Please cite as: ECPS Staff. (2025). “ECPS Conference 2025 / Roundtable I — Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00103
Held at the University of Oxford on July 1, 2025, Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference launched the discussions of “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy.” Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session explored how “the people” is constructed, contested, and deployed in contemporary European and global politics. Presentations by Professors Martin Conway, Aurelien Mondon, and Luke Bretherton examined the historical resurgence of popular politics, the elite-driven narrative of the “reactionary people,” and the theological dimensions of populism. Together, the contributions offered a nuanced, interdisciplinary account of how populism’s democratic and anti-democratic potentials shape the political imagination and institutional realities of the 21st century.
Reported by ECPS Staff
Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference, hosted at the University of Oxford on July 1-3, 2025, brought together leading scholars to explore the shifting meanings and political uses of “the people” in contemporary Europe and beyond. Titled “Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe,” this session opened the in-person component of the Conference “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy,” an interdisciplinary initiative addressing the democratic backsliding, populist resurgence, and the pathways toward civic resilience in the 21st century.
Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff (Senior Research Fellow, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; President, Royal Institute of Philosophy), the roundtable featured three distinguished speakers: Professor Martin Conway (University of Oxford), Professor Aurelien Mondon (University of Bath), and Professor Luke Bretherton (University of Oxford). Their presentations tackled the historical re-emergence of “the people” as a political category, the elite construction of the so-called reactionary public, and the theological undercurrents of populist discourse—particularly in relation to Christianity.
Taken together, the presentations demonstrated that “the people” is not a static or universally democratic force. Rather, it is a flexible and contested category, often constructed, instrumentalized, and redefined by elites, political movements, and media systems. While it can serve as a source of democratic renewal—as in historical instances of resistance to authoritarian regimes—it can also be mobilized to undermine pluralism, dismantle institutions, and sacralize exclusionary forms of nationalism.
The roundtable emphasized that populism is neither inherently democratic nor inherently authoritarian. Its normative direction depends on how “the people” are imagined, who is included or excluded, and whether political participation is broadened or curtailed. The session challenged participants to move beyond reductive narratives that blame “the people” for democratic erosion, instead urging deeper inquiry into how elites, ideologies, and media infrastructures shape public discourse and democratic practice.
As Europe and its transatlantic partners grapple with polarized electorates, declining trust in institutions, and re-enchanted political imaginaries, understanding the politics of “the people” remains central to safeguarding and reimagining democratic life in our time.
Professor Martin Conway: “The Reappearance of ‘The People’ in European Politics”
Professor Martin Conway (far right), Professor of Contemporary European History at the University of Oxford, delivers his talk titled “The Reappearance of ‘The People’ in European Politics” during Roundtable I of the ECPS–Oxford Conference 2025.
In his compelling presentation, Martin Conway, Professor of Contemporary European History, University of Oxford, explored the reemergence and reconfiguration of “the people”in contemporary European politics. He framed his remarks within a broader intellectual and historical reflection on democratic transformation and political disruption, noting that current anxieties about populism echo earlier eras of upheaval in European history.
Professor Conway began by acknowledging what he termed a prevailing “liberal anxiety”—a sense of unease about the future of democracy that has come to define our political moment. This anxiety, articulated by many mainstream figures including Baroness Royall and commentators like Timothy Garton Ash, reflects a broader fear that democracy is moving in a precarious or even regressive direction. Conway noted that this sentiment contrasts sharply with the optimism of two decades ago, when history was assumed to be progressing in a linear, liberal-democratic trajectory. The shift, he argued, is not unprecedented; similar concerns were widespread in Europe on the eve of the revolutions of 1848. Today, we once again live in a period marked by ambient pessimism and apprehension about what lies ahead.
Several structural transformations underpin this shift, according to Professor Conway. First, he pointed to the stagnation and decline of living standards across much of Europe. While there are exceptions—such as regions in Spain or Poland—many Europeans have experienced over a decade of economic insecurity, eroding the sense of progress and stability that once undergirded liberal democratic institutions. This economic fragility, exacerbated by global market forces and the retreat of the welfare state, has deeply unsettled large segments of society, particularly small businesses, farmers, and precarious workers.
A second, related transformation is the collapse of analog political structures and their replacement by digital media environments. Professor Conway emphasized that the move to digital communication has “anarchized” political debate by weakening the traditional channels—such as party structures and deliberative institutions—that previously organized and moderated political participation. What has emerged in their place is a more fragmented, volatile, and emotionally charged political space.
Beyond these socio-economic and technological shifts, Professor Conway focused on a deeper historical development: the breakdown of a stable model of disciplined, representative democracy that had defined much of postwar Europe. This model, characterized by proportional representation, enduring party systems, and a deeply embedded political elite, ensured predictability and continuity. Politicians might lose a seat in parliament, but often resurfaced in other public roles—“never losing the chauffeur-driven car,” as Professor Conway wryly observed, referencing Belgian politics.
Today, according to Conway, that model is under strain. Challenger parties—often short-lived, leader-centric, and ideologically fluid—have emerged across Europe. They range from the Flemish nationalist Vlaams Belang to leftist, Maoist-rooted movements in Belgium and populist coalitions in Italy. These parties often lack coherent platforms but are united in their appeal to “the people” as a reactive force. Their rise reflects the erosion of elite control and the democratization—but also destabilization—of political life.
Populism, Professor Conway argued, is the label most often applied to this phenomenon. However, he warned that historians are justifiably skeptical of the term. While political scientists like Cas Mudde have successfully theorized populism as a “thin ideology,” historians are more attuned to national contexts, ideological distinctions, and historical specificity. The danger, Conway suggested, lies in collapsing all anti-establishment movements into a single, undifferentiated category, thereby overlooking the distinct traditions—secular, religious, leftist, rightist—that shape each movement.
Nonetheless, Professor Conway underscores that populism, for all its analytical imprecision, captures a genuine insurgent reality: the reassertion of “the people” in forms that diverge significantly from the norms of 20th-century political action. These new forms of engagement are often marked by a rejection of institutional decorum, a distrust of expertise, and the rise of emotionally driven, male-dominated political performances that are less about coherent goals and more about expressive, affective protest.
This shift from rational deliberation to emotional expression—what Professor Conway termed “a change in the musical key of European politics”—is both a cultural and political transformation. It reflects not only structural changes in how politics is conducted, but also the symbolic and psychological reorientation of “the people” as a force both feared and romanticized. Whereas 1989 symbolized the disciplined, hopeful advance of freedom through mass protest in Eastern Europe, today’s mobilizations often appear to many observers as erratic, exclusionary, and disruptive.
Professor Conway underscored that the liberal political class has responded by building rhetorical and institutional defenses—what he called “anti-popular politics.” These include efforts to create legal buffers against referenda, avoid direct electoral challenges, and portray populist movements as inherently irrational, racist, or manipulated by shadowy online forces. Yet such reactions, he warned, risk becoming elitist and anti-democratic in themselves.
In his closing reflections, Professor Conway posed several critical questions: Why did we assume that history would progress smoothly and democratically? Why do we dismiss the democratic potential embedded in disruptive and turbulent popular movements? And crucially, why are we so unwilling to recognize that today’s “people,” for all their volatility, remain committed to democratic participation—albeit in forms unfamiliar and uncomfortable to the liberal imagination?
The reappearance of “the people” in European politics, Professor Conway concluded, should not be seen merely as a threat. Rather, it presents an opportunity—if approached critically and constructively—to rethink the boundaries, forms, and aspirations of democracy in 21st-century Europe.
Professor Aurelien Mondon: “The Construction of the Reactionary People”
Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.
In his incisive presentation, “The Construction of the Reactionary People,”Aurelien Mondon, Professor of Politics, University of Bath, critically unpacked the prevailing narrative that positions contemporary far-right and authoritarian populism as an authentic expression of the will of “the people.” Drawing on over 15 years of research, Professor Mondon challenged the assumption that the so-called “reactionary people” are an organic democratic force. Instead, he argued that this concept is largely an elite-driven construction—a top-down narrative shaped by media, political actors, and intellectuals.
Professor Mondon began by distinguishing between two problematic “P” words: populism and the people. He cautioned against the overuse and imprecision of populism as a catch-all term, which, he argued, has distracted scholars and commentators from a more meaningful analysis of democracy. Instead, he emphasized the importance of critically interrogating how the people are represented, invoked, and constructed in political discourse—especially in reactionary and exclusionary ways.
Central to Professor Mondon’s argument is the idea that the figure of the reactionary people—often depicted as the “white working class” or “the left behind”—has been strategically constructed by elite discourse to justify regressive political shifts. Citing the rhetoric of Nigel Farage and Donald Trump, Mondon highlighted how these elite actors positioned themselves as champions of ordinary people, despite their wealth and elite status. For example, in a speech delivered shortly after the Brexit vote and just before Trump’s election in 2016, Farage drew a direct connection between disaffected Welsh voters and the American rust belt, constructing a transatlantic narrative of popular revolt. Yet, as Professor Mondon pointed out, this framing was less about listening to real grievances and more about legitimizing reactionary, often xenophobic agendas under the guise of popular will.
Empirically, Professor Mondon’s research—particularly in collaboration with Dr. Aaron Winter—demonstrates that the supposed mass support of the white working class for Brexit and Trump has been overstated or misrepresented. Their studies of electoral data reveal that lower-income individuals were in fact less likely to support Trump or Brexit. Many abstained from voting altogether, and among those who did vote, a significant proportion supported establishment candidates such as Hillary Clinton or remained skeptical of nationalist populism. Trump’s and Brexit’s bases, according to the presentation of Professor Mondon, were more accurately characterized by middle- and upper-income voters, including older property owners—groups not typically considered “left behind” in any meaningful socioeconomic sense.
Yet this data was widely ignored in mainstream discourse. Prestigious media outlets—from Newsweek and The Guardian to The Washington Post and Harvard Business Review—repeatedly promoted the notion that the rise of Trump and Brexit reflected the voice of the working-class majority. Professor Mondon emphasized that political scientists, journalists, and commentators across the spectrum helped entrench this myth. In doing so, they lent legitimacy to exclusionary and reactionary politics, even while claiming to merely reflect public sentiment.
Importantly, Professor Mondon warned that this elite narrative has real consequences. It racializes the working class by equating working-class identity with whiteness, thereby excluding ethnic minorities and immigrants who are themselves often working-class. It naturalizes racism by framing it as an inevitable response to economic hardship, rather than a political choice or a construct of political elites. And it normalizes regressive politics by presenting them as the authentic voice of a democratic majority.
This construction is, to Professor Mondon, continually reinforced by media coverage. For example, recent violent anti-migrant demonstrations in the UK were portrayed by outlets like the BBC as expressions of legitimate, working-class anger—despite the racist and xenophobic nature of the acts. The BBC even apologized for calling the far-right Reform Party “far-right.” Similarly, headlines after these riots claimed they were driven by “economic grievances,” offering justification rather than critique.
Professor Mondon challenged this narrative with data from Eurobarometer surveys, which show a stark gap between what people say matters to them personally—such as healthcare, jobs, and education—and what they perceive as problems for the country—typically immigration, a perception shaped by media and political discourse. During the 2016 Brexit campaign, for example, immigration emerged as a top concern at the national level, but it barely registered as a personal priority. This discrepancy reveals the power of media agenda-setting and elite framing in constructing “public opinion.”
Professor Mondon further questioned why only certain actors are granted the status of “the people.” Those protesting for climate action, racial justice, or trans rights are often dismissed as “elite,” “woke,” or “naïve.” Meanwhile, racist protestors, anti-migrant agitators, or conservative culture warriors are hailed as representing “real people” with “legitimate concerns.” Even billionaire authors like J.K. Rowling, or politicians like Farage and Trump, are cast as victims of elite suppression and defenders of democratic expression.
This discursive bias shapes policy outcomes. Both conservative and center-left parties—such as Labour under Keir Starmer—justify rightward shifts in immigration and cultural policy by claiming they are responding to “the people’s” demands. Yet, Professor Mondon argued, such moves are often preemptive responses to media-generated moral panics rather than genuine democratic pressures. The result is a cycle in which reactionary politics are platformed and amplified, while progressive movements are marginalized.
In concluding, Professor Mondon offered several urgent recommendations. First, we must stop exaggerating the electoral strength of the far right and critically interrogate low voter turnout and political disengagement. Second, we should resist euphemizing reactionary politics as “populism”—if a policy is racist or authoritarian, it should be named as such. Third, we must reject the reflex to blame “the people” for the democratic crisis, and instead scrutinize how power, media, and elite discourse mediate public knowledge and shape perceptions. Finally, Professor Mondon called for a critical reassessment of liberalism’s role in enabling far-right resurgence. Liberal elites’ failure to address inequality, racism, and disenfranchisement has contributed to the very crisis they now lament.
Rather than discarding “the people” as a dangerous force, Professor Mondon argued, scholars and policymakers must engage more honestly with the democratic potential of the broader population. The challenge lies not in taming the people, but in confronting the forces that construct reactionary myths in their name.
Professor Luke Bretherton: “Christianity in A Time of Populism”
A man clasps his hands in prayer during the opening ceremonies of President Donald Trump’s “Keep America Great” rally at the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New Jersey, on January 28, 2020. Photo by Benjamin Clapp.
In his presentation, Luke Bretherton, Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at the University of Oxford, offered a nuanced theological and political analysis of populism, with particular attention to its relationship with Christianity. Rather than treating populism solely as a pathological deviation from democratic norms—as is common in much of the European and North American literature— Professor Bretherton argued that populism is a perennial and ideologically fluid component of democratic life. Populism, he suggested, oscillates between democratic and anti-democratic forms, each shaping the political terrain in profound, and at times, conflicting ways.
Professor Bretherton opened by critiquing the dominant academic and journalistic lens through which populism is often viewed—namely, as an aberration associated with far-right, anti-immigrant movements. This narrow interpretation, he argued, overlooks historical and global instances of populism as vehicles of democratization, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and even populist peasant movements like La Vía Campesina. He emphasized that populism’s ideological indeterminacy makes it resistant to clear categorization on the traditional left-right spectrum, functioning instead as a vessel for diverse, often contradictory, political projects.
According to Professor Bretherton, populism’s complexity lies in its dual potential: it can either renew democratic life or corrode it. Drawing on the work of Margaret Canovan and Ernesto Laclau, Bretherton explained that populism arises from tensions internal to democracy itself, particularly between its redemptive promise—rule by the people—and its pragmatic reality, in which elite negotiation and institutional mediation often dominate. When the redemptive aspect is perceived to have been lost, populist movements emerge to reclaim it, often invoking the language of purity, moral renewal, and direct representation.
To differentiate forms of populism, Professor Bretherton proposed a typology contrasting democratic populism with anti-democratic populism. Democratic populism seeks to broaden political participation, construct shared moral vocabularies, and nurture long-term, deliberative engagement. It builds institutions, invests in civic education, and aims to create pluralistic forms of common life. Examples include community organizing movements like Citizens UK or the early American Populist movement of the late 19th century, which drew on religious traditions to foster democratic deliberation.
By contrast, anti-democratic populism, according to Professor Bretherton, simplifies political space through exclusion and dichotomy, often bypassing deliberative institutions in favor of plebiscitary rule and strongman leadership. It construes the people in essentialist, ethnoreligious, or racialized terms, delegitimizing opposition as traitorous or unpatriotic. Leaders like Donald Trump embody this form of populism, claiming to represent the “real people” while delegitimizing institutional checks and balances.
Professor Bretherton warned that while both forms of populism share characteristics—emphasis on leadership, romanticization of the “ordinary people,” skepticism toward elites and bureaucracy—they differ in their normative trajectories. Democratic populism aims to cultivate shared responsibility for the common good, while anti-democratic populism facilitates personal withdrawal from public life and the erosion of civic institutions in favor of authoritarian consolidation.
The latter part of Professor Bretherton’s presentation focused on the intersection between populism and Christianity. He argued that populism draws heavily on theological tropes, often reconfiguring religious narratives to legitimize its political vision. Christian theology itself, according to him, has longstanding populist impulses—particularly within Protestant traditions that emphasize unmediated access to God and critique ecclesial hierarchy. These impulses have historically fueled resistance to both clerical and political elites. However, Professor Bretherton cautioned that such impulses can be co-opted by anti-democratic populist movements, as seen in the rhetoric of far-right parties like Germany’s AfD or France’s Rassemblement National, which claim to defend Christian culture while attacking institutional churches.
Professor Bretherton emphasizes that this tension stems from the anti-institutional nature of anti-democratic populism, which bypasses mediating structures—such as churches or representative institutions—in favor of a direct identification between the leader and the people. Theologically, this dynamic manifests as a form of idolatry, in which the nation or a charismatic leader is elevated to a messianic role, effectively substituting for Christ. Bretherton described this as a “Christophobic and anti-ecclesial” form of Christianity—one that empties faith of its creedal and ethical commitments and repurposes it as a tool of exclusionary cultural identity.
Rather than treating Christian references in populist rhetoric as merely superficial or secularized, Professor Bretherton argued that we are witnessing a re-enchantment of political discourse. Far-right populism, he contended, does not secularize Christian symbols but sacralizes secular notions like sovereignty and nationhood, effectively reversing the modern trajectory of disenchantment. This shift represents a new kind of political theology, one in which secular concepts are infused with religious meaning, producing an existential, quasi-spiritual political struggle.
Professor Bretherton highlights global examples—from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist turn in Turkey to the rise of Hindu nationalism in India—that illustrate the resurgence of political movements in which the sacred and the political are strategically recombined with potent effect. In Europe, this re-enchantment emerges in response to technocratic liberalism’s perceived hollowness and its failure to address existential anxieties, community dislocation, and crises of agency.
Professor Bretherton concluded by asserting that Christianity must confront these dynamics with a return to its core commitments: love of God and neighbor, solidarity with the stranger, and the rejection of idolatrous narratives of salvation through nation or leader. The Church, he insisted, must become a site of resistance against both authoritarianism and technocratic alienation by cultivating forms of common life grounded in justice, plurality, and mutual care. The ultimate theological task, he contended, is to convert politics from a false gospel of domination into a means of neighboring—turning the earthly city into a penultimate place of peace rather than seeking salvation through it.
Conclusion
Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford offered a compelling and multifaceted reflection on the politics of “the people” in a time of democratic uncertainty and populist resurgence. Under the skillful moderation of Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session foregrounded how “the people” remains a highly malleable and contested category—evoked to both revitalize and erode democratic life. Drawing on historical, political, and theological perspectives, the speakers dismantled simplistic narratives that equate populism either with democratic renewal or authoritarian decline. Instead, they highlighted the need to interrogate how elites, institutions, and media infrastructures construct and instrumentalize notions of “popular will” for divergent ends.
A shared theme emerged: that contemporary politics is marked not simply by polarization, but by a crisis of representation, legitimacy, and moral imagination. Whether in the reappearance of emotionally charged political forms (Conway), the elite-driven construction of reactionary publics (Mondon), or the sacralization of exclusionary ideologies (Bretherton), the roundtable underscored the urgency of rethinking democratic participation. As the idea of “the people” continues to shape our political futures, this conversation reminded us that its meaning must remain a site of critical, ethical, and democratic contestation.
Note: To experience the panel’s dynamic and thought-provoking Q&A session, we encourage you to watch the full video recording above.
Please cite as: ECPS Staff (2025). “Opening Session of the ECPS Conference 2025: ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy – Interdisciplinary Approaches.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00101
The ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford began with a timely and thought-provoking opening session that explored the evolving meaning and political utility of “the people” in democratic discourse. Sümeyye Kocaman offered a nuanced welcome, highlighting how the term has been used across history to empower, exclude, and politicize identity. Kate Mavor, Master of St Cross College, underscored the value of interdisciplinary exchange in addressing democratic challenges, noting how the College’s diverse academic environment aligned naturally with the conference’s aims. Baroness Janet Royall then delivered a compelling keynote, warning of the double-edged nature of “the people” as both democratic ideal and populist tool. Her address emphasized the need for inclusion, institutional integrity, civic renewal, and interdisciplinary cooperation in the face of democratic erosion. The session set the stage for critical and globally relevant dialogue across disciplines.
Reported by ECPS Staff
The opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford commenced with a series of remarks that collectively set an intellectually rich and politically urgent tone for the days ahead. Sümeyye Kocaman, DPhil candidate at St. Catherine’s College and conference coordinator on behalf of the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), offered a thoughtful and inclusive welcome, grounding the event in the contested and evolving significance of “the people.” She reflected on how this concept—invoked across diverse historical, geographical, and ideological contexts—has served both emancipatory and exclusionary purposes. Drawing on her research and recent electoral analyses, she highlighted the growing resonance of populist narratives and the imperative to examine how democratic rhetoric shapes lived experience beyond the ballot box.
Following Kocaman, Kate Mavor, CBE, Master of St Cross College, welcomed participants on behalf of the host institution. Emphasizing the interdisciplinary character of St Cross—a graduate college home to scholars from over 60 fields—she noted the alignment between the conference’s aims and the College’s commitment to cross-disciplinary dialogue.
Baroness Janet Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, then delivered an incisive keynote, urging participants to confront the dual nature of “the people” as both democratic foundation and potential populist weapon. Her address called for rigorous, interdisciplinary engagement and collective democratic renewal.
Welcome Address by Conference Coordinator Sümeyye Kocaman
Sümeyye Kocaman, Managing Editor of Populism & Politics, and the coordinator of the ECPS Conference 2025 on behalf of the European Center for Populism Studies, opened the event with a thoughtful and inclusive welcome. Expressing gratitude to participants for arriving so promptly, she framed the conference around the contested nature of “the people.” Kocaman also highlighted the plurality and political weight of the term across time and place. From 19th-century American democratization to Cold War securitization and from the ideological symbolism of Albania’s People’s Republic to contemporary struggles for women’s rights and labor justice, she emphasized that invocations of “the people” are never ideologically neutral.
Kocaman noted that in populism studies, “the people” remains a central but fluid category—emerging in various forms such as “digital populism,” “climate populism,” and others. This terminological proliferation, she argued, speaks to the field’s theoretical dynamism but also to its increasing relevance in everyday political life. Drawing from her own research, she underscored the need to interrogate how notions of “the people” function not just in electoral discourse, but in the daily lived experiences of individuals and communities. This perspective, she asserted, is especially urgent in light of rising populist rhetoric across both Eastern and Western Europe, as recently documented in ECPS’s report on the EU elections.
Kocaman closed by acknowledging the collaborative support of academic and institutional partners—including the Rothermere American Institute, the European Studies Centre, Oxford’s Democracy Network, and scholars from Berlin and Brighton—and expressed solidarity with scholars unable to attend due to geopolitical crises. Her closing remarks served as a poignant reminder of the stakes of the conference: engaging critically with the idea of “the people” under conditions of global instability and democratic uncertainty.
Welcome Address by Kate Mavor on Behalf of the Host College
Kate Mavor, CBE, delivers the opening remarks at the ECPS Conference 2025 held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.
Kate Mavor, CBE, Master of St Cross College, opened the Conference with a warm and appreciative welcome to all participants. She expressed genuine delight that the conference was taking place at St Cross and extended her congratulations to Sümeyye Kocaman for organizing what she described as an exceptionally rich and meaningful academic program. She also offered thanks to Ben Gladstone, Junior Dean at St Cross, for his role in helping bring the event to the college.
Mavor took a moment to reflect on the nature of St Cross College itself—an entirely graduate institution at the University of Oxford, with approximately 620 students representing over 60 academic disciplines. She noted that this unique breadth makes the College an especially fertile ground for interdisciplinary dialogue, and she emphasized that hosting events like the ECPS Conference is very much in line with the College’s mission to encourage rigorous, open, and diverse scholarly conversations.
She acknowledged the topic of the conference—centered on the idea of “the people” and its implications for contemporary democracy—as both pressing and, in some respects, deeply unsettling. Yet she expressed hope that the conference would provide space for thoughtful, evidence-based discussion at a time when such engagement is more necessary than ever. She concluded by welcoming attendees once again and graciously passed the floor to Janet Royall, Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, Oxford University.
Keynote Address by Janet Royall (Baroness Royall of Blaisdon)
Baroness Janet Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, delivers the keynote address during the opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.
Baroness Royall, in her opening address, brought to the fore a compelling blend of political insight, institutional experience, and democratic advocacy. While modestly noting her non-academic background, she framed her intervention with both humility and urgency—an acknowledgment of the significance of the moment and the thematic depth of the conference.
Speaking from her current role as Principal of Somerville College and her former position as Chair of the People’s History Museum in Manchester—a self-declared “museum of democracy”—Baroness Royall underscored the symbolic and practical weight of convening such a conference at a time when democracy is under unprecedented strain. Her address moved fluidly from personal reflection to systemic critique, offering a panoramic view of the challenges and possibilities that define our democratic era.
Baroness Royall opened by commending the ECPS and conference organizers for their vision and rapid execution of a robust program. She recalled an early conversation in January 2025 with the conference coordinator, Sumeyye Kocaman, about an “embryonic” idea to convene a gathering on the theme of “We, the People.” In less than six months, that idea had matured into an intellectually rigorous and internationally inclusive conference. She highlighted the potential of this initiative to lay the groundwork for a broader academic and civic endeavor, notably the proposed Oxford Democracy Network—a platform to foster long-term collaboration around democratic renewal.
At the heart of Baroness Royall’s speech was the concept of “the people”—both as a foundational democratic ideal and as a source of contemporary political peril. She asked, pointedly, whether the title of the conference might have been better framed as “We, the People and the Precarious Future of Democracy.” This rhetorical shift captured her broader concern: that the invocation of “the people” has become a double-edged sword in today’s political landscape.
Baroness Royall cited the alarming statistic that one-fifth of the world’s democracies have declined or disappeared between 2012 and 2024, pointing to a structural crisis in democratic governance. This regression, she argued, is not attributable to a singular cause but reflects a toxic convergence of polarizing narratives, us-versus-them mentalities, and the erosion of social cohesion. Crucially, she emphasized that these trends do not signal the end of democracy, but rather call for its reinvention—grounded in inclusion, resilience, and renewed solidarity.
Drawing on her political experience, Baroness Royall articulated how the phrase “we the people,” while historically empowering—as in the US Constitution—can also be weaponized. When deployed inclusively, the phrase serves as a unifying force, anchoring citizenship in shared values and a common public life. However, in the hands of authoritarian populists, the same phrase is used to divide, exclude, and delegitimize. By framing political opponents as enemies of the people, populist leaders transform democratic mechanisms into tools of domination. Royall cited cases such as Hungary, India, Turkey, and the United States, where the language of majoritarian legitimacy is used to undermine pluralism, erode judicial independence, and roll back minority rights. In such contexts, democracy may persist in name but is hollowed out in substance.
To confront these challenges, Baroness Royall stressed the necessity of interdisciplinary engagement. No single field, she argued, can adequately diagnose or respond to the crisis of democracy. Political science and law illuminate how constitutions shape and channel power; sociology and anthropology explore the socio-cultural dimensions of exclusion and cohesion; history and philosophy provide the longue durée through which the evolution of “the people” can be understood; and media and technology studies reveal how digital platforms both fracture and connect public discourse. She notably added science to this list—an unusual but thought-provoking inclusion—arguing that scientific knowledge and the practices of truth-seeking are indispensable to democratic life. Citing Nobel Laureate Sir Paul Nurse, she affirmed that “democracy is built on truth and trust,” and that science, in its ideal form, sustains both.
Baroness Royall’s address was marked by a tone of constructive realism. While expressing concern over democratic decline, she rejected fatalism. Instead, she outlined a multidimensional agenda for democratic renewal. First, she called for a redefinition of “the people” as an inclusive and dynamic community, one capable of accommodating diversity without retreating into fragmentation. Here, she invoked the post-Apartheid experience of South Africa as a model for constructing cross-cutting civic identities that transcend ethnic or sectarian divisions.
Second, Baroness Royall underscored the need to reinforce institutional integrity. This involves defending the independence of the judiciary, safeguarding electoral systems, and protecting a free press—all vital bulwarks against the authoritarian temptation of majoritarian rule.
Third, she emphasized civic renewal through grassroots participation, deliberative assemblies, and public education. Democracy, in her view, is not merely a set of institutions but a culture of engagement—a shared commitment to dialogue, complexity, and the common good.
Fourth, she called for global solidarity. Authoritarian populism is a transnational phenomenon and demands coordinated international responses. Civil society watchdogs, transnational legal norms, and cross-border academic partnerships must be part of the democratic arsenal.
Turning to her own political reflections, Baroness Royall acknowledged the widespread disillusionment with politicians. She argued, however, that this disaffection is often rooted in unrealistic public expectations. Voters demand lower taxes, higher pensions, and expanded public services—expectations that cannot be reconciled without trade-offs. Populists exploit this cognitive dissonance by offering simple solutions to complex problems. In contrast, genuine democracy, she insisted, requires honesty—about limits, about governance, and about the costs of collective decisions.
She also lamented the decline of local journalism and the rise of disinformation—particularly via AI-generated content—which has fractured the public sphere. Without a shared reality, she warned, the very possibility of democratic deliberation is undermined. In this context, she called for renewed investment in the civic infrastructure of knowledge: public media, media literacy, and forums for reasoned debate.
Baroness Royall then addressed a structural limitation of democracy often left unspoken: the influence of global capital. She noted that the need to placate financial markets can restrict democratic choice, creating a form of “attenuated democracy” where formal procedures persist but real power is constrained. This reality, she argued, highlights the need for vigilance and adaptation to preserve meaningful democratic sovereignty.
In her concluding remarks, Baroness Royall affirmed the value of the ECPS conference and its role in advancing a crucial intellectual and political mission. The “We, the People” program, she said, addresses the central paradox of modern democracy: that the very concept designed to empower citizens can also be used to erode their rights. By combining rigorous scholarship with policy-relevant insights, the conference aims not only to diagnose democratic decay but also to formulate strategies for renewal.
Baroness Royall closed on a note of cautious optimism, invoking Antonio Gramsci’s famous formulation: “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.” While the threats to democracy are serious, she maintained that collective action, informed deliberation, and institutional resilience can chart a path forward. She expressed hope that the conference would inspire not only intellectually stimulating discussions but also concrete contributions to policy and democratic reform.
Conclusion
The opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 laid a compelling foundation for the days ahead, offering both a sobering diagnosis of democratic fragility and an urgent call for renewal grounded in intellectual rigor and interdisciplinary collaboration. Anchored by the interventions of Sümeyye Kocaman, Kate Mavor, and Baroness Janet Royall, the session deftly mapped the theoretical and practical stakes of examining “the people” as a contested and evolving concept at the heart of democratic politics.
Kocaman’s remarks highlighted the historical plurality and ideological malleability of “the people,” urging participants to interrogate its use not only in electoral campaigns but also in shaping everyday political experiences. Mavor emphasized the role of academic institutions in fostering open dialogue on questions of urgent public concern. Baroness Royall, meanwhile, offered a far-reaching keynote that moved from democratic theory to global political realities. Her speech underscored the double-edged nature of “the people” in democratic discourse—capable of both mobilizing collective agency and justifying exclusionary populism.
Collectively, these addresses set a tone of cautious optimism. While acknowledging the pressures of democratic backsliding, disinformation, and socio-political fragmentation, each speaker reaffirmed the possibility of renewal through civic education, institutional reform, and cross-sector dialogue. The session concluded with a clear message: that democracy cannot be taken for granted, and that critical, interdisciplinary engagement is essential not only for understanding the present crisis, but also for envisioning democratic futures that are more inclusive, participatory, and resilient. As the conference moves forward, the intellectual commitments voiced in the opening session will serve as both compass and challenge—calling participants to contribute meaningfully to the urgent task of democratic revitalization.
The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) successfully convened its Fourth Annual International Symposium at the University of Warsaw on May 22–23, 2025. The event brought together leading scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to examine the evolving dynamics of civilizational populism and its wide-ranging implications on local, national, transnational, and global levels.
Over two days of intensive dialogue and critical reflection, the symposium explored how populism—particularly in its civilizational form—interacts with religion, digital technologies, and identity-based narratives to shape political behavior, influence democratic institutions, and impact social cohesion across plural societies. Special attention was paid to the varied manifestations of populism in both the Global North and Global South.
The concept of civilizational populism—which deploys civilizational identity as a metanarrative to heighten antagonism between ‘the people’ and constructed ‘others,’ often along religious and cultural lines—was a central focus. Participants analyzed how this form of populism contributes to the intensification of intra- and inter-group conflicts and how it reshapes the discourse on globalization, South-South cooperation, and multipolar international relations.
Panels addressed the following core themes:
The relationship between civilizational populism and democratic backsliding.
The use of religion and civilizational rhetoric by populists to legitimize exclusionary policies.
The strategic role of digital technologies and artificial intelligence in amplifying populist messages.
Transnational linkages between populist actors and their impact on global governance frameworks.
The symposium further emphasized that while populism is often characterized as a “thin ideology,” it operates alongside thick ideologies—such as neoliberalism, nationalism, socialism, or religion—and plays a significant role in shaping emotions, mobilizing public sentiment, and reconfiguring political power structures.
Speakers highlighted that civilizational populist narratives, far from being confined to national borders, are increasingly embedded in global communication circuits, shaping diasporic politics, influencing foreign policy, and challenging multilateral norms.
Ultimately, the symposium fostered rich interdisciplinary discussions and called for innovative, inclusive, and ethically grounded strategies to address the challenges posed by civilizational populism in today’s digitally interconnected and ideologically polarized world.
Organizing Institution
European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) (Brussels)
Hosting Institution
Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw (Warsaw)
Partner Institutions
Georgetown University (Washington DC)
University of Birmingham (Birmingham)
Deakin University (Melbourne)
DAAD / Cambridge University
University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East Asian Studies
Centre for International Relations (Warsaw)
DAY ONE – May 22, 2025
Opening Speech
Dr. Adam Bodnar (Minister of Justice of Poland / (Video Recording).
Keynote Speech
“A Relational Approach to Religion and Populism: Recontextualizing Civilizational Narratives in National and Global Contexts,” by Dr. Jocelyne Cesari(Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham, UK, and Senior Fellow at the Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Panel 1
Populism: Is It a One-way Route from Democracy to Authoritarianism?
“Making Sense of Multiple Manifestations of Alternatives to Liberal Democracies,” by Dr. Radoslaw Markowski(Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences & Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator).
“Constitutional Intolerance: The Fashioning of ‘the Other’ in Europe’s Constitutional Repertoires,” by Dr. Marietta van der Tol(Politics & International Studies, DAAD-Cambridge).
Dr. Erkan Toguslu moderates a panel featuring Dr. Radoslaw Markowski and Dr. Marietta van der Tol, exploring alternatives to liberal democracies and the role of constitutional narratives in shaping ‘the Other’ in Europe. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.
Panel 2
Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion
Moderator
Dr. Erin K. Wilson(Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).
Paper Presenters
“Populism, Civilization, and Restorative Nostalgia,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).
“Emotional Dimensions of Civilisationist Populism: A Comparative Analysis of Erdogan, Modi, and Khan with Transformer-Based Classification,” by Dr. Matthew Belanger(Lecturer in Substance Use Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology Faculty of Social Sciences University of Stirling) and Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).
Dr. Erin K. Wilson moderates Panel 2 on “Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion,” featuring Professor Ihsan Yilmaz, Dr. Nicholas Morieson on populism and restorative nostalgia, and Dr. Matthew Belanger & Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc on the emotional dynamics of civilisationist populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.
Keynote Speech
Kamil Wyszkowski, Director of the UN Global Compact, delivers the keynote speech highlighting the challenges and responsibilities of global institutions in defending human rights amid rising populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.
The Role of the UN in Fighting for Human Rights in This Populist Age,” by Kamil Wyszkowski (Director of UN Global Compact).
Panel 3
Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions
Moderator
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari(Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).
Speakers
“Remember to be Jewish: Religious Populism in Israel,” byDr. Guy Ben-Porat (Professor of International Relations and Politics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev).
“Religious Populism and Civilizationalism in International Politics: An Authoritarian Turn,” byDr. Ihsan Yilmaz(Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations and Chair in Islamic Studies at Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization) & Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).
Paper Presenters
“National Populists of Christian Europe, Unite? Civilizations Dimensions of Far-right Populist Alliances in Post-Brexit Britain,” by Dr. Rafal Soborski(Professor of International Politics, The Department of Social Science at Richmond American University and Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University).
“Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: Between the Muslim World and Malaysia,” by Dr. Syaza Shukri(Assoc. Professor& Head of Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia).
Dr. Jocelyne Cesari moderates Panel 3 on “Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions,” presented by Dr. Bulent Kenes, and featuring contributions from Dr. Guy Ben-Porat on religious populism in Israel; Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz & Dr. Nicholas Morieson on civilizational authoritarianism; Dr. Rafal Soborski on Christian far-right alliances; and Dr. Syaza Shukri on Anwar Ibrahim’s civilizational populism. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.
DAY TWO – May 23, 2025
Keynote Speech
Dariusz Mazur, Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland, delivers a keynote speech addressing the challenges to the rule of law and the role of justice institutions in safeguarding democracy in an era of rising populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.
Dariusz Mazur (Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland).
Panel 4
Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization
Moderator
Antoine Godbert(Affiliate Professor of Law, Economics & Humanities at ESCP Business School, Paris, and Director of International Affairs at the Rectorat of Île-de-France – Paris).
Speakers
“On the Nature of Economics and the future of Globalization under Civilizational Populism,” by Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk (Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), Germany, Senior Economic Researcher at the ECPS, Brussels).
“Populism as a Reaction to Neoliberal Technocratism,” by Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki(Professor of Economic Sociology at the Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw).
“Far-Right Populism and the Making of the Exclusionary Neoliberal State,” by Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider (Associate Professor, Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna and Research Affiliate, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge).
Antoine Godbert moderates Panel 4 on “Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization,” with Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk examining the future of globalization, Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki analyzing populist responses to neoliberal technocracy, and Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider exploring the rise of the exclusionary neoliberal state. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.
Panel 5
Religion and Identity Politics
Moderator
Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc(Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).
Speaker
“Religion and Power in an Age of Identity Politics,” byDr. Erin K. Wilson(Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).
Paper Presenters
“Civilizational Populism and the Making of Sexualized Cultural Christianity,” byDr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey(Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Gender, and Culture, Le Moyne University, NY).
“Imagine No More Small Boats in the Channel’: How Populist Parties and Their Leaders Normalize Polarization in Their Communication on Social Media Platforms, a Multimodal Discourse Analysis,” byDr. Valeria Reggi(Post-doc Researcher at the University of Venice and Adjunct Professor and Tutor at the University of Bologna).
“Populism from a Double Perspective. Timo Soini and the Finnish Version of Populism,” byDr. Jarosław Suchoples(Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw, Former Polish Ambassador to Finland).
Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc moderates Panel 5 on “Religion and Identity Politics,” featuring Dr. Erin K. Wilson on the intersection of religion and power, Dr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey on sexualized cultural Christianity, Dr. Valeria Reggi on populist polarization via social media, and Dr. Jarosław Suchoples on the Finnish model of populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.
Gala Dinner
During the gala dinner, a short video clip was presented featuring a biopic on the Romani poet Papusza and Birds Are Singing in Kigali, two acclaimed Polish films directed by Joanna Kos-Krauze. Following the screening, Dr. Małgorzata Bonikowska moderated a brief conversation with the director and two other participants. (Photos: Muhammed Gemi)
Participants
During the coffee and lunch breaks, conference participants had the opportunity to connect, exchange ideas, and get to know one another better. They also engaged actively in the Q&A sessions, contributing thoughtful questions and insights to each panel discussion. (Photos: Muhammed Gemi.)
Please cite as: Wathtuwa-Durayalage, Sudeshika. (2025). “Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). June 11, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000115
Abstract
This study investigates the impact of civilizational populism on intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the United Kingdom using quantitative analysis of British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021 data. The findings reveal significant correlations between exposure to populist rhetoric and heightened negative emotions, such as fear and anger, toward ethnoreligious and political minorities (r = 0.56). While political affiliation demonstrates a weaker direct influence (r = 0.14), perceptions of migration as culturally and economically beneficial are strongly associated with higher social cohesion (r = 0.69). Minority groups report elevated levels of exclusion and fear, yet national pride correlates with inclusive attitudes in some cases (r = -0.64, with prejudicial views). Civil society organizations play a critical role in mitigating divisive effects by fostering inclusivity and dialogue. These insights inform strategies to counteract the polarizing impacts of civilizational populism, emphasizing the importance of inclusive narratives and policy interventions to enhance social cohesion in diverse societies. The study’s limitations include reliance on secondary data and challenges in establishing causality, highlighting the need for further research using more direct measures of populism and contemporary datasets. Despite these constraints, the findings contribute empirical evidence to the growing literature on the social and emotional consequences of populism, offering a foundation for policies aimed at promoting harmony and reducing polarization in the UK.
Keywords: Civilizational populism, intergroup emotions, social cohesion, civility
By Sudeshika Wathtuwa-Durayalage
Introduction
This study investigates the influence of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions and attitudes towards ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK. Specifically, it examines the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility at the local and national levels, and how individuals and communities respond to and resist populist rhetoric. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the emotional responses elicited by civilisational populism, such as fear, anger, and resentment, and the strategies civil society organisations employ to mitigate its divisive effects.
While there has been extensive research on the general impact of populism on political attitudes and intergroup relations, there is a significant gap in understanding the specific emotional and social consequences of civilisational populism, particularly in the UK context. Civilisational populism differs from other forms of populism by framing political discourse regarding civilisational identities and perceived existential threats to cultural values and ways of life. Current literature inadequately addresses how this form of populism shapes intergroup emotions, such as fear and resentment, and its implications for social cohesion. Furthermore, there is a paucity of research on how communities and civil society organisations respond to civilisational populism, especially in fostering social cohesion and civility in the context of rising divisive rhetoric.
This research is significant as it aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how civilisational populism influences emotional and social dynamics within ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK. By focusing on emotional responses and community reactions to civilisational populism, this study offers critical insights into how populist rhetoric shapes social cohesion and civility in diverse societies. Additionally, identifying the coping mechanisms and resistance strategies employed by communities will contribute to policy and intervention strategies aimed at mitigating the divisive impacts of populism. Ultimately, this research could inform efforts to strengthen social cohesion and civility in increasingly pluralistic and politically polarised societies.
The research questions are as follows:
How does civilisational populism influence intergroup emotions and attitudes toward ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK?
What are the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility in local and national contexts?
How do individuals and communities respond to populist rhetoric, and what coping mechanisms or resistance strategies are employed to maintain social cohesion?
There are three research objectives aligned with this research, as follows:
To explore how civilisational populism impacts the emotional responses (e.g., fear, anger, and resentment) of different ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK.
To analyse the relationship between civilisational populism and social cohesion, focusing on the extent to which it promotes or undermines community trust and cooperation.
To identify the strategies utilised by civil society organisations and communities to counteract the divisive effects of populism and foster civility.
Civilisational populism, as defined in this research, uniquely frames political discourse around existential threats to cultural values, in contrast to general populism that targets the elite. This study explores its significant emotional and societal impacts on social cohesion, particularly among ethnoreligious and political minorities. The central argument posits that civilisational populism exacerbates fear, anger, and resentment toward minority groups, undermining local and national social cohesion. Civil society and communities can mitigate these divisive impacts by fostering civility and employing coping mechanisms. Through a robust quantitative approach utilising British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) data, this research seeks to empirically establish correlations between populist rhetoric and intergroup emotions.
van Oosten, Sanne. (2025). “Do Muslims Have Different Attitudes and Voting Behaviour Than the Majority Populations of France, Germany and the Netherlands?” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). June 10, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00100
Abstract
The political preferences of Muslims are often the source of contention and misinformation. In continental Europe, there is not much data available on political preferences of Muslims due to strict privacy regulations, creating a knowledge lacuna allowing for misinformation to fester. In this report, I focus on three countries where privacy regulations are particularly longstanding: France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I use a novel sampling method that complies with privacy regulations while achieving a large enough sample of minority respondents to conduct statistical analyses. Regarding policy preferences, I find that respondents with a Muslim minority background have more conservative attitudes towards same-sex adoption, while showing very similar attitudes to white majority respondents when it comes to gender equality. Respondents with a Muslim minority background are, however, more progressive on immigration and religious freedoms for Muslims. Regarding voting preferences, Muslims show very similar patterns to their majority counterparts, with a few exceptions (La France Insoumise (FI) in France, and in the Netherlands DENK and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)). This paper seeks to put an end to persistent speculation about the political preferences of Muslims, particularly Muslims, in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.
The political preferences of Muslims in western countries are the subject of recurring speculation (Turnbull-Dugarte and Lopez, 2024; Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2025; van Oosten, 2025a; 2025b). Political leaders often claim that Muslims vote for them to present themselves as legitimate leaders of all people, while at the same time, some political leaders claim that Muslims and other minorities have been imported by elites to vote for pro-immigrant parties and change society from within (Bracke and Aguilar, 2022; van Oosten, 2025a). Political actors also often point to the attitudes of Muslims to justify their exclusion from national communities (Glas, 2023; Spierings, 2021; De Lange and Mügge, 2015). These claims focus on issues like opposition to gay rights (Puar, 2013), perceived sexism (Farris, 2017), antisemitism (van Oosten, 2024a) or animal cruelty (Backlund and Jungar, 2022; van Oosten, 2024b). Far-right parties use these examples to argue that Muslims do not share core liberal values, and therefore do not belong in liberal societies (van Oosten, 2024b; 2022). These claims, however, are rarely supported by data. This report examines whether Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands hold different political preferences from their white majority counterparts.
Standard sampling strategies do not yield enough minority participants for statistical analyses (Font and Méndez, 2013). Moreover, strict European privacy regulations limit the availability of sampling frames for racial/ethnic and religious minorities in the European context (Simon, 2017). To overcome these challenges, I surveyed a large sample of Kantar-panellists and used a mini-survey to oversample voters from France, Germany, and the Netherlands with a migration background in Turkey (France, Germany, and the Netherlands), North Africa (France), Sub-Saharan Africa (France), the Former Soviet Union (Germany), Surinam (the Netherlands), and Morocco (the Netherlands). I sampled a high number of minority respondents, with 1889 out of a total N of 3058 respondents having a migration background, of which 649 self-identify as Muslim. I asked these respondents for their propensity to vote (PTV) for all political parties in the French, German and Dutch parliament at the time of data collection, as well as their attitudes towards 8 key policy preferences spanning socio-cultural and socio-economic themes.
In this paper, I test whether Muslims and other minority groups differ from majority voters in their support for political parties in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I find that Muslim voters are much less likely to support PVV in the Netherlands but are just as likely to vote for the RN in France or AfD in Germany (all three far right). Minority and majority voters are equally likely to support mainstream left parties, such as PS in France, the SPD in Germany, and PvdA in the Netherlands. Muslim minority voters are more likely to support left-populist parties DENK in the Netherlands and FI in France. In terms of policy preferences, respondents with a Muslim minority background hold more conservative views on same-sex adoption but show similar attitudes to majority respondents on gender equality. They are, however, more progressive on immigration and Muslim religious freedoms.
This report aims to contribute to the debate about the voting behaviour of Muslims in Western Europe, a debate that is often speculative and not based on data from academic scholars. Far right party leaders, thinkers and pundits have fuelled misunderstandings about minority voting patterns. In reality, the political preferences of Muslims, a minority, are very similar to the political preferences of the majority population. This report seeks to provide clarity and offer a data-driven response to counter the narrative that some political leaders might use to exploit the supposed voting behaviours of minorities for their political gain. Through empirical analysis, this study contributes to a more accurate understanding of ethnic minority political preferences and aims to challenge rhetoric with factual evidence.
Sampling Method and Sample Composition
I conducted this research in France (van Oosten et al., 2024a), Germany (van Oosten et al., 2024b) and the Netherlands (van Oosten et al., 2024c), three countries with key differences. In France, there is a strong emphasis on citizenship, secularism and a strong division between church and state (Kuru, 2008). In Germany, Christian political parties have had a longstanding presence (Ahrens et al., 2022) and the approach towards Muslims is characterised by the history of integration of guestworkers (Yurdakul, 2009). The Netherlands has a host of Christian parties (Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019), a tradition of high minority representation in politics (Hughes, 2016: 560), increased by the emergence of a political party run by Muslim parliamentarians and voicing Muslim interests in 2017, DENK (van Oosten et al., 2024d). All three countries have a history of parliamentarians from mainstream and populist radical right parties espousing Islamophobic rhetoric, with France and the Netherlands having a longer and more vociferous history of populist radical right parties and Germany being relatively new to the game and taking on a comparatively less strident tone (Brubaker, 2017).
I oversampled respondents with specific migration backgrounds to make group-specific statistical inferences (Font and Méndez, 2013: 48) and chose minoritised groups: numeric minorities that state experiencing discrimination to the largest extent (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 31). In France, the oversampled groups of ethnic minority citizens consist of French citizens with a North-African (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), Sub-Saharan African (Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo) and Turkish background. In Germany, I oversampled German citizens with a Turkish and Former Soviet Union (FSU) background. In the Netherlands, I oversampled Dutch citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese background. Some groups have come to France, Germany or the Netherlands as a result of the colonial ties between host and home country, some came as guest workers (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 93). I also oversampled French citizens with a Turkish background and German re-migrants from the FSU. Some, but not all, of the oversampled migration backgrounds are countries with Muslim-majority populations, making it possible to disentangle whether differences are either religiously or ethnically/racially driven. In this paper, I present data for the Muslim subgroup, but the data also includes other minoritised groups and analyses by these groups are also available for researchers.
After running pilots and obtaining the ethics approval, (see appendix: van Oosten, 2025c), I gathered data between March and August of 2020 amongst 3058 citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands, administered by survey agency Kantar Public (for all replication materials and appendices, see van Oosten, 2025b). One important challenge in surveying ethnic/racial minority groups comes from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a European law legally restricting saving data on race and ethnicity (European Commission 2018). I overcame this challenge by employing a large-scale filter question to the representative Kantar-panels in all three countries. I asked a very large sample to participate in a mini survey. The first and only question of this mini survey asks where their mother and father were born. If either one of their parents were born in a country of origin I wanted to oversample, I redirected this respondent to the full survey. If not, I either terminated the survey or redirected a small percentage to the full survey. This enabled us to form sizable groups of minority citizens for our final survey, ensuring ample diversity, a feature so often missing from survey research (e.g. Coppock and McClellan, 2018). Though there is still a chance of selection bias (see van Oosten, 2025d for a discussion on the selection bias in this sample), I have variables to weight the data on gender, migration background, education, age, urbanisation and region, and the findings are broadly the same with and without weights.
Respondents received so-called ‘LifePoints’ (France and Germany) or ‘Nipoints’ (the Netherlands) for the completion of the survey. With these points, respondents can periodically convert their saved points to an online gift card. The survey took about fifteen minutes to complete, which translated to an equivalent of two euros in gift card value. I ended up with the following number of respondents in each group:
I assessed migration background by inquiring about the birthplaces of respondents’ mothers and fathers. It was necessary to ask this question first for sampling purposes. To minimise potential ordering effects on the data, I randomised the order in which respondents viewed the policy questions and experimental profiles (for the full questionnaire, see appendix in van Oosten, 2025c). To mitigate acquiescence bias, where respondents tend to agree with statements, I randomised the wording of the policy questions. For instance, one half of the sample saw the statement: “the taxes for this rich should be raised” and the other half saw “the taxes for the rich should be lowered” and I recoded the variables accordingly. I prepared the data using R-package ‘tidyr’ (Wickham, 2020, see all code and replication materials here: van Oosten, 2025c).
Minorities’ Policy Preferences
In the following section, I first present the policy preferences of two groups: non-religious ethnic majority respondents and Muslim ethnic minority respondents (for other subgroups see appendix at van Oosten, 2025c). I present the distribution of the responses in a histogram, with a black line indicating the mean score. I asked respondents to indicate their agreement with a series of policy statements using an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). The statements covered a broad range of topics, including attitudes towards state intervention, immigration, Islam, gender and sexuality. The attitudes towards state intervention are as follows: “The tax rate for the rich must be higher/lower,” “Our government should raise/lower support for the unemployed,” “Our government should do less/more to combat climate change than now,” and “Our government needs to lower/raise fuel prices.” Attitudes towards immigration and Islam are as follows: “Immigrants are a burden/an asset to our country,” “Islam should (not) be restricted by law.” I measure gender attitudes as follows: “That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should (not) be regulated by law,” and sexuality as follows: “Homosexual couples should (not) be allowed to adopt children.”
I compared the responses of non-religious ethnic majority respondents with those of ethnic minority respondents who self-identified as practicing Muslims. Differences between the groups were negligible for most policy areas, including taxation, unemployment, climate policy, fuel prices, and gender equality. However, Muslim respondents were more likely to oppose adoption rights for same-sex couples, and more supportive of immigration and religious freedoms for Muslims.
Subsequently, I present data for voting preferences. I asked respondents about their willingness to vote for a wide range of political parties in their respective countries using so-called “Propensity to Vote” (PTV) questions. Respondents were asked: “Please indicate the likelihood that you will ever vote for the following parties. If you are certain that you will never vote for this party then choose 0; if you are certain to vote for this party someday, then enter 10. Of course you can also choose an intermediate position.” In France, the list of parties included LREM, LR, PS, MoDem, FI, PCF, RN (formerly Front National), and MR. In Germany, I asked about CDU, SPD, AfD, FDP, Die Linke, Grüne, and CSU. In the Netherlands, the full list consisted of CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FvD, GroenLinks, PvdA, PvdD, PVV, SGP, SP, and VVD.
In the figures below, I present histograms of the responses for two parties per country: FI and RN in France, Die Linke and AfD in Germany, and DENK and PVV in the Netherlands. These pairs were selected to contrast parties often associated with the ethnic majority versus those associated with minority or immigrant support. Full results for all parties are available in the appendix (van Oosten, 2025c). Our findings show that there are relatively few differences in voting propensities between non-religious ethnic majority respondents and Muslim ethnic minority respondents in France and Germany. In France, Muslims are about as likely as non-religious majority respondents to consider voting for both RN and FI. Similarly, in Germany, I find little difference between these two groups in their willingness to vote for Die Linke or AfD. The Netherlands stands out in this regard: Muslim respondents are significantly more likely to consider voting for DENK, a party with strong minority and Muslim support, while being far less likely to vote for the PVV, a party known for its anti-Muslim rhetoric. This suggests that differences in vote propensity by group are more pronounced in the Dutch context than in France or Germany.
Minorities’ Voting Preferences
Conclusion
In terms of policy preferences, the differences between Muslims and non-religious ethnic majority respondents are generally small, except in a few areas. Muslims tend to be more supportive of immigration and Muslim rights and less supportive of same-sex couples adopting children. There are no major differences on issues like gender equality, though. When it comes to voting preferences, there are bigger differences in the Netherlands compared to France and Germany. In the Netherlands, Muslims are much less likely to vote for the PVV, but more likely to vote for DENK. In France and Germany, there are fewer differences between Muslims and non-religious ethnic majorities, with both groups showing similar preferences for parties like RN and FI in France, and AfD and Die Linke in Germany.
This paper addresses the ongoing speculations about the policy and voting preferences of Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Political leaders and commentators regularly spread misinformation; possibly unintentionally, possibly deliberately (van Oosten, 2025a). This false information about minority voting habits can mislead the public and fuel xenophobic views. In reality, Muslims often share similar political preferences with the majority population, though not always. This paper presents descriptive statistics to challenge false narratives. Combating misinformation is vital for the health of democracies, as it helps maintain informed discussions and trust in democratic institutions.
References
Ahrens, P., Ayoub, P. M., & Lang, S. (2022). “Leading from behind? Gender equality in Germany during the Merkel era.” In: Leading from behind (pp. 1–19). Routledge.
Backlund, A., & Jungar, A.-C. (2024). “Animal advocacy and the radical right: The case of Sweden.” Journal of Political Ideologies, 29(3), 614–633. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2022.2138292
Bracke, S., & Hernández Aguilar, L. M. (2020). “‘They love death as we love life’: The ‘Muslim question’ and the biopolitics of replacement.” British Journal of Sociology, 71(4), 680–701. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-4446.12742
Brubaker, Rogers. (2017). “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 40 (8): 1191–1226. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1294700.
Font, J, and M Méndez. (2013). Surveying Ethnic Minorities and Immigrant Populations. Amsterdam: IMISCOE Research Amsterdam University Press. www.imiscoe.org.
FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2017). Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (EU-MIDIS II): Main Results. https://doi.org/10.2811/902610.
Glas, Saskia. (2023). “What Gender Values Do Muslims Resist? How Religiosity and Acculturation Over Time Shape Muslims’ Public-Sphere Equality, Family Role Divisions, and Sexual Liberalization Values Differently.” Social Forces, Volume 101, Issue 3, March 2023, Pages 1199–1229, https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soac004.
Hughes, Melanie M. (2016). “Electoral Systems and the Legislative Representation of Muslim Ethnic Minority Women in the West, 2000-2010.” Parliamentary Affairs 69: 548–68. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsv062.
Kešić, Josip, and Jan Willem Duyvendak. (2019). “The Nation under Threat: Secularist, Racial and Populist Nativism in the Netherlands.” Patterns of Prejudice 53 (5): 441–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2019.1656886.
Kuru, Ahmet T. (2008). “Secularism, State Policies, and Muslims in Europe Analyzing French Exceptionalism.” Comperative Politics 41 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041508×12911362383552.
de Lange, S. L., & Mügge, L. M. (2015). “Gender and right-wing populism in the Low Countries: Ideological variations across parties and time.” Patterns of Prejudice, 49(1–2), 61–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2015.1014199
Simon, Patrick. (2017). “The Failure of the Importation of Ethno-Racial Statistics in Europe: Debates and Controversies.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 40 (13): 2326–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1344278
Spierings, N. (2021). “Homonationalism and voting for the populist radical right: Addressing unanswered questions by zooming in on the Dutch case.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 33(1), 171–182. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa005
Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J., López Ortega, A., & Hunklinger, M. (2025). “Do citizens stereotype Muslims as an illiberal bogeyman? Evidence from a double-list experiment.” British Journal of Political Science, 55, e23. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123424000437
Turnbull-Dugarte, S. J., & López Ortega, A. (2024). “Instrumentally inclusive: The political psychology of homonationalism.” American Political Science Review, 118(3), 1360–1378. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055423000849
van Oosten, S. (2022) “What shapes voter expectations of Muslim politicians’ views on homosexuality: stereotyping or projection?” Electoral Studies, 80(December). Elsevier Ltd: 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2022.102553
van Oosten S., Mügge L., Hakhverdian A, Van der Pas D. and Vermeulen F. (2024a). French Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination. (EMMAVID) – EMMAVID Data France. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ULQEAY
van Oosten S., Mügge L., Hakhverdian A., Van der Pas D. and Vermeulen F. (2024b). German Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination. (EMMAVID) – EMMAVID Data Germany. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GT4N9J
van Oosten S., Mügge L., Hakhverdian A., Van der Pas D. and Vermeulen F. (2024c). Dutch Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination (EMMAVID) – EMMAVID Data the Netherlands. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BGVJZQ
van Oosten, S., Mügge, L., Hakhverdian, A., & van der Pas, D. (2024d). “What explains voting for DENK: Issues, discrimination or in-group favouritism?” Representation, 60(4), 601–623.https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2024.2387011
van Oosten, S. (2025a). “The Importance of In-group Favouritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 12, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0046
Abstract How do voters evaluate female Muslim politicians? The literature mainly approaches voter evaluations of underrepresented groups from a unitary perspective, focusing on either female or minoritized politicians, leaving Muslim politicians out of the picture altogether. I take an intersectional approach and consider a finding intersectional when evaluations of a Muslim woman politician are significantly different from both non-religious women and Muslim men. I test this by running survey experiments amongst 3056 respondents in France, Germany, and the Netherlands and presenting 18,336 randomly constructed profiles of hypothetical politicians varying their religion, gender, and migration background. Voters have a strong negative bias against Muslim politicians. However, voters do not assess female Muslim politicians significantly differently than their male counterparts. These conclusions have implications for researchers studying intersectionality using conjoint experiments and researchers concerned with the electoral consequences of diversity in a political landscape increasingly influenced by populist radical right parties.
Keywords: Intersectionality, Muslims, Islamophobia, Muslim women, Descriptive representation
There are many examples of female Muslim politicians being targeted by politicians of the Populist Radical Right (see Farris, 2017; Oudenampsen, 2016), sometimes leading to female Muslim politicians receiving extraordinary amounts of discursive backlash (Saris & Ven, 2021; van Oosten, 2022). At the same time, Muslim women tend to outnumber Muslim men in politics (Hughes, 2016), especially in contexts where party selectors craft candidate lists: Muslim women tick two diversity boxes while also challenging stereotypes of Muslim women as oppressed, simply by being politicians (Dancygier, 2017). Despite these challenges and the unique positioning of Muslim women in politics, the question remains how voters evaluate them. Does being a female Muslim politician pose electoral challenges, or is there an electoral benefit? In this paper, I test whether intersectionality plays a role in how voters evaluate female Muslim politicians.
An intersectional analysis is distinct from a unitary or multiple one (Hancock, 2007). Where a unitary analysis foregrounds one background characteristic (race or gender) and a multiple analysis adds up the effects of multiple ones (race and gender), an intersectional analysis highlights the interaction between them (race interacts with gender) (idem). In order to study the intersectional position of minoritized women in politics quantitatively, many scholars call the use of interaction effects and candidate experiments viable methodological solutions (Block et al., 2023; Klar & Schmitt, 2021, p. 493, 495). This paper tests the limits of both the method of data collection (candidate experiments) and the method of analysis (interaction effects) by studying what is arguably a most-likely case: female Muslim politicians.
Though there has been much research on intersectionality and politicians in the US (Brown, 2014a, 2014b; Collins, 1998; Holman & Schneider, 2018; Lemi & Brown, 2019; Reingold et al., 2020), intersectionality and politicians in the European context is poorly understood. In Europe, Muslim women play a crucial role in many nationalist debates in western countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands (Dancygier, 2017; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2021). The general framing tends to imply that Muslim women are significantly different from both non-Muslim women and Muslim men because being Muslim influences what it means to be a woman and being a woman influences what it means to be Muslim. As Islam and gender are thus “mutually reinforcing”, an intersectional lens is indispensable (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1283). This is particularly apparent when female Muslim politicians attempt to enter politics (Dancygier, 2014; Hughes, 2016; Murray, 2016). However, whether female Muslim politicians face a “double disadvantage” or a “strategic advantage” (Gershon & Lavariega Monforti, 2021) depends heavily on the specific political and societal context in which they operate. In order to study this, I presented 3056 respondents in France, Germany, and the Netherlands a total of 18,336 short bios of hypothetical politicians while randomizing their religion, ethnorace and gender. I asked respondents to assess these politicians by asking evaluation and choice-questions. Candidate conjoint experiments rarely include Islam as an experimental condition and when they do, intersectional analyses are rarely conducted (one notable exception being Benstead et al., 2015).
In line with Hancock (2007), I analyze the results in a unitary, multiple and intersectional way. In the intersectional analysis I use interactions while controlling for direct (unitary) effects. Although I do not find voters assess women and ethnoracially minoritized politicians negatively, I find robust and consistent evidence that voters have a strong negative and unitary bias against Muslim politicians. However, this analysis did not garner any evidence for intersectional effects of religion and gender. Given the sizable sample and effect sizes, I do not consider a lack of statistical power the cause of these null results. Though I remain confident that interaction effects are the most fitting method of analysis, I argue that conjoint experiments are not the most fitting method of data collection due to the cognitive overload causing respondents to single out one attribute to base their choices on.
Please cite as: Yilmaz, Ihsan; Mamouri, Ali; Morieson, Nicholas & Omer, Muhammad. (2025). “The Transnational Diffusion of Digital Authoritarianism: From Moscow and Beijing to Ankara.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). May 12, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0098
This report examines how Turkey has become a paradigmatic case of digital authoritarian convergence through the mechanisms of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence. Drawing on Chinese and Russian models—and facilitated by Western and Chinese tech companies—Turkey has adopted sophisticated digital control strategies across legal, surveillance, and information domains. The study identifies how strategic partnerships, infrastructure agreements (e.g., Huawei’s 5G and smart city projects), and shared authoritarian logics have enabled the Erdoğan regime to suppress dissent and reshape the digital public sphere. Through legal reforms, deep packet inspection (DPI) technologies, and coordinated digital propaganda, Turkey exemplifies how authoritarian digital governance diffuses globally. The findings highlight an urgent need for international accountability, cyber norms, and ethical tech governance to contain the expanding influence of digital repression.
This research explores the diffusion of digital authoritarian practices in Turkey as a prominent example of the Muslim world, focusing on the three mechanisms of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence, covering four main domains: Legal frameworks, Internet censorship, urban surveillance, and Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs). The study covers both internal and external diffusion based on a wide range of sources. These include domestic precedents, examples from authoritarian regimes like China and Russia, and the role of Western companies in spreading digital authoritarian practices.
The study had several findings. The key findings are detailed below:
Learning: Turkey, like other regional countries that experienced public unrest, has learned from previous experience in order to impose power and control on people using different digital capabilities. Countries like China and Russia played significant roles in this learning process across the region, including in Turkey. The research highlights the importance of both internal learning from past protest movements and external influences from state and non-state actors.
Emulation: Authoritarian regimes in Turkey and across the Muslim world have emulated China and Russia’s internet governance models in all four aforementioned domains. The Turkish government has developed its own surveillance and censorship techniques, influenced by the experiences of authoritarian states and bolstered by training and technology transfers from China and Russia, and certain western companies.
Cooperative interdependence: Turkey’s economic challenges have led it to forge closer ties with China, particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This cooperation often comes with financial incentives, promoting the adoption of China’s digital governance practices, including urban surveillance systems and censorship technologies.
Role of private technology companies: Western companies have played a significant role in facilitating the spread of digital authoritarianism, often operating independently of their governments’ policies. Companies like Sandvine and NSO Group have provided tools that support the Turkish government’s digital control strategies, contributing to a complex landscape of censorship and surveillance.
Diffusion of SDIOs: The diffusion process of digital authoritarian practice is not limited to importing and using digital technologies. It also includes the spreading of legal frameworks to restrict digital freedom and also running Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs), including state propaganda and conspiracy theories that China and Russia had a significant role in.
Based on these findings, the study proposes several recommendations to counteract the spread of digital authoritarian practices:
– Strengthening international cyber norms and regulations to define and regulate digital governance, particularly in countries with strong ties to the West.
– Enhancing support for digital rights and privacy protections by advocating for comprehensive laws and supporting civil society organizations in Turkey.
– Encouraging responsible corporate behavior among technology firms to ensure compliance with human rights standards.
– Fostering regional and global cooperation on digital freedom to counter digital authoritarianism through joint initiatives and technical assistance.
– Leveraging economic incentives to promote ethical technology use and partnerships with human rights-aligned providers.
– Using strategic diplomatic channels to encourage Turkey to adopt responsible surveillance practices and align with global digital governance norms.
The research illustrates the dynamics of digital authoritarianism in Turkey, revealing a complex interplay of emulation, learning, and economic incentives that facilitate the spread of censorship and surveillance practices. The findings underscore the need for international cooperation and proactive measures to safeguard digital freedoms in an increasingly authoritarian digital landscape.
Photo: Hannu Viitanen.
Introduction
Research suggests that a significant number of countries in the Muslim world, specifically those in the Middle East, are often characterized by authoritarian governance (Durac & Cavatorta, 2022; Yenigun, 2021; Stepan et al., 2018; Yilmaz, 2021; 2025). The rise of the internet and social media during the late 2000s provided immense capacities to civil society and individual activists in the Muslim world. This development burst into political action during the late 2000s and the early 2010s in the instances of the Gezi protests in Turkey and other examples in the region, including the Green Movement in Iran and the Arab Spring protests across the Arab world (Iosifidis & Wheeler, 2015; Demirhan, 2014; Lynch, 2011; Gheytanchi, 2016).
The fact that the protesters in all these cases have extensively used the internet and associated technologies (e.g., social media, digital messaging, and navigation) has led many observers to declare the latter as ‘liberation technology’ due to their role in facilitating anti-government movements across non-democratic countries (Diamond & Plattner, 2012; Ziccardi, 2012). Advocates of the internet as a liberation tool have also pointed to enhanced social capacity to mobilize and organize through the spread of dramatic videos and images, instigating attitudinal change, and countering government monopoly over the production and dissemination of information (Breuer, 2012; Ruijgrok, 2017). These qualities have been seen as giving the internet an equalizing power between the state and society. In the early 2000s, when the Internet and social media were spreading across the developing world, authoritarian governments were generally unable to control the digital sphere; they lacked the technical expertise and the digital infrastructure to curb the internet. So, they typically relied on completely shutting it down (Cattle, 2015; Gunitsky, 2020).
However, authoritarian regimes gradually learned how to use the digital space for empowering their control on the society and have even started using it for transnational repression and sharp power (Yilmaz, 2025, Yilmaz et al., 2024; Yilmaz, Akbarzadeh & Bashirov 2023; Yilmaz, Morieson & Shakil, 2025; Yilmaz & Shakil, 2024). Scholars such as Sunstein (2009) and Negroponte (1996) have warned against the capacity of the internet to fragment the public sphere into separate echo chambers and thus fundamentally impede ‘deliberative democracy,’ which is supposed to be based on debates of ideas and exchange of views.
Furthermore, the breakthroughs in deep learning, neural network, and machine learning, together with the widespread use of the internet, have accelerated the growth of artificial intelligence (AI), providing more capability to authoritarian regimes to impose control on people. In a Pew poll, almost half of the respondents believed that the ‘use of [modern] technology will mostly weaken core aspects of democracy and democratic representation in the next decade’ (Anderson & Rainie, 2020). This pessimism is driven by an unprecedented degree of surveillance and digital control brought forward by digital technologies, undermining central notions of freedom, individuality, autonomy, and rationality at the center of deliberative democracy (Radavoi, 2019; Stone et al., 2016; Bostrom, 2014; Helbing et al., 2019; Damnjanović, 2015). Tools of the governments to digitally repress democracy include smart surveillance using facial recognition applications, targeted censorship, disinformation and misinformation campaigns, and cyber-attacks and hacking (Feldstein, 2019).
Research as to how digital technologies such as high-speed internet, social media, AI, and big data affect, enable or disable democracy, human rights, freedom, and electoral process is in its infancy (Gardels & Berggruen, 2019; Margetts, 2013; Papacharissi, 2009). Further, most of this scant literature is focused on Western democracies. The existing literature on Muslim-majority countries is mostly focused on traditional social media (Jenzen et al., 2021; Wheeler, 2017; Tusa, 2013). This is despite the fact that extensive digital capabilities, especially AI and big data, offer governments of these countries the capabilities to exert control over their citizens, with disastrous outcomes for democracy. Indeed, we may be facing the rise of a new type of authoritarian rule: digital authoritarianism, that is, ‘the use of digital information technology by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate domestic and foreign populations’ (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019; see also Ahmed et al., 2024; Akbarzadeh et al., 2024; 2025).
With the expansion of the internet in developing countries, authoritarian governments derive a similar benefit from technological leapfrogging with the capacity to selectively implement new surveillance and control mechanisms from the burgeoning supply of market-ready advanced AI and big-data-enabled applications. As one internet pioneer foreshadowed to Pew “by 2030, as much of 75% of the world’s population will be enslaved by AI-based surveillance systems developed in China and exported around the world” (Anderson & Rainie, 2020). Developing countries often experience technological leapfrogging; they shift to advanced technologies directly, skipping the middle, more expensive and less efficient stages because modern technologies, by the time of their implementation within those countries, become more economical and effective than the initial technology. This leapfrogging is demonstrated via the adoption lifecycle of mobile phones to that of landlines. It took less than 17 years, from the early 2000s to 2017, for mobile phones to be extensively adopted in Turkey, from 25% to 96%. (Our World in Data, 2021).
After the crises of the early 2010s, both democratic and authoritarian regimes worldwide started to invest heavily in sophisticated equipment and expertise to monitor, analyze, and ultimately crack down on online and offline dissent (Aziz & Beydoun, 2020; Feldstein, 2021). In addition to curtailing independent speech and activism online, authoritarian regimes have sought to deceive and manipulate digital environments in order to shape their citizens’ views. They have flooded the digital realm with propaganda narratives using trolls, bots, and influencers under their control (Tan, 2020).
More importantly, thanks to authoritarian diffusion, governments in developing countries are learning from and emulating the experiences of their peers of surveillance technologies such as China and Russia. However, there has been limited research on the political mechanisms through which such digital authoritarian practices spread. Against this backdrop, this report examines the mechanisms through which digital authoritarian practices diffuse in Turkey as an example of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. We ask: What kind of authoritarian practices have the governments enacted in the digital realm? How have these practices diffused across the region? To address these questions systematically, we develop an analytical framework that examines the mechanisms of diffusion of digital authoritarian practices. Our framework identifies three mechanisms of diffusion: emulation, learning, and cooperative interdependence. We focus on four groups of digital authoritarian practices: legal frameworks, Internet censorship, urban surveillance, and Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs). We aim to show how emulation, learning and cooperative interdependence take place in each of these four digital authoritarian practices. In addition to the above, the report will explore the international dimension of this phenomenon, discovering how Western companies, in addition to totalitarian systems like Russia and China, played a role in empowering the Turkish government to claim the digital space.
We first discuss our analytical framework which integrates the scholarship of digital authoritarian practices and authoritarian diffusion, and explain the concepts of learning, emulation, and as prominent diffusion mechanisms. We then move to the empirical section where we first identify convergent outcomes that are comparable between earlier and later adopters and then we will elucidate the mechanisms through which the diffusion process occurred by showing contact points and plausible channels through which decision-makers were able to adopt from one another.
Analytical Framework
To explore the phenomenon of diffusion, we follow best practices laid out in the literature (see Ambrosio, 2010; Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019; Bank & Weyland, 2020). We begin by identifying convergent outcomes that are comparable between earlier and later adopters. As part of this, we will also establish feasible connections between the two parties, which may take the form of physical proximity, trade linkages, membership in international organizations, bilateral arrangements, historical ties, cultural similarities, or shared language. Then, we will elucidate the mechanisms through which the diffusion process occurred by identifying contact points and plausible channels through which decision-makers were able to adopt from one another.
We will follow three good practices that have been advised by scholars (e.g., Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019; Strang & Soule, 1998; Gilardi, 2010; 2012). First, we adopt a comparative design that involves four middle powers (see Strang & Soule, 1998). There are important similarities and differences among the four cases that make comparison a useful exercise. Second, we provide extensive data to showcase the workings of diffusion mechanisms despite the challenge of working on authoritarian settings. As Ambrosio and Tolstrup (2019: 2752) noted, “the relevant evidence needed can be hard to acquire in authoritarian settings.” It is much more likely to gain access to strong evidence in liberal democratic settings where much of the current diffusion research has accumulated. Our article contributes to the literature on diffusion in authoritarian settings with Turkey as a prominent example. Finally, we provide smoking gun evidence based on several leaked documents to support our assertions.
In the empirical section, we follow the convention (see Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019) and start with identifying convergent outcomes among the major political actors in regard to the practices of restrictive legal frameworks, Internet censorship, urban surveillance and SDIOs. This section involves demonstrating the items that have been diffused between earlier and later adopters. Not only is there a substantial amount of similarity between the practices among these political systems, but also, we show a temporal sequence between earlier and later adopters that point at convergence.
We then move on to explain plausible mechanisms of diffusion, following the model provided by Bashirov et al. (2025): Learning, Emulation, and Cooperative Interdependence. It’s important to highlight from the outset that these three mechanisms functioned together in Turkey settings. As was observed in other settings (see Sharman, 2008), it is not feasible to examine the impact of these mechanisms independently. Instead of existing as separate entities or operating in a simple additive manner, these mechanisms are inherently interconnected, and they do overlap. We follow this understanding in our empirical analysis and discuss how each mechanism worked in tandem with other mechanisms.
Types of Digital Authoritarianism
Illustration: Shutterstock / Skorzewiak.
We identified four main domains of digital authoritarianism in general, and examples of them could be found in Turkey’s case as well.
Restrictive Legal Frameworks
The legal framework includes a variety of practices. We identified the following:
1- Laws that mandated internet service providers to establish a system allowing real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks. These legislations mandated internet service providers to establish a system allowing real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks (Privacy International, 2019). Moreover, all censorship laws refer to national security and terrorism as vague criteria to enforce widespread censorship of undesirable content. In Turkey, a Presidential decree (No 671) in 2016 granted the government extensive power to restrict internet access, block websites, and censor media (IHD, 2017). Under the decree, telecommunications companies are required to comply with any government orders within two hours of receiving them. In recent years, the Turkish government also prosecuted thousands of people for criticizing President Erdogan or his government in print or on social media (Freedom House, 2021).
2- Laws that have converged around penalization of online speech, referring to concepts such as national identity, culture, and defamation. It is hard to miss similarities between the laws in Turkey among other regional countries and those enacted in China earlier. In 2013, China’s Supreme People’s Court issued a legal interpretation that expanded the scope of the crime of defamation to include information shared on the internet (Human Rights Watch, 2013). In 2022, the Turkish Parliament passed new legislation that criminalized “disseminating false information,” punishable by one to three years in prison, and increased government control over online news websites. Article 23 of the law was particularly controversial as it stated that “Any person who publicly disseminates untrue information concerning the internal and external security, public order and public health of the country with the sole intention of creating anxiety, fear or panic among the public, and in a manner likely to disturb public peace, shall be sentenced to imprisonment from one year to three years” (Human Rights Watch, 2022). This clearly shows the pattern of diffusion from China and Russia by leaving vague and broad provisions of what constitutes “national security,” “peace” and “order” (Weber, 2021: 170-171; Yilmaz, Caman & Bashirov, 2020; Yilmaz, Shipoli & Demir, 2023; Yilmaz & Shipoli, 2022).
3- Laws that ban or restrict the use of VPNs following China and Russia’s lead. In Turkey, VPNs are legal, but many of their servers and websites are blocked. China banned unauthorized VPN use in 2017 in a new Cybersecurity Law. Russia introduced a similar ban the same year. The Information and Communication Technologies Authority (BTK), national telecommunications regulatory and inspection authority of Turkey, issued a blocking order targeting 16 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). These VPNs, including TunnelBear, Proton, and Psiphon, are popular tools used by audiences seeking to access news websites critical of the government.
While entirely banning VPN access remains a challenge, governments can employ Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) technology to identify and throttle VPN traffic. Countries like Iran, China, and Russia are indulging in such practices. Users in Iran and Turkey, for example, have reported extensive blockage of VPN apps and websites since 2021. Engaging in efforts to access blocked content through a VPN can potentially result in imprisonment (Danao & Venz, 2023). Simon Migliano, research head at Top10VPN.com, acknowledges that blocking VPN websites in Turkey makes it harder to download and sign up for new services. Moreover, individual VPN providers like Hide.me, SecureVPN, and Surfshark confirm technical difficulties for their users in Turkey. Proton, on the other hand, maintains that their services haven’t been completely blocked.
As such, the report “Freedom on the Net 2023” by Freedom House (2023) reflects the aforesaid harsh reality, ranking Turkey as “not free” in terms of internet access and freedom of expression. However, it is worth noting that the Turkish government’s censorship efforts are met with a determined citizenry. Audiences, even young schoolchildren according to Ozturan (2023), have become adept at using VPNs to access banned content. Media outlets themselves sometimes promote VPNs to help their audiences bypass restrictions. Examples abound: VOA Turkish and Deutsche Welle (DW), upon being blocked, directed their audiences towards Psiphon, Proton, and nthLink to access their broadcasts. Diken, a prominent news website, even maintains a dedicated “VPN News” section offering access to censored content dating back to 2014.
4- Laws that tighten control on social media companies. While Western social media platforms remain accessible in Turkey, in recent years the government has introduced similar laws and regulations that increase their grip over the content shared on these platforms. They do so by threatening the social media companies with bandwidth restrictions and outright bans if they fail to comply with the governments’ requests. Moreover, in 2020, the Turkish Parliament passed a new law that mandated tech giants such as Facebook and Twitter (now X) to appoint representatives in Turkey for handling complaints related to the content on their platforms. Companies that decline to assign an official representative have been subject to fines, advertising prohibitions, and bandwidth restrictions that would render their networks unusable due to slow internet speeds. Facebook complied with the law in 2021 and assigned a legal entity in Turkey after refusing to do so the previous year (Bilginsoy, 2021).
Since the early 2010s, many countries in the region including Turkey have enacted a series of legal reforms that converged around similar concepts and restrictions. As Table 1 shows, these laws follow the Chinese and Russian laws in temporal order. The table makes a comparison with some other countries in the region as well, in order to see Turkey’s position in this field.
Internet Shutdown
All governments in the region have resorted to shutting down the internet as a simple solution over the past 20 years, mostly during the times of mass protests, social unrest or military operations. In Turkey, in 2015, access to Facebook, Twitter and YouTube as well as 166 other websites were blocked when an image of a Turkish prosecutor held at gunpoint was circulated online. The internet was also cut off multiple times during the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, as well as during the Turkish military’s operations in the Southeastern regions of the country. In many instances, the government has used bandwidth throttling to deny its citizens access to the internet. However, internet shutdown is costly as it affects the delivery of essential public and private services and has been dubbed as the Dictator’s Digital Dilemma. Therefore, even when it is practiced, the shutdown is limited to a certain location, mostly a city or a region, and would typically last only few days. According to Access Now (2022), an internet rights organization, no internet shutdown has taken place in Turkey in 2021.
Given the high cost of switching off the internet and thanks to the rise of sophisticated technologies to filter, manipulate and re-direct internet content, censorship has become a more widely used digital authoritarian practice over the last decade. Countries have converged on the use of DPI technology. DPI is “a type of data processing that looks in detail at the contents of the data being sent, and re-routes it accordingly” (Geere, 2012). DPI inspects the data being sent over a network and may take various forms of actions, such as logging the content and alerting, as well as blocking or re-rerouting the traffic. DPI allows comprehensive network analysis. While it can be used for innocuous purposes, such as checking the content for viruses and ensuring the correct supply of content, it can also be used for digital eavesdropping, internet censorship, and even stealing sensitive information (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011).
Countries across the Muslim world including Turkey started in the mid-2010s to acquire DPI technology from Western and Chinese companies who have become important sources of diffusion. US-Canadian company Sandvine/Procera has provided DPI surveillance equipment to national networks operating in Turkey (Turk Telekom). This system operates over connections between an internet site and the target user and allows the government to tamper with the data sent through an unencrypted network (HTTP vs. HTTPS). Sandvine and its parent company Francisco Partners emerged at the center of the diffusion of DPI technology in the Middle East. Recent revelations show that the company has played significant role in facilitating the spread of ideas between countries. Through their information campaign, Sandvine contributed to learning by governments. As such, Sandvine and Netsweeper’s prominent engagement in provision of spying technology shows that it is not merely Chinese companies that enable digital authoritarianism. Western companies have been just as active.
Turkey made its first purchase from Sandvine (then Procera) in 2014 after the Gezi protests and corruption investigations rocked the AKP government the previous year. The government later used these devices to block websites, including Wikipedia, and those belonging to unwanted entities, such as independent news outlets and certain opposition groups in later years. The governments in the region including Turkey have gathered widespread spying and phishing capabilities sourced from mostly Western companies. For example, in Turkey, FinFisher used FinSpy in 2017 on a Turkish website disguised as the campaign website for the Turkish opposition movement and enabled the surveillance of political activists and journalists. FinSpy allowed the MIT to locate people, monitor phone calls and chats and mobile phone and computer data (ECCHR, 2023). This could link in with our discussion in emulation more clearly as well regarding private companies being key actors (Marczak et al., 2018).
Urban Surveillance
Three high-definition video surveillance cameras operated by the city police. Photo: Dreamstime.
With the advance of CCTV and AI technology, urban surveillance capabilities have grown exponentially over the past ten years. Dubbed as “safe” or “smart” cities, these urban surveillance projects are “mainly concerned with automating the policing of society using video cameras and other digital technologies to monitor and diagnose “suspicious behavior” (Kynge et al., 2021). The concept of Smart city captures an entire range of ICT capabilities implemented in an urban area. This might start with the simple goal of bringing internet connectivity and providing electronic payment solutions for basic services and evolve to establishing AI-controlled surveillance systems, as we have seen in many Chinese cities (Zeng, 2020). Smart cities deploy a host of ICT—including high-speed communication networks, sensors, and mobile phone apps—to boost mobility and connectivity, supercharge the digital economy, increase energy efficiency, improve the delivery of services, and generally raise the level of their residents’ welfare (Hong, 2022). The “smart” concept generally involves gathering large amounts of data to enhance various city functions. This can include optimizing the use of utilities and other services, reducing traffic congestion and pollution, and ultimately empowering both public authorities and residents.
The rapid development of smart city infrastructures across world has led to controversies as critics argued that the surveillance technology enables pervasive collection, retention, and misuse of personal data by everything from law enforcement agencies to private companies. Moreover, in recent years, China has been a major promoter of the ‘safe city’ concept that focuses on surveillance-driven policing of urban environments – a practice that has been perfected in most Chinese cities (Triolo, 2020). Several Chinese companies have been at the forefront of China’s effort to export its model of safe city: Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Zhejiang Dahua Technology, Alibaba, and Tiandy (Yan, 2019).
China has been a significant exporter of surveillance technology worldwide, including to countries like Turkey. Chinese firms such as Hikvision and Dahua have supplied surveillance equipment, including facial recognition systems, to various nations. Reports indicate that Turkey has utilized facial recognition software to monitor and identify individuals during protests (Radu, 2019; Bozkurt, 2021).
Holistically, the global expansion of China’s urban surveillance model sparks significant concerns, particularly in relation to its potential to increase authoritarian practices in adopting countries. In the absence of robust counter mechanisms, the adoption of Chinese surveillance model by authoritarian states is only likely to augment.
Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs)
Another interesting aspect of authoritarian regimes is the use of digital technologies in creating and spreading pro-regime propaganda and conspiracy narratives that benefit the regimes. This is happening extensively in the region, including Turkey, as a part of the manipulation of the people in order to impose control on them and silence the opposition. The pro-regime propaganda machine uses conspiracy theories with a dual strategy, defensive and offensive, to shape the public perception of the regime. Defensively, it seeks to portray the regime as a legitimate national authority, emphasising its adherence to the nation’s interests and well-being in a way that no legitimate alternative is imaginable. In these narratives, leaders are portrayed as heroic figures with exceptional qualities, and the system is presented as flawless and well-suited to the country’s needs. On the offensive front, the propaganda machine works to discredit any alternative to the current regime. Opposition figures are either assassinated, arrested or labelled as traitors, criminals, or foreign agents so they can be eliminated politically. To reach to this end, conspiracy theories link opposition figures to nefarious plots or foreign intervention, thus undermining the credibility of opposition narratives.
In recent years, propaganda and conspiracy theories have played a significant role in Turkey’s political landscape, influencing political narratives and public opinion. The Turkish government, particularly under President Erdoğan and his ruling party (AKP), has been known for using state-controlled or pro-government media to push certain narratives. The government’s media strategy includes promoting nationalistic themes, highlighting Turkey’s achievements under AKP rule, and portraying the government as the protector of national interests against both internal and external threats. The government often emphasizes Turkey’s sovereignty and positions itself against perceived Western interference, such as criticisms from the European Union or the United States. By doing so, it strengthens a nationalist image, resonating with citizens who view Turkey as being unfairly targeted by foreign powers. Propaganda often incorporates Islamic and conservative values to appeal to the AKP’s core voter base. Erdoğan’s speeches and media outlets supportive of the government emphasize the defense of Islamic culture and values, framing the AKP as a protector of both religion and national identity. Government narratives frequently depict opposition groups as threats to national stability. This includes not only political rivals but also groups like the Kurdish population, the Gülen movement (which is accused by Erdogan regime of being behind the 2016 coup attempt), and the pro-Kurdish HDP party, who are often associated with terrorism or disloyalty.
Additionally, conspiracy theories have been pervasive in Turkish political culture, often used to explain domestic unrest or justify political decisions. Here, pro-government media often propagate conspiracies about the opposition, portraying them as aligned with foreign powers or terrorist organizations. A persistent theme in Turkish political discourse is the idea that foreign powers or global financial institutions are working to undermine Turkey’s economy and political stability. Moreover, the failed coup attempt in July 2016 became a fertile ground for conspiracy theories. While the Turkish government attributed the coup attempt to Fethullah Gülen, a cleric who lived in exile in the United States for decades until his death, alternative theories continue to circulate. Some claim that foreign powers, particularly the US, were involved in the coup plot, while others suggest that elements within the Turkish government may have allowed the coup to proceed as a means to justify a subsequent crackdown on opposition. In the same vein, many conspiracy theories center around the idea that Western powers, particularly the US and Europe, are conspiring against Turkey to prevent it from becoming a major regional power. These theories often cite Turkey’s geopolitical location, its military interventions in the region, or its aspirations to become an independent economic powerhouse.
A significant portion of the mainstream media in Turkey is either directly controlled by the government or aligned with it. These outlets often echo government narratives, downplaying criticisms, and emphasizing government achievements or conspiracy-laden stories about opposition and foreign interference. Despite the dominance of pro-government media, social media platforms have become spaces for both opposition voices and pro-government voices. The government has sought to control these platforms through legal means, introducing laws to regulate social media and threatening to block access to platforms that do not comply with government requests to remove content.
Mechanisms of Diffusion
We observed that the diffusion of digital authoritarianism occurs in three main mechanisms: learning, emulation and cooperative interdependence.
Learning
It has been widely argued that countries across the globe learned from domestic and foreign experience to adopt various forms of digital authoritarian practices. This is more prominent in countries experiencing public unrest, like Turkey and Egypt. For example, they both have learned lessons from the Gezi Park and Tahrir Square protests, respectively. Despite many indications to this effect, for a long time there was a lack of smoking gun evidence pointing at this type of learning. In 2016, a series of leaked emails from Erdogan’s son-in-law and then Energy Minister Berat Albayrak’s account revealed that in the aftermath of the Gezi Park protests, the Erdogan regime identified its lack of control of digital space as a problem and sought solutions in the form of “set[ting] up a team of professional graphic designers, coders, and former army officials who had received training in psychological warfare” (Akis, 2022). In later years, the regime built one of the world’s most extensive internet surveillance networks on social media, particularly on X, according to Norton Symantec.
In regard to external learning, China (and Chinese companies) and Western private companies have been at the forefront of actors promoting internet censorship practices. China has been not only a major promoter but also a source of learning for middle powers when it comes to internet surveillance, data fusion, and AI. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a key vehicle that drives these efforts. For example, during the 2021 SCO summit, Chinese officials led a panel titled the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms, which trained the international audience that included many developing country representations on developing a “national data brain” that integrates various forms of financial and personal data and uses artificial intelligence to analyze it. The SCO website reported that 50 countries are engaged in discussions with the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms initiative (Ryan-Mosley, 2022). China has also been active in providing media and government training programs to representatives from BRI-affiliated countries. In one prominent example, Chinese Ministry of Public Security instructed Meiya Pico, a Chinese cybersecurity company, to train government representatives from Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and other countries on digital forensics (see Weber, 2019: 9-11).
Moreover, the spread of internet censorship and surveillance technologies points to a highly probable learning event facilitated by western corporate entities. Specifically, Sandvine, NSO Group, and their parent company Francisco Partners, emerged at the center of the diffusion of DPI technology in most Middle Eastern countries except for Iran where the company is not allowed to operate. Recent revelations show that the company has played a significant role in facilitating the spread of ideas between countries. Alexander Haväng, the ex-Chief Technical Officer of Sandvine, explained in an internal newsletter addressed to the company’s employees that their technology can appeal to governments whose surveillance capacities are hampered by encryption. Haväng wrote that Sandvine’s equipment could “show who’s talking to who, for how long, and we can try to discover online anonymous identities who’ve uploaded incriminating content online” (Gallagher, 2022).
The spread of DPI practices in general and Sandvine’s technology in particular is also evidenced by the chronology of acquisition by developing countries. The list of countries contracted to buy Sandvine’s DPI technology includes Turkey, Algeria, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Eritrea, Jordan, Kuwait, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Sudan, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, and Uzbekistan (Gallagher, 2022). There is a clear trend here, both in terms of regime susceptibility and chronology of adoption. Turkey purchased Sandvine’s DPI technology in 2014, Egypt in 2016, and Pakistan did so in 2018 (Malsin, 2018; Ali & Jahangir, 2019).
It is highly likely that later adopters of this technology reviewed its performance in early adopters and decided upon their own adoption. We know from previous research that private companies can “influence the spread of state policies by encouraging the exchange of substantive and procedural information between states” (Garrett & Jansa, 2015: 391). Governments are required to understand details about the content of a technology and relevant institutional mechanisms to use it effectively. Corporations facilitate communication about these details. The existence of extensive links between Sandvine and authoritarian regimes, the similarities of how the tech has been used, and the sheer prominence of this company and its technology demonstrate a plausible argument for diffusion.
Using practice framework, we focus on ‘configurations of actors’ who are involved in enabling authoritarianism (Glasius & Michaelsen, 2018). In most instances, these actors are not states, but private companies (see Table 2). Moreover, contrary to perceived active role of Chinese companies, with the prime exception of Iran, it was Western tech companies that provided most of the high-tech surveillance and censorship capabilities to authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world including Turkey. These included, inter alia, US-Canadian company Sandvine, Israeli NSO Group, German FinFisher and Finland’s Nokia Networks.
Emulation
There’s evidence that authoritarian countries in the region like Turkey have emulated major powers, as well as each other, when it comes to internet censorship practices. Among other things, homophily of actors played important role as actors prefer to emulate models from reference groups of actors with whom they share similar cultural or social attributes (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Political alignment and proximity among nations foster communication and the exchange of information (Rogers, 2010). We observe the influence of this dynamic between China and Russia, and political regimes in the Muslim world who are susceptible to authoritarian forms of governance to varying degrees.
Research noted that states tend to harmonize their policy approaches to align with the prevailing norms of the contemporary global community, irrespective of whether these specific policies or institutional frameworks align with local conditions or provide effective solutions. Notably, since most transfers originate from the core to the periphery, policy transfers to developing regions might be ill-suited and consequently ineffective. There’s evidence that adoption of city surveillance is driven by the desire for conformity rather than the search for effective solutions. China’s CCTV-smart city solutions are considered in the region to be “bold innovations” as they’ve gathered disproportionate attention from the developing countries across the world. However, there’s evidence that the countries adopt this technology because of their apparent promise rather than demonstrated success. For example, there has been a controversy about whether Huawei’s safe city infrastructure actually helps to reduce urban crime. In a dubious presentation in 2019, Huawei claimed that its safe city systems have been highly effective in reducing crime, increasing the case clearance rate, reducing emergency response time, and increasing citizen satisfaction. However, research by CSIS revealed that these numbers have been grossly exaggerated if not completely fabricated (Hillman & McCalpin, 2019).
Emulation and learning appear to be the major mechanisms through which such practices spread. First, by demonstrating the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns and propaganda – such as Russian interference in US presidential elections in 2016 and China’s propaganda around the Covid-19 pandemic – these countries have shown other regimes that similar tactics can be used to control their own populations and advance their interests (Jones, 2022). Second, China and Russia have acted as important sources of learning for authoritarian regimes. China has hosted thousands of foreign officials and members of media from BRI countries in various training programs on media and information management since 2017 (Freedom House, 2022). For example, in 2017, China’s Cyberspace Administration held cyberspace management seminars for officials from BRI countries. Chinese data-mining company iiMedia presented its media management platform which is advertised as offering comprehensive control of public opinion, including providing early-warnings for “negative” public opinions and helping guide the promotion of “positive energy” online (Laskai, 2019).
The governments in the Muslim world learned how to use the social media and other digital technologies for ‘flooding,’ which helps strengthen and legitimize their political regime. This is a part of a broader objective of shaping the information environment domestically and internationally (Mir et al., 2022). At home, these governments are attempting to mold their citizens’ conduct online. They hired social media consultants and influencers to do their propaganda. They learned how to flood the information space with propaganda narratives using troll farms and bots. For example, in Turkey, the AKP government created a massive troll army in response to the Gezi Protests in 2013. A 2016 study published by the cyber security company Norton Symantec shows that among countries in Europe, the Middle East and Africa, Turkey is the country with the most bot accounts on Twitter (Akis, 2022). In 2020, Twitter announced that it was suspending 7,340 fake accounts that had shared over 37 million tweets from its platform. Twitter attributed the network of accounts to the youth wing of the ruling AKP.
Through the aforementioned techniques, Turkey moved beyond strategies of “negative control” of the internet, in which the government attempt to block, censor, and suppress the flow of communication, and toward strategies of proactive co-optation in which social media serves regime objective. The opposite of internet freedom, therefore, is not necessarily internet censorship but a deceptive blend of control, co-option, and manipulation. As the public debate is seeded with such disinformation, this makes it hard for the governments’ opponents to convince their supporters and mobilize (Gunitsky, 2020).
Here, the practices appear to be a mixed bag of diffusion, convergence and even innovation on the part of some regional countries. There is some proof of learning on the part of the Turkish regime: Berat Albayrak’s emails reveal the government’s learning from the Gezi protests and intentional establishment of their own troll farms (Akis, 2022). Similarly, the Sisi regime learnt from the Arab Spring protests as well. While it is hard to find a smoking gun evidence of these regimes copying Russian or Chinese playbook, extensive links between some of these countries (such as Pakistan and Turkey), as well as between some of these countries and Russia/China (Turkey and Russia; China and Pakistan/Iran) brings some evidence of diffusion.
Cooperative Interdependence
Nested dolls depicting authoritarian and populist leaders Vladimir Putin, Donald Trump, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan displayed among souvenirs in Moscow on July 7, 2018. Photo: Shutterstock.
We have observed that a cooperative interdependence has been at play when it comes to the diffusion of internet censorship practices from China to developing countries. Countries like Turkey are facing serious economic challenges and are in dire need of foreign direct investment. When tracing China’s technology transfer in these countries, a common thread emerges that tie most of the Chinese engagement to various forms of aid, trade negotiations, or grants. Prominently, China uses its Digital Silk Road (DSR) concept under the banner of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to push for adoption of its technological infrastructure and accompanying policies of surveillance and censorship in digital and urban environments (Hillman, 2021). For example, at the 2017 World Internet Conference in China, representatives from Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE signed a “Proposal for International Cooperation on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Digital Economy,” an agreement to construct the DSR to improve digital connectivity and e-commerce cooperation (Laskai, 2019). The core components of the DSR initiative are smart (or “safe cities”), internet infrastructure, and mobile networks.
We do not argue that China is “forcing” these countries to adopt internet censorship practices. Rather, a cooperative interdependence works through changing incentive structures of BRI-connected states where financial incentives by China, coupled with technology transfer, promote China’s practical approach to managing the cyberspace as well. Indeed, BRI’s digital dimensions include many projects such as 5G networks, smart city projects, fiber optic cables, data centers, satellites, and devices that connect to these systems. In addition to having commercial value in terms of expanding China’s business of information technology, these far-reaching technologies have strategic benefit as they help the country achieve geoeconomic and geopolitical objectives that involve promotion of digital authoritarian practices and Chinese model of internet governance (Malena, 2021; Tang, 2020).
For example, Huawei’s growing influence in Turkey, and other regional countries such as Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, and particularly in the context of building their 5G infrastructure, is tied to these countries’ involvement in DSR projects. As mentioned above, all the abovementioned countries have signed agreements to cooperate with Huawei to build their 5G infrastructure. The latter is not merely an advanced technology, but also a vehicle of promoting an entire legal and institutional infrastructure for China. In 2017 the Standardization Administration of China (SAC) released the “BRI Connectivity and Standards Action Plan 2018-2020” which aims at promoting Chinese technical standards and improving related policies among BRI-recipient states across technologies including AI, 5G, and satellite navigation systems (Malena, 2021).
Cooperative interdependence such as loans, commercial diplomacy and other state initiatives are prominent mechanisms through which China spreads its urban surveillance practices. The Table 2 also demonstrates this process.
In the Muslim world, countries converged on importing China’s smart city platforms in recent years. A close collaboration between Chinese technology companies and authoritarian governments has led to the development of smart city infrastructures in multiple urban settings. Several Chinese companies have been at the forefront of this endeavor: Huawei, Hikvision, ZTE Corporation, Alibaba, Dahua Technology, and Tiandy (Yan, 2019). Huawei is a key source of diffusion of urban surveillance practices.
Huawei has established partnerships with major Turkish telecom companies, Turkcell and Vodafone TR, to implement smart city technologies in Samsun and Istanbul, respectively (KOTRA, 2021). Additionally, Turkey hosts one of Huawei’s 19 global Research and Development centers. In 2020, Turkcell became the first telecom operator outside China to adopt Huawei’s mobile app infrastructure, a system developed by Huawei in response to US sanctions that limited the use of certain Google software on Huawei devices. In 2022, Turk Telekom signed a contract with Huawei to build Turkey’s complete 5G network (Hurriyet, 2022). This infrastructure, known as Huawei Mobile Services (HMS), encompasses a suite of applications, cloud services, and an app store, which Huawei describes as “a collection of apps, services, device integrations, and cloud capabilities supporting its ecosystem” (Huawei, 2022).
Countries have also emulated China as the role model when it comes to urban surveillance practices. Indeed, China’s influence was highly discernible in the area of urban surveillance, where it has emerged as a role model and a key provider of high-tech tools (Germanò et al., 2023). To begin with, there are extensive linkages between sender (mostly China) and adopter countries in political and economic areas. These include the growing presence of China in regional economies, participation in China-dominated organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and cooperation with China on internet governance issues such as the statement in the UN by several countries. Moreover, China has long acted as a laboratory to observe the results of its unique blend of high-tech authoritarianism that combined extensive urban surveillance with control of the internet under the pretext of national security and sovereignty (see Mueller, 2020). The perceived success of Chinese officials in curbing crime, ensuring stability and efficient management of urban settings, including their draconian measures to control the spread of COVID-19, have elevated China as a role model to be emulated by many authoritarian countries, including those in the Muslim world (Barker, 2021).
The table below demonstrates China’s role in the diffusion of digital authoritarianism in the region including Turkey:
Conclusion
This research illustrates how Turkey’s adoption of digital authoritarian practices—encompassing restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and strategic digital information operations—has been propelled by a combination of learning from domestic unrest, emulating paradigms set by major authoritarian players like China and Russia, and capitalizing on cooperative interdependence forged through economic and strategic partnerships. Despite Turkey’s NATO membership and other Western affiliations, the government has selectively borrowed from authoritarian models, integrating advanced surveillance technologies and normative frameworks that restrict civic freedoms in the digital realm. In this ecosystem, private Western companies, operating with limited oversight, have facilitated the supply of censorship and surveillance tools, challenging conventional expectations that illiberal digital governance is primarily state-driven.
These findings highlight the urgent need to establish robust international cyber norms and regulations that delineate clear boundaries on digital governance, particularly in states with deep ties to the West. Multilateral fora, including the United Nations and the Council of Europe, can take the lead by defining the scope of “digital authoritarianism,” instituting transparent guidelines on surveillance exports, and ensuring that technology providers are held accountable for the potential misuse of their products. Greater emphasis on privacy protections and digital rights is equally critical, calling for comprehensive legislation within Turkey that shields citizens from unwarranted data collection. Support from the international community—through funding, awareness campaigns, and legal assistance—can empower local civil society groups to advocate for these rights, educate citizens on online privacy, and hold authorities to account.
A second imperative is responsible corporate behavior, where companies must be compelled—via legal and reputational mechanisms—to adhere to human rights standards and disclose how their technologies are deployed in countries like Turkey. Establishing an independent monitoring entity to track repressive digital practices, publicize violations, and elevate them to international organizations can reinforce such accountability. Equally important, regional and global cooperation on digital freedom can help counter Turkey’s authoritarian trajectory; governments committed to open societies should launch joint initiatives aimed at improving cybersecurity, combating disinformation, and expanding transparent governance models that respect human rights. Technical assistance and knowledge-sharing will be particularly valuable where Turkey’s domestic institutions seek alternatives to purely repressive tools.
Moreover, economic incentives can be used strategically to steer Turkey away from partnerships that reinforce authoritarian tendencies. By prioritizing trade relationships and development aid tied to ethical technology practices, major economic powers and international financial institutions can encourage Turkey to align more closely with suppliers committed to democratic values. Such an approach has the added benefit of opening the market to innovators developing privacy-enhancing products, thus providing viable alternatives to invasive surveillance systems. Finally, the use of strategic diplomatic channels remains a powerful lever. Dialogue within NATO, discussions at the European Union level, and broader diplomatic engagements allow Turkey’s partners to advocate for transparent, responsible digital practices. Joint resolutions or multilateral condemnations of authoritarian behaviors can further raise the political costs of continued repression.
Taken together, these initiatives underscore that countering digital authoritarianism in Turkey requires a proactive, holistic strategy. While local factors—such as domestic protest movements and longstanding elite interests—play a crucial role, the role of international actors and private corporations is equally significant. Each dimension, whether it be legal reform, corporate accountability, economic leverage, or diplomatic pressure, offers a piece of the puzzle. Coordinated action that weaves these elements into a cohesive approach is essential not only for Turkey but for the broader effort to preserve the open, rights-respecting nature of the global digital landscape. By challenging the unchecked diffusion of repressive technologies and policies, the international community can mitigate the risks posed by an ever-expanding authoritarian playbook and ensure that the internet remains a domain of freedom and democratic possibility.
Funding:This work was supported by Australian Research Council [Grant Number DP230100257]; Gerda Henkel Foundation [Grant Number AZ 01/TG/21]; Australian Research Council [Grant Number DP220100829].
Authors
Ihsan Yilmaz is Deputy Director (Research Development) of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, where he also serves as Chair in Islamic Studies and Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations. He previously held academic positions at the Universities of Oxford and London and has a strong track record of leading multi-site international research projects. His work at Deakin has been supported by major funding bodies, including the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Victorian Government, and the Gerda Henkel Foundation.
(*) Ali Mamouri is a scholar and journalist specializing in political philosophy and theology. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University. With an academic background, Dr. Mamouri has held teaching positions at the University of Sydney, the University of Tehran, and Al-Mustansiriyah University, as well as other institutions in Iran and Iraq. He has also taught at the Qom and Najaf religious seminaries. From 2020 to 2022, he served as a Strategic Communications Advisor to the Iraqi Prime Minister, providing expertise on regional political dynamics. Dr. Mamouri also has an extensive career in journalism. From 2016 to 2023, he was the editor of Iraq Pulse at Al-Monitor, covering key political and religious developments in the Middle East. His work has been featured in BBC, ABC, The Conversation, Al-Monitor, and Al-Iraqia State Media, among other leading media platforms. As a respected policy analyst, his notable works include “The Dueling Ayatollahs: Khamenei, Sistani, and the Fight for the Soul of Shiite Islam” (Al-Monitor) and “Shia Leadership After Sistani” (Washington Institute). Beyond academia and journalism, Dr. Mamouri provides consultation to public and private organizations on Middle Eastern affairs. He has published several works in Arabic and Farsi, including a book on the political philosophy of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr and research on political Salafism. Additionally, he has contributed to The Great Islamic Encyclopedia and other major Islamic encyclopedias.
Nicholas Morieson is a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University. He was previously a Lecturer at the Australian Catholic University in Melbourne. His research interests include populism, religious nationalism, civilizational politics, intergroup relations, and the intersection of religion and political identity.
(**) MuhammadOmer is a PhD student in political science at the Deakin University. His PhD is examining the causes, ideological foundations, and the discursive construction of multiple populisms in a single polity (Pakistan). His other research interests include transnational Islam, religious extremism, and vernacular security. He previously completed his bachelor’s in politics and history from the University of East Anglia, UK, and master’s in political science from the Vrije University Amsterdam.
Ahmed, Zahid Shahab; Yilmaz, Ihsan; Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Bashirov, Galib. (2023). “Digital Authoritarianism and Activism for Digital Rights in Pakistan.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 20, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0042
Akbarzadeh, S., Mamouri, A., Bashirov, G., & Yilmaz, I. (2025). “Social media, conspiracy theories, and authoritarianism: between bread and geopolitics in Egypt.” Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2025.2474000
Ambrosio, Thomas, and Jakob Tolstrup. (2019). “How Do We Tell Authoritarian Diffusion from Illusion? Exploring Methodological Issues of Qualitative Research on Authoritarian Diffusion.” Quality & Quantity 53(6): 2741-2763.
Ambrosio, Thomas. (2010). “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research.” International Studies Perspectives 11(4): 375-392.
Aziz, Sahar. F., & Beydoun, Khalid. A. (2020). “Fear of black and brown internet: policing online activism.” Boston University Law Review, 100(3), 1151-1192.
Bank, André, and Kurt Weyland, eds. (2020). Authoritarian Diffusion and Cooperation: Interests vs. Ideology. Routledge.
Barker, Tyson. (2021). “Withstanding the Storm: The Digital Silk Road, Covid-19, and Europe’s Options.” China after Covid-19 Economic Revival and Challenges to the World, Institute for International Political Studies and Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation.
Bashirov, G., S. Akbarzadeh, I. Yilmaz, and Z. Ahmed. (2025). “Diffusion of Digital Authoritarian Practices in China’s Neighbourhood: The Cases of Iran and Pakistan,” Democratization, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2025.2504588
Bendrath, Ralf, and Milton Mueller. (2011). “The End of the Net as We Know It? Deep Packet Inspection and Internet Governance.” New Media & Society 13(7): 1142-1160.
Breuer, Anita. (2012). “The Role of Social Media in Mobilizing Political Protest: Evidence from the Tunisian Revolution.” German Development Institute Discussion Paper 10: 1860-0441.
Cattle, Amy E. (2015). “Digital Tahrir Square: An Analysis of Human Rights and the Internet Examined through the Lens of the Egyptian Arab Spring.” Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 26: 417.
Damnjanović, Ivana. (2015). Polity without Politics? Artificial Intelligence versus Democracy: Lessons from Neal Asher’s Polity Universe. Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 35(3-4), 76-83.
Demirhan, Kamil. (2014). “Social Media Effects on the Gezi Park Movement in Turkey: Politics Under Hashtags.” In: Pătruţ B., Pătruţ M. (eds) Social Media in Politics. Public Administration and Information Technology, New York: Springer
Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. (2012). Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy. JHU Press.
Durac, Vincent, and Francesco Cavatorta. (2022). Politics and Governance in the Middle East. Bloomsbury Publishing.
Gardels, Nathan., & Berggruen, Nicolas. (2019). Renovating Democracy: Governing in the Age of Globalization and Digital Capitalism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Garrett, Kristin N., and Joshua M. Jansa. (2015). “Interest Group Influence in Policy Diffusion Networks.” State Politics & Policy Quarterly. 15(3): 387-417.
Germanò, Marco André, Ava Liu, Jacob Skebba, and Bulelani Jili. (2023). “Digital Surveillance Trends and Chinese Influence in Light of the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Asian Journal of Comparative Law, 1-25.
Gheytanchi, Elham. (2016). “Iran’s Green Movement, social media, and the exposure of human rights violations.” In: M. Monshipouri (Ed.), Information Politics, Protests, and Human Rights in the Digital Age (pp. 177-195). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gilardi, Fabrizio. (2010). “Who learns from what in policy diffusion processes?” American Journal of Political Science.54(3): 650-666.
Gilardi, Fabrizio. (2012). “Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies.” Handbook of International Relations 2: 453-477.
Gunitsky, Seva. (2020) “The Great Online Convergence: Digital Authoritarianism Comes to Democracies .” War on the Rocks. February 18, 2020. https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/the-great-online-convergence-digital-authoritarianism-comes-to-democracies/.
Iosifidis, Petros, and Mark Wheeler. (2015). “The Public Sphere and Network Democracy: Social Movements and Political Change?.” Global Media Journal 13(25): 1-17.
Jenzen, Olu., et al. (2021). The symbol of social media in contemporary protest: Twitter and the Gezi Park movement. Convergence, 27(2), 414-437.
Laskai, Lorand. (2019). How China Is Supplying Surveillance Technology and Training Around the World. Privacy International.
Lynch, Marc. (2011). “After Egypt: The Limits and Promise of Online Challenges to the Authoritarian Arab State.” Perspectives on Politics. 9(2): 301-310.
Malena, Jorge. (2021). “The extension of the digital silk road to Latin America: Advantages and potential risks.” Brazilian Center for International Relations.
Margetts, H. (2013). “The Internet and Democracy.” In: The Oxford Handbook of Internet Studies. Edited by W. H. Dutton, New York: Oxford University Press.
Michaelsen, Marcus. (2018). “Transforming Threats to Power: The International Politics of Authoritarian Internet Control in Iran.” International Journal of Communication. 12: 3856-3876.
Mir, Asfandyar, Tamar Mitts and Paul Staniland. (2022). “Political Coalitions and Social Media: Evidence from Pakistan.” Perspectives on Politics, 1-20.
Mueller, Milton L. (2020). “Against Sovereignty in Cyberspace.” International Studies Review22(4): 779-801.
Negroponte, Nicholas. (1996). Being digital. New York: Vintage Books.
Polyakova, Alina., & Meserole, Chris. (2019). “Exporting digital authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese models.” Policy Brief, Democracy and Disorder Series (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2019), 1-22.
Radavoi, Ciprian. N. (2019). “The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Freedom, Rationality, Rule of Law and Democracy: Should We Not Be Debating It?” Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, 25, 107.
Sharman, Jason C. (2008). “Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-money Laundering in Developing States.” International Studies Quarterly. 52 (3): 635-656.
Stepan, Alfred, eds. (2018). Democratic transition in the Muslim world: a global perspective (Vol. 35). Columbia University Press.
Stone, Peter., et al. (2016). One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence: Report of the 2015-2016 Study Panel. Stanford University, Stanford, CA: http://ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report.
Strang, David, and Sarah A. Soule. (1998). “Diffusion in Organizations and Social Movements: From Hybrid Corn to Poison Pills.” Annual Review of Sociology.24(1): 265-290.
Sunstein, C. R. (2009). Republic.com 2.0. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Tan, Netina. (2020). “Digital Learning and Extending Electoral Authoritarianism in Singapore.” Democratization, 27(6): 1073-1091.
Tang, Min. (2020). “Huawei Versus the United States? The Geopolitics of Exterritorial Internet Infrastructure.” International Journal of Communication, 14, 22.
Triolo, Paul. (2020). “The Digital Silk Road: Expanding China’s Digital Footprint.” Eurasia Group.https://www.eurasiagroup.net/files/upload/Digital-Silk-Road-Expanding-China-Digital-Footprint.pdf.
Tusa, Felix. (2013). “How Social Media Can Shape a Protest Movement: The Cases of Egypt in 2011 and Iran in 2009.” Arab Media and Society, 17, 1-19.
Weber, Valentin. (2019). “The Worldwide Web of Chinese and Russian Information Controls.” Center for Technology and Global Affairs, University of Oxford.
Weber, Valentin. (2021). “The diffusion of cyber norms: technospheres, sovereignty, and power.” PhD diss., University of Oxford.
Wheeler, Deborah. (2017). Digital Resistance in the Middle East: New Media Activism in Everyday Life. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
Yenigun, Halil Ibrahim. (2021). “Turkey as a Model of Muslim Authoritarianism?” In: Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism (840-857). Routledge.
Yilmaz, I., Caman, M. E., & Bashirov, G. (2020). “How an Islamist party managed to legitimate its authoritarianization in the eyes of the secularist opposition: the case of Turkey.” Democratization, 27(2), 265–282. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2019.1679772
Yilmaz, I. (2021). Creating the Desired Citizen: Ideology, State and Islam in Turkey. Cambridge University Press.
Yilmaz, I. (2025). Intergroup emotions and competitive victimhoods: Turkey’s ethnic, religious and political emigrant groups in Australia. Palgrave Macmillan Singapore.
Yilmaz, I. & Shipoli, E. (2022). “Use of past collective traumas, fear and conspiracy theories for securitization of the opposition and authoritarianisation: the Turkish case.” Democratization. 29(2), 320-336.
Yilmaz, I., Shipoli, E., & Demir, M. (2023). Securitization and authoritarianism: The AKP’s oppression of dissident groups in Turkey. Palgrave Macmillan Singapore.
Yilmaz, Ihsan; Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Bashirov, Galib. (2023). “Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs).” Populism& Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 10, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0024
Yilmaz, Ihsan; Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Bashirov, Galib. (2023). “Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs).” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 10, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0024a
Yilmaz, I., Akbarzadeh, S., Abbasov, N., & Bashirov, G. (2024). “The Double-Edged Sword: Political Engagement on Social Media and Its Impact on Democracy Support in Authoritarian Regimes.” Political Research Quarterly, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241305035
Yilmaz, I. and K. Shakil. 2025. Reception of Soft and Sharp Powers: Turkey’s Civilisationist Populist TV Dramas in Pakistan. Singapore:Palgrave Macmillan.
Yilmaz, I., Morieson, N., & Shakil, K. (2025). “Authoritarian diffusion and sharp power through TV dramas: resonance of Turkey’s ‘Resurrection: Ertuğrul’ in Pakistan.” Contemporary Politics, 1–21. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2024.2447138
Ziccardi, Giovanni. (2012). Resistance, Liberation Technology and Human Rights in the Digital Age. Vol. 7. Springer Science & Business Media.
Please cite as: Yilmaz, Ihsan; Mamouri, Ali; Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Omer, Muhammad. (2025). “Authoritarian Diffusion in the Cyberspace: How Egypt Learns, Emulates, and Cooperates in Digital Authoritarianism.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). May 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0097
Egypt has emerged as a key adopter and regional diffuser of digital authoritarian practices. Once limited by weak digital infrastructure, the Sisi regime has transformed the country into a technologically repressive state through sweeping legal reforms, censorship mechanisms, and expansive surveillance networks. Drawing heavily from the models of China and Russia—particularly in urban monitoring and information control—Egypt actively emulates their approaches. Crucially, both Chinese and Western technology firms have facilitated this transformation, revealing a broader pattern of global complicity. This report demonstrates how Egypt’s trajectory illustrates the transnational diffusion of digital authoritarianism through mechanisms of learning, emulation, and interdependence—and offers a stark warning to democracies about the rising threat of state-enabled digital repression.
By Ihsan Yilmaz, Ali Mamouri*, Shahram Akbarzadeh**, Muhammad Omer***
Executive Summary
This report examines the rise and entrenchment of digital authoritarianism in Egypt, spotlighting how the regime systematically reclaims and militarizes the digital space to suppress dissent and erode democratic freedoms. Digital authoritarianism in Egypt spans four key domains: restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and strategic digital information operations (SDIOs).
Drawing on a wide array of sources—including academic literature, human rights reports, institutional data, and credible news coverage—the report demonstrates how the Egyptian government has aggressively expanded its control over digital life. This control includes deep surveillance tactics, the criminalization of online expression, and state-sponsored manipulation of digital discourse, all contributing to the shrinking of civic space and the violation of fundamental rights to privacy and free speech.
The regime employs advanced tools such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), widespread website blocking, and targeted internet shutdowns to neutralize opposition. These repressive tactics are reinforced by an expansive legal arsenal that frames digital expression as a threat to national security—penalizing dissent, limiting VPN use, and compelling tech companies to align with government mandates.
At the urban level, AI-driven CCTV networks and Smart City initiatives—often developed in partnership with Chinese and Western firms—create a pervasive surveillance infrastructure, enabling real-time monitoring of public behaviour. Meanwhile, through coordinated SDIO campaigns, the regime floods social media and state-aligned platforms with pro-government narratives, systematically silencing alternative viewpoints. These operations blend defensive strategies (legitimizing the regime and quelling criticism) with offensive disinformation that delegitimizes opposition groups.
The diffusion of these practices is not solely domestically engineered. Egypt’s digital authoritarian model is transnational in character, built through mechanisms of learning, emulation, and technological dependence. China has emerged as a central enabler, exporting both surveillance infrastructure and governance models. Yet, Western corporations—including Sandvine, NSO Group, FinFisher, and Nokia Networks—have also contributed significantly, supplying critical technologies that bolster Egypt’s repressive digital architecture, often with little regard for ethical implications.
Egypt’s model of digital control illustrates a dangerous global trend: the normalization and globalization of digital authoritarianism, where regimes exploit emerging technologies and international complicity to entrench power, silence dissent, and undermine democratic norms.
Recommendations
To effectively counter the growing threat of digital authoritarianism in Egypt and beyond, a comprehensive, multi-pronged strategy must be adopted. The following recommendations highlight key interventions to safeguard digital freedoms, enhance democratic resilience, and hold both states and corporations accountable:
1. Strengthen International Cyber Norms and Regulatory Frameworks: Establish binding international standards and protocols to govern the use of digital technologies by states. These norms must explicitly prohibit mass surveillance, politically motivated internet shutdowns, and the deployment of spyware against civilians. Multilateral organizations—such as the United Nations, the European Union, and regional bodies—must play a central role in enforcing these norms through treaties, sanctions, and export control regimes that restrict the transfer of surveillance technologies to authoritarian regimes.
2. Defend Digital Rights and Data Privacy at the National and Global Levels:Push for robust data protection legislation that empowers individuals and protects them from arbitrary state surveillance. Promote digital literacy campaigns and citizen awareness programs to strengthen public understanding of online rights and safety. Support grassroots civil society organizations, independent media, and digital rights defenders who expose abuses and advocate for open, secure, and rights-respecting digital environments.
3. Enforce Corporate Accountability and Ethical Tech Governance: Hold technology firms—both domestic and transnational—legally and morally accountable for their role in enabling repression. Establish international watchdog bodies to investigate, name-and-shame, and penalize companies complicit in human rights violations through the export or maintenance of surveillance technologies. Implement mandatory human rights impact assessments for all technology exports to high-risk regimes and enhance supply chain transparency in the tech sector.
4. Promote Strategic International Collaboration to Safeguard Digital Democracy: Strengthen multilateral coalitions of democracies to share intelligence, technological tools, and policy approaches for combating disinformation, propaganda, and transnational repression. Support cross-border investigations into Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs) and develop joint early warning systems to detect digital repression tactics. Extend technical and legal support to countries resisting authoritarian encroachment into their digital spheres.
5. Leverage Economic Incentives to Deter Authoritarian Partnerships: Use trade agreements, investment flows, and development aid as tools to condition engagement with states on the basis of their digital human rights records. Encourage private and public institutions to divest from companies involved in digital repression and prioritize investment in technologies that strengthen democratic institutions, secure communications, and civil society networks.
6. Deploy Diplomatic and Legal Instruments to Challenge Repression:Utilize bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to pressure authoritarian regimes to reform their surveillance laws and practices. Sponsor UN resolutions, global forums, and high-level summits that spotlight digital repression and mobilize international consensus. Support international legal actions against regimes and actors who violate digital human rights, using forums such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and regional human rights courts.
7. Build Resilience Through Innovation and Empowerment: Invest in the development of privacy-preserving technologies, secure communication platforms, and censorship circumvention tools. Support the creation of local digital infrastructures that resist surveillance, especially in vulnerable democracies. Back innovation ecosystems that empower civic tech, independent media, and digital rights advocacy to thrive even under authoritarian pressure.
Addressing digital authoritarianism requires more than reactive measures—it demands proactive, coordinated, and sustained global action. The recommendations above provide a roadmap for governments, international institutions, civil society, and the private sector to reclaim the digital domain as a space of freedom, accountability, and democratic possibility.
Photo: Dreamstime.
Introduction
In recent years, scholars have increasingly focused on the diffusion of authoritarianism (Ambrosio, 2010; Bank, 2017), a process where authoritarian institutions, practices, policies, strategies, rhetorical frames, and norms spread from one regime to another (Ambrosio & Tolstrup, 2019). This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in the Middle East and Muslim World, where many countries exhibit authoritarian governance (Durac & Cavatorta, 2022; Yenigun, 2021; Stepan et al., 2018; Ahmed et al., 2023; Akbarzadeh et al., 2024; Yilmaz et al., 2024).
The advent of the internet and social media in the developing world in the late 2000s significantly empowered civil society and individual activists in these regions, creating an equalizing power between the state and society (Breuer, 2012; Ruijgrok, 2017). The extensive use of these technologies by protesters led many to consider them as “liberation technology,” facilitating anti-government movements across non-democratic countries (Diamond & Plattner, 2012; Ziccardi, 2012).
Initially, authoritarian governments struggled to control the digital sphere due to a lack of technical expertise and digital infrastructure. They often resorted to internet shutdowns, as seen in Egypt during the Arab Spring 2011 protests (Cattle, 2015). However, as digital technologies evolved, so did the capabilities of authoritarian regimes. Therefore, despite the internet’s potential as a tool for liberation, its use by authoritarian regimes to disseminate propaganda, conduct surveillance, and control information has led to a new form of authoritarianism (Polyakova, 2019).
This transformation is driven by advancements in artificial intelligence (AI), big data, and the widespread use of the internet, which have enabled unprecedented levels of surveillance and control. As Wael Ghonim, an Egyptian activist, has reminded us: “The Arab Spring revealed social media’s greatest potential, but it also exposed its greatest shortcomings. The same tool that united [people] to topple dictators eventually tore [us] apart through echo-chamber polarization, misinformation, toxic hate speech” (Gardels, 2019).
Such widespread adoption of digital control measures has led to the emergence of “digital authoritarianism” literature (Polyakova & Meserole, 2019; Dragu & Lupu, 2021; Khalil, 2020; Lilkov, 2020; Mare, 2020; Feldstein, 2019; Ahmed et al., 2023; Akbarzadeh et al., 2024; Yilmaz et al., 2024). This literature posits that as regimes leverage AI and other digital tools to monitor and control dissent, the need for policymakers and civil society organizations to counter these practices has become critical. The pessimism surrounding the potential of modern technology to undermine democracy is growing, with concerns about misinformation, data collection, surveillance, spread of conspiracy theories and propagation of authoritarian governance models (Radavoi, 2019; Stone et al., 2016; Bostrom, 2014; Helbing et al., 2019; Damnjanović, 2015; Yilmaz et al., 2025; Yilmaz & Shakil 2025). In a poll conducted by Pew, almost half of participants believed that the “use of [modern] technology will mostly weaken core aspects of democracy and democratic representation in the next decade” (Anderson, 2020).
Extant literature mainly focuses on countries such as China and Russia and their technology companies facilitating and promoting digital authoritarian practices (Khalil, 2020; Taylor, 2022; Zhang, Alon, & Lattemann, 2020). Moreover, the literature has treated policies, norms, and technological tools in a general manner as phenomena analysing authoritarian regimes’ use of tools like filtering and digital surveillance (Hellmeier, 2016; Xu, 2021) and examining policies governing the internet (Kerr, 2018). However, policies, norms, and technologies cannot be separated as they are usually interlinked among government entities, private companies, and international organizations across global networks (Dragu & Lupu, 2021). Therefore, as Adler and Pouliot (2011: 5) stated, practices are “patterned actions that are embedded in particular organized contexts,” this study chose a more holistic analysis, investigating norms, policies, and technologies employed by governments and non-state entities in an integrated manner.
This report examines the digital authoritarian practices in Egypt (see Akbarzadeh et al., 2025) and the diffusion of these practices by investigating the norms, policies, and technologies employed by the Egyptian government. What we mean by diffusion is the process that Gilardi (2012: 454) describes as what “leads to the pattern of adoption, not the fact that at the end of the period, all (or many) countries have adopted the policy.” As such, diffusion refers to the use of digital technologies by authoritarian regimes to surveil, repress, and manipulate populations (Feldstein, 2021). Therefore, diffusion does not necessarily require an absolute convergence of practices; rather, an increase in policy similarity across countries generally follows diffusion processes (Gilardi, 2010; 2012), which we demonstrate here. Egypt, similar to other authoritarian regimes, utilize digital technology—often sourced from abroad, including from Western countries—such as the internet, social media, and artificial intelligence to maintain control and suppress dissent.
We aim to understand how these practices spread and what can be done to counter them. Egypt, like other authoritarian regimes, have become adept at using sophisticated digital tools to monitor and control the internet rather than simply shutting it down. Technologies like DPI, “a type of data processing that looks in detail at the contents of the data being sent, and re-routes it accordingly” (Geere, 2012), allow for comprehensive network analysis and can be used for digital eavesdropping, internet censorship, and data theft (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011). This report will explore these dynamics in detail, providing a comprehensive analysis of the diffusion of digital authoritarianism in Egypt.
Data Analysis of the Digital Space in Egypt
Egypt, with a total population of 116 million by mid-2024 and a USD476.7 billion GDP as of 2022 (Worldometer, 2024), is considered one of the most important countries in the Middle East and has a wide influence on the Arab world. It was among the first countries to witness the Arab Spring Movement and go through dramatic changes in the political system. The internet played a significant role in this period and also in the aftermath of the military’s cope in 2013. The table below shows the rise of internet usage in Egypt.
The brief political openings in the late 2000s and the early 2010s were fuelled by the internet and social media’s empowerment of social mobilization and the authoritarian regimes’ inability to control the digital sphere as they lacked technical expertise and digital infrastructure to rein in on the internet (Cattle, 2015). However, as the use of the internet was on the rise in Egypt, the government’s efforts to control the digital space and impose more surveillance on people have been increasingly on the rise as well. Freedom House has reported a significant rise of government control on digital space in Egypt. The Freedom House Index shows that, on average, internet freedom has declined by about 40% in Egypt.
Freedom House’s World Index shows that Egypt has experienced declines in freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, the rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (Freedom House, 2022). As a result, Egypt scored 26 on a scale of 0 (least free) to 100 (most free) in 2020, according to Freedom House (2021).
Tracing the pattern of practising digital authoritarianism in the world indicates that China and Russia play a significant role in leading this conduct, setting an effective example for authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, including Egypt, to follow the same pathway. The table in Figure 4 shows how Egypt followed the pathway of Chinese and Russian legislation in imposing digital authoritarianism.
The diffusion of digital authoritarian practice in Egypt is not limited to China. Many Western companies have contributed to providing the Egyptian government with sufficient technologies to impose control on digital space. The table in Figure 5 provides details about the source of technologies used in Egypt.
Digital Authoritarian Strategies, Policies, andPractices
In this section, we explore a variety of strategies and policies the Egyptian government has adopted to impose a digital authoritarian regime in the country. The Egyptian government worked on four domains: restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and SDIOs. By leveraging these four domains, the Egyptian government has constructed a comprehensive system of digital authoritarianism. This system not only fortifies its grip on power but also serves as a blueprint for other authoritarian regimes seeking to exploit digital technologies to suppress dissent and maintain control.
Restrictive Legal Frameworks
Digital authoritarian regimes implement four main types of legal restrictions, and examples of all of these can be found in Egypt. First, laws that mandate internet service providers to establish systems for real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks. This enables continuous surveillance of online activities. Second, legal frameworks that penalize online speech under the guise of protecting national identity, culture, and preventing defamation. This often results in the suppression of dissenting opinions and freedom of expression. Third, VPN Restrictions, which follow the lead of countries like China and Russia to ban or restrict the use of Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). While VPNs are technically legal in Egypt, many VPN servers and websites are blocked, hindering their practical use. Fourth, control over social media companies in various methods. Although Western social media sites remain accessible in Egypt, the government has introduced laws that increase its control over the content shared on these platforms. This is achieved by threatening social media companies with bandwidth restrictions and outright bans if they fail to comply with government requests. Moreover, Egypt’s 2018 Cybercrime Law requires foreign companies handling personal data within the country to designate a representative located in Egypt (Fatafta, 2020).
Despite the Egyptian Constitution guaranteeing freedom of the internet to some extent (for example, Articles 57, 68, 71, and 72), by prohibiting blocking websites, surveilling digital space, and harassing and prosecuting journalists and activists, the authorities continued to develop legislation in this direction and implement it on a large scale. Multiple legislations have been passed and applied to reach above goals.
The “cybercrime law” in Egypt, signed by President Sisi in 2018, legalizes and reinforces the existing censorship and blocking of websites (Freedom House, 2021). The new law treats all social media accounts with more than 5,000 followers as “media outlets,” making them eligible for censorship (RSF, 2018). The laws also mandated internet service providers to establish a system allowing real-time monitoring and recording of traffic on their networks (Privacy International, 2019). The cybercrime law criminalizes any form of speech that is against ‘national security’ which is defined so broadly that it covers “all that is related to the independence, stability, and security of the homeland and its unity and territorial integrity” and anything to do with the president’s office and all defence and security departments. The law permits the search of citizens’ personal devices and social media accounts can be blocked without judicial authorization, ostensibly for disseminating “false” information or inciting unlawful activities (Manshurat, 2018). Article 2 mandates that service providers retain and store records of their information systems, including all user-related data, for a period of 180 days. This information must be made available to any government agency upon request. Article 7 outlines the procedure for blocking websites that publish content deemed threatening to national security or detrimental to the country’s security or economy. Article 9 grants the Public Prosecutor the authority to issue travel bans and bring individuals accused of violating Article 7 before the Criminal Court.
The cybercrime law has led to increased penalties and harassment of journalists and activists on social media platforms (Freedom House, 2022). Consequently, there is minimal political opposition in Egypt, as expressing dissenting views on social media can lead to criminal prosecution and harsh punishments. Furthermore, there are significant restrictions and harassment of civil liberties, including freedom of expression, assembly, and the press. Security forces also engage in widespread violations against marginalized groups, including homosexuals and minorities, under the guise of national security concerns.
The Anti-Terrorism Law, passed in 2015, encompasses broad forms of criminalization and grants extensive powers to address electronic activities, including the arrest of journalists and activists, digital surveillance, and the closure and blocking of websites (Manshurat, 2020). Article 49 of this law empowers the Public Prosecution or relevant investigative authority to halt or block websites specified in Article 29 or any other aspect of online usage outlined in the legislation, as well as to confiscate devices and equipment used in the commission of such offenses. For instance, the Cairo Court of Urgent Matters issued an order to seize and freezethe assets, accounts, and properties of “Mustafa Mukhtar Mohamed Saqr,” the president of “Business News,” the company that owns the two Daily News Egypt websites.
Moreover, at the end of 2022, the Telecom Law amendments were made to expand telecommunication equipment restrictions (Rezk & Hashish, 2023). Now, not only is the importation, manufacturing, assembly of such equipment prohibited without a permit, but also possession, use, operation, installation, or marketing is prohibited without obtaining permission from relevant authorities like the NTRA (The National Telecommunications Regulatory Authority) and national security agencies. The penalty for violating these requirements has been increased to a fine ranging from 2 million to 5 million Egyptian pounds.
Internet Censorship
Photo: Dreamstime.
According to Access Now, a leading internet research organization, at least 182 internet shutdowns occurred in 34 countries in 2021 (Access Now, 2022). The Mubarak regime famously switched off the country’s internet during the mass protests in Cairo in January 2011. In recent years, however, internet shutdowns have been rare in Egypt. In 2018, the Egyptian Armed Forces ordered a region-wide shutdown of internet and telecommunication services in the Sinai Peninsula and adjacent areas during the army’s military campaign against ISIS-affiliated insurgents in the region (SMEX, 2018). One reason behind the reduction of internet shutdowns is that they are costly as they affect the delivery of essential public and private services and have been dubbed the Dictator’s Digital Dilemma (Hussain, Howard & Agarwal, 2011). Therefore, even when it is practised, the shutdown is limited to a certain location and typically lasts only a few days. According to Access Now (Hernández et al., 2023), no internet shutdown occurred in Egypt in 2021.
Common methods of censorship, which Deibert et al. (2010) highlighted as “first generation” are filtering and site blocking, which became more common in the late 2000s. IP blocking/filtering and DNS tampering are the common methods of filtering. IP filtering is used to block or filter objectionable content by restricting access to specific IP addresses. Freedom House reported in 2022 that Egypt was a not-free country in relation to the use of digital technologies, ranking it 27 out of 100, identifying three major issues: obstacles to access, limits to contents, and violation of users’ rights (Freedom House, 2022).
Since the imposition of a “state of emergency” in Egypt in 2017 (Atlantic Council, 2019), which directly granted the authorities the power to impose censorship and monitor all forms of online communication, Egypt blocked over 500 websites (AFTE Egypt, 2020). This includes independent news websites that publish articles criticising the Egyptian government, such as Mada Masr, Al-Manassa and Daily News Egypt, in addition to international news websites, such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, and Huffington Post Arabic. The blocking also included well-known Egyptian blogs that had previously warned since Sisi took power that he was rebuilding an authoritarian regime. The banned blogs included Fahmi Huwaidi’s blog (including his column in Shorouk News), Jawdell’s blog, Manal’s blog, Alaa’s blog, Bahia’s blog, and Ahmed Gamal Ziada’s personal blog. Manal and Alaa had previously won awards (Welle, 2005) from Reporters Without Borders. The blocking expands websites that provide content related to human rights and civil society, such as the website of Reporters Without Borders, the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), the Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, the Journalists Against Torture Observatory, and the website of Human Rights Watch, one day after the organisation released a report documenting the systematic use of torture in prisons in September 2017. The blocking was not limited to news sites only but also went on to block 261 VPN and proxy sites, including “Tunnelbear,” “CyberGhost,” “HotspotShield,” and messaging application Signal.
Censorship sometimes occurs via prosecution measures, which come in conjunction with punishing the authors or contributors. Egyptian authorities severely undermined media freedom and the right to access information and punished the publication of opinions on news sites and social media posts. For example, in February 2023, the Public Prosecution referred three journalists (Welle, 2023) from Mada Masr to trial in a case related to publishing a report alleging corruption in the pro-Sisi “Nation’s Future Party,” and in June, the authorities blocked two independent news websites, “Egypt 360” and “The Fourth Estate” (Access Now, 2023). In September 2023, security forces arrested two individuals from their homes in Menoufia and Mansoura governorates after they published tweets on the “X” website, supporting Tantawi and democratic change. In October 2023, the Supreme Council for Media Regulation referred workers (“x.com,” n.d.) at the independent media website “Mada Masr” to the prosecution, with the charge of “practising media activities without a license” and “spreading false news without verifying its sources.”
Authoritarian regimes have tended to use more subtle and insidious forms of censorship, which also use surveillance techniques and rely on quasi-democratic legal mechanisms (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010). This has included using DPI surveillance technology acquired from Western and Chinese companies, which have become essential sources of diffusion of authoritarian practices. Companies such as Sandvine Corporation, a US-Canadian company, have provided tech to over a dozen countries, including Egypt. DPI is “a type of data processing that looks in detail at the contents of the data being sent and re-routes it accordingly” (Geere, 2012). DPI inspects the data being sent over a network and may take various forms of action, such as logging the content and alerting, as well as blocking or rerouting the traffic. DPI allows comprehensive network analysis. While it can be used for innocuous purposes, such as checking the content for viruses and ensuring the correct supply of content, it can also be used for digital eavesdropping, internet censorship, and even stealing sensitive information (Bendrath & Mueller, 2011).
Urban Surveillance
In addition to digital monitoring, the government has significantly expanded its surveillance capabilities within urban areas. Advanced surveillance systems, including extensive CCTV networks equipped with facial recognition technology, have been deployed. These systems are integrated with AI-powered analytics capable of tracking and identifying individuals, monitoring public gatherings, and analysing behavioural patterns. This pervasive surveillance infrastructure not only deters public dissent but also enables the rapid identification and apprehension of activists and protesters.
Egypt has employed extensive surveillance technologies such as Smart City/Safe City platforms, facial recognition systems, and smart policing, as highlighted in the AI Global Surveillance (AIGS) Index. These technologies have been instrumental in suppressing democratic movements (Wheeler, 2017). During the 2010s, Egypt witnessed increased internet technology adoption and a concurrent decline in democratic practices. Data from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) indicates a dramatic rise in internet usage in Egypt since 2019, which led the Egyptian government to more investment in urban surveillance.
The aforementioned DPI technology acquired from the American company Sandvine/Procera Networks enabled the Egyptian government to monitor citizens’ internet activities, hack accounts, and reroute internet traffic. This technology allows Telecom Egypt to spy on users and block human rights and political content (Marczak et al., 2018). Additionally, Egypt’s General Intelligence Service has conducted sophisticated cyber-spying operations on opposition and civil society activists by installing software on their phones, granting access to files, emails, GPS coordinates, and contact lists (Bergman, 2019).
Safe or smart cities are another policy that Egypt is undertaking in order to increase its urban surveillance capabilities. The “Smart” concept generally involves gathering large amounts of data to enhance various city functions. This can include optimizing the use of utilities and other services, reducing traffic congestion and pollution, and ultimately empowering both public authorities and residents. According to a Huawei report, “Safe cities are an essential pillar supporting the future development of smart cities” (Hillman & McCalpin, 2019). These cities deploy high-speed communication networks, sensors, and mobile apps to enhance mobility, connectivity, energy efficiency, service delivery, and overall resident welfare (Hong, 2022). Becoming “smart” typically involves harnessing troves of data to optimize city functions—from more efficient use of utilities and other services to reducing traffic congestion and pollution—all with a view to empowering public authorities and residents (Muggah, 2021). With the advance of CCTV and AI technology, urban surveillance capabilities have grown exponentially over the past ten years. Dubbed “safe” or “smart” cities, these urban surveillance projects are “mainly concerned with automating the policing of society using video cameras and other digital technologies to monitor and diagnose suspicious behaviour” (Kynge et al., 2021).
Egypt’s most significant smart city project under the Sisi government is the New Administrative Capital (NAC) east of Cairo (Al-Hathloul, 2022). The NAC is designed with a full suite of smart/safe city solutions, including 6,000 CCTV cameras and a surveillance system by American company Honeywell, which monitors crowds, traffic congestion, theft, and suspicious activities and triggers automated alarms during emergencies (Mourad & Lewis, 2021). Honeywell also has contracts for Saudi Arabia’s NEOM megaproject. Huawei’s presence in Egypt has also been growing. In 2018, Huawei signed a memorandum with Telecom Egypt to establish a $5 million data centre for a cloud computing network, aiming to develop one of the five largest cloud networks globally and the first in MENA. Egypt and Huawei are also negotiating to bring Huawei’s 5G infrastructure to the country (Blaubach, 2021). The surveillance infrastructure includes Schneider Electric’s EcoStruxure platform, which connects various systems for optimization and sustainability (Egypt Today, 2022).
The development of smart city infrastructures has sparked controversies, with critics arguing that these technologies enable pervasive collection, retention, and misuse of personal data by law enforcement and private companies. The NAC, which is being built by China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) (Al-Hathloul, 2022), has been driven by an attempt by the authoritarian Sisi government to isolate and protect itself from a revolutionary scenario that befell the Mubarak regime in 2011. By moving government offices 50 km away from central Cairo and Tahrir Square, the regime aims to ensure its structures are safeguarded even during unrest. All the surveillance capabilities in the NAC will be further helpful in protecting the regime (see Middle East Monitor, 2021; Bergman & Walsh, 2021; Menshawy, 2021).
Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs)
Banners supporting Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi’s bid for a second term during the presidential elections, displayed along the crowded Al Moez Street in the Gamalia district of Cairo, Egypt, on March 25, 2018. Photo: Halit Sadik.
The Egyptian government employs a sophisticated network of SDIOs. SDIOs refer to “efforts by state and non-state actors to manipulate public opinion as well as individual and collective emotions by using digital technologies to change how people relate and respond to events in the world” (Yilmaz et al., 2023). Thus, the Egyptian government does not only rely on randomized acts of internet shutdowns but carefully manipulates and alters the information environment to serve its motives.
Egypt has begun to move beyond strategies of ‘negative control’ of the internet, in which regimes attempt to block, censor, and suppress the flow of communication and toward strategies of proactive co-optation in which social media serves regime objectives. The opposite of internet freedom, therefore, is not necessarily internet censorship but a deceptive blend of control, co-option, and manipulation. Scholars call this phenomenon ‘flooding’ as the governments try to ‘flood’ the informational space with false, distracting or otherwise worthless pieces of information (Roberts, 2018; Mir et al., 2022). As the public debate is seeded with such disinformation, this makes it hard for the governments’ opponents to convince their supporters and mobilize.
The Egyptian government employs a robust propaganda machine to shape public perception and maintain control over the narrative. This involves the strategic use of state-controlled media, social media platforms, and online influencers to disseminate pro-regime content and discredit opposition. The regime propagates conspiracy theories that portray political dissenters as foreign agents or terrorists, thereby justifying its repressive measures. As Akbarzadeh et al. (2025) demonstrates, “President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi frequently talks about conspiracies against the Arab World and Egypt in particular, thanking Egyptians who stood against these conspiracies and prevented the country from falling in the direction of Iraq, Syria, and Libya, all that were intervened by the US and other Western allies.” In the same way “Sisi used the consequences of the Western role in Iraq, Syria, and Libya as a method to promote his rule in Egypt and scare Egyptians from seeking change in their country, which would lead them to get trapped in conspiracies undertaken in other Middle Eastern countries” (Akbarzadeh et al., 2025).
Egyptian officials commonly instil fear among citizens to ensure their loyalty to the current government, often by amplifying concerns about potential conspiracies against the nation. This rhetoric tends to escalate as elections approach (Akbarzadeh et al., 2025). State-run TV channels, newspapers, and online portals play a crucial role in this information warfare, ensuring that the regime’s message reaches a broad audience. The Sisi regime, for example, employs troll armies to be used in political astroturfing operations. In 2020, Twitter banned over 9,000 accounts that were spreading misleading information. Another report found that the Sisi government used automated/bot accounts to promote its popular hashtags on Twitter (DFRLab, 2023).
The regime usually employs defensive and offensive approaches in this regard. The dual strategy, seamlessly blending defensive and offensive tactics, creates a narrative that reinforces the regime’s image and marginalizes any alternatives, fostering an environment of public trust and unity under the existing leadership.
Defensively, it seeks to portray the regime as a legitimate national authority, emphasising its adherence to the nation’s interests and well-being in a way that no legitimate alternative is imaginable. In these narratives, government leaders are portrayed as heroic figures with exceptional qualities, and the system is presented as flawless and well-suited to the country’s needs. Like many examples Igor Golomstock provided in his book Totalitarian Art (1990), Egyptian propaganda presents the head of state as the father of the nation, and any attempt to criticise him or his authority is introduced as a betrayal to Egypt. Egyptian TV channels frequently host Arab leaders praising Sisi and portraying him as the savour of Egypt and the Arab nation.
On the offensive front, the propaganda machine works to discredit any alternative to the current regime. Opposition figures or movements are subjected to character assassinations and labelled as traitors, criminals, or foreign agents. Conspiracy theories are propagated, linking opposition figures to nefarious plots or foreign interference, thereby undermining the credibility of opposing narratives. Additionally, the propaganda machine manipulates national unity sentiments to marginalise dissent, presenting the regime as a unifying force and framing opposition as divisive threats to the country’s unity. This comprehensive approach aims to fortify public support for the current regime while systematically diminishing the credibility of dissenting voices. In conjunction with the magnification and glorification of the president’s image, extensive work has been done to demonise the image of the opposition as a whole, generalising all under the unsightly titles of “traitors” cooperating with foreign enemies, “terrorism,” “riot” and “suspicious calls,” slamming all attempts of demonstrations or criticising the government.
One significant rationale lies in the inherent lack of genuine legitimacy, coupled with a substantial disconnect between the state and society. Consequently, the fabrication of imaginary adversaries becomes a tool for fostering national unity and identity under the regime’s rule. A parallel goal of this strategy is the cultivation of a cult of leadership. Totalitarian regimes craft an image of leaders as defenders against external enemies, fostering a cult of personality that solidifies their control over the narrative and the populace. This narrative, in turn, rallies support for the militarization of both the state and society. Moreover, the identification of enemies becomes a rationale for increased militarization and defence spending. Totalitarian regimes leverage perceived external threats to justify allocating resources to the military, enhancing capabilities, and maintaining control over the security apparatus. Consequently, these regimes effectively maintain fear and control over the population. Ultimately, the perpetual portrayal of an external threat or identification of internal enemies sustains a climate of fear among citizens, discouraging challenges to the regime.
In authoritarian regimes, conspiracy theories play a crucial role in consolidating power by channelling public discontent toward perceived external or internal threats. These narratives function as propaganda tools, allowing governments to justify repression, delegitimize critics, and deflect attention from governance failures. Unlike in democratic contexts, where conspiracy theories are often propagated by fringe actors, authoritarian regimes institutionalize them, presenting them as official truths that shape political realities. A key tactic involves accusing dissidents of affiliations with groups like the Muslim Brotherhood to suppress freedom of speech, protest, and independent media. By framing opposition figures as existential threats to national unity, regimes cultivate public trust and reinforce their own legitimacy while silencing alternative voices (Akbarzadeh et al., 2025).
Collectively, the sophisticated implementation of SDIOs manipulate feelings of national unity to marginalise the opposition, presenting the regime as a unifying force and framing the opposition as a divisive threat to the country’s unity. This comprehensive approach aims to strengthen popular support for the current regime while systematically diminishing the credibility of opposition voices. The dual strategy, which seamlessly blends defensive and offensive tactics, creates a narrative that enhances the regime’s image and marginalises any alternatives, fostering an environment of public trust and unity under the current leadership.
Diffusion of Authoritarian Practices
Photo: Dreamstime.
Diffusion mechanisms are systematic sets of statements that provide a plausible explanation of how policy decisions in one country are influenced by prior policy choices made in other countries (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; 299). The literature on this topic often highlights areas of convergence and contact points between early and later adopters (see Kerr, 2018). Diffusion is any process where earlier adoption or practice within a population increases the likelihood of adoption among non-adopters (Strang, 1991: 325). It occurs when policy decisions in one country are systematically influenced by previous policy choices in other countries (Dobbin et al., 2007: 787; Gilardi, 2012). Traditionally, research on diffusion has focused on the spread of popular uprisings against autocratic leaders (Koesel & Bunce, 2013; Beissinger, 2007). However, more recently, scholars have shifted their focus to the diffusion of authoritarian practices (Ambrosio, 2010; Bank, 2017). The diffusion process occurs through three main mechanisms: learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence (Bashirov et al., 2025).
Learning
The process of learning can be driven internally, where actors learn from their own experiences, evaluating and adopting innovations based on the success of prior applications. It can also be externally driven, with an external actor facilitating the learning process. The role of the external actor can range from small, such as selling or installing technological tools, to extensive, involving large-scale activities like seminars and training programs to promote a policy or practice. Using a practice framework, we focus on ‘configurations of actors’ involved in enabling authoritarianism (Michaelsen, 2018). Often, these actors are private companies rather than states.
Contrary to the perceived active role of Chinese companies, it was Western tech companies that provided most of the high-tech surveillance and censorship capabilities to authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world. Notable examples include the US-Canadian company Sandvine, the Israeli NSO Group, German FinFisher, and Finland’s Nokia Networks. Internet surveillance has been facilitated through the cooperation between adopter countries willing to purchase the technology and companies like Sandvine willing to sell it. Sandvine’s willingness is evidenced by the company’s chief technology officer, who stated, “We don’t want to play world police. We believe that each sovereign country should be allowed to set their own policy on what is allowed and what is not allowed in that country” (Gallagher, 2022).
Regarding external learning, China, along with Chinese and Western private companies, has been leading the promotion of internet censorship practices. China has become a major advocate and a learning source for middle powers in internet surveillance, data fusion, and AI. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has become a crucial platform for these efforts. For instance, at the 2021 SCO summit, Chinese officials led a panel called the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms, training an international audience, including many representatives from developing countries, on creating a “national data brain” that integrates various forms of financial and personal data and employs artificial intelligence for analysis. According to the SCO website, 50 countries are involved in discussions with the Thousand Cities Strategic Algorithms initiative (Ryan-Mosley, 2022). China has also been proactive in offering media and government training programs to representatives from countries affiliated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). A notable example includes the Chinese Ministry of Public Security directing Meiya Pico, a Chinese cybersecurity company, to train government representatives from Turkey, Pakistan, Egypt, and other nations on digital forensics (see Weber, 2019: 9-11).
Russia is another leading source of diffusion of digital authoritarianism in the Middle East. Russia’s brazen attempts at disinformation and propaganda lend support to the emergence of digital manipulation as an acceptable practice across authoritarian countries. By demonstrating the effectiveness of disinformation campaigns and propaganda – such as Russian interference in US presidential elections in 2016 – the country has shown other regimes that similar tactics can be used to control their own populations and advance their interests (Day, 2022).
The role in the diffusion of digital authoritarian practice in the Middle East is not limited to China and Russia. Western countries, in fact, played significant roles as well. Despite Huawei’s involvement in projects like the $5 million data centre with Telecom Egypt and discussions about 5G infrastructure, Egypt has shown a preference for Western technology in its major smart city projects, like the New Administrative Capital (NAC). The adoption of urban surveillance capabilities in Egypt is thus a result of both internal and external learning mechanisms. The Sisi regime’s strategies, especially in the NAC, reflect an attempt to insulate the government from potential unrest.
US-Canadian company Sandvine/Procera has provided DPI surveillance equipment (hardware and software) to national networks operating in Egypt (Telecom Egypt). This system operates over connections between an internet site and the target user and allows the government to tamper with the data sent through an unencrypted network (HTTP vs. HTTPS). Moreover, recent revelations show that the company has played a significant role in facilitating the spread of ideas between countries. In an internal newsletter sent to employees, Sandvine Chief Technical Officer Alexander Haväng wrote Sandvine’s equipment could “show who’s talking to who, for how long, and we can try to discover online anonymous identities who’ve uploaded incriminating content online.” Through their information campaign, Sandvine contributed to learning by governments. In Egypt, the government has been using Sandvine’s devices “to block dozens of human rights, political, and news websites, including Human Rights Watch, Reporters Without Borders, Al Jazeera, Mada Masr, and HuffPost Arabic” (Marczak et al., 2018: 8).
Emulation
Emulation can be defined as “the process whereby policies diffuse because of their normative and socially constructed properties instead of their objective characteristics” (Gilardi 2012: 467). Research has shown that in complex and uncertain environments, policymakers respond by emulating the structural models of recognized leaders in the domain (Barnett & Finnemore, 2005). This behaviour is primarily driven by the pursuit of legitimacy and harmonization. International organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, play a crucial role in spreading commonly accepted standards of behaviour and organizational structures among countries.
Emulation has been significant in the diffusion of legal norms regarding internet restrictions and, to a lesser extent, in adopting Chinese urban surveillance infrastructures. Chinese corporations have established training hubs and research initiatives to disseminate expertise in artificial intelligence, internet surveillance, and digital space management (Kurlantzick, 2022). For instance, Huawei set up an OpenLab in Egypt in 2017, focusing on smart city, public safety, and smart government solutions. China has been a major promoter of the ‘safe city’ concept, which focuses on surveillance-driven policing of urban environments. This approach has been refined in many Chinese cities (Triolo, 2020). Companies such as Huawei, ZTE Corporation, Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology, Zhejiang Dahua Technology, Alibaba, and Tiandy are leading the export of this model (Yan, 2019).
Moreover, homophily, in the form of cultural and political alignment, as well as China’s emergence as an authoritarian role model, contributed to the emulation process. Homophily among actors played an important role, as actors prefer to emulate models from reference groups with whom they share similar cultural or social attributes (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Political alignment and proximity among nations foster communication and the exchange of information (Rogers, 2010). This dynamic is observed between China and Russia and political regimes in the Muslim world including Egypt, which are susceptible to varying degrees of authoritarian governance. Loan conditionalities and trade negotiations within the context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have also played a role in enabling the spread of censorship and surveillance technologies from China to the Muslim world.
The Egyptian government has gathered widespread spying and phishing capabilities sourced from mostly Western companies. An obscure wing of the General Intelligence Directorate called the Technical Research Department (TRD) has purchased equipment from Finland-based Nokia-Siemens Networks (now Nokia Networks) that permits dial-up internet connection, enabling users to access the internet even if the primary national infrastructure is offline. Furthermore, Nokia Siemens Networks has provided the Egyptian government with an interception management system and a surveillance hub for fixed and mobile networks, granting the government mass surveillance capabilities to intercept phone communications (Privacy International, 2019). Another company involved in Egypt was the Italian surveillance technology company Hacking Team. In 2015, the latter was contracted by both the TRD (Technical Research Department) affiliated with Egyptian intelligence, and the Mansour Group (a conglomerate belonging to the second richest family in Egypt) to provide malware that grants the attacker complete control of the target computer (Privacy International, 2019).
In a brazen example of emulation of the practices of other authoritarian states, the Egyptian government started a widespread phishing campaign called Nile Phish in 2016 against the country’s civil society organizations implicated in the Case 173 crackdown (Scott-Railton et al., 2017). The campaign involved sending predatory emails and text messages to members of civil society to hack into their devices and accounts. An Amnesty International Report (2020) revealed that the Egyptian government used spying technology called FinSpy supplied by German company FinFisher Gmbh. FinSpy is a computer spyware suite sold exclusively to governments to monitor and intercept internet traffic, as well as to initiate phishing attacks against targeted users. FinSpy Trojan has been in use in Egypt to spy on opposition movements and enable the surveillance of political activists and journalists (ECCHR, 2023). In addition, denial-of-service (DoS) or packet injection practices are common in Egypt. For example, between May and September 2023, former Egyptian MP Ahmed Eltantawy was targeted by Cytrox’s Predator Spyware via links sent on SMS and WhatsApp. Eltantawy had announced he would be running in the 2024 presidential elections. Citizen Lab found that the network injection attack could be attributed to the Egyptian government and Sandvine’s PacketLogic product (Marczak et al., 2018).
Cooperative Interdependence
The practice of cooperative interdependence in the context of digital technologies refers to how internet censorship and surveillance are enabled through collaboration among adopting countries and state actors and private companies like Sandvine and NSO Group. Both Sandvine and NSO Group have faced significant controversy in their home countries, the US and Israel, over selling surveillance products to authoritarian regimes in the Middle East and beyond, Egypt in particular as explained in this report. NSO Group has been banned by the Israeli government from selling its products to major clients in the Middle East, including Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Staff, 2021). Similarly, Sandvine ceased operations in Russia following US sanctions after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and was forced to stop selling equipment to Belarus after reports revealed its technology was used by the Lukashenko regime to suppress protests in 2021 (Gallagher, 2022).
The broad process of digital authoritarian diffusion has created cooperative interdependence between the involved parties. Through cooperation with global actors, both corporate and state-level, Egyptian governments have imported sophisticated technologies enabling comprehensive internet and urban surveillance. Cooperative interdependence occurs when the policy choices of some governments create externalities that others must consider, leading to mutual benefits from adopting compatible policies (Braun & Gilardi, 2006). This dynamic incentivizes decision-makers to adopt policies chosen by others, enhancing efficiency and yielding mutual benefits. Here, China leverages its Digital Silk Road (DSR) under the BRI to promote the adoption of its technological infrastructure and accompanying surveillance and censorship policies (Hillman, 2021).
For instance, at the 2017 World Internet Conference in China, representatives from Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE signed a “Proposal for International Cooperation on the ‘One Belt, One Road’ Digital Economy” to construct the DSR, enhancing digital connectivity and e-commerce cooperation (Laskai, 2019). Core components of the DSR include smart cities, internet infrastructure, and mobile networks. Rather than forcing these countries to adopt internet censorship practices, China alters the incentive structures of BRI-connected states. Financial incentives, coupled with technology transfer, promote China’s practical approach to managing cyberspace. The DSR’s digital projects—such as 5G networks, smart cities, fibre optic cables, data centres, satellites, and connecting devices—have commercial value and strategic benefits, helping China achieve its geoeconomic and geopolitical objectives by promoting digital authoritarian practices and its internet governance model (Malena, 2021; Tang, 2020).
Conclusion
Photo: Hannu Viitanen.
This research has demonstrated the mechanisms through which digital authoritarian practices diffuse in Egypt. We found that Egypt has enacted multiple policies, including restrictive legal frameworks, internet censorship, urban surveillance, and strategic digital information operations (SDIOs), to reclaim the digital space from opposition and civil society, thereby entrenching digital authoritarianism in the country. The models adopted by the Egyptian regime closely emulate China and Russia’s paradigms of internet sovereignty and information control. China’s extensive political and economic linkages with Egypt, its strategic role in regional economies, and its leadership in forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have facilitated this trend. Through initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has exported its digital governance model while positioning itself as a global leader in information technology (Ryan-Mosley, 2022; Weber, 2019).
The diffusion of surveillance and censorship technologies also reflects a complex learning process involving both state and corporate actors. While China has played a critical role in promoting internet censorship practices, private Western companies have equally enabled Egypt’s digital authoritarian turn. Companies such as Sandvine, NSO Group, FinFisher, and Nokia Networks have supplied surveillance infrastructure independently of state policy, a departure from conventional diffusion literature that associates such practices with national strategic interests (Gallagher, 2022; Marczak et al., 2018; Privacy International, 2019). For instance, Sandvine’s DPI technology has been used in Egypt to block dozens of news and human rights websites, while its executives openly dismiss responsibility by deferring to national sovereignty (Gallagher, 2022). This corporate-led diffusion challenges the notion that digital authoritarianism is solely state-driven and reveals an under-regulated global market in repressive technologies.
Our findings have three broader implications. First, while Chinese influence is significant, the role of Western technology firms in enabling authoritarian diffusion should not be underestimated. Their operations in Egypt have not been directly aligned with their home states’ policies, contradicting earlier findings that firms facilitating authoritarian practices often act under state guidance (Arslan, 2022). Second, these private firms are not only exporters of tools but are actively involved in implementing government-sanctioned strategies, including malware distribution and interception systems (Appuhami et al., 2011; Teets & Hurst, 2014). Third, the study identifies the mechanisms of diffusion—learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence—as key to understanding how regimes adapt digital authoritarian tactics to shifting political and technological contexts (Braun & Gilardi, 2006; Dobbin et al., 2007; Gilardi, 2012; Strang, 1991; Kerr, 2018).
Developing states may increasingly adopt practices such as national firewalls, smart city surveillance, and social credit systems modelled on early adopters like China and Russia. As they become embedded in transnational authoritarian networks—whether through SCO summits or Digital Silk Road initiatives—these regimes are incentivized to replicate practices that strengthen regime durability and evade democratic scrutiny (Hillman, 2021; Malena, 2021; Tang, 2020; Laskai, 2019).
Given these trends, addressing the entrenchment and diffusion of digital authoritarianism requires a coordinated, multi-level response. There is an urgent need to institutionalize international cyber norms and regulations that clearly define and prohibit practices such as mass surveillance, politically motivated internet shutdowns, and spyware exports. Multilateral institutions, including the United Nations and the European Union, must lead the effort to develop enforceable standards, promote transparency, and strengthen export control regimes. This would include holding corporations accountable through mandatory human rights due diligence, transparency disclosures, and legal sanctions when they contribute to repression.
Defending digital rights also requires robust national privacy protections and support for civil society organizations operating under authoritarian conditions. These groups need financial resources, digital tools, and international solidarity to resist surveillance, educate the public, and pursue legal redress where possible. Supporting democratic actors in repressive environments is essential for countering the normalization of authoritarian digital governance.
Private companies must no longer operate in a legal and ethical vacuum. Regulatory mechanisms should ensure that firms exporting surveillance technologies are held accountable for complicity in human rights violations. Public pressure campaigns and state-level policy interventions—such as targeted sanctions or procurement restrictions—can help enforce these norms. At the same time, incentives should be offered for ethical innovation and secure technology development that supports open societies.
International cooperation among democracies must deepen through the sharing of intelligence, technologies, and best practices in countering cyber repression and disinformation. Cross-national partnerships can create rapid response frameworks to detect and disrupt strategic digital information operations. Capacity-building programs should support governments seeking to manage their digital ecosystems in ways that uphold civil liberties and protect against authoritarian creep.
Economic leverage should be strategically employed. Trade policies, investment frameworks, and development aid must be conditioned on adherence to digital rights standards. This includes shifting financial relationships away from authoritarian technology providers and toward partners committed to democratic norms. Financial institutions and donor agencies must integrate digital governance benchmarks into their programming.
Diplomacy should play a more assertive role in exposing and isolating regimes that abuse digital technologies. Bilateral engagements, international resolutions, and public diplomacy should be used to condemn repressive practices, promote digital transparency, and advocate for global standards of accountability. Countries like Egypt must be pressured to reform not only through external criticism but through coordinated global action that combines legal, economic, and diplomatic tools.
In conclusion, the diffusion of digital authoritarianism is a multi-dimensional and complex phenomenon driven by both state and corporate actors, operating through networks of learning, emulation, and cooperative interdependence. The Egyptian case exemplifies how these processes work in practice and the urgent need for a sustained, global response. Confronting this challenge will require a blend of regulation and resistance, innovation and accountability, diplomacy and solidarity. Only through such an approach can the digital realm be reclaimed as a space of freedom, rights, and democratic resilience.
Funding: This work was supported by the Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.
Authors
Ihsan Yilmaz is Deputy Director (Research Development) of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, where he also serves as Chair in Islamic Studies and Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations. He previously held academic positions at the Universities of Oxford and London and has a strong track record of leading multi-site international research projects. His work at Deakin has been supported by major funding bodies, including the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Department of Veterans’ Affairs, the Victorian Government, and the Gerda Henkel Foundation.
(*) Ali Mamouri is a scholar and journalist specializing in political philosophy and theology. He is currently a Research Fellow at the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University. With an academic background, Dr. Mamouri has held teaching positions at the University of Sydney, the University of Tehran, and Al-Mustansiriyah University, as well as other institutions in Iran and Iraq. He has also taught at the Qom and Najaf religious seminaries. From 2020 to 2022, he served as a Strategic Communications Advisor to the Iraqi Prime Minister, providing expertise on regional political dynamics. Dr. Mamouri also has an extensive career in journalism. From 2016 to 2023, he was the editor of Iraq Pulse at Al-Monitor, covering key political and religious developments in the Middle East. His work has been featured in BBC, ABC, The Conversation, Al-Monitor, and Al-Iraqia State Media, among other leading media platforms. As a respected policy analyst, his notable works include “The Dueling Ayatollahs: Khamenei, Sistani, and the Fight for the Soul of Shiite Islam” (Al-Monitor) and “Shia Leadership After Sistani” (Washington Institute). Beyond academia and journalism, Dr. Mamouri provides consultation to public and private organizations on Middle Eastern affairs. He has published several works in Arabic and Farsi, including a book on the political philosophy of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr and research on political Salafism. Additionally, he has contributed to The Great Islamic Encyclopedia and other major Islamic encyclopedias.
(**) Shahram Akbarzadehis Convenor of Middle East Studies Forum (MESF) and Professor of International Politics, Deakin University (Australia). He held a prestigious ARC Future Fellowship (2013-2016) on the Role of Islam in Iran’s Foreign Policy-making and recently completed a Qatar Foundation project on Sectarianism in the Middle East. Professor Akbarzadeh has an extensive publication record and has contributed to the public debate on the political processes in the Middle East, regional rivalry and Islamic militancy. In 2022 he joined Middle East Council on Global Affairs as a Non-resident Senior Fellow.
(***) MuhammadOmer is a PhD student in political science at the Deakin University. His PhD is examining the causes, ideological foundations, and the discursive construction of multiple populisms in a single polity (Pakistan). His other research interests include transnational Islam, religious extremism, and vernacular security. He previously completed his bachelor’s in politics and history from the University of East Anglia, UK, and master’s in political science from the Vrije University Amsterdam.
Ahmed, Zahid Shahab; Yilmaz, Ihsan; Akbarzadeh, Shahram & Bashirov, Galib. (2023). “Digital Authoritarianism and Activism for Digital Rights in Pakistan.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 20, 2023. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0042
Akbarzadeh, S.; Mamouri, A.; Bashirov, G., & Yilmaz, I. (2025). Social media, conspiracy theories, and authoritarianism: between bread and geopolitics in Egypt. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/19331681.2025.2474000
Ambrosio, Thomas, and Jakob Tolstrup. (2019). “How Do We Tell Authoritarian Diffusion from Illusion? Exploring Methodological Issues of Qualitative Research on Authoritarian Diffusion.” Quality & Quantity 53(6): 2741-2763.
Ambrosio, Thomas. (2010). “Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research.” International Studies Perspectives 11(4): 375-392.
Appuhami, Ranjith; Perera, Sujatha and Perera, Hector. (2011). “Coercive policy diffusion in a developing country: The case of public-private partnerships in Sri Lanka.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 41(3): 431-451.
Arslan, Melike. (2022). “Legal Diffusion as Protectionism: The Case of the US Promotion of Antitrust laws.” Review of International Political Economy 1-24. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2022.2158118
Bank, André. (2017). “The Study of Authoritarian Diffusion and Cooperation: Comparative Lessons on Interests Versus Ideology, Nowadays and in History.” Democratization 24(7): 1345-1357.
Barnett, Michael., and Finnemore, Martha. (2005). “The power of liberal international organizations.” Power in Global Governance 161: 163-171.
Bashirov, G.; Akbarzadeh, S.; Yilmaz, I. and Ahmed, Z. (2025). “Diffusion of Digital Authoritarian Practices in China’s Neighbourhood: The Cases of Iran and Pakistan.” Democratization, DOI: 10.1080/13510347.2025.2504588
Beissinger, Mark. (2007). “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer, Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5(2): 259–76.
Bendrath, Ralf, and Mueller, Milton. (2011). “The End of the Net as We Know It? Deep Packet Inspection and Internet Governance.” New Media & Society 13(7): 1142-1160.
Blaubach, Thomas. (2021). “Chinese Technology in the Middle East: A Threat to Sovereignty or an Economic Opportunity?” MEI Policy Center.
Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies. New York: Oxford University Press.
Braun, Dietmar, and Gilardi, Fabrizio. (2006). “Taking ‘Galton’s Problem’ Seriously: Towards a Theory of Policy Diffusion.” Journal of theoretical politics 18(3): 298-322.
Breuer, Anita. (2012). “The Role of Social Media in Mobilizing Political Protest: Evidence from the Tunisian Revolution.” German Development Institute Discussion Paper 10: 1860-0441.
Cattle, Amy E. (2015). “Digital Tahrir Square: An Analysis of Human Rights and the Internet Examined through the Lens of the Egyptian Arab Spring.” Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 26: 417.
Damnjanović, I. (2015). “Polity without Politics? Artificial Intelligence versus Democracy: Lessons from Neal Asher’s Polity Universe.” Bulletin of Science, Technology & Society, 35(3-4), 76-83.
Deibert, Ronald, John Palfrey, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan L. Zittrain. (2010). “Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace.” The MIT Press.
Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner, eds. (2012). Liberation Technology: Social Media and the Struggle for Democracy. JHU Press.
Dobbin, Frank, Beth Simmons, and Geoffrey Garrett. (2007). “The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, Competition, or Learning?” Annual Review of Sociology. 33: 449-472.
Dragu, Tiberiu, and Yonatan Lupu. (2021). “Digital Authoritarianism and the Future of Human Rights.” International Organization 75(4): 991-1017.
Durac, Vincent, and Francesco Cavatorta. (2022). Politics and Governance in the Middle East. Bloomsbury Publishing.
Elkins, Zachary, and Beth Simmons. (2005). “On waves, clusters, and diffusion: A conceptual framework.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598(1): 33-51.
ECCHR (European Center for Constitutional and Human Rights). (2023).https://www.ecchr.eu/en/
Gardels, Nathan, & Berggruen, Nicolas. (2019). Renovating Democracy: Governing in the Age of Globalization and Digital Capitalism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Gilardi, Fabrizio. (2010). “Who learns from what in policy diffusion processes?” American Journal of Political Science.54(3): 650-666.
Gilardi, Fabrizio. (2012). “Transnational Diffusion: Norms, Ideas, and Policies.” Handbook of International Relations. 2: 453-477.
Golomshtok, Igor. (1990). Totalitarian Art in the Soviet Union, the Third Reich, Fascist Italy, and the People’s Republic of China. https://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA21226005
Hellmeier, Sebastian. (2016). “The dictator’s digital toolkit: Explaining Variation in Internet Filtering in Authoritarian Regimes.” Politics & Policy. 44(6): 1158-1191.
Hernández, Marianne Díaz, Felicia Anthonio, Sage Cheng, and Alexia Skok. (2023). “Internet Shutdowns in 2021: The Return of Digital Authoritarianism.” Access Now. https://www.accessnow.org/internet-shutdowns-2021/
Hillman, Jonathan E. (2021). The Digital Silk Road: China’s Quest to Wire the World and Win the Future. Profile Books.
Hillman, Jonathan E, and Maesea McCalpin. (2019). “Watching Huawei’s safe cities”. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Hong, Caylee. (2022). “Safe Cities in Pakistan: Knowledge Infrastructures, Urban Planning, and the Security State.” Antipode 54(5): 1476-1496.
Julien, Giry and Doğan Gürpınar. (2020). “Functions and uses of conspiracy theories in authoritarian regimes.” In: Routledge Handbook of Conspiracy Theories.
Kerr, Jaclyn A. (2018). “Authoritarian Practices in the Digital Age| Information, Security, and Authoritarian Stability: Internet Policy Diffusion and Coordination in the Former Soviet Region.” International Journal of Communication 12: 21.
Khalil, Lydia. (2020). “Digital authoritarianism, China and COVID.” Lowy Institute.
Koesel, Karrie J., and Valerie J. Bunce. (2013). “Diffusion-proofing: Russian and Chinese Responses to Waves of Popular Mobilizations Against Authoritarian Rulers.” Perspectives on Politics. 11(3): 753-768.
Laskai, Lorand. (2019). “How China Is Supplying Surveillance Technology and Training Around the World.” Privacy International.
Lilkov, Dimitar. (2020). “Made in China: Tackling Digital Authoritarianism.” European View19(1): 110-110.
Malena, Jorge. (2021). “The extension of the digital silk road to Latin America: Advantages and potential risks.” Brazilian Center for International Relations.
Mare, Admire. (2020). “Internet Shutdowns in Africa| State-Ordered Internet Shutdowns and Digital Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe.” International Journal of Communication, 14, 20.
Michaelsen, Marcus. (2018). “Transforming Threats to Power: The International Politics of Authoritarian Internet Control in Iran.” International Journal of Communication. 12: 3856-3876.
Mir, Asfandyar, Tamar Mitts and Paul Staniland. (2022). “Political Coalitions and Social Media: Evidence from Pakistan.” Perspectives on Politics, 1-20.
Muggah, Robert. (2021). “Digital Privacy Comes at a Price.” Agenda. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2021/09/how-to-protect-digital-privacy
Polyakova, A., & Meserole, C. (2019). “Exporting digital authoritarianism: The Russian and Chinese models.” Policy Brief, Democracy and Disorder Series, Brookings, 1-22.
Radavoi, C. N. (2019). “The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Freedom, Rationality, Rule of Law and Democracy: Should We Not Be Debating It?” Texas Journal on Civil Liberties & Civil Rights, 25, 107.
Stepan, Alfred, eds. (2018). Democratic transition in the Muslim world: a global perspective (Vol. 35). Columbia University Press.
Stone, P., et al. (2016). One Hundred Year Study on Artificial Intelligence: Report of the 2015-2016 Study Panel. Stanford: Stanford University Press. http://ai100.stanford.edu/2016-report.
Strang, David. (1991). “Adding Social Structure to Diffusion Models: An Event History Framework.” Sociological Methods & Research19(3): 324-353.
Tang, Min. (2020). “Huawei Versus the United States? The Geopolitics of Exterritorial Internet Infrastructure.” International Journal of Communication. 14, 22.
Taylor, Monique. (2022). “China’s Digital Authoritarianism Goes Global.” In: China’s Digital Authoritarianism: A Governance Perspective, pp. 111-130. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
Teets, Jessica C, and William Hurst. (2014). “Introduction: The Politics and Patterns of Policy Diffusion in China.” In: Local Governance Innovation in China, pp. 1-24. Routledge.
Weber, Valentin. (2019). “The Worldwide Web of Chinese and Russian Information Controls.” Center for Technology and Global Affairs, University of Oxford.
Xu, Xu. (2021). “To Repress or to Co‐opt? Authoritarian Control in the Age of Digital Surveillance.” American Journal of Political Science 65(2): 309-325.
Yenigun, Halil Ibrahim. (2021). “Turkey as a Model of Muslim Authoritarianism?” In: Routledge Handbook of Illiberalism, pp. 840-857. Routledge.
Yilmaz, Ihsan; Shahram Akbarzadeh, and Galib Bashirov. (2023). “Strategic Digital Information Operations (SDIOs).” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
Yilmaz, I.; Akbarzadeh, S.; Abbasov, N. & Bashirov, G. (2024). “The Double-Edged Sword: Political Engagement on Social Media and Its Impact on Democracy Support in Authoritarian Regimes.” Political Research Quarterly, 0(0). https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129241305035
Yilmaz, I. and K. Shakil. (2025). Reception of Soft and Sharp Powers: Turkey’s Civilisationist Populist TV Dramas in Pakistan. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
Yilmaz, I.; Morieson, N., & Shakil, K. (2025). “Authoritarian diffusion and sharp power through TV dramas: resonance of Turkey’s ‘Resurrection: Ertuğrul’ in Pakistan.” Contemporary Politics, 1–21.https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2024.2447138
Zhang, Wenxian; Ilan Alon, and Christoph Lattemann, eds. (2020). Huawei Goes Global: Volume I: Made in China for the World. Springer International Publishing.
Ziccardi, Giovanni. (2012). Resistance, Liberation Technology and Human Rights in the Digital Age, vol. 7. Springer Science & Business Media.
Please cite as: Lahti, Yannick & Palonen, Emilia. (2025). “Populism and EP Elections – Case Finland: Populism Gone Mad from Scissors and Chopping-board to Firing Guns and Latino Rush.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 28, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0049
Abstract
After two relatively successful recent elections, the far-right Finns Party (FP) approached the early summer 2024 European Parliament elections amid a supranational atmosphere suggesting that these elections would mark a “turn for the far right” across both Europe and Finland. After successfully leading her party to a historic victory one year earlier in the national elections of Finland 2023, Riikka Purra was, according to polls and pundit opinions, heading toward a new election record—this time in the European Parliament. Facing a charged political atmosphere in national politics and due to her visible role as the national treasurer, Purra’s FP party adopted the populist radical right strategy of their ID and ECR fellows in the EU, and instead of loudly criticising the Union, as has traditionally been the case with far-right parties, they too adopted the tactic of aspiring to “change the European Union from the inside.” This led their whole campaign strategy to declare the FP as the “most pro-Europe party of Finland.” As neighbouring country Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine had left the FP with a united front, the question of whether to support Ukraine or not did not even enter the elections. FP in this regard was and still remains the most anti-Russian party of the far-right party families in Europe. With media coverage being favourable toward a positive outcome for the FP, the party’s concrete message left something to be desired. The cases of now former FP members Timo Vornanen and Teuvo Hakkarainen, not to mention the “Riikka scissors and chopping-board minister” case, undermined a more coherent message to the Finnish electorate, who just over a year ago had voted for the FP in great numbers. Partly, this led to an overwhelmingly poor result for the Finns Party, which took most politicians and spectators by surprise. The European Parliament elections of 2024 in Finland stand out as an interesting exception within the far-right in Europe, as FP steadily lost support in various constituencies.
Keywords: Finns Party (FP), Populist radical right, Far-right, European Parliament 2024, Riikka Purra, Sebastian Tynkkynen, Finnish populist radical right, populist influence.
By Yannick Lahti* & Emilia Palonen**
Introduction – Towards the Elections
The 2024 European Parliament elections were preceded by two intense national contests: the parliamentary elections in 2023 and the presidential elections in January 2024. The National Coalition Party (Kokoomus) emerged first in both but also witnessed a significant rise of the far-right Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset).
The first significant election result of the anti-elitist Eurosceptic party was in 2011 marking a change in the party landscape within the national scale of politics in Finland (Arter, 2011; Palonen 2020). In the subsequent elections, the two opposition parties emerged victorious, and the Finns Party (FP) became one of the key governing parties in the government led by Juha Sipilä from 2015 to 2019. However, the party’s rank and file were dissatisfied, and in 2017, the FP split after electing Jussi Halla-aho as its new leader, marking a radical shift toward a nativist direction. The former party elite and some marginal factions emerged as new splinter groupson the political spectrum and registering as political parties (Fagerholm, 2022; Lahti & Palonen, 2023). By 2021, Jussi Halla-aho had handed over the party leadership to Riikka Purra, who continued to advance a strong nativist agenda. Under her leadership, the party achieved its best-ever result in the 2023 parliamentary elections, becoming the second-largest party in the country with 20.1% of the vote (620,981 votes). The FP then entered government for the second time, this time in coalition with the NCP, the Christian Democrats, and the Swedish People’s Party of Finland. The FP currently holds seven ministerial posts. Purra’s predecessor, Jussi Halla-aho, came from the far-right organization Suomen Sisu, which had established a strong foothold within the FP. Although Halla-aho stepped down in 2021, his nativist line has continued (Palonen, 2021).
Finland’s next-door neighbour, Russia, and its full-scale war in Ukraine have played a significant role for the Finns Party, even under the leadership of former chair—and current Speaker of the Finnish Parliament—Jussi Halla-aho, who completed his doctoral thesis at the University of Helsinki in Slavic studies. The party first marginalized its pro-Russian faction, notably removing MP Mika Niikko from his position as chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Finnish Parliament as early as December 2021, prior to the attack on Kyiv. In 2023, the Finns Party also shifted from the ID group to the ECR group in the European Parliament (Lahti & Palonen 2023).
According to Heinö (2024), the Finns Party’s move from the ID to the ECR group coincided with its entry into the new Finnish government. Party leader Riikka Purra aimed to avoid unnecessarily provoking the coalition partners—particularly the newly appointed Prime Minister Orpo of the National Coalition Party—by signalling a more moderate and less radical approach to the party’s EU policies. However, just ten days into the new government, one of the Finns Party ministers, Vilhelm Junnila, resigned due to allegations of fascist references and neo-Nazi connections (Kuokkanen, Horsmanheimo & Palonen, 2023). Interestingly, both Junnila and Mika Niikko were candidates on the party list in the 2024 European Parliament elections.
In the presidential elections of January 2024, the Finns Party candidate Jussi Halla-aho finished fourth, securing 18.99 percent of the total vote (615,802 votes). Green Party (Vihreät) MP and former Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto—running as an independent but backed by the Greens—and former National Coalition Party Prime Minister Alexander Stubb advanced to the second round, with Stubb ultimately winning by a narrow margin of 51.62 percent. Despite not making it to the runoff, Halla-aho maintained a strong presence on social media, and widespread opposition to the far right played a notable role in shaping the outcome.
The Finns Party largely fits into the Radical Right category as defined by Mudde (2019), who distinguishes between the anti-democratic Extreme Right and the Radical Right, which operates within democratic systems. However, Heinö (2024) notes that ideologically, the Finns Party is best described as a national conservative party—socially conservative while leaning left on economic issues. The party’s founder, Timo Soini, once famously referred to it as a “workers’ party without socialism” (Demokraatti, 2016). The party’s roots lie in the Finnish Rural Party, which challenged the Centre Party’s realpolitik under President Urho Kekkonen, Finland’s longest-serving president, particularly its friendly posture toward the Soviet Union (Palonen & Sunnercrantz, 2021).
Five new populist Radical Right parties emerged on the Finnish political scene since 2017 (Fagerholm, 2022). These include the Blue Reform movement (now known as the Finnish Reform Movement) and Suomen Kansa Ensin (Finnish People First), which has its origins in the anti-immigration Rajat Kiinni! (“Close the Borders!”) movement. Two personal splinters are on a more general populist line: Valta Kuuluu Kansalle (Power Belongs to the People, VKK), formed around Ano Turtiainen, a former FP member of Parliament, in 2021. The VKK has networks among the leaders and influencers of Finland’s digital pro-Russian counter public. Vapauden Liitto (Freedom Alliance), a splinter of the VKK, was founded in 2022 by a former FP activist, Ossi Tiihonen, who also ran for party chair and has been vocal against Finland’s COVID-19 measures. Ano Turtiainen and his Valta Kuuluu Kansalle party did not get re-elected in the 2023 parliamentary elections, and thus the party lost its only seat.
In the EP elections, Vapauden Liitto received 0.9% of the total votes (16,717). Also ideologically distinct was the proto-fascist, ethnonationalist Sinimusta Liike (Blue-and-Black Movement), which was also founded in 2022. However, on April 23, 2024, the Supreme Administrative Court of Finland de-registered the movement. In its ruling, the court found that the party’s program was anti-democratic and disrespectful towards human rights, thus strictly contrary to the Finnish Constitution and the European Union’s Charter on Human Rights (Yle, 2024). In the following month, May 2024, the Blue-and-Black Movement re-applied to be re-registered into the official party register by preparing to collect the necessary 5,000 signatures that it would require, but it was not able to nominate candidates for the European parliamentary elections of summer 2024.
Also, the opposition party, Liike Nyt (“Movement Now”), is noteworthy due to its populist tendencies, even as it can by no means be regarded as a populist radical left nor right-wing party. It is an emerging force that fashions itself after Italy’s Movimento Cinque Stelle (M5S), which successfully won seats outside the capital in the Finnish regional elections in 2021 (Yle, 2021). While a disproportionate number of the current leading figures of the FP hail from the universities and the teaching professions (Saresma & Palonen, 2022), Liike Nyt’s leadership consists of business elites that have been tied to Russian oligarchs (Luukka, 2022; Lahti & Palonen, 2023), which they now publicly disavow (Nalbantoglu, 2023). In the national elections of spring 2023, Liike Nyt managed to hold on to their one and only seat in the 200-seated parliament. The MP, co-founder, and chair Harry Harkimo also ran for president early 2024, arriving in last place out of 9 candidates with 0.53% of the votes (17,030). In the European Parliament elections, Liike Nyt had an electoral alliance with the Christian Democrats (Kristillisdemokraatit), who are serving in Orpo’s government. This alliance created a particular dynamic between an oppositional, rather liberal populist opposition party and a Christian conservative group serving in the government. The Christian Democrats’ candidate Eija-Riitta Korhola was clearly the most successful in this coalition, and with the exception of the multi-party debates, Liike Nyt was not very visible in the electoral campaigning.
Overall, with their two seats in the European Parliament and continuous representation since 2015—when then-party leader Timo Soini was elected—the Finns Party (FP) was the most relevant populist radical right party to observe in these elections.
The Finns Party in the European Parliament
In the context of the European Parliament, the Finns Party belongs to the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists). The FP has traditionally been at least softly Eurosceptic; it has had a long-term goal of leaving the EU, but in the short term, it argues that Finland needs to remain in the union to defend Finnish interests. In the 2024 elections, this was contested, and the party seemed happy to remain in the EU in the long run. Initially, together with most of the Finnish population and parliamentary parties, the FP was also against NATO membership claiming the need for national sovereignty. The party changed its stance on this matter after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 (Lahti & Palonen, 2023) and is among the most anti-Russian of Europe’s populist parties (Heinö, 2024). In short, the FP has roots in strong anti-Soviet thinking and lacks the Russophilia of other far-right parties in Europe (e.g., France’s Rassemblement National and Italy’s Lega Nord). This is echoed in the current pro-Ukraine stance, which is also strengthened by the former party leader’s personal history. In this sense, their anti-Sovietism also turned them against Russia and for Ukraine. Finally, Halla-aho’s policy direction testifies to his emergence in the anti-immigration faction of his party (Vaarakallio, 2015). For these reasons, the question about Finland’s stance on the Russia-Ukraine war was not a theme in the European Parliament elections of 2024, even though overall security was. The party leader repeatedly raised two issues during the campaigning: Ukraine and migration. The leading MEP candidate MP Sebastian Tynkkynen of the FP also visited Georgia quite prominently during his campaign for the EP.
The MEPs for the Finns Party have included party chairs like Timo Soini and Jussi Halla-aho, but in 2019 two MEPs were elected after significantly successful elections: Teuvo Hakkarainen and Laura Huhtasaari. Eurosceptic Laura Huhtasaari, MP in 2015–2019 and again from 2023, ran for president in 2018 and received 6.9 percent of the vote with over 200,000 personal votes. A year later, running for the EP, she received 92,760 votes, which is a fine score in Finland, where, in the Finnish preferential voting system, voters choose a candidate within a party list to vote for. Teuvo Hakkarainen (29,083 votes in 2019) is an owner of a sawmill in central Finland who originally rose to the national parliament in 2011. Despite his personal popularity among voters since his first days in politics, he has been in the spotlight for perceived problematic language and conduct. Many claimed to have believed he was representing the interests of the forest industry in the EP for Finland. In the most recent news before the 2024 elections, MEP Hakkarainen was presented as largely absent from the parliamentary work, and he admitted having moved to Honduras, South America, in 2020. Laura Huhtasaari returned to the Finnish national parliament and was replaced by Pirkko Ruohonen-Lerner, a long-term Finns Party activist, who became an MP already in 2007 in the Soini era, serving in the European Parliament from a deputy seat in 2015–2019 and again in 2023–2024.
Indistinct EU-agenda and Other Issues
Even as the political climate as a whole seemed to be fatalistic toward an upcoming far-right surge in the context of the European Parliament elections of 2024, one ruling element alongside this was the fact that the FP party seemed to lack a direct focus and message in the upcoming elections. Events that had little to do with traditional day-to-day politics also emerged, as did some specific incidents such as the shooting affair of FP MP, now former FP member, Timo Vornanen.
FP published its EP2024 election program called “Päätetään itse – Let’s decide for ourselves” on April 24, 2024. The opening paragraph was as follows: The Finns Party is Finland’s most pro-Europe party. The people’s movement which is the Finns Party is uncompromisingly committed to protecting European civilization and to solving the many challenges facing Europe. Just as the Finns Party sees Finland as a refuge for Finns, Europe must first and foremost be the home of European nations.
This turned around the whole Eurosceptic undertones. Riikka Purra was mentioning in election debates the way in which authority in the EU lies within the member states. Moving away from Euroscepticism to a ‘critical European’ stance, as identified by Herkman and Palonen (2024) in the 2019 elections, the Finns Party appeared Eurosceptic, and the Centre Party (Renew) was critical European at home. It is relevant to point out that the FP declared themselves the most pro-Europe—not the most pro-EU—party of Finland.
Also in Finland, the FP EP2024 election campaign for the Finns Party kicked off in a period of hype for the far right in Europe (only that the Finnish media translated it to laitaoikeisto) (De Fresnes & Stenroos, 2024; Yle, 2024; Sutinen, 2024). Some scholarly opinions that were openly sceptical about a “far right tsunami” also emerged, as it was pointed out that the discourse within the European liberal media had been repetitive in this regard, considering the EP elections of 2014 and 2019 (Vaittinen, 2024). Yet, the major narrative remained widely fatalistic towards a “far right landslide” both nationally in Finland and elsewhere within the European Union member states.
Three factors negatively affected the Finns Party’s results: the Cases Vornanen and Hakkarainen, the jubilant Thatcherism of the party chair Purra, and the party list.
By the end of the same week of the official EP24 campaign start, an unfortunate shooting incident happened outside a nightclub. It involved a Finns Party MP since 2023, previously a policeman, Timo Vornanen, who fired his (legal) firearm (illegally carried) outside a bar not far from the Finnish parliament during the early hours of a Friday morning (Toivonen et al., 2024). Vornanen was immediately taken into police custody and later released facing official criminal charges. The incident was the political top news of the weekend and the week to come as the party had their campaign cruise event. Almost a week later, on May 2, 2024, the FP party dismissed Vornanen from its parliamentary group, and on May 9 the governing body of the FP ousted Vornanen from the party altogether, which led to him forming his one-man group in the parliament’s opposition.
Simultaneously with the case Vornanen, some unfavourable news governed the media sphere around the sitting Finns Party MEP Teuvo Hakkarainen as investigative journalists from the newspaper Helsingin Sanomat wrote about Hakkarainen’s de facto absence and lack of fulfilling his duties in the European Parliament (Teittinen, 2024; Teittinen & Elo, 2024). Commenting on his absences, MEP Hakkarainen referred to his “Latinokiireet”—translating as something like “being busy with Latino-related things” or “Latino business.” The news around Hakkarainen led to the party secretary of FP, Harri Vuorenpää, announcing that Hakkarainen would not be among the party’s picks to seek re-election in the upcoming European Parliament elections; the official reasons for his dismissal were never clarified (Harju, 2024). Contrary to his party’s wishes, MEP Hakkarainen claimed that he was seeking re-election anyway as an independent candidate from the list of the above-mentioned splinter group: Vapauden liitto (Freedom Alliance). This move was ultimately too much and resulted in the governing body of FP firing Hakkarainen from the party altogether. Hakkarainen continued to criticize his former political home, claiming that “FP has turned into a beagle (lapdog) of prime minister Orpo’s Central Coalition Party” (Hakahuhta et al., 2024; Sutinen & Toivonen, 2024).
Within the context of national politics, the party chair Purra started to obtain growing criticism about her online behaviour regarding the austerity politics in Prime Minister Orpo’s government and her role as the national treasurer. Purra posted on social media a picture of a gift she had received: two wooden chopping boards in the shape of an axe, with her face and the text “now is the time to cut” printed on them. A few weeks later, an MP of Purra’s party posted another picture on social media with an unapologetic and smiley Purra holding a big pair of scissors. Promoting a tight austerity regime, Purra was heavily criticized for her perceived lack of empathy and even glee towards what were seen as some of the heaviest public sector and social welfare cuts in the history of Finland, leading even to foreign media headlines such as: “Finland’s Thatcher tests limits of local frugality” (Kauranen, 2024). This is in stark contradiction with the historical takes of the Finns Party and its predecessor as guardians of the ordinary and vulnerable people.
With Hakkarainen, Huhtasaari, nor Halla-aho no longer on the list, the Finns Party list for 2024 was composed of less prominent figures but also included the very popular social media politician Sebastian Tynkkynen. FP vice chair and second-term MP Sebastian Tynkkynen stands among the leading figures but was not a minister of the unpopular government. He announced already in February that he was running in the upcoming elections with an “ambitious plan” (STT, 2024). Tynkkynen has been known as a widely skilful and provocative politician in terms of social media. Online video content allows the far right to affectively articulate and perform socio-political identities and construct relations to targeted audiences, and the Finns Party and Tynkkynen have been pioneers in Finland in this (Ekman, 2014; Salojärvi et al., 2023).
Tynkkynen, who proudly claims to have renewed his seat in the Finnish parliament in 2023 with a budget of 0€—relying only on creating online content—declared in his EP24 candidacy video that he intends to use the assistance money granted to members of the European Parliament in an unprecedented way for extensive framing. Tynkkynen’s bid and the rationale for it was an unprecedented case in Finnish politics, but it was not widely covered. In this case, the far-right politician’s goal was to act in the law-making parliament more as part of the journalists’ challenge and as a replacement for the media than as a legislator (Lahti & Mörttinen, 2024: 33). However, Tynkkynen was widely seen as one of the most potential winners of the upcoming elections, and the polls were favourable both to him and the FP, showing that the party might increase their seats from 2 to 3 (Hara, 2024; Hara & Särkkä, 2024).
Purra claimed the list was the best ever by the Finns Party. It included several figures known for their anti-immigrant and far-right stances, such as the short-lived minister of Orpo’s government in the summer scandal of 2023, MP Vilhelm Junnila. Even if Europe and Ukraine were Purra’s key issues, it also included Mika Niikko, who had been moved from party leadership for his earlier pro-Russian stances. None of these got questioned by the Finnish media. The most notable campaign ad by the FP during the late spring elections was one where traditionally masculine figures—two males working on construction—struggle to open a can of milk during their coffee break. The conclusion of the video is that due to EU regulation, the cork of the milk carton is an unnecessary nuisance. The punchline at the end of the video is the chosen FP party slogan: “Päätetään itse – Let’s decide for ourselves.” The realism behind this stance was also not much discussed. The public discussion around the campaign was focused mainly on the question of Ukraine and security, and the far right in the leadership of the European Parliament.
Given that the Finns Party was already the second party in the Finnish government, the EP elections also became a vote on the government. The opposition discourse was strong. SDP, the leading party of the previous government under PM Sanna Marin, was now the country’s main opposition party and, under the new leadership of MP Antti Lindtman, it was expected to do relatively well in the elections. Lindtman, facing the challenge of leading the SDP after the unprecedented Sanna Marin phenomenon, but also the historically most right-wing government of Finland in terms of fiscal policy since the Second World War, decided to embrace the so-called challenge of the “Rise of the European Far Right” and made the party’s entire campaign for the European Parliament in 2024 about repelling this rising.
Indeed, on May 4, 2024, the SDP announced that they would not collaborate with the far right in the European Parliament, promising that: “Every Finnish voter can be confident that the vote given to the SDP will definitely not promote the far-right’s rise to power in Europe.” Similarly to their self-stated political rivals, the SDP was also on the verge of getting their seat numbers increased from 2 to 3 inside the European Parliament. But they were not the only opposition party, and their party list was not as prominent as those for the Greens, the Left Alliance, or the Centre, who had several sitting or former MEPs and former party leaders. Even the Swedish People’s Party, who was slightly controversially in government again, now together with the Finns Party, had their party leader running for the European Parliament. The Sanna Marin phenomenon did contribute to these elections, boosting several former ministers of her cabinet and women into the Parliament.
Results of the Election
The momentum and media hype were on their side, but the far-right takeover did not happen in Finland. The election results came almost as a shock to the Finns Party leadership. Even until the last days before the election, the predictions suggested that the party would increase its seats from 2 to 3, even though the exact opposite happened: it lost one of its two seats. The party gained barely over half of their previous results in 2019: 7.6% of the vote (139,160 votes in total) compared to EP2019, where the party received 13.8%. They lost one of their two seats in the European Parliament, with Sebastian Tynkkynen being elected as the only one of his party, and Ruohonen Lerner lost her seat with only 0.4% of the vote (6,902 votes), while Junnila, shortly a minister in Orpo’s government, received 0.9% of the vote (16,357 votes), the second highest for the Finns Party. This came as a surprise to journalists, some media pundits, and researchers, as well as the FP chair Riikka Purra herself, as she commented on the results on election night: “Äärettömän huono – Extremely bad” (Strömberg 2024).
Perhaps more surprising was the success of Left Alliance (Vasemmistoliitto) chair and MP Li Anderson, who received personally a record number of 247,604 votes (13.5 percent of nationwide personal support), securing three seats for her party with 17.3% nationwide support (316,859 votes). The EPP’s Kokoomus won the elections, increasing their seats from three to four with 24.8% support (453,636 votes). The most popular candidate for Kokoomus was Mika Aaltola, an academic and leader of the Finnish Institute for Foreign Affairs known from his TV commentary, who had run as an independent candidate for president in January 2024: now he increased his personal votes to 95,757 votes, and a total of 5.2% national support. In the presidential elections, Aaltola had received 47,467 votes, a total of 1.5%. MP with expertise in military strategy, Pekka Toveri, with a similar public profile, was the second most popular. Curiously, the strategy adopted by the opposition leader Antti Lindtman for his party SDP did not bring the wished-for result, as the party had to settle for its two current seats without a poll-promised increase. The Greens lost one seat, but their two former party leaders and ministers secured seats in the EP, and the Centre and the Swedish People’s Party also retained two and one seats, respectively.
The splinter group Vapauden liitto (Freedom Alliance) got 0.9% (16,717 votes), with the former FP MEP Hakkarainen gaining 7,414 votes, thus not renewing his seat. Liike Nyt (Movement Now) received 0.5% of the vote share (9,641 votes altogether). Indeed, even though the FP did not do well due to a lack of a clear message, the message of opposing the far right and standing up for liberal democracy also did not resonate strongly with the voters of the SDP. However, the overall result can be seen as a victory for the opposition parties against those in government.
All Finnish citizens and EU citizens with permanent residency in Finland aged 18 and above were eligible to cast a vote. Similarly to the presidential elections, and contrary to the national parliamentary and municipal/regional elections, the entire country functioned as a single polling district. Voter turnout was 42.4%, a minor decrease from the previous elections, where the turnout was 42.7%.
In summary: the FP steadily lost support in various constituencies. In rural areas, where the support of the FP has been strong, the party’s percentage of support almost halved. It weakened significantly across the board in other ways as well, least of all in the core areas of large cities, where the FP generally gets little support.
Changes in electoral support for the FP can be observed as we compare the results of the previous European Parliament elections of 2019 to those of June 2024, gathered by the Suomen vaalidatapalvelu (Finnish election data service).
Outer frame area: 2019: 16.8% vs. 2024: 9.4%
Inner frame area: 2019: 14.5% vs. 2024: 8.2%
Countryside: 2019: 16.1% vs. 2024: 8.9%
A suburb or suburban area: 2019: 14.0% vs. 2024: 7.7%
Local center: 2019: 10.9% vs. 2024: 5.9%
The core area of big cities: 2019: 6.7% vs. 2024: 4.2%
Further Analysis: “Smile, You Are in the EU!” – The Finns Party’s Government Participation and Its Potential Influence on the Results
As has been widely established, in recent decades a growing number of various populist parties have succeeded in entering government coalitions with mainstream political parties—or even with other populist parties in Western Europe, such as is the case in Italy, for example. In Finland, the governing National Coalition Party faced the EU elections with a sense of calm and optimistic campaigning, as the party has traditionally been successful in these elections and is often regarded as the so-called EU party. The fact that the second largest party in both parliament and government—the Finns Party—was also fully campaigning under a pro-Europe message cannot be disregarded without underlining the paradoxicality and ironies that political reality sometimes brings forward in our field of studies.
Even as it is evident that a coalition government such as that of Prime Minister Orpo could proceed with the pragmatic “business as usual” attitude from a national politics point of view during another election, the fact remains that the national treasurer Purra was at the same time advocating for a very different future for the European Union. One cannot overlook the fact that the roots of her Finns Party lie fundamentally in the populist discourse of anti-elitism and Euroscepticism. Indeed, the founder of the Finns Party, Timo Soini, coined the phrase “Missä EU, siellä ongelma – Where there is the EU, there is the problem” into the history books of Finnish political rhetoric. Additionally, as mentioned before, just in January of the same year, the National Coalition Party had won the presidential elections with their candidate, former Prime Minister Alexander Stubb, who ran his campaign with a clear and steadfast angle on Finland being international, multilingual, and tolerant. It was also Stubb who, two decades ago, had launched his political career and risen to prominence as a young MEP with a famously unapologetic EU agenda for Finland. Stubb’s—back then still considered a progressive tool for political communication—blog was later published as a book: Hymyile, olet EU:ssa! Europarlamentaarikon päiväkirja – Smile, you are in the EU! A MEP’s Diary (Stubb, 2005; Lahti & Mörttinen, 2024).
This blatant conflict of interest between Prime Minister Orpo and Deputy Prime Minister Purra, as far as their parties’ EU policy was concerned, did not manifest itself publicly as a quarrel, but the undeniable tension on an ideological level politically requires further exploration—especially when analysing why the FP voters voted as they did (or as turned out to be the case: did not show up to vote). In general, when looking at the wide body of research investigating the changes in populist parties once they enter governmental positions, the question of populism’s moderation versus radicalization comes up for debate (Akkerman & de Lange, 2015; Albertazzi & McDonnell 2015; Krause & Wagner 2019).
Within the framework of the Finns Party and the surprising 2024 European Parliament election results, this scenario provides fruitful conditions to consider the weight of the contemporary argument which debates whether populist actors in government can exert a certain degree of influence on their coalition partners or if, conversely, they have to quit their populist and anti-system character under the impact of their “experience in office.” The questions proposed in these cases are often of the nature: “To what extent did populist parties succeed in influencing their government coalition partners, leading them to adopt a populist rhetoric and change their policy positions?” and “Have populist parties been successful in retaining their populist ‘outside mainstream politics’ identity, or have they been assimilated into mainstream parties?”
In the case of the EP2024 elections, the government of Prime Minister Orpo had not been in power for more than a year, and it had already overcome its most acute crisis: the mentioned summer scandal of 2023, regarding then-Minister MP Vilhelm Junnila, who as a result resigned. During and after this incident, Orpo’s government—under his leadership and his visibly loyal deputy, FP’s chair Purra—became known for repetitively referring to their ironclad commitment to the government’s program in the media. According to a textual analysis using corpus-assisted discourse studies, the results showed that the program was, in fact, very strongly driven and based on policies traditionally imposed and held in high regard by Orpo’s Central Coalition Party, and that Purra’s Finns Party had been given leverage in issues that were important to their core supporters, such as immigration policy, citizenship restrictions, and foreign aid to third-world countries (Lahti & Mörttinen 2023). This ensured that neither party was willing to “rock the boat” unnecessarily. From a practical point of view, it also means that whether populistic influence or, vice versa, non-populist influence was spreading within the coalition partners, it was too early a stage to identify any credible indications of it.
In terms of influence, we can accept Robert Dahl’s definition of it: “a relation among actors in which one actor induces other actors to act in some way they would not otherwise act” (Robert Dahl 1973, in Biard et al., 2019: 5). More widely, the actual concept of “political contagiousness” finds its roots in the field of electoral competition studies (Van Spanje, 2010), and it is firmly associated with the strategies political parties might adopt towards their (newcoming) competitors in an attempt to attract more voters. Direct populist influence, however, can be defined as follows: Populist influence is the impact exerted by populist parties on their government coalition partners in terms of communication contagiousness (people-centrism, anti-elitism, and general will) and policy position change (depending on the populist ideological attachment) (Napoletano, 2022: 60–61).
When investigating whether the FP was somehow assimilated into the mainstream parties from the point of view of the voter, it is relevant to note what happened to the party a decade ago when, in 2015, it entered into a centre-liberal coalition with the result of “a dramatic loss of popular support because it was not able to keep its promises” (Blanc-Noël, 2019: 69). The then leader and founder of the party, Soini, was seen as appeasing the coalition partners by moderating his pre-election agenda. In general, when this type of moderation takes place (Akkerman et al., 2016), populist parties certainly do not succeed in exerting a real influence on their coalition partners and, more extremely, they risk disappearing from the political scenario. Of course, what happened to the FP in 2015 until their splitting into two and later the resurrection into nationwide electoral success again is not explicitly comparable with what happened in the EP 2024 elections, as the context differs, but ignoring the fact that the FP has suffered sufficient loss in support before due to perceived moderation in times of a coalition government cannot be overlooked. It is important to underline that we are not arguing that the FP seriously altered their EU policy or, more prudently, their campaigning in the EP2024 elections due to the fact of political contagiousness—in this case, being in a coalition government with the traditionally pro-EU party of Finland, the National Coalition Party. We, however, note that their incoherent campaigning strategy and unorthodox message for the flagship party of Finnish Euroscepticism affected their traditional voter base, which has historically not been keen on voting in European Parliament elections to start with.
This alternation with the FP’s electoral support also challenges yet again the stances of many researchers between the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, as they declared populism in power to be an “episodic” phenomenon that was not bound to last for a significant period of time. Indeed, in 2015, Albertazzi and McDonnell were among the first to argue that this conclusion was inaccurate and that, as a phenomenon, populism in power is here to stay. More interestingly, in regard to this paper, they claimed that populism in power is a “contagious” phenomenon able to make a concrete difference within the Western European political landscape.
Furthermore, Albertazzi and McDonnell claimed that, once in power, populist parties behave according to a combination of “responsiveness and responsibility” (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2015: 170; Biard et al., 2019). As a consequence of this choice, part of the populist electorate will feel betrayed, although in the long run, populist parties succeed (to different degrees) in maintaining their electorate. Some authors have also tried to explain the variation of such success; Akkerman and De Lange (2012: 578) argued that post-incumbency electoral success of the populist radical right seems to depend on three main factors: 1. policy achievements, 2. the performance of populist radical right ministers, and 3. party strategies to maintain internal coherence. Especially factors 2 and 3 are important as we analyse what has contributed to the end result of the FP’s electoral success in the EP2024 election.
Conclusion
Throughout the elections, the contradiction was the fact that the political discourse and the analysis in the media seemed to concentrate on the unavoidable landslide victory of the far right in Europe as such. Considering first and foremost the diversity inside the so-called far-right family of party groups in Europe, we see that the starting point was missing the point from the get-go. The discourse always remained on a very general level, thus underplaying the different actors and variations which might come into play. In Finland, the populist radical FP was enjoying steady support, and yet the support and seats halved, while overall the national voting turnout remained more or less the same – a difference of 0.3%.
Confusion within the party due to the cases of Vornanen and Hakkarainen and the lack of a strong election strategy, narrative, and mission towards the European Parliamentary elections played a role. The political discourse around the FP was mostly on Purra’s provocative communication, the far-right threat in Europe, and the campaigning of the most successful online politician of the FP group, vice chair and now newly elected MEP, Sebastian Tynkkynen. His political supporters followed him and showed their loyalty during election day, but even his message was more about himself as a politician and his mission to broadcast more effectively and intensively, instead of commenting on what his contribution would be to the Finnish electorate.
As popular as Tynkkynen is among his online audiences and actual voters, it is reasonable to argue that his message might not have been that effective in mobilizing voters outside of the digital sphere. Considering that the FP’s main television ad also aired on various online platforms, with its milk carton EU-regulated corks and the declaration of the FP as the most pro-Europe party of the nation, contributed to the lack of a wholesome message. It is possible that in fact, in that regard, one of the variables in order to ensure party success—as mentioned earlier by Akkerman & De Lange (2012)—the FP did not successfully execute a comprehensive party strategy to maintain internal coherence, not at least from the point of view of the Finnish voter.
It is important to note again that the FP declared themselves the most pro-Europe—not the most pro-EU—party of Finland. This distinction is clear, and it can be hypothesized that this was created as an attempt to redefine what being pro-European and pro-EU meant in a Finnish political context. Whether or not this was a strategy and a bait by the FP, the fact remains that the whole EP election campaign theme went largely unnoticed by the media and political opponents. It bears mentioning that the FP party secretary Harri Vuorenpää had started his tenure by the end of August 2023 and was not as experienced as his predecessors. However, Vuorenpää’s role in the analysis on why the party underachieved in the EP2024 elections should not be overstressed.
Indeed, even as it can be argued that the FP did not moderate their stances on national policy issues towards those of their coalition partner, the National Coalition Party—as was indeed unnecessary from a voter-pleasing strategic point of view, since both parties had strongly committed to the government’s program—it was, however, unexpected and peculiar from a campaign strategy stance to attempt to overshadow the traditional pro-EU party by declaring itself superior in so-called Europe-positivity.
It can also be argued that the stance of being the most pro-Europe party in the country was considered an act of moderation as far as their EU policy was concerned. It is possible that the voters who loyally showed up for the FP during the parliamentary elections of 2023 and the presidential elections later were not convinced of this new direction—in addition to the fact that the FP voter base is the least interested in the EP elections, as is the case for the entire Finnish voter base.
Taking into consideration that the Finns Party candidate came in third place in Finland’s previous—and timewise very recent—presidential elections, all that can be stated at this point is that the zigzag, volatile, and effectively complete change in direction in terms of the rhetoric of the traditionally anti-EU party did not work. If anything, it remains a case in point of a populist party in a coalition government proving that their presence is not contagious to the non-populist parties, but on the contrary, the opposite happened. It is also a finding worthy of further research.
The hybrid threat posed by Russia, in terms of transporting immigrants and asylum seekers to Finland’s eastern border, was considered—and still is—more of a national and defence policy affair rather than something that directly concerns the EU. It should also be noted that the FP voter base prioritizes national, presidential, and lastly regional elections.
In conclusion, we suggest that the predicted far-right threat mobilized opposition party voters on a large scale. Even the Swedish People’s Party held on to their seat (which they were in danger of losing) at a time when their partnership in the Finnish government with the FP was widely criticized by their own electorate. The voter turnout in these elections—almost identical to the previous EP2019 elections—indicates that many FP voters stayed at home instead of casting their votes.
One of the interesting details to note is also the fact that the FP lost support in Lapland—an electoral district where they usually do well. The unprecedented electoral success of the Left Alliance leader Li Anderson also reflected in the results in the area, as she personally received 13.6% (7,049 votes). Additionally, the Centre Party (Keskusta) elected two female MEPs from Lapland, MP Katri Kulmuni and incumbent MEP Elsi Katainen. This can be seen as a less conservative move by the voters in Lapland.
As much as this result came as a surprise, even to the scholars who remained sceptical throughout the election about the so-called “Far right tsunami,” it should be noted that the FP still holds a strong position within national politics in the country and that these elections, with their surprising result, are too recent for us to draw any further conclusions about a far-right downfall in Finland.
Indeed, even as the FP faced the 2025 local and regional elections with challenges of a different nature (due to its core voter base and their unenthusiastic approach towards these elections) and even as they again underperformed greatly coming in at sixth place with an overall 7.6% vote share (overall 184 616 votes) and a 6.8% drop from previous elections it is not credible to announce a general degradation of the Finnish populist radical right, or even the Finns Party. As further analysis in upcoming research will show in greater detail whether these two elections the EP2024 and the following local and regional ones had any similarities as far as the FP party support is concerned, it has to be stated again that only as recently as in 2023 Riikka Purra led her party to an all-time victory in the parliamentary elections – an election which traditionally has been the one were the FP dominates. The future elections will provide more data for analysis in order to make conclusions of the Finnish far right in the long run. So far, there are no concrete indications which would lead us to state that a long-term demand for populist radical right parties would be fading away from the Finnish political landscape.
To conclude, the European Parliament elections of 2024 in Finland stand out as one of the interesting exceptions, as the FP steadily lost support in various constituencies against the most optimistic predictions. In the future, we researchers must remain in our current positions, where we do not feed the narratives often adopted by the liberal news media in which election X is either about the huge victory of the far right or the great defeat of liberal democracy, or vice versa. The issues leading to far-right support (steady and unsteady) are far more complex and multifaceted, as we know. The Finnish case also demonstrated a new emergence of the left in 2024.
The authors thank the Research Council of Finland (RCF) for co-funding the Trans-Atlantic Platform Consortium project “ENDURE: Inequalities, Community Resilience, and New Governance Modalities in a Post-Pandemic World” (funding number 352413).
(*) Yannick Lahti is a political scientist and a former postdoctoral research fellow at the University of Helsinki. Lahti obtained his PhD-degree in 2022 from the University of Bologna in Italy. In his research, he examined European populism, populist actors, and political communication during the European Union elections of 2019 within the Hybrid Media system. In his work Yannick Lahti departed from the consideration that as populism and populist rhetoric are challenging concepts to define – especially in relation to different media environments; they should be addressed and analyzed through the usage of a combination of methods and theoretical perspectives, namely Communication Studies, Corpus Linguistics, Political theory, Rhetoric and Corpus-Assisted Discourse Studies. Recently Lahti was involved with Whirl of Knowledge project and until 2023 conducting research for the transatlantic ENDURE-project funded by the Finnish Academy (Suomen Akatemia). Now as an independent scholar with a funding of C. V. Åkerlund mediafoundation, Yannick Lahti is conducting further research on populist radical right politics and its impacts on democracy. Right now Lahti is also working together with award winning journalist Matti Mörttinen on their third collaboration: a book titled: Jäähyväiset demokratialle (A Farewell to Democracy) which will be published in spring 2026. The researcher-journalist pair has previously published two books called Populismin anatomia / The Anatomy of Populism (2023) and Politiikan pinnan vangit / The prisoners of political shallowness (2024) which both received critical and commercial acclaim in Finland.
(**) Emilia Palonen is Associate Professor, Senior University Lecturer in Political Science, University of Helsinki. Currently Emilia is on research leave as Programme Director in Datafication at the Helsinki Institute for Social Sciences and Humanities and as Leader of HEPPsinki research group. She is PI of Academy of Finland project WhiKnow (2019-2022), Kone Foundation project Now-Time Us Space (2020-24), European Commission funded DRad project (2020-2023), and Academy of Finland and other Trans-Atlantic Partnership project funders’ ENDURE exploring resilience in crisis (2022-2024). Palonen has been evaluated as fit for full and associate professor (2022). She received in 2015 a title of Docent (Adj./Ass. Prof.) in Political Science (spec. Cultural Politics), University of Jyväskylä, where has taught and collaborated in research projects.She is an engaged scholar in media and associations: She is an Executive Committee member and chair of the publications committee of the International Political Science Association (IPSA). She served in 2018-2022 as the Chair of the Finnish Political Science Association. She is a board member of the Finnish Federation of Learned Societies (2021-2023), and Treasurer of the Society of Scientists and Parliament Members, Tutkas ry. (2019-2023).Palonen is a discourse theorist and an expert on politics, polarisation and communication, populism and democracy, local participative governance and planning. She has been working on politics of memory in symbolic urban landscapes but also populist movements and even the far right. Besides her expertise on Hungary since 1999, she has been actively following Finnish politics and authors the EJPR Political Data Yearbook on Finland. Academically she is particularly interested in Europe but also engages worldwide. She is an active and engaged scholar invited for talks.
References
Akkerman, T.; Lange, S. D. L. & Rooduijn, M. (2016). Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Into the Mainstream? (Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy) (1st ed.). Routledge.
Akkerman, T. & de Lange, S. L. (2012). “Radical Right Parties in Office: Incumbency Records and the Electoral Cost of Governing.” Government and Opposition, 47(4), 574–596.
Albertazzi, D. & McDonnell, D. (2015). Populists in Power. Oxon: Routledge.
Arter, D. (2020). ‘Taking the Gilt off the Conservatives’ Gingerbread: The April 2011 Finnish General Election, in 34 West Eur. Polit. 6, 1284–1295 (2011); E. Palonen, Populismin muoto, diskursiivisuus ja retoriikka. Analyysi soinilaisuudesta, in 62 Politiikka 2, 125–145 (2020).
Balfour, R. & Lehne, S. (2024). “Charting the Radical Right’s Influence on EU Foreign Policy.”
Carnegie Europe. Publications Department.
Blanc-Noël, N., (2019). “When Governing Is Losing Advantage: Denmark and Finland, Two Opposite Cases of Radical Right Pospulist Parties’Influence on Policy Making.” In: Biard, B., Laurent., B., & Betz, H., G., (ed), Do they Make a difference? The policy influence of radical right populist parties in Western Europe. London: ECPR Press, (57 – 78)
Biard, B.; Bernhard, L. & Betz, H.-G. (2019). Do they make a difference?: The policy influence of radical right populist parties in Western Europe. London: ECPR Press.
Dahl, R. A. (1956). A preface to democratic theory. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Demokraatti (2016, November 11th). Nyt se tuli selväksi: Näin määritellään perussuomalaiset – Timo Soini kertoi itse. Demokraatti-magazine. https://demokraatti.fi/nyt-se-tuli-selvaksi-nain-maaritellaan-perussuomalaiset-timo-soini-kertoi-itse
De Vries, CE and Hobolt, SB (2020). Political Entrepreneurs: The Rise of Challenger Parties in Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Elo, E. & Teittinen, P. (2024, March 3). Lähes viisi vuotta, kolme ilmoitettua tapausta – HS kävi läpi Teuvo Hakkaraisen toimia europarlamentissa. Helsingin Sanomat. https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000010281749.html
Ekman, M. (2014). “The Dark Side of Online Activism: Swedish Right-Wing Extremist Video Activism on YouTube.” MedieKultur: Journal of Media and Communication Research 30 (56): 79–99. https://doi.org/10.7146/ mediekultur.v30i56.8967.
Hakahuhta, A.; Hyytinen, T. & Muilu, H. (2024, May 13). ”Purra: Vornasen ja Hakkaraisen erottamisen syyt ”kaikille selvät” – Hakkarainen: perussuomalaisista on tullut kokoomuksen beagle.” Yle News. https://yle.fi/a/74-20088330
Hara, J. & Särkkä, N. (2024, May 2). Ylen eurovaalimittaus: Kokoomus suosituin puolue – RKP ja vihreät menettämässä meppipaikan. Yle News. https://yle.fi/a/74-20086411
Hara, J. (2024, June 6). Ylen eurovaalimittaus: Vihreät menettämässä kaksi meppipaikkaa ja RKP ainoansa – perussuomalaiset vahvistunut. Yle News. https://yle.fi/a/74-20090719?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR2XWJQiKyFTlaSfz40RlfSeE4OFk14JsCw7bN42UQ5X-bF3F0ZiMZEYWbc_aem_OJRsVVjKayb-75pk0z0Uzw
Herkman, J.; Sibinescu, L.; Palonen, E. (2024). “Finland: Populist Polarisation of the Finnish Political Communication.” In: Herkman, J., Palonen, E. (eds) Populism, Twitter and the European Public Sphere. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41737-5_4
Kauranen, A. (2024, April 29). “Finland’s Thatcher tests limits of local frugality”. Reuters, Europe. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finlands-thatcher-tests-limits-local-frugality-2024-04-29/
Kervinen, E. (2024, June 10). ”Perussuomalaisten kannatus maaseudulla romahti – Tilastot näyttävät, missä vaalit voitettiin ja hävittiin.” Helsingin Sanomat. https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000010488350.html
Kisic Merino, P. and C. Kinnvall. (2023). “Governing Emotions: Hybrid Media, Ontological Insecurity and the Normalisation of Far-Right Fantasies.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 48 (1): 54–73. https://doi.org/10. 1177/03043754221123467.
Kuokkanen, K.; Horsmanheimo, L. E. & Palonen, E. (2023). “Conceptualising Finnish deradicalisation policies: Implicit or explicit, projectified or institutionalised?” DPCE Online, 59(2), 2019-2038. https://doi.org/10.57660/dpceonline.2023.1956
Krause, W. and Wagner, A (2019). “Becoming Part of the Gang? Established and Nonestablished Populist Parties and the Role of External Efficacy.” Party Politics, 27(1), 161–173
Lahti, Y., & Palonen, E. (2023). “The impact of the Russia–Ukraine War on right-wing populism in Finland.” In: G. Ivaldi, & E. Zankina (Eds.), The Impacts of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine on Right-Wing Populism in Europe: A report by European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) (pp. 126-138). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0018, https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0010
Lahti, Y. (2022). Populism as a battlefield; Populist actors and their representation on social and legacy media during the European parliament elections 2019 in Finland, Italy and the Netherlands. University of Bologna.
Lahti, Y. & Mörttinen, M. (2024). Politiikan pinnan vangit. Into publishing.
Lahti, Y. & Mörttinen, M. (2023). ”Hallitusohjelma on oikeistolainen, mutta vain tietyin osin populistinen”. Kanava lehti 5/23.
Luotonen, A. (2024, June 6). Analyysi: Vaaleilla oli yksi todellinen voittaja ja yksi suuri häviäjä. Yle News. https://yle.fi/a/74-20092968
McDonnell, Duncan and Annika Werner. (2020). International Populism: The Radical Right in the European Parliament (2020; online edn, Oxford Academic, 17 Sept. 2020), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197500859.001.0001(accessed 26 June 2024).
Moffitt, B. (2022). “How Do Mainstream Parties ‘Become’ Mainstream, and Pariah Parties ‘Become’ Pariahs? Conceptualizing the Processes of Mainstreaming and Pariahing in the Labelling of Political Parties.” Government and Opposition. 57(3):385-403. doi:10.1017/gov.2021.5
Napoletano, A. (2022). A Double chance to investigate populist influence: The Five Star Movement. University of Bologna.
Palonen, E. (2023, Apr 30). New populist dynamics: Is political polarisation emerging in Finland? Colégio de S. Jerónimo.
Palonen, E. (2021). “The New Leader of the Finns Party Reinforces an Illiberal Turn.” The Loop ECPR’s Political Science Blog. https://theloop. ecpr.eu/the-new-leader-of-the-finns-party-reinforces-anilliberal-turn/
Palonen, E. & Sunnercrantz, L. (2021). “Nordic populists as hegemony challengers.” In: The Nordic Economic, Social and Political Model. Routledge.
Saresma, T. & Palonen, E. (2022). “On the emergence of alt-science counterhegemony: The Case of the FP.” In: H. Eslen–Ziya, & A. Giorgi (Eds.), Populism and science in Europe (pp. 117–40). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030- 97535-7_6
Salojärvi, V.; Palonen, E.; Horsmanheimo, L. & Kylli, R. M. (2023). ”Protecting the future ‘Us’: a rhetoric-performative multimodal analysis of the polarising far-right YouTube campaign videos in Finland.” Visual Studies, 38(5), 851–866.
Sutinen, T. & Toivonen H. (2024, April 30). ”Teuvo Hakkarainen EU-vaaleihin Vapauden liiton listalta.” Helsingin Sanomat. https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000010397060.html
Strömberg, J. (2024, June 9). ”Perussuomalaisten kannatuksen romahdus tuli Purralle yllätyksenä: ’Äärettömän huono tulos’.” Yle News. https://yle.fi/a/74-20093012
Stubb, A. (2005). Hymyile, olet EU:ssa! Europarlamentaarikon päiväkirja. WSOY.
Teittinen, P. (2024, March 31). T”euvo Hakkarainen vetosi latinokiireisiin, HS:n tutkimat läsnäolotiedot herättävät lisää kysymyksiä.” Helsingin Sanomat. https://www.hs.fi/politiikka/art-2000010315678.html
Toivonen, T., Kangas, L. & Strömberg, J. (2024, April 13). „PS:n puoluesihteeri: Aseen käytöstä epäilty Vornanen on vapautettu – tämän tiedämme kansanedustajan rikosepäilystä nyt.” Yle News.https://yle.fi/a/74-20086052
Vaarakallio, T. (2015). “The ideological framework of the French Nouvelle Droite and The contemporary Finnish Far Right.” Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory, 18(2), 202–24. https://doi.org/10.7227/R.18.2.5
Vaittinen, H. (2024, March 19). “Oikeistopopulistit koristelivat seinät Putin-kuvilla ja poseerasivat fanipaita päällä – ”Perussuomalaiset positiivinen poikkeus”. MTV-Uutiset. MTV News. https://www.mtvuutiset.fi/artikkeli/oikeistopopulistit-koristelivat-seinat-putin-kuvilla-ja-poseerasivat-fanipaita-paalla-perussuomalaiset-positiivinen-poikkeus/8900964
Van Spanje, J. (2010). “Contagious Parties: Anti-Immigration Parties and Their Impact on Other Parties’ Immigration Stances in Contemporary Western Europe.” Party Politics, 16(5), 563–586.
Widfeldt, A. (2018). The Radical Right in the Nordic Countries.
Yle News (2024, April 23). ”KHO: Fasistisen ja rasistisen sinimustan liikkeen puoluerekisteröinti on purettu.” STT/ Yle News. https://yle.fi/a/74-20085074
Yle News (2021, June 16). “Municipal elections: Result service.” https://vaalit.yle.fi/kv2021/ en
Online Material
Finns Party: Election program for the European Parliament elections of 2024 (Published 24th of April 2024). https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/ajankohtaista/psn-eu-vaaliohjelma-on-julkaistu-katso-julkistustilaisuus-suorana-klo-9-30-alkaen/
Pretorius, Christo. (2025). “Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 26, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0096
Following Germany’s pivotal 2025 federal election, the ECPS hosted a high-level panel exploring the rise of the far-right AfD, democratic resilience, and the broader political shifts underway. Held on March 13, 2025, the event featured leading scholars, offering critical insights into the AfD’s electoral surge, its normalization and radicalization, and the East-West divide shaping German politics. Speakers examined key voter demographics—especially youth, working-class, and immigrant voters—and dissected issues like immigration, identity, gender, and economic anxiety that have fueled the far-right narrative. The session also addressed the implications for Germany’s transatlantic ties, institutional stability, and future party strategies. This report captures the panel’s core arguments, raising essential questions about how liberal democracies can respond to populist and authoritarian threats without compromising democratic norms or alienating significant voter blocs.
The 2025 federal election in Germany on February 23, 2025 marked a watershed moment in the nation’s postwar political landscape. Amid record-high voter turnout and deepening societal divides, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) achieved its most significant electoral gains to date. Against this backdrop, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened a special panel titled “Post-Election Germany: Democracy, Populism and the Far-Right Surge” to assess the causes, consequences, and wider implications of the vote. Held online on March 13, 2025, the session brought together leading political scientists from Germany and beyond, each offering unique insights into one of Europe’s most closely watched political stories.
Moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member, the discussion delved into the normalization and radicalization of the AfD, the party’s growing impact on Germany’s democratic institutions, and the broader realignment of the country’s political and social order. The panel also explored the East-West divide in voting patterns, the role of identity politics, youth and working-class engagement, and how key issues—such as immigration, economic anxiety, and gender—have been instrumentalized by the far right.
Moreover, speakers raised concerns about foreign influence on German politics, the future of the transatlantic alliance, and whether traditional parties should seek to exclude or accommodate the AfD. With contributions from Dr. Eric Langenbacher, Teaching Professor and Director of the Senior Honors Program in the Department of Government at Georgetown University, Dr. Kai Arzheimer, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz, Dr. Hannah M. Alarian, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Dr. Conrad Ziller, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Duisburg-Essen, and Dr. Sabine Volk, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Chair of Political Science and Comparative Politics, Faculty of Social and Educational Sciences at the University of Passau, the panel offered a comprehensive and sobering look at a country grappling with both internal polarization and global geopolitical uncertainty.
This report summarizes the session’s key discussions and analytical takeaways, providing an in-depth overview of the far-right surge in Germany and its implications for democracy, governance, and European politics at large.
To start off this special session off, Dr. Cengiz Aktar highlighted two major trends that he noticed within Germany’s 2025 federal election results. First, was the rise of populism itself in Germany, and second was the interference of American decision makers, ‘both elected and unelected,’ in the election. He then gave the floor to the first speaker.
How Worried Should We Be About the AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship?
Dr. Eric Langenbacher’s presentation on “The AfD and the Transatlantic Relationship” began with an overview of the election results which highlighted the East-West divide in the country, with the former primarily serving as the Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) voter base in the election. This was followed by a quick look at important factors that affected the final result, such as age demographics of voters, and pointing out that this was the highest turnout since 1987’s election.
Turning to his own takeaways from the election result, Dr. Langenbacher notes that the AfD has normalized within German politics but also radicalized in their policies. He notes that although the AfD does not have a majority in the Bundestag, they now have a blocking minority, which will make any action requiring a super majority, such as amending the constitution, difficult to do. He also notes that the results show a clear divide in German politics stemming from the old Cold War divisions, and that on a smaller scale these divisions affect AfD candidates from both the East and West. Western members are, in Dr. Langenbacher’s opinion, more pragmatic and willing to compromise if it meant joining a coalition government, juxtaposing their more hardline eastern counterparts.
Moving onto his analysis of the Transatlantic Relationship, Dr. Langenbacher highlighted Elon Musk’s intervention in German politics but points out that there is no evidence suggesting that his endorsement of AfD had any effect on the result. He questions the Republican Party and right-leaning individuals from the United States’ support of the AfD in general, especially as the party contains many anti-American politicians that speak out against what they see as US hegemony over Germany. Dr. Langenbacher theorizes that this might be due to similarities in the AfD and Trump’s policies, especially regarding Russia and the Ukraine, but it could just as likely be a strategy to weaken the EU’s geo-political power. To conclude, Dr. Langenbacher finds that German foreign policy towards the US has been damaged beyond the point of fixing, and elected officials now seek alternative means to strengthen Germany on the global stage without US support, especially as it remains uncertain whether or not the US will continue to maintain a military presence in Europe and/or support NATO moving into the future.
How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD?
The next speaker was Dr. Kai Arzheimer, who investigated the question: “How Can We Explain the Rise of the AfD in the 2025 Election?” Also pointing out the stark East-West divide in voter support for the AfD, Dr. Arzheimer notes the map most commonly used to highlight the political divisions within Germany is misleading – especially as East Germany is less populated with only one sixth of Germany’s overall population (without Berlin) and only made up a quarter of the total vote. The increase of AfD’s support in Western Germany is more important to analyze. Younger voters made up a significant proportion of the party’s support in the election, especially with young men, but this gender gap seems to be narrowing. The working class also supported the AfD more this time around, mobilizing 1.8 million former non-voters which joined the additional voters the AfD won from the Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats.
Immigration was still the most important policy issue for voters, especially the rejection of Muslims who are often mistakenly linked to terrorism and an increase in crime. Dr. Arzheimer points out that the AfD tends to play up terrorism and crime as out of control, even though evidence shows that it has gone down. Other ‘Culture War’ issues such as gender and the green transformation also played a part in AfD’s success, but economic anxiety is what pushed many working-class voters towards the party.
According to Dr. Arzheimer, from a geo-political perspective, the AfD had a near monopoly on peace politics, especially as Russia’s renewed attack on Ukraine made it difficult to maintain their main pro-Russian narrative. To this end, they focused on the economy as an issue, and how it became worse after Germany’s involvement with the war, and how Germany’s energy security was being undermined.
Unlike neighboring country’s right-wing parties, Dr. Arzheimer points out that the AfD is becoming ever more radical in their politics, using examples such as the party’s leader being convicted twice for using Nazi slogans during the European Parliament election campaign, and right-wing extremists from outside the party being staffed in the Bundestag. Identity politics has also radicalized, with some AfD members using the issue of immigration as a means to push their desired agenda of expelling Germans with a so-called ‘migration background’ from Germany. Despite this, their popularity has grown.
Dr. Arzheimer went on to show a timeline of events in the last few years affecting the AfD’s popularity and concluded that he would estimate 50% of AfD voters have consistently voted for the party, and the other 50% of voters might still be swayable to other parties. He goes on to recommend that Germany’s other political parties should focus on their own policy issues, rather than compete with the AfD ‘on their field’ as they try to win back voters.
Accommodation or Exclusion?
The third presentation focused on “Accommodation or Exclusion? Immigration, the AfD, and Democratic Challenges in the 2025 Election,” and was presented by Dr. Hannah Alarian. Building on the previous presentations, she sought to investigate the question of what will happen after the election. Focusing once again on immigration as a key policy issue, Dr. Alarian highlighted the persistence of this issue for the electorate, with as many as one in six voters mentioning it as an important political problem. In the eastern states, more people favored greater restrictions on immigration, which correlates with their vote for AfD. Voters turned to the AfD as they were the party that was most eager to talk about the issue. The AfD’s 2021 party manifesto made more references to the issue than any other comparable party, and this trend continued into the 2025 election where most other parties seemed to have dismissed the issue altogether since they did not want to talk about it lest they draw attention to the AfD. This left a lot of voters to turn to the AfD as the only party addressing this key policy issue, and they controlled the narrative with various anti-migration media, some of which Dr. Alarian presents in her talk by sharing anti-immigration campaign posters used by the AfD.
Looking forward, Dr. Alarian points out that the questions of democratic legitimacy, and party and government strategy are important – namely, do we accommodate, or do we exclude the AfD? By choosing to exclude the AfD, it excludes a large portion of the voting population, but inclusion allows the AfD access to the policy making space. Exclusionary tactics are already being used, such as the CDU’s refusal to enter a coalition with the AfD, but after the CDU relied on the AfD’s vote for an anti-migration measure, the people came out to protest in mass across the country. Dr. Alarian indicates that perhaps the people can be the ‘firewall’ then. However, according to her data, these made no real change towards people’s attitude of AfD. Similarly, AfD’s exclusion, nor other party’s adaptation to the political climate, also made no real change.
To conclude, Dr. Alarian makes some recommendations for moving forward, including an acknowledgement of immigration as a political issue by other parties, and addressing socio-economic concerns of voters. In effect this will provide an alternative to the alternative vote.
Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications
Dr. Conrad Ziller started his presentation on “The AfD’s Surge in the 2025 Germany Federal Election: Patterns of Realignment and Political Implications,” by focusing on who are the new voters, and what motivates them to vote for the AfD. He repeated some of the information from the previous presentations as to why the AfD doubled their votes in a lot of places compared to the last election – mainly the non-voters and policy issues such as immigration, internal security and the economy.
Three surprising allies who voted for the AfD include immigrant voters, blue collar workers and young men. 10.4% of immigrant voters and 40.2% of post-soviet re-settlers voted for AfD, doubling since the last election. The number of voters lost by the SPD correlates with the amount gained by the AfD, highlighting how the working class shifted to the party this election. Finally, young men aged 18-24 voted overwhelmingly for the AfD. Dr. Ziller highlighted some explanatory frameworks for why these three groups voted the way they did, including: Cultural backlash against universalism, lack of social recognition, nostalgic appeal of the far right, a declining middle, structural transformations in the knowledge economy, transformations of the left parties, and group identities and out-group perceptions.
Focusing in-depth on some of these frameworks, Dr. Ziller highlights academic research that might explain why the three highlighted groups voted the way they did. Social identity could be a factor as research found that marginalized people didn’t feel that they gained as much from a redistribution party, but by voting of a nationalist one with anti-immigrant views, they believed they would achieve a higher status in society. Arguments made for social belonging highlights how people can find a sense of community in right wing groups, which in particular attracts young men. Progressive policies are found to alienate blue collar workers who often feel they stand to lose from such policies. And finally, those who feel left behind turn to alternative parties to show their discontent at established parties and politics.
Dr. Ziller provides some empirical insights from a survey he ran on a website in the days leading up to and after the election. 2,568 people responded, and the results closely reflected the election results. Predictors of an AfD vote include a low level of social trust, threat perception particularly against Muslims, and people who felt left behind. How this correlated to the three groups in focus paints the picture that all three groups felt left behind and displayed Islamophobia, although each one had different underlining reasons for voting AfD. To conclude he suggests that investment in left-behind places could regain the trust of disenfranchised voters, but the underlining question is whether or not we can roll back the ‘need for chaos’ preference in radical right-wing populist and authoritarian politics.
Germany’s Far Right and Antifeminism
The final speaker, Dr. Sabine Volk, focused on the topic “The German Far Right: Antifeminism Sells.” Highlighting that the AfD were already campaigning in 2013 that there is a clear gender divide between men and women, the talk focused on gender issues which became more prominent within the AfD over successive elections. Dr. Volk presented the clear gender gap within the AfD party, which is comprised roughly of 19% women members overall. In the new Bundestag only 11.8% of the AfD’s group are women, and Alice Weidel is the only female AfD member in the Bundesvorstand(Federal Executive Board). As the face of the AfD, Alice Weidel juxtaposes a lot of AfD’s stances on gender and family, especially as she has a same-sex partner.
AfD’s antifeminist stances have partially modernized on gender equality and sexual diversity, reacting on the processes of emancipation and seeking to maintain heteronormative power relations. Their key messages are heteronormative family relations, ‘Trans panic,’ and the mobilization of masculinity. The topic of gender is important to the AfD, but there is regional diversity within the party, with some more extreme factions being located in eastern Germany. According to Dr. Volk, what is missing from the discussion is the idea of female nationalism and the mobilization of women’s rights as part of an anti-Islam agenda present in previous elections. This allows for antifeminist alliances to be built with conservative and religious actors and groups and appeals to people with antifeminist attitudes – mostly located in eastern Germany. Gender is therefore of particular importance, and Dr. Volk predicts that discussions surrounding this policy area will only grow in the coming years.
I assessed migration background by inquiring about the birthplaces of respondents’ mothers and fathers. It was necessary to ask this question first for sampling purposes. To minimise potential ordering effects on the data, I randomised the order in which respondents viewed the policy questions and experimental profiles (for the full questionnaire, see appendix in van Oosten, 2025c). To mitigate acquiescence bias, where respondents tend to agree with statements, I randomised the wording of the policy questions. For instance, one half of the sample saw the statement: “the taxes for this rich should be raised” and the other half saw “the taxes for the rich should be lowered” and I recoded the variables accordingly. I prepared the data using R-package ‘tidyr’ (Wickham, 2020, see all code and replication materials here: van Oosten, 2025c).
Conclusion
