Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi—Associate Professor at Department of History, California State University, San Marcos.

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Authoritarianism Is the New Normal and the Prevailing Norm

by AuthoritarianismDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

In this timely and thought-provoking interview, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi explores how authoritarianism has become “the new normal” in the Middle East amid a global retreat from democratic norms. Speaking to the ECPS, Dr. Al-Marashi analyzes the region’s complex landscape shaped by imperial legacies, resource politics, and shifting global alliances. He highlights how populist rhetoric, digital platforms, and transactional diplomacy—especially under Trump-era politics—are empowering authoritarian leaders and weakening democratic institutions. While civil society faces mounting repression, Dr. Al-Marashi suggests that digital activism and “artivism” may offer spaces of survival and resistance. This interview provides essential insight into how populism and authoritarianism intersect in the Middle East—and what that means for the future of governance in the region.

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an era marked by the erosion of liberal democratic norms and the global resurgence of authoritarian tendencies, Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi—Associate Professor at Department of History, California State University, San Marcos—offers a timely and incisive analysis of the Middle East’s evolving political landscape. In an in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Al-Marashi argues that “authoritarianism has become normalized—it’s now the prevailing norm,” particularly in a world increasingly shaped by populist and transactional leadership.

Drawing from historical legacies and contemporary global shifts, Dr. Al-Marashi underscores how imperial interference and resource wealth have long laid the groundwork for authoritarian populism in the region. “Hydrocarbons enable political elites to generate revenue without relying on taxation,” he explains, allowing regimes to distribute wealth in ways that bypass democratic accountability and reinforce autocratic control. He connects this dynamic to broader regional patterns, noting that even militant groups such as ISIS have employed populist strategies by attempting to dismantle colonial-era borders and mobilize transnational support.

Dr. Al-Marashi highlights the impact of shifting global power dynamics, particularly the rise of multipolarity and the influence of Trumpism, in undermining democratic aspirations. With the US retreating from its rhetorical commitment to democracy, populist-authoritarian leaders find renewed legitimacy. “If the US is adopting these behaviors,” he argues, “this is the new norm—this is the future.” This sets a precedent for regimes that increasingly embrace personalistic and sultanistic rule, with little concern for liberal democratic values.

Transactional diplomacy, particularly under Trump, has also reshaped regional alliances. Dr. Al-Marashi notes that such diplomacy empowers authoritarian actors like Netanyahu, while simultaneously emboldening sectarian militias and weakening traditional state structures. “It’s a double-edged sword—quite literally,” he remarks, especially when it comes to balancing regional power plays and proxy conflicts in places like Syria, Iraq, and Yemen.

While the picture appears bleak, Dr. Al-Marashi also points to the resilience of digital resistance. He suggests that civil society and democratizing efforts may survive—if not flourish—through digital activism and what he terms “artivism.” In a region where the state has often failed to provide basic services, digital spaces may serve as the last frontier for democratic imagination and mobilization.

This interview captures the complexity of a region grappling with entrenched authoritarianism amid a globally permissive environment—and offers critical insights into how populist movements and power politics intersect in the 21st century Middle East.

Here is the lightly edited transcript of the interview with Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi.

Imperial Legacies and Oil Wealth Laid the Foundation for Authoritarian Populism in the Middle East

Oil pump jack in the desert of Bahrain. Photo: Dreamstime.

Professor Ibrahim Al-Marashi, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: What historical and socio-political conditions in Iraq and the broader Middle East have laid the groundwork for the rise of populist authoritarianism in the region?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: The obvious factors are imperial interference and hydrocarbons—oil and gas. The involvement of foreign powers, whether Britain or the US, consistently provides a convenient enemy to rally against. Meanwhile, hydrocarbons enable political elites to generate revenue without relying on taxation. This, in turn, enhances populism, as the revenues can be distributed directly through large-scale projects that bolster support for figures like Saddam Hussein—or any other authoritarian leader—not only in Iraq but across the region.

How have legacies of colonialism, militarization, and post-conflict governance contributed to the entrenchment of populist and authoritarian leadership styles in the Middle East?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: In the case of Iraq, the British were always a convenient target to rally against. In other states ruled by France, for example, populations could similarly rally against the legacy of the colonial power. Even if you look at ISIS as a kind of populist and terrorist group, its goal of dismantling borders was an attempt to mobilize the masses—not just in the Middle East, but across the entire Muslim world. Saddam Hussein framed the invasion of Kuwait as an effort to erase borders established by British colonialism, making it a similarly convenient rallying point. And then, let’s not forget the United States. In the case of the Houthis, for instance, their appeal extends not only beyond Yemen but throughout the region, as they are perceived as one of the last groups seeking agency in a region largely shaped by US control. This is the legacy: there are concrete historical borders that have divided communities, but there is also, in the collective imagination, a persistent target around which to rally. 

Authoritarianism Has Become the New Norm—This Is the Future

From a populism perspective, how are shifting global power dynamics — especially the rise of multipolarity and the return of a nationalist, transactional Trump administration — shaping authoritarian resilience and weakening democratic aspirations in the Middle East? In what ways might these trends bolster authoritarian populist movements across the region?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Authoritarianism has become normalized—it’s now the prevailing norm. Even though the US has often behaved in authoritarian ways, it at least used to pay lip service to the promotion of democratic governance around the world. I think that facade has now been abandoned. As a result, populist leaders can more or less say, “Look, if the US is adopting these behaviors, this is the new norm—this is the future.”

Even in the case of Russia, there appears to be, at the very least, a personalistic rapprochement—a relationship based more on the closeness of individual leaders than shared values. The emerging regime type in this multipolar world is personalistic—what you might call sultanistic—drawing on the term “Sultan,” as used by the academic Houchang Chehabi.

If that’s the case, then there is no longer a democratic model to aspire to. This increasingly looks like the wave of the future—the future of governance.

How has the populist rhetoric of the Trump administrations—particularly their framing of “radical Islam” and their regional double standards—impacted the legitimacy of state institutions and non-state actors in Iraq and the broader Middle East?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: In this case, there are two dynamics at play. This ties back to your earlier question about transactional foreign policy. If Trump makes a deal with Iran over its nuclear program—well, the Iraqi Shia militias are essentially mass mobilization forces for the Shia population, and much of that mobilization is supported by Iran. If Iran enters negotiations with the US, it would have less incentive to continue backing those militias. That’s one example involving non-state actors.

Then there’s the other paradox: an escalation of the war against the Houthis in Yemen. Iran might choose to rein them in, but if not, the Houthis may continue attacking Red Sea shipping as a consequence of these ongoing tensions. This illustrates how transactionalism, populism, and non-state actors intersect in the region.

Transactional Diplomacy Fuels Sectarian Populism

Shiite fighters take position in the Shia village of Al-Zahra, Syria, amid intense clashes involving Hezbollah.
Photo: Ibrahim Khader / Pacific Press.

Could the Trump administration’s emphasis on transactional diplomacy further embolden sectarian and ethnic populism in conflict zones like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and how?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Not okay—on two levels. Transactional diplomacy with Netanyahu might embolden him to act unilaterally in Syria and Lebanon, and perhaps even as far as Yemen. Israel’s actions in these areas could fuel sectarianism in several ways: it could lead to a resurgence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, embolden the Houthis, and prompt Israel to use the Syrian Druze minority as a proxy. That’s one pathway through which sectarianism might be intensified.

Israel might also be emboldened to target Iraq’s Shia militias, which are part of the so-called “axis of resistance.”

On the other hand, if this transactional diplomacy were to result in a grand bargain with Iran, those same actors might be reined in.

So it’s a double-edged sword—quite literally—in terms of how this foreign policy could shape the region.

In your view, how does the militarization of politics via militias such as The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) reflect populist strategies of political mobilization in the Middle East, especially in terms of bypassing traditional democratic institutions and appealing to ‘the people’?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: The PMU is really a broad body of militias. A good number of them first emerged to resist the US occupation of Iraq. Initially, I don’t think it was about bypassing democratic institutions. Many were mobilized because Ayatollah Sistani was able to rally the masses in response to the ISIS threat.

The way they later contributed to undermining institutions in Iraq was by becoming a parallel force to the Iraqi military, and eventually by playing a role against the protests that called for better governance and technocratic rule.

So it’s complicated. The Popular Mobilization Units emerged in response to the occupation, later served as Iranian proxies, then fought against ISIS, and eventually remained as a force that prevented the Iraqi military from maintaining a monopoly on violence—borrowing from Max Weber’s concept.

Again, we’re at an inflection point. I think it all hinges on a potential deal with Iran: whether these militias will be reined in and subsumed into the army or the security sector, or whether they will continue to act as spoilers to Iraq’s post-conflict governance structure.

When the State Fails, Militias Become the Security Provider

Mahdi Scouts boys during a funeral ceremony in Jannata, southern Lebanon, on February 9, 2017, for a Hezbollah military commander killed in the Syrian war.
Photo: Nabil Kassir.

Considering your work on COVID-19 and militia reinvention, how do crises (like pandemics or conflicts) serve as opportunities for populist-authoritarian actors in the Middle East to entrench power under the guise of serving ‘the people’—and how might this intensify under a second Trump presidency?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Take the case of the pandemic—and I’ll give you an example closer to home, where I am in San Diego. When COVID hit Mexico, you had drug cartels, like those formerly under Guzmán (El Chapo), distributing medical kits—such as masks and water—to people affected by COVID-19. In other words, when the Mexican security sector failed and the health sector also failed, these non-state actors filled the void. They became both the security and health sectors.

That’s exactly what happened with COVID-19 in the Middle East—in places like Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq. It was the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the Shia militias that were disinfecting public spaces, distributing masks, and so on. What these places have in common is the collapse of the security sector. As Max Weber said, when the state no longer holds a legitimate monopoly on violence, non-state actors step in and become both the security and health providers.

This is ultimately an indictment of the weak health sectors in those societies. But the weak health sector is a reflection of a weak security sector—you don’t have an army capable of enforcing the state’s monopoly on violence. When the state is unable to provide basic services—what we call biopower, the ability to keep the population alive—you get necropolitics instead. That’s when the state is too weak to deliver health services, and violent non-state actors—cartels or militias—step in to fill the void.

How do Middle Eastern regimes employ especially Islamist populist rhetoric domestically to justify authoritarian practices, especially in an international environment increasingly tolerant of illiberal governance?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Islamist rhetoric is by definition an attempt to mobilize the masses through faith. When governance fails, you turn to divine governance to justify authority and appeal to the imagination. That’s how I would see it. It’s similar to using anti-colonial rhetoric—it’s more or less an appeal to the masses. When the public has very little faith in the structures that govern them, this is where Islamist rhetoric steps in to fill the gap.

Every Power Is Backing Proxies—Democracy Is No Longer the Goal

What role do you foresee for regional actors (such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey) playing in either reinforcing authoritarianism or providing openings for democratic movements under these new global conditions?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: You know, in that regional mix, I would also add Israel—and this is a post-October 7th development. I’ll tell you why. In 2011, during the Arab Spring, for the first time in the region’s history, the US more or less refrained from intervening in the fate of regimes. It allowed the regime of Hosni Mubarak, a longtime ally, to fall. In that vacuum, Saudi Arabia and Iran engaged in a regional cold war, with Turkey also entering the mix. It became, in effect, a three-way conflict.

What followed was a regional cold war accompanied by counter-revolutionary dynamics. One of those counter-revolutionary tendencies eventually prevailed. Turkey, Iran, and Saudi Arabia each chose sides—supporting different counter-revolutionary or revisionist forces. These rivalries played out through proxy conflicts.

Now, after October 7th, Israel has entered the fray.

So the region today looks very different from the era of Arab Spring optimism. Every major power is backing proxies to serve its own interests. And this is especially evident in Syria.

If you want to understand how four actors are shaping Syria’s future: Turkey is deeply invested in the current Syrian government; Israel is working to expand its presence; Saudi Arabia is wiping away Syria’s debts; and Iran is trying to preserve the influence it has lost. None of these four powers are interested in a transition to democratic governance in Syria. All are focused on maintaining their respective spheres of influence. In that sense, each is likely to reinforce autocratic tendencies. They are more inclined to back warlords as proxies than to support any meaningful democratic transition.

Given the historical reliance of Middle Eastern authoritarian regimes on external patrons, how might a US foreign policy under Trump 2.0 reshape alliances, especially with regimes facing internal legitimacy crises?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: I think the best case in point is how close the Trump administration was to Saudi Arabia. So it might try, in a second term, a strategy of offshore balancing—essentially carving out spheres of influence in a multipolar system and telling Saudi Arabia: “We’re not really concerned about your human rights issues, but you maintain order in the Gulf.”

The US would provide as many weapons as needed, and of course, Trump would say, “You have to pay for them,” to boost his standing domestically. But the message would be: it’s your job to be the policeman in the Gulf. That’s what I mean by offshore balancing.

The same approach would likely apply to Israel. That doesn’t bode well for the future of Palestinian governance, and Saudi Arabia would have little incentive to address human rights issues—as long as it continues to receive a blank check from Washington.

Authoritarianism Is Not Just Tolerated—The Masses Are Seen to Want It

Protest march in Beirut against Lebanon bombing by Israel. Photo: Sadık Gulec.

Could the erosion of liberal democratic norms in the West, accelerated by populist leaders like Trump, provide ideological “cover” for Middle Eastern populist-authoritarian leaders? How?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Absolutely—especially now that the US doesn’t even go through the motions of paying lip service to human rights.

From the perspective of international relations theory—specifically constructivism—a new norm has been constructed: not only can authoritarian governance be tolerated, but the masses actually want it. It’s no accident that the masses elected someone like Trump. Or, to go further, take the case of El Salvador—you have another kind of authoritarian-populist leader who is more or less aligned with the Trump administration’s approach.

And I think that’s become a model for the rest of the world. Regimes can now say: not only does the US want strongman leadership, but you—the people—want it too. Because a strong hand gets things done.

In what ways might regional populist movements exploit global discourses of “national sovereignty” and “anti-globalism,” championed by Trumpism, to consolidate authoritarian rule?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: When you talk about discourses and global dynamics, there’s an important element here called digital populism. All of this is enabled because politics now also occurs on a digital plane. More or less, digital platforms have become a way for authoritarian regimes to bypass traditional media structures and appeal directly to the masses—especially in cases where traditional media has not yet been fully co-opted by authoritarian leaders. So, to answer your question, digital populism is the key. It’s the mechanism through which these discourses become normalized and reach mass audiences.

Exclusion, Not Sectarianism, Is the Real Threat

Given the weakening of traditional international pressure for democratization, do you foresee populist movements in the Middle East mutating toward more overt forms of sectarianism, ethno-nationalism, or exclusionary politics?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: I would say more toward exclusionary politics. And here’s why: if we look at this in terms of ethno-sectarianism, I wonder if the region has been exhausted by those challenges. Let me explain what I mean. At one point, the so-called “axis of resistance” included Persian Twelver Shia Iran; Arab Twelver Shia militias in Iraq; an Arab Alawite regime in Syria; Arab Twelver Shia Hezbollah; Zaydi Shia Houthis in Yemen; and Arab Sunni Islamist groups like Islamic Jihad and Hamas. Of course, that axis of resistance has been dealt a very heavy blow in recent years. But the fact that such an ideologically diverse coalition could form makes me question whether the ethno-sectarian frame has been over-fetishized. There are other, more complex realities on the ground.

I think ethnic and sectarian identities are securitized—that is, they are instrumentalized when convenient for those in power, and then abandoned when such divisions no longer serve political interests. So, if that’s the case, I see the trajectory more in terms of exclusionary politics. Populism becomes a mask to mobilize the masses—but always at the expense of issue-based politics and inclusive governance. Those who are excluded often include civil society actors, journalists, and ethnic minorities, for example.

In a context where Western powers show declining interest in promoting democracy abroad, is there still space for bottom-up democratization efforts in the Middle East, or are we entering a phase of entrenched authoritarianism?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: I don’t think they’re mutually exclusive. We are indeed facing entrenched authoritarianism, but I would also say—thinking back to digital populism—that if authoritarianism is being entrenched through digital means, then perhaps bottom-up approaches can also survive through digital spaces.

I’m thinking, for example, of the digital hacktivist collective Anonymous. During the Arab Spring, when various regimes tried to crush protests, Anonymous hacked into state systems in support of the protesters. That’s just one example.

Because, of course, ideas can’t be killed, right? And the one sphere that hasn’t been fully subsumed by the state is still the digital realm. I think that’s where these democratic ideas and efforts can continue to exist.

Does that necessarily translate into on-the-ground resistance? That has yet to be seen. But at this particular inflection point, I believe that’s where the ideas will, at the very least, find refuge.

If Silence Is Spreading in the US, Imagine How Much Worse It Is in the Middle East

And finally, Professor Al-Marashi, considering the weakening of global democratic norms, how can civil society actors in the Middle East adapt their strategies for resistance and survival amid a more authoritarian-friendly international environment?

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Marashi: Again, I refer to my previous answer. I think, at the end of the day, these groups might survive digitally. They’ll be able to organize online. But to be honest, if you look at how the region has been transformed since 2011, it does not look good. So many of these actors are barely surviving.

At the end of the day, the ideas might persist—through digital activism, through art, through artivism.

But I’m speaking from the US, where even here, the ability to speak openly—on campuses, for example—is being threatened. If I can sense a wave of silence coming here, I can only imagine how much worse it must be in the Middle East.

Social Media

How Identity Shapes Perception in a Polarized World: Insights from an Online Survey Experiment with AI-Enhanced Media

by AuthoritarianismCommentariesDigital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHome

Who do people trust in politics, and why? Our online survey experiment reveals that trust and credibility are driven less by emotional victimization narratives and more by partisanship. Political messages resonate most when they align with the audience’s ideological beliefs, overshadowing the impact of emotional appeals. These findings highlight the power of identity in shaping perceptions and the challenges of bridging partisan divides in today’s polarized landscape. Tailored messaging that speaks to shared values remains key to building trust and engagement.

By  Ihsan Yilmaz, Ana-Maria Bliuc & Daniel S. Courtney*  

Introduction: A New Battleground for Ideas

In today’s hyperconnected world, the arena of political debate has shifted from parliaments and rallies to the digital stage of social media. Here, every post has the potential to build trust or spark outrage, amplifying voices and emotions in ways that redefine public discourse (Huszár et al., 2021; Yarchi et al., 2020). Our study examines this dynamic space, exploring how political affiliation and narratives of victimhood shape perceptions of credibility and emotional engagement.

At the heart of this research lies a fundamental question: “How do people decide whom to trust?” Furthermore, we ask, “How do identity and emotion shape these judgments?” To explore these questions, we conducted an experiment that reflects the digital realities of political communication. Using AI-generated posts, participants were exposed to messages from representatives of two ideologically distinct UK political parties: the right-wing populist Reform UK and the progressive Green Party. Some posts portrayed the communicators as victims of political persecution, while others focused solely on party platforms. By combining new technology with real-world political dynamics, the study examines the intersection of emotion, trust, and identity. As social media increasingly becomes the dominant arena for political persuasion (De Zúñiga et al., 2022a, 2022b), understanding how these factors influence public opinion is essential for addressing the challenges of modern democracy.

The Online Survey Experiment

Imagine scrolling through your social media feed, where political messages compete for attention amid a sea of hashtags and soundbites. This study aimed to replicate that environment by exposing participants to custom-designed posts that mirrored the type of content people encounter daily on platforms like X. After engaging with these posts, participants provided their reactions through a survey, enabling us to measure two critical factors: the extent to which they trusted the messages and their emotional responses.

The experiment was designed to explore the relationship between political affiliation and emotional appeals. To achieve this, we introduced a fictional candidate representing either the Green Party or Reform UK. The fictional candidate either portrayed themselves as a victim of political persecution or focused solely on communicating their party’s agenda, avoiding any mention of personal hardship. This deliberate design allowed us to investigate how the intersection of identity politics, emotional narratives, and party alignment shapes perceptions of trust and credibility in the digital age.

By simulating the dynamics of online political discourse, the study offers insights into how emotional and ideological cues influence the way people perceive and engage with political messaging. In a world where social media serves as the primary battleground for political persuasion, understanding these mechanisms is more critical than ever.

Trust and Emotions in A Polarized World

In the polarized world of politics, trust and credibility are often elusive goals. Our preliminary findings offer intriguing insights into what makes political messages resonate—or fail—depending on the audience. Messages framed as coming from a Green Party candidate consistently inspired higher trust and credibility compared to those attributed to a Reform UK candidate, particularly among our predominantly left-leaning sample. This trend held true regardless of whether victimization narratives were employed. In essence, partisanship outweighs narrative.

Interestingly, our findings suggest that victimization narratives—often a powerful emotional tool in political rhetoric—didn’t significantly influence trust or credibility within the same political frame. Instead, political ideology appears to be an effective barrier to rhetorical strategy, lending credence to the idea of partisans being stuck in echo-chambers, preventing them from accepting opposing messages.

But there’s another layer to this story: political alignment. For left-leaning individuals, the Green Party’s message was consistently rated as more trustworthy and credible than Reform UK’s, across all scenarios. On the other hand, right-leaning individuals were less swayed by the policy frame, though they showed a slight preference for Reform when victimization narratives were included. This dynamic highlights how deeply our ideological beliefs shape the way we perceive political communication, with certain rhetorical strategies being effective for some but not others.

These findings carry a potentially important lesson for political strategists and communicators. Tailoring messages to match the values and priorities of a target audience is not just effective—it’s essential. While the Green Party’s approach seemed to appeal broadly, Reform struggled to build credibility, especially among left-leaning individuals. Furthermore, it seems that relying on victimization narratives alone may not be enough to shift perception among those not already susceptible to such rhetoric. Ultimately, it’s more likely that the strength of the policy message and its alignment with the audience’s worldview could make the real difference.

These preliminary findings are interesting because they remind us that politics isn’t just about policies; it’s about people. To win trust and build credibility, politicians need to understand the hearts and minds of those they seek to persuade. And that means crafting messages that resonate not only with their base but with the broader public.

Implications for Politics and Polarization

In an era of deepening political divides, understanding the dynamics of trust and credibility in communication is essential. This study highlights a key insight: the identity of the messenger often outweighs the content of the message. For political actors, this reality carries significant implications, particularly in creating narratives that resonate across ideological lines.

Reassessing Victimhood Narratives

While victimhood is often portrayed as a powerful rhetorical device (Armaly & Enders, 2021; Hronešová & Kreiss, 2024), this research suggests that its impact on trust and credibility may be overstated, particularly when the core message lacks alignment with the audience’s values. Although victimization can evoke empathy, it is not a panacea for overcoming ideological divides. Rather than relying on emotional appeals, politicians must recognise that the framing of their policies—and their alignment with the audience’s worldview and expectations—plays a far more critical role in shaping (positive) perceptions.

The Polarizing Force of Echo Chambers

The findings also bring to attention the risks of echo chambers. People are far more likely to trust narratives that align with their political affiliations, reinforcing a selective feedback loop that limits exposure to diverse perspectives. This dynamic can deepen polarisation, narrowing opportunities for meaningful dialogue (Bliuc et al., 2024). As trust becomes a partisan commodity, the gap between ideological groups grows, making it increasingly difficult to foster a shared sense of reality.

The Emotional Costs of Division

The emotional divide between ideological camps is another sobering takeaway. Messages from one’s political in-group are often met with admiration and pride, while those from the out-group trigger anger and distrust. This emotional schism exacerbates societal divisions, perpetuating cycles of antagonism (Harteveld, 202; Whitt et al., 2020). Over time, these entrenched emotional responses weaken the potential for compromise, dialogue, and understanding.

A Broader Context of Political Messaging

Beyond immediate political debates, the study hints at broader social trends, including the role of nostalgia and perceived cultural threats. Those who feel their heritage or values are under siege may be particularly vulnerable to messaging framed around urgency or loss. In this context, the study shows a troubling tendency in modern politics: the weaponization of emotion (see also Hidalgo-Tenorio & Benítez-Castro, 2021). When political narratives prioritize emotional impact over substantive discussion, the space for genuine policy debate diminishes.

Concluding Remarks: Toward a Healthier Democracy

If we are to support a more informed and less polarized democracy, we must move beyond strategies that merely stoke division. This begins with critical media literacy: citizens must learn to question not only the content of political messages but also the emotional appeals embedded within them. For political leaders, the challenge lies in promoting narratives that resonate without exploiting emotions or deepening divides. Authenticity, truthfulness, and a commitment to civil disagreement should guide political communication.

Overall, political narratives are likely to achieve their greatest impact when they resonate strongly with a partisan audience by aligning with its values, beliefs, and identity. Such tailored appeals foster emotional engagement and reinforce shared purpose among supporters. Without this initial alignment, narratives will likely fail to mobilize the base or sustain its commitment.

At its heart, this research reflects an increasing complexity of the relationship between emotion, trust, and political identity. It reminds us that our perceptions of credibility are shaped as much by how we feel as by what we hear. To navigate the volatile waters of modern politics, we must prioritize intellectual humility and create spaces for open dialogue. Only by bridging ideological divides can we build a society where trust transcends partisan loyalties, paving the way for a more inclusive and informed democracy.

 

Funding: This work was supported by the Australian Research Council [ARC] under Discovery Grant [DP220100829], Religious Populism, Emotions and Political Mobilisation and ARC [DP230100257] Civilisationist Mobilisation, Digital Technologies and Social Cohesion and Gerda Henkel Foundation, AZ 01/TG/21, Emerging Digital Technologies and the Future of Democracy in the Muslim World.

 

(*) Daniel Sebastian Courtney is a PhD candidate in Psychology at the University of Dundee, focusing on the impact of publicly sharing opinions on overconfidence. His research interests include social media behavior, conspiracy ideation, misinformation, polarization, and nationalism. He holds an MSc in Developmental Psychology from the University of Dundee, with a dissertation on nonlinguistic context effects on reading times in social media posts, and an MA in Applied Linguistics from the University of Birmingham, where he explored metaphor and metonymy in English and Japanese. Courtney has published on vaccine hesitancy and collective action, and has extensive teaching experience in psychology and English, including positions at Meiji Gakuin, Sophia, Obirin, and Josai International universities in Japan.

References

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Bliuc, A. M., Betts, J. M., Vergani, M., Bouguettaya, A., & Cristea, M. (2024). A theoretical framework for polarization as the gradual fragmentation of a divided society. Communications Psychology, 2(1), 75. https://doi.org/10.1038/s44271-024-00125-1

De Zúñiga, H., González-González, P., & Goyanes, M. (2022a). Pathways to Political Persuasion: Linking Online, Social Media, and Fake News With Political Attitude Change Through Political Discussion. American Behavioral Scientist.https://doi.org/10.1177/00027642221118272.

De Zúñiga, H., Marné, H., & Carty, E. (2022b). Abating Dissonant Public Spheres: Exploring the Effects of Affective, Ideological and Perceived Societal Political Polarization on Social Media Political Persuasion. Political Communication, 40, 327 – 345. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2022.2139310.

Harteveld, E. (2021). Fragmented foes: Affective polarization in the multiparty context of the Netherlands. Electoral Studies. https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ELECTSTUD.2021.102332.

Hidalgo-Tenorio, E., & Benítez-Castro, M. (2021). Trump’s populist discourse and affective politics, or on how to move ‘the People’ through emotion. Globalisation, Societies and Education, 20, 86 – 109. https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2020.1861540.

Hronešová, J., & Kreiss, D. (2024). Strategically Hijacking Victimhood: A Political Communication Strategy in the Discourse of Viktor Orbán and Donald Trump. Perspectives on Politics. https://doi.org/10.1017/s1537592724000239.

Husz’ar, F., Ktena, S., O’Brien, C., Belli, L., Schlaikjer, A., & Hardt, M. (2021). Algorithmic amplification of politics on Twitter. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 119. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2025334119.

Whitt, S., Yanus, A., Mcdonald, B., Graeber, J., Setzler, M., Ballingrud, G., & Kifer, M. (2020). Tribalism in America: Behavioral Experiments on Affective Polarization in the Trump Era. Journal of Experimental Political Science, 8, 247 – 259. https://doi.org/10.1017/XPS.2020.29.

Yarchi, M., Baden, C., & Kligler-Vilenchik, N. (2020). Political Polarization on the Digital Sphere: A Cross-platform, Over-time Analysis of Interactional, Positional, and Affective Polarization on Social Media. Political Communication, 38, 98 – 139. https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2020.1785067.

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We, as ECPS, are excited to share the videos of thought-provoking sessions from the International Conference on Populisms, Digital Technologies, and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia, hosted by Deakin University in collaboration with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Universitas Indonesia, and Universitas Gadjah Mada. This event, funded by the generous support of the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization (ADI), and ECPS, offers invaluable insights into Indonesia’s dynamic political landscape following its multi-level elections.

Held at the Alfred Deakin Institute, the conference provided a platform to discuss the evolving roles of populism, digital technology, AI, disinformation, religion, and socio-political forces shaping Indonesia’s democratic discourse. Over two engaging days, 31 papers were presented across eight panels, each diving into specific aspects of populism—from Gender and Youth to the impacts of Sharp Power, Disinformation, and Cancel Culture, and from Populist Strategy and Communication to Authoritarianism and Islamist Populism.

The conference also featured keynote addresses from esteemed scholars, Professor Simon Tormey, an expert in populism theory, and Professor Vedi Hadiz, known for his work on Islamic populism in Indonesia, bringing depth and perspective to this vital topic.

Don’t miss the opportunity to engage with these groundbreaking discussions—watch the full conference videos, thanks to the support of ARC, ADI, and ECPS.

 

Welcoming Speech

By Dr. Fethi Mansouri (Deakin Distinguished Professor, the Founding Director of the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation at Deakin University, Australia.) 

 

Keynote Speech

“The Populism Puzzle – Sociological Approach,” by Dr. Simon Tormey (A Political Theorist and the Executive Dean of Arts and Education at Deakin University in Australia). 

 

Panel 1: Populism and Gender

 

Panel 2: Populist Strategy and Communication

 

Panel 3: Youth

 

Panel 4: Sharp Power, Disinformation, Cancel Culture

 

Panel 5: Authoritarianism

 

Panel 6: Populist Rhetoric

 

Panel 7: Digital Technologies, Algorithms, AI

 

Panel 8: Islamist Populism

 

Keynote Speech and Closing Remarks

Keynote by Professor Vedi R Hadiz (The Asia Institute, the University of Melbourne, Australia).

Donald Trump and Elon Musk on the X social media platform. Photo: Rokas Tenys.

Professor Nownes: Ceding Too Much Power to Tech Giants Poses a Threat to Democracy

by Digital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Highlighting Elon Musk’s dual role as a private tech mogul and a potential quasi-governmental leader under elected US President Donald Trump, Professor Anthony J. Nownes underscored the dangers of unregulated private power intersecting with public institutions. He emphasized that ceding excessive power to any private interest—whether in the tech industry or another sector—poses a significant threat to democracy. Illustrating this concern, Professor Nownes pointed to the proposed “Doge Department,” noting, “Unlike actual government departments with conflict-of-interest rules, such private entities lack safeguards, making them a potential avenue for unchecked influence over public resources.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In an illuminating discussion with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Professor Anthony J. Nownes, a political science expert from the University of Tennessee and co-author of the book titled The New Entrepreneurial Advocacy -Silicon Valley Elites in American Politics, offered his insights on the growing influence of tech elites and its implications for democracy. Centering on the theme of the delicate balance between private power and public accountability, Professor Nownes emphasized a pressing concern: “Ceding too much power to any private interest—whether the tech industry or any other sector—poses a threat to democracy.”

Highlighting Elon Musk’s dual role as a private tech mogul and a potential quasi-governmental leader under elected US President Donald Trump, Professor Nownes pointed out the dangers of unregulated private power intersecting with public institutions. He explained, for instance, the risks of the proposed “Doge Department” (or Department of Government Efficiency), stating that “unlike actual government departments with conflict-of-interest rules, such private entities lack safeguards, making them a potential avenue for unchecked influence over public resources.”

Turning to the broader historical context, Professor Nownes compared today’s tech moguls to past industrial giants. While corporate influence is not a new phenomenon, he argued that the tech industry’s vast resources and rapid innovation—outpacing government regulation—make its impact unique. Using examples like Microsoft protecting Ukraine from cyberattacks and SpaceX ensuring Ukrainian connectivity, Professor Nownes highlighted how tech companies wield unprecedented power over geopolitical and societal outcomes.

On the issue of lobbying and political advocacy, Professor Nownes delved into the disproportionate focus of Silicon Valley philanthropy on post-material causes, such as environmental conservation and DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion), rather than structural inequalities. He warned that this prioritization risks sidelining critical issues like income inequality and homelessness, leaving a vacuum often filled by populists like Donald Trump, who, while lacking substantive solutions, at least address these concerns rhetorically.

Professor Nownes also discussed the erosion of public trust in tech companies, exacerbated by scandals such as Cambridge Analytica. Referencing a Pew study that found 78% of Americans believe social media companies wield too much political power, he noted that despite this skepticism, tech giants have not yet faced significant political or economic repercussions. However, he foresees this changing, particularly as ethical considerations—such as the negative effects of social media on children—gain political traction.

Professor Nownes also addressed the future of American democracy under a second Trump administration. While cautiously optimistic about its survival, he acknowledged the erosion of democratic norms and the slow response of legal institutions to recent challenges. His reflections offer a sobering reminder of the delicate equilibrium between private power and public accountability, as well as the need for vigilance in preserving democratic principles in the face of rapid technological and political change.

Professor Anthony J. Nownes is a political science expert from the University of Tennessee and co-author of the book titled The New Entrepreneurial Advocacy – Silicon Valley Elites in American Politics.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Anthony J. Nownes with some edits.

Tech Titans Shape Public Discourse by Spotlighting Key Issues

Professor Nownes, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How do you view the growing influence of tech elites in shaping political agendas? Are they effectively becoming a new form of political aristocracy? How has the concentration of economic power among tech giants influenced the balance of political power in the United States? Could you discuss whether their dominance undermines or enhances democratic institutions?

Professor Anthony J. Nownes: First of all, thank you for having me here today. I appreciate the opportunity. I’m glad you phrased the first part of your question the way you did, focusing on agendas rather than policy outcomes. This distinction is important. There’s no question that tech elites shape the political agenda. Let’s start with Elon Musk. He’s the wealthiest man on earth and commands significant media attention for almost anything he does. Beyond that, his direct involvement in media platforms like Twitter—now X—and others like Instagram amplifies his influence. His posts, or whatever they’re called now, and his public statements certainly affect which issues people think about.

This doesn’t necessarily mean people agree with him, but it does mean they see what he says and often recognize the issues he highlights as important. Elon Musk is not alone in this regard. Other tech elites—Mark Zuckerberg, Reid Hoffman, Tim Cook, and many others—also have massive social media followings. While they may not always achieve their desired policy outcomes, there’s no doubt that the issues they publicly engage with are those that garner significant public attention. In this way, they have considerable success in shaping the political agenda.

Now, regarding the second part of your question about the concentration of economic power, these are, of course, challenging questions to answer definitively. Speaking both as a scholar and a citizen, I would argue that whenever the government cedes too much power to private actors, it risks undermining democracy. The government should and must work with private actors—after all, in a capitalist system, the economy’s health depends largely on the private sector’s vitality. But the government has its own role here, and at least theoretically, that role is to look out for the rest of us. I believe that ceding too much power to any private interest—whether the tech industry or any other sector—poses a threat to democracy. To demonstrate this, let me highlight some of the perils of granting excessive power to private actors.

Take, for example, the so-called “Doge Department.” You may not be familiar with this, but it’s the quasi-governmental body Donald Trump has claimed he has already begun forming. Officially called the Department of Government Efficiency (I use air quotes because it’s not actually a government department), it’s essentially a quasi-governmental—or really, a non-governmental—organization. Trump has reportedly chosen Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy to head it, with the stated goal of making the government more efficient.

Real government institutions, agencies, and bureaucratic departments operate under strict rules and regulations. These rules dictate who they can hire, what sorts of behavior are and are not allowed in the workplace, the qualifications required for employment, and, crucially, who the department is accountable to.

Now, imagine this organization gets up and running. Suppose, within six months, Trump grants it actual power. There would be little to stop someone like Elon Musk from making decisions that, for example, ensure his companies receive lucrative government contracts while his competitors do not. Unlike actual government departments, which have conflict-of-interest rules and similar safeguards, a private, non-governmental organization like this lacks such mechanisms.

This is one of the clearest examples of what could go wrong when excessive power is given to private actors within a democratic system. It underscores the importance of maintaining strict oversight and clear boundaries between public institutions and private entities to preserve the integrity of democratic governance.

Power of Tech Giants Today Is Unprecedented Compared to Past Corporate Interests

Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg in Press conference at VIVA Technology (Vivatech) the world’s rendezvous for startup and leaders in Paris, France on on May 24, 2018. Photo:
Frederic Legrand.

Looking at the historical relationship between corporate power and politics, how does the role of hi-tech oligarchs compare to past industrial moguls in shaping American political landscapes? Is this a continuation of corporate influence, or does the unique nature of digital platforms present new challenges?

Professor Anthony J. Nownes: For the first part of your question, I’d like to preface my response by acknowledging that I’m not a historian, so I hesitate to draw extensive comparisons between current tech oligarchs and past industries in American politics. That said, it’s certainly not unprecedented for a powerful industry to wield significant influence over political outcomes in this country. 

For instance, every school kid in the US learns about the robber barons of the Gilded Age. Additionally, the tobacco industry wielded extraordinary political power for decades, successfully staving off serious regulation of tobacco products. Throughout US history, doctors, the insurance industry, and other healthcare providers have collectively spent immense amounts of money lobbying against socialized medicine, with considerable success. So, corporate influence in politics is nothing new—it has been a feature of the American Republic from its very beginning.

However, I think it’s worth noting that the tech industry is different in several respects from previous industries that wielded political power. One key difference is the almost unfathomable resources these companies possess. As an industry and even at the individual company level, tech entities have significantly more wealth and resources than many nation-states. This is unprecedented.

Another difference is the rapid pace of innovation within the tech industry, which often outpaces the ability of governments and regulatory agencies to keep up. For example, SpaceX is currently more capable than the US government when it comes to space exploration. Similarly, Alphabet (Google) is far ahead of the US government—and likely any other government—in developing and deploying artificial intelligence. This gives tech companies tremendous influence over our lives, even if that influence is not overtly political.

I believe the rise of the tech industry introduces challenges that are different from those posed by previous corporate powers—some of which we may not even fully understand yet. For instance, consider the war in Ukraine. Tech companies are not directly involved in the conflict, yet they are significantly affecting events on the ground. Microsoft, for example, protects Ukraine from cyberattacks. SpaceX ensures that Ukrainians remain connected to the Internet. I recently read that Google has removed images of Ukraine from its open-source maps. These actions, while not traditionally political, have a profound impact on real-world political and international events. In this sense, the power of the tech industry over people’s lives is unprecedented compared to the influence wielded by previous corporate interests. 

‘Leave Us Alone’ Ethos Shapes Platforms and Policies

How do hi-tech firms’ lobbying activities compare to other industries in terms of expenditure and focus? Specifically, what does the dominance of issues like taxes, intellectual property, and technology indicate about their priorities in shaping US policy? How does this concentrated influence by a few tech giants affect policymaking transparency and public interest considerations?

Professor Anthony J. Nownes: I certainly understand why both the media and ordinary people are focusing on tech lobbying and the political influence of big tech. However, I think it’s important to recognize that the tech industry is just one of many industries in this country that spend hundreds of millions of dollars every year attempting to influence policy and elections.

There are other perennial heavyweight industries that spend on a similar scale to the tech industry. For example, the pharmaceutical industry, the health insurance industry, securities and investment companies, and the oil and gas industry are all highly politically active and spend significant sums. In that sense, the tech industry is not fundamentally different from other high-profile, politically active industries.

As for your final question, I found it interesting the way you phrased it. I study what we call public interest groups or non-governmental organizations in this country, which are comprised of individual members. At this point, there simply aren’t many public interest groups—or what we might also call citizen groups—working on the opposite side of the issues that big tech is pushing.

In many other industries, there are countervailing groups. For instance, in the oil and gas industry, there are hundreds of environmental groups in the United States. While they don’t have the same resources as oil and gas companies, they’ve managed to achieve a number of political victories over the past several decades. Similarly, healthcare and pharmaceutical companies often contend with public interest groups—especially senior citizen organizations—that lobby against them on issues like the cost of prescription drugs and government programs. Currently, I don’t see many public interest groups or citizen groups actively working to counterbalance the power of big tech. This, I believe, is another way in which this corporate sector is somewhat unusual.

What role do tech oligarchs play in shaping public discourse, and how do their personal ideologies influence the policies and practices of their platforms? Are we witnessing a new form of political lobbying through algorithmic curation and platform management?

Professor Anthony Nownes: This question seems almost perfectly shaped to refer to Elon Musk. Certainly, his personal ideology seems to affect every aspect of his newest company, X. I think there’s an element of this influence among other tech moguls as well.

It’s a cliché, but I believe it’s accurate to say that many of these individuals, even those who have traditionally supported center-left or left causes and the Democratic Party, are at their core economic libertarians. They are libertarians on social issues as well, but their general ethos of “leave us alone and let us do what we want” seems to permeate how they run their companies. I’m particularly thinking here of platforms like Facebook, Instagram, YouTube, and X. It doesn’t take much time spent on these platforms to realize that a fairly libertarian ethos influences what happens on them.

As for your second question, I’m not entirely sure I know enough about algorithms and platform management to say much definitively. However, I can say this: it seems to me that the conservative criticism these companies faced during the first Trump administration did affect some of their practices. For example, this criticism likely influenced content moderation policies, decisions to label certain material as misinformation or disinformation, and determinations about who to platform and who to de-platform. So, I do think there is some evidence that algorithmic curation and platform management are having political effects.

Social Media Companies Contribute Significantly to Misinformation Epidemic

Given the rise of misinformation and polarization on social media platforms, do you believe tech companies bear responsibility for mitigating these issues, or should this be addressed through government regulation? How do we balance such regulation with the principles of free speech? 

Professor Anthony J. Nownes: I’m not sure this is exactly how the question was intended—but I’ll answer it this way regardless, more as a citizen than as a scholar. Social media companies absolutely bear some responsibility for the explosion of misinformation and disinformation in this country. Of course, they don’t see it that way, but I think the evidence is overwhelming that they have contributed significantly to the epidemic of misinformation and disinformation in the US and elsewhere.

No matter how one feels about government regulation, it seems to me that there’s really only one entity in this country large enough, powerful enough, and well-resourced enough to rein in these companies: the federal government. The EU, of course, also has the capacity to impose regulations. However, these companies have shown very little commitment to addressing misinformation and disinformation on their own, so I see the idea of self-regulation as a bit of a nonstarter.

As for the free speech aspect of the issue, I don’t think balancing regulation with free speech is particularly difficult. We already do it all the time in other domains—for example, with tobacco advertising. I think the free speech defense offered by social media companies to justify their conduct is, frankly, somewhat nonsensical. We regulate many things in society without infringing on people’s rights to express themselves or act within legal boundaries.

Do you think the political donations and lobbying efforts by Silicon Valley’s tech executives disproportionately sway policy outcomes? Are there examples where their influence has significantly impacted legislation or political campaigns? With federal campaign finance laws being described as “byzantine and ever-changing,” what challenges do these laws pose in regulating the contributions of tech leaders, and how can these challenges be addressed without infringing on free speech rights?

Professor Anthony J. Nownes: Before addressing this question directly, I want to point out something that may already be familiar to many of you: for those of us who study interest groups, corporate influence, or lobbying, determining influence is incredibly difficult. The primary reason is the old adage: correlation does not equal causation.

For example, in the US, we see the gun lobby making significant contributions to right-leaning politicians, who then work diligently to maintain access to firearms. However, this doesn’t necessarily prove influence because these politicians likely would have acted the same way without the gun lobby’s financial support. Indeed, that alignment is often why the gun lobby supports them in the first place. As a result, proving policy influence is challenging, and at best, we can make educated guesses based on available evidence.

That said, it’s clear to me that the tech industry, like many others, has been highly influential politically. One prominent example is the tech sector’s campaign to preserve Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. This legislation protects online platforms from being treated as publishers, granting them virtual legal immunity for content posted on their sites—a unique advantage in US law. Social media companies have invested significant time and resources at both the state and federal levels to ensure Section 230 remains intact.

Another notable example is Proposition 22 in California. Uber and Lyft spent substantial sums to secure their exemption from labor laws in one of the country’s most liberal states. Similarly, big tech firms, including Amazon, have successfully resisted legislation aimed at increasing transparency about how user data is utilized. On the individual level, tech leaders like Peter Thiel have played pivotal roles in the political ascendance of figures such as J.D. Vance.

As for the second part of your question about campaign finance laws, I think it’s essential for people to realize that campaign finance laws in this country, as they are currently configured, really can’t stop an individual or organization from pouring as much money as they want into our campaign finance system. Yes, there are regulations, and yes, these regulations can and do prevent the ultra-rich and well-resourced organizations from donating money directly to candidates for office. However, the way the laws are currently structured—and I don’t see this changing anytime soon—there is nothing the government or anyone else can do to stop a person or organization from spending unlimited sums of money to support candidates or parties they favor. 

For example, Elon Musk reportedly contributed something between $200 and $300 million to help Trump get elected. He’s not allowed to give that money directly to Trump, as the amount he can donate directly to a candidate is severely limited. But he is allowed to give that money to a Super PAC. In this case, he contributed to his own Super PAC, “America PAC.” All he had to do was hire one or two competent lawyers to ensure they followed the letter of the law, and there was nothing to stop him from funneling unlimited sums of money into the election. 

I see no evidence at all that either major political party has any appetite to change anything about the current system. As such, I view the question of regulating this kind of spending as rather moot. I do not see any significant reform in this area on the horizon.

Most People Are Getting All Their News from Podcasters

You discuss “super citizens” leveraging their wealth and public profiles to influence policy through media and social platforms. How do you see this form of direct advocacy evolving, especially with the growing influence of social media as an unmediated channel?

Professor Anthony J. Nownes: I’m not particularly skilled at predicting the future of politics, and I don’t feel I know enough about technology to provide a deeply insightful answer to this question. However, after reflecting on it, I can offer the following observation: One trend my co-author, Darren Halpin, and I have noted regarding the concept of “super citizens” is that an increasing number of people—particularly younger individuals, and especially younger men—are receiving all of their news, not just part of it, from individuals who are not traditionally part of the news industry. Figures like Joe Rogan and Theo Vaughn, for instance, are immensely popular podcasters who exemplify what we term prototypical super citizens. These individuals initially gained fame through non-political activities but now wield considerable political influence through their podcasts.

I think the extent to which people rely on these sources for news and information is somewhat underappreciated. As traditional or legacy media continues to decline in importance, and in some cases disappears altogether, I believe we’re going to see much more of this phenomenon. Unfortunately, as a result, disinformation and misinformation are likely to become even bigger problems moving forward.

Your book suggests that Silicon Valley philanthropy tends to favor postmaterial causes, such as environmental conservation and arts, over redistributive efforts that address economic inequality. What implications does this trend have for addressing structural inequalities in American society?

Professor Anthony J. Nownes: The first part of the question addresses disproportionate funding for certain issues. A good example here is education. Our research showed that Silicon Valley figures and their foundations have spent considerable amounts of money over the past couple of decades on what they call education reforms—initiatives such as charter schools, privatization, and voucher schemes. There’s substantial evidence that this advocacy, and in some cases direct funding, has influenced state policies and school districts across the United States. This demonstrates how Silicon Valley’s prioritization of certain issues over others can have significant impact, though it remains challenging to definitively prove causation.

Regarding the disproportionate focus on post-material issues, the implications are far-reaching. This emphasis on post-material causes means that critical problems in the US, such as income inequality, homelessness, underemployment, poverty, and inadequate access to healthcare, are not prioritized in political discourse. To be a liberal in the 1930s meant focusing on the day-to-day economic interests of ordinary people. Today, however, left-leaning Silicon Valley elites often concentrate on issues like abortion, DEI (Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion) programs, LGBTQ rights, and global warming. While these issues are undeniably important, this shift has left economic concerns largely to right-wing populists like Donald Trump.

Although Trump does not approach these issues with serious policy solutions, he, at least, acknowledges them, which resonates with voters. The center-left’s overwhelming focus on post-material issues has been disastrous for the working class and has, in part, enabled the rise of Trump and other MAGA Republicans.

Regarding current political tendencies, there’s no question that some high-profile tech figures—Elon Musk being a prime example—have aligned themselves with Trump and the right. Others, such as Mark Zuckerberg and Jeff Bezos, appear to have softened their rhetoric toward Trump, even if they may not have supported him outright. However, voting and campaign finance records suggest that Silicon Valley employees, including both rank-and-file workers and many executives, remain largely Democratic and liberal-leaning.

I think that some high-profile names have definitely turned toward Trump. However, I don’t believe they have changed that much. It’s politics that has changed significantly. For example, even though many Silicon Valley employees—particularly the rank-and-file employees—haven’t changed much in their political tendencies, they are certainly more silent than they were 8 or 10 years ago.

I think some of the rhetoric coming from the tech titans—the entrepreneurs, owners, and founders—stems from sheer pragmatism. They understand Trump as a political reality, and this time, they want to position themselves favorably. As for employees, they see how the world has changed and likely feel there’s little reason to engage in protests, as it probably wouldn’t make a significant difference. Additionally, such actions could potentially get them into trouble at work. So, that was a bit of a rambling answer, but that’s my perspective.

People Believe Social Media Companies Wield Too Much Political Power

Elon Musk, founder, CEO, and chief engineer of SpaceX; CEO of Tesla; CTO and chairman of X (formerly Twitter); and co-founder of Neuralink and OpenAI, at VIVA Technology (Vivatech) in Paris, France, on June 16, 2023. Photo: Frederic Legrand.

Given the discussion on the erosion of public trust in tech firms due to scandals like Cambridge Analytica, what role do you think transparency and ethical considerations should play in maintaining the political capital of these companies?

Professor Anthony J. Nownes: I think it’s quite interesting. Given how much influence tech companies wield and how closely Donald Trump has aligned himself with Elon Musk, public opinion polls in this country clearly show that the vast majority of Americans are skeptical or even negative about tech companies. For example, in my lobbying class, I reference a Pew study from earlier this year that revealed 78% of Americans believe social media companies wield too much political power. To me, this is an astonishing figure.

Despite this widespread skepticism, these companies haven’t yet paid a significant political or economic price. However, I believe this may be starting to change, potentially influenced by recent political shifts among some tech leaders. What do I mean by this? Over the past couple of years, somewhat quietly, multiple states in the US have passed age verification laws for pornographic websites. While this development hasn’t garnered much media attention, I suspect social media companies are paying close attention. They may be wondering if similar regulations could soon target them, particularly given the growing discourse about the harmful effects of social media on children.

For instance, Jonathan Haidt’s highly successful book The Anxious Generation discusses these negative effects, particularly on children, and I think this conversation is beginning to permeate our political discourse. As a result, tech companies will likely need to start addressing the ethical considerations you mentioned. This growing dialogue and the precedent set by regulations on other industries might push tech companies to pay more attention to these issues in the near future.

And lastly, Professor Nownes, there are those pundits arguing that American democracy may not survive another Trump administration. How do you think American institutions will react to a second Trump administration?

Professor Anthony J. Nownes: Well, this is a tough question. For both professional and personal reasons, I’ll say this: Do I think American democracy will survive? Yes, I do. But what it will look like a few years from now? I honestly don’t know. I see some disturbing signs, particularly regarding democratic norms. Many of these norms have taken quite a hit over the last few years. The legal system, for example, has been quite slow in addressing certain actions, especially attempts by the president-elect to change the outcome of the last election. I think this remains an open question. I wish I had a more definitive answer, but at this point, I just don’t know.

Dr. Paul Levinson, Professor of Communication & Media Studies at Fordham University.

Professor Levinson: Elon Musk Must Choose Between Government Role and Control of X

by Digital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomeInterviews

Highlighting the dangers of overlapping corporate and governmental powers, Professor Paul Levinson cautioned, “I am deeply opposed to having the person who owns X also hold a high-ranking government position. That kind of overlap means the government could end up controlling communication platforms.” He elaborated on Musk’s ethical responsibility, stating that if Musk were a “true believer in free speech,” he would either divest from X or refuse a government post. However, Levinson expressed skepticism: “I think we both know he’s likely to do neither.” Levinson also voiced his deep concern for American democracy under a potential second Trump administration, describing it as “the worst threat to our democracy since the Civil War.”

Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

In a riveting interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Paul Levinson, Professor of Communication & Media Studies at Fordham University, discussed pressing concerns about the intersection of technology, politics, and democracy. Professor Levinson’s insights are especially timely, given Elon Musk’s rising influence as the owner of X (formerly Twitter) and his potential role in a second Trump administration. Highlighting the dangers of overlapping corporate and governmental powers, Professor Levinson cautioned, “I am deeply opposed to having the person who owns X also hold a high-ranking government position. That kind of overlap means the government could end up controlling communication platforms.”

Professor Levinson elaborated on Musk’s ethical responsibility, stating that if Musk were a “true believer in free speech,” he would either divest from X or refuse a government post. However, Professor Levinson expressed skepticism: “I think we both know he’s likely to do neither.”

Throughout the interview, Professor Levinson addressed the broader implications of concentrated power in technology. Despite concerns about billionaires like Musk or the owners of Facebook, Levinson pointed out that their influence has not yet stifled democratic impulses. “Social media provides a unique platform for individuals to disseminate the truth widely, even as it enables lies and fascism,” he noted, striking a balance in his evaluation.

On the issue of disinformation and algorithms, Professor Levinson argued that the negative impact of these technologies is often overstated. He acknowledged their role in targeted advertising, referencing Facebook’s data-sharing with Cambridge Analytica during the 2016 US election. However, he emphasized, “The blame lies not with the algorithms themselves but with the disinformation they are used to spread.”

Professor Levinson’s critique of governmental overreach was particularly sharp. Drawing historical parallels, he warned, “When governments gain such control, they can jeopardize democratic systems, even those that have existed for hundreds of years.” He cited the Thatcher administration’s suppression of unfavorable news during the Falklands War as a case study in the dangers of government-controlled communication.

Reflecting on Trump’s weaponization of “fake news,” Professor Levinson described it as a hallmark of fascism, akin to tactics used by Stalin and Hitler. He lamented, “It amazes me how many people have fallen for this tactic, despite the lessons we should have learned from history.”

Professor Levinson shared his deep concern for American democracy under a potential second Trump administration, describing it as “the worst threat to our democracy since the Civil War.” From absurd appointments to calculated assaults on institutions, Professor Levinson’s insights underline the precarious state of democratic governance in the digital age.

Here is the transcription of the interview with Professor Paul Levinson with some edits.

Democratic Impulses Persist Despite Billionaires’ Control Over Social Media

Illustration by Ulker Design.

Professor Levinson, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question. How do you perceive the influence of hi-tech oligarchs, such as Elon Musk, on the digital public sphere? Does the concentration of digital platforms in the hands of a few individuals pose a unique threat to democratic discourse? 

Professor Paul Levinson: Let me answer the second part of your question first. Everything new in communications can potentially threaten a democratic society. However, so far in our history—both the history of the United States and the history of democracies in general—new forms of communication have largely benefited democracy. In fact, they have often undermined dictatorships, autocracies, and oligarchies.

A notable example I often cite is the White Rose group in Germany during World War II. This courageous group of college students used a primitive Xerox machine to disseminate the truth about Nazi atrocities to the German public. Their efforts have always left a profound impression on me. Another example is from the final decade of the Soviet Union in the 1980s. There was something called Samizdat Video, a primitive video technology by today’s standards, but it was instrumental in undermining the autocracy of the Soviet regime, even under Gorbachev, who was probably the most enlightened Soviet leader.

With this historical perspective in mind, while I am always concerned about new technologies, I don’t believe social media presents an insurmountable threat to democracy. In fact, it cuts both ways. Social media enables lies, fascism, and the suppression of truth, which are central to fascistic systems. At the same time, social media provides a unique platform for individuals to disseminate the truth widely.

Now, regarding Elon Musk and other billionaires like those controlling Facebook, despite their unprecedented control over social media platforms, this has not yet prevented democratic impulses from finding expression through these platforms. 

The Negative Impact of Algorithms and AI Is Often Overrated

How do you address concerns about the unchecked power of tech companies to shape public discourse, especially when their decisions significantly influence political narratives? In what ways do algorithms on social media platforms amplify populist narratives, and how much responsibility should platform owners like Musk take for the political polarization these technologies can create?

Professor Paul Levinson: First, we’ve heard a lot about algorithms, and more recently, about AI. I think the negative impact of these technologies is often overrated. One area where algorithms have proven particularly effective is targeted advertising. This was evident during the 2016 election in the United States when Facebook provided Cambridge Analytica with detailed data about users—what they were sharing, liking, and discussing on the platform. This data allowed the Trump campaign—who, in this regard, were ahead of the Democrats in recognizing its potential—to tailor their ads to specific audiences. For instance, the ads weren’t wasted on someone like me, who wouldn’t have voted for Trump under any circumstances because I already understood him for what he was.

This approach overcame one of the limitations of traditional advertising, where ads are broadcast to a wide audience via television, newspapers, or billboards, with no way to ensure they reach the right people. A significant portion of the ad spend is wasted because many viewers or readers are not the intended target audience. Algorithms, on the other hand, allowed for precision targeting, which made advertising far more efficient in this context.

The use of such algorithms in 2016, which allowed Facebook to share user data, is something that should be and has been controlled to some extent in the United States by agencies like the Federal Trade Commission. Preventing social media platforms from selling user data is an important step, and it does not interfere with free speech or the First Amendment.

As for algorithms spreading disinformation, the blame lies not with the algorithms themselves but with the disinformation they are used to disseminate. This raises the question of what can and should be done about disinformation on platforms like Twitter—now known as X—and other social media outlets.

Let me introduce an important concept here. In the United States, the First Amendment has never been intended, nor can it be used, to protect criminal communication. For example, if a group uses social media to plan a bank robbery, kidnapping, or murder, that communication is not protected. The government has a vested interest in preventing crimes before they occur.

So, the question is, what are the algorithms spreading? If they are spreading deliberate lies—such as disinformation about COVID-19—that result in harm or death, I believe that constitutes a crime and must be stopped. However, if they are spreading statements like, “Oh, we love Donald Trump! He was such a great President,” even though I strongly disagree with that sentiment, it is still acceptable. That is simply a part of the democratic system.

Do you believe governments or international bodies should regulate hi-tech oligarchs to prevent potential misuse of their platforms for political manipulation? If so, what should such regulations prioritize?

Professor Paul Levinson: This is another central topic. The real question here is: which is worse—the enormous power held by corporations and oligarchs, or governments regulating them?

The reason I frame it this way is that Trump has repeatedly made it clear that, if he returns to office, he plans to target cable media, broadcast media, and social media platforms that, in his distorted view, are spreading lies about him. For Trump, anyone who criticizes him is accused of delivering fake news and lying. He’s essentially attempting to flip the narrative.

The critical difference between the power held by the government and that wielded by massive corporations or billionaires like Elon Musk is that the government controls the military. In my view, this is the most significant threat to democratic systems. Trump has also spoken about using the National Guard to break up protests and take other actions that represent substantial steps toward establishing a fascist state in the United States.

While I don’t like billionaires having so much power, what concerns me even more is the government having the ability to stop communication and prevent people from sharing their ideas—whether or not I agree with those ideas—in the public sphere for others to read and comment on.

Once the government starts regulating communication, it’s a very short step to punishing dissent, arresting people, and throwing them in jail—exactly what the Nazis did in the 1930s. That’s a road I’m deeply concerned about.

Counter Lies with Truth, Not Suppression

Illustration: Shutterstock.

Digital technologies have been tools for both democratic and populist movements. In your opinion, how can society harness these technologies to strengthen democratic values while mitigating their misuse by authoritarian populist leaders?

Professor Paul Levinson: This is a very long-standing issue. John Milton addressed it 400 years ago in his Areopagitica tract, where he argued for keeping the marketplace of ideas open. Milton believed that allowing both truth and falsity to exist in the same marketplace enables people to identify the truth and distinguish it from lies.

When you start regulating what can enter that marketplace, the government—or anyone trying to regulate it—could easily make a mistake or even deliberately suppress the truth while presenting it as false. This prevents people from making rational decisions. That, again, is what fascists do—they attempt to control the public sphere. By keeping the truth out of the public sphere, they can masquerade as truth-tellers while propagating lies.

Much more recently, here in the United States, one of the greatest Supreme Court justices in history, Louis Brandeis—so influential that a university in Massachusetts was named after him, Brandeis University—expressed a similar idea. Brandeis famously said that the best way to combat a lie is not to suppress it but to counter it with the truth. That’s how you destroy lies—by presenting the truth clearly and rationally.

Of course, some people are hopeless; no matter what you say, they won’t change their minds. But I’m an optimist and believe that most human beings are rational. Like John Milton and Louis Brandeis, I think the best way forward is to keep the marketplace of ideas as open as possible. This openness allows the truth to emerge and shine a light on the lies.

A Clear Line Must Be Drawn When Speech Leads to Criminal Activity or Endangers Lives

With Elon Musk’s vision of Twitter as a “public square” open to all opinions, how should social media platforms navigate the tension between upholding free speech and preventing the spread of harmful disinformation? How should actors like Musk balance their personal ideologies with their ethical responsibilities toward maintaining a fair and inclusive digital space?

Professor Paul Levinson: Well, again, the first question has to be addressed by considering whether the communication in question constitutes criminal activity. Are lives put in jeopardy because of such communication? If the answer is yes, then that communication should not be allowed on any platform.

The challenge, of course, lies in defining what constitutes criminal communication. Consider the example of Trump and the attack on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, which he incited after losing the 2020 election. Trump has since been indicted in multiple cases for criminal activity related to that attack. However, he maintains his innocence, and tragically, if he were to regain the presidency, he could potentially ensure that these cases are dismissed-a deeply unfortunate prospect.

That said, the Capitol attack was, in my view, unequivocally a criminal activity. The individuals involved were not patriots; they were part of a group that believed they could overturn the results of a democratically conducted election through violence, including threats to hang the Vice President for allowing the certification of electoral votes.

First, we must establish a consensus on what constitutes a crime. For example, during a pandemic that has already claimed millions of lives, deliberately spreading lies and deceiving the public about false cures is a clear case of criminal activity. In such instances, figures like Elon Musk have an ethical obligation to prevent this content from being shared on their platforms. If they fail to act, I believe the government has a duty to intervene to stop such harmful communication.

This brings us to the debate on the limits of free speech. Elon Musk presents himself as an absolutist regarding free speech, and we can certainly debate how far I or anyone else leans toward free speech absolutism. Personally, I draw a clear line when speech leads to criminal activity or endangers human lives. It is not difficult to identify such communications online, and when Musk fails to remove this kind of content, I believe he is culpable.

In such cases, the government—though certainly not under Trump, as he and Musk appear to be allies—has a responsibility to engage with Musk and press him to adopt more responsible policies.

Government Intervention in Communication Is Far More Dangerous

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump at a rally for then-VP nominee J.D. Vance in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

You argue that it’s concerning that tech executives can exercise so much power over who can use their platforms. But the alternative – government intervention – could be much worse. You argued this before Elon Musk was appointed to a significant post in the second Trump administration. Do you still think the same?

Professor Paul Levinson: Yes, because, as I mentioned, the government wields military power. While corporations can be problematic, and it is undeniably concerning for the richest person in the world to hold so much power that they can essentially do whatever they want—even if they lose millions of dollars and still remain the wealthiest—it is far more dangerous for the government to be involved in communication.

Let me give you another example of this—a relatively minor one, but still important. Some people may remember the Falklands War in the 1980s. Argentina wanted the United Kingdom to relinquish control of the Falkland Islands, which are located off Argentina’s coast. Understandably, Argentina questioned why the UK was still holding on to these islands, which they had seized during the colonial era.

At that time, Margaret Thatcher was the Prime Minister of the UK. She wanted to project toughness and refused to give up the islands, leading to war. The BBC, the British Broadcasting Corporation, unlike media systems in the United States, is not independent of the government. It is part of the British government, and naturally, it reported on the war.

One day, the Argentine forces inflicted significant damage on the British Expeditionary Force in the Falklands. The British government, under Thatcher, didn’t want the British public to know about this, fearing it would provoke public outrage. So, they instructed the BBC not to broadcast or report the news.

This demonstrates the immense power of governments, even in democracies like the United Kingdom. The government effectively told the nation’s primary broadcasting organization, “Don’t report that.” This is precisely the kind of government overreach that concerns me here in America and across Western democracies, where fascist tendencies have been gaining ground.

When governments gain such control, they can jeopardize democratic systems, even those that have existed for hundreds of years. This is why I continue to believe that government intervention in communication is far more dangerous than the unchecked power of tech executives.

Violating the Spirit of the First Amendment Is Not as Severe as Violating the First Amendment Itself

You declare yourself a First Amendment radical, i.e., a staunch supporter of the First Amendment, which says Congress shall make no law abridging free speech. Yet, you have supported Twitter’s ban on Donald Trump. Don’t you think there is a contradiction between these two positions? Where should the ethical line be drawn for social media platforms when balancing freedom of expression with the risk of harm caused by certain types of speech?

Professor Paul Levinson: First of all, I’d like to draw a distinction between the First Amendment itself and what I call the spirit of the First Amendment.

The First Amendment says, “Congress shall make no law abridging freedom of speech or the press.” Through the 14th Amendment, which was enacted after the Civil War in the 1800s, this prohibition on federal government interference with communication was extended to state governments and, in general, to municipalities, including cities. Over the years, the Supreme Court has correctly ruled that no government can interfere with communications—again, unless it involves some kind of criminal activity. That’s the First Amendment.

Now, let’s take an example like the Grammy Awards. These awards, given for the best music in a given year, are broadcast on American television stations like CBS. During a rap artist’s performance, where cursing and vulgarity are often part of the genre, viewers might hear bleeps censoring certain words. What’s happening there? CBS is bleeping those words because they fear their sponsors might object, or that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) might penalize them by refusing to renew their license.

For the record, I believe the FCC is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment—it’s a government agency that interferes with communication. Nevertheless, CBS’s actions, while cowardly in my opinion, do not violate the First Amendment. Instead, they violate the spirit of the First Amendment because CBS is not the government.

Similarly, when Elon Musk or, before him, the previous owners of Twitter banned Donald Trump from the platform, they were not acting as representatives of the government. In Trump’s case, his tweets were rightly perceived as contributing to the instigation of the attack on the Capitol in January 2021—a criminal activity. For this reason, I believe banning him from the platform was the correct decision. However, this action was taken by a private social media company, not the government. As such, while it may have violated the spirit of the First Amendment, it did not violate the First Amendment itself.

In general, my position is that the spirit of the First Amendment should be respected, as censorship is rarely beneficial. However, violating the spirit of the First Amendment is not as severe as violating the First Amendment itself.

To illustrate a clear violation of the First Amendment, consider when President Richard Nixon attempted to prevent The New York Times and The Washington Post from publishing the Pentagon Papers. Nixon argued that publishing the papers would undermine his war effort in Vietnam. Fortunately, the Supreme Court correctly ruled that such an action would violate the First Amendment and voted against Nixon, affirming that a US president cannot impose restrictions on what newspapers can publish. This case represents a classic and correct application of the First Amendment.

The Danger of Elon Musk Holding Power in Both Government and Social Media

Elon Musk, founder, CEO, and chief engineer of SpaceX; CEO of Tesla; CTO and chairman of X (formerly Twitter); and co-founder of Neuralink and OpenAI, at VIVA Technology (Vivatech) in Paris, France, on June 16, 2023. Photo: Frederic Legrand.

You suggest that market forces can effectively counterbalance the dominance of tech giants, as seen with Microsoft’s decline in influence. Do you believe similar market corrections are plausible for current tech behemoths like Twitter or Amazon, given their role as gatekeepers of global communication?

Professor Paul Levinson: Yes, I do. Let’s go back to what I was saying about Microsoft. This happened in the 1990s when Microsoft was at its peak, and Bill Gates was probably the richest man in the world. There was a lot of talk about breaking up Microsoft—claims that it had a monopoly, too large a market share, and that this dominance was unhealthy for the intellectual and economic well-being of the country.

Even back then, I said, “Take it easy.” The market will regulate itself; there’s no need to rush into breaking up the Microsoft corporate system. People were reacting to something that had only happened in the last year or two. I suggested we wait and see what would happen. Sure enough, by the late 1990s and into the 21st century, Microsoft’s influence had already started to decline, and new giants like Amazon were beginning to grow.

Once again, I am more concerned about the government regulating any communication system than I am about the damage caused by such systems. Consider Donald Trump returning to the White House—he’s already naming some of the bizarre people (and that’s putting it kindly) he plans to appoint to important positions in his cabinet and administration.

The last thing I want to see is a scenario where the government goes after MSNBC, an important progressive voice in cable television, or NBC as a whole, claiming they have too much power and must be broken up. That kind of government intervention poses a greater threat to democracy than allowing corporate systems to continue operating.

Now, I’m not saying I’m thrilled about the power Elon Musk holds. In fact, I need to emphasize this point: Trump has stated he wants to put Musk in charge of a new government agency tasked with making the government more efficient. While I’m all for making the government more efficient, I am deeply opposed to having the person who owns X (formerly Twitter) also hold a high-ranking government position. That kind of overlap means the government could end up controlling communication platforms.

As for Musk, I’m not overly concerned about most of the things he’s done so far. What does concern me is the idea of him simultaneously being a member of the new administration and maintaining his powerful position at X. If Musk were a true believer in free speech, he would either divest himself of X or refuse the government post. But I think we both know he’s likely to do neither.

Projection Is a Hallmark of Fascism

You argue that Donald Trump turned the concept of “fake news” into a tool to undermine legitimate media. What long-term impact do you think this has on public trust in journalism and the democratic process? 

Professor Paul Levinson: It’s already had a very negative effect, and it’s one of the worst things Donald Trump has done. I remember watching television back in January 2017, shortly after Trump had been elected president in the 2016 election. As president-elect, he was holding a news conference here in New York City. At the end of the conference, reporters raised their hands to ask questions.

A prominent CNN reporter, Jim Acosta, raised his hand, and Trump looked at him and said, “I’m not going to call on you. You’re with CNN, right? You’re fake news.” I remember thinking, “Wow, that’s a pretty clever thing Trump is trying to do.”

CNN was not spreading fake news in any way. It was truthfully reporting on things that made Trump look bad. For Trump, however, anything that embarrasses or criticizes him is automatically labeled as “fake news.” Whether the idea originated with Trump or one of his advisers, it’s a brilliant but dangerous way of undermining criticism.

This tactic reflects what Sigmund Freud called projection. When we look at the world and disagree with someone, we project our own intentions onto them, accusing them of doing what we plan to do. This, in turn, justifies actions against them. Projection is a hallmark of fascism. It’s something Hitler did. It’s something Stalin did. Stalin referred to the press as the “enemy of the people,” which is another favorite term of Trump. In Nazi Germany, during the 1930s, Joseph Goebbels popularized the term Lügenpresse, meaning “lying press”—essentially, fake news.

What amazes me is how many people have fallen for this tactic in 2024, and indeed, over the past decade, despite the lessons we should have learned from the 1930s. Unfortunately, it highlights just how ignorant many people are of history.

The Greatest Threat to American Democracy Since the Civil War

How do you think American people and American institutions will react to second Trump administration?

Professor Paul Levinson: I don’t know, and I have to tell you, I am deeply concerned. I think the United States of America is facing the worst threat to our democracy since the Civil War.

The election results obviously surprised and stunned a lot of people. I’ll just note, parenthetically, that once again, the polls were off. They predicted a razor-close race. While Trump didn’t win by a landslide, he did secure an impressive victory. Even here in New York State, where the Democrats won, they did so by a smaller margin than Joe Biden or even Hillary Clinton had achieved.

This election revealed a significant aspect of American life and I thought that many, including myself, didn’t fully recognize before the election. It’s a deeply troubling realization. As historians know, it’s not as though Germany had an autocratic system in place before Hitler’s rise to power. The Weimar Republic was actually a strong democracy with a robust constitution.

Fascism often doesn’t seize power through a coup d’état—though that can ultimately happen—but rather by undermining democratic systems and turning them against themselves. That’s what makes this such a deeply concerning time.

I’m an optimist, so I hope that the worst won’t happen. But at this point, it just remains to be seen.

Trump’s Appointments Are Not Just Concerning, They Border on Absurdity

Independent presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy introduced his running mate, Nicole Shanahan, during a campaign event in Oakland, California, on Tuesday, March 26, 2024. Photo: Maxim Elramsisy.

And lastly, Professor Levinson, there are those who are deeply concerned about the future of American democracy under a second Trump administration. Some argue that American democratic institutions may not survive. Where do you stand in this debate?

Professor Paul Levinson: Well, as I just said, I’m very worried. During Trump’s first administration, many of the people he appointed seemed to operate under the mistaken belief that, while Trump might be a little unhinged, they could keep him in check. They thought they knew what was right and would steer him accordingly. Trump’s response to that? He fired anyone who disagreed with him.

He famously dismissed James Comey, the FBI director, and Rex Tillerson, his Secretary of State. Trump became infamous for firing people, both in his presidency and on The Apprentice. This time around, however, he’s being much more calculated in his appointments.

The only person he has appointed so far who, in my view, is not completely unfit for the role is Marco Rubio, a senator from Florida who is now Secretary of State. While I don’t agree with Rubio’s policies, at least he’s not irrational. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for many of Trump’s other appointees.

For example, Matt Gaetz, recently appointed Attorney General, was until recently a member of the House of Representatives. He resigned to take this post despite being the subject of an investigation involving allegations of sex trafficking, including minors. The idea of someone with such a history holding the top legal position in the country is deeply troubling.

Then there’s Dr. Mehmet Oz. Yes, he’s an MD, but he hasn’t practiced medicine in years and is better known as a television personality. He’s been appointed to lead the CDC or a similar health organization—it’s hard to keep track.

Or take Robert F. Kennedy Jr., who has been appointed Secretary of Health. While he’s Robert F. Kennedy’s son, his anti-vaccine stance goes against the very measures that saved millions of lives during the COVID pandemic. These appointments are not just concerning; they border on absurdity.

At this point, I’m holding out hope that the Senate, which is currently split 50-50 between Democrats and Republicans, might reject some of these nominees. However, it’s unclear whether that will happen. I don’t have a crystal ball, but if I did, I’d see nothing but clouds and stormy weather ahead. Unfortunately, I can’t see through the storm.

Digital

Authoritarian Information Manipulation and Dissemination — National, Transnational, and International Perspectives

by Digital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomeMultimediaVideos

 

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The emergence of repressive and authoritarian “hybrid regimes” poses one of the most significant threats to democracy today. These regimes and authoritarian actors wield information suppression and manipulation as essential tools to disseminate narratives that erode democratic institutions. This issue transcends national borders; digital technologies now enable authoritarian states to infiltrate robust democracies, allowing them to project their authoritarian narratives globally. The transnationalization of authoritarian politics, facilitated by digital technologies, presents substantial challenges to the integrity of democratic processes and institutions.

In response to these challenges, a workshop which is a collaborative effort organized on November 7-8, 2024, by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, Australia, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in Brussels, Belgium. The workshop aimed to investigate how various actors—governments, non-state organizations, state-sponsored entities, and political parties—suppress and manipulate information to erode trust in democratic processes, both domestically and internationally. The workshop also examined the darker dimensions of social media, focusing on the interactions between misinformation, negativity, and polarization.

Moreover, the workshop addressed strategies to counter misinformation and disinformation, along with intervention techniques to mitigate their impacts. It also focused on countering disinformation through activism and explored everyday online experiences with misinformation, emphasizing the importance of evidence-based media literacy education initiatives. Additionally, the event discussed necessary curricular reforms to combat disinformation, toxicity, and polarization in educational contexts, as well as the responses of political elites to conspiracy theories.

The aim of the workshop, funded by the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA), the Australian Research Council (ARC), and the Gerda Henkel Foundation, is to deepen the understanding of these critical issues and explore collaborative strategies to combat misinformation and disinformation in our increasingly complex digital environment.

Round Table 1 – Foreign Interference Campaigns on Social Media: Insights from Field Theory and Computational Social Science

Keynote by Dr. Robert Ackland (Professor, The Australian National University)

 

Round Table 2 – Manipulating Truth: Authoritarian Strategies of ‘Attention Bombing’ and ‘Epistemic Modulation’ in Hybrid Media Systems

Keynote by Dr. Timothy Graham (Associate Professor, Queensland University of Technology)

 

Round Table 3 – The Dark Side of Social Media: Misinformation, Negativity, and Polarization

Keynote by Dr. Jason Weismueller (Assistant Professor, University of Western Australia)

 

Round Table 4 – The Influence of Familiarity and Identity Relevance on Truth Judgements

Keynote by Dr. Li Qian Tay (Postdoctoral Fellow, The Australian National University)

 

Round Table 5 – Countering State-Sanctioned Information Operations: The #FreeYouth Movement in Thailand

Keynote by Dr. Aim Sinpeng (Associate Professor, The University of Sydney)

 

Round Table 6 – Investigating Everyday Online Experiences with Misinformation and Responding with Evidence-Informed Media Literacy Education Initiatives

Keynote by Dr. Tanya Notley (Associate Professor, Western Sydney University)

 

Round Table 7 – Reforming the Curriculum to Counter Disinformation, Toxicity, and Polarization

Keynote by Dr. Mathieu O’Neil (Professor, The University of Canberra; Honorary Associate Professor, The Australian National University)

 

Round Table 8

Ignore, Rebut or Embrace: Political Elite Responses to Conspiracy Theories

Keynote by Dr. Zim Nwokora (Associate Professor, Deakin University)

And

Disinformation in the City Response Playbook

Keynote by Dr. Jessica (Ika) Trijsburg (Research Fellow in City Diplomacy at the Melbourne University)

 

Closing Remarks

By Dr. Lydia Khalil (Program Director, Transnational Challenges at Lowry Institute)

A moment from the International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific,’ held in a hybrid format from Melbourne on September 25-26, 2024.

International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific’

by Digital-populismEditor’s ChoiceMultimediaVideos

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Explore the insightful discussions from the International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific,’ held on September 25-26, 2024, in a hybrid format from Melbourne. This conference brought together a diverse coalition of experts, hosted by leading institutions across the Indo-Pacific and Europe, including the Alfred Deakin Institute at Deakin University, Universitas Indonesia, National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), Universitas Gadjah Mada, Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang, International Islamic University Malaysia, UIN Salatiga, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).

The conference delved into how digital technologies, though transformative, have become tools for disinformation, political manipulation, and digital authoritarianism, posing serious challenges to democracy and social unity. This issue is particularly urgent in the Indo-Pacific, where misinformation on platforms like Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp has fueled divisions and where political forces sometimes restrict access to vital digital spaces to consolidate control.

Attendees, including scholars, practitioners, and policymakers, shared perspectives on how digital disinformation affects the region and discussed strategies for promoting digital literacy, inclusivity, and democratic resilience.

Generously supported by the Australian Research Council, Gerda Henkel Foundation, ECPS, and the Alfred Deakin Institute, this conference aimed to foster collaboration and shed light on countering disinformation in today’s digital age.

Don’t miss the opportunity to engage with these compelling sessions—watch the full conference videos here:

Video 1

Video 2

Video 3

Video 4

Video 5

 

Data protection concept featuring binary code overlayed with the European Union flag. Photo: KB-Photodesign.

Future Resilience of the European Technology Security Policy Paper

by Digital-populismEditor’s ChoiceHomePolicy Papers

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Please cite as:

Miguel De Vera, Anton; Hamaiunova, Viktoriia; Koleszár, Réka & Pasquettaz, Giada. (2024) “Future Resilience of the European Technology Security.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0004

 

Abstract

This paper explores vulnerabilities in the European Union’s technological security, focusing on Huawei as a case study to illuminate broader security challenges. Amid intensifying US-China tensions, especially under former US President Donald Trump, the EU encountered new risks linked to the strategic positioning of Chinese tech firms within critical European infrastructure. Trump’s “America First” policy targeted China with tariffs and trade restrictions to address perceived unfair practices, triggering disruptions in global supply chains that reverberated through the EU economy. For Europe, heavily reliant on secure, stable trade flows, these events highlighted the urgency of reassessing technological dependencies and reinforcing digital security. The paper presents a series of strategic recommendations for the EU to mitigate such vulnerabilities, emphasizing the need for diversified supply chains, rigorous security standards for tech partnerships, and collaborative policies among EU members to strengthen resilience in the face of geopolitical shifts and technological competition.

Keyword: Populism, EU, Framing, US, China, Technology

 

Authored by Anton Miguel De Vera, Viktoriia Hamaiunova, Réka Koleszár & Giada Pasquettaz

Introduction

In the increasingly uncertain geopolitical climate, the European Union (EU) is facing the challenge of maintaining its technological resilience while protecting its security and autonomy. The fast-paced international competition for technological leadership is closely tied to the bloc’s economic competence and has consequences for its security. Given the importance of transatlantic cooperation in this domain, the upcoming US elections, and the possibility of a second Trump administration should urge policymakers to focus on strengthening the EU’s preparedness. This paper addresses the existing vulnerabilities in the EU’s technological security through the exemplary case of Huawei and outlines recommendations on how to tackle them.

Connectivity, one of the critical technologies of the rapid Fourth Industrial Revolution, has been at the center of heated discussions in recent years. Several nations identified connectivity to be an essential part of their competitiveness and development and, among others, Huawei emerged at the forefront of advanced technologies. The Chinese-owned ICT provider was among the world leaders in rolling out their next-generation telecommunication networks worldwide. Within the EU, the choice of 5G providers has generated crucial debates. Next to the obvious economic interests, building telecommunication networks came with important security considerations. As the US-China rivalry intensified under President Trump, the EU faced an important vulnerability.

Donald Trump’s trade war with China, a key component of his “America First” agenda, had significant repercussions for the EU. By imposing tariffs on Chinese goods, Trump sought to counter what he perceived as unfair trade practices by China. This conflict disrupted global trade and impacted the EU’s economy, which is heavily dependent on stable supply chains.

For the EU, the escalating US-China trade tensions presented both challenges and opportunities. While the trade war resulted in market volatility, it also provided Europe with a chance to strengthen its trade relationships with China. The two reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) in 2020 – although it was later put on hold due to the tit-for-tat sanctions. The prospect of deepening ties with China posed a risk of straining transatlantic relations, particularly as Trump urged European nations to collaborate with the US in pressuring Beijing. Trump’s populist trade policies thus compelled the EU to carefully balance its relationships with both the US and China while prioritizing its own economic and security interests. It is in this context that the debate around Huawei and the EU’s technological security is situated in.

The EU’s 5G Rollout:  Rhetoric Coercion and Uneven Progress

The European Commission identified the possibilities of 5G early on and adopted an action plan in 2016 to launch 5G services in all member states by the end of 2020 (European Commission, 2024). Although some experts warned that the EU is falling behind in technological transformation, member states quickly began catching up and published their roadmaps. However, progress was uneven and fragmented (5G Observatory Quarterly Report 2, 2019). At that time, Huawei was in a prime position in the European market to support the 5G rollout and was already working with several European providers. By 2019, the Chinese company signed memorandums of understanding with wireless providers in at least 9 EU countries, including Germany, Spain, and France (5G Observatory, 2021). For many, it seemed evident that for the EU to stay competitive and meet the plans for 5G coverage, Huawei was the answer.

In parallel, however, concerns about the security of Huawei equipment began circulating. Against the backdrop of the escalating trade war between the US and China, the former began prompting allies to exclude Huawei from their networks (Woo & O’Keeffe, 2018). President Trump labelled Huawei a security risk and threatened to cut off intelligence and information-sharing with allies using the ‘untrustworthy’ 5G vendor (Business Standard, 2020).

US Policy towards China under Donald Trump: Framing as a Strategic Tool

Donald Trump’s political rise is often analyzed through the lens of populism and framing theory, both of which help explain his appeal and communication strategies. Populism, broadly defined, refers to a political approach that pits the “common people” against a perceived corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). Trump’s rhetoric embodies this populist style, as he frequently claims to speak for ordinary Americans against the political establishment. His 2016 campaign, for instance, centered on “draining the swamp” in Washington, positioning himself as an outsider who would challenge entrenched elites. During the 2024 election, he is still using this populist communication, by portraying himself as “one of the people”, like in one of his recent tweets where he works for one shift in McDonalds.

One of the key aspects of Trump’s populism is his use of framing. He does not only use it on a national level for criticizing his opponents but also in relation to foreign policy issues. Framing theory, as defined by Entman (1993), involves highlighting certain aspects of a reality while downplaying others, effectively shaping how an issue is understood by the public. Trump’s framing of China is a prime example. Throughout his presidency and during his campaigns, Trump consistently framed China as a threat to American economic interests and national security. By doing so, he shaped public discourse and channeled public frustrations about job losses and trade imbalances into hostility toward China.

A prominent example of Trump’s framing of China came during his trade war with the country. He portrayed China as an “unfair” player in global trade, accusing it of “stealing” American jobs and intellectual property. In a 2019 speech, Trump stated, “China has taken advantage of the United States for many, many years. And those days are over.” This framing was effective in galvanizing his political base, particularly among working-class voters who felt economically marginalized by globalization (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). By framing the issue as a battle between patriotic Americans and a foreign adversary, Trump reinforced his populist credentials.

Trump’s framing of China intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, where he repeatedly blamed China for the spread of the virus, referring to it as the “China virus” and the “Kung flu” (The New York Times, 2020). By doing so, he shifted public discourse to portray China as responsible not only for the economic challenges faced by the US but also for the public health crisis, a narrative that resonated with many of his supporters.

A notable example of this framing came in March 2020, when Trump tweeted, “The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus.” This statement reported widely in the media, sparked accusations of racism and xenophobia (CNN, 2020). However, Trump defended his rhetoric, arguing that it was necessary to hold China accountable for the pandemic’s global spread. His framing successfully linked the frustrations over COVID-19 to broader concerns about China’s role in the world economy, feeding into his populist narrative of protecting American interests.

Framing theory is particularly relevant here because it highlights how political actors shape public perception by focusing on certain narratives. As Entman (2007) notes, framing involves selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in communication. Trump’s framing of China as both an economic competitor and a national security threat played a significant role in justifying his tariffs and aggressive foreign policy stance. Moreover, Trump’s use of this frame was amplified by the media, contributing to rising anti-China sentiments in the US (Goffman, 1974).

By framing China as a direct threat to American prosperity, Trump not only advanced his populist message but also reshaped political discourse, making foreign policy a central issue for many voters. Through this, he created the basis of US trade policy against foreign companies deemed as a threat and towards allies who seemed hesitant to follow this approach.

With all this, the EU faced a two-fold dilemma: giving in to Trump’s strategy and losing out on competitiveness while appearing to have little strategic autonomy or seizing the opportunities with Huawei but straining the transatlantic relationship while potentially endangering critical infrastructure. As of 2024, the EU’s answer has been fragmented and disunited. Only 10 of the 27 member states have excluded Huawei and although almost all states put in place some kind of restrictions, only a handful of them implemented it (European Commission, 2023a). President Trump’s approach of pressuring allies and threatening to cut off intelligence-sharing may have been counterproductive, but it exposed an important weakness of the EU. 

What Next – The Way Forward

With the US elections approaching, the EU has a window of opportunity to address this dilemma. The possibility of a second Trump administration brings the risk of further aggravating the US-China ties and putting the EU into an even more uncomfortable position. The war in Ukraine has heightened the EU’s need and dependence on intelligence-sharing with the US Upcoming challenges in transatlantic relations are likely to have significant repercussions for the EU’s security. At the same time, the EU-China relations are also at a heightened risk of entering into a trade war as the latest developments around the export of Chinese electric vehicles demonstrate. The economic vulnerability of certain European member states to Chinese pressure adds another dimension to the complex nature of achieving united European approaches. Essentially, the EU needs to safeguard its autonomy against unilateral actions while maintaining its competitiveness and ensuring the security of its critical infrastructure. To do that, policymakers should consider the following scenarios and the presented policy recommendations.

If Trump Wins

First, in case of a Trump victory, Europeans have to embrace another period of uncertainty. A second Trump Administration will renew concerns about US support for NATO while the protectionist policies will put direct pressure on transatlantic trade relations. It is expected that President Trump will continue his previous hardline approach towards China leading to an intensified trade war and a bigger volume of Chinese exports being dumped on the European market. All the while, Europeans will increasingly be pulled into a trade and technology war with the Eastern power amid calls from the US to reduce relations. In this scenario, Trump’s rhetorical pressure, as in the previous case of calling to exclude Huawei from the 5G rollout to maintain intelligence-sharing, might turn into actual policies. In 2025, this would come with a huge price given the EU’s dependence on the American intelligence infrastructure to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s war. Any threats thus must be taken seriously and addressed accordingly.

Next to that, internally, Trump’s success would galvanize far-right, populist figures and movements. His ideological allies in Europe, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Polish President Andrzej Duda would be emboldened to continue their path after a Trump victory. Far-right, populist politicians would find renewed reassurance to oppose more European integration. Consequently, reaching unity on crucial foreign policy questions might further be hindered.

Faced with the prospect of this challenging situation, European policymakers would do well to address the potential pitfalls early on. Given the foreseeable fragmentations, the EU must strengthen and implement the framework it already has agreed upon (such as the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox and the Digital Services Act). According to the latest assessment of the 5G Toolbox, which was adopted to mitigate security risks, only 10 out of the 27 Member States have restricted or excluded high-risk suppliers from their 5G networks (European Commission, 2023b). Based on its own and Member States’ independent analyses, the European Commission considers Huawei along with another Chinese company, ZTE, to ‘pose materially higher risk than other 5G providers.’ Dependency on these providers for critical infrastructure, which the 5G network is considered, creates a serious risk across the Union. Considering the level of interconnectedness between EU networks, a fragmented policy could jeopardize the entire bloc’s security. For instance, last year Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó highlighted Hungary’s development of 5G networks with the help of Huawei, next to signing additional cooperation agreements with the company (Szijjártó Péter, 2023).  

To address the diverging approaches, the EU should develop a mechanism to actively encourage Member States to implement the existing framework and use the available tools. It should also hold Member States accountable for doing so. Considering the weight of risks in the EU’s technological security, policymakers should call for an EU-wide regulation with clear and urgent deadlines. This would support the EU’s autonomy in making security-related decisions as assessments of risks are done both by Member States and by the European Commission. Transatlantic relations are likely to become more friendly as a result and the EU’s security would increase. One of the downsides of this approach, however, is the expected response from Beijing. China is likely to retaliate for a European policy naming and restricting its companies from the market. Besides, reaching this agreement on a European level will not be easy as Member States’ security priorities and relations with China differ significantly. Nevertheless, this approach offers the EU a starting point to be a proactive actor.

If Harris Wins

If Americans choose a Harris administration for the next four years, the EU would find itself in a similar position as they were during Biden’s administration assuming that Harris will take up a similar approach against China. Despite their opposition to each other, President Joe Biden had taken a similar approach to his Republican predecessor. Biden ordered heavy tariffs on Chinese imports of high-tech items such as semiconductor chips while diversifying its sources for imports such as the EU and Mexico (Davis, 2024; Lovely et al., 2024). In doing so, the United States has become less dependent on China for all types of imported manufactured goods since 2018, according to recently released 2023 customs data (Lovely et al., 2024). 

The EU and China, however, have maintained or increased their reliance on each other for almost all types of imported goods” (Lovely et al., 2024). As such, the EU could potentially clash with the US by maintaining this dependence which showcases some form of limited autonomy. On the one hand, the EU exercises its agency to shift towards maintaining and deepening ties with China. However, on the other hand, the EU’s agency is somewhat limited given its trade dependency with China which may compel it to act in favor of Beijing on certain issues.

A Harris administration would likely maintain the use of tariffs, particularly targeting China, to counter perceived unfair competition as emphasized by Trump, and to drive progress in the US energy transition, supporting its emissions reduction goals. This was evident during the presidential debate between Harris and Trump in September 2024. She highlighted Trump’s failed attempt to subdue China as an economic powerhouse arguing that “under Donald Trump’s presidency, he ended up selling American chips to China to help them improve and modernize their military” (Butts, 2024). She concluded with the statement, ″[he] basically sold us out when a policy about China should be in making sure the United States of America wins the competition for the 21st century” (Butts, 2024). This comment indicates to the EU and other US allies that Harris is likely to continue Biden’s approach if she wins the presidential race.

In this scenario, the EU faces a more predictable transatlantic landscape. This, however, may prove more perilous. Albeit Harris will follow a hardline approach to China and the pressure on allies to not share advanced technology with Beijing will remain, she is unlikely to strongly push the EU. In contrast to the Trump administration, instead of coercive rhetoric, she is likely to use softer means of persuasion. This carries in itself the risk that the EU will sit on its hands for too long instead of addressing the legitimate security threats that China poses. To ensure that the resilience of technological security remains a priority, the European Parliament should establish a sub-committee of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The sub-committee should deal with the security considerations that come with technologies and equipment from third countries and should ensure that the interests of European citizens are considered in tech security-related questions. This would address the risks of de-prioritization and would contribute to enhanced and more nuanced debates. Considering the viewpoints of Members of the Parliament directly through the sub-committee could help the European Commission to propose regulations that are more likely to enjoy support. The only constraining factor to consider is the budget of setting up the sub-committee but the importance of this issue should outweigh that.

Conclusion

This paper highlighted the importance of European technology security and looked at different scenarios European leaders will face during the US presidential election. The example of the rollout of the 5G technology in the EU and the debates around using Chinese Huawei as the technology provider illustrated the EU’s vulnerability when it comes to maintaining its autonomy and competitiveness in the tech sector. In the rapidly changing global landscape, EU leaders are facing a crucial dilemma about the way forward. To maintain technological competitiveness, the EU may have no choice but to rely on Chinese partners while to ensure the continent’s security and stability, it cannot afford to alienate its key transatlantic partner. At the same time, legitimate security risks should not be overlooked and considered as subordinate to trade relations.

This paper offers a concise depiction of the main factors EU leaders should consider as Americans head to the polls. In either scenario, what is crucial for the EU is to be prepared and engage in collective planning. A second Trump administration is likely to bring about a more hectic and turbulent period. His framing of China as a security threat could lead to more pressure on European allies to cut ties with Beijing while his victory could galvanize European populists making it harder to achieve consensus on the European level. To offset this, the paper recommends taking concrete steps to implement the already existing framework and strengthen the available toolbox. In case of a Harris victory, the EU can expect reasonable continuity. Perhaps an important challenge the bloc will face will be finding the impetus to keep the technology security issue in focus. The paper argues that one way to do that would be to set up a dedicated sub-committee within the European Parliament to keep the issue on the agenda and ensure the interests of European citizens.

 

Authors’ Biographies

Anton Miguel De Vera is an MA student in International Business and Economic Diplomacy at IMC FH Krems. He previously earned a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from Central European University in Vienna, where he specialized in International Relations and Economics. His thesis examined the dynamics of Philippine agency within the US-Philippine security alliance and its nuanced relationship with China, entitled “The Faces of Philippine Agency in Foreign Affairs: The Philippines and the United States Security Alliances”. Currently based in Vienna, Anton works at Raiffeisen Bank International, where he combines his academic expertise with practical experience in finance and international relations.

Viktoriia Hamaiunova is a Ph.D. candidate at Newcastle University (UK), where she investigates the role of legal culture in shaping fair trial standards within ECHR member states, focusing on the integration of mediation into judicial systems to enhance human rights protections. Her research combines doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches, incorporating thematic analysis and insights from interviews with ECtHR judges to examine how legal culture influences judicial reform and access to justice. Viktoriia Hamaiunova holds an MA in International Law and Human Rights from the University of Tartu, enriched by academic exchanges at Masaryk University and Comenius University.  Her legal career includes in-house experience and ECtHR  traineership. An accredited mediator and published author, Viktoriia Hamaiunova has presented her work at prominent conferences, including SLSA Annual Conference and the Human Rights Law Conference at the University of Cambridge. With extensive teaching experience, she leads discussions on topics spanning international law to mediation practices. As an interdisciplinary researcher, Viktoriia Hamaiunova is committed to culturally informed legal reforms, fostering development and facilitating discussions on effective judicial systems and dispute resolution. 

Réka Koleszár is an independent researcher focusing on the relations between the European Union and Asia, in particular East Asia. Her experience spans international organizations and think tanks including working for the Council of the European Union and the European Policy Centre. Réka holds an MSc in Political Science from Leiden University, an MA in International Relations specializing in East Asian studies from the University of Groningen, and a diploma in the Art of Diplomacy from the European Academy of Diplomacy.

Giada Pasquettaz is a doctoral student at the Chair of Political Science and International Politics of Prof. Dr. Dirk Leuffen since October 2023. Her interests are mainly in political communication, international relations, political behavior, comparative politics and quantitative methods. She holds a master’s degree in mass media and politics with a focus on international social movements’ communication from the University of Bologna. She also completed her bachelor’s degree in Sociology at the University of Bologna with a specialization in migration frames used in media. She completed semesters abroad at the University of Sundsvall (Sweden), at UCLouvain (Belgium) and at the UIT Tromsø (Norway).

 

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Digital

Hybrid Workshop: Authoritarian Information Manipulation and Dissemination — National, Transnational, and International Perspectives

by AuthoritarianismDigital-populismPast Events

Date/Venue: November 7-8, 2024 — Deakin Burwood Corporate Centre (BCC)

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The emergence of repressive and authoritarian “hybrid regimes” poses one of the most significant threats to democracy today. These regimes and authoritarian actors wield information suppression and manipulation as essential tools to disseminate narratives that erode democratic institutions. This issue transcends national borders; digital technologies now enable authoritarian states to infiltrate robust democracies, allowing them to project their authoritarian narratives globally. The transnationalization of authoritarian politics, facilitated by digital technologies, presents substantial challenges to the integrity of democratic processes and institutions.

In response to these challenges, our workshop aims to investigate how various actors—governments, non-state organizations, state-sponsored entities, and political parties—suppress and manipulate information to erode trust in democratic processes, both domestically and internationally. The workshop will also examine the darker dimensions of social media, focusing on the interactions between misinformation, negativity, and polarization.

The workshop, a collaborative effort organized by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, Australia, and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in Brussels, Belgium, will also address strategies to counter misinformation and disinformation, along with intervention techniques to mitigate their impacts. It will focus on countering disinformation through activism and explore everyday online experiences with misinformation, emphasizing the importance of evidence-based media literacy education initiatives. Additionally, the event will discuss necessary curricular reforms to combat disinformation, toxicity, and polarization in educational contexts, as well as the responses of political elites to conspiracy theories.

The organizing team, led by Professor Ihsan Yilmaz, encourages all participants to actively engage in discussions and share insights throughout the workshop. The aim of the workshop, funded by the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA), the Australian Research Council (ARC), and the Gerda Henkel Foundation, is to deepen the understanding of these critical issues and explore collaborative strategies to combat misinformation and disinformation in our increasingly complex digital environment.

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Photo: Nico El-Nino.

International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific’

by AuthoritarianismDigital-populismEventsPast Events

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We are pleased to announce that the International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific’ is scheduled to take place on September 25-26, 2024, both online via Zoom and in person in Melbourne. This significant conference is a collaborative effort organized by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI) at Deakin University, Australia; the Department of Communication Sciences at Universitas Indonesia (UI); the Institute of Social Sciences and Humanities at the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN); the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM); the Faculty of Social and Political Sciences at Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM); the Department of Political Science at Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM); the State Islamic University (UIN) Salatiga; and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in Brussels, Belgium.

While digital technologies have revolutionized many aspects of our societies, the promises of inclusivity and progress they bring often do not align with the realities on the ground. These technologies are increasingly being exploited as tools for disinformation, political manipulation, and even digital authoritarianism, posing significant challenges to democratic values and social cohesion.

The Indo-Pacific region is particularly susceptible to these challenges, as disinformation and misinformation spread rapidly across digital platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp, exacerbating societal divisions. Moreover, political actors often leverage these platforms to silence criticism, control information flows, and even restrict access to critical digital infrastructure to consolidate their power.

The discussions during this international conference will explore the complex interactions between digital technologies, cyberspace, social media platforms, and political dynamics in the region. Scholars, practitioners, and policymakers from various institutions will offer insights into the impacts of digital disinformation and explore pathways to counter these challenges while promoting digital literacy and inclusivity.

This conference is made possible through the generous support of the Australian Research Council (ARC) via a Discovery Project grant, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), and the Alfred Deakin Institute (ADI), all of which are committed to fostering academic inquiry into this pressing global issue. The conference aims to serve as a platform for fruitful discussions and meaningful collaboration, enabling us to better understand digital complexity and its implications for democracy in the Indo-Pacific.

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