People.

ECPS Virtual Workshop Series — Session 13: Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 13: Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). March 9, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00144

 

Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series examined how “the people” are constructed, contested, and institutionalized across diverse political arenas. Chaired by Dr. Leila Alieva (Oxford School for Global and Area Studies), the panel brought together interdisciplinary perspectives on populism, democratic participation, and representation. Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović analyzed the ethnic dynamics of populist subject formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-Dayton political order. Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve explored how participants in France’s Yellow Vests movement sought to institutionalize grassroots assembly-based democracy. Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez examined the exclusion of stateless and marginalized communities from international diplomacy, arguing for a “right to diplomacy.” Together, the contributions illuminated the evolving and contested meaning of “the people” in contemporary democratic politics.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, March 5, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened the thirteenth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the title “Constructing and Deconstructing the People in Theory and Praxis.” Bringing together scholars from political science, democratic theory, and critical diplomacy studies, the session addressed one of the most urgent questions in contemporary political analysis: how “the people” are imagined, institutionalized, contested, and reconfigured across different political settings. From post-conflict power-sharing arrangements and assembly-based democratic experiments to the exclusions embedded in international diplomacy, the panel examined the shifting boundaries of political representation in a time of democratic strain and institutional transformation.

The participants of the session were introduced by Reka Koleszar, ECPS intern. Chairing the session, Dr. Leila Alieva of the Oxford School for Global and Area Studies framed the discussion as the product of an increasingly mature and sophisticated intellectual agenda within the workshop series. As she observed, by the thirteenth session the series had reached a “quite intricate level of analysis,” with all three presentations deeply interconnected in their exploration of “the genesis, evolution, and formation of populism, and concepts and images related to that.” She underscored the broader strengths of the ECPS project—above all its multidisciplinary, comparative, and constructivist orientation. In a post-Cold War environment marked by uncertainty, complexity, and multiple interacting forces across political, social, and international levels, such a broad approach is particularly necessary. The rise of populism, she suggested, cannot be adequately understood within the limits of a single discipline; rather, it must be approached through the combined lenses of political science, international relations, democratic theory, and broader social inquiry.

Under Dr. Alieva’s chairmanship, the panel featured three speakers whose papers illuminated distinct yet overlapping dimensions of democratic representation. Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović (University of Sarajevo) explored the ethnic dynamics of populist subject formation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, offering a new framework for understanding inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populisms within a post-Dayton consociational order. Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve(Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain) examined how participants in the Yellow Vests movement in France sought to institutionalize direct democracy through popular assemblies, thereby pushing beyond protest toward constituent democratic experimentation. Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez (UNPO) extended the discussion into the international arena by arguing that diplomatic representation itself must be rethought as a pillar of democracy, especially for unrepresented nations, Indigenous peoples, and politically marginalized communities.

The session also benefited from the incisive engagement of its two discussants, Associate Professor Christopher N. Magno (Gannon University) and Dr. Amedeo Varriale (University of East London). Their interventions not only drew out the conceptual strengths of the presentations but also situated them within wider comparative debates on populism, democratic innovation, sovereignty, and political exclusion. Together, chair, speakers, and discussants produced a rich exchange that revealed both the diversity of contemporary democratic struggles and the common tensions that run through them. As Dr. Alieva noted in her concluding reflections, the discussion demonstrated that populism often functions as a sign of deeper institutional pressure—an indication that inherited political forms are struggling to respond to changing social realities. Session 13 thus offered a compelling interdisciplinary inquiry into how democratic subjects are made, constrained, and reimagined across multiple arenas of political life.

 

Assist. Prof. Jasmin Hasanović: “Reimagining Populism: Ethnic Dynamics and the Construction of ‘the People’ in Bosnia and Herzegovina” 

Dr. Jasmin Hasanović, Assistant Professor and researcher in the Department of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo.

Assistant Professor Jasmin Hasanović presented a theoretically informed analysis of populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina, proposing a conceptual rethinking of how “the people” are politically constructed within the country’s ethnically structured post-conflict order. Moving beyond dominant interpretations that treat populism as a thin ideology attached to ethno-nationalism, Dr. Hasanović advanced a discursive and relational understanding of populism grounded in Ernesto Laclau’s theoretical framework. His presentation examined how populist logics interact with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s institutionalized ethnic power-sharing system, producing multiple and sometimes contradictory constructions of the political subject known as “the people.”

Dr. Hasanović began by situating the Bosnian political system within its historical and institutional context. The end of the Bosnian war and the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement established a complex power-sharing arrangement among the country’s three dominant ethnic groups—Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The agreement institutionalized a consociational structure that translated wartime territorial and political balances into a post-war governance framework characterized by parity, consensus mechanisms, and territorial division into two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. This arrangement, while designed to stabilize a deeply divided society, also embedded ethnic identity into the very architecture of political representation and competition.

Within this institutional environment, political life has largely been structured through ethnically segmented arenas. Electoral competition and party organization tend to operate primarily within ethnic constituencies, resulting in parallel political subsystems rather than a fully integrated national political sphere. Existing scholarship, Dr. Hasanović observed, has therefore tended to interpret Bosnian politics through the lenses of ethnic nationalism, power-sharing institutions, or the challenges of democratic consolidation. When populism is discussed, it is frequently conceptualized either as “ethnic populism” or as a thin ideological layer attached to ethno-nationalist politics.

Dr. Hasanović challenged this prevailing approach by proposing that populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina should instead be understood as a political logic that discursively constructs collective political subjectivities. Drawing on Laclau’s conceptualization, he defined populism not by its ideological content but by its form: a discursive strategy that constructs a political frontier between “the people” and an antagonistic order of power. In this perspective, populism does not mobilize a pre-existing people; rather, it actively constructs the people by linking heterogeneous social demands into what Laclau calls a “chain of equivalence.” When one demand temporarily comes to represent a wider set of grievances, it becomes an “empty signifier” capable of symbolically unifying those demands and establishing a political frontier between the people and those perceived as responsible for their grievances.

Building on this theoretical foundation, Dr. Hasanović argued that the ethnicized power-sharing system itself generates populist dynamics by producing persistent unmet political demands across society. Rather than viewing populism as an external threat to democratic institutions, he suggested that populist logics emerge from within the structural tensions of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-conflict governance system. In order to capture these dynamics, he identified three interconnected forms of populism operating within the Bosnian political landscape: inter-ethnic populismintra-ethnic populism, and cross-ethnic populism.

The first and most visible form is inter-ethnic populism, which largely corresponds to what earlier research describes as ethno-nationalist populism. In this configuration, the populist frontier is constructed horizontally across ethnic groups rather than vertically between the people and elites. Political actors mobilize discourses that distinguish “our people” and “our elites” from “their people” and “their elites,” reinforcing antagonism among ethnic communities. Here, the “empty signifier” that unifies social demands is constrained by ethnic identity, meaning that only demands framed through ethnic belonging can enter the chain of equivalence. As a result, the political subject constructed through this form of populism is an ethnicized people whose grievances are directed toward perceived injustices within the constitutional order established after the war. Dr. Hasanović emphasized that ethnicity in this context is not simply a cultural category, but a politically constructed subject formed through populist articulation of dissatisfaction with the post-Dayton system.

The second form, intra-ethnic populism, emerges within the segmented political arenas created by the power-sharing arrangement. According to Dr. Hasanović, because electoral competition takes place largely within monoethnic constituencies, populist rhetoric frequently develops inside ethnic communities rather than across them. In this case, the populist frontier assumes a vertical form, opposing “our people” to “our corrupt elites.” Opposition parties and splinter political movements often deploy such narratives, accusing established ethnic leaders of monopolizing representation, capturing state institutions, and exploiting public resources through clientelistic networks. These actors frame themselves as authentic representatives of the people against entrenched political insiders. Yet despite its vertical orientation, intra-ethnic populism remains bounded by the ethnic framework. The political subject it constructs is still defined ethnically, and the critique of elites does not transcend the segmented structure of the political system.

The third and most fragile form identified by Dr. Hasanović is cross-ethnic populism, which attempts to construct a political subject that transcends ethnic divisions altogether. Unlike the previous forms, cross-ethnic populism articulates the people primarily as citizens rather than members of ethnic groups. It mobilizes grievances that cut across ethnic boundaries, including socio-economic inequality, corruption, demands for justice, and broader calls for institutional accountability. Dr. Hasanović pointed to civic protests, grassroots mobilizations, and civil society initiatives as examples of this form of populism. One illustrative moment occurred during the protests of 2013–2014, when demonstrators adopted the slogan “We are hungry” expressed simultaneously in Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian. By articulating a shared experience of economic hardship across linguistic variations, the slogan attempted to construct a unified citizenry opposed to an unresponsive political establishment.

Despite its emancipatory potential, however, cross-ethnic populism faces significant structural obstacles. Ethno-national elites frequently reinterpret cross-ethnic mobilizations as threats to their respective communities, portraying them as externally driven attempts to undermine group interests. Such reframing disrupts the formation of a durable chain of equivalence capable of unifying heterogeneous demands across the broader population. Consequently, cross-ethnic populist initiatives have struggled to produce a stable and lasting political subject capable of challenging the entrenched ethnopolitical order.

In conclusion, Dr. Hasanović argued that these three forms of populism interact dialectically within Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political system. Inter-ethnic populism reinforces ethnic fragmentation and inadvertently stabilizes the existing power-sharing framework, even when it rhetorically criticizes it. Intra-ethnic populism introduces competition within ethnic communities, challenging the dominance of entrenched elites while remaining confined to monoethnic arenas. Cross-ethnic populism, by contrast, represents an attempt to destabilize the entire hegemonic configuration by constructing a new political subjectivity beyond ethnic identity.

To Dr. Hasanović, these dynamics suggest that populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be understood simply as a democratic threat or a corrective force. Rather, it operates as a political logic embedded within the structural conditions of a post-conflict power-sharing system. The Dayton constitutional order continuously generates antagonistic frontiers that shape how political actors construct and mobilize “the people.” As Dr. Hasanović emphasized, the concept of the people is never neutral or pre-given; it is always discursively mediated and shaped by the institutional and social dynamics of a particular society. His analysis therefore contributes to a deeper understanding of how populist logics function within divided post-conflict states and how the very meaning of “the people” remains contested, constructed, and continuously renegotiated in political practice.

 

Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve: “Institutionalizing the Assembled People

Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve
Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve is Postdoctoral Researcher at Radboud Universiteit; UCLouvain.

Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve presented a theoretically and empirically grounded exploration of grassroots democratic experimentation under the title “Institutionalizing the Assembled People.” Drawing on research derived from her doctoral dissertation, Dr. Van Outryve examined how ordinary citizens engaged in radical democratic practices during the Yellow Vests movement in France attempted not merely to deliberate collectively but also to institutionalize direct democratic governance. Her analysis offered an important contribution to contemporary debates on democratic theory by investigating how political actors outside formal institutions conceptualize and attempt to institutionalize forms of self-government.

The presentation began by situating the problem historically. For centuries, the processes of instituting democratic systems and making decisions on public affairs have largely been monopolized by professional political elites. Representative institutions, while formally democratic, have tended to concentrate both constitutive and decision-making authority in a specialized political class. Against this background, Dr. Van Outryve advanced the central hypothesis guiding her research: that ordinary citizens are capable not only of deciding on public affairs but also of determining the institutional procedures through which those decisions should be made. This hypothesis challenges the conventional model of democratic innovation, which typically proceeds from top-down reforms initiated by states or policymakers.

Dr. Van Outryve examined this proposition through extensive fieldwork conducted in the town of Commercy in northeastern France during and after the emergence of the Yellow Vests (Gilets Jaunes) movement in 2018. Over the course of two years, she undertook a comprehensive ethnographic study of local democratic practices that developed within the movement. Her research methods included participant observation in assemblies, demonstrations, and meetings; two rounds of interviews conducted before and after the municipal elections of 2020; a collective interview session lasting two days; and the collection of approximately 2,500 documents produced by the movement. Through this combination of qualitative methods, Dr. Van Outryve sought to reconstruct how participants themselves conceptualized and institutionalized their democratic experiment.

The theoretical orientation of the research was articulated through what Dr. Van Outryve termed “inductive political theory.” This approach seeks to bridge normative political theory and empirical research by deriving theoretical insights from the practices and reflections of political actors engaged in real-world democratic experiments. Her doctoral project pursued two parallel objectives: the elaboration of a normative democratic theory based on assembly-based direct democracy—what she refers to as “communist direct democracy,” inspired by the ideas of Murray Bookchin—and the empirical reconstruction of how such democratic practices were attempted by grassroots actors. By allowing participants themselves to address fundamental questions about democracy and self-government, the project aimed to generate a political theory grounded in lived democratic practice.

The empirical core of Dr. Van Outryve’s presentation focused on the case of Commercy, a town of roughly 5,400 inhabitants that became a notable site of democratic experimentation within the Yellow Vests movement. Like many other local groups across France, activists in Commercy initially organized daily assemblies in which participants gathered to deliberate collectively on political grievances and strategies. These assemblies operated according to principles of direct democracy: equality of participation, one person–one vote, and open deliberation without permanent leadership. Instead of formal leaders, the assemblies appointed rotating spokespersons tasked with conveying collective decisions. The assemblies also sought to coordinate with other similar groups, forming confederated networks of local assemblies.

At this early stage, these practices functioned primarily as prefigurative politics—that is, attempts to enact the democratic forms participants wished to see in society at large. However, the trajectory of the Commercy group evolved when some participants decided to contest the municipal elections in March 2020. Their objective, to Dr. Van Outryve, was not to assume traditional representative authority but rather to institutionalize the direct democratic practices that had emerged during the movement. The electoral list they presented proposed to transfer effective political authority to a popular assembly open to the residents of the town. Elected officials would remain formally responsible for administrative tasks, but their mandate would be strictly tied to decisions made by the assembly.

This transition from prefigurative activism to institutional design marked a crucial stage in the movement’s development. During the electoral campaign, participants engaged in what Dr. Van Outryve described as a constituent process, drafting several foundational documents intended to define the institutional architecture of this proposed system. Among these were a local constitution and a commitment charter specifying the relationship between elected officials and the popular assembly. Through this process, participants confronted a series of classical questions in political theory, including the nature of sovereignty, the boundaries of political authority, and the mechanisms through which democratic decisions should be made and revised.

One of the central theoretical dilemmas addressed by the group concerned what Dr. Van Outryve referred to as the “constituent paradox.” This refers to the problem of how a political community decides on the procedures through which it will decide—in other words, how to “decide on how to decide.” Participants grappled with this issue by collectively debating the rules governing deliberation, participation, and decision-making within the assembly. These discussions extended to practical questions such as where assemblies should be held, how information should be shared with the broader population, and how to address the challenges of participation and self-selection among citizens.

The resulting proposals envisioned the assembly as the central locus of political power. The assembly would deliberate on municipal issues, organize specialized commissions, determine decision-making procedures, and supervise the actions of elected representatives. At the same time, participants were acutely aware of the potential risks associated with direct democracy, including the possibility that assemblies might adopt decisions that could be perceived as unjust or undesirable. This concern led to the development of self-limiting institutions designed to regulate the exercise of collective power.

Dr. Van Outryve highlighted this dimension as a particularly significant aspect of the experiment. Drawing inspiration from historical precedents in ancient Greek democracy—particularly the institution of graphe paranomon, which allowed citizens to challenge laws adopted by the assembly—participants devised mechanisms through which decisions could be reviewed. One such mechanism involved the creation of a Citizens’ Constitutional Council, whose members would be selected by lot. This body would examine whether decisions taken by the assembly were compatible with the principles articulated in the preamble of the local constitution. If a decision were found inconsistent with these principles, it would be returned to the assembly for reconsideration.

Importantly, the safeguards envisioned by participants were not intended to constrain democratic debate or impose ideological boundaries on the assembly. Rather, they reflected a commitment to what Dr. Van Outryve described as the democratization of dissensus. Participants explicitly rejected the idea that assemblies should strive for unanimity or suppress political disagreement. Instead, they emphasized that conflict and disagreement are inherent features of democratic politics and should be managed collectively by citizens rather than monopolized by party competition within representative institutions.

This perspective also shaped their understanding of political neutrality and partisanship. While the movement sought to remain non-partisan and unaffiliated with established political parties, this stance did not imply the absence of political conflict. On the contrary, participants insisted that assemblies must remain open spaces where diverse viewpoints could be expressed and debated. The aim was therefore not to eliminate disagreement but to create institutional conditions in which political conflict could be deliberated among citizens themselves.

Throughout the presentation, Dr. Van Outryve underscored that the Commercy experiment represented a broader attempt to rethink foundational concepts in democratic theory through lived political practice. Participants revisited questions concerning representation, deliberation, participation, and constitutional authority, seeking to rearticulate them within a framework centered on assemblies rather than elected representatives. In doing so, they attempted to move beyond a model of democracy based primarily on consent to authority toward one in which citizens collectively exercise political power.

In concluding, Dr. Van Outryve emphasized that the creation of democratic institutions enabling widespread participation cannot be designed solely by theorists or political elites. Echoing the reflections of Cornelius Castoriadis, she argued that the development of non-alienating forms of democracy must ultimately emerge from the collective creativity and practical experimentation of the people themselves. The Commercy assemblies thus illustrate how grassroots movements can contribute to democratic theory by demonstrating that citizens are capable not only of governing themselves but also of collectively determining the institutional frameworks through which self-government may be realized.

 

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez“Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez
Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez is a Global Advocacy Officer at UNPO, the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization.

Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez presented an ambitious and conceptually rich paper that examined democratization from a diplomatic perspective. Her presentation, “Re-imagining Diplomatic Representation as a Pillar of Democracy,”proposed that diplomacy should not be understood merely as a technical instrument of interstate relations, but as a normative and institutional domain deeply implicated in the realization—or denial—of democratic participation. In doing so, she shifted the discussion of democracy beyond domestic institutions and electoral representation toward the international arena, where questions of voice, visibility, recognition, and participation remain profoundly unequal.

The central argument of the presentation was that the exclusion of unrepresented nations, Indigenous peoples, minority communities, and non-sovereign political actors from meaningful diplomatic engagement constitutes a structural failure of democratic governance at both national and international levels. Drawing on critical and post-positivist approaches to diplomacy, Cancela Sánchez argued that diplomatic representation should be regarded as a foundational pillar of democracy rather than as an external or secondary concern. Her intervention therefore sought to expand the conceptual boundaries of democracy by foregrounding the institutions and practices through which political communities seek recognition, negotiate their futures, and participate in decisions that affect their lives.

The presentation opened with a reflection on the well-known phrase that begins the United Nations Charter: “We the Peoples of the United Nations.” This rhetorical commitment to peoples rather than merely states served as a point of departure for a critical inquiry into the actual functioning of multilateral diplomacy. Cancela Sánchez asked to what extent contemporary diplomatic institutions live up to this promise. While diplomacy has undoubtedly changed over recent decades—with broader issue agendas, the increasing involvement of multiple governmental and non-governmental actors, and expanding forums for participation—she emphasized that these developments have not eliminated the deep inequalities that shape access to diplomatic representation. Spaces of participation may have widened, but they remain uneven, contested, and structurally constrained.

A key contribution of the presentation lay in its conceptual discussion of diplomacy itself. Cancela Sánchez traced an evolution from classical, state-centric definitions toward broader and more socially embedded understandings. Traditional definitions present diplomacy as the conduct of business between states or as communication through official channels in a system of states. By contrast, post-positivist scholars have redefined diplomacy as a practice of representation structured through institutions and processes that manage relations among human beings more broadly. Particularly important for her argument was the idea that diplomats, like elected representatives, function as agents entrusted by principals. This analogy enabled her to draw a direct conceptual link between diplomatic representation and representative democracy.

On this basis, Cancela Sánchez explored the nexus between democracy and diplomacy. Although the two may pursue different immediate objectives—democracy oriented toward equality and freedom, diplomacy toward the peaceful advancement of interests—they nevertheless share important underlying principles, including participation, negotiation, representation, and cooperation. The question, then, is whether diplomacy can genuinely claim democratic legitimacy if it fails to reflect the full diversity of those in whose name it operates. Her answer was clearly negative: where entire peoples are denied meaningful access to diplomatic arenas, democracy is compromised at its foundations.

The presentation further argued that the absence of diplomatic representation has serious normative and legal consequences. Exclusion from diplomatic spaces silences communities in settings where decisions affecting their future are made. This, Cancela Sánchez suggested, compounds violations already recognized in international legal instruments concerning civil and political rights, Indigenous rights, labor rights, and participation. Such exclusions thus cannot be dismissed as procedural oversights; they represent systematic denials of political agency. In response, she drew on the recently developed concept of the right to diplomacy, which provides the normative framework for her analysis.

As presented by Cancela Sánchez, the right to diplomacy goes beyond mere presence or symbolic inclusion in international forums. It requires meaningful participation, including the right to be consulted, to negotiate, to provide free, prior, and informed consent, and to contribute to shaping the legal and institutional arrangements that govern one’s community. This framework challenges the hierarchical, state-centered organization of diplomacy by insisting that actors beyond sovereign states possess legitimate claims to diplomatic agency. Democratizing diplomacy, in this view, requires both normative and institutional transformation.

To illustrate the practical relevance of this argument, Cancela Sánchez examined the case of the Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization (UNPO), founded in 1991 to address the exclusion created by the formal requirement of recognized statehood for participation in international decision-making. UNPO, she argued, functions as an institutional workaround that enables unrepresented peoples and minority communities to engage international institutions, gain visibility, and mediate relationships with the broader international community. Yet it also reveals the limits of informal or substitute forms of representation when access to binding diplomatic power remains restricted.

Her first case study, Tibet, demonstrated the constraints of diplomatic action without sovereignty. The Tibetan government in exile has created institutional structures resembling a foreign ministry and established offices abroad to represent Tibetan interests. Tibetan representatives have engaged in negotiations and have, in some cases, received forms of ambassadorial recognition. Yet these interactions remain fundamentally precarious and unofficial. Governments may engage Tibet informally while avoiding formal recognition of its right to diplomatic participation. As Cancela Sánchez showed, Tibet’s diplomatic efforts therefore remain confined to the margins, illustrating the profound limitations imposed by the denial of formal standing.

The second case, East Timor, offered a contrasting example of what diplomatic representation can achieve when political space is opened. During the Indonesian occupation, East Timorese representatives used platforms such as UNPO to sustain international visibility, engage foreign governments and civil society, and keep humanitarian concerns on the global agenda. This sustained diplomatic representation contributed to the eventual conditions under which the East Timorese people could participate in a UN-supervised referendum in 1999. For Cancela Sánchez, East Timor demonstrated that diplomatic representation can make politically visible what would otherwise remain excluded from international negotiation and resolution.

The third case, the Chamorro people of Guam, revealed the paradoxes of disenfranchisement within a formal democratic order. Although Chamorro people are citizens of the United States, they lack full political representation within the institutions that govern them. At the same time, their appeals to international institutions regarding military expansion, decolonization, and cultural survival have encountered resistance. Through Guam, Cancela Sánchez underscored that diplomatic exclusion is not limited to non-state peoples external to democratic states; it can also affect communities formally located within them.

In conclusion, the presentation argued that exclusion from diplomatic spaces is a structural and democratic problem with far-reaching implications for self-determination, human rights, and cultural survival. While organizations such as UNPO provide valuable frameworks for advocacy and visibility, they cannot substitute for full diplomatic standing. Cancela Sánchez therefore called for a rethinking of both democracy and diplomacy, insisting that meaningful diplomatic participation should be recognized as a democratic right of all peoples. Her presentation made a compelling case that democratizing diplomacy is not peripheral to democratic theory but essential to any serious account of inclusive political representation in a deeply unequal international order.

 

Discussants’ Feedback

Feedback by Assoc. Prof. Christopher Magno

Christopher N. Magno is an Associate Professor, Department of Justice Studies and Human Services, Gannon University.

Serving as discussant for Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series, Associate Professor Christopher Magno offered a series of reflections and critical questions engaging with the three presentations delivered in the panel. His comments highlighted the conceptual contributions of the papers while situating them within broader debates on populism, democratic innovation, and diplomatic representation. Rather than offering extensive critique, Assoc. Prof. Magno focused on identifying key analytical insights and raising questions that could further develop the presenters’ arguments.

Assoc. Prof. Magno began with a brief summary of Dr. Jasmin Hasanović’s presentation on populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He noted that the paper addressed an important puzzle: how populism operates in a post-conflict society where politics is already structured around ethnic power-sharing arrangements. Unlike many studies of populism that focus on Western democracies and conceptualize populism primarily as a vertical conflict between “the people” and political elites, Bosnia presents a distinct configuration in which political competition is embedded within a tri-ethnic institutional framework. Assoc. Prof. Magno highlighted Dr. Hasanović’s typology of inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populism as a useful analytical framework for understanding these dynamics. In this context, populism does not appear as a singular political logic but as a multi-layered phenomenon shaped by ethnic competition between groups, political rivalry within groups, and occasional civic mobilization across ethnic boundaries.

Expanding on this point, Assoc. Prof. Magno emphasized that inter-ethnic populism remains the dominant form in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as political actors often frame politics as a struggle between ethnic communities. Political elites mobilize historical grievances, wartime memories, and narratives of collective threat in order to maintain political support. In contrast, intra-ethnic populism introduces competition within ethnic communities by challenging the authority of established leaders and accusing them of corruption or betrayal. Cross-ethnic populism, while comparatively weaker, attempts to articulate common socio-economic grievances—such as unemployment, corruption, and inequality—across ethnic divisions. However, Assoc. Prof. Magno observed that the institutional structure of the Bosnian political system continually redirects political competition back into ethnic categories, thereby constraining the development of broader civic mobilization.

Building on Dr. Hasanović’s framework, Assoc. Prof. Magno proposed an additional analogy drawn from contemporary digital politics. He suggested that similar dialectical dynamics of identity formation can be observed in online communities shaped by algorithmic sorting and psychographic profiling. Social media platforms often cluster users into identity-based networks that reinforce shared narratives and ideological affinities. Within these networks, horizontal conflicts between different online “tribes” mirror the dynamics of inter-group populism, while internal disputes between members and community leaders resemble intra-group populist tensions. Although presented as an illustrative parallel rather than a direct theoretical claim, this observation pointed toward possible connections between identity-driven populism and digitally mediated political environments.

Assoc. Prof. Magno then turned to Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve’s presentation on the institutionalization of popular assemblies emerging from the Yellow Vests movement in France. He framed the paper around a central question: whether grassroots democratic practices can be transformed into durable governing institutions. The case of the Commercy citizens’ assembly, he noted, represents an attempt not merely to protest representative democracy but to construct an alternative institutional model grounded in direct citizen participation. By drafting a local constitution and designing institutional mechanisms linking elected officials to the citizens’ assembly, participants effectively acted as a constituent power seeking to redefine how political authority should be exercised.

In discussing the analytical contribution of the paper, Assoc. Prof. Magno identified three central challenges associated with institutionalizing assembly-based democracy. The first concerns the boundaries of political participation—that is, who constitutes “the people” in such assemblies. While the Commercy model opened participation to all residents, voluntary participation raises questions about representativeness and the risk of self-selection bias. The second challenge relates to deliberative procedures. Assemblies initially served as spaces for expressing grievances but gradually evolved into arenas for collective deliberation in which preferences could be revised through discussion. Assoc. Prof. Magno connected this process to broader theories of deliberative democracy, including the idea of the public sphere as a space where citizens transform private concerns into collectively debated public issues. The third challenge involves the limits of power, particularly the tension between radical democratic experimentation and the existing institutional framework of representative government. Even when assemblies claim political authority, they must operate within established legal and electoral systems, raising questions about whether such initiatives can transform existing institutions or whether they will ultimately be absorbed by them.

Finally, Assoc. Prof. Magno briefly addressed the presentation by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez on diplomatic representation and the “right to diplomacy.” He highlighted the paper’s effort to rethink the relationship between diplomacy and democracy by questioning whether state diplomacy genuinely reflects the diverse populations it claims to represent. In democratic theory, diplomacy is often assumed to aggregate the will of a population through state representation. Yet in practice, Assoc. Prof. Magno noted, states frequently operate as strategic actors pursuing national interests rather than consultative representatives of internal constituencies. This tension, he suggested, creates a gap between a consultative model of diplomatic representation and a sovereignty-driven model in which governments act autonomously in international negotiations. The “right to diplomacy” framework discussed in the presentation seeks to address this gap by proposing that communities inadequately represented by states—including Indigenous peoples and non-self-governing territories—should gain more direct or mediated access to diplomatic platforms.

Across his remarks, Assoc. Prof. Magno concluded by posing several questions intended to stimulate further discussion among the presenters. These included whether populism might strengthen democratic participation under certain conditions, whether assembly democracy can realistically function as a governing system, and how diplomatic representation might be reimagined to better reflect the voices of marginalized communities. Through these interventions, his commentary framed the session as a broader exploration of how “the people” are constructed, represented, and institutionalized across different political arenas—from post-conflict societies and grassroots democratic movements to the structures of international diplomacy.

 

Feedback by Dr. Amedeo Varriale

Dr. Amedeo Varriale earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism.

Serving as second discussant for Session 13, Dr. Amedeo Varriale offered thoughtful reflections on the three presentations delivered during the panel. His commentary emphasized the analytical contributions of the papers while situating them within broader comparative debates on populism, democratic experimentation, and diplomatic representation. Drawing on his own comparative research on political ideology and populism, Dr. Varriale focused particularly on the conceptual frameworks advanced by the presenters and their potential applicability beyond the specific cases examined.

Dr. Varriale began by addressing Dr. Jasmin Hasanović’s presentation on populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. He commended the paper’s effort to conceptualize populism within the context of a post-Dayton political system characterized by externally imposed power-sharing institutions and deeply entrenched ethnic divisions. In his view, the principal strength of the work lies in its proposed typology distinguishing inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and cross-ethnic populisms. This categorization, he argued, provides a useful analytical framework for understanding how populist mobilization operates in Bosnia’s consociational political environment.

Beyond its immediate empirical application, Dr. Varriale emphasized the broader analytical value of the typology. He suggested that these categories possess considerable “travelability,” enabling scholars to apply them to different political contexts outside the Balkans. For example, he noted that dynamics resembling inter-ethnic populism can be observed in cases where political actors mobilize territorial or cultural divisions within a state. He pointed to early iterations of the Northern League in Italy as a case in which political mobilization drew upon regional divisions between northern and southern Italians while simultaneously employing anti-elitist rhetoric.

Similarly, the concept of intra-ethnic populism resonated, in his view, with developments associated with several left-wing populist movements across Europe. Parties such as the Five Star Movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain, and Syriza in Greece have often framed their political discourse in terms of reclaiming democratic power from corrupt or detached elites and returning agency to ordinary citizens. In such cases, populist rhetoric may contribute to enhancing political participation by giving voice to constituencies that perceive themselves as excluded from established decision-making processes. Cross-ethnic populism, although less common, can also appear in transnational or supra-national initiatives that attempt to mobilize citizens across national boundaries, such as the Democracy in Europe Movement 2025 associated with Yanis Varoufakis.

While praising the conceptual innovation of Dr. Hasanović’s framework, Dr. Varriale also raised a question regarding the relative weight of populism in certain Bosnian political parties. Specifically, he wondered whether some parties often categorized as populist might more accurately be understood primarily as ethno-nationalist formations that employ populist rhetoric instrumentally. Parties such as the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) may rely heavily on ethnonationalist narratives, with populism functioning as a secondary strategic component rather than the core ideological element. This observation, he suggested, may represent a fruitful avenue for further reflection within the broader theoretical framework proposed in the paper.

Turning to the presentation by Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve on the institutionalization of assembly-based democracy emerging from the Yellow Vests movement in France, Dr. Varriale highlighted the paper’s relevance for understanding contemporary debates about democratic participation. At a time when representative democratic institutions are often perceived as increasingly detached from ordinary citizens, the case examined in the paper illustrates how grassroots movements attempt to operationalize alternative democratic forms at the local level.

Dr. Varriale emphasized that one of the principal contributions of the research lies in its detailed reconstruction of how direct democratic practices can be translated into institutional arrangements. While the concept of direct democracy is well known in theoretical discussions, empirical studies examining its practical implementation remain comparatively rare. In this respect, the paper’s analysis of the Citizens’ Assembly in Commercy provides valuable insights into the institutional design, deliberative processes, and practical challenges associated with such democratic experiments. In particular, he noted that the tensions described between the Citizens’ Assembly and the municipal council illustrate a long-standing theoretical dilemma: the coexistence—and often conflict—between radical forms of direct democracy and the institutional structures of representative liberal democracy.

Dr. Varriale also observed several parallels between the democratic practices described in the paper and developments associated with European left-wing populist movements. Mechanisms such as imperative mandates, the principle of one person–one vote, and participatory decision-making processes resemble organizational features adopted by parties such as Italy’s Five Star Movement. These parallels suggest that contemporary movements seeking to revitalize democratic participation frequently converge around similar institutional innovations, even when operating in distinct political contexts.

While commending the sophistication of the theoretical and methodological framework—particularly the extensive fieldwork underpinning the study— Dr. Varriale suggested that future research might further situate the case within the broader political context of France. Additional discussion of the political conditions that facilitated the emergence of the Yellow Vests movement, as well as the reactions of state institutions, could enrich the analysis. Nevertheless, he emphasized that the paper successfully demonstrates how social movements can function as laboratories for democratic experimentation.

Finally, Dr. Varriale addressed the presentation by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez on diplomatic representation and the “right to diplomacy.” He noted that the case studies presented—Tibet, Timor-Leste, and Guam—highlight different forms of political exclusion within the contemporary international order. The example of Guam, in particular, drew his attention as a striking illustration of democratic contradiction within an established democratic state. Despite holding US citizenship, residents of Guam lack voting representation in Congress and cannot participate in presidential elections, revealing a gap between democratic principles and constitutional structures.

Dr. Varriale observed that among the cases examined, Timor-Leste represents the most evident example of diplomatic success, as international engagement ultimately culminated in a referendum enabling self-determination. This outcome illustrates how diplomatic advocacy and international visibility can, under certain conditions, contribute to political transformation.

Concluding his remarks, Dr. Varriale reflected on the tension between sovereignty and democratic inclusion in international diplomacy. Sovereignty, he noted, provides a framework of order and legitimacy that structures diplomatic relations among states. Yet, at the same time, the formal authority associated with sovereignty may obscure the political voices of communities that lack recognized statehood. The challenge, therefore, lies in reconciling the stability provided by the sovereign state system with the normative imperative to expand political voice and representation within international decision-making processes.

 

Responses

Response by Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez

In her brief response to the discussants’ remarks, Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez elaborated on several aspects of her research concerning diplomatic representation and the “right to diplomacy,” while clarifying the broader scope of her study beyond the case studies presented during the session.

Cancela Sánchez first addressed comments regarding the role of the UNPO. She emphasized that the examples discussed in her presentation represent only a small portion of the organization’s broader membership and historical trajectory. Over the years, UNPO has included communities with diverse political aspirations, ranging from groups seeking full statehood to those primarily concerned with securing recognition, representation, and voice in international decision-making processes. In some cases, UNPO has served as a platform through which political entities later achieved internationally recognized statehood. Estonia and Latvia, for example, were once members before eventually becoming sovereign states. These trajectories demonstrate that UNPO can function both as a diplomatic platform for stateless nations and as a transitional space within broader processes of political recognition.

At the same time, Cancela Sánchez stressed that not all members pursue independence. For many communities—such as the Chamorro people of Guam—the central objective is not statehood but meaningful political representation and the ability to articulate their interests in national and international arenas. Such cases illustrate the diversity of political claims that exist beyond the state-centered diplomatic order.

Responding further to methodological questions, Cancela Sánchez clarified that the “right to diplomacy” framework, developed by Costas Constantinou and Fiona McConnell in 2023, forms the conceptual foundation of her research. This framework builds on post-positivist and critical approaches to diplomacy, seeking to rethink diplomatic practice by emphasizing the representation of peoples rather than exclusively sovereign states. As she noted, the framework is still relatively recent, and ongoing research—including her own work—aims to contribute to its further theoretical and empirical development.

Finally, Cancela Sánchez briefly addressed the broader structural context of international diplomacy. Contemporary diplomatic institutions remain fundamentally state-centered, and even the limited mechanisms created to include non-state actors often impose significant barriers to meaningful participation. Forums such as ECOSOC consultative mechanisms, the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, and the UN Forum on Minority Issues provide important avenues for engagement, yet they remain uneven and insufficient to guarantee direct diplomatic representation for all affected communities. Her research therefore seeks to highlight these structural limitations while exploring pathways toward a more inclusive and representative diplomatic order.

 

Response by Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve

In her response to the discussants’ remarks, Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve elaborated on several conceptual and practical issues raised during the discussion of her paper on the institutionalization of assembly-based democracy emerging from the Yellow Vests movement in France. Her reflections focused primarily on the questions of participation, institutional feasibility, and the democratic risks associated with direct forms of governance.

Addressing first the issue of participation, Dr. Van Outryve acknowledged that the legitimacy of an assembly-based democratic system fundamentally depends on sustained citizen involvement. If only a small number of participants attend assemblies, the democratic claim of such institutions would be weakened. However, she emphasized that participants in the Commercy experiment did not conceptualize participation merely in numerical terms or as a short-term challenge. Rather, they viewed it as a long-term political process. According to this perspective, meaningful participation becomes more likely when citizens perceive that their deliberations have real political consequences. In contrast, participatory initiatives that lack decision-making authority often experience declining engagement over time.

Dr. Van Outryve illustrated this dynamic by referring to the French Citizens’ Climate Convention, which demonstrated the capacity of ordinary citizens to deliberate effectively but ultimately saw several of its proposals set aside by the government. For activists in Commercy, such outcomes underscored the importance of granting assemblies genuine decision-making power. When citizens recognize that their contributions directly influence policy outcomes, the motivation to participate is expected to increase. Empirical experiences from nearby municipalities experimenting with similar institutional models suggest that high levels of engagement are possible. In one neighboring locality where participatory institutions were introduced, approximately half of the population attended assemblies, indicating that even non-activist residents may become involved when participatory mechanisms are institutionalized.

Dr. Van Outryve further explained that the solutions proposed by activists to address participation barriers emerged directly from their practical experiences during the Yellow Vests mobilization. Recognizing the social constraints faced by working-class participants—such as irregular work schedules, family responsibilities, and limited free time—the movement explored various institutional adaptations. These included organizing multiple assemblies on the same topic at different times, creating mechanisms to synthesize and circulate deliberative arguments across meetings, and allowing citizens to vote either in person or through accessible channels. Additional measures such as childcare services, transportation assistance, and flexible meeting schedules were also considered to facilitate broader participation.

Another institutional mechanism designed to compensate for potential low attendance was the introduction of a local citizens’ referendum. Under this arrangement, if a specified portion of the electorate—approximately ten percent—challenged a decision adopted by the assembly, the issue could be referred to a broader vote. This mechanism aimed to ensure that decisions retained broader democratic legitimacy even when participation in assemblies fluctuated.

Turning to the broader question of whether assembly-based democracy could realistically function as a governing system, Dr. Van Outryve acknowledged that significant structural obstacles currently exist. Assemblies attempting to exercise political authority must operate within the framework of representative institutions that continue to dominate contemporary political systems. Nevertheless, she emphasized that the long-term strategy envisioned by participants extends beyond isolated municipal experiments. Inspired by traditions of communalist political theory, activists envisioned a network of self-governed municipalities confederated through delegated and recallable mandates. Such a configuration would create a form of dual power between existing state institutions and a confederation of locally governed communes.

Dr. Van Outryve also noted that similar governance structures have been attempted in other contexts, citing the example of the Kurdish political experiment in Rojava as an illustration of how assembly-based forms of governance can operate at larger territorial scales under particular historical conditions. However, she acknowledged that the pathways leading to such transformations differ significantly depending on political context.

Finally, responding to concerns about the potential risks associated with direct democracy—including the possibility of authoritarian or exclusionary outcomes—Dr. Van Outryve emphasized the central role that deliberation plays in the democratic vision articulated by participants in Commercy. For activists involved in the movement, collective deliberation is not simply a procedural step but a transformative political practice capable of reshaping citizens’ perspectives. Their experiences during the Yellow Vests mobilization reinforced the belief that sustained dialogue among citizens can challenge entrenched political divisions and foster mutual understanding.

In this sense, the Commercy experiment reflects a broader conviction that democratic renewal may depend not only on institutional reform but also on the creation of participatory spaces in which citizens engage directly with one another in the ongoing process of collective self-government.

 

Response by Dr. Jasmin Hasanović

In his response to the discussants’ comments, Dr. Jasmin Hasanović elaborated on several conceptual aspects of his framework for analyzing populism in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Addressing questions raised by the discussants, he clarified both the theoretical foundations of his argument and the structural conditions that shape the forms of populism observed in the country’s post-conflict political order.

Dr. Hasanović began by reflecting on the broader question of whether populism inherently deepens political division. In his view, political division should not be regarded as an anomaly but rather as an intrinsic feature of political life. From this perspective, populism does not generate social antagonisms ex nihilo; rather, it operates as a political logic that articulates and organizes existing tensions within society. Drawing on a discursive approach inspired by Ernesto Laclau, Dr. Hasanović emphasized that populism links disparate grievances into a chain of equivalence through which a political subject—the people—is constructed in opposition to a perceived adversary.

Within the Bosnian context, however, the construction of “the people” has been profoundly shaped by the institutional architecture established after the Dayton Peace Agreement. According to Dr. Hasanović, the consociational power-sharing arrangement effectively replaced a civic conception of sovereignty with an ethnically structured system of political representation. Instead of the demos functioning as the primary bearer of sovereignty, political subjectivity has largely been organized around ethnically defined collectivities. In this sense, Bosnia and Herzegovina operates less as a conventional liberal democracy than as an ethnocratic system in which ethnic identity constitutes the central axis of political competition.

This institutional configuration helps explain why inter-ethnic populism remains more prominent than cross-ethnic forms of mobilization. Political actors frequently construct antagonistic narratives that position one ethnic community against others, thereby reinforcing horizontal divisions within society. Dr. Hasanović noted that such dynamics cannot be understood independently of the broader institutional and territorial arrangements established after the war. The country’s administrative divisions, including the highly autonomous entities of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska, correspond largely to ethnically homogeneous territories that emerged through wartime processes of ethnic cleansing and displacement.

Furthermore, the logic of consociational democracy itself reinforces ethnic segmentation. As theorized by Arend Lijphart, such systems grant ethnic groups significant autonomy in matters considered central to their identity, including cultural, linguistic, and religious affairs. While intended as mechanisms of conflict management, these institutional arrangements also contribute to the entrenchment of ethnic political identities. Over time, the ethnic principle has extended beyond representation to shape broader patterns of social and political life, producing what Dr. Hasanović described as a deeply pillarized society.

Within this framework, Dr. Hasanović also addressed the question raised by discussants regarding the relationship between populism and ethnonationalist parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Rather than treating populism as a fixed ideological label, he proposed understanding it as a political logic through which actors construct antagonistic boundaries. From this perspective, ethnonationalist parties may employ populist discourse when mobilizing their constituencies against perceived adversaries, even if ethnonationalism remains their primary ideological foundation.

Given these structural constraints, Dr. Hasanović suggested that the most realistic arena for democratic transformation may lie within intra-ethnic political competition. In the current institutional setting, political contestation largely unfolds within ethnically segmented party systems. Strengthening pluralism and ideological differentiation within these arenas could create conditions for more substantive democratic competition. Over time, the emergence of ideologically convergent actors across different ethnic constituencies might facilitate more cooperative forms of power-sharing and potentially open space for broader cross-ethnic political projects.

In this sense, Dr. Hasanović concluded that the reconstruction of “the people” as a democratic political subject remains a central challenge in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Expanding pluralism within existing political arenas may represent an incremental pathway through which more inclusive forms of democratic politics could eventually emerge.

 

Closing Remarks by Dr. Leila Alieva

Dr. Leila Alieva
Dr. Leila Alieva is an Associate of REES, Oxford School for Global and Area Studies (OSGA).

In her closing remarks, Dr. Leila Alieva reflected on the key themes and insights that emerged from the thirteenth session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series. She expressed appreciation to the presenters, discussants, and audience for what she described as a rich and intellectually stimulating discussion that not only addressed important questions but also generated new avenues for inquiry.

Dr. Alieva emphasized that the presentations collectively highlighted populism as a broader political signal—an indicator of underlying tensions and contradictions within contemporary political systems. In this sense, populism can be understood as a symptom of institutional arrangements that increasingly lag behind evolving societal, political, and economic dynamics. The session’s contributions illustrated how such pressures often manifest through contested relationships between society, political actors, and institutional frameworks.

Reflecting on the individual presentations, Dr. Alieva noted how Dr. Jasmin Hasanović’s analysis illuminated the enduring influence of institutional legacies in shaping the construction of “the people” within post-conflict political systems. Similarly, the work presented by Dr. Sixtine Van Outryve shed light on tensions between different models of democracy, particularly the contrast between established representative institutions and emerging participatory practices through grassroots assemblies. These dynamics illustrated how societies may attempt to compensate for perceived institutional shortcomings by experimenting with alternative forms of democratic organization.

Dr. Alieva also highlighted the importance of the comparative perspective raised during the discussion. As noted by the discussants, examining cases across different regions—from Eastern and Western Europe to post-Soviet contexts—revealed both shared patterns and distinctive trajectories in the relationship between populism, democracy, and institutional change. Finally, she underscored the significance of Nieves Fernanda Cancela Sánchez’s contribution, which addressed the often-overlooked question of representation and inclusion within diplomatic institutions. 

 

Conclusion

Session 13 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered an interdisciplinary exploration of how “the people” are constructed, contested, and institutionalized across diverse political contexts. By examining cases that ranged from Bosnia and Herzegovina’s post-conflict constitutional order to grassroots democratic experimentation in France and the diplomatic marginalization of stateless or underrepresented communities, the panel illuminated the multiple arenas in which the meaning of popular sovereignty is negotiated. Collectively, the presentations demonstrated that “the people” is neither a stable nor a self-evident political category; rather, it is continuously shaped through institutional arrangements, political struggles, and discursive practices.

The discussions also revealed a shared analytical thread across the three papers: the recognition that contemporary democratic tensions often arise from mismatches between evolving social demands and the institutional frameworks designed to represent them. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the institutionalization of ethnic power-sharing structures constrains the formation of broader civic political subjects. In the French case, grassroots assemblies reflect citizens’ attempts to reclaim agency in the face of perceived distance between representatives and the represented. In the international arena, the exclusion of unrepresented peoples from diplomatic participation exposes structural limitations within a state-centered global order that formally invokes “the peoples” while largely privileging sovereign states.

In sum, the session underscored that debates about populism, democratic participation, and representation cannot be confined to a single institutional domain. Instead, they span local, national, and international levels, revealing interconnected struggles over voice, legitimacy, and political inclusion. By bringing these diverse perspectives into dialogue, Session 13 contributed to a deeper understanding of the dynamic processes through which democratic subjects are formed and contested. In doing so, it reinforced the broader aim of the ECPS workshop series: to provide an interdisciplinary platform for critically examining the evolving meanings of democracy and “the people” in a rapidly changing political world.

Africans

Virtual Workshop Series / Session 12 — Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff (2026). “Virtual Workshop Series / Session 12 — Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 23, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00143



Session 12 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series explored how “decolonizing democracy” requires attention to the material and symbolic structures shaping participation, legitimacy, and representation. The presentations framed democracy not as a settled institutional model but as a contested field shaped by colonial legacies, extractive political economies, and identity-based struggles over inclusion and authority. Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja’s comparative study of Nigeria and the United Kingdom showed how environmental governance can produce “participation without power,” where formal inclusion coexists with persistent injustice. Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s analysis of Cameroon highlighted how pluralism has intensified communal claims to state ownership, complicating political alternation. Supported by Dr. Gabriel Cyril Nguijoi’s feedback, the session underscored the value of concepts such as biocultural sovereignty and communocratic populism and emphasized the need for context-sensitive, interdisciplinary approaches to democratic renewal in the Global South.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, February 19, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 12 of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the theme “Decolonizing Democracy: Governance, Identity, and Resistance in the Global South.” The session foregrounded a core problem in contemporary democratic theory and practice: how democratic institutions—often inherited, transplanted, or externally modeled—are reshaped, contested, and resisted in postcolonial contexts marked by extractive political economies, unequal state–society relations, and enduring struggles over recognition and voice.

Moderated by Neo Sithole (University of Szeged), the workshop approached “the people” not as a stable category but as a contested political project—produced through governance arrangements, mobilized through identity, and asserted through resistance. Across the session, democracy emerged less as an institutional endpoint than as a field of struggle in which colonial legacies, state power, and community agency intersect. Rather than treating decolonization as a symbolic discourse, contributors examined its concrete implications for how participation is structured, how resources are governed, and how legitimacy is claimed in environments where the state’s democratic form may coexist with exclusionary or coercive practices.

The session brought together two presentations that, while distinct in focus, converged on a shared concern with democratic deficit: the gap between formal mechanisms of participation and the effective capacity of communities to shape political and material outcomes. First, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja (Olabisi Onabanjo University) examined environmental governance as a critical site of democratic contestation in a paper jointly authored with Busayo Olakitan Badmos (Olabisi Onabanjo University), titled “Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom.” Positioning environmental politics within the broader architecture of power, he explored how colonial histories and technocratic governance models marginalize local knowledge and produce “participation without power,” while proposing biocultural sovereignty as a pathway toward more inclusive ecological governance.

Second, Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme (University of Ngaoundéré) analyzed electoral politics and identity mobilization in Cameroon in “Africa at the Test of Populism: Identity Mobilisations, Crises of Political Alternation, and the Trial of Democracy,” jointly authored with Dr. Yves Valéry Obame (University of Bertoua / Global Studies Institute & Geneva Africa Lab). His contribution interrogated how multiparty competition can intensify communal claims to representation, framing elections not as programmatic contests but as struggles over inclusion, alternation, and the symbolic ownership of the state.

The discussion was anchored by Dr. Gabriel Cyril Nguijoi (National Institute of Cartography; ICEDIS), whose role as discussant helped connect the papers’ empirical insights to broader debates on coloniality, accountability, and democratic substance. His interventions highlighted how both contributions disrupt common analytical shortcuts—whether the assumption that environmental injustice is confined to the Global South, or the notion that repeated elections necessarily constitute democratic consolidation. 

Taken together, Session 12 offered a layered and comparative exploration of how democracy is challenged—and potentially renewed—through the politics of governance, identity, and resistance in postcolonial settings.

Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja: “Decolonial Environmentalism and Democracy: A Comparative Study of Resource Governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom”

Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Olabisi Onabanjo University.

Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja of Olabisi Onabanjo University delivered a thought-provoking presentation examining the entanglement of environmental governance, colonial legacies, and democratic practice. Speaking from a comparative Nigeria–United Kingdom framework, he advanced the central claim that environmental governance should be understood not merely as a technical or administrative domain but as a site of democratic struggle shaped by historical power asymmetries and contemporary political economies.

Positioning his research within ongoing debates on participation and sustainability, Dr. Solaja noted that mainstream environmental governance literature often assumes that stakeholder inclusion naturally enhances democratic legitimacy and ecological outcomes. However, he argued that such frameworks frequently overlook how colonial histories and extractive economic structures continue to shape decision-making processes. In many contexts, governance systems privilege capital accumulation over community well-being, thereby reproducing ecological inequality across regions. From this perspective, environmental governance cannot be treated as politically neutral; rather, it reflects contested struggles over resources, voice, and knowledge.

The study was guided by three principal research questions: i) how colonial legacies continue to shape environmental governance in both Nigeria and the United Kingdom; ii) how distributive, procedural, and recognitional injustices manifest across the two cases; and iii) how Indigenous and decolonial approaches might offer alternative pathways toward sustainable governance. 

By placing a Global South extractive economy alongside a Global North post-industrial democracy, the project sought to challenge the assumption that environmental injustice is primarily a Southern phenomenon and instead reveal its structural character across diverse political systems.

Dr. Solaja explained that the comparison was deliberately constructed. Nigeria’s Niger Delta represents a post-colonial, resource-dependent region marked by centralized control, oil extraction, and militarized environmental conflict. In contrast, the United Kingdom’s post-industrial regions—particularly South Wales and Northern England—illustrate an advanced industrial democracy navigating decarbonization and energy transition. Despite these differences in institutional capacity and policy development, both contexts exhibit what he termed a “democratic deficit” embedded within environmental governance arrangements.

The presentation’s theoretical foundation drew on decolonial environmentalism, particularly the work of Walter Mignoloand related scholars. Dr. Solaja argued that dominant environmental governance models are shaped by Eurocentric and technocratic assumptions that privilege market-oriented and state-centric solutions while marginalizing relational, place-based, and Indigenous ecological knowledge systems. Decoloniality, in this sense, involves challenging the presumed universality of Western sustainability paradigms and embracing what he described as “epistemic disobedience”—the refusal to accept a single authoritative model of environmental knowledge. Environmental conflicts, therefore, emerge not only from competition over resources but also from struggles over recognition and authority.

Methodologically, the study employed a cooperative qualitative case-study design grounded in critical interpretivism. The research team analyzed legislative archives, reports from NGOs and international organizations, media coverage, environmental indices, and data from the Environmental Justice Atlas. Through thematic coding, they identified patterns related to governance models, justice dimensions, and underlying power relations shaped by colonial continuities.

Turning to the findings, Dr. Solaja highlighted stark contrasts and parallels. In the Niger Delta, thousands of oil spill incidents in recent years have produced severe ecological damage, including heavy-metal contamination and concentrated environmental risk zones near pipeline infrastructure. While official narratives often attribute spills to sabotage, the research emphasized the role of weak regulation and aging infrastructure. The result is pronounced distributive injustice, with local communities bearing disproportionate environmental burdens.

The United Kingdom, by contrast, has achieved measurable progress in decarbonization, including the phase-out of coal and expansion of renewable energy. Yet structural tensions remain: fossil fuels continue to dominate overall energy consumption, new oil projects are still approved, and community influence over environmental decision-making is often limited. Thus, although distributive injustice may appear less severe in absolute terms, procedural and recognitional deficits persist.

Across both cases, environmental injustice manifested along three dimensions. Distributive injustice concerned the unequal allocation of environmental harms and benefits. Procedural injustice involved exclusion from meaningful decision-making processes, whether through repression in Nigeria or limited consultation mechanisms in the United Kingdom. Recognitional injustice referred to the marginalization of local knowledge, identities, and historical experiences. Dr. Solaja summarized this dynamic as “participation without power”: communities may be consulted, yet they rarely possess the authority to shape outcomes.

The presentation also underscored the role of resistance movements. In the Niger Delta, environmental activism is intertwined with ethnic identity, territorial sovereignty, and cultural survival, exemplified by movements such as the Ogoni struggle. In the United Kingdom, climate justice activism often reflects class, regional, and generational concerns. Despite contextual differences, movements in both regions increasingly share strategies, including civil disobedience, digital mobilization, and transnational solidarity networks—suggesting the emergence of a broader planetary justice framework.

In concluding, Dr. Solaja proposed alternative pathways centered on “biocultural sovereignty” and plural ecological governance. In Nigeria, this could involve ethical extractivism grounded in free, prior, and informed consent, equitable benefit sharing, and stronger accountability mechanisms. In the United Kingdom, community-owned renewable energy initiatives and locally driven transitions could advance energy democracy. Ultimately, he argued that democracy must extend beyond electoral institutions to encompass ecological sovereignty, epistemic plurality, and intergenerational justice. Only through such transformations, he concluded, can environmental governance become genuinely democratic.

Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme: “Cameroon at the Trial of Democracy: Presidential Elections, Communaucratic Populism, and the Crisis of Political Transition”

Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme
Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme is from the University of Ngaoundéré, Laboratoire camerounais d’études et de recherches sur les sociétés contemporaines (Ceresc).

In his presentation, Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme offered a sociologically grounded analysis of electoral politics in Cameroon, advancing the concept of “communocratic populism” to explain the enduring tensions between democratic pluralism and community-based political mobilization. The presentation situated Cameroon’s contemporary political trajectory within the broader challenges of democratic transition in postcolonial African states, where formal multiparty systems coexist with deeply rooted communal identities.

Dr. Essaga Eteme began by framing the study within Cameroon’s transition to political pluralism in 1990, a watershed moment that introduced multiparty competition after decades of single-party dominance. While this transition generated widespread optimism about democratic reform, he argued that it also revealed structural constraints. Cameroon is composed of more than 250 ethnic communities, each with distinct historical and political aspirations. In such a context, electoral competition has increasingly become a mechanism for negotiating communal representation rather than contesting ideological programs. Presidential, legislative, and municipal elections alike are thus shaped by the imperative to secure community backing, transforming democratic participation into what Dr. Essaga Eteme conceptualized as communocratic populism—political mobilization grounded in communal identity claims rather than policy platforms.

The presentation traced the historical roots of this phenomenon to Cameroon’s post-independence political consolidation. From 1972 until the early 1990s, the country operated under a highly centralized system characterized by limited political freedoms and restricted avenues for dissent. The transition to multiparty democracy raised hopes for political alternation and broader participation. However, Dr. Essaga Eteme noted that the persistence of long-term incumbency—particularly the extended tenure of President Paul Biya—has generated both expectations and frustrations. While some citizens initially viewed democratic reforms as an opportunity for renewal, others increasingly perceived them as insufficient to produce meaningful change, thereby fueling community-based demands for political inclusion.

Central to the analysis was the observation that presidential elections have become focal points for communal competition. The announcement of President Biya’s candidacy in the 2025 election, after decades in power, intensified perceptions among various groups that political authority had been monopolized by a particular regional or ethnic constituency. This perception, Dr. Essaga Eteme argued, reinvigorated communocratic narratives asserting that leadership should rotate among communities. Such narratives do not necessarily reject democracy but reinterpret it as a mechanism for redistributing access to state power among identity groups.

The research was guided by three principal questions: i) identifying the forms and manifestations of communocratic populism during presidential elections; ii) examining how community affiliation shapes voter alignment; and iii) analyzing how political actors exploit communal sentiments either to legitimize incumbency or to challenge it. To address these questions, Dr. Essaga Eteme employed a mixed-methods approach combining field observations, social media analysis, and electoral data from recent presidential contests, particularly those of 2025. This methodology enabled a multi-layered understanding of both elite strategies and grassroots perceptions.

Empirical findings highlighted patterns of continuity across successive elections. Electoral outcomes revealed the sustained dominance of the incumbent leadership, accompanied by accusations of fraud and declining trust in electoral institutions. At the same time, opposition candidates frequently mobilized support by appealing to communal solidarity. For example, challengers from northern, western, or Anglophone regions framed their campaigns around the notion that their respective communities deserved access to national leadership after prolonged exclusion. Such appeals resonated strongly with voters who interpreted political power as a collective resource to be shared among groups.

Dr. Essaga Eteme illustrated how these dynamics have evolved over time. Earlier opposition figures, including prominent Anglophone leaders in the 1990s and 2000s, mobilized regional grievances against perceived Francophone dominance, contributing to tensions that later fed into the Anglophone crisis. More recent challengers have similarly invoked regional identity, arguing that the concentration of power within one community undermines national cohesion. Even post-electoral disputes often reflect communal narratives, with defeated candidates attributing outcomes to structural favoritism toward the incumbent’s group rather than to programmatic differences.

The presentation emphasized that communocratic populism shifts the focus of democratic competition from ideological debate to identity-based claims. Elections become symbolic contests over which community will control the state apparatus rather than deliberations over policy direction. This dynamic, Dr. Essaga Eteme suggested, contributes to a broader crisis of political transition, as democratic institutions struggle to mediate between national integration and communal representation. Instead of fostering a shared civic identity, electoral politics may reinforce divisions by encouraging leaders to frame political demands in communal terms.

At the same time, the analysis acknowledged the ambivalent character of communocratic mobilization. On one hand, it can serve as a vehicle for marginalized groups to articulate grievances and demand inclusion. On the other hand, it risks entrenching zero-sum perceptions of power, where one group’s gain is viewed as another’s loss. This tension complicates efforts to build stable democratic institutions capable of transcending identity politics.

Dr. Essaga Eteme concluded that Cameroon’s experience demonstrates the limits of procedural democratization in deeply plural societies. The introduction of multiparty elections does not automatically produce programmatic competition or institutional trust; instead, it may activate preexisting communal cleavages. Addressing the crisis of political transition therefore requires reimagining democracy beyond electoral mechanics, fostering inclusive governance structures that balance communal recognition with national cohesion. Without such reforms, communocratic populism is likely to remain a defining feature of Cameroon’s political landscape, continuing to shape both the aspirations and anxieties of its democratic experiment.

Discussant Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijois Feedback

Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi is a researcher at the National Institute of Cartography (NIC), and lecturer at the Cameroonian Institute of Diplomatic and Strategic Studies (ICEDIS).

 

Dr. Gabriel Cyrille Nguijoi offered substantive and analytically rich feedback on the presentations delivered by Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja and Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme, highlighting their contributions to contemporary debates on populism, governance, and democratic transformation from African perspectives. His remarks underscored both the conceptual significance and the empirical originality of the two studies while posing clarifying questions aimed at strengthening their theoretical implications.

Regarding Dr. Solaja’s presentation on decolonial environmentalism and democratic deficit, Dr. Nguijoi characterized the paper as a stimulating and timely contribution to populism and governance studies. He was particularly struck by the comparative framework linking environmental governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom, which juxtaposed a Global South extractive context with a developed post-industrial democracy. This transnational comparison, he emphasized, offered a compelling analytical lens that challenged conventional assumptions that environmental injustice is primarily a problem of the Global South. Instead, the paper demonstrated that tensions between resource governance and democratic accountability transcend regional boundaries and manifest across different political systems.

Dr. Nguijoi highlighted the presentation’s central argument that environmental governance is not politically neutral but historically embedded in colonial legacies and extractive political economies. He noted that this insight implicitly raised a profound normative question: whether democracy can genuinely flourish within development models that reproduce forms of colonial extractivism. In his view, this question extended beyond environmental politics to the broader relationship between governance structures and historical power asymmetries.

He further praised the paper for introducing environmental issues into populism discourse, an area often dominated by identity, economic, or institutional analyses. By situating environmental governance within debates on decolonization, identity, and resistance in the Global South, the presentation expanded the conceptual terrain of populism studies. At the same time, Dr. Nguijoi invited further clarification on the concept of decolonial environmentalism. Specifically, he asked whether the approach implied epistemic recognition of Indigenous knowledge systems alone, or whether it also entailed deeper institutional transformation involving ownership, participation, accountability, and governance restructuring. He also questioned whether environmental resistance movements, while democratizing public discourse, were capable of transforming governance architectures in practice. Overall, he expressed strong appreciation for the paper’s innovative integration of environmental governance into analyses of populism and democratic transformation.

Turning to Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s presentation on communocratic populism and the crisis of political alternation in Cameroon, Dr. Nguijoi described the case as particularly significant given the country’s long-standing presidential incumbency and its implications for democratic renewal. He framed the study as addressing a structurally sensitive question: whether identity-based mobilization in electoral politics represents democratic participation or contributes to democratic erosion.

Dr. Nguijoi identified two principal analytical strengths in the presentation. The first concerned the centrality of identity mobilization in Cameroonian politics. He observed that political competition in this context appears structured less around ideological programs than around communal belonging, regional solidarity, historical grievances, and narratives of stability and protection advanced by political elites. In his interpretation, this dynamic captured the essence of communocratic populism, whereby electoral alignment becomes embedded in community affiliation, particularly during presidential elections. He noted empirical examples illustrating how opposition candidates mobilized regional and communal support bases in recent electoral contests, reinforcing the salience of identity in political mobilization.

The second strength he highlighted was the analysis of political alternation as a test of democratic substance. Although elections have been regularly held since the country’s transition to pluralism, executive turnover has not occurred, raising questions about whether democracy can be reduced to procedural repetition or must include a credible possibility of leadership change. Dr. Nguijoi suggested that Cameroon exhibits a pattern of electoral persistence without alternation, where communal rhetoric frames political competition as a struggle for survival, regional balance, or national stability. This dynamic, he argued, renders alternation structurally improbable and complicates assessments of democratic consolidation.

In concluding his feedback, Dr. Nguijoi emphasized that both presentations addressed crucial themes linking populism, identity, governance, and democratic transformation. He commended their focus on historically embedded structures — colonial legacies in the Nigerian case and identity-based mobilization in Cameroon — while encouraging further theoretical clarification. His remarks framed the two studies as important contributions to understanding how democratic processes are shaped, constrained, and contested in diverse political contexts.

Responses to Discussant’s Feedback

Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja

In his response to Dr. Nguijoi’s feedback, Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja expressed appreciation for the questions and comments, clarifying key aspects of his comparative framework on environmental governance in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. Speaking from a reflective standpoint, he emphasized that the contrast between the two cases was deliberate and methodological rather than evaluative. The study, he explained, did not seek to measure or compare the degree of environmental injustice across the two countries. Instead, its primary objective was to identify and illuminate democratic deficits present in both contexts despite their differing levels of development.

Solaja underscored that the United Kingdom, as a developed country with robust institutional structures, regulatory frameworks, and environmental governance mechanisms, nonetheless exhibits forms of democratic deficit. He noted that certain communities and groups remain marginalized in decision-making processes, particularly regarding environmental policy formulation and implementation. Even within a system characterized by strong democratic representation, unequal participation and limited voice for affected communities persist, revealing that institutional strength alone does not eliminate governance shortcomings.

Turning to the Nigerian case, Dr. Solaja highlighted the enduring influence of colonial legacies on environmental management. He argued that Nigeria inherited centralized, state-centric governance structures from colonial administrations, which continue to shape contemporary environmental policies. In this framework, the state retains dominant control over natural resources and extraction activities, often without meaningful consultation with indigenous populations or local communities. As a result, those who bear the ecological consequences of extraction are frequently excluded from decision-making processes, creating a pronounced democratic deficit.

He reiterated that the comparative analysis aimed to demonstrate that environmental governance challenges are not exclusive to the Global South. By juxtaposing Nigeria with the United Kingdom, the study sought to challenge the assumption that democratic deficits in environmental management are primarily a Southern phenomenon. Instead, Dr. Solaja argued, such deficits manifest in different forms across both the Global South and Global North, shaped by distinct historical and institutional trajectories.

Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme

In his response to Dr. Nguijoi’s feedback, Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme expressed gratitude for the discussant’s observations and used the opportunity to clarify key dynamics underlying his concept of communocratic populism in Cameroon. He focused particularly on the role of alliance formation among opposition forces and communities during presidential elections, presenting it as empirical evidence reinforcing his analytical framework.

Dr. Essaga Eteme explained that the persistent contestation of electoral procedures since the country’s transition to pluralism in 1990 has created a political environment marked by distrust and accusations of fraud. While acknowledging that post-electoral disputes are not uncommon in many democracies, he emphasized that in Cameroon such contestation often takes on a communal dimension. Opposition parties and communities excluded from power tend to interpret electoral outcomes as illegitimate, prompting efforts to build cross-community alliances against the incumbent’s support base.

He highlighted the 2025 presidential election as a revealing example. According to his account, when a prominent opposition figure was deemed ineligible to run by electoral authorities, segments of his regional support base redirected their backing to another candidate from a different community. This strategic convergence of voters across communal lines, he argued, illustrates how alliance-building operates within a communocratic logic: electoral behavior becomes driven less by ideological affinity than by the shared objective of displacing the community perceived to monopolize power.

Dr. Essaga Eteme concluded that these alliance dynamics demonstrate the adaptive nature of communocratic populism. Faced with a dominant ruling party and entrenched incumbency, opposition actors mobilize communal solidarities and forge temporary coalitions to challenge the status quo. In his view, such practices further substantiate his argument that identity-based mobilization remains central to understanding Cameroon’s electoral politics.

Q&A Session 

The Q&A session developed into a wide-ranging and intellectually engaged dialogue that deepened the themes raised in the presentations, particularly the intersections between populism, environmental governance, democratic legitimacy, and identity-based political mobilization. Moderated by Neo Sithole, the discussion brought together conceptual reflections, empirical clarifications, and comparative insights, revealing the broader implications of the research beyond the specific case studies of Nigeria and Cameroon.

Opening the session, Sithole offered strong praise for Dr. Oludele Mayowa Solaja’s paper, emphasizing its methodological rigor and its successful integration of theory with empirical evidence. He noted that the study provided not only a clear conceptual framework but also concrete proof, particularly through environmental data from the Niger Delta demonstrating the presence of harmful chemicals and minerals in topsoil affecting local populations. Sithole framed the discussion within a broader critique of minimalist understandings of democracy, arguing that governance should not be confined to electoral processes but must extend to everyday conditions of life, including environmental quality and access to clean resources. In his view, the paper effectively illustrated how democratic governance—or its absence—directly shapes environmental outcomes.

Sithole also situated the Niger Delta within a wider global political economy, highlighting how multinational corporations often relocate environmentally harmful extraction activities to regions in Africa, Latin America, and Asia where regulatory frameworks are weaker. He characterized the Niger Delta as both one of the longest-running cases of environmental degradation and one of the most sustained examples of environmental resistance, noting that such resistance has become embedded in local identity. Extending the argument, he suggested that dissatisfaction with democratic governance across Africa stems from unmet expectations following the democratic transitions of the 1990s and 2000s, when many citizens assumed political liberalization would lead to improved living conditions. Instead, he observed, many postcolonial states continue to operate within institutional frameworks inherited from colonial administrations that were not designed to address local needs.

Drawing on examples from Kenya and South Africa, Sithole highlighted ongoing disputes over land rights and resource ownership, illustrating how colonial-era patterns of dispossession persist in contemporary governance. He posed a forward-looking question about whether environmental resistance movements across the continent could serve as catalysts for democratic renewal at a broader scale.

In response, Dr. Solaja clarified the intent of his research. He stressed that the study did not advocate dismantling existing environmental governance frameworks but rather reforming them through the integration of indigenous ecological knowledge systems. According to Dr. Solaja, contemporary democratic institutions in many postcolonial societies were externally derived and insufficiently adapted to local realities. The proposed solution, which he described as a biocultural approach, involves incorporating indigenous practices and knowledge into formal governance structures to create more inclusive and effective systems. This approach, he argued, would address democratic deficits while strengthening environmental stewardship by recognizing the long-standing expertise of local communities.

The discussion then shifted toward the question of accountability and reporting mechanisms. Sithole raised concerns about the effectiveness of multinational institutions and international organizations in contexts where domestic environmental reporting systems are weak or unreliable. He asked whether reliance on external actors was sufficient to ensure environmental justice or whether strengthening state capacity should be prioritized. 

Dr. Solaja responded by emphasizing the importance of community participation in monitoring environmental conditions. He proposed bottom-up reporting mechanisms that would enable local populations to communicate environmental challenges directly to authorities, potentially using technological tools such as mobile applications. While acknowledging the necessity of formal institutional frameworks, he argued that they must be complemented by indigenous knowledge and grassroots engagement to achieve meaningful environmental democracy.

Dr. Bülent Kenes expanded the discussion by introducing a geopolitical perspective that connected environmental governance in Africa to the rise of contemporary populist movements in Western countries. He framed his question around the potential global implications of political ideologies associated with figures such as Donald Trump and the MAGA movement, which he characterized as challenging postcolonial frameworks and signaling a form of renewed imperial assertiveness. Dr. Kenes invited the speakers to reflect on whether African states and societies should be concerned about the broader consequences of these developments, particularly in relation to historical patterns of external domination. He specifically asked whether such political trends could generate new forms of re-colonization or intensified exploitation of African resources, labor, and environmental assets. His intervention underscored the possibility that shifting power dynamics in the Global North might place renewed pressure on Africa’s ecological systems and resource governance, thereby linking domestic environmental issues to wider geopolitical transformations.

In his response, Dr. Solaja addressed the geopolitical concerns surrounding potential renewed exploitation of African resources by situating them within a longer historical continuum of extractivism. He emphasized that African communities have endured the adverse consequences of intensive resource extraction both during colonial rule and in the post-independence period, often with limited benefits for local populations. According to Dr. Solaja, the well-being of affected communities has frequently been compromised, while state interventions have tended to be delayed, insufficient, or absent altogether. In many cases, assistance has been mediated through international donors or multinational corporations rather than delivered directly by national governments, creating complex arrangements that do not always serve the interests of local beneficiaries.

Dr. Solaja noted that although most African countries have been politically independent for decades, the persistence of asymmetrical global economic relationships continues to shape environmental governance and resource management. He argued that while no country can operate in isolation, interactions between the Global North and Global South should evolve toward more equitable and mutually beneficial partnerships rather than exploitative ones.

Returning to the conceptual framework of his paper, Dr. Solaja reiterated the importance of biocultural sovereignty, which advocates integrating indigenous knowledge systems into formal environmental governance structures. He suggested that empowering local communities to participate in decision-making over resource control, distribution, and management could reduce conflict and resistance movements. By drawing on longstanding indigenous ecological practices, he concluded, marginalized communities could gain greater democratic voice and contribute to more sustainable and inclusive resource governance.

The session also addressed conceptual issues arising from Dr. Salomon Essaga Eteme’s presentation on communocratic populism. Dr. Kenes noted the novelty of the concept and requested clarification of its meaning and applicability beyond the Cameroonian context. Dr. Eteme explained that communocratic populism refers to a form of political mobilization grounded in community identity rather than ideological programs. In this framework, electoral competition becomes a contest among communal groups seeking access to state power, often leading to alliances between communities aiming to displace incumbents.

He elaborated that political discourse frequently attributes governmental actions to entire communities rather than to individual leaders, reinforcing identity-based interpretations of power. As a result, electoral campaigns focus less on policy proposals and more on demonstrating communal strength, intelligence, or entitlement to rule. Dr. Eteme further explained that communocratic alliances emerge when communities perceive the existing power structure as monopolized by a particular group. These alliances are pragmatic and strategic, formed not around shared ideological visions but around the collective objective of redistributing political power.

Throughout the discussion, participants acknowledged that such dynamics complicate conventional democratic theory, which assumes competition based on policy alternatives and public interest. Instead, identity-based mobilization can transform elections into zero-sum contests among communities, challenging the ideal of governance oriented toward the common good.

The Q&A session concluded with a recognition of the originality and relevance of the concepts introduced by the presenters, particularly the integration of environmental governance into populism studies and the articulation of communocratic populism as a framework for understanding identity-driven electoral politics. The exchange underscored the importance of interdisciplinary approaches that consider historical legacies, institutional structures, and socio-cultural dynamics in analyzing contemporary democracy.

Overall, the session demonstrated how localized case studies—whether environmental conflicts in the Niger Delta or identity politics in Cameroon—can illuminate broader structural challenges facing democratic governance in the Global South and beyond. By fostering dialogue between empirical research and theoretical reflection, the discussion highlighted the value of comparative and context-sensitive analyses for advancing the study of populism, governance, and democratic transformation.

Concluding Remarks

ECPS Early Career Research Network (ECRN) member Neo Sithole. Photo: Umit Vurel.

In his concluding remarks, moderator Neo Sithole reflected on the thematic contributions of the presentations and highlighted their broader significance for understanding populism and democracy in African contexts. He began by acknowledging his limited familiarity with the politics of Central Francophone Africa but noted that the presentations resonated with patterns he had observed elsewhere, particularly the role of geographical and historical divides in shaping populist mobilization. Drawing on comparative examples, he emphasized how north–south disparities rooted in colonial infrastructure development have produced enduring political imbalances in several postcolonial states. He commended the presenters for illuminating these structural divides and their implications for democratic governance. Sithole also encouraged further scholarly development of the concept of communocratic populism. 

Offering brief feedback on the presentations, Sithole observed that both papers revealed understudied dimensions of populist expression in Africa. He noted that Dr. Solaja’s research demonstrated how environmental resistance can become central to local identity while exposing the persistence of colonial-era governance practices that continue to marginalize affected communities. In contrast, Dr. Essaga Eteme’s work shed light on identity-based mobilization and the enduring dominance of strong leadership patterns in certain Francophone states, where communal affiliation shapes political competition.

Conclusion

Session 12 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series underscored the urgency of rethinking democracy through the lenses of decolonization, governance, and identity in the Global South. By juxtaposing environmental struggles in Nigeria and the United Kingdom with identity-driven electoral politics in Cameroon, the session demonstrated that democratic deficit is neither geographically confined nor institutionally uniform. Rather, it manifests in diverse forms shaped by colonial legacies, political economies of extraction, and enduring contestations over representation and authority. The discussions revealed that formal democratic procedures—whether participatory environmental frameworks or multiparty elections—do not automatically translate into substantive inclusion or equitable outcomes. Instead, communities often confront structures that allow consultation without empowerment and participation without transformative capacity.

A key takeaway was the necessity of expanding democratic theory beyond procedural benchmarks toward a more substantive understanding that incorporates ecological justice, epistemic plurality, and communal recognition. The concept of biocultural sovereignty advanced in the environmental context, alongside the notion of communocratic populism in electoral politics, illustrated how locally grounded analytical frameworks can illuminate dynamics that conventional models overlook. Both contributions highlighted the ambivalence of resistance movements and identity mobilization, which may simultaneously articulate legitimate grievances and risk reinforcing new forms of exclusion.

Ultimately, the session emphasized that decolonizing democracy requires confronting the historical and structural conditions that shape contemporary governance, rather than merely adapting existing institutional templates. By bringing empirical case studies into dialogue with broader theoretical debates, Session 12 contributed to a more nuanced understanding of how democracy is negotiated, contested, and reimagined in postcolonial settings. It thus reinforced the importance of interdisciplinary and context-sensitive approaches for advancing scholarship on populism, governance, and democratic transformation in an increasingly interconnected world.

An ECPS panel at the European Parliament in Brussels, held on 3 February 2026, marked the launch of the report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options, examining mounting strains on the post-war Atlantic order. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

ECPS Panel at European Parliament: Populism, Trump, and Changing Transatlantic Relations

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff (2026). “ECPS Panel at European Parliament: Populism, Trump, and Changing Transatlantic Relations.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 11, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00143

 

The ECPS panel held at the European Parliament on 3 February 2026 marked a critical intervention into debates on the future of transatlantic relations amid the resurgence of right-wing populism in the United States. Convened to launch the report “Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options,” the event brought together policymakers, scholars, and civil society actors to assess how Donald Trump’s re-election has reshaped Europe’s strategic environment. Discussions highlighted the simultaneous erosion of security cooperation, trade norms, multilateral institutions, and shared democratic values. Rather than treating these developments as temporary disruptions, the panel framed them as structural challenges requiring European agency, strategic autonomy, and democratic resilience. The report positions Europe not as a passive responder, but as a decisive actor capable of shaping a post-assumptive transatlantic order.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On 3 February 2026, the European Parliament hosted an ECPS panel convened to launch the report Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options, a timely intervention into the accelerating strain on the post-war Atlantic order. Held in the Spinelli building in Brussels and hosted by MEP Radan Kanev, the event assembled Members of the European Parliament, scholars, policy practitioners, journalists, and civil society observers around a shared concern: the extent to which renewed US right-wing populism—crystallized in Donald Trump’s re-election in 2024—has shifted the premises of Europe’s external environment and, increasingly, its internal political equilibrium.

The discussion proceeded from the report’s core proposition that transatlantic relations cannot be understood only as a matter of diplomacy or foreign policy. Rather, domestic political dynamics—polarization, institutional capture, disinformation, and the reconfiguration of party systems—now shape the external posture of states and alliances. Against this backdrop, the panel examined how pressures on the four foundational pillars of the liberal international order—security cooperation, free trade, international institutions, and shared democratic values—are unfolding simultaneously and interactively. The report, coordinated under the ECPS and produced through a transatlantic academic collaboration involving the University of Illinois Urbana–Champaign, UC Berkeley, the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and ARENA at the University of Oslo, offers a structured assessment of these developments and outlines policy options aimed at risk reduction and strategic adaptation.

Co-moderated by ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese and former MEP Sir Graham Watson, the event opened with reflections that framed the moment as one of geopolitical reordering and democratic vulnerability. Von Wiese situated Europe’s predicament within a wider shift in power relations, while Sir Watson emphasized the immediacy of populist mobilization and the need for democratic coordination beyond Europe. MEP Kanev’s hosting remarks foregrounded the entanglement of European domestic politics with US leadership change and warned of new forms of external meddling in Europe’s internal affairs. Further political interventions by MEP Valérie Hayer (The Chair of the Renew Europe Group) and MEP Brando Benifei (Chair of the EP Delegation for relations with the United States) underscored the ideological nature of Trumpism’s challenge to “liberal Europe,” the necessity of European firmness and credibility, and the growing imperative of strategic autonomy across trade, technology, and security.

The report’s editors—Marianne RiddervoldGuri Rosén, and Jessica Greenberg—then presented the report’s analytical architecture and central findings, before a wide-ranging Q&A tested its implications against questions of narrative, coalition-building, European divisions, and the operationalization of democratic resilience. Collectively, the panel framed the report not as a lament for a weakening alliance, but as a call to clarify Europe’s agency under uncertainty—and to translate unity, leverage, and values into durable policy choices.

Irina von Wiese: Opening Reflections on Populism and a Changing Geopolitical Order

ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese delivers opening remarks as co-moderator of the panel, framing the discussion on populism, Donald Trump, and changing transatlantic relations. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her opening remarks as co-moderator of the panel, ECPS Honorary President Irina von Wiese set an reflective tone, situating the discussion of populism, Donald Trump, and changing transatlantic relations within both institutional and geopolitical contexts. Von Wiese noted that the report under discussion had been initiated well before its public launch, remarking on the striking extent to which unfolding global developments had amplified its relevance. She suggested that the themes addressed would likely remain salient for the foreseeable future, given the enduring transformations underway in global politics.

Drawing on a personal yet analytically resonant observation from her vantage point in central London, von Wiese referred to the construction of the new Chinese “super embassy” as a symbolic marker of broader geopolitical shifts. This development, she argued, encapsulated the pressures facing Europe as it navigates a rapidly evolving international order characterized by intensifying competition between emerging and established superpowers. Without pre-empting the panel’s substantive debates, she framed Europe’s position as increasingly constrained, compelled to recalibrate its strategic choices amid rival spheres of influence.

Concluding her remarks, von Wiese emphasized the importance of dialogue and multidisciplinary engagement, before inviting MEP Kanev to proceed and introducing Sir Graham Watson, her predecessor as Honorary Chair of ECPS, as a special guest.

Sir Graham Watson: Europe’s Populist Moment and the Imperative of Democratic Unity

Sir Graham Watson, founding honorary president of the ECPS, delivers opening remarks in a concise and candid tone. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In his opening remarks, Sir Graham Watson, founding honorary president of the ECPS, adopted a deliberately concise and candid tone. Sir Watson expressed strong appreciation for the participation of Valerie Heyer and Radan Kanev, emphasizing that their support for the report had been exemplary. He underlined their importance as political actors actively resisting the advance of populism within Europe, describing such engagement as both timely and essential.

He then drew attention to the immediacy of the populist challenge by noting that, at that very moment, a gathering of European populist actors was taking place nearby. Sir Watson warned that these movements were seeking to replicate in Europe the political dynamics associated with Donald Trump in the United States. Countering this trend, he argued, required firm and value-based cooperation with democratic partners committed to the rule of law and structured multilateral engagement, specifically referencing countries such as Canada and South Korea.

Sir Watson further criticized what he described as incoherence in European trade policy, pointing to the inconsistency of rejecting an unfair trade agreement with the United States while subsequently referring the Mercosur agreement to the Court of Justice. He stressed the need for Europe to “de-risk” its relations with populist-led governments, proposing closer engagement with democratic governments in countries such as Brazil and Argentina.

Sir Watson clarified that while these broader issues framed the discussion, the report itself offered a more focused analysis of the populist challenge and concrete guidance for policymakers, which he warmly commended to the audience.

Openning Remarks by MEP Radan Kanev: “The Importance of Re-evaluating Transatlantic Relations in the Current Global Political Climate”

MEP Radan Kanev, host of the event, delivers opening remarks highlighting the timeliness and political significance of the discussion. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In his opening remarks as host of the event, MEP Radan Kanev emphasized both the timeliness and the political significance of the discussion, expressing sincere appreciation for the opportunity to host what he described as an extremely important initiative. He thanked fellow Members of the European Parliament, including Valerie Hayer and Brando Benifei, for their participation, highlighting their presence as evidence of the cross-party character of the meeting and of a shared concern that transcended partisan boundaries.

Kanev opened substantively by citing the very first premise of the report being launched: that, under current conditions, domestic politics may matter more than foreign policy. He expanded this proposition by arguing that what is at stake is not merely domestic politics in general, but specifically Europe’s internal political dynamics and their growing entanglement with leadership developments in the United States. To illustrate this point, he turned to the political situation in his home country of Bulgaria, describing a striking competition among three prominent political figures—an influential oligarch, a long-standing dominant political leader, and a recently resigned president-turned-political actor—each openly vying for the favor of Donald Trump.

This dynamic, Kanev suggested, had reached an unprecedented point with the decision of Bulgaria’s already resigned pro-European prime minister to sign the so-called “Charter of the Board of Peace,” making Bulgaria—alongside Hungary—the only representatives of the European Union to do so. He underscored the paradox of this situation, noting that one of the signatories belonged to the European People’s Party (EPP) rather than to the political families typically associated with extremist or openly anti-European positions.

Kanev stressed that populism alone did not sufficiently explain the gravity of the current moment. Drawing on his own long political experience, he observed that Bulgaria, like many European countries, had been governed by various forms of populism—left-wing, right-wing, and centrist—for decades. The rise of populist movements, he argued, was therefore not in itself a novel or alarming development, nor an inevitable cause for panic. What Europe was facing, however, was something more profound and more destabilizing than the circulation of populist rhetoric.

To clarify this distinction, Kanev urged the audience to acknowledge several uncomfortable but necessary truths. From a European perspective, he argued, every Republican US president could historically be perceived as a form of right-wing populist, and indeed every American president since Andrew Jackson could be seen as populist to some degree. Moreover, US foreign policy had long been difficult for Europeans to accept, well before the Iraq War of 2003. Yet, Kanev insisted, Donald Trump represented a qualitatively different phenomenon.

This difference, he argued, could not be reduced simply to right-wing populism, domestic authoritarian tendencies, or aggressive rhetoric abroad—traits that many Europeans had, rightly or wrongly, long associated with US leadership. European leaders, Kanev suggested, might have been willing to tolerate Trump’s domestic agenda, despite its damaging effects on American institutions, and even his confrontational, transactional style in transatlantic relations, as evidenced by recent trade and security negotiations.

What fundamentally distinguished the present situation, in Kanev’s view, was the unprecedented level of direct meddling in Europe’s internal political affairs. Historically, while the United States had supported authoritarian or unsavory regimes elsewhere, it had never done so in Europe. On the contrary, US policy had consistently promoted democracy, market economies, free trade, and, crucially, European integration. Kanev emphasized that Bulgaria’s own accession to the European Union had been made possible largely through strong US pressure, a fact well known both in Western Europe and in the Balkans.

This longstanding pattern, he argued, had now been reversed. The current US administration, Kanev maintained, was actively working toward European disunity, seeking to transform Europe into an insecure and fragmented space of competing client projects—an approach previously seen in other regions of the world, but never within Europe or the transatlantic partnership. He cautioned against overemphasizing ideology or values in explaining this shift, suggesting instead that many European leaders aligning themselves with Trumpist positions were motivated less by genuine conservatism or nationalism than by personal authoritarian ambitions or corruption.

Kanev concluded by stressing that the challenges identified in the report—particularly in the areas of security and trade—were not confined to Brussels but affected national and pan-European levels alike, extending even beyond the EU to partners such as Norway, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Addressing Europe’s right-wing nationalist and conservative movements directly, he posed a series of rhetorical questions to underline the contradictions inherent in their current alignments. He argued that the emerging political cleavage in Europe would no longer be defined by traditional ideological labels, but by a stark choice between accepting Europe as a chaotic sphere of multiple foreign influences or defending European solidarity as a matter of fundamental security and prosperity.

MEP Valérie Hayer: “Reflections on the Implications of Renewed US Populism for European Policies, Democratic Values, and Foreign Relations”

MEP Valérie Hayer, Chair of the Renew Europe Group, speaks on renewed US populism and its implications for transatlantic democracy. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her address, Valérie Hayer, Chair of the Renew Europe Group in the European Parliament, situated the discussion of renewed US populism within a broader transatlantic and democratic framework. Opening with expressions of gratitude to the organizers and contributors to the report, she emphasized both the importance and urgency of the initiative. She extended particular thanks to Radan Kanev for the invitation, noting that her remarks were shaped by her recent visit to Bulgaria, where she had met with civil society actors, journalists, advocates of judicial independence, and public authorities.

Drawing on this experience, Hayer pointed to the role of entrenched oligarchic power in undermining the rule of law, arguing that such dynamics posed threats comparable to, or even exceeding, those posed by the current US administration within its own institutional context. This observation served as an entry point into her central argument: that attacks on democracy are intensifying globally, including in the United States, long regarded as a bastion of freedom. The return of populism to the center of American power, she stressed, constituted not merely a domestic political development but a transatlantic shockwave with direct implications for European policies, democratic resilience, and Europe’s global position.

Hayer framed her intervention around three interrelated questions: what US populism means for Europe, how it operates, and how Europeans must respond. She argued that understanding these implications required conceptual clarity about Trumpism itself. While Donald Trump’s initial election in 2016 had often been interpreted in Europe as an anomaly driven by protest voting and institutional fatigue, his return to power in 2024 decisively shattered this assumption. Rather than an accident, it represented confirmation that Trumpism had evolved into a consolidated and ideologically coherent movement exercising near-total control over the Republican Party. Populism in the United States, she argued, had proven structural and resilient, capable of returning even after electoral defeat.

Trumpism Does Not Oppose Europe Per Se; It Opposes Liberal Europe

A central clarification in Hayer’s analysis concerned the object of Trumpism’s hostility. The Trumpist movement, she contended, is not directed against Europe as a civilization or geographical entity, but against liberals, moderates, pluralists, and defenders of democratic norms wherever they are found. In this sense, Trumpism does not oppose Europe per se; it opposes liberal Europe. This distinction explained why Trump and his allies often appeared ideologically closer to European far-right parties than to large segments of their own domestic electorate. Hayer noted that Trumpism displayed greater affinity with parties such as Germany’s AfD or France’s National Rally than with US Democrats or moderate Republicans, a pattern reflected in Trump’s hostility toward liberal European leaders and his praise for illiberal ones.

This ideological divide, she argued, was starkly exposed by the events of January 6, 2021. The assault on the US Capitol was not simply a security failure but a test of democratic allegiance. Those who unequivocally condemned it affirmed their commitment to liberal democracy, while those who minimized or justified it revealed a different set of priorities. Trump’s subsequent return to power sent a powerful signal to populist actors worldwide: violations of democratic norms could be politically survivable. This message, Hayer warned, emboldened illiberal movements in Europe as much as in the United States.

She further argued that the first norm eroded by Trumpism was truth itself. Trump’s governance, she observed, was marked by apparent contradictions: claims to uphold law and order while attacking judges and prosecutors; rhetorical support for democratic protesters abroad while repressing dissent at home; denunciations of corruption alongside the rewarding of personal loyalty over legality. These were not inconsistencies, she maintained, but defining features of transactional populism, in which loyalty and expediency outweigh institutions and rules. Such an approach destabilizes alliances by replacing predictability with improvisation and shared values with ad hoc deals.

This logic, Hayer argued, extended directly into foreign policy. Trump’s hostility toward the European Union was not merely economic or strategic, but ideological. The EU embodies regulation, multilateralism, minority protection, climate governance, and judicial independence—precisely the elements Trumpism frames as illegitimate liberal overreach. Consequently, EU laws are portrayed as constraints, European unity as a threat, and even territories such as Greenland as negotiable assets. In this worldview, European leaders are divided not by nationality but by ideology—classified as allies or adversaries depending on their stance toward liberal democracy.

Faced with this reality, Hayer called for a strategic, rather than emotional, European response. Europeans cannot determine US electoral outcomes, she acknowledged, but they retain agency in shaping their own reactions. She cited recent European initiatives—the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, the Digital Services Act, and the Digital Markets Act—as examples of necessary assertions of sovereignty in a hostile global environment. At the same time, she identified a major European failure: complacency following the election of Joe Biden, which led many to assume that Trumpism had been definitively defeated.

This misjudgment, she argued, contributed to delayed investments in European autonomy and resilience, particularly in defense, financial integration, and industrial capacity. She emphasized that the current US administration responds primarily to leverage rather than goodwill. When Europe demonstrated resolve—through trade instruments, deterrence signals, or legal firmness—the tone of engagement shifted. When it hesitated or sought appeasement, pressure intensified. The episode surrounding Greenland illustrated the necessity of firmness, not escalation, but credible dissuasion grounded in clear red lines.

Hayer concluded that European independence is no longer optional. Dependence creates vulnerability, whereas strategic autonomy enables resilience. She stressed that Europe possesses substantial industrial, technological, and economic assets, naming key actors across defense, energy, and technology sectors. Europe’s weakness, she argued, lies not in a lack of resources but in fragmentation, underinvestment, and political hesitation.

The decisive battleground, however, remains internal. While Europe cannot prevent populism in the United States, it can prevent it from governing Europe. Hayer warned against European populist leaders who align themselves ideologically with Trumpism, describing them as conduits rather than defenders of European sovereignty. Trumpism, she concluded, is not an external imposition but a project that survives in Europe only if Europeans legitimize it. The ultimate question, therefore, is not whether populism exists, but whether Europeans allow it to rule them.

MEP Brando Benifei: Taking Europe Seriously in an Era of Populism and Uncertainty

MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States, reflects on the present and future of transatlantic relations from a practitioner’s perspective. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In his address, MEP Brando Benifei, Chair of the European Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the United States, offered a practitioner-oriented reflection on the state and future of transatlantic relations, grounded in his direct and ongoing engagement with US counterparts. Benifei expressed particular gratitude to Radan Kanev and Valérie Hayer for convening the meeting in cooperation with the ECPS, emphasizing the importance and timeliness of the report being launched. He briefly previewed the report’s analytical framework, noting that it focused on four core pillars currently under strain: security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values. These themes, he suggested, captured the multidimensional nature of the present challenges, which would be explored in greater depth by the report’s authors.

Drawing on his role as chair of the transatlantic delegation, Benifei underlined the value of sustained dialogue with US political actors, highlighting both his frequent visits to the United States and the presence of representatives from American think tanks in the audience. He described the European Parliament as a “House of Democracy” and welcomed the opportunity for open exchange within this institutional setting.

Turning to the substance of the report, Benifei referred to the three scenarios it outlines for the future of transatlantic relations: potential disintegration, functional adaptation, or reorganization on new foundations. Based on his recent experiences with US administration officials, members of Congress, and other stakeholders, he argued that all three scenarios remained plausible in the current complex context. He emphasized, however, a central lesson drawn from these interactions: the European Union must be taken seriously. This requires clarity of position, internal unity, and—crucially—consistency between declarations and actions.

Benifei warned that recent patterns of announcing positions and subsequently retracting or failing to implement them had undermined the EU’s credibility in the eyes of US interlocutors. While he shared the view, often expressed by members of the US Congress, that Europeans should not overreact to daily rhetoric or shifting statements, he stressed that words had, at times, translated into concrete actions requiring firm responses.

In this context, he echoed the importance of European legislative sovereignty, particularly in relation to digital regulation. Referring to the Digital Services Act and the Digital Markets Act, Benifei expressed concern that US counterparts had explicitly urged changes to these laws in formal meetings. He rejected this approach, arguing that Europe must stand firm in defending its regulatory choices.

In concluding, Benifei argued that confronting populism and redefining transatlantic relations requires clarity about Europe’s own political project. Citing remarks by Mario Draghi delivered the previous day, he endorsed the view that the era of the EU as a loose confederation had ended. In a relationship increasingly shaped by political and security considerations, rather than commerce alone, Europe must strengthen its sovereignty and internal organization if it wishes to engage the United States on a more equal footing. The report, he concluded, offers a valuable contribution to understanding both Europe’s current position and the strategic paths ahead.

Professor Marianne Riddervold: The Four Pillars of the Atlantic Order Under Strain

Professor Marianne Riddervold presents the report’s analytical framework and key findings on transatlantic relations under renewed US right-wing populism. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her presentation as one of the three editors of the ECPS report, Professor Marianne Riddervold, affiliated with ARENA at the University of Oslo, NUPI, and the University of California, Berkeley, introduced the report’s core analytical framework and key findings concerning the evolving state of transatlantic relations under renewed US right-wing populism. 

Professor Riddervold grounded the report’s intellectual motivation in an observation made as early as 2018 by John Peterson, who argued that the future of US–European relations and the liberal international order depended less on foreign policy choices than on domestic democratic politics in both Europe and the United States. In light of Donald Trump’s reelection in 2024, she suggested that this assessment had proven prescient. Contemporary news coverage, she noted, is dominated by developments that appear to challenge the very foundations of the transatlantic relationship, including disputes over tariffs, divergent approaches to Ukraine, tensions surrounding international treaties and voting behavior in the United Nations, uncertainty about NATO’s future, and deep disagreements over free speech norms. These tensions have been further exacerbated by Trump’s public threats to annex parts of the territory of NATO allies.

At the same time, Professor Riddervold emphasized that Europe and North America remain more closely interconnected than any other regions of the world, with over eight decades of dense cooperation behind them. The transatlantic relationship, she reminded the audience, has weathered major crises in the past and has at times emerged stronger as a result. Against this backdrop, the report set out to address a series of fundamental questions: how to make sense of current developments; how right-wing populism under Trump is affecting transatlantic relations; whether the present moment represents a qualitatively different rupture; and whether Europe is facing a more serious and long-term breakdown of a relationship long taken for granted.

To answer these questions, the report deliberately steps back from the volatility of the daily news cycle in order to provide a more systematic analysis. Professor Riddervold highlighted that the volume brings together leading experts on transatlantic relations, each drawing on extensive scholarly research to offer concise, focused analyses of how the relationship is changing and what these changes imply for Europe. She then outlined the structure of the report, explaining that it is organized around four foundational pillars that have historically underpinned the post-war transatlantic order: security, trade, international institutions, and liberal democratic values.

This framework draws on the work of G. John Ikenberry, who conceptualized the “Atlantic order” as resting on these four interlinked pillars, established under US leadership after the Second World War. The first pillar is the security alliance system; the second concerns trade and finance; the third encompasses multilateral institutions and rules; and the fourth consists of shared liberal democratic norms. Professor Riddervold further explained that Ikenberry identified two mutually reinforcing bargains underpinning the relationship. The “realist bargain” involved European acceptance of US leadership in exchange for security guarantees and access to US markets, technology, and resources within an open global economy. The “liberal bargain” linked security and economic openness to shared commitments to multilateralism and democratic governance, institutionalized through NATO, the World Trade Organization, and other international bodies. Together, these arrangements placed transatlantic relations at the core of the broader liberal international order.

Professor Riddervold stressed that the transatlantic relationship has never been based solely on strategic or economic interests. It has also functioned as a security community rooted in shared values, often described as part of the Pax Americana. Although US foreign policy has long been criticized for inconsistencies and double standards, she observed that successive administrations and Congresses prior to Trump broadly shared the conviction that democracies possess a unique capacity for cooperation and that European integration served US as well as European interests.

To capture possible trajectories of change, each chapter in the report distinguishes between three future scenarios. The first is outright disintegration or breakdown of transatlantic relations, potentially affecting one or multiple policy areas, driven by domestic political pressures and structural geopolitical shifts. However, Professor Riddervold emphasized that the relationship is also sustained by deep economic, institutional, and cultural bonds that may help stabilize it even under strain. This recognition led the authors to explore two additional scenarios: a second scenario in which the relationship weakens but “muddles through” via functional adaptation in areas of mutual interest, and a third scenario in which the relationship is redefined and potentially revitalized, for example through external shocks such as war or crisis, or through the emergence of a more united and capable Europe seen as a valuable partner by Washington. She also noted the possibility, explored later in the report, of a redefined transatlantic relationship shaped by right-wing populist convergence.

A Deep and Potentially Durable Rift in Transatlantic Relations

Across all four pillars, the report’s overarching conclusion is stark: transatlantic relations are experiencing what it terms a deep and potentially durable rift. Professor Riddervold identified two main reasons for this assessment. First, weakening is occurring simultaneously across security, trade, institutions, and values—a pattern unprecedented in earlier crises. Second, Trump does not perceive a strong transatlantic relationship as valuable, marking a sharp departure from post-war US policy traditions. Even beyond Trump, she argued, US domestic polarization and shifting strategic priorities mean that a return to previous patterns of relations is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Despite this sobering diagnosis, Professor Riddervold emphasized that the report also identifies sources of cautious optimism. Several authors highlight functional adjustments that may allow cooperation to persist in specific areas, such as trade frameworks or defense-industrial cooperation linked to increased European defense spending. While the relationship may be weaker, such adaptations could gradually lead to a redefined partnership. Crucially, the report stresses that Europe has agency. When united, Europe possesses the capacity of a global power and can decide which values, institutions, and partnerships it seeks to uphold.

Concluding her presentation, Professor Riddervold summarized the report’s findings in the security and defense domain. Across multiple chapters, the authors argue that transatlantic security relations are entering a “post-American” phase, in which Europe can no longer rely on stable US leadership and must assume greater responsibility for its own defense. Whether the relationship muddles through or weakens further, the implication for Europe is the same: it must strengthen its security, defense, and strategic autonomy, reduce dependence on US military enablers, prepare for potential weakening of NATO commitments, and fully exploit its institutional, budgetary, and legal capacities. She concluded by stressing the need for a more unified and firmer European stance toward Washington before passing the floor to her co-editor for the subsequent sections of the report.

Assoc. Prof. Guri Rosén: Trade, Multilateralism, and the Erosion of the Rules-Based Order

Associate Professor Guri Rosén discusses the report’s analysis of trade and international institutions. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her presentation as one of the three editors of the ECPS report, Guri Rosén, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Oslo and Senior Researcher at ARENA – the Centre for European Studies – focused on the sections of the report addressing trade and international institutions. Building on the analytical framework outlined by her co-editor, she emphasized that transatlantic relations have historically rested on shared commitments to liberal trade principles and to rules-based institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). A central conclusion emerging from the report’s trade section, she noted, is that the rise of populism has significantly weakened domestic support for trade liberalization, thereby accelerating a shift—particularly under the Trump administration—toward protectionism, unilateral tariff policies, and a transactional approach that challenges the foundations of the global trading system.

Dr. Rosén explained that the trade section of the report examines several interrelated dynamics: the growing tension between globalization and domestic autonomy, the dual shocks posed by China and the United States to the international trading system, the new disruptions following the second Trump administration, and the broader collapse of the WTO’s authority. She then provided a structured overview of the individual chapters.

The first chapter, authored by Eric Jones of the European University Institute, traces the evolution of the international trade system after the Second World War. Jones highlights the enduring tension between the international division of labor and the need for domestic policy autonomy. He revisits the post-war “embedded liberalism” compromise, which enabled global trade while allowing governments to protect welfare states and manage social dislocation. As globalization deepened, however, capital mobility increasingly overshadowed trade, constraining governments’ policy autonomy and generating domestic discontent—conditions that, Jones argues, have fueled contemporary populist movements. Two key insights emerge from this analysis: first, the existence of a “control dilemma,” reflecting the structural conflict between a globally integrated economy and national social protection; and second, the growing contestation of institutions designed to coordinate economic interdependence. While intended to prevent governments from exporting domestic political problems to one another, such institutions increasingly address politically sensitive issues, reinforcing perceptions that critical decisions are being removed from democratic control.

Against this backdrop, Alasdair Young of the Georgia Institute of Technology examines the drastic shift in US trade policy during Trump’s second term. Young argues that the Trump administration views trade as a zero-sum game in which the European Union is portrayed as benefiting unfairly at America’s expense. From this perspective, the existing EU–US trade framework appears highly fragile, a vulnerability underscored by recent disputes such as those surrounding Greenland. Young emphasizes that the Trump administration has repeatedly returned with new demands even after agreements have been reached, undermining trust and predictability. He raises the question of how the EU should respond, concluding that retaliation would likely inflict comparable economic costs on Europe and the United States. This assessment helps explain why the EU has largely pursued a strategy of waiting out the Trump period while focusing on internal reforms.

The third chapter in the trade section, written by Kent Jones of Babson College, analyzes the breakdown of the multilateral trading system. Dr. Rosén noted that Jones characterizes recent developments as a systemic rupture. The Trump administration, he argues, has abandoned core WTO principles, including the most-favored-nation clause, and has invoked national security exceptions to justify measures aimed primarily at reducing trade deficits. By bypassing WTO dispute settlement mechanisms and imposing discriminatory tariffs, the United States has violated the multilateral norms it once championed. This shift from rule-based governance to transactional bargaining forces the EU to negotiate on a sector-by-sector basis rather than relying on treaty-based frameworks.

The final chapter in the trade section, authored by Arlo Poletti of the University of Trieste, examines the political consequences of the “China shock”—the surge of Chinese imports since the early 2000s—on European labor markets and party systems. Poletti argues that this shock has contributed to the rise of far-right populist parties across Europe. As a result, the EU now finds itself constrained between a protectionist United States and an increasingly assertive China, a position made more difficult by Europe’s continued reliance on US security guarantees. Poletti contends that the EU should be prepared to credibly commit to retaliation in response to further US protectionist escalation, while also strengthening relations with other trade partners and fully deploying its expanded economic policy toolkit.

Dr. Rosén acknowledged that there are some differences of emphasis among the authors, but she stressed that their analyses converge on a shared strategic orientation. Taken together, the trade section recommends that the EU build economic strength and resilience while remaining anchored in a rules-based system. This entails prioritizing domestic objectives—growth, employment, and security—through the use of market power and regulatory tools, thereby forming the basis of a more competitive strategic autonomy. At the same time, member states must coordinate more effectively to avoid shifting the costs of globalization onto one another and to prevent a fragmented patchwork of national measures. Diversifying trade and investment ties across regions is also essential to reduce vulnerability to pressure from either the United States or China. Strengthening supply chains, technological capacity, and defense-related industrial bases is presented as integral to this effort, alongside continued engagement to keep the WTO functioning and to update its rules wherever possible.

Managing Multilateral Crisis without Escalation

Turning to the section on international institutions, Dr. Rosén explained that the report analyzes how right-wing populism and the “America First” agenda have disrupted the rules-based international order. While the EU regards multilateralism as central to its identity, the current US administration portrays international institutions as inefficient, elitist, and restrictive of national sovereignty. Mike Smith of the University of Warwick provides a conceptual framework for understanding what he terms a revolutionary assault on established international norms. Smith argues that while the first Trump administration was constrained by limited preparation, Trump’s second term operates with a far more radical and unconstrained agenda. He identifies three strategic options facing the EU: accommodating US demands, standing up to them, or working to build a more resilient form of multilateralism, potentially without US participation.

A further chapter by Edith Drieskens of KU Leuven examines the turbulence confronting the United Nations system. Dr. Rosén noted that a series of US executive orders mandating reviews of international organizations and foreign aid have resulted in severe budget cuts, pushing many UN agencies into survival mode. Organizations such as UNESCO have been singled out for defunding or potential withdrawal, while US support for the Sustainable Development Goals and for diversity and inclusion norms has been curtailed. Drieskens argues that the EU has adopted a cautious posture, refraining from overt criticism of the United States to avoid retaliation in areas such as trade or NATO cooperation.

Climate governance is addressed in a chapter by Daniel Fiorino of American University, who analyzes the consequences of the United States’ second withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement. Fiorino argues that the administration has shifted from mitigation toward an “energy emergency” posture, dismantling regulatory constraints on fossil fuel development. While the most immediate effects are domestic, he suggests that US disengagement risks ceding technological and economic leadership in the green transition to Europe and China. From his perspective, the EU’s most pragmatic strategy is to maintain its Green Deal policies while waiting for potential change in the US political cycle.

The final chapter, by Frode Veggeland, examines the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization in 2025. Veggeland argues that global health governance is experiencing turbulence as funding becomes increasingly fragmented and earmarked. In this context, the EU must deepen cooperation with like-minded partners and assume a more prominent role in global health security, potentially filling the vacuum left by US disengagement through coalition-building as a form of soft power.

Dr. Rosén concluded by emphasizing that, across both trade and international institutions, the report’s authors view multilateral frameworks as core instruments of European power and legitimacy. Rather than waiting passively for renewed US engagement, the EU should combine short-term adaptation with selective pushback and long-term institutional strengthening. This approach, she argued, would allow Europe to protect its agency, defend core norms and interests, and contribute to more resilient international institutions capable of withstanding funding shocks, obstruction, and shifting power balances.

Professor Jessica Greenberg: Moving from Muddling Through to EU Leadership

Associate Professor Jessica Greenberg presents and synthesizes the report’s final section on democratic values. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

In her presentation as one of the three editors of the ECPS report, Jessica Greenberg—Professor of Anthropology at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, and a political and legal anthropologist specializing in Europe, human rights, social movements, democracy, and law—introduced and synthesized the report’s final section on democratic values. She described the report as both rewarding and collaborative to produce alongside her co-editors and contributing authors. She framed her remarks under the title “Moving from Muddling Through to EU Leadership,” signaling an intention to offer a more forward-looking assessment, even while acknowledging the gravity of the present transatlantic moment.

Professor Greenberg first underscored the methodological distinctiveness of the democratic values section. Unlike the report’s other sections, which are anchored primarily in international relations, political economy, or institutional analysis, this section is heavily shaped by sociological and anthropological approaches to institutions. She observed that democracy and populism are notoriously difficult to define and practice, often triggering a familiar “we know them when we see them” reaction. The aim of the section, she argued, is to move beyond such first-blush recognitions by probing how democracy, liberalism, and rule of law are lived, practiced, and reproduced inside institutions. Populism, in turn, is examined not merely as rhetoric or political style but as a “lifeworld”—an everyday, granular set of perceptions, dispositions, and practices. This emphasis, she explained, is critical for understanding democratic resilience, since democracy and rule of law operate through daily, practice-based dimensions that can be eroded gradually and normalized in subtle ways.

To illustrate the section’s conceptual framing, Professor Greenberg referenced a striking passage by Douglas Holmes, one of the contributors, which characterizes populism as a creative force capable of shaping not only politics but also feelings, thoughts, moods, intimacies, actions, and even perceptions of justice and reality. For Professor Greenberg, this formulation captured the section’s analytical ambition: to understand how populism works from the inside out, at the level where institutions and everyday life intersect.

She then turned to the first two chapters of the section—by Douglas Holmes and Saul Newman—which she described as mapping “populism’s paradoxes.” These chapters, she argued, establish the institutional and cultural terrain on which any effective response to populist capture must be built. Among the key paradoxes is that populist politics often presents itself as anti-elitist, anti-establishment, and anti-institutional, yet simultaneously relies on institutional frameworks at the international and European Union levels and pursues institutional capture domestically. The chapters emphasize that populist actors do not simply confront institutions from the outside; they rework them from within, altering their internal logics and operational “genetic code.” Understanding this reconfiguration, Dr. Greenberg suggested, is indispensable to designing meaningful responses.

A second paradox concerns populism’s relationship to nation and network. Populist politics tends to focus on national frameworks and racialized, homogeneous notions of “the people,” yet it is also increasingly transnational in practice. Populist movements share strategies, repertoires, discourses, and social media memes across borders, producing an internationalized—and in a counterintuitive sense, “cosmopolitan”—populist landscape. A third paradox, as Professor Greenberg presented it, is that populism functions as a critique of liberalism: it directly challenges liberal claims to provide representation, solidarity, care, justice, and inclusive political membership. Recognizing how populism positions itself against liberal institutions is, she argued, central to understanding its appeal and operational power.

Professor Greenberg proceeded to summarize the subsequent chapters, each offering a different window onto the erosion and contestation of democratic values. Reuben Anderson’s chapter, “The Liberal Bargain on Migration: Convergence in Securitizing Borders,” examines how framing migration as a security problem undermines meaningful integration and constrains democratic commitments to pluralism, rule of law, and inclusive governance. Professor Greenberg highlighted Anderson’s analysis of a “two-faced” migration regime on both sides of the Atlantic: migrants are funneled into labor-hungry economies, including through illegalized and exploitable work, while governments simultaneously stage “tough” crackdowns at physical borders and in third countries. The result, Anderson argues, is the expansion of an enforcement industry and a self-reinforcing spiral of securitization, displacing opportunities to address migration rights and labor-market needs in a more transparent and democratic manner.

The following chapter, Robert Benson’s “Illiberal International: The Transatlantic Rights Challenge to Democracy,” develops the theme of transnational far-right mobilization. Professor Greenberg emphasized Benson’s argument that such movements cannot be understood in isolation because they are deeply networked across borders. Think tanks, party foundations, legal advocates, and online platforms form alliances that circulate strategies, legal models, ideological frames, and digital tactics aimed at weakening democratic norms. Professor Greenberg drew attention to Benson’s description of a “transnational ecosystem of distrust” that corrodes confidence in electoral integrity, journalism, and scientific expertise. In her account, the chapter portrays this as intentional, organized, sophisticated, and strategically coordinated—requiring both place-based countermeasures and broader transnational coordination.

The final chapter in the section, by Albena Azmanova, centers on precarity and democratic resilience. Professor Greenberg presented this chapter as demonstrating how inequality, social vulnerability, and the affordability crisis fuel distrust in government and create fertile ground for grievance politics. She suggested that Azmanova’s analysis reinforces a core implication running through the section: robust social welfare policies are not peripheral to democratic stability but central to it. In this view, social policy is a key component of democratic resilience and a substantive counter-politics to populist mobilization.

The Transatlantic Alliance “As We Know It” Is Effectively Over

Having summarized the chapters, Professor Greenberg widened the lens to offer concluding reflections that also drew together threads from the report’s other sections. She argued that the transatlantic alliance “as we know it” is effectively over, citing President Trump’s threats to invade Greenland and the possibility that NATO itself could be destabilized. In her formulation, Trump’s repudiation of multilateral cooperation in trade and security, rejection of rule of law domestically and international law abroad, and nativist political stance collectively undermine the foundational commitments of the post-war alliance. The United States, she argued, has replaced cooperation and liberal trade with zero-sum protectionism and tariffs, while Trump’s disdain for democracy and global legal order finds affinity with populist forces on both sides of the Atlantic.

Yet Professor Greenberg also insisted on a crucial counterpoint: the alliance was never merely a technocratic handshake among bureaucrats. It was a living set of commitments that provided institutional architecture for multilateral cooperation, created pathways to respect sovereignty while binding national interests through shared visions of peace and security, and linked prosperity to democratic participation, human rights, constitutional guarantees, and equality. She invoked the breadth of actors who helped realize these commitments—from local communities and policymakers to human rights advocates and entrepreneurs—turning abstract principles into lived realities.

From this diagnosis, Professor Greenberg drew a stark strategic imperative: as long as Donald Trump remains president, he will continue to destabilize whatever trust remains in the decades-long alliance, and Europe cannot afford to wait, minimize the danger, or adopt a posture of denial. Europe, she argued, must “go it alone,” and it must act immediately. While she acknowledged that calls for a more unified Europe are not new, she argued that far more specificity is needed, and that the report’s four-pillar framework remains a useful guide for action. The EU, she maintained, is well positioned to lead in international cooperation, trade, security, and democratic values—if it consolidates internal integration, strengthens economic and financial coordination, and takes a firmer, more coherent line toward Washington beyond appeasement and passive wait-and-see strategies.

Professor Greenberg emphasized that the EU possesses political and financial leverage and should be prepared to use it. The United States, she argued, needs a unified EU in responding to Russia and China, in both security and trade, which positions Europe to advance strategic autonomy while serving as the most credible partner for strengthened bilateral and plurilateral arrangements. She reiterated themes of the report’s security recommendations: a more coherent long-term European security strategy, a stronger European defense industrial base, and more predictable support and guarantees for Ukraine—combined with careful management of relations with China and other partners. Strength, flexibility, and conviction, she argued, must guide the EU’s posture, enabling it to seize opportunities for cooperation when aligned interests arise—even as the United States becomes less reliable.

At the domestic level, Professor Greenberg echoed the report’s emphasis on prioritizing internal policy goals and using the EU’s market power and regulatory tools to support growth, jobs, and security at home, while avoiding race-to-the-bottom dynamics that reward fragmentation. Such an approach, she argued, would foster unity and build collective solutions to shared challenges—from precarity and public health to climate crisis. She also underscored the importance of sustaining international institutions as central to European power, legitimacy, and interests, with multilateral networks promoting rule-setting, transparency, and democratic procedures.

Finally, Professor Greenberg returned to the normative core of her section: a unified Europe must be defined by reasoned action and a strong ethical foundation. Democracy, pluralism, and rule of law cannot function as afterthoughts or merely procedural commitments. In her assessment, EU approaches to precarity, migration, and climate have at times reflected backsliding or even capitulation to populist pressures. Across the report, she noted, experts emphasize the necessity of confronting inequality, affordability crises, and institutional distrust if Europe is to lead democratically. Values, she concluded, must be made credible through concrete action: rule-of-law commitments, inclusion, human-rights-compliant migration, and renewed commitments to sustainability, health, and well-being across both urban and rural spaces.

In Professor Greenberg’s closing argument, Europe cannot outpace populist “shock and awe” tactics—rapid policy shifts, disregard for legal norms, and conspiratorial narratives designed to overwhelm and demobilize. Instead, Europe must counter destabilization with substance, endurance, clear communication, pragmatic hope, and institutional leadership. She ended on a horizon of conditional optimism: if Europe acts now to uphold the promise of the broken alliance, it can preserve a democratic home to which a future United States might one day return.

Q&A Session

Audience members pose questions during the panel’s Q&A session. Photo: Ümit Vurel.

The Q&A session opened with an intervention by Robert Benson, affiliated with the Center for American Progress (CAP), who posed two interrelated questions to the editors and panelists. First, he observed that the discussion had not drawn a clear analytical distinction between left-wing and right-wing populism and asked whether populism could function as an emancipatory political force—or even as a potential antidote to the form of populism associated with the Trump White House. Referencing ongoing debates within the US Democratic Party, Benson framed the issue as a strategic dilemma between more radical or more centrist political pathways.

His second question addressed the apparent contradiction inherent in transnational nationalism. Benson queried how nationalist parties such as Germany’s AfD could simultaneously align with the Trump administration and with counterparts like France’s National Rally, given nationalism’s ostensibly inward-looking logic. He suggested that such alliances might be better understood as instrumental rather than ideological, serving common ends such as profiteering, corruption, and the extraction of political or economic concessions from a fragmented Europe—an interpretation he linked to recent US national security thinking.

Responding first, Jessica Greenberg emphasized that, for the purposes of the report, the key analytical takeaway was not the normative distinction between left- and right-wing populism, but the observable political energy generated by both. She noted that populist movements across the ideological spectrum have mobilized significant loyalty, grassroots participation, and youth engagement, effectively capturing a sense of renewed citizenship and political agency. Greenberg argued that liberal democratic institutions cannot afford to relinquish this mobilizing capacity, stressing that liberalism must inspire hope and engagement rather than operate solely as a reactive force.

The second response came from Riccardo Alcaro, who addressed the question of transnational nationalist convergence. He argued that while alliances between nationalist parties and the Trump administration are inherently unstable, they persist because of a shared understanding of political enemies—primarily internal rather than external. This convergence, he suggested, transforms transatlantic relations from a strategic partnership into a politicized and ideologized framework. In such a configuration, transatlantic ties serve less to advance shared interests than to legitimize domestic political struggles against migrants, liberal institutions, and perceived “globalist” elites, a dynamic with particularly far-reaching implications for Europe.

The second round of the Q&A session was initiated by Kristo Anastasov, who framed his intervention from a geopolitical and historical perspective. Commending the panel for avoiding an exclusively ideological reading of contemporary transatlantic tensions, he argued that the report compellingly invited deeper engagement. Anastasov contrasted the current political landscape in the United States—characterized, in his view, by the existence of “two American nations” and a level of polarization historically associated with civil conflict—with the European situation. Despite the rise of populism and persistent divisions, he maintained that Europe continues to rest on a cross-ideological basis of consensus that prevents systemic rupture, with Hungary standing as a partial exception rather than the rule.

From this perspective, Anastasov suggested that Europe’s strategic task is not to replicate the American experience but to position itself as a stabilizing counterpoint—restoring damaged transatlantic links where possible while simultaneously forging new ones. He cited the European response to the Greenland crisis as illustrative of both strengths and weaknesses in Europe’s approach. On the one hand, Europe demonstrated unity and institutional capacity; on the other, he argued that hesitation—such as the decision not to seize frozen Russian assets held in Belgium—was interpreted by the Trump administration as weakness, prompting renewed rhetorical escalation. By contrast, Anastasov pointed to initiatives such as the Mercosur agreement and negotiations with India as examples of effective demonstrations of European strength, though he lamented that these efforts had been partially undermined by internal institutional delays. He concluded by asserting that appeasement and coexistence are ineffective in dealing with a deal-breaking counterpart, insisting that consistency and credible displays of strength are essential.

Responding, Marianne Riddervold thanked Anastasov for his remarks and for encouraging engagement with the report. She reiterated that the report’s objective was precisely to provide a systematic, conceptually grounded analysis rather than reactive commentary. Riddervold emphasized that all contributing authors converge on the recommendation that Europe must act firmly and collectively. At the same time, she acknowledged the structural dilemma facing Europe: persistent dependencies on the United States, particularly in security and defense, necessitate continued cooperation even as Europe works to reduce those dependencies. She noted that the Trump administration’s tendency to conflate trade and security—such as linking trade negotiations to Ukraine—poses an unprecedented challenge. Nevertheless, she observed that the European Union has demonstrated increasing speed and cohesion in responding to successive crises. While acknowledging delays and internal disagreements, she characterized the EU as an exceptionally flexible system capable of adapting creatively within its legal framework, including through partial or staged implementation of contested agreements.

Guri Rosén added that divergences among the report’s authors reflect real strategic tensions rather than analytical weakness. Some contributors stress the importance of demonstrating strength and leadership, while others argue that a “wait-it-out” strategy minimizes economic and political costs. Rosén argued that the report’s four-pillar framework—security, trade, institutions, and values—reveals the necessity of integrated thinking across policy domains. The central challenge for Europe, she concluded, lies not only in responding to external pressures but also in overcoming internal coordination difficulties. Determining whether to assert strength or exercise restraint ultimately depends on evaluating Europe’s collective interests across all sectors simultaneously, rather than in isolation.

The third round of the Q&A broadened the discussion to questions of strategy, narrative, internal European divisions, and the structural meaning of contemporary populism. Sandra Kaduri opened by asking whether a political tipping point might be emerging in the United States and whether European actors were fully exploiting this moment. Referring to subnational engagement at the most recent COP in Brazil—where over one hundred US governors and officials participated—she suggested that Europe might bypass the Trump administration by engaging more systematically with American actors beyond the federal executive. Kaduri also emphasized the potential of public opinion, polling, and values-based communication, arguing that majorities remain concerned about polarization and receptive to democratic norms, and questioning whether existing opportunities for narrative leadership were being missed.

A related intervention came from Becky Slack, who welcomed the report’s attention to framing and narrative. She posed a practical question regarding implementation: how the report’s recommendations on narrative could be operationalized, and which actors—political, institutional, or societal—would need to serve as partners in translating analytical insights into concrete communicative strategies capable of reducing polarization and strengthening democracy.

Reinhard Heinisch shifted the focus inward, challenging what he perceived as an overly homogeneous portrayal of Europe. He asked the panel to address persistent divisions between Eastern and Western Europe, their interaction with transatlantic relations, and the extent to which the United States might exploit these internal fractures—alongside what Europe could do to mitigate such vulnerabilities.

Offering a reflective comment rather than a direct question, Douglas Holmes introduced a historical and anthropological perspective. Drawing on his long experience interviewing Members of the European Parliament, he cautioned against linear or moralized readings of history. Holmes noted the paradox that the framers of the US Constitution—figures he described provocatively as religious fanatics and populists—produced one of the world’s most liberal political documents. From this, he suggested that the current moment may also contain unexpected possibilities, and he concluded by characterizing Trumpism less as an expression of American strength than of systemic weakness—an interpretation he offered as a potential source of strategic confidence.

Responding on behalf of the panel, MEP Radan Kanev addressed several of the themes raised. He argued that cooperation among European nationalist forces presents a greater challenge for those actors themselves than alignment with American dominance. Illustrating this point, he recounted the Romanian elections, where Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s support for a Romanian far-right candidate backfired, alienating ethnic Hungarian voters and inadvertently strengthening a liberal candidate. Such missteps, Kanev suggested, are likely to recur in attempts to build a coherent “nationalist international.”

At the same time, Kanev warned that history offers many examples of nationalist leaders willingly subordinating themselves to stronger external powers, citing Vichy France as a paradigmatic case. He expressed particular concern about Eastern Europe, where post-communist power structures have normalized dependency, making alignment with distant American power appear safer than genuine sovereignty.

Kanev concluded with a controversial but central argument: building a strong Europe requires distinguishing between nationalist and populist actors based not on ideological sympathy, but on their commitment to an independent Europe. Given the fragmentation of today’s political landscape and the erosion of traditional grand coalitions, he argued that European consensus-building must expand beyond familiar alliances to include Greens and selected conservative forces unwilling to act as external proxies—an inherently difficult but unavoidable task for Europe’s political future

Conclusion

The ECPS panel at the European Parliament underscored a central and sobering conclusion: transatlantic relations are no longer governed by inherited assumptions of stability, convergence, or automatic solidarity. The re-election of Donald Trump has not merely revived earlier tensions but has accelerated a deeper structural shift in which populism, domestic polarization, and transactional power politics increasingly define the terms of engagement. As the discussions repeatedly emphasized, this transformation affects not only external relations between Europe and the United States, but also the internal cohesion, democratic resilience, and strategic self-understanding of the European Union itself.

Across the panel, a clear analytical consensus emerged around three interlinked insights. First, the weakening of transatlantic relations is occurring simultaneously across security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values—an unprecedented convergence of pressures that cannot be addressed through isolated or short-term fixes. Second, Europe retains agency. While it cannot shape US domestic politics, it can determine whether fragmentation, dependency, and narrative passivity define its response, or whether unity, strategic autonomy, and institutional leadership prevail. Third, populism must be understood not only as a political style or ideology, but as a governing logic capable of reshaping institutions from within, eroding norms gradually, and normalizing democratic backsliding unless actively countered.

The report and the panel discussions converge on the necessity of moving beyond reactive “muddling through.” Strengthening European defense capacity, asserting regulatory sovereignty, reinforcing multilateral institutions, and addressing socioeconomic precarity are not parallel agendas but mutually reinforcing dimensions of democratic resilience. Equally, narrative and coalition-building emerged as indispensable tools: Europe’s response must speak not only to elites and institutions, but to publics increasingly vulnerable to polarization, distrust, and grievance politics.

Ultimately, the panel framed the current moment not as the end of transatlantic cooperation, but as the end of its taken-for-granted form. The future relationship—if it is to endure—will depend on a more autonomous, coherent, and values-grounded Europe capable of engaging the United States as a partner when possible, resisting it when necessary, and leading where leadership is absent. The challenge, as the report makes clear, is no longer whether Europe should act, but whether it can act decisively enough, and soon enough, to shape the order emerging around it.

Report2025-3

Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options 

Please cite as:

Riddervold, Marianne; Rosén, Guri & Greenberg, Jessica R. (2026). Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00140

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“Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options” is a comprehensive ECPS report examining how the resurgence of right-wing populism—most notably under Donald Trump’s second presidency—reshapes the foundations of EU–US relations. Bringing together leading scholars, the report analyses the erosion of trust and shared norms across four pillars of the Atlantic order: security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values. It shows how domestic polarisation and illiberal trends now pose deeper, longer-term challenges than traditional diplomatic disputes. Combining theoretical insight with concrete policy recommendations, the volume outlines how the European Union can adapt strategically to a more volatile partner while defending multilateralism, democratic principles, and European strategic autonomy. An essential resource for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners navigating a changing transatlantic landscape.

The report offers a timely and comprehensive examination of how contemporary populism is reshaping one of the most consequential relationships in global politics. Published by the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), it brings together leading scholars from both sides of the Atlantic to assess the structural impact of right-wing populism—most visibly under Donald Trump’s second presidency—on EU–US relations.

In this project, ECPS collaborates with the ARENA at the University of Oslo, the European Union Center at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, IES at the University of California, Berkeley, and CES at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. The report is partially funded by the Jean Monnet-TANDEM and Transat-Defence Projects.

Moving beyond episodic diplomatic disputes, the report advances a central argument: the most serious long-term threat to transatlantic cooperation today stems from domestic political transformations. Rising polarisation, illiberal democratic practices, and populist challenges to multilateralism on both sides of the Atlantic increasingly undermine the shared norms and institutional foundations that have sustained the postwar Atlantic order. In this context, transatlantic relations are no longer strained merely by diverging interests, but by a growing clash over values, rules, and the meaning of democracy itself.

Analytically, the report is anchored in a four-pillar framework—security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values—derived from the liberal foundations of the Atlantic political order. Each section combines historical perspective with forward-looking analysis, examining how populist governance affects NATO and European security, rules-based trade and the WTO, multilateral institutions such as the UN and WHO, and the liberal-democratic norms that once underpinned mutual trust. Across these domains, contributors identify patterns of erosion, adaptation, and selective cooperation, highlighting a shift toward a more transactional, fragmented, and unstable relationship. Overall, the EU–US relationship is entering a phase best described as “muddling through”: selective cooperation where interests align, paired with growing divergence elsewhere.

While acknowledging areas of continued collaboration, the authors emphasise that any future stability will depend less on restoring past arrangements than on Europe’s capacity to adapt strategically without abandoning its commitment to multilateralism, democracy, and the rule of law.

The report concludes with detailed, policy-oriented recommendations aimed at EU institutions and member states. These include strengthening European strategic autonomy, reinforcing democratic resilience, investing in defence and industrial capacity, and building new coalitions to sustain global governance in an era of populist disruption. As such, the volume serves not only as an analytical diagnosis of a transatlantic relationship at a crossroads, but also as a practical guide for navigating an increasingly contested international order.

Please see the Introduction, 17 chapters, and Conclusion of the report presented separately below.

Introduction

By Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén & Jessica Greenberg


SECTION 1: SECURITY

Chapter 1: Overview and Background: Right-wing Nationalism, Trump and the Future of US-European Relations

By Riccardo Alcaro

 

Chapter 2: Functional Adaptation without much Love: NATO and the Strains of EU–US Relations

By Monika Sus

 

Chapter 3: EU-US-China Security Relations

By Reuben Wong

 

Chapter 4: The Russia-Ukraine War and Transatlantic Relations

By Jost-Henrik Morgenstern-Pomorski & Karolina Pomorska

 

SECTION 2: TRADE

Chapter 5: Overview and background: Transatlantic Trade from Embedded Liberalism to Competitive Strategic Autonomy

By Erik Jones

 

Chapter 6: EU-US-China Trade Relations

By Arlo Poletti

 

Chapter 7: From Trade Skirmishes to Trade War? Transatlantic Trade Relations during the Second Trump Administration

By Alasdair Young

 

Chapter 8: Transatlantic Trade, the Trump Disruption and the World Trade Organization

By Kent Jones

 

SECTION 3: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Chapter 9: Overview and Background: International Institutions, Populism and Transatlantic Relations

By Mike Smith

 

Chapter 10: The United Nations in the Age of American Transactionalism

By Edith Drieskens

 

Chapter 11: The Trump Administration and Climate Policy: The Effects of Right-wing Populism

By Daniel Fiorino

 

Chapter 12: Turbulence in the World Health Organization: Implications for EU-United States Cooperation during a Changing International Order

By Frode Veggeland

 

SECTION 4: DEMOCRATIC VALUES

Chapter 13: Overview and background: Democracy and Populism — The European Case

By Douglas Holmes

 

Chapter 14: Illiberalism and Democracy: The Populist Challenge to Transatlantic Relations

By Saul Newman

 

Chapter 15: The Illiberal Bargain on Migration

By Ruben Andersson

Chapter 16: Illiberal international: The Transatlantic Right’s Challenge to Democracy

By Robert Benson

 

Chapter 17: Vulnerable Groups, Protections and Precarity

By Albena Azmanova

 

Conclusion: How Should the EU Deal with Changing Transatlantic Relations?

By Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén & Jessica Greenberg

 

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UNTOLD Europe Workshop

UNTOLD Europe Workshop – Case Study Session Report

The interactive case study session of the UNTOLD Europe Workshop (Brussels, 21 October 2025) translated critical discussions on colonial legacies, migration narratives, gender, and human rights into comparative policy analysis. Participants worked in four groups examining labour migration to Greece, the EU Migration Pact, the EU–Tunisia Memorandum, and Spain–Morocco circular migration schemes. Across cases, recurring patterns emerged: securitization over protection, racialized labour hierarchies, gendered recruitment structures, and externalisation practices rooted in asymmetrical power relations. By combining structural analysis with creative reframing, the session encouraged participants to challenge dominant narratives and articulate rights-based alternatives. The findings underscore how colonial continuities remain embedded in contemporary migration governance—and highlight the need for dignity-centred, inclusive policy approaches across the Euro-Mediterranean space.

 

Case Study Session Overview

The case study session, held during the UNTOLD Europe Workshop on Migration Narratives on 21 October 2025 in Brussels, constituted a central interactive component of the workshop and was designed to translate the workshop’s conceptual discussions on colonial legacies, migration narratives, gender, and human rights into concrete and comparative analysis.

Participants were divided into four small working groups of 5-person, each focusing on a distinct case reflecting contemporary forms of migration governance and externalisation in the Euro-Mediterranean context. The session combined collective analysis, critical reflection, and creative reframing, encouraging participants to interrogate how historical power asymmetries and colonial continuities remain embedded in current migration frameworks.

Objectives of the Case Study Session

The case study session pursued three interrelated objectives:
– To analyse how colonial legacies, racialised hierarchies, and unequal power relations shape present-day migration policies and narratives;
– To examine the implications of these frameworks for labour rights, gender equality, and human rights;
– To encourage participants to reframe dominant migration narratives and develop alternative, rights-based perspectives.

Structure and Methodology

The session was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, groups familiarised themselves with their assigned case and identified key narrative frames, policy mechanisms, and governance logics. In the second stage, groups shifted from analysis to reflection and creative reframing. Each group concluded by formulating key observations and insights, which were later shared in the closing plenary.

Case Study Groups and Thematic Focus

Group 1: Labour Migration from Egypt and Bangladesh to Greece

This group examined labour migration pathways from Egypt and Bangladesh to Greece, focusing on temporary and irregular labour regimes in sectors such as agriculture and construction. Discussions highlighted how colonial and postcolonial labour hierarchies shape recruitment practices, legal precarity, and working conditions. Particular attention was paid to racialisation, the commodification of migrant labour, and limited access to rights and legal protection.

Group 2: The EU Migration Pact

This group analysed the EU Migration Pact as a framework reshaping migration governance across the European Union. Discussions focused on securitisation, border procedures, and differentiated treatment of migrants, as well as the broader narrative implications of managing migration primarily through control-oriented approaches.

Group 3: The EU–Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding

This group explored the EU–Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding as an example of migration externalisation. The analysis centred on asymmetrical power relations, the delegation of border management, and the implications for accountability and human rights protection.

Group 4: Spain–Morocco Circular Migration

This group focused on Spain–Morocco circular migration schemes, particularly in seasonal agricultural labour. Discussions examined how controlled mobility regimes reproduce colonial patterns of labour extraction, gendered recruitment, and structural dependency.

Conclusion

Across all four case studies, participants identified recurring themes, including the persistence of colonial and racialised hierarchies, the prioritisation of labour and security concerns over rights, and the gendered dimensions of migration governance. The session enabled participants to connect theoretical discussions with concrete cases and to reflect collectively on alternative narratives grounded in dignity and inclusion.

The case study session underscored the value of participatory and comparative analysis in understanding contemporary migration dynamics. By engaging with diverse cases, participants contributed to a shared reflection on how migration narratives can be critically examined and reimagined beyond colonial continuities.

Untold Europe

Towards Coherent and Human Rights-Based Migration Governance in Europe: Addressing Structural Imbalances in the Light of Colonial Narratives on Migration in Europe

This policy paper, developed from the Untold Europe workshop (Brussels, 21 October 2025), examines structural imbalances in European migration governance across three domains: circular labour migration, external migration cooperation, and internal EU asylum systems. While each field operates within distinct legal frameworks, comparative analysis reveals a recurring tension between control-oriented management tools and the consistent safeguarding of rights. From employer-dependent seasonal labour schemes to accountability gaps in external partnerships and uneven asylum protection standards within the EU, the findings highlight the need for stronger monitoring, legal clarity, and enforceable safeguards. The paper argues that sustainable migration governance requires integrating mobility management with equal treatment, transparency, and human rights-based benchmarks—ensuring coherence, credibility, and long-term legitimacy across EU migration policies.

 

Executive Summary

This policy paper synthesises findings from three thematic case studies examined during the Untold Europe workshop in Brussels on 21 October 2025. Each case examined a different layer of European migration governance: circular labour migration, external migration cooperation, and internal asylum governance. Through comparative analysis, the workshop identified recurring structural patterns in how mobility is managed, how responsibilities are distributed, and how protection standards are implemented.

While each policy field has its own legal and institutional logic, the cases revealed common tensions between management objectives and rights safeguards. This paper consolidates those findings into a coherent policy analysis aimed at supporting more balanced, sustainable, and legally consistent migration governance within and beyond the European Union.

Case Study 1 – Circular Labour Migration and Agricultural Work

The first case study focused on circular migration schemes in the agricultural sector, discussed during the workshop as an example of labour mobility designed to address seasonal workforce shortages. Participants examined how such programmes operate in practice, particularly in Southern Europe, and how recruitment, residence status, and working conditions are structured. The discussion highlighted that while these schemes offer employment opportunities and address labour market needs, they frequently rely on highly temporary statuses and employer-dependent residence arrangements.

Workshop participants concluded that this structural design could limit workers’ bargaining power, restrict mobility between employers, and create differentiated access to social and labour rights. The case demonstrated how labour migration governance can unintentionally contribute to segmented labour markets if mobility, equal treatment, and access to remedies are not adequately safeguarded. These findings informed the broader policy recommendation that labour migration frameworks should integrate stronger rights protections alongside economic objectives.

Case Study 2 – External Migration Cooperation and Responsibility Distribution

The second case study addressed EU cooperation with third countries on migration management, examined through the lens of recent partnership frameworks discussed at the workshop. Participants analysed how operational responsibilities related to border control and containment are shared between the EU and partner countries. The discussion focused on governance capacity, accountability mechanisms, and the alignment between financial support and protection standards.

The workshop concluded that external cooperation could contribute to migration management objectives but also creates potential responsibility gaps where monitoring, legal safeguards, and access to remedies are limited. Participants emphasised that policy effectiveness depends not only on reducing movements but also on ensuring that protection outcomes are verifiable and consistent with international and EU legal standards. These conclusions shaped the recommendation that external partnerships should be systematically linked to transparency, independent monitoring, and rights-based benchmarks.

Case Study 3 – Internal EU Asylum Governance and Solidarity Mechanisms

The third case study examined recent developments in EU asylum governance, with particular attention to solidarity mechanisms, procedural harmonisation, and the treatment of vulnerable applicants. Workshop participants explored how reforms aim to improve system functionality and coordination among Member States while managing pressures on national systems.

Discussions highlighted that while solidarity tools are intended to distribute responsibilities more evenly, protection standards and reception conditions remain unevenly implemented across the Union. Participants noted that procedural obligations for asylum seekers are increasingly detailed, whereas enforcement of Member State compliance with protection standards can be inconsistent. The workshop, therefore, concluded that solidarity and system functionality must be closely linked to enforceable protection guarantees to ensure long-term system credibility and legal coherence.

Integrated Analysis

Across the three cases, the workshop identified a shared governance pattern: migration is frequently addressed through instruments designed to manage distribution, containment, and procedural compliance. By contrast, mechanisms ensuring participation, equal treatment, and consistent protection standards often develop more slowly or unevenly.

The comparative discussion showed that these dynamics are not confined to one policy field but arise across labour migration, external cooperation, and asylum governance. This insight underpins the paper’s central argument: strengthening accountability, legal clarity, and rights consistency across all migration governance domains is essential for effective and sustainable policy.

Policy Directions

Building on the workshop conclusions, the paper proposes policy directions aimed at better aligning management tools with protection standards. Strengthened monitoring and accountability mechanisms, clearer procedural standards, and improved access to remedies are key elements across all governance areas.

In labour migration, ensuring mobility rights and equal treatment would support fair labour market outcomes. In external cooperation, linking funding and partnerships to verifiable protection benchmarks would reduce legal and reputational risks. Within the EU, solidarity mechanisms should be directly tied to minimum protection standards to ensure that responsibility-sharing also guarantees rights consistency.

The workshop-based comparative approach demonstrates that structural imbalances between control-oriented measures and protection safeguards can emerge across different migration governance fields. Addressing these imbalances does not require abandoning management objectives but integrating them more closely with legal certainty, accountability, and protection standards.

A more coherent and rights-consistent migration governance framework would strengthen the EU’s capacity to manage migration sustainably and credibly while upholding its legal and normative commitments.

Iranian citizens living in Turkey protest the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini and the Iranian government in front of the Iranian Consulate General in Istanbul on October 4, 2022. Photo: Tolga Ildun.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 11: Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff (2026). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 11: Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). February 6, 2026.https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00142

 

Session 11 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series examined the tension between democratic inclusion as a normative promise and inclusion as an everyday institutional practice. Bringing together interdisciplinary perspectives, the panel explored how belonging is constructed, experienced, and contested across administrative, participatory, historical, and theoretical domains. Contributions highlighted how exclusion often operates through subtle mechanisms—bureaucratic encounters, identity-based narratives, digital mobilization, and post-revolutionary boundary drawing—rather than overt denial. Across cases from the United States, Sub-Saharan Africa, Iran, and liberal democracies more broadly, the session underscored that democratic legitimacy today depends on both representation and effective, fair governance. Collectively, the discussions illuminated why gaps between democratic ideals and lived experiences continue to fuel distrust, polarization, and populist mobilization.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, February 5, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 11 of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches, under the theme “Inclusion or Illusion? Narratives of Belonging, Trust, and Democracy in a Polarized Era.” The session brought together scholars working across political theory, political sociology, comparative politics, and historical analysis to examine a central tension of contemporary democracy: the growing disjuncture between formal promises of inclusion and the everyday experiences and institutional practices through which belonging is granted, denied, or conditionally recognized.

The workshop opened with welcoming and framing remarks by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who situated the panel within the broader aims of the series: to scrutinize how invocations of “the people” can function both as a democratic claim-making device and as a mechanism of boundary drawing that facilitates exclusionary politics. 

Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira (University of Bucharest) chaired and moderated the session, providing an interpretive frame that foregrounded the duality between the “defined” and the “definers.” Her introduction emphasized that inclusion operates simultaneously as an affective, lived experience of belonging and as a political-institutional process through which elites, parties, bureaucracies, and other authorities define legitimate membership in the demos. This perspective oriented the panel toward subtle mechanisms—discursive, administrative, legal, and historical—through which democratic inclusion may become performative, selective, or strategically narrowed.

The papers collectively illuminated how legitimacy and exclusion are produced at multiple levels of governance and across distinct contexts. PhD candidate Ariel Lam Chan (Stanford University) examined citizen engagement with the administrative state through a conjoint experimental design that tested how procedural and performance cues shape “approach intention” toward public-facing agencies. 

Dr. Dieudonné Mbarga (Independent Researcher) brought a comparative Global South perspective to democratic resilience, analyzing how active citizenship and participatory governance can strengthen accountability while also risking polarization and instrumentalization—particularly in digitally mediated political environments. 

Dr. Ali Ragheb (University of Tehran) offered a historically grounded account of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution (1905–1906), arguing that democratic breakdown followed from the post-victory narrowing of “the people,” especially through the exclusion of women and minorities. 

Complementing these empirical interventions, PhD candidate Saeid Yarmohammadi (University of Montreal) developed a theoretical argument about how identity politics and contested procedures of social justice can unintentionally intensify populist dynamics by deepening “us/them” boundaries within liberal democracies.

The session’s discussion was enriched by interventions from Professor Jennifer Fitzgerald (University of Colorado) and Dr. Russell Foster (King’s College London), whose feedback linked the presentations to wider debates on legitimacy, polarization, civic participation, and the variable meanings of “the people.” 

Taken together, Session 11 offered a cohesive and analytically layered exploration of how contemporary democracies confront not only the challenge of governing effectively, but also the deeper question of who is recognized as belonging—and on what terms—in an increasingly polarized political age.

 

Assoc. Prof. Andreea Zamfira: The Defined and the Definers — Power, Inclusion, and Democratic Meaning

Andreea Zamfira is an Associate Professor with the Department of Political Science, University of Bucharest.

In her opening assessment of Session 11, Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira offered a conceptually rich and analytically nuanced framing of the panel’s central theme, “Inclusion or Illusion?”, situating it firmly within contemporary debates on democracy, populism, and representation. Drawing on insights developed during the ECPS hybrid conference “We, the People and the Future of Democracy,” she emphasized that the question of inclusion is not merely empirical but deeply political, normative, and discursive.

Dr. Zamfira structured her reflection around a key duality: the defined and the definers. On the one hand, inclusion and exclusion refer to citizens’ lived experiences of belonging within the political community—the demos. On the other, they point to the actors and institutions with the power to define “the people,” impose official narratives, and translate these narratives into policy. This distinction allowed her to foreground both bottom-up perceptions of political membership and top-down constructions of political identity.

She further argued that the panel’s contributions collectively interrogate subtle and often overlooked mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion, moving beyond formal citizenship or electoral participation to examine discursive, symbolic, and institutional practices. In this sense, the session was positioned as an effort to bridge the gap between how political belonging is experienced socially and how it is strategically constructed by political elites.

Dr. Zamfira critically engaged with competing explanations for the contemporary “deplorable state of democracy.” While some scholarly accounts attribute democratic decline to citizens’ alienation, mistrust, and limited understanding of governance, others place responsibility on political parties and governing elites that increasingly fail to represent societal interests while demanding popular trust. She leaned toward the latter interpretation, highlighting a growing distance between political elites and citizens, marked by disregard for personal autonomy, popular sovereignty, and the general will.

Invoking the work of scholars such as Peter Mair and Colin Crouch, Dr. Zamfira framed this rupture as a symptom of post-democracy, generated by the convergence of state bureaucracies and dominant economic actors. This convergence, she argued, erodes democratic sovereignty and fuels populist mobilization. Importantly, she warned against reductive or dogmatic analyses of populism, emphasizing instead Mair’s proposition that populism should be understood first as a symptom of de-democratization, and only secondarily as its cause.

In closing, Dr. Zamfira turned to the contentious concept of militant democracy, noting its growing prominence in responses to democratic crises. While some view it as a necessary safeguard, she cautioned that its restrictive logic risks undermining pluralism and further narrowing the political community. Her concluding question—whether such models protect democracy or deepen exclusion—set a critical and reflective tone for the panel discussions that followed.

Ariel Lam Chan: “What Does the Public Want? A Multidimensional Analysis of Cues in the Administrative State”

Ariel Lam Chan is a PhD student in the Department of Sociology at Stanford University.

In her presentation, Ariel Lam Chan offered a theoretically grounded and methodologically innovative contribution to ongoing debates on democratic legitimacy, administrative governance, and citizen–state relations. Her study interrogates a central but underexplored question in the literature on public administration and democratic governance: what cues motivate citizens to engage with the administrative state, particularly in everyday encounters that shape perceptions of government legitimacy?

Chan situated her research within the administrative state as the primary and most tangible interface between citizens and government. Rather than abstract institutions such as legislatures or courts, she emphasized that citizens’ lived experiences of the state are mediated through street-level bureaucrats—police officers, teachers, welfare officials, and frontline administrators. These quotidian interactions, she argued, play a decisive role in shaping trust, avoidance, or engagement with public authority. The metaphor of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) served as an emblematic site where bureaucratic friction, frustration, and legitimacy are most acutely felt.

The presentation engaged critically with existing scholarship on administrative burden, which traditionally focuses on learning costs, compliance costs, and psychological costs that deter service take-up. Chan identified two limitations in this literature. First, service take-up captures only completed interactions and overlooks the prior decision of whether to approach the state at all. Second, attitudinal surveys often measure abstract preferences without embedding respondents in decision-making contexts that approximate real-world choices. To address these gaps, Chan introduced a conjoint experimental design that centers on approach intention—the subjective willingness of citizens to engage with a public service agency before interaction occurs.

Theoretically, the study bridges two influential but often competing frameworks of legitimacy. On one side is performance-based trust, which views legitimacy as a function of efficiency, speed, and outcome effectiveness. On the other is procedural justice theory, which emphasizes fair, respectful, and impartial treatment as the foundation of relational legitimacy. Chan’s intervention does not privilege one framework a priori; instead, it empirically tests how citizens respond to competing process and outcome cues when making hypothetical but realistic choices between public service offices.

Methodologically, the study employed a nationally representative survey experiment with 1,073 US respondents. Participants evaluated pairs of public service agencies across three decision tasks, yielding over 6,000 agency evaluations. Agencies spanned fourteen domains, including the DMV, Social Security Administration, and welfare offices. Cues were randomized along two dimensions: process cues (fairness and respectful treatment) and outcome cues (efficiency and performance). Importantly, cue statements were designed to mimic short online reviews, thereby approximating informational environments citizens commonly encounter.

Chan’s findings offer several important insights. First, all positive cues—both procedural and outcome-oriented—significantly increased citizens’ willingness to approach an agency, confirming that legitimacy signals matter at the point of engagement. However, the relative importance of these cues varied by measurement context. When respondents evaluated agencies on an ordinal confidence scale, considerations of fairness and efficiency carried comparable weight. Yet when forced into a binary choice between two offices, respondents prioritized outcome cues over process cues. This distinction suggests that while procedural justice remains normatively salient, instrumental performance becomes decisive when choices are constrained.

A particularly robust finding concerned fairness. Across both ordinal and binary models, fairness emerged as a stable predictor of approach intention, indicating that it functions as a foundational element of perceived legitimacy rather than a contingent preference. At the same time, the study found no evidence that process cues systematically outweighed outcome cues, challenging some expectations derived from procedural justice theory.

The analysis further revealed important interaction effects. High process cues amplified the impact of favorable outcome cues beyond their additive effects. Agencies perceived as both competent and respectful enjoyed a 5.2–6 percent boost in likelihood of selection, suggesting that relational capacity operates as a multiplier of performance rather than a substitute for it. This finding underscores the complementary, rather than competitive, relationship between efficiency and procedural justice.

Chan also examined subgroup differences, testing hypotheses related to racialized administrative burden, political ideology, and socioeconomic status. Contrary to expectations, marginalized groups and frequent welfare users did not exhibit stronger preferences for relational cues over outcomes. Similarly surprising was the ideological pattern: Democrats displayed a significantly stronger preference for outcome cues than Republicans, suggesting a potential shift toward demands for a high-capacity, high-performing state even among traditionally process-oriented constituencies. In contrast, higher-income and more highly educated respondents prioritized outcomes over relational ease, aligning with established literature.

In conclusion, Chan argued that public trust in the administrative state rests on a dual expectation of competence and fairness. While efficiency and results guide immediate engagement decisions, procedural justice remains the aspirational bedrock of institutional legitimacy, as reflected in respondents’ open-ended responses. Her presentation closed by advancing a normative implication: investments in relational capacity should not be treated as ancillary but as essential to rebuilding trust, reducing avoidance, and strengthening the democratic fabric linking citizens and the state.

Dr. Dieudonné Mbarga: “Active Citizenship, Democracy and Inclusive Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Nexus, Challenges and Prospects for a Sustainable Development”

Dr Dieudonne Mbarga is an independent researcher.

In his presentation, Dr. Dieudonné Mbarga offered a comparative and empirically grounded analysis of the role of active citizenship in fostering inclusive governance and democratic resilience in Sub-Saharan Africa. Speaking from the perspective of a Global South scholar, Dr. Mbarga emphasized both the analytical relevance and normative urgency of situating debates on inclusion, participation, and populism within contexts marked by fragile democratic transitions, deep social pluralism, and uneven institutional capacity.

Dr. Mbarga framed his intervention around a central puzzle: how active citizenship can strengthen democratic governance in polarized environments without reinforcing exclusionary or populist narratives of “the people.” He noted that Sub-Saharan Africa presents a particularly complex terrain for addressing this question, given the coexistence of declining institutional trust, intensifying political polarization, and rising mobilization of youth and women—dynamics increasingly mediated by digital platforms.

Conceptually, Dr. Mbarga defined active citizenship as the sustained commitment of individuals to participate meaningfully in public governance, drawing on established definitions from governance and citizenship studies. His theoretical framework combined insights from deliberative democracy, participatory governance, and contributivist approaches to populism. While participation is often normatively associated with accountability, legitimacy, and inclusion, Dr. Mbarga cautioned that it can also generate division when political actors instrumentalize popular mobilization through exclusionary definitions of “the people.”

Methodologically, the study adopted a qualitative and comparative approach, combining interviews, participant observation, policy analysis, and secondary literature across five country cases: Kenya, Ghana, Ethiopia, Senegal, and Cameroon. This design allowed Dr. Mbarga to trace both common patterns and context-specific dynamics of civic engagement across diverse political and institutional settings.

The findings revealed a dual and ambivalent role of active citizenship in the region. On the one hand, civic engagement has demonstrably strengthened accountability and policy performance. In Kenya, youth and women’s mobilization has shaped climate governance and inclusion agendas. In Ghana, participatory budgeting initiatives have enhanced transparency and local accountability. Ethiopia’s community-based participation mechanisms have contributed to improved social protection outcomes. These cases underscore the democratic potential of active citizenship when embedded in participatory institutions.

On the other hand, Dr. Mbarga highlighted the risks of politicized and instrumentalized mobilization. In Senegal, digitally mediated youth participation has energized political engagement but also intensified polarization. In Cameroon, civic engagement persists despite restrictive institutional environments, yet often takes fragmented and informal forms. Across cases, Dr. Mbarga observed that digital platforms simultaneously expand opportunities for inclusion and amplify fragmentation, enabling political elites to mobilize citizens—particularly youth—without fostering sustained civic understanding or democratic learning.

A recurring theme in Dr. Mbarga’s analysis was the salience of ethnic and tribal identities in shaping political participation. Unlike racialized dynamics more common in Western democracies, Sub-Saharan African contexts are often structured around multi-ethnic and multi-tribal cleavages. These identities, he argued, can be readily activated by populist leaders, transforming civic participation into a vehicle for exclusion rather than inclusion and undermining institutional trust.

In terms of policy implications, Dr. Mbarga emphasized the need to institutionalize participatory governance mechanisms, strengthen civic education, support youth and women’s leadership, protect civic space, and promote inclusive digital participation in line with SDG 16. His concluding assessment stressed that active citizenship could enhance democratic resilience only when anchored in inclusive institutions, structured participation, and protected civic freedoms.

Overall, Dr. Mbarga’s presentation contributed a nuanced Global South perspective to the session’s broader inquiry into inclusion and illusion, highlighting both the democratic promise and the political risks of active citizenship in polarized and plural societies.

Dr. Ali Ragheb: “Silenced Voices in a Democratic Dawn: How the Iranian Constitutional Revolutionaries (1905–1906) Weaponized ‘the People’ Against Minorities”

Dr. Ali Ragheb is from University of Tehran.

Dr. Ali Ragheb’s contribution to Session 11 was delivered in the form of a pre-recorded presentation, necessitated by repeated and ultimately unsuccessful attempts to join the session live due to enforced internet restrictions in Iran. This constraint, which Dr. Ragheb explicitly framed as an instrument of political control during a moment of acute national crisis, served not merely as a logistical obstacle but as a poignant extension of the substantive themes of his paper. His intervention thus unfolded at the intersection of historical inquiry, political theory, and lived authoritarian experience.

Dr. Ragheb’s presentation addressed the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of the early twentieth century as a critical historical case for understanding the paradoxes of popular mobilization, inclusion, and democratic failure. He began by situating the phrase “We, the People” not as a constitutional abstraction for Iranians, but as a lived and contested condition—one shaped by resistance, repression, and repeated cycles of hope and betrayal. This framing connected Iran’s contemporary crisis, marked by violent repression of popular protests and renewed exposure to war, to a longer genealogy of failed democratic aspirations.

The core research question guiding Dr. Ragheb’s study was deceptively simple yet theoretically ambitious: why did a revolution that succeeded through mass participation fail to defend itself once it achieved institutional power? While existing historiography has emphasized external imperial intervention and internal structural weaknesses—such as low literacy rates or institutional fragility—Dr. Ragheb argued that these explanations overlook a crucial dynamic: the deliberate narrowing of the political meaning of “the people” by revolutionary elites after victory.

Theoretically, Dr. Ragheb approached “the people” as a political construction rather than a fixed sociological entity. Drawing on Ernesto Laclau’s notion of the people as an “empty signifier,” he conceptualized revolutionary mobilization as a moment in which heterogeneous social demands were temporarily unified under an ambiguous political banner. Jacques Rancière’s work informed his analysis of political visibility, helping to explain how marginalized groups briefly entered the political stage before being rendered invisible once again. Partha Chatterjee’s distinction between civil society and political society further clarified how revolutionary elites selectively recognized some actors as legitimate citizens while governing others through exclusion and control.

Methodologically, the study was grounded in extensive qualitative analysis of parliamentary debates, constitutional drafts, electoral laws, petitions, underground pamphlets, intelligence reports, newspapers, memoirs, and visual materials. This rich archive allowed Dr. Ragheb to trace the transition from inclusive mobilization to exclusionary consolidation with empirical precision.

The findings highlighted the internal heterogeneity and fragility of the revolutionary coalition. Intellectuals sought legal-rational representation, merchants prioritized property and trade security, clerics were divided between constitutionalist and conservative camps, and the urban poor mobilized largely in response to economic precarity. During the revolutionary phase, these divergent interests were held together through strategic ambiguity. After victory, however, revolutionary leaders increasingly prioritized stability, elite consensus, and property rights, reframing mass participation as disorderly and dangerous.

This shift had far-reaching consequences. The urban poor, whose economic grievances were largely ignored by parliament, became disillusioned and politically volatile, making them susceptible to counter-revolutionary mobilization. Women, despite their active participation through demonstrations, boycotts, armed resistance, and petitions, were systematically excluded from political recognition; electoral laws explicitly denied them suffrage, transforming revolutionary visibility into post-revolutionary invisibility. Religious minorities—Armenians, Jews, and Zoroastrians—faced similarly entrenched exclusion. Although early constitutional debates promised equality, political belonging was ultimately defined in Islamic terms, rendering minorities conditionally visible and politically expendable.

Dr. Ragheb emphasized that this exclusion was not accidental but the result of strategic compromises between secular constitutionalists and conservative clerics, in which minority rights were sacrificed to preserve elite unity. Exclusion was further institutionalized through restrictive suffrage laws, class-based representation, and the overrepresentation of Tehran at the expense of provinces, tribes, peasants, and ethnic minorities.

At the discursive level, revolutionary elites increasingly portrayed the masses as ignorant and irrational, legitimizing demobilization and repression. When counter-revolutionary forces regrouped, parliament stood isolated—not because of popular apathy, but because the social base that had enabled revolutionary victory had been systematically excluded and betrayed.

Dr. Ragheb concluded by situating the Iranian case within a broader comparative frame, noting parallels with the French Revolution and the Young Turks Revolution. His central lesson was universal: revolutions that rely on broad coalitions cannot survive if they consolidate power by narrowing the definition of the people. Without institutionalized pluralism across class, gender, religion, and region, revolutionary victories remain fragile. His closing remarks, honoring those silenced in Iran’s current crisis, powerfully underscored the enduring relevance of this historical insight.

Saeid Yarmohammadi: “When Identity Politics and Social Justice Procedures Contribute to Populism”

Saeid Yarmohammadi is a PhD candidate in religious studies at the Institute of Religious Studies, University of Montreal, Canada.

In his presentation, PhD candidate Saeid Yarmohammadi offered a theoretically oriented and normatively reflective analysis of the relationship between identity politics, social justice procedures, and the expansion of populist discourse in liberal democracies. Despite joining the session with technical difficulties and presenting in a condensed format, Yarmohammadi articulated a coherent argument that linked sociological theories of otherness with political-philosophical debates on democracy and justice.

Yarmohammadi framed his intervention around a central concern: how contemporary identity politics and the politicization of social justice principles can unintentionally reinforce populist dynamics rather than counter them. His point of departure was the concept of “otherness,” which he traced to ethnographic traditions historically rooted in colonial modes of knowledge production. Although ethnography has increasingly turned its analytical lens toward Western societies, he argued that the conceptualization of outsiders—particularly immigrants and marginalized groups—often continues to reproduce a dichotomous logic of “us” versus “them.” This persistent distinction, he suggested, provides fertile ground for populist narratives that claim to represent a homogenous “people” against constructed outsiders.

Building on this foundation, Yarmohammadi examined identity politics as a central mechanism through which the “We, the People” discourse is articulated. Identity politics, in his account, seeks to define a unified in-group by emphasizing selected cultural, social, or political characteristics while marginalizing or essentializing others as an out-group. This process intensifies polarization by shifting political disagreement away from contestation over shared problems and policy solutions toward the assertion of incompatible group interests. As a result, the political community becomes fragmented into competing “we’s,” a condition that populist actors can readily exploit.

To deepen this analysis, Yarmohammadi drew on social identity theory, highlighting four key components relevant to populist mobilization: categorization, identification, social comparison, and psychological distinctiveness. Together, these mechanisms help explain how individuals derive political meaning and emotional attachment from group membership, reinforcing in-group solidarity while sharpening out-group exclusion. In politicized contexts, this dynamic transforms identity from a social marker into a political weapon.

The second major strand of the presentation focused on the formation of social justice principles. Yarmohammadi argued that debates over justice, when conducted under conditions of polarized identity politics, tend to exacerbate rather than mitigate populist tendencies. He contrasted populist conceptions of democracy—where “the people” are treated as a singular collective agent—with alternative democratic models grounded in liberal egalitarian and republican traditions. Drawing on John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas, he emphasized that democratic legitimacy in liberal democracies depends on public reason, overlapping consensus, and the recognition of citizens as free and equal participants in a shared political enterprise.

In this framework, justice emerges not from the dominance of particular groups but from inclusive deliberative processes embedded in democratic institutions. However, Yarmohammadi argued that when identity politics reshapes democratic participation, agreement on social justice principles shifts from individual reasoning to group-based priority setting. This transformation undermines the possibility of shared consensus and instead deepens polarization, creating conditions conducive to populist democracy.

A key implication of this argument concerned the failure of bottom-up democratic efforts to formulate social justice principles within civil society. Yarmohammadi suggested that such efforts are increasingly overridden by top-down identity-based mobilization, resulting in the erosion of liberal democratic norms, rising inequality, and heightened social anger and anomie. These conditions, in turn, further enable populist movements to thrive.

In conclusion, Yarmohammadi maintained that the relationship between social justice and populism is contingent on the underlying model of democracy. Where justice is grounded in inclusive, deliberative, and institutionally mediated processes, populism can be constrained. Where justice becomes politicized through polarized conceptions of “the people,” populist discourse finds fertile ground. His presentation thus contributed a critical theoretical lens to the session’s broader exploration of inclusion, exclusion, and the fragility of democratic norms.

Discussants’ Feedback

Dr. Russell Foster 

Dr. Russell Foster is a Senior Lecturer in British and International Politics at King’s College London, School of Politics & Economics, Department of European & International Studies.

In his role as discussant, Dr. Russell Foster offered an intellectually generous, theoretically informed, and methodologically attentive commentary on the panel as a whole and on each of the individual papers presented. His intervention did not merely evaluate the technical merits of the papers but situated them within a broader diagnosis of the contemporary democratic condition, thereby reinforcing the session’s overarching theme of the growing gap between political institutions and the demos.

Dr. Foster opened by explicitly engaging with Assoc. Prof. Zamfira’s framing of the session, noting that all papers directly addressed what she identified as the widening “void” between political elites and popular constituencies across different contexts. He highlighted the relevance of her discussion of militant democracy, connecting it to Karl Popper’s paradox of intolerance. In particular, Dr. Foster underscored the normative tension inherent in militant democratic strategies: while potentially necessary in moments of democratic crisis, such approaches risk excluding precisely those segments of the demos that democracy claims to represent. This conceptual tension, he suggested, resonated strongly with the empirical findings of the papers under discussion.

Turning first to the presentation by Ariel Lam Chan, Dr. Foster praised the paper as a “rich” and “refreshing” contribution to the study of the administrative state, particularly for its focus on street-level bureaucracy rather than elite institutions. He commended the paper’s attention to the psychological and somatic dimensions of administrative burden, noting that these factors are often overlooked in studies of legitimacy and governance. By foregrounding everyday encounters with public institutions—such as interactions with the DMV—the paper illuminated how legitimacy is constructed or eroded through mundane, routine experiences rather than grand constitutional moments.

At the same time, Dr. Foster offered several constructive critiques and suggestions for refinement. He questioned the applicability of the phrase “voting with one’s feet” in the context of what he described as “captive bureaucracies,” where citizens lack meaningful alternatives to state-provided services. This raised an important conceptual issue about agency and choice within administrative systems. Dr. Foster also engaged critically with the paper’s discussion of instrumental versus relational legitimacy, suggesting that the empirical failure of initiatives such as the US “Department of Government Efficiency” (DOGE) might call into question the coherence or sustainability of purely instrumental legitimacy models. He encouraged the author to further explore alternative institutional cases that might better illustrate instrumental legitimacy in practice.

Methodologically, Dr. Foster expressed appreciation for the paper’s extensive dataset and sophisticated experimental design, while recommending greater clarity regarding case selection. He suggested that the paper would benefit from explicitly identifying the public agencies included in the study and clarifying whether they operated at federal, state, or local levels. This distinction, he argued, could significantly shape citizens’ perceptions of competence and fairness. Dr. Foster also proposed expanding the analysis of age-based differences in perceptions of administrative legitimacy, particularly given the growing salience of generational divides in populist politics. Finally, he encouraged greater transparency regarding the use of AI tools, such as ChatGPT, for coding qualitative data, including clearer justification and documentation of prompts and procedures.

In his discussion of Dr. Dieudonné Mbarga’s paper on active citizenship in sub-Saharan Africa, Dr. Foster emphasized the importance of hearing Global South perspectives articulated by scholars embedded in the contexts they study. He praised the paper’s nuanced account of polarization, uneven democratic consolidation, declining institutional trust, and expanding youth civic engagement. Dr. Foster noted that the paper offered valuable insights into how active citizenship can simultaneously strengthen accountability and intensify populist dynamics.

Here too, Dr. Foster suggested avenues for further development. He encouraged greater temporal specificity, asking whether the patterns identified were recent phenomena, post-pandemic developments, or part of longer historical trajectories. He also proposed deeper comparative reflection across the selected case studies, including attention to linguistic differences between Anglophone and Francophone contexts and their implications for populist communication. A particularly salient contribution of Dr. Foster’s feedback was his emphasis on blame attribution in populist discourse. He invited the author to more explicitly analyze who populist actors in sub-Saharan Africa identify as internal and external enemies, noting emerging narratives that simultaneously reject Western powers while embracing alternative global actors such as Russia. Dr. Foster also highlighted the paper’s compelling comparison between racism in the Global North and tribalism in the Global South, suggesting that this analytical parallel could be further elaborated.

In his final set of remarks, Dr. Foster addressed Dr. Ali Ragheb’s pre-recorded presentation on the Iranian Constitutional Revolution. He expressed solidarity with the author’s situation and praised the paper as both theoretically sophisticated and historically illuminating. Dr. Foster emphasized the originality of the argument, particularly its challenge to conventional explanations for revolutionary failure that focus on foreign intervention or elite factionalism. Instead, he highlighted the paper’s central claim that revolutionary leaders narrowed the definition of “the people” after achieving power, thereby undermining the very coalition that had enabled success.

Dr. Foster commended the paper’s creative integration of Western political theory—particularly Laclau’s concept of empty signifiers and Chatterjee’s distinction between civil and political society—into the Iranian historical context. He also welcomed the shift away from elite-centered narratives toward everyday political experiences, drawing on Reinhart Koselleck’s notion of Alltagsgeschichte. At the same time, he suggested that the paper could be strengthened by greater methodological transparency regarding archival sources, translation challenges, and criteria of selection. He also encouraged further exploration of intra-urban dynamics, asking whether the revolutionary experience differed across Iranian cities beyond the Tehran–province divide.

In closing, Dr. Foster characterized all three papers as theoretically rich, empirically grounded, and highly relevant to understanding what he described as “the great crisis of our time.” His feedback not only affirmed the scholarly quality of the contributions but also demonstrated how they collectively advance critical debates on populism, legitimacy, and democratic fragility across diverse global contexts.


Professor Jennifer Fitzgerald

Jennifer Fitzgerald is Professor of Political Science at the University of Colorado.

Professor Jennifer Fitzgerald’s intervention as discussant offered a reflective, conceptually rich, and methodologically attentive assessment of the papers presented. Her remarks were unified by a strong concern with how foundational democratic concepts—legitimacy, accountability, transparency, inclusion, and exclusion—are not merely institutional abstractions but are actively produced and contested through everyday political experiences. Across her discussion, Professor Fitzgerald consistently emphasized the importance of connecting macro-level democratic theory to micro-level encounters between citizens and the state.

At the panel level, Professor Fitzgerald highlighted the shared strength of the presentations in foregrounding lived experience. She praised the “street-level” orientation running through the papers, noting that citizens’ daily interactions with bureaucracies, civic institutions, and political movements profoundly shape how democracy is perceived, trusted, or rejected. These encounters, she argued, inform whether individuals feel that rules apply fairly to them, whether they belong to the political community, and whether they are seen as politically consequential. In this sense, the panel collectively illuminated how democratic legitimacy is built—or eroded—not only through formal institutions but through routine practices and symbolic recognition.

Turning to Ariel Lam Chan’s presentation, Professor Fitzgerald described the project as innovative and intellectually exciting. She singled out the concept of “approach intention” as a particularly original contribution, interpreting it as a promising analytical bridge between individual political behavior and the administrative state. In her view, this concept captures how citizens anticipate and navigate interactions with public services, thereby expanding political analysis beyond elections and party competition.

Professor Fitzgerald encouraged deeper theoretical engagement with political science debates that seek to broaden the definition of politics to include service delivery as a core democratic outcome. She suggested that integrating this literature could substantially widen the paper’s audience and underscore its relevance to scholars concerned with how governance is experienced at the ground level. She also proposed several potential extensions, including closer attention to gender and generational dynamics. Drawing on existing research, she noted that women and men often engage differently with public services and possess distinct forms of political knowledge, while age cohorts may vary in their expectations of state responsiveness—patterns that could further enrich the analysis.

Additionally, Professor Fitzgerald raised the possibility that citizens’ experiences of legitimacy may be shaped by the perceived identity of bureaucratic actors themselves. Inspired by work on interviewer effects, she suggested that factors such as gender, age, language, or cultural similarity between citizens and street-level officials could influence how fairness and competence are evaluated. While framed explicitly as future research directions rather than critiques, these reflections reinforced her broader emphasis on relational dynamics in democratic governance.

In discussing Dr. Dieudonné Mbarga’s presentation, Professor Fitzgerald characterized the work as ambitious, timely, and normatively significant. She expressed particular interest in the paper’s focus on digital polarization, emphasizing that scholars still lack a sufficient understanding of how digital environments reshape political participation, trust, and fragmentation. The notion of inclusive digital governance, in her view, represented a particularly fertile conceptual space with strong potential for theoretical and policy-relevant contributions.

Professor Fitzgerald also situated Dr. Mbarga’s analysis within a broader comparative framework, suggesting connections to research on local governance and gendered leadership in contexts such as India, as well as to historical analyses of democratic fragility, including work on interwar Europe. These linkages, she argued, could help position the paper within wider debates on institutional design, democratic resilience, and participation in polarized societies.

Her engagement with Dr. Ali Ragheb’s presentation was marked by both scholarly admiration and personal reflection. Professor Fitzgerald openly acknowledged the privilege of conducting academic work in secure environments and expressed humility in light of Dr. Ragheb’s circumstances and subject matter. She praised the paper’s theoretical clarity and framing, describing it as exemplary in its ability to demonstrate how revisiting neglected dimensions of a historical event can fundamentally reshape understanding.

A central theme she drew from Dr. Ragheb’s work was the fluidity and political malleability of “the people.” Professor Fitzgerald emphasized the analytical power of treating “the people” not as a fixed category but as a rhetorical construct that can be strategically expanded or narrowed. She underscored how such shifts carry profound consequences for inclusion, exclusion, and political violence, making the paper highly relevant to contemporary debates on populism and authoritarianism.

Importantly, Professor Fitzgerald noted that Dr. Ragheb’s analysis demonstrated how redefining the boundaries of the people is never merely symbolic; it has concrete implications for political participation, rights, and historical trajectories. She viewed this insight as one of the paper’s most enduring contributions, with clear pedagogical value for graduate training and broader comparative research.

Finally, Professor Fitzgerald offered reflections on Saeid Yarmohammadi’s presentation, which examined the intersection of identity politics and social justice procedures. She described this thematic space as critically important, particularly in polarized liberal democracies where democratic participation can paradoxically reinforce populist dynamics. Professor Fitzgerald highlighted the paper’s core insight that when social justice principles are formulated within fragmented and politicized conceptions of “we, the people,” democratic deliberation risks being displaced by group-based prioritization and zero-sum logic.

Drawing from political science and anthropology, she suggested that Yarmohammadi’s work could be fruitfully connected to the concept of “culture as points of concern,” which posits that what defines a political culture is not consensus, but the issues over which disagreement is most intense. From this perspective, the paper sheds light on how contested understandings of justice and identity become focal points for populist mobilization. Fitzgerald also recommended engagement with scholarship on emotions in politics—such as resentment and envy—as complementary lenses for understanding how identity-based narratives gain traction among mass publics.

In concluding her remarks, Fitzgerald expressed strong appreciation for all the projects discussed, describing them as theoretically rich, empirically grounded, and deeply relevant to the central democratic challenges of the present moment. Her feedback underscored a unifying message: democratic backsliding and populism cannot be understood solely through institutional decay or elite maneuvering, but must also be analyzed through the everyday practices, identities, and expectations that shape how citizens experience—and contest—democracy itself.

Responses to Discussants’ Feedback

Ariel Lam Chan 

In her response to the discussants’ feedback, Ariel Lam Chan offered a reflective and methodologically transparent engagement with the comments raised, situating her project within both its intellectual genealogy and its future research trajectory. She began by acknowledging Professor Jennifer Fitzgerald’s remarks as highly resonant, emphasizing that the project itself originated in a political science classroom environment. Chan credited the formative influence of Michael Tomz and Paul Sniderman, particularly Sniderman’s encouragement to examine how citizens respond to institutional cues at the administrative level rather than focusing solely on elite or electoral politics. This framing reinforced the project’s grounding in behavioral political science while underscoring its interdisciplinary ambitions.

Chan directly addressed the discussants’ suggestion regarding the social characteristics of public service offices and bureaucratic actors. She noted that the project’s original design was indeed motivated by social identity theory and an interest in how intergroup affiliations might shape citizens’ responses to administrative institutions. However, she explained that a key methodological constraint emerged in the conjoint experimental design: operationalizing social identity cues in a realistic manner without exposing participants to psychological discomfort or ethical risk proved challenging. This tension, she suggested, reflects a broader trade-off between experimental rigor and ethical sensitivity, and she expressed openness to continuing this discussion beyond the workshop setting.

Responding to questions about gender, Chan clarified that while the analysis did not yield statistically significant gender differences in overall cue responsiveness, there were indicative patterns suggesting that women tend to prioritize relational cues more strongly. She interpreted this as a potentially meaningful finding that warrants deeper qualitative and contextual exploration, particularly in relation to women’s prior experiences navigating public services and their practical knowledge of institutional pathways.

Chan also welcomed encouragement to further elaborate the concept of “approach intention,” acknowledging her initial caution in advancing a framework not yet well established in the literature. The discussants’ validation, she noted, strengthened her confidence in developing this concept more explicitly as a theoretical contribution. Finally, she expressed enthusiasm for comparative extensions of the project, signaling openness to cross-national applications and collaborative dialogue as the research evolves.

Dr. Dieudonné Mbarga

Dr. Dieudonné Mbarga’s response was marked by a reflective and collegial tone, emphasizing openness to critique and scholarly learning. He expressed sincere appreciation for the discussants’ feedback and situated his intervention within an early stage of academic development. Framing the comments as constructive guidance, he underscored his intention to integrate them into the revision of his paper and signaled willingness to continue the dialogue, exemplifying an iterative and collaborative approach to knowledge production.

Closing Assessment by Assoc. Prof. Andreea Zamfira

In her closing assessment, Assoc. Prof. Andreea Zamfira offered a concise yet conceptually rich synthesis of the panel’s contributions, situating them within broader debates on democratic legitimacy, representation, and exclusion in contemporary political systems. Her remarks foregrounded the analytical coherence of the session, emphasizing how diverse empirical cases converged around shared structural tensions affecting democracies across regions and historical contexts.

Reflecting on Ariel Lam Chan’s presentation, Dr. Zamfira highlighted the dual democratic deficit facing modern states: declining representation and declining governance effectiveness. She underscored that citizens’ expectations toward democratic systems increasingly encompass both procedural representation and administrative efficiency. Failures on either front, she noted, can generate political disillusionment, disengagement, and radicalization—dynamics that feed into broader patterns of democratic erosion. This observation positioned administrative performance not as a technocratic concern, but as a core component of democratic legitimacy.

Turning to Dr. Mbarga’s contribution, Dr. Zamfira emphasized the corrosive effects of exclusion from meaningful political participation. She framed his findings within a wider comparative trajectory, noting that political parties and representative institutions across contexts are struggling to mediate effectively between citizens and the state. This growing disconnect, she argued, fuels skepticism, erodes trust, and contributes to increasingly critical attitudes toward democratic regimes—not only in Europe or the United States, but globally.

Dr. Zamfira’s engagement with Dr. Ragheb’s historical analysis of Iran’s Constitutional Revolution further reinforced this theme. She underscored that the revolution’s failure stemmed not from societal backwardness or external interference, but from the deliberate narrowing of the definition of “the people” by revolutionary elites. The systematic exclusion of key social groups—along class, gender, religious, and ethno-national lines—undermined pluralism and prevented durable democratic consolidation. Dr. Zamfira stressed the contemporary relevance of this case, drawing parallels with modern forms of exclusion driven by identity politics.

In integrating Saeid Yarmohammadi’s analysis, she highlighted how identity-based exclusions help explain why significant segments of society gravitate toward anti-system or populist movements. Across the panel, exclusion emerged as a recurring mechanism linking democratic disenchantment with populist mobilization.

Dr. Zamfira concluded by urging scholars to critically interrogate competing democratic models—pluralist, elitist, technocratic, or epistemocratic—and their implications for inclusion, representation, and effective governance. In an era marked by polarization and post-democratic challenges, she emphasized that many foundational questions remain unresolved, underscoring the need for continued research and collective scholarly engagement.

Conclusion

Session 11 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series provided a conceptually integrated and empirically rich examination of the tension between democratic inclusion as promise and inclusion as practice. Across diverse methodologies, regions, and theoretical traditions, the contributions converged on a central insight: contemporary democratic fragility is deeply rooted in the gap between formal claims of belonging and the lived, institutionalized, and discursively mediated experiences through which political membership is enacted or denied.

The papers collectively demonstrated that exclusion rarely operates through overt denial alone. Instead, it emerges through subtle yet consequential mechanisms—administrative encounters that discourage engagement, participatory processes vulnerable to instrumentalization, identity-based narratives that harden boundaries, and historical moments in which revolutionary coalitions are narrowed after victory. Whether in the everyday interactions of citizens with the administrative state, the dynamics of digitally mediated participation in Sub-Saharan Africa, the post-revolutionary consolidation of power in Iran, or the politicization of social justice in liberal democracies, exclusion repeatedly appeared as a driver of democratic disillusionment and populist mobilization.

Equally important, the session highlighted that democratic legitimacy today rests on a dual expectation. Citizens demand not only representation and voice, but also competence, fairness, and effectiveness. Failures on either dimension—procedural or performance-based—risk eroding trust and fostering disengagement. As several interventions underscored, technocratic efficiency without inclusion, or participation without institutional grounding, can both generate democratic backlash.

Rather than offering definitive resolutions, Session 11 productively foregrounded unresolved questions about how democracies can reconcile pluralism, participation, and governance capacity under conditions of polarization and post-democracy. In doing so, it reaffirmed the importance of interdisciplinary, historically informed, and globally attentive scholarship for understanding—and potentially reimagining—the future of democratic belonging.

Participants march down Fifth Avenue during the nationwide “No Kings” protest against US President Donald Trump and his administration, New York City, USA, June 14, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

Virtual Workshop Series / Session 10 — Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2026). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 10: Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 26, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00141

ECPS convened Session 10 of its Virtual Workshop Series, bringing together scholars to examine how democracies endure, adapt, and contest authoritarian pressures amid the normalization of populist discourse and the weakening of liberal-constitutional safeguards. Chaired by Dr. Amedeo Varriale, the session framed resilience as an active democratic project—defending rule of law, pluralism, and civic participation against gradual forms of authoritarian hollowing-out. Presentations by Dr. Peter Rogers, Dr. Pierre Camus, Dr. Soheila Shahriari, and Ecem Nazlı Üçok explored resilience across market democracies, local governance, feminist self-administration in Rojava, and diaspora activism confronting anti-gender politics. Discussants Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois and Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano connected these contributions through probing questions on the ambivalence, burdens, and transformative potential of resilience.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On Thursday, January 22, 2026, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) convened Session 10 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Held under the theme “Resisting the Decline: Democratic Resilience in Authoritarian Times,” the session brought together an interdisciplinary group of scholars to examine how democratic systems, institutions, and civic actors seek to withstand—and, at times, transform—the pressures generated by authoritarian resurgence, the normalization of populist discourse, and the erosion of liberal-constitutional guarantees across diverse political contexts.

The workshop opened with welcoming remarks by ECPS’s Reka Koleszar, who introduced the session’s theme, outlined the format, and presented the contributing scholars and discussants. Her opening situated Session 10 within ECPS’s broader intellectual agenda: advancing comparative, theory-informed, and empirically grounded research on populism and its implications for democratic governance, civic space, and rights-based politics. 

The session was chaired by Dr. Amedeo Varriale (PhD, University of East London), whose framing remarks offered a synthetic lens for the panel. Drawing attention to the contemporary “populist zeitgeist,” Dr. Varriale underscored how authoritarianism increasingly advances not merely through abrupt ruptures, but through gradual practices that hollow out democratic norms while preserving formal institutional shells. Against this backdrop, he proposed democratic resilience as an active project: the defense of rule of law, pluralism, and rights through institutions and civic participation, as well as the re-engagement of citizens whose disillusionment can become a resource for anti-democratic entrepreneurs.

Four presentations explored resilience across distinct but connected domains. Dr. Peter Rogers (Senior Lecturer in Sociology, Macquarie University) delivered “Resilience in Market Democracy,” interrogating resilience as a traveling concept shaped by market logics, welfare-state capacities, and shifting moral expectations of citizenship. Dr. Pierre Camus (Postdoctoral Fellow, Nantes University) presented “The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the Future of Democracy,” analyzing how professionalization and training—often justified as democratizing—can also reproduce inequalities and widen the distance between representatives and citizens. Turning to conflict and non-state governance, Dr. Soheila Shahriari (EHESS) offered “The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava,”examining feminist self-administration as civil-society resilience amid regional authoritarianism and geopolitical exclusion. Finally, Ecem Nazlı Üçok (PhD Candidate, Charles University) presented “Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey,” conceptualizing exile-based feminist organizing as a site of transnational resistance to anti-gender politics and authoritarian repression.

Discussion was enriched by two discussants: Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois (University of Helsinki) and Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano (Rey Juan Carlos University), whose interventions connected the papers through shared questions about the ambivalence of resilience, the distribution of democratic burdens, and the conditions under which resilience becomes transformative rather than merely adaptive.

Moderator Dr. Amedeo Varriale: From Populist Zeitgeist to Democratic Resistance

Dr. Amedeo Varriale earned his Ph.D. from the University of East London in March 2024. His research interests focus on contemporary populism and nationalism.

In his opening remarks as chair of the session, Dr. Amedeo Varriale framed the panel within a broader moment of profound geopolitical, socioeconomic, and sociocultural transformation. He emphasized that contemporary politics is increasingly shaped by what Dutch political scientist Cas Mudde has described as a “populist zeitgeist”—a diffuse mood or historical moment in which populist ideas have become normalized across political systems.

Dr. Varriale argued that the current rise of authoritarianism cannot be separated from this populist moment, particularly within an emerging multipolar global order. While authoritarian regimes continue to consolidate power in contexts where liberal democracy has historically lacked deep institutional roots—such as China and Russia—he noted with concern that authoritarian tendencies have also re-emerged within long-standing democracies, most notably the United States. In these cases, authoritarianism does not typically appear as outright regime change but rather manifests through populist discourse, attitudes, and political practices that challenge the liberal-constitutional foundations of democracy.

He highlighted how the rule of law, as well as individual and minority rights, are increasingly threatened by actors once confined to the political fringes but now progressively mainstreamed. Against this backdrop, Dr. Varriale stressed that resisting authoritarianism requires the active strengthening of democratic resilience. This entails defending institutions, constitutional norms, and civic participation, while re-engaging disillusioned and passive citizens.

Democracy, he concluded, can survive authoritarian pressure only when citizens, leaders, and state systems actively uphold accountability, pluralism, freedom of expression and association, human rights, and the rule of law. Previewing the session’s contributions, Dr. Varriale noted that the papers would address these challenges through analyses of civil society, activism, democratic resilience, and contemporary feminism, before inviting the first presenter to begin.

 

Dr. Peter Rogers: “Resilience in Market Democracy”

Dr. Peter Rogers is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Macquarie University.

In his presentation at the 10th Session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop series, Dr. Peter Rogers offered a wide-ranging and conceptually rich reflection on the notion of resilience in contemporary market societies. Drawing on material from his forthcoming book, he approached resilience not as a fixed or neutral concept, but as a “traveling” one—whose meaning, moral coding, and political implications shift depending on whether it is encountered through the lens of market society, welfare-state governance, or democratic resilience.

Dr. Rogers began by laying out a set of foundational assumptions to frame his argument. First, he proposed that contemporary societies should be understood as market societies, in which market mechanisms—competition, supply and demand, profit, and efficiency—have expanded far beyond the exchange of goods and services to become the dominant organizing principles of social life. These mechanisms, he argued, increasingly shape cultural norms, moral values, and the boundaries of what is perceived as wise, legitimate, or even lawful action. Whether embraced or resisted, market logic has become the pragmatic reference point through which social and political possibilities are assessed.

Second, Dr. Rogers suggested that market society has grown more extreme than the market economy from which it emerged. Whereas earlier market arrangements were embedded within broader ethical and social frameworks, contemporary market society increasingly extends its logic into domains once governed by moral, communal, or political considerations. Individual freedom is framed primarily as freedom of choice within markets, while minimal government and entrepreneurial self-reliance are prioritized. This model, he noted, was historically shaped by postwar efforts to protect liberty from authoritarian state power. Yet because markets are not inherently moral, unregulated market systems tend toward exploitation, inequality, and the concentration of wealth among elites.

To mitigate these outcomes, Dr. Rogers introduced his third assumption: that the excesses of market society are, in principle, balanced by the welfare state. Welfare institutions intervene where markets are blind to collective interests, providing social protections such as healthcare, pensions, and employment benefits. Through redistribution mechanisms and regulatory frameworks, welfare states seek to correct market failures and protect citizens from the risks generated by individual self-interest. In this sense, modern governance rests on a fragile balance between market-driven individual liberty and state-supported social equity.

Against this backdrop, Dr. Rogers positioned resilience as a concept that operates across these competing systems. In market society, resilience resonates strongly with ideals of individual autonomy and responsibility. It is framed as a personal trait or capacity—the ability to endure shocks, adapt to disruption, and persevere in the face of adversity. The resilient individual is expected to anticipate risks, respond proactively to crises, and reorganize personal resources to maintain financial, physical, and psychological well-being amid economic instability, precarious employment, or systemic disruption. This understanding aligns with influential global development narratives, such as those advanced by the World Bank, which emphasize individual recovery and functional improvement following negative shocks.

In contrast, resilience takes on a very different meaning within welfare-state contexts. Here, the focus shifts away from individual capacities toward the resilience of institutions, legal frameworks, ethical norms, and governance practices. Building resilience in this sense requires investment in social infrastructure, public services, and decommodified essential goods. Rather than emphasizing self-reliance, welfare-based resilience aims to foster stability, trust, and collective protection through state intervention and social solidarity.

Dr. Rogers emphasized that these differing models of resilience generate distinct expectations of citizenship. Market-based resilience places responsibility primarily on individuals, with the state acting largely as a facilitator of market processes. Welfare-based resilience, by contrast, relies on the state as a central provider of security and social protection. Both models depend on collective investments in social capital and networks of solidarity, yet they distribute moral responsibility and political obligation in markedly different ways.

These tensions, he argued, become especially visible in policy domains such as disaster management, climate adaptation, civil defense, and even democratic governance. As resilience becomes institutionalized through technical practices, guidelines, and risk-management frameworks, it increasingly shapes the rules of governance themselves. This gives rise to what Dr. Rogers described as a broader “politics of resilience,” in which choices about how resilience is defined also determine who bears the burden of coping with crisis.

While acknowledging the appeal of resilience as a positive and empowering concept, Dr. Rogers also addressed critical perspectives. He noted that resilience can function as a tool of neoliberal governance, shifting responsibility for managing systemic crises—from financial instability to climate change—from the state onto individuals. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Peter Bloom, he raised concerns that contemporary narratives of individualized resilience may reinforce a moral framework in which citizens are held personally responsible for adapting to the failures of systems they neither designed nor control.

At the same time, Dr. Rogers cautioned against dismissing resilience outright. Psychological and behavioral approaches to resilience, he argued, can foster agency, learning, and growth, enabling individuals and communities to recover from setbacks and engage in collective action. The challenge lies in balancing personal responsibility with social connectivity, altruism, and institutional support. Notably, he observed that market societies often struggle to fund and sustain initiatives that build social cohesion, as such projects rarely align with profit-driven investment models.

Concluding his presentation, Dr. Rogers returned to the central theme of balance. Resilience, he argued, can be a force for both empowerment and depoliticization, depending on how it is framed and enacted. The task for scholars and policymakers is not simply to promote resilience, but to ask what kind of resilience is being built—for whom, by whom, and at what cost. As a traveling concept, resilience demands continual critical reflection, particularly in democratic contexts where the relationship between citizens, markets, and the state remains deeply contested.

 

Dr. Pierre Camus: “The Contradictory Challenges of Training Local Elected Officials for the Future of Democracy”

Dr. Pierre Camus is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Nantes University.

In his presentation, Dr. Pierre Camus offered a sociologically grounded examination of an often-overlooked dimension of democratic governance: the training of local elected officials. Drawing on his doctoral research and ongoing work on political training in France, Europe, and parts of North America, Dr. Camus argued that what appears at first glance to be a technical or administrative issue in fact raises fundamental questions about democracy, political equality, and populism.

Focusing on the French case, which he described as particularly instructive, Dr. Camus advanced the central claim that training for local elected officials constitutes a “democratic paradox.” While officially justified in the name of accessibility, equality, and democratic inclusion, training programs often produce empirical effects that contradict these stated objectives. His analysis rested on two main arguments: first, that training does not reduce inequalities of access to political office and may even widen the gap between elected officials and citizens; and second, that training reproduces inequalities among elected officials themselves, particularly along territorial and gender lines.

Dr. Camus grounded his argument in a mixed-methods research design. Quantitatively, he drew on data from the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations covering more than 30,000 local elected officials who participated in training programs between January 2022 and December 2025. Qualitatively, his analysis was informed by several dozen interviews with elected officials conducted over an extended period. Together, these sources allowed him to assess both formal institutional arrangements and their concrete social effects.

He began by outlining the French legal framework governing the training of local elected officials. In France, training is legally recognized as a right directly linked to the exercise of political mandate. It is publicly funded and explicitly justified on democratic grounds, with the stated aim of ensuring that political office is accessible to all citizens regardless of education, profession, or prior political experience. Training is intended to compensate for inequalities in knowledge and skills and to enable any citizen, once elected, to govern effectively.

This framework is structured around two main mechanisms: local authorities are required to allocate part of their budget to the training of elected officials, and each elected official has access to an individual annual training entitlement. From a formal perspective, Dr. Camus noted, this arrangement appears inclusive and egalitarian, premised on the idea that political competence can be acquired institutionally rather than inherited through social background. Yet it is precisely here that the first paradox emerges.

Training, Dr. Camus argued, intervenes only after electoral selection has already taken place. It does not help citizens gain access to political office; rather, it supports those who have already been elected. As a result, the social inequalities that structure electoral access—such as education, profession, gender, social capital, and political networks—remain largely unchanged. More critically, training may reinforce the distance between elected officials and citizens by concentrating key forms of democratic knowledge within closed institutional settings accessible only to representatives.

Legal rules, public finance, administrative procedures, and other forms of governing expertise are transmitted in spaces from which ordinary citizens are excluded. In this way, democratic knowledge becomes a specialized resource reserved for elected officials, reinforcing the notion that governing requires expertise available only to a professional political class. Dr. Camus suggested that this dynamic challenges a core element of the French republican tradition: the idea of the elected official as an ordinary citizen temporarily entrusted with political responsibility. Paradoxically, a device designed to strengthen democracy may instead deepen the symbolic and practical separation between representatives and the represented.

The second paradox concerns inequalities within the group of elected officials themselves. Although training rights are formally equal, access to training is highly unequal in practice. Dr. Camus showed that elected officials in large municipalities, metropolitan areas, or higher levels of local government are significantly more likely to participate in training. They benefit from larger budgets, higher allowances, stronger administrative support, and closer ties to political parties that actively encourage professional development.

By contrast, elected officials in small and rural municipalities face structural constraints, including limited financial resources, time scarcity, fewer training opportunities nearby, and weaker institutional support. Drawing on longitudinal data from his doctoral research, Dr. Camus demonstrated that training participation rates are relatively high among regional and departmental officials but approach zero in municipalities with fewer than 2,000 inhabitants. Training thus accelerates political professionalization for some while leaving others on the margins of institutional competence.

Gender inequalities further complicate this picture. While men and women participate in training at similar overall rates, they tend to enroll in different types of programs. Male elected officials are overrepresented in training related to strategically valued policy areas such as public finance, urban planning, and infrastructure. Female elected officials, by contrast, are more likely to receive training in social policy, education, childcare, and cultural affairs—domains that, while essential, carry less political prestige and are less associated with executive power. Rather than correcting gender inequalities, training may therefore stabilize existing divisions in political roles.

In conclusion, Dr. Camus emphasized that the French case reveals a broader structural tension in contemporary democracies. How can political systems respond to the growing complexity of governance without transforming representation into a professional monopoly? And how can competence be promoted without reinforcing new forms of exclusion—especially at a time when populist discourses increasingly challenge expertise and political elites? These questions, he argued, extend far beyond France and invite comparative reflection on the future of democracy, political equality, and populism.

 

Dr. Soheila Shahriari: “The Rise of Women-Led Radical Democracy in Rojava: Global Democratic Decline and Civil Society Resilience Amidst Middle Eastern Authoritarianism”

Dr. Soheila Shahriari holds a doctorate in political science, awarded by the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS) in 2024.

In her presentation, Dr. Soheila Shahriari examined the emergence of women-led radical democracy in Rojava as a rare and fragile counter-hegemonic experiment in an era marked by global democratic decline and entrenched Middle Eastern authoritarianism. Situating her analysis within the broader context of democratic recession, civil war, and geopolitical realpolitik, Dr. Shahriari argued that Rojava represents not merely a local anomaly, but a diagnostic case that exposes the structural limits of contemporary democracy at both regional and global levels.

Dr. Shahriari’s research focused on the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES), commonly known as Rojava, which emerged amid the Syrian Civil War and consolidated itself after 2012. Her analysis was framed by three intersecting developments: the global democratic recession since the mid-2000s, the consolidation of authoritarianism in the Middle East, and the persistence of Rojava’s experiment in democratic confederalism despite sustained violence and political marginalization. She emphasized that Rojava’s significance lies not only in its survival under extreme conditions, but in its substantive challenge to dominant models of governance rooted in the nation-state, patriarchy, and centralized sovereignty.

To contextualize Rojava, Dr. Shahriari situated it within what scholars such as Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt have described as a global democratic recession characterized by institutional decay, executive centralization, and declining public trust. While this recession has taken the form of democratic backsliding in many parts of the Global North, she stressed that the Middle Eastern trajectory is distinct. In the region, the dominant pattern is not democratic erosion but the consolidation of authoritarianism. Drawing on Hamid Bozarslan’s work, she described regional authoritarianism as an anti-democratic system that actively dismantles democratic aspirations while maintaining a façade of legality through elections, constitutions, and populist narratives. In countries such as Turkey, Iran, and Syria, civic space has been systematically constricted and pluralism delegitimized.

Against this backdrop, Rojava emerged as a feminist and pluralist project grounded in the ideology of democratic confederalism developed by Abdullah Öcalan. This model explicitly rejects the nation-state and draws heavily on Murray Bookchin’s theory of social ecology. It emphasizes decentralized self-administration, grassroots participation, ecological sustainability, and radical pluralism across ethnic and religious lines. Dr. Shahriari stressed that Rojava should not be understood as an improvised response to state collapse, but as a deliberate counter-model rooted in a coherent ideological and political project. Scholars such as Dilar Dirik, Janet Biehl, and David Graeber have described Rojava as a rupture in regional history, challenging both ethno-nationalism and patriarchal political orders.

A central pillar of Dr. Shahriari’s analysis was women’s leadership as a structural driver of democratic resilience in Rojava. She highlighted the institutionalization of gender equality through mechanisms such as the co-chair system, which mandates joint male–female leadership across political bodies. As scholars like Joost Jongerden have argued, this arrangement transforms gender equality from a symbolic commitment into a foundational principle of governance. Women’s institutions, including autonomous councils and the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), disrupt the masculinized logic of militarized resistance and reframe security through care, solidarity, and collective responsibility. Drawing on recent feminist scholarship, Dr. Shahriari suggested that women-led civil society functions as a form of “symbolic infrastructure” that sustains resilience under conditions of chronic insecurity.

However, Dr. Shahriari emphasized that Rojava’s survival has been increasingly constrained by both regional authoritarianism and global geopolitical recalibration. Although Rojava gained international visibility during the Battle of Kobane and the defeat of ISIS, it has remained politically marginalized. The collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the emergence of a transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa did not alter this trajectory. Instead, she argued, exclusionary state logics have persisted. The new authorities continue to frame Kurdish self-determination as a separatist threat to national unity, reproducing earlier statist narratives that prioritize elite-driven transition over negotiated autonomy and pluralism. Rojava representatives remain excluded from constitutional negotiations, reflecting a broader regional consensus against non-state democratic models.

Dr. Shahriari also examined the role of global realpolitik in reinforcing this marginalization. She pointed to Western selective engagement and recalibration, particularly the European Union’s decision to provide substantial financial support to Syria’s transitional authorities despite ongoing concerns about their origins and human rights practices. Such policies, she argued, reflect a hollowing out of democratic commitments in favor of geopolitical stability, state-centric sovereignty, and security governance. In this context, Rojava’s exclusion should be read not as a local failure, but as a symptom of the global democratic recession.

In concluding, Dr. Shahriari framed Rojava as a critical test case for the future of democracy. Its endurance demonstrates that popular sovereignty can be institutionalized through feminist, horizontal, and non-statist forms of governance, even under conditions of extreme repression. At the same time, its marginalization exposes the narrowing boundaries of what is considered “acceptable” democracy in the contemporary international order. Rojava, she argued, not only challenges authoritarianism in the Middle East, but compels a deeper rethinking of democracy itself—beyond the nation-state, beyond patriarchy, and beyond the limits imposed by global realpolitik.

 

Ecem Nazlı Üçok: “Feminist Diaspora Activism from Poland and Turkey: Resisting Authoritarianism, Anti-Gender Politics, and Reimagining Transnational Solidarity in Exile”

Ecem Nazlı Üçok is a PhD Candidate at the Institute of Sociological Studies, Charles University in Prague.

PhD candidate Ecem Nazlı Üçok presented a theoretically rich and empirically grounded analysis of feminist diasporic activism emerging from Poland and Turkey in response to authoritarianism and transnational anti-gender politics. Drawing on her ongoing doctoral research, Üçok framed her presentation around the concept of “feminist diaspora activism” and explored how feminist activists in exile resist authoritarian regimes, challenge anti-gender ideologies, and reimagine transnational solidarity beyond the confines of the nation-state.

Üçok began by outlining the conceptual and methodological foundations of her research. Inspired by Zapatista thought and decolonial feminist theory, she positioned her work within a broader inquiry into how marginalized groups generate new political imaginaries when existing political systems no longer serve them. Rather than treating exile and migration solely as experiences of loss or displacement, her research conceptualizes feminist diasporic spaces as generative sites where new forms of political subjectivity, solidarity, and democratic practice are actively produced.

The research adopts a comparative framework, focusing on Poland and Turkey—two countries that, despite significant differences in historical trajectories, religious contexts, and institutional settings, share striking similarities in the rise of right-wing populism and state-led anti-gender politics. Üçok argued that existing scholarship has tended to examine anti-gender movements within nationally bounded frameworks, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, while parallel developments in regions such as Turkey are often analyzed in isolation. Her research seeks to bridge this gap by bringing Poland and Turkey into conversation, demonstrating that anti-gender politics operate transnationally through shared narratives, strategies, and moral panics.

A central argument of the presentation was that local political actors in both Poland and Turkey are not passive recipients of transnational anti-gender discourses imported from elsewhere. Instead, they actively produce, adapt, and circulate these narratives, positioning “gender ideology” as an existential threat to the nation, family, and children. In Poland, Üçok noted, gender has been framed by right-wing elites as a force more dangerous than communism, while homosexuality has been depicted as a civilizational threat. Similarly, in Turkey, anti-gender rhetoric has been articulated through a fusion of nationalist and Islamic discourses, portraying feminism and LGBTQ+ rights as Western impositions incompatible with Turkish and religious values.

Üçok emphasized the symbolic power of family-oriented policies in both contexts. Despite Poland’s Catholic identity and Turkey’s secular–Islamic framework, governing elites in both countries have mobilized the family as a moral anchor to legitimize authoritarian governance and suppress dissent. She highlighted key moments such as Poland’s tightening of abortion laws and both countries’ withdrawal from the Istanbul Convention, arguing that these developments illustrate how moral panic travels across borders and reinforces populist authoritarian agendas. The temporal overlap of elections in Poland and Turkey further underscored the uneven but persistent nature of right-wing populism, even when electoral outcomes diverge.

Methodologically, Üçok’s research is rooted in feminist qualitative approaches. She conducted in-depth life-history interviews with feminist activists who migrated from Poland and Turkey to various European countries due to political repression and anti-gender policies. These interviews explored activists’ pre-migration political identities, experiences of repression, and post-migration transformations. In a second research phase, Üçok organized visual focus groups that brought together Polish and Turkish feminist diaspora activists, enabling a comparative analysis of post-migrant activism and transnational solidarity practices. 

A key analytical lens employed in the research is the concept of “prefigurative politics.” Üçok used this framework to examine how feminist diaspora activists do not merely resist authoritarian regimes from afar, but actively embody the social and political values they wish to see realized in the future through their everyday organizing. In exile, activism becomes not only oppositional but also constructive—centered on care, mutual support, horizontal decision-making, and inclusive community-building.

Üçok’s findings highlighted the emotional and political dislocation experienced by activists following migration. Many participants described a sense of losing their political voice or feeling distanced from the political life of their host societies. However, this rupture did not result in passivity. Instead, it prompted the creation of new activist collectives and feminist diaspora networks across countries such as Germany, Belgium, Austria, and the Czech Republic. These spaces allowed activists to reconstruct political belonging outside national frameworks and to develop what Üçok described as a “politics of space”—a form of activism that prioritizes embodied presence, visibility, and affective connection over formal institutional engagement. 

Visual protest practices played a particularly important role in these diasporic spaces. Üçok presented examples of performative demonstrations, symbolic imagery, and creative interventions staged in front of embassies and public institutions. These acts served multiple purposes: drawing attention to gender-based violence and authoritarian repression in home countries, confronting European audiences with the transnational nature of anti-gender politics, and fostering collective healing and solidarity among activists themselves. While emotionally demanding, these practices enabled feminist diasporas to transform vulnerability into political agency.

Üçok also underscored the intersectional challenges faced by feminist activists in exile. Gendered political identities were compounded by migrant status, producing layered experiences of marginalization and emotional strain. Yet, these intersecting identities also facilitated new alliances and solidarities across national and cultural boundaries. Drawing on Edward Said’s reflections on exile, Üçok framed diasporic activism not only as oppositional but as deeply generative—capable of producing new forms of belonging, care, and political imagination.

In concluding, Üçok argued that feminist diasporic activism from Poland and Turkey illustrates a broader politics of possibility in authoritarian times. Migration, while often forced and traumatic, can enable the reconfiguration of democratic practice beyond the nation-state and normative citizenship frameworks. Rather than viewing activism solely as resistance, her research emphasizes everyday practices of solidarity, mutual care, and community-building as essential components of democratic resilience. Through these transnational feminist networks, exile becomes not an endpoint, but a space for reimagining democracy, plurality, and collective life under conditions of global authoritarian resurgence.

 

Discussants’ Feedback

Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois

Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois is a sociologist based at the University of Helsinki.

Serving as discussant for the session, Dr. Gwenaëlle Bauvois offered a wide-ranging and incisive set of reflections that situated the four presentations within the broader global moment of democratic fragility. She opened by emphasizing the particular timeliness of the session, noting that democratic resilience is no longer a question confined to protecting democracy “elsewhere,” but one that increasingly concerns established and powerful democracies themselves. In this context, resilience must be understood not simply as a defensive response to external authoritarian threats, but as a concept deeply entangled with how democracy is reshaped, strained, and hollowed out from within.

Across the panel’s diverse empirical settings—market democracies, local institutions, revolutionary experiments, and diasporic activism—Dr. Bauvois observed that resilience was consistently presented not as a straightforward remedy to democratic decline, but as an ambivalent and politically charged concept. While resilience can protect democratic practices, it can also normalize crisis, reproduce inequality, and shift the burdens of democratic maintenance onto specific groups. She identified this critical treatment of resilience, rather than its celebration, as one of the session’s central intellectual contributions.

Turning first to Dr. Peter Rogers’s presentation, Dr. Bauvois praised his conceptualization of resilience as a polysemic and “travelling” concept. Rather than attempting to impose a fixed definition, the paper illuminated how resilience derives its political power precisely from its multiplicity of meanings. This, she suggested, raised an important methodological challenge: how to operationalize resilience analytically without flattening its conceptual richness. She was particularly struck by the idea of resilience as an emergent institution of contemporary democracy—an insight that moves beyond seeing resilience as merely reactive and instead positions it as something that actively structures democratic expectations, behaviors, and norms.

At the same time, Dr. Bauvois raised a series of critical questions about the institutionalization of resilience. If resilience becomes an expectation rather than a choice, she warned, it risks functioning as a mechanism through which citizens are asked to endlessly adapt to crisis rather than challenge its structural causes. She asked who ultimately bears responsibility for maintaining democratic resilience—the citizenry, the state, or political elites—and whether the discourse of resilience could be appropriated to claim democratic robustness even as rights, participation, and accountability quietly erode.

Engaging with Dr. Pierre Camus’s paper on the training of local elected officials in France, Dr. Bauvois highlighted its strength in translating abstract debates about resilience into a concrete, empirically grounded paradox. Training programs, she noted, are officially framed as tools to democratize access to political office and “re-enchant” local democracy. Yet, as Dr. Camus demonstrated, they simultaneously reinforce the idea that politics requires specialized expertise accessible only to certain actors endowed with specific forms of capital. In this sense, training functions as a form of institutional resilience that stabilizes local governance, but potentially at the cost of representativeness. While narrowing gaps in technical competence, it widens the symbolic distance between elected officials and ordinary citizens.

Dr. Bauvois posed a provocative question arising from this paradox: what would local democracy look like without such training regimes? Would it become more chaotic, or might it be more inclusive? She also invited reflection on whether alternative, more collective or open forms of political learning could strengthen democratic resilience without reinforcing political elitism—both in France and in other democratic contexts.

Dr. Bauvois then turned to Dr. Soheila Shahriari’s analysis of Rojava, which she described as productively unsettling many conventional assumptions about democracy and resilience. She emphasized how the Rojava case reframed resilience not as institutional continuity, but as collective survival and feminist transformation under conditions of extreme precarity. Democracy, in this account, is not safeguarded by stable state structures but lived through everyday practices of care, participation, and horizontal governance. Dr. Bauvois underscored the importance of Dr. Shahriari’s critique of Western “selective solidarity,” whereby democratic values are rhetorically endorsed but abandoned when supporting non-state or radical democratic actors becomes geopolitically inconvenient.

This led her to pose challenging theoretical questions: What are the minimum conditions for democracy? Can democratic resilience persist without state sovereignty, security guarantees, or international recognition? And how should democratic theory account for forms of resilience that are inseparable from permanent geopolitical threat?

Finally, commenting on the presentation by Ecem Nazlı Üçok, Dr. Bauvois highlighted the paper’s contribution in shifting attention to transnational and diasporic spaces of democratic practice. She commended its framing of exile not only as loss, but as a site of political possibility where agency is recomposed through care, solidarity, and prefigurative politics. At the same time, she suggested that the analytical clarity of the paper could be sharpened by harmonizing its use of overlapping terms such as “far-right,” “neo-fascist,” “conservative,” and “right-wing populist.” She also raised questions about the relationship between feminist diasporic activism and other struggles in exile, including labor rights, anti-racist mobilization, and migrant justice, asking whether feminist frameworks offer a transferable model of resilience for broader political movements.

In closing, Dr. Bauvois posed three overarching questions that cut across all four papers: Is resilience always democratic, or can it merely enable system survival without renewal? Who bears the costs of resilience, particularly given its reliance on the labor of women and grassroots actors? And finally, is resilience ultimately conservative—helping democracies endure as they are—or transformative, opening pathways toward fundamentally different democratic futures? These questions, she concluded, provided a powerful agenda for further discussion and comparative inquiry.

Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano

Gabriel Bayarri Toscano is an Assistant Professor, Department of Audiovisual Communication, Rey Juan Carlos University.

In his role as discussant, Dr. Gabriel Bayarri Toscano offered a conceptually rich and politically attuned commentary that framed the four papers within what he described as the current “populist moment”—a period marked by crisis-driven politics, accelerated decision-making, and what he evocatively termed a form of global political “carnivalism.” Referring to contemporary manifestations of Trumpism and its symbolic excesses, Dr. Bayarri Toscano suggested that this broader context makes the question of democratic resilience not only urgent but analytically indispensable.

He opened by noting that, despite their diverse empirical settings, all four papers converged on a shared concern: how democratic practices, institutions, and movements endure, adapt, and are reinvented under sustained authoritarian pressure. Rather than treating resilience as simple endurance, he proposed a broader interpretive frame in which resilience is intimately tied to democracy’s relationship with time, legitimacy, and hope.

Dr. Bayarri Toscano argued that authoritarian and populist politics thrive on speed and simplification. They promise rapid solutions, depict procedures as weaknesses, and frame checks and balances as obstacles. Democracy, by contrast, operates through slower rhythms—deliberation, accountability, and incremental change. This temporal gap, he suggested, has profound political consequences. Leaders often fear the “charisma cost” of admitting that democratic reform takes time. Instead, they sustain political momentum through permanent crisis, keeping publics emotionally engaged while postponing tangible improvements. In this sense, the news cycle becomes a sequence of shocks, not merely reporting events but actively producing urgency and distraction.

Within this framework, resilience becomes deeply future-oriented. Dr. Bayarri Toscano observed that many citizens, especially those facing precarious work, high rents, and weakened public services, attach hope to technoutopian promises—innovation, artificial intelligence, growth, and prosperity perpetually “just around the corner.” When democratic projects fail to translate such future-oriented narratives into material improvements, authoritarian shortcuts can begin to appear effective. Resilience, he suggested, thus operates at the intersection of hope deferred and legitimacy strained.

He also emphasized that resilience is shaped by global power asymmetries and what he termed “colonial conditions of meaning.” In fragmented institutional settings—drawing in particular on examples from Latin America—governance often becomes more vertical and hierarchical. Citizens experience policy as something done to them rather than built with them. In such contexts, resilience risks becoming a language that masks domination rather than enabling participation.

Turning to Dr. Peter Rogers’s paper, Dr. Bayarri Toscano praised its treatment of resilience as a polysemic concept and as an emerging institutional norm within contemporary democracies. He found this move analytically powerful, as it revealed how resilience shifts from description to expectation, and ultimately to moral obligation. In market democracies, resilience can become a demand placed on citizens: adapt, cope, remain flexible. The danger, he warned, is that this discourse hides structural insecurity and reframes endurance in the face of precarity as personal strength rather than systemic failure. In crisis-driven political environments, resilience may slide into a form of “managed survival,” normalizing insecurity rather than transforming it. His guiding question to Dr. Rogers asked how one might distinguish analytically between resilience that is genuinely transformative and resilience that merely institutionalizes lowered expectations.

Engaging with Dr. Pierre Camus’s presentation, Dr. Bayarri Toscano highlighted the paradox at the heart of training local elected officials. While designed to open politics and renew local democracy, training can unintentionally reinforce specialization and widen the distance between representatives and citizens. He linked this to a broader Bonapartist tendency in contemporary politics, where legitimacy increasingly derives from competence, executive know-how, and administrative mastery. Training risks signaling that politics is a technical profession requiring certification, thereby narrowing democratic imagination. His question to Camus focused on whether alternative training designs might simultaneously build competence and democratic closeness, rather than reinforcing vertical authority.

Dr. Bayarri Toscano then turned to Dr. Soheila Shahriari’s paper on Rojava, which he described as a crucial shift in perspective. Here, resilience is not about preserving stable liberal institutions but about the everyday production of democratic life under conditions of war, embargo, and geopolitical abandonment. He emphasized the international dimension of democratic decline, noting how Western states may rhetorically support democratic experiments like Rojava while abandoning them when strategic costs rise. His question centered on what concrete forms of international support and responsibility are necessary for such projects to sustain democratic life over time.

Finally, commenting on Ecem Nazlı Üçok’s work, Dr. Bayarri Toscano underscored its contribution in conceptualizing resilience through transnational feminist activism in exile. He highlighted the importance of care infrastructures, solidarity networks, and political practices formed in host societies. At the same time, he raised concerns about the digital infrastructures on which diaspora activism often relies, pointing to trade-offs between visibility and safety amid risks of surveillance and transnational repression. His guiding question asked which practices—formal organizations, informal networks, or care-based relations—most effectively sustain solidarity over time in exile.

In closing, Dr. Bayarri Toscano posed a unifying question for the panel: where is the line between resilience as democratic persistence and resilience as accommodation that quietly reshapes democracy itself? Identifying the first signs of this slide, he suggested, is essential for understanding not only how democracies survive authoritarian pressure, but whether they emerge transformed—or diminished—in the process.

Questions by Participants

The questions raised by participants extended the panel’s discussion by probing the conceptual boundaries of democracy and the political–economic alternatives emerging amid global democratic decline.

Fatima Zahra Ouhmaida, drawing on her background in gender studies, reflected on Dr. Soheila Shahriari’s analysis of Rojava as a feminist and horizontal democratic experiment operating beyond the nation-state. She observed that in contexts such as Morocco, debates on democratic reform and women’s rights remain largely confined within state-centered and institutional frameworks. Rojava, by contrast, revealed how democracy could be imagined as a practice rooted in collective decision-making rather than state authority or international recognition. Her question asked whether projects like Rojava are marginalized primarily because they confront authoritarian power or because they challenge the dominant, state-centric model of democracy itself. She further questioned whether similar feminist and participatory models could emerge within relatively stable states without being framed as existential threats to political order.

Dr. Bülent Keneş addressed Dr. Peter Rogers with a broader political–economic concern, focusing on the global “market” of political systems. He noted that inequalities and distributive failures within liberal market economies are increasingly exploited by far-right and populist actors, and occasionally by left-populist movements as well. In this context, Keneş questioned the growing appeal of “state capitalism” as a purported remedy to democratic deficits and backsliding, particularly following the perceived effectiveness of China’s model during the COVID-19 period. While expressing skepticism toward state capitalism, he asked what critical arguments scholars should advance against it and what democratic dangers might arise from promoting such a model as an alternative to liberal democracy.

 

Responses by Presenters

Dr. Soheila Shahriari

In her response to the comments and questions raised by discussants and participants, Dr. Soheila Shahriari offered a sobering and deeply critical reflection on the structural conditions that marginalize Rojava’s experiment in feminist radical democracy. She reiterated that Rojava should not be understood as an improvised outcome of Syria’s state collapse, but as the institutional realization of democratic confederalism—an ideology theorized by Abdullah Öcalan over several decades and practiced in various forms long before 2012. As such, Rojava represents a sustained, bottom-up model of governance grounded in pluralism, gender equality, ecological principles, and collective self-administration.

Dr. Shahriari emphasized that what ultimately renders Rojava illegible—and expendable—within the international system is precisely this radical departure from the nation-state model. In international relations, she noted, the nation-state remains the dominant unit of analysis, leaving little conceptual or political space for non-state democratic actors. Rojava’s existence as a feminist, non-state democratic entity challenges this foundational assumption, making it structurally incompatible with prevailing geopolitical logics.

She traced this contradiction through Western engagement with Rojava during the battle against ISIS. At the height of the Kobani resistance, Kurdish women fighters were widely celebrated in international media as symbols of freedom and emancipation. Yet, once the immediate strategic threat of ISIS receded, this rhetorical support evaporated. Dr. Shahriari argued that the subsequent Turkish invasions of Rojava in 2018 and 2019—and the ongoing pressure following the post-2024 Syrian transition under Ahmad al-Shara—have unfolded amid striking Western indifference. The same actors once framed as allies were effectively abandoned once they ceased to serve short-term strategic interests.

Responding directly to questions about democratic resilience, Dr. Shahriari identified civil society—particularly women and feminist actors—as those who shoulder the burden of resilience in Rojava. This resilience, she argued, is transformative in intent but tragically constrained by the absence of any meaningful balance of power, whether militarily or institutionally. Under such conditions, resilience becomes an act of survival rather than a pathway to sustainable democratic consolidation.

Addressing calls for concrete forms of international support, Dr. Shahriari expressed deep skepticism about the adequacy of existing measures such as petitions or symbolic political pressure. While not dismissing these actions entirely, she questioned whether they are remotely sufficient to halt ongoing violence, rising death tolls, and the systematic marginalization of Kurdish-led democratic forces. She concluded by leaving the audience with an unresolved but pressing question: in the face of persistent war and geopolitical abandonment, what forms of solidarity and intervention can genuinely protect radical democratic experiments like Rojava from extinction?

Dr. Peter Rogers

In his response to the discussants’ interventions and participants’ questions, Dr. Peter Rogers framed the debate on resilience within what he described as an emerging era of political realism and pragmatic recalibration. Acknowledging the breadth of the comments, he focused particularly on the question raised about state capitalism and the shifting responsibilities between markets, states, and citizens.

Dr. Rogers argued that the relocation of resilience from the state to the individual has already produced new and often troubling market formations, including what he termed “disaster capitalism.” In this context, market forces increasingly step into domains once associated with public protection, not to safeguard collective welfare, but to extract profit from crisis. This trend, he suggested, reflects a broader and ongoing retreat of the welfare state, as public investment is redirected toward security while resilience-building is increasingly outsourced to private actors, philanthropic foundations, and think tanks.

Rather than framing this shift in purely pessimistic terms, Dr. Rogers urged attention to the evolving metrics through which resilience is evaluated. Drawing on examples from global policy forums, he emphasized the growing importance of redefining “return on investment” beyond narrow fiscal calculations. For resilience to be democratically meaningful, he argued, its success must be measured not only in economic terms but also through moral and social outcomes—particularly the strengthening of social connectivity and collective capacity.

Central to his response was the concept of social capital as a bridge between market logic and democratic resilience. Social capital, he noted, has become an increasingly influential indicator precisely because it translates communal bonds and trust into measurable outcomes legible to policymakers. Investments in social cohesion and networks of solidarity thus offer a language through which collective resilience can be defended within pragmatic governance frameworks.

Dr. Rogers also addressed concerns that resilience discourse risks becoming a moral injunction that normalizes precarity. While acknowledging this danger, he posed a provocative counterpoint: in societies marked by declining welfare provision and weakened collective institutions, citizens may need to reclaim a more active role in shaping democratic life. Individual responsibility, in this sense, should not replace structural accountability but serve as a catalyst for renewed collective engagement against authoritarian and populist pressures.

Finally, Dr. Rogers returned to his core argument that resilience is an inherently polysemic concept. Its meaning, he stressed, shifts across institutional and professional contexts—from emergency responders to security planners to democratic activists. Recognizing these divergent interpretations is not a weakness but a prerequisite for meaningful dialogue. Only by understanding which form of resilience is at stake, he concluded, can scholars and practitioners remain relevant to the political and ethical challenges of democratic survival today.

Dr. Pierre Camus

In his response to the discussants’ comments and participants’ questions, Dr. Pierre Camus addressed the democratic tensions underlying the training of local elected officials, situating the French case within a broader historical and institutional perspective. He began by recalling that, historically, political training in France was largely embedded within political parties—particularly socialist and revolutionary socialist organizations—which played a central role in socializing activists and future officeholders into political skills, ideological frameworks, and the practical workings of government.

In contrast, Dr. Camus noted that contemporary training rights are now framed as individual entitlements rather than collective political processes. In practice, access to training depends heavily on personal resources, time availability, employer cooperation, and institutional position. As a result, training programs often reproduce existing social and political inequalities instead of mitigating them. This dynamic reflects a deeper democratic tension between competence and citizenship: while citizenship is formally treated as sufficient for political participation, competence increasingly operates as an informal prerequisite.

Dr. Camus emphasized that local authorities tend to remain largely passive in overseeing how training rights are implemented and who effectively benefits from them. This regulatory gap allows inequalities to persist, particularly disadvantaging elected officials from working-class backgrounds, small municipalities, or those whose employers restrict time off for political duties. Although he stressed that the current framework is preferable to the absence of training altogether, he argued that its symbolic character limits its democratizing potential.

Responding to questions about alternative models, Dr. Camus highlighted the example of the Australian state of Victoria, where political training is structured in three stages: mandatory pre-nomination training for candidates, compulsory induction for newly elected officials, and ongoing training during the mandate. This model, he argued, “de-enclaves” political competence by circulating basic democratic knowledge before electoral selection, thereby reducing the divide between representatives and citizens.

However, he concluded that such a model remains politically difficult to implement in France, where mandatory training is widely perceived as an illegitimate barrier to candidacy and a threat to the republican ideal that citizenship alone should suffice for political participation.

Ecem Nazlı Üçok

In her response to the comments and questions raised by the discussants and participants, PhD candidate Ecem Nazlı Üçok offered a reflective clarification of her conceptual approach to democratic resilience, transnational solidarity, and feminist diasporic activism. She began by expressing appreciation for the feedback and emphasized her intention to briefly synthesize the main issues rather than extend the discussion.

Üçok directly engaged with questions concerning the limits and sustainability of coalitions and solidarities, particularly those raised by the discussants. She challenged linear and teleological understandings of resistance and resilience that assume a steady progression toward long-term salvation or political resolution. Instead, she highlighted how the activists she studies are acutely aware of the temporality of solidarity. Many of the solidaristic formations she observed are intentionally short-lived, event-based, or situational rather than permanent structures.

For Üçok, the political significance of these formations lies not in their durability but in their capacity to create ruptures within dominant systems. These moments of collective action—however fleeting—allow participants to recognize shared moral frameworks, alternative ways of thinking, and the existence of parallel political imaginaries. In this sense, solidarity functions as a space of recognition and affirmation, even when it does not crystallize into lasting institutions.

Responding to questions about tactics and intersections with other struggles, Üçok emphasized the diversity and creativity of activist practices. She described how feminist diasporic groups intersect with labor rights, migrant rights, and broader political struggles through informal, grassroots initiatives. Examples included the creation of listening spaces centered on protest music, community-based support networks for migrant women from different countries, and hands-on solidarity practices embedded in everyday life.

She also underscored the importance of digital spaces as key infrastructures for sustaining transnational connections, visibility, and care. Üçok concluded by reiterating that resilience, in her research, is not solely about endurance but about creating alternative political spaces—however temporary—that enable new forms of belonging, care, and collective imagination.

 

Conclusion

Session 10 of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a nuanced and theoretically rich examination of democratic resilience at a moment when authoritarian pressures increasingly operate through gradual, normalized, and often legally sanctioned practices. Across diverse empirical contexts—from market democracies and local governance structures to revolutionary self-administration and diasporic feminist activism—the session underscored that resilience is neither a neutral concept nor an unambiguously democratic good. Rather, it is a contested political terrain shaped by power relations, institutional design, and the uneven distribution of social and moral burdens.

A key takeaway from the session was the ambivalence of resilience. As several contributions demonstrated, resilience can function as a mode of democratic defense and innovation, but it can also legitimize adaptation to structural injustice, shift responsibility from institutions to individuals, and normalize permanent crisis. Whether resilience becomes transformative or merely adaptive depends on who defines it, who enacts it, and who bears its costs. The presentations collectively challenged celebratory narratives by insisting on the need to interrogate resilience as an emerging norm of governance, citizenship, and political expectation.

At the same time, the session highlighted sites of democratic possibility. Feminist self-administration in Rojava and transnational diaspora activism illustrated how resilience can be grounded in care, solidarity, and prefigurative practice, expanding democratic imagination beyond state-centric and procedural models. These cases also exposed the limits of international democratic commitment, particularly when radical or non-state forms of democracy clash with prevailing geopolitical logics.

Taken together, Session 10 reaffirmed ECPS’s commitment to critical, comparative inquiry into populism and democratic decline. It concluded not with a singular prescription, but with an agenda of questions—about responsibility, transformation, and democratic futures—that remain essential for scholars, decisionmakers, practitioners, and citizens confronting authoritarian times.

Report2025-Introduction

Introduction — Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options

Please cite as:
Riddervold, Marianne; Rosén, Guri & Greenberg, Jessica R. (2026). “Introduction.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00121

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This report examines how the resurgence of right-wing populism—most visibly under Donald Trump’s second presidency—reshapes the foundations of transatlantic relations. Moving beyond short-term diplomatic disputes, the authors argue that domestic polarization and illiberal democratic trends now pose the most serious long-term threat to EU–US cooperation. Anchored in the four liberal pillars of the Atlantic order—security, trade, international institutions, and democratic values—the analysis shows how populist governance undermines shared norms, weakens multilateralism, and destabilizes trust. The report concludes with policy options for the EU, emphasizing strategic adaptation without abandoning the liberal principles that have long sustained the transatlantic alliance.

By Marianne Riddervold*, Guri Rosén** & Jessica Greenberg***

Introduction

Several years ago, John Peterson (2018, 647) wrote that

the future of US–European relations and the liberal international order depend less than we might expect on what the US or Europe do to invest in their alliance or in foreign policy more generally. What really matters is domestic democratic politics in Europe and America.

Donald Trump’s return to the presidency in January 2025, together with the consequential shifts in United States (US) foreign policy, makes Peterson’s claim appear well-founded. We are now witnessing nothing short of a deep and potentially durable rift between the European Union (EU) and the US.

With weakening transatlantic relations, broader geopolitical uncertainties and war on the European continent, the EU must navigate simultaneous internal strains and external pressure. The increasing support for radical right parties across Europe and their influence on EU institutions and domestic agendas make it more challenging for the EU to unify and present a cohesive front in response to Trump’s attempt to destabilize the transatlantic alliance. The EU faces new challenges that are the consequence of Trump’s policies in defence, trade and his undermining of international institutions, democratic norms and the rule of law. At the international level, the EU’s goal to be a global leader in promoting democracy, human rights and international law both in its immediate vicinity and globally requires proactive and strategic actions to defend and enhance the current liberal order. With Trump’s return to the presidency, EU leaders must reevaluate transatlantic relations and recalibrate EU policy to mitigate risks from shifts in US foreign policy.

This report assesses how changes in US foreign policy under a right-wing populist president affect the EU–US relationship and offers concrete policy recommendations on pressing issues. Focusing on the links between foreign-policy shifts, domestic polarization and antiliberal democratic trends, the report examines how domestic dynamics may constitute the most severe long-term challenge to transatlantic cooperation. It also evaluates specific policy challenges and opportunities for strengthening that cooperation in the years ahead.

‘Transatlantic relations’ is a broad concept that refers to the historic, economic, strategic, cultural, political and social relations that exist between countries in North America and Europe. A key feature of international relations since the end of the Second World War, we here define it as the overall set of relations between the EU and the United States, ‘within the broader framework of the institutional and other connections maintained via NATO and other institutions’ (Smith 2018, 539). After several decades of close cooperation, no other regions in the world have such strong ties as North America and Europe. Transatlantic cooperation is a cornerstone of the United States-originated post-war liberal order, which originated from the liberal idea that democracy, human rights, liberalized trade and active participation in international institutions produce economic gains and advance stability, peace and human dignity. The transatlantic relationship emerged as a security alliance under American leadership, established to protect Europe from the Soviet Union. Its continuing relevance after the Cold War has been driven primarily by the shared values, identities and strategic outlooks that have united its members (Schimmelfennig 2012). Despite differences in specific policy issues, a core set of shared liberal values was always at the heart of this relationship. Risse (2016), for instance, describes the transatlantic relationship as a security community – one grounded not only in common strategic and economic interests, but also in shared liberal ideas. Ikenberry (2008; 2018) similarly frames the transatlantic relationship as the ‘Atlantic Political Order’, a security community that moved beyond its defence origins to rest on liberal tenets, free trade and cooperation through multilateral institutions within and outside the United Nations (UN) system (Riddervold and Newsome 2018, 2022; Risse 2012; Smith et al. 2024).

For West, and later most European nations, the Atlantic order provided a framework within which liberal democracies could secure greater protection and influence, and a framework within which the European integration project could evolve. Being part of this liberal hegemonic system meant integration into a comprehensive network of economic, political, and security institutions (Tocci and Alcaro 2012; Riddervold and Bolstad 2026; Smith et al. 2024). The relationship with the United States has thus been central to European states’ foreign policies, just as ties with Europe have long been a core element of US international strategy.

While there have always been disagreements both over values and interests in the transatlantic relationship, we seem to have reached a point where this contestation does not just affect domestic developments, but also the very basis of the transatlantic relationship itself (Riddervold and Bolstad 2026). There is no longer a clear consensus that European and US markets and political institutions are bound together by common goals and interests. Trump is withdrawing from international cooperation in the UN. In the realm of security, he has cast doubt on American security guarantees in NATO and its commitment to come to the aid of its European allies in the event of an external attack. In trade, the administration’s focus has been more on tariffs and trade restrictions than on the need to uphold global and transatlantic free trade and strong relations. And not least, as the US National Security Strategy of December 2025 clearly illustrates, the deepening transatlantic divide is fundamentally rooted in a clash of values between Trump’s America and the EU. This illustrates the growing value divide between the two partners and risks undermining the liberal basis of the different pillars on which transatlantic relations have rested and thus the transatlantic relationship writ large (Riddervold and Bolstad 2026). Viewed together, these developments mean the transatlantic relationship is at a critical crossroads, where substantive shifts are more probable now than continued adherence to long-standing institutional collaboration and norms (Jones 2025).

By exploring developments in US foreign policies and how these are linked to domestic polarization and antiliberal democratic ideas, chapters in this report shed light on how this domestic factor poses a severe challenge to the transatlantic relationship. Authors focus on how the rise of right-wing populism – with an increasing portion of the population resisting globalization, international institutions, free trade and even democratic values on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g., de Vries et al., 2021; Mansfield et al., 2021; Rogowski et al., 2021; Walter, 2021) – affects the transatlantic relationship. After all, ‘the futures of the liberal order, transatlantic alliance and western democratic politics are inextricably bound together’ (Peterson 2018, 638).

To gain a comprehensive understanding of how US policies under Trump affect EU–US relations, we draw on Ikenberry (2008, 2018) to distinguish between four liberal pillars on which the transatlantic relationship has rested: security, trade, international institutions and democratic values. The report is organized accordingly and is composed of four main parts that each start with a chapter giving a broader historical overview of developments in the domain, followed by three case studies of how US policies now affect the transatlantic relationship. To systematize the changes we observe, we distinguish between three possible scenarios that are discussed in the different chapters: that transatlantic relations are breaking apart due to domestic polarization and/or structural geopolitical changes, that they will muddle through due to ongoing changes based on functional cooperation, networks and interdependencies; or that we in fact over time, despite current challenges, may be witnessing a change towards a different and redefined but stronger relationship (Tocci and Alcaro 2012); Riddervold, Trondal and Newsome 2021).

Framework: The Four Pillars of Transatlantic Relations

Drawing on Ikenberry (2008, 2018), the ‘Atlantic Political Order’ has been built on four foundational, interlinked pillars established under US liberal hegemony: security alliances, trade and finance, common institutions and rules, as well as shared democratic, liberal norms.

Ikenberry identifies two mutually beneficial bargains that have underpinned the transatlantic relationship. The ‘realist bargain’ involved the United States using its military strength to support its European (and other) allies, with Europe agreeing to subsume a US-led system. This bargain was institutionalized through NATO and numerous bilateral security agreements between the United States and its Western allies. The ‘liberal bargain’ involved Europe accepting US leadership in exchange for security protection, access to US markets, technology and resources within an open world economy, amongst other things, resulting in a strong trade and financial relationship.

While security and trade form the first two pillars, the transatlantic relationship has also formed the core of what is often called the multilateral system, meaning international cooperation within the UN and other international organizations built under US leadership after the Second World War. Ruggie (1982) referred to key parts of this system as ‘embedded liberalism’, where economic liberalism was integrated into a managed global economy, giving governments greater control over trade and economic openness. Institutions designed to support this framework aimed to reinforce cooperation, while strengthening US ties with its post-war partners and reducing concerns about domination and abandonment. Over time, this rules-based order expanded beyond monetary and trade cooperation to cover security, development, health and, more recently, global challenges such as climate change, with states increasingly relying on multilateral frameworks for coordinated action (Zürn 2018). Multilateral cooperation and institutions have also been so central to the EU that it is described as part of the ‘EU’s DNA’ (Smith 2011).

Lastly, while focused on security and trade, the transatlantic relationship has, as discussed above, had a liberal value-based core, extending beyond economic and strategic cooperation and institutional rules and institutions to also include broader commitments to democracy and human rights. While the order’s principles, like Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘Four Freedoms’ and post-war multilateralism, were framed as universal, its structure was shaped by Cold War realities and centred on the United States and its democratic allies. Initially focused on Western Europe and Japan, the community of democracies expanded after the Cold War to include a larger and more diverse group of nations. While often being accused of double standards and with much variation in their foreign policies, from Wilson to Biden, US presidents before Trump have operated on the belief that democracies possess a unique ability to cooperate due to shared interests and values (Riddervold and Bolstad 2026). This belief reinforced the idea that the ‘free world’ was not merely a temporary alliance against the Soviet Union, but a growing political community united by a common liberal democratic vision. For Europe, the Atlantic order ‘provided a ‘container’ within which liberal democracies could gain greater measures of security, protection and economic prosperity as well. To be inside this liberal hegemonic order was to be positioned inside a set of economic, political and security institutions. It was both a Gesellschaft – a ‘society’ defined by formal rules, institutions and governmental ties – and a Gemeinschaft, a ‘community’ defined by shared values, beliefs and expectations (Ikenberry 2018, 17).

Changes under Trump: Three Possible Scenarios

Across the post-war era, US presidents – despite partisan differences – have consistently prioritized and maintained the transatlantic partnership. Successive administrations from both parties regarded robust NATO alliances, international cooperation and extensive trade links with Europe and other partners as vital to American security and economic prosperity.

With the re-election of Trump in 2024, all four pillars of the relationship are now being challenged. Domestic policies directly and indirectly disturb the shared interests, interdependence, institutions and values that have served to uphold a strong transatlantic relationship (Risse 2016; Riddervold and Newsome 2022; Smith et al 2024). Regarding security interests, Trump is questioning the United States’ commitments to NATO, forcing the EU to step up the game in security and defence. This change, however, also reflects longer-term structural and domestic trends. Indeed, the need to counter China’s global expansionism is one of the few issues where the US political elite, across both parties, agree. American voters also consider China one of the main threats to the United States (Smeltz 2022; Bolstad and Riddervold 2023). Domestically, the view on transatlantic relations is somewhat mixed. On the one hand, Congress continues to be less polarized on foreign policy than on domestic issues, and there are different perspectives on foreign policy within the Republican Party (see Alcaro, this volume). Polls also show a continued, although declining, commitment to NATO and European allies (Smeltz 2022). On the other hand, however, studies suggest that Democrats and Republicans are increasingly divided on whether the United States should focus on domestic problems or continue to support international engagement (Smeltz 2022). The United States’ changing security policies under Trump are also evident in the president’s more aggressive foreign policies and his apparent willingness to use the United States’ might to enforce American interests, also vis-à-vis its traditional allies.

Weak informal ties also make the transatlantic relationship vulnerable to changing US administrations. Despite close cooperation for decades, the transatlantic relationship rests on rather few formal institutional ties. There is for example no trade agreement between the EU and the United States. As Elsuwege and Szép (2023) note, many networks, in epistemic communities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations are essentially informal and political rather than based on formal legal or institutional structures. Hence, although many of these expert communities and diplomatic and other networks may persist under Trump (see Smith, this volume), and as such help stabilize the relationship somewhat, the lack of formal institutions makes the transatlantic relationship more vulnerable to changes introduced by the policy decisions of different administrations. Formal institutions are harder to break and are more consistent and stable over time compared to informal networks, which depend more on the people they consist of. Moreover, Trump and his team have extended the number of administrative positions referred to as political and thus subject to change substantially (Wendling 2024). Over time, this is likely to affect informal transatlantic diplomatic and expert networks.

At the same time, observers argue that the current challenges should not be exaggerated (Tocci and Alcaro 2012). The transatlantic relationship has withstood crises before, such as disagreements following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which at the time was described as the biggest crisis ever facing the transatlantic relationship (Abelson and Brooks 2022). Tocci and Alcaro (2012) even found that the transatlantic relationship has changed and reemerged through periods of stability and crisis, with structural changes, crises and disagreements leading to a renewed relationship between the United States and Europe, rather than to a breakdown or a weakening.

To discuss if and how transatlantic relations are changing under Trump, all our chapters engage with the following three scenarios:

  • A first scenario suggests that transatlantic relations disintegrate in one or more policy areas, owing to diverging interests and responses to structural geopolitical changes, or to domestic political changes linked to antiglobalization, America First or isolationist sentiments.
  • A second scenario suggests that the EU–US relationship will be able to muddle through contemporary geopolitical and domestic challenges by undergoing a functional adjustment where cooperation is maintained in policy areas where this is seen as mutually advantageous (Tocci and Alcaro 2012, 15). This adjustment is made possible by factors such as pre-existing interdependencies, networks and institutionalized relations or overlapping interests in issue-specific areas. If these types of agreements are found in many areas, the overall relationship will be stronger than if they are only found in some domains.
  • A third scenario posits that the transatlantic relationship might even move forward in the face of global uncertainty and common challenges. This scenario could, for example, arise in the face of external shocks, as part of a broader balancing game, and/or because changing global structures and shared challenges reinforce and strengthen existing networks and interdependencies. These new forms of cooperation will be more resilient if they are formally institutionalized. However, it is also possible that convergence in a new and redefined relationship follows populist or right-wing trends, for example, securitization of borders or a shared set of policy approaches intended to weaken liberal values like pluralism, civic freedoms and human rights.

Structure of the Report

Within each section of the report, a background chapter introduces the overarching debate, followed by three case studies focusing on observed changes, policy implications and recommendations for EU responses.

Section 1: Security (Alcaro, Pomorska and Morgenstern-Pomorski, Sus, Wong)

In security, NATO has traditionally served as the alliance’s institutional backbone, but the EU has also increasingly taken on a bigger role, especially after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine (Fiott 2023; Grand 2024; Rieker and Giske 2023). Originally established to deter and, if necessary, defend against Soviet expansionism, NATO’s survival beyond the Cold War was largely due to the common values, identities, and worldviews on which it was founded (Schimmelfennig, 2012). NATO is a trust-based pact whose deterrent power rests on the expectation that Article 5 will be honoured rather than on legal enforcement. Recent US conduct, however, has strained that normative foundation: proposals for a transactional, ‘two-tier’ NATO tied to defence spending and rhetoric about Greenland contribute to undermining the alliance’s values-based solidarity and the liberal principles of sovereignty and self-determination (Riddervold and Bolstad 2026). The clearest manifestation of an eroding liberal consensus and increasing strategic divide is visible in responses to Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine: under Biden, the United States acted with Europe to condemn a breach of core international norms and lead a coordinated response grounded in multilateral and human rights arguments (Bosse 2022; Riddervold and Newsome 2022). Three years later, the Trump administration’s posture – advocating neutrality and even entertaining recognition of Russia’s annexation of Crimea and other territorial areas – diverges sharply from the liberal principles that have sustained the transatlantic order since the Second World War.

Section 2: Trade (E. Jones, K. Jones, Poletti, Young)

A second foundational pillar of the transatlantic relationship has been a shared commitment to liberal trade principles, which holds that regulated free trade through rules-based institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), produces mutual economic gains and stabilizing interdependence (Ikenberry 2018; Keohane and Nye 2012). Both the United States and the EU have at times fallen short of these ideals: the EU has long sheltered its agricultural sector, and no comprehensive EU–US trade agreement has materialized despite deep commercial ties (Risse 2016), while public concerns about consumer protection and other values helped derail the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership or TTIP (de Ville and Siles-Brügge 2016). Rising populism has amplified scepticism toward multilateral bodies such as the WTO and weakened domestic support for trade liberalization (Kerremans 2022). Under Trump’s second administration, protectionist policies, tariff measures and abrupt renegotiations have strained transatlantic trade and regulatory cooperation, undermined trust, and contravened core WTO principles such as the most favoured nation (MFN) principle, whereas the EU continues to champion the WTO and rules-based trade – summed up in the claim that ‘with Europe, what you see is what you get’ (von der Leyen 2025) – producing a widening divergence over economic liberalism and deepening the transatlantic divide.

Section 3: International institutions (Drieskens, Fiorino, Smith, Veggeland)

Right-wing populist, antiglobalization currents on both sides of the Atlantic have increasingly challenged multilateral cooperation and liberal institutions, with the Trump administration providing the clearest political expression of this transatlantic divergence. Under his second term, Trump has initiated a rolling back of American engagement with international bodies – reaffirming withdrawals from the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN Human Rights Council (UNHCR) and the Paris Agreement, slashing foreign aid as ‘wasteful spending’, and framing multilateral institutions as inefficient, elite-driven constraints on national sovereignty. These moves reflect a broader ideological shift from liberal internationalism toward a sovereignty-first, ‘America First’ posture that casts multilateral commitments as threats to identity and autonomy. At the same time, the EU has become a focal point of populist ire in the US narrative – portrayed as an external extension of domestic liberal opponents (Belin 2024) – so that withdrawals and unilateralism both signal and deepen a growing rupture between US populist politics and the EU’s commitment to global governance.

Section 4: Democratic values (Andersson, Azmanova, Holmes, Newman)

At the heart of the widening transatlantic divide is a core value conflict between the Trump administration and the EU, where rising illiberal social trends erode the liberal democratic norms that long anchored transatlantic ties. Far-right populists on both sides of the Atlantic are actively critical of democratic and rule of law institutions that were so central to deepening US–European cooperation following the end of the Cold War (Carothers 2007). The US administration’s support has likewise emboldened self-proclaimed ‘illiberal’ leaders in Europe. This approach was starkly visible at the 2025 Munich Security Conference, where Vice President JD Vance echoed populist rhetoric and signalled support for Germany’s ostracized far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD), while figures within the administration (and allied private actors) openly backed illiberal parties and attacked democratic institutions and higher education. The administration’s challenges to election legitimacy (e.g., claims about Romania’s 2025 vote), its cuts to federally funded research, its elimination of long-standing programs to support democracy, rule of law and humanitarian assistance, both in and in collaboration with European partners, and its differing approach to regulating misinformation further widened the values gap with Europe. Attacks on US higher education, and cuts to funding for programs that enhance European–US scholarly exchange, undermine scientific collaboration, threaten transatlantic opportunities for innovation and undercut long-standing commitments to citizen diplomacy. Although far-right movements in the United States and Europe vary in context, they share a populist, nativist orientation – what Mudde (2007, 19) describes as an exclusionary ideology hostile to nonnative elements – that reframes democracy as majoritarian rule and rejects liberal protections for minority rights and the rule of law.

Our conclusion sums up key findings and provides recommendations for how the EU should respond to changing transatlantic relations.


 

(*) Marianne Riddervold is a research professor at Arena, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo and at the Norwegian Institute of international affairs (NUPI). She is also a senior fellow at the UC Berkeley Institute of European studies. Email: mariarid@arena.uio.no

(**) Guri Rosén is Associate Professor of Political Science at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo, Norway. She is also a senior researcher at Arena, Centre for European Studies at the University of Oslo, Norway. Email: guri.rosen@stv.uio.no

(***) Jessica Greenberg is a professor of Anthropology at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. She is a political and legal anthropologist, with expertise in the anthropology of Europe, postsocialism, human rights, social movements, revolution, democracy and law. Her most recent book is Justice in the Balance: Democracy, Rule of Law and the European Court of Human Rights (Stanford University Press, 2025). Email:  jrgreenb@illinois.edu


 

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US-EU

Right-wing Nationalism, Trump and the Future of US–European Relations

Please cite as:
Alcaro, Riccardo. (2026). “Overview and Background: Right-wing Nationalism, Trump and the Future of US-European Relations.” In: Populism and the Future of Transatlantic Relations: Challenges and Policy Options. (eds). Marianne Riddervold, Guri Rosén and Jessica R. Greenberg. European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). January 20, 2026. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00122

DOWNLOAD CHAPTER 1

Abstract
The rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the United States is often seen as a threat to the transatlantic relationship. This movement challenges the internationalist, institutional and liberal principles that have long underpinned US–European ties and sustained American leadership. In the United States, Donald Trump has pushed conservatism toward nationalism and nativism. His administration’s multiple – often conflicting – approaches make both transformation and rupture of the transatlantic bond plausible outcomes. Traditional Republicans still see alliances as tools to contain rivals; MAGA conservatives advocate isolationism and protectionism, and the nativist right envisions a ‘civilizational alliance’ of Christian nation-states in the West opposing liberal internationalism. Trump himself treats alliances as client relationships, rewarding loyalty and punishing defiance. Understanding this interplay of forces is essential to interpreting the volatility of Trump-era policies toward Europe and evaluating their implications for the European Union (EU) and the continent’s security.

Keywords: transatlantic relations; national conservatism; New Right; Trump foreign policy; European strategic autonomy

 

By Riccardo Alcaro*

Introduction

There is a growing sense amongst experts and policymakers that the transatlantic relationship, as we have come to know it in the 80 years since the Second World War, has run its course (Fahey 2023). In part, transatlantic change reflects broader systemic change, as the United States adapts irregularly but inexorably to a global context in which the centre of geopolitical gravity has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Equally important, however, is the questioning of the ideational and strategic foundations of the transatlantic relationship in the domestic landscapes of the United States and, to a lesser extent, Europe. Hence, while the transatlantic relationship will evolve in light of global structural shifts, the interplay between domestic political dynamics across the ocean will determine its quality and direction (Laderman 2024–25). For Europeans, the stakes are high indeed, given the United States’ role in the defence of Europe and the amplification of European clout in an international system built over decades around the Euro–Atlantic order.

Were political elites in the United States and Europe to forge a new alliance infused with ideational commonalities and grounded in strategic convergence, the relationship could be revived in a different form. Alternatively, ideological affinities may enhance a sense of common belonging across like-minded parties but may be insufficient to provide a platform for structured foreign policy coordination. The transatlantic relationship would thus become a series of arrangements based on the contingent interests of either side. Finally, absent any form of strong transnational ties, the relationship may drift apart, potentially giving way to systemic competition. Intermediate forms of these scenarios of partnership, functional relationship (a way of muddling through where cooperation is issue-contingent) and breaking apart are equally plausible (Alcaro and Tocci 2014). One such form that does not neatly fit into any of these three scenarios is a relationship in which the United States’ hierarchical centrality is reasserted through the weakening and fragmentation of the European side.

The manner in which the relationship adapts to systemic changes is thus being forged in domestic political struggles about the value and relevance of the transatlantic bond, especially in the United States. The main – although not the only – drivers of such political fights are forces that in the 2010s were grouped under the heading of right-wing populism, but which today should be described as distinct instances of national (or nationalist) conservatism. On the rise in a number of European Union (EU) member states, national conservatism has scored massive political victories in the United States, where President Donald Trump has served as its standard-bearer (The Economist 2024).

This introductory chapter briefly explains Trump’s Europe policy in light of the different strands of thought within his administration and his personalistic understanding of power. Next, it recaps how European countries have adjusted. Finally, it draws preliminary conclusions about how national conservatism and Trump’s personalistic hold on power can affect Europe’s domestic debate and choices regarding the transatlantic relationship.

Multifaceted American Conservatism and Europe

In the Trump administration, the Republican Party and the US conservative world at large coexist with different visions of America’s role in the world and the corresponding foreign policy priorities – including with regard to Europe (Dueck 2019). At the risk of oversimplifying, the conservative foreign policy debate breaks down into three broad categories – primacists, conservative realists and civilizational warriors – that define schools of thought conceptually distinct from one another, even if they are not always mutually exclusive in terms of policy options.

The primacists comprise what is left of traditional Republican internationalism (Ruge and Shapiro 2022). The liberal and universalist impetus that once positioned the United States as the leader of the free world and guarantor of the international system – a proposition extended to economic relations through the promotion of unrestrained movement of goods and capital and the globalization of efficiency-based supply chains – has faded. Yet the conviction endures that America’s hegemonic position should be preserved through deep involvement in global affairs (Schake 2024).

From this perspective, alliances and partnerships are essential to augment the United States’ capacity to push back against a coalition of adversaries whose strategic alignment is assumed to be strong and long-term due to their authoritarian regimes and anti-Western orientation: the ‘axis of four’ of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran (as well as their minions like Venezuela) (Kendall-Taylor and Fontaine 2024). Although of lesser importance, international organizations and treaties retain utility insofar as they can be used to promote narratives and policy recipes in line with US interests and thus isolate rivals.

Europe occupies a significant position in this vision because NATO guarantees the continental hegemony of the United States, and the European countries act as a first line of defence against Russia and as a check on Moscow’s ambitions. While important, Europe’s capacity to strengthen its military is not an absolute priority for primacists, as it may, after all, affect the United States’ ability to influence European countries’ foreign policy. It follows that continuous investment of political and military resources in NATO and the defence of Ukraine remains critical to weakening Russia and ensuring European followership (Michta 2024).

Although it no longer enjoys the same degree of public support as it once did, this school of thought retains significant influence within the US foreign policy establishment — particularly among Washington think tanks, conservative media outlets such as The Wall Street Journal, senior members of Congress (with Senator Lindsey Graham leading the group of Republican foreign policy hawks), and within the administration itself, where it is represented primarily by Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Conservative realists encompass a range of diverse voices united by a common desire to see the United States act upon narrowly defined national interests (Borg 2024). A segment of the public opinion sees US exceptionalism as a national peculiarity that does not need to be exported abroad and favours a limited international role for the United States, largely free of any binding commitments arising from alliances or membership in international institutions. Among foreign policy experts, this strand of thought has its roots in the realist school of International Relations, which appreciates alliances and multilateral regimes insofar as they can help limit the United States’ military exposure.

Those grouped under the conservative realism label tend to agree on certain foreign policy priorities, most notably the need to prevent or contain the emergence of China as a threat to geopolitical balances in East Asia and, potentially, globally too. Still, conservative realism is open to the construction of a multipolar system in which US military might (which remains of paramount importance) works primarily for deterrence and offshore balancing, and the defence of US interests is made more sustainable through the pursuit of stability-oriented arrangements with rival powers (Mearsheimer and Walt 2016).

From this perspective, the notion that allies and partners of the United States may acquire greater autonomy is acceptable inasmuch as they can better guarantee the stability of the geopolitical theatres that have absorbed a disproportionate share of US political and military resources – namely the Middle East and Europe – so that Washington can concentrate more extensively on the Asian front. A more integrated and potentially autonomous EU is less a threat to America’s primacy (to which conservative realists do not have an obsessive attachment) than it is an opportunity to share the burden for continental stability and the containment of Russia (Williams 2025). It is also the best option to reduce the security risks that a downgrading of the United States’ strategic commitment to Europe and its military presence across NATO countries would carry with it (Chivvis 2025).

While still in the minority, this strand of thought has moved beyond academia. It resonates with the inward-looking instincts of the MAGA crowd, but also with the section of the left-wing electorate that has grown weary of what it perceives as American militarism abroad. It has also entered the foreign policy debates inside the Beltway as a regular voice in favour of restraint. However, conservative realism has made little inroads into the administration, even if ‘China prioritizers’ like Undersecretary of Defence Elbridge Colby may be loosely associated with it.

The third category, the civilizational warriors, has its ideological roots in the national conservatism espoused by much of the US new right (Hazony 2022). This strand of thought holds together the forceful reassertion of American absolute sovereignty against any form of long-term international commitment with the conviction that America is the core, engine and apex of Western civilization. Civilizational warriors do not construct the West as an alliance of states bound by shared strategic interests and a common commitment to universalistic values such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Rather, they conceive of it as a community of nations from Europe and of European descent linked to one another by history, Christianity (or the Judeo-Christian tradition) and, to some at least, race.

Civilizational warriors see this community as threatened not so much by the authoritarianism and militaristic expansionism of rival powers like Russia. Instead, it is migrants with an alien ethnic, linguistic and religious background and globalist elites promoting open trade, globalized supply chains and the supposedly intolerant and degenerate ‘woke’ ideology that risk subverting Western freedoms, welfare and cultural traditions. This vision is shared, in whole or in part, by sections of the MAGA movement, as well as by tech billionaires like Elon Musk and Peter Thiel, and has its most prominent reference point in Vice President JD Vance (Lopez 2025).

Europe is both the object of nostalgia and the source of hatred for those holding this view. On the one hand, the EU is deeply resented not just because of its potential to empower its member states, but also because it embodies the set of values that this movement despises most: supranationalism, inclusivity, diversity, and cosmopolitanism (Franke 2025). On the other hand, the European nations are the natural candidates to join the United States in a ‘civilizational alliance’ against migrants and the enemies from within (Samson 2025).

US foreign policy under the second Trump administration comprises elements of these various strands of conservatism, which explains the at times wild oscillations in rhetoric and policy actions on display regarding the Ukraine war and the approach to NATO and Europe’s security in general. While this multiple origin makes US foreign policy look incoherent, another element gives it greater intelligibility – namely, Trump’s understanding of power (Moynihan 2025). The US president sees power as a never-ending exercise in renegotiating relations, in which the stronger side, the United States, uses its vast array of assets – from tariffs to military assistance to investment – to extract ever more concessions (Bertoldi and Buti 2025). He views US alliances and partnerships as a client system in which the US’s burden is diminished, and its advantage is aggressively pursued. Similarly, rival powers are less systemic enemies to be defeated than potential interlocutors for deals in which influence is shared according to each party’s relative power and interests (Feaver 2024).

What makes this combination of extreme transactionalism and penchant for unrestrained sovereignty unique is the construction of the US national interest as inexorably linked to Trump’s personal power, and the ensuing blurring of the line between public and private interests. The elevation of personal ties with Trump, his family and his closest entourage, above formal relations between state institutions, creates incentives for allies, partners and rivals alike to contribute to his political and private fortunes. Governments that do not have to worry excessively about domestic opposition, such as the Arab Gulf dynasties, which have struck multi-billion-dollar deals with the Trump administration (and generously contributed to the financial and crypto ventures of the president’s family), have adapted with relative ease. For European governments, which are often supported by multi-party parliamentary coalitions and are subject to greater scrutiny from the press and public opinion, the process is more complicated.

Europe’s Adjustments: The Benefits and Costs of Appeasement

European adjustment to US foreign policy under Trump has taken on different forms. There has been an extensive use of flattery to win the US president’s favour, with European leaders echoing his rhetoric or developing new language consistent with it (Shapiro 2025; Brands 2025). More significantly, European governments have made efforts to meet US expectations beforehand. They have raised military and security-related spending to address the US’s longstanding concern about NATO’s uneven burden-sharing, agreed to buy US weapons on behalf of Ukraine, maintained economic pressure on Russia, and shown readiness to support a post-war settlement through deployed military assets (Scazzieri 2025; Ondrych 2025). Some have signalled their value to the pursuit of strategic goals that the Trump administration deems priorities, as when Finland agreed to build icebreakers to strengthen the United States’ hold on the Arctic (Foroohar 2025).

In return, the Europeans have often resorted to damage limitation. The latter has involved absorbing the effects of Trump’s most disruptive policies – such as tariffs, the phasing out of military transfers to Ukraine, and threats to take Greenland from Denmark – through coordinated diplomatic engagement, notably at the level of leaders. The objective of these efforts has been to prevent unwelcome outcomes such as a deal with Russia to the detriment of Ukraine and Europe’s security, further tariff escalation or the opening of new disputes (for instance over climate or digital regulations) (Momtaz et al. 2025).

These tactics have yielded some results. Trump’s recurrent outbursts against NATO have ceased, and the administration’s rhetoric on Europe has improved. Most importantly, support for Ukraine has not been interrupted, and sanctions on Russia have been maintained, even if Moscow’s stubborn rejection of any US opening and Kyiv’s deft management of Trump’s expectations have arguably been more consequential than European entreaties (Mikhelidze 2025). Even so, Europe’s reactive approach has limits and carries risks and costs. As mentioned above, support for maintaining a significant military presence in Europe is fading in the US public and even among elites. Thus, the most the European governments can hope for is to coordinate the downgrading of US assets within NATO with Washington so that it does not leave them overly exposed, and cultivate bilateral military relations to keep as many of those assets as possible on their national soil.

In addition, Trump’s volatile nature and transactional approach force European governments into continuous efforts to appease him, which in turn feeds his tendency to renegotiate the terms of their arrangements and add new demands. An example is Trump’s initial insistence that US sanctions on Russia could happen if the EU first adopted impossibly high tariffs on China and India as retribution for purchasing Russian oil (he later cast aside this condition, but not because of European opposition) (Hoskins 2025). Even when no demand is explicitly uttered, the Europeans may opt for alignment to avoid injecting an irritant into the transatlantic relationship, as their endorsement of the US bombing of Iran (an eventuality they had long opposed) attests (Azizi and Van Veen 2025).

This highly reactive and largely accommodating attitude means EU and national policymakers end up sharpening the tension between the urgent need to keep the United States engaged, on the one hand, and the long-term goal of reducing European vulnerability to external pressure through more integrated EU institutions and capacities, on the other. The domestic incentives to invest diplomatic resources and political capital in greater EU integration, by nature a slow and cumbersome process, diminish if bilateral action can more easily secure gains from a US administration that is short on sympathy for the supranational EU.

The commitment to investing in a systematic and extensive upgrade of EU governance and capabilities is also affected by the fact that Trump’s power-based, sovereignty-driven foreign policy approach, which has been given an aura of legitimacy by European appeasement, has emboldened Eurosceptic forces that share ideological affinities with US national conservatism.

Trump and Europe’s Right: So Far, So Close?

There is much in common within the transatlantic right-wing galaxy, spanning a nationalist attachment to sovereignty, visceral opposition to immigration, revulsion at the ‘degenerate’ woke values of liberal progressivism, resentment against regulations in the digital and climate sectors, as well as impatience with political and constitutional checks and balances. Ideological affinities underpin growing ties between US and European right-wing movements, with institutions from Poland and Hungary (a central reference point for the US new right) quite active in promoting a transatlantic community of right-wing intellectuals and activists.

However, replicating the American right’s success in Europe is not as straightforward. The European right remains fractious and its relationship with its US counterpart anything but linear (Balfour et al. 2025). On a number of issues, European right-wing parties follow national preferences that are not easily reconcilable – the Hungarians and Poles, for instance, oppose greater burden-sharing in migration management and stronger fiscal capacity in Brussels, both of which the Italians would support. Marked divisions also exist regarding Russia. Some, notably the Polish and Scandinavian right as well as parts of the Italian right, view Russia as a threat and favour support for Ukraine. The bulk of the European right continues to nurture some sympathy towards Moscow, although this has become much more muted in the wake of the Ukraine war. They see Russian nationalist and authoritarian conservatism as a natural interlocutor for the preservation of Europe’s cultural and religious heritage as well as its stability and energy security. Adding to these policy divergences are party and leadership rivalries, with three distinct right-wing groups in the European Parliament.

In short, the electoral strength of right-wing parties does not translate into an equally strong capacity to shape policies at the EU level, let alone create a coherent foreign policy platform on which to engage the United States. Right-wing parties, like anyone else, must also contend with the harm inflicted by US tariffs on EU exports and wavering security commitments, as well as with Trump’s scarce popularity in most of Europe (O’Brien 2025). Even internally, the US president’s average approval rating has been stuck in the mid-to-low 40s (RealClearPolitics 2025).

The reality is that the deliberately confrontational approach to politics of right-wing nationalism and Trump’s personality tends to generate counterbalancing dynamics of aggregation. Moreover, Trump’s power-based foreign policy, even when one shares its nationalist premises, fuels a demand in Europe for security and welfare that cannot be met in full through a critically unbalanced relationship with the United States, which is constantly open to review. Russia’s war of conquest in Ukraine and Trump’s nationalistic and unilateralist re-orientation of US foreign policy are tangible manifestations of a geopolitical reality that is not just debated in foreign policy circles but felt across populations in Europe. It follows that the pragmatic logic underlying European appeasement of Trump can also be applied to the EU. Whether regarded as an alternative, a complement or merely an accessory to the relationship with the United States, the EU’s potential to improve member states’ military, energy, technological and industrial assets, as well as protect their regulatory sovereignty and trade – including to contain the costs of renewed US–China tensions – is easier to appreciate for elites and general public alike. The weakness of pro-EU political forces, which may be more a problem of leadership than policy, obscures but cannot erase these structural realities.

Political forces that remain committed to the transatlantic bond, or that regard the relationship with Washington primarily through a pragmatic lens, should recognize that the advantages of accommodation diminish over time. The current US administration, in all its iterations of conservative views of US foreign policy and with Trump’s power-infused understanding of foreign relations, is largely insensitive to European objections, not least because it perceives little or no cost in adopting positions that openly contradict European preferences. Persisting in appeasement not only reinforces this dynamic but also undermines collective efforts to enhance the EU’s capacity to withstand external pressure and adapt to a gradual recalibration of American commitments to the continent. By the same token, European nationalist movements that oppose deeper integration should reflect on the tangible costs of failing to forge a common stance in response to US measures (be they on trade, technology or other strategic issues) that harm the very constituencies these movements claim to defend.

An Uncertain Future

There can be little doubt that the political struggles on the future of the transatlantic relationship across Europe are being fought on a favourable terrain for the right-wing forces and President Trump himself. Nevertheless, those struggles are not settled yet, and the future is open to different scenarios.

In one possible scenario – consistent with the worldview of US primacists – the United States would maintain its commitment to Europe’s defence in exchange for a greater European contribution to continental security and, more broadly, Washington’s pursuit of global hegemony. This approach would not only entail participation in the containment of Russia but also complete alignment in pushing back against China’s influence and isolating other adversarial powers, such as Iran. Such an arrangement would loosely represent a continuation of the post-war transatlantic relationship, albeit one in which normative and institutional dimensions are downgraded since the development of European military capabilities becomes instrumental to the consolidation of a rigidly hierarchical Euro–Atlantic structure. The relationship would thereby assume the form of a hub-and-spoke system, characterized by a stronger bilateralization of US security and defence ties with individual European states, the relative marginalization of NATO as a locus of transatlantic consensus-building, and indifference or mild hostility towards the EU. Although not entirely compatible with President Trump’s aversion to long-term commitments, this configuration of US–European relations would nonetheless chime with his conception of America’s alliances and partnerships as a clientelist network reaffirming US centrality.

In another scenario, the development of integrated European capacities for resource generation and defence and security provision would endow EU member states with greater bargaining power in dealings with Washington across domains ranging from trade and relations with China to the security governance of Europe itself. This dynamic would clash with Trump’s anti-EU instincts and his ambition to reassert American primacy. Yet, it would resonate with his transactional understanding of international relations and with his preference, shared by conservative realists, for a substantial US retrenchment from Europe.

Both scenarios rest on the assumption that transatlantic political elites would frame their domestic political interests in terms of the strategic advantages of preserving a strong Euro–Atlantic coalition, although in the second case, the relationship would be more prone to engendering largely contingent, functional forms of cooperation. However, another scenario envisions the inverse dynamic, whereby strategic security concerns are subordinated to short-term political expediency, particularly on the European side.

In such a context, the containment of Russia, the management of tensions with China or the pursuit of stability in the Middle East would rank lower on the hierarchy of priorities than the quest for control over domestic centres of power through the continuous mobilization against internal political adversaries and, increasingly, against the supranational governance system of the EU. In this scenario, which reflects the ideological convictions of the civilization warriors, the transatlantic relationship would become ‘de-strategized’. It would in effect assume a partisan function, operating as a shared ideological framework through which right-wing parties mutually legitimize their respective domestic political struggles, with strategic coordination being relegated to either contingent arrangements or, again, European followership.

As mentioned at the start of this introduction, the evolution of the transatlantic relationship will be shaped as much by the capacity of political elites to reconcile strategic imperatives with domestic political pressures as by shifts in material power or institutional design. Whether this reconciliation yields a renewed yet asymmetrical alliance, a more equal but functional partnership or devolves into a fragmented, ideologically charged alignment will determine the degree to which the Euro–Atlantic area continues to constitute a coherent pole of order in a contested international system.

 


(*) Riccardo Alcaro is Research Coordinator and Head of the Global Actors Programme at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI). His main area of expertise is transatlantic relations, with a particular focus on US and European policies towards Europe’s surrounding regions. He has been a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington and a fellow of the EU-wide programme European Foreign and Security Policy Studies (EFSPS). He has coordinated the EU-funded TRANSWORLD project on transatlantic relations and global governance (7th Framework Programme) and the JOINT project on EU foreign and security policy (Horizon 2020). Riccardo is the author of Europe and Iran’s Nuclear Crisis (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018) and co-author of Conflict Management and the Future of EU Foreign and Security Policy: Relational Power Europe (Routledge, 2025). He also edited The Liberal Order and its Contestations (Routledge, 2018). He holds a summa cum laude PhD from the University of Tübingen. Email: r.alcaro@iai.it


 

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