In a wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Dr. Mariana Sendra, Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Deusto, examines the endurance and contradictions of Javier Milei’s populist-neoliberal experiment in Argentina. She interprets Milei’s strong midterm showing as “an endorsement of his government—but not a blank check,” warning that he and his followers “might interpret this electoral support as a green light to override institutional constraints.” Dr. Sendra highlights the exhaustion of Peronism, the influence of US backing, and Milei’s alignment with transnational far-right networks. While his administration remains formally democratic, she cautions that Argentina’s “democratic coexistence” is under pressure from rising intolerance and exclusion, calling on observers to “remain vigilant.”
Interview by Selcuk Gultasli
In the wake of Argentina’s pivotal midterm elections—widely regarded as a referendum on President Javier Milei’s two years in office—Dr. Mariana Sendra, Postdoctoral Researcher in Social and Human Sciences at the University of Deusto, offers a penetrating analysis of Argentina’s evolving political landscape in her interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS).
Dr. Sendra explains that Milei’s strong electoral performance, with La Libertad Avanza securing over 40 percent of the national vote, can be seen as “an endorsement of Milei’s government and of the future reforms that at least part of society considers necessary.” Yet, she cautions, “this is not, of course, a blank check for Milei.” According to her, many voters sought to avert economic instability following US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s suggestion that Washington’s financial support might be withdrawn if Milei performed poorly.
In assessing the opposition’s weakness, Dr. Sendra highlights the exhaustion of Peronism and its credibility crisis. After years of alternating rule and recurring scandals, “the movement does not have the legitimacy to point out Milei’s own mistakes,” she notes, arguing that “people simply do not see them as a credible alternative.”
The interview delves into Milei’s fusion of radical market liberalism and populist rhetoric, a dynamic Dr. Sendra explored in her co-authored study “Is Milei a Populist?” She calls this a conceptual “puzzle,” since neoliberalism “dismantles the idea of ‘the people’ as a collective subject,” whereas populism depends on it. Milei, she observes, reframes the shrinking of the state “not as a loss, but as a way to make room for individual initiative.”
Addressing Milei’s international alignments, Dr. Sendra underscores the significance of “the Trump factor” and US financial intervention, which she describes as “a form of foreign interference.” However, she distinguishes Milei from nativist far-right leaders, arguing that “his ideology is not nativist” but rooted in a nostalgic vision of Argentina’s 19th-century prosperity.
At the institutional level, Dr. Sendra warns that Milei’s growing concentration of power and confrontational leadership style could erode democratic safeguards. “Milei and his followers might interpret this electoral support as a green light—or a kind of blank check—to override institutional constraints,” she cautions. Still, she notes that Argentinian civil society and political elites retain “the institutional resources to push back if he crosses certain lines.”
Looking ahead, Dr. Sendra predicts that Milei’s model could endure if inflation continues to decline and middle-class sectors remain shielded from austerity. Yet she foresees long-term risks: “His policies will produce inequality and exclusion,” she concludes, “but we will see that in the long term.”
Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Mariana Sendra, revised for clarity and flow.
Milei’s Victory Is an Endorsement—but Not a Blank Check
Dr. Mariana Sendra, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: In Sunday’s midterm elections, widely viewed as a de facto referendum on Javier Milei’s two years in power, La Libertad Avanza secured over 40% of the national vote — defying expectations amid deep economic hardship, rising unemployment, and corruption scandals involving top officials, including Milei’s sister. How do you interpret this surprisingly strong performance? Does it reflect an enduring popular mandate for Milei’s shock-therapy reforms, or a more complex realignment within Argentina’s populist political culture?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: I think these results could indeed be interpreted as an endorsement of Milei’s government and of the future reforms that at least part of society considers necessary. But this is not, of course, a blank check for Milei. I believe there is support for certain reforms that people feel are needed, but it was also partly a response to the US government’s support and an attempt by society to prevent economic chaos after election day. There was considerable fear generated both by the government itself and by public statements from US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, suggesting that if Milei failed to achieve a strong electoral performance, that support could be withdrawn.
As in every election in Argentina, when the incumbent fails to secure the necessary performance to maintain a solid majority in Congress, market indicators — such as interest rates and the dollar exchange rate — tend to rise, which can trigger economic turmoil. So, yes, I think society voted to prevent that scenario and to give Milei a mandate for the second half of his term, though certainly not a blank check.
Peronism No Longer Seen as a Credible Alternative to Milei’s Rule
Despite economic hardship and declining living standards, the Peronist opposition under Fuerza Patria failed to convert public discontent into electoral gains, securing barely a third of the national vote. How do you explain the opposition’s limited capacity to mobilize against Milei’s populist-neoliberal project? Does this signal an ideological exhaustion within traditional Peronism, or a broader crisis of progressive representation in Argentina?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: The poor results of Peronism — around 30% of the vote — can be explained by the fact that, even though they are now in opposition, there is a certain exhaustion among the people. Peronism governed for 12 years under the Kirchners’ administrations, then there was a short alternation with Macri in 2015, and they returned to power in 2019.
The memory of that last administration is still very fresh. It’s important to remember that they were the ones managing the pandemic, and that period left a very negative mark. There were serious mistakes. Even though they did well in some aspects of pandemic management, there were symbolic failures that deeply affected public perception — for example, the VIP vaccination scandal and the president himself breaking lockdown rules within the official residence.
Additionally, by the end of that government, Argentina was on the verge of hyperinflation. In this election, moreover, Peronism did not present new faces, new candidates, or new ideas.
We should also not forget that the movement is still burdened by corruption scandals. Cristina Fernández de Kirchner was recently sentenced to house arrest because of such allegations. So, right now, Peronism as a party and as a movement lacks the credibility to point out Milei’s own mistakes and corruption scandals, because people simply do not see them as a credible alternative. So, yes, that would be the explanation for Peronism’s weakness in opposition.
Washington’s $40 Billion Bailout Gave Milei a Crucial Boost
To what extent did Donald Trump’s $40 billion bailout and open endorsement shape the electoral outcome? Do you see this as a case of foreign populist interference or a new model of transnational illiberal collaboration?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: The Trump factor and the bailout were definitely significant. It can certainly be seen as a form of foreign interference. It’s worth noting that this kind of US involvement in Argentina’s domestic politics has only one precedent in the country’s history — in 1945, during Perón’s re-election campaign. But never before had Washington shown such explicit support for a candidate.
By mid-October, the mood within the government was rather pessimistic because of the corruption scandals, the economic recession, and growing public discontent. But everything shifted — or at least partially shifted — after Milei’s visit to the White House, when Trump openly announced a $20 billion financial assistance package, which was, of course, conditional on Milei winning the election.
As I mentioned earlier, the message of “Milei or economic chaos” really resonated with parts of society. Washington’s support also had a tangible impact: it helped stabilize the currency and prevented the dollar from skyrocketing in the final days before the vote. So yes, it had a significant effect and was indeed perceived as a form of foreign interference in Argentina’s domestic politics.
Reconciling Neoliberalism and Populism Remains a Conceptual Puzzle
In your recent work on “Is Milei a Populist?”, you explore the hybridization between libertarian economics and populist discourse. How does Milei reconcile anti-statist neoliberalism with the populist logic of representing “the people” against “the elite”?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: This is a puzzle in my research, which I co-authored with Hugo Marco Marne, and one that we have not yet fully solved, because we need to conduct further research incorporating other cases like Milei. But of course, if we conceive populism as a unique set of ideas where the homogeneity of “the people” is a crucial element, this makes us wonder to what extent neoliberalism and populism can actually be compatible.
Neoliberalism, as we know, is committed to dismantling the idea of “the people,” understood as a form of collective subjectivity that interferes with the natural order created by the market. So, when Milei was a challenger, during his presidential campaign, he occasionally referred to the will of the majority and romanticized the idea of “good Argentinians.” For him, “good Argentinians” are those who are earnest, hardworking, and have been harmed by la casta — the political elites.
However, the key point is that Milei doesn’t try to speak to “the people” as a single or homogeneous group. Even when he romanticizes “good Argentinians,” he does not consistently apply this strategy. In the Argentinian context, addressing “the people” would mean engaging especially with the low-income sectors and explaining why public services are being cut and why they are not benefiting from his policies — which is very difficult.
So, how does he resolve this tension? He tries to frame the reduction of public services not as a loss, but as a way to make room for individual initiative — for people’s effort, their own income, and their personal tools and abilities. His argument is that the state has mismanaged scarcity, and therefore it should be reduced in order to return power and resources to individuals rather than to inefficient bureaucracies.
Each Country Is Now Pursuing Its Own Survival Strategy
Can Milei’s “chainsaw” policies—mass privatization, deregulation, and fiscal shock therapy—be understood as a continuation of the neoliberal wave in Latin America, or do they constitute a qualitatively new populist-neoliberal synthesis?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: Honestly, I wouldn’t say that these policies, even if they are fully implemented, can be understood as a new neoliberal wave in Latin America. In my view, the regional context today doesn’t work like that — it no longer operates in waves or cycles as it once did. For example, in the 1990s there was a clear regional turn toward neoliberalism, and in the 2000s we saw the so-called pink tide. Back then, there was a certain degree of coordination among governments across the region, but that is no longer the case.
Today, each country is more or less trying to survive on its own, pursuing its own domestic strategy. Political systems or governments swing to the left or to the right, but not in a coordinated pattern. Some countries seek to maintain alignment with the United States, while others deepen their trade and economic ties with China.
In Milei’s case, yes, there is a clear ideological alignment with the US and, of course, with the broader global far-right current. But I would be cautious about calling this a neoliberal wave. We’ll have to see what happens in places like Chile and Colombia, where the far right is also gaining ground. Still, I don’t see this as part of a regional trend — rather, it reflects the increasingly fragmented and uncoordinated nature of Latin American politics today.
Milei as a Reloaded Version of Menemism
What similarities and divergences do you see between Milei’s governance and earlier populist experiments in the country and region, such as Menem’s market populism or Bolsonaro’s hybrid of neoliberalism and moral authoritarianism?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: Of course, this combination of neoliberalism and populism is not new. In Latin America, we have several examples from the 1990s, such as Fujimori in Peru, Collor de Mello in Brazil, and Menem in Argentina — and of course, more contemporary examples like Bolsonaro in Brazil.
The thing with those populist leaders in the 1990s was that there was also a deep economic crisis at the end of the 1980s. These leaders managed to win elections by blaming the elite for the country’s dire situation and by claiming that the people were being robbed — though each framed that narrative differently.
However, the main divergence I see between Milei and Menem — because Milei is, in a sense, a reloaded version of Menemism — is that Menem, at the time, did not develop clear programmatic stances on how to confront the economic crisis. He never really said what he was going to do; in fact, he promised some highly redistributive policies and then completely reversed course once in office.
That, for me, as an observer of Argentinian politics, is very striking. This is the first time that a politician openly announces massive cuts and austerity measures during a campaign, wins the election, implements exactly what he promised, displays even a certain cruelty toward those suffering from these cuts — and still manages to retain popular support, at least among part of the electorate.
Of course, the electorate is quite heterogeneous, and we should carefully analyze the distribution of votes by sector, since not all groups are being equally affected by the cuts. Some sectors are actually benefiting from Milei’s policies. But there are still many people willing to endorse him because they have been promised change. Unlike many leaders in the 1990s, this form of populism does not conceal the magnitude of the sacrifice that society will need to make to achieve those changes — and that, for me, is truly remarkable.
Milei’s Neoliberalism Sets Him Apart from Protectionist Peers
The ideological and financial linkages between Milei, Trump, Elon Musk, and European far-right actors like Giorgia Meloni or Nigel Farage suggest a coordinated illiberal front. How should scholars conceptualize these transnational populist networks?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: What really connects all these leaders you’ve mentioned is their discursive irreverence — this deliberate rejection, at the rhetorical level, of what is considered, in their terms, politically correct. They employ highly extreme rhetoric when talking about minorities, for example, or when addressing the major challenges the world is facing today.
We are living globally through a time of enormous change — demographic, technological, productive, and environmental. What these leaders do is to offer citizens a sense of orientation in this changing and uncertain world, where it increasingly feels like future generations will have fewer opportunities compared to their parents, in terms of stability or prosperity. They position themselves against those they portray as decision-makers — those they identify as responsible for these transformations — although who is held responsible varies depending on each national context.
At the same time, Milei’s case is quite particular within the Argentinian economic context, which is extremely fragile, marked by economic crisis and chronic inflation. So, his situation is very specific. Ideologically speaking, in the economic realm, he is almost the opposite of what we see in Trump or Brexit. While those movements lean toward economic protectionism, Milei represents the opposite — he embodies an open economy and proposes an uncompromising neoliberalism.
‘Make Argentina Great Again’ Evokes a 19th-Century Nostalgia
Do you see the US bailout and Milei’s pro-Washington orientation as a reconfiguration of dependency—what some have called “illiberal neoliberalism”—in which populist regimes rely on global capital while claiming nationalist sovereignty? How do Milei’s symbolic gestures—such as echoing “Make Argentina Great Again”—fit into the global grammar of far-right populist performativity?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: This is actually a very good question, because Milei’s ideology is not nativist, unlike the radical right in Europe or the US. This means that he’s not trying to embody the idea of sovereignty or defend a national community against an external threat—whether that threat comes from immigration or from the influence of supranational institutions like the European Union over nation-states.
So, when Milei speaks of “Make Argentina Great Again,” I think he’s invoking a nostalgic vision of Argentina that we can trace back to the 19th century, when the country was in the early stages of nation-building. At that time, Argentina was seen as a land of opportunity, welcoming thousands of migrants seeking economic advancement. That was a long time ago, and Milei evokes that period—but not in the nativist way or with the nationalist vision of sovereignty that defines much of the radical right in Europe or the US.
We can identify this nostalgic tone, which is characteristic of right-wing populism, but it’s not the same—it’s not expressed in the same way.
Despite His Style, Milei Still Operates Within Democratic Boundaries
Given the concentration of power around Milei and his sister Karina, how do you interpret the institutional dynamics of his presidency? Are we witnessing a shift from populist mobilization toward personalized authoritarianism?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: So far in his administration, Milei has shown some tendencies that push against the rule of law. For instance, there have been attempts to censor the media by prohibiting the publication of material related to the corruption scandal involving his sister, or through the excessive use of presidential vetoes after Parliament approved certain laws to assist people suffering from the financial and fiscal cuts.
That said, Milei is still operating within the boundaries of democratic rule. And now, with these results—having increased his representation from 37 seats to 80 or 82 in the Chamber of Deputies, and from about 8 seats in the Senate to 16 or 18—and with the additional seats that could come from other center-right parties, such as PRO, which holds 24 seats, he could potentially reach a quorum and build a majority in Parliament to advance key reforms.
In that sense, I would say the government is not necessarily moving toward personalized authoritarianism, because now he has the institutional numbers to pursue reforms through the legislative process. However, because of his eccentric and confrontational leadership style, there is reason for concern. Milei and his followers might interpret this electoral support as a green light—or a kind of blank check—to override institutional constraints. So yes, we should remain vigilant.
Argentina’s Institutions and Elites Still Have the Power to Push Back
The judiciary, media, and opposition have faced increasing pressure under Milei. What risks does this pose to Argentina’s democratic resilience compared with other Latin American cases, such as El Salvador under Bukele or Brazil under Bolsonaro?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: On this point, I would say Milei’s influence over the judiciary or the media is much smaller than many people think. It’s true that now, in his cabinet, there are people linked to economic interests, and he’s aligned with Trump, who in many ways represents corporate interests and global financial elites. But in Milei’s case, given his background, I see him more as an outsider who is being used as a vehicle for these interests rather than a political actor with the capacity to influence major power structures.
It’s true that he has recently adopted a very aggressive discourse toward the press whenever he’s criticized. But we can see that even in the past few days, as Argentina has begun facing several economic problems, such as unemployment and new corruption scandals around his party, the main media outlets in the country—the more hegemonic ones—that once treated him favorably have now started to openly criticize Milei.
So, I don’t think his attacks on the media or the opposition will go much further than rhetoric, in my opinion. And of course, this is connected to the fact that Argentinian society and traditional political elites are deeply empowered when it comes to rights and institutional resources to push back if Milei were to cross certain lines.
Economic Faith Turns Into Political Intolerance Among Milei’s Base
In your co-authored work on “Presidential Approval, Tolerant Attitudes and Economic Performance,” you examine how tolerance mediates citizens’ evaluation of executives. How might this framework help explain Milei’s endurance amid economic hardship?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: Indeed, what we are seeing with these results is that those who rate the president’s performance positively—who approve of his leadership and feel he’s doing a good job—continue to support him even when the economic indicators are not particularly strong in areas such as unemployment, consumption levels, or purchasing power. Inflation is coming down, that is true, but objectively speaking, the government’s overall economic performance is far from solid.
That said, this group of people continues to support him. But even beyond their support, they are also starting to show, even before the election, certain intolerant attitudes toward those who disagree with Milei or who do not approve of the government’s performance. This is very dangerous and is highly visible on social media, but also in the streets and daily interactions.
There is a growing tendency among his supporters to delegitimize or discredit anyone who thinks differently. For example, anyone who suggests that the state should take some responsibility in certain key areas is immediately labeled a communist or a collectivist, and their views are dismissed. Even more dangerous is the notion that such ideas should not belong in the country or should be eliminated. That kind of reaction reflects an increasingly intolerant attitude, and it endangers what we call Argentina’s democratic coexistence.
The Social Costs of Milei’s Model Will Become Visible Over Time
And finally, Dr. Sendra, looking ahead, do you foresee Milei’s Argentina as a durable model for the global far right—or as another short-lived experiment in authoritarian neoliberal populism destined for crisis and collapse?
Dr. Mariana Sendra: That’s a difficult question to answer. My view is that if, over the next two years—until 2027—the government manages to bring inflation under control to the point where it is no longer perceived as the major problem, and if the sectors currently benefiting from its policies, or at least those with stable employment who are not being severely affected, remain a majority compared to those who are losing out, it is quite possible that Milei could be re-elected for another term.
However, I also think that the consequences of his policies will become more visible in the long run. Perhaps over the next five years or so, we are likely to start seeing their structural weaknesses—particularly the social costs for segments of the population that are now being excluded from Milei’s model. That could eventually trigger social unrest, manifested in protests and mobilizations. And that, of course, will have an impact. I think Milei’s policies will produce inequality and exclusion, but we will see that in the long term.
