All posts by : ECPS_admin

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 1: The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). September 6, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00113

The ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, launched its Virtual Workshop Series on “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World” on September 4, 2025. Spanning 16 sessions through April 2026, the series examines how populist strategies reshape democracy across diverse contexts. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the opening session featured Professor David Sanders’ keynote on six structural drivers fueling populism and its growing threats to liberal democracy. Case studies explored populist dynamics in the US, India, Greece, Thailand, and Argentina, highlighting intersections of dynasties, corporate power, elite cues, and economic crises. Discussant Dr. João Ferreira Dias emphasized three takeaways: populism as performance, polarization over persuasion, and the enduring impact of national political cultures.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, inaugurated its Virtual Workshop Series with the opening session, “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism around the World,” held on Thursday, September 4, 2025. Spanning 16 sessions from September 2025 to April 2026, the programme brings together leading scholars to examine the contested meanings of “the people” and their pivotal role in shaping the trajectory of democracy across diverse political, cultural, and institutional settings. Designed as a continuation of the successful three-day in-person conference at St. Cross College, Oxford University (July 1–3, 2025) — “‘We, the People’ and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches,” — the series deepens and extends those debates, fostering comparative, cross-disciplinary dialogue on democratic backsliding, resilience, and transformation in a rapidly shifting global landscape.

Opening on behalf of ECPS, Stella Schade outlined the series’ comparative and cross-disciplinary ambition: to move beyond regional silos and examine how populist projects travel, adapt, and entrench themselves within distinct political and media ecologies.

Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni (University of Lausanne), a leading authority on populism and party systems, the session framed populist authoritarianism not as a single doctrine but as a repertoire of strategies—discursive, organizational, and institutional—deployed under diverse conditions. 

Professor David Sanders (University of Essex, Emeritus) set the analytical agenda with a wide-ranging keynote that argued populism poses greater risks to liberal democracy today than in earlier cycles, owing to transnational diffusion of tactics and the erosion of shared standards of truth. He identified six structural drivers—declining left–right anchors, post-truth dynamics, politicized immigration, identity fragmentation, globalization’s discontents, and norm subversion through strategic learning—and outlined five fronts for democratic response, from inclusive immigration policy and rebalanced rights discourse to retooled economic governance, renewed state capacity, and robust platform regulation.

The panel that followed translated these themes into concrete case studies. Dr. Dinesh Sharma and Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich (Fordham University) traced the entanglement of family dynasties, corporate finance, and “outsider” populist narratives in India and the United States, highlighting the paradox whereby leaders mobilize anti-elite sentiment while constructing elite power networks of their own. 

Professor Gregory W. Streich and Dr. Michael Makara (University of Central Missouri) examined how elite cues and out-group framing shape opinion formation, showing that populist endorsements polarize more than they persuade and exert greatest influence on low-salience issues where prior beliefs are weak. 

Professor Akis Kalaitzidis (University of Central Missouri) offered a comparative analysis of Thailand, Argentina, Greece, and the United States to argue that economic dislocations catalyze distinct populist trajectories, each filtered through national political cultures and institutional constraints. 

Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou (University of Illinois Springfield), in joint work with Kalaitzidis, revisited the Papandreou era to illuminate how charismatic leadership, clientelism, and European integration jointly reconfigured Greece’s political economy, leaving a durable imprint on state capacity and party competition.

Serving as discussant, Dr. João Ferreira Dias synthesized the contributions around three cross-cutting claims: populism functions as performance more than program; polarization, not persuasion, is its primary mass effect; and national political cultures mediate how populist styles are institutionalized. His commentary linked micro-level mechanics (elite cues, media incentives) to macro-level outcomes (executive aggrandizement, clientelist normalization), underscoring the session’s central lesson: understanding populist authoritarianism requires attention to both the technologies of mobilization and the structures that enable their entrenchment. 

As the series unfolds, ECPS and its partners will continue to probe these dynamics comparatively, asking not only how democracies backslide, but also how they can be renewed.

Introductory Speech by Professor David J. Sanders: From Post-Truth to Power—Risks and Remedies

The session began with a keynote intervention by Professor David Sanders (Regius Professor of Political Science, University of Essex, Emeritus), a renowned scholar of political behavior and public opinion. Framing the discussion for the subsequent panel presentations, Professor Sanders delivered a wide-ranging and analytically rich lecture on the global rise of populist authoritarianism, examining its causes, dangers, and potential counterstrategies. Speaking in an urgent yet measured tone, Professor Sanders argued that populism has always posed risks to democratic stability, but it is “more dangerous now than ever before.” He attributed this heightened threat to the increasing transnational interconnectedness of populist actors, who share strategies, rhetoric, and institutional models across borders, accelerating the erosion of democratic norms. His lecture was structured around three central questions: Why has support for populism grown so dramatically? Why is populism especially dangerous for contemporary democracies? What can be done to contain its advance?

Explaining the Rise of Populism: Six Structural Drivers

Professor Sanders identified six interrelated drivers behind the global surge of populism, focusing primarily on Europe and North America but emphasizing broader international patterns.

The Decline of Left-Right Political Anchors: Professor Sanders argued that traditional left-right ideological cleavages have eroded, especially since the collapse of Soviet communism in 1990. With voters less able to situate themselves within stable ideological frameworks, political affiliations have become fluid, creating fertile ground for populist appeals. “Without these anchors,” Professor Sanders noted, “voters are far more susceptible to movements promising simple answers to complex problems.”

The Rise of Post-Truth Politics: The fragmentation of epistemic authority has, in Professor Sanders’ view, created a “post-truth environment” where empirical evidence is devalued and “multiple truths” proliferate. This shift, exacerbated by social media platforms, has empowered “liars, conspiracists, and fantasists” while weakening evidence-based policymaking. Populists thrive in this environment by framing facts as opinions and dismissing scientific consensus as “elitist bias.”

Immigration and Political Avoidance: Professor Sanders highlighted immigration as a critical yet mishandled political issue in Western democracies. For decades, mainstream parties feared being perceived as illiberal, leading to a reluctance to engage substantively with public concerns. Populists, by contrast, capitalize on voter frustrations, using immigration narratives to construct “us vs. them” dichotomies and mobilize distrust toward elites.

Identity Fragmentation and Social Cohesion: The digital era has amplified group-based identity politics, reducing the sense of common national belonging. As shared civic identities weaken, Professor Sanders warned, populists exploit social fragmentation, scapegoating out-groups and deepening polarization.

Globalization and Economic Discontent: Populism has also gained traction from the failures of mainstream economic discourse to address the negative externalities of globalization. While global integration benefited elites, many communities experienced declining living standards and job precarity. Populists seize on these grievances, positioning themselves as defenders of “ordinary people” against globalist elites.

Norm Subversion and Strategic Learning: Finally, Professor Sanders underscored the willingness of populist leaders to bend or break constitutional norms, often learning from one another across contexts. He cited Donald Trump’s attempts to undermine US democratic institutions and Boris Johnson’s efforts to sidestep parliamentary constraints, framing these as part of a “global playbook of democratic erosion.”

Why Populism Is Uniquely Dangerous Today

Professor Sanders then turned to the three main dangers posed by contemporary populism:

Erosion of Social Cohesion: By demonizing minorities, populists heighten intergroup conflict and weaken the foundations of inclusive citizenship.

Authoritarian Drift: Populist leaders often centralize power, eroding judicial independence and institutional checks, leading to counterproductive repression against dissent.

Policy Failure and Disillusionment: Populists typically offer simplistic solutions to complex problems. When these fail, public disillusionment deepens, further undermining confidence in democratic governance.

“Populists,” Professor Sanders warned, “rarely solve the problems they promise to address, but they succeed in leaving democracies weaker than they found them.”

Countering Populist Authoritarianism: Five Strategic Priorities

In the final part of his lecture, Professor Sanders outlined five strategic pathways for safeguarding democratic resilience:

Addressing Immigration Through Inclusive Policy: Mainstream parties must reclaim the immigration debate with evidence-based, humane policies that both uphold human rights and ensure adequate state support for newcomers. Failing to do so, Professor Sanders cautioned, “hands the narrative to populists by default.”

Reframing Human Rights Discourses: Professor Sanders advocated a shift from purely individualistic frameworks toward a balance that also emphasizes collective and community rights, countering populist narratives that depict liberal values as detached from social realities.

Reforming Globalization and Economic Governance:  To undercut populist grievances, governments should restructure trade and investment rules to prioritize domestic employment and social protections, using multilateral cooperation rather than unilateral disruption.

Restoring Trust in State Capacity: Democracies, Professor Sanders argued, must “talk up the role of the state” in solving collective problems — from infrastructure and education to social security and environmental resilience — demonstrating the state’s relevance to everyday wellbeing.

Regulating Social Media and Combating Disinformation: Finally, Professor Sanders called for draconian reforms to social media governance, including penalties for platforms that facilitate misinformation. Without systemic regulation, he warned, populists will continue to weaponize digital ecosystems to bypass accountability.

Conclusion: A Call for Interdisciplinary Action

Professor Sanders closed by emphasizing the urgency of collective scholarly engagement. Combating populist authoritarianism, he argued, requires interdisciplinary collaboration across political science, sociology, communication studies, and law. The ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, he noted, offers an ideal platform to generate context-specific solutions, enabling comparative insights into how different democracies resist or succumb to populist pressures.“Populism,” Professor Sanders concluded, “is not merely a passing disruption but an existential challenge. Our intellectual and civic responsibility is to confront it directly — with evidence, clarity, and democratic resolve.”

Dr. Dinesh Sharma and Ms. Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich: “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?”

The session featured a joint presentation by Dr. Dinesh Sharma and Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich (Fordham University, NYC), of a work done with contributions from Britt Romagna, Ms. Ayako Kiyota, and Amartya Sharma. Their talk, titled “The Rise of Populist Authoritarianism in India and the US: Do Family Dynasties and Big Businesses Really Control Democracy?” examined the interplay between political dynasties, corporate power, and populist narratives in shaping democratic governance across two of the world’s largest democracies.

Drawing on material from Dr. Sharma’s forthcoming book The Orphan Paradox (Bloomsbury, forthcoming), the presentation explored the historical weight of inherited political capital, the growing influence of corporate financing, and the paradoxical rise of populist “outsiders” who simultaneously mobilize anti-elite sentiment while forging their own elite power structures.

Dynastic Politics and Democratic Capture

Dr. Sharma began by situating India and the United States within a comparative framework, emphasizing both convergences and divergences in their democratic trajectories. In India, dynastic politics remains deeply entrenched. Since independence, the Nehru-Gandhi family has dominated national electoral politics, holding power for more than half of the country’s post-1950 history. Beyond the national level, numerous regional dynasties — such as the Yadav family in Uttar Pradesh, the Thackerays in Maharashtra, and the DMK in Tamil Nadu — wield significant influence over state and local politics, shaping party structures and patronage networks.

In the United States, Dr. Sharma noted, dynastic influence has historically been less centralized but nonetheless persistent. Families like the Kennedys, Roosevelts, Bushes, Clintons, and, more recently, the Trumps, have leveraged name recognition, financial networks, and inherited legitimacy to secure enduring political influence. While American political culture celebrates self-made leaders, Dr. Sharma observed that brand recognition and elite networks remain powerful assets in electoral politics.

Corporate Power, Campaign Financing, and Policy Capture

A key theme of the presentation concerned the growing role of big business and corporate lobbying in shaping democratic outcomes. Dr. Sharma highlighted the landmark US Supreme Court ruling Citizens United v. FEC (2010), which effectively removed limits on corporate spending in political campaigns, institutionalizing the dominance of corporate financing. In India, similar trends emerged under the now-invalidated electoral bond scheme, which allowed opaque funding streams that disproportionately benefited ruling parties backed by large corporations.

According to Dr. Sharma, these developments represent a global convergence in which wealthy donors, multinational corporations, and media conglomerates exert outsized influence on electoral agendas, policy priorities, and political narratives. Media ownership — from the Ambani empire in India to the Murdoch network across the US, UK, and Australia — amplifies populist messaging, channels public anger, and fosters resentment toward elites while simultaneously serving elite interests.

The Populist Outsider Paradox

Perhaps the most striking insight in Dr. Sharma’s presentation concerned what he termed the “orphan paradox”: the tendency of voters to support leaders who position themselves as political outsiders or underdogs, even when they later consolidate their own elite power bases.

In India, Narendra Modi has long fashioned his public image as a “self-made son of the soil,” rising from modest beginnings outside the Nehru-Gandhi establishment to challenge entrenched dynastic power. In the United States, figures like Donald Trump similarly leveraged outsider narratives — despite being deeply embedded within elite business and political networks.

Dr. Sharma argued that this paradox reveals a deep tension in democratic psychology: voters oscillate between skepticism toward entrenched elites and admiration for disruptive figures who claim authenticity and independence from the system. Yet, as Dr. Sharma noted, many of these “outsiders” eventually replicate the same patterns of institutional capture they campaign against.

Resistance, Institutions, and the Future of Democracy

While dynasties and corporations exert significant influence, Dr. Sharma emphasized that democratic capture is not inevitable. Countervailing forces — from civil society movements and grassroots protests to independent courts, election commissions, and free media — remain critical in constraining elite dominance. Historical examples such as India’s anti-corruption mobilizations and the US civil rights movement demonstrate that organized citizen activism can challenge concentrated power, though sustaining such momentum remains difficult.

Dr. Sharma concluded by underscoring the fragility of democratic institutions in both contexts. In India, the Supreme Court and Election Commission face mounting pressures, while in the United States, corporate lobbying, partisan polarization, and media fragmentation undermine public trust. Populist leaders like Modi and Trump amplify this institutional strain, mobilizing resentment against “elites” while consolidating their own networks of influence.

A Psychodynamic Drama of Rivalry, Mourning, and Repetition

In her contribution, Ms. Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich (Fordham University) offered a distinctive literary-theoretical and psychoanalytic perspective on political succession, exploring how leadership transitions in authoritarian and revolutionary contexts can be interpreted through Freud’s Oedipus complex and trauma theory. Her analysis framed political power as a psychodynamic drama marked by rivalry, mourning, and repetition.

Ms. Baraschi-Ehrlich argued that succession crises often involve a form of symbolic “patricide,” where the paternal figure — whether a dynastic leader, revolutionary founder, or state authority — must be displaced or replaced. Yet paradoxically, successors frequently reproduce the very structures they sought to dismantle, perpetuating cycles of control. Drawing on trauma theory, particularly the work of Cathy Caruth and Dominick LaCapra, she explained that unresolved historical wounds resurface belatedly and repetitively, shaping patterns of political instability and repression.

Her analysis was grounded in three illustrative cases. First, revolutionary movements — such as the Cuban Revolution — often enact an Oedipal rupture against paternal authority, only to reconstruct new patriarchal orders, as seen under Castro. Second, in North Korea, dynastic succession is framed as filial devotion, yet marked by anxiety over legitimacy and loss, with citizens participating in rituals of mourning that sustain authority. Third, leaders like Lenin and Mao cultivated images of rupture while demanding absolute loyalty, embodying the ambivalence of rejecting and replicating paternal power.

Contrastingly, Ms. Baraschi-Ehrlich highlighted that democratic systems can mitigate these dynamics, enabling peaceful transitions that transform rivalry into continuity rather than trauma. Concluding, she underscored that political authority is haunted by unresolved loss — revolutions often reproduce the structures they oppose, dynasties rely on filial rituals, and democracies, at their best, offer pathways to healing through institutional stability.

Conclusion

Dr. Dinesh Sharma and Shoshana Baraschi-Ehrlich’s presentation offered a multifaceted exploration of the forces reshaping democratic governance in India and the United States, highlighting the intertwined roles of political dynasties, corporate power, and populist narratives. Sharma demonstrated how inherited political capital and opaque corporate financing create structural advantages that enable elites to shape policy agendas and electoral dynamics, even as populist leaders mobilize resentment against these very systems. Yet, as he underscored, the “outsider” paradox reveals a deeper democratic tension: figures like Narendra Modi and Donald Trump ascend by presenting themselves as authentic disruptors, but frequently replicate the same networks of influence they claim to oppose.

Baraschi-Ehrlich’s psychoanalytic lens added a distinct theoretical depth, framing leadership transitions as a “psychodynamic drama” marked by rivalry, mourning, and repetition. By invoking Freud’s Oedipus complex and trauma theory, she illuminated how unresolved historical wounds shape cycles of rebellion and restoration, particularly within authoritarian and revolutionary contexts. Her comparative insights revealed why revolutions often reproduce hierarchical structures and why dynasties rely on rituals of loyalty to sustain authority, contrasting these patterns with democracy’s potential to transform rivalry into institutional continuity.

Together, their analysis situates the rise of populist authoritarianism within a broader global challenge: resisting elite capture while navigating voter ambivalence toward power, authenticity, and belonging. The question, they concluded, is whether democratic institutions and civic movements can still provide pathways to resilience in an era where populism both contests and consolidates authority.

Professor Gregory W. Streich and Dr. Michael Makara: “Out-Groups, Elite Cues, and Populist Persuasion: How Populists Shape Public Opinion”

In their joint presentation, Professors Gregory W. Streich (Professor of Political Science and Chair of the School of Social Sciences and Languages, University of Central Missouri) and Dr. Michael Makara (Associate Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, University of Central Missouri) explored the mechanisms through which populist leaders influence public opinion, focusing on the interaction between elite cues, perceptions of out-groups, and the salience of policy issues. Their research, presented under the title “Out-groups and Elite Cues: How Populists Shape Public Opinion,” forms part of a broader project examining how voters reconcile competing influences when forming political attitudes, especially in the context of Donald Trump’s presidency.

Competing Theories of Public Opinion Formation

Professor Streich started presentation by framing the research within two dominant theories of opinion formation: 

Social Attributes Theory — Individuals’ policy preferences are shaped by their demographic identity and attitudes toward specific groups. For example, support or opposition to immigration policy often depends on whether voters perceive certain ethnic, religious, or socio-economic groups as beneficiaries or threats.

Elite Cues Theory — Also called the “follow-the-leader effect,” this perspective argues that voters align their policy preferences with cues from political leaders or parties they trust. When elites endorse a policy, their supporters are more likely to back it, even when it contradicts long-standing ideological positions.

The research seeks to understand what happens when these forces pull voters in opposite directions. Do citizens defer to elite endorsements, or do their social identities dominate? This question becomes especially salient under populist leadership, where leaders like Donald Trump often adopt positions that diverge sharply from traditional party orthodoxy.

Populism, Partisan Realignment, and Donald Trump’s Role

Professor Streich highlighted Trump’s ability to reorient Republican priorities, often in ways that defy the party’s historical platforms. For example:

Trade Policy: Trump’s tariffs represented a stark departure from Republican free-trade orthodoxy.

Immigration: Whereas Ronald Reagan framed America as a “shining city on a hill” and signed limited amnesty measures in 1986, Trump’s rhetoric emphasized exclusion and restriction.

According to Professor Streich, Trump’s deviations highlight his populist strategy: positioning himself as the authentic voice of “the people” against “corrupt elites,” while simultaneously forging new ideological coalitions. The study aimed to test empirically how persuasive this strategy has been across different issues.

High-Salience vs. Low-Salience Issues

Dr. Michael Makara expanded on the theoretical framework by introducing the concept of issue salience — the degree to which voters already hold well-formed, emotionally charged opinions on a topic.

High-Salience Issues — Highly visible, polarizing debates such as immigration evoke strong ideological divides.

Low-Salience Issues — Less publicly debated policies, such as trade, generate weaker prior attitudes and are thus more open to elite influence.

Their central hypothesis predicted that elite cues — in this case, endorsements by Donald Trump — would exert greater influence on low-salience issues (e.g., trade) than on high-salience issues (e.g., immigration), where voters’ views are already entrenched.

Research Design and Methodology

The researchers conducted a national survey in September 2025, using two factorial experiments. Respondents read short policy vignettes describing fictional immigration and trade proposals and were randomly assigned different conditions:

Endorsement Cues: Some were told Donald Trump supported the policy, while others received no elite cue or were told it was backed by generic officials.

Framing Effects: In the immigration vignette, immigrants were alternately described as “illegal aliens” or “undocumented immigrants” to test whether language influenced responses.

Respondents indicated whether they supported or opposed each policy. Logistic regression analyses measured the interaction between ideology, Trump’s endorsement, and issue salience.

Key Findings

Strong Elite Cues Effect

Trump’s endorsement significantly shaped conservative opinion across both policy areas:

Immigration Policy: Conservatives informed that Trump supported a proposal were four times more likely to support it compared to those receiving no cue.

Trade Policy: Trump’s endorsement similarly increased conservative support, demonstrating the persuasive power of elite cues even when policies contradict traditional Republican priorities.

Elite Cues and Polarization

While Trump mobilized conservatives, his endorsements also intensified liberal opposition. In both vignettes, liberals exposed to Trump’s support were significantly less likely to back the policy.

Salience Moderates Influence

Consistent with the authors’ hypothesis, elite cues proved more influential on low-salience issues like trade: On immigration, voters’ pre-existing ideological commitments dominated, limiting Trump’s persuasive reach. On trade, where voters lacked strong priors, Trump’s endorsement created substantial opinion shifts.

The Role of Information Gaps

Dr. Makara emphasized that voters with limited knowledge about trade policy were especially susceptible to elite influence. This finding suggests that populists thrive in policy domains where uncertainty is high and narratives can be shaped more freely.

Implications for Populist Mobilization

The study highlights how populist leaders leverage elite cues and out-group framing to reshape political landscapes:

Redefining Party Orthodoxy — By combining contradictory policy stances, populists like Trump create hybrid ideological platforms that mobilize cross-cutting constituencies.

Targeting Out-Groups — Populists amplify fears around immigration and cultural threats, using emotionally charged narratives to reinforce group identity and deepen divides.

Exploiting Low-Salience Issues — Populists strategically mobilize opinion on less familiar policy domains where facts are contested, and leaders’ cues carry disproportionate weight.

Future Directions

Professor Streich and Dr. Makara noted several areas for ongoing research:

Cross-Leader Comparisons: Testing whether similar elite cue effects emerge when policies are endorsed by other figures, such as Joe Biden or state-level leaders.

Media Ecosystems: Examining how different information sources shape susceptibility to elite cues.

Out-Group Framing: Integrating more detailed measures of identity-based threat perceptions.

Conclusion

Professor Streich and Dr. Makara’s findings illuminate the psychological and informational mechanisms through which populist leaders mobilize public opinion. While elite cues strongly shape attitudes, their influence is conditional: populists are most persuasive when voters lack strong priors, allowing leaders to frame issues and define narratives unchallenged.

In high-salience contexts, such as immigration, polarization constrains persuasion, reinforcing existing divides rather than shifting positions. By contrast, in low-salience policy domains like trade, populists wield significant power to shape voter attitudes and reconfigure partisan alignments.

The broader implication is sobering: populist influence thrives where knowledge gaps are greatest and where leaders exploit identity-based divisions alongside uncertainty. As the authors concluded, understanding these dynamics is critical for explaining not only Trump’s continued hold over Republican politics but also the global rise of populist-authoritarian movements.

Professor Akis Kalaitzidis: “From Economic to Political Catastrophe: Four Case Studies in Populism”

In his insightful presentation, Professor Akis Kalaitzidis, a political scientist from the University of Central Missouri, analyzed how economic crises in Thailand, Argentina, Greece, and the United States catalyzed the rise of distinct forms of populism. Drawing on comparative analysis, he argued that financial dislocations—from collapsing currencies to sovereign debt defaults—create fertile ground for populist movements, but the resulting forms of populism diverge significantly depending on cultural values, institutional structures, and historical trajectories.

Professor Kalaitzidis’s central thesis is that economic catastrophe often triggers political catastrophe, dismantling established political orders and reshaping governance models. Across the four cases, populist leaders capitalized on social grievances, deploying a mixture of policy populism, rhetorical populism, organizational strategies, charismatic leadership styles, and media mobilization techniques. Yet, despite their contextual differences, these cases reveal a common pattern: populism thrives by framing “the people” against entrenched elites while promising rapid relief to the most vulnerable sectors of society.

Thailand: Rural Populism and the Thaksin Model

Professor Kalaitzidis began with Thailand, which he described as the most challenging case due to language barriers and limited direct research. Following the 1997 Asian financial crisis and the collapse of the baht, Thaksin Shinawatra, a billionaire businessman, rose to power by forging a coalition between rural farmers and urban working classes.

Thaksin’s policy populism centered on concrete economic benefits: Universal healthcare via a symbolic “30 baht” ($1) hospital fee, direct cash transfers of one million baht per rural village, and debt relief for farmers, enabling significant poverty alleviation. His rhetorical populism framed the struggle as “rural masses versus Bangkok elites,” positioning himself as the defender of marginalized communities against urban dominance. Institutionally, he created the Thai Rak Thai Party, a personal political vehicle, consolidating control through charismatic CEO-style leadership and media dominance.

Despite repeated military coups and Thaksin’s exile, his political network remains influential. As Professor Kalaitzidis noted, “the populist version of the Thai Rak Thai Party continues unabated,” reflecting the enduring power of rural-based populism in Thailand.

Argentina: Kirchnerism and Anti-IMF Populism

In Argentina, the 2001 economic collapse—marked by sovereign default and skyrocketing unemployment—triggered another form of populism. Néstor Kirchner and, later, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner led Kirchnerismo, a political project combining expansive welfare policies with defiant anti-IMF rhetoric. Their policy populism included: Increased social spending on pensions and welfare, subsidies for energy and public transportation, and aggressive debt renegotiations with international creditors.

Cristina Fernández de Kirchner’s leadership style was symbolically confrontational, presenting herself as the “defender of Argentina against foreign exploitation.” Professor Kalaitzidis highlighted a revealing interview with her former economics minister, who told him directly: “Don’t believe the IMF—they’re lying.”

Media strategy further amplified their narrative: while state-controlled outlets promoted Kirchnerism, opponents were framed as neoliberal agents undermining Argentine sovereignty. Even as Argentina later elected Javier Milei, an exclusionary populist, Kirchnerism remains deeply entrenched, reflecting the enduring centrality of anti-IMF populism in Argentina’s political identity.

Greece: Syriza and the Anti-Austerity Movement

Professor Kalaitzidis next turned to Greece, where the 2008 global financial crisis and EU-imposed austerity created fertile ground for Syriza’s left-wing populism. Led by Alexis Tsipras, Syriza built a broad anti-austerity coalition of pensioners, students, and social movements demanding relief from EU-imposed fiscal constraints. Key policy populism measures included: Promising debt relief and pension restoration, halting privatizations mandated by the “Troika” (IMF, EU, and ECB), and holding a national referendum on whether Greece should remain in the Eurozone.

Tsipras cultivated an anti-establishment image, symbolized by his refusal to wear a tie, signaling resistance to EU norms and domestic elites. His rhetorical populism framed the conflict as “Greeks versus the Troika,” appealing to national sovereignty amid external economic pressures.

However, Syriza’s eventual concessions to EU demands fractured its base and weakened its populist momentum. Today, Greece hosts a fragmented populist landscape, where multiple exclusionary and inclusionary movements—from the far left to the far right—compete for influence, illustrating populism’s institutional diffusion even after Syriza’s decline.

United States: Trumpism and Permanent Campaign Politics

The final case focused on the United States, where Donald Trump’s presidency (2017–2021) redefined populism in a highly polarized democracy. Professor Kalaitzidis characterized Trumpism as a right-wing, exclusionary populism rooted in white working-class, rural, and disaffected conservative constituencies. Trump’s policy populism emphasized: Tax cuts and deregulation, protectionist tariffs under “America First” trade policy, and restrictive immigration measures framed as defending “real Americans.”

His rhetorical populism weaponized the narrative of “real Americans versus corrupt Washington elites,” encapsulated in the slogan “Drain the Swamp.” Meanwhile, his organizational strategy involved capturing the Republican Party via the MAGA movement, transforming it from Reagan-era conservatism into a personalist political vehicle.

Trump leveraged social media mastery to bypass traditional gatekeepers, embracing a “permanent campaign” style based on real-time polling, online mobilization, and conspiratorial counter-narratives. Professor Kalaitzidis stressed that Trumpism’s influence extends beyond Trump himself, reshaping electoral rules, redistricting strategies, and policymaking for the foreseeable future.

Populism’s Legacy: Structural Shifts and Unresolved Tensions

Professor Kalaitzidis concluded by emphasizing that populism is not merely rhetorical performance but a structural response to globalization’s disruptions. In all four cases, populists emerged as mediators between national sovereignty and global economic pressures, but their methods and outcomes diverged: In Thailand, rural-based populism survives despite elite pushback; in Argentina, populism remains central to political identity, whether inclusive or exclusionary; in Greece, Syriza’s decline fragmented but did not extinguish populist forces; in the United States, Trumpism has permanently reshaped party politics and electoral norms.

Yet, across these contexts, populism’s strategies—mobilizing “the people,” rejecting establishment elites, and exploiting economic dislocation—share a common DNA. As Professor Kalaitzidis observed, “Economic crises highlight the tensions between national democracy and global markets, and populism thrives in this gap.”

Proefessor Elizabeth Kosmetatou:“Populism, Clientelism, and the Greek State under Papandreou”

In her detailed and engaging presentation, Professor Elizabeth Kosmetatou (Professor of History, University of Illinois Springfield) examined the political trajectory, leadership style, and enduring legacy of Andreas Papandreou — one of Greece’s most charismatic yet polarizing leaders. Drawing from archival research, declassified CIA documents, and historical accounts, she explored how Papandreou’s populism and clientelist practices reshaped Greek politics during his premierships (1981–1989, 1993–1996) and left a lasting imprint on Greece’s democratic institutions, political culture, and economic trajectory.

Professor Kosmetatou framed Papandreou as a transformative yet controversial figure, whose governance combined populist mobilization with entrenched patronage networks. His leadership marked a critical juncture in Greece’s modern history, defined by democratization after the fall of the junta, accession to the European Economic Community (EEC), and struggles over modernization and European integration. Yet, she argued, Papandreou’s blend of charismatic authority, populist narratives, and systemic clientelism simultaneously empowered marginalized groups while deepening structural vulnerabilities that still shape Greek politics today.

Early Life, Political Formation, and Exile

Born in 1919 into a prominent political family, Andreas Papandreou was the son of George Papandreou, one of Greece’s most influential liberal statesmen, nicknamed “the Old Man of Democracy.” Despite growing up under his father’s towering shadow, Andreas forged his own path, first as a Harvard-trained economist and later as a professor at elite US universities including Minnesota, Northwestern, and Berkeley, where he chaired the economics department.

Papandreou’s early political experiences were shaped by Greece’s turbulent mid-20th century history: authoritarianism under Metaxas (1936–1941), the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), and the deep polarization between left and right. Arrested in 1939 for links to a Trotskyist group, he fled to the US and reinvented himself academically before returning to Greece in 1963 to enter politics under his father’s Center Union Party.

By the mid-1960s, Papandreou had already cultivated an image as a radical reformer within the establishment. However, the 1967 military coup disrupted his rise: he was arrested, imprisoned, and later exiled to Sweden and Canada. It was during this exile that he founded PASOK (Panhellenic Socialist Movement) in 1974, marking a decisive ideological break from his father’s centrist tradition. Six years later, in the 1981 elections, PASOK surged from 13% to 48% of the vote — an unprecedented transformation in Greek political history.

Charismatic Leadership and Populist Narrative

Professor Kosmetatou emphasized Papandreou’s mastery of charismatic authority, placing him within the Weberian framework of “extraordinary leaders” who derive legitimacy not from institutions but from personal magnetism. His style combined academic intellect with performative populism, making him both an elite economist and a fiery nationalist orator.

His political discourse blended anti-elitism, social justice, and sovereignty. Papandreou portrayed Greece as a “dependent country” shackled by foreign powers, casting “the people” against corrupt domestic elites and imperialist outsiders — first the United States (blamed for supporting the junta and mishandling Cyprus) and later Germany (associated with austerity and economic conditionality).

One of Papandreou’s slogans, “Η Ελλάδα στους Έλληνες” (“Greece belongs to the Greeks”), became emblematic of his populist framing. He called for “change” (αλλαγή), promising to restore national dignity, expand welfare protections, and empower ordinary citizens. His rallies drew hundreds of thousands — sometimes over a million attendees — turning politics into mass performance. His speeches, delivered in simple, emotive language infused with slang, created a sense of collective ownership over history, epitomized by PASOK’s iconic slogan: “Ραντεβού με την Ιστορία” (“Appointment with History”).

Professor Kosmetatou argued that Papandreou’s charisma and mobilization techniques placed him within a global tradition of populist leadership, comparable to Perón in Argentina, Chávez in Venezuela, or Narendra Modi in India. However, his brand of populism was distinctly Greek, rooted in historical grievances, cultural narratives, and the lingering trauma of civil conflict.

Clientelism, Patronage, and Institutional Transformation

A central theme of the presentation was Papandreou’s use of clientelism — the exchange of public resources for political loyalty — as both a tool of governance and a mechanism of populist inclusion.

Papandreou’s governments expanded the public sector dramatically, appointing thousands of loyalists to state jobs, often bypassing competitive exams. Subsidies, pensions, and direct resource allocations were distributed along patronage networks spanning unions, rural constituencies, and marginalized groups historically excluded from power.

While this empowered underrepresented communities, Professor Kosmetatou stressed, it also entrenched dependence on the state and weakened institutional autonomy. Ministries became politicized, bureaucratic turnover soared, and policymaking increasingly relied on informal personal networks rather than transparent procedures. Papandreou frequently handpicked ministers and dismissed them abruptly — most famously firing Deputy Foreign Minister Asimakis Fotilas in 1982 for diverging from his directives at a European Community meeting.

Over time, clientelist governance blurred into systemic corruption. Major scandals, such as the Koskotas affair, implicated senior officials and eroded public trust. By normalizing patronage, Papandreou reshaped Greek political culture: all major parties adopted similar practices, embedding clientelism as a defining feature of the Greek state well beyond his premiership.

Economic Policy, European Integration, and Fiscal Vulnerability

Professor Kosmetatou situated Papandreou’s populism within Greece’s shifting economic and European context. After joining the European Economic Community in 1981, Greece received massive inflows of EU structural funds with minimal oversight. Papandreou used these resources to expand welfare spending, subsidize key sectors, and support clientelist distribution — while maintaining low taxation levels. Public debt, however, escalated sharply: In 1981, debt was 23% of GDP, by 1991, it had risen to 71%, and by 2002, when Greece entered the Eurozone, it stood at 117%.

Professor Kosmetatou highlighted how populist fiscal policies, combined with persistent trade deficits and weak administrative controls, laid the groundwork for Greece’s 2010 sovereign debt crisis. Declassified CIA reports from the 1980s had already warned of structural vulnerabilities, citing unsustainable populist spending and limited regulatory oversight.

Despite his anti-European rhetoric, Papandreou pragmatically kept Greece within the EEC and NATO, using nationalist themes to negotiate aid and favorable military balances, especially vis-à-vis Turkey. This dual strategy — radical discourse paired with pragmatic diplomacy — epitomized Papandreou’s political adaptability.

Reforms and Contradictions

Papandreou’s governments were not solely defined by patronage and debt; they also enacted significant social reforms that reshaped Greek society: Establishing a National Health Service to expand hospital access; liberalizing family law, strengthening women’s rights in marriage and divorce; introducing student participation in university governance, transforming academic culture; and officially recognizing the Greek Resistance during the German occupation, granting symbolic justice to excluded generations. Yet these reforms coexisted with instability and scandals. Between 1981 and 1989, his cabinets reshuffled 13 times, reflecting the fragility of decision-making within an intensely personalized political system.

Professor Kosmetatou argued that Papandreou’s contradictory legacy—progressive reforms alongside deepened clientelism and fiscal imbalances—continues to shape Greece’s governance and economic trajectory today.

Legacy and Polarization

Nearly three decades after his death in 1996, Papandreou remains one of Greece’s most polarizing figures. To admirers, he was the liberator who brought αλλαγή (“change”), consolidated democracy after the junta, and gave voice to marginalized groups. To critics, he was the architect of systemic corruption, unsustainable debt, and institutional decay.

Nevertheless, Professor Kosmetatou stressed, Papandreou’s mastery of populist charisma fundamentally transformed Greek political culture. His ability to mobilize mass enthusiasm, personalize governance, and redefine national identity created a template for subsequent Greek leaders, including Alexis Tsipras of Syriza, who consciously modeled aspects of his style on Papandreou’s performative populism.

PASOK’s decline after Papandreou’s death underscores the personalized nature of his power. Without his leadership, the party fragmented, highlighting the structural risks of politics built on charismatic authority rather than institutional strength.

Conclusion

Professor Kosmetatou concluded that Andreas Papandreou’s legacy embodies the paradox of populism: it can simultaneously democratize and destabilize. Through charisma, clientelism, and mass mobilization, Papandreou transformed Greek politics, empowered excluded constituencies, and reoriented the nation’s relationship with Europe and the global order. Yet, his fiscal policies, personalized governance, and embedded patronage systems created enduring vulnerabilities — economic, institutional, and cultural — that continue to shape Greece’s trajectory well into the 21st century.

Papandreou’s story illustrates a broader lesson about populism’s dual edge: while it can energize democratic participation, it often weakens institutional capacity, leaving states exposed to future crises. As Professor Kosmetatou concluded, understanding Papandreou’s era is essential not only to explaining Greece’s recent past but also to grappling with the long-term consequences of charismatic populism in contemporary democracies.

Discussant Dr. João Ferreira Dias: Is Populism Offspring of Crisis—or Accelerant?

Dr. João Ferreira Dias offered a brisk, conceptually grounded set of remarks that stitched the panel’s papers into a broader argument about what populism is and how it works. He opened by defining populism less as a doctrine than as a discourse and performance that can be grafted onto multiple ideologies. In his view, it thrives amid social and political polarization and is frequently entangled with ethno-nationalism, his own area of research. Populist drama, he suggested, often promises a kind of psychological or spiritual renewal for the nation.

On Dynasties, Big Business, and Outsider Rhetoric

Responding to the first paper, Dr. Dias praised the conceptual pairings—“orphans,” “patricians,” and “entrenched elites”—as analytically fertile. The “orphan” posture lets leaders claim proximity to “the people,” while elite lineage can be reframed as stability, experience, and success. He urged the authors to sharpen the paradox of Trump and Modi: both channel anti-elite narratives while forging tactical alliances with powerful political and economic actors (e.g., tech and corporate lobbies). Historically, dynasties are part of the democratic “furniture”; what is new, he argued, is the coincidencia oppositorum—the coupling of oligarchic networks, family power, and anti-establishment populism—that uses national drama to claim, and then consolidate, power.

On Out-groups and Elite Cues

Turning to the second paper, Dr. Dias underscored the centrality of in-group/out-group framing in populist strategy, noting how leaders in the US and Europe defend a supposed “biocultural identity” against migrants and minorities. He welcomed the distinction between “follow-the-leader” (elite cues) and “social attributes” effects, but argued they often operate together. Drawing on Portugal, he described how André Ventura is portrayed as a “weather vane,” echoing bottom-up talk from taxis, taverns, and social media, even as top-down moral panics about migration are manufactured by elites and amplified by media competition for audience share. He found the study’s results striking: Trump’s cues polarize rather than persuade—conservatives rally, liberals recoil—implying that the real mechanism is mobilization and polarization, not cross-cutting persuasion. A qualitative agenda, he added, should test whether “follow-the-leader” is the DNA of MAGA, a coordinated reaction to social change, economic anxiety, and migration pressures that Trump effectively orchestrated.

On Economic Crisis and Divergent Populisms

Addressing the comparative paper on Thailand, Argentina, Greece, and the US, Dr. Dias lauded its robust design, showing how economic dislocation yields different populist species: military intervention in Thailand, Kirchnerismo in Argentina, left-nationalist forms in Greece, and Trumpism in the US. He suggested extending the arc to Milei’s libertarian populism in Argentina, which flips the economic script (anti-state, radical market) while retaining the populist grammar of “the people” vs. “the caste.” Populism, he argued, is reshaped by successive crises rather than produced once and for all. Likewise, the post-2008 surge of Europe’s radical left often subsided as party systems re-sorted (he cited Portugal’s sharp contraction from a 19-seat bloc to a single deputy). He floated Brazilian parallels (Collor’s campaigning among the “shirtless” and urban poor) to show how stylistic outreach can reposition populist appeals. The larger theoretical question he posed: Does populism require economic crisis, or do crises simply accelerate latent cultural and socioeconomic grievances that populists voice and mobilize?

On Papandreou: Charisma, Clientelism, and Executive Populism 

Dr. Dias called the historical reconstruction excellent and asked whether charisma mainly legitimized clientelism or constituted an independent source of appeal. He proposed reading Andreas Papandreou as an instance of “cabinet” or “executive” populism: not merely oppositional rhetoric, but a mode of governing—concentrating power, distributing state resources, and embedding patronage. Comparing Portugal, he noted how the Socialist Party lost voters amid perceptions of clientelism and corruption, illustrating how left populisms that once represented “the people” can later cede ground to the right. His key questions for Greece were pointed: To what extent did Papandreou strengthen democracy while simultaneously entrenching clientelist practices? And how did European integration and EU funds help mask or magnify the paradox of populism plus clientelism?

Cross-cutting themes and closing provocations. Across the papers, Dr. Dias returned to three through-lines: 

Performance over program: Populism is stylistic and strategic, injected into left, right, or libertarian projects as needed. 

Polarization over persuasion: Elite cues rarely convert opponents; they harden camps and energize bases.

National political cultures matter: Populism travels, but local institutions, histories, and media ecosystems shape its form, targets, and durability.

He encouraged further work on media logics (how competition and virality make charismatic leaders “fashionable”), on the feedback loop between grassroots talk and elite cue-setting, and on the institutional afterlives of populist governance—especially where clientelist distribution becomes routine statecraft. His final challenge to the panel distilled his critique: Is populism the offspring of crisis, or the accelerant that turns smoldering cleavages into open fire?

Overall Conclusion

Session 1 underscored a clear, sobering consensus: populist authoritarianism is less a fixed ideology than a flexible toolkit that exploits uncertainty, identity conflict, and institutional weakness. Across cases—from India and the US to Greece, Thailand, and Argentina—speakers showed how leaders fuse outsider performances with insider alliances (dynasties, corporate finance), mobilize elite cues to polarize rather than persuade, and convert economic shocks into durable political change. Professor Sanders’ structural diagnosis (eroded left–right anchors, post-truth dynamics, migration politics, identity fragmentation, globalization’s losers, and strategic norm-bending) aligned with panel evidence that national political cultures filter these pressures into distinct, yet rhyming, trajectories.

The session also pointed toward remedies. Reclaiming immigration with humane, evidence-based policy; rebalancing rights discourse to include community goods; rewiring globalization to protect social contracts; rebuilding state capacity; and enforcing platform accountability emerged as mutually reinforcing priorities. Methodologically, participants called for comparative, mixed-methods research that links micro-level opinion formation and media incentives to macro-level patterns of executive aggrandizement and clientelist governance.

As the series proceeds, ECPS will move from diagnosis to design: testing what institutional guardrails, civic coalitions, and communicative strategies actually bend polarization downward and restore democratic problem-solving. The challenge is long-term, but the session showed a path—empirical, interdisciplinary, and resolutely comparative.