Hussain, Shilan Fuad. (2025). “Violence Against Women: Towards a Policy Understanding of the Patriarchy.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 5, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0005
Abstract
Violence Against Women (VAW) and girls can take many forms globally, from the absence of personal agency to sexual violence and domestic abuse. To better understand how VAW affects women in the Middle East in particular, this policy brief addresses various instances of violence against Kurdish women in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI). A particular focus is given to forced/arranged marriages, honour-based violence, and female genital mutilation, which form a ‘patriarchal trifecta’ of oppression: a phenomenon that the author has identified and researched extensively. The policy brief recommendations informed by this research are relevant to policymakers both in the KRI and beyond, including European Union member states that have dealt with troubling cases of violence against women in immigrant communities and are facing similar challenges to women’s rights. Examining violations against women is relevant for many parts of the Middle East, and more broadly societies and communities where patriarchal values and norms produce a social milieu where the main justification for VAW is the protection of a social construct of honour. This policy brief is informed by fieldwork conducted in the KRI; 55 qualitative interviews with policymakers, United Nations officials, attorneys, academics, activists, civil society members, plus women and male survivors and perpetrators of VAW; and a quantitative survey conducted among 200 women and men to gauge their opinions on this multi-faceted phenomenon. The goal of this policy brief is to give the public institutions responsible for monitoring women’s welfare a better picture of the challenges to equality that women still face and offer ways forward in terms of addressing these challenges.[1]
Women and girls experience numerous forms of gender-based violence (GBV) on a global scale. This policy brief examines specific cases of GBV against Kurdish women in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) to shed light on the unique impact of GBV on Middle Eastern women. During my research I observed, defined, and examined a trinity of oppression, which I have coined the ‘patriarchal trifecta’ (Hussain, 2024). This trio includes forced/arranged marriages, female genital mutilation (FGM), and so-called ‘honour killings’/honour-based violence (HBV); phenomena which I believe operate symbiotically and merit special attention from a public policy standpoint (Payton, 2019; Beghikhani, 2015; Haig et al., 2015; Ruba, 2010; Brown & Romano, 2016; Ahmady, 2018; Burrage, 2016; Barrett et al., 2021).
The findings and recommendations of this policy brief are based on research conducted between 2022 and 2024. In 2023, I carried out fieldwork in the cities of Erbil, Duhok, Sulaymaniyah, Kelar, and Xanaqin, conducting interviews with 55 women and men that have been either survivors or perpetrators of GBV, policymakers, United Nations (UN) officials, attorneys, academics, activists, and civil society members. I also conducted a quantitative survey with 200 randomly selected women and men, as a control variable to ascertain their views on the different phenomena examined in this policy brief.
This policy brief is significant beyond the KRI because the wider Middle East region faces comparable obstacles to women’s equality. This issue also gains prescience in diasporic communities because of the growing tension between conservative, traditionalist understandings of Islam in the Middle East and liberal modernist ‘Anglo-European’ views of women’s rights enshrined in EU legislation. Such an ideological environment shared by the KRI and diasporas in Western European states means that many women survivors are ostracised from society and forced to endure these injustices in silence. Given these challenges, this policy brief includes seven general recommendations that address violations of women’s rights.
The policy brief aims to offer governmental agencies that are responsible for tracking women’s well-being further insights on how to better guarantee women’s equality in society through putting forward cohesive strategies. The recommendations of this policy brief align closely with UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 5 on gender equality and the SDG 16 on peace, justice, and strong institutions.[2]
Forced and Arranged Marriages
My data collection in the KRI revealed that the forced marriage rate among girls who married at ages 14-17 and 18-24 was 20% for both groups. Child and forced marriages stem from various factors, including tribal and patriarchal norms, cultural practices, lack of formal education, household power imbalances, and harmful masculine expectations (Khan, 2020; Erman et al., 2021). These marriages often occur in rural areas governed by customs that disregard state laws.
The prevalence of child marriage in the KRI is difficult to quantify, but a UNFPA survey found that 20.53% of women aged 20-24 in the Kurdistan region and 23.02% in wider Iraq were married before age 18 (UNFPA, 2016). Contributing factors include outdated customs, poverty, and low education levels, which leave girls vulnerable to exploitation and economic dependence (UN Women, 2018; 2019; El Ashmawy et al., 2020). Men are also affected, as young husbands often face the pressure of supporting households without stable careers or incomes (Hussain, 2024).
Following the rise of the Islamic State (IS) in 2014, economic hardship and declining living standards in the KRI led to increased violence against women. Many girls were forced to leave school and marry young due to financial strain, family pressure, or forced labour environments where they faced sexual exploitation and harassment.
Families often viewed early marriage as a way to “protect” daughters from greater harm, despite objections from the girls. Physical abuse within marriages was normalized by parents as a better alternative to their daughters being “unclaimed” and potentially vulnerable to multiple abuses. Arranged marriages were perceived as opportunities for social mobility, leveraging patriarchal structures to improve a daughter’s material prospects. However, such unions often lacked love and empathy, reducing marriages to transactional arrangements where women were treated as property or servants, leading to isolation and confinement.
In rural and tribal regions, male dominance shaped all aspects of life. Men often justified their control through religious beliefs, rejecting secular laws protecting women as corrupting influences. Obedience from girls and women was seen as a moral imperative, and defiance of parental choices in marriage was considered dishonourable. Ultimately, my research highlighted that forced marriage practices were deeply rooted in cultural norms.
Violence Based on Perceived Dishonour
Honour-based violence (HBV) remains prevalent in the KRI, rooted in patriarchal and tribal norms as well as cultural perceptions of women’s ‘proper’ roles. Official data shows that 44 women were killed for ‘honour’ in 2022. Many others allegedly committed suicide under suspicious circumstances, often by self-immolation, with speculation that some were honour killings staged as suicides. As one NGO representative in Sulaymania explained, “it is very easy for a woman to be a victim of honour killing by family members in the KRI or Iraq and get away with it.”
Triggers for honour killings include premarital sexual relations, being a victim of rape, refusing an arranged marriage, or marrying someone disapproved of by the family. While murder is the most severe form, other abuses, such as mutilation and facial disfigurement, are also inflicted to render women ‘undesirable.’
Iraqi law addresses honour killings but allows reduced sentences for such crimes, often treating them as lesser offenses. In wider Iraq, sentences can be as low as six months, compared to life imprisonment or death for non-honour-related murders (AlKhateeb, 2010). This leniency perpetuates the idea that honour killings are ‘natural’ reactions to perceived family shame. In contrast, KRI authorities abolished laws allowing such reduced sentences in 2000.
Unlike forced marriages, HBV cuts across socioeconomic backgrounds. A UNICEF survey revealed that 59% of women aged 15-59 found physical abuse by husbands acceptable (AlKhateeb, 2010). Many women internalise patriarchal norms, perceiving these dangers as relevant only to ‘others.’ Interviews highlighted how older women, including mothers and aunts, often viewed honour killings as justified for ‘grave’ moral transgressions like perceived sexual promiscuity, believing such actions tarnish family honour.
Policy Recommendations
The ‘patriarchal trifecta’—forced/arranged marriages (Hussain, 2024), honour-based violence (HBV), and female genital mutilation (FGM)—is a complex issue requiring holistic solutions. To address these abuses, the KRI government must implement a comprehensive national strategy. While progress, such as a decline in FGM, has been noted, these phenomena continue to have catastrophic consequences for women, families, and communities.
On an institutional level, policy proposals include expanding state-funded gender-based violence (GBV) response services, such as healthcare, psychological support, housing assistance, and legal protections (Waylen, 2014; Piscopo, 2020). Eliminating sexist practices that limit women’s access to the workplace and resources is critical to enhancing their economic agency, offering alternatives to arranged marriages, and reducing the risk of honour killings (Chenoweth & Zoe, 2022; Hussain, 2024).
Key objectives to achieve these aims include:
Strengthening legislation to challenge harmful gender norms and beliefs.
Reducing societal acceptance of violence against women (VAW) by promoting gender-equitable norms.
Collaborating with women-led organisations, NGOs, and community leaders to drive meaningful change.
Prioritising health-related laws and accountability measures to mitigate violence and foster gender equality.
Enhancing women’s access to skills training, formal employment, and labour rights to improve their economic opportunities.
Encouraging inclusive economic growth by supporting firms that prioritise women’s leadership and entrepreneurship.
Coordinating cross-sectoral efforts to support adolescents in addressing child marriages, FGM, and HBV.
Structural reforms should include integrating these measures into the education system. Comprehensive reproductive health education can inform young people about the dangers of FGM, while ensuring equal access to mandatory education until 18 can combat economic desperation (EGER, 2021). Schools could also employ female administrators and nurses to address girls’ unique challenges and provide guidance on personal and safety concerns (World Food Program USA, 2022).
Legislative action is essential. Clerics must be prohibited from registering marriages outside formal courts, and HBV and FGM should incur stricter penalties. Special units should investigate such offences, and divorce processes for abused women must be simplified, with state assistance provided during their transition. As one young woman in the KRI stated, “We need men to feel the urgency to do so.” Dismantling the ‘patriarchal trifecta’ (Hussain, 2024) requires participation from those it benefits (Levtov et al., 2015; Dabla-Norris & Kochhar, 2019). The limitations on women’s rights are interconnected, demanding holistic solutions that address root causes rather than merely alleviating symptoms. These insights and recommendations hold relevance far beyond the KRI, extending to global contexts.
(*) Dr. Shilan Fuad Hussain is a Research Fellow in Gender Studies and Cultural Analysis. She was previously a Marie Sklodowska-Curie Postdoctoral Fellow (2022-2024, UKRI), a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Kurdish Institute (US), and a Doctoral Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (Switzerland). She is an interdisciplinary academic and works on a variety of topics, among them: cultural representation, production, and practices; gender-based violence; state policies enhancing female equality; FGM and arranged/forced marriages; the social impacts of masculinity; and multi-identity and culture in the diaspora diasporas. Her current work sits at the intersection of sociology and cultural analysis, and its symbiotic relevance to modern society. More information is available on her personal website: https://www.shilanfuadhussain.com/
References
Ahmady, K. (2018). “The Politics of Culture-Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Iran.” Journal of Humanity. Vol 4(1) (March):1-022.
AlKhateeb, Basma. (2010). Persistent gender-based violence an obstacle to development and peace. Developing Programs for Women and Youth Iraqi. Al-Amal Association, Social Watch Poverty Eradication and Gender Justice. https://www.socialwatch.org/node/12087
Barrett, H. R.; Bedri, N. & Krishnapalan, N. (2021). “The Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) – migration matrix: The case of the Arab League Region.” Health Care for Women International, 42(2), 186–212. https://doi.org/10.1080/07399332.2020.1789642
Beghikhani, N. (2015). Honour Based Violence. Gill & Hague.
Brown, L., & Romano, D. (2006). “Women in Post-Saddam Iraq: One Step Forward or Two Steps Back?” NWSA Journal, 18(3), 51–70. https://doi.org/10.2979/NWS.2006.18.3.51
Burrage, H. (2016). Female Mutilation: The Truth Behind the Horrifying Global Practice of Female Genital Mutilation, New Holland Publishers.
Erman, Alvina; De Vries Robbe, Sophie Anne; Thies, Stephan Fabian; Kabir, Kayenat; Maruo, Mirai. (2021). Gender Dimensions of Disaster Risk and Resilience: Existing Evidence. World Bank, Washington, DC. http://hdl.handle.net/10986/35202
Haig, G. L. J.; Öpengin, E.; Hellinger, M. & Motschenbacher, H. (2015). “Gender in Kurdish: Structural and socio-cultural dimensions.” In: Gender Across Languages (Vol. 36, pp. 247–276). John Benjamins Publishing Company. https://doi.org/10.1075/impact.36.10hai
Hussain, S. F. (2024). Protecting women’s agency in the Middle East: Interventions and reforms to ensure women’s rights. CWS Policy Insights No. 1. Center for War Studies.
Khan, A. R.; Ratele, K. & Arendse, N. (2020). “Men, Suicide, and Covid-19: Critical Masculinity Analyses and Interventions.” Postdigital Science and Education, 2(3), 651–656. https://doi.org/10.1007/s42438-020-00152-1
Levtov, R.; van der Gaag, N.; Greene, M.; Kaufman, M. & G. Barker. (2015). “State of the World’s Fathers: A Men Care Advocacy Publication.” Washington, DC: Promundo, Rutgers, Save the Children, Sonke Gender Justice, and the Men Engage Alliance. https://www.fatherhood.gov/sites/default/files/resource_files/e000003287.pdf
Payton, J. (2019). Honour and Political Economy of Marriage. Rutgers University Press.
Piscopo, Jennifer. (2020). The Impact of Women’s Leadership in Public Life and Political Decision-Making. Prepared for UN Women’s Expert Group Meeting for the 65th Session of the Committee on the Status of Women. New York: UN Women.
Ruba, S. (2010). Transnational Public Spheres from ‘Above’ and from Below’, Feminist Networks across the Middle East and Europe, Transnational Public Spheres.
UN Women. (2019). Women’s Full and Effective Participation and Decision-Making in Public Life, as Well as the Elimination of Violence, for Achieving Gender Equality and the Empowerment of All Women and Girls. New York: UN Women, 2019: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3898140?ln=en
[1] Funding Details: This project was funded by UKRI, Grant Number: EP/X024857/1, carried out by Shilan Fuad Hussain at the Department of Law and Social Science, Middlesex University, United Kingdom.
[2] Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ), published by CEDAW – UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, ‘Shadow Report on Iraq submitted by Geneva International Centre for Justice (GICJ) to the Committee of the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; 74th Session; 21 October – 8 November 2019; Geneva, Switzerland’, 10 October 2019. United Nations Population Fund, UN Children’s Fund, UN Women, ‘Protecting Girls in Iraq from Female Genital Mutilation’, 6 February 2019, from: https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/protecting-girls-iraq-female-genital-mutilation-enarku. The United Nations have put forward multiple documents on the elimination of violence against women, including forced marriages, e.g., the 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (UN Doc. A/Res/48/104). United Nations Statistics Division. United Nations Global SDG Database. Data retrieved July 2022. From: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/dataportal.
Miguel De Vera, Anton; Hamaiunova, Viktoriia; Koleszár, Réka & Pasquettaz, Giada. (2024) “Future Resilience of the European Technology Security.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0004
Abstract
This paper explores vulnerabilities in the European Union’s technological security, focusing on Huawei as a case study to illuminate broader security challenges. Amid intensifying US-China tensions, especially under former US President Donald Trump, the EU encountered new risks linked to the strategic positioning of Chinese tech firms within critical European infrastructure. Trump’s “America First” policy targeted China with tariffs and trade restrictions to address perceived unfair practices, triggering disruptions in global supply chains that reverberated through the EU economy. For Europe, heavily reliant on secure, stable trade flows, these events highlighted the urgency of reassessing technological dependencies and reinforcing digital security. The paper presents a series of strategic recommendations for the EU to mitigate such vulnerabilities, emphasizing the need for diversified supply chains, rigorous security standards for tech partnerships, and collaborative policies among EU members to strengthen resilience in the face of geopolitical shifts and technological competition.
Authored by Anton Miguel De Vera, Viktoriia Hamaiunova, Réka Koleszár & Giada Pasquettaz
Introduction
In the increasingly uncertain geopolitical climate, the European Union (EU) is facing the challenge of maintaining its technological resilience while protecting its security and autonomy. The fast-paced international competition for technological leadership is closely tied to the bloc’s economic competence and has consequences for its security. Given the importance of transatlantic cooperation in this domain, the upcoming US elections, and the possibility of a second Trump administration should urge policymakers to focus on strengthening the EU’s preparedness. This paper addresses the existing vulnerabilities in the EU’s technological security through the exemplary case of Huawei and outlines recommendations on how to tackle them.
Connectivity, one of the critical technologies of the rapid Fourth Industrial Revolution, has been at the center of heated discussions in recent years. Several nations identified connectivity to be an essential part of their competitiveness and development and, among others, Huawei emerged at the forefront of advanced technologies. The Chinese-owned ICT provider was among the world leaders in rolling out their next-generation telecommunication networks worldwide. Within the EU, the choice of 5G providers has generated crucial debates. Next to the obvious economic interests, building telecommunication networks came with important security considerations. As the US-China rivalry intensified under President Trump, the EU faced an important vulnerability.
Donald Trump’s trade war with China, a key component of his “America First” agenda, had significant repercussions for the EU. By imposing tariffs on Chinese goods, Trump sought to counter what he perceived as unfair trade practices by China. This conflict disrupted global trade and impacted the EU’s economy, which is heavily dependent on stable supply chains.
For the EU, the escalating US-China trade tensions presented both challenges and opportunities. While the trade war resulted in market volatility, it also provided Europe with a chance to strengthen its trade relationships with China. The two reached an agreement in principle on a comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI) in 2020 – although it was later put on hold due to the tit-for-tat sanctions. The prospect of deepening ties with China posed a risk of straining transatlantic relations, particularly as Trump urged European nations to collaborate with the US in pressuring Beijing. Trump’s populist trade policies thus compelled the EU to carefully balance its relationships with both the US and China while prioritizing its own economic and security interests. It is in this context that the debate around Huawei and the EU’s technological security is situated in.
The EU’s 5G Rollout: Rhetoric Coercion and Uneven Progress
The European Commission identified the possibilities of 5G early on and adopted an action plan in 2016 to launch 5G services in all member states by the end of 2020 (European Commission, 2024). Although some experts warned that the EU is falling behind in technological transformation, member states quickly began catching up and published their roadmaps. However, progress was uneven and fragmented (5G Observatory Quarterly Report 2, 2019). At that time, Huawei was in a prime position in the European market to support the 5G rollout and was already working with several European providers. By 2019, the Chinese company signed memorandums of understanding with wireless providers in at least 9 EU countries, including Germany, Spain, and France (5G Observatory, 2021). For many, it seemed evident that for the EU to stay competitive and meet the plans for 5G coverage, Huawei was the answer.
In parallel, however, concerns about the security of Huawei equipment began circulating. Against the backdrop of the escalating trade war between the US and China, the former began prompting allies to exclude Huawei from their networks (Woo & O’Keeffe, 2018). President Trump labelled Huawei a security risk and threatened to cut off intelligence and information-sharing with allies using the ‘untrustworthy’ 5G vendor (Business Standard, 2020).
US Policy towards China under Donald Trump: Framing as a Strategic Tool
Donald Trump’s political rise is often analyzed through the lens of populism and framing theory, both of which help explain his appeal and communication strategies. Populism, broadly defined, refers to a political approach that pits the “common people” against a perceived corrupt elite (Mudde, 2004). Trump’s rhetoric embodies this populist style, as he frequently claims to speak for ordinary Americans against the political establishment. His 2016 campaign, for instance, centered on “draining the swamp” in Washington, positioning himself as an outsider who would challenge entrenched elites. During the 2024 election, he is still using this populist communication, by portraying himself as “one of the people”, like in one of his recent tweets where he works for one shift in McDonalds.
One of the key aspects of Trump’s populism is his use of framing. He does not only use it on a national level for criticizing his opponents but also in relation to foreign policy issues. Framing theory, as defined by Entman (1993), involves highlighting certain aspects of a reality while downplaying others, effectively shaping how an issue is understood by the public. Trump’s framing of China is a prime example. Throughout his presidency and during his campaigns, Trump consistently framed China as a threat to American economic interests and national security. By doing so, he shaped public discourse and channeled public frustrations about job losses and trade imbalances into hostility toward China.
A prominent example of Trump’s framing of China came during his trade war with the country. He portrayed China as an “unfair” player in global trade, accusing it of “stealing” American jobs and intellectual property. In a 2019 speech, Trump stated, “China has taken advantage of the United States for many, many years. And those days are over.” This framing was effective in galvanizing his political base, particularly among working-class voters who felt economically marginalized by globalization (Inglehart & Norris, 2016). By framing the issue as a battle between patriotic Americans and a foreign adversary, Trump reinforced his populist credentials.
Trump’s framing of China intensified during the COVID-19 pandemic, where he repeatedly blamed China for the spread of the virus, referring to it as the “China virus” and the “Kung flu” (The New York Times, 2020). By doing so, he shifted public discourse to portray China as responsible not only for the economic challenges faced by the US but also for the public health crisis, a narrative that resonated with many of his supporters.
A notable example of this framing came in March 2020, when Trump tweeted, “The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus.” This statement reported widely in the media, sparked accusations of racism and xenophobia (CNN, 2020). However, Trump defended his rhetoric, arguing that it was necessary to hold China accountable for the pandemic’s global spread. His framing successfully linked the frustrations over COVID-19 to broader concerns about China’s role in the world economy, feeding into his populist narrative of protecting American interests.
Framing theory is particularly relevant here because it highlights how political actors shape public perception by focusing on certain narratives. As Entman (2007) notes, framing involves selecting some aspects of a perceived reality and making them more salient in communication. Trump’s framing of China as both an economic competitor and a national security threat played a significant role in justifying his tariffs and aggressive foreign policy stance. Moreover, Trump’s use of this frame was amplified by the media, contributing to rising anti-China sentiments in the US (Goffman, 1974).
By framing China as a direct threat to American prosperity, Trump not only advanced his populist message but also reshaped political discourse, making foreign policy a central issue for many voters. Through this, he created the basis of US trade policy against foreign companies deemed as a threat and towards allies who seemed hesitant to follow this approach.
With all this, the EU faced a two-fold dilemma: giving in to Trump’s strategy and losing out on competitiveness while appearing to have little strategic autonomy or seizing the opportunities with Huawei but straining the transatlantic relationship while potentially endangering critical infrastructure. As of 2024, the EU’s answer has been fragmented and disunited. Only 10 of the 27 member states have excluded Huawei and although almost all states put in place some kind of restrictions, only a handful of them implemented it (European Commission, 2023a). President Trump’s approach of pressuring allies and threatening to cut off intelligence-sharing may have been counterproductive, but it exposed an important weakness of the EU.
What Next – The Way Forward
With the US elections approaching, the EU has a window of opportunity to address this dilemma. The possibility of a second Trump administration brings the risk of further aggravating the US-China ties and putting the EU into an even more uncomfortable position. The war in Ukraine has heightened the EU’s need and dependence on intelligence-sharing with the US Upcoming challenges in transatlantic relations are likely to have significant repercussions for the EU’s security. At the same time, the EU-China relations are also at a heightened risk of entering into a trade war as the latest developments around the export of Chinese electric vehicles demonstrate. The economic vulnerability of certain European member states to Chinese pressure adds another dimension to the complex nature of achieving united European approaches. Essentially, the EU needs to safeguard its autonomy against unilateral actions while maintaining its competitiveness and ensuring the security of its critical infrastructure. To do that, policymakers should consider the following scenarios and the presented policy recommendations.
If Trump Wins
First, in case of a Trump victory, Europeans have to embrace another period of uncertainty. A second Trump Administration will renew concerns about US support for NATO while the protectionist policies will put direct pressure on transatlantic trade relations. It is expected that President Trump will continue his previous hardline approach towards China leading to an intensified trade war and a bigger volume of Chinese exports being dumped on the European market. All the while, Europeans will increasingly be pulled into a trade and technology war with the Eastern power amid calls from the US to reduce relations. In this scenario, Trump’s rhetorical pressure, as in the previous case of calling to exclude Huawei from the 5G rollout to maintain intelligence-sharing, might turn into actual policies. In 2025, this would come with a huge price given the EU’s dependence on the American intelligence infrastructure to help Ukraine defend itself against Russia’s war. Any threats thus must be taken seriously and addressed accordingly.
Next to that, internally, Trump’s success would galvanize far-right, populist figures and movements. His ideological allies in Europe, such as Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni and Polish President Andrzej Duda would be emboldened to continue their path after a Trump victory. Far-right, populist politicians would find renewed reassurance to oppose more European integration. Consequently, reaching unity on crucial foreign policy questions might further be hindered.
Faced with the prospect of this challenging situation, European policymakers would do well to address the potential pitfalls early on. Given the foreseeable fragmentations, the EU must strengthen and implement the framework it already has agreed upon (such as the 5G Cybersecurity Toolbox and the Digital Services Act). According to the latest assessment of the 5G Toolbox, which was adopted to mitigate security risks, only 10 out of the 27 Member States have restricted or excluded high-risk suppliers from their 5G networks (European Commission, 2023b). Based on its own and Member States’ independent analyses, the European Commission considers Huawei along with another Chinese company, ZTE, to ‘pose materially higher risk than other 5G providers.’ Dependency on these providers for critical infrastructure, which the 5G network is considered, creates a serious risk across the Union. Considering the level of interconnectedness between EU networks, a fragmented policy could jeopardize the entire bloc’s security. For instance, last year Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Péter Szijjártó highlighted Hungary’s development of 5G networks with the help of Huawei, next to signing additional cooperation agreements with the company (Szijjártó Péter, 2023).
To address the diverging approaches, the EU should develop a mechanism to actively encourage Member States to implement the existing framework and use the available tools. It should also hold Member States accountable for doing so. Considering the weight of risks in the EU’s technological security, policymakers should call for an EU-wide regulation with clear and urgent deadlines. This would support the EU’s autonomy in making security-related decisions as assessments of risks are done both by Member States and by the European Commission. Transatlantic relations are likely to become more friendly as a result and the EU’s security would increase. One of the downsides of this approach, however, is the expected response from Beijing. China is likely to retaliate for a European policy naming and restricting its companies from the market. Besides, reaching this agreement on a European level will not be easy as Member States’ security priorities and relations with China differ significantly. Nevertheless, this approach offers the EU a starting point to be a proactive actor.
If Harris Wins
If Americans choose a Harris administration for the next four years, the EU would find itself in a similar position as they were during Biden’s administration assuming that Harris will take up a similar approach against China. Despite their opposition to each other, President Joe Biden had taken a similar approach to his Republican predecessor. Biden ordered heavy tariffs on Chinese imports of high-tech items such as semiconductor chips while diversifying its sources for imports such as the EU and Mexico (Davis, 2024; Lovely et al., 2024). In doing so, the United States has become less dependent on China for all types of imported manufactured goods since 2018, according to recently released 2023 customs data (Lovely et al., 2024).
The EU and China, however, have maintained or increased their reliance on each other for almost all types of imported goods” (Lovely et al., 2024). As such, the EU could potentially clash with the US by maintaining this dependence which showcases some form of limited autonomy. On the one hand, the EU exercises its agency to shift towards maintaining and deepening ties with China. However, on the other hand, the EU’s agency is somewhat limited given its trade dependency with China which may compel it to act in favor of Beijing on certain issues.
A Harris administration would likely maintain the use of tariffs, particularly targeting China, to counter perceived unfair competition as emphasized by Trump, and to drive progress in the US energy transition, supporting its emissions reduction goals. This was evident during the presidential debate between Harris and Trump in September 2024. She highlighted Trump’s failed attempt to subdue China as an economic powerhouse arguing that “under Donald Trump’s presidency, he ended up selling American chips to China to help them improve and modernize their military” (Butts, 2024). She concluded with the statement, ″[he] basically sold us out when a policy about China should be in making sure the United States of America wins the competition for the 21st century” (Butts, 2024). This comment indicates to the EU and other US allies that Harris is likely to continue Biden’s approach if she wins the presidential race.
In this scenario, the EU faces a more predictable transatlantic landscape. This, however, may prove more perilous. Albeit Harris will follow a hardline approach to China and the pressure on allies to not share advanced technology with Beijing will remain, she is unlikely to strongly push the EU. In contrast to the Trump administration, instead of coercive rhetoric, she is likely to use softer means of persuasion. This carries in itself the risk that the EU will sit on its hands for too long instead of addressing the legitimate security threats that China poses. To ensure that the resilience of technological security remains a priority, the European Parliament should establish a sub-committee of the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE). The sub-committee should deal with the security considerations that come with technologies and equipment from third countries and should ensure that the interests of European citizens are considered in tech security-related questions. This would address the risks of de-prioritization and would contribute to enhanced and more nuanced debates. Considering the viewpoints of Members of the Parliament directly through the sub-committee could help the European Commission to propose regulations that are more likely to enjoy support. The only constraining factor to consider is the budget of setting up the sub-committee but the importance of this issue should outweigh that.
Conclusion
This paper highlighted the importance of European technology security and looked at different scenarios European leaders will face during the US presidential election. The example of the rollout of the 5G technology in the EU and the debates around using Chinese Huawei as the technology provider illustrated the EU’s vulnerability when it comes to maintaining its autonomy and competitiveness in the tech sector. In the rapidly changing global landscape, EU leaders are facing a crucial dilemma about the way forward. To maintain technological competitiveness, the EU may have no choice but to rely on Chinese partners while to ensure the continent’s security and stability, it cannot afford to alienate its key transatlantic partner. At the same time, legitimate security risks should not be overlooked and considered as subordinate to trade relations.
This paper offers a concise depiction of the main factors EU leaders should consider as Americans head to the polls. In either scenario, what is crucial for the EU is to be prepared and engage in collective planning. A second Trump administration is likely to bring about a more hectic and turbulent period. His framing of China as a security threat could lead to more pressure on European allies to cut ties with Beijing while his victory could galvanize European populists making it harder to achieve consensus on the European level. To offset this, the paper recommends taking concrete steps to implement the already existing framework and strengthen the available toolbox. In case of a Harris victory, the EU can expect reasonable continuity. Perhaps an important challenge the bloc will face will be finding the impetus to keep the technology security issue in focus. The paper argues that one way to do that would be to set up a dedicated sub-committee within the European Parliament to keep the issue on the agenda and ensure the interests of European citizens.
Authors’ Biographies
Anton Miguel De Verais an MA student in International Business and Economic Diplomacy at IMC FH Krems. He previously earned a bachelor’s degree in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics from Central European University in Vienna, where he specialized in International Relations and Economics. His thesis examined the dynamics of Philippine agency within the US-Philippine security alliance and its nuanced relationship with China, entitled “The Faces of Philippine Agency in Foreign Affairs: The Philippines and the United States Security Alliances”. Currently based in Vienna, Anton works at Raiffeisen Bank International, where he combines his academic expertise with practical experience in finance and international relations.
Viktoriia Hamaiunova is a Ph.D. candidate at Newcastle University (UK), where she investigates the role of legal culture in shaping fair trial standards within ECHR member states, focusing on the integration of mediation into judicial systems to enhance human rights protections. Her research combines doctrinal and non-doctrinal approaches, incorporating thematic analysis and insights from interviews with ECtHR judges to examine how legal culture influences judicial reform and access to justice. Viktoriia Hamaiunova holds an MA in International Law and Human Rights from the University of Tartu, enriched by academic exchanges at Masaryk University and Comenius University. Her legal career includes in-house experience and ECtHR traineership. An accredited mediator and published author, Viktoriia Hamaiunova has presented her work at prominent conferences, including SLSA Annual Conference and the Human Rights Law Conference at the University of Cambridge. With extensive teaching experience, she leads discussions on topics spanning international law to mediation practices. As an interdisciplinary researcher, Viktoriia Hamaiunova is committed to culturally informed legal reforms, fostering development and facilitating discussions on effective judicial systems and dispute resolution.
Réka Koleszáris an independent researcher focusing on the relations between the European Union and Asia, in particular East Asia. Her experience spans international organizations and think tanks including working for the Council of the European Union and the European Policy Centre. Réka holds an MSc in Political Science from Leiden University, an MA in International Relations specializing in East Asian studies from the University of Groningen, and a diploma in the Art of Diplomacy from the European Academy of Diplomacy.
Giada Pasquettazis a doctoral student at the Chair of Political Science and International Politics of Prof. Dr. Dirk Leuffen since October 2023. Her interests are mainly in political communication, international relations, political behavior, comparative politics and quantitative methods. She holds a master’s degree in mass media and politics with a focus on international social movements’ communication from the University of Bologna. She also completed her bachelor’s degree in Sociology at the University of Bologna with a specialization in migration frames used in media. She completed semesters abroad at the University of Sundsvall (Sweden), at UCLouvain (Belgium) and at the UIT Tromsø (Norway).
Lovely, M. E. & Yan, J. (2024, August 27). “While the US and China decouple, the EU and China deepen trade dependencies.” PIIE. https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2024/while-us-and-china-decouple-eu-and-china-deepen-trade-dependencies
Inglehart, R., & Norris, P. (2016). “Trump, Brexit, and the rise of populism: Economic
Trump, D. J. [@realDonaldTrump]. (2020, March 16). The United States will be powerfully supporting those industries, like Airlines and others, that are particularly affected by the Chinese Virus [Tweet]. X.https://x.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1239685852093169664
Please cite as: Bottura, Beatrice; O’Keeffe-Johnston, Paris; Gkampeta, Pinelopi; Malai, Ludmila; Lynch, Matt; Park, Joon & Gräf, Leon. (2024). “Anticipating the Trump Effect: Strengthening the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum Amid Populist Pressures.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 24, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0001
This policy paper analyzes the potential effects of the 2024 US presidential election on EU politics, particularly the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Trump victory may intensify Euroscepticism and lead to more restrictive migration policies among his European allies. Conversely, a Trump defeat could fuel distrust in electoral processes, potentially triggering events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack. The paper recommends regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to develop tailored migration strategies, anticipating that either election outcome could increase fragmentation and populist influence within EU member states, though with varying degrees of impact.
Authored by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park & Leon Gräf
As the “Common Implementation Plan” for the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum was adopted by the European Commission in June 2024 (European Commission, 2024a), the European and international political landscape was changing. The results of the EU 2024 parliamentary elections revealed a rise of Right-wing populist parties (RPP) on the European scene, a trend which mirrors recent national electoral results (Europe Elects, 2024; Europe Politique, 2024). This right-wing shift is causing a tightening of migration policy across EU countries and affecting the viability of the EU Pact on Migration, with almost half EU countries openly contesting its initiatives and some countries even considering an opt-out, following the Netherlands’ recent opt-out request (Carlson, 2024; Liboreiro, 2024). Simultaneously, former president Donald Trump is running for office once again.
This policy paper examines how the results of the 2024 presidential election might affect EU politics, especially in regard to the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. Though a horizon scanning methodology, the paper found that Trump’s previous presidency coincided with a period of increased Euroscepticism within member countries (Langlois, 2021; Löfflmann, 2019). Additionally, Trump has built strong connections with RPP leaders which, in the past, have become more vocal as Trump gained power (Fusiek & Marconi, 2021). Given Trump’s stance on political elites, supra-national organizations and migration, the paper predicts that:
– in the case of Trump’s victory: Eurosceptic sentiments and restrictive migration policies might increase across the EU, especially among Trump’s European supporters
– in the case of Trump’s loss: events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack might occur (Abramowitz, 2024) which could further distrust in electoral processes both in the US and the EU. This could be leveraged by populist actors, which, to a lesser extent compared to a Trump victory, could still increase fragmentation across EU member states
Finally, given these findings, the paper provides policy options for the European Commission to take into consideration for a successful implementation of the plan. Among these, the paper focuses on the introduction of regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) which are aimed at creating country-tailored implementation strategies for the Pact. In practice, by shedding light onto nation-specific issues when it comes to migration and asylum, these ICRs would allow national leaders to have more control over the actual implementation of the Pact. This should increase the willingness to cooperate of RPPs as it brings together both national sovereignties, an important value to these parties, and European policy.
1. Introduction
Migration is one of the most discussed political and security challenges today. Worsening conflicts, natural disasters, and the hopes of better economic opportunities bring people from across the world to migrate to other areas that are deemed more prosperous or can offer something their homeland cannot. The nature of migration is transboundary, often exacerbating geopolitical issues among countries that are expected to share the burden. This can be illustrated by Trump’s abandonment of the EU during the refugee crisis, leaving Europe alone in dealing with the issue (Koppa, 2017).
As of 2022, there are 46.1 million migrants in the US (Geiger, 2024). Anti-migration and its link to nationalism are core aspects of Trump’s political campaigns and of his past presidency (Löfflmann, 2019). Indeed, during his past campaigns, Trump had made promises for stricter migration policies. Quotes such as “America First” and “Make America Great Again” were commonplace in his speeches and rallies (Lacatus, 2021; Löfflmann, 2022; Magcamit, 2017; Mirza et al., 2021). Unlike other populists, Trump succeeded in passing several anti-migration policies while in office (Table 1).
Europe has also faced difficulties controlling the increasing numbers of its migrant population. According to the International Organization for Migration (McAuliffe & Oucho, 2024), there are approximately 87 million migrants living in Europe. In the context of migration crises, which often disproportionately impact EU member states, balancing European cohesion has fragmented the Union. Additionally, in recent years, Western politics has witnessed a trend of a right-wing shift (see Figure 1) and increased support for populist leaders, which exacerbates this fragmentation (Europe Elects, 2024; Europe Politique, 2024).
Trump’s US presidency coincided with a period of EU instability which saw the rise of right-wing populist parties (RPP) in Europe and the significant decision for Britain to leave the EU, with migration a core topic for the Leave campaign (Langlois, 2021; Löfflmann, 2019). Authors such as Fusiek & Marconi (2021) argue that the popularity of a nationalistic populist in the US gave confidence to populist political actors in Europe to become more vocal and gather support. In the face of EU fragmentation, the Union must be prepared for leniency with its Pact on Migration and Asylum if it wishes to maintain cohesion.
Note: Data sourced from European parliament election 2024, by Europe Elects, 2024 (https://europeelects.eu/ep2024/). Data sourced from Parliament Européen (2019, 2014, 2009, 2004, 1999, 1994, 1989, 1984, 1979), by Europe Politique, 2024.(https://www.europe-politique.eu/parlement-europeen.htm).
This paper delivers policy suggestions for the successful implementation of the Pact, especially in the context of the 2024 US Presidential elections and of its possible repercussions. To do so, the paper briefly delves into the 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, focusing on its strengths, its weaknesses, and how it is perceived by EU member states. Following, the paper conducts a horizon scanning methodology to discuss the possible outcomes of the 2024 US elections and how they could affect international politics and the implementation of the Pact. Finally, the paper provides recommendations to the European Commission to ensure readiness and resilience in the implementation of the Pact in any scenario deriving from the result of the upcoming US elections.
2. The EU and Migration
The EU has faced difficulties in dealing with migration, especially as the issue disproportionately affects certain member states. In dealing with this issue, the EU has developed the EU Pact on Migration, for all EU member states to adhere to.
2.1 The Pact on Migration and Asylum
The 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum establishes a comprehensive and flexible framework that addresses border management, asylum processes, and migrant integration while introducing a mandatory yet adaptable solidarity mechanism (European Commission, 2024b). This framework, as shown in Figure 2, aims to distribute responsibilities more fairly among member states, allowing contributions through relocations, financial support, or alternative measures (Ibid.). However, the Pact faces significant challenges, including bureaucratic complexity, varying political will, and potential conflicts with member states resistant to migration, such as those of the Visegrád Group (V4: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary), which will be discussed in section 2.2 of the paper.
Note: From Pact on Migration and Asylum, by European Commission, 2024b. (https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en). Copyright 2024 by the European Union.
A SWOT analysis of the Pact (Figure 3) was made by the authors which found that the resource-intensive nature of the Pact may strain member states’ capacities, particularly amid shifting political priorities. Nonetheless, it offers opportunities for enhanced cooperation, stronger external partnerships, and economic benefits through managed migration. These potential gains are counterbalanced by threats such as geopolitical instability, rising anti-immigration sentiment, legal disputes within the EU, and the risk of migrants resorting to more dangerous routes due to increased border controls. The success of the pact will depend on its ability to navigate these complexities while ensuring the protection of human rights and fair distribution of responsibilities.
Note: Authors’ creation.
2.2 Backlash from Member States
The Pact has received severe backlash from a number of actors within the EU for very different reasons. On the one hand, due to its attempt at regulating and partially restricting immigration, many on the political left view the Pact as giving too many concessions to the far right, and failing to protect fundamental rights (Griera, 2024). For example, the German Left MEP Cornelia Ernst called the pact “a pact of shame and disgrace,” while other MEPs from Left and Green parties considered the Pact to be a model for a fortress of Europe and a victory for the far-right (Ibid.). Many NGOs also criticized the Pact, with Amnesty International attesting a “surge in suffering” for asylum seekers, if the Pact was to enter into effect (Nattrass, 2024). On the other hand, right-wing governments and parties across the EU also greatly criticized the Pact.
However, contrary to the above-mentioned examples, their main concern is that the Pact is not strict enough on immigration regulation and forces every EU member state to contribute and show solidarity, hence overruling national sovereignty (Nattrass, 2024). The Visegrád countries in particular – namely: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary – heavily criticized the Pact and its solidarity mechanisms, with Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk promising that Poland will “find ways so that even if the migration pact comes into force in a roughly unchanged form, we will protect Poland against the relocation mechanism” (Nattrass, 2024), while the Hungarian government also pledged to find ways to avoid taking in immigrants and called the Pact “another nail in the coffin of the European Union” (Nattrass, 2024).
In addition to the Visegrád Group, an increasing number of member countries is expressing its discontent with the Pact, a trend tied to the rise of RPPs throughout Europe (Vinocur et al., 2024). In particular, this is manifesting through a push for tighter deportation and border control measures across Europe (Vinocur et al., 2024). 17 countries in the Schengen area – Austria and the Netherlands and endorsed by Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Slovakia and Sweden. Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein – have recently signed an appeal to the EU executive to toughen return policies when asylum applications are rejected as well as increasing European coordination when it comes to deportations (Carlson, 2024; Liboreiro, 2024). Additionally, numerous countries in the Schengen area – i.e. Austria, Denmark, France, Italy, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden (Dell’Anna, 2024) – are increasing border controls, which hinders the right to freedom of movement. In addition to these general trends, in countries where RPPs are gaining executive positions, the stance on migration policy is toughening even more (Carlson, 2024; Stekić, 2024; Vinocur et al., 2024). Recent examples of this trend – including the extreme example of the Netherlands’ request to opt-out of the Pact – are shown visually in Figure 4 and a full table is available in Appendix A.
Note: Authors’ creation.
This restrictive stance appears also at the European level where, as illustrated in section 1, right-leaning groups have gained more influence (Vinocur et al., 2024). In particular, members of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) and of the European People’s Party (EPP) support the toughening of deportation mechanisms, the increase of asylum-seeker reception centers outside of the EU, and the funding for extra EU border control (Ibid.).
In sum, the Migration Pact, which is supposed to offer a compromise, is seen negatively by both sides of the political spectrum for respectively leaning too much into the opposite political spectrum, a trend that has led countries to push for a re-draft of the pact (Vinocur et al., 2024). In this context, the main challenge to the successful implementation of the Pact remains to satisfy parties and voters on the left-wing and pro-immigration side and on the right-wing anti-immigration side concurrently. This challenge will be addressed in section 5 of this policy paper, where policy options and recommendations are provided.
3. Methodology
Horizon scanning is used by building on early warning signs and predictions based on current events, by analyzing political discourse. Geopolitical issues are increasingly complex and interconnected. With such challenges, the use of horizon scanning is crucial to prepare and inform policymakers and decision-makers about potential opportunities and threats (Amanatidou et al., 2012). There are two core aspects of horizon scanning: alerting and creating. Alerting includes the early identification of emerging issues, whereas the creative aspect refers to the reassembly of current issues into a prediction for what might develop into a policy problem. Current political discourse in Europe has centered around a migration debate and discontent towards failing solutions to handle the issue, simultaneously the US Presidential debate has Donald Trump potentially returning for a second term.
4. Examinations of Findings: The US 2024 Presidential Elections
As a two-party system, there exists only two possible results of the US Presidential election – a Trump victory, or a Harris victory. Regardless, there shall be a possibility of outcomes in either scenario. Having conducted horizon scanning, there are two possible scenarios that may impact European politics on migration: whether Trump should achieve victory, or whether Trump reacts poorly and encourages disruption in the event of a loss.
4.1 A Trump Victory
In the event that Trump achieves victory, there are two core aspects that will shape the political landscape around migration. Trump has demonstrated an ability to influence and encourage populists in the EU to be more vocal and gather support, as illustrated in Figure 5 (Fusiek & Marconi, 2021). In this regard, it can be expected that the political landscape in Europe will continue to favor populism during a revival of right-wing shift while Trump would have his second term. A second Trump presidential term would likely embolden European populist leaders such as Viktor Orbán, Marine Le Pen, Matteo Salvini, Jarosław Kaczyński, and even populist parties such as the Alternative for Germany (AfD) or Austria’s Freedom Party (FPÖ) by validating their nationalist, anti-EU, and illiberal policies (Naughtie, 2024). During his first presidency, Trump openly praised some of these leaders, especially Viktor Orbán, Trump was quoted saying “Let me just say about world leaders, Viktor Orbán, one of the most respected men, they call him a strong man” and undermined multilateral bodies, sending a clear signal that illiberal governance and nationalist policies are able to thrive without any significant repercussions from the US (Euractiv, 2024).
Note: Authors’ creation. Purple shows the Visegrád Group countries and yellow shows Western European states. Politicians who have a direct link or friendship with Trump are highlighted in red.
Trump’s alignment with right-wing ideologies would also likely embolden these leaders to promote policies that further marginalize minority groups, restrict immigration, and consolidate political power by undermining judicial independence and press freedoms. In a second term, Trump’s open disdain for international organizations like NATO and the EU would likely reduce pressure on these populist leaders to adhere to democratic norms (Stekić, 2024). By downplaying concerns over democratic backsliding and encouraging isolationist policies, Trump would create an EU environment where these leaders and parties continue to push their nationalist agendas further, almost completely free from the fear of diplomatic or economic consequences.
Further issues that may surface from a Trump victory is the implementation of Project 2025: a Republican policy mantra with strict consequences for migration (The Heritage Foundation, n.d.). Core proposals of the project include continued and increased funding of the ‘Border Wall’, the deportation of migrants, and the removal of visa categories for victims of crime and human trafficking (Wendling, 2024). The project calls for the dissemination of the Department of Homeland Security to be replaced with stronger immigration enforcement bodies for stricter border control (Ibid.). Legal migration would also face stricter measures, through increased fees for visa applications (Ibid.). Donald Trump, as a form of populism, has been linked to the Brexit debate and fueling the “politics of anger”, a concept which some believe has contributed to euroscepticism across the Union (Smorag, 2020; Wind, 2017). If Trump were to be re-elected, it could be expected such sentiments may become prevalent in European political discourse again.
Should Trump win and implement Project 2025, the EU could mirror a restrictive stance again. This prediction is increasingly plausible (Vinocur et al., 2024), especially given the latest trends highlighted in section 2b. Overall, Trump’s influence has the power to destabilize democracies through the use of disinformation which causes greater distrust. Trump may prompt RPP leaders and their parties to entrench their power through policies aimed at curbing media freedom, overhauling the judicial system and the rule of law both at the national and supranational level, and even denouncing opposition parties.
4.2 Reactions to A Trump Loss
On the contrary, should Harris be elected as the first woman President, implications will lead to different roads. It is possible that the post-election events of January 2021 – i.e. the Capitol attacks – could have a sequel (Abramowitz, 2024). Many EU leaders took to the media to condemn the attack on the Capitol, denouncing the use of violence in any form of democratic process. Most were outright with their criticism of Trump’s handling of the situation and the consequences of his words. Common responses from RPP leaders and members – i.e. Marine Le Pen, Giorgia Meloni, and Victor Orbán- were to include a condemning of violence, protecting democracy, whilst simultaneously illustrating Trump in a positive light, often as a ‘peacemaker’ for his limited calls to avoid violent attacks during the protest, whilst others excused Trump of any wrongdoing (Herszenhorn et al., 2021). Should a similar situation arise, where Trump would instigate a protest after losing the election, it is expected that the previously mentioned EU leaders would follow similar actions as before. In this scenario, European leaders are likely to hold a consensus view that democracy is the forefront of our political system, not to be undermined. Likewise, it is expected that Harris would share the same sentiments for democracy and condemn his final attempt at power.
Regardless of the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election, Europe is undeniably fragmented politically, which significantly impacts the practical implementation of the EU Migration Pact. In recent months, in Germany, the far-right party Alternative for Germany (AfD) has been vocal about its opposition to migration. It further supports a “remigration” implementation (Hockenos, 2024) that has surged in federal elections. In Austria, the Freedom of Austria Party (FPÖ) won in the recent election. The FPÖ is expected to push a hardline stance on immigration and resist EU-level initiatives. The FPÖ will likely join forces with other mainstream populist parties (Cameron & and Goldstein, 2024).
In addition to the success of far-right parties across Europe, the ongoing war in Ukraine continues to drive a wedge between nations more friendly and dependent on Russia to take a harder line on accepting Ukrainian refugees, let alone migrants from the Middle East or North Africa. Nations such as Greece and Italy continue to deal with the Mediterranean migration crisis, which is expected to continue for years. These existing crises continue to be a launch pad for far-right populist parties’ rhetoric.
5. Policy Options
At the time of writing, there was around one month remaining until the 2024 US Presidential election would be held. Three policy options were created for the European Commission to consider for a smooth and coherent implementation of the 2024 EU Pact on Migration and Asylum.
The European Commission must organize a commonly managed and coordinated European asylum systemcentered around the wellness of human beings: the EU should work on the defense of fundamental human rights, immigrants’ safety and dignity. It is also suggested that the Union ought to use the reservation of migrants as a last resort and try to create other effective solutions, like open reception centers, since prolonged detention results in devastating effects on migrants’ mental health (International Rescue Committee, 2023).
The European Commission should strengthen the resettlement of refugees in the Union Resettlement Framework (URF): this includes timely and just handling of the reception and integration of refugees and immigrants from day one. More specifically, the Union must offer decent reception conditions throughout the EU, such as providing education and healthcare. Moreover, the Union ought to worry about the progress with an organized and transparent mechanism for monitoring the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.
The European Commission should fund and conduct regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to track the impact of the Pact on Migration and Asylum at a national level and allow for country-tailored implementation strategies:similar reviews are already conducted by the Commission such as European Semester reports, the Environmental Implementation Review and economic IDRs annually. These reviews would provide a mechanism for member states to detail the impact of migration in areas that are core concerns for countries. Each country review should conclude with action points and priorities at the member state and EU-level.
Though all three policy options are of equal importance to ensure the successful and coherent implementation of the plan, this paper proceeds to focus on the last policy option as a strong recommendation to the European Commission, in order to ensure preparedness for the ongoing implementation of the Pact in this time of political uncertainty. The reasons and specifics behind this recommendation follow in the next subsection.
5.1 Recommendations
The recommendation of ICRs within the context of the implementation of the Pact acts as a preventative method which focuses on three areas and values that are important for European RPPs with the aim of ensuring their increased cooperation in the implementation of the Pact. First, the country-specific analyses yielded by the IDRs would allow national leaders to suggest implementation strategies tailored to each nation’s socio-economic needs and capabilities. These tailored solutions will preserve national sovereignty. Second, through these country-specific analyses and implementation strategies, it would be possible to put a specific attention on a proper cultural integration of migrants, ensuring their wellbeing within society whilst preserving national traditions. This possibility could strengthen social cohesion, hence appeasing any anti-immigration sentiments that are likely to be strengthened by Trump’s influence. Finally, IDRs would strengthen national agencyand allow for national interests to be at the heart of policy implementation whilst EU’s core objectives and values are upheld.
In particular, to ensure their above-mentioned purpose, we envision ICRs to present key sections as follows. First, an Economic Contributions and Challenges of Migration section of the review would report statistics relating to the economy, workforce and their welfare states. This will allow member states to further detail shortages in the job market where migration of people with work experiences related to the field are required. For example, countries experiencing shortages of agricultural workers, healthcare, or otherwise may request that their migrant quota includes those able to contribute to those sectors. Migration is often talked about as a burden by RPPs, highlighting the skills and benefits migrants can bring to suffering industries should mitigate this issue.
Second, a section dedicated to reporting on Social Dynamics and Community Integration would allow states to report statistics related to socio-cultural data, such as attendance to language courses, educational attendance, and integration into society through work or social programmed. This would address the common concerns of RPP tied to the erasure of national identity and traditions due to immigration. It is hoped that providing member states an avenue to report on socio-cultural impacts of migration will demonstrate an effort to protect national identity whilst promoting integration
Finally, a section for Impacts Not Otherwise Stated is proposed. This would allow member states to flag any additional issues they are facing in the implementation of the Pact to EU institutions. Such issues could include difficulties in processing of incoming migrants, including manpower, biometrics, and service availability. Overall, this should help with national governance for the Pact.
All ICRs ought to conclude with a plan for the future. Plans should enable co-working between the Commission and Member States to come up with priorities and action points for each stakeholder going forward with the Pact, as similar EU reports conclude with. With this recommendation, member states can agree with the EU on what is most important and applicable to the individual country, rather than having a “one size fits all” method applied to all EU members.
Due to the politically sensitive nature of migration, the importance of impartiality was noted. It is recommended that the ICRs are conducted independently, with assistance from the Eurostat peer-review team. The EU has six funding pools that it may draw from that can achieve this recommendation feasibly: (1) Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund, (2) Internal Security Fund, (3) European Social Fund Plus, (4) European Regional Development Fund, (5) Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, and (6) Emergency Assistance and Other Ad Hoc Funding.
6. Conclusion
At this stage, the result of the American elections is ambiguous. The scenario of Trump’s re-election to power will bring about unfavorable results both at the overall EU level and on the immigration issue, as a Trump presidency would entail significant disruptions in US-EU relations (Frangeul-Alves & Weber, 2024). Trump’s troubled relations with the EU and his pursuit of isolationism, as well as his apparent apathy towards immigrants and refugees, mean that the former president will once again leave the Union alone on the issue that plagues it. Therefore, the developments in the field of immigration will differ greatly depending on the US election results.
In any case, the EU should not be complacent, regardless of the election result, as the migrant – refugee crisis plagues Brussels. Migration is one of the most important policy issues (Lovato, 2021) and it has turned into a geopolitical issue. Immigration is a labyrinthine for the EU and a complex problem, thus the solution will not be easy, especially given EU member states’ diverse opinions on the matter (Donceel, 2024).
To conclude, this policy paper delved into the implementation of this Pact, focusing on how it is susceptible to the rise of populism both in Europe and abroad. In particular, after conducting a SWOT analysis of the Pact and providing an overview of how it is perceived across Europe, the paper focused on how the implementation of the Pact could be affected by the results of the upcoming US presidential elections. Based on previous cases, it is expected that in case of victory Trump will incentivize his EU “allies”, such as Hungary’s Orban, Italy’s Meloni, and Slovakia’s Fico (Naughtie, 2024), resist the Pact in the name of national sovereignty and anti-elitism. In the case of Trump’s loss however, the likely scenario is that the former president would encourage them to challenge the election outcomes and attempt to undermine democratic processes. This could deepen the public’s distrust in representative institutions across the US and the EU, ultimately furthering the disengagement from electoral processes (i.e. increasing voter absenteeism).
The authors of this paper believe that the recommended introduction of periodic in-depth country reviews (ICRs) would serve as a preventative measure in anticipation of Trump influencing RPPs in Europe. Of course, whilst future outcomes are uncertain due to the vivacity of the electoral campaigns in the US as well as worsening international orders, we are confident that as the European Commission sustains the cooperative nature of the Pact across political spectrums – which we recommend doing by ensuring tailored implementation strategies across member states’ government – its implementation will be successful.
(*) This policy paper is based on research conducted by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park and Leon Gräf during the ECPS Case Competition “US Foreign Policy and Populism,” held as part of the ECPS Summer School from July 1-5, 2024.
Authors’ Biographies
Beatrice Bottura is a Sciences Po master student in Public Policy, specializing in Social Policy and Social Innovation, and a Central European University (CEU) graduate in Philosophy Politics and Economics. Her research interests revolve around the crisis of democracy and how it relates to political attitudes and policymaking. She has explored this in her bachelor thesis “Ethnopopulists’ reaction to crises: the case of Fratelli D’Italia”, from which she derived an article for the Horizon Europe project “AuthLIB – Neo-Authoritarianisms in Europe and the Liberal Democratic Response”, which she is involved in as a research assistant. For this project she has worked with CEU’s Democracy institute and Sciences Po’s Centre d’Études Européennes (CEE). Particularly, she conducted discourse analyses for the working paper “Illiberalism and Social Policy: A Four-Country Comparison”, is authoring an upcoming publication on varieties of illiberalism across policy areas with CEU and has coded speech for the CEE’s work measuring “Ideological configurations”.
Joon Park is a third-year student at George Washington University, pursuing a bachelor’s in international Affairs and Finance with a minor in Economics. Born to Korean immigrants and raised in Germany, her academic focus spans EU economics, German domestic and foreign politics, U.S. foreign policy, and East Asian geopolitical strategy. She is currently researching the rise of right-wing populism in Europe in collaboration with the Center for Faith, Identity, and Globalization in Washington, D.C. Joon’s passion lies in exploring how global political systems and economic dynamics intersect to shape international relations and policy.
Matthew Lynch is a Master of Science candidate in Global Studies and International Relations at Northeastern University in Boston. He received a Bachelor of Science in Supply Chain Management from the University of Massachusetts Dartmouth. With a background in international business, his current research focuses on how populism creates vulnerabilities in EU defense and security, particularly the potential for external actors to exploit these weaknesses. He also researches German foreign and defense policy.
Leon Gräf holds a BA in Political Science and Philosophy, University of Heidelberg, Germany and an MA in Political Science, University of Mannheim, Germany. He is currently working as Research Fellow at the Max Planck Foundation for International Peace and the Rule of Law, and as a Research Assistant at the Chair of Empirical Macrosociology at Heidelberg University. Additionally, is has been working as a researcher at the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) since 2021. His MA thesis focused on mediator characteristics and their effect on ceasefire success across different regions.
Pinelopi Gkampeta is a graduate student in the Advanced M.Sc. in “European Integration” in Brussels School of Governance (VUB) and she currently lives in Brussels. Furthermore, she has obtained a master’s degree in “International and European Governance and Politics” from the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens and a bachelor’s degree in “Philosophy” from the same university. She has taken part in the Erasmus+ Program “Maritime Security Common Module “by European Security and Defence College and Hellenic Naval Academy. Moreover, she is a research intern in the Institute of International Relations (Athens, Greece) and also an editor and analyst at the Association of International and European Affairs. Pinelopi worked as a research assistant for the Identity and Conflict Lab (Yale University) for some months. Her areas of interest and research are EU as a Global Actor, EU External Relations, EU Security and Defense Policy, Maritime Security and Immigration Policy.
Paris O’Keeffe-Johnstonholds an MA in International Relations, Conflict & Security from Northumbria University. Her research focuses primarily on societal security, with an emphasis on digital threats. Her dissertation explored how EU policy documents framed cybersecurity as an existential threat. Currently, her research interests have expanded to include the societal risks posed by AI. This includes how populists may use generative AI to either gather support or create the illusion of widespread backing, as well as to drive disinformation campaigns. By investigating this area, she aims to uncover how algorithms could be leveraged for early detection and mitigation of polarizing content ahead of elections.
Ludmila Malaiis an experienced EU Project Manager at the Intercultural Dialogue Platform, with a diverse academic background in Economics, Administration, Politics, Diplomacy, and Conflict Resolution. She holds a Master’s in International Law and Security Studies from the Free University of Brussels and is fluent in English, French, Russian, Italian, and Romanian. Over the past six years, Ludmila has specialized in writing and coordinating European projects focused on CVE/PVE, radicalization, combating racism, Antisemitism, Islamophobia, the security of places of worship, women’s empowerment, and youth civic engagement.
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Ronco, Massimo & Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “Revising the Trumpian Legacy in the US Foreign Policy towards Latin America.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 16, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0003
Abstract
This paper revisits the legacy of former US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), with a particular focus on economic policies and their long-term impact. It argues that Trump’s policies eroded US soft power in the region and failed to adequately address China’s expanding influence. Although the Joe Biden administration sought to reset US relations with LAC, it retained the bulk of Trump’s protectionist policies, perpetuating ongoing trade volatility and regional instability. This paper emphasizes the need for a revised US economic strategy in Latin America that both counters China’s influence and fosters deeper economic integration across the region. The authors propose three policy scenarios for the future: a more aggressive protectionist stance under a second Trump administration, a continuation of Biden-era policies under potential future Democratic leadership, or a more integrative approach that enhances regional cooperation and infrastructure development.
Authored by Massimo Ronco & Christo Pretorius
Edited by Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins
Introduction
Although the US influence in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been undermined by a lack of targeted engagement following the Cold War (McKinley, 2023), at the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency, US policy choices in LAC rapidly eroded American soft power and compromised the US’s regional interests by inadequately addressing China’s growing regional influence. The paper intends to outline the features of a revised American foreign policy towards LAC by focusing on the economic policies enacted by Trump. The aim of this brief is to provide recommendations on how to develop a strategy to rebuild trust with Latin American countries and prevent China from further increasing its influence on the continent. While the focus is on Trump’s policies, this paper remains highly relevant, as much of the former president’s foreign policy has been maintained by President Joe Biden. Many protectionist policies remain in place – and some tariff barriers and subsidies to national companies have even increased. The paper argues that any responsible economic policy launched in the region should be integrated into a comprehensive strategy which acknowledges that the main obstacle to unlocking the region’s potential as a partner remains the trade volatility between North and Global South economies, in this case, between the US and the LAC.
The paper’s focus on economic policies is warranted by three considerations. The first is that trade constitutes the foundation for future, deeper cooperation and the conditions for developing political and strategic partnerships (Kehonane & Nye, 2011; Haas, 1964). Second, economic agreements are more palatable to foreign allies. Against the backdrop of Trump’s rhetorical resort to the Monroe Doctrine (PBS NewsHour, 2018), economic policy is perceived as less damaging to state sovereignty than agreements of a political, military or strategic nature. The third reason has to do with the nature of the regimes of some countries in Latin America, which display some socialist tendencies and may offer reduced margins for cooperation in the political or military fields. This paper also emphasizes the connection between the economic policies enacted in the region under Trump and the populist character of the broader strategy from which they emerged, which approaches foreign policy issues as opportunities to appeal to the domestic base (Cadier, 2024; Hall, 2021).
Revising Trump’s Economic Policy
Although outspoken about how the US would ‘reject the interference of foreign nations in this hemisphere’ during his 2018 address to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the Trump administration’s general approach to Central and Latin America was marked by a blend of strategic disinterest in the region and isolationist closure, as exemplified by the barriers established at the border with Mexico in 2018 or by Trump’s stated intention of withdrawing from the NAFTA (PBS NewsHour, 2018). The US’s relative indifference to the LAC region is to be contextualized within a progressive loss of appeal following the collapse of the Soviet Union (Campos & Prevost, 2019: 22; Gurtov, 2021), which originally comprised three components: free trade and economic liberalization, democracy and governance, and security. Trump’s rise to power meant the restructuring of such a triad and a weakening of the first two pillars. The economic policy choices made by Trump’s administration were mainly motivated by the desire to correct the terms of trade relations that were considered detrimental to US interests and American workers and to curb the expansion of China’s influence on the continent.
This paper proposes to revise and mitigate some populist elements of Trump’s foreign policy in the region, which are considered counterproductive and weakening the US influence.
The first amendable element is the transactional and short-term approach to dealing with trade agreements and, more broadly, the economic issues of the continent. The promise to withdraw from NAFTA and the imposition of tariffs on items like steel and aluminum resulted in negative consequences, as the volatility of Latin American countries’ markets increased due to the uncertainty of access to the US market or aid assistance, Latin American countries became more vulnerable to the Chinese debt trap and, finally, during Trump’s tenure China became Latin America’s largest trading partner, with the exception of Mexico. (Stuenkel, 2020; Roy, 2023).
The second element worthy of scrutiny is the Trump presidency’s anti-globalist rhetoric and adoption of old-style protectionist policies. Trump’s economic policies were guided by the objective of reducing US dependency on other productive economies, such as China and South Korea, without fully taking into account that reducing dependency does not necessarily translate into autonomy because value chains still have an important global dimension. The result of this approach was a substantial blow to US credibility in the eyes of Latin American countries, even those considered more aligned, such as Brazil. In fact, despite former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro’s anti-Chinese stance and ideological affinities with Trump, the US president still imposed barriers on products and metals from Brazil, such as steel and aluminum (Gilardi, 2019).
Assessing Three Policy Options
At the moment of the writing, three policy scenarios can be envisaged:
The first policy option, likely to be implemented if Trump is elected in the 2024 US presidential elections on November 5, will consist of putting pressure on Mexico to review the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in view of its renegotiation scheduled for 2026. In this case, further restrictions on rules of origin would be included with the intention both to bar China from accessing the Mexican market and to continue to shrink trade deflection, which would otherwise allow some imported goods from non-USCMA countries to enter the US market via Mexico without paying tariffs.
Furthermore, Trump may engage in a trade war with some other countries in the region. He may suspend the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Nicaragua if its policies towards illegal migration do not change, while relations with Colombia, the US’s closest partner in the region, which in 2022 saw the first leftist government of the country’s modern history, may cool due to ideological divergences. Likely, the result of the will to impose tariff barriers, introduce reinforced rules of origin and subside the American national industry would damage US interests by precipitating higher domestic inflation, reallocation of market shares towards less efficient domestic producers, lower capital investment, the decline of the demand for domestic goods, and a loss of jobs in the USMCA area.
The second option would be to multiply the number of economic agreements and partnerships in the region while maintaining or doubling down on protectionist policies. This scenario would be most likely in the case of Democratic nominee Kamala Harris’ victory in the presidential elections. As Biden’s vice president with limited previous experience in foreign policy (Ashford & Kroenig, 2024) and with not a dominating character (Jenkins, 2024), Harris may seek to preserve some of Biden’s economic policies in the region, founded on subsidies to national industry, tariffs and “Buy American” rules (White House, 2021). For instance, the new partnerships negotiated by the Democratic presidency, such as the “Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity” (APEP), did not foresee provisions of preferential access to the US market, thus denying the eleven Latin American countries who signed the pact to benefit from a reduction of tariffs or a significant increase in trade flow (Hufbauer & Hoogan, 2021). If, on the one hand, Biden rejected the populist character of his predecessor’s strategy, on the other hand, he did not substantially change the US’s economic approach, including towards Latin America. Closer economic cooperation between the US and Latin America ties into supranationalist and intergovernmentalist theories of integration, reinforcing regional ties whilst maintaining peace and stability (Leuffen et al., 2022).
The third option, recommended by the writers of this paper, is to implement a set of measures which would aim to offset the disparity of trade relations between Northern and Global South economies. Indeed, in 2023, the relations between the US and Latin American countries were characterized by low levels of trade in comparison with those between the US and other advanced economies, such as European countries or Japan. In other words, Northern American countries record a higher level of economic integration (EI) than Latin American countries. This third scenario would entail a mitigation process of the dragging effect of the protectionist policies enacted by the last two presidencies with the aim of gaining the trust of Latin American countries. One step in this direction would be the enlargement of the USCM, an FTA to which the US, Mexico, and Canada are already signatories, to other Latin American countries (de la Calle, 2023). The USMCA could be extended to Chile, which has a solid market-oriented economy and stable democratic institutions; Panama, which constitutes a major distribution center for goods moving between North and South America; and Costa Rica, given its economic stability, strong regulatory alignment, and existing close ties with the US and Canada. The enlargement of the market would allow Mexico to offset the economic loss derived from the imports coming from extra-USCMA countries, especially the EU and China, by exporting to the FTA products with a higher level of foreign backward participation originating from Costa Rica and Panama.
Secondly, the US should support a modification of the economic agreement, which will discipline the expansion of the free trade area in order to reduce the instability of preferential market access. The targets of the amendments should concern three provisions of the current agreement. The first is the sunset clause, which foresees the agreement’s expiration after sixteen years since its entry into force and a review period after six years, weakening the investors’ trust for long-term investments. Regarding this point, the US should introduce automatic renewal mechanisms and extend review periods to create stability in the markets and members of the USMCA. The second provision concerns the limitation of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) to only certain sectors with high upfront costs, including oil and gas. In future negotiations, the US should consider extending the protection to a higher number of economic sectors to provide more guarantees to investors.
Finally, the third provision established three new rules concerning automotive rules of origin: the extension of the Regional Value Contents (RVCs) to core parts of vehicles, the requirement that 70% of a vehicle’s steel be sourced from North America and, finally, the requirement that the production of 40/45% of a vehicle or a truck occur in factory plants where the Mexican workers’ wage is five to eight times higher than average (Ludovic, 2023: 365). These measures contributed to a decline in investments and a 0.971% reduction in Mexico’s annual real GDP in 2020, other than an estimated loss of US GDP of 0.12% compared to NAFTA (Manak, 2020). There is evidence to suggest the objective of strengthening the North American value chains was not achieved, as, between 2019 and 2022, imports from the USMCA area (29%) rose less than imports from the rest of the world (32%) (Sarukhán et al., 2023). To counter the negative impact of the tightening of the rules of origin, the US should negotiate an enlargement of the USMCA with Chile, Costa Rica, and Panama, as already mentioned above, and provide incentives to small and medium-sized companies of the members of the expanded USMCA.
Thirdly, the US should launch a long-term program of targeted investments in the construction and improvement of infrastructure in Latin American countries. The construction of ports, airports, canals and highways is an essential condition for reaching the objective of offsetting the structural volatility of trade relations between the US and Latin American countries, but also within Latin America. Investments in the infrastructure field would equip Latin American countries with the appropriate platforms, hubs and roads to increase the trade flows within the continent.
Conclusion
The paper tackled not only the economic policy choices towards Latin America undertaken during Trump’s presidency but, by embracing a broader timeline, analyzed the more problematic subject of the legacy of Trump’s foreign policy in Latin America. Despite Biden’s entry into office and the current president’s stated intention to reset relations with Latin American countries and increase cooperation, relatively scarce attention has been given to the Latin American strategic quadrant in the past four years.
The fact that after the first six months of the Democratic administration, the position of Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs was still vacant indicates what little priority Latin America has for current US policymakers. As the Western Hemisphere can be considered the US’s “backyard,” it is a region in which the emergence of a hegemonic country – like China- cannot be tolerated, and current US foreign policy does not seem suited to address this challenge.
This paper emphasized the cruciality of the Latin American strategic quadrant for the US’ interests by recommending a set of economic policy measures which should respond to an organic and coherent economic-strategic logic, aimed at increasing trade flows and boosting regional economic integration. Since the 1950s, scholars have tried to find a solution for the trade volatility between LAC countries and industrialized countries, such as the US or EU. They proposed implementing measures aimed at privileging intra-regional trade and building a regional integration process (Goodman & Schneider, 2023).
Nonetheless, the failure of economic integration from the inside should make the US consider how it can foster both trade flows with LAC countries and favorable conditions for building a regional integration process. Such a strategy would also counter China’s growing influence, derived from their FTAs already negotiated with four countries and the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) (Duckworth, 2023). Chinese funding for infrastructure projects leveraged LAC countries’ structural need to build a regional integration space to face the low levels of trade with more advanced economies such as the US and EU and the uncertainty of access to their markets.
(*) This policy paper is based on research conducted by Andrea Sanchez, Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins, Christo Pretorius, Massimo Ronco, and Muhmmed Sihabudheen during the ECPS Case Competition “US Foreign Policy and Populism,” held as part of the ECPS Summer School from July 1-5, 2024.
Authors’ Biographies
Massimo Ronco is a Researcher and International Policy Analyst with a master’s degree in international studies from Turin and a master’s degree in EU external relations from the Brussels School of International Studies of Kent. He is currently working in Brussels in the field of EU research and project management. In 2023, he became a member of the “German-Italian Young Leaders Dialogue,” a forum promoted by the Italian and German Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Also, in 2023, he obtained a diploma in Geopolitics at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies. His areas of interest and research are geopolitics, US foreign policy, European security, Russian foreign policy, politics and culture of the Middle East, and political philosophy.
Christo Pretorius graduated with an MSc in International Public Policy and Diplomacy from University College Cork and was the first student to receive a postgraduate “Student of the Year” award from the Department of Government. His dissertation was published and acquired by the Bar of Ireland’s Law Library and has gone on to support Irish policymakers. Stemming from his undergraduate degree in Ancient and Medieval History and Culture from Trinity College Dublin, his research interests include the mechanisms for authoritarian power and control, as well as democratic backsliding, particularly when viewed from a historical lens.
Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins is a second-year Ph.D. researcher at the University of Oxford. Her research primarily concerns studies of masculinity and elite culture in post-WWII Italy. By examining a number of clusters of upper-middle-class male networks of solidarity from 1945 to the mid-1970s, she hopes to understand the fabric of the post-war democratic ‘classe dirigente.’ While working on her thesis, she also continues to research the development of Christian Democratic politics in the 20th century and remains broadly interested in the history of gender, the history of friendship, and – when time allows — 19th and 20th-century art history.
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Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “EU Employment Law and the AI Act: A Policy Brief Putting the Human Back in ‘Human-Centric’ Policy.” Policy Papers. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 11, 2024.https://doi.org/10.55271/pop0002
This policy paper analyzes the European Union’s (EU) AI Act, aimed at regulating Artificial Intelligence (AI) through four risk classifications related to data protection, privacy, security, and fundamental rights. While the Act establishes regulatory frameworks, it neglects employment security, a critical factor behind public mistrust of AI. The paper warns that failure to address this issue could deepen socio-economic inequalities and lead to political unrest. Recommendations include promoting collective negotiation between workers and employers, advocating for legislation on redundancies linked to AI, and launching information campaigns to educate workers, thus ensuring fair working conditions and improving trust in AI technology.
The European Union (EU) is attempting to regulate the deployment of Artificial Intelligence (AI) through the recently passed AI Act. Overall, the Act outlines four distinct classifications for AI systems, categorizing them on the risk they pose on an individual’s data protection, privacy, security, and fundamental rights. It further provides regulations and guidance to member states on each category and calls for the establishment of national and EU level regulatory bodies to enforce the Act. However, ultimately the Act overlooks the critical issue of employment security, which is the main cause behind mistrust of AI. This gap could exacerbate socio-economic inequalities and fuel political unrest in the short to long term if it is not addressed promptly.
Research indicates that AI will have a disruptive effect on employment overall as certain types of work is automated and augmented, but the effects of this will be felt most in clerical, secretarial, and para-professional roles, which poses a risk to vulnerable groups including women and those with lower educational attainment. There is a pressing need for proactive measures to mitigate the harmful effects of the technology’s implementation on workers and their families, specifically the protection against unjustified dismissal and the assurance of fair working conditions. The following recommendations are proposed to address the Act’s shortcomings:
Collective Negotiation: Encourage cooperation between workers, employers, and worker associations to assess AI’s impact on jobs. This could lead to agreements on redeployment, education opportunities, or redundancy notices, providing workers with clearer timelines and reducing workplace disruption.
Advocacy for New Legislation: Push for legislation that mandates notice periods for redundancies due to technological innovation, building on the EU Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions. The International Labor Organization’s 1982 Termination of Employment Convention offers a valuable template for such legislation.
Information Campaigns: Launch campaigns to educate workers on AI systems, their potential benefits, and available upskilling opportunities. These efforts would enhance trust in AI, aligning with the AI Act’s goal of ensuring human-centric, safe, and lawful AI deployment.
Context: The Problem with the AI Act
The discussion about AI regulation in the European Union (EU) began with Ursula von der Leyen’s 2019-2024 agenda for Europe, A Union that Strives for More (2019). It stated that she would ‘put forward legislation for a coordinated European approach on the human and ethical implications of Artificial Intelligence’ (von der Leyen, 2019: 13). What followed was a call for greater focus on enabling more investment in, and the better coordination of the development and deployment of AI in the EU, alongside a call for a clear definition of what high-risk AI systems are (General Secretariat of the Council to Delegations, 2020). Jointly, the Coordinated Plan on Artificial Intelligence was published to help foster trust in AI systems yet failed to address the real consideration that such a disruptive technology would have on the world of work (European Commission, 2021). The purpose of this policy brief is to advocate for greater attention to be given to the area of employment law, so that action may be taken to ease the concerns over job loss relating to AI, and thus, foster greater trust in this new technology.
A report from the International Labor Organization estimated that the introduction of AI systems would have an overall disruptive effect worldwide, highlight that an important share of clerical, secretarial, and para-professional jobs would be most affected (Gmyrek et al., 2023). These findings are supported by similar ones from PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited (PWC), the US-based National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Pew Research Centre, which also found that women and individuals with lower levels of education are most vulnerable to job loss due to automation (Hawksworth, Berriman, & Goel, 2018; Acemoglu, & Restrepo, 2021; Kochhar, 2023). Although this is an evolving issue, as AI indeed has the potential to increase economic growth and improve lives, the disruptive impact of AI systems on the world of work has yet to be felt. Therefore, it is important to take the necessary steps now to mitigate the harmful affect this technology can have on workers and their families and provide a safety net to individuals during this period of transition.
Currently the EU’s AI Act states that it is trying to ensure ‘a high level of protection of health, safety, fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2012) of the European Union (hereby referred to as the ‘Charter’), including democracy, the rule of law and environmental protection, to protect against the harmful effects of AI systems in the Union…’. However, one of the fundamental rights not addressed was that of Articles 30 (Protection in the event of unjustified dismissal) and 31 (Fair and just working conditions) of the Charter (European Union, 2012). The focus on adopting AI throughout the EU, whilst highlighting the issues of data protection, privacy, and security of individuals in the long term, has left the area of employment concerns unaddressed.
The EU has highlighted that this area is one that should be legislated on in the future, stating in their 2022 report on artificial intelligence in the digital age: ‘[The European Parliament] emphasises that the use of AI in this area gives rise to a number of ethical, legal and employment related challenges… [and] stresses that AI is currently already substituting or complementing humans in a subset of tasks but that it is not yet having detectable significant aggregate labour market consequences’ (European Parliament, 2022). The report also highlights that strong links between AI and the rising socio-economic inequality has been found, and researchers warn that unregulated AI will further increase the wealth gap within society, a finding supported by other academic publications (Rotman, 2022; Bushwick, 2023). MEP Brando Benifei indicates that a proposal for a directive on AI at the workplace is something to be discussed in the future, but at present there is not much information from Benifei or anyone else on what policy discussions in this area will look like (Publyon, 2024). This uncertainty continues following von der Leyen’s announcement that more research investments will be made into AI, leaving commentators to speculate what will actually be funded (Wold, 2024). Much like the events of 2008, people that feel left behind by the increasing automatization and augmentation of the workplace could be persuaded into more extreme populist politics, which is why delaying discussions on this topic are problematic (Steiner et al., 2023). While the EU continues to refine policy, the implementation of AI into the workplace is happening now, and the situation for workers could change rapidly as new technology hits the market. Just as the EU attempted to get ahead of AI by defining it, they should attempt to get ahead of employment concerns before they evolve past being concerns alone.
The AI Act in Brief
To understand the shortcomings of the AI Act (2024), it is helpful to summarize the contents of the regulation first. The European Union’s AI Act came into force on the 13th of June 2024, seeking to create rules that would govern the development, employment, and use of artificial intelligence (AI) systems within the Union. The rules define four levels of risk regarding AI systems, offering only a description of what each category is, and indicate what systems are I place to regulate them within the common market:
Unacceptable Risk: These AI are banned within the EU, except in limited circumstances.
[Article 5.1(a/b)] Manipulative AI that can deceive, subvert, or impair autonomy, decision-making and free choice. This includes AI that may exploit disadvantaged persons whether through socio-economic vulnerabilities or take advantage of a disability. Notable exceptions to this are AI used in the context of medical treatment such as psychological treatment of a mental disease or physical rehabilitation, or within advertisement.
[Article 5.1(c)] AI systems that provide social scoring as it may lead to discrimination and exclusion.
[Article 5.1(d)] Risk assessment or predictive AI systems in the context of law enforcement.
[Article 5.1(e)] AI systems that scrape footage to expand facial recognition databases.
[Article 5.1(g/h)] Biometric categorization systems that are based on natural persons’ biometric data, such as an individual person’s face or fingerprint, to deduce or infer an individuals’ political opinions, trade union membership, religious or philosophical beliefs, race, sex life or sexual orientation. The notable exception to this rule is biometric categorization systems employed by law enforcement agencies for anti-terrorism and missing persons.
High Risk: [Preamble (paragraph 48)] Thesesystems are defined as having a negative effect on safety or the following fundamental rights, the latter of which is in this case a person’s access to education, employment, public or private services, legal representation, and administrative or democratic processes:
The protection of personal data,
The rights of persons with disabilities,
Freedom of expression and information,
Gender equality,
Freedom of assembly and of association,
Intellectual property rights,
The right to non-discrimination,
Workers’ rights,
The right to an effective remedy and a fair trial,
The right to education,
Consumer protection,
The right to good administration
The right of defense and the presumption of innocence,
High risk systems are also classified as that related to critical infrastructure and biometric identification systems.
Limited Risk: [Preamble (paragraph 53)] AI systems that do not materially influence the outcome of decision-making, and/or augment tasks that are either automated or conducted by humans are considered to be limited risk. This category is highlighted as needing further guidelines in the future.
Minimal Risk: Most AI systems currently available fall under this category – they provide solutions with minimal risk, and are therefore not regulated, nor will be moving forward.
The regulation achieved most of the mandated aims, creating clear definitions for different levels of risk, whilst focusing on the impact different AI systems could have on individuals.
Recommendations
The need to deal with the issue of job loss and employment law concerns are real and present and must be addressed in a timely manner during these early stages of AI implementation. Although further training opportunities is an avenue that the EU is pursuing, to contribute to the Commission’s call for the development of an ecosystem of trust by proposing a legal framework for trustworthy AI, this paper proposes three different avenues the issue of employment security could be addressed:
Collective Negotiation: Close cooperation betweenworker associations, the groups represented by them, and employers, can allow for investigation on the potential disruptive impact that AI systems can have on various professions. This will allow them to make informed decisions so that they may take steps to reach collective agreement that would allow for either redeployment of workers, advertise or make available further education opportunities, or have a guaranteed period of redundancy notice with regards to the implementation of AI systems. Similarly, management could make available to workers a clear AI implementation plan so that workplace disruption is reduced, and workers know in advance the time they have should their work be made redundant.
Advocacy For the Adaption/Adopting of New Legislation: If no provisions are currently in place, countries within the EU must take active steps to create or adapt legislation that will allow workers to have a notice period that they will be made redundant due to technological innovation. The EU Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions in the European Union, 2019, set a precedent that the EU was willing to use its competency in the area of social rights to address new forms of employment to protect EU workers from unpredictable employment (Official Journal of the European Union, 2019).
Given the close relationship between the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the EU, the ILO’s 1982 -Termination of Employment Convention (C158) would provide a good basis for text that could be incorporated into the EU Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions in the European Union (Pretorius, 2023). Only nine nations have ratified the convention, which contains the following article that could either be incorporated into EU law, or provide an example that can be followed:
‘[Article 13.1.] When the employer contemplates terminations for reasons of an economic, technological, structural or similar nature, the employer shall:
(a) provide the workers’ representatives concerned in good time with relevant information including the reasons for the terminations contemplated, the number and categories of workers likely to be affected and the period over which the terminations are intended to be carried out;
(b) give, in accordance with national law and practice, the workers’ representatives concerned, as early as possible, an opportunity for consultation on measures to be taken to avert or to minimise the terminations and measures to mitigate the adverse effects of any terminations on the workers concerned such as finding alternative employment’ (ILO, 1982).
Information Campaigns: At the moment, the uncertainty surrounding AI systems in the workplace is fuelling distrust in the technology (Chakravorti, 2024). Campaigns that inform workers not only of the capabilities of implemented AI systems and how to utilize their potential, but also about opportunities to upskill, are essential moving forward. Regardless of how these campaigns are run, giving workers more accessible information would go a long way towards realizing the ‘human centric’ ideals of the AI Act – ‘so that people can trust that the technology is used in a way that is safe and compliant with the law, including the respect of fundamental rights’ (European Commission (2021).
(*) Christo Pretorius graduated with a MSc in International Public Policy and Diplomacy from University College Cork and was the first student to receive a postgraduate “Student of the Year” award from the Department of Government. His dissertation was published and acquired by the Bar of Ireland’s Law Library and has gone on to support Irish policy makers. Stemming from his undergraduate in Ancient and Medieval History and Culture from Trinity College Dublin, his research interests include the mechanisms for authoritarian power and control, and democratic backsliding, particularly when viewed with a historical lens.
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Jensen, C.L.; Thomsen, L.K.; Zeuthen, M.; Johnsen, S.; Jashi, R.E.; Nielsen, M.F.B.; Hemstra, L.E. & Smith, J. (2024) “Biomedical laboratory scientists and technicians in digital pathology – Is there a need for professional development?” Digital Health. 10. https://doi.org/10.1177/20552076241237392
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Europe has also faced difficulties controlling the increasing numbers of its migrant population. According to the International Organization for Migration (McAuliffe & Oucho, 2024), there are approximately 87 million migrants living in Europe. In the context of migration crises, which often disproportionately impact EU member states, balancing European cohesion has fragmented the Union. Additionally, in recent years, Western politics has witnessed a trend of a right-wing shift (see Figure 1) and increased support for populist leaders, which exacerbates this fragmentation (Europe Elects, 2024; Europe Politique, 2024).
