Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 2: The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 19, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00114
On September 18, 2025, ECPS held the second session of the Virtual Workshop Series — “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (Oxford), the panel examined Poland’s democratic trajectory through themes of patriotism, constitutional conflict, human rights, and representation. Highlights included Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s call to recover Solidarity’s inclusive legacy, Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional “quagmire,” Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s exploration of contested women’s and minority rights, and Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reframing of judicial representation. Discussants added comparative and moral-philosophical perspectives. The session concluded that Poland’s experience reflects global struggles: reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending institutions, and embedding rights remain vital for democratic renewal.
Reported by ECPS Staff
On September 18, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the second session of its Virtual Workshop Series — ‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. The session, titled “The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland,” brought together leading scholars to examine the Polish case as a lens into broader struggles over democracy, representation, and rights. Chaired by Professor Mavis Maclean (University of Oxford), the event highlighted Poland’s experience of post-1989 transformation, the contested legacy of Solidarity, constitutional polarization, and ongoing battles over women’s and minority rights.
Following the introduction of the programme and participants by Reka Koleszar on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mavis Maclean, CBE (St Hilda’s College, University of Oxford) opened by situating the discussion within a wider European context. Reflecting on Britain’s surge of far-right populism, she posed a dilemma: should mass populist movements be regarded as authentic expressions of civic grievance, or as dangerous forces of hatred and violence? She expressed hope that the Polish experience could illuminate how democracies might redirect discontent toward renewal rather than demagoguery.
The first presentation, delivered by Professor Jacek Kurczewski on behalf of his wife, the absent Professor Joanna Kurczewska (Polish Academy of Sciences), revisited her long-standing work on Polish patriotism. Drawing on the legacy of Solidarity and the role of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, she argued that inclusive, pluralist patriotism once united workers, intellectuals, and clergy, but that its legacy has since weakened. She warned that today’s exclusionary populism thrives on the failure to sustain that inclusive vision.
Dr. Kamil Jonski (University of Łódź) then addressed Poland’s constitutional polarization. His paper, “Single Text, Clashing Meanings,” traced how the 1997 Constitution, from its inception, was a battleground of rival axiologies. While liberals view it as a rights-based framework, conservatives interpret it through a lens of sovereignty and morality. The 2015 constitutional crisis, resulting in right-wing packing of the Tribunal, offered opportunity to impose one of those visions, and produced a constitutional quagmire with disagreement not only on values, but also legitimacy of institutions (including top judicial bodies).
Professor Malgorzata Fuszara (University of Warsaw) explored the contested trajectory of human rights. She distinguished between broad consensus on universal rights after 1989 and the divisive politics of women’s and minority rights. Abortion restrictions, stalled LGBTQ reforms, and uneven protections illustrate enduring resistance. Yet she also highlighted progress, including the redefinition of rape law and gender quotas in parliament, underscoring the unfinished task of fully integrating women’s and minority rights into Poland’s human rights framework.
Finally, Professor Jacek Kurczewski (University of Warsaw) presented his own paper on representation and the rule of law. He challenged populist claims that only elected politicians embody the nation, arguing that judges also represent the nation through law, oath, and culture. Reviving lay participation in justice, he suggested, could counteract populist narratives and strengthen judicial legitimacy.
The discussion was enriched by three international discussants. Dr. Magdalena Solska (University of Fribourg) highlighted the need to revisit the legacy of Solidarity for democratic resilience and probed the paradox of women’s electoral behavior. Professor Barry Sullivan (Loyola University Chicago) compared Poland’s constitutional struggles to US debates, raising questions about the gap between cultural appeals and economic policy. Professor Krzysztof Motyka (Catholic University of Lublin) drew attention to the moral-philosophical dimensions of rights discourse, from Father Popiełuszko’s defense of life to the linguistic shift from civic to human rights.
Together, the session illuminated Poland as a microcosm of global struggles: how inclusive traditions are eroded by polarized politics, how constitutions fracture under competing axiologies, and how rights remain contested terrain.
Professor Mavis Maclean: Populism — Authentic Civic Voice or Dangerous Force of Hatred?
Mavis Maclean opened her contribution by emphasizing the significance of the discussion, describing it as both urgent and only just beginning to receive the attention it deserves. Reflecting on a recent conversation with a colleague who asked about the figure of Tommy Robinson, Maclean situated him within a broader European surge of far-right populism rooted in anxieties over immigration. She recalled that even British prime ministers had spoken of the country as becoming an “island of strangers.” For Maclean, this illustrates how immigration has become a focal point for rising populist energies that have caught established institutions unprepared.
She posed a central dilemma: should populist movements be valued as authentic expressions of civic sentiment, or feared as destabilizing forces that can slip into violence and hatred? Drawing contrasts with more hopeful movements in other contexts, Maclean warned that in Britain today the populist surge appears more threatening than transformative. Traditional party structures have weakened, with the Conservatives in decline and figures such as Nigel Farage and the Reform Party gaining visibility on the far right. Maclean expressed hope that the day’s presentations would help identify constructive responses—ways to reinforce the rule of law, rebuild political trust, and channel popular discontent into democratic renewal rather than demagoguery.
Joanna Kurczewska: “Varieties of Polish Patriotism: Experience of Solidarity 1980–1989 in the Context of History and Anthropology of Ideas”
Because of illness, Professor Joanna Kurczewska (Polish Academy of Sciences) could not attend the panel in person. Her paper was instead delivered by her husband, Professor Jacek Kurczewski (University of Warsaw). His presentation offered a rich reconstruction of Kurczewska’s long-term research on the intellectual and cultural legacies of Polish patriotism, with particular attention to the Solidarity movement (1980–1989).
Kurczewski opened with reflections on the difficulty of translating concepts such as “patriotism” and “nationalism” across linguistic and cultural contexts. In Poland, patriotism carries largely positive connotations, while nationalism is often viewed with suspicion. By contrast, in English-language scholarship “nationalism” is frequently a neutral, technical category. Kurczewska’s analysis insists that these terms cannot be divorced from their cultural histories.
The paper revisited her pioneering study from the 1990s, based on interviews with 53 Polish politicians in the early years of the Third Republic. Surprisingly, many of them—whether from the former Communist Party or from the anti-communist opposition—downplayed Solidarity as a living source of political ideas. While acknowledging its historical importance, they treated it as a closed chapter rather than a repertoire for democratic renewal.
From Solidarity to Liberal Patriotism
Today, in a deeply polarized Poland divided between Law and Justice (PiS) and the Civic Coalition, Kurczewska argues it is essential to recall the pluralism and inclusivity that defined Solidarity’s original ethos. Born from the Interfactory Strike Committee in 1980, Solidarity united workers, engineers, intellectuals, and Catholic clergy under a shared platform, symbolized by the charismatic figure of Lech Wałęsa and the Black Madonna emblem on his lapel.
A key focus of Kurczewska’s analysis is the role of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, the Catholic priest murdered by communist security services in 1984. Through his “Masses for the Homeland,” Popiełuszko created spaces that were both liturgical and profoundly civic. These gatherings became cultural products of resistance: religious rituals infused with democratic, republican, and Romantic ideals of truth, justice, courage, and solidarity. Importantly, they were inclusive, drawing believers and non-believers alike, and forging bonds between workers and intellectuals. In this, Kurczewska identifies a crucial anthropological dimension of patriotism—as lived practice and social performance, not just political ideology.
Popiełuszko’s sermons, she argues, advanced a form of “liberal patriotism.” Unlike traditional Polish Romantic nationalism, his vision insisted that the national community must guarantee individual autonomy and human rights. This creative redefinition of patriotism during late communism exemplifies how cultural and religious traditions can be reinterpreted to support democratic values.
Enigmatic Representation and Forgotten Legacies
Kurczewski then turned to the transition of the 1990s, when post-communist social democrats successfully reinserted themselves into politics. By appropriating elements of national tradition, they achieved electoral victories, while radical nationalists were marginalized to the political fringe. Yet, as Kurczewska warns, this era of “inclusive politics” has given way to a new fragmentation. Today, figures from the far-right fringe not only gain parliamentary seats but even sit in the European Parliament, bringing anti-Semitic, xenophobic, and anti-European rhetoric into the mainstream.
The conclusion of the paper introduced the notion of “enigmatic representation.” Kurczewska observed that Polish politicians of the 1990s, whether post-communist or from the Solidarity camp, tended to speak in the name of “the nation” or “society” without genuine interest in citizen voices. Society was treated as an object to be mobilized rather than a subject of representation. She suggested that this top-down approach may have sown long-term frustration, paving the way for today’s populist politics, which relies on exclusive language, sharp polarization, and appeals to younger generations through anti-migrant and anti-EU narratives.
The paper ultimately invites us to reconsider Solidarity not as a nostalgic memory, but as a resource for rebuilding democratic culture. Its pluralism, inclusive patriotism, and agonistic rather than antagonistic style of communication offer lessons for today’s Poland, where politics risks sliding into exclusionary populism. Kurczewska’s anthropological lens underscores that patriotism, when rooted in lived practices of solidarity, can remain a democratic force rather than a vehicle of division.
Delivered with warmth and intellectual care by Professor Jacek Kurczewski, the paper stood as both a historical analysis and a contemporary warning: Poland’s democratic future may depend on recovering the forgotten legacies of inclusive patriotism forged in the crucible of Solidarity.
Dr. Kamil Joński: “Single Text, Clashing Meanings: Political Polarization, Constitutional Axiology and the Polish Constitutional Quagmire”
Dr. Kamil Joński’s presentation offered a penetrating exploration of the Polish constitutional crisis, reframing it as not merely a legal or institutional dispute but as a struggle over political meaning, legitimacy, and the cultural axiology of constitutionalism itself. His central thesis was clear: although the 1997 Constitution has become an accepted normative text in Poland, its interpretation has fractured along deep political, cultural, and religious cleavages. This fragmentation has led to what Dr. Joński called a “constitutional quagmire,” in which the same constitutional text sustains radically divergent visions of democracy, the rule of law, and the legitimacy of the judicial bodies to be recognized as a court of law.
Historical Cleavages and the Rise of Polarization
Dr. Joński began by situating the problem historically. The first decade after the fall of communism was dominated by what scholars call the post-communist cleavage: the political opposition between former regime actors and the dissident opposition. Yet this cleavage reached exhaustion by the early 2000s.
By 2001, two new parties emerged from the younger generation of anti-communists: Civic Platform (PO), founded by Donald Tusk, and Law and Justice (PiS), founded by the Kaczyński brothers. Since 2005, Dr. Joński argued, the rivalry between these two parties has organized not only political life but also the constitutional order itself.
The Fragile Legitimacy of the 1997 Constitution
Dr. Joński turned next to the peculiar circumstances of the 1997 Constitution. Although it has endured for nearly three decades, its legitimacy has always been contested. Drafted by a parliament with an artificial post-communist majority—produced by electoral reform rather than a genuine social mandate—it was opposed by the Christian right, which offered an alternative “citizens’ draft” of the constitution. Finally, the constitution was approved in a referendum by the majority of 53.5% of voters on a 43% turnout. According to its critics, this meant less than one-quarter of eligible Poles endorsed the Constitution, labeling it not only “post-communist” but also “a minority constitution.” Yet, this contested document functioned relatively effectively for nearly 20 years, providing a framework for governance, EU accession, and steady economic development.
The 2015 Break: From Amendment to Interpretation
This balance collapsed in 2015. For the first time since democratization, one party—PiS—secured both a single-party parliamentary majority and the presidency. This unique constellation of power made it possible to embark on what retired Constitutional Tribunal justice Professor M. Wyrzykowski described as a “war against the Constitution.” Crucially, PiS lacked the supermajorities needed for formal constitutional amendment. Instead, it turned to institutional capture of the Constitutional Tribunal as a means of constitutional change through interpretation.
To this end PiS embarked what Dr. Jonski called “purposeful top-down de-legitimization” of the Tribunal. Initially respected across the political spectrum, and even praised for rulings sympathetic to Catholic doctrine in issues like abortion, the Tribunal was rapidly delegitimized through propaganda campaigns. branding it as an enemy of “the people.” Once PiS nominees assumed control over the Tribunal, it became what Professor Wojciech Sadurski has termed a “governmental enabler.” For PiS supporters, the Tribunal was re-legitimized as a defender of “the people” against liberal elites.
The Long Shadow of 1997
One of the most striking elements of Dr. Joński’s presentation was his demonstration of the continuity between the 1997 referendum and contemporary politics. Using electoral and survey data, he showed that nearly 45% of the variance in the 2025 presidential runoff could be explained by voting patterns from the 1997 constitutional referendum. In other words, attitudes toward the Constitution nearly three decades earlier are still visible on the Poland’s political map.
This persistence suggests that disputes about the Constitution are not only institutional but deeply cultural, rooted in long-standing divisions between religiously practicing conservatives and more secular, liberal constituencies.
Survey Evidence: Religion, Memory, and Constitutional Identity
Dr. Joński enriched his argument examining data from the late 1990s through the 2010s, to trac how different groups answered the questions related to the Constitution. Due to the shifts in Polish political landscape, he grouped respondents according to two criteria: self-identification on the left-right scale and religious service attendance.
In 1997, opposition to the constitution was heavily concentrated among respondents identifying with political right and declaring weekly service attendance. By 2017, very few Poles openly admitted to opposing the Constitution twenty years earlier—evidence that it had been normalized as a “fact of life.” Yet this apparent acceptance concealed ongoing dissatisfaction. Practicing right-wing voters most frequently expressed the strongest desire for constitutional change.
In 1997, opposition was heavily concentrated among practicing Catholics on the right. By 2017, very few Poles openly admitted to opposing the Constitution—evidence that it had been normalized as a “fact of life.” Yet this apparent acceptance concealed ongoing dissatisfaction. Practicing right-wing voters consistently expressed the strongest desire for constitutional change, arguing that the text was ill-suited to Poland’s needs.
When constitutional amendment proved politically unattainable, these constituencies turned to reinterpretation through institutional capture. This strategy was visible in survey responses during the height of the Tribunal crisis: when asked whether they supported the Tribunal or the government, practicing right-wing voters typically sided with the latter, despite the Tribunal’s earlier record of religiously sympathetic rulings on abortion, “blasphemy” and “conscientious objection.
Competing Constitutional Axiologies
The idea of saturating constitutional text with values is offered by legal doctrines favored on the political left (R. Dworkin’s 1996 “moral reading” of constitution) as well as right (A. Vermeule’s 2022 “Common Good Constitutionalism”).
At the heart of Dr. Joński’s analysis is the idea that such process occurred in Poland, and on both sides of axiological conflict. Thus, Poland faces a paradox: the Constitution can be shared as a text, yet it divides substantively as a contested source of meaning. Each camp projects its values onto the same text, producing parallel constitutional orders.
The Dual-Track Constitutional Order
After 2015 constitutional crisis and its implications, the situation is even worse, as both sides disagree not only on axiological meaning of the constitutional provisions, but also on the institutions legitimized to resolve the disputes (the legality of judicial appointment and the very status of the court of law). Today, Poland operates under what Dr. Joński called a dual-track constitutional regime.
Conclusion: A Constitution without Consensus
In closing, Dr. Joński emphasized the paradoxical nature of Polish constitutionalism. The 1997 Constitution, once derided as illegitimate, has become broadly accepted as a normative framework. Yet this acceptance has not produced consensus. Instead, it has given rise to clashing interpretations, each claiming fidelity to the text while advancing divergent value systems, visions of democracy, sovereignty, and rights.
This “single text, clashing meanings” dynamic illustrates the fragility of constitutional democracy in polarized societies. Poland’s experience suggests that legitimacy is not only a matter of formal adoption but of sustained cultural consensus. Absent that, constitutions risk becoming battlegrounds of identity, leaving societies vulnerable to constitutional crises.
Prof. Małgorzata Fuszara: “Protection of Human Rights and Its Implications for Women’s and Minority Rights”
Professor Małgorzata Fuszara delivered a nuanced and historically grounded analysis of the trajectory of human rights in Poland, with particular attention to the contested arenas of women’s rights and minority rights. Her paper carefully distinguished between two categories: the general, universal human rights that gained wide acceptance after 1989, and the more divisive domains of gender equality and minority protection, which remain highly politicized.
Human Rights under Authoritarianism and the Democratic Breakthrough
Professor Fuszara began with a reminder of the authoritarian context before 1989. For half a century, fundamental rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of association, the right to demonstrate, and the freedom to travel abroad were absent or severely restricted. Even trivial matters, such as the minutes of academic meetings, required approval by the censor. Public gatherings of more than five people needed official authorization. Passports were withheld and permission was required for every trip abroad.
Such restrictions underscored how authoritarian regimes can comprehensively curtail freedoms. Against this backdrop, the democratic breakthrough of 1989 brought a remarkable consensus: across the political spectrum, there was broad agreement on the need to enshrine fundamental rights. Drafting regulations for assemblies, for instance, was not a divisive issue. The recognition of basic human rights became part of Poland’s democratic DNA, at least at the level of principle.
From Consensus to Contestation
Yet Professor Fuszara emphasized that the consensus around general human rights did not extend to the rights of women and minorities. Here, division emerged immediately after 1989. The most striking example was reproductive rights. Under communism, abortion had been legal since 1956, earlier than in much of Western Europe. Generations of Polish women grew accustomed to reproductive autonomy. Thus, it came as a shock when the very first legislative proposals in the post-1989 parliament sought to introduce a total ban on abortion.
This debate revealed deep internal fractures. Even within Solidarność, the emblem of democratic opposition, the leadership supported abortion restrictions, while the women’s section opposed them. Since then, reproductive rights have remained one of the most divisive issues in Polish politics. Attempts to tighten abortion laws, particularly through Constitutional Tribunal rulings, repeatedly sparked mass mobilizations. The so-called “Black Protests” drew waves of young women—and many men—onto the streets, reshaping electoral patterns. Yet despite these mobilizations, restrictive laws remain in place, making abortion a symbol of both resistance and regression in contemporary Poland.
Minority Rights: Uneven Trajectories
Turning to minority rights, Professor Fuszara offered a differentiated assessment. The situation of ethnic and national minorities is relatively stable and in line with European Union standards. Legal provisions facilitate their parliamentary representation, and although disputes persist over which groups qualify as national minorities, these are largely managed within democratic debate.
In contrast, sexual minorities remain excluded from full equality. Efforts to introduce marriage equality or even civil partnerships have repeatedly failed. Professor Fuszara recalled attempts made over a decade ago, including during her own tenure as government plenipotentiary for equality, which were ultimately defeated. Although new proposals occasionally emerge, expectations remain low, and Poland continues to lag behind Western Europe in this field.
Professor Fuszara also stressed that formal legal guarantees often diverge from political practice. She recalled episodes when women protesting abortion restrictions faced harsh police repression, highlighting how authorities can undermine rights through coercive enforcement. These instances illustrate the fragility of rights protections in polarized contexts: while the principles of human rights may enjoy rhetorical consensus, their application can be obstructed by partisan or authoritarian impulses.
Recent Advances and Sources of Optimism
Despite these challenges, Professor Fuszara pointed to important achievements. Poland has ratified the Istanbul Convention, strengthening protections against gender-based violence. A major legal reform last month redefined rape in line with feminist jurisprudence, foregrounding the perspective of the victim for the first time. This marked an overdue recognition of the principle that women’s rights are human rights.
She also highlighted the adoption of gender quotas in electoral lists in 2011. Poland is, alongside states of the former Yugoslavia, one of the few post-communist countries to institutionalize such measures. As a result, women now hold slightly over 30% of parliamentary seats—a modest but significant improvement compared to the past, and higher than in several neighboring states, such as Hungary, where women constitute just 15% of parliament.
Nevertheless, Professor Fuszara closed with a sober reflection. Under communism, gender equality had been proclaimed as a principle, but often only formally. Post-1989, this principle was never fully reframed within the human rights paradigm. The slogan “women’s rights are human rights,” first articulated globally at the Vienna Conference in 1993 and reaffirmed in Beijing in 1995, still struggles to gain full resonance in Poland. For many politicians, gender equality remains a marginal issue, subordinated to party competition or cultural conservatism.
Conclusion
Professor Fuszara’s presentation revealed a paradox at the heart of Polish democracy. On one hand, there is a strong, cross-party commitment to universal human rights, born of the shared memory of authoritarian restrictions. On the other, women’s rights and minority rights continue to be arenas of deep contestation, exposing the limits of consensus and the persistence of patriarchal and exclusionary norms.
Her reflections traced both regression—visible in abortion restrictions and stalled progress on LGBTQ rights—and genuine advances, such as the redefinition of rape and the implementation of gender quotas. Above all, she insisted that rights cannot be taken for granted. They must be continuously defended, reframed, and expanded. The challenge remains to integrate women’s rights and minority rights fully into the fabric of human rights, so that they are no longer treated as exceptions but as integral to the democratic promise made in 1989.
Professor Jacek Kurczewski: “Who Speaks for Whom: The Issue of Representation in the Struggle for the Rule of Law”
In his presentation, Professor Jacek Kurczewski explored the contested notion of representation at the heart of Poland’s ongoing rule-of-law conflict. Framing the problem through both political sociology and constitutional analysis, he examined how populist rhetoric weaponizes the formula “we, the people” against the judiciary, and how judges themselves may legitimately be understood as representatives of the nation.
Populism, “the People,” and Judicial Autonomy
Professor Kurczewski began by situating the debate in the populist appropriation of democracy. Leaders of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS) claimed to embody the authentic will of the people, portraying judicial independence as an undemocratic obstacle. Judges, they argued, were relics of communist privilege or elitist guardians hostile to popular sovereignty. The rhetoric was often vulgar—accusations ranged from petty theft to corruption—but also grounded in a doctrinal attack: the judiciary was accused of claiming sovereignty for itself, elevating constitutional interpretation above the elected parliament.
This framing, Professor Kurczewski noted, created a false dichotomy: elected representatives as the sole voice of the people versus judges cast as self-appointed elites. The populist narrative ignored the constitutional and cultural grounds by which judges themselves exercise representative authority.
The Judiciary and Competing Logics of Representation
Drawing on Hanna Pitkin’s classic theory of representation—the idea of representing what is not physically present— Professor Kurczewski argued that judges too represent the nation. They do so not through electoral mandate but through their role as guardians of law, which is itself a core element of national culture. The Polish constitution, party manifestos, and civic tradition define the nation as a community of culture, history, and shared values. Law, he emphasized, is inseparable from this community; to apply and protect it is to embody the nation’s identity.
Judicial oaths reinforce this function. Each Polish judge swears to serve the Republic faithfully, uphold the law, and dispense justice impartially and with dignity. In this way, judges symbolically—and practically—act as representatives of the nation’s legal and moral order, even though they are not chosen by direct election.
Professor Kurczewski highlighted that the tension is not between representation and non-representation but between different forms of representation. Parliamentarians, under the free mandate principle inherited from Burkean tradition, represent the nation as a whole rather than their constituencies. Judges, by contrast, represent justice and the legal order. Both are indirect vehicles of sovereignty, as Article 4 of the Polish Constitution affirms that power derives from the nation and is exercised either directly or through representatives. Thus, the confrontation between politicians and judges is not about legitimacy per se, but about clashing logics of legitimacy—electoral versus legal-constitutional.
Professor Kurczewski also lamented the decline of lay judges in Poland since 1989. Once a significant institution allowing citizens to participate directly in adjudication, lay judges were marginalized in the transition era as professional judges sought to elevate the dignity and autonomy of the judiciary. This, he argued, was a missed opportunity. Strengthening lay participation could provide a democratic bridge between the judiciary and society, countering populist claims that judges are isolated elites.
Conclusion
Professor Kurczewski concluded that defending judicial independence cannot rely solely on institutional autonomy. It must also involve rethinking representation in more inclusive ways. Recognizing judges as representatives of the nation—albeit in a distinct mode from elected politicians—undermines populist accusations of illegitimacy. At the same time, reinforcing lay participation in courts could help reconnect the judiciary with society, blunting populist attacks and deepening democratic legitimacy.
Ultimately, the struggle for the rule of law in Poland is not only a battle over institutions but also over meanings of representation itself. Who speaks for the nation—the politicians who claim its voice, or the judges who embody its law? Professor Kurczewski’s intervention suggested that the answer must acknowledge both, while resisting the authoritarian temptation to silence one in the name of the other.
Discussants’ Contributions
Dr. Magdalena Solska (University of Fribourg)
The first discussant, Dr. Magdalena Solska, Assistant Professor at the University of Fribourg, opened the commentary session by reflecting on the richness of the panel and the uniqueness of the Polish case. She approached her role primarily through questions and reflections designed to stimulate further debate.
Turning first to Prof. Joanna Kurczewska’s paper on Polish patriotism and the legacy of Solidarity, Dr. Solska praised the author’s use of the concept of resistance rather than mere opposition. She underlined that in political science, resistance carries a moral and normative dimension highly relevant to understanding the Solidarity movement of the 1980s. Yet she also raised a challenging question: was it perhaps inevitable that the legacy of Solidarity would weaken in the face of the unprecedented pressures of post-communist transformation—social, political, and especially economic? In her view, the turbulence of systemic change may have eroded the sense of national community that Solidarity once embodied. If so, she suggested, today’s polarized context may offer an opportune moment to revisit that legacy and ask how it could contribute to democratic resilience.
On Dr. Kamil Joński’s analysis of constitutional polarization, Dr. Solska praised the presentation as resourceful and empirically rich, especially in its reconstruction of the long and contentious constitution-making process of the 1990s. She welcomed the reminder that Poland’s constitutional reality long preceded its final text, making the process unique compared with other post-communist countries. At the same time, she offered constructive critiques. First, she encouraged Dr. Joński to state his research question more clearly at the outset, as the central argument—explaining the enduring loyalty of PiS’s electorate—only emerged at the end. Second, she questioned his use of “liberal-democratic” versus “religious-traditional” categories, suggesting that the latter can also be democratic and that alternative labels might better capture the cleavage. Finally, she argued that the desire for constitutional change among practicing conservatives should not automatically be viewed as negative, given the ambiguities of the 1997 constitution. She encouraged deeper engagement with the role of political polarization, which in her view desensitizes electorates to rule-bending practices by their preferred parties.
With respect to Professor Małgorzata Fuszara’s presentation on human rights, women, and minorities, Dr. Solska raised a probing question about electoral behavior: why do significant numbers of women in Poland vote for PiS, often in higher proportions than for the liberal Civic Coalition? This paradox, she suggested, requires careful sociological and political analysis.
Finally, commenting on Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reflections on representation and the rule of law, Dr. Solska asked how, in a context of deep political polarization, the rule of law might realistically be restored or strengthened. Since the rule of law presupposes broad consensus, she expressed skepticism about whether such consensus is achievable in today’s climate and pressed Professor Kurczewski to consider not if but how this renewal might occur.
Her remarks set the tone for an engaged and critical discussion, highlighting conceptual nuances, empirical puzzles, and the pressing challenge of polarization across all contributions.
Professor Barry Sullivan (Loyola University Chicago School of Law)
The second discussant, Professor Barry Sullivan of Loyola University Chicago, opened his remarks by situating the Polish experience within a comparative perspective shaped by his own work on American constitutionalism. Noting that he often asks his students to grapple with the challenges of interpreting and implementing a constitution written more than two centuries ago, he found Dr. Joński’s analysis of Poland’s constitutional trajectory particularly illuminating. He highlighted the striking continuity Dr. Joński traced between the contested adoption of the 1997 Constitution and today’s disputes over its meaning, emphasizing how early legitimacy deficits continue to reverberate decades later.
Drawing from the US context, Professor Sullivan posed a pointed question: to what extent does the Polish case reveal a disconnect between cultural politics and economic interests similar to that visible in the United States? He observed that in contemporary American politics, ruling parties often cultivate loyalty by appealing to socially conservative values—on issues such as abortion, marriage equality, and education—while simultaneously advancing deregulatory or pro-capitalist policies that may not materially benefit the same constituencies. He asked whether a similar disjunction between value-based appeals and economic outcomes can be seen in Poland’s current political landscape.
Turning to Professor Jacek Kurczewski’s reflections on judicial independence and representation, Professor Sullivan drew an instructive comparison with the US Supreme Court. In recent years, he noted, the Court has increasingly aligned itself with the executive branch, issuing consequential rulings at great speed and often without reasoned explanations. This, he stressed, departs from the traditional American ideal of the rule of law, which requires not only judgments but transparent justifications that anchor decisions in legal reasoning rather than political expediency. Professor Sullivan thus invited further discussion of whether Poland’s embattled judiciary faces parallel challenges, and how judges can maintain legitimacy in the face of politicized attacks.
Finally, Professor Sullivan engaged with Professor Fuszara’s presentation on human rights, women, and minority rights, drawing an analogy to the US struggle over civil society and historical memory. He noted that in Poland, as Professor Fuszara described, the media and public institutions became contested arenas after 1989. Today, in the US, similar dynamics are unfolding as political actors attempt to control not only state institutions but also cultural ones once assumed to be apolitical, such as museums, the Smithsonian, or even the National Park Service. He cited recent reports of efforts to purge references to slavery and racial injustice from park materials, framing this as part of a broader strategy to politicize civil society and restrict critical narratives.
In closing, Professor Sullivan praised the panel for offering a rich comparative perspective on constitutionalism, human rights, and political polarization. While acknowledging his questions as those of an outsider, he emphasized how Poland’s experience provides important lessons for scholars and practitioners wrestling with the fragility of the rule of law in democracies old and new.
Professor Krzysztof Motyka (John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
The third discussant, Professor Krzysztof Motyka, offered reflections that bridged the three presentations while drawing on historical, theological, and sociological perspectives. He began with a commentary on the legacy of Blessed Father Jerzy Popiełuszko, situating him not only as a figure of anti-communist resistance but also as an early defender of human rights. Professor Motyka underscored that Popiełuszko consistently emphasized the sanctity of life “from conception,” opposing the liberal abortion laws of communist Poland. While not advocating punitive measures, he insisted that the Church’s responsibility lay in both proclaiming the sanctity of life and ensuring social and state support for women in difficult circumstances. Professor Motyka reminded the audience that Popiełuszko remains venerated as a patron of reconciliation and respect for life, symbolized by his inclusion in national commemorations. He also recalled Cardinal Glemp’s 1988 caution that protecting the unborn must not become a tool of political bargaining, highlighting the tension between moral conviction and political instrumentalization.
Turning to Professor Fuszara’s presentation, Professor Motyka focused on the linguistic and conceptual transformation in Poland’s rights discourse. Before 1989, he noted, academic and legal circles predominantly used the language of “civil” or “civic rights,” tied to the framework of citizenship and the state. Only in the late 1980s did the universalist vocabulary of “human rights” gain prominence, a shift that reflected broader philosophical and political change. The adoption of this language after the democratic transition, he argued, signaled a recognition that rights derive from human dignity and nature, not merely from state recognition.
Finally, commenting on Dr. Joński’s analysis of constitutional polarization, Professor Motyka provided a personal reflection. While uncertain of his own vote in the 1997 constitutional referendum, he recalled that many Poles who opposed the text did so less for substantive reasons than for historical or emotional ones. For some, it seemed a bitter irony that a parliament dominated by post-communists was entrusted with drafting and adopting the nation’s new constitution—a task many believed should have belonged to the democratic opposition. For these voters, rejecting the Constitution was less about legal content and more about expressing a sense of historical injustice.
Professor Motyka concluded by thanking the panel, stressing that such interdisciplinary dialogue helps illuminate the deeper moral, cultural, and symbolic dimensions of Poland’s constitutional struggles.
Concluding Assessments by Professor Mavis Maclean
In her closing reflections, Professor Mavis Maclean offered a comparative perspective from the United Kingdom, noting with interest that none of the panelists had raised the issue of money. In the UK, she explained, questions of judicial policy, legal reform, or access to justice are always framed by cost. Having worked as an advisor in the Ministry of Justice, she recalled that every proposal was first judged by whether it offered “value for money”—a narrow and often crude measure for shaping a justice system. By contrast, Australia has adopted a more nuanced framework, discussing reforms in terms of “social return on investment,” yet even there, financial justification dominates policymaking. Maclean observed, with a touch of irony, that Poland must be “so rich” not to worry about such constraints, though she suspected this might not fully be the case.
Turning back to the themes of the seminar, she emphasized how refreshing it was to hear discussions focused on values rather than pounds and pence. In Britain, even debates about immigration, populist protest, and human rights are quickly reduced to questions of affordability—border controls, asylum procedures, or welfare costs. By contrast, today’s conversation had foregrounded principles: rule of law, democracy, patriotism, and social solidarity. She concluded warmly, congratulating the presenters for offering not only answers but also new terms and questions to reflect upon long after the session.
Panelists’ Replies
Professor Małgorzata Fuszara began by addressing the question of why women appeared to support Law and Justice (PiS) more than Civic Coalition (KO). She clarified that this impression is misleading. While PiS did secure more total votes than KO, the gender balance within each electorate shows a different pattern. Among PiS voters, men outnumbered women; conversely, among KO supporters, women outnumbered men. The clearest gender divide emerges at the extremes. In the far-right Confederation electorate, fewer than 30% of voters are women, while over 70% are men. On the left (Lewica), the trend reverses: more than 60% of voters are women. This divide has sharpened since the abortion protests, particularly among younger generations—young women tend to vote for the left, while young men lean to the far right.
Turning to media, Professor Fuszara stressed that control over television, though still significant, is an old debate. The new battlefield lies in social media, which once held the promise of greater freedom of expression but is now vulnerable to manipulation. Disinformation campaigns and far-right influence in digital spaces, she warned, pose a profound threat to democracy.
Dr. Kamil Jonski added a brief but pointed reflection on constitutional politics. He agreed that recognizing the need to amend the Polish Constitution is not problematic in itself. The danger, however, lies in the trajectory: opposition to the Constitution, followed by calls for amendment, then support for court-packing, and finally acceptance of its outcomes. This sequence, he argued, captures the narrative of groups seeking to reshape constitutional law to their advantage.
Replying to Dr. Solska’s question on how to resolve the conflict over the Rule of Law in Poland, Professor Kurczewski said: “I think we need to once again draw on Solidarity’s past experience. As Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Poland’s first non-communist Prime Minister after 1989, said, we need a ‘thick line’ (gruba kreska) to separate the future from the past. A full reset of the machinery of justice and a renewal of the judiciary is the only solution.”
Overall Conclusion
The second session of the ECPS–Oxford University Virtual Workshop Series, “The ‘Nation’ or just an ‘Accidental Society’: Identity, Polarization, Rule of Law and Human Rights in 1989–2025 Poland,” revealed Poland as both a distinctive case and a mirror of global democratic challenges.
Professor Joanna Kurczewska’s paper, presented by Professor Jacek Kurczewski, underscored how Solidarity’s inclusive patriotism—once uniting workers, clergy, and intellectuals—has been eclipsed by exclusionary narratives. Dr. Kamil Joński traced the constitutional quagmire created by divergent axiological readings of the 1997 Constitution, showing how a single text can sustain polarized visions of democracy. Professor Małgorzata Fuszara demonstrated that while consensus formed around universal human rights after 1989, women’s and minority rights remain embattled terrain, marked by regression in reproductive rights but tempered by incremental progress such as gender quotas and reforms to sexual violence law. In his own contribution, Professor Jacek Kurczewski reframed the judiciary as a representative institution of the nation, stressing that defending the rule of law requires broadening the democratic meaning of representation.
The discussants deepened the analysis: Dr. Magdalena Solska highlighted the fragility of Solidarity’s legacy and the paradoxes of electoral behavior; Professor Barry Sullivan drew US–Polish comparisons on constitutionalism and the politicization of civil society; and Professor Krzysztof Motyka reminded participants of the moral-philosophical dimensions of rights discourse, linking contemporary struggles to the witness of Father Jerzy Popiełuszko.
As Chair, Professor Mavis Maclean reminded the audience that while populism may reflect civic grievances, it can also corrode democratic institutions. The Polish experience, she argued, offers lessons for how democracies might transform discontent into renewal rather than demagoguery.
This session thus underscored a central theme of the workshop series: that the future of democracy hinges on reclaiming inclusive traditions, defending contested institutions, and embedding rights in both law and culture.
