Long Read — Trump and the European Right: A Strained Relationship
Protesters wave placards and banners during an anti-Trump rally in Trafalgar Square, London, opposing the US president’s policies on Palestine, Gaza, Iran, and food safety, including chlorinated chicken. Photo: Stephen Butler / Dreamstime
In this long-read analysis, Dr. Amedeo Varriale examines the increasingly strained relationship between Donald Trump and Europe’s right-wing and far-right leaders, focusing on Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel. Despite enduring ideological affinities over nationalism, immigration, and opposition to progressive liberalism, Dr. Varriale identifies four sources of divergence: Trump’s declining popularity, protectionist trade policies, controversial foreign-policy interventions, and the institutional constraints limiting the transferability of Trumpism to European political systems. Through comparative analysis of Italy, France, Britain, and Germany, he demonstrates how national interests, electoral calculations, and geopolitical considerations increasingly override transatlantic ideological solidarity. The study suggests that future cooperation between Trump and Europe’s nationalist right and far right may become more pragmatic and transactional than ideologically driven.
This extensive commentary explores the relationship between US President Donald J. Trump and political figures from the European right who are currently polling strongly in Italy, France, Britain, and Germany.
The first part of the piece will focus on how and why key right-wing and far right leaders such as Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel have, to varying degrees, recently been distancing themselves from Trump, while simultaneously analyzing their ideological convergences and divergences with him, and speculating about how their relationship may evolve as these leaders exercise, or potentially come to exercise, political power.
The second part will argue that presently the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is straineddue to a series of factors, ranging from the unpopularity of the President (at home and abroad), and his tariff dispute with the European Union (EU), to his unconventional foreign policy (particularly concerning Iran and Ukraine) and the limitations of reproducing his political model in the European context.
The investigation is meant to be timely and pertinent in a moment of broad opposition towards Trump’s second presidency across Europe. In fact, it attempts not only to shed light on the present condition of international right-wing conservatism and populism but also indirectly contributes to ongoing debates surrounding the new right’s domestic and foreign policy vis-à-vis transatlantic relations.
Giorgia Meloni
Giorgia Meloni, Prime Minister of Italy and leader of the Fratelli d’Italia party, speaks at an electoral rally ahead of the national elections in Turin, Italy, September 13, 2022. Photo: Antonello Marangi / Dreamstime.
As a right-wing leader Meloni’s relationship with Trump (and “Trumpism”) has always been ambivalent and has been previously defined as one of only “partial harmony” (Lazar, 2026: 56). While the Italian Prime Minister expressed her support for Trump on several occasions — she attended his second Presidential inauguration, spoke at CPAC 2025, and referred to his politics as “a model for Italy’s center-right” (Valenti, 2020) — her political vision and Italian concrete interests (as interpreted by Meloni’s government) do not always align with the American President’s.
One reason why Meloni has been accused by political analysts and opponents of being excessively close to Trump is that JD Vance (a staunch promoter of the MAGA/America First platform) prefaced the English version of Meloni’s book (Giorgia’s Vision) as he saw affinities between Trumpism and Meloni’s agenda revolving around national identity, anti-immigration(-ism), and Judeo-Christian values. Actually, clear convergences between Meloni and Trump do not go beyond their opposition to illegal immigration and woke ideology. In fact, the former does not aspire to create an “illiberal democracy” (like Viktor Orbàn’s in Hungary) nor has she resorted to methods like those utilized by Trump’s ICE to tackle immigration in Italy.
Also, while remaining a fervent sovereigntist, Meloni is substantially aligned with the EU’s elite and is in particularly good terms with Ursula von der Leyen (Alli, 2025: 4) and Manfred Weber’s European People’s Party (EPP) — a liberal-conservative group that does not share Trump’s radical views on globalization, trade, and immigration. To be sure, Meloni distanced herself from Trump on more than one occasion. First, she criticized Trump’s verbal attack on Pope Leo XIV, calling it “unacceptable” (Le Monde with AFP, 2026). Second, Meloni called Trump’s tariffs threat against the European countries that objected to his plans concerning Greenland “a mistake” (AFP & Rapporteur, 2026). Third, Meloni’s unequivocal pro-Ukraine stance is in conflict with Trump’s transactional approach, which is more conciliatory towards Russia. Fourth, Meloni’s government refused to allow Trump’s US to utilize the Italian airbase at Sigonella in Sicily for offensive military operations correlated to the war against Iran (Giuffrida, 2026).
Together, these incidents led to a gradual deterioration of the relationship between Meloni and Trump. In fact, Trump accused Italy of not doing enough to support the US against Iran (Mazza, 2026) and claimed in an interview that Meloni “begged” for a photo with him at the G7 summit (also calling her unpopular) (Amante & Balmer, 2026; Cheetham, 2026). Trump also shared a meme of Meloni with the caption “restraining order needed” on his social media Truth Social (Duso, 2026). While in the first case Meloni responded to Trump calling him out for making up the story and stating “…neither I nor Italy ever beg” (Amante & Balmer, 2026), in the second case she decided to ignore Trump.
In the following months, personal relations between Meloni and Trump may even worsen, mainly as a consequence of Trump’s unpredictable character. However, they are more likely to stabilize, with the US and Italy continuing to cooperate strategically, as Meloni will possibly do her best to avoid new personal confrontations and prevent any significant diplomatic rupture. In fact, although with some flexibility, Meloni continues to support higher defense spending at a NATO level (Ciriaco & Colombo, 2026; Gagliardi, 2026), and this aligns with Trump’s long-standing demand regarding Europe.
Even if the relationship between Meloni and Trump remains somewhat strained and they never become full-fledged political and ideological allies, under Meloni the Italian government will maintain the Atlanticist and Europeanist foreign policy pursued since 1945, entailing “a duty to remain close to America and to be among its most reliable and zealous allies” (Lazar, 2026: 55). This will occur regardless of the political color of temporary US administrations and Trump’s behavioral patterns.
Moreover, Italy’s position at the heart of the Mediterranean exposes it to Russian military and intelligence threats, making continued US support essential for its defense. Concomitantly, the current conservative government fears that reduced US commitment may result in Italy being more dependent on the EU, possibly steering the country towards deeper integration and an additional loss of sovereignty. This scenario is not desirable to Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI) party and most of her political class. Therefore, Italy seeks to balance strong bonds with both the United States and the European Union.
Marine Le Pen
Marine Le Pen delivers a speech at a gathering of European far-right party representatives in Wenceslas Square, Prague, April 25, 2019. Photo: Dreamstime.
For several years, the relationship between Le Pen and Trump has been a positive one underpinned by mutual respect and (limited) reciprocal support. In fact, Le Pen was the only French Presidential candidate to openly endorse Trump in the 2016 American electoral competition and was the first to congratulate the tycoon before his victory against Hillary Clinton was even officialized (McAuley, 2016). Similarly, Le Pen’s right-hand man, Jordan Bardella, praised Trump’s nationalist politics, stating his success represented “a wind of freedom, of national pride blowing all over Western democracies” (Gozzi, 2025). Bardella also argued that Trump won because he “defended America’s interests” (Bardella, 2025). More recently, after Le Pen’s conviction in early 2025, Trump expressed his solidarity to the French politician by writing the message “FREE MARINE LE PEN,” and referring to the court’s ruling as a “Witch Hunt” on Truth Social (Solmaz, 2025).
However, a long-standing anti-American sentiment deeply ingrained both within the French general public (81% think Trump is dangerous) (see Odoxa, 2026) and in the ideology and political tradition of the National Rally (RN) (formerly National Front) has prevented Le Pen (and Bardella) from embracing Trump’s program fully. While the RN’s agenda on topics such as immigration, climate change, and the “culture war” against woke and gender ideology perfectly aligns with Trump’s, the French far right has disassociated itself from the American President’s foreign policy, particularly on trade and security.
Regarding trade, although both Trump and Le Pen are protectionists, the former’s wide-ranging tariffs on imports — including French goods such as wine, luxury products, aerospace components — significantly damage French economic interests as an exporting country.
Regarding security, while Trump wants European allies to spend much more on defense within the NATO framework, Le Pen instead promotes French strategic independence, calling for a reduced involvement and integration within NATO’s military command. Actually, once the conflict in Ukraine ceases, Le Pen aims to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command altogether (Besch & Varma, 2025: 19). Notwithstanding, it was mainly Trump’s threats to Greenland, his hostile demeanor towards Volodymyr Zelensky’s Ukraine, his overthrow of Nicolás Maduro, and his military actions against Iran that marked a turning point in relations between the US administration, the RN, and much of the European right.
For example, concerning Iran, Le Pen declared: “Nobody knows what Donald Trump’s ultimate goal is in Iran. Today, this war has taken proportions that were not foreseen, affecting many Gulf countries, and with consequences that directly impact us: the increase in energy prices” (Roundtable, 2026). Instead, concerning Ukraine, Le Pen denounced the “brutality” of Trump’s decision to freeze US aid to the Eastern European country (Guillou, 2025).
Allegedly, Le Pen even told officials within her party to maintain a distance from Trump as he has turned into a political liability (Caulcutt & Nöstlinger, 2026). The same reasoning had previously led Bardella to cancel his appearance at CPAC after the MAGA ideologue, Steve Bannon, supposedly made a Nazi salute on stage (Reuters, 2025).
Le Pen’s cautious distancing from Trump may result in a substantial change of the nature of their relationship, making it more withdrawn in public but more transactional — on farming, trade, defense spending, and military activities — in the event of a future Le Pen presidency. This transactional disposition seems very appropriate and likely to prevail since American and French interests do not always align in those areas. However, this does not necessarily mean that Le Pen and Trump will be openly antagonistic towards each other. After all, the two still share a common enemy identified by both in “the international(-ist) left” operating at an elite level within supra-national institutions such as the European Commission, Council of Europe, United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Trade Organization (WTO).
Given this, if Trump’s foreign policy shifts back to a more isolationist/non-interventionist one especially with regards to the Middle East (while simultaneously not abandoning Ukraine), there are stronger possibilities of an open rapprochement between Le Pen’s RN and Trump before the next Presidential elections in France and the US. Even so, in the more distant future it will be JD Vance (even more[1] nationalist, populist, and isolationist than Trump himself) who will play a key role in redefining the relationship between the American Republicans and European far right parties such as the RN and others.
Nigel Farage
Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.
Farage and Trump have been friends and essentially political allies since the latter’s rise to power in 2016. The two partially share a weltanschaaung revolving around capitalism, the defense of borders, law and order, Western exceptionalism, and the preservation of national cultural identity. Moreover, both have always been skeptical of (if not opposed to) the gradual development of the European Union as a political and economic power, and its strategic relationship with China.
Farage has spoken favorably about Trump on distinct occasions. For instance, he has stressed that Trump is a role model for him (and his party Reform UK) because the American President stands for “national interest” and keeps the promises made to his electorate (Bloomberg, 2025). Also, during a rally in the US, Farage has praised Trump as the “most resilient” and “bravest person” he has ever met (BBC, 2020). Undeniably, Trump holds a positive view of Farage as well, given he has expressed an interest in having him as UK ambassador to the US (Langfitt, 2016) and has always supported the Brexit project (Langlois, 2018: 7).
Against this backdrop, the relationship between the two became colder between late 2025 and early 2026. Today, it appears Farage does not have the same privileged access to Trump, and — at least on one occasion — the American President did not meet the British politician who had purposely traveled to the US expecting to reinforce their “special relationship” (Gross et al., 2026; Cobham, 2026). Since then, not only have Trump’s priorities shifted (he currently focuses on domestic issues rather than securing alliances abroad) but Farage himself discreetly distanced himself from Trump (Gibbons, 2026).
One reason for this is Trump continues to be very unpopular among voters in Britain (Schofield, 2026; The Economist, 2025), including part of Reform UK’s electoral base (Mitchell, 2025). Research indicates that a significant portion of potential Reform voters — especially women — have trouble understanding why Farage associates with Trump (Dawson, 2026). While they may support the party on other policy issues, this perceived closeness to Trump could dissuade them from voting for Reform UK. After all, Trump’s hardline approach on “law and order,” exemplified by the Minnesota immigration raids (carried out by ICE), may have limited appeal among many moderate voters in Britain and continental Europe (see Wike et al., 2025).
Another issue that has certainly (negatively) influenced the relationship between the two leaders is the Iran war. Although Farage has refrained from unequivocally condemning Trump’s campaign in the Middle East (which he initially supported) and has even stated Iran is a “bigger danger than Putin” (Mason, 2026), concomitantly, he has warned against British involvement in the war (White, 2026). The conflict with Iran has been devastating for the British economy,[2] mainly due to the sharp rise in oil and gas prices alongside general inflation. Thus, while Farage remains strongly opposed to the Iranian regime for pragmatic reasons, he has also had to state that Trump was badly advised on the war (Elliot, 2026) and that the UK should remain out of the conflict, inevitably distancing himself from the US administration’s position.
The divergences vis-à-vis the Iran war have been exacerbated by broader economic and foreign policy disagreements. While Farage has always praised free markets, Trump is a pro-tariff protectionist. Additionally, over the years, Farage has endorsed the West supplying weapons to Zelensky’s government more explicitly than Trump. Perhaps these differences have further contributed to the increasing distance between the two political figures.
Nonetheless, considering a circumstance where Trump remains US President and Farage becomes UK Prime Minister, it is likely the relationship between the two would be largely amicable, with their respective countries expanding collaboration in certain policy areas.By way of illustration, a Trump-Farage synergy is expected to lead to a large-scale UK-US free trade agreement and a general reduction of barriers and regulation for bilateral trade.
Given this, America and Britain will presumably continue to cooperate at a NATO-level as — notwithstanding his confrontational statements — Trump does not have a concrete plan to withdraw from the transatlantic organization. Actually, it is possible that a Farage-led Britain could embrace Trump’s position on “burden-sharing” and pressure European allies (especially France, Germany, and Italy) to increase expenditure on defense.
Similarly, Farage and Trump’s agreement on the immigration issue is very likely to result in greater cooperation on intelligence, security, and border control.
Ultimately, their skepticism regarding climate change and policies to protect the environment could lead them to economize on climate policy and instead pursue an increase of oil and gas production.
Alice Weidel
Election posters featuring Alice Weidel, co-leader of Germany’s far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), displayed during the 2025 German federal election campaign. Such posters are reportedly often torn down or vandalized. Photo: Dreamstime.
Before 2025, direct contact between Trump and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) was relatively limited and intermittent, and to this day, a close relationship between Trump and the AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, does not appear to have fully developed at either a personal or a direct political level. Be that as it may, in the weeks preceding and months following the 2025 German federal election, high-profile figures from the Trump administration such as Elon Musk, Marco Rubio, and JD Vance have publicly defended or openly expressed support for Weidel’s party. In fact, while interviewing Weidel online, Musk proclaimed, “only AfD can save Germany, end of story” (Le Monde with AFP, 2025). In the same context, Weidel reiterated (as she had previously stated during a Bloomberginterview[3]) that it caused her “physical pain” to see Trump and his entire family “disparaged” by the mainstream media (Alice Weidel, 2025).
Instead of explicitly endorsing the AfD as Musk did, US Secretary of State, Rubio, disputed Germany’s domestic intelligence agency’s classification of Weidel’s party as “right-wing extremist” (Wertheimer, 2025). The US Vice-President JD Vance went even further, meeting Weidel at the margins of the Munich Security Conference (February 14-16, 2025) to discuss issues ranging from the war in Ukraine to freedom of speech and German politics (Reuters, 2025). Vance’s decision to meet Weidel can be interpreted as an act of legitimization by the Trump administration.
Beyond pro-AfD statements, Trump’s officials have engaged with AfD politicians/lawmakers through private meetings in Washington D.C. (Pfeifer, 2025). For example, the more “moderate” national-conservative wing of the German party, which includes the popular Beatrix von Storch, is known to have had repeated contacts not only with Vance’s staff but also with representatives of the US State Department and National Security Council (Pfeifer, 2025). Although there are substantial differences between Trump’s distorted form of American exceptionalismand the anti-American latent Eurasianism promoted by the most radical faction of the AfD (mainly led by Björn Höcke), this did not prevent Trump’s loyalists from seeking ties with the AfD and inviting them to the US After all, until recently, Weidel, von Storch, and the AfD’s establishment have looked upon Trump favorably due to his campaign (or “culture war”) against woke ideology, immigration, Islam (Pfeifer, 2025) and liberal-progressivism in general. This alignment was broadly reciprocal. As the Anglo-German journalist Henry Donovan (2026) posits: “In MAGA World, the AfD was increasingly spoken of as Germany’s conservative insurgency – a mirror image of how Trump sees his so-called revolt against liberal elites” (Donovan, 2026).
Weidel and Trump hold common beliefs on several issues. First, both leaders have centered their platform on opposing immigration. Second, Weidel and Trump share a skepticism towards climate change policy and the introduction of renewable energy sources. Third, the two leaders embrace supply-side (or even “trickle-down”) economics and selective forms of protectionism simultaneously — and can be (paradoxically) described as “liberal-protectionist” (for an account of the AfD’s economics, see Cattani, 2016).
Nevertheless, the ideological affinities between Trump’s MAGA movement and Weidel’s AfD were not sufficient to impede an almost sudden break between the American and German far right earlier this year. Trump’s unpredictability and risky political moves such as armed conflict with Iran, regime-change operation in Venezuela, and repeated threats to Greenland forced AfD leaders and key figures — including co-chair of the party Tino Chrupalla and Weidel herself — to markedly distance themselves from both the tycoon and the “Grand Old Party” (GOP). It was especially the strikes on Iran (highly unpopular among the German electorate[4]) that led Weidel to ask her party’s senior lawmakers to cut back on their trips to the US where they would regularly meet pro-MAGA Republicans (Pitel, 2026). Condemnation of Trump’s actions came from both Weidel and Chrupalla who in a joint statement remarked “renewed destabilization of the Middle East is not in the German interest and must end” (Hoyer, 2026). The fears of the AfD’s elite, particularly Chrupalla, is that Trump — who apparently “started off as a peace president” — would become another American president known for war campaigns and neoconservative interventionism (Hoyer, 2026).
Overall, far-right parties like the AfD remain largely skeptical about US interventionism (sometimes described as “US imperialism”) due to its economic and migratory consequences, such as recession, higher gas prices, and mass migration towards Europe. This is the main reason why Weidel (sounding like her opponents from the pacifist far-left) also referred to the Iran War as “a catastrophe” (Pitel, 2026). However, the party appears divided, as there have been prominent figures within the AfD — especially Maximilian Krah and (to a lesser extent) Markus Frohnmaier — who continue to unequivocally support Trump despite the Iran war (Pitel, 2026). In early April 2026, the former expressed his opinion on social media: “a break with Trump would be harmful to the AfD in all sorts of ways. It must not be allowed to happen” (Pitel, 2026).
Surprisingly, as of this writing, Trump has not reconsidered his predominantly positive opinion concerning the AfD. In fact, the American President welcomed the AfD’s striking 44% electoral victory in the Saxony-Anhalt region in early September by stating (on Truth Social) “Wow! The Populist Party in Germany just had a really big night” and congratulated the party (Zakharova, 2026). In any case, although a near future (unlikely) scenario where an AfD-led Germany is simultaneous to a Trump-led America is still technically possible, predicting the type of relationship the two countries would have in such a context remains a difficult and problematic endeavor.
In essence, as the political scientist Marco Tarchi explains, the AfD has three ideological currents: the first, is the national-conservative one, which is also economically liberal and is currently the majoritarian faction in the party led by Weidel; the second, is the “old-school” nationalist one, unfairly (according to Tarchi) labelled as neo-Nazi; the third, is the social-national one which was very successful in the recent elections occurring in the Eastern region(s) of the country and could possibly engage in dialogue with Sahra Wagenknechts’s party (BSW) (Tarchi as cited in Boezi, 2026, my translation).
Currently, with the party on the rise electorally, it is unclear which one of these three factions will politically prevail and in which manner and degree they will interact with Trump in the event they obtain power. For example, AfD’s “national conservatives” could rekindle their relationship with Trump (especially if the Iran war ends abruptly) and be strongly backed by the latter when they pursue hardline “law and order” policies, including their signature policy, Remigration,[5]which may put Germany at odds with the European Union and part of the international community. Also, notwithstanding some of Weidel’s anti-American rhetoric, the AfD and Washington can have a transactional transatlantic partnership that stems from sovereigntism, meaning Germany would spend more on defense and rearm but buy American weapons (and American LNG[6]). How this very pragmatic settlement would fit in a major bilateral or multi-lateral framework is still uncertain.
For instance, would the present NATO agreements remain the strategic “umbrella” for Germany yet? Regarding such potential developments from Trump’s perspective, providing AfD’s Germany with preferential treatment, in terms of both security and bilateral trade, America would be promoting the party’s sovereigntist ideology and at the same time even encourage Weidel government’s gradual distancing from the European Union.
Reversely, in contrast with the EU’s common foreign policy, Weidel’s AfD could pressure an already Ukraine-skeptic Trump administration to realign with Russia, leaving Ukraine to its own fate. The predictability of the above-described scenario — it has to be recognized — is highly dependent on a series of factors, the main of which is the capacity and the will of the most anti-American views in the party to compromise with the idea of a new partnership with the US. Weidel herself should revise some previous hostile attitudes towards the military American presence on German soil.
Why Trump’s Relationship with the European Right and Far Right Is Strained: Four Factors
The relationship between President Trump and significant segments of the European right and far right has become increasingly strained. While — as mentioned previously — a substantial ideological overlap endures (especially opposition towards immigration and progressivism), several developments have resulted in tensions between Trump’s “America First!” agenda and the national interests of the European right-wing and far right parties led by Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel. Today, Trump is no longer the ideological lodestar for Europe’s right and far right: with Meloni, relations are cold at best, while Le Pen keeps the MAGA movement at arm’s length, similarly, Farage is now more cautious in publicly expressing support for the tycoon, and Weidel has distanced herself and limited her party’s contacts with the US administration.
More specifically, there are four factors that have contributed to alienating Trump’s US from the European right and far right. First, Trump’s popularity has significantly declined both domestically and internationally (Hartig & Kiley, 2026; Dionne, Jr., 2025). A recent study shows his approval rating at a very low 32% in America, losing 15 percentage points since the beginning of his second term in January 2025 (Lange, 2026). At the same time, Trump’s approbation among the Republican electorate has also declined, standing at 73% (Lange, 2026).
Considering the wider context, a YouGov survey (from October 2026) found that 85% of Italians have an unfavorable opinion of Trump, against 83% in France, 86% in Britain, and 85% in Germany (YouGov, 2026). After all, Trump’s political brand has become so toxic for the global right that nearly every time he became directly or indirectly involved in a country’s election — either by threatening annexation, tariffs, or by endorsing a candidate — his engagement has backfired on the candidates he endorsed.
This occurred in the last Canadian election in April 2025, as Trump suggested Canada could become the US’s “51st state” while concurrently increasing tariffs against the country, and resulted in a Liberal Party victory and an unexpected defeat of the conservative pro-Trump candidate Pierre Poilievre (Dionne Jr., 2025).
It also occurred in Hungary, precisely a year later, as Vance attended a Viktor Orbàn rally in Budapest with 1,000 supporters on behalf of Trump (Spike, 2026). However, this strategy did not produce the intended outcome as elections were ultimately won by Orbàn’s opponent, Péter Magyar.
As simply put by two experts — Jeremy Shapiro and Zsuzanna Vegh (2025) — “His [Trumps’s] growing unpopularity means aligning with him may not appear politically advantageous for these forces” (Shapiro & Vegh, 2025).
Second, Trump’s protectionism, which has taken the form of tariffs as a trade policy against EU nations, has led to an escalation of tension between the US administration and some of its rightist “allies” in Europe. In essence, while far right forces such as the RN and the AfD may embrace economic nationalism or protectionism theoretically, and even practically when it suits their own national economies, they instead wholeheartedly oppose it when US tariffs[7] on European goods risk damaging their own countries’ businesses, industries, and workers. After all, for years populists have presented themselves as the main defenders of rural and blue-collar workers, who now form their core constituency.
Thus, aligning with Trump over his tariffs and trade measures (even if for purely ideological reasons) would be counter-productive and self-sabotaging for the European right and far right, as they ultimately damage artisans, luxury craft producers, exporters, farmers, manufacturers, and small-medium businesses in general, located in Italy, France, Britain, Germany and so forth. While there have been examples of populist politicians (e.g. Le Pen and Matteo Salvini) on the right defending Trump’s economic strategy (especially anti-China tariffs) the majority of rightists have either awkwardly ignored or condemned his course of action contra the EU.
Among those who originally supported Trump but criticized him on anti-EU tariffs are Le Pen (who spoke of the American’s “brutal approach”) and Weidel (who called them “far too aggressive and self-defeating” and “fundamentally bad for free trade”) (Pitel, 2025). Instead, the conservative PM Meloni, simply called Trump’s tariffs “a mistaken choice” (Pitel, 2025). In fact, one commentator, writing for The Guardian has shrewdly suggested that “analysts have long noted the difficult challenge that Trump’s policies pose to nationalists in the EU: while they may agree with some of them principle, MAGA is ‘America first’ – while they are ‘France first,’ ‘Germany first’ or ‘Spain first’” (Henley, 2025).
Third, Trump’s foreign policy — especially regarding Iran — emerged as increasingly at odds with the crypto-isolationist, selectively non-interventionist (see Greene, 2024) and sovereigntist foreign policy stances of the nationalist right in Europe. Trump’s involvement (alongside Israel) in a conflict that expanded beyond the initial strikes (February 2026) and targeting of Iran’s nuclear program became viewed as an indirect threat to Europe by part of the right and far right. This is due to the costs of the war, its negative economic consequences to international trade and oil, gas, and fuel prices, as well as its wider impact on mass migration and population displacement. For evident reasons, a large-scale war in Iran could result in a new wave of migration and increase in the influx of refugees in the Old Continent.
Also, the European nationalist right (but also part of the mainstream right) wants to avoid getting involved in an American-Israeli War that would potentially result in hardship for European soldiers and taxpayers. As discussed previously, far right leaders like Le Pen and Weidel have shown their disdain for Trump’s actions against Iran, whilst Farage called in question Trump’s judgement (Coates, 2026). In essence, Trump’s move against Iran (like the one against Maduro’s Venezuela beforehand) did not consolidate Trump’s “transatlantic alliance” with the European right and far righ but actually contributed to its deterioration (Riccardi & Spike, 2026).
Instead, regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the situation is more complex. Whilst some right-wing parties — inspired by Eurasianists ranging from Alexander Dugin to Alain de Benoist[8] — have remained staunchly pro-Putin and pro-Russia (e.g. AfD) others have shifted to more “mainstream” pro-Ukraine positions (e.g. FdI, RN, Reform UK). Unlike specifically extreme right parties (e.g. AfD), today, conservative (e.g. FdI) and populist radical right parties (e.g. RN, Reform UK) and leaders in Europe are increasingly skeptical of Trump’s conciliatory approach towards Russia.
Unsurprisingly, Meloni often calls Russia an “aggressor” (Hook Global, 2026) and has clearly criticized Trump’s deal with the Russian President (to import a significant amount of Russian diesel fuel and temporarily lift US sanctions) calling it “a very risky choice” that legitimizes Moscow (Barbati, 2026). In the Italian Parliament, her party has consistently voted to aid Ukraine militarily.
More surprisingly, the — once Russophile — RN has reassessed its position on Russia, because although the party has opposed sending French troops and military aid (for long-range strikes) both Le Pen and Bardella have publicly supported Ukraine’s right to defend (and recover) its sovereignty (Sandford, 2022; Par Le Parisien avec AFP, 2025; Crone & Klinke, 2025: 24, 44). Also, the RN supposedly interrupted all contacts with the Kremlin after 2022 (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 44). This shift towards more liberal-conservative positions has been prompted by the increasing influence of a new generation of identitarian, Gaullist, and civilizationist thinkers that advise the higher ranks of the party — such as Pierre-Romain Thionnet and few others (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25). The “new” RN no longer considers Russia a bastion for traditional Christianity and European identity but instead views it as a multicultural melting pot (a “Eurasian empire” with a considerable Islamic population) that represents a menace to the sovereignty of a white, Christian, and Western, “Fortress Europe” (see Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25, 27, 40, 44).
Shifting the focus to Britain, even Farage — possibly the greatest admirer and supporter of Trump in Europe — has recently spoken against Trump’s new Russian deal (Henrys, 2026) and now is more inclined to back Ukraine (even suggesting NATO adherence) (Keate, 2025) at the cost of disagreeing with the American President.
It is difficult to say whether these parties and leaders are ideologically or strategically (as some are close to obtaining governmental power) driven to support Ukraine over Russia. However, what is evident is that whilst the US-Iran War is viewed as something occurring far from Europe’s borders and involving a nation that is culturally very distinct and of little interest to the Old Continent, the Russia-Ukraine War is a conflict at the heart of Europe involving a nation that has been invaded by an “alien” superpower.
Moreover, far right and right-wing parties are much more comfortable with Ukrainian immigration than with Iranian immigration resulting from the War, as the former are perceived as “white” and “Christian” and the latter as “non-white” and “Muslim.” A further concept worth exploring is that introduced by the French political analyst Thibault Muzergues (2026): many of these right-wing and/or far right parties in Europe are presently led by a younger generation of politicians who have become increasingly wary of aligning with Putin’s Russia (France 24 English, 2026). Essentially, this new political elite adopts a different stance towards Russia than its predecessors did fifteen to twenty-five years ago (France 24 English, 2026).
Fourth, Trump’s political model, especially his modus operandi of leadership and exercise of executive power, is difficult (if not impossible) to reproduce in Europe. The particular institutional structure and political-cultural context of the US confer the American President significantly more decisional autonomy, power, and freedom of maneuver compared to the numerous checks and balances, political fragmentation, and institutional constraints characterizing systems such as the European Union.
In the event that they assume office, leaders such as Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel would operate in a very distinct context from Trump — one that involves specifically European parliamentary mechanisms, proportional electoral frameworks, coalition administrations, independent constitutional tribunals, and supranational regulatory bodies.
Contrastingly, Trump’s institutional environment is shaped by a two-party system where — although restrained by courts, Congress, and the states — the executive is directly elected by the people and is able to exercise substantial authority without having to necessarily depend on a parliamentary majority. For instance, the American President has the right to pull out from most international agreements without the approval of Congress. Furthermore, Trump utilized executive orders to make US immigration policy stricter (also enforcing mass deportations) without always relying on new legislation.
In summary, the impracticality of replicating Trump’s model in Europe ineluctably contributed to an increasing estrangement between the American President and the European right.
Conclusion
This commentary examined the complex political and relational dynamics surrounding President Trump and successful right-wing and far right party leaders in Europe. The analysis revealed that although — overall — the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is significantly strained, it has yet to reach a breaking point, nor does such an outcome appear imminent. After all, given the American and European economies are largely interconnected, especially considering trade and supply chains, finance, military security, intelligence, energy, and technology, a full rupture between the US and Europe’s major nations (and its potential future leaders) such as Italy, France, Britain, and Germany appears both undesirable and unrealistic.
In any case, the main takeaway is that although there is strong ideological affinity between at least three of the four leaders discussed and Trump — Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel (more so than Meloni) are closely aligned to the US President’s views on state authority to combat globalization, immigration, woke, and modern liberalism — realpolitik combined with Trump’s trade and foreign policy have forced these parties/leaders to distance themselves from his actions and emerging legacy, primarily to defend their own national interests.
Considering political realism, Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel have all understood the political cost of aligning too closely with a foreign President who is experiencing a sharp decline in public support (both domestically and internationally) and who always prioritizes pursuing his own national agenda to satisfy his electoral base at home (MAGA) rather than strengthening transatlantic alliances.
Furthermore, these leaders evidently see no benefit in attempting to imitate or replicate Trump’s failing political model in their own parliamentary (Italy, Britain, Germany) and semi-presidential (France) democracies. Considering Trump’s policies, all of the rightist and far right leaders mentioned above have no choice but to object to the President’s hazardous maneuvers on trade and foreign policy that damage their economies and long-term societal plans. Today, American tariffs on European goods, Russian “appeasement,” and new wars (e.g. Iran) (potentially causing an increase in global immigration), are not looked upon favorably by the leaders of parties who are — above all — sovereigntist (and except for the AfD — FdI, RN, and Reform UK, view Russia as a foreign threat to national sovereignty), nativist, culturally and economically nationalist, and partially isolationist.
After Trump’s failed midterms election, it is likely the European right will distance itself from him and his political paradigm (namely “Trumpism”) even further. However, it is only natural that — if they take office — the European right and far right will seek coordination and cooperation with Trump’s America on most of the issues mentioned above (trade, security, intelligence, energy, etc.). Nevertheless, such cooperation is likely to become increasingly pragmatic, transactional and driven by strategic considerations rather than ideological affinity.
As already stated, Trump is no longer considered an ideological point of reference or natural ally by any of the leaders and parties under scrutiny. On the contrary, Trump is perceived as an erratic, precarious, and unpredictable interlocutor whose imperatives and core aims usually diverge significantly from their own, especially on topics such as commercial policy and foreign policy. Ideally, future studies could shift the focus towards other right-wing political actors (e.g. Santiago Abascal, Péter Magyar, and Geert Wilders) and assess their affinity with Trump from a political-strategic and ideological standpoint.
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[4] A recent survey shows that most Germans disapprove of Trump’s actions against Iran (and Maduro in Venezuela) — see Claudia Müller (2026).
[5] This particular AfD policy is concisely (yet comprehensively) discussed in a book chapter written by the scholar Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli (2026: 149-151).
[7] Especially the 20% levy on all EU imports (see Hernández-Morales et al., 2025).
[8] Alain de Benoist is not strictly Eurasianist in the Duginist sense. While he supports multipolarity (objecting to American dominance and liberal universalism) and calls for an ethno-pluralist “Europe of the peoples”, he also believes Russia’s role is central in any anti-American, anti-Atlanticist, and illiberal continental project.
Long Read — Trump and the European Right: A Strained Relationship
In this long-read analysis, Dr. Amedeo Varriale examines the increasingly strained relationship between Donald Trump and Europe’s right-wing and far-right leaders, focusing on Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel. Despite enduring ideological affinities over nationalism, immigration, and opposition to progressive liberalism, Dr. Varriale identifies four sources of divergence: Trump’s declining popularity, protectionist trade policies, controversial foreign-policy interventions, and the institutional constraints limiting the transferability of Trumpism to European political systems. Through comparative analysis of Italy, France, Britain, and Germany, he demonstrates how national interests, electoral calculations, and geopolitical considerations increasingly override transatlantic ideological solidarity. The study suggests that future cooperation between Trump and Europe’s nationalist right and far right may become more pragmatic and transactional than ideologically driven.
By Amedeo Varriale
This extensive commentary explores the relationship between US President Donald J. Trump and political figures from the European right who are currently polling strongly in Italy, France, Britain, and Germany.
The first part of the piece will focus on how and why key right-wing and far right leaders such as Giorgia Meloni, Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage, and Alice Weidel have, to varying degrees, recently been distancing themselves from Trump, while simultaneously analyzing their ideological convergences and divergences with him, and speculating about how their relationship may evolve as these leaders exercise, or potentially come to exercise, political power.
The second part will argue that presently the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is straineddue to a series of factors, ranging from the unpopularity of the President (at home and abroad), and his tariff dispute with the European Union (EU), to his unconventional foreign policy (particularly concerning Iran and Ukraine) and the limitations of reproducing his political model in the European context.
The investigation is meant to be timely and pertinent in a moment of broad opposition towards Trump’s second presidency across Europe. In fact, it attempts not only to shed light on the present condition of international right-wing conservatism and populism but also indirectly contributes to ongoing debates surrounding the new right’s domestic and foreign policy vis-à-vis transatlantic relations.
Giorgia Meloni
As a right-wing leader Meloni’s relationship with Trump (and “Trumpism”) has always been ambivalent and has been previously defined as one of only “partial harmony” (Lazar, 2026: 56). While the Italian Prime Minister expressed her support for Trump on several occasions — she attended his second Presidential inauguration, spoke at CPAC 2025, and referred to his politics as “a model for Italy’s center-right” (Valenti, 2020) — her political vision and Italian concrete interests (as interpreted by Meloni’s government) do not always align with the American President’s.
One reason why Meloni has been accused by political analysts and opponents of being excessively close to Trump is that JD Vance (a staunch promoter of the MAGA/America First platform) prefaced the English version of Meloni’s book (Giorgia’s Vision) as he saw affinities between Trumpism and Meloni’s agenda revolving around national identity, anti-immigration(-ism), and Judeo-Christian values. Actually, clear convergences between Meloni and Trump do not go beyond their opposition to illegal immigration and woke ideology. In fact, the former does not aspire to create an “illiberal democracy” (like Viktor Orbàn’s in Hungary) nor has she resorted to methods like those utilized by Trump’s ICE to tackle immigration in Italy.
Also, while remaining a fervent sovereigntist, Meloni is substantially aligned with the EU’s elite and is in particularly good terms with Ursula von der Leyen (Alli, 2025: 4) and Manfred Weber’s European People’s Party (EPP) — a liberal-conservative group that does not share Trump’s radical views on globalization, trade, and immigration. To be sure, Meloni distanced herself from Trump on more than one occasion. First, she criticized Trump’s verbal attack on Pope Leo XIV, calling it “unacceptable” (Le Monde with AFP, 2026). Second, Meloni called Trump’s tariffs threat against the European countries that objected to his plans concerning Greenland “a mistake” (AFP & Rapporteur, 2026). Third, Meloni’s unequivocal pro-Ukraine stance is in conflict with Trump’s transactional approach, which is more conciliatory towards Russia. Fourth, Meloni’s government refused to allow Trump’s US to utilize the Italian airbase at Sigonella in Sicily for offensive military operations correlated to the war against Iran (Giuffrida, 2026).
Together, these incidents led to a gradual deterioration of the relationship between Meloni and Trump. In fact, Trump accused Italy of not doing enough to support the US against Iran (Mazza, 2026) and claimed in an interview that Meloni “begged” for a photo with him at the G7 summit (also calling her unpopular) (Amante & Balmer, 2026; Cheetham, 2026). Trump also shared a meme of Meloni with the caption “restraining order needed” on his social media Truth Social (Duso, 2026). While in the first case Meloni responded to Trump calling him out for making up the story and stating “…neither I nor Italy ever beg” (Amante & Balmer, 2026), in the second case she decided to ignore Trump.
In the following months, personal relations between Meloni and Trump may even worsen, mainly as a consequence of Trump’s unpredictable character. However, they are more likely to stabilize, with the US and Italy continuing to cooperate strategically, as Meloni will possibly do her best to avoid new personal confrontations and prevent any significant diplomatic rupture. In fact, although with some flexibility, Meloni continues to support higher defense spending at a NATO level (Ciriaco & Colombo, 2026; Gagliardi, 2026), and this aligns with Trump’s long-standing demand regarding Europe.
Even if the relationship between Meloni and Trump remains somewhat strained and they never become full-fledged political and ideological allies, under Meloni the Italian government will maintain the Atlanticist and Europeanist foreign policy pursued since 1945, entailing “a duty to remain close to America and to be among its most reliable and zealous allies” (Lazar, 2026: 55). This will occur regardless of the political color of temporary US administrations and Trump’s behavioral patterns.
Moreover, Italy’s position at the heart of the Mediterranean exposes it to Russian military and intelligence threats, making continued US support essential for its defense. Concomitantly, the current conservative government fears that reduced US commitment may result in Italy being more dependent on the EU, possibly steering the country towards deeper integration and an additional loss of sovereignty. This scenario is not desirable to Meloni’s Brothers of Italy (FdI) party and most of her political class. Therefore, Italy seeks to balance strong bonds with both the United States and the European Union.
Marine Le Pen
For several years, the relationship between Le Pen and Trump has been a positive one underpinned by mutual respect and (limited) reciprocal support. In fact, Le Pen was the only French Presidential candidate to openly endorse Trump in the 2016 American electoral competition and was the first to congratulate the tycoon before his victory against Hillary Clinton was even officialized (McAuley, 2016). Similarly, Le Pen’s right-hand man, Jordan Bardella, praised Trump’s nationalist politics, stating his success represented “a wind of freedom, of national pride blowing all over Western democracies” (Gozzi, 2025). Bardella also argued that Trump won because he “defended America’s interests” (Bardella, 2025). More recently, after Le Pen’s conviction in early 2025, Trump expressed his solidarity to the French politician by writing the message “FREE MARINE LE PEN,” and referring to the court’s ruling as a “Witch Hunt” on Truth Social (Solmaz, 2025).
However, a long-standing anti-American sentiment deeply ingrained both within the French general public (81% think Trump is dangerous) (see Odoxa, 2026) and in the ideology and political tradition of the National Rally (RN) (formerly National Front) has prevented Le Pen (and Bardella) from embracing Trump’s program fully. While the RN’s agenda on topics such as immigration, climate change, and the “culture war” against woke and gender ideology perfectly aligns with Trump’s, the French far right has disassociated itself from the American President’s foreign policy, particularly on trade and security.
Regarding trade, although both Trump and Le Pen are protectionists, the former’s wide-ranging tariffs on imports — including French goods such as wine, luxury products, aerospace components — significantly damage French economic interests as an exporting country.
Regarding security, while Trump wants European allies to spend much more on defense within the NATO framework, Le Pen instead promotes French strategic independence, calling for a reduced involvement and integration within NATO’s military command. Actually, once the conflict in Ukraine ceases, Le Pen aims to withdraw from NATO’s integrated military command altogether (Besch & Varma, 2025: 19). Notwithstanding, it was mainly Trump’s threats to Greenland, his hostile demeanor towards Volodymyr Zelensky’s Ukraine, his overthrow of Nicolás Maduro, and his military actions against Iran that marked a turning point in relations between the US administration, the RN, and much of the European right.
For example, concerning Iran, Le Pen declared: “Nobody knows what Donald Trump’s ultimate goal is in Iran. Today, this war has taken proportions that were not foreseen, affecting many Gulf countries, and with consequences that directly impact us: the increase in energy prices” (Roundtable, 2026). Instead, concerning Ukraine, Le Pen denounced the “brutality” of Trump’s decision to freeze US aid to the Eastern European country (Guillou, 2025).
Allegedly, Le Pen even told officials within her party to maintain a distance from Trump as he has turned into a political liability (Caulcutt & Nöstlinger, 2026). The same reasoning had previously led Bardella to cancel his appearance at CPAC after the MAGA ideologue, Steve Bannon, supposedly made a Nazi salute on stage (Reuters, 2025).
Le Pen’s cautious distancing from Trump may result in a substantial change of the nature of their relationship, making it more withdrawn in public but more transactional — on farming, trade, defense spending, and military activities — in the event of a future Le Pen presidency. This transactional disposition seems very appropriate and likely to prevail since American and French interests do not always align in those areas. However, this does not necessarily mean that Le Pen and Trump will be openly antagonistic towards each other. After all, the two still share a common enemy identified by both in “the international(-ist) left” operating at an elite level within supra-national institutions such as the European Commission, Council of Europe, United Nations (UN), World Health Organization (WHO), and World Trade Organization (WTO).
Given this, if Trump’s foreign policy shifts back to a more isolationist/non-interventionist one especially with regards to the Middle East (while simultaneously not abandoning Ukraine), there are stronger possibilities of an open rapprochement between Le Pen’s RN and Trump before the next Presidential elections in France and the US. Even so, in the more distant future it will be JD Vance (even more[1] nationalist, populist, and isolationist than Trump himself) who will play a key role in redefining the relationship between the American Republicans and European far right parties such as the RN and others.
Nigel Farage
Farage and Trump have been friends and essentially political allies since the latter’s rise to power in 2016. The two partially share a weltanschaaung revolving around capitalism, the defense of borders, law and order, Western exceptionalism, and the preservation of national cultural identity. Moreover, both have always been skeptical of (if not opposed to) the gradual development of the European Union as a political and economic power, and its strategic relationship with China.
Farage has spoken favorably about Trump on distinct occasions. For instance, he has stressed that Trump is a role model for him (and his party Reform UK) because the American President stands for “national interest” and keeps the promises made to his electorate (Bloomberg, 2025). Also, during a rally in the US, Farage has praised Trump as the “most resilient” and “bravest person” he has ever met (BBC, 2020). Undeniably, Trump holds a positive view of Farage as well, given he has expressed an interest in having him as UK ambassador to the US (Langfitt, 2016) and has always supported the Brexit project (Langlois, 2018: 7).
Against this backdrop, the relationship between the two became colder between late 2025 and early 2026. Today, it appears Farage does not have the same privileged access to Trump, and — at least on one occasion — the American President did not meet the British politician who had purposely traveled to the US expecting to reinforce their “special relationship” (Gross et al., 2026; Cobham, 2026). Since then, not only have Trump’s priorities shifted (he currently focuses on domestic issues rather than securing alliances abroad) but Farage himself discreetly distanced himself from Trump (Gibbons, 2026).
One reason for this is Trump continues to be very unpopular among voters in Britain (Schofield, 2026; The Economist, 2025), including part of Reform UK’s electoral base (Mitchell, 2025). Research indicates that a significant portion of potential Reform voters — especially women — have trouble understanding why Farage associates with Trump (Dawson, 2026). While they may support the party on other policy issues, this perceived closeness to Trump could dissuade them from voting for Reform UK. After all, Trump’s hardline approach on “law and order,” exemplified by the Minnesota immigration raids (carried out by ICE), may have limited appeal among many moderate voters in Britain and continental Europe (see Wike et al., 2025).
Another issue that has certainly (negatively) influenced the relationship between the two leaders is the Iran war. Although Farage has refrained from unequivocally condemning Trump’s campaign in the Middle East (which he initially supported) and has even stated Iran is a “bigger danger than Putin” (Mason, 2026), concomitantly, he has warned against British involvement in the war (White, 2026). The conflict with Iran has been devastating for the British economy,[2] mainly due to the sharp rise in oil and gas prices alongside general inflation. Thus, while Farage remains strongly opposed to the Iranian regime for pragmatic reasons, he has also had to state that Trump was badly advised on the war (Elliot, 2026) and that the UK should remain out of the conflict, inevitably distancing himself from the US administration’s position.
The divergences vis-à-vis the Iran war have been exacerbated by broader economic and foreign policy disagreements. While Farage has always praised free markets, Trump is a pro-tariff protectionist. Additionally, over the years, Farage has endorsed the West supplying weapons to Zelensky’s government more explicitly than Trump. Perhaps these differences have further contributed to the increasing distance between the two political figures.
Nonetheless, considering a circumstance where Trump remains US President and Farage becomes UK Prime Minister, it is likely the relationship between the two would be largely amicable, with their respective countries expanding collaboration in certain policy areas.By way of illustration, a Trump-Farage synergy is expected to lead to a large-scale UK-US free trade agreement and a general reduction of barriers and regulation for bilateral trade.
Given this, America and Britain will presumably continue to cooperate at a NATO-level as — notwithstanding his confrontational statements — Trump does not have a concrete plan to withdraw from the transatlantic organization. Actually, it is possible that a Farage-led Britain could embrace Trump’s position on “burden-sharing” and pressure European allies (especially France, Germany, and Italy) to increase expenditure on defense.
Similarly, Farage and Trump’s agreement on the immigration issue is very likely to result in greater cooperation on intelligence, security, and border control.
Ultimately, their skepticism regarding climate change and policies to protect the environment could lead them to economize on climate policy and instead pursue an increase of oil and gas production.
Alice Weidel
Before 2025, direct contact between Trump and the Alternative for Germany (AfD) was relatively limited and intermittent, and to this day, a close relationship between Trump and the AfD’s leader, Alice Weidel, does not appear to have fully developed at either a personal or a direct political level. Be that as it may, in the weeks preceding and months following the 2025 German federal election, high-profile figures from the Trump administration such as Elon Musk, Marco Rubio, and JD Vance have publicly defended or openly expressed support for Weidel’s party. In fact, while interviewing Weidel online, Musk proclaimed, “only AfD can save Germany, end of story” (Le Monde with AFP, 2025). In the same context, Weidel reiterated (as she had previously stated during a Bloomberg interview[3]) that it caused her “physical pain” to see Trump and his entire family “disparaged” by the mainstream media (Alice Weidel, 2025).
Instead of explicitly endorsing the AfD as Musk did, US Secretary of State, Rubio, disputed Germany’s domestic intelligence agency’s classification of Weidel’s party as “right-wing extremist” (Wertheimer, 2025). The US Vice-President JD Vance went even further, meeting Weidel at the margins of the Munich Security Conference (February 14-16, 2025) to discuss issues ranging from the war in Ukraine to freedom of speech and German politics (Reuters, 2025). Vance’s decision to meet Weidel can be interpreted as an act of legitimization by the Trump administration.
Beyond pro-AfD statements, Trump’s officials have engaged with AfD politicians/lawmakers through private meetings in Washington D.C. (Pfeifer, 2025). For example, the more “moderate” national-conservative wing of the German party, which includes the popular Beatrix von Storch, is known to have had repeated contacts not only with Vance’s staff but also with representatives of the US State Department and National Security Council (Pfeifer, 2025). Although there are substantial differences between Trump’s distorted form of American exceptionalism and the anti-American latent Eurasianism promoted by the most radical faction of the AfD (mainly led by Björn Höcke), this did not prevent Trump’s loyalists from seeking ties with the AfD and inviting them to the US After all, until recently, Weidel, von Storch, and the AfD’s establishment have looked upon Trump favorably due to his campaign (or “culture war”) against woke ideology, immigration, Islam (Pfeifer, 2025) and liberal-progressivism in general. This alignment was broadly reciprocal. As the Anglo-German journalist Henry Donovan (2026) posits: “In MAGA World, the AfD was increasingly spoken of as Germany’s conservative insurgency – a mirror image of how Trump sees his so-called revolt against liberal elites” (Donovan, 2026).
Weidel and Trump hold common beliefs on several issues. First, both leaders have centered their platform on opposing immigration. Second, Weidel and Trump share a skepticism towards climate change policy and the introduction of renewable energy sources. Third, the two leaders embrace supply-side (or even “trickle-down”) economics and selective forms of protectionism simultaneously — and can be (paradoxically) described as “liberal-protectionist” (for an account of the AfD’s economics, see Cattani, 2016).
Nevertheless, the ideological affinities between Trump’s MAGA movement and Weidel’s AfD were not sufficient to impede an almost sudden break between the American and German far right earlier this year. Trump’s unpredictability and risky political moves such as armed conflict with Iran, regime-change operation in Venezuela, and repeated threats to Greenland forced AfD leaders and key figures — including co-chair of the party Tino Chrupalla and Weidel herself — to markedly distance themselves from both the tycoon and the “Grand Old Party” (GOP). It was especially the strikes on Iran (highly unpopular among the German electorate[4]) that led Weidel to ask her party’s senior lawmakers to cut back on their trips to the US where they would regularly meet pro-MAGA Republicans (Pitel, 2026). Condemnation of Trump’s actions came from both Weidel and Chrupalla who in a joint statement remarked “renewed destabilization of the Middle East is not in the German interest and must end” (Hoyer, 2026). The fears of the AfD’s elite, particularly Chrupalla, is that Trump — who apparently “started off as a peace president” — would become another American president known for war campaigns and neoconservative interventionism (Hoyer, 2026).
Overall, far-right parties like the AfD remain largely skeptical about US interventionism (sometimes described as “US imperialism”) due to its economic and migratory consequences, such as recession, higher gas prices, and mass migration towards Europe. This is the main reason why Weidel (sounding like her opponents from the pacifist far-left) also referred to the Iran War as “a catastrophe” (Pitel, 2026). However, the party appears divided, as there have been prominent figures within the AfD — especially Maximilian Krah and (to a lesser extent) Markus Frohnmaier — who continue to unequivocally support Trump despite the Iran war (Pitel, 2026). In early April 2026, the former expressed his opinion on social media: “a break with Trump would be harmful to the AfD in all sorts of ways. It must not be allowed to happen” (Pitel, 2026).
Surprisingly, as of this writing, Trump has not reconsidered his predominantly positive opinion concerning the AfD. In fact, the American President welcomed the AfD’s striking 44% electoral victory in the Saxony-Anhalt region in early September by stating (on Truth Social) “Wow! The Populist Party in Germany just had a really big night” and congratulated the party (Zakharova, 2026). In any case, although a near future (unlikely) scenario where an AfD-led Germany is simultaneous to a Trump-led America is still technically possible, predicting the type of relationship the two countries would have in such a context remains a difficult and problematic endeavor.
In essence, as the political scientist Marco Tarchi explains, the AfD has three ideological currents: the first, is the national-conservative one, which is also economically liberal and is currently the majoritarian faction in the party led by Weidel; the second, is the “old-school” nationalist one, unfairly (according to Tarchi) labelled as neo-Nazi; the third, is the social-national one which was very successful in the recent elections occurring in the Eastern region(s) of the country and could possibly engage in dialogue with Sahra Wagenknechts’s party (BSW) (Tarchi as cited in Boezi, 2026, my translation).
Currently, with the party on the rise electorally, it is unclear which one of these three factions will politically prevail and in which manner and degree they will interact with Trump in the event they obtain power. For example, AfD’s “national conservatives” could rekindle their relationship with Trump (especially if the Iran war ends abruptly) and be strongly backed by the latter when they pursue hardline “law and order” policies, including their signature policy, Remigration,[5]which may put Germany at odds with the European Union and part of the international community. Also, notwithstanding some of Weidel’s anti-American rhetoric, the AfD and Washington can have a transactional transatlantic partnership that stems from sovereigntism, meaning Germany would spend more on defense and rearm but buy American weapons (and American LNG[6]). How this very pragmatic settlement would fit in a major bilateral or multi-lateral framework is still uncertain.
For instance, would the present NATO agreements remain the strategic “umbrella” for Germany yet? Regarding such potential developments from Trump’s perspective, providing AfD’s Germany with preferential treatment, in terms of both security and bilateral trade, America would be promoting the party’s sovereigntist ideology and at the same time even encourage Weidel government’s gradual distancing from the European Union.
Reversely, in contrast with the EU’s common foreign policy, Weidel’s AfD could pressure an already Ukraine-skeptic Trump administration to realign with Russia, leaving Ukraine to its own fate. The predictability of the above-described scenario — it has to be recognized — is highly dependent on a series of factors, the main of which is the capacity and the will of the most anti-American views in the party to compromise with the idea of a new partnership with the US. Weidel herself should revise some previous hostile attitudes towards the military American presence on German soil.
Why Trump’s Relationship with the European Right and Far Right Is Strained: Four Factors
The relationship between President Trump and significant segments of the European right and far right has become increasingly strained. While — as mentioned previously — a substantial ideological overlap endures (especially opposition towards immigration and progressivism), several developments have resulted in tensions between Trump’s “America First!” agenda and the national interests of the European right-wing and far right parties led by Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel. Today, Trump is no longer the ideological lodestar for Europe’s right and far right: with Meloni, relations are cold at best, while Le Pen keeps the MAGA movement at arm’s length, similarly, Farage is now more cautious in publicly expressing support for the tycoon, and Weidel has distanced herself and limited her party’s contacts with the US administration.
More specifically, there are four factors that have contributed to alienating Trump’s US from the European right and far right. First, Trump’s popularity has significantly declined both domestically and internationally (Hartig & Kiley, 2026; Dionne, Jr., 2025). A recent study shows his approval rating at a very low 32% in America, losing 15 percentage points since the beginning of his second term in January 2025 (Lange, 2026). At the same time, Trump’s approbation among the Republican electorate has also declined, standing at 73% (Lange, 2026).
Considering the wider context, a YouGov survey (from October 2026) found that 85% of Italians have an unfavorable opinion of Trump, against 83% in France, 86% in Britain, and 85% in Germany (YouGov, 2026). After all, Trump’s political brand has become so toxic for the global right that nearly every time he became directly or indirectly involved in a country’s election — either by threatening annexation, tariffs, or by endorsing a candidate — his engagement has backfired on the candidates he endorsed.
This occurred in the last Canadian election in April 2025, as Trump suggested Canada could become the US’s “51st state” while concurrently increasing tariffs against the country, and resulted in a Liberal Party victory and an unexpected defeat of the conservative pro-Trump candidate Pierre Poilievre (Dionne Jr., 2025).
It also occurred in Hungary, precisely a year later, as Vance attended a Viktor Orbàn rally in Budapest with 1,000 supporters on behalf of Trump (Spike, 2026). However, this strategy did not produce the intended outcome as elections were ultimately won by Orbàn’s opponent, Péter Magyar.
As simply put by two experts — Jeremy Shapiro and Zsuzanna Vegh (2025) — “His [Trumps’s] growing unpopularity means aligning with him may not appear politically advantageous for these forces” (Shapiro & Vegh, 2025).
Second, Trump’s protectionism, which has taken the form of tariffs as a trade policy against EU nations, has led to an escalation of tension between the US administration and some of its rightist “allies” in Europe. In essence, while far right forces such as the RN and the AfD may embrace economic nationalism or protectionism theoretically, and even practically when it suits their own national economies, they instead wholeheartedly oppose it when US tariffs[7] on European goods risk damaging their own countries’ businesses, industries, and workers. After all, for years populists have presented themselves as the main defenders of rural and blue-collar workers, who now form their core constituency.
Thus, aligning with Trump over his tariffs and trade measures (even if for purely ideological reasons) would be counter-productive and self-sabotaging for the European right and far right, as they ultimately damage artisans, luxury craft producers, exporters, farmers, manufacturers, and small-medium businesses in general, located in Italy, France, Britain, Germany and so forth. While there have been examples of populist politicians (e.g. Le Pen and Matteo Salvini) on the right defending Trump’s economic strategy (especially anti-China tariffs) the majority of rightists have either awkwardly ignored or condemned his course of action contra the EU.
Among those who originally supported Trump but criticized him on anti-EU tariffs are Le Pen (who spoke of the American’s “brutal approach”) and Weidel (who called them “far too aggressive and self-defeating” and “fundamentally bad for free trade”) (Pitel, 2025). Instead, the conservative PM Meloni, simply called Trump’s tariffs “a mistaken choice” (Pitel, 2025). In fact, one commentator, writing for The Guardian has shrewdly suggested that “analysts have long noted the difficult challenge that Trump’s policies pose to nationalists in the EU: while they may agree with some of them principle, MAGA is ‘America first’ – while they are ‘France first,’ ‘Germany first’ or ‘Spain first’” (Henley, 2025).
Third, Trump’s foreign policy — especially regarding Iran — emerged as increasingly at odds with the crypto-isolationist, selectively non-interventionist (see Greene, 2024) and sovereigntist foreign policy stances of the nationalist right in Europe. Trump’s involvement (alongside Israel) in a conflict that expanded beyond the initial strikes (February 2026) and targeting of Iran’s nuclear program became viewed as an indirect threat to Europe by part of the right and far right. This is due to the costs of the war, its negative economic consequences to international trade and oil, gas, and fuel prices, as well as its wider impact on mass migration and population displacement. For evident reasons, a large-scale war in Iran could result in a new wave of migration and increase in the influx of refugees in the Old Continent.
Also, the European nationalist right (but also part of the mainstream right) wants to avoid getting involved in an American-Israeli War that would potentially result in hardship for European soldiers and taxpayers. As discussed previously, far right leaders like Le Pen and Weidel have shown their disdain for Trump’s actions against Iran, whilst Farage called in question Trump’s judgement (Coates, 2026). In essence, Trump’s move against Iran (like the one against Maduro’s Venezuela beforehand) did not consolidate Trump’s “transatlantic alliance” with the European right and far righ but actually contributed to its deterioration (Riccardi & Spike, 2026).
Instead, regarding the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the situation is more complex. Whilst some right-wing parties — inspired by Eurasianists ranging from Alexander Dugin to Alain de Benoist[8] — have remained staunchly pro-Putin and pro-Russia (e.g. AfD) others have shifted to more “mainstream” pro-Ukraine positions (e.g. FdI, RN, Reform UK). Unlike specifically extreme right parties (e.g. AfD), today, conservative (e.g. FdI) and populist radical right parties (e.g. RN, Reform UK) and leaders in Europe are increasingly skeptical of Trump’s conciliatory approach towards Russia.
Unsurprisingly, Meloni often calls Russia an “aggressor” (Hook Global, 2026) and has clearly criticized Trump’s deal with the Russian President (to import a significant amount of Russian diesel fuel and temporarily lift US sanctions) calling it “a very risky choice” that legitimizes Moscow (Barbati, 2026). In the Italian Parliament, her party has consistently voted to aid Ukraine militarily.
More surprisingly, the — once Russophile — RN has reassessed its position on Russia, because although the party has opposed sending French troops and military aid (for long-range strikes) both Le Pen and Bardella have publicly supported Ukraine’s right to defend (and recover) its sovereignty (Sandford, 2022; Par Le Parisien avec AFP, 2025; Crone & Klinke, 2025: 24, 44). Also, the RN supposedly interrupted all contacts with the Kremlin after 2022 (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 44). This shift towards more liberal-conservative positions has been prompted by the increasing influence of a new generation of identitarian, Gaullist, and civilizationist thinkers that advise the higher ranks of the party — such as Pierre-Romain Thionnet and few others (Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25). The “new” RN no longer considers Russia a bastion for traditional Christianity and European identity but instead views it as a multicultural melting pot (a “Eurasian empire” with a considerable Islamic population) that represents a menace to the sovereignty of a white, Christian, and Western, “Fortress Europe” (see Crone & Klinke, 2025: 25, 27, 40, 44).
Shifting the focus to Britain, even Farage — possibly the greatest admirer and supporter of Trump in Europe — has recently spoken against Trump’s new Russian deal (Henrys, 2026) and now is more inclined to back Ukraine (even suggesting NATO adherence) (Keate, 2025) at the cost of disagreeing with the American President.
It is difficult to say whether these parties and leaders are ideologically or strategically (as some are close to obtaining governmental power) driven to support Ukraine over Russia. However, what is evident is that whilst the US-Iran War is viewed as something occurring far from Europe’s borders and involving a nation that is culturally very distinct and of little interest to the Old Continent, the Russia-Ukraine War is a conflict at the heart of Europe involving a nation that has been invaded by an “alien” superpower.
Moreover, far right and right-wing parties are much more comfortable with Ukrainian immigration than with Iranian immigration resulting from the War, as the former are perceived as “white” and “Christian” and the latter as “non-white” and “Muslim.” A further concept worth exploring is that introduced by the French political analyst Thibault Muzergues (2026): many of these right-wing and/or far right parties in Europe are presently led by a younger generation of politicians who have become increasingly wary of aligning with Putin’s Russia (France 24 English, 2026). Essentially, this new political elite adopts a different stance towards Russia than its predecessors did fifteen to twenty-five years ago (France 24 English, 2026).
Fourth, Trump’s political model, especially his modus operandi of leadership and exercise of executive power, is difficult (if not impossible) to reproduce in Europe. The particular institutional structure and political-cultural context of the US confer the American President significantly more decisional autonomy, power, and freedom of maneuver compared to the numerous checks and balances, political fragmentation, and institutional constraints characterizing systems such as the European Union.
In the event that they assume office, leaders such as Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel would operate in a very distinct context from Trump — one that involves specifically European parliamentary mechanisms, proportional electoral frameworks, coalition administrations, independent constitutional tribunals, and supranational regulatory bodies.
Contrastingly, Trump’s institutional environment is shaped by a two-party system where — although restrained by courts, Congress, and the states — the executive is directly elected by the people and is able to exercise substantial authority without having to necessarily depend on a parliamentary majority. For instance, the American President has the right to pull out from most international agreements without the approval of Congress. Furthermore, Trump utilized executive orders to make US immigration policy stricter (also enforcing mass deportations) without always relying on new legislation.
In summary, the impracticality of replicating Trump’s model in Europe ineluctably contributed to an increasing estrangement between the American President and the European right.
Conclusion
This commentary examined the complex political and relational dynamics surrounding President Trump and successful right-wing and far right party leaders in Europe. The analysis revealed that although — overall — the relationship between Trump and the European right and far right is significantly strained, it has yet to reach a breaking point, nor does such an outcome appear imminent. After all, given the American and European economies are largely interconnected, especially considering trade and supply chains, finance, military security, intelligence, energy, and technology, a full rupture between the US and Europe’s major nations (and its potential future leaders) such as Italy, France, Britain, and Germany appears both undesirable and unrealistic.
In any case, the main takeaway is that although there is strong ideological affinity between at least three of the four leaders discussed and Trump — Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel (more so than Meloni) are closely aligned to the US President’s views on state authority to combat globalization, immigration, woke, and modern liberalism — realpolitik combined with Trump’s trade and foreign policy have forced these parties/leaders to distance themselves from his actions and emerging legacy, primarily to defend their own national interests.
Considering political realism, Meloni, Le Pen, Farage, and Weidel have all understood the political cost of aligning too closely with a foreign President who is experiencing a sharp decline in public support (both domestically and internationally) and who always prioritizes pursuing his own national agenda to satisfy his electoral base at home (MAGA) rather than strengthening transatlantic alliances.
Furthermore, these leaders evidently see no benefit in attempting to imitate or replicate Trump’s failing political model in their own parliamentary (Italy, Britain, Germany) and semi-presidential (France) democracies. Considering Trump’s policies, all of the rightist and far right leaders mentioned above have no choice but to object to the President’s hazardous maneuvers on trade and foreign policy that damage their economies and long-term societal plans. Today, American tariffs on European goods, Russian “appeasement,” and new wars (e.g. Iran) (potentially causing an increase in global immigration), are not looked upon favorably by the leaders of parties who are — above all — sovereigntist (and except for the AfD — FdI, RN, and Reform UK, view Russia as a foreign threat to national sovereignty), nativist, culturally and economically nationalist, and partially isolationist.
After Trump’s failed midterms election, it is likely the European right will distance itself from him and his political paradigm (namely “Trumpism”) even further. However, it is only natural that — if they take office — the European right and far right will seek coordination and cooperation with Trump’s America on most of the issues mentioned above (trade, security, intelligence, energy, etc.). Nevertheless, such cooperation is likely to become increasingly pragmatic, transactional and driven by strategic considerations rather than ideological affinity.
As already stated, Trump is no longer considered an ideological point of reference or natural ally by any of the leaders and parties under scrutiny. On the contrary, Trump is perceived as an erratic, precarious, and unpredictable interlocutor whose imperatives and core aims usually diverge significantly from their own, especially on topics such as commercial policy and foreign policy. Ideally, future studies could shift the focus towards other right-wing political actors (e.g. Santiago Abascal, Péter Magyar, and Geert Wilders) and assess their affinity with Trump from a political-strategic and ideological standpoint.
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Footnotes
[1] For detailed accounts of JD Vance’s political views refer to Benjamin Wallace-Wells (2024), and Swapna Venugopal Ramaswamy (2025).
[2] For an in-depth account on how the Israel/U.S.-Iran conflict has negatively impacted the UK economy, see Daniel Harari (2026).
[3] The interview mentioned above can be found online at the following link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IeYB_Hmsu84.
[4] A recent survey shows that most Germans disapprove of Trump’s actions against Iran (and Maduro in Venezuela) — see Claudia Müller (2026).
[5] This particular AfD policy is concisely (yet comprehensively) discussed in a book chapter written by the scholar Ubaldo Villani-Lubelli (2026: 149-151).
[6] Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).
[7] Especially the 20% levy on all EU imports (see Hernández-Morales et al., 2025).
[8] Alain de Benoist is not strictly Eurasianist in the Duginist sense. While he supports multipolarity (objecting to American dominance and liberal universalism) and calls for an ethno-pluralist “Europe of the peoples”, he also believes Russia’s role is central in any anti-American, anti-Atlanticist, and illiberal continental project.
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