MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar

MEP López Aguilar: The Return Regulation Is a Violation of EU Fundamental Values

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As the European Union implements its new Migration and Asylum Pact amid growing populist pressures, fundamental questions are emerging about the future of European constitutionalism. In this exclusive interview with the ECPS, MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents “a violation of EU fundamental values” and warns that migration governance is increasingly being reshaped by radical-right narratives. Reflecting on the erosion of the cordon sanitaire, the “Melonization” of European migration policy, and the normalization of exclusionary rhetoric, MEP López Aguilar contends that “migration is a fact, not a crisis,” while insisting that “asylum is a right” that must remain protected. The interview offers a timely reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, human rights, and the future of European integration.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a moment when migration has become one of the most polarizing issues in European politics, the European Union finds itself confronting a profound constitutional dilemma. The implementation of the Migration and Asylum Pact, together with the Return Regulation, has reignited fundamental debates about sovereignty, solidarity, fundamental rights, and the future of European integration. Once conceived as a legal and political project founded upon supranational cooperation, shared responsibility, and the protection of human dignity, the European Union is increasingly facing accusations that it is redefining migration governance under the growing influence of populist radical-right politics. Against a backdrop of geopolitical instability, demographic change, electoral realignments, and increasingly contested debates over migration, the central question is no longer simply how Europe manages migration, but whether it can continue to do so without compromising the constitutional and humanitarian values upon which the Union itself was built.

Few policymakers are better positioned to reflect on these developments than Juan Fernando López Aguilar. A Member of the European Parliament (MEP) representing Spain’s Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) since 2009, López Aguilar previously served as Spain’s Minister of Justice and chaired the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) between 2019 and 2024. Trained as a constitutional lawyer and widely recognized as one of Europe’s foremost authorities on constitutionalism, the rule of law, migration governance, and fundamental rights, he has played a central role in shaping EU migration and asylum legislation over the past decade. His long engagement with the negotiations surrounding the Migration and Asylum Pact places him at the heart of one of the Union’s most consequential constitutional debates.

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), MEP López Aguilar argues that the Return Regulation represents far more than a technical adjustment to migration management. Rather, he contends that it constitutes “a violation of EU fundamental values” and departs from the legal architecture painstakingly constructed through the Migration and Asylum Pact. Rejecting the growing trend toward externalizing asylum responsibilities, he warns that “migration management cannot come at the expense of the rule of law,” insisting that migration must be addressed through a genuinely European response grounded in “shared responsibility and binding solidarity” rather than bilateral arrangements with third countries.

Throughout the interview, MEP López Aguilar situates the transformation of European migration policy within broader processes of democratic and political change. He argues that the European People’s Party’s (EPP) increasing cooperation with radical-right parties has effectively dismantled the traditional Brandmauer or cordon sanitaire, allowing what he calls the “Melonization” of European migration policy to become mainstream. In his assessment, attempts to externalize migration control, normalize return hubs, and securitize asylum are inseparable from the wider normalization of populist narratives within European politics. At the same time, he cautions that Europe risks undermining its own credibility as a global defender of human rights through increasingly visible double standards in both migration and foreign policy.

Perhaps most strikingly, MEP López Aguilar rejects the assumption that migration itself constitutes Europe’s principal challenge. “Migration is a fact, not a crisis,” he argues, insisting that “reducing migration to zero is not only impossible—it is stupid.” Likewise, he defends asylum as a non-negotiable legal obligation, declaring that “asylum is a right. It must be respected, no matter the cost.” For MEP López Aguilar, the real danger lies not in migration itself but in the gradual erosion of Europe’s constitutional identity through the normalization of policies and rhetoric that once belonged exclusively to the political fringes. The interview therefore offers not merely a critique of current migration policy, but a broader reflection on populism, democratic backsliding, constitutionalism, and the future of the European project itself.

Here is the revised version of our interview with MEP Juan Fernando López Aguilar, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Gino Pauselli.

Asst. Prof. Pauselli: LGBTQ+ Rights Have Become a Symbolic Boundary in Global Politics

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Authoritarian governments, populist movements, and rising powers are increasingly challenging the liberal international order not only by contesting specific human rights norms but also by questioning the institutions that create and enforce them. In this interview with the ECPS, Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli of the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign examines how international norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped in an era of geopolitical rivalry and democratic uncertainty. Drawing on research spanning LGBTQ+ rights, migration, border securitization, China’s influence in global governance, international organizations, and civil society, he argues that contemporary struggles over human rights are fundamentally contests over political authority, sovereignty, and the power to define international law itself.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Throughout the post-Cold War era, the international human rights regime has often been understood as one of the defining pillars of the liberal international order. Built upon the principles of universality, multilateral cooperation, and the progressive expansion of international legal protections, this order has contributed to significant advances in the promotion of civil liberties, minority rights, and transnational accountability. Yet, in recent years, these foundations have come under mounting pressure. Across both established and emerging democracies, populist leaders, authoritarian governments, and rising powers have increasingly challenged not only specific human rights norms but also the institutions and legal processes through which those norms are produced, interpreted, and enforced. Far from being confined to domestic politics, contemporary conflicts over sovereignty, migration, borders, LGBTQ+ rights, and civil society have become central battlegrounds in a broader contest over the future of global governance and the legitimacy of liberal universalism.

It is precisely these transformations that lie at the heart of the scholarship of Dr. Gino Pauselli, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. Combining insights from international relations, comparative politics, and human rights scholarship, Dr. Pauselli examines how international norms emerge, diffuse, and are contested through interactions among states, international organizations, NGOs, and transnational advocacy networks. His research offers an original perspective on the contemporary struggle between liberal and illiberal visions of international order, moving beyond simplistic accounts of democratic decline to reveal the complex political processes through which global norms are negotiated, resisted, and reshaped.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Pauselli argues that contemporary disputes over LGBTQ+ rights are ultimately less about sexuality than about political authority itself. As he puts it, “the ostensible subject is LGBT rights, but the deeper objection concerns who gets to make international law and how.” In his view, sexual orientation and gender identity have become powerful symbolic markers through which states signal their position in an increasingly polarized international order. Consequently, “LGBT rights have become the issue through which states perform that boundary—a way of signaling which side of a supposed civilizational divide a state stands on.”

Dr. Pauselli also offers important insights into the changing dynamics of authoritarian and populist politics. While acknowledging that anti-LGBT rhetoric often serves to divert attention from policy failures, he argues that it represents something more ambitious: “an active project to reshape society or build society around a notion of a heteronormative state.” Similarly, his research on border securitization demonstrates that restrictive migration policies can generate unintended human rights consequences. Rather than rhetoric alone, he finds that visible state projects such as border walls communicate heightened threat perceptions to border officials, thereby increasing the likelihood of abuse.

The interview further explores China’s growing influence within international institutions, the contestation surrounding sexual orientation and gender identity resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council, the emergence of illiberal NGO networks, and the evolving relationship between populism and international human rights governance. Throughout the conversation, Dr. Pauselli challenges conventional assumptions that rising powers necessarily reject global governance altogether. Instead, he argues that they increasingly seek to reshape existing institutions from within, because they “do value order and global governance,” while contesting the liberal content of the norms that sustain them.

Despite documenting an increasingly coordinated transnational backlash against liberal human rights norms, Dr. Pauselli remains cautiously optimistic about the future of the human rights project. Resistance to human rights, he observes, is hardly new; what is new is “the transnational coordination of this opposition at both the state and non-state levels.” Yet he also insists that attacks on the postwar human rights regime cannot ultimately succeed without offering a compelling alternative. The greatest challenge for liberal actors, he concludes, is not simply defending abstract legal principles but demonstrating, through people’s lived experiences, how universal human rights meaningfully improve everyday life. In an era increasingly shaped by populism, geopolitical rivalry, and normative contestation, this interview offers a timely and sophisticated examination of the future of democracy, international law, and the global human rights order.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Assistant Professor Gino Pauselli, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Martin Tanaka.

Prof. Tanaka: Populism Remains a Risk in Peru, but It Is Far More Contained Today

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Peru’s 2026 presidential election has reopened fundamental debates about populism, democratic resilience, institutional decay, and constitutional governance in one of Latin America’s most politically volatile democracies. In this timely interview with the ECPS, Professor Martín Tanaka, Full Professor of Political Science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and Senior Researcher at the Institute of Peruvian Studies, argues that while “populism remains a risk,” it is “much more controlled and limited” than many feared. He explains why Peru’s democratic crisis stems less from executive authoritarianism than from party fragmentation, legislative dysfunction, and institutional weakness, while cautiously suggesting that the country’s new political balance may create opportunities for negotiation, institutional reform, and democratic stabilization.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Peru’s 2026 presidential election has once again thrust one of Latin America’s most fragile democracies into the center of international attention. A razor-thin presidential runoff, renewed allegations of electoral fraud, deepening institutional distrust, chronic party fragmentation, and mounting public insecurity have revived long-standing debates over democratic resilience, populism, political representation, and constitutional governance. While Peru has long been viewed as an outlier for combining macroeconomic stability with persistent political instability, the election of Keiko Fujimori has introduced a new layer of uncertainty by reopening unresolved questions about the country’s post-authoritarian trajectory. At a moment when many democracies are struggling with populist polarization and democratic erosion, Peru offers an important case for examining whether institutional recovery remains possible after years of political fragmentation and declining public confidence.

Few scholars are better positioned to assess these developments than Professor Martín Tanaka, Full Professor of Political Science at the Pontifical Catholic University of Peru and Senior Researcher at the Institute of Peruvian Studies. Widely recognized for his pioneering scholarship on weak party systems, ‘brokered democracy’, clientelism, populism, and democratic deterioration, Professor Tanaka has spent more than two decades analyzing why Peru’s democratic institutions have struggled to consolidate despite sustained economic growth. His research has fundamentally shaped comparative debates on party institutionalization, democratic accountability, and the paradoxes of governance in contemporary Latin America.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Tanaka offers a measured yet cautiously optimistic assessment of Peru’s political future. Although he acknowledges that the 2026 election reproduced many of the structural weaknesses that have characterized Peruvian politics over the last decade—including institutional fragmentation and declining trust—he nevertheless argues that the outcome may represent an important turning point. As he observes, “the results are much better than our worst expectations,” because many of the parties most closely associated with irresponsible populism and legislative obstruction suffered significant electoral defeats. Rather than signaling the consolidation of anti-system politics, the new Congress may create stronger incentives for negotiation and coalition-building.

Throughout the interview, Professor Tanaka challenges several conventional assumptions about Peru’s democratic crisis. He argues that Peru’s recent democratic erosion has been driven less by executive aggrandizement than by “the decay of parties and the control of parties by particular interests and very narrow interest groups.” Unlike many contemporary cases of democratic backsliding, Peru’s principal danger has not been excessive presidential power but institutional fragmentation, legislative clientelism, and the collapse of effective political mediation. Yet he also sees reasons for cautious hope, emphasizing that “the distribution of political forces puts on the agenda the need to negotiate and to achieve agreements between parties with different perspectives,” while noting that “the risk of the continuation of this populist logic still exists, but it is much more controlled and limited.”

The conversation also explores broader theoretical questions concerning the evolution of populism, democratic legitimacy, corruption, judicial activism, and institutional reform. Professor Tanaka reflects on Peru’s distinctive combination of economic orthodoxy and political instability, examines why anti-corruption campaigns have generated widespread public disappointment, and assesses whether bicameralism and a more structured party system can help restore democratic governance. 

Looking beyond the current electoral cycle, he concludes that rebuilding Peru’s democracy will ultimately depend on strengthening the state’s administrative capacity, professionalizing the civil service, and reconstructing political parties capable of reconnecting citizens with representative institutions. As he puts it, “state reform and civil service reform are the major issues in Peru,” alongside political reforms that can begin “to reverse the dynamic of deterioration that we have faced in recent years.”

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Martín Tanaka, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Cynthia McClintock.

Prof. McClintock: The Desire for an ‘Iron Fist’ Helped Shift Peru to the Right

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Peru’s razor-thin 2026 presidential election has reopened fundamental debates about democratic legitimacy, populism, institutional resilience, and political representation in Latin America. As Keiko Fujimori returns to power amid allegations of electoral fraud, rising insecurity, and deep public distrust, critical questions emerge about whether Peru is entering a period of democratic stabilization or renewed political crisis. In this timely interview, Professor Cynthia McClintock of George Washington University examines the structural forces reshaping Peruvian politics—from fragmented party competition and the enduring legacy of Fujimorismo to the regional rise of right-wing populism. She argues that “the desire for the iron fist” has helped shift Peru to the right while warning that the country remains democratically vulnerable despite important institutional and economic advances.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Peru’s 2026 presidential election represents one of the most consequential democratic tests in contemporary Latin America. The razor-thin runoff between Keiko Fujimori and Roberto Sánchez unfolded against a backdrop of escalating organized crime, allegations of electoral fraud, institutional reform, and profound public distrust in political institutions. Although the election culminated in the return of Fujimorismo to the presidency, it also exposed the enduring fragility of Peru’s democratic order and highlighted broader regional debates over populism, representation, democratic legitimacy, and state capacity. Rather than resolving Peru’s long-running political crisis, the election underscored the persistent tensions between demands for democratic accountability and growing public desires for order and security.

In this timely interview, Professor Cynthia McClintock, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University and Director of GWU’s Latin American and Hemispheric Studies Program, offers a nuanced assessment of Peru’s political trajectory while placing recent developments within broader comparative debates on democratic resilience in Latin America. Drawing on decades of scholarship on Peruvian politics, electoral institutions, democratization, and runoff elections, Professor McClintock argues that the 2026 contest should not be understood simply as a story of ideological polarization. Instead, she contends that “most Peruvian voters were actually not at these extremes; rather, their vote fragmented,” pointing to the unprecedented presence of thirty-five presidential candidates and the collapse of the democratic center before the runoff.

Throughout the interview, Professor McClintock examines why democratic legitimacy has become increasingly fragile despite Peru’s comparatively strong macroeconomic performance. She warns that declining trust in electoral institutions constitutes “a very worrisome pattern,” while emphasizing that rising insecurity has fundamentally reshaped political competition. In her view, “there’s been a particularly tragic increase in extortion in Peru, which has led to this desire for the iron fist,” helping explain both the electoral shift to the right and the growing appeal of right-wing populism across the region.

At the same time, Professor McClintock cautions against simplistic interpretations of Peru’s political evolution. She argues that institutional reforms—including bicameralism and runoff elections—remain valuable, insisting that “institutions matter,” even though “there is no magic formula for high-quality democracy.” Likewise, while recognizing the continuing appeal of Fujimorismo, she stresses that Peru’s persistent fragmentation has prevented any single populist actor from fully consolidating power, making Alberto Fujimori “an exception” rather than the rule.

Ultimately, Professor McClintock presents Peru as a democracy caught between meaningful progress and persistent vulnerability. Although she concludes that the country “is still vulnerable to these problems,” she also reminds us that Peru has made remarkable democratic advances over recent decades. The conversation therefore offers not only an illuminating analysis of Peru’s turbulent political landscape but also broader insights into the evolving relationship between populism, democratic representation, institutional resilience, and political legitimacy across Latin America.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Cynthia McClintock, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Julio Carrión

Prof. Carrión: I Am Very Pessimistic About the Prospects for Peruvian Democracy

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Peru’s 2026 presidential election revealed far more than another episode of political volatility. It exposed deep and persistent weaknesses in political representation, institutional trust, and democratic legitimacy. In this timely interview, Professor Julio Carrión argues that Peru’s crisis is rooted not primarily in ideological polarization but in the fragmentation of the party system, the erosion of public confidence in institutions, and the growing normalization of illiberal political practices. Reflecting on the enduring appeal of Fujimorismo, anti-establishment politics, democratic fatigue, and declining rule of law, Professor Carrión warns that Peru may be entering a “post-populist” era in which democracy survives formally but steadily deteriorates in quality. The interview offers important insights into democratic resilience and democratic erosion across Latin America.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Peru’s 2026 presidential election has once again exposed the deep structural weaknesses that have long characterized the country’s democratic system. The narrow runoff victory of Keiko Fujimori over Roberto Sánchez followed an extraordinarily fragmented first-round contest involving dozens of candidates and revealed not only the persistence of anti-establishment sentiment but also the continuing erosion of political representation, institutional trust, and democratic legitimacy. While Peru remains formally democratic, growing concerns over political instability, institutional capture, declining public confidence, and the normalization of illiberal political practices have raised fundamental questions about the future of democratic governance in the country.

Few scholars are better positioned to assess these developments than Professor Julio Carrión, Professor of Comparative and Latin American Politics and Populism at the University of Delaware. Throughout his distinguished career, Professor Carrión has examined democratic legitimacy, populism, public opinion, political representation, and democratic accountability across Latin America, with particular attention to Peru’s enduring institutional vulnerabilities.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Carrión argues that Peru’s current predicament extends far beyond electoral volatility. The election results themselves, he contends, provide “prima facie evidence of the deep crisis of political representation,” noting that the two runoff candidates together secured only 29 percent of first-round votes, forcing the overwhelming majority of Peruvians to choose between candidates they had initially rejected. For Professor Carrión, this reflects a political system marked by extreme fragmentation and weakening links between citizens and parties.

The interview also explores the enduring appeal of Fujimorismo, anti-establishment politics, regional divisions, and the persistent tensions between Lima and the provinces. Yet Professor Carrión’s most sobering assessment concerns the broader state of Peruvian democracy. Repeated confrontations between presidents and Congress, institutional dysfunction, and the weakening of checks and balances have, in his view, produced not democratic resilience but democratic exhaustion. Indeed, he warns that Peru’s political trajectory has brought the country dangerously close to a systemic crisis of democratic governance.

“I am very pessimistic about the prospects for Peruvian democracy,” Professor Carrión states bluntly. In his assessment, informal political coalitions have significantly weakened the rule of law, secured influence over institutions designed to provide oversight, and created conditions under which democratic erosion can continue without the dramatic ruptures that characterized earlier authoritarian episodes.

At the same time, Professor Carrión offers a broader reflection on contemporary Latin American politics. He argues that the region may be entering a “post-populist” era in which populism has become normalized rather than exceptional. While democracy may not necessarily collapse outright, illiberal practices, polarization, hardball politics, and attacks on institutional constraints have increasingly become part of the political mainstream. The result, he suggests, is a political environment in which democracy survives but steadily declines in quality.

The interview offers a timely and penetrating analysis of Peru’s uncertain future and raises broader questions about democratic resilience, populism, representation, and institutional decay across Latin America.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Julio Carrión, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Eric Hacopian.

Eric Hacopian: Armenia Won’t Become Turkey, but the Warning Signs Are There

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Armenia stands at a critical crossroads. In the aftermath of the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, amid efforts to normalize relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey, and against the backdrop of declining Russian influence, the country faces profound questions about democracy, national identity, state-building, and geopolitical orientation. In this ECPS interview, political analyst Eric Hacopian offers a candid and often provocative assessment of Armenia’s democratic trajectory. He examines the risks of democratic backsliding, the criminalization of political opposition, the implications of the government’s “Real Armenia” narrative, and the challenges of preserving freedom in a region dominated by authoritarian regimes. More broadly, Hacopian reflects on democratic resilience, national trauma, and the enduring struggle to build a competent and genuinely democratic state.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The aftermath of the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, the pursuit of a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, the normalization process with Turkey, the erosion of Russian influence, and Armenia’s gradual reorientation toward Europe have transformed the country’s political landscape and raised fundamental questions about the future of Armenian democracy. At the same time, debates over national identity, state-building, democratic resilience, constitutional reform, and the limits of geopolitical accommodation have become increasingly central to public life. As Armenia seeks to navigate a volatile regional environment marked by authoritarian neighbors, unresolved security dilemmas, and profound national trauma, the country has emerged as an important case for understanding the challenges facing democracies under conditions of war, defeat, and external pressure. 

Against this backdrop, Eric Hacopian offers a critical and often unconventional assessment of Armenia’s current trajectory. An Armenian-American political analyst, public affairs consultant, and prominent commentator on Armenian politics, democracy, state-building, and regional geopolitics, Hacopian has become one of the most outspoken voices examining the consequences of the post-war political order. In this interview, he challenges many of the dominant assumptions shaping international discussions of Armenia, arguing that the country’s political divisions cannot be reduced to a simple choice between Russia and the West. Instead, he contends that deeper questions concerning sovereignty, accountability, national memory, and democratic legitimacy lie at the heart of contemporary Armenian politics. 

Throughout the conversation, Hacopian warns against the growing tendency to frame political disagreement as evidence of foreign influence. While acknowledging Russian efforts to shape Armenian politics, he argues that democracies must avoid adopting authoritarian methods in response. As he puts it, “You cannot use Russian methods to fight Russian disinformation,” emphasizing that transparency and due process remain essential safeguards against democratic backsliding. In his view, the criminalization of opposition figures and the use of vague accusations of foreign influence risk undermining the very democratic principles that Armenia seeks to protect. 

The interview also explores the contentious debate surrounding the government’s “Real Armenia” narrative and the legacy of the Nagorno-Karabakh struggle. Hacopian argues that attempts to reinterpret the Karabakh movement as a historical mistake are generating new forms of political polarization. More broadly, he warns that linking military defeat to democratization and westernization risks alienating younger generations and creating future instability. “Because Nikol Pashinyan is unwilling to take responsibility for his own failures,” Hacopian argues, the government is increasingly “identifying failure and defeat with democratization and westernization.” 

At the same time, Hacopian reflects on Armenia’s efforts to build a more competent state, the historic decline of Russian influence after 2023, and the broader geopolitical pressures confronting the country. Yet despite his concerns, he remains optimistic about Armenia’s democratic future. For him, the country’s greatest strength lies not in any particular leader or government but in a deeply rooted political culture. “Countries become democracies—or become free—because the people in them demand it and are willing to fight for it,” he argues. This conviction underpins his broader belief that Armenia’s long-term resilience will ultimately depend less on geopolitics than on the continued determination of its citizens to defend their freedoms and democratic institutions.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Armenian-American analyst Eric Hacopian, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Javier Corrales.

Prof. Corrales: Even Rigged Elections Can Still Produce Competitive Outcomes

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At a time when democratic backsliding, populist polarization, and executive aggrandizement dominate political debate across the globe, Professor Javier Corrales offers a timely challenge to one of the most pervasive assumptions in contemporary political science: that democratic erosion inevitably culminates in consolidated authoritarianism. Drawing on his recent article, co-authored with Susan Stokes, Professor Corrales argues that elections, opposition mobilization, party coordination, and institutional constraints continue to provide viable pathways for removing democracy-eroding leaders. In this wide-ranging interview, he examines why even heavily manipulated elections can remain competitive, how opposition movements can overcome demoralization and fragmentation, why excessive presidential popularity may itself constitute a democratic vulnerability, and how courts, parties, and legal institutions shape democratic survival. His reflections offer both analytical insight and cautious optimism about the resilience of democratic politics in an age of global democratic uncertainty.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Across much of the contemporary world, democratic pessimism has become increasingly pervasive. From Latin America and Eastern Europe to South Asia and the United States, concerns about democratic backsliding, executive aggrandizement, institutional capture, and the erosion of liberal norms have fueled a growing belief that once elected leaders begin dismantling checks and balances, democratic decline becomes almost irreversible. In this climate, elections are often viewed with skepticism, particularly when incumbents manipulate institutions, tilt the playing field, and exploit state resources to entrench themselves in power.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Javier Corrales challenges this prevailing narrative. As the Dwight W. Morrow Professor of Political Science at Amherst College and one of the foremost scholars of democratic backsliding, populism, and authoritarianism, Professor Corrales has spent decades examining how democracies erode and how leaders concentrate power. Yet his recent work, co-authored with Susan Stokes and published in the Journal of Democracy under the title “How Aspiring Autocrats Exit,” offers a more nuanced and cautiously optimistic perspective. Rather than focusing exclusively on how democracies die, Professor Corrales asks an equally important question: How do aspiring autocrats leave power?

The answer, he argues, is more encouraging than many observers assume. While acknowledging that “there is plenty of evidence that illiberal presidents and hyper-populist presidents can undermine democracy, concentrate power, and erode liberal democracy,” Professor Corrales emphasizes that “they often do not go much farther than that, and they may even get ejected from office.” Indeed, one of the central findings of his research is that the most traditional democratic mechanism remains surprisingly resilient. As he puts it, “the most old-fashioned route is still available, which is defeating them at the polls.”

This conclusion runs counter to widespread assumptions about electoral politics under conditions of democratic erosion. Professor Corrales notes that many backsliding leaders continue to maintain elections even after weakening institutional constraints. Although such contests are frequently marred by irregularities and heavily skewed in favor of incumbents, they often remain meaningful arenas of political competition. “These elections,” he observes, “are very often incredibly rigged in favor of the incumbent. But the election still happens, and there can be enough opportunities for competition.”

The key challenge, according to Professor Corrales, is not merely institutional manipulation but political demoralization. Autocratizing leaders seek to convince citizens, and opposition forces that resistance is futile. Yet the comparative evidence from countries as diverse as Poland, Hungary, Brazil, Zambia, and elsewhere suggests that democratic recovery remains possible when opposition forces overcome fragmentation, mobilize new voters, and maintain faith in electoral competition.

In this interview Professor Corrales discusses the resilience of elections, the importance of opposition unity, the dangers of excessive presidential popularity, the role of courts and parties in democratic survival, and the common authoritarian playbook shared by populist leaders across ideological divides. His reflections offer a timely reminder that democratic backsliding is neither predetermined nor irreversible—and that even under adverse conditions, democratic institutions can still provide pathways to political renewal.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Javier Corrales, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Beatriz Magaloni

Prof. Magaloni: Democratic Backsliding Is Not Universal; People Still Believe in Democracy, but They Want Better Delivery

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Professor Beatriz Magaloni, Graham Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University, argues that contemporary democratic crises cannot be understood solely through institutional erosion or elite manipulation. Drawing on her recent research, she contends that growing dissatisfaction with democracy stems largely from failures of delivery rather than a rejection of democratic values themselves. While citizens remain strongly committed to civil liberties, competitive elections, and democratic norms, many feel that democratic governments are no longer providing security, opportunity, and effective public services. In this wide-ranging ECPS interview, Professor Magaloni examines democratic backsliding, populist leadership, authoritarian resilience, polarization, immigration, and the future of democracy. Her central message is clear: people still believe in democracy, but democracies must deliver better if they are to retain public trust and legitimacy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

At a time when democratic backsliding, populist mobilization, declining institutional trust, and the rise of high-performing autocracies are reshaping political life across the globe, scholars and policymakers are increasingly confronted with a fundamental question: Are contemporary democratic crises primarily the result of institutional erosion and elite manipulation, or do they stem from a deeper failure of democratic systems to deliver tangible benefits to citizens? Few scholars are better positioned to address this question than Professor Beatriz Magaloni, the Graham Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford University and one of the world’s leading authorities on democracy, authoritarianism, state capacity, and political development.

Through seminal works such as Voting for Autocracy and a distinguished body of research on authoritarian resilience, electoral politics, governance, and political violence, Professor Magaloni has transformed scholarly understanding of why citizens support political regimes and how both democracies and autocracies maintain legitimacy. In recent years, her research has increasingly focused on the relationship between democratic legitimacy and state performance, arguing that democratic survival depends not only on institutions and norms but also on governments’ capacity to deliver meaningful outcomes.

In this wide-ranging interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Magaloni challenges conventional explanations of democratic decline that focus exclusively on populist leaders or institutional weaknesses. While acknowledging that democratic support remains rooted in principles and freedoms, she argues that scholars have overlooked what she calls “the critical importance of delivery.” Across regions as diverse as Europe, Latin America, Asia, and North America, voters increasingly believe that “democracy is not delivering what they want” and express growing dissatisfaction with democratic governance.

Yet Professor Magaloni rejects the notion that democracy itself is losing public legitimacy. On the contrary, she insists that “democratic backsliding is not universal” and cautions against interpreting dissatisfaction with government performance as a wholesale rejection of democratic values. Drawing on extensive survey research, she emphasizes that citizens remain strongly committed to core democratic principles, particularly civil liberties and competitive elections. “There is still commitment to democratic norms,” she argues. “What people are telling us is: please deliver better.”

The interview explores why citizens increasingly support anti-establishment leaders, how authoritarian regimes cultivate loyalty through performance and selective benefits, why immigration has become a powerful driver of populist radical-right mobilization, and how democratic institutions are being challenged in both established and emerging democracies. Despite expressing concern about contemporary developments—particularly in the United States and parts of Latin America—Professor Magaloni ultimately offers a cautiously optimistic assessment of democracy’s future. Her central message is both sobering and hopeful: citizens have not abandoned democracy, but democratic governments must become far more effective at meeting citizens’ expectations if they hope to preserve public trust and democratic resilience.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Beatriz Magaloni, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Georg Lutz

Prof. Lutz: Population Aging Has Changed the Immigration Debate in Switzerland

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Switzerland’s rejection of the Swiss People’s Party’s proposal to cap the country’s population at ten million has been widely interpreted as a crucial test of contemporary European politics. While the referendum exposed persistent anxieties about immigration, housing, infrastructure, and national identity, it also revealed an emerging counter-narrative centered on demographic aging and labor-market needs. In this interview with the ECPS, Professor Georg Lutz examines the referendum’s implications for direct democracy, populism, and the future of liberal democracy. He discusses the resilience of the populist radical right, the role of issue ownership in electoral politics, and the opportunities and limits of direct democracy. Professor Lutz also reflects on political distrust, misinformation, democratic participation, and the evolving relationship between popular sovereignty and constitutional liberalism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Switzerland is frequently portrayed as the world’s most sophisticated laboratory of direct democracy—a political system in which citizens regularly decide major policy questions through referendums and popular initiatives. Yet the country’s June 2026 referendum on the Swiss People’s Party’s (SVP) proposal to cap the population at ten million revealed that even Switzerland’s celebrated democratic model is increasingly shaped by the same tensions confronting liberal democracies across Europe: migration, demographic change, economic insecurity, national identity, and the rise of the populist radical right.

Although voters ultimately rejected the initiative, the campaign exposed deep divisions over immigration and the future direction of Swiss society. More importantly, it highlighted a significant shift in public debate. As Professor Georg Lutzargues in this interview, discussions about immigration are no longer driven solely by concerns over cultural identity or social cohesion. For the first time, a prominent counter-argument emerged around demographic realities and economic necessity. In his words, “all populations in European countries are aging,” and immigration was increasingly discussed as “something that is also necessary for the labor market.” As he notes, “we see a bit of a shift in this debate compared to what we have seen in previous times.”

In this wide-ranging conversation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Lutz—Director of FORS, the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences, and Professor of Political Science at the University of Lausanne—offers a nuanced assessment of the referendum, the resilience of the SVP, and the broader relationship between direct democracy and populism. Rejecting simplistic interpretations, he argues that the referendum result represented both a setback and a success for the SVP. While the initiative failed, “45 percent of the Swiss population voted in favor of limiting the population to 10 million,” a figure substantially higher than the party’s own electoral support.

The interview also explores whether direct democracy serves as a safeguard against populism or inadvertently empowers it. Professor Lutz challenges common assumptions on both sides of the debate. While acknowledging concerns about minority rights and majoritarian pressures, he argues that “the reality is much more nuanced” than many critics suggest. Direct democracy, he contends, is deeply intertwined with representative institutions and often acts as an indirect mechanism of accountability rather than a revolutionary alternative to parliamentary politics.

Perhaps most importantly, Professor Lutz shifts attention away from institutional design and toward what he sees as the more pressing threats facing contemporary democracies: the fragmentation of information systems, the spread of misinformation, growing political distrust, and systematic efforts to undermine confidence in democratic institutions. In an era of polarization and populist mobilization, his reflections offer important insights into both the strengths and vulnerabilities of democratic governance in Switzerland and beyond.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Georg Lutz, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.

Professor Marlene Laruelle.

Prof. Laruelle: Liberalism Is No Longer the Only Game in Town as It Was for the Past Four Decades

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Professor Marlene Laruelle argues that the contemporary challenge to liberal democracy extends far beyond electoral populism. In this wide-ranging ECPS interview, she contends that illiberalism has evolved into a substantive political project that offers alternative visions of identity, belonging, community, and political order. Rejecting the notion that liberal democracy is merely a victim of external threats, Professor Laruelle emphasizes that many illiberal movements emerge from liberalism’s own contradictions, particularly the socio-economic and cultural consequences of neoliberalism. The interview explores the future of Trumpism, Christian nationalism, Russia’s role in global ideological networks, the rise of alternative epistemic communities, and the cultural foundations of “banal illiberalism.” Despite her concerns, Professor Laruelle sees the current moment as an opportunity to rethink and renew democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Marlene Laruelle, Full Professor in the Department of Political Science at Luiss University in Rome and one of the foremost scholars of illiberalism, ideological contestation, and the global challenges facing liberal democracy, argues that contemporary politics can no longer be adequately understood through the lens of populism alone. Instead, she contends that the rise of illiberalism reflects a deeper ideological transformation—one that challenges the normative dominance liberalism has enjoyed since the end of the Cold War and forces democracies to confront fundamental questions about identity, belonging, and political community.

Drawing on her extensive scholarship on illiberalism, Russia, transnational ideological networks, and democratic contestation, Professor Laruelle maintains that “illiberalism is an alternative political project” rather than merely a reactionary or anti-democratic impulse. While populism functions as a mobilizing framework organized around the opposition between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” illiberalism offers a more substantive worldview that questions the foundational assumptions of the liberal order itself. In her view, understanding why illiberalism resonates requires moving beyond electoral behavior and examining the deeper social imaginaries through which citizens seek meaning, moral order, and collective belonging.

A central theme of the interview is Professor Laruelle’s rejection of the notion that illiberalism is simply liberalism’s external adversary. Instead, she argues that “liberalism is generating its own critics from within.” The social and economic consequences of neoliberal globalization, rising inequality, cultural fragmentation, and the erosion of shared forms of citizenship have created a growing demand for political projects that promise identity, security, and community. As she notes, liberal institutions often respond through procedural neutrality and technocratic solutions, while many citizens increasingly seek “belonging” and “meaningful answers.” This mismatch, she suggests, helps explain the appeal of illiberal movements across the democratic world.

Perhaps the most striking argument advanced by Professor Laruelle concerns the durability of the illiberal challenge. Contrary to interpretations that view Trumpism, Orbánism, and related movements as temporary electoral phenomena, she argues that “the illiberal offer is here to stay.” Electoral defeats may alter political leadership, but they do not eliminate the deeper cultural narratives, moral frameworks, and social aspirations that sustain illiberal politics. Indeed, Professor Laruelle believes that contemporary democracies are entering a new era of ideological competition in which “liberalism is no longer the obvious normative answer” and “no longer the only game in town, as it was for the last 30 or 40 years.”

The interview also explores the transnational circulation of illiberal ideas, Christian nationalism and its challenge to liberal pluralism, Russia’s role as an ideological laboratory rather than a “puppet master,” the emergence of alternative epistemic communities in the digital age, and the growing importance of what Professor Laruelle calls the cultural and everyday dimensions of “banal illiberalism.” Throughout, she emphasizes that the future of liberal democracy depends not only on institutional resilience but also on its ability to recover a compelling moral and social vision.

Yet despite her sober diagnosis, Professor Laruelle concludes on a cautiously hopeful note. The current crisis of liberalism, she argues, should also be understood as an opportunity—an invitation to reopen debates about the social contract, political imagination, and the kind of democratic future citizens wish to build together.

Here is the revised version of our interview with Professor Marlene Laruelle, edited lightly to enhance clarity, readability, and overall flow for publication.