Plastic waste has become one of the defining environmental crises of the twenty-first century—but its politics extend far beyond questions of recycling and waste management. In his commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines how global plastic trade reflects deep structural inequalities between the Global North and the Global South, where environmental burdens are systematically displaced onto poorer regions. Drawing on insights from political economy and environmental justice scholarship, he introduces the concept of waste sovereignty—the claim that states should exercise political control over transboundary waste flows as part of broader struggles for ecological justice and economic autonomy. By examining global waste markets and emerging regulatory responses, Dr. Solaja highlights how plastic pollution has become a key arena of power, sovereignty, and inequality in global environmental governance.
By Dr. Oludele Solaja*
For decades the plastic waste has been travelling through global trade routes and has ultimately landed on waste pickers and informal sector recyclers in developing countries. Although most of the plastic products are consumed in richer economies, the bulk of waste generated through their consumption processes is handled in countries that lack technical capabilities and facilities to do proper recycling. What seems like a technical issue of dealing with waste is, in fact, tied up to the power politics and global asymmetrical relationship between Global North and South resulting in large transfer of environmental risk and pollution to the poorer world, thereby causing rampant pollution.
The first part of the twenty-first century has undoubtedly been defined by an environmental crisis involving plastics. The production of plastic has rapidly escalated to over 400 million tons of material annually since the late 1970s. Despite this, only countries in the Global South have to manage the overwhelming environmental problems related to the processing of this waste, which is mostly generated by more prosperous countries. The flow of plastic waste to the South is a direct result of the export business where more industrialized countries ship their own plastic waste to developing countries for disposal under the guise of recycling markets. Although these movements often disguise themselves as a technical solution to plastic waste disposal, it’s truly about exporting environmental harms to less equipped regions.
According to many researchers and environmentalists, these movements reflect a “plastic colonialism,” where developing nations bear the burden of ecological unequal exchange. As political economist Dani Rodrik describes “globalization is in conflict with democratic politics. A great tension now exists between deep global economic integration and the conditions of domestic political legitimacy.” Plastic has therefore moved beyond being merely an environmental problem; it has become a symbol of global inequality, giving rise to the emerging political concept of waste sovereignty—the argument that nations should have the right to control the transboundary movement of waste as part of broader struggles for environmental justice and economic autonomy.
The Global Plastic Waste Economy
The world economy of plastic involves intricate networks spanning continents that link production, consumption, and disposal, while producing globally distributed yet inequitable environmental impacts. For a long time, China has been a recipient of bulk quantities of plastic waste exported from the US, Japan, and various European countries; this changed in 2018 when China refused to process contaminated waste products. In turn, the export markets shifted, mainly to Southeast Asia and parts of Eastern Europe.
However, these new arrangements are evidence of weaknesses in our recycling infrastructure. In 2017, research from the journal Science showed that only a mere 9% of all plastic waste has ever been recycled. While the remainder of the waste gets dumped, incinerated, or deposited in natural environments. A study from Nature reveals the sheer amount of plastic pollution in our oceans: “275 million tons of plastic, of 4.8 million tons, are drifting across the world’s seas” (Jambeck et al., 2015). The irony of promoting recycling for plastic waste is clear: the recycling industry relies on disposable structures.
Plastic Colonialism and Environmental Inequality
Political ecology and critical political economy inform the notion of plastic colonialism, illustrating that waste is rarely just a result of technical failures in managing waste disposal; rather it is a consequence of wealth disparities, power imbalances, and weaknesses within governmental infrastructure.
In this light, the flow of global waste represents a process of ecological unequal exchange, where waste generated in richer parts of the world results in environmental degradation predominantly in the poorer regions of the world. Thomas Piketty in his study of political economy confirms the persistence of structural disparities within global politics. Moreover, it has been suggested by scholars like Nancy Fraser that environmental problems frequently entail “expropriation,” where marginalized populations bear the ecological costs of production within a globalized world. Plastic waste is therefore not simply about recycling techniques but a critical political struggle between different parties over an issue of environmental justice and unequal resource distribution.
Waste Sovereignty Theory
In an effort to contextualize these issues, Waste Sovereignty Theory introduces the concept of governing waste as an expression of political and environmental sovereignty. Here, governments seek to reclaim ownership over environmental decision making while rebuffing impositions by international markets which place the burden of ecological costs on them. The theory is best understood through the framework of four interconnected concepts representing how states and communities tackle unequal global waste governance.
Territorial Control: States attempt to regulate and control transboundary movements of waste through bans and regulatory checks, with China’s 2018 plastic waste ban being a prime example.
Economic Transformation: Nations are looking to make waste a resource rather than a burden. The creation of circular economy strategies aims to reintroduce waste as part of the production system.
Environmental Justice: Claims for waste sovereignty are primarily derived from accusations that developing nations bear an unjust ecological burden due to the consumption in wealthier nations. These claims call for a new system of waste trade that prevents the unequal distribution of environmental responsibility.
Political Mobilization: The debate over waste governance is often linked to populist and nationalist narratives, which frame these issues as a struggle against oppressive distant powers and an exploitative system where rich nations offload their environmental burdens.
These four pillars, therefore, show how waste politics has become a political and environmental battlefield.
Global Case Studies
Several of the countries across the world exemplify the increasing power of waste sovereignty politics. In Malaysia, a dramatic increase in exports of plastic waste, recently taking place there, is attracting national concern over pollution. Malaysia’s government is trying to regain control of waste streams via a strategy of inspection and sending of suspect materials back to source countries.
Turkey, along with other European countries, is also now dealing with large shipments of plastic waste from Europe, leading to domestic focus on the issues the trade raises in Turkey, and demands for a more responsible waste trading relationship with European countries.
The management of plastic waste across many African countries, presents a multifaceted problem intimately linked to development, and millions survive by waste picking (Ghana). In Kenya, there is a ban on all single-use plastic bags, and in Nigeria research explores avenues for using waste plastic in sectors like textiles.
They all portray a story of nations attempting to address their domestic plastic pollution concerns, while also attempting to retain some control over imported waste streams.
Waste Politics and Populist Narratives
Waste politics and populist ideas are increasingly interconnected. Waste import debates offer powerful evidence that the world’s powerful global players continue to exploit weaker nations. As demonstrated in Naomi Klein’s analysis of environmental crises, these issues can become a part of a larger critique against neoliberalism; the problem of plastic waste is not just a technological issue but also political as it symbolizes the unequal nature of globalization.
Conclusion
The worldwide crisis in plastics unveils a significant discrepancy between the circular economy strategies proposed by global institutions and the ongoing replication of inequality in the sharing of environmental problems that exists in the global waste trade. Plastic colonialism isn’t just an inability to deal with waste, but a structured reflection of the inequality found within the globe, a growing challenge that has sparked protest across the Global South. Waste Sovereignty theory provides an understanding of such developments by framing waste governance as a battle for environmental justice, political sovereignty, and economic autonomy. The international debate surrounding waste governance is likely to play an integral role in the future of global environmental politics and the path towards establishing a more equal world.
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.
References
Brooks, A. L.; Wang, S. & Jambeck, J. R. (2018). “The Chinese import ban and its impact on global plastic waste trade.” Science Advances, 4(6), eaat0131. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aat0131
Fraser, N. (2016). Expropriation and exploitation in racialized capitalism: A reply to Michael Dawson. Critical Historical Studies, 3(1), 163–178. https://doi.org/10.1086/685779
Geyer, R.; Jambeck, J. R. & Law, K. L. (2017). “Production, use, and fate of all plastics ever made.” Science, 3(7), e1700782. https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1700782
Jambeck, J. R.; Geyer, R.; Wilcox, C.; Siegler, T. R.; Perryman, M.; Andrady, A.; Narayan, R.; & Law, K. L. (2015). “Plastic waste inputs from land into the ocean.” Nature, 347(6223), 768–771. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1260352
Klein, N. (2014). This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate. New York: Simon & Schuster.
In this commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja examines the often-overlooked ecological consequences of modern warfare. Moving beyond traditional analyses focused on military strategy and territorial control, he argues that contemporary conflicts produce long-lasting environmental damage that can destabilize societies for decades. From contaminated farmland and polluted water systems to devastated ecosystems and forced migration, war’s environmental fallout directly undermines human security. Drawing on historical examples such as Agent Orange in Vietnam and the Kuwaiti oil fires during the 1991 Gulf War, the commentary highlights how ecological destruction persists long after hostilities end. Dr. Solaja ultimately calls for stronger international environmental governance and greater integration of environmental protection into global security and peacebuilding frameworks.
By Dr. Oludele Solaja*
Thinking About War in an Ecological Framework
When war is finished in terms of battles, water systems remain polluted, nature destroyed, and infrastructure shattered—and continues to shape the ways in which societies survive and exist. Whereas the majority of scholarly focus concerning warfare centers on issues of military victory, deterring enemies, or controlling territory, the environmental consequences of war can often produce effects that can persist over decades (Lawrence & Stohl, 2019; UNEP, 2009). The current confrontation between the United States, Iran, and Israel, for instance, should be understood not merely as a geopolitical conflict, but as an ecological disaster, as well. The bombing and attack on industrial and energy infrastructure result in more than mere destruction of physical property; these incidents produce ecological disarray, which can lead to widespread contamination of landscape, livelihood and inhabitants, even long after the end of hostilities (Foster et al., 2010; Ide, 2021).
Understanding war in relation to ecology and displacement is one way of looking at the long-term consequences of military combat. Destruction to environment can create instability for societies by contaminating farmland, polluting water sources, or even eliminating the natural resource base required to survive. Therefore modern warfare reaches beyond the battlefield to create different forms of insecurity that may exist in the environment for generations (Nixon, 2011). Hence a sociological study of war, examining both strategic and environmental results of battle, should be adopted in understanding conflict in the 21st century. In an age of increasing environmental crises and security concerns, treating war as an ecological affair can become as significant as viewing it as the domain of military actions (Foster et al., 2010).
Environmental Effects of Modern Warfare
Even though destruction of the environment has historically been a factor of warfare, it often goes overlooked in analyses of security. It can create massive ecological devastation, not just exacerbate humanitarian crises within a warzone, but create an environmental crisis for surrounding regions as well (UNEP, 2009; Lawrence & Stohl, 2019). Aerial bombardment of infrastructure can spread poisons into the air, water sources and natural habitat required for sustenance. Industrial buildings and energy sources—refineries, chemical plants, water treatment plants—are sometimes prime targets. When these sites are destroyed, dangerous pollution can linger in land, air and ground water long after fighting has ended, with effects on human security far reaching (Ide, 2021).
Toxic lands may become unfit for farming and public health will be compromised by contaminants and the food supply jeopardized. It can often take decades to repair the environmental damage so that it may become safely habitated again (UNEP, 2009). Attacks on Iranian oil refineries and petrochemical industries, for example, could cause catastrophic environmental degradation over a wide region of the Middle East, compromising public health and damaging natural ecosystems of the area (Lawrence & Stohl, 2019).
Historical Evidence of Environmental Destruction during War
The long-term humanitarian effects have historically been a characteristic of war-induced ecological damage. Between 1961 and 1971, the US deployed large quantities of Agent Orange across Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. Large portions of farmland and forest became useless while their soils were contaminated with toxins. In addition to long-lasting health problems, communities continue to deal with the aftermath of these chemicals (Vo & Ziegler, 2018).
Also, during the 1991 Gulf War, Iraqi troops burned hundreds of Kuwaiti oil wells in an attempt to deter advancing forces. Large quantities of pollutants were released into the air, and oil slicks devastated marine life (Al-Dabbous & Kumar, 2014). As in Vietnam, long-lasting human security issues and a devastated ecosystem resulted from environmental disaster during wartime. The widespread destruction of natural and manmade landscapes caused during conflict does not end immediately and the need for their repair is a long-term challenge that often prolongs instability within nations affected by war. Such environmental harm frequently unfolds gradually and invisibly, what Nixon describes as “slow violence,” in which ecological destruction continues to affect communities long after the immediate conflict has ended (Nixon, 2011).
War, Environmental Degradation and Human Security
Seeing war as a source of ecological devastation helps to better understand the link between war and human security. Attacks on water systems, farms or factories can harm societies through ecological harm which causes social consequences. An attack on an ecosystem could destroy farms, harm public health through pollution of water sources and prompt migration as farming has no longer become an option. These elements—war, environment, displacement—can therefore be described as having a circular relationship, where destruction to one aspect of existence directly fuels destruction in another.
Rural communities are particularly susceptible, since their entire way of life is contingent on their surrounding environment. Without the existence of healthy ecosystems, a livelihood becomes unsustainable and this leads to forced migration in order to survive (Ide, 2021). Homer-Dixon has emphasized the importance of the environment as the driver of conflict through its impact on resource availability and human security; with widespread ecological destruction during conflict, this connection is intensified, creating an even more dire situation (Homer-Dixon, 1999).
Implications for International Environmental Governance
The ecological devastation that war leaves in its wake makes clear the need for international action to help govern the conduct of war so that environment is not harmed so severely and, hopefully, at all. Although international laws of armed conflict are already in place to help alleviate the harm inflicted upon the environment during war, their enforceability has not been successfully maintained (UNEP, 2009). The long-lasting results of ecological destruction often are not considered and may never be compensated for or rectified in the absence of stronger governance structures.
The establishment of environmental monitoring systems, strict liability laws for states or parties engaged in warfare that are responsible for ecological damage, and inclusion of environmental restoration within peacebuilding initiatives would all serve to diminish the long-term negative effects of war on ecology (Ide, 2021). Making protection of the environment a component of security strategy will make policies aligned with global security concerns, and address issues of ecological sustainability as well.
Conclusion
The conflict with Iran highlights the vast ecological consequences of modern warfare. It is a process that not only brings conflict to lands and peoples, but can reshape entire landscapes. Its consequences, historically in war zones such as Vietnam and the Persian Gulf, show that it can be a far more destructive phenomenon to ecosystems than merely battlefield action, lasting far into the future of human habitation (Vo & Ziegler, 2018; Al-Dabbous & Kumar, 2014). Considering war an ecological threat has made it easier to grasp its entire meaning, and looking at warfare from a strategic and environmental perspective allows for a far greater understanding of warfare itself. In an age of increasing geopolitical turmoil, it may soon become just as significant as military victories, if not more so, to understand the environmental threat war poses.
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.
References
Al-Dabbous, A. & Kumar, P. (2014). “Environmental impacts of the Gulf War oil fires.” Environmental Pollution, 189, 59–68.
Foster, J. B., Clark, B., & York, R. (2010). The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Earth. Monthly Review Press.
Homer-Dixon, T. (1999). Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton University Press.
Ide, T. (2021). “Environmental peacebuilding and the impact of war on ecosystems.” Global Environmental Politics, 21(1), 1–12.
Lawrence, M., & Stohl, A. (2019). “The impact of military emissions on climate change and air pollution.” Nature Communications, 10(1), 1–9.
Nixon, R. (2011). Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor. Harvard University Press.
UNEP. (2009). Protecting the Environment During Armed Conflict: An Inventory and Analysis of International Law. United Nations Environment Programme.
Vo, M., & Ziegler, A. (2018). “Agent Orange and the environmental legacy of the Vietnam War.” Journal of Vietnamese Studies, 13(2), 1–28.
Along Nigeria’s vulnerable coastline, climate change is not a projection but a daily struggle shaping survival, governance, and democracy. In this incisive commentary, Dr. Oludele Solaja reveals how communities—from Lagos to Cross River—are filling critical gaps left by weak institutions, organizing drainage cleanups, mangrove restoration, and informal warning systems to confront flooding, pollution, and shoreline loss. These grassroots practices constitute “climate security from below,” challenging state-centric narratives that equate security with national planning alone. Yet this resilience also exposes deep democratic deficits, as citizens assume responsibilities that should belong to public authorities. The Nigerian case calls for a rethinking of climate security—one that bridges community initiative with accountable governance and recognizes local actors not as substitutes for the state, but as indispensable partners in building sustainable, democratic adaptation.
By Oludele Solaja*
Along the Nigerian coast, climate change is not a distant forecast; it is an everyday reality. Floodwaters inundate homes. Shorelines relentlessly recede. Saltwater contaminates freshwater supplies. Drains choke with plastic refuse, transforming streets into temporary lakes when the rains arrive. For those in the Niger Delta and adjacent coastal areas, climate insecurity is not a concept but a lived experience.
Yet climate security is often discussed in terms of state stability, resource conflicts, or national-level adaptation planning. On the ground, the picture is very different. In many parts of the Nigerian coast, securing the climate is a local endeavor—it is climate security from below.
All along Nigeria’s long coastal belt—from Lagos in the west to Cross River in the east—communities are filling governance gaps caused by weak infrastructure, state absenteeism, and an economy structured around extractive activities. Their everyday efforts to prevent environmental hazards, safeguard livelihoods, and protect daily life from environmental instability constitute a concrete instance of climate security from below.
Climate Risk and Governance Gaps
Among all regions of Nigeria, the coastal zone—characterized by high population density, vital ecosystems, and extensive oil-sector industrial development—is one of the country’s most climate-sensitive areas. Devastating nationwide floods (2012 and 2022) caused massive population displacement (UN OCHA, 2023), while the low-lying areas of the delta region are vulnerable to flooding due to the combined effects of sea-level rise and subsidence. The persistent and serious pollution of marine and coastal areas by oil (UNEP, 2011; World Bank, 2021) is another major challenge to the region’s resilience, in addition to the issue of waste disposal.
However, these climate hazards do not operate independently of existing governance failures: the most basic measures of environmental protection—drainage, waste management systems, shoreline stabilization, and adaptation measures—are still absent from the majority of coastal Nigerian communities even after over half a century of oil production. The institutions responsible for addressing these hazards often exist only on paper rather than being effectively implementable, and are seen by communities as out of reach, lacking sufficient resources, or being overly controlled by industrial corporations (Watts, 2004; Adekola & Mitchell, 2011).
National planning and large infrastructure projects have come to dominate official discourse on climate security. However, daily maintenance tasks—such as unblocking drainage channels and maintaining vegetation cover along coastlines—appear to receive little attention. The resulting governance gaps mean that environmental risks mount even as the ability of institutions to respond to them fails to keep pace. The response? Communities themselves have filled these gaps.
Everyday Climate Security
Across the Nigerian coast, locals organize cleanups of drainage channels in anticipation of the rains. Youth groups remove plastic waste from waterways. Local fishers actively plant mangrove trees that offer protection from storm surges, and some local leaders invest in manually reinforcing shorelines. Informal communication networks are established to disseminate warnings during extreme weather events. These actions perform critical climate-security functions: clearing waterways reduces flooding risks, planting mangroves strengthens coastlines, waste removal enhances public health, and social networks bolster community solidarity during critical moments.
This is climate security lived through everyday practice. It involves the extensive use of local ecological knowledge—the implicit understanding of local tidal systems, sedimentation processes, vegetation cover, and flood dynamics that formal engineering approaches sometimes fail to capture (Berkes, 2018). These efforts are frequently outside state plans, organized through communal labor, volunteers, and community associations (Adger et al., 2005; IPCC, 2022). This form of security has moved from a distant policy objective to a matter of routine—often invisible, often unpaid—maintenance that ensures continued habitation in these communities.
The Politics of Resilience
However, community agency is only one aspect of the story. It reveals deep democratic deficits in Nigeria’s governance landscape. Many communities in Nigeria’s coast have had minimal participation in environmental decision-making and very limited input in planning related to coastal infrastructure (Adekola & Mitchell, 2011). Environmental damage and subsequent exclusion caused by the operations of the oil industry in the Niger Delta continue to fuel local suspicion and resentment of both the state and oil companies (UNEP, 2011).
Dominant narratives about national development tend to focus on megaprojects, especially those involving infrastructure such as new highways and expanding coastal reclamation schemes, instead of the vital work of maintaining drains or planting mangroves. Communities therefore take on tasks that ought to be part of municipal governance. On the one hand, this enhances community resilience; yet, on the other, it may inadvertently normalize state withdrawal and a general lack of commitment from both national and subnational governments. When people do not expect the municipality to respond, self-help becomes the norm, and they may no longer notice the absence of this state function. Climate security from below becomes both a function of and evidence of failed state governance. Understanding this dynamic is critical; the ability of a community to exhibit resilience through its own actions should not serve as justification for abandoning its rights to a participatory state governance structure.
Informality and Legitimacy
A significant proportion of this community-based environmental management along Nigeria’s coast operates informally. There are no municipal plans that document these practices, nor are there official funds allocated to support them, yet they possess strong local legitimacy. The practice of collective labor and a long tradition of shared ownership over local environments continue to be powerful social resources. The application of indigenous ecological knowledge enhances their efficacy, given that local actors may possess more detailed knowledge of flood dynamics than engineers. For instance, locally managed mangrove planting may have higher survival rates than centrally implemented technical solutions that are often not sensitive to local ecology (Berkes, 2018; IPCC, 2022). Nevertheless, informality means that these efforts struggle when faced with widespread industrial pollution or encroaching urban waste. Sustained resilience under such conditions requires not only community initiative but also institutional support and legitimacy.
Rethinking Climate Security
The Nigerian case thus requires a reconsideration of conventional understandings of climate security. Security may not simply entail preventing conflict and safeguarding states but also includes the protection of livelihoods, human health, and natural ecosystems threatened by contemporary climate change processes. In the Global South, resilience is emerging first in informal, grassroots, locally managed communities rather than through national adaptation planning.
To achieve sustainable climate security, bridging grassroots efforts and inclusive state governance institutions must be a priority. Formal acknowledgement of these community-led adaptations within national adaptation frameworks, cooperative frameworks integrating local knowledge and technical capacity, participatory planning mechanisms to overcome democratic gaps, small-scale climate financing to support community projects without over-bureaucratization, as well as the integration of local ecological knowledge into formal assessments are some policy strategies. This reconfigures communities not as a substitute for the state but as legitimate and important partners in governance.
Conclusion
In fact, climate security is already being constructed from below on Nigeria’s coast—with drainage repair, mangrove planting, waste disposal, and vigilant self-policing, communities are managing daily life under accelerating environmental breakdown. This is indicative of both community strength and utter policy collapse simultaneously. The Nigerian case makes clear that strategies for climate security need to consider possibilities beyond the state and engage in discussions around daily security practices if adaptation is to become the practice of democratic, responsive statehood.
(*) Dr. Oludele Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University in Ago-Iwoye, Ogun State, Nigeria.
References
Adger, W. N.; Hughes, T. P.; Folke, C.; Carpenter; S. R. & Rockström, J. (2005). “Social-ecological resilience to coastal disasters.” Science, 309(5737), 1036–1039.
Adekola, O. & Mitchell, G. (2011). “The Niger Delta wetlands: Threats to ecosystem services, their importance to dependent communities and possible management measures.” International Journal of Biodiversity Science, Ecosystem Services & Management, 7(1), 50–68.
Berkes, F. (2018). Sacred ecology (4th ed.). Routledge.
IPCC. (2022). Climate change 2022: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Cambridge University Press.
UNEP. (2011). Environmental assessment of Ogoniland. United Nations Environment Programme.
UN OCHA. (2023). Nigeria floods situation report 2022–2023. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.
Watts, M. (2004). “Resource curse? Governmentality, oil and power in the Niger Delta.” Geopolitics, 9(1), 50–80.
World Bank. (2021). Climate risk country profile: Nigeria. World Bank Group.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff (2026). “Virtual Workshop Series / Session 12 — Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 23, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00143
Session 12 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series explored how “decolonizing democracy” requires attention to the material and symbolic structures shaping participation, legitimacy, and representation. The presentations framed democracy not as a settled institutional model but as a contested field shaped by colonial legacies, extractive political economies, and identity-based struggles over inclusion and authority. Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja’s comparative study of Nigeria and the United Kingdom showed how environmental governance can produce “participation without power,” where formal inclusion coexists with persistent injustice. Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s analysis of Cameroon highlighted how pluralism has intensified communal claims to state ownership, complicating political alternation. Supported by Dr. Gabriel Cyril Nguijoi’s feedback, the session underscored the value of concepts such as biocultural sovereignty and communocratic populism and emphasized the need for context-sensitive, interdisciplinary approaches to democratic renewal in the Global South.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On Thursday, February 19, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 12 of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the theme “Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South.” The session foregrounded a core problem in contemporary democratic theory and practice: how democratic institutions—often inherited, transplanted, or externally modeled—are reshaped, contested, and resisted in postcolonial contexts marked by extractive political economies, unequal state–society relations, and enduring struggles over recognition and voice.
Moderated by Neo Sithole (University of Szeged), the workshop approached “the people” not as a stable category but as a contested political project—produced through governance arrangements, mobilized through identity, and asserted through resistance. Across the session, democracy emerged less as an institutional endpoint than as a field of struggle in which colonial legacies, state power, and community agency intersect. Rather than treating decolonization as a symbolic discourse, contributors examined its concrete implications for how participation is structured, how resources are governed, and how legitimacy is claimed in environments where the state’s democratic form may coexist with exclusionary or coercive practices.
The session brought together two presentations that, while distinct in focus, converged on a shared concern with democratic deficit: the gap between formal mechanisms of participation and the effective capacity of communities to shape political and material outcomes. First, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja (Olabisi Onabanjo University) examined environmental governance as a critical site of democratic contestation in a paper jointly authored with Busayo Olakitan Badmos (Olabisi Onabanjo University), titled “Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.” Positioning environmental politics within the broader architecture of power, he explored how colonial histories and technocratic governance models marginalize local knowledge and produce “participation without power,” while proposing biocultural sovereignty as a pathway toward more inclusive ecological governance.
Second, Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme (University of Ngaoundéré) analyzed electoral politics and identity mobilization in Cameroon in “Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy,” jointly authored with Dr. Yves Valéry Obame (University of Bertoua / Global Studies Institute & Geneva Africa Lab). His contribution interrogated how multiparty competition can intensify communal claims to representation, framing elections not as programmatic contests but as struggles over inclusion, alternation, and the symbolic ownership of the state.
The discussion was anchored by Dr. Gabriel Cyril Nguijoi (National Institute of Cartography; ICEDIS), whose role as discussant helped connect the papers’ empirical insights to broader debates on coloniality, accountability, and democratic substance. His interventions highlighted how both contributions disrupt common analytical shortcuts—whether the assumption that environmental injustice is confined to the Global South, or the notion that repeated elections necessarily constitute democratic consolidation.
Taken together, Session 12 offered a layered and comparative exploration of how democracy is challenged—and potentially renewed—through the politics of governance, identity, and resistance in postcolonial settings.
Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja:“Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom”
Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University.
Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja of Olabisi Onabanjo University delivered a thought-provoking presentation examining the entanglement of environmental governance, colonial legacies, and democratic practice. Speaking from a comparative Nigeria–United Kingdom framework, he advanced the central claim that environmental governance should be understood not merely as a technical or administrative domain but as a site of democratic struggle shaped by historical power asymmetries and contemporary political economies.
Positioning his research within ongoing debates on participation and sustainability, Dr. Solaja noted that mainstream environmental governance literature often assumes that stakeholder inclusion naturally enhances democratic legitimacy and ecological outcomes. However, he argued that such frameworks frequently overlook how colonial histories and extractive economic structures continue to shape decision-making processes. In many contexts, governance systems privilege capital accumulation over community well-being, thereby reproducing ecological inequality across regions. From this perspective, environmental governance cannot be treated as politically neutral; rather, it reflects contested struggles over resources, voice, and knowledge.
The study was guided by three principal research questions: i) how colonial legacies continue to shape environmental governance in both Nigeria and the United Kingdom; ii) how distributive, procedural, and recognitional injustices manifest across the two cases; and iii) how Indigenous and decolonial approaches might offer alternative pathways toward sustainable governance.
By placing a Global South extractive economy alongside a Global North post-industrial democracy, the project sought to challenge the assumption that environmental injustice is primarily a Southern phenomenon and instead reveal its structural character across diverse political systems.
Dr. Solaja explained that the comparison was deliberately constructed. Nigeria’s Niger Delta represents a post-colonial, resource-dependent region marked by centralized control, oil extraction, and militarized environmental conflict. In contrast, the United Kingdom’s post-industrial regions—particularly South Wales and Northern England—illustrate an advanced industrial democracy navigating decarbonization and energy transition. Despite these differences in institutional capacity and policy development, both contexts exhibit what he termed a “democratic deficit” embedded within environmental governance arrangements.
The presentation’s theoretical foundation drew on decolonial environmentalism, particularly the work of Walter Mignoloand related scholars. Dr. Solaja argued that dominant environmental governance models are shaped by Eurocentric and technocratic assumptions that privilege market-oriented and state-centric solutions while marginalizing relational, place-based, and Indigenous ecological knowledge systems. Decoloniality, in this sense, involves challenging the presumed universality of Western sustainability paradigms and embracing what he described as “epistemic disobedience”—the refusal to accept a single authoritative model of environmental knowledge. Environmental conflicts, therefore, emerge not only from competition over resources but also from struggles over recognition and authority.
Methodologically, the study employed a cooperative qualitative case-study design grounded in critical interpretivism. The research team analyzed legislative archives, reports from NGOs and international organizations, media coverage, environmental indices, and data from the Environmental Justice Atlas. Through thematic coding, they identified patterns related to governance models, justice dimensions, and underlying power relations shaped by colonial continuities.
Turning to the findings, Dr. Solaja highlighted stark contrasts and parallels. In the Niger Delta, thousands of oil spill incidents in recent years have produced severe ecological damage, including heavy-metal contamination and concentrated environmental risk zones near pipeline infrastructure. While official narratives often attribute spills to sabotage, the research emphasized the role of weak regulation and aging infrastructure. The result is pronounced distributive injustice, with local communities bearing disproportionate environmental burdens.
The United Kingdom, by contrast, has achieved measurable progress in decarbonization, including the phase-out of coal and expansion of renewable energy. Yet structural tensions remain: fossil fuels continue to dominate overall energy consumption, new oil projects are still approved, and community influence over environmental decision-making is often limited. Thus, although distributive injustice may appear less severe in absolute terms, procedural and recognitional deficits persist.
Across both cases, environmental injustice manifested along three dimensions. Distributive injustice concerned the unequal allocation of environmental harms and benefits. Procedural injustice involved exclusion from meaningful decision-making processes, whether through repression in Nigeria or limited consultation mechanisms in the United Kingdom. Recognitional injustice referred to the marginalization of local knowledge, identities, and historical experiences. Dr. Solaja summarized this dynamic as “participation without power”: communities may be consulted, yet they rarely possess the authority to shape outcomes.
The presentation also underscored the role of resistance movements. In the Niger Delta, environmental activism is intertwined with ethnic identity, territorial sovereignty, and cultural survival, exemplified by movements such as the Ogoni struggle. In the United Kingdom, climate justice activism often reflects class, regional, and generational concerns. Despite contextual differences, movements in both regions increasingly share strategies, including civil disobedience, digital mobilization, and transnational solidarity networks—suggesting the emergence of a broader planetary justice framework.
In concluding, Dr. Solaja proposed alternative pathways centered on “biocultural sovereignty” and plural ecological governance. In Nigeria, this could involve ethical extractivism grounded in free, prior, and informed consent, equitable benefit sharing, and stronger accountability mechanisms. In the United Kingdom, community-owned renewable energy initiatives and locally driven transitions could advance energy democracy. Ultimately, he argued that democracy must extend beyond electoral institutions to encompass ecological sovereignty, epistemic plurality, and intergenerational justice. Only through such transformations, he concluded, can environmental governance become genuinely democratic.
Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme:“Cameroon at the Trial of Democracy: Presidential Elections, Communaucratic Populism, and the Crisis of Political Transition”
Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme is from the University of Ngaoundéré, Laboratoire camerounais d’études et de recherches sur les sociétés contemporaines (Ceresc).
In his presentation, Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme offered a sociologically grounded analysis of electoral politics in Cameroon, advancing the concept of “communocratic populism” to explain the enduring tensions between democratic pluralism and community-based political mobilization. The presentation situated Cameroon’s contemporary political trajectory within the broader challenges of democratic transition in postcolonial African states, where formal multiparty systems coexist with deeply rooted communal identities.
Dr. Essaga Eteme began by framing the study within Cameroon’s transition to political pluralism in 1990, a watershed moment that introduced multiparty competition after decades of single-party dominance. While this transition generated widespread optimism about democratic reform, he argued that it also revealed structural constraints. Cameroon is composed of more than 250 ethnic communities, each with distinct historical and political aspirations. In such a context, electoral competition has increasingly become a mechanism for negotiating communal representation rather than contesting ideological programs. Presidential, legislative, and municipal elections alike are thus shaped by the imperative to secure community backing, transforming democratic participation into what Dr. Essaga Eteme conceptualized as communocratic populism—political mobilization grounded in communal identity claims rather than policy platforms.
The presentation traced the historical roots of this phenomenon to Cameroon’s post-independence political consolidation. From 1972 until the early 1990s, the country operated under a highly centralized system characterized by limited political freedoms and restricted avenues for dissent. The transition to multiparty democracy raised hopes for political alternation and broader participation. However, Dr. Essaga Eteme noted that the persistence of long-term incumbency—particularly the extended tenure of President Paul Biya—has generated both expectations and frustrations. While some citizens initially viewed democratic reforms as an opportunity for renewal, others increasingly perceived them as insufficient to produce meaningful change, thereby fueling community-based demands for political inclusion.
Central to the analysis was the observation that presidential elections have become focal points for communal competition. The announcement of President Biya’s candidacy in the 2025 election, after decades in power, intensified perceptions among various groups that political authority had been monopolized by a particular regional or ethnic constituency. This perception, Dr. Essaga Eteme argued, reinvigorated communocratic narratives asserting that leadership should rotate among communities. Such narratives do not necessarily reject democracy but reinterpret it as a mechanism for redistributing access to state power among identity groups.
The research was guided by three principal questions: i) identifying the forms and manifestations of communocratic populism during presidential elections; ii) examining how community affiliation shapes voter alignment; and iii) analyzing how political actors exploit communal sentiments either to legitimize incumbency or to challenge it. To address these questions, Dr. Essaga Eteme employed a mixed-methods approach combining field observations, social media analysis, and electoral data from recent presidential contests, particularly those of 2025. This methodology enabled a multi-layered understanding of both elite strategies and grassroots perceptions.
Empirical findings highlighted patterns of continuity across successive elections. Electoral outcomes revealed the sustained dominance of the incumbent leadership, accompanied by accusations of fraud and declining trust in electoral institutions. At the same time, opposition candidates frequently mobilized support by appealing to communal solidarity. For example, challengers from northern, western, or Anglophone regions framed their campaigns around the notion that their respective communities deserved access to national leadership after prolonged exclusion. Such appeals resonated strongly with voters who interpreted political power as a collective resource to be shared among groups.
Dr. Essaga Eteme illustrated how these dynamics have evolved over time. Earlier opposition figures, including prominent Anglophone leaders in the 1990s and 2000s, mobilized regional grievances against perceived Francophone dominance, contributing to tensions that later fed into the Anglophone crisis. More recent challengers have similarly invoked regional identity, arguing that the concentration of power within one community undermines national cohesion. Even post-electoral disputes often reflect communal narratives, with defeated candidates attributing outcomes to structural favoritism toward the incumbent’s group rather than to programmatic differences.
The presentation emphasized that communocratic populism shifts the focus of democratic competition from ideological debate to identity-based claims. Elections become symbolic contests over which community will control the state apparatus rather than deliberations over policy direction. This dynamic, Dr. Essaga Eteme suggested, contributes to a broader crisis of political transition, as democratic institutions struggle to mediate between national integration and communal representation. Instead of fostering a shared civic identity, electoral politics may reinforce divisions by encouraging leaders to frame political demands in communal terms.
At the same time, the analysis acknowledged the ambivalent character of communocratic mobilization. On one hand, it can serve as a vehicle for marginalized groups to articulate grievances and demand inclusion. On the other hand, it risks entrenching zero-sum perceptions of power, where one group’s gain is viewed as another’s loss. This tension complicates efforts to build stable democratic institutions capable of transcending identity politics.
Dr. Essaga Eteme concluded that Cameroon’s experience demonstrates the limits of procedural democratization in deeply plural societies. The introduction of multiparty elections does not automatically produce programmatic competition or institutional trust; instead, it may activate preexisting communal cleavages. Addressing the crisis of political transition therefore requires reimagining democracy beyond electoral mechanics, fostering inclusive governance structures that balance communal recognition with national cohesion. Without such reforms, communocratic populism is likely to remain a defining feature of Cameroon’s political landscape, continuing to shape both the aspirations and anxieties of its democratic experiment.
Discussant Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi’s Feedback
Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi is a researcher at the National Institute of Cartography (NIC), and lecturer at the Cameroonian Institute of Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (ICEDIS).
Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi offered substantive and analytically rich feedback on the presentations delivered by Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja and Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme, highlighting their contributions to contemporary debates on populism, governance, and democratic transformation from African perspectives. His remarks underscored both the conceptual significance and the empirical originality of the two studies while posing clarifying questions aimed at strengthening their theoretical implications.
Regarding Dr. Solaja’s presentation on decolonial environmentalism and democratic deficit, Dr. Nguijoi characterized the paper as a stimulating and timely contribution to populism and governance studies. He was particularly struck by the comparative framework linking environmental governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, which juxtaposed a Global South extractive context with a developed post-industrial democracy. This transnational comparison, he emphasized, offered a compelling analytical lens that challenged conventional assumptions that environmental injustice is primarily a problem of the Global South. Instead, the paper demonstrated that tensions between resource governance and democratic accountability transcend regional boundaries and manifest across different political systems.
Dr. Nguijoi highlighted the presentation’s central argument that environmental governance is not politically neutral but historically embedded in colonial legacies and extractive political economies. He noted that this insight implicitly raised a profound normative question: whether democracy can genuinely flourish within development models that reproduce forms of colonial extractivism. In his view, this question extended beyond environmental politics to the broader relationship between governance structures and historical power asymmetries.
He further praised the paper for introducing environmental issues into populism discourse, an area often dominated by identity, economic, or institutional analyses. By situating environmental governance within debates on decolonization, identity, and resistance in the Global South, the presentation expanded the conceptual terrain of populism studies. At the same time, Dr. Nguijoi invited further clarification on the concept of decolonial environmentalism. Specifically, he asked whether the approach implied epistemic recognition of Indigenous knowledge systems alone, or whether it also entailed deeper institutional transformation involving ownership, participation, accountability, and governance restructuring. He also questioned whether environmental resistance movements, while democratizing public discourse, were capable of transforming governance architectures in practice. Overall, he expressed strong appreciation for the paper’s innovative integration of environmental governance into analyses of populism and democratic transformation.
Turning to Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s presentation on communocratic populism and the crisis of political alternation in Cameroon, Dr. Nguijoi described the case as particularly significant given the country’s long-standing presidential incumbency and its implications for democratic renewal. He framed the study as addressing a structurally sensitive question: whether identity-based mobilization in electoral politics represents democratic participation or contributes to democratic erosion.
Dr. Nguijoi identified two principal analytical strengths in the presentation. The first concerned the centrality of identity mobilization in Cameroonian politics. He observed that political competition in this context appears structured less around ideological programs than around communal belonging, regional solidarity, historical grievances, and narratives of stability and protection advanced by political elites. In his interpretation, this dynamic captured the essence of communocratic populism, whereby electoral alignment becomes embedded in community affiliation, particularly during presidential elections. He noted empirical examples illustrating how opposition candidates mobilized regional and communal support bases in recent electoral contests, reinforcing the salience of identity in political mobilization.
The second strength he highlighted was the analysis of political alternation as a test of democratic substance. Although elections have been regularly held since the country’s transition to pluralism, executive turnover has not occurred, raising questions about whether democracy can be reduced to procedural repetition or must include a credible possibility of leadership change. Dr. Nguijoi suggested that Cameroon exhibits a pattern of electoral persistence without alternation, where communal rhetoric frames political competition as a struggle for survival, regional balance, or national stability. This dynamic, he argued, renders alternation structurally improbable and complicates assessments of democratic consolidation.
In concluding his feedback, Dr. Nguijoi emphasized that both presentations addressed crucial themes linking populism, identity, governance, and democratic transformation. He commended their focus on historically embedded structures — colonial legacies in the Nigerian case and identity-based mobilization in Cameroon — while encouraging further theoretical clarification. His remarks framed the two studies as important contributions to understanding how democratic processes are shaped, constrained, and contested in diverse political contexts.
Responses to Discussant’s Feedback
Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja
In his response to Dr. Nguijoi’s feedback, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja expressed appreciation for the questions and comments, clarifying key aspects of his comparative framework on environmental governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Speaking from a reflective standpoint, he emphasized that the contrast between the two cases was deliberate and methodological rather than evaluative. The study, he explained, did not seek to measure or compare the degree of environmental injustice across the two countries. Instead, its primary objective was to identify and illuminate democratic deficits present in both contexts despite their differing levels of development.
Solaja underscored that the United Kingdom, as a developed country with robust institutional structures, regulatory frameworks, and environmental governance mechanisms, nonetheless exhibits forms of democratic deficit. He noted that certain communities and groups remain marginalized in decision-making processes, particularly regarding environmental policy formulation and implementation. Even within a system characterized by strong democratic representation, unequal participation and limited voice for affected communities persist, revealing that institutional strength alone does not eliminate governance shortcomings.
Turning to the Nigerian case, Dr. Solaja highlighted the enduring influence of colonial legacies on environmental management. He argued that Nigeria inherited centralized, state-centric governance structures from colonial administrations, which continue to shape contemporary environmental policies. In this framework, the state retains dominant control over natural resources and extraction activities, often without meaningful consultation with indigenous populations or local communities. As a result, those who bear the ecological consequences of extraction are frequently excluded from decision-making processes, creating a pronounced democratic deficit.
He reiterated that the comparative analysis aimed to demonstrate that environmental governance challenges are not exclusive to the Global South. By juxtaposing Nigeria with the United Kingdom, the study sought to challenge the assumption that democratic deficits in environmental management are primarily a Southern phenomenon. Instead, Dr. Solaja argued, such deficits manifest in different forms across both the Global South and Global North, shaped by distinct historical and institutional trajectories.
Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme
In his response to Dr. Nguijoi’s feedback, Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme expressed gratitude for the discussant’s observations and used the opportunity to clarify key dynamics underlying his concept of communocratic populism in Cameroon. He focused particularly on the role of alliance formation among opposition forces and communities during presidential elections, presenting it as empirical evidence reinforcing his analytical framework.
Dr. Essaga Eteme explained that the persistent contestation of electoral procedures since the country’s transition to pluralism in 1990 has created a political environment marked by distrust and accusations of fraud. While acknowledging that post-electoral disputes are not uncommon in many democracies, he emphasized that in Cameroon such contestation often takes on a communal dimension. Opposition parties and communities excluded from power tend to interpret electoral outcomes as illegitimate, prompting efforts to build cross-community alliances against the incumbent’s support base.
He highlighted the 2025 presidential election as a revealing example. According to his account, when a prominent opposition figure was deemed ineligible to run by electoral authorities, segments of his regional support base redirected their backing to another candidate from a different community. This strategic convergence of voters across communal lines, he argued, illustrates how alliance-building operates within a communocratic logic: electoral behavior becomes driven less by ideological affinity than by the shared objective of displacing the community perceived to monopolize power.
Dr. Essaga Eteme concluded that these alliance dynamics demonstrate the adaptive nature of communocratic populism. Faced with a dominant ruling party and entrenched incumbency, opposition actors mobilize communal solidarities and forge temporary coalitions to challenge the status quo. In his view, such practices further substantiate his argument that identity-based mobilization remains central to understanding Cameroon’s electoral politics.
Q&A Session
The Q&A session developed into a wide-ranging and intellectually engaged dialogue that deepened the themes raised in the presentations, particularly the intersections between populism, environmental governance, democratic legitimacy, and identity-based political mobilization. Moderated by Neo Sithole, the discussion brought together conceptual reflections, empirical clarifications, and comparative insights, revealing the broader implications of the research beyond the specific case studies of Nigeria and Cameroon.
Opening the session, Sithole offered strong praise for Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja’s paper, emphasizing its methodological rigor and its successful integration of theory with empirical evidence. He noted that the study provided not only a clear conceptual framework but also concrete proof, particularly through environmental data from the Niger Delta demonstrating the presence of harmful chemicals and minerals in topsoil affecting local populations. Sithole framed the discussion within a broader critique of minimalist understandings of democracy, arguing that governance should not be confined to electoral processes but must extend to everyday conditions of life, including environmental quality and access to clean resources. In his view, the paper effectively illustrated how democratic governance—or its absence—directly shapes environmental outcomes.
Sithole also situated the Niger Delta within a wider global political economy, highlighting how multinational corporations often relocate environmentally harmful extraction activities to regions in Africa, Latin America, and Asia where regulatory frameworks are weaker. He characterized the Niger Delta as both one of the longest-running cases of environmental degradation and one of the most sustained examples of environmental resistance, noting that such resistance has become embedded in local identity. Extending the argument, he suggested that dissatisfaction with democratic governance across Africa stems from unmet expectations following the democratic transitions of the 1990s and 2000s, when many citizens assumed political liberalization would lead to improved living conditions. Instead, he observed, many postcolonial states continue to operate within institutional frameworks inherited from colonial administrations that were not designed to address local needs.
Drawing on examples from Kenya and South Africa, Sithole highlighted ongoing disputes over land rights and resource ownership, illustrating how colonial-era patterns of dispossession persist in contemporary governance. He posed a forward-looking question about whether environmental resistance movements across the continent could serve as catalysts for democratic renewal at a broader scale.
In response, Dr. Solaja clarified the intent of his research. He stressed that the study did not advocate dismantling existing environmental governance frameworks but rather reforming them through the integration of indigenous ecological knowledge systems. According to Dr. Solaja, contemporary democratic institutions in many postcolonial societies were externally derived and insufficiently adapted to local realities. The proposed solution, which he described as a biocultural approach, involves incorporating indigenous practices and knowledge into formal governance structures to create more inclusive and effective systems. This approach, he argued, would address democratic deficits while strengthening environmental stewardship by recognizing the long-standing expertise of local communities.
The discussion then shifted toward the question of accountability and reporting mechanisms. Sithole raised concerns about the effectiveness of multinational institutions and international organizations in contexts where domestic environmental reporting systems are weak or unreliable. He asked whether reliance on external actors was sufficient to ensure environmental justice or whether strengthening state capacity should be prioritized.
Dr. Solaja responded by emphasizing the importance of community participation in monitoring environmental conditions. He proposed bottom-up reporting mechanisms that would enable local populations to communicate environmental challenges directly to authorities, potentially using technological tools such as mobile applications. While acknowledging the necessity of formal institutional frameworks, he argued that they must be complemented by indigenous knowledge and grassroots engagement to achieve meaningful environmental democracy.
Dr. Bülent Kenes expanded the discussion by introducing a geopolitical perspective that connected environmental governance in Africa to the rise of contemporary populist movements in Western countries. He framed his question around the potential global implications of political ideologies associated with figures such as Donald Trump and the MAGA movement, which he characterized as challenging postcolonial frameworks and signaling a form of renewed imperial assertiveness. Dr. Kenes invited the speakers to reflect on whether African states and societies should be concerned about the broader consequences of these developments, particularly in relation to historical patterns of external domination. He specifically asked whether such political trends could generate new forms of re-colonization or intensified exploitation of African resources, labor, and environmental assets. His intervention underscored the possibility that shifting power dynamics in the Global North might place renewed pressure on Africa’s ecological systems and resource governance, thereby linking domestic environmental issues to wider geopolitical transformations.
In his response, Dr. Solaja addressed the geopolitical concerns surrounding potential renewed exploitation of African resources by situating them within a longer historical continuum of extractivism. He emphasized that African communities have endured the adverse consequences of intensive resource extraction both during colonial rule and in the post-independence period, often with limited benefits for local populations. According to Dr. Solaja, the well-being of affected communities has frequently been compromised, while state interventions have tended to be delayed, insufficient, or absent altogether. In many cases, assistance has been mediated through international donors or multinational corporations rather than delivered directly by national governments, creating complex arrangements that do not always serve the interests of local beneficiaries.
Dr. Solaja noted that although most African countries have been politically independent for decades, the persistence of asymmetrical global economic relationships continues to shape environmental governance and resource management. He argued that while no country can operate in isolation, interactions between the Global North and Global South should evolve toward more equitable and mutually beneficial partnerships rather than exploitative ones.
Returning to the conceptual framework of his paper, Dr. Solaja reiterated the importance of biocultural sovereignty, which advocates integrating indigenous knowledge systems into formal environmental governance structures. He suggested that empowering local communities to participate in decision-making over resource control, distribution, and management could reduce conflict and resistance movements. By drawing on longstanding indigenous ecological practices, he concluded, marginalized communities could gain greater democratic voice and contribute to more sustainable and inclusive resource governance.
The session also addressed conceptual issues arising from Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s presentation on communocratic populism. Dr. Kenes noted the novelty of the concept and requested clarification of its meaning and applicability beyond the Cameroonian context. Dr. Eteme explained that communocratic populism refers to a form of political mobilization grounded in community identity rather than ideological programs. In this framework, electoral competition becomes a contest among communal groups seeking access to state power, often leading to alliances between communities aiming to displace incumbents.
He elaborated that political discourse frequently attributes governmental actions to entire communities rather than to individual leaders, reinforcing identity-based interpretations of power. As a result, electoral campaigns focus less on policy proposals and more on demonstrating communal strength, intelligence, or entitlement to rule. Dr. Eteme further explained that communocratic alliances emerge when communities perceive the existing power structure as monopolized by a particular group. These alliances are pragmatic and strategic, formed not around shared ideological visions but around the collective objective of redistributing political power.
Throughout the discussion, participants acknowledged that such dynamics complicate conventional democratic theory, which assumes competition based on policy alternatives and public interest. Instead, identity-based mobilization can transform elections into zero-sum contests among communities, challenging the ideal of governance oriented toward the common good.
The Q&A session concluded with a recognition of the originality and relevance of the concepts introduced by the presenters, particularly the integration of environmental governance into populism studies and the articulation of communocratic populism as a framework for understanding identity-driven electoral politics. The exchange underscored the importance of interdisciplinary approaches that consider historical legacies, institutional structures, and socio-cultural dynamics in analyzing contemporary democracy.
Overall, the session demonstrated how localized case studies—whether environmental conflicts in the Niger Delta or identity politics in Cameroon—can illuminate broader structural challenges facing democratic governance in the Global South and beyond. By fostering dialogue between empirical research and theoretical reflection, the discussion highlighted the value of comparative and context-sensitive analyses for advancing the study of populism, governance, and democratic transformation.
Concluding Remarks
ECPS Early Career Research Network (ECRN) member Neo Sithole. Photo: Umit Vurel.
In his concluding remarks, moderator Neo Sithole reflected on the thematic contributions of the presentations and highlighted their broader significance for understanding populism and democracy in African contexts. He began by acknowledging his limited familiarity with the politics of Central Francophone Africa but noted that the presentations resonated with patterns he had observed elsewhere, particularly the role of geographical and historical divides in shaping populist mobilization. Drawing on comparative examples, he emphasized how north–south disparities rooted in colonial infrastructure development have produced enduring political imbalances in several postcolonial states. He commended the presenters for illuminating these structural divides and their implications for democratic governance. Sithole also encouraged further scholarly development of the concept of communocratic populism.
Offering brief feedback on the presentations, Sithole observed that both papers revealed understudied dimensions of populist expression in Africa. He noted that Dr. Solaja’s research demonstrated how environmental resistance can become central to local identity while exposing the persistence of colonial-era governance practices that continue to marginalize affected communities. In contrast, Dr. Essaga Eteme’s work shed light on identity-based mobilization and the enduring dominance of strong leadership patterns in certain Francophone states, where communal affiliation shapes political competition.
Conclusion
Session 12 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series underscored the urgency of rethinking democracy through the lenses of decolonization, governance, and identity in the Global South. By juxtaposing environmental struggles in Nigeria and the United Kingdom with identity-driven electoral politics in Cameroon, the session demonstrated that democratic deficit is neither geographically confined nor institutionally uniform. Rather, it manifests in diverse forms shaped by colonial legacies, political economies of extraction, and enduring contestations over representation and authority. The discussions revealed that formal democratic procedures—whether participatory environmental frameworks or multiparty elections—do not automatically translate into substantive inclusion or equitable outcomes. Instead, communities often confront structures that allow consultation without empowerment and participation without transformative capacity.
A key takeaway was the necessity of expanding democratic theory beyond procedural benchmarks toward a more substantive understanding that incorporates ecological justice, epistemic plurality, and communal recognition. The concept of biocultural sovereignty advanced in the environmental context, alongside the notion of communocratic populism in electoral politics, illustrated how locally grounded analytical frameworks can illuminate dynamics that conventional models overlook. Both contributions highlighted the ambivalence of resistance movements and identity mobilization, which may simultaneously articulate legitimate grievances and risk reinforcing new forms of exclusion.
Ultimately, the session emphasized that decolonizing democracy requires confronting the historical and structural conditions that shape contemporary governance, rather than merely adapting existing institutional templates. By bringing empirical case studies into dialogue with broader theoretical debates, Session 12 contributed to a more nuanced understanding of how democracy is negotiated, contested, and reimagined in postcolonial settings. It thus reinforced the importance of interdisciplinary and context-sensitive approaches for advancing scholarship on populism, governance, and democratic transformation in an increasingly interconnected world.
Please cite as: Fiorino, Daniel. (2026). “The Trump Administration and Climate Policy: The Effects of Right-wing Populism.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00132
Abstract The Trump administration’s renewed withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement forms part of a wider retreat from multilateralism that has defined recent US foreign policy. Beyond exiting the Paris framework – which remains the central mechanism for global coordination on climate mitigation and adaptation – the administration has disengaged from institutions such as the World Health Organization, curtailed international assistance and launched broad reviews of US participation in global governance. Climate policy is especially vulnerable under a right-wing populist presidency marked by hostility toward multilateral cooperation and scepticism of scientific expertise. Given the United States’ role as the largest historical emitter, a major current emitter and a key actor in climate diplomacy, its disengagement has significant systemic consequences. Yet the most profound effects may arise from domestic rollbacks of emissions regulation and constraints placed on state-level climate action. For the European Union – committed to net-zero by 2050 and the world’s largest climate financier – sustained US disengagement necessitates continued autonomous climate leadership.
Keywords: climate change; populism; Paris Agreement; multilateralism; global engagement
With the arrival of the second Donald Trump administration in January 2025, a new era dawned in the foreign affairs of the United States and the world. A goal of the Trump administration is to withdraw as much as possible from multilateral institutions and problem-solving. This stance reflects a tenet of right-wing populism: hostility to working with other nations in international platforms. The United States became one of four nations not participating in the Paris Climate Agreement. This is the second time the United States has pulled out of the Paris Agreement. The first occurred during the first Trump administration, although President Joe Biden rejoined before the withdrawal became official.
President Trump issued Executive Order 14162 on 20 January 2025, calling for a review of ‘international agreements and initiatives that do not reflect our country’s values’ as the administration defines them (The White House 2025b). As the Democratic Party-oriented Center for American Progress noted at the time, the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and other global initiatives ‘marks a stark return to isolationism at a moment when global cooperation is needed’ (Gibson 2025). What are the consequences of the United States’ withdrawal from global platforms? What, in particular, does this shift in US engagement mean for the European Union (EU)?
The withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement was part of a larger pattern. The United States also dropped participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) (Yamey and Titanji 2025), turned on and threatened traditional allies, including Canada and the European Union; eviscerated the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and terminated funding for many international initiatives. The effect of all these actions, Stewart Patrick has observed, is that President Trump ‘is declaring independence from the world America made’ (Patrick 2025). The Trump global agenda reflects many of the views that foreign policy conservatives have long held dear: that multilateral institutions and agreements interfere with American national sovereignty; that international law is illegitimate and constrains freedom of action; and that countries should deal with each other bilaterally under a ‘might makes right’ framework. Part of this worldview is a disavowal of global development and creation of ‘destabilizing tariffs’ that upend decades of open trade policies. From a global sustainability perspective, this view also constitutes a ‘rejection of global public goods’ as the US government denies climate science, ignores biodiversity collapse, rejects global environmental collaboration, and declares ‘war on the Sustainable Development Goals’ adopted by the United Nations (Patrick 2025).
This chapter reviews US–EU climate negotiations, how they changed during the transition from President Biden to President Trump, the direction they are moving under the Trump administration, and the prospects for US–EU relations over the next three years. Given the position of the Trump administration on climate science (and, for that matter, on scientific expertise generally), the administration’s emphasis on developing and exploiting the fossil fuel resources of the United States, and the administration’s hostility to global engagement, it is difficult to be optimistic about the prospects for climate negotiations and the US–EU relationship more generally.
Consequences of Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
On his first day in office, as he had done at the start of his first administration, President Trump withdrew the United States from the Paris Climate Agreement. So far, no other countries have withdrawn from the Paris Climate Agreement (Crowfoot 2025), although President Javier Milei of Argentina announced that he is considering it (Gibson 2025). Otherwise, what are the effects of Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement? When the largest historical emitter of greenhouse gases walks away from the principal platform for addressing the global problem of climate change, there will be consequences (CRS 2025; Paraguasso and Volcovici 2025). Not having the United States participate substantively in future annual Conferences of the Parties (COPs) to monitor progress and set Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) is, in itself, a setback. The United States is still the second-largest emitter of greenhouse gases. It is also the world’s largest economy and has been a formidable influence in global politics. Indeed, the system of relationships that Trump is dismantling was largely created by the United States in the years following the Second World War.
One consequence of the US withdrawal from international climate negotiations is a reduction in funding for mitigation and adaptation in developing and other countries. EO 14162, discussed earlier, ended any financial commitments made under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC). On 4 March 2025, the United States also withdrew from the Climate Loss and Damage Fund, which was designed to compensate countries for climate change-related damages and to help fund adaptation. The administration is not only eliminating financial support for climate-related initiatives but also reducing assistance across the board, including humanitarian aid.
The pattern of the Trump administration is to disrupt relationships with traditional allies. The administration has not only insulted allies; it has also imposed tariffs that undermine the global economy and those of many nations, with the EU generally seen as losing in the trade agreement (FitzGerald and Geoghagan 2025). The asserted goal is to revive domestic manufacturing with high tariffs on imported goods. That is unlikely to prove effective, according to most experts. The tariffs have been directed especially at China, which the administration sees as the United States’ principal economic and military competitor. They have also been directed at many other countries.
Jennifer Lind and Daryl Press (2025) see an effort to refocus American resources on China as at least part of the motivation for this strategy of global disengagement. The catch is that this effort to refocus on China, which the administration perceives as the primary global threat to US primacy, could cede the role of international technology and economic leader to the Chinese government. Certainly, withdrawing from the Paris Agreement risks ceding global climate leadership to the EU and China if it aspires to play that role. Combined with the significant reductions in climate, scientific and other research, these actions put the United States at a disadvantage relative to China in the coming decades.
Yet the main effects of Trump’s actions, at least in the short term, may be in the domestic policy arena (Brown and Stevens 2025). Before November 2024, assuming the continuation of Biden’s climate mitigation policies, the United States was likely to meet the goal of a 50–52% reduction in emissions by 2030 relative to a 2005 baseline. The tax credits and incentives in the Inflation Reduction Act (enacted in 2023) and the Investment and Infrastructure Jobs Act (passed in 2022) were expected, if implemented, to get the United States most of the way toward that goal. Efforts at the state and local levels, supplemented by corporate and other actors, could have carried the United States the rest of the way toward that goal (King et al. 2024). With Trump’s reversal of provisions in those laws and a range of other domestic policy changes, that emissions reduction goal is now out of reach.
The Trump administration not only set out to reverse legislative and other policy changes taken by its predecessor; it also declared an ‘energy emergency’ to justify and facilitate the further development of fossil fuels (The White House, 2025a). This executive order claims that US energy capacities ‘are all far too inadequate to meet our Nation’s needs’. In a dig at wind and solar generation, it asserted that the country had come to depend on ‘a precariously inadequate and intermittent energy supply, and an increasingly unreliable grid’ (The White House 2025b). Among the measures outlined in the executive order were expanding oil and gas production on federal lands, facilitating the production of corn-based ethanol, and removing regulatory barriers to expanded fossil fuel infrastructure from laws such as the Clean Water Act (enacted in 1972) and the Endangered Species Act (enacted in 1973).
In addition to declaring an ‘energy emergency’, the Trump administration has taken steps to promote the expansion of fossil fuels, which are the principal source of greenhouse gases. In an order titled ‘Unleashing American Energy’, it committed to expanding fossil fuel production on federal lands, including the outer continental shelf; stated an intent to eliminate what it called the ‘electric vehicle mandate’ in order to ‘promote consumer choice’, proposed to eliminate ‘unfair subsidies and other ill-conceived market distortions that favour electric vehicles (EVs) over other technologies and effectively mandate their purchase’, and directed officials ‘to safeguard the American people’s freedom to choose from a variety of goods and appliances’, a threat to revise federal product energy efficiency standards (The White House 2025c). In a direct challenge to the scientific consensus on climate change, the Trump administration has also proposed to overturn the ‘endangerment finding’ that underpins authority granted in the Clean Air Act (Joselow and Friedman 2025). If this effort succeeds, it will not only directly affect vehicle emission standards but also undermine the legal basis for future administrations’ climate mitigation actions.
Even state-level policies are being threatened. Using authority granted under the Congressional Review Act, the Republican-controlled Congress and the president revoked the California waivers issued by the Biden administration, allowing the state to mandate zero-emission vehicles. First included in the Air Quality Act of 1967 and later incorporated into the Clean Air Act in 1970, the State of California has the legal authority to set stricter motor vehicle standards than the federal government. In 1977, amendments to the Clean Air Act extended that authority to other states wishing to adopt more stringent California standards, which more than a dozen states have adopted. The administration wants to revoke that authority as part of its defence of the fossil fuel industry. California and other states are challenging this decision in court (Rosenhall and Friedman 2025). California has been especially aggressive in its climate policies.
Prospects for the US–EU Relationship
The long-standing collaborative relationship between the United States and the European Union is particularly fraught in the light of these developments. President Trump is unlikely to be persuaded to change course regarding multilateral institutions and agreements. This view is firmly ingrained in the Trump administration’s worldview. The United States is out of the Paris Climate Agreement (CRS 2025). Some in the administration are even calling for the United States to withdraw from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), although that would require ratification by the US Senate and would be more difficult. The EU’s strategy is to ‘wait it out’ while continuing to exercise international climate leadership, as it has for years. The EU should continue to make an economic and security case for mitigating emissions and for strategically adapting to the impacts of climate change. Renewable energy is the most efficient way to generate electricity in most of the world; the environmental, economic and national security benefits are compelling. Energy innovation delivers more jobs per unit of investment, provides economic benefits to national and regional economies, improves air quality and contributes to global reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. The public policy case for committing to a clean energy transition is strong.
The case for EU climate leadership is compelling (Zito 2024). The European Commission views climate change as an existential threat. It aims to be the ‘first climate-neutral continent’ and has committed to a net-zero-emission economy and society by 2050, relative to 1990 levels (European Commission 2025a, 2025b). The EU has an Emissions Trading System covering 40% of emissions, which recently expanded to include aviation and maritime sources (European Commission 2025c). It has adopted an intermediate goal of a 55% reduction in emissions by 2030, with a 90% target for 2040. The EU adopted a Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and is (alongside the member states and the European Investment Bank) the largest source of funding for developing nations. The EU has set targets for carbon removals for 2030. Although progress toward net-zero was recently deemed ‘insufficient’, it has adopted goals and is making more progress than any other group among developed economies. It plays a leading role in the annual Conferences of the Parties to the UNFCCC, and the EU actively participates in efforts to implement the Paris Agreement (Zito 2024).
The EU has been a global climate leader and must continue to play that role. Although it has experienced difficulty in cutting emissions, as all countries have, it has made as much or more progress than any other part of the world. Indeed, in the most recent ‘Climate Change Performance Index’, which compares countries across a range of mitigation indicators, EU members held 11 of the top 20 positions (CCPI 2025). Although some experts are calling for a suspension of democratic norms and procedures in light of the urgency of the problem, the research suggests (although not uniformly) that democratic systems, like most in the EU, are better at mitigating emissions than more authoritarian states (Fiorino 2018).
The United States is balanced between two competing coalitions: one accepts the need for climate action; the other rejects it. US policies are also evenly balanced, with about half of the states preferring progressive policies to mitigate emissions and the other half avoiding them. The pattern in midterm congressional elections is for the party of the sitting president to lose seats in the US House of Representatives; the Senate is harder to predict. This pattern, combined with President Trump’s low approval ratings, makes it likely that Democrats will gain a majority in the House in 2026. And of course, there is a new presidential election in 2028. Exercising its leadership on climate change may be the EU’s best strategy over the next few years. Following this approach is arguably the most sensible way to ‘wait out’ the Trump presidency.
With this administration unlikely to change its views on climate change or on multilateral commitments, the best course for the European Union is to continue to exercise climate leadership, to muddle through and hope for a more favourable US position on climate change and on multilateral problem-solving.
(*) Daniel J. Fiorino is a Distinguished Executive in Residence and Director of the Center for Environmental Policy in the School of Public Affairs at American University. He teaches courses on environmental and energy policy and public policy approaches to sustainability. He is the author or co-author of eight books, many of which have been recognized with national or international awards. His most recent books are the Clean Energy Transition: Policies and Politics for a Zero-Carbon World (Polity Press, 2022) and A Good Life on a Finite Earth: The Political Economy of Green Growth (Oxford University Press, 2018). He also was the lead editor of the Elgar Encyclopedia of Climate Policy, published in 2024. Before joining American University in 2009, he served in a variety of management and analytical positions at the United States Environmental Protection Agency. His PhD is in Political Science from Johns Hopkins University. Email: dfiorino@american.edu
Yamey, Gavin and Boghuma K. Titanji. 2025. “Withdrawal of the United States from the WHO—How President Trump is Weakening Public Health.” The New England Journal of Medicine 392 (15): 1457–1460.
Zito, Anthony R. 2024. “European Union.” In Daniel J. Fiorino, Todd A. Eisenstadt, and Manjyot Kaur Ahluwalia, eds. Elgar Encyclopedia of Climate Change, pp. 429–433. Edward Elgar.
In her sharp analysis of the COP30 summit, Dr. Heidi Hart,an environmental humanities researcher and guest instructor at Linnaeus University in Sweden, captures the surreal moment when an exhibition pavilion in Belém caught fire—an unsettling metaphor for a world already burning. Despite tense negotiations and an extra day of talks, petrostates secured a final text that completely omitted fossil fuels, leaving UN Secretary-General Guterres to warn of a widening gap between science and policy. Dr. Hart situates this failure within a shifting global landscape marked by illiberal regimes, climate denial, and powerful petro-interests. With geopolitical turmoil and corporate greenwashing shaping outcomes, her commentary underscores a stark truth: on a “spaceship” with finite resources, political paralysis is accelerating us toward irreversible tipping points.
The defining image of the COP30 climate summit flashed around the world: fire in an exhibition pavilion at the meeting site in Belém, Brazil, flames spreading up the tent’s walls and forcing evacuations. No one was injured beyond smoke inhalation, but the “world is on fire” adage took a literal turn as delegates wrestled to find consensus. The summit spilled over into an extra day, with a win for petrostates like Saudi Arabia, as the final agreement ceded more funding to at-risk countries but failed to include any language about fossil fuels.
On Saturday, COP30 President André Corrêa do Lago announced a forthcoming “side-text” about fossil fuels and forest protections, also a hot topic among Indigenous protesters who had pressed into the secure COP “Blue Zone” on Friday evening. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres’ assessment after the summit was grim, despite acknowledging some progress on “adaptation” funds: “The gap between where we are and what science demands remains dangerously wide … The reality of overshoot is a stark warning: we are approaching dangerous and irreversible tipping points.” The lack of even a mention of fossil fuels in the final agreement, let alone the “deep, rapid emission cuts” Guterres acknowledges are necessary to keep the planet below overshoot carbon levels, is not just the result of Saudi and Russian delegates’ bully tactics (Al Gore has referred to the agreement as an “Opec text”) but also a symptom of profoundly shifting political realities around the world.
The notable absence of US delegates, while the Trump administration slashed environmental protections at home, was the source of relief for some at the summit but also pointed to the normalization of climate denial amid illiberal regimes’ growing influence and far-right pressures in green-aspirational countries like Germany. Even Norway, known for its own sustainable, egalitarian culture, has no plans to sacrifice its oil wealth for the larger planetary good. Meanwhile, costly wars and deep political divisions in countries like the US and Brazil distract from efforts to forge coherent climate policy. Finally, the sheer scale of petrostates’ and billionaire technocrats’ influence cannot be overstated in watering down and even – in this case – completely avoiding action on carbon emissions cuts. Bill Gates’ recent essay diminishing the dangers of climate emergency has not helped; though “civilization” will likely not be wiped out in a sci-fi doomsday scenario, the suffering of millions and the loss of innumerable nonhuman species are hardly points to be glossed over in the name of “innovation.” Neoliberal optimism sounds increasingly tone-deaf in a time when the limits of human progress are becoming palpably clear around the world.
The idea of “Spaceship Earth,” popularized by Buckminster Fuller in the late 1970s, portrays the planet as a closed system with limited resources. Though this idea has informed many efforts toward more sustainable living, greenwashing for the sake of profit has become the norm among large corporations. The comforts of petrocultures, the material, cultural, and economic manifestations of decades of cheap oil, are so embedded in privileged countries, there are limits, too, to how much individuals can do to shrink their carbon footprints.
On the political level, Saudi and Russian influence is only one part of the picture; lack of concern or climate denialism (often cast as denial of the human cause) is growing in countries like Indonesia, Mexico, India, and Australia, places where the risks from global heating are high. In the formerly stable if systemically inequitable US, the lurch toward anti-science authoritarianism has been so swift as to induce a kind of vertigo. In his recent book Impasse: Climate Change and the Limits of Progress, Roy Scranton writes, “We can recognize the Earth as a closed system in which we all depend on each other, but the political reality within that system resembles gang warfare more than it does a unified crew,” (91). The deep lack of consensus at COP30, when the risks of climate collapse are clearer than ever, shows how much more difficult the problem is to address in today’s chaotic political landscape.
Nearly ten years ago, in her essay “What Is the Anthro-political?”, culture theorist Claire Colebrook engaged with the already contested Anthropocene term to argue that, in light of ecological destruction, “the political” as a norm can no longer be taken for granted. This provocative stance is worth revisiting today. Especially with the rise of populist tendencies that tap into human “affect and corporeality,” the political no longer appears as a regulating modality of human-being but rather as a contingent aspect of human culture that, once that culture destroys its own “milieu” or literal environment, will go down with it. In Colebrook’s more elegant terms, “What if what we know as politics … were possible only in a brief era of the taming of human history?” (115).
This geologic-scale perspective on last week’s pitting of the EU’s and other climate-sympathetic delegates against fossil-friendly regimes (with the absent US in the background noise) does not diminish the stakes at COP30 but shows how vast and planetary those stakes are. With our closed system threatening to burn beyond livable thresholds, the responsibility of one global gathering to stave off one local disaster after another becomes painfully clear.
The ECPS Academy Summer School 2025 brought together leading scholars to examine how populism and climate change intersect—a dynamic that now shapes global governance, political polarization, and environmental policy. Across nine lectures, participants critically explored how populist movements exploit climate debates, from outright denialism to attacks on climate elites and institutions. These sessions highlighted profound tensions: how can we promote equitable, science-based climate action in an era of rising populism, misinformation, and distrust of expertise? The collection of reports and video recordings now available captures these rich interdisciplinary discussions, offering essential resources for researchers, policymakers, and citizens alike. Engage with this unique body of work to better understand the challenges—and possibilities—for climate governance and democracy in the 21st century.
Reported by ECPS Staff
The ECPS Summer School 2025 offered a rigorous, interdisciplinary examination of how populism intersects with the climate crisis—a nexus increasingly shaping politics globally. Climate change is no longer a purely environmental issue; it is deeply entwined with economic, social, cultural, and political dynamics that populist movements actively exploit. Whether through denialism, deregulation, appeals to “the people” against “globalist elites,” or opportunistic co-optation of environmental grievances, populist narratives have reshaped climate debates in ways that complicate international cooperation and local policymaking.
Across nine lectures by leading scholars—including experts in environmental politics, disinformation, conflict studies, political psychology, and critical theory—the program investigated both the challenges and opportunities posed by populist interventions in climate governance. Participants explored key questions: How do populists construct climate skepticism? When can populism mobilize for climate justice rather than obstruct it? What is the role of disinformation infrastructures in shaping climate discourse? And how do structural inequalities, colonial legacies, and class power inflect contemporary climate conflicts?
The summer school addressed the profound tension between the urgent need for global climate action and the populist turn toward polarization, distrust of expertise, and nationalist retrenchment. From analyses of right-wing anti-environmentalism in the Trump era to debates over “eco-populism,” climate-related rural protests, and the technopolitics of AI and climate governance, the lectures illuminated how climate action itself is a contested terrain.
Readers and audiences are invited to access comprehensive reports and video recordings of all lectures—a vital resource for scholars, practitioners, policymakers and citizens seeking to understand the fraught intersection of populism and climate change. The collection not only documents the state of scholarly thinking on these urgent issues but also provides conceptual and practical insights for crafting equitable, democratic, and resilient climate policies in an age of populist challenge.
Watch, read, and engage with these materials to critically examine the pathways forward in one of the defining crises of our time.
In his lecture at the ECPS Summer School 2025, Professor John M. Meyer offered a compelling exploration of the relationship between populism and climate politics. He critiqued authoritarian populism as a threat to equitable climate action while also questioning mainstream climate governance’s elitist, technocratic tendencies. Rather than viewing populism solely as an obstacle, Professor Meyer argued that climate justice movements themselves embody a form of inclusive, democratic populism—centered on equity, participation, and solidarity. Drawing on examples from grassroots activism and Naomi Klein’s concept of “eco-populism,” Professor Meyer proposed that climate action must address material injustices and engage people where they are. His lecture encouraged participants to rethink populism as a political form that, when inclusive and justice-oriented, can help build legitimate, durable, and democratic climate solutions.
Professor Sandra Ricart delivered a timely and insightful lecture on the intersection of climate change, agriculture, and populism in Europe. She explored how structural and demographic challenges, including a declining farming population and economic precarity, have fueled widespread farmer protests across the continent. Prof. Ricart emphasized how these grievances, while rooted in genuine hardship, have increasingly been exploited by far-right populist movements eager to position themselves as defenders of rural interests against European institutions. Her analysis highlighted the pressures created by climate change, policy reforms, and global market dynamics, and she called for more inclusive, responsive, and sustainable agricultural policies. Prof. Ricart’s lecture provided participants with a critical understanding of rural Europe’s evolving political and environmental landscape.
The fourth lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025 featured Professor Daniel Fiorino, a leading expert on environmental policy at American University. Professor Fiorino examined how right-wing populism—characterized by distrust of expertise, nationalism, and hostility to multilateralism—combined with entrenched fossil fuel interests to undermine climate mitigation efforts in the United States during the Trump administration. He highlighted the geographic and partisan divides that shape US climate politics and explained how Republican dominance in fossil fuel-dependent states reinforces skepticism toward climate action. Professor Fiorino’s lecture underscored the vulnerability of US climate policy to political polarization and partisan shifts, warning that right-wing populism poses an enduring challenge not only to American climate governance but to global efforts to address the climate crisis.
Dr. Heidi Hart’s lecture illuminated the provocative intersection of art, activism, and climate trauma. Through an interdisciplinary lens, she explored why climate activists increasingly target iconic artworks in museums as sites of performative protest, interpreting these acts not as mere vandalism but as symbolic disruptions challenging elitist cultural values amid ecological crises. Drawing on frameworks from populism studies, art history, and affect theory, Dr. Hart examined how these interventions reflect a passionate response to climate grief and injustice. Her analysis underscored the importance of understanding such protests within broader debates on decolonization, posthumanism, and collective responsibility, encouraging participants to view artistic destruction as both a critique of cultural complacency and a call for ecological transformation.
In his compelling lecture, Professor Erik Swyngedouw offered a radical critique of contemporary climate discourse, describing it as trapped in a “climate deadlock” where knowledge and activism coexist with deepening ecological crisis. He argued that mainstream and radical climate narratives mirror the structure of populism, constructing simplistic binaries while displacing attention from capitalism’s core role in driving environmental destruction. Professor Swyngedouw challenged participants to recognize that the environmental apocalypse is not an imminent future but an unevenly distributed present reality for much of the world. His provocative call to dismantle the comforting fantasy of a unified humanity urged a re-politicization of the climate crisis, demanding systemic transformation and solidarity grounded in confronting global inequalities.
Professor Philippe Le Billon’s lecture critically examined how climate-related conflicts emerge from three sources: the impacts of climate change itself, contestation over climate inaction, and backlash against climate action. He argued that climate change operates as a “threat multiplier,” intensifying pre-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities rather than acting as an isolated trigger of violence. He explored how climate activism—while driven by moral urgency—can be framed as elitist and provoke populist opposition, and how the implementation of climate policy can generate new conflicts when perceived as unjust or technocratic. Professor Le Billon warned that “green capitalism” risks reproducing extractive logics, creating new “green sacrifice zones,” and underscored that climate justice requires confronting colonial legacies, class inequality, and structural power relations.
The eighth lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025 was delivered online by Professor Stephan Lewandowsky, a globally recognized expert on misinformation and political psychology. His presentation offered a penetrating analysis of how climate disinformation is fueled by an organized infrastructure of vested interests and amplified by populist politics, which undermine trust in science. Professor Lewandowsky highlighted that ideological commitments—particularly free-market conservatism—strongly shape public acceptance of climate science. He emphasized that communicating the overwhelming scientific consensus on climate change can be a powerful corrective but cautioned that disinformation thrives in an environment where politics and identity outweigh facts. His lecture underscored the urgent need to confront these structural and ideological barriers to effective climate action.
In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025, Professor Robert Huber examined how populist parties across Europe construct climate skepticism, emphasizing that populism’s “thin-centered ideology” (as defined by Cas Mudde) pits “the pure people” against “corrupt elites.” This framing makes climate science and policy institutions prime targets for populist critique. Professor Huber’s expert survey of 31 European countries showed a clear trend: the more populist a party, the more skeptical it is of climate policy and climate science, regardless of its left- or right-wing orientation. He cautioned participants to disentangle populism from related ideologies like nationalism or authoritarianism, underscoring that populism’s challenge to climate politics is complex, context-dependent, and shaped by deeper struggles over legitimacy, authority, and representation.
In his lecture at the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025, Professor Robert Huber examined how populist parties across Europe construct climate skepticism, emphasizing that populism’s “thin-centered ideology” (as defined by Cas Mudde) pits “the pure people” against “corrupt elites.” This framing makes climate science and policy institutions prime targets for populist critique. Professor Huber’s expert survey of 31 European countries showed a clear trend: the more populist a party, the more skeptical it is of climate policy and climate science, regardless of its left- or right-wing orientation. He cautioned participants to disentangle populism from related ideologies like nationalism or authoritarianism, underscoring that populism’s challenge to climate politics is complex, context-dependent, and shaped by deeper struggles over legitimacy, authority, and representation.
Reported by ECPS Staff
The ninth lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025, titled “Populism and Climate Change: Understanding What Is at Stake and Crafting Policy Suggestions for Stakeholders,” was held online from July 7 to 11, 2025. On Friday, July 11, Professor Robert Huber delivered his lecture on “Populist Narratives on Sustainability, Energy Resources and Climate Change,” offering participants a rigorous exploration of the complex intersections between populist politics and climate discourse.
The Summer School convened scholars, students, and practitioners from around the world to engage in critical discussions about how populism shapes—and is shaped by—the politics of climate change. It provided a unique interdisciplinary forum to analyze these global dynamics and to develop policy-relevant insights for stakeholders navigating the overlapping crises of climate and democracy.
The session was moderated by Dr. Susana Batel, Assistant Researcher and Invited Lecturer at the University Institute of Lisbon’s Center for Psychological Research and Social Intervention. Dr. Batel’s own research focuses on the green transition and its relationship to socio-environmental justice, exploring how climate and energy policies may reproduce or challenge entrenched social inequalities. More recently, she has turned her attention to the relationship between green transition efforts and far-right populism, particularly in Portugal. In her introduction, Dr. Batel underscored the relevance of Professor Huber’s expertise for these pressing questions, noting that his work has become central to ongoing debates on how populist actors respond to climate policies and narratives.
Dr. Robert Huber is Professor of Political Science Methods at the University of Salzburg. His research expertise lies at the intersection of populism, political methodology, and climate politics, and he has become a leading figure in the emerging field studying how populist parties and leaders engage with environmental and energy issues. As Dr. Batel observed in her remarks, Professor Huber has helped illuminate how populist actors contest not only the facts of climate change but also the legitimacy of the processes through which climate policy is made and implemented.
In his lecture, Professor Huber tackled the core question of why populists, both on the right and left, have often adopted a skeptical or adversarial stance toward climate action. He emphasized the importance of distinguishing populism from adjacent ideological forces such as nationalism, authoritarianism, or economic liberalism, arguing that only careful conceptual and empirical work can reveal the mechanisms through which populism interacts with climate skepticism. His lecture offered participants a comprehensive framework to understand the diversity of populist climate narratives, setting the stage for deeper discussion and analysis of this timely and globally significant phenomenon.
Why Populists Target Climate Issues
Installation of Donald Trump’s head by artist Jacques Rival floating on the Moselle River, Metz, France, August 31, 2019. Photo: Kateryna Levchenko.
In his lecture, Professor Huber provided a rigorous and insightful analysis of why populist actors engage with climate issues, highlighting the complexity and nuance often overlooked in popular discussions. Professor Huber opened his talk by reflecting on the emerging nature of this research agenda, noting, “When I started studying populism and climate change back in 2016, there was not much on that—very little research and few opportunities to think about how these two pressing societal issues intersect.”His remarks underscored both the novelty of the topic and the importance of its exploration.
Professor Huber’s central inquiry revolved around understanding the mechanisms through which populist parties and leaders construct skepticism toward climate action. He acknowledged that figures such as Donald Trump inevitably dominate discussions of climate populism, citing one of Trump’s early tweets: “NBC News just called it the great freeze – coldest weather in years. Is our country still spending money on the GLOBAL WARMING HOAX?” While this is a classic example of conflating weather with climate, Professor Huber emphasized that such rhetoric also reflects broader concerns about public spending and government priorities.
To illustrate variation within populist climate skepticism, Professor Huber turned to European populists, including Thierry Baudet, the leader of the Dutch radical-right party Forum for Democracy. Baudet framed climate action as futile and wasteful, complaining that billions were being spent “just to decrease global warming by 0.007 degrees,” which he characterized as “madness.” Similarly, Marcel de Graaff, formerly a member of the European Parliament, attacked EU climate policy as deceitful, claiming that elites benefited financially from “green lies.” Professor Huber observed that while all three cases reflect skepticism toward climate action, they differ in emphasis—Trump’s framing centered on economic competitiveness, Baudet on policy effectiveness, and de Graaff on political betrayal.
These examples led Professor Huber to ask the central question driving his lecture: “Why is it that populist politicians are so often skeptical about climate change?” He insisted that an analytical approach is required to move beyond anecdote and description, seeking instead to understand underlying patterns and causal mechanisms.
Professor Huber introduced the audience to Van Rensburg’s (2015) typology of climate skepticism, which distinguishes between skepticism about the evidence (whether climate change is real and human-caused), the process (whether decision-making and knowledge-production are legitimate), and the response (whether proposed policies are desirable). While populists may sometimes question the reality of climate change itself, Professor Huber suggested that their skepticism more often targets the process and response dimensions—expressing distrust toward scientific expertise, democratic legitimacy, and the distributive impacts of climate policy.
A particularly vivid example of this process skepticism emerged from the “Yellow Vests” protests in France, where demonstrators opposed carbon taxes not only for their economic burden but also because they perceived climate policy as undemocratic and detached from ordinary people’s needs. Professor Huber noted how one protester’s sign declared: “I want my democracy now,” reflecting the sentiment that climate decisions are made by remote technocratic elites without sufficient public input. As Professor Huber remarked, “For some people, climate policy really feels out of touch with their everyday needs.”
Professor Huber emphasized that much of this skepticism appears on the political right but cautioned against equating populism with right-wing ideology. “It may just be that they are right-wing,” he observed, highlighting that climate skepticism among populists could stem from other ideological commitments—such as nationalism, conservatism, or libertarianism—that overlap but are analytically distinct from populism itself.
Nonetheless, Professor Huber acknowledged that left-wing populism can also intersect with climate discourse in distinct ways. He pointed to emerging instances of “green populism” on the left, where actors such as Jean-Luc Mélenchon or Podemos in Spain critique climate policies for failing to address social inequalities or for being captured by corporate interests. Professor Huber explained, “Recent examples suggest that left-wing populists may foster a pro-climate populism that emphasizes social justice and corporate accountability.”
Huber structured his presentation around three guiding questions:
What features of climate change and climate politics make them attractive targets for populist narratives?
Are populists systematically different from non-populists in their climate attitudes?
What recurring patterns can we identify in the narratives that populists employ when discussing climate issues?
He emphasized that populist climate skepticism should be understood as multifaceted and context-dependent. In Western Europe, outright denial of climate science (so-called “trend skepticism”) is rare; more commonly, populists challenge the legitimacy of scientific expertise, international institutions, and the distributive fairness of climate policies. Professor Huber summarized this dynamic: “What we often see is that populists are not necessarily denying climate change itself—they are contesting who makes the decisions and who pays the price.”
However, Professor Huber urged his audience to avoid conflating populism with far-right ideology and to disentangle populism’s distinctive contributions to climate skepticism from other ideological factors. He called for systematic, empirically grounded research that recognizes the diversity of populist climate narratives while remaining attentive to their common thread: a distrust of elites and a framing of climate policy as a battleground between “the pure people” and “corrupt elites.”
Theoretical Explanations for the Populism–Climate Link
Then, Professor Huber delved into the theoretical underpinnings that help explain why populist actors so often engage in climate skepticism. He posed a central question: “What is it essentially about populism that links it to climate change?” His objective was not only to describe the phenomenon but also to dissect its causal mechanisms, emphasizing the need to distinguish populism from overlapping ideologies like nationalism or authoritarianism.
Professor Huber began by outlining three principal ways of conceptualizing populism, noting that each offers different implications for understanding populist positions on climate change.
The first perspective defines populism as a political strategy. Drawing on the work of Kurt Weyland, Professor Huber explained that this approach sees populism as a mode of leadership in which a charismatic leader builds “direct, unmediated, uninstitutionalized support from large numbers of unorganized masses.” This definition, more prevalent in Latin America, highlights the personalistic and anti-institutional nature of populist movements. However, as Professor Huber observed, “this kind of definition doesn’t contain much information about how populist leaders should think about climate change,” suggesting that skepticism in this context may arise from opportunistic attempts to mobilize supporters rather than a core ideological stance.
The second conceptualization frames populism as a political style, a view associated with scholars such as Benjamin Moffitt. Here, populism is performative: it relies on provocation, transgression, and signaling difference from mainstream elites. Populists may adopt a combative tone or deliberately violate elite norms as a way of connecting with “the people.” According to Professor Huber, this style is often visible in populist climate rhetoric, where actors deny climate science not necessarily because they disbelieve it, but as a way of “demonstrating that one is different… to distance themselves from the mainstream elite.” He offered the example of Boris Johnson’s disheveled appearance as a performative signal of outsider status, adding that similar tactics are evident when populists question the legitimacy or value of climate action.
The third and most analytically productive definition, according to Professor Huber, treats populism as an ideology or a thin-centered set of ideas that divides society into two antagonistic groups: the pure people and the corrupt elites. This binary worldview, he noted, is key to understanding the climate-populism link. Populists “excel at framing politics as a struggle between good and evil,” and thus are predisposed to portray climate elites—whether scientists, international organizations, or bureaucrats—as self-serving actors imposing policies that harm ordinary citizens. As Professor Huber explained, “It’s here where we can most clearly see how populism might shape climate skepticism: elites are seen as either failing to implement climate action or doing so at the expense of the people.”
However, Professor Huber emphasized that many factors commonly associated with populism are distinct causal forces that must not be conflated with populism itself. “We often fall into the trap of saying populism and meaning the far right,” he warned, underscoring the importance of disentangling populism from other ideological dimensions such as authoritarianism, nationalism, or economic left-right positions. For example, he noted that nationalist skepticism toward international climate agreements arises not from populist anti-elitism but from a preference for national sovereignty. Similarly, authoritarian discomfort with lifestyle changes required by climate action (e.g., promoting veganism) stems from a rigid adherence to tradition, not necessarily from populist ideology.
Professor Huber also observed that left-wing populists might oppose climate policy from a different ideological position: they may view climate measures as economically regressive or damaging to the working class. Thus, left-wing and right-wing populist critiques of climate policy differ in content but share a populist framing that pits “the people” against elites.
Moreover, Professor Huber called for analytic precision in research on populism and climate politics: “We need to disentangle what is populism and what are other things that are related to populism but are not necessarily the same thing.” His careful mapping of different conceptualizations and mechanisms underscored the value of distinguishing populism from adjacent ideologies when explaining its impact on climate discourse—a message of particular relevance for scholars seeking to understand the heterogeneity of populist climate narratives.
Empirical Evidence: The Expert Survey
During his lecture, Professor Huber also presented original empirical findings from an expert survey he conducted with two colleagues across 31 European countries. The survey, fielded in 2023, sought to provide systematic insights into how populism relates to political parties’ climate positions, shifting the discussion from anecdotal observations to measurable patterns.
Professor Huber began by stressing the survey’s scope and methodology. He explained that experts—primarily political science scholars—were asked to rate the degree of populism and the climate positions of parties in their own countries. The goal was to move beyond speeches and manifestos to capture a broader and more nuanced reputational assessment of where parties stand. “This is not an absolute measure of where parties stand, but rather what experts think where this party stands,” he clarified, noting that reputational measures offer insight into parties’ perceived orientations while acknowledging their limitations in detecting recent or subtle shifts.
Populism in the survey was operationalized through a widely used definition: attitudes towards elites, attitudes towards “the people,” and belief in a unified popular will. For climate positions, the survey asked about two dimensions: (1) the extent to which parties prioritized long-term climate gains over short-term socioeconomic costs, and (2) whether parties supported a stronger role for climate science in policymaking. These two questions, he explained, were designed to tap into different aspects of skepticism: what he termed “response skepticism” (about policies) and “process skepticism”(about science and institutions).
Professor Huber then turned to the findings. Presenting a scatterplot, he pointed out that “the more populist parties get, the more climate-skeptic they get in terms of not supporting climate policy.” A clear downward-sloping trend line indicated a negative relationship between degree of populism and support for climate action. This pattern was echoed when looking at parties’ support for the role of climate science: populist parties tended to express greater skepticism about scientific expertise, too.
However, a more granular analysis yielded even more striking insights. When Professor Huber divided parties into three ideological families—left, center, and right—he found that in all groups, increased populism correlated with greater climate skepticism. “What I find quite stunning,” he remarked, “and what runs a bit against this narrative of left-wing populist parties being a force for climate action, is that in all three groups we see a negative slope.” In other words, while right-wing populist parties were the most skeptical overall, even left-wing populists displayed less enthusiasm for climate action than their non-populist counterparts on the left.
This nuanced finding complicates common assumptions that left-populists are natural allies of ambitious climate policy. Professor Huber acknowledged that this pattern might partly reflect comparisons between left-populist parties and strongly pro-climate Green parties, but insisted it was a meaningful result nonetheless: “On average, left-wing populist parties are not that much more progressive when it comes to climate action than conservative or centrist parties that are not populist.”
Turning to right-wing populist parties, Professor Huber observed that these were the most skeptical of climate policy and science, but emphasized that this reflected their right-wing ideological orientation as much as their populism. “That’s not the effect of populism—that’s the effect of left-right orientation,” he cautioned, reiterating a key theme of his lecture: the need to disentangle populism from adjacent ideological factors such as authoritarianism, nationalism, or economic liberalism.
Professor Huber also reflected on the broader literature, acknowledging a “Western Europe focus” in both his own data and much existing research. He pointed out that this geographic concentration raises questions about generalizability, noting, for example, that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi represents a case that does not fit typical European populist patterns.
To illustrate how populist narratives manifest in practice, Professor Huber concluded by revisiting some familiar and varied examples. Tweets by Donald Trump highlighted skepticism framed around economic competitiveness and confusion between weather and climate. French Yellow Vest protesters exemplified resistance to climate policies perceived as unfair to working-class citizens, captured in the now-famous phrase “end of the world vs. end of the month.” Meanwhile, left-wing populists like Bernie Sanders and Spain’s Podemos criticized elites for blocking strong climate action—what Professor Huber termed “pro-climate populist frames.” However, he cautioned that such pro-climate populism remains relatively rare empirically. “Empirically, as the expert survey data shows, we don’t see this that often—it seems to be more isolated,” he concluded.
Professor Huber’s closing reflections emphasized the complexity of the populism-climate relationship. Populism’s “thin-centered” nature allows it to take multiple forms—right, left, pro-climate, or anti-climate—depending on context and adjacent ideologies. The task for scholars, he urged, is to avoid simplistic conflations and instead carefully disentangle the multiple drivers behind populist parties’ climate positions: “There is a lot of variation, and we need to systematically analyze this and disentangle the different underlying reasons for these narratives and frames.”
Conclusion
Professor Robert Huber’s lecture offered participants of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025 a deeply analytical and empirically grounded understanding of the complex relationship between populism and climate politics. His key contribution was to disentangle populism from adjacent ideologies—such as nationalism, authoritarianism, and economic left-right positioning—insisting on analytical precision when examining why populist actors often exhibit climate skepticism.
Importantly, drawing on the work of Cas Mudde, Professor Huber distinguished populism as a “thin-centered ideology” that frames politics as a moral struggle between the “pure people” and “corrupt elites,” providing fertile ground for contesting the legitimacy of climate science, policy processes, and institutions. Populism’s anti-elitist orientation predisposes it to target those perceived as technocratic or detached from “the people,” such as climate scientists, international organizations, and bureaucratic policymakers. However, as Professor Huber emphasized, this predisposition manifests differently depending on ideological context: while right-wing populists typically reject climate action as a threat to national sovereignty, tradition, or economic competitiveness, left-wing populists may frame climate policy as failing to address social justice concerns or as captured by corporate elites.
Professor Huber’s empirical findings, drawn from an original expert survey spanning 31 European countries, provided systematic evidence that higher degrees of populism correlate with greater climate skepticism across left, center, and right ideological groups—a pattern that challenges assumptions that left-wing populism is inherently pro-climate. His analysis revealed that while right-wing populist parties are the most climate-skeptic overall, even left-wing populists tend to express less support for climate policy and climate science than their non-populist counterparts.
Professor Huber’s closing call for researchers to avoid simplistic conflations and instead carefully disentangle the multiple drivers of populist climate narratives underscored a central lesson for Summer School participants: populism’s engagement with climate change is multifaceted, context-dependent, and inseparable from broader struggles over democracy, legitimacy, and trust in expertise.
The eighth lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025 was delivered online by Professor Stephan Lewandowsky, a globally recognized expert on misinformation and political psychology. His presentation offered a penetrating analysis of how climate disinformation is fueled by an organized infrastructure of vested interests and amplified by populist politics, which undermine trust in science. Professor Lewandowsky highlighted that ideological commitments—particularly free-market conservatism—strongly shape public acceptance of climate science. He emphasized that communicating the overwhelming scientific consensus on climate change can be a powerful corrective but cautioned that disinformation thrives in an environment where politics and identity outweigh facts. His lecture underscored the urgent need to confront these structural and ideological barriers to effective climate action.
Reported by ECPS Staff
The eighth lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025, titled “Climate Change, Populism, and Disinformation,” took place online on July 11, 2025, as part of a week-long program dedicated to exploring the intersection of populism and climate change under the theme “Populism and Climate Change: Understanding What Is at Stake and Crafting Policy Suggestions for Stakeholders.”The lecture was delivered by Professor Stephan Lewandowsky, a globally renowned cognitive scientist and Professor of Psychology at the University of Bristol.
ProfessorLewandowsky’s research spans political psychology, misinformation, and the relationship between human cognition and digital media, focusing particularly on how misinformation about critical issues—such as climate change—takes hold and persists. His expertise has earned him numerous accolades, including fellowships from the Royal Society and the Academy of Social Science, a Humboldt Research Award, and election to the prestigious German National Academy of Sciences (Leopoldina). He has authored hundreds of scholarly publications, many of which appear in leading journals, and is a frequent contributor to policy discussions and media commentary on the challenges posed by misinformation to democracy and public understanding.
Moderating the session was Neo Sithole, a Research Fellow at ECPS, whose work focuses on the relationship between populist politics and global governance.
Professor Lewandowsky’s lecture addressed one of the most urgent and challenging phenomena of our time: the proliferation of disinformation in the climate domain and its entanglement with populist politics. The lecture provided participants with a comprehensive framework structured around four key themes: (1) contextualizing today’s “post-truth” condition; (2) examining the supply side of climate disinformation, including the institutional and financial networks that propagate it; (3) analyzing the demand side—why certain segments of the public are receptive to misinformation; and (4) exploring potential strategies to counteract the spread and influence of climate-related falsehoods.
In doing so, Professor Lewandowsky offered a penetrating analysis of how populism not only fosters skepticism about climate change but also contributes to the erosion of the very idea of factual truth itself. His presentation challenged participants to think critically about the deeper cultural, political, and epistemological forces at play in shaping public attitudes toward climate change, making it an essential contribution to the Summer School’s interdisciplinary exploration of populism’s global impact.
Populism, Propaganda, and the Collapse of Truth
Donald J. Trump, the 47th President of the United States, at his inauguration celebration in Washington, D.C., on January 20, 2025. Photo: Muhammad Abdullah.
Professor Lewandowsky began by setting the scene with a trenchant analysis of today’s so-called “post-truth world.” He described this condition as exemplified by US President Donald Trump, who “during his first presidency made more than 30,000 false or misleading claims—about one an hour, 24/7 for four years.” Yet despite this unprecedented torrent of misinformation, Professor Lewandowsky noted a striking paradox: “About three-quarters of his voters considered him to be honest during that time, and that to me is a real conundrum.”
This conundrum, he argued, reveals that misinformation today is not simply about factual disputes but reflects a deeper collapse in the very notion of truth itself. He illustrated this through the infamous controversy surrounding Trump’s inauguration crowd size. Using photographs that plainly demonstrated that Obama’s inauguration had far higher attendance, Professor Lewandowsky posed the question: “The falsehood is so easily disproven that you wonder why anybody would even bother with this.” The answer, he suggested, lies in what has been termed “shock and chaos disinformation”—an intentional blizzard of lies whose purpose is not to persuade but to undermine the very idea of factual reality.
Indeed, a revealing study conducted immediately after Trump’s inauguration showed that “Trump voters, and in particular those who are highly educated, were more likely to pick the wrong picture.” This led Professor Lewandowsky to conclude that this behavior reflects “participatory propaganda,” where individuals knowingly repeat falsehoods to signal political allegiance rather than out of ignorance. “They knew there were fewer people attending Trump’s inauguration, but it didn’t matter, because they wanted to support him,” he explained.
Professor Lewandowsky then situated this phenomenon within a broader critique of populism. At its core, populism asserts an artificial and often arbitrary division between “the people” and “the elites,” a division which, he noted, “negates pluralism because any opposition to the people is by definition bad, so it is anti-democratic.” Crucially, he highlighted that populism undermines epistemic standards by elevating intuition and “common sense” above empirical evidence. Citing Trump’s baseless attribution of a plane crash to diversity hires in air traffic control, Professor Lewandowsky observed: “There’s no evidence for that—complete, utter nonsense—and when he was asked about it, he said, ‘Well, it’s common sense.’”
This epistemological posture, he argued, renders populism “by design incompatible and in constant conflict with science,” because it rejects the principle that “evidence matters to adjudicating the state of the world.” As a result, even in contexts where survey data show that a majority of Americans accept anthropogenic climate change, Professor Lewandowsky cautioned that “what this obscures is the amazing divergence… less than a quarter of Republicans think climate change is a big deal or should be taken seriously.” He concluded that the Republican Party had “mutated into this populist-slash-fascist organization that has little resemblance to the Republican Party that I’m used to when I was living in the United States.”
Through this analysis, Professor Lewandowsky made clear that contemporary climate denialism and disinformation cannot be understood apart from the populist assault on truth itself. His lecture highlighted how misinformation serves as a political identity marker, shielding adherents from empirical falsification and entrenching ideological divides.
The Supply Side: The Infrastructure of Climate Disinformation
Illustration: Shutterstock / Skorzewiak.
In his incisive lecture, Professor Lewandowsky devoted significant attention to what he termed the “supply side” of climate disinformation—the institutional, financial, and rhetorical infrastructure fueling public misunderstanding about climate change. He began by posing critical questions: What forces drive disinformation? Who is shaping the narratives that mislead the public? Drawing on empirical research, he argued that climate disinformation is not random but anchored in a visible network of organizations operating predominantly in the United States and Europe. This infrastructure, while “in broad daylight,” often escapes the public’s attention.
At the core of this infrastructure is a striking financial commitment from vested interests, particularly fossil fuel industries and their affiliates. Professor Lewandowsky observed that these actors receive almost a billion dollars annually—a figure that, though not exclusively devoted to climate denial, reflects the depth of resources sustaining disinformation campaigns. In addition, lobbying efforts aimed at blocking climate policy in the US Congress account for approximately two billion dollars more, illustrating the immense scale and persistence of attempts to distort climate discourse.
Professor Lewandowsky highlighted a study by Justin Farrell that mapped relationships among organizations engaged in climate denial. This research demonstrated that institutions known to be funded by Exxon or the Koch Brothers tend to occupy central positions in these disinformation networks. This finding underscores how denial campaigns are not simply ideological but orchestrated, with financial and strategic backing from corporate interests.
He turned next to media dynamics that amplify this disinformation. Professor Lewandowsky critiqued the enduring journalistic tendency toward false balance: while balance is appropriate in political contexts, it becomes problematic when applied to science, where the balance should be “between evidence and not between opinions.” He illustrated how mainstream media for years gave equal time to climate scientists and fringe voices opposing the science, sometimes to absurd extremes—such as featuring an astrologist predicting cats’ personalities while dismissing climate change as a hoax.
Although this problematic media practice has improved marginally, Professor Lewandowsky argued that a disproportionate voice is still granted to contrarians. He pointed out that press releases from conservative think tanks attacking climate science continue to receive more media attention than university research highlighting the scientific consensus.
Having described this infrastructure of disinformation and amplification, Professor Lewandowsky turned to the disinformation content itself. He acknowledged that it is commonly assumed—sometimes too casually—that the claims spread by think tanks are inaccurate, but he insisted on demonstrating this rigorously. He introduced a taxonomy of science denial rhetoric, highlighting cherry picking as one of the most pervasive techniques.
To illustrate cherry picking, Professor Lewandowsky described a notorious example: a British opinion piece that cited a short-term drop in global temperature between two Januarys in 2007 as proof that climate science was wrong. This claim ignored long-term warming trends in favor of a trivial fluctuation—a classic instance of cherry picking. Professor Lewandowsky explained that natural variability, when isolated from broader trends, can be rhetorically exploited to mislead, despite the overwhelming evidence for global warming.
Recognizing that simply pointing out such fallacies often fails to persuade in a polarized environment, Professor Lewandowsky recounted a creative study he and colleagues designed to test denialist reasoning in an ideologically neutral way. They translated climate-denialist claims into an unrelated context—village population trends—and presented these translated claims, accompanied by corresponding graphs, to professional statisticians. The statisticians overwhelmingly found that the denialist interpretations were inaccurate and not suitable for informing policy, whereas the scientific consensus interpretations aligned with the data. This experiment compellingly demonstrated that denialist arguments fail not because of political contestation but because they are empirically incorrect.
Professor Lewandowsky concluded this portion of his lecture with a sobering observation: the public is being actively denied the right to accurate information about an existential risk. This is not simply a matter of competing narratives, he argued, but a profound ethical and political problem. The public is being misled through a coordinated and well-funded campaign, obstructing collective action on one of the most urgent challenges of our time.
Overall, Professor Lewandowsky’s analysis exposed a sophisticated, well-resourced, and tightly coordinated infrastructure of climate disinformation, showing that climate denial is not simply ignorance but an orchestrated political project closely tied to populist movements and vested interests. His lecture called on participants to recognize the structural forces behind disinformation and underscored the need for rigorous, empirically grounded responses that hold these forces accountable.
The Demand Side: Why People Believe Climate Misinformation
In this part of his lecture, Professor Lewandowsky explored the “demand side” of climate disinformation, focusing on the question of why significant segments of the public are receptive to misinformation about climate change. Rather than attributing this to simple ignorance or lack of information, Professor Lewandowsky argued that the primary driver is ideology: people’s deeply held worldviews and political identities shape how they interpret and accept information, including scientific evidence.
He began by underscoring a striking pattern from decades of research: attitudes toward climate change are strongly determined by an individual’s ideological orientation, particularly their endorsement of free-market principles. Whether measured as conservatism, libertarianism, or party affiliation, the relationship is consistent globally: individuals who favor small government and deregulated markets are much more likely to reject the scientific consensus on climate change. As Professor Lewandowsky summarized, this pattern is “pervasive,” observed not only in the United States and other English-speaking countries but also in diverse contexts worldwide.
One particularly counterintuitive finding Professor Lewandowsky emphasized was that increased education does not necessarily reduce skepticism about climate change; instead, it amplifies existing ideological divides. In the United States, for example, more educated Democrats are more likely to accept climate science, while more educated Republicans become even more dismissive. This suggests that higher education may provide the cognitive tools for individuals to selectively reinforce beliefs aligned with their political identities—a phenomenon known as “motivated reasoning.”
Professor Lewandowsky encouraged participants to think not only about political ideology but also about the relationship between science itself and certain ideological outlooks. He pointed out that science, over the centuries, has displaced humanity from its perceived centrality in the universe, challenging beliefs in human exceptionalism. For those who maintain strongly anthropocentric or hierarchical worldviews—a tendency more common among conservatives—this can be profoundly unsettling.
Moreover, Professor Lewandowsky highlighted how the core norms of science may conflict with conservative values. Drawing on classical sociological analysis, he explained that science rests on principles such as universalism, communal sharing of knowledge, and disinterestedness. He noted that even the language—terms like “communism” and “universalism”—can sound alien or even threatening to those who value national sovereignty, individualism, and hierarchy. This creates a deeper tension: resistance to climate science may not only reflect skepticism about a particular set of facts but discomfort with the very norms and practices of scientific inquiry.
To substantiate this, Professor Lewandowsky described empirical work examining correlations between individuals’ conservatism, their acceptance of scientific norms, and their attitudes toward climate change and vaccination. The results revealed that people who strongly endorsed conservative values were less likely to accept both climate science and vaccines and were also less likely to endorse the core norms of science itself. This association existed independently of exposure to specific scientific findings, suggesting that a general distrust of the scientific enterprise plays a significant role in shaping attitudes.
Professor Lewandowsky also noted that this distrust is exacerbated by the policy implications of climate science: addressing climate change requires government interventions in the market, such as carbon pricing or emissions regulations—policies fundamentally at odds with libertarian or free-market worldviews. Thus, opposition to climate science is often inseparable from opposition to perceived threats to economic freedom.
Communicating Consensus and Political Realism
In the final part of his lecture, Professor Lewandowsky addressed possible strategies for countering climate misinformation, with a focus on the communication of scientific consensus. He began by acknowledging a fundamental challenge: simply providing accurate information is often ineffective in today’s polarized environment. Ideological commitments, he noted, strongly shape whether people accept or reject scientific evidence, meaning that facts alone are unlikely to change minds.
Nevertheless, Professor Lewandowsky argued that one communicative strategy stands out as particularly promising—emphasizing the overwhelming consensus among climate scientists. To illustrate this point, he used an analogy: “Would you eat oysters if 97 out of 100 microbiologists told you they were contaminated and unsafe to eat? I wouldn’t touch these damn things,” he remarked, underscoring how consensus messaging taps into a basic human intuition about expert agreement.
Professor Lewandowsky stressed that the scientific consensus on climate change is similarly robust: over 97 percent of climate scientists agree that human activity is driving global warming, a level of agreement comparable to other widely accepted scientific facts. Importantly, he explained, communicating this fact has been empirically shown to be effective. “Consensus information can be a very powerful tool to shift people’s perceptions,” he noted, citing meta-analyses and recent studies across 27 countries that found this approach particularly helpful in reaching audiences with low institutional trust and right-leaning ideological commitments.
He highlighted his own collaborative work, including the production of a handbook explaining how consensus messaging works, why it matters, and how it can be deployed effectively. However, Professor Lewandowsky offered a sobering caveat. “Everything I’m saying about communication needs to be assessed against the harsh political realities we’re facing,” he warned. These realities include the global retreat of democracy and the increasing concentration of power among unaccountable elites who actively oppose climate action, even when market-based.
In this context, he cautioned against overestimating what better communication can achieve: “We’re living in a world in which people aren’t waiting for scientists to inform them. It’s a political battle. It’s about power, not science or communication.” While communicating consensus remains a useful tool, he concluded, it is not a panacea. The struggle over climate change is ultimately embedded in larger political and ideological conflicts that extend far beyond the reach of scientific expertise.
Professor Lewandowsky’s closing reflections captured the dilemma facing climate communicators today: opportunities exist, particularly because most people still trust scientists, but these must be pursued with humility about the limits of persuasion in a polarized and increasingly illiberal political environment.
Conclusion
Professor Stephan Lewandowsky’s lecture provided a powerful analysis of how climate denialism is rooted not simply in ignorance or confusion but in the intersection of populist politics, ideological worldviews, and deliberate disinformation campaigns. His four-part framework—contextualizing the post-truth environment, analyzing the disinformation infrastructure, understanding ideological drivers of belief, and offering communicative responses—equipped participants of the ECPS Academy Summer School with critical tools for diagnosing and confronting climate denial.
At its core, Professor Lewandowsky’s argument underscored that the climate crisis is as much a political and epistemological challenge as it is a scientific one. As he emphasized throughout, combating disinformation will require more than facts—it will require confronting the ideological and institutional forces that weaponize misinformation to obstruct climate action.
His insights resonated deeply with the Summer School’s overarching theme, illuminating the complex entanglements between populism and climate politics in an age of disinformation. The lecture not only dissected the mechanisms of denial but also pointed toward the political struggle ahead, reminding participants that defending climate science ultimately means defending democracy itself.
Professor Philippe Le Billon’s lecture critically examined how climate-related conflicts emerge from three sources: the impacts of climate change itself, contestation over climate inaction, and backlash against climate action. He argued that climate change operates as a “threat multiplier,” intensifying pre-existing inequalities and vulnerabilities rather than acting as an isolated trigger of violence. He explored how climate activism—while driven by moral urgency—can be framed as elitist and provoke populist opposition, and how the implementation of climate policy can generate new conflicts when perceived as unjust or technocratic. Professor Le Billon warned that “green capitalism” risks reproducing extractive logics, creating new “green sacrifice zones,” and underscored that climate justice requires confronting colonial legacies, class inequality, and structural power relations.
Reported by ECPS Staff
The seventh lecture of the ECPS Academy Summer School 2025—titled “Populism and Climate Change: Understanding What Is at Stake and Crafting Policy Suggestions for Stakeholders”—took place online on July 10, 2025. The day’s featured lecturer was Professor Philippe Le Billon, an esteemed scholar of political geography and political ecology at the University of British Columbia (UBC). Prior to joining UBC, Professor Le Billon worked with prominent institutions including the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as well as with environmental and human rights organizations. His research has long focused on the political economy of natural resources, extractivism, and the connections between environment, development, and security—especially in conflict settings. His current work engages closely with environmental defenders, small-scale fisheries, and the socio-political dimensions of the so-called “green transition.”
Though Professor Le Billon modestly framed himself as “not a major expert on climate change,” his extensive scholarship on the political economy of resource sectors, conflict, and environmental governance provided a compelling framework for analyzing climate-related conflicts in relation to populism. His lecture, titled “Climate Change, Natural Resources and Conflicts,” examined how climate-related conflicts increasingly shape and are shaped by populist mobilizations globally.
Professor Le Billon invited participants to think critically about climate conflict through a tripartite analytical lens: conflicts driven by the impacts of climate change; conflicts driven by perceived climate inaction; and conflicts triggered by the implementation of climate action itself. Framing his talk within what he described as the current era of “polycrisis”—marked by intertwined crises of climate, inequality, and governance—Professor Le Billon emphasized that climate change must be understood as a political issue embedded in structures of power, inequality, and historical injustice.
By drawing on case studies from around the world, his lecture challenged participants to reflect on the multifaceted relationship between populism and climate politics, showing how climate change is at once a driver of conflict and a contested arena where competing visions of justice, sovereignty, and socio-ecological futures play out.
Conflicts over Climate Impacts: From Environmental Stress to Political Violence
Hundreds of climate activists lie down in front of News Corp Australia headquarters in Sydney calling the Murdoch press liers on January 31, 2020.
Professor Le Billon reflected on the prevailing focus in academic and policy circles on conflicts attributed to the material impacts of climate change itself. He framed this discussion within the literature that examines how climate-induced environmental stress—particularly droughts, altered rainfall, and extreme weather—affects resource availability and contributes to tensions over land, water, and livelihoods.
As he explained, “generally, the drivers have been portrayed and naturalized as fitted with things like higher temperature, altered rainfall patterns, more frequent and intense disasters, sea level rise, etc. So droughts in particular have been a major focus.” To this list, he added lesser-discussed ecological dynamics such as “shifts in resources—so grassland seasonality, but also fish migrations. Every fish species has a temperature range that they like, and so they’ll migrate as temperatures warm up or cool down, and that can lead to fishing conflicts.”
Professor Le Billon was careful to emphasize that while climate change is an important contextual factor, it is rarely the sole or primary driver of violent conflict. He invoked the now widely accepted notion that climate change acts as a “threat multiplier,” noting that it “amplifies existing vulnerabilities” where poverty, inequality, livelihood insecurity, and political exclusion already prevail. He stressed that scholars and policymakers must avoid simplistic causality and instead attend to these intersections as the crucial sites of analysis.
To illustrate this argument, he cited several case studies, including the recurrent droughts in Syria, which “had a nasty effect on communities in Syria, and would have been part of the lead-up to the Syrian civil war. Of course, this is by far not the only factor, but it would have been an aggravating one.” He similarly highlighted the Sahel, where tensions between farmers and herders reflect a long history of land disputes now exacerbated by environmental pressures.
Professor Le Billon also drew attention to lesser-known cases of ecological disruption, such as fisheries conflicts prompted by species migration as ocean temperatures change. These examples underscore that climate change is interwoven with complex social and economic dynamics rather than being an external or autonomous driver of violence.
Critically, Professor Le Billon challenged dominant frameworks for analyzing these conflicts, identifying two key forms of reductionism: the naturalization of climate change itself and the culturalization of conflict. He argued that “what it has done also is generally depoliticized the inequalities that are at play in those countries, the kind of colonial legacies that have led to the type of property rights or absence of property rights,” and the “type of extractivist legislation that is in place.” Such framings, he cautioned, obscure the historical and structural conditions that have made many communities in the Global South so vulnerable to environmental shocks in the first place.
This depoliticization, he warned, enables securitized responses, particularly in the Global North, where governments increasingly treat climate-affected populations as threats—especially potential climate migrants—rather than as subjects of justice and solidarity. As Professor Le Billon put it, “many of these conflicts take place in, and affect, populations in the Global South which are the least responsible for what has happened.” Yet Northern discourse tends to focus on fears of migration, feeding into anti-immigration agendas and populist narratives of external threat.
Professor Le Billon’s intervention here was also a normative one: he argued that these conflicts should not be framed as technical problems requiring security solutions, but rather as calls for climate justice. He proposed that “rather than seeing [them] as a conflict,” these phenomena “should be seen as a call for justice rather than a call for militarized protection from Northern societies against those climate and conflict migrants.”
Moreover, he drew attention to the way populist actors at the domestic level have manipulated identity politics to escalate these conflicts. In many contexts, governments have “legitimated violence against those groups,” by framing nomadic herders or marginalized populations as scapegoats for broader socio-economic grievances. He noted that this dynamic is mirrored at the international level, where right-wing populists in the Global North leverage the specter of mass climate migration to bolster anti-immigration policies.
Conflicts over Climate Inaction: The Rise of Climate Activism and Eco-Populism
No Mining protest sign in Kaeo, New Zealand, September 15, 2013. While coal mining produced 5.3 million tonnes in 2010, acid mine drainage remains a serious environmental problem. Photo: Rafael Ben Ari.
The second broad category explored by Professor Le Billon concerned conflicts motivated by perceived inaction on climate change. These conflicts, while often nonviolent and institutional in form, represent an important and increasingly contentious terrain of political struggle. Professor Le Billon traced the rise of protests, demonstrations, and civil disobedience aimed at governments and corporations failing to address climate change. These movements, such as Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion, have emerged as potent social forces, demanding rapid action to avert climate catastrophe and often invoking the urgency of saving humanity and the planet. As Professor Le Billon put it, these movements are driven by “concerns for current and future impacts of climate change… it’s often a call for saving humanity and the planet in general, and in itself it can be sometimes quite problematic.” This universalist framing, he noted, is both rhetorically powerful and politically vulnerable.
While recognizing the moral force and legitimacy of these movements, Professor Le Billon offered a critical reflection on their social composition and political rhetoric. “Very often the people participating in the protests also have a relatively privileged background, and so it’s relatively easy to frame them as essentially privileged elites not being too preoccupied with the immediate concerns of some of the other population,” he observed. This tension, he argued, can be—and often is—instrumentalized by populist actors who portray climate activists as out-of-touch elites imposing burdens on ordinary people.
At the same time, Professor Le Billon highlighted the distinctive populist inflection of much climate activism itself, particularly in its critique of fossil fuel lobbies, global corporations, and corrupt elites. In this framing, “the climate inaction is framed as a result of decisions made by corrupt elites, greedy corporations, elitist global institutions that are done at the expense of local communities and the planet.” Thus, progressive eco-populism casts “the people” as aligned with the planet against an oligarchy of corporate and political actors who block meaningful climate action. This framing frequently intersects with indigenous and peasant movements, as seen in opposition to pipelines and extractive projects in North America and beyond.
However, as Professor Le Billon noted, these movements are not without internal tensions and external challenges. He pointed out that their demands often shift toward more radical critiques of the underlying political economy: “Essentially when people start not only to claim that there is climate inaction on the part of governments, but that the current system means that the government is incapable of acting… thus there is a need for a system change—that’s when we see a lot of violence taking place in different ways.”
This dynamic helps explain why such movements are subject to escalating repression and criminalization, particularly when they adopt disruptive tactics such as blockades and sabotage. Professor Le Billon discussed how governments in liberal democracies such as Australia, the UK, and Norway have responded with “very high arrest rates… while police violence has tended to be relatively low,” in contrast to countries like France, South Africa, or Peru, where “the rate of arrest is very low but the rate of police violence is very high.”
He emphasized that repression tends to correlate with movements that shift their critique beyond specific policies to systemic structures of capitalism and fossil fuel dependence: “It’s essentially when they start to challenge the system itself that we see an intensification of violence and repression.” Thus, his lecture illuminated the complex relationship between climate activism, eco-populism, and state repression. Professor Le Billon’s analysis underscored both the promise and the perils of contemporary climate movements, situating them as key arenas where conflicts over climate inaction are contested not only between activists and the state but also within broader struggles over privilege, legitimacy, and systemic change.
Conflicts over Climate Action: Green Transitions and Class Struggles
Protest against lithium mining in Belgrade, Serbia, August 10, 2024. A protester holds a placard reading “Stop Rio Tinto” during a demonstration opposing the company’s lithium mining plans. Photo: Dreamstime.
The third type of conflict examined by Professor Le Billon concerned resistance to climate action itself. Paradoxically, he noted that even as climate movements demand urgent measures, the implementation of climate policies can generate backlash and new sites of conflict—especially when these policies are perceived as unjust, unequal, or technocratic. As he remarked, “it’s common sense to intervene and change our system so that we’ve got more climate action—but the common sense also is that this transition cannot happen overnight,” capturing the contested terrain of climate policy.
He discussed the removal of fossil fuel subsidies in countries such as Nigeria, where the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and climate policy imperatives have converged in advocating for subsidy reforms. While the removal of subsidies might advance climate objectives on paper, they also provoke protests from populations who view them as essential to their livelihoods and who see such reforms as anti-poor. “Many people see material well-being and the imperative of social reproduction as being very important,” he observed, underscoring why such reforms often spark resistance.
Similar tensions have emerged around carbon taxes, electric vehicle subsidies, and renewable energy projects. In Canada, for example, carbon taxation became a major electoral issue in 2025, with fierce populist opposition portraying it as an attack on the working class. In France, Marine Le Pen’s far-right party has opposed offshore wind farms, portraying them as an imposition on local fishing communities—a populist strategy that, Professor Le Billon noted, mirrors narratives used in the American context around coal miners and oil workers. He pointed out that such movements tap into a grievance that “green liberalism puts a lot of focus on individual responsibility,” leading to perceptions that environmental policies disproportionately burden working-class populations while privileging elites.
Professor Le Billon introduced a critical perspective on what he termed “green capitalism” and “green extractivism”: the reproduction of extractive logics in the pursuit of green growth. Renewable energy infrastructure and low-carbon technologies, he observed, rely heavily on critical minerals such as lithium, often extracted from indigenous lands or ecologically sensitive regions in the Global South. These new “green sacrifice zones,” as he put it, “frame the climate crisis as resolvable through resource-intensive technological fixes” while perpetuating inequality and ecological harm. He noted that “about 70% of the energy transition mineral projects are near land that can be qualified as sites with indigenous people or traditional peasants,” a statistic that lays bare the colonial patterns embedded in the green transition.
He referenced resistance movements in the Andes, where lithium extraction has threatened fragile ecosystems and indigenous communities, as well as protests in Serbia against a Rio Tinto mining project. These conflicts illustrate how green transitions, if pursued within the existing capitalist framework, may perpetuate old injustices even as they address carbon emissions. As one protester quoted by Le Billon put it, “Green mining doesn’t exist… Politicians need to stop trying to get rid of pollution in cities by polluting our villages instead,” a vivid expression of the local-global tensions animating these struggles.
Professor Le Billon argued that the articulation of populism in these conflicts often turns on competing definitions of “the people.” In some cases, populist rhetoric is mobilized from the right, defending local or national sovereignty against globalist green agendas. In others, it emerges from the left, articulating an anti-elite critique of corporate greenwashing and imperialism. Both forms, he suggested, reflect deeper class struggles over who bears the costs and reaps the benefits of the energy transition: “We see a kind of two main categories… one is a critique of green liberalism… and the second one is against green extractivism, pushing back against the so-called extractivist imperative.”
In sum, Professor Le Billon’s analysis illuminated the complex and often contradictory ways in which climate action itself generates conflict, highlighting how struggles over green transitions are increasingly shaped by narratives of class, sovereignty, and justice. His lecture invited participants to recognize that without attention to these underlying dynamics, climate policy risks reproducing precisely the inequalities and exclusions it seeks to remedy.
Conclusion
In concluding his lecture, Professor Le Billon underscored the importance of understanding climate conflicts in all their complexity—not simply as environmental disputes but as deeply embedded in histories of inequality, structures of capitalism, and struggles over power and justice.
His three-part framework highlighted that conflicts emerge not only from the material impacts of climate change but also from contestation over climate inaction and from the contested implementation of climate policies themselves. Across these domains, populism plays an ambivalent role: sometimes reinforcing reactionary politics and obstruction, sometimes animating progressive alliances around climate justice.
Throughout the lecture, Professor Le Billon emphasized the need to critically examine the political economy of the green transition. He warned against narratives that frame climate mitigation as a purely technocratic project, disconnected from questions of inequality, colonialism, and class power. Without confronting these deeper structures, he argued, climate action risks reproducing the very injustices it seeks to redress.
His analysis also illuminated the paradoxical dynamics at play: climate policy can simultaneously be a site of progressive mobilization and conservative backlash; climate discourse can empower grassroots movements but also invite repression; and the pursuit of sustainability can generate new forms of extractivism and environmental sacrifice.
In sum, Professor Le Billon’s lecture made an invaluable contribution to the ECPS Summer School’s exploration of the nexus between populism and climate change. It provided participants with critical tools for understanding how climate conflicts are not simply about environmental degradation but also about contested visions of justice, sovereignty, and the political future. His call to recognize the uneven and contested terrain of climate politics resonated with the overarching theme of the Summer School: the urgent need to craft policy responses that are attentive not only to ecological imperatives but also to the demands of social and global justice.
