Scholars examined how civil society, crisis governance, and performative protest shape democratic futures during Panel VI, “The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy,” at the ECPS Conference 2025. Speakers: Rashad Seedeen, Jana Ruwayha, and Özge Derman. Chair: Max Steuer.

ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel 6 — The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel 6 — The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00110

 

As part of the ECPS Conference 2025 titled “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” held at St Cross College, University of Oxford from July 1–3, Panel VI—“The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy”—brought urgent focus to the evolving meaning of democratic agency. Chaired by Dr. Max Steuer (Comenius University, Bratislava), the session opened with a reflection on whether democracy and “the people” can be conceptually disentangled. Rashad Seedeen examined how Gramsci’s war of position and Wright’s real utopias intersect in Indigenous civil society initiatives. Jana Ruwayha analyzed how prolonged emergencies blur legal norms, threatening democratic accountability. Özge Derman showcased how the “we” is performatively constructed in Occupy Wall Street and the Gezi movement. Together, the panel offered sharp insights into the plural and contested meanings of “the people” in contemporary democratic struggles.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The 6th panel, titled “The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy,” served as a dynamic and intellectually rich segment of the ECPS Conference 2025, held at the University of Oxford. It brought together three distinct, interdisciplinary perspectives on how democratic agency, civil resistance, and institutional transformation are being reshaped by contemporary crises, social movements, and emergent political subjectivities. The panel addressed some of the most urgent and foundational questions animating the future of democratic life: Who are ‘the people’? What modes of collective action best articulate democratic claims? And how do crisis, governance, and performance intersect in today’s contested political landscapes?

In his opening remarks as chair of the panel, Dr. Max Steuer—Principal Investigator at the Department of Political Science at Comenius University in Bratislava and affiliated with Jindal Global Law School—offered a thoughtful framing of the session in light of the ECPS Conference theme, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches (St Cross College, Oxford University, July 1–3, 2025). Reflecting on the panel’s title, he raised the provocative question of whether democracy and “the people” can—or should—be conceptually disentangled. Can there be democracy without “the people”? Steuer suggested that this line of inquiry opens new possibilities in democratic theory, particularly in relation to posthumanist and planetary frameworks that look beyond the human subject as the core agent of democratic life. At the same time, he pointed to the resilience and agency of “the people” in resisting authoritarianism—a theme that would recur throughout the panel presentations.

The panel unfolded with three carefully crafted presentations: Rashad Seedeen explored how Antonio Gramsci’s concept of war of position and Erik Olin Wright’s real utopias framework converge to reimagine democracy through grassroots civil society initiatives. Jana Ruwayha examined the normalization of emergency governance and its transformative—sometimes regressive—effects on liberal democratic orders, using the lens of legal theory and complex adaptive systems. Finally, Özge Derman illuminated the role of performative collectivity in Occupy Wall Street and the Gezi Movement, showing how “the people” emerged not through institutional structures, but through embodied acts of protest, silence, and solidarity.

Together, these interventions illustrated the multiple ways in which “the people” are both agents and constructs in the ongoing redefinition of democratic life. Dr. Steuer’s facilitation guided the panel toward an inclusive and critical conversation, allowing for reflections that transcended disciplinary silos while remaining grounded in rigorous analysis.

Rashad Seedeen: Between Antonio Gramsci and Erik Olin Wright: Deepening Democracy through Civil Society Engagement

At Panel 6 of the ECPS Conference 2025, Rashad Seedeen presented a thought-provoking analysis of civil society’s potential to advance democratic engagement, combining rich theoretical insights with grounded empirical reflection.

Delivered during Panel 6 of the ECPS Conference 2025, Rashad Seedeen’s presentation offered a compelling theoretical and empirical examination of civil society as a site for deepening democratic practice. Seedeen, Adjunct Research Fellow at La Trobe University, Melbourne, proposed an analytical synthesis of Antonio Gramsci’s theory of “war of position” and Erik Olin Wright’s “real utopias” framework, arguing that democratic transformation is most viable when it combines radical institutional experimentation with strategic ideological contestation.

Framed against the backdrop of growing far-right populism and the erosion of democratic norms, Seedeen began by grounding his work in respect for Indigenous sovereignty, acknowledging the Wurundjeri Woi-wurrung people and emphasizing that the research was developed in solidarity with their ongoing struggles. From this ethical foundation, Seedeen outlined the stakes: democracy is increasingly under assault, particularly in contexts where marginalized communities face heightened vulnerability. The response, he asserted, must involve more than liberal proceduralism—it must entail active efforts to reconstruct power relations through civil society engagement.

Drawing on Wright’s “real utopias” project, Seedeen highlighted the normative and functional principles that underpin such emancipatory designs: equality, democracy, sustainability, desirability, viability, and achievability. A real utopia, he explained, is not a utopian fantasy but a transformative institutional form that is both visionary and grounded. However, Seedeen noted a critical limitation in Wright’s approach: a lack of attention to antagonistic social forces and historical-political context. This omission, he argued, leaves real utopias vulnerable to ideological sabotage and institutional capture.

To address this shortcoming, Seedeen turned to Antonio Gramsci, whose concept of “war of position” offered a strategic complement to Wright’s institutional vision. Gramsci, steeped in historicism, theorized the war of position as a slow, strategic contest for ideological hegemony within civil society. For Seedeen, this Gramscian heuristic provides the necessary lens to account for counter-hegemonic resistance and the need to construct “an intellectual and moral bloc” that can sustain democratic innovation against reactionary backlash. Gramsci’s emphasis on mutual education, inclusivity, and grassroots leadership further resonates with democratic aspirations of real utopias.

The analytical model Seedeen proposed—an integration of Wright’s normative-functional metrics and Gramsci’s strategic-historic lens—was then applied to a case study from Seedeen’s home country: the First Peoples’ Assembly of Victoria (Australia). This Indigenous-led body was established to negotiate a treaty process with the Victorian government and exemplifies what Seedeen termed “associative democracy.” Structurally, the Assembly includes elected and traditional-owner representatives, supports youth and elder voices, and uses culturally grounded deliberative mechanisms such as yarning circles and community gatherings. Moreover, it asserts Indigenous data sovereignty by maintaining a separate electoral roll and governing structures.

Central to this initiative is the Yoorrook Justice Commission, a truth-telling process that collected over 10,000 documents and testimony from 9,000 Indigenous participants, with recommendations for restitution and self-determination. Seedeen demonstrated how the Assembly and Yoorrook fulfill Wright’s principles: they aim for equality through inclusive representation; foster democratic participation through grassroots engagement; and contribute to sustainability via institutional recognition and government support. Yet challenges remain: non-traditional Indigenous residents of Victoria are excluded from representation, leading to internal critique, and as the Assembly grows, it risks bureaucratization and diminished transparency.

Gramsci’s war of position, Seedeen argued, is vital to the Assembly’s resilience. He compared two contrasting examples of Indigenous political engagement to underline this point. The failed 2023 Australian Indigenous Voice referendum, despite initial majority support, was defeated after a coordinated disinformation campaign by conservative elites. Lacking a robust counter-hegemonic intellectual bloc and suffering from strategic ambiguity and internal divisions, the “Yes” campaign faltered. In contrast, the Māori resistance to New Zealand’s Treaty Principles Bill in 2024 provided a vivid illustration of successful war of position. Māori leaders, supported by civil society and mainstream politicians, launched a multi-layered, culturally resonant protest campaign—culminating in a nationwide Hīkoi (march) and parliamentary haka that galvanized public opposition and ultimately defeated the bill.

Seedeen’s comparative analysis reinforced Gramsci’s insight: the battle for democratic reform is won not only in institutional design but also in the ideological trenches of civil society. The Māori example demonstrated the power of a coherent moral-intellectual bloc mobilized through historical consciousness, cultural symbolism, and participatory solidarity.

In concluding, Seedeen contended that treaty processes and democratic experiments like the First Peoples’ Assembly should not be viewed as endpoints but as evolving processes of radical democratic deepening. The marriage of Gramscian historicism with Wrightian pragmatism provides an essential framework for theorizing—and realizing—sustainable democratic alternatives in the face of entrenched power and populist reaction. His presentation exemplified the spirit of ECPS Conference 2025: interdisciplinary, critical, and committed to the defense and expansion of democracy through innovative, context-sensitive scholarship.

Jana Ruwayha: Resilient or Regressive? How Crisis Governance Reshapes the Democratic Future of ‘The People’

In her sharp and timely presentation, Jana Ruwayha (University of Geneva) examined how the normalization of emergency powers in liberal democracies reshapes the role and agency of “the people” within democratic governance.

In her incisive presentation, Jana Ruwayha, a PhD candidate at the University of Geneva’s Faculty of Law and a teaching and research assistant at the Global Studies Institute, interrogated the growing normalization of emergency powers in liberal democracies and its implications for the democratic role of “the people.” Through a combination of legal analysis and Complex Adaptive Systems Theory (CAST)—a framework more commonly used in the sciences—Ruwayha provided an interdisciplinary lens to assess how governance during crises may either deepen resilience or accelerate democratic regression.

Ruwayha began by challenging the “classical emergency paradigm,” which traditionally views emergencies as temporary, exceptional, and proportional deviations from normal legal order, with the ultimate aim of returning to a pre-crisis status quo. Historically, such frameworks were rooted in legal constructs like the Roman dictatorship (limited to six months) or post–World War II constitutional safeguards in Europe designed to prevent authoritarian overreach. Emergencies were viewed as akin to a light switch: clearly demarcated, temporally bound, and reversible.

However, Ruwayha argued that this binary view is increasingly obsolete. The crises of our time—whether the COVID-19 pandemic, the global war on terror, or the Russian invasion of Ukraine—are interconnected, prolonged, and overlapping. They do not “switch off,” but instead operate on a dimmer switch of intensities, gradually embedding emergency logics into ordinary governance. This metaphor, borrowed from legal scholar Stephanie Boucher, illustrates how democratic erosion becomes incremental and opaque, making it harder for citizens to discern when normal governance ends and emergency rule begins.

To map these shifts, Ruwayha applied CAST to legal systems, conceptualizing them as nonlinear, dynamic, and interconnected networks. This approach illuminated several crucial insights. First, crises introduce “trigger mechanisms”—acute shocks such as terrorist attacks or pandemics—that legitimize sweeping emergency measures. Second, they foster “feedback loops”: public fear and insecurity generated during crises often bolster support for policies that further concentrate power and suppress dissent. Third, prolonged crises may reach “bifurcation points,” forcing democratic systems to choose between adaptation and backsliding. When states normalize exceptional measures and extend them into regular law, they risk entering a condition of “hysteresis”—a point of no return.

Ruwayha substantiated her argument with contemporary examples. In the United States, emergency surveillance powers introduced via the Patriot Act after 9/11 remain largely intact more than two decades later. In France, counterterrorism measures enacted after the 2015 Paris attacks—originally designed to combat jihadist threats—have since been repurposed to target environmental activists and migrants. Similarly, COVID-era public health laws in various countries have institutionalized digital surveillance, mobility restrictions, and data collection—many of which persist despite the waning of the pandemic.

This contamination of ordinary law, Ruwayha warned, undermines foundational democratic principles such as transparency, accountability, and proportionality. It also erodes the legal architecture designed to protect civil liberties, and fosters executive overreach at the expense of parliamentary or judicial scrutiny. At the discursive level, governments increasingly rely on crisis rhetoric—characterizing challenges as existential threats and invoking metaphors of war (e.g., “war on terror,” “battle against the virus”)—which not only legitimizes exceptionalism but also fuels populist narratives that portray “the people” as besieged by external or internal enemies.

Here, Ruwayha highlighted the paradox at the heart of emergency governance: while it is often justified in the name of protecting “the people,” it simultaneously sidelines them from meaningful participation in shaping policy. “The people” become passive subjects to be secured, rather than active democratic agents. 

Against this bleak backdrop, Ruwayha turned to the notion of resilience—not as a return to pre-crisis normalcy, but as the ability of democratic systems to adapt, endure, and regenerate without abandoning core values. She outlined three pillars of resilient legal systems: Robustness – the capacity to withstand disruptions while upholding democratic norms. Adaptability – the flexibility to recalibrate laws and institutions in response to evolving threats. Recovery potential – the ability to regain full democratic functionality post-crisis without suffering permanent distortion.

Resilient governance, Ruwayha contended, requires more than legal insulation; it demands participatory structures that preserve the voice of the people during and after crises. This involves strengthening democratic feedback mechanisms, embedding civil society oversight, and ensuring constitutional safeguards that are not easily overridden by executive discretion. Drawing connections to other presentations in the panel, she emphasized that inclusive, grassroots engagement—such as citizen assemblies or bottom-up accountability initiatives—are indispensable to counter the instrumentalization of crises by populist actors.

In conclusion, Ruwayha’s presentation made a forceful case for rethinking the democratic implications of long-term emergency governance. She urged scholars and practitioners to abandon the myth of the “short-term exception” and recognize that today’s emergencies are shaping a new legal equilibrium. Whether this equilibrium is resilient or regressive, she argued, will depend on how institutions are reconfigured and whether “the people” are empowered as central actors in crisis governance. Her framework—combining legal theory with systems thinking—offered a powerful interdisciplinary contribution to understanding how democracy can be defended, not only through law, but through collective vigilance and participatory renewal.

Özge Derman: The Performative Power of the ‘We’ in Occupy Wall Street and Gezi Movement

In her richly interdisciplinary and empirically grounded presentation, Özge Derman (PhD, Sciences Po and Sorbonne University) explored how the collective “we” is visually, bodily, and discursively constructed through performative acts of togetherness in post-2010 protest movements—namely, Occupy Wall Street (New York, 2011) and the Gezi Park protests (Istanbul, 2013). Drawing on fieldwork, interviews, archival material, and theories from political philosophy and performance studies, Dr. Derman made a compelling case for understanding social movements not merely through ideological content or institutional outcomes, but through their embodied and creative enactments of solidarity and dissent.

Dr. Derman began by situating her work within a broader theoretical framework, particularly the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt and Judith Butler. As Arendt reminds us in The Human Condition, power arises when people act in concert in public space. Yet this power is inherently ephemeral, lasting only as long as people continue to appear, speak, and act together. Building on this, Butler emphasizes the performative nature of political assembly—the way bodies materialize dissent and generate public space through their presence, speech, and action. Dr. Derman took these insights further to argue that the “we” of democratic resistance is not a fixed or homogenous identity, but a precarious, plural, and performatively constituted subjectivity.

To investigate this dynamic, Dr. Derman employed a qualitative methodology involving semi-structured interviews with activists, participant observation, and analysis of both traditional and digital archives. She framed her inquiry around how the “we” emerges not from shared ideology, but from acts of co-presence, speech, and performance that reconfigure urban space and challenge hegemonic narratives.

In Occupy Wall Street, Dr. Derman observed how protestors reclaimed Zuccotti Park in the heart of New York’s financial district, creating an experimental space of non-hierarchical, direct democracy. General Assemblies were held daily, enabling collective decision-making through consensus rather than majoritarian voting. Importantly, the protestors adopted creative tools to circumvent legal restrictions—most notably, the “human microphone” (a call-and-repeat communication method) and hand signals, both of which emphasized listening, repetition, and embodied consensus. These practices disrupted conventional oratory and leadership models, fostering what activists called “leaderlessness” or “leaderfulness”—forms of horizontal organization where every voice, especially those traditionally marginalized, could be heard.

Dr. Derman highlighted how the slogan “We are the 99%” encapsulated this collective subjectivity. Far from a rigid class category, the phrase acted as a discursive and visual representation of solidarity, uniting debt-ridden students, unemployed workers, and housing activists under a shared opposition to the global financial elite. The slogan’s visual dissemination—in banners, digital media, street art, and performative projections (such as the iconic “bat signal” on the Verizon building)—allowed the “we” to materialize across physical and digital platforms.

In Istanbul’s Gezi movement, similar performative articulations of the “we” took root. Here, too, urban space—Gezi Park and Taksim Square—was transformed through encampments, assemblies, and artistic interventions. One of the most emblematic performative acts was that of the “Standing Man” (Duran Adam), a silent dancer who stood immobile for eight hours to protest police brutality. His non-verbal act of resistance quickly became contagious, replicated by individuals across Turkey and online. Dr. Derman described this as a moment where a single body became a performative catalyst, activating a dispersed and resilient collective “we”—a political choreography of stillness that reclaimed public space through vulnerability and silence.

Notably, Dr. Derman emphasized that these performative enactments were not free of conflict or contradiction. In both Occupy and Gezi, internal tensions emerged—from disagreements over the role of drumming collectives in Zuccotti Park, which disrupted deliberations, to ideological schisms within Gezi between secularists, feminists, Kurds, and Islamists. Yet these tensions, rather than undermining the movements, served to reveal the heterogeneity of democratic action. Drawing on Jacques Rancière, Dr. Derman suggested that these “conflictual disruptions” were themselves forms of politics—moments where the established order is contested and new forms of inclusion imagined.

Dr. Derman further examined how symbols and slogans became sites of performative identification. In Occupy, the blog “We Are the 99 Percent” allowed individuals to narrate their struggles, visually linking diverse lives into a common narrative of injustice. In Gezi, the figure of the “Çapulcu” (roughly translated as “looter”)—a term initially used by then-Prime Minister Erdoğan to delegitimize protestors—was ironically reclaimed by activists as a badge of resistance. T-shirts, graffiti, memes, and even Noam Chomsky’s public declaration (“I am a Çapulcu”) reinforced the idea of a collective identity forged through performance and creativity.

Despite the ephemeral nature of both movements, Dr. Derman argued that their performative legacies endure. The aesthetic and discursive repertoires developed in Occupy and Gezi continue to inspire new generations of protest, offering alternatives to top-down politics through acts of improvisation, embodiment, and mutual recognition. These movements did not produce traditional party structures or electoral victories, but they redefined political space, rendering visible new forms of democratic agency.

In her conclusion, Dr. Derman returned to Arendt’s formulation that power arises when people “are with others,” not necessarily for or against them. In both Occupy and Gezi, the “we” was not a predetermined category but a performative constellation—a fleeting yet potent political form. Through creative enactments of togetherness, protestors generated a space where direct democracy, dissent, and solidarity could be experimented with in real time. 

Ultimately, Dr. Derman’s presentation offered a nuanced, affective, and visually rich account of how democratic subjects emerge in protest. By tracing the embodied practices, affective resonances, and symbolic innovations of two landmark movements, she illuminated the transformative power of performative “we-ness.”

Conclusion

Panel VI, “The ‘People’ in Search of Democracy,” concluded with an enriched understanding of how democratic agency is redefined in contemporary contexts of crisis, social resistance, and performative politics. From the outset, Chair Dr. Max Steuer framed the discussion with a provocative question: can democracy exist without “the people”? This critical inquiry anchored a session that interrogated democracy not as a fixed institutional arrangement, but as a dynamic field of struggle, rearticulation, and reimagination.

Through Rashad Seedeen’s synthesis of Gramsci and Wright, the panel explored how democratic deepening must be anchored in civil society’s ideological and institutional labor, especially when practiced from within historically marginalized communities. Jana Ruwayha’s legal-systems approach revealed the creeping normalization of emergency governance and the risks it poses to democratic resilience. Özge Derman’s analysis of the Occupy and Gezi movements showed how democratic subjectivities form not only through formal structures but through aesthetic, embodied acts of collective presence and dissent.

Taken together, the panel demonstrated that “the people” are not a singular, stable identity but an ever-contested construct—sometimes excluded, sometimes mobilized, always central to the democratic imagination. Whether through grassroots utopias, legal resilience, or performative solidarity, the search for democracy is ongoing, multifaceted, and urgent. Panel VI offered a compelling, interdisciplinary contribution to the ECPS Conference 2025, reminding us that democracy’s future lies in rethinking who “the people” are—and who they might yet become.


 

Note: To experience the panel’s dynamic and thought-provoking Q&A session, we encourage you to watch the full video recording above.

 

At Panel 5 of the ECPS Conference 2025, titled "Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations," scholars explored how nationalism, religion, race, and populist politics intersect to shape fractured political identities across Europe and beyond.

ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel 5 — Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations

Please cite as: 
ECPS Staff. (2025). “ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel 5 — Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations.”  European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00111

 

Panel V of the ECPS Conference 2025, “Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations,” held on July 2 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, explored how contested constructions of “the people” are shaped by populist discourse across national, religious, and ideological contexts. Co-chaired by Dr. Leila Alieva and Professor Karen Horn, the session featured presentations by Natalie Schwabl (Sorbonne University), Dr. Sarah Riccardi-Swartz (Northeastern University), and Petar S. Ćurčić (Institute of European Studies, Belgrade). The panel examined Catholic nationalism in Croatia, American Christian ethno-populism, and the evolving German left, offering sharp insights into the manipulation of collective identity and memory in populist projects. Bridging multiple regions and disciplines, the panel revealed populism’s capacity to reframe belonging in deeply exclusionary and globally resonant ways.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel V of the ECPS Conference 2025, titled Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations, convened on July 2, 2025 at St Cross College, Oxford, under the overarching theme of “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This intellectually charged session examined the fractured and contested constructions of “the people” across varied historical, cultural, and political contexts, focusing particularly on how populist discourse navigates religious identity, memory politics, and socio-political polarization.

Co-chaired by Dr. Leila Alieva (Associate Researcher, Russian and East European Studies, Oxford School of Global and Area Studies) and Professor Karen Horn (Professor of Economic Thought, University of Erfurt), the session benefitted from their combined expertise in post-Soviet transformation, democratic theory, and political economy. Dr. Alieva welcomed the audience by underlining the significance of case-driven approaches to dissecting populism’s conceptual ambiguity and real-world diversity. 

The panel featured three analytically rigorous and empirically rich presentations. Natalie Schwabl (Sorbonne University) opened with a diachronic analysis of Catholic nationalism in Croatia, demonstrating how the term Hrvatski narod has been sacralized, politicized, and manipulated by state and ecclesiastical actors from the Ustaša period through post-socialist independence. Sarah Riccardi-Swartz (Northeastern University) followed with a provocative ethnographic account of American far-right Christian nationalism, highlighting transnational alignments between U.S. Orthodox converts and Russian illiberalism. Finally, Petar S. Ćurčić (Institute of European Studies, Belgrade) offered a comparative analysis of Die Linke and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance in Germany, interrogating whether a coherent form of left-wing populism is still viable amid competing ideological pressures and electoral challenges.

Under the guidance of the co-chairs, the session provided a vibrant space for critical reflection and scholarly dialogue. The panel’s breadth of focus—from Southeastern Europe to the US and Germany—underscored the global entanglements of populist discourse and the enduring power of identity politics in shaping both democratic crisis and populist resurgence.

Natalie Schwabl: Catholicism and Nationalism in Croatia: The Use and Misuse of ‘Hrvatski Narod’

In a historically informed and sharply analytical talk at the ECPS Conference 2025, Natalie Schwabl (Sorbonne University) examined how Catholicism and nationalism intersect in shaping Croatian identity, focusing on the symbolic use of Hrvatski narod (“the Croatian people”).

In her historically grounded and analytically incisive presentation at the ECPS Conference 2025, Natalie Schwabl, a doctoral candidate at the Sorbonne University, explored the entangled relationship between Catholicism, nationalism, and the construction of the Croatian national identity—specifically through the discursive deployment of the term Hrvatski narod (“the Croatian people”). Her talk, “Catholicism and Nationalism in Croatia: The Use and Misuse of ‘Hrvatski Narod’,” offered a compelling diachronic examination of how religious symbolism and political narratives have fused across different regimes to forge, sacralize, and instrumentalize national identity.

Schwabl opened her presentation by quoting historian Matveyevich, who warned of the ideological reshaping of national consciousness through mythmaking. This interpretive lens framed the entirety of her presentation, which tracked how Croatian nationalism, especially in the 20th century, was often undergirded by religious imaginaries and selectively mythologized histories. She laid out a chronological structure that traced the evolving concept of Hrvatski narod, highlighting its oscillations between heroization, victimization, and erasure, depending on the prevailing political regime.

Central to Schwabl’s analysis was the Catholic Church’s enduring role in shaping Croatian identity, especially during periods when Croatia lacked formal statehood. In both Yugoslav periods, the Church served as a surrogate national institution, reinforcing a millenarian narrative that aligned Croatia with Catholic Western Europe while casting its Orthodox and Muslim neighbors as alien others. She underscored the Church’s dual role: as both a spiritual guardian and a political actor, contributing to the persistence of a civilizational us versus them discourse.

In her discussion of the interwar period and the rise of the Ustaša movement in the 1930s, Schwabl provided a detailed account of how the movement drew heavily on 19th-century Catholic-nationalist ideas. Thinkers such as Ante Starčević and later ideologues developed a narrative of divine providence, framing Croats as a chosen people with a sacred duty to protect Western Christendom from Eastern encroachment. This narrative found powerful visual and rhetorical expression in the fascist puppet state known as the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), established in 1941 under Ante Pavelić with Nazi and Italian backing.

Schwabl examined the NDH’s ideological apparatus, showing how Catholic symbols, medievalist imagery, and notions of providential destiny were mobilized to construct a sacralized Croatian national myth. Examples included newspapers like Hrvatski narod, iconography invoking the Virgin Mary as the nation’s protector, and reinterpretations of medieval history to justify contemporary political goals. She identified these deployments as examples of “medievalism”—a selective invocation of historical tropes to legitimize nationalist claims.

The presentation then turned to the Titoist period (1945–1980), where the Yugoslav state promoted a new supranational identity centered on brotherhood and unity. Under this second Yugoslavia, Schwabl noted, the concept of narod was depoliticized and homogenized into the abstract figure of the “Yugoslav people.” The violence and complicity of Croatian actors during World War II were largely subsumed under a collective narrative of anti-fascist resistance, sidelining culpability while emphasizing shared suffering under Nazi and Axis occupation. Drawing on Luca Manucci’s theoretical framework, Schwabl mapped how this period was characterized by a triad of memory strategies: victimizationheroization, and cancellation of culpability.

Crucially, Schwabl argued that this historical amnesia laid the groundwork for the resurgence of nationalist sentiment during the Croatian Spring of the 1970s and especially in the post-1991 independence period. The Croatian Catholic Church regained institutional and symbolic prominence, often supporting revisionist interpretations of history that glorified the Ustaša regime or downplayed its atrocities. Under President Franjo Tuđman, state-Church relations intensified, with promises made to restore ecclesiastical rights and national memory restructured through a nationalist lens. The destruction of anti-fascist monuments and their replacement with Catholic and national symbols in Herzegovina served, in Schwabl’s view, as a clear example of memoricide—the systematic rewriting of public memory to align with a new ideological order.

In her final sections, Schwabl turned to contemporary Croatia. She illustrated the persistence of fascist-era symbols and slogans in public life, particularly in emotionally charged moments such as football matches or nationalist commemorations. Phrases like “Za dom spremni” (“For the homeland, ready”), once used by the Ustaša, continue to circulate, sometimes with the tacit or explicit approval of clergy. The blending of Church colors, Vatican symbolism, and national flags at public events exemplifies the dual appropriation of religion for nationalist purposes and the Church’s active participation in shaping political narratives.

Throughout her presentation, Schwabl remained attentive to the historical continuities and ruptures in the use of Hrvatski narod. She emphasized that this term has not remained stable over time but has been redefined and repurposed across different ideological regimes—monarchical, fascist, communist, and post-socialist. Each reconfiguration involved the intertwining of religious myth, political opportunism, and selective memory, often producing exclusionary and essentialist visions of national identity.

Her critical insight lay in revealing the instrumental use of religion not for theological reflection, but as a legitimizing force in nationalist projects. The Croatian case, she argued, offers a potent example of how the sacred can be weaponized for the political—and how institutions like the Church can both shape and be shaped by the forces of populism and ethno-nationalism.

In conclusion, Schwabl’s presentation was a methodologically rich and theoretically robust contribution to the ECPS Conference. By unpacking the symbolic, historical, and political dimensions of Hrvatski narod, she demonstrated how the politics of belonging in Croatia have been built upon—and continue to rely upon—the selective invocation of Catholicism, historical memory, and national myth. Her work not only sheds light on Croatia’s past and present, but also offers critical tools for interrogating the broader dynamics of religious nationalism and populist memory politics in post-socialist Europe.

Sarah Riccardi-Swartz: ‘Become Ungovernable:’ Covert Tactics, Racism, and Civilizational Catastrophe

In a methodologically robust and compelling presentation, Dr. Sarah Riccardi-Swartz (Northeastern University) analyzed how Christian nationalism, racialized populism, and civilizational discourse intersect within the contemporary American far right.

In her deeply compelling and methodologically rich presentation, Dr. Sarah Riccardi-Swartz (Assistant Professor of Religion and Anthropology at Northeastern University) addressed the complex convergence of Christian nationalism, racialized populism, and civilizational rhetoric in the contemporary American far right. Drawing on ethnographic research, digital media analysis, and transnational theoretical frameworks, Dr. Riccardi-Swartz traced how far-right American Christians are constructing an ideologically potent imaginary of “becoming ungovernable”—a theological-political vision grounded in racial purity, anti-democratic sentiment, and an admiration for Russia’s illiberal authoritarianism.

The presentation began with Dr. Riccardi-Swartz recounting the symbolic and ideological affinities articulated by groups such as the League of the South, which has praised cultural and “bloodline” similarities between white Southerners and Russians. Such transnational rhetorical gestures serve to legitimize a shared civilizational project among white Christian ethno-nationalists, linking the American South to Putin’s Russia. In particular, figures like Michael Hill, Christopher Caldwell, and digital influencers have framed Russia as a bulwark against Western liberalism, multiculturalism, and globalism—values they associate with societal decay.

Central to Dr. Riccardi-Swartz’s argument is the paradoxical desire among these actors for both securitization and rebellion: the wish to reimpose a stable, morally homogenous society governed by Christian traditionalism, and simultaneously, the desire to become “ungovernable” within the framework of liberal democratic institutions they reject. In this vision, civilizational collapse becomes not a threat to be averted but a purifying crucible through which white Christian dominance might be re-established.

Her case study of Rebecca Dillingham, an Orthodox Christian content creator known as “Dissident Mama,” powerfully illustrated these dynamics. A former atheist and feminist turned traditionalist, Dillingham represents a new genre of far-right micro-celebrities who fuse religious conviction with white nationalist nostalgia. Her media content blends neo-Confederate symbolism, theological commentary, and conspiratorial narratives of white marginalization, all situated within a broader rejection of the American liberal order.

Dr. Riccardi-Swartz traced Dillingham’s affiliations to the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) and her support of Putin’s geopolitical vision. Her digital content, broadcast across platforms and amplified through networks of far-right actors, promotes the mythos of white victimhood and Christian civilization under siege. She positions herself and her followers not just as culture warriors, but as defenders of an imagined moral order threatened by racial diversity, gender equality, and religious pluralism.

This fusion of Southern American nationalism with Orthodox Christian traditionalism, Dr. Riccardi-Swartz argued, reflects a larger movement among disaffected white Christians seeking sanctuary in Russia’s illiberalism. Russia, she demonstrated, has been rebranded in American far-right circles as a moral stronghold. This is evidenced by events like the World Congress of Families and by the alignment of Russian state ideology with anti-LGBTQ+ legislation, anti-feminism, and civilizational rhetoric centered on the Christian family.

Dr. Riccardi-Swartz located these trends within a longer history of white anxieties about demographic change, migration, and the collapse of racial hierarchies—what some frame as “white genocide.” However, in the digital age, these concerns are refracted through coded language and aesthetic strategies that allow for broader reach while evading direct censorship. She highlighted how new media technologies facilitate connections between American Christian nationalists and Russian Orthodox actors, allowing for transnational collaborations that rest on shared disdain for liberalism, modernity, and secularism.

Particularly disturbing, Dr. Riccardi-Swartz noted, is the resurgence of anti-Semitism and the valorization of violence. She referenced the paramilitary aspirations of groups like “The Base,” a neo-Nazi organization with operational links across the US, Russia, and Ukraine. Such networks, she argued, seek to create a white ethnostate that is unmoored from geography but unified ideologically through faith, race, and militant opposition to modern democratic institutions.

Quoting Michael Hill and other white nationalist voices, Dr. Riccardi-Swartz demonstrated how such figures view Putin’s Russia as both inspiration and ally. The invocation of spiritual warfare, “defense of the motherland,” and the Christianization of the geopolitical domain are rhetorical strategies used to frame authoritarianism as not only legitimate but divinely sanctioned.

In her concluding reflections, Dr. Riccardi-Swartz drew upon political theorist Michael Feola’s assertion that ethno-nationalism’s defining feature lies in the racialized construction of “the people.” For actors like Dillingham, whiteness and Christianity become the twin axes of moral legitimacy and national destiny. Populist suspicion of elites is not only political but deeply existential—framed as a struggle for the survival of civilization itself.

Thus, Dr. Riccardi-Swartz’s presentation unveiled the theological undercurrents of contemporary white Christian nationalism as more than a reactionary cultural force. It is, she contended, an apocalyptic vision that seeks to re-found the political order on notions of racial purity, heteronormative family values, and religious homogeneity. In doing so, it constitutes a transnational illiberal project—one that sees in Russia not an enemy of the West, but the last hope for its imagined civilizational continuity.

This presentation, situated at the intersection of religion, digital anthropology, and political extremism, was one of the most provocative of the ECPS Conference 2025. It illuminated the global dimensions of far-right mobilization, the spiritualized grammar of white grievance, and the alarming ideological bridges being built between American dissidents and Russian ethno-authoritarians. Dr. Riccardi-Swartz’s work offers a crucial lens for understanding how populism, religion, and racism co-produce new imaginaries of power and belonging in the post-liberal era.

Petar S. Ćurčić: Is There Left-wing Populism Today? A Case Study of the German Left and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance

In a historically grounded and analytically precise presentation, Petar S. Ćurčić (Institute of European Studies, Belgrade) examined the current relevance of left-wing populism in Europe, interrogating its presence through the lens of political theory and electoral developments.

In his analytically detailed and historically informed presentation, Petar S. Ćurčić, Research Associate at the Institute of European Studies in Belgrade, tackled a pressing question at the intersection of political theory and contemporary electoral dynamics: does left-wing populism still exist in Europe today? Through a comparative case study of Die Linke (The Left Party) and the Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW, Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance for Reason and Justice), Ćurčić examined the evolving contours of left-populist mobilization in Germany in the context of broader ideological fragmentation, party realignment, and the competing appeals of radical left and right formations.

Framing his inquiry within the theoretical lens of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s discourse on populism—particularly the dialectic between radical reformism and revolutionary politics—Ćurčić identified post-reunification Germany as a key site where the legacy of East German socialism, structural transformations in the political economy, and shifting voter coalitions continue to shape the prospects of left populism. The fusion of the post-communist PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) with disaffected elements of the SPD (Social Democratic Party) in the early 2000s birthed Die Linke, but the new formation was beset by internal ideological divisions that compromised coherence and hindered long-term consolidation.

The presentation mapped the electoral landscape following Germany’s 2024 federal elections, which saw Die Linke gain an unexpected boost (8.8% of the vote and six direct mandates) while the BSW failed to pass the 5% threshold required for parliamentary representation. Interestingly, Die Linke’s modest resurgence was interpreted as a function of its return to a clear outsider status, recapturing disillusioned voters from the Greens and SPD, especially those dissatisfied with the Ampelkoalition (traffic light coalition). By contrast, the BSW’s populist promise—centered around Sahra Wagenknecht’s personalized leadership and contrarian stances—sputtered under internal contradictions, policy ambiguities, and a misreading of the electorate’s tolerance for anti-immigration rhetoric within a left-wing frame.

In the first analytical section, Ćurčić assessed socioeconomic policy as the bedrock of left-wing populist appeal. Both Die Linke and BSW espoused redistributive agendas: nationalizing large housing corporations, advocating public ownership, and taxing the ultra-wealthy. These were classical populist demands—aimed at mobilizing economically marginalized constituencies against “the rich” and “corporate elites.” Yet Ćurčić noted that BSW’s more cautious embrace of this rhetoric, due to concerns about capital flight and economic stagnation, signaled strategic ambivalence.

The second dimension of analysis—migration—revealed a sharper divergence between the parties. Die Linke remained staunchly pro-immigration, defending asylum rights and inclusive multiculturalism. BSW, by contrast, advocated for migration quotas and structured assimilation—a position veering into exclusionary populist discourse more typically associated with the radical right. Although framed as a defense of working-class interests, BSW’s appeal to migration referenda (legally unviable under German constitutional law) and regional party divisions—particularly in Bavaria—highlighted both the ideological risks and operational incoherence of such positioning. Ćurčić stressed that while BSW distanced itself from AfD’s overt xenophobia, it flirted with similarly populist tropes of national destabilization through immigration.

In the third section, Ćurčić addressed the anti-fascist orientation of left populism, contrasting the firewall politics (Brandmauerpolitik) of Die Linke—a refusal to cooperate with the far-right AfD—with BSW’s critique of such strategies. While Die Linke called for mass mobilization against fascism, including street protests and institutional exclusion of AfD, BSW positioned itself as a defender of “dissenting opinion” against political correctness and establishment censorship. Wagenknecht’s rhetoric reframed the anti-AfD consensus as authoritarian overreach, drawing criticism from within her own ranks for weakening democratic resistance to extremism.

The fourth point delved into political strategy and engagement with state institutions—an often-neglected dimension in populism studies. Ćurčić underscored the strategic dilemma of left-wing populists when transitioning from opposition to governance. BSW’s brief coalition experiments in Thuringia and Brandenburg, followed by a decline in electoral support, were emblematic of the broader challenge populist parties face when tasked with compromise and administration. In response to electoral setbacks, BSW alleged vote-counting irregularities—a narrative tactic borrowed from right-wing populism and suggestive of eroding trust in democratic institutions. In contrast, Die Linke used its electoral gains to press for constitutional reforms (notably the abolition of Germany’s debt brake) and anchored itself in parliamentary activism rather than populist delegitimation of the system.

The final section of the presentation explored populist responses to war, particularly in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza. Ćurčić explained how Die Linke redefined its foreign policy stance by condemning Russian aggression and advocating a multilateral peace initiative involving the EU and Global South actors. This marked a break from its earlier ambiguity and showcased an anti-militarist, solidarity-based foreign policy that resisted both NATO interventionism and Kremlin propaganda. BSW, on the other hand, adopted an anti-war discourse rooted in economic nationalism and skepticism of Atlanticist geopolitics. Wagenknecht’s critiques of NATO expansion and warnings about Germany’s economic vulnerabilities mirrored some elements of Kremlin talking points, raising concerns about the resonance of such narratives with disaffected constituencies in Eastern Germany.

In conclusion, Ćurčić contended that the German left is undergoing a deep recalibration of its populist potential. While both Die Linke and BSW articulate critiques of neoliberalism and centrist consensus, their strategic divergences on migration, anti-fascism, institutional engagement, and foreign policy illustrate fundamentally different visions of what left-wing populism can be. For Die Linke, the path lies in reinvigorating class-based solidarities and institutional legitimacy. For BSW, the wager is on a heterodox populism that blends left economics with cultural conservatism—an experiment that, thus far, appears to have reached its electoral limits. Ćurčić suggested that the future of left-wing populism in Germany may depend on its ability to both differentiate itself from the radical right and avoid internal fragmentation in the face of complex societal challenges.

Conclusion

Panel V, Governing the ‘People’: Divided Nations, provided a timely and multi-dimensional exploration of how populist narratives around national identity, religion, race, and ideology are constructed, contested, and reconfigured across diverse geopolitical contexts. Drawing from richly sourced case studies—Croatia, the United States, and Germany—the panel offered nuanced insights into the ways in which “the people” are defined, governed, and mobilized in fractured democratic landscapes.

A recurring theme across the three presentations was the instrumentalization of collective identity—be it religious, racial, or class-based—for populist ends. Natalie Schwabl’s historical excavation of Croatian Catholic nationalism demonstrated how sacralized narratives of belonging, buttressed by the Church and selectively curated memory politics, can be wielded to legitimize exclusionary nationalisms. In parallel, Sarah Riccardi-Swartz’s ethnographic investigation into white Christian nationalism in the United States spotlighted the globalizing, digitally mediated dimensions of populist theology and its alignment with illiberal, transnational authoritarianism. Petar S. Ćurčić’s comparative study of Germany’s left-wing populist spectrum added further depth by analyzing intra-left tensions over migration, anti-fascism, and institutional trust in the wake of electoral realignments.

Together, these contributions not only affirmed the conference’s interdisciplinary ethos but also challenged simplistic binaries between populist left and right, secular and religious, or nationalist and globalist. Instead, they highlighted the hybrid and often paradoxical formations populism takes in contemporary political life. Under the thoughtful stewardship of co-chairs Dr. Leila Alieva and Professor Karen Horn, the session fostered critical reflection on the global entanglements of populist discourse and the urgent need for historically informed, context-sensitive scholarship to navigate the complexities of democratic backsliding and contested belonging in the 21st century.


 

Note: To experience the panel’s dynamic and thought-provoking Q&A session, we encourage you to watch the full video recording above.

Participants of Roundtable II – "'The People' in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought" engage in a vibrant discussion on political philosophy, populism, and the contested meanings of ‘the people’ at St Cross College, University of Oxford.

ECPS Conference 2025 / Roundtable II — ‘The People’ in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “ECPS Conference 2025 / Roundtable II — ‘The People’ in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 10, 2025.  https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00112

 

Held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, as part of the ECPS Conference 2025 (“We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” July 1–3), Roundtable II offered a wide-ranging philosophical and political interrogation of how “the people” is theorized, invoked, and contested in contemporary democratic thought. Chaired by Dr. Aviezer Tucker (University of Ostrava), the session featured presentations by Naomi Waltham-Smith (Oxford), Bruno Godefroy (Tours), Karen Horn (Erfurt), and Julian F. Müller (Graz). Together, the panel explored the rhetorical, constitutional, and epistemic instabilities surrounding the concept of “the people,” challenging static or essentialist understandings and calling for renewed attention to pluralism, temporality, and audibility within liberal democratic frameworks.

Reported by ECPS Staff

At the ECPS Conference 2025, held from July 1–3 at St Cross College, University of Oxford under the theme “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” Roundtable II offered a particularly provocative and philosophically expansive exploration of the populist challenge to liberal democratic thought. Chaired by Dr. Aviezer Tucker (University of Ostrava), the session titled “‘The People’ in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought”assembled a diverse array of perspectives, traversing political theory, music philosophy, legal studies, and liberal political economy.

As chair, Dr. Tucker aptly remarked on the intellectual breadth of the panel—a “smorgasbord” (smörgåsbord) of approaches that might well result in an Eintopf, or philosophical stew. With four distinct yet interrelated presentations, the roundtable demonstrated both the urgency and conceptual richness of current debates surrounding democratic legitimacy, popular sovereignty, and the epistemic ruptures posed by populism.

The sequence began with Professor Naomi Waltham-Smith (University of Oxford), whose philosophical interrogation of “listening to the people” challenged political theorists to take seriously the ontological and rhetorical weight of listening in democratic discourse. She provocatively reclassified both “listening” and “the people” as “impossible concepts,” offering a compelling intervention that bridged musical aesthetics and democratic theory.

Next, Associate Professor Bruno Godefroy (University of Tours) advanced a bold normative framework that redefined “the people” in temporal rather than essentialist terms. Arguing for a “presentist” conception grounded in the authority of the living generation, Godefroy called for a democratic constitutionalism that embraces periodic renewal over historical entrenchment.

Finally, Professors Karen Horn (University of Erfurt) and Julian F. Müller (University of Graz) co-presented insights from their edited volume Liberal Responses to Populism. While Professor Horn charted the liberal tradition’s internal reckoning with populism, Professor Müller offered a theoretically rigorous diagnosis of populism’s epistemic incompatibility with liberal democracy—underscoring its rejection of pluralism, compromise, and fallibility.

In sum, Roundtable II embodied the interdisciplinary ethos of the ECPS Conference. Under Dr. Tucker’s guidance, the panel created a dynamic intellectual space in which normative theory, conceptual critique, and institutional reflection could intersect to reassess one of the most contested categories in contemporary politics: the people.

Naomi Waltham-Smith: Listening to ‘the People’: Impossible Concepts in Political Philosophy

At Roundtable 2 of the ECPS Conference 2025, Professor Naomi Waltham-Smith (University of Oxford) offered a deeply reflective and conceptually bold presentation exploring the political and philosophical significance of the often-invoked terms “listening” and “the people.”

In a rigorously reflective and conceptually adventurous presentation delivered during Roundtable 2 of the ECPS Conference 2025, Professor Naomi Waltham-Smith (Music Faculty, University of Oxford) interrogated the political and philosophical stakes of two deceptively ordinary yet persistently invoked terms in contemporary public life: listening and the people. Speaking with evident intellectual clarity, Professor Waltham-Smith situated her remarks within her ongoing project exploring the philosophy of listening—an inquiry that traverses music, political thought, and rhetorical analysis.

Her central argument unfolded around the notion that both “listening” and “the people” are impossible concepts: the former is conceptually vague yet rhetorically ubiquitous, while the latter is theoretically contested and politically volatile. Drawing on a wide-ranging archive of political speech—from Margaret Thatcher’s leadership bid to Mike Huckabee’s Trumpist populism— Professor Waltham-Smith demonstrated how politicians frequently promise to “listen to the people” as a performative gesture, often substituting this phrase for concrete political accountability. Citing examples from both sides of the Atlantic, she showed how this rhetorical move appears across ideological lines, from Thatcher and Tony Blair to contemporary figures like Zoran Mamdani and Lord Ashdown.

Professor Waltham-Smith argued that listening, despite its popular currency, is notably absent from the lexicon of political philosophy. Unlike concepts such as democracy, equality, or sovereignty, listening rarely appears in political theory’s formal vocabulary. Yet, paradoxically, it functions as a universalizing metaphor in democratic discourse—an elastic term used to build consensus, gloss over division, and offer reassurance without structural change. It carries an emotional and ethical charge that often masks its conceptual vagueness, which she characterized as a kind of “polysemy without politics.” In this way, listening becomes an ideologically neutral placeholder, performatively invoked but seldom critically examined.

In contrast, the people is a thoroughly theorized but equally problematic concept—particularly in the tradition of Carl Schmitt, who identifies political concepts as “contested” in both subject and usage. Professor Waltham-Smith emphasized that “the people” is often wielded to draw friend/enemy distinctions, collapsing plural constituencies into singular identities for the sake of rhetorical force. Here, the concept becomes both powerful and exclusionary, prone to being mobilized against its own pluralistic potential.

To further illustrate the “impossibility” of listening as a political concept, Professor Waltham-Smith offered a theoretical taxonomy of current political analyses that presuppose a crisis of listening—even if they do not name it as such. She identified three dominant frameworks: first, the cultural backlash thesis, which views the rise of right-wing populism as a reaction to liberal, post-materialist value shifts that ignored traditionalist constituencies; second, a political-economic critique that sees party de-alignment and neoliberal technocracy as failures to respond to the socio-economic demands of core electorates; and third, a structural critique of neoliberal governance as inherently anti-democratic, intentionally limiting popular voice through selective responsiveness and institutional silencing.

Each of these frameworks, she argued, can be interpreted as responding to a deficit of listening—whether understood as empathy, responsiveness, or structural audibility. Yet, listening, in these contexts, remains undertheorized. Its presence is symptomatic of a deeper malaise in democratic representation, but it is rarely elevated to the level of philosophical scrutiny. Professor Waltham-Smith thus proposed that we must begin treating listening as a political concept in its own right, not merely as an affective or rhetorical gesture.

Her intervention was also historical. Tracing the problem of listening back to classical contract theorists like Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, she explored how each understood the sovereign’s relationship to popular voice. While Hobbes dismissed the need for further listening once authorization had been granted, Locke envisioned more reciprocal dynamics, and Rousseau—most intriguingly—was skeptical of deliberation as a means of producing the general will, fearing it would always be skewed by inequalities in property and voice. Professor Waltham-Smith extended Rousseau’s insight by proposing that listening might serve as a metaphor for justice—not in the abstract legal sense, but in the sense of redistributing audibility across social and political domains.

This concept of “audibility justice” emerges as a potential way to reimagine universalism not as the flattening of difference, but as a careful and contested project of equalizing the conditions for being heard. In this framing, listening is not about passive receptivity or liberal tolerance, but about transforming the structural conditions under which political voice can be articulated, recognized, and responded to.

By the close of her talk, Professor Waltham-Smith had not only traced the genealogies of listening and “the people” through theory and praxis but had also made a compelling case for why political philosophy must take the act—and impossibility—of listening seriously. Her remarks challenged participants to rethink foundational assumptions in democratic theory, opening up a rich terrain for interdisciplinary investigation. In doing so, she embodied the ECPS Conference 2025’s core ambition: to interrogate the boundaries of populism and democracy through fresh conceptual lenses that resist disciplinary silos and easy consensus.

Bruno Godefroy: The Living Generation – A Presentist Conception of the People

During Roundtable 2 of the ECPS Conference 2025, Associate Professor Bruno Godefroy (University of Tours) presented a stimulating talk on “The Living Generation – A Presentist Conception of the People,” offering fresh insights into legal and philosophical understandings of political community.

At Roundtable 2 of the ECPS Conference 2025, Bruno Godefroy, Associate Professor in Law and German at the University of Tours, delivered a thought-provoking presentation titled “The Living Generation – A Presentist Conception of the People.” His intervention advanced a bold normative argument and conceptual reorientation, challenging dominant paradigms in constitutional theory and democratic legitimacy by reframing “the people” as a temporally limited collective: the living generation.

Professor Godefroy’s presentation began with a diagnosis of contemporary democratic malaise. Populism, he argued, does not arise ex nihilo but emerges in response to a persistent and structural crisis of representative democracy. This crisis is visible in phenomena such as the erosion of trust in political institutions, declining party memberships, the inability of democratic regimes to adapt to challenges like climate change, and the growing gap between citizens and elites. Central to this crisis is what Professor Godefroy termed “the paradox of constitutionalism”: while modern constitutional regimes claim legitimacy from the people’s sovereign will, they simultaneously entrench legal and institutional structures designed to resist further exercises of constituent power. In this view, the sovereign people are permitted to speak only once—during the founding moment—and are thereafter placed in constitutional “coma,” unable to reassert their will without triggering accusations of destabilization.

Professor Godefroy’s core concern was to evaluate the different responses to this paradox, particularly in relation to populist constitutionalism. Populists, he observed, often call for the reactivation of constituent power to amend constitutions in the name of reclaiming popular sovereignty. However, while these appeals can initially appear democratic, they frequently result in long-term democratic erosion. Citing the 2007 Venezuelan reforms and the 2012 Hungarian constitution, Professor Godefroy warned that populist-driven constitutional change often concentrates power and undermines institutional checks.

In the face of this dilemma, political theorists tend to fall into two camps. The first adopts a position of constitutional entrenchment, advocating resistance to constitutional change by invoking a transgenerational understanding of “the people”—one that transcends any given generation and anchors sovereignty in an abstract, collective identity. This conception protects institutions from volatile shifts but sidelines the living citizenry’s role in shaping their legal and political order.

The second approach, aligned with democratic constitutionalism, recognizes the partial validity of populist critiques and seeks to deepen democratic participation through controlled, incremental constitutional innovation. However, this perspective lacks a robust alternative conception of “the people.” Professor Godefroy’s intervention aims to fill this conceptual gap by articulating what he called a presentist or living generation conception of the people.

Drawing inspiration from Jefferson, Paine, and Condorcet, Professor Godefroy proposed that the people should be understood not as a transhistorical entity binding the dead, living, and unborn—as Edmund Burke famously claimed—but as the concrete collective of those currently alive. This reorientation reframes political legitimacy around the idea that constitutions and institutions derive authority from the ongoing, renewed consent of the living generation.

To clarify the stakes of this proposal, Professor Godefroy identified two central challenges to any theory of “the people”: the identity problem and the time problem. The identity problem asks how a coherent collective identity of “the people” can be grounded without appealing to fixed traits like ethnicity or culture. Traditional answers often rely on pre-political or essentialist notions, as found in Carl Schmitt’s existential homogeneity or in liberal theorist Alessandro Ferrara’s distinction between ethnos and demos. However, these models risk exclusionary consequences, as evidenced in the 1993 ruling by the German Constitutional Court on the Maastricht Treaty, which declared that democracy was only viable within the homogenous confines of the nation-state.

Professor Godefroy’s presentist alternative circumvents this by anchoring identity not in substance but in temporality and coexistence. The people, he argued, should be seen as a thin, temporally limited collective bound by shared existence rather than immutable characteristics. This view allows for the existence of collective identity without invoking dangerous essentialisms, while retaining the possibility of democratic self-constitution.

The second challenge—the time problem—asks whether the people’s identity and sovereignty are permanent or contingent. The transgenerational conception treats the people as an eternal subject, thereby curbing its capacity to act in time. In contrast, the presentist model insists on sovereignty as inherently temporal: the authority to constitute or reconstitute institutions belongs to the people insofar as they are alive and coexisting. Rather than viewing change as dangerous rupture, Professor Godefroy suggested that periodic constitutional renewal could be a safeguard of democracy, not its threat.

Critically, Professor Godefroy addressed common criticisms of this view. Detractors argue that a temporally limited conception of the people threatens stability and weakens institutional legitimacy. But Professor Godefroy contended that this critique overlooks the democratic necessity of periodic re-legitimation. Without such renewal, constitutions risk becoming vehicles of inert tradition rather than expressions of popular will.

In the final portion of his presentation, Professor Godefroy outlined institutional implications of his theory. He proposed three mechanisms for operationalizing the presentist conception of the people. First, periodic constitutional conventions—as endorsed by Jefferson and Condorcet—could be institutionalized every 20 years, enabling living generations to reaffirm or revise foundational texts. Second, mandatory constitutional referendums, still found in several US states, could require electorates to decide periodically whether to initiate constitutional reform. Third, sunset clauses—or temporary constitutional provisions—could prevent the ossification of laws and allow for regular reconsideration of foundational norms. He pointed to the German Basic Law as a historical example that, while never formally sunsetted, was initially conceived as provisional.

By the end of his presentation, Professor Godefroy had not only challenged dominant constitutional paradigms but had articulated an ambitious, normatively rich, and practically oriented alternative. His conception of the people as the living generation foregrounds coexistence, consent, and temporal finitude as central to democratic legitimacy. In so doing, he offered a compelling framework that reclaims constituent power from both populist excess and technocratic inertia, offering a democratic vision rooted in temporal humility and political responsibility.

Professor Godefroy’s intervention resonated powerfully with the interdisciplinary goals of the ECPS Conference, drawing together legal theory, political philosophy, and democratic practice. His presentist lens invited scholars to rethink how we define “the people,” challenging them to take seriously the sovereignty of the living—not as an abstract slogan but as a constitutional imperative. 

Karen Horn: Liberal Responses to Populism

At Roundtable 2 of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford, Professor Karen Horn (University of Erfurt) offered a nuanced and analytically grounded presentation on “Liberal Responses to Populism,” examining how liberal thought engages with contemporary populist challenges.

At Roundtable 2 of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford, Professor Karen Horn (University of Erfurt) delivered a reflective and analytically rich presentation titled “Liberal Responses to Populism.” Speaking from a third-eye vantage rooted in both historical scholarship and contemporary liberal thought, Professor Horn used the occasion to introduce an important recent anthology she co-edited, also titled Liberal Responses to Populism. The volume, a product of an academic workshop hosted by the interdisciplinary New Ideas in Economic Thought (NEWS) network, was both the backdrop and the scaffolding of her address.

Professor Horn began by situating the work within the broader intellectual infrastructure of NEWS—an international, interdisciplinary network of approximately 200 scholars from philosophy, political science, economics, sociology, and history. Established in Germany in 2015 and increasingly global in scope, NEWS is explicitly non-partisan and non-sectarian, aiming not to advocate specific political agendas but to foster rigorous inquiry across ideological lines. It is in this space of pluralistic yet rigorous liberal inquiry that the anthology was conceived.

The volume, Professor Horn explained, emerges from a three-part framing of liberalism’s contemporary challenges. The first question: Does classical liberalism need to rethink its relationship with democracy? This question recognizes the historical ambivalence within liberal thought toward majority rule and popular sovereignty, sometimes prioritizing the rule of law and institutional constraint over participatory processes. The second question: Can liberalism be reformulated—conceptually or institutionally—in ways that withstand the populist challenge? And third: How do digital transformations impact liberal democratic governance, especially as technologies potentially empower both authoritarian control and radical democratization?

Professor Horn underscored that populism’s threat is not merely rhetorical but structural. Drawing from thinkers like Jan-Werner Müller, she affirmed that democracy requires pluralism, and that liberalism—rooted in freedom, equality, and diversity—cannot coexist comfortably with populist projects that seek homogeneity, personalization of power, and political antagonism. Populism, in its more pernicious forms, threatens to reconfigure society into clientelist regimes, eroding liberal democratic norms from within. Thus, the liberal challenge is to defend democratic institutions without falling into illiberal strategies in the process.

Central to Professor Horn’s argument was a nuanced critique of liberalism itself. While rejecting populist anti-liberalism, she emphasized the need for internal reform and self-critique. Classical liberalism, she argued, must confront its blind spots—especially its often reductive economic focus and historical indifference to the psychological and sociocultural dimensions of political life. This detachment, she suggested, has weakened liberalism’s capacity to offer compelling responses to the grievances that fuel populist support.

Professor Horn’s presentation moved beyond abstract critique to outline the structure and insights of the Liberal Responses to Populism volume. Divided into four thematic parts, the book begins with conceptual analyses of populism, followed by empirical discussions of political responses, normative proposals for liberal reform, and engagements with influential thinkers such as Chantal Mouffe, Michael Sandel, and Isaiah Berlin. Several essays within the volume stood out in Horn’s summary. Max Friebe’s piece, for instance, explores how populist appeals often express a yearning for representation and recognition—an insight echoed by Bruno Godefroy’s earlier remarks on constituent power. Another contribution by Aristotle Tziampiris explores how populism corrodes liberal democracy by morphing it into a clientelist system—a gateway to authoritarianism that is difficult to reverse.

Professor Horn also highlighted contributions that explore more constructive liberal strategies. Essays examining the role of civic virtues, the revival of decentralized governance (especially in areas like migration), and institutional pluralism offer pathways for reform that remain faithful to liberal principles while addressing populism’s roots. One particularly timely intervention considers the risks and opportunities presented by blockchain technologies—an emblem of digital transformation that intersects with debates about decentralization, transparency, and institutional trust.

Throughout her presentation, Professor Horn stressed the breadth and openness of liberalism as a tradition. Rejecting narrow or doctrinaire definitions, she insisted that liberalism encompasses a wide spectrum—from ordoliberals to social liberals—and can draw from both center-right and center-left sensibilities. The task, then, is not to ossify liberal orthodoxy, but to renovate it, ensuring that it remains responsive to the challenges of the 21st century while preserving its core commitment to individual dignity, institutional pluralism, and democratic deliberation.

Professor Horn closed by inviting further engagement with the volume, emphasizing that it was conceived not as a definitive answer, but as a springboard for debate and reflection. Her presentation served as both an introduction to a collective scholarly effort and a call to action for liberals confronting a volatile political landscape: to reaffirm their principles, to rethink their frameworks, and to resist the temptation to sacrifice liberal values in the name of expediency.

In sum, Professor Horn’s intervention offered a deeply considered, self-reflective, and interdisciplinary approach to one of the central political questions of our time. Rather than retreating into dogma or despair, she advocated for an intellectually honest and reform-oriented liberalism—one that confronts populism not with authoritarian mimicry, but with renewed democratic conviction.

Julian F. Müller: Liberal Responses to Populism

During Roundtable 2 at the ECPS Conference 2025, Professor Julian F. Müller (University of Graz) contributed a thought-provoking philosophical perspective to the discussion.

At the ECPS Conference 2025, Professor Julian F. Müller (University of Graz) also delivered a compelling philosophical intervention during Roundtable 2. Speaking in continuity with Professor Karen Horn—his co-editor of the newly published volume Liberal Responses to Populism— Professor Müller shifted the discussion from liberal reform strategies to a more fundamental inquiry into the epistemic foundations of populism itself.

Professor Müller began by contextualizing his remarks within the broader editorial project. While the book includes their joint exploration of “crypto-democracy”—a technologically enabled model for liberal-democratic reform—his Oxford presentation focused instead on his individual theoretical work, published recently in Episteme. His goal was to offer a precise and conceptually robust account of populism, one capable of distinguishing it from adjacent but distinct political positions such as conservatism.

From the outset, Professor Müller insisted that “getting populism right” is not a mere academic exercise but an urgent political necessity. Misidentifying populism, he argued, leads to diagnostic errors, ineffective remedies, and a dangerous flattening of ideological distinctions. He illustrated this point through a stark comparison: the respectful political disagreements voiced by Senator John McCain in contrast to Donald Trump’s conspiratorial, delegitimizing rhetoric about Barack Obama. Without conceptual clarity, Professor Müller warned, we risk conflating principled conservatism with demagogic populism.

Turning to existing theories, Professor Müller systematically critiqued two influential models. The first is Ernesto Laclau’s discourse-based theory, which defines populism as a rhetorical strategy of constructing “the people” against “the elite,” unified around empty signifiers like “America First.” For Professor Müller, this theory’s flaw lies in its overreach: if all politics is populist in Laclau’s framework, the term loses discriminatory power. It becomes impossible to distinguish between democratic mobilization and illiberal manipulation.

The second model Professor Müller addressed was Cas Mudde’s “thin-centred ideology” approach, which posits that populism hinges on a moral dualism between a pure people and a corrupt elite. While more analytically discrete than Laclau, Mudde’s model, Professor Müller argued, fails to explain a critical aspect of populist behavior: hostility toward democratic institutions. Even if citizens share moral values, they still require institutional mediation to resolve instrumental disagreements—such as how best to achieve economic growth or safeguard national security. Mudde’s model, Professor Müller claimed, does not account for this institutional deficit in populist politics.

In response to these theoretical shortcomings, Professor Müller presented the core of his own contribution: a deductive theory of populism grounded in four axioms. While he did not enumerate each axiom in full during the brief presentation, he emphasized that these foundational premises allow us to derive a wide range of empirical patterns characteristic of populist behavior. Among these patterns are the populists’ rejection of compromise and pluralism, their deep distrust of institutions and intellectual elites, their preference for direct democracy and charismatic leadership, and their habitual invocation of conspiracy theories and “fake news.”

The distinctive contribution of Professor Müller’s theory lies in its epistemic framing. Populism, he contended, is not merely a political style or strategy—it is an epistemological stance fundamentally incompatible with the norms of liberal democracy. Liberal democratic theory, from John Stuart Mill to Karl Popper and contemporary deliberative democrats, rests on the assumption that human judgment is fallible, that truth is contestable, and that disagreement is a normal outcome of free public reasoning. In contrast, populists believe truth is self-evident and univocal—already known by “the people”—and only obstructed by corrupt elites, bureaucrats, or intellectuals. This epistemic certainty, Professor Müller warned, dissolves the very foundation of democratic legitimacy, which is predicated on negotiation, compromise, and the open-ended search for shared understanding.

Professor Müller’s ultimate diagnosis is stark but illuminating: populism is not just a threat to liberal democracy because of its procedural violations or authoritarian impulses; it is a threat because it rejects the epistemic humility upon which democratic discourse depends. By treating disagreement as betrayal and dissent as treason, populism delegitimizes pluralism at its root.

In conclusion, Professor Müller’s remarks provided an incisive complement to the themes raised by Professor Horn. While Professor Horn explored institutional and ideological reforms within the liberal tradition, Professor Müller pushed the conversation deeper—toward the cognitive and epistemic conditions that sustain democratic life. His presentation underscored the importance of epistemology in political theory and positioned the fight against populism not only as a battle over institutions or rhetoric, but as a defense of intellectual openness, fallibilism, and deliberative engagement. In this respect, Liberal Responses to Populism emerges not just as an edited volume, but as a timely philosophical intervention in the democratic crises of our time.

Conclusion

Roundtable II of the ECPS Conference 2025—“‘The People’ in and against Liberal and Democratic Thought”—offered a powerful testament to the intellectual and normative complexities involved in defining “the people” within democratic theory, especially in an era marked by populist turbulence. With interventions traversing political epistemology, constitutional theory, liberal reform, and philosophical inquiry into affect and rhetoric, the session advanced the conference’s overarching ambition to unsettle and reconceptualize foundational democratic categories.

Each speaker brought distinct disciplinary perspectives to bear, yet converged on a shared insight: that “the people” is not a static referent but a contested and often dangerous construct, simultaneously invoked to legitimize political authority and obscure pluralism. Professor Naomi Waltham-Smith’s notion of listening as an “impossible concept” foregrounded the performative and often depoliticizing invocation of the people in democratic discourse—unmasking the rhetorical mechanisms through which representation is claimed but not enacted. Her call for an “audibility justice” expands the terrain of democratic theory to include sensory and affective registers, reminding us that political voice is not only about speech but about being heard in structurally just ways.

Professor Bruno Godefroy’s proposal for a presentist conception of the people advanced this interrogation into constitutional temporality, arguing that democratic legitimacy must stem from the authority of the living generation. His emphasis on periodic constitutional renewal as a democratic safeguard challenges both populist nostalgia and liberal entrenchment, offering a framework that is as normatively robust as it is institutionally concrete.

Meanwhile, Professor Karen Horn and Professor Julian F. Müller turned the lens inward on liberalism itself. While Professor Horn called for an adaptive, self-critical liberalism that resists both dogmatism and despair, Professor Müller’s epistemological critique of populism underscored how liberal democracy depends not just on institutions, but on the shared acceptance of fallibility and contestation as democratic virtues. Populism’s threat, they argued, is not merely institutional but epistemic.

Together, these contributions demonstrated that the concept of “the people” is not merely a tool of populist mobilization but a central site of philosophical and political contestation. Roundtable II thus reaffirmed the value of interdisciplinary dialogue in the struggle to preserve—and reimagine—democracy in the face of populist encroachment.


 

Note: To experience the panel’s dynamic and thought-provoking Q&A session, we encourage you to watch the full video recording above.

In Panel 3, Maria Jerzyk (Masaryk University) presented an interdisciplinary analysis of how children are used as symbolic tools in populist discourse in post-communist Poland.

ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel 4 — Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “ECPS Conference 2025 / Panel 4 — Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00106

 

Panel IV of the ECPS Conference 2025, held at St Cross College, Oxford University (July 1–3), explored the theme “Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing.” Chaired by Dr. Azize Sargın (ECPS), the panel investigated how belonging is constructed and contested through populist discourse and historical memory. Dr. Maarja Merivoo-Parro (University of Jyväskylä) examined olfactory memory and grassroots aid in Estonia’s democratic awakening. Maria Jerzyk (Masaryk University) analyzed how the figure of the child is symbolically instrumentalized in Polish populism, revealing deep continuities with communist-era narratives. Together, the papers offered rich insights into how identity, exclusion, and affect shape democratic participation in post-authoritarian and populist contexts.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Panel IV of the ECPS Conference 2025, titled Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing, was held on the morning of July 2 at St Cross College, University of Oxford. As part of the broader conference theme—‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches—this panel delved into how democratic belonging is shaped, contested, and narrated within and beyond populist frameworks.

Chaired by Dr. Azize Sargın (PhD), Director of External Relations at the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), the session opened with a theoretically grounded overview of the politics of belonging. Dr. Sargın emphasized that in an age of resurgent populism, belonging is no longer a neutral or merely affective category but a highly politicized mechanism of inclusion and exclusion. Populist actors increasingly construct “the people” by drawing sharp lines between insiders and outsiders, often invoking exclusionary logics tied to ethnicity, morality, or national destiny. Drawing on insights from political theory and migration studies, she outlined two key dimensions of belonging: “to whom one belongs” (social group affiliation) and “where one belongs” (spatial-territorial identity), both of which play critical roles in populist and post-authoritarian contexts.

The panel featured two intellectually rich and methodologically distinct papers. Dr. Maarja Merivoo-Parro (Marie Curie Fellow, University of Jyväskylä) explored the role of olfactory memory in the democratization of Estonia, arguing that cross-border sensory exchanges—especially smells tied to Finnish aid—played a profound role in shaping political consciousness and belonging during the late Soviet period. Maria Jerzyk (Masaryk University, Czechia) examined how children are symbolically deployed in contemporary Polish populist narratives, tracing striking continuities with communist-era state propaganda. She showed how the child functions as both a vessel of national purity and a screen for projecting anxieties over societal change.

Together, these contributions offered a powerful demonstration of how the politics of belonging operate through both the body and the imagination—an approach that resonated strongly with the interdisciplinary aims of the ECPS Conference.

Opening Remarks by Dr. Azize Sargın 

Dr. Azize Sargın, Director of External Relations at the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), opened the first panel of the second day of ECPS Conference at the University of Oxford with a concise yet conceptually rich introduction to the session’s theme: The Politics of Belonging, Voices, and Silencing. Her remarks served to establish a theoretical and thematic framework, situating the panel within broader academic debates on identity, exclusion, and populism.

Dr. Sargın emphasized that questions of belonging have become increasingly politicized in recent years, particularly under the influence of populist movements that define “the people” through narrow, exclusionary frameworks. Populist rhetoric, she noted, often draws stark lines between insiders and outsiders, thus marginalizing those deemed threats to the imagined national community. This binary logic fundamentally reshapes notions of identity, social boundaries, and democratic participation.

Drawing on scholarship in the field, she distinguished between two core dimensions of belonging: to whom one belongs (social group belonging) and where one belongs (spatial or territorial belonging). She argued that both questions are central to the study of populism—domestically, through the politics of exclusion within state borders, and transnationally, in the experiences of immigrants and diasporas navigating their place within multiple communities.

Importantly, Dr. Sargın differentiated between the personal, affective experience of belonging and the politics of belonging—the latter being a deliberate political project aimed at constructing collective identities. Concluding, she underscored the temporal and contested nature of belonging, and the panel’s aim to explore these dynamics in historical and interdisciplinary perspective.

Maarja Merivoo-Parro: The Scents of Belonging: Olfactory Narratives and the Dynamics of Democratization

Chaired by Dr. Azize Sargın, this panel explored the sensory and symbolic dimensions of belonging and exclusion in populist contexts, with Maarja Merivoo-Parro examining olfactory narratives and democratization, and Maria Jerzyk analyzing the role of children in post-communist populist discourse in Poland.

In her richly evocative and methodologically innovative presentation, titled “The Scents of Belonging: Olfactory Narratives and the Dynamics of Democratization,” Dr. Maarja Merivoo-Parro (Marie Curie Fellow, University of Jyväskylä) offered a compelling interdisciplinary account of how smell shaped and symbolized the democratization process in late Soviet-era and post-Soviet Estonia. Delivered during Panel 4 of the ECPS Conference 2025 at Oxford University, her paper bridged political history, cultural memory, and sensory studies to examine how grassroots aid from Finnish citizens not only supported material survival but also catalyzed a sensory awakening to democratic possibility.

Merivoo-Parro began by setting the geopolitical stage: the late 1980s economic collapse in Soviet-occupied Estonia, and the contrasting openness of nearby Finland. Despite Finland’s cautious official stance due to “Finlandization”—a Cold War policy of alignment to Soviet interests—ordinary Finnish citizens took unprecedented grassroots action. They formed personal networks with Estonians, delivering tailor-made humanitarian relief (food, medicine, clothes, toys) in an improvised diplomacy of the people. These exchanges were not only materially transformative but also emotionally intimate and culturally revealing.

What made this aid unique, argued Dr. Merivoo-Parro, was its sensory intensity—especially its olfactory dimension. Western hygiene products, foods, and technologies carried unfamiliar yet alluring smells that stood in stark contrast to the scarcity and uniformity of Soviet life. Smell, she explained, is neurologically encoded with emotion and memory, and these olfactory stimuli became vessels of hope, aspiration, and belonging. Finnish deodorant, chocolate, and even the lingering scent of well-laundered clothes subtly communicated democratic abundance, cultivating what she called a “smell of democracy.”

She illustrated this dynamic through oral history, children’s correspondence, and anecdotal recollections—such as a girl’s envy at her Finnish pen-pal’s casual mention of ice cream. These accounts revealed the disjuncture between two neighboring worlds and illustrated how material exchanges carried symbolic, even ideological weight.

Critically, Dr. Merivoo-Parro suggested that this early, tangible exposure to democratic life inoculated Estonia against the pathologies of many post-Soviet transitions. Unlike other former Soviet republics that experienced high levels of corruption and authoritarian backsliding, Estonia pursued a robust democratic trajectory. Dr. Merivoo-Parro provocatively likened this process to Pavlovian conditioning: Estonians became conditioned to associate democracy with reliability, dignity, and material abundance—not through abstract theory but through smell, taste, and lived experience. This sensory grounding helped them “hit the ground running” in 1991, fostering low corruption, high civic trust, and strong digital and educational institutions.

In closing, she proposed that this case demonstrates the need to expand democratic theory beyond legal and institutional frameworks to include sensory, affective, and cultural registers. Belonging, she argued, is not only a political status but also a sensory experience—one capable of fostering or foreclosing democratic identification. Her intervention thus resonated deeply with the conference’s interdisciplinary mission and underscored the value of unexpected analytical lenses in studying democratization.

Dr. Merivoo-Parro’s talk stands as a powerful reminder that democracy is not only read in constitutions or heard in speeches—but smelled, touched, and tasted in daily life.

Maria Jerzyk: Silent Symbols, Loud Legacies — The Child in Populist Narratives of Post-Communist Poland

In her thoughtful and innovative presentation, Maria Jerzyk (graduate student, Masaryk University, Czechia) offered a compelling interdisciplinary analysis of how children function as symbolic instruments within populist political discourse in post-communist Poland. Her paper, titled “Silent Symbols, Loud Legacies: The Child in Populist Narratives of Post-Communist Poland,” brought to light the ideological potency of the child figure—often marginalized in both academic and policy debates—while interrogating its historical continuity and symbolic plasticity from communist to contemporary populist regimes.

Jerzyk opened by observing a common omission in populism studies: while elites, migrants, and minority groups frequently occupy the spotlight as the primary antagonists or protagonists in populist narratives, the child—less visible, less vocal—is often overlooked. Yet, she contended, the symbolic power attached to children is profound. In Poland, particularly under the rule of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, children have been recast as vessels of moral authority, purity, and national continuity. This symbolic construction is neither neutral nor inclusive. It privileges the “ideal child”—patriotic, Catholic, obedient, and heterosexual—while marginalizing children who do not conform, including those who are queer, politically engaged, or critical of nationalist narratives.

To uncover the mechanics of this symbolic deployment, Jerzyk drew from three intersecting disciplines: populism studies, childhood studies, and the sociology of memory. This triangulated framework enabled her to situate children not merely as political recipients or rhetorical props, but as figures embedded in a contested moral economy shaped by post-communist legacies. Her central questions—why exclusionary populist narratives around children still resonate in Poland, and how these narratives adapt motifs from the communist past—guided a deeply contextual and historically grounded investigation.

One of Jerzyk’s central arguments was that populist discourses, like their communist predecessors, rely on a binary construction of the child: one to be celebrated and one to be feared. Under communism, the ideal child was disciplined, collectivist, and loyal to the socialist cause; deviant children were framed as dangerous, Westernized, and individualistic. In the contemporary populist regime, the ideological content has shifted from socialism to nationalism and traditionalism, yet the structural logic remains intact. The ideal child today symbolizes moral rectitude and cultural belonging, while those who diverge—especially children of migrants or LGBTQ+ youth—are seen as ideological threats, vulnerable to foreign influence and moral decay.

Jerzyk offered a particularly striking illustration of how these dynamics are operationalized through the metaphor of the school. In both communist and populist Poland, schools are treated not only as educational institutions but also as ideological battlegrounds where future citizens are shaped. She referenced archival propaganda films from the 1960s in which children, during summer holidays, were depicted building schools with their own hands—a powerful image of self-disciplining youth serving the state. This motif reappears in contemporary populist discourses where state officials position schools as protective spaces for instilling “proper” values and shielding children from ideological contamination, whether from liberal elites, Western media, or LGBTQ+ advocates.

Methodologically, Jerzyk combined discourse analysis of recent political speeches by Law and Justice (PiS) officials with a close reading of archival media from the communist period. This diachronic approach enabled her to identify what she termed “symbolic recycling,” whereby contemporary populists inherit and reframe motifs from the past to legitimize present anxieties. She provided translated excerpts from speeches and slogans to reveal how moral panics are manufactured and how boundaries are drawn between “our children” and “their children”—a division that mirrors broader populist strategies of inclusion and exclusion.

Throughout her analysis, Jerzyk emphasized that children, though prominently featured in populist discourse, are rarely treated as autonomous political subjects. Drawing on insights from childhood studies, she reminded the audience that children are not merely “citizens in the making,” but existing participants in the political community—albeit frequently denied voice, agency, and representation. This silencing, she argued, is symptomatic of a broader authoritarian dynamic, wherein the child becomes a screen upon which adult anxieties, traumas, and aspirations are projected.

Jerzyk’s intervention was also attentive to the role of historical trauma and memory. She introduced the concept of “post-civic trauma”—a form of collective suffering linked to the legacy of communism—which remains latent in many post-communist societies. In Poland, she argued, this trauma is not only remembered but actively instrumentalized by populist leaders who draw upon Cold War tropes of cultural invasion, Western decadence, and moral crisis to justify repressive policies in education and family life.

She concluded her presentation by reflecting on the structural absence of children’s rights in Poland. Notably, the country lacks an independent ombudsperson for children—a role that is subject to parliamentary appointment and thus highly politicized. This institutional gap, coupled with the widespread belief (echoed in a Polish saying) that “children and fish have no voice,” contributes to a civic environment where children are spoken about but rarely spoken with. This cultural and institutional silencing, Jerzyk suggested, reinforces populist strategies that rely on symbolic purity while stifling actual pluralism.

Jerzyk’s presentation ultimately served as both scholarly analysis and normative appeal. She urged the audience to consider how the child—seemingly apolitical—serves as a powerful vehicle for moral panic, exclusionary nationalism, and cultural nostalgia. Populism, she argued, claims to break with the past, yet it inherits one of the most potent symbols of state ideology: the child. In both past and present, the child remains a “silent symbol,” but the ideological legacies it carries speak volumes.

Her talk thus made a vital contribution to the interdisciplinary goals of the ECPS conference. It not only expanded the scope of populism studies but also foregrounded the ethical and political urgency of treating children as full participants in the democratic project, rather than as mute emblems of contested futures.

Conclusion

Panel IV of the ECPS Conference 2025—Politics of Belonging: Voices and Silencing—brought into sharp focus the nuanced and often overlooked ways in which symbolic and sensory politics shape collective identities under populist and post-authoritarian regimes. Through the interdisciplinary lenses of cultural memory, childhood studies, and affect theory, the panel illuminated how belonging is constructed not only through institutional frameworks, but also through deeply embodied and historically situated experiences. 

Both Dr. Maarja Merivoo-Parro and Maria Jerzyk underscored the persistence of ideological residues from past regimes, highlighting how present populist actors selectively inherit and retool historical narratives to legitimize exclusionary claims. Their work advanced the conference’s broader aim—captured in its title ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches—by demonstrating that the politics of inclusion and exclusion unfold not only through speeches and ballots, but through scent, schooling, silence, and symbolic order.


 

Note: To experience the panel’s dynamic and thought-provoking Q&A session, we encourage you to watch the full video recording above.

 

Roundtable I of the ECPS–Oxford Conference 2025, held on July 1–3 at St Cross College, was titled “Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe.” Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session featured presentations by Professor Martin Conway, Professor Aurelien Mondon, and Professor Luke Bretherton.

ECPS Conference 2025 / Roundtable I — Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “ECPS Conference 2025 / Roundtable I — Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00103

 

Held at the University of Oxford on July 1, 2025, Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference launched the discussions of “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy.” Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session explored how “the people” is constructed, contested, and deployed in contemporary European and global politics. Presentations by Professors Martin Conway, Aurelien Mondon, and Luke Bretherton examined the historical resurgence of popular politics, the elite-driven narrative of the “reactionary people,” and the theological dimensions of populism. Together, the contributions offered a nuanced, interdisciplinary account of how populism’s democratic and anti-democratic potentials shape the political imagination and institutional realities of the 21st century.

Reported by ECPS Staff

Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference, hosted at the University of Oxford on July 1-3, 2025, brought together leading scholars to explore the shifting meanings and political uses of “the people” in contemporary Europe and beyond. Titled “Politics of the ‘People’ in Global Europe,” this session opened the in-person component of the Conference “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy,” an interdisciplinary initiative addressing the democratic backsliding, populist resurgence, and the pathways toward civic resilience in the 21st century.

Chaired by Professor Jonathan Wolff (Senior Research Fellow, Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford; President, Royal Institute of Philosophy), the roundtable featured three distinguished speakers: Professor Martin Conway (University of Oxford), Professor Aurelien Mondon (University of Bath), and Professor Luke Bretherton (University of Oxford). Their presentations tackled the historical re-emergence of “the people” as a political category, the elite construction of the so-called reactionary public, and the theological undercurrents of populist discourse—particularly in relation to Christianity.

Taken together, the presentations demonstrated that “the people” is not a static or universally democratic force. Rather, it is a flexible and contested category, often constructed, instrumentalized, and redefined by elites, political movements, and media systems. While it can serve as a source of democratic renewal—as in historical instances of resistance to authoritarian regimes—it can also be mobilized to undermine pluralism, dismantle institutions, and sacralize exclusionary forms of nationalism.

The roundtable emphasized that populism is neither inherently democratic nor inherently authoritarian. Its normative direction depends on how “the people” are imagined, who is included or excluded, and whether political participation is broadened or curtailed. The session challenged participants to move beyond reductive narratives that blame “the people” for democratic erosion, instead urging deeper inquiry into how elites, ideologies, and media infrastructures shape public discourse and democratic practice.

As Europe and its transatlantic partners grapple with polarized electorates, declining trust in institutions, and re-enchanted political imaginaries, understanding the politics of “the people” remains central to safeguarding and reimagining democratic life in our time.

Professor Martin Conway: “The Reappearance of ‘The People’ in European Politics”

Professor Martin Conway (far right), Professor of Contemporary European History at the University of Oxford, delivers his talk titled “The Reappearance of ‘The People’ in European Politics” during Roundtable I of the ECPS–Oxford Conference 2025.

In his compelling presentation, Martin Conway, Professor of Contemporary European History, University of Oxford, explored the reemergence and reconfiguration of “the people”in contemporary European politics. He framed his remarks within a broader intellectual and historical reflection on democratic transformation and political disruption, noting that current anxieties about populism echo earlier eras of upheaval in European history.

Professor Conway began by acknowledging what he termed a prevailing “liberal anxiety”—a sense of unease about the future of democracy that has come to define our political moment. This anxiety, articulated by many mainstream figures including Baroness Royall and commentators like Timothy Garton Ash, reflects a broader fear that democracy is moving in a precarious or even regressive direction. Conway noted that this sentiment contrasts sharply with the optimism of two decades ago, when history was assumed to be progressing in a linear, liberal-democratic trajectory. The shift, he argued, is not unprecedented; similar concerns were widespread in Europe on the eve of the revolutions of 1848. Today, we once again live in a period marked by ambient pessimism and apprehension about what lies ahead.

Several structural transformations underpin this shift, according to Professor Conway. First, he pointed to the stagnation and decline of living standards across much of Europe. While there are exceptions—such as regions in Spain or Poland—many Europeans have experienced over a decade of economic insecurity, eroding the sense of progress and stability that once undergirded liberal democratic institutions. This economic fragility, exacerbated by global market forces and the retreat of the welfare state, has deeply unsettled large segments of society, particularly small businesses, farmers, and precarious workers.

A second, related transformation is the collapse of analog political structures and their replacement by digital media environments. Professor Conway emphasized that the move to digital communication has “anarchized” political debate by weakening the traditional channels—such as party structures and deliberative institutions—that previously organized and moderated political participation. What has emerged in their place is a more fragmented, volatile, and emotionally charged political space.

Beyond these socio-economic and technological shifts, Professor Conway focused on a deeper historical development: the breakdown of a stable model of disciplined, representative democracy that had defined much of postwar Europe. This model, characterized by proportional representation, enduring party systems, and a deeply embedded political elite, ensured predictability and continuity. Politicians might lose a seat in parliament, but often resurfaced in other public roles—“never losing the chauffeur-driven car,” as Professor Conway wryly observed, referencing Belgian politics.

Today, according to Conway, that model is under strain. Challenger parties—often short-lived, leader-centric, and ideologically fluid—have emerged across Europe. They range from the Flemish nationalist Vlaams Belang to leftist, Maoist-rooted movements in Belgium and populist coalitions in Italy. These parties often lack coherent platforms but are united in their appeal to “the people” as a reactive force. Their rise reflects the erosion of elite control and the democratization—but also destabilization—of political life.

Populism, Professor Conway argued, is the label most often applied to this phenomenon. However, he warned that historians are justifiably skeptical of the term. While political scientists like Cas Mudde have successfully theorized populism as a “thin ideology,” historians are more attuned to national contexts, ideological distinctions, and historical specificity. The danger, Conway suggested, lies in collapsing all anti-establishment movements into a single, undifferentiated category, thereby overlooking the distinct traditions—secular, religious, leftist, rightist—that shape each movement.

Nonetheless, Professor Conway underscores that populism, for all its analytical imprecision, captures a genuine insurgent reality: the reassertion of “the people” in forms that diverge significantly from the norms of 20th-century political action. These new forms of engagement are often marked by a rejection of institutional decorum, a distrust of expertise, and the rise of emotionally driven, male-dominated political performances that are less about coherent goals and more about expressive, affective protest.

This shift from rational deliberation to emotional expression—what Professor Conway termed “a change in the musical key of European politics”—is both a cultural and political transformation. It reflects not only structural changes in how politics is conducted, but also the symbolic and psychological reorientation of “the people” as a force both feared and romanticized. Whereas 1989 symbolized the disciplined, hopeful advance of freedom through mass protest in Eastern Europe, today’s mobilizations often appear to many observers as erratic, exclusionary, and disruptive.

Professor Conway underscored that the liberal political class has responded by building rhetorical and institutional defenses—what he called “anti-popular politics.” These include efforts to create legal buffers against referenda, avoid direct electoral challenges, and portray populist movements as inherently irrational, racist, or manipulated by shadowy online forces. Yet such reactions, he warned, risk becoming elitist and anti-democratic in themselves.

In his closing reflections, Professor Conway posed several critical questions: Why did we assume that history would progress smoothly and democratically? Why do we dismiss the democratic potential embedded in disruptive and turbulent popular movements? And crucially, why are we so unwilling to recognize that today’s “people,” for all their volatility, remain committed to democratic participation—albeit in forms unfamiliar and uncomfortable to the liberal imagination?

The reappearance of “the people” in European politics, Professor Conway concluded, should not be seen merely as a threat. Rather, it presents an opportunity—if approached critically and constructively—to rethink the boundaries, forms, and aspirations of democracy in 21st-century Europe.

Professor Aurelien Mondon: “The Construction of the Reactionary People”

Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

In his incisive presentation, “The Construction of the Reactionary People,” Aurelien Mondon, Professor of Politics, University of Bath, critically unpacked the prevailing narrative that positions contemporary far-right and authoritarian populism as an authentic expression of the will of “the people.” Drawing on over 15 years of research, Professor Mondon challenged the assumption that the so-called “reactionary people” are an organic democratic force. Instead, he argued that this concept is largely an elite-driven construction—a top-down narrative shaped by media, political actors, and intellectuals.

Professor Mondon began by distinguishing between two problematic “P” words: populism and the people. He cautioned against the overuse and imprecision of populism as a catch-all term, which, he argued, has distracted scholars and commentators from a more meaningful analysis of democracy. Instead, he emphasized the importance of critically interrogating how the people are represented, invoked, and constructed in political discourse—especially in reactionary and exclusionary ways.

Central to Professor Mondon’s argument is the idea that the figure of the reactionary people—often depicted as the “white working class” or “the left behind”—has been strategically constructed by elite discourse to justify regressive political shifts. Citing the rhetoric of Nigel Farage and Donald Trump, Mondon highlighted how these elite actors positioned themselves as champions of ordinary people, despite their wealth and elite status. For example, in a speech delivered shortly after the Brexit vote and just before Trump’s election in 2016, Farage drew a direct connection between disaffected Welsh voters and the American rust belt, constructing a transatlantic narrative of popular revolt. Yet, as Professor Mondon pointed out, this framing was less about listening to real grievances and more about legitimizing reactionary, often xenophobic agendas under the guise of popular will.

Empirically, Professor Mondon’s research—particularly in collaboration with Dr. Aaron Winter—demonstrates that the supposed mass support of the white working class for Brexit and Trump has been overstated or misrepresented. Their studies of electoral data reveal that lower-income individuals were in fact less likely to support Trump or Brexit. Many abstained from voting altogether, and among those who did vote, a significant proportion supported establishment candidates such as Hillary Clinton or remained skeptical of nationalist populism. Trump’s and Brexit’s bases, according to the presentation of Professor Mondon, were more accurately characterized by middle- and upper-income voters, including older property owners—groups not typically considered “left behind” in any meaningful socioeconomic sense.

Yet this data was widely ignored in mainstream discourse. Prestigious media outlets—from Newsweek and The Guardian to The Washington Post and Harvard Business Review—repeatedly promoted the notion that the rise of Trump and Brexit reflected the voice of the working-class majority. Professor Mondon emphasized that political scientists, journalists, and commentators across the spectrum helped entrench this myth. In doing so, they lent legitimacy to exclusionary and reactionary politics, even while claiming to merely reflect public sentiment.

Importantly, Professor Mondon warned that this elite narrative has real consequences. It racializes the working class by equating working-class identity with whiteness, thereby excluding ethnic minorities and immigrants who are themselves often working-class. It naturalizes racism by framing it as an inevitable response to economic hardship, rather than a political choice or a construct of political elites. And it normalizes regressive politics by presenting them as the authentic voice of a democratic majority.

This construction is, to Professor Mondon, continually reinforced by media coverage. For example, recent violent anti-migrant demonstrations in the UK were portrayed by outlets like the BBC as expressions of legitimate, working-class anger—despite the racist and xenophobic nature of the acts. The BBC even apologized for calling the far-right Reform Party “far-right.” Similarly, headlines after these riots claimed they were driven by “economic grievances,” offering justification rather than critique.

Professor Mondon challenged this narrative with data from Eurobarometer surveys, which show a stark gap between what people say matters to them personally—such as healthcare, jobs, and education—and what they perceive as problems for the country—typically immigration, a perception shaped by media and political discourse. During the 2016 Brexit campaign, for example, immigration emerged as a top concern at the national level, but it barely registered as a personal priority. This discrepancy reveals the power of media agenda-setting and elite framing in constructing “public opinion.”

Professor Mondon further questioned why only certain actors are granted the status of “the people.” Those protesting for climate action, racial justice, or trans rights are often dismissed as “elite,” “woke,” or “naïve.” Meanwhile, racist protestors, anti-migrant agitators, or conservative culture warriors are hailed as representing “real people” with “legitimate concerns.” Even billionaire authors like J.K. Rowling, or politicians like Farage and Trump, are cast as victims of elite suppression and defenders of democratic expression.

This discursive bias shapes policy outcomes. Both conservative and center-left parties—such as Labour under Keir Starmer—justify rightward shifts in immigration and cultural policy by claiming they are responding to “the people’s” demands. Yet, Professor Mondon argued, such moves are often preemptive responses to media-generated moral panics rather than genuine democratic pressures. The result is a cycle in which reactionary politics are platformed and amplified, while progressive movements are marginalized.

In concluding, Professor Mondon offered several urgent recommendations. First, we must stop exaggerating the electoral strength of the far right and critically interrogate low voter turnout and political disengagement. Second, we should resist euphemizing reactionary politics as “populism”—if a policy is racist or authoritarian, it should be named as such. Third, we must reject the reflex to blame “the people” for the democratic crisis, and instead scrutinize how power, media, and elite discourse mediate public knowledge and shape perceptions. Finally, Professor Mondon called for a critical reassessment of liberalism’s role in enabling far-right resurgence. Liberal elites’ failure to address inequality, racism, and disenfranchisement has contributed to the very crisis they now lament.

Rather than discarding “the people” as a dangerous force, Professor Mondon argued, scholars and policymakers must engage more honestly with the democratic potential of the broader population. The challenge lies not in taming the people, but in confronting the forces that construct reactionary myths in their name.

Professor Luke Bretherton: “Christianity in A Time of Populism”

A man clasps his hands in prayer during the opening ceremonies of President Donald Trump’s “Keep America Great” rally at the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New Jersey, on January 28, 2020. Photo by Benjamin Clapp.

In his presentation, Luke Bretherton, Regius Professor of Moral and Pastoral Theology at the University of Oxford, offered a nuanced theological and political analysis of populism, with particular attention to its relationship with Christianity. Rather than treating populism solely as a pathological deviation from democratic norms—as is common in much of the European and North American literature— Professor Bretherton argued that populism is a perennial and ideologically fluid component of democratic life. Populism, he suggested, oscillates between democratic and anti-democratic forms, each shaping the political terrain in profound, and at times, conflicting ways.

Professor Bretherton opened by critiquing the dominant academic and journalistic lens through which populism is often viewed—namely, as an aberration associated with far-right, anti-immigrant movements. This narrow interpretation, he argued, overlooks historical and global instances of populism as vehicles of democratization, such as the Solidarity movement in Poland, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and even populist peasant movements like La Vía Campesina. He emphasized that populism’s ideological indeterminacy makes it resistant to clear categorization on the traditional left-right spectrum, functioning instead as a vessel for diverse, often contradictory, political projects.

According to Professor Bretherton, populism’s complexity lies in its dual potential: it can either renew democratic life or corrode it. Drawing on the work of Margaret Canovan and Ernesto Laclau, Bretherton explained that populism arises from tensions internal to democracy itself, particularly between its redemptive promise—rule by the people—and its pragmatic reality, in which elite negotiation and institutional mediation often dominate. When the redemptive aspect is perceived to have been lost, populist movements emerge to reclaim it, often invoking the language of purity, moral renewal, and direct representation.

To differentiate forms of populism, Professor Bretherton proposed a typology contrasting democratic populism with anti-democratic populismDemocratic populism seeks to broaden political participation, construct shared moral vocabularies, and nurture long-term, deliberative engagement. It builds institutions, invests in civic education, and aims to create pluralistic forms of common life. Examples include community organizing movements like Citizens UK or the early American Populist movement of the late 19th century, which drew on religious traditions to foster democratic deliberation.

By contrast, anti-democratic populism, according to Professor Bretherton, simplifies political space through exclusion and dichotomy, often bypassing deliberative institutions in favor of plebiscitary rule and strongman leadership. It construes the people in essentialist, ethnoreligious, or racialized terms, delegitimizing opposition as traitorous or unpatriotic. Leaders like Donald Trump embody this form of populism, claiming to represent the “real people” while delegitimizing institutional checks and balances.

Professor Bretherton warned that while both forms of populism share characteristics—emphasis on leadership, romanticization of the “ordinary people,” skepticism toward elites and bureaucracy—they differ in their normative trajectories. Democratic populism aims to cultivate shared responsibility for the common good, while anti-democratic populism facilitates personal withdrawal from public life and the erosion of civic institutions in favor of authoritarian consolidation.

The latter part of Professor Bretherton’s presentation focused on the intersection between populism and Christianity. He argued that populism draws heavily on theological tropes, often reconfiguring religious narratives to legitimize its political vision. Christian theology itself, according to him, has longstanding populist impulses—particularly within Protestant traditions that emphasize unmediated access to God and critique ecclesial hierarchy. These impulses have historically fueled resistance to both clerical and political elites. However, Professor Bretherton cautioned that such impulses can be co-opted by anti-democratic populist movements, as seen in the rhetoric of far-right parties like Germany’s AfD or France’s Rassemblement National, which claim to defend Christian culture while attacking institutional churches.

Professor Bretherton emphasizes that this tension stems from the anti-institutional nature of anti-democratic populism, which bypasses mediating structures—such as churches or representative institutions—in favor of a direct identification between the leader and the people. Theologically, this dynamic manifests as a form of idolatry, in which the nation or a charismatic leader is elevated to a messianic role, effectively substituting for Christ. Bretherton described this as a “Christophobic and anti-ecclesial” form of Christianity—one that empties faith of its creedal and ethical commitments and repurposes it as a tool of exclusionary cultural identity.

Rather than treating Christian references in populist rhetoric as merely superficial or secularized, Professor Bretherton argued that we are witnessing a re-enchantment of political discourse. Far-right populism, he contended, does not secularize Christian symbols but sacralizes secular notions like sovereignty and nationhood, effectively reversing the modern trajectory of disenchantment. This shift represents a new kind of political theology, one in which secular concepts are infused with religious meaning, producing an existential, quasi-spiritual political struggle.

Professor Bretherton highlights global examples—from Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist turn in Turkey to the rise of Hindu nationalism in India—that illustrate the resurgence of political movements in which the sacred and the political are strategically recombined with potent effect. In Europe, this re-enchantment emerges in response to technocratic liberalism’s perceived hollowness and its failure to address existential anxieties, community dislocation, and crises of agency.

Professor Bretherton concluded by asserting that Christianity must confront these dynamics with a return to its core commitments: love of God and neighbor, solidarity with the stranger, and the rejection of idolatrous narratives of salvation through nation or leader. The Church, he insisted, must become a site of resistance against both authoritarianism and technocratic alienation by cultivating forms of common life grounded in justice, plurality, and mutual care. The ultimate theological task, he contended, is to convert politics from a false gospel of domination into a means of neighboring—turning the earthly city into a penultimate place of peace rather than seeking salvation through it.

Conclusion

Roundtable I of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford offered a compelling and multifaceted reflection on the politics of “the people” in a time of democratic uncertainty and populist resurgence. Under the skillful moderation of Professor Jonathan Wolff, the session foregrounded how “the people” remains a highly malleable and contested category—evoked to both revitalize and erode democratic life. Drawing on historical, political, and theological perspectives, the speakers dismantled simplistic narratives that equate populism either with democratic renewal or authoritarian decline. Instead, they highlighted the need to interrogate how elites, institutions, and media infrastructures construct and instrumentalize notions of “popular will” for divergent ends.

A shared theme emerged: that contemporary politics is marked not simply by polarization, but by a crisis of representation, legitimacy, and moral imagination. Whether in the reappearance of emotionally charged political forms (Conway), the elite-driven construction of reactionary publics (Mondon), or the sacralization of exclusionary ideologies (Bretherton), the roundtable underscored the urgency of rethinking democratic participation. As the idea of “the people” continues to shape our political futures, this conversation reminded us that its meaning must remain a site of critical, ethical, and democratic contestation.


 

Note: To experience the panel’s dynamic and thought-provoking Q&A session, we encourage you to watch the full video recording above.

Participants of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, gather for a group photo on July 1, 2025.

Opening Session of the ECPS Conference 2025: ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy – Interdisciplinary Approaches

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff (2025). “Opening Session of the ECPS Conference 2025: ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy – Interdisciplinary Approaches.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 8, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00101

The ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford began with a timely and thought-provoking opening session that explored the evolving meaning and political utility of “the people” in democratic discourse. Sümeyye Kocaman offered a nuanced welcome, highlighting how the term has been used across history to empower, exclude, and politicize identity. Kate Mavor, Master of St Cross College, underscored the value of interdisciplinary exchange in addressing democratic challenges, noting how the College’s diverse academic environment aligned naturally with the conference’s aims. Baroness Janet Royall then delivered a compelling keynote, warning of the double-edged nature of “the people” as both democratic ideal and populist tool. Her address emphasized the need for inclusion, institutional integrity, civic renewal, and interdisciplinary cooperation in the face of democratic erosion. The session set the stage for critical and globally relevant dialogue across disciplines.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 at the University of Oxford commenced with a series of remarks that collectively set an intellectually rich and politically urgent tone for the days ahead. Sümeyye Kocaman, DPhil candidate at St. Catherine’s College and conference coordinator on behalf of the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), offered a thoughtful and inclusive welcome, grounding the event in the contested and evolving significance of “the people.” She reflected on how this concept—invoked across diverse historical, geographical, and ideological contexts—has served both emancipatory and exclusionary purposes. Drawing on her research and recent electoral analyses, she highlighted the growing resonance of populist narratives and the imperative to examine how democratic rhetoric shapes lived experience beyond the ballot box.

Following Kocaman, Kate Mavor, CBE, Master of St Cross College, welcomed participants on behalf of the host institution. Emphasizing the interdisciplinary character of St Cross—a graduate college home to scholars from over 60 fields—she noted the alignment between the conference’s aims and the College’s commitment to cross-disciplinary dialogue.

Baroness Janet Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, then delivered an incisive keynote, urging participants to confront the dual nature of “the people” as both democratic foundation and potential populist weapon. Her address called for rigorous, interdisciplinary engagement and collective democratic renewal.

Welcome Address by Conference Coordinator Sümeyye Kocaman

Sümeyye Kocaman, Managing Editor of Populism & Politics, and the coordinator of the ECPS Conference 2025 on behalf of the European Center for Populism Studies, opened the event with a thoughtful and inclusive welcome. Expressing gratitude to participants for arriving so promptly, she framed the conference around the contested nature of “the people.” Kocaman also highlighted the plurality and political weight of the term across time and place. From 19th-century American democratization to Cold War securitization and from the ideological symbolism of Albania’s People’s Republic to contemporary struggles for women’s rights and labor justice, she emphasized that invocations of “the people” are never ideologically neutral.

Kocaman noted that in populism studies, “the people” remains a central but fluid category—emerging in various forms such as “digital populism,” “climate populism,” and others. This terminological proliferation, she argued, speaks to the field’s theoretical dynamism but also to its increasing relevance in everyday political life. Drawing from her own research, she underscored the need to interrogate how notions of “the people” function not just in electoral discourse, but in the daily lived experiences of individuals and communities. This perspective, she asserted, is especially urgent in light of rising populist rhetoric across both Eastern and Western Europe, as recently documented in ECPS’s report on the EU elections.

Kocaman closed by acknowledging the collaborative support of academic and institutional partners—including the Rothermere American Institute, the European Studies Centre, Oxford’s Democracy Network, and scholars from Berlin and Brighton—and expressed solidarity with scholars unable to attend due to geopolitical crises. Her closing remarks served as a poignant reminder of the stakes of the conference: engaging critically with the idea of “the people” under conditions of global instability and democratic uncertainty.

Welcome Address by Kate Mavor on Behalf of the Host College

Kate Mavor, CBE, delivers the opening remarks at the ECPS Conference 2025 held at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

Kate Mavor, CBE, Master of St Cross College, opened the Conference with a warm and appreciative welcome to all participants. She expressed genuine delight that the conference was taking place at St Cross and extended her congratulations to Sümeyye Kocaman for organizing what she described as an exceptionally rich and meaningful academic program. She also offered thanks to Ben Gladstone, Junior Dean at St Cross, for his role in helping bring the event to the college.

Mavor took a moment to reflect on the nature of St Cross College itself—an entirely graduate institution at the University of Oxford, with approximately 620 students representing over 60 academic disciplines. She noted that this unique breadth makes the College an especially fertile ground for interdisciplinary dialogue, and she emphasized that hosting events like the ECPS Conference is very much in line with the College’s mission to encourage rigorous, open, and diverse scholarly conversations.

She acknowledged the topic of the conference—centered on the idea of “the people” and its implications for contemporary democracy—as both pressing and, in some respects, deeply unsettling. Yet she expressed hope that the conference would provide space for thoughtful, evidence-based discussion at a time when such engagement is more necessary than ever. She concluded by welcoming attendees once again and graciously passed the floor to Janet Royall, Baroness Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, Oxford University.

Keynote Address by Janet Royall (Baroness Royall of Blaisdon)

Baroness Janet Royall of Blaisdon, Principal of Somerville College, delivers the keynote address during the opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 at St Cross College, University of Oxford, on July 1, 2025.

Baroness Royall, in her opening address, brought to the fore a compelling blend of political insight, institutional experience, and democratic advocacy. While modestly noting her non-academic background, she framed her intervention with both humility and urgency—an acknowledgment of the significance of the moment and the thematic depth of the conference.

Speaking from her current role as Principal of Somerville College and her former position as Chair of the People’s History Museum in Manchester—a self-declared “museum of democracy”—Baroness Royall underscored the symbolic and practical weight of convening such a conference at a time when democracy is under unprecedented strain. Her address moved fluidly from personal reflection to systemic critique, offering a panoramic view of the challenges and possibilities that define our democratic era.

Baroness Royall opened by commending the ECPS and conference organizers for their vision and rapid execution of a robust program. She recalled an early conversation in January 2025 with the conference coordinator, Sumeyye Kocaman, about an “embryonic” idea to convene a gathering on the theme of “We, the People.” In less than six months, that idea had matured into an intellectually rigorous and internationally inclusive conference. She highlighted the potential of this initiative to lay the groundwork for a broader academic and civic endeavor, notably the proposed Oxford Democracy Network—a platform to foster long-term collaboration around democratic renewal.

At the heart of Baroness Royall’s speech was the concept of “the people”—both as a foundational democratic ideal and as a source of contemporary political peril. She asked, pointedly, whether the title of the conference might have been better framed as “We, the People and the Precarious Future of Democracy.” This rhetorical shift captured her broader concern: that the invocation of “the people” has become a double-edged sword in today’s political landscape.

Baroness Royall cited the alarming statistic that one-fifth of the world’s democracies have declined or disappeared between 2012 and 2024, pointing to a structural crisis in democratic governance. This regression, she argued, is not attributable to a singular cause but reflects a toxic convergence of polarizing narratives, us-versus-them mentalities, and the erosion of social cohesion. Crucially, she emphasized that these trends do not signal the end of democracy, but rather call for its reinvention—grounded in inclusion, resilience, and renewed solidarity.

Drawing on her political experience, Baroness Royall articulated how the phrase “we the people,” while historically empowering—as in the US Constitution—can also be weaponized. When deployed inclusively, the phrase serves as a unifying force, anchoring citizenship in shared values and a common public life. However, in the hands of authoritarian populists, the same phrase is used to divide, exclude, and delegitimize. By framing political opponents as enemies of the people, populist leaders transform democratic mechanisms into tools of domination. Royall cited cases such as Hungary, India, Turkey, and the United States, where the language of majoritarian legitimacy is used to undermine pluralism, erode judicial independence, and roll back minority rights. In such contexts, democracy may persist in name but is hollowed out in substance.

To confront these challenges, Baroness Royall stressed the necessity of interdisciplinary engagement. No single field, she argued, can adequately diagnose or respond to the crisis of democracy. Political science and law illuminate how constitutions shape and channel power; sociology and anthropology explore the socio-cultural dimensions of exclusion and cohesion; history and philosophy provide the longue durée through which the evolution of “the people” can be understood; and media and technology studies reveal how digital platforms both fracture and connect public discourse. She notably added science to this list—an unusual but thought-provoking inclusion—arguing that scientific knowledge and the practices of truth-seeking are indispensable to democratic life. Citing Nobel Laureate Sir Paul Nurse, she affirmed that “democracy is built on truth and trust,” and that science, in its ideal form, sustains both.

Baroness Royall’s address was marked by a tone of constructive realism. While expressing concern over democratic decline, she rejected fatalism. Instead, she outlined a multidimensional agenda for democratic renewal. First, she called for a redefinition of “the people” as an inclusive and dynamic community, one capable of accommodating diversity without retreating into fragmentation. Here, she invoked the post-Apartheid experience of South Africa as a model for constructing cross-cutting civic identities that transcend ethnic or sectarian divisions.

Second, Baroness Royall underscored the need to reinforce institutional integrity. This involves defending the independence of the judiciary, safeguarding electoral systems, and protecting a free press—all vital bulwarks against the authoritarian temptation of majoritarian rule.

Third, she emphasized civic renewal through grassroots participation, deliberative assemblies, and public education. Democracy, in her view, is not merely a set of institutions but a culture of engagement—a shared commitment to dialogue, complexity, and the common good.

Fourth, she called for global solidarity. Authoritarian populism is a transnational phenomenon and demands coordinated international responses. Civil society watchdogs, transnational legal norms, and cross-border academic partnerships must be part of the democratic arsenal.

Turning to her own political reflections, Baroness Royall acknowledged the widespread disillusionment with politicians. She argued, however, that this disaffection is often rooted in unrealistic public expectations. Voters demand lower taxes, higher pensions, and expanded public services—expectations that cannot be reconciled without trade-offs. Populists exploit this cognitive dissonance by offering simple solutions to complex problems. In contrast, genuine democracy, she insisted, requires honesty—about limits, about governance, and about the costs of collective decisions.

She also lamented the decline of local journalism and the rise of disinformation—particularly via AI-generated content—which has fractured the public sphere. Without a shared reality, she warned, the very possibility of democratic deliberation is undermined. In this context, she called for renewed investment in the civic infrastructure of knowledge: public media, media literacy, and forums for reasoned debate.

Baroness Royall then addressed a structural limitation of democracy often left unspoken: the influence of global capital. She noted that the need to placate financial markets can restrict democratic choice, creating a form of “attenuated democracy” where formal procedures persist but real power is constrained. This reality, she argued, highlights the need for vigilance and adaptation to preserve meaningful democratic sovereignty.

In her concluding remarks, Baroness Royall affirmed the value of the ECPS conference and its role in advancing a crucial intellectual and political mission. The “We, the People” program, she said, addresses the central paradox of modern democracy: that the very concept designed to empower citizens can also be used to erode their rights. By combining rigorous scholarship with policy-relevant insights, the conference aims not only to diagnose democratic decay but also to formulate strategies for renewal.

Baroness Royall closed on a note of cautious optimism, invoking Antonio Gramsci’s famous formulation: “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will.” While the threats to democracy are serious, she maintained that collective action, informed deliberation, and institutional resilience can chart a path forward. She expressed hope that the conference would inspire not only intellectually stimulating discussions but also concrete contributions to policy and democratic reform.

Conclusion 

The opening session of the ECPS Conference 2025 laid a compelling foundation for the days ahead, offering both a sobering diagnosis of democratic fragility and an urgent call for renewal grounded in intellectual rigor and interdisciplinary collaboration. Anchored by the interventions of Sümeyye Kocaman, Kate Mavor, and Baroness Janet Royall, the session deftly mapped the theoretical and practical stakes of examining “the people” as a contested and evolving concept at the heart of democratic politics.

Kocaman’s remarks highlighted the historical plurality and ideological malleability of “the people,” urging participants to interrogate its use not only in electoral campaigns but also in shaping everyday political experiences. Mavor emphasized the role of academic institutions in fostering open dialogue on questions of urgent public concern. Baroness Royall, meanwhile, offered a far-reaching keynote that moved from democratic theory to global political realities. Her speech underscored the double-edged nature of “the people” in democratic discourse—capable of both mobilizing collective agency and justifying exclusionary populism.

Collectively, these addresses set a tone of cautious optimism. While acknowledging the pressures of democratic backsliding, disinformation, and socio-political fragmentation, each speaker reaffirmed the possibility of renewal through civic education, institutional reform, and cross-sector dialogue. The session concluded with a clear message: that democracy cannot be taken for granted, and that critical, interdisciplinary engagement is essential not only for understanding the present crisis, but also for envisioning democratic futures that are more inclusive, participatory, and resilient. As the conference moves forward, the intellectual commitments voiced in the opening session will serve as both compass and challenge—calling participants to contribute meaningfully to the urgent task of democratic revitalization.

Religious symbols on sand: Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Orthodoxy Buddhism and Hinduism. Photo: Godong Photo.

Fourth Annual International Symposium on ‘Civilizational Populism: National and International Challenges’

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) successfully convened its Fourth Annual International Symposium at the University of Warsaw on May 22–23, 2025. The event brought together leading scholars, practitioners, and policymakers to examine the evolving dynamics of civilizational populism and its wide-ranging implications on local, national, transnational, and global levels.

Over two days of intensive dialogue and critical reflection, the symposium explored how populism—particularly in its civilizational form—interacts with religion, digital technologies, and identity-based narratives to shape political behavior, influence democratic institutions, and impact social cohesion across plural societies. Special attention was paid to the varied manifestations of populism in both the Global North and Global South.

The concept of civilizational populism—which deploys civilizational identity as a metanarrative to heighten antagonism between ‘the people’ and constructed ‘others,’ often along religious and cultural lines—was a central focus. Participants analyzed how this form of populism contributes to the intensification of intra- and inter-group conflicts and how it reshapes the discourse on globalization, South-South cooperation, and multipolar international relations.

Panels addressed the following core themes:

  • The relationship between civilizational populism and democratic backsliding.
  • The use of religion and civilizational rhetoric by populists to legitimize exclusionary policies.
  • The strategic role of digital technologies and artificial intelligence in amplifying populist messages.
  • Transnational linkages between populist actors and their impact on global governance frameworks.

The symposium further emphasized that while populism is often characterized as a “thin ideology,” it operates alongside thick ideologies—such as neoliberalism, nationalism, socialism, or religion—and plays a significant role in shaping emotions, mobilizing public sentiment, and reconfiguring political power structures.

Speakers highlighted that civilizational populist narratives, far from being confined to national borders, are increasingly embedded in global communication circuits, shaping diasporic politics, influencing foreign policy, and challenging multilateral norms.

Ultimately, the symposium fostered rich interdisciplinary discussions and called for innovative, inclusive, and ethically grounded strategies to address the challenges posed by civilizational populism in today’s digitally interconnected and ideologically polarized world.

Organizing Institution

European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) (Brussels)

Hosting Institution

Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw (Warsaw)

Partner Institutions

Georgetown University (Washington DC)

University of Birmingham (Birmingham)

Deakin University (Melbourne)

DAAD / Cambridge University

University of Duisburg-Essen, Institute of East Asian Studies 

Centre for International Relations (Warsaw)

 

DAY ONE – May 22, 2025

Opening Speech

Dr. Adam Bodnar (Minister of Justice of Poland / (Video Recording).

 

Keynote Speech

“A Relational Approach to Religion and Populism: Recontextualizing Civilizational Narratives in National and Global Contexts,” by Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham, UK, and Senior Fellow at the Berkeley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).

 

Panel 1

Populism: Is It a One-way Route from Democracy to Authoritarianism?

Moderator

Dr. Erkan Toguslu (Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies at KU Leuven, Belgium).

Speakers

“Making Sense of Multiple Manifestations of Alternatives to Liberal Democracies,” by Dr. Radoslaw Markowski (Professor of Political Science, Center for the Study of Democracy, Director, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Warsaw & Polish Academy of Sciences & Polish National Election Study, Principal Investigator).

“Constitutional Intolerance: The Fashioning of ‘the Other’ in Europe’s Constitutional Repertoires,” by Dr. Marietta van der Tol (Politics & International Studies, DAAD-Cambridge).

Dr. Erkan Toguslu moderates a panel featuring Dr. Radoslaw Markowski and Dr. Marietta van der Tol, exploring alternatives to liberal democracies and the role of constitutional narratives in shaping ‘the Other’ in Europe. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

 

Panel 2

Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion

Moderator

Dr. Erin K. Wilson (Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).

Paper Presenters

Populism, Civilization, and Restorative Nostalgia,” by Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).

“Emotional Dimensions of Civilisationist Populism: A Comparative Analysis of Erdogan, Modi, and Khan with Transformer-Based Classification,” by Dr. Matthew Belanger (Lecturer in Substance Use Sociology, Social Policy, and Criminology Faculty of Social Sciences University of Stirling) and Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).

Dr. Erin K. Wilson moderates Panel 2 on “Civilizational Rhetoric, Emotions, and Societal Cohesion,” featuring Professor Ihsan Yilmaz, Dr. Nicholas Morieson on populism and restorative nostalgia, and Dr. Matthew Belanger & Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc on the emotional dynamics of civilisationist populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

 

Keynote Speech

Kamil Wyszkowski, Director of the UN Global Compact, delivers the keynote speech highlighting the challenges and responsibilities of global institutions in defending human rights amid rising populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

The Role of the UN in Fighting for Human Rights in This Populist Age,” by Kamil Wyszkowski (Director of UN Global Compact).

 

Panel 3

Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions

Moderator

 Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Professor and Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).

Speakers

“Remember to be Jewish: Religious Populism in Israel,” by Dr. Guy Ben-Porat (Professor of International Relations and Politics, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev).

“Religious Populism and Civilizationalism in International Politics: An Authoritarian Turn,” by Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz (Research Professor of Political Science and International Relations and Chair in Islamic Studies at Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization) & Dr. Nicholas Morieson (Research Fellow, Deakin University’s Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization).

Paper Presenters

“National Populists of Christian Europe, Unite? Civilizations Dimensions of Far-right Populist Alliances in Post-Brexit Britain,” by Dr. Rafal Soborski (Professor of International Politics, The Department of Social Science at Richmond American University and Senior Research Fellow at the Global Diversities and Inequalities Research Centre at London Metropolitan University).

“Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: Between the Muslim World and Malaysia,” by Dr. Syaza Shukri (Assoc. Professor & Head of Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia).

Dr. Jocelyne Cesari moderates Panel 3 on “Religion and Populism: Local, National, and Transnational Dimensions,” presented by Dr. Bulent Kenes, and featuring contributions from Dr. Guy Ben-Porat on religious populism in Israel; Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz & Dr. Nicholas Morieson on civilizational authoritarianism; Dr. Rafal Soborski on Christian far-right alliances; and Dr. Syaza Shukri on Anwar Ibrahim’s civilizational populism. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.

DAY TWO – May 23, 2025

Keynote Speech 

Dariusz Mazur, Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland, delivers a keynote speech addressing the challenges to the rule of law and the role of justice institutions in safeguarding democracy in an era of rising populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

Dariusz Mazur (Deputy Minister of Justice of the Republic of Poland).

 

Panel 4

Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization

Moderator

Antoine Godbert (Affiliate Professor of Law, Economics & Humanities at ESCP Business School, Paris, and Director of International Affairs at the Rectorat of Île-de-France – Paris).

Speakers

“On the Nature of Economics and the future of Globalization under Civilizational Populism,” by Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk (Professor of Economics, Duisburg-Essen University, Institute of East Asian Studies (IN-EAST), Germany, Senior Economic Researcher at the ECPS, Brussels).

Populism as a Reaction to Neoliberal Technocratism,” by Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki (Professor of Economic Sociology at the Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw).

“Far-Right Populism and the Making of the Exclusionary Neoliberal State,” by Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider (Associate Professor, Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna and Research Affiliate, Department of Sociology, University of Cambridge).

Antoine Godbert moderates Panel 4 on “Impacts of Civilizational Populism on the Market and Globalization,” with Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk examining the future of globalization, Dr. Krzysztof Jasiecki analyzing populist responses to neoliberal technocracy, and Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider exploring the rise of the exclusionary neoliberal state. Photos: Muhammed Gemi.

 

Panel 5

Religion and Identity Politics

Moderator

Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc (Reader in Psychology, School of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Law at the University of Dundee).

Speaker

“Religion and Power in an Age of Identity Politics,” by Dr. Erin K. Wilson (Professor, Chair of Politics and Religion, the Faculty of Religion, Culture, and Society, University of Groningen).

Paper Presenters

“Civilizational Populism and the Making of Sexualized Cultural Christianity,” by Dr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey (Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, Gender, and Culture, Le Moyne University, NY).

“Imagine No More Small Boats in the Channel’: How Populist Parties and Their Leaders Normalize Polarization in Their Communication on Social Media Platforms, a Multimodal Discourse Analysis,” by Dr. Valeria Reggi (Post-doc Researcher at the University of Venice and Adjunct Professor and Tutor at the University of Bologna).

Populism from a Double Perspective. Timo Soini and the Finnish Version of Populism,” by Dr. Jarosław Suchoples (Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw, Former Polish Ambassador to Finland).

Dr. Ana-Maria Bliuc moderates Panel 5 on “Religion and Identity Politics,” featuring Dr. Erin K. Wilson on the intersection of religion and power, Dr. Ludger Viefhues-Bailey on sexualized cultural Christianity, Dr. Valeria Reggi on populist polarization via social media, and Dr. Jarosław Suchoples on the Finnish model of populism. Photo: Muhammed Gemi.

Gala Dinner

During the gala dinner, a short video clip was presented featuring a biopic on the Romani poet Papusza and Birds Are Singing in Kigali, two acclaimed Polish films directed by Joanna Kos-Krauze. Following the screening, Dr. Małgorzata Bonikowska moderated a brief conversation with the director and two other participants. (Photos: Muhammed Gemi)

Participants

During the coffee and lunch breaks, conference participants had the opportunity to connect, exchange ideas, and get to know one another better. They also engaged actively in the Q&A sessions, contributing thoughtful questions and insights to each panel discussion. (Photos: Muhammed Gemi.)

Several thousand protesters marched in Bristol, UK, on February 4, 2017, opposing President Trump's scheduled state visit to the UK and his executive order banning travel to the US from seven Muslim-majority countries. Photo: Dreamstime.

Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK

Please cite as:
Wathtuwa-Durayalage, Sudeshika. (2025). “Impact of Civilizational Populism on Intergroup Emotions, Social Cohesion, and Civility in the UK.”
Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). June 11, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000115



Abstract

This study investigates the impact of civilizational populism on intergroup emotions, social cohesion, and civility in the United Kingdom using quantitative analysis of British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) 2021 data. The findings reveal significant correlations between exposure to populist rhetoric and heightened negative emotions, such as fear and anger, toward ethnoreligious and political minorities (r = 0.56). While political affiliation demonstrates a weaker direct influence (r = 0.14), perceptions of migration as culturally and economically beneficial are strongly associated with higher social cohesion (r = 0.69). Minority groups report elevated levels of exclusion and fear, yet national pride correlates with inclusive attitudes in some cases (r = -0.64, with prejudicial views). Civil society organizations play a critical role in mitigating divisive effects by fostering inclusivity and dialogue. These insights inform strategies to counteract the polarizing impacts of civilizational populism, emphasizing the importance of inclusive narratives and policy interventions to enhance social cohesion in diverse societies. The study’s limitations include reliance on secondary data and challenges in establishing causality, highlighting the need for further research using more direct measures of populism and contemporary datasets. Despite these constraints, the findings contribute empirical evidence to the growing literature on the social and emotional consequences of populism, offering a foundation for policies aimed at promoting harmony and reducing polarization in the UK.

Keywords: Civilizational populism, intergroup emotions, social cohesion, civility

 

By Sudeshika Wathtuwa-Durayalage

Introduction

This study investigates the influence of civilisational populism on intergroup emotions and attitudes towards ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK. Specifically, it examines the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility at the local and national levels, and how individuals and communities respond to and resist populist rhetoric. Central to this inquiry is an exploration of the emotional responses elicited by civilisational populism, such as fear, anger, and resentment, and the strategies civil society organisations employ to mitigate its divisive effects. 

While there has been extensive research on the general impact of populism on political attitudes and intergroup relations, there is a significant gap in understanding the specific emotional and social consequences of civilisational populism, particularly in the UK context. Civilisational populism differs from other forms of populism by framing political discourse regarding civilisational identities and perceived existential threats to cultural values and ways of life. Current literature inadequately addresses how this form of populism shapes intergroup emotions, such as fear and resentment, and its implications for social cohesion. Furthermore, there is a paucity of research on how communities and civil society organisations respond to civilisational populism, especially in fostering social cohesion and civility in the context of rising divisive rhetoric. 

This research is significant as it aims to provide a nuanced understanding of how civilisational populism influences emotional and social dynamics within ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK. By focusing on emotional responses and community reactions to civilisational populism, this study offers critical insights into how populist rhetoric shapes social cohesion and civility in diverse societies. Additionally, identifying the coping mechanisms and resistance strategies employed by communities will contribute to policy and intervention strategies aimed at mitigating the divisive impacts of populism. Ultimately, this research could inform efforts to strengthen social cohesion and civility in increasingly pluralistic and politically polarised societies.

The research questions are as follows:

How does civilisational populism influence intergroup emotions and attitudes toward ethnoreligious and political minorities in the UK?

What are the effects of civilisational populism on social cohesion and civility in local and national contexts?

How do individuals and communities respond to populist rhetoric, and what coping mechanisms or resistance strategies are employed to maintain social cohesion?

There are three research objectives aligned with this research, as follows:

To explore how civilisational populism impacts the emotional responses (e.g., fear, anger, and resentment) of different ethnoreligious and political groups in the UK.

To analyse the relationship between civilisational populism and social cohesion, focusing on the extent to which it promotes or undermines community trust and cooperation.

To identify the strategies utilised by civil society organisations and communities to counteract the divisive effects of populism and foster civility.

Civilisational populism, as defined in this research, uniquely frames political discourse around existential threats to cultural values, in contrast to general populism that targets the elite. This study explores its significant emotional and societal impacts on social cohesion, particularly among ethnoreligious and political minorities. The central argument posits that civilisational populism exacerbates fear, anger, and resentment toward minority groups, undermining local and national social cohesion. Civil society and communities can mitigate these divisive impacts by fostering civility and employing coping mechanisms. Through a robust quantitative approach utilising British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) data, this research seeks to empirically establish correlations between populist rhetoric and intergroup emotions.

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A woman votes at a polling station on general election day in Palma de Mallorca. Photo: Dreamstime.

Do Muslims Have Different Attitudes and Voting Behaviour Than the Majority Populations of France, Germany and the Netherlands?

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Please cite as: 

van Oosten, Sanne. (2025). “Do Muslims Have Different Attitudes and Voting Behaviour Than the Majority Populations of France, Germany and the Netherlands?” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). June 10, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00100

 

Abstract

The political preferences of Muslims are often the source of contention and misinformation. In continental Europe, there is not much data available on political preferences of Muslims due to strict privacy regulations, creating a knowledge lacuna allowing for misinformation to fester. In this report, I focus on three countries where privacy regulations are particularly longstanding: France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I use a novel sampling method that complies with privacy regulations while achieving a large enough sample of minority respondents to conduct statistical analyses. Regarding policy preferences, I find that respondents with a Muslim minority background have more conservative attitudes towards same-sex adoption, while showing very similar attitudes to white majority respondents when it comes to gender equality. Respondents with a Muslim minority background are, however, more progressive on immigration and religious freedoms for Muslims. Regarding voting preferences, Muslims show very similar patterns to their majority counterparts, with a few exceptions (La France Insoumise (FI) in France, and in the Netherlands DENK and Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV)). This paper seeks to put an end to persistent speculation about the political preferences of Muslims, particularly Muslims, in France, Germany, and the Netherlands.

 

By Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher at University of Oxford, COMPAS, sanne.vanoosten@compas.ox.ac.uk)

Introduction

The political preferences of Muslims in western countries are the subject of recurring speculation (Turnbull-Dugarte and Lopez, 2024; Turnbull-Dugarte et al., 2025; van Oosten, 2025a; 2025b). Political leaders often claim that Muslims vote for them to present themselves as legitimate leaders of all people, while at the same time, some political leaders claim that Muslims and other minorities have been imported by elites to vote for pro-immigrant parties and change society from within (Bracke and Aguilar, 2022; van Oosten, 2025a). Political actors also often point to the attitudes of Muslims to justify their exclusion from national communities (Glas, 2023; Spierings, 2021; De Lange and Mügge, 2015). These claims focus on issues like opposition to gay rights (Puar, 2013), perceived sexism (Farris, 2017), antisemitism (van Oosten, 2024a) or animal cruelty (Backlund and Jungar, 2022; van Oosten, 2024b). Far-right parties use these examples to argue that Muslims do not share core liberal values, and therefore do not belong in liberal societies (van Oosten, 2024b; 2022). These claims, however, are rarely supported by data. This report examines whether Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands hold different political preferences from their white majority counterparts.

Standard sampling strategies do not yield enough minority participants for statistical analyses (Font and Méndez, 2013). Moreover, strict European privacy regulations limit the availability of sampling frames for racial/ethnic and religious minorities in the European context (Simon, 2017). To overcome these challenges, I surveyed a large sample of Kantar-panellists and used a mini-survey to oversample voters from France, Germany, and the Netherlands with a migration background in Turkey (France, Germany, and the Netherlands), North Africa (France), Sub-Saharan Africa (France), the Former Soviet Union (Germany), Surinam (the Netherlands), and Morocco (the Netherlands). I sampled a high number of minority respondents, with 1889 out of a total N of 3058 respondents having a migration background, of which 649 self-identify as Muslim. I asked these respondents for their propensity to vote (PTV) for all political parties in the French, German and Dutch parliament at the time of data collection, as well as their attitudes towards 8 key policy preferences spanning socio-cultural and socio-economic themes. 

In this paper, I test whether Muslims and other minority groups differ from majority voters in their support for political parties in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. I find that Muslim voters are much less likely to support PVV in the Netherlands but are just as likely to vote for the RN in France or AfD in Germany (all three far right). Minority and majority voters are equally likely to support mainstream left parties, such as PS in France, the SPD in Germany, and PvdA in the Netherlands. Muslim minority voters are more likely to support left-populist parties DENK in the Netherlands and FI in France. In terms of policy preferences, respondents with a Muslim minority background hold more conservative views on same-sex adoption but show similar attitudes to majority respondents on gender equality. They are, however, more progressive on immigration and Muslim religious freedoms.

This report aims to contribute to the debate about the voting behaviour of Muslims in Western Europe, a debate that is often speculative and not based on data from academic scholars. Far right party leaders, thinkers and pundits have fuelled misunderstandings about minority voting patterns. In reality, the political preferences of Muslims, a minority, are very similar to the political preferences of the majority population. This report seeks to provide clarity and offer a data-driven response to counter the narrative that some political leaders might use to exploit the supposed voting behaviours of minorities for their political gain. Through empirical analysis, this study contributes to a more accurate understanding of ethnic minority political preferences and aims to challenge rhetoric with factual evidence.

Sampling Method and Sample Composition

I conducted this research in France (van Oosten et al., 2024a), Germany (van Oosten et al., 2024b) and the Netherlands (van Oosten et al., 2024c), three countries with key differences. In France, there is a strong emphasis on citizenship, secularism and a strong division between church and state (Kuru, 2008). In Germany, Christian political parties have had a longstanding presence (Ahrens et al., 2022) and the approach towards Muslims is characterised by the history of integration of guestworkers (Yurdakul, 2009). The Netherlands has a host of Christian parties (Kešić and Duyvendak, 2019), a tradition of high minority representation in politics (Hughes, 2016: 560), increased by the emergence of a political party run by Muslim parliamentarians and voicing Muslim interests in 2017, DENK (van Oosten et al., 2024d). All three countries have a history of parliamentarians from mainstream and populist radical right parties espousing Islamophobic rhetoric, with France and the Netherlands having a longer and more vociferous history of populist radical right parties and Germany being relatively new to the game and taking on a comparatively less strident tone (Brubaker, 2017).

I oversampled respondents with specific migration backgrounds to make group-specific statistical inferences (Font and Méndez, 2013: 48) and chose minoritised groups: numeric minorities that state experiencing discrimination to the largest extent (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 31). In France, the oversampled groups of ethnic minority citizens consist of French citizens with a North-African (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria), Sub-Saharan African (Niger, Mauritania, Ivory Coast, French Sudan, Senegal, Chad, Gabon, Cameroon, Congo) and Turkish background. In Germany, I oversampled German citizens with a Turkish and Former Soviet Union (FSU) background. In the Netherlands, I oversampled Dutch citizens with a Turkish, Moroccan and Surinamese background. Some groups have come to France, Germany or the Netherlands as a result of the colonial ties between host and home country, some came as guest workers (FRA: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017: 93). I also oversampled French citizens with a Turkish background and German re-migrants from the FSU. Some, but not all, of the oversampled migration backgrounds are countries with Muslim-majority populations, making it possible to disentangle whether differences are either religiously or ethnically/racially driven. In this paper, I present data for the Muslim subgroup, but the data also includes other minoritised groups and analyses by these groups are also available for researchers. 

After running pilots and obtaining the ethics approval, (see appendix: van Oosten, 2025c), I gathered data between March and August of 2020 amongst 3058 citizens of France, Germany and the Netherlands, administered by survey agency Kantar Public (for all replication materials and appendices, see van Oosten, 2025b). One important challenge in surveying ethnic/racial minority groups comes from the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), a European law legally restricting saving data on race and ethnicity (European Commission 2018). I overcame this challenge by employing a large-scale filter question to the representative Kantar-panels in all three countries. I asked a very large sample to participate in a mini survey. The first and only question of this mini survey asks where their mother and father were born. If either one of their parents were born in a country of origin I wanted to oversample, I redirected this respondent to the full survey. If not, I either terminated the survey or redirected a small percentage to the full survey. This enabled us to form sizable groups of minority citizens for our final survey, ensuring ample diversity, a feature so often missing from survey research (e.g. Coppock and McClellan, 2018). Though there is still a chance of selection bias (see van Oosten, 2025d for a discussion on the selection bias in this sample), I have variables to weight the data on gender, migration background, education, age, urbanisation and region, and the findings are broadly the same with and without weights.

Respondents received so-called ‘LifePoints’ (France and Germany) or ‘Nipoints’ (the Netherlands) for the completion of the survey. With these points, respondents can periodically convert their saved points to an online gift card. The survey took about fifteen minutes to complete, which translated to an equivalent of two euros in gift card value. I ended up with the following number of respondents in each group:

I assessed migration background by inquiring about the birthplaces of respondents’ mothers and fathers. It was necessary to ask this question first for sampling purposes. To minimise potential ordering effects on the data, I randomised the order in which respondents viewed the policy questions and experimental profiles (for the full questionnaire, see appendix in van Oosten, 2025c). To mitigate acquiescence bias, where respondents tend to agree with statements, I randomised the wording of the policy questions. For instance, one half of the sample saw the statement: “the taxes for this rich should be raised” and the other half saw “the taxes for the rich should be lowered” and I recoded the variables accordingly. I prepared the data using R-package ‘tidyr’ (Wickham, 2020, see all code and replication materials here: van Oosten, 2025c).

Minorities’ Policy Preferences

In the following section, I first present the policy preferences of two groups: non-religious ethnic majority respondents and Muslim ethnic minority respondents (for other subgroups see appendix at van Oosten, 2025c). I present the distribution of the responses in a histogram, with a black line indicating the mean score. I asked respondents to indicate their agreement with a series of policy statements using an 11-point scale, ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree). The statements covered a broad range of topics, including attitudes towards state intervention, immigration, Islam, gender and sexuality. The attitudes towards state intervention are as follows: “The tax rate for the rich must be higher/lower,” “Our government should raise/lower support for the unemployed,” “Our government should do less/more to combat climate change than now,” and “Our government needs to lower/raise fuel prices.” Attitudes towards immigration and Islam are as follows: “Immigrants are a burden/an asset to our country,” “Islam should (not) be restricted by law.” I measure gender attitudes as follows: “That men and women receive equal pay for equal work should (not) be regulated by law,” and sexuality as follows: “Homosexual couples should (not) be allowed to adopt children.” 

I compared the responses of non-religious ethnic majority respondents with those of ethnic minority respondents who self-identified as practicing Muslims. Differences between the groups were negligible for most policy areas, including taxation, unemployment, climate policy, fuel prices, and gender equality. However, Muslim respondents were more likely to oppose adoption rights for same-sex couples, and more supportive of immigration and religious freedoms for Muslims.

Subsequently, I present data for voting preferences. I asked respondents about their willingness to vote for a wide range of political parties in their respective countries using so-called “Propensity to Vote” (PTV) questions. Respondents were asked: “Please indicate the likelihood that you will ever vote for the following parties. If you are certain that you will never vote for this party then choose 0; if you are certain to vote for this party someday, then enter 10. Of course you can also choose an intermediate position.” In France, the list of parties included LREM, LR, PS, MoDem, FI, PCF, RN (formerly Front National), and MR. In Germany, I asked about CDU, SPD, AfD, FDP, Die Linke, Grüne, and CSU. In the Netherlands, the full list consisted of CDA, ChristenUnie, D66, DENK, FvD, GroenLinks, PvdA, PvdD, PVV, SGP, SP, and VVD. 

In the figures below, I present histograms of the responses for two parties per country: FI and RN in France, Die Linke and AfD in Germany, and DENK and PVV in the Netherlands. These pairs were selected to contrast parties often associated with the ethnic majority versus those associated with minority or immigrant support. Full results for all parties are available in the appendix (van Oosten, 2025c). Our findings show that there are relatively few differences in voting propensities between non-religious ethnic majority respondents and Muslim ethnic minority respondents in France and Germany. In France, Muslims are about as likely as non-religious majority respondents to consider voting for both RN and FI. Similarly, in Germany, I find little difference between these two groups in their willingness to vote for Die Linke or AfD. The Netherlands stands out in this regard: Muslim respondents are significantly more likely to consider voting for DENK, a party with strong minority and Muslim support, while being far less likely to vote for the PVV, a party known for its anti-Muslim rhetoric. This suggests that differences in vote propensity by group are more pronounced in the Dutch context than in France or Germany.

Minorities’ Voting Preferences

Conclusion

In terms of policy preferences, the differences between Muslims and non-religious ethnic majority respondents are generally small, except in a few areas. Muslims tend to be more supportive of immigration and Muslim rights and less supportive of same-sex couples adopting children. There are no major differences on issues like gender equality, though. When it comes to voting preferences, there are bigger differences in the Netherlands compared to France and Germany. In the Netherlands, Muslims are much less likely to vote for the PVV, but more likely to vote for DENK. In France and Germany, there are fewer differences between Muslims and non-religious ethnic majorities, with both groups showing similar preferences for parties like RN and FI in France, and AfD and Die Linke in Germany.

This paper addresses the ongoing speculations about the policy and voting preferences of Muslims in France, Germany, and the Netherlands. Political leaders and commentators regularly spread misinformation; possibly unintentionally, possibly deliberately (van Oosten, 2025a). This false information about minority voting habits can mislead the public and fuel xenophobic views. In reality, Muslims often share similar political preferences with the majority population, though not always. This paper presents descriptive statistics to challenge false narratives. Combating misinformation is vital for the health of democracies, as it helps maintain informed discussions and trust in democratic institutions.

References

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Glas, Saskia. (2023). “What Gender Values Do Muslims Resist? How Religiosity and Acculturation Over Time Shape Muslims’ Public-Sphere Equality, Family Role Divisions, and Sexual Liberalization Values Differently.” Social Forces, Volume 101, Issue 3, March 2023, Pages 1199–1229, https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/soac004.

Hughes, Melanie M. (2016). “Electoral Systems and the Legislative Representation of Muslim Ethnic Minority Women in the West, 2000-2010.” Parliamentary Affairs 69: 548–68. https://doi.org/10.1093/pa/gsv062.

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Kuru, Ahmet T. (2008). “Secularism, State Policies, and Muslims in Europe Analyzing French Exceptionalism.” Comperative Politics 41 (1): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041508×12911362383552.

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Simon, Patrick. (2017). “The Failure of the Importation of Ethno-Racial Statistics in Europe: Debates and Controversies.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 40 (13): 2326–32. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2017.1344278

Spierings, N. (2021). “Homonationalism and voting for the populist radical right: Addressing unanswered questions by zooming in on the Dutch case.” International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 33(1), 171–182. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edaa005

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van Oosten S., Mügge L., Hakhverdian A, Van der Pas D. and Vermeulen F. (2024a). French Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination. (EMMAVID) – EMMAVID Data France. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ULQEAY  

van Oosten S., Mügge L., Hakhverdian A., Van der Pas D. and Vermeulen F. (2024b). German Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination. (EMMAVID) – EMMAVID Data Germany. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/GT4N9J  

van Oosten S., Mügge L., Hakhverdian A., Van der Pas D. and Vermeulen F. (2024c). Dutch Ethnic Minority and Muslim Attitudes, Voting, Identity and Discrimination (EMMAVID) – EMMAVID Data the Netherlands. Harvard Dataverse. DOI: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/BGVJZQ

van Oosten, S., Mügge, L., Hakhverdian, A., & van der Pas, D. (2024d). “What explains voting for DENK: Issues, discrimination or in-group favouritism?” Representation, 60(4), 601–623.https://doi.org/10.1080/00344893.2024.2387011

van Oosten, S. (2024a).” Judeonationalism: Calling out antisemitism to discredit Muslims.” ECPR The Loop, 2024(6). https://theloop.ecpr.eu/judeonationalism-antisemitism-for-the-discrediting-of-muslims/ (accessed on April 10, 2025).

van Oosten, S. (2024b). “Animeauxnationalism: ‘They are eating the pets’.” Digressions and Impressions.https://digressionsnimpressions.typepad.com/digressionsimpressions/2024/10/animeauxnationalism-they-are-eating-the-pets-guest-post-by-sanne-van-oosten.html (accessed on April 10, 2025).

van Oosten, S. (2025a). “The Importance of In-group Favouritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 12, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0046

van Oosten, S. (2025b). “The ‘Awkward Alliance’ of the Left and the Right.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). https://www.populismstudies.org/the-awkward-alliance-of-the-left-and-the-right/ (accessed on April 10, 2025).

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Urban graffiti depicting the face of a woman in a hijab, located in an immigrant-populated neighborhood on September 1, 2015. The urban area of Berlin, Germany—home to 4 million residents—ranks as the 7th most populous in the European Union. Photo: Dreamstime.

Evaluations of Female Muslim Politicians in a Populist Era: Measuring Intersectionality Using Interaction Effects and Conjoint Experiments

Abstract
How do voters evaluate female Muslim politicians? The literature mainly approaches voter evaluations of underrepresented groups from a unitary perspective, focusing on either female or minoritized politicians, leaving Muslim politicians out of the picture altogether. I take an intersectional approach and consider a finding intersectional when evaluations of a Muslim woman politician are significantly different from both non-religious women and Muslim men. I test this by running survey experiments amongst 3056 respondents in France, Germany, and the Netherlands and presenting 18,336 randomly constructed profiles of hypothetical politicians varying their religion, gender, and migration background. Voters have a strong negative bias against Muslim politicians. However, voters do not assess female Muslim politicians significantly differently than their male counterparts. These conclusions have implications for researchers studying intersectionality using conjoint experiments and researchers concerned with the electoral consequences of diversity in a political landscape increasingly influenced by populist radical right parties.

Keywords: Intersectionality, Muslims, Islamophobia, Muslim women, Descriptive representation

Please find all replication materials here: https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/JZYR7

By Sanne van Oosten

Introduction

There are many examples of female Muslim politicians being targeted by politicians of the Populist Radical Right (see Farris, 2017; Oudenampsen, 2016), sometimes leading to female Muslim politicians receiving extraordinary amounts of discursive backlash (Saris & Ven, 2021; van Oosten, 2022). At the same time, Muslim women tend to outnumber Muslim men in politics (Hughes, 2016), especially in contexts where party selectors craft candidate lists: Muslim women tick two diversity boxes while also challenging stereotypes of Muslim women as oppressed, simply by being politicians (Dancygier, 2017). Despite these challenges and the unique positioning of Muslim women in politics, the question remains how voters evaluate them. Does being a female Muslim politician pose electoral challenges, or is there an electoral benefit? In this paper, I test whether intersectionality plays a role in how voters evaluate female Muslim politicians.

An intersectional analysis is distinct from a unitary or multiple one (Hancock, 2007). Where a unitary analysis foregrounds one background characteristic (race or gender) and a multiple analysis adds up the effects of multiple ones (race and gender), an intersectional analysis highlights the interaction between them (race interacts with gender) (idem). In order to study the intersectional position of minoritized women in politics quantitatively, many scholars call the use of interaction effects and candidate experiments viable methodological solutions (Block et al., 2023; Klar & Schmitt, 2021, p. 493, 495). This paper tests the limits of both the method of data collection (candidate experiments) and the method of analysis (interaction effects) by studying what is arguably a most-likely case: female Muslim politicians.

Though there has been much research on intersectionality and politicians in the US (Brown, 2014a, 2014b; Collins, 1998; Holman & Schneider, 2018; Lemi & Brown, 2019; Reingold et al., 2020), intersectionality and politicians in the European context is poorly understood. In Europe, Muslim women play a crucial role in many nationalist debates in western countries such as France, Germany and the Netherlands (Dancygier, 2017; Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2021). The general framing tends to imply that Muslim women are significantly different from both non-Muslim women and Muslim men because being Muslim influences what it means to be a woman and being a woman influences what it means to be Muslim. As Islam and gender are thus “mutually reinforcing”, an intersectional lens is indispensable (Crenshaw, 1991, p. 1283). This is particularly apparent when female Muslim politicians attempt to enter politics (Dancygier, 2014; Hughes, 2016; Murray, 2016). However, whether female Muslim politicians face a “double disadvantage” or a “strategic advantage” (Gershon & Lavariega Monforti, 2021) depends heavily on the specific political and societal context in which they operate. In order to study this, I presented 3056 respondents in France, Germany, and the Netherlands a total of 18,336 short bios of hypothetical politicians while randomizing their religion, ethnorace and gender. I asked respondents to assess these politicians by asking evaluation and choice-questions. Candidate conjoint experiments rarely include Islam as an experimental condition and when they do, intersectional analyses are rarely conducted (one notable exception being Benstead et al., 2015).

In line with Hancock (2007), I analyze the results in a unitary, multiple and intersectional way. In the intersectional analysis I use interactions while controlling for direct (unitary) effects. Although I do not find voters assess women and ethnoracially minoritized politicians negatively, I find robust and consistent evidence that voters have a strong negative and unitary bias against Muslim politicians. However, this analysis did not garner any evidence for intersectional effects of religion and gender. Given the sizable sample and effect sizes, I do not consider a lack of statistical power the cause of these null results. Though I remain confident that interaction effects are the most fitting method of analysis, I argue that conjoint experiments are not the most fitting method of data collection due to the cognitive overload causing respondents to single out one attribute to base their choices on.

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