Posts in category: MONITOR

Professor Simon Tormey stated that great power rivalry is more significant than any new ideology, indicating a shift away from globalization, which suggested diminishing differences between countries. Tormey highlighted that nationalist and nativist power struggles are likely to shape political outcomes for at least the next two decades. He noted the reemergence of great power rivalry, alongside economic interconnectedness and trends of de-globalization and decoupling. Tormey predicted continued regional conflicts and the persistence of populism without evolving into a new form of neo-populism.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) on Monday, Professor Simon Tormey, a political theorist and the Executive Dean of Arts and Education at Deakin University in Australia, discussed the complex dynamics shaping the current global political landscape. Professor Tormey offered a deep dive into what he describes as an era characterized by economic liberalism intertwined with great power rivalry.

“Great power rivalry is probably more important than any neologism or new ideology,” stated Professor Tormey, highlighting the significant geopolitical shifts that have overshadowed the once-dominant narrative of globalization. He pointed out that we are witnessing a retreat from the idea that the differences between countries are becoming less significant than their similarities. Instead; nativist, nationalist great power rivalries are reemerging and are likely to dictate political outcomes for the next 15-20 years.

The interview covered various topics, including the role of populism in modern democracies. Professor Tormey explained that populism, whether from the right or left, often arises in response to crises. “We are in an era of poly-crisis,” he noted, referring to the simultaneous challenges of economic turmoil, climate emergencies, geopolitical conflicts, and social instability. These conditions create fertile ground for populist movements that seek to undermine trust in ruling elites and offer radical solutions.

Despite the rise of populism, Professor Tormey argued that the fundamental structures of capitalism and economic liberalism remain robust. “Neoliberalism is more entrenched than this description suggests. The belief in the market, capitalism, and the ability of people to invest in various countries is intrinsic to capitalist modernity,” he asserted.

On the topic of migration and social cohesion, Professor Tormey acknowledged the concerns of right-wing populists but emphasized the benefits of multiculturalism. He pointed out that successful multicultural societies, such as the US, Canada, and Australia, enrich democratic life. However, he also recognized the need for a balanced approach to immigration, as seen in the ongoing debates in the UK, the Netherlands and Australia.

Reflecting on the future, Professor Tormey underscored the importance of democratic engagement and innovation. He believes that democracy must adapt to include both traditional institutions and new forms of participation driven by technological advances. “We need both established institutions and the energy of street protests and new forms of political participation,” he concluded.

This insightful interview with Professor Simon Tormey offers a comprehensive overview of the current state of global politics, the challenges of populism and the enduring influence of economic liberalism and great power rivalry.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Simon Tormey with some edits.

Crisis and Populism Are Closely Intertwined

Thank you so much, Professor Tormey, for joining our interview series. I’d like to start right away with the first question. In your article titled “Stresses and Strains: Will We Ever Agree on What’s Going Wrong with Democracy?” you discuss the chronic nature of democracy’s crisis under capitalist conditions. How do you think current global economic trends, such as rising inequality and economic uncertainty are influencing this crisis and the public’s perception of democracy?

Professor Simon Tormey: We are in an era of poly-crisis, a modern term that encapsulates our current multifaceted challenges. We face an economic crisis, a climate emergency, significant geopolitical risks, a land war in Europe and threats of conflict elsewhere. Additionally, poverty, starvation and political instability plague many regions. These crises provide fertile ground for populism, which thrives by undermining trust in the ruling elites and their ability to improve the situation. To understand populism, we must recognize its deep interconnection with crisis; the two are closely intertwined.

We can see this dynamic clearly in Europe, where a confected immigration crisis is fueling the far-right. Italy currently has a far-right leader, and the Netherlands has just formed a new government. We’ve got the British, who are trying desperately to avoid tumbling into a populist right-wing formula for dealing with immigration problem. Ireland may also shift to the right soon. Additionally, of course, we have the run-up to the French Presidential election in 2027. It looks like the far-right is poised to do very well in the next European elections.

Another crucial point is that contemporary media amplifies these crises. The media thrives on crisis, generating a sense of collective doom with images from Palestine and other troubled regions. This exacerbates the feeling, especially among young people that we are heading towards disaster and that only those with radical, simplistic solutions can help. Contemporary democracy has amplified our sense of crisis, and populism feeds off this, making life increasingly difficult for the once dominant technocratic elite.

In your discussion of the democratic crisis, you mention that the global financial crisis and subsequent austerity measures accelerated certain negative traits in liberal democracy, leading to the rise of populism. How do you see the interplay between economic factors and political populism evolving in the current global landscape?

Professor Simon Tormey: These issues are very intimately interconnected. Before the global financial crisis, interest in populism was quite limited in my field. In political science, it was mostly a few scholars examining curious, idiosyncratic movements like the Narodniks in Russia, certain figures in the US during the 1920s and 1930s, and the Cordillo movements and parties in Latin America. However, what really sparked contemporary interest in populism was the global financial crisis, which called into question the competence and trustworthiness of the elites leading Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, the US and similar regions.

This crisis elicited two main reactions. The first is the right-wing populist approach, which argues that open markets, free borders and cosmopolitanism have created a precarious interconnectedness where problems in one part of the world quickly impact another. This perspective fuels a backlash against these principles, exemplified by figures like Donald Trump, who represent a right-wing rejection of open markets and cosmopolitanism.

On the other hand, the global financial crisis also provoked a left-wing reaction. This began with Syriza in Greece and continued with movements like Podemos in Spain and Jeremy Corbyn’s anti-austerity stance in Britain. These movements also employ populist rhetoric, framing the struggle as the people versus the elites and critiquing the European Union as a pro-capitalist, pro-austerity entity.

The contemporary wave of populism is thus deeply rooted in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, manifesting in various forms. We see both right-wing and left-wing backlashes. Mark Blyth highlights this well in his work, justifiably arguing that populism can be seen as a response to the perceived failure of neoliberalism.

As populism scholars, we recognize that populism predates the financial crisis. It is more intrinsic to democratic life than merely a backlash or reaction to economic turmoil. Populist movements have existed since the mid- to late-19th century. Thus, there is a deeper aspect to populism beyond just responding to financial crises. It is a political stance that seeks to position elites as complicit in the hardships faced by the people. These hardships can be expressed in economic terms but also in other ways.

In unequal societies, there is a persistent dynamic where some claim that the people are being used or abused by elites for their own purposes. This is inherent in unequal societies, particularly in feudal and aristocratic systems, and in our modern capitalist societies, where inequality is deeply embedded in the structure.

Even Anti-Representative or Anti-Elite Movements Make Representative Claims

Given your discussion on the decline of traditional party-based representative politics and the emergence of new forms of political engagement, what do you consider the most promising alternatives to traditional democratic structures for addressing the current democratic stress? Additionally, what role will populist parties and leaders play in either exacerbating this crisis or potentially mitigating the crisis of representation and democracy?

Professor Simon Tormey: I think populism is an interesting case because populist leaders often say, “We, the voiceless, need a voice. I can be that voice for the voiceless.” This represents a paradoxical response to the crisis of representation. In my 2015 book, I didn’t delve deeply into this because it predated the rise of many populist figures. Populism can be seen as a form of hyper-representation, positioning the people against those who are supposed to represent their interests.

On the other side of the coin, we have various democratic innovations, closely linked to technological advances over the last 20-30 years. Researchers like Lance Bennett and Clay Shirky have documented the impact of digital mechanisms on increasing connectivity among people. Some political scientists dismiss this as “slacktivism” or “clicktivism,” but my research suggests that tools like Twitter, Facebook, and flash mobs have flattened organizational structures, transforming how political life operates. This shift calls into question the traditional modus operandi of political parties.

In Spain, for example, we’ve seen the rise of instant political parties. Technology hasn’t rendered political parties obsolete; it has transformed them. Now, we have a variety of political party types, from mainstream parties to pop-up parties, single-issue and flash parties, even those that are anti-representational by design. This has expanded the repertoire of representation forms, some paradoxically anti-representative.

I agree with Ernesto Laclau, who argues that even anti-representative or anti-elite movements still make a representative claim, asserting that they represent the people’s deepest needs. This challenges traditional theories of representation, leading to a rethinking of why we need political parties to represent us. Social media and digital mechanisms have dismembered, dismantled, and reprogrammed our understanding of political representation.

Despite these changes, I believe democracies are as lively as ever. We haven’t lost the desire to come together, participate, and make our grievances heard. The mechanisms for doing so have become more diverse, and we are still learning which are most effective.

Democracies Inherently Involve Crisis

You highlight that some theorists view the democratic crisis as a permanent and endemic condition, while others see it as episodic and short-lived. How do you think these differing perspectives influence the strategies proposed to address the democratic crisis? You also argue that the term “stress” might be more appropriate than “crisis.” Can you elaborate on specific actions or reforms that could help alleviate this ‘democratic stress’ and strengthen democratic institutions?

Professor Simon Tormey: At one level, I share David Runciman’s view on democratic crises: democracies inherently involve crisis. Similarly, we might agree with Nassim Nicholas Taleb that democracies are “Anti-Fragile.” Democracies provoke crises, respond to them, and this is one of their strengths. If we consider democracy as a style of crisis management, it prompts the realization that crises aren’t existential threats to democracy. Instead, they are what democracies are designed to manage and organize. There’s always a crisis, whether it’s a COVID crisis, a geopolitical crisis, or a climate crisis. Democracies are remarkably permeable, malleable, and resistant to the kind of existential crises that often concern critics.

On the other hand, we might discuss democratic stresses—factors that impact how democracy functions. When people shut down a national newspaper, threaten insurrection or imperil the modus operandi of democracy, these can be seen as stresses. We need to be mindful that democracy is a civilizational construct, a way of life as well as a set of institutions and practices. Therefore, it’s crucial to consider how we can protect and fortify democracy against these stresses.

I’m still surprised by how little emphasis is placed on education in the accounts of those who support democracy. In most countries, we don’t teach citizenship or strive to inspire young people with the heritage and inheritance of democratic structures. This is evident in places like Australia and the UK, where I recently observed the same issue. There’s very little civics education, the kind that late-19th century thinkers like J.S. Mill or Henry Thoreau advocated for—educating and encouraging young people to understand and nurture democracy.

In the Australian case, for example, we have compulsory voting. Initially, I wasn’t in favor of this policy when I moved to Australia, as I lean towards a libertarian viewpoint and prefer people to make their own decisions about how to act. However, I’ve seen the impact of compulsory voting on my own children, their friends and students in general. It forces people to take a stake in the system, prompting them to get off the fence and stop blaming others for their situations.

If we consider enhancing civics education, maintaining compulsory voting and involving citizens more directly in deliberative or citizen juries, we could introduce interesting innovations. These could alleviate some issues related to the perception that democracy is controlled by elites in places like Canberra, Brussels or London. Viewing democracy as a practice that everyone should engage in—and indeed has an obligation to engage in—through voting and other interactions with our systems could foster a shared sense of responsibility. This collective engagement could serve as a defense against the unrealistic promises and rhetoric of some populist leaders.

The Contemporary Mindset Is Inherently Democratic

In your article published in 2015 and titled “Democracy will never be the same again: 21st  Century Protest and the transformation of Politics,” you discuss the emergence of new forms of political mobilization such as cloud, swarm, and connective initiatives. How do these new forms challenge traditional organizational structures, and what implications do they have for the future of representative liberal democracy?

Professor Simon Tormey: In political science literature, we discuss the difference between vertical organizations, like political parties and horizontal political organizations. Horizontal organizations are characterized by a commitment to open participation, with no leaders or representatives for the movement or groups. We’ve seen examples of this in recent history with the Occupy Movement, the Indignados Movement in Spain, and the Arab Spring. These innovations are often technologically driven. This isn’t to say that the belief in horizontal structures didn’t exist in classical, Marxist or socialist traditions but technology has made them easier to operationalize for social movements.

On the other hand, another recent lesson is that even these movements, like the Indignados, represent a broad social base and make collective claims. They speak for “we, the 99%” and highlight systemic failures and necessary changes. Despite their horizontal nature, these movements still embody elements of representation. This reveals that even the most horizontal movements incorporate vertical elements.

The binary between vertical and horizontal is not as clear-cut as we once thought. Vertical organizations, such as modern political parties, now often include elaborate forms of participation and engagement. They have evolved significantly over the past 40-50 years to include open structures, consultations, mechanisms of self-control, and accountability.

Conversely, horizontal structures, like social movements, need to be more transparent and accountable regarding leadership and organization. They must clarify their rules and regulations for diverse actor participation, ensure balanced agendas and maintain an equitable platform. This blend of vertical and horizontal elements in both types of organizations suggest a more nuanced understanding of political organization is needed. 

All of these points suggest to me the need for greater sophistication in our understanding of organization and how we organize. We need to be more visible, accountable, and transparent. This aligns with the current Zeitgeist. These themes are prevalent in universities, corporate governance and business. Society is now less accustomed to hierarchy and asymmetry and more inclined towards democracy, accountability and transparency, regardless of the organizational form.

The contemporary mindset is inherently democratic. We want people to be present and involved as much as possible. It’s crucial to establish and maintain mechanisms that enable this participation.

You highlight the decline in trust and participation in traditional electoral politics and the rise of anti-representative movements. Do you see these movements as capable of sustaining long-term political engagement and effecting substantial policy changes, or are they more likely to remain episodic and focused on immediate issues? What kind of populism-proof democracy are you envisaging?

Professor Simon Tormey: This is really about institutionalizing social energies. Reflecting on my fieldwork in Spain, there were initially many street demonstrations, followed by semi-permanent encampments. However, sustaining that level of engagement is impractical—people need to care for children, look after the elderly, work and study. Institutionalization is intrinsic to political life.

Agnes Heller, the renowned political philosopher, made this observation when I interviewed her about 30 years ago. She pointed out that we can’t have a polis or demos that is permanently active. People have lives to lead and responsibilities to manage, so institutionalization is necessary. A healthy democracy is one where both these dimensions—the vibrant moments of direct engagement and the stable institutional structures—are vividly enacted.

We also see citizens participating in various ways, whether through street protests, creating new Facebook groups or finding other methods to make their voices heard. Some of these activities will be brief and fleeting, while others will become institutionalized. For example, in Spain, the Indignados movement gave rise to Podemos, and other movements led to figures like Ada Colau in Barcelona and Manuela Carmena in Madrid. These leaders emerged from street protests and social movements, carried forward by the organizational structures that developed from those movements.

Currently, while large-scale demonstrations have subsided, there is still activity and noise from neighborhood communities and committees. This shows a blend of direct citizen engagement and the institutionalized outcomes of previous movements, reflecting the dynamic nature of democratic participation.

Political parties, in a few years, will themselves be challenged. This reflects a healthy democratic ecology, where we need both established institutions and the energy of street protests and new forms of political participation. If you have one without the other, problems arise.

For instance, if you only have street protests and public clamor without trust in political elites, you’re close to a breakdown, akin to post-Chavez Venezuela or Argentina. Conversely, if you only have a traditional party system without citizen participation beyond political parties, the system becomes stale and susceptible to challenges from those with vigorous social agendas. Thus, democracy requires both institutional structures and dynamic citizen engagement to thrive.

Democracy Should Be Emotional and About What People Want and Need

In your article ‘Populism: Democracy’s Pharmakon’, you argue that framing populism as either negative or positive is, in an important sense, unsatisfactory. Taking into consideration the fact that populism is usually construed negatively, can you please elaborate the positive side of populism?

Professor Simon Tormey: In the 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, much of the political science literature focused on why citizens were turning off, becoming apathetic and feeling bored with politics. This was largely due to a technocratic consensus around neoliberalism, market centrality and cosmopolitanism. This consensus dictated how the world should function, leading to a lack of contestation and technocratic governance, where citizens felt unheard.

What disrupted this system was the global financial crisis and the emergence of voices challenging the consensus. These challengers argued that democratic debate and discussion should encompass more than what the consensus allowed. Populists often brought this energy and sense of emotion into the public sphere, highlighting the need for a more inclusive and contested democratic discourse.

Depending on your ideological orientation, reactions to populism vary. Left-wing individuals may dislike far-right populism, while right-wing individuals and culturalists may oppose left-wing movements. However, it’s undeniable that this shake-up was probably necessary in hindsight. We were blindly walking towards a collapse of democratic life, marked by a lack of debate and a consensus that left citizens feeling unneeded. We had a democracy without citizen engagement, devoid of the contingency and emotion about the collective’s fate that populists brought with them.

So I saw very closely in Spain, at close hand, a left-wing set of responses to the global financial crisis. People like Ada Colau and Manuela Carmena from Podemos self-declared their populism. I’m not accusing them of being populist; they said we needed a populist series that required popular leaders like Jeremy Corbyn for the many, not the few. These are populist phrases and movements. What they did was shake our sense that we had to accept whatever the elites brought to us as medicine. They re-energized politics.

They re-energized the sense of possibility for citizens at a time when it seemed harmless. I use the parable of the pharmakon as a way of saying that sometimes shaking the tree hard is a necessary antidote to the opposite, which is boredom, paralysis and apathy on the part of citizens. Where it leads, of course, is dependent on the nature and forms of the populist movements that arise in those moments of crisis and urgency. But I think that is the political. I agree with Ron Sierra and Chantal Mouffe. Democracy isn’t a technocratic image; it’s not a machine and shouldn’t be one. It should be emotional and about what people want and need, where they see their interests, and it needs to play out. But that energy also needs to be institutionalized because, without institutions, we do have chaos, no doubt about it.

How can we check and balance the elite and make the elite more accountable?

Professor Simon Tormey: Obviously, in a democracy, we do have traditional means. We do have political parties and I’m not the kind of person who says that there’s no difference between them. There are incredible differences between political parties and there’s also an incredible difference now between presidential candidates if we look at the upcoming US election. The choice for citizens between Trump and Biden is significant, particularly in areas like geopolitics and immigration. However, if you’re looking for a candidate who supports socialism or transformational changes to capitalism, you will be disappointed.

But we know that in American political life, there are candidates who highlight these issues. We’ve had Bernie Sanders running for president, who brought these issues to the forefront. We’ve got Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, we’ve got Kennedy, we’ve got Beto O’Rourke, and so on. It’s naive to imagine that these arguments aren’t being discussed, but it’s also naive to imagine that the scales aren’t tipped in favor of the status quo in terms of consensus and so on. But I think that is all part of the cut and thrust of democracy.

I’d also point out that we have many more effective ways of being heard and participating in democratic life than our forebears. For example, in the 1950s and 1960s, street protests and demonstrations were seen as last resorts by some democratic theories. I can almost hear my former colleague, Pippa Norris, saying that elections are really what count. However, we can’t imagine that people standing for election are immune to street protests, mobilizations or the kind of ruckus we see regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. All these forms of clamor are ways of being heard. They are capable of influencing public opinion and ultimately, we don’t achieve social progress simply by trusting political elites and parties to do what’s best for us. We get progress because those elites come under pressure to respond and react to what ordinary citizens are articulating.

The welfare state, free education, housing and healthcare are products of a groundswell of popular opinion, sometimes expressed at the ballot box but also in various other ways—subtle and not so subtle—that citizens have available to them. That is the right and proper approach in a democracy. Democracy is not just about casting a vote every four or five years (or every three years in Australia); it’s also about people making themselves heard and they have many opportunities to do that.

Without Immigration, Aging Societies Are Dead in the Water

Is populism or its right-wing version problematic for social cohesion?

Professor Simon Tormey: Of course, right-wing populists believe that they are in favor of social cohesion. They think social cohesion is threatened by an influx of refugees and new migrants from parts of the world with different values, whether that’s the Middle East, Asia, or elsewhere. Their view is that social cohesion is a cultural artifact of indigenous people organizing themselves according to a common core of values. I believe multiculturalism is the antidote to that. There are very successful multicultural societies, such as the US, Canada, and Australia (where I am currently), which are essentially nations of migrants. The proper counterbalance is to point out the incredible richness and diversity of contemporary democratic societies.

One can also understand the concerns people have and that’s the debate we’re having at the moment in the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium, Australia and so on. Is there a critical mass picture? Is there an optimal number of people coming into a society before it gets out of control? We are living in an experiment of transnational populations, movements, and flows of people at the moment. There is also a very serious reaction to that, and we will find out over the next couple of decades whether people are happy to concede that our societies have been enriched or otherwise.

Ultimately, I think this is a topic for democratic contestation. People feel that the balance may tip too far towards open borders, creating issues. Here in Australia, the debate is about housing. We don’t have enough housing, infrastructure lags behind the sheer number of people coming in and so on. We’ll just have to find a happy medium. This is democratic life—people are interested in how many people are enough, basically.

However, we also have the problem of aging populations in places like Italy, Japan and parts of Europe. Without immigration, these societies are actually dead in the water—they won’t be able to pay for their welfare bills or support their aging populations and they won’t be able to renew themselves. So, there is an interesting balance in the argument and we just have to see how democracies are able to cope with this set of issues.

Economics Trumps Politics vis-a-vis Rise of Populism and Great Power Rivalry

How can liberal democracies tackle with the rising civilizational populism in the US, Russia, India, China, Turkey and elsewhere?

Professor Simon Tormey: It’s a kind of backlash against globalization argument. For 30, 40, 50 years, we’ve had globalization. We’ve had relatively porous borders and increased mobility. I was born in Ireland, moved to the UK, then to Australia, and back to the UK. My kids all have multiple passports, which has been a great advantage. However, this advantage is primarily enjoyed by the elite. The problem is that elites, even those who benefit from globalization—such as Donald Trump with his overseas investments, Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen, and others—are often the ones arguing against it. This two-faced aspect is evident, but politicians are responding to the demands of their populace and trying to come up with creative solutions.

I hope the wheel will turn, as I believe economics trumps politics in this matter. Economic globalization and the ability of countries to import and export goods and people have driven significant economic growth over the last half-century. For example, the relative integration of the US and China means that China would be very unlikely to jeopardize this relationship by invading Taiwan, as the US has made clear that this would harm their economic ties. China also holds substantial investments in the US.

Even the emerging great power politics involving Russia, China, India and the US will likely be tempered by their economic needs. However, we are on the edge of a precipice. There’s no doubt about it. We must hope that the economically and commercially minded elites prevail over the aggressive nationalist and nativist factions, which are powerful in places like India, China, and the US. These economic elites are crucial, as many politicians depend on them for support and to maintain their political parties and privileges. We’ll see how it goes, but it’s a key question for the next part of the 21st century.

In a New York Times article titled “A New Centrism is Rising in Washington,” it is argued that a new centrism is emerging in Washington because neoliberalism has failed to deliver, and both Democrats and Republicans have grown skeptical of free trade. This shift is referred to as “neo-populism.” Do you agree with the assertion that we are witnessing the dawn of neo-populism?

Professor Simon Tormey: It’s an interesting article. Of course, people are reflecting on the 30 years between the early to mid-1970s and the global financial crisis when there seemed to be a strong consensus in favor of free trade, open borders, transnational flows and so on. In the current phase, it seems that this consensus has come to an end. People are using phrases like de-globalization or neo-nationalism to describe these emerging trends.

I think neoliberalism is more entrenched than this description suggests. The belief in the market, capitalism and the ability of people to place their money and bets in whatever currency they choose and to invest in various countries, including those in Europe and China, is intrinsic to capitalist modernity. I don’t see any real threats to this fundamental organization of our society. At this level, we’re kidding ourselves if we think politics will trump economics. We tend to take capitalism for granted as we try to come up with new phrases and terminology to describe the current situation. 

I think we are in an era of economic liberalism with great power rivalry. I would take a more cautious approach, much like John Mearsheimer, who I’ve been watching a lot recently because he’s very controversial, particularly regarding the origins of the Ukraine war and the rise of China. It seems that great power rivalry is probably more important than any neologism or new ideology. I don’t think we’re heading towards a new kind of consensus, as neo-populism suggests. Instead, we’re witnessing a retreat from the narrative of globalization, which posited that the differences between countries would become less significant than the similarities.

The core of nativist nationalist great power rivalry is present and will likely dictate political outcomes for the next 15-20 years at least. We’re in the shadow of the reemergence of great power rivalry, with an undercurrent of economic interconnectedness. This includes some forms of de-globalization and decoupling at the core, along with numerous regional wars and conflicts to manage over the next 15-20 years. It’s reasonable to imagine that populism is not going to die, but nor is it going to evolve into a new ideological neo-populism. I’m not a believer in that perspective.