A man clasps his hands in prayer during the opening ceremonies of President Donald Trump’s "Keep America Great" rally at the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New Jersey, on January 28, 2020. Photo by Benjamin Clapp.

Professor Ingersoll: The Theocratic Blueprint of Christian Nationalism, Reconstructionism, and Catholic Integralism Behind Trump’s Agenda

by Editor’s ChoiceExtremism & RadicalisationHomeInterviews

In an exclusive interview with ECPS, Professor Julie Ingersoll exposes how Christian Nationalism, Reconstructionism, and Catholic Integralism have coalesced into a powerful theocratic force behind Trump’s second presidency. She explains how these groups reject democracy, embrace authoritarian governance, and aim to reshape American society under biblical rule. “They all seek to make religion the dominant force in shaping society,” she warns, highlighting Project 2025 and figures like Paula White as key players in this movement. This is not a fleeting moment but a systematic, decades-long effort to transform US governance.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

For decades, the influence of religion on American politics has been a subject of intense debate. While the United States was founded on principles of religious freedom, it has never fully separated faith from governance. Now, with Donald Trump’s second presidency, this intersection is more powerful than ever, as a broad-based coalition of Christian movements seeks to shape policy and redefine democracy itself.

In a revealing interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Julie Ingersoll, Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies and Religious Studies Program Coordinator at the University of North Florida, unpacks how Christian Reconstructionism, Christian Nationalism, and Catholic Integralism have coalesced into a powerful force behind Trump’s agenda and the broader transformation of American governance.

“It’s huge. And this is where we get into expanding our understanding from Christian Reconstructionism specifically to the broad-based coalition of various versions of Christianity that are in power at the moment,” says Professor Ingersoll.

She traces this movement’s ideological roots back 75 years—to Christian Reconstructionists, who developed a biblical worldview that sought to apply scripture to every aspect of life. Over time, they joined forces with Charismatic Pentecostals, forming what is now called the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR)—a movement that believes in spiritual warfare, divine authority, and the division of people into “God’s people” and “Satan’s people.”

But their influence doesn’t stop there. A third group—Catholic Integralists—have also entered the political fray, advocating for a return to a society in which the church and state are united under a hierarchical order. These groups, Professor Ingersoll warns, are not merely religious factions but political actors with a shared vision of theocratic governance.

“They all seek to make religion the dominant force in shaping how society functions. While they may have different visions of what that should look like, they agree on the goal,” she explains.

One of the most striking elements of this coalition is its rejection of democracy. While they tolerate elections when they serve their interests, they are equally comfortable with authoritarian rule, monarchy, or any system that delivers a biblically ordered society.

As these forces gain more power—through figures like Paula White in the White House or Project 2025 at the Heritage Foundation— Professor Ingersoll argues that ignoring their long-term ambitions is dangerous. This is not a fleeting moment in American politics; it is a systematic effort to reshape the country’s future.

Dr. Julie Ingersoll, Professor of Philosophy & Religious Studies and Religious Studies Program Coordinator at the University of North Florida.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Julie Ingersoll with some edits.

How Christian Nationalism Challenges Secular Governance in the US

Professor Ingersoll, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: The US was founded on the  principle of religious freedom, yet religion has always played a central role in shaping its political identity. How do you see the tension between secular governance and religious influence in American political history?

Professor Julie Ingersoll: That’s a really complicated question, which is interesting because most of the discourse about it is very simplified. You have one faction in the US that says the Founding Fathers wanted religion in the public square, and then another faction that says, “No, no, no, they were secularists,” when, in fact, the historical truth is somewhere in between.

The way the Constitution was originally set up, there was no federal prohibition on established churches; the prohibition, or the Establishment Clause, only applied to the federal government. So, in the founding era, there was an assumption that the federal government would be religiously neutral, as a compromise between the different religious communities that were dominant in various states. However, there were state-established churches at that time, and I believe the last state to disestablish its churches was Massachusetts in the 19th century.

So, it isn’t the case that America’s founding was based purely on religious freedom. Rather, it was a decentralized system that evolved over time. This, in part, is why the conflict over secular governance and religious influence continues today.

Christian Nationalism has been a growing force in American politics. In what ways has it influenced policy-making and public discourse, and how does it compare to earlier religious movements in American history?

Professor Julie Ingersoll: Well, the conversation about religious nationalism using that label is relatively recent. If you go back to the middle of the 20th century, we were talking about the Religious Right. Then we talked about the New Religious Right, which meant that we needed a name for what came before, so we called that the Old Christian Right. Then there was the Tea Party and other movements.

In my view, these movements were just different iterations of the same impulses, but scholars and journalists have given them different names, demarcating them from each other. I think that’s a problem because we lose the thread that shows that this tension—between a secular civil society and a religious civil society—goes all the way back to the founding era and even the pre-founding era. When the Puritans settled New England, they thought they were building a theocracy. They wanted religious freedom for themselves, not for everyone.

So again, this tension runs throughout American history and is replicated in different eras. Today, we are calling the side that wants a theocratic—or at least theocratically tinged—public square “Christian Nationalists.” But, in my view, this is not a new movement.

How Religious Narratives Shape American Power and Policy

A “God, Guns, and Trump” sign displayed on an old military bus following the 2020 presidential election in November 2020, Tampa, Florida. Photo by Florida Chuck.

Many political leaders have framed the US as a divinely chosen nation. How has this religious narrative shaped American foreign and domestic policies over time?

Professor Julie Ingersoll: Oh, that’s such a huge question, isn’t it?

I think the most important thing is what Americans have come to call American exceptionalism. When the Puritans built a theocratic New England, they used the famous phrase that Ronald Reagan later popularized—that it was going to be a “city on a hill.” This phrase came from the Puritans, and what they meant by it was that their society would be so impressive that everyone around the world would emulate it. So they had these kind of expansionist goals from the very beginning.

It was always rooted in this divine right that early Americans believed they had—and that many Americans still do—to shape not only their own communities but also to transfer what they think is God’s will to the rest of the world.

Evangelical Christians have been a powerful political bloc, particularly since the late 20th century. What historical factors contributed to their political influence, and how has it evolved in the 21st century?

Professor Julie Ingersoll: Again, I have to say I’ve been very impressed with your questions. They’re rooted in some solid research on the issues at hand, and even in my own work, for the purpose of asking me questions, and I appreciate that so much.

My book Building God’s Kingdom traces the rise of today’s iteration of theocratic Protestantism. Now, there are a couple of other threads that make up the contemporary movement that we’re calling Christian Nationalism, and we could talk about those. But the Protestant movement itself is rooted in a mid-20th-century obscure group called Christian Reconstructionism.

The Christian Reconstructionists had a whole worldview about how the Bible applies to every area of life, and they meant that literally. They detailed how that would play out in a biblical society. Most theological systems sort of fall by the wayside. Most of the ones that have developed across history we’ve never even heard of, let alone have they taken hold.

But what happened with the Christian Reconstructionists is they developed the view that public education was unbiblical and that it should ultimately be dismantled. In order to make that happen, they developed the Christian school movement, and the foundations of that led to the Christian homeschool movement. Without the Christian Reconstructionists, you wouldn’t have had those movements, and those movements spread the obscure group’s ideas out to the broader conservative evangelical subculture.

People who had never heard of Christian Reconstructionists often sent their kids to Christian schools, and the Christian Reconstructionist way of thinking about things framed the curriculum that Christian schools promote. Then, of course, a decade or so later, on that foundation, the Christian homeschool movement developed. So those two educational movements, which have been 75 years in the making, have shaped this contemporary evangelical understanding of the relationship between church and state and the role of Christians in politics.

The Role of Religion in Shaping Social Change and Political Polarization

A homeowner displaying their political affiliation and religious devotion on their front lawn in Forest, Virginia, USA, on August 21, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Religion has played a dual role in both supporting and resisting social change in America, from abolitionism to civil rights to contemporary issues. How do religious traditions shape activism and policy debates today? Your work especially discusses the rise of affective polarization in American politics. How do religious identity and political affiliation reinforce each other in this dynamic?​

Professor Julie Ingersoll: I consider it a rise of affective politics. My approach to the study of religion comes out of social science and even social history rather than theology. People who approach religion through the study of theology presuppose that theological systems, theologies, and ideas come first and that cultural developments follow.

I, as a social scientist, take a different view. I think culture comes first. For me, there is no Christianity that exists apart from history and culture. So I don’t think you can go back to a time where affective politics wasn’t part of what we are now calling religion. I think religions serve to establish social boundaries between different groups, reinforce those boundaries, and make people inside those boundaries feel like they have a particularly correct, appropriate, or valuable way of seeing the world over and against the people that get put on the outside of those social boundaries. And that’s deeply political from the very beginning.

So, I don’t know that if that has changed. But it is the case that progressive Christianity has long served as an alternative vision of how religion should engage in politics. Certainly, in America, the Black Church has had a deeply profound influence on thinking about how religion might engage in the public square, and these are starkly different versions of what Christianity means in the political sphere.

The versions between, say, the Black Church, progressive Christians, and Socialist Catholics share certain understandings about how Christianity should engage the public sphere. And that’s very distinctly different from how the Christian Nationalist, Christian Reconstructionist folks think about how Christianity should shape the public sphere.

Can you please explain the concepts of Christian Reconstructionism and Christian Nationalism for our audience? Your work traces the ideological influence of Christian Reconstructionism on contemporary politics. What are the keyways in which Reconstructionist theology continues to shape the Christian Right today?​

Professor Julie Ingersoll: The Christian Reconstructionist movement—this is what I primarily write about—has its origins at least as early as the 1950s, but certainly the 1960s in the US. The key figure there was R.J. Rushdoony.

He developed a system in which Christians think of the Bible as a continuous whole, from Genesis to Revelation. They don’t understand there to be a disjuncture between the Old Testament and the New Testament the way a lot of modern Christians do. They believe that this continuous revelation from the Old Testament to the New Testament provides everything needed to understand how to live in the world.

There are theological structures through which they interpret what the Bible says about specific topics, and we could discuss this if you’d like. But for some people, that level of detail is a little too in the weeds. Nevertheless, they develop a system that speaks to every part of life. A central idea in this system is that God granted authority to humans in three distinct spheres: the church, the family, and civil government. These encompass everything regarding how humans should live, at least according to Christian Reconstructionists.

Each of these spheres has distinct tasks and is given specific authority. They are not allowed to interfere with the authority granted to the other spheres. This concept becomes particularly important when discussing education because, in this framework, education is a task assigned to families. Therefore, the state has no legitimate role in educating children. This belief leads them to conclude that public schools are unbiblical and should be dismantled.

This also explains how they can claim to believe in the separation of church and state, even though, from an outside perspective, it doesn’t appear that they do. In their view, the church and the state have separate authority derived from God and are assigned separate tasks. However, both remain under the authority of the Bible, making it a theocratic system despite the distinct roles of church and state.

This distinction confuses a lot of people. Some assume they are simply being dishonest when they claim to support the separation of church and state. They’re not lying. The question is how much they allow the misunderstanding to persist. Some people will hear them say they believe in the separation of church and state and just accept it at face value. Others will push back and say, “But that doesn’t make sense.” And if you press them, you’ll see that they mean something entirely different by it.

Christian Nationalism Plays Huge in the Second Trump Administration

A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.

What roles do these two concepts, Christian Reconstructionism and Christian Nationalism play in the second Trump administration?

Professor Julie Ingersoll: Well, it’s huge, it’s huge. And this is where we can get into expanding our understanding from Christian Reconstructionism specifically to the broad-based coalition of various versions of Christianity that are in power at the moment.

So, in the movement that we’re calling Christian Nationalism, you do have a thread rooted in a kind of traditional Protestantism—a Calvinist kind of Protestantism, such as Presbyterianism, maybe some early Baptists, or the Christian Reformed movement—and that is Christian Reconstruction. But in addition to that, you have a charismatic Pentecostal movement.

For readers or listeners who may not be familiar, Pentecostalism emerged in the 20th century as a version of Christianity that emphasizes a literal spiritual realm. It includes practices distinct from other forms of Christianity, such as speaking in tongues, miraculous healing, and other actions described in the Bible that most other Christian traditions tend to mythologize. These believers are called Charismatics and Pentecostals.

In the 1980s, Christian Reconstructionists started working with Pentecostals to bring them around to the idea of applying the Bible to every area of life. They called this Dominionism. Over time, this Dominionist Pentecostalism evolved into what is now called the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR).

When you see figures like Paula White, who was appointed head of the faith-based office in the White House, she comes from this New Apostolic Reformation movement. While it may sound benign, their view of “spiritual warfare” is central to their ideology. They don’t interpret it as a personal struggle against sin, as many Christians do, but as a literal battle in which people are divided into God’s people and Satan’s people. This apocalyptic worldview has become a crucial part of the movement.

At the same time, the Christian Reconstructionists and the New Apostolic Reformation have joined forces with a third movement within US Christianity: Catholic Integralism. This movement draws from a medieval form of Catholicism in which the Church and State were united under a monarchy. You can see this influence at institutions like the Heritage Foundation, which produced Project 2025.

All three of these groups—Christian Reconstructionists, the New Apostolic Reformation, and Catholic Integralists—share key components of Christian Nationalism and have made common cause. One shared component is a theocratic impulse; they all seek to make religion the dominant force in shaping how society functions. While they may have different visions of what that should look like, they agree on the goal.

Another shared characteristic is their lack of commitment to democracy. They are fine with democracy if it leads to a religiously based, biblical society, but they are also comfortable with monarchy or authoritarian structures as long as they result in the “right” kind of biblical society. These groups have united around these core ideas.

In practice, their influence is visible. There is a faith-based office in the White House led by a New Apostolic Reformation figure. Catholic Integralists were behind Project 2025, which essentially serves as the policy agenda for the Trump administration. Meanwhile, Christian Reconstructionists laid much of the ideological groundwork over the last 75 years to make this possible.

So, yeah, I think that answers your question.

Tech Elites and Religious Extremists Unite to Undermine Democracy and Equality

Donald Trump and Elon Musk on the X social media platform. Photo: Rokas Tenys.

In the interview you gave to the Guardian on January 24th, you underline that: ‘“When these guys say they believe in the separation of church and state, they’re being duplicitous. They do believe in separate spheres for church and state, but also in a theocratic authority that sits above both.’ Do you mean that Trump and his team do endorse a theocratic authority above democracy? If yes, how much of a danger do these people pose to American democracy and American secularism?

Professor Julie Ingersoll: Well, I didn’t mean Trump necessarily. I meant the coalition of Christian groups that are behind the Trump administration. Because I think that you do have more secularized versions of political organization that also join in the goals of the Christian Nationalists. So let me back up just a little bit.

Because I treat religion like a social scientist, I recognize that the categories we’re using to talk about these things are socially and culturally produced. So, for example, the distinctions between the Reconstructionists, the New Apostolic Reformation, and the Catholics—we can think of those as distinct and separate movements with clear-cut boundaries for the purpose of understanding. But in reality, that’s not the case. These are fluid movements, and they make common cause where it’s useful. The people on the ground are not necessarily concerned about theological consistency, so they’ll embrace part of what one of these groups says and let go of the rest if it doesn’t fit their worldview.

Likewise, there’s no strict division between these three religious groups that we’re calling Christian Nationalists and other groups that we might not think of as religious but share some of the same underlying concerns about how society should function. For example, I think the best contemporary example is the “Tech Bros” out of Silicon Valley. These folks are not religious per se. They’re not necessarily connected to Christian Nationalism, but they share underlying views about how society should be ordered. They believe that certain people are naturally more equipped to be leaders, while others ought to be followers. They hold a commitment to the idea that there is some moral right for those who are equipped to lead to take charge and do what they think is best.

These Tech Bros coming out of Silicon Valley are also not committed to the idea of democracy or to the principles of equality that underpin it. All three of those religious groups, along with the Tech Bros, agree that equality is a problematic category. They are not committed to the idea that all human beings are equal, and they believe that efforts to promote equality in society undermine the strength and power of society.

So the lines between the religious groups and the secular groups aren’t as clear in reality as we often think they are. We talk about them as though they are distinct, and in some ways, they are, but in other ways, they are not. So, in Trump’s administration, you have a coalescence of factions in society who do not believe in equality, who aren’t committed to democracy, and in particular, who—at least in expressions found in the US—believe that white people are superior and that men are superior.

So, in terms of leadership, you’ll see that play out in the administration, where the leaders will mostly be white and mostly be men, and they will actively work to undermine what has historically been a commitment to increasing equality in civil society. That is a goal they do not support. You also see this playing out in international relations. It comes down to this idea that “might makes right.”

And with Trump’s recent conversations about Gaza and about Ukraine and Russia, the underlying thread is that if you have the power to take the land, then it’s okay. It’s moral for you to do so. If you have the power, you have the right to do it.

All of these groups might have different justifications for why they have power. The Christian ones will say, “Well, we have the power because God gave it to us.” Others might not invoke God but instead claim that power comes from a kind of moral superiority of a certain class of people. But in practice, those two views aren’t different. They both build a society that is colonizing.

Christian Nationalism’s Theocratic Push and Its Threat to Democracy

Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

In the same interview, you argue that “So their commitment is to theocracy: the government of civil society according to biblical law and biblical revelation.” Can we call this the resurgence of Christian fundamentalism? How do you think fundamentalist Christian groups and other religious movements will be affected by the second Trump administration?

Professor Julie Ingersoll: For me, fundamentalism is a specific movement in Christianity that is tied to a particular place and time. It’s a Protestant Christian movement that originates in the late 19th, early 20th century, and has its heyday up through, say, the 1950s. It’s a specific thing, and efforts to argue that there are fundamentalists across the globe and to export that language, I think, are problematic.

But here’s another way to think about it. There’s a scholar in religious studies whose work I use a lot and really like. His name is Bruce Lincoln, and he talks about religious movements in terms of how they understand their place in larger society. He categorizes them into two groups: minimalist and maximalist.

He explains that Enlightenment philosophers were attempting to put a hold on the wars of religion that were happening in Europe. They aimed to make religion exist within its own sphere, distinct from the rest of society. Religion was still very powerful in a spiritual and personal way, but not in a public way. He calls the movements that adopted this modernist way of thinking about religion “minimalist.” He calls those that reject it and believe that religion speaks to all areas of life “maximalist.”

I think that is a more helpful framework for conceptualizing this issue. If you consider early fundamentalism in 20th-century America, they were maximalist. They rejected the idea that religion should be limited to a private, personal matter. Certain forms of Islam around the world are also maximalist, just like Christian fundamentalists of the 20th century. Other forms of Islam are minimalist. American Muslims, for example, mostly resemble other religious groups in the US in this regard.

At my university, we often have interfaith events where a Protestant, a Catholic, a Jew, a Hindu, and a Muslim share a stage and talk with each other. It quickly becomes clear that they have more in common with one another as minimalists than they do with their counterparts under the same religious label who are maximalists. My colleagues at UNF, who are Muslims, are minimalist Muslims, and they can engage in discussions with minimalist Jews, but they don’t really talk to maximalist Muslims. The same pattern applies to Jews, Christians, and Hindus.

So, I think this is a better way to understand the rise of fundamentalism. These categories are less tied to a specific place and time than the language of fundamentalism itself.

In your article titled ‘Classification matters: Hiding violence in Christianity in the US,’ you argue that: “Since Christianity is the dominant religious tradition in the US, it is the beneficiary of rhetorical structures and classification systems that function to obscure its relationship to violence.” In the West, it is usually Islam that is strongly associated with violence. How do you think these classifications shape public perceptions of religious extremism in the US?​ Can you explain the relationship between violence and Christianity and the dynamics of this relationship?

Professor Julie Ingersoll: Well, this is great because this question follows the last one, right? We’re not talking about all Christians. Christianity in general, if there were such a thing, isn’t necessarily violent, but there are forms of Christianity that see the employment of violence as legitimate, just as there are forms of Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism— and even Buddhism—that legitimize the use of violence.

By those structures that hide it, in the context of the US—a society infused with forms of Christianity—the result is that, a decade ago, as Americans, we could readily see Islamic forms of violence around the world. But when a group identified with Christianity enacted violence, there was no notion that it represented Christianity in general, right? So, when Muslims committed acts of violence, they were associated with all of Islam. But when Christians committed acts of violence, they were disassociated: Oh, that’s an aberrant form of Christianity. Those aren’t “real” Christians, right?

Those dividing lines separated the rest of us—who are “nice people” and “not violent” (in quotes as a distancing mechanism)—so that everyday Americans could look at someone like Timothy McVeigh, who blew up the federal building in Oklahoma City, killing a lot of people, including many children, and say, Oh, but he wasn’t really a Christian. But yes, he was. Yet he didn’t get identified as a Christian terrorist. He didn’t even get identified as a terrorist. He was labeled as a kind of right-wing crazy guy who committed a violent act.

If Timothy McVeigh had been a Muslim, that would have been framed as Islamic violence attacking us. The way these events are framed is shaped by the fact that Americans take for granted a Christian backdrop and more easily discern the distinctions between various forms of Christianity than they would with a religious tradition that is less familiar.

There are other answers to that question, but yeah, this discussion could go on for a long time.

The Media’s Failure to Capture Long-Term Influence of Christian Nationalism

Christian singer Sean Feucht hosts a “Worship Protest” on the National Mall in Washington, DC, during the COVID-19 pandemic on October 25, 2020. Photo: Nicole Glass.

And the last question, Professor Ingersoll; in the article “From Christian Reconstruction to Christian Nationalism: What the media need to know about the 75-year effort to establish theocracy in the US,” you critique how media coverage of Christian Nationalism often fails to grasp its long-term influence. What changes would you recommend for journalists covering this topic?​ 

Professor Julie Ingersoll: Well, it’s interesting how you organize this, because this question really brings us back to much earlier in our conversation about Christian nationalism—what it is and how we think about it. One of the things the media does—and scholars do it too, particularly those who don’t root their work in history and lack a historical sense of the development of things—is systematically rename this group of Christians, whatever you call them.

The consistent renaming happens about every 10 years. Around five or six years into that cycle, reporters say, Oh, well, they’re gone now. Then, a few years later, they’re not gone. A few years after that, something happens—often an election—and people start recognizing them again, but under a new name.

This renaming has some advantages. For example, talking about evangelicalism—which is how I used to refer to this movement—suggests that it is mostly Protestant. Calling it Christian nationalism today expands the way we see it to include Catholics and Charismatics, which is helpful. But the problem with this renaming is that it erases the historical trajectory.

As a result, we, as a culture, think this movement has just arisen out of nowhere. In fact, some reporters even ask, Who could have thought this would happen? Well, everybody who has been paying attention should know that this could happen because they’ve been trying to do it for at least 75 years—really, even longer.

We miss the long-term time horizon with which these people work. If we rename them every 10 years, decide they have disappeared, and fail to connect the previous version to the new one that arises, we misunderstand the movement. Because of this mistaken sense of time, we think we can address the issue within an election cycle. People believe that if they can just power through the Trump administration for two years, they can change everything in the midterms.

We might have a midterm election—I hope we do—and we might be able to change the composition of the three branches of government in a way that could make things better. But even if that happens, this movement doesn’t go away. They’ve been working on this for a long time, and they will continue to work on it.

Two quick illustrations of this long-term project:

  1. Project 2025, which now serves as the blueprint for a second Trump administration, didn’t come out of nowhere. The Heritage Foundation started developing these plans—under the larger name The Mandate for Leadership—going into the Reagan administration. Every four years, they have released a new version. The latest one is by far the most comprehensive. They got right to work at the end of the last Trump administration, and if you read that document, the level of detail is overwhelming. This is the most coherent version of their strategy so far, but it is not new. They have been doing this since the late 1970s.
  2. Christian Reconstructionists in the homeschool movement have created a curriculum that instructs families to build a 200-year plan for a family dynasty. They encourage homeschooling families to sit down at their kitchen table and map out a two-century-long plan for their descendants.

This is not something that can be resolved in two years. What I would like the media to recognize is the long-term nature of this movement because the only way to address it is to also work long-term.

Supporters of the Flemish far-right party Vlaams Belang wave Flanders flags during a protest in Brussels, Belgium, on May 29, 2023. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

Dr. van Haute: The Habits of Consensus Democracy Are Slowly Fading in Belgium

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Belgium’s long-standing reputation as a consociational democracy—marked by power-sharing, compromise, and consensus-building—is under strain. According to Dr. Emilie van Haute, the country’s political landscape has undergone a fundamental transformation, with growing polarization and the increasing influence of populist radical parties. In this compelling interview with the ECPS, Dr. van Haute examines the rise of populism on both the left and right, the impact of linguistic divisions, and how mainstream parties are adapting to radical competition. She provides valuable insights into Belgium’s shifting democracy and the challenges ahead.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Belgium has long been regarded as a model of consociational democracy, characterized by political compromise, power-sharing, and consensus-building. However, according to Dr. Emilie van Haute, Associate Professor of Political Science and Department Chair at SciencePo ULB, and researcher at Cevipol, this perception no longer reflects reality. “The habits of consensus democracy are slowly fading,” she warns. “That poses a significant challenge for future government formation and the stability of coalition governments.”

In an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. van Haute explores the shifting dynamics of Belgian politics, particularly the rise of populist radical parties on both the left and the right. She highlights how political parties like Vlaams Belang (VB) and Parti du Travail de Belgique (PTB–PVDA) have capitalized on discontent and distrust in mainstream political institutions. “These are voters who feel alienated from the political system,” she explains. “They opt for radical parties not randomly, but because these parties align with their political priorities.”

Belgium’s linguistic and regional divisions further shape this political landscape. In Flanders, Vlaams Belang’s ethno-regionalist stance has gained traction by advocating for Flemish autonomy and opposing so-called “solidarity transfers” to the French-speaking south. In contrast, in French-speaking Belgium, populist momentum has been driven by the radical left, which prioritizes economic redistribution and national solidarity. These diverging political priorities contribute to a growing polarization within the country.

Mainstream parties have not remained immune to these shifts. As Dr. van Haute notes, they have increasingly adopted populist rhetoric and strategies in response to radical party successes. “Mimicking the radical right legitimizes their positions and facilitates their electoral success,” she observes, citing the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA) and the French-speaking Liberal Party (MR) as examples of this trend.

Looking ahead, Dr. van Haute sees Belgium at a crossroads. With growing affective polarization, the erosion of consensus politics, and populist parties gaining ground, the country faces an uncertain future. “It is difficult to govern with multiple coalition partners when parties are constantly engaging in antagonistic politics,” she warns.

In this thought-provoking discussion, Dr. van Haute dissects these pressing political challenges and reflects on the implications of populism, nationalism, and polarization in Belgium’s evolving democracy.

Dr. Emilie van Haute, Associate Professor of Political Science and Department Chair at SciencePo ULB, and researcher at Cevipol.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Emilie van Haute with some edits.

What Drives the Success of Populist Parties Is Discontent and a Lack of Trust in Mainstream Political Actors

Professor van Haute, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: What are the key similarities and differences between left-wing and right-wing populist parties in Belgium in terms of their ideology, voter base, and political strategies? How have economic, social, and cultural factors contributed to the rise of populist movements in Belgium, and how do these factors differ between the radical left (PTB–PVDA) and the radical right (Vlaams Belang)?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: That’s three broad questions. The commonality between the two radical forces is their protest appeal—their protest and populist appeal. You can clearly see in the voters they attract that this protest appeal is quite strong. So that’s the commonality because, otherwise, in terms of political positioning, they are at two opposite extremes. Politically, they are radically different. The radical right is positioned at the extreme right, both socioeconomically and culturally. Although we often hear that the radical right can sometimes have a blurred position on socioeconomic issues, that is not the case here. They are located at the right end of the political spectrum, whereas the radical left is on the left, both socio-economically and socio-culturally.

These two political forces are not identical when it comes to their political positions, but what they share is a protest appeal—protest against mainstream parties and the political system. That’s how they are similar and different.

Now, what drives their success is, again, discontent and a lack of trust in mainstream political actors, which generates discontent and protest. This strong protest appeal is where they find their success.

Now, why is it the radical right that attracts support in the north of Belgium (Flanders) and the radical left in the south (French-speaking Belgium)? It is because Belgium has two different party systems. On the Dutch-speaking side, the system is dominated by the mainstream right. When voters protest against the mainstream right, they turn to the clean or pure equivalent, which is the radical right. If they are not happy with the mainstream right, they shift to the radical right.

In contrast, in French-speaking Belgium, the dominant actor has been the Socialist Party, which is mainstream left. When voters are dissatisfied with the mainstream left, they turn to the alternative, which is the radical left. That is why these polarizing trends have occurred in Belgium.

The Evolution Over the Last Decade Has Clearly Been Toward More Polarization

How has Belgium’s political landscape changed over the last decade, especially in relation to the growing influence of Vlaams Belang (VB) and the Workers’ Party of Belgium (PTB–PVDA)? Looking at the historical trajectory, how have populism and populist parties developed over time? Would you classify sub-state nationalist parties such as N-VA, VB, and DéFI as populist movements?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: Okay, so the evolution over the last decade has clearly been toward more polarization—polarization of the political landscape due to the success of radical parties. The radical parties have pulled the party system to the extremes, and you can clearly see that voters are increasingly positioning themselves further away from the center. That is one of the most important developments.

The radical right has fluctuated over time. If you look at the electoral performance of Vlaams Belang, it has evolved. It was a party that saw a constant increase in its electoral performance throughout the 1990s until the early 2000s. Then, it reached a ceiling.

N-VA emerged as a mainstream right alternative for voters. At that time, Vlaams Belang started to lose voters to the benefit of N-VA because N-VA had a protest appeal and had not participated in the federal government. However, as soon as N-VA entered the federal government, it lost that protest appeal. Then, we saw a shift again—Vlaams Belang started to gain voters, and N-VA began losing voters. So there has been a back-and-forth dynamic in the Dutch-speaking political landscape between the mainstream right and the radical right. Right now, the radical right has regained the protest appeal and is once again on the rise.

On the French-speaking side, there has never been a successful radical right party, as I mentioned, because the radical left has embodied the protest appeal. The radical left has only gained traction in the last two or three federal elections, so it is a more recent phenomenon.

Now, regarding how to characterize these parties as radical or populist—clearly, Vlaams Belang and PTB–PVDA qualify as radical parties. Whether other parties have a populist component—essentially, a protest appeal—fluctuates over time. N-VA, at some point, had that protest appeal and, therefore, a populist component.

You can see that when the party first entered the federal coalition in 2014 and again more recently, its protest component dropped. It is really difficult for a party to be included in the government while maintaining a protest discourse. Once you are part of the establishment and making decisions, it becomes hard to continue criticizing decision-makers. As a result, N-VA has started to lose its protest and populist component.

Regarding DéFI, another regionalist party, it is a Brussels-based party that defends French speakers in Brussels. It has been part of coalition governments at the regional level for a long time and does not necessarily have a protest component in that context. However, when DéFI attempted to develop a branch in Wallonia, the other French-speaking region, it adopted a strong protest component because it was an emerging party and positioned itself against the existing political actors.

So, you can really see that parties tend to have a protest and populist component, particularly when they are in opposition and able to challenge the mainstream parties in their respective party systems.

Vlaams Belang and PVDA-PTB Share a Common Main Driver: Protest

What are the drivers of support for populist radical left and populist radical right parties in Belgium? How have protest attitudes and ideological considerations affected the recent election results of Vlaams Belang (VB) and Parti du Travail de Belgique (PVDA-PTB)?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: Clearly, these two parties share a common main driver: the protest component. Voters with a low level of political trust—trust in political institutions—have a higher probability of voting for these parties. Voters who are cynical toward the political system, those with a low level of political interest, and those who do not feel politically efficacious—meaning they do not believe they can change the political system—all exhibit attitudes that drive support for these two radical parties.

In a nutshell, these are voters who feel alienated from the political system and mainstream parties, leading them to opt for radical parties. However, they do not choose randomly; they also select protest parties that align with their political priorities.

These parties not only have a protest component but also offer specific political positions. In Flanders, voters who support Vlaams Belang are positioned on the right of the political spectrum and prioritize migration issues. These are protest voters who support a party that matches their political priorities but is more radical than the mainstream parties in power. Their vote is a protest against the governing mainstream parties—they seek specific policies, are disappointed by the ruling parties, and turn to more radical alternatives on the same issues.

In French-speaking Belgium, the pattern is similar. Protest voters tend to support radical left parties, but their vote is driven by positions on socioeconomic issues and left-wing economic policies.

Considering that radical-right parties like VB thrive in Flanders, whereas French-speaking populist radical-right parties struggle to gain traction, how does linguistic fragmentation impact the ideological positioning and success of populist radical parties in Belgium?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: In Flanders, Vlaams Belang is clearly an ethno-regionalist party—one that defends Flemish culture and interests and advocates for greater autonomy for Flanders. This is not the case in French-speaking Belgium.

The radical party that has the most traction there is a unitary party, meaning it has branches across the entire national territory, which is an exception in Belgium. Because of this unique characteristic—having branches in both Flanders and French-speaking Belgium—it is difficult for this party to advocate for regionalism. Instead, it emphasizes socioeconomic issues as its main priority and promotes national solidarity in socioeconomic redistribution.

So, in French-speaking Belgium, the radical party pushes for more national solidarity in socioeconomic matters, while in Flanders, Vlaams Belang advocates for more autonomy for the region. This dynamic is also one of the key polarizing debates in Belgium.

Ruling N-VA Is the Successor of a Former Ethno-Regionalist Party

Bart De Wever, former Mayor of Antwerp, at the Chinese New Year parade in Antwerp, Belgium, on February 2, 2019. Photo: Yves Van Tente.

A new government has just been announced in Belgium under the leadership of the New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), with Bart De Wever becoming the country’s first nationalist prime minister. How would you define the N-VA as a political party? Based on your research, how do you explain the party’s emergence and breakthrough, its organizational choices, ideological profile, prospects for survival, and potential trajectory following its first experience in government?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: N-VA is actually the heir of a former ethno-regionalist party, Volksunie. So it is not necessarily a completely new party. It has existed in its current form since 2001 but is the successor of Volksunie, a party that emerged in 1954. In that sense, it is a “new party with old roots.”

This historical background is important to understand because, as a “new” party, it was able to establish its organization based on existing party branches. As a result, it quickly developed territorial anchorage, which is extremely important for party survival. This is one of the reasons why N-VA was able to establish itself and survive more easily than other new parties.

N-VA positions itself on the right wing of the political spectrum, both socioeconomically and culturally. Initially, the party performed poorly in elections and had to form an alliance with the Christian Democrats in Flanders. That alliance was crucial—it not only helped the party survive electorally but also allowed it to present itself as a protest party. While allied with the Christian Democrats, N-VA distinguished itself as a more radical alternative, particularly on linguistic issues, refusing to compromise on certain key positions.

This stance appealed to voters, particularly those who had previously supported Vlaams Belang. Some of these voters saw N-VA as a “purer” party on linguistic issues while also being more embedded in the political system, giving it a chance to participate in government—something Vlaams Belang could not do due to the cordon sanitaire. As a result, some former Vlaams Belang voters decided to support N-VA, seeing it as a viable alternative that could both enter government and maintain strong, radical positions.

N-VA built its position on this foundation. From the start, it participated in power at the regional level, gaining coalition government experience in Flanders. It also joined the federal government once, between 2014 and 2019. Therefore, it is not an inexperienced party; it has both governmental experience and a strong party organization.

These elements—its historical roots, organizational strength, and governmental experience—are crucial for its survival. N-VA is a party that is well-established and is likely to remain a key player in Belgian politics for the long term.

As you mention in your articles, the Flemish Nationalist Party N-VA is a relatively young or newly established party. How do you account for its success, and what internal and external dynamics have contributed to its rise? Given the N-VA’s evolution from a regionalist successor party to a dominant force in Belgian politics, what insights can be drawn about the adaptability and trajectory of nationalist and populist radical-right movements?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: So, N-VA is, as we mentioned, an “old-new” party, established in 2001 with roots in a former ethno-regionalist party. The way it developed was by not becoming a single-issue party. While regionalist issues were central, they were not enough to gain electoral traction. So, the party embedded its ethno-regionalism into socioeconomic issues.

They started developing a socioeconomic program that is conservative—but it is conservative ethno-regionalism, emphasizing the idea of rewarding workers, the workforce, and economic dynamism. However, behind this rhetoric, the underlying message is about rewarding Flanders. Since Flanders has a higher active workforce than French-speaking Belgium—where more people rely on unemployment benefits—N-VA framed its policies as a way to reward Flanders.

This allowed them to combine the two core issues, presenting economic conservatism as a means to defend Flemish interests and stop what they call “solidarity transfers” to unemployed French speakers in the rest of the country. By intertwining these themes, they managed to appeal to a broader electoral audience.

The Habits of Consensus Democracy Are Slowly Fading in Belgium

Billboards for the 2024 Belgian elections in Berchem-Sainte-Agathe, Brussels-Capital Region, Belgium, on May 18, 2024. Photo: Werner Lerooy.

Belgium has traditionally been regarded as a classic example of a consociational or consensus democracy. How does this political system influence the opportunities and constraints faced by populist parties, and in what ways have these parties adjusted to Belgium’s intricate institutional structure? In the light of the N-VA’s electoral success and the growing support for Vlaams Belang (VB), do you believe this characterization still accurately reflects Belgium’s political landscape?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: No. Consensual democracies—and Belgium has been an ideal type of consensus or consensual democracy—are characterized by cooperation and compromise. However, you can clearly see, first in Flanders, growing antagonisms, and this is partly driven by N-VA. I would say N-VA, even more than Vlaams Belang, plays a very antagonistic game and does not necessarily adhere to the consensus logic, which has, of course, an effect on voters. Increasingly, we see more polarization among voters in Flanders than in French-speaking Belgium.

However, a similar trend is emerging in French-speaking Belgium, partly due to the radical left, but also increasingly among conservatives. The French-speaking Liberals are starting to play a role similar to the one N-VA has played in Flanders. You can see that the conservative party in French-speaking Belgium is beginning to adopt a more antagonistic stance.

The habits of consensus democracy are slowly fading, and I think this poses a significant challenge for future government formation and the stability of coalition governments. It is difficult to govern for four to five years with five coalition partners if parties are constantly engaging in antagonistic politics. This is becoming an increasingly significant challenge, and we have already seen that government formation and coalition stability have become more difficult due to the gradual erosion of Belgium’s consensus democracy.

How has affective polarization been instrumental in Belgian elections and in the success of populist parties? How do you think separatist politics will be influenced by the victory of N-VA?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: We have seen affective polarization present in Belgium, more so in Flanders than in French-speaking Belgium. This is due to the presence of parties like Vlaams Belang and N-VA in Flanders, which polarize the electorate into groups that do not necessarily like each other. However, we are also starting to see the same trend emerging in French-speaking Belgium.

Affective polarization is present, though not as strongly as in other representative democracies. It is still at a lower level compared to many other countries, but it is a clear sign of the vanishing consensus. There is a growing dislike between electorates from different parties.

I believe this is a self-reinforcing cycle: parties antagonize, leading to more polarized voters. As voters become more polarized, parties have less incentive to seek consensus, further fueling the cycle.

‘Contamination Effect’ of Populist Parties on Mainstream Political Discourse

Given the indirect “contamination effect” of populist parties on mainstream political discourse, how has their presence impacted traditional parties in Belgium? Have mainstream parties adopted elements of populist rhetoric or policies in response?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: Clearly, the answer is yes. The way mainstream parties react to their radical competition is through imitation.

In Flanders, the mainstream right—primarily N-VA and, to a lesser extent, the Christian Democrats and the Liberals (Open VLD)—has adopted some of the rhetoric of the radical right. N-VA, in particular, made migration a highly salient issue when they were in power at the federal level between 2014 and 2019. In fact, they exited the government before the end of the legislature over migration issues. Research shows that mimicking the radical right tends to legitimize their positions and facilitate their electoral success. So, in Flanders, there is clear evidence of mainstream parties adopting the radical right’s rhetoric, effectively mainstreaming their positions.

In French-speaking Belgium, the Socialist Party, which was the dominant mainstream left party and was challenged by the radical left, also adopted more radical positions on socioeconomic issues. The presence of radical parties has led to polarization across the political spectrum.

Additionally, in French-speaking Belgium, there has been a rightward shift of the Liberal Party (the conservative party). When faced with strong competition from the Socialist Party and the Workers’ Party on the left, the Liberal Party moved further to the right to engage in the same antagonistic dynamic. This has contributed to a clear polarization of the political landscape.

The Main Challenge for Belgian Politics Is the Adoption of a ‘Trump 2.0’ Version by Mainstream Parties

Former U.S. President Donald Trump and vice-presidential nominee J.D. Vance at a rally in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

How do Belgian populist parties engage with European politics, particularly in relation to the European Union and broader transnational populist networks?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: Clearly, regarding the European Union, it is easy for these parties to adopt an anti-EU rhetoric, engaging in “Europe bashing” to highlight various issues they want to make salient. This is a commonality between the radical right and the radical left—both hold Eurosceptic views and positions.

That being said, there are links with transnational movements of the same kind. For instance, there are connections between Vlaams Belang and other populist radical-right parties in Europe, although these relationships can be somewhat of a love-hate dynamic. Coordinating among these parties is not always easy because, while they advocate for their national interests, promoting international collaboration can sometimes create tensions.

On the left, the radical-left party has strong ties with other radical-left parties in Europe. This collaboration is well-established and has existed for a long time, making it relatively easier to maintain.

Overall, Belgian populist parties exhibit Euroscepticism while still engaging in some forms of transnational collaboration.

And lastly, Professor van Haute, how do you think populist parties in Belgium will be affected by the second Trump administration in the US?

Dr. Emilie van Haute: I am less concerned about the impact on populist radical parties than on how mainstream parties will be affected. That is my main fear. We are already seeing conservative parties—both N-VA and MR, on the Dutch- and French-speaking sides, respectively—adopting some of the strategies and rhetoric of early Trump, perhaps resembling Trump in 2016. The question is whether they will move toward adopting a “Trump 2.0” version. The main concern is not necessarily the radical parties that remain in opposition. Rather, the challenge lies in governing parties increasingly adopting radical rhetoric. That is the main challenge.

(L-R) Iran President Hassan Rouhan, Belarusian President Aleksander Lukashenko and Russian President Vladimir Putin at the session of the supreme Eurasian Economic Council in Yerevan, Armania on October 1, 2019. Photo: Asatur Yesayants.

Dr. Leukavets: The West Must Maintain Sanctions Against the Lukashenko Regime in Belarus

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an exclusive interview with the ECPS, Dr. Victoria Leukavets highlights the critical role of sanctions in pressuring Lukashenko’s authoritarian regime. She argues, “Sanctions do work, though some have a delayed effect—particularly economic and sectoral sanctions. However, they do have an impact.” Dr. Leukavets also discusses Russia’s deepening control over Belarus, media repression, and the resilience of Belarusian democratic forces in exile. She underscores that continued Western support for independent media and civil society is essential to counter Lukashenko’s grip on power and prevent Belarus from becoming a full extension of Russia’s influence.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a candid and insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Victoria Leukavets, a Research Fellow at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS), discusses the evolving political landscape in Belarus, Aleksander Lukashenko’s populist strategies, Russia’s growing influence, and the role of the West in countering authoritarian consolidation. Dr. Leukavets emphasizes that the continuation of Western sanctions is essential in exerting pressure on the Lukashenko regime, stating, “Sanctions do work, though some have a delayed effect—particularly economic and sectoral sanctions targeting strategic sectors of the Belarusian economy. However, they do have an impact.”

According to Dr. Leukavets, recent waves of political prisoner releases signal that sanctions are forcing Lukashenko to test the waters for negotiations with the West. “Many would agree that sanctions’ pressure has played a key role in forcing him into this scenario, making him test the waters for negotiations. His primary goal remains easing sanctions’ pressure.” However, she warns that Lukashenko remains committed to tightening his grip on power and that sanctions must continue to be a key instrument in the EU’s foreign policy toolbox.

Throughout the interview, Dr. Leukavets provides a historical overview of Lukashenko’s use of populist rhetoric to maintain control over Belarus, tracing it back to his first electoral campaign in 1994, when he positioned himself as a “man of the people” and an anti-corruption crusader. She explains that Lukashenko’s authoritarian populism has evolved over time, particularly after the 2020 protests, with an intensified level of repression and a media crackdown that has silenced independent voices.

Moreover, Russia’s role in propping up Lukashenko has deepened, making Belarus increasingly dependent on Moscow’s economic, military, and cultural influence. “Frankly speaking, what we are witnessing is the gradual transformation of Belarus into an extension of Russia’s military, economic, and cultural space.”

Dr. Leukavets also discusses the complex relationship between Lukashenko and far-right parties in Europe, the potential U.S. stance under Donald Trump’s presidency, and the strategies Belarusian democratic forces are employing to challenge the regime. She underscores that support for independent media, civil society, and opposition groups in exile remains crucial in resisting Lukashenko’s authoritarian consolidation.

In this interview, Dr. Leukavets offers a compelling analysis of Belarus’s future, outlining what the West can do to counter Lukashenko’s grip on power while avoiding further repression.

Dr. Victoria Leukavets, a Research Fellow at the Stockholm Center for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS).

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Victoria Leukavets with some edits.

Media as a Key Tool for Lukashenko’s Grip on Power

Dr. Leukavets, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How has Aleksander Lukashenko used populist rhetoric to maintain his grip on power in Belarus? In what ways does his approach differ from or resemble other authoritarian populist leaders?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: Thank you very much for inviting me to do this interview. I think you have raised a very important question. Alexander Lukashenko has indeed used populist rhetoric to maintain his power, and he started using it in the early 1990s. During his first electoral campaign in 1994, he built his campaign on strong anti-corruption narratives. Before running for president, he was the head of the Anti-Corruption Committee in the Supreme Council of Belarus. At that time, he began constructing an image of himself as a man of the people—someone who was very close to the Belarusian electorate and could be seen as a defender of the nation. He positioned himself as a new voice, a fresh figure in the Belarusian political spectrum, and someone capable of cleaning up the system by removing bureaucrats.

His main opponent in the election was Vyacheslav Kebich, who was the Prime Minister of Belarus. Lukashenko’s populist rhetoric at the time proved very successful, as many Belarusians believed in him. In fact, the 1994 elections are considered the only free and fair elections in the history of independent Belarus. As a result, Lukashenko managed to win and secure the presidency.

He has continued to use populist rhetoric throughout his rule up until today. One of his favorite strategies to maintain control over the elites in Belarus and co-opt them has been the use of selective purges. Whenever members of his inner circle showed signs of criticism or disagreement with his political course, he would initiate a public purge, accusing them of corruption or tax evasion. He would present himself as the one capable of identifying and imprisoning these individuals, portraying himself as a fighter who protects the nation from such “parasites.” Thus, Lukashenko has consistently used populist rhetoric as an instrument to maintain and solidify his control over Belarus.

How has Lukashenko’s state-controlled media shaped public perception of his rule? To what extent does propaganda fuel populist narratives and suppress opposition voices in Belarus?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: Media is very important for Lukashenko to maintain his power. Starting from the early 1990s, as soon as he was elected President in 1994, he began consolidating his power, first and foremost, by taking control of the media space. Throughout his subsequent presidencies, we can observe that he gradually tightened control over the media space. 

After 2020, what we witness now is that almost all independent media outlets have been labeled as extremist. Most journalists from these independent outlets are either behind bars, imprisoned, or operating from exile. According to the most recent data, around 400 representatives of independent mass media are currently working from abroad. Lukashenko has effectively managed to take full control of the media space, which has been particularly crucial for him, especially before his most recent presidential campaign and the elections, which took place on January 26.

Lukashenko’s Escalating Repression to Prevent Another 2020 Uprising

Peaceful protests on Niezaliežnasci Street in Minsk, Belarus. Demonstrators rally and march toward Independence Avenue on August 23, 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Do you see Lukashenko’s rule as primarily authoritarian, or does it still retain elements of populist appeal? How has his rhetoric and governance style evolved over time, especially after the 2020 protests?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: First of all, I would say that one does not contradict the other. Many authoritarian states have a populist appeal, and in fact, populism is used—as we have already discussed—as a tool to maintain a connection with a loyal segment of society and the broader electorate.

If we look at the evolution of the regime in Belarus from the early 1990s until now, 2020 can clearly be considered a watershed moment. Before 2020, Lukashenko resorted to repression, but after 2020, the extent, level, and scale of these repressions have significantly increased. There are now over a thousand political prisoners in Belarus. Lukashenko also engages in trans-border repression, targeting civil society and independent media. As I have already mentioned, he silences anyone who dares to criticize him.

The recent presidential elections were also held in a highly repressive environment. Most of the leaders of the 2020 protests and key opposition figures were imprisoned, and they remain behind bars. Some managed to flee abroad and continue their activities from exile, but they lack strong links to influence the situation in Belarus effectively.

Once again, the level of repression in Belarus is now extremely high. Lukashenko is doing everything he can to tighten his grip on power to prevent a repeat of the 2020 scenario, when his rule was challenged by an unprecedented wave of popular protests.

Belarus Transformed into an Extension of Russia’s Military, Economic, and Cultural Sphere

How does Russia’s influence impact Belarus’s political landscape? To what extent does Lukashenko balance populist nationalism with growing economic and security dependence on Moscow?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: That’s a very important question. In fact, the Russia factor is a crucial variable in the equation. When we discuss Belarus-Russia relations, Russia’s influence plays a significant role in shaping the Belarusian political landscape. Since the early 1990s, Russia has been trying to increase its influence and control over Belarus in various spheres—political, economic, military, and cultural.

Lukashenko was able to resist this influence with relative success before 2020. However, after 2020, when he was challenged by popular resistance, he turned to the Kremlin for support. Moscow was the one that helped him stay afloat. Since then, Russia’s influence has increased tremendously across all the spheres I identified. It has grown in the economic and political realms but, most importantly, in the military domain.

Belarus and Russia are now effectively building a common defense space. They recently signed a package of agreements, including the security concept of Belarus, which unifies the military policies and armies of both countries even further. Russian influence is also growing in the cultural space, and developments in this area are truly concerning.

One of the most recent developments I would like to highlight is the decision to establish a so-called media conglomerate that would unify the media spaces of Russia and Belarus. This entity would broadcast news in Russian across Belarusian territory, further strengthening Russia’s hold over Belarusian cultural discourse. Additionally, both Belarus and Russia are actively rewriting history books. More subjects in Belarusian schools and universities are now being taught in Russian. 

Frankly speaking, what we are witnessing is the gradual transformation of Belarus into an extension of Russia’s military, economic, and cultural space.

As Europe’s longest-serving leader, Lukashenko cruised to his seventh election victory in a row in a contest that his exiled opponents dismissed as a sham. EU called the elections ‘neither free nor fair.’ How would you characterize the elections as an academician?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: Indeed, these elections were not democratic. For any election to be recognized as democratic, they must adhere to certain international standards, and these elections failed to meet those standards at every phase of the electoral process. I would like to remind our audience that when we talk about elections, it is not only election day (E-day) that should be analyzed but the entire electoral process, starting from the beginning of the electoral campaign.

Once again, I would like to emphasize that the Lukashenko regime violated international standards for free and fair elections during every phase—the electoral campaign, election day, and the post-electoral phase.

If we look at the most common violations, I would highlight three major points. First, the highly repressive environment, which I have already mentioned, and the tightly controlled media space allowed Lukashenko to manipulate the narrative and deprived Belarusian citizens of alternative sources of information.

Second, the candidate registration process was highly flawed. Although four other candidates ran in the election alongside Lukashenko, they could not be considered real opponents or challengers. They were merely spoiler candidates whose main goal was to create the illusion of political competition.

Third, independent electoral observation was severely restricted. The OSCE/ODIHR mission, for example, was not invited to participate in the elections in time. The Belarusian regime did send an invitation, but it was too late—only about 10 days before the election. This was far too late for international observation missions from organizations such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, or the EU, whose role is to monitor the entire electoral process, beginning with the campaign period. These organizations typically begin their observation at least a month before election day. The lack of independent electoral observation further compromised the integrity of the election results and simply helped Lukashenko accomplish his mission—to “win” the elections with an inflated vote count that does not reflect his actual support among the Belarusian population.

European Far-right Parties and the Lukashenko Regime Share Certain Synergies

Photo: Shutterstock.

Far-right parties in Europe like Alternative for Germany (AfD), hailed the vote as a victory for democracy and denounced criticism of the election by European officials and the European Parliament. How would you explain the dynamics of relationship between Lukashenko and European far-right parties?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: It’s an interesting relationship. Far-right parties and the Lukashenko regime share certain synergies, particularly in their opposition to Western liberal values and Western influence. This is where their interests converge. For instance, Germany sent some electoral observers representing these problematic far-right parties to observe the previous parliamentary elections in Belarus, which took place last year. All of them praised how well the elections were organized.

Lukashenko’s connection with these right-wing parties essentially helps him offset Western criticism and send a signal that his regime, his values, and his positions are supported by certain forces in Europe. He tries to present these forces as growing in popularity, claiming they represent a significant segment of the European public. This, in turn, helps him promote the narrative that there is currently a global demand for authoritarian regimes and dictatorships—as he explicitly calls them. In precisely this way, he argues that the world is increasingly seeking out dictatorial governance.

It is known that the newly elected US president Donald Trump is sympathetic to far-right parties and populist parties in Europe. Elon Musk, who is now responsible for government efficiency in the US has already declared his support for German far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD). How do you think the relationship between US and Lukashenko will  evolve during Trump’s presidency?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: That’s an important question—one that many Belarusian analysts and representatives of Belarusian democratic forces are trying to answer. We need to understand that we are all in the realm of speculation here, as Trump is known for his unpredictability. That being said, most analysts agree that we will not witness any drastic shifts in US policy toward the Lukashenko regime or the Belarusian democratic movement. For instance, it is unlikely that we will see an easing of sanctions or a reduction in pressure against the Lukashenko regime. The new US administration will likely continue criticizing Lukashenko for human rights violations and repression while maintaining or even imposing new restrictive measures against him.

It is also highly unlikely that we will see any high-level visits from US officials to meet with Lukashenko. Let me remind that during the previous Trump administration, several US representatives visited Belarus. For instance, Mike Pompeo and John Bolton traveled to Minsk, where they met with Lukashenko and discussed various critical issues, including energy supply. In fact, Belarus even began purchasing some energy from the US to offset its dependence on Russia. We will not witness anything of this sort during the new presidency. Instead, US policy will likely continue along the lines established by the Biden administration.

The nature of relations may, however, become more transactional. It is not out of the question that the US administration might signal an openness to negotiations, but any such negotiations would come with very strict conditions. Any offer from international partners, including the US, to the Lukashenko regime would be accompanied by firm preconditions.

As for Belarusian democratic forces, they remain hopeful. They hope that the US will continue supporting them and maintaining the strategic dialogue with the Belarusian democratic movement, which was launched during the Biden presidency. They also hope to send a message that Belarus remains highly relevant to US interests—primarily because Belarus serves as a gateway for China’s growing influence in Europe. Given the US’s strong interest in curbing Chinese influence, they may recognize the importance of supporting the Belarusian democratic movement.

Belarus Under Lukashenko Is Sliding Into a Totalitarian Regime

Given the repression of the Belarusian opposition, what strategies have emerged to challenge Lukashenko’s rule? Is there potential for a new populist movement from the opposition, or is Belarus heading toward deeper authoritarian consolidation?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: Belarus is definitely under the Lukashenko regime, and it is sliding further into a totalitarian state. However, Belarusian democratic forces have developed very efficient methods, and they are doing their best to challenge the Lukashenko regime.

One of these methods is active advocacy on the international stage. Over the past five years, since Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was forced into exile, they have been actively building contacts with numerous international actors and institutionalizing relations with various organizations. For example, the Council of Europe (CoE) has already established a working group on Belarus that raises issues such as human rights violations and ongoing repression in the country. A similar group was established within the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. The European Parliament also signed an agreement for cooperation with the Belarusian Parliament in Exile, the Coordination Council.

In general, this parliamentary dimension of cooperation is very strong and continues to grow. The Belarusian democratic forces have created an international parliamentary alliance in support of Belarus, which includes over 20 countries, both EU and non-EU. In the parliaments of these countries, there are groups of friends for democratic Belarus that serve as vehicles for keeping Belarus on the international agenda, raising awareness, and attracting global attention to the country’s problems.

Democratic forces also prioritize the issue of political prisoners—not only their release but also their rehabilitation. Thanks to their efforts, they established the International Humanitarian Fund to support political prisoners. Several countries have already contributed substantial amounts of money to this fund to assist those who have suffered from the harsh repressions of the Lukashenko regime.

Overall, I would characterize the Belarusian democratic movement as relatively united. Yes, of course, there are certain conflicts within the movement—this is inevitable and part of a healthy process. However, on a comparative scale, if we look at other opposition movements in exile, such as the Russian opposition, we can see that the level of internal cohesion and coherence within the Belarusian democratic movement is very high. This unity is one of the key markers of its success.

Belarusian Democrats in Exile Represent the Future of a Free and Democratic Belarus

Belarusian opposition leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya participates in a protest against the political situation in Belarus outside the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, on September 21, 2020. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

You highlight the Kremlin’s role in sustaining Lukashenko’s regime. What specific steps should the EU take to counter Russia’s leverage in Belarus and support a democratic transition without provoking further repression?

Dr. Victoria Leukavets: It’s a very difficult question. It’s a tough balancing act, and, in fact, counterbalancing Russia’s influence in Belarus might not be entirely feasible under the current circumstances. One way to do so is by supporting free and independent Belarusian media, as media serves as a powerful instrument for providing unbiased information to the Belarusian people and combating propaganda from both the Russian and Lukashenko regimes.

Of course, the West should continue its sanctions. Sanctions do work, though some have a delayed effect—particularly economic and sectoral sanctions targeting strategic sectors of the Belarusian economy. However, they do have an impact. Some analysts argue that, thanks to sanctions pressure, Lukashenko is now seeking ways to open negotiations with the West.

A recent development worth mentioning is that he has been releasing political prisoners in Belarus since July last year. There have been several waves of prisoner releases, leading many to speculate on Lukashenko’s motivations. Many would agree that sanctions pressure has played a key role in forcing him into this scenario, making him test the waters for negotiations with the West. His primary goal remains easing sanctions’ pressure.

So once again, sanctions do work—they are one of the most effective tools in the EU’s foreign policy toolbox, and the EU should continue using them.

Lastly, another critical instrument the EU can use to help democratic Belarus is to support Belarusian democratic forces and civil society, particularly those in exile. These individuals are agents of change and key stakeholders who can exert real pressure on the Lukashenko regime. They represent the future of a free and democratic Belarus.

Photo: Shutterstock.

Dr. Smajljaj: Sunday’s Elections Will Be Decisive for the Future of Democracy in Kosovo

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

As Kosovo heads into a decisive election, Dr. Avdi Smajljaj warns of its significance for the country’s democratic trajectory. “The upcoming elections this Sunday will be crucial in determining the future of democracy in Kosovo,” he explains, emphasizing the risk of increasing authoritarian tendencies. Meanwhile, tensions with the EU and US complicate Kosovo’s international standing. “Kosovo’s statehood remains heavily dependent on US support,” he adds, particularly with the uncertainty of second Trump presidency. With growing populism and strained foreign relations, Kosovo’s future hangs in the balance, making this election a turning point for its domestic and international course.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an insightful discussion with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Avdi Smajljaj, a lecturer in Political Science and International Relations at Epoka University, Albania, highlights the significance of Kosovo’s upcoming elections, its evolving relationship with the European Union, and the critical role of US support—particularly in light of a potential second Trump presidency. With Kosovo still in the process of democratic consolidation, the elections this Sunday will be a pivotal moment. “The upcoming elections this Sunday will be crucial in determining the future of democracy in Kosovo. If opposition parties manage to return to power, either alone or through coalitions, this could help prevent further steps toward authoritarianism,” Dr. Smajljaj explains.

A key player in Kosovo’s current political landscape is Vetëvendosje, the ruling party, which has transitioned from an anti-establishment movement to the dominant force in government. Since gaining power, Vetëvendosje has maintained a populist rhetoric that emphasizes anti-corruption, sovereignty, and resistance to foreign interference. However, Dr. Smajljaj notes that the party has also consolidated its control over state institutions, mirroring some of the very practices it once opposed. “The government has increasingly relied on ethno-nationalist mobilization, particularly in northern Kosovo, to maintain public support despite governance failures,” he explains. The party’s initial promises of justice, meritocracy, and institutional reform have been overshadowed by its own efforts to replace existing officials with loyalists, raising concerns about democratic backsliding.

Vetëvendosje’s approach has also influenced Kosovo’s relations with international actors, particularly its stance toward the EU and US. While the government officially supports European integration, its unilateral actions—especially in northern Kosovo—have drawn criticism from both Brussels and Washington. “The Kosovo government has taken what it describes as unilateral actions, leading to diplomatic consequences,” Dr. Smajljaj states. These tensions have resulted in EU sanctions and strained relations with the Biden administration, fueling speculation about how a second Trump presidency might approach Vetëvendosje’s governance style. With populism shaping both domestic politics and foreign policy, the party’s future role will be a critical factor in determining Kosovo’s stability and international standing.

Beyond domestic concerns, Kosovo’s international standing remains highly dependent on the United States, which has historically been its most influential ally. However, a second Trump administration could alter the dynamics of US engagement in the Balkans. “Kosovo’s statehood remains heavily dependent on US support… It remains heavily dependent on increasing the number of recognitions, heavily dependent on possible membership in NATO, and in EU membership as well,” he states. US troops within KFOR serve as the primary security guarantee in the region, and any change in American priorities could have serious consequences. “If there were a decision to minimize US troops in Kosovo or to withdraw them, this would be bad news for the prosperity of Kosovo as a state,” he warns.

Dr. Smajljaj also reflects on past US diplomatic efforts, particularly under the Trump administration, which proposed alternative approaches to resolving the Kosovo-Serbia dispute. “Just before Trump left office, the Washington Agreement was signed, but this agreement was completely ignored by the new government in Kosovo,” he notes. There was also discussion of a controversial land swap deal between Kosovo and Serbia, which, according to some reports, could have influenced Russia and China’s stance on Kosovo’s UN membership. With Trump’s unpredictability and “America First” approach, a second Trump term could bring either new diplomatic strategies or reduced engagement, potentially leaving Kosovo in a precarious position.

At the same time, Kosovo’s relationship with the European Union remains strained. While Kosovo officially supports EU integration, tensions with Brussels and dissatisfaction with the EU-facilitated dialogue process have led to what Dr. Smajljaj calls “implicit Euroscepticism.” “Currently, Kosovo is under sanctions from the European Union, and the United States has consistently blamed the Kosovo government for unilateral actions,” he explains. With both the US and EU at crossroads in their foreign policy approaches, Kosovo faces an uncertain future, making the upcoming elections and potential shifts in global politics more consequential than ever.

In this interview, Dr. Smajljaj provides a critical analysis of Kosovo’s political landscape, the rise of populism, and the uncertain role of international actors, particularly in the face of shifting US policies under a potential second Trump presidency.

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj, a lecturer in Political Science and International Relations at Epoka University, Albania.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Avdi Smajljaj with some edits.

Populism in Kosovo: A Persistent Force Since the 1990s Democratic Transition

Professor Smajljaj, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How has populism shaped political discourse in Kosovo, and which parties or leaders have utilized populist rhetoric most effectively?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: Actually, a dose of populism has almost always been present since the introduction of pluralism and democracy in the 1990s. However, it was a sort of soft populism, mostly found in the rhetoric of politicians trying to mobilize people through specific words and expressions.

More recently, since 2019 and especially in 2021, one of the major parties has shifted from this soft populism to a much harder form. This transformation is evident in its strong anti-establishment stance, which is a key characteristic of hard populism. One of the main slogans of the party was that they were going to build the “Third Republic,” referring to the consecutive developments of the French Revolution, where one republic replaced another. This idea aimed to create a new establishment in Kosovo while also dividing society into two groups, another defining feature of populism—the “corrupt elite” versus the “good people.”

Another feature of this party is that its leader, associated with the Lëvizja Vetëvendosje (Self-Determination Movement), initially hesitated to call it a party. They claimed to be a movement, positioning themselves as a social movement rather than a political party. However, they are indeed a political party, as they contest elections and seek governmental power.

Regarding ideology, if we categorize populism into left and right, this movement incorporates elements of leftist ideology, but it is mostly a mixed form of populism. On the leftist side, they have pursued policies related to redistribution, though at a relatively low level. For example, they implemented social policies such as small monthly payments for children, starting at €10 and later increasing to €20. Additionally, they provided financial support for mothers who gave birth. Although these measures gained them considerable public support, their primary appeal stemmed from their strong anti-establishment stance.

The party also initially promoted an ethno-nationalist agenda, advocating for the creation of a unified Albanian state encompassing Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, and other regions with Albanian populations. Furthermore, they were strongly opposed to the role of the international community in Kosovo. However, Kosovo’s statehood relied significantly on international involvement, given its legal status and the complexities of the Yugoslav break-up. Despite this, due to their ethno-nationalist ideology, they rejected such external influence.

Since coming to power—now almost completing four years in office—they have somewhat toned down their ethno-nationalist rhetoric. However, actions taken in northern Kosovo, where the government still struggles to assert its authority, have further fueled ethnic nationalism. These actions have also hindered efforts to integrate the Serbian community in northern Kosovo into state institutions and recognize Kosovo’s authority. In many ways, these policies align with the ethno-nationalist ideology that has defined the Self-Determination Movement for a long time.

Rising Euroscepticism Among the Masses

How does Vetëvendosje’s populism differ from other populist movements in the Western Balkans and Europe, particularly in terms of its nationalist and leftist ideological blend?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: If we first examine populism in the Western Balkans, I think populism in this region is still primarily at the level of rhetoric. Excluding, perhaps, the case of Republika Srpska in Bosnia, where Milorad Dodik’s political party is also an anti-establishment party that seeks secession from Bosnia—either to become an independent state or to join Serbia—populism in other parts of the Western Balkans remains largely rhetorical. At various levels, we see populism as a strategy for gaining votes rather than a direct challenge to the establishment.

Unlike in some other cases, populist movements in the Western Balkans are not actively fighting against institutions such as prosecutors’ offices or courts, nor are they attempting to blur the separation of powers. However, as Kosovo is still a developing democracy, these institutions remain in the process of consolidation. What we are currently witnessing in Kosovo is an attempt by the government to exert greater control over these institutions.

When I refer to “Valence Populism,” I mean the kind of populism that focuses on fighting corruption and state capture. One of the main slogans of the ruling party was that the state had been captured by the opposition parties, which governed for around 20 years, and that they came to power to combat this. However, in practice, they are engaging in similar behaviors—removing existing officials and replacing them with their own loyalists.

In relation to populism in Western Europe, which is often linked to xenophobia—particularly anti-migrant sentiment—this is not an issue in Kosovo. We are not overwhelmed by migrants, though Kosovo may occasionally serve as a transit route. Migration is not a major political issue requiring attention in the way it is in Western Europe.

Regarding populism and Euroscepticism, which is a significant issue in Europe, I would say that there is a degree of hidden Euroscepticism in Kosovo. Why hidden? If we examine Eurobarometer data, which consistently measures public attitudes toward the EU, Kosovo ranks highest in support of European integration. However, the current government, through its ethno-nationalist ideology and its actions in northern Kosovo over the past four years to extend state authority, has contributed to a form of implicit Euroscepticism.

This sentiment is particularly tied to the role of the European Union in the dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, with the EU often being accused of taking sides—favoring Serbia rather than maintaining neutrality or supporting Kosovo. As a result, there is a growing dose of Euroscepticism at the masses’ level. However, I would still classify it as implicit, because no party dares to openly oppose EU membership. 

Vetëvendosje’s Populist Strategy: Electoral Success and Governance Contradictions

“No Negotiation – Self-Determination!” spray-painted overnight in a clandestine operation on a concrete structure near a highly frequented pedestrian bridge in Peja, Kosovo, on March 12, 2006. Photo: Shutterstock.

To what extent has populist rhetoric contributed to the electoral success of parties like Vetëvendosje, and how has their governance aligned with or diverged from their populist promises?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: Populist rhetoric has played a significant role, and the most extreme example was the polarization of society into two highly opposed groups—Vetëvendosje on one side and all other parties grouped together on the other. Their rhetoric suggested that the previous governments had completely destroyed the state over the past 20 years. However, this was not entirely true, as during that period, Kosovo gained its freedom and established statehood, which it did not have before.

Nonetheless, the narrative focused on the claim that institutions had been captured by previous ruling parties, that corruption was rampant, and that organized crime was deeply entrenched. Through this rhetoric, Vetëvendosje managed to gain significant popular support. Kosovo has a multi-party system with a single electoral district and a proportional system, which usually makes it difficult for any single party to govern alone. However, in 2021, against expectations, Vetëvendosje was able to defeat all other previous ruling parties, primarily due to its strong polarization strategy—portraying itself as the force for good and the opposition as corrupt and evil.

Vetëvendosje campaigned on promises of justice, meritocracy, the rule of law, and equal opportunities for all. A key aspect of their platform was employment reform, claiming that, under previous governments, securing a job in public institutions or state-owned enterprises required party affiliation. These promises resonated with voters, allowing Vetëvendosje to win more than 50% of the vote—an extraordinary achievement in a proportional multi-party system.

However, after coming to power, their actions deviated from these promises. If we refer to Jan-Werner Müller’s theory on how populists “colonize” institutions upon gaining power, Vetëvendosje followed a similar pattern. They used all possible legal means, including legislative amendments, to place their own people in key institutional positions—essentially engaging in the same practices they had previously criticized. This has disappointed many of their supporters, who had voted for them based on their pledges to bring justice, equal opportunities, and institutional reform.

To compensate for their shortcomings in fulfilling campaign promises, the government has increasingly relied on ethno-nationalist mobilization, particularly in northern Kosovo. By invoking wartime experiences between Albanians and Serbs, they have sought to maintain public support despite governance failures. However, rather than breaking from past practices, their governance has, in many ways, mirrored the actions of previous ruling parties.

Sunday’s Elections Will Be a Defining Moment for Kosovo’s Democratic Future

Your article, titled “Populism in a Never-Ending and Multiple System Transformation in Kosovo: The Case of Vetëvendosje,” argues that Kosovo’s incomplete democratic transformation has provided fertile ground for populism. In what ways has Vetëvendosje capitalized on this, and do you see any indications that it may shift towards authoritarianism as a governing party?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: As a never-ending transition—yes, I would say the entire Western Balkans is experiencing this process. The Western Balkans started transitioning in the early 1990s with the fall of the Berlin Wall, and now we have entered the fourth decade of democratization.

In Kosovo, the process began a bit later due to the war. However, we are now in the third decade of democratization, following the country’s liberation. During this period, several studies have discussed a regression toward authoritarianism, and some argue that we are witnessing a transition back to authoritarian rule. Across the Western Balkans, we see the dominance of single-party rule. For example, Serbia has a dominant party system, and the same trend can now be observed in Albania.

Currently, the only factor still maintaining multi-party systems in the region is the presence of ethnic parties. These parties, representing specific ethnic groups, remain significant in preserving pluralism. In the case of Kosovo, the upcoming elections this Sunday will be crucial in determining the future of its democracy. If opposition parties manage to return to power, either alone or through coalitions, this could help prevent further steps toward authoritarianism.

Additionally, as Kosovo is a young democracy and not yet fully consolidated, its institutions are fragile and weak, making them highly vulnerable to authoritarian tendencies—especially when faced with a government that has more than 50% of the vote. This, combined with the country’s political culture and its historical lack of democratic governance, has contributed to the persistence of authoritarian political values within society.

For example, during the current electoral campaign, there have been reports of people referring to the leader of Vetëvendosje, Albin Kurti, as a “father” figure. Such rhetoric is an authoritarian signal. Moreover, while Kosovo’s institutions were already weak—partly because they had been captured by previous ruling parties—this has created an opportunity for the current government to consolidate its control over institutions.

This institutional takeover has been evident in the restructuring of governing boards in public companies, changes across all ministries where possible, and amendments to the law on civil servants. These legal changes facilitate the replacement of existing civil servants with individuals loyal to the ruling party. Additionally, there has been an open attack by the Prime Minister on the judiciary and prosecution.

For instance, a corruption case was under investigation in one of the ministries, and the prosecutor sent an invitation for the Prime Minister to be interviewed as a witness. However, he refused to comply, stating that the prosecutor could come to his office at a designated time instead. This incident is just one of many indicators of the government’s tendency to undermine or disregard the separation of powers, which is essential for democracy to function properly.

Democracy in Kosovo and the broader Western Balkans remains fragile and susceptible to regression. It still heavily relies on international support. However, with ongoing changes in the US administration and the EU facing uncertainty, if external support for democratization in the region declines, it will provide further opportunities for populist parties to reinforce authoritarian regimes.

Kosovo’s Populist Government Is Undermining Its EU Future

Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Albin Kurti, speaks to the media after a meeting in Brussels, Belgium, on February 27, 2023. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

How do populist movements in Kosovo interact with the European Union and other international actors? Does populism present a challenge to Kosovo’s European integration?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: I would say yes, it presents a challenge in relation to the European Union and also to the US, which are the two main sponsors of democratization in the region and in Kosovo as well.

The current government has mostly dealt with them with a sovereignist attitude, claiming that Kosovo is a sovereign country while downplaying the role of the international community in building the state of Kosovo. This has led to unilateral actions, particularly in the northern part of Kosovo, which have significantly affected relations between the Kosovo government, the European Union, and the United States. At one point, the European Union even imposed sanctions on Kosovo due to these actions.

Of course, it is well known that the Serbian government often uses the Serbian community in Kosovo to prevent their integration into Kosovo’s institutions, effectively trying to sabotage Kosovo’s statehood. However, the international community has maintained that such issues should be resolved through dialogue and with their involvement. Instead, the Kosovo government has taken what it describes as unilateral actions, leading to diplomatic consequences.

As a result, Kosovo is currently under sanctions from the European Union, and the United States has consistently criticized the Kosovo government for these actions. This has led to repeated statements by US special representatives for the region, expressing that such actions complicate US efforts to advocate for Kosovo’s international recognition. The government seems to have ignored the fact that Kosovo is recognized by fewer than two-thirds of UN member states—approximately 100 to 117, though some recognitions have been withdrawn or frozen, making the exact number unclear. However, this number is not sufficient for Kosovo to become a UN member, which is a crucial step for consolidating its statehood at the international level. Without US and EU support, achieving this goal would be nearly impossible. While other countries around the world support Kosovo, they do not have the influence that the US and EU have in convincing other states to recognize Kosovo. This recognition is vital for Kosovo’s international legitimacy and statehood.

Furthermore, such a populist government delays the process of European integration. The main criteria for joining the European Union include democracy, separation of powers, and strong institutions. However, if there is a tendency to capture institutions, weaken the state, and blur the lines between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches—particularly between the executive and judiciary—this represents a setback in meeting the EU’s membership criteria.

Declaratively, the government tries to appear active in the EU integration process. For example, when the EU introduced the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, the Kosovo government quickly submitted its reform agenda. However, if we look at actual developments, there are actions being taken that undermine progress in meeting the EU’s accession requirements.

The Second Trump Presidency Could Leave Kosovo in a Precarious Position

French KFOR soldiers guard the Brnjak border crossing around September 2011 in Kosovska Mitrovica. Photo: Nikola Fific.

Given Donald Trump’s “America First” approach and past skepticism towards US commitments abroad, how do you foresee a second Trump presidency impacting Kosovo’s relationship with the US, particularly in terms of security guarantees and diplomatic support?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: I would say that the Trump administration is still consolidating itself in terms of priorities at the global level. As we see now, new ideas are emerging, and issues that were previously top priorities are being revised—such as the role of USAID, for example. USAID has been one of the main supporters of the democratization process in the region.

I would say it is still a bit early to predict exactly how a second Trump presidency would approach the region, including Kosovo. We are entering a highly unpredictable period. However, what is clear for now is that Kosovo’s statehood remains heavily dependent on US support. This includes increasing the number of recognitions for Kosovo’s independence and potential membership in NATO. US influence also plays a crucial role in Kosovo’s EU membership prospects, given the relationship between the US and the EU, and Washington’s ability to encourage its allies to support Kosovo’s integration.

Furthermore, US troops stationed in Kosovo as part of KFOR are the primary guarantors of security in the region. Their presence plays a crucial role in preventing any potential conflict, particularly between Kosovo and Serbia. Serbia continues to challenge Kosovo’s sovereignty, particularly in the northern part of the country, by leveraging the loyalty of local Serbs to Belgrade.

If, for instance, a decision were made to reduce or withdraw US troops from Kosovo, or if Kosovo were no longer a priority for the US government, this would be very bad news for Kosovo’s stability and prospects as a state. While there are other international partners willing to assist, they do not have the same capacity as the US.

The role of the US in NATO’s intervention to stop ethnic cleansing in 1999 was vital. Additionally, US support was crucial in giving Kosovo the green light to declare independence and encouraging many states worldwide to recognize it. The highest number of recognitions for Kosovo’s independence came as a result of US diplomatic efforts. If Kosovo is no longer among the priorities of the US, this would create a bleak future for the long-term prospects of Kosovo as a state.

Kosovo’s Statehood Remains Heavily Dependent on US Support

And lastly, Professor Smajljaj, as you mentioned, Kosovo has relied heavily on strong U.S. backing in its international recognition efforts and dialogue with Serbia. If Trump were to reduce US engagement in the Balkans or push for a different diplomatic strategy, what potential risks and opportunities might arise for Kosovo’s international standing and regional stability?

Dr. Avdi Smajljaj: As I have already said, Kosovo’s statehood remains heavily dependent on US support. Currently, there is an agreement known as the Franco-German plan, along with an annex to this plan, which Kosovo and Serbia agreed upon in Brussels and Ohrid as a potential solution to the ongoing dispute. Up until now, the US has supported this agreement, particularly under the Democratic administration when it was reached. However, the agreement has not yet been fully implemented by either party, with both sides often stating that they have accepted it but have not formally signed it.

At present, this agreement serves as the primary framework for both the European Union and the US in resolving the Kosovo-Serbia issue. One of the key elements of the agreement is the creation of an association of Serbian municipalities in Kosovo, which, under the Brussels Agreement, would grant a degree of self-management to the Serbian community. However, the exact definition of “self-management” remains to be determined within the statute of this association.

With the new US administration, I believe it is still somewhat early to determine the direction of its policies. The government is still in the process of consolidating itself and is likely reviewing various international engagements. I hope that in this revision process, Kosovo remains a priority for the US government because American support is vital—not only for Kosovo’s international recognition and diplomatic efforts but also for preventing potential conflicts in the region. US backing is also crucial for the consolidation of Kosovo’s statehood, increasing the number of recognitions, gaining membership in international organizations, and, if possible, securing a seat at the United Nations. If Kosovo were to achieve UN membership, it would no longer be viewed as a contested state by a significant number of countries, thereby fully legitimizing its statehood on the international stage.

US support has played a key role in Kosovo’s diplomatic advancements. For instance, just before Trump left office in his first administration, the Washington Agreement was signed. However, this agreement was completely ignored by the new government in Kosovo. One of its outcomes was the recognition of Kosovo by Israel, marking a significant diplomatic achievement. While the Washington Agreement did not propose a final settlement, it was designed to enhance dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, potentially paving the way for a comprehensive resolution. It remains to be seen whether this agreement will be revisited in the future.

Additionally, during the Trump administration, there was also discussion of a potential land swap proposal, involving the exchange of the northern part of Kosovo for areas in the Presheva Valley, where Albanians reside. This proposal was ultimately dismissed by the current government, but at the time, there was speculation that such a deal could have persuaded Russia and China—two permanent members of the UN Security Council—to support Kosovo’s UN membership. However, there was also strong opposition, with some labeling the proposal as a betrayal, arguing that it amounted to giving land to Serbia.

It remains uncertain whether such proposals could resurface under a second Trump administration, or if entirely new options might emerge. As I have already mentioned, we are in a period of highly unpredictable developments, making it very difficult to foresee the exact direction that US policy toward Kosovo and the Balkans might take.

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić, a political scientist and Scientific Advisor at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia.

Dr. Šelo Šabić: If the US Under Trump Ceases to Be the Anchor of Stability in the Balkans, the Region Will Wake Up to a Different Future

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In an interview with the ECPS, Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić discusses the shifting geopolitical landscape of the Balkans, emphasizing the critical role of the United States in maintaining regional stability. She highlights concerns over the potential impact of Donald Trump’s second term, arguing that if the US withdraws from its stabilizing role, the region could face new uncertainties. Dr. Šelo Šabić also explores Croatia’s position within the EU and NATO, the rise of populist leaders, and the influence of Russia and China, offering a comprehensive analysis of the region’s evolving political dynamics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an exclusive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies, Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić, a political scientist and Scientific Advisor at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia, shared her insights on the evolving political landscape of the Balkans. She discussed the role of populist leaders, the future of European integration, and Croatia’s position within NATO and the EU, particularly under President Zoran Milanović.

Dr. Šelo Šabić addressed international concerns regarding Milanović’s rhetoric, especially in relation to NATO, Ukraine, and EU foreign policy. While some accuse him of being a “pro-Russian puppet,” she emphasized: “I always wait to see more evidence that Milanović is a pro-Russian player. He has made statements that could lead to such a conclusion, particularly in discussions about Ukraine, NATO’s engagement in Ukraine, and NATO enlargement concerning Sweden and Finland’s membership. But I have not seen concrete evidence that he could significantly steer Croatian politics away from the European Union or cause a fundamental shift in Croatia’s foreign policy.”

When discussing Milanović’s record-breaking electoral success, she attributed it to his personal appeal rather than an ideological shift: “He did appeal broadly to Croatian citizens. He comes from a social-democratic background, but he also has a distinct personal political character and a very specific way of communicating. This is something that a majority of traditional citizens respect and accept.” She further explained that “while Milanović ran in the parliamentary elections and did not win, citizens overwhelmingly chose him as President. This suggests that they see him in that specific role, rather than as a political leader shaping government policy.”

Dr. Šelo Šabić also reflected on the potential consequences of Donald Trump’s second term as US President, cautioning that a radical shift could have serious implications for the region. “Some leaders in the Balkans are very hopeful, while others are fearful of what a new Trump administration might bring. The United States has been, for the last 30-plus years, a key force in stabilizing this region. If that changes—if the United States ceases to be the anchor of stability in this region—then we will wake up to a different future. I sincerely hope this does not happen and that peace is maintained in the Balkans.”

Beyond Milanović and transatlantic relations, Dr. Šelo Šabić also examined Croatia’s role in EU enlargement, the rise of populist movements, and the growing influence of Russia and China in the region. Her analysis provides a striking perspective on the challenges facing Croatia and the Western Balkans today.

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić, a political scientist and Scientific Advisor at the Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO) in Zagreb, Croatia.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić with some edits.

The Balkans Turned from Refugee Solidarity to Migration Securitization

Dr. Šabić, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do populist narratives in the Balkans leverage the refugee crisis to deepen divisions and reinforce ethno-nationalism, particularly in relation to the securitization of migration? What role does the portrayal of refugees as cultural or economic threats play in populist movements within the Balkan region, and how does this compare to similar strategies in Western Europe?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I will try to give a short answer to this complex question. There are three key elements in responding to your question. The first is the personal experience of many Balkan citizens from the 1990s, when they were refugees and displaced persons due to the wars in the former Yugoslavia. Many people still have personal reflections and direct experiences from that time.

The second element is that, since the refugee crisis in 2015, we have seen—at first a more humanitarian or solidarity-based response from most countries in the Western Balkans and Southeast Europe, including Croatia. However, this later transformed into a more securitized and border-focused approach to migration. This shift was also a result of the European Union’s policy and approach, which prioritizes border protection, prevents irregular crossings, and increasingly lacks both the capacity and the willingness to process asylum claims with empathy.

The third emerging element is the trend of new immigrants as foreign workers. Like many other countries in the European Union (EU) and beyond, these nations face a labor shortage. This shift is creating additional social, political, and economic challenges for societies that are unprepared for such changes. The transformation is happening without real policy discussions, and I see that as a problem.

How has the rise of populist leaders in the Balkans influenced policymaking during and after the refugee crisis, especially regarding border security and the treatment of asylum seekers?

A group of war refugees walks through a cornfield on the Serbia-Croatia border on November 3, 2015, as they seek passage to the EU. Many are Syrian refugees fleeing conflict. Photo: Ajdin Kamber.

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: As I mentioned earlier, most governments at the time—except for a few, particularly in the Western Balkans—took a similar stance. Without delving too much into history, if we focus on Croatia, for instance, the country demonstrated a humanitarian approach by accepting, assisting, and facilitating the transit of refugees.

Our concept of humanitarianism was largely defined by our ability to provide aid and ensure safe passage. Even today, most Western Balkan nations remain transit countries for refugees, except for certain foreign workers who settle. In general, refugees continue to move through these countries toward wealthier European nations.

Currently, a radical anti-migrant political force has not fully taken root. However, it is gaining traction due to several factors: the EU’s securitization policies, populist narratives, and the arrival of new legal migrants. The lack of public discourse, education, and engagement with the local population has led many to perceive these migrants as a threat. This is further amplified by the rise of a broader global anti-liberal discourse.

Why EU Rule of Law Reforms Falter in the Western Balkans

You argue that the underlying gap between massive formal transfers and shallow or reversible enforcement of EU rules is particularly evident in the area of the rule of law (RoL) across the Western Balkan countries. Can you explain why this is the case?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: You are referring to an article that I wrote with my colleague, Roald Elbassani, where we compared Croatia and Albania. However, the main theme has been explored by many different researchers and authors.

We see evidence of this issue in a number of what one could call new EU Member States, although by now they have had quite a long membership. The idea has been that EU accession transforms candidate states, and once they fulfill the criteria and conditions set before them, they will reform in a way that enables them to become fully functional members of the European Union.

However, the problem lies in these countries’ low level of democratic development. Many have undergone post-war transitions, as well as post-socialist or post-communist political and economic transitions—from a collective to a market economy—along with dealing with wars and broader global changes. These countries still need assistance in democratic development. At the same time, the EU is facing its own internal problems, where, despite pledges, the promise of enlargement remains distant.

Both sides publicly commit to the process, yet in reality, they remain reserved and not structurally or objectively dedicated to the goal of reform. Many of my colleagues say that the EU pretends it wants to enlarge and admit new members, while candidate countries pretend they genuinely want to reform to join the EU. This creates a kind of “dance of pretense.”

For many reasons, this applies not only to Western Balkan countries but also to any other potential EU candidate states. The EU, as a mechanism for sharing values—normative values of peace, dialogue, cooperation, and solidarity, along with the four key freedoms—has a crucial role to play. These goals remain essential for the sustainability of the EU itself. Hopefully, the EU will be able to incorporate new members in a way that strengthens rather than weakens it.

What has Brexit’s impact been on the Europeanization of Croatia’s foreign and defense policies and the possible advancement or undermining of its Europeanization process?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Limited. The only fun fact, let’s say, is that when Croatia joined the European Union in 2013, the pre-campaigning for Brexit had already begun. Very soon after, there was a referendum, and a few years later, the United Kingdom officially left the European Union. For Euro-enthusiasts in Croatia, this was hurtful because we were joining a union—an organization that had been the country’s key political goal since gaining independence—while a prominent member was departing. However, in many other aspects, bilaterally, Croatia and the UK were not deeply entangled, so Brexit did not significantly diminish or decrease Croatia’s European aspirations.

‘Euroscepticism in Croatia Is Not a Significant Political Force’

Street view in the city center of Zagreb, Croatia. Photo: Arsenie Krasnevsky.

How have elite and public Euroscepticism in Croatia evolved towards key EU policies such as Eurozone membership, enlargement, common security and defense, and the rule of law? How do populist parties and rhetoric leverage narratives of national identity, sovereignty, and economic or cultural anxieties to shape public opinion and resistance to deeper European integration, both domestically and in comparison with other Balkan countries?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I think this question is a prospective one, and we will see whether stronger Eurosceptic political parties emerge. In 2016, for example, there was a short period of six months when we had a different parliamentary makeup, with more right-wing or even far-right populist Eurosceptic parties. These parties were not anti-European but rather Eurosceptic. However, this was short-lived.

Currently, all our key political parties remain committed to EU membership. Our key political figures, including the President and the Prime Minister, are pro-EU and pro-NATO. Despite political differences in ideology or preferences and the natural competition among political actors, there are not many significant differences regarding EU membership.

It will be interesting to see if changes occur due to evolving realities within the European Union or, more broadly, in transatlantic relations. However, at present, Euroscepticism in Croatia is not a significant political force. That said, it does not mean that it may not become one in the future.

How does the rise of conservative ideologies and nationalist rhetoric in Croatia reflect broader populist trends, and what role does EU membership play in either amplifying or mitigating these tendencies?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: As in any other EU Member State and even in candidate countries, every society is pluralistic, and we have seen trends of polarization in many societies. Croatia is no exception. Polarization is not a novelty here—it is evident in Germany, France, the results of the American elections, and elsewhere in Europe and the world.

Regarding how EU membership influences these forces, yes, it fosters liberal thought, but it also strengthens conservative thought, as both are strongly present within the European Union. In that sense, liberals, centrists, conservatives, and right-wing individuals all have their interlocutors in other EU Member States and in the European Parliament.

‘Croatia Must Engage More Substantially in Enlargement Discussions’

How has the interaction between populist rhetoric and Euroscepticism in Croatia impacted its role as an advocate for EU enlargement in the Western Balkans?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Croatia is in the minority within the European Union in advocating for further enlargement, as most Member States and their citizens are generally against it. The UK was actually an exception compared to some other wealthier EU Member States, and in that sense, Brexit was a loss for enlargement. However, the issue I see with Croatian support is that while Croatia is particularly keen on supporting the enlargement of the Western Balkans—specifically the six Western Balkan countries—it needs to engage more actively in the process.

I’m trying to find the right way to phrase this: it is one thing to say, “We want the EU to expand,” but we must recognize that one of the key problems with enlargement is the issue of internal decision-making within the European Union. If a country wants to see the EU admit new members, it should also be willing to discuss the rules—or even consider changing them—regarding decision-making in the EU. For example, if we agree on qualified majority voting, this could alleviate fears of inefficiency and blockades caused by Member States using veto powers. This would lead to a more constructive discussion on enlargement. Croatia remains largely silent on this topic, and I believe we need to engage more substantially in this discussion. If we want to defend and realize our interests, we must also acknowledge the interests of other members—this is still lacking.

What are the key factors driving the rise of populist movements in Croatia, and how do these factors differ from those in Western Europe?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: When you say “populist movements,” it is a broad term, and definitions may vary. However, if I consider political parties that exhibit at least some similarities to those seen elsewhere, certain trends emerge. We have a strong conservative ideology, with a significant influence from the Catholic Church, particularly in terms of upholding and protecting values, norms, and cultural aspects of traditional society—such as family values and language.

Additionally, as I mentioned, the anti-migrant narrative is not yet as prominent in Croatia. While it is developing, it has not been central to populist ideology thus far. One additional factor that may not be as prevalent elsewhere is the legacy of the wars in this part of Europe at the end of the 20th century. There are still many unresolved issues with neighboring countries, and this remains a major driver of populist rhetoric, particularly for citizens who feel these issues strongly on an emotional level.

Reckoning with the Past Is the Only Path to Lasting Stability

To what extent do populist leaders in the Balkans utilize nationalism and historical narratives to consolidate their power, and how does this impact regional stability?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: This builds on your previous question. Ethnic hatred, ethnic distrust among different nations, and exclusive nationalism as an ideology fueled the contested issues in the former Yugoslavia, ultimately leading to violent wars. Even today, we still face unresolved problems and challenges from three decades ago that continue to burden our present reality.

Our societies still need to go through a phase of reckoning, and I hope we will take that path without new conflicts—either in Europe or in our region. This path should involve confronting the past, investing in dialogue with former enemies, and working toward reconciliation and peace with our neighbors and within our own societies.

We can continue insisting on our own version of the truth and our own rights, but if we do so without making an effort to establish channels of communication, understanding, and dialogue with those we disagree with, we will remain closed societies.

The whole idea of the European Union was founded on the decision that wars should no longer be used as instruments for resolving disputes, and I truly hope that one day, Balkan societies will mature enough to follow this path.

How have external actors, such as the European Union, Russia, and China, influenced the trajectory of populist politics in Balkan countries?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: We have already mentioned the EU, as there is a reflection, communication, and sharing of political ideologies within the European Union. Different parties or political families in the EU have their counterparts in this region. Some of these align closely with the political ideology and worldview coming from China and Russia.

They are not necessarily all in the same category, but there are overlaps. I am not sure how much detail you want me to go into regarding Balkan politics, but let’s say that, as elsewhere in Europe and within the European Union, in the Balkans—particularly in Croatia—there are overlaps, similarities, or at least a certain level of sympathy and understanding for different positions in relation to mainstream European politics.

How have Croatian far-right parties employed populist strategies to address economic grievances, such as rising costs of living and inflation, and how effective has this been in broadening their appeal beyond traditional nationalist bases?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Not successfully—not because these issues are unimportant, but rather because, somewhat unexpectedly, Croatia is currently experiencing a relatively favorable financial situation due to European funds. In this financial framework, Croatia has received substantial support from the European Union, leading to salary increases and higher public spending, including investments in reconstruction and various other projects.

Inflation is a concern, but so far, economic hardship has not become a dominant issue in Croatia. However, this does not mean it won’t in the future, particularly when EU funding is reduced. This is something to monitor closely, as Croatia faces several negative economic trends, including demographic decline, an aging population, deindustrialization, and a heavy reliance on tourism as one of its key industries. Given the impact of climate change and the volatile geopolitical environment, tourism remains a highly sensitive sector. These factors make the economic outlook something to watch closely.

‘Milanović’s Victory Is Unquestionable In Terms of Legitimacy’

President of Croatia, Zoran Milanović, addresses a press conference in Ploče, Croatia, on September 14, 2024. Photo: Jure Divich.

Zoran Milanović achieved the highest electoral score for a presidential candidate since Croatia’s independence in 1991. What factors contributed to this remarkable success during his second term?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: Several factors contributed. He appealed broadly to Croatian citizens. While he comes from a social-democratic political background, he also has a distinct personal political character that he brings to the public and a very specific way of communicating with people. This is something that a majority of traditional citizens respect and accept.

Additionally, the Croatian Constitution mandates that the President is popularly elected but holds limited power, as most authority lies with the government in Croatia’s parliamentary democracy. Zoran Milanović also ran in the parliamentary elections, where he did not win, which indicates that citizens overwhelmingly chose him for the presidential role rather than as a parliamentary leader.

His election reflects not only his personal appeal but also his role in maintaining checks and balances within the system. In that sense, his victory is unquestionable in terms of legitimacy, particularly within the constitutional framework of Croatia.

‘If the US Ceases to Be the Anchor of Stability in This Region…’

US Presidential candidate Donald Trump held a campaign rally at PPG Paints Arena in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on November 4, 2024. Photo: Chip Somodevilla.

Milanović is often accused of being a “pro-Russian puppet” who undermines Croatia’s credibility within NATO and the EU. With leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Robert Fico in Slovakia, how significant is Milanović’s potential influence in weakening the EU’s pro-Ukraine stance?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I always wait to see more evidence that Milanović is a pro-Russian player. He has made statements that could lead to such a conclusion, particularly in discussions about Ukraine, NATO’s engagement in Ukraine, and NATO enlargement concerning Sweden and Finland’s membership. He has also linked these issues to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, I have not seen concrete evidence that he could significantly steer Croatian politics away from the European Union or cause a fundamental shift in Croatia’s foreign policy. Many of the mutual suspicions and accusations stem from domestic political debates rather than an actual change in the country’s foreign policy orientation.

And lastly, with Donald Trump beginning his second term as US President, how might Milanović and other populist leaders in the region be impacted by Trump’s renewed leadership?

Dr. Senada Šelo Šabić: I don’t think Milanović is in the same camp as other leaders in the region, if we are discussing the broader Balkans, because Croatia is a member of the European Union. We still operate under a collective umbrella that largely determines our transatlantic relationship with the United States.

However, some other leaders in the Balkans are either very hopeful or very fearful of what the new Trump administration might do. The United States has been, for the last 30-plus years, a key force in stabilizing this region. If that changes—if the United States ceases to be the anchor of stability in this region—then we will wake up to a different future. I sincerely hope this does not happen and that peace is maintained in the Balkans.

President of Croatia, Zoran Milanović, addresses a press conference in Ploče, Croatia, on September 14, 2024. Photo: Jure Divich.

Dr. Petsinis: Populism in the Balkans Shaped by Persistent Ethno-Nationalism and Euroscepticism

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

The Balkans, a region deeply influenced by historical tensions and sociopolitical complexities, has become a breeding ground for diverse populist movements. Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, an authority on Central and Eastern European politics, dissects the dynamics driving populism in Croatia, Serbia, and North Macedonia. According to Dr. Petsinis, the persistence of ethno-nationalism is a defining characteristic that distinguishes Balkan populism from its Western European counterparts. His analysis explores the interplay of nationalism, Euroscepticism, and historical grievances, shedding light on how populist actors consolidate power and reshape political landscapes, offering insights into the unique challenges populism poses in the region.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

The Balkans, a region marked by historical tensions and complex political dynamics, has emerged as a fertile ground for populist movements in recent years. In this illuminating interview, Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, Associate Professor of Politics, Corvinus University in Budapest and a prominent scholar specializing in Central and Eastern European politics, delves into the factors driving populism in Croatia, Serbia, North Macedonia, and other nations. According to Dr. Petsinis, regarding differences between the Balkans and Western Europe, one key element is the persistence of ethno-nationalism across Balkan societies. Dr. Petsinis sheds light on how these movements leverage nationalism, Euroscepticism, and historical grievances to shape public narratives and consolidate power.

According to Dr. Petsinis, Balkan populism differs significantly from its Western European counterparts. In Croatia, for instance, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement) capitalizes on anti-establishment sentiment and critiques of European Union policies. The party’s focus on defending Croatian sovereignty and opposing perceived EU intervention resonates strongly with voters disillusioned by traditional parties. However, as Dr. Petsinis observes, the Homeland Movement’s transition into a coalition government has tempered some of its anti-establishment rhetoric, reflecting the fluid nature of populist politics.

In Serbia, Dr. Petsinis highlights how the ruling Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) under President Aleksandar Vučić employs ethno-nationalist narratives centered on Kosovo. By emphasizing the reintegration of Kosovo into Serbia and the protection of Serbian cultural and historical sites, Vučić consolidates support among nationalist constituencies. Meanwhile, in North Macedonia, left-wing populist movements, such as Levica, incorporate nationalist and anti-imperialist themes, favoring alignment with BRICS nations rather than traditional Western alliances.

Dr. Petsinis also explores the influence of external actors, including the European Union, Russia, and China on Balkan populism. Serbia’s populist actors, for example, view Russia as a key ally, particularly in the context of the Kosovo issue. Conversely, Croatia’s populist rhetoric often distances itself from Russia due to historical alignments with Serbia. Dr. Petsinis emphasizes that China’s economic investments in the region offer populist leaders a viable alternative to EU frameworks, further complicating the geopolitical landscape.

With populist leaders like Zoran Milanović in Croatia combining Euroscepticism with domestic critiques of corruption, Dr. Petsinis underscores the delicate balancing act these figures perform to appeal to diverse voter bases. This interview offers a nuanced analysis of Balkan populism, highlighting the interplay between nationalism, external influences, and shifting political landscapes under Dr. Petsinis’s expert guidance.

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis, Associate Professor of Politics, Corvinus University in Budapest and a prominent scholar specializing in Central and Eastern European politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Vassilis Petsinis with some edits.

Ethno-Nationalism and Populism in the Balkans: A Unique Political Landscape

Professor Petsinis, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. What are the key factors driving the rise of populist movements in the Balkan countries such as Serbia, Croatia, and Montenegro, and how do these factors differ from those in Western Europe?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think that, depending on the perspective, we should first address the question of defining populism. For example, if we start with Serbia, I would suggest that whether we study populism from a more discursive perspective, like that of Ernesto Laclau, or from the ideational approach, as presented by Cas Mudde, we don’t have genuine populist political actors in these countries.

In Serbia, the leading right-wing Serbian Progressive Party could be seen mostly as a cartel or an established right-wing party with certain anti-establishment rhetoric, especially regarding international, global, and European institutions. However, I wouldn’t classify it as a genuinely populist political actor.

In Croatia, we have the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement), which is currently a government partner to HDZ (the Croatian Democratic Union). This right-wing party has incorporated powerful anti-establishment rhetoric since its formation in 2020, focusing on ethno-nationalism, gender-related issues, nativism, and relations between the Church and State. It also emphasizes anti-abortion and pro-life stances. However, last spring, the Homeland Movement quickly entered a coalition government with HDZ, thereby alleviating many of its anti-establishment prerogatives. Overall, it could now be classified more as a national conservative party.

As for North Macedonia, we see an interesting case with the left-wing populist party Levica. This party, while left-wing, also incorporates a nationalist component and expresses a preference for the BRICS global alliance in international politics. Additionally, elements of right-wing populism exist under the umbrella of the leading VMRO-DPMNE party, although its new leadership has sought to curb these tendencies.

Regarding differences between the Balkans and Western Europe, one key element is the persistence of ethno-nationalism across Balkan societies. For example, in Croatia, sociocultural factors such as Vatican contracts with the Roman Catholic Church have strengthened anti-LGBT and pro-life tendencies within populist, radical-right, and national-conservative circles. These factors contribute to the unique landscape of populist movements in the region compared to their Western European counterparts.

How do you interpret the relationship between the rise of right-wing populism in Central and Eastern Europe and its influence on domestic ethnopolitics, particularly in terms of shaping public narratives around minority groups and immigration?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends on the context. Central and Eastern Europe is such a vast region geographically, politically, and socioculturally. To narrow down the discussion, I would prefer to focus on the countries of the former Yugoslavia, as I have dedicated several reports on Croatia and ethno-nationalism for ECPS.

Starting with ethno-nationalism, there are specific open issues. For instance, in Croatia, for the radical right and the national conservative right, maintaining the country’s national sovereignty is of paramount importance. A common theme in the rhetoric of parties like the Homeland Movement, as well as the right-wing faction within the ruling HDZ in Croatia, is the emphasis on protecting Croatia’s sovereignty. This sovereignty, tied to the country’s independence following the Homeland War of the 1990s, is often framed within the current international context, highlighting the need to maintain autonomy while participating in alliances like NATO and the EU.

In Serbia, the situation revolves around the status of Kosovo, the protection of the ethnic Serbian minority in Kosovo, and the preservation of cultural monuments in the region. These issues fuel ethno-nationalist tendencies and provide substantial material for right-wing populist forces in Serbia.

These specific, contextual ethno-nationalist concerns drive much of the particularistic ethnopolitics in these societies. They fuel ethno-nationalism and provide material for radical right-wing populism, which may not be directly applicable to other societies in Central and Eastern Europe or Europe as a whole.

Populist Rhetoric and Ethnic Identity: Contrasting Strategies in the Baltics and the Balkans

In your comparative analysis of the Baltic States and Western Balkans, what role does populist rhetoric play in framing ethnic minorities as either threats or integral parts of national identity, and how does this rhetoric vary across these regions?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it really depends on the country. Starting with Estonia, the main radical right-wing party there, although its popularity has been declining since 2022, initially securitized the collective status of the ethnic Russian minority in Estonia. However, in recent years, they have also attempted to approach this minority by playing the card of allegedly shared conservative values.

In Latvia, the National Conservative National Alliance Party has also been somewhat suspicious of the ethnic Russian minority. It was only after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine that they began calling more emphatically for the securitization of domestic politics in Latvia.

Moving further south to Croatia, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement) and the right-wing faction within the ruling HDZ have been very skeptical of the ethnic Serb political party, the Serbian Independent Democratic Party. The Homeland Movement, in particular, has included in its political program calls for the semi-securitization of bilateral relations between Serbia and Croatia. They have also demanded that Serbia pay reparations for the war in the 1990s.

In Serbia, the broader radical right and national conservative circles have primarily focused on Kosovo, which they continue to regard as a constitutional part of Serbia. Domestically, however, there is less emphasis on framing ethnic minorities as threats. For example, the ethnic Hungarian community in Vojvodina is no longer perceived as a threat. While there has been some suspicion about the Bosniaks in Sandžak, the focus has shifted toward Euroscepticism and the protection of Serbia’s sovereignty in European and global politics, rather than targeting ethnic minorities in the same way as in the 1990s.

Given your discussion of Euroscepticism and populism, how do populist parties in Central and Eastern Europe balance their critiques of the EU’s influence on sovereignty with their need to engage with EU frameworks on issues like ethnic minority rights and migration?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends. Again, I would like to focus mostly on Croatia and Serbia, as these are the countries I prepared for this conversation.

In the case of Croatia, the Homeland Movement is rather rigid regarding the protection of national borders by the state itself, rather than relying on the EU. They are against the EU’s common defense policies, and since their formation, they have been skeptical of EU intervention, such as that of the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, particularly before Croatia’s accession to the EU. This skepticism extends to the enhancement of collective rights for minorities, especially the ethnic Serb minority and their institutional representation in the Croatian Parliament. This is a significant dimension of their emphasis on state sovereignty.

Turning to Latvia, parties such as the National Alliance were, in their early stages, quite skeptical of what they perceived as EU interventionism, which they felt challenged the ethnic democracy model applied in Latvia. A similar sentiment existed in Estonia. However, over time, the context has evolved.

For instance, in Croatia, while nationalist principles are maintained, the focus has shifted primarily to domestic politics, such as efforts to exclude the ethnic Serb minority party from power, without directly blaming the EU for this.

As for Serbia, and also Estonia and Latvia, the context becomes more complex. In Estonia, EKRE (the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia) attempted to approach the ethnic Russian community in recent years. However, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine significantly altered the situation.

Overall, there is no uniform pattern here. The strategies of these populist parties vary depending on the national and geopolitical context.

Populism’s Role in Power Dynamics and Regional Stability in the Balkans

Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić participates in an SNS political campaign at Hall Čair in Niš, Serbia, on March 30, 2022. Photo: Radule Perisic.

To what extent do populist leaders in the Balkans utilize nationalism and historical narratives to consolidate their power, and how does this impact regional stability?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends on the context. In Serbia, for example, there is the prominent issue of Kosovo. All political parties, including the leading SNS under Aleksandar Vučić, programmatically prioritize the defense of Kosovo, advocating for its effective reintegration into the Serbian state structure. Additionally, they emphasize the protection of the ethnic Serbian minority and Serbian cultural monuments in the region, presenting these as top priorities. This issue holds significant weight in both domestic and international politics.

In Croatia, on the other hand, there is a strong emphasis on the concept of sovereignty. The prevailing notion is that Croatian sovereignty must be staunchly defended and not compromised, whether in relations with Western, Eastern, or other global partners. This focus on sovereignty is a key element of the political narrative.

How have external actors, such as the European Union, Russia, and China, influenced the trajectory of populist politics in Balkan countries?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it really depends on the context. In the case of Serbia, right-wing populist actors have long viewed Russia as a key partner, especially since the 1990s. Political parties, including more recent ones like Dveri, as well as the broader radical and national conservative right-wing spectrum, regard Russia as Serbia’s main ally in international politics.

In Croatia, however, the situation is different. There is a more staunch approach, and while China has been viewed as a more reliable economic partner compared to the EU by the broader right-wing spectrum in Serbia, this perspective is not as prevalent in Croatia. The radical and national conservative right in Croatia has historically been open to a degree of economic cooperation with Russia. However, they have always been somewhat suspicious of Russia, largely due to its perceived partnership with Serbia. This skepticism intensified after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

In North Macedonia, we see the example of the Levica party, which adopts a different approach. They are quite open to cooperation with the BRICS countries, including Russia and China, as well as other nations they associate with the Global South. Levica justifies this stance through a quasi-anti-imperialist platform, presenting it as an alternative to traditional Western alliances.

How Religion Fuels Populist Rhetoric and National Identity in the Balkans

What role does religion play in shaping the rhetoric and appeal of populist parties and leaders in the Balkan countries?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: Well, of course, it does. In Croatia, for example, parties like the Domovinski Pokret, the right-wing faction within HDZ, and smaller parties such as the Croatian Sovereignty Movement, Bloc for Croatia, and Most (Bridge), to the extent that it can be regarded as a national conservative right party, advocate for a partnership-like relationship between the state and the Roman Catholic Church. They also strongly support the protection and continuation of the so-called Vatican contracts.

In Serbia, the broader right-wing political spectrum emphasizes a similar partnership-like relationship between the state and the Orthodox Church. This includes some particularistic interpretations of the Orthodox doctrine, such as Svetosavlje. This Serbian-specific brand of Orthodox theology, rooted in the teachings of Serbian theologian Justin Popović during the interwar period, remains a distinctive and particularistic interpretation of Orthodoxy. It is often espoused by political actors from the radical right, reinforcing their ideological narratives.

How do the national conservative and radical right-wing parties in Croatia use populist rhetoric to mobilize support, particularly regarding issues like the “Homeland War” and minority rights, and how does this compare to similar movements in other Central and Eastern European countries?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: Well, they do. For instance, the Domovinski Pokret (Homeland Movement), founded in 2020, has been very active in protests, both through demonstrations and online campaigns via their websites. A notable example is their opposition to the public use of the Serbian Cyrillic script in areas like Vukovar. Vukovar holds a central symbolic role in contemporary Croatian nationalism due to the resistance mounted by the Croatian military against the Yugoslav People’s Army and Serbian auxiliary forces in 1991.

The Homeland Movement also incorporates ethno-nationalist principles into its broader anti-establishment rhetoric, targeting Croatia’s two major parties: the center-right Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP). However, the interplay between ethno-nationalist principles and anti-establishment rhetoric can be quite malleable. For example, since last spring, the Homeland Movement has been a member of a governing coalition with HDZ.

This intersection of ethno-nationalism and establishment politics shows that parties like the Homeland Movement are not always as anti-establishment as they claim to be. It is worth noting that a faction within the Homeland Movement opposed the coalition pact with HDZ, seeing it as a betrayal of the movement’s anti-establishment principles. In response, this faction formed a new party, Domovinski Otpora (Homeland Resistance), in September 2024.

Euroscepticism and National Sovereignty in a Shifting Political Landscape

In a recent chapter, you discuss the soft Euroscepticism of Croatia’s Homeland Movement (DP). How does the populist framing of national sovereignty by this party challenge or reinforce broader European Union integration narratives?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: Well, the Homeland Movement does not have a standard pro-EU stance. They advocate for a Europe of sovereign nations and do not support Eurofederalism.

In your analysis, how have Croatian far-right parties employed populist strategies to address economic grievances, such as rising costs of living and inflation, and how effective has this been in broadening their appeal beyond traditional nationalist bases?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: They have consistently accused the government of mismanaging the economy. Like other political actors on the broader right across Europe, they have also blamed the EU’s Green Deal for the increase in energy prices over the last couple of years.

At the same time, there has been a powerful emphasis on ethno-nationalist underpinnings. The Homeland Movement’s critique of alleged economic mismanagement often focuses on the revitalization of Croatian regions such as Slavonia, Lika, or parts of Dalmatia—areas ravaged by war. These regions have a notable presence of wartime veterans or invalids, making them key target groups for the party.

Alongside its critique of economic mismanagement by HDZ and the Social Democratic Party in the past, the Homeland Movement has also promoted a more concrete program for economic support specifically aimed at these categories of the population, particularly war veterans from the Homeland War.

SDP Voters Back Milanović Despite Diverging Views on Euroscepticism

Croatian President Zoran Milanović attends a ceremony in Vrgorac, Croatia, on July 1, 2022. Photo: Jure Divich.

According to Euractiv, Zoran Milanović achieved the highest score by a presidential candidate since Croatia’s independence in 1991. How do you explain this huge success during his second term as president?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think Zoran Milanović is a rather controversial character, and it’s not easy to pin down his appeal. He has made several contentious statements in the past, particularly regarding relations between Croatia and Bosnia, as well as Croatia and Serbia. He has also expressed doubts about the protection of collective minority rights of ethnic groups in Bosnia. Furthermore, he questioned Serbia’s legitimacy as a candidate for EU membership. More recently, since 2022, he has expressed skepticism about Ukraine’s eligibility for NATO or EU membership. So, he’s been quite a colorful figure, so to speak.

At the same time, his success in the elections likely has several explanations. First, since the constitutional amendments of 2000–2002, the actual powers of the Croatian president have been significantly reduced. The current president has far more limited competencies compared to Franjo Tuđman’s term in office during the 1990s. This semi-parliamentary arrangement doesn’t make the president a purely decorative figure, but the role is definitely less influential compared to the prime minister.

Most likely, Milanović’s success reflects the fact that Croatian voters, who elect the president directly, saw him as a more reliable candidate compared to others.

Last Sunday, after the vote in Zagreb, Milanović criticized Brussels as “in many ways autocratic and unrepresentative,” run by unelected officials. The 58-year-old Milanović regularly blames the HDZ for the party’s long-standing corruption problems and calls Prime Minister Plenković “a Brussels employee.” How much of a role did his attacks on the EU play in his victory in the presidential elections?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think they did play a part, as he managed to create an umbrella for Eurosceptic trends among the Croatian electorate. These are voters who do not necessarily want to align with the national conservative or radical right and do not want to vote for HDZ. This could be one explanation.

Additionally, Zoran Milanović originates from the Social Democratic Party (SDP), which does not necessarily adopt such strong Eurosceptic stances on a party level or share Milanović’s harsh criticism of the EU. However, having a representative from the SDP in the presidential office could enhance the party’s standing vis-à-vis HDZ in Croatian politics. This may have been another incentive for SDP voters to support Milanović, even if they do not entirely agree with his Eurosceptic views.

Donald Trump has just started his second term as president of the US. How do you think the populist Milanović and other populist leaders in the region will be affected by Trump’s second term?

Dr. Vassilis Petsinis: I think it depends on the context. Milanović has not expressed any real preference, even indirectly, for Donald Trump.

Now, in Serbia, considering the political establishment, particularly the ruling SNS (Serbian Progressive Party) under President Aleksandar Vučić, they may look for a better deal regarding Kosovo during Donald Trump’s term in office. This seems to be what they are aiming for.

Myanmar

Dr. Subedi: Majoritarian Populist Politics Marginalizes Minorities in South and Southeast Asia

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Dr. DB Subedi highlights how majoritarian populist politics in South and Southeast Asia marginalizes minorities by leveraging identity politics and ethno-religious narratives. He underscores how populist leaders, from Myanmar to India, utilize state apparatuses to consolidate power, often legitimizing exclusionary policies and fostering polarization. With examples like Hindu nationalism in India, Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar, and Islamist populism in Bangladesh, Dr. Subedi examines how these movements exploit historical grievances and global populist trends while adapting them to local contexts. His analysis sheds light on the fragile state of pluralism and democracy in these multicultural societies.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Dr. DB Subedi, a distinguished lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia, delves deeply into the dynamics of majoritarian populist politics in South and Southeast Asia in an insightful interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Drawing from his extensive academic expertise, Dr. Subedi examines how populist leaders in the region leverage identity politics and state apparatuses to marginalize minorities and consolidate power, often at the expense of democratic institutions and pluralism.

In the interview, Dr. Subedi sheds light on how the historical, cultural, and political landscapes of post-colonial South and Southeast Asia have created fertile ground for nationalist and religious populist ideologies. He highlights the role of religion, ethnicity, and national identity in shaping these populist movements, often leading to the exclusion of minorities and the reinforcement of majoritarian dominance. The cases of India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh serve as pivotal examples, with each showcasing how populism adapts to local contexts while drawing on broader global populist trends.

Dr. Subedi also explores the economic underpinnings of populism in the region, emphasizing the interplay between economic inequality, globalization, and populist rhetoric. He points out that while globalization has lifted millions out of poverty in Asia, it has simultaneously deepened economic divides, creating grievances that populist leaders exploit to craft exclusionary narratives.

Furthermore, the discussion extends to the intersection of nationalism and populism, where Dr. Subedi identifies the trend of leader-centric politics replacing traditional party-led systems. This shift has enabled authoritarian populist leaders to manipulate institutions, bypass democratic norms, and entrench their authority. The examples of Narendra Modi in India, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines, and the Rajapaksa brothers in Sri Lanka illustrate how such leaders use religion and identity to legitimize their power while marginalizing dissenting voices and minority groups.

The interview provides a comprehensive understanding of how majoritarian populist politics operates in South and Southeast Asia, offering valuable insights into its implications for democracy, social cohesion, and the region’s broader political landscape. Dr. Subedi’s analysis serves as a critical lens through which to examine the challenges posed by populism in multicultural societies.

Dr. DB Subedi, a distinguished lecturer in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Australia.

Here is the transcription of the interview withDr. DB Subedi with some edits.

The Roots of Populism: Religion, Identity, and Authoritarianism in South and Southeast Asia

Professor Subedi, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In the context of South and Southeast Asia, what historical, cultural, and political factors have contributed to the rise of nationalist and religious populism, and how do these dynamics align with authoritarian populism to shape contemporary political narratives?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s a very important question. When we talk about populism in South and Southeast Asia, to understand the overall dynamics of populism, we need to examine the historical context of post-colonial state formation in this region.

Religion, culture, and national identity have always been contentious issues in South and Southeast Asia. From the time of post-colonial state formation, for example, the role of Islam in Pakistan and Indonesia was heavily debated. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, religion has always been central to defining the majoritarian identity, and this has been deeply contested by minority groups. These dynamics are common across other regions as well.

Religion, history, and culture collectively define the social identity of one group of people, but at the same time, the same applies to minority groups. This creates a form of social polarization. Over time, populist leaders have tapped into these polarizations, mobilizing them to construct and define their own bounded political communities, which they then appeal to, while pursuing populist political narratives, ideas, and policies. The question of religion is particularly central in this regard.

This has also translated into various political discourses, such as the formulation of political ideologies and policies, where religion has often been both a contentious and central element. Countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan are key examples, and we see similar instances in other parts of South and Southeast Asia.

The historical context of nation-state formation, the creation of national identity, and the manipulation of collective identities have become key features in defining populism in this region, both in the past and to a large extent in the present. For instance, the first wave of populism in South and Southeast Asia was led by national heroes—what we might call the nationalist leaders of independence movements. Not all of them, of course, but some of these founding fathers of modern nation-states had populist elements in the way they defined national identities, often at the cost of excluding others and mobilizing specific constituencies.

If you like, we could see these leaders as the first generation of populist figures. But times have changed. Over the past 50–70 years, if we look back to the 1950s and 1960s, there have been different waves of populism in this region. However, religion and national identity continue to play a crucial role in defining populist movements in South and Southeast Asia.

The Role of Economic Inequality and Globalization in Driving Populism

What role do economic grievances, inequality, and globalization play in fueling nationalist and religious populism in South and Southeast Asian countries?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s another very important question. Earlier, I mostly discussed the cultural aspects of the rise of populist politics in this region. However, economic factors also play a significant role. Economic inequalities—both within and between ethnic groups, at national and sub-national levels—are key drivers of grievances. These inequalities often fuel resentment toward groups perceived as affluent or privileged within the community.

Inequality has consistently been a major issue shaping populist movements. For instance, in the 1980s, agrarian populist movements in parts of India were largely driven by economic grievances. Similarly, economic inequalities played a central role in mobilizing support for former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand. In this sense, inequality has always been a central issue in the rise of populism.

Globalization is another critical factor. When addressing inequality, populist rhetoric often targets political elites at the national level, but it frequently extends to external actors, such as multinational corporations and proponents of neoliberal policies, who are portrayed as the “enemies of the people.” Economic grievances stemming from globalization provide fertile ground for populist narratives.

In the contemporary wave of populism, almost all populist leaders in the region have proposed ambitious and transformative economic policies aimed at redistribution. However, these agendas have often failed, with many populist leaders losing power after an average of 4–5 years.

In Asia, the role of globalization is complex. Unlike the “losers of globalization” thesis commonly seen in Western Europe and the US, where certain groups are left behind, globalization in Asia has largely benefited many countries. For example, the globalization of production industries has led to the relocation of manufacturing from the Global North to countries in the Global South, such as India, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. This shift has contributed to economic growth and lifted many people out of extreme poverty.

However, this growth has been accompanied by rising inequality. While a segment of the population has profited greatly, the majority have seen only incremental improvements, leaving systemic economic inequality intact. This dynamic fuels public grievances and provides populist leaders with a platform to craft their narratives and agendas.

In this sense, globalization in Asia acts as a double-edged sword. On one hand, it creates opportunities for populist leaders to exploit growing inequality and public frustration, leading to anti-government and anti-establishment protests that propel populist figures to power. On the other hand, globalization has delivered tangible benefits to many in Asia, making the relationship between globalization and populism more ambiguous and requiring further exploration.

The Impact of Populist Nationalism on Marginalized Communities

A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee
celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.

How do nationalist and religious populist ideologies intersect and manifest in countries like India, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka, shaping the broader sociopolitical landscape, and what are the implications for marginalized communities across Hindu-majority, Muslim-majority, and Buddhist-majority contexts in South and Southeast Asia?

Dr. DB Subedi: When we talk about the intersection of nationalism and religion, we should first look at the interface between ethnicity and religion, in Asian countries, because religion and ethnicity are deeply intertwined in many Asian countries. Take Sri Lanka, for example, where the majority of Sinhalese follow Buddhism, and as a result, historically, since the colonial period and in the post-colonial state formation, Sinhala Buddhism has become a dominant ideology. Sinhala Buddhist leaders of the past, and even more recently, have mobilized that ideology to define their majority political constituency.

We can say similar things about India. India is vast in terms of geography, ethnicity, caste, and so on. Even today, Hindus form the majority population, which provides political parties like the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) leverage to pursue Hindu nationalist politics both at the center and in the regions. In other words, the intersection of ethnicity and religion constructs the collective social identity of the people, providing leverage for political parties and populist leaders to define their bounded political communities, which they mobilize in their populist politics. One example is the populist nationalist politics of the BJP and its current Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, who many have analyzed as a Hindu nationalist and populist leader.

You can see similar dynamics in Bangladesh, where Islam and politics go hand in hand, and ethnicity obviously comes into play. In the case of the countries you mentioned—Sri Lanka, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar—the majoritarian ethno-religious identities of the majority populations have always been central features in attempts to homogenize national identities.

This process of homogenization has been deeply contested by minorities in countries like Myanmar or India, where Muslim minorities, along with secular and liberal-minded political leaders and parties, contest this idea. Similar patterns are evident in Thailand, where the homogenization of national identity, based on Thai national identity drawn primarily from Buddhist culture and religious identities, is contested by other minorities.

As a result, there are multiple effects on the national polity, both from a populist and nationalist point of view. One major implication of this political dynamic is that in most Asian countries, nationalism often hosts populism. In other words, populism travels alongside nationalism in most Asian countries. Of course, the role of religion is present, and we can discuss religious populism separately. However, one prominent feature across the region is populist nationalism.

In terms of policy and political outcomes, minorities have suffered, as this form of politics often shares exclusionary characteristics similar to populist politics seen elsewhere, particularly in Western Europe and North America.

Power Consolidation and Minority Exclusion in South Asia

To what extent do nationalist and religious populist leaders in Buddhist, Hindu, and Muslim-majority countries leverage identity politics and state apparatuses to consolidate power, legitimize violence, and exclude minorities, and how do institutional and cultural narratives in post-colonial South Asia justify and sustain these populist-authoritarian practices?

Dr. DB Subedi: That’s another very good question. It actually points to some of the issues I mentioned in my earlier response, particularly the interplay between religious identity and national identity. What we have seen most recently across Asia is that populist leaders have frequently referred to the blending of religious and national identities in these countries to define their sociopolitical landscapes.

Having said that, we should also acknowledge that Southeast Asia and South Asia are vast regions, with diverse sociocultural and sociopolitical contexts, as well as differing historical and contemporary dynamics. These variations shape the realization, aspiration, and respect for pluralism and democracy in this region. Therefore, while identifying common trends, we must be cautious not to overgeneralize.

Despite these differences, one commonality across these countries is the centrality of leaders in shaping the political landscape. In the past, political parties held this central role. However, with the rise of authoritarian, populist, and nationalist politics—from the Rajapaksa regime in Sri Lanka to Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh, Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, Hun Sen in Cambodia, and Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines—we have seen strong and powerful leaders dominating the political sphere.

This shift toward leader-centric politics has been a significant trend across South and Southeast Asia. Leaders like Narendra Modi in India connect directly with their followers, often bypassing institutional processes, by mobilizing cultural, religious, or national identities. Similarly, Duterte in the Philippines sought direct engagement with the public, frequently circumventing institutional frameworks.

Populist leaders often appeal to the “will of the people” to justify and consolidate power. They use this direct connection with their political constituencies, defined by religious, national, or ethnic identities, to legitimize their authority. This raises the question: where do institutions stand in this process?

Institutions do matter, and in Asia, as elsewhere, populist leaders often come to power through elections, no matter how free or fair those elections might be. The presence of democratic institutions, even minimally, has been a prerequisite for populist leaders to rise to power. However, once in power, these leaders employ various tactics to manipulate, dismantle, or reform existing political and democratic institutions to consolidate their authority.

For example, in Sri Lanka, the populist-nationalist government of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his predecessor, his brother Mahinda Rajapaksa, pushed for constitutional reforms to concentrate power in the presidency. Similarly, in the Philippines, Duterte passed an anti-terrorism law that weakened civil society organizations, particularly those engaged in peacebuilding in conflict-affected areas like Mindanao. Institutional manipulation and re-engineering of democratic structures have become common strategies for populist and authoritarian leaders to sustain their hold on power.

Contrasting Populisms: Nationalist Narratives in Asia and the Global West

Large protests demand the resignation of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government as part of the Anti-Quota Movement and Bangladesh Quota Reform Protests. Thousands took to the streets in Dhaka, Bangladesh, on August 4, 2024. Photo: M.D. Sabbir.

How does the rise of nationalist and religious populism in Asia compare with similar movements in the global West in terms of discourse strategies and mobilization methods, and to what extent are these movements influenced by global populist trends while adapting international narratives to local contexts?

Dr. DB Subedi: Interesting question. Asia, especially South and Southeast Asia, is a unique region in terms of understanding populism. It is unique because, unlike in the West, in South and Southeast Asia, we have seen populist movements and populist styles of politics that involve different varieties of populist movements. There isn’t one singular form of populism.

As I mentioned earlier, nationalism has often hosted populism in Asia, and the two frequently go hand in hand. This is because questions of national identity, ethnicity, and religion are central to defining both nationalist and populist movements. While there are key differences between the two, most populist leaders in the region also embody elements of nationalism to some extent. Narendra Modi is an example, and you can observe similar trends in Thailand, Myanmar, and Indonesia, among others.

This is a unique feature of populism in Asia. However, across the region, we should be cautious when interpreting or explaining populism with the same degree of intensity. By “degree of intensity,” I mean that in some cases, when populism intersects with nationalism, it manifests as what I would call “soft populism.”

When I say “soft populism,” the overall political manifestation or style of a particular populist leader might appear nationalist but incorporates populist orientations or elements. Imran Khan’s politics in Pakistan is a recent example. In Bangladesh, politics under Sheikh Hasina was mostly authoritarian, but in her later years in government, she also played the nationalist card while implementing redistributive economic policies, which had populist undertones. She reached out to Muslim voters and her support base using a populist style of politics. Similar examples can be observed elsewhere.

Soft populism can involve a strong leader or political party that is primarily nationalist or authoritarian but includes populist elements. On the other hand, there are also cases of “hard populist” governments and leaders in the region. Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines is a prime example, as is Thaksin Shinawatra in the past in Thailand. These leaders represent a more pronounced form of populism.

This distinction—between soft and hard populism—is one of the differences between populism in Asia and the populist leaders in Western Europe and North America. The phenomenon in Asia is shaped by the region’s distinct history of post-colonial state formation and its sociopolitical landscape of collective identity and politics.

In this sense, soft populist politics in South and Southeast Asia often appears as an extended form of identity politics.

Finally, when we compare similarities and differences, we observe that during the 1980s and 1990s, there was a rise in left-wing populism. Interestingly, in the last 10 to 15 years, we have seen the emergence of populism that looks more exclusionary, sharing certain elements of right-wing populism seen elsewhere. However, there are still a few examples of left-wing populism in this region.

Comparing Buddhist, Hindu, and Islamist Populist Policies in South Asia

In what ways has Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar influenced the state’s policies towards minorities, and how does it compare to Hindu nationalism in India or Islamist populism in Bangladesh?

Members of Myanmar’s Muslim Rohingya minority walk through a broken road at Shah Porir Deep, at Teknaf in Cox’s Bazer, Bangladesh on September 11, 2017. Photo: Sk Hasan Ali.

Dr. DB Subedi: All these countries have different histories and contexts of post-colonial state formation, although one similarity is that all three countries were colonized. So, they are post-colonial nations with a history of colonial rule. At the same time, they are multicultural countries with both ethnic and religious majorities as well as minorities.

In Myanmar, for a long time, when the military junta was in power—and they remain in power today—they have consistently used ethno-religious nationalism as a key strategy and ideology for ruling the country. This trend has been especially pronounced over the last few decades. When the military first came to power, they seemed to adopt a different kind of socialist policy, and the religious and ethno-religious dimension was not as prominent at that time. However, over time, there has been a growing trend of mobilizing the sentiments of Theravada Buddhist Burmese, which has been deeply contested by other ethnic and religious minorities.

One consequence of this trend has been the subordination and marginalization of ethnic minorities, which has contributed to ongoing civil wars in Myanmar for decades.

In India, the situation is quite different. The BJP came to power relatively recently, whereas before that, the Indian National Congress, which was more oriented toward pluralism and liberal policies toward minorities, held power. Under the current government, however, Hindu nationalist policies have led to the introduction of certain citizenship laws and other policies that discriminate against Muslim minorities.

Similar trends can be observed in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh as well. In a nutshell, minorities have often become victims of majoritarian, exclusivist politics when such ideologies are in power.

Professor Michael Kazin from Georgetown University, a renowned historian and expert on American politics and social movements.

Professor Kazin: Right-Wing Populism Is a Morbid Symptom of Political Transition

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In a compelling interview with the ECPS, renowned historian Professor Michael Kazin explores the rise of right-wing populism as a “morbid symptom” of today’s political transition. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of interregnum, Kazin analyzes Donald Trump’s presidency, highlighting its profound impact on American and global politics. From galvanizing his MAGA base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism to forging ties with far-right leaders abroad, Trump’s leadership reflects the challenges of this transitional era. Kazin also envisions the potential for a progressive populism rooted in economic justice to counterbalance these dynamics.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

Renowned historian and scholar of American politics and social movements, Professor Michael Kazin of Georgetown University, offers a thought-provoking analysis of right-wing populism in the context of Donald Trump’s presidency in a comprehensive interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). Framing contemporary politics as an “interregnum”—a period of transition—Professor Kazin draws on Antonio Gramsci’s observation that such times often produce “morbid symptoms,” which he associates with the global rise of right-wing populism. He explores how Trump’s leadership embodies this phenomenon, highlighting its implications for both domestic and international politics.

In the interview, Professor Kazin delves into Trump’s unique ability to sustain a populist movement despite his focus on personal popularity over policy. He discusses how Trump has galvanized his base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism, creating a potent political force that continues to shape American political discourse. Professor Kazin critiques Trump’s approach to governance, describing his first administration as “wretched,” marked by policy ignorance and self-serving actions. However, he acknowledges that Trump’s movement, particularly the MAGA base, has no parallel within the Democratic Party, providing him with a solid foundation of unwavering support.

Professor Kazin also examines the potential global ripple effects of Trump’s second term, noting his alignment with leaders like Viktor Orbán and the admiration he garners from right-wing populist movements in Europe. While Trump’s “America First” stance complicates the formation of international alliances, Professor Kazin suggests that his presidency could embolden far-right leaders worldwide. However, he tempers this with cautious optimism, emphasizing the resilience of American democratic institutions and the structural limits of Trump’s power.

Finally, Professor Kazin explores the broader dynamics of populism, contrasting left- and right-wing variants. He argues that left-wing populism, rooted in economic justice and social democracy, offers a constructive path forward. As global demands for equitable governance grow, Professor Kazin envisions the potential for a revival of progressive populism that challenges elite power while addressing urgent issues like economic inequality and climate change.

The interview with Professor Kazin offers a nuanced perspective on Trump’s presidency, the resilience of democratic institutions, and the evolving role of populism in shaping both domestic and global politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Michael Kazin with some edits.

Populism in America: Bridging or Deepening Divides?

Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

Professor Kazin, thank you so much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. In your book titled The Populist Persuasion, you discuss how populist rhetoric has evolved in the U.S. What role does populism play in bridging or deepening the divide between cultural and economic grievances today?

Professor Michael Kazin: As you know, populism is both a language and, some would argue, a governing philosophy. I focus on it as a language in American history, with ramifications for populism in other countries, of course. Historically, I think there has been a distinction in the United States—which is really all I can speak about with authority—between left-wing populism and right-wing populism.

Left-wing populism tends to focus on an economic elite—the 1% versus the 99%, the robber barons, the plutocrats, the monopolists. Many terms have been used to critique those with significant wealth and economic power. Left-wing populists aim to unite a large majority, regardless of gender, race, or national origin.

In contrast, right-wing populists in the US—and to some degree in Europe—view “the people” as a broad middle segment of the population, primarily native-born individuals. According to right-wing populists, this group is being exploited and oppressed by two forces: a small elite at the top (both economic and cultural, and sometimes perceived as controlling the state, such as the European Union in Europe or the federal government in the US) and a small but growing group at the bottom, often composed of non-white and immigrant populations.

Historically, this group at the bottom has included Latinos, Asian Americans, and African Americans. More recently, undocumented or illegal immigrants have been the focus. Right-wing populists argue that these groups are used by the elite to drive down wages and erode the cherished culture of the native-born middle class.

Generally, this is how left-wing and right-wing populists operate in the US, with similar analogs in Europe.

Currently, in American politics, left-wing populists—such as Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, and other progressives within and outside the Democratic Party—are striving to emphasize the tradition of left-wing populism. However, they face challenges because Democrats and progressives also prioritize cultural issues, such as more lenient immigration policies, transgender rights, and racial equality. This creates some tension with economic left-wing populists, who prefer to focus narrowly on issues like corporate greed, wealth inequality, and combating the power of the very rich, including figures like Donald Trump.

On the right, as most people are aware, Donald Trump exemplifies the continuity of right-wing populism from the 19th century to today. Right-wing populists argue that a “Hollywood elite” or “woke elite” in universities and cultural institutions seeks to impose its values on the hardworking, native-born majority. Additionally, they claim that undocumented immigrants take jobs from native-born Americans, drive down wages, and increase crime in cities.

This is how the two traditions of left-wing and right-wing populism are playing out in contemporary American politics.

Populist Rhetoric and Its Impact on Economic Inequality and Social Justice

How has populist rhetoric shaped the policy priorities of modern political parties in the US, particularly regarding economic inequality and social justice?​

Professor Michael Kazin: Social justice is a term that’s hard to define. It’s been used by both the left and the right throughout American history, so I’ll set that aside for the moment. In terms of economic inequality, this has been a longstanding issue in American politics, but it has especially risen to prominence as a major concern for both right-wing and left-wing populists since the Great Recession of 2008–2009. Following the well-publicized but relatively small Occupy Wall Street movement in 2011–2012, progressive Democrats have increasingly focused on this issue. They argue that neoliberalism—which many view as the dominant ideology in American politics and economics since the 1970s, especially after Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980—has exacerbated economic inequality.

Progressive Democrats have supported programs like those championed by Joe Biden, albeit with moderate success, to help unions organize, provide childcare benefits to all American families, and implement other measures aimed at narrowing economic inequality.

On the other hand, conservative populists, including figures like Donald Trump and J.D. Vance, argue that the primary issue with economic inequality lies with corporations that they claim are “too woke” and favor individuals with the “right” cultural politics over ordinary Americans. Some very conservative Republicans have embraced a form of anti-corporate politics.

For example, Josh Hawley, a Senator from Missouri, has supported the Teamsters Union, one of the largest unions in America. Additionally, some right-wing Catholic thinkers have drawn on the Catholic Church’s social justice tradition, referencing papal encyclicals like Rerum Novarum (1891) and others to argue that unions are essential for improving the lives of ordinary people and to criticize practices like excessive rents and interest rates that harm workers and the poor.

This trend has given rise to a form of “Catholic populism,” which uses these religious principles to legitimize arguments against corporate power. An interesting book on this topic, Tyranny, Inc., by a conservative journalist, critiques corporations for engaging in behavior that harms workers, such as union-busting, charging excessive credit card interest, and denying healthcare coverage.

There is, to some extent, agreement between right-wing and left-wing populists in the US on reducing corporate power and supporting private-sector unions. Currently, only 6% of private-sector workers in the US are unionized—a historically low figure.

However, significant disagreements remain between right-wing and left-wing populists, particularly on cultural issues, which are deeply entrenched and difficult to reconcile. For example, debates over abortion—whether it is a fundamental right for women or equivalent to the killing of babies—highlight how cultural arguments are often intractable and resistant to compromise.

In one of your interviews, you argue that ‘if the political and economic elites in our society and others around the world were more effective at living up to their ideals, populist talkers would likely be less popular.’ What do you mean by ‘ideals of political and economic elites?’

Professor Michael Kazin: Perhaps I should have said the ideals of the nation led by these elites to be more accurate. In the United States, especially—and to varying degrees in Europe—the stated ideals include equality, democracy, majority rule, and a government that promotes the common welfare, as referenced in the preamble to the American Constitution. These ideals are echoed in other historical documents, such as the Declaration of the Rights of Man in Europe.

As a social democrat, I would say that if social democracy were practiced more widely and people were guaranteed a decent life in their societies, populism would likely be less popular. For example, in the United States between the late 1940s and the mid-1960s, despite many challenges, it was generally a prosperous time. Unions were very powerful, Social Security was extended to nearly every working American, and the beginnings of health insurance coverage for older and poorer individuals under Medicare and Medicaid were implemented. During that period, populist rhetoric was not particularly influential, and populist movements were relatively subdued. While there were significant social movements, such as the Black freedom movement, they were primarily advocating for the inclusion of an oppressed minority in American life rather than claiming to represent the great majority. Of course, there were radical elements within some movements, but they were not the mainstream.

In my recent book, What It Took to Win: A History of the Democratic Party, I argue that “moral capitalism”—a phrase I borrow from a fellow historian—was the governing promise of the Democratic Party during these years. Democrats were the majority party, and most Americans, including working-class citizens, believed that things were improving. When people believe their lives are getting better, populist leaders and movements struggle to gain traction.

Trump’s Leadership Defined by Self-Interest and Controversy

Donald Trump with a serious look as he delivers a speech at a campaign rally held at the Mohegan Sun Arena in Wilkes-Barre, PA – August 2, 2018. Photo: Evan El-Amin.

In one of your articles, you characterize Donald Trump’s first administration as ‘one of the most wretched president and administration in living memory.” What factors have contributed to your defining of Trump’s administration as the most wretched?

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, of course, “wretched” is a loaded, emotional term, and here I’m speaking from my own preferences. There’s no scholarly objectivity possible in this context. I could also talk about why he won again last November, but first, let me focus on the question.

As a leader, I think Trump is someone primarily interested in his own popularity and not particularly interested in policy. He wants to be the center of attention at all times and is committed to no ideal or policy unless it benefits him personally. He’s also unwilling to take risks, particularly when it comes to policy decisions, which I believe was evident during his first term and will likely remain true during his second term—though, of course, we’ll have to wait and see.

His personal behavior also contributes to this characterization. He has been credibly accused of actions that would be considered rape in many nations, though he wasn’t convicted of rape but rather of defaming someone who accused him. His statements about immigrants and what he referred to as “shithole countries,” among other things, reflect his character. As an individual, I find him to be a rather wretched person—someone I wouldn’t want to associate with or have anyone I know associate with.

That said, his administration itself was more cautious than I expected, in part because he leads a party that still includes more traditional, cautious members. Many corporate executives and traditional Republicans influenced his policies. For instance, his Cabinet included several conventional Republican figures, and the Speaker of the House for much of his term was Paul Ryan, a Reaganite libertarian Republican focused on cutting the size of government rather than pursuing anti-immigrant crusades.

The major accomplishment of his administration aligned with a long-standing conservative Republican agenda: cutting taxes, especially for wealthier Americans, though all Americans received some form of tax cut. This is something Ronald Reagan might also have done.

In that sense, while his administration had the potential to be wretched, it was less so than I expected. However, Trump’s statements and actions on immigration were deeply problematic. His attempt to build a wall across the southern border wasted significant funds and was ultimately easy to evade. This demonstrated not only ignorance about policy but also a lack of genuine concern for it.

Unlike other American presidents, as the leader of the most powerful state in the world, Trump showed very little interest in the actual workings of the state unless they directly benefited him personally. In that sense, I would still describe him as a wretched leader.

You argue that ‘like most adherents of left egalitarian politics, I believe the only path to such a future (the more egalitarian and climate-friendly society) lies in adopting a populist program about jobs, income, health care, and other material necessities, while making a transition to a sustainable economy? What exactly do you mean by ‘populist programs?’

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, by that, I mean majoritarian—programs that genuinely benefit the majority of people. When governments are popular, that’s typically what they do. So, in this sense, being “popular” and being “populist” can overlap, though they are not always synonymous.

As I mentioned before, I believe an honest social democracy, or what I would call “moral capitalism” in the US, is the best approach. Such programs would include housing allowances, universal health care that is well-administered and provides good working conditions for healthcare workers, unions to protect the majority of people against workplace abuse, and, critically, a vigorous transition to a sustainable economy—because without that, the entire world is in trouble.

Now, using the term “populist” might seem to betray my own definition of populism, which in American history refers primarily to a discourse or rhetoric. But I don’t subscribe to the simplistic view of “populism bad, liberalism good.” As I argue in my book, The Populist Persuasion, populism can be a way for ordinary people—and movements aiming to represent them—to highlight the gap between a society’s stated ideals and the actual performance of its elites, whether cultural, political, or economic.

Populism can play a very positive role by pointing out these shortcomings and harking back to a society’s ideals, including those rooted in religion, like charity and comfort for the afflicted. It doesn’t necessarily demand, as socialism often does, a completely different kind of society—although socialists can also adopt populist rhetoric. Instead, it appeals to the ideals of the existing society, challenging elites to live up to them.

This is why I think populism has an important role in producing a decent society. Unlike some critics, like Jan-Werner Müller, who argue that populism always fuels movements that lead to authoritarian leaders, I believe populism doesn’t have to serve that role. While it certainly has done so in some parts of Europe, where we see leaders with authoritarian tendencies in and out of office, I think left-wing populism can play a vital and constructive role.

Trump’s Second Term: The Future of Populist Politics in the US and Beyond

A Trump supporter holds up a “Make America Great Again” sign at presidential candidate Donald Trump’s rally in the convention center in Sioux City, Iowa, on November 6, 2016. Photo: Mark Reinstein.

How do you explain Donald Trump’s victory for a second term, given his open and aggressive endorsement of populist policies both in the US and globally? Additionally, how might his administration reshape the populist narrative domestically, particularly in aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism?

Professor Michael Kazin: That’s an important question, obviously, and one we won’t really be able to answer until he’s been several years into his term. Let me address the first part of your question.

Again, you’ve probably read, and your viewers have likely heard and read, many analyses of why Trump won. The most important reason he won—and this is usually why anyone unseats an incumbent party in this country, and probably in others as well—is that most Americans believed the performance of the Biden administration, or the Biden-Harris administration, wasn’t good. This perception was based on several factors, including inflation, a more open immigration policy than most Americans preferred, and, I think, Biden himself, who is a very poor communicator.

Biden used to be a mediocre communicator when he was younger, but in the last couple of years, he became very bad at selling his own programs. Some of those programs, I believe, could have been quite popular if Americans had known more about them, but they didn’t.

This was an election that was actually rather close. For instance, if 232,000 voters in three key states—Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania—had voted differently, with slightly more in Pennsylvania than the other two states, Harris would have been elected, even though she would have won fewer popular votes than Trump. As everyone watching this knows, we don’t have a national popular vote in this country. We have state-by-state elections that determine the presidency.

Trump, on the other hand, is a charismatic figure. While he doesn’t have the majority of Americans on his side, a significant portion—perhaps 30%—strongly supports him. He has a movement, the MAGA movement, which the Democrats don’t have anything comparable to. Even though the Democrats had more people on the ground to get voters to the polls, Trump had more solid support.

As a result, he won somewhat more votes than he did in 2016—about 2 million more popular votes. However, Harris won 10 or 11 million fewer votes than Biden had in 2020. Trump’s victory was largely due to many Democrats deciding not to vote. They were disenchanted enough with the Biden-Harris administration’s performance but not sufficiently motivated by Trump to come out and vote against him.

Now, regarding what Trump will do in terms of reshaping the populist narrative—let me remind myself of the second part of your question here…

How much his administration reshapes the populist narrative domestically.

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, again, it depends on how well he performs, right? This is a question of contingency—how he navigates his role as president during the second term. Trump is a much better politician than he is a policymaker, so he will certainly try to maintain support from both the more traditional Republicans and the cultural populists within his coalition.

On the traditional side, he will aim to keep corporate Republicans on board—those who favor lower taxes, less regulation, and smaller government in general. Simultaneously, he’ll also work to retain the cultural populists who want to drastically cut immigration, both legal and illegal, and who oppose transgender rights and certain aspects of gay and lesbian rights.

Trump will likely attempt to strengthen US manufacturing, pushing for more products to be made domestically. However, this will be challenging given that final manufacturing in the US relies heavily on parts sourced from around the globe. Reducing this dependency and producing those parts domestically, which are currently made more cheaply elsewhere, will be difficult. Nevertheless, he will likely focus on this rhetorically.

As always, much will depend on the state of the economy, the presence or absence of scandals within his administration, and the outcome of the midterm elections. In 2026, Democrats are well-positioned to potentially take back the House of Representatives. If that happens, anything Trump aims to achieve would have to be done through executive actions. While some of these actions may be popular, others might not resonate as well with the public.

Additionally, the 2028 presidential campaign will overshadow the final years of Trump’s term. In fact, the campaign will likely begin even before the 2026 midterm results are fully processed. This means Trump might have only two effective years to accomplish his goals, including efforts to satisfy both the traditional and cultural populists in his coalition.

Trump’s Return: Shaking but Not Breaking American Democracy

Jake Angeli or QAnon Shaman was among those who participated in the riots initiated by former US President Donald Trump at the Capitol, Washington D.C. on January 6, 2021. Photo: Johnny Silvercloud

How concerned are you about the second Trump administration in terms of the resilience of American democratic institutions? There are those pundits who argue that American democracy will not survive another Trump term.

Professor Michael Kazin: Here I part ways with some others on the left. I don’t think that American democratic institutions are in serious trouble. I believe they will be shaken—and are already being shaken—by Trump’s reelection and his return to power next month.

First of all, Congress is still fairly evenly divided between the two parties, even though Republicans are in charge. Many large states, such as New York, California, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Illinois, are governed by Democrats, and most of these states have Democratic majorities in their legislatures as well. These state governments can act and bring cases to court to challenge some of Trump’s policies.

Civil society in the United States remains relatively strong. There are significant non-governmental organizations, like the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), which will likely file lawsuits against some of Trump’s actions—particularly those related to immigration. For example, if he tries to deport children born in the US to immigrant parents (who are American citizens by birthright), the ACLU and others will step in.

Even though the grassroots left is somewhat dormant and exhausted since the election, there are still key groups on the left, including unions like the American Federation of Teachers and the United Auto Workers. These organizations were supportive of Kamala Harris and will mobilize opposition against Trump’s administration.

As always, Trump’s ability to act depends on how popular he remains. If his popularity holds, he will have more freedom to pursue his agenda. However, the court system remains a check on his power. While the Supreme Court leans conservative, with three justices appointed by Trump during his first term, other courts are more balanced, with progressives or liberal judges presiding over lower courts.

I anticipate chaos and turmoil, but that doesn’t necessarily mean democratic institutions are in existential danger.

One area of concern is Trump’s apparent eagerness to sue media organizations he disagrees with. For instance, he already sued ABC News over a comment made by anchor George Stephanopoulos, and ABC settled for several million dollars. He might pursue similar legal actions against other media outlets, particularly legacy institutions like The New York Times, The Washington Post, and major networks. While this could intimidate some of these institutions, he won’t be able to silence the Internet or prevent people from organizing protests.

The military, which served as a check on him during his first term—particularly during the protests of 2020—will likely play a similar role this time. He won’t be able to call on the military to suppress peaceful demonstrations, even if he expresses the desire to do so.

I wouldn’t call myself optimistic, but I am hopeful. Also, as I mentioned earlier, he only has four years in this term and likely only two effective years to implement policies. So, I’m not as fearful as some others I know.

Implications for Global Populism and Far-Right Alliances

And lastly, Professor Kazin, right-wing populism continues to rise across Europe despite the liberal European Union’s success story. How do you think populist parties and movements will be influenced globally after Trump begins his second term? Could his presidency embolden far-right leaders abroad and foster new alliances among far-right populist governments?

Professor Michael Kazin: Well, that’s certainly a possibility. As you know, he’s been very close to Viktor Orbán. Orbán has been invited to National Conservative Conferences, and there was even one held in Budapest, which I believe was the first time an American conservative organization hosted its conference overseas. Clearly, right-wing populist leaders, including those of parties like the Rassemblement National (RN) in France, are likely very pleased with Trump’s reelection. This is probably true for right-wing populist parties and movements across the continent.

At the same time, if you emphasize “America First” and express suspicion toward European institutions such as the EU or NATO, it becomes very difficult to form any kind of operationally powerful alliance between Trump and his counterparts in Europe.

Structurally and historically, I believe we’re in what could be described as an interregnum—a period of transition. My friend Gary Gerstle, in his excellent recent book, describes the end of the neoliberal order, which has concluded in many ways and in some places entirely. As the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci famously said, during such an interregnum, “many morbid symptoms appear.” From my perspective, right-wing populism is one such morbid symptom.

However, as demands grow for the state to provide a decent living for a majority of its citizens—and as governments actually fulfill those demands—I think there could be a revival of left-wing populism or social democracy, even if it’s not labeled as such. People will demand that the government deliver on its promises to improve living standards for the majority, ideally in collaboration with private capital.

I am somewhat heartened by the fact that Trump is limited to four years. He cannot serve more than that without a constitutional amendment, which is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in this country—far more so than in many others.

Additionally, most Americans who support Trump are not particularly enthusiastic about alliances between the United States and other countries. They prefer the US to remain independent of such alliances, especially if those alliances are perceived to be costly. So, we’ll have to see how this unfolds.

The election is viewed by many as a crucial midterm evaluation of President Yoon Suk-yeol’s government. President Yoon Suk-yeol (center) is pictured attending the NATO summit in Madrid, Spain on June 30, 2022. Photo: Shutterstock.

Dr. Shaw: Tit-for-Tat Politics Hinder Reforms and Deepen Public Disillusionment in South Korea

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

As South Korea’s Constitutional Court reviews President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his martial law declaration, Dr. Meredith Shaw highlights the deep-rooted issues plaguing the nation’s politics. Speaking with the ECPS, Dr. Shaw explains that a “tit-for-tat dynamic” of political retaliation has hindered systemic reforms, while populist appeals during economic crises fuel disillusionment. Drawing on South Korea’s history of authoritarian rule, she emphasizes the need for reform-minded leadership to restore public confidence. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” Dr. Shaw remarked, urging systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions amid this critical moment for South Korea’s democracy.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

As South Korea’s Constitutional Court begins reviewing President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his controversial attempt to impose martial law on December 3, 2024, Dr. Meredith Shaw highlights that both sides of South Korean politics have failed to inspire public confidence. According to Dr. Shaw, a tit-for-tat dynamic continues to hinder systemic reforms while entrenching disillusionment with establishment politicians.

South Korea’s political landscape, shaped by its history of authoritarian rule and rapid democratization, faces persistent challenges rooted in populism, economic inequality, and geopolitical tensions. In an interview with European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Shaw, a leading expert on East Asian politics, shared her invaluable insights into South Korea’s current crisis, historical patterns, and the implications for its democracy.

“South Korea has significant experience with authoritarian, particularly military, regimes,” Dr. Shaw noted, referencing the martial law imposed under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan that lasted nearly 15 years. These experiences, she explained, left a lasting legacy on political and social movements. “The so-called ‘386 generation,’ who fought courageously against martial law, still lean left-wing and remain deeply skeptical of right-wing leaders.”

Dr. Shaw also addressed the cycles of political retaliation and corruption that have plagued South Korea’s governance. “There’s a historical pattern of people in power helping friends and family in ways that most would consider corrupt, followed by the opposition prosecuting and jailing members of the previous administration,” she explained, adding that this dynamic has obstructed meaningful reform.

Economic instability further complicates the political landscape. “South Korea, like most places, tends to be drawn to populist appeals during times of economic crisis and change,” Dr. Shaw observed. Recent backlash against gender equality movements and perceptions of economic inequality have also fueled populism and anti-feminist sentiment.

Geopolitical narratives amplify these issues. “North Korea is always in the background—not just as a security threat but as a perceived economic burden,” Dr. Shaw remarked. She noted that South Korea’s emphasis on national identity often intertwines anti-communism with anti-Japanese sentiment, allowing political leaders to exploit these narratives.

As South Korea navigates the aftermath of Yoon’s impeachment, Dr. Shaw emphasized the importance of reform-minded leadership. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” she said, calling for systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions. With the Constitutional Court set to hold its first public hearing on December 27, 2024, this interview offers a comprehensive analysis of South Korea’s ongoing political challenges and the lessons that could shape its future.

Dr. Meredith Shaw, a leading expert on East Asian politics, shared her invaluable insights into South Korea’s current crisis, historical patterns, and the implications for its democracy.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Meredith Shaw with some edits.

South Korea’s Struggles with Populism, Retributive Politics, and the Legacy of Authoritarianism

Professor Shaw, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How have South Korea’s historical experiences with authoritarian regimes, such as those under Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, shaped the contemporary interplay between populism and authoritarianism in its political landscape?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: South Korea has significant experience with authoritarian, particularly military, regimes. As you know, it has had considerable experience with martial law in the past. Martial law was imposed under the Park Chung-hee dictatorship in 1972 and continued almost continuously for about 15 years until 1987.

People over 50 in Korea today would have some memory of this period, particularly the generation that was in college during the last years of martial law, the so-called “386 generation.” They remember fighting very courageously against martial law. As a result, they tend to lean left-wing, are generally very skeptical of right-wing leaders, and oppose the current Yoon administration, which is associated with the right-wing People Power Party (PPP). The real leaders of the anti-martial law movement from that generation, now in their sixties, along with younger activists, often continue to hold these views.

On a deeper level, South Korea has a historical pattern of people in power helping friends and family members in ways that most would consider corrupt. Then, after those individuals are removed from power, the opposition conducts prosecutions and jails members of the previous administration. This has normalized the idea of a tit-for-tat dynamic, where each power shift from left to right (and vice versa) results in retaliatory prosecutions. While one might hope this cycle would encourage honesty, it instead perpetuates an ongoing issue of retributive justice on both sides, which has become particularly problematic in recent years.

Finally, the legacy of authoritarian regimes has contributed to the development of a strong leftist coalition in South Korea, consisting of unions, student activists, and agricultural cooperatives. This coalition retains the ability to quickly mobilize mass protests in response to public outrage. However, while one might expect such a coalition to strengthen democratic institutions, it often seizes on emotional triggers—such as the Itaewon tragedy, the Sewol Ferry disaster, or similar incidents—rather than pushing for systemic reform.

As a result, we often see massive protests, sometimes involving a million people in the city square, yet these demonstrations rarely translate into meaningful systemic changes. This creates a puzzle: the legacy of South Korea’s authoritarian past has left.

To what extent do economic factors, such as income inequality or economic crises, contribute to the rise of populist and authoritarian leaders in South Korea? Are these patterns similar to those seen in other countries?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: I think South Korea, like most places, tends to be drawn to populist appeals during times of economic crisis and change. There have been some economic struggles and downturns in recent years.

Thinking most recently, President Yoon rose to power partly on a wave of male South Korean backlash against the gender equality movement and the perception that men are being left out of the economy as the feminist movement secures more opportunities for women. This has led to a strong anti-feminist and men’s rights backlash, which can inevitably be tied to economic inequality and uncertainty.

On the other hand, South Korea faces serious issues of opportunity and equality, particularly regarding access to higher education and career advancement. The opposition Leftist Democratic Party tends to champion these issues more, but they haven’t offered real solutions during their time in power. They often seem to get bogged down in expensive programs related to North Korea, which has not inspired much confidence.

Additionally, leaders from both parties tend to be beneficiaries of the entrenched institution of crony capitalism. As a result, many Koreans have lost faith in establishment politicians on both sides, making them more susceptible to populist appeals.

How Anti-Communism and Anti-Japanese Sentiment Shape South Korean Politics

How does South Korea’s emphasis on national identity, often tied to anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment, influence the populist rhetoric of political leaders? Are these cultural narratives being manipulated to consolidate power?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: In South Korea, I would say North Korea is always in the background as a political presence—not just as a security threat, but also due to the perceived economic damage caused by lost investment as a result of that threat and past administrations’ massive aid projects, which often went nowhere and cost taxpayers a lot of money. This contributes to a sense of grievance, a strong sense of anti-communism, and the belief that things would be better if North Korea didn’t exist.

On one hand, the ongoing threat from North Korea makes it very difficult for South Korea to eliminate some of the legacy Cold War legal institutions designed to crack down on alleged pro-North Korean elements in society. These include still fairly draconian laws against distributing North Korean materials or making statements perceived as pro-North Korean. These laws can be easily abused by the political right wing, but it’s hard to remove them because North Korea is undeniably a real and persistent threat.

More so than European countries, South Korea struggles to shed this Cold War legacy. For example, President Yoon referenced “anti-state forces” in his declaration of martial law, which is essentially a euphemism for pro-North Korean forces. The fact that he was even able to declare martial law in the first place is partly due to these legacy institutions that grant the government stronger powers when it perceives or claims there is a threat from North Korea. In an ideal democratic society, the government shouldn’t have the ability to do such things, but this is a reality South Korea continues to grapple with.

On the other side, because North Korea exists and is often associated with the left being more sympathetic to it, the leftist opposition has difficulty countering that rhetoric without invoking a similar boogeyman of their own. This is where Japan sometimes comes into play. The right is often perceived as being too forgiving of Japan, and the left can exploit this by emphasizing that Japan has historically been a serious enemy and arguing that its history with South Korea needs to be addressed more strongly.

These two historical narratives—anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment—often play off each other in South Korean politics. President Yoon, for instance, has been seen as particularly pro-Japan and has made some rhetorical gaffes that reinforce this perception. However, because he has so many other scandals and gaffes unrelated to Japan, the opposition hasn’t focused on this issue in recent years. Still, anti-Japan sentiment could easily become a factor if the opposition needs further ammunition against him.

Considering South Korea’s history of democracy emerging from periods of anti-communism and anti-Japanese sentiment, what historical and socio-political factors have contributed to the rise of populism and authoritarian tendencies in the country? How might the current crisis surrounding President Yoon influence these trends?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: The rise of populism and authoritarian tendencies in South Korea, I would say, is influenced primarily by the strong role of personalities in South Korean politics. The most powerful politicians on both sides often have family histories tied to being pro-Japan or associated with past dictatorships.

South Korea, more than most countries, tends to focus on who is related to whom, whose patronage a politician has received, and how those relationships might make them beholden to special interests. This scrutiny often leads people to become extraordinarily skeptical of legacy politicians and more inclined to support newcomers with less experience who claim to be anti-establishment. However, once those newcomers gain power, they quickly become part of the establishment themselves, almost immediately losing the anti-establishment appeal they once had.

If you look at President Yoon’s career trajectory, this pattern is clear. He comes from a very unusual background—he was never a legislator but a former prosecutor who was heavily involved in prosecuting the last conservative presidential scandal. This gave him a degree of independence from the political groups involved in that scandal and allowed him to claim he was anti-establishment.

When the liberal Moon administration became deeply unpopular, people wanted conservative leadership again. However, the mainstream conservatives were still tainted by connections to the previous scandal involving Park Geun-hye. This allowed Yoon to set himself apart and win the presidency. But now, as the establishment leader, he is at the center of scandals himself and appears to be rapidly losing support, even within his own party.

This situation could provide an opportunity for the conservative People Power Party to rebrand itself, though it’s hard to predict what will happen. The broader trend, however, remains consistent: the “outcast” or anti-establishment politician tends to gain popularity initially but loses that appeal very quickly once in power.

Lessons from South Korea’s Struggle to Preserve Democracy

South Korea has a long history of authoritarian military regimes, including extensive periods under martial law. Photo: Shutterstock.

From a historical perspective, how have populist and authoritarian tendencies impacted democratic institutions in South Korea, including governance, civil liberties, the rule of law, and the broader democratic framework? Given South Korea’s history of overcoming authoritarian regimes, what lessons from its political and social movements can inform the response to the current crisis and safeguard democratic governance?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: There is a legacy of suspending civil liberties in the name of defending against the communist threat from North Korea. This legacy, however, has also been retroactively intertwined with the idea of high economic growth. South Korea experienced its highest economic growth during the period of military dictatorship, and some people have come to associate authoritarian, somewhat imperialist leadership with stability and economic prosperity.

When economic concerns arise, or when instability is seen as driving away investment, there is a tendency to believe that a stronger president with more powers is necessary to overcome gridlock in the National Assembly. This perspective is linked to the fact that South Korea’s high economic growth coincided with its period under military dictatorship.

In contemporary times, South Korea has a very strong and evenly matched political competition between the left and the right. However, both sides have a tendency to use the tools of the Justice Ministry and the National Intelligence Service for political retaliation when in power. As a result, almost all surviving ex-presidents—if they don’t pass away soon after leaving office—end up in prison at some point. It has almost become an expectation, and the current president seems likely to face a similar fate.

The current crisis can be seen as part of this ongoing pendulum shift, swinging from right to left. We can likely anticipate more tit-for-tat prosecutions, but unfortunately, no real systemic reform to address this underlying issue. That said, one possible legacy of the current crisis is that no South Korean president is likely to attempt declaring martial law again for quite some time.

South Korea’s President, or rather, we should say, former President Yoon, declared martial law to save the country from what he called anti-state opposition parties, accusing them of using their legislative majority to paralyze the nation. Who are these anti-state parties, and what specific actions or strategies have they allegedly employed to paralyze the government?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: No, Yoon is still the President. He has been impeached by the National Assembly, but he remains President until the Constitutional Court removes him from power. When he made this announcement, referring to what you mentioned as “anti-state parties,” this is essentially code for leftists and those perceived as pro-North Korea.

In fact, I believe it’s enshrined in the Constitution that “anti-state” essentially refers to individuals or groups supporting North Korea or advocating for the overthrow of the democratic government in the name of communism. That’s the understood meaning of the term.

In his subsequent speech, President Yoon clarified further, and it seems he is primarily targeting the Democratic Party majority in the National Assembly. Since the last election, they have held a sizable majority, and they’ve been blocking his budget proposals, his appointees, and generally making it difficult for him to govern. Additionally, they have been prosecuting the President’s wife for bribery scandals that have been following him for quite some time.

Moreover, President Yoon has been attempting to investigate the National Election Commission (NEC) over allegations that his opposition somehow rigged the last election. He appears to be partially justifying his actions as necessary to uncover the truth about what happened at the NEC. However, the idea of using martial law as a solution to these challenges is, frankly, bizarre. I believe it stems from Yoon’s background as a former prosecutor. He seems inexperienced in dealing with the National Assembly and appears to have little patience for the normal gridlock expected in a democratic system—especially when the opposition holds such a significant majority in the Assembly.

There is also speculation about whether martial law was initially President Yoon’s idea or if it was suggested to him by the Defense Minister. This is something that will likely be explored in the court cases over the coming months.

Ultimately, martial law is supposed to be reserved for instances of imminent crisis, such as a genuine threat from anti-state actors or pro-North Korean forces actively working to undermine democracy. It’s not a tool meant to resolve legislative disagreements or to push through a budget. This entire episode suggests inexperience and a fundamental misunderstanding of democratic governance. By associating his political opposition with North Korea, President Yoon appears to be attempting to justify his actions.

Comparing Yoon Suk Yeol’s Declaration to Past Dictatorships

Martial law declarations in South Korea have been tied to periods of dictatorship and significant political upheaval. How does Yoon Suk Yeol’s martial law declaration compare with past instances under leaders like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: In the past, during that 15-year period of martial law under military leaders like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, the declarations meant full military government with no functioning National Assembly. For ordinary people, it meant curfews imposed at night, harsh crackdowns on any form of student activism or gatherings, and strict state control of the media. The government provided the media with official talking points, and there was no deviation from them until the transition to democracy.

This most recent martial law declaration by Yoon Suk Yeol is extremely tame in comparison, although it was too short-lived to fully understand where it might have headed. Essentially, it amounted to a few hours of trying to seize control of the National Assembly and block legislators from voting, as well as an attempt to take control of the Election Commission, which the President wanted to investigate. There was no effort to restrict the media, the internet, or public gatherings, and only a few hundred troops were involved.

President Yoon is now retroactively trying to portray the martial law declaration as a mere warning rather than an actual implementation, claiming it was symbolic rather than substantive. However, it was martial law, and there was a serious attempt to prevent legislators from voting it down. How long he intended it to last, or what he hoped to achieve, is hard to say.

The key difference, in my mind, lies in the backgrounds of the leaders. Previous dictators like Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan were former military officers. They understood the military chain of command and thought in military terms. Yoon, on the other hand, is a prosecutor and a lawyer with no command experience. He seemed to lack a clear understanding of what he was doing, and the enforcement of the declaration was extremely inept.

For example, the commander of South Korea’s martial law command claimed he had not been given any advance notice and did not know what the military was supposed to be doing during those six hours. It seems the Defense Minister was effectively in charge of the situation, which is not how it is supposed to work. In several ways, this declaration was destined to fail. It’s hard to discern what it was meant to accomplish, and it doesn’t compare in scale or severity to the martial law of the past era.

What factors contributed to the rapid collapse of martial law? What roles did political parties and the broader public play in ending military rule?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: First of all, the immediate response from the lawmakers was crucial. The declaration occurred on a weeknight around 6 PM, so many lawmakers were still in town. They quickly rallied to do their jobs, backed by public support and local residents who, upon hearing the news, gathered to break down police barricades.

This was coupled with what I would describe as lukewarm participation by the troops involved. Political science has an entire branch of theorization about when troops will follow orders to fire on a crowd or choose to defy those orders. This situation will likely become an interesting case study for that field. In this instance, the words “martial law” elicited such a strong and visceral reaction in the South Korean public that opposition was immediate and resolute. The troops didn’t appear to fully support the declaration, and there was no indication they would fire on the crowd. It’s puzzling to consider what the administration’s expectations were in this scenario.

Yoon’s own political party, the People Power Party, did not seem to rally around him either. In fact, they now appear to be distancing themselves significantly, as evidenced by the impeachment vote. While his party might prefer for him to step down voluntarily rather than endure a drawn-out impeachment process in court, their support for him has been far weaker than one might expect if this were simply a party-line issue.

South Korea’s Democratic Institutions Face a Critical Test

A photograph which was taken during Candlelight March in South Korea. Photo: Shutterstock.

And lastly, Professor Shaw, now that President Yoon has been impeached by the South Korean Parliament, what perspectives do you foresee for the stability of democratic institutions, and what is the significance of this impeachment in the history of South Korea’s democratization process?

Dr. Meredith Shaw: For South Korea, this is the third time a President has been impeached. The most recent one was just eight years ago. I was in South Korea at the time, and I vividly remember it. They’ve survived this before, and they will survive it again.

I think this will be an opportunity for both parties to get their houses in order. Both major parties have recently gone through a phase of populist leadership, with Yoon on the conservative side and Lee Jae-myung leading the Democratic Party. Both leaders have become extremely unpopular. While it’s still a bit too early to predict, I believe the public might now be looking for steadier, more establishment-oriented leadership—especially with the uncertainty surrounding the incoming Trump administration and North Korea’s increasingly unpredictable behavior over the past year. Nobody seems to want a rabble-rousing, anti-establishment leader to emerge from this situation.

If this process unfolds similarly to the last impeachment, we can expect a winter of continuous protests. However, protests in South Korea often have the character of a peaceful, celebratory demonstration of democracy, almost like a festival. There will likely be a police presence to maintain safety, but not to crack down on crowds. If the Constitutional Court chooses to remove President Yoon from power, a snap election will follow. I believe there’s a short period—perhaps two or three weeks, though it could be longer—for parties to organize their campaigns and select candidates.

Currently, the Conservative Party is very splintered, which may result in multiple contenders vying for leadership. Meanwhile, their main rival, the Democratic Party, is also embroiled in scandals, and its leadership is highly unpopular. In fact, one reason some people hesitate to support impeachment is because the current leader of the Democratic Party is himself extremely unpopular.

Given this, we may see lesser-known figures emerge, and hopefully, some steadier leadership will arise as a result of these latest shocks. That said, South Korea fundamentally needs a strong left-wing party to address systemic inequalities in society and a strong right-wing party to defend against the very real threat from North Korea.

Unfortunately, in recent years, both sides have behaved in ways that fail to inspire confidence. I expect a much needed reckoning in the upcoming election, which I anticipate will take place in the spring.

Sri Lanka’s President Anura Kumara Dissanayake attends the ceremonial opening of the First Session of the Tenth Parliament at the Sri Lankan Parliament in Colombo on November 21, 2024. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

Dr. Gamage: Buddhist Civilizational Populism Declines Amid Sri Lanka’s Progressive Promises

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeInterviewsMONITOR

Dr. Rajni Gamage highlights the decline of Buddhist civilizational populism in Sri Lanka, noting its diminished public resonance following the transformative 2022 protests. These protests, she explains, challenged both the political elite and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, creating a moment of reckoning. However, Gamage warns that if Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government fails to deliver on its promises of progressive politics and economic recovery, opposition groups may exploit public discontent to revive Buddhist civilizational populism. “This phase of decline,” she says, “could shift if promises remain unmet, fueling alternative populist narratives.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a thought-provoking interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Rajni Gamage, a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS), offered an incisive analysis of Buddhist civilizational populism in Sri Lanka. She highlighted how this ideological force has shaped the country’s political and social dynamics, particularly its impact on the marginalization of minority communities.

According to Dr. Gamage, Buddhist civilizational populism, deeply intertwined with Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, has historically emerged in waves. Currently, Sri Lanka appears to be in a receding phase, evidenced by a diminished public resonance and the reluctance of political movements to mobilize this rhetoric extensively. She attributed this decline, in part, to the transformative 2022 protests, which delegitimized both the political elite and hegemonic narratives like Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism.

Reflecting on the contemporary landscape, Dr. Gamage remarked, “The 2022 protests created a moment of reckoning, challenging not only the established political order but also the ideological frameworks that sustained it.” However, she cautioned that if the current government, led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake, fails to deliver on its promises of progressive politics and economic recovery, alternative opposition groups might capitalize on public discontent to revive Buddhist civilizational populism as a political tool.

In tracing the roots of this ideology, Dr. Gamage explored its colonial-era antecedents. She noted that early 20th-century Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism emerged as a reaction to British colonial rule, mimicking colonial logics to frame minority communities as inferior and responsible for the majority’s material impoverishment. These exclusionary tendencies, she argued, have persisted in post-independence Sri Lanka, finding renewed expression during the Rajapaksa regime.

Discussing the political trajectory of President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and the National People’s Power (NPP), Dr. Gamage underscored the transformative role of economic populism in their rise to power amidst the socio-economic fallout of the 2022 crisis. She observed, “The anti-establishment narrative of corruption and inequality was pivotal in mobilizing grassroots support.”

Dr. Gamage examined the broader implications of these populist narratives for Sri Lanka’s democratic governance. She warned that securitization efforts, such as anti-drug campaigns and moral panics, could risk undermining civil liberties while consolidating political power. The interview with Dr. Gamage not only sheds light on Sri Lanka’s evolving political dynamics but also offers critical insights into the interplay between populism, nationalism, and democracy in the context of economic and social crises.

Dr. Rajni Gamage, a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS).

Here is the transcription of the interview with Dr. Rajni Gamage with some edits.

Traces of Authoritarianism and Nationalism in Sri Lanka 

Dr. Gamage, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start with the first question. What historical periods did authoritarianism have in Sri Lanka? Can you explain the key themes and developments from a historical perspective?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: I think that’s a very pertinent question when we consider the current political moment in Sri Lanka. Looking at authoritarianism within politics and governance in Sri Lanka, we can identify several key historical periods shaped by distinct developments.

First, colonial legacies, especially British colonialism, left a significant imprint. During British rule, colonial powers consolidated authority in Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) through specific laws, the establishment of state institutions, and the deployment of ideological discourses aimed at maintaining their control. These authoritarian elements—embedded within institutions, laws, and ideologies—continued to influence the post-colonial state formation process in Sri Lanka.

The British colonial period is thus a critical moment to examine in the history of authoritarian politics in Sri Lanka. In the post-independence period, authoritarianism became intertwined with the democratic institutions formed after colonial rule. A key example is the executive presidency established under the 1978 Constitution. Significant scholarship highlights how this institution centralized power and legitimized authoritarian practices, reaching its peak during the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime from 2005 to 2015.

Another significant aspect of authoritarianism was its explicit manifestation during the ethnic conflict from 1983 to 2009. The militaristic approach to resolving the conflict culminated in the state’s victory in 2009, characterized by the dominance of majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. This ideology shaped both state governance and popular discourse during and after the civil war, fostering an exclusionary and hegemonic nation-building process. Consequently, many minority groups—whether ethnic, religious, or gender-based—were marginalized in the state’s formation and development.

Mahinda Rajapaksa attends the National War Memorial commemoration ceremony marking the 10th anniversary in Battaramulla, Colombo, Sri Lanka, on May 19, 2019. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

How has the historical encounter of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism with colonial modernity shaped the exclusivist tendencies of contemporary Buddhist nationalist movements, such as the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), particularly in framing the Muslim “Other”? In what ways has this discourse intersected with and reinforced the authoritarian populism observed during the Rajapaksa regime, contributing to the marginalization of minority groups in nation-building and the evolution of Islamophobia in recent years?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: When we examine Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism gaining significant momentum under the Rajapaksa regime, and compare it to the early 20th-century Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism spearheaded by figures like Anagarika Dharmapala, we can see a clear lineage. This early nationalism emerged as a reaction to the racial hierarchies and colonial logics imposed by British colonial forces at the time.

Nationalism was formed in response to the racial and developmental politics of the colonial administration. For example, early 20th-century Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism often mimicked colonial logics, identifying minority groups in Ceylon as inferior to the majority Sinhala group and as being responsible for the material impoverishment of the local population.

These exclusionary logics of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism have continued to be reproduced in the post-colonial context. Under the Rajapaksa regime, particularly in the post-war period, the military victory over the ethnic conflict brought an increase in military jingoism and majoritarian nationalism, which received significant state patronage. Groups like the Bodu Bala Sena (BBS) gained momentum, especially with their amplified presence on social media, further marginalizing minority groups and fostering Islamophobia. The future trajectory of nationalism is perhaps something we could explore further in another discussion, but I will conclude here for now.

NPP’s Evolution Reflects Moderation in Economic Policies and Emphasis on Inclusivity

How do you interpret Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s presidential victory as a reflection of Sri Lanka’s populist political trends, particularly in the context of economic crises and disillusionment with traditional elites? What does this suggest about the relationship between economic instability and populism in the country and what does this signify for the future of populist politics in Sri Lanka?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: The election of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the current president of Sri Lanka, occurred in the context of the 2022 economic crisis and the country declaring itself bankrupt. His presidential campaign was largely built on an anti-establishment narrative and an economic populist message of “us versus them,” where the corrupt elite were portrayed as being in opposition to the ordinary people. This narrative proved to be very powerful, as it followed the largest economic crisis Sri Lanka has faced since independence. The crisis was widely attributed to a governance failure by a political elite seen as disconnected from the public and deeply corrupt—an elite accused of misusing and stealing public finances to the point of bankrupting the country.

Within President Dissanayake’s political rhetoric, we can clearly identify elements of economic populism. This is evident both in the issues he and his party highlighted and in the solutions they proposed. For example, during the campaign, we saw populist promises such as salary increases for public servants and tax cuts. However, it’s important to note that this form of economic populism did not start with President Dissanayake. We observed similar trends in earlier left-oriented governments from 1994, and even with Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the president elected in 2019 and later ousted by popular protests. Rajapaksa, too, was a populist politician, coming from outside the traditional establishment and running on a narrative of cleaning up a corrupt and inefficient political system.

Situating President Dissanayake’s populist politics within this longer trajectory of populism in Sri Lanka helps us understand its evolution and its potential future impacts.

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) has evolved significantly from its past. What role has this transformation played in its appeal as part of the National People’s Power (NPP) coalition, and how does this align with global trends in left-wing populism? In your view, how has the JVP transformed its populist appeal to distance itself from its violent past, and what lessons can other populist movements learn from this evolution?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: I think this is a question that has sparked significant interest, especially among external observers of Sri Lankan politics. The coalition called the National People’s Power (NPP), formed in September this year, is primarily driven by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which, as you mentioned, is its main and only political party.

The JVP has a complex history, having led two Communist insurgencies in 1971 and 1988. After the failure of these uprisings, the party re-entered parliamentary politics in the 1990s. Historically, the JVP has been associated with revolutionary left-wing politics and Sinhala nationalist ideologies. However, the NPP is observed to have shifted towards the center in its economic policies, effectively positioning itself as a center-left party. This shift towards centrism and pragmatism has become more apparent, particularly since the NPP came into power.

Regarding issues of race and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, the NPP has adopted a much more progressive stance, including advocating for power devolution to minority-dominated areas. In terms of lessons for other populist parties, especially those seeking to access state power, the NPP’s evolution demonstrates that moderating economic policies and adopting a more inclusive approach can resonate more effectively with both the public and important international stakeholders, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The Clock Is Also Ticking for the Current Government

Anti-government protesters gather to stage a demonstration in Colombo on July 9, 2022, demanding the resignation of Sri Lanka’s president and prime minister. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

What is your assessment of the populist strategies used by Dissanayake and the NPP, particularly in mobilizing grassroots support through anti-corruption and transparency narratives? How sustainable are these approaches in governance? How does the NPP navigate the tension between economic nationalism and international obligations, particularly in the context of foreign policy and development projects?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: This kind of mobilization through an anti-corruption narrative is one of the key strategies that Dissanayake and his party effectively utilized during these elections. When we observe other examples of left-wing populist movements gaining popularity globally, this approach is not uncommon. Anti-corruption is a particularly powerful narrative. Within Sri Lanka itself, we’ve seen past governments, such as the Yahapalana government in 2015, rise to power on a good governance and anti-corruption platform.

However, as powerful as the anti-corruption narrative is, sustainability remains a critical question. When corruption is identified as the main problem, it implies that the current system can function with minor fixes to governance. This framing, on one hand, prevents broader discussions about structural reforms and, on the other, primes the public to expect immediate and short-term outcomes.

So far, the NPP government has demonstrated this to some extent. While there have been highly publicized low-level legal cases, significant progress on high-level corruption remains absent. Delivering accountability and justice on large-scale corruption involving powerful figures from the old political establishment is both politically challenging and legally complex. For instance, while the NPP has pledged to recover stolen assets from capital flight, the question remains whether the necessary legal frameworks are in place to enable the identification and recovery of such assets.

The clock is ticking for the current government. If it cannot deliver substantial economic growth in the short term, it must at least demonstrate progress on its anti-corruption mandate to maintain public trust and legitimacy.

How do you see the collapse of Tamil legacy parties and the emergence of new political actors reshaping Tamil nationalism within Sri Lanka’s broader political landscape? Could this fragmentation weaken or strengthen the Tamil political struggle?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: This is a significant development, especially in light of the recent parliamentary elections in Sri Lanka. For the first time in the country’s history, mainstream Tamil and Muslim political parties suffered considerable electoral setbacks. There are several reasons for this. One key factor is the fragmentation within these parties due to internal infighting. Additionally, there is a broader delegitimization of establishment parties, driven in part by the NPP and the powerful narrative of the 2022 popular protests. These protests highlighted the failures of the political establishment and criticized the state’s capture by a small elite.

This context has contributed to the setbacks faced by the legacy of Tamil and Muslim political parties. However, it is also important to note the emerging sentiment that Tamil nationalism, like Sinhala nationalism, is on the decline. This assumption, I believe, warrants closer scrutiny. Sri Lanka has experienced waves of nationalism throughout its history. While Sinhala nationalism appears to have slightly waned in the post-2022 period and did not emerge as a dominant campaign theme during the elections, history suggests that nationalism—both Sinhala and Tamil—tends to resurface in cycles. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect a resurgence of Tamil nationalism in the future, even as new political actors continue to reshape the landscape.

Risk of Social Unrest Rises Amid Revenue Growth Challenges

In light of Dissanayake’s pledges to renegotiate IMF loan terms and focus on economic recovery, what challenges and opportunities do you foresee in balancing populist promises with the realities of austerity-driven economic policies?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: During the campaign, similar to the other main opposition party, the SJB, the NPP was highly critical of the debt sustainability agreement (DSA) forming the framework for the IMF program. They argued that it was not negotiated on terms favorable to Sri Lanka, particularly for the working and poorer classes. One of the NPP’s key promises was that, upon coming to power, they would renegotiate the DSA’s terms to adjust conditions such as tax thresholds and revenue-raising measures.

However, the government has now been in power for over two months, and there are no clear indications that such renegotiations are underway. Instead, there has been notable continuity with the existing economic program, despite the previous Ranil Wickremesinghe government being arguably one of the most neoliberal in Sri Lanka’s history, and the NPP having campaigned on left-leaning economic policies.

The question of whether President Dissanayake can sustain austerity-driven policies under the IMF program while maintaining popular support remains crucial. Currently, the government enjoys a strong mandate and significant popularity. However, if it fails to generate sufficient revenue through alternative means—such as boosting domestic industrialization, tourism, and local cooperatives—social unrest similar to what previous governments faced may resurface.

Operation Yukthiya: Moral Panics as Tools of Political Control

What role does the securitization of issues like drug control and trade union action play in consolidating power under the current Sri Lankan government, and how does this framing of extrajudicial measures as tools for justice shape public opinion and political legitimacy, particularly through the creation of “moral panics” such as Operation Yukthiya, and how do these strategies align with broader patterns of populist governance globally?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: I think it’s a very common aspect of populist politics, whether right-wing or left-wing, to identify specific social dynamics and frame them as threats to society or as the root causes of material or security crises. This strategy allows populist leaders to consolidate power and redirect public attention.

During the Wickremesinghe government, we observed the introduction of campaigns like Operation Yukthiya, an anti-drugs initiative that created “moral panics” to legitimize an expanded role for the police and increase the securitization of social spaces. These strategies were framed as necessary for justice but often functioned to enhance political control and suppress dissent.

The current NPP government has indicated that it will continue with such programs. However, as I mentioned earlier, the current administration remains highly popular. Historically, we see governments resorting to creating or amplifying moral panics when their popularity begins to decline. Whether this government will emphasize issues like drug control or other security concerns to maintain its legitimacy will likely depend on shifts in its public support in the future.

How do populist narratives in Sri Lanka address or sideline ethnic and minority issues, and what implications does this have for long-term reconciliation and inclusive governance in the country? Are there similarities with other populist leaders across the World?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: This is a very important issue and one that is quite distinctive in the NPP’s left politics, especially when compared to past Sri Lankan left-nationalist politics. The “othering” of Tamil and Muslim minorities has historically been a popular political instrument used by past governments, including left-nationalist administrations such as the Mahinda Rajapaksa government, if we can characterize it as such.

However, the NPP was distinct in the 2024 elections for not mobilizing a strong Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist narrative. Instead, it advocated for greater ethnic inclusivity. This was evident in the November 2024 elections, where the NPP secured a mandate across the island, including in minority-dominated areas. This represents a unique moment for Sri Lanka, perhaps paralleling the political atmosphere of 1994, when a similarly inclusive national space was created.

In response to your question, while the NPP’s politics can be characterized as left-populist on an economic level, it has maintained a strong inclusive narrative regarding ethnic and religious groups. This is reflected in its proposals for a new constitution and its push for power devolution to smaller territorial units as a more sustainable solution for reconciliation. Whether these measures will provide a lasting resolution to the ethnic question in Sri Lanka, however, remains to be seen.

Timing Challenges Doom ‘One-Country-One-Law’ Initiative

How has ‘one-country-one law’ principle been instrumentalized by the political leaders in Sri Lanka in terms of democracy and civil liberties? How has securitization been employed by the political leaders to empower the police force? How do these populist narratives manipulate public frustration to justify anti-democratic measures, and what long-term risks does this pose to civil liberties?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: The “one-country-one-law” principle, to briefly explain for those unfamiliar with Sri Lanka, was a political campaign mobilized during the 2019 presidential elections. The idea was to address perceived heterogeneity within Sri Lanka’s legal framework, particularly concerning ethnic communities. For instance, there was the Muslim Marriage and Divorce Act (MMDA) and other legal regimes specific to certain communities. The argument was that there was a need to homogenize laws in Sri Lanka to promote equality.

However, underlying this drive was a strong Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist sentiment aimed at reinforcing the mandate of the majority ethnic group. The “one-country-one-law” initiative ultimately failed, largely due to the timing of its implementation. In 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa came to power with this mandate, but by 2020 the COVID-19 pandemic hit, followed by the economic crisis, preventing the campaign from gaining momentum.

While these sentiments suffered a significant defeat, especially after the 2022 protests, it is possible they could resurface if the current NPP government fails to meet the high expectations it has fostered. For example, in neighboring India, the idea of a uniform civil code has gained considerable public legitimacy. Whether such a mandate could re-enter Sri Lanka’s political discourse remains a possibility in the future.

How has the socio-economic fall-out in 2022 played into the hands of victory of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, leader of the leftist National People’s Power (NPP)?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: As I mentioned earlier, the economic inequality and dispossession of people were significantly exacerbated by the 2022 economic crisis. While Sri Lanka already had high levels of inequality and poverty, the crisis accelerated these issues dramatically. People felt the impact immediately, particularly due to the long hours of power cuts and disruptions in access to essentials like gas and fuel.

This economic crisis, which severely disrupted everyday livelihoods, fueled widespread anger and anti-establishment sentiment among the populace. People attributed their struggles to the poor governance of the political elite at the time. Anura Kumara Dissanayake effectively mobilized this anger, even though the NPP did not play a direct leadership role in the protests. The party skillfully channeled the public’s frustration, which contributed to their landslide victory in November.

Risk of Populist Resurgence Looms

Sri Lankan protesters storm the prime minister’s office in Colombo on July 13, 2022, demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Photo: Ruwan Walpola.

Given the global rise of religious and civilizational populism, what lessons can Sri Lanka draw from its history to foster inclusivity and prevent the recurrence of divisive politics in the context of current economic and social crises?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: The idea of civilizational populism refers to political actors identifying themselves and their state beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. In the context of pre-independence Ceylon, we observe certain nationalist leaders framing the island as a Buddhist civilizational state. This rhetoric legitimized the notion of a once-prosperous society and statehood—idealized as the birthplace of great ideas about governance and social organization—that had been lost. These leaders argued for a return to such a golden age, attributing its decline to colonial forces and the perceived collusion of ethnic minorities with those forces.

In the post-independence era, Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism has frequently drawn on civilizational populist narratives, even as it operates within the framework of the nation-state. These sentiments continue to feed into nationalist discourse, especially during times of economic and social upheaval. As Sri Lanka confronts its current economic crisis, there is an increasing tendency to invoke the idea of a broader, more successful Buddhist civilizational entity. This rhetoric becomes particularly appealing to leaders as the nation’s prospects seem diminished. 

And lastly, Dr. Gamage, how has Buddhist civilizational populism shaped the political and social dynamics of post-war Sri Lanka, particularly in the othering of minority communities, and how does its contemporary manifestation compare with colonial-era Buddhist revival movements in terms of goals, rhetoric, societal impact and the enduring influence of colonial legacies?

Dr. Rajni Gamage: As I mentioned in a previous response, Buddhist civilizational populism certainly informs Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, but it emerges in waves. Currently, we seem to be in a receding phase of nationalism. This is evident not only in the reluctance of political movements to mobilize it extensively but also in its diminished resonance with the public.

One reason for this decline is the 2022 protests, which not only delegitimized the political elite of that period but also discredited certain hegemonic narratives, including Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism. These protests created a moment of reckoning, where dominant ideologies were challenged alongside the established political order.

However, as you noted, the current government has presented itself as promoting progressive politics on the ethnic front while also making economically populist or left-leaning promises. If it fails to deliver on these fronts, there is a possibility that alternative opposition groups may seize the opportunity to re-mobilize Buddhist civilizational populism to gain political traction.