Labour Party leader Sir Keir Starmer speaking and gesturing in the House of Commons, UK Parliament, at Westminster Palace in London, UK, on February 7, 2024. Photo: Tennessee Witney.

How Should Mainstream Parties Respond to Populism? The Internal Debates of Britain’s Labour Party under Starmer

by CommentariesEditor’s ChoiceHomeLeadership & PersonaVoice of Youth

When Keir Starmer denounced populism as a “snake oil charm” in July 2024, he became the first British Prime Minister to attack it so explicitly in a major parliamentary speech. Yet inside Labour, the strategy is contested. Should populism be called out as corrosive to democracy, or quietly disarmed by fixing everyday grievances? Starmer prefers direct confrontation; his strategist Morgan McSweeney stresses delivery — “potholes, not populism.” Luke Malhi’s interviews with MPs, aides, and journalists reveal a party caught between naming the threat and co-opting parts of its language to blunt Reform UK’s rise. The debate echoes dilemmas across Europe, underscoring a central question: how can mainstream parties defend institutions without alienating the voters populists claim to represent?

By Luke Malhi

On a warm July morning in 2024, as parliament resumed for the first time following the election, Keir Starmer stood at the dispatch box and denounced populism as a “snake oil charm” that promised easy answers but could deliver only division (Starmer, 2024a). It was the first time a British Prime Minister had attacked populism so explicitly in a set-piece moment of national politics. For some, it sounded like the steady voice of reason after years of turbulence. For others, it risked reinforcing the image of a detached mainstream elite who scold rather than persuade the most dissatisfied in society.

Behind the scenes, Labour figures admit the party is still working out how best to handle the populist threat presented by Reform UK, a populist radical right (PRR) party which secured 14.3% of the vote in 2024, and is now polling at around 34% (Ipsos, 2025). In January of 2025, I conducted interviews with MPs, strategists, and senior journalists, with the promise of anonymity to encourage them to speak candidly. What emerged was a picture of a party that both fears the corrosive potential of populist politics and struggles with how directly to confront it.

Exploring these tensions matters because Britain is hardly alone. Across Europe, mainstream parties face the same dilemma of how they should respond to populists who thrive on frustration with the status quo. Do they call out populism as dangerous, risking charges of elitism? Do they try to quietly address the grievances that fuel it? Or do they attempt to co-opt aspects of the populist policy platform and rhetoric in an attempt to diffuse their appeal? Labour’s struggle with this balance offers a case study in how mainstream parties might navigate this populist age, and what that means for the future of democracy.

Labour’s Response to Populism

When asked how Labour’s inner core thinks about populism, one party strategist sighed: “It’s the problem we can’t ignore, but we can’t talk about it either.” On the surface, Starmer has not been shy about naming populism. In his New Year speech, he condemned “the politics of the easy answer” and accused right-wing populists of offering “grievances, not solutions” (Starmer, 2024c). In the King’s Speech, he branded populism a “snake oil charm” that divided communities (Starmer, 2024a). On a train to the 2025 party conference, he described a battle with the “populist Right Reform” for “the soul of the country” (Starmer, as quoted in BBC, 2025, 03:00). Several MPs told me this reflected his genuine conviction that populism corrodes democracy. One said: “he really does think it’s dangerous. He sees it as a slide toward US-style democratic backsliding.”

Yet many Labour elites worry that naming populism head-on risks alienating voters. As one backbencher put it: “You can’t just tell people they’ve been conned. That sounds like you’re calling them stupid.” A Labour strategist was even more blunt: “That was the Remain mistake. They shouted about how bad Brexit would be and people told them to sod off. If we repeat that with populism, we’ll lose again.”

These doubts are rooted in recent history. The failure of the “Stronger In” campaign during the 2016 referendum still looms large. Its warnings of economic collapse were dismissed by many voters as fearmongering, and that experience has left strategists wary of repeating the mistake of lecturing voters. Several MPs pointed out that even the term “populist”risks alienating audiences, since it is almost always used in a pejoratively charged manner, often shorthand for “irrational” or “ignorant.”

This tension has produced what insiders describe as a split between Starmer and his chief strategist, Morgan McSweeney. Starmer leans toward confrontation, “naming and shaming” populists in the words of one MP, while McSweeney takes the opposite view. According to a Labour aide, “Morgan thinks delivery is the only answer. Fix the potholes, raise living standards, and you’ll take the wind out of Reform’s sails. That’s the fight.”

But delivery is only part of the story. McSweeney’s strategy was said to increasingly involve borrowing selectively from populists where feasible, adopting their language on issues like patriotism or immigration, and co-opting policy themes that resonate with disaffected voters. One journalist explained: “It’s not just about competence. Morgan’s theory is giving people some of the populist framing but strip out the nastiness. Show them you hear their anger but redirect it.” 

The difference between the two men is not just tactical but stylistic. Starmer prefers sober warnings about the dangers of populism. McSweeney is more interested in whether voters feel their everyday concerns are being met. As one Labour organiser summarised: “Keir wants to talk about democracy. Morgan wants to talk about potholes. And that’s the real debate inside Number 10.”

Journalists I spoke to consistently described Starmer’s style as technocratic. Some called him “prosecutorial,” others “old-fashioned” or “statesmanlike.” Even sympathetic insiders conceded that he can come across as an “enforcer of the status quo.” Several argued that this style is both personal and political: it reflects Starmer’s legal training, but also Labour’s deliberate attempt to ‘detoxify’ after Jeremy Corbyn. One campaign aide said: “We knew we couldn’t win if we looked like we were promising the moon again. Voters didn’t want grand visions. They wanted someone boring enough to fix the basics.”

That instinct shaped the 2024 campaign. Unlike Boris Johnson, who thrived on flamboyant gestures, or Corbyn, who rallied crowds with populist appeals to the “many not the few,” Starmer positioned himself as the steady alternative. His rhetoric avoided spectacle. His speeches focused on detail, compromise, and delivery. A senior journalist put it this way: “The whole pitch was: ‘We’ll be dull but competent.’ After fifteen years of drama, dull sounded good.”

At times, this meant deliberately lowering expectations. Multiple insiders recalled that Starmer instructed the party to avoid language that might create impossible promises. One MP said: “He didn’t want a repeat of 2017 or 2019, when we wrote cheques we couldn’t cash. He genuinely fears that broken promises feed populism.”

Starmer’s Worldview and the Parliamentary Party

Starmer’s instinct to treat populism as a moral threat is rooted in his background. As a barrister and former Director of Public Prosecutions, he was steeped in the idea that rules and institutions hold society together. Starmer’s choice to appoint Richard Hermer as attorney general in July 2024 was a clear example of this, and something which required ‘considerable effort’ according to one political journalist (Rodgers, 2025). Soon after his appointment, Hermer (2024) gave a speech which made clear his concern about populism and his plans to counter it:

‘We are increasingly confronted by the divisive and disruptive force of populism… We face leaders who appeal to the ‘will of the people’ – as exclusively interpreted by them – as the only truly legitimate source of constitutional authority. Their rhetoric conjures images of a conspiracy of ‘elites’ – an enemy that is hard to define but invariably including the people and independent institutions who exercise the kind of checks and balances on executive power that are the essence of liberal democracy and the rule of law… I hope you take some comfort in the fact that the importance of the rule of law and the constitutional balance is embedded in my DNA and that of a Prime Minister who not only rose to the top ranks of the Bar but served his country as DPP.’

Political journalist Ian Dunt correctly observed that it is rare for British politicians, especially attorney generals, to demonstrate “the kind of political and philosophical depth shown in that speech.” Given their shared history, Dunt (2025) claimed Starmer “had clearly authorised him to do the work they both believed in [to counter populism], in a much more robust and outspoken way.”

Labour’s MPs generally echoed Starmer and Hermer’s worldview. In interviews, many brought up Cas Mudde’s (2017) definition of populism unprompted, describing it as a worldview that pits a virtuous “people” against a corrupt “elite.”They consistently rejected this framing as corrosive to democracy. One MP told me: “The idea that politics is just a battle between good, ordinary people and a corrupt elite goes against how democracy really works – I think we’ve tried to push against that.” Indeed, Labour interviewees’ comments echoed many of the inherent dangers of populism for democracy identified by political scientist Jan Werner Muller (2016). They stressed that compromise and pluralism are essential, that it is impossible to distil the will of the people into a single viewpoint, and that institutions such as the judiciary and Parliament are safeguards, not obstacles. One insider remarked: “Respect for institutions is what sets us apart from the populists. I think for everyone here, that is absolutely key.”

This worldview shaped Labour’s stance on contentious issues. When the Conservatives tried to override the Supreme Court on the Rwanda deportation scheme, Yvette Cooper (2024) chastised a party that wanted to “stop all courts.” When Boris Johnson was accused of breaking lockdown rules during Partygate, Angela Rayner (2024) argued that the Prime Minister had “degraded” Britain’s institutions. When Conservative MPs criticised the International Criminal Court (ICC) for issuing an arrest warrant for Benjamin Neteyahu, David Lammy (2025) passionately argued that the UK’s duty was to uphold international law, no matter what.

For MPs, these moments weren’t simply opportunistic attack lines. Rather, they reflect an institutionalist ethos that sets Labour apart from its populist rivals. Several interviewees contrasted this with both right-wing populism and left-wing ‘Corbynism,’ which, at times, they claimed, flirted with a Manichean and binary view of “the people versus the elite”described by the ideational definition of populism (Mudde, 2017). As one journalist observed: “Starmer doesn’t do binaries. He does compromise. That’s his politics.” This rejection of populism runs deep within the identity of the Parliamentary Labour Party. MPs and advisers alike saw their role as defending the structures and norms of democracy against the polarising logic of populism.

A Compromise Strategy

Despite these convictions, Labour’s public-facing stance has been more muted. The compromise between Starmer and McSweeney means explicit attacks on populism are largely confined to Starmer’s speeches, whilst the wider party message stresses competence and delivery. At the same time, McSweeney’s strategy has steered Labour toward selective co-option of populist themes, borrowing rhetoric on sovereignty, fairness, and security when it helps shore up support against the PRR Reform UK.

MPs are divided over this balancing act. Some welcomed Starmer’s willingness to call out populism explicitly, saying it reassured the new intake that the party was willing to “name the problem.” Others warned that in Leave-voting constituencies such rhetoric could backfire.

A similar divergence in opinion appeared when MPs were asked about McSweeney’s push for Labour to co-opt populist policies and rhetoric in certain areas. Some Labour elites felt that, although it was uncomfortable, it was necessary to reduce the electoral appeal of Reform UK. However, others felt it risked legitimising right-wing populists and alienating their voter base on the left.

Indeed, recent research highlights that mainstream parties risk alienating their core voter bases when co-opting populist policies or rhetoric. A 2024 study on mainstream partisans’ responses to populist radical right parties found that even tactical forms of cooperation can provoke feelings of betrayal among core supporters, while outright exclusion may conversely reassure them that democratic boundaries are being defended (van der Brug et al., 2024). In other words, accepting far-right actors as legitimate competitors may backfire by alienating loyal voters, reinforcing the dilemma that ignoring populism allows it to grow, but engaging with it risks damaging mainstream parties’ own legitimacy.

The result is a fractured Labour elite, and a party that highlights it is not populist, but is simultaneously cautious about declaring itself against populism. As one senior journalist told me: “They’ll quietly fix things, and when it helps, they’ll borrow the populist language.”

The European Dilemma

Labour’s balancing act is part of a wider European story. Both the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) frequently denounce the Freedom Party (FPÖ) as a right-wing populist force that threatens democratic stability. They highlight the FPÖ’s history of extremism and corruption scandals to argue it is unfit to govern. However, some analysts suggest that this moralising tone has also reinforced the FPÖ’s image as an outsider persecuted by the political establishment (Greilinger, 2024). 

In France, Emmanuel Macron has pitched himself as the rational bulwark against Marine Le Pen. His rhetoric helped him win two presidential elections, yet his reputation as the anti-populist “president of the elite” has also fuelled the resentment that benefits her party (Alduy, 2024). 

And in Slovakia, opposition leaders stress the importance of defending institutions against Robert Fico, though appeals to democratic norms often fail to resonate with voters who are more concerned about wages or security (OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, 2025).

Labour’s interviews echo these patterns. Starmer’s decision to call populism a “snake oil” resembles Macron’s confrontational stance, while McSweeney’s “pothole theory” mirrors the German CDU’s instinct to quietly address material grievances. And his tactic of co-opting populist themes recalls centre-left parties across Europe that have edged rightward on migration or nationalism in hopes of undercutting their rivals. Both approaches highlight the same paradox: ignoring populism lets it grow but confronting it risks alienating dissatisfied voters drawn to populist ‘common sense’solutions.

Conclusion: Lessons for Democracy

Labour’s struggle over how to deal with populism reflects a central dilemma facing European democracies. Mainstream parties increasingly recognise that populism threatens democratic norms, yet they are torn between exposing it and addressing the grievances that fuel it.

My interviews reveal a party uneasy about this balance. Starmer is inclined to call out populism for what it is. McSweeney and other strategists argue that delivery, not denunciation, is what keeps populists at bay – along with carefully borrowing some of their language and themes. MPs, often caught in between, worry about how rhetoric plays in their constituencies.

Since my research in January 2025, Starmer appears to have shifted closer to McSweeney’s view. He has grown more willing to co-opt populist policy positions and language in the hope of winning back voters tempted by Reform UK. A YouGov poll in early 2025 showed Reform UK as likely to be the largest party in parliament if a snap election were called, underscoring how desperate party elites have become. But comparative research suggests that Labour’s gamble may backfire. Political scientist Tarik Abou-Chadi has shown that when mainstream parties adopt aspects of populist policies from the far-right, they rarely succeed in winning over these voters. Instead, they might risk normalising the very politics they sought to resist.

Labour’s experience illustrates the challenge facing mainstream parties: how to safeguard democratic principles while competing in a political landscape reshaped by populism. These are not uniquely British problems, but global ones. For young people inheriting these democracies, the question is urgent: how can political actors who genuinely care about democracy confront populism without alienating voters or belittling their grievances?

 

References

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BBC. (2025, September 28). “Sunday with Laura Kuenssberg: Interview with the Prime Minister [TV broadcast].” BBC iPlayer. https://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/m002k6hc/sunday-with-laura-kuenssberg-interview-with-the-prime-minister

Cooper, Y. (2024, June 20). “Speech on Supreme Court ruling and Rwanda deportation.” Hansard. https://hansard.parliament.uk

Dunt, I. (2025, February 5). “A good man in government.” Politics.co.uk. https://iandunt.substack.com/p/a-good-man-in-government

Greilinger, G. (2024, January 2). “Normalising the far right: a warning from Austria.” Social Europe.

Hermer, R. (2024, July 25). “Speech as Attorney General on populism and the rule of law.” UK Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/attorney-general-richard-hermer-on-populism

Ipsos. (2025, January). “Voting intention poll, January 2025.” Ipsos. https://www.ipsos.com/en-uk/polling-voting-intention-2025

Lammy, D. (2025, March 10). “Statement on the International Criminal Court.” Hansard. https://hansard.parliament.uk

March, L. (2018). “Left and right populism compared: The British case.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 20(2), 281–298. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118763892

Müller, J.-W. (2016). What is populism? University of Pennsylvania Press.

Mudde, C. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780190234874.001.0001

OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. (2025, January 28). “Slovakia: Fico’s government in trouble.” https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-01-28/slovakia-ficos-government-trouble

Rayner, A. (2024, April 21). “Referral of Prime Minister to Committee of Privileges.” Hansard. https://hansard.parliament.uk

Rodgers, S. (2025, February 24). “For evidence of Labour doubt in the Starmer project, look no further than his attorney general.” The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2025/feb/24/labour-keir-starmer-project-attorney-general-richard-hermer

Russo, Luana & Brock, Paula Schulze. (2025). “Mainstream partisans’ affective

response to (non) cooperation with populist radical right parties.” West European Politics, 48:6, 1389-1427, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2024.2336436

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Starmer, K. (2024b, October 14). “PM International Investment Summit speech.” UK Government. https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-international-investment-summit-speech-14-october-2024

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The ongoing Russia-Ukraine war and its implications for EU defense policies.” Photo: Kirill Makarov.

Between Security and Suffering: The Human Cost of Europe’s Defense Resurgence 

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

As Russia’s invasion of Ukraine reshapes Europe’s security landscape, the EU faces a “watershed moment” demanding unprecedented defense spending and strategic autonomy. The “ReArm Europe Plan” allocates €800 billion for defense modernization, while EU states’ military expenditure has already surged 30% since 2021. Yet, this security buildup comes at a profound human cost: since 2022, over 1.3 million soldiers have been killed or wounded, with tens of thousands more facing lifelong trauma. While Europe seeks to safeguard territorial integrity and independence, the article questions whether spiraling militarization undermines humanitarian priorities, deepens instability, and perpetuates cycles of suffering rather than ensuring lasting security.

By Mohammed Afnan

Europe faces a serious threat to its territorial integrity, unprecedented since the Cold War. It is going through a “watershed moment in its security.” “Business as usual approach of underinvestment and fragmentation” is no longer viable given the Ukraine-Russia war and the American President Donald Trump’s frequent calls for the EU to take greater responsibility for its own defense.

Recent calls for increased defense spending by NATO members, predominantly including EU states, along with US Vice President J.D. Vance’s emphasis on “Europe’s threat within” at the last Munich Security Conference, signal the potential for tectonic shifts in the transatlantic relationship. It requires the EU to adopt a holistic and horizontal approach integrating defense and security dimensions of the continent. Nevertheless, questions remain regarding how far the EU can go, particularly within the milieu of historic transatlantic connections between the EU and the US, and the internal divergences concerning security within the EU member states. Since the wider debates have been taking place in this regard, the article will examine how a resurgence of traditional security concerns on the backdrop of Russia-Ukraine War, is going to affect the human cost of war.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed the European defense landscape since February 2022. European Commissions’ “White Paper for European Defense –Readiness 2030” proposed a vision to rearm Europe by enhancing the indigenous defense production and rapid deployment of military troops and assets across the EU. It clearly signifies the European Union’s maneuver to protect its citizens and consolidate its defense capabilities. “Readiness Plan,” also known as “ReArm Europe Plan” presented in March 2025 suggests leveraging over €800 billion in defense spending. As a matter of time, EU clearly understands the importance of strategic independence in the chaotic world.

Following the Russian invasion, EU leaders adopted the Versailles declaration pledging to enhance investment in defense sector. It aimed to boost the defense industry and gain strategic independence. Between 2021 and 2024, EU member states overall defense expenditure stood at €326 billion, marking an increase of 30%. The expenditure is expected to increase by more than €100 billion in real terms by 2027. It correlates with the defense investments too. In 2023, compared to the preceding year, defense investment increased by 17%, setting a record high of €72 billion. In 2024 alone, €102 billion was invested, in which beyond €90 billion was used for defense equipment procurement. Nevertheless, it raises questions regarding the utility of these enormous amounts in terms of enhancing the conditions of citizens, even those of soldiers engaged in deadly conflicts. Eventually, border defense and territorial integrity comes at the cost of losing lives, undermining the cost of human lives.

Throughout history, the recurring military conflicts and wars have brought devastating damage and countless destruction to both the lives and the physical environment. It is estimated that more than 37 million combatants have died in wars since 1800. If we take civilian deaths into consideration, the number of deceased will pile up. In the Second World War alone, which spread across much of the globe, 21 million soldiers died. Based on the data provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), 3.9 million people, including both civilians and combatants, have died in the armed conflicts between 1989 and 2024. Europe and America witnessed the fewest deaths, with around 370,000 and 230,000 deaths, respectively.

Parallels have been drawn comparing the casualties of the Second World War and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. Based on the issue brief by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), over 950,000 Russian soldiers have been killed or wounded since the war began between Russia and Ukraine. Most of these soldiers belong to Russia’s Far North, Far East, and prisons. On the Ukrainian side, a total of 400,000 have been killed or wounded, and between 60,000 and 100,000 combatants have lost their lives. The severe injuries may have taken the well-being of the remainder of their life. Defense spending with its strong emphasizes on defense production and modernization makes these lives and their relatives futile. It may hinder the post-war reconstruction, especially in addressing long-term psychological trauma. Along with that, there are apprehensions that this increased spending could waste resources and cause political instability without delivering real security for the citizens. 

Overall, the resurgence of traditional security threats in Europe due to the Russia-Ukraine war is accompanied by sharply increased defense spending and military preparedness. This, however, comes with a high human cost in terms of lives lost and wounded, reminding that the price of safeguarding territorial integrity and security continues to be profound human suffering and loss. Human cost of war may hinder the post-war reconstructions. This needs to be taken into consideration in policy circles.

In sum, Europe’s renewed focus on defense and security — marked by unprecedented spending, strategic realignments, and calls for autonomy — reflects an unavoidable response to the Russia-Ukraine war and shifting transatlantic dynamics. Yet, this militarization entails profound trade-offs. While €800 billion in planned defense investments aims to safeguard territorial integrity, the staggering casualties — over 1.3 million killed or wounded since 2022 — highlight the immense human cost of security. Without balancing strategic preparedness with humanitarian priorities and post-war recovery, Europe risks undermining the very values it seeks to defend, perpetuating cycles of suffering and instability.

Falun Gong practitioners gather at Old Town Square in Prague, Czech Republic on July 20, 2019 to raise awareness about organ harvesting in China. Photo: Dreamstime.

Harvested in Silence: The Silent Surgery War on Migrant Bodies

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeHuman RightsMigrationVoice of Youth

While the global community often articulates refugee detention as a banner of humanitarian concern, escalating evidence from Libya and North African regions reveals a deeper systemic failure where stateless refugees and other displaced persons are being subjected to medical procedures and organ removal through coercion masked as border security and health screening. Across these detention zones, a shadow economy thrives thereby transforming stateless refugees into targets of extrajudicial biomedical intervention. This article uncovers the alarming rise of coerced organ extraction and exploitative medical practices presented as humanitarian care, introducing the concept biomedical sovereignty to expose the violent necropolitics at play. To build upon forensic data, survivor testimonies, and policy analysis, the following article calls for an urgent re-evaluation of international ethical obligations toward radically marginalized populations. 

By Umavi Pagoda*

A 19-year-old Eritrean refugee is relocated from a detention center near Tripoli for what officials call a routine medical check-up. His departure marked the start of an absence that would never find closure as he became another unreturned face in a system that forgets too quickly. The following day, his belongings are returned to the dormitory with no explanation. His name is erased from records. His body is never found.

This incident is a fragment of a broader systematic pattern, one propagated across detention zones with troubling consistency in North Africa, where refugees are processed not only as asylum-seekers but as medical targets. While corridors of power continue to argue over the ethics and logistics of migration quotas and border security, a quieter atrocity is unfolding where the systematic medical exploitation of stateless persons, often unfolding into coerced organ removal. Within the ward where law disguises violence as care, silence kills quieter than bullets, outruns justice, and erases crimes before they are named. In extraction zones, silence enforced policy by design, not by accident.

Militias, Traffickers, and Medical Collusion

Since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, Libya represents a textbook case of post-revolutionary power vacuum, dominated by militia entrenchment, coercion by proxy, and smuggling networks. Moreover, in the absence of central governance, detention centers have evolved into profit-generating hubs for human trafficking, including a disturbing development: organ trade. 

Strategic assessments by the Inter-Agency Coordination Group against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT) outline that trafficking in persons for the purpose of organ removal is recognized under the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol (Palermo Protocol) as a serious but hidden form of exploitation. Furthermore law-enforcement analysis by INTERPOL (2021) lays bare how criminal networks present in North and West Africa, which includes actors with medical links target vulnerable migrants and displaced populations for organ removal. Moreover, media investigation have further illustrated these risks, with platforms such as The Guardian (2024) bear witness to testimonies of migrants who were coerced into organ sales exposing the collusion between traffickers and medical staff.

Migrants and the displaced from sub-Saharan Africa, Syria, Bangladesh, and the Horn of Africa are frequently subjected to captivity under force along main transit routes through Agadez in Niger and eastern Sudan, with Libya positioned as Europe’s de facto checkpoint. In addition, these detention centers are often routinely run by militias and other non-state actors in alliance with traffickers and smugglers, under credible allegations of organ-trafficking risks and unease over possible complicity of medical personnel. Without independent oversight or any mechanism for accountability, these facilities—designed for secrecy—function as black boxes

From Rumor to Routine: Coerced Organ Removal Across Migration Routes

What was once a rumor is now routinized —measured in spreadsheets, hidden in budgets, and carved into bodies. In recent years, humanitarian workers and forensic specialists have uncovered disturbing patterns of disappearances and allegations of coerced medical procedures—making clear that the undocumented body, once erased by the state, is reintroduced into systems of value as currency, commodity, and collateral. Illicit transplant surgeries have been documented in multiple countries through police operations and court cases, even as UNODC’s Assessment Toolkit (2015) characterizes trafficking for organ removal as a hidden, under-reported crime whose true scale remains unknown.

From capitals to courtroom, global monitors have begun documenting the horror. The July 2024 IMO-UNHCR Mixed Migration Centre Report interviewed migrants, revealing patterns of detainees taken for blood testing and disappearing shortly afterward. Survivors report post-procedural states marked by disorientation, physical pain, and memory loss—reflecting a troubling loss of bodily agency under conditions where medical procedures are imposed rather than chosen. 

In July 2023, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) warned of deepening shadows over Libya, where layers of entrenched crimes have become almost invisible to international oversight: human trafficking, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, and the systematic torture of migrants and refugees—many lacking recognized nationality and thus classified as stateless under international law (OHCHR, 2023). 

Statelessness strips individuals of legal protection, leaving them defenseless against exploitation, including illicit organ removal. This risk is echoed in multiple reports, including a study led by the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the Mixed Migration Center (July 2024), which documents the experiences of refugees and migrants—many likely stateless—describing non-consensual organ removal along migration routes to the Mediterranean (Reuters, 2024). Witness journalism documents the experiences of 43 individuals from Sudan, South Sudan, and Eritrea—many of whom are absent from any civil registry—who sold a kidney under coercion, underscoring how displacement and the absence of state protection leave individuals acutely vulnerable to the most extreme forms of trafficking (The Guardian, 2024). 

Borders Beneath the Skin

In the shadows of ports, prisons, and refugee camps, the passport has been reduced to flesh, and the border is inscribed in blood. The trail starts in Tripoli, where the Mixed Migration Centre’s Everyone’s Prey briefing (July 2019) reports patterns of kidnapping and extortion of migrants in Libya’s detention industry. Moreover structural analysis such as the OSCE study on trafficking for organ removal coupled with the ICAT policy brief highlight how displacement and detention centers formulate systematic flaws that can be preyed upon by trafficking networks. 

Law-enforcement alarm remains unambiguous in  INTERPOL’s 2021 assessment which documents that organized crime groups based in North and West Africa prey on migrants and other displaced persons for coerced organ removal often shadowed by medical collusion. The UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (2022) observes that such trafficking persists in shadows, though it remains rare when in comparison to sexual or labor exploitations. Diesel generators hum into the darkness, fueling flickering lights over neglected wounds. The hum echoes east, into Xinjiang’s Dabancheng complex. Moreover, survivors bore witness before the Uyghur Tribunal revealing that they were subjected to blood draws, tissue typing, and ultrasound scans stripped of consent. In forensic retrospect, these procedures suggest a system where the border no longer ends at territory but continues beneath the skin.

This brutality is mirrored in the testimonies of countless individuals whose voices bleed through silence. On August 10, 2024, The Diplomat reported the public testimony of Cheng Pei Ming, described as the first known survivor of forced organ harvesting in China to speak openly. Cheng remains a crucial witness to an ongoing, state-directed system of coerced organ extraction — a campaign that the independent China Tribunal (2019) concluded was organized and carried out by the Chinese Communist Party, beyond reasonable doubt.

However, Beijing rejects any acknowledgement of state-directed coerced organ harvesting, particularly when involving prisoners of conscience. The official position maintains a stance of denial, asserting that the practice of using organs from executed prisoners was halted in 2015.

Bodies as Evidence: Testimonies of Coerced Organ Harvesting and the Global Shadow Trade

Policy is prose, while the body is evidence. Cheng’s testimony stands as a singular, rare first-person account. He recounts: “They said that I had to undergo an operation, but I firmly refused. They held me down and gave me an injection, and I quickly lost consciousness. When I woke up, I was still in the hospital and felt terrible pain in my side.” Refusal. Confinement. Injection. Blackout. Waking up shackled, with an IV taped to his foot, a drainage tube in his chest, oxygen tubes in his nose, and a thirty-five-centimeter incision. “There was a tube with bloody liquid coming from under the bandaging that was on my side,” he adds, as documented in the ETAC media release.

Additionally, The Diplomat reports that Xinjiang authorities plan to establish six new organ transplant centers despite the region’s strikingly low official voluntary donation rate — a figure widely disputed by human rights organizations.

While the East provides a witness, the South offers a case file. Described by authorities as Egypt’s largest organ-trafficking case to date, the December 2016 raids targeted 10 medical centers, resulting in 37 convictions in 2018. Among those arrested were several medical professionals, and authorities reported the recovery of millions in assets.

Victims, including Sudanese asylum seekers, recounted waking from anesthesia to find fresh surgical dressings, visible scars, and the absence of a kidney. Within North and West Africa, INTERPOL (2021) assessment states that organized crime groups frequently prey on migrants and refugees, often under the guise of “altruistic donations” and frequently shadowed by medical-sector complicity.

Additionally, some clinics are reported to perform both legal and illegal procedures simultaneously. However, weak reporting mechanisms and fragmented medical registries allow the illicit trade to thrive in the shadows.

Across borders, the UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (2022) records that trafficking for organ removal remains a statistical rarity in detected cases and is chronically under-reported. Furthermore, the only treaty directly addressing organ trafficking, the Council of Europe Convention against Trafficking in Human Organs (CETS No. 216), continues to struggle with limited ratification.

In a parallel theatre, in the Sinai, Eritrean captives have been kidnapped and tortured for ransom. In some cases, they were killed when payments failed; several testimonies also allege organ removal—a practice all too familiar—although rights reporting primarily emphasizes the ransom-torture economy. Yet the trail does not end in Sinai.

In April 2025, the trail led to Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province, where the body of 19-year-old Beatrice Warguru Mwangi was returned to Kenya. What was returned was missing a stomach, eyes, and reproductive organs; her neck was almost severed. “How is this my daughter? Her body was empty. No stomach inside. Her breasts were cut …,” her mother testified to Migrants-Rights.org. The post-mortem examination in Nairobi further documented signs of strangulation, dehydration, and prolonged starvation. Despite petitions, the case remains unanswered—with no formal inquiry, no published findings, and no transparent remedial steps. One body speaking for many, her body stands as a summons to states to intervene.

Surgical Sovereignty and Stateless Bodies

This cross-national pattern highlights how, in detention and transit zones, where oversight falters and legal authority is often liminal, protection gaps open like unhealed wounds. The absence of identification papers renders human beings harder to see and easier to exploit. These are not isolated anomalies; rather, they expose a deeper implementation gap: the 1954 Convention and the Palermo Protocol—while widely ratified—remain unevenly enforced in practice, repeatedly failing at the stage of implementation. As a result, data remain under-reported, justice remains selective, and access to remedies often depends on documentation and financial means.

At the core of this atrocity lies a collapse of medical integrity—a reversal of the healer’s oath. Clinical spaces become theatres of harm, with ethics dissolved into silence. The obligation remains clear: voluntary, informed consent and the absence of financial gain are fundamental norms, and physicians must not participate in abuse, including in detention settings.

Yet, in documented cases, detainees have repeatedly been subjected to medical procedures without consent and denied proper care—from coercive interventions behind the closed gates of Libyan detention centers to intrusive medical testing in Xinjiang—while criminal networks exploit these systemic gaps. In such contexts, human bodies are treated as inventory rather than as patients.

This dynamic aligns with the concept of surgical sovereignty—the ability of non-state and state-adjacent actors to exert coercive control and extract biological value from stateless and displaced persons.

The concept of surgical sovereignty refers to the ability to use medical infrastructure by non-state actors to exert coercive control and exploit the biological value of stateless persons — those “not considered as nationals by any State under the operation of its law,” as defined in the 1954 Convention Art.1 (1). In these spaces, procedures continue to occur without voluntary, informed consent or credible oversight, reversing medicine’s role from care to control. The framework aligns with biopolitics but specifically isolates the role of medical systems. Moreover, the Palermo Protocol defines trafficking to include exploitation for the removal of organs, even as its implementation remains weak.

In February 2025, authorities in southeast Libya uncovered two migrant mass graves, freed 76 captives, and made three arrests linked to suspected trafficking sites. The following month, Sudanese refugees reported accounts of starvation, rape, slavery — and, in some testimonies, organ harvesting — along migration routes to the north. From a forensic perspective, such conditions cannot sustain lawful surgery: there is no anesthesia, no sterile field, and no consent, as required under the WHO Guiding Principles. Moreover under international law, such death and disappearances demand the recognition of right to life and a duty to reinvestigate as outlined in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 and the Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 36. An individual’s right to health requires consent, documentation and oversight under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 12 and CESR General Comment No.14. Failure to keep records or examine remains may be treated as violations.

Although abuses remain widespread and often under-investigated, the law frequently erodes into silence. This is compounded by the absence of an effective accountability mechanism to enforce WHO health standards in conflict settings and detention sites. Current mandates also struggle to reach non-state actors who control many of these camps. As of 2025, the international response has been both limited and late.

Cut in Silence: The Cost of Global Inaction

This silence echoes earlier failures and undermines the very foundations of the post-war settlement the world claims to uphold. The 1947 Nuremberg Code declared voluntary, informed consent to be non-negotiable — even in times of conflict. Yet in modern-day Libya, while the principle is acknowledged in theory, it remains absent in practice.

What fails in implementation locally is often underwritten by decisions made in Europe. Amnesty International’s Europe’s Gatekeeper (2015) reported that EU funding and equipment to Libya’s coastguard and detention systems have given cover to abuses against migrants: arbitrary detention, torture, extortion. Moreover, UN reporting and rights groups have revealed a grim pattern: people returned to Libya vanish into detention centers or unregistered sites. Many then become effectively untraceable. Furthermore, The Global Protection Cluster cautions that Libya’s legal ambiguity  between migrants, asylum seekers, refugees, and trafficking survivors becomes a structural barrier to protection and remedies. Médecins Sans Frontières has reported overcrowding and the lack of adequate care: conditions that are irreconcilable with the very principles of medical care and a blatant disregard for the laws of human dignity.

Yet beneath the reports and the evidence, a deeper question is left unanswered. What happens to the body unclaimed by nation, unnamed by law, unacknowledged by history? What happens to a life that holds no legal weight, does its loss echo anywhere? In these spaces, the lack of prosecution remains as the infrastructure of impunity.

Breaking the Silence on Hidden Atrocities

This article does not claim to resolve the failures of states. However, it demands that the silence surrounding medical atrocities be dismantled. As the world increasingly governs bodies before protecting them, a pressing question persists: how long until the promise of healing conceals the reality of extraction?

When the refugee body is no longer seen as a body in need but one that is policed, processed, and politicised, the surgeon’s scalpel — once an instrument of care — becomes a tool of control. These atrocities are not merely the actions of complicit individuals; they are the outcome of systemic structures that strip the stateless and the dispossessed of their humanity.

Once, the international community drew a line after gas seared lungs. Today, the responsibility falls on governments, international bodies, and all who claim moral authority to draw a new line — for those cut in silence — and to outlaw surgical violence against the voiceless. If we remember only the suffering but not the perpetrators, we bury the crime beside the victim.

Will those who once enforced accountability now hold states, militias, and complicit actors responsible for the scalpel used without consent — or will silence remain the price of statelessness? If the world outlawed gas, will it also outlaw surgical violence, or will the voiceless continue to pay the cost of inaction?

 

(*) Umavi Pagoda is a UK-based A-level student studying Politics, Chemistry, Biology, and Physics, with a focus on the intersection of medical ethics, human rights, and international law. Their work in international debate and policy stimulation has been recognized at multiple high-level Model United Nations conferences Worldwide. Email: pagodaumavi41@gmail.com

Refugees and migrants disembark at the port of Thessaloniki after being transferred from the Moria refugee camp on Lesvos Island, Greece, September 2, 2019. Photo: Vasilis Ververidis.

Locked Out, Building In: Refugees in Greece Persevere Amidst Exclusion

by CommentariesECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeMigrationVoice of Youth

Greece has become a critical gateway for asylum-seekers, yet increasingly restrictive migration policies, harsh detention conditions, and reduced aid leave refugees in precarious circumstances. Amid systemic exclusion, NGOs like REFUGYM, Sama Community Center, and El-Sistema Greece foster hope, dignity, and belonging through education, sports, arts, and grassroots initiatives. Drawing on interviews with NGO leaders, refugees, and first-hand field observations, this article highlights both the barriers asylum-seekers face and the community-led solutions redefining resilience. In a climate of tightening borders and rising polarization, refugee-led spaces remain vital for empowerment, solidarity, and imagining more inclusive futures.

By Layla Hajj*

On July 9th, 2025, Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis announced that Greece will stop the processing of asylum applications arriving from North Africa for three months, claiming that those who enter the country illegally will be “arrested and detained.” Despite the Greek Council for Refugees demanding that there be no suspension of asylum under the premise that it is “illegal,” a violation of international law, and a demonstration of Greece’s failure to guarantee basic fundamental rights, Greece has justified their migration restrictions with the influx of migrants arriving via the Mediterranean route. The government defends that they must halt all illegal migration to increase their country’s security and ensure that they have the adequate resources to distribute to their own citizens, who are currently facing issues such as widespread unemployment.

Despite being one of Europe’s main gateways for migration, with 80% of asylum-seekers who cross the Mediterranean landing in Greece, the country continues to tighten restrictions on asylum seekers, who already face a life-threatening journey to reach the island-nation (IRC). The UN agency IOM reports that as of July 2025, 743 people have died this year as they attempt to cross the Mediterranean to Europe, inducing 538 on the Central Mediterranean route, one of the main pathways to Greece and the deadliest migration route in the world. 

Those who make it to Greece live in detention centers, formally called refugee camps. Despite government officials denying all accusations, Cyprus and Greece have been repeatedly accused of human rights violations and push backs against migrants by the European Court of Human Rights and other councils.

While camps have always been isolated, cast away in remote mountains outside of the line of sight of most Greek citizens, they have become increasingly restricted in recent years. In 2020, the Greek government built 10 foot concrete retainer walls around a camp referred to as Malakasa 1, which was already surrounded by barbed wire. Within these towering walls, the government has limited the entrepreneurship of refugees, including shutting down most, if not all, of the small businesses running in the camps.

The government has even limited assistance for basic survival necessities. In 2021, between the months of October and December, the state stripped asylum seekers of cash card assistance, a provision that impacted many thousands of asylum-seekers (Refugees International). In 2024, cash assistance was not paid out to migrants for the months of May, June, July, and August. Recently in March of 2025, the government reduced the eligibility period for Refugee Cash Assistance (RCA) and Refugee Medical Assistance (RMA) from 12 months to 4 months. The government has not provided a specific reason for the halting of said assistance. 

In an interview with Britty Grace, founder of the NGO REFUGYM and a former service worker in Malakasa 1, she shared some insights into the realities of life inside the camps. “People refer to the camps as prisons” she revealed. People are often uninformed of their rights, detained in the camps for weeks on end for paperwork processing, which inhibits their ability to get a job and provide for their families, and are stripped of housing opportunities overnight. And when asked if the conditions inside of camps have improved over the years, she responded with a direct “No. Things have gotten worse. And when you think things can’t get any worse, they do.” 

Britty Grace started working in camps in 2016. Two years later, she started REFUGYM, an NGO that provides community-led-sports programming and language lessons to asylum-seekers. While there are many NGOs like Grace’s dedicated to servicing individuals living in refugee camps, the Greek government has placed several restrictions on their entry. According to Grace, the process of registration with a camp is “very expensive, bureaucratic, and difficult. Even after registration, it ultimately comes down to the discretion of the camp manager. Oftentimes, they don’t provide a reason for kicking us out. And I guess they don’t have to – they’re in charge.”

Grace was kicked out of the camp 5 times over the course of 6 years for trying to implement REFUGYM. “When I started it (REFUGYM), I had always created it to be a community led gym in the eventuality I would be kicked out. That way, it wasn’t completely dependent on me. So when I was forced to leave, REFUGYM was still able to continue for 6 years being led by the community.” However, her continued removal from the camps made management of her organization incredibly difficult, forcing Grace to eventually move her services to an external location.

A colleague of Grace’s, Katerina Tsikalaki, who now collaborates with Grace at her new location, shares similar experiences from working within the camps. As the co-founder of the NGO Science United, she is dedicated to providing science education to displaced youth in Greece. A valuable aspect of her services is providing children with the opportunity to go on field trips to observe the subjects they are learning about.

Tsikalaki shared a vivid memory of a setback she faced while implementing her travel programming: “A few years ago, I spent time planning a science field trip for the kids so that they could visit the Athens Science Festival. It was a much needed opportunity for them to get out of the camp and learn. However, on the planned day of the excursion, the minister abruptly decided to lock down the camp for what he described as procedures. Instead of a fun science excursion, the kids were stuck in the camps all day, watching their parents run through another round of security checks.”

“This was not an isolated event,” Tsikalaki continued. “While residents are allowed out of the camp, they must show identification. And if something goes wrong, they must remain in the camp until further notice. The children, and even adults, absolutely do not have the same rights as Greek residents outside of the camps. But it’s not surprising. We now have a very far-right minister of migration and asylum, Thanos Plevris.”

In the face of strict policy, refugees, with the support of NGOs, still manage to create their own spaces for belonging and success. Since relocating REFUGYM to the Sama community center, positioned right outside Malakasa 1 and 2,  Britty Grace has been able to do so much more with her organization. A big part of REFUGYM’s programming has always been the escapism element that it presents participants – before from the typical day in the camps and since relocating, from the camps altogether. 

“People come to hang out at Sama when we’re not there. It’s a safe space – a home,” Grace reflects.

Jumping in to support Grace’s comment, a refugee attending a Sama event revealed that “Sama makes life in the camps bearable. Sama gives me a purpose. When I leave to go back to camp, I am more joyful and hopeful.”

Sama is both a place of comfort and excitement. REFUGYM’s sports programming includes climbing trips, hiking, watersports, boxing, yoga and more. The center also hosts women’s weekly only days, cultivating a space in which women feel empowered and secure by offering activities like self-defense and meditation. On top of programming, Sama offers medical services and asylum support every week with the help of doctors and social workers from other NGOS.

A 16 year old frequenter of Sama serves as a prime example of the impact of the centers’ multifaceted program opportunities. He came to Sama illiterate and with a very bad eye condition. However, Britty Grace was able to connect him with an ophthalmologist and get him strong prescription glasses. From that point forward, his confidence increased exponentially. He became literate and learned English within months. Now, he helps translate the English classes for his less-fluent peers. This boy is one of many dedicated participants at the Sama community center. “People often attend 3 or 4 language classes. They are thirsty and keen for knowledge!” Grace exclaimed.

“Over the years a lot of people have asked me to write reference letters for them from when they were a leader in our program, and then that helped them to obtain a job,” Grace revealed. Their dedication inside Sama presents far-reaching opportunities.

Sama community center has also manifested into a space for cultural exchanges. Oftentimes, a Greek native named Maria, who helps teach the Greek lessons, plays music for the migrants on weekends. In return, migrants teach songs to their peers in their native language. “It is a super lovely reciprocal exchange of music. This is such an amazing, organic element that we should encourage,” Grace reflects. “Music is so universal and is an incredible way to promote mutual understanding and connection.” 

El-Sistema Greece, a partner organization of REFUGYM, utilizes music as its key tool to promote unity. The organization is a Greek-led NGO that teaches music to both displaced youth and Greek locals, cultivating a space that promotes understanding and cohesion. The team is adamant that they remain a completely Greek team in order to foster a tight-knit community that promotes Greek inclusion, and makes the clear statement that Greece is an inviting country.

In an interview with Anis Barnat, co-founder of the NGO, he explained that: “What we developed is not so much music lessons, it’s nice but it’s not the purpose of what we’re doing. The social element is the most important one and the values that we’re giving to the kids, like learning how to understand differences and how to understand that barriers are most of the time very psychological so you have to overcome that. We try to give our kids as much control over the lesson plan as possible, and encourage them to work together in order to devise a plan. This is the thing that is lacking, I think, in the world in general. Fear and polarization are overtaking our world – and we seek to combat that division through El-Sistema.  I love the arts, but we are creating good people, good leaders, and good citizens.”

“It’s essential to start community led projects so that they can be sustainable,” adds Grace. “In such programs. community members feel like it’s their space, so they contribute to it. It’s not just something that they passively show up to. They contribute to it, they help with upkeep, cleaning, and teaching. It’s a collective space as opposed to a hierarchical one.”

We will only see more people displaced from their home countries with the rise of climate change, poverty, and global conflict. In such a time, it is critical to lean on communities and cultivate spaces for inclusion. In the words of Britty Grace, “we must break down barriers in order to foster belonging.”

 

Layla Hajj is a rising senior at the National Cathedral School in Washington, D.C., and the founder of Refugee Youth Support, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit providing tutoring, mentorship, and school-prep programs for refugee children in the DC area. Over the past three summers, she has interned with the Blossom Hill Foundation, supporting educational initiatives for displaced youth worldwide. She has also traveled to Jordan and Greece to teach English to refugee children, conduct interviews with migration experts and asylum-seekers, and document grassroots efforts to build inclusive communities.

As a youth writer and advocate, Layla works to empower migrant youth and address systemic barriers facing displaced communities. For this article, she draws on interviews with NGO leaders and refugees, as well as her first-hand experiences working near refugee camps, aiming to amplify and contextualize the voices of migrants themselves.

 

References

Al Jazeera. (2025, June 17). “At least 60 people ‘feared dead’ after shipwrecks off the coast of Libya.” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/17/at-least-sixty-asylum-seekers-missing-after-shipwrecks-off-the-coast-of-libya (accessed on September 1, 2025).

Al Jazeera. (2025, July 9). “Greece halts migrant asylum processing from North Africa.” https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/9/greece-to-halt-migrant-asylum-processing-from-north-africa (accessed on September 1, 2025).

Greece Refugee.info. (n.d.). “Information and services about rights and procedures for refugees in Greece.” https://greece.refugee.info/en-us (accessed on September 1, 2025).

Mixed Migration Centre. (2024). Quarterly Mixed Migration Update: Europe. https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/QMMU-2024-Q4-Europe.pdf

International Rescue Committee. (n.d.) Refugee Inclusion, Greece. https://www.rescue.org/country/greece (accessed on September 1, 2025).

Spinnicchia, C. (2025, April 11). “Greece: Government suspends cash assistance to asylum seekers for nine months.” Melting Pot Europa. https://www.meltingpot.org/en/2025/04/greece-the-government-has-suspended-economic-assistance-to-asylum-seekers-for-9-months/ (accessed on September 1, 2025).

MedMA, Mediterranean Migration & Asylum Policy Hub. (2025, February 24). “Unpacking Greece’s 2024 Migration & Asylum Report: Data and Trends. https://med-ma.eu/publications/unpacking-greeces-2024-migratio (accessed on September 1, 2025).

The controversial Israeli separation wall dividing Israel from the West Bank, often referred to as the segregation wall in Palestine. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

The Psychological Toll of Graphic Content in the Israel-Palestine Conflict

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

As massacre and starvation content floods social media in the wake of Hamas’s October 7 attack, a new generation of users—especially teenagers—grapples with its psychological toll. In this Voice of Youth commentary, 19-year-old aspiring journalist Andrea Castelnuovo explores how platforms like Instagram, X, and TikTok have become both vital sources of information and sources of distress. Drawing on recent studies from Israel and Jordan, Castelnuovo highlights the anxiety, trauma, and emotional numbness that graphic imagery can induce in young viewers. He also shares his own experience of digital overwhelm and the importance of finding alternative, less triggering ways to stay informed. His article raises a crucial question for journalists: Can we raise awareness without harming those who bear witness?

By Andrea Castelnuovo*

Since Hamas’s attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, people have turned to platforms like Instagram, X, and TikTok to stay informed. However, many are struggling with the emotional toll of witnessing violent content.

The Israel-Palestine conflict is one of the most discussed topics on social media – now the main source of information for much of the Western population. Studies show that people prefer following independent journalists on platforms like Instagram and TikTok over reading mainstream outlets like the BBC, Fox, and Sky News – often criticized for a perceived pro-Israel bias. Content on social media is usually more direct as journalists share raw pictures and videos that make the news easier to grasp. However, many viewers – teenagers in particular – are triggered by this approach. 

In the article “It matters what you see: Graphic media images of war and terror may amplify distress” by the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (PNAS), two researchers examined how graphic content can pressure governments to act – but also emphasized how often its emotional impact on viewers is overlooked. 

Cyber psychology researchers Liat Franco and Meyran Boniel-Nissim studied the psychological, physical, and mental toll – along with coping strategies – among teenagers in northern Israel exposed to war content on social media. Their symptoms included anxiety, sleep disturbances, and shifts in political views. Based on interviews with thirty-one adolescents aged 13 to 15 in northern Israel, the study found that many teens were becoming emotionally numb – a defense mechanism to shield themselves from ongoing trauma. 

A similar pattern emerged in research led by Dua’a Al-Maghaireh and colleagues, who studied acute stress symptoms among Jordanian teenagers. Nearly half of Jordan’s population has Palestinian roots, which intensifies the emotional impact of the content they view. All 180 students interviewed said they watched Gaza-related news on social media, with 61% consuming it for more than three hours a day. All of them reported viewing content on YouTube – a platform where footage is especially graphic and unfiltered. As a result, 70% described themselves as highly stressed, and only 11% reported low levels of stress. Common feelings included sadness, shock, and hopelessness.

One teenage boy recalled his first time seeing images of bombings in Gaza: “I was very shocked by the scenes of killing, blood, and destruction of homes – and the people inside them. I have never seen such scenes before.”

Another said the emotional weight had affected his relationships: “After I watched news footage of the Gaza attack on social media and described it to my family and friends, my friends became very sad, and there was no laughter like before. Also, my house became gloomy.”

As a 19-year-old aspiring journalist, I care deeply about staying informed – but also about protecting my mental health. Recently, I deleted Instagram, as its content made me anxious and triggered my dissociation. Being exposed to graphic imagery every day left me feeling hopeless and powerless – too small to make a difference. Since I started listening to podcasts and reading long-form articles, I have managed to stay informed without feeling overwhelmed. This approach may not work for everyone, but for people like me – who want to stay aware without burning out – it is a valuable starting point.

The main question remains: Is there a way journalists and content creators can sensitize their audience without harming them?

 

(*) Andrea Castelnuovo is a nineteen-year-old aspiring journalist from Italy. He studied languages and literature in high school, with a focus on English, German, and Chinese. In 2024, he attended NHSMUN in New York City, where he gained insight into international law and the importance of journalism. Email: castelnuovo.andrea2006@gmail.com

A poster for the 2024 European elections featuring Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in Rome, Italy on May 4, 2024. Photo: Stefano Chiacchiarini.

The Role of Mainstream Parties in the Success of Radical Right Populists 

by CommentariesECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have been gaining votes in recent decades, votes that were once almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. At the same time, voter turnout has declined. Regardless of the analytical reasons, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not convincing as many people as they once did. While it’s easy to blame external factors like misinformation or divisive rhetoric, that’s not enough in a democratic system. Our system is straightforward: parties and politicians need to win votes. If people aren’t convinced, they will shift their support to other parties. Blaming factors beyond their control will only further harm liberal democratic mainstream parties. 

By Maël Jones

The issue of radical right populism (RRP) has exploded onto the political science scene in the last two to three decades. Naturally, this was to be expected after the success of these parties in elections across western democracies. As a result, a flurry of different opinions on the causes of the success of RRP parties have emerged, some mutually inclusive others less so. 

Much of the focus has been on the voter, the so-called demand-side. Here the big divide is generally between those who believe that RRP parties succeed because of economic reasons, while others believe the main driver to be cultural issues (Engler & Weisstanner, 2020; Bornschier, 2018: 213). Some other researchers have focused specifically on the supply-side: the parties (Mols & Jetten, 2020; Russo & Brock, 2024). In this case the focus is generally on the role of the radical right parties themselves (Mols & Jetten, 2020), or in rarer cases, the way in which other parties have interacted with RRPs (Russo & Brock, 2024). By focusing too much on the phenomenon of RRP itself, students of this discipline have forgotten much of what surrounds it. Because, while RRPs do influence voter decisions, voters do not only vote for RRPs they also vote against those parties that they, and the generations before them, trusted for decades – mainstream parties. To avoid lengthy definitions, we will consider mainstream parties as those broadly situated in the middle of the political spectrum and encompassing the country’s political establishment. In the EU, these parties are generally affiliated with the S&D, EPP, Renew, or the Greens. 

Since the onset of the liberal democratic model, mainstream parties have been central actors of the system – parties played an important role in simplifying the political process, representing a large amount of people and pulling people into the political process (Stokes, 1999: 243-244). Of course, the system of parties is imperfect, but the division of the political system into segments of society that were more or less adequately represented by said parties made for a stable system (Lipset, 2000: 50-51). Generally, left-wing parties represented the poorer working class while richer, middle- and upper-class voters opted for right-wing parties. Some systems also had a divide along race lines or religious beliefs (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; 2000: 50) Yet, in recent years, the decline of these parties has been apparent (Casal Bértoa & Rama, 2021: 37). At times, the green or liberal parties attracted voters away from the mainstream. Increasingly, though, as the latter have been integrated into the political establishment (Burchell, 2014), it has been the radical right that has taken over many of the votes previously held by mainstream parties. One of the main reasons for why this has happened, is due to political disaffection (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174, Hooghe et al., 2011).

The first strong indicator of such disaffection emerged in the decades around the end of the cold war: declining rates of voter turnout (Hay, 2007; Mair, 2011). Today, this issue is still at the heart of many political debates despite slowing down and even showing some signs of improvement (IDEA, 2024). In its stead, in the last 20 or so years we have seen votes for the radical right populists increase drastically across the board (Ivaldi, 2024). 

Political Disaffection

European Parliament offices and European flags in Brussels, Belgium on July 20, 2020. Photo: Lena Wurm.

Let us first analyze what has driven political disaffection before turning to how voter turnout and the success of RRPs are linked.

There are multiple drivers for political disaffection. What is clear is that for people to feel implicated in a system and for that system to be of interest to them, they must feel like they have some power within it (Harder & Krosnick, 2008: 538). Thus, drivers of disaffection would cause people to doubt their importance within the political system and abandon it or look for ways to regain this power. Yet, increasingly, mainstream parties have taken steps to decrease the power of the people (Mair, 2011).

First, is the convergence of mainstream parties on policy issues. Some might be surprised by the claim that parties are “converging” when we are constantly being told that our democracies and societies are becoming increasingly polarized (Nguyen & Vu, 2019). But one must not automatically exclude the other. A convergence can exists on policy issues even when political rhetoric is as divided as ever. Additionally, the attention here is specifically on mainstream parties.

For decades, a body of literature has argued that the more political parties converge to the center, the better they will perform electorally (Spoon & Klüver, 2019: 1023). The theory holds merit and cannot entirely be dismissed. Yet, while maximizing their votes in order to win over the ‘median voter,’ mainstream parties have failed to represent those with more radical values. This creates a more volatile political arena that is more inclined to turn to the extremes (Bartolini & Mair, 1990: 1).

As some have remarked, Germany might be the best example for this in Western Europe. For decades now, the CDU and the SPD have moved towards the center (Berman & Kundani, 2021: 23). The former – a family and Christian-oriented party – increasingly moved left on social issues, while the latter – a left-wing workers’ party – increasingly moved to the right on certain economic issues. Both forming a ‘Grand Coalition’ and working together across most of the beginning of the 21st Century (Berman & Kundani, 2021).

But even France, an oftentimes divided society with historically strong labor movements, experienced a neoliberal transformation that transcended party politics. As some of the biggest neoliberal decisions were taken by socialist Presidents François Mitterand and François Hollande (Masquelier, 2021; Pinçon & Pinçon Charlot, 2014). Other countries have seen similar trends within their borders as well. Tony Blair’s Labor Party and Bill Clinton’s democrats both became important drivers of neo-liberalization in their respective countries, with little protest from opposition parties on that particular matter (Rieger, 2021: 113; Meerpool, 2019). 

Today, as Mair (2011: 72) notes, the question between state-controlled and market-controlled economies has been answered: the winners are market-controlled economies. The left-right divide on this issue has thus eroded and the current positions present a far less clear distinction. Therefore, mainstream parties attempt to find distinctions somewhere else: they insist on personalities, character traits and rhetorical differences. But these significantly impoverish the possible policy changes once in power and thus deprives electors of a feeling of potential change (Hay, 2007: 56-58).

In parallel to party convergence, a similar but distinct phenomenon has also been changing Western European societies: the depoliticization of many issues and the rise of the regulatory state. The effect of this is that many decisions which once lay with elected politicians – and thus by extension with the people – have been removed from the political sphere and into the bureaucratic and/or the market-controlled sphere. 

For example, a case of this is Central Bank independence. Central Banks originally emerged in very different circumstances depending on the countries and their history – some were private, others independent, and some were dependent on the national treasury (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020). But today, the idea that these institutions must be independent has been dominant for decades and remains almost entirely unchallenged. This idea was first formulated in 1962 by Milton Friedman (Wachtel & Blejer, 2020), an economist dubbed by Krugman (2007) as an “ideologue [and] the great popularizer of the free-market doctrine.” He was incidentally the man who went on to advise Raegan and Thatcher for their economic policies. While he remains one of the most influential and knowledgeable economists ever to live, he can hardly be described as neutral or apolitical. Yet, his long-term fight to make Central Banks independent has today been made to seem exactly that: neutral and apolitical. In turn, this has justified the depoliticization of central banks and its removal from public decision-making.

In the UK, the Bank of England was one of the last Central Banks to remain under the responsibility of the treasury, but in 1998, under Tony Blair’s Labor government, this changed, and the Bank was granted independence to set interest rates (Burnham, 2001). In a more global study encompassing 155 countries, Romelli (2024: 3), found that out of 370 reforms to central bank designs between 1923 and 2023, over 75 percent of them increased the bank’s independence. In the European Union (EU), the Maastricht treaty required EU countries to have an independent Central Bank. This was in addition, of course, to the European Central Bank (ECB) which is also independent and covers all 27 EU countries (Bruni, 1997).

The EU has not only pushed the depoliticization of central banks, but it has also brought about many depoliticizing policies within its member states. In the early 1990s, the European Commission began heavily banking on regulation and became a powerful actor in restraining an increasingly privatized market; thus began the regulatory state in Europe (Majone, 1994). 

Regulation became a way for a Commission with a low budget to increase its decision-making powers without changing the rules of the game. At the beginning, this did not really pose too many problems. The Commission played a role which, in other democracies, was often taken on by independent agencies and this role was limited in scope (Majone, 1994). But with years passing, the Commission became more powerful, and the roles it took on, outgrew those that made it possible to overlook the institution’s undemocratic nature (Majone, 2014: 1217). Because after regulation came financial control. Of course, member states signed up to this. For example, they agreed to adhere to the so-called ‘Fiscal Stability Treaty’ in 2012 which significantly restrained individual state’s fiscal policies. States must for example avoid excessive public debt and must also submit their budget plans to the Council in order for them to be scrutinized (and possibly asked to be altered). This constrained governments’ actions and put more power into the hands of those with little to no accountability (Majone, 2014: 1220).

While it may seem that the blame is being shifted onto the EU and away from mainstream parties, this is not entirely accurate for two main reasons. First, as Mair (2011: 127) rightly argues, the EU did not grow organically, instead it was built by its architects. These architects were primarily the foreign ministers and leaders of European countries and thus members of the political establishment. Second, critique of the EU has been very constrained, especially in Western Europe. When governments disagree with EU policies, they blame Brussels without calling for real change. When they are happy with these policies, they take credit for them. The only real critics of the EU have been populist parties from both the left and the right (Grzymala-Busse, 2019: 43). Thus, anyone who does not entirely agree with the European project or with the direction it has taken, has to either accept it or vote for populists.

Some other factors can also be named which originate from the political establishment and foster disaffection. Some examples of this are globalization which has deeply affected western societies but has been regarded by the political establishment as the only way forward (even though, in recent years, this enthusiasm has been curtailed slightly); as well as the metamorphosis of mainstream parties, going from ones representing specific groups and interests to catch-all parties with a hugely eroded identity (Mair, 2011: 79-85). 

Consequences of Political Disaffection

Photo: Shutterstock.

Having established the factors of political disaffection, we can move our focus to attempting to understand its consequences.

As mentioned earlier, lower voter turnout has been one of the main symptoms of political disaffection in the last few decades. The direct impact of the latter onto the former is of course hard to assess analytically because it contrasts a subjective state (disaffection) with a phenomenon that is directly and objectively quantifiable (turnout). 

Whether the existence of a link between low turnout and political disaffection needs to be “proven” is debatable. One could argue that the theoretical framework of representative democracy is sufficient to establish this connection. After all, the election of politicians to represent us is fundamental to the functioning of our system. This does not mean that those who do not vote are necessarily apolitical, indeed, many other ways to express one’s opinions exist. Yet, within the formal system, voting is the only universal way of making one’s opinions heard. Choosing not to vote – whether out of apathy or out of protest – can thus be seen as a symptom of disaffection from the present political system.

Based on this though, a vote for radical right populists must not necessarily be a sign of disaffection. And this is true, it is not per se a vote of disaffection, many other reasons exist to vote for RRPs, from authoritarian tendencies to a simple agreement with the party’s policies (Tillman, 2015). But what is of interest to us is specifically the rise of RRPs and why people today are far more likely to vote for such parties than they were 40 years ago. Here, it seems extremely likely that the disaffected have played an important role.

Not all scholars agree on the idea that those who are more dissatisfied will vote for RRPs. This is in large parts because those academics seem to associate disaffection with the idea of ‘protest votes,’ the latter of which is seen as an extension of ‘non-ideological votes’ (Arzheimer, 2008; Van der Brug et al. 2000). Yet, a protest vote must not necessarily be non-ideological. Voters can feel dissatisfaction with a political system because the parties that once represented them do not align with them anymore and thus their ideology is not represented anymore. In this case, an ideological vote simultaneously becomes a protest vote. 

In addition, in the likely case that parties do truly influence political opinion (Slothuus & Bisgaard, 2021), voters who might once have felt only some affinities to RRPs are likely to have developed a stronger ideological overlap over time – Thus distorting studies based on ideological overlap.

It thus seems obvious that when defined right and seen from a broader angle, disaffection from the political system and distrust of its main actors is a central driver of this political movement. People are more likely to vote for the radical right when politicians lose their trust and in turn radical right voters trust mainstream politicians less (Ziller & Schübel, 2015: 382; Söderlund & Kestilä‐Kekkonen, 2009: 174). We know from Germany for example that “turnout surges benefit the populist right ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AfD) in contexts of widespread political distrust” (Schulte-Cloos & Leiniger, 2022: 431) meaning that those who did not go out to vote in past elections and were dissatisfied with the system voted in large parts for the AfD. Additional research such as Hooghe et al.’s work (2011: 265) in Belgium also showed how those who are dissatisfied or distrustful are more likely either not to vote or to vote for populist radical right parties.

More simply though, radical right parties have been winning over votes in recent decades, votes that once were almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. Additionally, turnout has dwindled. Whatever the analytical reason, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not winning over or convincing as many people as they once were. One can always blame external factors such as misinformation or divisive rhetoric for this but that is not sufficient in our democratic system. Our system is simple, it requires parties and politicians to win votes. People thus need to be won over and convinced, if they are not, they will defect to other parties. Blaming elements out of their control will only make matters worse for liberal democratic mainstream parties.

Conclusion 

Having established a link between mainstream parties and disaffection with the political system in a first instance, and then between disaffection and radical right votes in a second; one can see a clear link between the mainstream’s failures and the success of RRPs. This link is important to make for a number of reasons. Firstly, simply because it has been overlooked by researchers. Secondly because it shifts a part of the responsibility from the voters onto the political establishment. This matters because the often-used argument that those who vote for RRPs are simply ill-informed or racist is analytically and politically rather unhelpful and oftentimes overlooks important components of the RRP vote. Lastly, establishing this link gives mainstream parties the tools to recenter their fight against the radical right. Many have attempted to fight this fight, but a misunderstanding of the causes seems to have led most of these efforts to failure. To truly fight RRPs, mainstream parties must know their voters, aim to truly represent them, and ensure that their policies – rather than their rhetoric – truly stand out and distance themselves from their political opponents and rivals.

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UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson arrives in 10 Downing Street in London ahead of flying to Brussels for Brexit trade talks on December 09 2020. Photo: Shutterstock.

Many Facets of Medical Populism: British Political Tradition (BPT) and Covid-19

by CommentariesECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

The traditional British political style and rhetoric were utilized by both former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage of UKIP as tools to communicate their approaches to managing the COVID-19 crisis. This demonstrates the resilience of established political traditions while highlighting the volatility and ambiguity of populist strategies. Notably, populist narratives varied significantly depending on whether the leader was in power or in opposition, which influenced their responsibility towards citizens and their ability to connect populist grievances with pre-existing political arguments in the context of the pandemic. In particular, Johnson’s actions reflect a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, blending epistemic and political authority in determining the necessary measures to address the pandemic.

By Andrea Guidotti*  

Introduction

This paper analyzes the role and significance of the Covid-19 pandemic in the development and behavior of British populist parties. It aims to observe how and when the so-called British Political Tradition (BPT) has been used by these parties as a guiding principle warranting the actions and policies implemented during the Covid-19 crisis in the UK. First, it will briefly introduce medical populism from a general perspective and within the specific situation of the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, it will analyze the overall actions taken by the two main British (right-wing) populist parties at the time and their leaders: the Conservatives in power under Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage’s UKIP party. This piece is not intended to be a theoretical discussion regarding the populist status of the considered parties and assumes that both can be meaningfully characterized as consistently (but differentially) populist on a variety of issues – such as health, immigration, economics or Brexit. The final section discusses the relationships between populists’ responses to the pandemic and the BPT. It evaluates if populists’ attitudes towards COVID-19 and its political management are positively affected by the BPT.

Populism and the Pandemic

One must first understand what kind of crisis the COVID-19 pandemic was and, thus, what kind of phenomena populists were dealing with at the time. Some scholars conceive a crisis as a moment of saliency for systemic contradictions and a consequent perceived need for structural change and strong interventions to take place. In such a situation, political agents are overwhelmed by the unfolding events and there is no common recognized rationality for handling the crisis-driven situation (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 3).

Under a dynamic conception of crises, populist actors may be better conceived not just as passively reacting to given external shocks, but “as actors that actively perform and spread a sense of crisis” (Bobba & Hubé, 2021: 6). This is a general characterization of an endogenous crisis, where all the contradictions are generated within the political system, and in which political agents are acting. In other words, when confronted with such a scenario, populists from all over the political spectrum usually tend to at least trigger or even manufacture the crisis themselves to gain some leverage in the political system (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 4). Being an exogenous crisis with respect to populism, the pandemic is harder to politicize than other political shocks or events that are at least partially originated inside the system itself. In addition, it should also be noted that the pandemic has a peculiar nature: as a public health crisis, no one is free from its consequences and implications. 

Bobba & Hubé (2021: 9-10), drawing from other authors, use the following general framework to better understand health crises such as Covid-19. Health crises are thought to be divisible into three parts: (a) an initial phase in which you are confronted with the emergence of the problem; (b) a confrontation phase in which some actors blame other actors for being responsible for what is happening; (c) a managing phase in which who is blaming responsibility upon others generally tries to propose and claim its solutions.

Moving to populism to connect it with the pandemic, a meaningful characterization of the term in the context of public health crises is needed. Following Gideon Lasco’s argument (2020: 1), one could say that “medical populism” is “a political style based on performances of public health crises that pit ‘the people’ against ‘the establishment’.” Different examples of medical populism can be given, going from Jair Bolsonaro downplaying the threat of the virus and pitting the economy against public health policies, to Donald Trump paving the way for conspiracy theories about the virus’ creation and blaming illegal immigrants for its spread around the country. 

With specific reference to Covid-19, we can distinguish some main features of populist strategies acting within such a crisis: (i) the simplification of the pandemic, offering the simplest (and most simplistic) solutions to the problems that the health emergency is posing; (ii) the dramatization, distortion and spectacularizing the threats posed by the crisis; (iii) the forging of societal divisions claiming to be on the side of the ‘real people’ quite often opposed to an unspecified ‘otherhood’; (iv) the invocation of knowledge claims: for example with regards to the virus’ origins, about the most appropriate methodologies to prevent its spreading or on how to treat it consistently (Lasco, 2020: 2-3). 

Investigating the second feature of populism (ii), we can add the fact that populist actors must not be obscured by the coverage of the pandemic itself. They need to spectacularize the crisis with their messaging, a strategy that allows them to stand out as relevant and influential figures in the public and online media to claim reliability and legitimacy properly (Ringe & Rennó, 2023: 5). 

Regarding the third feature (iii), it is difficult to frame the populist concept of the ‘real people’ alongside the strategy of pitting them against other groups or entities when the virus indiscriminately affects everyone. Being aware of this problem, “‘the people’ are imbued with various characteristics, biomedical and otherwise [with populists] claiming that their citizens are less susceptible to the virus” (Lasco, 2020: 4-7). Thus, the ‘others’ against which populists claim to fight in representation of the “real people” during the pandemic are generally international and supranational actors such as the WTO or other states such as China – if not intellectual elites such as academics, journalists or public health experts (Bobba & Hubé, 2021). 

Points (i) and (iv) are strictly intertwined in that simplification goes hand in hand with false claims and controversial scientific statements. In other words, we observe a “widespread deployment of scientific language and imagery – and a selective deployment of scientific consensus” (Lasco, 2020: 8).

British Populism and Covid-19

To better connect British populism with the case of the pandemic, it is useful to get a brief and general background of the previous relationships between populism and healthcare policies in the UK before Covid-19. There is a distinction between healthcare systems that are more or less resistant to populist performances. The former are well-resourced, present a developed network-based model of governance, and involve professions in the policy processes. On the contrary, the latter are poorly financed, present high levels of command along the line of the New Public Management-type (NPM) governance model and display low trust in healthcare providers (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 3). 

But the most important thing to recall regarding the evolution of the British healthcare system (NHS) and populism is the BREXIT process. During those years, right-wing populists argued that by leaving the European Union (EU) more funds could be allocated to better finance the NHS. Specifically, they framed the unsustainability of the NHS and its underdevelopment (mostly in terms of funds and available high-skilled personnel) as a problem of immigration, as the blame was directed towards immigrants enjoying health services paid for by British citizens (Speed & Mannion, 2020: 8). 

Johnson and the Conservatives

The Conservatives, led by then Prime Minister Boris Johnson, were in power when Covid-19 became a global medical problem, and remained so until the end of the pandemic. For some authors (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021), the first wave of the pandemic, from February 2020 to roughly July 2020, can be divided in three phases. The ‘breakout’ phase was characterized by state authorities acting in a relaxed way, without invasive governmental control over people’s freedoms. This moment corresponds to the public’s response to the news about the virus’ spreading. During the ‘confrontation’ phase, the virus’ infection began widely spreading, and the number of people testing positive to Covid-19 began to grow exponentially. The final, ‘managing,’ phase is characterized by attempts to stabilize the situation and enforce measures in order to cope and coexist with the virus while waiting for the development of vaccines. 

During the first two phases the Conservative Party did not take the risks seriously and showed a libertarian way of thinking, arguing against a strict and hard response to the crisis in terms of closures and restrictions. In particular, Prime Minister Johnson did not attend the meetings dedicated to the government’s response to the pandemic in early February 2020 and criticized some warnings made by the British Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) (Bale, 2023: 69-70). An explanation for that could be that his actions and public statements were influenced and warranted by ‘misplaced optimism’ and regressive and nationalistic ideas, historically speaking, of the British role in the world – stressing the narrative around the exceptionality and efficiency of the NHS (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 6). 

Starting from the end of March and the beginning of April, things became more dramatic, and the Prime Minister Johnson’s attitude changed. Around this time the first lockdown was issued, disregarding the idea of ‘herd immunity’ where the virus is left to spread in the population to lower its virulence (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 21). In general, the government stressed conventional public measures and followed international guidelines along other major Western and European states (Bale, 2023: 70). Additionally, Johnson’s Cabinet avoided using tropes potentially contributing to the politicization of the crisis, and attempted to emphasize the importance of scientific guidelines (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26). 

Analyzing the rhetorical repertoire that has been used, the governmental discourse historically situated Covid-19 in mainly three different ways. To do so, the Cabinet used so-called ‘temporal claims,’ as defined in narrative discourse theory. Following the construction of a (i) radically discontinuous time, the virus has been described as a moment of generational significance. The pandemic was to be seen as an unprecedented event disrupting people’s habits and usual social behavior, in order for new economic, social and political initiatives to be ruled and legitimized. From another point of view, events have been plotted with a (ii) linear timeline, positing a unidirectional and cumulative development. Here, a descriptive account of some sequences and a principle of evaluation of the events and by which to assess the correctness of the action leading to their unfolding have been invoked. Lastly, the construction of a (iii) cyclical time helped the government to depict everyday life after the pandemic in a radically different way. In this respect, narratives were prospecting and sketching the idea of a ‘new normalcy’ bringing the emergence of new habits for everyone (Jarvis, 2021: 27-31).

To conclude this investigation of Johnson’s political communication during the pandemic, it is notable that he also employed daily governmental press briefings, using so-called the ‘numbers arms race’ and more broadly the already cited ‘war language.’ Both of them served as an enforcement to the claim of fighting for Britain in a once in a lifetime event. The key mantra has been the following statement: “Stay Home, Protect the NHS, Save Lives” (Sim & Tombs, 2022: 9-10). 

Farage and the UKIP

Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

In contrast to Johnson, who avoided politicizing the pandemic, Nigel Farage opted to fully utilize a populist political communication style typically associated with right-wing parties. Despite taking a cautious stance at the beginning of the breakout, he started acting as a radical libertarian, opposing public health restrictions and showing his open skepticism about government actions towards the pandemic (Bale, 2023). 

Two major critiques can be identified. The former critique strictly concerns the governmental actions taken when the health situation started being very problematic. Farage accused Johnson’s government of incompetency and indecisiveness in dealing with the crisis, framing his actions as a lack of leadership on the side of the Prime Minister (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 27). His arguments are composed by a mixture of “support for draconian measures on ‘law and order’ and ‘Britain’s borders’,” and “its essentially libertarian opposition to ‘political correctness gone mad’ as well as ‘red tape’ and the ‘faceless bureaucrats’” (Bale, 2023: 71). Resorting to well-known populist grievances, alongside other world leaders such as Trump, he adapted the issue of immigration and the concerns associated with it in claiming that migrants could enter and spread the virus if police enforcement on British borders were not sufficiently severe or incoming international flights were to be easily allowed for foreign travelers coming from high-risk countries (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 23). He also denounced the ‘herd immunity’ strategy initially sought to be pursued by the government, although he maintained a libertarian posture by stressing the fact that measures taken to stop the virus’ transmissibility were not meant to become a “house arrest” for the entire nation (Bale, 2023: 72). 

The latter part of his narratives, and the second critique he posed, is about the role of the UK in the world and the attempt to identify responsible actors for the pandemic to occur. In other words, he blamed China for not telling the truth about Covid-19’s emergence in the first place and for its deliberate suppression of key information and the intentional delaying of their communication to the international community (Bale, 2023: 71). Concisely: “While the government undermined the seriousness of the crisis mostly because of economic concerns, Farage opportunistically used the COVID-19 crisis to suggest a scale down to the UK’s relations with the EU and China” (Sahin & Ianosev, 2021: 26).

The British Political Tradition in Times of Crisis

According to Lijphart (1999), the British Westminster Model presents nine core tenets: (1) the concentration of the executive power in one party; (2) cabinet dominance; (3) a two-party system, where parties produce manifestos and seek a mandate to govern; (4) a majoritarian electoral system; (5) a unitary and centralized government; (6) interest group pluralism; (7) the concentration of legislative power in Parliament; (8) constitutional flexibility; (9) the central bank is controlled by the executive. Following Hall (2011: 9-10) and Richards and Smith (2002)  we can add two more tenets: (10) the doctrine of ministerial responsibility; (11) a permanent, neutral, and anonymous civil service. 

What is important to us here is the fact that the Westminster Model emphasizes some peculiar aspects. First, a linear and gradual development of the British political system and its institutions. Second, it stresses a great degree of British exceptionalism, and the superior nature of its system compared to other Western ones. Third, it is warranted by the idea that power is to be concentrated and exercised with a top-down approach. Warranting this system, according to Hall (2011: 124-125), the British Political Tradition (BPT) could be characterized as presenting the following main themes: (i)A discourse that stresses a limited liberal notion of representation and the elitist view that politicians are best suited to make decisions on behalf of the populace […] and are willing to act against the expressed will of the public or in the face of substantial public opposition; (ii) A discourse that stresses a conservative notion of responsibility and the view that a strong, decisive government is the most effective, efficient and desirable form of government. […] (iii) A discourse about change which emphasizes the virtues of continuity, gradualism, flexibility and stability. […] (iv) A discourse concerning a sense of British distinctiveness and superiority politically (Hall, 2011: 124-125)

Regarding discourse (i), it must be added that the BPT is sustained by an elitist conception of democracy, particularly the famous ‘Westminster and Whitehall know best’ statement, which itself reflects the interest of the political elite, thus reinforcing their status and power (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 128). The BPT reifies over time already existing inequalities and asymmetries in the British political system between citizens. Therefore, these ideas and beliefs have been mostly supported by most of the population. This results in the populace developing a somewhat deferential attitude towards politics, where politicians are seen as the best holders of the right to take the most important and crucial decisions for all (Hall, 2011: 159). Moreover, Marsh and Hall rightly highlight that the BPT not only served the interest of the political elite, but also of the socio-economic one. Specifically, regarding discourse (ii) above, the climax of political conservatism made it easier for the working class to accept the status quo. Furthermore, the dominance of the executive power helped political elites to enact policies more favorable to the socio-economic ones without too much opposition (Marsh & Hall, 2016: 135). 

Johnson and the BPT

The discussion seems to beg the question: Has the BPT influenced the populist (Johson and Farage) behavior described above? Following Finlayson et al. (2023), we can observe the employment of several traditional tropes dating back to the language and discourse of the BPT. Particularly, Prime Minister Johnson’s behavior indicates the presence of a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, merging epistemic and political authority over the actions needed to cope with the pandemic. For example, the invocation of the concept of ‘the people’ is used to hide the public’s limited political agency and retain the rights and legitimacy over the enactment of the counteracting measures. All of this is also related to the low participatory governance tradition inherent in the British State, but also shows how Johnson proved to strategically build its narrative of the pandemic to advance and increase the further legitimization of past policy decisions, and in particular the ones connected with the Brexit process (Wellings et al., 2023: 238). The former British premier revitalized the concept of the ‘British people’ within the public imagination, employing the sustainability and functioning of the NHS and other health issues as an element of continuity in his narratives from the beginning of the ‘Leave Campaign’ for Brexit to their management during the pandemic (Welling et al., 2023: 242). 

To better understand the British government’s communicative repertoire, the authors identify four main figurations of ‘the people’ (Finlayson et al., 2023: 344). First, we have ‘statistical realities.’ Here, ‘the people’ are represented and aggregated numerically, thus appearing more as abstract elements that legitimize the quest for acquiescence from the government (Finlayson et al., 2023: 345-346). Put another way, this kind of framing not only confers to the Cabinet epistemic authority because numbers don’t need further explanations, but also certifies its tight cooperation with the scientific community (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 222). 

Second, we have the figuration of ‘suffering families.’ This narrative aims to develop a public ‘ethos’ via which it can acquire the rights and legitimacy required to advance its policies. The BPT here is involved and works when this communicative strategy properly connects governmental instructions with people’s feelings, needs, and emotions – knowing what is best to accomplish them (Finlayson et al., 2023: 347). 

Third, ‘the people’ are framed as responsible individuals. This one is seen as a rule follower, encapsulated in a hierarchical structure that crystallizes a top-down and vertical conception of the people/state relationships. Once again, the BPT widens the divide between the elites and the public. ‘The people’ are required to follow the moral claims encouraged by the elite to fulfill their individual and collective responsibilities and duties towards resolving the crisis. The individual responsibility regards the task that people are assigned to complete, such as wearing protective masks in public spaces while avoiding unnecessary contact with strangers. The collective responsibility is rooted in utilitarian reasoning: complying with the rules means a faster crisis resolution (Finlayson et al., 2023: 348-349). 

The second and third depictions help understand the way in which Johnson tried to preserve its populist-driven consensus from the backlash of its unpopular decisions during the crisis. He tried not only to highlight the community as a collective as the real protagonist of the effort to fight against the virus’ infection, but also to present himself as a transparent and compassionate leader (Massidda & Sacca, 2023: 209-215). 

The fourth and final depiction utilized is ‘freedom-loving citizens.’ This time, citizens are represented as rights holders and interests to be appropriately recognized. Consequently, the government has a duty to protect these fundamental freedoms and, by showing the truth about them, affirm the legitimacy of its guidelines (Finlayson et al., 2023: 350). 

Farage and the BPT

The case of Farage is different. Being an oppositional force during the COVID-19 pandemic breakout, it was much easier for him to resort to typical and proven to be more effective populist grievances. However, the BPT resonates consistently in Farage’s discourses during the crisis: I’m convinced that its influence is evident when the UKIP’s leader blamed Johnson for his lack of leadership and inefficient management in the initial months of the crisis development. Specifically, Farage used his oppositional platform on health policies to rally against the government and exploit the newly achieved consensus to fuel support around the rebranding of UKIP in ‘Reform UK’ (McManus, 2021: 148-150). 

Relating to discourse (ii) presented before, I argue that Farage somewhat recalls the necessity for the executive to be strong and decisive in its actions on behalf of the State. Second, and about discourse (iv) discussed above, I argue that Farage recalls the BPT when he stresses the role of the UK in the world vis-à-vis the actions and warnings undertaken towards China by other Western leaders. Put another way, he tried to point out the distinctiveness and peculiarity of the British political system as opposed to others, especially in the Western World, while asking for a different resolution path for the crisis (Bale, 2023; Sahin & Ianosev, 2021). 

Overall, even if Farage was not in a position that favored traditional forms of British political thinking, the BPT proves to have (at least) partially influenced his claims and actions during Covid-19’s unfolding. 

Conclusion

To recall the main points of the argument above, there is clear evidence that the British Political Tradition (BPT) still influences how politicians behave in ordinary British political life and their policy-making choices. Even in the face of essential shifts and changes caused by the Covid-19 crisis, many political actors tried to adapt these new challenges to the long-standing historical and common way of interpreting political actions and decision-making in the UK (Hall et al., 2018: 15). 

The aim of this article was to check for the influence of the BPT on populist leaders. As we observed, the British traditional political style and tropes served both Johnson and Farage as a means to instill their ideas about how to manage the crisis. This proves the resilience of established political tradition and clarifies the volatility and ambiguity of the populist repertoire and strategies. Regarding the latter point, populist narratives varied a lot depending on two factors: (i) the position of the leader – being in charge or standing as an oppositional force – and hence its responsibility towards citizens; (ii) the ability to legitimately connect populist grievances in the context of the pandemics with already existing lines of political reasoning. Some examples exemplifying the second point are the case of migration and the issue of border control regarding the likelihood of importing and spreading the virus uncontrolled. 

(*) Andrea Guidotti is a master’s student at the University of Pavia and an intern at the ECPS.

References

Bale, T. (2023). “The United Kingdom: The Pandemic and the Tale of Two Populist Parties.” In: Ringe N. & Rennó L. (Eds.), Populists and the Pandemic: How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19. Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003197614

Bobba, G. & Hubé, N. (2021). “COVID-19 and Populism: A Sui Generis Crisis.” In: G. Bobba & N. Hube (Eds.), Populism and the Politicization of the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 17-30. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66011-6

Finlayson, A.; Jarvis, L. & Lister, M. (2023). “COVID-19 and ‘the public’: U.K. government, discourse and the British Political Tradition.” Contemporary Politics. 29(3). pp. 339-356. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2022.2162206

Hall, M. (2011). Political Traditions and UK Politics, Palgrave Macmillan: London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230336827

Hall, M.; Marsh, D. & Vines, E. (2018). “A changing democracy: contemporary challenges to the British political tradition.” Policy Studies. 39(4). pp. 365-382. https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2018.1451504

McManus, I. (2021). “The Case of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).” In: Falkenbach, M., Greer, S.L. (eds). The Populist Radical Right and Health. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70709-5_8

Marsh, D. & Hall, M. (2015). “The British Political Tradition and the Material-Ideational Debate.” The British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 18(1), 125-142. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-856X.12077

Massidda, L. and Selva, D. (2023). “Correction to: Boris Johnson’s Approach to the Pandemic, In: European Political Leaders and the Social Representation of the Covid-19 Crisis.” Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-38380-9_13

Jarvis, L. (2022). “Constructing the coronavirus crisis: narratives of time in British political discourse on COVID-19.” British Politics. 17. pp. 24-43. https://doi.org/101057/s41293-021-00180-w  

Lasco, G. (2020). “Medical Populism and the COVID-19 Pandemic.” Global Public Health. pp. 1417-1429. https://doi.org/10.1080/17441692.2020.1807581

Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. Yale University Press: New Haven. https://doi.org/10.12987/9780300189124

Richards, D. & Smith, M. (2002). Governance and Public Policy in the UK, Oxford University Press.

Ringe, N. & Rennó, L. (2023). “Populists and the Pandemic: How Populists Around the World Responded to COVID-19.” In: Routledge Studies in Extremism and Democracy, Routledge: New York. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003197614

Sahin, O. & Ianosev, B. (2021). “UK: Between Managed Moderation and Far-Right Conspiracy Theories.” In: G. Bobba & N. Hube (Eds.). Populism and the Politicization of the COVID-19 Crisis in Europe, Palgrave Macmillan: London. pp. 17-30. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-66011-6

Sim, J. & Tombs, S. (2022). “Narrating the coronavirus crisis: state talk and state silence.” UK, Power and Resistance. 5(1-2). pp. 67-90. http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1332/xfuq5523

Speed, E. & Mannion, R. (2020). “Populism and health policy: three international case studies of right-wing populist policy frames.” Sociology of Health & Illness, 42(8), pp. 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9566.13173

Wellings, B.; Bonotti, M.; Rublee, M. R. & Zech, S. T. (2024). “Correction to: Narrative fusion and layering: statecraft and the shaping of Boris Johnson’s pandemic narrative, 2020–2021.” British Politics. 19(2), 253–253. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41293-023-00241-2

Illustration by Ulker Design.

Techno-Populism: The Youth Electorate in Europe and the Interplay Between Social Media and Populism

by ECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

As proven by a 2021 European Parliament Youth survey, which supported that people rely primarily on the web, whether this is social media or online news outlets to be informed for political and societal developments. This ultimately explains why politicians gradually turn to social media – it broadens their electoral base as they attempt to connect to younger voters but has the negative consequence of popularizing populism. 

By Konstantina Kastoriadou

Social media has become integral to our lives, profoundly influencing our political landscape. While its pervasive presence is undeniable, there is often little analysis of how it shapes electoral campaigns, which are increasingly prevalent across Europe. Political advertisements and activities are widely disseminated on social media platforms, subtly and overtly shaping public opinion. This article delves into the complex interplay between contemporary politics and social media, drawing inspiration from Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti’s (2021) work, Techno-populism — The New Logic of Democratic Politics. It explores how this dynamic interaction (sub)consciously affects our political preferences and contributes to rising populist parties and figures globally. 

Almost 400 million people all over Europe were eligible to vote in the 2024 European Elections. Several parties across Europe have tried their best to engage longtime supporters and attract new ones, securing their votes either way, under the light of the pressuring events that have surrounded Europe for the last two years.  However, the most complex war is fought during the pre-electoral period on social media platforms, where parties, party leaders and candidates try to engage the most difficult-to-convince audience – the youth. For years, the younger generations proved challenging to engage with as it was widely believed that they abstained from politics, yet some researchers claim this was never the case. More specifically, they support the idea that the youth has always been politically engaged. Still, this engagement is taking many forms, with one notable case being social media (Del Monte, 2023: 3). According to Flew and Iosifidis (2020), the internet allows social, political or cultural movements to form alliances and communities internationally (For example, BLM, and the equal rights movement), as people now exchange opinions and experiences with other people from across the globe which helps shape opinions about situations and problems that appear in different parts of the world. 

Social media users, as of 2024, were estimated to be roughly around 5.17 billion globally, with the most active users being the youngest generation (Shewale, 2024). The significant number of users and the popularity of some social media platforms decisively reshaped political communication. As proven by a 2021 European Parliament Youth survey, which supported that people rely primarily on the web, whether this is social media or online news outlets to be informed for political and societal developments (Del Monte, 2023: 3). This ultimately explains why politicians gradually turn to social media – it broadens their electoral base as they attempt to connect to younger voters but has the negative consequence of popularizing populism. This turn of events in the political reality is of enormous interest as it shows a dismissal of the traditional political divide of the left/right axis, which now, according to Bickerton & Accetti (2021), was transformed into a dipole between populism and technocracy which are better understood as “modes of political action” rather than solid ideological systems. 

Techno-populism is “the new logic of political action based on the combination of populist and technocratic traits,” somehow like the definition of techno-populism by Lorenzo Castellani, who defines the latter as a “political regime” characterized by “an interaction between global capitalism, technocratic institutions and new polarizing populist political movements” (Bickerton & Accetti, 2021: 18). Techno-populism is also a relatively new phenomenon, as there has been a steadily growing appeal to the concept of the “people” during recent years, that did not exist during the 20th century. Political parties, especially after World War II, had their target group (For example, the Christian Democrats, the Socialists, etc.) and therefore did not appeal to the masses in general. Compared to contemporary politics, more and more politicians claim to represent the people, as in mainstream political parties, there wasn’t a notion of the “people” as we know it, but society consisted of different groups and classes that each party represented (Bickerton & Accetti, 2021: 7).

Many scholars argue that populism is a mainstream phenomenon. Roitman et al. (2023) argue that: “The rise of populist discourses in many countries in the last decades may have been due to changes in political communication.” This argument is strongly supported by data that show the rise of political and party participation on social media platforms. As argued by Bickerton and Accetti (2021: 21), this shift in political communication is an attempt for parties to become more attractive towards the youth, helping themselves to secure more votes, as the sole goal of political competition in all electoral democracies is the rise to power (Accetti & Bickerton, 2021: 21).

A strong case of this trend is presented in the work of Cervi et al., (2021: 269 – 270), who examined the interplay between TikTok and political communication. As a primary example, the Spanish populist parties, Vox and Podemos, seem to have claimed the most significant gains out of the other mainstream established parties, as most of their supporters come from the youngest generation. Podemos is the most followed (191.400 followers) and the most active party on social media, having gathered more than 3.1m likes. The youngest generation represents the bulk of the supporters gathered on the platform.

In Podemos’ case, social media is tightly interwoven into the very existence of the party, as they broadly use it as a means in its political strategy – mobilizing its audience both online and offline (Cervi et al., 2021: 271). Similarly to Podemos is the case of the Five Star Movement (M5S) in Italy. The M5S, undoubtedly classified as a populist party, claims to have an unmediated relationship with the people, especially by utilizing the internet. By accessing the internet and mobilizing the citizens by creating cyberspaces in which they interact with their electoral base, the M5S claims that it can offer more efficient government by utilizing the “collective intelligence” it gathers through the web. M5S use the internet to access ordinary citizens’ competence, making the web a means to provide a better quality of public policy. This is described by Accetti and Bickerton (2021) as: “techno-populism from below” (Bickerton & Accetti, 2021: 4). 

Another case that proves the rising power of social media in politics is the example of Ireland, where the current Prime Minister (Irish term: Taoiseach) of the Fine Gael party, Simon Harris, is characterized as the first TikTok Prime Minister of the country, and coincidently also the youngest leader of the nation, rising to the chair of the party thanks to his TikTok popularity (Pogatchnik, 2024). Such cases can be observed in every established democracy in the Western world – not exclusively by populist leaders but also by the traditionally established parties’ leaders, who try to expand their electoral base to the young electorate. 

Social Media and the New Reality of Politics

As mentioned above, politics have been transformed since the mid-20th century, and society catalyzes this change. Bickerton & Accetti (2021: 35) argue that society is far more complex than in the 20th century when society seemed more homogenized. This complexity makes societal formations more fragile and fluid than they used to be, therefore making the electoral appeal of contestants for office harder than before. Perhaps due to this fragmentation and fragility, it is more effective for political contestants to appeal to emotion and, therefore, adopt post-truth tactics than to rely on the old ways of political communication to secure people’s support. According to data, 97% of world leaders use Twitter, being the first and leading social media platform for political communication (Munoz, Ripolles, 2020).

The importance of social media is also reflected in the enormous sums of money parties have spent advertising on social media during this European Electoral Campaign. Based on Google and Facebook data, such examples are Fidesz with €60.000 spent on one single ad; the separatist Flemish party Vlaams Beelang spent around €50 – 60.000 as well; and Macron’s party seems to have spent approximately €50.000 (Shickler, 2024). However, the most shocking numbers come from Greece, where the governing right-wing party New Democracy (Νέα Δημοκρατία) has spent €192.000 on Google ads alone, while the total amount of spending of the country is €321.800 for 5.753 digital ads (Μπογιόπουλος, 2024a). New Democracy’s spending on Facebook accounts for €31.430, while €17.276 of this was spent on the advertisement of Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis (Μπογιόπουλος, 2024b). Such amounts show that the presence on social media is now necessary, as parties won’t survive in the new political reality without them since society now prefers to be more active than passive news consumers (Putmans, 2017: 2). 

Post-Truth, Propaganda and Skepticism

Although one use of social media platforms is for advertisement, for most, social media serves primarily as a source of information and the exchange of opinions, which shapes everyday life. Yet, social media has a “dark side” as they are closely linked to the spread of fake news and post-truth politics (Flew & Iosifidis, 2020). Misinformation and post-truth political rhetoric are commonalities and apply firmly to pre-electoral campaigns. The BBC found plenty of misleading content on social media platforms during the pre-electoral campaign in the UK. The content is AI generated (Spring, 2024) and could be passed as accurate, especially by people who are not so familiar with the newly introduced technologies.

Post-truth politics is widely associated with populist parties and personas. According to ECPS’ (n.d.) dictionary of populism, post-truth is: “a political culture in which debate is framed largely by appeals to emotion disconnected from the details of policy, and by the repeated assertion of talking points to which factual rebuttals are ignored.” Taş (2021: 169) further supports that post-truth politics are in fact: “a reliance on assertions that ‘feel true’ but have no basis in fact” – therefore minimizing the importance of facts in the process of shaping the public opinion. As social media lacks supervision or strict political guidelines, which is more likely to happen to television, radio or press, communication among peers is loose and emotionally charged, as they mostly share their opinions and experiences. This makes social media the most appropriate medium for “disseminating” meta-truth, affecting politics and everyday life.

In the Western sphere, the truth can be explained – proved scientifically, so the truth is perceived as objective. However, since the 20th century, the perception of truth has changed again taking Nietzsche, or the post-structuralists like Foucault as an example – who highlighted the relevance of truth, making it a subjectivity and therefore contradicting the previous perception of truth as objectivity. Finally, the digital era reshaped the perception of truth, as misinformation and fake news became a common incident in our era (Youvan, 2024: 4). Post-truth, therefore, comes directly in contrast with the primary perception of “the truth” being objective, as it is based on the 20th-century revision on the objectivity of the truth highlighting the subjective nature of it. This, combined with the rise of social media, made people in advanced democracies more skeptical towards democracy and governments and even questioned the integrity of the press industry, which overall is boosted by a generalized discontentment created by the declining quality of life. 

For many political and social analysts, social media is a reason of high significance that democracies are in decline. According to research conducted in 19 countries by the Pew Research Center in 2022, social media seems to be perceived overall as a good thing for democracy, with the exception being the US, where the survey concluded that social media are perceived as a bad thing for democracy with 64%. This trend seemed popular among Republicans and Republican-leaning supporters, as they proved to be the social group more likely to be critical and negative towards social media (Wike et al., 2022). 

Additionally, 84% of the questioned people across the 19 countries believe that social media and the internet made people more accessible to manipulate with false information and/or news. 70% of them support that fake news is the second biggest threat globally, just after climate change. Another interesting finding is that across the 19 countries that participated in the Survey, people agree that social media had a positive impact on people in terms of information about worldwide and domestic events, which is believed to make people good citizens of the world – and work in favor of acceptance of different races and religions. Yet, they find that they contribute negatively to how people talk about politics, finding that 46% of individuals believe social media makes people less civil in the way they talk about politics. Maybe this is related to the fact that 65% support the idea that social media has made people divided on their political opinions (Wike et al., 2022). 

In this framework of division, confusion and growing disappointment are where the populists flourish the most. If we were to hypothesize that fear is constantly generated within our societies, through our everyday lives, then a feeling of powerlessness may occur. According to Müller (2022), fear is a medium for populist leaders, who invoke fear to provoke a revolt against the “corrupt establishment.” However, he finds that fear must not exceed a certain point, for populist leaders do not want their societies to live in fear. If this happens, populist personas will betray their promise of “being better democrats.” Wike et al. (2022) found that social media can affect people’s psychological stance, making them feel less powerless as they grow more informed about international and domestic situations. Maybe here, the fact that social media are a place where people can form alliances and exchange their views and experiences is the most critical factor contributing to a growing feeling of empowerment. 

This empowerment may stem from consumption and people’s identification with populistic agendas promoted on social media, leveraging the dissatisfaction of the masses. As populism is traditionally based on the emotional stance of society, post-truth political rhetoric is the most efficient medium to secure support and broaden their electoral base. This trend has been evident since the 2016 US Presidential election when people seemed to believe and identify more with fake news than facts. As Dan (2023) supports, populism is a force that can change the collective memory and shape peoples’ opinions and ideas, which in this case is the primarily exclusionary right-wing populism stands for identity. It promotes the protection of the mass identity, which is being attacked by various factors such as economic, class, or alternative ethnicity. Hayes defines identity politics as: “a phrase that has come to signify a wide range of political activity and theorizing founded in the shared experiences of injustice of members of certain social groups. Rather than organizing solely around belief systems, programmatic manifestos, or party affiliation, identity political formations typically aim to secure the political freedom of a specific constituency marginalized within its larger context” (Heyes, 2020).

Even from the definition, it shows that identity politics is a phenomenon of a strong psychological and emotional background that is the backbone of its very existence (Dan, 2023). Maybe that’s an essential factor that makes people in the Western sphere more critical of social media and democracy. It’s found that nativists are the most skeptical among citizens. Usually, they are dissatisfied with electoral outcomes, regardless of being on the winning or losing end of the electoral process (Kokkonen & Linde, 2022).

Conclusion

Political reality has been drastically transformed over the past years, and populism can be considered both the result and the cause of the new political reality, which depends on the latest technologies for the political actors to secure support from their peers. To this progress and change of political reality, Bickerton & Accetti’s book is a perfect and realistic approach to the new way of political action, as techno-populism seems to be a phenomenon that explains precisely the current state of politics, with people growing dissatisfied with democracy due to the existing economic struggles and with populism, that will not cease. 

This transformation could be the outcome of the “win” of capitalism at the end of the Cold War Era, which established capitalism as the dominant, unchallenged system and gradually made the distinction between left and right irrelevant and outdated. It’s not a coincidence that populist figures have continuously risen and taken over globally since the 2000s. However, the most critical factor lies in this societal transformation of recent years that made society more fragmented and fragile than before, making the electoral appeal of contestants for office harder than it was during the 20th century. 

To the latter, social media are an essential factor, as they shape the opinions and dissatisfaction of the masses because they provide them with the opportunity to have almost complete access to everything. This free flow of information can also justify the rising skepticism of people towards their governments, as nowadays, it is more feasible to identify aberrant and reprehensible actions, such as institutional corruption. Also, with the free flow of experiences and opinions, people grow even more critical of their political, social or economic situation, as they can easily compare their reality with the reality of citizens from different parts of the world and are more susceptible to populistic agendas. Most importantly, on many occasions, social media presents the truth compared to television. In many instances, there is proof that television is under governmental or special interests’ control, contributing to the growth of skepticism inside liberal democracies. 

Politically speaking, this may be a strong reason why social media seem to have such overwhelming approval overall, as people see it as a positive asset for democracy, with the only exception being the US, where mostly the conservatives were more prone to rejecting social media as a beneficial factor for democracy. While people generally agree that social media made them more accepting towards different cultures and races, there is an explicit acknowledgement that social media generates a lot of negative emotions and affects people’s way of expressing political opinions, as there is a consensus that social media makes people politically divided. This could be attributed to the success of populism, which penetrated society, and the accessibility to information provided by the internet. This is the combination that Bickerton & Accetti discussed. In contemporary politics, the fight over political power doesn’t revolve around the traditional divide between right and left, but how the already established political parties with either the left or right use both populism and technocracy to their benefit. 

It’s sensible that people feel vulnerable to fake news, as the populist mode of communication seems to be the predominant one, with post-truth politics spreading steadily over the internet. Their anger and frustration can be amplified or soothed, and due to the structure of social media platforms, they can be controlled and guided in a specific direction. This controlled environment makes a “safer” framework for the contestants to power to survive and adapt. Youth engagement seemed to be the ulterior motive for political personas to turn to the web for promotion. Still, this move is undoubtedly populistic, as it builds rapport with the base, creating the illusion of closeness to the people. However, the youth is committed and politically active, and with all the necessary equipment, they seem ready to claim the change for a better tomorrow. 

 

References

— (n.d.). Post-Truth Politics. European Center for Populism Studies. Available at: https://www.populismstudies.org/Vocabulary/post-truth-politics/

Μπογιόπουλος, Γ. (2024a, June 3). Νέα Δημοκρατία: Ο καλύτερος πελάτης της Google στην πολιτική διαφήμιση, παρά το εξωφρενικό χρέος της. Documento. https://www.documentonews.gr/article/nea-dimokratia-o-kalyteros-pelatis-tis-google-stin-politiki-diafimisi-para-to-exofreniko-xreos-tis/ (accessed on June 15, 2024). 

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EP

EP Elections and the Connection Between Populism and Identity Politics in the EU

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeVoice of Youth

The 2024 EU parliament election polls show the populist right and far-right as the main winners. The tendency of voters to choose populist parties could push the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far-right. This could be an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the other and creates further social conflicts. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation now.

By Katharina Diebold

The mostly expected European Parliamentary elections results and the next presidency of the Council of the EU, Hungary, will likely be contentious issues for the European Community (Henley, 2024). The 2024 EU elections and the Hungarian presidency polls have indicated a rise of right-wing and anti-Europe populist parties. These tendencies fuel the transformation of the EU towards the right and conservativism (Wax & Goryashko, 2024). 

The 2024 EU parliament elections has showed the populist right and far right as the main winners. The fact that voters tend to choose populist parties could increase the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far right as an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the “other” and creates further social conflicts (Henley, 2024; Suiter, 2016; Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Therefore, we must ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation and what predictions can be made for the post-2024 elections.

In this essay, it will be argued that recently adopted EU legislation—the Green New Deal (including the Nature Restoration Regulation and Deforestation Regulation) and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum—is influenced by populist rhetoric and identity politics, which ultimately harms the EU. In connection with this, populist candidates driven by identity politics will be shown to threaten the future of the EU. 

Theoretical Framework 

Populism is a thin ideology comprising three key elements: the people, the general will and the elite, (Zulianello & Larsen, 2021; Mudde, 2004). Additionally, it incorporates the dimension of the “dangerous others,” often represented by migrants, positioned in contrast to the people (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015).

Previous research suggests that populism, taken as a framework for populist communication and rhetoric (Aalberg et al., 2017), is also used by mainstream parties to improve their relationship with voters on social media (Lin et al., 2023). Key themes identified are people-centrism, anti-elitism, restoring popular sovereignty and exclusion (Aalberg et al., 2017; Engesser et al., 2017). Additionally, specific negative and emotional populist communication styles on social media correlate with a positive increase in relationships between mainstream parties and their voters (Lin et al., 2023, p. 608). This analysis will use populism as a guide for identifying potential populist rhetoric. 

Even though populism in Western Europe is often associated with the right, the left has increasingly adopted populist strategies, specifically in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, which was covered in the media as “the rise of leftist populism” (Gross, 2022). The negligence of academic research about the populist left could be responsible for the recent findings. This seems even more relevant when we consider the electoral performance of populist left parties compared to populist right parties for the elections of the European Parliament in 2019, such as Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and Sinn Féin in Ireland (Bernhard & Kriesi, 2021; Statista, 2024). For example, the Greek Syriza Party (founded in 2004) and the Irish Sinn Féin Party (founded in 1905) were only recognized as left-wing populist parties in 2014 (O’Malley & Fitzgibbon, 2014;Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). Nevertheless, Syriza’s populism has been questionable throughout its government term and recent opposition in 2021 (Markou, 2021). Recently, the focus on populism in Western countries shifted again towards right-wing populist parties (Bartel, 2023; Morison, 2023). 

Identity is a set of labels describing persons distinguished by attributes (Noury & Roland, 2020). Identity politics is the belief that identity is a fundamental focus of political work, which can be connected to lifestyle and culture (Bernstein, 2005). Politicizing immigrants as the “other” is an example of that. In Europe, identity politics is referred to as the protection of the “silent majority” from harmful consequences of immigration, which is used by right-wing populists (Noury & Roland, 2020). 

The effect of rising populism within the EU on the right- and left-wing can be recognized by looking at EU-party campaigns or populist candidates for the recent EP elections. Similar to the right-wing, the left-wing populists also employ identity politics. Leftist-populism can be seen promoting marginalized identities, such as racial and ethnic identities and seeking to transform the shame previously associated with these identities into a point of pride (Salmela & Von Scheve, 2018). Accordingly, these protests generate “others,” including people who abide by a different value system and also the privileged “elite” who overlook intersectional identities as a threat. While promoting human rights, advocacy for intersectional identities can also fall into the trap of populism among leftist groups and other advocates (Stavrakakis & Katsambekis, 2014). However, intersectionality may not be the only advocacy that can turn into a populist movement in the name of advocacy. Climate and human rights activists can also be politicized and positioned as polarized identities (Mackay et al., 2021). 

Inherent Populism in EU Legislation

Environmental politics presents a point of contention for both the right- and left-wing parties. Both sides instrumentalize newly adopted legislation to increase the public appeal of voters (European Commission, 2023). This can be exemplified in the recent regulations. The newest adopted legislation, the European Green New Deal, including its Deforestation Regulation and its Regulation on Nature Restoration, and the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, have elements of this otherization and marginalization of identities. 

A closer examination of de jure analysis and how these laws, as portrayed in political language, unearths the need for more interest in realizing the general goals of protecting nature. It looks like nature is wiped of its identity within the hands of humans who instrumentalize nature as a theme broadly advocated by large swaths of society. Therefore, identity politics exploiting nature must be identified and widely discussed to protect nature and the shared values of humanity, not to sacrifice basic human dignity for politics. 

The European Green New Deal

The European Green New Deal, including the Deforestation Regulation, entered into force on June 29, 2023, and the provisional agreement for the Regulation on Nature Restoration was accepted on November 9, 2023. These legislations gaining the left’s support have also been instrumentalized to boost the attention and sympathy of left-wing parties.

The populist rhetoric surrounding the Nature Restoration Regulation can be approached as a case exemplifying populist politics appealing to the left (The EU #NatureRestoration Law, 2023). The left uses advocacy of this legislation, especially the Greens/EFA, in the elections for greenwashing purposes and voter accumulation. However, this law focused more on economic benefits than actual environmental protection and lost its progressiveness throughout the legislative procedure. Therefore, it is based on the misconception that this regulation substantially improves nature restoration and indigenous rights protection (Pinto, 2023). Moreover, the conservative European People’s Party (EPP) claims this law increases the financial burden for the forestry, fishery, and farming sectors (Weise & Guillot, 2023). However, these realities are dismissed in the political language of environmental advocacy. 

We can assess that the Greens-European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA) campaign for 2024 EP elections utilised populist rhetoric by defining the people as the “citizens, farmers, fishers and business in the EU;” The elite as “the conservatives, far right and some liberals” who “try to tear down a new EU law to restore nature;” and The general will of the people could be characterized as focussing on tackling biodiversity and the climate crisis (Greens/EFA, 2023b). The campaign by the Greens/EFA for this regulation played into identity politics as the party used a language claiming to advocate for the protection of marginalized Indigenous and local communities. While this claim remains to be only a discourse, regardless, it boosts the popularity of the Greens. Examined closely, the ostensibly evergreen legislation advocating biodiversity protection promotes local cartels and exploitative companies that benefit and take advantage of the EU partnerships (Euronews, 2023). The hypocrisy and the tact in the use of language can be seen in the advocacy language of the party, which left these cartels out intentionally.

Deforestation Regulation 

The Greens/EFA campaign for the Deforestation Regulation shows characteristics of populist rhetoric (European Commission, 2023). The Greens/EFA emphasize the importance of “the people,” for example, by the quote “The rights of people and nature must always come before profit,” which could be interpreted as people-centrism (Greens/EFA, 2023c). 

Another example of anti-elitism could be identified by emphasizing the misinformation and fake news campaign against the nature restoration law in a video by the Greens/EFA (Greens/EFA, 2023d). The misinformation campaign was conducted before the 2024 EP elections in multiple EU countries, including Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Poland by political parties, Member of the European Parliament (MEP)-candidates and farming groups such as the Dutch National Farmers Party (BoerBurgerBeweging-BBB), the Dutch far-right fringe party (Forum voor Democratie) and the polish Earth farmer’s support foundation (Greens/EFA, 2023d; Carlile, 2023). 

The MEP negotiator for the nature restoration law, Jutta Paulus, mentions the agriculture lobby as a factor that made the legislation less progressive and ambitious and prevented meaningful, sustainable EU laws, such as laws regarding agricultural goods (Paulus, 2023a). Paulus mentions in another video about the nature restoration law that, specifically, the conservatives and the far-right are responsible for preventing and decreasing the effectiveness of the new legislation (Paulus, 2023b). Those examples do not mention misinformation campaigns by politicians, farming groups, the agriculture lobby, or the far-right elite. However, it can be argued that this language and framing emphasizing the element of conspiring groups could be interpreted as populist rhetoric.

This connects to other findings that suggest that left parties connect political anti-elitism to economic anti-elitism and the argument that hardworking, ordinary citizens are betrayed by the political-economic power elite (Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2015). Additionally, the new regulation on deforestation will only prevent EU customers from buying products derived from deforestation. However, deforestation and sales of deforested products to other customers worldwide can continue (Greenpeace, 2021). The regulation also lost its progressive and ambitious character throughout the legislation procedure (Fairtrade.net, 2022).

New Pact on Migration and Asylum 

The left and the right used identity politics as a tool to increase sympathy for the EP elections through the usage of marginalized identities such as “migrants” and “asylum seekers” (Greens/EFA, n.d.). The recent pact on migration can be shown as an example of populist identity politics transcending the right and left binary, uniting the voters around the so-called threat posed by the influx of migrants and asylum seekers. 

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum reinforces the topic of illegal migration and thus supported the right-wing campaigning for the European Elections 2024. The political language on this regulation is laden with populist elements. Firstly, the right-wing European Peoples Party defines “the people” as “European citizens” or “our citizens” who deserve security, safety and protection in times of migration (EPP Group, 2023; EPP, 2016). Secondly, von der Leyen specifically points out in her New Pact on Migration statement that smugglers and traffickers control illegal migration (Press Statement von der Leyen, 2023). This can be understood as a symptom of a “corrupt elite” in government that allows smugglers and traffickers to run unhampered (Rusev, 2013). Thirdly, a comment by the leader of the EPP, Manfred Weber, could give insight into how his party wants to respond to the “general will” of the people (including the voters for the EP elections). He said the EPP would be “crystal clear about its desire to reduce immigration in the campaign for European elections” (O’Carroll, 2024). The populist language forebears the identity politics around migration, appealing to both the right and the left. The New Pact and statements by the EU Commission play into identity politics through the terminology of the “bad migrants,” positioning them as “dangerous others.” Unfortunately, the New Pact has been under debate in the EU since 2020 and was used as a promotional tool for the EP elections to attract voters on both the left and right (Georgian, 2024). 

The New Pact has also been used by the Greens/EFA populist campaign for the European Elections 2024, reinforced the idea of a unified peace union. In this instance, we can deduce that “the people” could be defined as “us and the migrants and asylum seekers, that we do not leave behind;” “the general will” could be characterized as ” upholding human rights and international law” (Greens/EFA, 2023a). 

The Greens/EFA shadow rapporteur for the new asylum and migration management regulation (which is part of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum), Damien Carême, emphasized in a post on his social media that EU interior ministers and the European Commission adopted vocabulary regarding migration that pleases the far right only to gain popularity and votes for the EU elections (Carême, 2024). In his view, this rhetoric compromises the truth and neglects migrants (Carême, 2024). Another post criticizes the former director of the European Border and Coast Guard agency (FRONTEX), Fabrice Leggeri, for spreading fake news and lies about the new pact on migration (Carême, 2024b). Those examples do not specifically mention politicians or the far-right as elites. However, it can be argued that this language and framing emphasize an element of conspiring groups spreading fake news to increase distrust. This could be interpreted as constituting populist rhetoric, which characterizes an “elite.”

Additionally, another shadow rapporteur of the Greens/EFA responsible for the crisis and force majeure regulation (also part of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum), Damian Boeselager, emphasizes yet more rhetoric element connected with populism – the element of populist sovereignty. In one of his posts, he claims that the EU asylum system can only be tackled on the EU level if the EU regains its sovereignty (Boeselager, 2024). Moreover, he claims that if “we” want to win sovereignty back, we must do this at the EU level (Boeselager, 2024). Concerning the New Pact on migration, specifically migration agreements with Tunis, Libya and Egypt are increasingly scrutinized in the media and by the Greens/EFA (Greens/EFA, 2023e; Carême, 2024c).

Another interesting element is that research suggests that an “emotional” populist communication style positively increases the relationship between mainstream parties and their voters. By looking at postings by the Greens/EFA and their MEPs, it can be argued that dramatic music, pictures of migrants in boats at sea, in refugee and asylum camps and centers used by Carême, as well as the main Greens/EFA page could be identified as emotional communication style. Additionally, the new Migration Pact favors the reinforcement of border controls, returns and re-admissions over legal migration opportunities. Those stay symbolic, vague, and distant policy goals. Recent reviews of policy documents show that the EU prioritizes regulating irregular migration, and despite its rhetoric for “strengthening legal migration,” concrete action is missing (Sunderland, 2023). 

Identity Politics and Candidates 

Introducing inexperienced candidates tailored to resonate with particular social groups was a common strategy employed by both left and right populist parties to garner support. This practice is another instance of identity politics shaping the European political landscape. Following in the footsteps of their forerunners, like Marie Le Pen or Hugo Chávez from the past, these charismatic political figures engage in populist rhetoric, addressing a diverse range of social and legal issues in their political discourse—from environmental protection to EU identity and migration (Serra, 2017).

Examples for the European Parliament elections 2024 included Nicola Gehringer, promoted by the German right-wing party CSU (Christian Social Union), on place nine. Gehringer is a successful executive assistant of a big corporation, “Neoloan AG,” with the potential to attract successful business owners. Another figure is the farmer and agriculture expert Stefan Köhler, who run for the CSU on place six to attract farmers (Zeit Online, 2023). Farmers have become increasingly crucial in the European discourse, with the recent increase in farmer protests in Germany, France, and the Netherlands (Trompiz & Levaux, 2024). 

Legal and security experts also run with public appeal to the voters across political divides. Carola Rackete, the German candidate for “Die Linke,” a leftist Party, is a human rights activist fighting for better refugee rights and asylum laws, run for the second position (MDR.DE., 2023). The human rights activist as a candidate were expected to increase the number of radical voters from the left. The German Green Party was heading with a policeman on place eighteen in the EP elections, tried to include more right-leaning social groups in the Green voter repertoire since police officers tended to vote for conservative and right-wing parties (Papanicolaou & Papageorgiou, 2016).

In Austria, the first candidate for the Greens party was Lena Schilling, a climate activist of “Fridays-for-future.” Schilling had a high chance of attracting young voters as she was the only young female top candidate among all running top party candidates in Austria (Völker, 2024). The second place was Thomas Waitz, a sustainable and organic farmer who aimed to attract sustainable farmers in Austria (Waitz, 2023; Schweighofer, 2024).

The references to the people vs. lying or misinformation-spreading groups blurred the lines between right and left ideologies and connected these figures around a shared sentiment: fighting for the people against a designated other. 

Conclusion 

The increasing populist rhetoric of left and right parties in the EU and the fanatism of those who want to increase their share of voters for the EU elections are responsible for the outcomes of recent EU legislation. The populist rhetoric before and after the adoption of new EU legislation shows how parties instrumentalize the outcomes of EU legislation procedure instead of trying to find real compromises and long-term, future-oriented solutions for the problems of unregulated migration and the climate crises. 

Regulated migration is still almost not touched upon in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, which has been part of discussions in the EU since 2020. The Green New Deal, especially with the Nature Restoration and Deforestation Regulations, was a proper start to increase sustainability, environmental protection, and indigenous rights. However, both proposals lost their progressiveness and lacked ambition and actual help for developing countries outside of the profit-making fetishism of the EU. If the upward trend of populist communication persists on both the left and right, EU politics and legislation may increasingly adopt populist and voter-driven approaches, potentially jeopardizing the democratic and compromise-oriented decision-making process within the EU. This heightened polarization between parties could further contribute to a bashing climate and hinder cooperative efforts.

Remarkably, identity politics has not only permeated the populist rhetoric of EU party politics but also extended to the selection of candidates for the EP elections. If identity politics continues to embed itself deeply within the strategic political framework of EU parties, the shift towards prioritizing short-term voter turnout and popularity contests over substantive and long-term democratic considerations seems inevitable. This trend risks undermining EU values by leveraging EU legislation for immediate political gains rather than establishing enduring goals for the European Community. It is imperative to educate voters about this form of political manipulation that compromises EU values for short-term advantages. No political gain should supersede long-term EU objectives, as such a scenario would entail the erosion of EU values and identity.

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Migrants boat

Death Toll Much Higher Than Reported: Rising Casualties Among Migrants Attempting to Reach the EU

by ECPS YouthHomeMigrationVoice of Youth

Statistics on the EU migration crisis indicate that over 3,000 lives have been lost in the Mediterranean Sea, with 60% of the deaths linked to drowning. However, these figures are not precise, many ‘ghost boats’ disappear from radar with no record of the number of migrants on board. Indeed, the majority of migrant deaths worldwide go unrecorded.

By Greta Martinez

In recent years, Europe has witnessed a large number of migrants risking their lives in search of better life and opportunities. Tragically, this search sometimes results in death. The danger of this route is too great to ignore, and this paper aims to examine the intersection between migration policies, populism, human rights, and the escalating number of deaths.

In the last decade, Europe has faced an unprecedented number of migrants attempting to cross its borders, particularly via the Mediterranean Sea, which is infamous for being the deadliest migration route. The number of deaths is alarming; in 2023, the total number increased by 20%, making it the deadliest year for migrants since the International Organization for Migration (IOM) began keeping records (IOM Report, 2024). Statistics on the EU migration crisis indicate that over 3,000 lives have been lost in the Mediterranean, with 60% of the deaths linked to drowning. However, these figures are not precise, as the IOM explains, many ‘ghost boats’ disappear from radar with no record of the number of migrants on board. Indeed, the majority of migrant deaths worldwide go unrecorded (Migration Data Portal, 2024).

Populist Migration Policies to Blame for Increasing Death Tolls

To understand the reasons behind the rising death toll and the increasing number of migrants taking more dangerous routes, it is necessary to examine the interaction between these deaths and populist migration policies. The growing popularity of populist politics across Europe has dramatically impacted migration policies. Populist policymakers are known for their nationalistic rhetoric, which fosters fear of the unknown and of those who are different. Border protection policies are a central element of populism, prioritizing border security over human lives. This results in policies that focus on protecting borders rather than saving the lives of those fleeing unstable states, poverty, or wars (Osuna, 2022). When countries restrict legal routes for refugees, they force individuals to undertake even more perilous journeys to reach safety (Oxford, 2024).

The externalization of border control by populist governments often involves proposing migration deals to improve partner countries’ border management and migrant interception capabilities. Examples of these policies include the recent bilateral agreement between Italy and Albania signed by Italian populist Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, and a similar agreement with Libya, primarily signed by former populist Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi (Martini & Megerisi, 2023). These agreements shift the responsibility of handling migrants to third-party states, which do not always respect fundamental human rights or adhere to the Geneva Convention. Populist migration policies are frequently criticized by international human rights organizations for violating international laws and agreements on asylum and refugee rights (Muižnieks, 2017).

The migration policies followed by populist governments, which often result in more deaths, include measures such as refusing docking rights to rescue ships. A notable example of this was the ‘Sea Watch Case’ in Italy. The then Italian Interior Minister, Matteo Salvini, did not permit the docking of the NGO “Open Arms” rescue ship. However, the ship’s captain, Carola Rackete, defied his orders and docked anyway, sparking a legal dispute about the interpretation of humanitarian aid for migrants with sanitary needs. The policy of denying docking rights to ships in the European Union after a long and perilous journey often leads to more deaths in the Mediterranean Sea due to delayed responses from authorities. It is crucial to highlight the dangerous situations that delayed responses create for migrants arriving in the EU on illegal boats. Late actions by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) or national authorities can result in shipwrecks, such as the one that occurred in Cutro, Italy, on the night of February 25, 2023.

Border States’ Responsibility to Save Lives: The Italian Example

Populist parties in Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Italy, and Greece are known by the EU Commission (Triandafyllidou, 2013) for emphasizing migration issues more strongly than other EU states, as these border countries are more affected by the illegal arrival of irregular ships. The increase in deaths is linked to the inadequate response of these states often lacking the resources and infrastructure to cope with the influx of arrivals. For example, the Italian approach to the migrant crisis has gained significant attention and generated controversy, with their closed-border policies raising critical humanitarian concerns. Italy has been a primary destination for migrants coming from North Africa and the Middle East.

The new regulations, which are part of the migration policy followed by Italian PM Meloni to prevent irregular migration, reduce the possibility of multiple rescues and introduce sanctions and administrative measures for violations. These measures have consequently led to an increase in deaths on the Mediterranean Sea. By closing ports and restricting rescue operations, Italy has effectively left thousands of migrants stranded at sea in dangerous conditions, as seen in the Cutro catastrophe. This fatal incident occurred just three days after the approval of the restrictions on NGO rescues. The cause of this shipwreck was Italy’s delayed response following the FRONTEX report of a ship needing rescue. The Italian authorities approached the situation as a police operation to stop irregular migration, not as a humanitarian mission (Pons, 2023). Despite the application of this new regulation, in 2023, Italy experienced a 50% increase in migrants arriving by sea compared to 2022.

Conclusion 

As noted in the analyzed example of Italy, populist governments justify stringent migration policies as necessary for their national security and sovereignty. However, they often do not respect international refugee and migration law and fundamental human rights. The protection of borders, fueled by populist agendas, perpetuates and maintains a lack of empathy towards the deaths during the migration process, reducing these tragedies to mere numbers in European newspapers. Furthermore, populist agendas create and perpetuate a narrative of “us versus them,” neglecting the ethical imperative to protect human rights. This undermines European credibility as an exemplar of human rights advocacy on the global stage. The escalating number of deaths at EU borders is a stark reminder of the human cost of racist and restrictive migration policies driven by populist agendas. To prevent further deaths, the EU must adopt an approach that prioritizes protecting human rights, human lives and fosters international cooperation to avoid casualties.

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