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Dr. Subedi: Majoritarian Populist Politics Marginalizes Minorities in South and Southeast Asia

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Dr. DB Subedi highlights how majoritarian populist politics in South and Southeast Asia marginalizes minorities by leveraging identity politics and ethno-religious narratives. He underscores how populist leaders, from Myanmar to India, utilize state apparatuses to consolidate power, often legitimizing exclusionary policies and fostering polarization. With examples like Hindu nationalism in India, Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar, and Islamist populism in Bangladesh, Dr. Subedi examines how these movements exploit historical grievances and global populist trends while adapting them to local contexts. His analysis sheds light on the fragile state of pluralism and democracy in these multicultural societies.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Dr. DB Subedi, a distinguished lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, delves deeply into the dynamics of majoritarian populist politics in South and Southeast Asia in an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Drawing from his extensive academic expertise, Dr. Subedi examines how populist leaders in the region leverage identity politics and state apparatuses to marginalize minorities and consolidate power, often at the expense of democratic institutions and pluralism.

In the interview, Dr. Subedi sheds light on how the historical, cultural, and political landscapes of post-colonial South and Southeast Asia have created fertile ground for nationalist and religious populist ideologies. He highlights the role of religion, ethnicity, and national identity in shaping these populist movements, often leading to the exclusion of minorities and the reinforcement of majoritarian dominance. The cases of India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh serve as pivotal examples, with each showcasing how populism adapts to local contexts while drawing on broader global populist trends.

Dr. Subedi also explores the economic underpinnings of populism in the region, emphasizing the interplay between economic inequality, globalization, and populist rhetoric. He points out that while globalization has lifted millions out of poverty in Asia, it has simultaneously deepened economic divides, creating grievances that populist leaders exploit to craft exclusionary narratives.

Furthermore, the discussion extends to the intersection of nationalism and populism, where Dr. Subedi identifies the trend of leader-centric politics replacing traditional party-led systems. This shift has enabled authoritarian populist leaders to manipulate institutions, bypass democratic norms, and entrench their authority. The examples of Narendra Modi in India, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and the Rajapaksa brothers in Sri Lanka illustrate how such leaders use religion and identity to legitimize their power while marginalizing dissenting voices and minority groups.

The interview provides a comprehensive understanding of how majoritarian populist politics operates in South and Southeast Asia, offering valuable insights into its implications for democracy, social cohesion, and the region’s broader political landscape. Dr. Subedi’s analysis serves as a critical lens through which to examine the challenges posed by populism in multicultural societies.

Dr. DB Subedi, a distinguished lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia.

Here is the transcription of the interview withDr. DB Subedi with some edits.

The Roots of Populism: Religion, Identity, and Authoritarianism in South and Southeast Asia

Professor Subedi, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In the context of South and Southeast Asia, what historical, cultural, and political factors have contributed to the rise of nationalist and religious populism, and how do these dynamics align with authoritarian populism to shape contemporary political narratives?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s a very important question. When we talk about populism in South and Southeast Asia, to understand the overall dynamics of populism, we need to examine the historical context of post-colonial state formation in this region.

Religion, culture, and national identity have always been contentious issues in South and Southeast Asia. From the time of post-colonial state formation, for example, the role of Islam in Pakistan and Indonesia was heavily debated. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, religion has always been central to defining the majoritarian identity, and this has been deeply contested by minority groups. These dynamics are common across other regions as well.

Religion, history, and culture collectively define the social identity of one group of people, but at the same time, the same applies to minority groups. This creates a form of social polarization. Over time, populist leaders have tapped into these polarizations, mobilizing them to construct and define their own bounded political communities, which they then appeal to, while pursuing populist political narratives, ideas, and policies. The question of religion is particularly central in this regard.

This has also translated into various political discourses, such as the formulation of political ideologies and policies, where religion has often been both a contentious and central element. Countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are key examples, and we see similar instances in other parts of South and Southeast Asia.

The historical context of nation-state formation, the creation of national identity, and the manipulation of collective identities have become key features in defining populism in this region, both in the past and to a large extent in the present. For instance, the first wave of populism in South and Southeast Asia was led by national heroes—what we might call the nationalist leaders of independence movements. Not all of them, of course, but some of these founding fathers of modern nation-states had populist elements in the way they defined national identities, often at the cost of excluding others and mobilizing specific constituencies.

If you like, we could see these leaders as the first generation of populist figures. But times have changed. Over the past 50–70 years, if we look back to the 1950s and 1960s, there have been different waves of populism in this region. However, religion and national identity continue to play a crucial role in defining populist movements in South and Southeast Asia.

The Role of Economic Inequality and Globalization in Driving Populism

What role do economic grievances, inequality, and globalization play in fueling nationalist and religious populism in South and Southeast Asian countries?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s another very important question. Earlier, I mostly discussed the cultural aspects of the rise of populist politics in this region. However, economic factors also play a significant role. Economic inequalities—both within and between ethnic groups, at national and sub-national levels—are key drivers of grievances. These inequalities often fuel resentment toward groups perceived as affluent or privileged within the community.

Inequality has consistently been a major issue shaping populist movements. For instance, in the 1980s, agrarian populist movements in parts of India were largely driven by economic grievances. Similarly, economic inequalities played a central role in mobilizing support for former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand. In this sense, inequality has always been a central issue in the rise of populism.

Globalization is another critical factor. When addressing inequality, populist rhetoric often targets political elites at the national level, but it frequently extends to external actors, such as multinational corporations and proponents of neoliberal policies, who are portrayed as the “enemies of the people.” Economic grievances stemming from globalization provide fertile ground for populist narratives.

In the contemporary wave of populism, almost all populist leaders in the region have proposed ambitious and transformative economic policies aimed at redistribution. However, these agendas have often failed, with many populist leaders losing power after an average of 4–5 years.

In Asia, the role of globalization is complex. Unlike the “losers of globalization” thesis commonly seen in Western Europe and the US, where certain groups are left behind, globalization in Asia has largely benefited many countries. For example, the globalization of production industries has led to the relocation of manufacturing from the Global North to countries in the Global South, such as India, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This shift has contributed to economic growth and lifted many people out of extreme poverty.

However, this growth has been accompanied by rising inequality. While a segment of the population has profited greatly, the majority have seen only incremental improvements, leaving systemic economic inequality intact. This dynamic fuels public grievances and provides populist leaders with a platform to craft their narratives and agendas.

In this sense, globalization in Asia acts as a double-edged sword. On one hand, it creates opportunities for populist leaders to exploit growing inequality and public frustration, leading to anti-government and anti-establishment protests that propel populist figures to power. On the other hand, globalization has delivered tangible benefits to many in Asia, making the relationship between globalization and populism more ambiguous and requiring further exploration.

The Impact of Populist Nationalism on Marginalized Communities

A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee
celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.

How do nationalist and religious populist ideologies intersect and manifest in countries like India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, shaping the broader sociopolitical landscape, and what are the implications for marginalized communities across Hindu-majority, Muslim-majority, and Buddhist-majority contexts in South and Southeast Asia?

Dr. DB Subedi: When we talk about the intersection of nationalism and religion, we should first look at the interface between ethnicity and religion, in Asian countries, because religion and ethnicity are deeply intertwined in many Asian countries. Take Sri Lanka, for example, where the majority of Sinhalese follow Buddhism, and as a result, historically, since the colonial period and in the post-colonial state formation, Sinhala Buddhism has become a dominant ideology. Sinhala Buddhist leaders of the past, and even more recently, have mobilized that ideology to define their majority political constituency.

We can say similar things about India. India is vast in terms of geography, ethnicity, caste, and so on. Even today, Hindus form the majority population, which provides political parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leverage to pursue Hindu nationalist politics both at the center and in the regions. In other words, the intersection of ethnicity and religion constructs the collective social identity of the people, providing leverage for political parties and populist leaders to define their bounded political communities, which they mobilize in their populist politics. One example is the populist nationalist politics of the BJP and its current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who many have analyzed as a Hindu nationalist and populist leader.

You can see similar dynamics in Bangladesh, where Islam and politics go hand in hand, and ethnicity obviously comes into play. In the case of the countries you mentioned—Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar—the majoritarian ethno-religious identities of the majority populations have always been central features in attempts to homogenize national identities.

This process of homogenization has been deeply contested by minorities in countries like Myanmar or India, where Muslim minorities, along with secular and liberal-minded political leaders and parties, contest this idea. Similar patterns are evident in Thailand, where the homogenization of national identity, based on Thai national identity drawn primarily from Buddhist culture and religious identities, is contested by other minorities.

As a result, there are multiple effects on the national polity, both from a populist and nationalist point of view. One major implication of this political dynamic is that in most Asian countries, nationalism often hosts populism. In other words, populism travels alongside nationalism in most Asian countries. Of course, the role of religion is present, and we can discuss religious populism separately. However, one prominent feature across the region is populist nationalism.

In terms of policy and political outcomes, minorities have suffered, as this form of politics often shares exclusionary characteristics similar to populist politics seen elsewhere, particularly in Western Europe and North America.

Power Consolidation and Minority Exclusion in South Asia

To what extent do nationalist and religious populist leaders in Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim-majority countries leverage identity politics and state apparatuses to consolidate power, legitimize violence, and exclude minorities, and how do institutional and cultural narratives in post-colonial South Asia justify and sustain these populist-authoritarian practices?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s another very good question. It actually points to some of the issues I mentioned in my earlier response, particularly the interplay between religious identity and national identity. What we have seen most recently across Asia is that populist leaders have frequently referred to the blending of religious and national identities in these countries to define their sociopolitical landscapes.

Having said that, we should also acknowledge that Southeast Asia and South Asia are vast regions, with diverse sociocultural and sociopolitical contexts, as well as differing historical and contemporary dynamics. These variations shape the realization, aspiration, and respect for pluralism and democracy in this region. Therefore, while identifying common trends, we must be cautious not to overgeneralize.

Despite these differences, one commonality across these countries is the centrality of leaders in shaping the political landscape. In the past, political parties held this central role. However, with the rise of authoritarian, populist, and nationalist politics—from the Rajapaksa regime in Sri Lanka to Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, Hun Sen in Cambodia, and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines—we have seen strong and powerful leaders dominating the political sphere.

This shift toward leader-centric politics has been a significant trend across South and Southeast Asia. Leaders like Narendra Modi in India connect directly with their followers, often bypassing institutional processes, by mobilizing cultural, religious, or national identities. Similarly, Duterte in the Philippines sought direct engagement with the public, frequently circumventing institutional frameworks.

Populist leaders often appeal to the “will of the people” to justify and consolidate power. They use this direct connection with their political constituencies, defined by religious, national, or ethnic identities, to legitimize their authority. This raises the question: where do institutions stand in this process?

Institutions do matter, and in Asia, as elsewhere, populist leaders often come to power through elections, no matter how free or fair those elections might be. The presence of democratic institutions, even minimally, has been a prerequisite for populist leaders to rise to power. However, once in power, these leaders employ various tactics to manipulate, dismantle, or reform existing political and democratic institutions to consolidate their authority.

For example, in Sri Lanka, the populist-nationalist government of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his predecessor, his brother Mahinda Rajapaksa, pushed for constitutional reforms to concentrate power in the presidency. Similarly, in the Philippines, Duterte passed an anti-terrorism law that weakened civil society organizations, particularly those engaged in peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas like Mindanao. Institutional manipulation and re-engineering of democratic structures have become common strategies for populist and authoritarian leaders to sustain their hold on power.

Contrasting Populisms: Nationalist Narratives in Asia and the Global West

Large protests demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government as part of the Anti-Quota Movement and Bangladesh Quota Reform Protests. Thousands took to the streets in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 4, 2024. Photo: M.D. Sabbir.

How does the rise of nationalist and religious populism in Asia compare with similar movements in the global West in terms of discourse strategies and mobilization methods, and to what extent are these movements influenced by global populist trends while adapting international narratives to local contexts?

Dr. DB Subedi: Interesting question. Asia, especially South and Southeast Asia, is a unique region in terms of understanding populism. It is unique because, unlike in the West, in South and Southeast Asia, we have seen populist movements and populist styles of politics that involve different varieties of populist movements. There isn’t one singular form of populism.

As I mentioned earlier, nationalism has often hosted populism in Asia, and the two frequently go hand in hand. This is because questions of national identity, ethnicity, and religion are central to defining both nationalist and populist movements. While there are key differences between the two, most populist leaders in the region also embody elements of nationalism to some extent. Narendra Modi is an example, and you can observe similar trends in Thailand, Myanmar, and Indonesia, among others.

This is a unique feature of populism in Asia. However, across the region, we should be cautious when interpreting or explaining populism with the same degree of intensity. By “degree of intensity,” I mean that in some cases, when populism intersects with nationalism, it manifests as what I would call “soft populism.”

When I say “soft populism,” the overall political manifestation or style of a particular populist leader might appear nationalist but incorporates populist orientations or elements. Imran Khan’s politics in Pakistan is a recent example. In Bangladesh, politics under Sheikh Hasina was mostly authoritarian, but in her later years in government, she also played the nationalist card while implementing redistributive economic policies, which had populist undertones. She reached out to Muslim voters and her support base using a populist style of politics. Similar examples can be observed elsewhere.

Soft populism can involve a strong leader or political party that is primarily nationalist or authoritarian but includes populist elements. On the other hand, there are also cases of “hard populist” governments and leaders in the region. Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines is a prime example, as is Thaksin Shinawatra in the past in Thailand. These leaders represent a more pronounced form of populism.

This distinction—between soft and hard populism—is one of the differences between populism in Asia and the populist leaders in Western Europe and North America. The phenomenon in Asia is shaped by the region’s distinct history of post-colonial state formation and its sociopolitical landscape of collective identity and politics.

In this sense, soft populist politics in South and Southeast Asia often appears as an extended form of identity politics.

Finally, when we compare similarities and differences, we observe that during the 1980s and 1990s, there was a rise in left-wing populism. Interestingly, in the last 10 to 15 years, we have seen the emergence of populism that looks more exclusionary, sharing certain elements of right-wing populism seen elsewhere. However, there are still a few examples of left-wing populism in this region.

Comparing Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamist Populist Policies in South Asia

In what ways has Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar influenced the state’s policies towards minorities, and how does it compare to Hindu nationalism in India or Islamist populism in Bangladesh?

Members of Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya minority walk through a broken road at Shah Porir Deep, at Teknaf in Cox’s Bazer, Bangladesh on September 11, 2017. Photo: Sk Hasan Ali.

Dr. DB Subedi: All these countries have different histories and contexts of post-colonial state formation, although one similarity is that all three countries were colonized. So, they are post-colonial nations with a history of colonial rule. At the same time, they are multicultural countries with both ethnic and religious majorities as well as minorities.

In Myanmar, for a long time, when the military junta was in power—and they remain in power today—they have consistently used ethno-religious nationalism as a key strategy and ideology for ruling the country. This trend has been especially pronounced over the last few decades. When the military first came to power, they seemed to adopt a different kind of socialist policy, and the religious and ethno-religious dimension was not as prominent at that time. However, over time, there has been a growing trend of mobilizing the sentiments of Theravada Buddhist Burmese, which has been deeply contested by other ethnic and religious minorities.

One consequence of this trend has been the subordination and marginalization of ethnic minorities, which has contributed to ongoing civil wars in Myanmar for decades.

In India, the situation is quite different. The BJP came to power relatively recently, whereas before that, the Indian National Congress, which was more oriented toward pluralism and liberal policies toward minorities, held power. Under the current government, however, Hindu nationalist policies have led to the introduction of certain citizenship laws and other policies that discriminate against Muslim minorities.

Similar trends can be observed in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well. In a nutshell, minorities have often become victims of majoritarian, exclusivist politics when such ideologies are in power.

Hundreds of migrants attempt to cross the US-Mexico border as the Texas National Guard works to prevent irregular crossings in Juárez, Chihuahua, Mexico on March 21, 2024. Photo: David Peinado Romero.

The “Awkward Alliance” of the Left and the Right

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeMigration

The politics of immigration in the U.S. reveal peculiar alliances on both sides of the aisle. For Democrats, the coalition spans ethnoracial diversity, balancing ideals of equality with the economic and cultural concerns of immigration. This tension often leaves the Left grappling with its own contradictions. For Republicans, an equally uneasy partnership emerges. Grassroots voters, driven by ethnonationalist anxieties, align with capitalist elites who benefit from cheap immigrant labor. This “awkward alliance” pits anti-immigrant rhetoric against the economic realities of business reliance on immigration, fueling policies that prioritize elite agendas while alienating vulnerable voters.

By Sanne van Oosten*

Politicians of Populist Radical Right Parties (PRRP) often cite material scarcity faced by the populations of receiving countries as arguments against immigration. Whether the argument is that ‘they’ are stealing ‘our’ jobs, public services, or housing; materialist concerns are central to their arguments against immigration. The mobilisation of perceived economic injustice has proven to be an effective strategy for attracting voters, with the most recent U.S. elections serving as yet another example.

The U.S. Republican Party now also champions strong anti-immigration narratives, though this has not always been at the top of the party’s political agenda. This shift occurred during the Obama-era. Despite Obama’s first campaign and term being predominantly focused on healthcare reform, beneath the surface of the Republican Party, anti-immigration sentiments swelled, with many voters perceiving Obama as a symbol of immigration. While he didn’t, in reality, let more immigrants in than his Republican predecessors, Bush or Reagan. Although voters are generally positive about Black politicians, Obama’s African roots invigorated the Tea Party, a grassroots movement, leading them to turn to immigration as a response to the latent, smouldering old-fashioned racism his presidency stirred.

Even in the most conservative corners of the U.S., openly admitting to being racist is stigmatised, prompting many to mask such views. Concerns over economic justice often serve as a justification for racism by pointing to the scarcity of ‘our’ jobs, public services, housing; or whatever scarce economic resource is the challenge of the moment. By invoking these appeals to economic justice, one can pull off xenophobic claims without the stigma attached to more explicit expressions of xenophobia. These forms of strategic masking not only help avoid stigma in everyday life and political discourse, Republicans also can leverage these strategically against Democrats. After all, weren’t Democrats the ones who were supposed to protect ‘our’ jobs, public services, and housing? Didn’t they claim to care about the people and economic justice? Well, with all the immigrants they’re letting into our country, I guess they don’t!

Besides materialist masking, ‘civilisationist‘ masking serves to destigmatise racist and xenophobic claims while simultaneously dividing Democratic voters. Trump’s call to protect ‘our’ women from Latino immigrant rapists is a prime example of contemporary U.S. femonationalism. His calls to protect American gay people from dangerous Muslims illustrate homonationalism. Amid student protests against the war in Gaza, Trump also invoked the need to protect Jewish safety—what I refer to as Judeonationalism. Essentially, the infamous U.S. election campaign quote, ‘they are eating the pets,’ was also a form of civilisationist masking—what I call animeauxnationalism. These arguments follow the same logic and purpose as materialist justice: they not only serve to avoid stigma in everyday life and political discourse, but they also act as a wedge to internally divide the Democratic electorate.

And the truth is, in Western countries, the Left represents a much more ethnoracially diverse voting coalition, creating an ‘awkward alliance’ as I call it. White Leftists often support the Left out of ‘conviction’ for equal rights for all, including women and gay people, as well as animals and nature, while non-white Leftists tend to stay with the Left out of ‘necessity:’ the opposition denies their identities, yet, they often prioritise other concerns over equal rights and individual freedoms. This uneasy coalition unsettles political elites of the Left, leaving them uncertain about how to navigate this political catch-22.

Indeed, there is an inherent awkwardness in the Democratic claim to champion individual freedoms and equal rights while also supporting (or at least tolerating) immigration of people who do not necessarily hold the same core national values. This awkwardness mirrors the one found in materialist concerns: the Democrats advocate for workers, stronger public services, and affordable housing, yet they also support immigration, which some believe jeopardises jobs, strains public services, and drives up housing prices. Very awkward indeed.

Yet, the alliances on the other side of the aisle might be even more awkward. The Republican Party unites forces from the top-down and the bottom-up. From the bottom-up, Republicans represent an ethnonationally anxious voting base unsettled by ‘demographic panic’ due to immigration, grown from the grass roots Tea Party movement. From the top-down, the Republican alliance consists of large business elites (such as the Koch-network) who benefit from immigration by relying on workers willing to take jobs that many white Americans won’t, such as hard agricultural labour. These forces—both top-down and bottom-up—create another ‘awkward alliance,’ or an ‘uneasy marriage,’ or even ‘strange bedfellows,’ between a voting base riled up by anti-immigration sentiment and capitalist elites who profit from cheap labour and the economic growth that immigration fuels. The racist views that are often masked by arguments of economic justice serve as a ‘godsend’ for capitalist plutocrats, enabling them to mobilise an ethnonationalist electorate. Meanwhile, top-down forces prefer concealing the fact that their voters might not be voting in their own best interest through expressing and fuelling anti-immigrant sentiment by keeping unsettling news about immigration on the national agenda and the back of people’s minds.

These top-down capitalist elites are, however, most interested in boosting business, cutting back on regulations, and shrinking government social spending by, ironically, courting a voting base that is often reliant on Social Security and Medicare. ‘Anti-Obama anger,’ fuelled by racist undertones, proved to be a ‘godsend.’ For instance, by dubbing universal healthcare ‘Obamacare,’ opposition to government spending was built with the help of racism-driven xenophobia, even among those most dependent on the exact same public services, and those who are positive about the policies when not named after the first Black president, but Clinton. Even though immigration helps their businesses grow, these capitalist elites accept Trump’s strong anti-immigration stance as ‘unpleasant ransom’ to advance their libertarian agenda, which benefits capitalism and large corporations to the detriment of the lesser-educated voters riled up by anti-immigration rhetoric. This may be the most ‘awkward alliance’ of all.

(*) Dr. Sanne van Oosten is a postdoctoral researcher at Centre for Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS), University of Oxford.

Photo: Shutterstock.

Gouveia e Melo and the Military Messianic Zeitgeist in Portugal

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s rise from COVID-19 vaccination leader to potential presidential contender reflects Portugal’s cultural heritage of military messianism. His disciplined leadership, amplified by media narratives, crafted a savior image transcending political divides. This phenomenon taps into Portugal’s historical archetypes, where military figures with messianic undertones captivate public imagination. While appealing to a public seeking stability, his trajectory highlights the tension between democratic governance and charismatic authority. This case underscores the risks of media-driven political personas overshadowing pluralism and institutional accountability in democratic systems.

By João Ferreira Dias 

We are living in the age of populism (v.g. Kaltwasser et al., 2017; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). The dichotomic distinction between the “good people” and the “corrupt elite” is an old concept, perpetually relevant and adaptable to different historical and political contexts. The division rests on a potent narrative that appeals to collective identity and moral superiority, where the people are depicted as inherently virtuous and the elite as inherently corrupt or self-serving. This framing, though simplistic, resonates deeply with human societies, reflecting a timeless unease with concentrated power and authority. Discomfort in the face of “power,” whether embodied in a monarch, a state, or other ruling structures, has been a persistent theme throughout history. This is particularly significant given that the rule of law, liberal democracy, and pluralism—foundations of modern governance—are relatively recent achievements, fragile in their existence and often under siege.

In this light, the enduring impulse to give “voice” to the voiceless, to free the oppressed, or to emancipate marginalized groups has been a driving force of revolutionary thought and action across eras. Figures such as Jesus Christ, Karl Marx, Zumbi dos Palmares, and the architects of the French Revolution embody this ethos in vastly different contexts yet share the common thread of striving against perceived systems of domination or exploitation. These examples illustrate the universality of the struggle against oppression, transcending specific cultural or economic systems.

Indeed, the concept of “oppression” is not the exclusive domain of capitalist or Western paradigms, as some postmodern critiques suggest. Rather, it reflects a fundamental aspect of human societies—an observable dynamic of dominance and resistance that appears across diverse geographies and historical periods. This suggests that the drive for justice and liberation is an intrinsic part of human behavior, rooted in our collective desire for fairness, equity, and autonomy. As such, the discourse of populism, while modern in its form, taps into an ancient and deeply embedded narrative that continues to shape our political and social realities.

But today, the zeitgeist has shifted, and the narrative of “the will of the majority” has been co-opted by radical right populists, who position themselves as the champions of “the people” against “the elites,” thereby deepening societal divisions. As Mudde (2017) articulates, populism is characterized by four “core concepts”: ideology, the people, the elite, and the general will. These elements form the backbone of populist rhetoric, creating a binary opposition that fuels polarization. However, this polarization has expanded beyond the classic dichotomy of “people vs. elites,” evolving into a broader confrontation of “people vs. democracy” (Mounk, 2018). In this redefined landscape, the struggle manifests as a “culture war” against progressivism, driven by what Norris and Inglehart (2019) describe as a “cultural backlash,” where the illiberal tendencies of radical right movements and parties gain momentum.

This cultural conflict not only pits traditionalism against progressive ideals but also allows radical right populists to portray themselves as defenders of the people’s will. They adopt a performative stance, positioning themselves as the true voice of the people while simultaneously framing their ideological adversaries—progressives and the left—as disconnected elites or as perpetrators of societal decay. This reversal of roles further intensifies societal rifts. Those once perceived as the oppressors claim the mantle of representing popular sovereignty, while the “left,” in their focus on identity politics and critiques of systemic inequality—dismissively labeled as “cultural Marxism” (e.g., Dworkin, 1997; Kellner, 2013; Jamin, 2014)—is portrayed as elitist and divisive.

In this context, radical right populists leverage grievances about cultural and economic change, presenting themselves as custodians of traditional values in the face of perceived threats from globalism, multiculturalism, and liberal progressivism. This strategy not only mobilizes support but also weaponizes nostalgia for a past where societal roles and cultural norms were allegedly more stable. The resulting dynamic is a volatile reconfiguration of populist discourse, where claims of defending “the people” serve to legitimize illiberal practices and undermine democratic norms.

The Charismatic-Messianic Leader and Military Uniforms in Portugal

The association between charismatic leaders and military symbolism has long shaped political narratives in Portugal. The notion of the authoritarian populist, as described by Canovan (1981, 1999), centers on a leader who positions themselves as distinct from traditional elites, embodying anti-elitism (Taggart, 2000). Such leaders often portray themselves as the singular representatives of “the people,” channeling frustrations and grievances while presenting themselves as truth-tellers against a corrupt establishment. This narrative intersects with messianism, rooted in religious traditions. The figure of the Messiah—whether as the warrior-king David or the redeemer Jesus—has laid the groundwork for the Messiah-politician, a charismatic leader claiming to lead the “chosen people” toward peace and justice (Negrão, 2001). In Portuguese and Brazilian cultures, this messianic ideal deeply influences political imaginaries, particularly through Sebastianism, a mythological construct that has left a lasting legacy.

Sebastianism emerged after the disappearance of King Sebastian at the Battle of Alcácer-Quibir in 1578, which triggered a dynastic crisis. The myth of the king’s return, mounted on a white horse amidst the fog, intertwined notions of national salvation with religious messianism. As Oliveira Martins (2014) described, Sebastianism was a “posthumous proof of nationality,” while Lourenço (1978) saw it as emblematic of Portugal’s “irrealistic existence.” Later, Fernando Pessoa associated it with the Arthurian legend, while Teixeira de Pascoaes connected it to the Portuguese sentiment of saudade—a complex mix of absence, longing, and hope (Barros Dias, 2017). Under the Estado Novo regime (1933–1974), Salazar appropriated Sebastianism as a political tool. His leadership, steeped in authoritarianism, was often framed through a messianic lens, consolidating his charismatic authority (Plo, 2006).

Charismatic leadership persists in democratic societies, adapting to contemporary needs. Ferreira da Cunha (2015) notes that Portuguese society’s disillusionment with electoral systems fosters susceptibility to leaders blending personal charisma with symbolic unity. Portugal, historically considered resistant to populism and radical right movements (Carreira da Silva & Salgado, 2018; Santana-Pereira & Cancela, 2020; Valle, 2020), nevertheless exhibits subtler forms of populism. Zúquete (2022) highlights “soft populism” in figures such as Sidónio Pais, Humberto Delgado, and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho. Sidónio Pais, as president in 1918, symbolized military populism, often appearing in uniform and on horseback, claiming to unify the “good people” against partisan elites. Humberto Delgado, running for president in 1958, used his military background to challenge Salazar, portraying himself as a moral alternative to the regime’s corruption. After the 1974 Revolution, Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho became a socialist populist figure, advocating for direct democracy and opposing capitalist and imperialist forces (Zúquete, 2022).

These examples illustrate how charismatic military figures resonate within Portuguese political culture, leveraging historical and cultural archetypes to establish authority. Military symbolism, intertwined with messianic undertones, remains a potent element in the public imagination, particularly during crises, reflecting the enduring interplay of history, myth, and leadership.

The Vice-Admiral Gouveia e Melo

Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s rise to prominence during Portugal’s COVID-19 vaccination campaign was undoubtedly shaped by his disciplined leadership and problem-solving approach. However, his transition from a public health figure to a potential presidential contender highlights the significant role of media in constructing political personas. The media’s portrayal of Gouveia e Melo not only amplified his public image but arguably fabricated his emergence as a viable political figure, providing him with disproportionate coverage and framing him as a savior in a time of crisis.

From the outset, media narratives emphasized his charisma, military efficiency, and straightforward communication style, crafting an image of stability and trustworthiness. Frequent headlines lauded his achievements and speculated on his political future, often portraying him as a unifying, non-partisan figure capable of navigating the complexities of national leadership. This excessive attention contributed to a sense of inevitability around his potential candidacy, aligning with the archetype of the charismatic leader rooted in Portugal’s cultural tradition of messianism and military populism (Zúquete, 2022).

Despite his avoidance of explicit political rhetoric or anti-elitist positioning, the media filled this ideological void, elevating his military credentials and projecting him as a figure above the political divide. This media-driven fabrication can be seen as both a response to public demand for strong, competent leadership during a period of uncertainty and an active shaping of public opinion. By consistently spotlighting Gouveia e Melo, news outlets contributed to the perception of his indispensability in the political sphere, even before he expressed any clear intention to run for office. However, the anticipation of his retirement from military functions in the Navy paved the way to make very clear his intentions to run for the presidency, becoming a hot topic in political debate programs, and making the mainstream parties to avoid presenting an early candidate, especially considering that public surveys are giving him a most likely win.

Conclusion

Vice Admiral Gouveia e Melo’s trajectory from a public health figure to a potential presidential contender epitomizes the interplay between charismatic leadership, media-driven narratives, and Portugal’s cultural heritage of (military) messianism. His disciplined leadership during the COVID-19 vaccination campaign, amplified by media narratives, crafted an image of a savior capable of transcending political divides. This phenomenon is deeply rooted in Portugal’s historical and cultural archetypes, where figures associated with military symbolism and messianic undertones have long captured the public imagination.

Gouveia e Melo’s rise highlights the fragile boundaries between democratic governance and the allure of charismatic authority. While his candidacy may appeal to a public yearning for stability and strong leadership in times of crisis, it also underscores the risks of media-fueled political personas overshadowing democratic pluralism and institutional accountability. This case serves as a contemporary reflection of Portugal’s historical relationship with populism, messianism, and the enduring tension between tradition and progress.

 

References

Canovan, M. (1981). Populism. New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the people! Populism and the two faces of democracy. Political Studies, 47(1), 2–16.

Carreira da Silva, F., & Salgado, S. (2018). Why no populism in Portugal? In Changing societies: Legacies and challenges. Vol. 2. Citizenship in crisis (pp. 249–268).

Dworkin, D. (1997). Cultural Marxism in postwar Britain: History, the New Left, and the origins of cultural studies. Duke University Press.

Jamin, J. (2014). Cultural Marxism and the radical right. In The post-war Anglo-American far right: A special relationship of hate (pp. 84–103).

Kellner, D. (2013). Cultural Marxism & cultural studies. Critical Quest.

Kaltwasser, C. R., Taggart, P. A., Espejo, P. O., & Ostiguy, P. (Eds.). (2017). The Oxford handbook of populism.Oxford University Press.

Lourenço, E. (1978). O labirinto da saudade. Lisboa: Publicações D. Quixote.

Mounk, Y. (2019). The people vs. democracy: Why our freedom is in danger and how to save it. Harvard University Press.

Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: An ideational approach. In C. R. Kaltwasser, P. A. Taggart, P. O. Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of populism (pp. 27–47). Oxford University Press.

Mudde, C., & Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

Negrão, L. N. (2001). Revisitando o messianismo no Brasil e profetizando seu futuro. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 16, 119–129.

Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash: Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism. Cambridge University Press.

Oliveira Martins, J. P. (2014). História de Portugal. Edições Vercial.

Plo, A. R. R. (2006). Elecciones presidenciales en Portugal: cavaquismo, sebastianismo e ilusiones colectivas. Análisis del Real Instituto Elcano (ARI), 10(1), 1696–3466.

Santana-Pereira, J., & Cancela, J. (2020). Demand without supply? Populist attitudes and voting behaviour in post-bailout Portugal. South European Society and Politics, 25(2), 205–228.

Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham: Open University Press.

Valle, A. L. R. M. N. D. (2020). Populismo nos programas eleitorais dos partidos portugueses para as legislativas de 2019: Uma questão de grau? (Doctoral dissertation).

Zúquete, J. P. (2022). Populismo: Lá fora e cá dentro. Lisboa: Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.

Professor Michael Kazin from Georgetown University, a renowned historian and expert on American politics and social movements.

Professor Kazin: Right-Wing Populism Is a Morbid Symptom of Political Transition

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In a compelling interview with the ECPS, renowned historian Professor Michael Kazin explores the rise of right-wing populism as a “morbid symptom” of today’s political transition. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of interregnum, Kazin analyzes Donald Trump’s presidency, highlighting its profound impact on American and global politics. From galvanizing his MAGA base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism to forging ties with far-right leaders abroad, Trump’s leadership reflects the challenges of this transitional era. Kazin also envisions the potential for a progressive populism rooted in economic justice to counterbalance these dynamics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Renowned historian and scholar of American politics and social movements, Professor Michael Kazin of Georgetown University, offers a thought-provoking analysis of right-wing populism in the context of Donald Trump’s presidency in a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Framing contemporary politics as an “interregnum”—a period of transition—Professor Kazin draws on Antonio Gramsci’s observation that such times often produce “morbid symptoms,” which he associates with the global rise of right-wing populism. He explores how Trump’s leadership embodies this phenomenon, highlighting its implications for both domestic and international politics.

In the interview, Professor Kazin delves into Trump’s unique ability to sustain a populist movement despite his focus on personal popularity over policy. He discusses how Trump has galvanized his base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism, creating a potent political force that continues to shape American political discourse. Professor Kazin critiques Trump’s approach to governance, describing his first administration as “wretched,” marked by policy ignorance and self-serving actions. However, he acknowledges that Trump’s movement, particularly the MAGA base, has no parallel within the Democratic Party, providing him with a solid foundation of unwavering support.

Professor Kazin also examines the potential global ripple effects of Trump’s second term, noting his alignment with leaders like Viktor Orbán and the admiration he garners from right-wing populist movements in Europe. While Trump’s “America First” stance complicates the formation of international alliances, Professor Kazin suggests that his presidency could embolden far-right leaders worldwide. However, he tempers this with cautious optimism, emphasizing the resilience of American democratic institutions and the structural limits of Trump’s power.

Finally, Professor Kazin explores the broader dynamics of populism, contrasting left- and right-wing variants. He argues that left-wing populism, rooted in economic justice and social democracy, offers a constructive path forward. As global demands for equitable governance grow, Professor Kazin envisions the potential for a revival of progressive populism that challenges elite power while addressing urgent issues like economic inequality and climate change.

The interview with Professor Kazin offers a nuanced perspective on Trump’s presidency, the resilience of democratic institutions, and the evolving role of populism in shaping both domestic and global politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Michael Kazin with some edits.

Populism in America: Bridging or Deepening Divides?

Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

Professor Kazin, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your book titled The Populist Persuasion, you discuss how populist rhetoric has evolved in the U.S. What role does populism play in bridging or deepening the divide between cultural and economic grievances today?

Professor Michael Kazin: As you know, populism is both a language and, some would argue, a governing philosophy. I focus on it as a language in American history, with ramifications for populism in other countries, of course. Historically, I think there has been a distinction in the United States—which is really all I can speak about with authority—between left-wing populism and right-wing populism.

Left-wing populism tends to focus on an economic elite—the 1% versus the 99%, the robber barons, the plutocrats, the monopolists. Many terms have been used to critique those with significant wealth and economic power. Left-wing populists aim to unite a large majority, regardless of gender, race, or national origin.

In contrast, right-wing populists in the US—and to some degree in Europe—view “the people” as a broad middle segment of the population, primarily native-born individuals. According to right-wing populists, this group is being exploited and oppressed by two forces: a small elite at the top (both economic and cultural, and sometimes perceived as controlling the state, such as the European Union in Europe or the federal government in the US) and a small but growing group at the bottom, often composed of non-white and immigrant populations.

Historically, this group at the bottom has included Latinos, Asian Americans, and African Americans. More recently, undocumented or illegal immigrants have been the focus. Right-wing populists argue that these groups are used by the elite to drive down wages and erode the cherished culture of the native-born middle class.

Generally, this is how left-wing and right-wing populists operate in the US, with similar analogs in Europe.

Currently, in American politics, left-wing populists—such as Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and other progressives within and outside the Democratic Party—are striving to emphasize the tradition of left-wing populism. However, they face challenges because Democrats and progressives also prioritize cultural issues, such as more lenient immigration policies, transgender rights, and racial equality. This creates some tension with economic left-wing populists, who prefer to focus narrowly on issues like corporate greed, wealth inequality, and combating the power of the very rich, including figures like Donald Trump.

On the right, as most people are aware, Donald Trump exemplifies the continuity of right-wing populism from the 19th century to today. Right-wing populists argue that a “Hollywood elite” or “woke elite” in universities and cultural institutions seeks to impose its values on the hardworking, native-born majority. Additionally, they claim that undocumented immigrants take jobs from native-born Americans, drive down wages, and increase crime in cities.

This is how the two traditions of left-wing and right-wing populism are playing out in contemporary American politics.

Populist Rhetoric and Its Impact on Economic Inequality and Social Justice

How has populist rhetoric shaped the policy priorities of modern political parties in the US, particularly regarding economic inequality and social justice?​

Professor Michael Kazin: Social justice is a term that’s hard to define. It’s been used by both the left and the right throughout American history, so I’ll set that aside for the moment. In terms of economic inequality, this has been a longstanding issue in American politics, but it has especially risen to prominence as a major concern for both right-wing and left-wing populists since the Great Recession of 2008–2009. Following the well-publicized but relatively small Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011–2012, progressive Democrats have increasingly focused on this issue. They argue that neoliberalism—which many view as the dominant ideology in American politics and economics since the 1970s, especially after Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980—has exacerbated economic inequality.

Progressive Democrats have supported programs like those championed by Joe Biden, albeit with moderate success, to help unions organize, provide childcare benefits to all American families, and implement other measures aimed at narrowing economic inequality.

On the other hand, conservative populists, including figures like Donald Trump and J.D. Vance, argue that the primary issue with economic inequality lies with corporations that they claim are “too woke” and favor individuals with the “right” cultural politics over ordinary Americans. Some very conservative Republicans have embraced a form of anti-corporate politics.

For example, Josh Hawley, a Senator from Missouri, has supported the Teamsters Union, one of the largest unions in America. Additionally, some right-wing Catholic thinkers have drawn on the Catholic Church’s social justice tradition, referencing papal encyclicals like Rerum Novarum (1891) and others to argue that unions are essential for improving the lives of ordinary people and to criticize practices like excessive rents and interest rates that harm workers and the poor.

This trend has given rise to a form of “Catholic populism,” which uses these religious principles to legitimize arguments against corporate power. An interesting book on this topic, Tyranny, Inc., by a conservative journalist, critiques corporations for engaging in behavior that harms workers, such as union-busting, charging excessive credit card interest, and denying healthcare coverage.

There is, to some extent, agreement between right-wing and left-wing populists in the US on reducing corporate power and supporting private-sector unions. Currently, only 6% of private-sector workers in the US are unionized—a historically low figure.

However, significant disagreements remain between right-wing and left-wing populists, particularly on cultural issues, which are deeply entrenched and difficult to reconcile. For example, debates over abortion—whether it is a fundamental right for women or equivalent to the killing of babies—highlight how cultural arguments are often intractable and resistant to compromise.

In one of your interviews, you argue that ‘if the political and economic elites in our society and others around the world were more effective at living up to their ideals, populist talkers would likely be less popular.’ What do you mean by ‘ideals of political and economic elites?’

Professor Michael Kazin: Perhaps I should have said the ideals of the nation led by these elites to be more accurate. In the United States, especially—and to varying degrees in Europe—the stated ideals include equality, democracy, majority rule, and a government that promotes the common welfare, as referenced in the preamble to the American Constitution. These ideals are echoed in other historical documents, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man in Europe.

As a social democrat, I would say that if social democracy were practiced more widely and people were guaranteed a decent life in their societies, populism would likely be less popular. For example, in the United States between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s, despite many challenges, it was generally a prosperous time. Unions were very powerful, Social Security was extended to nearly every working American, and the beginnings of health insurance coverage for older and poorer individuals under Medicare and Medicaid were implemented. During that period, populist rhetoric was not particularly influential, and populist movements were relatively subdued. While there were significant social movements, such as the Black freedom movement, they were primarily advocating for the inclusion of an oppressed minority in American life rather than claiming to represent the great majority. Of course, there were radical elements within some movements, but they were not the mainstream.

In my recent book, What It Took to Win: A History of the Democratic Party, I argue that “moral capitalism”—a phrase I borrow from a fellow historian—was the governing promise of the Democratic Party during these years. Democrats were the majority party, and most Americans, including working-class citizens, believed that things were improving. When people believe their lives are getting better, populist leaders and movements struggle to gain traction.

Trump’s Leadership Defined by Self-Interest and Controversy

Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

In one of your articles, you characterize Donald Trump’s first administration as ‘one of the most wretched president and administration in living memory.” What factors have contributed to your defining of Trump’s administration as the most wretched?

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, of course, “wretched” is a loaded, emotional term, and here I’m speaking from my own preferences. There’s no scholarly objectivity possible in this context. I could also talk about why he won again last November, but first, let me focus on the question.

As a leader, I think Trump is someone primarily interested in his own popularity and not particularly interested in policy. He wants to be the center of attention at all times and is committed to no ideal or policy unless it benefits him personally. He’s also unwilling to take risks, particularly when it comes to policy decisions, which I believe was evident during his first term and will likely remain true during his second term—though, of course, we’ll have to wait and see.

His personal behavior also contributes to this characterization. He has been credibly accused of actions that would be considered rape in many nations, though he wasn’t convicted of rape but rather of defaming someone who accused him. His statements about immigrants and what he referred to as “shithole countries,” among other things, reflect his character. As an individual, I find him to be a rather wretched person—someone I wouldn’t want to associate with or have anyone I know associate with.

That said, his administration itself was more cautious than I expected, in part because he leads a party that still includes more traditional, cautious members. Many corporate executives and traditional Republicans influenced his policies. For instance, his Cabinet included several conventional Republican figures, and the Speaker of the House for much of his term was Paul Ryan, a Reaganite libertarian Republican focused on cutting the size of government rather than pursuing anti-immigrant crusades.

The major accomplishment of his administration aligned with a long-standing conservative Republican agenda: cutting taxes, especially for wealthier Americans, though all Americans received some form of tax cut. This is something Ronald Reagan might also have done.

In that sense, while his administration had the potential to be wretched, it was less so than I expected. However, Trump’s statements and actions on immigration were deeply problematic. His attempt to build a wall across the southern border wasted significant funds and was ultimately easy to evade. This demonstrated not only ignorance about policy but also a lack of genuine concern for it.

Unlike other American presidents, as the leader of the most powerful state in the world, Trump showed very little interest in the actual workings of the state unless they directly benefited him personally. In that sense, I would still describe him as a wretched leader.

You argue that ‘like most adherents of left egalitarian politics, I believe the only path to such a future (the more egalitarian and climate-friendly society) lies in adopting a populist program about jobs, income, health care, and other material necessities, while making a transition to a sustainable economy? What exactly do you mean by ‘populist programs?’

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, by that, I mean majoritarian—programs that genuinely benefit the majority of people. When governments are popular, that’s typically what they do. So, in this sense, being “popular” and being “populist” can overlap, though they are not always synonymous.

As I mentioned before, I believe an honest social democracy, or what I would call “moral capitalism” in the US, is the best approach. Such programs would include housing allowances, universal health care that is well-administered and provides good working conditions for healthcare workers, unions to protect the majority of people against workplace abuse, and, critically, a vigorous transition to a sustainable economy—because without that, the entire world is in trouble.

Now, using the term “populist” might seem to betray my own definition of populism, which in American history refers primarily to a discourse or rhetoric. But I don’t subscribe to the simplistic view of “populism bad, liberalism good.” As I argue in my book, The Populist Persuasion, populism can be a way for ordinary people—and movements aiming to represent them—to highlight the gap between a society’s stated ideals and the actual performance of its elites, whether cultural, political, or economic.

Populism can play a very positive role by pointing out these shortcomings and harking back to a society’s ideals, including those rooted in religion, like charity and comfort for the afflicted. It doesn’t necessarily demand, as socialism often does, a completely different kind of society—although socialists can also adopt populist rhetoric. Instead, it appeals to the ideals of the existing society, challenging elites to live up to them.

This is why I think populism has an important role in producing a decent society. Unlike some critics, like Jan-Werner Müller, who argue that populism always fuels movements that lead to authoritarian leaders, I believe populism doesn’t have to serve that role. While it certainly has done so in some parts of Europe, where we see leaders with authoritarian tendencies in and out of office, I think left-wing populism can play a vital and constructive role.

Trump’s Second Term: The Future of Populist Politics in the US and Beyond

A Trump supporter holds up a “Make America Great Again” sign at presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rally in the convention center in Sioux City, Iowa, on November 6, 2016. Photo: Mark Reinstein.

How do you explain Donald Trump’s victory for a second term, given his open and aggressive endorsement of populist policies both in the US and globally? Additionally, how might his administration reshape the populist narrative domestically, particularly in aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism?

Professor Michael Kazin: That’s an important question, obviously, and one we won’t really be able to answer until he’s been several years into his term. Let me address the first part of your question.

Again, you’ve probably read, and your viewers have likely heard and read, many analyses of why Trump won. The most important reason he won—and this is usually why anyone unseats an incumbent party in this country, and probably in others as well—is that most Americans believed the performance of the Biden administration, or the Biden-Harris administration, wasn’t good. This perception was based on several factors, including inflation, a more open immigration policy than most Americans preferred, and, I think, Biden himself, who is a very poor communicator.

Biden used to be a mediocre communicator when he was younger, but in the last couple of years, he became very bad at selling his own programs. Some of those programs, I believe, could have been quite popular if Americans had known more about them, but they didn’t.

This was an election that was actually rather close. For instance, if 232,000 voters in three key states—Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—had voted differently, with slightly more in Pennsylvania than the other two states, Harris would have been elected, even though she would have won fewer popular votes than Trump. As everyone watching this knows, we don’t have a national popular vote in this country. We have state-by-state elections that determine the presidency.

Trump, on the other hand, is a charismatic figure. While he doesn’t have the majority of Americans on his side, a significant portion—perhaps 30%—strongly supports him. He has a movement, the MAGA movement, which the Democrats don’t have anything comparable to. Even though the Democrats had more people on the ground to get voters to the polls, Trump had more solid support.

As a result, he won somewhat more votes than he did in 2016—about 2 million more popular votes. However, Harris won 10 or 11 million fewer votes than Biden had in 2020. Trump’s victory was largely due to many Democrats deciding not to vote. They were disenchanted enough with the Biden-Harris administration’s performance but not sufficiently motivated by Trump to come out and vote against him.

Now, regarding what Trump will do in terms of reshaping the populist narrative—let me remind myself of the second part of your question here…

How much his administration reshapes the populist narrative domestically.

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, again, it depends on how well he performs, right? This is a question of contingency—how he navigates his role as president during the second term. Trump is a much better politician than he is a policymaker, so he will certainly try to maintain support from both the more traditional Republicans and the cultural populists within his coalition.

On the traditional side, he will aim to keep corporate Republicans on board—those who favor lower taxes, less regulation, and smaller government in general. Simultaneously, he’ll also work to retain the cultural populists who want to drastically cut immigration, both legal and illegal, and who oppose transgender rights and certain aspects of gay and lesbian rights.

Trump will likely attempt to strengthen US manufacturing, pushing for more products to be made domestically. However, this will be challenging given that final manufacturing in the US relies heavily on parts sourced from around the globe. Reducing this dependency and producing those parts domestically, which are currently made more cheaply elsewhere, will be difficult. Nevertheless, he will likely focus on this rhetorically.

As always, much will depend on the state of the economy, the presence or absence of scandals within his administration, and the outcome of the midterm elections. In 2026, Democrats are well-positioned to potentially take back the House of Representatives. If that happens, anything Trump aims to achieve would have to be done through executive actions. While some of these actions may be popular, others might not resonate as well with the public.

Additionally, the 2028 presidential campaign will overshadow the final years of Trump’s term. In fact, the campaign will likely begin even before the 2026 midterm results are fully processed. This means Trump might have only two effective years to accomplish his goals, including efforts to satisfy both the traditional and cultural populists in his coalition.

Trump’s Return: Shaking but Not Breaking American Democracy

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

How concerned are you about the second Trump administration in terms of the resilience of American democratic institutions? There are those pundits who argue that American democracy will not survive another Trump term.

Professor Michael Kazin: Here I part ways with some others on the left. I don’t think that American democratic institutions are in serious trouble. I believe they will be shaken—and are already being shaken—by Trump’s reelection and his return to power next month.

First of all, Congress is still fairly evenly divided between the two parties, even though Republicans are in charge. Many large states, such as New York, California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Illinois, are governed by Democrats, and most of these states have Democratic majorities in their legislatures as well. These state governments can act and bring cases to court to challenge some of Trump’s policies.

Civil society in the United States remains relatively strong. There are significant non-governmental organizations, like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which will likely file lawsuits against some of Trump’s actions—particularly those related to immigration. For example, if he tries to deport children born in the US to immigrant parents (who are American citizens by birthright), the ACLU and others will step in.

Even though the grassroots left is somewhat dormant and exhausted since the election, there are still key groups on the left, including unions like the American Federation of Teachers and the United Auto Workers. These organizations were supportive of Kamala Harris and will mobilize opposition against Trump’s administration.

As always, Trump’s ability to act depends on how popular he remains. If his popularity holds, he will have more freedom to pursue his agenda. However, the court system remains a check on his power. While the Supreme Court leans conservative, with three justices appointed by Trump during his first term, other courts are more balanced, with progressives or liberal judges presiding over lower courts.

I anticipate chaos and turmoil, but that doesn’t necessarily mean democratic institutions are in existential danger.

One area of concern is Trump’s apparent eagerness to sue media organizations he disagrees with. For instance, he already sued ABC News over a comment made by anchor George Stephanopoulos, and ABC settled for several million dollars. He might pursue similar legal actions against other media outlets, particularly legacy institutions like The New York Times, The Washington Post, and major networks. While this could intimidate some of these institutions, he won’t be able to silence the Internet or prevent people from organizing protests.

The military, which served as a check on him during his first term—particularly during the protests of 2020—will likely play a similar role this time. He won’t be able to call on the military to suppress peaceful demonstrations, even if he expresses the desire to do so.

I wouldn’t call myself optimistic, but I am hopeful. Also, as I mentioned earlier, he only has four years in this term and likely only two effective years to implement policies. So, I’m not as fearful as some others I know.

Implications for Global Populism and Far-Right Alliances

And lastly, Professor Kazin, right-wing populism continues to rise across Europe despite the liberal European Union’s success story. How do you think populist parties and movements will be influenced globally after Trump begins his second term? Could his presidency embolden far-right leaders abroad and foster new alliances among far-right populist governments?

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, that’s certainly a possibility. As you know, he’s been very close to Viktor Orbán. Orbán has been invited to National Conservative Conferences, and there was even one held in Budapest, which I believe was the first time an American conservative organization hosted its conference overseas. Clearly, right-wing populist leaders, including those of parties like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France, are likely very pleased with Trump’s reelection. This is probably true for right-wing populist parties and movements across the continent.

At the same time, if you emphasize “America First” and express suspicion toward European institutions such as the EU or NATO, it becomes very difficult to form any kind of operationally powerful alliance between Trump and his counterparts in Europe.

Structurally and historically, I believe we’re in what could be described as an interregnum—a period of transition. My friend Gary Gerstle, in his excellent recent book, describes the end of the neoliberal order, which has concluded in many ways and in some places entirely. As the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci famously said, during such an interregnum, “many morbid symptoms appear.” From my perspective, right-wing populism is one such morbid symptom.

However, as demands grow for the state to provide a decent living for a majority of its citizens—and as governments actually fulfill those demands—I think there could be a revival of left-wing populism or social democracy, even if it’s not labeled as such. People will demand that the government deliver on its promises to improve living standards for the majority, ideally in collaboration with private capital.

I am somewhat heartened by the fact that Trump is limited to four years. He cannot serve more than that without a constitutional amendment, which is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in this country—far more so than in many others.

Additionally, most Americans who support Trump are not particularly enthusiastic about alliances between the United States and other countries. They prefer the US to remain independent of such alliances, especially if those alliances are perceived to be costly. So, we’ll have to see how this unfolds.

The election is viewed by many as a crucial midterm evaluation of President Yoon Suk-yeol’s government. President Yoon Suk-yeol (center) is pictured attending the NATO summit in Madrid, Spain on June 30, 2022. Photo: Shutterstock.

Dr. Shaw: Tit-for-Tat Politics Hinder Reforms and Deepen Public Disillusionment in South Korea

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

As South Korea’s Constitutional Court reviews President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his martial law declaration, Dr. Meredith Shaw highlights the deep-rooted issues plaguing the nation’s politics. Speaking with the ECPS, Dr. Shaw explains that a “tit-for-tat dynamic” of political retaliation has hindered systemic reforms, while populist appeals during economic crises fuel disillusionment. Drawing on South Korea’s history of authoritarian rule, she emphasizes the need for reform-minded leadership to restore public confidence. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” Dr. Shaw remarked, urging systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions amid this critical moment for South Korea’s democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As South Korea’s Constitutional Court begins reviewing President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his controversial attempt to impose martial law on December 3, 2024, Dr. Meredith Shaw highlights that both sides of South Korean politics have failed to inspire public confidence. According to Dr. Shaw, a tit-for-tat dynamic continues to hinder systemic reforms while entrenching disillusionment with establishment politicians.

South Korea’s political landscape, shaped by its history of authoritarian rule and rapid democratization, faces persistent challenges rooted in populism, economic inequality, and geopolitical tensions. In an interview with European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Shaw, a leading expert on East Asian politics, shared her invaluable insights into South Korea’s current crisis, historical patterns, and the implications for its democracy.

“South Korea has significant experience with authoritarian, particularly military, regimes,” Dr. Shaw noted, referencing the martial law imposed under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan that lasted nearly 15 years. These experiences, she explained, left a lasting legacy on political and social movements. “The so-called ‘386 generation,’ who fought courageously against martial law, still lean left-wing and remain deeply skeptical of right-wing leaders.”

Dr. Shaw also addressed the cycles of political retaliation and corruption that have plagued South Korea’s governance. “There’s a historical pattern of people in power helping friends and family in ways that most would consider corrupt, followed by the opposition prosecuting and jailing members of the previous administration,” she explained, adding that this dynamic has obstructed meaningful reform.

Economic instability further complicates the political landscape. “South Korea, like most places, tends to be drawn to populist appeals during times of economic crisis and change,” Dr. Shaw observed. Recent backlash against gender equality movements and perceptions of economic inequality have also fueled populism and anti-feminist sentiment.

Geopolitical narratives amplify these issues. “North Korea is always in the background—not just as a security threat but as a perceived economic burden,” Dr. Shaw remarked. She noted that South Korea’s emphasis on national identity often intertwines anti-communism with anti-Japanese sentiment, allowing political leaders to exploit these narratives.

As South Korea navigates the aftermath of Yoon’s impeachment, Dr. Shaw emphasized the importance of reform-minded leadership. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” she said, calling for systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions. With the Constitutional Court set to hold its first public hearing on December 27, 2024, this interview offers a comprehensive analysis of South Korea’s ongoing political challenges and the lessons that could shape its future.

Dr. Meredith Shaw, a leading expert on East Asian politics, shared her invaluable insights into South Korea’s current crisis, historical patterns, and the implications for its democracy.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Meredith Shaw with some edits.

South Korea’s Struggles with Populism, Retributive Politics, and the Legacy of Authoritarianism

Professor Shaw, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How have South Korea’s historical experiences with authoritarian regimes, such as those under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, shaped the contemporary interplay between populism and authoritarianism in its political landscape?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: South Korea has significant experience with authoritarian, particularly military, regimes. As you know, it has had considerable experience with martial law in the past. Martial law was imposed under the Park Chung-hee dictatorship in 1972 and continued almost continuously for about 15 years until 1987.

People over 50 in Korea today would have some memory of this period, particularly the generation that was in college during the last years of martial law, the so-called “386 generation.” They remember fighting very courageously against martial law. As a result, they tend to lean left-wing, are generally very skeptical of right-wing leaders, and oppose the current Yoon administration, which is associated with the right-wing People Power Party (PPP). The real leaders of the anti-martial law movement from that generation, now in their sixties, along with younger activists, often continue to hold these views.

On a deeper level, South Korea has a historical pattern of people in power helping friends and family members in ways that most would consider corrupt. Then, after those individuals are removed from power, the opposition conducts prosecutions and jails members of the previous administration. This has normalized the idea of a tit-for-tat dynamic, where each power shift from left to right (and vice versa) results in retaliatory prosecutions. While one might hope this cycle would encourage honesty, it instead perpetuates an ongoing issue of retributive justice on both sides, which has become particularly problematic in recent years.

Finally, the legacy of authoritarian regimes has contributed to the development of a strong leftist coalition in South Korea, consisting of unions, student activists, and agricultural cooperatives. This coalition retains the ability to quickly mobilize mass protests in response to public outrage. However, while one might expect such a coalition to strengthen democratic institutions, it often seizes on emotional triggers—such as the Itaewon tragedy, the Sewol Ferry disaster, or similar incidents—rather than pushing for systemic reform.

As a result, we often see massive protests, sometimes involving a million people in the city square, yet these demonstrations rarely translate into meaningful systemic changes. This creates a puzzle: the legacy of South Korea’s authoritarian past has left.

To what extent do economic factors, such as income inequality or economic crises, contribute to the rise of populist and authoritarian leaders in South Korea? Are these patterns similar to those seen in other countries?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: I think South Korea, like most places, tends to be drawn to populist appeals during times of economic crisis and change. There have been some economic struggles and downturns in recent years.

Thinking most recently, President Yoon rose to power partly on a wave of male South Korean backlash against the gender equality movement and the perception that men are being left out of the economy as the feminist movement secures more opportunities for women. This has led to a strong anti-feminist and men’s rights backlash, which can inevitably be tied to economic inequality and uncertainty.

On the other hand, South Korea faces serious issues of opportunity and equality, particularly regarding access to higher education and career advancement. The opposition Leftist Democratic Party tends to champion these issues more, but they haven’t offered real solutions during their time in power. They often seem to get bogged down in expensive programs related to North Korea, which has not inspired much confidence.

Additionally, leaders from both parties tend to be beneficiaries of the entrenched institution of crony capitalism. As a result, many Koreans have lost faith in establishment politicians on both sides, making them more susceptible to populist appeals.

How Anti-Communism and Anti-Japanese Sentiment Shape South Korean Politics

How does South Korea’s emphasis on national identity, often tied to anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment, influence the populist rhetoric of political leaders? Are these cultural narratives being manipulated to consolidate power?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: In South Korea, I would say North Korea is always in the background as a political presence—not just as a security threat, but also due to the perceived economic damage caused by lost investment as a result of that threat and past administrations’ massive aid projects, which often went nowhere and cost taxpayers a lot of money. This contributes to a sense of grievance, a strong sense of anti-communism, and the belief that things would be better if North Korea didn’t exist.

On one hand, the ongoing threat from North Korea makes it very difficult for South Korea to eliminate some of the legacy Cold War legal institutions designed to crack down on alleged pro-North Korean elements in society. These include still fairly draconian laws against distributing North Korean materials or making statements perceived as pro-North Korean. These laws can be easily abused by the political right wing, but it’s hard to remove them because North Korea is undeniably a real and persistent threat.

More so than European countries, South Korea struggles to shed this Cold War legacy. For example, President Yoon referenced “anti-state forces” in his declaration of martial law, which is essentially a euphemism for pro-North Korean forces. The fact that he was even able to declare martial law in the first place is partly due to these legacy institutions that grant the government stronger powers when it perceives or claims there is a threat from North Korea. In an ideal democratic society, the government shouldn’t have the ability to do such things, but this is a reality South Korea continues to grapple with.

On the other side, because North Korea exists and is often associated with the left being more sympathetic to it, the leftist opposition has difficulty countering that rhetoric without invoking a similar boogeyman of their own. This is where Japan sometimes comes into play. The right is often perceived as being too forgiving of Japan, and the left can exploit this by emphasizing that Japan has historically been a serious enemy and arguing that its history with South Korea needs to be addressed more strongly.

These two historical narratives—anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment—often play off each other in South Korean politics. President Yoon, for instance, has been seen as particularly pro-Japan and has made some rhetorical gaffes that reinforce this perception. However, because he has so many other scandals and gaffes unrelated to Japan, the opposition hasn’t focused on this issue in recent years. Still, anti-Japan sentiment could easily become a factor if the opposition needs further ammunition against him.

Considering South Korea’s history of democracy emerging from periods of anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment, what historical and socio-political factors have contributed to the rise of populism and authoritarian tendencies in the country? How might the current crisis surrounding President Yoon influence these trends?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: The rise of populism and authoritarian tendencies in South Korea, I would say, is influenced primarily by the strong role of personalities in South Korean politics. The most powerful politicians on both sides often have family histories tied to being pro-Japan or associated with past dictatorships.

South Korea, more than most countries, tends to focus on who is related to whom, whose patronage a politician has received, and how those relationships might make them beholden to special interests. This scrutiny often leads people to become extraordinarily skeptical of legacy politicians and more inclined to support newcomers with less experience who claim to be anti-establishment. However, once those newcomers gain power, they quickly become part of the establishment themselves, almost immediately losing the anti-establishment appeal they once had.

If you look at President Yoon’s career trajectory, this pattern is clear. He comes from a very unusual background—he was never a legislator but a former prosecutor who was heavily involved in prosecuting the last conservative presidential scandal. This gave him a degree of independence from the political groups involved in that scandal and allowed him to claim he was anti-establishment.

When the liberal Moon administration became deeply unpopular, people wanted conservative leadership again. However, the mainstream conservatives were still tainted by connections to the previous scandal involving Park Geun-hye. This allowed Yoon to set himself apart and win the presidency. But now, as the establishment leader, he is at the center of scandals himself and appears to be rapidly losing support, even within his own party.

This situation could provide an opportunity for the conservative People Power Party to rebrand itself, though it’s hard to predict what will happen. The broader trend, however, remains consistent: the “outcast” or anti-establishment politician tends to gain popularity initially but loses that appeal very quickly once in power.

Lessons from South Korea’s Struggle to Preserve Democracy

South Korea has a long history of authoritarian military regimes, including extensive periods under martial law. Photo: Shutterstock.

From a historical perspective, how have populist and authoritarian tendencies impacted democratic institutions in South Korea, including governance, civil liberties, the rule of law, and the broader democratic framework? Given South Korea’s history of overcoming authoritarian regimes, what lessons from its political and social movements can inform the response to the current crisis and safeguard democratic governance?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: There is a legacy of suspending civil liberties in the name of defending against the communist threat from North Korea. This legacy, however, has also been retroactively intertwined with the idea of high economic growth. South Korea experienced its highest economic growth during the period of military dictatorship, and some people have come to associate authoritarian, somewhat imperialist leadership with stability and economic prosperity.

When economic concerns arise, or when instability is seen as driving away investment, there is a tendency to believe that a stronger president with more powers is necessary to overcome gridlock in the National Assembly. This perspective is linked to the fact that South Korea’s high economic growth coincided with its period under military dictatorship.

In contemporary times, South Korea has a very strong and evenly matched political competition between the left and the right. However, both sides have a tendency to use the tools of the Justice Ministry and the National Intelligence Service for political retaliation when in power. As a result, almost all surviving ex-presidents—if they don’t pass away soon after leaving office—end up in prison at some point. It has almost become an expectation, and the current president seems likely to face a similar fate.

The current crisis can be seen as part of this ongoing pendulum shift, swinging from right to left. We can likely anticipate more tit-for-tat prosecutions, but unfortunately, no real systemic reform to address this underlying issue. That said, one possible legacy of the current crisis is that no South Korean president is likely to attempt declaring martial law again for quite some time.

South Korea’s President, or rather, we should say, former President Yoon, declared martial law to save the country from what he called anti-state opposition parties, accusing them of using their legislative majority to paralyze the nation. Who are these anti-state parties, and what specific actions or strategies have they allegedly employed to paralyze the government?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: No, Yoon is still the President. He has been impeached by the National Assembly, but he remains President until the Constitutional Court removes him from power. When he made this announcement, referring to what you mentioned as “anti-state parties,” this is essentially code for leftists and those perceived as pro-North Korea.

In fact, I believe it’s enshrined in the Constitution that “anti-state” essentially refers to individuals or groups supporting North Korea or advocating for the overthrow of the democratic government in the name of communism. That’s the understood meaning of the term.

In his subsequent speech, President Yoon clarified further, and it seems he is primarily targeting the Democratic Party majority in the National Assembly. Since the last election, they have held a sizable majority, and they’ve been blocking his budget proposals, his appointees, and generally making it difficult for him to govern. Additionally, they have been prosecuting the President’s wife for bribery scandals that have been following him for quite some time.

Moreover, President Yoon has been attempting to investigate the National Election Commission (NEC) over allegations that his opposition somehow rigged the last election. He appears to be partially justifying his actions as necessary to uncover the truth about what happened at the NEC. However, the idea of using martial law as a solution to these challenges is, frankly, bizarre. I believe it stems from Yoon’s background as a former prosecutor. He seems inexperienced in dealing with the National Assembly and appears to have little patience for the normal gridlock expected in a democratic system—especially when the opposition holds such a significant majority in the Assembly.

There is also speculation about whether martial law was initially President Yoon’s idea or if it was suggested to him by the Defense Minister. This is something that will likely be explored in the court cases over the coming months.

Ultimately, martial law is supposed to be reserved for instances of imminent crisis, such as a genuine threat from anti-state actors or pro-North Korean forces actively working to undermine democracy. It’s not a tool meant to resolve legislative disagreements or to push through a budget. This entire episode suggests inexperience and a fundamental misunderstanding of democratic governance. By associating his political opposition with North Korea, President Yoon appears to be attempting to justify his actions.

Comparing Yoon Suk Yeol’s Declaration to Past Dictatorships

Martial law declarations in South Korea have been tied to periods of dictatorship and significant political upheaval. How does Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law declaration compare with past instances under leaders like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: In the past, during that 15-year period of martial law under military leaders like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the declarations meant full military government with no functioning National Assembly. For ordinary people, it meant curfews imposed at night, harsh crackdowns on any form of student activism or gatherings, and strict state control of the media. The government provided the media with official talking points, and there was no deviation from them until the transition to democracy.

This most recent martial law declaration by Yoon Suk Yeol is extremely tame in comparison, although it was too short-lived to fully understand where it might have headed. Essentially, it amounted to a few hours of trying to seize control of the National Assembly and block legislators from voting, as well as an attempt to take control of the Election Commission, which the President wanted to investigate. There was no effort to restrict the media, the internet, or public gatherings, and only a few hundred troops were involved.

President Yoon is now retroactively trying to portray the martial law declaration as a mere warning rather than an actual implementation, claiming it was symbolic rather than substantive. However, it was martial law, and there was a serious attempt to prevent legislators from voting it down. How long he intended it to last, or what he hoped to achieve, is hard to say.

The key difference, in my mind, lies in the backgrounds of the leaders. Previous dictators like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were former military officers. They understood the military chain of command and thought in military terms. Yoon, on the other hand, is a prosecutor and a lawyer with no command experience. He seemed to lack a clear understanding of what he was doing, and the enforcement of the declaration was extremely inept.

For example, the commander of South Korea’s martial law command claimed he had not been given any advance notice and did not know what the military was supposed to be doing during those six hours. It seems the Defense Minister was effectively in charge of the situation, which is not how it is supposed to work. In several ways, this declaration was destined to fail. It’s hard to discern what it was meant to accomplish, and it doesn’t compare in scale or severity to the martial law of the past era.

What factors contributed to the rapid collapse of martial law? What roles did political parties and the broader public play in ending military rule?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: First of all, the immediate response from the lawmakers was crucial. The declaration occurred on a weeknight around 6 PM, so many lawmakers were still in town. They quickly rallied to do their jobs, backed by public support and local residents who, upon hearing the news, gathered to break down police barricades.

This was coupled with what I would describe as lukewarm participation by the troops involved. Political science has an entire branch of theorization about when troops will follow orders to fire on a crowd or choose to defy those orders. This situation will likely become an interesting case study for that field. In this instance, the words “martial law” elicited such a strong and visceral reaction in the South Korean public that opposition was immediate and resolute. The troops didn’t appear to fully support the declaration, and there was no indication they would fire on the crowd. It’s puzzling to consider what the administration’s expectations were in this scenario.

Yoon’s own political party, the People Power Party, did not seem to rally around him either. In fact, they now appear to be distancing themselves significantly, as evidenced by the impeachment vote. While his party might prefer for him to step down voluntarily rather than endure a drawn-out impeachment process in court, their support for him has been far weaker than one might expect if this were simply a party-line issue.

South Korea’s Democratic Institutions Face a Critical Test

A photograph which was taken during Candlelight March in South Korea. Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, Professor Shaw, now that President Yoon has been impeached by the South Korean Parliament, what perspectives do you foresee for the stability of democratic institutions, and what is the significance of this impeachment in the history of South Korea’s democratization process?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: For South Korea, this is the third time a President has been impeached. The most recent one was just eight years ago. I was in South Korea at the time, and I vividly remember it. They’ve survived this before, and they will survive it again.

I think this will be an opportunity for both parties to get their houses in order. Both major parties have recently gone through a phase of populist leadership, with Yoon on the conservative side and Lee Jae-myung leading the Democratic Party. Both leaders have become extremely unpopular. While it’s still a bit too early to predict, I believe the public might now be looking for steadier, more establishment-oriented leadership—especially with the uncertainty surrounding the incoming Trump administration and North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable behavior over the past year. Nobody seems to want a rabble-rousing, anti-establishment leader to emerge from this situation.

If this process unfolds similarly to the last impeachment, we can expect a winter of continuous protests. However, protests in South Korea often have the character of a peaceful, celebratory demonstration of democracy, almost like a festival. There will likely be a police presence to maintain safety, but not to crack down on crowds. If the Constitutional Court chooses to remove President Yoon from power, a snap election will follow. I believe there’s a short period—perhaps two or three weeks, though it could be longer—for parties to organize their campaigns and select candidates.

Currently, the Conservative Party is very splintered, which may result in multiple contenders vying for leadership. Meanwhile, their main rival, the Democratic Party, is also embroiled in scandals, and its leadership is highly unpopular. In fact, one reason some people hesitate to support impeachment is because the current leader of the Democratic Party is himself extremely unpopular.

Given this, we may see lesser-known figures emerge, and hopefully, some steadier leadership will arise as a result of these latest shocks. That said, South Korea fundamentally needs a strong left-wing party to address systemic inequalities in society and a strong right-wing party to defend against the very real threat from North Korea.

Unfortunately, in recent years, both sides have behaved in ways that fail to inspire confidence. I expect a much needed reckoning in the upcoming election, which I anticipate will take place in the spring.

Sri Lanka’s President Anura Kumara Dissanayake attends the ceremonial opening of the First Session of the Tenth Parliament at the Sri Lankan Parliament in Colombo on November 21, 2024. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

Dr. Gamage: Buddhist Civilizational Populism Declines Amid Sri Lanka’s Progressive Promises

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsMONITOR

Dr. Rajni Gamage highlights the decline of Buddhist civilizational populism in Sri Lanka, noting its diminished public resonance following the transformative 2022 protests. These protests, she explains, challenged both the political elite and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, creating a moment of reckoning. However, Gamage warns that if Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government fails to deliver on its promises of progressive politics and economic recovery, opposition groups may exploit public discontent to revive Buddhist civilizational populism. “This phase of decline,” she says, “could shift if promises remain unmet, fueling alternative populist narratives.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Rajni Gamage, a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS), offered an incisive analysis of Buddhist civilizational populism in Sri Lanka. She highlighted how this ideological force has shaped the country’s political and social dynamics, particularly its impact on the marginalization of minority communities.

According to Dr. Gamage, Buddhist civilizational populism, deeply intertwined with Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, has historically emerged in waves. Currently, Sri Lanka appears to be in a receding phase, evidenced by a diminished public resonance and the reluctance of political movements to mobilize this rhetoric extensively. She attributed this decline, in part, to the transformative 2022 protests, which delegitimized both the political elite and hegemonic narratives like Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.

Reflecting on the contemporary landscape, Dr. Gamage remarked, “The 2022 protests created a moment of reckoning, challenging not only the established political order but also the ideological frameworks that sustained it.” However, she cautioned that if the current government, led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake, fails to deliver on its promises of progressive politics and economic recovery, alternative opposition groups might capitalize on public discontent to revive Buddhist civilizational populism as a political tool.

In tracing the roots of this ideology, Dr. Gamage explored its colonial-era antecedents. She noted that early 20th-century Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism emerged as a reaction to British colonial rule, mimicking colonial logics to frame minority communities as inferior and responsible for the majority’s material impoverishment. These exclusionary tendencies, she argued, have persisted in post-independence Sri Lanka, finding renewed expression during the Rajapaksa regime.

Discussing the political trajectory of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the National People’s Power (NPP), Dr. Gamage underscored the transformative role of economic populism in their rise to power amidst the socio-economic fallout of the 2022 crisis. She observed, “The anti-establishment narrative of corruption and inequality was pivotal in mobilizing grassroots support.”

Dr. Gamage examined the broader implications of these populist narratives for Sri Lanka’s democratic governance. She warned that securitization efforts, such as anti-drug campaigns and moral panics, could risk undermining civil liberties while consolidating political power. The interview with Dr. Gamage not only sheds light on Sri Lanka’s evolving political dynamics but also offers critical insights into the interplay between populism, nationalism, and democracy in the context of economic and social crises.

Dr. Rajni Gamage, a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS).

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Rajni Gamage with some edits.

Traces of Authoritarianism and Nationalism in Sri Lanka 

Dr. Gamage, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. What historical periods did authoritarianism have in Sri Lanka? Can you explain the key themes and developments from a historical perspective?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: I think that’s a very pertinent question when we consider the current political moment in Sri Lanka. Looking at authoritarianism within politics and governance in Sri Lanka, we can identify several key historical periods shaped by distinct developments.

First, colonial legacies, especially British colonialism, left a significant imprint. During British rule, colonial powers consolidated authority in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) through specific laws, the establishment of state institutions, and the deployment of ideological discourses aimed at maintaining their control. These authoritarian elements—embedded within institutions, laws, and ideologies—continued to influence the post-colonial state formation process in Sri Lanka.

The British colonial period is thus a critical moment to examine in the history of authoritarian politics in Sri Lanka. In the post-independence period, authoritarianism became intertwined with the democratic institutions formed after colonial rule. A key example is the executive presidency established under the 1978 Constitution. Significant scholarship highlights how this institution centralized power and legitimized authoritarian practices, reaching its peak during the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime from 2005 to 2015.

Another significant aspect of authoritarianism was its explicit manifestation during the ethnic conflict from 1983 to 2009. The militaristic approach to resolving the conflict culminated in the state’s victory in 2009, characterized by the dominance of majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. This ideology shaped both state governance and popular discourse during and after the civil war, fostering an exclusionary and hegemonic nation-building process. Consequently, many minority groups—whether ethnic, religious, or gender-based—were marginalized in the state’s formation and development.

Mahinda Rajapaksa attends the National War Memorial commemoration ceremony marking the 10th anniversary in Battaramulla, Colombo, Sri Lanka, on May 19, 2019. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

How has the historical encounter of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism with colonial modernity shaped the exclusivist tendencies of contemporary Buddhist nationalist movements, such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), particularly in framing the Muslim “Other”? In what ways has this discourse intersected with and reinforced the authoritarian populism observed during the Rajapaksa regime, contributing to the marginalization of minority groups in nation-building and the evolution of Islamophobia in recent years?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: When we examine Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism gaining significant momentum under the Rajapaksa regime, and compare it to the early 20th-century Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism spearheaded by figures like Anagarika Dharmapala, we can see a clear lineage. This early nationalism emerged as a reaction to the racial hierarchies and colonial logics imposed by British colonial forces at the time.

Nationalism was formed in response to the racial and developmental politics of the colonial administration. For example, early 20th-century Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism often mimicked colonial logics, identifying minority groups in Ceylon as inferior to the majority Sinhala group and as being responsible for the material impoverishment of the local population.

These exclusionary logics of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism have continued to be reproduced in the post-colonial context. Under the Rajapaksa regime, particularly in the post-war period, the military victory over the ethnic conflict brought an increase in military jingoism and majoritarian nationalism, which received significant state patronage. Groups like the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) gained momentum, especially with their amplified presence on social media, further marginalizing minority groups and fostering Islamophobia. The future trajectory of nationalism is perhaps something we could explore further in another discussion, but I will conclude here for now.

NPP’s Evolution Reflects Moderation in Economic Policies and Emphasis on Inclusivity

How do you interpret Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s presidential victory as a reflection of Sri Lanka’s populist political trends, particularly in the context of economic crises and disillusionment with traditional elites? What does this suggest about the relationship between economic instability and populism in the country and what does this signify for the future of populist politics in Sri Lanka?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: The election of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the current president of Sri Lanka, occurred in the context of the 2022 economic crisis and the country declaring itself bankrupt. His presidential campaign was largely built on an anti-establishment narrative and an economic populist message of “us versus them,” where the corrupt elite were portrayed as being in opposition to the ordinary people. This narrative proved to be very powerful, as it followed the largest economic crisis Sri Lanka has faced since independence. The crisis was widely attributed to a governance failure by a political elite seen as disconnected from the public and deeply corrupt—an elite accused of misusing and stealing public finances to the point of bankrupting the country.

Within President Dissanayake’s political rhetoric, we can clearly identify elements of economic populism. This is evident both in the issues he and his party highlighted and in the solutions they proposed. For example, during the campaign, we saw populist promises such as salary increases for public servants and tax cuts. However, it’s important to note that this form of economic populism did not start with President Dissanayake. We observed similar trends in earlier left-oriented governments from 1994, and even with Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the president elected in 2019 and later ousted by popular protests. Rajapaksa, too, was a populist politician, coming from outside the traditional establishment and running on a narrative of cleaning up a corrupt and inefficient political system.

Situating President Dissanayake’s populist politics within this longer trajectory of populism in Sri Lanka helps us understand its evolution and its potential future impacts.

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) has evolved significantly from its past. What role has this transformation played in its appeal as part of the National People’s Power (NPP) coalition, and how does this align with global trends in left-wing populism? In your view, how has the JVP transformed its populist appeal to distance itself from its violent past, and what lessons can other populist movements learn from this evolution?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: I think this is a question that has sparked significant interest, especially among external observers of Sri Lankan politics. The coalition called the National People’s Power (NPP), formed in September this year, is primarily driven by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which, as you mentioned, is its main and only political party.

The JVP has a complex history, having led two Communist insurgencies in 1971 and 1988. After the failure of these uprisings, the party re-entered parliamentary politics in the 1990s. Historically, the JVP has been associated with revolutionary left-wing politics and Sinhala nationalist ideologies. However, the NPP is observed to have shifted towards the center in its economic policies, effectively positioning itself as a center-left party. This shift towards centrism and pragmatism has become more apparent, particularly since the NPP came into power.

Regarding issues of race and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, the NPP has adopted a much more progressive stance, including advocating for power devolution to minority-dominated areas. In terms of lessons for other populist parties, especially those seeking to access state power, the NPP’s evolution demonstrates that moderating economic policies and adopting a more inclusive approach can resonate more effectively with both the public and important international stakeholders, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Clock Is Also Ticking for the Current Government

Anti-government protesters gather to stage a demonstration in Colombo on July 9, 2022, demanding the resignation of Sri Lanka’s president and prime minister. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

What is your assessment of the populist strategies used by Dissanayake and the NPP, particularly in mobilizing grassroots support through anti-corruption and transparency narratives? How sustainable are these approaches in governance? How does the NPP navigate the tension between economic nationalism and international obligations, particularly in the context of foreign policy and development projects?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: This kind of mobilization through an anti-corruption narrative is one of the key strategies that Dissanayake and his party effectively utilized during these elections. When we observe other examples of left-wing populist movements gaining popularity globally, this approach is not uncommon. Anti-corruption is a particularly powerful narrative. Within Sri Lanka itself, we’ve seen past governments, such as the Yahapalana government in 2015, rise to power on a good governance and anti-corruption platform.

However, as powerful as the anti-corruption narrative is, sustainability remains a critical question. When corruption is identified as the main problem, it implies that the current system can function with minor fixes to governance. This framing, on one hand, prevents broader discussions about structural reforms and, on the other, primes the public to expect immediate and short-term outcomes.

So far, the NPP government has demonstrated this to some extent. While there have been highly publicized low-level legal cases, significant progress on high-level corruption remains absent. Delivering accountability and justice on large-scale corruption involving powerful figures from the old political establishment is both politically challenging and legally complex. For instance, while the NPP has pledged to recover stolen assets from capital flight, the question remains whether the necessary legal frameworks are in place to enable the identification and recovery of such assets.

The clock is ticking for the current government. If it cannot deliver substantial economic growth in the short term, it must at least demonstrate progress on its anti-corruption mandate to maintain public trust and legitimacy.

How do you see the collapse of Tamil legacy parties and the emergence of new political actors reshaping Tamil nationalism within Sri Lanka’s broader political landscape? Could this fragmentation weaken or strengthen the Tamil political struggle?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: This is a significant development, especially in light of the recent parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. For the first time in the country’s history, mainstream Tamil and Muslim political parties suffered considerable electoral setbacks. There are several reasons for this. One key factor is the fragmentation within these parties due to internal infighting. Additionally, there is a broader delegitimization of establishment parties, driven in part by the NPP and the powerful narrative of the 2022 popular protests. These protests highlighted the failures of the political establishment and criticized the state’s capture by a small elite.

This context has contributed to the setbacks faced by the legacy of Tamil and Muslim political parties. However, it is also important to note the emerging sentiment that Tamil nationalism, like Sinhala nationalism, is on the decline. This assumption, I believe, warrants closer scrutiny. Sri Lanka has experienced waves of nationalism throughout its history. While Sinhala nationalism appears to have slightly waned in the post-2022 period and did not emerge as a dominant campaign theme during the elections, history suggests that nationalism—both Sinhala and Tamil—tends to resurface in cycles. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect a resurgence of Tamil nationalism in the future, even as new political actors continue to reshape the landscape.

Risk of Social Unrest Rises Amid Revenue Growth Challenges

In light of Dissanayake’s pledges to renegotiate IMF loan terms and focus on economic recovery, what challenges and opportunities do you foresee in balancing populist promises with the realities of austerity-driven economic policies?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: During the campaign, similar to the other main opposition party, the SJB, the NPP was highly critical of the debt sustainability agreement (DSA) forming the framework for the IMF program. They argued that it was not negotiated on terms favorable to Sri Lanka, particularly for the working and poorer classes. One of the NPP’s key promises was that, upon coming to power, they would renegotiate the DSA’s terms to adjust conditions such as tax thresholds and revenue-raising measures.

However, the government has now been in power for over two months, and there are no clear indications that such renegotiations are underway. Instead, there has been notable continuity with the existing economic program, despite the previous Ranil Wickremesinghe government being arguably one of the most neoliberal in Sri Lanka’s history, and the NPP having campaigned on left-leaning economic policies.

The question of whether President Dissanayake can sustain austerity-driven policies under the IMF program while maintaining popular support remains crucial. Currently, the government enjoys a strong mandate and significant popularity. However, if it fails to generate sufficient revenue through alternative means—such as boosting domestic industrialization, tourism, and local cooperatives—social unrest similar to what previous governments faced may resurface.

Operation Yukthiya: Moral Panics as Tools of Political Control

What role does the securitization of issues like drug control and trade union action play in consolidating power under the current Sri Lankan government, and how does this framing of extrajudicial measures as tools for justice shape public opinion and political legitimacy, particularly through the creation of “moral panics” such as Operation Yukthiya, and how do these strategies align with broader patterns of populist governance globally?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: I think it’s a very common aspect of populist politics, whether right-wing or left-wing, to identify specific social dynamics and frame them as threats to society or as the root causes of material or security crises. This strategy allows populist leaders to consolidate power and redirect public attention.

During the Wickremesinghe government, we observed the introduction of campaigns like Operation Yukthiya, an anti-drugs initiative that created “moral panics” to legitimize an expanded role for the police and increase the securitization of social spaces. These strategies were framed as necessary for justice but often functioned to enhance political control and suppress dissent.

The current NPP government has indicated that it will continue with such programs. However, as I mentioned earlier, the current administration remains highly popular. Historically, we see governments resorting to creating or amplifying moral panics when their popularity begins to decline. Whether this government will emphasize issues like drug control or other security concerns to maintain its legitimacy will likely depend on shifts in its public support in the future.

How do populist narratives in Sri Lanka address or sideline ethnic and minority issues, and what implications does this have for long-term reconciliation and inclusive governance in the country? Are there similarities with other populist leaders across the World?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: This is a very important issue and one that is quite distinctive in the NPP’s left politics, especially when compared to past Sri Lankan left-nationalist politics. The “othering” of Tamil and Muslim minorities has historically been a popular political instrument used by past governments, including left-nationalist administrations such as the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, if we can characterize it as such.

However, the NPP was distinct in the 2024 elections for not mobilizing a strong Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist narrative. Instead, it advocated for greater ethnic inclusivity. This was evident in the November 2024 elections, where the NPP secured a mandate across the island, including in minority-dominated areas. This represents a unique moment for Sri Lanka, perhaps paralleling the political atmosphere of 1994, when a similarly inclusive national space was created.

In response to your question, while the NPP’s politics can be characterized as left-populist on an economic level, it has maintained a strong inclusive narrative regarding ethnic and religious groups. This is reflected in its proposals for a new constitution and its push for power devolution to smaller territorial units as a more sustainable solution for reconciliation. Whether these measures will provide a lasting resolution to the ethnic question in Sri Lanka, however, remains to be seen.

Timing Challenges Doom ‘One-Country-One-Law’ Initiative

How has ‘one-country-one law’ principle been instrumentalized by the political leaders in Sri Lanka in terms of democracy and civil liberties? How has securitization been employed by the political leaders to empower the police force? How do these populist narratives manipulate public frustration to justify anti-democratic measures, and what long-term risks does this pose to civil liberties?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: The “one-country-one-law” principle, to briefly explain for those unfamiliar with Sri Lanka, was a political campaign mobilized during the 2019 presidential elections. The idea was to address perceived heterogeneity within Sri Lanka’s legal framework, particularly concerning ethnic communities. For instance, there was the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA) and other legal regimes specific to certain communities. The argument was that there was a need to homogenize laws in Sri Lanka to promote equality.

However, underlying this drive was a strong Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist sentiment aimed at reinforcing the mandate of the majority ethnic group. The “one-country-one-law” initiative ultimately failed, largely due to the timing of its implementation. In 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa came to power with this mandate, but by 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic hit, followed by the economic crisis, preventing the campaign from gaining momentum.

While these sentiments suffered a significant defeat, especially after the 2022 protests, it is possible they could resurface if the current NPP government fails to meet the high expectations it has fostered. For example, in neighboring India, the idea of a uniform civil code has gained considerable public legitimacy. Whether such a mandate could re-enter Sri Lanka’s political discourse remains a possibility in the future.

How has the socio-economic fall-out in 2022 played into the hands of victory of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, leader of the leftist National People’s Power (NPP)?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: As I mentioned earlier, the economic inequality and dispossession of people were significantly exacerbated by the 2022 economic crisis. While Sri Lanka already had high levels of inequality and poverty, the crisis accelerated these issues dramatically. People felt the impact immediately, particularly due to the long hours of power cuts and disruptions in access to essentials like gas and fuel.

This economic crisis, which severely disrupted everyday livelihoods, fueled widespread anger and anti-establishment sentiment among the populace. People attributed their struggles to the poor governance of the political elite at the time. Anura Kumara Dissanayake effectively mobilized this anger, even though the NPP did not play a direct leadership role in the protests. The party skillfully channeled the public’s frustration, which contributed to their landslide victory in November.

Risk of Populist Resurgence Looms

Sri Lankan protesters storm the prime minister’s office in Colombo on July 13, 2022, demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

Given the global rise of religious and civilizational populism, what lessons can Sri Lanka draw from its history to foster inclusivity and prevent the recurrence of divisive politics in the context of current economic and social crises?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: The idea of civilizational populism refers to political actors identifying themselves and their state beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. In the context of pre-independence Ceylon, we observe certain nationalist leaders framing the island as a Buddhist civilizational state. This rhetoric legitimized the notion of a once-prosperous society and statehood—idealized as the birthplace of great ideas about governance and social organization—that had been lost. These leaders argued for a return to such a golden age, attributing its decline to colonial forces and the perceived collusion of ethnic minorities with those forces.

In the post-independence era, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has frequently drawn on civilizational populist narratives, even as it operates within the framework of the nation-state. These sentiments continue to feed into nationalist discourse, especially during times of economic and social upheaval. As Sri Lanka confronts its current economic crisis, there is an increasing tendency to invoke the idea of a broader, more successful Buddhist civilizational entity. This rhetoric becomes particularly appealing to leaders as the nation’s prospects seem diminished. 

And lastly, Dr. Gamage, how has Buddhist civilizational populism shaped the political and social dynamics of post-war Sri Lanka, particularly in the othering of minority communities, and how does its contemporary manifestation compare with colonial-era Buddhist revival movements in terms of goals, rhetoric, societal impact and the enduring influence of colonial legacies?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: As I mentioned in a previous response, Buddhist civilizational populism certainly informs Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, but it emerges in waves. Currently, we seem to be in a receding phase of nationalism. This is evident not only in the reluctance of political movements to mobilize it extensively but also in its diminished resonance with the public.

One reason for this decline is the 2022 protests, which not only delegitimized the political elite of that period but also discredited certain hegemonic narratives, including Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. These protests created a moment of reckoning, where dominant ideologies were challenged alongside the established political order.

However, as you noted, the current government has presented itself as promoting progressive politics on the ethnic front while also making economically populist or left-leaning promises. If it fails to deliver on these fronts, there is a possibility that alternative opposition groups may seize the opportunity to re-mobilize Buddhist civilizational populism to gain political traction.

Social Media

How Identity Shapes Perception in a Polarized World: Insights from an Online Survey Experiment with AI-Enhanced Media

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHome

Who do people trust in politics, and why? Our online survey experiment reveals that trust and credibility are driven less by emotional victimization narratives and more by partisanship. Political messages resonate most when they align with the audience’s ideological beliefs, overshadowing the impact of emotional appeals. These findings highlight the power of identity in shaping perceptions and the challenges of bridging partisan divides in today’s polarized landscape. Tailored messaging that speaks to shared values remains key to building trust and engagement.

By  Ihsan Yilmaz, Ana-Maria Bliuc & Daniel S. Courtney*  

Introduction: A New Battleground for Ideas

In today’s hyperconnected world, the arena of political debate has shifted from parliaments and rallies to the digital stage of social media. Here, every post has the potential to build trust or spark outrage, amplifying voices and emotions in ways that redefine public discourse (Huszár et al., 2021; Yarchi et al., 2020). Our study examines this dynamic space, exploring how political affiliation and narratives of victimhood shape perceptions of credibility and emotional engagement.

At the heart of this research lies a fundamental question: “How do people decide whom to trust?” Furthermore, we ask, “How do identity and emotion shape these judgments?” To explore these questions, we conducted an experiment that reflects the digital realities of political communication. Using AI-generated posts, participants were exposed to messages from representatives of two ideologically distinct UK political parties: the right-wing populist Reform UK and the progressive Green Party. Some posts portrayed the communicators as victims of political persecution, while others focused solely on party platforms. By combining new technology with real-world political dynamics, the study examines the intersection of emotion, trust, and identity. As social media increasingly becomes the dominant arena for political persuasion (De Zúñiga et al., 2022a, 2022b), understanding how these factors influence public opinion is essential for addressing the challenges of modern democracy.

The Online Survey Experiment

Imagine scrolling through your social media feed, where political messages compete for attention amid a sea of hashtags and soundbites. This study aimed to replicate that environment by exposing participants to custom-designed posts that mirrored the type of content people encounter daily on platforms like X. After engaging with these posts, participants provided their reactions through a survey, enabling us to measure two critical factors: the extent to which they trusted the messages and their emotional responses.

The experiment was designed to explore the relationship between political affiliation and emotional appeals. To achieve this, we introduced a fictional candidate representing either the Green Party or Reform UK. The fictional candidate either portrayed themselves as a victim of political persecution or focused solely on communicating their party’s agenda, avoiding any mention of personal hardship. This deliberate design allowed us to investigate how the intersection of identity politics, emotional narratives, and party alignment shapes perceptions of trust and credibility in the digital age.

By simulating the dynamics of online political discourse, the study offers insights into how emotional and ideological cues influence the way people perceive and engage with political messaging. In a world where social media serves as the primary battleground for political persuasion, understanding these mechanisms is more critical than ever.

Trust and Emotions in A Polarized World

In the polarized world of politics, trust and credibility are often elusive goals. Our preliminary findings offer intriguing insights into what makes political messages resonate—or fail—depending on the audience. Messages framed as coming from a Green Party candidate consistently inspired higher trust and credibility compared to those attributed to a Reform UK candidate, particularly among our predominantly left-leaning sample. This trend held true regardless of whether victimization narratives were employed. In essence, partisanship outweighs narrative.

Interestingly, our findings suggest that victimization narratives—often a powerful emotional tool in political rhetoric—didn’t significantly influence trust or credibility within the same political frame. Instead, political ideology appears to be an effective barrier to rhetorical strategy, lending credence to the idea of partisans being stuck in echo-chambers, preventing them from accepting opposing messages.

But there’s another layer to this story: political alignment. For left-leaning individuals, the Green Party’s message was consistently rated as more trustworthy and credible than Reform UK’s, across all scenarios. On the other hand, right-leaning individuals were less swayed by the policy frame, though they showed a slight preference for Reform when victimization narratives were included. This dynamic highlights how deeply our ideological beliefs shape the way we perceive political communication, with certain rhetorical strategies being effective for some but not others.

These findings carry a potentially important lesson for political strategists and communicators. Tailoring messages to match the values and priorities of a target audience is not just effective—it’s essential. While the Green Party’s approach seemed to appeal broadly, Reform struggled to build credibility, especially among left-leaning individuals. Furthermore, it seems that relying on victimization narratives alone may not be enough to shift perception among those not already susceptible to such rhetoric. Ultimately, it’s more likely that the strength of the policy message and its alignment with the audience’s worldview could make the real difference.

These preliminary findings are interesting because they remind us that politics isn’t just about policies; it’s about people. To win trust and build credibility, politicians need to understand the hearts and minds of those they seek to persuade. And that means crafting messages that resonate not only with their base but with the broader public.

Implications for Politics and Polarization

In an era of deepening political divides, understanding the dynamics of trust and credibility in communication is essential. This study highlights a key insight: the identity of the messenger often outweighs the content of the message. For political actors, this reality carries significant implications, particularly in creating narratives that resonate across ideological lines.

Reassessing Victimhood Narratives

While victimhood is often portrayed as a powerful rhetorical device (Armaly & Enders, 2021; Hronešová & Kreiss, 2024), this research suggests that its impact on trust and credibility may be overstated, particularly when the core message lacks alignment with the audience’s values. Although victimization can evoke empathy, it is not a panacea for overcoming ideological divides. Rather than relying on emotional appeals, politicians must recognise that the framing of their policies—and their alignment with the audience’s worldview and expectations—plays a far more critical role in shaping (positive) perceptions.

The Polarizing Force of Echo Chambers

The findings also bring to attention the risks of echo chambers. People are far more likely to trust narratives that align with their political affiliations, reinforcing a selective feedback loop that limits exposure to diverse perspectives. This dynamic can deepen polarisation, narrowing opportunities for meaningful dialogue (Bliuc et al., 2024). As trust becomes a partisan commodity, the gap between ideological groups grows, making it increasingly difficult to foster a shared sense of reality.

The Emotional Costs of Division

The emotional divide between ideological camps is another sobering takeaway. Messages from one’s political in-group are often met with admiration and pride, while those from the out-group trigger anger and distrust. This emotional schism exacerbates societal divisions, perpetuating cycles of antagonism (Harteveld, 202; Whitt et al., 2020). Over time, these entrenched emotional responses weaken the potential for compromise, dialogue, and understanding.

A Broader Context of Political Messaging

Beyond immediate political debates, the study hints at broader social trends, including the role of nostalgia and perceived cultural threats. Those who feel their heritage or values are under siege may be particularly vulnerable to messaging framed around urgency or loss. In this context, the study shows a troubling tendency in modern politics: the weaponization of emotion (see also Hidalgo-Tenorio & Benítez-Castro, 2021). When political narratives prioritize emotional impact over substantive discussion, the space for genuine policy debate diminishes.

Concluding Remarks: Toward a Healthier Democracy

If we are to support a more informed and less polarized democracy, we must move beyond strategies that merely stoke division. This begins with critical media literacy: citizens must learn to question not only the content of political messages but also the emotional appeals embedded within them. For political leaders, the challenge lies in promoting narratives that resonate without exploiting emotions or deepening divides. Authenticity, truthfulness, and a commitment to civil disagreement should guide political communication.

Overall, political narratives are likely to achieve their greatest impact when they resonate strongly with a partisan audience by aligning with its values, beliefs, and identity. Such tailored appeals foster emotional engagement and reinforce shared purpose among supporters. Without this initial alignment, narratives will likely fail to mobilize the base or sustain its commitment.

At its heart, this research reflects an increasing complexity of the relationship between emotion, trust, and political identity. It reminds us that our perceptions of credibility are shaped as much by how we feel as by what we hear. To navigate the volatile waters of modern politics, we must prioritize intellectual humility and create spaces for open dialogue. Only by bridging ideological divides can we build a society where trust transcends partisan loyalties, paving the way for a more inclusive and informed democracy.

 

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion and Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.

 

(*) Daniel Sebastian Courtney is a PhD candidate in Psychology at the University of Dundee, focusing on the impact of publicly sharing opinions on overconfidence. His research interests include social media behavior, conspiracy ideation, misinformation, polarization, and nationalism. He holds an MSc in Developmental Psychology from the University of Dundee, with a dissertation on nonlinguistic context effects on reading times in social media posts, and an MA in Applied Linguistics from the University of Birmingham, where he explored metaphor and metonymy in English and Japanese. Courtney has published on vaccine hesitancy and collective action, and has extensive teaching experience in psychology and English, including positions at Meiji Gakuin, Sophia, Obirin, and Josai International universities in Japan.

References

Armaly, M., & Enders, A. (2021). ‘Why Me?’ The Role of Perceived Victimhood in American Politics. Political Behavior, 44, 1583 – 1609. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09662-x.

Bliuc, A. M., Betts, J. M., Vergani, M., Bouguettaya, A., & Cristea, M. (2024). A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation of a divided society. Communications Psychology, 2(1), 75. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00125-1

De Zúñiga, H., González-González, P., & Goyanes, M. (2022a). Pathways to Political Persuasion: Linking Online, Social Media, and Fake News With Political Attitude Change Through Political Discussion. American Behavioral Scientist.https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642221118272.

De Zúñiga, H., Marné, H., & Carty, E. (2022b). Abating Dissonant Public Spheres: Exploring the Effects of Affective, Ideological and Perceived Societal Political Polarization on Social Media Political Persuasion. Political Communication, 40, 327 – 345. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2022.2139310.

Harteveld, E. (2021). Fragmented foes: Affective polarization in the multiparty context of the Netherlands. Electoral Studies. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ELECTSTUD.2021.102332.

Hidalgo-Tenorio, E., & Benítez-Castro, M. (2021). Trump’s populist discourse and affective politics, or on how to move ‘the People’ through emotion. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 20, 86 – 109. https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2020.1861540.

Hronešová, J., & Kreiss, D. (2024). Strategically Hijacking Victimhood: A Political Communication Strategy in the Discourse of Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump. Perspectives on Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592724000239.

Husz’ar, F., Ktena, S., O’Brien, C., Belli, L., Schlaikjer, A., & Hardt, M. (2021). Algorithmic amplification of politics on Twitter. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 119. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2025334119.

Whitt, S., Yanus, A., Mcdonald, B., Graeber, J., Setzler, M., Ballingrud, G., & Kifer, M. (2020). Tribalism in America: Behavioral Experiments on Affective Polarization in the Trump Era. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 8, 247 – 259. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.29.

Yarchi, M., Baden, C., & Kligler-Vilenchik, N. (2020). Political Polarization on the Digital Sphere: A Cross-platform, Over-time Analysis of Interactional, Positional, and Affective Polarization on Social Media. Political Communication, 38, 98 – 139. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1785067.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a rally organized by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at Istanbul Ataturk Airport ahead of the local elections in Istanbul, Turkey on March 24, 2024. Photo: Tolga Ildun.

The Transmission of Nostalgia, Threat and Unity in Populist Communication: Using AI to Analyze Erdogan and Supporters’ Speech

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHome

How does Erdogan’s populist rhetoric resonate with his supporters? Our study dives into his use of nostalgia, threat, and unity to rally his base. We found that while Erdogan and his followers align on “threat” messaging—framing enemies as existential dangers—supporters amplify this far more than his calls for unity. Nostalgia for Turkey’s Ottoman past adds a powerful emotional pull, fueling his vision of a revived Islamic identity. These findings reveal how populist language not only connects leaders to their base but also reshapes grassroots narratives, driving division and loyalty in equal measure.

By Matthew J. Belanger*, Ana-Maria Bliuc, John Betts** & Ihsan Yilmaz 

Populist movements have reshaped politics worldwide, and language lies at their heart. This study explores how rhetoric may drive these movements by focusing on Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s President, and examining three key strategies in his communication style. Crucially, it also looks at how these strategies echo in the voices of his supporters.

Populism is often defined as a specific political communication style that emphasizes proximity to the “people,” takes an anti-establishment stance, and stresses the homogeneity of the people by excluding certain segments or subgroups of the public (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). Populist communication is typically polarizing (Bliuc et al, 2024) and juxtaposes the virtuous “people” against a “corrupt elite,” portraying the people as the sole legitimate source of political power (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). It combines key messages (content) with stylistic devices (form), often using social media platforms rather than traditional media (Engesser et al., 2017; Ernst et al., 2019).

Moreover, populism is often used as a strategic tool by political challengers, particularly those distant from the center of power, to mobilize support by positioning themselves as outsiders (Bonikowski & Gidron, 2016). Populist communication styles can be understood through the dimensions of identity construction, rhetorical style, and media relationship, and they can influence power relations and political actors of both right and left (Block & Negrine, 2017).

Erdogan has long been established as a populist leader. His communication during critical national events from 2013 to 2023 (for example, national and local elections, the 2016 coup attempt, or the 2017 constitutional referendum) provides an opportunity to understand what rhetorical constructions are present in his discourse and how they can be transmitted and reflected among the population.

Nostalgia has been well-documented in populist rhetoric and typically idealizes collective memories from a supposed golden age (Kenny, 2017; Karakaya, 2018; Elçi, 2021; Menke & Wulf, 2021). Threat, or division, is a further rhetorical device that describes external or internal dangers to create solidarity among supporters as well as a sense of urgency, with xenophobia and racism typically supporting such developments (Rydgren, 2003).

This paper investigates how such rhetorical devices manifest in the rhetoric of both Erdogan and his supporters. Using a combination of thematic analysis and machine learning, we analyze speeches from Erdogan alongside interview data from his grassroots supporters. This study uniquely addresses both the supply of political narratives (the leader’s messaging) and the demand for these narratives (the grassroots reception and reproduction). This allows for a direct comparison of how Erdogan’s language resonates with and influences his supporters.

Erdogan’s Populism

Erdogan’s leadership has reshaped Turkey’s political landscape through a distinctive form of populism often referred to as “civilizational populism.” As the leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP), Erdogan has framed political conflicts as existential struggles between civilizational identities, casting himself and his party as defenders of Islamic values against the perceived encroachments of secular and Western influences (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).

Erdogan’s populist narrative constructs a stark dichotomy between the “righteous people” and the “corrupt elite.” The latter, often characterized as Westernized secularists, are portrayed as detached from Turkey’s authentic Islamic identity (Yilmaz, 2021). These narrative leverages historical grievances, particularly the exclusion of religious conservatives during the Kemalist era, to rally support (Morieson et al., 2024). By drawing upon Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic heritage, Erdogan positions himself within a broader narrative of resistance against Western hegemony and secular modernity, aligning his leadership with the defense of an Islamic civilization (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023; Morieson et al., 2024).

Central to Erdogan’s rhetoric is the portrayal of Turkey as besieged by both external adversaries and internal subversives. He often attributes domestic challenges to foreign conspiracies and malign influences, framing himself and his administration as the bulwark against these existential threats (Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2021; Yilmaz et al., 2021). This narrative fosters a siege mentality, consolidating support through fear and the promise of protection (Tas, 2020; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023).

Following the failed 2016 coup attempt, Erdogan framed the incident as a plot by foreign and domestic enemies, thereby justifying widespread purges within the state and society (Yilmaz, 2021). He depicted the AKP as the ultimate safeguard of Turkey’s sovereignty and Islamic values, branding critics and opponents as traitors and adversaries of both the state and religion (Tas, 2020). He emphasizes national unity, urging all segments of society to come together under his leadership to strengthen Turkey’s cohesion. He calls for solidarity against perceived enemies, emphasizing the need to transcend ethnic, sectarian, and ideological divides to protect the “true people” of Turkey led by himself. By framing himself as the sole political force capable of safeguarding this unity, Erdogan consolidates his support base while marginalizing dissenters as disruptors of national harmony (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2023).

Erdogan frequently evokes a romanticized restorative nostalgic vision of the Ottoman Empire, portraying it as a pinnacle of Islamic grandeur and cultural richness. This deliberate invocation of the past serves to cultivate a collective yearning among supporters for a return to Turkey’s former glory (Karakaya, 2018; Elçi, 2021; Yilmaz, 2021). By aligning his leadership with this illustrious heritage, Erdogan crafts a narrative suggesting his governance continues the Ottoman legacy, aiming to reestablish Turkey’s prominence on the global stage (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018; Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).

The Study – What We Did

Our study forms part of an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant project, led by Ihsan Yilmaz and Ana-Maria Bliuc. As a component of the broader project, Erdogan’s speeches from 10 significant national events between 2013 and 2023 were systematically collected. Additionally, 52 of his supporters in Istanbul were interviewed using semi-structured format. The interviews were transcribed and translated into English. The data gathered from Erdogan’s speeches and interviews forms the foundation of our study.

The language analysis was conducted in two primary stages. An inductive thematic analysis was first performed to manually identify examples of two a priori rhetorical devices: nostalgia and threat. These two themes were then used as inputs into a seeded sequential Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model (Watanabe & Baturo, 2024) which was then used to identify language (words) associated with themes in Erdogan’s speeches. This process also revealed a third residual rhetorical device present in his discourse: unity.

Using a dictionary of thematic labels (terms related to each rhetorical device) identified using LDA, zero-shot text classification (Alcoforado et al., 2022) was then used to identify the presence of these key rhetorical sentiments in Erdogan’s speeches and his supporters’ discourse. The analysis used the xlm-roberta-large-xnli classification model (Hugging Face, 2024; Conneau, 2018) to categorize sentences into the predefined themes: Unity, Nostalgia, Threat, or None, depending on their thematic alignment. A confidence threshold of 0.85 was set to ensure classification accuracy whereby sentences above this threshold were deemed to contain these themes. The comparative analysis then identified the thematic alignment between the leader’s rhetoric and his supporters’ discourse, highlighting similarities and differences in the prevalence of the three rhetorical themes.

Results & Implications

This research quantitatively evaluates the rhetorical alignment and divergence between a populist leader and his supporters. The findings reveal that Unity (8735 sentences; 8.41%) and Threat (8500 sentences; 8.19%) were the most prevalent rhetorical devices in Erdogan’s speeches, with Nostalgia being comparatively less prominent (506 sentences; 0.49%).

Examining the sentences identified as Nostalgia, Unity, and Threat over time, it appears that the proportions of all three remained relatively consistent over time, apart from 2016 which had the highest proportion of threat discourse (i.e., during the 2016 coup).  See Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. Proportion of Unity, Threat, and Nostalgia discourse within Erdogan’s speeches over time.

Similarly, the interview data from his supporters shows Threat (1563 sentences; 5.51%) as the dominant rhetorical device, followed by Unity (700 sentences; 2.47%) and Nostalgia (52 sentences; 0.18%). These results indicate both alignment and divergence between Erdogan and his supporters, with alignment in the overall prevalence of Threat and Nostalgia, but a notable divergence in the frequency of Unity rhetoric.

The findings suggest that supporters may either amplify threat rhetoric while deprioritizing or underutilizing unity-based messaging. This could reflect a selective resonance with certain aspects of Erdogan’s rhetoric. Threat amplification (i.e., conflict-oriented narratives) may signal the emotional or strategic appeal of threat rhetoric within populist movements, while less emphasis on unity could indicate that it has limited perceived relevance or applicability in grassroots contexts.

This combination of alignment and divergence demonstrates a bit of a dichotomy with respect to rhetorical transmission. On one hand, the alignment demonstrates how populist rhetoric enters supporters’ discourse, and embeds themes of exclusion, moral division, and collective identity into their language. But, on the other hand, the divergence shows that supporters may prioritize certain themes over others based on their own interpretations or circumstances. It could also be the case that unity messaging does not carry the same level of emotional urgency that threat-based rhetoric does. While unity messaging is often framed as positive and affirming, it can lack the intensity that divisive and threatening language provides. Threat rhetoric, on the other hand, inspires more emotional responses such as fear and anger, which are more likely to provoke immediate and powerful reactions. This emotional charge may make threat-oriented messages more compelling and memorable, especially in the context of populist movements where a sense of crisis or danger is central to the narrative.

Through representations of nostalgia, threat, and unity, Erdogan builds a collective identity that contrasts many virtuous “people” with corrupt elites and this method reflects the key themes of populist communication. Our study shows that these themes are not only present in Erdogan’s speeches but are also, somewhat proportionally, internalized and reproduced in the language of his supporters. The language used by political leaders can be viewed as a tool for identity formation, as it can become embedded into the daily speech and thoughts of their followers, as demonstrated within this study. This promotes feelings of solidarity, legitimizes political power, and motivates action.

Overall, our findings show that political leaders can sustain influence over their supporters through carefully crafted rhetorical constructions that resonate with their audience’s values, emotions, and social identities. While far-right populist leaders may claim to promote unity and cohesion, their strategies often involve exploiting social divisions and consolidating national identity in ways that can ultimately reduce social trust and increase tensions between groups (Jay et al., 2019). For example, populism’s rise is closely linked to xenophobia and political violence through mechanisms of power consolidation, symbolic violence, and socio-political grievances. On top of this, nostalgic constructions create a narrative that contrasts a glorified past with a troubled present, which can further cause unrest. Understanding these dynamics is essential for addressing the challenges posed by populist movements and mitigating their impact on society.

 

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion and Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.

 

(*) Dr Matthew J. Belanger is a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology at University of Stirling, United Kingdom. He serves on the research advisory board at the Recovery Outcomes Institute and is on the board of directors at Recovery Scotland. He has a BSc in Kinesiology (2017) from the University of Massachusetts – Amherst, an MSc in Brain Sciences (2019) from the University of Glasgow, and a PhD in Addiction Psychology/Data Science (2024) from the University of Dundee, where he studied biopsychosocial factors influencing addiction recovery. Previously, he worked as a research scientist in the Department of Psychiatry and Psychotherapy at Universitaetsklinikum Carl Gustav Carus in Dresden Germany, undertaking research concerning environmental influences on behaviour. Beyond addiction recovery, Belanger’s interdisciplinary research also heavily involves the application of machine learning in sociological and political contexts.

(**) Dr. John Betts is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Data Science & AI at the Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Australia. He holds a PhD in Operations Research from Monash University, alongside qualifications in statistics, mathematics, and education. His expertise lies in computational modeling, optimization, simulation, and data science, with applications spanning social sciences, medicine, and manufacturing. His research has made significant contributions to areas such as online political behavior, prostate cancer treatment, and Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing. Noteworthy collaborations include studies on the influence of online influencers in societal polarization and the effects of local socio-political events on far-right online communities.

 

References

Alcoforado, A., Ferraz, T. P., Gerber, R., Bustos, E., Oliveira, A. S., Veloso, B. M., … & Costa, A. H. R. (2022) ‘ZeroBERTo: Leveraging zero-shot text classification by topic modeling’, International Conference on Computational Processing of the Portuguese Language, pp. 125-136. Cham: Springer International Publishing.

Bliuc, A-M., Betts, J. M. & Yilmaz, I. (2024) ‘Agent-Based Simulation and Linguistic Analysis of Populist vs. Non-Populist Rhetoric: Insights on Polarization and Cohesion’, European Center for Populism Studies. Available at: www.populismstudies.org/ (Accessed: 6 December 2024).

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Bonikowski, B. & Gidron, N. (2016) ‘The populist style in American politics: Presidential campaign discourse, 1952–1996’, Social Forces, 94(4), pp. 1593-1621.

Conneau, A., Khandelwal, K., Goyal, N., Chaudhary, V., Wenzek, G., Guzmán, F., … & Stoyanov, V. (2020) ‘Unsupervised Cross-lingual Representation Learning at Scale’, Proceedings of the 58th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pp. 8440–8451. Association for Computational Linguistics.

Elçi, E. (2021) ‘Nostalgia as a Political Tool: The Use of Ottoman Imagery in Turkish Populism’, Middle East Critique, 30(1), pp. 47–62.

Engesser, S., Ernst, N., Esser, F. & Büchel, F. (2017) ‘Populism and social media: How politicians spread a fragmented ideology’, Information, Communication & Society, 20(8), pp. 1109-1126.

Ernst, N., Engesser, S., Büchel, F., Blassnig, S. & Esser, F. (2017) ‘Extreme parties and populism: An analysis of Facebook and Twitter across six countries’, Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), pp. 1347-1364.

Jagers, J. & Walgrave, S. (2007) ‘Populism as political communication style: An empirical study of political parties’ discourse in Belgium’, European Journal of Political Research, 46(3), pp. 319-345.

Jay, S., Batruch, A., Jetten, J., McGarty, C. & Muldoon, O. T. (2019) ‘Economic inequality and the rise of far‐right populism: A social psychological analysis’, Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 29(5), pp. 418-428.

Karakaya, Y. (2018) ‘The Conquest of Hearts: The Central Role of Ottoman Nostalgia within Contemporary Turkish Populism’, Middle Eastern Studies, 54(5), pp. 790–813.

Kenny, M. (2017) ‘Back to the Populist Future? Understanding Retrogressive Politics in the United States and Europe’, American Affairs, 1(2), pp. 58–72.

Menke, M. & Wulf, T. (2021) ‘The dark side of inspirational pasts: An investigation of nostalgia in right-wing populist communication’, Media and Communication, 9(2), pp. 237-249.

Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040        

Rydgren, J. (2003) ‘Meso-level reasons for racism and xenophobia: Some converging and diverging effects of radical right populism in France and Sweden’, European Journal of Social Theory, 6(1), pp. 45-68.

Tas, H. (2020). “The chronopolitics of Erdogan’s populism in Turkey.” International Political Science Review, 41(4), 632–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119885444

Watanabe, K. & Baturo, A. (2024) ‘Seeded sequential LDA: A semi-supervised algorithm for topic-specific analysis of sentences’, Social Science Computer Review, 42(1), pp. 224-248.

Yilmaz, I. & Morieson, N. (2023). “Civilizational Populism: Definition, Literature, Theory, and Practice.” In: Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. (pp. 1-22). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4262-6_2

Yilmaz, I., & Bashirov, G. (2018). “The AKP after 15 years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly, 39(9), 1812–1830. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371

Yilmaz, I., & Morieson, N. (2022). “Civilizational Populism in Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey.” Religions, 14(5), 631. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050631

Yilmaz, I., & Shipoli, E. (2021). Use of past collective traumas, fear and conspiracy theories for securitization of the opposition and authoritarianisation: the Turkish case. Democratization, 29(2), 320–336. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1953992

Yilmaz, I., Shipoli, E., & Demir, M. (2021). Authoritarian resilience through securitization: an Islamist populist party’s co-optation of a secularist far-right party. Democratization, 28(6), 1115–1132. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1891412

Yilmaz, I. (2021). Creating the Desired Citizen: Ideology, State and Islam in Turkey. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 

New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern speaks at the Memorial Service for the Muslim victims of the Christchurch shootings, held in Christchurch, Canterbury, New Zealand, on March 29, 2019, with a significant police presence. Photo: Sheryl Watson.

Agent-Based Simulation and Linguistic Analysis of Populist vs. Non-Populist Rhetoric: Insights on Polarization and Cohesion

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeLeadership & Persona

Our agent-based simulations show that non-populist rhetoric, exemplified by former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, fosters societal cohesion through positivity, inclusivity, and broad audience engagement. By maintaining a “middle ground,” it promotes civil discourse and prevents ideological divisions from deepening into polarization. Inclusive language ensures all groups feel recognized, addressing societal fractures. In contrast, populist rhetoric, typified by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, reinforces divides through negativity and exclusion. By antagonizing outgroups and amplifying grievances, it fosters conflict and consolidates ingroup loyalty at the expense of societal harmony. This sharp contrast highlights the stabilizing potential of inclusive rhetoric versus the fragmenting impact of populist communication.

By Ana-Maria Bliuc*, John Betts** & Ihsan Yilmaz

Introduction

Charismatic leaders hold extraordinary influence over their audiences, shaping the emotional and ideological contours of polarization. Their rhetoric can intensify divisions when it is extreme or reduce tensions when it emphasizes inclusivity and moderation (Betts & Bliuc, 2022; Bliuc et al., 2023; Bliuc et al., 2024). Through emotional appeals, they cultivate trust, admiration, and even anger, channeling these emotions into collective action. However, this influence is complex: emotional appeals often create feedback loops that deepen loyalty while perpetuating divisive rhetoric. The “awestruck effect,” where followers suppress their emotions in response to a leader’s overwhelming presence, highlights the intensity of this dynamic. Additionally, charisma can be contagious, fostering intra-group cohesion while amplifying intergroup polarization.

This article explores how populist and non-populist rhetoric influences societal polarization, focusing on the speeches of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and former New Zealand Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern between 2017 and 2023. We present preliminary findings from our ongoing research, which uses linguistic analysis and computational modelling to understand how their communication styles shape societal dynamics. Erdogan’s speeches often reflect populist tendencies, using divisive language to define “the people” in opposition to “the elite” and “the others,” reinforcing group divisions. In contrast, Ardern’s rhetoric emphasizes inclusivity and optimism, promoting unity and social cohesion. These contrasting approaches offer valuable insights into the role of leadership communication in fostering either polarization or cohesion.

Our analysis uses tools such as Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) and Natural Language Processing (NLP) to examine the tone, content, and inclusivity of their speeches. Additionally, we apply an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate how these rhetorical styles influence societal divisions over time. The ABM treats individuals as “agents” with distinct responses to messages, allowing us to explore how individual reactions can shape larger societal trends like polarization or unity. This ongoing research aims to shed light on how leaders’ rhetoric impacts societal cohesion or division. This preliminary analysis offers critical insights into how political communication shapes group dynamics, paving the way for further exploration of its long-term effects on societal cohesion or division.

Populists and Polarization

Populism is often a significant driver of societal polarization. Populist leaders, particularly those with charismatic appeal, play a central role in driving polarization. Their rhetoric often mobilizes emotions such as anger and fear, framing societal divides as existential battles (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). Right-wing populists tend to focus on issues like immigration and national sovereignty, while left-wing populists emphasize economic inequality and social justice. Regardless of ideological orientation, their communication strategies frequently amplify societal divisions by fostering in-group loyalty and out-group hostility (Hawkins, 2009).

Populist leaders often employ divisive rhetoric that frames societal conflicts as a struggle between a virtuous “people” and a corrupt “elite,” thereby deepening societal divisions. This “us versus them” narrative simplifies complex issues and fosters an environment of distrust and animosity among different social groups. The emotional and moralistic language used by populists can exacerbate polarization by reinforcing in-group solidarity while marginalizing out-groups. The relationship between populism and polarization is particularly acute in contexts where political institutions are weak or trust in governance is low.

Erdogan’s Populism

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addresses a rally organized by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) at Istanbul Ataturk Airport ahead of the local elections in Istanbul, Turkey on March 24, 2024. Photo: Tolga Ildun.

Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s populism has become a defining feature of Turkey’s contemporary political landscape. His leadership, particularly as head of the Justice and Development Party (AKP), illustrates a shift towards “civilizational populism.” This approach frames political conflicts not merely in terms of domestic divides but as existential struggles between competing civilizational identities, with Erdogan positioning himself and the AKP as defenders of Islamic values against secular and Western influences (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022).

Erdogan’s populist rhetoric constructs a binary between the “pure and virtuous people” and the “corrupt elite,” with the latter often described as Westernized secularists who are portrayed as out of touch with Turkey’s authentic Islamic identity. This narrative draws on historical grievances, including the marginalization of religious conservatives during the Kemalist era, to galvanize his base. By invoking Turkey’s Ottoman-Islamic heritage, Erdogan aligns himself with a broader “Islamic civilization” and situates his leadership within a narrative of resistance to Western domination and secular modernity (Yilmaz & Morieson 2023; Morieson et al., 2024).

One hallmark of Erdogan’s populism is his strategic use of crises to consolidate power and deepen polarization. For example, in the aftermath of the 2016 failed coup attempt, Erdogan framed the event as an existential threat orchestrated by foreign conspirators and domestic traitors, which justified the purging of perceived enemies within the state and society. His narrative positioned the AKP as the sole protector of national sovereignty and religious values, marginalizing dissenters as enemies of the state and Islam (Tas, 2020). Civilizational populism also extends to Erdogan’s foreign policy. His rhetoric frequently portrays Turkey as the leader of the Muslim world, defending Islamic interests against a hostile West (Yilmaz & Bashirov, 2018).

Jacinda Ardern’s Leadership and Inclusive Rhetoric

Jacinda Ardern’s leadership as Prime Minister of New Zealand (2017–2023) offers a compelling example of how inclusive and empathetic rhetoric can foster societal cohesion in a world increasingly divided by polarization. Unlike populist leaders who often amplify divisions through exclusivity and antagonism, Ardern’s communication style is characterized by optimism, inclusivity, and a focus on collective well-being. Her leadership emphasized unity over division and shared values over antagonistic narratives.

One of the defining moments of Ardern’s tenure was her response to the 2019 Christchurch Mosque attacks, in which 51 people lost their lives in an act of white supremacist terrorism. Ardern’s immediate response, marked by empathy and solidarity, included public expressions of grief, wearing a hijab to demonstrate respect for Muslim communities, and categorically denouncing hate. Her government’s “Wellbeing Budget,” introduced in 2019, shifted the focus of governance from traditional economic indicators to measures of societal well-being, such as mental health, child poverty, and environmental sustainability. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Ardern’s empathetic communication style played a pivotal role in maintaining public trust and compliance. Her use of direct communication through social media, coupled with clear and consistent messaging, fostered a sense of unity and shared purpose (Craig, 2021). 

Unlike the divisive strategies often employed by populist leaders such as Erdogan, Ardern’s rhetoric consistently avoided antagonism, focusing instead on fostering dialogue and inclusivity. Her communication style offers an alternative to traditional populism, highlighting the capacity of empathetic and inclusive leadership to bridge divides and promote societal cohesion.

Contrasts in Rhetorical Styles

The analysis of speeches delivered by Erdogan and Ardern highlights striking contrasts in their rhetorical styles. Erdogan’s speeches are characterized by brevity, negativity, and exclusivity, with an average length of 430 words compared to Ardern’s more expansive 2,051 words. His frequent appeals to a specific ingroup and the simultaneous exclusion or demonization of outgroups reflect a populist approach. This rhetoric employs divisive language that frames societal dynamics in binary terms: a virtuous “us” versus a corrupt or threatening “them.” Language tokens show the content of his speeches to be focused on Turkey’s prominence in the world (“nation,” “future,” “great,” “world”). This type of communication reinforces group boundaries, creating a heightened sense of identity among ingroup members while fostering animosity toward outgroups.

By contrast, Ardern’s speeches are characterized by inclusivity, positivity, and a focus on shared national identity. Her use of inclusive language, such as incorporating Māori terms like “koutou” (you all) and “katoa” (all), underscores her commitment to addressing diverse audiences as part of a unified whole. This rhetoric not only bridges ideological and cultural divides but also actively works to foster cohesion. By framing political challenges as collective issues requiring mutual effort, Ardern cultivates a sense of solidarity and reduces the potential for societal polarization.

Emotional Tone

A key finding of our study is the role of emotional tone in driving or mitigating polarization. Erdogan’s speeches often employ fear, anger, and grievance to mobilize his base. He also makes a greater use of words belonging to categories such as “power,” “politics,” “authority” compared to Ardern. These emotional appeals resonate strongly with ingroup members but simultaneously alienate outgroup members, fostering an antagonistic environment. The cyclical nature of such rhetoric—where repeated exposure reinforces emotional divides—intensifies polarization over time.

Ardern’s positive emotional appeals focus on empathy, hope, and collective well-being. This is evident in the greater prevalence of terms from categories like “perception,” “authentic,” “insight” compared to Erdogan. These messages resonate across diverse groups, creating an emotional connection that fosters trust and mutual respect. This ability to evoke positive emotions while addressing collective concerns makes inclusive rhetoric particularly effective in promoting cohesion and mitigating polarization.

Audience Reach

Another critical factor is the scope of a leader’s audience reach. Erdogan’s targeted approach speaks primarily to his ingroup, limiting the broader appeal of his message. This narrow scope ensures that his rhetoric resonates deeply with a specific subset of society but fails to engage or persuade others. His targeted communication exacerbates divisions by leaving outgroups feeling excluded and marginalized.

In contrast, Ardern’s broad reach allows her rhetoric to address diverse segments of society. By framing her messages in inclusive terms, she creates a sense of belonging among a wider audience. This broad appeal reduces the likelihood of polarization by fostering dialogue and understanding across ideological and cultural divides.

Broader Implications of Leadership Communication

The findings illustrate that the tone and reach of a leader’s rhetoric are as critical as its content in shaping societal dynamics. Erdogan’s populist approach leverages exclusionary narratives to consolidate ingroup loyalty but at the cost of societal cohesion. Ardern’s inclusive style demonstrates the potential for leadership to bridge divides and foster unity, even in challenging contexts.

These results have implications for understanding the role of political communication in contemporary society. They highlight the dual-edged nature of rhetoric: while it can mobilize and inspire, it can also divide and alienate. Leaders, therefore, carry a significant responsibility in shaping the emotional and ideological landscape of their societies.

Agent-Based Simulation: A Window into Long-Term Impacts

The Agent-Based Model (ABM) is a powerful analytical tool that simulates the way individuals interact within a society. In this case, we used it to explore how different rhetorical styles may shape public beliefs over time. This method allowed us to test the long-term effects of leaders’ communication styles in a controlled virtual environment, offering insights into their potential societal impact.

The agent-based simulations provide a unique perspective on the long-term effects of rhetorical styles. They show how individual responses to rhetoric can aggregate into broader societal trends. In Erdogan’s case, targeted, negative rhetoric creates a feedback loop of polarization. Even if the frequency of such rhetoric decreases, its polarizing effects persist due to the entrenched divisions it creates.

In contrast, Ardern’s inclusive rhetoric has a stabilizing effect. By fostering dialogue and promoting mutual understanding, her communication style helps build resilience against external shocks that might otherwise exacerbate societal divisions. These findings highlight the potential of positive, inclusive rhetoric to mitigate the destabilizing impact of populist communication.

The results show stark contrasts between these approaches. Ardern’s speeches were longer, more positive, and emphasized inclusivity and shared national identity. Her frequent use of inclusive language, including Māori terms reinforced this approach. Erdogan’s speeches, by contrast, were shorter, more negative, and often appealed to a specific in-group while excluding the out-group. When modelled over time using agent-based simulations, these rhetorical styles produced markedly different effects. Erdogan’s negative, targeted rhetoric deepened societal divisions, driving bipolarization. His exclusionary language reinforced pre-existing divides, ensuring polarization persisted even when communication was less frequent. Ardern’s inclusive and positive rhetoric, however, promoted cohesion by stabilizing the “middle ground,” where disagreements occurred without escalating into entrenched polarization. Her approach acted as a mitigating force, countering the effects of external shocks or crises that might otherwise deepen divisions.

Our study also highlights the importance of context in shaping the effects of rhetoric. Erdogan’s rhetoric resonates strongly in a political environment marked by economic challenges, geopolitical tensions, and cultural divisions. These conditions amplify the appeal of populist narratives that frame societal problems as the fault of external adversaries or internal enemies.

Ardern’s rhetoric, on the other hand, is tailored to a context emphasizing collective well-being, inclusivity, and national identity. Her communication style aligns with New Zealand’s cultural emphasis on egalitarianism and community, enhancing its effectiveness in fostering cohesion. These contextual factors demonstrate that the impact of rhetoric is not solely determined by the leader’s style but also by the broader social and political environment in which it is delivered.

Conclusion

The findings of this study underscore the profound impact of political rhetoric on societal polarization. Non-populist rhetoric, characterized by its positive tone, inclusivity, and broad audience reach, emerges as a critical tool for fostering societal cohesion. By maintaining a “solid middle ground,” such rhetoric enables civil disagreements while preventing ideological divisions from escalating into entrenched polarization. Inclusive language ensures that both ingroups and outgroups feel recognized and valued, addressing the psychological and ideological fractures that often underlie societal tensions.

In contrast, populist rhetoric, with its negative tone and narrow audience focus, deepens divides by reinforcing group boundaries and antagonizing outgroups. The polarizing effect of this rhetoric lies not only in its content but in its delivery—its ability to heighten conflict, amplify grievances, and consolidate ingroup loyalty at the expense of broader societal harmony. By appealing to exclusionary identities and emotional grievances, populist leaders exacerbate societal fragmentation, leading to a more divided and contentious public sphere.

For policymakers and practitioners, these findings highlight the necessity of prioritizing communication strategies that unite rather than divide. The tone and delivery of a leader’s message can determine whether disagreements are addressed constructively or exacerbate social cleavages. This calls for a re-evaluation of political discourse, focusing on strategies that emphasize shared values and mutual respect. While these preliminary findings highlight the power of rhetoric to shape group dynamics, further investigation is needed to fully understand the long-term implications of these communication styles in diverse contexts.

 

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion.

 

(*) Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc is an Associate Professor of Social and Political Psychology in the Psychology Department at the University of Dundee, where she has been a faculty member since 2019. Her research explores how social identities influence behavior across various contexts, including health, environmental issues (such as climate change), and socio-political domains (such as collective action and social change). Recently, her work has focused on online communities, investigating how collective identities and behaviors are shaped through digital interactions.

(**) Dr. John Betts is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Data Science & AI at the Faculty of Information Technology, Monash University, Australia. He holds a PhD in Operations Research from Monash University, alongside qualifications in statistics, mathematics, and education. His expertise lies in computational modeling, optimization, simulation, and data science, with applications spanning social sciences, medicine, and manufacturing. His research has made significant contributions to areas such as online political behavior, prostate cancer treatment, and Just-in-Time (JIT) manufacturing. Noteworthy collaborations include studies on the influence of online influencers in societal polarization and the effects of local socio-political events on far-right online communities.

 

References  

Betts, J. M. & Bliuc, A. M. (2022). “The effect of influencers on societal polarization.” In: 2022 Winter Simulation Conference (WSC) (pp. 370-381). IEEE.  

Bliuc, A. M.; Betts, J. M.; Vergani, M.; Bouguettaya, A. & Cristea, M. (2024). “A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation of a divided society.” Communications Psychology, 2(1), 75. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00125-1

Bliuc, A.M.; Cristea, M. & Betts, J. (2023). The role of charismatic influencers in polarisation: an agent-based modelling approach. Paper presented at 19th General Meeting of the European Association of Social Psychology (EASP), Krakow, Poland.

Craig, G. (2021). “Kindness and Control: The Political Leadership of Jacinda Ardern in the Aotearoa New Zealand COVID-19 Media Conferences.” Journalism and Media, 2(2), 288-304. https://doi.org/10.3390/journalmedia2020017

Hawkins, K. A. (2009). “Is Chávez Populist? Measuring Populist Discourse in Comparative Perspective. “Comparative Political Studies, 42(8), 1040–1067. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414009331721

Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash.” HKS Faculty Research Working Paper Series. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2818659

Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040        

Tas, H. (2020). “The chronopolitics of Erdogan’s populism in Turkey.” International Political Science Review, 41(4), 632–646. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512119885444

Yilmaz, I., & Bashirov, G. (2018). “The AKP after 15 years: Emergence of Erdoganism in Turkey.” Third World Quarterly, 39(9), 1812–1830. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2018.1447371

Yilmaz, I., & Morieson, N. (2022). “Civilizational Populism in Domestic and Foreign Policy: The Case of Turkey.” Religions, 14(5), 631. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel14050631

Yilmaz, I. & Morieson, N. (2023). “Civilizational Populism: Definition, Literature, Theory, and Practice.” In: Religions and the Global Rise of Civilizational Populism. (pp. 1-22). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-99-4262-6_2

Dr. Sorina Christina Soare, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence.

Professor Soare: Romania’s Radical Right Populism Reflects Deep-Rooted Socio-Economic Frustrations

by Editor’s ChoiceEuropean ObservatoryHomeInterviews

Describing Călin Georgescu’s first-round presidential victory as “shocking,” Professor Sorina Christina Soare highlights the pivotal role of social media, particularly TikTok, in mobilizing young voters. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she explains. She emphasizes Georgescu’s populist appeal, driven by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility,” she notes. Despite warning of potential instability, Professor Soare remains optimistic that Romania’s semi-presidential system and pro-European coalitions can sustain the country’s European trajectory.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a candid and insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Thursday, Dr. Sorina Christina Soare, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, delves into the dynamics shaping Romania’s political landscape. She examines the resurgence of radical-right populist parties (RRPPs), their connections to historical and socio-economic grievances, and the transformative role of social media in contemporary politics.

Professor Soare begins by contextualizing Romania’s political evolution, emphasizing its “tradition of populist mobilization in post-communist politics” while highlighting systemic issues that have persisted since the democratic transition. She attributes the 2020 resurgence of RRPPs like the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) to a “perfect storm of pandemic-driven malaise, skilled political entrepreneurship, and strong grassroots mobilization.” She explains, “Significant portions of the Romanian population do not see themselves as beneficiaries of the democratic transition or EU membership, fueling dissatisfaction and driving migration.”

The interview also explores the rise of far-right parties such as AUR and SOS Romania. Despite their shared emphasis on defending national identity and traditional values, Professor Soare draws a clear distinction between their organizational strategies, noting that AUR is a “rooted party with strong social ties,” whereas SOS operates as a “personal party” reliant on its leader’s visibility. This reflects broader societal trends, she adds, where “diffuse nationalism and skepticism about EU norms cross party lines,” resonating deeply with voters.

Professor Soare further examines how social media, particularly TikTok, has become a powerful tool for mobilizing young voters, pointing to Călin Georgescu’s “shocking” first-round presidential victory in 2024. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she observes. On Georgescu’s candidacy, she emphasizes its populist appeal, underpinned by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. She notes, “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility.”

Finally, discussing the implications of Georgescu’s potential presidency, Professor Soare underscores the risks and safeguards within Romania’s semi-presidential system. While cautioning against possible instability, she remains optimistic about the country’s ability to maintain its European trajectory, provided mainstream parties can mobilize effectively. 

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Sorina Cristina Soare with some edits.

Causes of the Populist Resurgence in Romania

Professor Soare, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your two articles on Romania for two ECPS reports in 2023 and 2024, you argue that the country was once considered a partial exception to the global diffusion of populism. However, in 2020, Radical Right Populist Parties (RRPPs) made a notable return to Parliament. What factors do you believe have driven this resurgence of RRPPs in Romanian politics?

Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Thank you for your question. There are different reasons to consider. Romania has a tradition of populist mobilization in post-communist politics, and this is something we have to take into account, particularly in the 1990s and early 2000s, when different political parties adopted populist platforms with relevance in terms of electoral success.

What happened in 2020 reflects, on the one hand, a specific event connected to the pandemic and the malaise felt by different segments of the population. On the other hand, it highlights something more systemic that has crossed the political arena since the very beginning of the transition to democracy: the lack of widely distributed economic benefits. This is crucial because significant portions of the Romanian population do not see themselves as beneficiaries of the democratic transition or, later, of the EU membership status achieved in 2007.

This dissatisfaction helps explain why Romania has one of the highest levels of citizens living abroad. Many emigrated due to the lack of a decent standard of living in Romania, while a smaller but significant minority sought opportunities where their training and high competencies could be better recognized in the job market.

There was an insightful article published today on Politico that illustrates the stark disparities in Romania, including gaps in education, the economy, and the pronounced divide between Bucharest and the rest of the country, as well as between the major cities and rural areas.

The 2020 resurgence of RRPPs was the result of a perfect storm: a context of widespread malaise driven by the pandemic, the rise of a skilled political entrepreneur in George Simion’s personality, and the organizational strength of the AUR party. Unlike some other populist movements, AUR cannot be considered a personal party. It has developed strong grassroots mobilization through associations and other structures, which have provided it with stable support over time since 2020.

The Rise of AUR and SOS Romania

George Simion, president of the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR), answers journalists’ questions during a press conference at the party’s headquarters in Bucharest, Romania, on May 10, 2023. Photo: Shutterstock.

How do you interpret the rise of far-right parties like AUR and SOS Romania in the context of Romania’s political landscape? What specific societal or political factors have contributed to their increasing influence? What role do you think Romanian national identity and Euroscepticism play in shaping the populist rhetoric of parties like AUR and SOS Romania, particularly in their emphasis on sovereignty and traditional values?

Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Thank you for your question. It is very relevant and covers several aspects. AUR and SOS Romania come from the same origins, or a new class of populist radical-right movements. Considering that SOS Romania’s leadership is represented by Diana Iovanovici Șoșoacă, who was elected as an MP on AUR’s list in 2020, there is some alignment between the two parties. However, the difference is particularly linked to their type of party organization. As I mentioned, AUR is a rooted party with social ties to various associative and activist experiences on the ground. On the other hand, SOS Romania operates more like a personal party, heavily relying on the vocal presence and visibility of its leader.

Both parties, however, share an emphasis on defending national identity. This emphasis is not unique to them. In the current presidential election, particularly during the first round, we can see that symbols of nationalism and religion are prevalent across the political spectrum. For instance, the candidate presented as pro-European, liberal, and progressive also subtly echoed these themes. She wore a small bracelet with the Romanian flag and a large cross, signaling diffuse nationalism and religious sentiment that transcends party lines.

What distinguishes AUR and SOS is the intensity with which they voice these themes. AUR increasingly resembles a radical-right party that tries to control the populist elements of its discourse, making it appear more mainstream. In contrast, SOS frequently crosses constitutional boundaries, echoing extremist rhetoric, including anti-semitism, which fundamentally clashes with Romania’s democratic constitutional pillars.

Regarding the European Union, mainstream parties often temper their criticism due to their positions in government and affiliations with European parliamentary groups. Opposition parties like AUR and SOS, however, are freer to express vocal critiques. AUR does not advocate an EU exit but calls for greater compatibility and synergy between Romanian values and EU expectations. For example, they argue against being forced to accept certain norms, such as those related to the LGBTQI+ community. Interestingly, this stance is not unique to AUR but is voiced more strongly because they are outside the governing establishment.

What I want to emphasize is that nationalism and skepticism about certain EU-related aspects are widespread in Romania. This sentiment is rooted in society, not concentrated in specific groups, and it crosses party lines. These attitudes were channeled effectively during the 2024 presidential election by a candidate who presented himself as an outsider, not part of the establishment. This provides a bridge to understanding more recent political developments.

Radical-Right Populism’s Shift in Romania From Ethnicity to Morality

How do you interpret the shift in focus from ethnic-based exclusion to cultural and religious-based exclusion among Romania’s radical-right populist parties, and what factors might have driven this transformation?

Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: In my most recent fieldwork, I gained a better understanding of the origins and organization of AUR. During earlier phases of research with Glad and Țufiş, we identified two main roots of AUR’s ideology. One root emphasized the need to restore a “Greater Romania,” particularly through unification with the Republic of Moldova. The other focused on conservative values, which draw on Romania’s history, including the so-called fascist period between the two World Wars. I use “so-called” because the term refers to the legendary movements of that era.

Beyond these two roots, there is a third, particularly evident in Transylvania, where a group of militants focus on defending Romania’s cultural integrity. This group views the Hungarian minority as a potential threat to the country’s territorial integrity. This tension helps explain why Viktor Orbán was so vocal when AUR joined the ECR group after the 2024 EP elections. However, ethnic minority integration is not a central issue in Romania’s political arena. Instead, AUR and SOS Romania emphasize the need to control the cultural and moral identity of the Romanian people.

Why is this so? From my interviews with militants, members, voters, and candidates for the EP elections, the explanation is relatively straightforward. There is a widespread frustration that European integration and globalization threaten the survival of Romania’s national identity. On one side, there is the perception that values inconsistent with Romania’s religious traditions—such as a liberal understanding of gender—are being imposed. On the other side, there is economic frustration, with narratives portraying Romania as a “colony” of other countries, forced to import norms and values misaligned with its traditions.

This frustration extends beyond short-term concerns. For instance, Romania experiences one of the most intense flows of economic migration in Eastern Europe, leading to a population decline. AUR and SOS claim that this shrinking population weakens Romania’s demographic strength and diminishes the relevance of the Romanian majority. While they do not explicitly target the Roma community, other groups, such as Hungarians, are subtly framed as long-term threats.

This also explains their stance on the role of women in society. AUR and SOS advocate for a traditional role for women, not only as part of Romania’s cultural traditions but also as a strategic element in ensuring the reproduction of the Romanian people. Women are viewed as critical to maintaining and securing the nation’s demographic sustainability in the long run.

Romania’s 2015 Law Transformed Party Dynamics

Official campaign posters for the 2024 Romanian presidential election in Timișoara, Romania, on October 27, 2024, featuring candidates Marcel Ciolacu, Nicolae Ciucă, Mircea Geoană, Elena Lasconi, George Simion, Hunor Kelemen, Ludovic Orban, and Cristian Terheș. Photo: Adrian Păcurariu.

How changes in Romania’s party registration laws in 2015 created an opportunity for the proliferation of new political parties? To what extent do you believe these changes reflect a broader trend in post-communist democracies, and how sustainable are these new parties in the long term?

Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Romania has been criticized, particularly by various NGOs active in democracy advocacy and monitoring, for having one of the most rigid laws regulating political parties. Previously, party registration required a threshold of 10,000 to 25,000 members, along with additional criteria for territorial distribution, and so on.

The original purpose of this regulation, introduced in the 1990s and amended in the early 2000s, was to reduce fragmentation in the political arena and enhance governability. However, NGOs, experts, and academics highlighted its negative consequences. The most significant issue was the difficulty new parties faced in organizing themselves, which severely restricted opportunities for renewal within the party system. Romania’s party system has often been described in the literature as relatively closed. While this framework provided predictability and stability, it also created an artificially constrained system—a cartel of parties that, through legal regulations on party laws, funding, and electoral thresholds (e.g., requiring a high number of signatures for candidacies), implicitly controlled not only Parliament but also broader political competition, thereby limiting the voice of the people.

When the party registration law changed, lowering the membership threshold to just two or three members—the same number required to establish an NGO—it symbolically aligned political parties with genuine civil society representation. This change significantly increased the number of new parties being created. As Claudia Țuțuianu and I observed in an article even before 2020, there was already evidence of radicalism in the extra-parliamentary political party landscape, indicating a demand for representation.

The change in the law facilitated the development of radical parties in Romania. For example, ahead of the legislative elections scheduled for December 1, several new parties associated with former AUR MPs are emerging as potential surprises. One such party, focused on young people, even endorsed the unexpected candidate who won the first round of the 2024 presidential election.

While the legal reforms certainly encouraged the proliferation of these parties, they did not create them. These parties emerged in response to existing conditions on the ground—political entrepreneurs addressing widespread frustration and a perceived need for greater representation.

This phenomenon is not unique to Romania and can be observed across Eastern Europe. A useful comparison is Bulgaria, where the political party system also experienced significant changes and increased fragmentation, particularly with the rise of radical right populist parties. These developments highlight similar levels of frustration and disillusionment among the electorate in both countries.

AUR Mobilized Economic Anxieties and Harnessed Diaspora Support 

How has the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) managed to capitalize on economic and social anxieties to expand its political influence despite its controversial ties and radical rhetoric?

Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: I think one element I forgot to mention in the previous question, but which I will use as the starting point here, is that while the law facilitated the proliferation of parties, some of these parties are well-developed in terms of organizational infrastructure, and AUR is one of them.

How AUR succeeded in voicing these anxieties is quite simple. First of all, through its origins, particularly at the diaspora level. What we observed in our research with Claudio Țuțuianu was that many militants were already active in providing social services to Romanians in Romania. They were channeling part of their well-being in Western countries to help their families, relatives, and, more broadly, the Romanian community in need back home. 

By channeling these frustrations and demonstrating that they cared—through recruitment and by creating networks and connections with active individuals in formal and informal diaspora associations—AUR showed credibility. It was not just a political entrepreneur making promises; it presented itself as genuinely engaged. These networks significantly increased its credibility.

Additionally, George Simion himself was seen as credible because of his involvement in these networks, particularly in projects related to the union with the Republic of Moldova. While SOS Romania uses skilled communication and a highly fluid approach, the capacity of AUR to voice these anxieties is linked to its stability and organizational pervasiveness. The difference lies in AUR’s solid and far-reaching networks compared to SOS’s reliance on skilled political representation, particularly in the person of its leader, Mrs. Șoșoacă.

What role has the Romanian diaspora played in shaping the electoral success of populist parties like AUR, particularly in the light of their strategic targeting of diaspora voters?

Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: This is one of the most intensive areas of research on my agenda, so I feel quite comfortable answering it. The Romanian diaspora began to matter politically, becoming a significant actor capable of altering the direction and results of national-level competition, particularly starting with the 2009 presidential election.

The diaspora did not become active solely with AUR; its mobilization has evolved over time, particularly after 2008, when a change in the electoral law reserved seats in Parliament for diaspora representation. This created an incentive for political parties to mobilize diaspora voters. Of course, when discussing the diaspora, we are referring to a multi-layered and multi-sectoral community.

Why multi-layered? Because there are different temporal layers corresponding to various waves of migration. Some began their migration trajectory before the fall of the Berlin Wall, others in the early 1990s, and more in the 2000s and beyond. The level of integration within their resident communities varies depending on these chronological trajectories. There is also significant variation in professional trajectories—some diaspora members moved to highly skilled jobs, while others took less-skilled positions. Some exchanged exploitation in Romania for severe exploitation in other areas, particularly in southern Sicily, where there have been numerous reports of Romanian agricultural workers being exploited by Italian entrepreneurs. This triggered mechanisms from the Romanian state to defend its migrant workers.

The Romanian diaspora is highly heterogeneous. Why have these people felt mobilized by AUR, SOS, and even a credible, liberal party like USR? They have been mobilized primarily by parties presenting themselves as new—whether through their origins, age (as newer parties), or connections with the diaspora—and by their vocal anti-establishment platforms. These parties stood out as different from the traditional offerings of political parties, particularly the Social Democrats and Liberals.

Diaspora voters tend to vote not only based on the content of party platforms but also on the belief that they need politicians who are fundamentally different from the traditional post-communist elite. They seek politicians who can dismantle the “cartel” of parties, reduce corruption, and bring real change. Interestingly, in my interviews, I found that many diaspora voters expressed a strong desire for a future for themselves in Romania. They viewed their investment in these parties as a way to increase the quality of life and democracy in Romania.

The people I interviewed were not extremists, to the best of my knowledge. None of them advocated for regime changes or anti-democratic positions. Instead, their concerns centered on increased transparency, reduced corruption, and improved living standards in Romania, which would enable them to return and rebuild. This is, I believe, an important aspect of their motivation.

Calin Georgescu’s ‘Shocking’ Rise

Although far-right independent candidate Calin Georgescu was not seen as a serious candidate in almost all the polls, he won the first round of presidential elections which was dubbed as ‘shocking’ by many European experts. What are the key factors behind the unprecedented surge in support for Georgescu, particularly given his low polling numbers before the election? Do you agree with the characterization of his victory as ‘shocking’?

Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: Yes, it was definitely shocking on different levels. First of all, as you rightly pointed out, it was unexpected based on the analyses and surveys published before the elections, which foresaw a runoff between the candidate endorsed by the Social Democrats and, in second position, a tight fight between the candidates of USR (Uniunea Salvați România-Save Romania Union) and AUR.

This candidate seemingly came out of nowhere. He was not very well known to the broader public, but he was not entirely new to Romanian politics. Those familiar with Romania’s political landscape and its moments of governmental instability know that his name had been mentioned on various occasions, starting in 2011 and again in 2015, as a potential technocratic Prime Minister. Additionally, after the 2020 elections, AUR initially endorsed Călin Georgescu as a potential Prime Minister before distancing themselves from him. This split occurred after a highly controversial interview in which Georgescu publicly supported two controversial figures in Romanian history—one a leader of the Legionary Movement and the other a marshal who aligned with Nazi Germany during the war in Russia. These statements were widely criticized as aligning with anti-democratic ideals, and Georgescu faced legal scrutiny over them, though the outcome of these proceedings remains unclear.

Furthermore, Georgescu has been active in publishing books and participating in associations that echo themes deeply rooted in nationalist rhetoric. These themes, while seemingly simple and basic, are reminiscent of ideas prevalent in the 1990s and even earlier. For example, he has espoused an unrefined form of nationalism, portraying Romanians as an extraordinary people and civilization. In one interview, he controversially claimed that proto-Romanian is the basis of Latin, which contradicts conventional historical and linguistic understanding.

Georgescu has also propagated conspiracy theories, such as denying the moon landing or questioning the official narrative of the September 11 attacks in the United States. While these ideas are contentious, they resonate with certain segments of the population, aligning with the common suspicions and frustrations of everyday people. This ability to connect with widespread sentiments is a hallmark of populism: speaking like the people while presenting oneself as a savior or a figure with extraordinary abilities.

Georgescu excels in this role. He voices what people think and does so with a reassuring tone and demeanor. He is well-educated, speaks polished Romanian, and appears as a composed and credible figure. These traits contrast with George Simion’s more vocal and aggressive style, which uses a simpler Romanian. Georgescu, by comparison, projects an image of sophistication and calm.

His campaign also made strategic use of visual and symbolic elements. For example, TikTok videos depicted him on a white horse wearing traditional Romanian clothing or as a wolf with fire emanating from his eyes or mouth, symbolizing strength and purity. These portrayals reinforced his image as a savior or protector. What truly explains his success, however, is his effective use of TikTok. His campaign on the platform was remarkably successful, allowing him to reach a broad audience with simple, relatable messages that resonated deeply with many voters.

How do you interpret the role of social media, particularly platforms like TikTok, in mobilizing voter support for far-right candidates in Romania? Does this signal a broader trend in European politics?

Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: I wouldn’t generalize about TikTok at the European level, but it has definitely been both utilized and challenged by different candidates—not only in Romania but also across Europe and in the United States. TikTok is undoubtedly efficient. Why? Because it allows for short, impactful messages. While there is limited space for interaction, there is significant potential for engagement.

TikTok’s visual nature and simplicity make it highly accessible, which explains why a significant portion of Georgescu’s support came from young people, who are particularly familiar with the platform. Moreover, TikTok has been less scrutinized by regulatory organizations responsible for monitoring campaign activities, giving it an edge in reaching audiences without strict oversight.

As you may know, there has been ongoing debate in the European Parliament about TikTok’s policies, particularly its claim that it does not allow political campaigns or engagement. However, cases like this reveal vulnerabilities or loopholes in the system that enable mobilization in gray areas. This is a challenge not only for Romania but potentially for Europe and beyond.

Risks and Scenarios for Romania’s Future in EU and NATO

Marcel Ciolacu, president of the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and Romanian prime minister, delivers a speech at the conclusion of the PSD Congress at ROMEXPO in Bucharest, Romania, on August 22, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Lastly, Professor Soare. What chance do you give to Calin Georgescu in the second round of presidential elections that will be held on December 8th? If elected, how efficient will he be in challenging EU and NATO’s positions on Ukraine? Given Georgescu’s pro-Russia stance and criticism of NATO, what might his potential presidency mean for Romania’s foreign policy, especially its role as a NATO member and supporter of Ukraine?

Professor Sorina Cristina Soare: It is difficult to assess Georgescu’s chances at the moment. There has been significant endorsement for his opponent, and a burgeoning cordon sanitaire is forming among mainstream political parties. However, one major factor is missing: the position of the Social Democrats. This is understandable, given the strategic importance of the legislative elections, which are scheduled between the two rounds of the presidential elections. The legislative elections will take place on December 1, followed by the second round of the presidential election on December 8.

Parties may be hesitant to publicly endorse Elena Lasconi at this stage, as such endorsements could jeopardize their own performance in the legislative elections. This creates a significant risk because Romania is a semi-presidential republic. On one hand, if the legislative elections result in a pro-European and mainstream coalition securing a majority, the risk posed by Georgescu’s presidency could be mitigated. The constitutional court’s rulings over the past decades have circumscribed presidential powers, meaning that control by a pro-European government and Parliament would ensure stability.

However, there is also a significant risk given that, in the first round, radical right candidates, including Georgescu, collectively received around 37% of the vote. This suggests strong potential for these parties, including smaller ones connected to AUR’s network, like the Party of Young People, which was active in supporting Georgescu’s candidacy. These parties could gain substantial influence in the next Parliament, complicating coalition-building efforts.

Two scenarios are plausible: i) A co-habitation scenario where Georgescu wins the presidency but is constrained by a pro-European government and Parliament, similar to the political situation in Poland. ii) An alignment between a pro-European coalition and Lasconi’s victory, driven by increased voter mobilization in the second round. This scenario seems credible but faces challenges.

One significant risk for the second round is that Georgescu could position himself as a victim of the establishment. If voter mobilization for Lasconi fails to materialize, it could instead rally anti-establishment voters behind Georgescu. This risk is heightened by the current complaint filed with the constitutional court, alleging illegal activities related to Georgescu’s TikTok campaign and calling for the annulment of the first round. Such actions could provoke greater sympathy for Georgescu and further energize his supporters, especially those with anti-establishment sentiments.

If Georgescu wins, however, there are still factors that could maintain Romania’s European trajectory. The alignment of Parliament and government with pro-European forces would act as a counterbalance, ensuring the preservation of Romania’s commitments to the EU and NATO. Thus, while his presidency could introduce instability, the broader political framework offers some safeguards for maintaining the country’s European route.