ECPS Annual Activity Report 2024

Content


On November 7, 2024, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) organised a panel at the European Parliament in Brussels to explore the rising influence of populism on the 2024 European Parliament elections and the upcoming US administration. Photo: Umit Vurel.

Foreword

Introduction

Projects

     Completed and Ongoing Projects

            VOLUNCITIZEN

            ENCODE

            UNTOLD EUROPE

      Project Proposals  

           GOVERNOR (Horizon Europe)

           CERYS (CERV)

           IMN-SEMES (CERV)

           GenDrive (CERV)

           Mediascope (Erasmus)

Events

        Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series

        Other Panels

        Annual International Symposium

        Partnerships with International Conferences

        ECPS Academy Summer School

        ECPS Workshops

Publications

       Journal of Populism & Politics (P&P)

       ECPS Interview Series

       ECPS Commentaries

       Voice of Youths (VoY)

       Policy Papers

       Reports

       Profiles

Conclusion

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Foreword


 

It is with great pride and a deep sense of responsibility that I present the European Center for Populism Studies’ Activity Report for 2024. This year has been one of significant growth, intellectual maturity, and global engagement for ECPS. As the challenges posed by populism and authoritarianism intensify across regions, our mission—to safeguard democratic values through rigorous research, public dialogue, and international cooperation—has never been more crucial. 

In 2024, ECPS affirmed its role as a dynamic international hub by producing an exceptional volume of scholarship. Our digital journals published numerous articles, offering cutting-edge analyses on civilizational populism, digital authoritarianism, electoral transformations, and religious mobilization across continents. Beyond the journals, our researchers produced more than 100 additional outputs, including expert interviews, analytical articles, commentaries, and research reports. These contributions have enriched global understanding of political disruptions and democratic backsliding—from India and Indonesia to Europe, Latin America, and beyond. 

Equally inspiring has been our expanding engagement with scholars, practitioners, and the public. ECPS organized 29 academic and outreach events, including major international conferences and the highly successful ECPS Academy Summer School, which received over 140 applications. Our Early Career Researchers Network, Youth Group, and internship programs continue to cultivate the next generation of critical thinkers—an investment in democracy’s long-term resilience. 

Partnerships remain at the heart of our work. Through collaborations with leading universities, think tanks, and EU-funded initiatives such as ENCODE and UNTOLD Europe, ECPS strengthened its interdisciplinary reach and policy relevance. These alliances amplify our impact and ensure that our research informs both scholarly debate and practical policymaking. 

Looking back at 2024, I am immensely proud of what our community has accomplished. ECPS stands today as a vibrant, credible, and globally recognized institution—one committed not only to diagnosing the threats of populism, but also to supporting democratic resilience in constructive and inclusive ways.

I extend my deepest gratitude to our team, researchers, partners, supporters, and young scholars. Together, we will continue to build the knowledge, networks, and civic capacity needed to confront the challenges of our time.

Irina von Wiese
ECPS President

 

Introduction


 

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) continued to strengthen its role in 2024 as a young and dynamic international hub for research, dialogue, and policy engagement on the challenges posed by rising populism and authoritarianism worldwide. Established as an independent, nonpartisan, and nonprofit organization based in Brussels, ECPS remains firmly committed to advancing the core values of liberal democracy, including the rule of law, human rights, pluralism, freedom of speech, gender equality, and social and environmental justice.

Populism, once seen as a peripheral phenomenon, has evolved into a central force in contemporary politics. In 2024, its reach remained visible across advanced and developing democracies alike, often intertwined with authoritarian tendencies. The inability of post–World War II institutions to adequately respond to compounding crises—from climate shocks and geopolitical conflict to disinformation, economic instability, and widening social inequalities—continued to fuel mistrust in democratic structures and nourish populist mobilization. Increasingly, leaders and movements employing exclusionary rhetoric, conspiracy narratives, and institutional subversion have challenged democratic norms and global stability.

Yet 2024 also demonstrated the importance of civic and intellectual resilience, and institutional collaboration. ECPS has played an active role in this landscape by producing research-based knowledge, enhancing public awareness, and fostering international cooperation. Through its ten specialized research programs, ECPS mobilizes scholars working on extremism and radicalization, authoritarianism, foreign policy, the digital sphere, gender, economics, climate change, and related fields. This interdisciplinary structure enables rigorous analysis and accessible outputs for diverse audiences.

In 2024, ECPS delivered an exceptionally productive year of scholarship and outreach. The Journal of Populism & Politics (P&P) published 18 peer-reviewed articles, providing cutting-edge analysis on civilizational populism, digital authoritarianism, electoral politics, and religious mobilization across regions including North and South Americas, Indonesia, Turkey, Europe, and China. 

Complementing these contributions, ECPS published 51 expert interviews, 20 analytical articles, 9 commentaries, 3 policy papers, and 42 research reports, including extensive multi-country analyses under the Mapping Global Populism initiative and the 2024 European Parliament Elections project.

ECPS continued to prioritize academic networking, training, and capacity building. In 2024, it organized 29 events, including international conferences, regional panels, workshops, and the annual ECPS Academy Summer School, which received over 140 applications, admitting more than 70 participants. The Early Career Researchers Network (ECRN) and ECPS Youth Group, each comprising around 30 young scholars, deepened engagement with emerging researchers, while the internship program provided practical experience to approximately 10 young researchers.

ECPS also strengthened partnerships with leading universities and think tanks, collaborating on research and co-organizing high-impact events. Its continued involvement in EU-funded initiatives—including the ENCODE (Horizon) and UNTOLD Europe (CERV) projects—further expanded its policy relevance and research capacity.

Looking ahead, ECPS remains committed to providing independent, evidence-based scholarship and open dialogue, working to ensure that democratic institutions and civic values remain resilient in the face of global populist challenges.

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Projects


 

In 2024, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) significantly strengthened its engagement in major European research, innovation, and civic-education initiatives by participating in numerous project proposals submitted to the European Commission. These proposals were developed under leading funding programmes—including Horizon Europe, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values (CERV) programme, and Erasmus+—and brought together universities, think tanks, civil society organisations, municipalities, research institutes, and digital-innovation partners from across the continent. This broad collaborative landscape reflects ECPS’s growing reputation as a key contributor to interdisciplinary research on populism, democracy, governance, and social transformation.

The proposals submitted in 2024 covered a wide thematic spectrum: digital democracy and governance innovation (GOVERNOR); youth Euroscepticism and European historical awareness (CERYS); intergenerational migration narratives and anti-discrimination frameworks (IMN-SEMES); gender equality and work–life balance (GenDrive); and media literacy, disinformation, and civic resilience (Mediascope). These initiatives demonstrate ECPS’s ability to integrate its core expertise—populism, democratic backsliding, political communication, and civic engagement—into broader, multi-sectoral research frameworks addressing Europe’s complex socio-political challenges.

Although funding outcomes varied across calls, ECPS’s participation in these competitive proposals solidified its visibility within European research ecosystems and reinforced its position as a trusted partner in interdisciplinary, impact-driven consortia. The collaborations forged throughout 2024 have expanded ECPS’s academic and policy networks and laid a strong foundation for future applications under Horizon Europe, Digital Europe, and CERV.

Through these endeavours, ECPS continues to contribute to innovative, policy-relevant knowledge production that promotes democratic resilience, social inclusion, and active citizenship across Europe.

 

Completed and Ongoing Projects


 

VOLUNCITIZEN

The VolunCITIZEN Erasmus+ journey was launched in Denmark with the first kickoff meeting in January 2024, marked by passion and collaboration with partners from Poland, Estonia, and Belgium.

VolunCITIZEN is an online platform that connects civil society organisations, youth, and migrants. Its aim is to increase active citizenship, social participation, and intercultural exchange through these associations. By participating in this project, you can become a valuable volunteer for civil society organizations and contribute to society. This project is funded by the Erasmus + Small Scale program. Its total budget is 60,000 euros, and ECPS was rewarded with 12,500 euros. The project was implemented between 01/10/2023 and 30/09/2024. Project website: https://voluncitizen.eu/

 

ENCODE

The ENCODE project aims to explore and decode the role of emotions in political discourse and their impact on democratic processes. The project’s primary goal is to create new positive narratives that can foster trust and engagement in European democratic processes, thereby counteracting the negative emotions that often dominate political discussions. Through innovative methodologies, including social media sentiment analysis, biometric research, and surveys, ENCODE aims to provide policymakers with better tools and strategies for incorporating citizens’ emotional needs into governance. This will ultimately enhance democratic resilience and foster a more inclusive political environment. This project is funded by HORIZON program. ECPS is rewarded 269.125.00 euro for all activities between June 2024 and May 2027. Project website: https://encodemotions.eu/

 

UNTOLD EUROPE

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxfam Intermón and Qalia, hosted the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives at the Residence Palace in Brussels on October 21, 2025. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

The UNTOLD Europe project is built around the need to analyze the implications of the legacy of colonialism on contemporary multicultural European societies in different areas: 1) public policies, 2) narratives of Europe, and 3) the digital world. The Action is aligned with Priority 3 of the Call. It aims to deepen the analysis and raise awareness of how European colonialism operates today, with its different tools, the narratives used in public debates, the digital space, and specific public policies. This project is funded under the Citizens, Equality, Rights, and Values (CERV) program. It will start in 2025, and ECPS will receive 18,500 euros in total. Project website: https://untoldeurope.eu

 

Project Proposals


 

GOVERNOR (Horizon Europe)

In 2024, the ECPS participated as a partner in the Horizon Europe proposal GOVERNOR, submitted under the call HORIZON-CL2-2024-DEMOCRACY-01 (HORIZON-RIA). The proposal, coordinated by ASM – Centrum Badań i Analiz Rynku (Poland), aimed to analyse the crisis of digital democracy in Europe and develop innovative tools to strengthen democratic governance, citizen participation, and institutional resilience across EU member states. The project sought to deliver a Digital Democracy Index, a decision-support tool for public institutions, and a deliberative governance playbook designed to inform policy processes at multiple governance levels.

The consortium comprised ten partners representing research institutions, civil society, local government, and technology-focused organisations. In addition to the coordinator ASM, the consortium included: Clever Together Democratie SAS (France); the European Center for Populism Studies – ECPS (Belgium); Universität Wien (Austria); Maynooth University (Ireland); Tallinn University (Estonia); Major Cities of Europe IT Users Group e.V. (Germany); Center for the Study of Democracy (Bulgaria); Comune di Modena (Italy); and Aalto University Foundation (Finland).

ECPS contributed expertise on populism, democratic backsliding, and digital political behaviour, supporting the proposal’s analytical framework and planned dissemination strategy.

The proposal was submitted on February 7, 2024 and was not selected for funding. Despite the negative outcome, GOVERNOR strengthened ECPS’s engagement in Horizon consortia focused on democracy, governance innovation, and digital transformation. The partnership also expanded ECPS’s collaborations with leading European universities, municipalities, and research organisations, laying groundwork for future joint applications.

 

CERYS (CERV) 

In 2024, ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the CERYS project proposal (Combating Euroscepticism in Young Students), submitted under the CERV Call CERV-2024-CITIZENS-REM (European Remembrance). The proposal (ID: 101196722) was coordinated by PROGEU – Progress in European Union (Italy) and brought together four civil society and research organisations: PROGEU (Coordinator, Italy), Foundation for Entrepreneurship, Culture and Education – FECE (Bulgaria), YouNet APS (Italy), and the European Center for Populism Studies – ECPS (Belgium).

The consortium aimed to address the rising trends of Euroscepticism among young people by designing a transnational programme of educational, cultural, and debate-based activities. The proposal envisioned structured training on EU history and institutions, a guided visit to the House of European History, and a multi-country public debate involving students, experts, and political representatives. ECPS contributed as the research and analytical partner, drawing on its expertise in populism studies and youth engagement to shape the project’s intellectual framework and dissemination strategy.

The consortium structure represented a balanced combination of EU-level civil society organisations with complementary competencies in youth training, cultural education, and academic research. Activities were to be implemented across Belgium, Italy, and Bulgaria, ensuring geographic diversity and transnational participation.

The proposal was submitted on June 6, 2024, successfully passing all administrative checks, but was ultimately not selected for funding. Despite this outcome, ECPS’s involvement strengthened its collaborative ties with European partners and reinforced its strategic commitment to combating disinformation, Euroscepticism, and democratic disengagement among youth.

 

IMN-SEMES (CERV) 

In 2024, the ECPS participated as a partner in the proposal IMN-SEMES – Intergenerational Migration Narratives: Shaping Equality and Inclusion in Multicultural European Societies, submitted under the CERV-2024-CITIZENS-REM (CERV-LS) call (Proposal ID: 101196723). The initiative aimed to explore the historical and contemporary dimensions of migration in Europe through the narratives of intergenerational migrant and local women, situating personal stories within broader legacies of colonialism, racism, and structural discrimination. The project sought to counter rising xenophobia and far-right discourse by promoting inclusive historical understanding, critical thinking among youth, and cross-cultural community dialogue. 

The proposal was coordinated by DRAMBLYS (Spain) and brought together ten organisations: DRAMBLYS (Spain), IDEC S.A. (Greece), CESIE (Italy), KMGNE – Institut für Kommunikation und Medien (Germany), Materahub (Italy), ALDA – European Association for Local Democracy (France), CARDET (Cyprus), the Irish Refugee Council (Ireland), Technovation Girls (Belgium), and ECPS (Belgium). 

The partnership combined expertise in migration research, gender equality, digital storytelling, youth engagement, and human rights advocacy—ensuring a robust interdisciplinary structure aligned with the aims of the CERV programme. ECPS contributed in its capacity as a research partner, particularly in areas related to populism, discrimination, and democratic resilience.

The proposal was submitted on June 6, 2024 and received a negative funding decision. Despite its rejection, IMN-SEMES represented an important strategic engagement for ECPS, strengthening partnerships within a wide European network and expanding the organisation’s involvement in projects addressing the intersection of migration, identity, and anti-discrimination efforts.

 

GenDrive (CERV)

In 2024, ECPS participated as a consortium partner in the GenDrive proposal submitted under the CERV-2024-GE call, which sought to promote gender equality through innovative, cross-sectoral tools and collaborative engagement. The project, formally titled “Promoting the Dual Earner Dual Carer Equality Model and Work-Life Harmony Through Innovative Solutions,” aimed to address the persistent gender care gap by advancing shared caregiving responsibilities, combating structural stereotypes, and supporting employers and working caregivers with practical resources and digital tools.

The GenDrive consortium consisted of nine partners representing diverse expertise across Europe: Polska Fundacja Osrodkow Wspomagania Rozwoju Gospodarczego OIC Poland (Coordinator, Poland), G.G. Eurosuccess Consulting Limited (Cyprus), Camera di Commercio Italiana–Barcelona (Spain), FREYR Institute (Denmark), Intellisync Srl (Italy), C.M. Skoulidi & SIA E.E. (Greece), Universidad de Alicante (Spain), Ljudska Univerza Ptuj (Slovenia), and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) (Belgium). 

Together, the partners designed a comprehensive framework comprising primary research, an innovative online platform, tailored training modules, capacity-building initiatives, and EU-level dissemination efforts. ECPS contributed its research and dissemination expertise, particularly in Work Package 6, drawing on its strong track record in policy analysis and public outreach.

The proposal was submitted on April 9, 2024 and evaluated later in the year. Despite the consortium’s strong expertise and the project’s alignment with EU gender-equality priorities, GenDrive was not selected for funding in the 2024 CERV call cycle. Nonetheless, the experience strengthened ECPS’s collaborative networks and informed future proposal development.

 

Mediascope (Erasmus+) 

In 2024, the ECPS submitted the MediaScope project proposal under the Erasmus+ Small-Scale Partnerships in Adult Education (KA210-ADU) call. As project coordinator, ECPS led a four-partner consortium composed of: The European Center for Populism Studies (Belgium), Vidipost OU (Estonia), Creative Art Farm in Italy APS – CAFI (Italy), and Young Entrepreneurs Society – YES (Poland). This transnational partnership brought together expertise in digital education, media literacy, youth engagement, and cultural innovation. 

MediaScope was designed to address the growing challenge of digital misinformation by promoting media literacy, critical thinking, and responsible digital citizenship among adults and young people. The project proposed three core activities: development of online Media Literacy Courses, a virtual Art-Tech Fair combining creative expression with digital awareness, and an interactive Fake News Game to strengthen critical evaluation skills through experiential learning. These activities collectively aimed to empower citizens to identify misinformation, understand manipulation techniques, and engage more confidently in democratic processes. 

The consortium structure ensured strong complementarity: ECPS coordinated research and course development; Vidipost provided technical expertise in digital platform and game development; CAFI led art-based educational activities; and YES facilitated youth outreach and dissemination.

The proposal was submitted on March 4, 2024 and requested a total budget of €60,000, of which ECPS would manage €25,000 as coordinator. Although the project was not selected for funding, MediaScope strengthened ECPS’s collaborative network, expanded its capacity in media literacy initiatives, and laid valuable groundwork for future Erasmus+ and cross-sector partnerships. 

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Events


 

 

In 2024, the ECPS organized and co-hosted about 30 major events, reaffirming its role as a leading international hub for research-driven dialogue on populism, authoritarianism, and democratic resilience. These activities—including global and regional panel discussions, academic conferences, high-level policy forums, workshops, and the annual Summer School—brought together hundreds of scholars, policymakers, journalists, and practitioners. With most events attracting 30–100 participants, ECPS sustained a dynamic and diverse platform for critical engagement across continents.

A centerpiece of this year’s programming was the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) series, which provided in-depth analyses of political developments across Asia, Eurasia, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. The sessions explored a wide array of themes, including digital authoritarianism in China, populist autocracy in Russia, democratic fragility in the Caucasus, Islamist nationalism in Turkey, and the growing influence of civilizational populisms. These global perspectives highlighted how populist narratives and strategies transcend borders, adapting to local political, social, and cultural contexts.

Complementing the MGP series were specialized regional panels on Latin America and Africa, the Populism & Politics Workshop at the University of Oxford, and the Third Annual International Symposium on “The Future of Multilateralism Between Multipolarity and Populists in Power.” ECPS also strengthened academic partnerships through two major conferences at Deakin University (Australia), focusing on digital disinformation, democratic resilience, and Indonesia’s 2024 elections.

A notable addition in 2024 was the high-level policy event, “Transatlantic Outlook on Populism in the US and Europe in Light of the ECPS 2024 Report on EP Elections,” held at the European Parliament in Brussels and hosted by MEP Radan Kanev. Featuring keynote speeches by Radan Kanev and Nathalie Loiseau, and a presentation of ECPS’s flagship report by Dr. Emilia Zankina and Dr. Gilles Ivaldi, the event underscored ECPS’s growing relevance in transatlantic policy debates on populism and democracy.

The ECPS Summer School 2024 further expanded the institution’s educational mission, offering interdisciplinary training on populism and foreign policy to emerging scholars worldwide.

Collectively, ECPS’s 2024 events illustrate its commitment to advancing global scholarship, informing public policy, and fostering collaborative research on the most pressing challenges posed by populism today.

 

Mapping Global Populism (MGP) Panel Series


Panel IX: Civilizational Populism and Religious Authoritarianism in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives

Date/Time: Thursday, January 25, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)

Moderator

Dr. Syaza Shukri (Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia).

Speakers

  • “Islamic Extremism, Populism and Formation of National Identity in Bangladesh,” by Mr. Bobby Hajjaj(Department of Management, North South University, Bangladesh).
  • “Religious Extremism and Islamist Populism in Contemporary Bangladesh,” by Dr. Maidul Islam (Assistant Professor of Political Science, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta).
  • “Civilisational Populism and Buddhist Nationalisms in Sri Lanka,” by Dr. Rajni Gamage (Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore). 
  • “Will Rise of Religious Nationalism and Populism in the Maldives Lead to Another Authoritarian Reversal?” by Dr. Mosmi Bhim (Assistant Professor, Fiji National University).

 

Panel X: Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan 

Date/Time: Thursday, February 29, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)

Moderator

  • Dr. Dachi Liao (Emeritus Professor at the Institute of Political Science at National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan).

Speakers

  • “The State of Populism in Japan: A Comparative Perspective,” by Dr. Toru Yoshida (Full Professor of Comparative Politics at Doshisha University in Japan).
  • The Nature of Populism in Japan: Japan as an Uncharted Territory of Global Populism?” by Dr. Airo Hino(Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University)
  • “Populism in Taiwan: Rethinking the Neo-liberalism–Populism Nexus,” by Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu (Assistant Professor, Political Science, McMaster University).
  • “How Professionalized Are Parties’ Populist Communication Strategies on Facebook? A Case Study of 2024 Taiwan National Election,” by Dr. Jiun-Chi Lin (Postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Marketing Communication, National Sun Yat-sen University).

 

Panel XI: Forces Shaping Populism, Authoritarianism and Democracy in South Korea, North Korea and Mongolia

Date/Time: Thursday, March 28, 2024 — 10:00-12:15 (CET)

Moderator

  • Dr. John Nilsson-Wright (Associate Professor in Modern Japanese Politics and International Relations at University of Cambridge).

Speakers

  • “Discourse Regimes and Liberal Vehemence,” by Dr. Joseph Yi (Associate Professor of Political Science at Hanyang University, Seoul).
  • “Foreign Threat Perceptions in South Korean Campaign Discourse: Japan, North Korea and China,” by Dr. Meredith Rose Shaw (Associate Professor, Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo).
  • “Transformation of Populist Emotion in Korean Politics from 2016 to 2024,” by Dr. Sang-Jin Han (Emeritus Professor of Sociology, Seoul National University). 
  • “Nationalism and Resilience of Authoritarian Rule in North Korea,” by Dr. Junhyoung Lee (Research Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Ulsan, South Korea).
  • “Populist Nationalism as a Challenge to Democratic Stability in Mongolia,” by Dr. Mina Sumaadii (Senior Researcher at the Sant Maral Foundation, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia).

 

Panel XII: Populist Authoritarianism in China – National and Global Perspectives

Date/Time: Thursday, April 25, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)

Moderator

  • Dr. Rune Steenberg (Anthropologist Researching Uyghurs and Central Asia, Principal Investigator at Palacký University Olomouc).

Speakers

  • “Who Are the People, Populist Articulation of the People in Contemporary China,” by Dr. Kun He (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Computational Linguistics Group within the University of Groningen).
  • “Religion with Chinese Characteristics – Regulating Religions under Xi Jinping,” by Dr. Martin Lavička(Visiting Research Fellow at the Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University).
  • “Unveiling China’s ‘Global Populism’: Sharp Power Politics Along the Belt and Road Initiative,” by Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk (Professor of Economy and visiting fellow at the University of Duisburg-Essen).
  • “The Expanding Reach of China’s Authoritarian Influence: Shaping a New Illiberal Digital Order,” by Dr. Yung-Yung Chang (Assistant Professor at Asia-Pacific Regional Studies, National Dong Hwa University, Hualien, Taiwan).

 

Panel XIII: Resurgence of Expansionist Tsarism: Populist Autocracy in Russia

Date/Time: Thursday, May 30, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)

Moderator

  • Dr. Maxine David (Lecturer in European Studies at Leiden University and Foreign Policy Analyst Specializing in Russian and EU Foreign Policy).

Speakers

  • “Why Putin Is Not a Populist, But Worse,” by Dr. Luke March (Professor, Personal Chair of Post-Soviet and Comparative Politics at the University of Edinburg).
  • “Katechontintic Sovereignty of Z-Populism in Putin’s Russia,” by Dr. Alexandra Yatsyk (Researcher at IRHIS-CNRS at the University of Lille and a lecturer at Sciences Po, France).
  • “‘Traditional Values’: Gendered and (New)Imperial Dimensions in Russia,” by Dr. Yulia Gradskova (Associate Professor, Researcher at Södertörn University, Sweden).
  • “The Economic Costs of Autocracy in Putin’s Russia,” by Dr. Dóra Győrffy (Professor of Economy at Institute of Economics, Corvinus University of Budapest).

 

Panel XIV: Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism Across Central Asia 

Date/Time: Thursday, June 20, 2024 — 10:00-12:00 (CET)

Moderator

  • Dr. David Lewis (Professor of Politics at University of Exeter).

Speakers

  • “Autocracy’s Past and Present in Kazakhstan,” by Dr. Dinissa Duvanova (Associate Professor at Lehigh University).
  • “Autocracy in Turkmenistan and The Role of Media in Cultivating Personality Cult,” by Oguljamal Yazliyeva(Ph.D. Researcher in International Area Studies at the Department of Russian and East European Studies of the Institute of International Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague).
  • “Clan Politics: Kyrgyzstan between Informal Governance and Democracy,” by Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova(Postdoctoral Researcher, Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient).

 

Panel XV: Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan

Date/Time: Thursday, September 26, 2024 — 15:00-17:10 (CET)

Moderator

  • Dr. Simon P Watmough (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS).

Speakers

  • “Counter-extremism and Authoritarian Governance in Tajikistan,” by Dr. Hélène Thibault (Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Nazarbayev University, Astana, Kazakhstan).
  • “Radical Islamism vs Extremist Secular State in Tajikistan,” by Dr. Kathleen Collins (Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science and a faculty affiliate in Islamic Studies at Minnesota University).
  • “The Taliban’s Totalitarian Regime: Governance, Extremism, and Control,” by Dr. Zakia Adeli (Deputy Minister of Justice of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Kabul University (2018-2021) before joining East-West Center).
  • “Gender Dynamics and the Plight of Afghan Women under Taliban Rule,” by Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani (Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science, School of Liberal and Creative Arts, Lovely Professional University).
  • “The Rise of Populism in Iran: Inequality, Class Conflict, and Nationalist Authoritarianism,” by Amir Hossein Mahdavi (Ph.D. candidate at Department of Political Science, University of Connecticut).

 

Panel XVI:  The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism & Populism in Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan & Georgia)

Date/Time: Thursday, October 31, 2024 — 15:00-17:30 (CET)

Moderator

  • Dr. Cengiz Aktar (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and Advisory Board Member of ECPS).

Speakers

  • “The State of Democracy and Populism in Armenia,” by Dr. Nerses Kopalyan (Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
  • “Populism Against Post-war Armenia’s Democratization and European Integration,” by Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan(Professor, Chair of Political Science, Faculty of International Relations at Yerevan State University).
  • “Hegemonic Authoritarianism in Azerbaijan,” by Dr. Jody LaPorte (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford).
  • “Autocracy in Azerbaijan and Its Regional Implications,” by Thomas de Waal (Senior Fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region).
  • “From Technocratic Facade to Right-Wing Reality: The Evolution of Populism in Georgia,” by Dr. David Aprasidze (Professor of Political Science at Ilia State University).
  • “The Rotating Populist Discourses of the Post-Soviet Georgia – From the Nationalist Populism to the Conservative Populism,” by Dr. David Matsaberidze (Associate Professor at Department of International Relations, Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University).

 

Panel XVII: The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey

Date/Time: Thursday, November 28, 2024 — 15:00-17:10 (CET)

Moderator

  • Dr. Jocelyne Cesari (Chair of Religion and Politics at the University of Birmingham (UK) and Senior Fellow at the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs at Georgetown University).

Speakers

  • “In Search of the ‘Infant People’: Continuity and Rupture in Turkey’s Political Landscape,” Dr. Spyros Sofos(Assisstant Professor, Department of Global Humanities, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver).
  • “Populism in Transition: Continuities and Shifts in Turkey’s Political Landscape (2023-2024),” by Dr. Emre Erdogan (Professor of Political Science at Istanbul Bilgi University).
  • “Autocratic Practices of The Gendered Regime in Turkey,” by Hafza Girdap (Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies, Stony Brook University, New York).
  • “Erdogan’s Media Capture Strategies and Their Role in Founding and Consolidating Autocracy in Turkey,” by Ergun Babahan (Journalist, Former Editor-in-Chief of Sabah daily and Ahval news).
  • “Erdogan Regime as Emerging Sharp Power,” by Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska (Research Fellow at the Polish Institute of International Affairs).

 

Panel XVIII: Populism and Autocracy in the Gulf Countries

Date/Time: Thursday, December 19, 2024 — 15:00-17:30 (CET)

Moderator

  • Dr. Courtney Freer (Assistant Professor, Department of Middle Eastern and South Asian Studies, Emory University, Atlanta, GA).

Speakers

  • “Key Drivers of Autocratization in the Gulf Region,” by Dr. Thomas Demmelhuber (Professor, Chairholder, Institute of Political Science, Chair of Middle East Politics and Society, the Friedrich-Alexander-University of Erlangen-Nürnberg).
  • “The Evolving Social Contract in the GCC,” by Dr. Gail Buttorff (Associate Director of the Center for Public Policy and Assistant Professor at the Hobby School, University of Houston).
  • “The New Green Autocrats: How Saudi Arabia and the UAE Redefine Environmental Leadership,” by Dr. Tobias Zumbraegel (Postdoc at Geography Institute, the University of Heidelberg).
  • “The Role of Salafism in the National and International Politics of Gulf Monarchies,” by Kardo Kareem Rached(Assistant Professor at University of Human Development, Sulaymaniyah, Kurdistan Region of Iraq).
  • “Populism in Gulf Monarchies:  Suppression, Cooptation, Adoption,” by Dr. Kristin Smith Diwan (Senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington).

       

      Other Panels


       

      ECPS Regional Panel 1 — Old and New Facets of Populism in Latin America

      Date/Time: Thursday, March 7, 2024 / 15:00-17:30 CET

      Moderator

      • Dr. Maria Puerta Riera (Adjunct Professor in the Political Science at Valencia College)

      Speakers

      • “Populism and Socio-Political Transformation in Latin America,” by Dr. Ronaldo Munck (Professor of Sociology and Director of the Centre for Engaged Research at Dublin City University).
      • “Varieties of Populism and Democratic Erosion: The Case of Latin America,” by Dr. Julio F. Carrión (Professor of Comparative Politics, University of Delaware).
      • “Global Power Dynamics and Authoritarian Populism in Venezuela,” by Dr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera (Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina).
      • “Libertarian Populism? Making Sense of Javier Milei’s Discourse,” by Dr. Reinhard Heinisch (Professor of Comparative Politics at the University of Salzburg and Head of the Department of Political Science) and Dr. Andrés Laguna Tapia (Director of the Center for Research in Communication and Humanities and head of Communication Studies at UPB in Cochabamba).
      • “The Phenomenon of ‘Bolsonarism’ in Brazil: Specificities and Global Connections,” by Dr. Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho (Professor of the Human Sciences at Universidade Federal do Maranhão).

       

      ECPS Regional Panel 2: Crisis of Democratic Political Legitimacy and Emerging Populism in Africa

      Date/Time: Thursday, May 09, 2024 — 15:00-17:30 (CET)

      Moderator

      • Dr. Chipo Dendere (Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at Wellesley College).

      Speakers

      • “Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian, and Nationalist Trends in Africa,” by Dr. Henning Melber (Professor, Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala; Extraordinary Professor at the Department of Political Sciences at the University of Pretoria and the Centre for Gender and Africa Studies at the University of the Free State in Bloemfontein).
      • “Democratizing Africa: Navigating Populist Trends, Building Trust in Institutions, and Promoting Stability through Inclusive Governance,” by Dr. Nchofua Anita Nyitioseh (Assistant Lecturer, Department of English Law, University of Bertoua, Cameroon).
      • “Taming the Lion: On the Conditions of Possibility of a Progressive Populism in Sub-Saharan Africa,” by Dr. Sergiu Mișcoiu (Professor of Political Science, Director of the Centre for International Cooperation Babeș-Bolyai University).
      • “Populism and The Challenges of Democratic Governance in Africa,” by Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo(Executive Director and Principal Researcher at the Bureau of Strategic Studies (BESTRAT), University of Yaoundé II, Cameroon).
      • “Populism Discourse and the Proliferation of Hate during Elections in Central African Sub-region,” by Dr. Derick Fai Kinang (University of Buea, Cameroon).
      • “The Protection of Female Rights and the Rise of Populism in African Democracies: A Need for a Reformed Society,” by Dr. Ama-Ambo Chefor (Senior Lecturer, Department of English Law, University of Dschang, Cameroon).

       

      ECPS Regional Panel 3: Where Is Europe Heading?

      Date/Time: Tuesday, June 18, 2024 / 15:00-17:00 (CET)

      Moderator

      • Irina von Wiese (ECPS Honorary President; Affiliate Professor at European Business School, the ESCP, and former MEP).

      Speakers

      • “European Democracy’s Resilience to Populism‘s Threat,” by Dr. Kurt Weyland (Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts at University of Texas).
      • “A Far-right Tipping Point? The Impact of the 2024 European Elections in France,” by Dr. Gilles Ivaldi (Senior Researcher in Politics at CEVIPOF and Professor at Sciences Po Paris).
      • “The Populist Rebellion of the Young,” by Dr. Albena Azmanova (Professor of Political and Social Science at University of Kent).
      • “EP Elections in Austria: Between ‘So What’ and the New Normal,” by Dr. Robert A. Huber (Professor of Methods at the University of Salzburg and Co-editor in Chief of Political Research Exchange).
      • “Beyond the Cordon Sanitaire: Normalization of Far-right and Racist Politics,” by Dr. Ulrike M. Vieten(Assistant Professor in Sociology at Queen’s University Belfast).

         

        Annual Symposium


         

        The Third Annual International Symposium on “The Future of Multilateralism Between Multipolarity and Populists in Power”

        Day I (March 19, 2024)

        (13:00–17:00 Central European Time)

        Opening Speech

        • Irina VON WIESE (Honorary President of the ECPS).

         Keynote Speech

        Moderator

        • Dr. Simon P. WATMOUGH (Non-Resident Fellow in the Authoritarianism Research Program at ECPS).
        • “The Implications of Rising Multipolarity for Authoritarian Populist Governance, Multilateralism, and the Nature of New Globalization,” by Dr. Barrie AXFORD (Professor Emeritus in Politics, Centre for Global Politics Economy and Society (GPES), School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University).

        Panel -I-

        Interactions Between Multilateralism, Multi-Order World, and Populism

        (14:00-15:30 Central European Time)

        Moderator

        • Dr. Albena AZMANOVA (Professor, Chair in Political and Social Science, Department of Politics and International Relations and Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent).

        Speakers

        • “Reimagining Global Economic Governance and the State of the Global Governance,” by Dr. Stewart PATRICK (Senior Fellow and Director, Global Order and Institutions Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).
        • “The World System: Another Phase of Structural Deglobalization? A Comparative Perspective with the Former Episode of Deglobalization in the Late 19th and Early 20th Centuries,” by Dr. Chris CHASE-DUNN (Distinguished Professor of Sociology and Director of the Institute for Research on World-Systems, University of California, Riverside).
        • “Multipolarity and a post-Ukraine War New World Order: The Rise of Populism,” by Dr. Viktor JAKUPEC (Hon. Professor of International Development, Faculty of Art and Education, Deakin University, Australia; Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences, Potsdam University, Germany).

        Panel -II-

        The Future of Democracy Between Resilience & Decline

        (15:30-17:00 Central European Time)

        Moderator

        • Dr. Nora FISHER-ONAR (Associate Professor of International Studies at the University of San Francisco).
        • “Global Trends for Democracy and Autocracy: On the Third Wave of Autocratization and the Cases of Democratic Reversals,” by Dr. Marina NORD (Postdoctoral Research Fellow at V-Dem Institute, University of Gothenburg).
        • “Resilience of Democracies Against the Authoritarian Populism,” by Dr. Kurt WEYLAND (Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts, Department of Government University of Texas at Austin).
        • “The Impact of Populist Authoritarian Politics on the Future Course of Globalization, Economics, the Rule of Law and Human Rights,” by Dr. James BACCHUS (Distinguished Professor of Global Affairs; Director of the Center for Global Economic and Environmental Opportunity, School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs, University of Central Florida, Former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body).

        Day II (March 20, 2024)

        (13:00-17:30 Central European Time)

        Keynote Speech

        • “How Globalization, under Neoliberal Auspices, Has Stimulated Right-wing Populism and What Might Be Done to Arrest That Tendency?” by Dr. Robert KUTTNER (Meyer and Ida Kirstein Professor in Social Planning and Administration at Brandeis University’s Heller School, Co-Founder and Co-Editor of The American Prospect).

        Panel -III-

        Globalization in Transition

        (14:00-15:30 Central European Time)

        Moderator

        • Dr. Anna SHPAKOVSKAYA (Postdoctoral Research Fellow, China Research Analyst at Institute of East Asian Studies, Duisburg-Essen University).

        Speakers

        • “China’s Appeal to Populist Leaders: A Friend in Need is a Friend Indeed,” by Dr. Steven R. DAVID (Professor of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University).
        • “Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Vision for Globalization?” by Dr. Jinghan ZENG (Professor of China and International Studies at Lancaster University).
        • “Predicting the Nature of the Next Generation Globalization under China, Multipolarity, and Authoritarian Populism” by Humphrey HAWKSLEY (Author, Commentator and Broadcaster). 

        Special Commentator 

        • Dr. Ho Tze Ern BENJAMIN (Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, Coordinator at the China Program, and International Relations Program).

        Panel -IV-

        Economic Implications of Rising Populism and Multipolarity

        (15:30-17:00 Central European Time)

        Moderator

        • Dr. Patrick HOLDEN (Associate Professor in International Relations at School of Society and Culture, University of Plymouth).

        Speakers

        • “Demise of Multilateralism and Politicization of International Trade Relations and the Multilateral Trading System,” by Dr. Giorgio SACERDOTI (Professor of Law, Bocconi University; Former Chairman of the WTO Appellate Body).
        • “China Under Xi Jinping: Testing the Limits at a Time of Power Transition,” by Dr. Alicia GARCIA-HERRERO (Chief Economist for Asia Pacific at Natixis).

        Closing Remarks

        (17:00-17:15 Central European Time)

        • Dr. Cengiz AKTAR (Adjunct Professor of Political Science at the University of Athens and ECPS Advisory Board Member).

         

        Transatlantic Outlook on Populism in the US and Europe in Light of ECPS 2024 Report on EP Elections


         

        On November 7, 2024, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) organised a panel at the European Parliament in Brussels to explore the rising influence of populism on the 2024 European Parliament elections and the upcoming US administration. Photo: Umit Vurel.

        Date/Time: November 7, 2024 — 15:00-17:00 CET.

        Venue: European Parliament’s Spaak Building in Brussels / Room: P5B001.

        This event is hosted by MEP Radan Kanev in cooperation with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS)

        Moderator

        • Dr. Simon P. WATMOUGH (Postdoctoral Researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a Non-resident Research Fellow at ECPS).

        Speakers

        • “Opening Remarks” by Irina VON WIESE (Honorary President of the ECPS).
        • Welcome and Keynote Speech by Radan KANEV (Member of EP, EPP) on “EU Elections and the Fragmentation of the Right-wing Populism: ‘Normalisation’ vs ‘Cordon Sanitaire’.”
        • Keynote Address by Nathalie LOISEAU (Member of EP, Renew) on “A Transatlantic Perspective on the New Composition of the EP and Upcoming Administration in the US, Challenges of Populist Politics and Its Repercussions on the Relations between the US and EU.”

        Presentation of the ECPS Report

        • “2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism,” by Dr. Emilia ZANKINA (Editor of the Report, ECPS Advisory Board Member, Temple University-Rome) and Dr. Gilles IVALDI (Editor of the Report, ECPS Advisory Board Member, Centre de Recherches Politiques de Sciences Po).

         

        Partnership with International Conferences


        A scene from the International Conference on Populisms, Digital Technologies, and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia, hosted at Deakin University.

        International Conference on Populisms, Digital Technologies, and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia

        Venue/Date: Deakin University, Australia | April 17–18, 2024

        In April 2024, Deakin University, in collaboration with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Universitas Indonesia, and Universitas Gadjah Mada, hosted The International Conference: Populisms, Digital Technologies, and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia. Held shortly after Indonesia’s multi-level elections in February, the conference offered a timely and comprehensive examination of the evolving intersections between populism, technology, and democracy. 

        Organized by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization (ADI), the two-day event featured 31 papers across eight panels, covering a broad range of topics such as populist strategy and communication, gender and youth politics, sharp power and disinformation, and authoritarian and Islamist populism. These discussions provided a nuanced understanding of how digital technologies, artificial intelligence, religion, and collective emotions shape Indonesia’s democratic and political dynamics. 

        The conference featured two distinguished keynote speakers: Professor Simon Tormey, an internationally recognized scholar of populism theory, and Professor Vedi Hadiz, a leading expert on Islamic populism in Indonesia. Their insights helped frame the debates on the global and local trajectories of populism in the digital age. Generously supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC), ADI, and ECPS, the conference successfully fostered cross-disciplinary collaboration, enriching both academic and policy-oriented conversations about populism’s influence in Southeast Asia and beyond.

         

        International Conference on ‘Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific’

        Venue/Date: Deakin University, Melbourne & Online | September 25–26, 2024

        In September 25-26, 2024, the International Conference on “Digital Complexity and Disinformation in the Indo-Pacific” convened both online and in person at Deakin University, Melbourne. This high-profile academic event was jointly organized by the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), Universitas Indonesia (UI), Universitas Gadjah Mada (UGM), Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM), International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), State Islamic University (UIN) Salatiga, the National Research and Innovation Agency (BRIN), and the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). 

        The conference examined how digital technologies, while promising inclusivity and progress, have also become tools for disinformation, manipulation, and digital authoritarianism. Scholars and practitioners from across the Indo-Pacific explored how misinformation circulating through social media platforms—such as Facebook, X (formerly Twitter), Instagram, Telegram, and WhatsApp—undermines democratic governance, social cohesion, and freedom of expression.

        Participants analyzed case studies across the region, highlighting how political actors weaponize digital spaces to silence dissent and consolidate power, while others proposed innovative solutions to counter disinformation and promote digital literacy, accountability, and transparency.

        Supported by the Australian Research Council (ARC), the Gerda Henkel Foundation, ECPS, and ADI, the conference successfully advanced international collaboration and critical dialogue on the urgent need to strengthen democratic resilience and ethical governance in the rapidly evolving digital ecosystem of the Indo-Pacific.

         

        Summer School


         

        ECPS Academy Summer School — Populism and Foreign Policy: How Does Populist Politics Influence Foreign Affairs? (July 1-5, 2024) 

        ECPS-SummerSchool2024

        Date: July 1–5, 2024 | Format: Online

        The ECPS successfully organized its fourth virtual Summer School from July 1–5, 2024, focusing on Populism and Foreign Policy. This intensive, five-day academic program brought together young scholars, early-career researchers, and graduate students from around the world to explore the growing intersection between populism and international relations.

        Challenging the conventional view of populism as a purely domestic phenomenon, the 2024 Summer School examined how populist leaders reshape foreign policy, global institutions, and international norms. Case studies such as Trump’s “America First” diplomacy, Modi’s Hindu nationalist foreign policy, Erdogan’s transnational populism, and Orbán’s Euroscepticism were discussed to illustrate how populist politics affect global cooperation and the liberal international order.

        The Summer School featured lectures by globally renowned scholars, including Professor Sandra Destradi, Dr. Angelos Chryssogelos, Dr. Jessica Greenberg, Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Dr. Georg Loefflman, Professor Cengiz Aktar, Professor Emeritus Louis Kriesberg, Professor Bertjan Verbeek, Irina von Wiese, Professor Craig Calhoun, and Professor Joanna Dyduch. Each session was moderated by distinguished academics such as Dr. Rubrick Biegon, Dr. Gustav Meibauer, Dr. Jonny Hall, Professor Ana E. Juncos Garcia, and Professor Franco Zappettini, ensuring rich, interactive discussions.

        A highlight of the program was the Case Competition, where participants collaboratively addressed real-world challenges in populist foreign policy, developing innovative policy proposals evaluated by experts.

        By fostering an interdisciplinary and cross-cultural learning environment, ECPS’s 2024 Summer School empowered participants to critically engage with pressing global issues. It strengthened their analytical, research, and communication skills while building an international network of scholars dedicated to understanding the populist transformation of global politics. The program awarded 5 ECTS credits and continues to serve as a model for academic excellence and civic engagement in populism studies.

        Photos: Umit Vural.

         

        Workshops


         

        Populism & Politics Workshop – The Interplay Between Migration and Populist Politics Across Europe Ahead of European Parliament Elections

        Date: May 22–23, 2024

        Venue: European Studies Centre, University of Oxford (in-person) & ECPS Virtual Platform

        In May 22-23, 2024, the ECPS, in collaboration with the European Studies Centre (ESC) and the Oxford Democracy Network at the University of Oxford, co-organized the two-day workshop “The Interplay Between Migration and Populist Politics Across Europe Ahead of European Parliament Elections.” This timely event brought together leading academics and emerging scholars to analyze the nexus between migration, populism, and electoral politics across Europe.

        Hosted at the European Studies Centre in Oxford and online, the workshop was co-chaired by Dr. Othon Anastasakis (ESC, University of Oxford), Sumeyye Kocaman (University of Oxford & ECPS), and George Hadjipavli (University of Oxford). Opening remarks were delivered by Dr. Anastasakis and Irina von Wiese (Honorary President, ECPS).

        Over six thematic panels, participants explored how anti-immigration narratives, diaspora engagement, and populist rhetoric shape European politics ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Topics ranged from political psychology and xenophobia to gendered representations of refugees, diaspora politics, and digital populism. Panels featured contributions from scholars across Europe, including Dr. Filipa Figueira, Dr. Sanne van Oosten, Dr. Márton Gerő, Dr. Tamas Dudlak, Dr. Ezgi Irgil, and Dr. Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek, among many others.

        The second day, held virtually, expanded the discussion to encompass the far right’s use of asylum policies, Euroscepticism, and the role of populism in redefining citizenship and social inclusion.

        By bridging disciplinary boundaries and fostering collaboration, the event deepened understanding of how migration continues to shape and be shaped by populist discourse across Europe—especially in the run-up to one of the most consequential European Parliament elections in recent history.

        DAY ONE

        Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 08:30-17:00 (UK Time)

        Opening Remarks

        • Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre).
        • Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS).

        Panel 1 – Supply and Demand Sides of Populism: Political Psychology, Neoliberalism and Xenophobia

        Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 09:00-10:45 (UK Time)

        Chair 

        • Irina von Wiese (Honorary President of the ECPS). 

        Discussant

        • Dr. William L. Allen (British Academy Postdoctoral Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, and Nuffield College, University of Oxford). 

        Presentations

        • “Populism, Fast and Slow – A Dual Thinking Approach to Populist Attitudes,” by Dr. Filipa Figueira (Lecturer at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London) & George Hajipavli (DPhil Candidate in Area Studies and Research Associate at Southeast European Studies at Oxford).
        • “Recalibration, Not Austerity: The Interplay of Populism, Neoliberalism, and Welfare States in the Struggle for Liberal Values,” by Jellen Olivares-Jirsell (PhD Candidate in Politics at Kingston University).
        • “In-group Love Explains Voting for Populist Radical Right Parties amongst Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands,” by Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, Equal Strength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).

        Panel 2: Hungary: A Case Study for Migration, Elections and Diaspora

        Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 11:00-13:00 (UK Time)

        Chair

        • Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director, European Studies Centre, Oxford University).

        Discussant

        • Dr. Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University).

        Papers

        • “You Don’t Even Have to Press It Anymore” – The Moral Panic Button (MPB) and the Road to the 2022 Election in Hungary,” by Dr. Márton Gerő (Assistant Professor of Sociology at the Faculty of Social Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University) & Dr. Endre Sik (Research Professor at the Institute of Sociology – Centre for Social Sciences of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence).
        • “Migration Challenge and Populist Responses. A Comparative Analysis of Parliamentary Elections in Hungary and Turkey,” by Dr. Tamas Dudlak (Researcher at the Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).
        • “Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Kin-State Minorities in the Hungarian State’s Diaspora Engagement,” by Judit Molnar (DPhil Candidate in Anthropology at the University of Oxford).

        Panel 3 – Anti-Migrant Perceptions and Populist Reactions Across Europe

        Date/Time: May 22, 2024 / 14:30-16:30 (UK Time)

        Chair

        • Rob McNeill (Deputy Director of Migration Observatory, Compas Researcher, University of Oxford).

        Discussant

        • Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).  

        Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).  

        Presentations

        • “Nationalist Myths and The Emergence of Anti-Immigration Discourses,” by Luca Venga (Post-graduate Student at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford).
        • “Scandinavian Countries and the Rise of Extremism,” by Priscilla Otero Guerra (Postgraduate Student at the University of Oxford).
        • “Gendering Conflict: A Comparative Study of How Palestinian Civilians and Arab European Refugees Are Portrayed within Europe Parliamentarian Narratives,” by Arunima Cheruvathoor (MPhil in Global and Area Studies at the University of Oxford).
        • “Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm,” by Ayshan Mammadzada (PMP, PhD Candidate at uOttawa).

        Concluding Remarks 

        • Dr. Othon Anastasakis (Director of the European Studies Centre, University of Oxford).
        • Rob McNeill (Deputy Director of Migration Observatory, Compas Researcher, University of Oxford).

        DAY TWO

        Panel 4 – Intersection of Populist Politics, Far Right and Asylum Policies

        Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 09:00-11:00 (UK Time)

        Co-chairs

        • Dr. Ilkhom Khalimzoda (Postdoctoral Researcher at the Department of Language and Communication Studies, University of Jyväskylä, Finland).
        • Dr. Sanne van Oosten (Postdoctoral Researcher, EqualStrength, COMPAS, University of Oxford).

        Discussants

        • Dr. Simon Watmough (Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Leipzig in Germany and a non-resident research fellow at ECPS).
        • Dr. Tamas Dudlak (Researcher at the Contemporary Arab World Center, ELTE Eötvös Loránd University).
        • Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate in Management, University of St. Andrews).

        Presentations

        • “The Victory Party at the Crossroads of Asylum Policies and Populist Discourse in Turkey,” by Dr. Ezgi Irgil(Postdoctoral Research Fellow within the Global Politics and Security Programme at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs – UI) & Dr. Zeynep Sahin Mencutek (Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).
        • “Populist Politics Kills Asylum Policies: How Populist Discourses About Migration in Bulgaria Invent the ‘Refugee Crisis’,” by Dr. Ildiko Otova (Assistant Professor in International Migration at New Bulgarian University) & Dr. Evelina Staykova (Associate professor in Political Science at New Bulgarian University).
        • “‘The More Refugees, the More Votes’: The Role of Migration on the AfD Growth,” by Dr. Avdi Smajljaj(Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania).
        • “Between Gastfreundschaft and Überfremdung: The Populist Origins of Migration Politics in the Federal Republic of Germany, 1973-1983,” by Simon Ahrens (MPhil in Development Studies, University of Oxford).

        Panel 5 – The Influence of Populist Anti-Immigration Narratives on European Self

        Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 12:30-14:30 (UK Time)

        Co-Chairs

        • Dr. Avdi Smajljaj (Assistant Professor and lecturer at the Department of Political Sciences and International Relations, Epoka University, Tirana, Albania).
        • Dr. Marieke van Houte (Assistant Professor for Anthropology and Development Studies, Radboud University).

        Presentations

        • “Refugees and the Eurosceptics: Understanding the Shifts in the Political Landscape of Europe,” by Dr. Amrita Purkayastha (Assistant Professor at Bangalore, India).
        • “Populist Discourse and European Identity: A Poststructuralist Analysis,” by Nazmul Hasan (PhD Candidate in the Department of Philosophy and Comparative Religion, Visva-Bharati University, Santiniketan, West Bengal, India).
        • “Nationalism and Anti-Immigration Sentimentalism in Europe,” by Sulagna Pal (PhD Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, India).
        • “A Critique of Eurocentric Conceptualisations of Social Cohesion in Academia, Refugee Policy, and Refugee Settings,” by Basma Doukhi (PhD Candidate in Migration Studies at the University of Kent).

        Panel 6 – Diverse Aspects of Anti-Migrant Populism in Europe

        Date/Time: May 23, 2024 / 15:00-17:00 (UK Time)

        Co-Chairs

        • Dr. Tamirace Fakhoury (Associate Professor of International Politics and Conflict, Fletcher School, Tufts University).
        • Dr. Zeynep Sahin-Mencutek (Senior Researcher at Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies).

        Discussants

        • Dr. Jafia Naftali Camara (British Academy Research Fellow, University of Cambridge).
        • Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS).

        Presentations

        • “Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism,” by Dr. Ana Paula Tostes (Senior Fellow at the Brazilian Center of International Relations and Professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro).
        • “Emigration and Political Party Membership in Central and Eastern Europe: Evidence from a Difference-in-Differences Design,” by Melle Scholten (PhD Candidate at the University of Virginia).
        • “Digital Engagement and Political Voices: A Comparative Analysis of Skilled Immigrant Women in Ottawa and Stockholm,” by Ayshan Mammadzada (PMP, PhD Candidate at uOttawa).
        • “The Role of Populism in Redefining Citizenship and Social Inclusion for Migrants in Europe,” by Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo (Lecturer-Researcher in Political Science at the University of Yaoundé, Cameroon).

        Concluding Remarks & Thanks

        • Dr. Azize Sargin (Director for External Relations, ECPS). 
        • Sumeyye Kocaman (DPhil Researcher in Asian and Middle East Studies and Executive Editor of Populism & Politics).

        ***

         

        Publications


         

        Journal of Populism & Politics (P&P) 

        In 2024, Populism & Politics (P&P) further solidified its position as one of the interdisciplinary platforms of the ECPS for cutting-edge scholarship on populism, authoritarianism, and democratic resilience. The digital journal continued to foster vigorous academic inquiry across the humanities, social sciences, and related fields, encouraging bold theoretical and methodological innovation.

        Reflecting the journal’s mission to explore populism’s multifaceted expressions—from global shifts in democratic governance to localized experiences—P&P published 18 peer-reviewed articles in 2024. These contributions addressed a remarkable breadth of themes, including civilizational populism in Turkey, India, China, and Russia; the role of religion and informal Sharia structures in Indonesian elections; Euroscepticism and transnational diaspora politics in Europe; digital authoritarian practices; and the transformation of nationalist victimhood narratives. Collectively, these studies offered regionally grounded yet globally resonant insights into how populist discourse, leadership, and policy continue to reshape political life.

        A defining strength of P&P in 2024 was its emphasis on comparative and cross-disciplinary perspectives, with scholars drawing from political science, sociology, religious studies, international relations, gender studies, and media analysis. The journal maintained its commitment to inclusivity and conceptual diversity by promoting decolonial, gender-sensitive, and Public Humanities–oriented frameworks.

        The journal’s rigorous peer-review process, anonymized at every stage, ensured the highest standards of scholarly excellence. Each published article received a DOI, facilitating broad dissemination and citation within the global research community. P&P also encouraged innovative forms of knowledge production and interdisciplinary reflections that expand the conceptual boundaries of populism studies.

        P&P’s 2024 portfolio reflects both geographical range and thematic evolution. Special attention to the 2024 Indonesian elections and shifting patterns of populism in Europe’s changing political landscape illustrates the journal’s responsiveness to contemporary developments.

        As populism continues to evolve—reshaping identities, governance, and global order—P&P remains dedicated to advancing accessible, original, and methodologically robust scholarship. Through its expanding global authorship and cross-sector engagement, the journal contributes meaningfully to understanding and addressing the most urgent democratic challenges of our time.


        Articles Published by P&P in 2024

        Yilmaz, Ihsan; Triwibowo, Whisnu; Bachtiar, Hasnan & Barton, Greg. (2024). “Competing Populisms, Digital Technologies and the 2024 Elections in Indonesia.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 2, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0029

        Yilmaz, Ihsan; Bachtiar, Hasnan; Smith, Chloe & Shakil, Kainat. (2024). “Fluctuating Populism: Prabowo’s Everchanging Populism Across the Indonesian Elections.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 15, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0030

        Axford, Barrie. (2024). “The Implications of Rising Multipolarity for Authoritarian Populist Governance, Multilateralism, and the Nature of New Globalization.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 30, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0031

        Morieson, Nicholas & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Is A New Anti-Western Civilizational Populism Emerging? The Turkish, Hungarian and Israeli Cases.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0032 

        Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). “The Rise of Authoritarian Civilizational Populism in Turkey, India, Russia and China.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 14, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0033 

        Smith, Chloe; Bachtiar, Hasnan; Shakil, Kainat; Morieson, Nicholas & de Groot Heupner, Susan. (2024). “Appealing to a Religiously Defined ‘the People’: How Religion Was Performatively Operationalized in the 2019 and 2024 Election Campaigns of Indonesia’s President-Elect.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 25, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0034  

        Bachtiar, Hasnan; Shakil, Kainat & Smith, Chloe. (2024). “Use of Informal Sharia Law for Civilizational Populist Mobilization in the 2024 Indonesian Elections.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). April 26, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0035  

        Varriale, Amedeo. (2024). “Populism and the Extreme Right in Comparative Perspective: The French Rassemblement National and the Italian Forza Nuova.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). August 12, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0036

        Kenes, Bulent & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Fatwas as Tools of Religious Populism: The Case of Turkish Islamist Scholar Hayrettin Karaman.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 1, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0037 

        Erturk, Omer; Yilmaz, Ihsan and Smith, Chloe. (2024). “Blame Avoidance through Necropolitics and Religious Populism: Autocratic Responses to Nationwide Crises in an Authoritarian Islamist Polity.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 3, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0038 

        Pretorius, Christo. (2024). “Populism in Ireland: Sinn Féin and the Alternative to Fine Gael and Fianna Fáil’s Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 4, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0039       

        Morieson, Nicholas; Yilmaz, Ihsan & Kenes, Bulent. (2024). “From National to Manufactured: The Evolution of the AKP’s Victimhood Narratives.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0040       

        Yilmaz, Ihsan & Morieson, Nicholas. (2024). “How China’s Rise as a ‘Civilization State’ Spurs European States to Challenge US Political Dominance.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 10, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0041

        Kenes, Bulent & Yilmaz, Ihsan. (2024). “Digital Authoritarianism and Religious Populism in Turkey.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 14, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0042   

        Tostes, Ana Paula. (2024). “Enemies Inside: European Populism and Dimensions of Euroscepticism.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 5, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0043b

        Olivares-Jirsell, Jellen. (2024). “Recalibration, Not Austerity: Welfare States and the Struggle for Liberalism.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 6, 2024. Doi:https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0044

        Molnar, Judit. (2024) “Diasporas Intertwined: The Role of Transborder Hungarians in Hungary’s Diaspora Engagement.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). December 20, 2024. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0045

        van Oosten, Sanne. (2025). “The Importance of In-group Favoritism in Explaining Voting for PRRPs: A Study of Minority and Majority Groups in France, Germany and the Netherlands.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 12, 2025. Doi: https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0046

         

        Interview Series


         

        In 2024, the ECPS significantly expanded its global knowledge base through 51 in-depth interviews with leading scholars, policy experts, and regional specialists. These conversations provided timely, research-driven insights into the evolving landscape of populism, authoritarianism, democratic backsliding, and civil resistance across multiple world regions.

        The interview series captured critical developments—from the consolidation of Putinism and authoritarian resurgence in Russia, to democratic fragility in India, Iran, and Georgia; from the rise of radical-right forces in Europe to complex political transitions in Latin America and Southeast Asia. Scholars such as Arjun AppaduraiChristophe JaffrelotKurt WeylandKai ArzheimerMabel BerezinClaudia WiesnerStaffan Lindberg, and Yascha Mounk reflected on the ideological, institutional, and socio-economic drivers behind contemporary populist movements.

        Several interviews highlighted urgent democratic concerns: fears of intensified repression under Prabowo in Indonesia; the spread of civilizational populism; growing Euroscepticism and far-right electoral gains; and the potential global impact of a second Trump presidency. Others underscored the agency of citizens, institutions, and international networks in countering authoritarian pressures.

        Together, these interviews provided a rich, comparative archive of expert assessments on the global struggle between populist forces and democratic resilience. They remain an essential resource for scholars, journalists, and policymakers seeking to navigate a rapidly changing political order.

        Interviews

        Professor Kurt Weyland: Democracies Possess Inherent Defensive Mechanisms against Populist Challenges

        Professor Kurt Weyland, a political scientist and Mike Hogg Professor in Liberal Arts at the University of Texas at Austin, shared insights into the evolving nature of populist movements and their impact on democracies. The interview covered key aspects of his research, addressing the weaknesses of personalistic plebiscitarian leadership, the comparative analysis of populism‘s impact on democracy in Europe and Latin America, the role of charismatic leadership in damaging political-party systems, and the long-term impact of populist movements on the political landscape.

        Professor Kai Arzheimer: Exposed AfD Meeting Echoes Ideologies of 1930s-1940s, Reminiscent of Plans to Exterminate Jews 

        Dr. Kai Arzhemier, Professor of Political Science at the University of Mainz, assessed the exposure of a meeting involving right-wing extremist AfD politicians and neo-Nazis, where discussions about deporting millions of people with a non-German ethnic background, including citizens, took place. Professor Arzheimer characterize this meeting as echoing the ideologies of the 1930s-1940s, reminiscent of the Nazis’ plans to exterminate Jews. Arzheimer underscores that the meeting adds to the concerns about the AfD’s trajectory over the past few years, aligning with right-wing extremism.

        Professor Arjun Appadurai: Ayodhya Temple Opening Heightens Marginalization of India’s Muslims, Transforming Them into a Second-Class Population

        Professor Arjun Appadurai, an Emeritus Professor of Media, Culture and Communication at New York University, analyzed the inauguration of the Ayodhya Temple by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in 2024. He expressed concerns about the potential rise of Hindu majoritarianism and its impact on India’s significant Muslim population. Appadurai emphasized that the monumental structure, replacing the Babri Masjid, symbolizes a shift towards the marginalization of India’s Muslims, potentially relegating them to a second-class status. Alongside many analysts, Appadurai predicts that Modi is poised to maintain a formidable grip on power in the Indian elections in April 2024, unless unexpected shifts in the political landscape occur.

        Professor Albena Azmanova: Key Driver of Populism Is Insecurity Rather Than Inequality

        Professor Albena Azmanova, a distinguished academic in Political and Social Science at the University of Kent, emphasizes that the ascent of populist parties finds its roots in widespread economic insecurity rather than mere inequality. She contends that the fear of job loss affects not only the unemployed but also those with stable jobs and good pay, emerging as the primary catalyst for societal insecurity. She critically examines the term ‘populism,’ expressing reservations about its negative connotations, and advocates for a linguistic shift. Azmanova argues that the term “populism” is misleading, diverting attention from the actual transformations in ideological orientations. Instead, she proposes a reframing of the political divide, suggesting the lens of opportunity versus risk, transcending conventional left-right categorizations.

        Dr. Ann-Cathrine Jungar: Populists May Serve as Correctives, Amplifying Voices Underrepresented in Mainstream Politics

        Emphasizing that populist parties act as platforms for citizens with more critical perspectives, Professor Ann-Cathrine Jungar, Associate Professor of Political Science at Södertörn University in Stockholm, argues that these parties can serve as correctives for democracies, amplifying voices underrepresented in mainstream politics, even though not all their proposals may receive universal endorsement. While acknowledging that some supporters of populist parties may hold xenophobic views, she highlights the importance of distinguishing between exclusionary and inclusionary populism. Jungar notes that populist radical right parties typically fall into the exclusionary category due to their critical stance towards liberal democracy.

        Professor Samina Yasmeen: Radical Islamists and Islamist Populists Employ Similar Tactics, Albeit with Different Objectives

        Drawing a comparison between radical Islamism and Islamist populism, Professor Samina Yasmeen, the Director of the Centre for Muslim States and Societies at the University of Western Australia, emphasized the parallel communication styles utilized by both radical and populist Islamists, highlighting their reliance on simplicity and Islamic references to connect with the populace. However, she pointed out that while radical Islamists aim for a fundamental alteration of the state, populist Islamists, exemplified by figures such as Imran Khan, prioritize the establishment of a “well-governed state.”


        Professor Vedi Hadiz: Prabowo’s Election Heralds a New Level of Danger for Indonesian Democracy

        Emphasizing the pressing challenges confronting Indonesian democracy, Professor Vedi Hadiz, Director and Professor of Asian Studies at the Asia Institute, and Assistant Deputy Vice-Chancellor International at the University of Melbourne, stressed, “The current concern with Subianto Prabowo’s election lies in his deep ties to the oligarchy.” He highlighted Prabowo’s track record of human rights violations and his family’s (his brother) involvement in questionable economic activities, resulting in outstanding debts to the state. Additionally, Prabowo’s disregard for democratic processes, principles, and human rights was underscored. Acknowledging Indonesia’s enduring struggle with its oligarchic tendencies, Professor Hadiz warned that Prabowo’s election heralds a new level of danger for Indonesian democracy.

        Tatsiana Kulakevich: Belarusian People Await a Window of Opportunity to Usher in a New Regime

        Dr. Tatsiana Kulakevich, Associate Professor at the University of South Florida’s School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies and a research fellow and affiliated faculty at the USF Institute for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, underscores the resilience of the Belarusian protest movement amidst systematic repression and violence. Despite recent parliamentary elections failing to incite significant dissent, she suggests that future electoral events, especially presidential elections, could ignite substantial change. Despite the challenges ahead, the Belarusian people remain hopeful for a window of opportunity to usher in a new regime and reclaim their rights and freedoms. Kulakevich also draws attention to the plight of political prisoners in Belarus, whose uncertain fate mirrors Navalny’s tragic end.

        Professor Luke March: Russian Elections to be Another Milestone in Consolidation of Putin’s Authoritarian Rule

        Professor Luke March, from the University of Edinburgh, underscores that any surprises or intrigues in the upcoming Russian presidential elections are minor curiosities rather than significant events. He argues that these elections will further consolidate Vladimir Putin’s authoritarian rule, possibly securing up to 80% of the vote. According to March, Putin’s underlying message is clear: his dominance remains unassailable in the foreseeable future; any attempt at opposition will be swiftly quashed. March emphasizes his expectation that this pattern will persist without significant deviation.

        Professor Akbarzadeh: Election Results Confirm Iranian Regime’s Legitimacy at Risk, Potentially Non-existent

        Reminding that elections are pivotal in justifying Iranian religious leadership and sustaining political legitimacy, Professor Shahram Akbarzadeh, a distinguished Research Professor at the Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, emphasizes that the turnout data from Iran’s 2024 elections serves as a stark wake-up call for authorities. He argues that the low turnout raised serious concerns for the regime’s legitimacy and underscores that the Iranian regime has come to recognize that its legitimacy is significantly at risk, perhaps even non-existent.

        Professor Neil Robinson: Evolution of Putinism as ‘Collective Putin’ Reshapes Russian Politics

        Professor Neil Robinson, a distinguished scholar of Comparative Politics at the University of Limerick, expresses his concerns regarding a potential escalation in the crackdown on dissent, heightened control measures, intensified efforts to label domestic opponents as foreign agents or traitors, and increased indoctrination through the education and media systems following Vladimir Putin’s resounding victory in the 2024 election. Additionally, he underscores the notion that Putin does not operate alone at the apex of power but rather is bolstered by a circle of allies. Robinson argues, “While this has always been true, there’s now an effort to transform this ‘collective Putin’ into more than just a hegemonic identity that Russians are expected to adhere to; it’s becoming a true collective, an unquestionable identity. Thus, the expansion of these dynamics may lead us to reconsider Putinism as something distinct from official populism.”

        Professor Veljko Vujačić: The Recent Election Doesn’t Strengthen Putin

        Emphasizing that winning 87 percent of the vote and handpicking compliant candidates does not constitute a genuine election, Professor Veljko Vujačić, a distinguished scholar of Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies at Oberlin College and Conservator, argues that such practices do not strengthen Putin’s position; rather, they highlight the regime’s weaknesses. Similarly, the murder of Alexei Navalny does not demonstrate strength; it reveals weakness. He further asserts, “I find the term ‘dictatorship’ more accurately encapsulates the reality of the Putin regime than ‘autocracy’ or ‘authoritarianism’ because Putin’s behavior epitomizes dictatorship, where power is wielded outside the confines of law and constitution. Currently, his regime seems to be veering toward a weak form of totalitarianism.”

        Professor Emre Erdogan: Turkish Opposition Must Adeptly Harness Power of ‘Good Populism’

        Stating that populism’s appeal has not significantly diminished in Turkey despite the opposition’s win in local elections, Professor Emre Erdogan, Head of the Department of International Relations at Bilgi University, underscores the fact that even leading politicians within the opposition, such as Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, exhibit certain populist characteristics. “Imamoglu’s use of populist rhetoric suggests that populism continues to hold sway in Turkish politics,” argues Professor Erdogan, urging the opposition in Turkey to adeptly harness the power of “good populism” to achieve success in upcoming elections.

        V-Dem Director Staffan I. Lindberg: If Trump Is Reelected, Democracy in the US Might Not Survive

        Professor Staffan I. Lindberg, Director of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute at the University of Gothenburg, expresses his concern: “I am deeply concerned about the possibility of Donald Trump being reelected. In the current context, I believe that if Donald Trump is reelected, democracy in the US might not survive. He has been explicit about his dictatorial intentions, even going as far as labeling Democrats as vermin, a term that evokes disturbing parallels with Nazi Germany from the late 1930s to 1945. Such statements must be taken seriously, as they could embolden autocrats worldwide.”

        Professor Mereddith Shaw: Even Progressive Politicians in South Korea Occasionally Display Authoritarian Tendencies

        Professor Meredith Shaw, a research professor at the Institute of Social Science (社研), the University of Tokyo and the managing editor of Social Science Japan Journal, discussed the issue of “autocratization” in South Korea, highlighting concerns about authoritarian tendencies even within progressive political circles. She pointed out that some progressive politicians on the left have at times exhibited authoritarian behavior. For example, they have proposed laws in mimicry of the existing national security law, which aimed to penalize statements perceived as supportive of North Korea. These include recent proposals for laws targeting the misrepresentation of historical events, such as the Japanese colonial rule or the democratic movements, including the Kwangju massacre under the military dictatorship.

        Professor Sang-Jin Han: Threat to Democracy in South Korea Doesn’t Come from Populists, but from Neoliberals 

        When queried about the correlation between populism and democracy and the potential jeopardy to democracy in South Korea, Profesor Sang-Jin Han, Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University in South Korea, argues the potential threat to democracy in South Korea does not come from populist citizens, but from neoliberal ones. By sharing insights from his 2018 empirical study, he elucidated, “My research aimed to discern which citizens genuinely endorse autocracy and strong leadership. Surprisingly, the findings unveiled that those meeting specific criteria for populism did not inherently endorse robust autocratic leadership. Rather intriguingly, it was the neo-liberal citizens who exhibited a tendency to endorse such authoritarian leadership.”

        Professor Christophe Jaffrelot: India under Modi Shares Similar Patterns with Israel in Their ‘Ethnic Democracies’

        Professor Christophe Jaffrelot, distinguished CERI-CNRS Senior Research Fellow who teaches at Sciences Po, notes that under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Hindutva has taken on a distinctly populist and more aggressive posture, marking a shift from the Bharatiya Janata Party’s previously disciplined, cadre-based approach. Modi’s populist influence has further polarized Indian society, rendering his brand of Hindu nationalism more exclusionary and assertive than ever. He also highlights the subtle yet significant similarities between India and Israel in their conceptualization and treatment of minorities. In India, minorities, particularly Muslims, experience systemic exclusion from equal opportunities in employment, housing, and other areas.

        Dr. Pawel Zerka: Low Turnout in EP Elections Worries Me More Than the Results

        Just three weeks ahead of the 2024 European Parliament elections, Dr. Pawel Zerka, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), says he is more concerned about low turnout than the election results. Dr. Zerka stated, “Even if the far-right increases its number of seats, it will still be a clear minority. What is much more concerning is the lack of reasons for a high turnout.” Concerning the potential threat to liberal democracy in Europe due to the possible success of the far-right in the EP elections, Zerka said, “There is surely a danger for what the EU will stand for in the coming years. However, the responsibility for that danger lies on the shoulders of not just the far-right, but even more so on the center-right.”

        Sir Graham Watson: We Must Persuade Younger People to Go to the EP Polls

        As opinion polls indicated a potential surge in support for far-right parties in the European Parliament elections scheduled for June 6-9, Sir Graham Watson, a liberal politician and Advisory Board member of ECPS, emphasized the critical need to persuade younger people to vote. “In recent years, we have seen significant abstention among younger voters. This was a major factor in Brexit,” Watson explains. “We desperately need everyone eligible to vote, especially those over 18 across the European Union, to exercise their democratic rights. Perhaps the younger generation does not fully grasp that freedom must be actively used, or it can be lost. If they do not use their freedom to vote and participate in democratic society, they risk losing that freedom in the future,” he warns.

        Professor Tim Haughton on Fico Assassination Attempt: Polarization Boosts Charged Political Climate in Slovakia

        Dr. Tim Haughton, Professor of Comparative and European Politics and Deputy Director of CEDAR at the University of Birmingham, offered a concise analysis of Slovakia’s increasingly polarized political landscape. He noted that actors around Prime Minister Robert Fico have advanced narratives characteristic of populist discourse, deepening societal divides and contributing to a charged political climate—one in which an assassination attempt against Fico unfolded. Dr. Haughton highlighted the growing influence of radical-right forces, shifting national identity debates, and contentious immigration narratives. His reflections underscore the challenges facing Slovak democracy and the broader implications of polarization and populist mobilization for politics across Central and Eastern Europe.

        Professor Tormey: The World Is in an Era of Economic Liberalism with Great Power Rivalry

        Professor Simon Tormey, a political theorist and the Executive Dean of Arts and Education at Deakin University in Australia, stated that great power rivalry is more significant than any new ideology, indicating a shift away from globalization, which suggested diminishing differences between countries. Tormey highlighted that nationalist and nativist power struggles are likely to shape political outcomes for at least the next two decades. He noted the reemergence of great power rivalry, alongside economic interconnectedness and trends of de-globalization and decoupling. Tormey predicted continued regional conflicts and the persistence of populism without evolving into a new form of neo-populism.

        Professor Vieten: Individualized Profit and Socialized Risk Fuel Far-Right Populism

        Dr. Ulrike M. Vieten, an Assistant Professor in Sociology of Gender, Migration and Racisms, at Queen’s University Belfast, points out that the 2008 economic crisis played a significant role in exacerbating people’s anxieties, highlighting that “profit is individualized while risk is socialized.” This economic instability, coupled with the recent pandemic, has deepened the feeling of insecurity across Europe. These socio-economic factors, she argues, have paved the way for the far-right’s rise, as people seek to channel their distress and anger. Drawing parallels with the normalization of far-right ideologies in the early 20th century, Vieten underscores that this historical context is crucial in recognizing how quickly societal values can shift and the dangers of complacency.

        Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo: Sheinbaum’s Democratic Background Contrasts with Her Actions That Erode Mexican Democracy

        Professor Rodrigo Castro Cornejo, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts-Lowell and Associate Director of the UMass-Lowell Center for Public Opinion, says Claudia Sheinbaum’s government in Mexico is set to begin in October, and it will be a period of significant interest as both the current president and the president-elect navigate this transition. He noted that Sheinbaum has a democratic trajectory, having worked as a scholar and scientist before joining López Obrador’s movement and stated that “Given her background, one might expect her government not to pose a threat to democracy. However, recent signs indicate she supports measures that could further erode Mexican democracy. We will need to wait until her government starts to see if these policies are implemented.”

        Dr. Anastasakis: Biggest Risk in the EU is Far-right Parties Deciding to Unite in the EP

        From a historical perspective, Dr. Othon Anastasakis, the Director of the European Studies Centre and Southeast European Studies at Oxford (SEESOX) at St Antony’s College, Oxford University, acknowledged that the rise of far-right parties in the European elections does not represent a significant rupture from the past. The mainstream political context still dominates European politics, which he finds reassuring. However, he sees two main risks for the future: the unification of far-right parties within the European Parliament and the potential alliance of center-right parties with far-right elements, which could normalize extremist rhetoric.

        Professor Claudia Wiesner: Von Der Leyen and EPP Are Playing a Dangerous Game by Preferring Far-right to Greens

        Professor Claudia Wiesner, Jean Monnet Chair and Professor for Political Science at Fulda University of Applied Sciences, voices her concerns regarding the troubling trend of the European People’s Party (EPP) and Ursula von der Leyen, showing a preference for collaborating with populist far-right groups over the Greens. Professor Wiesner argues that this strategy is fraught with risks for the European Union. She questions the strategic interest behind such alliances, emphasizing, “These parties would not support strong European integration. They favor a weaker Europe, whereas the Greens support a stronger Europe. It would be in the interest of a strong European Commission to align with parties favoring a stronger European Union.” Wiesner further highlights the potential legitimacy crisis the EU might face if it continues down this path.

        Professor Camus: National Rally’s Electoral Success Goes Beyond Protest Votes

        Professor Jean-Yves Camus, a political analyst and Associate Research Fellow at The French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS), emphasizes that the social and economic policies of President Emmanuel Macron have driven many voters to the National Rally (NR). However, he cautions against viewing this merely as a protest vote. “When a party remains strong for over 50 years, it cannot be solely due to protest,” he notes. According to Camus, NR’s support base reflects a society grappling with increasing inequalities, where many citizens feel deprived of fair opportunities. This sentiment is compounded by a growing resentment towards foreigners, particularly those from North African, West African and Middle Eastern backgrounds.

        Professor Bale: PRR Parties Can Be Beaten at Elections, But They Can’t Be Eradicated

        By analyzing the electoral success of Nigel Farage’s Reform UK Party (RUKP) as a representative of European PRR parties, Professor Tim Bale, a renowned scholar from the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London, emphasized that “mainstream parties who oppose them have to learn to live with this fact and realize that while they can be beaten at elections, they can’t be eradicated.” Discussing the broader political climate, Professor Bale warned of the challenges posed by both right-wing and left-wing populism. He pointed out that left-wing populism, while lacking the xenophobic and Islamophobic elements of its right-wing counterpart, often proposes overly simplistic solutions that could threaten good governance and economic stability.

        Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera: Maduro is Likely the Reason the Chavismo Movement Will Not Survive

        Professor Maria Isabel Puerta Riera, a political scientist at Valencia College, US, emphasized that Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is unlikely to concede defeat or accept any outcome other than his own reelection. She warned that increasing state-driven violence is probable, while diplomatic efforts by Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico are unlikely to sway the regime. Puerta Riera stressed that the core pillar sustaining Maduro is the military, whose loyalty shields him from prosecution. Because Maduro faces serious international and US legal charges, she argues that he cannot exit power without jeopardizing his personal security—making voluntary transition highly improbable.

        Professor Louis Kriesberg: Right-Wing Populism in the US Is Doomed to Failure, Even If Trump Is Re-Elected

        Professor Louis Kriesberg, Maxwell Professor Emeritus of Social Conflict Studies at Syracuse University, argues that right-wing populism, as represented by Donald Trump in the US, is ultimately doomed to failure. He draws parallels to past episodes in American history, such as McCarthyism in the 1950s and the Ku Klux Klan’s influence in the 1920s, noting that while these movements caused significant harm, they eventually faded into obscurity as the country moved toward more inclusive and democratic norms. Although Professor Kriesberg expresses deep concern about the potential damage, he remains optimistic about the resilience of democratic institutions and the strength of resistance against authoritarian tendencies. He believes that the majority of Americans do not support Trump’s divisive rhetoric and that the country will ultimately reject right-wing populism in favor of more traditional, constructive political engagement.

        Professor Natalia Sátyro: Authoritarian Leaders in Brazil Face Fewer Obstacles to Implementing Harmful Strategies

        In her deep analysis of the challenges facing Brazil’s democracy under the influence of authoritarian populism, Professor Natália Sátyro, a professor and researcher at the Post-Graduate Program of Political Science at the Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG) in Belo Horizonte, Brazil and editor of the book titled “Social Policies in Times of Austerity and Populism – Lessons from Brazil,” highlights the vulnerabilities within Brazilian social policies and democratic institutions. She notes how these weaknesses have allowed authoritarian leaders to introduce harmful strategies with fewer obstacles. As Brazil navigates its political future, Professor Sátyro warns of the potential consequences if such populist strategies persist. She argues that Brazil’s resilience, while notable, will be further tested if global trends toward authoritarian populism continue to gain momentum, particularly with the possibility of leaders like Donald Trump regaining power in other countries.

        Professor Yascha Mounk: Second Trump Presidency Could Be Even More Dangerous Than His First

        Professor Yascha Mounk, Professor of the Practice of International Affairs at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies and founder of Persuasion, observes that many Americans perceive the Democratic Party as being out of sync with mainstream values and believe that Kamala Harris is too progressive, while fewer think Donald Trump is too conservative. He suggests that Democrats should consider making cultural concessions that align with public opinion, particularly where common sense prevails. Mounk presented two very different scenarios in the event of Trump’s victory on November 5, 2024. On one hand, he noted that Trump’s first term, though damaging and chaotic, was perhaps less consequential than some, including Mounk himself, feared in 2016. On the other hand, Mounk offered a sobering analysis of what a second Trump term could mean for the future of the US.

        Professor Alan Abramowitz: Signs Indicate Polarization in the US Could Lead to Violence If Trump Loses

        Reflecting on the deeply polarized political landscape in the US, Professor Alan Abramowitz, Alben W. Barkley Professor Emeritus at Emory College of Arts and Sciences, warned, “As we approach the 2024 election, there are signals that this polarization could again lead to violence, particularly if Trump loses the election.” His concerns stem from Donald Trump’s rhetoric, where Trump has already suggested that any loss would be due to fraud, effectively claiming the election would be stolen from him. Looking ahead to the 2024 election, Professor Abramowitz predicted a tight race, with Kamala Harris likely to win by a narrow margin. However, he cautioned that the dynamics of the Electoral College could result in a repeat of 2016, where the popular vote and the electoral outcome diverge.

        Professor Reinhard Heinisch: If You Don’t Want the FPÖ in Government, Hope They Come in First in Austria Polls

        Ahead of the 2024 Austrian elections, Professor Reinhard Heinisch, a leading expert on Austrian politics from the University of Salzburg, argued that “If you don’t want the Freedom Party (FPÖ) in government, you might actually hope they come in first.” He explained this seeming paradox by noting that a first-place FPÖ victory would make it less likely that other parties would join a government led by the radical Herbert Kickl. He emphasized that the Conservative Party (ÖVP) would retain multiple coalition options: partnering with the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and a smaller party, or with the FPÖ. However, he observed that the ÖVP would have little incentive to serve as junior partner under Kickl when it could instead lead a coalition with the SPÖ.

        Professor Marcia Pally: Evangelicals Face a ‘Double Loss’—Both Socio-Economic and as a Religious Community—Positioning Them to Find Trump Appealing

        In exploring the socio-political dynamics behind white Evangelicals’ support for Donald Trump and right-wing populism in the United States, Professor Marcia Pally of New York University identifies what she calls a “double loss” experienced by this group. She explains that white Evangelicals face both economic and societal losses—challenges shared by many Americans—which are further intensified by their distinct struggles as a religious community. This “double loss,” Pally argues, is coupled with a “double suspicion” of government and “outsiders”: a widespread American distrust of centralized authority, minorities, and new immigrants, paired with a doctrinal suspicion rooted of priestly and other authorities in Evangelical religious beliefs.

        Professor Jennifer McCoy: A Trump Victory to Embolden Populist Movements and Authoritarian Regimes Globally 

        Professor Jennifer McCoy, Regent’s Professor of Political Science at Georgia State University, warns that a Donald Trump victory in the November 5th US presidential elections could embolden populist movements and authoritarian regimes worldwide. Professor McCoy asserts that Trump is unlikely to prioritize reinforcing democracy in countries where leaders are consolidating power or undermining democratic norms. “Instead, his victory will empower authoritarian regimes, particularly in countries like Russia and China,” she explained, highlighting the potential global consequences of another Trump term.

        Professor Roesel: FPÖ Will Remain a Permanent and Strong Force in Austrian Politics

        Highlighting that the success of the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) is rooted in Austria’s long history of far-right politics, with origins tracing back to the post-World War I period, Professor Felix Roesel, a Professor of Economics, especially Urban and Regional Economics at Technische Universität Braunschweig in Germany, argues that the FPÖ’s presence as a dominant force in Austrian politics is unlikely to diminish, as historical, social, and political factors continue to bolster the party’s influence. He explains that Austria’s far-right movement is unique compared to other European countries, given its established presence both before and after World War II. According to Professor Roesel, the continuity of this tradition, marked by personal and ideological ties to the Nazi era, sets the FPÖ apart from other modern far-right parties in Europe.

        Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider: Austria Is an Exceptional Case Where Neoliberalism Was a Project of Far-Right Politics

        Underscoring that Austria represents a unique case where neoliberalism has been driven by far-right politics—a phenomenon not commonly seen in other European contexts— Dr. Valentina Ausserladscheider, Assistant Professor at the Department of Economic Sociology, University of Vienna, reflects on the FPÖ’s historical trajectory. She explains how the party, initially founded by former National Socialists, positioned itself as a pro-business, liberal alternative to the dominant Socialist and Conservative parties. This liberal economic stance was integrated into government policies when the FPÖ gained power, particularly during its coalition government in the early 2000s, introducing neoliberal measures such as deregulation and market liberalization. “What we’ve seen in Austria,” Professor Ausserladscheider notes, “is an unprecedented case of a far-right populist party significantly influencing economic policymaking.”

        Professor Tom Ginsburg: The Search for a ‘Strongman’ to Fix Everything Is a Naive Approach

        Professor Tom Ginsburg, Leo Spitz Professor of International Law at the University of Chicago, warns against the simplistic notion that a “strongman” can solve complex political and social problems, arguing that such leaders often weaken democratic institutions by eroding trust. He discusses how authoritarian regimes manipulate international law to shield themselves from scrutiny. Despite these trends, Ginsburg remains cautiously optimistic, believing that well-established democracies can endure with vigilance and strong institutions. However, he emphasizes the need for constant global cooperation to prevent the further erosion of democratic norms and institutions.

        Professor Francesco Tamburini: The Absence of Ennahda Is a Bleeding Wound for Tunisian Politics

        The re-election of Kais Saied on October 6, 2024, has sparked debates about the future of Tunisia’s democracy and the legacy of the Arab Spring. With only 28.8% voter turnout, the result reflects a growing disillusionment among Tunisians. Professor Francesco Tamburini, Professor of Political Science at Department of Political Sciences, Università di Pisa, examines the wider impact of Saied’s actions, drawing comparisons between Tunisia’s path and other post-revolutionary autocratic regimes in the MENA region. He emphasizes that “the absence of Ennahda is a significant loss for Tunisian politics,” noting that the lack of a moderate Islamic voice has left a deep void in the country’s political landscape.

        Professor Mabel Berezin: The People Behind Trump Are Scarier Than He Is

        The re-election of Donald Trump on November 5, 2024, raises significant concerns for American democracy, according to Professor Mabel Berezin, Distinguished Professor of Sociology at Cornell University. While she acknowledges that Trump is a troubling figure, she emphasizes that it is the individuals surrounding him who are especially dangerous. “What makes him even more dangerous is the group of people around him—J.D. Vance, Elon Musk, and the Project 2025 people. I think American democracy will be in serious danger if these people come into power. They are smart, they have a project, and they’re going to push it through,” she explains.

        Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski: Trump Externalizes US Problems, Presenting Them as Originating from Abroad

        Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Lecturer in International Relations at Coventry University, argues Trump uses foreign policy as a tool to externalize US problems, reframing issues like poverty and unemployment as outcomes of foreign influence. Trump’s “American people vs. Washington establishment” narrative, Wojczewski says, fuels populist-nationalist sentiment by attributing domestic challenges to global elites and immigration, aligning with longstanding US nativist narratives. Wojczewski compares this approach to other populist strategies, contrasting it with left-populists like Bernie Sanders, who emphasize multilateralism and solidarity.

        Professor Emilia Zankina: Many Bulgarians Remain Deeply Skeptical of the West

        Professor Emilia Zankina, a leading expert in political science and Vice Provost for Global Engagement at Temple University, explains that, despite the financial and mobility benefits of EU membership, “many people remain deeply skeptical of the West” due to Bulgaria’s strong historic ties to Russia. The communist era deeply embedded Russian language, culture, and education in Bulgarian life, and “for many,” Professor Zankina notes, “Russia is still seen as a liberator.” She observes that while the war in Ukraine initially reduced pro-Russian sentiment in the country, as the conflict continued, some Bulgarians have returned to their original views.

        Professor David Aprasidze: Ivanishvili Governs Georgia Like His Business Company

        Professor David Aprasidze, political science professor at Ilia State University in Tbilisi: In Georgia, the Georgian Dream party exemplifies a technocratic form of populism, treating state governance like corporate management. Founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, a former businessman, brings a non-ideological, efficiency-focused approach, applying principles from his business career to politics. He appoints key officials as “managers” to carry out strategic directives, allowing him to remain distanced while exercising control. This model emphasizes expertise and governance over ideology, with Ivanishvili viewing the state as if it were one of his companies.

        Professor Lucan Ahmad Way: I’m Deeply Concerned About How US Institutions Will Respond to Trump’s Autocratic Tendencies

        Professor Lucan Ahmad Way, Distinguished Professor of Democracy at the University of Toronto, expressed serious concerns about the durability of American institutions under Trump’s influence. “I am extremely worried about how American institutions might respond to Trump’s autocratic tendencies,” he stated, noting that subtle abuses, like politicized audits or investigations, could escape media scrutiny yet still erode democratic foundations. While US rule of law might limit overt actions, Professor Way emphasized the risk of covert pressures aimed at silencing opposition, highlighting the fragility of democratic safeguards in polarized times.

        Professor Paul Levinson: Elon Musk Must Choose Between Government Role and Control of X

        Highlighting the dangers of overlapping corporate and governmental powers, Paul Levinson, Professor of Communication & Media Studies at Fordham University, cautioned, “I am deeply opposed to having the person who owns X also hold a high-ranking government position. That kind of overlap means the government could end up controlling communication platforms.” He elaborated on Musk’s ethical responsibility, stating that if Musk were a “true believer in free speech,” he would either divest from X or refuse a government post. However, Levinson expressed skepticism: “I think we both know he’s likely to do neither.” Levinson also voiced his deep concern for American democracy under a potential second Trump administration, describing it as “the worst threat to our democracy since the Civil War.”

        Professor Tanweer Fazal: Otherization is a Deliberate Project in India

        Professor Tanweer Fazal, a distinguished sociologist from the University of Hyderabad, emphasizes that “otherization is primarily a deliberate process rather than something inherently embedded in a culture.” He explains how this systematic targeting involves mobilizing economic, cultural, historical, and political resources to marginalize specific communities. Reflecting on the state’s role, Professor Fazal critiques its evolving relationship with secularism and justice. He notes a shift in the post-2014 political landscape, observing, “The state has increasingly abandoned its efforts to project a secular or morally incorruptible image,” instead embracing a majoritarian framework.

        Professor Anthony J. Nownes: Ceding Too Much Power to Tech Giants Poses a Threat to Democracy

        Highlighting Elon Musk’s dual role as a private tech mogul and a potential quasi-governmental leader under elected US President Donald Trump, Professor Anthony J. Nownes, a political science expert from the University of Tennessee, underscored the dangers of unregulated private power intersecting with public institutions. He emphasized that ceding excessive power to any private interest—whether in the tech industry or another sector—poses a significant threat to democracy. Illustrating this concern, Professor Nownes pointed to the proposed “Doge Department,” noting, “Unlike actual government departments with conflict-of-interest rules, such private entities lack safeguards, making them a potential avenue for unchecked influence over public resources.”

        Professor Sorina C. Soare: Romania’s Radical Right Populism Reflects Deep-Rooted Socio-Economic Frustrations

        Describing Călin Georgescu’s first-round presidential victory as “shocking,” Professor Sorina Christina Soare, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Florence, highlights the pivotal role of social media, particularly TikTok, in mobilizing young voters. “TikTok’s visual simplicity and limited regulatory scrutiny allowed candidates to amplify anti-establishment narratives, effectively engaging younger demographics,” she explains. She emphasizes Georgescu’s populist appeal, driven by “simple yet resonant nationalist rhetoric” and a well-executed campaign strategy. “Georgescu’s polished image and reassuring tone contrasted with more vocal populist figures, enhancing his credibility,” she notes. Despite warning of potential instability, Professor Soare remains optimistic that Romania’s semi-presidential system and pro-European coalitions can sustain the country’s European trajectory.

        Dr. Rajni Gamage: Buddhist Civilizational Populism Declines Amid Sri Lanka’s Progressive Promises

        Dr. Rajni Gamage, a Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore (NUS), highlights the decline of Buddhist civilizational populism in Sri Lanka, noting its diminished public resonance following the transformative 2022 protests. These protests, she explains, challenged both the political elite and Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism, creating a moment of reckoning. However, Gamage warns that if Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government fails to deliver on its promises of progressive politics and economic recovery, opposition groups may exploit public discontent to revive Buddhist civilizational populism. “This phase of decline,” she says, “could shift if promises remain unmet, fueling alternative populist narratives.”

        Dr. Meredith Shaw: Tit-for-Tat Politics Hinder Reforms and Deepen Public Disillusionment in South Korea

        As South Korea’s Constitutional Court reviews President Yoon Suk Yeol’s impeachment following his martial law declaration, Dr. Meredith Shaw, a leading expert on East Asian politics, highlights the deep-rooted issues plaguing the nation’s politics. Speaking with the ECPS, Dr. Shaw explains that a “tit-for-tat dynamic” of political retaliation has hindered systemic reforms, while populist appeals during economic crises fuel disillusionment. Drawing on South Korea’s history of authoritarian rule, she emphasizes the need for reform-minded leadership to restore public confidence. “Both sides have behaved in ways that don’t inspire confidence,” Dr. Shaw remarked, urging systemic change to strengthen democratic institutions amid this critical moment for South Korea’s democracy.

        Professor Kazin: Right-Wing Populism Is a Morbid Symptom of Political Transition

        In a compelling interview with the ECPS, renowned historian Professor Michael Kazin of Georgetown University, explores the rise of right-wing populism as a “morbid symptom” of today’s political transition. Drawing on Antonio Gramsci’s theory of interregnum, Kazin analyzes Donald Trump’s presidency, highlighting its profound impact on American and global politics. From galvanizing his MAGA base by aligning economic grievances with cultural conservatism to forging ties with far-right leaders abroad, Trump’s leadership reflects the challenges of this transitional era. Kazin also envisions the potential for a progressive populism rooted in economic justice to counterbalance these dynamics.

         

        Commentaries


         

        In 2024, the ECPS continued to expand its editorial output through the ECPS Commentaries series, publishing 17 analytical essays that examined the multifaceted evolution of populism across global and regional contexts. Authored by distinguished scholars and experts, these commentaries provided timely, research-informed insights into the intersections of populism with nationalism, religion, gender, and democratic governance.

        The year opened with Simon P. Watmough’s comprehensive overview “Populism in 2023: The Year in Review,” which assessed populism’s fluctuating fortunes worldwide, highlighting its uneven electoral performance and enduring ideological appeal. A strong thematic strand throughout the 2024 collection was the growing globalization of populist discourse, illustrated by Ajay Gudavarthy’s and Priya Chacko & Kanchan Panday’s analyses of India’s elections, Junhyoung Lee’s exploration of South Korea’s populist-nationalist dynamics, and Nicholas Morieson’s study of South Africa’s shifting political landscape.

        European developments featured prominently, with Emilia Zankina & Gilles Ivaldi assessing the populist radical right’s advances in the 2024 European Parliament elections, while Kai ArzheimerHugo Marcos-Marne, and Robert Csehi provided country-specific insights into Germany, Spain, and Hungary. João Ferreira Dias contributed multiple essays exploring the populist right’s entrenchment in Portugal and the cultural polarization transforming Western democracies. Beyond electoral analyses, Hafza Girdap examined gendered Islamophobia through a transnational feminist lens.

        Collectively, these commentaries underscored ECPS’s commitment to rigorous, comparative, and interdisciplinary engagement with global populism. They not only documented the persistence of populist movements across continents but also deepened understanding of the structural crises—economic, cultural, and institutional—that sustain them. Through this rich body of analysis, ECPS reaffirmed its role as a leading platform for critical scholarship on populism and democracy in a rapidly transforming world.

        Commentaries

        Populism in 2023: The Year in Review

        By Simon P. Watmough

        In 2023, populism continued to shape the electoral landscape worldwide, notably in Europe but also in East Asia and Latin America. And it is clear that 2023 did not see the outright resurgence of populism worldwide as some had predicted but instead produced another year of mixed results, with critical successes and also major setbacks for populists at the ballot box.

        Revealing the Intricacies of Gendered Islamophobia and Populism through the Lens of Transnational Feminist Endeavors

        By Hafza Girdap

        As transnational feminist scholars and activists, it becomes imperative for us to intervene in feminist epistemologies by carefully discerning the nuances among the concepts of anti-Islam, anti-Muslim, and Islamophobia. An essential focus lies in understanding the ongoing transformation of the new transnational anti-Islamic movement from ethnic-based nationalism and oppressive authoritarianism towards a liberal standpoint that advocates equality, justice, and democratic values. This involves active participation in knowledge production through the experiences and agency of the complex subjects central to debates: Muslim immigrant women.

        The Changing Populist Performances of Prabowo Subianto: Indonesia’s Incoming President

        By Ihsan Yilmaz, Hasnan Bachtiar, Chloe Smith & Kainat Shakil

        Prabowo Subianto Joyohadikusumo is the anticipated victor of the 2024 Indonesian presidential election, boasting a political career spanning more than three decades in the country. Over the course of the past decade alone, Prabowo has undergone significant shifts in ideological stances, rhetorical appeals, and electoral strategies. He has transformed from an ultra-nationalist, chauvinist, and Islamist populist into a technocratic figure with a more approachable demeanor, strategically forming and changing alliances in his efforts to secure electoral success.

        Chega Emerges as the Elephant in the Room: What’s Next?

        By João Ferreira Dias

        Chega, a populist radical right-wing party known for its anti-systemic, morally conservative, and securitarian rhetoric, secured 48 MPs, solidifying its position as the most influential third force ever in the Parliament. This marks a substantial transformation in Portuguese politics. Despite warnings from the Left about the imminent threat of fascism, voters persist in seeking straightforward solutions and placing blame on elites and immigrants. Now, the pivotal question arises: “Will the Democratic Alliance break its cordon sanitaire with Chega?”

        Towards the Fall of ‘Erdoganism’ in Turkey

        By Ibrahim Ozturk

        Given the inability of Turkey’s strongman Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s to satisfy Turkey’s 86 million citizens with an economy reliant on corrupt patronage networks and the challenges of implementing a heavy austerity program within a democratic framework, diverting public attention to domestic and foreign disturbances to suspend democracy becomes a realistic expectation. Ultimately, Erdogan’s pursuit seems to lead toward a costly Pyrrhic Victory.

        The Role of Populism, Nationalism, and Xenophobia in South Korea’s 22nd General Election in 2024

        By Junhyoung Lee

        The 22nd general election in South Korea offers a pivotal perspective for examining the interactions of populism, nationalism, and xenophobia within the nation’s political fabric. It sheds light on persistent issues such as confronting authoritarianism, bridging societal divides, and integrating foreign nationals more deeply into the societal framework. This election marks a critical juncture in South Korea’s political development, with implications that extend far into the realms of democratic governance, social unity, and the broader political landscape.

        What after Populism? Analyzing General Elections in India, 2024

        By Ajay Gudavarthy

        The BJP consistently built a mass movement to construct a temple for Lord Ram at his birthplace of Ayodhya. This populist narrative, which framed an imagined majority as the ‘authentic people,’ resonated widely. The temple’s construction became the central issue for the 2024 General Elections. However, soon after the temple’s inauguration in February, the expected exuberance was noticeably absent. Mobilization around the temple fell flat, failing to create the kind of hysteria that Modi expected would secure him a third term in office.

        The Rise of Populist Parties in South Africa and End of the ANC’s Parliamentary Majority

        By Nicholas Morieson

        In the recent national elections in South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) lost its parliamentary majority for the first time, indicating widespread discontent with its governance. While the ANC remains the ruling party, its ongoing failure to address the nation’s economic woes, violent crime problem, and racial inequalities has made South Africa fertile ground for charismatic populist leaders, like Jacob Zuma and Julius Malema, who make grand promises to solve these issues.

        The EP Elections in Spain: A New Composition of the Radical-right?

        By Hugo Marcos-Marne

        The elections to the EP in Spain largely reflect the broader trends occurring at the European Union (EU) level but also have unique dynamics and consequences. Notably, the evolution of the radical-right space is crucial; it appears divided yet shows potential for growth. The expansion of the Eurosceptic radical-right should concern all pro-European parties. It seems logical for mainstream parties to consider whether incorporating radical-right ideas contributes to their normalization and electoral success.

        The Populist Radical Right in the New European Parliament

        By Emilia Zankina & Gilles Ivaldi

        The 2024 European Parliament elections have justified fears of the rise of the populist radical right (PRR) and a potential shift towards more right-wing policies over the next five years. While pro-European parties will still maintain a majority in the new parliament, the populist radical right has registered significant gains, however with varied performances across countries and regions.

        Shifting Political Landscapes: The Rise and Fall of Opposition Parties Amidst Fidesz’s Dominance in Hungary

        By Robert Csehi

        The EP election results in Hungary indicate interesting dynamics. The governing Fidesz party achieved a somewhat pyrrhic victory. Although it won 44.82% of the votes, making it the winner, this result is the worst the party has ever achieved in its EP election history. The big winner of the EP election is Magyar’s Tisza party, which received 29.6% of the votes and may send seven representatives to the EP. Given that the party practically did not exist in the minds of voters a few months prior, becoming the largest opposition party was a significant success. A big question now is, in which faction of the EP will the Hungarian parties find their political home?

        The 2024 General Election and the Future of Authoritarian Populism in India 

        By Priya Chacko and Kanchan Panday

        The 2024 election was the least free and fair election in India’s history. Just days after India’s nationalist-populist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) formed a government for the third time, Delhi’s BJP Lieutenant Governor, V.K. Saxena, proceeded to charge the writer Arundhati Roy, a fierce critic of Modi, under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) 2019 for a speech she gave in 2010. The already draconian law was amended in 2019 to allow the government more extraordinary powers to designate individuals and organizations as terrorists without a formal judicial process. BJP leaders accused Roy of being a traitor backed by the Congress party. This strongly indicates that some version of authoritarian populism, with its attacks on dissent, undermining of institutions, and social polarization, will likely continue to shape governance under the new government.

        The Far-right’s Success in the 2024 European Election in Germany — What Does It Mean, and What Is Its Impact?

        By Kai Arzheimer

        While the AfD has contributed to the widely expected shift towards the right in the new European Parliament by winning four additional seats, this is unlikely to make a significant political difference. However, the impact of this result in Germany is difficult to underestimate. Paradoxically, as the AfD has become more radical, it has also become an almost normal part of political life in Germany. Unlike in many other European countries, German mainstream parties still choose to ignore that the radical right “owns” the immigration issue. Any attempts by mainstream parties to publicly take a tough stance on immigration will likely further benefit the AfD.

        Right-Wing Populist Backlash: How Bolsonaro’s Brazil Targeted Academics

        By Gulsen Dogan

        Universities, akin to the judiciary, media, and civil society organizations, assume a vital role in the preservation of democratic principles. Inability to safeguard their independence from external influences like governmental interventions and corporate interests hampers universities’ capacity to uphold the rights of their constituents internally or advocate for public interests outside their precincts. Brazil is among the nations that have witnessed a notable decrease in academic freedom over the past decade. Instances of political turmoil or authoritarian rule, like Bolsonaro’s in Brazil, have resulted in constraints on academic pursuits and the imposition of censorship.

        J.D. Vance, Populism, and Culture Wars

        By João Ferreira Dias

        The entrenchment of populism and culture wars within the Republican Party, exemplified by J.D. Vance’s rise, raises serious concerns about the future of American democracy. This development reflects broader shifts within American conservatism, where cultural and moral issues have become central to political identity and strategy. The implications of this shift are profound, raising concerns about increased polarization and the potential for democratic backsliding. As the Republican Party continues to evolve in this direction, the stakes for the nation’s political and social fabric have never been higher.

        Once Dictators Seize Power, They’re Hard to Remove: Venezuela’s Elections

        By Imdat Oner

        Some observers believe Nicolás Maduro will follow in the footsteps of Nicaragua’s dictator, Daniel Ortega, by transforming his government into an isolated, repressive regime. Like Ortega, Maduro has already intensified his crackdown on the opposition through increased repression, including arrests, expulsions, and even stripping citizens of their nationality to consolidate control. As this authoritarian trend continues, more Venezuelans will likely flee in search of opportunities and freedoms abroad, exacerbating the already severe migration crisis in the region and beyond.

        Portugal in Cultural War: Racism, Security, and the Social Contract at Stake

        By João Ferreira Dias

        Portugal is facing heightened scrutiny after a young, inexperienced policeman fatally shot Odair Moniz, a Black man, under dubious circumstances. This incident has reignited longstanding debates about structural racism and revealed deep-seated cultural and social divides, exposing unresolved issues around race, security, and the state’s role. Reflecting James Davison Hunter’s concept of “culture wars,” these moral conflicts have deepened into societal divisions that erode shared values. Portugal’s colonial legacy further intensifies these tensions, perpetuating systemic racial exclusion and fostering fertile ground for populist narratives.

         

        Voice of Youths (VoY) 


         

        In 2024, the ECPS continued to prioritize the inclusion of young scholars’ perspectives through its Voice of Youths (VoY) platform — a key initiative designed to amplify youth engagement in critical debates on populism, democracy, and global governance. With the publication of nine original pieces, this series reflected ECPS’s firm commitment to fostering the next generation of researchers, analysts, and public intellectuals.

        The VoY commentaries tackled a wide range of contemporary challenges — from identity politics, digital populism, and activism, to migration, youth participation, and the resilience of liberal democracy. Authored primarily by postgraduate students and emerging scholars from across Europe, these contributions demonstrated analytical sophistication and a strong awareness of the social and technological transformations shaping modern politics.

        Among the highlights, Katharina Diebold published several insightful essays analyzing the interplay between populism, activism, and digital media, exploring how movements such as Fridays for Future and Black Lives Matter adopt populist rhetoric to articulate collective demands. Konstantina Kastoriadou examined techno-populism and the growing political influence of social media on the European youth electorate, while Greta Martinez exposed the tragic human costs of the EU migration crisis and the underreporting of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean.

        Expanding the intellectual scope of the section, Christo Pretorius provided a historical perspective on participatory governance in ancient Greece, linking classical democratic ideals to contemporary debates about citizenship and rights. Amedeo Gasparini’s reflection on the Ventotene Manifesto revisited the philosophical roots of European federalism and its relevance amid the rise of populism today.

        Through Voice of Youths, ECPS not only offers a scholarly platform but also nurtures critical thinking, independent analysis, and civic responsibility among young contributors. By integrating youth voices into its research ecosystem, ECPS reaffirms that democratic renewal depends on empowering younger generations to engage critically with populism, challenge disinformation, and envision more inclusive political futures.

        VoY Articles

        Connection Between Populism and Identity Politics in the European Union Before the 2024 European Parliament Elections

        By Katharina Diebold

        The 2024 EU parliament election polls show the populist right and far right as the main winners. The fact that voters tend to choose populist parties could increase the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far right, as an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the other and creates further social conflicts. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation and what forecasts we can identify for the elections in 2024.

        The Nexus between Activism and Populism Amid Global Protests and Digital Media

        By Katharina Diebold

        Activist movements such as Black Lives Matter (BLM), MeToo, Fridays for Future (FFF), Extinction Rebellion (XR) and many more use populist frameworks and rhetoric elements that contest the elites and claim the general will of the people. We see BLM standing up against the racist system of white elites. We look at #MeToo fighting against the patriarchal system of male elites. And we watch FFF and XR challenging the neoliberal, capitalist system of big corporate elites. All of these activist movements are supposedly fighting for the general will of the people, similar to populism. But how much of activist rhetoric is coopted from populist ideology, movements, and parties? And how much did populism copy from activist movements in their approach? This is what this article will try answer.

        The Contested Relevance of “Populism” in Politics, Law, and Mass Mobilization

        By Katharina Diebold

        Populism – a term frequently used in the media, politics, law, as well as in academia in social sciences and political science studies – aims to describe a particular concept, ideology, and strategy to explain mechanisms closely related to democracy and the far-right and far-left as well as extremism. Populism is often referred to as a comprehensive and flexible term. But where strictly does it come from, and how is it still relevant? 

        A Survey on Political Rights of Individuals under Different Forms of Ancient Greek Government

        By Christo Pretorius

        Although not perfect, as no government form ever is, Athenian democracy allowed citizens to have the greatest say in how they were governed, giving them necessary legal and economic protections to do so. One can see why modern scholars define Athens as having a ‘radical’ democracy, as actions such as changing the surnames of citizens to incorporate the name of their deme, having a highly complex jury selection system, and even paying individuals for public service, were all radical ideas when compared to the oligarchic systems of other city-states and kingdoms such as Macedonia.

        Ventotene Manifesto, Europe, and Federalist Liberalism Today

        By Amedeo Gasparini

        The Ventotene Manifesto beautifully weaves together the aspirations for a united Europe with the principles of (federalist) liberalism. Its legacy should encourage European citizens to ponder the significance of European values and to defend them. How? By promoting a system both market-based and social; that rejects collectivism and embraces individualism; that prompts personal responsibility and denounces populism; that promotes transparent, efficient, and democratic governance; that acknowledges liberal democracy’s flaws but knows that the authoritarian pathway – fostered by populist forces – is ruinous. This is federalist liberalism.

        Death Toll Much Higher Than Reported: Rising Casualties Among Migrants Attempting to Reach the EU

        By Greta Martinez

        Statistics on the EU migration crisis indicate that over 3,000 lives have been lost in the Mediterranean Sea, with 60% of the deaths linked to drowning. However, these figures are not precise, many ‘ghost boats’ disappear from radar with no record of the number of migrants on board. Indeed, the majority of migrant deaths worldwide go unrecorded.

        EP Elections and the Connection Between Populism and Identity Politics in the EU

        By Katharina Diebold

        The 2024 EU parliament election polls show the populist right and far-right as the main winners. The tendency of voters to choose populist parties could push the populist agenda of the left to compete with the far-right. This could be an attempt to transform xenophobic tendencies by the right into inclusionary populism, which describes the conservative elite as the other and creates further social conflicts. Therefore, we need to ask ourselves how populism (both left and right) impacts EU legislation now.

        Techno-Populism: The Youth Electorate in Europe and the Interplay Between Social Media and Populism

        By Konstantina Kastoriadou

        As proven by a 2021 European Parliament Youth survey, which supported that people rely primarily on the web, whether this is social media or online news outlets to be informed for political and societal developments. This ultimately explains why politicians gradually turn to social media – it broadens their electoral base as they attempt to connect to younger voters but has the negative consequence of popularizing populism. 

        Many Facets of Medical Populism: British Political Tradition (BPT) and Covid-19

        By Andrea Guidotti 

        The traditional British political style and rhetoric were utilized by both former Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage of UKIP as tools to communicate their approaches to managing the COVID-19 crisis. This demonstrates the resilience of established political traditions while highlighting the volatility and ambiguity of populist strategies. Notably, populist narratives varied significantly depending on whether the leader was in power or in opposition, which influenced their responsibility towards citizens and their ability to connect populist grievances with pre-existing political arguments in the context of the pandemic. In particular, Johnson’s actions reflect a ‘government knows best’ approach to the crisis, blending epistemic and political authority in determining the necessary measures to address the pandemic.

        The Role of Mainstream Parties in the Success of Radical Right Populists 

        By Maël Jones

        Populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have been gaining votes in recent decades, votes that were once almost exclusively given to mainstream parties. At the same time, voter turnout has declined. Regardless of the analytical reasons, mainstream parties are losing ground and are not convincing as many people as they once did. While it’s easy to blame external factors like misinformation or divisive rhetoric, that’s not enough in a democratic system. Our system is straightforward: parties and politicians need to win votes. If people aren’t convinced, they will shift their support to other parties. Blaming factors beyond their control will only further harm liberal democratic mainstream parties.

         

        Policy Papers


         

        In 2024, the ECPS advanced its policy engagement by publishing four policy papers that addressed critical global and regional governance challenges through evidence-based analysis and actionable recommendations. These papers reflect ECPS’s mission to bridge academic research and policymaking while promoting democratic resilience amid rising populism and technological disruption.

        In “EU Employment Law and the AI Act,” Christo Pretorius examined the social implications of artificial intelligence regulation, urging the EU to embed employment security within its human-centric digital policies. Massimo Ronco and Christo Pretorius, in “Revising the Trumpian Legacy in US Foreign Policy towards Latin America,” analyzed the long-term consequences of protectionist policies and proposed strategic alternatives to counter China’s growing influence in the region.

        The collaborative paper “Anticipating the Trump Effect,” led by Beatrice Bottura and co-authored by a diverse team of emerging scholars, assessed how US political shifts could shape Europe’s migration governance under populist pressures. Finally, “Future Resilience of European Technology” by Anton Miguel De Vera and colleagues explored vulnerabilities in EU technological infrastructure, emphasizing the need for coordinated policies to bolster digital security and autonomy.

        Together, these policy papers underscore ECPS’s vital role in informing public policy debates with rigorous, interdisciplinary research.

        EU Employment Law and the AI Act: A Policy Brief Putting the Human Back in ‘Human-Centric’ Policy

        By Christo Pretorius

        This policy paper analyzes the European Union’s (EU) AI Act, aimed at regulating Artificial Intelligence (AI) through four risk classifications related to data protection, privacy, security, and fundamental rights. While the Act establishes regulatory frameworks, it neglects employment security, a critical factor behind public mistrust of AI. The paper warns that failure to address this issue could deepen socio-economic inequalities and lead to political unrest. Recommendations include promoting collective negotiation between workers and employers, advocating for legislation on redundancies linked to AI, and launching information campaigns to educate workers, thus ensuring fair working conditions and improving trust in AI technology.

        Revising the Trumpian Legacy in the US Foreign Policy towards Latin America

        Authored by Massimo Ronco & Christo Pretorius; Edited by Angelica Lisa Rossi-Hawkins

        This paper revisits the legacy of former US President Donald Trump’s foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), with a particular focus on economic policies and their long-term impact. It argues that Trump’s policies eroded US soft power in the region and failed to adequately address China’s expanding influence. Although the Joe Biden administration sought to reset US relations with LAC, it retained the bulk of Trump’s protectionist policies, perpetuating ongoing trade volatility and regional instability. This paper emphasizes the need for a revised US economic strategy in Latin America that both counters China’s influence and fosters deeper economic integration across the region. The authors propose three policy scenarios for the future: a more aggressive protectionist stance under a second Trump administration, a continuation of Biden-era policies under potential future Democratic leadership, or a more integrative approach that enhances regional cooperation and infrastructure development.

        Anticipating the Trump Effect: Strengthening the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum Amid Populist Pressures

        Authored by Beatrice Bottura, Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston, Pinelopi Gkampeta, Ludmila Malai, Matt Lynch, Joon Park & Leon Gräf; Edited by Beatrice Bottura & Paris O’Keeffe-Johnston

        This policy paper analyzes the potential effects of the 2024 US presidential election on EU politics, particularly the EU Pact on Migration and Asylum. A Trump victory may intensify Euroscepticism and lead to more restrictive migration policies among his European allies. Conversely, a Trump defeat could fuel distrust in electoral processes, potentially triggering events similar to the 2021 Capitol attack. The paper recommends regular in-depth country reviews (ICRs) to develop tailored migration strategies, anticipating that either election outcome could increase fragmentation and populist influence within EU member states, though with varying degrees of impact.

        Future Resilience of the European Technology

        By Anton Miguel De Vera, Viktoriia Hamaiunova, Réka Koleszár & Giada Pasquettaz

        This paper explores vulnerabilities in the European Union’s technological security, focusing on Huawei as a case study to illuminate broader security challenges. Amid intensifying US-China tensions, especially under former US President Donald Trump, the EU encountered new risks linked to the strategic positioning of Chinese tech firms within critical European infrastructure. Trump’s “America First” policy targeted China with tariffs and trade restrictions to address perceived unfair practices, triggering disruptions in global supply chains that reverberated through the EU economy. For Europe, heavily reliant on secure, stable trade flows, these events highlighted the urgency of reassessing technological dependencies and reinforcing digital security. The paper presents a series of strategic recommendations for the EU to mitigate such vulnerabilities, emphasizing the need for diversified supply chains, rigorous security standards for tech partnerships, and collaborative policies among EU members to strengthen resilience in the face of geopolitical shifts and technological competition.

         

        Reports


        This image is a design created by NOW/UP Brand Agency.

        In 2024, the ECPS significantly expanded its research output, publishing 42 reports that included event summaries, annual analytical reports, and thematic sub-reports. Together, these publications form one of the most comprehensive yearly collections ECPS has produced, reflecting the organization’s commitment to documenting and interpreting the rapidly evolving global landscape of populism, authoritarianism, and democratic transformation.

        A cornerstone of this year’s output was the Mapping Global Populism (MGP) panel series, which brought together scholars from across the globe to examine populist dynamics in regions as diverse as Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Caucasus, the Middle East and Central Asia. Each report distilled key insights from these expert discussions, offering accessible yet rigorous analyses of how populist actors, narratives, and strategies shape political behavior, governance, and social conflict.

        The 2024 collection also included regional panels, thematic studies, and the ECPS Summer School report, collectively exploring intersections between populism and foreign policy, religion, gender, nationalism, state-society relations, digital authoritarianism, and global governance. This year’s flagship publication—The 2024 European Parliament Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism—provided a country-by-country examination of the electoral performance and policy influence of Europe’s populist parties, produced in collaboration with leading experts from all EU member states.

        Together, the ECPS reports published in 2024 serve as an authoritative record of contemporary populist trends and their implications for democracy worldwide. They not only map where populism is gaining ground but also illuminate the social, economic, geopolitical, and cultural forces driving its evolution. Through these publications, ECPS continues to advance informed debate, support evidence-based policymaking, and foster a global research community committed to understanding and addressing the challenges posed by populism in the 21st century.

        Religious Populism and Radicalization in Indonesia

        Report by Zhanyl Ashirbekova & Neo Sithole

        This report is based on the third installment of the Mapping Global Populism monthly panel series, held online from Brussels on May 25, 2023, under the theme “Religious Populism and Radicalization in Indonesia.” Co-organized by ECPS and the Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation (ADI), the event brought together leading scholars from Australia and Indonesia to examine how religious narratives shape populist mobilization and radicalization processes in contemporary Indonesia. The report presents concise summaries of the panel’s presentations, highlighting key insights into the political, social, and ideological dynamics driving religious populism across the country. Moderated by Dr. Ihsan Yilmaz, Research Professor and Chair of Islamic Studies and Intercultural Dialogue at ADI, the panel featured Dr. Inaya Rakhmani (Universitas Indonesia), Dr. Pradana Boy Zulian (Universitas Muhammadiyah Malang), Dr. Kurniawati Hastuti Dewi (BRIN), and Dr. I Gede Wahyu Wicaksana (Universitas Airlangga). Together, their contributions offer a timely, interdisciplinary understanding of Indonesia’s evolving religious and political landscape.

        Populism, Gender and Sexuality in Europe

        Report by Andrea Guidotti

        This report provides a brief overview of the eighth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping European Populism (MEP) panel series, titled “Populism, Gender and Sexuality in Europe” held online on January 26, 2023. Moderated by Dr.Agnieszka Graff, Professor at the American Studies Center, University of Warsaw, and a feminist activist, the panel featured speakers Dr.  Elżbieta Korolczuk, Associate Professor in Sociology at Södertörn University, Sweden, Dr. Eric Louis Russell, Professor in the Department of French & Italian and affiliated with the Program in Gender, Sexuality and Women’s Studies at the University of California, Davis, Nik Linders, PhD candidate at Radboud Social and Cultural Research for Gender & Diversity Studies, Dr. Pauline Cullen, Associate Professor in sociology at Center for European and Eurasian Studies, Maynooth University, Ireland.

        Civilizational Populism and Religious Authoritarianism in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives


        Report by Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi & Neo Sithole

        This report gives a summary of the 9th session of the ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series titled “Civilizational Populism and Religious Authoritarianism in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives,” which took place online on January 25, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Syaza Shukri, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia, the panel featured speakers by Mr. Bobby Hajjaj, Department of Management, North South University, Bangladesh, Dr. Maidul Islam, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, Dr. Rajni Gamage, Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore, and Dr. Mosmi Bhim, Assistant Professor at Fiji National University.

        Varieties of Populism and Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore

        Report by Andrea Guidotti

        This report provides an overview of the sixth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series, titled “Varieties of Populism and Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore” held online on October 26, 2023. Moderated by Dr. Garry Rodan, Honorary Professor of Political Science and International Studies at the University of Queensland) the panel featured speakers Dr. Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid, Professor of Political Science, University Sains Malaysia, Dr. Syaza Farhana Mohamad Shukri, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia, Dr. Kenneth Paul Tan, Professor of Politics, Film, and Cultural Studies, School of Communication, Hong Kong Baptist University and Dr. Shanon Shah, Visiting Research Fellow at the Department of Theology and Religious Studies, King’s College London.

        Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan and Tajikistan 

        Report by Beatrice Bottura

        The 15th session of the Mapping Global Populism panel series, organized by the ECPS, took place online on September 26, 2024, under the moderation of Dr. Simon P. Watmough(University of Leipzig; ECPS). The session explored the intersections of theocracy, radicalism, and populism in Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, offering a comparative lens on authoritarian and extremist dynamics in these regions. Dr. Hélène Thibault (Nazarbayev University) examined Tajikistan’s anti-extremism policies as tools of authoritarian control. Dr. Zakia Adeli (former Deputy Minister of Justice of Afghanistan) analyzed the Taliban’s governance structure and its implications for state legitimacy. Dr. Zahoor Ahmad Wani (Lovely Professional University) discussed gender oppression under Taliban rule, while Amir Hossein Mahdavi (University of Connecticut) reflected on Iran’s political trajectory and the emergence of populist actors.

        Civilizational Populism and Religious Authoritarianism in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives

        Report by Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi & Neo Sithole 

        This report gives a summary of the 9th session of the ECPS’s monthly Mapping Global Populism panel series titled “Civilizational Populism and Religious Authoritarianism in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives,” which took place online on January 25, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Syaza Shukri, Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Kulliyyah of Islamic Revealed Knowledge and Human Sciences, International Islamic University Malaysia, the panel featured speakers by Mr. Bobby Hajjaj, Department of Management, North South University, Bangladesh, Dr. Maidul Islam, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, Dr. Rajni Gamage, Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore, and Dr. Mosmi Bhim, Assistant Professor at Fiji National University.

        Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan

        Report by Philip Christo Pretorius & Neo Sithole

        This report provides a brief overview of the tenth event in ECPS’s monthly Mapping European Populism (MEP) panel series, titled “Various Facets of Populist, Authoritarian and Nationalist Trends in Japan and Taiwan” held online on February 29, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Dachi Liao, Emeritus Professor at the Institute of Political Science at National Sun Yat-sen University in Taiwan, the panel featured speakers Dr. Toru Yoshida, Full Professor of Comparative Politics at Doshisha University in Japan, Dr. Airo Hino, Professor, School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Dr. Szu-Yun Hsu, Assistant Professor, Political Science, McMaster University, Dr. Jiun-Chi Lin, Postdoctoral researcher at the Institute of Marketing Communication, National Sun Yat-sen University.

        Old and New Facets of Populism in Latin America

        Report by Luca Venga & Andrea Guidotti

        This report provides an overview of the first event in ECPS’s Regional Panel series titled “Old and New Facets of Populism in Latin America” and held online on March 7, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Maria Puerta Riera, Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Valencia College, the panel featured speakers Dr. Ronaldo Munck , Professor of Sociology, Dublin City University, Dr. Julio F. Carrión, Professor of Comparative Politics, Delaware University, Dr. Adriana Boersner-Herrera, Assistant Professor of Political Science at The Citadel, The Military College of Charleston, Dr. Reinhard Heinisch and Dr. Andrés Laguna Tapia, respectively Professor of Comparative Austrian Politics at the University of Salzburg and director of the Center for Research in Communication and Humanities and head of Communication Studies at UPB in Cochabamba, and Dr. Victor de Oliveira Pinto Coelho, Professor of History at Universidade Federal do Maranhão.

        Forces Shaping Populism, Authoritarianism and Democracy in South Korea, North Korea and Mongolia

        Report by Philip Christo Pretorius and Radoslav Valev

        This report encapsulates the highlights of the eleventh event hosted by the ECPS as part of its monthly Mapping European Populism (MGP) panel series on March 30, 2024. Dr. John Nilsson-Wright expertly moderated the panel, which boasted insights from five distinguished scholars in the field of populism. The panelists featured in the event included experts such as Dr. Joseph Yi, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Hanyang University, Seoul, renowned for his work on “Discourse Regimes and Liberal Vehemence.” Dr. Meredith Rose Shaw, an Associate Professor at the Institute of Social Science, The University of Tokyo, provided valuable insights into the regional context through her research on “Foreign Threat Perceptions in South Korean Campaign Discourse: Japan, North Korea, and China.” Dr. Sang-Jin Han, an Emeritus Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University, shared his expertise on sociopolitical trends in South Korea, focusing on the “Transformation of Populist Emotion in Korean Politics from 2016 to 2024.” Dr. Junhyoung Lee, a Research Professor in the School of International Relations at the University of Ulsan, South Korea, contributed with his research on “Nationalism and Resilience of Authoritarian Rule in North Korea.” Lastly, Dr. Mina Sumaadii, a Senior Researcher at the Sant Maral Foundation, Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, offered a unique perspective on “Populist Nationalism as a Challenge to Democratic Stability in Mongolia.”

        The Future of Multilateralism Between Multipolarity and Populists in Power 

        Report by Neo Sithole, Christo Pretorius, Radoslav Valev, Andrea Guidotti & Hilal Duman

        The ECPS convened its Third Annual International Symposium, titled “The Future of Multilateralism Between Multipolarity and Populists in Power,” held online on March 19–20, 2024. The event brought together distinguished scholars, policymakers, and experts to explore how populist governments are reshaping the global order and whether their policies are driving a new era of illiberal multilateralism characterized by economic protectionism, political isolation, and declining institutional trust. Panelists examined how the rise of multipolarity, coupled with populist rule, has weakened traditional institutions such as the UN, WTO, and IMF, while empowering alternative blocs like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Discussions underscored the challenges of sustaining global cooperation amid increasing nationalism and populist rhetoric that frames globalization as a threat to sovereignty. Speakers also analyzed how populist regimes maintain domestic support despite economic crises—by deflecting blame onto external actors and invoking notions of independence and “the will of the people.” The symposium concluded that understanding these dynamics is essential for devising inclusive, rule-based strategies that strengthen global governance and promote a new generation of equitable globalization resilient to populist disruption.

        Populist Authoritarianism in China: National and Global Perspectives

        Report by Christo Pretorius & Radoslav Valev

        The twelfth session of the ECPS Mapping Global Populism series was held online on April 25, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Rune Steenberg (Palacký University Olomouc), the panel brought together leading scholars to examine China’s evolving political order under Xi Jinping. Dr. Steenberg opened by tracing the rise of populist narratives in China, highlighting their fusion with nationalism, surveillance, and authoritarian governance. Dr. Kun He (University of Groningen) analyzed populism’s distinct linguistic and cultural dimensions, while Dr. Martin Lavička (Lund University) explored the tightening regulation of religion under Xi’s rule. Dr. Ibrahim Ozturk (University of Duisburg-Essen) unpacked the Belt and Road Initiative’s populist and coercive geopolitical logic, and Dr. Yung-Yung Chang (National Dong Hwa University) discussed China’s digital authoritarianism and its global implications. The session underscored China’s unique fusion of populism and authoritarianism, offering vital insights into its domestic and international impact.

        Crisis of Democratic Political Legitimacy and Emerging Populism in Africa

        Report by Neo Sithole, Gabriel Cyril Nguijol & Martina Micozzi

        The ECPS hosted its second regional panel in 2024, “Crisis of Democratic Political Legitimacy and Emerging Populism in Africa,” online on May 9, 2024. Expertly moderated by Dr. Chipo Dendere, Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at Wellesley College, the session brought together leading scholars to analyze the rise, evolution, and implications of populism across the African continent. Dr. Henning Melber (Nordic Africa Institute; University of Pretoria; University of the Free State) opened the discussion by tracing populism’s historical roots in Africa and its role in post-colonial political narratives. Dr. Sergiu Mișcoiu (Babeș-Bolyai University) examined the potential for progressive populism within African politics. Dr. Edouard Epiphane Yogo (University of Yaoundé II) highlighted populism’s destabilizing effects on governance and institutions. Continuing this theme, Dr. Nchofua Anita Nyitioseh (University of Bertoua) analyzed how policy failures and unemployment enable populist mobilization, while Dr. Derick Fai Kinang (Cameroon National Council of Crime Experts) discussed how populist rhetoric exacerbates hate speech and social polarization. Finally, Dr. Ama-Ambo Chefor (University of Dschang) explored how populist movements entrench patriarchal structures, undermining gender equality.

        Resurgence of Expansionist Tsarism: Populist Autocracy in Russia

        Report by Radoslav Valev

        The thirteenth session of the ECPS Mapping Global Populism (MGP) series was held online on May 30, 2024. Moderated by Dr. Maxine David, Lecturer in European Studies at Leiden University, the panel brought together distinguished experts to examine Russia’s evolving populist authoritarianism. Dr. Luke March (University of Edinburgh) argued that although populist elements exist in Russia, Vladimir Putin’s rule is primarily defined by statism, imperialism, and nationalism, prioritizing control over mass mobilization. Dr. Alexandra Yatsyk (University of Lille; Sciences Po) explored how Putinism’s populist rhetoric is amplified by regime-aligned networks and intellectuals. Dr. Yulia Gradskova (Södertörn University) analyzed the regime’s use of “traditional values” to justify anti-LGBTQ+ and patriarchal policies reinforcing militarism and nationalism. Dr. Dóra Győrffy (Corvinus University of Budapest) concluded with an assessment of Russia’s post-war economy and the long-term effects of Western sanctions. The panel provided rich, interdisciplinary insights into Russia’s fusion of populism and authoritarianism and its enduring impact on global political stability.

        Tracing the Pathways of Autocracy and Authoritarianism across Central Asia

        Report by Radoslav Valev

        The fourteenth session of the ECPS Mapping Global Populism (MGP) series was held online on June 20, 2024. Moderated by Dr. David Lewis, Professor of Politics at the University of Exeter, the panel gathered experts to examine the persistence and evolution of autocratic rule across Central Asia. Dr. Aksana Ismailbekova (Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient) analyzed Sadyr Japarov’s consolidation of power in Kyrgyzstan through populist rhetoric and cultural adaptation. Dr. Dinissa Duvanova (Lehigh University) discussed Kazakhstan’s managed populism under President Tokayev, highlighting its function in stabilizing elite power. Oguljamal Yazliyeva (Charles University) explored Turkmenistan’s deeply entrenched personality cults rooted in Soviet and tribal legacies. The panel offered a nuanced understanding of authoritarianism’s hybrid nature in Central Asia, emphasizing informal power networks, populist narratives, and enduring post-Soviet legacies.

        The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism and Populism in the Southern Caucasus

        Report by Stavroula Koskina

        The 16th session of the European Center for Populism Studies’ Mapping Global Populism panel series was held online on October 31, 2024, addressing “The Challenging Dynamics of Democracy, Authoritarianism & Populism in the Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan & Georgia).” Moderated by Dr. Cengiz Aktar (University of Athens), the panel brought together leading scholars to analyze current political trends across the region. Thomas de Waal (Carnegie Europe) outlined the deepening autocracy in Azerbaijan and its regional ramifications. Dr. David Aprasidze (Ilia State University) traced the development of populism in Georgia, while Dr. David Matsaberidze (Tbilisi State University) examined the shifting populist discourses in post-Soviet Georgia. Dr. Jody LaPorte (University of Oxford) provided insight into Azerbaijan’s hegemonic authoritarianism. Dr. Ashot S. Aleksanyan (Yerevan State University) discussed post-war Armenia’s democratization and European integration under populist pressures, and Dr. Nerses Kopalyan (University of Nevada, Las Vegas) assessed Armenia’s democratic landscape. The panel underscored persistent democratic fragility across the Caucasus amid rising populism and geopolitical tensions.

        The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey

        Report by Anastasia Stamoglou

        The ECPS held the 17th session of its Mapping Global Populism Panel Series on November 28, 2024, titled “The Rise and Reign of Autocratic Populism and Islamist Nationalism in Turkey.” The session examined how Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s leadership has reshaped Turkey’s political and social landscape through intertwined strategies of populism, authoritarianism, and Islamist nationalism. Moderated by Dr. Jocelyne Cesari, a leading scholar on religion and politics, the panel featured Dr. Spyros Sofos, who traced the historical evolution of Turkish populism; Dr. Emre Erdogan, who analyzed contemporary political participation and populist dynamics; Hafza Girdap, who highlighted the gendered impacts of political Islam; Ergun Babahan, who provided insights into media repression and narrative control; and Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska, who examined Turkey’s use of sharp power in international relations. Together, the speakers offered a multidisciplinary assessment of Turkey’s autocratic populist turn, contributing to the series’ broader effort to map global patterns of democratic erosion.

        Authoritarian Populist ‘Civilization-States’ and Their Influence in Africa: Hard and Soft Powers of TRIC

        By Ihsan Yilmaz & Nicholas Morieson

        Turkey, Russia, India, and China (TRIC) are reshaping the power dynamics in Africa, challenging Western dominance and promoting alternative development models. These nations leverage their untarnished histories with Africa and emphasize shared anti-colonial struggles to position themselves as allies of the Global South. However, their competition is far from altruistic. Beneath promises of “no-strings-attached” aid lies a strategic pursuit of resources, trade, and influence. While they share a common goal of diminishing Western power, TRIC nations also compete fiercely with each other, making Africa a critical battleground in the quest for a multipolar world order.

        ECPS Summer School 2024 — Populism and Foreign Policy: How Does Populist Politics Influence Foreign Affairs?

        Report by Radoslav Valev

        The ECPS held its fourth virtual Summer School from July 1–5, 2024, under the theme “Populism and Foreign Policy.” The five-day interdisciplinary program brought together emerging scholars and experts to explore how populism influences international relations, diplomacy, and global governance. The school featured lectures from leading academics, including Professor Sandra Destradi, Associate Professor Angelos Chryssogelos, Associate Professor Jessica Greenberg, Dr. Thorsten Wojczewski, Dr. Georg Löfflmann, Professor Cengiz Aktar, Professor Emeritus Louis Kriesberg, Professor Bertjan Verbeek, ECPS President Irina von Wiese, Professor Craig Calhoun, and Professor Joanna Dyduch. Each session was expertly moderated by Dr. Rubrick Biegon, Dr. Gustav Meibauer, Dr. Jonny Hall, Professor Ana E. Juncos Garcia, Professor Franco Zappettini, Professor Allison Carnegie, Dr. Ajay Gudavarthy, Dr. Aleksandra Spancerska, Professor Alexandra Homolar, and Dr. Andrei Zaslove. Participants analyzed theoretical and empirical dimensions of populism in foreign policy through case studies including the US, India, Turkey, Hungary, Israel, and the UK, deepening their understanding of how populist leaders reshape global norms and multilateral cooperation.

        ECPS Report: 2024 European Parliament Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism

        Edited by Gilles Ivaldi & Emilia Zankina


        The ECPS released a comprehensive report analyzing the performance and influence of populist parties in the 2024 European Parliament elections, which confirmed the electoral consolidation of populism across Europe. Populist parties won 263 of the 720 seats (36%), coming first in six countries. The report, based on contributions from local experts across all 27 EU member states, highlights the continued rise and mainstreaming of populist movements on both the far-right and far-left. While right-wing populists achieved their strongest results to date—dominating in countries like Italy, Hungary, and Poland—left-wing and centrist populists made fewer gains. ECPS notes that populist influence in the European Parliament is expected to reshape debates on migration, climate policy, and EU enlargement, marking a discernible shift of the Parliament’s center of gravity to the right. Despite their growing numbers, populist parties remain ideologically fragmented across multiple parliamentary groups.

        Introduction: The ECPS Project ‘Populism and the European Parliament Elections 2024’

        By Gilles Ivaldi & Emilia Zankina

        This report analyzes the performances and impact of populist parties in the 2024 European elections. Drawing from the analyses of country experts, we provide an account of how populist parties across the spectrum performed in each of the EU’s 27 member states, looking at the campaign, issues and demand for populist politics in each country separately and the challenges that populist party success more broadly bears for the future of the EU. In this introductory chapter, we briefly define populism, provide a topographic map of populist parties across all EU member states ahead of the 2024 European elections, and review the main drivers of populism identified in the literature. We then turn more specifically to the general context and outcome of the 2024 EP election, assessing the hypothesis of another ‘populist wave’ while also looking back at the 2019 election to compare populist party success over time.

        The Populist Radical-right Freedom Party in the Austrian 2024 EU elections

        By Eric Miklin

        The only competitive populist party running in the 2024 EU elections in Austria, the radical-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) relied on well-proven recipes that have made it one of the most successful populist parties in (Western) Europe for the last 30 years. It called for cutting down the EU’s competences to half the size of its institutions and budget and harshly criticized its policies concerning migration, the war in Ukraine, the climate crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. This criticism was combined with a highly alarmist rhetoric that portrayed political opponents as either corrupt, fanatical or insane. While all this met with uniform criticism by other Austrian parties and large parts of the media, this again allowed the party to present itself as the sole party actually fighting for the Austrian interest against a broken system controlled by a single establishment ‘unity party’ (Einheitspartei). Once more, this strategy paid off and the FPÖ landed in the first place for the first time in a nationwide election.

        Populist Radical Parties in Belgium and the 2024 European Elections

        By Emilie van Haute

        In 2024 elections in Belgium were concurrently held for the European, federal and regional levels. For that reason, the European elections were clearly second-order elections. As the main opposition parties at the federal level, populist radical parties of the right (Vlaams Belang, VB) and the left (the Workers’ Party of Belgium, PTB–PVDA) approached the 2024 elections in a strong position. They were portrayed as clear favourites in the polls and the media. From 2019 to 2024 they managed to set the agenda on their issues: migration and law and order for the VB, socioeconomic issues and civil liberties and rights for the PTB–PVDA. Both parties came out of the elections with more votes and seats. Part of the reason for this success is that their program matched with voters’ priorities. Their populist, anti-elite rhetoric also permeated public opinion. Yet they were perceived as having underperformed electorally. Moreover, because they were not politically indispensable, they were quickly sidelined. At the European level, the VB and the PTB–PVDA will likely continue directly pushing their respective populist, Eurosceptic and radical agendas. They are also likely to have a real indirect contamination effect through mainstream parties and public opinion integrating part of their programmatic positions and priorities.

        Populism and Polycrisis in Bulgaria on the Eve of the 2024 European Parliament Elections

        By Emilia Zankina

        The 2024 European Parliament election in Bulgaria took place amidst a prolonged political crisis and economic uncertainty. The EP elections, for the first time, coincided with national legislative elections – the sixth parliamentary elections in just three years. This two-in-one vote led to a complete overshadowing of the debate on Europe by domestic issues and concerns over the composition of the next national parliament and the likelihood of forming a stable government. The centre-populist GERB convincingly won the elections, although the populist radical right increased its representation by one MEP. Like many European countries, Bulgaria has had to contend with the rise of populism and nationalism, in addition to its continued struggle against corruption and, as a result of the war in Ukraine, with a population divided in attitudes towards Russia. This polycrisis has led to continued political fragmentation and polarization with little prospect of stable government and a growing disillusionment among voters.

        Between ‘Kingmakers’ and Public Indifference: Croatia’s National Conservative Right in the European Elections of 2024

        By Vassilis Petsinis

        This report focuses on Croatia and deals with the national conservative Domovinski Pokret/Homeland Movement (DP) party. In the latest European elections, the DP garnered a percentage of 8.82% (65,383 votes and one seat), taking third spot after the ruling (centre-right) Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the ‘Rivers of Justice’ coalition spearheaded by the (centre-left) Social Democrat Party (SDP). I begin the present chapter by sketching a typology of the constituent segments along the broad spectrum of the European right wing and situate the DP within it. I then offer a summary of the DP’s founding principles vis-à-vis further European integration and clarify the extent to which these principles were reflected in the party’s stances and active engagement in the latest European elections. I then identify the main catalysts behind the DP leadership’s success in mobilizing target groups and galvanizing electoral support for the party.

        Rising discontent with the EU, the Rise of the Right and the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Cyprus

        By Andreas Theophanous

        The objective of this report is to discuss the causes of rising discontent in Cyprus and assess the political outcomes. Within this framework we briefly assess how the EU has dealt with various crises in the last few years. Perceptions in Cyprus about the EU have changed over time. In the 9 June European elections, a member of the extreme right-wing party, National People’s Front (Ethniko Laiko Metopo, ELAM), was elected for the first time to the European Parliament. Understanding the circumstances in Cyprus that have gradually led to disillusionment with the national political system and the EU is essential to making sense of these developments.

        A Pyrrhic Victory for the Populist Right in Hungary

        By Robert Csehi

        The 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections brought significant changes to Hungary’s political landscape. While Fidesz, the ruling populist party led by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, retained first place, it lost two EP seats amid the rise of a new opposition force reshaping Hungary’s political balance. Orbán’s campaign, heavily funded and amplified by pro-government media, revived familiar themes from the 2022 national elections, centering on the war in Ukraine. His slogan — “no migration, no gender, no war” — resonated with Fidesz supporters, though the anti-war message ultimately dominated. Employing fear-based, Manichean rhetoric, Orbán portrayed all opponents, domestic and foreign, as part of a “pro-war” coalition allegedly serving Brussels and Washington. Meanwhile, the radical right-wing Our Homeland (OH) emphasized anti-EU, nationalist narratives, securing one MEP. Although both Fidesz and OH joined newly branded Eurosceptic right-wing groups, their political isolation in the EP persists.

        The Race of Populists: The 2024 EP Elections in the Czech Republic

        By Vlastimil Havlík & Alena Kluknavská

        The report analyses the performance of populist political parties in the 2024 EP election in the Czech Republic. The election ended with a significant increase in support for several populist parties: Action of Dissatisfied Citizens, Freedom and Direct Democracy and the Oath and Motorists. All populist parties used radical-right rhetoric before the election, expressing different levels of criticism of the European Union, strong anti-immigration attitudes and negative attitudes toward the Green Deal. The preliminary data show that the electoral support for the populists was based on a higher level of mobilization in so-called peripheral areas of the Czech Republic, potentially affected by recent inflation and austerity policies pursued by the government. All in all, the 2024 EP election in Czechia significantly increased support for populist political parties.

        Denmark’s Populism at the Crossroads: Insights into the 2024 European Parliament Election Results

        By Susi Meret

        The populist moment that defined Danish politics from 2001 to 2019 has recently transitioned into what can be described as mainstream populism. Two concurrent developments drive this shift: first, the Social Democrats’ strategy to reclaim (white) working-class support by adopting populist right-wing stances on immigration and integration, and second, the existential crisis confronting the Liberals (Venstre, V) and the Conservative party (Det Konservative Folkeparti, KF), whose electoral support reached historic lows. The 2024 European Parliament elections differed significantly from those of 2019, marked by the emergence of new political entities and pressing global issues such as the Russia–Ukraine and Israel–Hamas conflicts, along with the existential threat of climate change and the lingering effects of the post-pandemic time. Traditional populists are exploiting these issues to regain support, advocating for greater national sovereignty and cohesion in the face of perceived global threats. This paper examines the evolving dynamics of Danish politics, focusing on how the intersection of domestic and international changes is reshaping EU-related positions and the role of populism.          

        Populism in the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Estonia

        By Mari-Liis Jakobson

        Although past European Parliament (EP) elections in Estonia have witnessed the success of an anti-establishment candidate, Estonian EP elections are not generally fertile soil for populism. Estonian EP elections tend to be dominated by the liberal and progressive parties and candidates with notable foreign policy track records. The 2024 EP elections generally confirmed this pattern but also witnessed the conservative parties running on a second-order election agenda critical of the government and parties both on the right and left-wing edges of the spectrum tapping into the small but nonetheless committed pool of Eurosceptic voters. Moreover, most parties made use of the stylistic repertoires of populism, attempting to perform various crises. While the election results changed little in the overall composition of the Estonian MEP delegation, the events unravelling immediately after the election suggest that the Estonian populist radical right will become more diverse but also more isolated from its sibling parties on the European level.

        The Loss of the Populist Radical Right in the 2024 European Parliament Elections in Finland

        By Juha Herkman

        In the 2024 European Parliament (EP) elections, the populist radical-right Finns Party had a disappointing result; it came sixth nationally and lost 6.2% of the vote and one seat compared to the 2019 elections. The centre-right National Coalition (NC) party won the elections with 24.8% of the vote and four seats, but the real winner was the Left Alliance, which came second (17.3%) and gained three seats. The elections revealed voters’ deep distrust towards the government, in which the Finns Party supported significant austerity measures and cuts to public spending through its leader and finance minister, Riikka Purra. People’s fear of the rising far right in Europe was also a salient theme in campaign debates, which diminished the Finns Party’s support, alongside a low voter turnout.

        A Tipping Point for Far-Right Populism in France

        By Gilles Ivaldi

        The 2024 French European election took place against the backdrop of an economic and cost-of-living crisis in a context marked by global uncertainty arising from the war in Ukraine, social unrest and deep political discontent with President Emmanuel Macron. Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) emerged as the big winner with 31.4% of the vote, while Macron’s Renaissance list trailed far behind at 14.6%. Meanwhile, Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s left-wing populist La France Insoumise (LFI) won 9.9%, reflecting current internal dissent within the party and deep ideological divisions exposed by the Israel–Hamas war. National issues dominated the electoral agenda in June. Populist voting across both sides of the political spectrum was strongly fuelled by political discontent with Macron, making the 2024 European elections primarily a ‘second-order’ national election. A crucial test for Emmanuel Macron, the outcome of the European election led to the decision by the incumbent president to call a snap legislative election. The election confirmed the electoral strength of the RN; however, it showed the revitalization of the Republican Front against the far right, which blocked Le Pen’s party from winning an absolute majority, delivering instead a hung parliament split into three blocks.

        Germany’s 2024 EP Elections: The Populist Challenge to the Progressive Coalition

        By Kai Arzheimer

        The 2024 European parliamentary election in Germany marked a significant shift in the political landscape, with devastating results for the governing coalition of the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the Liberal Democrats (FDP). Chancellor Scholz’s SPD and the Greens experienced substantial losses, while the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) saw a modest increase in their vote share. The most notable gains were made by the populist radical-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the newly formed left-wing populist Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW), a breakaway from the Left (Die Linke), highlighting a growing demand for populist politics in Germany. The Left itself suffered heavy losses. Despite internal scandals and controversies that contributed to a considerable drop in support in pre-election polls, the AfD leveraged anti-immigration sentiments and economic concerns to gain substantial support. Like in previous elections, populist parties were much more successful in the post-communist eastern states. While its impact on the European level is limited, the election sent shock waves through Germany, suggesting a shift in future policy directions, particularly concerning the green transformation and relations with Russia.

        Economic Malaise and Political Discontent: An Analysis of the 2024 European Parliament Election in Greece

        By Sofia Vasilopoulou

        The 2024 European Parliament (EP) election in Greece was held against a background of geopolitical instability in Europe’s neighbourhood. However, domestic – rather than European – issues dominated the campaigns, including the economy, inflation and the cost-of-living crisis. The electoral results were primarily an anti-government protest vote and confirmed a trend of electoral fragmentation across the political spectrum. On the right, three relatively new far-right populist parties received parliamentary representation, i.e., the Greek Solution, Victory and the Voice of Reason. On the left, SYRIZA–PA maintained its second place, although its support declined substantively compared to the previous EP election. Course of Freedom and the KKE, on the other hand, were key electoral beneficiaries in the left-wing space. Younger age groups primarily opted for SYRIZA–PA, whereas older groups were more likely to support New Democracy. That said, far-right parties also received votes from younger generations. Geographically, the far right is more successful in the north of Greece. The key message of this election was political discontent and a general feeling of economic malaise posing dilemmas across the political spectrum.

        Ireland After the 2024 EP Elections: The Centre Holds … Just About

        By Eoin O’Malley

        The 2024 European Parliament elections in Ireland came on the back of a rise in the prominence of immigration as an issue. Although Ireland had seen significant migration in the early to mid-2000s, the large number of migrants at this time had no significant impact on politics or voting. Nor was Ireland a country that saw any significant anti-EU sentiment. Thus, Ireland could be seen as an anomaly in Europe. In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a sudden rise in the numbers in Ireland seeking international protection (asylum seekers). Most of these came as a direct result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and again, Ireland saw a positive reaction to inward migration even though the country accommodated a comparatively high number of Ukrainian refugees per head of population despite the country’s geographic distance. There had previously been ethnonationalist parties on the ballot paper in European and national elections, but they had never really featured. In 2024 none got elected, although some did in the concurrent local elections. The vote for some explicitly populist ethnonationalist parties was greater than ever before. This result occurred partly because Sinn Féin, another populist–nationalist (but not wholly ethnonationalist) party, saw its support drop dramatically. It suggests, however, that Ireland may not remain the anomaly it has been. In all about a third of the voting electorate chose parties or candidates that can be categorized as populist.

        The Spectrum of Italian Populist Parties in the 2024 European Elections: A Shift in the Balance of Power on the Right

        By Cecilia Biancalana

        Italy has historically been one of the strongest proponents of a united Europe. However, recent years have seen a rise in Euroscepticism within the country, with a notable increase in the electoral support for Eurosceptic parties. Have the 2024 elections confirmed or refuted this trend? Italy features a variety of populist parties, both on the right and on the left, each with different Eurogroup affiliations and varying positions on European integration. As a result, during the 2024 campaign, the parties adopted different strategies. The results of the 2024 elections highlight two significant trends: a decrease in turnout and the strengthened influence of Fratelli d’Italia, reflecting a sustained support for right-wing populist ideologies among Italian voters.

        Populism and the 2024 European Parliament Election in Latvia

        By Daunis Auers

        Populism has been a feature of Latvia’s political landscape since the 1990s. New insurgent parties have utilized increasingly anti-establishment rhetoric, often through intensive and innovative use of social media, to win seats in the Latvian parliament and even join government coalitions. However, European Parliament elections in Latvia have been comparatively free of populism. There are two main reasons for this. First, and most importantly, there is a broad pro-European consensus in Latvia. Membership in the European Union and NATO is central to all three Baltic nations’ security strategy in light of growing threats from Russia. As a result, there is no serious Eurosceptic party in Latvia and no explicitly Eurosceptic politicians have ever been elected to the European Parliament from Latvia. Second, Latvia’s voters tend to support serious, experienced politicians in European elections, believing that they are better placed to support Latvia’s national interests in the European system. Party politics take second place in campaigning, with the focus being on the experience of candidates (after all, Latvia elected just nine MEPs in 2024) rather than policy differences. As a result, populist anti-elite rhetoric has less salience. This chapter will explore the extent to which the 2024 European Parliament election in Latvia has continued these trends.

        Lithuanian Populist Far-right (In)security Discourse During the European Parliament Elections in the face of Russia’s War Against Ukraine

        By Jogilė Ulinskaitė

        The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia has disrupted the previously perceived stability in Central and Eastern Europe (CCE) and exacerbated the prevailing sense of insecurity. The evolving circumstances are reshaping the political terrain and presenting avenues to mobilize support for the populist far right. However, to date, the far-right populist parties in Lithuania have not been successful in either national or European Parliament (EP) elections, as they have failed to surpass the required thresholds. However, the most recent European Parliament elections were an exception, with the election of a long-standing far-right politician in Lithuania as an MEP. This study delves into an analysis of the discourse employed by Lithuanian far-right populists throughout the 2024 EP election campaign, with a specific focus on the narratives pertaining to (in)security that they propagated. The investigation seeks to ascertain whether the far right capitalized on the situation to fuel discussions on crisis with the aim of attracting support and identifying the strategies utilized in constructing the narratives surrounding (in)security.

        Right-wing Populism in Luxembourg During the 2024 EP Election

        By Paul Carls 

        Right-wing populism in Luxembourg is largely confined to the Alternative Democratic Reform Party (Alternativ Demokratesch Reformpartei, ADR). The name is, however, a bit of a misnomer. While ideologically, the ADR maintains national–conservative positions consistent with other European right-wing populist parties, its views are not as extreme. The party retains relatively constant support, consistently gaining around 10% of the vote in national elections; in the 2023 election for the Chamber of Deputies, it gained 9.3%, while in the 2019 European Parliament election, the party gained 10%, just short of enough to obtain a seat. Given the rise in support for right-wing populist parties in other European countries (e.g., the AfD in Germany or the National Rally in France), the ADR was optimistic about its chances of gaining its first-ever seat in the European Parliament, which would require about 12% of the vote total. This contribution will investigate the results of the European Parliament election in Luxembourg, focusing on the ADR. It will discuss any ideological shifts in the party as well as its positioning on a host of issues where one finds a prominent voice for right-wing populist parties in Europe, including NATO, the war in Ukraine, migration, COVID-19 or the functioning of the European Union. The entry will also address the results of the election to determine how strong support for right-wing populism in Luxembourg is. Other relevant aspects of the election (e.g., campaign events, media coverage) will be discussed if they featured prominently in the campaign.

        Dashed Hopes and the Success of the Populist Right: The Case of the 2024 European Elections in Poland

        By Artur Lipiński

        The European Parliament elections of 9 June 2024 were the next stage in the electoral marathon started by parliamentary elections in 2023 and local elections earlier in 2024 and ended with a good result for the populist Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) and the radical-right Confederation of Freedom and Independence (Konfederacja Wolność i Niepodległość), confirming the relevance of right-wing populist parties in Poland. The combined electoral outcome of both PiS (36.16%) and Confederation (12.08%) is only slightly below 50%. The hopes of all those who treated the 2023 parliamentary elections in Poland as a victory over populism, paving the way for more victories, were thus dashed. The report aims to highlight the political and social context that led to these results and offer arguments supporting the classification of PiS and Confederation as populist communicators. The subsequent sections analyse the political communication strategies employed by both parties, emphasizing the intricacies of their discursive articulations concerning national and European themes. Lastly, the report explores the correlation between the political agendas of PiS and Confederation and the thematic preferences of their electorate, offering a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics at play.

        The 2024 European Elections and Right-wing Populism in Portugal

        By Afonso Biscaia & Susana Salgado

        Unlike previous European elections, the 2024 European election brought the discussion of European issues to the media and political agendas in Portugal, a country where most voters hold a positive image of the EU. Despite managing to elect its first two MEPs, the European election was not fertile terrain for Chega, as it stopped Chega’s continuous electoral growth since 2019 and its objectives were not fully achieved. Poor candidate selection, overambitious goals, a disconnect between Chega’s soft Euroscepticism and its supporters’ mostly enthusiastic view of the EU, ambiguity about which European party group it would join, and intermittent support from its popular leader, André Ventura, were relevant factors influencing Chega’s campaign and ensuing results. A relatively low turnout and overrepresentation of constituencies that are unlikely to vote for the populist radical right compounded the scenario.

        Charting Populist Pathways: Romanian Populism’s Journey to the European Parliament

        By Sorina Soare

        This report examines the landscape of the far right in Romania within the context of the 2024 European Parliament elections. Two Romanian far-right parties secured seats in the European Parliament: the Alliance for the Union of Romanians (AUR) and SOS Romania (SOS), receiving 14.9% and 5% of the valid votes, respectively. Both parties emphasize the defence of Romanian sovereignty and promote nativist and authoritarian rhetoric. However, over the past year, the AUR has increasingly incorporated neoconservative elements into its platform. Consequently, the 2024 campaign has revealed notable differences in programs, candidates, styles of political campaigning and alliance strategies.

        Digital Strategies of Political Parties in the 2024 European Elections: The Case of Slovenia

        By Tanja Oblak Črnič & Katja Koren Ošljak

        This report offers a systematic analysis of Slovenian political parties in online campaigning during the 2024 EP elections. It draws on a dataset of political parties and their online representations, selected from official party websites and dominant social media platforms, such as Facebook, Instagram and TikTok, in May 2024. The results show that Slovenian parties’ communication during the 2024 EP campaign was quite self-referential, accompanied by images of the candidates, indicating a high degree of personalization of politics. Moreover, the results show the “non-European orientation” of the campaign, as domestic issues dominated the parties’ social media profiles and websites. Furthermore, the content analysis of the parties’ websites revealed five issues where some cross-party differences in attitudes were observed: 1) agreement in party attitudes towards the environment; 2) on Ukraine and Palestine, parties on the right took different positions; 3) the centre-left coalition supported the government’s domestic policy the most; 4) right-wing actors tended to frame migration and minority rights in a restrictive way; actors with a left-wing orientation took a more humanitarian approach; and 5) left-wing actors were most tolerant vis-à-vis gender and reproductive rights. The results, therefore, imply a clear distinction between Slovenian parties of the left and right during the 2024 EP campaign.

        Euroscepticism and Populism on Europhilic Soil: The 2024 European Parliament Elections in Spain

        By Hugo Marcos-Marne

        This report deals with the association between radicalism, populism and Euroscepticism in the context of the 2024 European elections. It first examines the electoral platforms of leading political parties and shows that Eurosceptic ideas, while not highly prevalent, are more common among forces of the radical right. It also suggests that, as second-order theories expect, national issues dominated the electoral campaign for the European Parliament (EP) in Spain. Second, public opinion data is used to describe the general state of attitudes towards the EU and their association with voting for different political parties. The main results from this section are evidence that voters of radical-right parties are more critical of the EU. They also underline a potential reconfiguration of the radical-right space that now includes Vox and a new anti-establishment, outsider formation, The Party is Over (Se Acabó La Fiesta, SALF).

        A Speed Bump in the Road or the Start of an Uphill Journey? The Sweden Democrats and the 2024 European Parliament Election Setback

        By Niklas Bolin

        Leading up to the 2024 European Parliament election, much attention was given to the anticipated gains of populist parties across Europe. While some populist parties made significant advances, the overall outcome was more moderate than expected. Sweden deviated from this general trend, witnessing gains for left-wing parties and a surprising setback for the populist radical right. The 2024 elections marked a historic decline for the Sweden Democrats, the first instance since their formation in 1988 that they regressed in comparison to previous national and European Parliament elections. This decline is particularly notable following their strong performance in the 2022 national elections, where they became Sweden’s second-largest party. This article examines these developments, drawing on existing research, media reports and exit polls, with a focus on the Sweden Democrats’ campaign strategies, election results and voter behaviour. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of these election outcomes for both Swedish domestic politics and the broader European political landscape.

        Waking the Sleeping Populist Giant: The 2024 European Elections and Populism in The Netherlands

        By Bertjan Verbeek & Andrej Zaslove

        The results of the 2024 European elections for populist parties in the Netherlands are intimately related to the events in national Dutch politics since 2021. The relative success of the Party for Freedom (VVD) since 2023 has been related to its more moderate position on European integration and Islam. This change of tone was part of increasing the party’s credibility at home and abroad. The European elections were presented as a litmus test for the proposed centre-right government in the Netherlands, and they testified to the increased room for the populist vote in general and the increased competition for that vote between various populist parties in particular. The European elections also proved a defeat for populist contenders such as JA21, Forum for Democracy and the left-wing populist Socialist Party. The impact of Dutch populists on European policies is most likely to be felt via the newly formed government, which contains two populist parties. At the level of the European Parliament, its impact will depend on the success of the newly formed Patriots for Europe (PfE) group.

        Slovakia: Mixed Results of Populist Parties in the 2024 EP Elections

        By Marek Rybář

        Since Slovakia’s EU accession in 2004, populist parties have dominated national politics, although they are less influential in European Parliament (EP) elections. While Smer–Slovak Social Democracy led five national elections and Ordinary People and Independent Personalities (OĽaNO) triumphed in 2020, populist parties performed weaker in EP elections. Progressive Slovakia (PS) won in 2019 and 2024, signalling different electoral dynamics. The rise of populism in Slovakia reflects a shared narrative of a virtuous people vs. a corrupt elite, although each party incorporates populism differently. Smer, led by Robert Fico, has shifted towards far-right nationalism, while OĽaNO evolved into Movement Slovakia (MS), with a focus on anti-corruption. The neo-Nazi Kotlebists (ĽSNS), initially successful, has splintered, losing its foothold in national politics. The 2024 EP elections, held amid an assassination attempt on Prime Minister Fico, reflected the political tensions. Smer placed second with 24.8%, while MS and ĽSNS underperformed. These results highlight the varied impact of populist parties on national and EU politics in Slovakia.

        Conclusion for the report on 2024 EP Elections under the Shadow of Rising Populism

        By Gilles Ivaldi & Emilia Zankina

        The reconfiguration of the extreme right in the European Parliament reaffirms prior tendencies and analysis (i.e., that despite the increased representation of radical-right actors, they continue to be divided and unable to act as a united front). Hence, we can expect more ad hoc coalitions on specific issues rather than united positions and policy proposals. What should not be neglected, although is the legitimation of the radical-right discourse and its impact on both European and domestic politics.

         

        Profiles 

        Since its launch, the ECPS has published over 150 scholarly profiles, covering political leaders, parties, organizations, and countries worldwide. These profiles form a cornerstone of ECPS’s research mission—offering in-depth, evidence-based analyses of populist movements, ideologies, and their global diffusion. In 2024, ECPS added a new Leader Profile authored by Dr. Simon P. Watmough, titled “From Political Pariah to President: Prabowo Subianto and the Perils of Populism in Indonesia.” The study traces Prabowo Subianto’s transformation from a controversial former general to Indonesia’s eighth president, situating his rise within broader global trends of nationalist populism. Dr. Watmough underscores the implications of Prabowo’s victory for Indonesia’s democratic resilience, warning of potential risks to civil liberties, institutional checks, and the return of militarized politics. This profile exemplifies ECPS’s commitment to mapping how populism continues to challenge governance and democratic norms across diverse political systems.

        From Political Pariah to President: Prabowo Subianto and the Perils of Populism in Indonesia

        By Simon P. Watmough

        Prabowo Subianto’s victory in Indonesia’s February 2024 presidential election marks a pivotal moment in the nation’s democratic evolution, echoing a global shift towards nationalist populism. As Indonesia’s eighth president, Prabowo’s political journey and ideological stance have sparked concerns about the future of the country’s democratic institutions. His controversial military past, including allegations of human rights abuses in East Timor and Aceh during the 1990s, continues to raise alarms about the potential for authoritarianism under his leadership. Critics fear his presidency may signal a return to repressive practices, with threats to civil liberties and increased polarization. Prabowo’s background as a former military general adds to concerns about a consolidation of power and the erosion of democratic checks and balances in one of the world’s largest democracies.

        ***

         

        Conclusion


         

        The activities undertaken by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) in 2024 collectively demonstrate an institution that has significantly expanded its global footprint, deepened its research capacity, and strengthened its role as a key actor in debates on populism, authoritarianism, and democracy. Across research, publication, training, outreach, and policy engagement, ECPS delivered a highly productive year marked by interdisciplinary rigor and international collaboration. 

        A central pillar of ECPS activity in 2024 was its remarkable scholarly output. With 18 peer-reviewed journal articles published in Populism & Politics, alongside 51 expert interviews, 20 analytical articles, numerous commentaries, and 42 research reports—including major multi-country studies—ECPS provided timely and globally relevant insights on the evolving dynamics of populism. These activities highlight ECPS’s commitment to accessible, high-quality knowledge production across continents and thematic areas. 

        ECPS also strengthened its convening power, organizing 29 events ranging from international conferences and thematic panels to workshops and its flagship Summer School. The Summer School’s continued growth, with over 140 applications and more than 70 participants, underscores ECPS’s emerging role as a leading center for capacity building in populism studies. Parallel initiatives such as the Early Career Researchers Network, Youth Group, and internship program enriched the Center’s ecosystem by engaging young scholars and fostering an inclusive academic community. 

        Equally important were ECPS’s efforts to forge international partnerships. Collaborations with leading universities, think tanks, and EU-funded projects—including ENCODE and UNTOLD Europe—enhanced both the policy relevance and the methodological diversity of its activities. These initiatives expanded ECPS’s reach beyond traditional academic audiences, reinforcing its mission to bridge research, practice, and public dialogue. 

        Across all domains, ECPS demonstrated an ability to respond rapidly to global developments—from democratic backsliding in various regions to shifting electoral landscapes—while maintaining analytical depth and editorial independence. The inclusion of youth voices through the Voice of Youths platform further highlighted ECPS’s commitment to nurturing democratic engagement and critical reflection. 

        Overall, ECPS’s 2024 activities reflect a dynamic, innovative, and globally engaged institution. With strengthened partnerships, expanding networks, and an increasingly diverse research agenda, ECPS is well-positioned to play an influential role in addressing the challenges posed by rising populism and authoritarianism in the years ahead.

        Photo: Julia Sudnitskaya.

        Dopamine Detox, Self-Discipline, and the Populist Moralization of Responsibility

        This commentary interrogates the rising popularity of “dopamine detox” as a moralized response to digital overload and burnout, situating it within contemporary populist logics. Rather than challenging the political economy of platform capitalism, the discourse reframes structural problems of attention extraction, inequality, and exhaustion as failures of individual self-discipline. Drawing on political economy and cultural sociology, the piece argues that dopamine detox resonates with a depoliticized form of populism that governs through moral binaries—disciplined versus undisciplined—rather than through explicit elite–people antagonism. By transforming self-control into a civic and economic virtue, the trend normalizes inequality and obscures corporate and regulatory responsibility. Ultimately, the commentary shows how neoliberal self-help cultures intersect with populist moralization to shift blame downward while leaving platform power largely unchallenged.

        By Zeynep Temel*

        The term “dopamine detox” has emerged as a popular self-regulation trend across digital platforms, wellness cultures, and productivity discourses in the past few years. It is being promoted as a remedy for distraction, burnout, and declining focus; through practices such as abstaining from social media, minimizing pleasurable stimuli, reducing digital consumption such as screen time, and deliberately embracing “boring” routines. The concept promises mental clarity and renewed productivity through individual restraint on various different platform ranging from TikTok videos to self-help books and corporate wellness advice.

        However, this trend goes beyond dopamine detox’s popular neuroscientific framing, as it effectively reflects a broader political and moral shift. This shift is visible in how attention, self-control, and responsibility are actively governed under contemporary capitalism. This commentary therefore argues that dopamine detox should be understood not merely as a lifestyle trend or productivity technique, but as a neoliberal moral project that resonates with contemporary populist narratives. The reason behind this is that dopamine detox, instead of challenging the structural conditions that produce distraction and exhaustion, places the responsibility onto individuals. This relocation transforms self-discipline into moral virtue while also depoliticizing systemic inequalities embedded in the digital attention economy.

        From Neuroscience to Moral Narrative

        The scientific language surrounding dopamine detox is often misleading. In essence, the neuroscientific definition of dopamine is more complex than it simply being a “pleasure chemical.” It is a neurotransmitter that is involved in motivation, learning, and reward prediction. In fact, work by Berridge & Robinson (1998) demonstrates that dopamine is more closely associated with “wanting” and incentive salience than with pleasure itself. Clinical interventions related to dopamine regulation are also typically reserved for neurological or psychiatric conditions, bearing little resemblance to the lifestyle practices promoted online as “dopamine detox.”

        Several scholars and clinicians further emphasize that dopamine detox lacks empirical grounding as a medical or neuroscientific intervention. Psychiatrist Anna Lembke notes that while excessive stimulation can indeed shape habits and compulsive behaviors, the idea of “resetting” dopamine through short-term abstinence is mainly metaphorical than clinical (Lembke, 2021). 

        However, the concept has gained remarkable cultural traction, and for a reason. As Eva Illouz (2007) argues, therapeutic language often migrates into everyday life not for being scientifically precise, but because it provides moral narratives of self-improvement and personal responsibility. In the case of “dopamine detox” therapeutic language functions to frame distraction as personal weakness, and to frame restraint as a signal of maturity, rationality, and self-mastery.

        The Attention Economy and Individualized Responsibility

        Political economy of digital platforms is also a crucial component of the rise of dopamine detox. Systemic extraction and monetization of attention are building blocks of contemporary platform capitalism. Similarly, social media platforms rely on algorithmic personalization, feedback loops, and continuous stimulation to maximize engagement and advertising revenue (Zuboff & Schwandt, 2019).

        The way in which social media infrastructures shape user behavior is demonstrated in various empirical research. One of them is Zulli & Zulli’s (2020) work saying TikTok fosters “imitation publics” by encouraging users to replicate trends, sounds, and formats through algorithmic visibility incentives. Another one is Schellewald’s ethnographic research demonstrating how TikTok’s “For You” page structures everyday interaction by curating content flows that blur the boundary between personal expression platform-driven circulation (Schellewald, 2024). 

        While these structural dynamics exist, dopamine detox discourse rarely questions platform design, corporate incentives or regulatory responsibility, and instead reframes overstimulation as a problem of individual excess (too much scrolling, too much pleasure, too little discipline). This shift echoes Michel Foucault’s description of neoliberal governmentality, in which individuals are encouraged to govern themselves according to market rationalities rather than asking for collective or institutional intervention (Foucault et al., 2010). The result is a paradoxical form of resistance that leaves the underlying economic model of attention extraction intact.

        Moralized Productivity and Populist Resonance

        Dopamine detox resonates with contemporary forms of populism not through electoral rhetoric or charismatic leadership, but through moralization. Because cultural and neoliberal variants of populism often operate by translating structural and economic problems into questions of individual virtue and responsibility, dopamine detox mirrors populist logics that divide subjects into “disciplined” and “undisciplined,” or the self-controlled and the irresponsible. In this sense, dopamine detox does not mobilize populism through the language of “the people” versus “the elite,” but through a moral distinction between the disciplined and the undisciplined. This type of populism governs through self-blame; thus dopamine detox discourse exemplifies a depoliticized, affective form of populist reasoning. 

        This framework transforms self-control into an economic and moral virtue, and productivity into a character trait instead of output. As observed by Jonathan Crary, even rest and withdrawal are increasingly instrumentalized as strategies to enhance future productivity rather than as forms of genuine refusal (Crary, 2014). 

        Dopamine detox fits neatly into this moral economy. High-dopamine activities such as social media usage, gaming, and entertainment are viewed as threats to cognitive capital and economic self-worth. By contrast, abstention is celebrated as common sense and self-discipline. This logic mirrors Weberian asceticism in a digital age-updated way, where self-denial signals moral legitimacy and economic rationality (Weber, 1930). 

        Crucially, this moralization obscures inequality as the capacity to disengage from platforms, curate “low dopamine” lifestyles or embrace minimalist routines assumes material security. For precarious workers, freelancers, and gig-economy participants, constant connectivity is more of a condition of survival than that of choice. 

        Affective Governance and the Politics of “Calm”

        “Affective governance,” a term coined by Sara Ahmed (2024) signifying the circulation of emotions that attach moral value to certain ways of being is an important component of dopamine detox narrative. This affective hierarchy favors calm, controlled subjects whose lives fit white-collar work and middle-class wellness norms. 

        Crucially, this hierarchy is not sustained only through discourse, but also through aesthetics. It is reproduced through carefully curated visual and lifestyle cues involving neutral color palettes, quiet mornings, and minimalist routines, thereby connecting dopamine detox to broader cultural trends such as “clean girl” aesthetics, soft productivity, and wellness minimalism. 

        Depoliticization Through Self-Blame

        What makes dopamine detox particularly significant is its depoliticizing effect. It normalizes exhaustion as a personal management issue rather than a political one by turning structural problems of attention extraction into individualized moral responsibility. This shift mirrors broader neoliberal-populist dynamics in which systemic failures ranging from labor precarity to digital surveillance are reframed as matters of individual choice and discipline.

        In this regard, dopamine detox illustrates a subtle but powerful form of contemporary populist reasoning: one that governs through affect, morality, and self-blame; rather than focusing on regulating platforms, addressing corporate power or rethinking digital labor. 

        Conclusion: Detox Without Transformation?

        This commentary argues that dopamine detox should be understood not as a scientifically grounded intervention, but as a neoliberal and moralized response to platform-induced overstimulation. It claims to resist distraction and burnout by framing them as failures of individual discipline which ends up in reinforcing the very economic logics causing them.

        The political question then, is not about whether individuals need to reduce screen time, but why attention economies remain largely unregulated while self-discipline is constantly promoted as the solution. Another question that arises is if dopamine detox risks becoming yet another form of self-blame -rather than transformation- in an economy designed to exhaust, unless the political economy of platforms is addressed.


         

        (*) Zeynep Temel is a PhD candidate in International Political Economy at Marmara University, Istanbul, but currently based in Shanghai. Her research interests span inequality, platform capitalism, popular culture, and gender, with a regional focus on East Asia. She works on how economic and political structures shape everyday practices, identities, and moral expectations, particularly through attention, consumption, and labor under contemporary capitalism.


         

        References

        Ahmed, S. (2014). The cultural politics of emotion (2nd ed.). Edinburgh University Press.

        Berridge, K. C. & Robinson, T. E. (1998). “What is the role of dopamine in reward? Hedonic impact, reward learning, or incentive salience?” Brain Research Reviews, 28(3), 309–369.
        https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-0173(98)00019-8

        Crary, J. (2014). 24/7: Late capitalism and the ends of sleep. Verso.

        Foucault, M.; Senellart, M.; Ewald, F.; Fontana, A.; Davidson, A.I. & Burchell, G.D. (2010). The birth of biopolitics. Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-79.

        Illouz, E. (2007). Cold intimacies: The making of emotional capitalism. Polity Press.

        Lembke, A. (2021). Dopamine nation: Finding balance in the age of indulgence. Unabridged. Penguin Audio.

        Müller, J. (2016). What Is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812293784

        Schellewald, A. (2024). “Discussing the role of TikTok sharing practices in everyday social life.” International Journal of Communication, 18, 909–926.

        Weber, M. (1930). The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Scribner/Simon & Schuster.

        Zuboff, S. & Schwandt, K. (2019). The age of surveillance capitalism: The fight for a human future at the new frontier of power. PublicAffairs.

        Zulli, D. & Zulli, D. J. (2020). “Extending the Internet meme: Conceptualizing technological mimesis and imitation publics on the TikTok platform.” New Media & Society, 24(8), 1872-1890. https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444820983603 (Original work published 2022)

        Ferenc Gyurcsany at a meeting of European Social Democrats in the Willy Brandt House in Berlin on March 24, 2007.  Photo: Mark Waters.

        Alcoholic Mobsters and Welfare Criminals: Xenophobia, Welfare Chauvinism and Populism in Gyurcsány Ferenc’s Facebook Posts on Ukrainian Citizens Prior to the War

        Please cite as:
        Andits, Petra. (2026). “Alcoholic Mobsters and Welfare Criminals: Xenophobia, Welfare Chauvinism and Populism in Gyurcsány Ferenc’s Facebook Posts on Ukrainian Citizens Prior to the War.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). January 5, 2026.
        https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000122



        Abstract
        This article examines how anti-Ukrainian sentiment was mobilized within Hungarian opposition politics prior to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Focusing on Gyurcsány Ferenc’s 2018 parliamentary election campaign, it analyzes two widely circulated Facebook posts that portrayed Ukrainians as welfare abusers and criminal outsiders. The article demonstrates how xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, and populist political style were combined through visual and narrative strategies to generate moral panic. By situating these representations in relation to Gyurcsány’s post-2022 pro-Ukrainian positioning, the study shows how Ukraine-related narratives function as strategically redeployable political resources rather than stable ideological commitments.


        By Petra Andits*

        Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the publication of academic articles, books, and policy briefs focusing on Ukraine has proliferated. In this paper, I discuss the campaign of Gyurcsány Ferenc, the most prominent figure of the Hungarian opposition in 2018, leading up to the 2018 parliamentary elections and I argue that anti-Ukrainian sentiment constituted a significant building block of the campaign. In particular, I examine two infamous Facebook posts on Ukrainians posted by the politician. I investigate how Ukrainians were perceived outside the Russian–Ukrainian context and analyze the historical, cultural, and political references that they evoked. Specifically, I shall investigate three elements of the campaign: xenophobia, welfare chauvinism, and, above all, populism.

        The campaign was not only deeply xenophobic but also deployed well-worn welfare-chauvinistic criticisms against Ukrainian citizens: ‘Do you agree that Ukrainian citizens who have never paid pension contributions in Hungary should not be allowed to receive pensions in Hungary?’ Gyurcsány asks voters, having announced in 2018 at the enlarged inaugural meeting of the DK National Council that a petition to this effect would be launched. He stated that hordes of Ukrainians enter Hungary and illegally claim pensions and, subsequently, citizenship rights.

        The campaign – and the Facebook posts, in particular – also echoed essentially populist undertones. Interestingly, to date, Gyurcsány’s populist rhetoric has gone entirely unexamined, highlighting a key shortcoming of populist research, whereby the heterogeneity in what may be categorized as ‘populist’ rhetoric is underexplored (Kovács et al., 2022). I argue that ‘populism’ can take various shapes and often operates in accordance with a place-based logic that does not necessarily echo official political discourses (ibid). The Facebook posts reveal a populist moral struggle in which the popular hero (Gyurcsány himself) defeats the devil (Ukrainian welfare criminals backed by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán), and features urgency, crisis, and simplistic solutions – well-known ingredients in populist rhetoric.

        The Demokratikus Koalíció’s narrative about Ukrainian pension fraud began to surface near the end of the 2018 election campaign A particularly striking aspect of the campaign is its intentional merging of two wholly distinct issues: first, the planned citizenship rights for minority Hungarians in Ukraine and, second, the pension benefits that some Ukrainians receive from the Hungarian state. Around that time, Orbán was engaged in initial negotiations with the Ukrainian authorities concerning the question of whether dual citizenship should be granted to minority Hungarians. These negotiations were sensitive, given that Ukraine does not allow dual citizenship, and the alignment between Orbán and Russia’s Vladimir Putin further overshadowed the talks. Hungary also has a treaty with Ukraine, based on a 1963 intergovernmental agreement with the Soviet Union, according to which retired Ukrainian citizens who reside permanently in Hungary can apply to have their pensions paid there in Hungarian forints (HUF) (Caglar et al., 2011).

        The Hungarian pension system does not simply convert their Ukrainian pensions into HUF but rather determines the amount on the basis of the beneficiary’s former employment using Hungarian mechanisms, as if they had worked in Hungary throughout their lives. This special pension entitlement is associated with residence and ostensibly has nothing to do with Hungarian citizenship,[i] given that any Ukrainian citizen with a permanent address in Hungary is eligible to receive it. Nevertheless, the opposition has intentionally blurred the two issue and incited an anti-Ukrainian hysteria.

        In this paper, I have selected for analysis two consecutively published Facebook posts from the campaign in which Gyurcsány disseminated visual materials pertaining to Ukrainian migrants in Hungary. The first is a fact-finding video, entitled ‘In search of the 300,000 Ukrainian pensions’ and featuring Gyurcsány in the guise of a private detective[ii]; the other is a short educational cartoon.[iii] The posts sparked controversy and criticism both in Hungary and from Ukrainian officials, who accused Gyurcsány of spreading false information and promoting anti-Ukrainian sentiment in Hungary.[iv]The incident proved highly significant, as the first video became the second most-watched Hungarian political video of all time on social media,[v] surpassing, for instance, any video made by Orbán.

         


        (*) Dr. Petra Andits is MSCA Seal of Excellence Fellow at the Free University of Bolzano where she leads a project on the emergence of sexual populism in Hungary in the context of migration. Petra is cultural anthropologist by training and holds a Ph.d. in Political and Social Inquiry from the Monash University in Melbourne, Australia. She was research fellow at various universities, among them Universidad Pompeu Fabra in Spain, Tel Aviv University, University of Granada, Ca’Foscari University in Italy as well as the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. She is also an experienced ethnographic and documentary film maker. Email: anditspetra@gmail.com; ORCID ID: 0000-0001-9448-7611

         

        Read Full Article

         

        Voters queue at a polling station in Sendra village near Beawar during the Panchayati Raj elections in India on September 28, 2020, held amid the COVID-19 pandemic, with turnout exceeding 83 percent in the first phase across 25 districts. Photo: Dreamstime.

        Voting with Freebies: How Direct Welfare Benefits Reshape Electoral Behaviour in India

        In this analytically rich commentary, ECPS Youth Group member Saurabh Raj examines how direct welfare delivery is transforming electoral politics in India. Focusing on the recent Bihar assembly election, Raj shows how visible and targeted benefits—especially cash transfers to women—have become a powerful political language shaping voter participation and choice. Conceptualising this shift as “freebie populism,” the article argues that welfare now operates not only as a developmental tool but as a mode of political mobilisation, mediated through digital infrastructures and personalised state–citizen encounters. While caste, religion, and ideology remain influential, Raj highlights the growing importance of the individual beneficiary as a new axis of political belonging. Situating Bihar within broader interstate patterns, the article raises critical questions about democratic accountability, political reasoning, and the future trajectory of Indian democracy.

        By Saurabh Raj*

        The recent Bihar state[1] assembly election provides a useful lens to examine how welfare-centred mobilisation is reshaping contemporary electoral politics in India. Bihar recorded its highest ever voter turnout at 66.9 percent. The gender pattern was even more striking. Women voted at 71.6 percent while men voted at 62.8 percent. In 130 of the 243 constituencies, more women than men participated. These are not small variations or one time anomalies. They represent a structural shift in who participates and who determines electoral outcomes (Basu 2021).

        The pattern of results closely mirrors this shift. The incumbent governing coalition won 114 of the 130 seats where women led the turnout which is close to 88 percent of all such constituencies. This alignment coincided with the scale and timing of welfare measures that reached women directly, warranting closer analytical attention. A direct cash transfer equivalent to approximately USD 120 to over twelve million women shortly before the election was only one part of a wider package that included pension increases, electricity bill relief and higher payments for frontline workers. The opposition responded with guarantee booklets, registration drives and promises of future support, as well as cards distributed by Jan Suraj[2] that signalled an alternative welfare imagination. Welfare was not an accessory to the campaign. It was the central axis around which political mobilisation occurred.

        This election therefore makes visible a broader phenomenon that has been unfolding across India. Welfare centred electoral strategies are transforming political communication, voter reasoning and the emotional structure of democratic belonging. The rise of freebie populism, a term used here to describe the combination of populist rhetoric with highly visible and personalised welfare delivery, marks a distinct shift in how the state is imagined and how voters evaluate political actors. The term “freebie populism” is used here as an analytic category rather than a normative judgement. It refers not to the undesirability of welfare provision but to a specific political logic in which competitive electoral incentives privilege immediacy, visibility, and personalisation of benefits. This logic differs from rights-based or institutionalised welfare regimes, where entitlements are routinised and less directly tied to electoral cycles. The distinction is important, as the argument advanced here concerns the mode of political mobilisation rather than the legitimacy of welfare itself. ​​

        Methods Note

        This commentary draws on publicly available data from the Election Commission of India (Election Commission of India, 2024), state budget documents, press releases, field reporting in Hindi and English media and academic literature on populism, welfare delivery and voting behaviour. Interpretive arguments build on comparative work on populism (Mudde, 2004; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017) and on scholarship that links welfare delivery to political participation (Khemani, 2022; Kruks Wisner, 2018). Additional reference is made to studies on gendered political engagement, digital welfare architecture and direct benefit transfer systems. The purpose of this article is analytical rather than predictive. It aims to situate the Bihar experience within a wider conceptual and empirical framework that illuminates the changing nature of electoral politics in India.

        Classic Understandings of Populism

        Cas Mudde defines populism as a thin centred ideology that imagines society as divided between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite” and insists that politics must directly express the general will (Mudde, 2004). Because it is thin centred, it can attach itself to a range of ideological projects including right wing, left wing or regionally specific imaginations of welfare, nationalism and identity. Mudde and Kaltwasser note that populism becomes powerful when leaders present themselves as direct protectors of ordinary citizens and construct emotional and symbolic shortcuts that bypass institutions and complex policy debates (Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017).

        Comparative research from Latin America demonstrates how populist leaders frequently combine emotive rhetoric with selective welfare delivery to cultivate direct affiliation with the masses (Hawkins, 2010; Roberts, 2015). These transfers are not incidental. They are political instruments through which belonging is reinforced and legitimacy is sustained. In India, populism has historically relied on religious mobilisation, symbolic gestures, charismatic leadership or caste-based appeals. Material transfers existed but did not shape political identity in the pronounced way witnessed today.

        The current moment therefore extends rather than replaces classic understandings of populism. It adds a strong material and bureaucratically mediated dimension that is deeply embedded in the digital public infrastructure of the state. This dimension is responsible for the heightened immediacy with which political commitment is experienced.

        Conceptualising Freebie Populism

        Freebie populism represents a contemporary variant of populist mobilisation in which the primary bridge between leaders and citizens is constructed through direct material transfers rather than symbolic or rhetorical appeals alone. It does not replace classic definitions of populism but operationalises the promise of protection and recognition by making it tangible through targeted benefits. Cash transfers, subsidised electricity, expanded pensions, and free travel serve as visible proof of political commitment. These benefits act as recurring reminders that the state, often personified through political leadership, acknowledges the immediate material needs of citizens. Three features distinguish freebie populism from broader welfare politics. 

        Immediacy is central, as transfers are often timed close to elections and their effects are felt within household budgets almost immediately. Voters therefore perceive the state not as a distant bureaucracy but as a source of immediate relief. 

        Visibility is another critical feature. Digital transfers generate SMS alerts and bank notifications, and these alerts themselves function as instruments of political communication, turning a routine bureaucratic act into a concrete political moment. 

        Personalised recognition is a third characteristic. Scholars note that direct transfers create a strong sense of being acknowledged by the state, particularly among women who manage household finances (Khemani, 2022). This personalisation transforms welfare from a bureaucratic entitlement into a more intimate political relationship between the individual and the state. 

        Freebie populism does not erase caste or religious identities, which remain significant in shaping expectations and voting behaviour (Jaffrelot, 2021). However, welfare delivered directly to individual bank accounts establishes a new axis of political belonging. A woman from the Yadav or Paswan community may continue to retain group-based preferences, but her voting choices are also influenced by whether the state has reached her personally. The digital architecture of Aadhaar-linked transfers deepens this individualisation, making the relationship between the voter and the state more immediate, measurable, and experientially reliable.

        Bihar and the Emergence of the Individual Beneficiary

        The Bihar election demonstrates the mechanics of freebie populism with unusual clarity because the scale of targeted transfers was unprecedented. The distribution of ten thousand rupees to more than one crore twenty lakh women created a widespread perception that the state was acknowledging their economic vulnerability. This was part of a larger environment that included electricity bill relief, increased pensions and higher remuneration for frontline workers. These measures were repeatedly communicated through public meetings, local level messaging and digital outreach, ensuring that beneficiaries associated them with the ruling leadership.

        The opposition attempted to counter this by centring women in its own campaign. Guarantee booklets, self-registration drives and targeted promises sought to build an alternative welfare narrative. Jan Suraj’s cards, for instance, attempted to construct a future oriented welfare claim. Yet the immediacy of actual deposits seemed to carry greater weight than future promises. Voters were able to verify receipt of benefits in the most tangible sense.

        Turnout and voting patterns align closely with this political strategy. Women led the turnout in 130 constituencies, and the incumbent governing coalition won 114 of these. The fact that this alignment occurred during a period of intense welfare messaging suggests the strong influence of direct benefits on electoral behaviour. The political message materialised not as an abstract claim but as a verified deposit received through a mobile phone alert. Politics was increasingly experienced through the position of the individual beneficiary.

        This alignment does not imply that welfare purchases votes. Rather it indicates that welfare is functioning as a channel through which political recognition, credibility and responsiveness are evaluated. Voters appear to be rewarding the government for delivering measurable relief and penalising actors whose promises remain untested.

        Shifting Political Behaviour

        The Bihar data indicates that freebie populism is reshaping political behaviour in ways that build on and extend earlier research. Scholars have noted that low-income voters are highly strategic and responsive to welfare delivery, often making reasoned decisions based on evidence of state performance (Khemani, 2022; Kruks Wisner, 2018). The Bihar experience reinforces this insight and highlights three important dimensions of change. 

        First, welfare is increasingly becoming the primary language of political recognition. Women voters demonstrated exceptionally high turnout and a strong preference alignment in constituencies where welfare delivery was both visible and recent, suggesting that direct transfers and other targeted benefits have emerged as key instruments through which citizens assess the state’s commitment. 

        Second, citizenship itself is being experienced through the household economy. This does not reduce political engagement to a transactional exchange but instead reflects a new democratic imagination in which the state operates as a direct economic actor within the household. For many women, welfare programmes provide relief from domestic pressures, enhance financial independence, and support caregiving responsibilities, thereby strengthening political agency. At the same time, political reasoning is increasingly grounded in immediacy. 

        Third, freebie populism shifts the focus from abstract or long term developmental claims toward the voter’s immediate lived experience. Citizens evaluate political actors on the credibility, timing, and scale of benefit delivery and the responsiveness they witness in practice. This approach does not indicate passivity; rather, it reflects active and informed political calculation based on tangible outcomes and personal experience (Chauchard, 2017). 

        Taken together, these patterns suggest that political loyalty is increasingly shaped by repeated and recognisable acts of recognition rather than broad ideological or identity-based appeals, signalling a profound shift in how democratic engagement is conceptualised and practiced.

        These patterns resonate with findings from other democracies where targeted welfare provision has become central to electoral competition, including parts of Latin America and Southeast Asia. In such contexts, welfare delivery increasingly functions as both policy and political communication, blurring the boundary between governance and mobilisation. The Indian case therefore contributes to a growing comparative literature on how material distribution reshapes democratic participation under conditions of economic precarity.

        Patterns Beyond Bihar

        The pattern observed in Bihar is not an isolated development but part of a broader transformation in electoral politics across multiple Indian states. Welfare centred strategies have become essential elements of political competition, and their design increasingly reflects the logic of freebie populism, where visible and immediate benefits shape political belonging and voter behaviour. Each state offers a slightly different model, yet all demonstrate the growing centrality of targeted welfare in shaping electoral outcomes.

        Jharkhand provides a clear example of this shift. The state expanded support for low-income women through age linked educational transfers and targeted assistance schemes that reached households directly. These interventions were not presented merely as development initiatives but became central to political communication, especially in rural districts where economic insecurity remains acute. The emphasis on young women and first-generation learners created a perception that the state was intervening meaningfully in the life chances of vulnerable households. Political actors highlighted these measures during election campaigns, illustrating how welfare has become a key electoral asset.

        Maharashtra further demonstrates the consolidation of welfare centred politics. The Ladki Bahin Scheme placed women at the centre of the electoral narrative by offering regular financial assistance and presenting the state as an active participant in household welfare. The scheme was supported by recognisable branding, sustained outreach and continuous communication that associated the ruling leadership with direct support for women. This combination of financial transfers and symbolic visibility strengthened the perception that welfare was both a right and a political commitment, reinforcing the link between beneficiaries and the state.

        Telangana presents another version of this emerging trend. Successive governments have relied heavily on targeted welfare, particularly through agricultural support schemes, marriage assistance programmes and community specific initiatives. These policies created strong emotional and material incentives for distinct social groups and demonstrated that welfare could be used strategically to cultivate enduring political alliances. Welfare delivery in Telangana has become an essential component of electoral mobilisation rather than a supplementary tool and continues to play a decisive role in shaping partisan loyalty.

        Tamil Nadu offers one of the longest running traditions of welfare linked mobilisation in India. The contemporary phase builds on earlier frameworks but introduces new elements such as free bus travel for women, expanded meal schemes, higher pensions and targeted relief for vulnerable households. Welfare delivery is deeply integrated into political identity and party narratives. Campaigns consistently highlight the immediacy and continuity of state support, reinforcing the idea that welfare programmes are expressions of political care rather than bureaucratic entitlements.

        Across these states, welfare is framed not merely as development but as a direct political relationship. This relationship is mediated through digital systems that enable individual bank transfers, local mobilisation networks that translate policy into political communication, frontline workers who act as intermediaries between the state and beneficiaries and the emotional resonance generated when citizens experience state recognition in concrete and material form. Together, these elements show how freebie populism has become a national phenomenon shaping political participation and redefining the meaning of electoral competition.

        However, important differences remain across states. In Tamil Nadu and other states, welfare programmes are embedded within long-standing party institutions and ideological narratives, reducing their electoral immediacy. In contrast, states such as Bihar and Jharkhand exhibit a more episodic and election-timed deployment of benefits, intensifying their political salience. These variations suggest that freebie populism operates most strongly where welfare delivery is newly individualised and weakly institutionalised.

        Limits of Attribution and Scope of Argument

        This article advances an interpretive rather than causal argument between welfare transfers and electoral outcomes. Voting behaviour is shaped by multiple overlapping factors, including caste alignments, candidate credibility, party organisation, and broader political narratives. The observed alignment between women-led turnout and electoral outcomes in Bihar should therefore be read as indicative rather than deterministic.

        The argument advanced here is that welfare delivery has acquired heightened political salience under conditions of digital transfer, electoral competition, and economic precarity. Direct benefits function as signals of state responsiveness that voters incorporate into broader political reasoning. This does not imply political passivity or vote-buying; rather, it reflects strategic and experiential evaluation by citizens based on verifiable state action. Future research using booth-level data or longitudinal beneficiary tracking would allow for more precise estimation of causal effects.

        Conclusion

        Welfare centred mobilisation has become a central feature of contemporary electoral competition in India. The Bihar assembly election provides a useful illustration of how direct and visible welfare delivery is reshaping patterns of political participation by foregrounding the individual beneficiary as a significant site of democratic engagement. High female turnout and the alignment of women dominated constituencies with electoral outcomes underline the growing importance of welfare as a medium through which citizens experience and evaluate state responsiveness.

        This shift does not indicate a decline in political reasoning or a reduction of citizenship to transactional exchange. Instead, it reflects a reorientation of democratic judgement in which voters increasingly rely on observable and verifiable state action to assess political credibility. Welfare delivery, mediated through digital and bureaucratic systems, functions not only as policy intervention but also as a communicative practice that signals recognition, reliability, and proximity between the state and citizens.

        At the same time, the increasing centrality of welfare in electoral mobilisation raises important questions for democratic accountability. An emphasis on immediacy and visibility may encourage short term distributive competition at the expense of institutional consolidation and sustained policy debate. As electoral legitimacy becomes more closely tied to the timing and scale of benefits, political contestation risks narrowing to questions of delivery rather than deliberation.

        The broader challenge for Indian democracy therefore lies not in the expansion of welfare itself but in the political logic through which welfare is mobilised. Understanding how welfare delivery reshapes political participation, voter reasoning, and experiences of citizenship is essential to assessing the evolving character of democratic practice in India. The Bihar case suggests that future electoral outcomes will increasingly be shaped by how convincingly the state makes itself present in the everyday lives of citizens, alongside enduring influences of identity, ideology, and organisation. Beyond India, the analysis highlights how welfare delivery can reconfigure democratic engagement in contexts where citizens encounter the state most directly through material transfers.


         

        (*) Saurabh Raj is a core team member at the Indian School of Democracy and is associated with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). He has a decade of experience in Indian politics and elections.


         

        References

        Aiyar, Y., and Walton, M. (2015). “Rights, accountability and citizenship: Examining India’s social welfare architecture.” Accountability Initiative.

        Basu, P. (2021). “Women and electoral participation in India: Changing patterns of turnout and political engagement.” Economic and Political Weekly, 56(12), 34 to 42.

        Chauchard, S. (2017). Why representation matters: The meaning of ethnic quotas in rural India. Cambridge University Press.

        Election Commission of India. (2024). State Assembly Election Data: Bihar.

        Hawkins, K. A. (2010). Venezuela’s Chavismo and populism in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press.

        Jaffrelot, C. (2021). Modi’s India: Hindu nationalism and the rise of ethnic democracy. Princeton University Press.

        Khemani, S. (2022). “Political economy of welfare delivery in India.” World Bank Research Observer, 37(2), 245 to 270.

        Kruks Wisner, G. (2018). Claiming the state: Active citizenship and social welfare in rural India. Cambridge University Press.

        Mudde, C. (2004). “The populist zeitgeist.” Government and Opposition, 39(4), 541 to 563.

        Mudde, C., and Kaltwasser, C. R. (2017). Populism: A very short introduction. Oxford University Press.

        Roberts, K. M. (2015). Changing course in Latin America: Party systems in the neoliberal era. Cambridge University Press.


        Footnotes

        [1] Bihar, one of India’s most populous and economically disadvantaged states, has historically exhibited lower levels of state capacity and social welfare penetration, making recent shifts in voter participation particularly significant.

        [2] A recently formed political party in Bihar positioning itself around governance and welfare reform.

        Dr. Matías Bianchi is Director of Asuntos del Sur, a think tank in Buenos Aires.

        Dr. Bianchi: Illiberal Actors No Longer Need to Pretend They Are Liberal

        In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Dr. Matías Bianchi offers a powerful diagnosis of contemporary illiberalism. Moving beyond regime-centric explanations, Dr. Bianchi argues that today’s defining shift is normative: “illiberal actors no longer need to pretend they are liberal.” He shows how illiberalism now operates through transnational networks embedded within liberal democracies, sustained by funding, coordination, and discourse originating largely in the Global North. Highlighting the erosion of liberal legitimacy, the normalization of illiberal language, and the structural weakening of the nation-state, Dr. Bianchi underscores why democratic institutions struggle to respond—and what is at stake if they fail to adapt.

        Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

        In an era marked by democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and the global diffusion of illiberal norms, understanding the evolving nature of authoritarian and illiberal politics has become an urgent scholarly and policy task. In this in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Matías Bianchi, Director of Asuntos del Sur in Buenos Aires and co-author of The Illiberal International,” offers a compelling diagnosis of contemporary illiberalism—one that departs decisively from regime-centric and state-centric explanations.

        At the heart of Dr. Bianchi’s analysis lies a striking observation captured in the interview’s headline: “Illiberal actors no longer need to pretend they are liberal.” For Dr. Bianchi, the defining feature of the current moment is not the novelty of illiberal ideas themselves, but rather a profound normative and cultural shift that has lifted the constraints once requiring authoritarian or illiberal actors to cloak their agendas in liberal rhetoric. As he explains, “What we aim to show is that there is a set of actors working together and collaborating at different levels—geopolitical, institutional, and interpersonal—for whom liberal practices and ideas are no longer the goal.”

        This “shedding of pretense,” as Dr. Bianchi describes it, represents a critical marker of the contemporary illiberal turn. Practices that were once “forbidden, punished, or had to be concealed are now openly articulated.” The symbolic need to maintain democratic façades—what Dr. Bianchi recalls through Fidel Castro’s claim that “we are a real democracy”—has eroded. “That veil is no longer necessary,” he argues, signaling a transformation not only in political behavior but also in the boundaries of legitimacy and civility within democratic publics.

        Crucially, Dr. Bianchi situates illiberalism not as a discrete regime type but as a networked, relational political formation that increasingly operates within liberal democracies themselves. He emphasizes that many illiberal actors are embedded in ostensibly democratic systems—“in the European Union, the United States, or other contexts”—and that a major novelty of the past decade is that “much of the financing, support, and networking now originates from the US and Europe,” regions once seen as the pillars of the liberal international order.

        Throughout the interview, Dr. Bianchi traces how cross-border coordination, transnational funding, and shared discursive strategies—exemplified by platforms such as The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) or slogans like “Make Europe Great Again”—have accelerated the normalization of illiberalism. These networks thrive amid what he identifies as a deeper crisis of liberalism itself: declining legitimacy, shrinking human rights cooperation, and the inability of liberal institutions to deliver material security, social inclusion, and credible governance in an increasingly unequal and digitally mediated global order.

        Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Matías Bianchi, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

        Illiberal Actors Now Operate Openly Within Liberal Regimes

        A banner depicts democracy as a leaf eaten by “caterpillars” named Putin, Kaczynski, Orban, Babis, Trump, and Fico on Labour Day, May 1, 2017 in Old Town Square, Prague. Photo: Jolanta Wojcicka.

        Dr. Matías Bianchi, thank you very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: How do you conceptualize illiberalism in distinction from classical authoritarianism and competitive autocracy? In “The Illiberal International,” illiberalism appears neither reducible to established authoritarian rule nor fully captured by frameworks of competitive authoritarianism or democratic erosion. What core institutional and normative markers define this “illiberal international,” particularly in terms of its relationship to legality, electoralism, and claims to popular sovereignty?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: In our article, we do not engage in a fine-tuned conceptualization of each of the concepts you mentioned. Rather, what we aim to show is that there is a set of actors working together and collaborating at different levels—geopolitical, institutional, and interpersonal—for whom liberal practices and ideas are no longer the goal. Our liberal order, already weakened, is being challenged, and we are not entirely certain about the motivations behind this challenge. Some actors may be seeking greater financial resources, others may wish to control their political space, while others pursue more ideological objectives, such as creating a new order, as in the case of Javier Milei in Argentina. They may have different aims, but what they share is that liberal practices—such as the Woodrow Wilson–style liberal global order—are no longer central.

        Traditionally, autocratic or authoritarian frameworks focus primarily on regimes. What we show, however, is that many of these illiberal actors are often operating within liberal regimes—such as those in the European Union, the United States, or other contexts. That is precisely what we seek to demonstrate. A key feature of the current situation is that much of the financing, support, and networking now originates from the US and Europe, which were once the primary sustainers of the liberal global order. This represents a major novelty of the past decade.

        As for the practices or markers we observe, one of the most significant is a cultural shift that enables ideas and practices that existed before but are now expressed more openly. In a sense, there has been a shedding of pretense surrounding liberal ideas, allowing actors to operate more freely. This is an important marker. Practices that were once forbidden, punished, or had to be concealed are now openly articulated. Even in Cuba, Fidel Castro used to say, “We are a real democracy.” There was always a veil that needed to be maintained. I believe that this veil is no longer necessary, and that in itself is a telling marker.

        Illiberalism Has Gone Transnational

        What explains the shift from predominantly domestic processes of democratic backsliding to increasingly coordinated, cross-border illiberal networks? In your article, illiberalism appears less as a discrete regime type than as a relational, networked political formation. How does this reconceptualization challenge state-centric and regime-centric approaches in comparative politics and international relations?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: Many of the things I am going to say are not directly related to the article and are more my own ideas, and not necessarily shared with my co-authors. What we are witnessing is a contested situation. The world order we are living in still includes a liberal order, but it is lacking both legitimacy and power. At the same time, other actors are gaining momentum; they have more financial resources and greater cooperation across many areas, including technology and the military.

        This operates at different levels, which is a crucial point. The key dimension here is the network—that these actors are collaborating more than ever before. If you look back a decade or two, these networks were far more limited. The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), for instance, was something quite restricted. “Make Europe Great Again” was either very limited or did not exist at all. Now, however, these spaces are becoming global. You have CPAC in Latin America, CPAC in Europe, and these platforms are expanding and increasingly sharing resources.

        I think this development is related to the loss of pretense—that these ideas no longer need to be hidden. This, in turn, changes the game. There is more funding, while at the same time the liberal camp is lacking resources, lacking investment, and experiencing less cooperation. So, while this dynamic operates at different levels, the networks functioning simultaneously are particularly important.

        For example, Tucker Carlson making Milei a global phenomenon, with hundreds of millions of viewers for his interviews, allows people across the United States to become familiar with this phenomenon. All of this network-based collaboration, to me, is absolutely crucial.

        Illiberal Power Reveals Itself Through Discourse Before It Acts

        Drawing on V-Dem data, the Authoritarian Collaboration Index, and your own empirical research, which indicators most effectively capture the qualitative transformation—not merely the quantitative expansion—of authoritarian cooperation in recent years? Which measures best reveal the growing organizational capacity, coordination, and strategic coherence of illiberal actors at the global level?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: Again, this goes beyond our analysis. I would say, once more, that the key element is the normative shift. There has been a change in what can be said at the level of language. Insults and the demonization of adversaries or other political actors have become more acceptable; at the level of discourse, the line of civility has shifted. This normative change is crucial, and it is followed by action. Language comes first.

        When you start making statements such as “women are this,” or when Muslims or immigrants are targeted, you begin naming things, and then actions follow—ICE raids and other measures come afterward. So, the normative shift, in terms of what is allowed without penalties, is essential. In the past, if actions like those taken by Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil or by others had occurred, there would have been phone calls from the White House or Brussels. There would have been at least threats involving investments, financial support, or other consequences.

        I am not sure those calls exist anymore. All of these shifts occur, again, at the level of language, which has penetrated civic discourse within societies, but also at the global level, where the normative environment itself has changed. There is a fundamental normative shift at work.

        When No One Enforces the Rules, Illiberal Networks Move Faster

        This editorial image, captured in Belgrade, Serbia, showcases an array of novelty socks featuring the likenesses of Vladimir Putin, Aleksandr Lukashenko, Viktor Orban, and Donald Trump in Belgrade, Serbia on December 12, 2024. Photo: Jerome Cid.

        Why have authoritarian and illiberal networks become more agile and effective than democratic alliances, despite the latter’s historical institutional advantages? To what extent do procedural neutrality, consensus-based decision-making, and legal formalism within liberal institutions create structural vulnerabilities that illiberal actors exploit?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: That is a very good question. I see liberal practices as a kind of social contract and a global contract. However, they need to be sustained by power. At some point, someone imposed those rules and others complied. I am not sure there is still sufficient power sustaining that liberal order at the international level, or in many cases at the national level. As a result, there is little punishment for violating it. So I am not sure this is primarily a question of institutional design; rather, it is a question of legitimacy. It is also about the fact that these regimes have not been delivering—both within countries and at the level of the global order.

        International cooperation on human rights is shrinking. By 2026, it is estimated to be 50 percent lower than it was three years ago. Support for independent journalists, NGOs engaged in strategic human rights litigation, and networks of young leaders seeking to promote democratic practices have declined dramatically. At the same time, other arenas have gained resources and visibility, with social media playing a major role in amplifying influence and reach. That is part of a different discussion, but the bottom line is that there is no longer sufficient power sustaining that contract. So, again, I am not sure this is a question of design; it is more fundamentally about power.

        Illiberal Networks Exploit 21st-Century Tools While Democracy Speaks in 20th-Century Language

        Your analysis highlights how liberal institutions’ commitment to proceduralism and neutrality can be exploited from within. Is this best understood as an institutional design flaw, a crisis of political will, or a deeper contradiction within liberal constitutionalism itself?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: This partially relates to what I just said: the lack of legitimacy and the lack of power. At the same time, I want to emphasize that the global arena is contested. There is no clear winner. It has always been contested, but there was once a clear predominance of liberal, pro-democracy, and human-rights–oriented international regimes, while alternative models were weaker.

        Today, the illiberal camp is growing, and illiberal networks and actors are increasingly effective in using 21st-century tools—misinformation, the manipulation and circulation of information, and the construction of conspiracy theories that support their worldview and preferred version of facts. A particularly important turning point was the pandemic, which exposed how nation-states and the international order lacked sufficient capacity to respond effectively. This moment acted as a major trigger; for instance, it coincides with the period when Milei entered politics.

        These actors have been highly effective in exploiting digital communication, narratives, and misinformation, which have proven especially appealing. In particular, they have successfully mobilized people’s disappointment and anger. When populations became frustrated by real-life experiences—lockdowns, unemployment, children being forced into online learning, and the collapse of healthcare systems—these grievances were skillfully leveraged to generate resentment toward democracy and politics more broadly.

        They have also been effective in promoting narratives such as “we are outsiders,” “we are going to drain the swamp,” or, as Milei puts it, attacking la casta, the political elite portrayed as the worst. Meanwhile, the democratic camp continues to rely on 20th-century tools—narratives that resonated in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s but are no longer persuasive today.

        Why should I pay my taxes if education continues to deteriorate? Why should I contribute to my pension fund if I will receive very little when I retire? We continue to invoke narratives of the social contract, welfare, and liberal rights when lived realities no longer fully align with them, or at least do so far less than before. Illiberal actors have been very effective at exploiting this anger and loss of legitimacy. As we all know, when people are angry, those who manage to tap into that emotion can manipulate their will.

        Illiberalism Grows Where the Nation-State Loses the Power to Set Boundaries

        To what extent should the rise of the illiberal international be understood as the product of structural transformations in the global political economy—such as shifts in GDP distribution, energy interdependence, and technological capacity—rather than ideological convergence alone?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: This is part of my own research, so I will not bring my co-authors into this. My work is precisely about this issue. I am fully convinced that the crucial challenge lies in the weakening power of the nation-state. As we know, democracy flourished only when there was a strong nation-state—institutions capable of placing boundaries on de facto powers, whether capitalist entrepreneurs seeking to maximize profits, illegal actors, large media conglomerates, or other forms of concentrated power. Democracy functioned more effectively when the state was able to exert some control over these forces.

        What we have witnessed is a long-term erosion of this capacity since the 1970s, driven by the deregulation of the financial sector and neoliberal policies that diminished the role of the state. This was followed by a series of crises—from the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the household debt crises of 2008 and 2013 to, most significantly, the COVID-19 pandemic, which marked a profound transformation. Today, inequality is no longer defined by the top 1 percent; rather, it is the top 0.01 percent, whose wealth has grown by a thousand percent over the past decade, while the bottom 50 percent of the world’s population has seen living standards stagnate or even decline.

        This also raises the issue of sovereignty—the ability to regulate transnational commerce and transnational information flows. With the rise of social networks, we now face an unprecedented situation: privately owned platforms such as Twitter or X, YouTube, Facebook, and Instagram function as their own media ecosystems, reaching billions of people worldwide. The lack of effective regulation means that these actors determine what is acceptable in public discourse, which voices are amplified, and which are marginalized.

        All of these developments point to structural factors affecting sovereignty, the provision of public goods, and civic discourse—three key arenas of stateness. The problem is that nation-state institutions were designed for national boundaries, analog societies, and national markets, whereas today we inhabit digital, globalized societies. The central challenge, then, is how to rebuild political capacity—to recreate forms of stateness capable of regulating de facto powers in the current context.

        Illicit Networks Spread as States Lose the Power to Enforce Rules

        Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission arrives for a EU Summit, at the EU headquarters in Brussels, on June 30, 2023. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

        How central are illicit financial flows, money laundering, and transnational corruption networks to the reproduction of illiberal politics within formally democratic systems? To what extent should these networks be understood not merely as enabling mechanisms but as constitutive pillars of contemporary illiberalism, shaping political competition, institutional capture, and democratic hollowing from within?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: This is part of the same answer. These dynamics have always been present in liberal systems. Money laundering, drug trafficking, and weapons trafficking have long existed. What has changed is our capacity to control them. There is now less power to set and enforce rules.

        As a result, these practices have, in a sense, spread. This is something we show in our article. There is no longer a clear “axis of evil” overseeing what were once perceived as isolated authoritarian or illiberal practices. Instead, these dynamics have become far more widespread. We now see even middle powers, such as Turkey or Hungary, exercising influence—for example, Hungary funding the Vox political party in Spain, or Vox supporting Kast in Chile.

        This points to a broader diffusion of such practices and, at the same time, to fewer constraints, fewer penalties, and weaker deterrents against this kind of behavior.

        When Norms Shift, Language Turns into Action

        Events such as The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) and “Make Europe Great Again” blur boundaries between conventional conservatism and authoritarian narratives. How does this discursive hybridization accelerate the normalization of illiberalism within democratic publics?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: There is a widespread diffusion of these practices that, again, were present before. Many of these ideas existed previously, but now they operate without constraints. The change—the normative shift in these cases—is crucial. It is crucial for redefining the boundaries of civic space and for determining what is considered acceptable or unacceptable in public debate.

        These dynamics generate cultural change, and that cultural change is central in these arenas. It allows actions to follow that have meaningful impact. Although we might initially see this as merely a matter of language or narratives—about women, about feminists being labeled as fascists, and similar claims—there are people who act upon these narratives.

        One striking example from a couple of months ago in Argentina involved a political activist of Milei who killed all the women in his family and was constantly mobilized by anti-feminist narratives. A similar dynamic can be observed in the United States with ICE and immigration, where many volunteers actively work for ICE.

        That is what is changing. These networks, again, existed before, or at least similar networks existed, but they were marginal and could not operate so openly. Now they are visible, awarding prizes and running their own news outlets, and that represents a major change.

        The Global Order No Longer Polices Illiberal Behavior

        How do authoritarian or illiberal middle powers—such as Turkey, the UAE, Hungary, and Saudi Arabia—operate as brokers or hubs within transnational illiberal networks, and how does their intermediary role complicate binary distinctions between “core” and “peripheral” autocracies in the global authoritarian ecosystem?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: I have already touched on this, but I want to return to the issue of the erosion of the global order. In the past, at least, a middle power selling weapons had to ask for permission. Today, there is a much freer flow of such activities. For example, the Emirates selling weapons to rogue regimes, or Hungary funding Vox, as I mentioned earlier. There is far less control over these actions. As a result, it is no longer just the “axis of evil” that we used to think about 20 years ago. These dynamics are now widespread at different levels, and this reflects a broader shift in the balance of the global order.

        Russia Disrupts, China Builds—and Democracy Must Respond Differently

        The Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, is pictured with the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, and the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, in Goa, India on May 25, 2019. Photo: Shutterstock.

        How do Russia and China differ in their modalities of illiberal influence—financial, ideological, technological, and diplomatic—and where do their strategies converge? How should we analytically distinguish Russia’s coercive and disruptive practices from China’s more institutionalized, developmental, and techno-governance–oriented approaches, and what do these differences imply for the design of effective democratic counter-strategies?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: That is a very good question. Russia has less soft power and relies more heavily on hard power, particularly through cyberattacks and arms sales. This calls for a specific set of responses, including stronger cybersecurity measures, better control over weapons distribution, and more effective countermeasures against disinformation.

        China, by contrast, is more complex. It is the second-largest economy in the world and the largest foreign investor in roughly half of the world’s countries. Its influence operates largely through development investments, as you noted—building bridges, infrastructure, highways, and nuclear plants. This requires a different kind of response. The problem is that the United States and the European Union have been retracting from development investment. This is not only about recent USAID cuts; it has been happening for a long time. Meanwhile, China has been expanding the Maritime Silk Road through investment and trade, even in countries that are not particularly sympathetic to China’s political ideas, such as Chile under its new government, which nevertheless maintains very strong commercial ties with China.

        This form of influence demands a different response—one based on greater investment and more credible policies. During the Pax Americana, the United States and Europe, in their hegemonic roles, often acted “under the table.” We should recall that the US funded many military coups in Latin America in the second half of the twentieth century, and that Europe has had deeply problematic practices in Africa for decades. This duality has always existed; it is not a simple story of good and bad actors. However, as Western actors retract and offer less, these contradictions become more visible and more damaging.

        In this context, the risk is that some regimes are openly calling out what they perceive as the hypocrisy of Europe and the United States: “You are not offering as much as they are. They are building schools and infrastructure, and you are not.”As a result, democratic strategies must be different and more complex. It is not only about money; it is also about credibility—being credible in contracts and in international agreements. Credibility itself is central.

        Democracy Must Be Made Attractive Again—Across All Levels

        Are existing global and regional institutions reformable enough to confront the illiberal international, or do we need entirely new organizational forms?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: Political scientists are trained more to analyze past events than to forecast the future. But I would say that we need to look at the larger picture and think strategically. If we want to restore the strength of a liberal order based on human rights, respect for people, economic development, and a sense of equality and inclusion, we need to rethink how we build the political muscle to sustain it.

        As I said before, in my opinion, the major crisis is that the institutional framework we have—the nation-state—lacks power. And it is not simply about going back to the nation-state. We need to restore ideas of stateness, sovereignty, the provision of public goods, and the creation of a civic community. The question is: what institutional frameworks, powers, and financial resources can sustain that? I feel that the nation-state alone is no longer sufficient. So the broader strategic challenge—the forest, not just the trees—is how we rebuild democratic power.

        At the same time, we need to think about tactics. We need to make democracy more attractive, not by relying on the narratives of the 1950s and 1960s, but by speaking the language of our time and developing more appealing communication strategies. We need to strengthen networks of people who want to live in democracy, who still believe in it, and who want to defend it.

        We need also to work at the geopolitical level, at the level of institutional networks, but also at the community and even individual levels. For example, in schools, we see emerging practices in different countries focused on critical thinking—teaching people to recognize when they are being exposed to misinformation or manipulation strategies, and to take a step back. At the same time, we need to think carefully about how we treat our neighbors, how we speak to our peers, and how we engage with our political opponents. I feel that, tactically, we need to think across these different levels where we can act, while at the same time conceptualizing and building new political power to sustain a rules-based, rights-based society.

        Without a More Honest Global Order, Polarization and Conflict Will Deepen

        UN Security Council meeting on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, August 25, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic.

        And lastly, Dr. Bianchi, under what conditions could democratic coordination regain momentum, and what do you see as the most plausible best- and worst-case scenarios for liberal democracy over the next decade?

        Dr. Matías Bianchi: I think the next decade will be highly contested. I feel that things could go very wrong. We currently have several wars underway, any of which could escalate at any moment. We also face irresponsible global leadership. In Washington, for example, the language toward China shifted four or five years ago; policymakers no longer speak of an adversary but of an enemy. With that mindset, things can indeed go very wrong.

        We could face a severe scenario marked by war and increasing societal polarization—developments we have experienced before and that we do not want to return to. At the same time, the desire for order has not disappeared. Clearly, we need to build a better one: a more honest order, one in which the Global South has greater influence and in which power and resources are more equitably distributed.

        The United States and Europe still have an opportunity to help shape the rules of this order. However, they need to understand that these rules can no longer be based on hegemonic dominance, or on the United States acting as a hegemon in particular. Instead, the focus must be on designing rules that meaningfully include emerging powers, especially China.

        If this does not happen, current trends will continue: China will further distance itself from liberal institutions and expand its own alternatives—such as the BRICS and other trade and financial frameworks. This will only deepen a bifurcated global order. There is much that could be done with greater generosity and a stronger commitment to inclusion, particularly toward the Global South and Asia.

        MatiasBianchi2

        Dr. Bianchi: Illiberal Actors No Longer Need to Pretend They Are Liberal

        In this wide-ranging interview with the ECPS, Dr. Matías Bianchi offers a powerful diagnosis of contemporary illiberalism. Moving beyond regime-centric explanations, Dr. Bianchi argues that today’s defining shift is normative: “illiberal actors no longer need to pretend they are liberal.” He shows how illiberalism now operates through transnational networks embedded within liberal democracies, sustained by funding, coordination, and discourse originating largely in the Global North. Highlighting the erosion of liberal legitimacy, the normalization of illiberal language, and the structural weakening of the nation-state, Dr. Bianchi underscores why democratic institutions struggle to respond—and what is at stake if they fail to adapt.

        Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

        In an era marked by democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and the global diffusion of illiberal norms, understanding the evolving nature of authoritarian and illiberal politics has become an urgent scholarly and policy task. In this in-depth interview with the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Matías Bianchi, Director of Asuntos del Sur in Buenos Aires and co-author of The Illiberal International,” offers a compelling diagnosis of contemporary illiberalism—one that departs decisively from regime-centric and state-centric explanations.

        At the heart of Dr. Bianchi’s analysis lies a striking observation captured in the interview’s headline: “Illiberal actors no longer need to pretend they are liberal.” For Dr. Bianchi, the defining feature of the current moment is not the novelty of illiberal ideas themselves, but rather a profound normative and cultural shift that has lifted the constraints once requiring authoritarian or illiberal actors to cloak their agendas in liberal rhetoric. As he explains, “What we aim to show is that there is a set of actors working together and collaborating at different levels—geopolitical, institutional, and interpersonal—for whom liberal practices and ideas are no longer the goal.”

        This “shedding of pretense,” as Dr. Bianchi describes it, represents a critical marker of the contemporary illiberal turn. Practices that were once “forbidden, punished, or had to be concealed are now openly articulated.” The symbolic need to maintain democratic façades—what Dr. Bianchi recalls through Fidel Castro’s claim that “we are a real democracy”—has eroded. “That veil is no longer necessary,” he argues, signaling a transformation not only in political behavior but also in the boundaries of legitimacy and civility within democratic publics.

        Crucially, Dr. Bianchi situates illiberalism not as a discrete regime type but as a networked, relational political formation that increasingly operates within liberal democracies themselves. He emphasizes that many illiberal actors are embedded in ostensibly democratic systems—“in the European Union, the United States, or other contexts”—and that a major novelty of the past decade is that “much of the financing, support, and networking now originates from the US and Europe,” regions once seen as the pillars of the liberal international order.

        Throughout the interview, Dr. Bianchi traces how cross-border coordination, transnational funding, and shared discursive strategies—exemplified by platforms such as The Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC) or slogans like “Make Europe Great Again”—have accelerated the normalization of illiberalism. These networks thrive amid what he identifies as a deeper crisis of liberalism itself: declining legitimacy, shrinking human rights cooperation, and the inability of liberal institutions to deliver material security, social inclusion, and credible governance in an increasingly unequal and digitally mediated global order.

        Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Matías Bianchi, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

        Turkish women took action on May 8, 2020 in Istanbul not to repeal the Istanbul Convention, which provides protection against domestic and male violence. Photo: Emre Orman.

        Iran and Turkey through ‘The Golden Cage’ and ‘Contextual Gendered Racialization’ Lens: Populism, Law, Gender and Freedom

        In this commentary, Dr. Hafza Girdap offers a compelling comparative analysis of populism, law, gender, and freedom across two authoritarian contexts. Bringing Shirin Ebadi’s “The Golden Cage” into dialogue with transnational feminist theory, Dr. Girdap examines how populist regimes in Iran and Turkey moralize “the people,” narrow citizenship, and weaponize law to discipline dissent—particularly women’s dissent. Drawing on her original framework of contextual gendered racialization, she shows how gender governance operates through both patriarchy and racialized belonging. The article foregrounds women’s resistance as a form of epistemic, legal, and care-centered praxis, redefining freedom not as order or security, but as memory, accountability, and collective struggle beyond the confines of the “golden cage.”

        By Hafza Girdap

        This piece offers a condensed commentary drawn from a broader, ongoing project of mine that seeks to trace a coherent trajectory bridging sociology, feminist theory, and human rights practice. Centering the experiences of racialized and marginalized women, my project examines how women actively reclaim voice, produce knowledge, and build solidarities across borders. By integrating scholarship with activism, it aims not only to interpret structures of oppression but also to intervene in them—amplifying marginalized women’s voices, reshaping public discourse, and contributing to justice-oriented social change at both local and global levels.

        Within this framework, the article examines populism, gendered repression, and resistance in Iran and Turkey by bringing Shirin Ebadi’s The Golden Cage into dialogue with transnational feminist theory and my conceptual framework of contextual gendered racialization.

        Across both cases, populism constructs a moralized vision of “the people,” narrows plural citizenship, and weaponizes law to discipline dissent, particularly women’s dissent. Read together, Iran and Turkey reveal a shared trajectory from revolutionary or reformist promise to authoritarian consolidation, where legality becomes an instrument of domination, intimacy is reorganized by fear, and women’s resistance redefines freedom not as comfort or order, but as accountability, memory, and collective care (Shabnam, 2016).

        Populism and the Moral Community

        In post-1979 Iran, Islamist populism intertwined anti-imperialism with religious moralism, deifying state power as the authentic voice of the ummah and framing dissent as moral deviance or foreign betrayal. Hardship, repression, and top-down governance are justified as ethical sacrifice, while sovereignty is equated with the regime itself (Qaderi et al., 2023; V for Human, 2025; Bottura, 2024).  

        In Turkey, the populism of ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan evolved from counter-Kemalist majoritarianism into a religio-nationalist project that performs unity through slogans such as “one nation, one flag, one religion,” increasingly centralizing authority in the figure of the leader. While initially framed as democratizing, this project narrowed citizenship through moral conformity, loyalty, and cultural homogeneity (Yalvaç & Joseph, 2019; Yabancı, 2022). 

        Ebadi’s metaphor of the golden cage” captures the populist bargain in both contexts: material security, national pride, and moral certainty are offered in exchange for silence. Belonging becomes conditional, and pluralism is redefined as threat. Populism thus does not merely mobilize “the people”; it redraws their boundaries.

        From Rule of Law to Rule-by-Law

        Ebadi’s central assertion, law without justice is violence,” resonates powerfully across both cases. In Iran, juridical language legitimates repression through moralized penalties, surveillance, and gender policing. Courts, decrees, and security forces recode dissent, especially women’s défiance, as disorder, immorality, or national betrayal. Following the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising, intensified surveillance technologies and punitive legislation targeted women’s everyday presence in public space (V for Human, 2025, Makooi, 2025).

        In Turkey, a shift from institutional reform to rule-by-law recalibrated the judiciary, media, and religious institutions to executive power. Gender governance became a central showcase of this transformation. The withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention via presidential decree exemplified how formal legality can be used to hollow out rights while projecting a moralized policy turn. In both contexts, legality masks authoritarian consolidation, transforming law into a technology of control rather than protection (Girdap, 2021; Sarac et al., 2023).

        Family, Fear, and Everyday Life

        The Golden Cage demonstrates how authoritarianism penetrates the most intimate spaces of life. Ebadi’s family narrative traces siblings forced into divergent ethical trajectories; revolutionary idealism punished by imprisonment or execution, loyalist complicity pursued for survival, exile chosen at the cost of belonging. Love and loyalty become calculations of risk under surveillance.

        Ebadi’s family members function as ethical projections under coercion: the revolutionary idealist destroyed by the system, the loyalist navigating compromise at psychological cost, and the exile living with safety and loss. Ebadi herself stands as the ethical center, a jurist-witness insisting that memory is a civic duty and that law must be reclaimed for justice. Her feminism is not abstract; it is anchored in accountability, testimony, and refusal to forget.

        Contemporary Turkey echoes this intimate violence. Employment bans, travel restrictions, stigmatization of dissidents, and criminalization of speech ripple through households. Families become sites of risk management; ordinary communication is shaped by caution. The political becomes domestic, and repression is lived not only through spectacular events but through everyday self-censorship and fractured trust.

        Gender as the Authoritarian and Democratic Measure

        Gender emerges as both the primary target of authoritarian control and the most sensitive measure of democratic erosion. In Iran, women led the Woman, Life, Freedom movement following the death of Mahsa (Jina) Amini. Despite lethal repression, mass arrests, and intensified surveillance, women’s everyday practices, particularly in urban spaces, signal irreversible shifts in presence, visibility, and refusal (European Parliament, 2022; Blout, 2025).

        In Turkey, women’s citizenship is increasingly restricted into motherhood, family duty, and moral loyalty. Feminism and LGBTQI+ activism are framed as moral and foreign threats, while patriarchal governance is legitimated through religious and nationalist discourse. The Istanbul Convention withdrawal galvanized resistance, making gender a central site through which democratic backsliding and civic resilience are simultaneously revealed.

        My framework of contextual gendered racialization sharpens this analysis by showing how Sunni Turkishness is privileged through an ethno-religious “Turkishness Contract,” producing double marginalization for Kurdish, Alevi, Armenian, and dissenting women. Gendered governance thus operates through both patriarchy and racialized belonging (Unlu, 2023).

        Transnational Racialization and Migration

        Racialization travels across borders. In Turkey, difference is marked through proximity to dominant Sunni Turkish identity rather than skin color; minority women are symbolically racialized as deviant or suspect. In the United States, Muslim women become hyper-visible within Islamophobic regimes of surveillance, legally white, socially brown (Aziz, 2020). Hijab, accent, and names trigger institutional scrutiny across immigration, healthcare, education, and labor.

        Women respond through strategic identity management: negotiating visibility, silence, and speech; altering dress or disclosure; cultivating selective belonging. These practices constitute feminist praxis rather than mere adaptation, resisting both authoritarian repression and reductive Western feminist frames. Situated feminisms emerge from lived negotiation rather than abstraction (Girdap, 2025).

        Law, Memory, and Care as Resistance

        Across Iran and Turkey, women deploy diverse resistance strategies that transform opposition from episodic protest into durable institution-building. Ebadi’s ethic of defending rights even within captured institutions finds parallels in feminist lawfare and documentation practices in Turkey. Litigation, femicide databases, survivor testimonies, and non-enforcement audits preserve public memory and sustain accountability even when legal victories are limited. As national protections erode, opposition-led municipalities expand shelters, hotlines, training, and care infrastructures, producing constituent feminism beyond electoral cycles. Campaigns such as #İstanbulSözleşmesiYaşatır (#IstanbulConventionSavesLives) and recurring protests after femicides sustain public scrutiny and agenda pressure. Groups like Mor Dayanışma link gender violence to labor precarity, militarism, ethnic repression, and anti-LGBTQI+ moral panics, expanding coalitions and articulating care-centered, class-conscious feminist praxis (Mor Dayanışma, 2025; Najdi, 2025; Şeker & Sönmezocak, 2021).

        Conclusion: Freedom Beyond the Golden Cage

        Bringing Ebadi’s ethic of law, memory, and freedom together with a transnational feminist analysis clarifies the stakes of the Iran–Turkey comparison. In both contexts, populism narrows [established] citizenship into a moral community, and gender becomes the key nexus of belonging. Yet women’s epistemic and practical resistance, through legal advocacy, documentation, care spaces, migration, and transnational solidarity, takes a huge step to widen citizenship back into rights, pluralism, and accountability.

        Freedom, in this sense, is not comfort or order. It is collective remembering, feminist institution-building, and sustained struggle against normalization. The golden cage is broken not by silence, but by women who insist on memory, justice, and shared political futures across borders.


         

        References

        Aziz, Sahar F. (2020). “Legally White, Socially Brown: Racialization of Middle Eastern Americans.” In: Routledge Handbook on Islam and Race (ed. Zain Abdullah), Rutgers Law School Research Paper No. Forthcoming, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3592699 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3592699

        Blout, Emily. (2025, September 16). “Resisting Iran’s High-Tech War on Women Three Years After Mahsa Amini’s Death.” Stimsonhttps://www.stimson.org/2025/resisting-irans-high-tech-war-on-women-mahsa-amini/

        Bottura, Beatrice. (2024). “Theocracy, Radicalism and Islamist/Secular Populism in Iran, Afghanistan & Tajikistan.”European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 18, 2024. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp0089

        European Parliament. (2022). Protests in Iran over the death of Mahsa Amini.https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2022/733671/EPRS_ATA%282022%29733671_EN.pdf

        Girdap, Hafza. (2021). “Right-wing populism, political Islam, and the Istanbul Convention.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). https://www.populismstudies.org/right-wing-populism-political-islam-and-the-istanbul-convention/

        Girdap, H. (2025). “Racialization and Response Through Embodied Identification.” In: From a Shadow to a Person: A Gender Studies Assessment of Women in the Middle East, edited by Shilan Fuad Hussain, Routledge, manuscript in preparation.

        Holliday, Shabnam J. (2016). “The legacy of subalternity and Gramsci’s national–popular: populist discourse in the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” Third World Quarterly, 37:5, 917-933, DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2015.1113872

        Makooi, Bahar. (2025, September 9). “Three years after Mahsa Amini’s death, Iranian women have seized ‘irreversible’ liberties.” France 24https://www.france24.com/en/middle-east/20250916-three-years-after-mahsa-amini-death-iranian-women-have-seized-irreversible-liberties

        Mor Dayanışma. (2025, February 11). “Women, Work, and War: Organizing and Resistance in Turkey – an Interview with Mor Dayanışma.” https://www.mordayanisma.org/2025/02/11/women-work-and-war-organizing-and-resistance-in-turkey-an-interview-with-mor-dayanisma/

        Najdi, Youhanna. (2025, September 16). “Mahsa Amini: 3 years on, will Iran face fresh protests?” DW.https://www.dw.com/en/mahsa-amini-3-years-on-will-iran-face-fresh-protests/a-74000756

        Qaderi, H.; Delavari, A. and Golmohammadi, A. (2023). “Populism and Politics in Iran after the Islamic Revolution: Content Analysis of Presidential Speeches from 1989 to 2017.” Political Strategic Studies12(44), 9-58. doi: 10.22054/qpss.2022.66333.3002

        Sarac, B. N.; Girdap, H., & Hiemstra, N. (2023). “Gendered state violence and post-coup migration out of Turkey.” Womens Studies International Forum, 99, 102796. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2023.102796

        Şeker, Berfu and Sönmezocak, Ezel Buse. (2021, June). “Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention: War on Gender Equality in Turkey.” Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/06292021_Freedom_House_Turkey_Policy_Brief-2-Withdrawal-from-the-Istanbul-Convention.pdf

        Unlu, B. (2023). “The Turkishness contract and the formation of Turkishness.” In: F. M. Gocek & A. Alemdaroglu (Eds.), Kurds in Dark Times. Syracuse University Press.

        V for Human (2025, August 12). Erased from the Scene: Türkiye’s Withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention. https://www.vforhuman.org/publications/erased-from-the-scene

        Yabancı, B. (2022). “Religion, nationalism, and populism in Turkey under the AKP.” Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2022-10/Religion%2C%20Nationalism%2C%20and%20Populism%20in%20Turkey%20Under%20the%20AKP.pdf

        Yalvaç, F. & Joseph, J. (2019). “Understanding populist politics in Turkey: a hegemonic depth approach.” Review of International Studies45(5), 786–804. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26843268

        Robert Butler1

        Dr. Butler on Trump’s European Strategy: Non-Intervention Can Itself Become a Form of Intervention

        In this interview with the ECPS, Dr. Robert Butler, Senior Lecturer at the University of Lorraine, examines how far-right actors in France and the UK construct legitimacy amid crisis and geopolitical uncertainty. Drawing on critical and multimodal discourse analysis, Dr. Butler explores authorization, crisis narratives, and moral evaluation in the rhetoric of Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, and Nigel Farage. Reflecting on Trump’s return to power, he cautions against simplistic readings of transatlantic influence, arguing that framing Europe as “weak and vulnerable” may have concrete political effects. As Dr. Butler strikingly notes, “non-intervention itself becomes a form of intervention,” reshaping sovereignty, responsibility, and counter-mobilization across Europe.

        Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

        Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Robert Butler, Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Languages at the University of Lorraine (Nancy) and editor of Political Discourse Analysis: Legitimisation Strategies in Crisis and Conflict, offers a nuanced comparative analysis of far-right discourse in France and the United Kingdom. Drawing on critical discourse analysis and multimodal approaches, Dr. Butler examines how contemporary populist and far-right actors seek legitimacy in what he characterizes as a “de-legitimized political world.”

        Across the interview, Dr. Butler emphasizes that far-right actors such as Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, and Nigel Farage rely heavily on authorization as a legitimization strategy, combining appeals to the personal authority of leaders with increasing references to impersonal authority, particularly “the rule of law.” As he notes, “we see authorization at work: the personal authority of leaders, alongside reliance on impersonal authority.” This dual strategy allows far-right actors to distance themselves from overt radicalism while positioning themselves as credible governing alternatives.

        A central theme of the interview is the discursive construction of crisis. In the UK context, Dr. Butler explains that Reform UK frames crisis as systemic collapse, encapsulated in the slogan “Britain is broken,” while in France, the National Rally (NR) increasingly portrays crisis through the lens of economic sovereignty, borders, and protection of domestic production. These crisis narratives are not only rhetorical devices but also serve to justify policy claims that move “beyond moral evaluation” toward what Dr. Butler calls “the realm of substance.”

        The interview’s headline theme emerges most clearly in Dr. Butler’s reflections on international crises and Donald Trump’s return to power. Addressing whether Trump acts as a catalyst for far-right normalization in Europe, Dr. Butler cautions against linear assumptions. Instead, he highlights how Trumpian discourse increasingly frames European leaders as “weak and vulnerable,” raising fundamental questions about sovereignty, protection, and authority. Crucially, Dr. Butler argues that a politics of disengagement may carry unintended consequences, noting that “non-intervention itself becomes a form of intervention.”

        This insight anchors the interview’s broader contribution: far-right legitimization does not rely solely on overt alignment with radical allies but often involves strategic distancing, ambiguity, and moral labeling. As Dr. Butler puts it, describing states as weak may function as “a form of moral evaluation” that lacks substance yet reshapes political expectations and responsibilities.

        By combining close discourse analysis with comparative political insight, this interview sheds light on how far-right actors navigate legitimacy, crisis, and authority—both domestically and internationally—at a moment when the boundaries between intervention, sovereignty, and normalization are increasingly blurred.

        Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Robert Butler, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

        Prime Minister Narendra Modi is showing victory sign with both hand to supporters at Bharatiya Janata Party office amid the results of the Indian General Elections 2024 in New Delhi, India on June 4 2024. Photo: PradeepGaurs.

        Bihar Provincial Assembly Elections Boost Modi’s Populism

        In his incisive analysis, Dr. Amir Ali, examines how the 2025 Bihar Provincial Assembly elections have reinvigorated Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s populist dominance in Indian politics. Situating Bihar’s results within India’s shifting electoral landscape, Dr. Ali shows how the BJP-led coalition’s victory undermines expectations of anti-incumbency following the party’s 2024 parliamentary setback. He critically engages controversies surrounding the Election Commission of India, welfare-driven electoral strategies, and the shrinking space for opposition politics. Drawing on his broader scholarship on populism, democracy, and sovereignty, Dr. Ali warns that the consolidation of power from “Parliament to Panchayat” raises serious concerns for institutional autonomy and democratic accountability in what V-Dem has termed an “electoral autocracy.”

        Amir Ali*

        The recently concluded election in the eastern Indian province of Bihar in early November 2025 was a shot in the arm for Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Bihar is one of the poorest provinces of the country with a per capita income that is a mere fraction of richer provinces. High unemployment levels result in outflux of unskilled workers. Among the controversies that plagued the Bihar assembly elections was the running of special trains carrying Bihari workers from the northern province of Haryana that abuts the national capital Delhi, back to their native province, to ensure they could vote.

        Despite its economic backwardness, Bihar is politically very important. The ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) is today the dominant political party in the country. It has replaced the earlier one-party dominant system of the Indian National Congress, that led India’s freedom struggle against British colonial rule. The BJP is at the center of the ruling coalition called the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). In the province of Bihar, the coalition partner of the BJP is the Janata Dal United JD(U) whose party boss, Nitish Kumar has been Chief Minister since 2005. Nitish Kumar is a leader whose political origins lie in samaajwaad or Indian socialism. Mr. Kumar is also known for his constant political flip-flops as he has constantly switched sides to continue in power. Back in 2015 he successfully fought the election in alliance with the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). This time the RJD was competing against him, winning only 25 seats.

        The alliance between the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the Janata Dal United JD(U) performed surprisingly well, winning together with other smaller allied parties, 202 seats in the 243-seat legislative assembly. The result was a major blow for the opposition I.N.D.I.A alliance that includes the once powerful Congress Party. The resounding victory of the ruling BJP led alliance means a further political consolidation, captured in a stated desire to prevail over Indian politics from ‘Parliament to Panchayat’ (the lowest tier of local self-governance at the level of the village). The ruling BJP has also expressed an intent to rid the country of the supposed baleful presence of the Congress that is captured in the Hindi expression of a Congress mukt Bharat (India/Bharat rid of the Congress). 

        The shrinking of the opposition becomes a cause for concern, especially as India has been characterized by the V-Dem institute as an ‘electoral autocracy.’ The provincial assembly election in Bihar needs to be seen in the backdrop of the 2024 parliamentary elections in which the ruling BJP suffered a setback as its numbers declined from 303 in 2019 to 240, forcing it into relying on significant support from coalition partners. This was viewed by the opposition as signaling a waning of the electoral dominance of the BJP.

        Two Developments in the Run-up to the Election

        The run up to the Bihar assembly election in early November 2025 was marked by two developments. The first was the announcement by the Election Commission of India (ECI) to conduct a Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, four months prior to the elections. This became controversial on account of the onerous demands of documentation put on voters to ensure their names were on the voters’ list. The opposition immediately protested and appealed to the Supreme Court of India, which did not stop the SIR exercise, but demanded lenient consideration in terms of the documents that voters were required to produce. The opposition had hoped to make the revision of electoral rolls an issue in the elections, suggesting in their campaigns that the ruling BJP was conniving with the Election Commission of India to ‘steal’ votes. 

        The aspersions cast on the Election Commission of India are unfortunate. It is a constitutional body that under Article 324 of the constitution is guaranteed autonomy from the executive to conduct free and fair elections. The Election Commission of India has generally been above board in terms of its conduct with a succession of Chief Election Commissioners, who head the institution, taking independently assertive positions against ruling governments. If the opposition’s allegations about lack of autonomy of the Election Commission are true, then this would tend to underline the anti-institutional element, characteristic of much populist politics that while exaggeratedly elevating the purity of the people, excoriates the very institutions that mediate the people’s will. The leader of the opposition, Rahul Gandhi of the Congress party has conducted a series of explosive press conferences where he has displayed proof of the Election Commission of India’s ‘conniving’ with the ruling BJP to ensure the latter’s electoral victory.

        The second significant development in the run up to the elections was the decision taken by the Nitish Kumar government in Bihar to announce the disbursal of ten thousand rupees (95.75 Euros) for women voters under a scheme to promote women’s self-employment. Analysts felt that this was decisive in terms of winning the elections for the ruling NDA coalition. Opponents of the ruling coalition cried foul at the decision announced in late September 2025. This was just before the model code of conduct came into place. Such announcements are seen as an infringement of the model code of conduct as they may induce votes in favor of the ruling party.

        Whither Anti-incumbency?

        The election results from Bihar impart momentum to the ruling BJP led coalition as the year 2025 closes. Next year in early 2026, provincial assembly elections are due in two more states further to the east of Bihar, in the provinces of West Bengal and Assam. The elections result in Bihar, especially considered in the light of the electoral setback that the BJP suffered in the parliamentary elections at the federal level in early 2024, seem to put paid to the phenomenon of anti-incumbency which refers to the uphill task that an incumbent party experiences as it seeks re-election. The BJP’s dominance seems to defy what in India is called the law of anti-incumbency.

         


        (*) Dr. Amir Ali is a faculty member at the Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi. Prior to this he taught at the Department of Political Science, Jamia Millia Islamia University. He was Agatha Harrison Memorial Visiting Fellow at St. Antony’s College, Oxford between the years 2012 to 2014. He has authored two books South Asian Islam and British Multiculturalism (Routledge, 2016) and Brexit and Liberal Democracy: Populism, Sovereignty and the Nation-State (Routledge, 2022). His areas of teaching, research and writing are political theory, multiculturalism, group rights, British politics and political Islam. His regularly written political commentary on Indian and global politics has appeared in the Economic and Political Weekly, Al Jazeera English, the Indian periodical Outlook and in Indian broadsheet newspapers such as The Indian Express, The Hindu, and The Telegraph. 

        Dr. Robert Butler is a Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Languages at the University of Lorraine (Nancy).

        Dr. Butler on Trump’s European Strategy: Non-Intervention Can Itself Become a Form of Intervention

        In this interview with the ECPS, Dr. Robert Butler, Senior Lecturer at the University of Lorraine, examines how far-right actors in France and the UK construct legitimacy amid crisis and geopolitical uncertainty. Drawing on critical and multimodal discourse analysis, Dr. Butler explores authorization, crisis narratives, and moral evaluation in the rhetoric of Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, and Nigel Farage. Reflecting on Trump’s return to power, he cautions against simplistic readings of transatlantic influence, arguing that framing Europe as “weak and vulnerable” may have concrete political effects. As Dr. Butler strikingly notes, “non-intervention itself becomes a form of intervention,” reshaping sovereignty, responsibility, and counter-mobilization across Europe.

        Interview by Selcuk Gultasli

        Giving an interview to the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), Dr. Robert Butler, Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Arts and Languages at the University of Lorraine (Nancy) and editor of Political Discourse Analysis: Legitimisation Strategies in Crisis and Conflict, offers a nuanced comparative analysis of far-right discourse in France and the United Kingdom. Drawing on critical discourse analysis and multimodal approaches, Dr. Butler examines how contemporary populist and far-right actors seek legitimacy in what he characterizes as a “de-legitimized political world.”

        Across the interview, Dr. Butler emphasizes that far-right actors such as Marine Le Pen, Jordan Bardella, and Nigel Farage rely heavily on authorization as a legitimization strategy, combining appeals to the personal authority of leaders with increasing references to impersonal authority, particularly “the rule of law.” As he notes, “we see authorization at work: the personal authority of leaders, alongside reliance on impersonal authority.” This dual strategy allows far-right actors to distance themselves from overt radicalism while positioning themselves as credible governing alternatives.

        A central theme of the interview is the discursive construction of crisis. In the UK context, Dr. Butler explains that Reform UK frames crisis as systemic collapse, encapsulated in the slogan “Britain is broken,” while in France, the National Rally (NR) increasingly portrays crisis through the lens of economic sovereignty, borders, and protection of domestic production. These crisis narratives are not only rhetorical devices but also serve to justify policy claims that move “beyond moral evaluation” toward what Dr. Butler calls “the realm of substance.”

        The interview’s headline theme emerges most clearly in Dr. Butler’s reflections on international crises and Donald Trump’s return to power. Addressing whether Trump acts as a catalyst for far-right normalization in Europe, Dr. Butler cautions against linear assumptions. Instead, he highlights how Trumpian discourse increasingly frames European leaders as “weak and vulnerable,” raising fundamental questions about sovereignty, protection, and authority. Crucially, Dr. Butler argues that a politics of disengagement may carry unintended consequences, noting that “non-intervention itself becomes a form of intervention.”

        This insight anchors the interview’s broader contribution: far-right legitimization does not rely solely on overt alignment with radical allies but often involves strategic distancing, ambiguity, and moral labeling. As Dr. Butler puts it, describing states as weak may function as “a form of moral evaluation” that lacks substance yet reshapes political expectations and responsibilities.

        By combining close discourse analysis with comparative political insight, this interview sheds light on how far-right actors navigate legitimacy, crisis, and authority—both domestically and internationally—at a moment when the boundaries between intervention, sovereignty, and normalization are increasingly blurred.

        Here is the edited transcript of our interview with Dr. Robert Butler, slightly revised for clarity and flow.

        Delegitimizing Elites, Authorizing Leaders

        Nigel Farage speaking in Dover, Kent, UK, on May 28, 2024, in support of the Reform Party, of which he is President. Photo: Sean Aidan Calderbank.

        Dr. Robert Butler, thank you so very much for joining our interview series. Let me start right away with the first question: From your perspective as editor of Political Discourse Analysis: Legitimisation Strategies in Crisis and Conflict,” how would you characterize the dominant legitimization strategies used by Marine Le Pen and Nigel Farage when they present themselves as defenders of “the people” against distant elites? Do these strategies converge across France and the UK, or are they embedded in quite distinct national political cultures?

        Dr. Robert Butler: I haven’t done specific research on the situation in France, so I’ve looked, to some extent, at developments in the UK, particularly Reform UK. What I would say is that there is a clear delegitimization of the establishment and the parties in power in both countries.

        In terms of the actual legitimization strategies used, I think they do, in both contexts, draw on what Theo van Leeuwen refers to in his seminal 2007 article on legitimization and legitimation—namely, authorization. There is a strong emphasis on the personal authority of leaders: Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella in France, and Nigel Farage, the leader of Reform UK, in the UK.

        There is an appeal to personal authority, but I also think there is a growing appeal to impersonal authority, particularly the rule of law—emphasizing the need to respect the law and to operate within its parameters.

        So, very much in terms of legitimization strategies, and following Van Leeuwen’s approach, we see authorization at work: the personal authority of leaders, alongside reliance on impersonal authority, namely the rule of law.

        Performing Insecurity Through Multimodal Authority

        In your work on authority and multimodal discourse, you stress how gesture, intonation, and visual framing help construct political identity. How do you see these multimodal resources operating in the performances of Farage and Le Pen (and now Jordan Bardella) when they dramatize insecurity, crisis, or loss of control?

        Dr. Robert Butler: I would say that, again, my focus has been on Reform UK rather than on the Rassemblement National in France, the National Rally. That said, what we can observe in both cases is a significant use of gesture, with gestures playing an important role alongside discourse.

        In particular, with Farage, we see frequent use of what we call open-hand supine gestures, where the hands are held with the palms facing upwards, often accompanied by outward and upward movements. These gestures can serve a pragmatic function, signaling uncertainty—conveying a sense of “I don’t know” or “what is there?”—and suggesting that the situation is difficult to interpret.

        This is a significant gesture because it contributes to the audience’s impression that the situation is politically untenable, that there is a broader social situation that needs to be managed. Accordingly, open-hand gestures appear frequently, often with a wide space between the hands.

        From what I have observed, we also see this with the National Rally in France: broader gestures and extensive use of the hands. Visually, this reinforces the audience’s impression that something needs to be done, that there is uncertainty about what that should be, and that the situation they face is untenable.

        From Slogans to Substance in Far-Right Legitimation

        Marine Le Pen, from the Front National, a national-conservative political party in France in meeting for the presidential election of 2017 at the Zenith of Paris on April 17, 2017. Photo: Frederic Legrand.

        One of the core themes of your edited volume is the challenge of sustaining legitimacy in a “de-legitimized political world.” To what extent has the far right in France and the UK successfully exploited this legitimacy deficit—especially the erosion of trust in parties, media, and expert authority—and what limits do you see to this strategy?

        Dr. Robert Butler: There has been a significant challenge to the legitimacy of established political parties—particularly catch-all parties—in power in both the UK and France. Again, drawing on Van Leeuwen’s 2007 article on legitimization and legitimization strategies, the challenge has been to move beyond what he calls moral evaluation—that is, the use of words or slogans that carry little meaning beyond statements such as “we are democratic” or “we believe in freedom,” where values are not supported by substantive action. The parties—what we refer to as the far right—have themselves moved beyond moral evaluation and are increasingly operating in the realm of substance when justifying their positions.

        This can be seen, for example, in an interview Bardella gave several months ago, in which he called out the Ministry of the Economy and Finance’s claims that businesses should be patriotic. He frames this as a form of moral evaluation—without stating it explicitly—suggesting that it amounts to little more than words. Here, we see something that can be assimilated to moral evaluation being directly challenged by the National Rally.

        So, I think they are attempting to expose moral evaluation strategies, move beyond them, and instead rely on authorization.

        In Power or In Office? Leverage Without Government

        Comparative research has often treated the Rassemblement National (RN) in France as a party on the cusp of governmental power, and Reform UK—despite its recent surge in influence—as an “outsider” shaping the agenda from the margins. Using the distinction between being “in power” and “in office,” how would you assess the current leverage of Le Pen and Farage over mainstream parties and policy in their respective systems?

        Dr. Robert Butler: In France, the National Rally has not obtained an absolute majority in the Assembly. There was some discussion about waiting and only seeking to govern with a majority; that is how I understood the situation. There has also been discussion about whether there might be a primary across the right in French politics. However, certain parties further to the left within the right have indicated that they do not share common ground with the RN, the National Rally. So, in terms of being in office and in power, the RN is seeking new elections in order to try to secure that majority.

        In the UK, various opinion polls have suggested that Reform UK would, if an election were called today—even though one is not due immediately—emerge as the largest party. It might not secure an overall majority, and this could result in a hung parliament. There is a portrayal of Reform UK as being on the outside, looking in at a UK that is collapsing or imploding, reflected in the slogan “Britain is broken” and in its emphasis on public services being unable to cope and being overwhelmed. In terms of being empowered in office, Reform UK is neither in office nor in power, but it is positioning itself around what is needed to take power. However, it is doing so very much from the outside, observing those in power and a situation that it portrays as collapsing and imploding.

        When ‘Britain Is Broken’ Meets Economic Sovereignty

        Your work highlights how crisis narratives are central to legitimization. How do far-right actors in France and the UK differently construct “crisis”—migration, cost of living, Europe, Islam, climate—and what does this tell us about the socio-economic and historical specificities of each case?

        Dr. Robert Butler: Following on from what I’ve just said, I think that in the UK, Reform UK frames crisis in terms of systemic failure, emphasizing that Britain is broken. At his conference last year, Mr. Farage, for example, asked the audience, “Who has an NHS dentist in the room?” So, the crisis is constructed around the idea that Britain can no longer cope and that the system is under strain.

        By contrast, from what I have followed with the National Rally in France, and from what I have observed in their speeches and interviews over the past few months, the situation is portrayed more as one in which France is seen as a system that needs to change—particularly a system of exchange in which goods are produced abroad rather than in France, and which must be reoriented to favor domestic production. Accordingly, crisis is increasingly framed as the need for barriers, especially to protect French goods and their quality. In an interview, Marine Le Pen refers to frontiers or borders as a means of protecting the quality of products coming into the country.

        Populism as Process, Not Outcome

        In recent years, French and British political language has seen an inflationary use of the term “populist” as a weapon of de-legitimation. Building on contributions in your volume that ask “who calls whom a populist?”, how has this labelling battle shaped the public perception and normalization of Le Pen’s RN and Farage-style projects?

        Dr. Robert Butler: The term populism is better understood as a process—a means rather than an end in itself. I see it as a way of working toward a different political outcome in the future, rather than as an end product. Populism, in this sense, is not the outcome but the process. It is a process of placing more people on the side of “us” as opposed to “them,” where elites—frequently identified as such in interviews given by the National Rally—are positioned as “them,” and “the people” are increasingly placed on the side of “us,” meaning those who support these political parties.

        I also think—and this is something I may not have mentioned earlier—that the concept of moral outrage plays an important role. This is another legitimization strategy identified more recently. An article published about five years ago by Rebecca Williams addresses moral outrage, and I think populism is closely linked to a certain degree of social outrage, where particular actions can be justified by expressions of disgust or dissatisfaction with the current situation.

        In this sense, the term populism functions as a means of bringing people onto “our” side, presenting the United Kingdom and France as countries that need to do better, while simultaneously associating the nation and the people with the party. Populism, then, is a process of mobilizing support by drawing people in, rather than aligning them with the opposing side, which is constructed as those currently in power or other parties seeking power.

        Moral Outrage, Media, and Knowledge Claims

        Stop Trump Coalition march, Central London, United Kingdom, September 17, 2025. Protesters dressed as Musk, Farage, Vance, Putin, Trump, and Netanyahu. Photo: Ben Gingell.

        You emphasize “epistemic vigilance” and post-truth conditions in contemporary politics. How do far-right entrepreneurs in France and the UK negotiate this environment—do they primarily undermine factual authority (“fake news,” “media system”), or do they also try to re-establish alternative epistemic authorities such as patriotic experts, “common sense,” or online influencers?

        Dr. Robert Butler: I haven’t done much work on influencers as such; my focus has been more on YouTube as a social media outlet. I think certain media outlets have popularized the idea of common sense, and this notion has, in effect, become a form of legitimization—legitimizing actions when they can be framed as common sense. This is an area where more work needs to be done and further research is required.

        With Reform UK, in particular, it is less about the issue of fake news and more about adding a certain level of moral outrage to claims that the NHS, the National Health Service, cannot cope, and that certain social mechanisms appear to be broken. In terms of common sense, I am not entirely sure; I think there is still much more work to be done on this notion, and further research is needed.

        Mainstream Right Parties in a Reactive Phase

        Looking at internal party dynamics, what similarities and differences do you see between the ways in which the French Republicans and the British Conservatives have responded discursively to the rise of the far right? Have their legitimization strategies tended to contain, converge with, or further empower RN and Reform-style actors?

        Dr. Robert Butler: Thank you for your question. There has been some splintering of the traditional right in French politics toward the far right. In the UK, there have been several defections, mainly of former Conservative MPs, to Reform. There has been a noticeable number of such defections. I think there has been quite a lot of delegitimization of the policies of Reform UK and the National Rally by both the French Republicans and the British Conservatives.

        Reform UK is often seen as having an alternative agenda, whereas the National Rally is perceived as having little or nothing in common with other mainstream political parties. That appears to be the prevailing view. In recent days, there was discussion, as I mentioned earlier, of a large primary ahead of the 2027 elections—either presidential, legislative, or both—but this seems to have been ruled out, suggesting that there is limited common ground with the RN, the National Rally.

        Overall, there has been a strong emphasis on delegitimization. However, over time—perhaps over the next year or two—I expect we will see both the Conservatives and the Republican Party develop alternative legitimization strategies to justify their own positions. At present, they appear to be in a reactive phase in response to the rise and growing success of the RN and Reform UK.

        From Negation to Affirmation

        In your multimodal analysis of Farage and Reform UK, you show how negation and modality help define what a party “is” and “is not.” If we apply this lens to Le Pen/Bardella, how do denial, distancing, and disavowal (“not extreme right,” “not racist”) function in their efforts to render the RN a credible party of government?

        Dr. Robert Butler: Again, my work has focused on Reform UK rather than on the RN, the National Rally. However, based on what I have observed, I think there is a growing emphasis on asserting what the party stands for. There appears to be less focus on defining what the RN is not, and more on clearly articulating what it represents. In a recent interview, Le Pen acknowledged that for around 30 years there had been considerable emphasis on the negative way the party was treated by the media and by other parties. I think there is now a shift toward emphasizing what the party stands for, rather than relying on negation—denying that it is this or that. There is a reason for this shift. 

        The context is different from that of Reform UK, where Nigel Farage stepped back from mainstream politics for a period and then, over the last 12 to 18 months, had to explain why he was returning. This is why, in my recent article, I observed extensive use of negation by Farage, as he justified his return to mainstream politics by explaining what he could not do or why he rejected certain principles. 

        By contrast, the situation is somewhat different for Le Pen and Bardella. They appear to be in a phase of asserting, through affirmative terms, what they actually stand for.

        Re-Legitimizing Europe: Borders, Sovereignty, and Reform

        Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella are seen at the conclusion of a political meeting for the Rassemblement National party in Marseille on March 3, 2024. Photo: Obatala-photography.

        At the European level, how do you interpret the far right’s attempt to re-legitimize the EU not as a technocratic polity but as a vehicle for “civilizational” or “sovereigntist” politics? Do you see France and the UK as following parallel or diverging trajectories in this respect, given that one is inside and the other outside the Union?

        Dr. Robert Butler: The notion of Frexit—France leaving the European Union—has been present in public debate over the last two or three years. More recently, the plight of farmers, allegedly linked to Mercosur, has become a topic of debate and is very much in the news in France this week. In contrast, the UK has focused more on controlling borders, particularly on who is coming into and going out of the country, and especially who is entering the UK. As a result, the European Union has become less of a direct feature in Reform UK’s discourse, with greater emphasis placed on fixing the UK’s infrastructure and protecting its borders. By contrast, the RN, the National Rally, appears more concerned with reforming the EU, first and foremost in ways that it argues would benefit France.

        Your editorial work stresses the importance of multimodal critical discourse studies. How have social media formats—short clips, memes, influencer-style videos—transformed far-right communication in France and the UK, and are there noteworthy differences in platform use or visual rhetoric between Le Pen/Bardella and Farage/Tice?

        Dr. Robert Butler: As I mentioned earlier, I haven’t focused specifically on the RN in my research, so it is difficult for me to provide a detailed answer with regard to the National Rally. However, if we take YouTube as an example, there are currently many clips of Mr. Farage commenting on the situation in the UK, for instance on immigration.

        In some of his own clips, he also incorporates footage from other users’ videos to illustrate his points. This creates a kind of mise en abyme, if you like—a clip within a clip.

        In several instances, the Union Jack flag is visible, either behind him in a car or on the screen, and there are also many clips of him seated at a desk. This produces a very formal, official setting, which again connects to the idea of being in power or in office—not actually holding office, but simulating a scenario in which one might be looking at a future leader in office.

        By contrast, if we look at Marine Le Pen’s YouTube account—having discussed Farage’s account—you see many clips of her speaking in the Assemblée Nationale or being interviewed by mainstream media outlets. This is a key difference. There are many more clips of Le Pen in clearly official settings, such as major media interviews or parliamentary contexts. This points to a clear difference in the use of context.

        From ‘Britain Is Broken’ to Paths to Power

        Looking ahead to the next decade, what scenarios do you consider most plausible for the far right in France and the UK: full governmental incorporation, permanent “blackmail” power over center-right parties, or gradual demobilization as issues and generations change? What indicators should researchers monitor to distinguish among these trajectories?

        Dr. Robert Butler: Thank you for asking this question, because one of the main slogans—or narratives—of Reform UK is “Britain is broken.” At some point, it will need fixing, and I think it is important to pay attention to metaphors related to rebuilding, fixing, and redoing. From a linguistic perspective, in addition to metaphors, we should also look for what are known as force-dynamic strategies, where interaction between entities involves overcoming difficulty and crisis, and observe whether these strategies are actually put into practice. In terms of language it will be particularly interesting in the UK to see how Britain is discursively framed as moving from being “broken” to being “fixed,” and how problems are presented as being overcome.

        In France, the far right’s objective is to win the Assembly and secure a majority in 2027, as well as to win the presidential elections that year. It will also be important to observe the results of the municipal elections scheduled for 2026.

        Focusing on the UK, a coalition involving Reform UK and another party—most likely the Conservatives, if it were to be any party—would probably be more attractive to Reform UK than holding an overall majority. We have a precedent for this in the Liberal Democrat–Conservative coalition from 2010 to 2015, in which the Liberal Democrats were the junior partner.

        In that situation, the Conservatives were able to take advantage of certain Liberal Democrat policies, such as raising the tax threshold, while also seeking to maximize credit for the junior partner’s policy initiatives. At the same time, there was an abstention campaign for changes to the electoral system which was put forward. Meanwhile, the Liberal Democrats were largely left to deal with the fallout from the rise in tuition fees, which, as we can agree, was not a particularly popular policy.

        If Reform UK were in a hung Parliament but emerged as the main coalition partner, it would be in a position to offload some responsibility for policy outcomes. Then, perhaps in ten years’ time, it could aim for full majority power.

        Overall, I think we could see some very interesting political as well as discursive strategies. It is quite conceivable that Reform UK could be involved in a coalition arrangement similar to that of 2010, with both political and discursive strategies unfolding in parallel.

        Legitimizing Authority Through Strategic Distancing

        Donald J. Trump, the 47th President of the United States, at his inauguration celebration in Washington, D.C., on January 20, 2025. Photo: Muhammad Abdullah.

        Given your interest in how authority is discursively constructed, how do international crises—Russia’s war in Ukraine, the US democratic crisis, or Middle East conflicts—influence the legitimization strategies of far-right actors in France and the UK? Are these crises used mainly to normalize their positions, or also to distance themselves from more radical allies?

        Dr. Robert Butler: I think that at conferences held by Farage last year, in 2024, there was some clear distancing from the leader of Russia. This distancing was definitely observable in the discourse.

        In France, more recently this year, interviews with the RN have reflected an acknowledgement of US sovereignty in relation to what is unfolding there, alongside an emphasis that US priorities are not necessarily France’s priorities. This again represents a defense of France’s national interest. There also appears to be support for the rule of law.

        I’m not sure I have much more to add to this question, but I think there is an acknowledgement of other countries combined with a certain degree of distancing, allowing both the UK and France to assert and defend their own national policies.

        Trump, Europe, and the Politics of Non-Intervention

        In light of the recently released Trump National Security Strategy, to what extent has the Trump presidency provided ideological validation or strategic inspiration for far-right actors in France and the UK? Do you see Le Pen, Bardella, or Farage consciously drawing on Trumpian rhetoric, political style, or governing practices, or is the transatlantic influence more diffuse and symbolic?

        Dr. Robert Butler: From what I have observed, there appears to be some distancing from Trumpian rhetoric. Again, this reflects what I have noted previously. In France, the emphasis is very much on defending national interests at the level of the nation-state and on asserting France’s sovereignty. The RN, in particular, places strong emphasis on the rule of law. In the UK, the picture is perhaps more complex. There does seem to be some aversion to the language used in the US context, but I am not sure I have observed enough to comment on this in greater detail.

        And lastly, Dr. Robert Butler, looking beyond national cases, do you see that the Trump presidency accelerates a broader European shift toward sovereigntist and civilization-based politics, or do European systems remain resilient and path-dependent? In other words, might Trump act as a multiplier for far-right normalization across the EU—or does his return instead provoke counter-mobilization among mainstream parties and institutions?

        Dr. Robert Butler: Thank you for your question. I think it is difficult to know and much depends on what the remainder of the Trump presidency offers to European leaders. If European leaders are framed as weak and vulnerable—and we have seen some of this in recent discourse—and if they continue to be framed in this way, then there may be a tendency to seek protection, perhaps in exchange for greater influence or possibly reduced sovereignty. The notion of weakness in European leadership does appear to be entering Trumpian discourse at the moment. Again, the question is whether this framing is simply a moral label—a form of moral evaluation—where countries are described as weak. What does that actually mean, and is it backed up by substantive claims?

        In terms of counter-mobilization, I think it depends on what, exactly, is being countered. If the discourse emphasizes non-intervention—leaving countries alone and withholding the financial, logistical, or other forms of support that may be required—then it becomes difficult to mobilize against any particular actor or policy.

        The question then becomes how other countries—such as Russia, China, or other states—respond in relation to Europe. There is therefore a broader issue of whether non-intervention itself becomes a form of intervention. If one ceases to intervene, even rhetorically, and frames this as “leaving countries alone,” there is a risk that such a stance could weaken or undermine potential counter-mobilization.