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Discursive Violence and Moral Repair: The Promise and Limits of Non-Violent Communication Against Populism

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Ozturk, Ibrahim & Fritsch, Claudia. (2025). “Discursive Violence and Moral Repair: The Promise and Limits of Non-Violent Communication Against Populism.” Populism & Politics (P&P). European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 19, 2025.  https://doi.org/10.55271/pp0051

 

Abstract

Marking the hundredth anniversary of fascism’s rise in Europe, this article explores the recent resurgence of authoritarian populism—now deeply embedded within democracies and intensified by digital technologies. It investigates how populist actors use emotionally manipulative and polarizing rhetoric, especially on social media, to diminish empathy, increase affective polarization, and weaken public discourse. Using Marshall Rosenberg’s Nonviolent Communication (NVC) framework, we see populist messaging as a form of discursive violence rooted in blame, moral absolutism, and dehumanization. Conversely, NVC offers a principled way of communicating based on observation, emotional awareness, shared human needs, and compassionate dialogue. Drawing on insights from political communication, discourse analysis, and moral psychology—including moral foundations theory and digital polarization studies—the article examines NVC’s potential as both an interpretive tool and a dialogical intervention. It also discusses important limitations of NVC in adversarial digital environments, such as asymmetrical intent, scalability issues, and the risk of moral equivocation. Ultimately, the article advocates for NVC-informed strategies to restore respectful, empathetic, and authentic free expression amid rising populist manipulation.

Keywords: Authoritarian Populism, Discursive Violence, Emotional Manipulation, Affective Polarization, Nonviolent Communication (NVC), Compassionate Dialogue, Moral Foundations Theory, Digital Polarization, Dehumanization, Moral Equivocation, Scalability Challenge

 

By Ibrahim Ozturk & Claudia Fritsch*

Introduction

Populist political movements have surged in recent years, characterized by a style of communication that many observers deem manipulative, polarizing, and emotionally charged. Populist rhetoric typically divides society into a virtuous “people” and a corrupt “elite,” conveying simplistic, us-versus-them narratives while often scapegoating minority groups or outsiders (Engesser et al., 2017). Messages from populist leaders are usually delivered in stark, moralistic terms (e.g., “with us or against us”) and strategically tap into emotions such as anger, fear, and resentment to mobilize support. Indeed, scholars note that populist discourse often employs a “manipulation strategy” that exploits emotions to the detriment of rational political considerations (Charaudeau, 2009). This is especially evident on social media, where algorithm-driven amplification rewards sensational and emotionally charged content, providing populist communicators with an ideal channel to disseminate their messages unfiltered. These trends challenge democratic discourse: How can society counter manipulative and divisive communication without resorting to censorship, instead fostering genuine and constructive dialogue?

This article examines Marshall Rosenberg’s framework of Nonviolent Communication (NVC) as a potential remedy to populist, manipulative discourse. NVC, rooted in principles of empathy, honest expression, and mutual understanding, provides a communication model that starkly contrasts with the populist approach of emotional manipulation and scapegoating. By analyzing insights from political communication, critical discourse analysis, psychology, and digital media studies, we will explain how populist strategies operate on social media and how Rosenberg’s NVC might help protect public discourse against them. We include empirical findings, such as studies of Twitter and Facebook rhetoric, to demonstrate populism’s emotional and divisive tactics. We also explore related psychological theories—from moral foundations to affective polarization—to strengthen the theoretical foundation. Furthermore, we address the limitations and critiques of applying NVC in the complex online populism landscape, including concerns about scalability, bad-faith actors, and the potential for moral neutrality. Ultimately, the aim is to promote a “truly free expression” online—not in the sense of unchecked abuse or propaganda, but a space where citizens can engage honestly without fear, manipulation, or dehumanization—an environment NVC strives to foster.

The article is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the theoretical framework, beginning with an analysis of populist communication in the digital age and its emotionally manipulative strategies, followed by an in-depth discussion of Marshall Rosenberg’s Nonviolent Communication (NVC) model and its foundational principles, and concluding with relevant psychological theories that explain the emotional and moral mechanisms underlying populist appeal, as well as the potential of NVC to address them. Section 3 synthesizes these insights to evaluate how NVC might serve as a discursive counterstrategy to populist manipulation, particularly in online contexts. Section 4 then critically examines the practical challenges and limitations of applying NVC against populist rhetoric, including issues of scalability, asymmetric intent, moral ambiguity, and evidentiary support. Finally, Section 5 concludes by reflecting on the promise and limits of NVC as a communicative antidote to rising authoritarian populism, while offering directions for future research, policy, and civic engagement.

Theoretical Framework

Populist Communication in the Digital Age: Manipulative Strategies and Emotional Appeals

Liberal democracy is facing legitimacy problems due to post-politics, post-democracy, and post-truth dynamics. Populism exploits emotional deficits and distrust in institutions, while digital media amplify fragmentation and emotional escalation (Schenk, 2024). Democracy generates emotional deficits such as individualism and isolation, which foster the rise of “soft despotism” (Helfritzsch & Müller Hipper, 2024). Populist actors exploit these emotional deficits—such as frustration, fear, and mistrust—for mobilization. 

Populism is often seen as a thin-centered ideology or style that pits “the pure people” against “the corrupt elite,” arguing that politics should prioritize the will of ordinary people above all else (Engesser et al., 2017). While populist movements exist across the political spectrum, their communication styles tend to follow common patterns. Research in political communication and discourse analysis reveals that populist actors tend to favor simple, colloquial language and binary framing over nuanced expressions (Engesser et al., 2017). Complex issues are often reduced to black-and-white narratives – for example, “you are either with us or part of the problem” – which reinforces in-group/out-group divisions. This kind of dichotomous framing is further supported by frequent use of stereotypes and sometimes vulgar or insulting language aimed at perceived “enemies,” all to dramatize the threat posed by “the elite” or out-groups. Critical discourse analysts observe that this mode of communication intentionally dehumanizes opponents and criminalizes certain groups, rallying the base while dismissing dissenting voices as illegitimate or evil.

A key feature of populist communication is its emotional strength. Populist leaders intentionally appeal to negative feelings—especially fear, anger, and resentment—to rally support and direct public anger toward specific targets. For example, a content analysis of thousands of Twitter messages by European populist parties found that “fear, uncertainty, or resentment are the emotions most frequently used” by these actors (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-Ripollés, 2023). In those social media messages, negative emotional language (expressing threat, crisis, outrage) was closely linked to references to out-groups or “corrupt authorities,” while positive emotions (such as pride or hope) were generally reserved for the in-group—celebrating “the people” or portraying the populist leader as the savior (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-Ripollés, 2023). This supports comparative research that suggests populists intentionally stir public anger and fear to rally their supporters. By emphasizing a sense of crisis and victimhood (e.g., depicting society as on the verge of collapse or “invaded” by outsiders), populist rhetoric creates a sense of urgency and danger where extreme actions seem justified. Charaudeau (2009) noted that populist discourse “plays with emotions to the detriment of political reason,” appealing to visceral feelings rather than critical thinking.

The rise of social media has intensified these manipulative techniques. Digital platforms like Twitter and Facebook allow populist politicians to bypass traditional media gatekeepers and connect directly with audiences. In this context, Pörksen (2018) speaks of a weakening of traditional gatekeepers (e.g., journalists) in favor of invisible agents of information filtering and distribution (Pörksen, 2018: 71). Studies show that populists eagerly utilize the features of social media for unfiltered self-promotion and aggressive opposition against opponents (Engesser et al., 2017). They control the online narrative by constantly pumping out simple, emotionally charged messages—attacks on “enemies” and triumphant praise of their own movement. Algorithms, in turn, tend to boost posts that provoke strong reactions. Posts that evoke moral outrage or fear often achieve higher engagement and spread quickly within and across networks (Brady et al., 2017). False or misleading information may also travel farther and faster when presented in dramatic, emotional terms, as shown by studies on the viral spread of conspiracy theories and “fake news” that tap into users’ anxieties. The result is a digital public sphere filled with provocative soundbites that reinforce tribal loyalties and drown out nuance.

Empirical research highlights how these dynamics promote polarization. Recent studies show that platforms like TikTok use algorithms that reinforce emotionally charged and extremist content, leading users—especially youth—into echo chambers that normalize hate and misinformation (FAZ Dossier, 2025: 16–18). This supports the notion that discursive violence is not only rhetorical but structurally embedded in digital systems. The FAZ Dossier highlights how social media platforms are increasingly abandoning traditional moderation in favor of user-driven models, such as ‘Community Notes,’ which may fail to prevent the viral spread of misinformation (FAZ Dossier, 2025: 21–22). This shift underscores the urgency of promoting ethical communication frameworks like NVC. 

A panel study on political social media use found that active engagement—such as regularly sharing, commenting, or posting political content—is linked to increased affective polarization, meaning a stronger dislike of opposing groups. In contrast, passive news consumption or simply scrolling showed no such effect (Matthes et al., 2023). This indicates that the communication style prevalent on social media, not just the content, deepens divisions. Populist communicators, with their emotionally charged and confrontational style, effectively draw followers into a constant online “us vs. them” battle that boosts in-group loyalty while fostering hostility toward outsiders. Over time, these communication patterns can normalize incivility and diminish empathy, as opponents become caricatures or enemies, and “winning” an argument takes precedence over seeking a shared truth. In this environment, the concept of free expression becomes compromised. Although it may seem that everyone can speak on social media, many voices are silenced or self-censored in the toxic atmosphere. Harassment and aggressive attacks—often launched by populist supporters against critics or minority groups—create a chilling effect on free speech, causing targeted individuals to withdraw out of fear of abuse (Amnesty International, 2020). Truly free expression involves an environment where people can share opinions and fact-based rebuttals without being drowned out by intimidation or deception. 

Combating populism’s manipulative communication requires not only fact-checking or content moderation but also a cultural shift in how we communicate—moving from hostility and propaganda toward empathy and honesty. Groeben & Christmann (2023) emphasize that fair argumentation—defined by integrity, rationality, and cooperativity—can serve as a bulwark against social discord and democratic erosion. This aligns closely with Rosenberg’s Nonviolent Communication (NVC), which seeks to replace adversarial rhetoric with empathetic dialogue. This is where Rosenberg’s Nonviolent Communication framework offers a promising solution.

Rosenberg’s Nonviolent Communication (NVC): Principles and Aims

Marshall B. Rosenberg (2003)’s Nonviolent Communication (NVC) is a communication methodology rooted in compassion, empathy, and authenticity. Initially developed in the 1960s and 1970s, and elaborated in Rosenberg’s seminal work, Nonviolent Communication: A Language of Life (2003), NVC emerged from a confluence of humanistic psychology (influenced by Carl Rogers’ client-centered therapy), Gandhian nonviolence principles, and practical conflict resolution techniques. At its core, NVC seeks to transform how we relate to one another by replacing habitual patterns of blaming, coercing, or criticizing with a language of feelings and needs. Rosenberg observed that adversarial or judgmental language often provokes defensiveness and disconnection, whereas empathic communication fosters trust and cooperation. NVC aims to enable honest self-expression and respectful listening so that all parties’ underlying human needs can be acknowledged and met through creative, collaborative solutions. NVC is often taught through a structured four-component model that guides individuals to communicate with clarity and empathy (Rosenberg, 2003):

Observation (without evaluation): Describe the concrete facts or actions you observe, without adding any judgment or generalization. For example, instead of saying “You are spreading lies,” one might say “I read the post where you stated X about immigrants.” The goal is to establish a neutral starting point based on observable reality. By separating observation from evaluation, we avoid language that could trigger defensiveness and set a calmer stage for discussion. (As one NVC practitioner notes, rather than “You’re misinformed,” say “I read an article that claims XYZ,” which opens curiosity instead of conflict.)

Feelings: State one’s own emotional response to the observation or attempt to recognize the other person’s feelings. This step involves a vocabulary of emotions (e.g., “I feel frustrated and concerned when I see that claim.”). Importantly, NVC encourages taking ownership of one’s feelings rather than blaming others for them. It also invites empathic guessing of the other’s feelings, demonstrating that one is trying to understand their emotional experience. For instance, “It sounds like you’re feeling afraid and angry about the economic situation.” Naming feelings – both one’s own and the other’s – helps humanize the interaction; instead of two opposing positions, there are two human beings with emotional lives.

Needs: Behind every feeling, according to NVC, lies a human need that is met or unmet. This step articulates the deeper needs or values connected to the feelings. Rosenberg’s approach assumes a universal set of human needs (such as safety, respect, autonomy, belonging, justice, etc.) that motivate our actions. For example: “I need our community to be safe and economically secure, and I guess you also need security and recognition for your work.” In conflict, parties’ strategies may clash, but at the level of fundamental needs, there is potential for common ground. By voicing the needs, we shift attention from personal attacks to the underlying concerns that matter to everyone. Crucially, guessing the other person’s needs (with humility, not presumption) can defuse tension: “Maybe the person sharing a conspiracy theory has an unmet need for understanding or control amid uncertainty.” This does not justify false or harmful statements, but it frames them as tragically misguided attempts to meet legitimate human needs. Such reframing opens the door to compassion: we can condemn the harmful strategy while still acknowledging the human need that drives it.

Request: Finally, NVC suggests making a concrete, positive request that aims to address the needs identified, inviting collaboration. A request is not a demand; the other person should have the freedom to say no or propose an alternative. For example: “Would you be willing to look at this data together and see if it addresses your concerns about jobs being lost?” or “Can we both agree to verify claims from now on before sharing them?” The idea is to foster mutual problem-solving. In a successful NVC exchange, the request emerges naturally after empathy has been established: once both sides feel heard at the level of needs, they are more open to finding a solution that works for all. Requests in NVC are straightforward, doable, and tied to the speaker’s needs – e.g., “I’d like us to have a respectful conversation without name-calling,” rather than a vague “Stop being wrong.” This collaborative tone contrasts with the coercive or zero-sum approach often seen in polarized debates (Kohn, 1990).

Underpinning these four components is an intention of empathy and mutual respect. NVC is often described as a mindset or heart-set as much as a communication technique. It requires genuinely caring about understanding the other’s perspective and honestly expressing one’s own truth. Rosenberg emphasized that NVC is not about being “nice” or avoiding conflict, but about engaging authentically without aggression or contempt. One can still disagree strongly and even confront injustice using NVC, but the confrontation targets the issue or behavior in factual terms, rather than attacking the person’s character. For example, an NVC-informed response to hate speech might be: “When I hear you say, ‘X group is ruining our country,’ I feel alarmed and sad, because I deeply value equality and safety for all people. Would you be willing to tell me what concerns lead you to feel this way? I’d like to understand and then share my perspective too.” This response does not condone the hateful statement; rather, it calls it out as concerning yet invites the person to reveal the fears or needs behind their claim. It keeps the door open for dialogue and potential transformation.

In summary, NVC provides a framework for non-manipulative, compassionately honest communication. Instead of dueling monologues aimed at scoring points (or riling up emotions), NVC calls for dialogue aimed at mutual understanding. This orientation directly challenges the populist communication style: where populism leverages blame and anger, NVC emphasizes empathy and curiosity; where populism simplifies and demonizes, NVC humanizes and searches for underlying concerns; where populism’s goal is to mobilize a base against an enemy, NVC’s goal is to connect people to each other’s humanity and find solutions that address everyone’s needs. But can such an approach gain traction in the rough-and-tumble world of social media and political tribalism? To explore that, we now consider how NVC’s principles intersect with findings from psychology—and whether they might help counter the psychological underpinnings of populist appeal.

Emotional and Moral Underpinnings: A Psychological Perspective

The contrast between populist rhetoric and NVC can be further understood through psychological theories of emotion, morality, and intergroup conflict. Moral Foundations Theory, for instance, sheds light on why populist messaging is so potent at a gut level. Jonathan Haidt and colleagues’ theory proposes that human moral reasoning is built on intuitive foundations such as care/harm, fairness/cheating, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation (with liberty/oppression sometimes added) (Haidt, 2012). Different political or cultural groups emphasize different foundations. Populist movements (especially right-wing variants) often appeal heavily to foundations of loyalty (e.g., patriotism, defending the in-group), authority (respect for a strong leader who will restore order), and sanctity (protecting the nation’s purity or traditional values), alongside a narrative of betrayal by elites (violating fairness or loyalty) and oppression of the common people by those in power. These moral appeals trigger deep emotional responses: outrage at the corrupt elite (those who violate fairness), fear and disgust toward perceived outsiders (those who violate sanctity or security), and righteous anger that the “true people” are not being respected (violations of loyalty or authority structures). In short, populist communication succeeds by activating moral intuitions that resonate strongly with its audience’s identity and worldview. Once activated, these moral-emotional responses can bypass deliberative reasoning—the audience’s intuitive “elephant” charges ahead before the rational “rider” catches up (Haidt, 2012).

How does NVC engage with this moral-emotional landscape? Notably, NVC deliberately avoids language of good vs. evil or us vs. them that maps onto those divisive moral foundations. Instead, it appeals to universal human needs, which might be thought of as underlying the moral foundations but not tied to any one ideology. For example, rather than arguing on the level of “your loyalty to group X is misplaced,” an NVC approach would dig into why loyalty to X matters – perhaps the need for belonging, identity, or security. Those needs are human universals, even if their expressions differ. In practice, this means an NVC-inspired dialogue might sidestep the usual triggers of partisan defensiveness. A populist supporter fulminating about “protecting our country’s purity from outsiders” is clearly operating within a sanctity/loyalty moral frame. Confronting them head-on (“That’s racist and wrong!”) will likely provoke an ego-defensive reaction or even deeper entrenchment – their moral foundations feel attacked. By contrast, an NVC-informed response might be: “It sounds like you’re really worried about our community’s safety and continuity. I also care about safety – that’s a basic need we all share. Can we talk about what specifically feels threatening to you, and how we might address that concern without harming innocent people?” This kind of response implicitly acknowledges the moral concern (safety, stability) but reframes it as a shared need rather than an us–them battle. It also avoids validating any factual falsehoods or bigotry – there is no agreement that “outsiders are ruining us,” only an attempt to hear the fear beneath that statement. In doing so, NVC may help to disarm the moral intensity that populist rhetoric exploits, channeling it into a conversation about needs and solutions that includes all stakeholders’ humanity.

Another relevant psychological concept is affective polarization, which is the mutual dislike and distrust between opposing political camps. Populist communication, with its demonization of “others,” greatly exacerbates affective polarization – followers are encouraged not only to disagree with opponents, but to actively hate and fear them. As discussed, social media echo chambers further reinforce this by rewarding strident partisan content. Affective polarization is partly fueled by what psychologists call ego-involvement or identity threat. When political viewpoints become deeply tied to one’s identity and sense of self-worth, any challenge to those viewpoints feels like a personal attack or an existential threat to one’s ego. Populist narratives often heighten this effect by framing politics as an existential battle to save one’s way of life or group. In such a charged context, facts and logic alone rarely persuade – people will reject information that contradicts their group narrative because accepting it would threaten their identity (a phenomenon related to confirmation bias and motivated reasoning). Here, NVC’s emphasis on empathy and non-judgmental dialogue can mitigate ego threat. 

By explicitly removing blame and personal attacks from the equation, NVC creates a safer psychological space for discussion. As one expert notes, “People don’t change their beliefs when judged and told they’re stupid or misinformed. That just shuts them down… Focusing on feelings and needs – showing human care – helps the other person be more open to a different perspective” (Seid, 2023). In essence, NVC tries to lower the defenses that come from feeling one’s identity is under siege. By first demonstrating understanding (“I hear that you’re really worried, and you value honesty in politics,”) we signal that we are not out to humiliate or annihilate the other person’s identity, which often de-escalates the confrontation. This approach aligns with conflict psychology findings that acknowledging the other side’s emotions can reduce perceived threat and open the door to persuasion. There is even emerging evidence that encouraging empathy across party lines can reduce affective polarization. One study found that when people were led to believe empathy is a strength rather than a weakness, they showed a greater willingness to engage constructively and less partisan animosity. NVC cultivates exactly this stance, treating empathy as a powerful tool rather than a concession.

A related factor is the role of ego and face-saving in public exchanges. On social media, debates often devolve into performative contests where each side seeks to “win” and save face in front of their audience. Admitting error or changing one’s view under those conditions is rare because it can feel humiliating. NVC’s philosophy addresses this by focusing on observations and personal feelings/needs instead of accusations. This minimizes the threat to the other person’s ego. For example, saying “I felt hurt when I read your comment” is less face-threatening than “Your comment was ignorant.” The former invites the person to consider your perspective without directly attacking their integrity. Over time, such small differences in phrasing and approach can create a climate where dialogue is possible without each participant staking their ego on rigid positions.

Lastly, consider the element of emotional regulation. From a psychoanalytic perspective, destructive populism operates through a perversion of the psychological function of containing: instead of processing and detoxifying destructive emotions, it amplifies and idealizes them. Democratic structures lose their capacity to absorb and transform aggression, resulting in escalating cycles of emotional escalation. Populist dynamics trigger a regression to a so-called “paranoid-schizoid mental state,” characterized by splitting, projection, and idealization. This undermines the integrative capacity of a democratic society and fosters black-and-white thinking and scapegoating. A symbiotic-destructive fit emerges between populist leaders and their followers, based on destructive narcissism. This relationship is sustained through continuous emotional escalation and mutual reinforcement of omnipotent fantasies. (Zienert-Eilts, 2020)

Populist content deliberately raises the emotional temperature – outrage, fear, and indignation are stoked because they drive engagement. NVC, by contrast, implicitly encourages slowing down and recognizing emotions rather than being driven by them impulsively. In practicing NVC, one learns to self-connect (“What am I feeling? What need is causing that feeling?”), which can prevent reactive outbursts. This self-empathy is crucial online: taking a moment to name “I’m furious at this tweet because I need honesty in our leaders” can prevent firing back an insult. It’s a form of emotional intelligence that could dampen the cycle of provocation and counter-provocation that populists rely on to keep issues inflamed. Indeed, the NVC approach to handling misinformation or extremist remarks often starts with self-empathy and calming oneself before engaging. Only then can one approach the other with genuine curiosity, rather than reactive rage. This emotional self-regulation aspect aligns with broader psychological research suggesting that interventions which reduce emotional arousal (like mindfulness or perspective-taking exercises) can facilitate more rational discussion even on contentious topics. By integrating these psychological insights, we see that NVC is not a naïve “just be nice” formula, but rather a strategy that operates on well-founded principles of human emotion and cognition: it seeks to redirect moral passion toward understanding, reduce ego defensiveness, and replace high-arousal anger with mindful dialogue.

NVC as an Antidote to Manipulative Populist Discourse

Having outlined both the nature of populist communication and the fundamentals of Nonviolent Communication, we can now draw the connections more explicitly: How could NVC serve as an antidote or counterstrategy to manipulative populist discourse, especially on social media?

First, consider the content level of communication. Populist manipulative discourse thrives on misinformation and oversimplification—sweeping claims that blame social ills on targeted groups or opponents (e.g., “The immigrants are stealing your jobs” or “The media always lies to you,”). An NVC-informed approach to countering such messages would not simply retort with facts (though fact-checking is important); instead, it would reframe the conversation around the underlying issues and needs. For example, instead of trading barbs about whether immigrants are “good” or “bad,” an NVC counter-discourse would probe: “What is the fear or hardship driving this anger toward immigrants? Is it economic insecurity? Lack of trust in the system? Let’s address that.” By doing so, it deactivates the scapegoating narrative. The focus shifts to the real causes of suffering (such as job loss due to automation or inequality) and the real needs (stable employment, community safety) that demagogic slogans have oversimplified or obscured. NVC’s emphasis on observations and needs can cut through propaganda by continually steering the discussion back to concrete reality and human concerns. It’s harder for manipulative rhetoric to take root when the audience is trained to ask, “What is the speaker feeling and needing? What am I feeling and needing?” This critical yet compassionate stance inoculates people against being swept away by slogans, as they learn to listen beneath the surface message. In fact, educational programs in media literacy and conflict resolution sometimes incorporate NVC principles to help students detect when language is manipulative or inflammatory, and to respond by seeking clarification and shared concerns rather than reacting in kind. By promoting habits of pausing and reflecting on needs, NVC serves as a kind of cognitive vaccine against disinformation and emotional manipulation.

Second, at the relational level, NVC aims to humanize the “other” and break down the us-versus-them mindset that populists promote. Populist leaders often explicitly dehumanize their opponents or scapegoats, calling them animals, traitors, or criminals—language that morally disengages their followers from feeling any empathy toward those targets. This dehumanization is a common precursor to verbal (or even physical) violence. NVC directly counters this by emphasizing the humanity of everyone involved. Practitioners of NVC seek to “attend to the humanity of everybody involved,” even while standing up to hate speech (Seid, 2023). In practical terms, this could mean that when faced with a hate-filled comment online, an NVC practitioner might respond with empathy (e.g., “It sounds like you’re really angry and hurting; I want to understand what’s behind that feeling”) rather than with an insult. This approach serves two purposes: it demonstrates to onlookers that the targeted person is not responding with hate (thus preserving their dignity and disproving the aggressor’s caricature), and it can sometimes surprise the aggressor into a more genuine conversation. There are anecdotal accounts of social media users successfully de-escalating trolls or bigoted commenters by responding with unexpected kindness or curiosity—tactics that align very much with NVC philosophy. Conversely, meeting fire with fire on social media (though understandable) often reinforces each side’s negative stereotypes. Therefore, NVC offers a toolkit for those who want to engage persuasively rather than resort to name-calling, helping to reduce the vicious cycle of escalating rhetoric.

Furthermore, NVC offers a mode of discourse that could help redefine what “free expression” entails on social media. The phrase “truly free expression” in this context suggests that current online discourse, though nominally free, is constrained by toxicity and manipulation. In an NVC-inspired vision, free expression would not merely mean anyone can post anything (the status quo, which often leads to harassment and misinformation). Rather, it implies a communication culture where individuals feel free to speak authentically—expressing their real feelings and needs—without fear of being attacked or cynically manipulated. Paradoxically, when populists weaponize “free speech,” the result is often less freedom for vulnerable voices (who are bullied into silence) and a polluted information environment that hampers everyone’s ability to speak truth. NVC can be seen as a remedy to this, encouraging norms of respectful listening and speaking that make it safer for all voices to be heard. 

For example, an online forum moderated with NVC principles might encourage users to phrase disagreements in terms of “I” statements about their own feelings and needs, rather than accusatory “you” statements. Over time, this could foster trust even among users with divergent views, because they see that expressing an opinion won’t result in immediate personal attacks. In short, NVC aligns freedom of expression with responsibility of expression – the idea that we are free to say what we want, but we choose to do so in a way that acknowledges the humanity and dignity of others. This resonates with long-standing arguments that a healthy public sphere requires norms of civility and empathy to truly function in the common good, not just to maximize individual liberty to offend. 

It is worth highlighting some concrete examples where a more nonviolent style of communication has made a difference. For instance, experimental studies in political psychology have shown that framing issues in terms of the other side’s moral values or shared human experiences can reduce polarization. One study found that when liberals and conservatives each reframed their arguments to appeal to the other side’s core values (e.g., arguing for environmental protection in terms of patriotism and purity of nature, rather than purely in terms of care/harm), persuasion increased significantly. This principle is akin to NVC’s approach of finding a need that underlies both sides’ concerns. Another example is dialogue programs that bring together people from opposite sides of contentious issues (such as abortion and gun control) in carefully facilitated conversations. Those programs, often inspired by empathic communication techniques like NVC, report that participants come away with reduced animosity and often find unexpected points of agreement or at least understanding. Similarly, on social media, initiatives like #ListenFirst or certain depolarization groups encourage users to practice reflective listening in comment threads. These micro-level efforts align with NVC’s core tenets and have shown anecdotal success in de-escalating what would otherwise be inflamed shouting matches. 

From a critical discourse analysis standpoint, introducing NVC into social media discourse could also be seen as a form of discursive resistance. Instead of allowing populist demagogues to set the terms of debate (with their loaded language and fear-driven frames), citizens trained in NVC can subtly shift the discourse. For example, when a populist tweet declares “Group X is the enemy of the people!” an NVC-informed counter-message might redirect the focus: “I hear anger and a longing for fairness. How can we ensure everyone’s needs are considered without blaming one group?” This kind of response doesn’t directly confront the claim on its face (which might be futile with committed partisans), but it introduces an alternative narrative centered on inclusivity and understanding. If enough voices respond in that vein, the public narrative gains complexity – it’s no longer a one-note story of blame; it’s also a story about empathy and problem-solving. In the long run, such discourse could erode the appeal of purely manipulative messages, as people see a path to address grievances without vilifying others.

Challenges and Critiques: Can NVC Work Against Online Populism?

Scalability and Context

NVC was initially conceived for interpersonal or small-group communication – for example, mediating between individuals in conflict or fostering understanding in workshops. The online world of mass communication and rapid-fire posts is a very different context. One critique is whether the painstaking, time-consuming process of empathetic dialogue can be scaled to thousands or millions of people interacting on social platforms. Engaging even one hostile commenter with genuine NVC empathy can demand patience and emotional labor; doing this across an entire “troll army” or deeply polarized forum might seem infeasible. 

Furthermore, text-based social media strips away tone and nonverbal cues, which are essential for conveying empathy. Without face-to-face interaction, attempts at NVC might be misinterpreted. In essence, can the NVC approach survive the chaotic, decontextualized, high-speed environment of Twitter or Facebook? Some suggest that for NVC to be scalable online, platforms would need to support it structurally – for instance, by providing guided prompts that encourage users to reflect (“What are you feeling? What do you need?”)before posting, or by highlighting posts that exemplify constructive communication. Such design changes are speculative and have not been widely implemented. Thus, in the current setup, NVC practitioners will likely find themselves swimming against a strong current of algorithmic and social incentives that favor short, incendiary content over thoughtful dialogue. This doesn’t invalidate NVC, but any realistic strategy must pair NVC with broader reforms (e.g., digital literacy education, platform moderation policies, community norms) to have a large-scale impact.

Asymmetry of Intentions

Another limitation arises from the imbalance between sincere dialogue seekers and manipulative actors. NVC assumes a baseline of goodwill – that if one expresses honestly and listens empathically, the other might do the same. But what if certain populist communicators (or their digital foot soldiers) have no interest in good-faith dialogue? Many populist leaders are adept propagandists who might see empathetic outreach as a weakness to exploit, rather than reciprocate. In online spaces, coordinated troll campaigns or extremist groups may deliberately feign personal grievances just to hijack the conversation. Engaging them with empathy might not always defuse their agenda; it could even provide more attention or a veneer of legitimacy to their hateful ideas if not handled carefully. Critics argue that NVC could be naïvely ineffective in such cases – akin to “bringing a knife to a gunfight,” or worse, bringing an open heart to a knife fight. It’s a genuine concern that must temper our expectations: NVC is not a magic wand that transforms every interaction, and some actors will simply not respond in kind. 

Advocates of NVC counter that even if die-hard extremists or trolls do not change, empathic engagement can still have positive effects on the wider audience. A compassionate response to hate speech, for example, might not convert the hater, but it shows bystanders an alternative to hate, potentially preventing the spread of toxicity. Also, NVC does not forbid setting boundaries. Rosenberg himself clarified that NVC is not about being permissive or a “doormat.” One can combine NVC with firm resistance – for instance, empathizing with someone’s anger while refusing to allow abuse in a discussion (Seid, 2023). In extreme cases, protective actions (like moderation, muting, or even legal measures) are necessary; NVC distinguishes the protective use of force (to prevent harm) from punitive or retributive force. Thus, while NVC urges understanding the unmet needs driving even hateful behavior, it does not require tolerating harm or giving manipulators endless platforms. The key is to try nonviolence first, and resort to stricter measures if dialogue truly fails or safety is at risk.

Accusations of Moral Equivalence or Neutrality

A nuanced critique comes from activists and scholars who worry that the ethos of NVC – in avoiding judgmental labels like “right” and “wrong” – might slide into an amoral stance that equates oppressor and oppressed. For example, if an immigrant-rights advocate uses NVC to dialogue with a xenophobic populist, some might accuse them of “normalizing hate” or not firmly condemning a harmful ideology. There is a tension here between empathy and justice: how do we empathize with a person’s feelings and needs without appearing to excuse or legitimize dangerous beliefs? Rosenberg’s approach would say we never excuse harmful actions – rather, we separate the person (who has human needs) from their action or belief (which we can vehemently disagree with). As NVC educators emphasize, “this is in no way to excuse or condone behaviors that hurt others!” (Seid, 2023). 

It is possible to hold someone accountable while treating them as a human being. Yet, in the public sphere, this nuance can be lost, and there is a risk that calls for empathy are misused to downplay the legitimate grievances of victims. NVC practitioners must be mindful of power dynamics: empathy should flow in all directions, but it must not become a tool to silence the less powerful by constantly demanding they empathize with their abusers. In practical terms, applying NVC in the populism context means walking a fine line – empathizing with, say, the economic anxieties that might fuel racist populism, without validating the racism. Some critics from feminist and anti-racist perspectives have pointed out that telling marginalized people to use NVC toward those who harm them can come off as tone-policing or burden-shifting (i.e., putting the onus on the targets of harassment to be “more understanding”). 

This critique is important: any advocacy of NVC in the populist context should clarify that NVC is voluntary and context-dependent. It is a tool for those who choose to engage; it should not be a cudgel to force civility on the oppressed while the oppressor goes unchecked. In dealing with populism, perhaps the best use of NVC is by allies and moderators – those not directly targeted by the hate – who have the emotional capacity to bridge divides, rather than expecting immediate empathy from someone under attack. Additionally, there may be situations where a more confrontational approach is necessary to stop harm quickly, even if it’s not “polite” or nonviolent in tone. NVC does not claim to replace all forms of political action; it is one approach among many, best suited for communication and relationship-building, and less applicable to urgent law enforcement against incitement or structural changes to social media algorithms.

Effectiveness and Evidence

Finally, a pragmatic critique: Do we have evidence that NVC works in reducing populist influence or changing minds at scale? While NVC has a considerable track record in conflict resolution, mediation, and educational settings, there is limited empirical research on its direct impact in political persuasion or online discourse moderation. Applying NVC principles systematically to social media debates is a relatively new and experimental idea. Early indicators, as mentioned, come from small-scale dialogue experiments or individual anecdotes of depolarization. These are promising but not yet definitive proof for society-wide change.

Therefore, some observers might label NVC in this context as idealistic – a noble ideal but one facing steep odds against the structural forces of polarization and human cognitive biases. To address this, proponents suggest more pilot programs and interdisciplinary research: for example, combining NVC training with digital literacy education, or conducting controlled experiments to see if NVC-informed interventions in comment sections lead to improved outcomes (e.g., more civil tone, greater willingness of participants to engage with opposing views, reduced hate speech). If such research finds concrete benefits, it will bolster the case for broader adoption. Until then, NVC’s role in countering populism remains a plausible theory needing further validation. At the very least, it provides a vision of how communication could shift from destructive to constructive. Whether that vision can be realized will depend on experimentation, cultural change, and perhaps most importantly, individuals’ willingness to practice empathy in adversarial situations – a truly challenging task.

Conclusion

Populist movements have demonstrated a formidable ability to sway public discourse through manipulative communication – simplifying complex issues into moral dichotomies, amplifying fear and resentment, and leveraging social media algorithms to create echo chambers of anger. This article has analyzed how such “communication populism” operates not just as political messaging, but as a challenge to the very fabric of democratic dialogue and mutual understanding. In response, we have explored Marshall Rosenberg’s Nonviolent Communication as a potential antidote: a way to infuse public discourse with empathy, clarity, and respect for truth. NVC encourages a shift from accusation to inquiry, from diatribe to dialogue – focusing on the feelings and needs behind words, and on solutions that acknowledge everyone’s humanity.

Integrating insights from political communication research, we noted that populist discourse is often emotionally charged and negative, thriving on conflict and division (Engesser et al., 2017; Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-Ripollés, 2023). NVC, by contrast, works to defuse negative emotions through empathetic listening and to prevent reflexive defensiveness by removing blame (Rosenberg, 2003). From psychology, we saw that populist rhetoric taps into moral intuitions and identity needs (Haidt, 2012); NVC offers a way to address those same needs (like security, belonging, fairness) without the antagonism and scapegoating, thus potentially undercutting the appeal of the demagogue’s message. Empirical examples on social media illustrated the dire need for such approaches: content analyses show populists inundate platforms with fear-based messaging (Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-Ripollés, 2023), and user studies link these patterns to growing polarization and a chilling effect on open dialogue (Matthes et al., 2023; Amnesty International, 2020). In this light, an approach that can break the cycle – by engaging opponents with understanding, changing the tone of conversations, and re-humanizing those who have been othered – is a welcome prospect.

However, we have also critically examined whether and how NVC can overcome this challenge. We acknowledged that NVC is not a cure-all or a quick fix. Its application in the sprawling, impersonal battleground of the internet faces hurdles of scale, bad-faith actors, and misperception. It demands skill, practice, and changes in platform design or community norms to truly flourish. Moreover, empathy-driven communication must be carefully balanced with accountability and justice: showing compassion for individuals does not mean validating harmful ideologies or foregoing the protection of those targeted by hate. Rosenberg’s own writings remind us that NVC can be a powerful tool, but that sometimes a protective force is necessary. Thus, “nonviolent” communication in the context of populism should not be mistaken for passive acceptance; rather, it is an active and courageous choice to fight fire not with fire, but with water – cooling tempers, inviting reflection, and standing firmly on values of dignity and truth.

For academics and policymakers concerned with the rise of populism, the NVC framework offers fruitful avenues for further exploration. It bridges disciplines: from critical discourse analysis, it borrows the idea of challenging dominant narratives (here, challenging the narrative of enemy-making by substituting one of mutual understanding); from psychology, it leverages what we know about emotion and identity to craft communication that connects; from media studies, it raises questions about how platform ecosystems might be tweaked to reward empathy over outrage. Future research might test communication interventions inspired by NVC in online forums or deliberative democracy projects. Educators might incorporate NVC training to cultivate a new generation of digital citizens skilled in compassionate communication. Such steps could gradually build resilience in the public against manipulative rhetoric: an audience that no longer reacts blindly to fearmongering, but pauses to ask, “What is really being felt, and what is needed?”

In conclusion, the struggle against populist manipulation is not only a political or informational one, but fundamentally a communicative one – a struggle over how we speak and listen to each other in the public sphere. Nonviolent Communication, as Rosenberg envisioned it, is both a philosophical stance and a practical method that affirms the possibility of “speaking truth in love,” even amid discord. It invites each of us to reclaim our voice from the dynamics of anger and deceit, and to exercise a freedom of expression that is truly free – free from violence, free from coercion, and free to seek common humanity. While challenging to apply, Rosenberg’s approach is a counter-cultural antidote to populism’s poison, reminding us that empathy and honest connection are not naïve ideals but potent forces for social healing. 

In a time of hardened divisions, listening without judgment and speaking without malice may be revolutionary acts. As we refine strategies to curb the excesses of populist communication, we should not overlook the transformative power of nonviolence in communication itself. This antidote works not by suppression, but by elevation: elevating the conversation to a plane where manipulation falters and understanding begins.


 

(*) Claudia Fritsch is a Psychologist and Psychotherapist in Stuttgart, Germany. 


 

References

Alonso-Muñoz, L. & Casero-Ripollés, A. (2023). “The appeal to emotions in the discourse of populist political actors from Spain, Italy, France and the United Kingdom on Twitter.” Frontiers in Communication, 8, Article 1159847. https://doi.org/10.3389/fcomm.2023.1159847

Amnesty International. (2020). “Tweet… If you dare: Five facts about online abuse against women.” https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/act10/1353/2020/en/

Brady, W. J.; Wills, J. A.; Jost, J. T.; Tucker, J. A. & Van Bavel, J. J. (2017). “Emotion shapes the diffusion of moralized content in social networks.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 114(28), 7313–7318. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1618923114

Carothers, T. & O’Donohue, A. (Eds.). (2019). Democracies divided: The global challenge of political polarization. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Charaudeau, P. (2009). Discours populiste et communication politique: Les ressorts de la démagogie. (Excerpt cited in Alonso-Muñoz & Casero-Ripollés, 2023).

Druckman, J. N. & Levy, J. (Eds.). (2021). Affective polarization. Routledge.

Engesser, S.; Ernst, N.; Esser, F. & Büchel, F. (2017). “Populist online communication: Introduction to the special issue.” Information, Communication & Society, 20(9), 1279–1292. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2017.1328525

FAZ Dossier Redaktion. (2025). “Einfluss und Macht sozialer Netzwerke: Angriff der Algorithmen.” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. https://www.faz.net/aktuell/dossier-soziale-medien

Groeben, N. & Christmann, U. (2023). “Fair argumentation as a safeguard for peace and democracy.” In: C. Cohrs, N. Knab, & G. Sommer (Eds.), Handbook of peace psychology. Forum Friedenspsychologie. https://doi.org/10.17192/es2022.0073

Haidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion. Pantheon Books.

Helfritzsch, P. & Müller Hipper, J. (Eds.). (2024). Die Emotionalisierung des Politischen. transcript Verlag. https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839452783

Kohn, A. (1990). No contest: The case against competition. Houghton Mifflin.

Matthes, J., et al. (2023). “The way we use social media matters: A panel study on passive versus active political social media use and affective polarization.” International Journal of Communication, 17, 3211–3232.

National Institute for Civil Discourse. (Various years). Reports on social media and civility. University of Arizona.

Pörksen, B. (2018). Die große Gereiztheit: Wege aus der kollektiven Erregung. Carl Hanser Verlag.

Rosenberg, M. B. (2003). Nonviolent communication: A language of life. PuddleDancer Press.

Rosenberg, M. B. (2015). Nonviolent communication: Companion workbook. PuddleDancer Press.

Seid, A. R. (2023). “Using nonviolent communication (NVC) to address the roots and impacts of extremism.” PuddleDancer Press, online series.

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Zienert-Eilts, K. J. (2020). “Destructive populism as ‘perverted containing’: A psychoanalytical look at the attraction of Donald Trump.” International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 101(5), 971–991. https://doi.org/10.1080/00207578.2020.1827955

Giorgia Meloni, leader of Brothers of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, leader of Forza Italia and Matteo Salvini, leader of the League, attend a center-right coalition rally in Rome, Italy on March 01, 2018. Photo: Alessia Pierdomenico.

‘Patriots to Defend Our Identity from the Islamisation of Europe’: How Populist Leaders Normalise Polarisation, a Multimodal Discourse Analysis

Please cite as:

Reggi, Valeria. (2025). “‘Patriots to Defend Our Identity from the Islamisation of Europe’: How Populist Leaders Normalise Polarisation, a Multimodal Discourse Analysis.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). November 16, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000120

 

Abstract

This article presents the results of several studies on the communicative strategies of right-wing populist leaders in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom in 2021 and 2024. The analyses focus on Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella of the National Rally (Rassemblement National) in France, Giorgia Meloni of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) and Matteo Salvini of the League (Lega) in Italy, and Nigel Farage and Richard Tice of Reform UK. The research explores how these leaders construct ingroup and outgroup identities through discursive strategies, whether the outgroup is defined in civilisational terms and if these narratives have evolved over time, becoming ‘normalised.’ Employing qualitative multimodal analysis, the studies incorporate Plutchik’s (1991) classification of basic emotions, Martin and White’s (2005) appraisal theory, and Kress and van Leeuwen’s (2006) framework for image composition. The findings suggest an instrumental use of religion to enhance polarisation, but with a notable transition from emotionally charged visual campaigns to more rationalised and institutionalised arguments, contributing to the normalisation of divisive discourse on immigration and national identity.

Keywords: civilisationism, multimodal discourse analysis, normalisation, populism, right wing

By Valeria Reggi

The discourse of right-wing populist parties in Europe has undergone significant transformations over recent years. As digital platforms become increasingly central to political communication, populist leaders have adapted their messaging strategies to reach and engage with their audiences more effectively. This work presents an overview of several studies – both ongoing and completed – on the populist discourse in France, Italy, and the United Kingdom in 2021 and 2024. It focuses on right-wing leaders Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella of the National Rally (Rassemblement National) in France, Giorgia Meloni of Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d’Italia) and Matteo Salvini of the League (Lega) in Italy, and Nigel Farage and Richard Tice of Reform UK. The aim is to explore how they construct their ingroups and outgroups and the discursive mechanisms they employ to reinforce their political narratives, with particular attention to instrumental references to religion as an oppositional divide (civilisational populism). The ultimate scope is to highlight possible trajectories towards normalisation (Krzyżanowski, 2020). In particular, the studies investigate how right-wing populist[3]leaders in France, Italy and the UK build the identity of their ingroup and outgroup and what discursive strategies they use (RQ1), if the outgroup is defined in civilizational terms (RQ2) and if it has changed and become normalised in time (RQ3).

The results show, first of all, a remarkable focus on religion as a means to define the ingroup against the outgroup, which confirms the relevance of studying populism under a civilisational lens. Moreover, they highlight some relevant shifts in the content shared on social media and official party websites between 2021 and 2024, which outlines possible paths towards the normalisation of civilisational polarisation in mainstream political debates. Although this overview involves data sets originated in different research contexts and with different objectives, and, accordingly, does not aim to present a comparison between definitive results, it suggests a possible trajectory in the communication of rightist populist parties and opens the path for further investigation on the normalisation of polarised debate.

The following section outlines the theoretical framework underpinning the research, offering insights into populism, the concept of normalisation, civilisationism, and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Section 3 provides a detailed account of the materials and methods employed in the analysis. Section 4 presents the key findings and engages in their discussion. The final section addresses the research questions directly, expands upon the discussion, and considers possible directions for future research. 

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Women’s March Demonstration — Protesters take to the streets of Eugene, Oregon, despite the rain. Photo: Catherine Avilez.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 6: “Populism and the Crisis of Representation –Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice”

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 6: Populism and the Crisis of Representation –Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 13, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00118

 

On November 13, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the sixth session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Under the skillful moderation of Professor Ilhan Kaya (Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada), the session featured Dr. Jonathan Madison, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho, and Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira, who examined how populism both mirrors and magnifies democracy’s crisis of representation. Their analyses, complemented by insightful discussant interventions from Dr. Amir Ali and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, generated a vibrant dialogue on institutional resilience, digital disruption, and the reconfiguration of democratic legitimacy in an age of populist contention.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On November 13, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened Session 6 of its ongoing Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This session, titled “Populism and the Crisis of Representation: Reimagining Democracy in Theory and Practice,” brought together a distinguished group of scholars from political science, sociology, and democratic theory to examine one of the defining questions of our age—how populism both reflects and reshapes the crisis of democratic representation.

Under the capable and engaging chairmanship of Professor Ilhan Kaya (Visiting Professor at Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada; formerly of Yildiz Technical University, Turkey), the session unfolded with remarkable intellectual rigor and fluidity. Professor Kaya’s moderation ensured a balanced and inclusive dialogue among the presenters, discussants, and participants, fostering an atmosphere of critical reflection and open exchange.

The session featured three compelling presentations. Dr. Jonathan Madison (Governance Fellow, R Street Institute) opened with “De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World.” His paper challenged conventional hierarchies between “established” and “emerging” democracies, arguing that institutional resilience—particularly the robustness of liberal institutions—rather than wealth or longevity, determines a democracy’s ability to withstand populist pressures.

Next, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho (LabPol/Unesp and GEP Critical Theory, Brazil) presented “Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy.” His intervention explored populism as a sociological manifestation of democracy’s structural contradictions, emphasizing the interplay of economic inequality, charismatic leadership, and digital communication in the destabilization of representative institutions.

Finally, Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira (University of Bucharest) delivered “Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Politics and Post-Democracy.” She advanced a sophisticated conceptual framework distinguishing between democratic and strategic populisms and called for reclaiming political science’s critical vocation amid the hollowing of democratic politics in the neoliberal era.

The presentations were followed by incisive discussant interventions from Dr. Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) and Dr. Amedeo Varriale (University of East London) whose reflections broadened the theoretical and comparative scope of the session. Their critiques and elaborations inspired an engaging debate that continued into the Q&A session, where Professor Kaya adeptly guided a lively, cross-regional discussion on the transnational diffusion of populism and the institutional responses to democratic backsliding.

In sum, Session 6 stood out as an exemplary exercise in interdisciplinary dialogue—anchored by Professor Kaya’s thoughtful moderation and enriched by a diverse array of perspectives that collectively illuminated the multifaceted relationship between populism, representation, and the evolving fate of democracy in the twenty-first century.

 

Dr. Jonathan Madison: “De-Exceptionalizing Democracy — Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World”

Supporters of Brazil’s former President (2019–2022) Jair Bolsonaro hold signs during a demonstration in São Paulo, Brazil, on September 7, 2025. Photo: Dreamstime.

In his thought-provoking presentation titled “De-Exceptionalizing Democracy: Rethinking Established and Emerging Democracies in a Changing World,” Dr. Jonathan Madison examined one of the most pressing paradoxes of contemporary politics: Why some established democracies have proven fragile in the face of populist authoritarianism, while certain so-called “emerging” democracies have demonstrated remarkable resilience. Drawing on a comparative analysis of the United States and Brazil, Dr. Madison challenged conventional assumptions about democratic consolidation and offered a compelling argument for rethinking how resilience is conceptualized in the age of democratic backsliding.

Rethinking Democratic Backsliding

Dr. Madison began by noting that, since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been widely regarded as the paradigmatic liberal democracy, while Brazil has struggled to maintain democratic stability amid recurring episodes of military rule and institutional volatility. Yet the trajectories of both nations under populist leadership—Donald Trump in the United States and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil—suggest a striking reversal of expectations. Whereas Brazil has, at least so far, managed to contain and punish anti-democratic actors, the United States has continued to experience deep institutional erosion and mounting threats to liberal norms.

This observation, Dr. Madison argued, invites a critical reconsideration of the analytical divide between “consolidated” and “emerging” democracies—a divide that has long underpinned political-science typologies. He presented three key findings: First, that Brazil’s liberal institutions have proven more resilient than those of the United States; second, that liberal, rather than strictly democratic, institutions are the decisive bulwark against populist authoritarianism; and third, that the conventional distinction between established and emerging democracies fails to predict resilience in the present era of backsliding.

Liberal vs. Democratic Institutions

A central conceptual contribution of Dr. Madison’s paper lies in his insistence on differentiating between democratic and liberal institutions. Democratic institutions refer to the procedures of electoral competition—regular elections, party systems, and voting mechanisms. Liberal institutions, by contrast, include independent courts, separation of powers, oversight agencies, and constitutional protections for individual rights. According to Dr. Madison, much of the existing literature on backsliding conflates these two domains, obscuring the fact that it is liberal institutions—rather than electoral ones—that are most often targeted and eroded by populist leaders.

Populist authoritarians such as Trump and Bolsonaro, he emphasized, have rarely campaigned on overtly anti-democratic platforms. Instead, they have portrayed themselves as embodiments of the “popular will” and have weaponized democratic legitimacy against liberal constraints. In this sense, democracy has not been rejected but appropriated as a rhetorical tool for dismantling the liberal guardrails that limit executive power.

Competing Explanations: Delivery vs. Institutions

Dr. Madison situated his argument within two major explanatory frameworks in the literature on backsliding. The delivery hypothesis attributes democratic erosion to governments’ failures to provide socioeconomic benefits—declining industrialization, rising inequality, and insecurity—thereby driving citizens toward anti-system alternatives. The institutional hypothesis, by contrast, focuses on how executives exploit loopholes and weakened checks to expand power.

While acknowledging both dynamics, Dr. Madison sided primarily with the institutional explanation, albeit with two refinements: First, that liberal institutions are the true targets of authoritarian populists, and second, that institutions are not self-executing. Their survival depends on political actors’ willingness to uphold them.

The Myth of Democratic Consolidation

Turning to the broader theoretical implications, Dr. Madison questioned the enduring validity of the distinction between “established” and “emerging” democracies. The twentieth-century paradigm, he noted, assumed that consolidated democracies—those of North America and Western Europe—had evolved beyond the fragilities of their “third-wave” counterparts. Yet, as recent developments show, phenomena once associated with Latin American politics—clientelism, corruption, and executive overreach—now thrive in the very heartlands of liberal democracy.

Brazil and the United States, he argued, invert the old hierarchy. The United States, supposedly the archetype of stability, has struggled to contain populist assaults, while Brazil, an “emerging” democracy with a much shorter democratic lineage, has successfully constrained executive excesses and imposed accountability after the fact.

Case Study I: The United States

Dr. Madison’s detailed case study of the United States underscored the weaknesses of its liberal architecture. Donald Trump’s rise in 2016, framed as a crusade on behalf of the “forgotten working class,” did not initially signal anti-democratic intent. Yet, once in office, Trump expanded executive authority through hundreds of executive orders, politicized the Department of Justice, and undermined independent oversight.

Institutional responses were inconsistent and often ineffectual. While the Supreme Court occasionally blocked his initiatives, partisan loyalty within Congress neutralized both impeachment efforts and subsequent investigations. The January 6th attack on the Capitol exposed the depth of the institutional malaise: Even in the face of direct insurrection, accountability mechanisms faltered.

Subsequent attempts to hold Trump legally responsible—including constitutional challenges under the 14th Amendment—were thwarted by judicial hesitation and partisan polarization. Dr. Madison argued that such failures illustrate how unwritten norms, rather than codified constraints, underpin much of the US system—norms that can easily be disregarded when political will collapses.

Case Study II: Brazil

By contrast, Dr. Madison presented Brazil as an unexpected success story of institutional resilience. Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency (2019–2022) resembled Trump’s in its populist style and attacks on liberal institutions. Bolsonaro ruled extensively through Medidas Provisórias (provisional measures), sought to politicize law enforcement, and vilified the Supreme Federal Tribunal. At rallies, he even declared, “I truly am the Constitution.”

Yet, Brazil’s institutions withstood these assaults. Congress allowed many provisional measures to expire or heavily amended them. The judiciary—particularly the Supreme Federal Tribunal—asserted itself repeatedly against executive encroachment. As Bolsonaro attempted to undermine the 2022 election by alleging fraud in Brazil’s electronic voting system, the country’s electoral justice apparatus acted swiftly, opening investigations and reaffirming the system’s integrity.

After Bolsonaro’s defeat, accountability followed with unprecedented speed. In 2023, the electoral court barred him from office for a decade for abusing presidential powers. In 2024, prosecutors indicted him for conspiring to subvert the election through a military coup attempt—marking the first time in Brazilian history that coup plotters faced prosecution.

Explaining Divergent Outcomes

Dr. Madison identified several structural factors explaining these divergent trajectories. Institutional design, he argued, was paramount. In Brazil, provisional measures expire automatically unless Congress acts—creating built-in limits on executive decree powers. In the United States, by contrast, executive orders and emergency powers are open-ended unless Congress intervenes, which it rarely does.

Party-system dynamics also played a role. The United States’ rigid two-party polarization has fostered a “siege mentality,” discouraging intra-party accountability. Brazil’s fragmented multiparty system, conversely, allowed legislators greater independence from the executive, enabling them to restrain Bolsonaro without threatening their own political survival.

Legal culture further deepens the contrast. Brazil’s civil-law system empowers its Supreme Court to act preemptively in defense of constitutional order, while the US common-law tradition restricts courts to adjudicating concrete disputes. Finally, Brazil’s collective memory of dictatorship has shaped a constitutional architecture that codifies protections the US continues to rely on as unwritten norms.

Liberal Institutions as the True Safeguard

Dr. Madison concluded by reiterating that the distinction between established and emerging democracies is increasingly untenable. The resilience of democracy depends not on age or wealth but on the vigor of liberal institutions and the political will to defend them. The Brazilian case demonstrates that even younger democracies can adapt and respond effectively to populist threats when constitutional design, judicial activism, and institutional pluralism align.

At the same time, Dr. Madison cautioned that Brazil’s assertive judiciary now faces its own dilemma: Overreach in defense of liberalism can itself undermine democratic pluralism if it suppresses legitimate dissent. Ultimately, the challenge is to strike a balance between constraint and participation—a task that requires constant vigilance in all democracies, established or emerging alike.

Through his nuanced comparative analysis, Dr. Madison’s paper offered a powerful reminder that no democracy is exceptional, immune, or permanently consolidated. In an age of populist volatility, resilience is earned, not inherited.

 

Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho: “Mobilizing for Disruption: A Sociological Interpretation of the Role of Populism in the Crisis of Democracy”

Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF) at night, Brasília, Federal District, Brazil, August 26, 2018. Photo: Diego Grandi.

In his presentation,  Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho explored populism as a sociological phenomenon intimately bound to the structural crisis of modern democracy. His analysis situated populism not merely as a reaction to democratic failure but as a dynamic force that both exploits and deepens democracy’s internal contradictions.

Dr. Carvalho opened by asserting that democracy is undergoing a structural crisis, not a temporary malfunction. Populism, he argued, cannot be understood in isolation from this broader transformation of democratic systems. Rather than external threats, populist movements are symptomatic of inherent tensions between the normative aspirations of democracy—equality, freedom, and solidarity—and the systemic imperatives of capitalist societies, which operate through competition and the pursuit of particular interests.

These contradictions, rooted in modernity itself, cannot be resolved by political will alone. Drawing on the sociological insights of Claus Offe, Dr. Carvalho recalled that the mid-20th century democratic compromise—anchored in welfare-state regulation and competitive party politics—temporarily stabilized the tension between capitalism and democracy. However, the neoliberal deregulation of markets and the rise of new social movements since the 1980s disrupted that equilibrium. In his view, the global economic crisis of 2007–2008 and subsequent political realignments made Offe’s diagnosis more relevant than ever: The institutional structures that once mediated social conflict have lost legitimacy and efficacy, opening space for new, disruptive forms of populist mobilization.

Charismatic Leadership and the Production of Meaning

The second pillar of Dr. Carvalho’s argument focused on populist leadership as a form of charismatic authority that emerges precisely in times of systemic dislocation. Drawing on Max Weber’s classical concept and Ulrich Bröckling’s reinterpretations, he described populist leaders as figures who interpret social contradictions, giving them symbolic meaning and emotional coherence within a political community. Leaders such as Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Donald Trump in the United States, and Javier Milei in Argentina exemplify what Dr. Carvalho called disruptive charisma—a leadership style that mobilizes discontent by presenting itself as a redemptive force against corrupt elites and unresponsive institutions.

Such leaders do not merely exploit crises; they narrate them. Through simplified dichotomies between “the people” and “the elite,” they transform diffuse frustrations into moral conflicts, thereby legitimizing attacks on democratic institutions. The leader becomes both the interpreter and the embodiment of the people’s supposed will.

Digital Media and the Disruption of the Public Sphere

A central innovation in Dr. Carvalho’s framework concerns the reconfiguration of the public sphere by digital media. Social networks, he argued, have profoundly destabilized traditional forms of political communication. In the past, legacy media served as institutional gatekeepers, moderating the flow of information and maintaining a degree of discursive coherence. Digital platforms, by contrast, enable direct and immediate communication between leaders and followers—an illusion of intimacy that bypasses established mediating institutions such as political parties, journalists, and civil society organizations.

While this “direct connection” appears democratic, it is in fact highly mediated by algorithms and platform architectures designed to maximize engagement rather than deliberation. The populist leader’s ability to speak “directly” to the people through social media thus amplifies polarization and erodes the legitimacy of traditional institutions. Dr. Carvalho likened this transformation to economic deregulation: Just as markets freed from oversight can generate instability, the deregulation of communication creates a volatile and fragmented public sphere.

Populism as Mobilization Against Mediation

For Dr. Carvalho, the defining feature of contemporary populism is its mobilization against institutional mediation. Populist discourse constructs representative institutions—parliaments, courts, and the media—as obstacles to authentic popular sovereignty. By delegitimizing these intermediaries, populist leaders claim to restore democracy to “the people,” while in practice undermining the very mechanisms that sustain democratic pluralism.

He illustrated this logic through an empirical vignette from Brazil. Following Jair Bolsonaro’s defeat in the 2022 presidential election, supporters gathered outside government buildings chanting: “Get out, justice—supreme is the people.” This slogan, he noted, encapsulates the populist inversion of democratic legitimacy. The protesters demanded the removal of Supreme Court justices, not by name, but by function—attacking the institutional role itself. Their claim that “the people are supreme” asserted a direct, unmediated sovereignty that rejects the procedural and institutional framework through which democracy operates.

In this sense, the populist demand is paradoxically framed as more democratic: It invokes the name of the people to justify the dismantling of institutions designed to protect popular rule. The rhetoric of “immediate democracy” thus becomes a vehicle for anti-institutional mobilization.

Toward a Sociology of Democratic Disruption

Dr. Carvalho emphasized that his research remains part of an ongoing project aimed at developing a sociological framework for empirical investigation. His future work will explore how populist movements, particularly through digital media, reconfigure the relationship between leaders, followers, and institutions. He intends to conduct qualitative case studies examining how online mobilization interacts with the transformation of party politics—citing Italy’s Five Star Movement as a paradigmatic case of “digital direct democracy.”

He also proposed a nuanced concept of crisis as an open-ended moment of transformation rather than mere breakdown. A crisis, in his interpretation, is a juncture of potential reconfiguration—it can lead toward renewed democratization or toward authoritarian closure. Populist movements seek to occupy this liminal space, channeling uncertainty and discontent into collective action. Understanding how populist leaders interpret and operationalize such moments, he argued, is key to grasping democracy’s current vulnerability and possible renewal.

Dr. Carvalho concluded by stressing that populism should not be viewed as an anomaly or external threat to democracy but as an internal mode of contestation emerging from its structural contradictions. The interplay between capitalism’s systemic logic and democracy’s normative promises has produced recurring crises of legitimacy, which populist leaders exploit through affective communication and anti-institutional rhetoric.

His sociological interpretation reframes populism not as the pathology of democracy but as one of its revealing expressions—a mirror reflecting the unresolved tensions of modernity. By mobilizing citizens against mediation in the name of immediacy and authenticity, populist movements both expose and accelerate democracy’s ongoing transformation.

Dr. Carvalho’s intervention thus offered a rigorous and thought-provoking framework for analyzing the sociopolitical mechanisms through which populism “mobilizes for disruption” in an era where democracy’s very foundations are being redefined by digital technologies, structural inequalities, and the erosion of institutional trust.

 

Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira: “Daniel Barbu’s and Peter Mair’s Theoretical Perspectives on Post-Politics and Post-Democracy”

A rear view of people with placards and posters on global strike for climate change. Photo: Dreamstime.

In her intellectually rich and methodologically reflective presentation, Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira advanced a powerful analytical framework for reinterpreting populism within the broader crisis of contemporary democracy. Rather than approaching populism as a pathology or deviation, she argued that it must be seen as a reaction—a symptom and sometimes a corrective—to the structural transformations that have hollowed out the meaning and substance of democratic politics.

Populism Reconsidered: Between Democratic and Anti-Democratic Forms

Dr. Zamfira began by situating her work in dialogue with previous presentations at the workshop, notably that of Dr. Carvalho. While concurring with the notion that democracy faces a structural crisis, she raised a crucial question: which populism are we addressing—the democratic or the anti-democratic? This question framed her broader argument that the contemporary conceptual landscape surrounding populism has become increasingly blurred, both in academia and in public discourse.

She noted that populism can be studied through several lenses—ideological, strategic, or discursive—but that the persistent conflation of these dimensions has led to confusion. Particularly, she distinguished between ideological (or democratic) populism and strategic populism. The former represents a normative and legitimate effort to reclaim political agency and representation in the name of the people, while the latter functions as a manipulative instrument within the spectacle of modern politics.

Citing the French political theorist Pierre Rosanvallon, Dr. Zamfira emphasized that populism—although often criticized for its anti-pluralist tendencies—can perform a democratic corrective function, exposing the deficits of representation and the alienation of citizens from political elites. In this sense, ideological populism reflects an authentic desire to re-politicize public life and re-anchor democracy in the sovereignty of the demos. By contrast, strategic populism is tied to the “spectacularization” and “theatricalization” of politics in the media age, where populism becomes a performance rather than a project.

The Positive and Negative Faces of Populism

Drawing on the works of Peter Mair, Philippe Schmitter, and Richard Katz, Dr. Zamfira reminded the audience that populism, despite its risks, may also yield positive outcomes. It can compel traditional parties—detached from society and reduced to electoral machines—to reconnect with citizens or face obsolescence. Democratic populism, in this sense, acts as an agent of renewal within a stagnant political order.

This approach, she argued, departs from the mainstream portrayal of populism as an inherently destructive or extremist force. While populist leaders and movements can indeed threaten liberal norms, ideological populism—understood as a set of ideas rather than as a strategy—offers a deeper philosophical and sociological insight into the nature of political legitimacy and popular sovereignty. For Dr. Zamfira, this theoretical differentiation is crucial for restoring balance and nuance to contemporary analyses of populism.

Revisiting Barbu and Mair: Diagnosing Post-Politics and Post-Democracy

Dr. Zamfira then turned to her two central interlocutors: Daniel Barbu, a Romanian political philosopher and historian, and Peter Mair, the late Irish political scientist. Both thinkers, she argued, provided penetrating accounts of the erosion of representative democracy—what Mair termed “the hollowing of Western democracy” and Barbu called “the absent republic.”

Peter Mair’s Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (2013) was presented as a seminal work for understanding how European democracies have lost their representational vitality. Mair traced the growing gap between political elites and citizens, arguing that parties have withdrawn from their societal roots while citizens, in turn, have disengaged from formal politics. The result is a “democratic void” in which electoral mechanisms persist, but meaningful political contestation declines.

Daniel Barbu, in The Absent Republic (1999), diagnosed a parallel condition in post-communist Europe. In his account, democracy has become formally present but substantively absent: The state operates according to its own self-referential logic of power rather than the will of its citizens. Popular sovereignty, while preserved as a rhetorical principle, is emptied of real influence. The republic, in Barbu’s phrase, becomes “absent” because its institutions no longer mediate between society and power.

Dr. Zamfira suggested that despite their distinct intellectual traditions, both thinkers converge on a shared diagnosis: The weakening of the link between rulers and ruled. Their reflections articulate the broader transition from politics to post-politics—a condition of depoliticization in which fundamental political questions are displaced by managerial and technocratic decision-making—and from democracy to post-democracy, where formal procedures remain but substantive pluralism and ideological conflict erode.

The Crisis of Political Science and the Loss of Critical Function

In a particularly reflective segment, Dr. Zamfira extended Barbu’s critique to academia itself. She argued that much of contemporary political science has become complicit in the post-political condition it describes. Echoing Barbu’s contention that political science is increasingly a “discourse that accompanies power,” she lamented its drift away from critique toward technocratic neutrality.

Political science, she argued, must reclaim its critical vocation as the conscience of democracy. The discipline’s task is not merely to measure political behavior but to interrogate the structures of power that constrain democratic agency. In the current intellectual climate—marked by polarization and conceptual simplification—this reflexive and critical function is more necessary than ever.

Populism as Effect, Not Cause, of Democratic Erosion

Dr. Zamfira challenged the prevailing tendency to treat populism as the cause of democratic backsliding. Instead, drawing on both Barbu and Mair, she proposed that populism should be seen as an effect of structural democratic erosion. The rise of populist discourse reflects the profound disconnect between politics and society—a void left by depoliticized elites, bureaucratic governance, and the dominance of market rationality.

Depoliticization, she explained, transfers decision-making from elected representatives to unelected experts and administrative bodies. As Mair observed, governance becomes “about people, not by them.” In such a context, populism emerges as a reaction—a demand to restore voice, representation, and conflict to a technocratic order that has rendered citizens spectators rather than participants.

The Road to Post-Democracy

Building on Colin Crouch’s notion of post-democracy, Dr. Zamfira outlined the broader trajectory of this transformation. Post-democracy is characterized by the persistence of democratic forms—elections, parties, and constitutions—without their substantive content. Ideological contestation gives way to managerial consensus; citizens remain nominally sovereign, but real power migrates toward economic elites, corporate actors, and international institutions such as the European Union or the World Trade Organization.

Citing Eric Schattschneider’s classic distinction between government by the people (the pluralist model) and government for the people (the elitist model), Dr. Zamfira argued that Western democracies have steadily moved toward the latter since the 1990s. The transition from pluralism to elitism, she suggested, has eroded the participatory foundations of democratic life.

Reclaiming the Critical Space for Democracy

In conclusion, Dr. Zamfira issued a clear call to re-evaluate both the academic and political treatment of populism. When elitist models of democracy dominate, all populist discourses—whether democratic or authoritarian—risk being delegitimized as extremist or irrational. This conflation, she warned, blinds political science to the genuine democratic energies that may animate certain populist movements.

To recover the integrity of democratic theory, Dr. Zamfira urged scholars to re-engage with populism’s critical dimension—as a response to alienation, not merely as a threat to order—and to reclaim the discipline’s role as democracy’s critical conscience. Her intervention stood out as both theoretically rigorous and normatively committed, illuminating the necessity of nuanced reflection in a time when democracy’s form endures but its meaning is at risk of disappearing.

 

Discussant’s Feedback: Dr. Amir Ali

Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Amir Ali, Associate Professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), offered a deeply engaging and intellectually expansive intervention as discussant, responding to three presentations. His comments demonstrated a remarkable comparative and theoretical breadth, drawing on experiences from India, as well as on key works in democratic theory and political economy.

Beginning with Dr. Jonathan Madison’s paper, Dr. Ali expressed broad sympathy with its analytical depth while identifying a key conceptual tension. He argued that Dr. Madison placed “too much explanatory weight” on the liberal dimension of democracy, implicitly assuming that liberal institutions could redeem democracy from its contemporary crisis. Invoking Canadian political theorist C.B. Macpherson, Dr. Ali reminded the audience that “liberal democracy” is a hyphenated idea in which the liberal element historically dominates and undermines the democratic one. This imbalance, he suggested, has led to a steady evisceration of democracy under liberal capitalism.

To reinforce this point, Dr. Ali referenced Timothy Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy (2011), arguing that the United States’ current democratic turmoil, epitomized by the Trump phenomenon, represents the “chickens of democracy coming home to roost.” The US project of exporting liberal democracy abroad, he contended, resulted in “carbon copies” of democracy—thin, depleted, and formalistic versions of a system already hollowed out at home.

While agreeing with Dr. Madison’s call to collapse the analytical divide between “established” and “emerging” democracies, Dr. Ali challenged the implicit optimism in liberal institutionalism. From his vantage point in India, he observed that constitutional institutions—such as the Election Commission—had been systematically weakened by populist-authoritarian governments. What was once a robust guardian of electoral integrity had become, in his words, “a toothless tiger.” This erosion of institutional autonomy, he argued, undermines any faith in liberal institutions as bulwarks against democratic backsliding.

Populism, Capital, and the Fractured Public Sphere

Turning to Dr. Carvalho’s sociological interpretation of populism, Dr. Ali praised the paper’s focus on the contradictions of democracy but urged a stronger integration of the contradictions of capitalism into the analysis. Populism, he argued, arises not merely from democratic tensions but from deeper economic dislocations produced by global neoliberalism—the “continuous defeat of labour by capital” over the last four decades. The populist construction of “the people,” he contended, serves to obscure these material contradictions by redirecting discontent away from structural inequality and toward cultural or institutional scapegoats.

Dr. Ali also expanded Dr. Carvalho’s discussion of the public sphere. Drawing on Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality, he argued that the fragmentation wrought by digital media is not simply a weakening of the public sphere but its obliteration. “Social media has smashed the public sphere into smithereens,” he remarked, noting how algorithmic logics and data manipulation—exemplified by the Cambridge Analytica scandal during the Brexit campaign—have reconfigured political consciousness itself. This transformation, he warned, poses an “existential threat”to democracy, as it dissolves the conditions for collective deliberation that once made democratic politics possible.

The Question of “Good” and “Bad” Populisms

In response to Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira’s paper, Dr. Ali began with initial disagreement but ultimately expressed appreciation for her nuanced approach. He questioned her distinction between “democratic” (good) and “anti-democratic” (bad) populisms, suggesting that populism, whether left- or right-wing, tends inevitably toward authoritarianism. Citing India’s political history, he invoked Indira Gandhi’s left-wing populism of the 1970s—which culminated in the suspension of democracy during the Emergency—as an example of how populist appeals, even when grounded in egalitarian rhetoric, can precipitate democratic backsliding.

Dr. Ali’s skepticism was rooted in his observation that populism’s logic of personalization and mass mobilization undermines institutional checks and pluralist deliberation, regardless of ideological orientation. In this sense, populism’s “democratic” variants may share more structural affinities with authoritarianism than is often acknowledged.

Political Science, Technocracy, and the Loss of Critique

Dr. Ali concluded his intervention with reflections that engaged Dr. Zamfira’s critique of political science as an increasingly accommodating discipline. He agreed that the field has too often become a “discourse that accompanies power” rather than interrogates it. Echoing her concern, he called for a revival of the discipline’s critical function, arguing that the marginalization of political theory and the ascendancy of technocratic and economic approaches have impoverished both scholarship and democratic imagination.

Returning to first principles, Dr. Ali proposed a return to Aristotle’s conception of politics as the master science—the discipline that encompasses the ends of all other human activities. The displacement of politics by economics and technology, he suggested, has produced not only a theoretical crisis but also the very political vacuum in which populism thrives. “Perhaps one way of countering populism,” he concluded, “is to reread Aristotle—again and again.”

Dr. Ali’s intervention stood out for its theoretical range, comparative insight, and critical acuity. By weaving together classical political philosophy, Marxian political economy, and lived experiences from India, he illuminated how global populism reflects the intertwined crises of capitalism, communication, and democratic representation. His commentary enriched the session’s intellectual dialogue, bridging empirical realities with enduring questions about democracy’s moral and philosophical foundations.

 

Discussant’s Feedback: Dr. Amedeo Varriale

Dr. Amedeo Varriale delivered an incisive and reflective intervention as discussant during the session, engaging critically and constructively with the presentations. His comments combined empirical insight, theoretical clarity, and comparative perspective, particularly drawing from his background in European political studies and his familiarity with both Western and Southern European populist experiences.

Dr. Varriale began by focusing on Dr. Madison’s paper. He praised it for its methodological precision, empirical richness, and conceptual originality, noting that it offers an important contribution to the academic debate on democratic backsliding. Dr. Madison’s central claim—that liberal institutions, rather than developmental indicators such as wealth or regime maturity, determine a state’s resilience to populist authoritarianism—was, according to Dr. Varriale, both compelling and empirically well-supported.

He commended Dr. Madison’s comparative analysis between Brazil and the United States, emphasizing how the paper demonstrated the Brazilian judiciary and legislature’s stronger capacity to constrain illiberal executives compared to their US counterparts. The examples of Bolsonaro’s medidas provisórias and Trump’s use of executive orders, emergency decrees, and partisan manipulation of independent agencies, he said, vividly illustrated how populist leaders “tamper with liberal aspects of democracy” while maintaining democratic façades.

Dr. Varriale found particular value in the way the paper foregrounded liberal institutions as guardians against populist excess, suggesting that it advanced the debate beyond the more traditional focus on populism’s discursive or ideological dimensions. However, he used Dr. Madison’s findings to open a broader reflection on the decline of classical liberalism in American conservatism. He observed that the Republican Party, once rooted in liberal individualism, free markets, and civic patriotism, had under Donald Trump devolved into a populist, crypto-authoritarian movement, marked by protectionism, conspiracy thinking, and xenophobia. This ideological transformation, he argued, represented one of the most striking manifestations of how populism can hollow out long-established party traditions and erode the liberal core of democratic politics.

Polarization, Populist Cycles, and the Limits of Centrist Politics

Expanding his remarks, Dr. Varriale reflected on the polarized state of American politics, where extremes on both right and left have squeezed out centrism, classical liberalism, and social democracy. Drawing on Benjamin Moffitt’s concept of “anti-populist consensus politics,” he expressed skepticism that such a consensus could re-emerge in a society as demographically and culturally fragmented as the United States. In his view, the disappearance of a shared political middle—combined with deep divisions between metropolitan and rural America—jeopardizes the country’s ability to continue functioning as the “leader of the free world” in an increasingly multipolar order. He warned that, given these divisions, “there is no guarantee that after Trump there won’t be another Trump—or someone worse.”

Populism, Partyless Democracy, and the Crisis of Representation

Turning to the presentations by Dr. Carvalho and Dr. Zamfira, Dr. Varriale connected their insights to the work of Peter Mair and William Galston, both of whom had theorized the weakening of the representative link between citizens and political elites. He highlighted Mair’s distinction between democracy’s two pillars—popular sovereignty and constitutionalism—and argued that populism thrives by overemphasizing the former while undermining the latter. Populists, he noted, have “no issue with popular sovereignty or majority rule, but a deep aversion to the rule of law and minority protections.” This imbalance transforms democratic majoritarianism into illiberal governance.

Building on Dr. Carvalho’s sociological framework, Dr. Varriale linked this dynamic to the phenomenon of “partyless democracy,” where populist movements reject political parties as corrupt intermediaries and promote direct forms of plebiscitary participation. He drew on examples from Italy—particularly the Five Star Movement (M5S)—to illustrate how anti-elite and anti-party sentiment can morph into anti-political and anti-constitutional tendencies. The M5S’s efforts to abolish public funding for parties and drastically reduce the number of parliamentarians, he argued, risked turning politics into a domain accessible only to the wealthy and further eroding democratic pluralism.

Populism’s Dual Face: Corrective and Destructive

Dr. Varriale nuanced his critique by acknowledging, in agreement with Dr. Zamfira, that not all populisms are inherently anti-democratic. In certain historical contexts—such as Solidarity (Solidarność) in Poland or the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in Mexico—populist movements have functioned as democratic correctives, challenging authoritarian elites and expanding political inclusion. Nonetheless, he cautioned that populism’s structural anti-pluralism—its conviction that only it represents the “true people”—renders it perpetually vulnerable to authoritarian outcomes. Whether on the left or the right, populism’s exclusionary logic and hostility to institutional mediation ultimately threaten the liberal core of democracy.

In closing, Dr. Varriale reiterated that the current populist zeitgeist is best understood as the product of a longstanding tension within democracy itself—between the popular and the constitutional dimensions. Populism amplifies one at the expense of the other, promising empowerment while eroding constraint. His intervention underscored the need for renewed scholarly and civic engagement with liberal institutions, representative mediation, and pluralist values if democracy is to withstand its contemporary trials.

Presenters’ Responses

Following the discussants’ insightful interventions by Dr. Amir Ali and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, the three presenters offered their concluding reflections. Their responses were thoughtful, collegial, and self-reflective, highlighting the intellectual complementarity of their research and the productive avenues for further development that emerged through the discussion.

Dr. Jonathan Madison began by expressing deep appreciation for the discussants’ thoughtful engagement, noting that the feedback illuminated new dimensions of his comparative study on democratic backsliding in Brazil and the United States. He particularly emphasized the intellectual convergence between his own paper and Dr. Carvalho’s work, remarking that their analyses “filled in some gaps for each other.” He acknowledged that the discussion, especially the points raised about social media and its role in reshaping democratic participation, had provided an important new perspective that he hoped to incorporate in future versions of his research. Dr. Madison reaffirmed that the intersection of institutional resilience, populist behavior, and digital disruption represents a crucial frontier in understanding contemporary democracy. 

Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho followed with a succinct and reflective response. He thanked both discussants for their rigorous and provocative assessments, emphasizing how the feedback would directly inform the ongoing development of his research project on populist mobilization and the structural crisis of democracy. Dr. Carvalho reiterated his appreciation for the interdisciplinary dialogue, noting that the comments had enriched his understanding of how populist discourse interacts with broader transformations in communication, capitalism, and political mediation. While he refrained from engaging in detailed debate, he emphasized that the exchange of ideas offered “something to think of and try to incorporate” into his evolving sociological framework. 

Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira provided the most extensive and reflective reply, directly addressing the points raised by both discussants. She began by thanking Dr. Ali and Dr. Varriale for their rigorous critiques, describing their interventions as intellectually stimulating and fruitful for her ongoing reflections.

Responding first to Dr. Ali, Dr. Zamfira acknowledged the value of his notion of the “populist construction of the people,” which she found conceptually intriguing and potentially useful for exploring populism as a reaction to capitalism and growing economic inequality. She clarified that her earlier distinction between “good” and “bad” populism was not intended as a moral hierarchy but as an analytical shorthand for differentiating “beneficial” and “pernicious” functions of populism within democratic regimes. Drawing on scholars such as Peter Mair and Richard Katz, she reiterated that certain populist movements can perform corrective functions by reactivating political participation and exposing representational deficits.

Addressing the discussion on the pandemic and populist governance, Dr. Zamfira agreed that populist leaders often managed the crisis poorly but contextualized this within a pre-existing technocratic drift in policymaking. Long before the pandemic, she argued, political decision-making had increasingly been justified through the rhetoric of urgency, expertise, and efficiency, rather than representation and deliberation. The pandemic, therefore, intensified rather than initiated this trend, placing populists in a reactive position against an already depoliticized public sphere.

She also strongly endorsed Dr. Ali’s call to restore the autonomy and critical function of political science, warning against its transformation into a technocratic discourse that “accompanies power.” For Dr. Zamfira, reclaiming this critical vocation is essential to understanding — and not merely diagnosing — democracy’s structural crisis.

Turning to Dr. Varriale’s comments, Dr. Zamfira nuanced her position on populism’s relationship with minorities and constitutionalism. While conceding that certain populist movements exhibit exclusionary, nationalist, or xenophobic tendencies, she argued that not all populisms are built on exclusion. In some cases, populism can function as a logic of articulation between the people and elites, incorporating marginalized groups into the political community. This inclusive variant, she noted, aligns with the interpretations of Pierre Rosanvallon and Peter Mair, who recognize populism’s potential to expand democratic participation under specific contexts.

In conclusion, Dr. Zamfira reiterated that populism should be understood as a symptom of democracy without a demos — a response to a representation void created by institutions that have lost their ability to reflect social expectations. Her closing reflections synthesized the session’s debates into a powerful theoretical statement: populism, far from being a monolith, represents the dynamic interplay between crisis, representation, and the enduring struggle to reclaim democracy’s social foundation.

Q&A Session

Photo: Dreamstime.

 

The Q&A session unfolded as an intellectually vibrant continuation of the day’s presentations and discussions. It deepened the exploration of the transnational dimensions of populism, the contextual dynamics of authoritarian drift, and the institutional and cultural factors shaping democratic resilience. The conversation was animated by thoughtful exchanges among the moderator, presenters, discussants, and audience members.

Opening the floor, Dr. Ilhan Kaya posed a fundamental question that framed the discussion: Is there a broader contextual or historical moment that explains the simultaneous rise of populist and authoritarian governments across diverse political systems—from India to the United States, from Turkey to Hungary and Brazil? He further inquired whether populism could be understood as a form of political “contagion,” spreading across borders through inspiration and imitation.

Responding first, Dr. Amir Ali argued that the post-2008 global financial crisis served as a decisive structural backdrop for the surge of populist movements. He identified 2016 as a symbolic turning point — the year of Donald Trump’s election and the Brexit referendum — that consolidated this wave. According to Dr. Ali, the economic dislocation of the late 2000s combined with mounting disillusionment toward neoliberal governance to produce fertile ground for anti-establishment politics. Populism, he suggested, emerged as both a reaction to economic precarity and a symptom of democratic malaise.

Building on this, Dr. Amedeo Varriale emphasized that populism’s spread has not been confined within national boundaries but has often evolved through transnational emulation. Drawing on examples from Central and Eastern Europe, he observed how leaders like Viktor Orbán in Hungary have inspired similar populist movements elsewhere, notably in Romania, where nationalist actors have consciously imitated Orbán’s rhetoric and political strategies. For Dr. Varriale, this demonstrated that populism functions as a transborder discourse, traveling through networks of ideological affinity, media exposure, and strategic learning.

Expanding the discussion, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho introduced a sociological perspective, situating the populist wave within two interconnected global transformations: The economic crisis and digitalization. These processes, he argued, have created quasi-universal conditions—economic insecurity and the transformation of communication—that enable the proliferation of populist styles of leadership. Yet, Dr. Carvalho stressed that the expression of populism remains nationally contingent. The global conditions may be shared, but the ways in which populist movements interpret and adapt them depend on domestic political histories, institutional configurations, and leadership dynamics. His intervention underscored the necessity of combining structural explanations with detailed empirical analysis to grasp populism’s heterogeneous manifestations.

Memory, Institutions, and the Lessons of Dictatorship

ECPS’ Executive Chair Selcuk Gultasli directed a pointed question to Dr. Jonathan Madison, asking about the role of collective memory—specifically Brazil’s memory of military dictatorship—in reinforcing democratic resilience, in contrast to the United States, which lacks such a historical experience. Dr. Madison’s response highlighted the institutional legacy of Brazil’s 1988 Constitution, deliberately crafted to prevent a recurrence of authoritarianism. This historical consciousness, he explained, has endowed Brazilian democracy with a stronger normative and institutional defense against executive overreach. He contrasted this with the American political culture, where the prevailing belief that “it can’t happen here” fosters complacency toward democratic erosion.

Dr. Madison noted that Bolsonaro’s glorification of the military past ironically reinforced institutional vigilance, prompting legislative and judicial bodies to codify new legal protections against threats to democracy. By contrast, the United States’ absence of a lived experience of dictatorship has contributed to a weaker reflex of institutional self-preservation in the face of populist challenges.

The Trump Factor and Republican Conformity

Returning to the American context, Dr. Ilhan Kaya inquired about the Republican Party’s accommodation of Donald Trump, despite opposition from prominent figures like George W. Bush and Mitt Romney. Dr. Madison responded by emphasizing the structural and electoral logic of partisanship in the US: Once Trump redefined the Republican base, dissent became politically untenable. The survival instincts of legislators—dependent on party nomination and voter loyalty—made resistance a “losing strategy.” Those who opposed Trump, he observed, “are no longer in the party or in politics.” In a two-party system, the inability to form new right-wing alternatives, unlike in Brazil’s multi-party setting, has entrenched Trumpism within the Republican mainstream.

Dr. Amir Ali concluded this exchange with a literary reflection, recalling Sinclair Lewis’s 1935 novel It Can’t Happen Here, which envisioned an American demagogue eerily resembling Trump. The reference served as a sobering reminder that the specter of authoritarian populism in liberal democracies, once thought impossible, has long been imaginable—and remains profoundly relevant today.

Conclusion

Session 6 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series offered a rigorous and multidimensional examination of the intricate relationship between populism and democracy’s representational crisis. Across the session’s three presentations and two discussant interventions, a coherent analytical thread emerged: Populism is not an external aberration but a constitutive symptom of democracy’s structural tensions. The dialogue underscored that the populist moment must be understood as both a mirror and a magnifier of the democratic malaise that stems from the erosion of liberal institutions, the commodification of politics, and the fragmentation of the public sphere.

Dr. Jonathan Madison’s comparative analysis of Brazil and the United States reconceptualized democratic resilience beyond the simplistic dichotomy of “established” and “emerging” democracies. His emphasis on the strength of liberal institutions—rather than developmental or historical pedigree—highlighted how institutional design and political will determine the capacity to withstand populist incursions. In contrast, Dr. João Mauro Gomes Vieira de Carvalho’s sociological approach situated populism within the structural contradictions of modernity, showing how capitalist imperatives and digital communication jointly destabilize traditional forms of political mediation. Finally, Associate Professor Andreea Zamfira extended this analysis into the domain of democratic theory, distinguishing between ideological (democratic) and strategic (instrumental) populisms, and urging a re-politicization of democracy through renewed scholarly critique.

The discussants, Dr. Amir Ali and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, deepened the debate by foregrounding global and comparative perspectives. Dr. Ali’s intervention emphasized the intersection of populism with neoliberal capitalism and the digital disintegration of the public sphere, while Dr. Varriale illuminated populism’s ambivalent role as both a democratic corrective and a vehicle for illiberal consolidation. Together, their insights reinforced the view that populism’s endurance reflects a deeper legitimation crisis rather than a transient political aberration.

Ultimately, Session 6 revealed that the future of democracy depends on restoring the delicate balance between popular sovereignty and institutional constraint. Defending liberal institutions is necessary but insufficient unless paired with a genuine effort to revive representation, pluralism, and critical engagement. Populism, in this light, serves as both a warning and a potential catalyst—an invitation to reimagine democracy not as a static form but as a living, contested process in need of perpetual renewal.

Photo: Dreamstime.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 5: “Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions”

Please cite as:

ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 5: Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). November 3, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00117

 

Session 5 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series examined how populist movements across different regions construct “the people” as both an inclusive democratic ideal and an exclusionary political weapon. Moderated by Dr. Heidi Hart, the session featured presentations by Dr. Amir Ali, Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari, and Andrei Gheorghe, who analyzed populism’s intersections with austerity politics, linguistic identity, and post-communist nationalism. Their comparative insights revealed that populism redefines belonging through economic moralization, linguistic appropriation, and historical myth-making, transforming pluralist notions of democracy into performative narratives of unity and control. The ensuing discussion emphasized populism’s adaptive power to manipulate emotion, memory, and discourse across diverse democratic contexts.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On October 30, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened Session 5 of its Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This ongoing series (September 2025–April 2026) explores the cultural, economic, and political dimensions of populism’s impact on democratic life across diverse global contexts.

Titled “Constructing the People: Populist Narratives, National Identity, and Democratic Tensions,” the fifth session brought together scholars from political science, sociology, and linguistics to interrogate how populist movements construct and mobilize “the people” as a moral, cultural, and emotional category. The discussion illuminated the multiple ways in which populist discourse reshapes collective identity, redefines sovereignty, and challenges democratic pluralism.

The session was moderated by Dr. Heidi Hart, an arts researcher and practitioner based in Utah and Scandinavia, whose expertise in cultural narratives and affective politics enriched the workshop’s interpretive lens. Three presentations followed, each approaching the notion of “the people” from a distinct analytical angle. Dr. Amir Ali (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) examined the paradox of austerity populism, arguing that fiscal conservatism has become a populist virtue masking economic dispossession. Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari (Technische Universität Dresden) turned to the linguistic life of democracy in Germany, tracing how words like Volk, Leute, and Heimat encode competing visions of community, inclusion, and exclusion in the contemporary public sphere. Andrei Gheorghe (University of Bucharest and EHESS, Paris) presented a comparative analysis of Romanian and Hungarian populisms, exploring how leaders from Viktor Orbán to Traian Băsescu construct national identity through historical memory and moral dualism.

The session also featured two discussants whose critical reflections deepened the dialogue: Hannah Geddes (PhD Candidate, University of St Andrews) offered comments that emphasized conceptual clarity, methodological coherence, and the comparative breadth of the papers. Dr. Amedeo Varriale (PhD, University of East London) provided incisive observations connecting the economic, cultural, and linguistic dimensions of populism, situating the presenters’ work within wider debates on ideology, nationalism, and discourse.

Throughout the session, Dr. Hart guided the discussion and er moderation fostered an interdisciplinary dialogue among presenters and discussants, drawing attention to the intersections of economy, discourse, and collective memory. Ultimately, Session 5 revealed that the populist construction of “the people” is not merely a rhetorical act but a performative process—one that transforms democratic ideals of equality and representation into instruments of control and exclusion.

Dr. Amir Ali: “Ripping Off the People: Populism of the Fiscally Tight-Fist”

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is showing victory sign with both hand to supporters at Bharatiya Janata Party office amid the results of the Indian General Elections 2024 in New Delhi, India on June 4 2024. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.

In his insightful and intellectually charged presentation, Dr. Amir Ali of Jawaharlal Nehru University examined the paradoxical relationship between populism and austerity in contemporary politics. With comparative references to India, the United Kingdom, and Argentina, Dr. Ali argued that modern populist regimes—despite their pro-people rhetoric—engage in policies that effectively “rip off” the very constituencies they claim to represent.

Dr. Ali began by framing the core paradox of his paper: while populism ostensibly celebrates and empowers “the people,” its economic manifestations often culminate in policies of fiscal restraint, austerity, and redistribution away from the lower classes. To conceptualize this tension, he introduced the evocative metaphor of “ripping off the people,” signifying the betrayal of the populist promise through the simultaneous glorification and exploitation of the masses.

From Geddes’s Axe to Milei’s Chainsaw: The Genealogy of Austerity

In his introduction, Dr. Ali employed a historical lens to trace the evolution of austerity politics—from the early twentieth-century “Geddes Axe” in Britain to the brutal symbolism of Argentine President Javier Milei’s “chainsaw.” The former, referencing post–World War I budget cuts under British Chancellor Sir Eric Geddes (1921), marked the institutionalization of austerity as a state virtue. The latter, Milei’s notorious use of a chainsaw as a political prop, epitomizes the contemporary radicalization of austerity—an aggressive, performative politics of cutting state expenditure to the bone.

This imagery, Dr. Ali suggested, captures a broader transformation in global political economy: austerity has shifted from being a technocratic policy of restraint to a populist spectacle of destruction. Under this regime, “cut, baby, cut”—echoing Donald Trump’s “drill, baby, drill”—becomes a rallying cry of fiscal violence dressed in popular legitimacy.

Three Faces of Populism: Anti-Elite, Anti-Establishment, Anti-Intellectual

Dr. Ali conceptualized populism through its tripartite oppositional structure: it is anti-eliteanti-establishment, and anti-intellectual. Yet, these negations coexist with an exaggerated pro-people posture, creating what he termed a “caricature of the people.” Drawing from Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), he observed that when “the people” are caricatured, they quickly transform into a mob—a collective easily manipulated by demagogues and complicit elites.

In Dr. Ali’s analysis, populism’s anti-elitism is thus inherently deceptive. It dismantles one elite only to enthrone another, often more corrupt and authoritarian. This “frying pan to fire” dynamic exemplifies the central irony of contemporary populism: in purporting to empower the people, it reconstitutes new hierarchies of domination.

Historical and Conceptual Distinctions: Populism Then and Now

A key contribution of Dr. Ali’s presentation was his distinction between twentieth-century populism and twenty-first-century populism—both historically and conceptually.

The populisms of the twentieth century, particularly in Latin America, were fiscally profligate and redistributive. Leaders such as Juan Perón in Argentina or Indira Gandhi in India engaged in state-led welfarism and social inclusion. In contrast, contemporary populism, as witnessed in the regimes of Narendra Modi, the Brexit Conservatives, and Javier Milei, is fiscally conservative. It espouses austerity while deploying populist rhetoric to justify inequality.

In Dr. Ali’s words, the “populism of the fiscally tight-fist” marks a conceptual rupture: it moralizes austerity and sanctifies fiscal prudence, transforming economic cruelty into civic virtue.

Case Studies: India, Britain, and Argentina

To substantiate his argument, Dr. Ali developed a comparative triad of case studies—India, the United Kingdom, and Argentina—each exemplifying a unique variant of austerity-driven populism.

India under Narendra Modi, he argued, exemplifies fiscally conservative populism. Modi’s government, while maintaining strict fiscal discipline, employs targeted welfare schemes—such as direct cash transfers—to cultivate an electorate of Labharthi (beneficiaries). These schemes, though presented as welfarist, are not redistributive in nature; rather, they create a beholden class whose dependence on state largesse ensures political loyalty.

Dr. Ali drew an instructive comparison between India’s Labharthi and the descamisado (“shirtless ones”) of Peronist Argentina. While Perón’s descamisados represented a mobilized working class empowered through redistribution, Modi’s Labharthi are atomized dependents sustained by piecemeal welfare. The former embodied class inclusion; the latter reinforces clientelism. This distinction, he argued, underscores the moral inversion of populism under neoliberal austerity: generosity becomes a tool of subordination.

In the United Kingdom, Dr. Ali turned to the work of economist Timo Fetzer (2019), whose empirical study in the American Economic Review demonstrated a causal link between austerity policies under David Cameron’s government and the 2016 Brexit vote. Fetzer’s data, Dr. Ali noted, reveal how regions most devastated by austerity were disproportionately likely to vote “Leave.” Hence, the populist revolt against elites was, paradoxically, the political offspring of elite-engineered austerity.

Finally, Argentina provided what Dr. Ali termed “the brutal extreme” of austerity populism. Drawing on research by Jem Ovat, Tisabri Anju, and Joel Rabinovich (Economic and Political Weekly), he noted that Milei’s shock therapy has slashed central government expenditure by 27.5% within a single year, producing a budget surplus of 3.3% of GDP—the first in fourteen years. This dramatic fiscal contraction, celebrated as economic salvation, has simultaneously deepened inequality and social precarity.

Together, these cases illustrate Dr. Ali’s thesis that austerity is the economic face of populism’s deceit: it claims to save the people from excess while impoverishing them through scarcity.

Austerity as Virtue and Violence

Dr. Ali engaged critically with two major works on austerity: Mark Blyth’s Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea (2013) and Clara E. Mattei’s The Capital Order (2022). From Blyth, he borrowed the notion of austerity as an ideological weapon masquerading as prudence. From Mattei, he adopted the argument that austerity originated as a political technology to discipline labor and preserve capitalist order.

Extending these insights, Dr. Ali argued that austerity today functions as virtue signaling—a moral performance by governments and elites who equate fiscal restraint with righteousness. While austerity may be an admirable personal trait, he warned, its translation into public policy is catastrophic. As a state doctrine, it penalizes the already austere working classes, weaponizing virtue into violence.

The Indian Trajectory: From Anti-Corruption to Authoritarian Populism

Dr. Ali traced the genealogy of India’s populism to the 2011 anti-corruption movement, which, under the guise of civic purification, delegitimized the political class and paved the way for Modi’s ascent. Like Brazil’s anti-corruption crusade that felled Dilma Rousseff, India’s movement transmuted moral indignation into reactionary populism.

Interestingly, Modi’s 2014 campaign was not overtly populist but technocratic—promising efficiency and reform. However, as Dr. Ali observed, over time his regime adopted increasingly populist tactics: emotional appeals, symbolic nationalism, and welfare clientelism. These, combined with austerity policies, have produced a paradoxical populism—economically neoliberal but culturally majoritarian.

Free Speech, Anti-Intellectualism, and the Politics of Hate

Dr. Ali also addressed the anti-intellectual dimension of contemporary populism. In India, institutions such as Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) have been vilified by the media as “anti-national.” He likened this to Viktor Orbán’s assault on the Central European University in Hungary—an effort to delegitimize critical thought and replace it with populist orthodoxy.

Linked to this is what he called the fetishization of free speech—exemplified by Elon Musk’s acquisition of X (formerly Twitter). In the guise of free speech absolutism, populist regimes weaponize communication platforms to normalize hate speech and suppress dissent. The result is a paradoxical public sphere: loud with propaganda, silent on inequality.

Silence on Inequality and the Rhetoric of the People

Despite their loquacity, populist leaders share a striking silence on one issue: inequality. Dr. Ali invoked Thomas Piketty’s recent work on the “billionaire raj” to highlight the deepening disparities in wealth and power. While populism mobilizes resentment against elites, it rarely challenges structural inequality; rather, it reconfigures resentment into cultural or religious antagonism.

In India, this silence is particularly pronounced. The populist narrative celebrates national pride and market success while masking the precarity of millions living below subsistence levels. The rhetoric of “the people” thus becomes, in Dr. Ali’s words, “a political caricature”—a manipulated portrait of the masses, drawn by leaders who claim to represent them but instead exploit their vulnerability.

The Populist Caricature and the Politics of Ripping Off

Dr. Ali concluded with a vivid metaphor. The populist leader, he suggested, resembles an artist who asks the people to pose for a portrait—only to render them grotesquely, as a caricature. When the people object to their distorted image, he tears up the paper and discards them. This, for Dr. Ali, encapsulates the moral economy of contemporary populism: it elevates the people rhetorically only to discard them materially.

Drawing on Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, he cited the line: “He will scorn the base degrees by which he did ascend.” Once the leader rises to power, he abandons the very people who lifted him. Similarly, Dr. Ali evoked King Lear“Tis the time’s plague when madmen lead the blind.” The metaphor aptly captures a global moment where demagogues, propelled by economic despair, guide nations into deeper crisis.

Ultimately, Dr. Ali’s presentation offered a sobering reflection on the moral contradictions of contemporary populism. The populism of the fiscally tight-fist, he argued, redefines austerity as virtue, dependency as empowerment, and domination as democracy. Beneath its pro-people veneer lies a politics of dispossession—a systematic ripping off of the people in the name of serving them.


Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari: “The Living Language of Democracy: Folk and Leute in Contemporary Germany”

PEGIDA supporters demonstrate in Munich, Germany, on February 15, 2018. Photo: Thomas Lukassek.

In his thought-provoking presentation, Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari explored the emotional and political dimensions of two fundamental German words—Volk (“the people” as a symbolic national collective) and Leute (“people” in the everyday, social sense). His research investigates how these linguistic categories shape the lived experience and imagination of democracy in modern Germany, particularly amid the resurgence of right-wing populism in the country’s east.

Dr. Doulatyari opened his talk by situating his research within the long tradition of German philosophical anthropology and sociology, referencing his collaboration with Siegbert Rieberg—one of the last academic assistants to Arnold Gehlen, a founding figure of twentieth-century philosophical anthropology. Drawing on this lineage, he posed a central question: How do Germans today use and feel the words “Volk” and “Leute” when they talk about nation, belonging, and democracy?

Both terms, he argued, carry deep emotional and historical weight. Volk represents a vertical, symbolic notion of unity—“one people, one nation”—while Leute expresses a horizontal sense of community grounded in daily coexistence: neighbors, friends, and ordinary citizens. These linguistic currents embody two distinct emotional orientations of democratic life. The Leute current is inclusive, open, and social, corresponding to everyday democracy; the Volk current is cohesive, symbolic, and often exclusionary, evoking the idea of an authentic or “true” people.

Language, Emotion, and the Grammar of Belonging

Dr. Doulatyari emphasized that these words are not merely lexical choices but emotional and political signifiers. Each term, he explained, constructs a “grammar of belonging” that defines who is included in or excluded from the democratic “we.” By studying how Volk and Leute appear in political speech, popular media, and street demonstrations, his research illuminates how collective identities are linguistically produced and contested in contemporary Germany.

His methodology combines field observation—being present in demonstrations, public gatherings, and social forums—with digital corpus analysis using the Leipzig Corpora Collection. This dual approach allows him to examine both the embodied use of language in real-life contexts and its broader semantic trends in contemporary German discourse, particularly during 2024.

By searching for instances where Volk and Leute occur alongside the pronoun wir (“we”), Dr. Doulatyari identified how Germans imagine collective identity through language. The recurring question, he observed, is not simply who are the people? but who are “we”?

From “Wir sind das Volk” to “Wir sind mehr”

A key part of his analysis focused on two powerful slogans that have defined Germany’s recent political discourse. The first, “Wir sind das Volk” (“We are the people”), emerged in 1989 as a democratic cry during the protests that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall. However, in recent years, this same phrase has been appropriated by right-wing populist movements—most notably the Pegida demonstrations—to advance exclusionary and nationalist agendas. What was once a rallying call for democratic inclusion has been transformed into a slogan of cultural homogeneity and xenophobia.

In contrast, the counter-slogan “Wir sind mehr” (“We are more”) arose in response, expressing solidarity with diversity, inclusion, and democratic pluralism. It embodies the same emotional energy as “Wir sind das Volk” but redirects it toward openness rather than closure. For Dr. Doulatyari, this semantic struggle over we-ness lies at the heart of Germany’s democratic tensions today.

Populism Between Folk and Leute

Dr. Doulatyari observed that right-wing populist politicians have become adept at navigating between these two registers of language. They speak the language of Leute—informal, familiar, and seemingly ordinary—to appear close to everyday citizens. Yet simultaneously, they invoke the symbolic power of Volk to claim moral and political authority, suggesting they alone speak for “the real people.” This rhetorical oscillation allows populists to naturalize exclusion while sounding democratic.

He further noted that in everyday expressions—such as die normalen Leute (“the normal people”)—the term Leute carries emotional warmth and authenticity but is increasingly co-opted by populist discourse to draw boundaries against supposed elites or outsiders, including the European Union or migrants. Thus, populism instrumentalizes linguistic intimacy (Leute) and symbolic unity (Volk) to sustain a politics of division.

The Missing Bridge: Democracy’s Structural Challenge

At the heart of Dr. Doulatyari’s argument lies a structural diagnosis. Beneath both Volk and Leute, he suggested, exists a “hidden wish”—a desire to be seen, to belong, and to participate meaningfully in collective life. Volk seeks stability and rootedness, while Leute seeks recognition and inclusion. The democratic challenge, therefore, is not the existence of emotion but the absence of institutional structures capable of linking these two desires.

Drawing on Siegbert Rieberg’s notion of Raum der Bedeutung—the “space of meaning”—Dr. Doulatyari argued that modern democracies face a profound crisis of meaning-space. When institutions fail to connect the symbolic (unity) and the social (participation), the linguistic field fractures. The result is polarization: emotional belonging turns into frustration, and nationalism replaces solidarity.

Reclaiming the Language of Democracy

Dr. Doulatyari concluded by emphasizing that language itself remains one of the strongest symbolic institutions of democracy. In cultural life, new efforts are emerging to reimagine Volk and Leute in inclusive ways. He pointed to artistic and civic examples such as the Volksbühne theater in Berlin, which has sought to reappropriate Volk through multicultural performances, and to the growing use of Leute in music and popular media that emphasize everyday connection and plural belonging.

Ultimately, he argued, the struggle over these two words mirrors the struggle over democracy itself. Whoever controls the meaning of “we” controls the moral legitimacy of the political order. To revitalize democracy, societies must rebuild trust not through ethnic or cultural homogeneity but through constitutional loyalty and civic inclusion.

In his concluding reflection, Dr. Doulatyari proposed a metaphor of reconciliation: Volk and Leute are not opposites but complementary forces—two sides of the same human story. Democracy thrives only when symbolic unity and social diversity remain in dialogue. Language, therefore, is not a mere reflection of democracy—it is its living heartbeat.


Andrei Gheorghe: “Constructing ‘the People’ in Populist Discourse: The Hungarian and Romanian Cases”

Viktor Orban, Hungary’s prime minister arrives to attend in an informal meeting of Heads of State or Government in Prague, Czechia on October 7, 2022. Photo: Alexandros Michailidis.

In his presentation, doctoral researcher Andrei Gheorghe explored the evolving concept of “the people” in contemporary populist rhetoric, focusing on Hungary and Romania. His analysis examined how populist leaders in both countries, responding to the 2008–2009 financial crisis, redefined the people as a moral and cultural community opposed to liberal elites and supranational structures such as the European Union.

Gheorghe began by recalling the paradox that inspired his study. After joining the European Union and benefiting from substantial economic aid and development funds, Hungary and Romania should have experienced greater trust in European institutions and liberal democracy. Instead, both countries witnessed the rapid rise of national populism. Populist movements began portraying Brussels not as a partner in reconstruction but as a foreign power threatening national sovereignty and identity. To Gheorghe, this paradox—prosperity accompanied by populist rebellion—signaled a deeper crisis of legitimacy rooted in the intersection of globalization, economic vulnerability, and post-communist transformation.

From Economic Transition to Populist Disillusionment

In both Hungary and Romania, the economic crisis exposed the limits of neoliberal reform and the fragility of the newly established democratic institutions. Gheorghe observed that privatization, market liberalization, and dependency on foreign investment constrained the ability of these states to protect citizens from economic shocks. The resulting unemployment, declining public services, and emigration eroded trust in liberal elites and created fertile ground for populist narratives that denounced both domestic and supranational actors as betrayers of the national interest.

This context, Gheorghe argued, explains why populist leaders could claim to speak in the name of the people even in societies that had only recently embraced democracy and European integration. Populism’s success, he suggested, lies not only in economic grievances but also in the symbolic redefinition of the people—from a plural civic community into a morally and culturally homogenous entity.

Theoretical Foundations: Who Are “the People”?

Turning to theory, Gheorghe drew on the works of Pierre Rosanvallon, Jan-Werner Müller, Cas Mudde, Carlos de la Torre, and Ernesto Laclau to situate his analysis within the broader field of populism studies. Rosanvallon famously noted that populism lacks programmatic texts defining its vision of society; instead, it operates through emotional and moral claims about representation. Mudde’s minimalist definition—a thin-centered ideology that divides society into two antagonistic groups, “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”—provides the foundation for Gheorghe’s conceptual framing.

For populists, Gheorghe explained, the people are not the civic collective of citizens found in liberal democracy. Rather, they are imagined as an organic, pre-political community bound by tradition, religion, and moral virtue. This “monolithic people” is contrasted with an alien elite—cosmopolitan, immoral, and detached from the national culture. Populist discourse, he noted, turns cultural alienation into political antagonism: elites are portrayed not merely as corrupt but as traitors serving foreign interests, “globalists,” or external powers such as Brussels or Washington.

Following Carlos de la Torre and Ernesto Laclau, Gheorghe emphasized the centrality of the populist leader in constructing this imagined community. The leader both embodies and defines the people—deciding who belongs, which grievances are legitimate, and what values constitute the national essence. The people, in this framework, do not pre-exist the leader’s discourse; they are performed and imagined through it.

This process, Gheorghe argued, is both inclusionary and exclusionary. While populist rhetoric unites diverse groups under the banner of a shared national identity, it demands conformity—participants must abandon plural identities in favor of a single, purified “we.” The populist people are thus inclusive in rhetoric but exclusive in practice, denying dissent and diversity.

Emotions, Memory, and the Construction of Unity

A major part of Gheorghe’s argument focused on the role of emotion in populist politics. While emotions are integral to all political communication, populists weaponize them to create a permanent sense of urgency and insecurity. The threats they invoke—loss of freedom, identity, sovereignty, or national dignity—are often vague yet omnipresent, mobilizing a collective fear that demands decisive action from the leader. This emotional climate reinforces dependence on the leader as protector and savior.

A second critical strategy is the manipulation of history and collective memory. Drawing on theoretical insights from memory studies, Gheorghe argued that populist leaders reconfigure the past to legitimize their present political projects. By reinterpreting historical traumas or glorifying national struggles, they produce a narrative of continuity between the “true people” of the past and the “authentic nation” of the present. Such myth-making not only strengthens community identity but also positions the leader as the inheritor of historical missions—defender of the nation, guardian of faith, or restorer of sovereignty.

Methodology and Empirical Focus

Gheorghe’s research is based on a qualitative discourse analysis of approximately seventy speeches and interviews by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and sixteen by Romanian populist leaders between 2010 and 2020. This comparative approach seeks to reveal both the shared logics and contextual differences in how Hungarian and Romanian populists construct “the people.”

One challenge he encountered, Gheorghe noted, was the difference in political stability. In Hungary, Orbán’s continuous rule since 2010 provided a coherent and evolving populist discourse. In contrast, Romania’s frequent leadership changes—between the Social Democrats and Liberals—produced a fragmented populist rhetoric that shifted with each election cycle. Nonetheless, both contexts shared a common reliance on emotional mobilization, historical distortion, and anti-elitist moral dichotomies.

The Hungarian Case: National Salvation and Christian Identity

In Hungary, Orbán’s speeches consistently portrayed the 2008 financial crisis as a civilizational rupture comparable to the First and Second World Wars or the fall of communism. He described the event as a “Western financial collapse” that revealed the decadence of liberal capitalism and the moral corruption of the West. In this narrative, Hungary is recast as a moral beacon—a Christian nation destined to defend Europe’s spiritual heritage against both neoliberalism and migration.

Gheorghe highlighted Orbán’s recurring themes: the “changing world,” the erosion of stable traditions, and the necessity of unity under a strong national leader. The populist discourse of Christian Hungary, he noted, transforms economic insecurity into a moral crusade. By positioning Hungary as the “shield of Europe” against external threats—Muslim immigrants, liberal globalists, or EU bureaucrats—Orbán constructs a homogenous people defined by faith, history, and obedience to the national mission.

The Romanian Case: Sovereignty and Anti-Corruption

In Romania, Gheorghe found a similar moral framing, though less coherent due to political turnover. Populist rhetoric depicted Brusselsand Washingtonas distant centers of control manipulating Romania’s political elites. The European Commission and anti-corruption campaigns launched after 2004 were reframed as tools of domination, undermining the sovereignty of “the Romanian people.”

Leaders accused domestic institutions—such as the Constitutional Court or the judiciary—of serving foreign interests. Gheorghe noted how some populist figures even compared anti-corruption investigations to the repressive tactics of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s communist regime, portraying themselves as victims of political persecution and defenders of national freedom. This rhetorical inversion—turning accountability into tyranny—allowed populist leaders to present themselves as moral saviors resisting external and internal conspiracies.

The Monolithic People and the Populist Savior

Gheorghe concluded that in both Hungary and Romania, populist discourse constructs a dichotomous world divided between the true people and their corrupt enemies. Through emotional manipulation, historical revisionism, and symbolic appeals to sovereignty, populist leaders transform plural democracies into moral theaters where only one voice—the leader’s—can claim authenticity.

The leader’s self-presentation as the savior of the people is central to this process. In Gheorghe’s analysis, the populist leader not only represents the people but creates them—defining their boundaries, their fears, and their identity. This monolithic construction of “the people” legitimizes authoritarian tendencies and weakens democratic pluralism.

Ultimately, Gheorghe’s research underscores how the concept of the people—once the foundation of democratic sovereignty—has been reappropriated as a tool of exclusion and control. In both Hungary and Romania, populism’s emotional and historical narratives reveal not the empowerment of citizens, but their transformation into instruments of moralized political power.


Discussant’s Feedback: Hannah Geddes
 

As the discussant for Session 5, Hannah Geddes offered a series of insightful, constructive reflections on the three presented papers, focusing on their conceptual clarity, methodological coherence, and potential contributions to the broader study of populism. Her interventions demonstrated both attentiveness to theoretical nuance and an appreciation for the diversity of approaches within the session.

Geddes began by commending the first paper for its eloquence and ambitious scope. The presentation traced the evolution of populism across different temporal and geographical contexts, juxtaposing the populist movements of the twentieth century with contemporary global manifestations. Geddes praised the richness and narrative breadth of this comparative approach but advised caution in managing its analytical scale. She observed that the project’s very strength—its temporal and spatial expansiveness—also posed a risk of diffuseness. To enhance conceptual focus, she encouraged the presenter to identify a single, clear narrative thread or central conceptual relationship to anchor the argument. While she interpreted the paper as a story about austerity and the shifting nature of populism from the last century to this one, Geddes urged the author to articulate explicitly what they wished audiences to take away as the paper’s core insight. She further recommended greater justification for the selection of case studies—given the movement between diverse contexts such as Argentina, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom—suggesting that more explicit criteria would clarify both the comparative logic and the contrasts being drawn.

Turning to the second paper, which explored populism in contemporary Germany through the linguistic lens of Folk and Leute, Geddes found the approach highly innovative. She praised the focus on specific words as a prism for understanding how citizens perceive the nation, democracy, and belonging. This, she noted, provided a compelling bridge between sociolinguistics and political sociology. Drawing from her own background in migration studies, Geddes found the discussion of social integration particularly resonant. She also drew an interesting parallel to civic nationalism in Scotland—an inclusive, left-leaning nationalism that offers a counterpoint to exclusionary nationalisms elsewhere. Methodologically, she encouraged the author to reflect further on how the micro-level linguistic analysis connects to the macro-level story about nationalism and democratic identity.

In her comments on the third paper, which examined the populist construction of “the people” in post-2008 Hungary and Romania, Geddes highlighted the analytical richness of comparing two national cases with differing political dynamics. She noted that while the author regarded Viktor Orbán’s long tenure as a challenge for comparative consistency, it might instead serve as an analytical advantage. The contrast between Hungary’s continuity of leadership and Romania’s frequent leadership changes, she argued, offers a unique opportunity to explore how the cult of personality—a recurrent theme in populism studies—shapes the formation of political legitimacy. This contrast could deepen the study’s comparative contribution by illuminating how populism functions both with and without a stable charismatic figure.

Geddes concluded by commending all three presenters for their originality and intellectual rigor. She emphasized that, collectively, the papers illuminated the many ways populism negotiates identity, representation, and belonging across diverse linguistic, cultural, and political terrains.

 

Discussants FeedbackDr. Amedeo Varriale

Serving as discussant for the session, Dr. Amedeo Varriale offered a set of insightful, critical, and comparative reflections on the three papers. His comments were characterized by a deep engagement with the economic, ideological, and cultural dimensions of populism and by a commendable openness to perspectives beyond his own regional expertise.

Dr. Varriale began by commending the overall quality of the session, noting that it provided him with an opportunity to engage with case studies situated outside his primary area of specialization, particularly those concerning Romania, Hungary, and India. His observations combined a critical analytical lens with an appreciation for the diversity of methodological approaches and the empirical richness that each presentation offered.

Dr. Varriale’s most detailed feedback concerned Dr. Amir Ali’s paper, which examined the evolution of populism through an economic lens. He praised the work for its originality and relevance, noting that while recent decades have seen a shift from economic explanations of populism toward ideational and discursive frameworks, Ali’s intervention restored analytical balance by foregrounding the economic underpinnings of populist politics.

He summarized the central argument as a contrast between twentieth-century populisms, which tended to be fiscally expansive, and twenty-first-century populisms, which are ostensibly more fiscally prudent and even pro-austerity. According to Dr. Varriale, Dr. Ali compellingly argued that today’s right-wing populists, through appeals to budgetary discipline and ordoliberal rhetoric, have paradoxically expanded inequality under the guise of responsibility. This “save now, spend later” ethos—borrowed from household economics and applied to the state—has, in Dr. Ali’s view, “ripped off the people,” undermining the egalitarian promises populism claims to defend.

Dr. Varriale praised the empirical rigor of the paper, which drew on multiple country examples—Argentina, Britain, and India—and incorporated statistical evidence alongside theoretical insight. He also commended its engagement with leading economists such as Thomas Piketty and political scientists of populism. However, he offered several critical reflections.

He questioned the neat historical division between “fiscally profligate” twentieth-century populisms and “fiscally prudent” contemporary ones. Citing examples such as Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Carlos Menem in Argentina, and Fernando Collor de Mello in Brazil, Dr. Varriale noted that some twentieth-century populists also embraced neoliberal reforms, privatization, and deregulation. Conversely, contemporary populists—both left and right—have often pursued expansive fiscal policies. He cited Italy’s Five Star Movement, whose universal basic income program resulted in massive unaccounted costs, and Matteo Salvini’s League, which simultaneously advocated higher spending and tax cuts. Likewise, Giorgia Meloni’s government has funded large-scale projects—such as repatriation centers in Albania and the proposed bridge between Sicily and mainland Italy—illustrating that fiscal restraint is hardly a defining feature of right-wing populism.

For Dr. Varriale, these examples reveal that populist economic behavior transcends simple ideological categories. Both left- and right-wing populists can be fiscally extravagant or interventionist depending on the political utility of such policies. He observed that many contemporary European populists—including Marine Le Pen and Viktor Orbán—combine leftist economic nationalism with right-wing cultural conservatism, producing a hybrid form of economic populism marked by protectionism, state interventionism, and resistance to supranational fiscal constraints.

Turning to Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari’s linguistically oriented paper on the German concepts Folk and Leute, Dr. Varriale highlighted its originality and the subtlety with which it linked language, culture, and politics. He found the exploration of these terms as emotional and symbolic markers of inclusion and exclusion within German democracy both innovative and methodologically rich.

Dr. Varriale expressed particular interest in Dr. Doulatyari’s attention to the word Heimat (homeland), noting that the concept carries heavy political and ideological weight in contemporary Germany. He connected it to the far-right’s appropriation of Heimat discourse, citing the emergence of the ultra-nationalist Heimat Party, which draws on neo-fascist traditions inherited from the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). In this regard, he suggested that Doulatyari’s linguistic analysis could shed light on how far-right actors strategically reclaim emotionally resonant terms to naturalize exclusionary identities.

In his reflections on Andrei Gheorghe’s comparative study of Hungarian and Romanian populism, Dr. Varriale commended the research for its historical and empirical depth. He appreciated the focus on post-2008 developments and the analysis of how political leaders in both countries manipulated collective memory to construct “the people” as a moral and cultural category.

Dr. Varriale’s central question to Gheorghe concerned the comparative framework. While Gheorghe had described Hungary’s political continuity under Viktor Orbán as a challenge for comparative consistency, Dr. Varriale suggested that this apparent limitation could instead be an analytical strength. The juxtaposition of Hungary’s stable populist leadership with Romania’s fragmented and frequently changing political elite, he argued, offers a valuable opportunity to explore the relationship between charismatic leadership and populist legitimacy.

He noted that such a comparison could illuminate broader questions within populism studies: namely, how populist movements sustain emotional and ideological coherence in the absence of a singular leader, and how the “cult of personality” functions differently across national contexts.

Dr. Varriale concluded his discussant remarks by commending all three presenters for their intellectual rigor, methodological diversity, and capacity to advance the interdisciplinary study of populism. Their combined contributions—spanning economics, linguistics, and comparative politics—illustrated the multiplicity of populist expression across time, geography, and ideology. His reflections underscored a unifying insight: that populism, in its economic, cultural, and discursive forms, remains a fluid and adaptive phenomenon whose contradictions reveal as much about democratic societies as about its self-proclaimed defenders of “the people.”

Presenter’s Response: Dr. Amir Ali

Responding to Hannah Geddes’s question regarding the principal takeaway of his paper, Dr. Amir Ali emphasized that the heart of his research lies in diagnosing the dramatic decline of democracy across both established and emerging democratic systems. He pointed to the erosion of democratic norms not only in countries historically considered stable—such as the United Kingdom and the United States—but also in nations like India and Argentina, where populist politics have increasingly undermined institutional checks and balances.

Dr. Ali situated this decline within a broader pattern of populist-driven democratic backsliding, arguing that the populist invocation of “the people” has been used to justify anti-institutional behavior and to erode procedural democracy. In countries like India, he noted, populism has shifted from mobilizing marginalized groups toward consolidating majoritarianism, producing an authoritarian populism that paradoxically weakens the very democratic institutions it claims to defend. His succinct yet powerful intervention reframed the economic discussion of his earlier presentation within the political consequences of populism’s global ascent.

Presenter’s Response: Andrei Gheorghe

Andrei Gheorghe responded at length to the comments from both Hannah Geddes and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, clarifying how political instability in Romania complicates comparative analysis with Hungary. He acknowledged Geddes’s observation that Hungary’s sustained leadership under Viktor Orbán contrasts with Romania’s revolving-door politics, where party leaders are frequently replaced after electoral losses. This instability, Gheorghe explained, stems from fragmented party structures, internal factionalism, and volatile coalitions that prioritize electoral expediency over ideological continuity.

He described this dynamic as a form of “duplicity”—where Romanian leaders often adopt divergent tones depending on context. For instance, figures like Victor Ponta, the former prime minister and leader of the Social Democratic Party, presented one discourse in official capacities and another in televised populist appeals. This rhetorical inconsistency, Gheorghe noted, reveals the opportunistic and performative nature of Romanian populism, which often relies on theatrical rather than substantive engagement with “the people.”

In response to Dr. Varriale, Gheorghe elaborated on his selection of Traian Băsescu as a central case in his PhD research, rather than newer populists like George Simion of the AUR (Alliance for the Union of Romanians). While acknowledging that AUR represents a rising anti-establishment force, he explained that his project focuses on the 2010–2020 period, examining earlier waves of populism that set the stage for contemporary developments. He drew parallels between Liviu Dragnea’s populist strategy and Orbán’s, noting that Dragnea sought to imitate the Hungarian leader’s anti-globalist and anti-Soros rhetoric. However, unlike Orbán, Dragnea’s approach was largely theatrical and self-serving, aimed primarily at obstructing anti-corruption reforms rather than establishing an enduring populist regime.

Gheorghe concluded by distinguishing between Hungary’s transformational populism, which sought to reshape the political order, and Romania’s performative populism, which functioned as an electoral instrument. His reflections demonstrated a nuanced understanding of populism’s diverse modalities within post-communist Europe.

Presenter’s Response: Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari

Finally, Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari responded warmly to the discussants’ observations, expressing appreciation for their engagement and particularly for Dr. Varriale’s comments on the semantic and political weight of the German term “Heimat.” He clarified that in his analysis, Heimat represents not merely a geographical or familial attachment but an emotionally charged concept that encapsulates both belonging and fear of change.

He elaborated that in contemporary Germany, Heimat has reemerged as a politically contested symbol—often invoked in far-right demonstrations by groups such as PEGIDA in Dresden or by nationalist parties seeking to preserve an idealized “German way of life.” The term thus functions ambivalently: for some, it expresses nostalgia and cultural continuity; for others, it becomes a vehicle for exclusion and xenophobia.

By linking this semantic field to collective memory and personal narratives, Dr. Doulatyari underscored how everyday language mediates the boundaries of inclusion in democratic societies. His response deepened the audience’s understanding of how linguistic symbols operate as repositories of national emotion, bridging sociology, linguistics, and political philosophy.

In their collective responses, the three presenters reaffirmed the intellectual depth and interdisciplinary scope of the session. Each, in their own way, illuminated how populism—whether expressed through fiscal policy, historical narrative, or linguistic identity—reshapes democratic life by redefining who “the people” are and what democracy itself means in the twenty-first century.

Q&A Session 

The question-and-answer segment that followed the presentations reflected a rich exchange of ideas connecting nationalism, transborder identities, and the populist construction of “the people.” Dr. Bulent Kenes opened the discussion by situating the presenters’ work within a broader transnational frame. He observed that many populist movements across the world invoke the notion of a “greater nation”—an expanded vision of the homeland that transcends current state borders. This rhetoric, he noted, has deep historical roots: from the idea of a Greater Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz to parallel visions such as Greater Romania, Greater Serbia, and even the historical Greek Megalidea. Kenes highlighted how these ideological constructs often blur the distinction between national and transnational belonging, with populist leaders positioning themselves as protectors of an imagined community that extends beyond formal state boundaries. He then asked Andrei Gheorghe and Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari to elaborate on how the idea of transborder nations operates in their respective cases—Hungary and Romania for Gheorghe, and Germany for Doulatyari—and how such rhetoric might extend to the diasporic sphere.

Andrei Gheorghe responded by affirming the centrality of transborder nationalism in Hungarian populist discourse. He explained that Viktor Orbán’s political project draws heavily upon the concept of the Carpathian Basin, a symbolic space encompassing all territories historically inhabited by Hungarians. This notion, he noted, remains deeply rooted in the Hungarian national consciousness, particularly through the trauma of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), which redrew Hungary’s borders after World War I.

According to Gheorghe, Orbán has strategically revived these memories of betrayal by the West—referring to the 1848 revolutions, the Trianon settlement, and the 1956 anti-communist uprising—as recurring episodes in which Hungary was “abandoned” by its Western allies. This narrative of victimhood, he observed, plays a vital role in Orbán’s populist self-image as the defender of the Hungarian nation against foreign interference, whether from Brussels, global capitalism, or multiculturalism.

Gheorghe further noted that Orbán’s 2010 policy granting citizenship rights to ethnic Hungarians abroad exemplifies this symbolic reconstruction of a transborder Hungarian community. This move, while politically strategic, also reinforces a form of exclusionary nationalism grounded in cultural and ethnic homogeneity. In Orbán’s rhetoric, the European Union and its liberal policies are often portrayed as existential threats that “dilute Hungarian blood” and undermine traditional values.

By contrast, Gheorghe explained that Romanian populism during the 2010–2020 period was less preoccupied with territorial nationalism. Instead, Romanian populist leaders focused on anti-liberal and anti-corruption narratives, framing the European Union and domestic liberal elites as agents of foreign control. Figures such as Traian Băsescu and Liviu Dragnea employed populist rhetoric to claim defense of the “Romanian people” against external imposition, but the Greater Romania idea itself was largely marginal during this decade.

Nonetheless, Gheorghe acknowledged that earlier nationalists like Corneliu Vadim Tudor, founder of the Greater Romania Party, had openly propagated territorial revisionism and anti-Western sentiment. His discourse—marked by hostility toward the EU and NATO—served as an early prototype for later nationalist populism. Gheorghe concluded that while Orbán’s project represents a systemic populism of transformation, Romanian populism has been largely performative and reactive, invoking national identity primarily for electoral gain.

Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari addressed Dr. Kenes’s question by reflecting on how the German concept of Heimat (homeland) functions as both a unifying and divisive symbol within populist discourse. He explained that while many Germans and migrants alike use Heimat positively—to express emotional attachment, memory, and the sense of home—right-wing populist movements have instrumentalized the term to evoke fear of change and resistance to cultural diversity.

Groups such as PEGIDA in Dresden, he noted, have repurposed Heimat as a slogan to defend a mythologized “German way of life” against perceived external threats, especially immigration. Thus, Heimat has become a site of symbolic conflict—a word that simultaneously embodies hope for belonging and anxiety about identity loss.

Speaking from his own perspective as an Iranian member of the diaspora, Dr. Doulatyari added that his personal engagement with German culture and philosophy has given him an empathetic understanding of Heimat as an inclusive emotional category. Yet he acknowledged that for many migrants, the term remains fraught with exclusionary overtones. Some prefer the more neutral Land (“country”) to avoid the nationalist implications of Heimat.

Dr. Doulatyari’s reflections illuminated how linguistic symbols like Heimat mediate the tension between inclusion and exclusion—revealing how populism transforms shared cultural words into battlegrounds of identity politics.

Conclusion

Session 5 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series illuminated the intricate mechanisms through which populism reshapes democratic imaginaries by redefining “the people.” Across the presentations and subsequent discussions, a unifying insight emerged: populism operates simultaneously as an affective narrative, an ideological strategy, and a performative act that fuses moral claims with political exclusion. Whether expressed through fiscal austerity, linguistic symbolism, or historical reimagining, the populist invocation of “the people” serves as both a promise of inclusion and a technique of control.

Dr. Amir Ali’s examination of austerity populism revealed how economic restraint is moralized as civic virtue, transforming the rhetoric of empowerment into a politics of dispossession. Dr. Yazdan Keikhosrou Doulatyari’s linguistic inquiry demonstrated that words such as Volk and Leute carry profound emotional weight, shaping democratic belonging through competing grammars of unity and diversity. Andrei Gheorghe’s comparative study of Hungary and Romania traced how post-communist populisms mobilize collective memory and moral dualism to construct homogenous national communities opposed to liberal pluralism. Together, these analyses highlighted populism’s ability to blend economic anxiety, cultural nostalgia, and emotional resonance into a coherent—yet exclusionary—vision of the social order.

The discussants, Hannah Geddes and Dr. Amedeo Varriale, underscored the interdisciplinary strength of the session, situating its findings within broader debates about representation, identity, and democratic resilience. Their reflections drew attention to the elasticity of populism as both discourse and practice—a phenomenon that adapts fluidly across linguistic, economic, and political contexts while sustaining its central dichotomy between “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite.”

Ultimately, the workshop underscored that populism’s greatest challenge to democracy lies not in its opposition to elites alone but in its capacity to redefine the meaning of democracy itself. By appropriating the language of popular sovereignty, populist actors transform inclusion into hierarchy and belonging into boundary, reminding scholars that the defense of democracy requires continuous vigilance over the words, emotions, and memories through which “the people” are imagined.

Photo: Dreamstime.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 4: “Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging”

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 4: Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 16, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00116

 


On October 16, 2025, the ECPS held the fourth session of its Virtual Workshop Series “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches.” The session examined how political actors construct and mobilize “the people” to legitimize both inclusive and exclusionary political projects. Chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni, the session featured presentations by Samuel Ngozi Agu, Shiveshwar Kundu, and Mouli Bentman & Michael Dahan, each exploring different regional and theoretical perspectives. Abdelaaziz El Bakkali and Azize Sargın provided incisive discussant feedback, followed by a lively Q&A. Concluding reflections by Prof. Mazzoleni emphasized populism’s dual nature as both a political strategy and a symptom of structural democratic crises, setting the stage for future interdisciplinary debate.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On October 16, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the fourth session of its ongoing Virtual Workshop Series, titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. This series (September 2025 – April 2026) provides a structured forum for interdisciplinary dialogue on the contemporary challenges of democratic backsliding, populism, and the future of liberal democracy across different regions.

The fourth session, titled “Performing the People: Populism, Nativism, and the Politics of Belonging,” focused on how political actors construct and mobilize the idea of “the people” to reshape democratic imaginaries, often in ways that blur the line between inclusion and exclusion. Against a backdrop in which one-fifth of the world’s democracies disappeared between 2012 and 2024, the session explored the dual role of “the people” as both a democratic resource and a political instrument used to legitimize exclusionary, often authoritarian projects. The event brought together a diverse group of scholars and practitioners from India, Nigeria, Israel, Morocco, Switzerland, and beyond, reflecting the comparative and interdisciplinary scope of the series.

The session was chaired by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni (University of Lausanne). Following a welcome by Reka Koletzer on behalf of ECPS, Prof. Mazzoleni opened with a conceptual framing that situated the panel within broader debates on populism and democratic legitimacy. He emphasized that there is “no populism without the people,” tracing the notion’s roots to ancient Greece and its evolution as a key source of political legitimation. 

Historically, he noted, when “the people” were not central, politics drew on divine authority. Today, however, democratic politics is increasingly intertwined with religion and sacralized notions of a homogeneous people—developments that pose serious challenges to the rule of law and democratic sustainability. Prof. Mazzoleni highlighted how populist leaders exploit these dynamics to consolidate power and reshape belonging, stressing the importance of contextual, cross-regional reflection—linking contributions from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East to global debates.

Three scholarly presentations followed, each addressing the theme from a distinct geographical and theoretical perspective: Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu (Abia State University, Nigeria) presented “We, the People: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches,” arguing for decentralization and participatory governance as democratic correctives to elite-dominated political systems. Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu (Jangipur College, University of Kalyani, India) delivered “The Idea of ‘People’ Within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” offering a psychoanalytic and structuralist interpretation of the rise of Hindu nationalist populism. Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Mike Dahan (Sapir College, Israel) presented “We, the People: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal,” examining how populist movements appropriate the universalist language of liberal democracy to undermine its institutions from within.

The presentations were followed by discussant feedback from Associate Professor Abdelaaziz Elbakkali (SMBA University, Morocco; Fulbright Postdoctoral Scholar, Arizona State University) and Dr. Azize Sargın (Director for External Affairs, ECPS). Their interventions offered comparative perspectives, theoretical reflections, and methodological suggestions, deepening the debate and encouraging the presenters to refine their arguments. A Q&A session allowed for interactive exchanges between the speakers and participants, further probing the conceptual, empirical, and normative implications of the presentations. Finally, Prof. Mazzoleni provided a general assessment, synthesizing the key insights of the session.

This report documents the presentations, discussants’ feedback, Q&A exchanges, and concluding reflections, offering a comprehensive overview of a rich and interdisciplinary scholarly discussion on how “the people” is performed, politicized, and contested in contemporary democratic politics.

Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu: The Idea of ‘People’ within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India

A man chanting songs with a dummy cow in the background during the Golden Jubilee
celebration of VHP – a Hindu nationalist organization on December 20, 2014 in Kolkata, India. Photo: Arindam Banerjee.

In his presentation titled “The Idea of ‘People’ within the Domain of Authoritarian Populism in India,” Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu explored the philosophical and structural underpinnings of contemporary populism, focusing particularly on the Indian case. His talk was anchored around two central questions: (1) how to understand the rise of populism in India and its philosophical justification, and (2) what kind of alternative conception of “the people” can offer a revolutionary counterpoint to right-wing populism. Through this dual lens, Dr. Kundu aimed to bridge political theory—especially psychoanalytic and structuralist perspectives—with empirical developments in Indian democratic politics.

Dr. Kundu began by noting that, historically, critiques of democracy tended to originate from outside liberal democratic systems—for example, from traditional societies or cultural contexts resistant to liberal political models. However, the current wave of populism represents a distinctive internal critique of liberal democracy, emerging from within its own institutional and ideological frameworks. This shift marks populism as a transformative force, challenging not external impositions but the internal logic and practices of liberal democratic governance.

Focusing on India, Dr. Kundu traced the philosophical roots of populism’s rise to its opposition to Enlightenment-derived ideas of consciousness, rationality, and elite liberal politics. Liberalism and Marxism, he argued, have historically relied on “conscious” language and scientific outlooks to address complex social problems. In the Indian context, this was vividly visible in the 1970s and 1980s when many liberal elites—especially from prestigious institutions such as Jawaharlal Nehru University, St. Stephen’s College, Jadavpur University, and Presidency College—engaged in social outreach projects in rural areas. Their efforts, however, often failed because they approached communities with pre-formulated “scientific” solutions rather than through genuine dialogue. This failure, according to Dr. Kundu, reflected a broader disconnect between liberal political discourse and the emotional, affective, and unconscious dimensions of popular life.

Similarly, in the period leading up to 2014, the language and policies of India’s dominant liberal-progressive forces, notably the Congress Party, were insufficient to prevent the rise of right-wing populism. Dr. Kundu emphasized that Hindu nationalist forces were able to mobilize repressed emotional energies linked to long-standing issues such as the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the abrogation of Article 370 concerning Kashmir, and debates over the Uniform Civil Code. These issues, though latent in the public consciousness, had been inadequately addressed by previous governments. Right-wing populists successfully activated these emotional reservoirs, enabling their rapid rise to power in 2014.

To make sense of this phenomenon, Dr. Kundu proposed a theoretical hypothesis grounded in Althusserian psychoanalysis. Drawing on psychoanalytic theory, particularly the concepts of the unconscious elaborated by Freud (id, ego, and superego), he argued that populist leaders can be understood as symptomatic expressions of the id—the primal, instinctual component of the human psyche. Liberal and Marxist political traditions have largely ignored or repressed the role of unconscious elements such as desire, fantasy, sexuality, and instinct in the public domain. Populism, by contrast, taps into these unconscious forces, channeling them into political mobilization.

For Dr. Kundu, this psychoanalytic perspective allows for a more structural understanding of emotion in politics. Rather than treating emotions as irrational residues to be overcome through reason, he urged scholars to analyze how unconscious drives are structured and mobilized within political contexts. Authoritarian populism, in this view, thrives where liberalism fails to address or incorporate these unconscious dimensions into its political discourse.

Dr. Kundu also linked the rise of populism to structural inequalities in both economic and political domains. Liberalism’s inability to offer credible redistributive solutions has created fertile ground for right-wing mobilizations. He noted that discussions of redistribution in contemporary democracies have become narrowly focused on land reform, neglecting broader possibilities for income and resource redistribution suited to modern contexts. A renewed focus on redistribution, he suggested, is essential to constructing a progressive alternative to populism.

The second major component of Dr. Kundu’s presentation addressed the question of alternatives: what kind of “people” could function as a revolutionary subject capable of countering right-wing populism? Here he engaged with debates among left theorists such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, who emphasized the political construction of “the people” as a central task of progressive politics. Dr. Kundu argued that in India—and indeed in many democracies—progressive forces have struggled to construct such a people. Their presence is often vibrant in student politics, gender activism, and issue-based mobilizations, but they have been unable to translate these energies into sustained electoral strength.

Dr. Kundu illustrated this point by referencing the case of Bernie Sanders in the United States. Sanders’ radical redistributive platform failed to secure the Democratic Party nomination twice, revealing a structural incompatibility between progressive redistribution and prevailing democratic politics. A similar gap exists in India, where progressive movements have not succeeded in transforming localized activism into a broad-based political subject capable of challenging Hindu nationalist hegemony.

Despite these challenges, Dr. Kundu identified signs of potential realignment in the 2024 Indian general election. He presented data from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) showing that the Congress Party increased its share of Dalit and Adivasi votes in 2024, reversing some of the gains made by the BJP in 2014 and 2019. Specifically, the BJP won 29 Scheduled Caste-reserved seats in 2024, down from 46 in 2019, while the Congress rose from 6 to 20 seats in the same category. The Congress also increased its national vote share from 16.7% in 2019 to 20.8% in 2024. Dr. Kundu interpreted these shifts as evidence that appeals to redistribution and social justice can resonate with marginalized groups, forming the basis for a counter-populist political alliance.

In his concluding reflections, Dr. Kundu reiterated that challenging authoritarian populism requires constructing alliances among marginalized and dispossessed groups—economically, culturally, and politically. The brief resurgence of center-left discourse in 2024 offers some grounds for cautious optimism. However, he emphasized that a durable alternative must address both structural inequalities and the unconscious dimensions of political subjectivity. Authoritarian populism has reshaped the notion of the political subject beyond universal, rationalist language; understanding and engaging with unconscious drives may be essential to forging new forms of democratic politics.

Overall, Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation offered a theoretically rich and contextually grounded analysis of populism’s rise in India. By integrating psychoanalytic theory, structural political economy, and empirical electoral data, he illuminated both the sources of right-wing populism’s appeal and the formidable challenges facing progressive alternatives.


Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu: ‘We, the People’: Rethinking Governance Through Bottom-Up Approaches

Street life and transportation in bustling, tropical Lagos, Nigeria. Photo: Dreamstime.

Due to unforeseen internet connectivity problems during the virtual panel, Dr. Samuel Ngozi Agu’s presentation could not be delivered live. Instead, this report provides a structured summary of his draft article titled “We, the People: Rethinking Governance through Bottom-Up Approaches,” capturing its key arguments, theoretical foundations, and policy recommendations.

The Crisis of Centralized Governance

Dr. Agu begins by interrogating the disjuncture between the ideals and practice of democracy. While democracy is often celebrated as governance “of the people, by the people, and for the people,” in practice, many democratic systems concentrate power at the center. This over-centralization alienates citizens from meaningful decision-making, erodes trust in institutions, and fuels social unrest.

Nigeria, his primary case study, exemplifies this paradox. After more than two decades of democratic rule, the country continues to struggle with corruption, inequality, and exclusionary governance structures. Mass movements such as #EndSARS, #OccupyNigeria, and #EndHardship reflect widespread frustration with a political system that privileges elite interests while sidelining the grassroots. These protests, Dr. Agu argues, are not isolated events but symptoms of a deeper crisis of representation.

To address this gap between citizens and the state, Dr. Agu proposes a shift toward bottom-up governance—an approach that places citizens and communities at the center of governance processes. By devolving decision-making authority, enhancing civic education, promoting community-based development, embracing digital democracy, and enacting inclusive legislative reforms, bottom-up governance can strengthen accountability, improve development outcomes, and restore democratic legitimacy.

Theoretical Framework: Participation–Accountability–Development Nexus

Dr. Agu anchors his analysis in a combination of Participatory Governance Theory and Sustainable Development Theory, integrating insights from deliberative democracy and Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach. i) Participatory Governance Theory emphasizes that democracy requires more than periodic elections. Active citizen engagement in decision-making enhances legitimacy, trust, and policy effectiveness. Participation is not merely instrumental; it is constitutive of democracy itself, transforming citizens from passive recipients into co-producers of governance. ii) Sustainable Development Theory stresses that development is most durable when it is inclusive and participatory. Decisions that emerge from the grassroots better reflect local needs and ensure long-term stewardship of resources.

From this synthesis, Dr. Agu develops the Participation–Accountability–Development (PAD) Nexus, which posits that: Decentralization + Civic Engagement → Increased Participation → Strengthened Accountability → Improved Governance Outcomes → Sustainable Development.

This model links governance reforms directly to human flourishing, suggesting that bottom-up governance expands people’s capabilities to lead lives they value.

Bottom-Up Governance: Concept and Rationale

Dr. Agu defines bottom-up governance as a participatory system of administration in which power and authority originate from the grassroots rather than being imposed from above. In this model, citizens directly influence policy formation, implementation, and evaluation. Unlike the top-down model, which treats citizens as passive recipients of elite decisions, bottom-up governance positions them as active co-creators of development outcomes.

This approach reclaims the moral foundation of democracy by restoring to citizens both agency and authorship. It turns governance from “government for the people” into “government with the people,” fostering trust, curbing corruption, and ensuring that policies reflect real needs.

In the Nigerian context, persistent problems such as declining voter turnout, the rise of separatist agitations (e.g., IPOB, Niger Delta movements), and youth-led mobilizations highlight the urgent need for participatory governance rooted in local realities.

Linking Participatory Governance to Sustainable Development

Empirical evidence, Dr. Agu notes, shows a direct relationship between grassroots participation and improved governance outcomes. Nigeria’s Community Social Development Project (CSDP) provides a compelling example. Under this initiative, communities identify their priorities, plan projects, and oversee their implementation. The result has been more inclusive, transparent, and effective local development.

Globally, similar successes abound:

  • Brazil’s participatory budgeting has improved resource allocation and citizen trust.
  • Rwanda’s Vision 2020 leveraged community participation (via Umuganda and Imihigo) to drive development.
  • Uganda’s Local Government Act (1997) empowered rural councils to deliver essential services more efficiently.

These cases demonstrate that bottom-up governance enhances transparency, curbs corruption, and produces more sustainable development outcomes than centralized models.

Nigeria’s Governance Challenges and Social Movements

Dr. Agu situates Nigeria’s governance crisis within this framework. Despite democratic institutions, the country has failed to translate formal democracy into inclusive development. Voter turnout has plummeted from over 69% in 2003 to just 26.7% in 2023, reflecting widespread disillusionment with political elites.

Social movements have increasingly filled this participatory vacuum. #OccupyNigeria (2012) emerged in response to fuel subsidy removal; #EndSARS (2020) evolved from police brutality protests to broader demands for accountability; more recent protests highlight worsening economic hardship. Alongside these movements, separatist agitations and insurgencies reflect deep grievances over political exclusion and resource distribution.

For Dr. Agu, these developments underscore a structural failure of top-down governance. Without meaningful channels for citizen engagement, protests and unrest become the primary means of political expression.

Strategies for Implementing Bottom-Up Governance

Dr. Agu identifies five interlinked strategies to institutionalize participatory governance in Nigeria:

Decentralization: Strengthen local governance through constitutional reforms that devolve fiscal, administrative, and political powers to local authorities. Empower local governments with independent revenue sources and decision-making authority.

Civic Education: Integrate civic learning into educational curricula to cultivate active citizenship. Promote civil society–led public debates, town halls, and participatory forums to bridge citizen–state gaps.

Community-Based Development (CBD): Institutionalize CDD frameworks that prioritize local ownership, inclusivity, and accountability. Target marginalized groups (youth, women, people with disabilities) to ensure equitable participation.

Digital Democracy: Leverage technology for transparency and citizen engagement through participatory budgeting platforms, budget tracking tools, and open data initiatives. Invest in digital inclusion to ensure rural populations are not excluded.

Legislative Reforms: Enact laws mandating community representation in decision-making bodies. Strengthen anti-corruption frameworks and consider electoral reforms (e.g., proportional representation) to enhance inclusivity.

Reclaiming Democracy from Below

Dr. Agu concludes that achieving inclusive democracy and sustainable development in Nigeria requires a fundamental shift from elite-centered, top-down governance toward citizen-centered, bottom-up approaches.

Grassroots participation, underpinned by decentralization, civic education, community engagement, and digital innovation, can bridge the widening gap between state and society. This shift is not merely a policy alternative but a democratic imperative. By empowering citizens as co-authors of governance, Nigeria can foster political stability, social cohesion, and sustainable growth. Ultimately, as Dr. Agu emphasizes, the future of democracy depends on restoring the agency of “We, the People” and making governance a shared enterprise.

 

Dr. Mouli Bentman & Dr. Michael Dahan: ‘We, the People’: The Populist Subversion of a Universal Ideal

Israelis protest in Tel Aviv, Israel on July 18, 2023, against Netanyahu’s anti-democratic coup as a bill to erase judicial ‘reasonableness clause’ is expected to pass despite 27,676 reservations. Photo: Avivi Aharon.

Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan delivered a jointly structured and intellectually rich presentation that explored how populist movements have appropriated the core language of democracy—particularly the notion of “the people”—to undermine liberal democratic institutions from within. Their central claim was both clear and unsettling: the rise of right-wing populism is not simply a matter of rhetorical manipulation but stems from deep-seated contradictions within liberal democracy itself. By tracing the intellectual genealogy of concepts like legitimacy and universality, and examining contemporary political developments in Israel, the speakers demonstrated how populists have weaponized democratic language to hollow out liberal democracy.

Dr. Bentman opened the presentation by focusing on the paradox at the heart of modern democracy. The phrase “We the People,” once celebrated as the most universal and inclusive expression of collective self-rule, has been turned upside down by populists. Rather than binding citizens across differences, it is now mobilized to divide society between an “authentic” people and its perceived enemies: corrupt elites, minorities, ideological adversaries, and liberal institutions. This shift, he argued, is not merely tactical—it reflects unresolved tensions within the liberal democratic project itself, particularly around questions of legitimacy, universality, and belonging.

To illustrate these tensions, Dr. Bentman offered a concise intellectual history. In the 17th and 18th centuries, debates over political legitimacy revolved around the source of authority. Conservatives grounded legitimacy in divine will, tradition, and natural hierarchy. Liberals, by contrast, rooted legitimacy in the individual—his rights, autonomy, and consent. Thinkers like John Locke argued that governments exist to protect natural rights—life, liberty, and property—while Jean-Jacques Rousseau located legitimacy in la volonté générale, the collective self-rule of the people. Out of this intellectual revolution emerged the liberal democratic order, promising universal rights and collective self-government.

Yet, as Dr. Bentman reminded the audience, critical thinkers from Karl Marx to Simone de Beauvoir exposed the limits of this liberal promise. Marx demonstrated how formal liberty meant little for the working class within a society structured by property and capital. Critical theorists such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno highlighted the dominance of instrumental reason. Postcolonial and feminist thinkers like Frantz Fanon and Beauvoir revealed how liberalism often coexisted with colonialism, patriarchy, and structural violence. By the mid-20th century, figures like Michel Foucault, Edward Said, and Judith Butler deepened the critique, showing how power was embedded not only in the state or capital but in knowledge systems, discourses, and identities themselves.

According to Dr. Bentman, these critiques were not intended to destroy liberal democracy but to deepen it—to expose hidden exclusions and move toward a more just and pluralistic order. However, they inadvertently opened a new political space. If universality had always been partial and exclusionary, could it ever truly include everyone? This unresolved question created an opening for the populist right. Traditionally defenders of hierarchy, the populist right seized upon liberalism’s self-critique, not to expand democracy but to hollow it out. By appropriating the language of postcolonialism, identity politics, and suspicion of elites, they reframed democratic institutions as tools of domination and presented themselves as the authentic voice of “the people.”

Dr. Bentman gave the example of American right-wing activist Charlie Kirk, who appropriated the language of decolonization to depict Christian Americans as the “colonized,” oppressed by secular liberal elites. Similarly, concepts like diversity are inverted to portray universities as discriminatory against conservatives, and the white middle class is recast as a marginalized group. This rhetorical reversal is emblematic of a broader global trend in which the tools of democratic critique are redeployed to legitimize exclusionary majoritarianism.

Dr. Michael Dahan then shifted the focus to Israel as a case study illustrating these dynamics with striking clarity. Ten years ago, Dr. Dahan noted, Israeli politics lacked clear populist parties. This has changed dramatically, particularly over the past two years. Today, two parties embody populist politics: Likud, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, and the Otzma Yehudit (Jewish Strength) Party, led by Itamar Ben-Gvir, which espouses Jewish supremacism. Over two decades, the Israeli right has reframed liberal universalism as a mask for elite domination, elevating instead a narrow ethno-national identity of “the Jewish people” as the sole legitimate sovereign. Palestinians, Arab citizens, left-wing Israelis, and anyone not fully aligned with this project are cast outside the political community.

The events of October 7, 2023—when the state catastrophically failed to protect its citizens—might have been expected to trigger a profound legitimacy crisis. State security apparatuses, emergency services, and welfare systems all collapsed. Civil society—volunteers, NGOs, local authorities—filled the void, rescuing survivors and supporting displaced communities. Rather than acknowledging this, the government turned against these actors, accusing them of betrayal or complicity. Dr. Dahan interpreted this as a deliberate strategy: by delegitimizing alternative sources of solidarity, the state seeks to monopolize the definition of “the people.” This strategy demonstrates how populism not only survives institutional failure but actively feeds on it, having already replaced a universal civic “we” with an exclusionary ethno-national fiction.

Dr. Dahan then tied these developments to broader theoretical trends. Liberalism’s hold on universality has weakened. Critical theories that once sought to liberate have been hijacked. Foucault’s critique of power is misused to undermine expertise; Butler’s performativity is invoked to question democratic norms; postcolonial critiques justify nationalist withdrawal. Pluralism devolves into fragmentation, and fragmentation is weaponized to justify majoritarianism. Democracy is redefined not as a system of rights, deliberation, and checks, but as the unchecked rule of a self-defined majority.

In concluding, Dr. Bentman and Dr. Dahan argued that reclaiming universality is essential to countering these trends. Drawing on thinkers like John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, and Hannah Arendt, they underscored that universality is not sameness, but the institutionalization of diversity under shared rules of fairness. “We the people” must mean all of us—not because we are identical, but because we commit to living together under a shared civic framework. Achieving this requires three strategies: (1) building deliberative infrastructures—citizen assemblies and participatory forums—to integrate diverse voices; (2) protecting civil society organizations from delegitimization; and (3) reinforcing constitutional and judicial safeguards to prevent majoritarian overreach.

Their presentation offered a powerful synthesis of political theory and contemporary politics, revealing how liberal democracy’s own internal critiques have become tools for its destabilization—and suggesting pathways to reclaim democratic universality in an era of resurgent populism.

 

Discussant’s Feedback: Associate Professor Abdelaaziz El Bakkali

Volunteers of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) on Vijyadashmi festival, a large gathering or annual meeting during Ramanavami a Hindu festival in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh on October 19, 2018. Photo: Pradeep Gaurs.

In his role as discussant, Associate Professor Abdelaaziz El Bakkali offered an incisive and comprehensive reflection on the three presentations delivered during the panel. His intervention combined an overall thematic synthesis with targeted commentary on each presentation, situating the papers within broader scholarly debates on populism, democracy, and political participation.

Dr. El Bakkali highlighted that, taken together, the papers moved beyond superficial analyses of populist rhetoric to probe the philosophical, institutional, and psychological foundations that make the performance of “the people” both possible and potent. He noted a common thread: the mobilization of “the people” not as a pre-given democratic sovereign, but as a politically constructed entity, often instrumentalized by leaders who claim to act in the name of democracy while redefining its substance.

Turning to individual presentations, Dr. El Bakkali commended Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s examination of Hindu nationalism as a form of authoritarian populism in India. He observed that Dr. Kundu’s analysis effectively linked the rise of Hindutva populism to disillusionment with liberal democratic institutions, emphasizing the role of emotions and psychological factors in shaping populist subjectivities. Dr. Kundu’s argument that Hindutva is rooted less in formal political strategy than in emotional mobilization and cultural identity was, in Dr. El Bakkali’s view, compelling. However, he suggested several ways to sharpen the analysis:  

First, the paper could focus more explicitly on emotion as a political technology—examining how populist leaders strategically use fear, pride, and resentment to define belonging and mobilize support. Second, incorporating empirical data, such as social media discourse or electoral mobilization, would ground the theoretical reflections more robustly. Third, linking the Indian case to global debates on post-truth politics and the psychology of populism could situate it within broader comparative frameworks, rather than treating it as a unique exception. 

Despite these suggestions, Dr. El Bakkali described the presentation as “very interesting and rich,” highlighting its contribution to understanding the emotional and psychological underpinnings of contemporary populism.

Dr. El Bakkali then turned to Dr. Samuel Agu’s presentation, which he found both timely and significant, especially for the Global South. Dr. Agu’s argument centered on how top-down governance in Nigeria has produced alienation, corruption, and inequality, and how decentralization, civic education, community-based development, and digital democracy can offer participatory alternatives. While praising the clarity and relevance of the paper, Dr. El Bakkali cautioned against romanticizing grassroots governance as a moral corrective to elite domination. He noted that local participation can itself be entangled with control and clientelism, as local elites may capture power, reproduce inequalities, or create new patronage networks. He suggested that the paper address the risks of elite capture and local clientelism, drawing on evidence from Nigerian municipal politics to strengthen its critique. 

He also posed two substantive questions: How can one distinguish between participatory democracy and populist mobilization, given that both claim to speak for “the people”? Why were Brazil and Uganda chosen as comparative cases, and how do their experiences differ from those of other Global South contexts?

Finally, Dr. El Bakkali discussed the paper by Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan, which he found theoretically rich and thought-provoking. He agreed with their argument that populism’s redefinition of “We the People” reflects a deep crisis within liberal democracy, where inclusive universalist ideals have been weaponized to draw exclusionary boundaries between “true” citizens and outsiders. He noted that their paper reveals how populist discourse cannibalizes the Enlightenment’s universalist vocabulary, converting inclusion into exclusion through subtle linguistic strategies. He suggested that this point could be elaborated further. Additionally, he encouraged the authors to integrate non-Western perspectives to avoid reproducing Eurocentric narratives and to expand their discussion on the role of civic education and institutions in reconstructing inclusive forms of belonging beyond ideological polarization.

He concluded with two broad, thought-provoking questions: How can we reclaim the notion of “the people” without reproducing the exclusionary binaries on which populism thrives? Has the concept of “the people” outlived its democratic usefulness?

In conclusion, Dr. El Bakkali praised all three presenters for their illuminating and multifaceted contributions, noting that their work enriched the scholarly conversation on populism, belonging, and democratic governance. His feedback was both analytical and constructive, offering theoretical reflections, methodological suggestions, and comparative perspectives to deepen and sharpen each paper’s contribution.

 

Discussant’s Feedback: Dr. Azize Sargın

Discussant Dr. Azize Sargın delivered thoughtful and analytically sharp feedback on the three presentations, combining conceptual engagement with practical questions that encouraged further development of each paper. She began by expressing her gratitude to the panel organizers and commended all presenters, highlighting in particular the efforts of the African presenter for ensuring that his research was represented despite technical difficulties. She emphasized that all scholars should have equal opportunities to present their work, framing this as a broader academic responsibility to support inclusive scholarly participation.

Dr. Sargın first turned to Dr. Samuel Agu’s paper, acknowledging that although the presentation itself could not be delivered due to technical issues, the abstract offered a compelling entry point for discussion. She found the argument for bottom-up governance—emphasizing decentralization, civic education, and digital democracy—particularly persuasive.

However, she raised several important conceptual and practical questions for the author to consider in further developing the paper. First, she asked for a clearer definition of “bottom-up governance”: whether it refers primarily to institutional decentralization, or whether it encompasses a broader social process of civic empowerment. This conceptual clarification, she argued, is crucial for understanding how such governance might function in practice.

Second, she commended Agu’s linkage between participatory governance and sustainable development, calling it a “powerful claim” that bottom-up governance can foster inclusivity, stability, and growth. However, she encouraged the author to demonstrate more concretely how these dynamics would work in practice, ideally through specific mechanisms, policy examples, or empirical evidence drawn from Nigeria or other comparative cases.

Third, she suggested that the author consider the challenges to implementing bottom-up governance in Nigeria, asking whether these are primarily political, structural, or related to civic capacity. By addressing these challenges, the paper could offer a more nuanced and grounded account of how bottom-up approaches might be operationalized in real-world governance systems.

Turning to Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation, Dr. Sargın praised the paper for its ambition and depth, especially in examining the conceptual and emotional dimensions of authoritarian populism within India’s contemporary political landscape. She highlighted the paper’s strength in linking the rise of Hindu nationalism to both the failures of liberal democratic institutions and the psychological and emotional undercurrents of Indian society, situating the discussion within the broader global crisis of liberal democracy.

She then offered several constructive reflections. First, she encouraged the author to clarify how these complex theoretical ideas would be operationalized—both methodologically and empirically. She suggested that clearly articulating how the politics of emotion is examined in the Indian context would strengthen the analytical coherence of the paper. Second, she raised an important comparative question: whether Hindu nationalist populism should be understood as a variant of global populism or as a distinct phenomenon rooted in India’s post-colonial and religious context. Finally, she expressed curiosity about the alternatives to populism that the paper hinted at. She asked whether these alternatives in the Indian context might involve a revival of liberal institutions, a grassroots democratic project, or a more radical reimagining of politics. These questions, she noted, could deepen the paper’s contribution to debates on authoritarian populism and democratic renewal.

Dr. Sargın concluded with reflections on Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan’s paper, which she described as “very engaging and conceptually rich.” She highlighted the central argument that populism’s redefinition of “We the People” reflects not mere rhetorical manipulation but a deeper crisis within liberal democracy itself. This framing, she argued, is significant because it positions populism as a symptom rather than a distortion, prompting critical reflection on liberalism’s internal tensions.

She raised two key questions for the authors. First, does the crisis lie within liberalism’s theory of inclusion itself, or in how that theory has been institutionalized and practiced? Second, she asked whether their analysis is grounded in specific empirical contexts—such as particular populist movements in Western democracies—or whether it is meant as a globally applicable conceptual reflection. These questions, she suggested, could help clarify the scope and applicability of their arguments.

Dr. Sargın concluded by thanking all presenters for their contributions, noting that each paper tackled different dimensions of the panel’s central theme with intellectual rigor and originality. Her feedback was structured, probing, and constructive, encouraging the presenters to strengthen conceptual clarity, operationalize their claims empirically, and engage with broader theoretical debates.

 

Presenter’s Response: Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu

Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu delivered a thoughtful and philosophically grounded response to the comments and suggestions raised by the discussants. His reply offered both clarifications on theoretical positioning and elaborations on how his analysis engages with the emotional and structural dimensions of authoritarian populism in India, as well as reflections on alternative democratic imaginaries.

Dr. Kundu began by thanking Dr. El Bakkali for his constructive suggestions, emphasizing that they aligned closely with aspects he had already sought to highlight in his presentation. In particular, he welcomed the suggestion to further develop the analysis of emotion as a political technology—that is, the ways in which political leaders deploy pride, belonging, and resentment to shape collective identities and mobilize political support. This, he noted, was already a central thread of his argument, and he plans to strengthen this dimension further. 

He also acknowledged the importance of incorporating empirical data, such as social media discourse and electoral mobilization strategies, to ground the theoretical reflections. In addition, he agreed that linking the Indian case more explicitly to global debates on post-truth politics and the psychology of populism would situate his work within broader comparative discussions, enhancing its analytical reach.

Responding to Dr. Sargın’s question on the operationalization of his theoretical framework, Dr. Kundu provided an extended explanation of how his work positions emotion within political theory. He observed that modern political philosophy has historically privileged reason over emotion, a hierarchy that can be traced back to Enlightenment thought and its liberal humanist legacy. Both liberalism and Marxism, he argued, have been shaped by this rationalist orientation—liberalism through its focus on institutional reason, and Marxism through its claim to be a “scientific” critique of capitalism.

Dr. Kundu explained that his project seeks to theorize emotion not as the opposite of reason but as an integral dimension of political subjectivity and mobilization. Drawing on Althusser’s post-Marxist intervention, he highlighted how Althusser linked ideology to the unconscious, thus opening a conceptual space where desire, fantasy, and affect become central to understanding political dynamics. By situating ideology within the unconscious, Althusser challenges the dominance of rationalist frameworks and reveals how structures of feeling shape political identification.

For Dr. Kundu, this perspective is essential for understanding the rise of Hindutva nationalism in India after 2014. Hindu nationalist movements, he argued, have strategically mobilized affective sentiments tied to religious identity, historical narratives, and collective grievances. Issues such as the Ram Janmabhoomi movement, the Uniform Civil Code, and the abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir tapped into deep-seated emotional reservoirs and historical resentments. Progressive parties, including the Indian National Congress, largely failed to address or mobilize these sentiments substantively, allowing Hindu nationalist forces to harness and redirect these affective energies for electoral gain.

By bringing psychoanalytic and structural perspectives into the analysis, Dr. Kundu aims to provide a richer theoretical account of how populist movements shape political subjectivities and construct “the people” through emotional infrastructures, rather than merely through rational discourse or institutional politics.

Addressing Dr. Sargın’s question regarding alternative democratic imaginaries, Dr. Kundu clarified that his notion of an “alternative people” refers to social groups and communities marginalized by existing structural logics—political, cultural, and social. In the Indian context, this primarily includes lower-caste communities, whose experiences of marginalization parallel those of racial minorities in other societies. He argued that any democratic reimagining must begin with these dispossessed groups, whose historical exclusion provides the basis for a more inclusive conception of “the people.”

Central to this reimagining is the principle of redistribution. Dr. Kundu stressed that redistribution should not be understood narrowly as land reform but as encompassing the redistribution of income, resources, and welfare benefits. He pointed to the 2024 general elections in India, where the Congress Party and opposition forces effectively mobilized redistributive politics to gain support among marginalized communities. He argued that reviving redistribution as a central political principle is essential for countering the affective and cultural narratives mobilized by populist movements, thereby addressing both material inequalities and symbolic exclusions.

Dr. Kundu concluded by reaffirming his commitment to integrating the discussants’ feedback into his ongoing research. He intends to deepen the empirical base, clarify conceptual frameworks, and further elaborate the normative and strategic implications of his work. His response underscored the theoretical ambition of situating emotional dynamics at the center of political analysis, while also engaging with the practical stakes of democratic politics in contemporary India.

 

Presenters’ Response: Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan

Protests against judicial reform and religious coercion in Israel. Photo: Dreamstime.

Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan offered a thoughtful and layered response to the feedback raised by the discussants on their joint presentation examining the populist subversion of the universalist ideal encapsulated in the phrase “We the People.” Their response addressed theoretical, methodological, and contextual questions, while also extending the discussion to the role of technology and the current crises of liberalism.

Dr. Bentman began by addressing Dr. El Bakkali’s observation that their paper relied primarily on European political theory, without engaging with non-European perspectives. He candidly acknowledged this as both a limitation and an opportunity. He noted that, as a scholar raised in a context that “pretends to be part of Europe while geographically located in Western Asia,” he had not developed expertise in non-European political philosophies. However, he agreed that integrating non-Western intellectual traditions could enrich the analysis, offering alternative conceptual vocabularies and historical experiences that may shed new light on populist transformations. He expressed genuine interest in pursuing this line of inquiry in future research, acknowledging the validity and importance of the comment.

Dr. Bentman then turned to the core theoretical question raised by both Dr. El Bakkali and Dr. Sargın: whether liberalism can be reconstituted to meet contemporary challenges, or whether it is in a terminal phase. Drawing a provocative historical analogy, he compared the current crisis of liberalism to the crisis of monarchy in the 16th and 17th centuries. Just as monarchies lost their legitimacy when they could no longer command the consent of their subjects, Dr. Bentman argued that liberalism today faces a legitimacy deficit. It struggles to convince citizens that its institutions and principles still offer a viable framework for collective life.

From his perspective, populism represents not an endpoint but a transitional phase, a political and ideological interregnum between the decline of liberalism as the hegemonic model and the emergence of whatever may replace it—whether a renewed form of liberalism or new authoritarian formations. He expressed doubts about whether liberalism can fully recover but left open the possibility of a “Liberalism 2.0,” contingent on liberal thought and institutions recognizing their limitations, reopening themselves to pluralism, and reclaiming political strength without ceding ground to populist forces.

Dr. Bentman pointed to contemporary political dynamics in Europe as illustrative. For example, in France, the collapse of centrist parties has led to unstable coalitions between radical right and left forces. Similar patterns, he observed, are visible across Europe, the United States, Israel, and India. These developments signal the erosion of liberalism’s institutional backbone—a challenge that demands both theoretical innovation and political reorganization.

Methodologically, Dr. Bentman emphasized that their project seeks to bridge political theory with empirical analysis, especially data on trust and legitimacy in democratic institutions. This dual approach is designed to ensure that the philosophical arguments remain grounded in political realities.

Dr. Michael Dahan supplemented Dr. Bentman’s remarks by addressing Dr. El Bakkali’s point on technology. Drawing on his background in technology and internet studies, Dr. Dahan clarified that the role of digital media in their analysis is not deterministic but catalytic. He described technology as functioning like a “chemical catalyst” in political processes—amplifying and accelerating underlying social and political dynamics rather than creating them outright. 

In particular, new media platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram play a critical role in disseminating populist rhetoric, often more so than visible public platforms like Twitter or Facebook. Their encrypted, closed-network nature makes them harder to monitor and analyze, but their role in embedding populist narratives in everyday communication is substantial. Dr. Dahan underscored that understanding these dynamics is crucial for any analysis of contemporary populist movements.

Dr. Dahan then turned to what he described as the “elephant in the room”: the mobilization of Jewish supremacist rhetoric and historical imaginaries in Israel. He argued that framing the October 7th attacks as a “second Holocaust” played a decisive role in enabling populist rhetoric to feed and justify acts of mass violence, including widespread participation in the war on Gaza. This, he suggested, illustrates how populist discourses can appropriate historical traumas and collective identities to mobilize support for exclusionary and violent political projects.

The presenters’ reply demonstrated an openness to critical feedback and a willingness to expand their analytical framework. They acknowledged gaps (particularly regarding non-European perspectives), clarified their theoretical stance on the crisis of liberalism, and highlighted the catalytic role of technology and identity narratives in contemporary populist politics. Their response situated their work at the intersection of political theory, empirical analysis, and contemporary political developments, reinforcing the paper’s relevance to ongoing debates about populism, democracy, and liberalism’s future.

 

Q&A Session 

The Q&A session opened with a conceptually rich question from Dr. Bülent Keneş, directed to Dr. Mouli Bentman and Dr. Michael Dahan, which probed the historical and normative tension between pluralism, polarization, and national unity. Referring to the presentation’s guiding motto—“People — Once united, now divided”—Dr. Keneş observed that calls for a “united people” often carry nostalgic undertones, yet history reveals that such unity has frequently been mobilized by fascist and authoritarian movements to suppress pluralism in the name of a singular, homogenous “people.” His question centered on three key points: How should we interpret the contemporary tension between pluralism, which sustains democratic contestation, and polarization, which turns difference into entrenched enmity? To what extent does the longing for a “united people” risk reviving homogenizing impulses that undermine liberal democratic pluralism? What might constitute the optimal balance between pluralism, polarization, and unity in a healthy democracy?

Dr. Dahan began by reflecting on the constructed nature of “the people,” drawing on political theory and comparative examples. He emphasized that “the people” is always imagined—whether as an ethno-national entity or as a pluralist civic collective. Nations, from Czechs to Turks to Serbs, are imagined communities, and the content of this imagination determines whether “the people” is inclusive or exclusionary.

If this imagined construct is filled with pluralist values and a multifaceted vision, democratic contestation can thrive without descending into authoritarianism. However, if the construct is defined in ethno-nationalist terms, history shows that societies eventually devolve toward exclusionary or authoritarian structures. This, he cautioned, is a “very dangerous slope” that has been observed across historical and contemporary contexts.

Dr. Dahan illustrated this tension through American historical imaginaries of “We, the People.” While the ideal was articulated as multifaceted and inclusive, its realization has always been contingent on institutional arrangements. He underscored that the key to achieving pluralist unity lies in building and maintaining institutions that can embody this inclusive vision and in ensuring that public trust in these institutions remains strong.

He cited Canada’s constitutional framework as a partial example of this attempt. Through a multicultural constitutional vision, Canada sought to establish an institutional basis for inclusive belonging. While not perfect—racism and nationalist sentiments persist—Canada demonstrates that institutional design matters in mediating between pluralism and unity.

Importantly, Dr. Dahan noted that political culture and historical trajectories shape how these tensions play out. Countries in Eastern Europe, for example, followed different democratic transitions depending on their political histories, demonstrating that no universal template exists. Any attempt to balance pluralism and unity must therefore take local political cultures seriously.

He concluded by invoking his own hybrid identity as a Moroccan Jew with an American accent to illustrate how multifaceted identities complicate ethno-national definitions of “the people” and point toward the need for inclusive imaginaries in diverse societies.

Dr. Bentman expanded on these themes by examining the conceptual duality of “we” in political thought. He argued that both liberalism and fascism mobilize “we,” but in fundamentally different ways. In liberal thought, “we” refers to individuals choosing to live together, either literally or metaphorically, under shared civic rules. In fascist and authoritarian conceptions, “we” refers to an organic national or racial body, something that transcends voluntary association and instead invokes essentialized cultural or racial unity.

Dr. Bentman observed that the founding liberal “we”—as in the American constitutional moment—was itself exclusive, excluding Black people, women, and many minorities. Over time, liberalism expanded the circle of inclusion. However, he argued that inclusion alone proved insufficient. Inviting marginalized groups into a structure designed for a dominant cultural model revealed deeper structural limitations. As societies became more plural, structural and cultural incompatibilities surfaced, contributing to today’s democratic crises.

He noted that contemporary right-wing actors are not necessarily openly fascist, but they appropriate liberal language—individualism, democracy, rights—strategically, blending it with exclusionary identity politics. This hybrid rhetoric allows them to appeal to citizens without explicitly disavowing democratic norms, making their challenge more insidious.

Dr. Bentman drew historical analogies to moments of deep political transformation, such as the 17th-century crisis of monarchy, when political theory (Hobbes, Locke) and institutional innovation (constitutional monarchy) developed in tandem. By contrast, today, he argued, there is a disconnect between political theory and political practice: political scientists and philosophers have not yet articulated a compelling new framework to address the current crisis, while the radical right has developed a coherent and widely disseminated intellectual infrastructure—often outside traditional academia—that is effectively reshaping political imaginaries.

Dr. Bentman concluded by stressing that liberal democracies face a conceptual and political struggle to articulate a renewed vision of pluralist unity. Without such a vision, the political ground may increasingly be ceded to exclusionary movements.

Dr. Azize Sargın raised an incisive theoretical question regarding the concept of the “revolutionary subject” in Dr. Shiveshwar Kundu’s presentation on authoritarian populism in India. Specifically, she asked whether the meaning and role of the revolutionary subject differ across contexts, such as between India and Western Europe, and how this concept might be contextually adapted in different socio-political settings.

In his response, Dr. Kundu affirmed that the notion of the “revolutionary subject” is deeply contextual and contingent upon local socio-political cultures. Drawing on the Indian case, he argued that the revolutionary subject comprises the dispossessed and marginalized communities—including Dalits, Adivasis, minorities, women, and other groups excluded from the country’s dominant economic and political narratives. These groups, he explained, are structurally positioned outside the logic of capital and have been systematically marginalized from India’s celebrated “growth story.”

Dr. Kundu emphasized that progressive political forces must engage with these groups if they wish to effectively counter the rise of right-wing populism. He argued that while right-wing populist movements possess strong cultural and nationalist narratives, they lack a coherent economic theory. This absence makes them vulnerable when confronted with structural questions of inequality. For Dr. Kundu, “redistribution” represents the key political discourse capable of challenging the entrenched structures—whether they be economic systems, caste hierarchies, patriarchal relations, or racial discrimination—that sustain inequality.

By centering redistribution, progressive movements can articulate a vision of economic and social justice that mobilizes marginalized groups as active political agents. Dr. Kundu concluded by agreeing with Dr. Sargın’s premise: the definition and composition of the revolutionary subject will vary across different contexts—shaped by specific historical, social, and political circumstances in each society.

 

Concluding Remarks by Professor Oscar Mazzoleni

Professor Oscar Mazzoleni closed the session with a set of thoughtful reflections that synthesized the key themes of the day’s discussion. He identified two central issues that framed the debate: 1) The hijacking of “the people” by populist movements, particularly those on the right and of an authoritarian character, which often deploy a top-down vision to construct an exclusionary notion of belonging. 2) The democratic responses from below, emphasizing bottom-up strategies, the role of civil society, the defense of pluralism and individual rights, and the promotion of an inclusionary political vision.

Prof. Mazzoleni highlighted the dual nature of populism as both a strategic political project—seeking to mobilize identity and belonging—and a symptom of deeper structural crises within liberal democracies. To understand the global success of populist movements, he argued, it is crucial to analyze three interrelated dimensions:

Rule of Law: Populist movements exploit weaknesses and contradictions within democratic legal systems. While the rule of law embodies universal principles such as pluralism and respect for others, its local variations and inconsistent application create vulnerabilities that populists capitalize on.

Territory and Borders: Questions of belonging are inseparable from territorial and border politics. Defining “who belongs” involves not only political conflict but also emotional dynamics and, in some contexts, war. Borders shape identities and collective imaginaries, becoming a key arena for populist mobilization.

Globalization and Neoliberalism: The neoliberal transformation has not merely reduced the role of the state but has reshaped cultural attitudes, placing competition—both between individuals and between nations—at the core of social relations. This has produced new uncertainties and a heightened desire for belonging, which right-wing populists have adeptly exploited.

According to Prof. Mazzoleni, populist movements thrive by tapping into these tensions, positioning “the people” against democracy, the rule of law, and pluralistic communities. Polarization and hate have emerged as dominant political emotions, deepening democratic fractures. While acknowledging the gravity of these challenges, Prof. Mazzoleni concluded with a measured pessimism: understanding these dynamics clearly is a necessary starting point for rebuilding hope and formulating effective democratic responses in the future.

 

Overall Conclusion

The fourth session of the ECPS Virtual Workshop Series offered a rich and multi-layered examination of how “the people” is constructed, mobilized, and contested across diverse political contexts. Bringing together perspectives from Nigeria, India and Israel, the session illuminated the dual role of “the people” as both a democratic resource and a political instrument leveraged to legitimize exclusionary projects. Throughout the discussions, three interrelated themes emerged.

First, the conceptual construction of “the people” remains central to both democratic renewal and authoritarian subversion. As shown in the presentations, populist actors strategically deploy affective, cultural, and institutional mechanisms to redefine “the people” in exclusionary ways, often by appropriating liberal democratic language itself.

Second, structural dynamics—legal, territorial, and economic—shape the political uses of “the people.” Populist movements thrive where the rule of law is inconsistently applied, where borders and belonging are contested, and where neoliberal globalization has generated competition, insecurity, and a search for identity. These structural tensions are not peripheral but fundamental to understanding contemporary populism.

Third, the responses to populist constructions of “the people” must engage both top-down and bottom-up dynamics. While populism often advances through centralized, leader-driven narratives, democratic resilience depends on revitalizing participatory governance, reinforcing pluralist institutions, and fostering inclusive imaginaries that bridge rather than deepen divisions.

The interplay of theoretical reflections, empirical insights, and comparative perspectives generated a vibrant interdisciplinary dialogue. Presenters offered innovative analyses of participatory governance, psychoanalytic approaches to populism, and the subversion of universalist ideals. Discussants sharpened these contributions through methodological and conceptual critiques, while the Q&A underscored the urgency of rethinking pluralism, polarization, and unity in fractured democracies.

As Professor Oscar Mazzoleni emphasized in his concluding remarks, understanding populism as both a strategic project and a symptom of structural crises is essential for formulating effective democratic responses. This session thus laid a strong foundation for continued interdisciplinary engagement on how “the people” is performed and politicized in the 21st century.

Malaysian politician Anwar Ibrahim delivering a speech on the eve of September 16, 2008 — the day he intended to take over the Malaysian government. Photo: Chee Sheong Chia.

Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: The Gaza War and Malaysia

Please cite as:
Shukri, Syaza & Hassan, Isyraf. (2025). “Anwar Ibrahim’s Civilisational Populism: The Gaza War and Malaysia.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). October 9, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000119



Abstract

This paper examines how Anwar Ibrahim, Malaysia’s tenth prime minister, employs civilisational populism in shaping his foreign policy rhetoric, particularly during the Gaza War that started in 2023. Through the lens of civilisational populism defined by Yilmaz and Morieson as a political strategy that constructs “the people” as defenders of a superior but threatened civilisation, the paper argues that Anwar leverages the Gaza/Palestinian cause to project Islamic solidarity and deflect domestic criticisms of liberalism. In doing so, he seeks to consolidate support against the conservative Islamist opposition, PAS, while maintaining international legitimacy. Drawing on the framework of Foreign Policy Decision Making (FPDM), the study emphasizes the role of individual agency, cognitive calculations, and domestic political pressures in guiding Malaysia’s external stance. Anwar’s rhetorical and symbolic actions such as mass rallies, public condemnations of Israel, and economic restrictions on Israeli-linked entities are analysed not simply as moral positioning but as calculated decisions aimed at managing political survival within a fragmented coalition. The paper highlights contradictions in this approach, such as the BlackRock controversy and local backlash over prioritizing Palestinian aid over domestic needs, revealing the tension between foreign policy idealism and domestic political pragmatism. By integrating FPDM with civilisational populism, the paper provides an understanding of how Malaysia’s foreign policy is not purely reactive or interest-based but shaped by identity politics, leadership perception, and populist imperatives.

Keywords: Anwar Ibrahim; Malaysia; civilisational populism; foreign policy; Gaza War; Palestine; Islamic solidarity; populist rhetoric; domestic politics; identity politics; PAS; leadership agency

 

By Syaza Shukri & Isyraf Hassan

Introduction

The pendulum of civilisationism has swung. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, humanity entered an era of globalisation where connectivity prevailed. However, it did not last, and now that we are in the third decade of the 21st century, we are referring back to Samuel Huntington’s most well-known work, which states that civilisation will be the basis for clashes. In the 1990s, the Washington Consensus fostered a wave of neoliberal globalization, making civilisational divisions seem unlikely. However, following the devastating events of 2001, these divisions have become more apparent, especially against Islamic civilisation. Instead of all-out war, the divisions we are seeing occurs within the framework of national elections. Politicians today are increasingly using civilisationism as part of their populist strategies to win votes.

According to Yilmaz and Morieson, civilisational populism is a political ideology that combines elements of populism with a civilisational framework. It involves a discourse that portrays a particular civilisation—often religious or cultural—as superior and under threat from outsiders or other civilisations. They argued, “populist uses of civilisational discourses differ from non-populist discourses insofar as they use civilisationism to construct internal divisions between an ingroup who they claim belong to ‘our’ civilisation (‘the people’), and outgroups (‘elites,’ ‘others’) who they claim have either betrayed the civilisation of the people or belong to a threatening foreign civilisation,” (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022: 8).

This form of populism appeals to sentiments of cultural heritage, identity, and belonging by positioning “the people” as defenders of their civilisation against perceived existential threats.

For this paper, we are looking at civilisational populism and its impact beyond the nation-state. We argue that Anwar Ibrahim, the tenth prime minister of Malaysia, has been involved with civilisational rhetoric for the purpose of gaining support. Domestically, Anwar’s main political rival is the Islamist Malaysian Pan-Islamic Party (PAS). Shukri (2023) argued that PAS definitely participated in the civilisational narrative of Islam against non-Muslims, specifically non-Muslim Chinese of Malaysia. On the other hand, Anwar, as argued by Shukri (2024), is more of an inclusivist populist. There is heightened political tension in Malaysia between the Islamists that get support from the majority Malay population and Anwar’s own coalition that is usually labelled derogatorily as “liberal” and finds support among non-Muslims and urban Malays. Due to this pressure, Anwar needs to portray himself as a “defender” of Malays and Muslims but in a civilisational way beyond Muslims in Malaysia in order to maintain his inclusivist reputation. Specifically, this paper will look at Anwar’s rhetoric on the Israel-Gaza War that erupted in October 2023. 

Anwar has established himself as an Islamist since his days as a youth leader, and he later transitioned to become a Muslim democrat (Malik & Shukri, 2018). However, we observe that his more assertive rhetoric since becoming prime minister is slightly different from his days as the deputy prime minister under Mahathir Mohamad’s first administration. As a result, it may have led to intra-civilisational discord with other Muslim countries, such as with Saudi Arabia, albeit before the start of the ongoing war, when he was unable to meet either the king or the crown prince during his first visit as prime minister.

The next section will look at Malaysian politics and Anwar Ibrahim’s background. Next, we will look at the literature on civilisational populism and foreign policy decision making in order to provide a framework to guide our understanding of Anwar’s rhetoric about Palestine, Gaza, and the Muslim world. Following that, we will delve deeper into Anwar’s civilisational populism and his relationship with other Muslim leaders. The penultimate section will discuss the impact of Anwar’s civilisational rhetoric in the broader Muslim world context.

Read Full Article Here

United States Bill of Rights alongside a Bible and bullets. Photo: Cheryl Casey.

Virtual Workshop Series — Session 3: Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes

Please cite as:
ECPS Staff. (2025). “Virtual Workshop Series — Session 3: Populism, Freedom of Religion and Illiberal Regimes.” European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS). October 3, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/rp00115



On October 2, 2025, the ECPS, in collaboration with Oxford University, held the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series, “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Chaired by Dr. Marietta D.C. van der Tol, the session examined how populist and illiberal actors across Hungary, Slovakia, and the United States instrumentalize the language of religious freedom to consolidate power and reshape national identity. Presentations by Dr. Marc Loustau, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, followed by reflections from Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, revealed how religion, once central to pluralism, is increasingly politicized as a weapon in culture wars and transnational illiberal strategies.

Reported by ECPS Staff

On October 2, 2025, the European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS), in collaboration with Oxford University, convened the third session of its Virtual Workshop Series titled “We, the People” and the Future of Democracy: Interdisciplinary Approaches. Session 3 explored the entangled relationship between populism, freedom of religion, and illiberal regimes. The session, chaired by Marietta D.C. van der Tol (Landecker Lecturer, University of Cambridge; Senior Postdoctoral Researcher, Trinity College, Cambridge), brought together a diverse set of perspectives, ranging from anthropological and theological insights to political and legal analyses. The session was opened with a welcome speech by ECPS intern Stella Schade, who introduced chair, speakers, and discussant on behalf of the Center. 

In her framing remarks, Dr. van der Tol pointed to “the strong connection that we are seeing between, on the one hand, the rise of illiberalism, and on the other hand, the use of Christianity within the narratives that underpin the rise of illiberalism.” For too long, she noted, illiberalism has been seen as a phenomenon of Central and Eastern Europe, associated with Russia, Hungary, or Slovakia. While acknowledging the reasons for that association, she warned against a narrative that renders Eastern Europe “less good than Western Europe.” What made this session distinctive, she argued, was its inclusion of the United States, which allows scholars to “bridge the East–West divide on this matter” and explore illiberalism as a transnational, rather than regionally bounded, phenomenon. 

To frame the discussion conceptually, Dr. van der Tol introduced the notion of “Christianism”—a politicized form of Christianity comparable to Islamism—drawing on Rogers Brubaker’s work. She emphasized that Christianism manifests not only at the level of ideas but “increasingly on the level of governance.” This, she suggested, requires interdisciplinary perspectives from politics, theology, anthropology, history, and law to grasp the shifting role of religion in illiberal politics.

The session featured three major contributions: Dr. Marc Loustau on Hungary’s instrumentalization of religious freedom, Dr. Juraj Buzalka on pragmatic politicization in Slovakia, and Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen on the incorporation of evangelical theology into Texas law. Their interventions were followed by commentary from discussants Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, who drew comparative and theoretical connections across the cases.

Together, Session 3 illuminated how the language of religious freedom—once considered central to liberal democracy—has been appropriated by illiberal actors to mobilize cultural symbols, entrench political power, and reshape national and transnational identities.

Marc Loustau: Religious Freedom as Hungaricum: Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom

Procession during Easter Holy Mass in the old village of Hollókő, Hungary. Photo: Dreamstime.

In his presentation, Dr. Marc Loustau (Independent Scholar) offered a critical examination of how illiberal regimes—most notably Hungary—instrumentalize the discourse of religious freedom for political ends. His paper, titled “Religious Freedom as Hungaricum: Hungarian Illiberalism and the Political Instrumentalization of Religious Freedom,” sought to unsettle long-standing scholarly assumptions that the institutionalization of religious freedom is solely a liberal project.

Dr. Loustau began by situating his intervention within the broader field of religious freedom studies. Traditionally, he explained, much of the critical scholarship has approached the subject as an essentially liberal discourse rooted in international law and Western foreign policy. This body of work, following thinkers such as Talal Asad and Saba Mahmood, often argued that religious freedom regimes operate as “ostensibly neutral” frameworks designed to protect religious minorities but in fact reproduce “Protestant, individualized religious subjectivities.” According to Dr. Loustau, the scholarly task had long been “to unmask the workings of power behind an ostensibly liberal regime of human rights.”

How Illiberal Regimes Reframe Religious Freedom as a Tool of Nationalist Legitimation

Yet, Dr. Loustau stressed, this framing overlooks the way in which illiberal regimes have increasingly co-opted the very language of religious freedom. “It struck us that religious freedom as a discourse, and its institutionalizations, were just as prominent, if not more prominent, in illiberal regimes like Hungary, Russia, and now, ever increasingly, the United States,” he argued. To limit critique only to liberal regimes, therefore, “misses the way that religious freedom is deployed as a central plank of illiberal politics.”

As a case study, Dr. Loustau focused on the Hungary Helps Program, a flagship initiative of Viktor Orbán’s government. The program, he explained, is publicly celebrated as Hungary’s effort to defend persecuted Christians abroad. “Hungary Helps was very active in Syria,” he noted, “alongside the work of Putin’s Russian regime to protect Orthodox Christians in the Middle East.” On the surface, this appears as a humanitarian initiative. Yet Dr. Loustau emphasized its deeper ideological function: “It was actually designed to unify the cause of defending Christians abroad with the cause of defending Christian culture within Europe against supposed persecution by secular Europeans and secular humanists, also in the United States.”

This dual strategy, he argued, effectively blurs the boundaries between international solidarity with persecuted Christians and a domestic culture war against liberal secularism. By presenting Hungary as a defender of a global Christian civilization, Orbán’s government re-frames religious freedom into a tool of nationalist and illiberal legitimation. Dr. Loustau placed this development in comparative perspective, pointing also to Slovakia’s recent illiberal turn under Robert Fico, and to the United States, where Republican leaders increasingly invoke religious freedom in culture-war politics.

Reframing Religious Freedom as a Tool of Power

The broader theoretical question raised by Dr. Loustau concerns how scholars should adapt the critique of religious freedom when liberalism is no longer the presumed framework. “If we cannot presume that liberalism is the institutional framework within which religious freedom emerges as a project,” he asked, “how might we imagine the scholarly project of critique?” His presentation thus invited a reconsideration of how illiberal regimes use religious freedom not to protect pluralism, but to consolidate cultural hegemony.

By highlighting Hungary’s instrumentalization of religious freedom, Dr. Loustau’s intervention underscored the need to extend critiques beyond liberal universalisms and into the realm of illiberal politics, where appeals to faith and persecution are mobilized as powerful tools of authoritarian populism.

 

Dr. Juraj Buzalka: Religious or Secular Freedom? Pragmatic Politicization of Religion in Post-Socialist Slovakia

Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico speaks at a joint press conference with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in Uzhhorod, Ukraine, on September 5, 2025. Photo: Yanosh Nemesh.

In his presentation, Dr. Juraj Buzalka, an Associate Professor of Social Anthropology, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Comenius University, explored the complex intersection of religion, politics, and populism in Slovakia. He argued that the country’s evolving religious landscape cannot be understood merely through statistics on declining religious identification, but must instead be seen through the lens of cultural economy, historical traditions, and global influences that have fueled the pragmatic politicization of religion by illiberal leaders.

A Breakthrough Moment

Dr. Buzalka began by situating his remarks in a very recent political development. “The spectacular clash of religious and secular liberalism took place last Friday,” he explained, “when Slovakia adopted a constitutional law recognizing only biologically defined male and female sexes.” This change, backed by Prime Minister Robert Fico’s far-right government and supported by Christian Democrats representing about ten percent of the electorate, effectively removed legal recognition for transgender citizens. “Transgender people are no longer recognized,” Dr. Buzalka emphasized. “The change of gender, or even a name from female and male in Slovak, is now not possible.”

This was no ordinary legislative amendment. It marked the 23rd change to Slovakia’s constitution since independence in 1993, but unlike previous amendments, it struck directly at the secular foundations of the state. According to Dr. Buzalka, the new law “undermines the secular character of the state, limits freedoms of citizens as defined by a liberal constitution, and even challenges the primacy of EU law.” While experts noted the implications for European integration, public debate largely overlooked this dimension.

The driving force behind the amendment, Dr. Buzalka suggested, was not primarily religious conviction but political opportunism. “The most profitable in this passing of law has been the political entrepreneur Robert Fico,” he said. Once a Social Democrat in the Blairite mold and a self-proclaimed champion of European integration, Fico has reinvented himself as a “National Social Democrat” with far-right leanings. His party, SMER, faces imminent expulsion from the Party of European Socialists. This dramatic ideological shift, Dr. Buzalka argued, is less surprising when seen through the logic of political instrumentalization: religion has become a useful resource for populist leaders seeking legitimacy and mobilization.

The Post-Peasant Setting

Dr. Buzalka framed his analysis in anthropological terms, drawing on the concept of cultural economy and what he described as Slovakia’s “post-peasant condition.” Despite modernization, urbanization, and globalization, Slovak society remains deeply shaped by its rural past. “Slovakia is still much more defined by its rural heritage than neighboring countries,” he explained. “The modern people traveling all around and speaking foreign languages are the children and grandchildren of former peasants.” This agrarian memory, he argued, sustains a cultural imagination in which religion retains moral authority and symbolic capital.

In this setting, religion is often perceived as morally superior to Western-style secular individualism. This moral economy resonates across political divides, making it unsurprising to Dr. Buzalka that former communists have embraced Catholicism or that voters support both progressive presidential candidates and far-right parties in parliamentary elections. “There are contradictions that might seem irrational from the perspective of top-down politics,” he observed, “but they have their own rationality connected to the post-peasant condition.”

To conceptualize this phenomenon, Dr. Buzalka drew on Douglas Holmes’s theory of integralism, a counter-Enlightenment tradition committed to traditional cultural forms but expressed in modern political settings. He argued that Slovakia’s version is a distinctly East European, post-socialist appearance of integralism—rooted in rural memory, family structures, and communal solidarity. “This is the local version of a religiously inspired movement,” he said, “vigorous and modern, but drawing legitimacy from an imagined moral superiority of traditional community.”

From Communism to Catholicism

One of the most striking themes in Dr. Buzalka’s talk was the fluidity of ideological identities in Slovakia. “It is not surprising for an anthropologist to see former communists sitting in church,” he noted. Similarly, Robert Fico’s personal trajectory—from communist youth, to Blairite reformer, to devout Catholic populist—illustrates this adaptability. Many Slovak voters, too, move between supporting liberal and illiberal actors depending on context. As Dr. Buzalka explained, “Believers could vote for a progressive, openly liberal president at one point, while supporting a Fascist party in parliamentary elections at another. These contradictions are easily swallowed.”

This political pragmatism is not a betrayal of tradition but a continuation of it, embedded in the post-peasant cultural economy where ideological boundaries blur. Dr. Buzalka emphasized that the seeming incoherence of Slovak politics must be understood in terms of lived cultural logics, not abstract ideological purity.

Global Dimensions of Religious Populism

While Slovakia’s political shifts are rooted in local traditions, Dr. Buzalka insisted they are also part of a global phenomenon. “Usually, we tend to see globalization coming from the West in the form of markets and democracy,” he noted. “But alongside these came zealous conservative values, carried by religious freedom movements—often financed from abroad.”

He cited reports showing that Slovak conservative associations received around $10 million from US-based evangelical movements, while across the EU similar groups benefitted from €1.1 billion in external funding. These resources have strengthened far-right and religiously conservative networks, embedding Slovakia in what Dr. Buzalka described as “a new alliance of religious extremists, far-right populists, and oligarchic funders.” This alliance, he warned, is “reshaping European politics, directed by private wealth and legitimized through state funding, engineering a long-term authoritarian transformation under the guise of tradition and care.”

The paradox, Dr. Buzalka observed, is that these populists portray progressivism as a decadent Western import, yet their own religious conservatism is itself imported. “They told us progressivism comes from the spoiled West,” he said, “but in fact, their practices and ideologies are also victims of imported beliefs.” This dynamic, he suggested, reveals the hybrid nature of illiberalism: deeply rooted in local cultural traditions, but also energized by transnational flows of ideology and capital.

Religion, Populism, and Hybrid War

In concluding his presentation, Dr. Buzalka returned to the broader stakes of his argument. Religiously motivated radicalism in Slovakia, he argued, succeeds because it draws strength from both local and global forces. Locally, it arises from the post-peasant condition, where communal solidarity and agrarian memory sustain integralist ideologies. Globally, it is reinforced by the flows of funding, ideology, and disinformation that link Slovakia to broader networks of populist and authoritarian politics.

This dynamic, he suggested, should be understood as part of a wider “hybrid war” against liberal democracy, in which religion is mobilized alongside other tools of disinformation and polarization. “What looks like a defense of national tradition,” he concluded, “is paradoxically itself imported from abroad.”

Although a progressive response is emerging, Dr. Buzalka expressed skepticism about its depth. “It is rather shallow,” he warned, “and still questioned by the global situation.” As Slovakia heads toward further electoral contests, including in neighboring countries like the Czech Republic, the struggle between secular liberalism and religious populism remains finely balanced. “We might see quite interesting results,” he observed, “but what is clear is that the liberal democratic order is being questioned by new forms of anti-modernist discourse.”

 

Dr. Colin Bossen: Illiberal Theocracy in Texas? Evangelical Christian Theology and State Law

A man holds cautionary signs, including one reading “Jesus Or Hellfire!”, in Times Square, New York City, on July 2, 2018. Photo: Erin Alexis Randolph.

In his presentation, Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, First Unitarian Universalist of Houston and Harris Manchester College, University of Oxford, explored how religious pluralism and Christian nationalism collide in contemporary US politics, with Texas as a case study. Drawing on a recent lawsuit filed by members of his own congregation, Dr. Bossen argued that struggles over religion and law in the United States are not merely contests between religion and secularism but rather between competing theological and political visions of religion in public life.

A Case Study from Texas

Dr. Bossen began by recounting how the case emerged directly from his congregation. In August 2023, a member of the First Unitarian Universalist Church of Houston and her daughter joined as plaintiffs in a lawsuit against 11 Texas public school districts. The case challenged Senate Bill 10 (SB10), which sought to require every public classroom to display a framed copy of the Ten Commandments.

Federal Judge Fred Biery issued a preliminary injunction preventing the law from taking effect, citing the First Amendment of the US Constitution: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” On the surface, Dr. Bossen observed, the ruling looked like a straightforward act of secular jurisprudence—a clear demarcation between church and state. But Dr. Bossen suggested otherwise. “My claim is that the lawsuit should not be seen as a contest between a secular understanding of the state and a religious one,” he argued. “Rather, it is best understood as a clash between two different religiously inflected views.”

The first, represented by the bill’s authors, is Christian nationalism. The second, invoked implicitly by the plaintiffs and Judge Biery, is what Dr. Bossen—drawing on historian David Hollinger—called liberalizing religion.

Christian Nationalism vs. Liberalizing Religion

Dr. Bossen outlined these competing visions. Christian nationalism, he explained, is the claim that the United States is fundamentally a Christian nation and that its laws and culture should reflect Protestant Christian values. Quoting Andrew Whitehead and Samuel Perry’s book Taking America Back for God, he emphasized that Christian nationalism blurs religion with race, citizenship, and ideology: “It conflates being Christian with being white, native-born, American, and conservative.” This was evident in the words of Texas Senator Mays Middleton, one of SB10’s authors: “We are a state and nation built on ‘In God We Trust.’”

By contrast, liberalizing religion—rooted in liberal Protestant traditions but now broader—asserts that religion should remain a matter of individual conscience and voluntary association. While maintaining the separation of church and state, liberalizing religion also insists that religiously grounded moral values have a legitimate place in shaping a pluralistic society.

Historically, this current emerged from mainline Protestant denominations—Methodists, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Episcopalians—and became influential through civil rights, women’s rights, immigrant rights, and other social movements. Hollinger has shown that even as mainline church membership declined, their liberalizing influence expanded outside churches, shaping public discourse on anti-racism, anti-sexism, and social justice.

From Liberal Protestantism to Liberalizing Religion

Dr. Bossen illustrated this trajectory through the story of former Texas governor Ann Richards. Richards, a Democrat, had ties to Unitarian Universalism, one of the most liberal religious traditions in the US. She sent her children to a Unitarian preschool in Dallas. Her daughter, Cecile Richards, later led Planned Parenthood, while maintaining ties to Unitarian congregations.

When Roe v. Wade was overturned, the Dallas Unitarian Church reaffirmed reproductive rights as a religious value. Rev. Daniel Cantor declared, “God loves you. You have dignity and worth, and your life is the priority here.” For Dr. Bossen, this demonstrates how liberalizing religion is not limited to Christianity but now includes Jews (especially in Reform and Reconstructionist traditions), Hindus, Buddhists, and even non-religious people committed to pluralism and individual conscience.

The Lawsuit: Rabbi Mara Nathan v. Alamo Heights ISD

The lawsuit against SB10, formally titled Rabbi Mara Nathan v. Alamo Heights Independent School District, exemplified this broader coalition. The plaintiffs included 22 adults and their children: nine Jewish, five Protestant, one Hindu, one Unitarian Universalist, and six non-religious individuals. Even atheists framed their objections in terms consistent with liberalizing religion. One couple argued that they wanted their child “to independently develop decisions on religious matters” rather than have one religious worldview imposed by the state.

The coalition did not withdraw into private schooling or homeschooling; instead, they sought to reform public institutions to ensure pluralism. Judge Biery’s ruling reflected this perspective. He warned against the dangers of “majoritarian government and religion joining hands,” invoking both religious and secular thinkers who advanced pluralist principles. Strikingly, he even suggested that instead of the Ten Commandments, Texas classrooms might post excerpts from Robert Fulghum’s All I Really Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten, a popular book associated with Unitarian Universalist moral teaching.

Christian Nationalist Backlash

Unsurprisingly, the ruling provoked backlash from Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton, a staunch Christian nationalist. Paxton claimed: “From the beginning, the Ten Commandments have been irrevocably intertwined with America’s legal, moral, and historical heritage.” He dismissed the plaintiffs as “woke radicals” bent on erasing American history—ignoring the fact that most were religious individuals advancing a theological vision at odds with his own.

Dr. Bossen noted that Paxton’s rhetoric exemplifies the Christian nationalist refusal to recognize liberalizing religion as genuinely religious. Instead, it delegitimizes pluralistic theologies by branding them as secular, elitist, or radical.

Political Theology and Populism

Dr. Bossen argued that this clash is best seen through the lens of political theology—the incorporation of theological concepts into state structures. In Texas, the question is whether the state will enshrine the theology of Christian nationalism or liberalizing religion.

He connected this to broader debates on populism: “Elsewhere, populist movements can be understood as efforts to create forms of collective identity that seek to answer the question of who ‘the people’ are for a given polity.” Christian nationalism aligns with white supremacist populism, defining “the people” as white, Christian, and native-born. Liberalizing religion, by contrast, aligns with a pluralist populism that imagines “the people” as multiracial, multiethnic, and religiously diverse.

Thus, the Texas case is more than a local legal battle. It reflects a national struggle over identity, belonging, and democracy. Will the United States be defined by exclusionary Christian nationalist theology or by an inclusive pluralist theology rooted in liberalizing religion?

Toward a Broader Framework

Dr. Bossen concluded by noting that his project is still developing. He expressed interest in deepening the theoretical framework connecting religion, law, and liberal statecraft. “My examination of the contest between Christian nationalism and liberalizing theology, white supremacist and pluralistic populism in my state of residence, is just at its beginning,” he said. “I look forward to perspectives that will help me develop a richer framework around the connections between religion and law.”

For now, however, the Texas case offers a vivid window into how religious freedom, constitutional law, and political theology are being contested in the United States. The struggle is not between religion and secularism, Bossen concluded, but between two rival theologies—one exclusionary, majoritarian, and authoritarian, the other pluralistic, voluntarist, and democratic.

 

Discussants’ Feedback

A man clasps his hands in prayer during the opening ceremonies of President Donald Trump’s “Keep America Great” rally at the Wildwoods Convention Center in Wildwood, New Jersey, on January 28, 2020. Photo by Benjamin Clapp.

Dr. Simon P. Watmough (Freelance Researcher; Non-Resident Research Fellow, ECPS)

Serving as discussant, Dr. Simon P. Watmough offered a wide-ranging and integrative commentary that placed the three case studies—Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas—into comparative and global perspective. He praised the panelists for providing “three rich case studies” that at first glance might seem disjointed, yet clearly “strike a common thread” in demonstrating the politicization of religious freedom as a tool of illiberalism.

Linking Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas

Dr. Watmough began by highlighting how the Hungarian and Slovak cases reveal the ways in which religious freedom has been instrumentalized as a wedge issue. In Hungary, he noted, post-2010 politics under Viktor Orbán have become the “classic exemplar of the culture war on a European stage.” Initiatives such as Hungary Helps, described in Dr. Marc Loustau’s presentation, exemplify how religion is used simultaneously to mobilize domestic constituencies and divide opponents at the EU level.

Here, Dr. Watmough posed a provocative question: “Does heritage status make religious freedom a national possession rather than a universal right?” If illiberal actors succeed in nationalizing religious freedom, it undermines its universality. He wondered whether EU universalism—anchored in rights-based frameworks—might provide a counter-strategy: “This whole Christian nationalism thing breaks down at some point when you confront it with universal rights and universal values.”

Turning to Slovakia, Dr. Watmough observed striking similarities with Hungary. Robert Fico, he argued, is “kind of Orbán redux”—a political entrepreneur who has reinvented himself across ideological lines, shifting from a socialist orientation to illiberal nationalism. Like Orbán, Fico demonstrates how populist leaders act as political chameleons, continually reshaping their platforms in response to perceived voter demand. “Give the customers what they want, sell, sell, sell, and make a tidy political profit,” Dr. Watmough remarked, framing such politics as a business model of pragmatic populist entrepreneurship.

The Texas Case in Historical Perspective

Addressing Colin Bossen’s Texas case, Dr. Watmough noted both continuity and divergence with Central Europe. The battle over displaying the Ten Commandments in schools represents not only a contemporary struggle but one deeply embedded in “a big strand of traditional American contestation about what America means, going back 250 years.” Whereas Hungary and Slovakia showcase the appropriation of religion for nation-building in post-socialist and EU contexts, Texas reflects long-standing American debates about religious establishment, pluralism, and the meaning of the First Amendment.

Dr. Watmough predicted that such state-level efforts at religiously inflected lawmaking would soon face scrutiny from the US Supreme Court: “There’s no more dodging. The Court is going to have to weigh in on these contestations in American politics very soon.” The question, he suggested, is whether Texas represents an outlier or a bellwether for broader US trends toward illiberal theocracy.

Cross-Cutting Themes

Dr. Watmough then drew out several themes that cut across all three cases. First, he underscored the instrumentalization of law as a mechanism of illiberal politics. Whether through constitutional amendments in Slovakia, legal initiatives in Hungary, or bills in Texas, religious freedom is mobilized not as a universal safeguard but as a weapon to entrench exclusionary visions of the polity.

Second, he returned to the theme of populist political entrepreneurship. Orbán, Fico, and actors in the US all display what he termed a capacity for pragmatic adaptation, reshaping ideology in order to maximize political profit while keeping illiberal projects intact.

Third, Dr. Watmough raised the question of pluralism’s future. Illiberal actors instrumentalize religion to define narrow and exclusionary conceptions of “the people.” In contrast, liberal-democratic traditions struggle to sustain universalist frameworks capable of resisting these wedge strategies.

The International Dimension

Finally, Dr. Watmough emphasized the importance of transnational linkages. He reminded the audience that ECPS has consistently highlighted the “illiberal internationale”—a loose but increasingly coordinated network of right-wing populists, illiberal regimes, and oligarchic funders who reinforce and legitimate one another across borders. He cited Russian financing of European far-right parties, the spread of disinformation campaigns, and the diffusion of Orbán’s governance model to Poland and Slovakia as examples. “The question we can ask ourselves,” he concluded, “is whether this is more than elective affinity. Are we talking about systemic international linkages?”

Dr. Watmough’s intervention provided a powerful comparative and global frame for the panel. By situating Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas within shared dynamics of lawfare, populist entrepreneurship, and transnational illiberal collaboration, he illuminated both the distinctiveness of each case and the broader structural forces connecting them. His remarks pressed the panelists to consider not only the national specificities of religious politicization but also its implications for the future of pluralism, the resilience of liberal universalism, and the rise of an illiberal international order.

Dr. Erkan Toguslu (Researcher at the Institute for Media Studies, KU Leuven, Belgium)

In his discussant remarks, Dr. Erkan Toguslu offered a thoughtful synthesis of the panel’s three case studies—Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas—focusing on how religion and the principle of religious freedom are being redefined and instrumentalized in contemporary illiberal politics. While acknowledging the contextual diversity of the cases, he highlighted common dynamics that reveal religion not as a neutral principle, but as a powerful tool of political entrepreneurship and symbolic politics.

Religion as Instrument and Symbol

Dr. Toguslu began by underscoring that “protecting religious freedom is not a neutral right.” Rather, across the cases, it emerges as a form of political entrepreneurship and the domestication of religion into political projects. In Hungary, for instance, programs such as Hungary Helps link the defense of persecuted Christians abroad to the narrative of Christianity being eroded at home by secular elites. This fusion of domestic and foreign policy, he argued, exemplifies how religious freedom is recast as a cultural weapon in ongoing symbolic battles.

Such strategies, he suggested, challenge the liberal assumption that public space is neutral and open to all. Instead, religion is increasingly imposed in arenas that should remain pluralistic—schools, constitutions, and civic institutions—transforming freedom itself into a contested object.

Redefining Freedom in Illiberal Politics

A key theme in Dr. Toguslu’s comments was the paradoxical role of religious freedom in illiberal settings. “What does it mean,” he asked, “if religious freedom is used to defend a majority rather than a minority, or to impose a single interpretation on the public?” The very principle meant to protect pluralism and diversity is turned into a justification for restricting them.

In Slovakia, as Dr. Juraj Buzalka showed, this dynamic is tied to what Dr. Toguslu called “hybrid ideologies.” Former communists turned Catholics, or ex-socialists aligning with religious conservatism, illustrate a “strange rationality of contradictions.” Yet, such contradictions are sustained by a post-peasant social imaginary in which rural memory and cultural conservatism provide a sense of moral superiority. Here, religion becomes a moral anchor against liberal modernity, even when articulated by actors with seemingly incompatible ideological pasts.

Liberal Democracies and Illiberal Politics

Turning to the United States, Dr. Toguslu emphasized the broader lesson of the Texas case: even within a liberal democratic regime, illiberal politics can take root. The Ten Commandments bill illustrates how legal and theological struggles play out in ostensibly secular institutions. He argued that this should not be seen simply as a clash between secularism and religion, but as “a confrontation between two theologies: Christian nationalism and liberal, individualistic religion.”

The case demonstrates how religious freedom is mobilized both by those seeking to impose a homogenous religious identity and by those defending pluralism. As in Hungary and Slovakia, law becomes a central battleground—whether through constitutional amendments, federal injunctions, or symbolic legislation.

Broader Theoretical Reflections

In closing, Dr. Toguslu connected his observations to broader critiques of secularism advanced by scholars like Saba Mahmood and Talal Asad. Their insights remind us that secular institutions themselves are never neutral; they can also be hegemonic frameworks that shape politics in particular ways. “Doesn’t matter if it’s liberal or illiberal,” he remarked, “somehow religion becomes a political strategy.”

Linking his comments back to Dr. Watmough’s intervention, Dr. Toguslu emphasized that the instrumentalization of religion in public space—whether in Europe or the United States—reflects a common strategy of illiberal actors. It is less about protecting diversity than about mobilizing cultural symbols for political power.

 

Q&A Heighlights

A “God, Guns, and Trump” sign displayed on an old military bus following the 2020 presidential election in November 2020, Tampa, Florida. Photo by Florida Chuck.

The Q&A session following the panel presentations provided a dynamic exchange of perspectives that deepened the central themes of religion, illiberalism, and populism. Moderated discussion was interspersed with audience interventions, and much of the dialogue focused on the intersections of religion, nationalism, and coalition-building across diverse contexts.

Cross-Religious Alliances and Conservative Convergence

The first question came from Dr. Bülent Keneş, who observed that despite deep doctrinal differences, religious groups across Islam, Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism often converge on conservative social issues—particularly around family values, gender roles, and LGBTQ+ rights. He noted that this convergence was evident in the support some Muslim migrants in the United States had shown for Donald Trump. He asked whether there is potential for “a broader cross-religious alliance among conservative religious constituencies” that could collectively challenge liberal democracy.

Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen responded affirmatively: “The short answer is yes. I think that is the major project that a great number of Christian nationalists are trying to engage in.” He pointed to efforts in Texas by leaders such as Governor Greg Abbott and Attorney General Ken Paxton, who not only mobilize around opposition to LGBTQ+ rights but also stoke fears of Islam by manufacturing what he called a “Muslim scare.” For Dr. Bossen, such strategies are designed to “unify that coalition of evangelicals and conservatives” by creating a common enemy. This, he argued, is not merely a possibility but an active project that is already undermining liberal democratic structures.

Dr. Erkan Toguslu added nuance, drawing on European examples. He recalled studies showing that Muslim voters in Belgium and elsewhere had shifted from supporting Socialist or Green parties to aligning with Christian Democrats due to shared traditionalist values. “These moral backgrounds come up during elections, always,” he noted, suggesting that shared cultural conservatism does create “easy connection points.” However, he remained cautious about whether this amounted to a genuine, coordinated cross-religious coalition.

Constitutional Limits and the Role of the Supreme Court

The next intervention came from Dr. Simon Watmough, who picked up on themes from his earlier feedback. He asked Dr. Bossen whether constitutional limits might constrain Christian nationalist projects, and whether the US Supreme Court would ultimately act as arbiter: “Is it going to be the Supreme Court that is going to be the arbiter of that, do you think?”

Dr. Bossen was skeptical. He described Texas as a testing ground for illiberalism in the United States, where state laws are intentionally crafted to provoke Supreme Court review. Drawing parallels to the long-term legal strategy that led to the overturning of Roe v. Wade, he warned that conservative activists are now honing similar approaches on issues like gender rights. “Law is becoming less and less a matter of reasoning, and more and more a matter of power,” Dr. Bossen argued. He foresaw a growing fragmentation of the United States into illiberal and liberal states, with the Supreme Court unlikely to hold the line: “I’m skeptical that the Court, as it is currently constituted, is going to maintain those limits.”

Youth, Education, and Coalition-Building

Nina Kuzniak raised the issue of young people, noting the increasing presence of theologically grounded values in US public schools. She asked Dr. Bossen whether religious freedom could serve as an antidote to Christian nationalism and how young people might be supported in resisting state-sponsored religious conservatism.

Dr. Bossen responded that the key lay in coalition-building across differences. He acknowledged the difficulty of interfaith dialogue but pointed to the diverse coalition of plaintiffs in the SB10 lawsuit—Jews, Protestants, a Hindu, a Unitarian Universalist, atheists, and agnostics—as a model. “Is there a way to expand that coalition to really push back against Christian nationalism on religious freedom as the unifying thread?” he asked. He also suggested that youth-focused initiatives, such as interfaith programs, could be a promising space for cultivating pluralistic values: “It’s a really interesting question to explore… something that we could even think about here in Houston.”

Christian Nationalism, Whiteness, and Inclusion

Finally, Erkan Toguslu returned with a probing question about the racial dynamics of Christian nationalism. He asked how non-white groups, particularly Black Americans, fit into a movement that appears to be overwhelmingly white.

Dr. Bossen acknowledged the centrality of whiteness to Christian nationalism: “The coalition of people that are Christian nationalists are overwhelmingly white.” Yet he also emphasized its fluidity, noting how European immigrant groups once outside whiteness were eventually incorporated. He suggested that some non-Black minorities, including Southeast Asians and Mexican Americans in Texas, may be seeking partial inclusion into whiteness by aligning with Christian nationalist politics. “They’re trying to perform a certain kind of whiteness and be incorporated into that system,” he explained. This dynamic, he argued, reflects how Christian nationalism continues to equate citizenship with whiteness, while offering conditional entry to groups willing to embrace its ideological framework.

Taken together, the Q&A highlighted the complex entanglement of religion, race, law, and politics across contexts. Dr. Bossen underscored the polarization of American religion into two competing camps: one rooted in Christian nationalism, the other in liberalizing religion. Dr. Toguslu and Dr. Watmough, meanwhile, stressed the transnational resonances, with parallels in Central Europe’s religious conservatism and the use of legal instruments to entrench illiberal values.

The Q&A session ended with a sense of both urgency and possibility: the urgency stemming from the active undermining of liberal democracy through cross-religious conservative coalitions, and the possibility residing in countervailing alliances of pluralistic religious and secular actors. As Dr. Bossen put it, the struggle is not merely legal but a contest over what kind of nation—and what kind of people—the United States, and by extension other democracies, will become.

 

Concluding Reflections by Dr. Marietta van der Tol

Christians raise their hands in worship during a church service. Photo: Joshua Rainey.

In her closing reflections, Dr. Marietta van der Tol offered a wide-ranging analysis that drew together the themes of the panel while situating them within broader questions about religion, illiberalism, and the fragility of constitutional democracy. She emphasized the importance of examining both the fragmentation of political life and the ways in which thin, flexible ideologies can sustain surprising alliances across religious and political divides.

Fragmentation and the Allure of Populist Rhetoric

Dr. van der Tol began by reflecting on the ways fragmentation enables individuals to selectively engage with populist rhetoric without assuming responsibility for its more dangerous implications. “One can identify with one part of the conversation, and sort of not be responsible for the other parts of that same conversation that might be appealing to others,” she observed. This selective embrace, she argued, helps explain the “marriage between Christian nationalism and far-right politics,” as well as the increasing openness to extremist groups in contexts such as the UK and the Netherlands.

From her conversations with those sympathetic to Christian nationalism, she noted that individuals often acknowledge problematic elements of the rhetoric but dismiss them as irrelevant: “They don’t think it is about them, or that it is about somebody else… it’s not in their immediate reference framework, so therefore it’s not that important.” This dynamic, she suggested, provides a crucial clue for understanding both the endurance of such politics and the challenge of dismantling the alliances it sustains.

Thin Ideologies and Transnational Coalitions

A key theme of her remarks was the fluidity of conservative religious and nationalist discourses. She described them as a “thin ideology”—adaptable to varied cultural contexts and capable of mobilizing disparate constituencies. Issues like abortion, feminism, and LGBTQ+ rights can be reframed as “anti-liberal,” “anti-Western,” or “anti-secular,” depending on the audience. “These issues can rally very different groups of people who may not normally see eye to eye,” she explained.

This flexibility helps explain how secular nationalists, Christian conservatives, Muslims, and Hindus sometimes converge in transnational coalitions. Yet Dr. van der Tol cautioned against assuming such actors share identical motivations. “Some people might vote for restrictions of abortion on biblical grounds. That is a very different argument from somebody who says we need the reproduction of the nation to be sped up,” she stressed. Recognizing these distinctions, she argued, is essential both for analytical clarity and for identifying potential fractures within alliances.

At the same time, she remained skeptical of the durability of these coalitions, pointing to their Western—and particularly American—centrism. Many alliances, she argued, are “dominated by Americans, often dominated by American funding.” This creates structural imbalances: non-Western actors may be symbolically included but not taken seriously. She recalled a case where Hindu nationalists were relegated to a marginal panel chaired by an Anglo-American figure, remarking: “It’s an uneven alliance… some of these alliances might not be as long-lived as people would like them to be.”

The Central Role of Law and Constitutionalism

Dr. van der Tol then turned to the role of law in these struggles. She highlighted how right-wing intellectuals often elevate the constitution as the “heart of the nation,” citing Roger Scruton’s claim that constitutionalism itself embodies national identity. This, she argued, explains why culture wars so often manifest through legal battles: “If people are trying to identify and determine what the heart of the nation is, one of the first places they will go is the law, and the Constitution.”

While this focus may seem circular, it is also dangerous. She expressed concern that illiberal actors are not merely amending constitutions but transforming constitutional interpretation itself. Subtle shifts in legal reasoning, rather than headline-grabbing amendments, may prove most consequential. “Paying attention to these technical changes at the level of interpretation requires legal skill, but it cannot live outside the analysis of sociologists, theologians, and political scientists,” she warned. For her, the erosion of constitutionalism risks destabilizing democracy more profoundly than episodic political crises.

Democracy, Pacification, and Religious Freedom

Finally, Dr. van der Tol raised sobering questions about the future of democratic stability. Whereas earlier eras relied on constitutional settlements or compromises—what she called “pacification, where people might exchange certain constitutional goods to pause the culture war”—today’s conflicts may resist such resolution. She cautioned that democracy itself is being redefined, not merely challenged: “The question now is even what is the measure of democracy that the far right thinks is necessary?”

In her conclusion, she reflected on the paradoxical role of Christianity in these processes. It is particularly troubling, she noted, that Christianity—historically a force for constitutional settlement after Europe’s religious wars—is now invoked to undermine constitutionalism. “It’s quite sad to see how Christianity is being used for some of these processes,” she remarked. Yet she also underscored that religious freedom remains key to renewing democratic legitimacy. Even conservative religious communities that are skeptical of liberal democracy have historically accepted it because of guarantees of religious liberty. “Whatever the future of democracy looks like, it’s going to have to take religious freedom seriously to the point where it allows these communities to buy in again.”

Dr. van der Tol’s closing assessment thus underscored the interdisciplinary challenge of analyzing religion, law, and populism in contemporary politics. She highlighted the fragility of alliances, the centrality of legal contestation, and the unsettling transformations of constitutionalism underway. Most of all, she reminded the audience that the stakes are not abstract: “There’s something at stake. Will our democracies ever look like the way they looked 10 or 20 years ago? If not, what will the alternative look like?”

Her reflections left the audience with both caution and urgency: caution, in recognizing the thin and fragile nature of many transnational illiberal alliances; and urgency, in grappling with the profound implications of constitutional and cultural transformations for the future of democracy itself.

 

Conclusion

Session 3 of the ECPS–Oxford Virtual Workshop Series made clear that the entanglement of religion, populism, and illiberalism is neither accidental nor confined to any one region. Across Hungary, Slovakia, and Texas, the panelists showed how appeals to religious freedom—once a cornerstone of liberal democracy—are increasingly being redefined as instruments of exclusion, mobilization, and power consolidation.

Dr. Marc Loustau demonstrated how Hungary reframes religious freedom to defend Christian identity at home while projecting humanitarian solidarity abroad, thereby transforming a liberal principle into an illiberal cultural weapon. Dr. Juraj Buzalka revealed how Slovakia’s “post-peasant” cultural economy and opportunistic leadership have enabled the pragmatic politicization of religion, blending global conservative funding with local traditions. Rev. Dr. Colin Bossen, meanwhile, highlighted the US case of Texas, where religious freedom is contested not between secularism and faith, but between two theologies—Christian nationalism and liberalizing pluralism.

The discussants, Dr. Simon P. Watmough and Dr. Erkan Toguslu, drew the threads together, underscoring how religion is domesticated into politics through lawfare, culture wars, and symbolic politics. Both stressed that these developments form part of a wider “illiberal internationale,” linking actors across borders through shared narratives, funding, and strategies.

In her closing reflections, Dr. Marietta van der Tol warned that these shifts point to deeper transformations of constitutionalism itself. If the constitution becomes not a neutral framework but the very terrain of ideological struggle, then democracy’s foundations may be unsettled in ways more enduring than electoral swings. As she cautioned, “Will our democracies ever look like the way they looked 10 or 20 years ago? If not, what will the alternative look like?”

Ultimately, the session underscored both the fragility and urgency of democratic resilience. Understanding how illiberal actors instrumentalize religion is not only an academic task but a political imperative for safeguarding pluralism, constitutionalism, and the future of democracy.

Photo: Dreamstime.

From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding

The ECPS convened leading scholars to assess how populist movements are accelerating democratic decay and edging toward fascism. Moderated by Professor Cengiz Aktar, the panel featured Professors Mabel Berezin, Steven Friedman, Julie Ingersoll, Richard Falk, and Larry Diamond. Discussions ranged from Christian nationalism and techno-utopianism in the US, to the failures of Western democratic models, to the global hypocrisy of international law. Panelists warned that populism now serves as a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with worldwide reverberations. They underscored the responsibility of intellectuals to resist euphemism, speak with clarity, and help reimagine democracy in an age of disinformation, mass manipulation, and systemic crisis.

Reported by ECPS Staff

The European Center for Populism Studies (ECPS) hosted a panel titled “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding.” The session gathered distinguished scholars to examine the accelerating erosion of democracy, the potential transition from populism to fascism, and the moral and intellectual duties of those who continue to defend democratic values in dark times.

Selcuk Gultasli, ECPS Chairperson, opened the session by emphasizing the urgency of the theme. He noted that the panel sought not only to analyze the rise of populism but also to confront how authoritarian tendencies may harden into fascism. ECPS, he explained, is committed to making the discussion widely accessible through a detailed report and online recordings, ensuring that policymakers, academics, and engaged citizens can benefit from the insights shared.

Moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar, adjunct professor of political science at the University of Athens, then set the tone by recalling ECPS’s mission: to document and analyze how populism threatens democracy worldwide. He warned that populist leaders are not isolated figures but draw legitimacy from mass support, which, in Arendtian terms, provides the essential condition for fascist governance. Today’s task, Professor Aktar concluded, is no longer about building democracy but about preventing its collapse.

Professor Mabel Berezin (Distinguished Professor of Arts & Sciences in Sociology and Director of the Institute for European Studies at Cornell University) opened with a comparative analysis of populism in Europe and the United States. She argued that American populism, embodied by Donald Trump, is marked by unpredictability and authoritarian experimentation, untethered from coherent historical anchors. The most dangerous development, she suggested, lies not in street militias but in “social authoritarianism”—elite legal and intellectual projects such as Project 2025 that aim to dismantle democracy from within. The elevation of Charlie Kirk as a martyr, she warned, signals a new form of religious-political mobilization with fascistic overtones.

Professor Steven Friedman (Research Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Johannesburg) challenged the myth of a pristine democracy interrupted by an authoritarian onslaught. He argued that the current model of democracy was already exclusionary before the rise of authoritarianism, and the current Western model itself is failing. By ignoring the dangers of private corporate power and clinging to Eurocentric notions of “consolidation,” democrats have overlooked the deeper roots of disillusionment. For Professor Friedman, the task is to redefine democracy as equal human choice in all decisions that affect people’s lives—a principle that requires confronting both state and private power.

Professor Julie Ingersoll (Professor of Religious Studies and Florida Blue Ethics Fellow at the University of North Florida) provided an ethnographic perspective on Christian nationalism in the United States. She mapped three strands—evangelical dominionism, Catholic integralism, and Pentecostal-charismatic movements—that, despite historical rivalries, now converge in rejecting pluralism and democracy. She also highlighted the convergence of these religious forces with secular techno-utopianism and nihilistic online subcultures. The result, she argued, is a coalition oriented toward collapse and accelerationism, united less by theology than by anti-democratic aspirations.

Professor Richard Falk (Albert G. Milbank Professor of International Law and Practice, Emeritus at Princeton University) situated the discussion in a global frame. He argued that democracy was tarnished long before populism’s rise, corrupted by Cold War secrecy, US hypocrisy in international law, and the exploitative logic of capitalism. Populism, in his view, compounds these crises by waging an “epistemological war” against truth and expertise. Facing climate change, nuclear peril, and extreme poverty, Professor Falk urged intellectuals to embrace utopian thinking and even revolutionary transformation, reorienting governance toward the global public good.

Professor Larry Diamond (Professor of Sociology and of Political Science, Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Mosbacher Senior Fellow in Global Democracy at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University) concluded with a stark warning about the authoritarian project underway in the United States. Drawing lessons from leaders such as Hungary’s Orbán and Turkey’s Erdoğan, he argued that Trump and his allies are pursuing a systematic strategy of democratic dismantling: media capture, judicial purges, lawfare, and gerrymandering. While fascistic elements are present, Professor Diamond stressed the importance of terminological precision. Resistance, he suggested, requires early mobilization, broad coalitions, and a focus on economic issues that resonate with ordinary voters.

Together, the panelists painted a sobering picture: populism today is no longer merely a style of politics but a vehicle for authoritarian consolidation with global reverberations. From Christian nationalism to techno-utopianism, from corporate power to manipulated legal frameworks, the threats are multifaceted. Yet the panel also underscored a common responsibility—that intellectuals must speak with clarity, resist euphemism, and foster new visions of democracy suited to the crises of our age.

 

Professor Mabel Berezin: “Locating the Fight? Strategic Engagement in the United States and Europe”

People gather at Turning Point USA headquarters in Phoenix, Arizona, on September 13, 2025, for a memorial following the fatal shooting of Charlie Kirk during his speech at Utah Valley University in Orem. Photo: Dreamstime.

In her presentation, Professor Mabel Berezin delivered a sobering analysis of the current trajectory of democracy in the United States and Europe. Speaking from the vantage point of an academic who has long studied populism and fascism, she situated the discussion within a comparative framework, but with particular urgency regarding developments in the United States since the 2024 presidential election.

Berezin opened with a reflection on the language used to describe contemporary democratic crises. The term “democratic backsliding,” she argued, now feels wholly inadequate for the American case. Since Donald Trump’s return to power, the country has been subject to what she described as a “high-speed wrecking ball” against its democratic institutions. While democratic erosion is a global phenomenon, its forms vary across national contexts, depending on political histories and institutional resilience. This, she suggested, underscores the need for context-specific strategies of intellectual and civic engagement.

European Populism and American Exceptionalism

Berezin revisited an argument she first articulated in 2017 in her essay “Trump is Not a European-Style Populist and That is Our Problem.” In that piece, she observed that while European far-right populists—such as Marine Le Pen in France or Giorgia Meloni in Italy—often ground their appeals in nostalgia for a stronger nation-state and postwar social protections, the American populist right is marked by unpredictability. European populists, she argued, want “more state, not less,” and their grievances frequently revolve around immigration and monetary issues within the European Union framework. By contrast, the American case lacks a coherent historical anchor, and Trump’s political appeal did not fit neatly into established narratives.

For Professor Berezin, this unpredictability made Trump particularly dangerous. While European populists often pursue recognizable policy goals rooted in the past, Trump’s movement was untethered, fueled instead by volatile grievances and charismatic mobilization. The absence of clearly defined political expectations in the US created fertile ground for authoritarian experimentation.

The Rise of Social Authoritarianism

Turning to the US after the 2020 and 2024 elections, Professor Berezin noted the growing academic consensus that Trumpism bears fascist characteristics. However, she argued that the most pressing threats to democracy are not necessarily the paramilitary groups that rallied in Charlottesville or stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Instead, the greater danger lies in what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a project spearheaded by intellectual cadres aligned with institutions such as the Heritage Foundation, the Federalist Society, and the architects of “Project 2025.”

These actors, she explained, represent the true intellectual core of the movement. Unlike the visible extremists brandishing weapons, these figures deploy law, language, and bureaucracy as instruments of authoritarian consolidation. By targeting institutions and systematically reshaping the judiciary, they seek to dismantle the so-called “deep state” and restrict fundamental freedoms under the veneer of legality. As Professor Berezin quipped, it is easier to imprison someone who fires an AR-15 than it is to restrain a legal strategist whose weapon is a thesaurus.

The Paramilitary of Jesus

While she downplayed the long-term mobilizing potential of armed militias, Professor Berezin identified a new and alarming development: the posthumous elevation of Charlie Kirk, a conservative media figure assassinated in September 2025. Initially dismissing him as a fringe podcaster, Professor Berezin admitted she was shocked by the scale and spectacle of his memorial service, which she described as a “paramilitary of Jesus with the blessings of the state.” The event drew millions of attendees and viewers, including Trump and much of his cabinet, and revealed a level of organization, youthful enthusiasm, and emotional intensity that Professor Berezin found profoundly unsettling.

What struck her most was the fusion of evangelical symbolism with political mobilization. The service emphasized family, reproduction, and communal solidarity, urging followers to “have more children than you can afford” and to embrace family as one’s central role in society. While the rhetoric appeared religious, Professor Berezin suggested it was in fact a form of secular mobilization—anchored less in theology than in a cultural project of authoritarian belonging.

Kirk’s assassination, she argued, paradoxically strengthened the movement. In death, he was transformed into a martyr, his charisma frozen in time, and his image available for endless appropriation by the MAGA movement. This development, she warned, fills a “missing link” in the analytical framework of American authoritarianism, supplying the movement with an emotionally powerful narrative and a mobilizing force that mainstream democratic actors struggle to match.

Intellectual Responsibilities

The central theme of Professor Berezin’s speech was the intellectual responsibility of scholars in confronting authoritarianism. She acknowledged the limitations of academic writing and debate in the face of mobilized authoritarian forces but insisted that silence or timidity is not an option. Universities, law schools, and other institutions must be willing to say “no” to authoritarian incursions, resisting the erosion of academic freedom and democratic values.

Dialogue, she suggested, remains valuable, but only if understood not as a tool of conversion but as a means of fostering engagement. In her own teaching on fascism and nationalism, Professor Berezin frequently encounters conservative students who seek to talk rather than proselytize. Creating spaces for such conversations, she argued, can generate a deeper understanding of democratic principles across divides.

Yet Professor Berezin also warned against complacency. She noted that the rhetoric of Trump’s movement is saturated with appeals to “freedom,” while democracy itself is rarely mentioned. The gap between these two concepts must be addressed directly. For her, one crucial task is rearticulating what democracy actually means in the public sphere. Many Americans, she lamented, support democracy as an abstract good but lack a concrete understanding of its practices and requirements.

Democracy and Education

Professor Berezin concluded by situating intellectual responsibility within the longer history of democratic education. She invoked John Dewey’s Democracy and Education (1916) and the civic initiatives launched in the United States during the onset of World War II, such as the National Foundation for Education and American Citizenship. These historical precedents, she argued, remind us that democracy must be taught, nurtured, and continuously reinforced through education.

For Professor Berezin, the path forward lies not in rhetorical denunciations of fascism but in cultivating a renewed public understanding of democracy itself. Education, both formal and informal, is the most effective channel for resisting the deeply embedded authoritarian forces now at work. If democracy is to be saved—or at least its decline attenuated—scholars, educators, and intellectuals must reclaim their role in shaping civic culture.

Conclusion

Professor Berezin’s presentation offered a bracing assessment of the state of democracy in America and beyond. By contrasting European and American populisms, highlighting the intellectual underpinnings of authoritarianism, and analyzing the symbolic mobilization of figures like Charlie Kirk, she illuminated the complex and evolving threats facing democratic societies. Her call to intellectual responsibility—grounded in education, engagement, and the defense of democratic institutions—underscored the urgent role of scholars in meeting this historical moment.

 

Professor Steven Friedman: “Democracy for All: Rethinking a Failed Model”

The controversial Israeli separation wall dividing Israel from the West Bank, often referred to as the segregation wall in Palestine. Photo: Giovanni De Caro.

In his presentation, Professor Steven Friedman offered a provocative and deeply critical re-examination of contemporary democratic theory and practice. Speaking as both a South African scholar and a citizen who lived through apartheid and the democratic transition of 1994, Professor Friedman challenged prevailing assumptions about democracy’s origins, legitimacy, and sustainability. His core argument was clear: the crisis facing democracy today is not merely the product of authoritarian incursions or populist disruption but the collapse of a flawed model of democracy that has dominated global thinking for the past three decades.

The Myth of a Pristine Democratic Past

Professor Friedman began by dismantling what he called the “myth of the pristine democratic environment.” Many observers, he argued, continue to think of democracy as a fully functioning, well-ordered system that has been corrupted by external “barbarians.” While acknowledging the existence of authoritarian challengers, Professor Friedman insisted that this framing misdiagnoses the problem. According to him, democracy has not simply been hijacked; rather, the dominant model itself is failing. To understand today’s crisis, we must interrogate the assumptions underpinning this model.

Democracy as a Western Export

The first of these assumptions, Professor Friedman argued, is the idea that democracy is inherently Western. For decades, he noted, democracy outside North America and Western Europe has been judged by the extent to which it resembles an idealized Western model. This attitude, embedded in the “transition to democracy” scholarship of the late twentieth century, created a hierarchy in which Africa, Asia, and Latin America were cast as perpetual apprentices striving to approximate Western democracies.

He pointed to the academic obsession with “democratic consolidation” as an example. Despite the proliferation of literature on the subject, there has never been a coherent definition of what a “consolidated democracy” actually is. In practice, Professor Friedman argued, the concept functioned as a mirror: if a country looked like Western Europe or North America, it was deemed consolidated; if not, it was considered deficient. This was less a political theory, he suggested, than an ethnic bias.

Today, the irony of this model is stark. The very Western democracies once held up as exemplars are themselves eroding fundamental freedoms. Professor Friedman shared a telling personal anecdote. During apartheid, South Africans envied Western societies for their freedoms of speech and assembly. Yet today, he noted, German academics fear losing their jobs for participating in discussions critical of Israel, and Americans risk detention for political speech. The “boot,” he observed, “is now on the other foot.” Modeling democracy on the West, he concluded, is no longer tenable.

Palestine as a Democracy Problem

Professor Friedman underscored this argument with a pressing contemporary example: Palestine. He contended that the suppression of pro-Palestinian expression in Western democracies represents a profound democratic failure. Citizens in the UK and elsewhere have been arrested for holding signs opposing genocide, while in many countries, calls for boycotts—an elementary form of democratic speech—are criminalized.

Equally troubling, Professor Friedman argued, is the gap between public opinion and elite policy. Surveys consistently show overwhelming public support for a just resolution to the conflict, yet Western governments either ignore this consensus or offer token gestures while maintaining policies that sustain the crisis. This disconnect illustrates how democracy, when treated as a Western possession, erodes its own legitimacy. For Professor Friedman, the Palestine issue is not peripheral but central to understanding democracy’s current global malaise.

Ignoring Private Power

The second flawed assumption of the dominant model, Professor Friedman argued, is its fixation on the state as the sole threat to freedom. According to this view, democracy exists primarily to constrain state power and ensure accountability to citizens. While important, this perspective ignores another crucial reality: private power can be equally oppressive when left unregulated.

Professor Friedman reminded his audience that this insight is hardly radical. Theodore Roosevelt, in the early twentieth century, warned that unregulated commercial power could dominate and oppress citizens just as much as the state. For much of the postwar period, Western democracies acknowledged this reality, regulating corporate influence to safeguard public interests. Yet in the past thirty years, this recognition has disappeared from mainstream democratic theory. Private power is rarely mentioned in contemporary scholarship or policy debates, leaving citizens vulnerable to corporate domination.

He illustrated this point with evidence from the 2024 US elections. Democratic candidates who campaigned on regulating corporate price gouging outperformed their peers by 8–10 percentage points, sometimes winning in unexpected constituencies. This, Professor Friedman argued, underscores the centrality of addressing private power to democratic renewal. Citizens disengage not because they are seduced by authoritarianism, but because they see mainstream parties as unwilling or unable to improve their material conditions.

The Real Crisis: Disillusionment, Not Populism

Professor Friedman pushed back against the notion that democracy’s greatest threat lies in the rise of populist strongmen. The problem, he suggested, is not the growth of the authoritarian right but the erosion of faith among non-right constituencies. In the US, for example, Trump did not dramatically expand his base between 2020 and 2024. Instead, 17 million former Democratic voters simply abstained. Disillusionment, not conversion, handed Trump his victory.

This phenomenon is not unique to the US. Across Western Europe, too, the crisis of democracy stems less from the swelling of the right than from the alienation of citizens who feel their votes no longer matter. When private power goes unregulated and living standards stagnate, democratic participation declines. Professor Friedman emphasized that this structural disillusionment is a more urgent challenge than the electoral gains of right-wing populists.

Redefining Democracy

In concluding, Professor Friedman turned to the question of intellectual responsibility. Scholars, he argued, must abandon the failed model of democracy and reimagine its meaning. For him, democracy is not a set of institutions or a Western inheritance but a principle: every adult human being should have an equal say in every decision that affects them.

He acknowledged that no society has ever fully realized this ideal. But, citing South African theorist Richard Turner’s essay “The Necessity of Utopian Thinking,” Professor Friedman insisted that such standards must serve as guiding measures. Without them, democrats risk losing sight of their goals.

Placing equal human choice at the center of democracy, Professor Friedman argued, has two transformative implications. First, it erases the Western bias by recognizing democracy as a universal entitlement, not a Western export. Second, it compels recognition that private power must be regulated just as much as state power to ensure genuine freedom. Free speech, free assembly, and other democratic rights flow from this foundational principle.

Conclusion

Professor Friedman’s presentation was both a diagnosis and a manifesto. He rejected nostalgic narratives of a lost democratic golden age, instead locating today’s crisis in the flaws of a dominant model that has privileged Western forms and ignored private power. By highlighting the Palestine issue, he demonstrated how democratic principles are being eroded in the very societies that claim to embody them. By pointing to corporate power, he revealed the blind spots of a state-centered understanding of democracy.

Ultimately, Professor Friedman’s call was for a radical rethinking of democracy as a universal system of equal human choice. Only by embracing this vision, he argued, can democrats move beyond disillusionment and resist both authoritarianism and apathy. His intervention offered a powerful reminder that democracy’s renewal depends not on replication of Western models but on confronting the structural inequalities—both public and private—that undermine it.


Professor Julie Ingersoll: “That Which Precedes the Fall: ‘Religion’ and ‘Secularism’ in the US”

Donald Trump’s supporters wearing “In God We Trump” shirts at a rally in Bojangles’ Coliseum in Charlotte, North Carolina, on March 2, 2020. Photo: Jeffrey Edwards.

In her presentation, Professor Julie Ingersoll offered a sobering ethnographic analysis of how religious and ostensibly secular movements in the United States have converged into a powerful populist force. Drawing on more than three decades of field-based scholarship on American religion, Professor Ingersoll explained how seemingly disparate strands of Christianity—along with nonreligious ideological currents—have coalesced into a theocratic, anti-democratic vision that underpins the populist movement known as MAGA. Her intervention highlighted the importance of rethinking how scholars conceptualize religion itself, arguing that theological differences often obscure shared cultural and political commitments.

The Ethnographer’s Lens

Professor Ingersoll situated her perspective within her disciplinary background. Unlike scholars who approach populism through theories of democracy or abstract political models, her work is rooted in ethnography and the close study of religious communities over time. Her aim, she explained, is not to prescribe strategies for saving democracy but to document the lived dynamics of religious movements and to clarify what society is up against. This commitment to description and analysis, she argued, is itself a vital intellectual responsibility: to bear witness, to explain, and to equip others with a deeper understanding of the cultural forces reshaping American politics.

Three Streams of Christian Nationalism

Central to Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her mapping of Christian nationalism into three distinct but increasingly interconnected traditions.

Evangelical Protestant Dominionism: The first stream emerges from white conservative evangelical Protestantism, particularly the Reconstructionist movement of the 1950s. These groups believe the Bible speaks to every area of life and advocate a theocratic social order rooted in pro-slavery Southern Presbyterianism. They view pluralism and social equality as heretical and insist that Christians are commanded to exercise “dominion” over the world, a mandate they trace back to Genesis. This dominionist vision has informed generations of evangelical activism, positioning biblical law as the sole legitimate foundation for governance.

Catholic Integralism: The second stream arises from Catholic integralism, a minority tradition within Catholicism that rejects church-state separation and seeks to organize society according to Catholic teaching. Integralists draw inspiration from the historic doctrine of the divine right of kings and today align themselves with efforts to dismantle the administrative state. Professor Ingersoll pointed to Leonard Leo and the Federalist Society’s transformation of the US Supreme Court as evidence of integralist influence. Their promotion of the “unitary executive” doctrine reflects a broader ambition to consolidate political power in ways that erode checks and balances.

Charismatic and Pentecostal Movements: The third stream comes from charismatic and Pentecostal Christianity, particularly the New Apostolic Reformation (NAR) that arose in the 1990s. Emphasizing prophecy, apostleship, and spiritual warfare, these groups interpret the world as a literal battlefield between divine and demonic forces. Their “Seven Mountains Mandate” envisions Christians seizing control of key spheres of society, from government and business to media and education. Professor Ingersoll warned that this branch of Christian nationalism, with its apocalyptic worldview and demonization of opponents, is especially prone to violence.

While historically divided and even hostile to one another, these three streams have forged common cause within the MAGA movement. Their theological disagreements, Professor Ingersoll argued, often matter less in everyday practice than their shared opposition to pluralism, egalitarianism, and democracy.

Rethinking Religion

A major contribution of Professor Ingersoll’s presentation was her challenge to conventional understandings of religion. Too often, she argued, scholars and observers treat religion as a coherent set of theological beliefs derived from sacred texts. In reality, religious communities function as shifting assemblages of practices, narratives, and cultural markers that organize social life, demarcate insiders and outsiders, and legitimate particular hierarchies.

She illustrated this with a simple example for her students: when people choose a church, they often do so based on social comfort and community ties, not doctrinal precision. Over time, their beliefs shift to align with the group. In this sense, theology frequently follows social belonging rather than the other way around. Recognizing this dynamic, she argued, helps explain how divergent Christian traditions can set aside doctrinal disputes to advance a shared political project.

The Blurring of Religious and Secular

Importantly, Professor Ingersoll emphasized that Christian nationalism does not exist in isolation. It converges with ostensibly secular ideological movements, most notably Silicon Valley techno-utopianism. Tech futurists, accelerationists, and advocates of the “Dark Enlightenment” envision the collapse of democracy and its replacement by corporate-style governance, with CEOs and elite boards as rulers. They promote building digital and physical enclaves—whether in the cloud, on artificial islands, or even on Mars—where hierarchy replaces equality.

Despite their secular self-image, these movements align with Christian nationalism on core commitments: hostility to egalitarianism, skepticism toward democracy, and openness to societal collapse as an opportunity for renewal. Together, they form a strange but potent coalition, bound less by shared theology than by shared anti-democratic aspirations.

Professor Ingersoll also pointed to nihilistic online subcultures that defy the left-right binary, particularly those implicated in the assassination of Charlie Kirk. These groups embrace collapse and seek to accelerate it, even if what follows is “nothingness.” Though ideologically incoherent, they reinforce the broader accelerationist impulse uniting religious and secular anti-democratic forces.

Theocratic Visions and Apocalyptic Anticipations

Across these groups—whether dominionist, integralist, Pentecostal, techno-utopian, or nihilist— Professor Ingersoll identified a common conviction that society is in chaos and decline, and that collapse is either inevitable or desirable. Some even imagine themselves as agents accelerating history toward apocalyptic ends. Though they may diverge sharply on what comes after collapse—the Kingdom of God, a Mars colony, or nihilistic nothingness—they are united in their rejection of democracy and equality in the present.

This convergence, she warned, explains why observers have underestimated their power. Analysts often dismissed each strand as fringe or mutually exclusive, missing the cultural work that bound them together. Only by reframing religion not as fixed belief but as lived practice can we see the coherence of this coalition.

Intellectual Responsibilities

Professor Ingersoll concluded by reflecting on the intellectual responsibilities of scholars in this precarious moment. She admitted that offering prescriptive solutions has never been her strength, nor does she claim to have a plan for saving American democracy. What she can do, she insisted, is “stay in her lane”: documenting, explaining, and bearing witness to the forces reshaping society.

She acknowledged the difficulty of gaining perspective within the United States, where daily life remains unchanged for many even as democratic institutions crumble. Yet she argued that democracy has already collapsed in significant ways, and the upcoming 2026 election may already be compromised beyond repair.

For academics, the challenge is compounded by growing pressures to remain silent. Universities, law firms, media organizations, and even independent institutions have faced campaigns to suppress dissent. Faculty—tenured, untenured, and even retired—have been fired or disciplined for their speech, often on the basis of accusations tied to social media. The silencing of intellectual voices, Professor Ingersoll warned, represents not just an attack on individuals but an erosion of democracy itself.

Conclusion

Professor Julie Ingersoll’s presentation illuminated the deep entanglements of religion, culture, and politics in the rise of American populism. By tracing the convergence of evangelical dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal charismatics, techno-utopians, and nihilist subcultures, she revealed a coalition united not by theology but by anti-democratic commitments. Her insistence on reframing religion as lived practice rather than doctrinal belief opened new avenues for understanding how these disparate groups reinforce one another.

Ultimately, her message was both analytical and cautionary. The coalition she described thrives on visions of collapse and acceleration, rejecting democracy and equality in favor of theocratic or technocratic alternatives. For scholars, the responsibility is to continue speaking, documenting, and explaining—even in the face of silencing. As Professor Ingersoll made clear, the stakes are nothing less than the future of American democracy.

 

Professor Richard Falk: “Emancipatory Politics in a Dark Time”

UN Security Council meeting on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, New York, August 25, 2016. Photo: Ognjen Stevanovic.

In his presentation, Professor Richard Falk offered a sobering international perspective on the decline of democracy, the failures of US leadership, and the urgent need to rethink political responsibility in light of global crises. Speaking as a longtime scholar of international law and global order, Professor Falk situated the challenges of populism and authoritarianism within broader structural failures—of US democracy, capitalism, and the international system established after World War II.

The Tarnishing of Democracy

Professor Falk began by challenging the notion that populism alone is the cause of democratic erosion in the US. Democracy, he argued, was already “badly tarnished” long before the rise of Trumpism. For decades, the United States projected itself as the world’s exemplary democracy, yet in practice it offered citizens only a “choiceless democracy.” The two-party system, constrained by Cold War ideologies, provided little space for fundamental debate on the most pressing issues.

Secrecy further hollowed out democratic practice. The CIA and other US agencies subverted democratic movements abroad—staging coups in Iran, Chile, and elsewhere—while concealing these actions from the American public under the guise of national security. By normalizing criminal interventions as necessary for security, Professor Falk argued, the US “permanently corrupted the moral sensibilities of the citizenry.” Democracy was reduced to participation in elections that offered no real alternative, fueling disillusionment among the poor, racial minorities, and other marginalized groups whose grievances were consistently dismissed.

The Global Projection of Hypocrisy

Internationally, the United States squandered the opportunity after World War II to construct a just world order. Instead, it entrenched a system that privileged the victors. The United Nations Security Council institutionalized inequality by exempting the five permanent members from compliance with international law. As Professor Falk emphasized, this design elevated geopolitics over morality and law, undermining the credibility of global governance from the start.

The consequences of this hypocrisy are evident today. In conflicts such as Ukraine and Gaza, international law is selectively invoked: wielded as a weapon against adversaries while ignored when allies commit violations. This double standard, Professor Falk argued, has transformed the US from a supposed champion of the rule of law into “the champion of moral hypocrisy.” The result is widespread alienation across much of the Global South, where US credibility as a promoter of democracy has eroded.

Capitalism, Populism, and the Assault on Truth

A further obstacle to democratic renewal lies in the current stage of global capitalism. Contemporary capitalism, Professor Falk argued, is both exploitative and ecologically destructive. By privileging short-term profits over sustainability, it undermines governments’ ability to act in the public interest. Corporate influence on politics ensures that urgent global challenges—climate change, poverty, and disarmament—are subordinated to private interests.

Within this context, populism becomes not a solution but an amplifier of democratic decay. Trumpism, Professor Falk contended, embodies an “epistemological war against the Enlightenment.” It is hostile to expertise, reason, and evidence, and sanctions those who attempt to tell inconvenient truths. The suppression of international voices speaking out about the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza, including United Nations officials, is emblematic of this assault on truth. Words such as “genocide” are rendered almost unspeakable, even as atrocities unfold in real time. By eroding the possibility of truth-telling, populist politics undermines responsible citizenship and corrodes the foundations of democratic accountability.

Toward Emancipatory Politics

Against this backdrop, Professor Falk posed the critical question: what does it mean to be a responsible citizen in such dark times? His answer pointed toward the necessity of utopian thinking and, potentially, revolutionary transformation. Incremental reform within existing structures, he argued, is insufficient. The dominant social forces—military-industrial complexes, corporate lobbies, and entrenched elites—must be displaced by actors committed to the global public good.

For Professor Falk, the form of governance is less important than its orientation toward reality. Addressing existential challenges—climate change, nuclear proliferation, mass poverty—requires political systems that privilege truth, sustainability, and the collective interest over short-term expediency. Intriguingly, he noted, some of the most responsible practices in these areas currently come from China, a state that is highly autocratic and, in many respects, anti-democratic. This paradox raises the possibility that the ecological and geopolitical crises of the twenty-first century may demand post-democratic or post-populist forms of governance if humanity is to survive.

Conclusion

Professor Richard Falk’s presentation was a sweeping indictment of both US democracy and the international order it helped create. He argued that the failures of American democracy—its secrecy, its choicelessness, and its moral corruption—have reverberated globally, eroding trust in the very idea of liberal democracy. Coupled with an ecologically destructive capitalism and a populism hostile to truth, these dynamics leave humanity in a perilous position.

Yet Professor Falk’s talk was not only diagnostic but also prescriptive in spirit. He called for a politics of emancipation grounded in truth-telling, utopian imagination, and global solidarity. Whether through democratic renewal or through new, post-democratic arrangements, he urged that political systems must be reoriented toward the survival and flourishing of the human species. In a dark time, emancipation requires both courage and a willingness to envision radical alternatives.

 

Professor Larry Diamond: “Combatting Authoritarian Populism”

Trump supporters marched toward Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C., USA. Photo: Dreamstime / © Bgrocker

In his presentation, Professor Larry Diamond delivered a sweeping and sobering assessment of the threats facing democracy in the United States and around the world. Framing his remarks against a backdrop of rising authoritarian populism, Professor Diamond emphasized that the global tide of illiberalism is far from cresting. Instead, the forces of democratic backsliding—anchored in right-wing populism—are accelerating across multiple continents, diffusing strategies and legitimizing authoritarian models. Against this international canvas, he examined the United States as a critical battleground, where Donald Trump’s return to power has raised the prospect of a systematic dismantling of liberal democracy.

A Global Wave of Authoritarian Populism

Professor Diamond began by situating current US dynamics within a global context. Across Latin America, he observed, populist models inspired by both Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele are gaining traction. Chile may soon see a populist restoration, Bolivia and Colombia could follow suit, and Ecuador has already taken a hard turn to the right. These trends reflect a wider diffusion effect: just as democratic activists once drew inspiration from leaders such as Mario Soares in Portugal or Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, today’s populist movements model themselves on figures like Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey.

Europe, too, faces serious risks. Marine Le Pen’s National Rally stands poised to take power in France, while Nigel Farage has become a plausible candidate for prime minister in the United Kingdom. Germany, traditionally a bulwark of liberal democracy, now contends with dynamics of polarized pluralism reminiscent of interwar Europe. In Central and Eastern Europe, right-wing parties are resurgent, with Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party threatening hard-won democratic restoration. Taken together, Professor Diamond warned, these developments mark an era of “deeply, dangerously fluid” political polarization.

Trumpism and the Project of Authoritarian Entrenchment

Within this global wave, the United States has reemerged as both a model and a cautionary tale. After returning to the presidency, Trump has pursued a far more methodical strategy to consolidate power, guided by the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025. This playbook, Professor Diamond explained, echoes Orbán’s transformation of Hungary from a liberal democracy to what he termed an “illiberal non-democracy”—a regime that preserves the appearance of competitive elections while hollowing out checks and balances.

Trump’s project, Professor Diamond warned, has advanced along nearly every step of the authoritarian “12-step program” outlined in his earlier book Ill Winds: Saving Democracy from Russian Rage, Chinese Ambition, and American Complacency. These steps include extreme polarization, demonization of the opposition, systematic attacks on the media, politicization of the courts, and the purge of independent institutions. What distinguishes the current moment, he stressed, is that these efforts are no longer impulsive but deliberate, refined over four years of preparation.

The Assault on Media, Courts, and Institutions

Professor Diamond catalogued the multiple fronts of authoritarian encroachment. Independent media face unprecedented threats from concentrated ownership by Trump-aligned billionaires, such as the Ellison family’s acquisitions of TikTok and Paramount (including CBS News). Once pillars of journalistic independence, these outlets risk being transformed into regime mouthpieces. The trend mirrors patterns in Turkey, Venezuela, and Hungary, where businessmen allied with ruling parties purchased media outlets to neutralize dissent.

The judiciary has likewise been targeted. Inspectors general across federal agencies were summarily dismissed at the outset of Trump’s new administration. Judge Advocate Generals in the Army, Navy, and Air Force—key advisors on constitutional limits within the military—were purged, raising concerns about the politicization of the armed forces. This, Professor Diamond noted, is a particularly ominous development: authoritarian leaders often seek to secure military loyalty as a safeguard against democratic resistance.

Universities, NGOs, and philanthropic foundations are also under attack. As in Hungary, where Orbán vilified George Soros, Trump’s allies have begun targeting major civil society organizations such as the Open Society Foundations and the Ford Foundation. Lawfare—weaponizing legal mechanisms to intimidate and suppress—has become a defining strategy, extending even to efforts to prosecute political opponents like former FBI director James Comey.

Gerrymandering, Lawfare, and Electoral Manipulation

At the electoral level, Trump’s allies have embraced grotesque gerrymandering to entrench minority rule. By redrawing districts with ruthless precision, they aim to secure durable Republican control of the House of Representatives, even without majority support. Echoing Orbán’s tactics in Hungary, such manipulation risks creating a façade of competition while structurally foreclosing alternation in power.

The broader strategy, Professor Diamond explained, is not to abolish elections but to subvert them—maintaining a veneer of democratic legitimacy while ensuring outcomes favorable to the regime. This is why vigilance over the 2026 midterms and 2028 presidential elections is crucial. Without robust mobilization and institutional safeguards, the US risks sliding into electoral authoritarianism.

Intellectual Responsibilities: Rigor and Precision

Responding to the session’s theme of intellectual responsibility, Professor Diamond underscored the importance of terminological clarity. While Trumpism has fascistic elements—such as the stigmatization of minorities and the elevation of a charismatic leader—he cautioned against prematurely labeling the United States a fascist regime. Misusing charged terms, he argued, risks polarizing discourse further and alienating potential allies in the defense of democracy. Instead, scholars must distinguish carefully between illiberal democracy, electoral authoritarianism, and full-fledged authoritarianism. Intellectual rigor, he insisted, is itself a form of civic responsibility.

Lessons for Resisting Authoritarianism

Professor Diamond concluded with several lessons drawn from global experiences of democratic backsliding.

Mobilize early and vigorously:  The sooner authoritarian projects are resisted, the greater the chance of success. Once the bureaucracy, judiciary, and security services are stacked with loyalists, reversing course becomes exponentially harder.

Combine institutional and civic strategies: Courts, legislatures, and oversight mechanisms remain critical tools, even if weakened. Judicial rulings can still draw lines, and regaining control of congressional committees would enable investigations into corruption. At the same time, civil society mobilization is indispensable: protests such as “No Kings Day,” which drew millions into the streets, exemplify the power of mass resistance.

Build broad electoral coalitions: Ultimately, authoritarian leaders are most often defeated at the ballot box. Opposition coalitions must transcend class and identity divides, adopting inclusive strategies that resonate beyond traditional partisan bases. Professor Diamond cited Turkey’s municipal elections, in which campaigns of “radical love” forged unlikely alliances, as an instructive model.

Prioritize economic performance: Voters care most about material conditions. Autocrats often mismanage economies due to corruption and cronyism, creating openings for opposition campaigns focused on bread-and-butter issues. As James Carville’s dictum reminds us: “It’s the economy, stupid.” Professor Diamond noted that Trump’s approval ratings are underwater across all policy areas, including crime and immigration, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with his governance.

Conclusion

Professor Larry Diamond’s presentation painted a stark picture of democracy under siege. Around the world, populist leaders are modeling themselves not on democratic icons but on illiberal strongmen. In the United States, Donald Trump’s methodical pursuit of power threatens to transform the country into an electoral authoritarian regime. From media capture and judicial purges to gerrymandering and lawfare, the signs are clear: America is far along the authoritarian pathway.

Yet Professor Diamond also offered hope rooted in historical lessons. Authoritarian regimes often collapse under the weight of their corruption, economic mismanagement, and overreach. Intellectuals must contribute with rigor and clarity, resisting hyperbolic labels while documenting authoritarian encroachments. Civil society must mobilize boldly, institutions must be defended, and electoral coalitions must be broadened.

The struggle, Professor Diamond concluded, is urgent but not lost. The fate of American democracy—and its global influence—will hinge on the ability of citizens, scholars, and leaders to confront authoritarianism with courage, precision, and unity.

 

Q&A Highlights 

A Trump flag waves at a pier on Coden Beach in Coden, Alabama, on June 9, 2024. The flag bears the slogan, “Jesus is my Savior. Trump is my President.” Photo: Carmen K. Sisson.

The Q&A session following the panel underscored the urgency and complexity of the challenges facing contemporary democracy. Questions probed deeply into the militarization of politics, the durability of authoritarian regimes, and the prospects for democratic renewal. The exchange illuminated both the dangers at hand and the intellectual responsibility of scholars to frame these dangers with clarity.

Militarization of Politics in the US

The first question raised the issue of Donald Trump’s overt and covert attempts to draw the military into American politics. Referencing the July 4th military parade and the deployment of the National Guard in major US cities including Washington, D.C., and Los Angeles, the questioner asked whether such actions risked militarizing US politics or politicizing the armed forces, with potential implications for other struggling democracies.

Professor Larry Diamond responded with grave concern. He described these moves as “serious, intentional, and very dangerous,” with both symbolic and practical consequences. Beyond rallying an exclusionary nationalism, Trump’s efforts have raised fears of outright constitutional violations. Professor Diamond relayed the warning of a senior retired military officer that Trump might attempt to deploy the National Guard in contested districts during the 2026 congressional elections to interfere with ballot access and recounts. Such maneuvers, he stressed, would mark a decisive step toward authoritarianism, as they seek to build a military apparatus personally loyal to Trump and the MAGA movement.

Professor Julie Ingersoll added another dimension, noting the religious undercurrents in Trump’s ties to figures such as Pete Hegseth, whose deep connections to Christian Reconstructionist networks highlight the fusion of military symbolism with theocratic ideologies. This overlap, she argued, further illustrates the blurred boundaries between religion, politics, and authoritarian aspirations in the US.

Can Authoritarian Regimes Be Reversed?

A second question asked whether history offered examples of authoritarian governments being deposed through democratic means, referencing Armitage’s claim that such reversals are rare. Responding, Professor Diamond acknowledged the difficulty but pointed to Poland as a partial example of democratic restoration, albeit one fraught with constitutional landmines left behind by previous authoritarian-minded governments. He predicted that future reversals would similarly confront dilemmas: how to dismantle authoritarian structures without replicating their illiberal methods.

Professor Diamond rejected the notion that authoritarian projects last indefinitely. Their corruption, failures, and reliance on aging leaders such as Erdoğan, he argued, ultimately erode their viability. New democratic moments do emerge, though they face immense challenges. For the US, the fundamental test will come in the 2026 midterm elections, where the integrity of voting and counting remains the essential condition for democracy.

 

Concluding Reflections by Professor Cengiz Aktar

In his closing remarks, moderator Professor Cengiz Aktar reflected on the themes of the discussion with a sobering tone. He observed that the global zeitgeist had shifted dramatically: no longer are scholars debating how to build democracy, but rather how to prevent its collapse. Echoing Richard Falk’s notion of “dark times,” Professor Aktar emphasized that naming the threat accurately—calling fascism by its name—is essential. Euphemisms, he argued, obscure the gravity of the crisis.

Professor Aktar pointed to both danger and paradox. While populist and authoritarian leaders draw significant mass support, their rise reveals the gap between freedom and democracy. He recalled Professor Mabel Berezin’s warning that invocations of “freedom” are often decoupled from democratic commitments, enabling libertarian and extremist actors to weaponize speech through digital platforms. At the same time, freedom of expression is selectively curtailed, as seen in the suppression of voices denouncing atrocities such as the Gaza genocide.

Ultimately, Professor Aktar concluded that the world is entering an especially perilous period marked by democratic erosion, mass manipulation, and authoritarian resilience. In this context, he stressed the vital role of intellectual gatherings like this one, noting that the ECPS will likely need to convene further forums to analyze and resist these trends. His remarks closed the session on a sober but mobilizing note: intellectuals, activists, and citizens alike must remain vigilant and engaged in defense of democracy.

 

Overall Conclusion

The ECPS panel “From Populism to Fascism? Intellectual Responsibilities in Times of Democratic Backsliding” offered a sobering yet clarifying examination of the forces eroding democracy across the globe. What emerged most clearly is that populism today cannot be dismissed as a passing style of politics or a democratic “correction.” Rather, it increasingly serves as a vehicle for authoritarian entrenchment, exploiting institutions, culture, religion, and technology in ways that carry fascistic echoes.

Professor Mabel Berezin’s analysis highlighted the transformation of US populism into what she termed “social authoritarianism”—a strategy less reliant on militias than on legal, cultural, and intellectual frameworks that dismantle democracy from within. Professor Steven Friedman dismantled the illusion of a pristine democratic past, reminding us that Western models themselves are faltering, especially when they ignore the power of corporate interests and the structural exclusions on which they rest. 

Professor Julie Ingersoll exposed the convergence of Christian dominionists, Catholic integralists, Pentecostal-charismatics, and techno-utopians into a shared anti-democratic coalition—an unlikely but potent fusion united by hostility to pluralism and democracy. Professor Richard Falk placed these developments in global perspective, underscoring the hypocrisy of US democracy promotion, the corrosive effects of secrecy and capitalism, and the urgent need for emancipatory politics grounded in truth-telling and ecological survival. Finally, Professor Larry Diamond warned of deliberate authoritarian projects in the United States, modeled on Orbán and Erdoğan, that weaponize law, gerrymandering, media capture, and even the military to consolidate power.

The Q&A deepened these concerns, particularly around the militarization of politics under Trump and the fragility of democratic reversals. The possibility of deploying the National Guard for electoral interference, as Professor Diamond relayed, illustrates how quickly democratic norms can collapse.

Moderator Cengiz Aktar closed with a stark reminder: the global zeitgeist has shifted. We are no longer asking how to build democracy but how to prevent its collapse. The panelists converged on a central responsibility—that intellectuals must resist euphemism, call authoritarianism and fascism by their names, and provide frameworks that clarify rather than obscure. In an era marked by disinformation, selective freedoms, and systemic crisis, clarity itself becomes a democratic act.

The challenge, then, is twofold: to defend democracy where it still exists and to reimagine it in forms capable of confronting the structural inequalities, ecological perils, and authoritarian tactics of our age.

Students and academics join a protest march in Haifa on September 9, 2023, against Israel’s controversial judicial overhaul. Photo: Dreamstime.

Authoritarianism Curbed? Populism, Democracy and War in Israel

Please cite as:
Ben-Porat, Guy & Filc, Dani. (2025). “Authoritarianism Curbed? Populism, Democracy and War in Israel.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 24, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000118

 

Abstract

Since January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of protests against the governments’ plan to restrict the power of the Supreme Court. The government, a coalition between the Likud’s populist party, the Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right announced a legislation package threatening Israel’s institutions’ -limited- liberal constitutionalism, opening the possibility of authoritarianism. Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse, it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.

Keywords: Israel, populism, democracy, religion, authoritarianism

 

By Guy Ben-Porat & Dani Filc

Introduction

In January 2023 hundreds of thousand Israelis took to the streets in an unprecedented wave of demonstrations against the government’s reform plan depicted as a threat to democracy. The government, a coalition between the Likud, Ultra-Orthodox and the extreme religious-right parties, one hitherto excluded from coalitions, introduced a legislation package that would, according to its opponents, undermine Israel’s democratic institutions, in particular the Supreme Court, and open the way for authoritarianism. The protestors, who took to the streets in the name of liberal democracy, compared the developments in Israel to those in Hungary and Poland, argued that the government plan would not only undermine Israel’s [already limited] democracy but also threaten civil rights, freedom and gender equality. Not only the threat of authoritarianism but also the potential transformation into a theocracy evoked the protests. Coalition agreements and proposed laws, advocated by the religious parties, would, once legislated, it was argued, undermine secular, LGBTQ+, and women’s rights. The protest involved not only large-scale demonstrations for months, but also roadblocks, economic boycotts, appeals to international leaders and media, and even declarations of army reservists they would not report to duty if the proposed legislation would be completed as planned. 

Right-wing populism, that in its Israeli version combines populist tropes with religion and nationalism, combined with other radical right parties to form a tight and determined coalition set to transform Israel’s political system into what was described by the government’s opposition as an authoritarian (and theocratic) threat. Notwithstanding the governments’ intentions we argue, using the Israeli case study, that the “slide” from right-wing populism to authoritarianism is not inevitable. First, right-wing populism positions itself as anti-liberal rather than anti-democratic. Consequently, second, it has to contend with a potential opposition, a large one undermining its claim to speak “for the people.” And third, when anti-liberal stance relies also on religious discourse it not only evokes liberal opposition but also divisions among populists regarding religious authority. These three reasons make authoritarianism a possibility but not an obligatory telos.

It is impossible to predict whether authoritarianism was curbed, even more so in light of the war in Gaza after Hamas attack in October 2023. Rather, our purpose is more modest, to highlight the inconsistencies within right-wing populism that enable opposition and potentially prevent authoritarianism based on the experience from Israel. Accordingly, we ask, first, looking beyond instrumental benefits, what explains the formation of a coalition between different expressions of radical right and religious fundamentalism? Second, how the anti-liberal and anti-democratic trends and commitment to religious ideas and identities combine and contrast in the government’s plan? And third, how have the anti-liberal and anti-democratic threat of Israeli right-wing populism enabled the opposition? 

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The Zhihu logo displayed on a smartphone screen. Photo: Rafael Henrique.

Diversity, Rationality, and the Diffusion of Online Populism: A Study of Chinese Social Media Discussions

Please cite as:

Su, Yu & Li, Tongtong. (2025). “Diversity, Rationality, and the Diffusion of Online Populism: A Study of Chinese Social Media Discussions.” Journal of Populism Studies (JPS). September 21, 2025. https://doi.org/10.55271/JPS000117

 

Abstract

This study asks whether two core dimensions of deliberative quality—viewpoint diversity and rationality—shape the diffusion of online populism on Zhihu, a major Chinese Q&A platform. Using Transformer-based language models and LLMs to operationalize diversity and rationality across threads on ten salient populist issues, and estimating multilevel negative binomial models, we find: (a) diversity is positively associated with diffusion (comments/likes), and (b) rationality is negatively associated with diffusion; moreover, issue-level random effects are substantial, indicating topic-specific virality. We theorize that rationality may dampen the diffusion, and—based on prior literature—this is plausibly because it reduces emotional arousal, increases cognitive load, interrupts outrage cycles, and weakens bandwagon cues typically rewarded by algorithms and users. Theoretically, the paper bridges deliberative democracy and populism by showing that diversity can be a double-edged amplifier in populist contexts, while rationality functions as a diffusion brake; it also recenters analysis on a non-Western, platform-level setting. Practically, the findings caution against diversity-only interventions, support community and design measures that elevate reason-giving (e.g., sourcing, evidence prompts) while accounting for issue-specific virality when governing online populism in China’s digital public sphere.

Keywords: online populism, deliberation, rationality, diversity, social media

 

By Yu Su & Tongtong Li

Introduction

In the digital public sphere, diversity of viewpoints and rationality of discussion are widely recognized as two core features of public deliberation, serving as important mechanisms for promoting healthy democratic discourse (Dryzek, 2000; Habermas, 1996). Diversity emphasizes the inclusion of different opinions and perspectives in the deliberative process, helping to break information echo chambers and reduce the emergence of extreme positions (Mutz, 2006); rationality advocates for providing reasons, evidence, and logical arguments to support one’s viewpoints, thereby facilitating information sharing and cognitive updating in discussions (Stromer-Galley, 2007).

However, today’s online space has witnessed the rapid rise of populism. In China in particular, although the meritocratic political system has to some extent constrained the emergence of populist politicians and effectively precluded top-down populist mobilization, a form of bottom-up populist expression continues to proliferate on the internet (Ma, 2015). Chinese online populism is characterized by grassroots political narratives, with ordinary netizens leveraging anonymity to launch collective criticism against elite misconduct and perceived threats from “the other” (He et al., 2021; Miao et al., 2020). Here, “the elite” refer to those who ostensibly speak on behalf of the people but fail to genuinely represent their interests, having lost the sense of “paternalistic responsibility” (Miao et al., 2020). “the other” are those perceived as threatening societal or collective interests, such as Western countries or “white left” ideologies (Zhang, 2020; Zhang, 2022), reflecting Chinese netizens’ strong exclusionary attitudes and the defense of mainstream values. Thus, anti-elitism and nationalism together form the fundamental tone of Chinese online populism.

The extremely low threshold for participation on Chinese social media has led to the emergence and fermentation of numerous hotly debated topics that are permeated with the aforementioned populist tendencies. For instance, the “Driving a Mercedes into the Forbidden City”incident triggered intense public anger toward elite privilege and wealth (He et al., 2025b); similarly, discussions surrounding the “996” work schedule are filled with resistance to excessive overtime and calls for the protection of workers’ rights. There is also the case of the public outcry over foreign brands ceasing to use Xinjiang cotton in their products2 (Tao et al., 2025). However, current communication studies on such populist issues mostly focus on the discursive construction and logic of populist discourse within individual topics (He et al., 2025a; He et al., 2025b; Tao et al., 2025; Zhang & Schroeder, 2024), while there remains a lack of attention to how these populist discourses actually diffuse in the online sphere.

Whether diversity and rationality—two essential elements of deliberation—can curb the diffusion of populist discourse is the central question of this study. When diversity is present, the discussion space accommodates heterogeneous voices, thereby depriving populist discourse—which heavily relies on singular positions and adversarial constructions—of fertile ground for spreading (Sunstein, 2001; Cinelli et al., 2021). Likewise, when discussions are grounded in rationality, participants are more likely to engage with issues prudently and are less susceptible to emotional mobilization, thus hindering the proliferation of populist discourse (Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 2021).

To examine this relationship, this study integrates computational analysis with traditional statistical testing. First, ten highly influential populist topics from Chinese social media were selected, and all related discussion threads from Zhihu—a major Chinese Q&A platform—were systematically collected as the research corpus. Next, a pre-trained large language model was employed to measure the two key predictor variables: diversity and rationality within the discussions. The number of comments and likes received by each thread were used as quantitative indicators of the extent of “diffusion.” Finally, regression analysis was conducted to explore the relationships among diversity, rationality, and the diffusion of populist discussions, thereby addressing the central research question.

This study makes two primary contributions: first, it deepens the understanding of the applicability and limitations of deliberative democratic theory in the context of non-Western digital platforms, expanding the conceptualization of diversity and rationality; second, it provides a theoretical basis for understanding the diffusion mechanisms of online populist discussions and offers insights for platform governance in China.

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