Supporters of the Flemish far-right party Vlaams Belang wave Flanders flags during a protest in Brussels, Belgium, on May 29, 2023. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Dr. van Haute: The Habits of Consensus Democracy Are Slowly Fading in Belgium

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Belgium’s long-standing reputation as a consociational democracy—marked by power-sharing, compromise, and consensus-building—is under strain. According to Dr. Emilie van Haute, the country’s political landscape has undergone a fundamental transformation, with growing polarization and the increasing influence of populist radical parties. In this compelling interview with the ECPS, Dr. van Haute examines the rise of populism on both the left and right, the impact of linguistic divisions, and how mainstream parties are adapting to radical competition. She provides valuable insights into Belgium’s shifting democracy and the challenges ahead.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Belgium has long been regarded as a model of consociational democracy, characterized by political compromise, power-sharing, and consensus-building. However, according to Dr. Emilie van Haute, Associate Professor of Political Science and Department Chair at SciencePo ULB, and researcher at Cevipol, this perception no longer reflects reality. “The habits of consensus democracy are slowly fading,” she warns. “That poses a significant challenge for future government formation and the stability of coalition governments.”

In an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. van Haute explores the shifting dynamics of Belgian politics, particularly the rise of populist radical parties on both the left and the right. She highlights how political parties like Vlaams Belang (VB) and Parti du Travail de Belgique (PTB–PVDA) have capitalized on discontent and distrust in mainstream political institutions. “These are voters who feel alienated from the political system,” she explains. “They opt for radical parties not randomly, but because these parties align with their political priorities.”

Belgium’s linguistic and regional divisions further shape this political landscape. In Flanders, Vlaams Belang’s ethno-regionalist stance has gained traction by advocating for Flemish autonomy and opposing so-called “solidarity transfers” to the French-speaking south. In contrast, in French-speaking Belgium, populist momentum has been driven by the radical left, which prioritizes economic redistribution and national solidarity. These diverging political priorities contribute to a growing polarization within the country.

Mainstream parties have not remained immune to these shifts. As Dr. van Haute notes, they have increasingly adopted populist rhetoric and strategies in response to radical party successes. “Mimicking the radical right legitimizes their positions and facilitates their electoral success,” she observes, citing the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and the French-speaking Liberal Party (MR) as examples of this trend.

Looking ahead, Dr. van Haute sees Belgium at a crossroads. With growing affective polarization, the erosion of consensus politics, and populist parties gaining ground, the country faces an uncertain future. “It is difficult to govern with multiple coalition partners when parties are constantly engaging in antagonistic politics,” she warns.

In this thought-provoking discussion, Dr. van Haute dissects these pressing political challenges and reflects on the implications of populism, nationalism, and polarization in Belgium’s evolving democracy.

Dr. Emilie van Haute, Associate Professor of Political Science and Department Chair at SciencePo ULB, and researcher at Cevipol.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Emilie van Haute with some edits.

What Drives the Success of Populist Parties Is Discontent and a Lack of Trust in Mainstream Political Actors

Professor van Haute, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: What are the key similarities and differences between left-wing and right-wing populist parties in Belgium in terms of their ideology, voter base, and political strategies? How have economic, social, and cultural factors contributed to the rise of populist movements in Belgium, and how do these factors differ between the radical left (PTB–PVDA) and the radical right (Vlaams Belang)?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: That’s three broad questions. The commonality between the two radical forces is their protest appeal—their protest and populist appeal. You can clearly see in the voters they attract that this protest appeal is quite strong. So that’s the commonality because, otherwise, in terms of political positioning, they are at two opposite extremes. Politically, they are radically different. The radical right is positioned at the extreme right, both socioeconomically and culturally. Although we often hear that the radical right can sometimes have a blurred position on socioeconomic issues, that is not the case here. They are located at the right end of the political spectrum, whereas the radical left is on the left, both socio-economically and socio-culturally.

These two political forces are not identical when it comes to their political positions, but what they share is a protest appeal—protest against mainstream parties and the political system. That’s how they are similar and different.

Now, what drives their success is, again, discontent and a lack of trust in mainstream political actors, which generates discontent and protest. This strong protest appeal is where they find their success.

Now, why is it the radical right that attracts support in the north of Belgium (Flanders) and the radical left in the south (French-speaking Belgium)? It is because Belgium has two different party systems. On the Dutch-speaking side, the system is dominated by the mainstream right. When voters protest against the mainstream right, they turn to the clean or pure equivalent, which is the radical right. If they are not happy with the mainstream right, they shift to the radical right.

In contrast, in French-speaking Belgium, the dominant actor has been the Socialist Party, which is mainstream left. When voters are dissatisfied with the mainstream left, they turn to the alternative, which is the radical left. That is why these polarizing trends have occurred in Belgium.

The Evolution Over the Last Decade Has Clearly Been Toward More Polarization

How has Belgium’s political landscape changed over the last decade, especially in relation to the growing influence of Vlaams Belang (VB) and the Workers’ Party of Belgium (PTB–PVDA)? Looking at the historical trajectory, how have populism and populist parties developed over time? Would you classify sub-state nationalist parties such as N-VA, VB, and DéFI as populist movements?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: Okay, so the evolution over the last decade has clearly been toward more polarization—polarization of the political landscape due to the success of radical parties. The radical parties have pulled the party system to the extremes, and you can clearly see that voters are increasingly positioning themselves further away from the center. That is one of the most important developments.

The radical right has fluctuated over time. If you look at the electoral performance of Vlaams Belang, it has evolved. It was a party that saw a constant increase in its electoral performance throughout the 1990s until the early 2000s. Then, it reached a ceiling.

N-VA emerged as a mainstream right alternative for voters. At that time, Vlaams Belang started to lose voters to the benefit of N-VA because N-VA had a protest appeal and had not participated in the federal government. However, as soon as N-VA entered the federal government, it lost that protest appeal. Then, we saw a shift again—Vlaams Belang started to gain voters, and N-VA began losing voters. So there has been a back-and-forth dynamic in the Dutch-speaking political landscape between the mainstream right and the radical right. Right now, the radical right has regained the protest appeal and is once again on the rise.

On the French-speaking side, there has never been a successful radical right party, as I mentioned, because the radical left has embodied the protest appeal. The radical left has only gained traction in the last two or three federal elections, so it is a more recent phenomenon.

Now, regarding how to characterize these parties as radical or populist—clearly, Vlaams Belang and PTB–PVDA qualify as radical parties. Whether other parties have a populist component—essentially, a protest appeal—fluctuates over time. N-VA, at some point, had that protest appeal and, therefore, a populist component.

You can see that when the party first entered the federal coalition in 2014 and again more recently, its protest component dropped. It is really difficult for a party to be included in the government while maintaining a protest discourse. Once you are part of the establishment and making decisions, it becomes hard to continue criticizing decision-makers. As a result, N-VA has started to lose its protest and populist component.

Regarding DéFI, another regionalist party, it is a Brussels-based party that defends French speakers in Brussels. It has been part of coalition governments at the regional level for a long time and does not necessarily have a protest component in that context. However, when DéFI attempted to develop a branch in Wallonia, the other French-speaking region, it adopted a strong protest component because it was an emerging party and positioned itself against the existing political actors.

So, you can really see that parties tend to have a protest and populist component, particularly when they are in opposition and able to challenge the mainstream parties in their respective party systems.

Vlaams Belang and PVDA-PTB Share a Common Main Driver: Protest

What are the drivers of support for populist radical left and populist radical right parties in Belgium? How have protest attitudes and ideological considerations affected the recent election results of Vlaams Belang (VB) and Parti du Travail de Belgique (PVDA-PTB)?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: Clearly, these two parties share a common main driver: the protest component. Voters with a low level of political trust—trust in political institutions—have a higher probability of voting for these parties. Voters who are cynical toward the political system, those with a low level of political interest, and those who do not feel politically efficacious—meaning they do not believe they can change the political system—all exhibit attitudes that drive support for these two radical parties.

In a nutshell, these are voters who feel alienated from the political system and mainstream parties, leading them to opt for radical parties. However, they do not choose randomly; they also select protest parties that align with their political priorities.

These parties not only have a protest component but also offer specific political positions. In Flanders, voters who support Vlaams Belang are positioned on the right of the political spectrum and prioritize migration issues. These are protest voters who support a party that matches their political priorities but is more radical than the mainstream parties in power. Their vote is a protest against the governing mainstream parties—they seek specific policies, are disappointed by the ruling parties, and turn to more radical alternatives on the same issues.

In French-speaking Belgium, the pattern is similar. Protest voters tend to support radical left parties, but their vote is driven by positions on socioeconomic issues and left-wing economic policies.

Considering that radical-right parties like VB thrive in Flanders, whereas French-speaking populist radical-right parties struggle to gain traction, how does linguistic fragmentation impact the ideological positioning and success of populist radical parties in Belgium?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: In Flanders, Vlaams Belang is clearly an ethno-regionalist party—one that defends Flemish culture and interests and advocates for greater autonomy for Flanders. This is not the case in French-speaking Belgium.

The radical party that has the most traction there is a unitary party, meaning it has branches across the entire national territory, which is an exception in Belgium. Because of this unique characteristic—having branches in both Flanders and French-speaking Belgium—it is difficult for this party to advocate for regionalism. Instead, it emphasizes socioeconomic issues as its main priority and promotes national solidarity in socioeconomic redistribution.

So, in French-speaking Belgium, the radical party pushes for more national solidarity in socioeconomic matters, while in Flanders, Vlaams Belang advocates for more autonomy for the region. This dynamic is also one of the key polarizing debates in Belgium.

Ruling N-VA Is the Successor of a Former Ethno-Regionalist Party

Bart De Wever, former Mayor of Antwerp, at the Chinese New Year parade in Antwerp, Belgium, on February 2, 2019. Photo: Yves Van Tente.

A new government has just been announced in Belgium under the leadership of the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), with Bart De Wever becoming the country’s first nationalist prime minister. How would you define the N-VA as a political party? Based on your research, how do you explain the party’s emergence and breakthrough, its organizational choices, ideological profile, prospects for survival, and potential trajectory following its first experience in government?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: N-VA is actually the heir of a former ethno-regionalist party, Volksunie. So it is not necessarily a completely new party. It has existed in its current form since 2001 but is the successor of Volksunie, a party that emerged in 1954. In that sense, it is a “new party with old roots.”

This historical background is important to understand because, as a “new” party, it was able to establish its organization based on existing party branches. As a result, it quickly developed territorial anchorage, which is extremely important for party survival. This is one of the reasons why N-VA was able to establish itself and survive more easily than other new parties.

N-VA positions itself on the right wing of the political spectrum, both socioeconomically and culturally. Initially, the party performed poorly in elections and had to form an alliance with the Christian Democrats in Flanders. That alliance was crucial—it not only helped the party survive electorally but also allowed it to present itself as a protest party. While allied with the Christian Democrats, N-VA distinguished itself as a more radical alternative, particularly on linguistic issues, refusing to compromise on certain key positions.

This stance appealed to voters, particularly those who had previously supported Vlaams Belang. Some of these voters saw N-VA as a “purer” party on linguistic issues while also being more embedded in the political system, giving it a chance to participate in government—something Vlaams Belang could not do due to the cordon sanitaire. As a result, some former Vlaams Belang voters decided to support N-VA, seeing it as a viable alternative that could both enter government and maintain strong, radical positions.

N-VA built its position on this foundation. From the start, it participated in power at the regional level, gaining coalition government experience in Flanders. It also joined the federal government once, between 2014 and 2019. Therefore, it is not an inexperienced party; it has both governmental experience and a strong party organization.

These elements—its historical roots, organizational strength, and governmental experience—are crucial for its survival. N-VA is a party that is well-established and is likely to remain a key player in Belgian politics for the long term.

As you mention in your articles, the Flemish Nationalist Party N-VA is a relatively young or newly established party. How do you account for its success, and what internal and external dynamics have contributed to its rise? Given the N-VA’s evolution from a regionalist successor party to a dominant force in Belgian politics, what insights can be drawn about the adaptability and trajectory of nationalist and populist radical-right movements?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: So, N-VA is, as we mentioned, an “old-new” party, established in 2001 with roots in a former ethno-regionalist party. The way it developed was by not becoming a single-issue party. While regionalist issues were central, they were not enough to gain electoral traction. So, the party embedded its ethno-regionalism into socioeconomic issues.

They started developing a socioeconomic program that is conservative—but it is conservative ethno-regionalism, emphasizing the idea of rewarding workers, the workforce, and economic dynamism. However, behind this rhetoric, the underlying message is about rewarding Flanders. Since Flanders has a higher active workforce than French-speaking Belgium—where more people rely on unemployment benefits—N-VA framed its policies as a way to reward Flanders.

This allowed them to combine the two core issues, presenting economic conservatism as a means to defend Flemish interests and stop what they call “solidarity transfers” to unemployed French speakers in the rest of the country. By intertwining these themes, they managed to appeal to a broader electoral audience.

The Habits of Consensus Democracy Are Slowly Fading in Belgium

Billboards for the 2024 Belgian elections in Berchem-Sainte-Agathe, Brussels-Capital Region, Belgium, on May 18, 2024. Photo: Werner Lerooy.

Belgium has traditionally been regarded as a classic example of a consociational or consensus democracy. How does this political system influence the opportunities and constraints faced by populist parties, and in what ways have these parties adjusted to Belgium’s intricate institutional structure? In the light of the N-VA’s electoral success and the growing support for Vlaams Belang (VB), do you believe this characterization still accurately reflects Belgium’s political landscape?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: No. Consensual democracies—and Belgium has been an ideal type of consensus or consensual democracy—are characterized by cooperation and compromise. However, you can clearly see, first in Flanders, growing antagonisms, and this is partly driven by N-VA. I would say N-VA, even more than Vlaams Belang, plays a very antagonistic game and does not necessarily adhere to the consensus logic, which has, of course, an effect on voters. Increasingly, we see more polarization among voters in Flanders than in French-speaking Belgium.

However, a similar trend is emerging in French-speaking Belgium, partly due to the radical left, but also increasingly among conservatives. The French-speaking Liberals are starting to play a role similar to the one N-VA has played in Flanders. You can see that the conservative party in French-speaking Belgium is beginning to adopt a more antagonistic stance.

The habits of consensus democracy are slowly fading, and I think this poses a significant challenge for future government formation and the stability of coalition governments. It is difficult to govern for four to five years with five coalition partners if parties are constantly engaging in antagonistic politics. This is becoming an increasingly significant challenge, and we have already seen that government formation and coalition stability have become more difficult due to the gradual erosion of Belgium’s consensus democracy.

How has affective polarization been instrumental in Belgian elections and in the success of populist parties? How do you think separatist politics will be influenced by the victory of N-VA?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: We have seen affective polarization present in Belgium, more so in Flanders than in French-speaking Belgium. This is due to the presence of parties like Vlaams Belang and N-VA in Flanders, which polarize the electorate into groups that do not necessarily like each other. However, we are also starting to see the same trend emerging in French-speaking Belgium.

Affective polarization is present, though not as strongly as in other representative democracies. It is still at a lower level compared to many other countries, but it is a clear sign of the vanishing consensus. There is a growing dislike between electorates from different parties.

I believe this is a self-reinforcing cycle: parties antagonize, leading to more polarized voters. As voters become more polarized, parties have less incentive to seek consensus, further fueling the cycle.

‘Contamination Effect’ of Populist Parties on Mainstream Political Discourse

Given the indirect “contamination effect” of populist parties on mainstream political discourse, how has their presence impacted traditional parties in Belgium? Have mainstream parties adopted elements of populist rhetoric or policies in response?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: Clearly, the answer is yes. The way mainstream parties react to their radical competition is through imitation.

In Flanders, the mainstream right—primarily N-VA and, to a lesser extent, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals (Open VLD)—has adopted some of the rhetoric of the radical right. N-VA, in particular, made migration a highly salient issue when they were in power at the federal level between 2014 and 2019. In fact, they exited the government before the end of the legislature over migration issues. Research shows that mimicking the radical right tends to legitimize their positions and facilitate their electoral success. So, in Flanders, there is clear evidence of mainstream parties adopting the radical right’s rhetoric, effectively mainstreaming their positions.

In French-speaking Belgium, the Socialist Party, which was the dominant mainstream left party and was challenged by the radical left, also adopted more radical positions on socioeconomic issues. The presence of radical parties has led to polarization across the political spectrum.

Additionally, in French-speaking Belgium, there has been a rightward shift of the Liberal Party (the conservative party). When faced with strong competition from the Socialist Party and the Workers’ Party on the left, the Liberal Party moved further to the right to engage in the same antagonistic dynamic. This has contributed to a clear polarization of the political landscape.

The Main Challenge for Belgian Politics Is the Adoption of a ‘Trump 2.0’ Version by Mainstream Parties

Former U.S. President Donald Trump and vice-presidential nominee J.D. Vance at a rally in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

How do Belgian populist parties engage with European politics, particularly in relation to the European Union and broader transnational populist networks?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: Clearly, regarding the European Union, it is easy for these parties to adopt an anti-EU rhetoric, engaging in “Europe bashing” to highlight various issues they want to make salient. This is a commonality between the radical right and the radical left—both hold Eurosceptic views and positions.

That being said, there are links with transnational movements of the same kind. For instance, there are connections between Vlaams Belang and other populist radical-right parties in Europe, although these relationships can be somewhat of a love-hate dynamic. Coordinating among these parties is not always easy because, while they advocate for their national interests, promoting international collaboration can sometimes create tensions.

On the left, the radical-left party has strong ties with other radical-left parties in Europe. This collaboration is well-established and has existed for a long time, making it relatively easier to maintain.

Overall, Belgian populist parties exhibit Euroscepticism while still engaging in some forms of transnational collaboration.

And lastly, Professor van Haute, how do you think populist parties in Belgium will be affected by the second Trump administration in the US?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: I am less concerned about the impact on populist radical parties than on how mainstream parties will be affected. That is my main fear. We are already seeing conservative parties—both N-VA and MR, on the Dutch- and French-speaking sides, respectively—adopting some of the strategies and rhetoric of early Trump, perhaps resembling Trump in 2016. The question is whether they will move toward adopting a “Trump 2.0” version. The main concern is not necessarily the radical parties that remain in opposition. Rather, the challenge lies in governing parties increasingly adopting radical rhetoric. That is the main challenge.

3D illustration: Lightspring.

The Economic Meaning and Consequences of Trump’s Trade Tariff Wars

by CommentariesEconomicsEditor’s ChoiceHome

Populist US President Donald Trump’s self-proclaimed favorite word, “tariff,” has far-reaching implications beyond simple taxation. In this insightful analysis, Professor Eser Karakaş dissects the economic distortions and welfare costs associated with protectionist trade policies. He examines how tariffs disrupt relative price structures, reducing efficiency and shifting wealth from consumers to producers, ultimately leading to net societal losses. Drawing on economic theory and Mancur Olson’s “Logic of Collective Action,” Karakaş explains why seemingly irrational tariff policies persist in political decision-making. He further explores Trump’s tariff war with China, its impact on global trade, and how it could weaken the US economy in the long run.

By Eser Karakas*

After being elected US president, Donald Trump declared that his favorite word in English was “tariff.” Tariffs refer to taxes and duties imposed on all goods and services subject to international trade. It is evident that the prices of tariffed goods and services will rise in the markets where they are offered to consumers. However, from an economic perspective, the most crucial issue is the change in the relative price structure between these goods and services and their substitutes, or more technically, the distortion of the relative price structure. This distortion in relative prices has significant implications for both efficiency and distribution. It can disrupt the natural functioning of markets, leading to inefficiencies in resource allocation and creating different economic consequences for specific industries and consumer groups.

At a certain stage in their careers, professional economists often share a well-known joke among themselves. Students who begin their economics education take a two-semester Introduction to Economics course in their first year of university. This course is built around a fundamental textbook, and the higher the quality of this book, the stronger the foundation for the student’s career in economics.

During our youth, Paul Samuelson’s textbook was widely used. Today, Gregory Mankiw’s book is the primary choice in many universities. Daron Acemoglu has also authored a highly contemporary and comprehensive introduction to economics textbook. However, for the author of these lines, the personal preference remains Mankiw.

As students progress, the level of economics courses becomes more advanced, leading to graduate and doctoral studies. A thesis is written on a specific field of economics, an academic career begins, and over time, one moves toward becoming a professor. As the years pass, one realizes that if the Introduction to Economics textbook studied in the first year of university was well-taught and well-learned, it provides significant insights into understanding global economic issues. In fact, I would go even further—half-joking, half-serious—and say that this book alone is often sufficient.

Let’s approach the meaning of the word “tariff” (customs tariff), which Trump has claimed to be his favorite, through a first-year Introduction to Economics textbook. However, towards the end of the article, I will reflect on the concept of tariffs through Mancur Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action and take the discussion to a more advanced level within the framework of endogenous growth theory.

Now, let’s consider Trump’s tariff policies. For instance, imagine he imposes a 30% tariff on automobiles produced in the EU, affecting brands like BMW, Mercedes, Audi, and Citroën. In the US market, importers of EU cars will pass on this additional tariff to consumers as much as they can, making EU-manufactured vehicles approximately 30% more expensive. As a result, the relative price structure between US-made and EU-made automobiles will be distorted. 

This distortion will have economic costs in terms of both efficiency and distribution. Because the most important factor in economics is the maximization of consumer surplus. However, the imposition of tariffs will reduce the surplus of US automobile consumers while increasing the producer surplus of domestic car manufacturers. This transfer of surplus (from consumers to producers) will grow even larger as tariff rates increase. Let’s not forget, surplus means welfare; therefore, as consumer welfare decreases, producer welfare increases.

As I mentioned above, the economic consequences of tariffs are not merely distributive. In other words, the issue is not just the transfer of consumer surplus or welfare from consumers to producers. Tariffs introduce significant efficiency costs to the extent that they distort relative prices. The practical implication of these efficiency costs is that the decline in consumer surplus (welfare) exceeds the increase in producer surplus (welfare). This is inevitable and results in an absolute welfare loss for society as a whole—including consumers, producers, and the state.

Just like balancing a shopkeeper’s ledger, when evaluating the effects of tariffs, one side should account for the increase in producer surplus and the tax revenue generated by tariffs (government revenue)—these represent the gains for certain segments of society. On the other side of the ledger, one must include the reduction in consumer surplus or overall consumer welfare. Theoretically, the losses will outweigh the gains. In other words, tariffs have a net negative impact on overall societal welfare. This decline represents the efficiency cost arising from the distortion of relative prices due to tariff policies. 

Therefore, as early as the 18th century, Adam Smith’s phrase “laissez-faire, laissez-passer” emphasized the need to allow the free movement of goods and services in international trade. It was argued that tariff barriers inevitably have negative effects on welfare, and thus, such restrictions should be avoided.

Trump’s statement, “I will close the US budget deficit by significantly increasing tariffs,” is narrowly correct, as it would lead to higher public revenues. However, on a broader scale, it is incorrect because, despite the increase in government revenue, overall societal welfare would decline due to these tariffs. At this point, we can ask a fundamental question: Although the welfare effects of tariffs—largely negative—have been well understood in economic theory for many years, why are they still implemented, at least to some extent, in every country and economic union, even if not as aggressively as Trump suggests?

Today, even the European Commission, which adopts a more liberal and Smithian stance on tariffs compared to the United States, imposes a Common Customs Tariff (CCT) on third countries and uses these revenues to finance a significant portion of the EU budget. However, it should be noted that these tariff rates are not at levels that would cause substantial welfare losses. Nevertheless, economic theory operates under the same fundamental principles everywhere and at all times.

Let’s delve a bit deeper into the negative effects of high tariffs with an example. Suppose the US imposes high tariffs on automobiles originating from the EU. As a result, American consumers will purchase fewer automobiles. Due to the distortion of relative prices, they will shift their consumption preferences toward domestically produced vehicles. However, it should not be overlooked that, thanks to these tariffs, US automakers, freed from import competition pressures, will be able to raise their prices and generate profits beyond normal levels. Additionally, as the competitive pressure from EU automobiles diminishes, the quality of US-produced cars may also decline. This situation presents a striking example of the distributive effects of tariffs.

Readers of this article can compare the quality and quantity of the Turkish automotive industry before and after the 1996 Customs Union and recall the welfare, efficiency, and distributional effects of tariffs and their removal (with a low common external tariff). As a result, due to the high tariffs Trump intends to impose on EU-origin automobiles, US consumers will be forced to purchase fewer and lower-quality vehicles at higher prices. Meanwhile, US automakers will be able to sell more expensive and lower-quality cars in greater numbers compared to the pre-tariff period. The winners and losers of this process are evident. The overall society experiences a welfare loss, and demographically, the number of those who lose from this policy far exceeds the number of beneficiaries.

So why, despite this reality, do political movements—such as the US Republican Party, even if not Donald Trump himself—dare to make such politically irrational decisions as they have to go an election? Could seemingly irrational actions, both politically and economically, actually be more rational than they appear? This question has long intrigued economists throughout the history of economic thought. However, one of the most significant contributions to this issue came from the renowned American economist Mancur Olson (1932–1998). Olson was a key figure in the public choiceschool of economics, which applies the fundamental philosophy of methodological individualism to group decision-making processes in a highly effective manner. Economists have coined the term “Olson Paradox” to describe his theory. In this brief article, I do not intend to delve deeper into this concept.

In the case of tariffs imposed on EU-manufactured automobiles, which I have attempted to outline above, the number of individuals experiencing welfare loss far exceeds those benefiting from the policy. However, despite their numerical superiority, these affected groups struggle to organize collective action to protect their interests. In fact, from a theoretical perspective, such collective action is nearly impossible. This is because an individual member of the large group suffering welfare loss seeks to maximize their potential gains from the group’s collective success while contributing as little as possible to the effort. This creates a paradox: the larger the group, the stronger the incentive for each individual to minimize their contribution. As a result, coordination costs rise, further discouraging collective mobilization. Consequently, due to this reluctance to bear even minimal costs, collective action fails to materialize.

In contrast, the small group that benefits from increased welfare faces minimal coordination costs. Their gains are larger and more tangible, making collective organization much easier. When considering the mechanisms of political financing in the United States, it becomes clearer which groups will take the lead in campaign donations and lobbying efforts. The logic of collective action is riddled with paradoxes, yet understanding these dynamics is crucial for making sense of the political and economic processes we experience today.

Now, let’s turn to the broader issue of Trump’s tariff wars and their impact on international economics. Earlier, we used the EU automobile industry as an example. Here, I would like to focus on the Chinese economy and its consumer goods sector as another key example.

The world’s annual value-added production—or global income, if you prefer—is approaching $120 trillion. The US economy, with a population of 350 million (compared to a global population exceeding 8 billion), accounts for more than a quarter of this global production. In the US, per capita income is approaching $100,000, whereas in China, it stands at approximately $15,000 at current exchange rates. This disparity in per capita income is crucial to our analysis. At this stage, in my view, Trump makes a critical mistake by imposing high tariffs on Chinese goods. But why do we see this decision as misguided—not only from the perspective of economic theory but also for the US economy itself? There are several reasons for this.

As long as Chinese consumer goods entered the US market tariff-free, an American worker with $100 in their pocket could walk into a mall and leave with a large basket of consumer goods. From an economic perspective, this means that even if nominal wages (in dollar terms) remained constant, the real wages of American workers would increase significantly due to cheaper goods. This scenario would have also benefited American employers, as the pressure to increase wages would have eased, allowing the US economy to gain efficiency in global competition. It is difficult to understand the logic behind a policy that deliberately increases the cost of wage goods within the US, thereby forcing monetary wages to rise inevitably. Beyond this, the services sector—which produces non-tradable services—would have also gained significant momentum as a result of rising real wages.

There is also the dimension of controlling and shaping the Chinese economy in this equation. As mentioned earlier, China remains a low-income economy in per capita terms, despite its massive population of just under 1.5 billion people. Given this reality, China is highly susceptible to significant employment challenges, making it a country prone to labor market instability in such a scenario.

As long as the US consumer goods market remained open to China with zero tariffs, the vast and wealthy American market’s high demand for consumer goods would have naturally shaped China’s economic priorities. In such a scenario, not only would China have had an interest in a cooperative US administration, but it would also have been compelled to prioritize consumer goods production to meet US demand. It is crucial to remember that, like every economy, China operates under the principle of limited resources. This means that the Chinese government, in its effort to create employment for its massive population, would have had to align its economic structure—at least partially— with the consumer goods demand of the US economy.

You may recall Trump’s fixation on bicycles, frequently questioning, “Why don’t we manufacture bicycles like we used to, instead of importing them from China?” This raises an important question: Within the framework of comparative advantage theory, which applies to the US economy as well, and considering the reality of limited resources, does it make sense for the US to allocate even a small portion of its labor and capital to bicycle production—an industry whose production techniques have remained largely unchanged since the 19th century? Would such a decision be economically rational for a nation with far more competitive and high-value industries?

One doesn’t need to be a Nobel laureate to recognize that eliminating tariffs on Chinese imports would create comparative economic structures that ultimately benefit the US. Instead of focusing on bicycle manufacturing or internal combustion engine cars, the US government should prioritize high-tech industries, driving economic expansion through endogenous growth (Paul Romer, 2018, Nobel Prize). By boosting national income at an increasing rate, the US government could then redistribute this growing wealth using the Hicks-Kaldor compensation principle, effectively mitigating social discontent and ensuring broad-based economic prosperity.

Paul Romer, half-joking yet half-serious, suggests that as long as major mistakes are avoided, the economy could continue growing for five million years. However, Trump appears to be doing the exact opposite—and is likely to continue on this path. These policies will have severely negative effects on both efficiency and income distribution within the US. Moreover, and perhaps equally significant, they will weaken the US in global economic relations, particularly with China, leading to relative economic decline and shifts in the balance of power. For now, I’m far from convinced—but let’s wait and see. Maybe they know something we don’t.

(*) Dr. Eser Karakas is a retired Professor of Economics from the University of Strasbourg, where he taught Law and Economics and the Economics of Public Issues at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques. He is also a member of the Advisory Board at ECPS. His primary research interests include public economics, public choice, public finance, European finances, public policy, law and economics, and good governance.

(L-R) Iran President Hassan Rouhan, Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the session of the supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Yerevan, Armania on October 1, 2019. Photo: Asatur Yesayants.

Dr. Leukavets: The West Must Maintain Sanctions Against the Lukashenko Regime in Belarus

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Dr. Victoria Leukavets highlights the critical role of sanctions in pressuring Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime. She argues, “Sanctions do work, though some have a delayed effect—particularly economic and sectoral sanctions. However, they do have an impact.” Dr. Leukavets also discusses Russia’s deepening control over Belarus, media repression, and the resilience of Belarusian democratic forces in exile. She underscores that continued Western support for independent media and civil society is essential to counter Lukashenko’s grip on power and prevent Belarus from becoming a full extension of Russia’s influence.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a candid and insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Victoria Leukavets, a Research Fellow at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS), discusses the evolving political landscape in Belarus, Aleksander Lukashenko’s populist strategies, Russia’s growing influence, and the role of the West in countering authoritarian consolidation. Dr. Leukavets emphasizes that the continuation of Western sanctions is essential in exerting pressure on the Lukashenko regime, stating, “Sanctions do work, though some have a delayed effect—particularly economic and sectoral sanctions targeting strategic sectors of the Belarusian economy. However, they do have an impact.”

According to Dr. Leukavets, recent waves of political prisoner releases signal that sanctions are forcing Lukashenko to test the waters for negotiations with the West. “Many would agree that sanctions’ pressure has played a key role in forcing him into this scenario, making him test the waters for negotiations. His primary goal remains easing sanctions’ pressure.” However, she warns that Lukashenko remains committed to tightening his grip on power and that sanctions must continue to be a key instrument in the EU’s foreign policy toolbox.

Throughout the interview, Dr. Leukavets provides a historical overview of Lukashenko’s use of populist rhetoric to maintain control over Belarus, tracing it back to his first electoral campaign in 1994, when he positioned himself as a “man of the people” and an anti-corruption crusader. She explains that Lukashenko’s authoritarian populism has evolved over time, particularly after the 2020 protests, with an intensified level of repression and a media crackdown that has silenced independent voices.

Moreover, Russia’s role in propping up Lukashenko has deepened, making Belarus increasingly dependent on Moscow’s economic, military, and cultural influence. “Frankly speaking, what we are witnessing is the gradual transformation of Belarus into an extension of Russia’s military, economic, and cultural space.”

Dr. Leukavets also discusses the complex relationship between Lukashenko and far-right parties in Europe, the potential U.S. stance under Donald Trump’s presidency, and the strategies Belarusian democratic forces are employing to challenge the regime. She underscores that support for independent media, civil society, and opposition groups in exile remains crucial in resisting Lukashenko’s authoritarian consolidation.

In this interview, Dr. Leukavets offers a compelling analysis of Belarus’s future, outlining what the West can do to counter Lukashenko’s grip on power while avoiding further repression.

Dr. Victoria Leukavets, a Research Fellow at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS).

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Victoria Leukavets with some edits.

Media as a Key Tool for Lukashenko’s Grip on Power

Dr. Leukavets, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How has Aleksander Lukashenko used populist rhetoric to maintain his grip on power in Belarus? In what ways does his approach differ from or resemble other authoritarian populist leaders?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: Thank you very much for inviting me to do this interview. I think you have raised a very important question. Alexander Lukashenko has indeed used populist rhetoric to maintain his power, and he started using it in the early 1990s. During his first electoral campaign in 1994, he built his campaign on strong anti-corruption narratives. Before running for president, he was the head of the Anti-Corruption Committee in the Supreme Council of Belarus. At that time, he began constructing an image of himself as a man of the people—someone who was very close to the Belarusian electorate and could be seen as a defender of the nation. He positioned himself as a new voice, a fresh figure in the Belarusian political spectrum, and someone capable of cleaning up the system by removing bureaucrats.

His main opponent in the election was Vyacheslav Kebich, who was the Prime Minister of Belarus. Lukashenko’s populist rhetoric at the time proved very successful, as many Belarusians believed in him. In fact, the 1994 elections are considered the only free and fair elections in the history of independent Belarus. As a result, Lukashenko managed to win and secure the presidency.

He has continued to use populist rhetoric throughout his rule up until today. One of his favorite strategies to maintain control over the elites in Belarus and co-opt them has been the use of selective purges. Whenever members of his inner circle showed signs of criticism or disagreement with his political course, he would initiate a public purge, accusing them of corruption or tax evasion. He would present himself as the one capable of identifying and imprisoning these individuals, portraying himself as a fighter who protects the nation from such “parasites.” Thus, Lukashenko has consistently used populist rhetoric as an instrument to maintain and solidify his control over Belarus.

How has Lukashenko’s state-controlled media shaped public perception of his rule? To what extent does propaganda fuel populist narratives and suppress opposition voices in Belarus?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: Media is very important for Lukashenko to maintain his power. Starting from the early 1990s, as soon as he was elected President in 1994, he began consolidating his power, first and foremost, by taking control of the media space. Throughout his subsequent presidencies, we can observe that he gradually tightened control over the media space. 

After 2020, what we witness now is that almost all independent media outlets have been labeled as extremist. Most journalists from these independent outlets are either behind bars, imprisoned, or operating from exile. According to the most recent data, around 400 representatives of independent mass media are currently working from abroad. Lukashenko has effectively managed to take full control of the media space, which has been particularly crucial for him, especially before his most recent presidential campaign and the elections, which took place on January 26.

Lukashenko’s Escalating Repression to Prevent Another 2020 Uprising

Peaceful protests on Niezaliežnasci Street in Minsk, Belarus. Demonstrators rally and march toward Independence Avenue on August 23, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Do you see Lukashenko’s rule as primarily authoritarian, or does it still retain elements of populist appeal? How has his rhetoric and governance style evolved over time, especially after the 2020 protests?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: First of all, I would say that one does not contradict the other. Many authoritarian states have a populist appeal, and in fact, populism is used—as we have already discussed—as a tool to maintain a connection with a loyal segment of society and the broader electorate.

If we look at the evolution of the regime in Belarus from the early 1990s until now, 2020 can clearly be considered a watershed moment. Before 2020, Lukashenko resorted to repression, but after 2020, the extent, level, and scale of these repressions have significantly increased. There are now over a thousand political prisoners in Belarus. Lukashenko also engages in trans-border repression, targeting civil society and independent media. As I have already mentioned, he silences anyone who dares to criticize him.

The recent presidential elections were also held in a highly repressive environment. Most of the leaders of the 2020 protests and key opposition figures were imprisoned, and they remain behind bars. Some managed to flee abroad and continue their activities from exile, but they lack strong links to influence the situation in Belarus effectively.

Once again, the level of repression in Belarus is now extremely high. Lukashenko is doing everything he can to tighten his grip on power to prevent a repeat of the 2020 scenario, when his rule was challenged by an unprecedented wave of popular protests.

Belarus Transformed into an Extension of Russia’s Military, Economic, and Cultural Sphere

How does Russia’s influence impact Belarus’s political landscape? To what extent does Lukashenko balance populist nationalism with growing economic and security dependence on Moscow?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: That’s a very important question. In fact, the Russia factor is a crucial variable in the equation. When we discuss Belarus-Russia relations, Russia’s influence plays a significant role in shaping the Belarusian political landscape. Since the early 1990s, Russia has been trying to increase its influence and control over Belarus in various spheres—political, economic, military, and cultural.

Lukashenko was able to resist this influence with relative success before 2020. However, after 2020, when he was challenged by popular resistance, he turned to the Kremlin for support. Moscow was the one that helped him stay afloat. Since then, Russia’s influence has increased tremendously across all the spheres I identified. It has grown in the economic and political realms but, most importantly, in the military domain.

Belarus and Russia are now effectively building a common defense space. They recently signed a package of agreements, including the security concept of Belarus, which unifies the military policies and armies of both countries even further. Russian influence is also growing in the cultural space, and developments in this area are truly concerning.

One of the most recent developments I would like to highlight is the decision to establish a so-called media conglomerate that would unify the media spaces of Russia and Belarus. This entity would broadcast news in Russian across Belarusian territory, further strengthening Russia’s hold over Belarusian cultural discourse. Additionally, both Belarus and Russia are actively rewriting history books. More subjects in Belarusian schools and universities are now being taught in Russian. 

Frankly speaking, what we are witnessing is the gradual transformation of Belarus into an extension of Russia’s military, economic, and cultural space.

As Europe’s longest-serving leader, Lukashenko cruised to his seventh election victory in a row in a contest that his exiled opponents dismissed as a sham. EU called the elections ‘neither free nor fair.’ How would you characterize the elections as an academician?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: Indeed, these elections were not democratic. For any election to be recognized as democratic, they must adhere to certain international standards, and these elections failed to meet those standards at every phase of the electoral process. I would like to remind our audience that when we talk about elections, it is not only election day (E-day) that should be analyzed but the entire electoral process, starting from the beginning of the electoral campaign.

Once again, I would like to emphasize that the Lukashenko regime violated international standards for free and fair elections during every phase—the electoral campaign, election day, and the post-electoral phase.

If we look at the most common violations, I would highlight three major points. First, the highly repressive environment, which I have already mentioned, and the tightly controlled media space allowed Lukashenko to manipulate the narrative and deprived Belarusian citizens of alternative sources of information.

Second, the candidate registration process was highly flawed. Although four other candidates ran in the election alongside Lukashenko, they could not be considered real opponents or challengers. They were merely spoiler candidates whose main goal was to create the illusion of political competition.

Third, independent electoral observation was severely restricted. The OSCE/ODIHR mission, for example, was not invited to participate in the elections in time. The Belarusian regime did send an invitation, but it was too late—only about 10 days before the election. This was far too late for international observation missions from organizations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, or the EU, whose role is to monitor the entire electoral process, beginning with the campaign period. These organizations typically begin their observation at least a month before election day. The lack of independent electoral observation further compromised the integrity of the election results and simply helped Lukashenko accomplish his mission—to “win” the elections with an inflated vote count that does not reflect his actual support among the Belarusian population.

European Far-right Parties and the Lukashenko Regime Share Certain Synergies

Photo: Shutterstock.

Far-right parties in Europe like Alternative for Germany (AfD), hailed the vote as a victory for democracy and denounced criticism of the election by European officials and the European Parliament. How would you explain the dynamics of relationship between Lukashenko and European far-right parties?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: It’s an interesting relationship. Far-right parties and the Lukashenko regime share certain synergies, particularly in their opposition to Western liberal values and Western influence. This is where their interests converge. For instance, Germany sent some electoral observers representing these problematic far-right parties to observe the previous parliamentary elections in Belarus, which took place last year. All of them praised how well the elections were organized.

Lukashenko’s connection with these right-wing parties essentially helps him offset Western criticism and send a signal that his regime, his values, and his positions are supported by certain forces in Europe. He tries to present these forces as growing in popularity, claiming they represent a significant segment of the European public. This, in turn, helps him promote the narrative that there is currently a global demand for authoritarian regimes and dictatorships—as he explicitly calls them. In precisely this way, he argues that the world is increasingly seeking out dictatorial governance.

It is known that the newly elected US president Donald Trump is sympathetic to far-right parties and populist parties in Europe. Elon Musk, who is now responsible for government efficiency in the US has already declared his support for German far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). How do you think the relationship between US and Lukashenko will  evolve during Trump’s presidency?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: That’s an important question—one that many Belarusian analysts and representatives of Belarusian democratic forces are trying to answer. We need to understand that we are all in the realm of speculation here, as Trump is known for his unpredictability. That being said, most analysts agree that we will not witness any drastic shifts in US policy toward the Lukashenko regime or the Belarusian democratic movement. For instance, it is unlikely that we will see an easing of sanctions or a reduction in pressure against the Lukashenko regime. The new US administration will likely continue criticizing Lukashenko for human rights violations and repression while maintaining or even imposing new restrictive measures against him.

It is also highly unlikely that we will see any high-level visits from US officials to meet with Lukashenko. Let me remind that during the previous Trump administration, several US representatives visited Belarus. For instance, Mike Pompeo and John Bolton traveled to Minsk, where they met with Lukashenko and discussed various critical issues, including energy supply. In fact, Belarus even began purchasing some energy from the US to offset its dependence on Russia. We will not witness anything of this sort during the new presidency. Instead, US policy will likely continue along the lines established by the Biden administration.

The nature of relations may, however, become more transactional. It is not out of the question that the US administration might signal an openness to negotiations, but any such negotiations would come with very strict conditions. Any offer from international partners, including the US, to the Lukashenko regime would be accompanied by firm preconditions.

As for Belarusian democratic forces, they remain hopeful. They hope that the US will continue supporting them and maintaining the strategic dialogue with the Belarusian democratic movement, which was launched during the Biden presidency. They also hope to send a message that Belarus remains highly relevant to US interests—primarily because Belarus serves as a gateway for China’s growing influence in Europe. Given the US’s strong interest in curbing Chinese influence, they may recognize the importance of supporting the Belarusian democratic movement.

Belarus Under Lukashenko Is Sliding Into a Totalitarian Regime

Given the repression of the Belarusian opposition, what strategies have emerged to challenge Lukashenko’s rule? Is there potential for a new populist movement from the opposition, or is Belarus heading toward deeper authoritarian consolidation?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: Belarus is definitely under the Lukashenko regime, and it is sliding further into a totalitarian state. However, Belarusian democratic forces have developed very efficient methods, and they are doing their best to challenge the Lukashenko regime.

One of these methods is active advocacy on the international stage. Over the past five years, since Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was forced into exile, they have been actively building contacts with numerous international actors and institutionalizing relations with various organizations. For example, the Council of Europe (CoE) has already established a working group on Belarus that raises issues such as human rights violations and ongoing repression in the country. A similar group was established within the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The European Parliament also signed an agreement for cooperation with the Belarusian Parliament in Exile, the Coordination Council.

In general, this parliamentary dimension of cooperation is very strong and continues to grow. The Belarusian democratic forces have created an international parliamentary alliance in support of Belarus, which includes over 20 countries, both EU and non-EU. In the parliaments of these countries, there are groups of friends for democratic Belarus that serve as vehicles for keeping Belarus on the international agenda, raising awareness, and attracting global attention to the country’s problems.

Democratic forces also prioritize the issue of political prisoners—not only their release but also their rehabilitation. Thanks to their efforts, they established the International Humanitarian Fund to support political prisoners. Several countries have already contributed substantial amounts of money to this fund to assist those who have suffered from the harsh repressions of the Lukashenko regime.

Overall, I would characterize the Belarusian democratic movement as relatively united. Yes, of course, there are certain conflicts within the movement—this is inevitable and part of a healthy process. However, on a comparative scale, if we look at other opposition movements in exile, such as the Russian opposition, we can see that the level of internal cohesion and coherence within the Belarusian democratic movement is very high. This unity is one of the key markers of its success.

Belarusian Democrats in Exile Represent the Future of a Free and Democratic Belarus

Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya participates in a protest against the political situation in Belarus outside the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, on September 21, 2020. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

You highlight the Kremlin’s role in sustaining Lukashenko’s regime. What specific steps should the EU take to counter Russia’s leverage in Belarus and support a democratic transition without provoking further repression?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: It’s a very difficult question. It’s a tough balancing act, and, in fact, counterbalancing Russia’s influence in Belarus might not be entirely feasible under the current circumstances. One way to do so is by supporting free and independent Belarusian media, as media serves as a powerful instrument for providing unbiased information to the Belarusian people and combating propaganda from both the Russian and Lukashenko regimes.

Of course, the West should continue its sanctions. Sanctions do work, though some have a delayed effect—particularly economic and sectoral sanctions targeting strategic sectors of the Belarusian economy. However, they do have an impact. Some analysts argue that, thanks to sanctions pressure, Lukashenko is now seeking ways to open negotiations with the West.

A recent development worth mentioning is that he has been releasing political prisoners in Belarus since July last year. There have been several waves of prisoner releases, leading many to speculate on Lukashenko’s motivations. Many would agree that sanctions pressure has played a key role in forcing him into this scenario, making him test the waters for negotiations with the West. His primary goal remains easing sanctions’ pressure.

So once again, sanctions do work—they are one of the most effective tools in the EU’s foreign policy toolbox, and the EU should continue using them.

Lastly, another critical instrument the EU can use to help democratic Belarus is to support Belarusian democratic forces and civil society, particularly those in exile. These individuals are agents of change and key stakeholders who can exert real pressure on the Lukashenko regime. They represent the future of a free and democratic Belarus.

Melting icebergs along Greenland's coast. Photo: Shutterstock.

Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by PiS, AfD, and SD

by ArticlesEditor’s ChoiceEnvironment & ClimateHomePopulism & Politics (P&P)

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Please cite as: 

Lewis, Morgan. (2025). “Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by PiS, AfD, and SD.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 6, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0047



Abstract

Two major global challenges of recent decades are climate change and populism. While there is a strong scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, social science research highlights how climate change and policy reforms have provoked significant backlash within populist discourse. Despite the clear intersection of these phenomena and the threats they pose to modern democracy, limited literature explores this relationship. This article examines the mechanisms by which right-wing populist (RWP) parties promote climate skepticism or hostility to climate policies. Focusing on the Law and Justice Party (PiS) in Poland, the Sweden Democrats (SD), and Alternative for Germany (AfD), this study conducts a rhetorical analysis of their climate communication to investigate how RWP positions align with shifting ideological and electoral contexts. The research employs Scott Consigny’s (1974) rhetorical situation framework and integrates Wodak’s (2015) interdisciplinary approach to populism, establishing a novel methodology for analyzing populist rhetoric. Findings reveal that RWP parties deploy rhetorical strategies such as framing an antagonism between the “elite” and “the people,” prioritizing national self-interest over climate concerns, and using anti-intellectual rhetoric. However, notable differences in rhetorical strategies emerge among the parties due to varying ideological and political contexts, demonstrating the adaptability of populist rhetoric around its ideological ‘center’. This study highlights the interplay between ideological and rhetorical facets of populism in shaping climate communication. By offering a nuanced understanding of how RWP parties engage with climate discourse across contexts, this research provides a foundation for further exploration of climate communication within populist narratives.

Keywords: Climate change, climate skepticism, right-wing populism (RWP), climate communication, anti-intellectualism, Euroscepticism

 

By Morgan Lewis*

Introduction

Contemporary international relations have been increasingly dominated by two salient challenges over recent decades: populism and climate change (Buzogány & Mohammad-Klotzbach, 2021). As right-wing populism (RWP) is on the rise, it has become an increasingly formidable presence in European politics, epitomized by results such as the Brexit referendum and strong electoral performances by Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) in 2024 (Angelos & Nöstlinger, 2024), French National Front (RN) (Forchtner & Lubarda, 2022), and Swedish Democrats (SD) (Diehn, 2022). 

This notable rise in RWP is paralleled by a climate crisis the genesis of which lies at the heart of our economic system. Climate change, as a paradigmatic example of a crisis that demands cosmopolitan and internationally orchestrated action, is contrasted by the fragmentary and nationalist discourse of RWP parties (Mudde, 2004; Huber, 2020). Thus, the global mushrooming of RWP and its congruence to climate skepticism and hostility to action poses a serious threat to global climate targets, as evidenced in a recent report by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, which found that rising populist opposition to climate policies is jeopardizing plans to achieve net zero emissions (Campanela & Lawrence, 2024). 

Indeed, as the more confrontational and transformative decisions on climate change increasingly lie fore front of political debate, understanding how RWP parties promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to action through their rhetoric is essential for generating an appropriate response that allows for a continuation (and acceleration) of decarbonization efforts (Lockwood, 2018). Despite the importance of understanding RWP climate communication, the specific rhetorical mechanisms through which this occurs remains largely unexplored (Lockwood, 2018; Marquardt et al., 2022). It is this lacuna in the relevant literature that forms the basis of this thesis. 

Literature Review

RWP is a longstanding feature of European politics and has attracted considerable interest from social scientists and political commentators. This has been engendered by the recent uprising of RWP movements across Europe (Sandrin, 2021; Ortu, 2014; Greven, 2016; Abromeit, 2017). While the impacts and potential ramifications of the growth of RWP across Europe have been heavily debated, there is a noticeable dearth of literature on how RWP parties promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to action on climate change. The most current literature suggests that climate skepticism is associated with conservative ideological positions, with many studies findings a correlation to institutional distrust, a preference for a small state, and the belief that environmentalism is stereotypically feminine (Huber, 2020; Atanasova & Koteyko, 2017; Jylha et al., 2020). In line with this, the literature on right-wing environmental communication also details how right-wing actors cast doubt over climate science to legitimize normative claims about climate change for ideological and political purposes (Carvalho, 2007; McCright & Dunlap, 2008).

However, few accounts directly interrogate the nature of the relationship between populism and climate skepticism. Mudde’s (2004) article interprets populism broadly as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology in which the fundamental cleavage in society is framed as between a ‘corrupt elite’ and ‘pure people,’ evoking a sovereign demos. More recent scholarship has conceptualized RWP as being marked by themes such as democratic backsliding and the erosion of institutions of the ‘liberal order,’ such as feminism or pacifism (Moghissi, 2016; Klein, 2018). The congruence of RWP and hostility to climate action is argued to be a consequence of both the ideological composition of RWP, which frames the ‘climate agenda’ as elitist and antithetical to national interest, and the changing structural conditions in many countries that have ‘left behind’ portions of the population. Indeed, within this framing, climate policies are conveyed as further extension of these processes of modernization and globalization that reflect the interests of an elite class that do not serve the population at large (Lockwood, 2018). Many recent examples illustrate this point, such as the AfD’s opposition to the Green New Deal, arguing it would harm farmers (Chatham House, 2024), and the Spanish Vox party’s claims that climate policies are part of a globalist agenda aimed at damaging Spain while benefiting China (Mathiesen, 2022). 

However, there are severe limitations to the current literature on this connection between RWP and climate skepticism. Limited research has examined the specific rhetorical devices used by populist parties to promote these views, despite their importance in understanding the dynamics of this relationship. Moreover, much of the literature does not differentiate between distinct RWP parties, often treating them as part of a broader regional or global phenomenon. An exception is Gemenis et al. (2012), who, after surveying 13 RWP parties across 12 EU countries, concluded that “party positions on this issue [anthropogenic global warming] are clearly anti-environmental.” My research addresses these cleavages in the literature, and in doing so will contribute to the literature by establishing a framework to better understand the linkages between the expansion and deepening of populist rhetoric in political discourse and climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate action. To best do this, I will analyze how this rhetoric is shaped by domestic political contexts, how these rhetorical devices differ between party contexts, and the implications for future climate change communication in the context of continued RWP electoral success. 

Methods and Structure

Regarding the chosen method for this study, I will undertake a qualitative, comparative analysis of three European populist parties. The relevant primary data I will be assessing will be speeches, interviews, or statements regarding climate change/climate policies, with a broader investigative framework also considering party manifesto transcripts and member magazines. Secondary sources will include monographs and academic journals. Due to language barriers, much of my primary data will be translated or collected via English-speaking media outlets/journals. 

This choice of methods is appropriate for two reasons: first, as I intend to perform a rhetorical analysis to inductively examine populist climate communication, a quantitative research approach is unnecessary as I am not seeking to quantify or provide a value for how populist leaders espouse hostility to climate policies. Second, a comparative research design enables me to assess RWP parties in relation to one-another, providing more insight into how domestic political contexts affect rhetorical choices as-well as mitigating the danger of individual examples reducing the more general applicability of my results (Clark et al., 2019).

I will be examining Poland’s PiS, Germany’s AfD, and Sweden’s SD. I have chosen these European parties as they provide a broad range in terms of the vehemence of their opposition to climate mitigating policies, with all members categorized as either ‘denialists/skeptical’ or ‘disengaged/cautious’ on their climate policies by Schaller and Carious’s (2019) study. Moreover, I have selected all European parties, with all three operating within EU states that share similar constitutional structures as this allows me to gain greater insight into the similarities and differences of populist rhetoric in broadly similar contexts.

My research project will be structured as follows: Section two will outline my methodology, through which my qualitative framework will be employed to answer my research question. Through doing so I will elucidate Consigny’s ‘rhetorical situation,’ an assessment of Wodak’s interdisciplinary interpretation of populism, and an analysis of the association between nationalism, climate change and RWP. Section three will implement a rhetorical analysis of each chosen political party. Section four, following the rhetorical analysis, will discuss the results and outline the implications of this research.

Methodology

In this section, I will outline the methodology employed in this thesis. By examining Scott Consigny’s theory of the rhetorical situation, I will demonstrate why this theoretical lens is the most suitable for the analysis. Additionally, I will evaluate and justify the selected methodology for studying populism, which aligns with Ruth Wodak’s interdisciplinary approach, highlighting its effectiveness for analyzing RWP positions on climate policy. Finally, this section will conclude with a summary of the intersection between populism, nationalism, and climate change.

The Rhetorical Situation

This study will use Scott Consigny’s notion of the rhetorical situation – referring to a determinate situation fueled by a problem – as a theoretical prism to inform and frame the later rhetoric analysis (Consigny, 1974). This framework provides an excellent foundation for interpretively understanding the rhetoric of the chosen right-wing populist (RWP) parties as it considers both the context and constraints that shape the construction of rhetoric, and the creative agency of the speaker to shape audiences’ perspectives in indeterminate situations. 

According to Consigny, there are three core aspects of the rhetorical situation: i) The Exigence/Urgency: which is a problem than can be modified by the audience; a defect of the status quo to which the rhetor responds. ii) The Audience:those with the capacity to act on the speaker’s message and mediate change. iii) Constraints: The limitations that shape the rhetorical situation and influence how the speaker responds, these can encompass cultural, social, historical, political, and technological factors.

Consigny’s theory initially came as an instructive intermediary between two theories of rhetorical political analysis: the positivist approach of Bitzer (1968) which emphasizes the importance of the situation in compelling the speaker to act on an exigence; and the constructivist approach of Vatz (1973) who emphasizes the agency of the speaker in actively shaping the situation through rhetoric. These origins of birth provide the strength of this framework for this thesis as its epistemological underpinnings balance the dual concerns of the poststructuralist and positivist rhetorical traditions that preceded it. Thus, by considering both the agency of the speaker to maneuver within their context, and the constraints created by their context, this approach offers a more complete understanding of how rhetoric is formulated and its implications (Consigny, 1974). 

Martin (2013) describes how overall, rhetorical analysis can be understood as an examination of how political actors’ ‘appropriate’ situations through interventions in which they deploy ideas that reorient the audiences’ perspective (Martin, 2013). Rhetoric, in this framework, can be considered akin to projectile-like ideas that move outward and displace the surrounding context (Consigny, 1976; Vatz, 1973). This is particularly useful for analysis of climate policy since how an audience comprehends climate change/policy is central to gaining the mass momentum required to reach net-zero. 

The importance of rhetoric in climate communication is supported by the most recent literature. As Nordensvard and Ketola (2021) note, the ambiguity surrounding climate change creates considerable space—what Consigny identifies as the ‘existential dimension’—for rhetors to creatively restructure the situation and reshape the electorate’s perspectives on climate change and policy. This is done as the rhetors—in this case, politicians—select argumentative structures (what Consigny identifies as ‘topics’) that are germane to the situation, enabling them to determine the form of persuasion that best fits the particularities of the issue (Lanham, 1991). Therefore, the actor can creatively resituate the situation, granting them considerable agency to construct narratives relating to the exigence—in this case, climate change and policy. 

This theoretical lens is also uniquely suited for assessing populist ideology, which is operationalized via a communication style that relies on established ideological focal points, namely nationalism and anti-elitism, which form a restricted core morphology (Mudde, 2004; Canovan, 2001). Accordingly, within this study, this theoretical framework will allow us to comparatively assess the narrative frames or ‘topics’ used by RWP party politicians, while also accounting for the contextual and structural constraints faced by each party and the creative agency of each actor. Thus, this interpretative approach emphasizes the value of historical and cultural context while also considering the rhetor’s agency to navigate their situation.

This framework of analysis is superior to other forms of hermeneutics for this analysis. An oft-used approach in reference to RWP is Critical Discourse Analysis as it provides an approach that embeds language in power and social inequality, thus utilizing a broader theoretical scope (Fairclough, 2013; Krotofil & Motak, 2018). However, as a mechanism for rhetorical meaning-making it is too broadly focused, taking as its object the “general domain of signs and symbolic exchanges [while] rhetoric specifies quite determinate techniques, devices and strategies” (Martin, 2022: 170). Consigny’s rhetorical situation rigorously assesses how language is used to influence an audience by identifying which rhetorical strategies are being employed, creating a more focused framework for comparative political analysis.

Having established a theoretical framework for rhetorical political analysis, I can move on to outlining a methodological understanding of populism.

How to Analyze Right-Wing Populism: An Interdisciplinary Approach

The contemporary literature on populism has posed significant methodological questions regarding how it should be interpreted, as De Cleen (2012: 1) notes, “one of the most used and abused terms inside and outside academia is undoubtedly populism.” The central focus of populist movements is regarded broadly as an emphasis on the inadequacy of the ‘corrupt governing elite’ to effectively respond to ‘general will’ of the ‘pure people’ (Huber at al., 2020; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). However, the marked increase in the prominence of populism globally has brought about significant debate on the potential causes and implications of its recent resurgence (Abromeit, 2017). These methodological debates have resulted in a significant breadth of literature on how to evaluate RWP, which I will now interrogate to demonstrate the applicability of this thesis for studying RWP.  

Scholars such as Jagers & Walgrave (2007) define populism as a political communication style devoid of any coherent or consistent ideological content or principles that guide it, the essence of which exists in its performative rhetoric and communication. This rhetoric appeals to abstract notions of ‘the people’, villainizes the establishment, and embellishes certain emotional tropes (Moffit, 2016; Nordensvard & Ketola, 2021). 

Others such as Laclau (2006) shift the focus to the ontology of populism, arguing that populism represents a method of articulating those demands via a performative structuring logic that discursively constructs collective identities between groups. Another dominant school of thought in the literature focuses on the ideologically substantive aspects of populism (Freeden, 2017; Stanley, 2008). In this view, populism is conceived as a ‘thin-centered’ ideology which views of politics as an “expression of the volonté généale (general will) of the people” (Mudde, 2004: 543). Thus, populism is interpreted as an existing ideology, which operates through a severely restricted but identifiable morphology that utilizes a small number of core concepts oriented around ‘people-centrism,’ anti-elitism and often an inclination toward authoritarianism (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). 

In view of these competing methodologies, truly interdisciplinary approaches to analyzing populism have been lacking (Marquardt et al., 2022). Recent literature has sought to remedy these blind spots. Following this, populism will be interpreted in line with Wodak’s discourse-historical approach, outlined in The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (Wodak, 2015). This study interprets RWP as a dynamic mixture of both style (the rhetorical devices being deployed) and substance (the ideological focal points around which RWP operates). Wodak’s approach establishes a methodology for studying populism that acknowledges the ideological content of RWP discourse, without reducing it to a “frivolity of form, prose and style” (Wodak, 2015: 3) which would downplay important aspects of how RWP resonates with the audience (Pels, 2012). This methodology for populism creates an interpretation of populism that “does not only relate to the form of rhetoric but to its specific contents” (Wodak, 2015: 1). 

Wodak’s interpretation is well-equipped for this thesis because it acknowledges how populism is both a form of communication and an ideology, which utilizes rhetorical devices to mobilize political support around certain ideas. Populist modes of communication thus help to “form expectations [and] shore up confidence” (Beckert & Bronk, 2018: 1-2), by helping guide people’s sensemaking facilities around the climate issues. Moreover, her study is primarily focused on Europe, therefore the ideological content she identifies is applicable to the ideologically ‘thick’ established politics of Germany, Poland and Sweden around which the ‘thin-centered’ populist ideology wraps itself. This enables a point of departure for my rhetorical analysis that is easily operationalized into a European context. One of the central content areas of populism identified by Wodak is nationalism. As such, this study will now turn to the intersection between nationalism, RWP and climate change to gain a more complete picture of its relevance for understanding climate skepticism. 

RWP, Nationalism and Climate Change: Patterns of Association

Wodak argues that, while there is no overarching explanation for the resurgence of RWP within Europe, certain phenomena transcend the ‘micro-politics’ of RWP, thereby providing a suitable framework for broader political analysis. The primary trend she identifies is the creeping ‘renationalization’ of EU politics (Wodak, 2015; Abromeit, 2017). As the ‘nation-state’ remains the dominant context for democratic political representation, populism operates via the vector of nationalism as the previously sharp distinction between nationalism and RWP becomes increasingly blurred (Brubaker, 2019; De Cleen, 2017). For Wodak (2015), RWP parties offer clear-cut answers for the electorate by constructing scapegoats and common enemies, as Pelinka (2013: 8) argues, “populism simplifies complex developments by looking for a culprit.” Which groups are selected depends largely on local political, economic, and historic contexts due to the adaptive plasticity of populist ideology. 

Contemporary RWP mobilizes less against a common enemy, and more against a (perceived) enemy from abroad by strategically selecting the ‘other.’ The ‘elites,’ in this view, play a key role as the secondary defining ‘others,’ who are represented as responsible for the modernizing trends that threaten the nation (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). These elites exist at regional and global stages, with organizations such as the EU and the United Nations being central to European RWP rhetoric (De Cleen & Stavrakakis, 2017). This results in a proclivity for conspiratorial thinking, with phenomena deemed to be damaging to the ‘nation-state’ being easily dismissible as elitist projects. Climate change here is reflective of a threat to the innately territorial and bordered nature of nationalism as a fundamentally borderless phenomenon. In this sense, the canopy comfort of a nationalist morphology encourages skepticism (Conversi, 2020; Ghosh, 2018). 

In summary, this section has outlined the theoretical framework of the rhetorical situation, its relevance for this study, and how it can be operationalized for analysis of RWP rhetoric. This section then explained the chosen methodology for populism, the usefulness of an interdisciplinary approach and the importance of nationalism as an ideological focal point for populist discourse. In sum, it has established a unique and valuable approach for analysis of RWP rhetoric.

Research and Analysis

Following the inductive question motivating this research, this study will now examine the selected RWP parties to uncover the rhetorical strategies they use to promote climate skepticism and/or hostility toward action on climate change. Drawing on our operational methodology for populism, the chosen primary and secondary sources are well-suited for analysis. To perform my analysis, I have accessed primary data through interview transcripts, conference statements, and parliamentary proposals/statements. Due to language barriers, a broader investigative framework will include quotes from online newspapers, articles, and academic journals.                        

This section outlines the context of each political party to inform the rhetorical political analysis, followed by an exploration of how the different rhetorical devices employed promote certain views on climate policy. This analysis is based on the notion that the statements made by various politicians within the chosen parties are interconnected, allowing the process of meaning-making to extend to the entire party.  

The Law and Justice Party (PiS)

Context

Poland is widely perceived as a laggard within the EU in terms of its climate ambitions. Identified as ‘disengaged/cautious’ by Carius & Schaller’s (2019) study of European climate agendas, the Polish Law and Justice Party (PiS) has prioritized economic development and energy security over climate protection (Biedenkopf, 2021; Lockwood, 2018; Judge & Maltby, 2017). Its strong opposition towards climate-friendly policies is illustrated through it being one of the last nations to put forth a decarbonization plan at the recent COP26 negotiations, after it reversed its decision to phase out coal by 2030 (Burki, 2021). Moreover, on a European level, its opposition to climate treaties such as the European Green Deal and the EU emissions trading scheme evidence its lack of ambition (Szulecki & Ancygier, 2015; KPMG, 2021). An important context for the PiS’s energy policies is Poland’s high reliance on indigenous coal supplies – which forms upwards of 70% of its energy supply (Notes From Poland, 2022). 

The PiS is an interesting case as it is the only selected party that has enjoyed complete political power after being elected in 2015, and again in 2019, while losing power in 2023, and enjoying the support of incumbent President Andrej Duda throughout (Cadier & Szulecki, 2020). Żuk & Szulecki (2020) argue that the PiS is a clear example of a RWP party, with an ideology that blends support for conservative ‘traditional’ values, nativist objection to immigration and nationalism (Kulesza & Rae, 2017). These form the ‘thick’ ideological bases around which the PiS construct a populist layer via a style of communication juxtaposing the ‘elites’ and Polish ‘people’ (Wodak, 2015).

Analysis 

These topics form the key narratives used by the PiS, acting as nodal points through which climate change rhetoric is oriented: i) Anti-intellectualism and scientific dissent over the existence of climate change. ii) Climate policy as elitist and a threat to national sovereignty and economic competitiveness

Scientific Dissent and Anti-intellectualism

A key layer of Wodak’s ideological micro-politics of populism is the construction of scapegoats and enemies via a discourse of an untrustworthy elite. This theme, as anticipated, was evident in PiS rhetoric with anti-elite frames being used to promote skepticism over the validity of climate science/climate policy (Faiola, 2016). Anna Zalewska, former PiS Minister of Education, when proposing the removal of anthropogenic climate change from school curriculums, claimed: “There is really no global warming because ice should melt in the Arctic, and it is growing. Why do they tell us otherwise? Because it’s cosmic money; ecologists earn such money on this warming” (via Nowak, 2016).

Furthermore, PiS leader and former deputy PM Jaroslaw Kaczyński has said that: “At least some of this so-called green policy is madness, [it is based on] theories without evidence” (Notes from Poland, 2021). He further argued that: “The climate is changing, but it’s not our fault. We’re not going to kill our industry just because some people in Brussels think they know better than us” (Reuters, 2018). 

Additionally, former PiS Minister of Foreign Affairs Witold Waszczykowski attempted to draw a more overt connection between pro-climate politics and Marxism, claiming that PiS’s predecessors acted “according to a Marxist model which has to automatically develop in one direction only—a new mixture of cultures and races, a world made up of cyclists and vegetarians who only use renewable energy” (Żuk & Żuk, 2018).

Disputing the viability of science and their motives is an important element of PiS discourse. 

Throughout the primary data, terms such as ‘Brussels,’ the ‘EU,’ ‘Ecologists’ and ‘Marxists’ were used interchangeably (based on the context) to denote an external and elitist enemy. Behind these quotes, a hidden ideology underpins RWP’s tendency toward conspiratorial thinking, which is the view that knowledge is always reflective of a form of power projection. Thus, by clearly defining the nation’s ‘enemies,’ the ‘people-elite’ dichotomy is re-emphasized while climate policy is presented as a means through which artificially constructed enemies exert power over the Polish nation (Wodak, 2015). 

This is exacerbated by the ambiguous and complicated nature of climate change, in addition to most climate communication being top-down from prestigious scientific institutions or government bodies which provides considerable space for RWP politicians to portray these issues as sinister elitist projects. This topic invokes nationalist and anti-EU sentiment as the foreign origins of climate policy is rhetorically foregrounded, inviting the audience to view climate policy and its proponents as similarly foreign. Pelinka (2013) observes that contemporary populist anti-elitism does not purely mobilize against an enemy, but a foreign enemy who are seen to be responsible for Europeanization and globalization. As noted by Laclau (2006: 648), “populism displaces the imminent social antagonism into the antagonism between the unified people and its external enemy.”

Another facet of this rhetoric topic is that it effectively illustrates what Wodak (2015: 2) identifies as the “arrogance of ignorance,” which refers to how RWP “appeals to common sense and anti-intellectualism [marking] a return to pre-modernist or pre-enlightenment thinking.” Phrases such as “some people in Brussels think they know better than us,”“because ice should melt in the arctic and it is growing” (see above quotations) communicate how expert views are framed as another mechanism through which elites seek to centralize authority to the disadvantage of the people (Brewer, 2016; Merkley, 2020).

Climate Policy as a Threat to Polish Sovereignty and Economic Competitiveness 

The EU’s institutions and political processes, while not the exclusive target of PiS, are typically in the firing line when attempts are made to undermine climate-friendly policies (Fuksiewicz & Klein, 2014). This rhetorical strategy occurs through a prism of national self-interest. As Wodak argues, the ‘renationalization’ of European politics is a core feature of RWP, with the nationalist leanings of PiS evidenced by the Health, Work and Family Programme (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2014), which stated: “We will not lead Poland into any voluntary arrangements increasing the extent of European integration that do not meet the criterion of being clearly beneficial for Polish interests.” This rhetorical topic is commonly operationalized around the notion that climate policy unjustly threatens Polish sovereignty, and in particular the long-term viability of the Polish coal industry (Biedenkopf, 2021). 

Krzysztof Szczerski, former PiS head of office, speaking on the EU’s Energy Union, stated: “Can it be called anything else than the death of Polish coal?… So, we eliminate our own energy resource and become even more addicted to imports” (wPolityce, 2015). Furthermore, in 2018, at COP24, Andrzej Duda stated: “There is no plan to abandon coal in Poland. Coal is our strategic raw material. We have supplies for 200 years, and it is difficult to give up coal, thanks to which we have sovereignty.” He followed this by claiming: “As long as I am president, I will not allow anyone to murder the coal industry. It’s because we have such deeply ingrained traditions in this industry, of which St. Barbara’s Day is a part—a part that is actually included in the list of our heritage” (TVP World, 2018).

These quotations effectively demonstrate an important intersection between climate change and the nationalist ideology – resource nationalism. This phenomenon is evident in PiS rhetoric and is employed by many RWP parties as a strategy that sacralizes soil-rooted national resources as a suggested common good, despite the small proportion of people that reap the benefits of their exploitation (Conversi, 2020). As fossil fuels are often framed as part of Poland’s cultural heritage and a source of sovereignty and economic growth, not only is coal extraction justified, but any proposals threatening its viability are presented as a threat to collective Polish well-being. However, this discourse rarely addresses the inherent contradiction of the intergenerational national catastrophe that continued coal exploitation and associated emissions will cause (Kim, 2019).

This argumentative strategy links PiS rhetoric directly to my methodology, as national self-interests form the ideological substance around which the thin ideology of populism wraps itself. While more recent PiS rhetoric contains frequent references to their intent to overhaul the coal industry and make it harmonious with global climate ambitions, as stated by Andrzej Duda in 2018: “[The coal industry] must be kept, although it needs modernisation and reform” (TVP World, 2018). These can be viewed as attempts to reappropriate and manage the rhetorical situation in the context of the growing pressures to decarbonize through attempts to align Polish industry with modern climate commitments, despite the fanciful notion that Poland can achieve carbon neutrality while reliant on coal (Wójcik-Jurkiewicz et al., 2021). 

Closely linked to discourse on energy security, the PiS also invoked the supposed threat climate-friendly policies pose to Polish economic competitiveness. The PiS Party Programme (2014) stated: “The biggest obstacle in the field of electricity production is the climate policy imposed by the European Union” and went on to state they will not lead Poland into any European climate arrangements “which do not meet the criterion of being clearly beneficial for Polish interests”(Fuksiewicz & Klein, 2014). Dismissing climate policies for economic reasons constitutes what Forchtner & Lubarda (2022) identify as the imagined economic pragmatism existing in far-right political discourse. In this sense, the PiS objection to climate policies can be embedded in a wider theme within their rhetoric that challenges the suggested unfair economic arrangements brought by globalization and European integration (Marquardt et al., 2022). 

Although, seeming contrary to what was outlined in my above methodology, PiS rhetoric on the economic cost of climate policies is far from cohesive. This is demonstrated through statements such as that of Konrad Szymanski, Minister for European Affairs, who stated that: “We should take into account not only the costs of the transformation in themselves but also the costs of the lack of transformation…there is the impression that the lack of transformation generates zero costs for the economy” (Biedenkopf, 2021). While the majority of PiS rhetoric villainizes climate policy, these important exceptions to the rule demonstrate that PiS climate communication is not monolithic, with a range of differing constraints and contexts shaping the rhetoric of individual speakers. In this case, there is an acknowledgement of the gravity of the crisis, and the long-term benefits of climate action, differing from the short-term and reactionary rhetoric of many RWP parties (Antonio, 2019). This acknowledgment also has important implications for policy decisions, evidenced by the PiS support for developing smaller scale renewable energy forms, such as solar panels (Lockwood, 2018). 

In summary, analysis of this rhetoric shows how PiS discourse on climate change can be distilled into several key rhetorical devices that employ some of the central aspects of Wodak’s interpretation of populism. The PiS consistently frame climate policy as an elitist conspiracy, with anti-intellectual rhetoric utilized to invite the listener to view climate policy/science as a means of power projection and a threat, alluded to via references to ‘Marxists’ ‘ecologists’ or ‘Brussels’ which represent a foreign enemy to the rhetorical audience (Polish electorate). This topic intersects with the broader villainization of pro-climate policies and its proponents, with organizations such as the EU and/or UN cast as elitist in a Manichean worldview. Furthermore, PiS rhetoric portrays climate policy as a threat to Polish sovereignty and economic competitiveness via a discourse of resource nationalism. While several PiS actors have produced rhetoric that demonstrates an appreciation of the long-term economic benefit of integration, the majority remains insular and nationalist. 

Swedish Democrats (SD)

Context

The Swedish Democrats (SD) are the second largest party in the Swedish parliament (Riksdag) after gaining 20.5% of the vote in the 2022 Swedish general election, their best ever electoral performance (Diehn, 2022). A former pariah party associated with fringe neo-Nazi movements, the SD has seen an astonishing rise in recent years after denounced its extremist roots and pursuing more populist dimensions. The SD, through taking a broadly Eurosceptic and anti-establishment stance, has sought to profile itself as a party free from elitism and ideological constraints, and thus free to represent the true will of ‘the people’ (Mudde, 2004; Wodak, 2015; Tomson, 2020). The SD’s ideology, which is rooted in nativism, nationalism, and social conservativism, has also integrated climate change/climate policy into their broader populist frame as it becomes an increasingly salient political issue (Emilsson, 2018). 

The SD’s official stance is that climate change is a real and pressing issue; however, the party’s rhetoric has frequently disputed scientific findings and is categorized as “deniers and skeptics” in Carius and Schaller’s 2019 study (Vilhma et al., 2021). The SD was the only Swedish party not to vote in favor of ratifying the Paris Climate Agreement, and they have strongly opposed the government’s climate strategy, particularly regarding wind power development and environmental taxes, as illustrated by their 2019 vote against increasing the aviation fuel tax (Bierbach, 2019; Hofverberg, 2022).

An important context for the SD climate change rhetoric is Sweden’s history as a global leader in environmental politics. Sweden is ranked 5th on the Environmental Performance Index and, as Lockwood (2018) notes, Nordic political discourse at large contains less outright climate denial compared to Anglophone countries due to climate denial carrying less political capital, which can be considered a limitation on Swedish climate skeptical rhetoric (EPI, 2022; Bäckstrand & Kronsell, 2015). 

Analysis 

These rhetorical topics have been identified as the central argumentative structures used to promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate action: i) Climate nationalism and eco-populism; ii) Promoting ambivalence and challenging universalized forms of knowledge production; ii) Climate policy as a threat to traditional lifestyles.

Climate Nationalism and Eco-populism  

As climate change has been getting more space in SD discourse following extreme weather events, in particular widespread wildfires in June 2018, the SD have sought to manage this changing context – or ‘exigence’ – by utilizing a variety of rhetorical strategies. One such topic has been to acknowledge the crisis, while simultaneously denying Sweden’s responsibility to make drastic emissions cuts. 

This topic was evident in the SD 2022 manifesto, which stated: “Sweden does not contribute to reduced emissions by raising fuel prices and making it more expensive for companies to operate in Sweden if China can increase its emissions every year by more than what all of Sweden emits” (Party Programme, 2022: 24). Moreover, in a 2020/21 motion the SD claimed: “In many places, there is a lack of basic insight that Sweden or the EU alone can control global carbon dioxide emissions to a significant extent.” And that: “When the EU decided on the burden sharing, Sweden was given the most ambitious emission reduction requirements by all countries. This is strange in light of the fact that Sweden’s emissions of greenhouse gases per capita are already well below the average for industrialized countries” (Motion 2020/21: 727). 

This topic demonstrates an acceptance of the scientific consensus, while refocusing issues of climate reform onto developing nations, such as China, while framing Sweden as having already serviced its debt and ‘done its share’ (Wodak, 2015). This climate nationalist rhetoric has been identified by the literature as a key strategy of RWP actors to recenter discussions of decarbonization away from their nation by inviting the listener to view it as both ineffectual and unjust (Bang & Schreurs, 2010; Kashwan et al., 2022). As Dubash (2019) notes, the “turn toward nationalism…has created a short-term, looking-out-for-our-own mentality that is inimical to the global collective action needed to address climate change.” This rhetoric not only centralizes Swedish national interest, but also normatively reasserts the nation-state as the primary actor when setting climate policy by inviting the listener to view it as an issue to be addressed by siloed and self-serving nations, instead of intergovernmental institutions (Forchtner & Kølvraa, 2015). 

This embeds SD rhetoric firmly into my previously outlined methodology as it promotes a populist framing of ‘us versus them’ wrapped around a nationalist ideology. Sweden’s environmentally progressive context and the mainstream presentation the SD are trying to establish could have limited the effectiveness of more overt climate denial. However, this rhetorical strategy still establishes a discourse that is antithetical to the collective climate action that is needed (Margulies, 2021). 

This topic of climate nationalism closely linked to another rhetorical strategy to promote hostility to climate action identified in my analysis: eco-populism. While not anticipated in my methodology, the ecological inclination of RWP parties has been heavily discussed in recent literature (Forchtner, 2019; Sconfienza, 2022). This narrative was present in the SD’s 2018 manifesto which stated that: “Sweden alone cannot solve the world’s environmental problems, so we want to protect our unique natural environment and take our share of responsibility for the global challenges, while our environmental considerations are based on love and care for our own homeland” (Party Programme, 2018: 18).

The SD romanticization of the local environment is identified by Fochtner (2019) as a form of “ethno-nationalist imagery according to which ‘the people’ is rooted, and emerged from, a particular space.” By attributing value to the symbiotic relationship between the ‘nation’ and the ‘homeland,’ the SD promote a nature-nation-purity nexus. This rhetorical strategy crafts a narrative in which support for the local environment via domestic governance and traditions stands in opposition to global environmental issues such as climate change, which are supported by cosmopolitan institutions/elites and supported by a range of foreign traditions, considered as ‘other,’ embedding this topic into a populist frame (Sconfienza, 2022). As the audience is invited to view ecological purity as an important facet of Swedish nationalist imagery, the importance of a nationalist environmentalist frame is reified while less importance is placed on climate change and global climate cooperation, which is dismissible as a transient issue (Hultgren, 2015).

Promoting Climate Ambivalence and Challenging Universalized Forms of Knowledge Production

The SD’s approach to climate change is characterized by ambiguity, as seen in statements such as: “The debate among researchers is alive about the consequences of different levels of temperature increase” (Motion 2020/21: 727). This quote underpins how the SD seeks to sow doubt over the scientific consensus by emphasizing the ‘aliveness’ of the climate change ‘debate.’

Moreover, this argumentative structure demonstrates how the SD questions the notion of universalized mechanisms of knowledge production for political means. Marquardt et al. (2022) argue that RWP parties utilize not only anti-elitist and anti-cosmopolitan arguments but also question the forms of knowledge production and experience upon which climate action is based. This was illustrated by Josef Fransson, an SD Politician, who emphasized the benefits of CO2 emissions in a 2015 article, claiming: “The soil [will] become greener, and crops grow larger due to the plants’ greater access to carbon dioxide” (Hultman et al., 2020). More recently, SD politician Elsa Widding, when denying the severity of climate change, argued that: “The last time that was the case was in the 1960s when summers either stopped or became so short that we couldn’t produce a harvest” (The Local, 2022). 

Parallel to the SD, online far-right media within Sweden also employ these rhetorical tools to sow distrust around climate science, with media sites such as Nya Tider claiming “climate threat-sceptics have identified a series of basic problems with climate science as it is presented by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Among these are deviations from the scientific method, the accuracy of climate models, modelling of the carbon cycle and questionable data adjustments” (Björklund, 2018a). Promotion of ambivalence around the scientific method reflects how the Swedish far-right utilize these rhetorical topics to frame science and the scientific method as a tool of cosmopolitan, supranational institutions or secondary ‘others,’ dismissing these institutions and forms of knowledge production as both fallible and the product of a corrupt elite.

This constitutes what Jasanoff (2010) argues is the prioritization of subjective and local experiences over the apolitical and universal imaginary of bodies such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The SD, by strategically creating tension between these competing epistemic worldviews – the local and the cosmopolitan – makes climate change a politicized and contestable issue as the epistemology being prioritized reflects a broader worldview. By reframing climate change with an emphasis on subjective personal experiences regarding ‘past short summers’ or ‘the positive effects of carbon,’ the SD are also posing a challenge to the forms of knowledge that bolster the scientific consensus and justify climate reform (Marquardt et al., 2022). This topic leads to personal experience constituting knowledge that is valued higher than the positivist knowledge claims of climate policy proponents. Wodak’s concept of the “arrogance of ignorance” (2015: 2) underscores this phenomenon, referring to the tendency of RWP communication to legitimize forms of truth conceived as the ‘common-sense’ of the people, while delegitimizing climate science.

Climate Policy as a Threat to Traditional Lifestyles  

The SD have often utilized a rhetorical pattern portraying climate policy, and its advocates as a cavalry of elites that threaten traditional lifestyles and industries. Wodak, (2015), as outlined previously, identifies RWP’s proclivity for scapegoating elites as the process of creating secondary defining ‘others,’ who are villainized based off their apparent responsibility for the modernizing policies and trends that threaten the nation-state and its traditions.  

This is evident throughout SD climate communication, as seen when stating: “The goal of a more environmentally friendly society should be achieved primarily through awareness raising, technological development, and positive incentives…not through a one-sided focus on punishing ‘undesirable’ lifestyles” (Sverigedemokraternas principprogram, 2019). This notion was also evidenced when claiming: “There is no indication that free people [should] refrain from travel and a good standard of living, nor should it be the aim of politics” (Motion 2019/20: 2682). As evidenced, SD climate rhetoric invites the listener to view climate policy as a threat to people’s lifestyle, thus creating a dichotomous perspective that positions climate reform as antithetical to the interests of the citizens. In this case, the ruling government is positioned as the ‘elites,’ reflecting the SD’s position as an opposition party in the Riksdag (Swedish Parliament). 

This topic is made more evident when the SD discuss specific policy issues, such as the petrol/diesel and carbon tax: “Aggressive taxation and policies focused on cities have turned the car into a class issue…for the vast majority of people the car is not a luxury but a necessity.” Moreover, the SD argued that: “Today, environmental taxes far exceed the cost of emissions. The car has become a cash cow for the government” (Party Programme, 2022: 27). These quotes demonstrate how climate policy is framed as antagonistic to aspects of modern life, such as individual car ownership, which are simultaneously portrayed as unproblematic. These discursive appropriations are supported by Hultman et al. (2020), who argue that RWP hostility to climate change is partly rooted in a refusal to recognize the inherent issues in modern lifestyles, rates of consumption, and capitalist modes of production which in part caused the current ecological crisis (Pulé & Hultman, 2019). This argumentative structure links to Wodak (2015) argument that RWP utilizes/constructs a ‘politics of fear’ to mobilize support around their party as the vindicators of these ‘harmless’ lifestyles, and therefore as the only truly representatives of ‘the people.’

Outside of direct party sources, parallels can be drawn here to Swedish anti-COVID discourse, with Önnerfors (2024) noting how similar rhetorical devices are employed in a range of so-called protest songs. One example includes Swedish artist Christoffer Lundquist’s, whose song ‘Vi är fria’ employed distinct rhetorical devices to promote skepticism about the role of the government in pushing vaccinations and COVID restrictions by urging brave truthtellers who “have truth and meaning” (Lundquist, 2021) to take back control as a unified grassroots movement against a suggested evil and overreaching state (Hughes et al, 2021: 7). The rhetorical devices emphasizing subjective ‘common sense’ knowledge are contrasted with the machinations of a vaguely defined elite, which threaten the freedom and lifestyles of the ‘people.’ Similar to the SD’s, these rhetorical topics position the government as a malicious elite in a quest to return the freedoms and traditional lifestyles which they claim have been lost. This wider discourse speaks to how RWP seeks to position the policies of a corrupt elite – such as through climate or pro-vaccination policy – against the suggested interest of the ‘people’ and diffuse claims of freedom and tradition.  

In summary, the SD employ various rhetorical devices to promote ambivalence and/or hostility to climate action. While important constraints limit the SD’s ability to formulate rhetoric, such as Sweden’s strong environmentally progressive ethos, SD actors creatively employ rhetorical devices to promote hostility to climate policy in ways that demonstrate some fundamental aspects of Wodak’s interpretation of RWP, while also differing in some unexpected ways. One such topic was climate nationalism, which directed the focus of the rhetoric audience away from domestic reform onto developing nations. Interestingly, this topic also intersected with eco-populism which was prevalent in SD climate discourse and sought to promote ecological purity within a nationalist frame, thereby positioning climate change and international climate cooperation as secondary to the importance of securing the ‘homeland’ ecology. 

SD’s rhetoric challenged the epistemologies underpinning climate science and in doing so, delegitimizing climate policy/expertise and its associated worldview while prioritizing subjective and local ‘common-sense’ knowledge forms. Moreover, closely associated with this topic, the SD depicted climate policy as an elitist threat to the lifestyles of the Swedish people, as suggested by Wodak (2015), invoking the suggested ‘elitism’ of climate science is a common strategy of RWP, however the defense of the free-market and modern consumerist lifestyles demonstrates how the rhetorical devices being employed shift in relation to ideological/contextual factors. 

Alternative for Deutschland (AfD)

Context 

The Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) party is a right-wing populist (RWP) party holding an influential position within the German political system after gaining 10.3% of the vote share in 2021, with 83 seats in the German Bundestag (parliament), and winning its first state election in the German state Thuringia in 2024 (Kirby & Parker, 2024; Laumond, 2023). Founded in 2013 in reaction to the European Central Bank (ECB) and European Commission’s bailout of Greece, the AfD has been characterized by extreme Euroscepticism and identarian nationalism as well as being in favor of a free-market economy (Boecher et al., 2022). Its radical political positions are paralleled by its position on climate change with the AfD vigorously opposing Germany’s ambitious plan to reach carbon-neutrality by 2045 (The German Energiewende) (Kurmayer, 2023). 

The AfD is an important case within this thesis as it is the only chosen party that has made climate policy as one of its key issues, only following immigration and the Euro in salience (Arzheimer, 2015). Categorized as ‘deniers and sceptics’ by Carius and Schaller’s 2019 study, the AfD have acknowledged a warming trend, however, dispute its anthropogenic origins. This attribution skepticism has become a key feature of its political profile and has mobilized voters around the suggested elitism and corruptness of climate policy (Grimm, 2015). In line with this, the AfD has voted against all EU climate and energy policy proposals tabled in the European Parliament and is opposed to the proposed phasing out of the fossil fuel industry while supporting nuclear development (Waldholz, 2019). 

For many of the quotes used in this analysis, articles from the AfD membership magazine (AfD Kompakt) were utilized. This is appropriate as these articles are written by AfD politicians and, although typically brief, provide a more detailed analysis of AfD policy positions and rhetorical strategies due to their frequent publication.

Analysis

These two topics were identified as the central rhetorical devises used to promote climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate action: i) Portraying climate science as false and elitist; ii) Promoting technological innovation as the solution.

Portraying Climate Science as False and Elitist 

A central mechanism through which the AfD promote doubt over climate change is by frequently highlighting the beneficial effects of carbon emissions, epitomized by AfD candidate Guido Reil declaring that: “Carbon Dioxide is good for plants [and is having] no impact on the climate” (Farand, 2019). Moreover, the AfD’s manifesto (2017: 78) claims: “[The] IPCC and German government conveniently omit the positive influence of CO2 on plant growth and world nutrition.” By emphasizing the benefit of carbon emissions, the AfD strategically reframed climate change from a less contestable situation, to one of ambivalence in which the listener is invited to challenge the epistemic authorities that underpin knowledge on climate change (Boecher et al., 2022). 

Prioritizing alternative or experiential knowledge over expertise is a common mechanism through which RWP reframes climate science within an ‘elite’ versus the ‘people’ dichotomy. By radically simplifying the issue, and challenging the knowledge foundations that support it, an antagonism between the ‘folk’ or experiential and scientific knowledge foundations is created, demonstrating Wodak’s (2015) notion of the ‘anti-intellectualism.’ 

In addition, contrary to what one might expect from RWP parties such as the Polish PiS, which typically promote conspiracist arguments claiming that scientists manipulate evidence, a dominant theme used by the AfD to invoke climate skepticism is that the establishment—primarily the German media, government, and the EU—is alarmist and employs scare tactics. Karsten Hilse, AfD spokesman for environmental policy, stated in AfD Kompakt that: “On the occasion of the terrible forest fires that rage in Sweden, the colleagues from Heute Journal [one of Germany’s main news programs] […] deemed it appropriate to once again produce a panic program on (man-made) climate change” (Hilse, 2018). Moreover, Professor Ingo Hahn, science policy spokesman for the AfD, claimed that: “The radicalization of the climate ideologues continues to increase. The main blame lies with the established parties and the mainstream media, which have been spreading fictitious horror scenarios about ‘climate change’ for years” (Hahn, 2023). 

While this rhetorical strategy differed from the other chosen parties, it does entail a topic which firmly embeds climate rhetoric into the AfD’s populist core by inviting the audience to perceive climate change/climate policies as a project orchestrated by a cosmopolitan elite, detached from the workings of everyday people that are defined within a nativist frame (Wodak, 2015; Lockwood, 2018). This is evident when AfD politician Alexander Gauland in an AfD Kompakt article claimed in 2017 that: “While more and more money is being pulled out of the pockets of the hard-working people, electric cars are to be subsidized” (Gauland, 2017). Another article claimed that “with the plans to deliberately increase the price of the staple food, meat, the old parties show that they are out of touch with the ‘little guy’” (Chrupalla, 2019).

Outside of the mainstream party discourse, a corpus of far-right German blogs and magazines have echoed this rhetorical device. For example, the far-right blog Politically Incorrect, which argued that climate change policy was leading to the suppression of “serious [scientific] voices” and resulted in the creation of blacklists of “climate deniers” (PI News, 2007). This discourse, while not produced directly by official AfD sources, speaks to the wider rhetorical approach of these ideological positions to the exigence of climate change and the characterization of scientific reasoning as fundamentally antagonistic to the interests of the people. Reflecting on these wider discourses underscores how the apparent ‘people-centrism’ of the AfD reorients the rhetorical situation into one in which the AfD are the defenders of the taxpayers from the machinations of a corrupt cosmopolitan enemy or a foreign ‘other’ which is juxtaposed against the ‘little guy,’ or German public who is framed as paying the consequences of policies such as electric var subsidies or meat taxes (Küppers, 2022).

This topic thus centers AfD rhetoric into our methodology for populism, as it centers a suggested ‘antagonism between the ‘people’ and ‘elite,’ using it to promote hostility to climate policy.

Technological Innovation as the Solution

The AfD frequently attempt to reorient discourse on the German energy transitions via a topic claiming that technological breakthroughs are the solution to energy/environmental issues. The AfD are outspoken champions of alternatives to renewables, citing vaguely described energy alternatives, arguing that: “Promising new developments such as the thorium high-temperature reactor in Hann Uentrop or the fast breeder in Kalkar were prematurely terminated. Thus, these ground-breaking ideas could never be fully developed” (Manifesto for Germany, 2017: 79). When discussing issues associated with nuclear expansion, such as nuclear waste, the AfD claimed that radioactive residues should be stored and catalogued “in order to recycle them when technical progress permits” (Manifesto for Germany, 2017: 79), underscoring the technological optimism in AfD energy policy. 

This topic is utilized to reframe the exigence of proposed climate reforms away from more ideologically threatening state-led reforms, such as carbon tax, by conjuring optimism over vaguely defined and abstract technological solutions created by the market. This strategy reflects the AfD’s right-wing conservative ideology, with several studies demonstrating the link between climate skepticism and pro-market attitudes (McCright & Dunlap, 2008; Cann & Raymond, 2018). As Küppers (2022) argues, the AfD’s support for a free market economy under its ‘ordo-liberal’ ideology informs its contemporary neoliberal economic position. Indeed, a primary reason stated for its rejection of the German Renewable Energy Act was that it is “akin to a state-directed economy and a departure from German social-market economy”(Manifesto for Germany, 2017: 79). Thus, by placing the onus of reform onto technological advancement, the status quo is fortified as any necessary changes to modern consumption patterns or lifestyles are circumvented in line with the AfD’s radical pro-market ideology (Damico et al., 2023). 

Another mechanism through which this rhetorical strategy promotes hostility to climate policy, particularly the German Energiewende, is by asserting that interests and power struggles determine science-policy relations. By painting academic/scientific findings as political positions, the listener is encouraged to view renewable energy as only being prioritized due to a corrupt, wealthy elite reaping the benefits of subsidies, while fossil fuels, nuclear energy, and alternative advanced technologies are rejected for political, instead of practical, considerations (Boecher et al., 2022). This sentiment was evident when Alice Weidel, Chairperson of the AfD parliamentary group, claimed: “The planned shutdown of the last German nuclear power plants is an ideologically insane act against all economic and political reason and against the will of a majority of German citizens” (Weidel, 2023). The AfD also argued, in reference to the Energiewende policy’s planned phasing out of nuclear energy, that: “Truly civilian nuclear concepts such as the liquid-salt reactor have never been seriously tested, although their feasibility has long been proven. Since the 1970s, no development has taken place, not least because money was invested in unrealistic visions such as renewable energy sources” (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020).

This topic thus reorients the audience away from the real concerns surrounding nuclear and fossil-fuel power generation, instead inviting the listener to view renewable development and climate policy as political ploys. As outlined in Wodak’s methodology for populism, the AfD evoke the antagonistic relation between the ‘elite’ and the ‘people,’ as the former are framed as the beneficiaries of renewable energy development and Germany’s Energiewende, thus promoting hostility to climate policy. This can be interpreted as the rhetor looking to structure an indeterminate situation, utilizing the complicated and nature of energy production and how it interfaces with the climate to promote doubt and hostility towards climate reform.

In summary, several central rhetorical topics are visible that promote hostility to climate change/policy. The party portrays climate science as false and elitist, while promoting technological innovation as the solution. Moreover, by employing mechanisms to challenge the knowledge foundations of climate science, an antagonism between experiential and scientific knowledge and a dichotomy between an ‘elite’ versus the ‘people’ frames climate policy as an elite-orchestrated project. The AfD’s rhetoric embeds climate change/policy into its populist core, while also making subtle changes given contextual differences, with key factors for the AfD being both the ambitious scale of the German Energiewende, and the AfD’s radical subscription to market economics. 

Comparative Analysis

All three RWP parties (PiS, SD and AfD) portray climate change as an agenda orchestrated by a self-interested and corrupt cosmopolitan elite. While each case demonstrated varying degrees of climate skepticism, all emphasized the injustice of climate reform on everyday people, thereby reframing the climate issue within a worldview defined by an antagonism between ‘the people’ and the ‘elites,’ as outlined in my preceding methodology. Which ‘elites’ are selected as the rhetorical focus depends largely on the context, with the AfD/SD parties primarily targeting the national government, while the PiS, as a former governing party, emphasizes regional/supranational groups such the EU/UN (Biedenkopf, 2021). PiS rhetoric was also less cohesive than the other parties, with some pro-climate frames being deployed, potentially reflecting what their constraints were during their position as a leading party to adhere to global and regional climate targets and expectations. 

Moreover, differences in how these argumentative strategies were utilized was evident with the AfD party, which invoked climate skepticism by suggesting climate predictions were an elite-driven scare tactic, while the SD/PiS primarily claim that climate change is an ideologically driven conspiracy that lacks evidence. These anti-establishment narratives are underpinned by a strong nationalist agenda among each party, with a discourse prioritizing national sovereignty over climate ambitions being readily apparent throughout the findings. 

The topic of climate nationalism was present in all three parties, which depicted climate-friendly policy as contrary to national sovereignty and/or economic interests, although how this topic was expressed differed based on party context. The PiS utilized a narrative of resource nationalism, arguing that climate reforms would have extreme economic ramifications given Poland’s high reliance on indigenous coal supplies, as-well as the traditional cultural value of coal as a source of sovereignty. The AfD party similarly primarily sought to discredit climate reform strategies under the German energy transition (Energiewende) by arguing climate policy is akin to a state-led economy designed to disadvantage Germany, thereby embedding anti-elitist sentiment in the AfD’s ideological underpinnings (Arzheimer, 2015). Following these ideological contexts, the AfD party also demonstrated an optimistic belief in the ability of future technological advancements to solve energy and climate issues, reflecting both its ‘ordoliberal’ enthusiasm for the free-market, and its support of nuclear energy advancement, which is planned to be rapidly phased out under the German Energiewende (Rechsteiner, 2021). This topic was also present in PiS rhetoric to a lesser extent, which made arguments for the development of ‘clean coal.’

The SD’s climate nationalism took a different form than that of the other chosen parties. While still portraying climate change as an undue economic burden, the party argued that Sweden has no responsibility to make further emissions cuts due to its relatively low emissions and that such cuts would be inconsequential. Instead, they advocated for higher-emitting nations to take greater responsibility. The SD’s nationalist ideology also took the form of eco-populist rhetoric which was less apparent in the other cases and promoted a symbiosis between the ‘nation’ and local environment, while dismissing international environmental issues like climate change.

Closely related to this topic, another rhetorical device used in each case was anti-intellectualism via prioritizing localized and experiential forms of knowledge over the scientific and positivist epistemologies that necessitate climate action. This crafting of an epistemic tension was utilized similarly by each party, demonstrating its centrality to RWP climate communication. 

Conclusion

Discussion of Findings

The starting point for this article, supported by a literature review, was that relatively little attention has been paid to the specific rhetorical mechanisms through which right-wing populism (RWP) promotes climate change skepticism and/or hostility to climate action. Thus, the chief aim has been to analyze the rhetorical choices of RWP parties regarding climate change/policy and offer new insights into how RWP positions reshuffle and adapt in line with shifting ideological considerations and contexts. By focusing on a range of relatively contemporary quotes from official party programmes, policy proposals and individual politicians, and buttressing my findings with supportive secondary data, I have demonstrated real examples of how RWP parties promote skepticism and/or hostility to climate change policy by deploying argumentative strategies, or topics, conceived within a rhetorical situation (Consigny, 1974)

In doing so, this study advances knowledge in the field in three ways. First, while nationalist discourse has long been understood as an ideological focus for RWP, as outlined in my methodology, the results of the study show how nationalist opposition to climate change shifts depending on each parties’ unique context. This demonstrates how nationalist ideology forms the ‘thick’ substantive base around which RWP articulates opposition to climate policy. 

Second, RWP opposition to climate policy is rhetorically promoted through a discourse of ‘the elites’ versus ‘the people,’ which serves as the central frame around which various forms of climate skepticism and/or hostility to climate change are articulated. Multiple narrative frames were deployed to undermine the scientific consensus on climate change, either by dismissing it as a scare tactic or outright conspiracy, or by claiming that climate policy threatens economic competitiveness and citizens’ lifestyles, often associating it with a socialist command economy. Given the varying ‘elite’ groups targeted depending on context, the adaptive plasticity of RWP climate communication is fully evident.

Third, it is also evident that European RWP parties frequently seek to disqualify scientific expertise by utilizing anti-intellectual rhetoric, while prioritizing local, experiential sources of knowledge. This was a core feature of RWP identified by Wodak (2015), these interpretative findings reveal by how this epistemic challenge to the universal, scientific epistemologies that support climate action is a shared strategy across European RWP parties. By focusing on the utilization of scientific knowledge, this study contributes to recent literature on populist climate communication. 

Furthermore, these findings are broadly supportive of Wodak’s (2015) methodology for populism, with both ideological substance and rhetorical style coalescing to form climate communication strategies. Indeed, much of the current literature interprets populism as isolated from the broader contexts in which it arises, resulting in theoretical and methodological assumptions (Mudde, 2004; Jagers & Walgrave, 2004). By emphasizing the importance of different contexts in shaping rhetoric, the way in which rhetorical devices shift in accordance with different conditions is evident while shared tendencies between parties can also be seen. 

This theoretical research builds upon the work of Stanley (2008: 95), who identified populism as an existing ideology that varies considerably based on the societal context as its ‘thin’ ideological base which can be found in “combination with established ‘full’ ideologies.” These findings are compatible with this thesis, however by emphasizing both the ideological and stylistic/rhetorical facets of populism, and how this differs between contexts, a more updated relationship between populism and climate change is apparent.

Limitations and Implications 

One limitation of my research was that all parties chosen were European. This could limit the applicability of my knowledge claims due to the potential bias inherent in only assessing Western-centric normative viewpoints on climate change. While this choice of methods allowed for a more focused interpretive research frame for analyzing European RWP discourse, the applicability of this study is arguably limited when examining the RWP in non-Western regions, such as Jair Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party in Brazil. Moreover, populism is a far more ideologically extensive and heavily debated issue than was presented in this study, and while some extent of the most contemporary debates on the issue is interrogated, a more extensive investigation into the relationship between other forms of populism, such as Left-wing populism, and the climate issue, is beyond the scope of this article (Gamble, 2018). 

In outlining how RWP parties promote skepticism/hostility to climate action, this article provides an investigative framework for future study on climate change communication. The impact of these findings on future climate change communication, and how it can more effectively circumvent populist anti-science rhetoric is valuable given the relevance of public opinion for climate politics (Huber et al., 2020). RWP primarily positions climate change and its policies as elitist and disconnected from the true interests of the ‘people,’ utilizing anti-science frames to dismiss the epistemologies that underpin climate policy. Thus, the top-down nature of climate communication, which primarily occurs in international settings and is negotiated by elites disconnected from the interests of local communities, could undermine public support.

These findings suggest that climate communication should take place more frequently in settings that foster community engagement and local participation to reach individuals exposed to RWP attitudes. This study finds that more inclusive modes of climate communication, such as messaging through local representatives and business owners, could be effective in conveying that climate reform is in the interest of all. Additionally, emphasizing the impact of climate change on local communities and ecologies would help contextualize it as a tangible and relevant issue, preventing it from being framed as an abstract and elite-led phenomenon.

 

(*) Morgan Lewis recently earned an MSc in International Business and Strategy from the University of Bristol, graduating with Distinction and receiving the Dean’s Award for Outstanding Academic Performance. His dissertation, Understanding Climate Skepticism: A Rhetorical Analysis of Climate Communication by the Polish Law and Justice Party, German Alternative for Deutschland, and Swedish Democrats, examined the rhetorical strategies used by right-wing populist parties to shape climate discourse. He also holds a First-Class BSc in Politics and International Relations from the same institution. His academic interests include political theory, contemporary European populism, and sustainability discourse.

 

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Young Kurdish women dressed in red in Erbil, Iraq, on September 10, 2021. Photo: Serhii Ivashchuk.

Violence Against Women: Towards a Policy Understanding of the Patriarchy

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Hussain, Shilan Fuad. (2025). “Violence Against Women: Towards a Policy Understanding of the Patriarchy.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 5, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0005

 

Abstract

Violence Against Women (VAW) and girls can take many forms globally, from the absence of personal agency to sexual violence and domestic abuse. To better understand how VAW affects women in the Middle East in particular, this policy brief addresses various instances of violence against Kurdish women in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). A particular focus is given to forced/arranged marriages, honour-based violence, and female genital mutilation, which form a ‘patriarchal trifecta’ of oppression: a phenomenon that the author has identified and researched extensively. The policy brief recommendations informed by this research are relevant to policymakers both in the KRI and beyond, including European Union member states that have dealt with troubling cases of violence against women in immigrant communities and are facing similar challenges to women’s rights. Examining violations against women is relevant for many parts of the Middle East, and more broadly societies and communities where patriarchal values and norms produce a social milieu where the main justification for VAW is the protection of a social construct of honour. This policy brief is informed by fieldwork conducted in the KRI; 55 qualitative interviews with policymakers, United Nations officials, attorneys, academics, activists, civil society members, plus women and male survivors and perpetrators of VAW; and a quantitative survey conducted among 200 women and men to gauge their opinions on this multi-faceted phenomenon. The goal of this policy brief is to give the public institutions responsible for monitoring women’s welfare a better picture of the challenges to equality that women still face and offer ways forward in terms of addressing these challenges.[1]

 

By Shilan Fuad Hussain* 

Introduction 

Women and girls experience numerous forms of gender-based violence (GBV) on a global scale. This policy brief examines specific cases of GBV against Kurdish women in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to shed light on the unique impact of GBV on Middle Eastern women. During my research I observed, defined, and examined a trinity of oppression, which I have coined the ‘patriarchal trifecta’ (Hussain, 2024). This trio includes forced/arranged marriages, female genital mutilation (FGM), and so-called ‘honour killings’/honour-based violence (HBV); phenomena which I believe operate symbiotically and merit special attention from a public policy standpoint (Payton, 2019; Beghikhani, 2015; Haig et al., 2015; Ruba, 2010; Brown & Romano, 2016; Ahmady, 2018; Burrage, 2016; Barrett et al., 2021).

The findings and recommendations of this policy brief are based on research conducted between 2022 and 2024. In 2023, I carried out fieldwork in the cities of Erbil, Duhok, Sulaymaniyah, Kelar, and Xanaqin, conducting interviews with 55 women and men that have been either survivors or perpetrators of GBV, policymakers, United Nations (UN) officials, attorneys, academics, activists, and civil society members. I also conducted a quantitative survey with 200 randomly selected women and men, as a control variable to ascertain their views on the different phenomena examined in this policy brief.

This policy brief is significant beyond the KRI because the wider Middle East region faces comparable obstacles to women’s equality. This issue also gains prescience in diasporic communities because of the growing tension between conservative, traditionalist understandings of Islam in the Middle East and liberal modernist ‘Anglo-European’ views of women’s rights enshrined in EU legislation. Such an ideological environment shared by the KRI and diasporas in Western European states means that many women survivors are ostracised from society and forced to endure these injustices in silence. Given these challenges, this policy brief includes seven general recommendations that address violations of women’s rights. 

The policy brief aims to offer governmental agencies that are responsible for tracking women’s well-being further insights on how to better guarantee women’s equality in society through putting forward cohesive strategies. The recommendations of this policy brief align closely with UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 on gender equality and the SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions.[2]

Forced and Arranged Marriages

My data collection in the KRI revealed that the forced marriage rate among girls who married at ages 14-17 and 18-24 was 20% for both groups. Child and forced marriages stem from various factors, including tribal and patriarchal norms, cultural practices, lack of formal education, household power imbalances, and harmful masculine expectations (Khan, 2020; Erman et al., 2021). These marriages often occur in rural areas governed by customs that disregard state laws. 

The prevalence of child marriage in the KRI is difficult to quantify, but a UNFPA survey found that 20.53% of women aged 20-24 in the Kurdistan region and 23.02% in wider Iraq were married before age 18 (UNFPA, 2016). Contributing factors include outdated customs, poverty, and low education levels, which leave girls vulnerable to exploitation and economic dependence (UN Women, 2018; 2019; El Ashmawy et al., 2020). Men are also affected, as young husbands often face the pressure of supporting households without stable careers or incomes (Hussain, 2024).

Following the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, economic hardship and declining living standards in the KRI led to increased violence against women. Many girls were forced to leave school and marry young due to financial strain, family pressure, or forced labour environments where they faced sexual exploitation and harassment. 

Families often viewed early marriage as a way to “protect” daughters from greater harm, despite objections from the girls. Physical abuse within marriages was normalized by parents as a better alternative to their daughters being “unclaimed” and potentially vulnerable to multiple abuses. Arranged marriages were perceived as opportunities for social mobility, leveraging patriarchal structures to improve a daughter’s material prospects. However, such unions often lacked love and empathy, reducing marriages to transactional arrangements where women were treated as property or servants, leading to isolation and confinement.

In rural and tribal regions, male dominance shaped all aspects of life. Men often justified their control through religious beliefs, rejecting secular laws protecting women as corrupting influences. Obedience from girls and women was seen as a moral imperative, and defiance of parental choices in marriage was considered dishonourable. Ultimately, my research highlighted that forced marriage practices were deeply rooted in cultural norms.

Violence Based on Perceived Dishonour

Honour-based violence (HBV) remains prevalent in the KRI, rooted in patriarchal and tribal norms as well as cultural perceptions of women’s ‘proper’ roles. Official data shows that 44 women were killed for ‘honour’ in 2022. Many others allegedly committed suicide under suspicious circumstances, often by self-immolation, with speculation that some were honour killings staged as suicides. As one NGO representative in Sulaymania explained, “it is very easy for a woman to be a victim of honour killing by family members in the KRI or Iraq and get away with it.”

Triggers for honour killings include premarital sexual relations, being a victim of rape, refusing an arranged marriage, or marrying someone disapproved of by the family. While murder is the most severe form, other abuses, such as mutilation and facial disfigurement, are also inflicted to render women ‘undesirable.’

Iraqi law addresses honour killings but allows reduced sentences for such crimes, often treating them as lesser offenses. In wider Iraq, sentences can be as low as six months, compared to life imprisonment or death for non-honour-related murders (AlKhateeb, 2010). This leniency perpetuates the idea that honour killings are ‘natural’ reactions to perceived family shame. In contrast, KRI authorities abolished laws allowing such reduced sentences in 2000.

Unlike forced marriages, HBV cuts across socioeconomic backgrounds. A UNICEF survey revealed that 59% of women aged 15-59 found physical abuse by husbands acceptable (AlKhateeb, 2010). Many women internalise patriarchal norms, perceiving these dangers as relevant only to ‘others.’ Interviews highlighted how older women, including mothers and aunts, often viewed honour killings as justified for ‘grave’ moral transgressions like perceived sexual promiscuity, believing such actions tarnish family honour.

Policy Recommendations

The ‘patriarchal trifecta’—forced/arranged marriages (Hussain, 2024), honour-based violence (HBV), and female genital mutilation (FGM)—is a complex issue requiring holistic solutions. To address these abuses, the KRI government must implement a comprehensive national strategy. While progress, such as a decline in FGM, has been noted, these phenomena continue to have catastrophic consequences for women, families, and communities.

On an institutional level, policy proposals include expanding state-funded gender-based violence (GBV) response services, such as healthcare, psychological support, housing assistance, and legal protections (Waylen, 2014; Piscopo, 2020). Eliminating sexist practices that limit women’s access to the workplace and resources is critical to enhancing their economic agency, offering alternatives to arranged marriages, and reducing the risk of honour killings (Chenoweth & Zoe, 2022; Hussain, 2024).

Key objectives to achieve these aims include:

  1. Strengthening legislation to challenge harmful gender norms and beliefs.
  2. Reducing societal acceptance of violence against women (VAW) by promoting gender-equitable norms.
  3. Collaborating with women-led organisations, NGOs, and community leaders to drive meaningful change.
  4. Prioritising health-related laws and accountability measures to mitigate violence and foster gender equality.
  5. Enhancing women’s access to skills training, formal employment, and labour rights to improve their economic opportunities.
  6. Encouraging inclusive economic growth by supporting firms that prioritise women’s leadership and entrepreneurship.
  7. Coordinating cross-sectoral efforts to support adolescents in addressing child marriages, FGM, and HBV.

Structural reforms should include integrating these measures into the education system. Comprehensive reproductive health education can inform young people about the dangers of FGM, while ensuring equal access to mandatory education until 18 can combat economic desperation (EGER, 2021). Schools could also employ female administrators and nurses to address girls’ unique challenges and provide guidance on personal and safety concerns (World Food Program USA, 2022).

Legislative action is essential. Clerics must be prohibited from registering marriages outside formal courts, and HBV and FGM should incur stricter penalties. Special units should investigate such offences, and divorce processes for abused women must be simplified, with state assistance provided during their transition. As one young woman in the KRI stated, “We need men to feel the urgency to do so.” Dismantling the ‘patriarchal trifecta’ (Hussain, 2024) requires participation from those it benefits (Levtov et al., 2015; Dabla-Norris & Kochhar, 2019). The limitations on women’s rights are interconnected, demanding holistic solutions that address root causes rather than merely alleviating symptoms. These insights and recommendations hold relevance far beyond the KRI, extending to global contexts.

 

(*) Dr. Shilan Fuad Hussain is a Research Fellow in Gender Studies and Cultural Analysis. She was previously a Marie Sklodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow (2022-2024, UKRI), a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Kurdish Institute (US), and a Doctoral Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Switzerland). She is an interdisciplinary academic and works on a variety of topics, among them: cultural representation, production, and practices; gender-based violence; state policies enhancing female equality; FGM and arranged/forced marriages; the social impacts of masculinity; and multi-identity and culture in the diaspora diasporas. Her current work sits at the intersection of sociology and cultural analysis, and its symbiotic relevance to modern society. More information is available on her personal website: https://www.shilanfuadhussain.com/

 

References

Ahmady, K. (2018). “The Politics of Culture-Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Iran.” Journal of Humanity. Vol 4(1) (March):1-022. 

AlKhateeb, Basma. (2010). Persistent gender-based violence an obstacle to development and peace. Developing Programs for Women and Youth Iraqi. Al-Amal Association, Social Watch Poverty Eradication and Gender Justice. https://www.socialwatch.org/node/12087

Barrett, H. R.; Bedri, N. & Krishnapalan, N. (2021). “The Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) – migration matrix: The case of the Arab League Region.” Health Care for Women International, 42(2), 186–212. https://doi.org/10.1080/07399332.2020.1789642

Beghikhani, N. (2015). Honour Based Violence. Gill & Hague.

Brown, L., & Romano, D. (2006). “Women in Post-Saddam Iraq: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?” NWSA Journal, 18(3), 51–70. https://doi.org/10.2979/NWS.2006.18.3.51

Burrage, H. (2016). Female Mutilation: The Truth Behind the Horrifying Global Practice of Female Genital Mutilation, New Holland Publishers. 

Chenoweth, Erica & Zoe, Marks. (2022, March 8). “Revenge of the Patriarchs: Why Autocrats Fear Women.” Foreign Affairs. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2022-02-08/women-rights-revenge-patriarchs

Dabla-Norris, E. & Kochhar, K. (2019). “Closing the Gender Gap.” IMF Paper.https://www.imf.org/Publications/fandd/issues/2019/03/closing-the-gender-gap-dabla

EGER. (2021). Girls Education Roadmap. https://apppack-app-eger-prod-publics3bucket-elt8wyly48zp.s3.amazonaws.com/documents/Girls_Education_Roadmap_2021_Report.pdf

El Ashmawy, Nadeen; Muhab, Norhan and Osman, Adam. (2020). “Improving Female Labor Force Participation in MENA.” The Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL). November 2, 2020. https://www.povertyactionlab.org/blog/11-2-20/improving-female-labor-force-participation-mena

Erman, Alvina; De Vries Robbe, Sophie Anne; Thies, Stephan Fabian; Kabir, Kayenat; Maruo, Mirai. (2021). Gender Dimensions of Disaster Risk and Resilience: Existing Evidence. World Bank, Washington, DC. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35202

Haig, G. L. J.; Öpengin, E.; Hellinger, M. & Motschenbacher, H. (2015). “Gender in Kurdish: Structural and socio-cultural dimensions.” In: Gender Across Languages (Vol. 36, pp. 247–276). John Benjamins Publishing Company. https://doi.org/10.1075/impact.36.10hai

Hussain, S. F. (2024). Protecting women’s agency in the Middle East: Interventions and reforms to ensure women’s rights. CWS Policy Insights No. 1. Center for War Studies.

Khan, A. R.; Ratele, K. & Arendse, N. (2020). “Men, Suicide, and Covid-19: Critical Masculinity Analyses and Interventions.” Postdigital Science and Education, 2(3), 651–656. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42438-020-00152-1

Levtov, R.; van der Gaag, N.; Greene, M.; Kaufman, M. & G. Barker. (2015). “State of the World’s Fathers: A Men Care Advocacy Publication.” Washington, DC: Promundo, Rutgers, Save the Children, Sonke Gender Justice, and the Men Engage Alliance. https://www.fatherhood.gov/sites/default/files/resource_files/e000003287.pdf

Payton, J. (2019). Honour and Political Economy of Marriage. Rutgers University Press.

Piscopo, Jennifer. (2020). The Impact of Women’s Leadership in Public Life and Political Decision-Making. Prepared for UN Women’s Expert Group Meeting for the 65th Session of the Committee on the Status of Women. New York: UN Women.

Ruba, S. (2010). Transnational Public Spheres from ‘Above’ and from Below’, Feminist Networks across the Middle East and Europe, Transnational Public Spheres.

UN Women. (2018). “Facts and Figures: Economic Empowerment.”  https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/economic-empowerment/facts-and-figures

UN Women. (2019). Women’s Full and Effective Participation and Decision-Making in Public Life, as Well as the Elimination of Violence, for Achieving Gender Equality and the Empowerment of All Women and Girls. New York: UN Women, 2019: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3898140?ln=en

UNFPA. (2016). Child Marriage in Kurdistan Region-Iraq. https://iraq.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Child%20Marriage%20Broucher%20English%20Final%20covers%206.pdf

Waylen, Georgina. (2014). “Strengthening women’s agency is crucial to underpinning representative institutions with strong foundations of participation.” Politics & Gender, 10, no. 4: 495–523.

World Food Program USA. (2022). “Top 6 Reasons Women Are Hungrier Than Men Today.” https://www.wfpusa.org/articles/women-in-crisis-top-ways-women-are-hungrier/

[1] Funding Details: This project was funded by UKRI, Grant Number: EP/X024857/1, carried out by Shilan Fuad Hussain at the Department of Law and Social Science, Middlesex University, United Kingdom.

[2] Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ), published by CEDAW – UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Shadow Report on Iraq submitted by Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ) to the Committee of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 74th Session; 21 October – 8 November 2019; Geneva, Switzerland’, 10 October 2019. United Nations Population Fund, UN Children’s Fund, UN Women, ‘Protecting Girls in Iraq from Female Genital Mutilation’, 6 February 2019, from: https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/protecting-girls-iraq-female-genital-mutilation-enarku. The United Nations have put forward multiple documents on the elimination of violence against women, including forced marriages, e.g., the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (UN Doc. A/Res/48/104). United Nations Statistics Division. United Nations Global SDG Database. Data retrieved July 2022. From: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/dataportal.

Photo: Shutterstock.

Dr. Smajljaj: Sunday’s Elections Will Be Decisive for the Future of Democracy in Kosovo

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

As Kosovo heads into a decisive election, Dr. Avdi Smajljaj warns of its significance for the country’s democratic trajectory. “The upcoming elections this Sunday will be crucial in determining the future of democracy in Kosovo,” he explains, emphasizing the risk of increasing authoritarian tendencies. Meanwhile, tensions with the EU and US complicate Kosovo’s international standing. “Kosovo’s statehood remains heavily dependent on US support,” he adds, particularly with the uncertainty of second Trump presidency. With growing populism and strained foreign relations, Kosovo’s future hangs in the balance, making this election a turning point for its domestic and international course.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an insightful discussion with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Avdi Smajljaj, a lecturer in Political Science and International Relations at Epoka University, Albania, highlights the significance of Kosovo’s upcoming elections, its evolving relationship with the European Union, and the critical role of US support—particularly in light of a potential second Trump presidency. With Kosovo still in the process of democratic consolidation, the elections this Sunday will be a pivotal moment. “The upcoming elections this Sunday will be crucial in determining the future of democracy in Kosovo. If opposition parties manage to return to power, either alone or through coalitions, this could help prevent further steps toward authoritarianism,” Dr. Smajljaj explains.

A key player in Kosovo’s current political landscape is Vetëvendosje, the ruling party, which has transitioned from an anti-establishment movement to the dominant force in government. Since gaining power, Vetëvendosje has maintained a populist rhetoric that emphasizes anti-corruption, sovereignty, and resistance to foreign interference. However, Dr. Smajljaj notes that the party has also consolidated its control over state institutions, mirroring some of the very practices it once opposed. “The government has increasingly relied on ethno-nationalist mobilization, particularly in northern Kosovo, to maintain public support despite governance failures,” he explains. The party’s initial promises of justice, meritocracy, and institutional reform have been overshadowed by its own efforts to replace existing officials with loyalists, raising concerns about democratic backsliding.

Vetëvendosje’s approach has also influenced Kosovo’s relations with international actors, particularly its stance toward the EU and US. While the government officially supports European integration, its unilateral actions—especially in northern Kosovo—have drawn criticism from both Brussels and Washington. “The Kosovo government has taken what it describes as unilateral actions, leading to diplomatic consequences,” Dr. Smajljaj states. These tensions have resulted in EU sanctions and strained relations with the Biden administration, fueling speculation about how a second Trump presidency might approach Vetëvendosje’s governance style. With populism shaping both domestic politics and foreign policy, the party’s future role will be a critical factor in determining Kosovo’s stability and international standing.

Beyond domestic concerns, Kosovo’s international standing remains highly dependent on the United States, which has historically been its most influential ally. However, a second Trump administration could alter the dynamics of US engagement in the Balkans. “Kosovo’s statehood remains heavily dependent on US support… It remains heavily dependent on increasing the number of recognitions, heavily dependent on possible membership in NATO, and in EU membership as well,” he states. US troops within KFOR serve as the primary security guarantee in the region, and any change in American priorities could have serious consequences. “If there were a decision to minimize US troops in Kosovo or to withdraw them, this would be bad news for the prosperity of Kosovo as a state,” he warns.

Dr. Smajljaj also reflects on past US diplomatic efforts, particularly under the Trump administration, which proposed alternative approaches to resolving the Kosovo-Serbia dispute. “Just before Trump left office, the Washington Agreement was signed, but this agreement was completely ignored by the new government in Kosovo,” he notes. There was also discussion of a controversial land swap deal between Kosovo and Serbia, which, according to some reports, could have influenced Russia and China’s stance on Kosovo’s UN membership. With Trump’s unpredictability and “America First” approach, a second Trump term could bring either new diplomatic strategies or reduced engagement, potentially leaving Kosovo in a precarious position.

At the same time, Kosovo’s relationship with the European Union remains strained. While Kosovo officially supports EU integration, tensions with Brussels and dissatisfaction with the EU-facilitated dialogue process have led to what Dr. Smajljaj calls “implicit Euroscepticism.” “Currently, Kosovo is under sanctions from the European Union, and the United States has consistently blamed the Kosovo government for unilateral actions,” he explains. With both the US and EU at crossroads in their foreign policy approaches, Kosovo faces an uncertain future, making the upcoming elections and potential shifts in global politics more consequential than ever.

In this interview, Dr. Smajljaj provides a critical analysis of Kosovo’s political landscape, the rise of populism, and the uncertain role of international actors, particularly in the face of shifting US policies under a potential second Trump presidency.

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj, a lecturer in Political Science and International Relations at Epoka University, Albania.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Avdi Smajljaj with some edits.

Populism in Kosovo: A Persistent Force Since the 1990s Democratic Transition

Professor Smajljaj, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How has populism shaped political discourse in Kosovo, and which parties or leaders have utilized populist rhetoric most effectively?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: Actually, a dose of populism has almost always been present since the introduction of pluralism and democracy in the 1990s. However, it was a sort of soft populism, mostly found in the rhetoric of politicians trying to mobilize people through specific words and expressions.

More recently, since 2019 and especially in 2021, one of the major parties has shifted from this soft populism to a much harder form. This transformation is evident in its strong anti-establishment stance, which is a key characteristic of hard populism. One of the main slogans of the party was that they were going to build the “Third Republic,” referring to the consecutive developments of the French Revolution, where one republic replaced another. This idea aimed to create a new establishment in Kosovo while also dividing society into two groups, another defining feature of populism—the “corrupt elite” versus the “good people.”

Another feature of this party is that its leader, associated with the Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination Movement), initially hesitated to call it a party. They claimed to be a movement, positioning themselves as a social movement rather than a political party. However, they are indeed a political party, as they contest elections and seek governmental power.

Regarding ideology, if we categorize populism into left and right, this movement incorporates elements of leftist ideology, but it is mostly a mixed form of populism. On the leftist side, they have pursued policies related to redistribution, though at a relatively low level. For example, they implemented social policies such as small monthly payments for children, starting at €10 and later increasing to €20. Additionally, they provided financial support for mothers who gave birth. Although these measures gained them considerable public support, their primary appeal stemmed from their strong anti-establishment stance.

The party also initially promoted an ethno-nationalist agenda, advocating for the creation of a unified Albanian state encompassing Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, and other regions with Albanian populations. Furthermore, they were strongly opposed to the role of the international community in Kosovo. However, Kosovo’s statehood relied significantly on international involvement, given its legal status and the complexities of the Yugoslav break-up. Despite this, due to their ethno-nationalist ideology, they rejected such external influence.

Since coming to power—now almost completing four years in office—they have somewhat toned down their ethno-nationalist rhetoric. However, actions taken in northern Kosovo, where the government still struggles to assert its authority, have further fueled ethnic nationalism. These actions have also hindered efforts to integrate the Serbian community in northern Kosovo into state institutions and recognize Kosovo’s authority. In many ways, these policies align with the ethno-nationalist ideology that has defined the Self-Determination Movement for a long time.

Rising Euroscepticism Among the Masses

How does Vetëvendosje’s populism differ from other populist movements in the Western Balkans and Europe, particularly in terms of its nationalist and leftist ideological blend?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: If we first examine populism in the Western Balkans, I think populism in this region is still primarily at the level of rhetoric. Excluding, perhaps, the case of Republika Srpska in Bosnia, where Milorad Dodik’s political party is also an anti-establishment party that seeks secession from Bosnia—either to become an independent state or to join Serbia—populism in other parts of the Western Balkans remains largely rhetorical. At various levels, we see populism as a strategy for gaining votes rather than a direct challenge to the establishment.

Unlike in some other cases, populist movements in the Western Balkans are not actively fighting against institutions such as prosecutors’ offices or courts, nor are they attempting to blur the separation of powers. However, as Kosovo is still a developing democracy, these institutions remain in the process of consolidation. What we are currently witnessing in Kosovo is an attempt by the government to exert greater control over these institutions.

When I refer to “Valence Populism,” I mean the kind of populism that focuses on fighting corruption and state capture. One of the main slogans of the ruling party was that the state had been captured by the opposition parties, which governed for around 20 years, and that they came to power to combat this. However, in practice, they are engaging in similar behaviors—removing existing officials and replacing them with their own loyalists.

In relation to populism in Western Europe, which is often linked to xenophobia—particularly anti-migrant sentiment—this is not an issue in Kosovo. We are not overwhelmed by migrants, though Kosovo may occasionally serve as a transit route. Migration is not a major political issue requiring attention in the way it is in Western Europe.

Regarding populism and Euroscepticism, which is a significant issue in Europe, I would say that there is a degree of hidden Euroscepticism in Kosovo. Why hidden? If we examine Eurobarometer data, which consistently measures public attitudes toward the EU, Kosovo ranks highest in support of European integration. However, the current government, through its ethno-nationalist ideology and its actions in northern Kosovo over the past four years to extend state authority, has contributed to a form of implicit Euroscepticism.

This sentiment is particularly tied to the role of the European Union in the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, with the EU often being accused of taking sides—favoring Serbia rather than maintaining neutrality or supporting Kosovo. As a result, there is a growing dose of Euroscepticism at the masses’ level. However, I would still classify it as implicit, because no party dares to openly oppose EU membership. 

Vetëvendosje’s Populist Strategy: Electoral Success and Governance Contradictions

“No Negotiation – Self-Determination!” spray-painted overnight in a clandestine operation on a concrete structure near a highly frequented pedestrian bridge in Peja, Kosovo, on March 12, 2006. Photo: Shutterstock.

To what extent has populist rhetoric contributed to the electoral success of parties like Vetëvendosje, and how has their governance aligned with or diverged from their populist promises?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: Populist rhetoric has played a significant role, and the most extreme example was the polarization of society into two highly opposed groups—Vetëvendosje on one side and all other parties grouped together on the other. Their rhetoric suggested that the previous governments had completely destroyed the state over the past 20 years. However, this was not entirely true, as during that period, Kosovo gained its freedom and established statehood, which it did not have before.

Nonetheless, the narrative focused on the claim that institutions had been captured by previous ruling parties, that corruption was rampant, and that organized crime was deeply entrenched. Through this rhetoric, Vetëvendosje managed to gain significant popular support. Kosovo has a multi-party system with a single electoral district and a proportional system, which usually makes it difficult for any single party to govern alone. However, in 2021, against expectations, Vetëvendosje was able to defeat all other previous ruling parties, primarily due to its strong polarization strategy—portraying itself as the force for good and the opposition as corrupt and evil.

Vetëvendosje campaigned on promises of justice, meritocracy, the rule of law, and equal opportunities for all. A key aspect of their platform was employment reform, claiming that, under previous governments, securing a job in public institutions or state-owned enterprises required party affiliation. These promises resonated with voters, allowing Vetëvendosje to win more than 50% of the vote—an extraordinary achievement in a proportional multi-party system.

However, after coming to power, their actions deviated from these promises. If we refer to Jan-Werner Müller’s theory on how populists “colonize” institutions upon gaining power, Vetëvendosje followed a similar pattern. They used all possible legal means, including legislative amendments, to place their own people in key institutional positions—essentially engaging in the same practices they had previously criticized. This has disappointed many of their supporters, who had voted for them based on their pledges to bring justice, equal opportunities, and institutional reform.

To compensate for their shortcomings in fulfilling campaign promises, the government has increasingly relied on ethno-nationalist mobilization, particularly in northern Kosovo. By invoking wartime experiences between Albanians and Serbs, they have sought to maintain public support despite governance failures. However, rather than breaking from past practices, their governance has, in many ways, mirrored the actions of previous ruling parties.

Sunday’s Elections Will Be a Defining Moment for Kosovo’s Democratic Future

Your article, titled “Populism in a Never-Ending and Multiple System Transformation in Kosovo: The Case of Vetëvendosje,” argues that Kosovo’s incomplete democratic transformation has provided fertile ground for populism. In what ways has Vetëvendosje capitalized on this, and do you see any indications that it may shift towards authoritarianism as a governing party?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: As a never-ending transition—yes, I would say the entire Western Balkans is experiencing this process. The Western Balkans started transitioning in the early 1990s with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and now we have entered the fourth decade of democratization.

In Kosovo, the process began a bit later due to the war. However, we are now in the third decade of democratization, following the country’s liberation. During this period, several studies have discussed a regression toward authoritarianism, and some argue that we are witnessing a transition back to authoritarian rule. Across the Western Balkans, we see the dominance of single-party rule. For example, Serbia has a dominant party system, and the same trend can now be observed in Albania.

Currently, the only factor still maintaining multi-party systems in the region is the presence of ethnic parties. These parties, representing specific ethnic groups, remain significant in preserving pluralism. In the case of Kosovo, the upcoming elections this Sunday will be crucial in determining the future of its democracy. If opposition parties manage to return to power, either alone or through coalitions, this could help prevent further steps toward authoritarianism.

Additionally, as Kosovo is a young democracy and not yet fully consolidated, its institutions are fragile and weak, making them highly vulnerable to authoritarian tendencies—especially when faced with a government that has more than 50% of the vote. This, combined with the country’s political culture and its historical lack of democratic governance, has contributed to the persistence of authoritarian political values within society.

For example, during the current electoral campaign, there have been reports of people referring to the leader of Vetëvendosje, Albin Kurti, as a “father” figure. Such rhetoric is an authoritarian signal. Moreover, while Kosovo’s institutions were already weak—partly because they had been captured by previous ruling parties—this has created an opportunity for the current government to consolidate its control over institutions.

This institutional takeover has been evident in the restructuring of governing boards in public companies, changes across all ministries where possible, and amendments to the law on civil servants. These legal changes facilitate the replacement of existing civil servants with individuals loyal to the ruling party. Additionally, there has been an open attack by the Prime Minister on the judiciary and prosecution.

For instance, a corruption case was under investigation in one of the ministries, and the prosecutor sent an invitation for the Prime Minister to be interviewed as a witness. However, he refused to comply, stating that the prosecutor could come to his office at a designated time instead. This incident is just one of many indicators of the government’s tendency to undermine or disregard the separation of powers, which is essential for democracy to function properly.

Democracy in Kosovo and the broader Western Balkans remains fragile and susceptible to regression. It still heavily relies on international support. However, with ongoing changes in the US administration and the EU facing uncertainty, if external support for democratization in the region declines, it will provide further opportunities for populist parties to reinforce authoritarian regimes.

Kosovo’s Populist Government Is Undermining Its EU Future

Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, speaks to the media after a meeting in Brussels, Belgium, on February 27, 2023. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

How do populist movements in Kosovo interact with the European Union and other international actors? Does populism present a challenge to Kosovo’s European integration?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: I would say yes, it presents a challenge in relation to the European Union and also to the US, which are the two main sponsors of democratization in the region and in Kosovo as well.

The current government has mostly dealt with them with a sovereignist attitude, claiming that Kosovo is a sovereign country while downplaying the role of the international community in building the state of Kosovo. This has led to unilateral actions, particularly in the northern part of Kosovo, which have significantly affected relations between the Kosovo government, the European Union, and the United States. At one point, the European Union even imposed sanctions on Kosovo due to these actions.

Of course, it is well known that the Serbian government often uses the Serbian community in Kosovo to prevent their integration into Kosovo’s institutions, effectively trying to sabotage Kosovo’s statehood. However, the international community has maintained that such issues should be resolved through dialogue and with their involvement. Instead, the Kosovo government has taken what it describes as unilateral actions, leading to diplomatic consequences.

As a result, Kosovo is currently under sanctions from the European Union, and the United States has consistently criticized the Kosovo government for these actions. This has led to repeated statements by US special representatives for the region, expressing that such actions complicate US efforts to advocate for Kosovo’s international recognition. The government seems to have ignored the fact that Kosovo is recognized by fewer than two-thirds of UN member states—approximately 100 to 117, though some recognitions have been withdrawn or frozen, making the exact number unclear. However, this number is not sufficient for Kosovo to become a UN member, which is a crucial step for consolidating its statehood at the international level. Without US and EU support, achieving this goal would be nearly impossible. While other countries around the world support Kosovo, they do not have the influence that the US and EU have in convincing other states to recognize Kosovo. This recognition is vital for Kosovo’s international legitimacy and statehood.

Furthermore, such a populist government delays the process of European integration. The main criteria for joining the European Union include democracy, separation of powers, and strong institutions. However, if there is a tendency to capture institutions, weaken the state, and blur the lines between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches—particularly between the executive and judiciary—this represents a setback in meeting the EU’s membership criteria.

Declaratively, the government tries to appear active in the EU integration process. For example, when the EU introduced the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, the Kosovo government quickly submitted its reform agenda. However, if we look at actual developments, there are actions being taken that undermine progress in meeting the EU’s accession requirements.

The Second Trump Presidency Could Leave Kosovo in a Precarious Position

French KFOR soldiers guard the Brnjak border crossing around September 2011 in Kosovska Mitrovica. Photo: Nikola Fific.

Given Donald Trump’s “America First” approach and past skepticism towards US commitments abroad, how do you foresee a second Trump presidency impacting Kosovo’s relationship with the US, particularly in terms of security guarantees and diplomatic support?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: I would say that the Trump administration is still consolidating itself in terms of priorities at the global level. As we see now, new ideas are emerging, and issues that were previously top priorities are being revised—such as the role of USAID, for example. USAID has been one of the main supporters of the democratization process in the region.

I would say it is still a bit early to predict exactly how a second Trump presidency would approach the region, including Kosovo. We are entering a highly unpredictable period. However, what is clear for now is that Kosovo’s statehood remains heavily dependent on US support. This includes increasing the number of recognitions for Kosovo’s independence and potential membership in NATO. US influence also plays a crucial role in Kosovo’s EU membership prospects, given the relationship between the US and the EU, and Washington’s ability to encourage its allies to support Kosovo’s integration.

Furthermore, US troops stationed in Kosovo as part of KFOR are the primary guarantors of security in the region. Their presence plays a crucial role in preventing any potential conflict, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia. Serbia continues to challenge Kosovo’s sovereignty, particularly in the northern part of the country, by leveraging the loyalty of local Serbs to Belgrade.

If, for instance, a decision were made to reduce or withdraw US troops from Kosovo, or if Kosovo were no longer a priority for the US government, this would be very bad news for Kosovo’s stability and prospects as a state. While there are other international partners willing to assist, they do not have the same capacity as the US.

The role of the US in NATO’s intervention to stop ethnic cleansing in 1999 was vital. Additionally, US support was crucial in giving Kosovo the green light to declare independence and encouraging many states worldwide to recognize it. The highest number of recognitions for Kosovo’s independence came as a result of US diplomatic efforts. If Kosovo is no longer among the priorities of the US, this would create a bleak future for the long-term prospects of Kosovo as a state.

Kosovo’s Statehood Remains Heavily Dependent on US Support

And lastly, Professor Smajljaj, as you mentioned, Kosovo has relied heavily on strong U.S. backing in its international recognition efforts and dialogue with Serbia. If Trump were to reduce US engagement in the Balkans or push for a different diplomatic strategy, what potential risks and opportunities might arise for Kosovo’s international standing and regional stability?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: As I have already said, Kosovo’s statehood remains heavily dependent on US support. Currently, there is an agreement known as the Franco-German plan, along with an annex to this plan, which Kosovo and Serbia agreed upon in Brussels and Ohrid as a potential solution to the ongoing dispute. Up until now, the US has supported this agreement, particularly under the Democratic administration when it was reached. However, the agreement has not yet been fully implemented by either party, with both sides often stating that they have accepted it but have not formally signed it.

At present, this agreement serves as the primary framework for both the European Union and the US in resolving the Kosovo-Serbia issue. One of the key elements of the agreement is the creation of an association of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo, which, under the Brussels Agreement, would grant a degree of self-management to the Serbian community. However, the exact definition of “self-management” remains to be determined within the statute of this association.

With the new US administration, I believe it is still somewhat early to determine the direction of its policies. The government is still in the process of consolidating itself and is likely reviewing various international engagements. I hope that in this revision process, Kosovo remains a priority for the US government because American support is vital—not only for Kosovo’s international recognition and diplomatic efforts but also for preventing potential conflicts in the region. US backing is also crucial for the consolidation of Kosovo’s statehood, increasing the number of recognitions, gaining membership in international organizations, and, if possible, securing a seat at the United Nations. If Kosovo were to achieve UN membership, it would no longer be viewed as a contested state by a significant number of countries, thereby fully legitimizing its statehood on the international stage.

US support has played a key role in Kosovo’s diplomatic advancements. For instance, just before Trump left office in his first administration, the Washington Agreement was signed. However, this agreement was completely ignored by the new government in Kosovo. One of its outcomes was the recognition of Kosovo by Israel, marking a significant diplomatic achievement. While the Washington Agreement did not propose a final settlement, it was designed to enhance dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, potentially paving the way for a comprehensive resolution. It remains to be seen whether this agreement will be revisited in the future.

Additionally, during the Trump administration, there was also discussion of a potential land swap proposal, involving the exchange of the northern part of Kosovo for areas in the Presheva Valley, where Albanians reside. This proposal was ultimately dismissed by the current government, but at the time, there was speculation that such a deal could have persuaded Russia and China—two permanent members of the UN Security Council—to support Kosovo’s UN membership. However, there was also strong opposition, with some labeling the proposal as a betrayal, arguing that it amounted to giving land to Serbia.

It remains uncertain whether such proposals could resurface under a second Trump administration, or if entirely new options might emerge. As I have already mentioned, we are in a period of highly unpredictable developments, making it very difficult to foresee the exact direction that US policy toward Kosovo and the Balkans might take.

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić, a political scientist and Scientific Advisor at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia.

Dr. Šelo Šabić: If the US Under Trump Ceases to Be the Anchor of Stability in the Balkans, the Region Will Wake Up to a Different Future

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić discusses the shifting geopolitical landscape of the Balkans, emphasizing the critical role of the United States in maintaining regional stability. She highlights concerns over the potential impact of Donald Trump’s second term, arguing that if the US withdraws from its stabilizing role, the region could face new uncertainties. Dr. Šelo Šabić also explores Croatia’s position within the EU and NATO, the rise of populist leaders, and the influence of Russia and China, offering a comprehensive analysis of the region’s evolving political dynamics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies, Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić, a political scientist and Scientific Advisor at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia, shared her insights on the evolving political landscape of the Balkans. She discussed the role of populist leaders, the future of European integration, and Croatia’s position within NATO and the EU, particularly under President Zoran Milanović.

Dr. Šelo Šabić addressed international concerns regarding Milanović’s rhetoric, especially in relation to NATO, Ukraine, and EU foreign policy. While some accuse him of being a “pro-Russian puppet,” she emphasized: “I always wait to see more evidence that Milanović is a pro-Russian player. He has made statements that could lead to such a conclusion, particularly in discussions about Ukraine, NATO’s engagement in Ukraine, and NATO enlargement concerning Sweden and Finland’s membership. But I have not seen concrete evidence that he could significantly steer Croatian politics away from the European Union or cause a fundamental shift in Croatia’s foreign policy.”

When discussing Milanović’s record-breaking electoral success, she attributed it to his personal appeal rather than an ideological shift: “He did appeal broadly to Croatian citizens. He comes from a social-democratic background, but he also has a distinct personal political character and a very specific way of communicating. This is something that a majority of traditional citizens respect and accept.” She further explained that “while Milanović ran in the parliamentary elections and did not win, citizens overwhelmingly chose him as President. This suggests that they see him in that specific role, rather than as a political leader shaping government policy.”

Dr. Šelo Šabić also reflected on the potential consequences of Donald Trump’s second term as US President, cautioning that a radical shift could have serious implications for the region. “Some leaders in the Balkans are very hopeful, while others are fearful of what a new Trump administration might bring. The United States has been, for the last 30-plus years, a key force in stabilizing this region. If that changes—if the United States ceases to be the anchor of stability in this region—then we will wake up to a different future. I sincerely hope this does not happen and that peace is maintained in the Balkans.”

Beyond Milanović and transatlantic relations, Dr. Šelo Šabić also examined Croatia’s role in EU enlargement, the rise of populist movements, and the growing influence of Russia and China in the region. Her analysis provides a striking perspective on the challenges facing Croatia and the Western Balkans today.

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić, a political scientist and Scientific Advisor at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić with some edits.

The Balkans Turned from Refugee Solidarity to Migration Securitization

Dr. Šabić, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do populist narratives in the Balkans leverage the refugee crisis to deepen divisions and reinforce ethno-nationalism, particularly in relation to the securitization of migration? What role does the portrayal of refugees as cultural or economic threats play in populist movements within the Balkan region, and how does this compare to similar strategies in Western Europe?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I will try to give a short answer to this complex question. There are three key elements in responding to your question. The first is the personal experience of many Balkan citizens from the 1990s, when they were refugees and displaced persons due to the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Many people still have personal reflections and direct experiences from that time.

The second element is that, since the refugee crisis in 2015, we have seen—at first a more humanitarian or solidarity-based response from most countries in the Western Balkans and Southeast Europe, including Croatia. However, this later transformed into a more securitized and border-focused approach to migration. This shift was also a result of the European Union’s policy and approach, which prioritizes border protection, prevents irregular crossings, and increasingly lacks both the capacity and the willingness to process asylum claims with empathy.

The third emerging element is the trend of new immigrants as foreign workers. Like many other countries in the European Union (EU) and beyond, these nations face a labor shortage. This shift is creating additional social, political, and economic challenges for societies that are unprepared for such changes. The transformation is happening without real policy discussions, and I see that as a problem.

How has the rise of populist leaders in the Balkans influenced policymaking during and after the refugee crisis, especially regarding border security and the treatment of asylum seekers?

A group of war refugees walks through a cornfield on the Serbia-Croatia border on November 3, 2015, as they seek passage to the EU. Many are Syrian refugees fleeing conflict. Photo: Ajdin Kamber.

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: As I mentioned earlier, most governments at the time—except for a few, particularly in the Western Balkans—took a similar stance. Without delving too much into history, if we focus on Croatia, for instance, the country demonstrated a humanitarian approach by accepting, assisting, and facilitating the transit of refugees.

Our concept of humanitarianism was largely defined by our ability to provide aid and ensure safe passage. Even today, most Western Balkan nations remain transit countries for refugees, except for certain foreign workers who settle. In general, refugees continue to move through these countries toward wealthier European nations.

Currently, a radical anti-migrant political force has not fully taken root. However, it is gaining traction due to several factors: the EU’s securitization policies, populist narratives, and the arrival of new legal migrants. The lack of public discourse, education, and engagement with the local population has led many to perceive these migrants as a threat. This is further amplified by the rise of a broader global anti-liberal discourse.

Why EU Rule of Law Reforms Falter in the Western Balkans

You argue that the underlying gap between massive formal transfers and shallow or reversible enforcement of EU rules is particularly evident in the area of the rule of law (RoL) across the Western Balkan countries. Can you explain why this is the case?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: You are referring to an article that I wrote with my colleague, Roald Elbassani, where we compared Croatia and Albania. However, the main theme has been explored by many different researchers and authors.

We see evidence of this issue in a number of what one could call new EU Member States, although by now they have had quite a long membership. The idea has been that EU accession transforms candidate states, and once they fulfill the criteria and conditions set before them, they will reform in a way that enables them to become fully functional members of the European Union.

However, the problem lies in these countries’ low level of democratic development. Many have undergone post-war transitions, as well as post-socialist or post-communist political and economic transitions—from a collective to a market economy—along with dealing with wars and broader global changes. These countries still need assistance in democratic development. At the same time, the EU is facing its own internal problems, where, despite pledges, the promise of enlargement remains distant.

Both sides publicly commit to the process, yet in reality, they remain reserved and not structurally or objectively dedicated to the goal of reform. Many of my colleagues say that the EU pretends it wants to enlarge and admit new members, while candidate countries pretend they genuinely want to reform to join the EU. This creates a kind of “dance of pretense.”

For many reasons, this applies not only to Western Balkan countries but also to any other potential EU candidate states. The EU, as a mechanism for sharing values—normative values of peace, dialogue, cooperation, and solidarity, along with the four key freedoms—has a crucial role to play. These goals remain essential for the sustainability of the EU itself. Hopefully, the EU will be able to incorporate new members in a way that strengthens rather than weakens it.

What has Brexit’s impact been on the Europeanization of Croatia’s foreign and defense policies and the possible advancement or undermining of its Europeanization process?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Limited. The only fun fact, let’s say, is that when Croatia joined the European Union in 2013, the pre-campaigning for Brexit had already begun. Very soon after, there was a referendum, and a few years later, the United Kingdom officially left the European Union. For Euro-enthusiasts in Croatia, this was hurtful because we were joining a union—an organization that had been the country’s key political goal since gaining independence—while a prominent member was departing. However, in many other aspects, bilaterally, Croatia and the UK were not deeply entangled, so Brexit did not significantly diminish or decrease Croatia’s European aspirations.

‘Euroscepticism in Croatia Is Not a Significant Political Force’

Street view in the city center of Zagreb, Croatia. Photo: Arsenie Krasnevsky.

How have elite and public Euroscepticism in Croatia evolved towards key EU policies such as Eurozone membership, enlargement, common security and defense, and the rule of law? How do populist parties and rhetoric leverage narratives of national identity, sovereignty, and economic or cultural anxieties to shape public opinion and resistance to deeper European integration, both domestically and in comparison with other Balkan countries?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I think this question is a prospective one, and we will see whether stronger Eurosceptic political parties emerge. In 2016, for example, there was a short period of six months when we had a different parliamentary makeup, with more right-wing or even far-right populist Eurosceptic parties. These parties were not anti-European but rather Eurosceptic. However, this was short-lived.

Currently, all our key political parties remain committed to EU membership. Our key political figures, including the President and the Prime Minister, are pro-EU and pro-NATO. Despite political differences in ideology or preferences and the natural competition among political actors, there are not many significant differences regarding EU membership.

It will be interesting to see if changes occur due to evolving realities within the European Union or, more broadly, in transatlantic relations. However, at present, Euroscepticism in Croatia is not a significant political force. That said, it does not mean that it may not become one in the future.

How does the rise of conservative ideologies and nationalist rhetoric in Croatia reflect broader populist trends, and what role does EU membership play in either amplifying or mitigating these tendencies?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: As in any other EU Member State and even in candidate countries, every society is pluralistic, and we have seen trends of polarization in many societies. Croatia is no exception. Polarization is not a novelty here—it is evident in Germany, France, the results of the American elections, and elsewhere in Europe and the world.

Regarding how EU membership influences these forces, yes, it fosters liberal thought, but it also strengthens conservative thought, as both are strongly present within the European Union. In that sense, liberals, centrists, conservatives, and right-wing individuals all have their interlocutors in other EU Member States and in the European Parliament.

‘Croatia Must Engage More Substantially in Enlargement Discussions’

How has the interaction between populist rhetoric and Euroscepticism in Croatia impacted its role as an advocate for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Croatia is in the minority within the European Union in advocating for further enlargement, as most Member States and their citizens are generally against it. The UK was actually an exception compared to some other wealthier EU Member States, and in that sense, Brexit was a loss for enlargement. However, the issue I see with Croatian support is that while Croatia is particularly keen on supporting the enlargement of the Western Balkans—specifically the six Western Balkan countries—it needs to engage more actively in the process.

I’m trying to find the right way to phrase this: it is one thing to say, “We want the EU to expand,” but we must recognize that one of the key problems with enlargement is the issue of internal decision-making within the European Union. If a country wants to see the EU admit new members, it should also be willing to discuss the rules—or even consider changing them—regarding decision-making in the EU. For example, if we agree on qualified majority voting, this could alleviate fears of inefficiency and blockades caused by Member States using veto powers. This would lead to a more constructive discussion on enlargement. Croatia remains largely silent on this topic, and I believe we need to engage more substantially in this discussion. If we want to defend and realize our interests, we must also acknowledge the interests of other members—this is still lacking.

What are the key factors driving the rise of populist movements in Croatia, and how do these factors differ from those in Western Europe?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: When you say “populist movements,” it is a broad term, and definitions may vary. However, if I consider political parties that exhibit at least some similarities to those seen elsewhere, certain trends emerge. We have a strong conservative ideology, with a significant influence from the Catholic Church, particularly in terms of upholding and protecting values, norms, and cultural aspects of traditional society—such as family values and language.

Additionally, as I mentioned, the anti-migrant narrative is not yet as prominent in Croatia. While it is developing, it has not been central to populist ideology thus far. One additional factor that may not be as prevalent elsewhere is the legacy of the wars in this part of Europe at the end of the 20th century. There are still many unresolved issues with neighboring countries, and this remains a major driver of populist rhetoric, particularly for citizens who feel these issues strongly on an emotional level.

Reckoning with the Past Is the Only Path to Lasting Stability

To what extent do populist leaders in the Balkans utilize nationalism and historical narratives to consolidate their power, and how does this impact regional stability?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: This builds on your previous question. Ethnic hatred, ethnic distrust among different nations, and exclusive nationalism as an ideology fueled the contested issues in the former Yugoslavia, ultimately leading to violent wars. Even today, we still face unresolved problems and challenges from three decades ago that continue to burden our present reality.

Our societies still need to go through a phase of reckoning, and I hope we will take that path without new conflicts—either in Europe or in our region. This path should involve confronting the past, investing in dialogue with former enemies, and working toward reconciliation and peace with our neighbors and within our own societies.

We can continue insisting on our own version of the truth and our own rights, but if we do so without making an effort to establish channels of communication, understanding, and dialogue with those we disagree with, we will remain closed societies.

The whole idea of the European Union was founded on the decision that wars should no longer be used as instruments for resolving disputes, and I truly hope that one day, Balkan societies will mature enough to follow this path.

How have external actors, such as the European Union, Russia, and China, influenced the trajectory of populist politics in Balkan countries?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: We have already mentioned the EU, as there is a reflection, communication, and sharing of political ideologies within the European Union. Different parties or political families in the EU have their counterparts in this region. Some of these align closely with the political ideology and worldview coming from China and Russia.

They are not necessarily all in the same category, but there are overlaps. I am not sure how much detail you want me to go into regarding Balkan politics, but let’s say that, as elsewhere in Europe and within the European Union, in the Balkans—particularly in Croatia—there are overlaps, similarities, or at least a certain level of sympathy and understanding for different positions in relation to mainstream European politics.

How have Croatian far-right parties employed populist strategies to address economic grievances, such as rising costs of living and inflation, and how effective has this been in broadening their appeal beyond traditional nationalist bases?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Not successfully—not because these issues are unimportant, but rather because, somewhat unexpectedly, Croatia is currently experiencing a relatively favorable financial situation due to European funds. In this financial framework, Croatia has received substantial support from the European Union, leading to salary increases and higher public spending, including investments in reconstruction and various other projects.

Inflation is a concern, but so far, economic hardship has not become a dominant issue in Croatia. However, this does not mean it won’t in the future, particularly when EU funding is reduced. This is something to monitor closely, as Croatia faces several negative economic trends, including demographic decline, an aging population, deindustrialization, and a heavy reliance on tourism as one of its key industries. Given the impact of climate change and the volatile geopolitical environment, tourism remains a highly sensitive sector. These factors make the economic outlook something to watch closely.

‘Milanović’s Victory Is Unquestionable In Terms of Legitimacy’

President of Croatia, Zoran Milanović, addresses a press conference in Ploče, Croatia, on September 14, 2024. Photo: Jure Divich.

Zoran Milanović achieved the highest electoral score for a presidential candidate since Croatia’s independence in 1991. What factors contributed to this remarkable success during his second term?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Several factors contributed. He appealed broadly to Croatian citizens. While he comes from a social-democratic political background, he also has a distinct personal political character that he brings to the public and a very specific way of communicating with people. This is something that a majority of traditional citizens respect and accept.

Additionally, the Croatian Constitution mandates that the President is popularly elected but holds limited power, as most authority lies with the government in Croatia’s parliamentary democracy. Zoran Milanović also ran in the parliamentary elections, where he did not win, which indicates that citizens overwhelmingly chose him for the presidential role rather than as a parliamentary leader.

His election reflects not only his personal appeal but also his role in maintaining checks and balances within the system. In that sense, his victory is unquestionable in terms of legitimacy, particularly within the constitutional framework of Croatia.

‘If the US Ceases to Be the Anchor of Stability in This Region…’

US Presidential candidate Donald Trump held a campaign rally at PPG Paints Arena in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on November 4, 2024. Photo: Chip Somodevilla.

Milanović is often accused of being a “pro-Russian puppet” who undermines Croatia’s credibility within NATO and the EU. With leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Robert Fico in Slovakia, how significant is Milanović’s potential influence in weakening the EU’s pro-Ukraine stance?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I always wait to see more evidence that Milanović is a pro-Russian player. He has made statements that could lead to such a conclusion, particularly in discussions about Ukraine, NATO’s engagement in Ukraine, and NATO enlargement concerning Sweden and Finland’s membership. He has also linked these issues to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, I have not seen concrete evidence that he could significantly steer Croatian politics away from the European Union or cause a fundamental shift in Croatia’s foreign policy. Many of the mutual suspicions and accusations stem from domestic political debates rather than an actual change in the country’s foreign policy orientation.

And lastly, with Donald Trump beginning his second term as US President, how might Milanović and other populist leaders in the region be impacted by Trump’s renewed leadership?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I don’t think Milanović is in the same camp as other leaders in the region, if we are discussing the broader Balkans, because Croatia is a member of the European Union. We still operate under a collective umbrella that largely determines our transatlantic relationship with the United States.

However, some other leaders in the Balkans are either very hopeful or very fearful of what the new Trump administration might do. The United States has been, for the last 30-plus years, a key force in stabilizing this region. If that changes—if the United States ceases to be the anchor of stability in this region—then we will wake up to a different future. I sincerely hope this does not happen and that peace is maintained in the Balkans.

President of Croatia, Zoran Milanović, addresses a press conference in Ploče, Croatia, on September 14, 2024. Photo: Jure Divich.

Dr. Petsinis: Populism in the Balkans Shaped by Persistent Ethno-Nationalism and Euroscepticism

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

The Balkans, a region deeply influenced by historical tensions and sociopolitical complexities, has become a breeding ground for diverse populist movements. Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, an authority on Central and Eastern European politics, dissects the dynamics driving populism in Croatia, Serbia, and North Macedonia. According to Dr. Petsinis, the persistence of ethno-nationalism is a defining characteristic that distinguishes Balkan populism from its Western European counterparts. His analysis explores the interplay of nationalism, Euroscepticism, and historical grievances, shedding light on how populist actors consolidate power and reshape political landscapes, offering insights into the unique challenges populism poses in the region.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The Balkans, a region marked by historical tensions and complex political dynamics, has emerged as a fertile ground for populist movements in recent years. In this illuminating interview, Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, Associate Professor of Politics, Corvinus University in Budapest and a prominent scholar specializing in Central and Eastern European politics, delves into the factors driving populism in Croatia, Serbia, North Macedonia, and other nations. According to Dr. Petsinis, regarding differences between the Balkans and Western Europe, one key element is the persistence of ethno-nationalism across Balkan societies. Dr. Petsinis sheds light on how these movements leverage nationalism, Euroscepticism, and historical grievances to shape public narratives and consolidate power.

According to Dr. Petsinis, Balkan populism differs significantly from its Western European counterparts. In Croatia, for instance, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement) capitalizes on anti-establishment sentiment and critiques of European Union policies. The party’s focus on defending Croatian sovereignty and opposing perceived EU intervention resonates strongly with voters disillusioned by traditional parties. However, as Dr. Petsinis observes, the Homeland Movement’s transition into a coalition government has tempered some of its anti-establishment rhetoric, reflecting the fluid nature of populist politics.

In Serbia, Dr. Petsinis highlights how the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) under President Aleksandar Vučić employs ethno-nationalist narratives centered on Kosovo. By emphasizing the reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia and the protection of Serbian cultural and historical sites, Vučić consolidates support among nationalist constituencies. Meanwhile, in North Macedonia, left-wing populist movements, such as Levica, incorporate nationalist and anti-imperialist themes, favoring alignment with BRICS nations rather than traditional Western alliances.

Dr. Petsinis also explores the influence of external actors, including the European Union, Russia, and China on Balkan populism. Serbia’s populist actors, for example, view Russia as a key ally, particularly in the context of the Kosovo issue. Conversely, Croatia’s populist rhetoric often distances itself from Russia due to historical alignments with Serbia. Dr. Petsinis emphasizes that China’s economic investments in the region offer populist leaders a viable alternative to EU frameworks, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.

With populist leaders like Zoran Milanović in Croatia combining Euroscepticism with domestic critiques of corruption, Dr. Petsinis underscores the delicate balancing act these figures perform to appeal to diverse voter bases. This interview offers a nuanced analysis of Balkan populism, highlighting the interplay between nationalism, external influences, and shifting political landscapes under Dr. Petsinis’s expert guidance.

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, Associate Professor of Politics, Corvinus University in Budapest and a prominent scholar specializing in Central and Eastern European politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Vassilis Petsinis with some edits.

Ethno-Nationalism and Populism in the Balkans: A Unique Political Landscape

Professor Petsinis, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. What are the key factors driving the rise of populist movements in the Balkan countries such as Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro, and how do these factors differ from those in Western Europe?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think that, depending on the perspective, we should first address the question of defining populism. For example, if we start with Serbia, I would suggest that whether we study populism from a more discursive perspective, like that of Ernesto Laclau, or from the ideational approach, as presented by Cas Mudde, we don’t have genuine populist political actors in these countries.

In Serbia, the leading right-wing Serbian Progressive Party could be seen mostly as a cartel or an established right-wing party with certain anti-establishment rhetoric, especially regarding international, global, and European institutions. However, I wouldn’t classify it as a genuinely populist political actor.

In Croatia, we have the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement), which is currently a government partner to HDZ (the Croatian Democratic Union). This right-wing party has incorporated powerful anti-establishment rhetoric since its formation in 2020, focusing on ethno-nationalism, gender-related issues, nativism, and relations between the Church and State. It also emphasizes anti-abortion and pro-life stances. However, last spring, the Homeland Movement quickly entered a coalition government with HDZ, thereby alleviating many of its anti-establishment prerogatives. Overall, it could now be classified more as a national conservative party.

As for North Macedonia, we see an interesting case with the left-wing populist party Levica. This party, while left-wing, also incorporates a nationalist component and expresses a preference for the BRICS global alliance in international politics. Additionally, elements of right-wing populism exist under the umbrella of the leading VMRO-DPMNE party, although its new leadership has sought to curb these tendencies.

Regarding differences between the Balkans and Western Europe, one key element is the persistence of ethno-nationalism across Balkan societies. For example, in Croatia, sociocultural factors such as Vatican contracts with the Roman Catholic Church have strengthened anti-LGBT and pro-life tendencies within populist, radical-right, and national-conservative circles. These factors contribute to the unique landscape of populist movements in the region compared to their Western European counterparts.

How do you interpret the relationship between the rise of right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe and its influence on domestic ethnopolitics, particularly in terms of shaping public narratives around minority groups and immigration?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends on the context. Central and Eastern Europe is such a vast region geographically, politically, and socioculturally. To narrow down the discussion, I would prefer to focus on the countries of the former Yugoslavia, as I have dedicated several reports on Croatia and ethno-nationalism for ECPS.

Starting with ethno-nationalism, there are specific open issues. For instance, in Croatia, for the radical right and the national conservative right, maintaining the country’s national sovereignty is of paramount importance. A common theme in the rhetoric of parties like the Homeland Movement, as well as the right-wing faction within the ruling HDZ in Croatia, is the emphasis on protecting Croatia’s sovereignty. This sovereignty, tied to the country’s independence following the Homeland War of the 1990s, is often framed within the current international context, highlighting the need to maintain autonomy while participating in alliances like NATO and the EU.

In Serbia, the situation revolves around the status of Kosovo, the protection of the ethnic Serbian minority in Kosovo, and the preservation of cultural monuments in the region. These issues fuel ethno-nationalist tendencies and provide substantial material for right-wing populist forces in Serbia.

These specific, contextual ethno-nationalist concerns drive much of the particularistic ethnopolitics in these societies. They fuel ethno-nationalism and provide material for radical right-wing populism, which may not be directly applicable to other societies in Central and Eastern Europe or Europe as a whole.

Populist Rhetoric and Ethnic Identity: Contrasting Strategies in the Baltics and the Balkans

In your comparative analysis of the Baltic States and Western Balkans, what role does populist rhetoric play in framing ethnic minorities as either threats or integral parts of national identity, and how does this rhetoric vary across these regions?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it really depends on the country. Starting with Estonia, the main radical right-wing party there, although its popularity has been declining since 2022, initially securitized the collective status of the ethnic Russian minority in Estonia. However, in recent years, they have also attempted to approach this minority by playing the card of allegedly shared conservative values.

In Latvia, the National Conservative National Alliance Party has also been somewhat suspicious of the ethnic Russian minority. It was only after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that they began calling more emphatically for the securitization of domestic politics in Latvia.

Moving further south to Croatia, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement) and the right-wing faction within the ruling HDZ have been very skeptical of the ethnic Serb political party, the Serbian Independent Democratic Party. The Homeland Movement, in particular, has included in its political program calls for the semi-securitization of bilateral relations between Serbia and Croatia. They have also demanded that Serbia pay reparations for the war in the 1990s.

In Serbia, the broader radical right and national conservative circles have primarily focused on Kosovo, which they continue to regard as a constitutional part of Serbia. Domestically, however, there is less emphasis on framing ethnic minorities as threats. For example, the ethnic Hungarian community in Vojvodina is no longer perceived as a threat. While there has been some suspicion about the Bosniaks in Sandžak, the focus has shifted toward Euroscepticism and the protection of Serbia’s sovereignty in European and global politics, rather than targeting ethnic minorities in the same way as in the 1990s.

Given your discussion of Euroscepticism and populism, how do populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe balance their critiques of the EU’s influence on sovereignty with their need to engage with EU frameworks on issues like ethnic minority rights and migration?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends. Again, I would like to focus mostly on Croatia and Serbia, as these are the countries I prepared for this conversation.

In the case of Croatia, the Homeland Movement is rather rigid regarding the protection of national borders by the state itself, rather than relying on the EU. They are against the EU’s common defense policies, and since their formation, they have been skeptical of EU intervention, such as that of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, particularly before Croatia’s accession to the EU. This skepticism extends to the enhancement of collective rights for minorities, especially the ethnic Serb minority and their institutional representation in the Croatian Parliament. This is a significant dimension of their emphasis on state sovereignty.

Turning to Latvia, parties such as the National Alliance were, in their early stages, quite skeptical of what they perceived as EU interventionism, which they felt challenged the ethnic democracy model applied in Latvia. A similar sentiment existed in Estonia. However, over time, the context has evolved.

For instance, in Croatia, while nationalist principles are maintained, the focus has shifted primarily to domestic politics, such as efforts to exclude the ethnic Serb minority party from power, without directly blaming the EU for this.

As for Serbia, and also Estonia and Latvia, the context becomes more complex. In Estonia, EKRE (the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia) attempted to approach the ethnic Russian community in recent years. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine significantly altered the situation.

Overall, there is no uniform pattern here. The strategies of these populist parties vary depending on the national and geopolitical context.

Populism’s Role in Power Dynamics and Regional Stability in the Balkans

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

To what extent do populist leaders in the Balkans utilize nationalism and historical narratives to consolidate their power, and how does this impact regional stability?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends on the context. In Serbia, for example, there is the prominent issue of Kosovo. All political parties, including the leading SNS under Aleksandar Vučić, programmatically prioritize the defense of Kosovo, advocating for its effective reintegration into the Serbian state structure. Additionally, they emphasize the protection of the ethnic Serbian minority and Serbian cultural monuments in the region, presenting these as top priorities. This issue holds significant weight in both domestic and international politics.

In Croatia, on the other hand, there is a strong emphasis on the concept of sovereignty. The prevailing notion is that Croatian sovereignty must be staunchly defended and not compromised, whether in relations with Western, Eastern, or other global partners. This focus on sovereignty is a key element of the political narrative.

How have external actors, such as the European Union, Russia, and China, influenced the trajectory of populist politics in Balkan countries?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it really depends on the context. In the case of Serbia, right-wing populist actors have long viewed Russia as a key partner, especially since the 1990s. Political parties, including more recent ones like Dveri, as well as the broader radical and national conservative right-wing spectrum, regard Russia as Serbia’s main ally in international politics.

In Croatia, however, the situation is different. There is a more staunch approach, and while China has been viewed as a more reliable economic partner compared to the EU by the broader right-wing spectrum in Serbia, this perspective is not as prevalent in Croatia. The radical and national conservative right in Croatia has historically been open to a degree of economic cooperation with Russia. However, they have always been somewhat suspicious of Russia, largely due to its perceived partnership with Serbia. This skepticism intensified after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In North Macedonia, we see the example of the Levica party, which adopts a different approach. They are quite open to cooperation with the BRICS countries, including Russia and China, as well as other nations they associate with the Global South. Levica justifies this stance through a quasi-anti-imperialist platform, presenting it as an alternative to traditional Western alliances.

How Religion Fuels Populist Rhetoric and National Identity in the Balkans

What role does religion play in shaping the rhetoric and appeal of populist parties and leaders in the Balkan countries?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: Well, of course, it does. In Croatia, for example, parties like the Domovinski Pokret, the right-wing faction within HDZ, and smaller parties such as the Croatian Sovereignty Movement, Bloc for Croatia, and Most (Bridge), to the extent that it can be regarded as a national conservative right party, advocate for a partnership-like relationship between the state and the Roman Catholic Church. They also strongly support the protection and continuation of the so-called Vatican contracts.

In Serbia, the broader right-wing political spectrum emphasizes a similar partnership-like relationship between the state and the Orthodox Church. This includes some particularistic interpretations of the Orthodox doctrine, such as Svetosavlje. This Serbian-specific brand of Orthodox theology, rooted in the teachings of Serbian theologian Justin Popović during the interwar period, remains a distinctive and particularistic interpretation of Orthodoxy. It is often espoused by political actors from the radical right, reinforcing their ideological narratives.

How do the national conservative and radical right-wing parties in Croatia use populist rhetoric to mobilize support, particularly regarding issues like the “Homeland War” and minority rights, and how does this compare to similar movements in other Central and Eastern European countries?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: Well, they do. For instance, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement), founded in 2020, has been very active in protests, both through demonstrations and online campaigns via their websites. A notable example is their opposition to the public use of the Serbian Cyrillic script in areas like Vukovar. Vukovar holds a central symbolic role in contemporary Croatian nationalism due to the resistance mounted by the Croatian military against the Yugoslav People’s Army and Serbian auxiliary forces in 1991.

The Homeland Movement also incorporates ethno-nationalist principles into its broader anti-establishment rhetoric, targeting Croatia’s two major parties: the center-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP). However, the interplay between ethno-nationalist principles and anti-establishment rhetoric can be quite malleable. For example, since last spring, the Homeland Movement has been a member of a governing coalition with HDZ.

This intersection of ethno-nationalism and establishment politics shows that parties like the Homeland Movement are not always as anti-establishment as they claim to be. It is worth noting that a faction within the Homeland Movement opposed the coalition pact with HDZ, seeing it as a betrayal of the movement’s anti-establishment principles. In response, this faction formed a new party, Domovinski Otpora (Homeland Resistance), in September 2024.

Euroscepticism and National Sovereignty in a Shifting Political Landscape

In a recent chapter, you discuss the soft Euroscepticism of Croatia’s Homeland Movement (DP). How does the populist framing of national sovereignty by this party challenge or reinforce broader European Union integration narratives?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: Well, the Homeland Movement does not have a standard pro-EU stance. They advocate for a Europe of sovereign nations and do not support Eurofederalism.

In your analysis, how have Croatian far-right parties employed populist strategies to address economic grievances, such as rising costs of living and inflation, and how effective has this been in broadening their appeal beyond traditional nationalist bases?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: They have consistently accused the government of mismanaging the economy. Like other political actors on the broader right across Europe, they have also blamed the EU’s Green Deal for the increase in energy prices over the last couple of years.

At the same time, there has been a powerful emphasis on ethno-nationalist underpinnings. The Homeland Movement’s critique of alleged economic mismanagement often focuses on the revitalization of Croatian regions such as Slavonia, Lika, or parts of Dalmatia—areas ravaged by war. These regions have a notable presence of wartime veterans or invalids, making them key target groups for the party.

Alongside its critique of economic mismanagement by HDZ and the Social Democratic Party in the past, the Homeland Movement has also promoted a more concrete program for economic support specifically aimed at these categories of the population, particularly war veterans from the Homeland War.

SDP Voters Back Milanović Despite Diverging Views on Euroscepticism

Croatian President Zoran Milanović attends a ceremony in Vrgorac, Croatia, on July 1, 2022. Photo: Jure Divich.

According to Euractiv, Zoran Milanović achieved the highest score by a presidential candidate since Croatia’s independence in 1991. How do you explain this huge success during his second term as president?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think Zoran Milanović is a rather controversial character, and it’s not easy to pin down his appeal. He has made several contentious statements in the past, particularly regarding relations between Croatia and Bosnia, as well as Croatia and Serbia. He has also expressed doubts about the protection of collective minority rights of ethnic groups in Bosnia. Furthermore, he questioned Serbia’s legitimacy as a candidate for EU membership. More recently, since 2022, he has expressed skepticism about Ukraine’s eligibility for NATO or EU membership. So, he’s been quite a colorful figure, so to speak.

At the same time, his success in the elections likely has several explanations. First, since the constitutional amendments of 2000–2002, the actual powers of the Croatian president have been significantly reduced. The current president has far more limited competencies compared to Franjo Tuđman’s term in office during the 1990s. This semi-parliamentary arrangement doesn’t make the president a purely decorative figure, but the role is definitely less influential compared to the prime minister.

Most likely, Milanović’s success reflects the fact that Croatian voters, who elect the president directly, saw him as a more reliable candidate compared to others.

Last Sunday, after the vote in Zagreb, Milanović criticized Brussels as “in many ways autocratic and unrepresentative,” run by unelected officials. The 58-year-old Milanović regularly blames the HDZ for the party’s long-standing corruption problems and calls Prime Minister Plenković “a Brussels employee.” How much of a role did his attacks on the EU play in his victory in the presidential elections?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think they did play a part, as he managed to create an umbrella for Eurosceptic trends among the Croatian electorate. These are voters who do not necessarily want to align with the national conservative or radical right and do not want to vote for HDZ. This could be one explanation.

Additionally, Zoran Milanović originates from the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which does not necessarily adopt such strong Eurosceptic stances on a party level or share Milanović’s harsh criticism of the EU. However, having a representative from the SDP in the presidential office could enhance the party’s standing vis-à-vis HDZ in Croatian politics. This may have been another incentive for SDP voters to support Milanović, even if they do not entirely agree with his Eurosceptic views.

Donald Trump has just started his second term as president of the US. How do you think the populist Milanović and other populist leaders in the region will be affected by Trump’s second term?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends on the context. Milanović has not expressed any real preference, even indirectly, for Donald Trump.

Now, in Serbia, considering the political establishment, particularly the ruling SNS (Serbian Progressive Party) under President Aleksandar Vučić, they may look for a better deal regarding Kosovo during Donald Trump’s term in office. This seems to be what they are aiming for.

Myanmar

Dr. Subedi: Majoritarian Populist Politics Marginalizes Minorities in South and Southeast Asia

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Dr. DB Subedi highlights how majoritarian populist politics in South and Southeast Asia marginalizes minorities by leveraging identity politics and ethno-religious narratives. He underscores how populist leaders, from Myanmar to India, utilize state apparatuses to consolidate power, often legitimizing exclusionary policies and fostering polarization. With examples like Hindu nationalism in India, Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar, and Islamist populism in Bangladesh, Dr. Subedi examines how these movements exploit historical grievances and global populist trends while adapting them to local contexts. His analysis sheds light on the fragile state of pluralism and democracy in these multicultural societies.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Dr. DB Subedi, a distinguished lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, delves deeply into the dynamics of majoritarian populist politics in South and Southeast Asia in an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Drawing from his extensive academic expertise, Dr. Subedi examines how populist leaders in the region leverage identity politics and state apparatuses to marginalize minorities and consolidate power, often at the expense of democratic institutions and pluralism.

In the interview, Dr. Subedi sheds light on how the historical, cultural, and political landscapes of post-colonial South and Southeast Asia have created fertile ground for nationalist and religious populist ideologies. He highlights the role of religion, ethnicity, and national identity in shaping these populist movements, often leading to the exclusion of minorities and the reinforcement of majoritarian dominance. The cases of India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh serve as pivotal examples, with each showcasing how populism adapts to local contexts while drawing on broader global populist trends.

Dr. Subedi also explores the economic underpinnings of populism in the region, emphasizing the interplay between economic inequality, globalization, and populist rhetoric. He points out that while globalization has lifted millions out of poverty in Asia, it has simultaneously deepened economic divides, creating grievances that populist leaders exploit to craft exclusionary narratives.

Furthermore, the discussion extends to the intersection of nationalism and populism, where Dr. Subedi identifies the trend of leader-centric politics replacing traditional party-led systems. This shift has enabled authoritarian populist leaders to manipulate institutions, bypass democratic norms, and entrench their authority. The examples of Narendra Modi in India, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and the Rajapaksa brothers in Sri Lanka illustrate how such leaders use religion and identity to legitimize their power while marginalizing dissenting voices and minority groups.

The interview provides a comprehensive understanding of how majoritarian populist politics operates in South and Southeast Asia, offering valuable insights into its implications for democracy, social cohesion, and the region’s broader political landscape. Dr. Subedi’s analysis serves as a critical lens through which to examine the challenges posed by populism in multicultural societies.

Dr. DB Subedi, a distinguished lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia.

Here is the transcription of the interview withDr. DB Subedi with some edits.

The Roots of Populism: Religion, Identity, and Authoritarianism in South and Southeast Asia

Professor Subedi, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In the context of South and Southeast Asia, what historical, cultural, and political factors have contributed to the rise of nationalist and religious populism, and how do these dynamics align with authoritarian populism to shape contemporary political narratives?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s a very important question. When we talk about populism in South and Southeast Asia, to understand the overall dynamics of populism, we need to examine the historical context of post-colonial state formation in this region.

Religion, culture, and national identity have always been contentious issues in South and Southeast Asia. From the time of post-colonial state formation, for example, the role of Islam in Pakistan and Indonesia was heavily debated. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, religion has always been central to defining the majoritarian identity, and this has been deeply contested by minority groups. These dynamics are common across other regions as well.

Religion, history, and culture collectively define the social identity of one group of people, but at the same time, the same applies to minority groups. This creates a form of social polarization. Over time, populist leaders have tapped into these polarizations, mobilizing them to construct and define their own bounded political communities, which they then appeal to, while pursuing populist political narratives, ideas, and policies. The question of religion is particularly central in this regard.

This has also translated into various political discourses, such as the formulation of political ideologies and policies, where religion has often been both a contentious and central element. Countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are key examples, and we see similar instances in other parts of South and Southeast Asia.

The historical context of nation-state formation, the creation of national identity, and the manipulation of collective identities have become key features in defining populism in this region, both in the past and to a large extent in the present. For instance, the first wave of populism in South and Southeast Asia was led by national heroes—what we might call the nationalist leaders of independence movements. Not all of them, of course, but some of these founding fathers of modern nation-states had populist elements in the way they defined national identities, often at the cost of excluding others and mobilizing specific constituencies.

If you like, we could see these leaders as the first generation of populist figures. But times have changed. Over the past 50–70 years, if we look back to the 1950s and 1960s, there have been different waves of populism in this region. However, religion and national identity continue to play a crucial role in defining populist movements in South and Southeast Asia.

The Role of Economic Inequality and Globalization in Driving Populism

What role do economic grievances, inequality, and globalization play in fueling nationalist and religious populism in South and Southeast Asian countries?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s another very important question. Earlier, I mostly discussed the cultural aspects of the rise of populist politics in this region. However, economic factors also play a significant role. Economic inequalities—both within and between ethnic groups, at national and sub-national levels—are key drivers of grievances. These inequalities often fuel resentment toward groups perceived as affluent or privileged within the community.

Inequality has consistently been a major issue shaping populist movements. For instance, in the 1980s, agrarian populist movements in parts of India were largely driven by economic grievances. Similarly, economic inequalities played a central role in mobilizing support for former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand. In this sense, inequality has always been a central issue in the rise of populism.

Globalization is another critical factor. When addressing inequality, populist rhetoric often targets political elites at the national level, but it frequently extends to external actors, such as multinational corporations and proponents of neoliberal policies, who are portrayed as the “enemies of the people.” Economic grievances stemming from globalization provide fertile ground for populist narratives.

In the contemporary wave of populism, almost all populist leaders in the region have proposed ambitious and transformative economic policies aimed at redistribution. However, these agendas have often failed, with many populist leaders losing power after an average of 4–5 years.

In Asia, the role of globalization is complex. Unlike the “losers of globalization” thesis commonly seen in Western Europe and the US, where certain groups are left behind, globalization in Asia has largely benefited many countries. For example, the globalization of production industries has led to the relocation of manufacturing from the Global North to countries in the Global South, such as India, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This shift has contributed to economic growth and lifted many people out of extreme poverty.

However, this growth has been accompanied by rising inequality. While a segment of the population has profited greatly, the majority have seen only incremental improvements, leaving systemic economic inequality intact. This dynamic fuels public grievances and provides populist leaders with a platform to craft their narratives and agendas.

In this sense, globalization in Asia acts as a double-edged sword. On one hand, it creates opportunities for populist leaders to exploit growing inequality and public frustration, leading to anti-government and anti-establishment protests that propel populist figures to power. On the other hand, globalization has delivered tangible benefits to many in Asia, making the relationship between globalization and populism more ambiguous and requiring further exploration.

The Impact of Populist Nationalism on Marginalized Communities

A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee
celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.

How do nationalist and religious populist ideologies intersect and manifest in countries like India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, shaping the broader sociopolitical landscape, and what are the implications for marginalized communities across Hindu-majority, Muslim-majority, and Buddhist-majority contexts in South and Southeast Asia?

Dr. DB Subedi: When we talk about the intersection of nationalism and religion, we should first look at the interface between ethnicity and religion, in Asian countries, because religion and ethnicity are deeply intertwined in many Asian countries. Take Sri Lanka, for example, where the majority of Sinhalese follow Buddhism, and as a result, historically, since the colonial period and in the post-colonial state formation, Sinhala Buddhism has become a dominant ideology. Sinhala Buddhist leaders of the past, and even more recently, have mobilized that ideology to define their majority political constituency.

We can say similar things about India. India is vast in terms of geography, ethnicity, caste, and so on. Even today, Hindus form the majority population, which provides political parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leverage to pursue Hindu nationalist politics both at the center and in the regions. In other words, the intersection of ethnicity and religion constructs the collective social identity of the people, providing leverage for political parties and populist leaders to define their bounded political communities, which they mobilize in their populist politics. One example is the populist nationalist politics of the BJP and its current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who many have analyzed as a Hindu nationalist and populist leader.

You can see similar dynamics in Bangladesh, where Islam and politics go hand in hand, and ethnicity obviously comes into play. In the case of the countries you mentioned—Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar—the majoritarian ethno-religious identities of the majority populations have always been central features in attempts to homogenize national identities.

This process of homogenization has been deeply contested by minorities in countries like Myanmar or India, where Muslim minorities, along with secular and liberal-minded political leaders and parties, contest this idea. Similar patterns are evident in Thailand, where the homogenization of national identity, based on Thai national identity drawn primarily from Buddhist culture and religious identities, is contested by other minorities.

As a result, there are multiple effects on the national polity, both from a populist and nationalist point of view. One major implication of this political dynamic is that in most Asian countries, nationalism often hosts populism. In other words, populism travels alongside nationalism in most Asian countries. Of course, the role of religion is present, and we can discuss religious populism separately. However, one prominent feature across the region is populist nationalism.

In terms of policy and political outcomes, minorities have suffered, as this form of politics often shares exclusionary characteristics similar to populist politics seen elsewhere, particularly in Western Europe and North America.

Power Consolidation and Minority Exclusion in South Asia

To what extent do nationalist and religious populist leaders in Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim-majority countries leverage identity politics and state apparatuses to consolidate power, legitimize violence, and exclude minorities, and how do institutional and cultural narratives in post-colonial South Asia justify and sustain these populist-authoritarian practices?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s another very good question. It actually points to some of the issues I mentioned in my earlier response, particularly the interplay between religious identity and national identity. What we have seen most recently across Asia is that populist leaders have frequently referred to the blending of religious and national identities in these countries to define their sociopolitical landscapes.

Having said that, we should also acknowledge that Southeast Asia and South Asia are vast regions, with diverse sociocultural and sociopolitical contexts, as well as differing historical and contemporary dynamics. These variations shape the realization, aspiration, and respect for pluralism and democracy in this region. Therefore, while identifying common trends, we must be cautious not to overgeneralize.

Despite these differences, one commonality across these countries is the centrality of leaders in shaping the political landscape. In the past, political parties held this central role. However, with the rise of authoritarian, populist, and nationalist politics—from the Rajapaksa regime in Sri Lanka to Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, Hun Sen in Cambodia, and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines—we have seen strong and powerful leaders dominating the political sphere.

This shift toward leader-centric politics has been a significant trend across South and Southeast Asia. Leaders like Narendra Modi in India connect directly with their followers, often bypassing institutional processes, by mobilizing cultural, religious, or national identities. Similarly, Duterte in the Philippines sought direct engagement with the public, frequently circumventing institutional frameworks.

Populist leaders often appeal to the “will of the people” to justify and consolidate power. They use this direct connection with their political constituencies, defined by religious, national, or ethnic identities, to legitimize their authority. This raises the question: where do institutions stand in this process?

Institutions do matter, and in Asia, as elsewhere, populist leaders often come to power through elections, no matter how free or fair those elections might be. The presence of democratic institutions, even minimally, has been a prerequisite for populist leaders to rise to power. However, once in power, these leaders employ various tactics to manipulate, dismantle, or reform existing political and democratic institutions to consolidate their authority.

For example, in Sri Lanka, the populist-nationalist government of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his predecessor, his brother Mahinda Rajapaksa, pushed for constitutional reforms to concentrate power in the presidency. Similarly, in the Philippines, Duterte passed an anti-terrorism law that weakened civil society organizations, particularly those engaged in peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas like Mindanao. Institutional manipulation and re-engineering of democratic structures have become common strategies for populist and authoritarian leaders to sustain their hold on power.

Contrasting Populisms: Nationalist Narratives in Asia and the Global West

Large protests demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government as part of the Anti-Quota Movement and Bangladesh Quota Reform Protests. Thousands took to the streets in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 4, 2024. Photo: M.D. Sabbir.

How does the rise of nationalist and religious populism in Asia compare with similar movements in the global West in terms of discourse strategies and mobilization methods, and to what extent are these movements influenced by global populist trends while adapting international narratives to local contexts?

Dr. DB Subedi: Interesting question. Asia, especially South and Southeast Asia, is a unique region in terms of understanding populism. It is unique because, unlike in the West, in South and Southeast Asia, we have seen populist movements and populist styles of politics that involve different varieties of populist movements. There isn’t one singular form of populism.

As I mentioned earlier, nationalism has often hosted populism in Asia, and the two frequently go hand in hand. This is because questions of national identity, ethnicity, and religion are central to defining both nationalist and populist movements. While there are key differences between the two, most populist leaders in the region also embody elements of nationalism to some extent. Narendra Modi is an example, and you can observe similar trends in Thailand, Myanmar, and Indonesia, among others.

This is a unique feature of populism in Asia. However, across the region, we should be cautious when interpreting or explaining populism with the same degree of intensity. By “degree of intensity,” I mean that in some cases, when populism intersects with nationalism, it manifests as what I would call “soft populism.”

When I say “soft populism,” the overall political manifestation or style of a particular populist leader might appear nationalist but incorporates populist orientations or elements. Imran Khan’s politics in Pakistan is a recent example. In Bangladesh, politics under Sheikh Hasina was mostly authoritarian, but in her later years in government, she also played the nationalist card while implementing redistributive economic policies, which had populist undertones. She reached out to Muslim voters and her support base using a populist style of politics. Similar examples can be observed elsewhere.

Soft populism can involve a strong leader or political party that is primarily nationalist or authoritarian but includes populist elements. On the other hand, there are also cases of “hard populist” governments and leaders in the region. Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines is a prime example, as is Thaksin Shinawatra in the past in Thailand. These leaders represent a more pronounced form of populism.

This distinction—between soft and hard populism—is one of the differences between populism in Asia and the populist leaders in Western Europe and North America. The phenomenon in Asia is shaped by the region’s distinct history of post-colonial state formation and its sociopolitical landscape of collective identity and politics.

In this sense, soft populist politics in South and Southeast Asia often appears as an extended form of identity politics.

Finally, when we compare similarities and differences, we observe that during the 1980s and 1990s, there was a rise in left-wing populism. Interestingly, in the last 10 to 15 years, we have seen the emergence of populism that looks more exclusionary, sharing certain elements of right-wing populism seen elsewhere. However, there are still a few examples of left-wing populism in this region.

Comparing Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamist Populist Policies in South Asia

In what ways has Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar influenced the state’s policies towards minorities, and how does it compare to Hindu nationalism in India or Islamist populism in Bangladesh?

Members of Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya minority walk through a broken road at Shah Porir Deep, at Teknaf in Cox’s Bazer, Bangladesh on September 11, 2017. Photo: Sk Hasan Ali.

Dr. DB Subedi: All these countries have different histories and contexts of post-colonial state formation, although one similarity is that all three countries were colonized. So, they are post-colonial nations with a history of colonial rule. At the same time, they are multicultural countries with both ethnic and religious majorities as well as minorities.

In Myanmar, for a long time, when the military junta was in power—and they remain in power today—they have consistently used ethno-religious nationalism as a key strategy and ideology for ruling the country. This trend has been especially pronounced over the last few decades. When the military first came to power, they seemed to adopt a different kind of socialist policy, and the religious and ethno-religious dimension was not as prominent at that time. However, over time, there has been a growing trend of mobilizing the sentiments of Theravada Buddhist Burmese, which has been deeply contested by other ethnic and religious minorities.

One consequence of this trend has been the subordination and marginalization of ethnic minorities, which has contributed to ongoing civil wars in Myanmar for decades.

In India, the situation is quite different. The BJP came to power relatively recently, whereas before that, the Indian National Congress, which was more oriented toward pluralism and liberal policies toward minorities, held power. Under the current government, however, Hindu nationalist policies have led to the introduction of certain citizenship laws and other policies that discriminate against Muslim minorities.

Similar trends can be observed in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well. In a nutshell, minorities have often become victims of majoritarian, exclusivist politics when such ideologies are in power.

Map: Shutterstock.

Unveiling China’s ‘Transnational Populism’ and Sharp Power Politics: The Case of the Belt and Road Initiative

by ArticlesEconomicsEditor’s ChoiceHomeJournal of Populism Studies

Abstract

In a mutually reinforcing context, the rise of multipolarity and the decline of the rules-based liberal multilateral world order have transformed populism from a national phenomenon into one with global dimensions, characterized by transborder transgressiveness. Rooted in nationalist rhetoric that emphasizes independence and sovereignty, this dynamic challenges the norms and values of multilateralism, fuels a vicious cycle of sharp power politics (SPP), and opens new fronts in the competition for national interests. China’s recent political and economic trajectory under President Xi Jinping provides a compelling case for examining the interplay between these factors. Drawing on the evolving theoretical framework of populism and an analysis of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), this article argues that Xi Jinping’s strategic framing of SPPs within an appealing populist narrative does not qualify him as a transnational populist leader. Notably, Chinese rhetoric lacks a cohesive ideology, a clearly defined transnational citizenry with shared interests, and a corresponding mechanism for the participatory representation of global citizens.

Keywords: Populism, sharp-power politics, multipolarity, multilateralism, China, governance, development, (in)dependence, global public goods, cooperation.

 

By Ibrahim Ozturk

Introduction

The transformation of global power dynamics, particularly in the post-Cold War era, has exposed vulnerabilities in the Western-dominated liberal multilateral order, leading to a multipolar world (dis)order. This shift has also curtailed the dominance of any single superpower, intensifying competition for influence and resources. This complex landscape has witnessed two notable political phenomena: the global rise of right- and left-wing populism and the adoption of Sharp Power Politics (SPP) by rising powers like Russia and China to enhance their global influence.

The emergence of this geopolitical landscape significantly limits the global cooperation necessary for collective action to effectively secure global public goods. Increasingly characterized by a “negative-sum game,” this environment poses deeply troubling implications for the future. It fosters the development of a causal chain in which populism, typically addressed at the national level, transcends borders and amplifies the influence of sharp-power politics.

While populists often portray themselves as champions of the people, challenging the established order on behalf of the masses, SPP co-opts populist rhetoric to serve the interests of authoritarian regimes, ultimately consolidating their power. A plausible transmission mechanism involves the gradual co-option of a functioning, though flawed, rule-based democracy by exclusionary, interest-driven coalitions of established elites. These elites prioritize their class interests at the expense of long-term efficiency, leading to stagnation. Over time, populist leaders exploit systemic vulnerabilities, using their rhetoric to gain power. If they maintain power long enough, they eventually transform the system into a form of authoritarianism, reinforcing this new status quo through sharp-power tactics both domestically and internationally to expand their influence and national interests.

Within this framework, the central aim of this article is to explore the extent to which the concept of “transnational populism” (TNP) can be considered an intermediate stage linking the progression from national-level populism to authoritarianism and, subsequently, to SPP beyond national borders. Following these theoretical discussions, the article also seeks to examine whether the notion of TNP can be inferred from the extensive use of populist rhetoric within China’s SPP framework, specifically in the context of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The article is organized as follows: The second section explores key theoretical issues, evaluating the existence of a robust concept of transnational populism while examining the intersections, overlaps, and tensions between national populism, transnational populism, and sharp power politics (SPP). The third section builds on these theoretical insights to assess whether China’s foreign policies can be interpreted through the framework of transnational populism within its authoritarian regime. The fourth section connects China’s so-called transnational populism (TNP) to SPP, highlighting their incompatibilities, particularly in the context of the BRI. The final section concludes by summarizing the key findings.

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