Giorgia Meloni, leader of Brothers of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, attend a center-right coalition rally in Rome, Italy on March 01, 2018. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.

The Spectrum of Italian Populist Parties in the 2024 European Elections: A Shift in the Balance of Power on the Right

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Please cite as:

Biancalana, Cecilia. (2024). “The Spectrum of Italian Populist Parties in the 2024 European Elections: A Shift to the Right.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0075

 

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Abstract

Italy has historically been one of the strongest proponents of a united Europe. However, recent years have seen a rise in Euroscepticism within the country, with a notable increase in the electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. Have the 2024 elections confirmed or refuted this trend? Italy features a variety of populist parties, both on the right and on the left, each with different Eurogroup affiliations and varying positions on European integration. As a result, during the 2024 campaign, the parties adopted different strategies. The results of the 2024 elections highlight two significant trends: a decrease in turnout and the strengthened influence of Fratelli d’Italia, reflecting a sustained support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.

Keywords: populism; Euroscepticism; Fratelli d’Italia; Lega; Forza Italia; Movimento 5 Stelle; European Parliament

 

By Cecilia Biancalana* (Department of Culture, Politics and Society, University of Turin, Italy)

Populism and Euroscepticism in Italy: Diverse actors and perspectives

Italy is an intriguing case study for examining the role, characteristics and influence of populist parties within the European context. Its relevance is due to two primary reasons related to the role of populism in the country and the attitudes of its citizens and political elites towards Europe.

On the one hand, Italy has been described as a ‘populist paradise’ (Tarchi, 2015) due to the strong presence and variety of populist parties. Indeed, Italy hosts a spectrum of populist movements spanning both right and left ideologies (Biancalana, 2020). This diversity extends to the European stage, where, as we will see, populist parties not only exhibit varying levels of Europhilia and Euroscepticism but also belong to different European groups. Notably, within the centre-right, three Italian parties fit the model of right-wing populism to varying degrees (albeit being quite different from each other): Forza Italia (FI), Lega (officially named Lega per Salvini premier), and Fratelli d’Italia (FdI). For instance, in the 2019–2024 legislature, FI was part of the European People’s Party (EPP) group, FdI was a member of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), presenting a more moderate stance than the Lega, which was part of Identity and Democracy (ID). Moreover, there was also a populist party leaning towards the left, the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S), standing among the Non-attached (NA) group of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who do not belong to any of the recognized political groups.

On the other hand, Italy has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of a united Europe, both at the elite level (Conti, 2017) and among the general populace (Isernia, 2008). However, it has recently become increasingly Eurosceptic (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020).

Italy as a populist paradise

Regarding populism, as mentioned, Italy has long been regarded as a testing ground for populism, earning it the designation of the ‘laboratory of populism’ (Tarchi, 2015). Various forms of populism coexist within the country, which we will briefly describe, also considering their relationship with Europe. As anticipated, the leading populist parties today are FdI, Lega, FI and the Movimento 5 Stelle. Collectively, these four parties secured 58.31% (Chamber of Deputies) of the vote in the September 2022 general elections, highlighting the significant electoral strength of populism in contemporary Italy. These parties are characterized by varying degrees and types of both populism and Euroscepticism.

Scholars have categorized FdI in contrasting ways (see Bressanelli & de Candia, 2023 for a comprehensive review): post-fascist, radical-right populist and national conservative. Here, we will consider FdI as a radical right party with elements of populism and Euroscepticism (Donà, 2022). Established in 2012, the party traces its roots to the Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI), a neo-fascist party founded in 1946 by supporters of former dictator Benito Mussolini. Since 2017, FdI platforms have introduced elements of nationalism, nativism and authoritarianism, along with anti-European Union (EU) stances. FdI made its electoral breakthrough in the 2022 elections, securing 25,98% of the vote and entering government for the first time under the leadership of Giorgia Meloni. The party promotes an extreme right-wing ideology, defending a homogeneous populace against perceived threats, such as LGBTQ+ groups and immigrants, particularly from Muslim-majority countries.

In the international arena, FdI advocates for national sovereignty over supranational integration while maintaining a relatively moderate stance on opposition to the EU (see Conti, di Mauro & Memoli, 2021). FdI is affiliated with the more moderate ECR group in the European Parliament (EP), of which Meloni has been president since 2020. Within the ECR group, FdI actively participates in crucial decisions alongside mainstream political factions, collaborating with them while distinguishing itself from the more radical right and Eurosceptic ID group. However, FdI continues to engage in ideological battles on specific policies such as civil liberties, environmental issues, gender equality, and EU constitutional matters (Bressanelli and di Candia 2023).

The Lega, known as Lega Nord until December 2017, was founded in 1991. Initially, it was a regionalist party (Bulli & Tronconi, 2011) that strongly advocated for Northern Italy’s interests and displayed ethnochauvinism towards Southern Italy, positioning itself against central political institutions. Since Matteo Salvini became party secretary in 2013, the Lega has shifted its focus to hostility towards immigration and European integration. Salvini’s leadership transformed the Lega’s claim and shifted the opposition to central political institutions from Rome to Brussels: the EU is portrayed as an enemy that deprives Italian citizens of resources and the freedom to determine their own destiny (Albertazzi et al., 2018; Brunazzo & Gilbert, 2017). Salvini has forged alliances with other right-wing populist parties, including France’s Rassemblement National (RN), which has been part of the same EP group: previously ID and currently the newly established group Patriots for Europe (PfE). They both held Eurosceptic views and had previously opposed the euro. However, by 2019, the Lega had dropped the idea of Italy exiting the euro, following a similar shift by Marine Le Pen in 2017.

Silvio Berlusconi’s FI was founded in December 1993 following the Tangentopoli corruption scandals. FI participated in the March 1994 general elections, securing 21,01% of the vote, heralding Berlusconi’s emergence as a prominent figure in Italian politics. Berlusconi is frequently cited as an exemplar of right-wing populism (Fella & Ruzza, 2013). As a billionaire media mogul, he entered politics as an outsider, leveraging his television channels to directly appeal to the people, a strategy that foreshadowed figures like Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra and Donald Trump in the United States. Historically, FI displayed ambivalent attitudes towards the EU (Conti, 2017) but has shifted towards a more pro-European stance in recent years. This transformation is partly attributed to the leadership change following Berlusconi’s passing in 2023, with Antonio Tajani, a former president of the EP, assuming leadership of the party (Biancalana, Seddone & Gallina, 2024).

The M5S is the newest among Italian populist parties and the only one not positioned on the right (Ivaldi, Lanzone & Woods, 2017; Mosca & Tronconi, 2019). Founded in October 2009 by former comedian and blogger Beppe Grillo, the party gained significant electoral momentum in the 2013 general elections, securing 25,56% of the vote (Chiaramonte & de Sio, 2014). In the 2018 general election, the M5S further increased its support, capturing 32.68% of the vote and entering a populist coalition government with Salvini’s Lega. After the collapse of the government with the Lega, the party formed a new government in partnership with the leftist Partito Democratico (PD). Between 2021 and 2022, the M5S joined Mario Draghi’s technocratic ‘grand’ coalition government.

The M5S’s relationship with Europe also reflects this fluidity and flexibility. In 2014, following its initial electoral success, the M5S campaigned against the euro, advocating for a referendum on Italy’s exit from the eurozone and rejecting significant EU financial constraints like those imposed by the ‘fiscal compact’. During the electoral campaign for the 2018 general elections, under a new leader, Luigi Di Maio, the M5S moderated its Eurosceptic stance, emphasizing that Italy’s departure from the euro was neither imminent nor planned. Nevertheless, according to Conti, Di Mauro and Memoli’s survey among MPs in 2019, when the M5S was part of a coalition government with the Lega, it could be unequivocally categorized as Eurosceptic. Furthermore, in 2019, the M5S adopted more moderate and ambivalent positions (see Conti, Marangoni & Verzichelli, 2020).

Following the dissolution of the coalition with the Lega and its subsequent alliance with the PD, the M5S supported Ursula von der Leyen’s appointment as president of the European Commission and endorsed the installation of a pro-European leader like Mario Draghi as Italy’s prime minister in early 2021, signalling a shift towards pro-Europeanism. Indeed, after five years (2014–2019) in the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group (created by Nigel Farage) and five years in the NA group, after the 2024 elections, it joined the GUE/NGL group, signalling a clear shift towards the left at the European level as well.

Against this backdrop, what were the main issues of the 2024 campaign? How did these parties perform in the 2024 elections? Before addressing these questions, let us analyse Italians’ relationship with Europe.

The Italian case: From Europhilia to Euroscepticism

Regarding the relationship between elites and citizens and Europe, we know that historically, Italy has been a staunch supporter of European integration, with EP elections reflecting a dominant narrative that views Europe as synonymous with peace, prosperity, and political stability (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020). As one of the founding members of the EU, its membership has enjoyed wide support among the political elite and the general public alike. By the early 1990s, nearly all parties shared not only broad support for the integration process but also specific support for the EU. However, the ‘permissive consensus’ supporting EU integration has been replaced by a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe & Marks, 2009). Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the previous narrative has significantly shifted (Conti, Marangoni & Verzichelli, 2020), and both Italian citizens and political elites have become much more critical toward EU integration (Brunazzo & Mascitelli, 2020).

It has been argued that this shift is due to multiple crises, such as the financial and economic crises (including the transition to the single currency and, more recently, the Great Recession and subsequent austerity policies) and migration crises (specifically the so-called refugee crisis in 2015–2016), which have significantly affected Italy and led to increased opposition to the EU. Consequently, a considerable electoral market for Eurosceptic parties has emerged, marking a notable departure from Italy’s post-war Europhile stance and reflecting a more complex and divided perspective on European integration (Conti, di Mauro & Memoli, 2021).

This shift is exemplified by two events: the success of populist Eurosceptic parties in the general elections of March 2018 and the subsequent formation of a government by two Eurosceptic parties, the M5S and the Lega, marking a turning point in Italian history within the EU (Conti, Marangoni, & Verzichelli, 2020). The second event is the result of the 2019 EP elections, which highlighted the growing Euroscepticism within the country. The Eurosceptic Lega Nord, led by Matteo Salvini, won 34.26% of the vote. The M5S, also critical of the EU, especially the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), garnered 17.06%; for their part, FI won 8.78%, and the far-right nationalist party, FdI, received 6.44%. Have the 2024 elections confirmed or refuted this trend?

Populist parties’ campaign and issues

After five years of significant political and economic turbulence, including a general election (2022), three changes in government (the PD–M5S coalition in 2019–2021, the technocratic Draghi government in 2021–2022, and the Meloni administration starting from 2022), and multiple crises in which the EU played a notable role, such as the COVID-19 and energy crises, the 2024 European elections emerge as a crucial indicator of both internal power dynamics within Italy’s party system and within the right-wing governing coalition, as well as their positions on Europe.

Consistent with its nationalist traits, FdI’s program – entitled Con Giorgia l’Italia cambia l’Europa (‘With Giorgia, Italy changes Europe’) – emphasizes defending the identity of European peoples and nations, referencing Europe’s ‘Judeo-Christian roots’. In her final rally, consistent with her sovereigntist traits, the party leader and Prime Minister Meloni stressed that ‘Europe must rediscover its historical role, focus on a few major issues, and leave other matters to national governments that do not need centralization’ (Pinto 2024). Throughout the campaign, Meloni had to balance her dual role as prime minister, which requires international credibility and as a populist party leader, striving to maintain equilibrium between these positions. 

Lega’s campaign is markedly more Eurosceptic, echoing the slogan ‘Più Italia, meno Europa’ (‘More Italy, less Europe’), which, interestingly, was previously used by FI in the 2014 European elections. Lega’s platform, Programma elezioni europee 2024, focused on halting the EU’s technocratic and centralizing drift and restoring the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Key proposals include rejecting the European Green Deal, ending austerity policies and protecting Italian production chains. The campaign was further stirred by the controversial candidacy of General Vannacci, a very controversial figure who ran as an independent on Lega’s lists. General Vannacci became known for his book Il Mondo al Contrario (‘The world turned upside down’), published in 2023, which sparked significant backlash due to homophobic, racist and sexist content. Despite internal opposition, Vannacci received substantial support, securing over 530,000 preferences and leading in four out of five constituencies.

Forza Italia remains the most pro-European party, presenting a ten-point program – Con noi al centro dell’Europa (‘With us at the heart of Europe’) – that includes goals like ‘building common defence and security’ and ‘reforming European treaties’. On 21 May, at a campaign event, FI’s national secretary Antonio Tajani criticized Lega’s Euroscepticism, remarking, ‘When I hear “Less Europe”, all beautiful things, but with no effectiveness and no logical sense’ (Canepa, 2024), adding that without being part of a broader project, Italy risks being overwhelmed and rendered irrelevant. Interestingly, as mentioned, this slogan was used by FI ten years ago, indicating the party’s softened positions vis-à-vis Europe over time.

In summary, on the right, Lega has sought to radicalize its stance to attract votes from those discontented with Meloni’s institutionalization, whereas FI has positioned itself as the moderate pole.

On the contrary, the Movimento 5 Stelle aimed to attract votes from the left, focusing on peace and opposing arms to Ukraine. Its program, entitled L’Italia che conta. Protagonisti in Europa (‘An Italy that counts: Protagonists in Europe’), emphasized anti-austerity measures, defence of the public healthcare system, anti-corruption efforts, environmental protection, and labour issues, including introducing a minimum wage and a 32-hour workweek.

Results: Decreased Turnout and a Shift in the Balance of Power Among Populist Parties

The 2024 European elections in Italy revealed some significant trends. The first one is the decline in voter turnout, which dropped by over 6 percentage points compared to the 2019 European elections (48.3%, down from 54.50%). This decline continues a long-term trend: turnout was 85.65% in 1979, 81.07% in 1989, 69.76% in 1999, and 66.47% in 2009.

Moreover, it is worth noting that in previous years, Italy’s voter turnout in European elections was consistently higher than the EU average. For instance, in 1979, Italy’s turnout was 85.65% compared to the EU average of 61.99%, and this pattern continued through the 1980s and 1990s. By 2019, Italy’s turnout was 54.5%, whereas the EU average was 50.66%. This trend ended in 2024, with Italy’s turnout declining further to 48.31%, while the EU average increased to 51.07%. Nevertheless, despite this increase in abstentionism, the latest Eurobarometer survey (Standard Eurobarometer 101, April–May 2024) indicates that 50% of Italians ‘tend to trust’ the EU, compared to a European average of 49%.

Regarding the performance of populist parties, it is notable that all the parties in the centre-right governing coalition (FdI, FI, Lega) improved their results compared to the 2022 general elections, the most recent national election in Italy. This outcome is significant as the ‘honeymoon’ period of the government elected in 2022 could have been expected to wane, and populist parties in office in other countries lost votes. This result marks a consolidation of the approval of the Meloni government at the domestic level.

However, it is also worth comparing the 2024 results with those of 2019, the most recent European elections. In this respect, FdI significantly increased its vote share from 6.44% in the 2019 European elections to 28.76% in the 2024 European elections, even improving on its result from the 2022 general election (25.98%). Forza Italia also improved its vote share, rising from 8.78% in the 2019 European elections to 9.59% in the 2024 European elections. This positive outcome under Antonio Tajani, the new leader following Berlusconi’s passing, indicates stable support within the electorate. In contrast, the Lega’s vote share saw a notable change, declining dramatically from 34.26% in the 2019 European elections to 9% in 2024. It is worth noting that in the 2022 general elections, the party scored 8.97%.

Within the right-wing area, we observe a shift in the balance of power between Lega and FdI: Giorgia Meloni’s party has become the strongest, while the Lega has declined. Concerning the 2022 general elections, data from the polling agency SWG (SWG 2024) shows indeed that there has been a shift of votes from other partners within the centre-right coalition towards FdI. While 68% of the votes FdI represent a confirmation of their 2022 vote, 16% come from the centre-right (8% from Lega and 8% from FI), and 16% come from other political areas (7% from other lists and 9% from abstention).

Conversely, the Movimento 5 Stelle experienced its worst performance in a national election in history. Its vote share dropped from 17.26% in the 2019 European elections to 9.98% in 2024. This result continues the decline observed in the 2022 general elections (15.43%). In the analysis of the Five Star Movement electorate conducted by SWG, it is evident that only 40% of those who chose them in 2022 reaffirmed their choice in 2024. The remaining votes were distributed as follows: 13% voted for a centre-left party, 6% for a centre-right party, 6% for another party, and a significant 35% abstained from voting.

This result can be explained by the absence of prominent candidates on the lists, indicating that the Five Star Movement failed to consolidate its political constituency. Additionally, the renewed bipolar competition in Italy between the right and left has significantly diminished the influence of a third party like the M5S. It is to be noted that the M5S shifted to the left over the years. However, left-wing voters likely feel better represented by other leftist parties, such as the PD and the Alleanza Verdi e Sinistra (AVS).

 

Finally, it is worth asking what the main differences between the populist parties are concerning the characteristics of their electorate. In this respect, a pre-electoral survey conducted by CISE (De Sio, Mannoni & Cataldi 2024) indicates that M5S voters differ from right-wing ones in terms of education. Right-wing parties are more popular among less-educated voters and have less support among university graduates. In contrast, the M5S draws strength from those with a secondary education. The party also receives considerable support from the unemployed, affirming its focus on social issues.

There are also some differences within the centre-right coalition (especially between FdI and Lega, the two parties whose power dynamics have reversed over the last few years), mainly regarding gender and social class. Concerning gender, FdI has a predominantly male profile, while Lega has a more female-oriented electorate. Regarding social class, the Lega is strong among the most disadvantaged classes (a relatively new trend for the Lega), while only 10% of FdI support comes from the lowest class, rising to 36% among the highest class. These figures indicate a strong complementarity between the two parties.

Conclusions

In sum, regarding the impact of populism in these elections, we note that in the 2019 European elections, the combined vote share for the right-wing populist parties – Lega, FdI and FI – was 49.5%. By 2024, this total increased to 51.7%. Including the percentages for the M5S, we see that the total for populist parties was 66.6% in 2019 and slightly decreased to 62.5% in 2024. This figure underscores the growing strength of right-wing populism in Italy and highlights a persistent and possibly deepening support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.

However, looking at the absolute votes, we note an increase in the percentage of votes for populist parties, but not in absolute terms. The votes for right-wing populist parties decreased from about 13 million in 2019 to 11 million in 2024. Including the Movimento 5 Stelle, the votes for populist parties (both right and left) fell from nearly 18 million in 2019 to just over 13 million in 2024. Abstention has also affected these parties, which may no longer be seen as a credible protest alternative to non-voting.

In summary, the results of the 2024 elections highlight two significant trends: a decrease in turnout and the strengthened influence of right-wing populism, particularly of FdI, within the centre-right coalition. Right-wing populism is increasingly prominent in Italy (at least among those who decide to vote), reflecting a sustained and potentially deepening support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.

Conversely, the steep decline of the M5S marks a critical point for the party, indicating a need for strategic reassessment and potential repositioning within the Italian political landscape. This decline could also indicate a return to bipolarity after the ‘electoral earthquake’ of 2013 (Chiaramonte & de Sio, 2014). In this new bipolar system, for the time being, FdI holds the lion’s share of the right-wing representation.

 

(*) Cecilia Biancalana is an assistant professor in the Department of Culture, Politics and Society at the University of Turin. Her research focuses on political ecology, party change, populism and the relationship between the internet and politics.

 

References

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Biancalana, C. (2019). Four Italian Populisms. In Multiple Populisms (pp. 216–241). Routledge.

Biancalana, C., Seddone, A., & Gallina, M. (2024). Italy: Political Developments and Data in 2023. European Journal of Political Research Political Data Yearbook.

Bressanelli, E., & De Candia, M. (2023). Fratelli d’Italia in the European Parliament: between radicalism and conservatism. Contemporary Italian Politics, 1–20.

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Chiaramonte, A. & De Sio, L. (2014). Terremoto elettorale. Le elezioni politiche del 2014. Bologna: Il Mulino.

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Pinto, F. (2024, 1 June). Elezioni, Meloni: “Europa non sia più gigante burocratico e nano politico”. Euronews. https://it.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/06/01/elezioni-meloni-europa-non-sia-piu-gigante-burocratico-e-nano-politico

SWG (2024, 10 June). Swg Radar speciale elezioni 2024. Elezioni europee – analisi dei flussi di voto. https://www.swg.it/pa/attachment/6666e60a2e297/Radar_speciale%
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Figure 5: Asylum seekers' tents near the International Protection Office and Refugee Legal Service on Lower Mount Street, Dublin, Ireland, on July 7, 2023. Photo: Derick P. Hudson.

Ireland After the 2024 EP Elections: The Centre Holds … Just About

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Please cite as:

O’Malley, Eoin. (2024). “Ireland After the 2024 EP Elections: The Centre Holds … Just About.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0074

 

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Abstract

The 2024 European Parliament elections in Ireland came on the back of a rise in the prominence of immigration as an issue. Although Ireland had seen significant migration in the early to mid-2000s, the large number of migrants at this time had no significant impact on politics or voting. Nor was Ireland a country that saw any significant anti-EU sentiment. Thus, Ireland could be seen as an anomaly in Europe. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a sudden rise in the numbers in Ireland seeking international protection (asylum seekers). Most of these came as a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and again, Ireland saw a positive reaction to inward migration even though the country accommodated a comparatively high number of Ukrainian refugees per head of population despite the country’s geographic distance. There had previously been ethnonationalist parties on the ballot paper in European and national elections, but they had never really featured. In 2024 none got elected, although some did in the concurrent local elections. The vote for some explicitly populist ethnonationalist parties was greater than ever before. This result occurred partly because Sinn Féin, another populist–nationalist (but not wholly ethnonationalist) party, saw its support drop dramatically. It suggests, however, that Ireland may not remain the anomaly it has been. In all about a third of the voting electorate chose parties or candidates that can be categorized as populist.

Keywords: migration; Ireland; populism; EU Pact on Migration; farmers

 

By Eoin O’Malley * (School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, Ireland)

Introduction

While electorally successful populism has always existed in Irish politics, the 2024 European election campaign and results in Ireland saw the emergence of a type of populism that had not hitherto been seen. Appeals, for instance, to a ‘pure Irish people’ that is distinct from a ‘corrupt elite’ are common not just in contemporary politics but in the nationalist politics on which the Irish state is founded. But there had never been an appetite in Ireland for any sort of ‘othering’ of migrants (or indeed other minorities). Although the results of the 2024 elections generally returned moderate, non-populist politicians, the centre parties’ success belies the emergence of a stronger chauvinistic ethnonationalism, indicating a possible direction of travel towards increased levels of populism. This chapter will outline the existing and emerging populist parties present in Ireland and then set out the context of the rise of migration as an issue since Ireland’s last general election in February 2020. This background leads into a discussion of the 2024 campaign, an outline of the results, and, finally, a discussion of trends.

Populist parties in Ireland

For many years, Ireland was an anomaly in having no electorally successful, hardline-ethnonationalist populist outfit, as most other European countries have. The standard explanation for this absence is that Ireland has an established nationalist–populist party that is left-leaning and explicitly progressive (i.e., pro-migrant rights). In turn the reason for this might be that the narrative of Irish nationalism is ‘small guy nationalism’, given that the Irish ‘story’ is of forced emigration, with no ‘great past’ to which the country might return (O’Malley, 2008). Sinn Féin, an explicitly left–populist party, was directly linked to the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), which killed thousands of people during the Troubles from the late 1960s to 1998. While much of that campaign of violence was clearly sectarian (and thus ethnonationalist), following its transition to normal politics in the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement (also known as the Belfast Agreement) in 1998, Sinn Féin has espoused what it called ‘civic nationalism’, although it continues to champion a particular type of cultural nationalism that excludes those living in Northern Ireland who identify as British.

Sinn Féin was largely responsible for suppressing support for conservative ethnonationalism when immigration rose in the mid-2000s to where about 17% of the population in Ireland was foreign born (up from negligible levels in the early 1990s). It opposed a referendum in 2004 to change the origin of citizenship from jus soli to one based on the child’s heritage. Yet it remained outside the mainstream, being ‘Eurocritical’, opposing all new EU treaties, which because of Irish law must be passed by referendum. It was particularly critical of what it saw as the neoliberal bent of EU institutions.

Sinn Féin support rose in the 2010s as it adopted a more populist line. It adopted the policy approach led by small left-wing parties in opposing water charges, suggesting that the charges were a prelude to privatization designed to benefit elite supporters of the main governing party, Fine Gael. Sinn Féin used populist communications strategies to categorize Fine Gael and the main opposition party at the time, Fianna Fáil, as two sides of the same elite coin. There was some truth to this; these were not parties with strong ideological divisions, and in 2016, Fianna Fáil had signed a confidence and supply agreement to support a new minority Fine Gael government, enabling Fine Gael to remain in power. Shortly before becoming the Sinn Féin leader, Mary Lou McDonald declared that that pact ‘serves only to confirm the political establishment’s indifference and inability to act in the interests of the many’ (An Phoblacht, 2017). Sinn Féin and McDonald have frequently referred to the mainstream party leaders as ‘the lads’ or called them ‘an old boys’ club.’

One of the parties that had led the anti-water charges protests was People Before Profit (PBP), a small, Trotskyite, populist party with four Teachtaí Dála (TDs; MPs in English). It is an electoral front for the Socialist Workers’ Party, although it also forms an alliance with the Socialist Party, whose electoral label is Solidarity. It had no seats in the EP, but Clare Daly of Independents4Change had been a member of Solidarity, leaving because it refused to work with Mick Wallace, who was then an independent TD. Both Daly and Wallace went on to take seats in the European Parliament, sitting with The Left group.

Because of the Irish electoral system, also used in Irish EP elections, many non-party or independent candidates run for elected office, more often than not using populist campaign styles. One such MEP, Luke ‘Ming’ Flanagan, was first elected to the EP as an independent candidate in 2014 on an explicitly anti-EU and anti-elite platform. His appearance and pronouncements were unconventional and anti-establishment. A member of The Left group in the EP, his voting record suggests he was concerned with protecting farmers’ interests.

Independent Ireland, formed in November 2023 and comprising three TDs, calls for greater control of migration but opposes EU co-operation on migration as well as action to tackle climate change. It might be categorized as a farmers’ party, but it also ran a candidate in Dublin whose main issue was migration. It describes itself as ‘a party that puts our people first … delivering on a program of reform and common-sense solutions’ (Independent Ireland, 2024). Farmers had traditionally been a powerful lobby group in Ireland, with most Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil usually sympathetic to their needs. But the inclusion of the Greens in government since 2020 (as well as some legal requirements from Brussels) saw the government implement policies against the wishes of many farmers. Ireland successfully negotiated an opt-out on a nitrates directive, but that was a small win for farmers.

The other smaller parties that fielded candidates were more clearly of an extreme position. A group of parties ran candidates, all claiming to speak for the Irish people, and most of which subscribe to ‘Great Replacement’ theories. Although they ran as separate parties, many voters would find it difficult to distinguish between the Irish Freedom Party (IFP), the National Party, Ireland First and The Irish People. The IFP’s aim is to re-establish ‘the national independence and sovereignty of Ireland and [restore] its national democracy by leaving the European Union’, no easy task in a country that regularly boasts the highest level of approval for EU membership among all the member states (Irish Freedom Party, 2024). It hoped that it might be able to benefit from migration being a significant issue at the elections, focusing heavily on that issue. IFP is led by Herman Kelly, who had been the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) press officer in Brussels. IFP had fielded candidates in previous elections but with limited success.

The National Party had also fielded candidates before, yet polled miserably. As with most of these parties, it is socially conservative and emerged from the pro-life movement. Comically, it split in two ahead of the elections, with the two factions each running candidates under the same banner. In terms of presentation it appears fascistic, with the diminutive leader almost copying Adolf Hitler in his physical appearance. It displays textbook populism in its stance ‘against the corrupt and amoral establishment who push replacement level immigration which will in time completely destroy Irish nationality’ (National Party, 2024).

Ireland First is a new party, largely a vehicle for Derek Blighe, a self-styled ‘citizen journalist’, who became prominent during the 2023 anti-immigrant protests (detailed further below), including spreading videos that would seem to encourage the rioting in Dublin. It describes itself as centre-right; most observers would see it as conservative nationalist and clearly populist: ‘Career politicians have consistently let us down, and it is time for the people, the true backbone of Ireland, to take matters into their own hands’ (Ireland First, 2024).

The Irish People is the newest of these parties. It presented itself as a loose coalition of independent candidates working under a shared banner and agreed principles, including ‘supporting Family values, advocating for Free Speech, prioritizing Housing for Irish citizens, endorsing Sensible Immigration policies, maintaining Neutrality in international conflicts, ensuring Education is free from indoctrination, and supporting Rural and farming communities’ (The Irish People, 2024). It railed against what it sees as ‘extremist’ policies being implemented by the government using nationalist rhetoric normally reserved for parties such as Sinn Féin.

While it would be hard to identify these parties on a left–right spectrum, another populist party that emerged and was sometimes accused of being ‘far right’ is more clearly on the left economically. Aontú emerged as a splinter group from Sinn Féin over the party’s stance on abortion. The leader of Aontú was a Sinn Féin TD who was disciplined for opposing the repeal of a provision in the Irish constitution banning abortion. The party shares Sinn Féin’s focus on a united Ireland and left-leaning economic policies, which it styles as ‘economic justice’. However, its supporters clearly position themselves on the right of the political spectrum, possibly because of abortion (Red C, 2024).

The 2020 general election and beyond

In the 2019 European elections Sinn Féin lost most of its seats and dropped seven percentage points in a performance that surprised most observers and has never been satisfactorily explained. Within the party the analysis was that it had become too angry and negative and not solutions-focused, but you could have argued it was this anger that saw the party rise in the polls. There seemed to be no obvious change in communications or electoral strategy in the following months. Nevertheless, seven months later, in the general election, the party’s support surged, becoming marginally the most popular in terms of votes, and would have been clearly the most popular in terms of seats except that it had underestimated its likely support and fielded too few candidates to take advantage of its popularity.

Sinn Féin benefited from economic grievances, particularly housing-related ones (Cunningham and Marsh, 2021: 231–4). The party’s increased vote share in 2020 was to a great extent the result of the medium-term strategy of linking Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael as the same party using the (somewhat pejorative) ‘FFG’ label mentioned above. So when voters came to think of an alternative to the existing government, it was difficult for Fianna Fáil to present itself as that alternative. The acuteness of the housing crisis also helped the party. Sinn Féin had campaigned vigorously on the housing issue, and it was this that brought it increased support among young progressive voters. Sinn Féin focused relentlessly on this issue, questioning whether the gains made from the country’s strong economic growth could reach ordinary people. The party also used a strategy of associating Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil with a ‘landlord class’, something with powerful resonance in Ireland due to the country’s nineteenth-century famine.

When the two parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, eventually formed a coalition government (together with the Green Party) in mid-2020, Sinn Féin doubled down on this rhetoric. It used its being the largest party in terms of votes to claim that somehow the party leader, Mary Lou McDonald, was nefariously denied the position of Taoiseach (prime minister). In tweets and other public communications, party supporters and representatives used language to deny that Micheál Martin was the rightful Taoiseach. They used hashtags such as #notmytaoiseach and spoke of McDonald as ‘the people’s choice’. This populist rhetoric was common in the subsequent years in opposition. And it worked. Although Fine Gael received a poll boost from its early handling of COVID-19, of which Sinn Féin was broadly supportive, Sinn Féin clearly became the largest party in voting intentions.

However, Sinn Féin also began to transition to become a more mainstream party, one that might be taken seriously as a prospective party of government. Walking this tightrope between populism and responsible party was to prove divisive for its supporters. Its mainstream position on COVID-19 probably led to the loss of some supporters, although individual party representatives were able to voice what many considered conspiracy theories on this issue without sanction by the party. In the months leading up to the EP elections, the party’s finance spokesman spoke to financiers in London to reassure them that Sinn Féin would not pose a threat to their interests. Mary Lou McDonald made a similar trip to Silicon Valley to reassure investors of her party’s intentions.

While it could have gotten away with this – even if it would have criticized others for doing it – the party also changed or took more mainstream positions on other issues. It dropped plans to immediately implement a wealth tax and instead said it would refer it to a commission on taxation. It opposed the EU Nature Restoration Law, causing some internal party division and criticism from left-wing groups. Sinn Féin supported the government’s referendum proposals to remove references to mothers and protections of marriage in the constitution, replaced instead by the vague concept of ‘durable relationships’. When a groundswell of opposition to the proposed changes led to their defeat, some in Sinn Féin acknowledged that the party was out of step with the people. It also supported legislation on hate crimes, which opponents claimed could limit free speech. The party then changed its mind on the issue, indicating it would oppose in later stages the legislation it had earlier voted for. The party was then criticized for a series of shifts in position and accused of ‘flip-flopping’ by its opponents.

However, it was its position on migration for which Sinn Féin received most opprobrium. The increase in refugees following the Russian invasion of Ukraine put severe pressure on Irish homelessness services. A subsequent spike in migration from other places, the Middle East and North Africa especially, put significant pressure on the ability of the state to accommodate them in the middle of an already-existing housing crisis. In 2023 Ireland saw violent anti-immigrant protests as hotels and other buildings were being used to accommodate the increased numbers of applicants for international protection. The mainstream political reaction, including that of Sinn Féin and the small populist left parties such as PBP, was condemnatory – dismissing those protesting as ‘far right’ or being led by the ‘far right.’

Sinn Féin’s falling support, then, can be seen as the party’s failure to hold together the coalition of supporters it had created since 2020. That coalition might be classified into three groups: anti-British nationalists who are most concerned about a united Ireland, young to middle-aged, less-educated ‘losers from globalisation’, and young left progressives who are most affected by the housing crisis. This coalition held together when the core issue was housing. But when migration was the focus of most media and public attention, the equivocal nature of the Sinn Féin response pleased none of these groups, the first two of which might have preferred to see the party oppose migration more clearly, whereas the last group might have been appalled at such an anti-progressive stance.

Aontú was in a position to soak up some of Sinn Féin’s faltering coalition. It more clearly called for controls on immigration and opposed the EU migration pact. It had scored some success in its referendum campaign opposing two new proposed amendments, one to redefine the traditional meaning of family and another to remove references to mothers from the constitution. Both were heavily defeated by voters. Aontú claimed to be ‘the only party listening to the people’ and campaigned on this line coming up to the EP elections.

With a riot in Dublin city centre in late 2023 and an increase in the importance of the migration issue, a political response and adverse fallout were inevitable. The minister for justice, Helen McEntee, was seen as ineffectual on the issue. Some media reports showed that Ireland had deported just 100 of the 7,300 failed asylum applicants since 2023. The government slowly started to shift its position, but when Leo Varadkar (Fine Gael leader and Taoiseach) stood down in April 2024, replaced by Simon Harris, there was an expectation that he might shift the government’s position. Certainly the rhetoric from the government changed somewhat, although no specific shift in policy could be identified.

The campaign for the 2024 EP elections

In opinion polls coming up to the EP election campaign migration rose as one of the main issues that respondents felt was important (the others mainly being housing and the cost of living). One of the most notable features of the polls was the fall in support for Sinn Féin. Much of this support appeared to be going to independent or small-party candidates rather than the mainstream parties. As there is a low threshold to get on the ballot, the ballot paper had a large number of candidates in each of the three constituencies (Dublin, 23 candidates for 4 seats; Ireland South, 23 candidates for 5 seats; and Midlands-North West, 26 candidates for 5 seats). The large number of candidates meant that they would inevitably split their vote and reduce their chances of exploiting the new salience of migration among the Irish electorate.

Sinn Féin had been vocally pro-migrant rights, but that message became more equivocal over time as some representatives acknowledged the pressure that recently arrived asylum seekers put on services. It tried to refocus public anger on the government, but its messaging was confused. In the run-up to and during the campaign, Sinn Féin changed its emphasis on migration. It rejected criticism that it was for ‘open borders’, saying it opposed the EU Pact on Migration on the basis that the party ‘firmly believes that Ireland must retain our sovereignty over these matters if we are to have an immigration system that is fair, efficient, and enforced’ (Ó Laoghaire, 2024). This shift was seen as a response to the direct threat from chauvinist nationalism in the form of some microparties, some with fascist overtones and from independent candidates or from Independent Ireland. Anti-immigrant protests increased in scale and number and, at some of them, crowds waving Irish flags shouted: ‘Sinn Féin are traitors!’ These protesters were able to use nationalist rhetoric, which had previously tended to be pro-migrant, by referencing a centuries-old attempt to replace the Catholic native population in a series of ‘Plantations’. These groups then referred to a ‘great replacement’ through a ‘new plantation’. There was a sense that Sinn Féin, once masters of nationalist populism, was now losing to nationalist populism.

On other issues, populist parties such as Sinn Féin and PBP were more in tune with the public mood. All these parties had opposed what it saw as the weakening of Irish neutrality by consecutive governments’ involvement in military partnerships, such as the NATO Partnership for Peace and PESCO, a platform for member state co-operation in European defence. PBP is explicitly anti-EU because of what it sees as the Union’s ‘imperial agenda’ and support for neoliberalism. Both it and Sinn Féin took strong positions on the Israel–Hamas war, including calls for the expulsion of the Israeli ambassador. On the issue of the Russia–Ukraine War, PBP took positions that were less in tune with popular opinion and often seen as pro-Russian, including calls for Ukraine to enter peace talks. Sinn Féin’s position was more equivocal. Historically it was more aligned with Russia, often blaming the West for being unnecessarily aggressive toward Putin. The invasion of Ukraine meant that the party said it was fully behind the smaller country. But it continued to abstain on packages designed to support Ukraine in the EP.

Two of Independent Ireland’s three EP candidates were high-profile broadcasters, one a recently retired regional correspondent for the national broadcaster and another a late-night phone-in-show host – often referred to as a ‘shock jock’. Their high profile immediately made them contenders to take seats. Although some saw Independent Ireland as an extreme right-wing group, it regards itself as centrist (albeit with a conservative bent). Outside Dublin it campaigned on farming issues, being critical of EU regulations and ‘EU overreach’, and also spoke more fervently in favour of greater control of migration than other centrist parties.

No seats for the new extremes, but …

Although Fine Gael (the European People’s Party-aligned governing party) lost vote share and one seat (down to four), it was relatively pleased with the outcome. At 20.8%, its vote share was slightly above the other centrist governing party, the Renew-aligned Fianna Fáil (20.4%), which gained two seats to equal Fine Gael’s four seats. Most pleasing for them was that they both were well ahead of Sinn Féin. The most prominent populist party sitting with The Left group in the EP, Sinn Féin won a seat in two constituencies but lost their only seat in another. It polled just 11% of the first-preference vote, about the same as in 2019, but well down on its polling in the run-up to the elections. It lost most in rural constituencies.

Despite the significant support for independent candidates, two prominent outgoing MEPs lost their seats. Independents4Change MEPs polled almost 5% of the vote, but both Clare Daly and Mick Wallace suffered from splits in the populist, anti-establishment left vote. We can see also in vote transfer patterns that they were also probably hurt by the presence of anti-immigrant candidates customarily considered on the ‘far right’. They also complained of a media campaign against them. The media had indeed been less than friendly to the pair in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion and their pro-Russian analysis of that conflict. On the other hand, Luke ‘Ming’ Flanagan comfortably retained his seat.

The new party, Independent Ireland, polled well in two of the three constituencies, picking up a seat in Midlands-North West probably at the expense of Sinn Féin. The winning candidate chose to sit with the Renew Europe group in the EP, which caused some annoyance within the party, as Renew was seen as too mainstream. The smaller left and right populist parties mentioned above failed to win representation in the European Parliament, partly because their votes were split between too many candidates. However, parties and candidates that were aggressively anti-immigrant (so, excluding Independent Ireland) polled a collective 7%, higher than ever before. This result suggests that the immigration issue has a resonance at the polling booths in Ireland that was not previously expected.

Discussion and perspectives

The unwinding of the voting coalition that had sustained Sinn Féin’s popularity was the most notable outcome of the EP and local elections in June 2024. The impact on Sinn Féin’s strategic choices is as yet not clear, but it is difficult to see how the party can recover this vote while immigration remains a significant issue. The party admitted that immigration was the issue that had caused it difficulties, and within months of the result, published an immigration policy that was immediately criticized for ‘dog whistle’ politics. A post-election study shows that Sinn Féin voters did not regard migration as one of the top three issues in the European elections (Red C 2024). This is despite it being the second most important issue for voters overall. It suggests that the voters Sinn Féin has lost are those who thought about migration. Even if it ceases to be an issue, the party may have lost some of its anti-establishment reputation among a section of voters. In the EP it has tended to oppose many of the proposals coming from the European Commission, and that is unlikely to change in the medium term. However, the Sinn Féin member elected for Dublin is highly motivated by concern for climate change, and she might shift the party’s direction on issues such as the European Green Deal.

The Independent Ireland member elected to the Renew Europe group, Ciarán Mullooly, is unlikely to feel tied to any whip and will oppose environmental measures that curtail agriculture. The same will be true of ‘Ming’ Flanagan. If the relative success of the mainstream parties was prominent in the post-election analyses, it ignores the fact that Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s combined support is lower than it has ever been. At least 40% of the first-preference vote went to parties or candidates that can be uncontroversially labelled populist.

Moreover, populist sentiment is common in Ireland for those parties identified here as populist. Although attitudes toward migrants split these parties on a clear left–right basis, when it comes to statements such as ‘Most politicians only care about the interests of the rich and powerful’, those most likely to agree are supporters of Sinn Féin (74%), PBP-Solidarity (84%), Aontú (71%) and Independent Ireland (78%) compared to 40% for Fianna Fáil voters. Conspiracy theories associated with populism are also more likely to be believed by supporters of these parties; 38% of Sinn Féin supporters and 45% of Independent Ireland’s supporters agreed with the statement ‘A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major decisions in world politics’. Furthermore, when it comes to trust in news sources, supporters of Sinn Féin (25%), PBP-Solidarity (24%), Aontú (13%) and Independent Ireland (25%) have the lowest levels of trust in the state broadcaster RTÉ.

This points to an available market for populist parties, particularly on the right. It seems that the problem is that support is divided between too many parties. However, the emergence of a significant political leader might tie together some of the anti-migrant and anti-European sentiment that is out there to create a significant electoral force in the future.

 

(*) Eoin O’Malley is Associate Professor of politics at the School of Law and Government, Dublin City University. He is author or editor of seven books on Irish politics, and author of over 40 peer-reviewed publications. His research centres mainly on Irish politics, including the party system and political leadership. e-mail: eoin.omalley@dcu.ie

 

References

An Phoblacht (2017). ‘Fianna Fáil plays at opposing Fine Gael but Fianna Fáil pact with Fine Gael keeps Leo Varadkar in power’ An Phoblacht 18 November, https://www.anphoblacht.com/contents/27200

Cunningham, Kevin & Marsh, Michael (2021) ‘Voting Behavious: The Sinn Féin Election’, in M. Gallagher, M. Marsh, & T. Reidy (eds) How Ireland Voted 2020: The End of an Era, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 219–54.

Independent Ireland (2024) party website at https://www.independentireland.ie/

Ireland First (2024) party website at https://ireland-first.ie/

Irish Freedom Party (2024) party website at https://www.irishfreedom.ie/

Irish People, The (2024) party website at https://www.irishpeople.org/

National Party (2024) party website at https://nationalparty.ie/

Ó Laoghaire, Donnacha (2024). Dáil Éireann Debate, 1 May 2024, Vol. 1053 No. 3.

O’Malley, Eoin (2008). Why is there no Radical Right Party in Ireland? West European Politics, 31(5), 960–977.

People Before Profit (2024). ‘Vote Left, Transfer Left’ https://www.pbp.ie/vote-left-transfer-left/

Red C (2024). ‘Post Local & European Elections Study – Data Report 2024’ available from https://neds.ie/reports/NEDS-2024-local-european-elections-report.pdf

 

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Viktor Orbán, Hungary's Prime Minister, arrives for a meeting with European Union leaders in Brussels, Belgium, on June 22, 2017. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

A Pyrrhic Victory for the Populist Right in Hungary

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Please cite as:
Csehi, Robert. (2024). “A Pyrrhic Victory for the Populist Right in Hungary.” In: 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism. (eds). Gilles Ivaldi and Emilia Zankina. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS. October 22, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0073

 

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Abstract

The 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections have produced tectonic shifts in the Hungarian political landscape. While the populist governing party, Fidesz, secured first place in the elections, it lost two seats in the EP, and a new political force emerged that has reshuffled the power balance in Hungary’s opposition. Additionally, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and his party, along with the pro-government media and social media outlets, spent huge amounts to deliver the government’s campaign messages, and the party reportedly broke mobilization records before the election. Orbán’s campaign returned to the themes of the 2022 national parliamentary election and made the war in Ukraine its centrepiece. Although the initial campaign slogan was ‘no migration, no gender, no war’ and all three elements resonated with Fidesz voters the most, the last component has eclipsed the other two. Orbán used fear-mongering and built a Manichean narrative where anybody failing to vote for Fidesz was part of the ‘pro-war’ camp. He labelled all his domestic and international political opponents ‘pro-war’ and even claimed that the Hungarian opposition was carrying out the demands of its international financiers in Brussels and Washington. The radical right-wing Our Homeland (OH) focused more on the municipal election yet led a negative campaign against the EU, claiming that Brussels has fallen under the influence of globalists and international interest groups and seeks to build a federal superstate. OH also managed to send one MEP to Strasbourg. Overall, while both Fidesz and OH have joined separate, rebranded, right-wing Eurosceptic groups, their political isolation within the EP remains a challenge.

Keywords: right-wing populism; Russia–Ukraine War; migration; gender; elites; Brussels; Soros

 

By Robert Csehi* (Department of Political Science, Institute of Social and Political Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest)

Background

In January 2024, it seemed that elections for the European Parliament (EP) would not hold any great surprises. Hungary’s prime minister, Viktor Orbán and his populist Fidesz party were expected to gain a majority of the votes, potentially repeating their electoral success from five years before and securing the party a majority of Hungary’s 21 EP seats. Also, it was expected that the radical right-wing populist Our Homeland (OH) party would potentially manage to send one representative to Strasbourg, given the historical success of radical Hungarian parties in European elections. After their defeat in the 2022 national parliamentary elections, opposition parties were still trying to come up with effective strategies to challenge Orbán’s government, yet most struggled even to influence the political agenda. Given their repeated losses to Orbán’s Fidesz, a growing number of the electorate became disillusioned with them and questioned their political credibility and capabilities. It was in this relative political tranquillity that a political scandal erupted, which eventually led to the emergence of a new political force that redrew the electoral map for Hungary.

In early February 2024 Katalin Novák, the president of the republic, found herself in a clemency scandal. The year before, she had granted a presidential pardon to someone who had helped cover up his superior’s paedophile crimes by forcing one of the victims to withdraw his confession. The issue was extremely sensitive given the Orbán government’s ongoing ‘protect our children’ campaign, which was used to mobilize against Hungary’s LGBTQ+ community. Although President Novák resigned, as did the former justice minister, Judit Varga, who was supposed to lead the Fidesz party list in the EP elections and who also had to sign off on the pardon, the public never received a justification for the pardon and never got to know the person who initiated the process. After Varga resigned from leading the party in the EP elections, her former husband, Péter Magyar, began posting on social media about the alleged involvement of the government in the matter and criticized them for being too cowardly to sacrifice his former wife instead of those who were truly responsible. Although he initially denied any ambition to become a politician, his first interview on the YouTube channel, Partizán, received so much attention (in the interview, he revealed much of his insider experience as part of the government) that he eventually decided to venture into politics, and established a new party, Respect and Freedom (Tisza). Within a few months, he was touring around the country making speeches and decided to run in the EP elections, where candidates of the party were selected through online voting. Given Magyar’s previous involvement with Fidesz, the governing party had a hard time finding a political antidote to his challenge. For their part, the established opposition parties were caught in a bind as Magyar lacked the kind of credibility challenges vis-à-vis voters they themselves laboured under.

In the end, although Fidesz came in first in the EP elections with 44.82% of the votes, this result is the party’s worst performance in an EP election. Pro-government commentators were quick to emphasize that the party received over 2 million votes, more than it had ever achieved before. This increase is largely attributed to the higher-than-average turnout, as the EP elections were held alongside municipal elections. However, this does not change the fact that the governing party (or coalition) has lost 2 seats in the EP and sent only 11 MEPs to Strasbourg. Magyar’s Tisza received 29.6% of the votes and sent seven representatives to the EP. The leftist environmentalist coalition (DK–MSZP–P) managed to secure only two seats compared to their previous five (the DK had four, and the MSZP–P had one MEP). In the 2019 EP election, DK received 16.05% of the votes, whereas in 2024, the coalition managed to gain only 8.03%.

While the leftist coalition survived Tisza’s challenge, the liberal Momentum did not. The party only received 3.7% of the votes and thus lost its two mandates in the EP. The radical right-wing populist OH doubled its support compared to 2019 and managed to secure one seat in the EP with a vote share of 6.71%. While 11 parties were competing for mandates, in the end, only 4 parties (or party coalitions) will represent the Hungarian people in Strasbourg.

The supply side: Populist tropes featuring war and peace

The governing party, Fidesz (in coalition with the Christian Democratic People’s Party or KDNP), started its EP campaign with Orbán’s 15 March commemoration speech. There, he relied on his usual Eurosceptic populist tropes and claimed that ‘Brussels has abandoned Europeans, and even turned against them’ (Orbán, 2024) and that ‘the people of Europe fear for their freedom in the face of Brussels’ (Ibid.). He blamed the EU for wrongdoing and claimed that because of the incompetent leadership in Brussels, ‘instead of peace, we have war, instead of security we have a rule-of-law ruckus, instead of prosperity we have financial blackmail’ (Ibid.).

Later, Tamás Deutsch, a Fidesz MEP, summarized the party’s criticism against ‘Brussels’ in ten points (Fidesz, 2 April 2024): its failure to manage the COVID-19 crisis; its incompetence in bringing a quick end to the Russia–Ukraine War, and its war-mongering; the European Green Deal; its position on and failure to curb illegal migration; a ‘gender ideology’ it imposes on member states; its failure to prevent Brexit; its rule-of-law ‘jihad’ against certain member states; incompetence that led to the collapse of the distribution of EU funds; pushing member states into debt, and; the Hungarian left that acts against the country in Brussels. Although Deutsch criticized the EU on its economic policies, its ‘gender agenda’, its rule-of-law procedures and migration policies occasionally during the campaign, the party’s fundamental message was summarized in the campaign slogan: ‘no migration, no gender, no war’. It was repeated so often at the beginning of the campaign that the mayor of a small village even posted it as a ‘welcome sign’ at the entrance to the village.

The slogan was supposed to reflect the various dimensions of the antagonistic relationship between the position of Fidesz and that of ‘Brussels’. As Orbán put it: “They [i.e., Brussels] want to press us into a war, they want to saddle us with migrants, they want to re-educate our children. But we shall not go to war, we shall not let in migrants, and we shall not hand over our children” (Orbán, 2024).

Orbán claimed to stop illegal migration into Hungary despite the EU’s alleged liberal policies and called for ‘resistance’ to ‘gender ideology’ in the name of safeguarding Hungarian children against the alleged LGBTQ+ propaganda. Tamás Menczer, the party’s communication officer, even argued that ‘we shall never forget that the Hungarian left would destroy the peace and security of Hungary. They would bring us into the war, they would let migrants in, and they would let the gender propaganda loose’ (Fidesz, 6 April 2024). While the first two elements of the campaign slogan featured in the social media messages of the governing party in the beginning, the third message, ‘no war’, gained ever-increasing attention in the party’s campaign and ultimately eclipsed the other two. Pro-government social media influencers even went so far as to discuss the implications of a potential nuclear bomb in Budapest as a result of the war psychosis in Brussels and the West in general.

Orbán employed a pro-war versus pro-peace distinction, essentially a form of the Manichean division often utilized by populists. He applied this moral dichotomy not only to European politics but also to the Hungarian political scene. On the one hand, he claimed that: “Brussels is actually a prisoner of George Soros’s network … the Soros network is embedded in the European institutions – so much so that the European institutions are giving them money for their operations … [T]hey’re present within the Commission, they’re in the European Parliament, and quite a few prime ministers are clearly Soros-backed people” (Fidesz, 22 March 2024a).

Additionally, he also argued that ‘the pro-war governments, the bureaucrats in Brussels [and] George Soros’ network, are sending millions of dollars to the pro-war left in Budapest’ (Fidesz, 19 April 2024). Deploying a typical populist narrative frame, Orbán not only criticized the EU for failing to listen to the people but also linked his domestic opposition with a malevolent elite. He and his party often pictured members of the different opposition parties conspiring with Brussels against Hungary, who were trying to push Hungary into the Ukraine–Russia War. In fact, most party figures who participated in the campaign actually claimed that the Hungarian opposition would enter the war because that is what ‘their financiers’ (Fidesz, 30 April 2024) are expecting from them. Among others, they claimed that ‘the feeding channel, the umbilical cord of the Hungarian left is here in Brussels and America, so they are fed from here, financed from here, bought by the kilo’ (Fidesz, 22 March 2024b). They often referred to Brussels and Washington as ‘the paymasters of the Hungarian left’ (Fidesz, 19 April 2024). Fidesz’s messages frequently depicted prominent European politicians, from Emmanuel Macron to Manfred Weber and Ursula von der Leyen, as warmongers. These messages also highlighted their alleged Hungarian allies, including key opposition figures such as former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, MEPs Klára Dobrev, Anna Donáth, Katalin Cseh and the new political actor, Péter Magyar. The claims about a pro-war Hungarian left were also repeated by Tamás Deutsch, Fidesz MEP, in the only televised debate where each party list leader of the EP election (altogether 11 parties) had 8 minutes to ‘debate’ with one another. Interestingly, the TikTok campaign of the governing party has never mentioned Russia as a responsible actor for the war in Ukraine, instead blaming European actors and NATO for escalating the conflict by supporting Ukraine with money and weapons. Throughout the campaign, it was unclear what Orbán and his party meant by ‘peace’ and how they would achieve it once their candidates appeared in the EP.

The campaign of the governing party appealed to the most basic fear of the population and constantly pictured the European Parliamentary elections as a decisive battle where people had to decide about war or peace, life or death, whether one was willing to send his/her sons, grandchildren into the war. Although the social media campaign has built heavily on Orbán – who also toured the country himself, appearing unannounced in different places where he would talk to a selected audience – and his speeches and interviews, other party members also participated in the campaign. Most importantly, Deutsch and another MEP, András László, were quite active in conveying the party messages to the people, mainly about the war. Billboards were also widely used that featured the word ‘war’ made out of pictures of their domestic political opponents and George Soros. In contrast, they also had a billboard with the word ‘peace’ featuring Orbán in the background.

Overall, Orbán and Fidesz have crafted a populist narrative that positions themselves as the voice of peace, claiming to represent the people’s true interests. This narrative sharply contrasts them with all other domestic political actors and their supposed financiers in Brussels. The governmental parties, along with the pro-government social media influencer group Megafon, spent an enormous amount on social media campaigns—more than any other political force in Europe (Portfolio, 2024). In addition, at the ‘Peace March’ held a week before the election, Orbán promised a record-breaking mobilization, which he referred to as ‘the day of one million encounters’ (Fidesz, 5 June 2024).

Although the radical right-wing, populist OH party did not have a specific EP election manifesto, it campaigned with negative messages about the EU. László Toroczkai, the party head, blamed the EU for its undemocratic nature, its globalist agenda, its pursuit of a federal superstate, and its corrupt dealings. The party’s main message centred on the idea that Brussels had been captured by globalist, international interest groups. Interestingly, food safety was frequently highlighted in the party’s social media campaigns. While their primary focus was on the ‘state capture’ accusation against the EU, the party also emphasized issues related to migration into the EU, particularly stressing the security aspect. Their domestic political messages highlighted labour migration as a significant issue, with the party’s MP, Dóra Dúró, advocating for higher wages instead of relying on guest workers and criticizing the government’s strategy to build battery factories. The party’s emphasis on domestic issues was partly due to their greater focus on municipal elections rather than the EP election. With much more limited financial resources than Fidesz, their message distribution was also more restricted.

The demand side: Older, less educated and rural populations as the mainstay of right-wing populism

As pointed out, Fidesz came out on top in the EP elections, even though it secured its worst result ever and effectively lost two mandates compared to 2019. In the capital, Budapest, the difference between the party and its primary challenger, Tisza, was 0.31%, yet in 9 out of 23 electoral districts, Magyar’s party won. Within the counties, the relative dominance of Fidesz was more traceable: they won in each of the 19 counties, and their winning margin fluctuated between 27.67% (in Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county) and 9.29% (in Pest county). Overall, there were 60 municipalities where Tisza received more votes than the governing party (Bódi and Kovalcsik, 2024), which must not be overstated, given that there are over 3,000 municipalities in the country. Interestingly, while OH came in second place in 17 of the 19 counties in the municipal elections, their vote share for the EP elections per county was much lower. Yet, compared to the party’s 2019 results, they managed to double their vote share in every settlement size category.

Initial studies on the demographic composition of Fidesz voters have started to emerge. One analysis reveals a clear pattern: the lower the percentage of high school graduates in a municipality, the higher the vote share for Fidesz (Hajdu, 2024). This correlation between education level and support for the governing party is deeply rooted in broader socioeconomic conditions: areas with lower educational attainment typically have lower wages, leading to greater reliance on welfare programs. Another poll highlighted that 63% of Fidesz voters are aged 50 or older, compared to just 29% of Tisza voters in the same age group (Propeller, 2024). Additionally, 34% of Fidesz voters are 65 or older, indicating that a significant portion of the voting base is in retirement, reflecting their increased dependence on state support. This is consistent with Orbán’s policies, which are consistently favourable towards pensioners.

Given that Fidesz’s campaign revolved around the notion of war and peace, it is worth looking into how much this message was successfully distributed. Poll data suggests that the governing party was once again successful in creating a cleavage: while 77% of Fidesz voters would not have sent any assistance to Ukraine, only 29% of Tisza voters would have done the same (Molnár, 2024). This survey, unsurprisingly, also suggested a positive correlation between the level of schooling and readiness to send assistance to Ukraine.

Another poll focused on support for Hungary’s EU membership just before the EP elections, aiming to assess the impact of Eurosceptic populist messages on public opinion regarding the country’s role in the EU. The results showed that 51% supported and 32% somewhat supported EU membership overall. However, Fidesz voters were the least supportive: only 25% fully supported EU membership, with another 46% somewhat supportive. In contrast, Tisza voters overwhelmingly backed EU membership, with 83% fully supportive and 13% somewhat supportive (Király, 2024). The same poll also asked about the most pressing issues facing the EU. Unsurprisingly, given the campaign context, 65% of respondents identified the war as the most serious issue, overshadowing concerns like migration, climate change, economic disparities among member states, and an ageing population. Regarding migration, 65% of Fidesz voters saw migration into Hungary as a significant problem, while 81% of Tisza voters viewed emigration from Hungary as a more significant issue.

While no new polls have been conducted on public views regarding migration or gender – the other two main campaign themes of Fidesz – a 2022 poll revealed that Fidesz voters rated the seriousness of these issues at 4.4 and 4.0 on a 1–5 scale, respectively (D. Kovács and Bita, 2022). These scores were above the national average, indicating that pro-government voters were more sensitive to these messages.

Overall, the data suggests that Fidesz voters tend to be older, less educated and rural residents. They are also more receptive to Eurosceptic rhetoric and resonate more strongly with issues related to migration, gender and the war in Ukraine.

Conclusion and discussion

Despite the electoral success of Fidesz, this victory was essentially pyrrhic. Not only did the party record its worst performance in the history of EP elections in Hungary, but it only secured its ‘victory’ at great cost (money spent on social media, billboards, and the like) and ostensibly with a massive mobilization campaign. In comparison, Tisza did not spend much on social media, had no billboards, and lacked any mobilization strategy given the early phase of its party building (the party was effectively created a couple of months before the EP elections).

Furthermore, despite one of the most significant victories across the EU, Orbán’s party faced the challenge of allying with others on the European scene. Initially, the governing parties strived to join the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group led by Italy’s prime minister, Georgia Meloni. Ultimately, Orbán rejected this option because he did not want to sit with the anti-Hungarian Romanian party, Alliance for the Unity of Romanians. Additionally, there was a cleavage on the Russia–Ukraine War: not only Meloni and Jarosław Kaczyński but also smaller members of the ECR from Finland, Latvia and Lithuania, held diametrically opposed views to Orbán’s on the matter. Most of these parties overwhelmingly supported financial assistance to Ukraine.

After weeks of negotiations, Orbán succeeded in forming a new coalition based on the former Identity and Democracy group, initially with the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) and the Czech ANO, which was ultimately led by the French National Rally (RN). Although the new Patriots for Europe (PfE) group is the third-largest faction in the EP, it could not secure any significant positions, and thus, Fidesz’s political isolation continues.

Little about the party’s objectives is known: a smaller European Parliament and correspondingly greater sovereignty for member states, a revision of the European Green Deal, and a more robust fight against illegal migration. Given that Hungary assumed the six-month rotating presidency of the Council of the European Union in July 2024, Fidesz is expected to pursue these objectives by putting them on the EU agenda. The extent to which Hungary can deliver on Fidesz’s objectives is yet another question, although Orbán’s international diplomatic meetings in the first weeks of July 2024 signalled his dedication to focusing on international matters. It is worth mentioning that Magyar’s Tisza has joined the European People’s Party (EPP). As a result, KDNP, Fidesz’s coalition partner, which remained in the EPP after Fidesz left the centre-right bloc in 2021, announced that they would also leave the EPP.

The far-right OH joined a new faction led by the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), whose leader visited his Hungarian counterpart, László Torockai, before the election. The Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) only has 25 MEPs, so their influence, along with that of OH, remains marginal.

 

(*) Robert Csehi is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Social and Political Sciences at Corvinus University of Budapest. His research focuses on comparative and European politics. More specifically, he studies populism and Euroscepticism in the Central and Eastern European region, the institutional development of the EU in general, and its economic governance framework in particular. His previous work appeared in Democratization, the Journal of European Public Policy, West European Politics, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Politics & Governance, and European Politics and Society. His book, The Politics of Populism in Hungary, was published by Routledge in 2022. E-mail: robert.csehi@uni-corvinus.hu

 

References

Bódi, Mátyás and Kovalcsik Tamás (2024). Térképen mutatjuk, hol verte meg a Tisza Párt a Fidesz-KDNP-t. https://telex.hu/valasztasi-foldrajz/2024/06/12/terkep-tisza-part-fidesz-magyar-peter-nagyobb-tamogatottsag

D. Kovács, Ildikó and Bita Dániel (2022). A Fidesz-szavazók nagyobb problémának tartják a genderlobbit, mint az inflációt és az egészségügy állapotát. https://24.hu/belfold/2022/03/25/magyarorszag-problematerkep-inflacio-egeszsegugy-gender-migracio-kozvelemeny-kutatas-zavecz/

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (22 March 2024a). 3. RÉSZ – Orbán Viktor a Kossuth rádióban. Jó néhány európai miniszterelnök is Soros embere. #orbanviktor #magyarorszag #radio https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7349104473341463840. TikTok.

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (22 March 2024b) 5. RÉSZ–Orbán Viktor a Kossuth rádióban. A baloldalt Brüsszelből és Amerikából etetik. #orbanviktor

https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7349104473341529376. TikTok.

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (2 April 2024) Miért kell változás Brüsszelben? – Deutsch Tamás 10 pontja. https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7353264916117212448. TikTok

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (6 April 2024) A baloldal háborúba vinné Magyarországot.
Védjük meg Magyarország békéjét és biztonságát! #magyarorszag #beke #biztonsag

https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7354766116100623648. TikTok

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (19 April 2024) Ne hagyjuk Magyarországot!
Harcolnunk kell, meg kell védeni a magyar emberek békéjét és biztonságát, meg kell védeni a gazdasági eredményeinket, meg kell védeni a családjainkat és különösen is a gyerekeinket! #orbanviktor #kampany #magyarorszag. https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7359584736945179936. TikTok

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (30 April 2024) Amikor azt gondoltuk, hogy nem lehet már rosszabb, akkor megkaptuk a nyakunkba a háborúpárti dollárbaloldalt és a háborúpárti Brüsszelt is. Nem kérünk belőlük! #menczertamas #baloldal #brusszel. https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7363691186420223264. TikTok

Fidesz [@fidesz_hu] (5 June 2024) Szombaton jön az Egymillió Találkozás Napja!
A választás előtti 24 órában, 50 ezer aktivistánk egyetlen nap alatt egymillió embert fog személyesen a választásra buzdítani. #fidesz

https://www.tiktok.com/@fidesz_hu/video/7377030865337027872. TikTok

Hajdu, Miklós (2024). Nincs fideszes többség, ahol a lakosság legalább 60 százaléka érettségizett. https://g7.hu/adat/20240612/nincs-fideszes-tobbseg-ahol-a-lakossag-legalabb-60-szazaleka-erettsegizett/

Király, András (2024). Hiába sulykolja a kormány, hogy háborúban állunk Brüsszellel, a magyarok elsöprő többsége még mindig EU-párti. https://telex.hu/kulfold/2024/06/05/eu-ep-median-kozvelemeny-kutatas-tisza-part

Molnár, Gergő (2024). Závecz Research: kettéosztja Magyarországot Ukrajna EU-s támogatása. https://index.hu/belfold/2024/05/31/europai-unio-ukrajna-haboru-tamogatas-segitseg-felmeres-kozvelemeny-kutatas-partok-kormany-ellenzek/

Orbán, Viktor (2024). Speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the 176th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49. https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-176th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-and-war-of-independence-of-184849

Portfolio (2024). Duplaannyit költöttek a magyar kormánypártok hirdetésekre, mint Európában bármelyik másik erő. https://www.portfolio.hu/unios-forrasok/20240603/duplaannyit-koltottek-a-magyar-kormanypartok-hirdetesekre-mint-europaban-barmelyik-masik-ero-689779

Propeller (2024). Itt vannak az adatok: kiderült, hogy kik szavaztak a Fideszre és kik Magyar Péterre. https://propeller.hu/itthon/4038304-magyar-peter-fidesz-kdnp-szavazok-eletkor

 

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Former U.S. President Donald Trump and vice-presidential nominee J.D. Vance at a rally in Atlanta, GA, on August 3, 2024. Photo: Phil Mistry.

Anticipating the Trump Effect: Strengthening the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum Amid Populist Pressures

by ArticlesECPS YouthEditor’s ChoiceHomeMigrationPolicy Papers

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Please cite as:
Bottura, Beatrice; O’Keeffe-Johnston, Paris; Gkampeta, Pinelopi; Malai, Ludmila; Lynch, Matt; Park, Joon & Gräf, Leon. (2024). “Anticipating the Trump Effect: Strengthening the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum Amid Populist Pressures.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 24, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0001

 

This policy paper analyzes the potential effects of the 2024 US presidential election on EU politics, particularly the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Trump victory may intensify Euroscepticism and lead to more restrictive migration policies among his European allies. Conversely, a Trump defeat could fuel distrust in electoral processes, potentially triggering events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack. The paper recommends regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to develop tailored migration strategies, anticipating that either election outcome could increase fragmentation and populist influence within EU member states, though with varying degrees of impact.

Authored by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park & Leon Gräf

Edited by Beatrice Bottura & Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston

Executive Summary

As the “Common Implementation Plan” for the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum was adopted by the European Commission in June 2024 (European Commission, 2024a), the European and international political landscape was changing. The results of the EU 2024 parliamentary elections revealed a rise of Right-wing populist parties (RPP) on the European scene, a trend which mirrors recent national electoral results (Europe Elects, 2024; Europe Politique, 2024). This right-wing shift is causing a tightening of migration policy across EU countries and affecting the viability of the EU Pact on Migration, with almost half EU countries openly contesting its initiatives and some countries even considering an opt-out, following the Netherlands’ recent opt-out request (Carlson, 2024; Liboreiro, 2024). Simultaneously, former president Donald Trump is running for office once again. 

This policy paper examines how the results of the 2024 presidential election might affect EU politics, especially in regard to the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Though a horizon scanning methodology, the paper found that Trump’s previous presidency coincided with a period of increased Euroscepticism within member countries (Langlois, 2021; Löfflmann, 2019). Additionally, Trump has built strong connections with RPP leaders which, in the past, have become more vocal as Trump gained power (Fusiek & Marconi, 2021). Given Trump’s stance on political elites, supra-national organizations and migration, the paper predicts that:

– in the case of Trump’s victory: Eurosceptic sentiments and restrictive migration policies might increase across the EU, especially among Trump’s European supporters

– in the case of Trump’s loss: events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack might occur (Abramowitz, 2024) which could further distrust in electoral processes both in the US and the EU. This could be leveraged by populist actors, which, to a lesser extent compared to a Trump victory, could still increase fragmentation across EU member states

Finally, given these findings, the paper provides policy options for the European Commission to take into consideration for a successful implementation of the plan. Among these, the paper focuses on the introduction of regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) which are aimed at creating country-tailored implementation strategies for the Pact. In practice, by shedding light onto nation-specific issues when it comes to migration and asylum, these ICRs would allow national leaders to have more control over the actual implementation of the Pact. This should increase the willingness to cooperate of RPPs as it brings together both national sovereignties, an important value to these parties, and European policy.

 

1. Introduction

Migration is one of the most discussed political and security challenges today. Worsening conflicts, natural disasters, and the hopes of better economic opportunities bring people from across the world to migrate to other areas that are deemed more prosperous or can offer something their homeland cannot. The nature of migration is transboundary, often exacerbating geopolitical issues among countries that are expected to share the burden. This can be illustrated by Trump’s abandonment of the EU during the refugee crisis, leaving Europe alone in dealing with the issue (Koppa, 2017). 

As of 2022, there are 46.1 million migrants in the US (Geiger, 2024). Anti-migration and its link to nationalism are core aspects of Trump’s political campaigns and of his past presidency (Löfflmann, 2019). Indeed, during his past campaigns, Trump had made promises for stricter migration policies. Quotes such as “America First” and “Make America Great Again” were commonplace in his speeches and rallies (Lacatus, 2021; Löfflmann, 2022; Magcamit, 2017; Mirza et al., 2021). Unlike other populists, Trump succeeded in passing several anti-migration policies while in office (Table 1).

Europe has also faced difficulties controlling the increasing numbers of its migrant population. According to the International Organization for Migration (McAuliffe & Oucho, 2024), there are approximately 87 million migrants living in Europe. In the context of migration crises, which often disproportionately impact EU member states, balancing European cohesion has fragmented the Union. Additionally, in recent years, Western politics has witnessed a trend of a right-wing shift (see Figure 1) and increased support for populist leaders, which exacerbates this fragmentation (Europe Elects, 2024; Europe Politique, 2024).

Trump’s US presidency coincided with a period of EU instability which saw the rise of right-wing populist parties (RPP) in Europe and the significant decision for Britain to leave the EU, with migration a core topic for the Leave campaign (Langlois, 2021; Löfflmann, 2019). Authors such as Fusiek & Marconi (2021) argue that the popularity of a nationalistic populist in the US gave confidence to populist political actors in Europe to become more vocal and gather support. In the face of EU fragmentation, the Union must be prepared for leniency with its Pact on Migration and Asylum if it wishes to maintain cohesion. 

Note: Data sourced from European parliament election 2024, by Europe Elects, 2024 (https://europeelects.eu/ep2024/). Data sourced from Parliament Européen (2019, 2014, 2009, 2004, 1999, 1994, 1989, 1984, 1979), by Europe Politique, 2024.(https://www.europe-politique.eu/parlement-europeen.htm).

This paper delivers policy suggestions for the successful implementation of the Pact, especially in the context of the 2024 US Presidential elections and of its possible repercussions. To do so, the paper briefly delves into the 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, focusing on its strengths, its weaknesses, and how it is perceived by EU member states. Following, the paper conducts a horizon scanning methodology to discuss the possible outcomes of the 2024 US elections and how they could affect international politics and the implementation of the Pact. Finally, the paper provides recommendations to the European Commission to ensure readiness and resilience in the implementation of the Pact in any scenario deriving from the result of the upcoming US elections.

2. The EU and Migration

The EU has faced difficulties in dealing with migration, especially as the issue disproportionately affects certain member states. In dealing with this issue, the EU has developed the EU Pact on Migration, for all EU member states to adhere to.

2.1 The Pact on Migration and Asylum

The 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum establishes a comprehensive and flexible framework that addresses border management, asylum processes, and migrant integration while introducing a mandatory yet adaptable solidarity mechanism (European Commission, 2024b). This framework, as shown in Figure 2, aims to distribute responsibilities more fairly among member states, allowing contributions through relocations, financial support, or alternative measures (Ibid.). However, the Pact faces significant challenges, including bureaucratic complexity, varying political will, and potential conflicts with member states resistant to migration, such as those of the Visegrád Group (V4: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary), which will be discussed in section 2.2 of the paper. 

Note: From Pact on Migration and Asylum, by European Commission, 2024b. (https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en). Copyright 2024 by the European Union.

A SWOT analysis of the Pact (Figure 3) was made by the authors which found that the resource-intensive nature of the Pact may strain member states’ capacities, particularly amid shifting political priorities. Nonetheless, it offers opportunities for enhanced cooperation, stronger external partnerships, and economic benefits through managed migration. These potential gains are counterbalanced by threats such as geopolitical instability, rising anti-immigration sentiment, legal disputes within the EU, and the risk of migrants resorting to more dangerous routes due to increased border controls. The success of the pact will depend on its ability to navigate these complexities while ensuring the protection of human rights and fair distribution of responsibilities.

Note: Authors’ creation.

2.2 Backlash from Member States

The Pact has received severe backlash from a number of actors within the EU for very different reasons. On the one hand, due to its attempt at regulating and partially restricting immigration, many on the political left view the Pact as giving too many concessions to the far right, and failing to protect fundamental rights (Griera, 2024). For example, the German Left MEP Cornelia Ernst called the pact “a pact of shame and disgrace,” while other MEPs from Left and Green parties considered the Pact to be a model for a fortress of Europe and a victory for the far-right (Ibid.). Many NGOs also criticized the Pact, with Amnesty International attesting a “surge in suffering” for asylum seekers, if the Pact was to enter into effect (Nattrass, 2024). On the other hand, right-wing governments and parties across the EU also greatly criticized the Pact.

However, contrary to the above-mentioned examples, their main concern is that the Pact is not strict enough on immigration regulation and forces every EU member state to contribute and show solidarity, hence overruling national sovereignty (Nattrass, 2024). The Visegrád countries in particular – namely: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary – heavily criticized the Pact and its solidarity mechanisms, with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk promising that Poland will “find ways so that even if the migration pact comes into force in a roughly unchanged form, we will protect Poland against the relocation mechanism” (Nattrass, 2024), while the Hungarian government also pledged to find ways to avoid taking in immigrants and called the Pact “another nail in the coffin of the European Union” (Nattrass, 2024). 

In addition to the Visegrád Group, an increasing number of member countries is expressing its discontent with the Pact, a trend tied to the rise of RPPs throughout Europe (Vinocur et al., 2024). In particular, this is manifesting through a push for tighter deportation and border control measures across Europe (Vinocur et al., 2024). 17 countries in the Schengen area – Austria and the Netherlands and endorsed by Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Sweden. Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein – have recently signed an appeal to the EU executive to toughen return policies when asylum applications are rejected as well as increasing European coordination when it comes to deportations (Carlson, 2024; Liboreiro, 2024). Additionally, numerous countries in the Schengen area – i.e. Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden (Dell’Anna, 2024) – are increasing border controls, which hinders the right to freedom of movement. In addition to these general trends, in countries where RPPs are gaining executive positions, the stance on migration policy is toughening even more (Carlson, 2024; Stekić, 2024; Vinocur et al., 2024). Recent examples of this trend – including the extreme example of the Netherlands’ request to opt-out of the Pact – are shown visually in Figure 4 and a full table is available in Appendix A.

Note: Authors’ creation.

This restrictive stance appears also at the European level where, as illustrated in section 1, right-leaning groups have gained more influence (Vinocur et al., 2024). In particular, members of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and of the European People’s Party (EPP) support the toughening of deportation mechanisms, the increase of asylum-seeker reception centers outside of the EU, and the funding for extra EU border control (Ibid.). 

In sum, the Migration Pact, which is supposed to offer a compromise, is seen negatively by both sides of the political spectrum for respectively leaning too much into the opposite political spectrum, a trend that has led countries to push for a re-draft of the pact (Vinocur et al., 2024). In this context, the main challenge to the successful implementation of the Pact remains to satisfy parties and voters on the left-wing and pro-immigration side and on the right-wing anti-immigration side concurrently. This challenge will be addressed in section 5 of this policy paper, where policy options and recommendations are provided. 

3. Methodology

Horizon scanning is used by building on early warning signs and predictions based on current events, by analyzing political discourse. Geopolitical issues are increasingly complex and interconnected. With such challenges, the use of horizon scanning is crucial to prepare and inform policymakers and decision-makers about potential opportunities and threats (Amanatidou et al., 2012). There are two core aspects of horizon scanning: alerting and creating. Alerting includes the early identification of emerging issues, whereas the creative aspect refers to the reassembly of current issues into a prediction for what might develop into a policy problem. Current political discourse in Europe has centered around a migration debate and discontent towards failing solutions to handle the issue, simultaneously the US Presidential debate has Donald Trump potentially returning for a second term. 

4. Examinations of Findings: The US 2024 Presidential Elections

As a two-party system, there exists only two possible results of the US Presidential election – a Trump victory, or a Harris victory. Regardless, there shall be a possibility of outcomes in either scenario. Having conducted horizon scanning, there are two possible scenarios that may impact European politics on migration: whether Trump should achieve victory, or whether Trump reacts poorly and encourages disruption in the event of a loss.  

4.1 A Trump Victory

In the event that Trump achieves victory, there are two core aspects that will shape the political landscape around migration. Trump has demonstrated an ability to influence and encourage populists in the EU to be more vocal and gather support, as illustrated in Figure 5 (Fusiek & Marconi, 2021). In this regard, it can be expected that the political landscape in Europe will continue to favor populism during a revival of right-wing shift while Trump would have his second term. A second Trump presidential term would likely embolden European populist leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Jarosław Kaczyński, and even populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) or Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) by validating their nationalist, anti-EU, and illiberal policies (Naughtie, 2024). During his first presidency, Trump openly praised some of these leaders, especially Viktor Orbán, Trump was quoted saying “Let me just say about world leaders, Viktor Orbán, one of the most respected men, they call him a strong man” and undermined multilateral bodies, sending a clear signal that illiberal governance and nationalist policies are able to thrive without any significant repercussions from the US (Euractiv, 2024).

Note: Authors’ creation. Purple shows the Visegrád Group countries and yellow shows Western European states.
Politicians who have a direct link or friendship with Trump are highlighted in red.

Trump’s alignment with right-wing ideologies would also likely embolden these leaders to promote policies that further marginalize minority groups, restrict immigration, and consolidate political power by undermining judicial independence and press freedoms. In a second term, Trump’s open disdain for international organizations like NATO and the EU would likely reduce pressure on these populist leaders to adhere to democratic norms (Stekić, 2024). By downplaying concerns over democratic backsliding and encouraging isolationist policies, Trump would create an EU environment where these leaders and parties continue to push their nationalist agendas further, almost completely free from the fear of diplomatic or economic consequences. 

Further issues that may surface from a Trump victory is the implementation of Project 2025: a Republican policy mantra with strict consequences for migration (The Heritage Foundation, n.d.). Core proposals of the project include continued and increased funding of the ‘Border Wall’, the deportation of migrants, and the removal of visa categories for victims of crime and human trafficking (Wendling, 2024). The project calls for the dissemination of the Department of Homeland Security to be replaced with stronger immigration enforcement bodies for stricter border control (Ibid.). Legal migration would also face stricter measures, through increased fees for visa applications (Ibid.). Donald Trump, as a form of populism, has been linked to the Brexit debate and fueling the “politics of anger”, a concept which some believe has contributed to euroscepticism across the Union (Smorag, 2020; Wind, 2017). If Trump were to be re-elected, it could be expected such sentiments may become prevalent in European political discourse again.

Should Trump win and implement Project 2025, the EU could mirror a restrictive stance again. This prediction is increasingly plausible (Vinocur et al., 2024), especially given the latest trends highlighted in section 2b. Overall, Trump’s influence has the power to destabilize democracies through the use of disinformation which causes greater distrust. Trump may prompt RPP leaders and their parties to entrench their power through policies aimed at curbing media freedom, overhauling the judicial system and the rule of law both at the national and supranational level, and even denouncing opposition parties.

4.2 Reactions to A Trump Loss

On the contrary, should Harris be elected as the first woman President, implications will lead to different roads. It is possible that the post-election events of January 2021 – i.e. the Capitol attacks – could have a sequel (Abramowitz, 2024). Many EU leaders took to the media to condemn the attack on the Capitol, denouncing the use of violence in any form of democratic process. Most were outright with their criticism of Trump’s handling of the situation and the consequences of his words. Common responses from RPP leaders and members – i.e. Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni, and Victor Orbán- were to include a condemning of violence, protecting democracy, whilst simultaneously illustrating Trump in a positive light, often as a ‘peacemaker’ for his limited calls to avoid violent attacks during the protest, whilst others excused Trump of any wrongdoing (Herszenhorn et al., 2021). Should a similar situation arise, where Trump would instigate a protest after losing the election, it is expected that the previously mentioned EU leaders would follow similar actions as before. In this scenario, European leaders are likely to hold a consensus view that democracy is the forefront of our political system, not to be undermined. Likewise, it is expected that Harris would share the same sentiments for democracy and condemn his final attempt at power.

Regardless of the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election, Europe is undeniably fragmented politically, which significantly impacts the practical implementation of the EU Migration Pact. In recent months, in Germany, the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has been vocal about its opposition to migration. It further supports a “remigration” implementation (Hockenos, 2024) that has surged in federal elections. In Austria, the Freedom of Austria Party (FPÖ) won in the recent election. The FPÖ is expected to push a hardline stance on immigration and resist EU-level initiatives. The FPÖ will likely join forces with other mainstream populist parties (Cameron & and Goldstein, 2024). 

In addition to the success of far-right parties across Europe, the ongoing war in Ukraine continues to drive a wedge between nations more friendly and dependent on Russia to take a harder line on accepting Ukrainian refugees, let alone migrants from the Middle East or North Africa. Nations such as Greece and Italy continue to deal with the Mediterranean migration crisis, which is expected to continue for years. These existing crises continue to be a launch pad for far-right populist parties’ rhetoric. 

5. Policy Options 

At the time of writing, there was around one month remaining until the 2024 US Presidential election would be held. Three policy options were created for the European Commission to consider for a smooth and coherent implementation of the 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. 

  1. The European Commission must organize a commonly managed and coordinated European asylum system centered around the wellness of human beings: the EU should work on the defense of fundamental human rights, immigrants’ safety and dignity. It is also suggested that the Union ought to use the reservation of migrants as a last resort and try to create other effective solutions, like open reception centers, since prolonged detention results in devastating effects on migrants’ mental health (International Rescue Committee, 2023).
  2. The European Commission should strengthen the resettlement of refugees in the Union Resettlement Framework (URF): this includes timely and just handling of the reception and integration of refugees and immigrants from day one. More specifically, the Union must offer decent reception conditions throughout the EU, such as providing education and healthcare. Moreover, the Union ought to worry about the progress with an organized and transparent mechanism for monitoring the fundamental rights of asylum seekers. 
  3. The European Commission should fund and conduct regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to track the impact of the Pact on Migration and Asylum at a national level and allow for country-tailored implementation strategies:similar reviews are already conducted by the Commission such as European Semester reports, the Environmental Implementation Review and economic IDRs annually. These reviews would provide a mechanism for member states to detail the impact of migration in areas that are core concerns for countries. Each country review should conclude with action points and priorities at the member state and EU-level. 

Though all three policy options are of equal importance to ensure the successful and coherent implementation of the plan, this paper proceeds to focus on the last policy option as a strong recommendation to the European Commission, in order to ensure preparedness for the ongoing implementation of the Pact in this time of political uncertainty. The reasons and specifics behind this recommendation follow in the next subsection. 

5.1 Recommendations

The recommendation of ICRs within the context of the implementation of the Pact acts as a preventative method which focuses on three areas and values that are important for European RPPs with the aim of ensuring their increased cooperation in the implementation of the Pact. First, the country-specific analyses yielded by the IDRs would allow national leaders to suggest implementation strategies tailored to each nation’s socio-economic needs and capabilities. These tailored solutions will preserve national sovereignty. Second, through these country-specific analyses and implementation strategies, it would be possible to put a specific attention on a proper cultural integration of migrants, ensuring their wellbeing within society whilst preserving national traditions. This possibility could strengthen social cohesion, hence appeasing any anti-immigration sentiments that are likely to be strengthened by Trump’s influence. Finally, IDRs would strengthen national agency and allow for national interests to be at the heart of policy implementation whilst EU’s core objectives and values are upheld.

In particular, to ensure their above-mentioned purpose, we envision ICRs to present key sections as follows. First, an Economic Contributions and Challenges of Migration section of the review would report statistics relating to the economy, workforce and their welfare states. This will allow member states to further detail shortages in the job market where migration of people with work experiences related to the field are required. For example, countries experiencing shortages of agricultural workers, healthcare, or otherwise may request that their migrant quota includes those able to contribute to those sectors. Migration is often talked about as a burden by RPPs, highlighting the skills and benefits migrants can bring to suffering industries should mitigate this issue.

Second, a section dedicated to reporting on Social Dynamics and Community Integration would allow states to report statistics related to socio-cultural data, such as attendance to language courses, educational attendance, and integration into society through work or social programmed. This would address the common concerns of RPP tied to the erasure of national identity and traditions due to immigration. It is hoped that providing member states an avenue to report on socio-cultural impacts of migration will demonstrate an effort to protect national identity whilst promoting integration  

Finally, a section for Impacts Not Otherwise Stated is proposed. This would allow member states to flag any additional issues they are facing in the implementation of the Pact to EU institutions. Such issues could include difficulties in processing of incoming migrants, including manpower, biometrics, and service availability. Overall, this should help with national governance for the Pact.

All ICRs ought to conclude with a plan for the future. Plans should enable co-working between the Commission and Member States to come up with priorities and action points for each stakeholder going forward with the Pact, as similar EU reports conclude with. With this recommendation, member states can agree with the EU on what is most important and applicable to the individual country, rather than having a “one size fits all” method applied to all EU members. 

Due to the politically sensitive nature of migration, the importance of impartiality was noted. It is recommended that the ICRs are conducted independently, with assistance from the Eurostat peer-review team. The EU has six funding pools that it may draw from that can achieve this recommendation feasibly: (1) Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, (2) Internal Security Fund, (3) European Social Fund Plus, (4) European Regional Development Fund, (5) Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, and (6) Emergency Assistance and Other Ad Hoc Funding.

6. Conclusion

At this stage, the result of the American elections is ambiguous. The scenario of Trump’s re-election to power will bring about unfavorable results both at the overall EU level and on the immigration issue, as a Trump presidency would entail significant disruptions in US-EU relations (Frangeul-Alves & Weber, 2024).  Trump’s troubled relations with the EU and his pursuit of isolationism, as well as his apparent apathy towards immigrants and refugees, mean that the former president will once again leave the Union alone on the issue that plagues it. Therefore, the developments in the field of immigration will differ greatly depending on the US election results.

In any case, the EU should not be complacent, regardless of the election result, as the migrant – refugee crisis plagues Brussels. Migration is one of the most important policy issues (Lovato, 2021) and it has turned into a geopolitical issue. Immigration is a labyrinthine for the EU and a complex problem, thus the solution will not be easy, especially given EU member states’ diverse opinions on the matter (Donceel, 2024). 

To conclude, this policy paper delved into the implementation of this Pact, focusing on how it is susceptible to the rise of populism both in Europe and abroad. In particular, after conducting a SWOT analysis of the Pact and providing an overview of how it is perceived across Europe, the paper focused on how the implementation of the Pact could be affected by the results of the upcoming US presidential elections. Based on previous cases, it is expected that in case of victory Trump will incentivize his EU “allies”, such as Hungary’s Orban, Italy’s Meloni, and Slovakia’s Fico (Naughtie, 2024), resist the Pact in the name of national sovereignty and anti-elitism. In the case of Trump’s loss however, the likely scenario is that the former president would encourage them to challenge the election outcomes and attempt to undermine democratic processes. This could deepen the public’s distrust in representative institutions across the US and the EU, ultimately furthering the disengagement from electoral processes (i.e. increasing voter absenteeism).   

The authors of this paper believe that the recommended introduction of periodic in-depth country reviews (ICRs) would serve as a preventative measure in anticipation of Trump influencing RPPs in Europe. Of course, whilst future outcomes are uncertain due to the vivacity of the electoral campaigns in the US as well as worsening international orders, we are confident that as the European Commission sustains the cooperative nature of the Pact across political spectrums – which we recommend doing by ensuring tailored implementation strategies across member states’ government – its implementation will be successful. 

 

(*) This policy paper is based on research conducted by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park and Leon Gräf during the ECPS Case Competition “US Foreign Policy and Populism,” held as part of the ECPS Summer School from July 1-5, 2024. 

Authors’ Biographies

Beatrice Bottura is a Sciences Po master student in Public Policy, specializing in Social Policy and Social Innovation, and a Central European University (CEU) graduate in Philosophy Politics and Economics. Her research interests revolve around the crisis of democracy and how it relates to political attitudes and policymaking. She has explored this in her bachelor thesis “Ethnopopulists’ reaction to crises: the case of Fratelli D’Italia”, from which she derived an article for the Horizon Europe project “AuthLIB – Neo-Authoritarianisms in Europe and the Liberal Democratic Response”, which she is involved in as a research assistant. For this project she has worked with CEU’s Democracy institute and Sciences Po’s Centre d’Études Européennes (CEE). Particularly, she conducted discourse analyses for the working paper “Illiberalism and Social Policy: A Four-Country Comparison”, is authoring an upcoming publication on varieties of illiberalism across policy areas with CEU and has coded speech for the CEE’s work measuring “Ideological configurations”. 

Joon Park is a third-year student at George Washington University, pursuing a bachelor’s in international Affairs and Finance with a minor in Economics. Born to Korean immigrants and raised in Germany, her academic focus spans EU economics, German domestic and foreign politics, U.S. foreign policy, and East Asian geopolitical strategy. She is currently researching the rise of right-wing populism in Europe in collaboration with the Center for Faith, Identity, and Globalization in Washington, D.C. Joon’s passion lies in exploring how global political systems and economic dynamics intersect to shape international relations and policy. 

Matthew Lynch is a Master of Science candidate in Global Studies and International Relations at Northeastern University in Boston. He received a Bachelor of Science in Supply Chain Management from the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. With a background in international business, his current research focuses on how populism creates vulnerabilities in EU defense and security, particularly the potential for external actors to exploit these weaknesses. He also researches German foreign and defense policy.

Leon Gräf holds a BA in Political Science and Philosophy, University of Heidelberg, Germany and an MA in Political Science, University of Mannheim, Germany. He is currently working as Research Fellow at the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law, and as a Research Assistant at the Chair of Empirical Macrosociology at Heidelberg University. Additionally, is has been working as a researcher at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) since 2021. His MA thesis focused on mediator characteristics and their effect on ceasefire success across different regions. 

Pinelopi Gkampeta is a graduate student in the Advanced M.Sc. in “European Integration” in Brussels School of Governance (VUB) and she currently lives in Brussels. Furthermore, she has obtained a master’s degree in “International and European Governance and Politics” from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and a bachelor’s degree in “Philosophy” from the same university. She has taken part in the Erasmus+ Program “Maritime Security Common Module “by European Security and Defence College and Hellenic Naval Academy. Moreover, she is a research intern in the Institute of International Relations (Athens, Greece) and also an editor and analyst at the Association of International and European Affairs. Pinelopi worked as a research assistant for the Identity and Conflict Lab (Yale University) for some months. Her areas of interest and research are EU as a Global Actor, EU External Relations, EU Security and Defense Policy, Maritime Security and Immigration Policy.

Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston holds an MA in International Relations, Conflict & Security from Northumbria University. Her research focuses primarily on societal security, with an emphasis on digital threats. Her dissertation explored how EU policy documents framed cybersecurity as an existential threat. Currently, her research interests have expanded to include the societal risks posed by AI. This includes how populists may use generative AI to either gather support or create the illusion of widespread backing, as well as to drive disinformation campaigns. By investigating this area, she aims to uncover how algorithms could be leveraged for early detection and mitigation of polarizing content ahead of elections. 

Ludmila Malai is an experienced EU Project Manager at the Intercultural Dialogue Platform, with a diverse academic background in Economics, Administration, Politics, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution. She holds a Master’s in International Law and Security Studies from the Free University of Brussels and is fluent in English, French, Russian, Italian, and Romanian. Over the past six years, Ludmila has specialized in writing and coordinating European projects focused on CVE/PVE, radicalization, combating racism, Antisemitism, Islamophobia, the security of places of worship, women’s empowerment, and youth civic engagement.

 

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Prabowo Subianto sings during a grand campaign at GBK Stadium in Jakarta on March 23, 2014. After four attempts, Prabowo was finally elected President of Indonesia in 2024. Photo: MRNPic.

From Political Pariah to President: Prabowo Subianto and the Perils of Populism in Indonesia

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Please cite as:
Watmough, Simon P. (2021). “From Political Pariah to President: Prabowo Subianto and the Perils of Populism in Indonesia.” ECPS Leader Profiles. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 24, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/lp0011

 

Prabowo Subianto’s victory in Indonesia’s February 2024 presidential election marks a pivotal moment in the nation’s democratic evolution, echoing a global shift towards nationalist populism. As Indonesia’s eighth president, Prabowo’s political journey and ideological stance have sparked concerns about the future of the country’s democratic institutions. His controversial military past, including allegations of human rights abuses in East Timor and Aceh during the 1990s, continues to raise alarms about the potential for authoritarianism under his leadership. Critics fear his presidency may signal a return to repressive practices, with threats to civil liberties and increased polarization. Prabowo’s background as a former military general adds to concerns about a consolidation of power and the erosion of democratic checks and balances in one of the world’s largest democracies.

By Simon P. Watmough

Introduction

Prabowo Subianto’s[1] stunning victory in Indonesia’s presidential elections in February marks a significant moment in the country’s democratic journey, reflecting a global trend towards authoritarian nationalist populism. As he assumes the presidency of the world’s third-largest democracy, Prabowo’s political career and ideological stance have ignited conversations about the potential implications for Indonesia’s democratic institutions and pluralistic society, prompting observers at home and abroad to scrutinize the trajectory Indonesia might take under his administration. This profile joins that conversation, asking: Who is Prabowo Subianto, Indonesia’s eighth president?

If the “peculiarity of populist discourse is to frame politics as an antagonistic confrontation between the people and the oligarchy” (de la Torre, 2007: 389), then Prabowo hits the mark. Known for his assertive rhetoric and strongman persona, Prabowo – a retired lieutenant general in the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI) – has successfully tapped into a vein of nationalist sentiment in Indonesia, promising robust leadership in the face of mounting economic and security challenges.

It is scarcely surprising that Prabowo embodies all the qualities of a “warrior populist” in the vein of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, as he has publicly declared his admiration for the late Venezuelan general-turned-dictator (Aspinall, 2015: 2). Equally, as the brother of one of Indonesia’s richest men (and a multimillionaire in his own right), we can see him as the paradigmatic “pluto-populist” in the vein of Donald Trump, the late Silvio Berlusconi and of course, Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra, whom Prabowo openly admires (ibid.).

The country itself is no stranger to populism, which has “deep roots in Indonesia” (Aspinall, 2015: 3). “Diffuse” forms of populist mobilization have played an outsized role in the country’s mass politics since the beginning, even during the “Guided Democracy” of the founding president, Sukarno, and the authoritarian “New Order” period under Suharto (ibid.). Some have even located the roots of Indonesian populism in the country’s birth as an independent nation (van Klinken, 2020). However, Indonesia’s current “populist moment” reflects conditions that have emerged in the 21st century, not least the attenuation of party functioning in the campaigns of political actors and the rise of “media-based populism,” which is “now the default mode of electioneering” (Gammon, 2023: 442). The allure of authoritarian nationalist populism, with its promise of decisive action and appeal to traditional values, poses questions about the future of Indonesia’s open and inclusive political climate. Critics argue that this could lead to a regression in human rights, freedom of the press and minority protections, elements that are foundational to Indonesia’s democratic framework.

This profile offers a comprehensive overview of the factors that have shaped Prabowo’s outlook and approach, including his early life, his military career (including his close links with the Suharto regime and his role in the transition to democracy in 1998) as well as his subsequent business and political ventures, all of which have led him to the seat of ultimate power. Charting his move from political pariah to perennial contender and now president, it sketches the key influences that have shaped his authoritarian populist outlook and the controversies that continue to devil him and give his critics pause for concern. Ultimately, it suggests he is likely to work to centralize power in the hands of the presidency, undermine Indonesia’s independent institutions, take the country backwards and possibly threaten to ignite conflicts far and wide.

A Cosmopolitan “Third Culture Kid” Forged in Exile

Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto greets the public during a 2024 general election campaign in Bengkulu City, Indonesia, on January 11, 2024. Photo: Shutterstock.

Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo was born on 17 October 1951, in Jakarta, Indonesia, into an aristocratic Javanese family “line that goes back centuries” (Connelly & Laksmana, 2018). His grandfather, Margono Djojohadikusumo (1894–1978), a prominent economist and founder of Bank Negara Indonesia (also serving as its first president), was a leading figure in Indonesia’s independence movement, while his father, Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (1917–2001), held key positions as Indonesia’s minister of trade and industry. Growing up amidst this political and economic elite exposed Prabowo to the inner workings of government and economics from a very young age (Purdey, 2016).

In the late 1950s, at just seven years of age, Prabowo was forced into exile with his family, his father and grandfather having been central players in an internal rebellion against Sukarno. Exile took the family first to Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand, then Switzerland and later to the United Kingdom, where Prabowo studied, graduating from the prestigious American School in London (ASL) in 1968 (Tanu, 2004). This international journey at a young age had a profound impact on Prabowo, exposing him to a wide range of cultures and shaping him into a “third culture kid” (Pollock & Reken, 2009), one who learned precisely how to navigate elite cosmopolitan circles (Tanu, 2004).

After the fall of Sukarno and the rise of the New Order regime in 1966 (headed by Suharto), the family were no longer political exiles. As Aspinall (2015: 3) notes, Prabowo returned to Indonesia “more comfortable speaking English than Indonesian, yet with powerful ambitions” to make something of himself in the country of his birth. Indeed, from a young age, Prabowo displayed a natural aptitude for strategy and a strong aspiration to the grand exercise of political power – a particular fascination in his youth was the Turkish general-turned-founding father Kemal Mustafa Ataturk (Friend, 2003: 323). Recognizing his teenage son’s leadership potential, Sumitro encouraged Prabowo to attend the military academy and pursue a career in the armed forces.

Military Career and Accusations of Human Rights Abuses

Understanding Prabowo’s military career is central to understanding both his outlook and style and the controversies that have dogged him in politics since 2004. His military journey began in 1970 when he enrolled in the Indonesian Military Academy in Magelang. He graduated in 1974, alongside fellow cadets who would go on to hold senior leadership positions, including Indonesia’s sixth president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (widely known as SBY).

After graduation, Prabowo served in elite regiments of the TNI, first in the Indonesian Special Forces (known as Kopassus), which he joined in 1976 and where he gained experience in counterinsurgency operations (Aspinall, 2015: 6). Indeed, during his several tours of East Timor after the Indonesian invasion in December 1975, he was responsible for many human rights violations. At just 26 years old, Prabowo became the youngest commander of a key commando unit operating in East Timor and was implicated in the execution of East Timor’s first prime minister and freedom fighter, Nicolau dos Reis Lobato, in December 1978 (van Klinken, 2014).

Prabowo’s career took off after his marriage to Siti Hediati Hariyadi (“Titiek”) – the daughter of Indonesia’s strongman President Suharto – in 1983. His marriage to Titiek further elevated his status within the ruling political elite and gave him access to important networks and resources, allowing him to rise through the ranks of the Indonesian military more swiftly than many of his peers.

In the early 1990s, Prabowo, now a Major General, led Kopassus Group 3 in its attempts to suppress the East Timorese independence movement. His methods included using irregular troops, known as “ninja” gangs, and militias directed by Kopassus commanders, leading to a rise in human rights abuses. He has also been implicated in killings in Indonesia’s restive province of West Papua, particularly targeting the region’s independence activists (Nairn, 2024). During the dying days of his father-in-law’s regime, “Prabowo emerged as the leader of a palace guard of generals most willing to use coercion to defend the regime” (Aspinall, 2015: 6). In March 1998, Prabowo was appointed as the head of the 27,000-strong Army Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) – a position Suharto himself once held, which he used to topple Sukarno and propel himself to power in 1965.

Just three months into this role, during the May 1998 riots, Prabowo sought to deploy Kostrad units to restore order in Jakarta. This move was met with controversy as it involved hundreds of individuals trained by Kopassus, Prabowo’s former command. Accusations of importing trouble and seeking to discredit rivals were raised, with some arguing that Prabowo was putting pieces in place for a military coup in which he would assume command of Indonesia. These events escalated tensions and played a role in the resignation of President Suharto on May 21, 1998 (Aspinall, 2005: 212).

In the aftermath of the 1998 riots, investigations revealed allegations of human rights abuses and kidnappings involving Prabowo’s troops, including the torture of democracy activists. He acknowledged responsibility for the abductions (although he continues to deny any role in the activists’ deaths), leading to his discharge from military service in August 1998 (Nairn, 2024).

Second Exile and Business Empire

As soon as he was expelled from the military, Prabowo again went into exile (this time self-imposed), residing in Jordan (Prabowo is reportedly close to King Abdullah). During this time, he downplayed involvement in the 1998 riots and maintained that he was not responsible for betraying his country or its leaders (Tesoro, 2000). On his return to Indonesia in 2004, he immediately began to plot a path to the presidency (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 352).

At the same time, Prabowo ventured into the business world, collaborating with his younger brother, Hashim Djojohadikusumo. His business interests reflect a pattern endemic to Indonesia’s “oligarchic” political economy (Winters, 2013). Today, Prabowo’s Nusantara Group oversees an extensive portfolio of 27 companies operating both within Indonesia and internationally. These companies cover a diverse range of sectors, including Nusantara Energy (focusing on oil, natural gas, and coal), Tidar Kerinci Agung (engaged in palm oil plantations), and Jaladri Nusantara (operating in the fishery industry) (Purdey, 2016).

From Political Pariah to Perennial Presidential Candidate

Even as a solider, Prabowo Subianto had established a reputation as a political player, leveraging his connections with President Suharto in the 1990s to engage in efforts to suppress critics in the journalistic and political spheres. In the dying days of the New Order, Prabowo attempted to sway Goenawan Mohamad to sell his controversial Tempo magazine (a leading mouthpiece of popular dissent) and warned various influential figures, including Abdurrahman Wahid (popularly known as Gus Dur, who served as Indonesia’s fourth president from 1999 to 2001) and Nurcholish Madjid, against taking a public stand against the regime (Friend, 2003: 203).

By 2004, Prabowo’s political aspirations led him to vie for the Golkar party’s presidential candidacy, but he received minimal support. He speaks of this campaign as a “trial run” that gave him the experience he needed to move forward. In this period, he also began to create grassroots networks, especially among farmers, small traders, and a wide range of other organizations, including “veterans’ associations, labor unions and organizations of village heads, which could provide him with access to a mass base” (Aspinall, 2015: 9) on which to ground a populist political movement.

In 2008, Prabowo’s inner circle established the Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra), supporting his presidential run in 2009. Hashim Djojohadikusumo serves as party chairman. Despite not winning enough parliamentary seats, Prabowo ran as a vice-presidential candidate alongside Megawati Sukarnoputri, daughter of Sukarno. The pair, known as Mega–Pro, lost to SBY, who succeeded Megawati as Indonesia’s sixth president on 20 October 2004. Unbowed by this failure, Prabowo doubled down on building up Gerindra, his business interests, and his populist networks (Mao, 2024).

The 2014 Presidential Election: The “Battle of the Populists”

President-elect Prabowo Subianto with the 7th President of Indonesia, Joko Widodo, at the 79th Indonesian National Armed Forces Anniversary in Jakarta, Indonesia, on October 5, 2024. Photo: Donny Hery.

By 2014, Indonesian politics had reached a critical juncture, one that was ripe for populist mobilization. While SBY’s ten years in office had seen the country bed down several important reforms, recover fully from the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and resolve some longstanding regional conflicts, they were largely seen as a lost opportunity, mainly due to the vacillating leadership of President Yudhoyono himself (Aspinall et all., 2015: 1–2). The period of political indecision and policy stagnation that characterized the last years of his presidency set the stage for the rise of a “populist challenger” in Indonesian politics, something “political scientists had been predicting for years” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 351; see also Anugrah, 2020: 5). Indeed, as Aspinall has rightly noted, “The rise of an authoritarian populist challenger like Prabowo was almost overdetermined in contemporary Indonesia” (Aspinall, 2015: 3)

Scholars widely agree that 2014 was a “watershed” and a “turning point” in Indonesian democracy in the post-Suharto era (see, for example, Anugrah, 2020: 6; Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 347). It was the year that saw Indonesia join “the new wave of illiberal populist mobilization in both established and newer democracies” (Anugrah, 2020: 11). The result was an epic “battle of the populists” – Joko Widodo (“Jokowi”), the incumbent governor of Jakarta, and Prabowo – in the presidential elections in July. While both were clearly populist, each had a distinctive populist style that contrasted with the other. For his part, Jokowi showcased a provincial “everyman” populist style (he promised to meet Yudhoyono’s do-nothing elitism with workaday governance on a platform of good governance and populist policies like cheap healthcare and education). As Aspinall & Mietzner (2014: 351) have noted: “In Jokowi, Indonesians found someone who possessed a popular touch that was the antithesis of Yudhoyono’s wooden formality.” In stark contrast stood Prabowo, who instead offered “‘firm leadership’ as the antidote to Yudhoyono’s hesitant style of leadership” (Ibid.). Despite his impeccable establishment credentials, Prabowo cast himself in classical populist terms as an “outsider” ready to take on the Indonesian elite.

Prabowo ran a lavish campaign funded mostly by his brother, Hashim, a wildly successful businessman and one of Indonesia’s dollar billionaires. Notwithstanding his claims of wanting to fight a corrupt oligarchy, Prabowo’s campaign was “organized using a pattern of cash-driven informal networking” (Aspinall, 2015: 3) that drew in many constituencies. Despite a campaign levelled at “corrupt elites,” Prabowo managed to perfect the game of “patronage democracy” that Indonesia has become known for (Van Klinken, 2009).

Consistent with a turn to “media-based populism” in Indonesia (Gammon, 2023: 442), Prabowo campaigned “with relentless media advertising and set piece mass rallies all stressing a simple message: Prabowo was the man Indonesia needed to lead it towards a desperately needed national renaissance” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 357). Prabowo’s appeal was enhanced by a “widespread – though diffuse – mood of nostalgia for the certainties of the New Order” regime of his father-in-law Suharto, Indonesia’s longest-serving president (Aspinall, 2015: 3).

His campaign adopted classic populist discursive frames, and he cast himself as Indonesia’s “savior” with promises to rescue the country from a rapacious elite in cahoots with foreigners seeking to exploit Indonesia’s vast natural resources (Hellmann, 2019: 13). His style was avowedly nationalist and sought to both burnish his credentials as a “strong leader” and draw on the symbolism of the populist Sukarno era: “His campaign appearances had a highly theatrical character, with lots of uniforms, marching, and fiery oratory, and with much of the styling obviously based on that of Sukarno and other nationalist leaders from the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 352).

Moreover, despite his claims to be the answer to the corruption and money politics of the Indonesian campaign system, Prabowo himself marshalled a wide range of constituencies through vote buying. In this way, he was able to galvanize Islamic groups, small businessmen and other mass constituencies. As Aspinall & Mietzner (2014: 359) note, “like his Thai role model Thaksin Shinawatra,” Prabowo “appealed mainly to the rural poor for support” (although in the end, he garnered as much or more urban support). Despite his mass appeal and backing from the outgoing SBY (the president reportedly held Prabowo “unfit to be president” but bowed to pressure and opinion polling to swing his weight behind the former general at the last minute), Jokowi won with 53% of the vote, after a late scramble to get out his base of his voters to the polls.

In the aftermath of the elections, both candidates declared victory. Jokowi’s claim was backed by most independent quick counts, showing a slight lead over Prabowo. The latter, however, citing different polls, also claimed victory, a strategy he would repeat in 2019. However, he withdrew from the race on the day the official tally was to be announced, citing “massive cheating” and declaring the election unconstitutional, a move that sparked legal and political controversies, culminating in an appeal to the Constitutional Court alleging significant voting irregularities, which the court unanimously rejected.

The 2019 Rematch: Islamic Populism and a Promise to “Make Indonesia Great Again”

Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto at a campaign event in Jakarta, Indonesia, on April 4, 2014. Photo: Simon Roughneen.

The 2019 campaign set up a “rematch” between the two populists and was even more divisive than their 2014 contest (Arifianto, 2019: 46). As had been the case in 2014, Prabowo’s participation in the 2019 campaign was contentious. He initially claimed victory despite independent counts favoring Jokowi (he was eventually declared the winner with 55.5% of the vote), who later faced violent protests from his supporters challenging the results, which were ultimately upheld by the Constitutional Court (Jakarta Globe, 2019). During the campaign, Prabowo was accused of emulating the tactics used by Donald Trump in his 2016 bid for the US presidency, particularly in emphasizing economic inequalities and foreigners ripping the country off. In a speech given in October 2018, Prabowo echoed Trump’s infamous slogan by declaring his desire to “Make Indonesia Great Again.”

In a pattern that has recurred across his presidential campaigns, Prabowo reinvented himself going into the election campaign, in this case as a pious Muslim, appearing at religious festivals and Islamist rallies and actively courting Muslims: “Unlike in the 2014 election, when the Islamists were just a small contingent of Prabowo’s mainly ultranationalist coalition, the Islamists had now become an integral part of his campaign team” (Arifianto, 2019: 47). He made much of his connections with hardline Muslim groups, notably exemplified by his relationship with Muhammad Rizieq Shihab of the Islamic Defenders Front. Rizieq, in self-imposed exile in Mecca at the time, was a vocal critic of Jokowi and supporter of Prabowo. The former general pledged to facilitate Rizieq’s return to Indonesia if he won the election. Prabowo’s courting of the populist Islamic vote shifted the entire tenor of the campaign, forcing Jokowi to select the “conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin” (Arifianto, 2019: 46) as his running mate.

Amidst a rancorous campaign, voter turnout in the 2019 elections reached record highs, fueled largely by the populist mobilization of Islam by the two leading contenders: “Religious-based polarization conducted by both sides during their campaigns helped boost total voter turnout to 154 million—approximately 80% of the electorate” (Arifianto, 2019: 49). This was up from the 69% who turned out to vote in the 2014 presidential poll (Anugrah, 2020: 9).

Rapprochement, Political Reinvention, and “Digital Populism” in the 2024 Presidential Campaign

Despite the bitterly fought campaign and Prabowo’s alleged role in violent post-election riots in Jakarta that killed six people (Soeriaatmadja & Chan, 2019), the ex-general opportunistically sought a rapprochement and approached Megawati and Jokowi to see if Gerindra could be included in the governing coalition (Indonesia’s party system is highly cartelized and parties often bandwagon in exchange for spoils; see Slater, 2018). In turn, and notwithstanding the rancor that had characterized their relations for half a decade, Jokowi appointed Prabowo his defense minister in October 2019 “as a gesture of national unity” (Anugrah, 2020: 1). Moreover, “[d]espite earlier tensions, Prabowo and Jokowi found common ground in a nationalist vision that emphasized sovereignty, defense, food security and energy security” (Utama, 2023).

His appointment as defense minister resurfaced criticisms of his past human rights abuses and comments praising charismatic populists who later became dictators, such as Hugo Chavez. Dogged by these criticisms, Prabowo sought to shed his image as a firebrand strongman (see below) in the run-up to the 2024 campaign, which culminated in a landslide win on February 14 (Prabowo took over 58% of the vote with another record turnout of 82%; Strangio, 2024).

Prabowo’s 2024 triumph after successive failed attempts rested on three central (and interrelated) dimensions, all of which contributed to his landslide win. The first was the backing of President Jokowi and the full force of the Indonesian state, which deployed a mix of “retail corruption” and “wholesale coercion” on a scale not seen in Indonesia since the 1970s (Nairn, 2024). This approach was coupled with a populist policy of offering one free meal to every child of school age in order to address malnutrition and stunting. A laudable policy on the face of it, it remains to be seen whether the US$30 billion price tag can be met from Indonesia’s strained central budget (Lindsey, 2024). Jokowi, who was term-limited, saw in Prabowo a chance to “carry forward his plans for a political dynasty and, with it, continued influence” (Utama, 2023). In late 2023, Prabowo skillfully wooed the president, offering the second spot on his ticket to Jokowi’s eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, whose constitutional ineligibility for the office was overruled by Indonesia’s Supreme Court, headed by none other than Gibran’s maternal uncle, Anwar Usman, in October 2023. Secondly, Prabowo had the backing of Indonesia’s elite, in particular his brother and “an alliance of mining oligarchs and several giant capitalists who … supported the pair behind the scenes” (Hermawan, 2024).

Finally, Prabowo reinvented himself yet again – this time as a “gemoy” (cute) grandpa – and launched a campaign of “digital populism” on social media (primarily the video platform TikTok), featuring him “dad dancing” on campaign stages and adopting an approach vaguely reminiscent of Trump’s rally antics. This “reinvention tour” appealed to thrill Indonesia’s GenZ and millennial voters, who make up the majority of the country’s electorate and have little or no memory of Indonesia’s authoritarian past or Prabowo’s role in the violent end to the New Order in 1998. Here, too, Jokowi’s backing was also critical, not only in furnishing the young Gibran as Prabowo’s campaign sidekick. As Ary Hermawan (2024) has noted, “Prabowo’s new persona as a ‘cuddly grandpa’ [was] manufactured by an army of cybertroopers,” the majority of which were inherited from Jokowi’s political outfit and which the Prabowo camp deftly used to blunt “campaigns targeting the former general’s checkered human rights record—a key issue in the 2014 election” that Prabowo, ironically enough, lost to Jokowi (Ibid.)

Political Style and Controversies

Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto and vice-presidential candidate Gibran Rakabuming Raka deliver a speech to their supporters in Jakarta, Indonesia, on February 14, 2024. Photo: Prayoga Nugroho.

Prabowo has been famously described as a chameleon, presenting different colors depending on the audience. As one profile put it on the eve of the 2014 presidential campaign, “The pro-business cosmopolitan who can ‘knock Indonesia together’ is the one who shows up to events at posh Jakarta hotels with diplomats and investors. The fist-shaking demagogue is the one who appears in front of the voters” (Tanu, 2004). Prabowo’s past has been a subject of scrutiny, particularly during his presidential campaigns in 2014, 2019 and 2024, with many organizations calling for investigations into his actions during this period. As far as personality is concerned, he is often described as “temperamental,” with “a propensity for outbursts of rage that sometimes involve physical violence, with reports circulating widely of him throwing cellphones, ashtrays, and even punches when angered by his associates or underlings” (Aspinall, 2015: 8–9).

His political style is emblematic of a broader global trend towards authoritarian nationalist populism, a mode of governance characterized by strong leadership, assertive nationalism, and, often, a skepticism towards liberal democratic norms. In Indonesia, Prabowo has cultivated an image of a decisive leader, one who promises to restore order, enhance national pride and protect Indonesian interests from foreign encroachment. This approach has garnered substantial support, particularly among voters disillusioned with the perceived inefficacies of previous administrations.

Despite his impeccable elite credentials (he descends from Javanese aristocracy on his father’s side and is the scion of one of Indonesia’s wealthiest and best-connected families), Prabowo loves to style himself as an “outsider” and a “maverick.” The latter is not actually far from the truth, a personality trait that has been in evidence since his days at the military academy in the early 1970s, where — despite his impressive mastery of military lore and practice — he quickly developed a reputation for independence (his graduation was delayed because he spent some time AWOL), most likely a reflection of his experience as a “third culture kid” in exile around the world in the 1960s.

However, this same political style raises concerns about the potential erosion of democratic principles, including checks and balances, freedom of speech and minority rights. Prabowo’s emphasis on nationalism and sovereignty taps into deep-seated sentiments among the populace, yet it also risks inflaming divisions within Indonesia’s ethnically and religiously diverse society. The manifesto of his Gerindra Party calls for a rollback of the post-Suharto constitutional reforms and a return to Indonesia’s original 1945 Constitution, which Indonesia’s first two presidents, Sukarno and Suharto, had used to establish authoritarian regimes over five decades.

Prabowo’s approach to governance also reflects a skepticism towards liberal internationalism, favoring instead a more insular, Indonesia-first policy. This stance is evident in his critiques of foreign investment and his proposals to reevaluate Indonesia’s participation in international trade agreements, which he argues disadvantage Indonesian workers and compromise national sovereignty. Such positions resonate with nationalist sentiments within Indonesia, promising economic sovereignty and the protection of local industries against global market forces. However, this economic nationalism has sparked debates about the practical implications for Indonesia’s economy, with critics cautioning that protectionist policies could isolate Indonesia from global supply chains and hinder economic growth.

Conclusion: What Can We Expect from a Prabowo Presidency?

After decades of aspiring to lead Indonesia, we can be sure that Prabowo has a clear idea of where he wants to take the country and a clear plan of how to do so. Volatile and mercurial, he is equally pragmatic and will almost certainly be looking to cut deals and build alliances, not least with his major opponent, Megawati’s Indonesian Party of Struggle (PDI–P), which has the largest number of seats in Indonesia’s House of Representatives (DPR). But at 72 years of age and in less-than-robust health, time is not on his side, and he is likely to quickly lose patience with Indonesia’s messy consensus-building approach or overt political opposition, be it in the DPR or on the streets.

Throughout his political career, Prabowo Subianto has faced numerous controversies, many of which stem from his tenure in the Indonesian military, as detailed above. Allegations of human rights abuses during his leadership of the special forces in the 1990s, particularly in regions like East Timor and Aceh, have dogged him, casting a long shadow over his subsequent political endeavors. While Prabowo has consistently denied any wrongdoing, these allegations have been a focal point for critics who argue that his presidency could signal a return to the repressive practices of Indonesia’s past. This history, combined with his current political rhetoric, feeds into fears of an authoritarian drift should Prabowo consolidate power, potentially leading to a curtailment of civil liberties and a crackdown on dissent.

Prabowo’s casual disregard for democracy has also been on display during his successive presidential bids. For example, his 2014 campaign “espoused an authoritarian populist message suggesting he wanted to recentralize power and dismantle key democratic institutions” (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2014: 347). He has also floated the idea that “the country to do away with direct elections of executive government leaders—which he described as a Western product inappropriate for Indonesia” (Ibid.: 352). Before constitutional reforms in the 2000s instituted popular elections of Indonesia’s president and regional governors, they were appointed by their respective legislatures. As Tim Lindsey (2024) has recently pointed out, much of the work of dismantling the reforms of the last 30 years has already been accomplished: “Many of the elements of the New Order are already in place. Much of the work of dismantling Indonesia’s liberal democracy has already been done by the outgoing president” Jokowi, who has overseen an “illiberal turn in Indonesian democracy” over the last decade (Anugrah, 2019).

These points underscore concerns about the erosion of democratic norms and the potential for increased polarization within one of the world’s most diverse countries. Prabowo’s background as a former military general with a controversial record further compounds fears about the centralization of power and the undermining of checks and balances in governance. As this profile shows, these fears are hardly overblown – Prabowo’s record offers clear pointers as to how he is likely to attempt to govern.

Indonesia now stands at a crossroads. President Prabowo’s leadership will test the resilience of the country’s democratic institutions and its capacity to navigate the tension between strongman governance and pluralistic values. Prabowo’s tenure could bring decisive action on issues like economic sovereignty and national security, but at what cost to civil liberties and political freedoms? His legacy will be determined not just by the policies he enacts but by how he handles the delicate balance between authority and accountability, nationalism and inclusivity. The question that now lingers is whether Prabowo’s leadership will unite Indonesia under a shared vision or deepen the divisions that have long shaped the nation’s complex political landscape.

 

References

Anugrah, I. (2020). “The Illiberal Turn in Indonesian Democracy.” The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 18(8), 1–17.

Arifianto, A. R. (2019). “What the 2019 Election Says About Indonesian Democracy.” Asia Policy, 26(4), 46–53. 

Aspinall, E. (2005). Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia. Stanford University Press.

Aspinall, E. (2015). “Oligarchic Populism: Prabowo Subianto’s Challenge to Indonesian Democracy.” Indonesia, 99, 1–28. https://doi.org/10.5728/indonesia.99.0001

Aspinall, E., & Mietzner, M. (2014). “Indonesian Politics in 2014: Democracy’s Close Call.” Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies, 50(3), 347–369. https://doi.org/10.1080/00074918.2014.980375

Aspinall, E., Mietzner, M., & Tomsa, D. (2015). The Yudhoyono Presidency: Indonesia’s Decade of Stability and Stagnation. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.

Connelly, Evan A., & Laksmana, A. (2024, 14 March). “Jokowi Offers Prabowo a Piece of the Pie.” Foreign Policy. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/31/indonesia-democracy-general-jokowi-offers-prabowo-a-piece-of-the-pie/

De la Torre, C. (2007). “The Resurgence of Radical Populism in Latin America.” Constellations, 14(3), 384–397.

Friend, T. (2003). Indonesian destinies. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Gammon, L. (2023). “Strong ‘Weak’ Parties and ‘Partial Populism’ in Indonesia.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs, 45(3), 442–464.

Hellmann, O. (2019). “Populism in East Asia.” In: C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. A. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Populism (pp. 161–178). Oxford University Press.

Hermawan, A. (2024, 19 June). “How Indonesia’s Cyberspace Entrenches Oligarchic Power.” Asialink. https://asialink.unimelb.edu.au/insights/how-indonesias-cyberspace-entrenches-oligarchic-power

Jakarta Globe (2019, 17 April). “Indonesia Sees Record Turnout in Historic Election, Braces for Fallout.” https://jakartaglobe.id/context/indonesia-sees-record-turnout-in-historic-election-braces-for-fallout

Lindsey, T. (2024, 19 October). “Indonesia’s New President, Prabowo Subianto, Finds Democracy ‘Very Tiring’. Are Darker Days Ahead for the Country?” The Conversation. http://theconversation.com/indonesias-new-president-prabowo-subianto-finds-democracy-very-tiring-are-darker-days-ahead-for-the-country-241256

Mao, F. (2024, 15 February). “Prabowo Subianto: The tainted ex-military chief who will be Indonesia’s new leader.” BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-68237141

Nairn, A. (2024, 10 February). “Indonesia State Apparatus Is Preparing to Throw Election to a Notorious Massacre General.” The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2024/02/10/indonesia-election-results-prabowo-fraud-stolen-election/

Pollock, D. C., & Reken, R. E. V. (2009). Third Culture Kids: Growing Up Among Worlds (2nd edition). Nicholas Brealey America.

Purdey, J. (2016). “Narratives to Power: The Case of the Djojohadikusumo Family Dynasty over Four Generations.” South East Asia Research, 24(3), 369–385. https://doi.org/10.1177/0967828X16659728

Slater, D. (2018). “Party Cartelization, Indonesian-style: Presidential Power-sharing and the Contingency of Democratic Opposition.” Journal of East Asian Studies, 18(1), 23–46. https://doi.org/10.1017/jea.2017.26

Soeriaatmadja, W., & Chan, F. (2019, 22 May). “6 Killed, 200 Injured in Jakarta Election Protests that Police Say are ‘By Design’.” The Straits Times. https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/security-forces-use-tear-gas-to-disperse-small-groups-of-rioters-in-jakarta

Strangio, S. (2024, 21 March). Indonesian Election Commission Affirms Prabowo’s Landslide Victory. https://thediplomat.com/2024/03/indonesian-election-commission-affirms-prabowos-landslide-victory/

Tanu, D. (2014, 26 June). “Prabowo the Chameleon.” New Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/prabowo-the-chameleon/

Tesoro, J. M. (2000, 3 March). “The Scapegoat.” Asiaweek, 26(8), http://www-cgi.cnn.com/ASIANOW/asiaweek/magazine/2000/0303/cover1.html

Utama, V. R. (2023, 15 December). “Prabowo Subianto: Indonesia’s Perennial Strongman Recast as the Adorable Grandpa.” Indonesia at Melbourne. Retrieved 21 October 2024, from https://indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/prabowo-subianto-indonesias-perennial-strongman-recast-as-the-adorable-grandpa/

van Klinken, G. (2009). “Patronage Democracy in Provincial Indonesia.” In: O. Törnquist, N. Webster, & K. Stokke (Eds.), Rethinking Popular Representation (pp. 141–159). Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230102095_8

van Klinken, G. (2014, 17 April). “Prabowo and Human Rights.” Inside Indonesia. https://www.insideindonesia.org/editions/elections-2014/prabowo-and-human-rights

van Klinken, G. (2020). “The Origins of Indonesian Populism: Public Debate in Java, March–June 1945.” Indonesia, 110(1), 43–72.

Winters, J. A. (2013). “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia.” Indonesia, 96(1), 11–33.

[1] Indonesian naming conventions differ significantly from the Western model of first, middle and last names. Names may consist of one or more words, with one-word names particularly common among the Javanese (e.g., Suharto). Prabowo Subianto is commonly referred to by his first name, “Prabowo,” which aligns with Indonesian naming conventions, where individuals with multiple names are often identified with a single, unique personal name. Thus, he does not generally use the family name “Djojohadikusumo,” in contrast to his father and brother, Hashim. In this profile I introduce each politician with his or her first and second names and refer subsequently to their most commonly used one-word identifier.

 

An Afghan woman in a burqa and locals are seen on the streets of Kabul. Photo: Shutterstock.

Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan 

by Editor’s ChoiceHomeReports

Please cite as:

Bottura, Beatrice. (2024). Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 18, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0089

 

“Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan” was the 15th session of the “Mapping Global Populism” panel series hosted by the European Center for Populism Studies’ (ECPS). The session was held online on the 26th of September and was moderated by Dr. Simon P. Watmough. The panel featured an extensive and diverse analysis on the manifestations of authoritarianism, extremism, and populism from distinguished scholars.

Report by Beatrice Bottura

The 15th session of the European Center for Populism Studies’ (ECPS) “Mapping Global Populism” panel series, aimed at creating a comprehensive understanding of populism worldwide, was held online on September 26, 2024. Titled “Theocracy, Radicalism, and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan,” the session featured insights from distinguished scholars on various manifestations of authoritarianism, extremism, and populism in these countries. This report provides an overview of the topics analyzed, with detailed accounts of each speaker’s contributions.

The panel was moderated by Dr. Simon P Watmough, a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Leipzig and a non-resident research fellow in ECPS’ research program on authoritarianism. Dr. Hélène Thibault, Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Nazarbayev University, illustrated the authoritarian nature of Tajikistan’s anti-extremism policies. Dr. Zakia Adeli, former Deputy Minister of Justice of Afghanistan and a professor at Kabul University (2018–2021), explored the Taliban regime’s government structure and impositions in Afghanistan. Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani, Assistant Professor in Political Science at Lovely Professional University, focused his presentation on gender issues under Taliban rule. Finally, Amir Hossein Mahdavi, a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Connecticut, discussed the potential rise of populist actors in Iran. Originally, Dr. Kathleen Collins, a Professor in the Department of Political Science and a faculty affiliate in Islamic Studies at the University of Minnesota, was scheduled to present on “Radical Islamism vs. Extremist Secular State in Tajikistan.” However, due to her absence, Dr. Thibault covered several key aspects of her colleague’s presentation during the session.

Dr. Hélène Thibault: “Counter-extremism and Authoritarian Governance in Tajikistan”

Having discussed the repressive aspect of counter-extremism policies in Tajikistan, Dr. Thibault then proceeded to cover its performative facet. She described how anti-extremism is used as a tool to promote lifestyles considered “safe” and “in line with national traditions.” To this end, she discussed how the regulation of female clothing is utilized to ensure the secularization of the state. She provided examples such as the ban on the hijab in schools and state institutions, as well as the prohibition of wearing, importing, or selling “foreign clothing” in public places, which international organizations have recognized as a violation of religious rights. She also mentioned restrictions on religious education.

Dr. Hélène Thibault commenced her presentation by addressing the presence and extent of extremism in Tajikistan, with the aim of depicting an accurate picture of the evolution of Islamic radicalization since independence in 1991. She began by demonstrating that the level of radical Islamization in Central Asia is, in practice, less extensive than originally predicted by the media and scholars. Citing works by Edward Lemon (particularly a 2018 report), she highlighted that most recruitment and attacks occur abroad. Based on this information, Dr. Thibault argued that the threat of extremism is exaggerated to create a perception of danger and is used to “eliminate political opponents of all allegiances,” including Islamist parties or other political mobilizations. In other words, the threat of extremism has been used to “sideline all sorts of political mobilization” in a repressive and authoritarian manner, which has become characteristic of politics in Tajikistan.

Dr. Thibault provided examples to support her case. First, the classification of the legally registered Islamic Revival Party as an extremist organization in 2015 led to the imprisonment, persecution, or exile of party members, their families, and lawyers. Second, she cited the harsh repressions and imprisonments during protests in the autonomous region of Gorno-Badakhshan.

Having discussed the repressive aspect of counter-extremism policies in Tajikistan, Dr. Thibault then proceeded to cover its performative facet. She described how anti-extremism is used as a tool to promote lifestyles considered “safe” and “in line with national traditions.” To this end, she discussed how the regulation of female clothing is utilized to ensure the secularization of the state. She provided examples such as the ban on the hijab in schools and state institutions, as well as the prohibition of wearing, importing, or selling “foreign clothing” in public places, which international organizations have recognized as a violation of religious rights. She also mentioned restrictions on religious education. By analyzing these aspects, Dr. Thibault addressed the concept of “authoritarian secularization,” central to Dr. Kathleen Collins’ work, thus connecting her presentation to that of her colleague.

Dr. Thibault concluded her presentation by stating that the exploitation of the concept of extremism, used as a tool for authoritarian and repressive politics, does not address the root causes of extremism—namely unfairness and feelings of exclusion from socio-economic well-being—which she also discussed in one of her 2018 publications.

Dr. Zakia Adeli: “The Taliban’s Totalitarian Regime: Governance, Extremism, and Control”

Dr. Zakia Adeli emphasized how the Taliban’s removal of democratic processes—such as the suppression of elections and political opposition, along with a shift toward decision-making concentrated in the hands of a small religious group—has established a theocratic totalitarian system. This system is characterized by the complete control of the leader, the erosion of human rights, and the restriction of individual and civil freedoms. Examples include the detention, torture, and intimidation of journalists and activists, as well as control over the media and women’s bodies and activities.

Dr. Zakia Adeli introduced her lecture by providing an overview of its core themes, particularly focusing on how the Taliban regime has “systematically centralized power, without any electoral process or legal accountability,” and the consequences of this trend. Hence, the subtitle of her lecture: “Analyzing the Features and Impact of the Taliban’s Rule in Afghanistan.”

The presentation outlined the characteristics of the Taliban’s totalitarian regime: centralization of power, suppression of dissent, the use of ideology to control public and private life, strict censorship, media control, and the homogenization of people. Dr. Adeli expanded on this last point by addressing the enforcement of uniformity through fear and violence, control over institutions (media, civil society, education, and culture), and the imposition of ideological conformity through decrees.

She then described the processes undertaken by the regime to dismantle democratic institutions, including the abolition of:

– Constitutional Law, the core framework of democracy ensuring legal representation and civil rights;

– Parliament, representing the removal of legislative authority;

– The Independent Commission for Overseeing the Implementation of the Constitution;

– The Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan;

– The Ministry of Women’s Affairs;

– Political Parties.

The author explained that, by doing so, the Taliban ensured a lack of checks and balances within the country, which allowed them to centralize power. Under the regime, there are no democratic processes to elect officials, and power is “centralized under the exclusive authority of Hibetullah Akhundzada” (the Taliban’s religious leader), who alone makes and ratifies all political and legal decisions. The institutions and individuals involved in governance—such as ministers—act under the direct orders of the Taliban leader. This structure enforces a “highly centralized and non-electoral regime” with no transparency or accountability, as power is concentrated in one individual, excluding citizens from governance.

Having provided an overview of the Taliban regime’s governance structure, Dr. Adeli focused on the monopolization of power, particularly analyzing the abolition of all political activities. She described how Afghanistan is now a one-party state, with the Taliban controlling media and communication while suppressing political opposition. She noted that in 2022, the Taliban approved a decree banning gatherings not previously approved, leading to the breakup of over 100 peaceful protests, with some individuals disappearing. These practices are enforced with religious justifications, often accompanied by extremist tactics, such as public executions of both previous political actors and individuals not conforming to the Taliban Regime’s ways. 

Following this, the presentation covered the importance of ideology in the totalitarian Taliban regime. Ideology is used as a tool to justify the extreme concentration of power, the elimination of opposition, and the enforcement of obedience from the population. In practice, this destruction of cultural diversity in favor of a singular way of life is executed through:

– Cultural suppression: replacing traditional cultural symbols with their own […];

– Destruction of Historical Heritage: eliminating ancient statues and monuments;

– Ban on Music and Arts: suppressing music, dance, and other forms of artistic expression.

This “homogenization of the people” comprises the core aspects of the Taliban regime, which the speaker carefully outlined throughout the presentation: the enforcement of unity through fear and violence, control of institutions (media, society, education, and culture), and the imposition of ideological conformity. These practices allow the Taliban regime to control both public and private life, depriving people of individual freedoms. In this context, Dr. Adeli highlighted the condition of women under the regime, providing examples such as mandatory dress codes and restrictions on women appearing in public spaces without men.

Dr. Adeli concluded with a brief summary of the main aspects of her presentation. She emphasized how the Taliban’s removal of democratic processes—such as the suppression of elections and political opposition, along with a shift toward decision-making concentrated in the hands of a small religious group—has established a theocratic totalitarian system. This system is characterized by the complete control of the leader, the erosion of human rights, and the restriction of individual and civil freedoms. Examples include the detention, torture, and intimidation of journalists and activists, as well as control over the media and women’s bodies and activities.

Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani: “Gender Dynamics and the Plight of Afghan Women under Taliban Rule”

Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani emphasized the role of external powers and how their attempts to maintain an imperial presence contribute to understanding the complexity of the region’s cultural, economic, and military heritage. He argued that these external actors destabilized social, tribal, and customary practices in a nearly Manichean manner, leading to decades of conflict, which form the backdrop to the current regime. Dr. Wani continued his historical approach by describing the systematic discrimination faced by Afghan women throughout history, often exacerbated by war and social norms influenced by foreign involvement in national conflicts.

Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani’s presentation consisted of a brief history of Afghanistan, aimed at providing context for his analysis, followed by a description of the characteristics of external intervention in Afghanistan and their relation to the current regime, and concluding with an analysis of how language affects the social condition of women. 

Dr. Wani began by discussing Afghanistan’s location, describing it as a crossroads in Central Asia and highlighting how this has given the country a crucial multicultural and multiethnic background. He explained how the high level of cultural and ethnic diversity across regions—intrinsically tied to Afghanistan’s geography—has shaped the complexity of external relations, as outsiders often required different, sometimes conflicting, approaches to connect with various regions. This factor, according to the speaker, has made Afghanistan a frequent site of “geopolitical entanglements” and internal conflicts, evidenced by the presence of different internal and external powers throughout history. 

Dr. Wani emphasized the role of external powers and how their attempts to maintain an imperial presence contribute to understanding the complexity of the region’s cultural, economic, and military heritage. He argued that these external actors destabilized social, tribal, and customary practices in a nearly Manichean manner, leading to decades of conflict, which form the backdrop to the current regime.

Dr. Wani then asserted that, within this political context shaped by “historical diversity and ongoing struggles for power,” one of the most pressing issues has always been the inequality between men and women. He continued his historical approach by describing the systematic discrimination faced by Afghan women throughout history, often exacerbated by war and social norms influenced by foreign involvement in national conflicts. Dr. Wani focused on the importance of terminology, referencing Richard Rorty’s “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” (1979), explaining how identity is socially constructed through language. He emphasized how this applies to the current Taliban regime, where both policy and informal institutions (social norms, customs, and discursive narratives) shape the daily lives of women.

Note: Due to connection issues, a more in-depth reporting of Dr. Wani’s presentation was challenging.

Amir Hossein Mahdavi: “The Rise of Populism  in Iran: Inequality, Class Conflict, and Nationalist Authoritarianism”

Mr. Amir Hossein Mahdavi’s presentation began with an overview of how left-wing and right-wing populism can be defined in the Iranian context.He first associated left-wing populism with Iran’s past politics, particularly following the 2005 elections and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and right-wing populism as a possibility in today’s politics in Iran. The speaker contends that, given Iran’s current political context, right-wing populism is more likely to develop. Mr. Mahdavi argues that due to the current government’s limited capacity and resources, left-leaning rhetoric on redistribution may be less credible to the public.

Mr. Amir Hossein Mahdavi’s presentation began with an overview of how left-wing and right-wing populism can be defined in the Iranian context. He first associated left-wing populism with Iran’s past politics, particularly following the 2005 elections and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency, and right-wing populism as a possibility in today’s politics in Iran. Mr. Mahdavi then proceeded with an in-depth analysis of both left- and right-wing populism and how they could manifest in the current Iranian context.

Mr. Mahdavi defined left-wing populism as focusing on “anti-austerity measures, social justice, opposition to economic inequality, and the perceived dominance of large corporations and financial elites.” Consequently, its main ideas are economic equality, social justice, opposition to neoliberalism and austerity policies, advocacy for the rights of marginalized groups, and criticism of global capitalism and large corporations.

He then explained how these ideas could manifest in the current Iranian context and how left-wing populists might leverage them:

  1. Economic inequality and social justice: Left-wing populists could exploit the growing socio-economic inequalities in Iran. The combination of economic sanctions, particularly those tied to Iran’s nuclear program that have intensified since Donald Trump’s presidency, and poor domestic management has increased inequality. Currently, the ratio of income in the top 1% compared to the bottom 10% is among the highest in the world. Meanwhile, 25-30% of the population lives in severe poverty, unable to secure 2,000 calories per day.
  2. Opposition to neoliberalism and austerity policies: Left-wing populists could tie the rising inequalities to neoliberalism and austerity measures. The speaker emphasized the skyrocketing inflation, now over 40%, as a potential target for linking mismanagement and government deficit to neoliberal policies.
  3. Advocacy for the rights of marginalized groups: The economic disparities have prompted marginalized groups to form active social movements, such as the “labor and teacher movement,” which seeks greater political representation and rights—potential support bases for left-wing populist rhetoric.
  4. Criticism of global capitalism and large corporations: In Iran, major corporations are government-controlled, but privatization has been on the rise. Left-wing populists could now tie labor issues to capitalist policies and actions, attributing problems to both private corporations and the government.

To conclude on left-wing populism, the author pointed out how the neglect of fundamental rights, such as those of gender and sexual minorities, could increase people’s receptiveness to any form of left-wing populism that may emerge from the current Iranian context.

Concerning right-wing populism, the author defined it as often emphasizing “nationalism, anti-immigration policies, and a strong stance against political elites, globalism, and multiculturalism.” Its main ideas are: “nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments, opposition to political elites and globalism, preservation of traditional cultural values.” 

The speaker then explained how these ideas manifest in the current Iranian context and how right-wing populists might leverage them:

  1. Nationalism and anti-immigration sentiments: The large influx of Afghan migrants and refugees after the Taliban came to power has sparked heated debate in Iran. Many images and videos showing the presence of these immigrants and refugees in public spaces (such as streets, schools, and health settings) have fueled this debate further, especially in the context of employment and tax contributions. Right-wing populists could exploit these fears to fuel anti-immigration sentiments and gain support.
  2. Opposition to political elites and globalism: Public disenchantment with political elites is widespread in Iran, evidenced by the lowest voter turnout in 46 years during the June presidential elections. The speaker argues that in this context, right-wing populists could present themselves as a “new political voice” against established political elites, gaining momentum and power.
  3. Preservation of traditional cultural values: The author suggests that right-wing populists could appeal to the era before the Islamic regime to gather voter support. Instead of upholding the current state-enforced values, they could draw on older traditions to gain influence.

Finally, the speaker contends that, given Iran’s current political context, right-wing populism is more likely to develop. Mr. Mahdavi argues that due to the current government’s limited capacity and resources, left-leaning rhetoric on redistribution may be less credible to the public.

US presidential candidates Kamala Harris and Donald Trump. Photo: Shutterstock.

Revising the Trumpian Legacy in the US Foreign Policy towards Latin America*

by EconomicsEditor’s ChoiceHomePolicy Papers

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Please cite as:

Ronco, Massimo & Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “Revising the Trumpian Legacy in the US Foreign Policy towards Latin America.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 16, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0003

 

Abstract 

This paper revisits the legacy of former US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), with a particular focus on economic policies and their long-term impact. It argues that Trump’s policies eroded US soft power in the region and failed to adequately address China’s expanding influence. Although the Joe Biden administration sought to reset US relations with LAC, it retained the bulk of Trump’s protectionist policies, perpetuating ongoing trade volatility and regional instability. This paper emphasizes the need for a revised US economic strategy in Latin America that both counters China’s influence and fosters deeper economic integration across the region. The authors propose three policy scenarios for the future: a more aggressive protectionist stance under a second Trump administration, a continuation of Biden-era policies under potential future Democratic leadership, or a more integrative approach that enhances regional cooperation and infrastructure development.

 

Authored by Massimo Ronco & Christo Pretorius

Edited by Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins

Introduction 

Although the US influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been undermined by a lack of targeted engagement following the Cold War (McKinley, 2023), at the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency, US policy choices in LAC rapidly eroded American soft power and compromised the US’s regional interests by inadequately addressing China’s growing regional influence. The paper intends to outline the features of a revised American foreign policy towards LAC by focusing on the economic policies enacted by Trump. The aim of this brief is to provide recommendations on how to develop a strategy to rebuild trust with Latin American countries and prevent China from further increasing its influence on the continent. While the focus is on Trump’s policies, this paper remains highly relevant, as much of the former president’s foreign policy has been maintained by President Joe Biden. Many protectionist policies remain in place – and some tariff barriers and subsidies to national companies have even increased. The paper argues that any responsible economic policy launched in the region should be integrated into a comprehensive strategy which acknowledges that the main obstacle to unlocking the region’s potential as a partner remains the trade volatility between North and Global South economies, in this case, between the US and the LAC. 

The paper’s focus on economic policies is warranted by three considerations. The first is that trade constitutes the foundation for future, deeper cooperation and the conditions for developing political and strategic partnerships (Kehonane & Nye, 2011; Haas, 1964). Second, economic agreements are more palatable to foreign allies. Against the backdrop of Trump’s rhetorical resort to the Monroe Doctrine (PBS NewsHour, 2018), economic policy is perceived as less damaging to state sovereignty than agreements of a political, military or strategic nature. The third reason has to do with the nature of the regimes of some countries in Latin America, which display some socialist tendencies and may offer reduced margins for cooperation in the political or military fields. This paper also emphasizes the connection between the economic policies enacted in the region under Trump and the populist character of the broader strategy from which they emerged, which approaches foreign policy issues as opportunities to appeal to the domestic base (Cadier, 2024; Hall, 2021). 

Revising Trump’s Economic Policy

Although outspoken about how the US would ‘reject the interference of foreign nations in this hemisphere’ during his 2018 address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA),  the Trump administration’s general approach to Central and Latin America was marked by a blend of strategic disinterest in the region and isolationist closure, as exemplified by the barriers established at the border with Mexico in 2018 or by Trump’s stated intention of withdrawing from the NAFTA (PBS NewsHour, 2018). The US’s relative indifference to the LAC region is to be contextualized within a progressive loss of appeal following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Campos & Prevost, 2019: 22; Gurtov, 2021), which originally comprised three components: free trade and economic liberalization, democracy and governance, and security. Trump’s rise to power meant the restructuring of such a triad and a weakening of the first two pillars. The economic policy choices made by Trump’s administration were mainly motivated by the desire to correct the terms of trade relations that were considered detrimental to US interests and American workers and to curb the expansion of China’s influence on the continent. 

This paper proposes to revise and mitigate some populist elements of Trump’s foreign policy in the region, which are considered counterproductive and weakening the US influence. 

The first amendable element is the transactional and short-term approach to dealing with trade agreements and, more broadly, the economic issues of the continent. The promise to withdraw from NAFTA and the imposition of tariffs on items like steel and aluminum resulted in negative consequences, as the volatility of Latin American countries’ markets increased due to the uncertainty of access to the US market or aid assistance, Latin American countries became more vulnerable to the Chinese debt trap and, finally, during Trump’s tenure China became Latin America’s largest trading partner, with the exception of Mexico. (Stuenkel, 2020; Roy, 2023). 

The second element worthy of scrutiny is the Trump presidency’s anti-globalist rhetoric and adoption of old-style protectionist policies. Trump’s economic policies were guided by the objective of reducing US dependency on other productive economies, such as China and South Korea, without fully taking into account that reducing dependency does not necessarily translate into autonomy because value chains still have an important global dimension. The result of this approach was a substantial blow to US credibility in the eyes of Latin American countries, even those considered more aligned, such as Brazil. In fact, despite former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s anti-Chinese stance and ideological affinities with Trump, the US president still imposed barriers on products and metals from Brazil, such as steel and aluminum (Gilardi, 2019).

Assessing Three Policy Options

At the moment of the writing, three policy scenarios can be envisaged: 

The first policy option, likely to be implemented if Trump is elected in the 2024 US presidential elections on November 5, will consist of putting pressure on Mexico to review the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in view of its renegotiation scheduled for 2026. In this case, further restrictions on rules of origin would be included with the intention both to bar China from accessing the Mexican market and to continue to shrink trade deflection, which would otherwise allow some imported goods from non-USCMA countries to enter the US market via Mexico without paying tariffs. 

Furthermore, Trump may engage in a trade war with some other countries in the region. He may suspend the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Nicaragua if its policies towards illegal migration do not change, while relations with Colombia, the US’s closest partner in the region, which in 2022 saw the first leftist government of the country’s modern history, may cool due to ideological divergences. Likely, the result of the will to impose tariff barriers, introduce reinforced rules of origin and subside the American national industry would damage US interests by precipitating higher domestic inflation, reallocation of market shares towards less efficient domestic producers, lower capital investment, the decline of the demand for domestic goods, and a loss of jobs in the USMCA area.

The second option would be to multiply the number of economic agreements and partnerships in the region while maintaining or doubling down on protectionist policies. This scenario would be most likely in the case of Democratic nominee Kamala Harris’ victory in the presidential elections. As Biden’s vice president with limited previous experience in foreign policy (Ashford & Kroenig, 2024) and with not a dominating character (Jenkins, 2024), Harris may seek to preserve some of Biden’s economic policies in the region, founded on subsidies to national industry, tariffs and “Buy American” rules (White House, 2021). For instance, the new partnerships negotiated by the Democratic presidency, such as the “Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity” (APEP), did not foresee provisions of preferential access to the US market, thus denying the eleven Latin American countries who signed the pact to benefit from a reduction of tariffs or a significant increase in trade flow (Hufbauer & Hoogan, 2021). If, on the one hand, Biden rejected the populist character of his predecessor’s strategy, on the other hand, he did not substantially change the US’s economic approach, including towards Latin America. Closer economic cooperation between the US and Latin America ties into supranationalist and intergovernmentalist theories of integration, reinforcing regional ties whilst maintaining peace and stability (Leuffen et al., 2022).

The third option, recommended by the writers of this paper, is to implement a set of measures which would aim to offset the disparity of trade relations between Northern and Global South economies. Indeed, in 2023, the relations between the US and Latin American countries were characterized by low levels of trade in comparison with those between the US and other advanced economies, such as European countries or Japan. In other words, Northern American countries record a higher level of economic integration (EI) than Latin American countries. This third scenario would entail a mitigation process of the dragging effect of the protectionist policies enacted by the last two presidencies with the aim of gaining the trust of Latin American countries. One step in this direction would be the enlargement of the USCM, an FTA to which the US, Mexico, and Canada are already signatories, to other Latin American countries (de la Calle, 2023). The USMCA could be extended to Chile, which has a solid market-oriented economy and stable democratic institutions; Panama, which constitutes a major distribution center for goods moving between North and South America; and Costa Rica, given its economic stability, strong regulatory alignment, and existing close ties with the US and Canada. The enlargement of the market would allow Mexico to offset the economic loss derived from the imports coming from extra-USCMA countries, especially the EU and China, by exporting to the FTA products with a higher level of foreign backward participation originating from Costa Rica and Panama.

Secondly, the US should support a modification of the economic agreement, which will discipline the expansion of the free trade area in order to reduce the instability of preferential market access. The targets of the amendments should concern three provisions of the current agreement. The first is the sunset clause, which foresees the agreement’s expiration after sixteen years since its entry into force and a review period after six years, weakening the investors’ trust for long-term investments. Regarding this point, the US should introduce automatic renewal mechanisms and extend review periods to create stability in the markets and members of the USMCA. The second provision concerns the limitation of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) to only certain sectors with high upfront costs, including oil and gas. In future negotiations, the US should consider extending the protection to a higher number of economic sectors to provide more guarantees to investors. 

Finally, the third provision established three new rules concerning automotive rules of origin: the extension of the Regional Value Contents (RVCs) to core parts of vehicles, the requirement that 70% of a vehicle’s steel be sourced from North America and, finally, the requirement that the production of 40/45% of a vehicle or a truck occur in factory plants where the Mexican workers’ wage is five to eight times higher than average (Ludovic, 2023: 365). These measures contributed to a decline in investments and a 0.971% reduction in Mexico’s annual real GDP in 2020, other than an estimated loss of US GDP of 0.12% compared to NAFTA (Manak, 2020). There is evidence to suggest the objective of strengthening the North American value chains was not achieved, as, between 2019 and 2022, imports from the USMCA area (29%) rose less than imports from the rest of the world (32%) (Sarukhán et al., 2023). To counter the negative impact of the tightening of the rules of origin, the US should negotiate an enlargement of the USMCA with Chile, Costa Rica, and Panama, as already mentioned above, and provide incentives to small and medium-sized companies of the members of the expanded USMCA.

Thirdly, the US should launch a long-term program of targeted investments in the construction and improvement of infrastructure in Latin American countries. The construction of ports, airports, canals and highways is an essential condition for reaching the objective of offsetting the structural volatility of trade relations between the US and Latin American countries, but also within Latin America. Investments in the infrastructure field would equip Latin American countries with the appropriate platforms, hubs and roads to increase the trade flows within the continent. 

Conclusion

The paper tackled not only the economic policy choices towards Latin America undertaken during Trump’s presidency but, by embracing a broader timeline, analyzed the more problematic subject of the legacy of Trump’s foreign policy in Latin America. Despite Biden’s entry into office and the current president’s stated intention to reset relations with Latin American countries and increase cooperation, relatively scarce attention has been given to the Latin American strategic quadrant in the past four years. 

The fact that after the first six months of the Democratic administration, the position of Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs was still vacant indicates what little priority Latin America has for current US policymakers. As the Western Hemisphere can be considered the US’s “backyard,” it is a region in which the emergence of a hegemonic country – like China- cannot be tolerated, and current US foreign policy does not seem suited to address this challenge. 

This paper emphasized the cruciality of the Latin American strategic quadrant for the US’ interests by recommending a set of economic policy measures which should respond to an organic and coherent economic-strategic logic, aimed at increasing trade flows and boosting regional economic integration. Since the 1950s, scholars have tried to find a solution for the trade volatility between LAC countries and industrialized countries, such as the US or EU. They proposed implementing measures aimed at privileging intra-regional trade and building a regional integration process (Goodman & Schneider, 2023).

Nonetheless, the failure of economic integration from the inside should make the US consider how it can foster both trade flows with LAC countries and favorable conditions for building a regional integration process. Such a strategy would also counter China’s growing influence, derived from their FTAs already negotiated with four countries and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) (Duckworth, 2023). Chinese funding for infrastructure projects leveraged LAC countries’ structural need to build a regional integration space to face the low levels of trade with more advanced economies such as the US and EU and the uncertainty of access to their markets. 

 

(*) This policy paper is based on research conducted by Andrea Sanchez, Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins, Christo Pretorius, Massimo Ronco, and Muhmmed Sihabudheen during the ECPS Case Competition “US Foreign Policy and Populism,” held as part of the ECPS Summer School from July 1-5, 2024. 

 

Authors’ Biographies

Massimo Ronco is a Researcher and International Policy Analyst with a master’s degree in international studies from Turin and a master’s degree in EU external relations from the Brussels School of International Studies of Kent. He is currently working in Brussels in the field of EU research and project management. In 2023, he became a member of the “German-Italian Young Leaders Dialogue,” a forum promoted by the Italian and German Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Also, in 2023, he obtained a diploma in Geopolitics at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. His areas of interest and research are geopolitics, US foreign policy, European security, Russian foreign policy, politics and culture of the Middle East, and political philosophy.

Christo Pretorius graduated with an MSc in International Public Policy and Diplomacy from University College Cork and was the first student to receive a postgraduate “Student of the Year” award from the Department of Government. His dissertation was published and acquired by the Bar of Ireland’s Law Library and has gone on to support Irish policymakers. Stemming from his undergraduate degree in Ancient and Medieval History and Culture from Trinity College Dublin, his research interests include the mechanisms for authoritarian power and control, as well as democratic backsliding, particularly when viewed from a historical lens. 

Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins is a second-year Ph.D. researcher at the University of Oxford. Her research primarily concerns studies of masculinity and elite culture in post-WWII Italy. By examining a number of clusters of upper-middle-class male networks of solidarity from 1945 to the mid-1970s, she hopes to understand the fabric of the post-war democratic ‘classe dirigente.’ While working on her thesis, she also continues to research the development of Christian Democratic politics in the 20th century and remains broadly interested in the history of gender, the history of friendship, and – when time allows — 19th and 20th-century art history.

 

References

— (2018). “Watch: President Donald Trump’s full address to the United Nations General Assembly.” PBS NewsHour.September 25, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wGK4DPn2R58 (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Arnaud, L. (2024). “From NAFTA to USMCA: revisiting the market access – policy space trade-off.” New Political Economy. 29(3), 356–369. https://doi.org/10.1080/13563467.2023.2260986

Ashford E. & Kroenig M. (2024). “Does Harris Have a Foreign Policy?” Foreign Policy. August 30, 2024. https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/08/30/harris-ukraine-gaza-israel-lebanon-dnc-hezbollah-foreign-policy/ (accessed on August 10, 2024).

Cadier, D. (2023). “Foreign Policy as the Continuation of Domestic Politics by Other Means: Pathways and Patterns of Populist Politicization.” Foreign Policy Analysis. 20(1). https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orad035

Campos, C. O. & Prevost, G. (2019). “The Trump Administration in Latin America: Continuity and Change.” The International Journal of Cuban Studies. 11(1), 13–23. https://doi.org/10.13169/intejcubastud.11.1.0013

De la Calle, L. (2023). “Time to Analyze Expansion of USMCA? Costa Rica and Uruguay Would Be Potential Candidates.” Wilson Center. January 12, 2023. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/time-analyze-expansion-usmca-costa-rica-and-uruguay-would-be-potential-candidates (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Duckworth, E. (2023). “Latin American and Caribbean Participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative.” Cornell International Affairs Review. 16(1), 115–161. https://doi.org/10.37513/ciar.v16i1.710

Gilardi, J. (2019). “Brazil and Argentina Surprised by Tariff Announcement: What Comes Next?” Atlantic Council. December 3, 2019. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/brazil-and-argentina-surprised-by-tariff-announcement-what-comes-next/ (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Goodman, L.W. & A. Schneider. (2023). “Conflict, Competition, or Collaboration? China and the United States in Latin America and the Caribbean.” In: Schneider A. & Teixeira A.G. (eds.) China, Latin America, and the Global Economy. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.  pp 163–185. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-18026-2_8

Gurtov, M. (2021). America in Retreat. Foreign Policy under Trump. Rowman & Littlefield. 

Haas, E.B. (1964). Beyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International Organization. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Hall, J. (2021). “In search of enemies: Donald Trump’s populist foreign policy rhetoric.” Politics (Manchester, England). 41(1), 48–63. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395720935377

Hufbauer, G.C. & Hogan, M. (2023). “Biden Embraces Buy America, Doubles Down on Trade Protection.” Promarket.February 21, 2023. https://www.promarket.org/2023/02/21/biden-embraces-buy-america-doubles-down-on-trade-protection/ (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Jensens, S. (2024). “Kamala Harris is no dominating leader – and that may be her biggest strength.” The Guardian. July 22, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/jul/22/kamala-harris-democrats-us-presidential-election-donald-trump (accessed on August 8, 2024).

Keohane, R. O. & Nye, J. S. (1987). “Power and Interdependence revisited.” International Organization. 41(4), 725–753. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818300027661

Leuffen, D., Rittberger B., & Schimmelfennig F. (2022). “Supranationalism.” In: Integration and Differentiation in the European Union. Palgrave Macmillan: Switzerland, (pp.89-116). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76677-1_4  

Manak, I. (2020). “Canada Evaluates USMCA, Raises More Questions than Answers.” CATO Institute. February 28. 2020. https://www.cato.org/blog/canada-evaluates-usmca-raises-more-questions-answers#:~:text=Howe%20Institute%2C%20a%20Canadian%20think,0.097%25%20for%20the%20United%20States. (accessed on August 9, 2024).

McKinley P.M. (2023). “Inflection Point: The Challenges Facing Latin America and U.S. Policy in the Region”. Center for Strategic and International Studies. https://www.cato.org/blog/canada-evaluates-usmca-raises-more-questions-answers#:~:text=Canada%20Evaluates%20USMCA%2C%20Raises%20More%20Questions%20than%20Answers,-By%20Inu%20Manak&text=This%20week%2C%20Canada%20released%20its,referred%20to%20in%20Canada%2C%20CUSMA (accessed on August 10, 2024).

Roy, D. (2023). “China’s Growing Influence in Latin America, Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations. June 15, 2023. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-bri (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Sarukhán, A.; Rangel, B.; McCoy, M.; Ciuriak, D. & Huenemann, J.E. (2023). “How Well Is the USMCA Working After Three Years.” The Dialogue. June 22, 2023. https://www.thedialogue.org/analysis/how-well-is-the-usmca-working-after-three-years/#:~:text=Formal%20analysis%20of%20the%20USMCA’s,percent%20compared%20to%20the%20NAFTA (accessed on August 9, 2024). 

Stuenkel, O. (2020). “Trump Drove Latin America Into China’s Arms.” Foreign Affairs, November 13. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/2020-11-13/trump-drove-latin-america-chinas-arms (accessed on August 9, 2024).

White House. (2021). Biden-⁠Harris Administration Issues Proposed Buy American Rule, Advancing the President’s Commitment to Ensuring the Future of America is Made in America by All of America’s Workers, July 28, 2021. https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/07/28/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-issues-proposed-buy-american-rule-advancing-the-presidents-commitment-to-ensuring-the-future-of-america-is-made-in-america-by-all-of-americas/ (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Further Reading

— (2024). Text – S.3878 – 118th Congress (2023-2024): Americas Act. Congress. March 6, 2024. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/3878/text/is (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Cheng, D. (2023). “U.S. Needs to Invest More in Latin America to Counteract China in the Region.” United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/10/us-needs-invest-more-latin-america-counteract-china-region (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Marczak, J.; Bozmoski, M.F. & Kroenig, M. (2024). Redefining US strategy with Latin America and the Caribbean for a new era. Atlantic Council. February 26, 2024. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/redefining-us-strategy-with-latin-america-and-the-caribbean-for-a-new-era/ (accessed on August 9, 2024).

Meltzer, J.P. (2021). Developing a roadmap for USMCA success. Brooking’s Institute. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/Developing-roadmap-USMCA.pdf (accessed on August 9, 2024).

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EU Employment Law and the AI Act: A Policy Brief Putting the Human Back in ‘Human-Centric’ Policy

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Please cite as:

Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “EU Employment Law and the AI Act: A Policy Brief Putting the Human Back in ‘Human-Centric’ Policy.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 11, 2024.https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0002

 

This policy paper analyzes the European Union’s (EU) AI Act, aimed at regulating Artificial Intelligence (AI) through four risk classifications related to data protection, privacy, security, and fundamental rights. While the Act establishes regulatory frameworks, it neglects employment security, a critical factor behind public mistrust of AI. The paper warns that failure to address this issue could deepen socio-economic inequalities and lead to political unrest. Recommendations include promoting collective negotiation between workers and employers, advocating for legislation on redundancies linked to AI, and launching information campaigns to educate workers, thus ensuring fair working conditions and improving trust in AI technology.

By Christo Pretorius

Executive Summary

The European Union (EU) is attempting to regulate the deployment of Artificial Intelligence (AI) through the recently passed AI Act. Overall, the Act outlines four distinct classifications for AI systems, categorizing them on the risk they pose on an individual’s data protection, privacy, security, and fundamental rights. It further provides regulations and guidance to member states on each category and calls for the establishment of national and EU level regulatory bodies to enforce the Act. However, ultimately the Act overlooks the critical issue of employment security, which is the main cause behind mistrust of AI. This gap could exacerbate socio-economic inequalities and fuel political unrest in the short to long term if it is not addressed promptly.

Research indicates that AI will have a disruptive effect on employment overall as certain types of work is automated and augmented, but the effects of this will be felt most in clerical, secretarial, and para-professional roles, which poses a risk to vulnerable groups including women and those with lower educational attainment. There is a pressing need for proactive measures to mitigate the harmful effects of the technology’s implementation on workers and their families, specifically the protection against unjustified dismissal and the assurance of fair working conditions. The following recommendations are proposed to address the Act’s shortcomings:

    Collective Negotiation: Encourage cooperation between workers, employers, and worker associations to assess AI’s impact on jobs. This could lead to agreements on redeployment, education opportunities, or redundancy notices, providing workers with clearer timelines and reducing workplace disruption.

      Advocacy for New Legislation: Push for legislation that mandates notice periods for redundancies due to technological innovation, building on the EU Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions. The International Labor Organization’s 1982 Termination of Employment Convention offers a valuable template for such legislation.

        Information Campaigns: Launch campaigns to educate workers on AI systems, their potential benefits, and available upskilling opportunities. These efforts would enhance trust in AI, aligning with the AI Act’s goal of ensuring human-centric, safe, and lawful AI deployment.

         

        Context: The Problem with the AI Act

        The discussion about AI regulation in the European Union (EU) began with Ursula von der Leyen’s 2019-2024 agenda for Europe, A Union that Strives for More (2019). It stated that she would ‘put forward legislation for a coordinated European approach on the human and ethical implications of Artificial Intelligence’ (von der Leyen, 2019: 13). What followed was a call for greater focus on enabling more investment in, and the better coordination of the development and deployment of AI in the EU, alongside a call for a clear definition of what high-risk AI systems are (General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations, 2020). Jointly, the Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence was published to help foster trust in AI systems yet failed to address the real consideration that such a disruptive technology would have on the world of work (European Commission, 2021). The purpose of this policy brief is to advocate for greater attention to be given to the area of employment law, so that action may be taken to ease the concerns over job loss relating to AI, and thus, foster greater trust in this new technology.

        A report from the International Labor Organization estimated that the introduction of AI systems would have an overall disruptive effect worldwide, highlight that an important share of clerical, secretarial, and para-professional jobs would be most affected (Gmyrek et al., 2023). These findings are supported by similar ones from PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited (PWC), the US-based National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Pew Research Centre, which also found that women and individuals with lower levels of education are most vulnerable to job loss due to automation (Hawksworth, Berriman, & Goel, 2018; Acemoglu, & Restrepo, 2021; Kochhar, 2023). Although this is an evolving issue, as AI indeed has the potential to increase economic growth and improve lives, the disruptive impact of AI systems on the world of work has yet to be felt. Therefore, it is important to take the necessary steps now to mitigate the harmful affect this technology can have on workers and their families and provide a safety net to individuals during this period of transition.

        Currently the EU’s AI Act states that it is trying to ensure ‘a high level of protection of health, safety, fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2012) of the European Union (hereby referred to as the ‘Charter’), including democracy, the rule of law and environmental protection, to protect against the harmful effects of AI systems in the Union…’. However, one of the fundamental rights not addressed was that of Articles 30 (Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal) and 31 (Fair and just working conditions) of the Charter (European Union, 2012). The focus on adopting AI throughout the EU, whilst highlighting the issues of data protection, privacy, and security of individuals in the long term, has left the area of employment concerns unaddressed. 

        The EU has highlighted that this area is one that should be legislated on in the future, stating in their 2022 report on artificial intelligence in the digital age: ‘[The European Parliament] emphasises that the use of AI in this area gives rise to a number of ethical, legal and employment related challenges… [and] stresses that AI is currently already substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable significant aggregate labour market consequences’ (European Parliament, 2022). The report also highlights that strong links between AI and the rising socio-economic inequality has been found, and researchers warn that unregulated AI will further increase the wealth gap within society, a finding supported by other academic publications (Rotman, 2022; Bushwick, 2023). MEP Brando Benifei indicates that a proposal for a directive on AI at the workplace is something to be discussed in the future, but at present there is not much information from Benifei or anyone else on what policy discussions in this area will look like (Publyon, 2024). This uncertainty continues following von der Leyen’s announcement that more research investments will be made into AI, leaving commentators to speculate what will actually be funded (Wold, 2024). Much like the events of 2008, people that feel left behind by the increasing automatization and augmentation of the workplace could be persuaded into more extreme populist politics, which is why delaying discussions on this topic are problematic (Steiner et al., 2023). While the EU continues to refine policy, the implementation of AI into the workplace is happening now, and the situation for workers could change rapidly as new technology hits the market. Just as the EU attempted to get ahead of AI by defining it, they should attempt to get ahead of employment concerns before they evolve past being concerns alone.

        The AI Act in Brief

        To understand the shortcomings of the AI Act (2024), it is helpful to summarize the contents of the regulation first. The European Union’s AI Act came into force on the 13th of June 2024, seeking to create rules that would govern the development, employment, and use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems within the Union. The rules define four levels of risk regarding AI systems, offering only a description of what each category is, and indicate what systems are I place to regulate them within the common market:

        Unacceptable Risk: These AI are banned within the EU, except in limited circumstances.

          [Article 5.1(a/b)] Manipulative AI that can deceive, subvert, or impair autonomy, decision-making and free choice. This includes AI that may exploit disadvantaged persons whether through socio-economic vulnerabilities or take advantage of a disability. Notable exceptions to this are AI used in the context of medical treatment such as psychological treatment of a mental disease or physical rehabilitation, or within advertisement.

            [Article 5.1(c)] AI systems that provide social scoring as it may lead to discrimination and exclusion.

              [Article 5.1(d)] Risk assessment or predictive AI systems in the context of law enforcement. 

                [Article 5.1(e)] AI systems that scrape footage to expand facial recognition databases.

                  [Article 5.1(g/h)] Biometric categorization systems that are based on natural persons’ biometric data, such as an individual person’s face or fingerprint, to deduce or infer an individuals’ political opinions, trade union membership, religious or philosophical beliefs, race, sex life or sexual orientation. The notable exception to this rule is biometric categorization systems employed by law enforcement agencies for anti-terrorism and missing persons.

                  High Risk: [Preamble (paragraph 48)] These systems are defined as having a negative effect on safety or the following fundamental rights, the latter of which is in this case a person’s access to education, employment, public or private services, legal representation, and administrative or democratic processes:

                  The protection of personal data,  The rights of persons with disabilities, 
                  Freedom of expression and information, Gender equality, 
                  Freedom of assembly and of association,  Intellectual property rights, 
                  The right to non-discrimination,  Workers’ rights,
                  The right to an effective remedy and a fair trial, The right to education,
                  Consumer protection,  The right to good administration
                  The right of defense and the presumption of innocence,  

                  High risk systems are also classified as that related to critical infrastructure and biometric identification systems.

                  Limited Risk: [Preamble (paragraph 53)] AI systems that do not materially influence the outcome of decision-making, and/or augment tasks that are either automated or conducted by humans are considered to be limited risk. This category is highlighted as needing further guidelines in the future.

                  Minimal Risk: Most AI systems currently available fall under this category – they provide solutions with minimal risk, and are therefore not regulated, nor will be moving forward.

                  The regulation achieved most of the mandated aims, creating clear definitions for different levels of risk, whilst focusing on the impact different AI systems could have on individuals. 

                  Recommendations

                  The need to deal with the issue of job loss and employment law concerns are real and present and must be addressed in a timely manner during these early stages of AI implementation. Although further training opportunities is an avenue that the EU is pursuing, to contribute to the Commission’s call for the development of an ecosystem of trust by proposing a legal framework for trustworthy AI, this paper proposes three different avenues the issue of employment security could be addressed:

                    Collective Negotiation: Close cooperation between worker associations, the groups represented by them, and employers, can allow for investigation on the potential disruptive impact that AI systems can have on various professions. This will allow them to make informed decisions so that they may take steps to reach collective agreement that would allow for either redeployment of workers, advertise or make available further education opportunities, or have a guaranteed period of redundancy notice with regards to the implementation of AI systems. Similarly, management could make available to workers a clear AI implementation plan so that workplace disruption is reduced, and workers know in advance the time they have should their work be made redundant. 

                      Advocacy For the Adaption/Adopting of New Legislation: If no provisions are currently in place, countries within the EU must take active steps to create or adapt legislation that will allow workers to have a notice period that they will be made redundant due to technological innovation. The EU Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions in the European Union, 2019, set a precedent that the EU was willing to use its competency in the area of social rights to address new forms of employment to protect EU workers from unpredictable employment (Official Journal of the European Union, 2019). 

                      Given the close relationship between the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the EU, the ILO’s 1982 -Termination of Employment Convention (C158) would provide a good basis for text that could be incorporated into the EU Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions in the European Union (Pretorius, 2023). Only nine nations have ratified the convention, which contains the following article that could either be incorporated into EU law, or provide an example that can be followed:

                      ‘[Article 13.1.] When the employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature, the employer shall:

                      (a) provide the workers’ representatives concerned in good time with relevant information including the reasons for the terminations contemplated, the number and categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which the terminations are intended to be carried out;

                      (b) give, in accordance with national law and practice, the workers’ representatives concerned, as early as possible, an opportunity for consultation on measures to be taken to avert or to minimise the terminations and measures to mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations on the workers concerned such as finding alternative employment’ (ILO, 1982).

                        Information Campaigns: At the moment, the uncertainty surrounding AI systems in the workplace is fuelling distrust in the technology (Chakravorti, 2024). Campaigns that inform workers not only of the capabilities of implemented AI systems and how to utilize their potential, but also about opportunities to upskill, are essential moving forward. Regardless of how these campaigns are run, giving workers more accessible information would go a long way towards realizing the ‘human centric’ ideals of the AI Act – ‘so that people can trust that the technology is used in a way that is safe and compliant with the law, including the respect of fundamental rights’ (European Commission (2021).

                        (*) Christo Pretorius graduated with a MSc in International Public Policy and Diplomacy from University College Cork and was the first student to receive a postgraduate “Student of the Year” award from the Department of Government. His dissertation was published and acquired by the Bar of Ireland’s Law Library and has gone on to support Irish policy makers. Stemming from his undergraduate in Ancient and Medieval History and Culture from Trinity College Dublin, his research interests include the mechanisms for authoritarian power and control, and democratic backsliding, particularly when viewed with a historical lens.

                        References 

                        — (1982). C158 – Termination of Employment Convention. International Labour Organization. 1982 (No. 158).  https://normlex.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C158 (accessed on August 18, 2024).

                        — (1997). Organisation of Working Time Act 1997. Irish Statute Book. https://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1997/act/20/section/23/enacted/en/html#sec23 (accessed on August 17, 2024).

                        — (2012). Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 326/02. http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/char_2016/oj(accessed on August 18, 2024).

                        — (2020) Special meeting of the European Council (1 and 2 October 2020) – Conclusions. General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations. Brussels. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/45910/021020-euco-final-conclusions.pdf

                        — (2021). Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence 2021 Review. European Commission. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/coordinated-plan-artificial-intelligence-2021-review (accessed on August 19, 2024).

                        — (2021). Document 52021PC0206: Proposal for a Regulation of The European Parliament and of the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts (COM(2021) 206 final). European Commission. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52021PC0206 (accessed on August 17, 2024).

                        — (2022). Report on artificial intelligence in a digital age (2020/2266(INI)). European Parliament. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2022-0088_EN.html (accessed on August 17, 2024).

                        — (2024). Artificial intelligence. European Commission.  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/artificial-intelligence/ (accessed on August 17, 2024).

                        — (2024). Corrigendum to Regulation (EU) 2024/… of The European Parliament and of the Council of laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act) (cor01). European Parliament.  https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2024-0138-FNL-COR01_EN.pdf

                        — (2024) The future of AI in the European Union: a chat with the AI Act’s co-rapporteur Brando Benifei. Publyon. https://publyon.com/the-future-of-ai-in-the-european-union-a-chat-with-the-ai-acts-co-rapporteur-brando-benifei/ (accessed on August 17, 2024).

                        Acemoglu D. & Restrepo P. (2021). Tasks, Automation, and the Rise in US Wage Inequality (NBER Working Paper 28920). National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w28920

                        Al Naam, Y.A.; Elsafi, S.; Al Jahdali, M.H.; Al Shaman, R.S.; Al-Qurouni, B.H. & Al Zahrani E.M. (2022). “The Impact of Total Automaton on the Clinical Laboratory Workforce: A Case Study.” Journal of Healthcare Leadership. 14, pp. 55-62.  https://doi.org/10.2147/JHL.S362614

                        Chakravorti, B. (2024). AI’s Trust Problem. Harvard Business Review. https://hbr.org/2024/05/ais-trust-problem (accessed on August 17, 2024).

                        Gmyrek P., Berg J., & Bescond D. (2023). Generative AI and jobs: A global analysis of potential effects on job quantity and quality (ILO Working Paper 96). International Labour Organization. https://doi.org/10.54394/FHEM8239

                        Hawksworth J.; Berriman R. & Goel S. (2018). Will robots really steal our jobs? An international analysis of the potential long term impact of automation. PWC. https://www.pwc.co.uk/economic-services/assets/international-impact-of-automation-feb-2018.pdf

                        Jensen, C.L.; Thomsen, L.K.; Zeuthen, M.; Johnsen, S.; Jashi, R.E.; Nielsen, M.F.B.; Hemstra, L.E. & Smith, J. (2024) “Biomedical laboratory scientists and technicians in digital pathology – Is there a need for professional development?” Digital Health. 10. https://doi.org/10.1177/20552076241237392

                        Kochhar, R. (2023) Which U.S. Workers Are More Exposed to AI on Their Jobs?. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2023/07/st_2023.07.26_ai-and-jobs.pdf

                        Pretorius, P.C. (2023) “Can Irish Industrial Relations Still be Called ‘Voluntarist’? An investigation into Irish Employment Law”. Irish Employment Law Journal, 20(1), pp. 11-21.

                        von der Leyen, U. (2019). A Union that strives for more: My agenda for Europe: political guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024, Luxembourg: Publication Office of the European Union.https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2020-04/political-guidelines-next-commission_en_0.pdf

                        Wold, J.F. (2024). “Von der Leyen gives nod to €100 billion ‘CERN for AI’ proposal.” Euroactiv. July 25, 2024.https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/von-der-leyen-gives-nod-to-e100-billion-cern-for-ai-proposal/ (accessed on August 10, 2024).

                        SummerSchool

                        ECPS Summer School 2024 — Populism and Foreign Policy: How Does Populist Politics Influence Foreign Affairs?

                        by ECPS YouthHomeReports

                        ECPS organized its fourth virtual Summer School on July 1-5, 2024, focusing on the relationship between populism and foreign policy. The five-day program offered young participants a dynamic, engaging, and interdisciplinary learning environment. Presented by world-class scholars of populism, this intellectually stimulating program helped participants develop as future academics, intellectuals, activists, and public leaders. It also provided an opportunity to gain valuable cross-cultural perspectives and foster knowledge exchange beyond European borders, preparing them for future endeavors.

                        By Radoslav Valev

                        ECPS organized its fourth virtual Summer School on July 1-5, 2024, focusing on the relations between populism and foreign policy. The goal was twofold: to examine the theories related to the influence of populism on international relations and analyze case studies such as the US, Turkey, India, Brexit, and Israel to see how leaders use populist instruments in external politics. 

                        Populism has often been studied as a subject of political science and investigated as a topic of domestic affairs, namely party politics and elections. Nevertheless, a growing body of literature suggests that this phenomenon is not confined to the borders of nation-states; it interferes with international relations thanks to populist leaders’ desire to shape foreign affairs with a populist and mostly revisionist view. Trump’s threats to withdraw the US from NATO, Modi’s handling of India’s relations with Pakistan, Erdogan’s diaspora politics towards European countries, Orbán’s instrumentalization of migration in the EU, Netanyahu’s approach to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Johnson’s management of the Brexit process and numerous attempts by populist leaders to undermine or subvert international or supranational organizations, such as the UN, WTO, and EU, are among many examples that showcase how external relations can be blended with populism. 

                        Considering the current political landscape in which the number of populist figures is on the rise, we may witness more similar instances in the international political arena in the period to come. Populism in international relations has the potential to complicate existing problems, create new ones and bring about repercussions for the multilateral liberal global system. In this light, this year, the summer school examined the theoretical background of the interplay between populism and foreign affairs and examined a number of case studies from different parts of the world with a view to see similarities as well as differences between the ways populist leaders craft external politics.

                        The lecturers for this year’s summer school were Professor Sandra Destradi, Associate Professor Angelos Chryssogelos, Associate Professor Jessica Greenberg, Dr. Thorsten Wojczewki, Dr Georg Loefflman, Professor Cengiz Aktar, Professor Emeritus Louis Kreisberg, Professor Bertjan Verbeek, ECPS President Irina Von Wiese, Professor Craig Calhoun and Professor Joanna Dyduch. Each session was moderated by a scholar. Hence, the moderators were Dr Rubrick Biegon, Dr Gustav Meibauer, Dr Jonny Hall, Professor Ana E. Juncos Garcia, Professor Franco Zappettini, Professor Allison Carnegie, Dr Ajay Gudavarthy, Dr Aleksandra Spancerska, Professor Alexandra Homolar and Dr Andrei Zaslove.

                        The opening lecture by Professor Destradi examined the international implications of populism, first by outlining how populism has been conceptualized in comparative politics and political theory. It also introduced the current state of research on the global effects of populism, particularly its potential impact on foreign policy, international disputes, contributions to global public goods, participation in multilateral institutions, and the formation of partnerships with authoritarian and populist governments. The following lecture by Dr Angelos Chryssogelos examined the global rise of populism and how it sparked debate about its impact on the liberal international order. He argued that a deeper understanding of populism is needed to appreciate its varied effects on the international system. 

                        On the second day, the first lecture by Dr Jessica Greenberg explored the paradox of increasing reliance on international legal institutions to address conflict and bolster governance while populists use these same institutions to authorize antidemocratic policies. The lecture discussed the conditions under which this paradox emerged and how to address it, examining the relationship between populism and the rule of law and how populists subvert the law from within. 

                        The following two lectures by Dr Georg Loefflman and Dr Thorsten Wojczewski examined the practical manifestations of populism on foreign policy in the cases of the United States and India. 

                        On the third day, Professor Cengiz Aktar examined another practical populist case, namely Turkey. The following lecture by Professor Louis Kriesberg examined populism as non-governmental actions aimed at changing the conduct of resistant groups, often influencing established institutions. The presentation also examined such actions in the US, Europe, and other countries, assessing their constructiveness or destructiveness based on conflict resolution research, including factors like persuasion, promised benefits, and coercion.

                        On the fourth day, Professor Bertjan Verbeek and Irina Von Wiese’s lectures examined the role of populism in the EU’s foreign policy and what the EU could do as a foreign affairs actor. 

                        On the final fifth day, the opening lecture by Professor Craig Calhoun examined Britain’s withdrawal from the EU in the context of populist politics and argued that it stemmed from contingent circumstances, mobilizations, and deeper political shifts, notably influenced by national conservatism and English nationalism prioritizing ethnonationalist identity. The final lecture by Professor Joanna Dyduch gave insights on populism and foreign policy based on the example of Israel, distinguishing between ‘liberalist’ and ‘historicist’ orientations, highlighting how historical memory drives state actions, with ‘Foreign Policy Historicism’ emphasizing a hawkish, emotionally charged approach tied to national identity and othering.

                        This year’s program was enriched by the participation of around 60 attendees from diverse backgrounds and various parts of the world. They found the opportunity to engage in discussions with the lecturers on the topics mentioned, and they networked with each other in small groups and practiced peer-to-peer learning in a truly international environment.

                        The Summer School also featured a unique learning opportunity in the form of a case competition, held over five days from 1-5 July. The competition was designed to help participants transform their academic knowledge into practical policy suggestions, providing a hands-on learning experience. 

                        The competition tackled a real-life problem within the broad topic of populism, specifically populism and US foreign policy. The groups were expected to focus on a specific foreign policy or action Trump has carried out during his past presidency, or that he may carry out if he were to be re-elected in Autumn. These included the withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, the renegotiation of NAFTA to USMCA, the trade war with China, immigration policies and the border wall, North Korea diplomacy, the withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), NATO relations and defense spending, the response to the Syrian civil war, and US relations with Russia. 

                        The participants could position themselves as think tank members preparing policy suggestions for the US Department of State, the EU, or NATO; advisors to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense or the Vice President; lobbyists aiming to change a policy in a particular direction; or academics drawing policy suggestions from their research on a specific foreign policy topic.

                        Participants were divided into teams to work together on solving the case and were expected to prepare policy suggestions. The proposals of the participants were then rigorously evaluated by an assessment committee composed of scholars and experts. The committee assessed the proposals based on criteria such as creativity, feasibility, and presentation skills, ensuring a high standard of competition. On the first day of summer school, ECPS provided the groups with an information pack that included documents and sources that outlined the case and its context. Moreover, each day, a one-hour-long consultation session was arranged for the competitors when the teams could discuss their progress and partake in the case-solving activity together. On the final day of the competition, short presentations were carried out and thoroughly evaluated by the assessing committee, which gave valuable feedback to the attendees.

                        The participants were divided into ten working groups, each named after a US state, and examined the various populist policies enacted by Trump. Two teams, the Texas group and the Utah-Kansas group, finished with the same number of points. Utah-Kansas group (Chiara Cerisola, Martina Micozzi, Muhammad Muhammad, Junsoek Lee, Adriana Duthon, Mohammad Shakib, Sana Akhter, Syed Waqas Bokhari) positioned themselves as a think-thank, examined the populist aspects of US migration policy and designed national and regional policy suggestions to address migration issue and brought recommendations to ensure the continuity of policies across different administrations. Texas group (Anton Miguel De Vera, Olivia Gheyselinck, Giada Pasquettaz, Reka Koleszar, George Kutty, Viktoriia Hamaiunova, M. Fahmi Asshidgy, Sara Torabian) brought suggestions for the EU to strengthen its technology security resilience in light of US technology policy towards China during Trump administration. Taking this opportunity, ECPS congratulates the teams for their diligence and professionalism in research and great talent in presenting their policy suggestions. 

                        All in all, our five-day schedule provided young people with a dynamic, engaging, and interdisciplinary learning environment. This intellectually challenging program, presented by world-class scholars of populism, allowed them to grow as future academics, intellectuals, activists, and public leaders. Participants had the opportunity to develop invaluable cross-cultural perspectives and facilitate a knowledge exchange beyond European borders, empowering them for their future endeavors.

                        ECPS Academy Summer School 2024

                        A rally on the main square of Bishkek. Photo: Omurali Toichiev.

                        Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism across Central Asia

                        by ArticlesEditor’s ChoiceHomeReports

                        Valev, Radoslav. (2024). “Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism across Central Asia.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). July 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0058

                         

                        The fourteenth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism (MGP) panel series, titled “Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism Across Central Asia,” convened online on June 20, 2024. This event delved into the evolving autocratic political landscape of Central Asian countries. Moderated by Dr. David Lewis, a respected professor of Politics at the University of Exeter, the panel featured insightful presentations that dissected various aspects of autocracy and authoritarianism from multiple disciplinary perspectives.

                        Report by Radoslav Valev

                        In a comprehensive examination of Central Asia’s political landscape, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted the fourteenth and final event of its academic year in the monthly Mapping Global Populism (MGP) panel series. Titled “Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism Across Central Asia,” this online event convened on June 20, 2024, bringing together a distinguished panel of scholars to discuss the region’s evolving dynamics. Moderated by Dr. David Lewis, a respected professor of Politics at the University of Exeter, the panel featured insightful presentations that dissected various aspects of autocracy and authoritarianism from multiple disciplinary perspectives.

                        Dr. Lewis set the stage by reflecting on the evolving discourse around authoritarianism and democracy in Central Asia. He noted the increasing complexity of political systems influenced by populism and regional dynamics, underscoring the shift in international engagement shaped by geopolitical factors rather than clear democratic promotion strategies. Dr. Lewis emphasized the importance of understanding the nuanced aspects of authoritarian regimes, including informal economics, clan politics, and power struggles, beyond mere repression.

                        The subsequent presentations offered deep dives into specific manifestations of autocracy in the region. Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova, a Postdoctoral Researcher at Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient, analyzed Sadyr Japarov’s rise to power in Kyrgyzstan, attributing his sustained popularity to his portrayal as a “man of the people” and his strategic adaptation to different cultural contexts despite authoritarian measures. Dr. Dinissa Duvanova, Associate Professor at Lehigh University, examined Kazakhstan’s shift towards populism under President Tokayev, arguing that it is a strategic adaptation to maintain autocratic rule by balancing elite interests with popular demands. Oguljamal Yazliyeva, a Ph.D. researcher at Charles University, explored how Turkmenistan’s autocratic system, influenced by Soviet legacy and tribal traditions, cultivates a personality cult around its leaders through controlled media and traditional respect for authority.

                        Although one of the speakers, Dr. Diana T. Kudaibergen(ova), could not join due to connectivity issues, the panel provided a rich exploration of Central Asian political systems. Dr. Lewis concluded by highlighting the value of this nuanced approach to understanding governance in the region, moving beyond simplistic binaries of democracy and autocracy, and expressed enthusiasm for the ongoing research in this complex field.

                        Moving Beyond Simplistic Binaries of Democracy and Autocracy 

                        Dr. David Lewis, the moderator of the panel, gave an overview of the context of the topic of the panel. He began by reflecting on the evolution of discourse surrounding authoritarianism, democracy, and liberal values in Central Asia over the past two decades. Initially, in the early 21st century, liberal democracy was seen as the dominant global paradigm, but this has been increasingly challenged. The rise of populism in Western democracies and a more nuanced understanding of political systems in regions like Central Asia have contributed to a more complex view of authoritarianism and democracy.

                        Dr. Lewis noted that populism, once associated with revolutionary movements, is now also prevalent in regime politics and authoritarian systems. He highlighted the shift in international engagement with Central Asia, often driven by geopolitical factors rather than a clear strategy for promoting democracy. Dr. Lewis emphasized the importance of understanding the complexities of authoritarian regimes beyond simple repression. This includes examining informal economics, clan politics, regional dynamics, and power struggles that persist even in non-democratic systems.

                        He remarked that the new generation of political scientists in Central Asia is providing more nuanced insights into these political systems, contributing to a more complex body of literature on the topic. Dr. Lewis concluded by expressing enthusiasm for the panel’s focus on this subject, seeing it as an opportunity to explore the latest research on Central Asian political systems. He emphasized the value of this more intricate approach to understanding governance in the region, moving beyond simplistic binaries of democracy and autocracy.

                        Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova: “Clean Politics: Kyrgyzstan between Informal Governance and Democracy”

                        Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova discussed Sadyr Japarov’s rise to power in Kyrgyzstan following the October 2020 revolution. She began by arguing that despite implementing authoritarian measures, Japarov has maintained popularity by portraying himself as a “man of the people” and leveraging his personal history of suffering and injustice. Japarov has demonstrated a talent for speaking the language of local people and using simple language that resonates with them. Dr. Ismailbekova argued that Japarov’s success lies in his ability to wear “several hats” simultaneously. He presents himself as a simple man, a Native Son, while proposing authoritarian power.

                        The presentation by Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova discussed Sadyr Japarov’s rise to power in Kyrgyzstan following the October 2020 revolution. She began by arguing that despite implementing authoritarian measures, Japarov has maintained popularity by portraying himself as a “man of the people” and leveraging his personal history of suffering and injustice. Kyrgyzstan has experienced three revolutions in recent history (2005, 2010, and 2020), driven by public dissatisfaction with government corruption, fraudulent elections, and mismanagement. The 2020 revolution, sparked by the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic, led to the overthrow of President Jeenbekov and the rise of Japarov to power.

                        According to Dr. Ismailbekova, Japarov, who was released from prison during the 2020 protests, quickly seized the opportunity to become acting president and prime minister. He criticized previous leaders for corruption and mismanagement while promising justice. However, he soon began consolidating power by amending the constitution to increase presidential authority, restricting media freedom, and taking control of the judiciary and foreign policy. Dr. Ismailbekova attributed this to Japarov’s ability to mobilize mass support by playing on emotions and using strategies of kinship. His personal suffering and tragic life story have become key elements in his political narrative, allowing many Kyrgyz citizens to identify with him.

                        Japarov’s biography plays a crucial role in his political appeal. In 2013, he organized protests to nationalize a gold company, leading to criminal charges and forcing him into exile. He often refers to this experience, claiming to understand the hardships faced by millions of Kyrgyz migrants, primarily in Russia. Dr. Ismailbekova emphasized how Japarov has become an “embodiment of injustice” in Kyrgyzstan. His attempted suicide in prison, which he claimed was a protest against the corrupt court system, resonated with many citizens. Furthermore, Japarov’s personal tragedies, such as losing his son and parents while in prison, have garnered sympathy and support from the public.

                        Dr. Ismailbekova underscored that Japarov’s suffering has been translated into political capital. He is perceived as more relatable than other candidates, someone who has experienced the injustices of the system firsthand. This narrative of suffering has been cultivated as a necessary virtue for being a good president. Dr. Ismailbekova noted that Japarov has positioned himself as the “hope of the nation” in a failed democracy. This narrative has been well-received by many of his constituents.

                        Interestingly, since Japarov became president, historians have begun searching for his ancestors to legitimize his right to lead Kyrgyzstan. Some claim that Japarov is a direct descendant of the Khans (a title historically given to rulers and military leaders in Central Asia), suggesting that the search for justice is “in his blood.” Dr. Ismailbekova highlighted how Japarov adapts his image to different situations. For example, when visiting southern Kyrgyzstan, he wore the hat of Iskhak Razzakov, the first Secretary of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, appealing to villagers and relatives by claiming to continue Razzakov’s mission.

                        Japarov has demonstrated a talent for speaking the language of local people and using simple language that resonates with them. Dr. Ismailbekova argued that Japarov’s success lies in his ability to wear “several hats” simultaneously. He presents himself as a simple man, a Native Son, while proposing authoritarian power. 

                        The international media has taken notice of Japarov’s rise to power, with many articles focusing on his journey “from prison to presidency.” This narrative reinforces his image as someone who has overcome adversity. 

                        In conclusion, Dr. Ismailbekova suggested that the popularity of Japarov stems from citizens’ identification with his tragic life story and his ability to tap into the emotional experiences of the Kyrgyz people. Japarov’s political strategy involves constantly referring to his personal history, particularly during elections. Dr. Ismailbekova concluded that Japarov’s approach has maintained his popularity. His ability to understand cultural nuances and to present himself as one of the people have been key to his success. 

                        Dr. Dinissa Duvanova: “Autocracy’s Past and Present in Kazakhstan”

                        Dr. Dinissa Duvanova argued that the seeming populist pivot in Kazakhstan is better understood as a strategic adaptation within a stable autocratic framework. The balance between elite interests and popular demands, mediated through regulatory constraints and economic management, continues to define the country’s political landscape. The increase in state capacity and regulatory oversight, influenced by economic conditions, highlights the nuanced strategies employed by the regime to maintain its authority.

                        Dr. Dinissa Duvanova began her presentation by stating that in Kazakhstan, the link between the autocratic nature of its political regime and populism appears tenuous compared to other cases. After the January 2022 protests, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev addressed the joint session of the Senate and Mazhilis (The Lower House of the Parliament in Kazakhstan) via a Zoom call. In his speech on January 11, 2022, he criticized powerful elites and profitable companies in Kazakhstan, suggesting it was time they paid their dues to the people. Tokayev proposed establishing a National Fund to collect these debts and redistribute them to the population. Dr. Duvanova suggested that this can be seen as a potential shift towards a populist style of governance, though it may also reflect a continuation of established strategies to maintain autocratic stability.

                        Following the protests, Tokayev initiated a crackdown on elite leaders behind the unrest, leading to the imprisonment and asset seizure of key figures. However, the extent of asset seizures varied significantly; for instance, only a small fraction of the estimated wealth of members of former President Nazarbayev’s family was confiscated. This indicates that while there was a response to popular demands, it may not represent a deep-rooted commitment to populism but rather a tactical move within a broader autocratic framework.

                        Dr. Duvanova added that in her research, detailed in her book “Thieves, Opportunists, and Autocrats,” she argued that what appears as a populist pivot in Kazakhstan is actually another iteration of maintaining stable autocratic power perfected during Nazarbayev’s era. This involves strengthening and institutionalizing authoritarian state mechanisms, balancing elite interests with those of the masses. This balance is crucial for autocrats to sustain their rule, ensuring both elite support and popular acquiescence.

                        Moreover, Dr. Duvanova argued that one way to think about state-building by autocrats is the need to balance the particularistic demands of elites with the promotion of collective goods. Neglecting the latter can lead to economic decline, intensifying competition for rents and destabilizing the regime. Therefore, autocrats must invest in economic performance, benefiting the national economy and, by extension, the populace.

                        A notable quote from Tokayev’s January 11, 2024 speech highlights this balancing act: “For my friends, everything; for my enemies, the law.” This saying, originally attributed to Latin American politician Oscar Benavides, encapsulates the Kazakh autocracy’s approach to governance, rewarding loyal elites while maintaining a facade of legal accountability for others.

                        The concept of a regulatory authoritarian state, which Dr. Duvanova explored in her research, involves the systematic construction of formal regulatory constraints on state agencies. These constraints ensure more predictable and accountable bureaucratic behavior. Data from Kazakhstan show a significant increase in formal regulatory constraints since the mid-2000s, driven primarily by ministerial orders rather than legislative statutes. This regulatory expansion corresponds with fluctuations in oil revenues, with more stringent regulations emerging during times of declining oil rents and vice versa.

                        Popular protests, such as those in January 2022, often prompt autocrats to streamline state institutions to improve responsiveness and effectiveness. Additionally, declining resources necessitate a focus on enhancing economic performance to maintain regime stability. The Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, leading to rising oil prices, provided Kazakhstan with increased resources, potentially alleviating some pressures to pursue populist policies aggressively.

                        Dr. Duvanova’s quantitative research demonstrates that in times of economic difficulty, characterized by declining state resources, there is an increase in regulatory oversight to curb bureaucratic opportunism. Overall, Kazakhstan has emerged as a high-capacity autocracy, evidenced by its regulatory quality and state capacity ratings. This increase in state capacity has occurred alongside systemic corruption and favoritism towards regime associates. Despite the heavy-handed use of regulations to manage economic activity, these regulations are often biased towards private interests.

                        The signs of liberalization under Tokayev can also be seen as the rise of digital authoritarianism, with increased digitalization of state services improving efficiency and state capacity. However, there is little evidence of reliance on transparency, public accountability, and oversight, as restrictions on press freedom and an independent judiciary persist.

                        In conclusion, Dr. Duvanova argued that the seeming populist pivot in Kazakhstan is better understood as a strategic adaptation within a stable autocratic framework. The balance between elite interests and popular demands, mediated through regulatory constraints and economic management, continues to define the country’s political landscape. The increase in state capacity and regulatory oversight, influenced by economic conditions, highlights the nuanced strategies employed by the regime to maintain its authority.

                        Oguljamal Yazliyeva: “Autocracy in Turkmenistan and the Role of Media in Cultivating Personality Cult”

                        Oguljamal Yazliyeva argued that Turkmenistan’s autocratic system is deeply entrenched, supported by a tightly controlled media apparatus that perpetuates a strong personality cult. The government’s use of historical tribal traditions recycled Soviet methods, and modern media techniques has created a robust system of authoritarian control. While this system appears stable, the lack of alternative media and independent information sources poses significant challenges for potential democratic development in the country.

                        Oguljamal Yazliyeva began her presentation by stating that Turkmenistan’s autocratic system and the role of media in cultivating a personality cult is a complex topic that intertwines historical, political, and cultural elements. The country, one of the five Central Asian republics, gained independence in 1991 after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then, it has developed into one of the most isolated nations in the region, with a political system characterized by authoritarianism and a strong personality cult surrounding its leaders.

                        Yazliyeva argued that the foundations of Turkmenistan’s current political culture can be traced back to two main sources: the recycling of the Soviet system and the historical tribal traditions of the Turkmen people. The first president of independent Turkmenistan, Saparmurat Niyazov, promised to develop the country towards democracy but emphasized that it would be a step-by-step process. In reality, this approach led to the state maintaining control over every aspect of life, including the media system.

                        The Turkmen government has utilized various strategies to legitimize its power and consolidate its authoritarian rule. One such method is the use of national symbols, such as the five patterns on the Turkmen flag representing the country’s five provinces. This symbolism serves to connect the current political system with the tribal history of the Turkmen people.

                        Yazliyeva also importantly noted that the media plays a crucial role in strengthening and consolidating the authoritarian regime in Turkmenistan. All media channels, including television, radio, print media, and the internet, are under strict state control. The constitution of Turkmenistan nominally guarantees freedom of speech and prohibits censorship, but in practice, the government exercises complete control over all media outlets.

                        Television remains a significant platform for the government to disseminate information about its policies. A survey conducted by Yazliyeva among Turkmen people revealed that more than 25% of media consumption is through television. Interestingly, over 50% of respondents prefer Russian-language media, which the government also uses to spread its message.

                        The Turkmen government employs the media to create a cult of personality around its leaders. This is particularly evident in the use of specific epithets and phrases to glorify the president, such as “Father of the Nation, be healthy.” In news broadcasts, these glorifying phrases are repeated multiple times, even in short reports about mundane events like sports.

                        According to Yazliyeva, the media landscape in Turkmenistan is characterized by repression, propaganda, and suppression. Academic literature on the subject is limited, but existing studies describe a system where all media channels are under state control. Even the single platform considered “private” was launched under government leadership and remains under strict official control.

                        Yazliyeva  added that the government uses media to consolidate its power through various means. One strategy involves broadcasting content that instills fear in the population. For example, television shows often depict the wrongdoings and subsequent imprisonment of individuals who deviate from government policy. Another tactic involves showcasing acts of extreme deference to the leader, such as hand-kissing or bowing, which are not traditional in Turkmen culture.

                        Yazliyeva underscored that the personality cult surrounding Turkmenistan’s leaders is a central feature of the country’s political culture. This phenomenon takes root in the historical tribal conditions, the legacy of Soviet communist control, and the idiosyncratic personality of the state leaders. The media consistently promotes the key role of the state leader in Turkmen society by glorifying them on various platforms.

                        Interestingly, Yazliyeva argued that the consolidation of this authoritarian regime is not solely the work of the political elite. Ordinary citizens also participate in and accept this system, partly due to traditional respect for patriarchal structures and tribal kinship. This acceptance makes it easier for the government to maintain its grip on power.

                        The development of Turkmenistan’s political system and media landscape since independence has resulted in a unique model of political culture. This model, based on authoritarianism and one-man rule, has played a significant role in building and maintaining the cult of personality around the country’s leaders, from the first president Saparmurat Niyazov to his son and current president, Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov.

                        In conclusion, Yazliyeva argued that Turkmenistan’s autocratic system is deeply entrenched, supported by a tightly controlled media apparatus that perpetuates a strong personality cult. The government’s use of historical tribal traditions recycled Soviet methods, and modern media techniques has created a robust system of authoritarian control. While this system appears stable, the lack of alternative media and independent information sources poses significant challenges for potential democratic development in the country. As such, the introduction of alternative media could be crucial in providing Turkmen citizens with diverse perspectives and information about their country and the world at large.