led by Haider, they sought new ways to differentiate themselves. This led to an increasing focus on Islam and Islamophobia began to take root. The existing Islam Law became a focal point of controversy, and identity issues were increasingly linked to it.

At some point, these issues were picked up by the Conservative Party (ÖVP), which was locked in competition with the radical right, particularly in areas with larger concentrations of immigrants. Gradually, these ideas went mainstream. Meanwhile, the Greens and Social Democrats distanced themselves from the issue of religion, leaving it to the Conservatives, who were more traditionally aligned with religious matters.

While in a coalition government with the Social Democrats, the Conservatives began rewriting the Islam Law, largely under pressure from the radical right. Around this time, several Islamist terrorist attacks occurred in different European countries, heightening the sense of insecurity and driving a securitization of the new law. The focus shifted toward “Austrianizing” Islam, which included requirements for official translations of the Quran, preaching in German and school curricula reflecting these changes. The Islamic community was pressured to be more proactive in cooperating with government authorities, as outlined in the new version of the Islam Law.

By the 2016 election campaign, when Sebastian Kurz emerged as the strongman of the ÖVP, the question of Islam and “political Islam” became a central campaign issue for both the Conservatives and the FPÖ. Ironically, the Conservatives amplified this issue so much that the FPÖ had to remind voters that they were the first to raise these concerns. Since then, the ÖVP has continued to use the issue of Islam, even establishing a committee and a website to investigate “political Islam,” though the exact nature of this remains unclear. It became a political tool for them, although recently they seem to have stepped back from this focus, possibly realizing it benefits the radical right more than themselves. However, there remains a faction within the Conservative Party that continues to see Islam as a key issue and uses it opportunistically when they believe it can garner votes.

President’s Potential Actions Remain a Significant Unknown That Could Influence the Outcome

Austrian President Alexander Van der Bellen during an interview with Russian television in Vienna on April 26, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

How do you assess the significance of the September 29 elections for the populist radical right in Austria? What are the key factors that could influence their performance this time? Most pundits in the media argue that FPÖ could make a comeback and can win elections on Sunday? What is your take on the elections in terms of the potential success of populist parties?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: I want to start with a paradoxical statement: If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope that they come in first. Let me explain this.

If the FPÖ comes in first, there’s a much greater probability that no other party would want to join a government led by someone as radical as Herbert Kickl. The Conservative Party (ÖVP) would have several options available, as they could form a coalition with either the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party or with the FPÖ, but why would the ÖVP want to be the junior partner in a coalition under Kickl when they could be the senior partner in a coalition with the SPÖ?

Kickl has very far-reaching ideas about transforming the state, heavily influenced by the Hungarian model, which are not aligned with the interests of the ÖVP. This would likely result in constant conflict, with the ÖVP being forced to explain the radical actions of the FPÖ, as they have had to do in the past. ÖVP leader Karl Nehammer has ruled out such a coalition so many times that it seems almost impossible for him to go back on that promise—unless he is forced out, which I don’t see happening.

If the ÖVP comes in first and the FPÖ is a close second, the likelihood of a coalition between the ÖVP and the FPÖ increases. In that scenario, Kickl might not insist on becoming Chancellor since his party didn’t win, and he could remain the head of the faction in Parliament while playing both an opposition and government role. The FPÖ is not monolithic; there are members who could be appointed to government positions. In fact, in two Austrian states, including Salzburg, the FPÖ is already in coalition with the Conservatives, so there are experienced individuals who could step up at the national level.

Regardless of what happens, the FPÖ would need to enter a coalition, which would likely dilute its agenda. However, if the FPÖ were to secure the Chancellorship and the Foreign Ministry, it would have significant implications for the European Union. Although Austria is not a major power, a government led by the FPÖ, alongside other like-minded governments such as those of Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Robert Fico in Slovakia, could complicate EU policymaking, particularly on issues like sanctions against Russia, which the FPÖ opposes, or the Green Deal. The more governments embrace FPÖ-like positions, the more difficult it becomes to achieve consensus on critical European policies.

At this stage, I see the radical right as spoilers rather than as architects or agenda setters, at least not on the European level. They can disrupt important initiatives and use certain issues as bargaining chips to extract concessions. The FPÖ could potentially leverage Austria’s role in the EU, although I don’t see that as a likely scenario.

One unknown factor that could play a significant role is the Austrian President. The President has powers comparable to those of the French President, although he typically does not exercise them. However, President Alexander Van der Bellen, who is in his second term and has a popular mandate, has already announced that he would not appoint Kickl as Chancellor and that he would insist on a pro-European government. These declarations could factor heavily into the calculations of the different parties. Since Van der Bellen is from the Green Party and not aligned with the parties likely to emerge on top in the elections, his potential actions remain a significant unknown that could greatly influence the outcome.

FPÖ’s Success Would Be Seen as a Positive Signal by Putin

Media outlet Politico argues that ‘most worryingly, an FPÖ win would establish a populist, Russia-friendly Central European bloc stretching from Ukraine’s border with Slovakia and Hungary to Austria’s frontier with Switzerland, making it easier for President Vladimir Putin to sow discontent at the heart of Europe.’ Do you think a win by FPÖ will create for Putin to make more inroads to EU?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: I would say yes, but with some qualifications. For this scenario to fully materialize, the FPÖ would need to gain 50% of the vote, which I don’t see happening. Additionally, I don’t see any coalition partner the FPÖ could align with that would fully support a pro-Russia stance. Even the Conservatives have defended Ukraine and criticized Russia, so the FPÖ wouldn’t be able to push this agenda on its own.

However, the election or success of a pro-Russian party, or a party friendly to Russia, would certainly be seen as a positive signal by Putin. It would be another piece in the puzzle for Russia, absolutely. If this trend continues, it could indeed lead to closer alignment with Putin.

That said, the upcoming US election is likely to be a much bigger issue on the global stage and will likely overshadow whatever happens in Austria. Given the lengthy negotiations that typically follow Austrian elections, it’s possible that the US election will be over before a new Austrian government is even formed. While the potential for increased Russian influence is there, the FPÖ would need to become much stronger to significantly impact EU-Russia relations. There would also be considerable pushback within Austria against such a shift.

FPÖ Leader Kickl: The Law Must Follow Politics

Some in Austria’s establishment believe that Herbert Kickl, the leader of FPÖ, would inevitably moderate should the FPÖ gain power, à la Giorgia Meloni, the leader of the far-right Brothers of Italy, who has taken a more pragmatic course than most expected since becoming Italy’s prime minister two years ago. Do you think we can witness a ‘Melonization of Kickle’ should FPÖ win the elections?

Professor Reinhard Heinisch: Generally, I’m not an alarmist, and I’ve always viewed the radical right as a more heterogeneous group. I should also disclose that one of the radical right leadership figures was a student of mine and I’ve known her for a long time. I’m not suggesting that we’re dealing with pure evil here. However, I do think we should take people at their word. I’m very much persuaded that when people make certain announcements, they mean what they say. When it comes to Kickl, we don’t know much about him, which is surprising for a political figure with his longevity and standing. He has no close allies within the party and we can’t look into his soul.

That said, he is one of the best communicators in Austrian politics. He’s extremely clever and was once known as the brain behind the previous party leader, the architect of many of the hard-right slogans. He skillfully peddles conspiracy theories and uses them to his advantage, but he’s also extremely disciplined. Kickl can tailor his message and say tough, often troubling things with a calm and reflective demeanor.

I believe he has an overarching agenda, one that involves fundamentally changing Austria and the European Union, if given the chance. I don’t think he’s simply interested in power for its own sake. Unlike other leaders who are content with a bit of glory and power, Kickl seems to have a mission. I take him seriously when he speaks about his goals.

If given the opportunity, I think he would go as far as he could to implement his agenda. If not, he might easily shift his stance and claim that his intentions were misunderstood. His brief tenure as Minister of the Interior was quite chilling; for instance, he once stated that “the law must follow politics,” rather than politics adhering to the Constitution. This gives us some insight into his mindset.

So, I believe it’s legitimate to be concerned about the extent of power Kickl might attain. He has surrounded himself with ideologically driven individuals who have become quite dogmatic. He has also used Nazi-era terminology, such as describing himself as a “Volkskanzler” (People’s Chancellor) and claims to represent a silent majority of Austrians. Despite the FPÖ garnering only around 27% of the vote, and survey after survey showing that the majority of Austrians are opposed to the Freedom Party being in government— with Kickl consistently ranking at the bottom of public trust indices—his discourse creates a distinctly different impression.

Introduction

A Cosmopolitan “Third Culture Kid” Forged in Exile

Military Career and Accusations of Human Rights Abuses

Second Exile and Business Empire

From Political Pariah to Perennial Presidential Candidate

The 2014 Presidential Election: The “Battle of the Populists”

The 2019 Rematch: Islamic Populism and a Promise to “Make Indonesia Great Again”

Rapprochement, Political Reinvention, and “Digital Populism” in the 2024 Presidential Campaign

Political Style and Controversies

Conclusion: What Can We Expect from a Prabowo Presidency?

References

Dr. Hélène Thibault: “Counter-extremism and Authoritarian Governance in Tajikistan”

Dr. Zakia Adeli: “The Taliban’s Totalitarian Regime: Governance, Extremism, and Control”

Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani: “Gender Dynamics and the Plight of Afghan Women under Taliban Rule”

Amir Hossein Mahdavi: “The Rise of Populism in Iran: Inequality, Class Conflict, and Nationalist Authoritarianism”

The United States Has Always Been Somewhat Exceptional

The Growing Threat of Institutional Reshaping in the US Mirrors Historical Fascism

Religion Is a Major Definer of Americanism

A Lack of Security Can Be Exploited in Various Ways

A Dangerous Mix of Misinformation and Inefficacy Could Propel Trump’s Return

The Real Threat Lies with the Powerful Figures Behind Trump

The Colonial Influence Remains Deep in the MENA Region

The State of Emergency Legitimizes an Autocratic Regime in Tunisia

Kais Saied Has Free Rein to Act as He Pleases

Islamic High Councils in the Maghreb Are Part of the Bureaucratization of Religion

The Absence of Ennahda Is a Great Loss for Tunisian Politics

Rising Polarization Is a Major Cause of Democratic Backsliding

European Union Failed to Develop a Demos

Authoritarian Constitutional Systems Are Incredibly Diverse

Constant Vigilance Needed to Prevent Authoritarian Hijacking of International Legal Institutions

Democracy Will Endure Under Another Trump Administration

State-Level Prosecutions of a President Can Set a Dangerous Precedent

Rise in FPÖ Votes Most Evident in ‘Left-Behind’ Areas

Connections Between Populism and Business Elites

Neoliberalism as a Far-Right Project in Austria

Links Between Socioeconomic Insecurities and Cultural Backlash

The Far-Right Becoming Normalized and Mainstream

Many Post-War Parties in Austria Had Direct Links to the Nazi Party

The ‘Proporz’ System May Have Contributed to the Rise of the Far-Right

Jörg Haider’s Focus on Immigration Built a Broader Voter Base

FPÖ’s Nazi History Occasionally Resurfaces, Highlighting Its Roots

FPÖ Links Sieges of Vienna by Ottoman Turks to Contemporary Issues

Whether FPÖ Can Form a Coalition Remains the Pressing Question

Criticizing a Third of the Voters Isn’t a Productive Approach

FPÖ Remains a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

Negative Emotions Are Generally More Powerful Than Positive Ones

Populist Leaders Deliberately Use Polarization to Divide Society

Solutions That Avoid Systemic Interruptions Are Needed

Polarization Eliminates the Cross-Cutting Ties Essential to Democracies

Transformative Repolarization Can Help Strengthen Democracy

US Electoral System Creates a Disproportionate Representation

Trump’s Victory Will Empower Authoritarian Regimes

Populism as a Response to Duress: Loss, Threat, Fear or Anxiety about Change

The Problems People Face Are Often Real and Justified

Nothing Trump Said Is New in the American Cultural or Political Context

Christian Nationalism Is Not a Form of Christianity, but a Form of Nationalism

FPÖ Poised to Emerge as Leading Party in Sunday’s Elections

FPÖ Takes Inspiration from Viktor Orbán’s Hungary

The Freedom Party Poses a Particular Challenge to the Conservatives

As a Hard Eurosceptic Party, the FPÖ Would Advocate for Leaving the EU

Austria: From Islam-Friendly to Islamophobic

President’s Potential Actions Remain a Significant Unknown That Could Influence the Outcome

FPÖ’s Success Would Be Seen as a Positive Signal by Putin

FPÖ Leader Kickl: The Law Must Follow Politics

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