Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have been gaining votes in recent decades, votes that were once almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. At the same time, voter turnout has declined. Regardless of the analytical reasons, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not convincing as many people as they once did. While it’s easy to blame external factors like misinformation or divisive rhetoric, that’s not enough in a democratic system. Our system is straightforward: parties and politicians need to win votes. If people aren’t convinced, they will shift their support to other parties. Blaming factors beyond their control will only further harm liberal democratic mainstream parties.
The issue of radical right populism (RRP) has exploded onto the political science scene in the last two to three decades. Naturally, this was to be expected after the success of these parties in elections across western democracies. As a result, a flurry of different opinions on the causes of the success of RRP parties have emerged, some mutually inclusive others less so.
Much of the focus has been on the voter, the so-called demand-side. Here the big divide is generally between those who believe that RRP parties succeed because of economic reasons, while others believe the main driver to be cultural issues (Engler & Weisstanner, 2020; Bornschier, 2018: 213). Some other researchers have focused specifically on the supply-side: the parties (Mols & Jetten, 2020; Russo & Brock, 2024). In this case the focus is generally on the role of the radical right parties themselves (Mols & Jetten, 2020), or in rarer cases, the way in which other parties have interacted with RRPs (Russo & Brock, 2024). By focusing too much on the phenomenon of RRP itself, students of this discipline have forgotten much of what surrounds it. Because, while RRPs do influence voter decisions, voters do not only vote for RRPs they also vote against those parties that they, and the generations before them, trusted for decades – mainstream parties. To avoid lengthy definitions, we will consider mainstream parties as those broadly situated in the middle of the political spectrum and encompassing the country’s political establishment. In the EU, these parties are generally affiliated with the S&D, EPP, Renew, or the Greens.
Since the onset of the liberal democratic model, mainstream parties have been central actors of the system – parties played an important role in simplifying the political process, representing a large amount of people and pulling people into the political process (Stokes, 1999: 243-244). Of course, the system of parties is imperfect, but the division of the political system into segments of society that were more or less adequately represented by said parties made for a stable system (Lipset, 2000: 50-51). Generally, left-wing parties represented the poorer working class while richer, middle- and upper-class voters opted for right-wing parties. Some systems also had a divide along race lines or religious beliefs (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; 2000: 50) Yet, in recent years, the decline of these parties has been apparent (Casal Bértoa & Rama, 2021: 37). At times, the green or liberal parties attracted voters away from the mainstream. Increasingly, though, as the latter have been integrated into the political establishment (Burchell, 2014), it has been the radical right that has taken over many of the votes previously held by mainstream parties. One of the main reasons for why this has happened, is due to political disaffection (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174, Hooghe et al., 2011).
The first strong indicator of such disaffection emerged in the decades around the end of the cold war: declining rates of voter turnout (Hay, 2007; Mair, 2011). Today, this issue is still at the heart of many political debates despite slowing down and even showing some signs of improvement (IDEA, 2024). In its stead, in the last 20 or so years we have seen votes for the radical right populists increase drastically across the board (Ivaldi, 2024).
Political Disaffection
European Parliament offices and European flags in Brussels, Belgium on July 20, 2020. Photo: Lena Wurm.
Let us first analyze what has driven political disaffection before turning to how voter turnout and the success of RRPs are linked.
There are multiple drivers for political disaffection. What is clear is that for people to feel implicated in a system and for that system to be of interest to them, they must feel like they have some power within it (Harder & Krosnick, 2008: 538). Thus, drivers of disaffection would cause people to doubt their importance within the political system and abandon it or look for ways to regain this power. Yet, increasingly, mainstream parties have taken steps to decrease the power of the people (Mair, 2011).
First, is the convergence of mainstream parties on policy issues. Some might be surprised by the claim that parties are “converging” when we are constantly being told that our democracies and societies are becoming increasingly polarized (Nguyen & Vu, 2019). But one must not automatically exclude the other. A convergence can exists on policy issues even when political rhetoric is as divided as ever. Additionally, the attention here is specifically on mainstream parties.
For decades, a body of literature has argued that the more political parties converge to the center, the better they will perform electorally (Spoon & Klüver, 2019: 1023). The theory holds merit and cannot entirely be dismissed. Yet, while maximizing their votes in order to win over the ‘median voter,’ mainstream parties have failed to represent those with more radical values. This creates a more volatile political arena that is more inclined to turn to the extremes (Bartolini & Mair, 1990: 1).
As some have remarked, Germany might be the best example for this in Western Europe. For decades now, the CDU and the SPD have moved towards the center (Berman & Kundani, 2021: 23). The former – a family and Christian-oriented party – increasingly moved left on social issues, while the latter – a left-wing workers’ party – increasingly moved to the right on certain economic issues. Both forming a ‘Grand Coalition’ and working together across most of the beginning of the 21st Century (Berman & Kundani, 2021).
But even France, an oftentimes divided society with historically strong labor movements, experienced a neoliberal transformation that transcended party politics. As some of the biggest neoliberal decisions were taken by socialist Presidents François Mitterand and François Hollande (Masquelier, 2021; Pinçon & Pinçon Charlot, 2014). Other countries have seen similar trends within their borders as well. Tony Blair’s Labor Party and Bill Clinton’s democrats both became important drivers of neo-liberalization in their respective countries, with little protest from opposition parties on that particular matter (Rieger, 2021: 113; Meerpool, 2019).
Today, as Mair (2011: 72) notes, the question between state-controlled and market-controlled economies has been answered: the winners are market-controlled economies. The left-right divide on this issue has thus eroded and the current positions present a far less clear distinction. Therefore, mainstream parties attempt to find distinctions somewhere else: they insist on personalities, character traits and rhetorical differences. But these significantly impoverish the possible policy changes once in power and thus deprives electors of a feeling of potential change (Hay, 2007: 56-58).
In parallel to party convergence, a similar but distinct phenomenon has also been changing Western European societies: the depoliticization of many issues and the rise of the regulatory state. The effect of this is that many decisions which once lay with elected politicians – and thus by extension with the people – have been removed from the political sphere and into the bureaucratic and/or the market-controlled sphere.
For example, a case of this is Central Bank independence. Central Banks originally emerged in very different circumstances depending on the countries and their history – some were private, others independent, and some were dependent on the national treasury (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020). But today, the idea that these institutions must be independent has been dominant for decades and remains almost entirely unchallenged. This idea was first formulated in 1962 by Milton Friedman (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020), an economist dubbed by Krugman (2007) as an “ideologue [and] the great popularizer of the free-market doctrine.” He was incidentally the man who went on to advise Raegan and Thatcher for their economic policies. While he remains one of the most influential and knowledgeable economists ever to live, he can hardly be described as neutral or apolitical. Yet, his long-term fight to make Central Banks independent has today been made to seem exactly that: neutral and apolitical. In turn, this has justified the depoliticization of central banks and its removal from public decision-making.
In the UK, the Bank of England was one of the last Central Banks to remain under the responsibility of the treasury, but in 1998, under Tony Blair’s Labor government, this changed, and the Bank was granted independence to set interest rates (Burnham, 2001). In a more global study encompassing 155 countries, Romelli (2024: 3), found that out of 370 reforms to central bank designs between 1923 and 2023, over 75 percent of them increased the bank’s independence. In the European Union (EU), the Maastricht treaty required EU countries to have an independent Central Bank. This was in addition, of course, to the European Central Bank (ECB) which is also independent and covers all 27 EU countries (Bruni, 1997).
The EU has not only pushed the depoliticization of central banks, but it has also brought about many depoliticizing policies within its member states. In the early 1990s, the European Commission began heavily banking on regulation and became a powerful actor in restraining an increasingly privatized market; thus began the regulatory state in Europe (Majone, 1994).
Regulation became a way for a Commission with a low budget to increase its decision-making powers without changing the rules of the game. At the beginning, this did not really pose too many problems. The Commission played a role which, in other democracies, was often taken on by independent agencies and this role was limited in scope (Majone, 1994). But with years passing, the Commission became more powerful, and the roles it took on, outgrew those that made it possible to overlook the institution’s undemocratic nature (Majone, 2014: 1217). Because after regulation came financial control. Of course, member states signed up to this. For example, they agreed to adhere to the so-called ‘Fiscal Stability Treaty’ in 2012 which significantly restrained individual state’s fiscal policies. States must for example avoid excessive public debt and must also submit their budget plans to the Council in order for them to be scrutinized (and possibly asked to be altered). This constrained governments’ actions and put more power into the hands of those with little to no accountability (Majone, 2014: 1220).
While it may seem that the blame is being shifted onto the EU and away from mainstream parties, this is not entirely accurate for two main reasons. First, as Mair (2011: 127) rightly argues, the EU did not grow organically, instead it was built by its architects. These architects were primarily the foreign ministers and leaders of European countries and thus members of the political establishment. Second, critique of the EU has been very constrained, especially in Western Europe. When governments disagree with EU policies, they blame Brussels without calling for real change. When they are happy with these policies, they take credit for them. The only real critics of the EU have been populist parties from both the left and the right (Grzymala-Busse, 2019: 43). Thus, anyone who does not entirely agree with the European project or with the direction it has taken, has to either accept it or vote for populists.
Some other factors can also be named which originate from the political establishment and foster disaffection. Some examples of this are globalization which has deeply affected western societies but has been regarded by the political establishment as the only way forward (even though, in recent years, this enthusiasm has been curtailed slightly); as well as the metamorphosis of mainstream parties, going from ones representing specific groups and interests to catch-all parties with a hugely eroded identity (Mair, 2011: 79-85).
Consequences of Political Disaffection
Photo: Shutterstock.
Having established the factors of political disaffection, we can move our focus to attempting to understand its consequences.
As mentioned earlier, lower voter turnout has been one of the main symptoms of political disaffection in the last few decades. The direct impact of the latter onto the former is of course hard to assess analytically because it contrasts a subjective state (disaffection) with a phenomenon that is directly and objectively quantifiable (turnout).
Whether the existence of a link between low turnout and political disaffection needs to be “proven” is debatable. One could argue that the theoretical framework of representative democracy is sufficient to establish this connection. After all, the election of politicians to represent us is fundamental to the functioning of our system. This does not mean that those who do not vote are necessarily apolitical, indeed, many other ways to express one’s opinions exist. Yet, within the formal system, voting is the only universal way of making one’s opinions heard. Choosing not to vote – whether out of apathy or out of protest – can thus be seen as a symptom of disaffection from the present political system.
Based on this though, a vote for radical right populists must not necessarily be a sign of disaffection. And this is true, it is not per se a vote of disaffection, many other reasons exist to vote for RRPs, from authoritarian tendencies to a simple agreement with the party’s policies (Tillman, 2015). But what is of interest to us is specifically the rise of RRPs and why people today are far more likely to vote for such parties than they were 40 years ago. Here, it seems extremely likely that the disaffected have played an important role.
Not all scholars agree on the idea that those who are more dissatisfied will vote for RRPs. This is in large parts because those academics seem to associate disaffection with the idea of ‘protest votes,’ the latter of which is seen as an extension of ‘non-ideological votes’ (Arzheimer, 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2000). Yet, a protest vote must not necessarily be non-ideological. Voters can feel dissatisfaction with a political system because the parties that once represented them do not align with them anymore and thus their ideology is not represented anymore. In this case, an ideological vote simultaneously becomes a protest vote.
In addition, in the likely case that parties do truly influence political opinion (Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021), voters who might once have felt only some affinities to RRPs are likely to have developed a stronger ideological overlap over time – Thus distorting studies based on ideological overlap.
It thus seems obvious that when defined right and seen from a broader angle, disaffection from the political system and distrust of its main actors is a central driver of this political movement. People are more likely to vote for the radical right when politicians lose their trust and in turn radical right voters trust mainstream politicians less (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174). We know from Germany for example that “turnout surges benefit the populist right ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) in contexts of widespread political distrust” (Schulte-Cloos & Leiniger, 2022: 431) meaning that those who did not go out to vote in past elections and were dissatisfied with the system voted in large parts for the AfD. Additional research such as Hooghe et al.’s work (2011: 265) in Belgium also showed how those who are dissatisfied or distrustful are more likely either not to vote or to vote for populist radical right parties.
More simply though, radical right parties have been winning over votes in recent decades, votes that once were almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. Additionally, turnout has dwindled. Whatever the analytical reason, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not winning over or convincing as many people as they once were. One can always blame external factors such as misinformation or divisive rhetoric for this but that is not sufficient in our democratic system. Our system is simple, it requires parties and politicians to win votes. People thus need to be won over and convinced, if they are not, they will defect to other parties. Blaming elements out of their control will only make matters worse for liberal democratic mainstream parties.
Conclusion
Having established a link between mainstream parties and disaffection with the political system in a first instance, and then between disaffection and radical right votes in a second; one can see a clear link between the mainstream’s failures and the success of RRPs. This link is important to make for a number of reasons. Firstly, simply because it has been overlooked by researchers. Secondly because it shifts a part of the responsibility from the voters onto the political establishment. This matters because the often-used argument that those who vote for RRPs are simply ill-informed or racist is analytically and politically rather unhelpful and oftentimes overlooks important components of the RRP vote. Lastly, establishing this link gives mainstream parties the tools to recenter their fight against the radical right. Many have attempted to fight this fight, but a misunderstanding of the causes seems to have led most of these efforts to failure. To truly fight RRPs, mainstream parties must know their voters, aim to truly represent them, and ensure that their policies – rather than their rhetoric – truly stand out and distance themselves from their political opponents and rivals.
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Professor Louis Kriesberg argues that right-wing populism, as represented by Donald Trump in the US, is ultimately doomed to failure, even if Trump were to be re-elected. He draws parallels to past episodes in American history, such as McCarthyism in the 1950s and the Ku Klux Klan’s influence in the 1920s, noting that while these movements caused significant harm, they eventually faded into obscurity as the country moved toward more inclusive and democratic norms. Although Professor Kriesberg expresses deep concern about the potential damage, he remains optimistic about the resilience of democratic institutions and the strength of resistance against authoritarian tendencies. He believes that the majority of Americans do not support Trump’s divisive rhetoric and that the country will ultimately reject right-wing populism in favor of more traditional, constructive political engagement.
Giving a compelling interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), veteran scholar Dr. Louis Kriesberg, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies at Syracuse University, delves into the complexities of right-wing populism in the United States (US), particularly in the context of Donald Trump’s political career. Central to the discussion with Professor Kriesberg is the idea that while Trump’s brand of right-wing populism has gained significant traction, it is ultimately doomed to failure. Professor Kriesberg draws parallels to past episodes in American history, such as McCarthyism and the Ku Klux Klan’s influence in the 1920s, to argue that while these movements caused significant harm, they eventually faded into obscurity as the country moved toward more inclusive and democratic norms.
However, the interview also touches on the possible dangers facing American democracy if Trump were to be reelected. Professor Kriesberg expresses deep concern about the potential damage but remains optimistic about the resilience of democratic institutions and the strength of the resistance against authoritarian tendencies. He believes that the majority of Americans do not support Trump’s divisive rhetoric and that the country will ultimately reject right-wing populism in favor of more traditional, constructive political engagement.
The conversation with Professor Kriesberg explores themes from his book Fighting Better, where he analyzes the constructive conflict approach in both international and domestic contexts. As a scholar with extensive experience in conflict resolution, Professor Kriesberg provides a nuanced perspective on how American democracy has been challenged, particularly during and after Trump’s presidency.
By reflecting on the motivations behind his book, Professor Kriesberg notes the increasing polarization and hostility in American politics. His work seeks to apply the principles of conflict resolution—traditionally used in international disputes—to the domestic conflicts tearing at the fabric of American society. He highlights how the progress of various status groups, such as African Americans, women, and LGBTQ people, has led to significant backlash, which right-wing populism has exploited to deepen divisions.
Professor Kriesberg also offers insights into the potential future of American democracy, stressing the importance of addressing the root causes of inequality and fostering greater cooperation across political divides. His analysis provides a hopeful yet realistic outlook on the challenges ahead, emphasizing that while the road may be difficult, constructive conflict resolution offers a path forward.
Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Louis Kriesberg with some edits.
Conflict Resolution Could Also Be Relevant to Domestic Conflicts
What reasons compelled you to write the book ‘Fighting Better’ and what is the main purpose of this book? Why did you choose the title of ‘Fighting Better’ for your book?
Professor Louis Kriesberg: Most of my research has focused on international conflicts, particularly the Cold War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, over time, I developed an interest in the transformations occurring within my own country since the end of World War II. I was struck by the increasing troubles in our society, particularly the growing political divisions, the nastiness in politics, and the threats of violence. This led me to believe that the development of conflict resolution, which I had contributed to for many years, could also be relevant to domestic conflicts, not just international ones.
In the preface, I mention that I had the audacity to undertake this analysis because I had lived through these changes and possessed the necessary skills. I felt I could contribute to understanding how our society’s troubles became so severe and how a constructive conflict approach could provide solutions.
I was driven to write this book because I wanted it to reach a broad audience—not just my academic colleagues or university courses, but the public at large. The title Fighting Better seemed fitting as it encapsulates the essence of what I aimed to achieve: a proper statement on how we can address conflicts more constructively.
Can you please explain to our readers how conflicts can be waged constructively by analyzing American conflicts that did or did not work out well for the contenders and the country as a whole?
Professor Louis Kriesberg: Certainly. Let me outline some basic principles of constructive conflict. I’ve discussed these ideas extensively in another book, Constructive Conflicts, co-authored with Bruce Dayton. The first edition was published in 1986, but the concepts remain fundamental.
First of all, many conflicts are managed through established institutions. All societies have rules for dealing with conflict—through legal systems, politics, and other institutionalized methods. Conflicts handled within these frameworks tend to be more constructive, provided the rules are fair and widely accepted.
Secondly, coercion isn’t the only way to influence conflict outcomes. There are three major inducements: persuasion, promises of benefits, and coercion. In nearly every conflict, one side tries to convince others of the rightness of their cause. Sometimes, offering benefits or incentives can also play a role in resolving conflicts. This means that not all conflicts rely solely on coercion, whether violent or nonviolent.
Thirdly, conflicts are often interwoven. We might frame them as isolated, but they are connected to broader and smaller issues. This interconnectedness offers opportunities to find better solutions, rather than seeing conflicts as fixed, zero-sum battles.
Fourthly, often, conflicts are framed as a battle between good and bad, but in constructive conflict resolution, it’s crucial to genuinely understand the other side—their needs, perspectives, and misunderstandings. This can lead to more effective conflict resolution.
Finally, conflicts evolve as contexts change, and different factions within each side may shift their positions. This fluidity can make finding better outcomes more possible or less likely, depending on how the situation is handled.
These are some of the basic ideas behind constructive conflict. We’ve explored these concepts further in other publications as well.
The Republican Party Has Pursued Policies That Exacerbated Inequality
In your analysis of class-related conflicts, how did you observe the relationship between economic policies and the rise of class inequality from 1970 to 1992? What were the key factors contributing to the “hyper class inequality” that you describe as occurring between 1993 and 2022? How do conflicts across different dimensions of inequality (class, status, and power) interact and influence each other according to your findings?
Professor Louis Kriesberg: There has been remarkable progress in achieving greater equality for certain status groups in America, particularly African Americans, since the end of World War II. After the war, there were raised expectations among African Americans that they deserved much greater equality than they had experienced under the oppressive conditions of slavery and segregation. Even President Harry Truman recognized this, believing in the integration of African Americans into the army. However, the South’s conditions were dire, with many whites attempting to maintain the status quo and keep African Americans “in their place.” This led to increased resistance to Jim Crow laws, and the civil rights movement began to take shape, with leadership focused on nonviolent actions as a means to achieve change.
The situation in Birmingham, Alabama, was particularly troubling, with issues like the denial of equal seating on buses. This became a well-defined target for change, with African Americans demanding the right to sit anywhere on the buses. Leaders like Martin Luther King Jr., who was thoughtful and strategic, worked closely with other community leaders, particularly within the church, to build a movement that was carefully planned and constructively waged.
Despite the constructive approach, the white leadership in many Southern cities responded with destructive tactics, including repression, violence, and arrests. These actions, however, only garnered more support for the African American cause. The federal government, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was sympathetic to the movement, eventually intervened. The movement’s success inspired other groups of African Americans to employ nonviolent techniques in their own struggles for equality.
I was influenced by the traditional sociological framework that emphasizes the major dimensions of society: class, status, and power. The ideas of class inequality, particularly as discussed by Marx, provided a convenient way to organize my analysis. Class inequality was largely addressed through legislation rather than direct action. Initially, under Democratic leadership, particularly Lyndon B. Johnson, there were efforts to improve welfare payments for low-income people, including African Americans. This contributed to some increase in equality in the years following World War II, despite the negative impact of the Vietnam War.
However, when Ronald Reagan became President and leader of the Republican Party, there was a clear shift. Reagan cut back on welfare payments, limited worker union activities, and reduced taxes for the wealthy and corporations. These actions marked the beginning of a significant increase in class inequality, primarily driven by legislation and the idea that giving more money to the rich would benefit everyone through a “trickle-down” or supply-side economy. This theory, however, was widely discredited by economists who pointed out that increased demand from workers with higher wages is what truly drives economic growth, not the other way around. Despite this, the Republican Party continued to pursue policies that exacerbated inequality whenever they were in power.
While Inequality May Benefit Some in the Short Term, It Is Ultimately Destructive
In the introduction of the book, you refer to main written documents that created US like the constitution and the American Declaration of Independence which defends freedom, justice and life for all Americans however African Americans until the end of 1960s did not enjoy their full civic rights. What made Americans so indifferent to the plight of African Americans for so long?
Professor Louis Kriesberg: I wouldn’t necessarily call it indifference. Some people, particularly the white leadership in the South during the Jim Crow era, believed they were benefiting from the system. They thought they could maintain cheaper labor by paying African Americans less and denying them basic rights. They saw this as advantageous for their own interests. However, in the long run, it was a mistake, even for those who thought they were benefiting. The South’s economy improved after the end of Jim Crow, proving that equality was beneficial for everyone. One of the key ideas of constructive conflict is to analyze the motivations of different groups and recognize when those motivations are shortsighted or harmful.
My emphasis on the founding documents, which pledge freedom and equality for all, was to highlight that these principles are more constructive and beneficial for society as a whole. It’s a normative judgment, but I believe that working towards equality and justice aligns with the core values of the United States. While inequality may benefit some in the short term, it is ultimately destructive to the nation’s founding ideals and to humanity as a whole.
In the book, you refer to events in the US since the presidency of Donald Trump and conclude that widespread fears have been common about the survival of American democracy and underline in the concluding chapter that: “In recent years democracy have deteriorated significantly.” Do you agree with those pundits who argue that American democracy is dying? Based on your study, what are the greatest threats to American democracy, and what constructive approaches could mitigate these dangers?
Professor Louis Kriesberg: I wouldn’t necessarily use the word “dying.” I don’t think American democracy is doomed, but it has certainly been damaged. One peculiar aspect of this situation is that the progress made by various status groups—African Americans, women, LGBTQ people—through their actions, demands, and some legislative changes has led to significant social advances. However, this progress has sparked backlash. Some people resisted these changes, feeling that they were undesirable or even disruptive, leading to efforts to roll back these gains and return to more oppressive inequalities.
The Republican Party, in particular, became increasingly uncooperative with Democrats. Even attempts by leaders like Bill Clinton to bridge the divide were met with rigidity from Republicans, who increasingly embraced obvious falsehoods, misogyny, and racism, often appealing to white Christian identity. This strategy garnered some support, especially as it played into the anxieties of those who felt left behind by economic changes.
As income inequality grew, many working-class people experienced relative deprivation, with stagnating wages and a declining sense of economic security. This, combined with status anxieties—particularly among some men who felt their social standing was threatened—created fertile ground for the Republican Party to exploit cultural grievances while distracting from the real issue: the growing class inequality.
In this context, the interplay between status gains and the hyper-inequality in income and wealth has been particularly dangerous. The decreasing intergenerational mobility has made it harder for future generations to benefit from economic gains, further exacerbating tensions. To address these dangers, it’s crucial to focus on policies that reduce inequality, enhance social mobility, and foster greater cooperation across political divides.
Trump’s Right-Wing Populist Appeal Will Not Endure in the Long Term
Donald Trump vs Kamala Harris for US President. Photo: Qubix Studio.
With Donald Trump as former president and now president hopeful, right-wing populism has turned out to be a permanent feature of American democracy. Do you think right-wing populism will be here to stay or is it a phenomenon that will be forgotten after Trump ends his political life?
Professor Louis Kriesberg: I don’t think it will be forgotten, but I believe the falsehoods and extremism in Trump’s rejection of American democratic principles will ultimately lead to its failure. I think we’ll see a restoration of more traditional American politics. Historically, we’ve seen similar episodes. McCarthyism was a dreadful chapter, but today, no one wants to be associated with it—it’s a term of shame. Similarly, in the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan had significant political influence in many areas, which was profoundly undemocratic. However, that period is now largely forgotten. I think right-wing populism, as represented by Trump, is also doomed to failure. Even if he were elected again, I don’t believe his appeal will endure in the long term.
In the last chapter of the book, you observe that Trump’s presidency has been and remain largely contrary to the constructive conflict approach. He has failed to achieve many of his stated goals and the results of what he has accomplished have worsened progress toward more class, status and political power equality. What will happen to American democracy if Trump is reelected on November 5?
Professor Louis Kriesberg: It would be terrible. However, I believe there will be significant resistance, and he won’t be able to impose his will entirely. During his first term, there was considerable pushback, and while he may have learned from that experience, I don’t think he will be more effective in overcoming the resistance. The strength of this resistance is well-grounded. Most people in this country are not staunch supporters of Trump—he has never had more than around 44% approval. As he tries to implement his agenda, I believe the resistance will only grow stronger.
After watching the debate of US presidential candidates on Tuesday night, who do you think will be the next US President?
Professor Louis Kriesberg: I’m not sure how much the debate will influence the outcome. There’s no question that Kamala Harris was very skillful in baiting Trump to be his typical self—going off on tangents, lying, distorting, blustering, and at times, appearing bewildered and incoherent. This might play a role in the electoral college outcome, but it’s not necessarily decisive.
I believe Harris did a brilliant job of proving that she would be an effective, powerful, and good President, while Trump showed none of those qualities. However, some people may need to witness even more failures before they reconsider their support. Overall, I think the American people, for the most part, are sensible, despite occasional evidence to the contrary.
Please cite as: Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). “How China’s Rise as a ‘Civilization State’ Spurs European States to Challenge US Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0041
Abstract
This article explores how China’s rise as a ‘civilization state’ encourages some European states to challenge US political dominance. While countries like Russia and Turkey have also employed civilizational populist rhetoric in domestic and foreign policy issues, this article focuses on Xi Jinping’s recent visits to France, Hungary, and Serbia and examines how European leaders like Emmanuel Macron, Viktor Orbán, and Aleksandar Vučić find inspiration in China’s civilizational model. Further research is needed on the growing civilizational competition between these states and the West, particularly in Africa, where China, Russia, and Turkey project all variants (soft, smart, sharp and hard) of power to assert influence and challenge Western dominance in international relations and global politics.
The Chinese President Xi Jinping’s trip to Europe sees him visit three “unlikely” – to quote the New York Times – countries: France, Hungary, and Serbia (Cohen & Buckley, 2024; Hawkins & O’Carroll, 2024).). While it is no surprise that Xi should visit France, Europe’s second-largest economy and one of the dominant powers within the European Union (EU), his decision to visit Hungary and Serbia, both comparatively smaller and economically less significant nations, raises important questions about China’s strategic interests in Europe. France, with its historical influence, advanced economy, and status as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, is a logical destination for a leader looking to engage with the political and economic powerhouses of Europe. However, Hungary and Serbia, despite their more modest economic profiles, have become increasingly important players in Europe, particularly in relation to China’s broader geopolitical and civilizational goals (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022, 2023a; Yilmaz, 2023).
We argue that the rationale for Xi’s visits to Hungary and Serbia lies not solely in economic opportunities, though both nations have benefitted from Chinese investment in recent years, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Rather, the visits are reflective of a deeper shift in the political landscape of these nations, which are characterized by an increasingly anti-American posture and skepticism toward the traditional liberal democratic order (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a). Both Hungary, under Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, and Serbia, under President Aleksandar Vučić, have expressed dissatisfaction with the dominance of the US and the EU in international and regional politics. This is where China’s appeal as a rising power offering a multi-polar global order becomes particularly significant. The governments of these countries see China as a potential ally in their efforts to challenge US hegemony and reshape the international system (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a).
The political leadership of France, Hungary, and Serbia increasingly align themselves with a worldview that emphasizes the decline of US dominance, and the rise of a multipolar order dominated by ‘civilization states’ (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; Yilmaz, 2023). This notion, which China has skillfully promoted, posits that the world is not merely divided by economic or political blocs, but by civilizations that possess distinct values, histories, and trajectories. China, under Xi Jinping, has positioned itself as the archetypal civilization state, drawing on thousands of years of history to assert its leadership on the global stage and present itself as an alternative to the Western liberal order. In this model, China seeks not only economic and political influence but also cultural and ideological legitimacy as a civilizational power.
For France, under President Emmanuel Macron, China’s rise presents both a challenge and an opportunity. Macron, while wary of China’s authoritarian tendencies, sees in China’s civilizational narrative a model for Europe’s own reawakening. The Chinese emphasis on unity, heritage, and the assertion of national and cultural identity resonates with Macron’s broader vision for Europe. Macron, like Xi, sees the dangers of the “false universalism” of the Anglo-American liberal order and is increasingly advocating for a European identity that stands apart from American influence. In this sense, China’s rise is not merely an economic partner for France but also a philosophical model for reclaiming European civilizational values (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b).
In Hungary, Viktor Orbán has long positioned himself as a critic of Western liberalism and American cultural hegemony. Orbán’s vision of Hungary as a bastion of traditional Christian civilization aligns well with China’s civilizational discourse. Orbán’s government has openly embraced the notion of a multipolar world where civilization states—rather than liberal democracies—are the dominant actors. The rise of China, along with Russia and Turkey, serves Orbán’s populist narrative that Hungary must resist the pressures of conforming to Western norms and, instead, forge its own path, drawing strength from its civilizational heritage (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023b; Yilmaz, 2023).
Similarly, Serbia’s Aleksandar Vučić has distanced his nation from the Western liberal democratic order, positioning Serbia as a state that is culturally and politically distinct from the EU and the US. Vučić does not explicitly frame Serbia’s political trajectory in terms of a clash of civilizations, but his rejection of Western interference and his embrace of Chinese investment and political support suggest that he sees in China an alternative model of governance—one that allows for authoritarian control without the need to submit to Western-style liberalism. The Chinese concept of a civilization state provides Vučić with the ideological justification to resist Western pressures, strengthen his own rule, and maintain Serbian autonomy in a world increasingly defined by civilizational competition (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024b).
This civilizational approach is not limited to China. Both Russia and Turkey have embraced the notion of a civilization state to justify their geopolitical ambitions and internal governance models (Yilmaz, 2023; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2024a). Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has adopted a civilizational discourse that emphasizes the uniqueness of Russian Orthodoxy, culture, and history. Putin’s Russia positions itself as a bulwark against Western liberalism, framing its foreign and domestic policies in terms of defending its civilizational values against a Western world it views as morally and politically degenerate. This framing allows Putin to justify both his authoritarian rule at home and Russia’s aggressive foreign policy, including its interventions in Ukraine and Syria.
Turkey, under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, has similarly embraced a civilizational discourse, one that draws on Turkey’s Ottoman past and its Islamic heritage. Erdogan’s vision of a neo-Ottoman Turkey asserts independence from the West and emphasizes Turkey’s role as a leader in the Muslim world. Turkey’s turn toward Islamist populist authoritarianism, justified by Erdogan as a defense of Turkish and Islamic values against Western liberalism, mirrors the civilizational narratives employed by both China and Russia (Yilmaz, 2021; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023c).
While Russia and Turkey’s adoption of civilizational rhetoric has certainly influenced their foreign policies and global politics, particularly in their respective regions, this article focuses specifically on China and its impact on Europe. We examine how Macron, Orbán, and Vučić find inspiration in China’s civilizational narrative and explore how China’s rise as a civilization state is reshaping the political and civilizational self-perception of these European nations. The emergence of a civilization-based framework in international relations is significant, not only for understanding China’s role in Europe but also for assessing the future of US-European relations (Yilmaz and Morieson 2024b).
Thus, we will take a closer look at Xi’s visits to France, Hungary, and Serbia and explore how the leaders of these countries are engaging with China’s civilizational narrative. We will examine how this engagement influences their domestic policies, foreign relations, and how this emerging partnership may affect the broader geopolitical landscape in Europe and beyond.
France: Drawing Inspiration from China’s Rise to Rejuvenate ‘European Civilization’
Emmanuel Macron and his wife Brigitte Macron welcoming chinese President Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan for thier state visit in France at the Elysee Palace in Paris on March 25, 2018. Photo: Frederic Legrand.
Xi’s visit toFrance is ostensibly to discuss trade issues with the populist French president, specifically those affecting China’s ability to sell electric vehicles in the European Union. Macron, for his part, also has economic issues to address with China, particularly regarding China’s restrictions on French agricultural goods. He has used this opportunity to urge Xi to stop supporting Russia and to pressure Putin into negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine. However, Xi’s decision to visit Serbia and Hungary – the European nations most sympathetic towards Moscow – suggests that Putin can expect continued support from China in their efforts to annex Ukraine.
These issues aside, there is a deeper purpose behind Xi’s visit and Macron’s enthusiastic reception, one that increasingly aligns with Macron’s views on the future of Europe and global politics. Indeed, Xi’s statement about France-China relations being a “model” for the world to follow suggests that something far more significant is taking place (Cohen & Buckley, 2024). Moreover, according to Xi, China “will work with France to deepen China-Europe mutually beneficial cooperation,” and the two are “major forces in building a multipolar world, two big markets that promote globalization, and two great civilizations that advocate cultural diversity” (Xi, 2024), a remark that underscores his civilizational perspective on global politics.
The leaders of both China and France, despite their differences, are drawn together by a shared antipathy towards the US and a shared civilizational perspective on global affairs, a perspective intrinsically connected with their anti-American politics. Naturally, China and France do not share the same opinion of the US. China views America as a rival; France views America, perhaps, as a perfidious ally, forcing ‘Anglo-Saxon’ culture upon an unwilling French people. However, both would prefer a world in which American culture was less pervasive, Western universalism abandoned, and American power reduced. Both believe that soon, the rise of civilization-states will drastically diminish American power and prestige globally.
Xi has dedicated himself to the rejuvenation of the great Chinese nation (sometimes understood as the Chinese ‘race’), which includes not only citizens of the People’s Republic of China but also Han Chinese globally (Carrai, 2021). At the same time, Xi portrays China not merely as a nation-state but as a continuation of Ancient Chinese culture merged with Marxism (Brown & Bērziņa-Čerenkova, 2018). Unlike Putin, he does not use the term “civilization state” to describe his country (Putin, 2023). However, much like Putin, Xi is adamant that China must draw on its civilizational heritage and reject the values of Western civilization, which he argues are not universal but particular to the West and thus unsuitable for China (Blackburn, 2021; Passeri, 2020). Civilizationism is thus a tool of liberation, through which Xi intends to free China of non-indigenous values and ideas, allowing it to overcome the US and establish the Chinese nation as Asia’s dominant power.
China’s increasing assertiveness in Asia is justified by Xi Jinping, if not motivated, as part of the necessary rise of Chinese civilization and its return to its rightful place as Asia’s hegemon, including the reclamation of traditional Chinese territories, such as Taiwan. Simultaneously, his regime’s repression of non-Han peoples, including the Muslim Uyghurs—a Turkic people—in Xinjiang, and the people of Tibet, is justified on the grounds that these regions have always been part of Chinese civilization. Therefore, the peoples of these regions are considered part of Chinese civilization, whether they accept it or not. In fact, those who resist must be coerced into this civilization, as evidenced by the ‘re-education’ camps in Xinjiang.
Moreover, Chinese leaders evidently believe that Western-style nation-states, particularly the small states of Europe, whatever their utility in the past, today prevent the West from gathering its true strength. In contrast, the large civilization-states of China, Russia, and India gain strength from their large populations and the ability to unite peoples who speak different languages under a single identity. In other words, Europe – despite its 300 million people – is weak because it is made up of many small nations, which would be far more powerful if they were to unite into a single polity.
French leader Macron appears to agree with this assessment. Writer Aris Roussinos (2020), who seems somewhat sympathetic to Macron’s project, is among the few who have remarked on the importance Macron places on rejuvenating what he calls European Civilization. Indeed, while right-wing populist Marine Le Pen calls for the protection of France’s Judeo-Christian yet secular civilization (Morieson, 2021; 2022), Macron is moving beyond the nation-state paradigm, advocating for centralizing power within the EU to protect an otherwise moribund European civilization. Macron is perhaps best understood as a technocratic populist, but this label may not fully explain his complex and shifting political positions and may give the impression that he lacks core beliefs or policies (Perottino & Guasti, 2020). However, a close reading of his speeches reveals that Macron is deeply concerned about the future of European civilization and believes it represents the best of humanity, thus must protect its ‘humanist’ values.
One might ask from whom Macron proposes to protect European civilization. For Macron, European civilization has many enemies, but perhaps the key adversary is the US, which he views as an enemy precisely because it is an anti-civilizational power that defends the nation-state paradigm, insists that its values are universal, and desires a relatively weak Europe. Macron does not believe that American values are universal. He does not even believe that the US and other ‘Anglo-Saxon’ nations, such as Great Britain, can be included within European civilization. In this way, Macron reveals that he does not believe in Western civilization per se, but rather that continental Europeans possess their own civilization, which is quite different from the traditions of the Anglos, particularly in that continental Europeans do not embrace the market economy and the nation-state paradigm as wholeheartedly.
Roussinos (2020) observes that in 2019, Macron gave a speech to France’s ambassadors in which he argued that “China, Russia, and India were not merely economic rivals but genuine civilization states… which have not just disrupted our international order, assumed a key role in the economic order, but have also very forcefully reshaped the political order and the political thinking that goes with it, with a great deal more inspiration than we have” (Roussinos, 2020). Warning his ambassadors that ‘civilizations,’ including European civilization, are ‘disappearing,’ Macron declined to condemn states that draw on their cultural heritage and proclaim themselves heirs to great civilizations. Instead, he suggested that Europeans should take inspiration from the ‘civilizational projects’ of Russia and Hungary, praising what he referred to as their ‘inspiring’ ‘cultural and civilizational vitality’ (Roussinos, 2020). According to Macron, such nations “take a logical approach to the world, they have a genuine philosophy, a resourcefulness that we have, to a certain extent, lost” (Roussinos, 2020). Furthermore, France has a mission to construct a “collective narrative and a collective imagination” among Europeans, meaning that his national project of rejuvenating France “must be undertaken as a project of European civilization” (Roussinos, 2020).
Later, in April 2024, Macron told an audience at Sorbonne University that “the European spirit” was essentially tired and “left to those who attacked it.” Macron admits that Europe has “lost its self-esteem,” which he regards as “strange” given its achievements (Macron, 2024). However, he says a defining aspect of European civilization is this self-doubt and “culture of confession,” worsened by the continent’s “demographic decline” – an obvious existential threat (Macron, 2024). His solution to Europe’s problems is to build “a more united, more sovereign, and more democratic Europe” in order to “assert ourselves among the other powers and in light of the century’s transitions” (i.e., the transition of power from Western nation-states to the civilization-states of the East) (Macron, 2024). Equally, Macron says European civilization is “humanist,” and to survive, it must reject the “Anglo-American model,” which permits the private sector to gain enormous power over human life, but also reject the Chinese model, in which the government is given total control over human life (Macron, 2024). Macron promises to challenge the Anglo-American model by taking control of cyberspace and enforcing European norms by banning hate speech and inappropriate content of various kinds, something he calls “a cultural and civilizational combat” (Macron, 2024).
Macron’s meeting with Xi thus brings together two men with civilizational perspectives on global affairs, both of whom believe that the age of Anglo-American universalism is coming to an end and that the nation-state paradigm must give way to something more vibrant, something that binds together past and present: the civilization-state, or in the case of Europe, a kind of supercharged, centralized EU. Despite the vast differences between the two men and their respective ‘civilizations,’ and the fact that Macron ultimately views China as a civilization Europe must challenge in the emerging multipolar world, they share a common belief in civilizationism that unites them in opposition to the US.
Fighting Liberal ‘Elites’ and Defending Judeo-Christianity by Drawing Hungary Closer to China
Chinese and Hungarian flags fly in the sky. Photo: Andy Liu.
When Xi visits Hungary, he will encounter a nation and a prime minister, Viktor Orbán, eager for Chinese investment, particularly in the form of an electric car plant that the Hungarian leader hopes the Chinese will build in partnership with his country. However, for Xi, this visit and whatever trade deals result from it are partly a reward for Orbán’s pro-China policies, his ambivalent attitude toward Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and his increasing anti-Western rhetoric, as well as his praise for China’s civilizational rejuvenation project. Equally, the visit demonstrates to Washington that Hungary cannot be relied upon to defend Western interests against Chinese aggression, and that Washington is growing increasingly isolated in its opposition to China’s rise.
Orbán is drawn to Xi in much the same way as Macron: both believe the rise of civilization-states like China is ineluctable, and both see China’s rise as an opportunity for their respective states – if not civilizations – to free themselves from Anglo-American norms. However, Orbán differs widely from Macron, and indeed the two might be understood as political enemies. While Macron calls for power to be centralized in Brussels, Orbán is a nationalist who rejects any notion that Hungary should comply with EU norms (Toomey, 2020). And although Orbán possesses a civilizational rejuvenation project, it is of an entirely different nature from Macron’s ‘humanist’ plan for Europe. Rather, Orbán calls for the re-Christianization of Europe, the strengthening of the nation-state and its borders, and he speaks not so much of European civilization but of Judeo-Christian civilization, a term that encompasses a different group of nations, possibly including Russia and the ‘Anglosphere’ nations. Where Macron sees the rejuvenation of European civilization as a way to defy growing autocracy in the East and the domination of the market in the West, Orbán is increasingly enamored with authoritarians abroad and authoritarian rule at home. Both believe that Europe’s demographic problem is existential, and that action is required to repopulate the continent. However, where Macron rejects ‘blood and soil’ ethno-religious nationalism, Orbán considers it a prerequisite for any successful plan to save Europe.
Furthermore, Morieson and Yilmaz (2024) observe that Orbán argues that “the EU and, particularly, the United States [are] so bent on forcing liberal culture on the world that they were inextricably moving all nations toward civilizational conflict: a conflict between the liberal West and ‘civilization-states’ that refused to liberalize, such as China and Russia” (Orbán, 2023). According to Orbán, the future of the world will be decided by this conflict, and therefore “the US ought to permit illiberal states – such as Hungary – to determine their own futures rather than impose ‘universal values’ upon them in an effort to prevent war” (Morieson & Yilmaz, 2024; Orbán, 2023).
Orbán is known for his opposition to allowing Muslims to enter Hungary, either to stay or settle in Western Europe (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016). According to Orbán, Muslims belong to a religion and civilization incompatible with Judeo-Christian values and, therefore, should not be allowed to live in Europe – especially considering Europeans’ rapid demographic decline – in great numbers (Ádám & Bozóki, 2016). However, Muslims are not really Orbán’s core enemy. Rather, it is Western political and cultural elites that he blames for Europe’s problems, especially its fertility problem. Orbán claims that elites have caused the West’s decline in power and loss of self-esteem by embracing liberalism. Liberalism is corrosive, according to Orbán, because it creates societies that do not produce citizens willing to have children and reject their societies’ traditional values – the values that made their societies superior in the past. Liberalism, because it teaches the equality of all peoples, encourages cosmopolitanism and individualism, robbing people of their unique national and religious identities (Morieson, 2022). As a result of this cosmopolitanism and the declining birth rates, Western societies have opened themselves to foreigners who not only do not share their liberal values but also have larger families. Consequently, Europe has paved the way for its own downfall by abandoning Judeo-Christian values in favor of liberalism and failing to assimilate Muslim migrants into a secular, liberal society (Morieson, 2022).
Orbán’s civilizational rejuvenation project is inextricably linked to his admittedly illiberal, authoritarian style of governance. Indeed, Orbán’s solution to the problems allegedly brought about by liberalism is to marginalize his liberal and Marxist opponents, centralize power, dominate Hungarian media, and replace, wherever possible, the liberal cultural and bureaucratic elite with his own supporters, a populist plan Orbán speaks of openly and with pride. To combat corrosive liberalism, Orbán claims that authentic Europeans must combat the influence of Washington and Brussels – the two great liberal powers, in Orbán’s estimation – and re-orient Western civilization towards post-liberal Judeo-Christian values, which he argues are still compatible with democracy and freedom (Morieson, 2022). In Orbán’s Hungary, women are thus encouraged with cash payments to have more children (a project that has met with only modest success), and post-Marxist investigations that critically examine Western culture are defunded in the nation’s universities. LGBTQ people are tolerated, but increasingly marginalized. All in all, ‘wokeness’ is not welcome in Orbán’s Hungary and is understood as the ultimate product of liberalism (Morieson, 2022).
It is easy to understand Orbán’s enthusiasm for China. China’s rise comes at the expense of Orbán’s liberal democratic foes (i.e., Washington and Brussels), decreasing their ability to pressure Hungary to return to liberal democratic norms. Similarly, because China is both an authoritarian state led by the populist Xi Jinping and approaches international relations from a civilizational perspective, its rise legitimizes Orbán’s own authoritarianism and his project of civilizational rejuvenation. Indeed, for Orbán, China’s rise proves that authoritarianism and civilizational rejuvenation projects help create strong nations that can stand against American cultural hegemony and prevent corrosive liberalism from eroding traditional identities and values. As a result, although Hungary will remain within the EU, we might expect Orbán to draw the country closer to China in the future. This means that China will have a friendly nation within the EU in Hungary, sowing disharmony and forming alliances with other nationalist states to prevent the centralization of power in Brussels and thwart Macron’s plans for the civilizational rejuvenation of Europe as a liberal-humanist power.
Serbia: Defying International Liberal Order by Embracing Chinese Civilization State
President of the Peoples Republic of China Xi Jinping on an official visit to the Republic of Serbia, at the invitation of President of Republic of Serbia, Belgrade on June 19, 2016. Photo: Golden Brown.
It should come as no surprise that the date Xi Jinping has chosen to visit Serbia coincides with the 25th anniversary of the American-led NATO bombings of Belgrade’s Chinese embassy. This apparent mistake by Western forces has long been viewed in China as a deliberate attack and part of the West’s – particularly the US’ – attempts to prevent the rise of China. Equally, Xi is no doubt aware of the prevalence of pro-Russian, anti-American attitudes in Serbia, largely the result of the belief that NATO and the US treated Serbs unfairly during the 1999 conflict, but also due to the conservative values held by many Serbs, which sometimes conflict with American liberal values, particularly on issues related to LGBTQ rights and religious freedom.
It is not merely shared resentment toward NATO and the US’ conduct during the Kosovo War that has brought Serbia and China closer. The two nations have become increasingly close since the 2012 election victory of the governing populist Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), which sees China as both a source of economic growth and technological development, but also as a partner less likely to criticize Serbia’s refusal to sanction Russia following its attempted annexation of Ukraine and its often socially conservative politics. The SNS has welcomed Chinese investment in mining operations and key infrastructure projects such as the construction of roads and bridges, making Serbia increasingly indebted to China as a result. At the same time, Western states’ criticism of Serbia, and a widespread belief among many Serbs that the US and NATO – representing the liberal order – are inherently hostile to Serbia, has driven the nation closer to China. Indeed, the SNS and its leader, Aleksandar Vučić, have positioned Serbia between the West and China, using its close relationship with China to improve its bargaining position with Brussels.
Although Serbia has sought EU membership, its democratic backsliding under populist rule has made this increasingly unlikely, and Vučić himself has campaigned against joining the EU. Moreover, EU states are increasingly critical of the so-called electoral autocracy that characterizes SNS rule (Seebass, 2024). For example, the German Federal Foreign Office considers the 2023 national elections in Serbia to have been fraudulent and “unacceptable for a country with EU candidate status” (X, 2023). According to the German Council on Foreign Relations, under SNS rule “the erosion of institutions that were only just democratizing has picked up pace.” The SNS now controls “Serbia’s media landscape… personal ties link the president to organized crime groups and well-coordinated hooligans prone to violence,” and “public discourse is marked by vicious rhetoric that has an especially detrimental effect on young people” (Seebass, 2024).
These trends have led to increasing criticism of Serbia by Western powers and NGOs, prompting the SNS to defy the West by maintaining good relations with Russia and deepening ties with China. Xi’s visit to Belgrade, and the extraordinary welcome provided by the SNS government, demonstrates Vučić’s desire to draw his nation closer to autocratic regimes that do not criticize his anti-democratic actions. Vučić received Xi in Belgrade with a ceremony during which he promised the Chinese leader that he would receive in Serbia a degree of “reverence and love” not “found anywhere else” and vowed that his government would only increase cooperation with Beijing, saying “the sky is the limit” (Hajdari, 2024).
Vučić is alleged to have instructed employees of state-owned companies to join the crowds welcoming the Chinese president, employing around 50 buses to increase crowd numbers and create the impression that the vast majority of Serbs love and revere Xi. Moreover, Xi authored an article in Serbia’s Politika (2024) news outlet describing China-Serbia relations as “ironclad” and noting that “China and Serbia have similar positions on many important international and regional issues” and that “facing the international situation intertwined with changes and turbulence,” the two nations “should continuously strengthen coordination… and stand together for an equal and orderly multipolar world” (Politika, 2024).
It is not difficult to read between the lines and recognize that Xi is calling for Serbia to assist China in challenging US and Western dominance in the international sphere. As Vedran Dihic (Cvetkovic & Heil, 2024) put it, “aside from any trade and economic benefits, there is a political message underlying Serbia’s hosting of Xi that is connected to broader efforts – notably by Moscow and Beijing – to challenge US influence and potentially reshape the international order. …Serbia is striving to deepen relations with actors outside the West and, in that sense, is a kind of autonomous player in the new geopolitical constellation.”
Serbia and China thus find themselves drawn together for similar reasons: both wish to challenge Western liberal dominance in the international sphere and to legitimize authoritarianism at home. China’s civilizational rejuvenation project is useful to Serbia, insofar as China’s insistence that Western values are anything but universal helps to legitimize the SNS’s turn against liberal democracy, the separation of powers, and the rule of law by portraying these principles as mere Western liberal constructs that have no place beyond Western Europe, and may even hold back the development of states like Serbia that exist beyond the West and East, or at their crossroads.
Conclusions
Xi Jinping’s tour of France, Hungary, and Serbia demonstrates the growing influence of China in Europe. But it also tells us much about how Europeans are responding to China’s rise as a self-styled civilizational power, especially insofar as the rise of China is inspiring some European leaders to challenge US dominance in international politics and embrace the core values of “European civilization.”
For Xi, this civilizational turn is a means to legitimize China’s rise as a global superpower, positioning China not only as an economic force but as a civilization that challenges the universalism of Western values. His outreach to countries like Hungary and Serbia, where populist leaders see benefits in aligning with China’s vision, strengthens this narrative. Serbia, in particular, exemplifies a country striving to balance its ambitions of EU integration with a deepening relationship with China, fueled by shared anti-Western sentiments and authoritarian tendencies.
The convergence of leaders like Macron, Orbán, and Vučić with Xi Jinping highlights the emerging trend of civilizational politics in global affairs. Despite their distinct national interests and ideological differences, these leaders share a skepticism towards the liberal international order championed by the US and NATO, and see the rise of China as a pivotal moment in redefining the global balance of power. Macron, with his vision of a centralized European civilization, and Orbán, with his push for a Judeo-Christian resurgence, both view the nation-state paradigm as inadequate for addressing contemporary challenges. In their own ways, they envision a future in which civilizational identity shapes the global political landscape.
For Macron, the rise of authoritarian China might not be entirely desirable, but it does provide France with an opportunity not just to grow its largely stagnant economy—finding in China a new market for its agricultural goods—but also to reflect on China’s civilizational assertiveness. Macron believes that China’s success, grounded in its ancient heritage and values, suggests that Europe must become more like China: united, assertive, and willing to stand up for its particular values against the false universalism of the Anglo-American world.
For Orbán, civilizationism is primarily a tool of populist discourse, used to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ with the ‘self’ represented as the traditional Christian Hungarian identity, and the ‘other’ as the Muslim or liberal West. However, like Macron, Orbán views the rise of civilization states as both inevitable and welcome. He believes this shift will create a multipolar world that weakens US and EU power, liberating Hungary from the burden of conforming to Western ‘universal’ norms.
Aleksandar Vučić may not explicitly frame his nation’s conflicts with the EU and the US as a clash of civilizations, but like Orbán, he rejects Western political interference in Serbian affairs. He appears to see in the rise of the Chinese self-proclaimed civilization state a way to challenge the US-dominated liberal international order and solidify his own authoritarian rule.
This civilizational approach is not confined to China alone. Russia, under Vladimir Putin, has embraced a similar narrative, framing itself as a protector of Orthodox Christian civilization, distinct from the West and immune to its liberal values. Turkey, under Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is another example, promoting a neo-Ottoman vision that emphasizes Turkey’s Islamic and Turkic heritage in contrast to the West. Both Russia and Turkey have strategically positioned themselves as civilization states seeking to challenge US and Western dominance, much like China.
While China’s civilizational model seems to inspire many of Europe’s populist and authoritarian leaders, it also reveals how the notion of a civilization state is being used to reject Western (particularly Anglo-American) norms. Whether these leaders seek to emulate China or simply leverage its rise to challenge US hegemony, China’s growing influence seems to validate the belief that nations must turn to their own traditional values and culture to overcome American imperialism and cultural dominance.
Ultimately, the alliance between these diverse leaders reflects a growing resistance to the liberal democratic norms that have dominated the global order since the end of the Cold War. By positioning themselves against American cultural and political hegemony, these leaders are contributing to the emergence of a new multipolar world, where civilizational states challenge the legitimacy of Western universalism and aim to reshape global governance according to their own values and interests. As this trend continues to unfold, the dynamics of international relations are likely to shift in significant and unpredictable ways, with far-reaching implications for the future of global order.
Yet, despite the clear allure of civilization-state rhetoric, whether rejecting liberal democratic and Western/Anglo-American norms and embracing ‘our’ civilizational values can increase fertility, provide peoples with a shared purpose, or inspire reindustrialization remains an open question. The rise of civilization states has certainly helped leaders like Macron, Orbán, and Vučić resist US-led globalization and liberalism, but the long-term consequences of these shifts are still uncertain.
One final point that deserves attention is the way the discourse of the civilization state is particularly useful to populist and authoritarian leaders. It allows them to legitimize authoritarian rule by rejecting liberal democracy on the grounds that it is not part of ‘our’ traditional values. Moreover, this discourse legitimizes bellicose foreign policies by justifying the annexation or control of territories that were once part of ‘our’ civilization. In this way, civilizationism creates a populist narrative of the ‘people’ vs. the ‘elites,’ often transnationalized to portray American or Western elites as the enemies preventing ‘our’ rise.
Furthermore, beyond Europe, China, Russia, and Turkey are increasingly extending their civilizational influence into Africa. All three are active in Africa through various soft, smart, sharp and hard power initiatives and projections, from China’s Belt and Road infrastructure projects, Russia’s security alliances, and Turkey’s cultural and religious diplomacy in addition to their Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs) all over the world (Yilmaz et al, 2023). These activities reflect not only their economic and political ambitions but also an ongoing civilizational competition with the West for influence on the continent.
China, for instance, promotes its model of development without political liberalization, offering African nations an alternative to Western aid conditionality. Russia has focused on military and energy cooperation, while Turkey emphasizes religious and educational connections, seeking to revive its historical ties to Africa. Each of these actors brings a distinct civilizational narrative to Africa, challenging Western norms and promoting alternatives to the liberal international order.
As these three powers expand their influence, the competition between civilization states and the West will likely intensify, not only in Europe but across the Global South. Further research is needed to better understand how these powers are positioning themselves in Africa and how their civilizational frameworks interact with local political, economic, and cultural dynamics. Understanding this evolving landscape is crucial for comprehending the broader implications of the civilizational turn in global politics.
Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.
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The traditional British political style and rhetoric were utilized by both former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage of UKIP as tools to communicate their approaches to managing the COVID-19 crisis. This demonstrates the resilience of established political traditions while highlighting the volatility and ambiguity of populist strategies. Notably, populist narratives varied significantly depending on whether the leader was in power or in opposition, which influenced their responsibility towards citizens and their ability to connect populist grievances with pre-existing political arguments in the context of the pandemic. In particular, Johnson’s actions reflect a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, blending epistemic and political authority in determining the necessary measures to address the pandemic.
This paper analyzes the role and significance of the Covid-19 pandemic in the development and behavior of British populist parties. It aims to observe how and when the so-called British Political Tradition (BPT) has been used by these parties as a guiding principle warranting the actions and policies implemented during the Covid-19 crisis in the UK. First, it will briefly introduce medical populism from a general perspective and within the specific situation of the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, it will analyze the overall actions taken by the two main British (right-wing) populist parties at the time and their leaders: the Conservatives in power under Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage’s UKIP party. This piece is not intended to be a theoretical discussion regarding the populist status of the considered parties and assumes that both can be meaningfully characterized as consistently (but differentially) populist on a variety of issues – such as health, immigration, economics or Brexit. The final section discusses the relationships between populists’ responses to the pandemic and the BPT. It evaluates if populists’ attitudes towards COVID-19 and its political management are positively affected by the BPT.
Populism and the Pandemic
One must first understand what kind of crisis the COVID-19 pandemic was and, thus, what kind of phenomena populists were dealing with at the time. Some scholars conceive a crisis as a moment of saliency for systemic contradictions and a consequent perceived need for structural change and strong interventions to take place. In such a situation, political agents are overwhelmed by the unfolding events and there is no common recognized rationality for handling the crisis-driven situation (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 3).
Under a dynamic conception of crises, populist actors may be better conceived not just as passively reacting to given external shocks, but “as actors that actively perform and spread a sense of crisis” (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 6). This is a general characterization of an endogenous crisis, where all the contradictions are generated within the political system, and in which political agents are acting. In other words, when confronted with such a scenario, populists from all over the political spectrum usually tend to at least trigger or even manufacture the crisis themselves to gain some leverage in the political system (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 4). Being an exogenous crisis with respect to populism, the pandemic is harder to politicize than other political shocks or events that are at least partially originated inside the system itself. In addition, it should also be noted that the pandemic has a peculiar nature: as a public health crisis, no one is free from its consequences and implications.
Bobba & Hubé (2021: 9-10), drawing from other authors, use the following general framework to better understand health crises such as Covid-19. Health crises are thought to be divisible into three parts: (a) an initial phase in which you are confronted with the emergence of the problem; (b) a confrontation phase in which some actors blame other actors for being responsible for what is happening; (c) a managing phase in which who is blaming responsibility upon others generally tries to propose and claim its solutions.
Moving to populism to connect it with the pandemic, a meaningful characterization of the term in the context of public health crises is needed. Following Gideon Lasco’s argument (2020: 1), one could say that “medical populism” is “a political style based on performances of public health crises that pit ‘the people’ against ‘the establishment’.” Different examples of medical populism can be given, going from Jair Bolsonaro downplaying the threat of the virus and pitting the economy against public health policies, to Donald Trump paving the way for conspiracy theories about the virus’ creation and blaming illegal immigrants for its spread around the country.
With specific reference to Covid-19, we can distinguish some main features of populist strategies acting within such a crisis: (i) the simplification of the pandemic, offering the simplest (and most simplistic) solutions to the problems that the health emergency is posing; (ii) the dramatization, distortion and spectacularizing the threats posed by the crisis; (iii) the forging of societal divisions claiming to be on the side of the ‘real people’ quite often opposed to an unspecified ‘otherhood’; (iv) the invocation of knowledge claims: for example with regards to the virus’ origins, about the most appropriate methodologies to prevent its spreading or on how to treat it consistently (Lasco, 2020: 2-3).
Investigating the second feature of populism (ii), we can add the fact that populist actors must not be obscured by the coverage of the pandemic itself. They need to spectacularize the crisis with their messaging, a strategy that allows them to stand out as relevant and influential figures in the public and online media to claim reliability and legitimacy properly (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 5).
Regarding the third feature (iii), it is difficult to frame the populist concept of the ‘real people’ alongside the strategy of pitting them against other groups or entities when the virus indiscriminately affects everyone. Being aware of this problem, “‘the people’ are imbued with various characteristics, biomedical and otherwise [with populists] claiming that their citizens are less susceptible to the virus” (Lasco, 2020: 4-7). Thus, the ‘others’ against which populists claim to fight in representation of the “real people” during the pandemic are generally international and supranational actors such as the WTO or other states such as China – if not intellectual elites such as academics, journalists or public health experts (Bobba & Hubé, 2021).
Points (i) and (iv) are strictly intertwined in that simplification goes hand in hand with false claims and controversial scientific statements. In other words, we observe a “widespread deployment of scientific language and imagery – and a selective deployment of scientific consensus” (Lasco, 2020: 8).
British Populism and Covid-19
To better connect British populism with the case of the pandemic, it is useful to get a brief and general background of the previous relationships between populism and healthcare policies in the UK before Covid-19. There is a distinction between healthcare systems that are more or less resistant to populist performances. The former are well-resourced, present a developed network-based model of governance, and involve professions in the policy processes. On the contrary, the latter are poorly financed, present high levels of command along the line of the New Public Management-type (NPM) governance model and display low trust in healthcare providers (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 3).
But the most important thing to recall regarding the evolution of the British healthcare system (NHS) and populism is the BREXIT process. During those years, right-wing populists argued that by leaving the European Union (EU) more funds could be allocated to better finance the NHS. Specifically, they framed the unsustainability of the NHS and its underdevelopment (mostly in terms of funds and available high-skilled personnel) as a problem of immigration, as the blame was directed towards immigrants enjoying health services paid for by British citizens (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 8).
Johnson and the Conservatives
The Conservatives, led by then Prime Minister Boris Johnson, were in power when Covid-19 became a global medical problem, and remained so until the end of the pandemic. For some authors (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021), the first wave of the pandemic, from February 2020 to roughly July 2020, can be divided in three phases. The ‘breakout’ phase was characterized by state authorities acting in a relaxed way, without invasive governmental control over people’s freedoms. This moment corresponds to the public’s response to the news about the virus’ spreading. During the ‘confrontation’ phase, the virus’ infection began widely spreading, and the number of people testing positive to Covid-19 began to grow exponentially. The final, ‘managing,’ phase is characterized by attempts to stabilize the situation and enforce measures in order to cope and coexist with the virus while waiting for the development of vaccines.
During the first two phases the Conservative Party did not take the risks seriously and showed a libertarian way of thinking, arguing against a strict and hard response to the crisis in terms of closures and restrictions. In particular, Prime Minister Johnson did not attend the meetings dedicated to the government’s response to the pandemic in early February 2020 and criticized some warnings made by the British Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) (Bale, 2023: 69-70). An explanation for that could be that his actions and public statements were influenced and warranted by ‘misplaced optimism’ and regressive and nationalistic ideas, historically speaking, of the British role in the world – stressing the narrative around the exceptionality and efficiency of the NHS (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 6).
Starting from the end of March and the beginning of April, things became more dramatic, and the Prime Minister Johnson’s attitude changed. Around this time the first lockdown was issued, disregarding the idea of ‘herd immunity’ where the virus is left to spread in the population to lower its virulence (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 21). In general, the government stressed conventional public measures and followed international guidelines along other major Western and European states (Bale, 2023: 70). Additionally, Johnson’s Cabinet avoided using tropes potentially contributing to the politicization of the crisis, and attempted to emphasize the importance of scientific guidelines (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26).
Analyzing the rhetorical repertoire that has been used, the governmental discourse historically situated Covid-19 in mainly three different ways. To do so, the Cabinet used so-called ‘temporal claims,’ as defined in narrative discourse theory. Following the construction of a (i) radically discontinuous time, the virus has been described as a moment of generational significance. The pandemic was to be seen as an unprecedented event disrupting people’s habits and usual social behavior, in order for new economic, social and political initiatives to be ruled and legitimized. From another point of view, events have been plotted with a (ii) linear timeline, positing a unidirectional and cumulative development. Here, a descriptive account of some sequences and a principle of evaluation of the events and by which to assess the correctness of the action leading to their unfolding have been invoked. Lastly, the construction of a (iii) cyclical time helped the government to depict everyday life after the pandemic in a radically different way. In this respect, narratives were prospecting and sketching the idea of a ‘new normalcy’ bringing the emergence of new habits for everyone (Jarvis, 2021: 27-31).
To conclude this investigation of Johnson’s political communication during the pandemic, it is notable that he also employed daily governmental press briefings, using so-called the ‘numbers arms race’ and more broadly the already cited ‘war language.’ Both of them served as an enforcement to the claim of fighting for Britain in a once in a lifetime event. The key mantra has been the following statement: “Stay Home, Protect the NHS, Save Lives” (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 9-10).
Farage and the UKIP
Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.
In contrast to Johnson, who avoided politicizing the pandemic, Nigel Farage opted to fully utilize a populist political communication style typically associated with right-wing parties. Despite taking a cautious stance at the beginning of the breakout, he started acting as a radical libertarian, opposing public health restrictions and showing his open skepticism about government actions towards the pandemic (Bale, 2023).
Two major critiques can be identified. The former critique strictly concerns the governmental actions taken when the health situation started being very problematic. Farage accused Johnson’s government of incompetency and indecisiveness in dealing with the crisis, framing his actions as a lack of leadership on the side of the Prime Minister (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 27). His arguments are composed by a mixture of “support for draconian measures on ‘law and order’ and ‘Britain’s borders’,” and “its essentially libertarian opposition to ‘political correctness gone mad’ as well as ‘red tape’ and the ‘faceless bureaucrats’” (Bale, 2023: 71). Resorting to well-known populist grievances, alongside other world leaders such as Trump, he adapted the issue of immigration and the concerns associated with it in claiming that migrants could enter and spread the virus if police enforcement on British borders were not sufficiently severe or incoming international flights were to be easily allowed for foreign travelers coming from high-risk countries (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 23). He also denounced the ‘herd immunity’ strategy initially sought to be pursued by the government, although he maintained a libertarian posture by stressing the fact that measures taken to stop the virus’ transmissibility were not meant to become a “house arrest” for the entire nation (Bale, 2023: 72).
The latter part of his narratives, and the second critique he posed, is about the role of the UK in the world and the attempt to identify responsible actors for the pandemic to occur. In other words, he blamed China for not telling the truth about Covid-19’s emergence in the first place and for its deliberate suppression of key information and the intentional delaying of their communication to the international community (Bale, 2023: 71). Concisely: “While the government undermined the seriousness of the crisis mostly because of economic concerns, Farage opportunistically used the COVID-19 crisis to suggest a scale down to the UK’s relations with the EU and China” (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26).
The British Political Tradition in Times of Crisis
According to Lijphart (1999), the British Westminster Model presents nine core tenets: (1) the concentration of the executive power in one party; (2) cabinet dominance; (3) a two-party system, where parties produce manifestos and seek a mandate to govern; (4) a majoritarian electoral system; (5) a unitary and centralized government; (6) interest group pluralism; (7) the concentration of legislative power in Parliament; (8) constitutional flexibility; (9) the central bank is controlled by the executive. Following Hall (2011: 9-10) and Richards and Smith (2002) we can add two more tenets: (10) the doctrine of ministerial responsibility; (11) a permanent, neutral, and anonymous civil service.
What is important to us here is the fact that the Westminster Model emphasizes some peculiar aspects. First, a linear and gradual development of the British political system and its institutions. Second, it stresses a great degree of British exceptionalism, and the superior nature of its system compared to other Western ones. Third, it is warranted by the idea that power is to be concentrated and exercised with a top-down approach. Warranting this system, according to Hall (2011: 124-125), the British Political Tradition (BPT) could be characterized as presenting the following main themes: (i)A discourse that stresses a limited liberal notion of representation and the elitist view that politicians are best suited to make decisions on behalf of the populace […] and are willing to act against the expressed will of the public or in the face of substantial public opposition; (ii) A discourse that stresses a conservative notion of responsibility and the view that a strong, decisive government is the most effective, efficient and desirable form of government. […] (iii) A discourse about change which emphasizes the virtues of continuity, gradualism, flexibility and stability. […] (iv) A discourse concerning a sense of British distinctiveness and superiority politically (Hall, 2011: 124-125)
Regarding discourse (i), it must be added that the BPT is sustained by an elitist conception of democracy, particularly the famous ‘Westminster and Whitehall know best’ statement, which itself reflects the interest of the political elite, thus reinforcing their status and power (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 128). The BPT reifies over time already existing inequalities and asymmetries in the British political system between citizens. Therefore, these ideas and beliefs have been mostly supported by most of the population. This results in the populace developing a somewhat deferential attitude towards politics, where politicians are seen as the best holders of the right to take the most important and crucial decisions for all (Hall, 2011: 159). Moreover, Marsh and Hall rightly highlight that the BPT not only served the interest of the political elite, but also of the socio-economic one. Specifically, regarding discourse (ii) above, the climax of political conservatism made it easier for the working class to accept the status quo. Furthermore, the dominance of the executive power helped political elites to enact policies more favorable to the socio-economic ones without too much opposition (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 135).
Johnson and the BPT
The discussion seems to beg the question: Has the BPT influenced the populist (Johson and Farage) behavior described above? Following Finlayson et al. (2023), we can observe the employment of several traditional tropes dating back to the language and discourse of the BPT. Particularly, Prime Minister Johnson’s behavior indicates the presence of a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, merging epistemic and political authority over the actions needed to cope with the pandemic. For example, the invocation of the concept of ‘the people’ is used to hide the public’s limited political agency and retain the rights and legitimacy over the enactment of the counteracting measures. All of this is also related to the low participatory governance tradition inherent in the British State, but also shows how Johnson proved to strategically build its narrative of the pandemic to advance and increase the further legitimization of past policy decisions, and in particular the ones connected with the Brexit process (Wellings et al., 2023: 238). The former British premier revitalized the concept of the ‘British people’ within the public imagination, employing the sustainability and functioning of the NHS and other health issues as an element of continuity in his narratives from the beginning of the ‘Leave Campaign’ for Brexit to their management during the pandemic (Welling et al., 2023: 242).
To better understand the British government’s communicative repertoire, the authors identify four main figurations of ‘the people’ (Finlayson et al., 2023: 344). First, we have ‘statistical realities.’ Here, ‘the people’ are represented and aggregated numerically, thus appearing more as abstract elements that legitimize the quest for acquiescence from the government (Finlayson et al., 2023: 345-346). Put another way, this kind of framing not only confers to the Cabinet epistemic authority because numbers don’t need further explanations, but also certifies its tight cooperation with the scientific community (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 222).
Second, we have the figuration of ‘suffering families.’ This narrative aims to develop a public ‘ethos’ via which it can acquire the rights and legitimacy required to advance its policies. The BPT here is involved and works when this communicative strategy properly connects governmental instructions with people’s feelings, needs, and emotions – knowing what is best to accomplish them (Finlayson et al., 2023: 347).
Third, ‘the people’ are framed as responsible individuals. This one is seen as a rule follower, encapsulated in a hierarchical structure that crystallizes a top-down and vertical conception of the people/state relationships. Once again, the BPT widens the divide between the elites and the public. ‘The people’ are required to follow the moral claims encouraged by the elite to fulfill their individual and collective responsibilities and duties towards resolving the crisis. The individual responsibility regards the task that people are assigned to complete, such as wearing protective masks in public spaces while avoiding unnecessary contact with strangers. The collective responsibility is rooted in utilitarian reasoning: complying with the rules means a faster crisis resolution (Finlayson et al., 2023: 348-349).
The second and third depictions help understand the way in which Johnson tried to preserve its populist-driven consensus from the backlash of its unpopular decisions during the crisis. He tried not only to highlight the community as a collective as the real protagonist of the effort to fight against the virus’ infection, but also to present himself as a transparent and compassionate leader (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 209-215).
The fourth and final depiction utilized is ‘freedom-loving citizens.’ This time, citizens are represented as rights holders and interests to be appropriately recognized. Consequently, the government has a duty to protect these fundamental freedoms and, by showing the truth about them, affirm the legitimacy of its guidelines (Finlayson et al., 2023: 350).
Farage and the BPT
The case of Farage is different. Being an oppositional force during the COVID-19 pandemic breakout, it was much easier for him to resort to typical and proven to be more effective populist grievances. However, the BPT resonates consistently in Farage’s discourses during the crisis: I’m convinced that its influence is evident when the UKIP’s leader blamed Johnson for his lack of leadership and inefficient management in the initial months of the crisis development. Specifically, Farage used his oppositional platform on health policies to rally against the government and exploit the newly achieved consensus to fuel support around the rebranding of UKIP in ‘Reform UK’ (McManus, 2021: 148-150).
Relating to discourse (ii) presented before, I argue that Farage somewhat recalls the necessity for the executive to be strong and decisive in its actions on behalf of the State. Second, and about discourse (iv) discussed above, I argue that Farage recalls the BPT when he stresses the role of the UK in the world vis-à-vis the actions and warnings undertaken towards China by other Western leaders. Put another way, he tried to point out the distinctiveness and peculiarity of the British political system as opposed to others, especially in the Western World, while asking for a different resolution path for the crisis (Bale, 2023; Sahin & Ianosev, 2021).
Overall, even if Farage was not in a position that favored traditional forms of British political thinking, the BPT proves to have (at least) partially influenced his claims and actions during Covid-19’s unfolding.
Conclusion
To recall the main points of the argument above, there is clear evidence that the British Political Tradition (BPT) still influences how politicians behave in ordinary British political life and their policy-making choices. Even in the face of essential shifts and changes caused by the Covid-19 crisis, many political actors tried to adapt these new challenges to the long-standing historical and common way of interpreting political actions and decision-making in the UK (Hall et al., 2018: 15).
The aim of this article was to check for the influence of the BPT on populist leaders. As we observed, the British traditional political style and tropes served both Johnson and Farage as a means to instill their ideas about how to manage the crisis. This proves the resilience of established political tradition and clarifies the volatility and ambiguity of the populist repertoire and strategies. Regarding the latter point, populist narratives varied a lot depending on two factors: (i) the position of the leader – being in charge or standing as an oppositional force – and hence its responsibility towards citizens; (ii) the ability to legitimately connect populist grievances in the context of the pandemics with already existing lines of political reasoning. Some examples exemplifying the second point are the case of migration and the issue of border control regarding the likelihood of importing and spreading the virus uncontrolled.
(*) Andrea Guidottiis a master’s student at the University of Pavia and an intern at the ECPS.
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Abstract
This paper explores the dynamic interplay of victimhood narratives, populism, and civilizational rhetoric in Turkish Islamist politics, centering on the tenure of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Tracing the historical trajectory of Islamist victimhood and its evolution, the study reveals how the AKP strategically fused domestic victimhood politics with Islamist civilizational populism. These narrative positions the AKP as the advocate for the victimized Sunni Muslim Turkish nation against a perceived pro-Western, secular, and corrupt elite. This narrative extends beyond the national level, portraying the AKP as the defender of the Muslim ummah against alleged Western conspiracies. Challenging existing literature that characterizes the AKP’s current victimhood discourse as a mere continuation of its Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative, this paper argues for its significant evolution. It introduces two additional layers constituting a ‘new’ victimhood: 1) a national victimhood discourse and 2) manufactured victimhood. In the post-Gezi Protests era, the AKP not only revisits its Islamist victimhood mindset, inclusive of anti-Western conspiracies, but also adopts a nationalist victimhood discourse through a mimetic process, seamlessly integrating it with its existing Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative. Furthermore, with the AKP’s rise to hegemonic status, the party strategically manufactures a novel victimhood narrative, rooted in conspiracy theories alleging Western opposition to the leader of the Muslim World, Turkey. This narrative strategy enables the AKP to deflect criticism, legitimize crackdowns, and solidify its grip on power. By unpacking these layers of victimhood, this paper provides a nuanced understanding of the AKP’s evolving narrative strategy and its implications for the political landscape in Turkey.
Within Turkish politics, the fusion of populist victimhood narratives has emerged as a potent force, catalyzing shifts in ideologies, political strategies, and societal perceptions. This paper embarks on a multifaceted exploration of these developments, by dissecting the evolution and strategic amalgamation of victimhood discourses, populism, and civilizational rhetoric within Turkish Islamist politics. Central to this study is an in-depth analysis of these narratives, with a particular focus on their manifestation and transformation during the AKP’s tenure. Historical grievances, intertwined with conspiratorial narratives and appeals to the victimhood of the Sunni Muslim Turkish nation, form the bedrock of these ideologies.
Beginning with a historical exposition of perceived injustices and pivotal events that sowed the seeds of Turkish Islamist victimhood, this paper navigates the roots of these victimhood narratives. Within these, segments of conservative society are portrayed as historically oppressed under the Kemalist elite, casting the AKP as the sole and genuine representative of the victimized Sunni Muslim Turkish nation. Moreover, this study illuminates the confluence of victimhood with populist rhetoric, epitomized by the AKP’s portrayal of itself as the champion of the people against a corrupt and oppressive elite. Furthermore, the analysis delves into civilizational populism, where the AKP constructs itself as the guardian of Turkish identity, fending off alleged Western conspiracies and positioning Turkey as a bulwark against external threats. Importantly, this analysis demonstrates how these narratives have transitioned victimhood from a solely national to a transnational experience by framing the ummah as under threat – and Turkey as its savior.
In societies entrenched in prolonged and unresolved conflicts, perceptions of victimhood emerge as integral within the narratives of populist political parties. Members of the in-group engage in a subjective process of branding the out-group as morally unjust and assigning blame to the group for perceived and actual harms. In contrast, the members of the in-group are presented as the sole victims of these supposed internal and external threats. This subjective process is associated with a higher degree of conspirational thinking. A strong correlation has been identified between a sense of victimhood and a propensity to embrace conspiracy theories. Collective experiences of perceived victimization, in particular, heighten susceptibility to adopting conspiracy stereotypes (Bilewicz & Sedek, 2015).
Following instances of perceived discrimination, disadvantage, or being targeted by crime or violence, groups may formulate theories that allege certain out-groups are conspiring against the in-group. Victimhood tends to generate its own moral framework, which legitimizes the actions and potential revenge of the victims. It also encourages the victim to identify scapegoats and attribute blame to them. Scapegoating solidifies the identity of an enemy and their negative characteristics, helping victims avoid feelings of ambiguity or moral doubt. (Tepeli & Demirok, 2014; Parlak & Uz, 2015). Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populism has effectively utilized scapegoating and conspiracy theories to achieve his goals (Yabanci, 2016).
Narratives of victimhood play a pivotal role within Turkey’s national discourse, yet the absence of dialogue about its diverse victimhood narratives presents a notable gap in Turkish political history research. Accordingly, the inadequate analysis of various victimhood claims has hindered a thorough understanding of the AKP’s recent authoritarian shift. Existing literature tends to perceive the AKP’s current victimhood discourse as a continuum of earlier Islamist victimhood narratives, overlooking its evolution which has seen the addition of two additional layers. These new layers, ‘national victimhood discourse/victimhood nationalism’ and ‘manufactured victimhood’, have helped create a distinct form of victimhood prevalent in contemporary Turkey.
This paper primarily examines the AKP’s use of victimhood discourses since 2002. Initially, these discourses gained momentum following tangible events such as ‘the February 28 post-modern coup process,’ headscarf ban, and discrimination against minorities. However, with the AKP’s third election victory and Gezi Park protests in 2013 (which led to anti-government mobilization), the party shifted to manufacturing victimhood narratives and employing anti-Western conspiracy theories to deflect failures. This manufactured victimhood, now centralized in official discourse and campaigning, aided in contradicting and distancing the party from its true status as the dominant national power. This paper highlights a shift from genuine to manufactured victimhood discourses by first exploring the historical development of victimhood in Turkey, then delving into its discursive evolution and its impact on Turkish politics.
The Vertical and Horizontal Dimension of Erdogan’s Populism
Numerous scholars concur that populism constitutes a distinct set of core ideas, often referred to as a thin ideology, rather than a comprehensive belief system with explicit guidelines addressing social, political, and economic issues, such as liberalism, social democracy, and communism. This thin ideology revolves around two central elements: (i) the antagonism between ‘the pure people’ and the elites, and (ii) the moral and normative supremacy of popular will (Mudde, 2004: 543). Populists interpret the concept of ‘the people’ in a manner that aligns with their political agenda. They assert that it is they alone that can represent the people against a perceived ‘corrupt’ elite seeking to exclude them from power. It’s important to note that this ‘unified and virtuous people’ represents an exclusionary political project and does not encompass the entire population of a given country (Lefort, 1988).
Populism manifests itself in two dimensions: vertical and horizontal (Taguieff, 1995: 32-35). The vertical dimension revolves around a binary of the ‘pure people’ versus the ‘corrupt, evil elite’, while the horizontal dimension involves a binary opposition between insiders and outsiders. The outsiders, who curiously may be citizens, are nevertheless perceived as foreigners or internal enemies based on their identities (Taguieff, 1995: 32-35). Within the ‘people,’ there exists a distinction between ‘people like us’ and those outside ‘our’ group, who are seen as threats to ‘our’ way of life. Across various political and social contexts, populism tends to designate certain out-groups, such as minorities, migrants, dissidents, and opposition parties and politicians, as scapegoats. In this regard, populism adopts a Manichean perspective, dividing society into opposing poles of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ or ‘friends’ versus ‘enemies.’ (Mudde, 2004: 543).
A recent study (Lewis et al., 2019) highlighted that Erdogan is the only right-wing leader who can be labelled as being ‘very populist.’ Since working in the National Outlook (Milli Gorus) years during the 1970s and 1980s, Erdogan’s worldview consistently featured Islamist populist elements, framing himself and practicing Muslims as the true owners of the homeland, who had been victims of the oppressive Kemalist establishment. Erdogan’s populism has intensified significantly in recent years and has become a core feature of his political narrative (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). This intensification was particularly noticeable following key political moments such as the nation’s economic challenges in 2009 and the Gezi protests in 2013. Post-Gezi, Erdogan’s populism merged with a revived Islamist ideology, marked by strong anti-Western rhetoric and conspiracy theories (Yılmaz & Bashirov, 2018). This ideological shift is rooted in former Prime Minister’s Erbakan’s National Outlook Islamism and the totalitarian ideology of Erdogan’s influential role model, Necip Fazil Kisakurek. Together, these elements provide a strong religio-moral component, asserting that ‘the people’ they represent include not only those who were exploited, excluded, oppressed, and victimized but also practicing Muslims who are regarded as morally superior (Tugal, 2002).
In Erdoğan’s populist vision, the Kemalist elite, along with non-Kemalist secular Turks—including leftists, liberals, democrats, and many urban-educated individuals—constitutes the vertical dimension of populism. These are often portrayed as ‘elites’ (referred to as Beyaz Turkler or White Turks) who are perceived as disconnected from the ‘real’ and authentic values of ‘the people.’ They are frequently caricatured as sipping whisky by the Bosporus while the ‘real Turks’ endure hardships. They are typically accused of imposing historical traumas on ordinary people in the name of Westernization or progress. Turkish-Islamist media intellectuals have particularly popularized the pejorative figure of the White Turk, depicting them as arrogant, elitist, and anti-Islamist. The White Turk is constructed as someone who views practicing Muslims as provincial, lower class, and ignorant to define their own (secular, civilized, and Westernized) identity and justify their authority. In the Erdoganist narrative, the White Turks are held responsible for any issues in the country, with the specter of the past Kemalist regime playing a crucial role in illustrating the potential consequences for ‘the people’ if Erdogan were to lose power (Yilmaz, 2021).
The horizontal dimension is also significant in Erdogan’s populism, and his policies aimed at fostering a pious in-group. This is particularly the case in the recent manifestation of victimhood, which poses that the AKP, Erdogan and the in-group are being threatened and attacked by a range of conspiring internal and external enemies. Alevis, Kurds, Armenians, Jews, liberals, and notably, the Gulen movement became targets within this resurrected discourse, fueling the ‘resentment/revenge of the Sunni constituency against the Westernized elite and citizens practicing a Western lifestyle, perceived as responsible for the banishment of religion itself’ (Yilmaz et al., 2023).
Erdoganist Victimhood and Resentment: Kemalists as the Oppressors
Turkish victimhood discourse has been shaped by several key narrative themes. These themes provide shape to claims of victimhood by describing who the oppressors are, who is being threatened (victimized), and how historical, political or other contextual factors justify and legitimize these narratives.
Turkish victimhood has a long history in the national political arena and there is a degree of continuity between earlier Islamist victimhood, Kemalist victimhood and contemporary Erdoganist victimhood. The insecurities, anxieties, and fears within Erdoganism bear a striking resemblance to those found in Kemalism. Much like their Kemalist counterparts, Turkey’s Islamists harbor their own insecurities, feelings of victimhood, fears, and a siege mentality towards the West. They attribute the decline of revered institutions, namely the Ottoman Empire and the Caliphate, to the West, as documented by Akkoyunlu and Oktem (2016: 510). However, in the Islamist and Erdoganist narrative, Kemalists are viewed as products of Western cultural imperialism—self-colonizing pawns of the godless West fixated on eroding Turkey’s Islamic identity and threatening its Muslim population (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 510). Thus, Erdogan’s populism finds its roots in Turkish Islamist victimhood. It positions itself against the Kemalist hegemony by purporting to represent the demands, interests, victimhood, resentments, and frustrations of practicing Muslims, whom Erdogan frames as the true owners of the country. In this context, the potential for democratization of Turkey only exists if democracy is conceived as the ‘power of the people’ or ‘popular sovereignty’ (Yilmaz, 2021).
Historically, victimhood discourses have held a central place in Islamist ideology in Turkey. The Turkish Islamist victimhood discourse argues that Islamists have been the true victims of the modernization process in Turkey (Yilmaz Z., 2017: 483). At the core of the Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative lies the transformative events of 1923, involving the destruction of the Ottoman State and the establishment of the secular Republic. Kemalist reforms in education, social interactions, and politics dealt a severe blow to the status and wealth of the Islamic establishment.
Consequently, the Kemalists, particularly represented by the Republican People Party (CHP) in political life, became the primary oppressor and threat in Turkish Islamist victimhood discourse. The persecution of leading Islamist intellectuals like Necip Fazil Kisakurek, Said Nursi, and Sezai Karakoc, made possible by new laws, generated deep resentment and disillusionment among intellectuals and their followers toward the existing political order in Turkey. These intellectuals perceived themselves as “alienated in their own country,” forced into “estrangement,” and cast as “pariahs” (Aktay, 2003; see also Singer, 2013). In this Islamist imagination, the history of modern Turkey is entirely framed as the “victimhood of devout Muslims” (Yilmaz Z., 20174: 87).
The Kemalist animosity towards Islamists during the Kemalist decades, exemplified by the Constitutional Court’s frequent closure of Erbakan’s political parties, the “Republican Rally” in 2007, headscarf bans at universities, and continuous demonization of Islamist figures in the media, served to solidify Islamists’ perception of Kemalists as adversaries. This has cultivated a sense of “resentment and victimhood” among Islamists (Yılmaz Z., 2017).
The conspiratorial anxieties and resentments of pro-Erdoganists related to the authoritarian secularism of Kemalism were not entirely unfounded. However, Erdogan’s discourse successfully manipulated these anxieties, fears, and resentments and leveraged them in sweeping narratives of the threat they posed to the fate of the nation and, more broadly, to the Muslim world. These narratives gained intense traction following the Gezi Protests in 2013 and, most prominently, the 2016 coup attempt. In Turkey’s current socio-political climate, even the slightest criticism is now framed as a terrorist activity masterminded by external enemies determined to destroy Turkey, Islam, and the Muslim World.
Islamist Civilizational Populism: Framing the EU and West as Civilizational Enemies
Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Ali Erbas, the head of the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) is seen during a public rally in Istanbul on the second anniversary of failed coup attempt on July 15, 2016. Photo: Shutterstock.
While civilizationism has been interpreted as a form of nationalism, the boundaries of belonging and the semantics of ‘self’ and ‘other’ undergo a reconceptualization when framed in civilizational terms. This perspective presents an alternative to nationalism, wherein the imagined community or nostalgic utopia is situated at a different level of cultural and political space compared to national discourse. It’s crucial to note that civilizationism doesn’t replace nationalism; instead, it becomes intertwined with nationalism (Brubaker, 2017: 1211).
‘Civilizational populism’ (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; 2023) is defined as a set of ideas that asserts politics should reflect the “volonté générale” (general will) of the people. It posits that society is divided into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups: ‘the people’ and ‘the corrupt elite,’ who collaborate with dangerous outsiders from other civilizations. These outsiders are portrayed as hostile and a direct threat to the people’s civilization and way of life (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022; 2023).
A civilisational populist perspective became prevalent in AKP politics following the decline of pro-European Union (EU) reforms and a weakening of ties with the EU. Firstly, it moved away from the prioritization of Westernization and relations-building with the West but, more significantly, it also placed a civilizational perspective at the core of Turkey’s interactions with the EU. This perspective framed Islamic civilization as being fundamentally opposed to Western civilization (Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020: 173-175).
The AKP’s Islamist victimhood narrative portrays a vision of a united Muslim world (the Ummah) threatened by conspiracies orchestrated by “the Crusader West.” This narrative not only designates the ruling Islamist regime as a victim but also frames Turkey as a nation and country under threat. The concept of Islamist victimhood enables the AKP to present itself simultaneously as a target of Western conspiracies and as the foremost defender of Turkey and the entire Muslim world against these perceived conspiracies. This has led to the AKP adopting a transactionalist foreign policy approach towards the EU, stripping away the former ideational or identity-related significance of Turkey-EU relations (Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020: 173-175).
The Arab Spring also presented a crucial opportunity for the AKP, as it offered hope regarding the fall of pro-Western authoritarian regimes, allowing Islamist forces to rise and potentially restore Islamic national identities. In response to the Arab Spring, the AKP identified a strategic window and began defining its civilizational identity in starkly anti-Western terms. This move aimed to address and appeal to anxieties, insecurities, and fears regarding Western retaliation. The AKP embraced its civilizational discourse more vehemently, categorizing the West and Islam as mutually exclusive and antagonistic enemies. Erdogan and his party increasingly employed a civilizational discourse that depicted Turkey as an exclusively Muslim nation. While presenting themselves and their supporters (AKP voters) as native and national, they categorized other political classes and their constituents as non-native due to their allegedly “alien” Western paradigms. Simultaneously, anti-Westernism escalated, with the AKP denouncing the EU/West for undermining Turkey’s alleged rise under AKP rule.
Religio-nationalist Victimhood
Another layer of the AKP’s victimhood discourse converges with the Kemalist national victimhood discourse that portrays Turkey as the prime target of Western powers and their local collaborators. The notion of a national victimhood discourse is deeply ingrained in the Turkish national psyche, emphasizing collective victimhood experienced by the Turkish people, especially at the hands of Western imperialist forces. This narrative, rooted in events dating back to 1908 and exacerbated during WWI, is also propagated through institutional mechanisms like the national curriculum.
Central to Turkey’s victimhood nationalism is what has been termed the Sevres Syndrome – a collective victimhood and siege mentality with roots in the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. This treaty marked the gradual and tumultuous collapse of the Ottoman State. Over time, the memory of this treaty and its associated fears and losses metamorphosed into Sevres Syndrome, giving rise to numerous anti-Western conspiracy theories grounded in nationalism and anti-imperialism. Scholars suggest that the perception of unique in-group victimhood, such as that developed in the Sevres Syndrome, often solidifies national identities, fostering a siege mentality in which certain nations perceive the world as inherently against them.
Both the late Ottoman Empire and the early Turkish Republic grappled with the need to rationalize their defeats and challenges, resorting to a narrative involving external forces and internal adversaries. In the late Ottoman Empire, adversaries included Greece, Armenia, Russia, and the UK. Over time, this narrative evolved to include Kurds, Jews, communists, and Christians as victims of an enduring demonization campaign. Despite changing actors, the narrative has remained fundamentally consistent. Identifying enemies and incorporating conspiracy theories has become an ingrained aspect of the collective mindset, observed among both secularist and Islamist factions within Turkish society (Yilmaz, 2021).
National Victimhood Discourse
Interpreting the world through the narrative lens described above provides both secular and Muslim Turks with a framework that absolves them from extending empathy to other victimized groups, such as the Armenians. Combined with the Sevres Syndrome, it also allows them to present themselves unequivocally as the true victims of historical events. For instance, rather than confronting the reality of the Armenian Genocide, the Turkish state projected Turks as historical victims, portraying them as targets of both murderous Armenians and the depredations of imperial powers. This framework is what we term the national victimhood discourse.
The national victimhood discourse has typically been (ab)used by the ruling elite within Turkish politics. This stands in contrast to the Turkish Islamist victimhood narrative, which emerged as an oppositional underdog narrative. The distinction lies in the requirement of victimhood nationalism for the claimant to represent both the nation and the state, necessitating a position of power to do so. The nation and state are the primary targets of victimization in this context, diverging from Turkish Islamist victimhood, where Islamists and their conservative constituents are the focus. Consequently, those invoking Turkish Islamist victimhood should ideally only speak on behalf of these particular segments.
Victimhood Narratives – and Their Evolution – During the AKP’s Rising Hegemony
Erdogan supporters are seen during the commemorations for the second anniversary of the 2016 coup attempt in Istanbul on July 15, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
The discussion above briefly outlined the key actors held responsible in AKP’s victimhood discourse, and the key influential factors that have shaped its narratives. In the following section, the content of these narratives and their evolution will be analyzed, investigating the initial articulations of victimization which were primarily in response to various socio-political and historical events. It will then examine their transformation and adoption of manufactured narratives and an increased reliance on conspiracy theories, which have been necessary to maintain a victimhood status—even as the AKP has become the most powerful hegemon in contemporary Turkey.
The evolution of the AKP’s contemporary victimhood narrative is marked by the integration of victimhoods associated with religio-nationalism, Turkish nationalism and Islamist populism. The party positions itself as a victimized yet conversely hegemonic entity speaking on behalf of the entire nation and, in an imagined sense, the Ummah. The contemporary manifestation of their claim to victimhood goes beyond these components to encompass an additional discursive layer of manufactured victimhood.
The AKP’s narrative of victimhood persists despite governing the country for twenty-one uninterrupted years and having acquired extensive political powers. When faced with challenges like economic downturns due to its policies or evidence of corruption, the party resorts to blaming external entities, such as foreign forces or interest lobbies, deflecting responsibility.
Initial Era of Victimhood Narratives: Predominantly Anti-Kemalist
The AKP’s rise to power in the 2002 general elections marked a significant departure from the long-standing dominance of Kemalists in Turkish politics. Utilizing the discontent of pious Muslims and broader dissatisfaction stemming from economic challenges, the AKP employed a potent populist discourse that perpetuated the belief that the majority were victims of the established order.
In the early 2000s, the AKP successfully portrayed itself as the victim of the ‘White Turks,’ referencing the Kemalist hegemony and military tutelage that discriminated against conservative segments of society. Turkish Islamists described themselves as the ‘Black Turks’ (Bilici, 2009; Demiralp, 2012; Arat-Koc, 2018), claiming to have endured oppression at the hands of the Kemalist hegemony since the establishment of the Republic. In constructing this opposition (Black Turks vs White Turks), the AKP was able to portray themselves as the voice of the Black Turks. Erdogan consistently asserted his identity as a ‘Black Turk,’ for instance stating on one occasion, “In this country, there is a segregation of Black Turks and White Turks. Your brother Tayyip belongs to the Black Turks.” On another occasion, he expressed, “I am honored to be a Black Turk” (Sabah, 2015).
During its two initial terms, the AKP’s victimhood discourses effectively highlighted Kemalist-era policies, including the February 28, 1997 “post-moder coup,” the headscarf ban, and discrimination in bureaucratic and military sectors. This political period saw a distancing from overtly Islamist victimhood references, and it was during this time that Erdogan famously stated the party had shed the garment of Islamism.
In its initial phase of governance, the AKP maintained a pro-Western stance while focusing on its primary objective of challenging the Kemalist establishment. The primary resentment of Turkish-Islamist subjects was initially directed at White Turks, Kemalist elites, and CHP cadres. It persistently asserted that its struggle against the establishment was fundamentally a fight for democracy and human rights—a strategic move, considering the fate of its predecessors. The victimization under the Kemalist regime extended beyond conservative Muslims, encompassing Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, liberals, and socialists to varying degrees throughout the Republican period.
Around the turn of the millennium, especially within the context of a military tutelage system, it became evident that a broader community needed to unite around a general democratization agenda. This unity was crucial for the AKP to address specific demands and gain power, resulting in the AKP and various victimized segments of society becoming mutually dependent in challenging the Kemalist tutelage regime. To garner support and demonstrate inclusivity, the AKP invited a broad spectrum of political actors, predominantly from center-right and liberal backgrounds, to participate in the party’s decision-making processes. Their narratives of Turkish victimhood incorporated discourses addressing long-standing issues faced by minorities under the Kemalist reign (Acikel, 1996; Demiralp, 2012; Yılmaz Z., 2017; Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2018). This discursive period of victimhood was grounded in real events and did not rely on conspiracy theories.
Aligning with its conservative democratic discourse, the AKP did not focus solely on expressing Muslim resentment but sought to empathize with other victimhood narratives and attempted to build a coalition among various marginalized groups. The party collaborated with actors such as the Gulen movement, religious Kurds, some Alevis, and the liberal democratic segments of society. These groups consistently supported the AKP, at least until the Gezi events in 2013, and benefited from the opportunity structures that emerged following the AKP’s election in 2002
Articulating Narratives of Human Rights Abuses
The AKP government responded to the demands of their coalition of victims by implementing reforms aimed at safeguarding human rights, especially in minority affairs. Between 2004 and 2013, significant openings were created in response to non-Muslim, Kurdish, and Alevi issues. Erdogan – the leader of this coalition of victims – opportunistically attempted to redirect the resentments of the non-Muslims, Kurds and Alevis toward blame attribution towards the CHP and Kemalism.
The AKP strategically anchored its victimhood claims in human rights discourses during the pre-Gezi period. Articulations of human rights (and human rights abuses) became a crucial tool for the AKP to assert and maintain its victimhood status. In a domestic political context, human rights arguments can be powerful in evoking a sense of ‘victimhood,’ portraying the state as an all-encompassing hegemon inflicting pain on less powerful groups. The AKP effectively utilized this argument, leveraging the balance of power in Turkish politics and events under the Kemalist regime, such as party closure cases, the headscarf ban, Erdogan’s short-term imprisonment, and the military’s rejection of Abdullah Gul’s presidential election due to his wife’s headscarf, which lent legitimacy to their rhetoric (Grigoriadis & Dilek, 2018: 299).
Victimhood Claims Taking on New Dimensions in Response to Key Political Events
In the pre-Gezi period, Turkish Islamist victimhood was primarily domestic, focusing on its underdog status against the Kemalists. However, the government response to the 2013 Gezi protests marked a significant departure from the predominantly anti-Kemalist and victimhood narratives that the AKP had been disseminating since coming into power. Erdogan perceived and presented the Gezi protests as a severe threat to his personal power, prompting a desperate need for new rhetoric to counter the peaceful civil protests. As Kemalist-centric victimhood narratives lost appeal, the AKP sought a new political discourse to reassert its victimhood status. During the Gezi protests, Erdogan resorted to civilisationist Islamist rhetoric, portraying not only the government but Turkey in its entirety as a victim of an international conspiracy orchestrated by the West and its local allies. This narrative amalgamated elements of ‘national victimhood discourse’ and ‘Turkish Islamist victimhood’ and positioned itself as a perpetual victim of various groups, countries, and interests, including Germany, the US, the UK, and media outlets Otpor! and CNN. The AKP also deployed a discourse of needing to protect itself and the ummah against imaginary enemies, including the ‘supreme intelligence,’ ‘interest rate lobbies,’ and foreign adversaries (Yilmaz, 2021).
In the same year as the Gezi Protests, the 2013 military coup in Egypt against the Muslim Brotherhood-supported presidency of Mohammad Morsi dealt both a geopolitical and psychological blow to the AKP leadership (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 518). The fall of a crucial Islamist ally and the imprisonment of its elected leader undermined the AKP’s regional aspirations, contributing to a deeper level of insecurity and an alarmist reading of domestic and regional dynamics. Importantly, the event validated Turkish Islamist’s deep mistrust and resentment towards the West. They perceived the muted response of Western media and governments to the coup, compared to the extensive attention given to the Gezi Protests, and the swift endorsement of the military-backed regime in Egypt, as proof of its double standards regarding democracy in the Muslim world (Akkoyunlu & Oktem, 2016: 518).
The controversial coup attempt on July 15, 2016, was also a traumatizing event for millions of Erdoganists (Adisonmez & Onursal, 2020: 298). Erdogan adeptly turned the failed coup attempt into an extraordinary source of popular support, using the event as a rallying and mobilizing opportunity. More importantly, he gained the unwavering support of conservative religious and nationalist segments of society by articulating a discourse that instilled fear and anxiety, portraying all opposition and criticism as detrimental to their interests, lifestyles, and even to their existence (Ozen, 2020: 1-3). He consistently used a discourse of securitization to maintain this anxiety and fear, framing opposition to his government as an attack against Islam, the nation’s unity, the flag, and all sacred national values.
Islamist Populism and Historical Islamist Victimhood
The political events detailed in the previous section have contributed significantly to the victimhood narratives propagated by Erdogan and the AKP. Although these events intersect with religious populism, there is also a distinct layer of victimhood that stems directly from Islamism and historical Islamist victimhood and addresses the perceived victimization of Muslims at the hands of various oppressors. Victimhood accounts within Turkish Islamism assert that Islamists have been the true casualties of Turkey’s modernization process, with a particular focus on the demise of the Ottoman State and the subsequent establishment of the secular Republic in 1923. Islamist populism plays a significant role in shaping AKP’s key narratives about friends and foes, and victims and victimizers. It has also allowed Erdogan and his party to create a victimhood discourse that connects to broader and transnational Muslim victimhood themes and narratives.
Turkish Islamist victimhood is rooted in historical experiences of victimization, stretching back to the early Republican period and, for the AKP, encompassing party closures, military coups, detainment, and headscarf bans. At the core of this victimhood narrative lies the profound impact of secular Kemalist reforms in education, social structures, and politics, which dealt a severe blow to the prior status and wealth of the Islamic establishment. The oversight of all religious education and preaching was centralized under the state-affiliated Diyanet, and numerous religious institutions, including dervish lodges and Islamic charities, were prohibited or abolished. The new Turkish Criminal Code criminalized almost all forms of non-state (non-Diyanet) religious dissemination, leading to the persecution of various religious groups.
While certain historical events during the Kemalist era did disadvantage Islamists, the core of Islamist ‘victimhood’ in the Turkish case is primarily grounded in an ‘imaginary’ context. The articulation of these victimizations powerfully combines factual events with imaginary elements. This blending serves to amplify and sanctify their significance, contributing to narratives of victimhood that resonate emotionally and symbolically within the broader Islamist community. Within this Islamist imagination, modern Turkish history is framed as witnessing the ‘victimhood of devout Muslims.’ This framing is deeply embedded within the political imagination of Islamists, existing in a realm where the boundaries between reality and fiction are blurred, and encompasses material practices, emotions, symbolic efficacy, performances, and dramatizations.
Although neither the AKP nor Turkey are officially the leader of the Muslim world, the Turkish Islamist imaginary envisions them as such (Cinar, 2018; Sezal & Sezal, 2017). Consequently, attacks against Turkish Islamists are portrayed as direct attacks against the Muslim world. President Erdogan, considered by many as the ‘heir presumptive’ of the caliphate and the leader of the Muslim world, plays a central role in legitimizing and disseminating this idea. In his famous balcony speeches following election victories, Erdogan claimed “Sarajevo won today as much as Istanbul. Beirut won as much as Izmir. Damascus won as much as Ankara. Ramallah, Nablus, Jenin, the West Bank, [and] Jerusalem won as much as Diyarbakir” (Phillips, 2017: 29). This suggests that his political victory in Turkey is a success for all Muslim lands. In this narrative, even minor losses for the AKP are construed as significant blows to the Muslim world.
Transitioning to a Manufactured Victimhood
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has transitioned from being a model of democratic political Islam to an Islamist populist autocrat. Photo: Mustafa Kirazli.
While Turkish Islamist victimhood encompasses both real and imagined accounts of events, it is important to note that this perception is not necessarily deliberate. It is a product of how Islamists interpret their political environment. In contrast, manufactured victimhood strategically combines the imagined Turkish Islamist victimhood with deliberately constructed falsehoods. Unlike Turkish Islamist and nationalist victimhood narratives, which originate from real events and their dramatizations, manufactured victimhood deliberately fabricates narratives—often in stark contradiction to the AKP’s hegemonic status—to create a sense of victimhood where none exists.
Despite the persuasiveness of the AKP’s victimhood claims, during its first decade in power, its overreliance on them eventually took its toll. Since their 2011 election victory, the AKP’s own supporters found it difficult to consolidate victimhood narratives that claimed the party was an underdog in Turkish politics. Regardless, even in 2014, the AKP continued to depict itself “as the oppressed blacks” and “eternal underdogs of Turkish society” (Yilmaz, 2021). Eventually, though, AKP’s Islamist victimhood vis-à-vis the Kemalists, which relied on human rights discourses, ceased to yield favorable political results.
The persuasiveness of this messaging took an even steeper dive after 2016, when the AKP became the nation’s primary hegemonic power in Turkish politics and succeeded in marginalizing the Kemalist tutelage (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018). At this juncture, the AKP needed a new ‘anchor’ to re-establish itself as a victim, which it found in anti-Western conspiracy theories. The AKP no longer required the support of the EU, as the pressure for democratization, anti-corruption measures, and transparency had become burdensome. By this point, the AKP deemed transactional relations with the EU to be sufficient (for a detailed analysis, see Bashirov & Yilmaz, 2020).
It was during this time that the AKP’s victimhood acquired more imaginary dimensions, and the party began constructing an imaginary victimhood narrative combined with Islamist civilizationism. These narratives rely on perpetuating anti-Western conspiracy theories to rationalize its problems, failures, and inefficiencies. This narrative shift allows the AKP to deflect criticism, attribute internal challenges to external actors, and maintain a sense of being besieged, despite holding significant political power. For the AKP, the West became a convenient rhetorical foil against which it sought to define the struggle of the faithful and the “national will” (Hoffman et al., 2018: 5).
Erdogan played a crucial role in creating momentum for this discursive shift in victimhood. As the leader acquired significant power, he shifted blame away from himself, propagated the belief that the AKP was being threatened or attacked by internal and external enemies, and disseminated securitization narratives (Lancaster, 2014: 1684). These narratives became more entrenched in the years that followed. For instance, on July 21, 2020, while reflecting on the second anniversary of the new presidential system, he passionately declared: “The Turkish nation and the Republic of Turkey are undergoing a historical period. In this period, there are all kinds of traps, attacks, conspiracies, betrayal, pain, and trouble. The Turkish Nation, with its citizens and security forces, is carrying out its struggle for independence and future, step by step to victory. We are determined to continue this struggle forever for the future of all our friends and brothers (the Muslim World) … Yes, we, as a nation that shed our sweat and blood, when necessary, believe that we will be gifted with God’s good tidings. We are well aware that the attacks that we have been experiencing for the last 7 years have aimed at our belief, history, culture, unity, togetherness, ezan (call to prayer), flag, and all our sacred values. We have no doubt that from the turmoil in the streets to the coup attempts, each attack meant shotgun shots for the same target. Our nation with its wisdom acquired through a thousand years of experience has seen this reality and has decided to join the ranks of its future and independence. It is our duty to pay our debt against this sacrifice of our nation by working with sacrifice, diligence and perseverance that will spoil all the conspiracies” (Erdogan, 2020: 2, 7).
Manufactured victimhood encompasses multiple layers, incorporating not only its own manufactured narratives but also elements of Turkish Islamist and nationalist victimhood. Major events like the Gezi Protests and the attempted coup illustrate the utilization of all three layers within different arguments presented by the AKP. This multifaceted approach serves to perpetuate the victimhood narrative, projecting the party as simultaneously oppressed despite wielding significant power. The strategic use of manufactured victimhood allows the AKP to shape public perception, maintain a sense of solidarity among its supporters, and deflect attention from internal challenges or criticisms.
The above discussion highlights how the AKP’s strategic move to adopt anti-Western conspiracy theories navigates the changing dynamics of Turkish politics. This new narrative angle resonates with a segment of its support base, explaining economic challenges, international scrutiny, and internal dissent. This new narrative anchor helps sustain victimhood rhetoric, even as the AKP’s political landscape and power dynamics undergo significant transformations.
Conclusion
To trace the trajectory of the AKP’s discourse of victimhood, it is essential to first acknowledge its roots in the broader historical context of Turkish Islamist ideology. For decades, Islamist discourse depicted its adherents as the oppressed ‘Black Turks,’ enduring discrimination under Kemalist rule since the Republic’s founding. Discriminatory practices in public service recruitment, the disapproval of conservative traditions by Kemalist leaders, and pivotal events like the February 28 process, the headscarf ban, and Erdogan’s imprisonment collectively fueled and solidified the Islamist victimhood narrative by the turn of the millennium.
The AKP’s electoral triumphs have been intricately linked to the strategic deployment of victimhood discourses, casting its opposition as antagonists while presenting the party and its support base as victims. Initially directed at Kemalists, particularly the main opposition CHP, the AKP’s victimhood narrative evolved into a multi-layered framework post-Gezi, seamlessly and concurrently adopting anti-Western conspiracy theories. Notably, the party expanded its narratives of victimization beyond domestic boundaries, aligning its fate with the Muslim Ummah and employing victimhood to legitimize crackdowns on domestic opposition. This narrative shielded the AKP from criticism and effectively stifled dissent, especially in the face of corruption scandals.
An intriguing aspect of the AKP’s narrative is its dual portrayal, presenting itself as a domestic hegemon and protector of the nation, while simultaneously depicting itself as an underdog and target in global politics against the West. The adept utilization of conspiracy theories is an attempt to maintain the AKP’s image as the sole representative of Turkey and casting the West as an omnipotent hegemon in the geopolitical arena.
The multifaceted functions of victimhood claims within the political sphere are evident in the AKP’s narrative. Pre-Gezi, victimhood, coupled with human rights discourse, bolstered the AKP’s moral standing against Kemalists and the West. This narrative not only resonated with the conservative masses but also justified the party’s crackdowns on opposition, both internally and externally. The narrative’s evolution into an internationalized victimhood, seamlessly merging historical grievances with contemporary political maneuvering, showcases the adaptability and resilience of the AKP’s discursive strategy within the ever-shifting landscape of Turkish politics.
The political benefits of claiming victimhood—providing moral superiority, absolving guilt and shame, justifying misdeeds, enabling unfair behavior, and evading responsibility—is evident in the political sphere, as seen in the AKP’s narrative.
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Abstract
This article seeks to investigate populism in Ireland, but more specifically the populist left-leaning party Sinn Féin. Although having a checkered past, in the last decade the party has seen a surge in popularity as the alternative voting option. Up until now academic literature discussing the populist nature of Sinn Féin often struggles to define it as such, and so, using political psychology and a clear definition of populism, this article not only categorizes the party as a populist, but also discusses its history and what effect it has had (or lack thereof) on its popularity in the leadup to the last few elections. Furthermore, the article concludes by investigating why the momentum the party had as the alternative choice slowed down, and how this vacuum allowed other fringe populist parties to see greater success during the 2024 elections.
Keywords: Populism, Ireland, Sinn Féin, Irish elections
On the periphery of Europe is the small island nation of Ireland – often overlooked due to its much larger, and arguably more internationally important neighbor, the United Kingdom (UK). Despite this overshadowing, Ireland is no less important when studying the rise of populism on the European continent. Having faced numerous issues since the 2008 economic crisis, particularly with the provision of healthcare, housing, and more recently immigration, dissatisfaction with the two historically important rival parties – Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil – has boosted the popularity of the populist alternatives. One such party on the left of the political spectrum is People Before Profit – Solidarity (PBP-S), contrasted by the parties Aontú and Independent Ireland on the right. However, the best-case study for the growth of populism in the lead up to the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections is Sinn Féin – a controversial left-leaning populist party who has a long history of relevance in the Republic, but only recently has begun shaking off its connection to the Irish Republican Army (IRA), a paramilitary organization seeking Irish reunification with Northern Ireland.
Delving into the history of Sinn Féin will highlight why a generational divide exists between voters, and why the party is considered controversial. Building on this, the article will primarily focus on Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric and campaigning using political psychology to analyze how they have used emotionally provocative language to sway the electorate to vote for them. As PBP-S and Aontú failed to make any significant gains in the 2020 and 2024 elections, they will only briefly be looked at. The new Independent Ireland party, founded as of December 2023, does however require a longer investigation at the end of this article, as they managed to gain one seat in the EU Parliament elections in 2024. Finally, while independent politicians are politically relevant in Ireland, this article will focus solely on Irish political parties. Analyzing independents in depth would require a separate, dedicated piece of work.
Historical Context of Sinn Féin
It might seem odd to those outside of Ireland that to understand modern Sinn Féin one must first return to 1913 when Ireland was still a part of the UK. In this year the Irish Volunteers, a paramilitary organization of Irish nationalists and republicans, was founded in direct response to the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (Martin, 2013: 1-4). Whilst the latter sought to oppose domestic self-government on the island, the Irish Volunteers sought to secure and maintain the ‘rights and liberties common to the whole people of Ireland’ (Martin, 2013: 4). After a failed military coup in 1916 by rebels, who were predominantly Irish Volunteers, widespread dissatisfaction with British rule began to emerge across the island, both in the response to the British execution of the revolutionaries, but specifically to the Conscription Crisis of 1918 which sought to impose a British military draft within Ireland during the First World War (WWI) (Irish Times, 2017; Laffan, 1999: 122-168).
Sinn Féin, founded in 1905 as a conservative party advocating for a dual monarchy with the UK, saw many of its members join the Irish Volunteers during the 1916 Easter Rising, resulting in the Irish Times (1917) dubbing it the ‘the Sinn Féin Rebellion.’ Various republicans across the political spectrum flocked to the party thereafter, and in 1918 Sinn Féin changed political direction – now committed to achieving an independent Irish republic (Laffan, 1999: 4). The first post-WWI (and post-Rising) election in 1918 saw Sinn Féin win a landslide victory with 46.9% of the vote on the island, whilst in the north only securing 19% of the vote (de Bromhead et al., 2020: 890). In 1919, the independent Irish state sought by the rebels of 1916, became a step closer to reality with the formation of the elected Irish assembly named the Dáil Éireann (Farrell, 1971).
Figure 1: A 1918 electoral map of Ireland. Green are Sinn Féin seats, orange are Unionist seats and white represents the Irish Party (RTÉ, 2015).
Following the brutal Irish War of Independence, peace negotiations between the members of the Dáil and the British government concluded in 1921 with a treaty that saw the partition of the island between the republican south and the unionist north, the latter of whom was to remain within the UK (Saorstát Eireann, 1922). Amongst other terms, Ireland would also remain within the British Commonwealth under a Dominion status, similar to that of Canada, and required members of the Dáil to swear an oath of allegiance to the British monarch. Both Sinn Féin and its military wing, the IRA, was split on whether or not to accept the treaty. More hardline elements argued that the fight should continue until the entire island was free from British rule and recognized as a free and independent republican nation. However, a narrow vote of 64 votes to 57 saw the treaty ratified in the Dáil, resulting in a nearly yearlong bloody civil war between the pro-treaty IRA (reorganized as the ‘Defense Forces’) and the anti-treaty IRA. Sinn Féin had been marred by the civil war as anti-treaty politicians abstained from partaking in the Dáil, whilst pro-treaty politicians founded the new political party Cumann na nGaedheal (which would later merge with two other organizations in 1933 to form Fine Gael). Sinn Féin disintegrated thereafter, losing all relevance once its anti-treaty leader, Éamon de Valera, left the party to found Fianna Fáil – primarily abandoning their abstentionist stance towards the Dáil (Laffan, 1999: 441).
A surprise victory by Fianna Fáil in 1932 put the remaining IRA on the backfoot, as initially Fianna Fáil legalized the organization and freed all the post-civil war prisoners, but ultimately refused to dispute the partitioned north and failed to declare a republican Ireland (Coogan, 2008: 29). De Valera criminalized the IRA once again in 1936 following high profile murders, but at this stage the organization was a shadow of its former self (Laffan, 1999: 448). During the 1930’s the more left-leaning IRA had founded their own rival organization, the Republican Congress, and the fascist right-wing members joined with Cumann na nGaedheal and their ‘Blueshirts’ modelled on the Italian fascist paramilitary militia nicknamed the ‘Blackshirts’ (Laffan, 1999: 448). IRA numbers decreased even more significantly when a large majority of its republic seeking members left the organization once Fianna Fáil introduced a republican constitution in 1937, abolishing the Oath of Allegiance to the British monarchy, introducing an elected president as head of state, and making a territorial claim to Northern Ireland (Constitution of Ireland, 1937).
Although the remaining members of the IRA were unified by the goal of ending the partition in Northern Ireland, they were on the fringes of both the left- and right-wings of the political spectrum. As is evident by members leaving to form their own political parties in the previous decade, in the aftermath of the Second World War the IRA was struggling to maintain its numbers and believed political organization was necessary to rebuild. Its leadership voted and passed the resolution instructing IRA members to join the irrelevant Sinn Féin party, and repurpose it as the political party of the IRA (Maillot, 2015: 128). With such a wide range of political beliefs amongst its remaining members, the party’s nearly sole political priority was that of reunification. Thereafter, the IRA began conducting armed operations in Northern Ireland, initially receiving political support from the south which most evident in the election of four new Sinn Féin TDs to the Dáil in 1957 (Maillot, 2015: 10).
This militaristic momentum was ultimately lost by the 1961 election with the introduction of internment without trial, both in Northern Ireland and the Republic. The failed military campaign was called off and the IRA became dominated by new, younger, left-leaning members, which cumulated in the election of the Marxist Cathal Goulding as Chief of Staff. These left-wing members split from Sinn Féin to establish the Worker’s Party following disagreements over how to frame the struggle for unification in Northern Ireland. The more traditional Northern ‘Provisional IRA’ sought to frame the conflict through a nationalist and religious lens, as Catholic Irish against Protestant British, whilst the socialist/communist ‘Official IRA’ of the Republic sought to frame it through class warfare, and believed unification could be solved through political means (Gregory, 2010; Maillot, 2015: 169). The Provisionals would continue in the same year to conduct a thirty-year armed campaign against what they described as a British occupation of Northern Ireland, today known as ‘the Troubles.’ The conflict only officially ended in 1998 with the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, claiming the lives of roughly 3,532 individuals, with the IRA being responsible for more than half this number (CAIN, n.d.).
Figure 2: Distribution of Catholics, at ward level, across Northern Ireland in 2001 (Prasannan, 2003).
Methodology
Defining ‘populism’ is often a difficult endeavor. For this article the widely accepted ‘the people’ vs ‘the elite’ narrative used by populist parties will be the primary qualifier to defining a party as populist. This theory argues that populists present “‘the people’ as a morally good force and contrasts them against ‘the elite,’ who are portrayed as corrupt and self-serving” (ECPS, n.d.). Investigating how modern Sinn Féin use this type of language against their rivals, Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil, will therefore be paramount in establishing them as one such populist party. But what type of language can be considered populist, especially when one man’s populist can be another man’s regular definition of a politician? In this case, the use of emotionally charged language will be used as the basis for investigation, primarily built on the ideas of political psychology that study the affect that emotions have of political mobilization (Aytac et al., 2024). Guillem Rico, Marc Guinjoan and Eva Anduiza’s article of how anger is mobilized will be the baseline for judging whether or not a statement or claim is populist (Rico et al., 2017). In their words: “Anger is linked to the perception that a frustrating event is certain, externally caused, and unfair… chiefly, the external attribution of blame and its fierce moral and confrontational outlook” (Rico et al., 2017: 445).
Using this foundation, we can deduce that Sinn Féin’s populist messaging revolves around being anti-establishment and anti-corporate, most evident in blaming the previous Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil governments for Irelands political issues by being ‘beholden to corporate interests’ (Sinn Féin, 2019). This article will only consider discourse that explicitly highlights an ‘us’ vs ‘them’ narrative as populist, meaning that which does not only state something a former government did, but actively generalizes and paints the opposition as the enemy in some manner. The following example highlights what this means: “In addition, the maintenance grant was cut and restricted under Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael Governments during the economic downturn and no sufficient attempts have been made by either party to restore them. Our third-level education system is simply not accessible to all. It is becoming less accessible to many on the basis of financial means” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 36).
In this paragraph arguing for free education in Sinn Féin’s 2020 manifesto, it is clearly stated that the party believes that previous governments are at fault for making education less accessible. However, while some may consider there to be populist undertones to this paragraph, there is no explicit discourse used that can be considered as emotionally charged. Compared to this paragraph from the same manifesto: “Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing, how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet” (Sinn Féin, 2020: 25).
We can clearly see that it uses a strong anti-establishment and anti-corporate message to evoke an emotional response by broadly claiming corporations only wish to make money from crises. This supports the previous definition of ‘anger’ which includes ‘moral evaluations constitut[ing] a key component of the populist belief system’ (Rico et al., 2017: 449). To this end, an appendix will be included at the end of this article to show which pieces of texts were considered to be populist. Some researchers may argue that Sinn Féin’s manifestos and campaigns contain more (or less) populist language, but the key issue is that it is present in the first place—and, as will be shown, to a much greater extent than in the other two mainstream political parties in Ireland.
When investigating the demographic details of supporters for populist parties, exit polls often provide the best answer. Yet, to support this information, this article will also delve into the opinion pieces written by party supporters as they often give a more personal and grounded view on what issues they find pressing, and why they urge other voters to vote the same way. This is yet another attempt to gauge the emotions that populist parties tap into during their campaigns. Readers must be made aware that Ireland has a unique system of voting which is termed the ‘single transferable vote’ (STV), which is even used for the European Parliamentary elections. In summary, this voting system allows individuals to rank politicians on the ballot and, in theory, seeks to ensure that the electorate has at least some representation in government (Electoral Reform Society, n.d.).
STV most often results in coalition governments, sometimes even excluding the party with the most votes if they fail to form a coalition with the various other parties and independent politicians elected to parliament. An extreme example of this was the first Irish inter-party government following the 1948 general election which saw a grand coalition of five different political parties, and independent politicians, all led by Fine Gael to keep de Valera and his Fianna Fáil party out (McCullagh, 1998). Here, Fianna Fáil was six seats short of a majority, and up to then had been winning successive elections since 1932. For this reason, the popular vote is often gauged by the first preference of voters, not by the coalition government that claims majority in the Dáil.
The Popular Populist Leftist Party
Sinn Féin’s populist anti-establishment and anti-corporate messaging is clearly seen in the party’s manifestos. Particularly looking at when Mary Lou McDonald took over the party, there are blatant examples such as in the 2019 EU election manifesto: “EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people;” the 2020 general election manifesto: “Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power;” and the 2024 EU election manifesto: “There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States. Sinn Féin’s vision, in contrast, is for a European Union that works better for the people of Europe, that focuses on common challenges which we are best dealing with collectively – the cost-of-living crisis, food security, regional development, and climate change.”
Counting the number of times, we see the clear use of emotionally provocative and ‘us’ vs ‘them’ language being used, 10 instances can be found in their 16 paged 2019 EU Parliament election manifesto, 19 instances in their 110 paged 2020 general election manifesto, and three instances in their 27 paged 2024 EU Parliament election manifesto (See Appendix). Comparatively, there was no similar language used in both Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’s manifestos from the same time (See Manifesto section in the bibliography for sources).
Manifestos only provide one avenue of investigation, their annual Ard Fheis, or annual party conference, is rife with emotionally charged discourse that portray Sinn Féin as the best party for the people to fight back against a corrupt elitist government. Take this example from McDonald’s speech in 2021: “I know you have had it with governments giving tax breaks to millionaire executives while homeless children eat dinner off cardboard on the street. Governments for the developers and bankers, for the cozy club and the insiders. It’s time now for a government for you and your family” (McDonald, 2021). Similarly, in 2023: “We ask for our chance. The others have had theirs. The longer they remain in power the worse things get. I’m asking you to back Sinn Féin. To back change and the future that you and your family deserve” (McDonald, 2023)
Such discourse builds into the larger political campaign that seeks to win votes by tapping into the ‘angry vote,’ the vote that seeks to disrupt the status quo, or as one voter puts it: “to send a message to the establishment” (Frayer, 2024). The younger generation played a key role in Sinn Féin’s strategy, which naturally involved leveraging social media to boost their popularity. Through various platforms, they were able to sustain the narrative that they represented the best chance for real change:
Figure 3: Screenshot example of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in Facebook posts (Sinn Féin, 2024).
Sinn Féin in a Post-Troubles Ireland
Clearly meeting the definition of populism, Sinn Féin’s use of emotionally provocative language attracts angry voters. However, the party is still affected by its historic links to the IRA. For instance, during his 2017 trial over his involvement in the killing of David Byrne a year earlier, Sinn Féin Teachta Dála (TD) Jonathan Dowdall was found guilty of membership in the IRA (BBC, 2017). Sinn Féin had already begun distancing itself from Dowdall after his resignation from the party in 2014—a move he attributed to bullying but could be seen as the party proactively managing the issue (Fegan, 2015).
On February 10, 2018, in a further attempt to shake off its bloody past, Mary Lou McDonald succeeded the controversial Gerry Adams, an individual who may have been a leading member of the IRA, despite his continuous denial of these allegations (O’Neill, 2019). McDonald differs from other leading members of Sinn Féin as she is a career politician with seemingly no ties to the paramilitary organization and was once part of Fianna Fáil but left the party due to policy differences and a strong support for Irish Unity – the latter issue of which she seemed to be undecisive about during Brexit (McCormack, 2020). More recently, during a televised national RTÉ’s Prime Time leaders’ debate a month before the 2020 election, McDonald was confronted with a question regarding a murder investigation that the victim’s family strongly claims was perpetrated by the IRA (BBC, 2020b). In the same election, after finding out he had been elected to the Dáil, Sinn Féin’s David Cullinane celebrated by ending his speech with: “Up the Republic, Up the ‘Ra. Tiocfaidh ár Lá” – the latter translating to ‘our day will come,’ a popular IRA slogan, alongside the show of support to the IRA that “Up the ‘Ra” displays (McGee & Leahy, 2020).
Since the Good Friday Agreement and their decision to end its support for the IRA’s armed struggle, Sinn Féin’s popularity has been steadily increasing (Adams, 1996). Within the national elections Sinn Féin obtained 2.55% of the vote in 1997, 6.5% in 2002, 6.94% in 2007, 9.94% in 2011, and 13.85% in 2016. The targeting of ‘those left behind’ has been the cornerstone of their campaigning in the post-2008 political climate, as affordable housing and accessible healthcare became the pressing issues over the last decade (Brennan, 2023).
Despite lingering links to the IRA, modern support for Sinn Féin comes from three primary sources. Staunch grassroot supporters of the party still have the primary goal of a united Ireland, dissatisfied that Northern Ireland is still part of the UK. The Irish Times investigated how these supporters viewed the change of leadership in 2018, and found they were excited by the prospect of McDonald offering a fresh new perspective, as long as policy remained the same – “…Irish unity, reconciliation, a shared republic, a big change in social conditions” (McGee, 2018). In an election exit poll conducted by The Irish Times, RTÉ, TG4 and University College Dublin after the 2020 general election, it was found that new Sinn Féin voters were predominantly younger, aged between 18-35, showing the effectiveness of Sinn Féin’s described strategy of ‘playing down the paramilitary legacy but without irking the republican base’ (Boyce, 2024; Collins, 2020). This could explain how the party can draw younger generations to vote for the party, as they do not have the same connection to ‘the Troubles’ that older generation might have, whilst retaining their ultimate goal of reunification. Polls and opinion pieces highlight that younger people feel let down by the continued dominance of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael in Irish politics – with housing and cost of living being the dominant pressing issues for this generation (IPSOS, B&A & The Irish Times, 2024; Haverty, 2022; Irish Times, 2022; Taylor, 2024). Finally, ‘those left behind’ also includes the working class that support the party’s leftist policies and have been one of the long-time supporters of Sinn Féin. The Think Ireland 2024 election poll provides concrete evidence of this as 61% of Sinn Féin voters described themselves as working class – the second highest group of working-class voters, right behind the ‘other right’ voters (Cunningham, 2024).
Sinn Féin During the Irish 2020 General Elections – The Time for Change?
In the lead up to the Irish general election of 2020 the fallout from Brexit had been one of the dominant political situations, but surprisingly it had very little impact on the campaign trail (Murphy, 2021). Instead, domestic issues—namely housing and healthcare—were the primary focus for all Irish parties. In healthcare, waiting times for appointments and admittance to inpatient hospital beds were at an all-time high, having increased year by year since 2016 (Department of Health, 2019). Housing is an issue resulting from rising rent and house prices. In 2020 the Irish Times explained: “Since 2012, house and apartment prices in Dublin have risen by 90 percent and 80 percent respectively (a little less in the country at large), while wages have increased by only 18 percent” (McWilliams & Taylor, 2020). Too few new housing builds, high prices for lower-priced apartments, all compound this issue (Tedin & Faubert, 2020).
The Irish general election of 2020 took place on February 8, roughly a month before the country-wide Covid-19 lockdown (Carroll, 2020). In a surprising turn, Sinn Féin received 24.5% of first preference votes, more than Fianna Fáil (22.2%) and Fine Gael (20.9%), and was set to form a majority coalition government if they could find allies to do so (Robertson, 2020). Ultimately Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, together having 72 of the 81-seat required for majority, formed a coalition alongside the Green Party. This kept Sinn Féin from governing, much to the party’s outrage and protests (BBC, 2020a). But why did Sinn Féin surge in popularity in this particular election?
The tipping point came from young people, especially those in the 18-35 year demographic that voted primarily with the housing issue in mind (Collins, 2020; Ní Aodha, 2020). This, coupled with dissatisfaction with how Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil had been running the country since the financial crisis, offered Sinn Féin an opportunity as the alternative vote. One analysis indicates that in the leadup to the election, the decision of RTÉ to initially exclude Sinn Féin in the televised Leader’s Debate, coupled with the refusal of the other two parties to form a coalition with Sinn Féin in case they gained enough votes, help to form a self-fulfilling prophecy that Sinn Féin was being excluded by the ‘old boys club’ of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael’ (BBC, 2020b; Brennan & McConnell, 2020). The issues, the generational shift, coupled with the traditional left-leaning voting base of Sinn Féin, all paved the way for the party to receive the most first preferential votes in the election. The question now was whether they could keep this momentum going into the 2024 EU Parliament and local elections.
Sinn Féin and Europe Before 2024
Sinn Féin’s stance towards European integration started in 1967 with deep distrust – believing that Ireland should align itself with ‘the third world’ rather than the “inward-looking, protected, monopoly dominated group of rich industrial countries.” They also believed: “If Ireland joined the [common market] with Britain we would thus have to recognize the territorial frontiers of the United Kingdom. Yet the Constitution lays claim to part of the territorial area of the UK. Is the Dublin Government wiling to abandon also its claim for a politically united Ireland?” (Irish Left Archive, 2011).
By the 2004 European Parliament elections Sinn Féin had softened their approach to a ‘Eurocritical, not Eurosceptic’ stance. They supported EU expansion, but ensured voters knew the party stood ‘for change in the EU,’ placing emphasis on nation’s rights to self-determination and promising to ‘argue our case for a United Ireland and for an end to all military occupation in the EU’ (Sinn Féin, 2004). They also highlight: “Critical engagement is not an anti-European approach. Indeed, Irish republicanism has its origins in a broader European democratic movement. Today Sinn Féin continues to build cooperative links with like-minded democratic movements throughout Europe and beyond.”
The 2024 election continues this trend, but by now Ireland is firmly committed to the EU, a fact Sinn Féin realizes in a post-Brexit landscape: “It is time for the EU to focus on what matters to workers and families: the cost-of-living crisis, improving wages and conditions, regional development, and economic development. It’s time for the EU to play its part in advocating for and planning for Irish unity” (Sinn Féin, 2024). It should be no surprise that the second item mentioned in the manifesto is ‘Standing up for Irish Unity’ and a call for the ‘EU institutions to become advocates for Irish reunification, consistent with their position on Cyprus.’
Sinn Féin can be seen using populist language once again in their manifesto for the joint 2024 European Parliament and local elections, but this time to a lesser extent than previous elections. Of the three instances of populist language being used to aggravate voters, all three have a stark anti-corporate, anti-elitist message (Sinn Féin, 2024). The media campaign online mirrors this:
Figure 4: Examples of Sinn Féin’s populist rhetoric in the leadup to the elections (Sinn Féin, 2024).
One video posted by Sinn Féin explicitly states that Fine Gael, Fianna Fail, and the Green Party are ‘the party of homelessness, the party of rising house prices, rising rents, the party of institutional investors and vulture funds,’ and Sinn Féin is the one to ‘deliver tens of thousands of genuinely affordable homes’ if you vote for them (Sinn Féin, 2024).
Sinn Féin During the Joint 2024 EU Parliamentary Elections and Local Elections – Steady as She Goes?
In the lead-up to the 2024 election, Ireland’s national public service broadcaster, RTÉ, highlighted that the key issues facing Ireland in 2024 are health, housing, migration, cost of living, the economy, and climate change (Cunningham, 2023). Sinn Féin’s 2024 European Parliament manifesto continues to address these challenges while also highlighting other issues considered important to Ireland at the European level, including Irish neutrality, Ireland’s stance on the Israel–Hamas conflict and the Ukraine war, human and workers’ rights, migration, and the environment (Sinn Féin, 2024).
During the same election, voters would be asked to vote in the local elections, which would see individuals elected to local government positions across the country. Unlike the 2020 general elections which saw a turnout of 62.88%, the 2024 elections only had 50.65% of the population turn up to vote (European Parliament, 2024; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, n.d.). Sinn Féin managed to secure 11.8% of the first preference votes in the local elections, compared to Fine Gael’s 23%, and Fianna Fáil’s 22.9%, a performance nearly echoed by the EU Parliament elections which saw the parties receive 11.8%, 29.6%, and 16.6% respectively (RTÉ, 2024). To Sinn Féin this came as a shock, with party member Matt Carthy stating during a radio interview: “There was a sense over the last number of weeks that there was a drop coming. To be quite frank nobody saw these results” (Halpin, 2024a). Despite the results Sinn Féin still managed to have two candidates elected to the European Parliament where they opted to join The Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL Group with other leftist European populist parties such as the Italian Five Star Movement and France’s La France Insoumise (European Parliament, 2024).
Commentators point to one leading cause of Sinn Féin’s less-than-stellar performance: immigration (O’Doherty, 2024; Pogatchnik, 2024). On November 24, 2023, three children and one woman were injured in a knife attack outside a Dublin school (Kwai & Satariano, 2023). Although Irish news outlets did not identify the man, rumors quickly spread online that he was an Algerian immigrant, escalating into a call to action that resulted in “tens of millions of euro worth of criminal damage” following an anti-immigration riot (Foy, 2023; Lally et al., 2023). Subsequently, there was the ongoing removal of “tent cities,” where migrants had gathered in tents due to the ongoing housing crisis and the government’s inability to find accommodation for the 1,780 unhoused migrant men as of May 14 (Figure 4) (Ehl, 2024). Taoiseach Simon Harris of Fine Gael supported these removals, stating: “We do not live in a country where makeshift shantytowns are allowed to just develop” (Halpin, 2024a). Reportedly, Sinn Féin failed to “reflect the concerns of ordinary people on immigration,” with reports suggesting that McDonald warned party members not to post anything contrary to her immigration stance, which remained unclear for a long time (Halpin, 2024b). Immigration became one of the key issues leading up to the 2024 elections, exacerbated by the housing crisis and the UK’s hardline immigration stance, which saw 80% of new applicants crossing the border from Northern Ireland (Finnegan & Conlon, 2024). UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak claimed this was due to the successful deterrent effect of his Rwanda deportation plan.
Figure 5: Asylum seekers’ tents near the International Protection Office and Refugee Legal Service on Lower Mount Street, Dublin, Ireland, on July 7, 2023. Photo: Derick P. Hudson.
However, this is not the only reason support for Sinn Féin has declined. Since the 2020 election, Sinn Féin has flip-flopped on many of its policy positions, losing “angry” supporters as a result of the decisions they made. Beginning with the coalition talks post-election, Sinn Féin alienated many grassroots voters by considering the possibility of forming a government with either Fine Gael or Fianna Fáil (Allen, 2023). This, combined with increased interaction with businesses, has led many to comment that their policies have been drifting economically more toward the center, thereby alienating their traditional left-leaning supporters (Brennan, 2023; Weckler, 2022). The party’s focus on the “wrong” social issues has also been problematic. They supported the “Family” and “Care” referendums, which aimed to modernize two articles within the constitution (39th and 40th) to be more vague about what constitutes a family unit and to remove a reference to a woman’s role within the home (University College Dublin, 2024). Before the referendum, Sinn Féin vowed to re-run them should they fail, but they did not anticipate that both acts would be resoundingly rejected, with 67% and 74% of voters casting a “No” vote on the amendments, respectively (O’Connell, 2024).
Adding to this, despite accusing “billionaire media moguls of pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists, and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power,” Sinn Féin has pursued a campaign of silencing critics, including The Irish Times and its political correspondent, Harry McGee, as well as the national broadcaster RTÉ (The Journal, 2023). The international community responded directly, with several journalist organizations and academics signing a joint letter to Sinn Féin and McDonald expressing their concerns about censorship (Reporters Without Borders, 2023). Additionally, Sinn Féin overestimated its success in the 2024 elections and fielded too many candidates, causing a split in the vote (McClafferty, 2024). These issues combined led supporters to turn to other populist options, namely PBP-Solidarity, Aontú, and Independent Ireland.
The Alternative to the Alternative Vote
Immigration has become the word du jour and many voters during the 2024 election that would have voted for Sinn Féin decided to turn to parties who are unapologetic in their hardline stance against immigration. Self-described as ‘a “comfortable alternative” to Sinn Féin,’ Independent Ireland was founded to focus on rural voters, but quickly became the right-wing populist party that attracted anti-immigration voters alongside Aontú (Ryan, 2023). The populism in both party’s stances on migration is clear: Independent Ireland states “We will secure Ireland’s borders by enforcing our immigration laws and end profiteering by vested interests at the expense of the Irish taxpayer” (Independent Ireland, n.d.); Whereas Aontú, ‘The Only Party Listening To The People,’ wish to solve the issue by tackling the various other crises facing Ireland, compensating communities where asylum seekers are moved into, and enforce stronger border control policies that will include more deportations (Aontú, n.d.).
Of the three alternative populist parties, only a candidate from Independent Ireland was elected to the EU Parliament, but divisions and criticisms quickly started to appear as MEP Ciaran Mullooly opted to join the liberal Renew Europe group (Independent Ireland, 2024). On a local level Independent Ireland preformed the best, gaining 2.8% of the first preference vote in their first election year, compared to PBP-S’ 1.2% and Aontú’s 2.1%. Overall, all three parties have seen an increase of seats on a local level, with each party now having 23, 13, and 8 seats respectively. Sinn Féin also gained 21 seats for a total of 102 during the local election, but with only 11.8% of the first preference votes, clearly their momentum from 2020 has slowed down (Irish Times, 2024).
Whether or not Sinn Féin will experience a resurgence in next year’s general election remains uncertain. Their historical connection to the IRA is now nearly irrelevant to most younger voters, and it appears that any news of Sinn Féin’s ties to the paramilitary organization primarily affects older voters who have a living connection to the violence. This generational divide is evident in a letter exchange between Irish Times readers discussing younger voters’ preference for Sinn Féin (Irish Times, 2022).
As for the other populist parties in the nation, while politically irrelevant and on the fringes for now, they stand to gain the most from Sinn Féin’s loss. Independent Ireland’s Ciaran Mullooly’s decision to join a pro-European parliament group despite the party’s Eurosceptic stance has raised the eyebrows of many, which might negatively affect the party’s ability to win over disgruntled voters in the next election. PBP-S continually fails to make any headway during elections, although left-leaning working-class voters may cast their lot in with PBP-S should they decide to stop supporting Sinn Féin. Most of all, Aontú stands to gain the most, offering disgruntled voters a new alternative to the alternative Sinn Féin, and attracting working class voters away from Independent Ireland, particularly given that The Think Ireland 2024 election poll suggests that this group predominantly support ‘other right’ parties (Cunningham, 2024).
However, Sinn Féin shouldn’t be counted out just yet, as they currently hold the majority in the Northern Irish Assembly—an unprecedented result that may drive further election promises in the Republic advocating for reunification (Pogatchnik, 2024). If Sinn Féin successfully refines its policies and regains public support, it could have a chance at making gains in the upcoming general election, reversing its currently declining popularity in polls, which now place them behind Fine Gael for the first time since September 2021 (REDC & Business Post, 2024). That said, Fine Gael’s response to immigration could explain their rise in the polls, a trend that might continue into the next election if the momentum persists (Clarke, 2024). While predicting the results of the next election may be futile, it is certainly one to watch closely.
Appendix: Populist Language Used in Sinn Féin’s Manifestos
2019 European Parliament Election Manifesto
Quote
Page
“Our MEPs now need to continue that fight – for communities, for ordinary working people and families.”
4
“In contrast, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael belong to the Right-wing EPP and ALDE groups which want to create a Superstate centralizing power in Europe far away from ordinary people. These groups are also determined to create an EU army with more military spending rather than investing to tackle the cost of living and provide quality public services. They are advocates of austerity and beholden to corporate interests.”
5
“Sinn Féin reject increased militarization and related spending and will fight for ordinary people.”
5
“It is only by voting for Sinn Féin that you will get credible and effective MEPs who will fight for ordinary Irish people’s interests in Europe, challenge vested interests and insiders and work for a radically and progressively reformed European Union.”
5
“EU banking policy, which is driven by unelected officials, favors banks and corporate elites at the expense of ordinary people.”
7
“The ECB’s quantitative easing programme is pumping billions into the banks to the benefit of corporations and major polluters.”
7
“Sinn Féin is opposed to PESCO and to Irish money being used to fund companies who are exporting arms and fueling conflicts around the world.”
10
“We call for a State Aid exemption for rural areas in light of Brexit and urge the reduction of bureaucracy so that a greater portion of EU funding for things like broadband actually reaches the intended beneficiaries instead of being pocketed by middlemen.”
10
“Local fisheries are suffering while profit-driven super-trawlers controlled by multi-nationals devastate our environment, fish stocks and coastal communities.”
11
“Sinn Féin MEPs oppose the Commission’s proposal to invest in militarization by plundering Regional Development Funding.”
11
2020 General Election Manifesto
Quote
Page
“In that time, we have had Governments for the wealthy, Governments for the privileged, Governments for the property developers, Governments for the banks. Sinn Féin believes that it’s time that we had a government for the people.”
3
“Successive governments have delivered for their friends and cronies. They have delivered for big business, for vested interests and for golden circles. In Government, Sinn Féin will deliver for the people.”
4
“Sinn Féin wants to be in Government to deliver for ordinary, working people. But we don’t want to be part of the system. We want to change the system.”
4
“Sinn Féin will take on the cartel-like beef processing sector that is pushing family farms out of business, reform the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) so that it supports the farmers who need it the most and ensure farmers are assisted in the transition towards a greener, more sustainable agriculture sector.”
13
“Without a government policy that is framed by climate justice and a just transition, the leadership and direction of climate action will become the plaything of bankers and corporate investors. They will be concerned with only one thing – how to make a buck out of the crisis. That is what they do, and it is killing the planet.”
25
“Without public broadcasting, we will be left with billionaire media moguls pushing their own agenda, drawing up blacklists of journalists and stifling debate and investigation of economic and political power.”
30
“Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, and Labor are the yes men of Europe. Whatever Brussels and Frankfurt propose, they support. Their MEPs are the EU’s representatives in Ireland, promoting the agenda of the EU institutions rather than the interests of people in Ireland in the EU.”
44
“It is time to stand up for Ireland and the interests of all of the people who share this island. It is time to end the Brussels power grab, to reign in the Commission, and return powers to the member states. It is time to halt the attack on the wages and conditions of working people and to promote a basic threshold of decency for all. It is time to rebuild our public services and defend our public utilities.”
44
“Sinn Féin will build a fairer and more democratic European Union that works for the people of Europe, not for the EU insiders, middlemen and corporate interests.”
44
“Sinn Féin are determined that ordinary people in working class and rural communities must be protected from criminals… “Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil before them have abandoned working class and rural communities to organized crime gangs. They both starved the Gardaí of the resources they need to protect communities and they both failed to tackle garda corruption. They have not taken the necessary steps to ensure consistent and appropriate sentencing by judges. They are both soft on crime.”
69
“Sinn Féin in Government will demand probity and accountability from all who hold positions of power and responsibility. We will take on white collar crime and we will uphold the common good.”
71
“To make matters worse, the Fine Gael Government, supported by Fianna Fáil, have hitched their wagon to costly, risky Public Private Partnerships. This is despite the fact that we know they do not provide value for money. The Government knows this too, which is why we have no published reports on the value for money of these initiatives.”
91
“Sinn Féin in Government would not tolerate such abuse of political power, and our proposals set out to restore confidence in politics and ensure that those in power are working for the people and not for money or the vested interests of the golden circle establishment.”
96
“The public have lost confidence in the Dáil, this must be a priority focus for political reform.”
96
“For years, the insurance industry has pursued an aggressive campaign to portray sky-high premiums as the result of claims and fraud. Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil have served the industry by peddling their spin.”
104
“It is only a decade since the banks of this state crashed our economy. Poor regulation, an arrogant banking class, and a parasitic relationship between the banks and Government of the time created a dangerous climate for customers, taxpayers, and our democracy.”
105
“It is time the banks gave something back to the Irish people. Government must be vigilant and hold the banks to account.”
105
“Sinn Féin will challenge the arrogance and contempt for customers that persists at the core of our banking system. We do not believe that banks should exist only to increase their profits and deliver handsome dividends and bonuses for their managers. Banks should exist to support Irish society, its customers and businesses.”
105
“The effects of the economic crisis and property crash still live with us today. Our housing and property sector should have been rebuilt in the interests of citizens, renters and homeowners. Instead, Fine Gael rolled out the red carpet to vulture funds and international investors, allowing them to hoover up assets from distressed families and buy up commercial property in our towns and cities. They have allowed these vultures and funds to transfer wealth out of Ireland to hidden international investors using low-tax arrangements.”
106
2024 European Parliament Manifesto
Quote
Page
“There are two competing visions for the future of the European Union. One is of an EU that continues to enlarge, becomes more centralized and bureaucratic, more militarized, lacks transparency, is under undue influence from corporate interests and lobbyists, and seeks to take ever more powers from Member States.”
5
“We have already seen worrying levels of de-regulation brought in with these crises used as an excuse. Lessons that had been learnt about the need for regulation of the financial sector seem to have been forgotten. Some like Fine Gael are openly pushing for further rules to help vulture funds and banks. Only Sinn Féin can be trusted to stand up to this agenda.”
13
“Focus to be placed on those large corporate interests that are responsible for the climate crisis rather than undue burdens being imposed on ordinary citizens.”
— (2011). “The Case Against the Common Market: Why Ireland Should Not Join.” Irish Left Archive. January 24, 2011. https://www.leftarchive.ie/document/408/ (accessed on July 13, 2024).
— (2019). Fighting For Ireland, Ag Troid Ar Son Na Héireann; All Ireland In Europe/Éire Ar Fad San Eoraip: Sinn Féin European Election Manifesto 2019. Sinn Féin.
— (2020b). “Irish election: Sinn Féin criticises ‘disgraceful’ Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael.” BBC. February 14, 2020. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-51508380 (accessed on July 27, 2024).
— (2024). “Homelessness hits record high of 14,000! Voting for Sinn Féin in the Local and European elections is the first step to getting a change of government that will fix this housing disaster. Because the longer Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Greens stay in government the worse this is going to get.” Sinn Féin. May 31, 2024. https://www.facebook.com/reel/1171661350920330 (accessed on July 13, 2024).
Aytac S. E.; Carkoglu A. & Elci E. (2024). “Populist Appeals, Emotions, and Political Mobilization.” American Behavioral Scientist, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642241240343
de Bromhead, A.; Fernihough, A. & Hargaden, E. (2020). “Representation of the People: Franchise Extension and the ‘Sinn Féin Election’ in Ireland, 1918.” The Journal of Economic History. 80(3), pp. 886-925. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022050720000376
Murphy M.C. (2021). “Brexit and the Election: The Issue That Wasn’t.” In: Gallagher M., Marsh M., & Reidy T. (ed.). How Ireland Voted 2020: End of an Era. Palgrave Macmillan: Switzerland.
Ní Aodha, G. (2020). “How did they do it? Sinn Féin’s historic 24% win was built on learnt lessons and a fed-up electorate.” The Journal. February 12, 2020. https://www.thejournal.ie/sinn-fein-comeback-5001379-Feb2020/ (accessed on July 24, 2024).
Rico, G.; Guinjoan, M. & Anduiza, E. (2017). “The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism: How Anger and Fear Affect Populist Attitudes.” Swiss Political Science Review. 23(4), 444–461. https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12261
— (2019). Fighting For Ireland, Ag Troid Ar Son Na Héireann; All Ireland In Europe/Éire Ar Fad San Eoraip: Sinn Féin European Election Manifesto 2019. Sinn Féin. https://www.sinnfein.ie/files/2019/EU_Manifesto1.pdf
Please cite as: Erturk, Omer; Yilmaz, Ihsan and Smith, Chloe. (2024). “Blame Avoidance through Necropolitics and Religious Populism: Autocratic Responses to Nationwide Crises in an Authoritarian Islamist Polity.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 3, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0038
Abstract
Blame avoidance, a strategic distancing from culpability following events resulting in the deaths of citizens of a country, has often been studied in democratic contexts, yet its manifestation in authoritarian scenarios remains understudied. This study addresses this gap by scrutinizing empirical data derived from Turkey’s party in power, the AKP, and their political narratives and policies concerning these fatalities. Synthesizing the concepts of blame avoidance and necropolitics, it investigates how Turkey’s ruling competitive authoritarian party uses blame-shifting strategies to account for deaths resulting from negligence. Employing a conceptualization of martyrdom intertwined with religious populism, the party appeals to both religious and nationalistic sentiments and succeeds in sidestepping responsibility and accountability for these tragic incidents.
Accidents or violent conflicts resulting in fatalities have a profound impact on individuals, communities, and societies, especially when these tragedies are linked to government failure or negligence. Such events often provoke significant criticism and challenge the government’s legitimacy. To manage the fallout and sustain their position, incumbents typically employ several strategies: controlling the media, calling for national unity, appealing to patriotism, using nationalistic rhetoric, promoting solidarity, implementing censorship, or putting the blame on others and so on. These methods are used to deflect criticism, manage public perception, and maintain authority in the face of government shortcomings, a practice commonly known as blame avoidance.
Blame avoidance generally refers to any actions taken by leaders and officials to distance themselves from situations that could result in blame or jeopardize their objectives (Hinterleitner, 2017: 243). This behavior can be observed across various levels, ranging from national governance to community leadership (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017; Li et al., 2021). Numerous studies have analyzed blame avoidance behaviors and strategies in both democratic and authoritarian or competitive authoritarian contexts, particularly during administrative, financial, security, or electoral crises (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002, 2011; Hood et al., 2015; Ellis, 1994; Mortensen, 2012). This strategy is important because it helps leaders—whether autocrats or democrats—deflect public criticism, ease social tensions, and legitimize their prolonged rule, ultimately turning such crises to their advantage. However, there is a gap in the literature regarding how autocrats use necropolitics, martyrdom, and religious populism narratives as a strategy of blame avoidance in response to nationwide accidents, catastrophes, and conflicts resulting in fatalities.
Specifically, while blame avoidance has emerged as a strategic tool frequently employed by Turkey’s competitive authoritarian ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), limited attention has been given to this phenomenon within the Turkish context. Only a handful of studies, such as those by Aytac (2021) and Soylemez & Angin (2023), have examined blame avoidance, focusing on economic and financial crises. Zahariadis, on the other hand, analyzed its role during the COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrating how leaders deflected government responsibilities (Zahariadis et al., 2020; Aytac, 2021; Soylemez-Karakoc & Angin, 2023). While necropolitics has been studied independently within the Turkish political landscape (Bargu, 2016; Akinci, 2018; Ahmetbeyzade, 2008; Islekel, 2017), its intersection with blame avoidance remains underexplored.
In this research, we will focus on how autocrats use necropolitics and religious martyrdom narratives alongside blame avoidance to navigate nationwide calamities, such as accidents or violent conflicts resulting in fatalities, to shape public perceptions and deflect government accountability. This article aims to bridge this gap by examining empirical data derived from the political populist narratives and policies of Turkey’s current leadership. By integrating the concepts of blame avoidance and necropolitics and applying this combined framework to the data, the paper reveals the strategies used by Turkey’s ruling competitive authoritarian party, the AKP. It assesses the extent to which these strategies are effective in a competitive authoritarian context and explores how the party seeks to avoid blame, evade responsibility, and deflect accountability for fatalities resulting directly from its negligence.
Turkey’s political trajectory under the ruling AKP has witnessed a notable shift from undemocratic responses to the Gezi Park protests in 2013 towards what many scholars now characterize as an Islamist populist competitive authoritarian regime (Yilmaz, 2018; 2021a). Scholars have given an understanding of the role of religion in shaping the party’s populist appeal, evident in analyses of Friday sermons and the strategic mobilization of diverse populist movements. These academic works insightfully map out Turkey’s socio-political landscape, particularly scrutinizing the dynamics within Erdogan’s tenure. By fusing elements of personal identity, political leadership, and national and religious affiliation, Erdogan orchestrates a narrative wherein allegiance to his policies is associated with religious devotion. This elevates Erdogan beyond the realms of conventional political figures, positioning him as a symbolic embodiment of Turkish identity itself. The mix of political leadership and religious identity engenders a transformative shift, fundamentally altering the contours of Turkish identity and governance. This recalibration fosters a symbiotic relationship between political allegiance and religious identity (Yilmaz, 2021a; Yilmaz, 2021b; Yilmaz et al, 2021; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021a; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021b; Yilmaz et al, 2021a).
In this article, we argue that the incumbent party adopts a strategic approach by framing deaths from accidents, clearly under its own responsibility, as acts of martyrdom, thereby deflecting accountability while appealing to both the religious and nationalistic sentiments of the Turkish populace. This tactic serves to deflect blame by recontextualizing fatalities as acts of martyrdom, intertwining them with religious and patriotic ideologies. In doing so, the party attempts to distance itself from culpability and obfuscate its accountability for these incidents. Through this lens of blame avoidance and the incorporation of necropolitics, the article sheds light on the strategies employed by the incumbent party to navigate and manipulate public perceptions surrounding these sensitive and politically charged events.
A structured approach is used in this paper to illustrate this argument. Initially, we look at the realms of the blame avoidance theory, establishing the theoretical and conceptual framework guiding our exploration. This foundation serves as a crucial backdrop for the subsequent analysis. Moving forward, the focus shifts to a comprehensive explanation of necropolitics and martyrdom, focusing on the definitions, characteristics and scholarly discourse surrounding these concepts. We add depth to this analysis by offering a brief yet impactful examination of martyrdom’s significance within Islam and its historical utilization by political figures in the Turkish context.
In the empirical analysis section, we focus our attention on evaluating how the AKP strategically integrates necropolitics with two pivotal blame avoidance strategies in incidents that result in fatalities. First, we delve into the AKP’s utilization of the presentational strategy, elucidating how they manipulate narrative presentation to deflect culpability and evade accountability. We then shed light on the AKP’s engagement in bargaining via rewards as another tactic employed to circumvent blame, showcasing how the party navigates and manages public perception amidst tragic events leading to fatalities. Through this empirical examination, we aim to provide concrete examples and critical insights into the AKP’s strategic maneuvering to avoid blame, supporting our argument regarding the convergence of necropolitics and blame avoidance strategies used in the Turkish political landscape.
Blame Avoidance Theory and Necropolitics
Politicians opportunistically highlight their successful policies to gain or maintain favor. However, they also often attempt to deflect blame when their failures come under scrutiny, especially in regimes with competitive but flawed electoral processes. This strategy is crucial for politicians, as voters are more likely to remember experiences of loss and suffering than instances of progress or success (Weaver, 1986; Hood, 2002; 2011). This is described in psychological studies which indicate a human inclination towards remembering adverse, harmful, or traumatic events over positive ones, a phenomenon commonly termed as negativity bias (Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Kanouse & Hanson, 1987). For those in office, shouldering blame can lead to significant political setbacks and, especially in contexts with multiple competing political parties, could even result in a loss of power (Hansson, 2015).
In his seminal work, The Politics of Blame Avoidance (1986), Weaver identifies eight strategic approaches that politicians utilize to evade responsibility in the face of potential blame. These strategies encompass agendalimitation, issue redefinition, resource investment after failure, delegation of blame-inducing decisions, scapegoating, aligning with popular alternatives, diffusing blame among multiple actors, and persisting in harmful actions despite recognition of their detrimental consequences.
First, agenda limitation serves as an attempt by policymakers to suppress blame-generating issues from gaining prominence in public discourse. However, when such issues cannot be entirely suppressed, issue redefinition becomes a secondary strategy, where policymakers introduce new policy narratives that obscure potential political damage. In scenarios where attempts to avoid loss have already failed, the strategy of “throwing good money after bad” is employed, whereby policymakers inject further resources into problematic situations in an effort to offset negative outcomes.
Moreover, when facing blame for undesirable outcomes, political leaders often seek to delegate decision-making authorityfor controversial matters to other actors, thereby distancing themselves from accountability. In cases where delegation is not feasible, they may resort to scapegoating—shifting the blame onto individuals or groups perceived as responsible. Another tactic commonly observed is blame diffusion, which involves dispersing accountability across multiple actors, thereby diluting personal culpability.
Finally, despite recognizing the wrongful nature of certain actions, policymakers may choose to persist in their course of action to avoid publicly acknowledging their mistakes. These interrelated strategies illustrate the multifaceted nature of blame avoidance and underscore the lengths to which political leaders will go to maintain their standing by deflecting or mitigating accountability in politically sensitive situations (Weaver, 1986).
Christopher Hood’s concept of the presentational strategy adds another dimension to the array of techniques political actors employ to navigate blame avoidance. This strategy revolves around the deliberate manipulation of information, spin, and persuasive rhetoric to deflect responsibility for blameworthy outcomes (Hood, 2011). As studied by some other scholars, these presentational strategies serve as crafty tools wielded by policymakers to manipulate the public narrative in several ways. Firstly, they succeed in redefining, reshaping, and spinning issues, working to divert public attention away from the heart of the matter. These strategies delve deeper into the realms of information control and manipulation, where policymakers impose restrictive measures on dissenting voices within the media landscape, effectively diminishing oppositional views and reinforcing the government’s narrative. Often, they craft narratives that border on fabrication, using these persuasive stories to evade responsibility (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017: 428). Alternatively, storytelling can be employed to portray governmental actions or responses as commendable or necessary, with the acceptance of blame serving as a strategic move to maintain political legitimacy or rationalize policy decisions (Hood, 2011: 47–49; Weaver, 1986: 385–86).
In authoritarian regimes, presentational strategies often hinge on secrecy, involving the restriction of information flow and stringent control over media outlets to influence how incidents are accessed and perceived. In contrast, in democratic settings, these strategies may manifest through media priming, where incumbents manipulate public perception by leveraging media platforms to frame issues favorably (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2017: 428).
The presentational strategy aims to reframe what might be perceived as a blameworthy issue into a strategic advantage—for instance, by portraying short-term crises as catalysts for long-term benefits (Hood, 2011: 17). Particularly in authoritarian regimes, incumbents often suppress oppositional voices and control the narrative surrounding incidents, transforming situations that might otherwise attract blame into justifications for their continued political rule (Hood, 2011: 18). Through these efforts, political actors shape public perceptions and influence how blame is assigned, ultimately using these strategies to safeguard their legitimacy and maintain control in the face of political adversity.
Building on this literature, our exploration reveals the AKP’s concerted efforts to intertwine necropolitics with two primary strategies in evading blame amid incidents that have resulted in fatalities: First, the presentational strategy and second, the technique of turning blame into credit and bargaining via rewards (an extension of Weaver’s ‘throwing good money’ after a bad situation). Before establishing these strategies empirically, it’s crucial to first establish a foundational understanding of necropolitics and martyrdom. Necropolitics, a concept that intertwines governance and death, demands comprehensive exploration. This theoretical framework demonstrates how power structures manifest in controlling not just lives of the citizenry, but also the circumstances of death, and how this can be wielded as a tool for political agendas.
Moreover, within the context of Islam, martyrdom holds profound significance, deeply embedded in religious narratives and revered as a noble sacrifice. Historically, martyrdom has resonated within Islamic cultures, serving as a powerful symbol to unite and galvanize communities. In modern times, however, martyrdom has been popularized primarily by violent Islamic groups in their armed struggles at both local and global levels, often within a jihadist framework. This contemporary use emphasizes the sacrifice of the self, devaluing life while highlighting the rewards of the afterlife. Understanding its significance within Islamic faith, alongside its current pro-Sharia and jihadi associations (Yilmaz, 2019a; 2019b; 2021b; Yilmaz et al., 2023), is crucial to grasping its utilization by AKP politicians in Turkey, given their historically close ideological and organic ties with these movements (See Erturk, 2002; 2023). Politicians in Turkey, aware of the emotional and ideological power of martyrdom, have strategically harnessed its symbolism to reinforce their narratives, influence public opinion and attack the opposition (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2022). This practice intertwines religious sentiments with political aims, leveraging the reverence for martyrs within society to consolidate power and garner support.
Necropolitical Use of Martyrdom by the AKP and Popularization of Death
Necropolitics, as defined by Mbembe (2003; 2019), refers to the sovereign’s authority to control both the lives and deaths of individuals, encompassing the power to decide who lives and who dies. This concept has found application in various contexts, notably within the Turkish landscape, as described in works by Ahmetbeyzade (2008), Bargu (2016; 2019), Zengin (2016), and Islekel (2017). These contributions have broadened the understanding of necropolitics, introducing novel dimensions that demonstrate its complexity and influence in contemporary political landscapes (Bargu, 2019: 5-6).
Within the realm of Turkish politics, the AKP has strategically harnessed martyrdom narratives, employing them as powerful tools that normalize and celebrate death when the deaths are perceived or explained as being on behalf of the masses (Carney, 2018; Bakiner, 2019; Yilmaz & Erturk, 2021a; 2021b; 2023). In the AKP’s discursive and representational necropolitics, the notion of death for the nation – epitomized through martyrdom – is elevated to a fetishized status (Carney, 2018: 94, 101). This fusion of necropolitical discourse with martyrdom narratives by the AKP indicates a calculated effort to both celebrate and sanctify the notion of death, evoking profound emotional responses within the populace, and intertwining cases of death with nationalist and religious fervor.
The Evolution of Martyrdom and Its Contemporary Application by the AKP
Funeral of a Turkish soldier killed by PKK militants on December 12, 2009, in Istanbul, Turkey. Photo: Thomas Koch.
The concept of martyrdom has a rich etymological and cultural history, with roots that trace back to the Greek word “martus” or “martyr,” meaning “witness.” While the term initially held a broader significance, it gradually acquired a religious connotation, coming to represent the act of sacrificing one’s life for God, especially within Christianity and Judaism (Freamon, 2003: 319). In the Islamic tradition, this concept is mirrored by the Arabic term “shahadah,” which also translates to “to witness.” The individual who carries out this act is known as a “shahid,” a title bestowed not just in Arabic but in many non-Arab Muslim societies as well (Hatina, 2014: 19). This evolution of the term across linguistic and religious boundaries highlights the profound and universal significance of martyrdom as a symbol of ultimate commitment to faith and principles.
Historically, martyrdom is deeply rooted in ancient civilizations such as Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Greece, evolving across religious and cultural landscapes throughout time. This archetype of the warrior-hero finds expression in diverse ideologies and conflicts, from kamikaze pilots in World War II to self-immolating Buddhist monks protesting the American occupation of Vietnam, and from Irish Republican Army (IRA) hunger strikers to freedom fighters in Middle Eastern liberation movements (Hatina, 2014: 2). Christianity and Islam significantly shaped the archetype of the martyr, offering promises of immortality, absolution, exemption from Judgment Day, and even direct communication with prophets as rewards for their sacrifice (Hatina, 2014: 2). These religious incentives imbue martyrdom with powerful emotional and spiritual weight, further solidifying its role in political and military narratives.
Scholars across disciplines have examined martyrdom’s global manifestations, emphasizing how this concept transcends cultural and religious boundaries. Martyrdom serves as a powerful mythological figure, often invoking revolutionary goals and legitimizing struggles, both secular and religious (Hatina, 2014: 7; Szyska, 2004). The adaptability of martyrdom across diverse contexts is particularly significant—it functions not only as a religious ideal but also as an emotional and motivational resource in secular struggles, helping individuals endure sacrifice for nationalistic or political causes (Sluka, 2000: 49; Anderson, 1983: 15). Whether in national liberation movements, ideological conflicts, or religious wars, martyrdom emerges as a central narrative that justifies extreme sacrifice.
In the Turkish context, martyrdom assumes a multifaceted role. It serves as a tool for mythmaking, helping to shape collective memory, ignite religious populism and nationalistic fervor, promote militarism, and facilitate collective mobilization (Altinay, 2006; Azak, 2007; Degirmencioglu, 2014a; 2014b). In particular, as our research explores, the ruling AKP has employed the concept of martyrdom as a form of blame avoidance. By assigning martyrdom to deaths that occur under contentious circumstances—such as accidents or conflicts—the AKP not only deflects blame but also reframes these tragedies as noble sacrifices for the nation or religion.
This paper establishes that assigning martyrdom also provides the AKP with an opportunity to manipulate public narratives and shift accountability, thus enhancing its political legitimacy. By intertwining religious symbolism with political agendas, the AKP leverages the revered status of martyrs in Turkish society to maintain public support and consolidate power in times of crisis. This rhetorical maneuver serves to bolster the regime’s legitimacy, blending religious sentiment with political strategy to maintain public support in the face of adversity.
The Co-optation of Religion by the Secular State
Turkish Islamist President Recep Tayyip Erdogan speaks in Van province of Turkey as holding a holy Quran on April 14, 2015. Photo: Shutterstock.
Despite its officially secular stance, the leadership of Turkey has long intertwined Islam with state operations at multiple levels since its foundation (Cagaptay, 2006; Yegen, 2007; Sakallioglu, 1996; Kaplan, 2002: 665; Yilmaz, 2021a). A key example of this is the state’s efforts to cultivate a devout and patriotic military force, which might seem contradictory to the secular image of the state (Kemerli, 2015: 282; Kaplan, 2002; Gurbey, 2009).
Rather than discarding the historical religious associations tied to soldiering, the Turkish state has effectively co-opted Islamic notions such as jihad and martyrdom to foster a sense of duty and militarism within society (Yilmaz, 2021a). These religious concepts have been reinterpreted to serve the goals of secular nationalism (Kemerli, 2015: 282), and more recently, have been redirected towards advancing an Islamist populist agenda. During times of national crisis, even secular leadership has sporadically invoked religious discourse to bolster public support. For instance, during the Cypriot intervention of 1974, the use of Islamic terminology such as “jihad,” “mujahids,” and “martyrs” revealed how religion could be tactically deployed to legitimize military actions. This paradoxical use of religious language by a state that claims to uphold secularism has conferred substantial religious legitimacy on the Turkish military, traditionally regarded as the staunch protector of secularism. Furthermore, since the 1980s, this religious rhetoric has also bolstered public support for conscription, even amid the protracted Turkish-Kurdish conflict, where significant loss of life continues to be a reality (Kemerli, 2015: 282). The integration of religion into state affairs—especially in the military sphere—demonstrates how the Turkish state has consistently navigated the tension between secularism and religious symbolism to achieve political and military objectives.
Beyond the historical military context, the AKP under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has strategically re-focused its discourse on martyrdom, particularly in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in July 2016. During this period, martyrdom became not only a symbol of national and religious sacrifice but also a powerful political tool to legitimize authoritarian populist and repressive measures and consolidate the ruling party’s authority (Yanik & Hisarlioglu, 2019: 57; Baykan et al., 2021). Erdogan and the AKP capitalized on the emotionally charged symbolism of martyrdom, aligning it with their broader political objectives, which allowed them to reframe public perceptions around death in a manner that reinforced their narrative of religious populism, resilience and divine purpose.
Building upon this shift, the AKP expanded the traditional understanding of martyrdom beyond the military realm, reimagining it to encompass civilian spheres. The party’s redefinition of martyrdom demonstrates a broader and more calculated approach to managing social and political realities. As Bakiner (2019) outlines, the AKP has employed four distinct strategies in controlling the narrative surrounding death. First, the party broadened the scope of martyrdom, extending its definition to include civilian deaths, with material benefits being provided to survivors through both formal laws and informal state mechanisms. Second, they normalized untimely deaths by framing them as natural consequences of citizens’ occupational, socioeconomic, or gender positions, thereby reducing the likelihood of public dissent. Third, the AKP actively depoliticized death to suppress any mobilization of opposition, particularly in the wake of state-linked fatal incidents. Finally, the party tightly controlled public discourse, ensuring that the narrative surrounding martyrdom remained aligned with the AKP’s ideological objectives and reinforced its discursive dominance (Bakiner, 2019).
Category One: Religious Narratives and Strategic Blame Avoidance—Redefining, Reshaping, Spinning, and Manipulating Death-Related Incidents
A coal mine in the Soma district of Manisa province, Turkey, exploded on May 13, 2014. This disaster remains the deadliest labor catastrophe in Turkish history, claiming the lives of 301 miners. Photo: F. Polat.
The AKP’s initial reaction to tragic incidents resulting in loss of life typically involves absorbing the immediate shock within society, followed by a narrative that attempts to normalize such events. The Soma mining disaster in Manisa on May 13, 2014, stands as a poignant example, marking the deadliest labor catastrophe in Turkish history, which claimed the lives of 301 miners. Revelations surrounding the incident indicated the role of governmental corruption within the AKP, with media reports highlighting close ties between the mining company’s owners and the AKP, along with documented safety concerns that had been circumvented by the company (Yetkin, 2014). Instead of assuming responsibility, Erdogan attempted to downplay the incident’s severity by characterizing the catastrophe as a typical ‘work accident,’ and ‘the nature of the work’ by asserting that mine explosions are common throughout the world (Cumhuriyet, 2014; Daloglu, 2014). This strategy aimed to evade liability and minimize the government’s role in the disaster in the eyes of the public.
The AKP adopted a similar presentational blame avoidance strategy following the tragic Aladag boarding girls’ Qur’anic school fire in 2016, which resulted in the deaths of eleven students and a teacher. Revelations indicated that the dormitory had not been subjected to the required comprehensive inspections, primarily due to its management by a pro-AKP religious community. The AKP again sought to diminish its responsibility, by labelling the catastrophe as an ‘act of fate’ (Shafak, 2016). This narrative tactic attempted to deflect accountability by framing the incident as an unforeseeable and uncontrollable occurrence, to sidestep the deeper scrutiny of the regulatory oversights or negligence that might have contributed to the tragedy.
The AKP once again employed a blame avoidance strategy in the aftermath of two Turkish soldiers losing their lives in 2018. The soldiers died due to freezing conditions in the eastern province of Tunceli (Dersim), a situation that occurred outside of wartime and sparked extensive debate and media coverage within Turkish politics. Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of main opposition Republican People Party (CHP), demanded the responsibility of ruling party officials and bureaucrats for this failure, prompting criminal complaints alleging negligence against top government figures including President Erdogan and other key ministers (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018).
In response, Erdogan employed the presentational strategy to deflect accountability for the government’s shortcomings in safeguarding these soldiers’ lives. He sought to normalize the soldiers’ deaths caused by hypothermia by equating it with the risks faced in martyrdom, remarking that “in martyrdom, there are bullets to be taken, as well as freezing” (Erdogan, 2018). To justify this narrative, Erdogan referenced his grandfather’s freezing to death during World War I, attempting to craft a narrative that would diminish the significance of soldiers succumbing to freezing temperatures (Hurriyet Daily News, 2018). These comments demonstrate a discursive effort to reshape the narrative about these tragic deaths. They dilute the government’s accountability by placing the deaths within the context of martyrdom and divert attention from any potential governmental oversights or failures in safeguarding soldiers’ safety.
Erdogan also invoked the concept of martyrdom to undermine the credibility of the main opposition leader, Kilicdaroglu, and to discredit his criticism. Erdogan accused Kilicdaroglu of not believing in martyrdom and publicly chastised him, stating, “You have no right to devalue this nation and this country. You already lack any belief in martyrdom. But the families [of the fallen soldiers] believed in martyrdom. You, however, have no such sense” (BBC, 2018).
The case of the captured, tortured, and then murdered soldiers by ISIS terrorists in 2016 provides another example of how the AKP’s blame avoidance strategy. In this case, instead of taking any responsibility for its failure to save the two soldiers or providing details of any efforts to save them, the AKP manipulated (‘spun’) how the event was communicated to the public on social media and conventional media, which is under its control. After ISIS streamed the video of killing the soldiers, the AKP immediately restricted access to social media and related news. After, the AKP proclaimed that the footage was fabricated (Sputnik, 2016; Hurtas, 2017). An AKP lawmaker, Samil Tayyar, also declared that the murdered soldiers were members of ISIS, and they had voluntarily joined the group (Sputnik, 2016). Almost a year later, the AKP informed the murdered soldiers’ fathers they would be rewarded with martyrdom privileges and their murdered sons would be bestowed with official martyrdom status.
As part of its presentational strategy, the AKP government promptly enforces media bans and restricts news that could potentially incite dissent, opposition, or mass protests. In the incidents described above, journalistic reporting was prohibited with the government reasoning that coverage might incite disruptive acts and protests, posing threats to the peace, safety, and public order throughout the country (BBC Turkce, 2016).
The restriction of opposing voices was highlighted again following the tragic deaths of high-ranking Turkish Air Force (TAF) officers, including two intelligence officers, in Libya. Traditionally, in situations where blame is attributed to groups like the PKK, the AKP government orchestrates official funeral ceremonies. These ceremonies often draw the upper echelons of military and political power, who strategically deliver speeches that transform the funeral into a moment of national credit and sympathy, and then broadcast live on television for public viewing. However, in this instance, the bodies of the officers were clandestinely interred without any public funeral rites.
Adding to the clandestine nature of this burial, journalists who reported on this event faced immediate repercussions. They were swiftly arrested the day after the incident, and their homes were raided in early morning police operations, severely restricting the ability to disseminate news regarding the incident (BBC Turkce, 2020). Media outlets critical of the government were branded disloyal and treasonous by pro-AKP media (Sabah, 2020). When details of the deaths eventually surfaced in the media, widespread complaints and criticisms targeting the AKP government ensued. The public discourse questioned the fundamental reason for Turkish soldiers’ involvement in Libya, labelling it ‘unnecessary’ and ‘adventurous’ (Euronews, 2020).
In response to the mounting criticisms, President Erdogan again instrumentalized martyrdom, acknowledging the fatalities by stating, “We have a few martyrs [in Libya]” (Euronews, 2020). He also attempted to normalize the deaths in his comment, “My brothers and sisters, we should never forget that the martyrs’ hill (cemetery) will not be empty” (Euronews, 2020). Contextualizing the fatalities through the language of martyrdom represents an attempt to shift public perception away from scrutiny and critique of the government’s decisions and actions by elevating the status of the deaths and assigning them with religious significance.
The night of July 15, 2016, marked a pivotal political moment as the AKP was targeted during the attempted coup, ostensibly becoming its victim. However, opposition parties raised pertinent questions about the neglectful stance and actions of the AKP government both preceding and following the event. The suspicion surrounding the coup led the leader of the main opposition to characterize it as a ‘controlled coup,’ insinuating that Erdogan and a select few, including the Head of National Intelligence Service (MIT) and the Chief of General Staff, were aware of the attempt and instead of thwarting it, orchestrated it in a manner to derive maximum advantage. The AKP hindered a comprehensive investigation into the coup attempt, barring the Head of MIT and the Chief of General Staff from testifying before the parliamentary committee, and withheld the committee’s report from publication, despite AKP lawmakers forming the majority and chairing the committee. The opposition contends that Erdogan and his close circle knowingly permitted the coup attempt, resulting in civilian casualties that night (Tas, 2018).
Moreover, rather than engaging with critical inquiries or allowing an open, thorough investigation, the AKP consistently employs these narratives to steer attention away from potential negligence or failures. This tactic serves to not only evade responsibility but also to maintain a strong grip on the public discourse, framing the narrative in a manner that aligns with the party’s interests and political survival.
In the subsequent section, we will examine how religious narratives and strategic blame avoidance are leveraged not only to deflect blame but also to transform it into a form of political credit. Building on Weaver’s and Hood’s theories, we will explore how these strategies are integrated into the broader context of necropolitics and martyrdom. This analysis will reveal how the AKP employs religious and political narratives to shift public perception, turning criticisms into affirmations of political legitimacy. Additionally, we will delve into how these narratives are coupled with mechanisms of bargaining and rewards, further extending traditional theories of blame avoidance. This exploration will provide insight into the complex interplay between religious symbolism and political strategy in the AKP’s approach to maintaining power amidst crises.
Category Two: Religious Narratives and Strategic Blame Avoidance—Transforming Blame into Credit and Bargaining via Rewards
Turkish soldiers on patrol during winter on January 3, 2017. Photo credit: Shutterstock.
The second category of strategies explored in this article delves into how the AKP transforms blame into credit and leverages bargaining rewards through religious narratives. A key tactic involves the use of martyrdom to reshape public perceptions of fatal incidents for which the government is solely responsible. By elevating certain deaths to the status of martyrdom—a revered religious honor—the AKP reframes these tragedies as symbols of triumph and honor, effectively turning blame into a form of credit.
This approach not only alters the narrative surrounding the victims but also influences how society and the victims’ families perceive these events. The popularization and necropolitical use of martyrdom make the results of these incidents more palatable to the public, allowing them to digest and accept the government’s role in these events. Instead of addressing criticisms or facilitating impartial investigations, the AKP employs a strategic discourse to deflect blame, suppress opposition, and galvanize support. By embedding martyrdom narratives into the political and social fabric, the AKP consolidates its legitimacy and mitigates dissent.
The transformation of blame into credit was evident in the case of the death of Eren Bulbul. In August 2017, the local 15-year-old boy lost his life at the hands of the outlawed PKK while in the presence of Turkish military officers, who had reportedly employed him as an informant. The boy’s grieving mother publicly declared the responsibility to belong to the government, prime minister, ministers, and other authorities for the tragic loss of life (Gazete Duvar, 2017). In response to the outcry, President Erdogan publicly praised Bulbul’s mother during a mass gathering and praised her for mothering thirteen children: “You have fulfilled the order of Allah and His messenger [by giving birth to many Muslims]. What a beautiful mother you are!” (Beyazgazete, 2017). This praise, steeped in religious and moral overtones, demonstrated a clear attempt to pacify the mother and to create a public perception of unity between the leader and the grieving mother.
Erdogan also drew on martyrdom, communicating to Bulbul’s mother that she possessed greatness due to her son’s status as a ‘martyr’: “Thanks to the ‘martyr’ Eren, you are guaranteed to enter Heaven together with your thirteen children”(Beyazgazete, 2017). This rhetoric served to divert attention from the failure to protect the boy, reframing the tragedy as a sacrifice for a higher cause and transforming the mourning mother into a figure of honor within a religious context.
In another instance, Erdogan conveyed to the mother of a soldier, captured and killed during a rescue operation, that she had attained an exceptional honor: “Not every mother can have such an honor, but you have this honor now as a neighbor of the Prophet and the martyrs in the hereafter” (Sozcu, 2021). This religious rhetoric attempts to transform the loss into a revered status, offering solace through the lens of martyrdom.
The AKP’s prolonged dissemination of martyr stories serves as a deliberate effort to embed a specific narrative within the public consciousness. This has allowed the party to solidify its political stance while strategically mitigating any potential scrutiny or dissenting views. It also serves to leverage emotional connections to nationalistic sentiments and a reverence for sacrifice.
By emphasizing the martyrs’ sacrifices and portraying their deaths in a manner that exalts their devotion to the nation, the AKP manipulates the collective memory and perception of these events. This deliberate and ongoing narrative construction aims to create a shield against any potential scrutiny or doubts about the party’s actions or policies.
Co-optation and Cooperation in Blame Avoidance: Bargaining via Rewards
In this segment, we delve into the AKP’s necropolitical strategy of deflecting blame through a technique we term “bargaining via rewards,” an extension of Weaver’s “throw good money after a bad situation” approach. This strategy involves the strategic use of various incentives—referred to as carrots—to co-opt the families of victims and bolster the party’s narrative. The AKP strategically employs these incentives, which include financial aid, assurances, privileges, and promises of elevated social standing, to align with its broader necropolitical agenda.
A notable element of this strategy is the official designation of martyrdom. This status is often conferred upon civilians whose deaths occur in incidents where the government is implicated in preventing such tragedies. By granting martyrdom status, the AKP not only elevates the victims’ families with unique material rewards but also integrates these incidents into a revered national narrative. This designation serves to mollify and placate the affected families, while simultaneously deflecting criticism and managing public perception, thereby reinforcing the government’s position and mitigating the fallout from its actions.
In the Turkish legal framework, the designation of ‘martyrdom’ (şehitlik) lacks an explicit definition or criteria for who qualifies as a ‘martyr’ (şehit). The Turkish Anti-Terror Law No. 3713 outlines specific guidelines that primarily pertain to support for the families of individuals (both military and civilian servants) who have been wounded or lost their lives due to terrorist acts. The authority to declare someone officially a martyr typically resides with the Turkish Armed Forces or the Turkish Judiciary (Yilmaz & Erturk, 2023).
During the AKP’s tenure, this authority appears to have been utilized more liberally. Notably, in 2012, the AKP government revised the regulations related to martyrdom, allowing civilians who lost their lives due to terrorist attacks to be classified as martyrs. This definition was subsequently expanded by the AKP to encompass victims of natural disasters, large-scale incidents resulting in fatalities, and the COVID-19 pandemic (Yilmaz & Erturk, 2023).
An illustrative instance was observed following the Soma mining accident, where an immediate announcement declared the deceased as ‘civil martyrs’ or ‘martyrs of the mine.’ Their direct relatives were then granted the benefits outlined in Terror Law No. 3713, entailing financial support, employment opportunities, and educational scholarships. In another instance, President Erdogan announced that the annual proceeds from the newly inaugurated Eurasia Tunnel would be directed to the families of the martyrs, exemplifying the government’s priority towards supplying financial benefits to these families.
It is crucial to recognize the selective application of this law in the Turkish context. Law 3713 was not invoked uniformly for families of mining incident victims. Instead, the AKP selectively used the legal framework in those incidents which garnered widespread public attention. This emphasizes the AKP’s propensity to utilize the notion of martyrdom for specific populist purposes, rather than as a consistent response to the death of Turkish employees.
The mechanisms overseeing financial aid, and its allocation predominantly fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services. Under the AKP’s tenure, there has been a noticeable elevation in the stature of the Presidency of Relatives of Martyrs and Veterans, which was upgraded to the status of a General Directorate. Minister Zehra Zumrut Selcuk highlighted a significant surge in employment, revealing that as of December 2020, the ministry had provided jobs for 44,781relatives in the civil service, a substantial increase from the 6,315 recorded before the AKP assumed office in 2002 (Aile ve Sosyal Hizmetler Bakanligi, 2020).
In addition to the customary rewards associated with legal martyrdom, policymakers have gone so far as to pledge homes to these families. Shockingly, reports emerged revealing instances where veterans and martyr families signed documents and petitions relinquishing the pursuit of compensation cases against the government in exchange for these promised residences. This unsettling revelation underscores how the assurance of housing was leveraged to dissuade families from seeking rightful recourse through legal avenues.
Bargaining via rewards thus emerges as a deliberate strategy employed by the government to publicly reward the families of ‘martyrs’. The term ‘martyrdom’ itself holds significant weight, not merely as a religious attribution but as a symbol bolstered by official and tangible assurances. Without material guarantees, martyrdom alone may not suffice for these families. Therefore, policymakers reinforce the revered status of martyrdom with a rewarding strategy, offering substantial monetary or material resources. This serves multiple aims including appeasing the affected families, fostering or solidifying their allegiance to the ruling authority, and pre-empting any potential dissent they may express online, via the media, or by aligning with oppositional political parties.
These endeavors underscore how necropolitical blame avoidance is reinforced by financial provisions, rewards, and the bestowment of privileged status, effectively elevating the status of victims’ families within societal ranks. This strategic utilization of martyrdom and its accompanying rewards serves as a mechanism through which families absorb blame in a way that diminishes blame toward the government. This bargaining process is often conducted in a public setting, frequently covered by the media, and broadcast on television. By presenting these ‘bargaining’ exchanges as transparent, equitable, and mutually agreed upon between the government and the affected families, it is possible for public blame to be neutralized, and criticism deflected.
Combined, the strategy of turning blame into credit and bargaining via rewards sees the AKP not only absolving itself of direct responsibility but also maneuvering the narrative by portraying these losses as emblematic of sacrifice for the nation’s greater good. By offering these rewards and privileges, particularly the esteemed status of martyrdom, the government aims to forge an emotional connection with the affected families while simultaneously solidifying its narrative in the eyes of the public. This strategy effectively co-opts the victims’ families, aligning their sentiments with the AKP’s narrative, thereby furthering the party’s blame avoidance tactics.
Conclusion
This study explores the underexamined dynamics of blame avoidance in political contexts marked by fatal incidents, using the Turkish incumbent government as a case study. It addresses the gap in scholarly attention regarding governmental responses to deaths, focusing on how the ruling competitive authoritarian party employs strategic blame avoidance tactics within an authoritarian setting.
Our findings reveal that in a Muslim-majority country, a populist electoral authoritarian Islamist party can effectively use religious elements—such as martyrdom, belief in the hereafter, and the devaluation of worldly life—to craft compelling narratives that bolster its blame avoidance strategies. The Turkish ruling party strategically combines these religious concepts with Weaver’s and Hood’s presentational strategies, including redefinition, reshaping, spinning, manipulation, and rewarding victims’ families. By bestowing martyrdom status and offering material rewards such as financial aid, social privileges, and promises of elevated standing, the AKP transforms blame into credit, deflecting responsibility for fatal incidents.
This approach not only mitigates the emotional and political implications of blame but also strengthens the party’s political legitimacy amidst crises. The AKP’s tactic of “bargaining via rewards” aligns with necropolitical principles, offering incentives to victims’ families to suppress dissent and deflect calls for accountability. This strategic use of religious and material rewards serves to shift public perception, making government-induced fatalities more palatable to the public.
This research bridges existing literature by applying blame avoidance theories to authoritarian regimes and integrating them with necropolitical and martyrdom discourses. It uncovers deliberate strategies employed by the Turkish ruling party to evade accountability for deaths caused by government negligence, highlighting how authoritarian and populist strategies can exploit religious elements and rewards to maintain power and legitimacy in the face of fatal crises.
(*) Omer Erturk is working as an Independent Researcher in Berlin, Germany with interests in Turkish politics, Islamist movements in Turkey, relations between politics and religion, radicalism, and autocracy.
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Abstract
This paper investigates the entanglement of religious authority, religious populism, political narratives, and societal transformation within the complex terrain of Turkish politics, through the influential role of Hayrettin Karaman, an Islamist scholar closely aligned with the AKP government under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through various media channels, have significantly impacted AKP supporters, fostering a radicalization that manifests in hate speech, intimidation, and reported acts of aggression toward political dissenters. The fusion of religious interpretations with political discourse has been crucial in legitimizing controversial governmental actions and policies, extending beyond domestic issues to global dynamics and defense strategies, including Karaman’s advocacy for the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction.
Introduction:AKP’s Religious Populism and Radicalization
Recent scholarly works have explored the convergence of authoritarianism, democracy, and Islamic movements across diverse regions. These studies delve into religious and pro-violence populism and assess the societal impacts of various far-right Islamist movements. Additionally, there’s a significant emphasis on the collaboration between Islamist populist parties and secularist far-right parties, examining how these partnerships influence and shape political landscapes. Further academic investigations have probed the relationship between populism, violence, and the stability of authoritarian regimes, including consideration of the concept of necropolitics within specific national contexts. Studies also dissect the role of religion in generating populist appeal, examining, for instance, the impact of the Friday sermons and the utilization of diverse populist narratives for political mobilization (Barton et al., 2021a; Barton et al., 2021b).
The Erdogan regime has cultivated a parallel legal system underpinned by unofficial and clandestine fatwas. To appease its religious constituents, the regime seeks validation for its actions from Islamist legal scholars. This article uses the case study of one such scholar, Hayrettin Karaman, to demonstrate how these Islamist figures can generate an ideological defense and validation for repressive Erdoganist policies, appeals and practices.
The Legitimizing Role of Hayrettin Karaman for the AKP
Hayrettin Karaman, a prominent Islamic Law professor and columnist for the pro-Erdogan daily Yeni Safak, has become one of the most influential figures in supporting the Erdogan’s parallel legal system. Karaman serves as an Islamist authority issuing fatwas which often legitimize illicit and corrupt practices among Islamist politicians and businessmen. These fatwas are connected to a range of political and social agendas, such as obtaining interest-based credit from banks and funneling substantial donations to politicians’ charities in exchange for lucrative public tenders and contracts.
Aligned with Karaman, numerous pro-Erdogan Islamist preachers espouse the belief that Turkey exists within a dar al-harb, an un-Islamic territory where their activities are considered jihad. In light of this argument, they argue for the circumvention of Islamic rules out of necessity, and they disregard official laws, which they perceive as products of the “infidel West.” They assert that the Erdogan’s AKP is the sole political representation of Islam in Turkey, and argue it is a religious duty for Muslims to vote for the party to prevent the division (fitnah, tafriqa) of the ummah, which is seen as being a graver offence than killing a fellow Muslim. The preachers propagate the idea that winning elections is akin to winning a jihad.
Political observers recognize the significant influence of figures like Karaman and the preachers supporting him within the AKP government and Erdogan’s inner circle. His fatwas and policy recommendations are perceived as authoritative in Islamic contexts, giving his statements substantial weight and warranting serious consideration. The remainder of this article presents and analyzes various statements, fatwas, and opinions provided by Karaman, which have helped legitimize and entrench Islamist ideas in Turkish society and support the Islamist populist agenda of the ruling AKP and authoritarian Erdogan regime.
Karaman’s support for the AKP and Erdogan extends to justifying even their controversial or morally contested actions, using interpretations of Islamic principles that benefit the ruling party. An illustrative instance is the 2010 incident involving Deniz Baykal, the former leader of the main opposition party, Republican People Party (CHP), and the release of a purportedly scandalous sex video he participated in. The surfacing of this scandal provoked reactions and criticisms from both sides, but significantly from those with the view that prying into an individual’s private life contradicts Islamic values.
The AKP and Erdogan defended the video’s release and were interestingly supported by Karaman, who stepped in to provide religious legitimacy to their defense. Karaman’s argument revolved around the idea of prioritizing the state’s interests over individual rights to privacy, aligning with the AKP’s stance that the exposure of such scandalous content was warranted for the greater good. Karaman wrote in his column:
“If one committing a sin in secret is a public office holder or trying to be one, in this case, ‘the duty of protecting people from its harm’ forestalls the duty of concealing of dishonor. The related people should be informed regarding the scandal. This sin and dishonor should not be concealed. If the law, without permission, forbids the prying and recording of the private activity, this law must be respected, unless there is no state of necessity (zaruret). According to Islamic ethic, it is also forbidden to attempt for prying and disclosing the secret behaviors of the individuals. However, if the concealed sin and misconduct bear upon the public and the act of concealing harms the public, the state of necessity becomes effective. In this case, this sin or misconduct can be released and publicized within the limits of the state of necessity allows” (Karaman, 2011).
His interpretation offered religious legitimacy by emphasizing the preservation of Islamic values within the context of governance and the political landscape.
Karaman’s Defense for the AKP During the 2013 Corruption Probe
Hundreds protest in Istanbul on December 22, 2013, against the country’s worst corruption scandal in years, which was linked to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Photo: Sadık Gulec.
During the notorious corruption probe of December 17-25, 2013 Karaman staunchly supported Erdogan and the AKP, fabricating religious fatwas in favor of the party’s politicians (Karaman, 2014a). Under this proposed system, elected Islamist officials may receive bribes, such as a 10—or 20 percent commission on billion-dollar public tenders from construction contractors, a practice Karaman likens to the share of “alms collectors” in the early days of Islamic civilization.
Karaman’s articles following the December 17-25, 2013, graft and bribery investigations take an intriguing turn, openly addressing the bribery and corruption associated with Erdogan. In an apparent effort to sway religious Erdogan supporters, Karaman endeavored to portray these actions not as personal misconduct but as contributions to the Islamic cause – a form of dawah and jihad, ostensibly carried out for the Islamist movement rather than Erdogan’s personal gain. Karaman defended the AKP’s actions in his minimizing statement that “corruption is not theft” (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).
Karaman’s Framing of the 2017 Referendum as a Religious Obligation
Intensifying his explicit support for the AKP and Erdogan, Karaman was also notably involved in discriminating against voters based on their political choices before the April 2017 referendum on Turkey’s Constitution, which facilitated the shift to an executive presidential system. His statements aligned voters’ preferences with fatwas, adding a religious connotation to the political decision. Karaman disseminated the view that casting a “yes vote” was not just a political act but also an Islamic obligation, intertwining religious obligation with the referendum. In another article, he openly states that Naysayers are those who are standing against the Islam (Karaman, 2017f).
This stance concurred with that of Erdogan and his affiliated media outlets, who emphatically emphasized that a devout Muslim should support the “Yes” vote, and that “No voters will go to hell.” The entanglement of religious authority and political discourse was crucial to the public debate, with religious rhetoric explicitly influencing the referendum’s outcome (Yayla, 2017). According to Karaman, since Erdogan’s actions are aimed at fulfilling a religious obligation (to form an Islamic state), “every action that brings us closer to this goal is a religious obligation (fardh), including a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum.”
Karaman as a Key Agitator Against the West
Karaman has been outspoken in his disdain and distrust towards the West. Karaman utilizes his platform to critique the behavior of Western countries, particularly regarding their interactions with Turkey under Erdogan regime, and has become an important figure in broader discussions on international relations and perceptions of Turkey within global contexts (O’Brien, 2017).
In a statement attributed to the scholar, Karaman blames the US for employing strategies that contradict conscience, religious values, and legal principles (Karaman, 2017b). He reflects on the perceived intentions and actions of the US in the Middle East and globally, suggesting that the US sought dominance over the Middle East and the entire world, driven by insatiable interests. Karaman implies that any entity attempting to challenge or impede US interests faced coercion, manipulation, and subjugation through various, potentially unethical means (Karaman, 2017b). He accuses the US of using alliances and collaborations within different countries to incite unrest, create chaos, provoke conflicts, propagate terrorism, and manipulate perceptions to serve its agenda (Karaman, 2017b).
Karaman is also a vocal critic of Western countries, particularly in Europe, for their negative attitudes towards Turkey and Islam. In an online post for instance, Karaman addressed Christian countries in the West, accusing them of egotism and racism and claiming their negative sentiments towards Turkey have been rapidly escalating (O’Brien, 2017). In another statement, Karaman (2017a) shares his perspective on Europe’s attitude toward religion, particularly Islam, and the economic aspects associated with it. He portrays Europe as a continent disconnected from a fulfilling religion that guides human life in both this world and the afterlife. He criticizes Europe for rejecting its original religion, conforming religious beliefs to fit personal desires, and even embracing atheism when conformity fails.
Karaman also alleges that Europe does not welcome Islam as a potential replacement for this void in religious guidance. He draws parallels between historical exploitation, mentioning the use of workers from Muslim countries for labor-intensive jobs, and a contemporary narrative where Europe, facing economic decline, turns its attention to the assets of Muslims residing in the continent (Karaman, 2017a).
Pushing an Islamist Agenda for Turkey, the Muslim World and the Ummah
Karaman has also disseminated a range of Islamist ideas that often align with or presumably generate interest in Erdoganist Islamist populism. He portrays Turkey under Erdogan rule as representing an Islamic movement that can liberate the Ummah from various forms of perceived oppression and take a stance against exploitation and subjugation (Karaman, 2017b). Karaman has also made statements that deepen religio-political tensions in society, such as in his writing about the Gulen movement, when he insinuated that the movement acts against the state’s interests, fostering division (fitnah), thus legitimizing state intervention to counter it (Yilmaz, 2015b).
Moreover, a sense of Islamist victimhood is identifiable in the scholar’s statements. His statements evoke a sense of crisis, which helps justify the Islamist agenda in Turkish politics and beyond. In one statement, for example, he claims, “the opposition and enmity that began when our prophet openly started to invite people to Islam in Mecca, has, to date, found members from almost all corners of the world, and their destructive activities are ongoing. They have tried everything to destroy Islam and Muslims or to deviate the religion from its original form to achieve their aims. One of their methods was to divide Muslims and ensure that the divided parts consume each other” (Karaman, 2017d).
Promoting the View that Turkey Should Strengthen Its Military and Acquire WMDs
The Turkish Army and Free Syrian Army operated in Afrin, Syria, on February 23, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
Karaman’s discourse reflects a strong belief in the need for Turkey to strengthen its military capabilities. He underscores the necessity for Turkey to maintain comprehensive power, including a robust military, to safeguard its interests. Karaman expresses hope that Turkey will become powerful across various domains, emphasizing the importance of strength in addressing geopolitical challenges (Karaman, 2017c).
Karaman pushes his view that Turkey needs to achieve a balance with the Western and non-Muslim world, and this will be achieved in part by matching or attaining comparable weaponry to counter potential adversaries (Karaman, 2017c). He envisions the unification of all Muslims, the ‘ummah,’ as a force to deter external threats, particularly those stemming from the West (Karaman, 2017c).
Concerningly, the Islamist scholar has expressed a deep interest in Turkey acquiring nuclear capabilities, which he positions a a means of establishing a balance of power against imperialist forces and as a deterrent against oppression (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman’s stance, as articulated in the Yeni Safak daily, strongly advocates for Turkey’s acquisition and production of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), including nuclear arms, to counter the perceived dominance of Western powers (Karaman, 2017c). He emphasizes the need for Turkey to consider creating these weapons autonomously, disregarding any opposition or constraints from Western entities (Karaman, 2017c).
In a notable example, Karaman not only sanctioned the government’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) but also urged Turkish leadership to pursue this path. The gravity of his statements shouldn’t be underestimated, considering their potential impact on policy directions, especially concerning the alarming proposal for WMDs (Bozkurt, 2017).
Karaman justifies this perspective by advocating for a realist approach in world politics, suggesting that smaller states with nuclear arsenals can exert considerable influence over larger populations (Karaman, 2017c). Karaman claims that the US and the West have attempted to control or restrict Muslim nations like Pakistan (possessing nuclear weapons) and have concerns about Iran acquiring similar capabilities. However, Karaman highlights a perceived shift in Turkey’s approach under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. He presents Erdogan as a determined leader who seeks to resist oppression and support the oppressed. Indeed, in 2018 President Erdogan expressed Turkey’s initiative in producing similar military capabilities as Western nations (El, 2018).
Conclusion
The context of Turkey’s political landscape involves a multifaceted interplay between religious authority, political narratives, and societal dynamics. Hayrettin Karaman’s influential role as an Islamist scholar and his ideological alignment with the AKP government under Islamist authoritarian populist Erdogan underscore a significant fusion of religious interpretation and political discourse. Karaman’s fatwas and writings, disseminated through media channels, have wielded substantial influence, particularly among the supporters of the Erdogan regime.
The influence of excommunicative fatwas and the narratives propagated by Islamist figures like Karaman within the media have had a notable impact on AKP/Erdogan followers. Karaman’s interpretations have bolstered the Erdogan regime’s stance on contentious issues and contributed to a radicalization of AKP/Erdogan followers. This radicalization is evident in the propagation of hate speech, intimidation tactics, and reported instances of physical aggression toward those holding opposing political affiliations.
Furthermore, Karaman’s narratives have extended beyond domestic matters, delving into geopolitical dynamics, defense strategies, and international relations. His assertions advocating the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and narratives concerning global powers highlight a vision of Turkey reliant on a robust stance against perceived adversaries.
The significance and widespread impact of Karaman’s controversial religious fatwas and recommendations within Islamist circles in Turkey and among Muslims should not be underestimated. They also have the potential to influence Turkey’s foreign policy and its relationships with other nations, particularly in defense and regional dynamics.
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Sithole, Neo. (2024). “Peacemaking & Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994.” ECPS Book Reviews. European Center for Populism Studies. August 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/br0016
In her book, Reverend Dr. Liz Carmichael unpacks the events, personalities, and socio-cultural, political, and economic realities during South Africa’s peace and transition negotiations from 1990 to 1998. She details the challenges faced by the country’s early popular mass movements and provides insights into the Manichean divide between political organizations. Through a reflective lens, Carmichael addresses the often-overlooked high emotions, ethnic-based societal cleavages, and split-second decisions that characterized the politics of the time. Crucially, the work demonstrates that the discussions surrounding the National Peace Accord were vital not only for bringing a decisive end to the political violence of that period but also for other significant reasons.
Violence in South Africa reached a zenith in 1990, the culmination of internal progressive active resistance carried out by civic society, workers unions, religious bodies and then-banned political organizations in the forms of mass protests, strikes, marches or sit-ins. Former President P.W. Botha’s notions of ‘total onslaught,’ that South Africa was under siege by militarized communist forces that threatened the security of Apartheid South Africa and the white political domination and privilege it upheld and its counterpart ‘total strategy,’ the required combination of reform and repression made necessary the formation of military wings ties to banned liberation movements. In a move to douse socio-political tensions, State President de Klerk decides to lift the ban on political parties and release political prisoners. Instead of introducing calm South Africa saw a shift of violence from the domain brutal Apartheid regime to adversarial political parties the African National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party. From massacres on trains and to wars between rival township settlements, ‘black on black’ violence was quickly spreading. Prompted by the scale and absurdity of mass violence various churches galvanized, organizing themselves to bring political parties together to engage in peace talks, a step that would see the adoption of the National Peace Accord, a linchpin document in South Africa’s relatively peaceful transition to a full democracy.
Due to its examination of political life influenced by some of South Africa’s earliest and largest popular movements (even being viewed as populist by scholars of transitioning South Africa) Reverend Dr. Liz Carmicheal’s work subtly examines themes of direct interest to populist scholars such as the Manichean ‘good vs evil’ and an inclusionary Left battling against an exclusionary Right. Additionally, the book offers examples of ethnic divides that materialize politically often seen in populist rhetoric or strategies.
In the introduction, author Carmichael offers the book’s aim as being “first full account of the Peace Accord” (pg.1) and how under NPA structures South Africans took part in directly birthing and developing peace and contributing to what would be seen globally as a remarkable transition from a horrific Apartheid regime to an inclusive and uplifting non-racial democracy. Upon review, this is somewhat misleading. Not because the text doesn’t fulfil this, but because when reading what is presented is an extensive detailing of the socio-political environment(s) that surrounded the accord generated continuous shifts in peace talks, the people and personalities that for better or worse had an immediate impact on the outcomes of negotiations, objectives that influenced informed decisions taken by political parties and civic/religious organizations, and the how agreed upon political configurations relied upon principles cooperation between ordinary citizens for their functionality. There exists a reflective habit to ‘telescope’ the period between the unbanning of political parties in 1990 and 1994 when the country held its first, closely watched free and fair elections which is often done by spotlighting a few key moments based on the discretion of who something the book aids in rectifying.
As the title suggests, the book’s central themes are peace-making and peacebuilding, providing what these meant and looked like in South Africa during the peak of internal conflict. A third theme not explicitly mentioned but vividly shown is ‘peace-selling,’ where we see the extent to which the state, in cooperation with business and political parties, knowing that for peace to take root the notion of peace needs to be circulated by means that would be far-reaching and see peace be synonymous with the popular culture to subvert still existing political, regional and racial tensions. Outside of these, there are additional themes that, decades after South Africa transitioned into a democracy, remain salient and prominent within the country’s political, social and economic sphere like the dire need for enduring political tolerance, the touchy relationship between the government, political organizations, and businesses, how realpolitik can supersede ideological cleavages, how political expansion often generates animosity between parties that may hold similar ideological foundations or how certain political organizations built legacies on the kind of support/opposition received from the Apartheid government.
Carmichael informs readers about how the people at the national level responded to what was very visibly aimed to be a shift in South Africa’s political dispensation and while doing so recognizes some who may not have been immortalized by previous works as being concerned with the business of peacemaking and peacebuilding on the ground.
The book places significant emphasis on the dynamic between the African National Congress (ANC), the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), and the Apartheid government, primarily due to their pivotal roles in the ongoing political violence of the time. The IFP, initially a cultural organization, transformed into a quasi-political party after the ANC was banned, with the intention of continuing the ANC’s work. However, tensions arose between the IFP and the ANC over ideological differences. The main points of contention included the ANC’s shift toward violent resistance, its calls for intensified boycotts and sanctions against the South African economy (which IFP leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi believed would harm Black South Africans the most), and its increasing alignment with communist influences, which the IFP strongly disapproved of.
The disputes, primarily stemming from friction between the IFP leadership—centralized around Zulu Chief and party leader Buthelezi—and the ANC leadership in exile, created a complex and multifaceted tension between the two organizations. These disagreements not only served as significant obstacles to peace during the period of violence but also influenced the negotiations leading up to South Africa’s first democratic election. The book highlights key aspects of the ANC-IFP conflict, including the controversial linkages between the IFP and the apartheid regime, which led many to view Inkatha as an extension of the regime’s security apparatus and collaborators in maintaining racial segregation. Additionally, the ANC’s refusal to disband its military wing, which the IFP viewed as a private army and thus a violation of peace accords, further fueled the strain between the two parties.
International sanctions, some in place since the instalment of the National Party in 1948, boycotts had limited the reach of South Africa goods and had caved under mounting internal pressure (notably the student movements) to leave Apartheid South Africa. These mirrored the economic forces internally that demanded change, spurred on by massive losses in profits brought on by stunted productivity, a shrinking market to sell to and crippling hikes in taxes introduced by the government in attempts to boost internal revenue and stave off total economic collapse. The widespread political violence and instability across the country significantly discouraged workers from attending their shifts, as they risked being attacked by rival political factions or killed by an elusive group of unknown assailants. Later in the text, Carmichael reveals that this shadowy group, commonly referred to as the ‘Third Force,’ was a combination of rogue elements within state security, members of political parties, and former liberation militants.
The recurring display of the ANC-IFP rivalry is recounted to have played out in forms across numerous occasions, the rivalry played out reinforces the understanding that for peace to be realistically achieved both parties needed to find themselves politically satisfied with their visions of the space they held in the country’s present and its future.
Ahistorical oversimplifications of the Left-Right divide present in South Africa at the time are also tackled by the text. The book unpacks the various political parties and organizations that fell across the Left-Right spectrum, in line with their role and relevance during that moment/event and shares their ideological underpinnings or contextualizes any conflicts between them where necessary, and it often is.
The deep ideological divide that shaped attitudes toward the peace process is thoroughly explored in the text. Dr. Carmichael highlights a notable example during the negotiations of the Peace Accord, where extreme right-wing factions rejected the Accord, labeling it a “communist trap” and a dangerous step toward handing over power to communist forces. They argued that there could be no peace without freedom for their respective “nations” (pg. 135). This rejection was mirrored on the far left by parties such as the Pan-African Congress and the Azanian People’s Organization, along with their allied unions. Initially participating in the peace negotiations as observers, these groups later withdrew from both the peace and future constitutional negotiations, believing that engaging with those they saw as the primary perpetrators of violence against the Black majority undermined the broader struggle for freedom.
Carmichael recounts some of the significant challenges of the peace process, noting that while getting all the necessary parties into the same room was difficult, an even greater challenge was getting leaders to genuinely communicate rather than talking past each other to score political points with their constituencies. On one occasion, a member of the far-right stood up during negotiations and argued that if the talks were truly open to dialogue, they must also entertain the possibility of allowing those who wished to remain segregated to do so.
The involvement of foreign organizations, including the United Nations and the Commonwealth Organization of African Unity, was strongly opposed by the South African government, as many of these entities had, in principle, sided with the ANC, which had called for the continuation of sanctions. Another theme explored in the book is the negotiations that took place outside the official talks. Away from their constituents and the media, where official positions often hindered progress, political leaders would engage in informal discussions at family homes, churches, or even during tea breaks, allowing them to clear disputes and build relationships more freely.
The National Peace Accord (NPA) was primarily a response to the widespread political violence in South Africa, aiming to prevent further bloodshed. Carmichael effectively breaks down how the Accord, once signed, was made functional and enforced. He details the evolution of the NPA, noting that the final agreement included chapters focused on addressing the structural issues contributing to national instability. These included socio-economic development, the restructuring of security forces to better represent the forthcoming democratic South Africa, and, crucially, the establishment of a code of conduct for political parties, the government, and unions.
Carmichael notes that for parties emphasizing consultative consensus with their constituents, there was discomfort with the ‘top-down’ approach taken in the accord negotiations. However, he cites that due to the immediacy and decisiveness demanded by the situation, it was the only viable option. That said, the book highlights that the real work for the NPA and the peace process occurred at the grassroots level, particularly in regions where violence had become entrenched, such as KwaZulu-Natal. This underscores an appreciation for the acknowledgment by NPA officers (many of them volunteers) of the need for varied approaches, as success in some areas relied on personalities and relationships for the effective establishment of NPA structures.
In discussing the sporadic nature of the clashes between party members, the book reveals that much of the political violence was either denied by political leadership or was the result of communities trying to defend themselves, taking pre-emptive action, or retaliating against previous political violence. It also addresses the challenges in finding effective ways to consolidate political cohesion between parties and their leaders on the ground, noting the frequent disruptions to negotiations caused by outbreaks of violence or retaliatory actions. Along these lines, sentiments of skepticism towards the accords are highlighted. Despite the accords being welcomed, there was widespread concern, particularly at the grassroots level, about whether the agreement would be adhered to. This skepticism was fueled by instances where signatories violated the principles of earlier peace agreements, thereby undermining both their commitment to peace and the accord as a whole.
It is shown that the NPA and surrounding discussions proved vital for a reason other than bringing a decisive end to the political violence; it was the prelude to the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) negotiations that painted the blueprint for what the post-Apartheid South Africa would look like. For many in attendance, the peace accord talks presented chances to vent frustrations as well a platform for political maneuvering- in both of these cases, the underlying logic was that it was becoming increasingly clear that political and economic power was rapidly restructuring and that involved parties needed to actively mark their places to avoid being left out.
Critically, the book clarifies how churches and businesses (capital) became pillars not only of the accords themselves but also of sustaining the negotiation process as early as 1990. These two groups, either independently or jointly, were pivotal in breaking down negotiation or communication deadlocks. They served as points of contact in violence-prone areas where neutrality was essential for quelling conflicts, highlighting the significance of churches, religious organizations, and collective businesses in facilitating the entire NPA process. The book provides insight into how large business groups shouldered much of the administrative burden behind the negotiations, offering resources such as boardrooms, cars, office buildings, and private jets. Regarding religious leaders, it reveals their shrewdness and acute understanding of the relative goodwill and reduced hostility afforded to them by their positions. They leveraged this to counsel political leaders, cool heated tensions, and, in some cases, bring political leaders of different denominations together through interfaith initiatives, thus bypassing the political divisions that would typically hinder such interactions.
While South Africa’s foreign policy and international presence have become characterized by principles of peace, universal human rights, and the need for dialogue, the book provides a background on the young democracy’s history of negotiation, highlighting its role in quelling international conflicts and paving the way for sustained peace and collective development. Dr. Carmichael contributes to crafting a holistic account of earlier populist movements by examining South Africa’s Manichean divides and ethnic-turned-political societal cleavages. Through reflective and detailed accounts of the events leading up to the peace talks, the relationships between key figures, and the short timeline between events, Carmichael illustrates that the period from 1990 to 1994 can be considered the most politically intense in the country’s recent history.
Liz Carmichael. (2023). Peacemaking and Peacebuilding in South Africa: The National Peace Accord, 1991-1994. Boydell and Brewer. 518 pp. $36.95, ISBN: 9781847013682
Some observers believe Nicolás Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.
By Imdat Oner*
“Lacking personal charisma and booming oil revenues, Nicolás Maduro has struggled to obtain his predecessor’s popular support and failed to legitimize his rule at the polls. Instead, Maduro consolidated his power through sharing it with elites and the military.”
In a profile I wrote about Nicolás Maduro three years ago, I emphasized that his grip on power was not rooted in broad popular support but rather in strategic alliances with elites and the military. This reality has been starkly highlighted by the recent presidential election in Venezuela, which revealed Maduro’s limited base of popular support.
The National Electoral Council (CNE) officially declared Maduro the winner, claiming he secured 52 percent of the vote compared to 43 percent for his main challenger, Edmundo González. However, despite Maduro’s declaration of victory three weeks ago, the CNE has yet to present credible evidence to substantiate this claim. In contrast, Venezuela’s opposition, represented by the Unitary Platform (PUD), has challenged the outcome by publishing a detailed vote count online. This data shows that Edmundo González actually received more than 7.3 million votes—approximately 67% of the total. The opposition’s numbers indicate that González is ahead by over 4 million votes, with Maduro losing in every state. Some reports are even calling this election manipulation one of the biggest electoral frauds in Latin American history. Although Maduro has faced similar allegations of election fraud before, the evidence against him has never been as overwhelming as it is now.
Lacking popular support, Maduro has resorted to familiar tactics. Instead of transparently sharing election results table by table, he requested that the Electoral Chamber of Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) review and certify the official results. The government is attempting to present the TSJ as a neutral body to resolve the controversy. Yet, Venezuela’s judiciary has long been co-opted by Maduro, functioning more as a tool to preserve his legitimacy than as an independent institution. Although the court has yet to announce its decision, it’s highly likely it will support the results from Maduro’s controlled CNE.
As the government delays the process to buy time, Maduro continues to rely on military support. His legitimacy has always been anchored in alliances with domestic elites, particularly the military, whose loyalty is crucial to the regime’s survival. The military, having historically shaped Venezuela’s political landscape, remains key to any potential transition of power. Following the disputed elections, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino reaffirmed the military’s “absolute loyalty” to Maduro, further solidifying their role as a pillar of his regime. Opposition leaders have called on the army to intervene, but this seems unlikely. Since taking power, Maduro has worked to ensure the military remains staunchly pro-government. Those officers who showed even slight disloyalty have been imprisoned, while loyalists have been generously rewarded with significant economic and political favors.
With the military solidly behind Maduro, along with the backing of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Supreme Court, Venezuela is going to slide further into dictatorship. Since Maduro’s 2013 election, the country has gradually grown more authoritarian, with opposition politicians, activists, and journalists consistently targeted by his regime. Yet, in recent days, the repression has intensified significantly. The government’s rhetoric and the actions of its security services signal to tighten its authoritarian grip further on the country, even at the cost of becoming a pariah in the region.
Some observers believe Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.
Venezuela’s elections once again serve as a warning to other authoritarian populist regimes that once dictators seize power, they become extremely difficult to remove—though not entirely impossible.
(*) Dr. Imdat ONER is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University (FIU). He holds a Ph.D. from FIU, where he completed a dissertation titled “Great Power Competition in Latin America Through Strategic Narrative.” Prior to joining FIU, he served as a Turkish diplomat, most recently at the Turkish Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, where he was the Deputy Head of Mission and Political Officer. His expertise lies in International Relations, with a primary focus on Latin American politics. Dr. Oner has published extensively on Venezuelan politics and Turkish foreign policy, with articles appearing in War on the Rocks, The National Interest, Americas Quarterly, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, and the Miami Herald. He is also a frequent contributor to Global Americans. His analyses have been featured in international media outlets, including Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, Miami Herald, and Agencia EFE.
