Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

Professor Abramowitz: Signs Indicate Polarization in the US Could Lead to Violence If Trump Loses

Reflecting on the deeply polarized political landscape in the US, Professor Alan Abramowitz warns, “As we approach the 2024 election, there are signals that this polarization could again lead to violence, particularly if Trump loses the election.” His concerns stem from Donald Trump’s rhetoric, where Trump has already suggested that any loss would be due to fraud, effectively claiming the election would be stolen from him. Looking ahead to the 2024 election, Professor Abramowitz predicts a tight race, with Kamala Harris likely to win by a narrow margin. However, he cautions that the dynamics of the Electoral College could result in a repeat of 2016, where the popular vote and the electoral outcome diverge.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a compelling interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), political scientist Dr. Alan I. Abramowitz, Alben W. Barkley Professor Emeritus at Emory College of Arts and Sciences, sheds light on the critical state of American democracy as the 2024 election approaches. Reflecting on the deeply polarized political landscape, Professor Abramowitz warns, “As we approach the 2024 election, there are signals that this polarization could again lead to violence, particularly if Trump loses the election.” His concerns are grounded in the rhetoric of Donald Trump, who has already suggested that any loss would be due to fraud, effectively claiming the election would be stolen from him. “This kind of rhetoric raises serious concerns about the potential for another outbreak of violence,” Abramowitz notes, emphasizing that while the events may not mirror January 6, the risk remains substantial, fueled by the provocative language of Trump and his allies, including his vice-presidential candidate, J.D. Vance.

Professor Abramowitz’s analysis highlights the unprecedented challenges facing American democracy. He points to the January 6, 2021, Capitol attack as a stark example of the violent potential of current political divisions, but he also expresses concern about other disturbing trends, including assassination attempts on former President Trump. These incidents, while rooted in complex motivations, are symptomatic of a nation deeply divided. “We tend to see things like that in times of deep division and polarization,” Abramowitz observes, adding that the normalization of such extreme actions is a dangerous precedent.

Looking ahead to the 2024 election, Professor Abramowitz predicts a tight race, with Kamala Harris likely to win by a narrow margin. However, he cautions that the dynamics of the Electoral College could result in a repeat of 2016, where the popular vote and the electoral outcome diverge. “There’s a real possibility that Harris could win the national popular vote but lose the electoral vote,” he states, underscoring the uncertainty and tension that will define the upcoming election.

Through his detailed examination of the current political climate, Professor Abramowitz provides a sobering assessment of the threats to American democracy. His insights offer a crucial perspective on the risks posed by heightened polarization and the potential consequences of another Trump presidency.

Political scientist Dr. Alan I. Abramowitz is an Alben W. Barkley Professor Emeritus at Emory College of Arts and Sciences.


Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Alan Abramowitz with some edits.

Trend Towards Heightened Polarization and Negative Partisanship to Continue

Professor Abramowitz, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me begin right away with the first question. In your work, you’ve emphasized the growing influence of negative partisanship in American politics, where voters are increasingly motivated by opposition to the other party rather than support for their own. You’ve particularly noted the significant role of racial resentment in shaping the voting behavior of white working-class voters in the 2016 election. Given the current demographic trends, how do you see this dynamic evolving in the upcoming 2024 election, especially considering the increasing diversity of the American electorate?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Well, I believe we’ll continue to see a trend towards heightened polarization and negative partisanship. The polling data for the 2024 election already indicates this, and I expect we’ll see even more evidence as post-election data becomes available. It’s quite evident that the messaging from the two major party candidates, particularly from Donald Trump, is heavily focused on negative attacks. Trump emphasizes opposition to the other party, portraying figures like Kamala Harris as dangerously radical and painting the Democratic Party as being far to the left. Trump aims to depict Democrats as a threat to the way of life for ordinary Americans, particularly those who support him.

On the other side, we also see a fair share of negativity. While Harris’s messaging has included more positive elements as she introduces herself to the American electorate, given that she isn’t as well-known as Trump, there is still a substantial amount of negative content. This includes strong criticisms of Trump’s positions on various issues, as well as of Trump himself—his personality, behavior and the fact that he has been convicted of criminal behavior, among other things.

Given the negative attacks from both sides, the deep mistrust and the intense dislike that each side has for the opposing party and its candidates, I think we’re likely to see a continuation and possibly even an intensification, of this trend toward negative partisanship.

Polarization Could Lead to Violence If Trump Loses

Can you give us a historical perspective into periods of intense political polarization in US history? What was so different in the Trump presidency?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: We’ve certainly experienced periods of intense division and polarization in American history. The Civil War era is an obvious example—perhaps the most well-known—where the nation was deeply divided, especially over the issue of slavery, which ultimately led to several states seceding from the Union and resulted in a very bloody civil war.

Even earlier, the post-Revolutionary period was marked by intense polarization, with leaders of the two major parties at the time—the Democratic-Republicans and the Federalists—deeply mistrusting and disliking each other. However, the Civil War era stands out as a time when the country was so profoundly split that it led to an actual conflict.

In the last 20 to 30 years, American politics has entered another period of intense polarization. While this polarization has not resulted in a civil war, it has led to a significant rise in intense dislike and vilification of the opposing party and its leaders. Negative attacks against party leaders are common, and we also see a very divided media landscape, which exacerbates this polarization. Supporters of the two major parties often rely on different sources of information that reinforce their existing beliefs, leading to a lack of a common base of knowledge—something we had more of 30 or 40 years ago.

One of the most alarming developments from this polarization has been the outbreaks of violence. The most notable example is the January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol, where supporters of President Trump, incited by his rhetoric, stormed the Capitol and engaged in violent confrontations with law enforcement, resulting in numerous injuries and several deaths.

While that is the most obvious example, there have been other troubling signs, such as recent assassination attempts on former President Trump. Though the motives behind these attempts are not entirely clear, they reflect the intense divisions within the country.

As we approach the 2024 election, there are signals that this polarization could again lead to violence, particularly if Trump loses the election. Trump has already indicated that he may not accept the election results, claiming that the only way he could lose is through fraud, effectively saying that the election would be stolen from him. This kind of rhetoric raises serious concerns about the potential for another outbreak of violence. While it may not take the exact same form as the events of January 6, given that the federal government and security forces will be better prepared, the risk of violence remains significant, driven by the rhetoric of Trump and some of his political allies, including his vice-presidential candidate, J.D. Vance.

Your research mentions the role of partisan media in reinforcing negative partisanship. With the rise of social media and alternative news platforms, how do you see media influence evolving in shaping voter behavior? Are there any interventions that could mitigate the polarizing effects of media?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: The media environment today remains highly polarized. We see that supporters of Republican and Democratic candidates generally receive their information from very different sources. For example, supporters of Vice President Harris and other Democratic candidates tend to rely on mainstream media outlets, such as the major news networks and CNN, as well as outlets with a clear liberal slant, like MSNBC. In contrast, supporters of former President Trump and other Republican candidates disproportionately get their information from sources with a strong conservative slant, particularly Fox News, but also from other online platforms like Newsmax and similar sites with a clear conservative bias.

This creates an environment where voters’ perceptions and views of the election and the candidates are continually reinforced by the media messages they consume. This is especially true with right-wing media outlets, where Fox News plays a significant role, but even more extreme sources are also contributing. A concerning aspect of this is the spread of misinformation, which we currently see disproportionately coming from the right in the United States. This misinformation includes false claims, such as those advanced by Trump about the 2020 election being stolen or the dangers posed by immigrants—claims that are not only untrue but also potentially dangerous.

While there is certainly slanted news coverage from some media outlets on the left, such as MSNBC and other liberal-leaning platforms, we don’t see the same level of misinformation, particularly the kind that could incite violence, to the extent that we do on the right. The intensity and potential consequences of misinformation from right-wing sources are far more pronounced.

‘Electoral College Roulette’ Could Result in a Repeat of 2016

US presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Photo: Shutterstock.

You argue that Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 presidential election was one of the most shocking upsets in American electoral history. Can you elaborate on why you describe it as one of the most shocking?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Well, heading into the 2016 election, the available polling data indicated that Hillary Clinton was a strong favorite. Nationally, she appeared to have a solid lead and she was also ahead of Trump, albeit by a narrow margin, in almost all of the key swing states that would ultimately decide the election in the Electoral College.

However, the outcome defied these expectations. The polls in several crucial swing states, particularly Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania, were off, showing Clinton with a lead of 2 to 4 points when, in reality, those states swung to Trump by narrow margins. These unexpected shifts in the swing states are what ultimately tilted the Electoral College in Trump’s favor.

This situation highlights a phenomenon I refer to as “Electoral College roulette.” When the national popular vote margin is relatively close—within 2, 3 or even 4 points—the election’s outcome hinges on a small number of swing states. This was true in both 2016 and 2020. Even though Joe Biden won the national popular vote by about 4.5 points in 2020, which would normally suggest a comfortable victory in the Electoral College, his actual Electoral College margin was much narrower due to the close results in those same swing states—Michigan, Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Arizona, Nevada and North Carolina. These are the same states likely to determine the outcome in the next election.

As we approach the 2024 election, Kamala Harris appears to have a modest lead nationally—about 3 points on average. But, as in 2016, the margins in the key swing states are extremely tight, making the outcome unpredictable. Harris could potentially win the popular vote by a comfortable margin, yet Donald Trump could still emerge as the winner in the Electoral College. So, while we’re not predicting this outcome, there’s a significant chance that something similar to 2016 could happen again.

Do you consider Trump’s presidency (2016-2020) caused irreparable damage to American democracy?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Yes, I believe Trump’s presidency has inflicted significant damage on American democracy. In modern times, no other defeated presidential candidate has refused to accept the results of an election to the extent that Trump did. Not only did he refuse to concede after the election, but he also actively sought to overturn the results. He encouraged his supporters in swing states to challenge the election outcomes, pushed for the creation of slates of false electors in several of those states and, most notably, incited the violent attack on the US Capitol on January 6, 2021.

These actions were unprecedented in modern American history. We have never seen a defeated presidential candidate behave in this manner. And now, as we approach another election, Trump is once again signaling that he might refuse to accept the results if he loses. His rhetoric often includes violent language, raising concerns that he could incite his supporters to act violently if the election doesn’t go his way.

While the deep divisions in American society and politics didn’t begin with Trump, they have certainly been exacerbated by him. Over the past several decades, the two major parties have grown increasingly divided along ideological lines, with highly emotional and divisive issues like abortion and gay rights, in addition to traditional economic issues, fueling this conflict. Trump capitalized on these divisions to gain control of the Republican Party and win the presidency in 2016. His presidency, and now his post-presidency, particularly the type of campaign he’s running for 2024, have further deepened these divisions, greatly increasing the risk that they could lead to violence.

Trump’s Rhetoric Marks a Significant Shift from the Republican Party’s Traditional Stance

Can you explain how racial resentment, negative partisanship and polarization under Trump’s presidency shaped the US politics and democracy?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: One of the key factors behind Trump’s appeal to a significant segment of white working-class voters in the United States is the dramatic transformation the country has been undergoing over the past several decades, particularly in terms of its racial and ethnic makeup. The US population is becoming increasingly diverse and the proportion of non-Hispanic whites in the population—and the electorate—has been steadily declining. It’s projected that within the next decade or two, non-Hispanic whites will make up less than 50% of the population, a threshold already crossed in several states like California and Texas.

This demographic shift is perceived as threatening by some members of the white population, which is no longer growing and may soon begin to decline. There’s a fear among this group that the country is being taken over by people who do not look like them or share their values. Trump has capitalized on these fears, using them to deepen divisions and present them as existential threats.

For instance, when discussing immigration, Trump often portrays immigrants in a highly negative light, characterizing them as criminals or individuals coming from prisons and mental institutions who are taking over cities and contributing to high levels of violence. He has even made outlandish and entirely false claims, such as Haitian immigrants in Ohio killing and eating people’s pets. Despite the absurdity of these claims, Trump continues to promote them and his vice-presidential candidate, J.D. Vance, along with other Republican figures, either echo these falsehoods or refuse to contradict them.

These kinds of divisive and fear-mongering messages resonate with a significant, though not majority, portion of the American electorate—those who score high on measures of racial resentment. Racial resentment in this context isn’t just about attitudes toward African Americans; it’s also about anxiety over the broader transformation of American society, particularly as it relates to immigration. Over the last several decades, the US has seen a large influx of immigrants, which has caused strains similar to those observed in Europe. Trump and other right-wing populist leaders have exploited these fears, portraying immigration as a threat to the economic well-being, values and even physical safety of the formerly dominant white population, especially those with lower levels of education.

This rhetoric marks a significant departure from the Republican Party’s stance 30 or 40 years ago. Even conservative politicians like Ronald Reagan did not talk about immigration in such negative terms. Historically, the Republican Party had a more favorable stance toward immigration, but under Trump’s influence, this has dramatically changed, with racial resentment and negative partisanship becoming central elements of the party’s messaging. 

Given your concerns about the risks of democratic backsliding in the United States, particularly under the influence of increasing polarization, what specific institutional reforms do you believe could help strengthen democratic norms and reduce the likelihood of further erosion?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Some important steps have already been taken, such as the reforms enacted to improve the process of counting the electoral vote, aiming to ensure that it occurs more smoothly and is less vulnerable to the kinds of attacks and disruptions we witnessed after the 2020 election. However, additional measures are necessary, particularly at the state and local levels, to further safeguard our democracy.

Protecting election workers, ensuring that elections are conducted safely and guaranteeing that votes are counted accurately are critical steps. Additionally, efforts to counteract the threat of violence during the election process are essential.

In the longer run, one significant reform that could help minimize the chances of disruptions would be to abolish the Electoral College entirely and move to a direct popular election of the President. This is something the US has come close to considering in the past, but it now seems quite distant. Establishing a more direct connection between the popular vote and the choice of the President would, in my view, reduce the opportunities for manipulation and attacks on the democratic process, as we’ve seen in recent elections.

New Assassination Attempts Could Potentially Target Leaders on Both Sides

Headlines in New York newspapers report on the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump on July 14, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Do you attribute the reason of two assassination attempts on Trump to the affective polarization in American politics? What role did Trump play in deepening the polarization?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: Yes, I believe Trump has been a significant factor in deepening polarization, particularly through his rhetoric. He has heavily emphasized portraying the opposition party and its leaders as existential threats to democracy and to the way of life of his supporters. This has greatly exacerbated the divisions that were already present in American society.

It’s difficult to say exactly what motivated the individuals behind the assassination attempts, but such actions tend to occur during times of deep division and polarization. Trump is undeniably a very divisive and polarizing figure, but we shouldn’t assume that future assassination attempts will be limited to him. Once the idea takes hold that it’s possible to target and attempt to kill a political leader, it could potentially happen to leaders on either side of the political spectrum.

This is a very dangerous situation and it underscores the importance of ensuring adequate security for political candidates. There have been efforts to enhance security measures to protect candidates when they are in public, but it’s worth noting that the United States has a long history of assassination attempts, some of which have been successful, dating back many years. What’s new is the sophistication of the weaponry available today. The accessibility of high-powered, military-style weapons increases the risk because someone no longer needs to be in close proximity to carry out an assassination. As we’ve seen in these recent attempts, an assailant could potentially strike from several hundred yards away if they have a clear line of sight.

There are pundits who argue that a second Trump administration will damage more seriously the American democracy than the first one. Where do you stand in this debate?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: I absolutely agree with that assessment. We’re already seeing clear signs from Trump and his supporters indicating that a second Trump administration would involve serious attempts to undermine American democracy. During his first term, Trump made efforts to target his political opponents, even pushing for their prosecution. However, he was often restrained by key individuals around him, including his own advisers, the Attorney General and the heads of agencies like the FBI, who refused to carry out his more extreme demands.

In a second Trump presidency, I believe this restraint would be far less likely. Trump and his allies have been actively seeking individuals who would be more willing to go along with his wishes, individuals who would not stand in his way if he returned to the White House. His primary motivation seems to be revenge—against his political enemies—and I think he would be much less restrained in pursuing that agenda.

There’s a very real risk that we could see serious attempts to prosecute individuals simply for opposing Trump politically. This threat wouldn’t just be limited to leaders of the opposition party but could also extend to media outlets that have been critical of Trump. 

Harris Is Expected to Win the Election by a Very Narrow Margin

There are institutions like V-Dem which argue that American democracy may not survive a second Trump administration? What will happen to American democracy and its liberal order if Trump re-elected on November 5? 

Professor Alan Abramowitz: As I mentioned earlier, there’s a great risk that a second Trump administration would seriously undermine American democracy. This could manifest in attempts to erode free and fair elections and misuse the powers of the presidency and the executive branch to target political opponents and intimidate those who oppose him.

While I believe there would be strong pushback against such efforts—it’s unlikely these actions would be met with passive acceptance—the potential consequences are worrisome. One of the biggest risks is that this situation could escalate into some form of violence, which is a deeply concerning prospect.

It’s difficult to predict the exact outcome, but I don’t necessarily believe it would mean the outright end of American democracy. However, it would certainly pose serious threats to the integrity of our elections, the Justice Department and other key government agencies. These institutions could become highly politicized, which would undermine their ability to function independently and effectively.

For instance, even something like the Federal Reserve, which is supposed to operate independently, could be at risk. Trump has indicated a desire to exert control over the Federal Reserve, preferring someone who would follow his directives rather than making independent decisions about critical issues like interest rates. It could have severe implications for the future of the American economy.

You accurately predicted the result of the 2020 presidential election by modifying the time-for-change model. What is your prediction for the upcoming November 5 election, perhaps using the incumbent-referendum model?

Professor Alan Abramowitz: In fact, I have used the original model to predict both the popular vote and the electoral vote for the upcoming election. According to my prediction, Kamala Harris is expected to win the election by a very narrow margin—somewhere between 2.5 and 3 points in the national popular vote, and with 280 to 290 electoral votes. This is a close margin, which means there is a significant amount of uncertainty in the prediction. When you have a margin this tight, whether in a poll or a forecasting model, it’s difficult to have a high degree of confidence in the outcome.

I would say the chances are better than 50-50 that Kamala Harris will win, but not significantly higher than that. If we were choosing the president based solely on the national popular vote, I would estimate a 90% chance of Harris winning. However, since the election is decided by the Electoral College and given that the swing states are more competitive than the nation as a whole, there’s a real possibility that Harris could win the national popular vote but lose the electoral vote. I’m not predicting that this will happen, but I do think there’s a reasonable chance it could.

Dr. Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion—an online magazine dedicated to defending the values of free societies.

Professor Mounk: Second Trump Presidency Could Be Even More Dangerous Than His First

Professor Yascha Mounk observes that many Americans perceive the Democratic Party as being out of sync with mainstream values and believe that Kamala Harris is too progressive, while fewer think Donald Trump is too conservative. He suggests that Democrats should consider making cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails. Mounk presents two very different scenarios in the event of Trump’s victory on November 5. On one hand, he notes that Trump’s first term, though damaging and chaotic, was perhaps less consequential than some, including Mounk himself, feared in 2016. On the other hand, Mounk offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the US.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Tuesday, Dr. Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion—an online magazine dedicated to defending the values of free societies—delivers a compelling analysis of the rise of populism and its implications for the future of democracy. Professor Mounk identifies three key drivers that have contributed to the rise of populism in the United States: the stagnation of living standards for ordinary citizens, rapid cultural and demographic transformations, and the rise of the internet and social media. These factors, he argues, have collectively fueled a sense of disillusionment and alienation among significant segments of the population, creating fertile ground for populist leaders like Trump to thrive.

As the November 5, 2024, US presidential election approaches, the stakes have never been higher. With Donald Trump’s re-election campaign gaining momentum, Professor Mounk states that ‘there are two very different prognostications. On one hand, you could argue that Trump was in power for four years, which turned out to be damaging and chaotic, but perhaps less consequential than some of us, including myself, feared in 2016’. He also offers a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the United States. He reflects on the evolution of Trump’s political influence, noting that “Trump now has about a 45% chance, according to betting markets, of regaining power,” highlighting the tight race and the potential consequences of his victory. Touching on the potential consequences of a second Trump presidency, Professor Mounk warns that while Trump’s first term was damaging, his probable second term could be even more dangerous given his increased experience, a loyal base within the Republican Party and a desire for retribution against institutions he believes hindered his first administration. The risks to American democracy, Professor Mounk suggests, are substantial, and the outcome of the 2024 election could have long-lasting implications for the country’s political landscape.

Reflecting on the broader debate about the resilience of democracies in the face of populist threats Professor Mounk acknowledges the strengths that have allowed American democracy to endure, while he also cautions against complacency, noting that the challenges posed by populism are far from over. Mounk points out that Trump’s four years in office, while chaotic, were mitigated by the resilience of American institutions, including the federal system and the economy. 

One of the central themes of the discussion in the interview is the impact of the changing demographic landscape on American politics. Professor Mounk notes that while immigration and demographic change are related, they are conceptually distinct phenomena. He argues that frustration over perceived loss of control—over borders and the cultural direction of the country—has been a significant driver of populist sentiment. This has been particularly evident in the case of Trump, whose appeal to voters is deeply rooted in cultural identity politics rather than purely economic concerns. Professor Mounk explains that Democrats had once banked on demographic shifts securing their electoral future, assuming that as the number of non-white voters increased, so too would their dominance. However, this assumption has not played out as expected. “The leftward drift of the Democratic Party has pushed many of these voters away,” Professor Mounk notes, underscoring the complex dynamics that have kept Trump competitive.

Professor Mounk also delves into the evolving media landscape, highlighting the profound shift from traditional broadcast networks to a more fragmented and polarized media environment dominated by social media, podcasts and independent platforms. He expresses concern over the term “misinformation” and how it has been used to suppress certain viewpoints, urging a more nuanced approach to the concept in public discourse. Professor Mounk’s insights provide a timely and critical perspective on the future of democracy in the United States and beyond.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Yascha Mounk with some edits.

There Are Broad Commonalities in the Rise of Populism Across the World

Professor Mounk, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me dive right in with the first question. In your analysis, what are the key historical events that have contributed to the rise of populism in the US and how do they compare it to similar movements in other democracies?

Professor Yascha Mounk: I think the best way to approach this topic is by comparing different countries. While different factors play varying roles in different places, there are broad commonalities. In my book The People versus Democracy, published in 2018, I focused on three key factors.

First, there is the stagnation of living standards for ordinary citizens in many democracies, particularly in Western Europe and North America. In the immediate post-war era, people in these democracies felt that their life opportunities were vastly different from those of their parents. That sense of progress is no longer true for most citizens today.

Second, I highlighted the rapid cultural and demographic transformations in many of these countries. This includes ethnic diversification and, for example, the significantly larger role of women in society and greater acceptance of sexual minorities. While these are positive developments, they have also triggered fears among some segments of the population who feel that their social status has declined—they can no longer take for granted the status they once enjoyed.

Third, I discussed the rise of the internet and social media, which has made it easier for populist parties and candidates to build political movements. Social media has also shifted public opinion by making it easier to spread hatred and misinformation.

Today, I would add a fourth factor, which is partially mediated by social media but also relates to a deterioration in governance. This is the perceived distance between ordinary people and the elite. Many citizens feel that elites are not only corrupt in some places but also culturally distant. They live in separate circles and seem to look down on average citizens. This is a factor I didn’t emphasize as much initially, but now I would give it greater weight.

You’ve written extensively about the erosion of democratic norms. How has the US’s unique political culture contributed to the vulnerability of its institutions to populist movements?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, again, this is something we’re witnessing in many different countries at the same time, which suggests that a universally relevant factor—social media—plays a significant role. The ability to reach voters directly through social media platforms and make emotional, polarizing appeals has largely contributed to the breakdown of democratic norms. Social media platforms have been instrumental in this process.

When we look specifically at the United States, polarization plays a significant role. The primary system, in particular, makes most Congress members and many Senators more dependent on keeping the goodwill of the 5 to 10% of the population that are decisive in primary elections, rather than appealing to the median voter who decides elections in closely contested seats or states, of which there are not many. This has had a significant impact as well.

Economic inequality is often cited as a driver of populism. To what extent do you believe the economic policies of the last few decades have fueled populist sentiments in the US?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Certainly, the economy plays a role. As I mentioned earlier, it helps explain the erosion of what political scientists call “output legitimacy.” In the past, people might have said, “I don’t fully understand or trust politicians, but they seem to be delivering for us.” Now, many people feel that politicians are not delivering, leading them to question why they should trust them and consider trying something new. The sentiment of “how bad could things get?” is increasingly common.

However, I believe cultural factors likely play a bigger role than economic ones. If economic factors were the primary drivers, you would expect people to vote for populist parties that focus mainly on the economy, perhaps even those on the left. We’ve seen this in Greece with Syriza, where economic concerns were paramount and more recently in Argentina with Javier Milei, where hyperinflation fueled the rise of a right-wing populist movement.

But for the most part, this isn’t the case with leaders like Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Narendra Modi and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. While they do talk about the economy and make economic promises, their primary appeal is cultural. They position themselves as defenders of the moral and religious traditions of a supposed majority—often a real majority—that feels sidelined and believes its preferences haven’t sufficiently shaped the public culture of the country.

Democrats Hold False Assumptions About Demographic Groups in the US

A Trump supporter engages in conversation with a pedestrian at Columbus Circle on October 17, 2020, in New York City. Photo: Ron Adar.

How has the changing demographic landscape in the US influenced the rise of populism and what role does identity politics play in this phenomenon?

Professor Yascha Mounk: We need to distinguish between immigration and demographic change. Immigration plays a significant role in the United States, as well as in many European countries. Most Americans and Europeans are willing to see the benefits of migration and recognize that countries need highly qualified migrants for economic reasons, acknowledging the real benefits they bring. However, opinion polls have shown that, for several decades now, majorities in these populations have preferred less, rather than more, migration. They feel that moderate and established political parties have ignored this preference. The frustration isn’t necessarily with the presence of immigrants but with the sense of having no control over who enters the country and no control over borders. This sentiment has been a big part of Donald Trump’s appeal. In the US, Trump is currently building his case for re-election not only on inflation during the Biden administration but also on the inflow of migrants in recent years. This is a real vulnerability for moderate political parties and a significant reason they’ve lost credibility among ordinary voters.

Demographic change is, of course, related to immigration, but it is conceptually distinct. Here, I would say the problem for moderate political parties, particularly the left in the US, has been a more roundabout one. Democrats had a very demographic view of the electorate, especially during the years when George W. Bush seemed dominant. They latched onto the hope that as the demographic balance in the country shifted, with the number of white voters declining and non-white voters growing, this would ensure inevitable electoral victories for them. However, this hasn’t turned out as expected. It was supposed to secure Hillary Clinton’s win in 2016, yet Donald Trump won the electoral college, even if he didn’t win the popular vote. The same assumption was expected to shift the electorate towards Biden in 2020. While Biden did improve his share of the white vote, Trump significantly increased his share among non-white voters, particularly among Latinos.

This false assumption—that victory was just going to fall into their lap—has been a real strategic problem for Democrats. They believed they could avoid making difficult trade-offs, thinking non-white voters were their base and were very progressive, which led them to think they didn’t need to moderate on any unpopular issues to win. However, this failed to recognize that historically, non-white voters in the Democratic electorate have been more moderate or even conservative than white voters. For instance, conservative white voters likely supported Republicans, but conservative Black or Latino voters often supported Democrats because they didn’t feel welcome in the Republican party. The leftward drift of the Democratic party has pushed many of these voters away and the anticipated demographic majority has not materialized. In fact, many working-class Latinos, some working-class Asian Americans and an increasing number of working-class African Americans are now tempted to vote for the Republican party, which is one of the reasons why Trump continues to be competitive.

This phenomenon isn’t unique to the US. In Brazil, for example, which is majority non-white, if non-white voters systematically refused to vote for Jair Bolsonaro, he would never have won the presidential election. His competitiveness was partly due to strong backing from evangelical non-white voters, including some of the less affluent segments of Brazilian society.

The Term ‘Misinformation’ Should Be Treated with More Skepticism

In your writings, you discuss the role of misinformation and media in the spread of populist ideas. How has the US media landscape, particularly the rise of social media, impacted the populist narrative?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Certainly, there’s been a significant structural transformation in the media landscape, particularly with the diversification of media sources. Fifty or sixty years ago, there were just a few major broadcast networks and most people got their news from them. Then came the introduction of cable news, which began to polarize information sources and made it much easier to broadcast purely partisan opinion programs. This was an important shift.

Then, of course, we saw the rise of social media, podcasts, YouTube channels and even talk radio, which really grew in importance. Today, Fox News isn’t as dominant as it once was. For example, in prime time, Fox News might have an audience of 300,000 to 400,000 viewers, whereas the Joe Rogan podcast can reach 5 to 6 million listeners per episode. Tucker Carlson appears to have even increased his audience since leaving Fox News and distributing his show independently on platforms like YouTube and X (formerly Twitter). This shift helps explain the irresponsible and partisan nature of much of our media today.

At the same time, I’m concerned about the profligate use of the term “misinformation.” Often, we refer to something as misinformation simply because it presents a worldview we disagree with or have misgivings about. Some positions that were censored as misinformation in recent years have turned out to have some truth to them, or at least some plausibility. For example, during the pandemic, scientists who speculated about the possibility that COVID originated from gain-of-function research in labs, potentially due to an inadvertent lab leak, were heavily censored. Now, this theory is taken seriously by mainstream news outlets and many federal agencies in the United States. This was perhaps the most prominent instance where the term “misinformation” was used to shut down a debate, and it should make us more self-critical about how we define and apply the term.

I believe we would benefit from treating the term “misinformation” with more skepticism than it currently receives.

Populism in the US has been linked to a growing distrust in traditional institutions. What socio-political factors do you believe are most responsible for this erosion of trust?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, we’ve touched on this issue throughout our discussion. It ties back to several key factors. First, there’s the lack of output performance—people feel that institutions are no longer delivering the results they expect. Then there’s the sense among some segments of the population that they’ve been deprived of the social status they once had and believe they naturally deserve.

Social media also plays a significant role. It’s now easier to highlight the actual failings of governing elites, who have always been imperfect, but whose flaws are much more visible now than in the past. Additionally, social media makes it easier for irresponsible actors to gain influence, to distort the failings of institutions, or to take decisions out of context, making them appear horrendous or obviously incompetent when there might be valid reasons for those actions.

In essence, the factors contributing to the loss of trust in institutions are the same as those driving the rise of populism.

Liberal Democracy Is Still the Only Legitimate Regime

In your article, “The End of History Revisited,” you argue in the conclusion, “It follows that the tempting phrase ‘the end of the end of history’ is, for now, premature.” It seems that you give credit to the thesis of The End of History, do you think the thesis is still valid?

Professor Yascha Mounk: In that article, I argue that it’s important to distinguish between two claims made in Francis Fukuyama’s seminal work. The first claim is that, during the mid-20th century, genuine ideological competitors to liberal democracy existed—namely fascism and communism. Each, in its own way, posed a serious challenge to liberal democracy and presented a consciously articulated alternative vision for legitimate governance. However, these alternatives ultimately failed and they failed catastrophically. By the time Fukuyama was writing, he argued that the only remaining grand theory of legitimate government with genuine international appeal was liberal democracy. This, for him, was the “end of history.” The second, more implicit claim was that liberal democracies would be particularly adept at solving their internal problems and would, therefore, prove to be more stable than those alternative regime forms.

On the first point, I think Fukuyama has largely been proven right—at least so far. I can’t say with certainty that we’ll never see another regime form that can genuinely compete with liberal democracy, but when we look around the world today, it’s clear that liberal democracy remains the only genuinely legitimate regime form. The alternatives each have significant limitations. For example, you have a form of Shia theocracy in Iran, but that doesn’t appeal to anyone outside of the Muslim world, or even outside of the Shia world, and it’s facing significant trouble even within Iran.

You also have strongman leaders like Vladimir Putin in Russia, who might appeal to some authoritarian-leaning individuals around the world, but there’s no global movement to adopt a “Russian model” of governance. Similarly, China is a genuine geopolitical and economic competitor to the West and perhaps a cultural one at some point. However, while the Chinese model might work well in theory, it’s a mess in practice and it’s entirely unclear how it could ever be exported. For instance, would people in Zimbabwe agree to be governed the way China is governed if it meant achieving the same level of wealth and development? Probably yes. But would they agree to let their leaders implement the Chinese model? Likely not, because it’s unclear what that would entail. While they might trust their leaders to centralize power in the way the CCP has in Beijing, they wouldn’t trust them to deliver the same results.

The Chinese model is built on 3,000 years of Mandarin meritocracy, 100 years of a centralized Communist Party and 30 years of a peculiar form of capitalism that claims to be socialist or communist while actually marketizing everything, including retirement and healthcare. It’s entirely unclear what it would mean to replicate this model elsewhere.

This situation highlights the continuing legitimacy of liberal democracy, as even clearly non-liberal and non-democratic regimes often pretend to embody both. There’s currently a lot of intellectual effort in China to argue why China is the true democracy, which you wouldn’t see if there were a self-conscious ideological alternative to the prevailing liberal democratic paradigm.

Where Fukuyama might have been overly optimistic, however, is in his predictions about the stability of liberal democracy at home. While liberal democracy remains the only legitimate regime form with genuine mass appeal worldwide, it is much more embattled and less popular domestically than it was in the past. This, I think, helps explain some of the chaos and uncertainty we are experiencing in our political moment.

In the same article you underline that “While there has of late been extensive speculation about the future of liberal democracies, there has been far less reflection on how dictatorships that issue from populism may fare in the long run.” In the year 2024 where populist movements all over Europe are on the rise, do you think we can now predict the future of populist parties more accurately or is it still very difficult?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, it’s clear that populism has become one of the dominant modes of politics today. Populist political parties, particularly those on the right, are now some of the largest political families around the world. In the European Parliament, for example, various incarnations of right-wing populism form a significant bloc and this is mirrored in national parliaments, which are even more consequential.

The critical question is what happens when populists actually win elections and begin to govern. Over the past decades, we’ve seen very different paths in different countries. On one side, you have countries like Venezuela and perhaps Turkey, where populist leaders have undermined democratic institutions to such an extent that free and fair elections are either nonexistent, as in Venezuela, or are in serious doubt, as in Turkey, where it’s questionable whether the opposition can still oust the sitting leader by democratic means.

Secondly, there are countries where populist movements have significantly damaged democratic institutions—limiting free speech, decimating independent institutions—but where elections remain meaningful, though perhaps no longer entirely fair. India, the world’s largest democracy, might be an example of this.

Lastly, there are countries where populists have, at least for now, failed to maintain power. Despite efforts to handicap the opposition, the opposition was able to remove them through elections. This has been the case in Brazil, in Poland and, at least in 2020, in the United States. However, as the American case indicates, this doesn’t necessarily mean it’s the end of the story. For example, betting markets currently give Trump about a 45% chance of regaining power through the ballot box.

So, what we need to recognize is that there is a large variance in outcomes when populists take over. We also need to move away from thinking of democracy in binary terms—either perfect or completely destroyed. Populist victories don’t necessarily mean the imminent death of democracy, but they do often cause serious damage. The extent and lasting impact of that damage depend on a variety of complex social factors.

In your article written back in 2017, “European Disunion- What the rise of populist movements means for democracy,” you argue: “We’ve made real progress in understanding the nature of populism, moderate progress in analyzing its causes, and barely any progress in identifying its potential remedies.” In the year 2024, do you think we now have some remedies or are we at a total loss?

Professor Yascha Mounk: I don’t remember writing that article or that specific line, but I stand by it a hundred percent. Unfortunately, I don’t think much has changed since 2017.

Many Americans Feel the Democratic Party Is Out of Touch with the Mainstream

Before the presidential debate last Tuesday, you wrote that “Americans view Harris as too progressive. Tonight, may be her last best chance to course correct…Harris is on track to lose the election.” What do you think now, after the debate? Will she win the elections or lose it?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Well, as I mentioned earlier, betting markets, the last time I checked, gave Trump about a 45% chance of winning and Harris about a 55% chance. Harris did quite well in the debate. It always helps to remind the American electorate of just how irresponsible and chaotic Donald Trump can be. While he still has a base of supporters, most Americans do not like that approach.

Kamala Harris came across as competent and composed, while Trump made a series of outrageous claims, lost his temper and didn’t control himself well. This certainly helped her significantly. However, the election remains very close and I still believe there are actions Harris and the Democrats could take to increase their chances of victory in November. 

More importantly, to put an end to Donald Trump’s political career and the broader danger posed by his MAGA-inspired politics, we need to build a much broader electoral coalition. This coalition must be strong enough to win a series of elections decisively, forcing the Republican Party to transform itself. And the same is true inversely—if Republicans move to a more moderate stance, they could push Democrats to do the same.

I think it’s fine for Democrats to lean somewhat to the left on economic issues. Most Americans, like most Europeans, want a robust welfare state and policies that ensure wage growth for lower earners, even as they also believe in a market economy and care about economic growth. These priorities can be combined.

However, on cultural issues, it’s clear that many Americans feel the Democratic Party is out of sync with the mainstream. While I don’t personally share that opinion, more Americans believe Kamala Harris is too progressive than think Donald Trump is too conservative. To address this, Democrats, I believe, need to champion the values of inclusion and tolerance, which are non-negotiable. However, they should also make some cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails.

A Second Trump Presidency Could Be Even More Dangerous Than the First

Former US President Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

What will happen to American democracy if Donald Trump is re-elected on November 5?

Professor Yascha Mounk: There are two very different prognostications. On one hand, you could argue that Trump was in power for four years, which turned out to be damaging and chaotic, but perhaps less consequential than some of us, including myself, feared in 2016. America has certain strengths compared to other democracies, such as the federal system, which distributes power to governors—many of whom would still be Democrats. The system also includes numerous veto points in the legislative process, which made it possible for Democrats, especially after the 2018 midterm elections, to block much of what Trump wanted to do. Additionally, the US economy is sufficiently robust and the media landscape is developed enough that it’s difficult for the state to fully capture it, reducing the incentives to comply with the executive’s dictates. These strengths would likely remain in place.

However, there are also ways in which Trump could be more dangerous now than he was in 2016. Back then, he had no political experience, lacked a trusted team of people who shared his worldview and had limited control over the Republican Party, which at the time included many representatives and senators who were publicly ambivalent and privately disdainful of him. Moreover, Trump did not have a clear sense of the institutional changes he wanted to make.

Now, things are different. He has four years of experience in the executive office, has built a deep bench of loyalists willing to do his bidding from day one and the Republican Party has transformed itself. Many of the people currently in the House of Representatives and a significant number in the Senate ran as Trump Republicans and are much more aligned with his political agenda. Those who weren’t initially aligned have often made a political turn toward him, as it has become a necessity for survival in Republican politics. Trump also has loyalists who served with him in lower positions and now understand how the federal bureaucracy works. Lastly, Trump is out for revenge—he believes the institutions hampered his efforts during his first term and targeted him after he left office. He may now aim to dismantle those institutions to ensure that what he calls the “deep state” can no longer contain him.

These factors suggest that a second Trump presidency could be more dangerous than the first. How much damage he might manage to inflict is difficult to predict and could ultimately depend on various circumstances, including how much discipline he applies to transforming the system—something that, thankfully, remains uncertain.

Academicians like Steven Levitsky and Kurt Weyland argue that democracies have shown, time and again, resilience on the face of populist threat however institutions like V-Dem strongly argue that democracy is under serious threat. Where do you stand in this debate?

Professor Yascha Mounk: Perhaps somewhere in between. It’s interesting to note that some objective metrics for measuring how democratic a country is seem to be holding up better than subjective ratings from institutions like V-Dem or Freedom House. For instance, if you look at how many journalists are in jail, the duration of governments in office, or how often term limits have been repealed, there doesn’t appear to be a significant change. The best research on this topic, in my view, comes from political scientists like Daniel Treisman and Sergei Guriev.

However, these statistics might not fully capture the extent of polarization, the breakdown of informal political norms, or the potential dangers on the horizon. In a country like the United States, for example, we’re certainly not at the point where journalists are being jailed, but we might be two or three steps away from a scenario where newspapers start to fall in line with more authoritarian tendencies.

This recent research provides a necessary and helpful corrective to some of the pessimism in the field, encouraging us to analyze the situation more carefully and perhaps with a bit more optimism that we can navigate through this moment. However, it’s certainly not a reason to stop being alarmed altogether.

Dr. Natália Guimarães Duarte Sátyro, a professor and researcher at the Post-Graduate Program of Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil.

Professor Sátyro: Authoritarian Leaders in Brazil Face Fewer Obstacles to Implementing Harmful Strategies

In her deep analysis of the challenges facing Brazil’s democracy under the influence of authoritarian populism, Professor Natália Sátyro, editor of the recently released book “Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism – Lessons from Brazil,” highlights the vulnerabilities within Brazilian social policies and democratic institutions. She notes how these weaknesses have allowed authoritarian leaders to introduce harmful strategies with fewer obstacles. As Brazil navigates its political future, Professor Sátyro warns of the potential consequences if such populist strategies persist. She argues that Brazil’s resilience, while notable, will be further tested if global trends toward authoritarian populism continue to gain momentum, particularly with the possibility of leaders like Donald Trump regaining power in other countries.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Natália Guimarães Duarte Sátyro, a professor and researcher at the Post-Graduate Program of Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, provides a deep analysis of the challenges facing Brazil’s democracy under the influence of authoritarian populism. Highlighting the vulnerabilities within Brazilian social policies and democratic institutions, Professor Sátyro notes how these weaknesses have allowed authoritarian leaders to introduce harmful strategies with fewer obstacles.

Reflecting on Brazil’s political landscape, Professor Sátyro emphasizes that while some areas of the country’s social policies are strongly institutionalized, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff exposed significant fragility in Brazil’s democratic institutions. “They withstood the process, but the effects were significant,” she states, drawing parallels with how populist authoritarian governments in other countries, like the United States and Hungary, have exploited identity-based antagonisms to mask their true predatory interests.

Professor Sátyro also discusses the broader global context, comparing Brazil’s right-wing populist movement with similar movements worldwide. She points out that the post-material issues such as neo-conservatism, gender debates and family roles distinguish the populist radical right from the mainstream right. Additionally, she stresses the inherent anti-democratic nature of the populist radical right’s reliance on fake news and disinformation drawing a connection to the strategies used by Donald Trump in the United States.

As Brazil continues to navigate its political future, Professor Sátyro warns of the potential consequences if similar populist strategies persist. She argues that Brazil’s resilience, while notable, will be tested further if global trends toward authoritarian populism continue to gain momentum, particularly with the possibility of leaders like Trump regaining power in other countries. This interview offers a compelling examination of the complex dynamics at play in Brazil’s ongoing struggle between democratic resilience and the rise of authoritarian populism.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Natália Sátyro with some edits.

Theoretical Frameworks Don’t Always Fully Capture Brazil’s Complexity

Professor Sátyro, thank you very much for joining our interview series. We will be discussing the new book that you edited, “Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism – Lessons from Brazil.” Let me begin with the first question. In the conclusion of the book, you refer to the musician Antonio Carlos Jobim, who famously said, “Brazil is not for beginners.” As a beginner myself, what should I understand from this phrase?

Professor Natália Sátyro: Thank you for the invitation. This phrase conveys the complexity of the Brazilian case and highlights the theoretical and practical challenges we face as academics. For instance, if we examine a political competition indicator at the subnational level, such as the number of effective parties, it might suggest the presence of three competitive parties in certain states. However, qualitatively, we must consider that each member of the same traditional political family may belong to a different party, rendering the measure of competition somewhat meaningless.

Another example is the need to understand Brazil as a presidential federation. It’s crucial to think about the coordination between the executive and legislative branches. In theory, to ensure governability, the president must maintain a majority in the legislative board, which is intuitive and applies to other political regimes as well. However, when we look at the context in which Jair Bolsonaro governed, for instance, he had a majority in the legislative branch, but he did not fully utilize this majority. He was a president who garnered less support from Congress for his proposals than Dilma Rousseff, who had such a poor relationship with Congress that it ultimately led to her impeachment. In other words, Bolsonaro could have accomplished much more in line with his agenda if he had chosen to or had the necessary skills.

This is the essence of Jobim’s statement—Brazil’s reality is more complex than it sometimes appears, and theoretical frameworks don’t always fully capture this complexity. That’s the idea behind this statement.

In your book, you highlight that the 13-year of left-wing governments came to an end through a broad coalition and an impeachment process. Could you elaborate on how President Dilma Rousseff’s 2016 impeachment contributed to the rise of right-wing populism in Brazil? What impact did Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato) have on eroding public trust in Brazil’s democratic institutions, thereby enabling populist rhetoric? What key factors led to the downfall of left-wing governance in Brazil?

Professor Natália Sátyro: These are three distinct and complex questions.

First, it’s crucial to understand that President Rousseff, who was elected by popular vote, was removed from power without any reasonable justification—a fact that has since been confirmed by the judiciary. This is highly irregular in a presidential system. In parliamentary systems, a political leader can be removed without significant consequences if they do not meet expectations. However, Brazil had rejected the option for parliamentary governance twice in referendums. So, while the impeachment process followed institutional rituals, it was fundamentally flawed from the outset, which destabilized the political system. This opened the door for the emergence of a right-wing populist leader like Bolsonaro, someone without a strong political background who could barely articulate coherent thoughts but had significant popular appeal.

Regarding the second part of your question, Operation Car Wash was highly influential. It effectively removed the principal candidate from the left, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, through an illegitimate process where the same individual acted as both judge and prosecutor. This lack of impartiality was later demonstrated, and the process was overturned, but the damage was done. Judge Sérgio Moro’s actions disqualified Lula from the 2018 presidential race, completely altering its outcome. Ironically, Operation Car Wash began with the strengthening of the Public Prosecutor’s Office during Lula’s administration but devolved into a witch hunt targeting only left-wing figures. Sérgio Moro later became a minister under Bolsonaro, further illustrating the political motivations behind the operation.

Finally, regarding the factors that led to the downfall of the left, it’s important to note that it wasn’t merely a downfall—it was a forceful removal. This distinction matters because Dilma Rousseff lacked the same economic acumen that Lula had. The economy was already struggling during the last year of her first term, and it was widely understood that an economic crisis was imminent, which indeed occurred. This reality weighed heavily on the electorate, as demonstrated by Perez Linan’s book titled Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America, which emphasizes the economic factor.

Additionally, Dilma was not a natural politician; she was more of a technician, whereas Lula was an exceptional statesman and negotiator. Anyone succeeding him would inevitably face challenges in maintaining cooperation. Moreover, we must recognize that Dilma was a woman, and gender issues cannot be ignored. She was a tough woman, not very flexible in negotiating with the predominantly white, sexist men in the Brazilian Congress. There’s also an argument that she encouraged investigations into corruption across all parties, including her own, and the judiciary. A famous recording by Senator Romero Jucá spoke about her removal as part of a concerted effort that also involved the judiciary. This truly was a coordinated effort to bring down the left in Brazil.

“Where There Is No Money, There Can Be No Policy”

You argue that the purpose of the book is to analyze the drivers and the scope of the changes and reforms in the Brazilian system of social protection over the period of Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro governments to understand how the golden age of social protection led to the dismantling of these systems. Can you elaborate what policies and strategies did Temer and Bolsonaro administrations use to dismantle the social protection system?

Professor Natália Sátyro: Oh, many strategies were used, and they varied depending on the specific social policy in question. The tactics included reforms, re-regulation, defunding, and deregulation of social policies. One of the most famous phrases during this period was, “Where there is no money, there can be no policy,” which reflects the strategy of defunding as a way to undermine social protection.

In the Brazilian case, we saw a combination of reforms, cutbacks, policy termination and deregulation, all aimed at containing and reducing social expansion. When observed together, it’s clear that these actions constituted a systematic retrenchment and dismantling of social policies. Different policies faced different strategies, but the overall goal was the same: to roll back the advancements made during the golden age of social protection.

Could you explain how neoliberal austerity measures and populist rhetoric interacted in Brazil during the presidencies of Michel Temer and Jair Bolsonaro? What were the significant challenges that traditional social policies in Brazil encountered due to the combined pressure of neoliberal austerity and populist rule?

Professor Natália Sátyro: First, it’s important to recognize that these two objectives—neoliberal austerity and populism—did not apply equally to Temer and Bolsonaro. Temer was the representative of austerity. He was not a populist; he communicated in formal Portuguese, without any intention or ability to connect with the masses. Bolsonaro, on the other hand, was very much a populist. Unlike Temer, Bolsonaro did not advocate for austerity; in fact, he spent heavily and this was not only due to the pandemic. In his last year, he went beyond any minimal restraint in using public resources.

When it comes to fiscal austerity, it’s a tricky subject. Of course, maintaining fiscal balance is important, but we also know that social policies during times of crisis can be crucial drivers for the market. For example, the Bolsa Família (BF)program in Brazil had a huge impact on local markets.

Another point to consider is the difference between public and private management, particularly in terms of fiscal austerity. The concept of the public good doesn’t always align with efficiency, but in Brazil’s case, the greatest limitation of social policy is not just austerity—it’s inequality itself. Inequality in Brazil is so extreme that it creates enormous costs to maintain social systems. For instance, the real problem with social security isn’t the basic pensions, but rather the retirement benefits and privileges of the military and judiciary, which are extremely expensive. These privileges are difficult to reform due to the strength of pressure groups, making the system unsustainable.

When we consider austerity alongside populism, it’s clear that Latin America has always had populist politicians, both on the left and the right. Similarly, fake news has long been a part of the political landscape. However, what’s concerning today is the scale of the disinformation ecosystem. It has taken fake news to a new level, destabilizing democratic systems. This combination of disinformation and populism creates a significant challenge for democracy. In a debate, for example, a populist politician has an advantage over opponents because they are not committed to the truth and they can use widespread social media to spread misinformation. I believe this is a new and serious threat to democracy.

Bolsonaro Used Public Resources in a Very Aggressive and Abusive Manner 

Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro during 74th Anniversary of Parachutist Infantry Battalion held at Military Village in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on November 23, 2019. Photo: Celso Pupo

How did the rise of populist radical right ideologies during Bolsonaro’s presidency contribute to the reshaping and dismantling of Brazil’s social protection systems? Can you discuss the specific strategies used by the Bolsonaro administration to dismantle Brazil’s social welfare system, particularly regarding social security and healthcare?

Professor Natália Sátyro: The pension reform was introduced in the first year of Bolsonaro’s government, but it’s important to note that the entire negotiation process for this reform was actually initiated under Temer. The pension reform implemented in 2019 was radical in its aim to reduce the attractiveness of the public system. It was a strategic move because its consequences are long-term rather than immediate.

According to the authors who contributed to the chapter on social security, even without directly adopting a full capitalization system, the reform carried out during Bolsonaro’s presidency established a reduction in benefits and increased the requirements for granting them. This encouraged workers to migrate to complementary private pension systems. Moreover, there was a significant decrease in the government’s commitment to maintaining the attractiveness and robustness of the contributory public pillar of the social security system.

On the one hand, the reform created an alternative for high-income workers to build their complementary pensions outside the public system. On the other hand, it imposed many restrictions, making it almost impossible for low-income workers to receive full pensions after a lifetime of contributions. This reform effectively created a two-tier system, where high-income individuals could exit the public system, while low-income individuals faced increased barriers to accessing benefits.

In terms of healthcare, both Temer and Bolsonaro pursued similar strategies, emphasizing privatization and valuing curative services over preventive ones. Their approach involved deregulating the public and universal aspects of the healthcare system and opening it up to private initiatives. Deregulation, re-regulation and, above all, defunding were key strategies used to undermine the public health system.

Ironically, the arrival of the pandemic in some ways saved Brazil’s Unified Health System (SUS) from complete dismantling. The importance of a system that virtually serves everyone became clear during the pandemic. However, Bolsonaro’s inability to coordinate the response to the pandemic was evident. He refused to provide leadership and instead allowed states and municipalities to handle the crisis independently, in addition to promoting denialism with statements against vaccines and other public health measures.

Ultimately, the dismantling of social security was far more severe and impactful than the challenges faced by the healthcare system, though both were targeted by the Bolsonaro administration.

Bolsonaro was not re-elected in 2022 however received 58 million votes against the winner’s 60 million. How do you explain the relative success of Bolsonaro despite his policies to dismantle Brazilian social welfare regime?

Professor Natália Sátyro: Yes, this is why I mentioned that Brazil is not for beginners—it’s truly remarkable. It’s important to understand how Bolsonaro used government resources in a very aggressive and, frankly, abusive manner during his final year in office to boost his re-election chances. 

For example, the government created and accelerated the release of over 6,000 benefits for truck drivers and taxi drivers. Bolsonaro also authorized 12 banks, including public ones, to extend loans to recipients of the Brazil Aid (the new name for the cash transfer program that replaced the Bolsa Família) and the Continuous Benefit Payment, which provides a minimum wage to the elderly and people with disabilities. In 2022, he increased the number of families receiving Brazil Aid by 6.6 million and raised the benefit amount, but this increase was only budgeted for that year—clearly intended to influence the election.

Furthermore, the 6.6 million cards distributed for the Brazil Aid had the symbol of Bolsonaro’s electoral campaign. He also used TV Brasil to broadcast numerous speeches and propaganda, particularly from the Minister of Economy, Paulo Guedes. By the end of the year, more than 400 billion reais (around 80 billion dollars) had been spent beyond what was originally planned—this is not what one would expect from someone supposedly committed to austerity.

In addition to these actions, Bolsonaro’s campaign was supported by a powerful fake news machine, which served as a smokescreen for many of his questionable practices. We are living in an era of post-truth, where a massive echo chamber of misinformation can significantly influence public opinion. The 58 million votes Bolsonaro received are a direct result of these efforts to secure re-election, despite his harmful policies.

Authoritarian Leaders Face Fewer Obstacles in Brazil 

A key question the book explores is whether populist radical right parties (PRRPs) in Brazil differ from the mainstream right, and if so, how? How does the Brazilian PRRPs’ approach to social policies compare to that of the traditional right, especially regarding welfare state retrenchment? Additionally, can you discuss the similarities and differences between Bolsonaro’s Social Liberal Party (PSL) and populist parties in Europe and the US in terms of economic, social and cultural issues? How does Brazil’s right-wing populist movement align with or differ from similar movements globally, particularly in social policy and governance?

Professor Natália Sátyro: There are at least two major differences between populist radical right movements and the mainstream right, at least in Brazil. The first major difference lies in post-material issues that characterize the far right, such as neo-conservatism, gender issues and debates on the role of the family. The second difference is their respect for democratic rules. While the mainstream right generally respects democratic norms, the populist radical right, as seen in their use of fake news on a large scale, is inherently anti-democratic.

I don’t consider myself an expert on other countries to make strong comparisons, but it’s clear that similar strategies are being used by figures like Donald Trump in the US. For instance, during the debate with Kamala Harris, Trump falsely claimed that immigrants were eating dogs and cats, a blatant lie that even the journalists had to immediately refute. Such absurd claims make meaningful debate difficult because they are so extreme that the opposition struggles to respond effectively.

Looking at Europe, the persistence of leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the victory of Giorgia Meloni in Italy, and Marine Le Pen’s strong showing in France, along with developments in Spain and Austria, highlight a broader cultural phenomenon affecting politics globally. In the Brazilian context, where social policies and institutions are weakly institutionalized or where democratic institutions are fragile, authoritarian leaders face fewer obstacles in introducing harmful strategies.

While Brazil has strong institutionalized policies in many areas, the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff revealed the vulnerability of our democratic institutions. They managed to endure the process, but the effects were significant. Some cases confirm that populist authoritarian governments exploit identity-based antagonisms to obscure their true commitment to predatory interests, as seen with Trump in the US or Orbán in Hungary. Scholar Kanchan Chandra describes Brazil and India under their respective leaders as exhibiting “ethnocratic populism,” where populism is intertwined with a fearmongering, traditional, social and cultural hierarchy. 

These differences between the populist radical right and the mainstream right are crucial for understanding the current political landscape.

While concluding the book, you argue that “Brazil appears to be a compelling case of resilience worth considering… it has resisted a violent and explicit attack.” Thinking the possibility that Donald Trump can be re-elected as the president of the US, how do you think Brazilian democracy will react? Will it galvanize populist movements and populists like Bolsonaro in Brazil?

Professor Natália Sátyro: There are two possible paths and the outcome will largely depend on who wins the election in Brazil. If the radical right wins the presidential elections again, Trump’s re-election could have a significant impact on Brazil. Following Bolsonaro’s line, we could see further subordination to similar political ideologies and movements, potentially leading to events like the January 6, 2021, insurrection in the US and the January 8, 2023, attack in Brazil. However, if the left or a more democratic and less authoritarian right wins in Brazil, I don’t foresee as much of a problem. While Trump’s potential re-election might not directly affect Brazil in that scenario, the broader consequences of Trump’s actions and irresponsibility would still have global repercussions.

A poster for the 2024 European elections featuring Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Rome, Italy on May 4, 2024. Photo: Stefano Chiacchiarini.

The Role of Mainstream Parties in the Success of Radical Right Populists 

Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have been gaining votes in recent decades, votes that were once almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. At the same time, voter turnout has declined. Regardless of the analytical reasons, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not convincing as many people as they once did. While it’s easy to blame external factors like misinformation or divisive rhetoric, that’s not enough in a democratic system. Our system is straightforward: parties and politicians need to win votes. If people aren’t convinced, they will shift their support to other parties. Blaming factors beyond their control will only further harm liberal democratic mainstream parties. 

By Maël Jones

The issue of radical right populism (RRP) has exploded onto the political science scene in the last two to three decades. Naturally, this was to be expected after the success of these parties in elections across western democracies. As a result, a flurry of different opinions on the causes of the success of RRP parties have emerged, some mutually inclusive others less so. 

Much of the focus has been on the voter, the so-called demand-side. Here the big divide is generally between those who believe that RRP parties succeed because of economic reasons, while others believe the main driver to be cultural issues (Engler & Weisstanner, 2020; Bornschier, 2018: 213). Some other researchers have focused specifically on the supply-side: the parties (Mols & Jetten, 2020; Russo & Brock, 2024). In this case the focus is generally on the role of the radical right parties themselves (Mols & Jetten, 2020), or in rarer cases, the way in which other parties have interacted with RRPs (Russo & Brock, 2024). By focusing too much on the phenomenon of RRP itself, students of this discipline have forgotten much of what surrounds it. Because, while RRPs do influence voter decisions, voters do not only vote for RRPs they also vote against those parties that they, and the generations before them, trusted for decades – mainstream parties. To avoid lengthy definitions, we will consider mainstream parties as those broadly situated in the middle of the political spectrum and encompassing the country’s political establishment. In the EU, these parties are generally affiliated with the S&D, EPP, Renew, or the Greens. 

Since the onset of the liberal democratic model, mainstream parties have been central actors of the system – parties played an important role in simplifying the political process, representing a large amount of people and pulling people into the political process (Stokes, 1999: 243-244). Of course, the system of parties is imperfect, but the division of the political system into segments of society that were more or less adequately represented by said parties made for a stable system (Lipset, 2000: 50-51). Generally, left-wing parties represented the poorer working class while richer, middle- and upper-class voters opted for right-wing parties. Some systems also had a divide along race lines or religious beliefs (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; 2000: 50) Yet, in recent years, the decline of these parties has been apparent (Casal Bértoa & Rama, 2021: 37). At times, the green or liberal parties attracted voters away from the mainstream. Increasingly, though, as the latter have been integrated into the political establishment (Burchell, 2014), it has been the radical right that has taken over many of the votes previously held by mainstream parties. One of the main reasons for why this has happened, is due to political disaffection (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174, Hooghe et al., 2011).

The first strong indicator of such disaffection emerged in the decades around the end of the cold war: declining rates of voter turnout (Hay, 2007; Mair, 2011). Today, this issue is still at the heart of many political debates despite slowing down and even showing some signs of improvement (IDEA, 2024). In its stead, in the last 20 or so years we have seen votes for the radical right populists increase drastically across the board (Ivaldi, 2024). 

Political Disaffection

European Parliament offices and European flags in Brussels, Belgium on July 20, 2020. Photo: Lena Wurm.

Let us first analyze what has driven political disaffection before turning to how voter turnout and the success of RRPs are linked.

There are multiple drivers for political disaffection. What is clear is that for people to feel implicated in a system and for that system to be of interest to them, they must feel like they have some power within it (Harder & Krosnick, 2008: 538). Thus, drivers of disaffection would cause people to doubt their importance within the political system and abandon it or look for ways to regain this power. Yet, increasingly, mainstream parties have taken steps to decrease the power of the people (Mair, 2011).

First, is the convergence of mainstream parties on policy issues. Some might be surprised by the claim that parties are “converging” when we are constantly being told that our democracies and societies are becoming increasingly polarized (Nguyen & Vu, 2019). But one must not automatically exclude the other. A convergence can exists on policy issues even when political rhetoric is as divided as ever. Additionally, the attention here is specifically on mainstream parties.

For decades, a body of literature has argued that the more political parties converge to the center, the better they will perform electorally (Spoon & Klüver, 2019: 1023). The theory holds merit and cannot entirely be dismissed. Yet, while maximizing their votes in order to win over the ‘median voter,’ mainstream parties have failed to represent those with more radical values. This creates a more volatile political arena that is more inclined to turn to the extremes (Bartolini & Mair, 1990: 1).

As some have remarked, Germany might be the best example for this in Western Europe. For decades now, the CDU and the SPD have moved towards the center (Berman & Kundani, 2021: 23). The former – a family and Christian-oriented party – increasingly moved left on social issues, while the latter – a left-wing workers’ party – increasingly moved to the right on certain economic issues. Both forming a ‘Grand Coalition’ and working together across most of the beginning of the 21st Century (Berman & Kundani, 2021).

But even France, an oftentimes divided society with historically strong labor movements, experienced a neoliberal transformation that transcended party politics. As some of the biggest neoliberal decisions were taken by socialist Presidents François Mitterand and François Hollande (Masquelier, 2021; Pinçon & Pinçon Charlot, 2014). Other countries have seen similar trends within their borders as well. Tony Blair’s Labor Party and Bill Clinton’s democrats both became important drivers of neo-liberalization in their respective countries, with little protest from opposition parties on that particular matter (Rieger, 2021: 113; Meerpool, 2019). 

Today, as Mair (2011: 72) notes, the question between state-controlled and market-controlled economies has been answered: the winners are market-controlled economies. The left-right divide on this issue has thus eroded and the current positions present a far less clear distinction. Therefore, mainstream parties attempt to find distinctions somewhere else: they insist on personalities, character traits and rhetorical differences. But these significantly impoverish the possible policy changes once in power and thus deprives electors of a feeling of potential change (Hay, 2007: 56-58).

In parallel to party convergence, a similar but distinct phenomenon has also been changing Western European societies: the depoliticization of many issues and the rise of the regulatory state. The effect of this is that many decisions which once lay with elected politicians – and thus by extension with the people – have been removed from the political sphere and into the bureaucratic and/or the market-controlled sphere. 

For example, a case of this is Central Bank independence. Central Banks originally emerged in very different circumstances depending on the countries and their history – some were private, others independent, and some were dependent on the national treasury (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020). But today, the idea that these institutions must be independent has been dominant for decades and remains almost entirely unchallenged. This idea was first formulated in 1962 by Milton Friedman (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020), an economist dubbed by Krugman (2007) as an “ideologue [and] the great popularizer of the free-market doctrine.” He was incidentally the man who went on to advise Raegan and Thatcher for their economic policies. While he remains one of the most influential and knowledgeable economists ever to live, he can hardly be described as neutral or apolitical. Yet, his long-term fight to make Central Banks independent has today been made to seem exactly that: neutral and apolitical. In turn, this has justified the depoliticization of central banks and its removal from public decision-making.

In the UK, the Bank of England was one of the last Central Banks to remain under the responsibility of the treasury, but in 1998, under Tony Blair’s Labor government, this changed, and the Bank was granted independence to set interest rates (Burnham, 2001). In a more global study encompassing 155 countries, Romelli (2024: 3), found that out of 370 reforms to central bank designs between 1923 and 2023, over 75 percent of them increased the bank’s independence. In the European Union (EU), the Maastricht treaty required EU countries to have an independent Central Bank. This was in addition, of course, to the European Central Bank (ECB) which is also independent and covers all 27 EU countries (Bruni, 1997).

The EU has not only pushed the depoliticization of central banks, but it has also brought about many depoliticizing policies within its member states. In the early 1990s, the European Commission began heavily banking on regulation and became a powerful actor in restraining an increasingly privatized market; thus began the regulatory state in Europe (Majone, 1994). 

Regulation became a way for a Commission with a low budget to increase its decision-making powers without changing the rules of the game. At the beginning, this did not really pose too many problems. The Commission played a role which, in other democracies, was often taken on by independent agencies and this role was limited in scope (Majone, 1994). But with years passing, the Commission became more powerful, and the roles it took on, outgrew those that made it possible to overlook the institution’s undemocratic nature (Majone, 2014: 1217). Because after regulation came financial control. Of course, member states signed up to this. For example, they agreed to adhere to the so-called ‘Fiscal Stability Treaty’ in 2012 which significantly restrained individual state’s fiscal policies. States must for example avoid excessive public debt and must also submit their budget plans to the Council in order for them to be scrutinized (and possibly asked to be altered). This constrained governments’ actions and put more power into the hands of those with little to no accountability (Majone, 2014: 1220).

While it may seem that the blame is being shifted onto the EU and away from mainstream parties, this is not entirely accurate for two main reasons. First, as Mair (2011: 127) rightly argues, the EU did not grow organically, instead it was built by its architects. These architects were primarily the foreign ministers and leaders of European countries and thus members of the political establishment. Second, critique of the EU has been very constrained, especially in Western Europe. When governments disagree with EU policies, they blame Brussels without calling for real change. When they are happy with these policies, they take credit for them. The only real critics of the EU have been populist parties from both the left and the right (Grzymala-Busse, 2019: 43). Thus, anyone who does not entirely agree with the European project or with the direction it has taken, has to either accept it or vote for populists.

Some other factors can also be named which originate from the political establishment and foster disaffection. Some examples of this are globalization which has deeply affected western societies but has been regarded by the political establishment as the only way forward (even though, in recent years, this enthusiasm has been curtailed slightly); as well as the metamorphosis of mainstream parties, going from ones representing specific groups and interests to catch-all parties with a hugely eroded identity (Mair, 2011: 79-85). 

Consequences of Political Disaffection

Photo: Shutterstock.

Having established the factors of political disaffection, we can move our focus to attempting to understand its consequences.

As mentioned earlier, lower voter turnout has been one of the main symptoms of political disaffection in the last few decades. The direct impact of the latter onto the former is of course hard to assess analytically because it contrasts a subjective state (disaffection) with a phenomenon that is directly and objectively quantifiable (turnout). 

Whether the existence of a link between low turnout and political disaffection needs to be “proven” is debatable. One could argue that the theoretical framework of representative democracy is sufficient to establish this connection. After all, the election of politicians to represent us is fundamental to the functioning of our system. This does not mean that those who do not vote are necessarily apolitical, indeed, many other ways to express one’s opinions exist. Yet, within the formal system, voting is the only universal way of making one’s opinions heard. Choosing not to vote – whether out of apathy or out of protest – can thus be seen as a symptom of disaffection from the present political system.

Based on this though, a vote for radical right populists must not necessarily be a sign of disaffection. And this is true, it is not per se a vote of disaffection, many other reasons exist to vote for RRPs, from authoritarian tendencies to a simple agreement with the party’s policies (Tillman, 2015). But what is of interest to us is specifically the rise of RRPs and why people today are far more likely to vote for such parties than they were 40 years ago. Here, it seems extremely likely that the disaffected have played an important role.

Not all scholars agree on the idea that those who are more dissatisfied will vote for RRPs. This is in large parts because those academics seem to associate disaffection with the idea of ‘protest votes,’ the latter of which is seen as an extension of ‘non-ideological votes’ (Arzheimer, 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2000). Yet, a protest vote must not necessarily be non-ideological. Voters can feel dissatisfaction with a political system because the parties that once represented them do not align with them anymore and thus their ideology is not represented anymore. In this case, an ideological vote simultaneously becomes a protest vote. 

In addition, in the likely case that parties do truly influence political opinion (Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021), voters who might once have felt only some affinities to RRPs are likely to have developed a stronger ideological overlap over time – Thus distorting studies based on ideological overlap.

It thus seems obvious that when defined right and seen from a broader angle, disaffection from the political system and distrust of its main actors is a central driver of this political movement. People are more likely to vote for the radical right when politicians lose their trust and in turn radical right voters trust mainstream politicians less (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174). We know from Germany for example that “turnout surges benefit the populist right ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) in contexts of widespread political distrust” (Schulte-Cloos & Leiniger, 2022: 431) meaning that those who did not go out to vote in past elections and were dissatisfied with the system voted in large parts for the AfD. Additional research such as Hooghe et al.’s work (2011: 265) in Belgium also showed how those who are dissatisfied or distrustful are more likely either not to vote or to vote for populist radical right parties.

More simply though, radical right parties have been winning over votes in recent decades, votes that once were almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. Additionally, turnout has dwindled. Whatever the analytical reason, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not winning over or convincing as many people as they once were. One can always blame external factors such as misinformation or divisive rhetoric for this but that is not sufficient in our democratic system. Our system is simple, it requires parties and politicians to win votes. People thus need to be won over and convinced, if they are not, they will defect to other parties. Blaming elements out of their control will only make matters worse for liberal democratic mainstream parties.

Conclusion 

Having established a link between mainstream parties and disaffection with the political system in a first instance, and then between disaffection and radical right votes in a second; one can see a clear link between the mainstream’s failures and the success of RRPs. This link is important to make for a number of reasons. Firstly, simply because it has been overlooked by researchers. Secondly because it shifts a part of the responsibility from the voters onto the political establishment. This matters because the often-used argument that those who vote for RRPs are simply ill-informed or racist is analytically and politically rather unhelpful and oftentimes overlooks important components of the RRP vote. Lastly, establishing this link gives mainstream parties the tools to recenter their fight against the radical right. Many have attempted to fight this fight, but a misunderstanding of the causes seems to have led most of these efforts to failure. To truly fight RRPs, mainstream parties must know their voters, aim to truly represent them, and ensure that their policies – rather than their rhetoric – truly stand out and distance themselves from their political opponents and rivals.


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Dr. Louis Kriesberg, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies at Syracuse University.

Professor Kriesberg: Right-Wing Populism in the US Is Doomed to Failure, Even If Trump Is Re-Elected

Professor Louis Kriesberg argues that right-wing populism, as represented by Donald Trump in the US, is ultimately doomed to failure, even if Trump were to be re-elected. He draws parallels to past episodes in American history, such as McCarthyism in the 1950s and the Ku Klux Klan’s influence in the 1920s, noting that while these movements caused significant harm, they eventually faded into obscurity as the country moved toward more inclusive and democratic norms. Although Professor Kriesberg expresses deep concern about the potential damage, he remains optimistic about the resilience of democratic institutions and the strength of resistance against authoritarian tendencies. He believes that the majority of Americans do not support Trump’s divisive rhetoric and that the country will ultimately reject right-wing populism in favor of more traditional, constructive political engagement.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving a compelling interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), veteran scholar Dr. Louis Kriesberg, Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies at Syracuse University, delves into the complexities of right-wing populism in the United States (US), particularly in the context of Donald Trump’s political career. Central to the discussion with Professor Kriesberg is the idea that while Trump’s brand of right-wing populism has gained significant traction, it is ultimately doomed to failure. Professor Kriesberg draws parallels to past episodes in American history, such as McCarthyism and the Ku Klux Klan’s influence in the 1920s, to argue that while these movements caused significant harm, they eventually faded into obscurity as the country moved toward more inclusive and democratic norms.

However, the interview also touches on the possible dangers facing American democracy if Trump were to be reelected. Professor Kriesberg expresses deep concern about the potential damage but remains optimistic about the resilience of democratic institutions and the strength of the resistance against authoritarian tendencies. He believes that the majority of Americans do not support Trump’s divisive rhetoric and that the country will ultimately reject right-wing populism in favor of more traditional, constructive political engagement.

The conversation with Professor Kriesberg explores themes from his book Fighting Better, where he analyzes the constructive conflict approach in both international and domestic contexts. As a scholar with extensive experience in conflict resolution, Professor Kriesberg provides a nuanced perspective on how American democracy has been challenged, particularly during and after Trump’s presidency. 

By reflecting on the motivations behind his book, Professor Kriesberg notes the increasing polarization and hostility in American politics. His work seeks to apply the principles of conflict resolution—traditionally used in international disputes—to the domestic conflicts tearing at the fabric of American society. He highlights how the progress of various status groups, such as African Americans, women, and LGBTQ people, has led to significant backlash, which right-wing populism has exploited to deepen divisions.

Professor Kriesberg also offers insights into the potential future of American democracy, stressing the importance of addressing the root causes of inequality and fostering greater cooperation across political divides. His analysis provides a hopeful yet realistic outlook on the challenges ahead, emphasizing that while the road may be difficult, constructive conflict resolution offers a path forward.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Louis Kriesberg with some edits.

Conflict Resolution Could Also Be Relevant to Domestic Conflicts

What reasons compelled you to write the book ‘Fighting Better’ and what is the main purpose of this book? Why did you choose the title of ‘Fighting Better’ for your book? 

Professor Louis Kriesberg: Most of my research has focused on international conflicts, particularly the Cold War and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, over time, I developed an interest in the transformations occurring within my own country since the end of World War II. I was struck by the increasing troubles in our society, particularly the growing political divisions, the nastiness in politics, and the threats of violence. This led me to believe that the development of conflict resolution, which I had contributed to for many years, could also be relevant to domestic conflicts, not just international ones.

In the preface, I mention that I had the audacity to undertake this analysis because I had lived through these changes and possessed the necessary skills. I felt I could contribute to understanding how our society’s troubles became so severe and how a constructive conflict approach could provide solutions.

I was driven to write this book because I wanted it to reach a broad audience—not just my academic colleagues or university courses, but the public at large. The title Fighting Better seemed fitting as it encapsulates the essence of what I aimed to achieve: a proper statement on how we can address conflicts more constructively.

Can you please explain to our readers how conflicts can be waged constructively by analyzing American conflicts that did or did not work out well for the contenders and the country as a whole?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: Certainly. Let me outline some basic principles of constructive conflict. I’ve discussed these ideas extensively in another book, Constructive Conflicts, co-authored with Bruce Dayton. The first edition was published in 1986, but the concepts remain fundamental.

First of all, many conflicts are managed through established institutions. All societies have rules for dealing with conflict—through legal systems, politics, and other institutionalized methods. Conflicts handled within these frameworks tend to be more constructive, provided the rules are fair and widely accepted.

Secondly, coercion isn’t the only way to influence conflict outcomes. There are three major inducements: persuasion, promises of benefits, and coercion. In nearly every conflict, one side tries to convince others of the rightness of their cause. Sometimes, offering benefits or incentives can also play a role in resolving conflicts. This means that not all conflicts rely solely on coercion, whether violent or nonviolent.

Thirdly, conflicts are often interwoven. We might frame them as isolated, but they are connected to broader and smaller issues. This interconnectedness offers opportunities to find better solutions, rather than seeing conflicts as fixed, zero-sum battles.

Fourthly, often, conflicts are framed as a battle between good and bad, but in constructive conflict resolution, it’s crucial to genuinely understand the other side—their needs, perspectives, and misunderstandings. This can lead to more effective conflict resolution.

Finally, conflicts evolve as contexts change, and different factions within each side may shift their positions. This fluidity can make finding better outcomes more possible or less likely, depending on how the situation is handled.

These are some of the basic ideas behind constructive conflict. We’ve explored these concepts further in other publications as well.

The Republican Party Has Pursued Policies That Exacerbated Inequality 

In your analysis of class-related conflicts, how did you observe the relationship between economic policies and the rise of class inequality from 1970 to 1992? What were the key factors contributing to the “hyper class inequality” that you describe as occurring between 1993 and 2022? How do conflicts across different dimensions of inequality (class, status, and power) interact and influence each other according to your findings?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: There has been remarkable progress in achieving greater equality for certain status groups in America, particularly African Americans, since the end of World War II. After the war, there were raised expectations among African Americans that they deserved much greater equality than they had experienced under the oppressive conditions of slavery and segregation. Even President Harry Truman recognized this, believing in the integration of African Americans into the army. However, the South’s conditions were dire, with many whites attempting to maintain the status quo and keep African Americans “in their place.” This led to increased resistance to Jim Crow laws, and the civil rights movement began to take shape, with leadership focused on nonviolent actions as a means to achieve change.

The situation in Birmingham, Alabama, was particularly troubling, with issues like the denial of equal seating on buses. This became a well-defined target for change, with African Americans demanding the right to sit anywhere on the buses. Leaders like Martin Luther King Jr., who was thoughtful and strategic, worked closely with other community leaders, particularly within the church, to build a movement that was carefully planned and constructively waged.

Despite the constructive approach, the white leadership in many Southern cities responded with destructive tactics, including repression, violence, and arrests. These actions, however, only garnered more support for the African American cause. The federal government, under President Lyndon B. Johnson, who was sympathetic to the movement, eventually intervened. The movement’s success inspired other groups of African Americans to employ nonviolent techniques in their own struggles for equality.

I was influenced by the traditional sociological framework that emphasizes the major dimensions of society: class, status, and power. The ideas of class inequality, particularly as discussed by Marx, provided a convenient way to organize my analysis. Class inequality was largely addressed through legislation rather than direct action. Initially, under Democratic leadership, particularly Lyndon B. Johnson, there were efforts to improve welfare payments for low-income people, including African Americans. This contributed to some increase in equality in the years following World War II, despite the negative impact of the Vietnam War.

However, when Ronald Reagan became President and leader of the Republican Party, there was a clear shift. Reagan cut back on welfare payments, limited worker union activities, and reduced taxes for the wealthy and corporations. These actions marked the beginning of a significant increase in class inequality, primarily driven by legislation and the idea that giving more money to the rich would benefit everyone through a “trickle-down” or supply-side economy. This theory, however, was widely discredited by economists who pointed out that increased demand from workers with higher wages is what truly drives economic growth, not the other way around. Despite this, the Republican Party continued to pursue policies that exacerbated inequality whenever they were in power.

While Inequality May Benefit Some in the Short Term, It Is Ultimately Destructive

In the introduction of the book, you refer to main written documents that created US like the constitution and the American Declaration of Independence which defends freedom, justice and life for all Americans however African Americans until the end of 1960s did not enjoy their full civic rights. What made Americans so indifferent to the plight of African Americans for so long? 

Professor Louis Kriesberg: I wouldn’t necessarily call it indifference. Some people, particularly the white leadership in the South during the Jim Crow era, believed they were benefiting from the system. They thought they could maintain cheaper labor by paying African Americans less and denying them basic rights. They saw this as advantageous for their own interests. However, in the long run, it was a mistake, even for those who thought they were benefiting. The South’s economy improved after the end of Jim Crow, proving that equality was beneficial for everyone. One of the key ideas of constructive conflict is to analyze the motivations of different groups and recognize when those motivations are shortsighted or harmful.

My emphasis on the founding documents, which pledge freedom and equality for all, was to highlight that these principles are more constructive and beneficial for society as a whole. It’s a normative judgment, but I believe that working towards equality and justice aligns with the core values of the United States. While inequality may benefit some in the short term, it is ultimately destructive to the nation’s founding ideals and to humanity as a whole.

In the book, you refer to events in the US since the presidency of Donald Trump and conclude that widespread fears have been common about the survival of American democracy and underline in the concluding chapter that: “In recent years democracy have deteriorated significantly.” Do you agree with those pundits who argue that American democracy is dying? Based on your study, what are the greatest threats to American democracy, and what constructive approaches could mitigate these dangers?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: I wouldn’t necessarily use the word “dying.” I don’t think American democracy is doomed, but it has certainly been damaged. One peculiar aspect of this situation is that the progress made by various status groups—African Americans, women, LGBTQ people—through their actions, demands, and some legislative changes has led to significant social advances. However, this progress has sparked backlash. Some people resisted these changes, feeling that they were undesirable or even disruptive, leading to efforts to roll back these gains and return to more oppressive inequalities.

The Republican Party, in particular, became increasingly uncooperative with Democrats. Even attempts by leaders like Bill Clinton to bridge the divide were met with rigidity from Republicans, who increasingly embraced obvious falsehoods, misogyny, and racism, often appealing to white Christian identity. This strategy garnered some support, especially as it played into the anxieties of those who felt left behind by economic changes.

As income inequality grew, many working-class people experienced relative deprivation, with stagnating wages and a declining sense of economic security. This, combined with status anxieties—particularly among some men who felt their social standing was threatened—created fertile ground for the Republican Party to exploit cultural grievances while distracting from the real issue: the growing class inequality.

In this context, the interplay between status gains and the hyper-inequality in income and wealth has been particularly dangerous. The decreasing intergenerational mobility has made it harder for future generations to benefit from economic gains, further exacerbating tensions. To address these dangers, it’s crucial to focus on policies that reduce inequality, enhance social mobility, and foster greater cooperation across political divides.

Trump’s Right-Wing Populist Appeal Will Not Endure in the Long Term

Donald Trump vs Kamala Harris for US President. Photo: Qubix Studio.

With Donald Trump as former president and now president hopeful, right-wing populism has turned out to be a permanent feature of American democracy. Do you think right-wing populism will be here to stay or is it a phenomenon that will be forgotten after Trump ends his political life?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: I don’t think it will be forgotten, but I believe the falsehoods and extremism in Trump’s rejection of American democratic principles will ultimately lead to its failure. I think we’ll see a restoration of more traditional American politics. Historically, we’ve seen similar episodes. McCarthyism was a dreadful chapter, but today, no one wants to be associated with it—it’s a term of shame. Similarly, in the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan had significant political influence in many areas, which was profoundly undemocratic. However, that period is now largely forgotten. I think right-wing populism, as represented by Trump, is also doomed to failure. Even if he were elected again, I don’t believe his appeal will endure in the long term.

In the last chapter of the book, you observe that Trump’s presidency has been and remain largely contrary to the constructive conflict approach. He has failed to achieve many of his stated goals and the results of what he has accomplished have worsened progress toward more class, status and political power equality. What will happen to American democracy if Trump is reelected on November 5?

Professor Louis Kriesberg:  It would be terrible. However, I believe there will be significant resistance, and he won’t be able to impose his will entirely. During his first term, there was considerable pushback, and while he may have learned from that experience, I don’t think he will be more effective in overcoming the resistance. The strength of this resistance is well-grounded. Most people in this country are not staunch supporters of Trump—he has never had more than around 44% approval. As he tries to implement his agenda, I believe the resistance will only grow stronger.

After watching the debate of US presidential candidates on Tuesday night, who do you think will be the next US President?

Professor Louis Kriesberg: I’m not sure how much the debate will influence the outcome. There’s no question that Kamala Harris was very skillful in baiting Trump to be his typical self—going off on tangents, lying, distorting, blustering, and at times, appearing bewildered and incoherent. This might play a role in the electoral college outcome, but it’s not necessarily decisive.

I believe Harris did a brilliant job of proving that she would be an effective, powerful, and good President, while Trump showed none of those qualities. However, some people may need to witness even more failures before they reconsider their support. Overall, I think the American people, for the most part, are sensible, despite occasional evidence to the contrary.

UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson arrives in 10 Downing Street in London ahead of flying to Brussels for Brexit trade talks on December 09 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Many Facets of Medical Populism: British Political Tradition (BPT) and Covid-19

The traditional British political style and rhetoric were utilized by both former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage of UKIP as tools to communicate their approaches to managing the COVID-19 crisis. This demonstrates the resilience of established political traditions while highlighting the volatility and ambiguity of populist strategies. Notably, populist narratives varied significantly depending on whether the leader was in power or in opposition, which influenced their responsibility towards citizens and their ability to connect populist grievances with pre-existing political arguments in the context of the pandemic. In particular, Johnson’s actions reflect a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, blending epistemic and political authority in determining the necessary measures to address the pandemic.

By Andrea Guidotti*  

Introduction

This paper analyzes the role and significance of the Covid-19 pandemic in the development and behavior of British populist parties. It aims to observe how and when the so-called British Political Tradition (BPT) has been used by these parties as a guiding principle warranting the actions and policies implemented during the Covid-19 crisis in the UK. First, it will briefly introduce medical populism from a general perspective and within the specific situation of the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, it will analyze the overall actions taken by the two main British (right-wing) populist parties at the time and their leaders: the Conservatives in power under Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage’s UKIP party. This piece is not intended to be a theoretical discussion regarding the populist status of the considered parties and assumes that both can be meaningfully characterized as consistently (but differentially) populist on a variety of issues – such as health, immigration, economics or Brexit. The final section discusses the relationships between populists’ responses to the pandemic and the BPT. It evaluates if populists’ attitudes towards COVID-19 and its political management are positively affected by the BPT.

Populism and the Pandemic

One must first understand what kind of crisis the COVID-19 pandemic was and, thus, what kind of phenomena populists were dealing with at the time. Some scholars conceive a crisis as a moment of saliency for systemic contradictions and a consequent perceived need for structural change and strong interventions to take place. In such a situation, political agents are overwhelmed by the unfolding events and there is no common recognized rationality for handling the crisis-driven situation (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 3).

Under a dynamic conception of crises, populist actors may be better conceived not just as passively reacting to given external shocks, but “as actors that actively perform and spread a sense of crisis” (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 6). This is a general characterization of an endogenous crisis, where all the contradictions are generated within the political system, and in which political agents are acting. In other words, when confronted with such a scenario, populists from all over the political spectrum usually tend to at least trigger or even manufacture the crisis themselves to gain some leverage in the political system (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 4). Being an exogenous crisis with respect to populism, the pandemic is harder to politicize than other political shocks or events that are at least partially originated inside the system itself. In addition, it should also be noted that the pandemic has a peculiar nature: as a public health crisis, no one is free from its consequences and implications. 

Bobba & Hubé (2021: 9-10), drawing from other authors, use the following general framework to better understand health crises such as Covid-19. Health crises are thought to be divisible into three parts: (a) an initial phase in which you are confronted with the emergence of the problem; (b) a confrontation phase in which some actors blame other actors for being responsible for what is happening; (c) a managing phase in which who is blaming responsibility upon others generally tries to propose and claim its solutions.

Moving to populism to connect it with the pandemic, a meaningful characterization of the term in the context of public health crises is needed. Following Gideon Lasco’s argument (2020: 1), one could say that “medical populism” is “a political style based on performances of public health crises that pit ‘the people’ against ‘the establishment’.” Different examples of medical populism can be given, going from Jair Bolsonaro downplaying the threat of the virus and pitting the economy against public health policies, to Donald Trump paving the way for conspiracy theories about the virus’ creation and blaming illegal immigrants for its spread around the country. 

With specific reference to Covid-19, we can distinguish some main features of populist strategies acting within such a crisis: (i) the simplification of the pandemic, offering the simplest (and most simplistic) solutions to the problems that the health emergency is posing; (ii) the dramatization, distortion and spectacularizing the threats posed by the crisis; (iii) the forging of societal divisions claiming to be on the side of the ‘real people’ quite often opposed to an unspecified ‘otherhood’; (iv) the invocation of knowledge claims: for example with regards to the virus’ origins, about the most appropriate methodologies to prevent its spreading or on how to treat it consistently (Lasco, 2020: 2-3). 

Investigating the second feature of populism (ii), we can add the fact that populist actors must not be obscured by the coverage of the pandemic itself. They need to spectacularize the crisis with their messaging, a strategy that allows them to stand out as relevant and influential figures in the public and online media to claim reliability and legitimacy properly (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 5). 

Regarding the third feature (iii), it is difficult to frame the populist concept of the ‘real people’ alongside the strategy of pitting them against other groups or entities when the virus indiscriminately affects everyone. Being aware of this problem, “‘the people’ are imbued with various characteristics, biomedical and otherwise [with populists] claiming that their citizens are less susceptible to the virus” (Lasco, 2020: 4-7). Thus, the ‘others’ against which populists claim to fight in representation of the “real people” during the pandemic are generally international and supranational actors such as the WTO or other states such as China – if not intellectual elites such as academics, journalists or public health experts (Bobba & Hubé, 2021). 

Points (i) and (iv) are strictly intertwined in that simplification goes hand in hand with false claims and controversial scientific statements. In other words, we observe a “widespread deployment of scientific language and imagery – and a selective deployment of scientific consensus” (Lasco, 2020: 8).

British Populism and Covid-19

To better connect British populism with the case of the pandemic, it is useful to get a brief and general background of the previous relationships between populism and healthcare policies in the UK before Covid-19. There is a distinction between healthcare systems that are more or less resistant to populist performances. The former are well-resourced, present a developed network-based model of governance, and involve professions in the policy processes. On the contrary, the latter are poorly financed, present high levels of command along the line of the New Public Management-type (NPM) governance model and display low trust in healthcare providers (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 3). 

But the most important thing to recall regarding the evolution of the British healthcare system (NHS) and populism is the BREXIT process. During those years, right-wing populists argued that by leaving the European Union (EU) more funds could be allocated to better finance the NHS. Specifically, they framed the unsustainability of the NHS and its underdevelopment (mostly in terms of funds and available high-skilled personnel) as a problem of immigration, as the blame was directed towards immigrants enjoying health services paid for by British citizens (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 8). 

Johnson and the Conservatives

The Conservatives, led by then Prime Minister Boris Johnson, were in power when Covid-19 became a global medical problem, and remained so until the end of the pandemic. For some authors (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021), the first wave of the pandemic, from February 2020 to roughly July 2020, can be divided in three phases. The ‘breakout’ phase was characterized by state authorities acting in a relaxed way, without invasive governmental control over people’s freedoms. This moment corresponds to the public’s response to the news about the virus’ spreading. During the ‘confrontation’ phase, the virus’ infection began widely spreading, and the number of people testing positive to Covid-19 began to grow exponentially. The final, ‘managing,’ phase is characterized by attempts to stabilize the situation and enforce measures in order to cope and coexist with the virus while waiting for the development of vaccines. 

During the first two phases the Conservative Party did not take the risks seriously and showed a libertarian way of thinking, arguing against a strict and hard response to the crisis in terms of closures and restrictions. In particular, Prime Minister Johnson did not attend the meetings dedicated to the government’s response to the pandemic in early February 2020 and criticized some warnings made by the British Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) (Bale, 2023: 69-70). An explanation for that could be that his actions and public statements were influenced and warranted by ‘misplaced optimism’ and regressive and nationalistic ideas, historically speaking, of the British role in the world – stressing the narrative around the exceptionality and efficiency of the NHS (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 6). 

Starting from the end of March and the beginning of April, things became more dramatic, and the Prime Minister Johnson’s attitude changed. Around this time the first lockdown was issued, disregarding the idea of ‘herd immunity’ where the virus is left to spread in the population to lower its virulence (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 21). In general, the government stressed conventional public measures and followed international guidelines along other major Western and European states (Bale, 2023: 70). Additionally, Johnson’s Cabinet avoided using tropes potentially contributing to the politicization of the crisis, and attempted to emphasize the importance of scientific guidelines (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26). 

Analyzing the rhetorical repertoire that has been used, the governmental discourse historically situated Covid-19 in mainly three different ways. To do so, the Cabinet used so-called ‘temporal claims,’ as defined in narrative discourse theory. Following the construction of a (i) radically discontinuous time, the virus has been described as a moment of generational significance. The pandemic was to be seen as an unprecedented event disrupting people’s habits and usual social behavior, in order for new economic, social and political initiatives to be ruled and legitimized. From another point of view, events have been plotted with a (ii) linear timeline, positing a unidirectional and cumulative development. Here, a descriptive account of some sequences and a principle of evaluation of the events and by which to assess the correctness of the action leading to their unfolding have been invoked. Lastly, the construction of a (iii) cyclical time helped the government to depict everyday life after the pandemic in a radically different way. In this respect, narratives were prospecting and sketching the idea of a ‘new normalcy’ bringing the emergence of new habits for everyone (Jarvis, 2021: 27-31).

To conclude this investigation of Johnson’s political communication during the pandemic, it is notable that he also employed daily governmental press briefings, using so-called the ‘numbers arms race’ and more broadly the already cited ‘war language.’ Both of them served as an enforcement to the claim of fighting for Britain in a once in a lifetime event. The key mantra has been the following statement: “Stay Home, Protect the NHS, Save Lives” (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 9-10). 

Farage and the UKIP

Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

In contrast to Johnson, who avoided politicizing the pandemic, Nigel Farage opted to fully utilize a populist political communication style typically associated with right-wing parties. Despite taking a cautious stance at the beginning of the breakout, he started acting as a radical libertarian, opposing public health restrictions and showing his open skepticism about government actions towards the pandemic (Bale, 2023). 

Two major critiques can be identified. The former critique strictly concerns the governmental actions taken when the health situation started being very problematic. Farage accused Johnson’s government of incompetency and indecisiveness in dealing with the crisis, framing his actions as a lack of leadership on the side of the Prime Minister (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 27). His arguments are composed by a mixture of “support for draconian measures on ‘law and order’ and ‘Britain’s borders’,” and “its essentially libertarian opposition to ‘political correctness gone mad’ as well as ‘red tape’ and the ‘faceless bureaucrats’” (Bale, 2023: 71). Resorting to well-known populist grievances, alongside other world leaders such as Trump, he adapted the issue of immigration and the concerns associated with it in claiming that migrants could enter and spread the virus if police enforcement on British borders were not sufficiently severe or incoming international flights were to be easily allowed for foreign travelers coming from high-risk countries (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 23). He also denounced the ‘herd immunity’ strategy initially sought to be pursued by the government, although he maintained a libertarian posture by stressing the fact that measures taken to stop the virus’ transmissibility were not meant to become a “house arrest” for the entire nation (Bale, 2023: 72). 

The latter part of his narratives, and the second critique he posed, is about the role of the UK in the world and the attempt to identify responsible actors for the pandemic to occur. In other words, he blamed China for not telling the truth about Covid-19’s emergence in the first place and for its deliberate suppression of key information and the intentional delaying of their communication to the international community (Bale, 2023: 71). Concisely: “While the government undermined the seriousness of the crisis mostly because of economic concerns, Farage opportunistically used the COVID-19 crisis to suggest a scale down to the UK’s relations with the EU and China” (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26).

The British Political Tradition in Times of Crisis

According to Lijphart (1999), the British Westminster Model presents nine core tenets: (1) the concentration of the executive power in one party; (2) cabinet dominance; (3) a two-party system, where parties produce manifestos and seek a mandate to govern; (4) a majoritarian electoral system; (5) a unitary and centralized government; (6) interest group pluralism; (7) the concentration of legislative power in Parliament; (8) constitutional flexibility; (9) the central bank is controlled by the executive. Following Hall (2011: 9-10) and Richards and Smith (2002)  we can add two more tenets: (10) the doctrine of ministerial responsibility; (11) a permanent, neutral, and anonymous civil service. 

What is important to us here is the fact that the Westminster Model emphasizes some peculiar aspects. First, a linear and gradual development of the British political system and its institutions. Second, it stresses a great degree of British exceptionalism, and the superior nature of its system compared to other Western ones. Third, it is warranted by the idea that power is to be concentrated and exercised with a top-down approach. Warranting this system, according to Hall (2011: 124-125), the British Political Tradition (BPT) could be characterized as presenting the following main themes: (i)A discourse that stresses a limited liberal notion of representation and the elitist view that politicians are best suited to make decisions on behalf of the populace […] and are willing to act against the expressed will of the public or in the face of substantial public opposition; (ii) A discourse that stresses a conservative notion of responsibility and the view that a strong, decisive government is the most effective, efficient and desirable form of government. […] (iii) A discourse about change which emphasizes the virtues of continuity, gradualism, flexibility and stability. […] (iv) A discourse concerning a sense of British distinctiveness and superiority politically (Hall, 2011: 124-125)

Regarding discourse (i), it must be added that the BPT is sustained by an elitist conception of democracy, particularly the famous ‘Westminster and Whitehall know best’ statement, which itself reflects the interest of the political elite, thus reinforcing their status and power (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 128). The BPT reifies over time already existing inequalities and asymmetries in the British political system between citizens. Therefore, these ideas and beliefs have been mostly supported by most of the population. This results in the populace developing a somewhat deferential attitude towards politics, where politicians are seen as the best holders of the right to take the most important and crucial decisions for all (Hall, 2011: 159). Moreover, Marsh and Hall rightly highlight that the BPT not only served the interest of the political elite, but also of the socio-economic one. Specifically, regarding discourse (ii) above, the climax of political conservatism made it easier for the working class to accept the status quo. Furthermore, the dominance of the executive power helped political elites to enact policies more favorable to the socio-economic ones without too much opposition (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 135). 

Johnson and the BPT

The discussion seems to beg the question: Has the BPT influenced the populist (Johson and Farage) behavior described above? Following Finlayson et al. (2023), we can observe the employment of several traditional tropes dating back to the language and discourse of the BPT. Particularly, Prime Minister Johnson’s behavior indicates the presence of a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, merging epistemic and political authority over the actions needed to cope with the pandemic. For example, the invocation of the concept of ‘the people’ is used to hide the public’s limited political agency and retain the rights and legitimacy over the enactment of the counteracting measures. All of this is also related to the low participatory governance tradition inherent in the British State, but also shows how Johnson proved to strategically build its narrative of the pandemic to advance and increase the further legitimization of past policy decisions, and in particular the ones connected with the Brexit process (Wellings et al., 2023: 238). The former British premier revitalized the concept of the ‘British people’ within the public imagination, employing the sustainability and functioning of the NHS and other health issues as an element of continuity in his narratives from the beginning of the ‘Leave Campaign’ for Brexit to their management during the pandemic (Welling et al., 2023: 242). 

To better understand the British government’s communicative repertoire, the authors identify four main figurations of ‘the people’ (Finlayson et al., 2023: 344). First, we have ‘statistical realities.’ Here, ‘the people’ are represented and aggregated numerically, thus appearing more as abstract elements that legitimize the quest for acquiescence from the government (Finlayson et al., 2023: 345-346). Put another way, this kind of framing not only confers to the Cabinet epistemic authority because numbers don’t need further explanations, but also certifies its tight cooperation with the scientific community (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 222). 

Second, we have the figuration of ‘suffering families.’ This narrative aims to develop a public ‘ethos’ via which it can acquire the rights and legitimacy required to advance its policies. The BPT here is involved and works when this communicative strategy properly connects governmental instructions with people’s feelings, needs, and emotions – knowing what is best to accomplish them (Finlayson et al., 2023: 347). 

Third, ‘the people’ are framed as responsible individuals. This one is seen as a rule follower, encapsulated in a hierarchical structure that crystallizes a top-down and vertical conception of the people/state relationships. Once again, the BPT widens the divide between the elites and the public. ‘The people’ are required to follow the moral claims encouraged by the elite to fulfill their individual and collective responsibilities and duties towards resolving the crisis. The individual responsibility regards the task that people are assigned to complete, such as wearing protective masks in public spaces while avoiding unnecessary contact with strangers. The collective responsibility is rooted in utilitarian reasoning: complying with the rules means a faster crisis resolution (Finlayson et al., 2023: 348-349). 

The second and third depictions help understand the way in which Johnson tried to preserve its populist-driven consensus from the backlash of its unpopular decisions during the crisis. He tried not only to highlight the community as a collective as the real protagonist of the effort to fight against the virus’ infection, but also to present himself as a transparent and compassionate leader (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 209-215). 

The fourth and final depiction utilized is ‘freedom-loving citizens.’ This time, citizens are represented as rights holders and interests to be appropriately recognized. Consequently, the government has a duty to protect these fundamental freedoms and, by showing the truth about them, affirm the legitimacy of its guidelines (Finlayson et al., 2023: 350). 

Farage and the BPT

The case of Farage is different. Being an oppositional force during the COVID-19 pandemic breakout, it was much easier for him to resort to typical and proven to be more effective populist grievances. However, the BPT resonates consistently in Farage’s discourses during the crisis: I’m convinced that its influence is evident when the UKIP’s leader blamed Johnson for his lack of leadership and inefficient management in the initial months of the crisis development. Specifically, Farage used his oppositional platform on health policies to rally against the government and exploit the newly achieved consensus to fuel support around the rebranding of UKIP in ‘Reform UK’ (McManus, 2021: 148-150). 

Relating to discourse (ii) presented before, I argue that Farage somewhat recalls the necessity for the executive to be strong and decisive in its actions on behalf of the State. Second, and about discourse (iv) discussed above, I argue that Farage recalls the BPT when he stresses the role of the UK in the world vis-à-vis the actions and warnings undertaken towards China by other Western leaders. Put another way, he tried to point out the distinctiveness and peculiarity of the British political system as opposed to others, especially in the Western World, while asking for a different resolution path for the crisis (Bale, 2023; Sahin & Ianosev, 2021). 

Overall, even if Farage was not in a position that favored traditional forms of British political thinking, the BPT proves to have (at least) partially influenced his claims and actions during Covid-19’s unfolding. 

Conclusion

To recall the main points of the argument above, there is clear evidence that the British Political Tradition (BPT) still influences how politicians behave in ordinary British political life and their policy-making choices. Even in the face of essential shifts and changes caused by the Covid-19 crisis, many political actors tried to adapt these new challenges to the long-standing historical and common way of interpreting political actions and decision-making in the UK (Hall et al., 2018: 15). 

The aim of this article was to check for the influence of the BPT on populist leaders. As we observed, the British traditional political style and tropes served both Johnson and Farage as a means to instill their ideas about how to manage the crisis. This proves the resilience of established political tradition and clarifies the volatility and ambiguity of the populist repertoire and strategies. Regarding the latter point, populist narratives varied a lot depending on two factors: (i) the position of the leader – being in charge or standing as an oppositional force – and hence its responsibility towards citizens; (ii) the ability to legitimately connect populist grievances in the context of the pandemics with already existing lines of political reasoning. Some examples exemplifying the second point are the case of migration and the issue of border control regarding the likelihood of importing and spreading the virus uncontrolled. 


(*) Andrea Guidotti is a master’s student at the University of Pavia and an intern at the ECPS.


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Wellings, B.; Bonotti, M.; Rublee, M. R. & Zech, S. T. (2024). “Correction to: Narrative fusion and layering: statecraft and the shaping of Boris Johnson’s pandemic narrative, 2020–2021.” British Politics19(2), 253–253. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-023-00241-2

President Nicolas Maduro

Once Dictators Seize Power, They’re Hard to Remove: Venezuela’s Elections

Some observers believe Nicolás Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.

By Imdat Oner*

“Lacking personal charisma and booming oil revenues, Nicolás Maduro has struggled to obtain his predecessor’s popular support and failed to legitimize his rule at the polls. Instead, Maduro consolidated his power through sharing it with elites and the military.” 

In a profile I wrote about Nicolás Maduro three years ago, I emphasized that his grip on power was not rooted in broad popular support but rather in strategic alliances with elites and the military. This reality has been starkly highlighted by the recent presidential election in Venezuela, which revealed Maduro’s limited base of popular support.

The National Electoral Council (CNE) officially declared Maduro the winner, claiming he secured 52 percent of the vote compared to 43 percent for his main challenger, Edmundo González. However, despite Maduro’s declaration of victory three weeks ago, the CNE has yet to present credible evidence to substantiate this claim. In contrast, Venezuela’s opposition, represented by the Unitary Platform (PUD), has challenged the outcome by publishing a detailed vote count online. This data shows that Edmundo González actually received more than 7.3 million votes—approximately 67% of the total. The opposition’s numbers indicate that González is ahead by over 4 million votes, with Maduro losing in every state. Some reports are even calling this election manipulation one of the biggest electoral frauds in Latin American history. Although Maduro has faced similar allegations of election fraud before, the evidence against him has never been as overwhelming as it is now.

Lacking popular support, Maduro has resorted to familiar tactics. Instead of transparently sharing election results table by table, he requested that the Electoral Chamber of Venezuela’s Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) review and certify the official results. The government is attempting to present the TSJ as a neutral body to resolve the controversy. Yet, Venezuela’s judiciary has long been co-opted by Maduro, functioning more as a tool to preserve his legitimacy than as an independent institution. Although the court has yet to announce its decision, it’s highly likely it will support the results from Maduro’s controlled CNE.

As the government delays the process to buy time, Maduro continues to rely on military support. His legitimacy has always been anchored in alliances with domestic elites, particularly the military, whose loyalty is crucial to the regime’s survival. The military, having historically shaped Venezuela’s political landscape, remains key to any potential transition of power. Following the disputed elections, Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino reaffirmed the military’s “absolute loyalty” to Maduro, further solidifying their role as a pillar of his regime. Opposition leaders have called on the army to intervene, but this seems unlikely. Since taking power, Maduro has worked to ensure the military remains staunchly pro-government. Those officers who showed even slight disloyalty have been imprisoned, while loyalists have been generously rewarded with significant economic and political favors.

With the military solidly behind Maduro, along with the backing of the National Electoral Council (CNE) and the Supreme Court, Venezuela is going to slide further into dictatorship. Since Maduro’s 2013 election, the country has gradually grown more authoritarian, with opposition politicians, activists, and journalists consistently targeted by his regime. Yet, in recent days, the repression has intensified significantly. The government’s rhetoric and the actions of its security services signal to tighten its authoritarian grip further on the country, even at the cost of becoming a pariah in the region.

Some observers believe Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.

Venezuela’s elections once again serve as a warning to other authoritarian populist regimes that once dictators seize power, they become extremely difficult to remove—though not entirely impossible.


 

(*) Dr. Imdat ONER is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy at Florida International University (FIU). He holds a Ph.D. from FIU, where he completed a dissertation titled “Great Power Competition in Latin America Through Strategic Narrative.” Prior to joining FIU, he served as a Turkish diplomat, most recently at the Turkish Embassy in Caracas, Venezuela, where he was the Deputy Head of Mission and Political Officer. His expertise lies in International Relations, with a primary focus on Latin American politics. Dr. Oner has published extensively on Venezuelan politics and Turkish foreign policy, with articles appearing in War on the Rocks, The National Interest, Americas Quarterly, Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica, and the Miami Herald. He is also a frequent contributor to Global Americans. His analyses have been featured in international media outlets, including Bloomberg, Al Jazeera, Miami Herald, and Agencia EFE.

Former US President Donald Trump at a rally with VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

J.D. Vance, Populism, and Culture Wars

The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.

By João Ferreira Dias

The rise of J.D. Vance in American politics signifies a critical juncture in the Republican Party, underscoring the entrenchment of right-wing populism and culture wars within its agenda. While seemingly modern, this phenomenon has deep roots in political history (Hicks, 1931) and must be understood within the broader context of populism and the moral conflicts that characterize contemporary American society. 

Populism: A Brief Overview

Populism is a multifaceted and highly debated concept in political science, with various scholars offering different interpretations and definitions. At its core, populism can be understood as a political approach that frames politics as a struggle between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” a conceptualization popularized by Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser (2017). However, this definition, while widely accepted, does not capture the full complexity of the phenomenon.

Mudde’s (2004) characterization of populism as a “thin-centered ideology” suggests that populism lacks the comprehensive nature of other ideologies, such as liberalism or socialism, and instead attaches itself to various political doctrines. This view is further explored by Hawkins and Kaltwasser (2017), who emphasize the ideational approach, focusing on the content of populist rhetoric and its distinction from mainstream political discourse. However, some scholars argue against categorizing populism strictly as an ideology. For instance, Aslanidis (2016) refutes the notion of populism as an ideology, proposing instead that it be seen as a discursive frame or a political strategy that can be employed by various ideological camps.

The debate extends to whether a minimum definition of populism is necessary for its study. De la Torre and Mazzoleni (2019) argue that a clear, minimal definition helps to prevent conceptual stretching, while others, like Benveniste, Campani, and Lazaridis (2016), suggest that the concept’s fluidity is essential to capturing its diverse manifestations across different contexts.

Furthermore, populism is often discussed in relation to its opposition to globalization and elite-driven policies. Steger (2019) maps the rise of anti-globalist populism, highlighting its ideological underpinnings and its appeal to those who feel disenfranchised by global economic and cultural changes. Similarly, Abts and Laermans (2018) explore the relationship between populism and the crisis of political parties, particularly in the context of Europe’s far-right movements.

Peter Diehl (2022) advocates for a more nuanced understanding of populism, acknowledging its complexity and the various forms it can take. This perspective aligns with the broader literature that sees populism as a reaction to perceived political failures, often articulated through a rhetoric of exclusion and opposition to the status quo (Taggart, 2018; Fukuyama, 2017). Anselmi (2017) and Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) provide further insights into the adaptability of populism across different political contexts, reinforcing the idea that populism is not a fixed ideology but a versatile tool in the hands of diverse political actors.

United States, Populism, and Culture Wars

In the American context, populism has historically manifested in various forms, from the agrarian populism of the late 19th century to the right-wing populism of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. The latter, exemplified by figures like Donald Trump and, more recently, J.D. Vance, capitalizes on cultural and economic anxieties, often framing issues in terms of a struggle between ordinary, hardworking citizens and a corrupt, out-of-touch elite. This form of populism erodes democratic norms by exploiting resentment to foster political and social polarization, embodying the adage “divide and conquer.”

The term “culture wars” refers to the ideological and moral conflicts that have increasingly defined political discourse in many Western democracies, particularly the United States. These conflicts revolve around issues such as abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, immigration, gun control, and the role of religion in public life (Hunter, 1991, 1993; Hartman, 2019). Culture wars are not merely debates over policy; they are battles over a society’s very identity and values. They tap into deep-seated beliefs and emotions, often leading to highly polarized and intractable conflicts. As Ezra Klein (2020) notes, these cultural and moral divisions have become so entrenched that they now shape political preferences and social identities. Political affiliation has become a proxy for a broader cultural identity, making compromise and dialogue increasingly difficult.

The convergence of populism and culture wars has significant implications for contemporary politics. Populist leaders often weaponize cultural issues to mobilize their base, framing themselves as defenders of traditional values against the perceived threats of liberal elites and progressive movements. This strategy is evident in J.D. Vance’s political trajectory.

Senator from Ohio and author of the bestseller Hillbilly Elegy, a work that depicts the reality of poor white populations in non-urban America, J.D. Vance, 39, is the face of a new generation of politicians who have embraced conservative populism as a successful political strategy, transitioning from a critic to a proponent of Trumpism. Vance’s rise and his involvement in the so-called “culture wars”—advocating for more restrictive immigration policies, being a fierce critic of progressive education in schools and universities (such as critical race theory and gender studies), defending the traditional American family by opposing abortion and same-sex marriage, and emphasizing that Hollywood is an industry destroying the “good old American values”—reflect a profound shift in the identity and priorities of the Republican Party, raising questions about the future of the party and American politics as a whole.

Vance’s transformation from a critic of Trump to an advocate of Trumpist populism reflects a broader trend within the Republican Party, where cultural conservatism has become a central pillar of political strategy. Vance’s positions on immigration, education, and family values are not merely policy preferences but are presented as part of a larger cultural battle to “save” America from moral decay. By emphasizing issues like opposition to abortion and same-sex marriage and critiquing progressive education and Hollywood’s influence, Vance taps into the anxieties of a conservative base that feels alienated by the rapid cultural changes of the past few decades.

This fusion of populism and culture wars has transformed the Republican Party’s identity, moving it away from its traditional focus on free-market economics and foreign policy and toward a more nationalistic, culturally conservative agenda. Traditionally marked by a commitment to free-market policies, military interventionism, and fiscal conservatism, the Republican Party is now undergoing a “Trumpification.” This shift aligns the party with nationalist agendas that evoke the nostalgic imagery of a bygone era, appealing to a working-class white electorate that yearns for the “happy golden days” of baseball games and hot dogs. Political scientists Aurelien Mondon and Aaron Winter (2020) have highlighted how this focus on a particular electorate was crucial for Trump’s victory and the success of Brexit.

However, this agenda, rooted in ideological nostalgia, poses a significant threat to American republicanism. By undermining liberal democratic principles—such as the separation of powers, freedom of the press, and protection of fundamental rights—this brand of politics could irreversibly alter the landscape of American democracy. The risks are heightened when cultural conflicts are involved, as these issues often carry a zero-sum mentality, where compromise is seen as a betrayal of core values. The parallels with countries like Hungary under Viktor Orbán are stark, suggesting that the US may be on a path toward illiberal democracy, potentially ushering in an era of recycled authoritarianism.

The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.

Implications for American Democracy

The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party poses significant challenges to American democracy. The populist rhetoric of defending “the people” against “the elite” often undermines democratic norms, as it tends to delegitimize political opposition and erode trust in institutions. Furthermore, the emphasis on cultural and moral issues exacerbates societal polarization, making it difficult to find common ground on even the most basic issues of governance.

As Daniel Ziblatt and Steven Levitsky argue (2019), the erosion of democratic norms is a gradual process, often facilitated by populist leaders who, once in power, seek to weaken institutional checks and balances. The risks are heightened when cultural conflicts are involved, as these issues often carry a zero-sum mentality, where compromise is seen as a betrayal of core values.

J.D. Vance’s rise within the Republican Party, therefore, is not just a personal political success but a symptom of broader trends that could have long-lasting consequences for American democracy. The intertwining of populism and culture wars represents a shift toward a more divisive and potentially authoritarian political landscape, where the foundational principles of liberal democracy—such as the rule of law, protection of minority rights, and respect for institutional norms—are increasingly under threat.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the rise of J.D. Vance within the Republican Party underscores a significant transformation in American politics, where populism and culture wars have become central to political identity and strategy. This shift reflects broader trends within conservative movements globally, where appeals to cultural nostalgia and opposition to progressive values are increasingly shaping political discourse. While these dynamics have proven effective in mobilizing certain segments of the electorate, they also pose substantial risks to the stability of liberal democratic principles, fostering division and eroding the common ground necessary for effective governance.

As the Republican Party continues to evolve under the influence of figures like Vance, the future of American democracy may hinge on how these tensions are navigated. The intertwining of populism and culture wars raises critical questions about the direction of American politics and the resilience of democratic institutions in the face of growing polarization. As these issues continue to unfold, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric remain exceedingly high, demanding careful consideration and active engagement from all corners of society.


 

References 

Abts, K. & Laermans, R. (2018). “Populism: Definitions, questions, problems, and theories.” In: C. de la Torre, & O. Mazzoleni (Eds.), Populism, populists, and the crisis of political parties: A comparison of Italy, Austria, and Germany, 19950-2015 (pp. 1-25). Springer.

Anselmi, M. (2017). Populism: An introduction. Routledge.

Aslanidis, P. (2016). “Is Populism an Ideology? A Refutation and a New Perspective.” Political Studies, 64(1_suppl), 88–104. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12224

Benveniste, A.; Campani, G. & Lazaridis, G. (2016). “Introduction: Populism: The concept and its definitions.” In: A. Benveniste, G. Campani, & G. Lazaridis (Eds.), The rise of the far right in Europe: Populist shifts and “othering” (pp. 1-23). Springer.

Darts, D. (2006). “Art Education for a Change: Contemporary Issues and the Visual Arts.” Art Education (Reston), 59(5), 6–12. https://doi.org/10.1080/00043125.2005.11651605

De la Torre, C. & Mazzoleni, O. (2019). “Do We Need a Minimum Definition of Populism? An Appraisal of Mudde’s Conceptualization.” Populism (Leiden, Netherlands), 2(1), 79–95. https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02011021

Diehl, P. (2022). “For a complex concept of populism.” Polity, 54(3), 509-518.

Fukuyama, F. (2017). What is populism? Tempus Corporate.

Hartman, A. (2019). A war for the soul of America: A history of the culture wars (2nd ed.). University of Chicago Press.

Hawkins, K. A. & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). “The Ideational Approach to Populism.” Latin American Research Review, 52(4), 513–528. https://doi.org/10.25222/larr.85

Hicks, J. D. (1931). The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers’ Alliance and the People’s Party. University of Minnesota Press.

Hunter, J. D. (1991). Culture Wars: The Struggle to Control the Family, Art, Education, Law, and Politics in America. New York: Basic Books.

Hunter, J. D. (1993). Covering the culture war: before the shooting begins. Columbia Journalism Review, July/August, 29-32.

Hunter, J. D. (1996). “Reflections on the culture wars hypothesis.” In: J. L. Nolan Jr. (Ed.), The American Culture Wars (pp. 243-256). Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press.

Klein, E. (2020). Why we’re polarized. Simon and Schuster.

Levitsky, S., & Ziblatt, D. (2019). How democracies die. Crown.

Mondon, A. & Winter, A. (2020). “Whiteness, populism and the racialisation of the working class in the United Kingdom and the United States.” In: Whiteness and Nationalism (pp. 10-28). Routledge.

Mudde, C. (2004). “The Populist Zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition (London), 39(4), 541–563. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x

Mudde, C. & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2014). “Populism and political leadership.” In: R. C. Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of populism (pp. 376-388). Oxford University Press.

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

Steger, M. B. (2019). “Mapping Antiglobalist Populism: Bringing Ideology Back In.” Populism (Leiden, Netherlands), 2(2), 110–136. https://doi.org/10.1163/25888072-02021033

Taggart, P. (2018). “Populism and ‘unpolitics’.” In: C. de la Torre (Ed.), Populism and the crisis of democracy (pp. 79-87). Routledge.

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Crowds protest against education cuts in Brazil. Students and teachers from hundreds of universities and colleges gathered on Paulista Avenue in São Paulo, Brazil, on May 15, 2019. Photo: Dado Photos.

Right-Wing Populist Backlash: How Bolsonaro’s Brazil Targeted Academics

Universities, akin to the judiciary, media, and civil society organizations, assume a vital role in the preservation of democratic principles. Inability to safeguard their independence from external influences like governmental interventions and corporate interests hampers universities’ capacity to uphold the rights of their constituents internally or advocate for public interests outside their precincts. Brazil is among the nations that have witnessed a notable decrease in academic freedom over the past decade. Instances of political turmoil or authoritarian rule, like Bolsonaro’s in Brazil, have resulted in constraints on academic pursuits and the imposition of censorship.

By Gulsen Dogan*

Why and how antiscientific fake news and discourse have gained momentum in the last decade while academics and scientific experts faced opposition? After the COVID-19 crisis (Galanopoulos & Venizelos, 2022), the phenomenon of populism, dissemination of misinformation, propagation of conspiracy theories, and dissemination of fake news have coalesced into what is known as ‘post-truth populism,’ a concept that disregards verifiable truths and manipulates public sentiment by capitalizing on emotions and uncertainties. The phenomenon of ‘post-truth populism’ has had the effect of diminishing academic freedom, particularly because right-wing populist movements perceive academic institutions as integral components of the elite ruling class that they oppose. These movements often direct their efforts towards curtailing academic freedom by undermining the independence of universities and stifling the voices of scholars, as academic freedom facilitates the unrestricted exchange of ideas and critical analysis, elements that have the potential to challenge the narratives and policies put forth by these groups (Ignatieff, 2018).

The decline in academic freedom on a global scale, as indicated by the Freedom House Report (Prelec et al., 2020), is attributed to the oppression and arrest of academics and students for their research endeavors. Moreover, there has been a notable increase in the implementation of the corporate governance model within universities worldwide. This shift can be linked to the growing influence of private enterprises’ agendas on the research activities pursued by academics, particularly in light of the proliferation of neoliberal policies. The transformation of knowledge into a techno-scientific paradigm has been observed, accompanied by the dominance of a narrow culture of expertise in the era of neoliberalism. Consequently, there has been a reduction in the financial and institutional independence of universities, leading to greater collaboration with governmental bodies and a subsequent constriction of the space for freedom of expression and critical thinking.

Brazil is among the nations that have witnessed a notable decrease in academic freedom over the past decade (V-DEM, 2024). The contemporary discourse on educational policy involves a variety of stakeholders such as NGOs, political consultative bodies, and lobbyists in the legislative branch, signaling a transition from conventional participants to a more heterogeneous group of actors (Miceli, 2018). Constitutionally, there exist provisions for academic freedom, enabling universities to function independently in their educational, research, and outreach endeavors (Miceli, 2018). However, instances of political turmoil or authoritarian rule have resulted in constraints on academic pursuits and the imposition of censorship. 

Primarily, individuals aligned with right-wing populism tend to portray scientists and experts as members of a corrupt elite, juxtaposing them with the virtuous “people” (Bellolio, 2024). This group tends to censor “truth” and scientific knowledge, preferring conspiracy theories while harboring distrust towards scholars and academic institutions (Haltinner& Sarathchandra, 2020). Notably, there is a tendency to overlook social sciences and humanities by providing limited funding opportunities and imposing constraints on research topics and publications to diminish diversity of thought and promote uniformity in ideas (EPRS, 2023; Folha De S. Paulo, 2022). The spread of misinformation through social media platforms has further rationalized the targeted harassment faced by state universities during Bolsonaro’s administration (Ares et al. 2022). Particularly during the COVID-19 crisis, there was an upsurge in disinformation and fake news disseminated through Brazilian media channels and platforms like WhatsApp, which exacerbated the divide between populist narratives and scientific discourse (Pereira & de Oliveira, 2024; Batista de Oliveira et al., 2022; Gagnon-Dufresne et al., 2023).

Secondly, right-wing populist administrations have emerged as regulatory mechanisms for the content disseminated, studied, and debated within academic institutions. Authorities tend to utilize universities and research institutions to advance their own political agendas. The content of academic research is supervised, subject to censorship to some degree, and is heavily reliant on the approval of those in power. Additionally, extracurricular activities and the selection of guest speakers on campus are scrutinized, thereby restricting the scope for independent thinking. Moreover, individuals offering critical evaluations on topics such as the global health crisis and authoritarian governance risk facing legal action. Those who engage in such critiques may face expulsion from academic institutions. Similarly, Bolsonaro’s opposition to public universities entailed unconstitutional government interference, financial cutbacks, and the targeting of dissenters, all of which propagated a conservative right-wing outlook and challenged the prevailing left-leaning cultural dominance within public higher education (Fiori & Fiori Arantes, 2023). The reductions in funding were linked to neoliberal policies aimed at commercializing social benefits, undermining the public education system established by the Federal Constitution of 1988, consequently leading to direct interference in the appointment of university leadership and a disregard for the preferences of the academic community in financial, administrative, and political matters (Lima & Iamamoto, 2022; Honorato & Souza, 2023).

Figure 1 compares the independence of institutions from the government control and measures the extent of universities ability to establish their own policies for education and research in Brazil. Figure 1 illustrates the level of autonomy of institutions in Brazil from governmental influence, as well as the capacity of universities to formulate their own regulations regarding education and research. Brazilian universities exhibit a moderate degree of autonomy. The level of autonomy remained relatively consistent between 2010 and approximately 2018. However, there has been a notable decrease in autonomy after 2018, particularly evident from around 2022. This trend indicates a substantial decrease in institutional autonomy, potentially signaling alterations in policies, financial support, or administrative authority affecting universities in Brazil.

Compiled from V-Dem Data 2024, Variable Graph, https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/

In Figure 2, the academic freedom also shows a consistent yet modest level across the timeframe, implying persistent restrictions in this domain. There is a gradual decrease observed until 2020, succeeded by a notable increase in 2021 regarding freedom of academic expression and dissemination. It is at times susceptible to constraints such as censorship, self-restraint, or other forms of limitation. The abrupt rebound after 2022 might suggest alterations in policies or transformations within the academic sphere in Brazil subsequent to the election of President Lula.

Compiled from V-Dem Data 2024, Variable Graph, https://www.v-dem.net/data_analysis/VariableGraph/

Universities, akin to the judiciary, media, and civil society organizations, assume a vital role in the preservation of democratic principles. Inability to safeguard their independence from external influences like governmental interventions and corporate interests hampers universities’ capacity to uphold the rights of their constituents internally or advocate for public interests outside their precincts (Valiverronen & Saikkonen, 2021). The discussion heavily involves social media platforms, which enable the fast proliferation of anti-intellectual content. Social media’s growth has enabled Artificial Intelligence (AI) to produce content that closely resembles authentic material. Utilizing these platforms, populists formulate and disseminate “fake news,” often distorting or twisting expert insights to suit their motives (Hameleers,2022). This phenomenon points out the rising power of misinformation and strategic utilization of social media platforms to influence public conversations, frequently fostering division and eroding trust in scientific knowledge and democratic values in the era of “post-truth populism.”


 

(*) Gulsen Dogan is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science and International Relations at Koc University in Istanbul, Turkey. She earned her M.A. in International Relations from Koc University, where her thesis focused on the institutional and ideological conditions for executive aggrandizement in Turkey and Brazil over the past decade. Her research interests include populism, democratic backsliding, political economy, governance, political parties, migration diplomacy, and disaster diplomacy. Geographically, her work focuses on Turkey, Brazil, and the European Union. Currently, Dogan is a project researcher at MiReKoc (Migration Research Center at Koc University) for the Horizon Europe Twinning project: BROAD-ER (Bridging the Migration and Urban Studies Nexus).


 

References

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— (2023). EP Academic Freedom Monitor 2023. EPRS. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2024/757798/EPRS_STU(2024)757798_EN.pdf

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Ares, G.; Villen, G.; Caira Gitahy, L. M. & Tessler, L. R. (2022). “Memória e desinformação: Os ataques da extrema-direita às universidades públicas brasileiras.” Relações Internacionais, 73, 53–66. https://doi.org/10.23906/ri2022.73a05

Batista de Oliveira, M.; Said Vieira M.; Synesio Alves Monteiro, M. & Akerman, M. (2022). “Covid-19 en Brasil: Controversias políticas por las medidas de aislamiento social para controlar la pandemia. ¿Una disputa entre ciencia y anticiencia?” Razón Y Palabra, 26(114).

Bellolio, C. (2024). “An inquiry into populism’s relation to science.” Politics (Manchester, England), 44(3), 486–500. https://doi.org/10.1177/02633957221109541

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Gagnon-Dufresne, M.-C.; Azevedo Dantas, M.; Abreu Silva, K.; Souza Dos Anjos, J.; Pessoa Carneiro Barbosa, D.; Porto Rosa, R.; de Luca, W.; Zahreddine, M.; Caprara, A.; Ridde, V. & Zinszer, K. (2023). “Social Media and the Influence of Fake News on Global Health Interventions: Implications for a Study on Dengue in Brazil.” International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 20(7), 5299-. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph20075299

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Ignatieff, Michael. (2018). “Rethinking Open Society.” June 10, 2018. https://michaelignatieff.ca/article/2018/rethinking-open-society/ (accessed on August 10, 2024). 

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Nicolás Maduro (center) with First Lady Cilia Flores (left) and Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López (right), in a militar parade in Caracas on February 1, 2017. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Puerta Riera: Maduro is Likely the Reason the Chavismo Movement Will Not Survive

Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera: Maduro will not concede, recognize his defeat, or agree to any outcome other than his reelection. I think we are going to see a lot more violence coming from the government. Unfortunately, I don’t think Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico understand that their efforts are not enough. They are not going to convince Maduro. The fundamental issue is not just Maduro and his coalition, but the military, which is keeping Maduro in power. The only way Maduro can leave power is if the military turns on him, and that’s not happening. Maduro’s main concern is not power for its own sake but remaining protected to avoid facing justice, both internationally and in the United States, where he faces very serious charges. This is the crux of the issue—Maduro cannot leave power without facing justice.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview on Friday with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera, a political scientist at Valencia College, US, assessed the recent controversial elections in her homeland Venezuela and stated that “Maduro has lost support, not just in terms of popularity, but also in the Chavista strongholds that historically voted overwhelmingly for Chavismo and Chavez. He lost these key areas, which were once solidly pro-Chavez, and they now voted against Maduro. As a result, he has decimated whatever was left of the Chavista movement as a popular political force. I’m confident that the movement is pretty much lost. Maduro, who was the heir to Chavez’s legacy, is likely the reason why the movement will not survive.”

Professor Puerta Riera shared her insights into the increasing repression under Maduro’s regime. “What I’m seeing now is an escalation of repression. For example, they are going to the homes of poll watchers and poll workers, taking them into custody without clear charges. These individuals are opposition members.” She continued, “What we are witnessing now is beyond the usual repression and persecution. Our impression is that Maduro is radicalizing. He will not concede, recognize his defeat, or agree to any outcome other than his reelection. I think we are going to see a lot more violence coming from the government.”

Highlighting the international dynamics, Professor Puerta Riera remarked, “Unfortunately, I don’t think Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico understand that their efforts are not enough. They are not going to convince Maduro. The fundamental issue is not just Maduro and his coalition, but the military, which is keeping Maduro in power.” She further emphasized that the only way Maduro could leave power is if the military turns on him, which she does not see happening. “Maduro’s main concern is not power for its own sake but remaining protected to avoid facing justice, both internationally and in the United States, where he faces very serious charges. This is the crux of the issue—Maduro cannot leave power without facing justice.”

In discussing the socioeconomic collapse of Venezuela, she painted a grim picture, “Poverty has now reached the middle class, and we essentially no longer have a middle class. The wealth gap and socioeconomic structure in Venezuela have deteriorated to the point of widespread malnutrition, lower life expectancy and very limited access to health services and education.”

With nearly 8 million people having left the country, she questioned, “How does a country sustain itself with an aging population, no social security, and no access to medicines or doctors?” She concluded by emphasizing the dire economic and social scenario, “There’s no way to invest in Venezuela, not just because of the political situation, but also because there is no consumption. The population is decreasing and those who remain have no means to even have a meal.”

Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera, a political scientist at Valencia College, Orlando, Florida, US.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera with some edits.

Chaves Created an Illusion That the People Had Power over the Economy

Professor Maria Puerta Riera, thank you so very much for your time. Let me start right away with the first question. What were the key socio-economic conditions and political dynamics in Venezuela that led to the rise of Hugo Chavez and the Chavismo?

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: I think there was a very complex scenario for Hugo Chavez and his political movement when the political system was under a lot of stress. The political elites and parties faced a significant lack of trust, not only from the poor and underprivileged but also from the middle class and some socioeconomic elites. They were essentially giving up on the status quo.

The Venezuelan electorate was convinced that the establishment elites and political parties had failed to introduce major reforms, not just in the economy but also in addressing the wealth disparity and corruption. The lack of trust and the shortsightedness of political parties and leadership led people to consider a different option, one that had some history. 

Chavez’s attempted coup shouldn’t be overlooked. Many saw it as a credential, thinking he aimed to eliminate corruption and inefficiency. The failed coup gave him notoriety and elevated his profile, although he wasn’t initially part of the democratic process. He later abandoned his call for electoral abstention and became a candidate himself. This marked the point where Venezuelan democracy was compromised, as the belief emerged that someone with Chavez’s background could be a savior.

How would you describe the political and economic legacy of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela? What were the major successes and failures of his policies? 

The former president of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez (L) and Nicolas Maduro (R) in Cumana, Venezuela, April 17, 2009. Photo: Harold Escalona.

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, I think he came with a message that aimed to close the gap between those who controlled the wealth associated with the government and the state. His message was one of inclusion and participation, although when it came to policy, it was essentially about replacing one elite group with another. They quickly dismantled the state after the new constitution passed.

It was not just a power grab, even though he won elections; it was about cutting any institutional limitations or basic checks and balances. These were diminished through legal means. Every election became an opportunity to remove any obstacles or limits to his power.

Chavez turned to oil income not just to redistribute wealth but also to create dependence. Clientelism is not new to Venezuelan politics, but under Chavez, it became so prominent that it was almost impossible for people, especially towards the end of his last term, to participate politically and socially without aligning with the government.

All the social programs he designed early on made it nearly impossible for people to benefit without identifying with and becoming part of what the government could control. The economy became an instrument for Chavez to gain more control, as he not only controlled state agencies, companies and corporations like the oil industry but also targeted private sector industries, bringing them to their knees.

He created the illusion that the people had power over the economy, but in reality, he weakened the entire economic system through legal means and controlled participation. The current deplorable state of Venezuela’s economy is often attributed to sanctions, but that is not the full explanation for the crisis.

Venezuela Joins a Group of Nations That Represents the Antithesis of Democracy

How does the Chavismo movement in Venezuela compare with other left-wing populist movements in Latin America? Are there common patterns or significant differences?

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: There are some similarities, especially now with other closed autocracies. Venezuela has been inevitably linked to Cuba, not just because of the close ties with Castro, both Castros and Miguel Díaz-Canel, but because of similar patterns in legislation, state control, social monitoring, constraints on political and civic participation, and human rights violations. If we were to establish a category, we should start at the top with Cuba and Nicaragua. Venezuela joins a small group of nations that can be considered the antithesis of any democracy in the region.

There are leftist governments that are democracies, such as Chile and Colombia under Gustavo Petro. Despite challenges, Petro hasn’t done what Nicaragua and Venezuela have done, which is to dismantle the Constitution and legal framework to ignore basic democratic institutions and mandates. More critically, there is the suppression of the opposition and that’s where we are right now.

Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua are regimes that do not recognize the opposition’s space and place in their political systems because they are not formal democracies. They are closed autocracies. That’s what we’re seeing right now.

How has Nicolas Maduro’s leadership differed from Hugo Chavez’s? In what ways has Maduro’s regime become more autocratic compared to his predecessor?

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, I think it’s important to establish a key difference. Chavez had charisma, which we can criticize alongside his populist approach to power. While his methods can be contentious, they were sometimes effective in advancing certain agendas. He also had some authoritarian tendencies. 

The problem for Maduro is that he has no military background. In Venezuela, there has historically been an attraction to strong men and Chavez, as a military commander, embodied that appeal. He was seen as a man of power, which resonated with the people.

Maduro, on the other hand, has no military background and lacks charisma. He inherited political assets and a regime built around the myth of Hugo Chavez and Chavismo. However, he has essentially destroyed Chavez’s legacy, not just because of the economic collapse and humanitarian catastrophe resulting from his inability to govern, but more importantly, due to the complete disengagement with the political base Chavez left behind.

We just received the second bulletin from the Electoral Council and the numbers don’t add up. Despite this, we understand that Maduro has lost support, not just in terms of popularity, but also in the Chavista strongholds that historically voted overwhelmingly for Chavismo and Chavez. He lost these key areas, which were once solidly pro-Chavez, and they now voted against Maduro.

As a result, he has decimated whatever was left of the Chavista movement as a popular political force. I’m confident that the movement is pretty much lost. Maduro, who was the heir to Chavez’s legacy, is likely the reason why the movement will not survive.

It Was a Fraudulent Election

Venezuelans received the candidate for the opposition primary elections, María Corina Machado in the populous sector of Santa Lucia Venezuela-Maracaibo on August 11, 2023. Photo: Humberto Matheus.

There is wide-spread speculation that the presidential election in Venezuela was rigged. What is your assessment of the elections process and the re-election of Nicolas Maduro for another six years as president?

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, I think it was a fraudulent election. It was always going to be very difficult for the opposition to win, given all the obstacles they faced. Despite the challenges in terms of participation, the tallies and reports from credible sources, like the Carter Center, indicate that the election was not free and fair. The results being issued cannot be trusted.

The tallies from the voting machines tell a different story. Several experts have confirmed that the numbers the government is trying to validate through the highest court are unreliable. We believe that the opposition, led by Mundo Gonzalez, won overwhelmingly, as indicated by polls, exit polls and the published tallies, which cannot be easily falsified.

There have been calls from the international community, including Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, to show the true tallies. The election results being certified do not reflect what actually happened on Sunday and a majority of Venezuelans believe there was fraud, not in the voting itself, but in the results the government is presenting, which do not match the supporting evidence.

Massive crowds took to the streets to protest the results of the election and according to New York Times at least 17 people have been killed. It is not the first time that people took to streets to show their anger. Do you think the protests could yield any result this time? In light of the elections and widespread protests, how do you think the political landscape in Venezuela might change? What impact could these elections and protests have on Maduro’s hold on power?

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, repression has always been the reaction, not just under Maduro but under Chavez as well. What I’m seeing now is an escalation of repression. For example, they are going to the homes of poll watchers and poll workers, taking them into custody without clear charges. These individuals are opposition members.

What we are witnessing now is beyond the usual repression and persecution. Our impression is that Maduro is radicalizing. He will not concede, recognize his defeat, or agree to any outcome other than his reelection. I think we are going to see a lot more violence coming from the government.

Unfortunately, I don’t think Brazil, Colombia and Mexico understand that their efforts are not enough. They are not going to convince Maduro. The fundamental issue is not just Maduro and his coalition, but the military, which is keeping Maduro in power.

The opposition leader, María Corina Machado, released data on Tuesday that she said showed Mr. Edmundo González, the candidate she backed, winning the presidency in a landslide. The opposition’s updated results, using paper tallies observers collected from 81 percent of the nation’s voting machines, showed that Mr. Gonzalez had won 7.1 million votes, or 67 percent, versus 3.2 million, or 30 percent, for Mr. Maduro. Do you think these figures could be true?

Opposition leaders Maria Corina Machado and Edmundo Gonzales Urrutia seen waving to thousands of Venezuelans in the streets in Caracas, Venezuela, July 30, 2024. Photo: Jonathan Mishkin.

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: Well, I am inclined to believe what they are showing because María Corina Machado has extensive expertise in electoral processes that no one else in Venezuela can match. They have the infrastructure and the knowledge and I can confidently say they are not falsifying results. 

We also have experts, not just those close to the opposition but also academics here in the US and Europe, who have reviewed the tallies. They confirm what we all know: that Gonzales won overwhelmingly. The problem for the government is that they have waited so long without providing verification or audits and they have turned to the Supreme Court.

This delay and reliance on the highest court do not instill trust in what the regime says. People’s trust lies with the opposition, because Maduro and his government have eroded trust in themselves.

Just look at the process: how they blocked every candidate, even the one elected in a primary. They thought they would win or that if they lost, it would be manageable. What we are seeing is that they can’t manage the loss.

Maduro Cannot Leave Power without Facing Justice

Venezuela’s foreign minister announced that the country was expelling diplomatic missions from seven Latin American countries that had condemned the official election results. Do you think the external pressure will persuade Mr. Maduro to accept the result of the polls? Do you think Venezuela under Maduro risks being diplomatically isolated?

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: I think Maduro is not going to follow any recommendations that involve conceding or recognizing his loss. He simply won’t do it. Brazil, Colombia and Mexico, who are the ones negotiating with Maduro, are trying to find a way for him to take an action that will resolve this situation. Unfortunately, the only viable option would be for him to recognize the results.

The problem for these three countries is that if the results do not recognize Gonzales’ victory, it will trigger another wave of Venezuelan migrants. Colombia, Mexico and Brazil will be the most affected by this. Their primary interest is not necessarily in upholding democracy or even keeping Maduro in power, but in preventing another migrant crisis. Unfortunately, this doesn’t seem possible.

The only way Maduro can leave power is if the military turns on him, and that’s not happening. Maduro’s main concern is not power for its own sake but remaining protected to avoid facing justice, both internationally and in the United States, where he faces very serious charges. This is the crux of the issue—Maduro cannot leave power without facing justice.

It’s not just Maduro; the top military brass also faces serious charges in the United States, including corruption, drug charges and human rights violations. They will remain in power unless they receive guarantees of immunity. However, we have not yet reached that point.

I think most countries that have withdrawn their diplomatic representation, such as Argentina and Chile, will continue to antagonize Maduro. Figures like Gabriel Boric (Chile) or Javier Milei (Argentina) will likely do the same, so they won’t be helpful.

Colombia, Brazil and Mexico are trying to maintain a back channel and avoid further isolation for Venezuela, but I think that’s inevitable. Maduro understands there is no way out. He entered this election seeking some form of legitimacy to convince the US to lift sanctions, regardless of the outcome. However, the international community is not going to recognize him as the legitimate president.

The Carter Center has been very forceful in its assessment, so Maduro lacks the legitimacy he thought would be enough to secure resources. He needs money, but he’s not going to get it. The sanctions are not going to be lifted. I’m not sure if there are any other sanctions the US can impose, as the country is already under heavy constraints and limitations.Maduro made his decision knowing that he, his regime and the country will become more and more isolated. I don’t think the region is ready for what is coming.

Maduro Believes He Can Survive Isolation

Mr. Maduro did receive support from allied leaders in Cuba, Serbia, Nicaragua, Russia, Bolivia and Honduras together with China and Iran, who applauded the results. Maduro has been hailed by the autocrats globally. How do you think this support will help Mr. Maduro as a populist to cement his rule? What roles have international and regional actors who show solidarity with Maduro played in shaping the trajectory of Chavismo and Maduro’s regime? How have possible US sanctions and other international pressures impacted Venezuela?

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: It’s clear that Maduro has made his choice, as I said. He is no longer seen as part of a democratic system and is not recognized as such. It makes sense for him to double down on his alliance with other illiberal, anti-democratic, closed autocracies. He has no other choice; he doesn’t belong in a regional or global community of democracies.

Maduro is likely seeking protection within this alliance. Yes, he will be isolated from democracies in the region and around the world, but he may find support from China and Russia, which could help him maintain his regime. We don’t know if China will support Maduro financially, but there might be possibilities once Venezuela settles its oil debt with China. This could lead to further investments from China, which is something he can’t expect from Russia. Strengthening ties with Iran is another strategy they have used to survive.

My guess is that Maduro believes he can survive this isolation, but it will be very hard for him to gain any financial breathing room. The challenges are immense, not just because of the huge debt, but also because the economic forecast in Venezuela is dire. With GDP, inflation, over 80% of the population in poverty, and more than 50% in extreme poverty, the socioeconomic structure has deteriorated to the point where people make approximately $130 a month. This situation is unsustainable. Maduro may stay in power, but it will not be due to popular support. The people are not willing to accept his mandate. It will be very difficult, and we will likely see a lot of repression because it is clear that the Venezuelan people do not recognize him as their leader.

In your article titled Venezuela: The Decline of a Democracy you wrote back in 2018 you argued that the economic imbalance has increased the chances of social disintegration while government focuses on holding to power. Six years after your article what can you tell us about the nature of democracy in the country and the looming possibility of social disintegration?

There were lots of Venezuelans crossing the border into the land of Colombia. This was captured in La parada, Colombia. Photo: Shutterstock.

Professor Maria Puerta Riera: I think, unfortunately, the situation has worsened. Poverty has now reached the middle class, and we essentially no longer have a middle class. The wealth gap and socioeconomic structure in Venezuela have deteriorated to the point of widespread malnutrition, lower life expectancy and very limited access to health services and education.

We have a country where nearly 8 million people have left. How does a country sustain itself with an aging population, no social security and no access to medicines or doctors? Young doctors and teachers are leaving the country. The workforce is either too old to work or the very young are just waiting to finish school—if they finish—only to leave the country.

How does the population sustain itself with an economic structure where people have no jobs? There’s no way to invest in Venezuela, not just because of the political situation, but also because there is no consumption. The population is decreasing, and those who remain have no means to even have a meal. That’s what I refer to as a dire scenario, and we are already in that scenario.